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ABSTRACT

This book provides a reflective analysis of the effort since 1991 of a group of Polish and U.S. educators to develop civic education programs for schools and teachers in Poland. The book contains 13 chapters and three appendices. Chapters include: (1) "Principles of Democracy for the Education of Citizens in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" (John J. Patrick); (2) "Essential Economics for Civic Education in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" (Steven L. Miller); (3) "Poland After the Democratic Revolution: Challenges for Civic Education" (Marta Zahorska-Bugaj); (4) "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland: Activities and Assumptions" (Richard C. Remy; Jacek Strzemieczny); (5) "The Curriculum Seminar: A Strategy for Developing Instructional Materials" (Richard C. Remy); (6) "Establishing Polish Centers for Civic and Economic Education" (Phillip J. VanFossen; Jacek Kowalski; Richard C. Remy); (7) "A Teacher Education Course: 'The School in Democratic Society'" (Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz); (8) "The Role of Cross-Cultural Experience in Developing a Teacher Education Course" (Gregory E. Hamot); (9) "Support for Democracy and a Market Economy Among Polish Students, Teachers, and Parents" (Kazimierz M. Slomczynski; Goldie Shabad); (10) "Reflections on the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project: An American's Perspective" (Sandra Stotsky); (11) "Polish and American Collaboration Through EDCP: Accomplishments from the Polish Perspective" (Jacek Strzemieczny); (12) "Toward Constitutional Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe" (A. E. Dick Howard); and (13) "The Future of Democracy" (Charles F. Bahmueller). Appendixes include a list of EDCP (Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland) Publications, a list of documents related to EDCP, and an overview of the education system in Poland. Contains a list of ERIC resources and information on contributors.
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Building
Civic Education
for
DEMOCRACY
IN
POLAND



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Edited by

Richard C. Remy and Marek Szymiecivny

BUILDING CIVIC EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN POLAND



EDITED BY
RICHARD C. REMY
AND
JACEK STRZEMIECZNY



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The National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) is the leading association of social studies educators in the United States. Founded in 1921, NCSS is dedicated to the promotion of social studies and its role in preparing students for citizen participation in public life. The Council publishes books on important issues affecting social studies education, as well as four periodicals, *Social Education*, *Theory and Research in Social Education*, *Social Studies and the Young Learner*, and *The Social Studies Professional*. NCSS has members in all 50 states, as well as almost 70 countries outside the United States.

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This book is dedicated to

Richard C. Snyder

whose vision and wisdom as Director of the Mershon
Center from 1970 to 1979 created an environment
that made multidisciplinary, policy-oriented
civic education efforts like Education for
Democratic Citizenship in Poland possible

and to

the teachers of Poland

whose courage and persistence
will help build a democratic civic culture
worthy of their great nation.

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We also express our gratitude to Dr. E. Gordon Gee who, as President of The Ohio State University, has consistently provided encouragement and continued assurance that civic education is central to the mission of a great state university.

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Finally, the work on civic education in Poland described in this book would not have been possible without financial assistance from the United States Information Agency, the National Endowment for Democracy, and The Pew Charitable Trusts. In particular, Gretchen Christison, Paul Hiemstra, Sally Kux, Allison Portnoy, and Judith Siegel at USIA; John Walsh and Dennis Wolfe at USIS, Warsaw, and Roger Potocki at NED have provided not only support but the tough questions that have continually challenged us to be reflective civic educators and project directors.

Richard C. Remy
Jacek Strzemieczny

Preface I

Disciplina in civitatem / "Education for citizenship"

This is the motto of The Ohio State University and the cornerstone of a democratic society.

In 1989, the world saw dramatic change in Central and Eastern Europe, a revolution of freedom. People and nations seized the opportunity for democracy. Now, the hard work of fulfilling the promise of such a system of government is under way.

Central and Eastern Europe are challenged to develop democratic systems that will support new and fragile democratic institutions of government. A.E. Dick Howard, one of the world's foremost constitutional scholars and author of a chapter in this book, notes: "Ultimately the prospects for the open society, like those for constitutional democracy itself, turn heavily upon the extent to which a civic culture thrives among the people themselves."

Civic cultures steeped in democracy will not emerge overnight. Nor can they simply be mandated. They must, instead, derive from the people's will, courage, and understanding. Ultimately, the ability to build a society in which people participate in governance is nourished through education.

There are many providers of civic education—families, churches, communities, and schools. In societies where there is little past experience with democracy, the academic curriculum is especially important. Through civic education, people learn what the government expects its citizens to know, to do, and to be.

Establishing a curriculum of democratic civic education in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe is an enormous challenge. And it is one in which The Ohio State University is an eager partner.

Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) is a multidisciplinary effort to contribute to democratic education in Poland and the region. This program involves classroom teachers, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, economists, historians, and university educators in the United States of America and Poland.

EDCP has pioneered programs that draw upon American experiences to develop teaching strategies and materials suitable to Polish culture and traditions. The Ohio State University faculty and students and Ohio teachers have learned from their CEE colleagues in exchange activities. EDCP is committed to building a long-term partnership between The Ohio State University and Poland that will continue to benefit Polish education and strengthen civic education in Ohio.

As President of The Ohio State University, I am proud of the EDCP's achievements. In 1991, I helped initiate the program and continue to closely follow its progress. This initiative is a reflection of Ohio State's mission and values. We are committed to leadership for a better tomorrow. We are dedicated to preparing our students for global citizenship. We share the scholarship of our faculty, applying new ideas and research to significant public policy problems.

Ohio State's success with EDCP—both now and for the future—is due to the leadership of our faculty from a number of fields. Our Mershon Center is built on the legacy of Ralph

D. Mershon, who expressed concern for "disseminating the principles which make for good citizenship." This program more than fulfills the objectives of the Center's faculty. Ohio State's College of Education is a critical part of our leadership team, with a distinguished faculty in educational reform and policy analysis.

With our partners in Central and Eastern Europe, we are shaping an educational program that will protect and promote the ideals of democracy and fashion a brighter future for us all.

E. Gordon Gee
President
The Ohio State University

Preface II

It is an honor and true pleasure for me to write this foreword. I have long been associated with the project which serves as the subject of this book; I was present when it originated, and for years I have been certain of its significance and importance.

When in the autumn of 1989 I took the post of the vice-minister of education in the first post-communist government of Poland, not all the tasks involved in the reconstruction of education were evident to me, but I was confident that two fields required special care and urgent actions. These fields were the teaching of foreign languages and the preparing of young people to function in a democratic society.

For many years, I have believed that democracy in Poland is indispensable, both as the best form of governing a state and the only way which could lead us to the integration of the country within the economically developed and democratic Western countries.

I also realized that sometimes my compatriots tend to share an erroneous understanding of democracy. When faced with endangering situations, Poles have often failed to distinguish between democratic institutions and the power of a recognized, charismatic leader. There have been many such situations over the past 200 years. However, this attitude does not help in building a civic society. I was also deeply convinced that one must not—as some people did—equalize anti-communism and democracy. "Anti-" itself will not suffice.

For years I have discerned a strict connection between democracy and the learning process. I was and am certain that the building of democracy is a creative process; in addition, it involves long-term action. Democratic forms and procedures are important, but perhaps what is even more important is whether citizens want to and can make use of democracy in a wise and responsible manner.

However, the view that one should teach democracy to oneself and to others has not been approved by everyone. For long years courses such as "Civic Education" and "Knowledge of Society" were imposed by ideological functionaries of the Communist party. These courses led to the dissemination of a false interpretation of the meaning of basic terms, such as democracy, justice, and human rights.

In addition to the acceptance of these false meanings, another consequence of these practices would be even worse: psychic agreement of many people to the assumption that "civic education" is destined to exist as a part of an ideology and hence by its very nature is something "dirty." The people who perceive the field of civic education in this way would be afraid that, in a new political situation, new indoctrination with different objectives would prevail. Thus, they believe that the best solution would be to eliminate civic education and, instead, to emphasize the teaching of "real" subjects.

There have also been people who have doubted whether or not behavior in a democratic society can be taught "through school"—they believed that it is only through participation in politics that people could develop civic competence. Thus, they were not willing to create new civic education programs.

I had to take all these considerations into account, but I was convinced that in a country that enjoyed the opportunities for independence and development as appeared in 1989, one

must not wait passively for the society itself to mature to democracy. In contrast, everything must be done so that young people may gain knowledge of the values and applications of democracy as soon as possible. Later they can add practical experiences to these bases.

Even earlier, I developed such a program for creating linkages between "what should be taught" and "what should be trained." In the 1980s I took part in a variety of discussions—in which some of the Polish contributors to this book also participated—aimed at preparing us for future actions.

Thus, in the autumn of 1989, we knew what to do but we did not realize clearly how to set about implementing the task of preparing the young generation to function in a democracy. Poland had an interesting tradition of civic education, dating even back to the end of the 18th Century as well as quite large achievements in the 20 years between the World Wars. However, there were no people prepared to develop modern civic education programs, there were no required publications and no domestic experiences.

I tried to present the task of creating new civic education on the ruins of communism as a thrilling challenge that faced not only teachers, but also all the humanists willing to seek ways of creatively preparing young people for life in a new homeland. The word "creatively" was very important to me. The new civic education framework should involve a new, original, and synthetic way of educating that included three elements: (1) the particular social needs which are important for the Polish nation, (2) the achievements in social and educational thought from countries that have a long history of free and open civic education, and (3) the past Polish tradition of civic education.

As the task was thus formulated, it was clear that it would not suffice to copy foreign experiences. The challenge required that we create a situation where it would be possible to achieve a new civic education program involving interaction between those experienced with the task in other countries and Polish educators who know our country and its problems.

And here exactly is when the magnificent proposal from The Ohio State University emerged. I found it an initiative which ideally fit my expectations about cooperation. The nature of civic education makes it necessary to know how to link in a harmonious way what is important for the society in which this education is to take place and what is universal. The Ohio State University has collected rich knowledge about preparing citizens for democracy and possesses great resources and experiences regarding how to do it.

In August of 1991, I participated in the signing of an agreement between the Ministry of National Education and The Ohio State University aimed at collaboratively developing curriculum materials to be used in Polish schools. As soon as two years later, I was positively surprised by the number of works which had been developed, as well as by the dedication of those involved in this undertaking.

Five years after the agreement was signed, I state with pleasure and satisfaction that the project, headed jointly by Dr. Richard C. Remy and Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, has produced magnificent effects. The program, widely applied in the country, proves to be very good in practice; in addition, in an essential way, it brings our education closer to Western educational thought. All those who will later study civic education in Poland will draw upon these experiences, knowing that this track has been cleared.

And, as one of the signers of the initial agreement, the benefits which my country enjoys also provide personal satisfaction. I think all those who have worked on the project share this sentiment.

Andrzej Janowski

Editors' Introduction

This book is about teaching democracy. It is a reflective analysis of the effort since 1991 of a group of Polish and American educators to develop civic education programs for schools and teachers in Poland. This cross-cultural effort, Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP), was initiated at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education and is a collaborative work of the Mershon Center and College of Education of The Ohio State University and the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw.

The idea for this book came out of discussions following a grueling but productive workshop in Warsaw in 1992, when both Americans and Poles first began to realize that EDCP could be a long-term, successful endeavor with significant accomplishments, and that we needed to be reflective about our efforts in order both to improve our own practice and to be able to share lessons learned with others concerned about civic education.

As it has turned out, EDCP has emerged as one of the largest, most comprehensive civic education projects involving collaboration among American and Central European educators. Thus, we hope that a close look at this effort will provide insights on how to approach American-European collaboration for civic education in the region, what can be achieved through such collaboration, and what American civic education and ideas have to offer colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe.

The first three chapters in this book set the context for an in-depth analysis of the various components of EDCP. John Patrick provides a conceptual map for all that follows by describing principles of liberal constitutional democracy that are most relevant to development of civic education in Central and Eastern Europe. Steven Miller elaborates upon Patrick's conceptual map by describing economic concepts and skills essential to successful civic education in the region. Marta Zahorska-Bugaj analyzes the Polish political and educational scene at the time of the revolution of 1989 that set the stage for EDCP. We summarize in Chapter 4 the projects EDCP has developed in response to this context and explain the assumptions which have shaped the design and implementation of the effort from the beginning.

The next five chapters provide an in-depth look at key components of EDCP. Richard Remy describes in Chapter 5 the development of EDCP's primary school civics course through a process called a Curriculum Seminar. Phillip VanFossen, Jacek Kowalski, and Richard Remy detail the creation of EDCP's Centers for Civic and Economic Education across Poland. Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz analyzes EDCP's preservice teacher education course. Gregory Hamot presents his qualitative analysis of the impact of cross-cultural experiences in development of the preservice teacher education course. Kazimierz Slomezynski and Goldie Shabad report results from one component of EDCP's research agenda—a systematic, empirically-based study of support for democracy among Polish parents, teachers, and students.

These chapters analyzing key components of EDCP are followed by two chapters which comment upon what has been accomplished to date. Sandra Stotsky provides her reflections on EDCP from the perspective of an American participant. Jacek Strzemieczny assesses the four original projects that made up EDCP and reflects upon their contribution to the long-term development of civic education in Poland.

In the last two chapters, we return to the wider context of the global democratic revolution of which EDCP is a part. A.E. Dick Howard reviews constitutional developments in the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Charles Bahmueller assesses the prospects for the maintenance and continued global spread of democracy.


Citizenship education is a continuing challenge for each succeeding generation, not an "issue" to somehow be resolved once and for all. Hence, EDCP remains a work in progress with projects being completed and new ones developed as this book is written. What follows is a picture of this ongoing effort at one point in time. More successes, mistakes, and lessons to be learned surely lie ahead. We hope those depicted here are of value to readers.



Richard C. Remy
Jacek Strzemieczny

Maps of Europe and Poland

(See the maps on the following facing pages.)







1

Principles of Democracy for the Education of Citizens in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

John J. Patrick



1

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1

Principles of Democracy for the Education of Citizens in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

John J. Patrick

From 1987 through 1991, as we Americans celebrated the Bicentennials of our Constitution and Bill of Rights, long-repressed peoples of Central and Eastern Europe overthrew despotic regimes and contemplated an unprecedented social and political transformation. They intrepidly intended to construct constitutional democracy from the ruins of totalitarian communism. And they quickly recognized the critical importance of civic education to their aspirations. Vaclav Havel, the great Czech leader, wrote, "The most basic sphere of concern is schooling. Everything else depends on that." His opinion echoes throughout the region. An Estonian educator (Sulev Valdmaa), for example, told me during a recent interview, "Development of a free and democratic Estonia depends upon development of effective and pervasive civic education for Estonian citizens. It can happen no other way."

An Unprecedented Opportunity for Democratic Civic Education

Educators of Central and Eastern Europe have looked to the West, especially to the United States of America, for inspiration, material aid, and, above all else, ideas for civic education in support of constitutional democracy. Can we help them? Can ideas of American civic education, embedded in our founding documents, become staples of curricula in schools of former communist countries such as Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic? What ideas should be at the core of the curriculum of civic education for democracy in countries moving from totalitarian communism to constitutional democracy?

I seriously considered these questions for the first time during three intense days in mid-September 1990 at an extraordinary meeting in the home of our fourth president and greatest

constitutionalist, James Madison. I was among a small group of Americans invited by the National Trust for Historic Preservation to Madison's Montpelier in Virginia's Orange County to discuss civic education for democracy—its goals, substance, and methods—with representatives of former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Europeans earnestly expressed their hopes for a democratic future and their fears of problems inherited from their communist past. Jacek Strzemieczny, a Polish educator, stressed the complex problem of overcoming the residual effects of Marxist civic education, which for more than 40 years had directed the minds and spirits of teachers and students toward ends diametrically opposed to constitutional democracy. He lamented, "Teachers of history [and civics] were either indoctrinated or repressed. We have to start over completely and train the trainers of the teachers. We are trying to fill an empty well with an empty bucket in a very great hurry."

Dr. Strzemieczny and other Central and Eastern Europeans asked the Americans at Montpelier for help in filling the "empty bucket" and thereby initiated projects in civic education that have brought me and American colleagues several times to five former communist countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. My visits have been more numerous and for longer periods to Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. During these trips to Central and Eastern Europe, I have had various rich experiences pertaining to civic education for democracy. For instance, I have been a lecturer and leader of seminars for primary and secondary school teachers, a consultant on curriculum development projects, and an observer of teaching and learning in schools. Further, I have met and exchanged ideas on civic education with professors of universities, officials of education ministries, members of parliaments, and leaders of civil society organizations.⁴

My recent experiences as a civic educator in Central and Eastern Europe have stimulated me to rethink and recast ideas about the uses of civic education for development of democratic citizenship. But more than ever, I am convinced that the subtle and often paradoxical ideas of constitutional democracy and liberty cannot be implemented successfully without a certain level of public understanding and support for them. Institutions of constitutional democracy, no matter how well constructed, cannot be a "machine that would go of itself." The efficacy and utility of the institutions rest ultimately on widespread comprehension and commitment, among masses of citizens, to the ideas at their foundations.

Political and civic ideas matter. Good ideas yield good consequences. But only if they are widely known, believed, and practiced, which points to an indispensable place for civic education in the great transformation from totalitarian communism to constitutional democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, for which so many people have sacrificed and yearned. So the primary question of civic education for this great transformation is about key ideas: *What are the principles of democracy that learners must know and support, if they would be prepared for citizenship?*

Treatment of this question, and the ideas embedded in it, certainly does not exhaust the topic of what and how to teach democracy through civic education. This discussion, however, does highlight fundamental elements of any workable and conceptually sound curriculum, which may be elaborated and practiced variously to suit social and cultural differences. The assumption is that the ideas presented here about curricular content are necessary, if not sufficient, to the development of democratic citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe or anywhere else in the world.

A Minimal Definition of Democracy

The first task of democratic civic education is clarification of the key idea, *democracy*. The global popularity of democracy as the preferred label for various political systems has obscured and confounded the concept. Since mid-century, democracy has become a virtually unchallenged "good idea," so that most regimes of our world have appropriated this term, although a minority of them have operated democratically. Totalitarian communist regimes, for example, were called "people's democracies." And various one-party dictatorships of post-colonial states in Africa and Asia have claimed commitment to democratic goals and procedures.

Given the semantic disorder associated with usage of the term democracy in the twentieth century, how should this key idea be introduced, defined, and elaborated upon in civic education programs? This is the recommended response: Introduce a minimal definition of democracy and then elaborate upon it through explication of a set of basic concepts with which it is inextricably associated in the operations of any authentic democratic polity. The intended educational outcome is to provide students with criteria to assess and appraise proposals and practices for which democratic claims are made. Students would possess intellectual tools for interpreting and judging the extent to which political systems (including their own) are, or are not, exemplifications of democracy. They would also acquire conceptual foundations for responsible citizenship in a democracy. If citizens would establish or improve a democratic political system, they must know what democracy is, how to do it, and why it is good.

Ancient and Modern Concepts

Construction of a minimal definition of democracy for today's world begins with a look back to the ancient world. The roots of democracy, more than 2,500 years old, are in the ancient city-republics of Greece, where the people (*demos*) began to rule (*kratia*). Democracy (*demokratia*) in ancient times, rule by the many, was commonly compared to aristocracy, rule by the few, and monarchy, rule by one. The ancients practiced direct democracy on a small scale. That is, the citizens (all people included in the polity) had the right to participate equally and immediately in making and executing public decisions for a very small realm, the *polis* (community of the city).⁶

Political thinkers of modern times, from the *philosophes* of the European Enlightenment to the founders of the United States of America and thereafter, have pointed to critical deficiencies of ancient democracy, such as its proclivity for disruptive factional conflict, majoritarian tyranny, excessive claims on the individual in behalf of the community, disregard of personal or private rights, and inept administration of government. Thus, James Madison wrote in his celebrated 10th *Federalist Paper*, "[t]hat such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."⁸

As in ancient times, democracy in our modern world still is, in Abraham Lincoln's memorable words, "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."⁹ Democracy today, however, is representative, not direct; and the nation-state, not the small city-republic, is the typical large-scale realm of the modern polity. Furthermore, unlike the very limited citizenry of the ancient *polis*, today's democracies are inclusive; virtually all inhabitants of the realm may possess equally the rights and privileges of citizenship.

Differences aside, however, the linkages of ancient to modern democracy are visible in a widely held minimal definition of democracy today, which provides a criterion for distinguishing democratic from non-democratic regimes. This is the *criterion* and minimal definition: *A political system is "democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."*¹⁰ Thus, for example, a political system is undemocratic if there is no authentic opposition party to contest elections, or if the right to vote or otherwise participate is systematically denied to particular categories of persons for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, and so forth. *This minimal definition emphasizes that the free, open, regular, fair, and contested election—decided by popular vote—is an essential condition of representative democracy.* In a representative democracy, there is government by consent of the governed, which is the only legitimate basis for the exercise of authority by some persons over others. Institutions of government are either directly or indirectly accountable to the people, the citizens. And the people's representatives in government may exercise power only if it is granted to them legally by the citizens. Thus, the rulers are public servants of the ruled, who have the right and responsibility to affirm or reject their rulers through periodic public elections. During the interval between elections, citizens have the right and responsibility to influence their representatives in government through various channels and practices.

In a democracy there is majority rule expressed directly by citizens or indirectly through their representatives. Any governmental body that makes decisions by combining the votes of more than half of those eligible and present is acting democratically. In order to sustain the democracy, however, majority rule must be tempered by minority rights. Thus, all individuals, including those outside the majority of the moment, are able to participate fairly, freely, and openly to influence their government.

Criteria for Civic Education

Protection of the political and personal rights of citizens, including those in the minority, depends upon constitutionalism (the rule of law) and civil society, which are included in the following widely accepted definition: "[A] democracy is a political system institutionalized under the rule of law. [There is] an autonomous civil society, whose individuals join together voluntarily into groups with self-designated purposes [to] collaborate with each other through mechanisms of political parties and establish through freely contested elections a system of representative government."¹¹ Like the preceding minimal definition, this one emphasizes free, fair, open, and competitive elections. This second definition, however, adds two central concepts, constitutionalism and civil society, which are stressed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Teachers and students of civic education should use the concepts in these two definitions as criteria by which to compare and evaluate political systems and thereby to determine whether they are more or less democratic. These cognitive exercises will reveal that the concepts or principles of democracy are practiced variously. There is no single set of institutions that exactly and exclusively embodies democracy. Rather, there are constitutional and institutional variations on the central themes or concepts.

Citizens in different countries have developed various models of democracy.¹² The populist and communitarian models emphasize citizen participation, civic responsibility, and the common good. The liberal democracy model calls for strictly limited government with the

primary purpose of securing liberty and other rights of individuals. The social democracy model stresses a strong government acting affirmatively to promote the public good through state-centered regulations and welfare programs. These different models, or various combinations of them, can be judged democratic only if they conform to certain concepts or principles—the criteria by which an inquirer decides the extent to which a political system is, or is not, a democracy.

The democracies of our contemporary world tend to be mixed systems, which include characteristics of two or more theoretical models of democracy. Differences of opinion about the best mixture of characteristics from different models (for example, the liberal and social models of democracy) have raised critical public issues in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. These critical issues should be part of civic education for democracy.

In its emphasis on limited government to protect individual rights, the following discussion favors the model often named "liberal constitutional democracy." *This model holds that the highest purpose of government is to secure for all its members such individual rights as life, liberty, property, equality of opportunity, and the personal pursuit of happiness and thereby to promote the common good.* This model, like all genuine theories of democracy, emphasizes constitutionalism and civil society, which are discussed in this chapter as central concepts of civic education for democracy.

Constitutionalism and Democracy

Modern democracies operate in terms of constitutions, or fundamental laws, established by consent of the people, which grant and limit the powers of government. There is, therefore, limited government according to the rule of law, which is supposed to prevent arbitrary and abusive exercise of power. No one, not even the chief executive or the leader of parliament, is above the law, which equally binds and protects all persons of the polity.

Limited government and the rule of law, according to the provisions of a constitution of the people, are the foundations of *constitutionalism* in democratic government. Here is a formal definition of constitutionalism: It is the "forms, principles, and procedures of limited government. Constitutionalism addresses the perennial problem of how to establish government with sufficient power to realize a community's shared purposes, yet so structured and controlled that oppression will be prevented."¹

Constitutionalism in a democracy both limits and empowers government of, by, and for the people. Through the constitution, the people grant power to their government to act effectively for the public good, which is formulated and implemented by majority rule of the people's representatives. There are, however, constitutional limits on the power of the majority to rule through representatives in government. An ultimate purpose is to protect the rights of all persons in the polity, including unpopular individuals or minority groups, against the threat of tyranny by the majority or by any other source of power. Thus, the supreme law of the constitution, established and supported by the people, limits the power of the people's government to secure the rights of everyone against potential abuses by the government. This is why a modern democracy, operating within the framework of a constitution, is precisely labeled a constitutional democracy to indicate clearly that the people's government may NOT legally exercise power in certain ways deemed undesirable by the people.

Constitutionalism and Individual Rights

Constitutional limitations on the democratic government's power are absolutely necessary to guarantee free, fair, open, and periodic competitive elections by the people and their representatives in government. The traditional constitutional rights of free speech, free press, free assembly, and free association must be guaranteed if elections are to fit the minimal definition of democratic government. Further, the rights of free expression and protection from abuses by the government in legal proceedings against the criminally accused are necessary to maintain loyal-but authentically critical opposition to the party in power. There must be little or no possibility for rulers to punish, incarcerate, or destroy their political opponents.

Constitutionalism, properly understood, is not antidemocratic in its limitations on majority rule and the popular will. Rather, it protects a democratic government against certain maladies or deficiencies, well known to students of the ancient *polis*, which could lead to the demise of a democracy. Cass Sunstein, a notable American political scientist, says it well: "[A] central goal of constitutional democracy is to secure a realm for public discussion and collective selection of preferences [through public elections, for example] while guarding against the dangers of factional [majoritarian] tyranny and self-interested representation."¹⁴ Constitutionalism in a democracy denotes an unshakable commitment to limited government and the rule of law for the two purposes of protecting **individual rights** and enabling authentic democratic government to operate for the **public good**.

Many nation-states with seemingly democratic constitutions, however, do not function as constitutional democracies. Constitutional appearances can be very deceptive. The modern world has been filled with sham constitutions, which have presented a facade of constitutional democracy with little or no correspondence to reality. Soviet-style constitutions of the recent past grandly proclaimed all kinds of rights while guaranteeing none of them.

Constitutionalism in Civic Education for Democracy

Bronisław Geremek, a former member of Poland's parliament and an eminent historian, provides an apt warning to civic educators about their lessons on constitutionalism: "Constitution: it is difficult to imagine another word more likely to be abused and compromised in a totalitarian system [such as Poland under the Communists]. . . . The citizens' education, as then practiced, made the constitution its subject matter. But we all realize how much the idea of citizens' education was not only abused but also compromised by school education."¹⁵ If lessons about constitutionalism are to be effective, they must be grounded in reality, with open inquiry about positive and negative examples of constitutions and constitutional practices in all parts of the modern world, including democracies of the West.

The way to proceed is aptly indicated by Wiktor Osiatyński, a highly regarded Polish scholar and adviser to his government. He recommends that the idea of constitutionalism should become the foundation for development of democratic government and civic education. According to him, "[T]he goal is constitutionalism as an awareness of rights and of some legal order in which the citizens live—of a consciousness of limited powers, of measures for appeal, of rules of the game which allow the citizens to foresee the future."¹⁶ Thus Osiatyński and many others like him in his region of Europe would constitutionalize democracy, in civil government, civil society, and civic education, to secure the immutable rights of all persons living under the regime's authority, including unpopular minorities and individuals.

To fully understand, analyze, and appraise democracy in modern times, and to distinguish it from non-democratic forms of government, students of civic education, in Central and Eastern Europe or elsewhere, must connect constitutionalism to their definition of democracy. The following criterion is offered as an example that can be explicated with students of civic education. *A constitutional democracy is a popular, representative government—based on free, fair, and periodic competitive elections of representatives by an all-inclusive pool of voters—which is both empowered and limited by the supreme law of a constitution to act for the public good and to protect the individual rights of everyone in the polity and thereby to support democratic procedures in elections and public policymaking.* This criterion incorporates and builds upon the minimal definition of democracy presented in the preceding section.¹⁷

Distribution of Power and Constitutional Democracy

Separation of powers is one way to design and use a constitution to distribute power to protect individual rights and support democratic procedures. James Madison stated the importance of separation of powers to prevent tyranny in the 47th *Federalist Paper*: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”¹⁸ Without some type of effective distribution of power, there cannot be an authentic constitutional democracy.

The American model of constitutional democracy distributes power among three coordinate branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Each branch has constitutional means to check the actions of the other branches to prevent any of the three coordinate departments from continually dominating or controlling the others. These constitutional checks involve practical overlapping and sharing of powers among three distinct branches of the government, each with a particular function.

There are many examples in the United States Constitution of ways that one branch of the government can check the actions of another branch to maintain a balance of powers among the three branches of government. For example, the President (executive branch) can check the Congress (legislative branch) by vetoing bills it has passed. The Congress, however, can overturn the President’s veto by a two-thirds vote of approval for the vetoed bill. The Supreme Court (judicial branch) can use its power of judicial review, if warranted, to declare unconstitutional actions of the executive or legislative branches. The people at large, acting in terms of Article Five of the Constitution, can nullify the Supreme Court’s use of judicial review by amending the Constitution to trump or overturn a particular decision by which the Court declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. Additional examples of the checks and balances system can be found in Articles I, II, and III of the United States Constitution.¹⁹ In the 48th *Federalist Paper*, James Madison highlighted the relationship of checks and balances to separation of powers as a means to effective constitutionalism. Madison wrote that unless the separate branches of government “be so far connected and blended [or balanced] as to give to each a constitutional control [check] over the others, the degree of separation . . . essential to a free government can never in practice be duly maintained.”²⁰

Of course, the American model is merely one way to distribute power in constitutional government. There are other workable structures, such as those associated with various forms of the parliamentary type of constitutional democracy. The parliamentary democracies usually exemplify legislative primacy vis-a-vis the executive functions of government. However, they also tend to have a separate and truly independent judiciary, including a constitu-

tional court with the power of constitutional review, which is roughly similar to the judicial review of the American system. The government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain is a notable exception to this global tendency on judicial operations. So is the Constitution of Latvia, which subordinates the judiciary to the parliament, which, however, is directly accountable to the people, as is the government of the United Kingdom. Authentic democracies—whether parliamentary, presidential, or some other type—are based on the citizens and are accountable to them. Thus, regardless of variations in constitutional design of institutions, the citizens collectively and individually have the primary and ultimate responsibility for maintaining their democracy and protecting their rights.

Judicial Independence and Constitutional Review

A notable worldwide trend in the development of democracy has been the distribution to an independent judiciary of the power to declare legislative and executive acts unconstitutional. This is a critical constitutional means to stop the legislative and executive powers from being used to violate individual rights and subvert democracy. A bill of rights in a constitution may eloquently declare lofty words about rights to life, liberty, property, and various forms of social security. But these rights will be practically useless unless there is governmental machinery to enforce them against acts of despotism. In the 78th *Federalist Paper*, Alexander Hamilton argued, "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. . . . Limitations of this kind [to protect the rights of individuals] can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."¹

The constitutional courts of former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe tend to concentrate their work on constitutional questions. Issues that pertain only to statutory interpretation, apart from the constitutionality of a law, usually are resolved by the lower courts, without action by the constitutional court. Unlike the American judiciary, these constitutional courts may provide opinions about the constitutionality of an act apart from the adversary process whereby a real case involving the act at issue is brought before the court by a prosecutor or someone filing suit against another party. Thus, these constitutional courts may render advisory opinions, which is not done by the American judiciary.²

The essence of constitutional review by the constitutional courts, however, is the same as the judicial review of the American judiciary. This power of an independent judicial branch of government is used to protect immutable individual rights to life, liberty, and property and sustain the fundamental procedures of democracy that depend upon freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and freedom to participate in public elections and other public actions aimed at influencing and holding accountable the people's representatives in government.

The importance of an independent judiciary and judicial review to constitutionalism in democratic government is underscored by Herman Schwartz, who has served as an adviser on constitutionalism in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He believes that "whatever chance these countries have to continue developing into constitutional democracies depends on strong, independent courts that can repel legislative and executive encroachments on their constitutions."³

There is, however, another side to the long-standing debate on how best to secure liberty, democracy, and the public good for a country and its people. Participatory models of consti-

tutional democracy, in contrast to the liberal model emphasized in this chapter, emphasize continuous interaction of the people with their parliamentary representatives. There is an immediate and direct accountability of the legislature, the supreme branch in this model of democratic government, to the people who are the ultimate guardians of their liberty. Critics, however, have claimed this model of democratic government to be prone to lapses in effective leadership and to majoritarian tyranny. Nonetheless, some constitutional governments of former communist countries, such as the constitutional government of Latvia, exhibit populist inclinations in their emphasis on parliamentary supremacy. These constitutional governments, however, also emphasize commitment to individual rights.

Distribution of Power in Civic Education for Democracy

The distribution of power in democratic governance is subsumed by the higher-order idea of constitutionalism. It is a necessary, if not sufficient, part of any constitutional design to secure individual rights and support democracy. If civic educators in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere would teach their students to understand, analyze, and appraise democratic governments, then they must teach them the idea of distributed powers, with attention to an independent judiciary with power to declare unconstitutional, when warranted, the acts of government officials. Students should also examine and appraise the advantages and disadvantages of alternative systems of distributed powers, in which the legislature and judiciary operate differently from their counterparts in the American model of constitutional government.

Students should be taught to use the idea of distributed and limited power as a criterion by which to comparatively analyze and appraise the authenticity of claims about democratic governance. They should understand that there are different practicable ways to achieve distribution and limitation of power in a constitutional democracy. However, they must know that a government with little or no practicable distribution of power cannot realistically be called a constitutional democracy.

Civil Society and Constitutional Democracy

A vibrant civil society is an indicator of effective constitutionalism in a democratic government. By contrast, a genuine civil society is impossible under a totalitarian government, which attempts to concentrate all power in a centralized state dominated by one party. The emergence and growth of civil society organizations during the 1980s in former communist countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, signaled the coming fall of the once-dominant communist regimes.

What is civil society? How is it related to constitutionalism, individual rights, and democracy? And why is it necessary to the freedom and workability of any democratic polity?

*Civil society is the complex network of freely formed voluntary associations, apart from the formal governmental institutions of the state, acting independently or in partnership with state agencies. Apart from the state, civil society is regulated by law. It is a public domain that is constituted by private individuals.*¹

According to Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, "We understand civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. Modern civil society is created through forms of

self-constitution and self-mobilization."²⁷ Examples of civil society organizations are free labor unions, religious communities, human rights "watchdog" groups, environmental protection groups, support groups providing social welfare services to needy people, independent newspaper and magazine publishers, independent or private schools for youth, and so forth.

Civil society is distinct from the state but not necessarily in conflict with it. In unitary models of democracy, emanating from the political philosophy of Rousseau, the relationship of the individual to the state is direct and total, and private organizations, apart from the state, are discouraged. In this conception of the democratic state, civil society organizations, if they exist at all, will be in conflict with the all-encompassing government, which may tend toward totalitarianism. By contrast, pluralist democracies, both the liberal and communitarian types, include many different kinds of civil society organizations, acting freely and independently of state control for the public good, which the state may also seek. Civil society organizations may act in harmony with the purposes of the state, if not always in agreement with particular practices of state agencies. But they also may act as an independent social force to check or limit an abusive or undesired exercise of the state's power.

In its pluralism, privatism, and decentralized communitarianism, civil society is a countervailing force against state-centered despotism and a guardian of civil liberties and rights. According to Ernest Gellner, "Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society."²⁸

In an authentic modern democracy, constitutionalism functions to protect individual rights to free expression, free assembly, and free association upon which the activities of civil society are based. Thus there is a top-down, from the constitution of the state, legal protection for the free establishment and operation of civil society organizations.

But there is also a bottom-up, from the people in local communities, practice of democratic participation in civil society organizations that contributes indispensably to the democratic government of the state and society at large. For example, civil society organizations are channels by which citizens articulate needs, wants, and interests to their candidates for office and representatives in government for possible transformation into legislation and public policy. They are public guardians by which citizens actively take responsibility for their rights and hold their representatives in government accountable to them. And most importantly, they are public laboratories in which citizens learn democracy by doing it.

An irrefutable indicator of the development of democracy in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the lively existence of many different kinds of civil society organizations. In Poland, for example, there are more than "15,000 associations, foundations, and self-help groups."²⁹ The situation is similar in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states.³⁰ Even in Romania, where democratization has proceeded rather weakly and slowly, there are hundreds of free, private-sector organizations, which the government tolerates.³¹ A country with a vital civil society has a realistic chance to become and remain a democracy.³²

Democracy in the Lives of Citizens

An important research project, conducted in Italy during the past twenty years, documents the necessity of civil society organizations for "making democracy work."³³ According to Robert D. Putnam, who reports the findings of this project, "The civic community [civil society] is marked by an active, public-spirited citizenry, by egalitarian political rela-

tions, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation," which he calls "social capital."³³ This social capital is a public good; if most citizens have acquired it through participation in civil society organizations, they can use it to strengthen democracy in the government of the state. In a country with a strong civic community or civil society, "both state and market operate more efficiently."³⁴

According to the research on Italy reported by Putnam, "Those concerned with democracy . . . should be building a more civic community [civil society]. . . . We agree with [those who urge] . . . local transformation of local structures [which builds social capital] rather than reliance [only] upon national initiatives [because this is] the key to making democracy work."³⁵

Many scholars have used Putnam's research, and similar findings by other prominent social scientists, to argue that social capital is a foundation for a stable democracy and a prosperous market-oriented economy. "A healthy capitalist economy is one in which there will be sufficient social capital in the underlying society to permit businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing. . . . That self-organizing proclivity is exactly what is necessary to make democratic political institutions work as well."³⁶ Research in Central and Eastern Europe has led to the hypothesis that "civil society may be instrumental in preparing the cultural and associational terrain for a market."³⁷ Both the market-based economy and civil society are foundations of democracy.

Civil Society in Civic Education for Democracy

The vitality of civil society is a gauge of the strength and prospects of democracy in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as it is in the West or anywhere in the world. Thus, if students of civic education programs would know, analyze, and appraise democracy in their country or elsewhere, they must be able to comprehend the idea of civil society, to assess the activities of civil society organizations, and to connect their knowledge of this idea to other key concepts, such as constitutionalism, individual rights, representation, elections, majority rule, and so forth.

Students should be taught to distinguish democratic from non-democratic governments by using as a criterion the idea of civil society to guide their comparative analyses and appraisals. A government with power to crush or control voluntary social organizations cannot be an authentic constitutional democracy. A political system without a genuine civil society cannot legitimately claim to be a constitutional democracy.

Students should also be taught the skills and dispositions or virtues they need to act effectively in the development of civil society. The behavioral skills and dispositions pertaining to cooperation, trust, tolerance, civility, and self-reliance can be learned through practice in school and in the community outside the school.

Markets and Constitutional Democracy

A free democratic government depends upon both a vibrant civil society and a market-oriented economy, which involves freedom of exchange at the marketplace. The market is a place where buyers and sellers freely make transactions, such as the exchange of goods and services.

Freedom of exchange at the market, like other social interactions of a constitutional democracy, is regulated by the rule of law, which prevails in all spheres of democratic civic life. Thus, the principle of constitutionalism is used to limit the government's power to con-

trol economic transactions, thereby protecting private rights to property and free exchanges at the market. Constitutionalism also empowers the government to regulate, within certain limits, the economic affairs of individuals, which yields the order and stability necessary to security for individual rights to life, liberty, property, equality of opportunity, and so forth, which represent the greatest good in the genuine liberal model of democracy. So, freedom of economic activity in a constitutional democracy is freedom under the rule of law.

Every democratic country has a market-oriented economy which the government modifies more or less in response to interests expressed by citizens. The result of this kind of government intervention is a mixed market economy; it is based more or less on a free market but restricted significantly by laws enacted presumably to satisfy the majority of citizens. According to an eminent political scientist, Robert Dahl, "[A]ll democratic countries have not only rejected a centralized command economy as an alternative to a market economy, but have also rejected a strictly free market economy as an alternative to a mixed economy in which market outcomes are modified substantially by government intervention."³⁹

The mixed market economies of democratic countries vary significantly in the amount and kind of modification by the constitutional government in response to public demand. The range extends from the highly regulated and modified markets of the social democracy model to the less regulated and freer markets of the liberal democracy model. World-renowned economists of the 1980s and 1990s, including recent Nobel prizewinners, have recommended less regulation and freer markets as a key to productivity, prosperity, and liberty for individuals and societies.

Markets and Individual Rights

The Nobel laureate in economics Milton Friedman asserts: "Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political freedom. By enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction, it reduces the area over which political power is exercised."⁴⁰ Further, Friedman claims, "Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity."⁴¹

The market, the means to freedom of exchange among parties in need of cooperative relationships to pursue certain economic interests, serves to offset or check concentrations of political power that could be exercised against individual rights. A market-based economy in tandem with a dynamic civil society enables development and maintenance of plural sources of power to counteract the power of the state and safeguard the people's freedom. By contrast, "The combination of economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for tyranny."⁴²

A centrally directed command economy, the antithesis of the market-based economy, substitutes the directives of government officials with virtually unlimited state power for the free choices of the marketplace. Through their total control of the production and distribution of goods and services (wealth and the means to wealth), the government officials in command of the economy have power to control totally the inhabitants of their realm. There are no effective limits to their power to abuse individuals at odds with the state or to deprive unpopular persons of their rights to liberty, to equality of opportunity, and to life.

The totalitarian state, the political order of communism, precludes the market-based economy and civil society, because it cannot abide countervailing sources of power. Likewise, the market with its relatively free choices and exchanges precludes totalitarianism and supports constitutional democracy.

Economics in Civic Education for Democracy

The vitality of free exchanges among individuals in a market-based economy is an indicator of the health of constitutional democracy and liberty in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as it is elsewhere. Some analysts of post-communist civic life in Europe are concerned that the indispensable linkages of markets, free governments, and free people are not fully understood. Professor Robert Zuzowski, for instance, fears, "A majority of East Europeans have a poor perception . . . of the linkage between private ownership and democracy. . . . Some even argue implicitly that one may achieve democracy without private property or a dispersion of economic power. Historical evidence, however, does not support this view. Never in modern history has liberal democracy been achieved without a widespread dispersion of economic power."²¹

If civic educators in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the West too, would teach their students to know constitutional democracy and liberty and to distinguish it from alternatives, then they must teach them that free exchange in a market-based economy is a foundational facet of free government. Further, these students must acquire knowledge of centrally controlled command economies and state-dependent people with little or no capacity to make free choices. They must learn that a government with sufficient power to comprehensively distribute, according to its commands, the goods of economic and social security also has sufficient power to deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty, property, equality of opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness. An enduring lesson of modern history has been that markets, which require free choices for their operations, are a condition for a civic life in liberty. This lesson from history must be at the core of civic education for democracy and freedom in a post-communist world.

Civic education for democracy should emphasize the necessary connection of a market-based economy to civil society. Students should have opportunities to learn that there can be no democracy without civil society and no civil society without a market-oriented economy. Further, they should understand that both a free economy and civil society depend upon constitutionalism, the rule of law. There cannot be authentically free societies and economies without constitutionally based regulation.

A perennial public issue of all constitutional democracies pertains to how much and what kind of legal regulation there should be. Fundamental rights of individuals will be at risk if there is too much regulation or too little regulation by the constitutional government. Achieving the appropriate mixture of liberty and order, freedom and regulation, is a challenge faced by citizens of a democracy. Examination of issues about the extent and kind of governmental regulations, therefore, should be emphasized in civic education for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Teaching Constitutional Democracy in Schools

Democracy has risen to global prominence in the 1990s, and major bastions of totalitarian communism have crumbled and collapsed. In various parts of the world, from Central and South America to Central and Eastern Europe, newly empowered citizens have understood that new curricula for their schools are as important as new constitutions for their governments. Among other educational goals, they have recognized that schools must teach young citizens the theory and practices of constitutional democracy, if they would develop and sustain free societies and free governments.

Basic Categories of Civic Education

All people interested in teaching constitutional democracy authentically and effectively must address three basic categories of civic education: (1) civic knowledge, (2) civic skills, and (3) civic virtues. These basic categories of civic education may be treated variously by educators of different countries. But there are certain themes within each generic category that are the criteria by which we define civic education for constitutional democracy.

Essential Civic Knowledge. The first objective of civic education is to teach thoroughly the meaning of the most basic idea, so that students will know what a constitutional democracy is, and what it is not. If students would be prepared to act as citizens of a constitutional democracy, they must know how to distinguish this type of government from other types. Through their civic education in schools, students should develop defensible criteria by which to think critically and evaluate the extent to which their government and other governments of the world do or do not function authentically as constitutional democracies. A few key concepts necessary to a deep understanding of constitutional democracy must be taught and learned, such as fair public elections, majority rule, citizenship, representative government, individual rights, constitutionalism, market economy, and civil society. Students must learn how these basic concepts of democratic political theory are institutionalized and practiced in their own country in comparison to other nation-states of the world. These basic concepts or principles of democracy are discussed in preceding sections of this chapter.

Essential Civic Skills. Basic knowledge must be applied effectively to civic life if it would serve the needs of citizens and their *civitas*. Thus, a central facet of civic education for constitutional democracy is development of intellectual skills and participatory skills, which enable citizens to think and act in behalf of their individual rights and their common good. Intellectual skills empower citizens to identify, describe, and explain information and ideas pertinent to public issues and to make and defend decisions on these issues. Participatory skills empower citizens to influence public policy decisions and to hold accountable their representatives in government. The development of civic skills requires intellectually active learning by students inside and outside the classroom. Students are continually challenged to use information and ideas, individually and collectively, to analyze case studies, respond to public issues, and resolve political problems.

Essential Civic Virtues. A third generic category of democratic civic education pertains to virtues. These are traits of character necessary to preservation and improvement of a constitutional democracy. If citizens would enjoy the privileges and rights of their polity, they must take responsibility for them, which requires a certain measure of civic virtue. Civic virtues such as self-discipline, civility, compassion, tolerance, and respect for the worth and dignity of all individuals are indispensable to the proper functioning of civil society and constitutional government. These characteristics must be nurtured through various social agencies, including the school, in a healthy constitutional democracy.

Problems of Teaching Democracy

Wide-spread knowledge of basic concepts or principles is the foundation of an effective civic education for democracy. A large obstacle to teaching and learning the key ideas, however, is the serious deficit of knowledge about basic concepts of democracy among many teachers in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Radmila Dostalova of Charles University in Prague, the Czech Republic, offers this explanation. "We were prevented from following the developments in social sciences

that have taken place in the West since 1939. . . . This long-term isolation has created many problems in the discussions [among ourselves and with Westerners] concerning the aims, content, and form of civic education."²² The Czechs and other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were greatly restricted in their access to Western scholarship in political philosophy and political science, which forms the foundation for civic education in the United States and other Western constitutional democracies. Thus, teachers of these former communist countries tend to suffer from a serious deficit in knowledge of ideas necessary to implementation of a new civic education for constitutional democracy and liberty.

A related problem, conceptual confusion, involves different meanings, often subtle shades of difference, attached to key words by civic educators in the West and their counterparts in former communist countries. In my experience, this conceptual confusion has sometimes stemmed from the vagaries of a translator's efforts to recast an abstract thought from English into Estonian, Polish, or some other language of Central and Eastern Europe. More often, however, the problem has originated from deeper cultural or philosophical divisions.

Democracy and rights, for instance, were important words in the lexicon of Marxist-Leninist philosophers and civic educators of Central and Eastern Europe, but their denotations of these terms differed radically from those attached to the same words by scholars and educators of the West. Thus many teachers in the former "people's democracies" of Central and Eastern Europe bring ideologically distorted meanings of key ideas to programs designed to teach them concepts and methods of a new civic education for democracy. According to Wiktor Kulerski, who had been a school teacher before becoming an activist in Poland's revolutionary struggle of the 1980s, "The great majority of civics teachers today are the same people who taught the Marxist versions of these courses in the past, and they are deeply conservative in their retention of old ideas and methods."²³

Priorities in Teacher Education

Extensive and systematic teacher education projects that address, first of all, the concepts or principles of democracy—the knowledge base of the new civic education—should be among the highest priorities of those who desire to advance the great transformation to a new political order in Central and Eastern Europe. A related high-priority task should be development of new curricula, textbooks, and other instructional materials for students that emphasize the concepts and principles of democracy. Of course, numerous and various other topics having to do with the particularities of cultural heritage, local and national institutions of government, contemporary issues, and so forth should be included in the new civic education, but always in terms of the concepts at the foundation of the content for teaching and learning democracy.

Ideas about the pedagogy for democratic civic education are as important as the essential concepts of its content. So teachers of the new civic education should be exposed to the best methods for engaging students actively in their learning of essential concepts and related topics and information. This is the kind of teaching and learning that is fully compatible with the spirit and practice of democracy.

Active learning by inquiring students involves their application of concepts and related information to various types of tasks, such as the interpretation and discussion of a political document, analysis and debate about a current or past public issue, composition of an essay to defend or evaluate a position on a question about constitutional review, involvement in a simulation of decision making by the parliament or the constitutional court, participation in various civic decision-making activities, such as deciding for whom to vote or which public

policy to support, and the use of criteria based on core concepts to evaluate the extent to which a political system is or is not democratic.

Intellectually active learning of knowledge, in contrast to passive reception of it, appears to be associated with higher levels of achievement. Furthermore, it enables the student to develop skills and processes needed for independent learning and civic decision making throughout a lifetime. These are the capacities of citizenship needed in a constitutional democracy committed to security for the rights of individuals.

Intellectually active learning in an open classroom enhances achievement of civic knowledge, democratic attitudes, cognitive skills, and participatory skills of the democratic citizen. In an open classroom, students feel free and secure in their expression and examination of ideas and issues, even those that are unpopular or unconventional. The democratic teacher in an open classroom is demonstrably supportive of free expression and inquiry by all students.⁴³ Further, the democratic teacher establishes and applies rules fairly. There is recognition that true liberty is inextricably connected with just rules, and that the equal right to freedom of individuals depends upon an equitable rule of law for all members of the community. Finally, the democratic teacher creates a classroom environment in which there is respect for the worth and dignity of each person.

If civic education for democracy is to succeed in former communist countries, or anywhere else, then teachers must be educated in the essential ideas and skills of the subject and the best pedagogy for enabling students to learn it. The democratic civic education of teachers, then, is an indispensable part of the first phase of democratic educational reform in elementary and secondary schools.

Civic Education and the Democratic Prospect

Well-designed and well-conducted civic education projects involving teacher education, course development, textbook production, and so forth—if pursued with intense commitment—are likely to overcome momentary problems of pedagogical and curricular reform, such as knowledge deficits and conceptual confusion. If so, new generations of citizens in the former communist countries will be on their way to achievement of deep understanding of the essential concepts or principles of democracy, strong commitment to them based on reason, and high capacity for using them to analyze, appraise, and decide about phenomena of their political world.

In using basic concepts to comprehend and evaluate political systems, students should learn that democracy is not Utopia. It involves neither the pursuit nor promise of perfection. Further, students should recognize the inevitable disparities in every democracy between ideals and realities. These disparities do not invalidate the principles of democracy. Rather, they should challenge students to become citizens committed to reducing the gap between principles and practices in their polity.

Through comparative analysis of political systems of the past and present, students will learn that democracies have tended to be less imperfect than other types of government. Thus, they might conclude that democratic governments are better than non-democratic types, because they are least imperfect.⁴⁴ Despite its flaws, democracy in practice has been better than other types of government in protecting human rights, respecting the individual's dignity and worth, and promoting international peace.⁴⁵ Civic educators can use the relatively positive record of modern democracies as evidence to justify their efforts to develop democratic citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe or elsewhere.

In contrast to the promise of civic education for democracy, there are many severe problems in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe which could, if not

resolved, distort or destroy the prospects for genuine democracy in the region. The risky road ahead, full of obstacles, is clearly seen by Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz—a scholar, political activist in Solidarity's struggle against communism, and participant in the project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland. She says that upon the fall of communist regimes, "It looked like the ideas of Western civilization finally had triumphed. However, now that the dust has settled, one can see that the implementation of these ideas is neither automatic nor simple. In the ruin of communism, with its broken economy, messy values, and corroded institutions, a most significant political battle has begun. It is a battle for democracy. Its outcome is far from decided."

New civic education programs under development in Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe could profoundly influence an outcome in the direction of democracy. This possibility is their ultimate justification.

Notes

1. Vaclav Havel, *Summer Meditations* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1993), p. 117.
2. John J. Patrick, interview with Sulev Valdmaa, Program Director of the Jaan Tonisson Institute of Tallinn, Estonia, at Andineeme, County of Harju, Estonia, June 30, 1994, during a seminar for teachers of civics.
3. Statement of Jacek Strzemieczny, "Latterday 'Madisons' Meet at Montpelier," *Constitution* 3:1 (Winter 1991), p. 77.
4. Projects involving John Patrick are (a) seminars and conferences on civic education in Estonia sponsored jointly by the Jaan Tonisson Institute of Estonia and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems of the United States, (b) Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland, sponsored jointly by the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University, the Polish Ministry of National Education, and the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw, Poland, (c) the Academic Advisory Panel on Civic Education Reform in Central and Eastern Europe of the United States Information Agency (USIA), and (d) Civic Education for Democracy in Latvia, sponsored by the Democratic Advancement Center of Latvia.
5. This phrase is taken from the title of a book on American constitutionalism by Michael Kammen and published in 1986 by Alfred A. Knopf of New York.
6. Excellent sources of information on ancient democracies are M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983); J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993); Paul Rahe, *Republics, Ancient and Modern* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); and A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
7. See Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987); this book includes an excellent chapter (pp. 278-297) on differences between Greek democracy of ancient times and modern democracy. In addition, see Martin Diamond, *The Founding of the Democratic Republic* (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1981); M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*; and Paul Rahe, *Republics, Ancient and Modern*.
8. Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay* (New York: A Mentor Book of the New American Library, 1961), p. 81.
9. Abraham Lincoln, "Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania" in Andrew Delbanco, ed., *The Portable Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Viking, 1992), p. 295.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 7.
11. Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 13.

12. An excellent study of different conceptions of modern democracy is provided by David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987). A persuasive presentation of the model of liberal democracy is provided by Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987).

13. See the article by Herman Belz on "Constitutionalism" in Kermit L. Hall, ed., *The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 190.

14. Cass R. Sunstein, "Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 352; this volume includes several excellent essays on the relationships of constitutionalism to democracy in modern governments.

15. Bronislaw Geremek, "Polish Constitutionalism," in Stanley N. Katz, ed., *Constitutionalism in East Central Europe* (New York: American Council of Learned Societies, 1994), p. 5.

16. Wiktor Osiatynski, "Polish Constitutionalism," in Stanley N. Katz, ed., *Constitutionalism in East Central Europe* (New York: American Council of Learned Societies, 1994), pp. 21-22. In addition, see an excellent article by Wiktor Osiatynski, "A Model Misinterpreted," *Constitution* 3 (Spring-Summer 1991): 46-54. In this article Osiatynski argues that "two principles of American constitutionalism are relevant for Poland today. One is the principle of limited democracy—the belief that individual rights and the rights of minorities are necessary limitations on the will of the majority because of the danger of an unrestrained majoritarian democracy. The other is the idea that a constitution represents a higher law that towers over the parliamentary or executive power." (See page 54.)

17. The critical importance of constitutionalism in any criteria for modern democracy is emphasized by Bruce Ackerman, *The Future of Liberal Revolution* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992); in particular see pages 46-68; Ackerman urges the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe to legitimize and protect their newly won rights by "constitutionalizing their revolutions."

18. Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay*, p. 301.

19. Bradford P. Wilson and Peter W. Schramm, eds., *Separation of Powers and Good Government* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1994).

20. Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay*, p. 308.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 466.

22. Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," in A. E. Dick Howard, ed., *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 163-207.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

24. Adam B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 3-5.

25. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994), p. ix.

26. Ernest Gellner, "The Importance of Being Modular," in John A. Hall, ed., *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 32.

27. Irena Wóycicka, "Grassroots Movements in Poland," in Ann McKinstry Micou and Birgit Lindsnaes, eds., *The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emerging Democracies* (Copenhagen: The Danish Centre for Human Rights, 1993), p. 56.

28. Svennik Hoyer, Epp Lauk, and Peeter Vihalemm, eds., *Towards a Civic Society* (Tartu, Estonia: Nota Baltica Ltd., 1993); See the book cited above, note 27, edited by Micou and Lindsnaes, for numerous examples of civil society organizations in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

29. Liviu Matei, "Voluntary Organizations in Romania," in Ann McKinstry Micou and Birgit Lindsnaes, eds., *The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emerging Democracies* (Copenhagen: The Danish Centre for Human Rights, 1993), pp. 66-69.

30. Giuseppe Di Palma argues that the vitality of civil society in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe indicates that they will make successful transitions to constitutional democracy and market economy. See "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond and

Mare F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 257-267.

31. Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

32. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

35. Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 356-357.

36. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Why Democracy Can Work in Eastern Europe," in Larry Diamond and Mare F. Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 265.

37. Robert A. Dahl, "Why All Democratic Countries Have Mixed Economies," in John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds., *Democratic Community* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 279.

38. Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), p. 2.

39. Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 9.

40. Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose*, p. 3.

41. Robert Zuzowski, "Prospects for Reform in Eastern Europe," in Colin Vale and Irene van den Ende, eds., *The Loss of Innocence* (Pretoria, South Africa: HSRC Publishers, 1994), p. 156.

42. John J. Patrick, interview with Radmila Dostalova, in her office at Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic, December 6, 1993.

43. John J. Patrick, interview with Wiktor Kulerski, President of the Foundation for Education for Democracy, at his Foundation office, Warsaw, Poland, December 13, 1993.

44. The pedagogical practices recommended in this paper are warranted by research documented in scholarly literature, such as Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987); John J. Patrick and Charles S. White, "Social Studies Education, Secondary Schools," in Marvin C. Alkin, ed., *Encyclopedia of Educational Research*, 6th Edition (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), pp. 1229-1245; and James P. Shaver, ed., *Handbook of Research on Social Studies Teaching and Learning* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991).

45. This way of thinking about the comparative and relative superiority of democracy is based on James Madison's manner of arguing for the republican form of government during the founding of the United States. See Adrienne Koch, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 105.

46. James David Barber, *The Book of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995). In addition, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

47. Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, "The Challenge to Democracy in Central Europe," Paper presented at the Conference on Educating for Democracy at Ohio Wesleyan University, November 12-13, 1992, p. 1.

2

Essential Economics for Civic Education in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Steven L. Miller



2

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2

Essential Economics for Civic Education in Former Communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Steven L. Miller

The role of economics as an essential component of civic education is accepted among economic educators in the United States of America.¹ Many civic educators in the U.S. also recognize the pressing need for systematic attention to economics in the education of competent citizens. *CIVITAS*, the comprehensive overview of civic education, for example, states: "Economics may have been dubbed the 'dismal science;' but ignorance of economics on the part of the citizens called upon to judge the ideas, criticisms, warnings, policies, and proposals that swirl about them in public debate is more dismal by far."²

This chapter sets forth essential economic topics to be included as part of civic education programs in Central and Eastern Europe. These topics are intended to serve as guidelines for those concerned with developing and assessing civic education programs in the region.³ These topics have been derived from my experience as the lead economic education consultant to Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP),⁴ and in civic education programs in Lithuania and Bulgaria.⁵

From the outset, a key premise of EDCP has been that effective civic education in Poland must include systematic attention to market economics. The recommended essential economics topics stress the relationship between democratic government, freedom, and a market economy. The topics are economic freedom, how markets allocate resources, the role of government in a market economy, international trade, and economic reasoning in civic education.

In addition, the chapter shows why an economics dimension of civic education is indispensable in Poland, specifically, and in the other newly democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The discussion of each topic suggests why the topic is of special importance to these countries. The economics aspect of civic education is partly founded on the notion that political and economic freedom are mutually supportive. It is also rooted in the idea that economics provides a set of conceptual tools to help citizens think about their gov-

ernment's relationship to the economy and the many economic issues citizens in a democratic society face. Indeed, developing more market-oriented economies goes hand-in-hand with establishing democratic governments characterized by constitutionalism and personal freedom. In sum, adequate attention to market economics is one key to developing effective civic education for constitutional democracy in Poland or any of the other democratizing states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Economic Freedom

In Chapter One of this volume, John J. Patrick has written succinctly and eloquently of the inextricable relationship between markets and constitutional democracy: "A free democratic government depends upon both a vibrant civil society and a market-oriented economy, which involves freedom of exchange in the marketplace." As Professor Patrick points out, there is concern among analysts of the events in Central and Eastern Europe "that the indispensable linkages of markets, free governments, and free people are not fully understood." (See Patrick's chapter, pages 13-15, for his discussion of these issues.) Thus, teaching about economic freedom and its relationship to constitutional democracy is the first essential aspect of economics in civic education programs.

Milton and Rose Friedman have noted that economic freedom is an essential part of "the freedom of individuals to pursue their own objectives." As will be pointed out in the section on "Voluntary Exchange vs. Coercion" that follows, one leg of economic freedom is the right of agreement and refusal—that is, to choose to enter into transactions or refuse to do so. Another leg is the right to private property, without which there can be no markets. The combination of these amounts to freedom of choice: to work at what one chooses and to commit one's resources as one chooses—in short, to pursue one's objectives.

It is worth reminding readers that economic freedom stands as both a worthy goal in its own right and an indispensable guardian of political freedom. Just as a person who could not speak freely in public to promote a position she favored is not considered free, neither is a person who cannot make free economic choices. For many (perhaps most) people, the loss of the right to decide, at what to work, whether to buy or sell, how much to save or spend, and so on, would constitute the forfeiture of the vast majority of their freedom, at least as measured by how much time they spend in various pursuits. Economic freedom is, therefore, an inseparable part of individual liberty and should properly be thought of in the same way as other "inalienable rights," such as free speech or freedom of religion, albeit limited by the rule of law as all individual rights are to some degree. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any meaningful conception of freedom absent economic freedom.

In addition, economic freedom is an essential bulwark of political freedom, especially through the dispersion of power, as described by Professor Patrick. Milton and Rose Friedman have noted two aspects of this power dispersion.⁷ One is that markets tend to scatter power among diverse economic and geographic areas, companies, and individuals. While it is easy to contest this point by citing the evident power of large economic organizations, e.g., corporations and unions, it remains true nonetheless that power is dispersed. Industries rise and fall (computers and railroads) as do specific companies (Microsoft and IBM), and power is often contested between industries (cable and telephone companies). Further, as GM learned, the global marketplace disperses power very effectively.

Moreover, the alternative is to concentrate economic power in the government. Indeed, much of the power thought to be wielded by large organizations is directed toward exercising

control *through* the coercive power of government. Yet, this is precisely the second means by which economic freedom can disperse power—by reducing the sphere over which government has control, thereby reducing the potential for tyranny. As John Stuart Mill put it:

If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and public charities were all of them branches of government; if in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves upon them, became departments of the central administration; if the employees of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name.'

This latter aspect of power dispersion is largely accepted in the American historical tradition where government is seen as both a threat to the inherent rights of the individual and as a means to protect these rights. It is not as readily admitted in nations where the feudal lords were overthrown and new governments established that "granted" rights to the people. This conception of government as the grantor of rights makes the power dispersion aspects of economic freedom less obvious and increases the need for educators to emphasize this connection. It is a connection that can best be developed when students understand what a market system is about.

Markets Allocate Resources

The essential function of a market *system* is to allocate scarce resources among the alternative and competing ends for which they might be used. This sparse statement packs a ton of economic theory into a simple, elegant, and powerful generalization that points to the fundamentally different economic approach that the Poles face. For two generations, they had their chief economic experiences within a command economy, where the allocation of resources was determined by central planners who established wage rates for various occupations and production levels for most everything from agricultural commodities to finished goods.

The Poles, perhaps more than some others in Central and Eastern Europe, had some rudimentary first-hand experiences with markets. These were frequently "gray markets," meaning that they were officially illegal, but were ignored by the authorities since they were beneficial in smoothing some of the distortions introduced by a command system. But to bargain in an occasional market is an experience several orders of magnitude different than to live in a society where the primary mechanism for directing economic activity is the market. Market systems function in a radically different and, for the Poles, foreign way with profound impacts on the daily life of each person.

Furthermore, the transition to a market system introduced pronounced dislocations that have become familiar to all who have followed the events in Central and Eastern Europe over the past few years. At the outset of the EDCP project, it was evident that Polish society was sailing on an unfamiliar vessel into a violent storm in uncharted waters. It was also clear that a part of the project had to be devoted to equipping the citizens with the knowledge to better navigate their way through the tempest.

Valuing Resources and Economic Efficiency

Key to understanding the changed nature of the economy under a market system is the idea that all economic resources have value relative to each other. Each resource's value is announced in the price of the resource, as established by markets, denominated in the units of the local currency. Thus, one can compare the value of resources directly through their prices. As a resource becomes more sought after, its relative price rises, thereby forcing users of the resource to either pay more or stop using that resource, perhaps by adopting a substitute. The rising price of the resource provides an incentive for its producers to bid more for the resources they need to produce it. The same thing happens with respect to the substitute resources to which some users have turned. Moreover, producers may adopt resources of a completely different type: that is, users might employ more machines (capital resources) and fewer people (human resources) if they were to find the costs of the latter rising relative to the former. Also, the value of a resource can decline, especially when the products or services for which the resource is used fall out of favor with consumers. For example, the value of the talents of a blacksmith has declined relative to those of a mechanic with the switch from horses to automobiles.

Ultimately, the value of a resource is determined by both its relative rarity (supply) and the demand for it as derived from consumers' desires for the products or services the resource can be used to produce. *Economic efficiency*, in this sense, is effectively allocating resources by translating consumers' desires, as expressed by their willingness and ability to pay, into the goods and services they have said they want. A well-functioning market system produces the "right" allocation of resources since, if a resource is being "over-used" or "under-used," its changing price provides the means by which its use will be corrected.

For instance, when hand-held calculators were first introduced in the mid-1960s, they were relatively expensive and most consumers continued to use their trusty slide rules as a means for doing calculations. However, within five years technological improvements in design and production caused the price of calculators to plummet. Resources, including labor (meaning people's jobs), were rearranged. More went into the production of calculators; none into slide rules, which became extinct.

The efficient allocation of resources is an accomplishment at which command economies are notable failures. The relative values of resources are skewed by government intervention, price setting, and production quotas. The guesses of bureaucrats are poor substitutes for the market's efficient translation of consumers' desires into goods and services. A command economy removes the market incentive to produce more of what people want. And, very significantly for Poland and the other newly democratizing nations, the old regimes left in place a set of resource prices that were seriously out of line with what markets would dictate, creating the necessity for an indefinite period of painful adjustment.

It is also important to note that while markets promote economic efficiency, they do not necessarily result in a valuing of resources that any particular person would find "moral." For instance, teachers will not necessarily be paid more for the great social contribution of their particular skills than entertainers will be paid. Markets sometimes remunerate people for possessing a resource at the moment it becomes highly valued, whether such ownership is the result of shrewd forecasting and risk-taking or simple good fortune. This outcome of a market system often runs counter to people's intuitive sense of justice that people should be rewarded for being honest, working hard, and producing good things for a society.

This last aspect of markets gives rise to suspicion of the market system among citizens in nations attempting to move to free economies. Already disparity in incomes is increasingly obvious. Some enterprising individuals have quickly managed to become economically successful while many, especially pensioners, have watched their incomes erode because of inflation. While such disparity certainly existed under the communists, it was far less conspicuous. Market systems can provide no guarantee of equal benefits. Indeed, greater economic efficiency is purchased, to some extent, at the cost of less equity of income (but not necessarily equity of opportunity). Understanding this phenomenon and developing a tolerance for it is a key ingredient to the longer-term success of growing market economies.

Moreover, there is a strong perception among Poles, in some cases well founded, that some individuals used their high political positions to convert state assets into their private assets, a situation not unique to Poland. This obviously conferred benefits on these unscrupulous operators. The risk is that there will be a temptation to blame the market system for what amounts to out-and-out theft. And such practices contribute to an atmosphere of mystery and suspicion among people who are unfamiliar with a market system.

Individual vs. Government Planning

In fact, the apparently chaotic free-for-all of a market system, with its seemingly incongruous and perceived "unfair" results, leaves some with the impression that such a system is irrational. This is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe where prices are madly darting about and the real value of wages, salaries, and pensions is gyrating wildly during the period of adjustment.¹⁰ Economic disarray often leads to the commonly held idea that the economy ought to be planned. After all, planning is a good thing: better to have a plan than no plan. In Poland, there is some sentiment that it was the plan that was bad, not the idea of planning. Indeed, some people describe command economies as "planned" and market economies as "unplanned."

A central idea in the EDCP project was to help educators dispel this erroneous distinction. *All* modern economies are planned. The relevant distinction is found in who does the planning. Command economies are centrally planned; market economies are individually planned with the participation of everyone. The planning component in a command economy is visible and easily understood. That it is hopelessly doomed to failure, as described earlier and is now clear from the historical record, is less obvious. Paradoxically, market economies are more effective (at least in terms of economic efficiency), but the planning component is less visible and more difficult to understand.

One has to help those in Central and Eastern Europe to see that the outcomes in a market system—what gets produced and how, how much people are paid, and so on—are a result of the choices and decisions of everyone. A market system is the mechanism for summing up all of these individual plans. Moreover, because people can make mistakes, their individual plans can go awry; that is, they can fail. We can buy a poorly made pair of shoes (although they seemed like a bargain at the time), invest in an enterprise that founders, enter the wrong occupation, or fail to save enough money. The outcomes of a market system are based on what people think they want given their individual designs, even if later they wish they had made other plans. Even so, the results under a market system are more likely to satisfy each individual, since each one gets to plan and make choices, than under a command economy, where someone else chooses for them.

Voluntary Exchange vs. Coercion

That individuals can plan badly and make mistakes in no way diminishes another major distinction between the command economy to which the Poles were accustomed and the market economy toward which they are moving. That distinction is the means by which plans, choices, and decisions are executed. Specifically, command economies operate upon the basis of coercion; market economies are based upon voluntary exchange. For the Poles, the coercive elements of command economies needed little further comment. Because the economic edicts of the central authorities carried the force of law, one ignored them at one's peril.¹¹ Voluntary exchange, however, deserves to be explored more fully.

The essence of voluntary exchange is the right of agreement and refusal. Two parties cannot be forbidden from entering into a transaction that they both find agreeable. Nor can either be forced to accept a transaction that he or she finds disagreeable. Obviously, that does not mean that one must inevitably be happy with the bargain. Instead, it means that one thinks one is better off to make the deal than not to do so. For example, one might be offered a wage that is less than one had hoped, but might still accept employment because it is better than the available alternatives.

Inherent in the idea of voluntary exchange is the notion that both sides expect to benefit (although either might later learn that he or she has not benefitted, at least to the extent expected). That both sides expect to benefit is an important way in which markets create added value. Even simple barter transactions illustrate why this is so. When one person voluntarily trades a chair to someone else for a lamp, value is added since the satisfaction of both persons is increased. Market systems multiply this process of adding value through millions of transactions for everything from economic resources to finished products and services.

Because both sides can benefit from an exchange, voluntary transactions make economic activity a positive-sum endeavor; that is, both parties win. This is counter-intuitive for many people. They often assume that, like many games where there is a winner and a loser, economic activity is a zero-sum activity where one side's gains come at the expense of the other side's losses.

Finally, a system based on voluntary exchange also promotes the goal of economic freedom. Because of the right of agreement, people are free to make economic decisions selected from the full breadth of their available opportunities. By limiting the extent of government proscription, the range of choice and, therefore, of freedom is expanded.

Non-Competitive Markets

The preceding discussion has assumed that a market system is characterized by perfectly competitive markets, something that even in well-developed market economies is often violated in practice. Perfectly competitive markets are assumed (1) to have many buyers and sellers, none large enough to influence prices; (2) to have no barriers to entry so that competitors can freely enter the market; (3) to have homogeneous products so that competition is by price, not rivalry (e.g., advertising); and (4) to have full and costless information, implying that everyone knows price changes instantaneously.¹² This list of assumptions is really quite demanding and surprisingly few markets can meet these tests. Poles and citizens in other newly democratizing nations have already observed the development of dominant companies in some markets and are rightly concerned about monopoly power, something that is anathema to the proponent of markets, since monopolies result in a misallocation of resources through too little production in order to exact a higher price.¹³

But what, if anything, can Polish educators teach about all of this short of a course in price theory? And what is the impact of these everyday observations on the shaky faith that Poles have in this new way of managing the economy? It is perhaps cold comfort to realize that monopoly power, *when it is unassisted by government power*, is temporal and fleeting. A remarkable thing about a market system is how robust it is and resistant to violations of these assumptions. Absent effective barriers to entry, successful monopolies attract competitors—aggressive, lean, and mean—although this can take time. Thus, one potential role of government in a market economy is to police the market for monopolists and colluders (more on which shortly), provided that the regulators are not “captured” by the regulated. Historically, the most effective long-term way to keep competitors out is to use the coercive power of government.

The Role of Government in a Market Economy

To implement market economies in Poland and throughout Central and Eastern Europe, these societies must reinvent the relationship between the government and the economy. Despite the comments at the end of the previous section, I do not intend to suggest that the government has no significant role in a market economy. Quite the contrary; a market system cannot flourish without active government participation. But the responsibilities and points of connection are vastly different under a market system than under the command system to which those living in communist regimes were accustomed. These nations must simultaneously decide what things government used to do that it should do no longer, and what things government did not do in the past that it now must do. Polish educators face the daunting prospect of helping future voters understand and define this new connection between government and economy. This section examines some of the guiding principles from economics that can contribute to clarifying this relationship.

Establishing the Rules

Uncertainty is both an inescapable fact of life and a potentially major drag on an economy. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the risk to all participants in the market. Greater risk means that a larger risk premium is built into everything from interest rates to prices. Uncertainty requires people to spend more resources minimizing risks, resources that otherwise could be used in production. Uncertainty increases the likelihood that plans will go amiss and that businesses will fail. Clearly, government can make an important contribution to the economic well-being of its citizens by reducing uncertainty.

Government must, therefore, institute and enforce basic rules for the market economy. Laws must establish clear private property rights; otherwise, owners of productive resources cannot engage in transactions. Few producers can afford the risk of investing in productive assets that might later be arbitrarily revoked. Moreover, the absence of clearly established property rights can reduce the foreign investment that these nations desperately need. This is a particularly knotty problem in Central and Eastern Europe where the communist regimes appropriated land from individuals. Some claims antedate World War I, and many documents have been lost or destroyed over the intervening years. Rights to patents, copyrights, and intellectual properties are also part of the basic rules. Citizens in these nations need to understand the importance of a quick resolution of these issues.

Government must provide the mechanism to enforce contracts entered into by private parties. Disputes inevitably arise: the parts are defective, the delivery date is missed, the work-

ing conditions are poor, the supplier suddenly demands a higher price, and so on. In the United States of America, there is a very large body of case law governing contracts. One problem in Central and Eastern Europe is the absence of a similar body of law.

Governments can act to reduce uncertainty through clear tax and regulatory policies and laws. The faster tax policy becomes stable, the more quickly uncertainty is reduced. Indeed, a change in tax policy can tip the balance for an enterprise from profitable to unprofitable. Chief Justice John Marshall was correct when he wrote that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."¹⁴ Clearly, great uncertainty attends a country with an unstable tax environment. Some regulation of the market is inevitable in a modern society; freedom is secured by the rule of law. But regulations that are constantly changing, arbitrarily enforced, or overly burdensome vastly increase uncertainty and decrease capability of participation in the market.

When Markets Fail: Regulations

Economic theory has for decades concluded that there are some areas in which markets inherently fail to allocate resources efficiently. This has led to an entire class of economic phenomena known as market failures in which government action is specifically required. These are situations with which Poles and others in Central and Eastern Europe must become acquainted, since this is a key component in redefining the relationship between government and the economy.

There are serious environmental/pollution problems in Poland and throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It seems that a command economy is no proof against environmental degradation. Perhaps, as some economists have suggested, a clean environment can be thought of as a good that a society decides to purchase only after it has reached some threshold level of economic development.¹⁵ Nonetheless, many students in Poland are rightly concerned about the state of the environment in their nation. They need to know that the market economy may help to provide the means to afford a cleaner environment, but it will take government intervention to provide the mechanism.

This is because market competition drives producers to produce in the least costly way. If a resource, such as the air or the water, can be used essentially at no cost, it will be. Even an environmentally conscious producer with the best intentions will not be able to absorb the cost of cleaning up his polluted effluent if his competitors do not. That added cost will price the environmentally friendly producer out of the market. In essence, society is bearing part of the costs of the market transaction between the producer and consumer. Two practical results are that more of this particular good is produced than would be the case if the producer bore the actual costs of production; thus, resources are misallocated. Second, more pollution occurs. It is necessary for government to intervene to force this external cost (hence the term "negative externality") back into the internal market transaction. This requires a regulatory scheme, perhaps involving effluent taxes.¹⁶

Markets also can fail when there are serious violations of the assumptions of the perfectly competitive model noted earlier. These problems of inadequate competition happen (for example) when there are too few competitors, especially if they are colluding with one another, or there is inadequate information, especially in highly technical fields like medicine. These problems can create the need for government intervention. For instance, a government agency might be created to investigate collusion or to force companies to break themselves into smaller entities, because there are too few competitors. Government might establish agencies that provide information to consumers when information is highly technical or difficult to acquire. Government might even establish regulatory stan-

dards for product safety, such as for food and drugs, and licenses for some professions, such as medical doctors.

That markets can fail in these ways is not in dispute; the appropriate government response is. The argument is, in general, about whether the government's regulatory "cure" is more costly than the "disease." Here there is wide range of opinions. Those favoring less intervention typically argue that government regulations quickly become barriers to entry (thereby reducing competition), that agencies have an inherent tendency to over-regulate, and that markets (while not perfect) generally provide a better remedy than bureaucrats. Those favoring more regulatory activity argue that people getting sick or dying are quite expensive ways to weed out bad food or "quack" doctors, that market solutions often take too long (as in attracting competitors to a non-competitive market), and that there are ways to establish sensible regulatory policies.

It is important for Poles and others in Central and Eastern Europe to understand that there are costs and benefits associated with proposed regulatory activity. While one might have a predisposition for or against the unfettered market, it is dangerous to embrace every proposed government solution because there is a "problem" to be remedied; it is also dangerous to assume that government should never intervene in any of these areas. There will be calls to regulate the markets in these developing market economies. Sorting out the "right" amount and the "right" kind of regulation in these societies is an essential but difficult task.

What Should Government Provide?

An enduring question throughout the history of predominantly market economies is what goods and services government should provide. Plainly, as the current battle over the federal budget shows, this issue is far from settled in the United States of America. Nor is there necessarily any "right" answer, at least as judged by the differences in the range of answers across the developed market economies. The answer a particular society gives is due partly to the decisions of its citizens within the context of the society's culture and history. Economics certainly has no monopoly in providing guidance here. Yet, the economic dimension of civic education has something to offer citizens of Poland and other newly democratizing nations as they wrestle with this question.

What the government should provide for Polish citizens is an especially important issue for them now. They are moving from a situation in which government provides relatively more and markets less to the opposite situation. Now, and in the future, citizens must respond, issue by issue, to these kinds of questions: Should government provide health care to all? Should it provide housing to all? Should the government provide mass transportation? Should the government guarantee a minimum standard of living?

Economics is very clear in positing that government must act in cases where private markets will not provide an adequate quantity of the good or service because of market failure. The most straightforward case is that of so-called public (or social) goods. To understand what a public good is, consider the two defining characteristics of a private good: (1) there is a rival (depletable) consumption, meaning that the consumption of the good (or service) prevents others from also enjoying the same good; and (2) there is exclusion, meaning that it is possible (or at least not prohibitively costly) for producers of the good to exclude consumers once the good (or service) has been produced. Here is an example: A can of Pepsi is a private good. After I have purchased a can, every sip I take is one that no one else can enjoy; thus, there is rival consumption. Also, the seller can exclude anyone who does not purchase the Pepsi from drinking it.

In contrast, public goods are characterized by non-rival (or shared or non-depletable) consumption and often exhibit non-excludability. A lighthouse on the shore to warn passing ships of a reef or rocky coast is a public good. Providing its warning to some passing ships in no way diminishes the benefit to other passing ships. Thus, consumption is non-rival. Moreover, once the lighthouse is built, there is no practical way to exclude passing ships from using it. Thus, there is non-excludability.

It is clear why private markets will not produce adequate amounts of public goods. What private company will build the lighthouse? No one will produce something that they do not think people will buy, and people will not buy the lighthouse's services since the benefits are available to everyone. Also, the builders of the lighthouse cannot capture any revenue from passing ships and cannot exclude the benefits to only some ships. No one will wish to purchase a public good because they will get its benefits for free (once it is produced), since they cannot be excluded (the so-called "free-rider problem").

Thus, economics clearly argues for leaving the production of private goods to private markets and for public goods to be provided by the government, either directly or by using government funds to hire private providers. Because these characteristics are relative rather than absolute (for instance, a public street can be more or less crowded), government also might subsidize their production by private firms.

Goods that have significant external benefits represent another class of goods for which a case can be made for government subsidization. This is the other side of the "negative externality" or pollution coin presented in the previous section. When a market in private goods produces substantial external benefits, it will tend to be underproduced, just as goods with substantial negative externalities tend to be overproduced. Consider precollegiate education. Plainly, there are private benefits to the individual receiving the education. There is not only the intrinsic value of greater knowledge, but the promise of higher income as well. If these were the only benefits, presumably precollegiate education would neither need nor receive any public funding. It is, however, argued that there are substantial external benefits to society as a whole due to having an educated populace. Thus, our society chooses to subsidize the production of precollegiate education.

There are, of course, many knotty questions to settle when citizens decide what government should provide. For instance, one must decide about the amount of subsidy necessary. One could question whether precollegiate education is *over*-subsidized since many (most?) of the benefits of education presumably go to the student. Thus, the ideas from economics help to clarify the costs and benefits of such choices, and point to the "right" solution from the standpoint of economic efficiency. It should also be remembered, however, that there may be other reasons for a society to provide goods and services, such as education, publicly. Nonetheless, the citizens of the newly democratizing nations cannot avoid the issue of what government should or should not provide. The students in these countries will be better prepared to answer this complicated question if they understand the contributions of economics to it.

Stabilizing the Economy

Macroeconomic (the overall economy) theory continues to be an area of disagreement among economists. Some think it is nonsense to even discuss government's role in stabilizing the economy, meaning to minimize inflation and recessions. Generally, this viewpoint is a negative reaction to attempts by governmental authorities to "fine tune" the economy by tweaking monetary policy here and fiscal policy there. These economists argue that the economic theory is too fraught with contention; the policy tools are too weak and uncertain; the

time lags between recognition of the problem and the time the policies produce the desired effects are too long; and the politicians in charge are too unreliable.

But there are two salient points that can be made about government's economic stabilization role in Poland and other newly democratizing nations. First, the economic dislocations they are experiencing will result in popular calls for their governments to do *something*. Second, economists might not know how to fine-tune all of the little bumps in the economic road, but they do know some ways in which government policies can do great harm to the overall economy.

One contribution economics can make to civic education is to help educators clarify this latter point. Whatever other causes of recession and inflation various economic theories may present, it is indisputable that poor monetary policy can produce either one. Monetary policy, the control of the supply of money to the economy, resides with the government's central banking authority. In an economy, the supply of money normally has to expand to accommodate increased economic activity at approximately the rate at which the economy is likely to grow. Too rapid monetary growth begets inflation. Too slow monetary growth can retard economic growth. And a monetary collapse, such as during the Great Depression, can have catastrophic results.

Moreover, there is a connection between fiscal policy (taxing and spending by government) and monetary policy that is especially important in the newly democratizing nations. The governments are under tremendous pressure to counterbalance the losses that some people are experiencing during the time of the adjustment to a market economy. There is always a great humanitarian and political temptation faced by government leaders to respond to those cries for help by spending beyond the government's means. In developed market economies, this can be done by borrowing through issuing government bonds (which, as we know in the U.S., has its own set of problems). But developing market economies, which are without functioning bond markets, sometimes resort to the expedient method of creating new money to pay for the expanded government programs.

This, as predicted by economics, creates inflation, which imposes enormous costs on the people in these nations. It is like a differential tax that hits hardest those whose incomes cannot keep up. It introduces massive uncertainty that acts like an anchor on the economy. It increases the length of time required for the adjustment of resource prices to be accomplished. And, it discourages outside investment by adding the risk of currency fluctuation to the already dicey prospect of investing in these new economies.

International Trade

Poland and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe face an entirely new set of issues in the sphere of international economies. As members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which was abolished in January 1991, their international economic activity was largely confined to trade with the other members of Comecon and was heavily dominated by the Soviet Union.¹ Now Poland has entered the hurly-burly world of the global economy. It has applied for membership in the European Union and has been granted associate status under a Europe Agreement. "The Europe Agreements create closer economic and political ties between the EU and each country, but do not guarantee membership into the EU. . . . The Europe Agreements will eventually lead to the creation of a free trade zone between the associated countries and the EU by eliminating tariffs and quotas over a ten-year period."²

This, along with increased trade with the United States of America and the entrance of many foreign firms as investors, threatens to create a protectionist sentiment that could result in government policies that slow trade and investment. International trade introduces new competitors with prices that may be well below those of domestic producers. This adds to the economic dislocation created by the necessary adjustment to prices established by the market, as noted in a previous section. It is, therefore, vitally important for Polish educators to help students understand international trade.

The case for free trade is well known and is nearly unanimously supported by economists,¹⁹ although there are some theoretical provisos. There is also considerable disagreement about the best strategy to employ in order to achieve freer trade.²⁰ The basis for free trade is comparative advantage. Consider a very simple example. John and Mary can both produce either oranges or potatoes in the amounts noted in the table below. For instance, John can produce three oranges, but if he does, he will have no resources left to produce any potatoes. If he produces two oranges, he can produce one potato, and so on. Note that Mary can produce more of either good than can John (maybe she's a better farmer).

Table 1
Comparative Advantage
Production Possibilities for Two Producers

John		Mary	
Oranges	Potatoes	Oranges	Potatoes
3	0	10	0
2	1	8	1
1	2	6	2
0	3	4	3
		2	4
		0	5

Note that both John and Mary can be better off by specializing and trading. Suppose John produces three potatoes and trades two of them for three of Mary's oranges, with Mary having specialized by producing ten oranges. John will have three oranges and one potato, one more potato than he would have had if he had produced the three oranges himself. Similarly, after trading Mary has seven oranges and two potatoes, one more orange than she would have had if she had produced two potatoes. This example shows how two parties can benefit by exploiting their different costs of production. In this case, each potato John produces costs him an orange and vice versa. For Mary, each potato costs two oranges to produce; each orange costs one-half potato. Thus, John has the cheaper potatoes, which he trades to Mary for her cheaper oranges. Note once more that this occurs despite the fact that Mary can produce more of either product. This means that there will be an opportunity for John to trade with his more productive partner.

While all of this is obvious enough when it comes to specializing and trading among individuals or within nations, strange things happen to our perceptions when the trade crosses international boundaries. Suppose for a moment that John and Mary are countries. Suppose further that John has been producing both oranges and potatoes. Then, suddenly, trade starts with Mary. John's orange growers are going to be put out of business. This negative conse-

quence is highly concentrated, and its cause is quite visible—the imported oranges from Mary. Meanwhile, John's potato farmers are somewhat better off, and the country as a whole has benefited, but the benefits are widely dispersed and the source might be invisible to the public as a whole. It is a fair bet that John's orange farmers will lobby the government heavily against the "unfair competition" from Mary, and that there will be little corresponding lobbying in favor of this trade.

With Poland and other Central and Eastern European nations increasingly thrust into the global economy, there will be unemployment in particular sectors due to trade. Economists would argue that this is good. These unemployed workers become labor resources that can be employed in producing other goods and services. And, as the above example demonstrates, there will be increased employment in the export sectors in addition to greater wealth in the society as a whole, since it is getting some products and services more cheaply than before. But it does not feel that way to the unemployed. While this is a positive-sum game for the nation as a whole, there are short-term individual losers who will call for government protection. The economics dimension of civic education can help future voters in Poland understand this ever more important situation.

Economic Reasoning in Civic Education

Many proposed policies that citizens face are muddled by differential impacts on various groups, further complicated by disparate effects over time and diverse impacts on a society's goals. Citizens, to participate effectively in the civic decisions of their country, must be able to reason competently and reach warranted conclusions about these policies. This critical need leads us to the final essential economic aspect of civic education programs in newly democratizing nations: economic reasoning.

The *first* feature of economic reasoning is the use of economics to predict consequences of possible courses of action. Economics attempts to be a science in that it suggests that outcomes are predictable because of the underlying principles of behavior that economists have discovered. An example is that if the price of something rises, people generally will buy less of it, *ceteris paribus*. Thus, if we were to levy a tax on gasoline, economics predicts that people would use less gasoline because some would drive less or buy smaller cars or both.

This example also directs us toward a *second* important part of economic reasoning: to assess the consequences of alternative policies in terms of social goals. To continue with the example of the tax on gasoline, the tax might be proposed to reduce auto emissions as a means to promote the goal of a cleaner environment. An alternative might be to tax automobiles—a graduated tax based on miles per gallon—to discourage purchases of gas-guzzling cars. Moreover, given the goal of a cleaner environment, other policies might be considered, such as subsidizing mass transportation. While specialists would have to determine how much emission reduction would result from any of these alternatives, it is clear that economics can be used to identify the least costly way to achieve the desired result—in this case, a cleaner environment. Thus, one must not only be able to identify likely costs and benefits of alternatives, but how the policies affect the goals of the society. For civic education programs, this means that students in Poland and the other newly democratizing nations must know enough economics to predict the consequences of proposed policies on their society's goals, or at least understand the arguments of "experts" who project such consequences.

Third, this means that students will also need to understand the goals to be achieved. Some commonly accepted economic goals include economic freedom, economic efficiency, eco-

conomic equity, economic security, economic growth, full employment, stable prices, and a clean environment. Plainly, defining some of these goals is problematic. For example, nearly everyone is in favor of economic equity in some form, but there is far less agreement about what economic equity means. Does it mean equal wealth or equal income or equal opportunity or equal application of the rules of the economic game? Economic efficiency, as noted earlier, has a fairly technical meaning in economics, but that is not how a lay person would likely construe the term.

Fourth, civic education programs must include the fact that almost all policies involve tradeoffs among desirable ends. Policies that promote one or more of these ends often do so at the expense of several others. For instance, the move to a market economy has clearly promoted economic freedom, economic efficiency, and economic equity (in an opportunity sense). It has come at the cost of economic security, unemployment, and economic equity (in a results sense). In the example of the gasoline tax, a cleaner environment is purchased at the cost of some economic freedom. Moreover, the time span involved affects the impact on the economic goals. In the short run, the move toward a market system has produced inflation and slower (even negative) economic growth. Yet, most analysts, based on the historical record, predict that the shift from a command economy will produce better results for both of these goals over the longer term.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of economic reasoning to civic education is the recognition that trade-offs among goals are *incremental*. Economist Thomas Sowell makes this point by contrasting two approaches to reasoning about goals:

Both Adam Smith and John Rawls made justice the primary virtue of a society, but their meanings were not only different but nearly opposite, because one was speaking incrementally and the other was speaking categorically. To Smith, some amount of justice was a prerequisite for any of the other features of a society to exist, but he was far from believing that all increments of justice invariably out-ranked increments of other things. . . . To Rawls, justice is categorically paramount . . . so that one consideration of justice may be sacrificed only to another consideration of justice, but not to any other desired goal. According to Rawls, a policy that benefitted all of the human race except one person should not be adopted, no matter how much they were benefitted, nor even if the one person were completely unharmed, because that would be an "unjust" distribution of the benefits of the policy.²¹

Economic reasoning uses an incremental approach that recognizes that specific policies might involve great costs in terms of one goal to secure only modest gains in terms of another. For instance, a proposed change in tax policy might have large, negative consequences on economic equity while generating small benefits in terms of growth. The reverse is also possible. The point is that knowing that a policy will have adverse consequences in terms of goals one holds important is not enough. The size of the impact is also important.

Finally, understanding that the public and politicians can disagree over which goal is most important is a significant insight for students. Policies are often promoted by one group because of their salutary effects on particular goals at the same time they are castigated by another group using different standards. Students need to be able to apply economic reasoning to judge consequences and weigh the tradeoffs among conflicting goals.

Civic education, including the economic ideas and topics outlined in this chapter, has a vital role to play in Poland and the other newly democratizing nations of Central and Eastern Europe. It will be all too easy for some to remember over-fondly the good old days before there was such turmoil and confusion. The economic adjustment process in these nations is

virtually unprecedented. There are no well-worn paths to follow—no comprehensive manuals explaining how to do it.

Civic education—as embodied in things such as knowledge of what is happening and why, an understanding of the meanings of freedom, and the ability to take an active and effective role in the nation's policies—is the best long-term ally of success for these nations in their quest for liberty and democracy. "[H]aving become so impressed with the fact that freedom is not everything or the only thing, perhaps we shall put that discovery behind us and comprehend, before it is too late, that without freedom all else is nothing."²² Civic education for constitutional democracy, therefore, must include teaching and learning about economic ideas, especially concepts that illuminate the inextricable linkage of markets to free people.

Notes

1. For example, see Judith Staley Brenneke, "The Case for Economic Education," in Judith Staley Brenneke, ed., *An Economy at Risk: Does Anyone Care?* (Atlanta: Georgia State University Press, 1992), pp. 1-17; and Steven L. Miller, *Economic Education for Citizenship* (Bloomington, Indiana: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, 1988), pp. 1-16.

2. Charles F. Bahmueller, ed., *CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic Education* (Calabasas, California: Center for Civic Education, 1991), p. 184. *CIVITAS* devotes major sections to the American economic system and public choice theory (pp. 184-206), among other economic topics.

3. These topics are not suggested as a replacement for distinct economic education programs. Rather, they are offered as ideas from economics essentials to helping young people acquire the competencies requisite to democratic citizenship.

4. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Merston Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Rerry, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

5. I have visited Poland and Bulgaria to consult with educators on how to infuse economic content into civic education courses. As part of EDCP, I have also assisted with establishing five Centers for Civic and Economic Education across Poland. I have also worked closely with Lithuanian educators on the development of civic education programs.

6. Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), p. 1.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

8. Quoted in Thomas Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 370.

9. Throughout the chapter, I make the *ceteris paribus* assumption, i.e., that other factors are held constant.

10. The use of the term "real" in economics generally means "adjusted for inflation." Hence, in the case of wages, salaries, and pensions, the real value is the purchasing power after accounting for inflation.

11. Modern market economies are, in fact, mixed economies in that they contain sizable command components (and often strong elements of tradition). The list of economic decisions by the federal authorities in the United States is long, including taxes, minimum wages, food and drug standards, and so on.

12. See any standard economics textbook, such as William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, *Economics: Principles and Policy* (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), p. 538.

13. For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to describe all of the various market structures that are less than perfectly competitive, e.g., oligopoly. All violate the fundamental assumptions of the perfectly competitive market, most often in the number of firms and homogeneity of products. There is never perfect information. The practical result is usually the same—less quantity and higher prices.

14. *McCulloch v. Maryland* (1819) excerpted in Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., *Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, 1994), p. 60.

15. Lester Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 103-121.

16. There is an entire body of literature in economics devoted to this issue. Space limitations preclude a full discussion here. But following the recognition of the need for government intervention is the necessity for examining how best to reduce pollution and by how much. Economic theory has produced some interesting and controversial ideas here, including the notion that some pollution is usually better than no pollution, that effluent taxes are often better than establishing technical equipment standards, and that a market in pollution waivers might be the most efficient solution to achieving the desired level of pollution.

17. George M. Vredeveld, "The Single European Market and Its Effect on the World," in Steven L. Miller, ed., *European Unification: A Conceptual Guidebook for Educators* (Bloomington, Indiana: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, 1995), p. 113.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Alan S. Blinder, *Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1987), pp. 109-110.

20. Bilateral trade negotiation moves the discussion into the realm of game theory. The "prisoners' dilemma" is an example in which two prisoners, separately interrogated, are likely to both confess, despite the fact that neither can be convicted as long as neither confesses. In a hypothetical trade negotiation, assume two sides (say the U.S. and Japan) are both better off under free trade. Let us say that Japan is restricting U.S. imports of autos and auto parts for internal political reasons. The U.S. might threaten trade restrictions. The Japanese might relent, making both sides better off; they might ignore the threat after which the U.S. will have to either adopt the restrictions (making both sides worse off), or have its bluff called; or the Japanese might adopt counter restrictions, making both sides very much worse off. Thus, depending on the game model employed, an advocate of free trade might argue for restrictions as a negotiating tactic.

21. Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions*, p. 118.

22. G. Warren Nutter, *Political Economy and Freedom: A Collection of Essays* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Press, 1983), p. 19.

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Poland After the Democratic Revolution: Challenges for Civic Education

Marta Zahorska-Bugaj



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3

Poland After the Democratic Revolution: Challenges for Civic Education

Marta Zahorska-Bugaj

The challenges faced by Polish society during its transition to democracy have set the context for the development of new civic education programs such as those conceived by the project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP).¹ This chapter treats optimistic and pessimistic views on the future of Polish democratic society following the euphoric days of triumph over totalitarianism in 1989. Education in this transitional context is explored in relation to continuing practices from the past and to problems faced while striving for a democratic future. Possibilities for new civic education programs to meet this mix of challenges are discussed in the conclusion of the chapter.

Totalitarianism's Last Breath

Poland's Round Table talks began early in 1989. These talks opened the final chapter in Polish society's five decades under the communist government with its totalitarian orientation.

After months of bargaining, the communist authorities under General Wojciech Jaruzelski agreed to discuss systemic political reform with the representatives of the opposition banded together under the name Solidarity (in Polish, *Solidarność*) led by Lech Wałęsa. By agreeing to negotiate, the autocratic authorities gave recognition and legitimacy to the opposition. This agreement was a significant step on the road to democratization in Poland. In many ways, the Round Table talks represented a culmination of Polish society's long struggle against the communist regime.

The ensuing decision to hold new parliamentary elections was one of the most significant outcomes of numerous meetings during which the government and the opposition clashed over their competing visions of Poland's future political system. As the first free election in Poland since World War II drew near, the communist authorities completed legislation that reserved 65 percent of all seats in the Parliament for their representatives. In spite of this legislative protection, the opposition won by a landslide.

From this point forward, the transformations in Poland began to occur at an unprecedented and unexpected rate. Even the world situation favored change. Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of *perestroika* eliminated the threat of Soviet intervention during Poland's political transformation. For the first time since 1939, Poland was freed from the influence of her powerful neighbors.

The Social Context for Civic Education Reform

The downfall of communism became a challenge for political activists, intellectuals, social scientists, and educators in East-Central European countries. They faced the daunting task of establishing the framework for a future social order and outlining the basic, functional rules for this order. During the continuing discussions on the future shape of these societies, two tendencies have emerged. For the sake of simplification, we may call these two tendencies "pessimistic" and "optimistic." The pessimists believe that various barriers will hinder or even prevent the development of democracy. The optimists believe that the introduction of democracy is unlikely to cause any serious problems, particularly in Poland.

The Pessimists' Views

The pessimists' views stem from an analysis of the roles operating in communist societies and the consequences of these roles on the socialization patterns of behavior, values, and attitudes. "Sociological void," a term coined by Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak, has been employed to portray the character of social roles and relationships in communist countries.² Based on his observations of the Polish political and social arena, Nowak set forth the hypothesis that Poles are integrated socially on two extreme levels: on the level of national and religious symbols and on the level of family and friends.

On the first level, Poles perceive the world of political institutions as hostile. Poles strongly identify with nationhood, and they are ready to make the greatest sacrifices for their homeland. They stress the unity and historical traditions of religion (90 percent of Poles are Catholic). These are the values that hold the society together.

On the second level, Poles have strong traditional ties with family and friends. They are willing to demand a great deal from family and friends, but they are also willing to act on their behalf. These groups, on the basis of "face-to-face" relations, create a feeling of security, enable a more or less normal everyday existence, and take the place of ineffective and malfunctioning public institutions.

According to Maria Hirszowicz, these excessively developed, centralized, and politicized institutions were a "communist Leviathan"—a soulless monster having control over the people.³ Getting an apartment, a promotion at work, permission to travel abroad, or having a child accepted to a kindergarten or a university depended on the state's evaluation of the applicant's political attitude. With the exception of a small, very strong-willed group, this enormous machine of bureaucratic administration hindered any possibility of political activism.

Average citizens were affected mainly by the bureaucracy's ineffectiveness in matters of everyday life. In short, the huge bureaucracy isolated the people and largely prevented the development of voluntary groups that could help provide the services and public goods people needed. For all practical purposes, ties of a public character did not exist. There were no trade unions, youth organizations, associations, or foundations generated spontaneously and independently from hierarchical state mandate. Typically, getting the indispensable com-

modities of everyday life was possible only with the help of a network of personal acquaintances. Life under communism was bearable as long as one could depend on such a broad network of personal contacts. These social bonds operated most effectively at the level of friends and family.

Nowak's diagnosis, made as early as the mid-1970s, was confirmed by the sociological descriptions of Polish society that appeared in the 1980s. There was talk of a specific type of "social schizophrenia."⁴ Values accepted in private life were disavowed and discarded in professional and public life. This paradox was interpreted as a tendency to concentrate on the present which, in turn, resulted from a feeling of helplessness in the face of uncontrollable fate.⁵ Social disorganization, anomie, or life strategies aimed mainly at survival were cited by various observers as manifestations of this schizophrenia.⁶

Such social relations formed an ideal background for the development of a personality known as *homo sovieticus*. Russian philosopher Alexander Zinoviev summarized this personality's distinguishing characteristics.⁷ According to Zinoviev, the personality of an individual raised in a communist society has the stigma of submissiveness—particularly to authority—and a resultant lack of responsibility for one's fate. This sort of person sees no sense in planning their activities by themselves. Therefore, they are not promising actors during the transition to democracy.

In addition, the pessimists cite several developments as evidence to support their view that it will be difficult to institutionalize democracy in Poland. First, several surveys have found groups of people who are in favor of rule with an iron fist. While these groups are not large, the most recent surveys indicate they contain people with a university-level education. This is a potentially troubling development because until these recent studies, all the relevant research carried out in Poland since 1960 had demonstrated a clear relationship between support for democratic values and higher levels of education.⁸ Second, support for reform has been dropping. The prestige of democratic institutions such as the legislature or *Sejm* (pronounced "same") and political parties has been declining, and the popularity of the army and the police has been growing. The authority of the state has also been shaken. Lech Walesa, once the unquestioned leader, began to hear vocal displays of dissatisfaction during public meetings. In November 1995, he was voted out of office.

Third, political parties may be more distinct in articulating their platforms, but their popularity continues to be very low. Only an insignificant portion of the society belongs to them.⁹

Fourth, voter turnout has been dropping. During the first parliamentary elections in 1989, over 60 percent of the potential voters participated. Subsequent elections indicate a decline in voter turnout. In fact, the 1994 local council elections saw less than a 40 percent turnout of eligible voters.¹⁰

This growing disillusionment and increasing disinclination toward democratic transformations are captured in public responses to post-communist parties. In Warsaw, and probably elsewhere, one can find wall signs pleading "Come back communism!" In the 1995 election, a former communist leader was elected to the office of President.

The Optimists' Views

The optimists believe that introduction of a democratic system should not be, at least in Polish society, a serious shock. Like the pessimists, the optimists believe the evidence best supports their position. They argue that the totalitarian system lost its model "purity" after Stalin's death in 1953. In the decades that followed, this system underwent a gradual erosion. Society, even though forced into an authoritarian mold, was able to organize and to take care

of its interests. Clubs, committees, and other organizations were formed initially in secret and later in semi-secret. This process culminated in the creation of a legal, mass organization—the Solidarity trade union—which, in effect, was a social movement.

The scope of Solidarity's actions and the degree of social support stimulated by this trade union exceeded greatly the mutiny of slaves that can occur in a totalitarian regime. Solidarity not only fought against the communists, it also formulated an organizational proposal for the future of Polish society: programs for economic transformation, educational reforms, reform of the health care system, and so on. Even the introduction of martial law did not sever the social ties that emerged during this time. These social ties continued in the activities of the underground publishing houses, underground radio, and numerous self-help groups.

As a result, the optimists claim that there are grounds to believe that the foundations of civil society already existed in Poland when communism collapsed. Perhaps Poland was exceptional with respect to the wide scope of the phenomenon, but the optimists note that organizations acting for a democratic society also formed in other communist countries, including the former Soviet Union. Thus the optimists argue that in Poland democratic institutions have been formed and are functioning, and they cite the following developments as evidence to support their view.

First, democracy as a system has been approved by a major portion of the Polish society. Two-thirds of the Poles responding to national surveys agree with the statement that democratic governments are superior to all other forms of government. Only nine percent believe that the country would be better if parliamentary government did not exist. Additionally, no significant group or organization is calling for the overthrow of democracy.¹¹

Second, Polish political life is developing in a positive direction. People are gaining an awareness of party differences. Party platforms have gained greater clarity. These party platforms concentrate on future reforms and not, as was the case, on stressing their achievements in overthrowing communism.

Third, civil society is growing beyond the base established in the 1980s under communism. Local self-governments function throughout Poland. In comparison to many other democratic institutions, they enjoy the greatest and most stable support of the society.¹² Also, many associations and foundations are being established. The Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Forum organized in the summer of 1994 was composed of such groups.

Fourth, people have been taking advantage of the freedom of action offered by democracy. Many newspapers and publishing houses presenting various views continue to emerge.

Five years is a very short period in the life of a society. Yet, this very brief period has witnessed changes on an enormous scale. The institutional framework of a democratic society has clearly developed. The direction of the change is set, or so the optimists believe.

The 1993 Parliamentary Elections

Contradictory evidence over the public acceptance or rejection of democracy in Poland continues to grow. In a way, however, communism has returned. In most post-communist countries, including Poland, former communist parties won the majority of seats in the 1993 parliamentary elections. In a nation-wide survey of public attitudes conducted on the fifth anniversary of the formation of the democratic system in Poland, most of those questioned said that they liked things better under the communist government!

What are the reasons for such a great and general dissatisfaction with the present democratic government? How is it possible that such unpopular political figures from a few years ago could return to power surrounded by glory? Were the pessimists right?

Optimists insist the return to power of the parties with a communist pedigree does not necessarily indicate a downfall of democracy. These parties are functioning in a pluralistic system. They won power through elections and social support rather than through the use of force. Nevertheless, their return is an important sign of a growing disinclination toward the process of transforming the old system. In order to understand these attitudes and the role of education in the formulation and transformation of these attitudes, an analysis of the changes that have taken place on the social scene in the last five years is essential.

The Syndrome of Withdrawal

Democracy surfaced in Poland in 1989. In the process, free elections took place, numerous political parties emerged, and civil rights began to receive legal protection. The institutional framework of democracy was built with widespread social support. Yet, for the democratic system to function properly, the post-communist social vacuum needs to be filled with the dense network of social ties that form a civil society. The development of a civil society is a long-term process that is considerably more difficult than just holding elections.

One question asked frequently in public opinion surveys is: "In your opinion, is there democracy in Poland?" Most respondents answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, the next most frequently asked question, "Do you feel you have any influence over what happens in the country?", tends to elicit a negative answer from most respondents.¹³

While people are encouraged by politicians to take matters into their hands, public activity is hindered greatly by mutual apprehension and by the lack of basic organizational skills. Polish society was wonderfully capable of organizing against the communist enemy. Yet, the creation of a network of relatively permanent arrangements, often based on mutual concessions and compromises for the attainment of practical goals, seems to be an uninspiring activity that does not provide any particular satisfaction. For example, organizing a group of students to distribute the clandestine Solidarity press, despite serious sanctions for such activity under communism, was easier than organizing a typical student magazine in today's Poland.

Volunteer work was discredited by the communists since they organized, through decisions from the top and direct orders, the so-called "volunteer initiatives" during which people were herded into performing civic duties as politically harmless as collecting garbage. Yet, authentic, voluntary civic activity was systematically persecuted. Now, people who are no longer forced into party membership or into demonstrating their support for the authorities in public have withdrawn into private life.

The "withdrawal syndrome" observed by sociologists is also the result of feeling lost and disoriented.¹⁴ After the disappearance of the "red spiders," Poles believed their country would be transformed automatically into a country of plenty similar to the countries in Western Europe and North America. The cataclysm experienced by the Polish economy in the process of changing from a command economy to a free market economy was accompanied by recession, bankruptcies, unemployment, and inflation. These manifestations resulted in the general belief that political elites act in the name of their private interests and not for the public good.

In fact, behavior of politicians departed from the official standards to which people were accustomed under communism. In a recent poll, 70 percent of the electorate believed that public debates, divisions within the parties, coalitions, and differences of opinion among those in power indicated the immaturity of politicians.¹⁵ Only 17 percent of the people surveyed considered such phenomena to be a normal part of democratic political life.

Under communism, rumors were the main source of information about disagreements between Communist Party leaders. Information about any internal disagreements was also

acquired through "reading between the lines" of speeches, or through observing the placement of political figures on podiums. The Parliament used to make decisions unanimously and without prolonged debate. Starting in 1989, the situation changed radically. Since 1989, the greatly disoriented electorate bears witness to a poorly understood spectacle. Yesterday's allies sling "mud" at each other and make alliances with former enemies. The political scene has lost clarity because no one can separate the "good guys" from the "bad guys."

The relationship between the authorities and society is also influenced by the legacy of expectations and attitudes from the previous epoch—particularly the tendency typical of authoritarian systems to perceive the social world in terms of "us" and "them." Once anyone is elected as deputy, city councilor, or mayor, they change from being part of the in-group to being part of the out-group. In the eyes of the public, the newly elected officials will be held fully responsible even for matters over which they have no control. At the same time, elected public officials can expect little cooperation on the part of the public. Every step they take is likely to be accompanied by suspicion of corrupt practice. Lack of deputies and councilors experienced in democratic government is the reason why the authorities, even local authorities, make their decisions without consulting the public. Usually, they follow only their intuition.

In many cases, one must admit that critical attitudes toward governmental representatives are justified. Often acting unwittingly, many members of the current political elite tend to behave in a manner similar to the communist *aparuchiki*. They do not know any other models for performing their duties. The striking lack of a democratic political culture, inadequate organizational capabilities, and awkwardness in social contacts do not help the image of democracy.

The Educational Context for Civic Education Reform

All efforts to reform civic education in Poland must cope with two seemingly contradictory facts. On the one hand, the role and importance of education in Polish society is changing dramatically. On the other hand, key features of the authoritarian Polish educational system developed under communism linger.

The Changing Role of Education

As Poland moves through the transition to democracy, the function served by education in Polish society is evolving in significant ways. Apparently, education is beginning to play a decisive role in becoming "a winner" in post-communist Poland. Under the communists, education was not a vehicle for individual development and upward social and economic mobility. The correlation between the level of income and the level of education was close to zero during the 1970s and 1980s, implying practically no connection between these factors under communism.¹⁶ As Poland enters the mid-1990s, the level of a person's education is emerging as an important predictor of a person's income level. Indeed, as early as 1993 this relationship attained a level typical of Western European countries.¹⁷ Thus in Poland education has clearly been gaining in significance as a determinant of one's social position and life opportunities. The greatest opportunities after the fall of communism are provided by a university-level education. People with a university-level education are not found in the lowest income groups. Unemployment has not drastically affected them. The unemployed are usually people with a grade school or a vocational school education.

The high value of a university-level education results partly from its relative scarcity, as only about seven percent of adult Poles have completed a university-level education. Adding

to this number those who have completed various post-secondary schools, the number doubles, but still accounts for a very low percentage of society.¹⁸ Further, Polish psychologist Janusz Czapinski has found a relationship between level of education and the strategies Poles are employing to cope with the changes being brought about by the transition to democracy and free market economics.

Czapinski notes that with the sort of changes and challenges Poles face today, they tend to adopt one of two strategies. One is the strategy of a porcupine. The other strategy is that of a fox. When a porcupine encounters something unusual, it rolls into a ball, extends its spikes, stops moving, and tries to wait out the unknown. The fox adopts a different approach: it tries to slide through, avoiding threats, but also trying as much as possible to take advantage of the new situation. In Polish society today, who is the porcupine and who is the fox? People with a university-level education are most likely to adopt a fox-like strategy. These people accept the changes and see their future in optimistic terms.¹⁹

Of course, education is not the only factor promoting success. To be young and to live in a large city is helpful. Under these circumstances, one can achieve upward mobility. However, these traits are usually cumulative. Large cities have many times the number of people with a university-level education when compared to the traditional Polish countryside. In the city, the younger generation is better educated than the older generation.

A more important factor that lowers the chances for advancement of those without a university-level education is the poor quality, inappropriate structure, and poor curricula of the lower level schools.²⁰ Although many of these drawbacks also apply to institutions of higher learning, the universities have been able to provide their students with opportunities for individual research and intellectual improvement. No such opportunities were or are provided by the lower-level schools, and almost 70 percent of the general public ended their formal education at this level.

Polish vocational schools were, to a large extent, geared toward developing poorly qualified graduates for employment in state-owned industry. Today, 50 percent of each year's graduates complete such schools.²¹ These schools offer practically no prospects for further education and, because of their narrow focus, make the acquisition of other qualifications virtually impossible. Graduates of these schools have practically no knowledge of the humanities or social sciences. Often having quite a high level of technical skill, these people are unable to "sell" their abilities under the new economic circumstances. The scope of their aspirations and of their professional and personal choices is, therefore, extremely limited.

Proposals for changing the structure of the educational system through making secondary schools more comprehensive (along the lines, for example, of American high schools), are on the mark. Unfortunately, the complete implementation of these proposals will have to wait many years due to Poland's enormous budget deficit. Meanwhile, today's graduates of a lower-level school must know the society in which they live, which circumstances will be conducive to success, and which circumstances will lead to failure. They should be equipped with the basic skills that will enable them to operate in a free-market economy, act in a world of new institutions, and defend their own interests as well as the interests of people with whom they live and work. In other words, they should be able to function effectively in a democratic society.

Evidently, then, Polish schools are now faced with an educational challenge with global economic ramifications. Much has been written about the role of human capital in economic development. A prime example is the role of knowledge and skills in the global economic transformations of Japan and the Asian "Tigers" during the latter half of the twentieth century. In Poland, the low level of education is a great obstacle to such an economic

transformation. Additionally, this situation divides the society into those who have a chance to succeed and those who are without opportunities from the start; those who are capable of understanding the new rules of the political and economic game, and those who can neither understand nor adopt them.

Obstacles to Civic Education: The Authoritarian Lab

The growing importance of education should over the long term provide a more favorable climate for new civic education programs. In the shorter term, however, efforts to create new civic education programs in Poland must cope with the fact that the legacy of communism still exists in the schools in several important ways. This legacy reflects the remnants of authoritarian habits and presents significant challenges to building new instructional programs designed to promote knowledge, skills, and values supportive of a democratic civic culture.

Centralization for Ideological Purposes. A prime example of these habits is the excessive centralization and bureaucratization for which the Polish educational system has been criticized. Both of these phenomena, of course, are a common illness of schools all over the world. Under communism, however, the highly centralized Polish educational system was burdened additionally by ideological tasks. An important official goal of education was the formation of the "socialist individual."

The system of values fostered by schools was, in many instances, contradictory to the convictions generally accepted in Poland. For instance, the history curricula stressed a longtime friendship between the Poles and the Russians that ran counter to the experiences of many generations of Poles. History courses often stood against Catholic religious values and diminished the role of the Church in the past and in the present, which was painfully felt by a society where a great majority was tied so strongly to the Catholic religion.

Also, school curricula tended to promote "socialist" values which, in many instances, were alien or even antagonistic to the values respected by most Poles. This contrived curriculum was supervised closely "from the top." Parents were left with no influence over the education of their children, particularly since the educational system in Poland allowed education only in state-controlled schools.

Nonetheless, many of the goals formulated at the top were not realized. They were rejected by the youth because they were presented in a prefabricated and dull way. They were rejected by many teachers who were required to teach things that were contrary to their knowledge, experience, and convictions.

The schools created a peculiar style of behavior by implementing a curriculum based on strict discipline. Assemblies, gatherings, and parades were attended because one had to go to them, and not because important or interesting things would happen during these events. In a classroom, one had to recite an opinion that everyone in class, including the teacher, knew was absurd. This "double face" of the school had a negative impact on the school's prestige. Officially, the schools had to prepare ideological warriors for the revolution. In reality, they taught conformity.

As a lever to assure social conformity, an overloaded curricula with an enormous amount of unnecessary, yet required, information could always be used to prove the student's lack of knowledge. Memorization is not an enticing intellectual pastime. As a result, boredom and fear were the two feelings experienced most often by Polish students in their school careers.

The Old Civics Courses. A second key impediment to reforming civic education is the mental association evoked by the concept of courses in the social sciences. For five decades,

subjects such as "Civic Education," "Basic Information about Poland and the World Today," or even "Knowledge about Society," a course still present today, served the purpose of indoctrination. They provided a propaganda based on obvious lies and primitive simplifications of Marxist ideology.

These courses were disliked by most teachers and a great majority of students. During periods of reduced political tension, emphasis on these courses decreased, only to increase during periods when the government "tightened the screws." At present, the course on "Knowledge about Society" appears in a rudimentary form: one hour per week in the last year of elementary education, as well as the last year of secondary education. The consequence of many years of teaching communist-style "civic education" is not only the disinclination toward this subject, but also a common belief in the pointlessness of the social sciences in general. The most harmful vestige of the previous system is that many basic concepts necessary for understanding social, economic, and political issues have been deprived of meaning. How can one communicate with another person who learned that "civic education" means indoctrination; a "citizen" is someone who has no influence over the authorities; "democracy" is really a dictatorship; a "politician" is someone who can do as he or she pleases; and the "economy" is an area of society controlled by the state?

At present, a course like "Knowledge about Society" has lost its propagandist *raison d'être*. The teachers are faced with the task of presenting the students with the basic rules concerning the operation of the democratic system and providing explanations for current events. However, polls carried out in schools show that disrespect for this course continues to prevail. Teachers would prefer, for example, that the topics involved in the course be divided among other courses.²² They are usually unwilling to teach this course.

The students also think this subject is uninteresting and treated with neglect by teachers.²³ Nonetheless, the majority of students feel there is a need to have this subject, and they propose that the teachers be better prepared and that appropriate teaching methods be applied. "Knowledge about Society" is evaluated most highly in classes where the teachers, instead of lecturing or dictating notes, encourage the students to hold discussions. Yet, the students admit critically that their lack of knowledge and low interest level in the subject are the reasons why these discussions are not successful.

Teacher Preparation. Apart from other past encumbrances, civic education faces an obstacle in the lack of properly prepared teachers. How can teachers teach democracy if they do not understand the term? Their social and economic knowledge obtained in courses on simplified Marxist theory is inadequate to enable them to describe the reality surrounding them. Teachers also lack the didactic skills needed to teach this subject. Methods of getting students involved in a discussion or other procedures based on active teaching/learning models are not well known and are seldom applied. Other problems arise when teachers try to illustrate and explain democratic mechanisms in the context of a school that operates in an authoritarian way.

Criteria for Successful Responses to the Challenges

A number of efforts are underway in Poland to create new civic education programs of one kind or another. What characteristics should such efforts embody if they are to successfully respond to the challenges described above?

The desired education should encompass knowledge of social relations, legal standards, economic rules, and the principles on which a democratic state operates. Educational programming of this sort should stress the teaching of "skills" or ways of acting in and coping

with various social settings and conditions. This type of teaching should, therefore, be clearly oriented toward practical applications rather than theory. In addition, these programs should be directed at children as well as adults with lower levels of education. Teaching should be done through the development of situations that would approximate, as much as possible, real life situations. The person conducting the courses should not be a traditional, authoritarian teacher, but should perform the role of an experienced partner helping others in overcoming a problem.

The preparation of courses based on such principles would help many people find their place under the new political and social conditions. However, these programs would play their greatest role in education at the lower levels of the educational system—elementary schools, basic vocational schools, and technical schools. At the lower levels of the previous educational system, there was a dramatic deficit of any knowledge concerning social relations. Today, and for many years to come, over 50 percent of Polish youth will end their education at the secondary school tier of the lower level. Therefore, social science propaedeutics alone cannot alleviate this deficit on the lower level.

Creating a simple curriculum with helpful instructions designed to teach students how to function in a democratic society would constitute one chance for the school to act as a change agent during Poland's transition from communism. If it would be a useful and practical program, accusations of indoctrination would fade. In addition to this practical approach, the curriculum would aid in realizing values by helping young people become informed citizens, who would be aware of their rights and know how to take advantage of these rights.

A paper on the methods of implementing a program that "realizes the ideas of a civil society" most successfully was presented during the Ninth Sociological Congress.²⁴ This paper, entitled "Education in a Democratic Society," described a project implemented with the help of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University.²⁵ A similar view was presented in Holly's discussion of a study concerning the extent of political awareness in Polish youth.²⁶

Conclusions

The optimists were right to expect the effective introduction of democratic institutions in Poland. Despite a gap of 50 years (1939-1989), and despite the authoritarian orientation during the period between the World Wars, the democratically organized Parliament began to operate. Further, many political parties formed, the free press came into being, television freed itself from the control of the authorities, and great authority was attained by the position of the ombudsman. After experiencing several years of democracy, a return to an authoritarian or totalitarian regime seems impossible.

Yet, one should not underestimate or dismiss the warnings of the pessimists. Democratic institutions are functioning, but often in a social vacuum with little involvement on the part of the citizens. The obstacle course separating the present society from a fully democratic society is still very long and extremely difficult.

Our duty is to analyze the obstacles that are forming or which may form during the system's transformation. That there are so many of these obstacles should come as no surprise. Some of them are remnants of the previous system. Others stem from dynamics inherent to the democratic system.

The operation of authoritarian systems is simpler because they do not have to consider social attitudes and opinions to the same extent as does a democratic system. The creation of a democracy requires a constant balancing act between planned reforms and social accep-

tance. There exists a real danger of halting the reforms if a certain threshold of social endurance is exceeded.

The factor that may partially mitigate the great costs of reform paid by the society may come from change in the educational system. The growing role of education in determining life opportunities will necessitate a restructuring of the educational system and changes in outdated education programs. Competition in the labor market is already forcing the teachers to gain additional qualifications.

An important element that may help to protect future generations from the drama experienced by their parents is knowledge of the rules directing political and economic life in a transitional democratic system. Unfortunately, these rules cannot be passed on by parents since they do not have this knowledge. Appropriate civic education programs, although burdened by stereotypes from the past, should be used to provide young people with such an opportunity.

Notes

1. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.
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3. Maria Hirszowicz, *The Bureaucratic Leviathan: A Study in the Sociology of Communism* (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
4. Mirosława Marody, "Antynomie Społecznej Świadomości," *Odra* 1 (1987).
5. Elżbieta Tarkowska, "Uncertainty of Future and Domination of Presentist Orientation: New Lasting Phenomenos?" *Sisyphus* 4 (1989): 175-88.
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12. CBOS, "Instytucje Publiczne w Opinii Społeczeństwa," *CBOS* (Warszawa) 1 (July 1994).
13. Starzynski, "Społeczna Akceptacja."
14. CBOS, "Zainteresowanie Polityką i Postawy Obywatelskiej Bierności," *CBOS* (Warszawa), (November 1994).
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16. Michał Póhowski and Jerzy Lissowski, "Ocena Dochodów," *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 4 (1987).
17. Henryk Domański, "Nowe Mechanizmy Stratyfikacyjne," *Studia Socjologiczne* 1 (1994).
18. Rocznik Statystyczny Szkolnictwa 1993/94 (Warszawa: Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, 1994): 3.
19. Mirosława Marody, "W Poszukiwaniu Zbiorowego Sensu," *Polityka* 42 (1993).
20. Władysław Adamki, *Edukacja W Okresie Transformacji* (Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk i PiS, 1993).

21. Rocznik Statystyczny Szkolnictwa, 15.
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23. Monika Majerska, "'Wiedza o Społeczeństwie' - za i Przeciw," *Społeczeństwo Otwarte* 8 (1992). For further discussion see Monika Sajkowska, "Raport of Stanie WOS," *Społeczeństwo Otwarte* 11, (1993).
24. Dariusz Ślusarz, "Problematyka Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego w Aktualnych Programach Nauczania 'Wiedzy o Społeczeństwie,'" Paper presented at the Ninth Sociological Congress, Lublin, 1994.
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4

Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland: Activities and Assumptions

Richard C. Remy and Jacek Strzemieczny



4

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4

Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland: Activities and Assumptions

Richard C. Remy and Jacek Strzemieczny

The overthrow of communist regimes in Poland and other nations of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 posed an unprecedented challenge and opportunity for civic educators. As educational reformers in the region began trying to build new civic education programs that could support democracy, they turned, in part, to the United States for assistance in overcoming an imposing array of obstacles left by the long night of communist despotism. These obstacles included the lack of classroom instructional materials, teachers with little or no understanding of democracy and no training in appropriate pedagogical techniques, teacher educators who themselves were ill-equipped to teach about self-government, and educational administrators with no professional training and little understanding of the implications of democracy for the operation of schools. Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created in response to such needs at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education. EDCP began as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. The Mershon Center is a multidisciplinary organization concerned with research and education related to national security, world affairs, and democratic citizenship. Since its inception, EDCP has expanded to include as the major new collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. The co-authors of this chapter initiated EDCP and serve as Co-Directors. In what follows we describe EDCP's creation, summarize the initial and subsequent projects that comprise EDCP, and set forth the key assumptions that have guided this effort at civic education.

Creating Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland

EDCP began in February 1991 when Richard Remy visited Poland at the request of Jacek Strzemieczny, then Director of Teacher Training for the Ministry of National Education, to consult with officials on the possibilities for civic education in Poland. At the time, the Ministry had identified civic education as one of the top educational priorities in Poland. By

Spring 1991, a long-term plan for EDCP had been devised by Remy in close collaboration with Polish colleagues and efforts to secure funds to implement the plan were underway.¹ In August 1991 Dr. E. Gordon Gee, President of The Ohio State University, visited Poland and formally initiated EDCP when he presented a Proclamation to the Minister of Education, Dr. Robert Głębocki, pledging the University's commitment to the effort. (See Appendix 2 for the Proclamation.)

EDCP Goals and Objectives

The original plan for EDCP set forth the following long-term goals:

- To enhance the capacity of Polish educators to develop their own civic education programs in the future.
- To use American expertise and resources in civic education to help Polish educators meet immediate needs they identified.
- To contribute to a national dialogue amongst Polish teachers, educational leaders, and university scholars on democratic citizenship and civic education.
- To build strong and continuing linkages between leading civic educators in the United States and Poland.²

We subsequently added to this list the goal of institutionalizing civic education in all schools in Poland during the next decade.

The plan we developed proposed four distinct but related projects that would respond to specific, urgent problems identified by the Poles, such as the desperate need for new teaching materials. At the same time we tried to design each of these projects so they would also contribute to EDCP's long-term goals. The four projects we initiated are summarized below and analyzed in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this book.

Funding for EDCP Projects

At the start of EDCP, the Ministry of National Education pledged to cover in-country expenses to the extent possible for Polish and American participants. For its part, the Mershon Center pledged to try to secure American financial support for EDCP. No agency was able or willing to provide the funds needed to simultaneously undertake the four projects proposed in our original plan. Hence, we sought funding from different sources for each project and began to proceed as best we could with the resources available to us at any given time.

As it turned out, the United States Information Agency (USIA), the National Endowment for Democracy, and The Pew Charitable Trusts have been the major American sources of financial support for EDCP projects. In addition, the Mershon Center has provided financial support as well as invaluable help in the form of graduate research assistants, secretarial staff, computer word processing, travel expenses, and office and conference facilities.

The Stefan Batory Foundation, the European Community, and most recently local government authorities across Poland have also contributed financial support for various EDCP projects. In addition, the Central Center for Teacher Training, an independent agency within the Polish system of teacher education overseen by the Ministry of National Education, has provided invaluable technical support in Poland, including the publication of EDCP's instructional products.

Four Initial Projects

The four projects called for in the original plan for EDCP were (1) development of civic education curriculum guidelines for primary and secondary schools, (2) development of a teacher training syllabus, (3) creation of a primary school civics course, and (4) establishment of a network of centers for civic and economic education. These projects have been successfully completed and are summarized below. Chapter 11 presents an assessment of each of these projects.

Curriculum Guide for Civic Education

Twenty-five Polish educators working in Poland with American civic educators developed a curriculum guide consisting of three documents.⁴ The first document sketches the rationale, goals, objectives, and content outlines for a primary school and secondary school civics curriculum. One supporting book presents sixteen sample lesson plans illustrating topics and goals and objectives set forth in the curriculum guide. A second book consists of 36 readings on political life, citizenship, and human rights by prominent Polish social scientists and political activists. The readings provide background information on key topics set forth in the guide. This project was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.

Primary School Civics Course

Eight Polish educators in residence at the Mershon Center from September 1992 to February 1993 developed an 82-lesson civics course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, for primary schools (grades 6-8). (See Appendix 3 for a description of the Polish educational system.) Each lesson contains step-by-step instructions for the teacher and materials for the students, such as case-studies, decision-trees, maps and charts, primary sources, and the like. The lessons are organized into seven units on such topics as "Principles of Democracy," "Human Rights and Freedoms," and "The Free Market Economy." The course has been approved by the Ministry of National Education as a replacement for previous courses. In 1995 a second edition of the course containing 100 lessons was published. (See Appendix 2 for the table of contents for the course.) This project was funded by the United States Information Agency. Chapter 5 describes the procedure used to develop this course.

Course Plan for Preservice Teacher Education

Polish teacher educators and university professors in residence at the Mershon Center from September through December 1992 prepared a plan for a two-semester course, "The School in Democratic Society," on the principles of democracy as they apply to the organization and operation of schools. The course plan is organized around seven topics, including "Student Rights and Responsibilities," "Schools and The Local Community," and "The Role of Schools in a Democratic Society." The plan presents goals, background information, suggested readings, and sample teaching strategies for each topic. (See Appendix 2 for the table of contents.) This project was supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Chapter 7 analyzes the development of this course plan.

Network of Centers for Civic and Economic Education

In early 1993 we established five Centers for Civic and Economic Education in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Kraków, Lublin, and Wrocław. They were later followed by two additional Centers

located in Olsztyn and Krosno. The Centers undertake professional development activities such as conferences and workshops on EDCP's primary school civics course as well as on other topics related to civic education. The primary purpose of the Centers is to provide a coordinated support system for educators and schools across Poland that are implementing new programs in civic education for democracy. This project has been supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. Chapter 6 presents an in-depth description of the efforts to create the Centers.

Additional Civic Education Projects

EDCP has evolved into a very dynamic enterprise. The success of the initial projects created the demand and opportunity for additional civic education activities involving Polish-American collaboration. In this section we summarize new EDCP projects not proposed in our original plan. These new activities have built upon the people, ideas, and materials developed in EDCP's original projects. As with the initial projects, the new projects have their own objectives while at the same time they are designed to contribute to the EDCP's long-term goals.

Center for Citizenship Education

In Spring 1994, the Polish Co-Director of EDCP established the Center for Citizenship Education (CCE) as a non-governmental, not-for-profit organizational base for EDCP in Poland. Located in Warsaw, CCE works with the network of Centers for Civic and Economic Education as a kind of lead center that initiates civic education projects of national scope. CCE also undertakes civic education projects that collaborate with, but are independent of, EDCP activities.

Civic Education in Local Government Schools

As part of educational reform in Poland, local governments have gained the opportunity to control and finance the schools in their jurisdiction.⁴ This project enlists the support of local governments for implementation of EDCP's primary school civics course. Local governments agree to pay teachers for the additional hours of teaching required by the new civics course. In return, CCE and the Centers for Civic and Economic Education train the teachers in how to use the course and provide course materials. The program was successfully pilot-tested in 51 schools run by 19 local governments during the 1994-95 school year. Moreover, the Center received applications from an additional 150 local governments for the 1995-96 school year. Currently, nearly 30,000 students in over 1,000 primary school classrooms in 300 schools are participating in the EDCP's primary civics course. The National Endowment of Democracy, United States Information Agency, and the *Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme* of the European Union have provided major support.

Teaching Constitutionalism in Secondary Schools

Understanding the meaning of constitutional government and the role of citizens in maintaining such government is essential for democratic citizens. In 1995, CCE began a three-year in-service teacher education and curriculum development project on teaching about constitutionalism in secondary schools. With the collaboration of the American Council of

Learned Societies and financial support from the Pew Charitable Trusts, the project is conducting in-depth courses, seminars, and short workshops for secondary school teachers on such topics as the meaning of constitutional democracy, the application of democratic principles to school life, and "active" pedagogical strategies. In 1995, over 300 teachers participated in these activities. This project is also sponsoring local, regional and national student debates on constitutional issues. Simultaneously, the project will develop a course on constitutional democracy for use in secondary schools that includes lessons modeled after the EDCP primary school civics course. National implementation of the new course will involve cooperation with local governments.

Secondary School Course on Constitutionalism

In June 1995 EDCP received a grant from the United States Information Agency to develop course materials for secondary school civic education in Poland that will draw upon the curriculum guide developed by EDCP, complement EDCP's primary school civics course, and add to the secondary school materials being developed by CCE as part of its project on constitutionalism. A team of Polish educators spent three months at The Ohio State University developing a draft course through a curriculum seminar process similar to the type used to develop the primary school civics course. This curriculum seminar was conducted by Richard C. Remy. The Polish team returned to Poland and conducted introductory training for a group of Polish teachers, the initial users of the draft materials.

Civis Polonus: A Close-Up Look at Polish Politics and Government

Some members of the Polish team who developed EDCP's primary school civics course have worked with Polish educators and politicians to create a program that brings students and their teachers from across Poland to Warsaw annually to meet government leaders and observe political activities first-hand. A first for Poland, *Civis Polonus* (Polish Citizen), is modeled on programs like those conducted by the Close-Up Foundation in the United States of America. The first program took place in July 1994 with students engaging in discussions with policy-makers, visiting key institutions of national government, and participating in a simulation of the role of the Polish Senate. The Mershon Center and United States Information Agency have provided partial support.

Young People Vote

In the Presidential Election of 1995, the Center for Citizenship Education involved students from approximately 100 secondary and over 200 primary schools in nationally recognized mock elections. This program, called "Young People Vote" (*Młodzi Głosują*), was inspired by the American Program "Kids Voting." The program consists of two components: theoretical and practical. Prior to the actual elections, the program teaches lessons that emphasize voter participation and the citizen's role in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. It also organizes national, regional, and local youth committees which conduct parallel electoral activities for students at elementary and secondary schools on the candidates in state elections. The students administer the election, tally the votes, and report the results to the National Youth Electoral Committee (NYEC). The results of the student elections are reported nationally with the results from the actual state elections.

Research on Civic Education and Political Socialization

A multidisciplinary team of Polish and American social scientists and educators have begun what is hoped will become a long-term research program on political socialization that examines the impact of Polish efforts to establish new programs of citizenship education. Initial steps have included an analysis of existing Polish data sets on political socialization in conjunction with a survey of a sample of teachers and students using the EDCP primary school civics course, the preparation of working papers on research methodology for assessing civic education, a small conference in Warsaw, and the preparation of case-studies on civic education reform. The Mershon Center provided initial support. (See Chapter 10 for an example of this work.)

Key Assumptions Behind EDCP

Several assumptions have shaped our thinking about the design and implementation of EDCP. These assumptions were present from the very start of this effort although not all were fully articulated at the beginning of our work together. We summarize them here as a guide to basic ideas that, in our judgment, need to be shared by participants in successful cross-national collaboration on civic education for democracy. While some of these ideas may seem obvious in theory, making them an integral part of practice is a challenge.

American Participants as Facilitators

Perhaps our most fundamental assumption is that the role of American educators in EDCP is to make ideas, materials, and experiences from the U.S. available to Polish colleagues who will take the lead in developing their own civic education programs. American participation in EDCP has been aimed at creating independence rather than dependence. It seeks to enhance the capacity of Polish colleagues to cope more satisfactorily with their own agendas and problems regarding civic education.

Put another way, from the very beginning we have always assumed that American civic educators could not and should not prepare materials, courses, or other instructional products for Polish teachers and students, nor would the Poles want them to do so. Rather, the Americans have sought to facilitate Polish understanding of and access to the U.S. experience with civic education as they sought to prepare programs suitable to Polish history, culture, and priorities.

American Experience Useful

The previous assumption, in turn, implies that the United States has something to offer Poland, as well as other nations of Central and Eastern Europe, with respect to building democratic civic education programs. While this idea might seem obvious to many, some have challenged this notion.⁷ Nonetheless, Poles and other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe recognize that from their founding era to the present, prominent Americans have believed in the universality—the global applicability—of their civic principles and political order. From Thomas Jefferson to Woodrow Wilson to the present, Americans have championed the world-wide spread of constitutional democracy and human rights.

In addition, the United States has had a unique experience with civic education from which to draw. Unlike other countries around the world that have built a nation-state based

on kinship and place, Americans had to develop by necessity a nation-state that is based upon a community of principle, which had to be nurtured through civic education. It is not surprising, then, that Poles and other peoples of former communist countries have looked to America for ideas and practices to assist their efforts to develop democracy.

Thus, from the outset we have believed that information about the meaning and practice of democracy drawn from the American experience could be of value to Polish educators. Further, we believed that techniques used by American civic educators for the development, implementation, and evaluation of civic and economic education programs and curriculum could be relevant to Poland. Such techniques include how to draw upon basic scholarship in the humanities and social sciences to create for young people instructional materials that employ active teaching/learning strategies. Finally, we believed that lessons learned from the successes and failures of American educators in their promotion of educational change might be useful as could the American experience with the democratic governance of schooling through local control.

Finally, we must note a complementary assumption. From the very outset we have assumed that learning would be reciprocal. Americans could, and would, learn a good deal about education for democratic citizenship in the United States of America from their interactions with Polish colleagues.

R. Freeman Butts, the distinguished historian of American education, put the entire matter under discussion here succinctly when he noted recently:

No one model of democracy will fit all nations. No single pattern should be imposed by one people upon another. But . . . we can learn from those who have long lived under tyranny and terrorism. They understand and appreciate the value of freedom and civic community. They can learn much from our long experience with a sturdy and stable democracy.⁵

Participatory Approach to Educational Change

We further assumed that it was essential to avoid using a top down model for civic education reform that had as its driving force a central ministry issuing orders to those in the schools. While we have never hesitated to try taking advantage of the leverage for change that official channels and institutions can sometimes provide, we have always believed that the support and sense of ownership of new civic education ideas and practices by teachers at the classroom level were absolutely essential to long-term success. This in turn implied the need to involve classroom teachers in all phases of EDCP. Support for and ownership of new ideas could develop only if people had the opportunity to participate in various ways in creating programs that embodied the new ideas.

Schools Have Key Function

We have also assumed that civic education in the schools has a critically important function in building democracy in Poland as well as other nations of Central and Eastern Europe. This assumption, in turn, rests on the proposition that schools can be an effective vehicle for delivering civic education to people, thereby enhancing civic competence.⁶ While civic education in and of itself is certainly not a sufficient condition to create democracy, especially in the short-term, it can facilitate the transition to constitutional democracy and a market economy, and it is an absolutely essential condition in the long term to creating a civic cul-

ture that will sustain constitutional democracy. Bronisław Geremek, a distinguished historian and Solidarity leader, describes the long-term process well:

The destruction of communism and the recovery of freedom are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the birth of democracy. Democracies are built only over time, through the forming and functioning of democratic institutions . . . through the growth of democratic political culture. The process is one of gradual maturation, of both democracy itself and of people in the ways of democracy.¹⁰

Instructional Materials Essential

Another basic assumption supporting EDCP is that the preparation of conceptually sophisticated but simple and appealing instructional materials that teachers can use with their students on a daily basis is an absolutely necessary, if not totally sufficient, condition for building civic education in Poland. Such materials should embody both new ideas about constitutionalism and democracy and a variety of active instructional strategies. Reasons for the importance of curriculum development are described in more detail in Chapter 5.

The development of innovative instructional materials that blend concepts and facts from the best scholarship available with practical, appealing teaching procedures is a technical, complex, and time-consuming process. Key steps include design, the preparation of prototype lessons, review of prototypes and design changes, the creation of a complete draft, critical review of the draft by scholars for content validity and by teachers for pedagogical validity, revising and editing, and publication. Ideally, the steps in curriculum development are correlated with an on-going series of teacher training activities designed to involve teachers in the process in ways that give them a sense of ownership in the materials being developed, an ability to use the new materials skillfully in their own classrooms, and the capacity to train their peers in how to use the materials.

We further assumed that the instructional materials we developed would not only serve the purpose of helping students learn democratic ideas and skills, but could also increase the knowledge and skills of the teachers using the materials. No curriculum teaches itself; teachers must interpret and apply instructional materials to suit their particular context. If instructional materials are creative and designed to take this fact into account, they can serve a dual purpose. Elliot Eisner calls this process "amplification." He explains:

The major function of creative curriculum materials is to amplify the teacher's skills, not to constrain them. . . . Good curriculum materials provide resources that amplify the teacher's ability, given the circumstances in which he or she works. Amplification contains the idea that good curriculum development not only teaches students, it helps the teachers learn as well.¹¹

Creating instructional materials to achieve amplification was especially important in Poland, where teachers are untrained and inexperienced with civic education, and where there is a lack of support services for civic education in their schools. With this assumption in mind, our strategy was not to wait for the next generation of teachers who might or might not be better equipped to teach about democracy, but rather to educate the teachers already in place through the materials we created for their students.

Importance of Market Economics

Another assumption explicit from the very start of EDCP has been that concepts and ideas about free-market economics should be infused into EDCP activities and products for two reasons. First, we view the development of democracy and freedom and a market economy as intertwined. Put another way, we assume it is important for Polish teachers and students to learn about the close relationship between political and economic freedom. Second, the complete lack of attention to economic education in Polish schools created the need to use our civic education activities to also promote teaching and learning about market economics. This assumption is manifested in several ways throughout EDCP. For example, we created Centers for Civic and Economic Education, and the EDCP primary school civics course has a unit on "The Free Market Economy" as well as economic concepts in other lessons.

A Transparent, Open Process

From the very beginning we have also assumed that the processes we used to build civic education programs were as important as the "solutions" at which we arrived. We believe these processes should be open, visible, and accessible to involvement by those interested in civic education, and to critical analyses. Thus, we have tried to make sure that anyone interested in participating in EDCP could have an opportunity to do so in some fashion or another. In December 1993, for example, EDCP held a conference in Jachranka, Poland that brought over 200 educators and scholars from across Poland to review and critique EDCP materials created up to that point.

It is likely in a dynamic enterprise of this scale that—with limited budgets and staff—we have met this assumption imperfectly. However, we believe it would be incongruous at best if a major effort to build civic education for democracy were an elitist, closed enterprise. Indeed, openness is instrumental to one of EDCP's long-term goals, which is to contribute to a national dialogue among Polish teachers, educational leaders, and university scholars on democratic citizenship and civic education.

Long-Term Professional Commitment

Finally, those most closely associated with EDCP have all made long-term, professional commitments to the effort rather than viewing the project as an interesting but fleeting activity. We have made the development of civic education programs in Poland a major part of our own professional agendas with the understanding that in doing so we must foreclose on certain other professional activities. We mention this to highlight two points relevant to other efforts on civic education in the region. First, successful efforts will require a core of people willing to invest significant amounts of time and energy over an extended period. Consultants who dip in and out of such projects for a special purpose can, of course, bring invaluable expertise to bear, but they are no substitute for a core of people on both sides of the Atlantic who push the effort forward month after month and year after year. Second, educational change pursued democratically and under conditions of scarce resources is inevitably a long-term process, but one we believe can yield significant benefits to citizens and their *civitas*.

Notes

1. Richard C. Remy, "Education for Democracy Project," a proposal from the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, June 1991).
2. Remy, "Education for Democracy," pp. 2-3.
3. The EDCP curriculum guide consists of three documents as follows: *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools* (available in English) which presents a rationale, objectives, and content outlines for a primary and a secondary school civics course; *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans* (in Polish) which presents sixteen lesson plans that illustrate how one might teach particular topics in primary and secondary school; *Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers* (in Polish) which presents articles by prominent Polish scholars on the topics recommended for primary and secondary school. See Appendix I for full citations and availability of these documents.
4. For a summary description of this process see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Education Reform in Poland," *Social Issues* 3 (January 21, 1994): 43-47.
5. Jacek Kowalski, Jacek Królikowski, Tomasz Masny, and Cezary Trutkowski, program proposal for "Civis Polonus: Propozycja Aktywności Obywatelskiej wśród Młodzieży," (Warsaw, Poland: Center for Civic Education, 1994).
6. For a description of the program, contact Kids Voting, Inc., 398 South Mill Avenue, Suite 304, Tempe, Arizona, 85281. See also, Matthew Gandal and Chester E. Finn, Jr. "Teaching Democracy," in *Freedom Papers Series*, Wayne Hall, ed., (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, October 1992), p. 6.
7. See, for example, Jacques Barzun, "Is Democratic Theory for Export?" *Ethics and International Affairs* 1 (1987): 53-71. For a somewhat different view of this issue see Graham Allison and Robert Beschel, "Can the United States Promote Democracy?" in Charles Wolfe, Jr., ed., *Promoting Democracy and Free Markets in Eastern Europe*. (San Francisco, California: A Sequoia Seminar, ICS Press, 1992), pp. 81-117.
8. R. Freeman Butts, "Many Blueprints for Democracy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Friday, June 23, 1995: 18.
9. Not all would agree with this proposition. See, for example, Stephen P. Hyneman, "America's Most Precious Export," *The American School Board Journal* 182 (March 1995): 23-26.
10. Bronislaw Geremek, "Civil Society Then and Now," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (April 1992): 9.
11. Elliot W. Eisner, "A Development Agenda: Creative Curriculum Development and Practice," *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision* 6 (Fall 1990): 67.

5

The Curriculum Seminar: A Strategy for Developing Instructional Materials

Richard C. Remy



5

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5

The Curriculum Seminar: A Strategy for Developing Instructional Materials

Richard C. Remy

The revolutions of 1989 that brought down the communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe have created a pressing need to develop civic education instructional materials for elementary and secondary schools. New teaching materials are needed to replace those used in existing courses and to serve as the basis for entirely new courses on democracy. The previous approaches to this subject were marked by lecture and recitation of approved communist ideology aimed at developing passive citizens in the mold of the "new Soviet man."

Along with this need has come a seemingly intractable dilemma. Cut off from knowledge of history and the social sciences, from current ideas on teaching and learning, and from direct personal experience with democracy, Central and Eastern European educators working alone have a limited capacity to develop new instructional materials for civic education. By the same token, American civic educators have relevant knowledge and experience, but, for cultural and political reasons, they have neither the ability nor the desire to develop materials for other countries. Nor can most American civic educators spend extended periods of time abroad working with Central and Eastern European colleagues.

The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) faced this dilemma squarely in early 1991 when the Polish Ministry of National Education stated that development of new instructional materials for civics was one of the nation's highest educational priorities.¹ In response, we created a process for developing instructional materials called a curriculum seminar.² This process was used by EDCP to develop *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, a successful new primary school civics course for Poland, and "The School in Democratic Society," a preservice teacher education course.³ This chapter describes the curriculum seminar process with the hope that this approach may be useful to other civic educators facing the curriculum development dilemma noted here.

Components of a Curriculum Seminar

The plan for EDCP, prepared in early 1991, called for the development of a primary school civics course and a preservice teacher education course plan.⁴ This plan reflected the vital need in Poland for new civic education instructional materials. These objectives required confronting the dilemma noted above. Polish educators were not ready to develop such new courses by themselves; the Americans were not able to do it for them, nor did the Poles want them to do so. We created the curriculum seminar to deal with this conundrum.

The curriculum seminar is a process designed to place a group of participants in an enriched environment that brings together, over an extended period of time, the resources necessary to help the participants accomplish a clearly specified instructional development task. As I use the term here, a curriculum seminar is a practical exercise, not a theoretical study attempting to explain an existential phenomenon.⁵ The goal of a curriculum seminar is to develop a new educational product that will improve instruction in schools.

As part of EDCP we conducted two curriculum seminars at the Mershon Center beginning in 1992. Eight Polish teachers were in residence at the Mershon Center for five months (September 1992 through January 1993) in order to prepare the first draft of a primary school civics course.⁶ In addition, five Polish university teacher educators were in residence at the Mershon Center for four months (September 1992 through December 1992) in order to prepare the first draft of a preservice teacher education course.⁷ The syllabi for both curriculum seminars are presented in Appendix 2. In both cases, upon completion of the curriculum seminars, the participants returned to Poland where the draft materials were reviewed, field-tested, and revised prior to publication.

Three related but distinct types of activity form the major components of a curriculum seminar. The first is in-depth professional development for participants on the subject matter of the materials to be developed and on relevant pedagogical techniques. The second is the participants' writing of instructional materials. The third is weekly meetings with the participants, the seminar director, and others for feedback and reflection upon progress in accomplishing the task. In addition, certain steps need to be followed prior to and after the seminar itself.


Professional Development

This component of a curriculum seminar is very focused and aims to enhance the capacity of the participants to accomplish the specific task at hand by making use of leading specialists and relevant field experiences. The syllabus for the curriculum seminar that developed the primary school civics course shows, for instance, that the seminar included intensive two- to four-day training sessions on key topics, such as law-related education, economics, and teaching decision-making skills. Professional development activities also included fieldwork, such as school visits, participation in professional meetings, and observation of relevant university courses.

Writing Instructional Materials

Participants in a curriculum seminar know from the outset that they are expected to produce a written product in the form of instructional materials. Thus, significant portions of seminar time are allocated to writing. In the Polish case, participants were provided by the Mershon Center with office space, computers for word processing, and technical assistance. In addition, we assembled a large collection of exemplary instructional materials, primary

 Professional Development and Writing in a Curriculum Seminar



sources, and readings upon which the participants could draw as they began their writing. Although all the Polish educators could read, speak, and comprehend English (a requirement for seminar participation because the Americans could not speak Polish), they wrote in Polish. Samples of their writing were translated into English. Thus, the seminar director and consultants could monitor progress and provide continuing assistance.

Seminar participants may work on the writing component individually or in small groups or some combination thereof. In the two Polish seminars the participants, in consultation with the seminar director, chose to divide up writing responsibilities by matching individual interests and specialties with key topics in the courses to be created.

During the early phase of a curriculum seminar the emphasis is on professional development with relatively little time left for writing. As the seminar proceeds, the time devoted to professional development steadily declines and the time devoted to writing increases. As the conclusion of the seminar draws near, the participants are spending nearly all their time writing instructional materials. The relationship between these two components over time is shown in the figure above.

Reflective Feedback

The third component of a curriculum seminar is reflective feedback on the progress of the seminar provided by regular, usually weekly, meetings of the seminar participants with the director. As the syllabi for the two EDCP curriculum seminars show, throughout the seminars the participants met weekly with the seminar director and staff. This provided an important opportunity for the participants to raise questions, to share ideas, and to help plan future seminar activities.

Pre- and Post-Seminar Activities

A curriculum seminar conducted in the United States with Central and Eastern European participants may be preceded by several activities in the target country. The seminar must be followed by activities in the target country that will insure completion of the highest quality product possible.

Pre-Seminar Steps. The Central European partner should recruit and select the seminar participants in consultation with the American curriculum seminar team. In addition, pre-seminar steps could include one or more training sessions for the seminar participants before their departure for the United States. American seminar faculty might participate if funds permit. Such sessions can help promote participants' understanding of the product development goal. The participants might also be given readings and other materials to help orient them to relevant subject matter and pedagogy. Finally, participants should be encouraged to collect and bring with them local materials that will help them with their writing assignments. Such materials might include primary documents, newspaper and magazine articles, and data from sources not readily available in the United States.

Post-Seminar Activities. Successful completion of the curriculum seminar does not mean development of the instructional product is finished. The curriculum seminar should yield a complete set of first-draft materials. Upon their return home the seminar participants, who now are highly trained, can assist with the evaluation, field-testing, and final revision of the materials.

The draft instructional materials should be edited and reproduced in an inexpensive format suitable for field-testing and evaluation by scholars and educators. The exact nature of this process will depend upon the type of product developed. Whatever the product, scholars and educators should assess the extent to which the materials are factually accurate and represent a balanced, non-partisan approach to the subject matter.

The American curriculum seminar team can also participate productively in post-seminar activities, if translations of the materials or a sample thereof are provided. By virtue of having conducted the seminar, the American team will be very familiar with the product as well as the intentions and goals of their European colleagues. As a result, they can review selected materials translated into English and contribute expertise to professional development activities aimed at disseminating the new product in the partner country.

Key Characteristics

Curriculum seminars may vary somewhat in length, number of participants, and task to be accomplished. However, our experience with two curriculum seminars suggests there are several features which must be present if such an enterprise is to be successful.

Product Development Goal

The single most important characteristic of a curriculum seminar is to have as the foremost goal the creation of a very clearly defined, focused instructional product. The EDCP seminars, for example, sought in one case to develop classroom lessons for a primary school civics course and, in the other, a detailed syllabus for a two-semester college course. A strong commitment to such product goals must be shared by all participants. Further, seminar consultants must be aware of the product goal, so they can tailor the ideas and materials they offer to attaining that goal.

It would be hard to overstate the importance of a product orientation in conducting a successful seminar. The goal of actually creating an instructional product during the seminar provides the guiding criterion in terms of which all other decisions regarding the design and conduct of the seminar are made. Choices regarding consultants, for instance, are conditioned by the nature of the product to be developed, as are decisions about relevant field

experiences. The value of all seminar activities is judged in terms of the extent to which they contribute to the development of the product. Activities are excluded or included on the basis of judgments about the degree to which they contribute to product development.

When the curriculum seminar is a cross-cultural experience, as the Polish seminars were, the product development goal—shared by all participants—is the characteristic that sharply distinguishes a curriculum seminar from most other cross-cultural programs such as study tours, exchange programs, and the like. The product orientation provides a lens or filter that can help participants select from the vast array of cross-cultural experiences those most relevant to their needs. (See Chapter 8 for an in-depth analysis of this point.)

Flexibility

As a seminar progresses, the ability to make adjustments to take into account unanticipated events or problems, new ideas, rapid or slow progress, and the like is essential. The syllabi for the two Polish curriculum seminars shown in Appendix 2 are final versions completed near the end of each seminar. The original syllabi were nearly as detailed, but they were modified numerous times as each seminar progressed.

The need for flexibility does not contradict a clear product development goal. All involved in a curriculum seminar must be able to make adjustments to insure that the product is developed. If work on product development indicates more information on a certain topic is needed, a consultant or materials must be found to provide the information. If development of the product is progressing more slowly than anticipated, activities planned for the future must be modified. If the participants decide more field experiences would help them with product development, adjustments should be made to provide such experiences.

Flexibility applies to the product development goal itself. Up to a certain point, it is possible and may be necessary to modify expectations regarding the product to be developed to take into account the learning that occurs in the professional development phase of the seminar. The curriculum seminar for EDCP's primary school civics course is a case in point. At the start of that seminar the goal was to develop a textbook for a primary school civics course. As the seminar evolved, progress was slow, and it became clear that the textbook format originally intended for the product was not as well suited to Polish needs as some other formats might be. Hence, we revised the product description to be short, flexible lessons that, taken together, would make up a primary school civics course. As a result of this change, productivity increased enormously and a very successful product was created. (See Chapter 11 for a discussion of the impact in Poland of the EDCP primary school civics course.)

Extended Time Frame

While there is no magic formula, a curriculum seminar is an extended experience as compared, for example, to a three- or four-week tour typical of many cross-cultural programs. The two curriculum seminars conducted by EDCP with Polish educators were 21 weeks and 14 weeks respectively. Sufficient time is needed to allow for both the professional development and writing components of a curriculum seminar to be fully developed.

A Team Approach

The success of a curriculum seminar depends to a considerable extent upon the participants functioning as a team rather than as a disparate collection of individuals. Seminar par-

ticipants will be more productive if they share a strong commitment to the product goal, work cooperatively, and are mutually supportive. Writing of any kind is a demanding task, and it can be especially stressful when people are under the pressure of deadlines, working in a different cultural context, and dealing with new subject matter. Such stressful conditions, however, can be positive rather than negative forces if confronted through teamwork.

The very nature of the curriculum seminar experience with a clear product orientation lends itself to the development of teamwork norms. There is, of course, a large body of literature in education and business from which to draw ideas on how to build a team orientation to tasks.⁵ The key point is simply that the development and reinforcement of such norms should be an objective of all planning by the seminar director, staff, and consultants.

Teacher Empowerment

Participants in a curriculum seminar may vary from classroom teachers to university professors depending upon the instructional product to be developed. However, when classroom teachers are the participants, a curriculum seminar has enormous potential to empower the teachers who participate because it puts them in control of the curriculum development process. This approach stands in direct contrast to the top-down, hierarchical model of curriculum development prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe in the past. The curriculum seminar process can contribute to educational reform and democratization by weakening the domination of national ministries of education or other government bureaucracies over the content and shape of school curriculum.

A curriculum seminar can also empower teachers by placing them in a collegial rather than subordinate relationship with university scholars during the instructional development process. Both scholars and classroom teachers have essential contributions to make to the creation of instructional materials that are conceptually and pedagogically sound. The curriculum seminar provides a vehicle for bringing these two groups together in a way which recognizes teachers as legitimate professionals with important contributions to make to the process.

Professional Growth

The primary goal of a curriculum seminar is development of a new instructional product. However, our experience in conducting two curriculum seminars with Polish colleagues has been that the professional development of the seminar participants is another very significant outcome of a successful seminar. Seminar participants are likely to return home with a significant new array of skills and a much deeper understanding of the specific subject matter and pedagogy relevant to their product and also of the process of civic education for democracy. In addition, they will have developed close professional relationships with the American civic educators with whom they have worked.

In short, participation in a successful curriculum seminar has the potential to amplify the knowledge, skills, and aspirations of participants. Such professional amplification can have important benefits for building civic education in the target country. After the seminar participants have returned home they can, for instance, conduct professional development activities, assume leadership of new projects, and in many other ways form the core of a continually expanding network of well-prepared civic educators.

Eight Polish teachers participated in the curriculum seminar that developed the EDCP primary school civics course. Nearly all have remained very active as key participants in new civic education projects in Poland, and several¹ have assumed important leadership roles. One

participant is now the Assistant Director of the National Center for In-Service Teacher Training (CODN), a key agency in the Polish Ministry of National Education's teacher education system. Another has become Director of EDCP's Center for Civic and Economic Education in Warsaw. Yet another has developed *Civis Polonus* (Polish Citizen), a highly successful new program that annually brings Polish students and their teachers from across Poland to Warsaw to meet government leaders and observe political activities first-hand.

The list of new programs, initiatives, and leadership roles among EDCP curriculum seminar participants continues to grow. Stimulated by the professional development gained through the EDCP curriculum seminars, the leadership of these Polish educational reformers is an important value added to the instructional materials produced through their efforts. In addition, both the materials created and the human talents amplified are an indicator of the potential power of in-depth cross-cultural experiences.

Developing Instructional Materials: A Key to Curricular Reform

Procedures like the curriculum seminar are important because the development of conceptually and pedagogically sound instructional materials on the basic concepts of democracy is an absolutely essential, if not sufficient, condition to promote civic education in schools in Central and Eastern Europe. The creation of instructional materials is essential for several reasons.

First and foremost, the demise of communism has left the schools of Central and Eastern Europe completely unprepared to educate the young in the core ideas, values, and skills required for democratic citizenship. Unlike other areas of the school curriculum, such as mathematics, where instruction can continue largely as before while benefitting marginally from the new openness, there is a vacuum with respect to civic education. Simply put, there are no effective instructional materials for teaching democracy. And our experience in Poland has begun to show that civic education materials adapted from other countries do not work well in elementary and secondary school classrooms. Yet, without practical, ready-to-use instructional materials, many teachers find it difficult to implement civic education for democracy no matter what national standards, curriculum guides, or other mandates may be handed down from ministries of education.

Second, the development of instructional materials is vitally important because there is a need to re-educate large numbers of teachers in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, in-service programs will have little impact on classroom practice unless such professional development is accompanied by the distribution of instructional material that help teachers put workshop ideas into practice upon their return to the classroom. Professional development activities may be interesting, intellectually stimulating experiences conducted by top scholars. Teachers may enjoy the experiences and leave such sessions with a strong desire to implement new ideas in their classrooms. However, upon returning to daily classroom realities, busy teachers simply may not be able on their own to translate theoretical ideas about democracy into classroom practice.

Third, even if teachers start using new ideas gleaned from professional development workshops, such practice is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sustain over time. Workshop training effects may quickly evaporate unless they are embodied in usable instructional materials that teachers can take with them from the workshop. In addition, as teachers leave the profession, move to other schools, or take on new course assignments, the work-

shop effects go with them. In short, new content on democracy conveyed only or largely through professional development activities unaccompanied by new instructional materials may have little staying power in the schools of Central and Eastern Europe.

Fourth, teachers will learn how to teach about democracy more effectively when the ideas presented by scholars in seminars and workshops are accompanied by instructional materials that illustrate the use of active teaching strategies to communicate those ideas to students. Most scholars, while masters of their subject matter, have little understanding of how the core concepts and related information about democracy can be communicated in elementary and secondary school classrooms to promote the development of young peoples' civic competence.

By the same token, teachers in Central and Eastern Europe have little or no experience with translating new subject matter about democracy and free-market economics to classroom use through active teaching strategies. They need exemplary materials that model how to promote active learning by inquiring students. With such materials in hand they can effectively bring new content and pedagogy into their classrooms. Further, they can become effective, credible instructors for other teachers. The use of trainer-of-trainer strategies, wherein teachers prepare other teachers who in turn prepare still others, can be an efficient way to widely disseminate new ideas to educators.

Fifth, properly designed instructional materials created through national projects can serve as models or templates for additional curriculum development at the local level. This allows teachers to, in essence, customize courses or programs to their own local needs and is an extremely powerful way to promote widespread distribution and acceptance of new approaches to civic education.

Sixth, properly designed instructional materials can be used for professional development on active teaching and learning methods as well as on content. For example, EDCP's primary school civics course contains 100 lessons. These lessons use different instructional strategies, such as role-plays, decision trees, case studies, and cooperative group activities. One can organize workshops for teachers on topics such as "How to Use Decision Trees and Role-Plays" by selecting lessons in the course that use those strategies.

Finally, new instructional materials can also be used to help improve preservice teacher education in pedagogical institutes, colleges, and universities. Preservice teachers must be educated in the core ideas of democracy and in the most effective pedagogical techniques for enabling their students to learn. Yet, many teacher educators in the region are themselves ill-equipped to provide and model instruction using active teaching and learning strategies. High quality instructional materials that embody active teaching and learning strategies can be effective "textbooks" for preservice teacher education courses.

The Curriculum Seminar As Model

Given the critically important role of new instructional materials in building civic education for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, it is essential to find procedures for successfully developing the needed materials. The curriculum seminar process described here is unlikely to be the only viable approach to the development of instructional materials for civic education in developing democracies. Yet this approach does have advantages that recommend it for serious consideration by civic educators and educational policymakers. Chief among these advantages is the potential to deal with the dilemma noted at the beginning of this chapter in a way that can not only yield "homegrown," high-quality instructional products, but also can amplify the professional abilities of those involved in the process.

Notes

1. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) to contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) to build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

2. The author of this chapter devised the curriculum seminar strategy and applied it to the task of developing instructional materials for Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland in concert with the faculty and seminar staff noted in the syllabi in Appendix 2. The roots of the curriculum seminar idea go back to much earlier work at the Mershon Center which created a "social planetarium" as a means to apply Harold Lasswell's approach to the policy sciences to social problem solving. See Harold D. Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., 1971) and Rodney Muth, "Institutional Leadership and Education Problem-Solving: A Clinical Approach," *Mershon Center Quarterly Report* 2(4): 1-3 (Summer 1977).

3. The EDCP curriculum guide that was developed through the curriculum seminar for the primary school civics course consists of three documents as follows: *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools* (available in English), which presents a rationale, objectives, and content outlines for a primary and a secondary school civics course; *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans* (in Polish), which presents sixteen lesson plans that illustrate how one might teach particular topics in primary and secondary school; *Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers* (in Polish), which presents articles by prominent Polish scholars on the topics recommended for primary and secondary school. The preservice teacher education course, "Curriculum Seminar: 'Schools and Democratic Society'" (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age, 1992), photocopied, was written by curriculum seminar participants Krzysztof Broclawik, Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, Marek Simlat, Marta Zahorska-Bugaj, and Elzbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz. (See Appendix 1 for citations and availability of this document and other CDGA publications.)

4. Richard C. Remy, "Education for Democracy Project," a proposal from the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, June 1991).

5. There is much literature in the field of education on the meaning of curriculum and the nature of curriculum development. See for example: Daniel Tanner and Laurel N. Tanner, *Curriculum Development: Theory Into Practice*, Second Edition (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980); William H. Schubert, *Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986); Edmund C. Short, "Three Levels of Questions Addressed in the Field of Curriculum Research and Practice," *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision* 9 (Fall 1993): 77-86.

6. This project was supported by a grant from the United States Information Agency.

7. This project was supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts.

8. See, for example, C. A. Melvin, "Restructuring Schools by Applying Deming's Management Theories," *Journal of Staff Development* 12 (1991): 16-20; G. Macroff, "Building Teams to Rebuild Schools," *Phi Delta Kappan* (1993): 512-519; and S. J. Rich, "Teacher Support Groups: Providing a Forum for Professional Development," *Journal of Staff Development* 13 (1992): 32-35.

6

Establishing Polish Centers for Civic and Economic Education

Phillip J. VanFossen, Jacek Kowalski, and Richard C. Remy



6

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6

Establishing Polish Centers for Civic and Economic Education

Phillip J. VanFossen, Jacek Kowalski, and Richard C. Remy

This chapter describes one of the activities of Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP), the development of a network of Centers for Civic and Economic Education at various sites across Poland.¹ The chapter reviews the needs that led to the application of the American "center" model to Poland, key steps in the creation of the Centers, and challenges faced in applying the American model to the Polish context.

The Need to Establish Centers

EDCP was conceived in early 1991. The idea developed as results of the tumultuous changes in Polish political, economic, and social life, initiated with the overthrow of communism in 1989, began to filter down to the Polish educational system, and as calls for reform of the Polish public schools were being sounded. A primary problem addressed from the inception of EDCP was how to provide a support system for educators across Poland who would be asked to implement new ideas in civic and economic education. At the time, EDCP Co-Directors Richard Remy and Jacek Strzemieczny were particularly concerned with the dissemination of curriculum guidelines and a primary school course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, that were under development.² It was clear that successful implementation of the new course would require ongoing in-service teacher education.

The need for such in-service support was heightened by the fact that the new curriculum guide and the civics course aimed to instruct Polish pupils in the key concepts of both a democratic polity and a market economy. The need to link education about constitutional democracy and a market economy was recognized from the very beginning of EDCP. Political theorists and economists have been writing about the inextricable link between free government and market economy since before Adam Smith's time.³ Indeed, the United States' own founders wrote eloquently on the relationships of popular constitutional governments to property rights, economic interests, and freedom.⁴

Finally, it was clear that any dissemination mechanism for the new course needed to avoid total reliance upon the Ministry of National Education. In 1991 and 1992 the Ministry was

very supportive of EDCP and was at the forefront of civic education reform in Poland. However, the Ministry, like any unit of the government, was subject to shifting political winds. Further, EDCP was eager to avoid a top-down model for disseminating curriculum reforms wherein the Ministry dictated what was to be taught. This hierarchical model had been standard operating procedure in the Polish educational system under the Communists.

The American Model of Centers

From the initial planning of EDCP, it was apparent that the organizational model provided by U.S. educational centers would serve as a guide or blueprint for building in Poland a human infrastructure, a coordinated group of reform-minded educators capable of meeting the needs described above. In American education, the term "center" is applied to a disparate range of academic and policy-oriented agencies. Some of the more prominent educational centers in the United States concerned with civic education include the Center for Civic Education in California, The Ohio State University's Mershon Center, the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University, the Council for Citizenship Education of Russell Sage College, state-level organizations such as the Ohio Center for Law-Related Education, and the national network of regional centers affiliated with the National Council on Economic Education.

These unique administrative units, while varying greatly across fields and academic disciplines, generally exhibit several distinctive characteristics. Among these are a focus on key issues and long-range plans for addressing these issues, a broad commitment to interdisciplinary work, projects on research and analysis, programs for dissemination of new materials, and a systematic outreach program. While not all such centers in the United States deal directly with teacher training, all of the centers noted above have had success in the areas of dissemination and educational outreach.

In terms of long-range outreach, perhaps the most successful manifestation of the center model may be seen in the National Council on Economic Education's (NCEE) nation-wide network of Centers for Economic Education. Established in 1949, the NCEE has evolved into a national program delivery network of some 275 Centers, each located at an accredited university or college. Each NCEE Center employs a professional economic educator to serve as Director and operates as a program arm of one of NCEE's 50 State Councils on Economic Education. The State Councils coordinate the delivery of economic programming within each state, promote the importance of economic education, and serve as programmatic liaisons between the NCEE and local Centers for Economic Education.⁴

Given the success of educational centers in the United States in promoting civic and economic education, the American partners in EDCP suggested the Poles consider creating a small network of centers to meet the ever-growing needs of teacher training about market economies and democratic principles, the publication and dissemination of materials in economic and civic education, and overall civic education reform.

The Proposal to Establish Centers

The creation of a network of centers was included in the original long-term plan for EDCP prepared in the early Spring of 1991 and in subsequent proposals for funding submitted to various agencies and philanthropic foundations. In August 1992, the Mershon Center secured financial support to establish the centers through a grant from the National Endowment for

Democracy (NED). The proposal called for the creation of a network of five Centers for Civic and Economic Education that would begin in-service education on the new EDCP curriculum guide and civics course, as well as on civic and economic education more generally.

One Center was to be located in Warsaw and affiliated with the Central Center for Teacher Training, *Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli* (CODN). CODN had been established by statute to assist in supplemental and in-service teacher training as an independent agency within the Polish system of teacher education supervised by the Ministry of National Education. Three of the five Centers were to be established through existing Provincial Methodology Centers (PMC). The PMCs, located in every Polish province, are institutions for organizing in-service teacher training and are also part of the Polish system of teacher education supervised by *kuratoria*, a local chapter of the Ministry. As an experiment in school-university cooperation, one Center was to be established in conjunction with a Polish university.

Thus, from the outset, while not government agencies, the Centers were linked indirectly to the Ministry of National Education because they were designed to operate within already established administrative structures for in-service teacher education in Poland. The idea was to inject into the existing system for professional development a small network of new units, the Centers for Civic and Economic Education. The Centers might then make use of resources available to units already in the system while simultaneously focusing their efforts solely on civic education reform as represented, at least initially, by instructional products being developed through EDCP.

Placing the Centers even loosely within the existing Ministry of National Education's administrative framework was convenient but, to some extent, also problematic. Some of the advantages included making initial access to Polish teachers and schools somewhat easier and guaranteeing at least minimal support for each Center. However, placing Centers in the existing structures might have had the possible outcome of discouraging some potential funding agencies and the possibility existed that (to date unrealized) those holding even part of the purse strings might try to influence the Centers' civic education reform agenda.

The proposal set forth the following short- and long-term goals for the network of Centers:

- To assist the Ministry and the Central Center for Teacher Training in developing a national network that would eventually be independent of U.S. funding and would be capable of providing ongoing support for teaching about democracy and market economics in Polish primary and secondary schools.
- To help a core group of Polish educational leaders clarify and further develop their own understanding of democracy and civic education.
- To conduct teacher training activities to support implementation of the new civics courses being developed.
- To provide a focal point through which Polish teacher advisers, school administrators, and teacher and university scholars could provide a wide variety of ongoing training programs to support education about democracy and market economics.

Under the proposal to NED, Co-Directors of EDCP Richard C. Remy and Jacek Strze-mieczny were made "responsible for the overall direction and administration of the project." Steven L. Miller, an Associate Professor at The Ohio State University and a leading economic educator, became Project Leader and was "responsible for assisting the Poles in the design, development, first-year operation, and evaluation" of the new Centers."

Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Kraków, and Wrocław were chosen as sites for the Centers. Geography was one factor in determining the location of the Centers; they had to be accessible to a large number of teachers and Teacher Advisers. Teacher Advisers are administrative positions in Polish schools (roughly equivalent to that of an Assistant Principal in the

United States) responsible for assisting and evaluating teachers. In addition, an effort was made to select sites where local educational authorities might be willing to commit resources to Center activities and to participate in other EDCP projects. EDCP recruited a Director and Deputy Director for each Center. These individuals had to meet several criteria, including experience with schools and teaching, familiarity with English, a commitment to reform in civic education, and approval by both local school superintendents (*Kurators*) and Provincial Methodology Centers.

Adaptation of the American "Center" Model to Poland

From the very outset a key premise of EDCP has been that the American partners would make available to Polish colleagues information on many different approaches to civic education and educational change, and the Poles would select from among this carefully chosen array of ideas those that seemed applicable to their situation. The use of educational centers to promote innovation was clearly an idea that seemed useful to the Poles. At the same time, all involved realized that application of the model to Poland would not be easy. Indeed, the closest translation of "Center" in Polish is *Centrum*, which means, literally, the "center" of a city or town, the "downtown," if you will. While the entities established by EDCP did eventually become known as "Centers for Civic and Economic Education," this semantic and conceptual difference served to foreshadow challenges to come.

Professional Development for Center Personnel

Professional development for Center Directors and Deputy Directors was a high priority. However, funds for training were very limited, permitting one workshop at the start of the project focused directly on professional development. Since the start of the project Center personnel have tried to take advantage of other opportunities to enhance their skills as such opportunities presented themselves. In addition, Jacek Kowalski, the first Director of the Warsaw Center and co-author of this chapter, was a member of the team of Polish educators who had spent five months at the Mershon Center during the fall and winter of 1992-93 developing the primary school civics course. This was an invaluable professional development experience he was able to draw upon in establishing the Warsaw Center.

The one funded professional development activity, a workshop that focused on preparing Center personnel, was held in Zaborów, Poland in February 1993. This workshop was designed to provide intensive training on economic and civic education curriculum development and pedagogy; begin initial work on developing both short- and long-term strategic plans for the Centers; provide an overview of the pragmatics of running a successful Center; and bring Center Directors and their Deputies together to establish collegial relationships that would help sustain future programming and networking efforts. Additionally, authentic collegial relations, among the Directors and between the Poles and the U.S. team, were cemented during coffee breaks, over dinner, and during relaxed social gatherings.

A second opportunity for professional development of the Centers' personnel occurred several months later. In December 1993 EDCP convened a major conference on "Education for Democratic Citizenship" held in Jachranka, Poland. More than 200 scholars and educators from across Poland participated along with representatives from the European Community, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Albania. The primary goal of the Jachranka Conference was to present for discussion and criticism two major EDCP products: (1) *Civic*

Education: Lesson Scenarios, the primary school civics course, and (2) "The School In Democratic Society," a two-semester pre-service teacher education course plan.

Along with other participants, the Center Directors had the opportunity to attend sessions on topics such as teaching civic leadership skills, teaching decision-making skills, developing civic writing skills, teaching market economics, and adapting American efforts to establish national standards for civic education. The Warsaw Center personnel also gained invaluable experience by taking on the responsibility for organizing the Jachranka Conference. Further, the Center Directors conducted their own sessions introducing the Center network to participants, many of whom were Polish teachers. Following this session, each teacher had an opportunity to meet with the Center Director from his/her respective region.

As the Centers became established and as EDCP secured grants for new projects, Center personnel became part of the plans for these projects and thereby continued their own professional development. In addition, Center personnel took advantage of other professional development opportunities. For example, the Center personnel at Wrocław completed an Educators for Social Responsibility (ESR) workshop on teaching ESR materials. The Director of the Warsaw Center attended several conferences on teaching about democracy in other countries. Other Center personnel have traveled to the United States as part of various projects such as a USIA-sponsored visit to the Mershon Center, the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University, and the Center for Civic Education in California.

Developing Center Goals and Strategic Plans

During the first few months of operation, Center personnel sought to define and implement plans for the remainder of 1993 and to begin in-service programming for teachers. As planning began, the Center Directors addressed several questions: What should the Centers' role be? Who would be the prime audience of Center programming? What could be sources of funding? What would be the most effective strategies for dissemination of new materials? Who should actually conduct teacher training sessions for each Center?

The Centers' long-range plans were developed in response to such questions. The Warsaw Center, for example, identified the following goals as integral to its long-term success:

- To improve the professional skills of teachers interested in civic education in schools, including teachers of such courses as Knowledge about Society and History.
- To improve the skills of class masters and wardens of school self-governing bodies.
- To gather information on active teaching methods, new curriculum proposals concerning civic education, and the promotion of these initiatives.
- To create and distribute supplementary materials for teachers.
- To manage national and international projects related to the Center's functions.
- To disseminate among Polish teachers the models and experience of European and world institutions dealing with civic education.
- To inspire teachers to implement innovative strategies for teaching issues related to democracy and the market economy.
- To interest various institutions in civic education and improve the status of civic education within schools.
- To maintain contact with active groups of young people and to initiate and promote their activities.¹¹

Funding for the Centers

It is probably safe to say that virtually all center directors are concerned with raising funds. Certainly this has been the case with the Centers for Civic and Economic Education in Poland. The initial NED grant provided only the minimum needed to initiate the Centers. Thus, a key challenge faced immediately by all Centers was to secure funds to sustain day-to-day operations at a reasonable level and to develop activities that would satisfy the increasing demand for Center programming.

In response, the Centers have attempted to engage in fund-raising activities. All Centers have tried to locate sponsors for in-service programming beyond that provided by grants from NED, and some Centers have been able to secure a modicum of outside funding. Funding agencies have included the Stefan Batory Foundation, the United States Information Service in Warsaw, the Initiative Educational Foundation, and the Polish Education for Democracy Foundation. Despite these modest successes, securing funds to support programming will be a continuing challenge for all the Centers.

Another funding challenge stemmed from the fact that the individual Centers have differed significantly in terms of office space, equipment availability, and the financial support available from the institution hosting the Center. For example, the Warsaw Center was very well supported by CODN. The Directors of the Central Center created a positive working climate for the fledgling Center. However, this situation was somewhat unique, and other Centers have received considerably less financial support because their host institutions were themselves struggling financially. For example, the local Provincial Methodology Centers (PMC) receive their funding from the Ministry of National Education. The Ministry has been scaling back all educational programming, which in turn limited resources the PMCs might contribute to their Centers.

The Kraków Center is illustrative of this problem. The Center is housed at the Kraków PMC. This PMC and its Director have been supportive of the Center, but only in a nominal way. The PMC has provided office space—a second floor walkup in a building four blocks away—but there have been neither computers nor a FAX machine furnished, and few additional resources have been available. Yet it is apparent that the Kraków Center has been a source of pride for the PMC; and during a 1994 EDCP evaluation, the PMC Director promised a continuing relationship with the Kraków Center. However, during the same evaluation it was also evident that the Director was very uncertain about his own future and that of his PMC. The situation at the Lublin Center was even worse, and in late 1994 responsibility for serving this region of Poland was moved to a new center in Krosno.

Building Relationships with Teachers

Another key challenge for the Centers has been to build collaborative working relationships with teachers in their area in order to implement in-service programming. During the first months of operation, the Centers discovered that two- to three-day workshops, focused on a narrow range of topics, were the most effective delivery system for use with teachers and Teacher Advisers. In addition to these intensive training sessions, the Warsaw Center also organized a series of one-day seminars, conferences, and meetings.

Several Centers have conducted surveys of local educational personnel in an effort to determine the most effective programming. These data provided several Center Directors with information on teacher preferences and expectations, and subsequent workshops were planned based on these results. A survey of teachers conducted by the Warsaw Center, for

example, was used to form a database of teachers interested in civic education. This database has been constantly updated, and the list now contains 800 teachers and 500 students. Unfortunately, not all Centers have had the opportunity to organize such databases, and the flow of data across Centers is still quite limited.

Developing communications with teachers and other educators has not been easy, in part because several of the Centers simply have not had the most basic computer and telephone equipment any American center director would take for granted. The Centers have tried to use traditional information channels available through the PMCs and local *Kuratoriums*; these channels, however, can be quite ineffective. In some regions, the local PMC has created official information networks that serve to keep local teachers informed on civic education. Such a network has worked successfully in the northeast region of Poland.

More fundamentally, communications with teachers have to overcome the legacy of "civic education" under communism. During the communist regime, political education was focused in a course called "Knowledge about Society" taught in primary and secondary schools. The course held little value for Polish teachers and their students and was generally considered boring and unnecessary. The purpose of the "Knowledge about Society" course was not to produce active, critical citizens; rather it was simply a way of transmitting to students a knowledge of their place within the communist system. Most teachers devoted as little to this course as did their students. (See Chapter 3 for further explanation.) In addition, the Polish academic community offered little support to these teachers of civics.

A related challenge that confronted the Centers, especially at the start of the project, was the limited number of teachers and Teacher Advisers capable of conducting workshops and in-service programming on active teaching/learning strategies and the new civics course. Most of the Center Directors and Deputy Directors themselves had little direct background or experience in this regard. In order to address this issue, the Centers were initially forced to rely upon a very small group of Polish teachers who had been directly involved in the development of the primary school civics course at the Mershon Center and in Poland. As a result of their work in the United States, these teachers had extensive training in civic education and curriculum development, an in-depth knowledge of the new course, and a strong personal commitment to dissemination of the course. The ability to call upon this group of teachers to conduct in-service training and related activities was critical to the survival of the Centers in the early phases of their work.

Examples of Center Programming

Each of the Centers has been successful in developing, promoting, and conducting a variety of professional development activities. The Krakow Center for Civic and Economic Education, for example, has conducted more than 25 workshops, seminars, and in-service training sessions during the period from September 1993 to March 1994. According to Kraków Center records, these activities have provided training for nearly 500 individuals including teachers, Teacher Advisers, and students.

The record of the Wrocław Center has been even more impressive. During the first four months of 1994, this Center conducted 21 workshops, seminars, and in-service programs that were attended by 572 individuals. Of these, 334 were teachers, 35 were Teacher Advisers, and 103 were students. Many of these workshops focused on teaching about market economics. For example, the Wrocław Center conducted programming entitled: "The Basis for Free Markets," "Macroeconomics for Teachers in Outlying Areas," and "The Functioning of Free Markets." Other programs have included "New Methods for Teaching Civics."

"Lessons in Conflict Resolution," "TV Systems in the Contemporary World," and "Democratic Education at School."

Center activities have also taken other forms. Some of these activities involved the translation and dissemination of international materials in civic and economic education, such as the NCEE curriculum materials. Several Center Directors have taken part in conferences outside Poland. Two Centers, Warsaw and Gdańsk, have sponsored Youth Forums in their respective cities. These Forums encouraged young students to meet and discuss political and social issues.

The Warsaw Center has assisted in developing *Civis Polonus* (Polish Citizen), a program modeled on programs like those conducted by the Close-Up Foundation in the United States. *Civis Polonus* brings students and their teachers from across Poland to Warsaw during the summer to engage in discussions with policy makers, to visit institutions of national government, and to participate in activities like a simulation on the role of the Polish Senate. The first *Civis Polonus* program took place in July, 1994.

Additionally, the Centers have had success integrating non-governmental organizations into their programming. The Wrocław Center, for example, developed workshops in conjunction with the United States' Educators for Social Responsibility. The Gdańsk Center has developed programming with the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. The Warsaw Center has cooperated with the Foundation for Teaching Economics (USA), the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, and the FALS Society (Denmark). Moreover, all the Centers have continued programmatic links with The Ohio State University's Mershon Center.

One of the most interesting and unexpected achievements of the Centers to date has involved the development of previously impossible cross-disciplinary collaboration with units in other academic fields. In particular, the Wrocław Center has established working relationships with several other educational units including the Wrocław University Institute for Political Science, the Economics Program at the Technical University, the Economics Academy, and the University's Institute of Social Theory. The Kraków Center has also established important contacts with other educational units including Jagellonian University, the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, and various government offices in Kraków.

Dissemination of the Primary School Civics Course

With the exception of the Warsaw Center, the Centers were slow to begin disseminating the primary school civics course. This stemmed, in part, from the fact that the new Directors were preoccupied with start-up activities as well as learning more about the course. In part, delays were also due to cultural differences. The Americans assumed that once the Centers were established the Directors and Deputy Directors would begin to conduct in-service activities to disseminate information about the new course. In the NCEE centers, as well as in most law-related and other civic education centers in the United States, the Directors actually conduct much of the programming themselves.

In the Polish administrative bureaucracy under the Communists, however, "Director" was an executive position involving the oversight of personnel. As time passed, the American consultants discovered that most of the Center Directors viewed themselves as coordinators of programming but not as the individuals who would actually do the in-service training.¹² With this view of their role, the Directors looked to find others who had the necessary administrative title for training teachers, and were capable of handling such new ideas and pedagogical techniques. Not unexpectedly, few educators beyond those who had participated in the development of the new course were qualified. Dissemination of the primary school course received

a major boost in March 1994 when EDCP received a significant new grant from NED to conduct regional workshops on the course for teachers, Teacher Advisers, and other educational leaders, and to establish 20 demonstration schools across Poland that would pledge to pilot-teach the new course during the 1994-95 school year. With additional support from the Stefan Batory Foundation, the number of demonstration schools grew to 51. The grant also supported some further professional development activities for Center personnel. With this support in hand, dissemination of the primary school civics course began in earnest.

Creation of the Center for Citizenship Education

In May 1994 a new Center, the Center for Citizenship Education (CCE), became a significant addition to the existing EDCP network of Centers. CCE was created by Jacek Strzemieczny in order to provide an organizational base for his continued work in civic education reform when he left his position as Director of Teacher Training at the Ministry of National Education. CCE is located in Warsaw and works closely with the network of Centers for Civic and Economic Education as a kind of "lead center" responsible for initiating and developing civic education projects that are national in scope. Jacek Strzemieczny serves as Director of CCE. Not long after the creation of CCE, the Centers and CCE negotiated an Inter-Center Agreement that sets forth some guidelines for coordination and cooperation among CCE and the Centers. In addition, CCE established a new Center in Olsztyn to better serve the northeast region of Poland.

The Centers for Civic and Economic Education participate in projects initiated by CCE either by implementing project activities in their regions and/or by undertaking specialized tasks such as organizing a conference, developing certain components of new materials, and the like. For example, the March 1994 NED grant to promote national dissemination of the primary school civics course went to CCE, which in turn involved the Centers in conducting in-service education activities in their regions. In January 1995 CCE received a major grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to conduct a three-year project to promote teaching about democracy and constitutionalism in Polish secondary schools. Under this grant, CCE is developing new curricula, training teachers, holding public seminars and conferences, and developing a teacher resource center in cooperation with the Centers for Civic and Economic Education. The creation of CCE has been a significant development for EDCP and the Centers, because CCE is successful in securing several major grants that have simultaneously helped alleviate the Centers' short-term funding problems and vigorously moved forward EDCP's civic education reform agenda.

Next Steps for the Centers

As of this writing there is every indication the EDCP Centers for Civic and Economic Education have played and will continue to play a helpful role in the reform of civic education in Poland. The experience to date clearly confirms our initial judgment that some form of infrastructure to support civic education innovation in Poland is absolutely essential if real, long-term educational change is to occur. A center model suitably adapted to Polish circumstances appears capable of providing such an infrastructure.

Key challenges for the Centers in the future include enhancing the capacity of Center Directors and Deputy Directors to act as instructional leaders as well as administrators. This, in turn, implies that Center personnel need additional opportunities for professional development aimed at enhanc-

ing their understanding of liberal constitutional democracy, market economics, and active teaching/learning strategies essential to civic and economic education in a democratic society.

Further, the Centers will need to continue to explore ways to functionally divide tasks and to coordinate activities. Not every Center, for example, needs to have the in-house capacity to undertake innovative curriculum development projects; nor do all Centers need to have the same level of expertise in the economic dimensions of civic education.

The Centers will need to continue to strengthen their ties to counterpart institutions in Poland, as well as the rest of Europe, and to work cooperatively with the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw. If the past is truly able to serve as prologue, the Centers will rise to meet these challenges as well as others that will surely develop.

Notes

1. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemiesz, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

2. *Projekt Programu Nauczania Kształcenia Obywatelskiego [Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools]* (Warsaw, Poland: Ministry of National Education, 1993). For additional information regarding the availability of this document, see Appendix 1.

3. See, for example, the writings of Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, and Francis Hutcheson on this topic.

4. Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., *How Capitalistic Is the Constitution?* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982).

5. For example, the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University has developed and conducted a number of programs for teachers in such areas as geography education, education about European unification, and national security education. The Mershon Center has also facilitated in-service seminars employing the so-called "trainer of trainers" model for educational administrators and supervisors.

6. Joint Council on Economic Education, *Centers for Economic Education: What They Are* (New York: Joint Council on Economic Education, 1985), p. 2.

7. Richard C. Remy, "Education for Democracy Project," a proposal from the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, June 1991).

8. "Establishing Centers for Civic and Economic Education," a proposal by the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University to the National Endowment for Democracy, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, August 1992), pp. 3-6.

9. "Establishing Centers," NED proposal, p. 10.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Program Review: Center for Civic and Economic Education*, (Warsaw, Poland: Center for Civic and Economic Education, 1993).

12. The Director and Deputy Director of the Warsaw Center had spent nearly six months at the Mershon Center helping develop the primary school civics course. Shortly after establishing their Center, they started extensive in-service training on the course.

7

A Teacher Education Course: “The School in Democratic Society”

Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz



7

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7

A Teacher Education Course: “The School in Democratic Society”

Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz

“The School in Democratic Society” is a sixty-hour, two-semester plan for a course of study. It is designed for preservice teacher education in Poland.¹ With some modifications, this course could also be used for in-service teacher professional development. The aim of the course is to provide future teachers with a particular perspective on the functions of the school in a democratic society, to facilitate their adoption of this vision, and to equip them with the basic skills necessary for implementing this vision in their teaching.

Five Polish scholars wrote the course plan as a component of the project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP).² This writing team included a political scientist, a sociologist, an educational psychologist, and two social psychologists. From September 14 to December 22, 1992, the Polish authors were in residence at The Ohio State University, during which time they wrote the first draft of the “The School in Democratic Society” course plan through participation in a process called a curriculum seminar. The curriculum seminar was designed to make a wide range of American expertise and experience available to the Poles. Richard C. Remy served as Seminar Director; Luvern L. Cunningham and M. Eugene Gilliom served as principal consultants to the seminar. The project was funded primarily by the Pew Charitable Trusts, with additional support provided by the Mershon Center.

The work by the Polish scholars while at The Ohio State University was devoted to defining the main aspects of the school’s operation in a democratic society and the relevance of these aspects to Poland’s present and future needs. The second stage of the project took place in Poland, where teaching methods and procedures in the course were fully developed, and evaluation, field-testing, and final revision were accomplished.

Cooperation between the Polish and American experts in this project stemmed from the basic assumption that to successfully develop a course plan, Polish teacher-educators needed to combine educational experiences acquired in a mature democratic system with the realities of Polish schools in the wake of communism’s collapse. On the one hand, a universal set of principles, values, and standards are promoted in schools in democratic societies regardless of any one society’s form of democracy. On the other hand, transformation of the Polish school to the democratic societal model requires a thorough exploration of the school’s strengths and weaknesses, and an in-depth understanding of current conditions, as

well as traditions that predate the experience of the past 45 years. The former was the domain of the American experts, and the latter was the domain of the Polish experts.

The Polish School in Transition

To understand the need for "The School in Democratic Society" course in Polish education, a brief synopsis of the conditions of education before the fall of communism is essential. Vestiges of the previous model of education, still evident in today's Poland, constitute the immediate need for such a preservice teacher education course.

The Previous Model of Polish Schooling

The fundamental feature of the Polish school system under communism was uniformity: uniform types of schools throughout the country, a uniform curriculum for all schools of a given type, curricular requirements equally obligatory of all students, and uniform textbooks for every subject and for every grade level. The students had to master the same knowledge regardless of the school they attended.

Educational goals were also uniform. Collectively, these goals aimed at creating a good, socially minded member of a "classless, egalitarian, and collective" socialist society. Every curriculum contained a meticulously described set of objectives that the teacher was supposed to instill in all students concerning a given topic in a given class.¹

In theory, the parents, the local authorities, or the society as a whole had little or no influence over the school. Party *apparatchiks* made decisions concerning the scope of education on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

This totalitarian model failed to be implemented fully for two reasons. First, a major obstacle against complete implementation was the diversity of Polish social life inconsistent with the communist ideal. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church, a major part of Poland's social, cultural, and religious life for over a millennia, played a crucial role with direct and indirect resistance to communist uniformity. This resistance ramified to schools through the Church's encouragement of parents to introduce some "corrections" to the formal education of their children.

Second, and similar to other spheres of life, education was driven less by ideological principles than by the interests of successive ruling elites. After seizing power as a result of some new historic "perturbations," they, almost without exception, initiated "reforms" of the educational system. These reforms, however, were never carried out fully since, by their very nature, reforms take time. This resulted in an internal incoherence of the system. Consequently, where courageous and dedicated teachers could be found, good quality and relatively open schools functioned frequently behind the facade of various "pedagogical experiments."

The model of communist pedagogy, with slogans of progressiveness notwithstanding, had much in common with the traditional, authoritarian model of the Eastern European school of the past. The student was expected to memorize as much information as possible, to not ask probing questions, and to be obedient to the teacher. According to one study, only 11 percent of secondary school students believed that the school provided a forum for the discussion of interesting subjects. According to a majority of the students surveyed (71.9 percent), conscientious fulfillment of all the duties was rewarded the most. Only a small minority (6.7 percent) thought that a courageous expression of one's convictions was rewarded.¹

Students attributed the following qualities to their teachers: vengefulness (83 percent), humiliation of students (82 percent), malice (79 percent), making fun of students (71 per-

cent), lack of understanding (68 percent), grading unfairly (67 percent), favoring some students and making others miserable (65 percent), and loudness (62 percent). A complement to these findings comes from the data showing that only 21 percent of teachers believed that corporal punishment was inappropriate. By implication, almost 80 percent of the surveyed teachers approved the use of such punishment at school. Therefore, it is not surprising that 65 percent of the students attended school with indifference and fatigue, 50 percent with annoyance and fear, 35 percent with resignation, and 25 percent with anger.⁵

Parents also perceived the school as an unfriendly environment. It should be stressed that parental hostility and lack of confidence in the schools were rooted in aversion toward "communist" education that conflicted with important family values, such as imposing atheism over the deeply rooted adherence of most Poles to the Catholic faith. A further hostility existed toward the authoritarianism of the schools and the perception that the fate and well-being of the child depended on the "good" or "bad" will of the teacher.

Polish Schools After the Fall

The new Educational System Act, drafted by the first non-communist government and adopted by Parliament in 1991, created a possibility to change the face of the Polish school.⁶ The Act abolished the state monopoly on education,⁷ gave parents and local authorities access to the education system through participation in School Councils, stimulated the establishment of authentic student self-government, and emphasized student rights. In addition, the Act envisioned a drastic decentralization of decision-making and educational activities.

Now, elected school principals make decisions with regard to the school's finances and hiring, but not dismissal, of teachers. Together with teachers, the principals have much to say in formulating curricula and are expected to address only a few basic requirements from the Ministry of National Education. Teachers are free to choose textbooks and other educational materials, to introduce new teaching methods, and to create original programs. The primary goal of these changes is to restore the teachers' autonomy and to create a situation in which teachers decide how far they will go in making use of their independence in exploring optimal programs and methodological teaching alternatives. The majority of teachers, however, have failed to take advantage of this opportunity.

Today, the negative image of the school and the teacher in the eyes of students stands in sharp contrast to the high self-evaluation of teachers. A majority of teachers (about 80 percent) think they are very effective in influencing student behavior and have a strong personal influence on student development. Almost 87 percent indicate that they try to be fair and patient in their interactions with their students; 70.6 percent believe they create a positive atmosphere in the classroom; and 96.9 percent want to get to know their students better. This positive self-assessment seems to stem from a belief in the effectiveness of an authoritarian didactic and pedagogical style. According to the majority of respondents (75 percent), students are motivated to study mostly by external incentives. The same proportion is of the opinion that the school should exercise strong control over the students.⁸

Teachers and Teacher Education During the Transition

After the communist seizure of power in the wake of the Second World War, the teaching profession found itself in the "ideological forefront." Teachers were expected to have significant input into the education of the socialist state's new generation of citizens. Survivors of the war who remembered the teachers of the past were distrustful, if not hostile, toward this

new breed. Also, the new authorities did not trust the pre-war teachers who, although often progressive or even leftist, were insufficiently communist." The goal was to raise a new and trustworthy cadre of teachers.

As is the case with other social institutions, changes in education depend on broader changes occurring outside its structure.¹⁰ It goes without saying, therefore, that the discrepancy between stated ideals and actual practice in every area of life, characteristic of the new system, had to have its impact on teacher training as well. Wholly dependent on Soviet pedagogy, teacher education at the universities, teacher colleges, and teacher high schools was used as an instrument of indoctrination and a tool of political selection by the communist regime.¹¹ In theory, what was called education of "the progressive and open-minded teacher" turned into training for obedience to the communist party vision of what should be taught and how it should be taught in Polish schools. Such a state of affairs discouraged many from entering the profession. Therefore, individuals admitted to the so-called "teachers' courses" in various university departments were those who acquired insufficiently good marks to be admitted to other professions. The most competent professors tended to avoid classes with the "weak" students which, in turn, lowered further the standards of educational studies and intensified future teacher dependence on ideological rather than on substantive authority. An analysis of the processes that took place at the Polish school under communism indicates that poorly educated and opportunistic teachers have deepened this inertia in the educational system.¹²

Since the collapse of communism, to no one's surprise, teachers are a force obstructing educational reform. A majority of teachers simply do not see any need for change at the school or in their behavior. They resist changes and see them only as a new source of further aggravation compounding their already heavy work load. There is a widespread lack of understanding among teachers concerning the foundations of a democratic system and the political processes currently under way in Poland and other post-communist countries.¹³

Teachers have concentrated instead on protecting their privileges and fighting for better salaries because the financial situation of teachers was and continues to be very bad. This concentration has been encouraged by the so-called Teachers' Charter guaranteeing teachers' job security.¹⁴ The Teachers' Charter was designed to keep teachers loyal to the authorities and vigilant with respect to the maintenance of a "proper ideological atmosphere" among students who naturally tended to sympathize with the underground *Solidarność* movement. Introduced under martial law, the Teachers' Charter provides teachers with specific privileges, including (1) the right of early retirement five years before the accepted retirement age, (2) state distinctions automatically awarded after a certain number of years on the job with all the related financial benefits, and (3) job security as a nominated teacher (nomination is, in fact, automatically acquired after three years school employment), who cannot be fired if he or she has not committed any criminal offense.

Assumptions, Goals, and Procedures of the Project

The picture painted above suggests a certain framework in which the authors of "The School in Democratic Society" course plan sought answers to the key questions: What and in what way should preservice teachers be taught so they can act to improve Polish schools? This new and improved school would be friendly, open, consistent with the ideals of a democratic society, and competent to prepare students for life in such a society.

Education and Democratization

The process of transition from what the Polish school "is" to what the Polish school "ought to be" can be described as a democratization process. More specifically, this process is understood to entail two different, but related, levels: external and internal democratization.

The external process of school democratization suggests that schools should be returned to the society. Education, according to this view, should serve the values and goals accepted broadly by the society as a whole. Also, education should recognize its diversity and plurality of interests. This recognition requires public discussion on topics such as finance, organization, content, methods of teaching, and a decentralized decision-making process. The right to participate in such a discussion belongs not only to representatives of the educational bureaucracy, educational experts, and teachers, but also to parents, employers, local communities, social authorities, ethnic and religious minorities, and, depending on their developmental possibilities, to students themselves.

The internal aspect of school democratization deals with interpersonal relations within the school community. Democracy as a political system is bound to remain unstable as long as it is exclusively a political system and not a type of society. Modern democracy is more than a form of government. It is also a form of community, and the "democratic ideal" manifests itself in the ways individuals and groups act and interact with each other.¹⁴ Thus, the democratic ideal implies that education for a democratic society should be based on democratic experiences. This sort of education requires some aspects of school (e.g., students' and teachers' self-governments) to be organized on the basis of authentic democratic rules and procedures. It also requires the school to become a democratic environment in the sense of both a democratic climate and democratic means. The Polish school should not remain a bastion of authoritarianism with Polish teachers as the mainstay.

If one acts on the assumption that education reflects societal change and, at the same time, that the school is a participant in this change,¹⁵ then school "democratization" described above is unavoidable and indispensable. This process is unavoidable because a democratizing society will not accept the exclusion of education from societal influence and control. The process is indispensable because if young people graduated without knowing how to live in a democracy, the school would ignore its basic role of "a means to social continuation and development."¹⁶ The authors of "The School in Democratic Society" intended to communicate these ideas to future teachers.

However, before these ideas can be implemented effectively, the post-communist reality in Poland needs to be taken into consideration, and not exclusively in the realm of education. Sociologists describe the condition of Polish society in transition as a dangerous situation. A major part of the society is not able to cope with the challenges of market economics and political pluralism, and reacts to these challenges negatively, passively, and with inadequate expectations.¹⁷ These problems are seen partly as the result of experiences from the "real socialism" period, which did not facilitate the development of attitudes and skills necessary for people to function under the new economic and political scenario.¹⁸

What is important from the perspective of this project, however, is the fact that not only older people, but also the younger generation—those currently graduating from high school—are approaching post-communist reality in Poland without much optimism. Polish youth share the opinion that Poland is heading in the wrong direction, and no one is in firm control of this process. In addition, only a few think the communist dictatorship has been replaced by democracy, although 60 percent consider democracy to be the best political system. The rest are divided between those who are sure that "other forces" are steering the actu-

al rulers and those who know neither how to describe nor how to understand the consequences of the current situation. Young people are distrustful of institutions, organizations, and public authorities. In one study, for example, only one percent of the respondents mentioned a politician in response to a question about their role models, and more than half could not come up with anyone worthy of serving as a role model. Very small segments of the youth selected values such as creativity (7 percent) and the ability to make important economic decisions (2 percent) and political decisions (2 percent) as meaningful. Similar to the 1980s, today's young people lack interest in broad issues outside their family life and their circle of friends. For example 38 percent of the respondents to one survey considered themselves to be members of the next "lost generation."³⁰

Basic Assumptions of "The School in Democratic Society"

The evidence cited above suggests that one has to take into account the possibility that the preservice teachers, targeted by "The School in Democratic Society" and recruited from the aforementioned generation, may be hostile to the proposed course, treating it as an attempt at indoctrination by unpopular and untrustworthy "new rulers." A widespread belief that the course constitutes nothing more than the replacement of an old ideology with a new one would be devastating. This fear, added to the conviction that the Polish school does not constitute an initially friendly environment for the democratization process, led the authors to adopt the following assumptions concerning the course plan's content and implementation.

First, the course should concentrate on the reality of school and how democratic principles, values, and standards of behavior can be implemented best within this realistic framework. Moreover, the course should contain references to positive Polish experiences as much as possible, even if not many of those experiences can be identified, so as to show that the "democratic school" is not totally alien and incompatible with Polish culture and tradition. To do so, the topics covered in the course were organized around the analysis of seven features of an educational system, such as the role and position of the teacher, students' rights and responsibilities, parental participation in the school, the school and the local community, the distribution of resources for education, the school as an organization and a community, and the role of the school in the democratic society. The criteria used in selecting these topics came from areas of necessary and partially fulfilled reforms in the Polish school system. Through this course, prospective teachers will learn to exercise democratic standards and procedures in these areas.

Second, the course should develop skills necessary for democratic behavior in the school environment. It would be naive to presume that rhetorical theories about the nature of school democracy are sufficient for the development of democratic skills that will eventually lead to democratic behavior. In addition, preservice teachers should be able to develop a sense of optimism toward their future professional settings. The contrast between personal, idealistic dreams about teaching and the reality of the situation can be discouraging. Thus, if prospective teachers are equipped with various ways of dealing with difficult problems, they may find it easier to believe and to realize in practice that the nature of the school depends partially on what teachers themselves do.

As a framework for the "democratic skills of teachers," the authors used the typology of "citizenship competencies" developed by Remy and Turner. They have defined these competencies as:

... the quality of persons' participation individually or with others in processes related to group governance such as making decisions, protecting one's interests or communicating effectively with group leaders. This includes the capacity to act individually in one's own behalf and the capacity to act in concert with others. . . . In a democratic society, competence implies that citizens will produce consequences which do not violate human rights and which are congruent with principles of liberty and justice.²³

The competencies distinguished by Remy and Turner are acquiring and using information, assessing involvement, making decisions, making judgments, communicating, cooperating, and promoting interest. According to the Remy and Turner design, these competencies typify essential activities in a democratic social system. They have been adapted, however, to the specific requirements of the role of the teacher as a member of the school community. It is not possible to create an "ideal teacher." However, it is possible to equip the teacher with useful skills for individual development approximating such a role.

Main Goal of "The School in Democratic Society"

One crucial problem faced by the authors of the course was how to organize the experiences of preservice teachers in such a way as to give them a chance to acquire and to practice the necessary skills. The authors responded to this question by incorporating practical teaching methods into the proposed course. These methods included case studies, simulations, and role playing. These practical teaching methods intertwined with the traditional, more academic forms of activity, such as discussions about literature and written essays. With respect to the overarching aims of the course, the usefulness of these methods rests on the fact that they allow a simulation of real situations in which participants are asked to choose alternative behaviors, confront the actions of others, and analyze reasons for and consequences of different behaviors. Thus, it is a kind of practical training which combines theoretical knowledge with real life events and one's own experiences.

These methods stimulate inquiry into and analysis of the problem from different perspectives, including personal values and standards. The latter is particularly important for a course steeped in values and normative behavioral standards. Moreover, practical methods demand a specific climate in the classroom that is characterized by confidence, openness, and freedom of thought and speech in task completion. This climate is absolutely necessary when taking into consideration the contents of the course, because it is difficult to imagine that one can comprehend fully the patterns of democratic behavior while experiencing intimidation and coercion. Finally, although this is not a direct goal of the course, the encounter of prospective teachers with inquiry-oriented methods of teaching might stimulate them to use such methods in their professional practice. This would undoubtedly translate into sheer profit for Polish education.

Preparation of the Course

The ideas and content of the teacher education course called "The School in Democratic Society" resulted from several months of intense cooperation between Polish and American experts at the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University. The curriculum seminar, led by Professors Remy and Cunningham, played a particularly important role in the development of the course. The curriculum seminar consisted of a carefully planned, four-month sequence of events including weekly discussions with Professors Remy and Cunningham; special lec-

tures by experts on various topics; participation in an OSU course for preservice teachers; participation in professional meetings and conferences; visits to schools and other educational institutions; and other activities focused on the development of a draft course plan.

The weekly discussions helped the course authors digest various experiences, adapt these experiences to the needs and exigencies of Polish education, exchange and verify ideas about the shape of the course, and evaluate and improve the results of successive stages of work on the course plan. These discussions also provided the opportunity to make changes in the seminar agenda to insure scheduled activities were meeting the needs of the Poles as the course development proceeded.

The special lectures and conversations with American education specialists from the OSU College of Education focused on helping the Poles understand significant dimensions of the American educational system. These sessions dealt with such topics as the organizational principles of American education, the problems of financing education, educational policy, and the principles and practice concerning respect for students' rights.

The Poles regularly attended a social studies teaching methods course for preservice teachers presented on campus during the autumn quarter. This course, taught by Professor M. Eugene Gilliom, proved to be especially useful as an introduction to practical, active teaching/learning strategies and as an example of the application of an inquiry-based approach to preservice teacher education.

Curriculum seminar activities were not limited to The Ohio State University's campus. The Polish authors visited Indiana University to learn about the work of the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and the Social Studies Development Center. They also gave a presentation on their work at the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) Annual Meeting in Detroit, Michigan. Locally, they participated in a conference organized by Ohio Wesleyan University entitled "Education for Democracy: Looking to the 21st Century" and observed a workshop on "Connecting Citizens and Schools" involving parents, teachers, and educational administrators from Columbus, Ohio. Further, the Poles visited primary and secondary schools in Columbus.

From the Polish perspective, the curriculum seminar process had a crucial significance because it helped the authors apply their experiences in the United States to the task of designing a course appropriate for Polish teachers and schools. Generally speaking, participants in cross-cultural experiences often describe them as interesting but not very useful because they tend to be incompatible with the realities of their own culture. Such a view can be considered only partially true. At least parts of such experiences are rejected because they prove incongruent with the content of the participants' former experiences and cognitive schemata derived from those experiences.²² The "manufacturing" of experiences carried out during the curriculum seminar proved extremely fruitful in the construction of a Polish preservice teacher education course.

The first draft of the course plan was written during these activities in the United States. In the second phase of work, after returning to Poland, the authors concentrated on further adapting the course content to Polish reality and adding teaching strategies and bibliographic material to the course. They developed examples of simulations, case studies, and other instructional strategies suited to Polish schools. First, however, they put together a reading list for students, striving to secure as much input from Polish scholars as possible.²³

Structure, Content, and Organization of the Course

"The School in Democratic Society" consists of two parts. The first part contains a description of the goals and assumptions of the course as well as the topics to be covered. Each topic is defined, key issues are specified, student objectives are delineated in terms of knowledge and skills, and general suggestions and a sample "path" toward course implementation are included. Further, student evaluation strategies are proposed, as are readings for students, supplementary readings for the instructor, and the suggested number of class hours per topic.

The second part of the course plan contains materials useful for implementing the course. This part provides a description of the most important "hands on" teaching methods (e.g., simulation, role playing, and the case study) supplemented with a list of proposed literature for instructors who would like to expand their knowledge of these methods. Finally, nine specific lesson scenarios are included to serve as examples of how these methods could be incorporated into teaching the course. The following sections synopsize the seven course topics as addressed in both parts of the course plan.

The Role and Position of the Teacher

This topic is concerned primarily with two matters: (1) the professional role and status of the teacher and (2) his or her relationship with the other "actors" on the school scene—students, parents, other teachers, and supervisors. The way preservice students understand and evaluate the role of the teacher can have a direct influence on their motivation to become teachers²⁴ and on how they perform that role. It is, therefore, important that future teachers be aware of a great variety of teaching methods, of the factors on which these methods depend, and of the consequences of these methods with regard to student-teacher relations.

It is also crucial that preservice teachers learn about the factors affecting the teacher's position in society, as well as the rights and responsibilities that come with that role. In the course plan, much attention is paid to the stereotype of the teacher in society and to the stereotype concerning the role prevalent among teachers themselves. Preservice teachers should have an opportunity to confront the myths, to look at the advantages and the disadvantages of the profession, and to devise possibilities for strengthening the profession that are yet to be explored. The aim of this topic is to develop in preservice teachers the ability to distinguish between and understand the factors responsible for the attitudes of others toward the school (e.g., students, parents, community, and local authorities). In so doing, this topic addresses conflicts that arise as a result of these attitudes with the goal of developing preservice teachers' abilities to promote constructive resolutions.

The classes are organized to enable students to experiment with different attitudes and behaviors while interacting with other members of the school community. This goal is achieved, in part, through simulation of group decisions concerning the distribution of money for different school projects and playing roles of participants in a specific school conflict centered on a pregnant student. The greatest number of class hours (from 14 to 20) are suggested for this topic.

Student Rights and Responsibilities

Most attention under this topic is given to student rights. Student responsibilities are illustrated mostly through contrasts with their rights. This lack of symmetry is intentional and

originates in the reality of the Polish school where responsibilities are harshly enforced, and student rights are neglected and often treated as privileges. In the course, future teachers should learn about specific student rights such as personal rights, the right to protection from abuse, social rights, and, as a separate category, the protection of the rights of students viewed as "trouble makers." They should also learn to understand the nature of these rights and their meaning within the context of the school environment, as well as the most important conflict areas embedded in this subject and the various strategies for conflict resolution.

Since university students who recently graduated from high school have a natural affinity with high school students and a propensity to idealize their future attitudes toward them, this part of the course should provide preservice teachers with as many opportunities as possible to identify with the teacher struggling with various problems surrounding the issue of student rights. Workshops constitute a proper tool for accomplishing this goal. They can serve as a forum for elaborating difficult cases based on actual events in Polish schools and a simulation of conflicts concerning the rights of students who engage in serious violations of school regulations. One simulation, for example, focuses on a situation involving a student-initiated bomb threat at the school.

Teachers are often the only individuals who can take initial action when children's rights are violated outside the school environment. Therefore, this topic gives preservice teachers an opportunity to get acquainted with the work of specialized organizations working on behalf of children. Eight to ten class hours are planned for this topic.

Parental Participation in Schools

This topic covers a variety of potential avenues for parental influence on Polish schooling and makes an argument in favor of increasing parental involvement in the school. In addition, this topic covers such aspects of parental participation as the relationship between the teacher and the parents, since teachers assume an important role in developing positive relations and creating opportunities for parental participation in the school. This relationship is particularly important in the present Polish school context where many parents exhibit helplessness in relationship to the school. The law alone cannot change this reality. Teachers' positive attitudes, initiatives, and skills are a necessary complement to legal changes.

This topic is designed to teach preservice teachers about different forms of parental participation in the life of the school, the meaning of this participation, the positive and negative consequences of participation, as well as reasons for parental reluctance toward any involvement. Analyses of appropriate documents, interviews with parents and teachers, and simulations of meetings with parents during which future teachers can analyze problems of interaction and test different ways of expanding parental participation in the education of their children should all serve this end. Four to six hours set aside for this topic do not seem sufficient. However, some of these issues are addressed in the context of other topics discussed in the course such as "The Role and Position of the Teacher" and "Student Rights and Responsibilities."

The School and the Local Community

This topic has three major goals. First, prospective teachers should learn how to recognize major formal and informal groups in their community, the relations between them, and the "locus of power" in the community. Second, they should learn how to cooperate with those groups and how to protect students from pathological groups in the community. Third, by ana-

lyzing the development of local communities and their influence on school life, preservice teachers should have an opportunity to focus on some general issues of democratic society, such as the problem of participation in public life and the process of developing civil society.

Apart from a discussion of the literature and case studies, the most important form of activity proposed in this portion of the course is the preparation, implementation, and elaboration of results of interviews with representatives of the local community. This interview process should focus on problems faced by the school in the preservice teacher's region. In addition to experiencing the actual operation of schools, this segment of the course gives students an opportunity to learn how to make useful contacts, to communicate effectively, and to acquire information from other people. Six to eight hours are allocated for this topic.

Distribution of Resources for Education

Only two to four hours are reserved for this topic. The goal of this course is not to involve students deeply in complex problems surrounding the financing of education. The goal is to acquaint them with the major principles of financing education recently introduced in Poland and to understand the consequences of these principles as they relate to the operation of the school and such issues as equal access to education. Since the new conditions require that schools learn how to seek outside money for some projects, these matters are also incorporated into this topic.

The course anticipates that preservice teachers will have the opportunity to write a letter to a potential sponsor of school activities, get acquainted with the school budget, and analyze and discuss various legal documents regulating the financing of education.

School as an Organization and as a Community

This topic focuses on the implementation of democratic principles in the school. To some extent, the interplay between the educational system and the society is investigated. However, the school is the basic unit of analysis. The primary goal of this topic is to strengthen future teachers' abilities to face the organizational reality of the school relevant to the problems of democracy without complicating the issue with intricate theories. This approach to the topic should facilitate student understanding of the democratic principles operating in their school. Further, students should be able to analyze critically the actual condition of the Polish school and to draw conclusions concerning the possibility of further school democratization. The second goal of this topic is to offer students the knowledge and skills necessary to exercise basic democratic processes in a school setting.

This topic is somewhat more theoretical when compared to other topics in the course. Considering that students might not possess an adequate knowledge of the psychology and sociology of organizations, course instructors should approach this topic so that preservice teachers can establish clear links between "abstract" knowledge and "concrete" school reality. One such approach relies on case studies as a method, and the authors of the course recommend this instructional strategy.

During the course, students will have an opportunity to analyze the multi-dimensionality of school organization (including the roles played by informal factors, such as the influence of different groups and the personal qualities of various agents) in order to build a "map" of power and control in their school. Through a school-based case study, they will investigate "the play of interests" (including the extension of influence and channels of influence) between the main actors on the school stage (teachers, students, and parents) and the exter-

nal influences on the school by such groups as educational experts, school administrators, politicians, and the public.

Students will also consider what can and cannot take on a democratic character in their school, the relationship between democracy and efficiency, and actual cases of the violation of democratic rules in the life of the school. A special study of an actual case that occurred in one of the Polish schools is presented for the analysis of leadership problems in the school. This case is called "The Experimental Riot." Ten to 14 hours are planned for discussion of this topic.

The Role of the School in a Democratic Society

This topic is meant to be a summary and assessment of the whole course. Students should be invited to examine the most fundamental assumptions of the democratic school through the perspective of a democratic society. They should consider not only the principles and values of education that differentiate a democracy from other political systems, but also those that are universal and transcend all political systems.

Three goals should be the aim in teaching this topic: (1) the development of student knowledge about the essential principles of a democratic society, (2) the investigation of the school's role in a democratic system, and (3) the building of a more general competence in dealing with tensions and problems in a democracy. Accordingly, students should be able to use the knowledge and skills acquired during the course for analyzing and understanding the problems and issues that arise in the school through the Polish societal perspective during the transition to democracy.

The way of dealing with this topic depends on how much, in the instructor's opinion, was achieved up to this point in the course. If students were well engaged in the course and the quality of their work was evaluated as satisfactory, it would be worthwhile to offer them the opportunity for independent examination of a problem or dilemma relevant to the idea of democracy in the context of the Polish educational system. If the course instructor makes a decision that the students are ready for this additional discussion, a conference entitled "The School in Democratic Society" should be organized, and the students should be allowed to present their papers. Going through the experience of presenting and defending one's convictions and comments in public will constitute an additional benefit from this undertaking.

If there are reasons to believe that students will not be able to manage this task, a review of the course by focusing on selected problems that will lead students to some generalizations and syntheses is recommended. Analyzing the problem of the free access to information in the school as one of the criteria of democratization, or the question of the "dilemmas of democracy" most frequently occurring in this environment, could constitute possible foci for this discussion. The framework for such discussion could be the broader phenomena in a democratic society that are suitable for defining educational institutions. The number of class hours allocated for this topic depends on the scope of the other topics, but should be no fewer than six hours.

Modular Organization

As should be apparent from the above discussion, "The School in Democratic Society" course is organized in what could be described as a modular way. This allows the instructor some leeway, including the freedom to establish the order of topics covered and the ability to rearrange course components according to individual needs and possibilities. This flexibility is a plus because existing conditions suggest that the course will be taught by repre-

sentatives of different professions (e.g., educators, psychologists, sociologists, or political scientists). These teachers might also differ in their level of experience concerning practical knowledge of school reality.

Evaluation and "The School in Democratic Society"

The concluding comments of this chapter pertain to two kinds of evaluation. First, there is a brief discussion of how to evaluate student performance. Second, there is commentary about how the substance of the course was evaluated.

Evaluation of Student Performance

A few remarks seem in order about the question of student grades. Students attending the proposed course will be faced with a combination of workshops and traditional academic work "on the literature." Such a mixed approach is rather atypical of a Polish university-level education.

These two types of activity are generally taught by different instructors ("practitioners" and "theoreticians"), and the results of student work are evaluated on the basis of different criteria. For instance, mere attendance often suffices in the case of workshops. Taking this into account, together with the above-mentioned "loading" of the course with values, it was proposed that the grading criterion for each topic be a specific assignment for the student (e.g., an essay on an assigned or chosen subject or a test of the students' familiarity with the readings).

It was also suggested that under no circumstances should students' attitudes or behaviors during simulations and psychodramas count as the basis for their grades. Much attention has been given to the issue of a general climate of openness and tolerance during the course. In addition, students should have an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the whole program before the course begins, to propose some modifications, and to have the right to a periodical evaluation of the course and the instructor's performance.

We also proposed that selected results of the students' work (e.g., data collected about children's protection organizations and the best examples of letters to individuals and institutions who might sponsor various school projects) might be published in the form of a separate brochure to serve as a useful reference tool for future teachers.

Evaluation of the Course

"The School in Democratic Society" has been evaluated twice: once by American experts and once by Polish experts. The first evaluation took place when the authors of the course plan were in the United States. The draft course plan was evaluated very positively by the American specialists.²⁵ They underscored that many of the proposed issues should be incorporated into teacher education efforts in countries, such as the United States, not undergoing a transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system.

At this point, the proposed plan has been evaluated with equal enthusiasm by most of the Polish experts who attended an International Conference on Civic Education organized by EDCP at Jachranka near Warsaw in December 1993.²⁶ Most importantly, the reviewers generally agreed that the course can be very useful and should be incorporated into teacher education programs under the current conditions. The teacher educators who participated in the Jachranka conference were enthusiastic, suggesting also that the course might be adapted to

a program for in-service teacher education. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the course evoked great interest among educational specialists from other post-communist countries attending the conference. They stressed the similarity of problems and needs in their countries, and argued that this Polish teacher education course might be used as a sort of heuristic tool for creating teacher education programs in their respective countries.

The crucial test of the course will take place when its implementation begins, or even later when young teachers start to work in the schools. However, it should be kept in mind that the success or failure of teachers depends as much on their knowledge of content as on the circumstances under which they will work. "The School in Democratic Society" is a proposal that covers only a small part of teacher education. And, although the course might contribute to raising a teacher's self-confidence and level of performance, it cannot be a substitute for genuine professional skills rooted in solid knowledge of the subject one teaches and the ability to communicate this knowledge to students.

Notes

1. Krzysztof Broclawik, Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, Marek Simlat, Marta Zahorska-Bugaj, and Elzbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz, "Curriculum Seminar: 'Schools and Democratic Society'" (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age, 1992), photocopied. Originally, the title of the project and course plan was "Schools and Democratic Society." In May, 1994, the authors changed the course title to "The School in Democratic Society." (See Appendix 1 for citations and availability of this document and other CIDGA publications.)

2. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

3. Mikołaj Kozakiewicz, "Education Transformation Initiated by the Polish Perestroika," *Comparative Education Review* 36 (1992): 91-100.

4. Janusz Gęsicki, *Sytuacja Ucznia w Szkole. Jaka Jest? Jaka Moż Być?* (Warszawa: IBE, 1990).

5. Janusz Gęsicki, "Szkolnictwo Ponadpodstawowe," in Polska Fundacja Dzieci i Młodzieży, eds., *Sytuacja Dzieci i Młodzieży w Polsce 5-20 lat. (Raport)* (Warszawa: EXIT, 1993).

6. *Government Gazette of the Republic of Poland*, "The Educational System Act," 7 (September 1991), no. 95, item 425.

7. In recent years, more and more non-public schools have come into being, but they account for only 2 percent of all schools. They are unlikely to compete seriously with state schools in Poland's poor society for quite some time, because few parents will be able to afford the relatively high tuition charged by private schools.

8. Gęsicki, "Szkolnictwo Ponadpodstawowe."

9. The Polish Teacher Association was established in 1909. Its members carried the most progressive education ideas of their time. They made great contributions to the education of Polish children in partitioned Poland, after Poland regained independence in 1918, and later in the underground education of Polish students under the German occupation during World War II. After the war, the Polish Teacher Association was "taken over" by the communists and transformed into a "transmission-belt" of the ruling party.

10. Florian Znaniecki, *Socjologia Wychowania* (Warszawa: PWN, 1973).

11. Wiktor Kulerski, "The Progress of Educational Reform in Poland," *News and Views* 11 (August 1992): 82-84.

12. Konwersatorium "Doświadczenie i Przyszłość," Sekcja d/s Oświaty i Nauki, *szkoła Polska Po Sierpniu 1980. Uwagi i Propozycje*. (Warszawa: Konwersatorium "Doświadczenie i Przyszłość," 1981).

13. Kulerski, "Progress of Educational Reform."

14. For further discussion regarding the Teachers' Charter, see "Review of Education Policy in Poland: Examiners' Report and Questions," prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; the Center for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition; and the Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Complete document available on OLIS in its original format [Reference: CCEIT/PIT/DEELSA/ED(95)22].

15. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

16. Zbigniew Kwieciński, *Koniecności-niepokój-nadzieja. Problemy Oświaty w Latach Siedemdziesiątych* (Warszawa: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1982).

17. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*.

18. Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland," *Acta Sociologica* 4 (1990).

19. The ideal of the citizen promoted by communism included conformity, obedience, and passivity. The communist institutions were perceived by the people as hostile, and they were hostile indeed. This resulted in a syndrome known best as "homo sovieticus," as described by Zinowiew in 1985. Among other things, this syndrome is characterized by one's perception of the outside world as threatening and uncontrollable, and by fear of taking personal action.

20. I refer here to the results of several studies focusing on the youth and carried out in Poland in the period 1989-1992. These have been summarized by Grazyna Fluderska in "A Report on the Situation of Children and Youth in Poland" (Polish Foundation for Children and Youth, 1993).

21. Richard C. Remy and M. J. Turner, "Basic Citizenship Competencies, Guidelines for Educators, Policy-makers, and Citizens," *Mershon Quarterly Report* 5 (Autumn 1979): 7.

22. The cognitive schemata that can play a significant role in this process are the so-called "scripts" or action-schemata. These schemata are widely shared cognitive structures that are generalized, schematic representations of chains of actions in a given situation, of typical actors, requisites, and results of their activity. One classic example of a script is the chain of events in which one would participate when going out to dinner. This would involve going to a restaurant, waiting to be seated, looking at the menus, ordering, and so on. A script serves as a tool for understanding one's own and others' actions and gives, in a sense, ready prescriptions for behavior in a given situation. Most behavior is said to be more or less automatically regulated by scripts; see Robert Shank and Robert P. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (New York: Erlbaum, 1977).

23. It is worth emphasizing that, in addition to the classics of progressive Polish pedagogical thinking, several publications on the subject of "democratic school" written after the collapse of communism were included in the list. The number of such publications is growing. Future instructors of the course will have ample opportunities to update the reading list.

24. One can observe a form of "escapism" from the profession among these teachers in Poland since they have an opportunity to find more attractive jobs (e.g., teaching a foreign language). Others may stay in the area of education, but try to avoid working in the school.

25. Dr. Lee Anderson, Professor of Political Science and Education at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois; Dr. John Patrick, Director of the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana; and Dr. Richard Snyder, Professor Emeritus of Educational Policy and Leadership at The Ohio State University, and former Director of the Mershon Center.

26. The Polish reviewers of the course included Dr. Andrzej Janowski, Professor Emeritus of Education, Institute of Pedagogical Research in Warsaw; Dr. Krzysztof Kruszewski, Professor of Education, Department of Education, The University of Warsaw; Dr. Adam Niemiżyński, Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków; and Dr. Bolesław Niemierko.

Professor of Pedagogy, University of Gdańsk. The last reviewer voiced the most critical comments about the program; most of them, however, had to do with the formal aspects of the program (e.g., linguistic clumsiness).

8

The Role of Cross-Cultural Experience in Developing a Teacher Education Course

Gregory E. Hamot



8

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8

The Role of Cross-Cultural Experience in Developing a Teacher Education Course

Gregory E. Hamot

Since 1989, cross-cultural projects between developing democracies in East Central Europe and American educational organizations have attracted considerable funding from governmental and private organizations in the United States. These projects, many aimed at reconsidering citizenship education after the fall of communism, include a variety of short-term exchange programs, lecture series, study tours, and a few long-term activities.¹ However, we know little about visiting scholars' interpretations of these experiences while in the United States.

This chapter presents an analysis of changes in a group of five Polish teacher educators' interpretations of the special role of schools in a democratic society that accompanied their experiences during a long-term project in the United States. My analysis includes attention to the relative contribution of different types of cross-cultural experiences to the Polish educators' orientations, as well as reference to the interplay between their experiences in the United States and their previous experiences in communist Poland.

The Cross-Cultural Setting

As part of the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) project, five Polish educators visited the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University for 14 weeks in the fall of 1992.² Their goal during this extended cross-cultural experience was to develop the draft version of a two-semester preservice teacher-education course plan focused on schools in a democratic society. This component of EDCP and the resultant plan for a course of study were known as "The School in Democratic Society."³

The previous chapter contains a detailed account of the Polish educators' experiences. Briefly, the formal experiences of the project were organized around a four-month program called a curriculum seminar. The curriculum seminar included the following activities related to the Poles' course plan development task: weekly meetings with the American Seminar

Director and one or more consultants; participation in a social studies methods course being taught on campus for preservice teachers, a visit to the Social Studies Development Center and ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education at Indiana University, school visits, and participation in two professional conferences. In addition, a significant portion of the Poles' time in the United States involved cross-cultural experiences outside the formal activities of the curriculum seminar schedule. These experiences stemmed from acquaintances made during the Polish educators' visit to the United States, activities of daily life in American society, and recreational activities such as a college football game and a barn dance.

I served as the coordinator for the curriculum seminar. My responsibilities included helping to plan and facilitate the formal and informal experiences of the Polish educators during their time in the United States. I attended virtually all curriculum seminar meetings and other activities, and I accompanied the Polish educators during many of their unscheduled experiences. Managing the myriad aspects of their cross-cultural experience became both a professional assignment and a personal charge. I used this opportunity to conduct a research project focused on the interplay between the Polish educators' cross-cultural experiences and their changing ideas about the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship.

The Research Questions

I began developing my research questions from the goal of the project as set forth by Richard C. Remy, the Director for the curriculum seminar. The plan for the curriculum seminar stated that the project goal was

to provide a team of five Polish educators with the training, instructional materials, background readings, field experiences, and assistance from expert consultants they need to develop a complete first draft of a *Course Syllabus* for a two-semester college course on "Schools and Democratic Society."

My investigation centered on the experiences of the five Polish educators as they sought to carry out their charge. Specifically, during the course of the study, the following three questions emerged from my experiences with the Polish educators:

1. During their cross-cultural experience, what changes occurred in the Polish educators' constructions, or interpretations, of the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship?
2. Which experiences did the Polish educators note as contributory to these changes?
3. How did the Polish educators' experiences in communist Poland blend with their experiences in the United States to shape their constructions?

The Research Process

I explored these questions through a qualitative research process. My goal was to hear the Polish educators "reveal their *own judgments* in their *own vocabulary* regarding some *important set of elements* in their *own experience*." In pursuit of this goal, I based my research process on the assumption that there are multiple realities of the same phenomenon, and these realities are constructed socially.

Data Gathering Procedures

This study proceeded with the gathering and constant analysis and comparison of qualitative data.⁷ The data gathered for this study included reflections of the Polish educators and myself, interviews with the project participants, observations, project documents, and respondent autobiographies. The following is a summary of the data gathering process:

- **Reflections:** I asked the five Polish educators to record their thoughts on any experiences that brought new information or perspectives to their construction of schooling for democratic citizenship. My reflections took the form of a reflexive journal that noted methodological considerations and choices, acted as a cathartic release, and described my personal contact with the Polish educators.
- **Interviews:** I conducted five regularly scheduled interviews with a set of pre-determined questions based on analysis of data gathered previously. Divergence within interviews occurred during respondent elaboration on the pre-determined questions.
- **Observations:** As both a participant in and systematic observer of the project, my observations included a journal describing each day's activities and detailed notes of the seminar sessions.
- **Project Documents:** The project documents most relevant to my research were the iterations of the draft course plan, the many revisions of the curriculum seminar schedule, and the project file kept in the form of a project chronology.
- **Autobiographies:** The Polish educators wrote autobiographies so I could better understand the relationship between their life histories and (1) their participation in the project and (2) their idiosyncratic interpretations of schooling for democratic citizenship.

Coding and Categorizing the Data

After transcribing each interview and journal entry, I asked the Polish educators to check the transcriptions for accuracy. I then coded sentences, strings of sentences, and fragments of sentences that stood alone in relation to text that came before and after these data.⁸

Subsequent to coding the first raw data, I grouped these data by their conceptual "fit" to each other. As more data were analyzed and certain themes emerged, I developed categorical definitions. Eventually, each stack of data took on a name and a definition.⁹ The categorization process led to the emergence of recurrent themes that addressed the three research questions.

Theoretical Framework for Analysis

In qualitative research, one needs to make sense of data as they are collected. Thus, the qualitative researcher applies one or more theoretical frameworks for analysis. I selected George Kelly's work on the theoretical foundations of cognitive psychology in order to develop an appropriate analytical framework. Kelly's theory, based in constructivist cognitive psychology, served my research purposes for two reasons.

First, this approach to cognitive psychology undergirds the objectives of a qualitative study. Both constructivist cognitive psychologists and qualitative researchers try to "do justice to the internal world of the person."¹⁰ The open question for constructivist psychology and qualitative research is not whether reality exists, but what people, in this case five Polish teacher educators, make of it. The assumption of an unknown reality does not preclude its existence. Rather, this assumption "contends that all we know of the world are human interpretations of our experience of the world."¹¹

Second, the constructivist notion of mutual simultaneous shaping facilitated my understanding of cross-cultural change over time within and across the five Polish educators' cases. Constructivist cognitive psychologists consider our conceptualization of the world as a process of mutual and simultaneous shaping between the individual and his or her environment, not necessarily a behavioral response of the human mind to extant reality. This process precludes the existence of a static universe.¹²

In his *magnum opus* entitled *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*, Kelly linked this notion to a person's idiosyncratic interpretation or construction of experience. He based his personal construct theory on the following epistemological assumption: "*We assume that all of our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision or replacement.*"¹³ He called this view "constructive alternativism." This assumption, its basic theoretical postulate, and pertinent accompanying corollaries operated as the analytical framework for this study.¹⁴

As an analytical framework, the most salient aspect of personal construct theory was Kelly's definition of a construct. To Kelly, a "construct was a basis of making a distinction and, by some act, creating an association. . . . [A] construct is not a class of objects, or an abstraction of a class [as in the case of a concept], but a dichotomous reference axis."¹⁵ In order to understand a person, we need to find both ends of meaning. The range of a construct is defined by what a person means with regard to a certain object or event and continues to what that person defines as its contrast. These dichotomous poles are the likeness and contrast ends of a construct. Beyond this range, the construct becomes irrelevant. So, this heuristic allowed me to analyze the data and to describe the Polish educators' constructions of the school's role in citizenship education through the likenesses and contrasts they noted during their cross-cultural experiences.

The Findings of the Study

Answers to the three questions that emerged throughout the study guided my development of the following findings. These findings refer only to the context and time frame of "The School in Democratic Society" project. However, one may view these findings as useful guides to future endeavors of a similar sort.

Changing Interpretations of the Role of Schools

What changes occurred in the Polish educators' interpretations, or constructions, of the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship? The data indicated that little change occurred in the Polish educators' understandings of the knowledge about democracy that schools needed to address. However, the Polish educators' thoughts changed considerably on the role schools should play in developing students' skills and attitudes.

Knowledge. Each of the Polish educators entered his or her cross-cultural environment with a pre-existing knowledge of democracy. This knowledge grew, in varying degrees, from the educators' longtime scholarly pursuits in Poland. All of them were higher education professionals, and four of them held doctorates in the social and behavioral sciences. Their backgrounds included study of the works commonly associated with Western democracy. Increasing their knowledge of democratic systems, democratic political philosophy, and democratic theory was not a high priority for the Polish educators. The following example represents this finding.

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Throughout the curriculum seminar, various "content" workshops and lectures on democracy took place. These workshops lessened as the mid-point of the project neared. During my second interview with one of the Polish educators, she referred to these workshops in relation to her pre-existing knowledge:

All this other information I already know. It's not so revolutionary for me. The general ideas of the principles of democracy I know. The system of law I didn't know, but it only applied to the development of my mind. I can see democracy in America more broadly, and perhaps my lectures will be better, but I can't see any direct influence.

She believed that the knowledge necessary for schools to address while educating for democratic citizenship was not new to her. Making this knowledge available to students, for the purposes of improving themselves and their society, held the position of importance.

Skills. Although consistent throughout the project, the Polish educators' pre-existing knowledge of democratic systems, democratic political philosophy, and democratic social theory gave them a starting point from which to reconceptualize the role of knowledge in the learning process as both a means and an end. In essence, their knowledge of democracy, when coupled with certain experiences in the United States, was the conduit through which they developed an understanding of the skills students need to have as members of a democratic society. Indicative of this finding was one Polish educator's interpretation of a school visit.

Early in the project, the Polish educators attended classes at one of Columbus' alternative public elementary schools. This alternative school exemplified the Deweyan tradition. The school had no bells, few classroom restraining walls, and classes of mixed age groups.

This experience, at a school involved heavily with skill development as a goal in educating for democratic citizenship, opened one Polish educator's construction to include the application of knowledge through skills:

This school impressed me because for the first time I saw a different framing of the teaching/learning process. The students were mixed in age. They were sitting on the floor and listening to the teacher. I was impressed that in America, you try to give the students democracy in elementary school. This school reminded me of an "academic workshop." For example, students were given a problem about the American electoral system, and they searched for solutions by themselves using resources in the room.

Examples of inquiry-based, active teaching methods designed to apply knowledge through problem-solving skills offered the Polish educators an opportunity to see how students form democratic attitudes.

Attitudes. Teacher modeling of democratic attitudes was essential to the Polish educators' changing constructs concerning the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship. To the Poles, the collaborative, synergetic relationship between American teachers and their students in approaching problems in a democracy represented the democratic process. This process involved the application of knowledge through skills that, when steeped in democratic attitudes, fulfilled the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship.

In a closing reflection, one Polish educator concentrated exclusively on attitudes as the crucial element in defining the function of schools in a democratic society. Over time, she developed a belief that the school's role revolved around the democratic character of the school and the school's efforts to develop this character in students:

My way of thinking about the role of school in a democratic society is rather stable. The democratic school should help in creating democratic attitudes among the students. The school should be a sort of laboratory of democracy. All the obstacles I see in democratizing the school pushes me to organize research on all these barriers. I want to investigate the students and the teachers.

By the end of her cross-cultural experience, this Polish educator believed that if schools are to educate students for democratic citizenship, then schools should model democratic attitudes.

Near the end of their stay in the United States, I asked the Polish educators to describe the teacher modeling they experienced in their cross-cultural environment that indicated the sort of personality conducive to developing democratic skills and attitudes in students. In offering a response, one of the Poles echoed the sentiments of the group by noting the personalities of three teacher educators with whom the Poles worked closely. With regard to one of these personalities, she noted "that it is the way in which he perceives the world. He is curious about the world, and he makes no assumptions about the world. He accepts differences. This is a democratic posture in a teacher." In reference to two American teacher educators who played key roles in the curriculum seminar, the same Polish educator pointed to the attitudes of tolerance and cooperation that pervaded the curriculum development process:

I learned from them that cooperation gives a sort of free space for the transformation of experiences. First of all, this is based on the tolerance of "teachers" and the active approach of "students" instead of the "giving-taking" behavioral pattern.

Experiences with these exemplary teacher personalities were valuable to the Poles' changing interpretations of the teacher's role in a society struggling through transition to democracy.

In addition, the Polish educators believed these teacher educators possessed the democratic attitudes necessary for cooperative efforts in developing democratic citizenship education programs between established and transitional democracies—no prescriptions, but related beliefs steeped in tolerance, cooperation, and open-mindedness. The Poles believed that students could learn these attitudes through teachers who "treat the basic values of democracy as their own. At least they behave like that. Somehow, it works."

Pertinent Cross-Cultural Experiences

Which experiences did the Polish educators note as contributory to their changing construction of the role of schools? Throughout the project, the Polish educators noted many different experiences that played a role in their changing constructions. However, the weekly discussions with the seminar director and one of the consultants, the social studies methods class, and school visits topped each Pole's list. The Poles noted repeatedly the contributory value of these experiences in learning how to relate educational theory to practice in a democratic society. Therefore, the long-term engagement and dialogue with teacher education experts, along with exposure to classes taught by master teachers, offered the Poles experiences through which they changed their ideas about the school's role in preparing students for democratic citizenship.

Curriculum Seminar Discussions. The following case highlights the importance the Polish educators placed on their experiences in the curriculum seminar. This case involved one Polish educator who, during the course of the curriculum seminar, changed his entry-level construction of the knowledge necessary for exercising democratic citizenship.

Initially, he believed in the importance of knowing the facts about democracy without any particular expression of how students should apply these facts. Over time, his interpretation

of necessary knowledge evolved into the applications of knowledge important to democratic citizenship in Poland as well as the content that specified this knowledge. In his reflective journal, he attributed this change to his experiences in the curriculum seminar:

I have learned much about different methods of teaching, but they must be adapted to Polish curricula, to Polish programs. A great deal of work is before us! Books, papers, and other materials that I collected are of great importance. General instructions on how to use them were given [in the curriculum seminars]. . . . Our curriculum seminars during this last period of time were a very important experience in creating modern ways of teaching.

Halfway through the project, I asked him about the importance of knowledge application as part of what schools should teach for democratic citizenship. He noted an example of this new-found use of knowledge in his first-hand experience with an American presidential election: "It has given me profound knowledge; knowledge of *how*, which has expanded my knowledge of *what*." His observation of the American electoral process indicated to him why students must learn to apply knowledge as a basic citizenship competency in a democracy.

Indicative of the other Polish educators, he proceeded to note his shift from the previously assumed primacy of knowledge to a broader construct of knowledge, skills, and attitudes working together through the educational process. The curriculum seminar contributed to his changed understanding: "I'm even more convinced than before that the content of teaching—knowledge—plays an equal role with practice in educating for democracy. If you know *how*, you have skills; knowledge gives you the *what*."

The Social Studies Methods Course. As part of the curriculum seminar process, the Polish educators attended a social studies methods course being taught on campus for pre-service teachers. The course met twice a week for ten weeks. One case typified the role this experience played for the group. This Polish educator interpreted the course activities as examples of essential teacher skills in a democratic society. In her second journal entry, she reflected on the aspects of the course that contributed to her understanding of the variety of skills teachers need to develop in a democratic society:

There is one course that I attend each week with great excitement. The course in methods is my favorite course each week. The professor is an inspiring teacher, and it is nice to be an observer of his teaching methods as well as a participant in his course. I find his own personal way of teaching to be gifted and inspirational. This has prompted me to observe my own teaching methods and do some work to keep my own methods from becoming routine and stale.

She wrote this reflection four weeks into the course. Having taken this course myself, I knew that problem solving through reflective inquiry and active teaching methods were at the heart of the professor's beliefs in educating for democratic citizenship.

However, I waited two weeks before asking her to elaborate on the specific teaching methods she took from the course. We conducted our second interview midway through the course. My interest was in the methods she believed to be of value in developing student skills for democratic citizenship:

Generally, I am impressed by the professionalism of his teaching strategies. For example, I see that some parts of his teaching methods—inquiry, simulations, case studies—can be very good material to adopt for future teachers and a good source of information about the formal aspect of the teaching process. My twenty years of experience were not so professional. I concentrated on lecturing in the didactic way.

During our fourth interview, this Polish educator elaborated on Poland's need to improve education in three skill-related areas: (1) teacher educator skills, (2) preservice teacher skill development, and (3) the skills that enable citizens to understand different points of view on controversial issues and resolve conflict over these differing views. Again, she referred to her experience in the social studies methods course:

When I think about my college students [preservice teachers], I have to use more of these techniques. I was asking them what they think when I gave them some readings, but I was not really concentrating on what they were really thinking. I really don't know if I was giving them the opportunity for critical thinking and finding out what they think as an outcome of the course.

I prefer active teaching and learning, especially if you have to think about diversity—different points of view, controversial issues, or conflict of values. You can't do this from an autocratic position or lecturing. The only way to do it is by using active teaching methods like inquiry, simulations, role playing, and games. When dealing with such content, you can't separate the method of teaching.

Her interpretations typified the contribution this experience made to the group's understanding of the relationship between student skills, teacher skills, and citizenship skills in a democracy. For her, the course presented a pragmatic link between these three skill-related areas.

School Visits. A third experience the Polish educators noted frequently as contributory to their constructions involved visits to local schools. One of these visits prompted a Polish educator to highlight this experience as an indication of the types of social skill development involved in problem solving that exemplified the school in a democratic society.

As part of this school visit, she attended a third-grade mathematics lesson. During the class, the teacher asked the students to divide into groups of four. Each group had to decide how to spend \$14. In her journal, the Polish educator described the scene that followed:

Then, a common decision making process started. The teacher was very concerned about the children following democratic rules. She was stressing the right of everybody to express one's own opinion, the importance of listening to others, etc. The children were amazingly competent in this process. I liked the idea of such exercises in school very much.

During our next interview, she referred to this sort of democratic skill development activity as a "positive approach to educating for democratic citizenship. Teachers must give students the possibility to solve problems and exercise their abilities on the issues. It cannot be given through simple, traditional prescriptions."

The Function of Experiences in a Communist Society

How did the Polish educators' experiences in communist Poland blend with their experiences in the United States to shape their constructions? Data from this study made clear that the Polish educators' pre-existing constructs served as contrasting standards against which they evaluated their experiences in the United States. They based these standards on the vestigial attitudes of a communist totalitarian society still evident during Poland's transition to democracy. These pre-existing constructs extended beyond schools to society in general.

Learned Helplessness and Intolerance. Since the Polish educators lived most of their lives under communism, this finding seems somewhat obvious. However, their different

experiences with and interpretations of communism converged on two aspects of life in both communist and post-communist Poland—learned helplessness and intolerance. The need for hierarchical direction to live one's life is learned helplessness. One's lack of openness toward different viewpoints is intolerance. These two aspects of life defined the contrast end of the Polish educators' pre-existing understandings of democratic citizenship.

Exemplary of this position, one Polish educator referred to a characteristic she believed inherent to all schools. This characteristic made Poland's transition from communism to democracy particularly problematic: "All education transmits values. School represents the social order, defends all traditional values and interests. It is resistant to social changes." I asked for her opinion on how Polish schools can approach a reconstruction of attitudes that would reflect a democratic perspective. Historical context played a role in her response:

There is a question before I become more precise. What kind of previous experience do we have to shape attitudes toward citizenship? This is a crucial question. This can be taught based upon a negation of what was. Without a direct experience, you have a difficult time understanding democratic citizenship.

Her previous, negative experiences centered on the twin barriers of learned helplessness reproduced through education and the high level of intolerance still evident in post-communist Polish society.

In our first interview, she explained both of these barriers. The barrier of learned helplessness involved a feeling in Polish society that "people have no control over the result of their actions. There are no links between your effort and the outcome." To this Polish educator, the barrier of intolerance was one of "the Polish human mentality. This means that there is intolerance for different points of view, including minority views."

Her pre-existing understanding of Polish society contrasted with her definition of the attitudes that schools needed to model for and develop in students. She believed that schools should nurture student attitudes that enable them to think independently and "tolerate each other's differences." Developing attitudes of this sort represented a way of countering learned helplessness and intolerance evident in Poland's transitional democracy.

Schools as Agents of Change. During their time in the United States, the Poles showed the greatest interest in experiences that illustrated how schools might nurture students toward democratic orientations that could counter key barriers to democratic transition, such as learned helplessness and intolerance. To each educator, though, the belief that society could be changed through the singular institution of schooling held little, if any, possibility. Yet, even though the role of schools as the major societal change agent was not realistic to the Poles, each of them believed that schooling could contribute to the development of democratic attitudes.

This changing interpretation was evident by the mid-point of the project. At that time, one of the Polish educators typified the group's movement in a direction of hope for the role schools can play in a society steeped in intolerant attitudes and learned helplessness. She referred to her experiences in the social studies methods class the Polish educators attended during the curriculum seminar as the type of preservice teacher preparation that could develop democratic attitudes in Poland's future teachers. She took from this course a way of thinking that indicated needed change in Polish schools: "I think the change of attitude, as I have told you, is important. If it's applicable or not, we'll see. The crucial point is changing the way of thinking. For this purpose, the methods class was the most important experience." Through her experience in the methods course, she concluded that if teachers are to play a

role in developing democratic attitudes in Polish society, they must highlight the best aspects of their students' abilities and model an open-minded attitude.

Also, the Polish educators formed the belief that certain skills developed through schooling could engender democratic attitudes in future adult generations. Aimed at continuous, positive change, the Poles believed that democracy fostered an attitude of active citizenship throughout people's lives. In the future, these attitudes could help to replace pathological remnants from the totalitarian, communist past.

Interpretations by the Poles concerning life in an established democracy that blended with their previous experiences indicated this belief. Their interpretations of American society pointed toward the inseparability of means and tentative ends in a democracy. These interpretations contrasted with a past incongruity between means (intolerant totalitarianism) and ends (utopian egalitarianism) in a communist society.

Implications for Policy Makers and Program Directors

In 1991, the Citizens Democracy Corps listed 178 American non-profit organizations providing voluntary, collaborative educational assistance to East Central Europe.¹⁶ In their most recent report, the Citizenship Democracy Corps listed 354 such projects.¹⁷

Although these efforts represent a wide range of applied and basic research, the dramatic growth of educational projects during the short time between these two reports is evidence of a remarkable phenomenon. First, these numbers represent projects started only since 1989—the year communism began to collapse in East Central Europe. Second, more than 176 projects started in the period between the first and second reports.¹⁸ These numbers indicate that the trend is not slowing down.

Given this situation, what does this study imply for an audience comprised of Ministries of National Education and non-governmental organizations¹⁹ in developing democracies and American governmental and non-governmental institutions, as they seek to collaborate on future, cross-cultural projects concerned with schooling in a transitional democracy? This audience includes the program directors appointed by policy makers to develop and to carry out these collaborative efforts. Although the following recommendations are for policy makers in the United States and in East Central Europe, some of the recommendations are relevant to any democracy emerging from civil strife or colonialism.

Focus on Developing a Product

First, as policy makers look to the educational needs of developing democracies, a recommendation from this study is to support projects that offer a wide range of experiences designed to help the participants complete a clearly focused, limited task. This task should be to create some type of tangible product, such as a course plan, book, or report that will meet needs established by the developing democracy.

Like many exchange programs of considerable length, the cross-cultural component of "The School in Democratic Society" project offered a very broad range of experiences. During this program, however, the five Polish educators spent 14 weeks immersed in the culture of the United States, with an imperative to complete a draft course plan before returning home. In total, the data gathered for this study indicated that the need to complete this task encouraged, in a positive way, a sort of selective perception wherein the Poles chose to interpret or pay the greatest attention to those events they saw as most germane to finishing their

task. Thus, the intense need to complete a task may have helped the Poles to sort through what otherwise might have been a nearly unmanageable array of cross-cultural experiences and focus their interpretations on those each of them deemed as most pertinent to educational reform in Poland.

For example, as evidenced by the curriculum seminar schedule, the Polish educators had the opportunity to explore many aspects of American education, social life, and professional development. These opportunities stemmed from the core element of the curriculum seminar and experiences drawn from ancillary activities. The relationship between the range of cross-cultural activities and the task at hand was viewed by the Polish educators as a crucial aspect of their experience. Through a project with an intense focus on product development, the Polish educators took every opportunity to assimilate their broad range of cross-cultural experiences into their conceptualization of the draft course plan. A broad range of experiences, coupled with a needs-based product, will help insure substantive outcomes from similar projects.

Flexibility in Pursuit of the Project Goal

The previous implication leads to the second recommendation. What is not evident from the curriculum seminar schedule is the flexible nature of the project in pursuit of the goal to complete a draft course plan. The schedule that appears in the Appendix is the final, and seventh, version of the schedule. Schedule changes took place as unexpected requirements for task completion became evident. My findings from the first two questions raised during this study emerged as a consequence of the schedule's flexibility. The Poles and Americans worked to adjust the schedule to fit the changing and developing constructs of the Poles and any unforeseen, task-related needs that arose during the project. An example of this flexibility involved two unscheduled events: one Polish educator's trip to a conflict resolution conference in Washington, DC, and another Polish educator's trip to visit with and interview a prominent American political scientist in New Haven, Connecticut.

All the findings indicated the applicability of certain knowledge, skills, and attitudes from an established democracy to a developing democracy. The five Polish educators left with a draft course plan indicative of some experiences not yet available to Polish students, teachers, and teacher educators. Their choices of what could be imported into the Polish educational system with regard to education for democratic citizenship stemmed from myriad experiences in their flexible, yet focused, cross-cultural environment. Policy makers should look to projects capable of offering such flexibility in relation to the project's needs-based task.

Prolonged Engagement by Participants

The third implication of this study is the length of such a project. This implication contrasts with the many requests for proposals concerning educational reform in East Central Europe that are short in length of cross-cultural components.

The notion of "prolonged engagement," a requirement for participant observation in a qualitative study, also applied to the Polish educators during this project. For example, the qualitative researcher engages a culture for long periods of time to make sure first impressions are not merely "skin deep." The Polish educators' prolonged engagement with their cross-cultural environment allowed them to go beyond a passing glance at aspects of American education. This length of engagement allowed for penetrating analysis of what on first impression, might have seemed applicable to the Polish context, but was later exposed as valueless. The opposite situation—eventually garnering value from experiences construed

initially as meaningless—was also the case in some instances. What the Polish educators experienced initially was not necessarily what they took from their cross-cultural environment weeks or months later at the end of their stay in the United States.

Know the Participants' Backgrounds

A fourth implication of this study for policy makers is the need to explore the backgrounds of participants from developing democracies. For example, the findings from the first question raised by this study revealed that the Polish educators' knowledge of democracy was greater than the American seminar director and consultants had anticipated.

An exploration of potential participants' pre-existing construct systems, possibly through analysis of autobiographical and interview data, could help insure participant selections that facilitate progress toward the goals of a similar project. Additionally, increased knowledge of prospective participants could assist policy makers in deciding whether or not a project merits funding.

The need to explore the backgrounds of prospective participants in such projects should be a matter of collaboration between project co-directors from the established and developing democracies. Indeed, this sort of collaboration was the case in "The School in Democratic Society" project. Yet, the initial process, regardless of prerequisite criteria generated collaboratively, is in the hands of the policy makers from the developing democracy. To them, this implication is of particular importance.

Next Steps

In this study, I explored five Polish educators' changing ideas about the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship. I concentrated on their cross-cultural experiences in the United States during an organized, task-driven project.

What, then, are the implications of the findings generated by this study as they relate to possible future research on "The School in Democratic Society" project and new projects of a similar sort? Two recommendations concerning further cross-cultural psychological research on such projects emanated from this study.

First, a follow-up question lingers. What residual aspects of the Polish educators' cross-cultural experiences emerged in their teaching of the role of schools in educating for democratic citizenship after they returned home and over time? In other words, was the project of lasting value to the participants?

In order to get at this question, research in Poland is a necessary next step. Further research on the residual aspects of the Polish educators' cross-cultural experiences could germinate from the three findings offered in this chapter.

Part of this research, namely interviews with the Polish educators, could be carried out in English. However, observations in the Polish educators' classrooms is an essential part of the next step. This observational aspect of further research requires collaboration with Polish-speaking researchers familiar with qualitative research techniques and the theory of personal constructs. Of course, Polish researchers could conduct the entire next study.

Second, as a prototype, "The School in Democratic Society" has no basis for comparison. Yet, the final version of the course plan is now in the hands of Ministries of Education throughout East Central Europe, scholars at East Central European and American universities, and policy makers in American governmental and non-governmental funding organizations. Coupled with the increasing number of collaborative education projects between

American and East Central European interests, this exposure leads me to believe that similar efforts might be forthcoming.

Given this broad interest in "The School in Democratic Society," the prospect of future teacher education projects offers the possibility for undertaking similar studies. As more cross-cultural psychological studies emerge from future collaborations, the findings from this study can function as a basis for comparison. Through increased knowledge on the way teacher educators from developing democracies interpret their cross-cultural experiences in established democracies, the resultant understanding of how schools can improve their role in educating future citizens will be of value to all democracies and their policy makers.

Notes

1. The following guides discuss the many educational efforts in East Central Europe funded by American and international governmental and private organizations: A. E. Dick Howard, *Democracy's Dawn: A Directory of American Initiatives on Constitutionalism, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1991); Elan Garonzik, ed., *International Guide to Funders Interested in Central and Eastern Europe* (Brussels, Belgium: Orpheus Programme, 1993); Citizens Democracy Corps, *Compendium: U.S. Nonprofit Activities in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States* (Washington, D.C.: Citizens Democracy Corps, 1994).

2. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

3. Krzysztof Broclawik, Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, Marek Simlat, Marta Zahorska-Bugaj, and Elzbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz, "Curriculum Seminar: 'Schools and Democratic Society'" (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age, 1992), photocopied. Originally, the title of the project and course plan was "Schools and Democratic Society." In May, 1994, the authors changed the course title to "The School in Democratic Society." (See Appendix I for citations and availability of this document and other CDGA publications.)

4. *Ibid.*, 1.

5. Mildred M. McCoy, "Personal Construct Theory and Methodology in Intercultural Research," in Jack Adams-Webber and James C. Mancuso, eds., *Applications of Personal Construct Theory* (Toronto: Academic Press Canada, 1983), p. 175.

6. Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba discussed multiple realities as an ontological assumption of qualitative research in *Naturalistic Inquiry* (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1985), pp. 70-91.

7. Initially, Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss explicated the constant comparison of cases as a method of sorting qualitative data in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); Strauss reiterated the process in *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

8. Regarding interview data, the respondent's name, interview number, and question number would have been lost without some sort of coding system. I developed a code for marking each datum in the

margin next to the datum. The following is an example: GrInt2#3(d)VI. This code indicates that the datum was Greg's (Gr) second interview (Int2), third question (#3), and fourth divergent question (d). Prior to cutting and mounting each datum on an index card for categorization, I bound photostatic copies of each analyzed sheet of text in individual binders by respondent and in chronological order. In so doing, I was able to return to the full transcript, if necessary, to find the quote in its original, textual setting.

9. In the example cited above, "VI" represents the category of "Values." For journal entries, the same system applied without recognition of question numbers and letters.

10. Maureen L. Pope, "Personal Construction of Formal Knowledge," *Interchange* 13 (1982): 3.

11. Anne K. Bednar, Donald Cunningham, Thomas M. Duffy, and J. David Perry, "Theory into Practice: How Do We Link?" in Gary J. Anglin, ed., *Instructional Technology: Past, Present, and Future* (Englewood, Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1991), p. 92.

12. The assumption of mutual simultaneous shaping as a way of understanding a person's relation to his or her environment is set forth by Lincoln and Guba, *Naturalistic Inquiry*, pp. 151-157.

13. George A. Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*, Volume 1, *A Theory of Personality* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955), p. 15.

14. George A. Kelly explicated his postulate and accompanying corollaries in *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*, Volume 1, *A Theory of Personality*; Kelly's abridged version of this meta-theory appears in "A Brief Introduction to Personal Construct Theory," in D. Bannister, ed., *Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory*, (London and New York: Academic Press, 1970).

15. Kelly, "A Brief Introduction," p. 17.

16. Citizens Democracy Corps, *Compendium: U.S. Nonprofit Activities in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States* (Washington, D.C.: Citizens Democracy Corps, 1991).

17. Citizens Democracy Corps, *Compendium*, 1994.

18. One must consider that some projects from the first two-year period finished before 1993. As a result, the number 354 represents an increase of more than 176 projects.

19. "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland" was a collaborative effort between the Mershon Center and the Polish Ministry of National Education. However, since the conclusion of this study, a non-governmental Polish organization, The Center for Citizenship Education, became a major partner in the ongoing project. As a result, the recommendations in this section can apply to non-governmental as well as governmental organizations in developing democracies.

9

Support for Democracy and a Market Economy Among Polish Students, Teachers, and Parents

Kazimierz M. Slomczynski and Goldie Shabad



9

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9

Support for Democracy and a Market Economy Among Polish Students, Teachers, and Parents

Kazimierz M. Slomczynski and Goldie Shabad

Scholars and pundits alike will long debate exactly what role the lack of popular support for single party rule and state socialism played in the downfall of communism in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Scholars will also continue to discuss the extent to which widespread commitment to democratic values and rules of the game on the part of the mass public is a necessary condition for stable democracy.¹ No one, however, disputes that governing elites are keenly interested in reproducing through political socialization processes core values and norms that underlie the prevailing political and economic order. Newly established regimes, in particular, will engage in efforts to shape the values and norms of young generations, since in the early stages of political transformation emergent ruling elites must confront the cultural legacies, and often the leaders and political forces, of the past. Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) originated in 1991 as one such effort.²

Focus of Inquiry

This research is part of a larger, multi-disciplinary research effort stimulated by EDCP to systematically examine the impact of Polish efforts to establish new programs of citizenship education.³ In this analysis we address two questions directly relevant to civic education reform in Poland. *First*, what are the relative levels of support for democracy and a market economy among students, teachers, and parents in postcommunist Poland? *Second*, what is the relative impact of two key determinants of support for democracy and the market—psychological dispositions and social structural characteristics—among Polish students, teachers, and parents. We conclude by outlining needed research on political socialization and civic education in Poland that can build upon baseline studies such as this.

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Support for Democracy and a Market Economy

Parents and teachers are principal agents of political socialization; students are the targets of such socialization. In our examination of levels and determinants of support for democracy, we focus on the principles of political equality, the legitimacy of the expression of group interests, and the holding of competitive elections as mechanisms for the selection of governmental leaders and for ensuring governmental accountability. These principles are at the core of the definition of liberal democracy,⁴ and they stand in sharp contrast to those that undergirded both the ideology and practice of communist rule in Poland.

Just as liberal democracy stands in sharp contrast to single party communist rule, the operating rules and institutions of market capitalism are the antithesis of those of state socialism.⁵ In our analysis of support for a new economic order, we focus on such key features of market capitalism as tolerance for marked disparities in income, the use of material incentives to promote and reward educational attainment, and the reliance on individual initiative and responsibility for one's well being.

The questions that we pose, then, are to what extent do students, teachers, and parents express agreement with these core elements of democracy and a market economy, and to what degree do the three groups differ from one another in terms of their political and economic orientations? Although this descriptive analysis is based on data derived from studies conducted a few years after the onset of the transition to democratic rule and market capitalism, it can nonetheless serve as a useful benchmark for later assessments of the extent to which political socialization efforts have succeeded in creating a value system congruent with the new political and economic order.

Determinants of Support for Democracy and the Market

Another purpose of this analysis is to determine the relative impact of key determinants of support for democracy and a market economy among students, teachers, and parents. Here we focus on two sets of variables known to affect the outcomes of political socialization.

The first variables are psychological dispositions or aspects of personality having to do with valuation of self-direction versus conformity, authoritarian-conservatism versus open-mindedness, and resistance to change versus acceptance of innovation. There is a substantial body of evidence in support of the long-standing argument that these three dimensions of psychological functioning, as well as others, influence individuals' political and economic orientations.⁶

We would expect that those persons who place greater emphasis on self-direction and who are more open-minded and receptive to change would be more likely to embrace democracy and a market economy. It may well be, however, that these psychological dispositions are linked more strongly to support for democracy than to acceptance of a market economy or vice-versa. Moreover, these personality characteristics may have greater impact on the views of teachers and parents, for example, than those of students. These are issues that we will address.

The second set of determinants of support for democracy and a market economy we explore pertains to the social structural characteristics of individuals. Income, employment status, and educational level, among other individual-level social structural attributes, are strongly related to one's self interests and hence to one's preferences regarding political and economic matters.

In the case of postcommunist societies, the ongoing transition to a market economy will likely create clear "winners" and "losers" depending upon individuals' market assets, and

their ability and willingness to adjust to the new economic rules of the game. But it is also well documented that in many societies, including Poland, an individual's position in the social structure is related as well to one's valuation of self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism, and resistance to change.⁷ Hence, in examining the degree to which psychological dispositions and social structural attributes are related to the political and economic orientations of students, teachers, and parents, we will also assess the independent effects of each set of variables on their support for systemic transformation in Poland.

This analysis of the psychological and social structural determinants of such political and economic orientations can also serve as a benchmark for subsequent studies of political socialization in Poland. This analysis presents a snapshot of the structural and psychological context in which the learning of political and economic values was taking place during the period of flux and uncertainty following the overthrow of communism in 1989. Our results may reflect long-term trends with regard to the determinants of support for democracy and a market economy, or they may be indicative of more short-term trends in the processes and outcomes of political learning. Only longitudinal studies of political socialization will be able to address this issue.

Sources of Data

In autumn 1994, EDCP introduced a new civic education course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, in 56 elementary schools in Poland.⁸ As part of a larger EDCP research initiative, we gathered original data in 1994 on a sample of 295 Polish students before they were exposed to the new course and a sample of 53 Polish teachers before they began teaching the course. The student and teacher surveys contained a common core of questions related to psychological dispositions, political and economic orientations, and standard, individual-level demographic characteristics.⁹

The EDCP Student and Teacher Survey

At the beginning of the 1994 school year a questionnaire was administered to students in 12 selected elementary schools in which the new EDCP civic education course was being introduced. We chose these schools from various regions of Poland so that they would "represent" diversified school environments. We do not claim to have a probability sample of either schools or students. Ours is a special sample of those who were to be subject to an experimental treatment. Nonetheless, we will show that the findings from this sample are very similar to the results from another, more representative, sample of students of the same age.

A somewhat different questionnaire was administered to teachers in June and August 1994 at the beginning of a special EDCP training session. The first session was attended by 27 teachers and the second by 26. Certainly, the teachers included in our study do not represent all elementary school teachers, or even all teachers of civic education; rather, they constitute a select group linked to EDCP. Since they volunteered to participate in the experimental program, it is likely that they were more interested in issues of democracy and the market than other teachers.

Other Survey Data

In this chapter we also use data from other surveys. In particular, we analyze data from a 1992-1993 study, "Social Structure and Psychological Functioning under Radical Social Change," in which respondents were students aged 12-15 and their parents.¹⁰ This constitutes our TRIADS 1993 data file. In addition, we make use of an analogous file, TRIADS 1978, which contains data for students and their parents gathered 15 years earlier, toward the end of Edward Gierek's rule and prior to the formation of Solidarity.¹¹

Finally, for comparative purposes we also present 1993 survey data from a national sample of Polish adults.¹² From this survey we extracted data for those who were parents of children aged 12-14. These data are referred to as PANEL 1993.

Levels of Support for Democracy and the Market

Our 1994 surveys of students and teachers, as well as Panel 1993, included a wide variety of questions related to political and economic orientations. Based on a factor analysis of survey items, we constructed indexes on support for democracy and support for a market economy that are at once comparable among the three groups—students, teachers, and parents—and valid for each of them.¹³ To investigate support for democracy, we focus here on items that refer to political equality, competitive elections, and the legitimacy of interest group politics. In the case of support for a market economy, our items refer to income differentiation, the use of material incentives to reward professional training, and individual initiative and responsibility. Table 1 presents the percentages of pro-democratic and pro-market responses to the two sets of questions.

How do students, teachers, and parents compare? We might suppose that of the three groups students would exhibit the greatest degree of support for democratic norms and certain features of a market economy because of their comparatively limited exposure to Communist-era values in the school and the mass media and their greater capacity for social learning.¹⁴ At the same time, one could argue that teachers and parents would be more apt than students to express pro-change views, at least with regard to the political order, because of their greater capacity for social learning and the greater likelihood that many of them actively rejected the Communist past based on their own personal experience. In terms of their economic orientations, however, one might expect that teachers and parents would show greater reluctance to endorse market principles because adults are more likely than young people to perceive that their self-interests might very well be harmed by the transition to a market economy.

The percentages of pro-democratic and pro-market responses shown in Table 1 provide a basis for assessing group differences. In general, adults tend to be substantially more supportive of democratic principles than students. For instance, almost five times as many teachers as students disagreed with the statement "Elections are not necessary if political leaders well represent the interests of citizens." Differences between parents and students in their degree of support for democracy were smaller, but still significant in statistical terms. For instance, 51.2% of parents and 15.1% of students disagreed with the statement "It is best for the state if only one well-suited person actually governs."

The pattern of responses among the three groups was different with regard to acceptance of basic features of a market economy. On the whole, students were somewhat more positive toward the market than were either teachers or parents. There was one noteworthy exception to this tendency, however. Only five percent of students, but 31% of teachers and 25% of parents, disagreed with the statement, "The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one."

Table 1
Indicators of Support for Democracy and a Market Economy among
Students and Teachers in 1994, and Parents in 1993

Indicators	Students	Teachers	Parents
	Percent of Answers		
A. Support for Democracy			
Everyone should have a right to participate in elections even if he or she knows nothing about politics: "strongly agree".	-	56.6	-
It is best for the state if only one well-suited person actually governs: "strongly disagree" or "rather disagree".	15.1	-	51.2
Only those who are able to act in the interest of all citizens should be involved in politics: "strongly disagree" or "rather disagree".	4.1	13.2	19.6
Elections are not necessary if political leaders well represent the interests of citizens: "strongly disagree" or "rather disagree".	14.2	67.9	42.7
B. Support for the Market			
Large differences in income are necessary to ensure the well being of our country: "strongly agree" or "rather agree".	43.7	37.7	40.1
No one would study for years in order to become a doctor or a lawyer if s/he didn't expect to make a lot more money than the average worker: "strongly agree" or "rather agree".	55.8	35.8	38.1
The state should provide a job for everyone who wants one: "strongly agree" or "rather agree".	5.4	31.4	25.3

Sources: Students' and teachers' data files (1994). Parents from Triads file (1993) for support for democracy and from the panel file (1993) for support for the market.

To facilitate inter-group comparisons, we examined the mean scores of students, teachers, and parents on the summary measures of support for democracy and a market economy derived from the factor analysis.¹⁴ In interpreting these results we should take into account that our group of teachers is comprised of those persons who chose to be involved in pursuing a new civics curriculum. Accordingly, the teachers in our sample were much more optimistic in their overall evaluation of recent political and economic changes in Poland than the comparative group of parents. In response to the question, "In your opinion, have the changes introduced in Poland in the past four years brought most people only benefits, more benefits than losses, as many benefits as losses, more losses than benefits, or only losses?", only 11 percent of teachers answered "more losses than benefits" or "only losses." In contrast, 68 percent of parents were equally negative in their assessments.

Students were less supportive of democracy than parents, as indicated by their respective arithmetic means for each of the three specific items. The differences between students and teachers should be assessed with caution because of the very small number of common items and their skewed distributions. However, in the case of the two common items, the average scores indicate that students were also less supportive of democracy than their teachers. With respect to support for a market economy, the differences between students and the two groups of adults are much clearer. The average value of the pro-market scale is significantly higher for students than it is for either teachers or parents.

Although our analyses indicate significant inter-group differences in the levels of support for democracy and a market economy, it is also clear that each group was marked by internal division in their political and economic orientations. In no instance was there an overwhelming majority in agreement with either democratic norms or with market principles. Indeed, when a consensus existed, it was over values associated with the "communist legacy" of social harmony, state welfarism, and "enlightened," responsive, but non-accountable political leadership. Thus, we see here among both adult agents of socialization and the targets of such political learning, adolescent youth, varied combinations of norms and orientations associated with two competing political and economic belief systems: one, the legacy of the communist past and the other, an emergent ideology of democracy and capitalism.

Determinants of Support for Democracy and a Market Economy

We now turn to our second question: what is the relative impact of two key determinants of support for democracy and a market economy—psychological dispositions and social structural characteristics—among Polish students, teachers, and parents? Put another way, why is it that some individuals are more likely to express pro-democratic and pro-market views than others? We will begin with an examination of psychological dispositions.

Psychological Dispositions and Levels of Support

Our analysis of the impact of psychological dispositions focuses on three dimensions of psychological functioning widely regarded to have considerable bearing on the content of political and economic orientations. These are valuation of self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism, and resistance to change.

Valuation of self-direction refers to non-conformity standards that people would like to see embodied in a young generation. Extensive cross-national analyses indicate that self-direction versus conformity is a universal dimension of values.¹⁶ Authoritarian-conservatism refers to people's definition of what is socially acceptable: at one extreme is a rigid adherence to dictates of authority and intolerance of non-conformity and, at the other extreme, open-mindedness.¹⁷ Resistance to change refers to people's lack of receptivity to innovation. Although authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change are strongly correlated with each other, they constitute distinguishable dimensions of personality, not only in the United States, but also in Poland and other countries.¹⁸

Measurement of Self-Direction. Our measurement of self-direction follows the tradition of studies originated by Kohn and Schooler.¹⁹ Their approach is based on the theoretical premise that a central manifestation of values is to be found in choice. It is not so important

Table 2
Measurement of Valuation of Self-direction among Students
in 1994, 1993, and 1978

Indicators	Students		
	1994	1993	1978
	Factor Loadings		
Good Manners	-.41	-.50	-.54
Neatness	-.21	-.28	-.39
Sound judgment	.27	.42	.49
Self-control	.19	.18	.56
Obedience	-.41	-.44	-.26
Responsibility	.32	.43	.09
Being interested	.35	.23	.47
Being a good student	-.40	-.41	-.49
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(2.11)	(2.35)	(1.74)

Sources: Students 1994—authors' own computation from data file Students 1994; students 1993 in Slomeczynski *et al.*, 1994, p. 140 (Table XI-1); students 1978 in Kohn and Slomeczynski, 1993, p. 177 (Table 7.1B)

that a person values honesty per se; the critical question is whether that person values honesty more or less than self-control, or obedience, or some other valued personality characteristic. Consonant with the most comprehensive study of self-direction in Poland, we included in our student and teacher questionnaires, thirteen personality and behavioral characteristics that can be valued for young people aged 13-15: responsibility, good manners, neatness and cleanliness, being a good student, honesty, obedience to parents, self-control, curiosity, sensitivity to others' needs, acting like a boy/girl should, getting along with others, and trying hard to succeed.²⁰ Using a scale created from our respondents' partial ranking of these thirteen characteristics, we conducted a factor analysis and found eight characteristics that constituted a self-direction dimension. They are presented in Tables 2 and 3.

The factor loadings shown in Table 2 indicate that virtually the same structure of valuation of self-direction emerged among students at three different points in time. For students in 1978, 1993, and 1994 such characteristics as responsibility, curiosity, sound judgment, and self-control were positively related to self-direction, while such characteristics as good manners, neatness, obedience, and being a good student were negatively related to self-direction.²¹ We can conclude that, with respect to self-direction, the students from our 1994 sample were as equally representative of this population group as those from the 1993 national survey. However, a significant difference emerged between students surveyed in 1993 and 1978. Mach's research²² and our own analysis²¹ reveal that students surveyed in 1993 valued self-direction more highly than did those surveyed in 1978.

Table 3 presents the results for teachers and parents with regard to their evaluation of self-direction. The structure of these results is very similar to that for students in 1993 and 1994 insofar as responsibility, curiosity, sound judgment, and self-control relate positively to self-direction, while good manners, neatness, obedience, and being a good student relate nega-

Table 3
Measurement of Valuation of Self-direction among
Teachers in 1994, and Parents in 1993 and 1978

Indicators	Teachers	Parents	
	1994	1993	1978
	Factor Loadings		
Good Manners	-.44	-.32	-.35
Neatness	-.10	.21	-.25
Sound judgment	.49	.25	.45
Self-control	.76	.27	.32
Obedience	-.43	-.56	-.41
Responsibility	.05	.32	.27
Being interested	.64	.39	.34
Being a good student	-.38	-.30	-.41
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(2.01)	(1.31)	(1.74)

Sources: Teachers 1994—authors' own computation from data file Teachers 1994; parents 1993 in Slomczynski *et al.*, 1994, p. 140 (Table IX-1); parents 1978 in Kohn and Slomczynski, 1993, p.177 (Table 7.1B), average loadings for fathers and mothers.

tively. Only with respect to one item, responsibility, is the loading for teachers noticeably lower than that for parents.

These results for parents are in accord with other studies of self-direction in Poland conducted in the 1970s and 1980s which showed that the valuation of self-direction is a very robust dimension of psychological functioning among adults.²⁴ According to these studies, inter-group differences among age cohorts and between men and women were negligible. Moreover, no research has found change in the valuation of self-direction over time among the adult population of Poland. Given this stability in adults' values of self-direction, it is worth emphasizing that we, like Mach,²⁵ have found that there has been a significant shift in the valuation of self-direction among students. In 1994 students valued self-direction more than they did at the end of 1970s.

Authoritarian-conservatism and Resistance to Change. Tables 4 and 5 show scales for authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. Our analysis for students, teachers, and parents shows that the fit of data to the scales of authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change is satisfactory, as indicated by the low ratio of chi square to the degree of freedom.

The average scores on the authoritarian-conservatism scale of both students and parents diminished significantly in the period 1978-1993.²⁶ Both students and parents were less conservative in the present period of rapid societal change than in the era of communist stability of the late 1970s. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the shifts over time on the scale for resistance to change, since for students and parents we lack a scale for resistance to change in 1978 due to an insufficient number of appropriate indicators.

Group Comparisons. Tables 3, 4, and 5 show that teachers and parents did not differ significantly from each other with respect to how they value self-direction, authoritarian-conservatism, and resistance to change. Thus, we can infer from these results that both adult

Table 4
Measurement of Authoritarian-conservatism and Resistance
to Change among Students in 1994, 1993 and 1978

Constructs and Indicators	Students		
	1994	1993	1978
	Factor Loadings		
A. Authoritarian-conservatism			
The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.	.37	.61	-
In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts.	.35	.56	.33
It's wrong to do things differently from the way our forefathers did.	.53	.56	.43
Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect.	.10	.37	.43
No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.	.45	.48	.42
One should always show respect to those in authority.	.28	.46	.59
You should obey your superiors whether or not you think they're right.	.39	.47	.64
Young people should not be allowed to read books that are likely to confuse them.	.45	.45	.57
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(2.31)	(2.16)	(2.91)
B. Resistance to Change			
Generally, change is much worse than no change.	.71	.67	-
People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble.	.59	.56	-
New things more often bring trouble than resolution.	.72	.76	-
It generally works out best to keep on doing things the way they have been done before.	.58	.61	-
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(.91)	(1.12)	-

Sources: See Table 3.

groups were likely to convey much the same "messages" to children regarding core personal values and psychological dispositions.

From the point of view of socialization processes, the crucial question is the degree to which adolescents share these basic values and dispositions. We discovered moderately large and statistically significant inter-generational differences. Students were less authoritarian and less resistant to change than both teachers and parents. Students valued self-direction more than did parents. We also observed an interesting temporal change in the extent of inter-generational differences in

Table 5
Measurement of Authoritarian-conservatism and Resistance
to Change among Teachers in 1994, and Parents in 1993 and 1978

Indicators	Teachers	Parents	
	1994	1993	1978
Factor Loadings			
A. Authoritarian-conservatism			
The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.	.46	.67	.66
In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts.	.35	.42	.52
It's wrong to do things differently from the way our forefathers did.	.31	.51	.50
Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect.	.47	.44	.53
No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.	.34	.43	.42
One should always show respect to those in authority.	.47	.40	.56
You should obey your superiors whether or not you think they're right.	.62	.47	.50
Young people should not be allowed to read books that are likely to confuse them.	.02	.41	.43
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(3.05)	(2.78)	(2.10)
B. Resistance to Change			
Generally, change is much worse than no change.	.49	.52	-
People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble.	.79	.63	-
New things more often bring trouble than resolution.	.28	.41	-
It generally works out best to keep on doing things the way they have been done before.	.56	.49	-
(Chi squared/degrees of freedom)	(1.09)	(.89)	-

Sources: See Table 3.

psychological functioning. In 1993 the difference between parents and their children was greater with respect to both the level of self-direction and authoritarian-conservatism than in 1978.²⁷

What these findings suggest, then, is that the inter-generational transmission of certain basic psychological values and dispositions appears to be weaker in the current period of systemic change than during the period of state socialism, in which the ideological values of the regime itself stressed submission to authority and to externally imposed rules, intolerance of non-conformity, and adherence to the status quo. We have noted that the parent population

did not change significantly, at least in terms of their valuation of self-direction, between 1978 and 1993. Thus, the fact that students have changed significantly and in the direction of increased self-directedness and less authoritarian-conservatism suggests that other socialization agents, who are conveying values and norms at variance with those of teachers and parents—but more in consonance with the emergent ideology of democratic capitalism—are also having an impact on adolescents' psychological dispositions.

Some evidence in support of this tentative conclusion can be found in the Pearson correlations between parents' and students' average scores on the three psychological measures derived from the 1993 TRIAD study. In 1993, the Pearson correlations were .41, and .32 for valuation of self-direction and authoritarian-conservatism, respectively. In 1978 the comparable correlations for valuation of self-direction and authoritarian-conservatism were .47 and .40. Thus, the inter-generational transmission of basic values has weakened during the period of rapid social change.

Further, we find that the correlations between students' and parents' political and economic orientations were much lower than those between the two groups' psychological dispositions. The Pearson correlation between parents' and their adolescent offsprings' scores on the scale measuring support for democracy was .10, and on the scale measuring pro-market orientations it was .08.

Impact of Psychological Dispositions. What is the effect of these psychological dispositions on support for democracy and a market economy? It is reasonable to expect that valuation of self-direction, less authoritarian-conservatism, and greater receptivity to change would all be positively associated with support for democracy and a market economy, inasmuch as the latter are based on individual rights, responsibility, and initiative, and characterized by diversity and differentiation, conflict and competition, and uncertainty of outcomes.²⁸

In Table 6, we present the Pearson correlations between our summary scales of pro-democratic and pro-market orientations, on the one hand, and the three psychological measures, on the other. As can be seen, all relationships are in the expected direction. Moreover, the coefficients are, in most instances, moderately strong and statistically significant for students, teachers, and parents.

In addition to the overall similarity in results for both pro-democratic and pro-market views and for all three groups, two other findings in Table 6 should be noted. First, among students, the three sets of psychological dispositions were more strongly linked to their economic orientations than to their political views. This was not the case for teachers, among whom psychological dispositions were as strongly associated with support for democracy as with support for a market economy. And second, psychological dispositions and pro-change orientations were more strongly related to each other among teachers and parents than they were among students.

We can only surmise why this was so with the data available to us. It may be due to the fact that adults' value systems, including both their psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations, are more internally constrained than those of adolescents. If for no other reason than the fact that adults have had more years of education, parents and teachers ought to be better able to make the appropriate cognitive connections between their basic views regarding authority, their valuation of self-direction, and orientations toward change, on the one hand, and norms associated with democratic rule and a market economy, on the other. Indeed, there is a clear effect of education on the congruence between psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations. Of course, this effect is relatively weak among teachers since the differences in their levels of educational attainment are very limited. However, even among them, the negative impact of authoritarian-conservatism on support for democracy is reduced

Table 6
Correlations of Psychological Variables with Support for Democracy
and the Market among Students, Teachers, and Parents in 1993-1994

Psychological Variables	Scale of Support for	
	Democracy	the Market
Correlations		
A. Students, 1994		
Valuation of self-direction	.028	.009*
Authoritarian-conservatism	-.110**	-.215**
Resistance to change	-.182**	-.216**
B. Teachers, 1994		
Valuation of self-direction	.161	.135
Authoritarian-conservatism	-.358**	-.273*
Resistance to change	-.335**	-.365**
C. Parents, 1993		
Valuation of self-direction	.194**	-
Authoritarian-conservatism	-.340**	-
Resistance to change	-.298**	-

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Sources: Students' and teachers' data file (1994); parents from triaus' data file (1993).

once we control for educational level. In the case of parents, among whom educational levels vary greatly, the impact of authoritarian-conservatism is weakened even more.

The effect of level of education on the congruence between psychological dispositions and political and economic orientations leads us to our second explanation of individual-level variations in support for democratic rule and a market economy, namely one's location in the social structure.

Relative Impact of Position in the Social Structure

Comparative value and attitudinal research clearly indicates that the social group to which one belongs shapes an individual's political and economic orientations. This includes not only attitudes toward the issues of the day but also more basic cognitive and normative views concerning equality, justice, the exercise of authority, and the economic order. Nonetheless, it has been argued by some that in the case of postcommunist Eastern Europe, one's position in the social structure will have relatively little bearing on the individual's political and economic views during this fluid and uncertain period of systemic change.²⁹ Thus, in Poland today the impact of one's location in the social structure on support for democracy and a market economy is an empirical question that requires systematic analysis. Here we present a preliminary examination of the relative impact of social structural position on support for democracy and a market economy. We begin with our student population.

Table 7
Regression of the Scales of Support for Democracy and the Market
on Structural and Psychological Variables, for Students in 1994

Structural and Psychological Variables	Scale of Support for	
	Democracy	The Market
	Correlation Coefficients	
Unemployment in the family	-.174*	-.112*
Family's financial situation	.104	.213**
	Beta Coefficients	
Unemployment in the family	-.134*	-.010
Family's financial situation	.064	.167*
Valuation of self-direction	.007	.057
Authoritarian-conservatism	-.059	-.149*
Resistance to change	-.163*	-.109
R	(.215)	(.248)
F	(2.353)	(3.161)

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Sources: STUDENTS' data file (1994).

Of the several social structural characteristics of students, two affected their level of support for democracy and a market economy. The first was whether at least one parent was unemployed.³⁰ The second was the financial resources of the family. Since, in Poland, persons working in their own private business tend to underreport their relatively high real income, we placed the group of self-employed at the top of a financial ladder. Those who received welfare benefits were placed at the bottom. Various intermediate categories were then divided into two broad lower-middle and higher-middle income groups.

As Table 7 shows, these rather crude social structural variables proved to have an effect on adolescents' support for democracy and the market, even after taking into account their valuation of self-direction and placement on the measures of authoritarian-conservatism and resistance to change. Unemployment in the family had a statistically significant and negative relationship with our pro-democracy measure. And as one might expect, students from higher income families tended to be more supportive of the market than their less well-off counterparts. As for the impact of our three measures of psychological functioning when taking into account students' social structural position, Table 7 shows that each retained its expected effects on support for democracy and a market economy. But only in two instances did the relationships continue to be statistically significant: (1) resistance to change negatively affected pro-democracy orientations and (2) authoritarian-conservatism was negatively related to acceptance of the market.

In the case of parents, the two most important structural variables were education and family income. They affected both psychological dispositions and political orientations. The more educated and those having higher incomes tended to value self-direction, exhibit more tolerant views, and opt for change to a greater extent than the less educated and more socio-

Table 8
Regression of the Scales of Support for Democracy and the Market
on Structural Variables, for Parents in 1993

Structural Variables	Scale of Support for	
	Democracy	The Market
	Correlation Coefficients	
Education	.204**	.143*
Family income	.199**	.226**
	Beta Coefficients	
Education	.144*	.096*
Family income	.021	.104*
Age	-.007	-.057
Gender	.016	.101*
R	(.261)	(.211)
F	(4.411)	(3.751)

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Sources: PANEL data file (1993).

economically disadvantaged parents. These findings are consistent with the results of various studies of adult samples in Poland. Also consistent are findings that the more educated and the better off financially tend to be more supportive of democracy and the market than those who have fewer years of education and lower income.

Table 8 shows the effects of structural variables on support for democracy and a market economy in terms of both correlation and regression coefficients. Each of these structural characteristics, as well as age and gender, is related to parental support for democracy and the market. The position in the social structure does matter for pro-democracy and pro-market orientations, since it indicates the interests of specific social groups.

Implications for Political Socialization and Civic Education

Our study of support for democracy and the establishment of a market economy among students, teachers, and parents in Poland shows that, at this time of systemic transformation, neither the cultural legacy of the past nor the emergent ideology of democracy and capitalism holds sway. Even teachers who volunteered to participate in EDCP's civic education program did not wholeheartedly embrace basic elements of democratic rule and a market economy.

These findings are not surprising given the recency of the transition, government instability, and the high social costs of inflation, unemployment, and growing poverty that have accompanied privatization and marketization of the economy. Whether over time support for democratic and market principles becomes more widespread will likely depend as much, if not more, on macro-level political and economic developments as on the success of political socialization efforts by the regime and pro-democracy non-governmental organizations.

Our analysis also shows that, at the individual level, support for democracy and a market economy is affected both by one's position in the social structure and psychological dispositions. Such findings might lead to skepticism about the degree to which efforts to inculcate democratic and market norms, even among the young, are likely to be successful. Social structural location and the self interests it generates, as well as psychological functioning, are not easily or quickly manipulable. However, our analysis indicates that these individual-level characteristics are not so closely linked to political and economic orientations as to foreclose the influence of schools and other agents of socialization.

Our findings also suggest that such political learning is by no means precluded by the intergenerational transmission of values, at least in this current period of flux. Although parents' beliefs certainly have an impact on those of their children, the relationship between the two is only moderately strong and is weaker now than it was in the late 1970s during the era of political stability.

The effects of both the social structural and psychological attributes of individuals, as well as familial values, may well become stronger should the normative and institutional context in which Poles live become more stable. But in the short term, there is considerable room for other determinants and other agents of socialization to have a discernible impact on the political and economic orientations of younger members of Polish society.

The school is, of course, one such arena of political socialization, and that is why we have focused here on the views of teachers in conjunction with those of students and parents. Moreover, apart from socialization in the school and in the family, there are numerous other agents of political learning in Poland: the peer group, the mass media, the Roman Catholic Church, and students' own personal experiences with political authority.¹¹ Some of these may reinforce the education for democracy and the free market that students receive in school. Others, however, might convey messages and provide experiences that counteract democratic and capitalistic values.

What our study implies then for political socialization in Poland is that the present context of political learning is quite malleable and allows for overt and concerted efforts to create a democratic and market culture among the young. But, given the uncertainty of political and economic developments and the existence of multiple and competing channels of socialization in the postcommunist period, the outcome of such efforts may be equivocal.

Next Steps: Research Opportunities and Challenges

The unprecedented events of 1989 in Poland, as well as across Central and Eastern Europe, have created a unique opportunity for research on civic education and political socialization. Our findings, and the tentative conclusions that can be drawn from them, strongly argue for the necessity to employ panel studies to investigate systematically the pattern and determinants of political and economic orientations among various groups involved in political socialization.¹² Such studies would serve two important purposes. The first is to understand continuities and changes in the processes and outcomes of political learning in societies undergoing profound transformation. The second, of particular interest to those who create, implement, and sponsor civic education programs, is to evaluate the impact of a specific curriculum on the cognitive and affective orientations of students toward democracy and a market economy.

Indeed, the next step in our research is to follow up our 1994 surveys of students and teachers involved in the first year of the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland pro-

ject with a second round of questionnaires to be administered in the winter of 1996. These questionnaires will include many items identical to those asked in the 1994 study, as well as new questions.

In order to assess the impact of involvement in the new civic education curriculum on students' systems of political values and beliefs, the 1996 survey will also be administered to control groups of students who have not participated in this program. Among studies on political socialization, this will be unique in its design: it will combine panel survey with quasi-experimental methods.

Our research and the larger program of which it is part have focused exclusively on Poland. Although processes of political socialization in that country are likely to exemplify in many respects patterns of continuity and change in political learning across post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, comparative research is needed to ascertain cross-national similarities and differences in this region. In addition, from the point of view of basic research, it would be instructive to compare political socialization processes in emerging democracies with those in more stable democratic regimes.

Notes

1. For various arguments regarding the necessity of developing a civic culture at the mass level for democratic stability, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 58 (1964): 361-82; James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Basis of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22 (1964): 276-294. See also Henk Dekker, "Socialization and Education of Young People for Democratic Citizenship: Theory and Research," in *Political Consciousness and Civic Education During the Transformation of the System*, Romuald Holly, ed., (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994).

2. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February, 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

3. A Polish-American symposium on this issue, "Challenges in Political Socialization of Children and Youth in Poland," was held in Jablonna near Warsaw, Poland, March 17-19, 1995. This symposium was sponsored by The Mershon Center at the Ohio State University, and organized by the Institute of Psychology and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.

4. See Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989) and discussion of liberal democracy in Chapter 1.

5. See Elemer Hankiss, *East European Alternatives* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): pp. 176-188 and Table 7.1.

6. For a good overview of research linking psychological functioning or personality to political orientations, see Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 2, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing

Co., 1975). See also Robert Lane, *Practical Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

7. Melvin L. Kohn and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1993).

8. The EDCP curriculum guide consists of three documents as follows: *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools* (available in English) which presents a rationale, objectives, and content outlines for a primary and a secondary school civics course; *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans* (in Polish), which presents sixteen lesson plans that illustrate how one might teach particular topics in primary and secondary school; *Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers* (in Polish) which presents articles by prominent Polish scholars on the topics recommended for primary and secondary school. The primary school civics course is titled, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios* (in Polish). See Appendix 1 for full citations and availability of these documents. Development of a secondary school course began autumn, 1995.

9. The field work was conducted by Polish social scientists, Dr. Marta Zahorska-Bugaj and Dr. Waldemar Kozłowski. The questionnaire was pretested by using the method of "critical respondents," which involved intensive interviewing by a small number of experienced field workers. The final data sets, STUDENTS 1994 and TEACHERS 1994, exist in SPSS format, and are available from the authors. The overview of results was presented in Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski's paper "Political Socialization, Public Policy and Civic Education: A Research Program," presented at the Polish-American Symposium for the Challenges in Political Socialization of Children and Youth in Poland, sponsored by the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University and organized by the Institute of Psychology and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jablonna near Warsaw, Poland, March 17-19, 1995.

10. For a detailed description of the data, see Bogdan W. Mach, "Self-direction and Authoritarianism Under Condition of Radical Systemic Change: Intergenerational Transmission of Values and Orientations in Poland," *Polish Sociological Review* 4, no.108 (1994): 1-11. Actually, in each triad one person—mother or father—was interviewed in 1992; a child and one parent was interviewed in 1993.

11. See Kohn and Slomczynski, *Social Structure*, pp. 25-30. Interviewing of the three persons—father, mother, and their child—took place in 1978-1980.

12. Henryk Domianski and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, *Social Changes in Poland 1987-1993: A Follow-up Study. Machine Readable Codebook* (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994), iii-xx.

13. We validated our measure of overall support for democracy and the market in separate analyses. Based on factor scores derived from the principal component analyses, the values of our measure were correlated with various additional items related to democratic norms, feelings of political efficacy and alienation, state welfarism and reliance on material incentives. In short, the formal properties of the pro-democratic and pro market scales are acceptable on statistical grounds for all three groups: students, teachers, and parents. See Kazimierz M. Slomczynski and Goldie Shabad, "Continuity and Change in Political Socialization in Poland," Occasional Paper of the Mershon Center, Columbus, Ohio, October 1995.

14. For research linking personality characteristics to democratic beliefs via the capacity for social learning, see Paul M. Sniderman, *Personality and Democratic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

15. Details of this analysis are presented in Slomczynski and Shabad, "Continuity and Change."

16. See Kohn and Slomczynski, *Social Structure*, pp. 63-64.

17. For a general discussion of authoritarianism, see W. F. Stone, G. Lederer, and R. Christie, eds., *Strength and Weakness: The Authoritarian Personality Today* (New York: Springer, 1993). The classical statement appears in Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel L. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950); see also Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954). A comparison of authoritarianism in North America, West Europe, East

Europe and Non-West can be found in Jos. D. Meloen, Russell Farnen, and Dan German, "Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Symbolic Political Leadership in the New World Order," in *Political Consciousness and Civic Education During the Transformation of the System*, ed. Romuald Holly (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994), pp. 255-281. The measurement issues of authoritarian-conservatism related to the specific Polish context are discussed in Joanne Miller, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, and Ronald J. Schoenberg, "Assessing Comparability of Measurement in Cross-National Research: Authoritarian-Conservatism in Different Sociocultural Settings," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 44 (1981): 178-191; see also Jadwiga Koralewicz, "Authoritarianism and Confidence in Political Leaders and Institutions" in *Societal Conflict and Systemic Change*, ed. Wl. Jyslaw W. Adamski (Warsaw: IFIS Publishers, 1993), pp. 169-189.

18. Melvin L. Kohn, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Krystyna Janicka, Valery Khmielko, Bogdan W. Mach, Vladimir Paniotto, Wojciech Zaborowski, and Roberto Gutierrez, "Class, Work, and Personality under Conditions of Radical Social Change: A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Ukraine," paper presented at The World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, Germany, July 18-22, 1994. Kohn and Slomczynski, *Social Structures*: Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Krystyna Janicka, Bogdan W. Mach, and Wojciech Zaborowski, *Struktura Społeczna I Psychiczne Funkcjonowanie Jednostki w Warunkach Zmiany Społecznej* [Social Structure and Individual's Psychological Functioning Under Conditions of Social Change] (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1994. Mimeograph).

19. Meivin L. Kohn, *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969); Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, *Work and Personality: An Inquiry Into the Impact of Social Stratification* (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1983). See also Duane F. Alwin and David J. Jackson, "The Statistical Analysis of Kohn's Measure of Parental Values," in *Systems Under Indirect Observation: Causality, Structure, and Prediction*, eds. Karl G. Joreskog and H. O. A. Wald (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1980).

20. Such a partial ranking makes it possible to place respondents' valuations of each characteristic along a five-point scale: 5 = the most valued of all; 4 = one of the three most valued, but not the most valued; 3 = neither one of the three most nor one of the three least valued; 2 = one of the three least valued but not the least valued; and 1 = the least valued of all.

21. Only these eight characteristics were finally included in confirmatory factor analysis, for which factor loadings are presented in Table 2.

22. Mach, "Self-direction and Authoritarianism."

23. Slomczynski and Shabad, "Continuity and Change."

24. Anna Titkow, *Wartosc Dziecka* [Value of a Child] (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1983); Magdalena Sokolowska, Anna Firkowska-Mankiewicz, Antonina Ostrowska, and Mirosław P. Czarkowski, *Intellectual Performance of Children: The Warsaw Study* (Warsaw: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1978); Krystyna Skarzynska, "Determinants of Values Accepted by Youth," *Polish Psychological Bulletin* 24, no.4 (1993): 195-207; Jadwiga Koralewicz-Zebik, "Wartosci Rodzicielskie a Stratifikacja Społeczna" [Parental Values and Social Stratification], *Studia Sociologiczne* 3-4, no. 86-87 (1982): 225-238.

25. Mach, "Self-direction and Authoritarianism."

26. Slomczynski and Shabad, "Continuity and Change."

27. For details see Slomczynski and Shabad, "Continuity and Change."

28. Lane, *Practical Ideology*; Sniderman, *Personality*; Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

29. Kenneth Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," in Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Marek Ziolkowski, "Social Structure, Interests and Consciousness: The Crisis and the Transformation of the System of Real Socialism in Poland," *Acta Sociologica* 4 (1990): 289-303. See also Barbara Hejns and Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania, "Values, Politics, and the Ideologies of Reform: Poland in Transition," in F. D.

Weil, ed., *Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe: A Research Annual* (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI, 1992).

30. We asked students whether their fathers and mothers were presently employed or worked in their own business. If at least one parent was unemployed we coded this as 1, and all other responses as 0. The resulting dichotomous measure was then used as an indicator of unemployment in the family.

31. James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, *The Social Legacy of Communism* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994).

32. For a discussion of the use of panel studies to investigate political socialization, see David O. Sears, "Political Socializations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 128-130.

10

Reflections on the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project: An American's Perspective

Sandra Stotsky



10

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10

Reflections on the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project: An American's Perspective

Sandra Stotsky

This essay represents the reflections of an American participant in the initial phases of Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP).¹

These reflections are based on my involvement in the development of the EDCP curriculum guide and primary school civics course and on conversations with several other American participants in the project.² I participated in EDCP's first workshop on curriculum guide development with Polish educators at Mietne, Poland in February 1992; conducted a session on civic writing on November 9-10, 1992 for the Poles developing a primary school civics course while in residence at the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University; participated in EDCP's International Conference on Education for Democracy held at Jachranka, Poland in December 1993; and reviewed components of EDCP's curriculum guide, primary school course, and college course plan at various stages of their development.³

In this essay, I note the challenges faced in the creation and early activities of EDCP. Then I discuss several changes that took place in the plans and expectations for these early activities. Third, I note lessons that may be relevant to others attempting similar projects with transitional democracies. Finally, I offer ideas on what might be learned from this project with regard to improving civic education in the United States.

Challenges Expected and Encountered

The Initial Challenge

The first challenge involved the courage to undertake the project. After an initial visit to Poland in February 1991, the American Co-Director, Richard C. Remy, believed the American approach to civic education had much to offer others. At the same time, it was not clear what aspects of American civic education might be directly relevant to Poland. Further,

Remy recognized that serious work on civic education in Poland implied a long-term commitment on his part as well as the involvement of a multidisciplinary group of American civic educators representing a variety of perspectives.

During Remy's initial talks in February 1991 with Jacek Strzemieczny, then Director of Teacher Training for the Ministry of National Education, the Poles indicated that reform of civic education was a high priority and expressed an interest in working with Americans on projects for rebuilding civic education in Poland. From the beginning it was expected that the Poles would decide what aspects of the American experience were useful to them in developing a plan suitable for their country. This premise was always basic to the Americans in accepting the challenge of the project. Remy stressed repeatedly that American consultants were to give advice on what we thought were the appropriate content and methods for civic education; we were never to expect that all our ideas would or should be accepted simply as presented.

Initially, the project posed an interesting conundrum, as Remy called it. The Poles alone could not create the new materials and courses they wanted. Yet the Americans could not and should not do the job for them, especially if the Poles were to have professional ownership and gain political acceptance of the new materials. Nor could such a dilemma be alleviated by the translation of American materials into Polish. The creation of curriculum seminars (see Chapter 5) to resolve this very significant issue was one of EDCP's most original and significant conceptual achievements.

In sum, a key premise of the project from the onset was that its instructional products had to be tailored completely to the Poles' history, educational resources, and social goals, and they had to be developed by Poles, not by Americans. Put simply, it was their project, not ours.

Bridging the Language Gap

None of the Americans involved in the early phases of the project spoke or read Polish, and most of the Poles had very limited abilities in English. We anticipated that the language differences would pose challenges in at least two ways, and they did.

To begin with, the language gap created enormous constraints on our working time with the Polish teachers. Although the Polish teachers developing the curriculum guide had been selected in part because of at least some ability with the English language, there was still a need for all sessions to be conducted in Polish as well as in English. In addition, the Poles wanted to be sure that an expert translation of what was said in English in the formal sessions at the Miętno workshop was immediately available in case there were any problems in understanding the vocabulary of our various disciplines. Thus, workshop sessions would require time for translation from Polish to English and vice-versa. This meant a halving of working time: a two-hour workshop in time would be a one-hour workshop in substance. Whatever we planned to do in our formal sessions with the Poles would have to take account of this reduction in available time.

In addition, the use of consecutive translation for workshop sessions meant that the American consultants needed to think about presenting material in fairly short, clear sentences to allow for quick and easy translation by professional translators. Such a procedure can considerably change one's style of delivery. Those of us giving talks or workshops had to be prepared to make changes, even if we had no experience with such a procedure.

A language gap was also embedded in the very act of cross-cultural communication because of the different historical experiences the Poles and Americans would bring to their understanding of the basic political vocabulary of liberal constitutional democracy. For

example, John Patrick, EDCP's Senior Consultant, felt that the Americans and the Poles would not necessarily bring identical meanings to the "concept of democracy." As our work on the curriculum guide and primary school course proceeded, some differences along these lines emerged. In discussions with the Poles, Patrick discerned a lesser fear of tyranny by the majority than we Americans might have in our country. Unlike our concern over constitutional protections for individual rights, he believed the Poles saw these rights safeguarded by the majority, with less concern for what the majority might do under certain circumstances. He summarized the difference as one between constitutional liberal democracy and communitarian democracy. In contrast to a democracy shaped by its constitution, he saw the Poles more oriented to the notion of a constitution shaped by the democratic majority. In support for his view, Patrick noted that the Poles were using people elected democratically to the national legislature to develop their new constitution instead of a selected group of people at a specially convened constitutional convention. In this conceptualization, democracy might be seen more as an end in itself, rather than as a means to an end; an end that promotes and fosters the creative capabilities and liberties of the individual. Such a subtle difference in the interpretation of a key term might well influence curriculum design and classroom pedagogy.

Gauging Priorities

From the very beginning, EDCP was a multidisciplinary undertaking. With respect to disciplinary or academic roles, a challenge for each consultant was to decide what were the most essential understandings to convey from our own areas of expertise. We spent long hours in stimulating discussion to decide the essential components for understanding fundamental political concepts and principles underlying a liberal constitutional democracy, for grasping political decision-making in such a democracy, for carrying out market reforms, for developing leadership skills, and for developing needed and appropriate participatory language skills. Much time was also spent deciding how to try to convey these basic components with a pedagogy that itself reflected the spirit of a liberal constitutional democracy and thus in its own right served to generate behaviors appropriate for democratic citizenship.

Another difficulty in setting priorities for the content and format of workshops was our limited knowledge about the background of the Polish teachers with whom we were to work on the curriculum guide. So far as civic education was concerned, we knew their backgrounds would be unlike those of American teachers. Moreover, even though these teachers had been selected by the Polish co-director and his colleagues after a nationwide search, we knew we were working with teachers who, under communism, were never allowed to develop a curriculum. For decades, the entire curriculum had been handed down to teachers from the Ministry of National Education in Warsaw, with no teacher involvement in the process.

Navigating Cultural Differences

Engaging in a curriculum development project of such scope is an awesome task that one would undertake with some humility in our country. Given the cross-national nature of this task, the overwhelming concern for many participants was how to handle the cultural and historical differences between the United States and Poland. What kinds of examples or specific situations could we use to illustrate abstract concepts? How would the Pole's experience in having lived and worked under communism one's entire life influence the project? In our workshops, for example, would we encounter cynicism on the part of the Poles regarding the responsiveness of government to individual needs?

Many Americans consider government responsiveness fundamental in evoking such acts of civic participation as voting in elections or trying to influence the government. Yet, as Vaclav Havel described it, communism left people with an anti-government mentality and anti-political bias. They did not see themselves as citizens who "owned" their government. A "People's Republic" was owned by the Communist Party, not the people, and the Party did as it pleased with the "people's" property. Communism created a deep cynicism toward government. In order to get anything accomplished, one had to avoid or work around government; if one had no force and did not want a bloody revolution, one resisted by ignoring authorities.

The goal for many Central and Eastern Europeans, as Havel put it, was to learn how to live independently of government regulation. This goal stimulated intellectuals to develop and to realize the concept of "civil society" through public gatherings in which one could discuss and conduct public affairs outside the purview and control of the state. The cynicism bred by this situation extended to the very language of democracy; words like "democracy" or "free elections" had been used and their meanings subverted by the Communist Party.⁴

The impact of communism seemed to be detectable during several seminars in which some of the Americans engaged in intense dialogues with the Polish scholars on the question of making value judgments. The Polish scholars tended to want no value judgments attached to what they were going to teach. The nature of the courses that had been required at both the school and university levels under communism led them to feel that any effort to make value judgments was an attempt at indoctrination. Yet, one cannot respond adequately to key questions about good government or good citizenship if one is reluctant to privilege any values.

Changes in Expectations and Plans

Not unexpectedly, as work progressed, the need arose frequently to modify plans and expectations about the structure and content of the curriculum guide and primary school civics course. The impact of communism on Polish civic culture was clearly one, but not the only, reason for our need to modify our plans.

Balancing Pedagogy and Content

One unexpected outcome of the early project workshops in which I participated was our discovery that the Poles were as interested in the pedagogy for active learning being demonstrated as they were in the political theory presented. The Poles realized that more student-centered learning through cooperative group activities and strategies such as role-playing, simulations, and decision trees was inherently related to the development of desirable attitudes and behaviors for democratic citizenship. As work on the curriculum guide and primary school civics course unfolded, we placed even greater emphasis on practical classroom ideas that illustrated the use of active teaching and learning. This emphasis was fortuitous because it resulted in more democratic content, and we could then point out how student behavior in such activities was similar to desirable participatory behavior in the world of government and politics outside of the school.

Refining Conceptual Frameworks

The conceptual framework underlying the curriculum guide and the primary school civics course revealed the Polish teachers' conscious responses to the past 50 years. The course, for

instance, exhibits an emphasis on individual and human rights. In contrast, it contains little explicit emphasis on "civic responsibility," despite the fact that the Poles sought to stress the concept of individual responsibility and the importance of taking initiative. I suspect that the emphasis on individual rights as well as the lack of emphasis on civic responsibility in the primary school course may be a reaction to the contents of pre-1989 education, which in true Marxist-Leninist fashion may have overly stressed social responsibility and slighted discussion of the specific individual rights possessed by Polish citizens. In classical Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the championing of individual freedoms is played down, if not denigrated, as a bourgeois and anti-communitarian value.

A recent study by Felisa Tibbetts has described the influence of Marxism-Leninism on curricula in countries that were part of, or allied to, the former Soviet Union. Tibbett's work is based on her experience developing human rights education in Romania and on her involvement in smaller-scale projects throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990's. She notes, "In concert with Marxist-Leninist outlook, membership in the collective was a key organising principle." "Today," she goes on to comment, "there is an interest in reclaiming 'individualism' as the operating educational paradigm, rather than the notion of the individual whose identity is wrapped up in group membership."

The Polish teachers' responses to the past 50 years also showed up in the many lessons they created on local government, all stressing the importance of citizen participation in resolving the serious problems their local communities face, such as water management and distribution, garbage disposal, and adequate day care facilities. Indeed, the first unit in the completed set of lesson plans for the primary school civics course is on local government, a placement that accords with the fact that the course begins in grade six and needs to deal with topics that young students can easily grasp. An emphasis on local government also reflects the teachers' belief that local government offers many opportunities for citizen participation and the learning of democratic behaviors.

The outline for "The School in Democratic Society," a 60-hour, two-semester course developed by EDCP for preservice teacher education in Poland, is similar in spirit to the primary school civics course.⁶ The college course plan emphasizes how schools can join the life of the community in a democratic manner. The five Polish scholars who created the course plan focused on the political and economic issues affecting the schools, such as decentralization, local financing, and how to structure community input on curriculum matters.

The goal of eliminating bureaucratic control of the schools, thus giving teachers and students more autonomy and flexibility, is clearly one major factor that motivated the five Polish scholars' interests in democratizing the classroom and the school. Moreover, some of them believed that democracy could not be taught meaningfully unless the schools were democratized. This led to many long discussions about what is meant by democratizing the classroom and the school. Exactly where and how would democracy take place in the schools? Americans involved in the course plan project tried to raise useful questions for the Polish educators to ponder after they had visited some of our public schools. These are questions familiar to American civic educators. What is democratic behavior by a principal? On what matters can a faculty vote? Are there limits to parents' and students' rights? Where do students participate? What rights do they have in our schools? What school-related matters are best decided professionally or privately rather than democratically?

Some Lessons for Other Projects

With the proverbial wisdom provided by hindsight, let me sketch out several things I believe we learned that may be of interest to those undertaking civic education projects in Central and Eastern European countries or other developing democracies.

Obtain Information on Counterpart Schools and Teachers

To the extent possible, projects will benefit from time and resources devoted to helping the American participants learn as much as possible about their counterparts before major activities are underway. While such advice might seem blatantly obvious, the pressures of time and limited resources can often make this an overlooked step. The EDCP co-directors did provide some background information for the American consultants. However, given what we learned about the nature of Polish education in the first workshop with the Poles in January of 1992, planning for the meeting would have benefited if, before we came to that meeting, we had known more about the organization of Polish schools and the conditions under which Polish teachers work. Of course, no matter how much information is made available, the very nature of a new cross-cultural project means that to a certain extent everyone learns on the job.

Involve American Teachers

Experienced classroom teachers can bring an invaluable perspective and practical wisdom to civic education reform projects. From the very start, EDCP involved many Polish teachers in significant roles. In retrospect, however, more American master teachers could have been involved in the early stages of the EDCP project both in Poland and when Polish teachers were at the Mershon Center to develop the primary school civics course. Pairing American teachers with counterparts from transitional democracies can encourage informal peer friendships and help all involved learn more about the cultural similarities and differences between their schools and their societies. It is helpful for teachers from emerging democracies to see that they already share some things with American teachers, despite cultural differences. Further, such pairing could afford the teachers from developing democracies more exposure to real school issues than academic consultants alone are able to provide. Subsequent EDCP curriculum development projects, most notably the project to develop a secondary school civics course which began in June 1995, have involved American master teachers in working closely with Polish counterparts.

Similarly, for work on the college level course, the planned involvement of a mix of scholars, teachers, and administrators might have been helpful. Teachers and administrators with practical experience in schools could have contributed their expertise regularly to philosophically oriented discussions. Fortunately, the Polish teachers who developed the primary school course and the Polish scholars who drafted the college course plan were at the Mershon Center simultaneously so that interactions could, and did, take place between the two groups as the scholars developed their course plan. Because the Polish scholars, like university educators in this country, had not been intimately involved in the daily life of the schools, they frequently needed to consult the Polish teachers on details of their work. But if the teachers had not been present, a group comprised of only university scholars would not have been as productive as the Polish scholars were in that project.

Recognize the Need to Address Political Cynicism

At the start of EDCP, we underestimated the depth and breadth of cynicism about political life that was apparently a legacy of communist rule. As the work evolved, it became clear that both the curriculum guide and the primary school civics course needed to include ways to address this cynicism beyond simply preaching against it. Much more attention needs to be given to the communists' subversion of the language of democracy, to help students and their parents build trust in democracy's possibilities, and to help them better understand its limitations as well as its promise. These concerns are among the most serious challenges facing educators working in developing democracies.

Establish Priorities

Because developing democracies may have few institutions and procedures in place in public life to support a program in democratic civic education in the schools, one question that is apt to arise is where to concentrate energies for such a program. How much should teachers and schools try to do, and what is best for them to do? Where might project attention be most productively directed?

Some argue that the training of new teachers may be the wisest priority if funds are not adequate for a new curriculum and an in-service program. Others think school/community relations might warrant the major focus if funds are scarce. If this is the case, students could make field trips to see their government in action, bring in public officials and other speakers from the community to discuss the issues, and then convey their ideas to their parents for the purpose of educating them and involving them in community affairs. Extracurricular activities like community service might be a part of a more limited model.

Much of the success of EDCP stems from the fact that the co-directors, working closely with their colleagues, established a clear set of priorities from the very beginning of the project. This promoted concentrated effort in fundraising, the recruitment of personnel, and the timely completion of products that could have a practical impact on teaching and learning in classrooms across Poland.

Some Lessons for America

Judgments about the quality of civic education in schools in the United States tend to be highly critical. Today, few people feel that our schools do very well with the subject. Nor is it clear that schools have ever done very well with the subject. While an increasing number of state legislatures are concerned about citizenship education and have asked their departments of education to develop tests to assess its outcomes in the schools, citizenship education has not yet been viewed nationwide with the same crisis mentality with which we have approached our deficiencies in the teaching of mathematics, reading, writing and the sciences. Thus, reflections on what the Poles chose to take up most eagerly from all the ideas and activities we shared with them—and why—led me to think more deeply about the content and goals of our own programs in civic education.

In my conversations with other American participants, several suggestions emerged that might be relevant to strengthening civic education in the United States. One concerned a basic feature of our political experience that seems to have been ignored in most of our civics textbooks or other curriculum materials on civic education and in articles in social studies

journals or the media. Another suggestion concerned a fundamental distinction in the history of democracy that does not seem to be discussed to the depth and breadth it deserves. A third concerned preservice or in-service education for teachers. A final suggestion addressed our perceived need to engage students in more active civic learning.

The Importance of Civil Society

For many of us, our collaboration with the Poles has helped us rediscover and rethink the significance of civil society in America, that extraordinarily large network of private organizations which Americans have voluntarily formed and supported in order to address specific community needs. Civil society deserves much more emphasis than it has received in our school curriculum. We take much for granted here, and our civil society has been, and remains, one of the strongest forces for good in American public life—a force that has received little attention in recent years. Largely independent of government interference or control, these private associations provide, and have provided, an array of opportunities for their members to acquire the group skills that are needed for accomplishing self-defined goals effectively. By their very presence, they have served to limit the extension of government into all areas of private life and have thus prevented an all-encompassing and stultifying bureaucracy, with its constant potential for abuse of power.

Almost 170 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville noted the multiplicity of functions these voluntary self-help associations serve. Above all, he noted the role they played in educating ordinary citizens in the art of democratic self-government.⁷ They still strike those who bring fresh eyes to our society as one of the most dominant and positive features of American public life. Yet, according to John Patrick, our current civics textbooks hardly mention these kinds of private voluntary organizations. The groups that tend to receive textbook or media attention are those that have been formed not so much for self-help, but to enhance the efforts of their individual members to shape public policy through advocacy. These efforts remain vitally important, but it is time for teachers to renew attention to the groups that constitute our civil society, that area of public life where citizens can muster their resources, make decisions, and use their resources independently from the government.

The Worth of Liberal Constitutional Democracy

Several of us came to the conclusion that American students need to spend more time discussing the distinctions between communitarian democracy and liberal constitutional democracy, and exploring the implications of each at different levels of government and for different types of issues. In addition, we see a need for much more serious thinking about what encompasses the most basic principles and concepts associated with liberal constitutional democracy. As Charles Bahmüller pointed out, liberal constitutional democracies tend to be more tolerant than communitarian democracies.

Students must understand that there are functions that government must perform, and they must have faith in the ability of government to perform these functions honestly and well. Students also need to understand that one of the functions of a constitution, historically and today, is to limit the power of government precisely in order to enhance individual initiative, the assumption of individual responsibility, and the moral growth that results from making choices and bearing the consequences. Bloated bureaucracies begin when citizens think that the government is responsible for serving all their needs, or when they think they must always look to the government whenever they have a problem.

Many of us most heavily involved in civic education do not have confidence that American students today truly understand the basic constructs by which one recognizes authentic democracy in various facets of society. We have a feeling that we are failing to help students understand the framework they need for recognizing and strengthening our constitutional democracy, a democracy that some of us perceive to be in as fragile a condition here as it is in many other countries around the world.

Civic Education Courses for All Teachers

Greg Hamot clearly articulated one way to address these concerns in American education—a course on the role of schools in a democratic society for all preservice teachers in undergraduate or graduate programs. Hamot noted that the college course plan developed by the Polish scholars may be offered to all preservice teachers in Poland, not just those in social studies or history education. As he observed, civic education entails much more than the teaching of basic political principles and our national history. It involves ways of initiating discussions and projects, modes of questioning in the classroom, one's sense of responsibility to one's fellow students and school, and student/teacher relationships. Viewed this way, civic education is implicated in all disciplines and should be seen as the implicit responsibility of all teachers, regardless of their academic specialty.

Given that a course in multicultural education now seems to be required of all students in most if not all undergraduate and graduate education programs in this country, it seems reasonable to consider simultaneously requiring a course in democratic civic education for all preservice teachers. The logic for this requirement is clear. If preservice teachers must take a course that improves their ability to teach their students to understand and respect the social groups they may belong to, then prospective teachers should also take a course that improves their ability to teach their students to understand and respect each other as individual members of a common, democratic civic entity that is based on individual rights and on acceptance of individual responsibility.

More Active Civic Learning: Why and Where

Finally, we need to engage students more actively in thinking about the problems of their civic communities and in doing something about them. All of us were impressed by the Poles' concern for helping their students acquire the knowledge, skills, and confidence they need for active participation in the reconstruction of their society. Several Poles noted that one reason they had decided upon a collaboration with American educators was their belief that Americans participate more actively and extensively in the activities of self-government than citizens of any other democracy, and that perhaps we were doing something right in our schools. Yet, we all know that what we do is far from adequate, that much cynicism towards government exists here, and that the moral and civic health of our present society leaves a great deal to be desired. Indeed, many social problems of our society seem to be worsening. Many of our own students must also learn how to obtain the information they may need, how to express themselves in appropriate language, and how to make a difference in their civic communities.

Some American civic educators would like to see more community service programs sponsored by the schools, more student-initiated projects that take students into their local communities, more training in ways to organize and carry out their own projects, and more mentoring to help students understand the processes that lead to decision-making in their

communities. In short, a move beyond turning students into merely informed citizens to more of a participatory model of civic education.

However, the social activism that some American educators are currently advocating for the classroom has raised a number of concerns that require more public discussion. Many parents are wary of having their children compelled to engage in political activities or a service program that the parents might not support themselves or in which the children might not want to get involved. Some also fear having their children enticed or coerced into activities serving the teacher's personal political interests. And some are also concerned that precious academic time will be used for activities that may develop political knowledge and skills, but give short shrift to academic learning and academic ways of thinking.

For their part, teachers, especially those at the high school level, are usually more interested in teaching the subjects for which they have been trained and often express concerns about student projects outside the classroom that are beyond their resources for appropriate supervision. Even if some teachers want to direct student learning toward social and political goals and are willing to ensure student choice of goals, the school must still be sensitive to how parents want class time used. Nor is it clear that a civic action model based in the classroom will necessarily enhance students' attitudes towards civic participation. A critical stance, encouraged by cause-oriented teachers, can too easily degenerate into anti-government activity and serve to create cynicism about democratically elected governments, a result to which the school should not be contributing.

Although the Polish teachers were clearly interested in stimulating active civic participation, I felt their central concern was changing their teacher-centered pedagogy. It is a pedagogy possibly more ingrained in Eastern European classrooms than elsewhere because of the support given by Communist Party-dominated ministries of education to a transmission model of pedagogy, with only approved information to be given to students and regurgitated in class or on tests to demonstrate learning. As one of the Polish scholars commented in a discussion I initiated to clarify this issue, European teachers generally see schooling serving chiefly academic purposes. Moreover, she added, the average Polish teacher is poorly equipped with respect to knowledge of teaching methods and more inclined to improve the teaching of his or her subject matter.

If it is indeed the case that Polish teachers will bring a strong academic orientation to civic education, activities for youth outside the structure of school may be a useful complement to in-school instruction. Some organizations and foundations have sprung up in Poland to absorb the energies of people committed to continuing the political and economic reforms begun after the revolution. Independent of government control and funding, many of these organizations sponsor forums that provide an opportunity for high school students, who come voluntarily after school, to discuss public issues, arrive at consensus, and then engage in political advocacy through letters, petitions, or protests to express their needs and views. Because these activities are outside of the structure of the school as well as government, they could be developing authentic political leadership skills in young people. And because such settings might provide high school students with more opportunities than schools can for discussion, debate, and follow-through activities, I find them a very exciting possibility to encourage in our own country. They could serve as the most productive resource for providing young people with participatory experiences. They might also be the least controversial.

Although the Polish teachers I have met seem to have had an academic orientation to civic education, they were enthusiastic about developing research projects that would take students into their local community, as well as encouraging genuine student government to help students acquire and use political knowledge. Once they have had enough experience with their

new directions in civic education to be able to assess their effectiveness, Polish civic educators will be able to bring a new perspective to the question of whether the seeming dualism between an academic and a participatory focus is a real one, or whether the issue is chiefly a matter of emphasis and pedagogical judgment. In our country, a debate continues about the best uses of school time and the best ways to develop active citizens for a liberal constitutional democracy in civics or government courses. Given their experiences in the past 50 years and their sensitivity to the kinds of abuse heaped on the entire educational process by Communist Party ideologues, Central and Eastern European civic educators may have fresh ideas to contribute to this debate.

Notes

1. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

2. I indicate here their names and professional positions at the time I participated in the project: Richard C. Remy, Co-Director of EDCP and Associate Professor of Education at The Ohio State University; Steven L. Miller, Associate Professor of Education at The Ohio State University; Robert Woyach, Mershon Center Faculty Associate at The Ohio State University; John J. Patrick, Professor of Education and Director of the Social Studies Development Center of Indiana University; Charles Bahmueller, Center for Civic Education in California; Gregory Hamot, graduate student in social studies and global education at The Ohio State University.

3. The EDCP curriculum guide consists of three documents as follows: *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools* (available in English), which presents a rationale, objectives, and content outlines for a primary and a secondary school civics course; *Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans* (in Polish), which presents sixteen lesson plans that illustrate how one might teach particular topics in primary and secondary schools; *Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers* (in Polish), which presents articles by prominent Polish scholars on the topics recommended for primary and secondary schools. See Appendix 1 for full citations and availability of these documents.

4. Vaclav Havel, *Summer Meditations*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

5. Felisa Tibbetts, "Human Rights Education in Schools in the Post-Communist Context," *European Journal of Education* 29.4: 367.

6. Krzysztof Broclawik, Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, Marek Simlat, Marta Zahorska-Bugaj, and Elzbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz, *The School in Democratic Society: A Course Plan for Poland's Future Teachers* (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, 1994).

7. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: The New American Library, 1956).

11

Polish and American Collaboration Through EDCP: Accomplishments from the Polish Perspective

Jacek Strzemieczny



11

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11

Polish and American Collaboration Through EDCP: Accomplishments from the Polish Perspective

Jacek Strzemieczny

This chapter presents an assessment from the Polish perspective of the original projects that comprised Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP).¹ In what follows, I offer my comments on the success with which those projects have been implemented by various teams of Polish and American colleagues and my reflections upon the contribution of these projects to EDCP's long-term goals, especially the effective introduction of civic education into Polish schools. This assessment is based upon my role as the Polish Co-Director of EDCP, and since May 1994, as the founder and Director of the Center for Citizenship Education (CCE), Warsaw.

EDCP's Original Projects: Achievement of Objectives

I initiated EDCP when, as Director of Teacher Training in the Ministry of National Education, I invited Richard Remy to visit Poland in February 1991 to consult with my colleagues on how we might create new civic education programs. The Ministry at that time had identified civic education as one of the top educational priorities in Poland. By spring 1991, a long-term plan for EDCP had been devised and efforts to secure funds to implement the plan were underway.

The design for EDCP included these long-term goals:

- To institutionalize civic education in schools in Poland for the next decade.
- To enhance the capacity of Polish educators to develop their own civic education programs.
- To contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education.
- To build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

The plan called for four projects that would meet some of the immediate needs in Polish education while at the same time contribute to these goals. The projects were (1) development

of civic education curriculum guidelines for primary and secondary schools, (2) development of a teacher training syllabus, (3) creation of a primary school civics course that contained detailed lesson scenarios, and (4) establishment of a network of civic and economic education centers.² In addition, we have translated some American materials into Polish.

No agency was able or willing to provide funds to undertake all four projects. Hence, we began to seek funding from different sources for each project and to proceed as best we could with the resources available to us at any given time. This meant each project required its own proposal to request funds along with its own timeline, budget, and staff. At the time this seemed a necessary but difficult and somewhat inefficient way to proceed. As I will explain below, it turned out this arrangement had significant, unanticipated benefits for Polish civic education.

Curriculum Guidelines for Primary and Secondary Schools

In September 1991, EDCP received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to develop a civic education curriculum guide for primary and secondary schools in Poland. A curriculum guide consisting of three documents was published in September 1992 and was the first civic education program designed in Poland after the political changes of 1989. The curriculum guide was developed by a group of Polish teachers working with the assistance of American civic educators and scholars and Polish scholars, who served as consultants to the project.

In Poland, the road from developing a school curriculum to its implementation is fairly long. Three important barriers have to be overcome: a formal/legal barrier, only curricula officially accepted by appropriate educational authorities may be used in schools; a financial barrier, teachers must be paid for teaching additional courses; and, most importantly, teachers need to be trained and equipped with appropriate educational materials. Of course, the development of new materials along with subsequent teacher training costs additional money.

The plan for civic education as set forth in the curriculum guide was accepted by the Ministry of National Education as an alternative curriculum for the course of study in Polish schools called "*Wiedza o Społeczeństwie*" (Knowledge about Society). This approval, however, did not require the Ministry or local education authorities to provide funds for the implementation of the new curriculum plan. The approval only provided formal grounds for incorporating selected parts of the new curriculum into the existing social science courses or, if sufficient funds were found, for introducing a new course in its entirety. The official acceptance, however, did enable us to begin talks with proper authorities, possible sponsors, teachers, and other educators about the actual introduction of civic education into schools.

The curriculum guide stimulated a greater interest among the more ambitious and active teachers of social sciences. They were, however, often uncertain about the best way of incorporating the ideas suggested in the curriculum guide into their courses. As a result, the EDCP curriculum guide was not immediately useful to the teachers in terms of practical application. However, the curriculum guide served to inform social science and history teachers about the direction of the work conducted within EDCP and led a large group of teachers to become interested in, or even identify with, that undertaking. In short, the development of the curriculum guide alerted potential users of new course materials that a project was underway that would eventually create new instructional materials.

Primary School Civics Course

Democratic civic education entails not only the transmission of new information but also requires teachers to adopt a new pedagogical style appropriate to teaching the concepts and

skills required for competent citizenship. The opportunity to develop civics materials for classroom use came in 1992, when a grant from the United States Information Agency (USIA) allowed EDCP to take a group of eight Polish teachers to the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University to work with Richard Remy on the development of the first draft of a primary school civics course. The Polish team then returned to Poland, where field-testing, critical review by Polish scholars, additional lesson development, and final revisions of the draft course took place.

The course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, was published in December 1993 and has become a huge success in great demand by teachers. In 1995, a second edition of the course was published. The primary school civics course has been very successful because it embodies not only a framework of topics for civic education, but also suggests ways of presenting the topics through practical, ready-to-teach classroom lessons using active teaching/learning strategies. The EDCP curriculum guide package had set forth a broad framework of goals, topic lists, names of suggested teaching methods, and some sample classroom lessons. Nevertheless, the curriculum guide was only partially understandable to Polish teachers and other educators who were completely unfamiliar with active teaching/learning methods named in the guide.

Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios contains 82 lessons in the first edition and 100 in the second edition. (See Appendix 2 for a Table of Contents.) Each lesson sets forth objectives defined in terms of the knowledge and skills that students were expected to acquire by the end of the lesson, step-by-step teaching methods to reach the objectives, and good materials in the form of handouts to be distributed among students during the lesson. The lessons use a variety of teaching strategies including role plays, decision trees, cooperative learning, case-studies, and the like.

We have found that a publication of this type is particularly valuable when teachers are insufficiently trained and totally unfamiliar with active teaching/learning methods. Fewer than 50 percent of the civic education or social science courses in Polish primary schools are taught by teachers who have the requisite formal qualifications required by the educational authorities. Those with training usually have backgrounds in history and, in some cases, political science. The remaining courses are taught by teachers completely untrained in a relevant subject area. These teachers possess some sort of general training, often in physical education, or are "head teachers" filling out their required number of teaching hours. This unfortunate practice is a relic of the times when a recommendation from the Communist Party was a basic qualification for teaching a social science course. For these reasons, the existence of a publication which offers teachers a simple overview of the knowledge of the subject as well as the methodology is crucial.

Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios is a truly pioneering work. In Poland, curriculum development and the presentation of materials differs from that often found in the United States. Curriculum materials are often presented in the form of a list of subject-matter topics to be covered during the instructional process. Thus, no similar publications with detailed methodological suggestions for teachers of civics or other subjects exist in Poland. As a result, the appearance of *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios* has been much appreciated by Polish teachers and other educators. It is worth adding that, in spite of the fact that *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios* was originally developed for primary schools, it turned out that many of the lessons in the course could be and have been used for teaching students at the secondary school level.

Translating American Materials for Supplementary Use

While not called for in the original plan for EDCP, we have also published several books of supplementary materials as part of EDCP. These materials included a selection of Polish texts and primary source materials, and translations from two categories of American texts: those from the economic and law-related education areas. American economic and law-related education materials present lessons on subjects virtually absent from Polish schools.

Translating American materials for civic education into Polish has proven to be of limited value, especially in situations where one might want to use such materials as the main basis for instruction. Proposing that this kind of education was necessary and possible in comprehensive secondary schools came as a shock to many Polish teachers and other educators. The likelihood of relying on those texts in practice was limited because they were very new to teachers.

Apart from the lack of teacher preparation to provide instruction in both economic and legal education, the value and use of translated American materials was also limited because those materials were not originally written for the Polish reader. Translated lesson plans, included in both the economic and legal education series, developed concepts in a cultural context unfamiliar to the Polish educators and their students. Most teachers, after reading those translations, were not able to adapt the contents to their local needs. This rendered the publications inappropriate for use directly by classroom teachers in their daily course work. Later, we did find that such translated materials were of some value when they were used as supplementary materials during teacher in-service workshops.³

Preservice Teacher Education Course Plan

From the beginning, we recognized the importance of infusing systematic attention to civic education in preservice teacher education, especially since the structure of curricula is frequently even less well developed and methodologically impoverished in Polish higher education institutions than in the primary and secondary schools. To address this problem, we developed, with support from the Pew Charitable Trusts, a two-semester preservice teacher education course plan, "The School in Democratic Society." Chapters 7 and 8 of this book present a detailed discussion of the rationale and development of this course plan.

"The School in Democratic Society" constitutes a genuine innovation in Polish teacher education—particularly since the course plan contains extensive methodological suggestions. Indeed, when the course plan was first presented at an international conference on civic education held at Jachranka, Poland in December 1993, it aroused much interest among teacher educators from pedagogical institutes and received very favorable reviews from several leading Polish university experts on teacher training.

Yet, even after the Jachranka Conference, the course plan has been put into practice by only a few teacher trainers. A broader introduction of the course plan to teacher training institutions will depend upon organized dissemination and professional development programs as well as other kinds of support for the teacher educators who would be implementing the course plan. Unfortunately, the grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts contained no support for such dissemination activities.

Some impetus was given to dissemination of the course plan at a small working conference focused on teacher education reform held in May 1995. Participants at the conference included leading American experts on teacher education reform from The Ohio State University's College of Education and Polish teacher educators, some of whom had been experimenting

with the course plan at their institutions. Participants at this conference, "The School in Democratic Society," considered strategies for promoting dissemination of the preservice course plan as well as priorities for next steps in preservice teacher education reform in Poland.

Network of Centers for Civic and Economic Education

A long-term goal of EDCP is national dissemination of new programs and courses in civic education. This requires the establishment of appropriate local institutions to recruit and support schools and teachers willing to try new ideas. For this reason, in early 1993, we established, with support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), five Centers for Civic and Economic Education. Chapter 6 presents a detailed discussion of these Centers. At this point, I offer a few comments on our experience with those institutions.

The Centers created with support from NED were located in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, and Kraków. They were later followed by two more located in Olsztyn and Krosno. Three of the original five were established through existing local teacher training organizations known as Provincial Methodology Centers (PMC). The PMCs are part of the Polish system of teacher education supervised by the Ministry. The Warsaw Center was affiliated with the Central Center for Teacher Training, *Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli* (CODN), an independent agency within the Polish system of teacher education overseen by the Ministry of National Education.

One Center was established outside the structures of secondary education at one of the universities. After a year and a half it can be said that such a location does not work well for this kind of Center. Our experience shows that the Polish system of higher education, its bureaucratic structure and the values around which a university is organized, do not constitute the right environment for an in-service teacher training institution.

The Warsaw Center developed at the fastest pace and, in addition to working with teachers in the Warsaw area, has also run in-service programs on a national scale. This was due to solid support this Center received from CODN and the fact that the original administrators had extensive experience in the United States of America. Two of the three individuals had participated in EDCP from the very beginning and had also spent nearly six months at The Ohio State University as members of a team of eight Polish teachers who developed EDCP's primary school civics course. The third individual, a specialist in economic education, had spent a year at Georgetown University. The great productivity of this Center and widespread respect for the high quality of its activities has contributed significantly to the excellent reputation of EDCP in Poland.

Upon reflection, it appears that we were correct to assume that it was essential to create a network of local organizations across Poland to disseminate and support national implementation of innovations in civic education. Further, the American center model has proven useful as a guide to the kinds of organizations we needed to create. At the same time, I believe we underestimated the difficulty of establishing such Centers with the very limited financial resources and numbers of qualified personnel that have been available for this kind of activity. In fact, due to inappropriate personnel decisions, one of the above-mentioned Centers had to be closed.

As it has turned out, the creation of the not-for-profit, non-governmental Center for Citizenship Education (CCE) in May 1994, an event we could not have foreseen in 1992, has helped support the Centers for Civic and Economic Education. At the same time, the existence of the Centers for Civic and Economic Education has given CCE the kind of network of local organizations committed to the reforms in civic education that we needed to press ahead with national dissemination of new programs.

Contributions to Civic Education in Poland

My evaluation up to this point has concerned the results or products—instructional materials, in-service training, and the like—promised and delivered as part of EDCP's projects funded largely by government agencies and foundations in the United States of America. We were accountable to the sponsors of these particular projects for outcomes which can be referred to as the planned or anticipated results of our work. In this section, I reflect upon the consequences for civic education in Poland that have flowed from the successful completion of EDCP's original projects.

Internal Network of Civic Education Leaders

We can argue that introducing civic education for democracy into schools depends on whether or not there are people within the educational system (teachers, administrators, and others) who possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes, including a strong personal commitment to educational reform. That is why it seems worthwhile to analyze the Polish-American collaboration discussed here in terms of the development of human resources. As different EDCP projects were successfully realized, an informal group of people who might be called "civic education leaders" came into being. These have been typically teachers and teacher educators who have acquired new knowledge and skills as a result of taking on significant roles, often in leadership, in EDCP projects. Basic competencies acquired by these individuals include knowledge and understanding of civic education, the ability to design educational materials and prepare lesson scenarios, and the ability to organize and run professional development workshops focusing on civic education. Each new project undertaken by EDCP has drawn upon this expanding group and their skills. At the same time, each new project has served to enlarge this group, and to add to the repertoire of knowledge and skills that were being gained by its members. The continuous selection and shifting of participants for particular tasks prevented the circle of people involved in the project from becoming too exclusive.

The manner in which the participants in EDCP activities were selected has contributed positively to the development of this group. As new project tasks appeared, individuals who had not been selected for earlier projects were recruited. When these individuals had not been chosen for earlier projects, we made sure to keep in touch with them by informing them in writing about the work in progress and enclosing relevant materials, and, when possible, by involving them in some minor way in the activity.

Over time, the growing number of EDCP projects and the many tasks associated with completing each project led to the establishment of a variety of formal relationships between the people involved, including project coordinators, executive staff, and participants. At the same time, informal relationships were formed, binding the "civic education leaders" to each other and to other teachers. The development of these networks was sustained by numerous meetings designed to facilitate team work as well as conferences and training sessions.

In short, one of the most important consequences of the various EDCP projects, especially the development of the curriculum guidelines and primary school civics course, has been the learning of key skills by the educators involved. The latter project proved especially effective in training future teacher trainers and specialists in civic education. It resulted in the preparation of a large number of teachers with new expertise in different areas of civic education. This synergistic process of creating networks of people connected with civic education and the continuing acquisition of new skills by the members of this group may be one of the most important contributions to the realization of EDCP's long-term goals, particular-

ly the goals of promoting a national dialogue about civic education and the goal of enhancing the capacity of Polish educators to develop programs on their own.

Development of Managerial Skills

From the start, EDCP has needed a group of formal leaders who would be in charge of various activities. Forming a managing team posed a problem because a barrier that could be called a "low organizational culture" exists in all post-communist societies. There is a real dearth of people with managerial skills; at the same time, such people receive fairly attractive offers from commercial institutions. As a consequence, it proved challenging to identify candidates with good managerial skills who would be willing to get involved in our project. Potential candidates with work experience in managerial and executive positions in education possessed skills useful only in big bureaucratic institutions along with numerous bad habits acquired in those same institutions. The existing administrative personnel could, therefore, not be used in the project.

As the Polish Co-Director of EDCP, I was faced with the necessity of recruiting and training a Polish managing staff. The most important qualities we looked for in the candidates were openness to new ideas and willingness to learn. Learning occurred naturally through experience and in the course of close collaboration with our American colleagues. Polish participants in the project got to know the organizational procedures introduced by the Americans and gradually learned to use similar procedures themselves. This included learning a great deal about international cooperation, drafting project proposals for presentation to potential sponsors, generating budgets, and accounting for project funds. As a result, we have learned to apply independently and successfully for funding from the American, European, and Polish foundations.

The process was not planned or guided, but its results are visible. Such "natural training" proved particularly effective in the case of rather young people who had no previous managerial or administrative experience in education or anywhere else. These people had to learn organizational procedures from scratch; their lack of bad habits, therefore, proved to be a considerable advantage.

One very important dimension of managerial skills we have developed has been the ability, in most instances, to successfully choose people for specific tasks. Selecting the right participants has been and remains critically important, since more than any other factor the quality of participants has determined the success of the EDCP projects. Further, in a situation of scarce financial and human resources, errors in selecting participants could be quite costly and not easily remedied. From the very beginning, the need arose to select from thousands of educators those individuals with the strongest motivation and the skills most helpful in project implementation. Selection of participants, of course, became especially important when it involved the opportunity to take part in a major activity such as a long-term visit to The Ohio State University as part of the Polish team developing the primary school civics course.

Many teachers found participation in EDCP activities very attractive. This did not mean, however, that they were all willing or really able to change old habits and ways of thinking or to take on creative tasks. In training adults, it proved necessary to look for people genuinely interested in learning and who had not lost the ability to do so. In our project it was also important to find participants with a strong commitment to civics and educational reform. Sometimes employing people who, based on their formal qualifications and positions in the educational system, were able to impress EDCP Co-Directors or project leaders enough to hire them proved to be a mistake.

The strategy which worked best in selecting individuals responsible for subsequent tasks was to look for people who had already made a contribution to EDCP. These contributions might have been organizing some event, preparing written materials, or conducting a training session. Under ideal circumstances, such prior activities were similar to the activities they were being recruited to accomplish. Looking at the results produced in earlier project activities, even if those activities were minor in nature, constituted the best premise for the selection of individuals for new, more important tasks. Thus, the organization of EDCP as a series of distinct but related projects continuously evolving over time made it possible for many people to prove themselves in different tasks and afforded opportunities for selection of those individuals who had already demonstrated effective participation in other, related EDCP activities.

Trust Between International Partners

Another long-term goal of EDCP is to build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators. The indispensable foundation for such linkages is mutual trust. The successful completion of EDCP's original projects entailed building deep, very strong levels of mutual trust between the Americans and Poles involved. As a member of the Polish group, I am able to comment on the process of overcoming certain prejudices toward American consultants that the Polish participants tended to have at the outset of our work together on civic education.

In the post-1990 period, a view prevailed in Poland, despite real appreciation for foreign aid, that expert advice and consultations offered by Western specialists were of low quality. In a few cases, in fact, reports developed by Western experts were simplistic, and time-consuming contacts with such specialists failed to produce valuable results for Poland. According to the stereotype which soon developed, it was the intention of the foreign "helpers" to make money on naive and incompetent Poles. The Polish leaders of EDCP were not completely free of this kind of prejudice. We needed several months working with our American colleagues to overcome our biases and recognize the strong, sound motivation and high professional qualifications of our American partners.

A key reason for the success of our collaboration has been a willingness by the Americans to recognize the difference between those areas in which the Poles were competent and could act independently, and those areas in which the Poles needed suggestions or training from foreign advisers. Receptivity to the Poles' opinions on the part of the American partners proved very important in this respect. The general strategy proposed by the Americans, according to which the Poles created the principal materials of the project and the Americans assumed auxiliary roles, was equally helpful in this building of mutual trust.

Acceptance from Polish Educators

The activities carried out thus far have served to gain the approbation of wider academic, educator, and teacher circles in Poland. The usefulness of the materials published has been of particular importance to teachers. For Polish teachers, a curriculum designed by their peers has numerous advantages over the curricula traditionally developed by academics. All of EDCP's publications, including the curriculum guide, the primary school civics course, translations, and even the preservice course plan for teacher educators, have been "teacher-oriented." This was based on an assumption that any real changes in education had to start

with the teachers and, ultimately, only teachers could be responsible for introducing them. This approach has been noticed and very much appreciated by teachers.

Eliciting a positive reaction from certain members of the academic circles initially proved much more difficult. Although most academics expressed their unyielding support for the project, and contributed to it in numerous ways, some felt slighted and threatened by the fact that the effort was oriented more toward teachers than toward them. Most academics regarded the process of curriculum design as falling within their domain. Some were also critical of the participation by American experts instead of, in their opinion, competent Polish specialists. Getting academics involved in EDCP in the capacity of reviewers of published materials proved successful in evoking their positive response. Eventually, the quality of the materials produced and the Polish perspective reflected in those materials has gained the academics' acceptance.

The Center for Citizenship Education

Developing long-term civic education in Poland through a collaborative relationship between Polish and American educators required a solid organizational base in Poland. At the outset of EDCP in 1991, the Polish base was the Ministry of National Education, where I was Director of Teacher Training and, along with Ministry colleagues, vigorously pursued educational reform. In the early stages, linkage with the Ministry had some advantages for EDCP. The Ministry, for example, helped cover in-country expenses for American consultants. The Ministry also provided secretarial and other types of office support in Poland at a time when we had no other centers or offices. At the same time, we were only one of many activities of the Ministry and often experienced the bureaucratic inertia felt by all efforts associated with the large Ministry bureaucracy.

As the scope of EDCP's activities grew significantly, the need to develop a new base devoted exclusively to civic education reform became increasingly apparent. We needed to have the flexibility and the freedom to move rapidly that one associates with a non-governmental organization. It is much easier for a non-governmental institution to manage a highly dynamic project and implement it in selected organizational forms, for example, through the creation of task groups and the recruitment of participants solely on the basis of the subject-matter criteria. Bringing the undertaking out of the bureaucratic, organizational, and financial framework of the Ministry of National Education allowed a significant addition of dynamism to activities.

The need to create a new base for EDCP was given further impetus by the political changes in Poland brought by the parliamentary elections of 1993. Those elections brought to power a government consisting of former Communists and subsequently muted the reform orientation of the Ministry of National Education. By late 1993 it had become clear that under the new government the Ministry was no longer going to aggressively pursue educational reform along lines conducive to our long-term goals.

Hence, in early 1994 I left the Ministry and in spring 1994 created the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw to fill the function of the Polish organizational base for EDCP. As it turned out, this change promoted an even greater expansion of new civic education projects that built upon the experience and network of people generated by the original four EDCP activities. (Chapter 4 provides an overview of these activities.)

Cooperation with Local Governments

A very significant, positive consequence of the original EDCP activities has been the development of close working relationships with local governments across Poland that will pay for implementing EDCP's primary school civics course in their schools. Involvement of local governments in civic education reform is especially important for two reasons. First, it provides one answer to a serious problem facing national implementation of civic education reform generally and the primary school civics course specifically—finding a sponsor that would pay for the extra hours of teaching required to implement the new course. Second, local governments can provide independent support for civic education reform in Poland, thereby lessening financial dependence on international assistance.

Until 1990, education in Poland was highly centralized under the Ministry of National Education. Schools of all levels had little connection to their local communities and were subordinated to the Ministry through regional educational authorities. One of the key educational reforms initiated in 1990 was to begin the process of decentralizing education by giving administration of schools to local government authorities. In Polish this process is often referred to as "uspołecznienie oświaty" (socializing education), meaning the process of local citizens gaining influence over education and thereby becoming for the first time stakeholders in the operation of their local schools.

We believed these local governments could be natural allies of the EDCP projects for two reasons. First, the concepts and ideas included in civic education for democracy support the importance of the local community and their elected body. Therefore, local governments value civic education in their schools. Second, local governments and their constituents naturally care about the quality of education in their area and are willing to direct resources toward school improvement.

Thus, in the spring of 1994, with support from NED and the Stefan Batory Foundation, CCE initiated a major new project called "Civic Education in Local Government Schools." Through this project, CCE entered into contracts with local government and school authorities to introduce EDCP's primary school civics course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, into grades seven and eight of their schools. In these contracts, the local governments are obligated to pay teachers to teach the additional hours required for the course, and CCE is obliged to train teachers and provide teaching materials to implement the extended civics program.

Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios constitutes a real change in civic education because of its content and teaching methods. Further, it is taught for two hours a week. Its equivalent taught in other Polish schools is called "Knowledge about Society" and is only taught in eighth grade for one hour a week. The extension of the former curriculum by about 100 hours required a sponsor. This role was assumed by the local governments. Therefore, through this local government project, civic education is being taught at the demand of the local community where a given school is located rather than at the directive of a distant national ministry.

The local government project began during the 1994-95 school year, with CCE entering into agreements with 19 local governments and 51 schools. Because of success during the first year, over 150 local governments approached CCE requesting training for their schools in 1995-96, and CCE entered into more than a hundred contracts with different local governments. We were able to expand the local government project for 1995-96 because of substantial new grants from the United States Information Agency and the European Community. The local government project will make a major contribution to EDCP's long-term goal of institutionalizing civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade. In school year 1995-96, EDCP's new civics course is being taught in 300 schools representing over

1,000 primary classrooms and thus affecting approximately 30,000 students. In the next year, we are planning to continue to expand the number of schools participating in the project. We anticipate that local governments will also expand their financial support for the project by covering part of the training costs.

Transfer of the American Experience

As the events of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe have unleashed many efforts at educational reform, some have asked, "Can education for democracy be exported?" My experience with EDCP since 1991 leads me to believe that this is the wrong question. For those of us in Central and Eastern Europe the question is "How can we help ourselves?" As I have repeatedly emphasized, the Polish participants in EDCP have been, and continue to be, the only authors of the produced curriculum guides, primary school civics course, and new products under development. For Poles there could be no other way and—to their great credit—our American partners have believed exactly the same thing. This belief has been the most fundamental assumption of the entire enterprise.

From the beginning, it has been important to the eventual users that all the materials developed through EDCP referred to and were rooted in a familiar Polish context. At the same time, we have recognized and appreciated that we could learn a great deal from the democratic experience, and successes and failures in civic education, of our American partners. Thus, the project has taken, and will continue to take, advantage of American educational, social, and political experiences. For example, the classroom lessons in the primary school civics course with their active teaching methods were inspired to a great extent by the American consultants and American teaching materials. The perspectives on civic education reflected in all the various EDCP products have also drawn on the American tradition of constitutionalism and political and social practice. At the same time, our work on civic education will always be by Poles for Poland.

Of course, the ability and willingness of one national group to draw upon the resources of another in an area as potentially sensitive as that of civic education does not happen automatically. Rather, as I believe our experience with EDCP illustrates, this kind of transference of ideas results from two groups working in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust over an extended period of time, a practice we hope to continue.

Notes

1. The project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP) was created at the request of the Polish Ministry of National Education in February 1991 as a cooperative effort of the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, and the Ministry. Since then, EDCP has expanded to include as the major collaborators the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and The Ohio State University College of Education. Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw, and Dr. Richard C. Remy, The Ohio State University, initiated EDCP and have served as Co-Directors since its inception. EDCP undertakes curriculum development, teacher education, and applied research projects designed to meet specific objectives while at the same time contributing to three long-term goals, which are to (1) institutionalize civic education in all schools in Poland for the next decade, (2) contribute to a national dialogue among Polish educators on the meaning of democratic citizenship and civic education, and (3) build strong linkages between American and Polish civic educators.

2. Richard C. Remy, "Education for Democracy Project," a proposal from the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, June 1991).

3. One small group of Polish educators actually made extensive use of translated publications. They were the Polish teachers who played a major role in developing the EDCP curriculum guide and the primary school civics course. These teachers had extensive professional development opportunities with American civic and economic educators as a result of their work on those projects, particularly the authors of the primary school civics course. Of course, these people could have been provided with the American materials in a much more direct manner.

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Toward Constitutional Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

A. E. Dick Howard



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12

Toward Constitutional Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

A. E. Dick Howard

After free elections signaled the end to decades of Communist rule in Hungary, a newly free parliament elected Árpád Göncz as the country's president. Göncz had spent six years in prison for his part in the unsuccessful uprising in 1956. Now, like the Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel, President Göncz is a symbol of the new era in Central and Eastern Europe.

On Constitution Day, September 17, 1990, President Göncz inaugurated a year-long celebration of the global legacy of the United States Bill of Rights, whose bicentennial Americans marked in 1991. Speaking in the Rotunda of the University of Virginia (founded by Thomas Jefferson), President Göncz drew parallels between the events of the founding era in the United States and the changes underway in his own country.

More recently, a friend returning from a visit to Albania reported that a veterinary surgeon had been sentenced to a year's hard labor for naming cattle after prominent leaders in his vil-
lage. No one supposes, of course, that countries in which liberty was so ruthlessly suppressed during the years of Communist tyranny would instantly become model democracies. Even the established democracies in North America and Western Europe have far from perfect records, as we all know. What can we say of recent constitutional developments in the states formerly under Soviet domination?

The Drafting of New Constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe

The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has brought a period of intense constitutional development. Hoping for the advent of constitutionalism and democracy, drafters in the region have embarked on the writing of new constitutions and bills of rights, and the creation of the infrastructure of an open, just, and democratic society based upon the rule of law. Recalling the example set by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, one might imagine Central and Eastern Europe to be entering upon its "Madisonian moment."

This essay is based on the Donahue Lecture given at Suffolk University Law School in November 1993. An earlier version of this essay appeared in the *Suffolk Law Review* (Spring 1994), and the revised version which appears here is published with the kind permission of the editors of the *Review*.

The road to constitutionalism in the region, however, has proved a good more rutted and uneven than the initial enthusiasm had supposed. The drafting of constitutions—not to mention the larger task of building democratic institutions—is not an academic exercise, undertaken with a few books of political theory at one's elbow. Significant political and practical problems have strewn the path of drafters who have set to work on new constitutions in the region.

Existing governmental structures, those already in place when constitution-making began, have proved to be an important factor in at least some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This is especially true where those institutions were established when political circumstances were quite different (for example, during the period of Communist dominance).

Czechoslovakia presents a case in point. The structure within which constitutional change was debated helped bring about the dissolution of the federation. A 1968 amendment to Czechoslovakia's Constitution created a Federal Assembly having two houses: a Chamber of People, elected by Czechs and Slovaks on the basis of population, and a Chamber of Nations, having equal numbers of deputies from the Czech and Slovak lands. The 1968 amendment further provided that, as to important legislation, a majority of the deputies from each of the two constituent republics in the Chamber of nations must concur for the bill to become law.

During the Communist period, such an arrangement might have seemed a harmless sop to nationalistic sentiments, especially in the Slovak lands (Slovaks being outnumbered by Czechs on the order of something like two to one). After all, whatever the formal parliamentary structure, real power lay in the hands of the Party; the Federal Assembly was but a facade.

After the Velvet Revolution, however, the Slovak members of the House of Nations found themselves holding what amounted to the power to veto important legislation. In formal terms there might be two chambers, but in a real sense there were three houses—the Chamber of People, a Chamber of Czechs, and a Chamber of Slovaks. The post-Communist era in Czechoslovakia brought harder times to the poorer Slovak regions than to the Czech lands. As political lines hardened, efforts to write a new constitution for the Czech and Slovak Federation foundered on the shoals of the *de facto* veto power exercised by Slovak opposition party members in the Chamber of Nations.¹

Structure aside, politics and personalities in the new democracies have been a major factor shaping the course of constitutional drafting and development. Sometimes a constitution's provisions reflect the place an important political figure has in the mind of the country at the time of the constitution's adoption. The leader may be admired and respected, he or she may be feared or distrusted (opinions may, of course, be mixed); in either event, a personality may affect what goes into the constitution.

For example, one can make no real sense of Poland's "Little Constitution" (adopted in 1992) without being aware of the dynamics of Polish politics, particularly the place of Lech Wałęsa. Solidarity, more a movement than a party, split into two factions after 1989. Wałęsa had his natural base in the "Gdańsk" faction; intellectuals of the "Warsaw" faction began to look to the draft constitution as a means to prevent Wałęsa from dominating Parliament and the government. The "Little Constitution" contains exceptionally complicated provisions regarding the executive and legislative branches (including no fewer than five ways to form a government). Those arrangements must be understood as a political compromise struck between Wałęsa's people and parliamentarians wary of his powers and policies.¹

In Czechoslovakia, the aspirations of political leaders played a key role in the divorce between the Czech and Slovak republics. Politicians and drafters working on a new constitution found the most difficult problem to be the question of how authority should be divided between the federal government and the governments of the two republics. As politicians struggled with this issue, public opinions polls consistently showed that a majority of the

population in both the Czech and Slovak republics wanted to remain in a common state. At the political level, however, the struggle was as much over power as over a constitutional document. Slovak leaders in the Federal Assembly created deadlock to such a degree that, whatever ordinary citizens may have wished, dissolution of the federation was the result.

Politics, personalities, and structure often take forms distinctive to a particular country. There are, at the same time, historical circumstances and other factors that affect the making of constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe. A common legacy of all of the nascent democracies in the region is, of course, their having been part of the Soviet sphere after World War II. They were denied, therefore, the formative experience of democratic institutions and constitutionalism that their more fortunate neighbors to the west enjoyed.

Czechoslovakia had a viable democracy between the two world wars, but that brief experiment ended over 50 years ago. Some countries in Central and Eastern Europe had never had a full-blown democratic experience. Whatever their fortunes before World War II, the countries of the region were deprived, for half a century after that war, of the opportunities to develop the political practices and the civic culture in which constitutionalism flourishes. One should not be surprised, therefore, to find constitutions being drafted that have a somewhat abstract quality about them—constitutions whose real test lies in the future.

This is not to say that Central and Eastern European countries have no tradition of constitutionalism. Poles still celebrate their country's period of eighteenth century Enlightenment, and they are well aware that Poland's great Constitution of May 3, 1791, was the world's second written constitution (followed soon thereafter by France's first written constitution).³

Hungary has traditions of constitutionalism that go back to the Golden Bull of 1222—Hungary's counterpart of England's Magna Carta. Even the repressions of the Communist years, during which party leaders sought to mold the local equivalent of the "Soviet man," could not erase traditional ideas of constitutionalism developed during centuries of Hungarian history. Peter Paczolay, chief counselor to that country's Constitutional Court, has demonstrated how Hungary's transition was in reality a "constitutional revolution." The constitutional change that unfolded beginning in 1989 bore some resemblance to the modes of thought in Hungary in 1848. Modern Hungary has achieved a peaceful transition to a multiparty system in a way that emphasizes the place of law in justifying the manner and mode of transition.⁴

The Influence of Europe and America

The drafting of constitutions in countries undergoing transition from communism to democracy presents fascinating case studies in the relative effects of indigenous experience and external influence. Much of what goes into the new constitutions is home-grown, reflecting a particular country's history, culture, politics, and traditions. Yet many ideas are borrowed, reflecting the comparative aspects of constitutionalism.

It should come as no surprise that those who draft constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe look, not only to their own country's experience, but also to that of other places. The international traffic in thinking about rights and constitutions is of long standing. When Americans in the 1770s and 1780s wrote their first state and federal constitutions, they built on, of course, generations of experience with law-making and institution-building on their own continent. But they also drew heavily upon ideas shaped in the Old World. Indeed, James Madison, the architect of the federal constitutional order, made extensive notes on the "ancient and modern confederacies" before composing the plan that, as introduced at Philadelphia, became the basis for the debates of 1787.⁵

To which countries and to what constitutions do the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe look when they write their own constitutions for a democratic age? Professors and other legal experts in the region are well read in both European and American constitutional ideas. One who looks, however, at the constitutions drafted or adopted in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will find that they are much more like the constitutions of Western Europe than like that of the United States.

The form of government adopted in the new democracies is European, not American. It is the parliamentary system so familiar in Europe, not the American model of separation of powers, that is to be found throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Even when a presidential model is under consideration, it is the constitution of France's Fifth Republic, not the American version, to which drafters look as a point of departure.

When judicial review is debated, constitutional drafters in Central and Eastern Europe may (but usually do not) mull the idea of a court of unified jurisdiction like the Supreme Court of the United States. Invariably, however, the drafters choose some form of a tribunal having specialized constitutional jurisdiction, drawing either upon the stronger model furnished by Germany's Constitutional Court or upon the variant suggested by France's Constitutional Council.⁷

The reasons for a pan-European influence are obvious. Central and Eastern Europe have particular reasons to wish to be seen, in constitutional terms, as peers of the countries of Western Europe. One incentive is economic. With the dissolution of patterns of trade and commerce enforced during the period of Soviet hegemony, countries in the former Communist bloc hope to attract trade and investment from richer countries like Germany. Indeed, the new democracies often hope to become members of the European Community. Adopting Western-style constitutions, along with modern business and banking codes, is one mark of a country that invites foreign investors and businessmen to feel at home in Prague or Budapest.

Economic motives are reinforced by the respect one finds among intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe for the great legal traditions and academic institutions in the West. Just as a professor at a small American law school would hope to make his or her mark on the pages of a law review published at one of the nation's most prestigious law schools, so do professors in Sofia or Bucharest want to be thought of as the peers of faculties in Heidelberg or Tubingen.

In general, European countries freed of Soviet domination yearn once again to be part of the "family of Europe." History, geography, economic aspirations, legal traditions, intellectual affinity—all play their part in drawing Central and Eastern Europe's constitutional drafters to think in European terms.

Thinking about Rights in Central and Eastern Europe

Bills of rights being drafted in Central and Eastern Europe reflect many of the patterns of modern constitutionalism. Every draft contains, in one form or another, assurances of free speech, freedom of conscience, and the right to form political parties. Similarly, one will inevitably find some version of the anti-discrimination principle—bans on discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, religion, or other specified grounds. As to criminal justice, every bill of rights contains procedural protections for those accused of crime. The symmetry of the new bills of rights reflects in good part the influence of international norms as found in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights.

The transition from authoritarian to democratic government in Central and Eastern Europe requires thinking about the nature of rights. What kinds of rights ought to be given constitu-

tional status, what should the scope of those rights be, and how can they be made effective? Of special interest is the way in which constitution-makers approach two kinds of rights: negative rights and affirmative rights.

Negative Rights

The more traditional human rights, such as freedom of expression, declare limits on government power—what government may *not* do. In this respect, the new bills of rights often give with one hand and take back with the other. Free speech, for example, enjoys only qualified protection. The typical bill of rights in the region declares a person's right to speak freely, but goes on to carve out significant exceptions. It is common for advocacy of "fascism" or "communism" to be excepted from the constitution's protection, or for bans on speech to be allowed where speech conflicts with "public morality" or with the "constitutional order." Such exceptions can swallow up the rule, especially when, as always seems the case, the bill of rights does not require some finding of "clear and present danger" or a like standard before a restriction on speech can be justified.

Romania's Constitution, adopted in 1991, declares the "freedom to express thoughts, opinions, or beliefs" to be "inviolable." But the Constitution goes on to add that the law may prohibit "defamation of the country and the nation; any instigation to a war of aggression; to national, racial, class, or religious hatred; any incitement to discrimination, territorial separatism, or public violence; as well as any obscene conduct contrary to morality."⁸ One wonders whether an ethnic Hungarian, inclined to complain about conditions in Transylvania, could rely on his "inviolable" right to speak freely when the Constitution itself declares such sweeping and malleable exceptions.

Negative rights, such as freedom of expression, are essential to liberal democracy. They enlarge the sphere of individual autonomy and bolster the open society. No rights are more critical to the success of constitutional democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Sweeping exceptions to such rights threaten the very idea of democracy. Self-government presupposes a citizen's right to criticize public officials and their actions. Vague exceptions to the free speech principle give excessive discretion to government officials to decide what expression is permissible and what is not. An elastic approach to freedom of expression is especially dangerous to national, ethnic, and other minorities, to the political opposition, in short, to just the people who most need the constitution's protection.⁹

Affirmative Rights

The twentieth century has brought entitlements (such as social security) and positive government. A corollary of more activist government is constitutional provisions that declare such affirmative rights. This approach to rights is especially obvious in countries in Central and Eastern Europe which, although they have put one-party government behind them, have powerful traditions of social democracy. A new constitution's preamble may announce a commitment to the market economy, but the enumeration of social and economic rights bespeaks a different cast of mind.

Thus the new bills of rights spell out claims upon government, such as the right to an education, the right to a job, and the benefits of care in one's old age. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, adopted in January 1991 for the now defunct Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, is typical. It declares that workers "are entitled to fair remuneration for work and to satisfactory working conditions."¹⁰ Other sections decree free medical care,

material security in one's old age, maternity benefits, and assistance to assure the needy of "basic living conditions."

The use of a bill of rights as an affirmative tool presents special problems. The traditional rights, such as expression or assembly, tell government what it *cannot* do and may be enforced through injunctions and other familiar judicial remedies. Affirmative rights tell government what it *must* do. Here enforcement is more problematical. Affirmative rights commonly entail legislative implementation or decisions about allocation of resources—tasks for which courts are often ill-suited. Anyone familiar with cases in which American judges have become administrators of school systems, prisons, and other public institutions will understand the skewing effect that decreeing affirmative rights has on public budgets.¹¹

One need not necessarily conclude that there is no place in a constitution for affirmative rights. Insofar as social or economic rights reflect an aspiration to a more just society, it is appropriate that they be viewed as having constitutional implications. But there is the danger that if some of a constitution's provisions, such as social rights, cannot be judicially enforced, then citizens may take the entire document less seriously. As long as a constitution was viewed as a political document, the problem of enforceability was less obvious. But with the creation of constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe, the issue of justiciability becomes more pressing.

A constitution ought not to read like a political party's platform. Consider the unfortunate example of Brazil's 1988 Constitution. All 559 members of Brazil's Congress, working without a master plan, participated in the drafting of the Constitution.¹² The resulting document is unrivaled among constitutions for conferring favors upon special-interest groups. There are, for example, 37 sections dealing just with the rights of workers.¹³

One possible approach, something of a middle ground, is to set forth social and political rights as statements of principle. Thus, they would be directives to the legislature, carrying aspirational value. Although not self-executing, such norms would also be useful to courts in interpreting legislation and administrative actions.¹⁴

Rights of National and Other Minorities

An interesting intersection between negative and affirmative rights may be found in the delicate area of ethnic and national minorities. In addition to banning various forms of discrimination, bills of rights in Central and Eastern Europe often declare affirmative rights of language, culture, and education. The Czech and Slovak charter, for example, guaranteed national and ethnic minorities the right to education in their own language, the right to use that language in official settings, and the right to participation (unspecified in form) in the resolution of matters concerning those minorities.¹⁵

The Copenhagen Document deals at length with the problem of national minorities. Agreed to by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at its 1990 meeting in Copenhagen, that document declares that persons belonging to national minorities can exercise their rights "individually as well as in community with other members of their group."¹⁶ This language raises the question whether constitution-makers should provide, not only for individual rights, but also for group rights.

One can argue that, in the context of a particular country's demography, some form of group rights (e.g., local autonomy as to education) may well be needed for political stability and social harmony. This should be seen as essentially a political decision. But, measuring the place of individual rights against group rights, drafters should give primacy to individual rights—to the classic human rights.

A theory of individual rights stresses human dignity and the worth of the individual. In countries faced with tensions among national or other groups, the vigorous enforcement of individual rights carries special force because they extend to all persons, regardless of race or nationality. Ready access to independent courts for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination principle and the protection of individual rights, such as free exercise of religion, can go a long way toward giving national and other minorities a sense of security, making the demand for group rights less pressing.

Civil Societies or National States?

Two basic approaches to the state clash in the making of the constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe. The ideals of a "civil" state presuppose liberal, democratic institutions and universal principles of equal citizenship and individual liberties. In such a society the citizen's relation to the state does not turn on one's religion, nationality, ethnicity, or politics. The state is viewed essentially in atomistic terms.

The competing principle is that of a "national" state—not a nation as Americans define it, but a state founded upon the identity of a particular people or nation in the European sense. Defining the political community in terms of the nation in this latter sense invites the undermining of universal rights and democratic institutions.

Clear examples may be drawn from the saddest of European arenas, the Balkans.¹⁷ To read some of that region's constitutions is to be taken one step closer to understanding the ideological underpinnings of "ethnic cleansing" and other evils. The Croatian Constitution, adopted in 1990, proclaims the realization of "the millennial national identity of the Croatian nation." The document proclaims Croatia to be "the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others . . ." The Constitution goes on to guarantee such peoples "equality with citizens of Croatian nationality."¹⁸

This assurance of "equal footing" was intended, no doubt, to allay concerns of minorities about how they might be treated in post-Yugoslav Croatia. But any citizen who is not ethnically Croatian should find the Constitution's basic premise unsettling. Defining the state in national or ethnic terms creates an atmosphere of "insiders" and "outsiders"—a distinction between those who are the core of the state's being and those who are permitted, as a matter of sufferance, to live in that country. One who does not belong to the chosen ethnic community is not an individual like all others; he or she is, by definition, a member of a national minority.

From Constitutions to Constitutionalism

Having a written constitution does not guarantee that a country will enjoy the benefits of constitutionalism. Nearly every country, even the most repressive, has some document called a "constitution." The Soviet Union's 1936 Constitution glowed with promises of justice and human dignity, but it bore little relation to the realities of that Stalinist society.

How does a country achieve constitutionalism? Some of the requisite conditions are external to the constitution and the institutions it creates. For example, a dedication to constitutional principles is not much help in the face of aggressive neighbors—as the Bosnians, who sought to create a tolerant, multi-ethnic state, found to their misery. Internally, a healthy polity depends in good measure on a stable economy. I remember being asked, when I engaged

a villager in the Philippines about that country's post-Marcos constitution, "But will it put food on my family's table?"

Writing even the best of constitutions is but one step on the road to constitutionalism. Building a constitutional democracy requires developing such institutions as an independent judiciary, an independent bar, a free press and media, and competitive political parties. In a region where law and lawyers were for so long part of the problem, it will take time to create a legal culture in which courts are seen to do justice, rather than being mere functions of the party's will.¹⁹

Ultimately, no objective is more important than civic education—the inculcation of civic virtues. A viable democracy requires that citizens understand that liberty is not license, that the open society depends on mutual tolerance, that rights have a universal quality. A people who do not understand the basic precepts of free government are unlikely to keep it alive and vibrant.

Even as they began the arduous process of transforming their civic life, the peoples of post-communist Europe grasped how demanding a task lay before them. In September 1990, at the very dawn of the new democratic era, educators from Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republic joined their American counterparts at James Madison's home, Montpelier, to discuss "Preserving a Nation's Constitutional Heritage Through Education." Zednek Deyl, of the Czech Ministry of Education, painted this graphic picture: "Imagine that you have people who have been deprived of any democratic education for their whole lives. They simply heard that something like democracy exists, but this was a negative pseudosystem of the capitalist world, so they never ever have seen how to behave and how to get involved in a democratic system."²⁰

Comments by other participants at the Montpelier meeting illustrated the hurdles to be surmounted. Jacek Strzemieczny, then with Poland's Ministry of National Education, stated, "Teachers of history [in the socialist era] were either indoctrinated or repressed. We have to start completely over and train the teachers of the teachers! We are trying to fill an empty well with an empty bucket in a very great hurry." Bertalan Andrasfalvy, Hungary's Minister of Education, lamented that, under the old order, humanists were not allowed to teach; only the natural scientists were allowed to pursue their research, publish, and travel abroad. A Slovak educator concurred: humanists were "really devastated" in the past three decades. "Between Christmas and New Year," he said, "we had to completely rewrite a civic education curriculum!"

Despite such problems, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have important assets. Many an established democracy would be pleased to have the moral leadership of a Göncz or a Havel. The intellectual insights of professors in Warsaw or Budapest can match any to be found in the West. And, above all, despite economic vicissitudes and other burdens, the peoples of the region have a vision of what has been denied them, but is now within reach.

Without civic education, however, the noblest of aspirations cannot be fulfilled. Polish leaders understood this when, in 1773, they established a National Commission on Education—the first such body in Europe. Thomas Jefferson, whose 250th birthday we celebrated in 1993, also understood the connection between civic education and free government. Describing his 1777 Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, Jefferson called for "rendering the people the safe, as they are the ultimate, guardians of their own liberty."²¹

No democracy—established or emerging—can take liberty for granted. Witnessing the making of constitutions in the emerging democracies is an occasion for probing the nature and meaning of rights, the means of their enforcement, and the habits of mind that keep those rights alive.

Notes

1. See Katarina Mathernova, "Czecho?Slovakia: Constitutional Disappointments," in A. E. Dick Howard, ed., *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 57, 64-67.
2. Andrzej Rapaczynski, "Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament," *University of Chicago Law Review* 58 (1991): 595, 601-04.
3. On the "Little Constitution," see Louisa Vinton, "Poland's 'Little Constitution' Clarifies Walesa's Powers," *RFE/RL Research Report* (September 4, 1992), p. 19.
4. See Mark Brzezinski, "Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland," *Virginia Law Review* 77 (1991): 49.
5. Peter Paczolay, "The New Hungarian Constitutional State: Challenges and Perspectives," in Howard, ed., *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe*, p. 21.
6. *The Papers of James Madison*, ed. Robert A. Rutland (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962-). IX, 4-22.
7. On the new constitutional courts, see Herman Schwartz, "The New East European Constitutional Courts," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 13 (1992): 741.
8. Constitution of Romania, Article 30, Sections 1, 7.
9. I explore the prospects for the "open society" in post-communist Europe in A. E. Dick Howard, "Toward the Open Society in Central and Eastern Europe," in Grethe B. Peterson, ed., *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 1995), pp. 191-264.
10. Article 28.
11. For arguments against including affirmative rights in the constitutions of the emerging democracies, see Cass Sunstein, "Against Positive Rights," *East European Constitutional Review* (Winter 1993): 35.
12. See Abdo I. Baaklini, *The Brazilian Legislature and Political System* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 157-77.
13. See, e.g., Constitution of Brazil, Article 7, Sections XIII (8-hour day and 44-hour week), XV (paid weekly rest, preferably on Sunday).
14. See Constitution of Ireland, Article 45: "The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles in the making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution."
15. Article 25, § 2a-c.
16. Paragraph 32.6.
17. For an eloquent statement, see George Soros, "Bosnia and Beyond," *New York Review of Books* (October 7, 1993): pp. 15-16.
18. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article I ("Historical Foundations").
19. I develop some of these indicia of constitutionalism in *The Road to Constitutionalism* (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1991).
20. This and the quotations in the following paragraph were transcribed at the conference "Preserving a Nation's Constitutional Heritage Through Education," which met at James Madison's Montpelier, in Virginia, on September 15-16, 1990.
21. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, ed., William Peden (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), p. 148.

13

The Future of Democracy

Charles F. Bahmueller



13

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13

The Future of Democracy

Charles F. Bahmueller

In the 1970s, some experts suggested that global democratic development in this era had reached its outer limits.¹ The year 1989, however, was a time of extraordinary euphoria, as democrats throughout the world celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Similar feelings of hope and renewal about democracy accompanied the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.

An Ambiguous Democratic Moment

By the beginning of the 1990s, a new democratic wave seemed to be breaking. Though unsuccessful, a movement for democracy had openly appeared in China. In Africa, demands for multiparty elections were heard in country after country. There, as everywhere else, with the end of the Cold War, it was clear that dictators could no longer depend on external support by playing off one side against the other. The tide of human affairs had once again changed; the world-wide energies of democracy seemed to be gathering force.²

By the mid-1990s, however, the picture was not so clear. While early in the decade some scholars could speak of "the democratic moment," a few years later others were not so sure. Savage ethnic fighting had broken out in the Balkans and elsewhere in the former-communist East and has continued for years. In neighboring Russia, the news was nearly as bad. By 1995, some students of the world's geographically largest nation were writing off democracy as unrealistic. Democracy, it was said, had roots neither in Russian history nor in the Russian soul. Seventy years of totalitarian communism had drained the population of its initiative, its sense of responsibility, and its feeling of efficacy in determining its own fate. Even much of the peasantry was stripped of the peasant's age-old desire for land.

A significant segment of the energetic and resourceful former Soviet subjects turned to organized crime, which, like some latent disease, arose everywhere. In the face of weak or unprepared states, organized crime boldly, openly flexed its muscles throughout the former Soviet region, moving beyond its borders into Poland and even into Western Europe, thumbing its nose at the promise of a decent life in a new democratic environment. Government, including the police itself, was not immune from the corrupting blandishments of these sinister organizations.³

Development elsewhere in the world did not always leave observers sanguine about democracy's future. In Africa, conditions for building democracy were exceptionally poor. Observers pointed to drought, the continuing spread of the Sahara, unchecked ravages of AIDS, genocide and other manifestations of ethnic strife, and an unabated increase of population and wondered how many of the continent's democratic movements could be successful in the face of such obstacles.⁴

In Latin America, where the situation was decidedly better, observers nevertheless said that "democracy in Latin America is far from robust," is "nowhere fully achieved," and is most firmly established "in those few countries where it was already deeply rooted and vibrant a generation ago."⁵ Democracy was vulnerable; in April 1992, Peru's was broken by its enemies when President Fujimori suspended constitutional government.⁶ In Brazil, democracy had been dealt a blow with the exposure of corruption at the highest levels of government.

In Asia, the Indian subcontinent saw miniature civil wars erupt between Muslim and Hindu, threatening India's status as a stable democracy.⁷ In Kashmir, "democratic" India, tolerating lawlessness by its army, committed countless atrocities against citizens it called its own. India's neighbor, China, despite the freeing of market forces, showed no indication that democracy was evolving. After the nation's democratic movement was brutally crushed, some analysts said that "democracy" in China would lead to chaos and hinted that evolutionary, communist-led economic development was best suited for the world's most populous country. When democracy might come, if at all, was an unanswered question.

Also in Asia, Philippine democracy stood on weak ground.⁸ Indonesia, whose population numbered some 190 million by the mid-1990s, remained, at least in the short term, fixed under the authoritarian gaze of its military government.⁹ And Myanmar (Burma) seemed far from democratic government despite the promises of multiparty democracy by a constitutional convention. Symptomatic of its anti-democratic tendencies was the refusal of the ruling military junta to heed insistent calls for the release from house arrest of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.¹⁰ Finally, in July 1995, she was released.

The picture, however, was by no means all bleak. Bright spots could be found throughout the world. In Africa, Namibian democracy appeared to be off to a successful start. After a long struggle, South Africa had launched its democratic vessel. And in newly emancipated Eritrea, the army modeled civic virtue to the world by agreeing to give two further years of unpaid service to construct the impoverished country's infrastructure.

Gains for democracy occurred in other countries, too. In Europe, peaceful changes in power were posted in new democracies such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland.¹¹ In Latin America, although tens of thousands protested its flaws in the nation's capital, Mexico's 1994 election was its least tainted ever; and Brazil's constitutional machinery had impeached a corrupt president.

This brief survey highlights the ambiguity of the current evidence for democracy's fate in the world. It underlies the fact that answers to the question of democracy's future must be tentative. It tells us that those who once expressed such confidence in eventual world-wide victory for liberal democracy must be doubted; but equally, those who write off democracy in the South and East cannot be so sure.

Factors Associated with Democratic Development

Although certainty eludes us, we can examine some of the conditions most conducive to democracy and offer tentative judgments about the likelihood of democracy's success. This

chapter accordingly will discuss economic, social, and other factors significant for the creation and consolidation of democratic regimes.¹² This brief commentary is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of all factors associated with democratic development. Rather, a few very significant ideas are featured. Expectations for an immediate global victory of democracy are unwarranted; instead, for the foreseeable future, the tide of democracy is likely to ebb and flow, successful here, a failure there; in many places a question mark.¹³

By *democracy* in this discussion, we mean *constitutional liberal democracy*. Briefly put, *constitutionalism* refers to government that is limited in practice; *liberalism* refers to protection of fundamental individual rights, such as freedom of religion, speech, association, the press, and respect for a private sphere; and *democracy* refers to widespread political participation and competition among power seekers for votes in free elections.¹⁴ Many regimes with none of these characteristics have called themselves democracies. But no one longs for these fraudulent imitations. (Chapter 1 by John J. Patrick includes an extensive definitional discussion of constitutional and liberal democracy.)

Economic Factors

The degree of economic development appears to be a very important factor in the feasibility of democracy in a particular country. This is not to say poor countries cannot be democracies or that rich countries will always be democratic. Wealth does not of itself cause democracy. Historical experience argues forcefully against economic determinism or, as we will see, a "law of democratic development," eliminating the possibility of democracy where the prescribed path is not followed. In Africa, for instance, The Gambia, with a 1992 per capita GNP of \$390, at various times has had democratic features; while Gabon, with a 1992 per capita income of \$4,480, mainly from oil revenues, is an authoritarian state.¹⁵

Nevertheless, a society's wealth is usually a key factor associated with its level of democracy. It is no accident that all of the ranks of the world's richest nations whose wealth resulted from general economic development (rather than from possession of oil), are democracies. The evidence strongly suggests that to have much chance of becoming stable democracies most nations must pass from the world's poorest countries to a "transition zone" in economic development.

There are several reasons why this is believed to be generally true. One is that economic development brings increasing literacy rates, and sufficient levels of literacy are thought to be a general prerequisite for democracy. At first glance, India appears to be an exception, though one must remember that India, for all its illiteracy (in 1990, 52% of those aged fifteen or older were illiterate), also has hundreds of millions of literate citizens (in 1990, about 260 million). India, however, is a prominent example of what has been called a restricted or "frozen democracy," a society evolved only part way toward a fully-realized, "consolidated" (possessing long-term stability) democratic order. Such societies are called "frozen" because they seem unable to proceed further along the lines of democratic development. Indian illiteracy, one result of its poverty, contributes significantly to the frozen character of its democracy.¹⁶

Besides raising literacy levels, economic development also results in considerable urbanization, another factor often cited as a precondition for successful democratization. Over a period of time, the growth of urban life can foster the development of civil society, the autonomous, self-organized portion of society independent of the state. In optimal circumstances civil society can be mobilized against the non-democratic state, as was the case in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. And the development of civil society that urbanization makes possible may also play a leading role in mobilizing social forces for the consolidation

of democracy, creating independent centers of political thought and action, providing training grounds for leadership and the development of the civic skills required for democratic political life.¹⁷ (See the discussion of civil society in Chapter 1.)

Above all, successful economic development means the growth of a middle class, a key ingredient in stable democracy. The role of the middle class in the historical development of democracy has long been recognized. Marx, of course, discussed at length the role of the middle class in the creation of "bourgeois democracy." In the 1960s, Barrington Moore, Jr., in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, formulated a succinct phrase that dramatizes this point: "no bourgeoisie, no democracy."¹⁸

A secure middle class is essential to democratic consolidation for a number of reasons. One is that stable middle classes tend to reject political extremism. Romantic or utopian ideologies seldom attract those with a stake in society and therefore in the creation and maintenance of a moderate political order. Also, middle classes are potential bases of democratic movements because they tend to reject the paternalism of autocratic government and demand a voice in the disposal of the taxes they pay and in formation of the political policies under which they live. Their interests are incompatible with irresponsible economic behavior by the state.

Moreover, skills that middle class individuals must cultivate for success in the marketplace, such as speaking, writing, and social skills, are transferrable to processes of democratic governance. And behavior on the job must be rational and predictable—qualities functional in the associations of civil society and in democratic politics. Of course, a middle class that has been economically dispossessed, as occurred in Germany during the inflation of the 1920s and the Great Depression of the 1930s, may abandon political moderation. But since World War II, a secure and prosperous middle class has formed the social backbone of every consolidated Western-style democracy.

How much economic development must take place before a society is likely to begin a transition to democracy? Some evidence suggests the \$1,000-\$3,500 per capita range is in most cases the lowest range. India is much poorer, but is an exception. A small population may be a benefit: the population of The Gambia, which, as noted above, has some democratic features, is just over 1 million. At lower levels of wealth, states are economically marginal and vulnerable to external interference and economic crisis. Most established ("old") democracies have a per capita GNP of \$12,000 or more, with a minority, such as Greece, Ireland, Israel, and Spain, in the \$5-\$10,000 range. The remaining democracies are poorer, but are substantially richer than the world's poorest countries, such as Mali (\$280) and Bangladesh (\$220), while per capita income of the African democracies Namibia and Botswana are both over \$2,500.¹⁹ For complex reasons, unless the world's poorest countries raise their standard of living appreciably, according to this index they are unlikely to democratize.

Strong evidence for a connection between economic development and democracy has been advanced by Seymour Martin Lipset and his associates. To be sure, Lipset denies economic determinism and is at pains to indicate that factors other than economic ones are important to the presence or absence of democratization. He argues, however, that levels of economic development are powerful predictors of democracy. He points out, for example, that in the mid-1980s, of the 32 nations with the lowest GNP, none was democratic; while all 19 richest industrial market economies were democracies. Those in between were more likely to be semi- or full democracies depending upon their level of economic development and growth rate. Sophisticated statistical techniques confirm these findings against those of other researchers.²⁰ A further conclusion of their study is that the path to democracy is not straightforward. After an initial achievement of democracy while progressing economically, many nations have experienced a temporary non-democratic period.²¹ Much of Europe between the

two World Wars illustrates this phenomenon, as does the twentieth century history of states such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

Other Lipset-study findings are consistent with what we have said of the relationships between economic development and the role of the middle class. "People with more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with more education, and more access to health and other services," the authors write, "are more likely to ask for increased political freedom." With more complex economic relations, new political norms and values arise. "As incomes rise, citizen demands become more visible, as does a pattern of politics that can accommodate them."²² Lipset and his colleagues also cite studies that correlate increased levels of GNP and "such characteristics as personal satisfaction, personal efficacy, anti-authoritarianism, and trust." Higher incomes bring higher levels of education and greater access to more sophisticated political writing.²³ One might add that the greater level of education, the greater the possibility of attaining a better grasp of democratic ideas both by elites likely to lead and sustain democratic movements and institutions and by non-elites.

Social and Political Factors

A further, often overlooked factor associated with democracy is national unity—a sense of national identity. "Nationalism" in this sense is an element of every successful democracy. Before "We the People" can make decisions, "the people" must be constituted, must be *self*-constituted as a corporate body, for only people themselves can decide their own identity.²⁴

The necessity for national self-identification, and thus for the national idea, is an inconvenient fact for some critics, since they tend to conflate all forms of nationalism into objectionable varieties. But such suggestions are misleading. The nationalism of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy bears little resemblance to the nineteenth century nationalism of Cavour and Mazzini or Abraham Lincoln: just as it has little in common with that of Poland or Lithuania and the other Baltic republics obliged to bear Soviet occupation for half a century. Such states endured continuing attempts at Russification and face the daunting task of reconstructing national culture and institutions. Without this form of nationalism, their task would be beyond hope.

The stark reality of the necessity for national self-determination before self-rule can proceed points to a further factor in democratization. This is the difficulty of attaining democracy in severely ethnically divided societies. Ethnic divisions in numerous countries have made "one person, one vote" democracy virtually impossible.²⁵

In this regard, the character and degree of social fissures is a key factor. One important consideration is whether boundaries between groups are weak or strong; that is, whether boundaries are permeable so that individuals can leave the exclusivity of one group and join others. The success of democracy in America, where most of the population has been part of a "melting pot," can partly be traced to the existence of weak boundaries among most ethnic groups.²⁶

In other places, ethnic divisions and conflicts have led to disastrous consequences. In Sri Lanka, animosity between minority Tamils and majority Sinhalese led to the outbreak of a Tamil insurgency. The ensuing violence has resulted in countless terrorist atrocities and, by September 1994, some 34,000 deaths on both sides.²⁷ Similar discrimination against the Ibo minority in Nigeria precipitated the Biafran War of the 1960s and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. A military coup overthrew a democratically elected government in Fiji because of the resentment of aboriginal Fijians over the victory of immigrant Indians. Bloody war was unleashed in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s between Serbs, Bosnians, and Croatians along ethnic/religious lines, with tens of thousands of innocent lives lost. Similar con-

licts cost the lives of more thousands after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the problems associated with ethnically divided societies are often so severe that democracy is at best strained even in developed countries. Thus, Belgium has been the scene of repeated violent clashes between French and Flemish speakers.

Ethnic divisions in sub-Saharan African states and other factors make democracy an unlikely proposition. In much of the region, it has proved impossible for any form of stable government, authoritarian or democratic, to be established. Colonial rule undermined traditional authority, and loyalty to the states that replaced the colonial powers often proved unreliable or non-existent. Instead, a common pattern of government has been personal rule, in the form of a strongman backed by a loyal army, with strong tribal overtones.

Attempts to form African democracies have called two traditional ideas into service. One is decision-making by consensus; the other is one-party rule. But these ideas have proved largely unsuccessful in forming the foundation of democracy. The first applies to face-to-face communities, not today's mass societies, which, for democracy to take root, require a developed civil society. The second has been a cloak to dictatorship.²⁸

Many areas of Africa are burdened by ethnic conflict, poverty, vast illiteracy, rapid population growth, and disease. Personalist politics abound in the context of cultures notable for the absence of civic traditions and historical roots of the modern state. Taken together, these factors are obstacles in the way of the establishment of stable democracy and make for a pessimistic prognosis over large expanses of the continent. That there are and will continue to be exceptions does not substantially detract from this gloomy picture. Attempts at aiding democracy in the continent—attempts which for moral reasons should not be abandoned—should take these factors into account on a country-by-country basis.²⁹

The Factors of Civic Culture and History

The absence of historical roots for the modern state in some parts of the world brings us to the factors of historical experience and elements of civic culture in the creation of successful democracy. In this regard, Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* is instructive. The book resulted from studying Italian regional government reforms for more than 20 years. Putnam's results were striking: he found that in areas with deeply-rooted traditions of civic values, democratic reforms were most effective. These areas were most influenced by the tradition of civic republicanism reborn during the Renaissance—a tradition whose central ideas and philosophical and literary texts reached England and North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But where there were no such traditions, regional government reforms were unsuccessful.³⁰

Regions where new regional government was most successful are what Putnam calls "civic communities." Civic community is characterized by civic engagement—active participation and interest in public affairs indicative of what traditional republicanism called civic virtue; by political relationships of equality rather than hierarchy, as in patron-client relations; by interpersonal trust, solidarity, and tolerance among citizens; and by a rich associational life that "instills in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness."³¹

Where civic community has taken root, it is successful in having created "social capital." Social capital, as opposed to economic capital (money) and human capital (education, skills, and know-how), consists of relationships in a community of trust, the norms that inform those relationships, and social networks—association of all kinds—that incorporate these norms and trust. In Italy, as in the United States described by Tocqueville, the level of social capital has been the key to making democracy work.³² Such conclusions bring to mind the psycho-social

roots of community life such as those studied by Edward Banfield in the 1950s. In his famous study of a town in southern Italy, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Banfield found that the individual's orientation to promote the short-term welfare of the nuclear family ("amoral familism") denied attention to the public good, excluding civic virtue."

These findings raise questions about how democracy appears to have prospered in other places. In the nearby Iberian Peninsula, why should Spain and Portugal, with little experience in the creation of democracy from the historical transmission of republican civic culture as in Italy, nevertheless emerge as stable democracies?

The answer is too complex to be explored here, but two factors may be mentioned. First, considerable modernization and economic development occurred during both nations' decades of dictatorship, creating the social basis for democracy. A second part of the answer is especially noteworthy. Both countries are geographically in Europe and, for economic and political reasons, had strong desires to belong to the European Community. The Community (now Union), however, required that new members be democracies. We may surmise that there were considerable demonstrations and ripple effects in both countries from the democratic political culture of Western Europe. What is instructive is the role of "external" factors, often decisive influences in recent transitions to democracy. "External" factors have their limits, however. In Italy, it was found that "social capital" cannot be imported from the outside; organizations generated from sources outside a region tended to be weak and ineffectual. Perhaps, however, external assistance to existing groups may bear positive results.

These "external" factors again illustrate that overly deterministic accounts of democratization are inadvisable. Still, Putnam's conclusions for "making democracy work" are deeply relevant. For example, they point to criteria for choosing where efforts are best concentrated in assisting nations in the preparation for, transition to, and consolidation of democracy. If the Italian experience cannot always be used to predict where democracy will be successful, it is nonetheless strongly suggestive. It means that inherited historical memories and traditions of self-government may often serve as foundations of a democratic ethos along with other factors, such as rising literacy, urbanization, and wealth.

There is also the much-debated question of whether democracy is desirable during economic development. We cannot enter this debate except to say that it seems morally indefensible for the developed world, especially the United States, to take positive measures to inhibit the gathering of a nation's democratic forces. Moreover, there may be a constructive role for Western civil society to play in situations where the hands of government are tied by policy or by adverse political circumstances. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may sometimes be able to form alliances with democratic forces in countries that have not yet entered the transition to democracy. NGOs may also play varying roles in countries that have entered the transition phase, as they have in the Baltic republics, Nicaragua, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, and elsewhere.

The Prospects for Democracy

Having surveyed the principal factors in the future of democracy, what are the most likely outcomes in the foreseeable future? Two views are presented, one more optimistic and the other less so.

An Optimistic View

Even though there are grave difficulties, some fatal for democracy and others not, in non-Western and ex-communist countries a pessimistic prognosis for democracy may be overdrawn. A sanguine view of the population question, for example, holds that where populations become richer and where methods of birth control are available, people find it in their interests to have fewer children. Such behavior, it is argued, is the natural course of events and can be expected to occur generally. The population "problem" will resolve itself by the free decisions of billions of people. Beyond providing information and facilities, government should restrain itself from all coercive measures. In much of the Third World today, many women have knowledge and access to the means of birth control. For example, 45% of women in impoverished Bangladesh are in this category.¹⁴ In this view of the population question, people *behave rationally*, just as they can be expected to do as participants in a market economy.

Moreover, it is argued, cultures change. Many European countries had strong cultural barriers of one kind or another to democracy, but in a fairly short time managed to change sufficiently to become stable democracies. Spain and Portugal fall into this classification. Prior to the 1960s, the predominance of Roman Catholicism was often a barrier to democracy; yet today a number of countries where Catholicism historically predominated and remains predominant are either consolidated democracies or are in the transition stage. Indeed, in many cases, such as in Poland and various countries in Latin America, they achieved transition from authoritarianism to democracy with the active assistance of the Roman Catholic Church.

In the same vein, perhaps, Islamic and Confucian cultures will be able to adapt to democratic institutions. Stranger historical occurrences have been recorded. It could be argued, too, that when Mongolian Marxists demand habeas corpus rights and young Chinese are prepared to give their lives for an end to communism; when the call for free elections is heard throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and when autocracy crumbles in such distant locations as South Africa and Nicaragua, as has occurred in recent years, the world can be assured that the intellectual seeds of Western democracy have been sown everywhere.

Given the key role often played by external factors in the democratization process, if the international community is prepared to extend itself in the cause of democracy, pessimistic views of the fate of democracy in poor countries are unwarranted. The will of the international community, especially of the United States, the European Union, and Japan, may often make the difference between transition to democracy and continuation of authoritarianism. The occupation of Haiti and the role of international sanctions in the fall of apartheid are recent examples.

Furthermore, wealthy nations are likely to exercise their power positively. With the end of the Cold War, the developed world no longer finds it necessary to prop up anti-communist dictatorships. The West is far freer to use political, military, and economic sanctions to enforce revitalized international standards of governmental behavior in such areas as election fraud, human rights abuses, corruption, and mismanagement. This view, then, places great weight on *political will* in determining the future, rather than on uncontrollable circumstances such as the effects on the South of population explosion.

A Pessimistic View

A more pessimistic view is that it is unlikely that many more stable and permanent (consolidated) democracies will be created outside the developed West. It is true that the United States, Japan, and other aid donors of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-

opment (OECD) have agreed to the standards for denying aid to regimes that refuse to democratize, respect human rights, and fight corruption and mismanagement. And it is also true that democratic ideas are stronger than ever in the world.

Other factors, however, seem to vitiate these points. First, although arguably the wealthy North *could* attempt to promote democracy throughout the South and East through economic and military power, the prospects are at best dim for deep sacrifice by the wealthy for the poor. Nearly everywhere in the North, government resources are under great pressure. Many of the world's richest countries, including the United States, have both large budget deficits and populations unwilling to bear further substantial taxation. Some are unwilling to continue supporting even the present low level of aid. And one can confidently predict that the nations of the North will be unwilling to consent to the loss of life required for frequent, perhaps constant, intervention in the four corners of the world, with no obvious national interests at stake. The political economy of interventionism cannot be controlled by critics who argue for generosity. For these reasons, substantially greater economic or military intervention for democracy around the world cannot be expected.

Even in the former communist countries, where education and decades of industrialization might be expected to give some countries important advantages, Western aid is insufficient or ineffective to provide smooth passage to a market economy.¹⁶ Of course, some parts of the former communist world are better off than others. The Czech Republic is well on its way to democratic consolidation, and Poland appears to be moving steadily in this direction, as does Hungary. In the Baltic republics, social and political conditions are hopeful, if less firm. The future of democracy in the remainder of the former Soviet bloc, however, is shaky indeed. Poor (in some places, catastrophic) economic conditions and the absence of effective government combine with a complete lack of democratic traditions and experience—the absence of “social capital”—to make the goal of democratic consolidation (or, in places such as dictatorial Uzbekistan, democratic transition) illusory to the point of naiveté.

Moreover, even if the West were willing to expend substantial lives and resources in peace-making and peace-keeping, this effort alone will not move the South further on the road to consolidated democracy. Even though the economic factor is not vital in every case, without sufficient growth most of the South will not move past the stage of fragile or restricted democracy. The exceptions will only prove the rule.

There is a further point in considering the prospects for “democracy.” It is *imperative*, as noted earlier, to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracy, because democracy is not necessarily liberal. Free elections based on majority rule may not institute a regime that protects fundamental human rights, the essence of liberalism. Cultural forces, such as religion, that helped undermine one form of authoritarianism, may seek to inaugurate another one that suits their prejudices. Thus, majorities may freely elect autocrats who then suspend democratic practice. The existence of free and fair elections is only one part of what *the West* knows as “democracy.” This is why the bare use of the term “democracy” is likewise inadequate. An expert on African politics, Michael Chege sees this clearly: “The last four years [1991-1994] should teach us that many countries have overemphasized multiparty elections as the foundations of democracy, and correspondingly neglected the basic tenets of liberal governance.”¹⁷

Civic Education and the Democratic Prospect

Civic education is the formal instruction and informal experience that prepares the individual for active membership in a self-governing community. What can be expected of civic

education? By itself, it cannot bring democracy into the world. Nor in themselves will civic education's positive results save fragile democracies from collapse in the face of the powerful causes that undermine them. That is not civic education's place, its function, or its claim. (See the discussion of civic education for democracy in Chapter One by John J. Patrick.)

What effective civic education can do is to inform, stimulate, and train potential citizens, in the end empowering them to be competent, responsible participants in their own governance.³⁴ Civic education can also (1) deepen an understanding of relevant ideas, practices, institutions, and history to foster the development of informed, responsible citizens committed to constitutional liberal democracy; (2) make new prospective citizens aware of the numerous avenues of influencing government, of participating in civil society, and of linking their organizations and concern about national and international affairs to others at home and abroad; (3) foster acceptance of norms and values that underlie and facilitate the functioning of the associations and social networks of civil society necessary for making democracy work—which is to say, foster the growth of "social capital"; (4) foster dispositions and traits of character, such as civic-mindedness and self-discipline, civility and persistence, conducive to the practice of democratic citizenship; (5) facilitate acquisition of social, organizational, and leadership skills required for building civil society and a civic community, a community characterized by the widespread involvement of citizens in civic affairs, political equality, solidarity, mutual trust and tolerance, and dense networks of cooperative associations; (6) stimulate awareness of voluntaristic possibilities for dealing with social problems; (7) promote recognition of the ideas, policies, and practices that are contrary to the democratic ethos, such as intolerance of legitimate difference or racial and ethnic hatred; and (8) encourage among citizens a sense of personal and collective responsibility for their nation's future and persuade them that fatalism is self-fulfilling prophecy they cannot afford.

In summary, effective civic education can inform the mind and fire the civic and moral imagination of present and future citizens. It can be an active agent in building democracy's intellectual and moral foundations and in cultivating the skills vital to the exercise of self-governance. Civic learning and democratic practice foster the culture of democracy. This is the purpose and promise of civic education for constitutional democracy.

Criteria for Concentration of Effort

What should be the scope and limits of Western assistance for education for democracy? Difficult choices must be made. Even if all states stood an equal chance of achieving democratization, nations are constrained to choose among possible recipients of assistance. In the real world, democracy has a more realistic opportunity for success in some countries than in others. Given that it is in the interest of the West to promote democracy around the world, it is useful to consider possible criteria for allocation of scarce resources.

Need. The most obvious criterion is need. This criterion is of little help, however, since presumably most or all of the world's aspiring democracies need assistance in creating programs to educate their citizenry in the ideas and practices of democracy.

Likelihood of Efficacy. Clearly, resources should be concentrated where aid is most likely to make an appreciable difference, especially where it appears that aid might be a significant factor in a democracy's success or failure. An important consideration is the state of economic development, including such factors as levels of social capital, literacy, population growth, organizations, and other aspects of development.

The presence or absence of historical, cultural, and social inducements or barriers to democracy are relevant criteria. Past experience in the practice of democracy is a strong indi-

cation that another attempt might be fruitful. But a country's complete inexperience in democratic practice or acquaintance with the traditions and values of civic life makes successful democracy less likely in the short term, especially in the absence of countervailing factors such as external influence, a small population, or growing wealth.

The likelihood of a prospective democracy's success should not, however, necessarily be a decisive criterion in the distribution of scarce resources. In some cases, one might conclude that a particular state's political orientation is so significant that programs to spread democratic ideas should be pursued despite substantial barriers to success. Much may be at stake, and it is far from impossible that short-term failure may yield to longer-term amelioration, or even to outright success. Russia may be a case in point.

Obligations Incurred. A third criterion in choosing how to allocate scarce resources is to consider where the West as a whole or, more likely, individual states have incurred obligations to support democratization in particular countries. Such obligations have been incurred if long-term moral or other support has been given for the overthrow of autocratic government. The Baltic republics, called "captive nations" by a succession of American Congresses, are one example; additional involvements of Western Europe or the United States provide others.

National Interest. Fourth, resources should be placed where the legitimate interests of the United States and the democratic West are best served. If it is true, as some scholars believe, that democracies are unlikely to wage war against each other, support for democratic movements or institutions abroad is an important United States and Western interest. In the case of nations capable of directly attacking democracies, that interest is vital, not contingent. Germany and Japan are instructive examples. Following World War II, with subsequent Western tutelage and support, they became peaceful, constitutional democracies. Here, the case of Russia is of paramount significance. A democratic, non-predatory Russia is essential for a decent world order; and a stable, friendly Europe is a vital American interest. One might conclude that, however unlikely the success of Russian democracy may seem to us now, the West should do what it can to strengthen its chances: too much is at stake to abandon the effort.

A Long-term View

What can be concluded from these considerations? As we have seen, expectations for a universal and permanent victory of liberal constitutional democracy are likely to be disappointed for a long time to come. The history of democracy is unlikely to be unilinear; setbacks in which nations revert to predemocratic stages have been frequent. Nor can we expect a "final" acceptance of the theory and practice of liberal democracy.

Samuel Huntington and others have spoken of democratic waves and reverse waves in the past nearly two centuries.¹⁰ Far more plausible than a final democratic victory is a world that witnesses a continuous ebb and flow of the democratic tide. Cultural, economic, social, and political factors play roles in varying degrees of importance and cannot always be expected to be sufficiently present for democratic regimes to be born or survive. A large part of today's non-democratic world will probably remain under some form of authoritarianism or oscillate between authoritarianism and fragile or restricted democracy.

Finally, the history of democracy in the West suggests that we should not be so "present oriented." In considering criteria for expending resources, government agencies and NGOs should recall that the development of today's stable democracies has taken considerable time. Though time is compressed in today's world, and no country has the luxury of the leisurely

development enjoyed by Europe and North America a century ago, democracies are not created in a few years.

Nations in transition will require decades to secure free government. We cannot expect instant gratification of our impulse to be mid-wives at the birth of new democracies. Education today nurtures the civic culture of tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The cultivation of bases of "social capital," the networks of mutual trust among citizens in the context of "civic community," is not the work of a brief span of time. "Those concerned with democracy . . . should be building a more civic community," writes Robert Putnam, "but they should lift their sights beyond instant results."⁴⁰

In the eighteenth century it was a common practice for people to plant trees for their progeny, knowing full well that they would not live to see the results. Within the limits of practical constraints, we, too, should consider the longer term in planting and cultivating the seeds of more decent, responsible, and humane governance for future generations.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984): 193-218.

2. See Marc Plattner, "The Democratic Moment," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Fall 1991): 34-46. Plattner was optimistic about democracy's future, writing that if Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" had not arrived, "we may at least be entering a period of peaceful democratic hegemony—a kind of 'Pax Democratica'" (p. 40). Yet he also foresaw ideologies that compete with liberal democracy (p. 45).

3. In the summer of 1994, the Mob's attempt to take over Old Town, Warsaw, prominent symbol of that nation's determination to recover from the destruction of World War II, led the area's business owners to close it completely for three days in protest against police inaction and government complacency, even though it was in the middle of the high tourist season. For a mostly pessimistic assessment of Russian democracy, see the symposium "Is Russian Democracy Doomed?" *Journal of Democracy* 5 (April 1994): 4-41.

4. For the problems of ethnic conflict, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See pp. 681-84 ("Ethnic Conflict and Democracy") for the author's denial that ethnic cleavage inevitably leads to violent conflict. In his view, democracy in ethnically divided societies is difficult, but not impossible.

5. Peter Hakim and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America's Fragile Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Summer 1991): 16-29.

6. Eduardo Ferro Costa, "Peru's Presidential Coup," *Journal of Democracy* 4 (January 1993): 28-40.

7. For a discussion of religious, caste, regional, and ethnic conflict in India, see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "India: The Dilemmas of Diversity," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (October 1993): 54-68. For a guardedly optimistic account of Indian democracy, see James Manor, "India After Dynasty," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Summer 1990): 102-113.

8. See, for example, Carl H. Lande, "Manila's Malaise," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Winter 1991): 45-57. The author points out the weakness of democratic institutions in the nation and the strength of the antidemocratic opposition, not just Marxists, but also in the army.

9. See R. William Liddle, "Indonesia's Three-fold Crisis," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (October 1992): 60-74. Liddle says that Indonesian democrats "have never been highly organized and are not militant" (p. 69). Although Liddle expects an "opening" for democratization, he emphasizes that the army can be expected to use its resources to remain in power (p. 74).

10. Aung San Suu Kyi, "Burma's Quest for Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (January 1992): 3-14.

11. In Lithuania, leader of the opposition Vytautas Landsbergis claimed, however, that the government of the reconstituted Communist party was in the process of constructing a "fake democracy." Interview with Dr. Vytautas Landsbergis, Vilnius, Lithuania, July 15, 1994.

12. For a discussion of the conditions favoring democracy, see Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971). Dahl argues that these conditions include favorable historical background, dispersed or neutralized access to means of violence, lack of extreme poverty, low levels of inequality, low cultural pluralism, lack of domination of a foreign power, and beliefs of political elites, such as mutual trust, as well as belief in compromise and in the efficacy of democracy.

13. My conclusions are in substantial, but not complete, agreement with those of Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 313-15. Dahl recognizes that new democracies are likely to revert to authoritarianism but he does not consider the possible consequences of unrestricted Third World population growth and is slightly more optimistic than the conclusions presented here. I am in more solid agreement with Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 123-133.

14. For a clear, succinct discussion of the meaning of democracy, see Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 3-24; and see "Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People," Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, p. 3.

15. For a number of reasons, students of the subject deny that there can be some law of democratic development. One reason is that there are exceptions to any "law" one could care to formulate. For any set of conditions thought to militate for or against success of democratization, counter-examples can be cited. Second, there may be a conflict of factors. Many societies may have factors that push or pull in contrary directions for or against democracy. Third is the role of the extraordinary individual. The extraordinary individual may overcome a country's handicaps, against all odds. Gandhi and Nehru in India are examples of this possibility. For denial of a law of democratic development, see for example, Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, p. 61.

16. For the idea of restricted or "frozen" democracies, see Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 84-85.

17. For the role of associational life in supporting democracy or democratic forces in Third World countries, see Larry Diamond, et al., eds., *Politics in Developing Countries* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), pp. 21-23. It is true, however, that civil society need not be liberal-democratic in character. Authoritarian societies can breed authoritarian civil society associations.

18. Barrington, Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 418.

19. Peter Merkl, "Which Are Today's Democracies?", *International Social Science Journal* 136 (May 1997): 257-270.

20. Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," *International Social Science Journal* 136 (May 1993): 157 and *passim*. The authors write: "This article does not assume that economic development alone produces democratization. [N]ational idiosyncracies, the play of historical, cultural, and political forces, and the behavior of leaders may advance or prevent democratization in any particular nation state or group of them, generally or at any one . . . time" (p. 156).

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-165. The result is the so-called "N-curve," which expresses graphically the initiation, fall, and resumption of democracy along an X-axis, while economic development proceeds along the Y-axis.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

23. *Ibid.*

24. A brilliant analysis of this point can be found in Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (October 1992): 3-22.

25. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985): pp. 681-684.

26. The fact that some groups, notably, though not limited to, blacks and other non-white races, have not assimilated, does not vitiate the point that most Americans have mostly or entirely "melted." The "melting pot" metaphor cannot be used without qualification, but it nevertheless accurately describes between 75 and 80 percent of American citizens.

27. *The New York Times*, September 21, 1994; and see Thomas Sowell, *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective* (New York: W. Morrow, 1990).

28. Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 36-37.

29. A Nigerian political economist has pointed out that even the fact that the end of the Cold War has freed the West from the need to support certain dictatorships may not be a boon to democracy. For the end of the Cold War has also meant the marginalization of Africa for Western security interests. See Claude Ake, "Rethinking African Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Winter 1991): 43.

30. Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 83-162.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

32. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, pp. 163-185. Putnam concludes (p. 185): "Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work." Significantly, Putnam has also argued that social capital in the U.S. is decreasing, as social participation has waned. See his "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995): 65-78.

33. Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).

34. For an optimistic appraisal of the possible positive effects of democratizing states on each other in Africa, see Paul Mtungwe Ndue, "Africa's Turn towards Pluralism," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (January 1994): 45-54. For discussions of conditions underlying transitions to democracy, see, for example, Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970); Ralf Dahrendorf, "Transitions: Politics, Economics," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1990): 133-142; and Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, *passim*.

35. Cable News Network news broadcast, August 28, 1994. The same broadcast noted, however, that only 12% of women in sub-Saharan Africa has similar knowledge and access.

36. Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, p. 124.

37. Michael Chege, "Between Africa's Extremes," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995): 47. In the same issue of the *Journal of Democracy*, see Marcin Król, "Where East Meets West," pp. 37-43. Król argues that the West must confront the question of whether the idea of "liberal democracy" can be completely relative or whether it has a minimum content. He argues for the latter position and says that it must be the West that establishes this minimum (p. 42). Also in the same issue, Guillermo O'Donnell writes in "Do Economists Know Best?": "Almost all observers agree that 'political democracy' means, at a minimum, reasonably free and competitive elections." (p. 23). But this is just what we are denying: free elections that elect anti-liberal regimes that do not accept limits on their power are decidedly *not* part of what we understand by "democracy," which embodies three core ideas: free elections, limited government, and protection of certain fundamental individual rights.

38. Rationales from which this discussion is drawn are C. F. Bahmueller, general editor, *CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic Education* (Calabasas, California: Center for Civic Education, 1991); R. Freeman Butts, *The Morality of Democratic Citizenship* (Calabasas, California: Center for Civic Education, 1989); and *National Standards for Civics and Government* (Calabasas, California: Center for Civic Education, 1994). See also Richard C. Remy, *Handbook of Basic Citizenship Competencies* (Alexandria, Virginia: Association for Supervision and Curricular Development, 1980).

39. Samuel Huntington identified "reverse waves" that followed each of the first two "waves" of democracy. He speculates that the third wave could have a reverse wave, too. See *The Third Wave, "The Waves of Democratization,"* pp. 13ff.

40. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, p. 185.

Appendix 1

List of EDCP Publications

This Appendix presents an annotated list of instructional materials and related items developed by Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP). The annotation for each item indicates from where the item may be obtained and whether it is available in English as well as Polish.

Projekt Programu Nauczania Kształcenia Obywatelskiego [*Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools*] (Warsaw Central Center for Teacher Training).

Presents the rationale, goals, objectives and content outlines for a primary school and secondary school civics curriculum in Poland. Developed in Poland by teams of primary and secondary educators and social scientists with the assistance of Mershon Center faculty. This short publication is supplemented by the two books described immediately below. Polish only; available from Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw.

Projekt Programu Nauczania Kształcenia Obywatelskiego: Przykłady Scenariuszy Lekcji [*Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans*] (Warsaw Central Center for Teacher Training, 1993).

Sixteen sample lessons developed in Poland by Polish primary and secondary school educators with the assistance of Mershon Center faculty. The lesson plans illustrate topics and goals set forth in ***Projekt Programu Nauczania Kształcenia Obywatelskiego***, the outline for a new civics curriculum in Poland. Each lesson plan contains instructions for the teacher and material for students. Polish only; available from Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw.

Wybór Tekstów Pomocniczych Dla Nauczycieli Kształcenia Obywatelskiego [*Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers*] (Warsaw Central Center for Teacher Training, 1993).

Collection of thirty-six readings on political life, citizenship, and human rights by prominent Polish social scientists and political activists. The readings provide background information on key topics set forth in ***Projekt Programu Nauczania Kształcenia Obywatelskiego***, the outline for a new civics curriculum in Poland. The readings were selected to help educators as they develop new primary and secondary school civics courses. Polish only; available from Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw.

Kształcenia Obywatelskie: Scenariusze Lekcji [*Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*] (Warsaw: Central Center for Teacher Training, 1993). Alicja Pacewicz, Editor.

A primary school civics course (grades 6-8). Contains 82 lessons developed by a team of eight Polish educators in residence at the Mershon Center from September, 1992 to February, 1993, with the assistance of Mershon Center faculty and Polish scholars. Each lesson contains instructions for the teachers and materials for students such as case-studies, decision-trees, maps and charts, primary sources. The lessons are organized into seven units. Approved by the Ministry of National Education as a replacement for previous courses. Polish only; available from Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw. Selected lessons available in English from the Mershon Center.

Kształcenia Obywatelskie: Scenariusze Lekcji, Wydanie drugie [*Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios, Second Edition*] (Warsaw: Central Center for Teacher Training, 1995), Alicja Pacewicz, Editor

An expanded and updated edition of the primary school civics course prepared in Poland. Contains 17 new lessons for a total of 99 lessons. See Appendix 2 for the Table of Contents. Polish only: available from the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw.

Szkoła W Społeczeństwie Demokratycznym: Kurs kształcenia nauczycieli [*The School in Democratic Society: A Course Plan for Poland's Future Teachers*] (Warsaw: Central Center for Teacher Education, 1995) Authors: Krzysztof Broclawik, Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz, Marek Simlat, Marta Zahorska-Bugaj, and Elżbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz. Edited in Polish and Translated to English by Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz. Edited in English by Gregory E. Hamot.

A plan or detailed syllabus for a two semester preservice teacher education course. The course plan focuses on principles of democracy as they apply to seven topics relevant to the organization and operation of schools. Developed by five Polish teacher educators while in residence at the Mershon Center from September, 1992 to January, 1993. Presents goals for the course, and suggested readings, detailed explanations and teaching strategies for each of the seven topics. See Appendix 2 for the Table of Contents. Available in Polish from the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw. Available in English in limited quantities from the Mershon Center.

To Obtain Items Available in English:
Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program,
Mershon Center
 1501 Neil Avenue
 Columbus, Ohio 43201-2602
 ph. (614)292-3810/fax (614)292-2407

To Obtain Items Available in Polish:
Center for Citizenship Education
 ul. Sierpecka 6 m. 32
 01-593 Warsaw, Poland
 ph. 011 48 90 29 21 03
 ph/FAX 011 48 22 33 04 09

Appendix 2

Selected EDCP Documents

Introduction

This Appendix contains five documents related to Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland (EDCP). The first is a Proclamation presented on August 6, 1991 by Dr. E. Gordon Gee, President of The Ohio State University, to Polish Minister of Education Dr. Robert Głębocki. This Proclamation set forth a pledge by The Ohio State University to work with the Polish Ministry of National Education to develop civic education in Poland.

The next two documents are the syllabi for the two curriculum seminars conducted by the Mershon Center to develop EDCP's primary school civics course, *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*, and EDCP's course plan for preservice teacher education, "The School in Democratic Society."

The fourth document is an English translation of the title page, table of contents and acknowledgment page for the second edition of *Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios*.

The fifth document is an English translation of the title page, table of contents, and introductory statement from "The School in Democratic Society" course plan.

PROCLAMATION

To Minister Robert Glebocki, Under Secretary of State Andrzej Janowski, Director of Teacher Training Jacek Strzemieczny and all Colleagues in the Ministry of National Education:

On behalf of The Ohio State University, we seek to assist your Education for Democracy Project develop a civics curriculum and instructional materials for primary and secondary schools, train civic education teachers and teacher trainers, and establish a network of Centers for Civic Education across Poland.

Our goal is to help Polish educators promote the development of democracy in Poland through the education of succeeding generations of Polish youth to be active, competent citizens committed to democratic values.

We in the United States are pleased to share our experiences and ideas on education for democratic citizenship with our colleagues in Poland. Through our work together we want to build strong and continuing linkages between civic educators in the United States and in Poland.

We agree to seek the financial support necessary to implement the Education for Democracy Project and we accept your offer to provide as many Polish funds as possible to support the Project.

We have followed the Polish struggle for freedom with great interest and admiration. We applaud your courage and your determination to establish within Poland an open, democratic society that will allow the full development of your great nation's rich cultural heritage and the many talents of the Polish people.


Dr. Richard C. Remy
Director

Program on Citizenship Development
for a Global Age
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University


E. Gordon Gee
President

The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio, USA



Dr. Charles F. Hermann
Director
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University

Presented on August 6, 1991

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USIA

Mershon Center Curriculum Seminar
Citizenship for Democracy
Richard C. Remy
Seminar Director

The goal of this seminar is to provide a team of eight Polish educators with the training, instructional materials, background readings, field experiences, and assistance from expert consultants they need to develop a complete first draft of all the teacher and student materials for a primary school (grades 7-8) civics course for Poland.

Seminar Components

The seminar will take place from September 14, 1992 to February 7, 1993. During this 21 week period the seminar will have four components:

1. **weekly meetings** of the eight participants with the Seminar Director and Seminar Coordinator to discuss progress, readings, and any issues relevant to the seminar;
2. **special workshops**, intensive 2- to 4-day training sessions on key topics such as economic education or teaching decision-making skills, conducted by the Seminar faculty;
3. **field experiences**, visits to professional social studies education meetings, schools, school board meetings, and the like; and
4. **individual work**, study of seminar material and curriculum writing undertaken individually or in small groups during work times not occupied by components 1 to 4.

Seminar Faculty and Staff

John J. Patrick, Professor of Education and Director of the Social Studies Development Center, Indiana University

Steven L. Miller, Associate Professor of Education and Director of the Central Ohio Center for Economic Education, The Ohio State University

Merry Merryfield, Assistant Professor of Education, The Ohio State University

Robert Woyach, Faculty Associate, Political Science, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

David Naylor, Professor of Education at the University of Cincinnati and Director of the Cincinnati Center for Law Related Education

Sandra Stotsky, Professor, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University

Ursula Szwest, Consulting Editor for Curriculum Writing

Jay Harris, Seminar Coordinator

Richard Steele, Computer Word Processing Consultant

Linda Little, Secretary

Doris Kisler, Secretary

Schedule for Seminar and Related Activities

Emphasis during the first weeks of the seminar will be on the special workshops in order to give seminar participants as much background material and ideas as possible to enrich their curriculum writing. Field experiences will be spread across the 21 weeks. The time devoted to individual work will gradually increase as the seminar progresses.

Unless otherwise noted all Workshops and Weekly Seminar Meetings will be held in the Mershon Center 3rd Floor Conference Room.

* = Activity includes College Course (Pew) Project participants

Week 1 (September 14)

- | | | |
|-------|----------|--|
| 9/14 | 6:15 pm | Arrival, Port Columbus Airport (Harris, Hamot, Remy) |
| *9/15 | 9:00 am | Cathy Creagar, Fiscal Officer Mershon Center
(Complete OSU paper work; obtain OSU identification cards) |
| | 4:30 pm | Orientation to Mershon (Dinner with Project Faculty) |
| *9/16 | 9:00 am | Orientation to Curriculum Seminar and Mershon Ctr. |
| | 10:00 am | <i>Computer Workshop, Session 1</i> (Steele) |
| | 2:00 pm | Campus Tour |
| *9/17 | 10:30 am | Orientation to OSU (Office of International Scholars) |
| | 2:00 pm | <i>Computer Workshop, Session 2</i> |
| *9/18 | 9:00 am | Orientation to OSU (Hamot, Harris) |
| | 11:00 am | <i>Computer Workshop, Session 3</i> |
| *9/19 | 4:30 pm | Reception and Dinner at Richard Remy's home |
| *9/20 | | <i>North Commons Open for Meals</i> |
| | 2:00 pm | Tour of the City of Columbus |

Week 2 (September 21)

- | | | |
|-------|----------|--|
| *9/21 | 10:00 am | Meet Dr. Gordon Gee, President, The Ohio State University |
| * | 11:00 am | Discussion of "Products" to be Developed (Remy, Harris, Hamot) |
| 9/22 | 1:30 pm | Library Orientation |
| *9/23 | 10:00 am | Orientation to NCCS Meeting (Harris, Hamot) |
| | 3:00 pm | Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris) |
| 9/24 | 9:00 am | Social Studies Teaching Methods Course
(EdStds 638 - Merryfield, Ramseyer Hall, Rm. 166) |
| | 12:30 pm | <i>Workshop on Textbook Development and Course Plan, Session 1</i>
(Szwast, Remy) |
| 9/25 | 9:30 am | <i>Workshop on Textbook Development and Course Plan, Session 2</i>
(Szwast, Remy) |
| *9/26 | 8:30 am | Conference: "Connecting Citizens and Schools"
- Fort Hayes Career Center |
| | 7:30 pm | Reception: Columbus Polish-American Club
(St. Margaret of Cortona, 1600 North Hague Ave.) |

Week 3 (September 27)

- 9/27 11:00 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 1 (Patrick)
 9/28 9:00 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 2 (Patrick)
 9/29 9:00 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 3 (Patrick)
 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods (Merryfield, Arps Hall, Rm 243)
 9/30 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 *10/3 10:00 am Charlotte Anderson Speech (Wexner Center)
 12:00 pm Lunch with OSU Student Volunteers (Flying Tomato Pizza)

Week 4 (October 5)

- 10/5 9:30 am *Workshop on Civic Leadership Skills*, Session 1 (Woyach)
 10/6 9:00 am *Workshop on Civic Leadership Skills*, Session 2 (Woyach)
 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 10/7 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Harris)
 *10/8 7:30 pm Mershon Conference: "Mass Media Technologies and Democracy"
 Address by Daniel Schorr, Senior News Analyst,
 National Public Radio (Optional)
 *10/9 9:30 am Mershon Conference (Cont.) (Optional)
 *10/10 9:30 am Mershon Conference (Cont.) (Optional)
 *10/10 8:00 pm Dance: Columbus Polish-American Club
 *10/11 9:30 am Mershon Conference (Cont.) (Optional)

Week 5 (October 12)

- *10/12 4:30 pm Reception OSU Faculty and Graduate Students (Mershon Center)
 10/13 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 * 7:00 pm Depart for ERIC Center at Indiana University
 *10/14 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC and Teaching Democracy*
 (Patrick, ERIC Staff)
 *10/15 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC* (Cont.)
 *10/16 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC* (Cont.) + Depart for Columbus, Ohio
 *10/17 11:00 am OSU v. Northwestern University Football Game and
 "Tailgate" Party hosted by Dick and Dec Remy

Week 6 (October 19)

- 10/19 9:00 am Meet with Central European Educators on USIA Visit to
 Mershon Center
 10/20 9:00 am *Workshop: Overview of Economic Education in U.S.* (Miller)
 with Central European Educators
 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 10/21 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 *10/23 4:00 pm Dr. Phillip T. K. Daniel: "Student Rights: Principles and Practice"

Week 7 (October 26)

- 10/26 9:00 am *Workshop on Teaching Free Market Economics* Session 1 (Miller)
 10/27 9:00 am *Workshop on Teaching Free Market Economics* Session 2 (Miller)
 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 10/28 9:00 am *Workshop on Teaching Free Market Economics* Session 3 (Miller)
 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 10/29 9:00 am *Workshop on Teaching Free Market Economics* Session 4 (Miller)
 * 7:00 pm Conduct Presentation on Project for Central Ohio Council for
 Social Studies (COCSS) Dinner Meeting
 10/30 9:00 am *Workshop on Teaching Free Market Economics* Session 5 (Miller)

Week 8 (November 2)

- 11/3 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 6:30 pm Election Evening at Richard Remy's House
Presidential Election
 11/4 1:00 am *Workshop on Law-Related Education* Session 1 (Naylor)
 5:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting
 11/5 9:00 am *Workshop on Law-Related Education* Session 2 (Naylor)
 11:30 am
 1:30 pm *Workshop on Law-Related Education* Session 3 (Naylor)
 5:00 pm

Week 9 (November 9)

- 11/9 9:00 am *Workshop on Civic Writing* Session 1 (Stotsky)
 11/10 9:00 am *Workshop on Civic Writing* Session 2 (Stotsky)
 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 11/11 7:30 am Reynoldsburg High School (Steve Shapiro)
 4:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 11/12 7:00 am Independence High School (Barbara Wainer)
Veterans Day

Week 10 (November 16)

- 11/17 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 11/18 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 *11/19 12:00 pm Departure for National Council for Social Studies (NCSS)
 Annual Meeting, Detroit
 *11/20 to 11/23 National Council for Social Studies Meeting
 11/23 10:00 am Departure for Columbus

Week 11 (November 23)

- 11/24 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Merryfield)
 11/25 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
 11/26 *Thanksgiving Holiday*

Week 12 (November 30)

- 12/1 4:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course *Last Class* (Merryfield)
 12/2 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)

Week 13 (December 7)

- *12/6 Jacek Strzemieczny Visits Projects, Mershon Center, and
College of Education (12/7,8,9)
- 12/9 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)

Week 14 (December 14)

- 12/16 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting (Remy, Harris)
- 12/17 TBA Observe "Youth in Government Day" Activities
9:00 Sells Middle School, Dublin Schools
10:30
North Commons Closed for Meals

Week 15 (December 21)

- 12/25 Merry Christmas

Week 16 (December 28)

Holiday Break

Week 17 (January 4)

- 1/6 9:00 am Weekly Seminar Meeting
- 1/7 5:00 am Depart from Harrison House for Washington, D.C.
- 1/7 to 1/11 Washington, D.C.
- 1/11 8:00 pm Depart Washington for Columbus

Week 18 (January 11)

- 1/13 3:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting
- 1/16 Meeting with Polish American Club

Week 19 (January 18)

- 1/20 Mifflin Schools (International Alternative)
- 1:00 pm Meeting with Bill Muthig, Consultant, Ohio Department of Education
- 1/21 3:00 pm USIA Group Meeting
- 1/24 11:00 am Brunch with Steve Miller

Week 20 (January 25)

- 1/26 3:30 pm Meeting with Dwight Groce, Centennial High School, Mershon Center
- 1/28 2:00 pm Weekly Seminar Meeting

Week 21 (February 1)

- 2/2 10:00 am Democracy in the Classroom (Gene Gilliom, 239 Arps)
- 3:30 pm Meeting with Abbejean Kehler (309 Ramseyer)
- 2/4 2:00 pm USIA Group Meeting
- 6:30 pm Final Meeting and Farewell Dinner at R. Remy's Home
- 2/7 7:00 pm Depart for Poland

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**Mershon Center Curriculum Seminar
Schools in Democratic Society**

Richard C. Remy
Seminar Director

Luvern L. Cunningham
Senior Consultant

Robert Lawson
Senior Consultant

The goal of this seminar is to provide a team of five Polish educators with the training, instructional materials, background readings, field experiences, and assistance from expert consultants they need to develop a complete first draft of a Course Syllabus for a two-semester college course on "Schools in Democratic Society." This Course Syllabus will serve as a model for fulfilling a new Ministry requirement that all students training to be teachers in Poland take such a course in order to be certified to teach any subject. The **Course Syllabus** will present the course rationale, objectives, readings/assignments, and bibliography; all student materials (readings) for the course; and a "Resource Guide" for the instructor containing additional readings and materials.

Seminar Components

The Seminar will take place from September 14, 1992 to December 22, 1992. During this 14 week period the Seminar will have four components:

1. **regular meetings** of the five participants with the Seminar Director, Consultants and Coordinator to discuss progress, readings, and any issues relevant to the seminar;
2. **special workshops and guest lectures** on key topics related to the politics and governance of education in a democracy;
3. **field experiences**, visits to professional social studies education meetings, schools, school board meetings, and the like; and
4. **individual work**, study of seminar material and curriculum writing undertaken individually or in small groups during work times not occupied by components 1 to 3.

Seminar Faculty and Staff

M. Eugene Gilliom, Professor of Education, The Ohio State University

John J. Patrick, Professor of Education and Director of the Social Studies Development-Center, Indiana University

Steven L. Miller, Associate Professor of Education and Director of the Central Ohio Center for Economic Education, The Ohio State University

Robert Woyach, Senior Faculty Political Science, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

Greg Hamot, Seminar Coordinator

Richard Steele, Computer Word Processing Consultant

Linda Little, Secretary

Doris Kisler, Secretary

Schedule for Seminar and Related Activities (9/21/92)

Unless otherwise noted all Workshops and Weekly Seminar Meetings will be held in the Mershon Center 3rd Floor Conference Room.

* = Activity includes Civics Course (USIA) Project participants

Week 1 (September 14)

- 9/14 6:15 pm Arrival, Port Columbus Airport (Harris, Hamot, Remy)
 9/15 11:00 am Cathy Creagar, Fiscal Officer Mershon Center
 (Complete OSU paper work; Obtain OSU identification cards)
 9/16 9:00 am Orientation to Curriculum Seminar and Mershon Ctr.
 10:00 am *Computer Workshop*, Session 1 (Steele)
 2:00 pm Campus Tour
 9/17 10:30 am Orientation to OSU (Office of International Scholars)
 2:00 pm *Computer Workshop*, Session 3
 9/19 4:00 pm Reception and Dinner at Richard Remy's home
 9/20 *North Commons Open for Meals*
 2:00 pm Tour of the City of Columbus

Week 2 (September 21)

- *9/21 10:00 am Meet Dr. Gordon Gee, President, The Ohio State University
 11:00 am Discussion of "Products" to be Developed (Remy, Harris, Hamot)
 9/22 3:00 pm Discussion of Syllabus (Cunningham, Remy)
 *9/23 10:00 am Orientation to NCSS Meeting (Harris, Hamot)
 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom, Rm. 243 Arps Hall)
 9/26 7:30 pm Reception: Columbus Polish-American Club
 (St. Margaret of Cortona, 1600 North Hague Ave.)

Week 3 (September 27)

- *9/27 11:00 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 1 (Patrick)
 *9/28 8:30 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 2 (Patrick)
 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 *9/29 9:00 am *Workshop on Principles of Democracy*, Session 3 (Patrick)
 *10/1 4:30 pm Reception: OSU Faculty and Graduate Students (Mershon Ctr)
 *10/3 12:00 pm Lunch with OSU Slavic Studies Students (Flying Tomato Pizza)
 *10/5 8:00 am *Workshop on Civic Leadership Skills*, Session 1 (Woyach)
 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 *10/6 9:00 am *Workshop on Civic Leadership Skills*, Session 2 (Woyach)
 10/7 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 10/8 3:00 pm Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
 *10/9 9:30 am Mershon Conference (Cont.)
 10/10 9:30 am Mershon Conference (Cont.)
 8:00 am Dance: Columbus Polish-American Club

Week 5 (October 12)

- 10/12 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 10/13 4:00 pm Organization of Schooling in American: Structure, Governance & Reflections on the System (Dr. Brad Mitchell)
 7:00 pm Depart for ERIC Center at Indiana University
 *10/14 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC and Teaching Democracy* (Patrick, ERIC Staff)
 *10/15 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC (Cont.)*
 *10/16 TBA *Workshop on Using ERIC (Cont.)* + Depart for Columbus, Ohio
 *10/17 9:00 am Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham)
 11:00 am OSU v. Northwestern University Football Game and "Tailgate" Party hosted by Dick and Dee Remy

Week 6 (October 19)

- 10/19 1:30 pm *Workshop on the Politics of Education* Session 1 (Lawson)
 10/20 1:30 pm *Workshop on the Politics of Education* Session 2 (Lawson)
 10/21 9:00 am *Workshop on the Politics of Education* Session 3 (Lawson)

Week 7 (October 26)

- 10/26 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 10/27 9:00 am Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
 10/28 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)

Week 8 (November 2)

- 11/2 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 11/3 9:00 am Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
 11/4 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)

Week 9 (November 9)

- 11/9 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 11/11 9:00 am Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
Veterans' Day

Week 10 (November 16)

- 11/16 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 11/17 9:00 pm Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
 *11/19 12:00pm Departure for National Council for Social Studies (NCSS) Annual Meeting, Detroit
 *11/20 to 11/23 National Council for Social Studies Meeting
 *11/23 10:00 am Departure for Columbus

Week 11 (November 23)

- 11/24 9:00 am Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
 11/25 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
 11/26 *Thanksgiving Holiday*

Week 12 (November 30)

- 11/30 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course (Gilliom)
11/30 Jacek Strzemieczny Visits Projects, Mershon Center, and College of Education (11/30 - 12/1,2,3)
12/1 Syllabus Development Seminar (Cunningham, Remy)
12/2 2:00 pm Social Studies Methods Course: *Last Class* (Gilliom)

Week 13 (December 7)

- 12/7-9 Working Conference With Scholars to Review Draft Syllabus (Cunningham, Remy)

Week 14 (December 14)

- 12/22 Depart for Poland

Civic Education: Lesson Scenarios

**Second Edition
(Corrected and Expanded)**

Authors:

Krystyna Brzakalik
Jacek Kowalski
Jacek Królikowski
Tomasz Masny
Alicja Pacewicz
Maciej Podbielkowski
Krzysztof M. Radziwiłł
Małgorzata Rutkowska-Pasza
Elżbieta Suska
Cezary Trutkowski
Jan Wróbel
Marta Zahorska-Bugaj

Editor:

Alicja Pacewicz

(This document was produced as a result of an ongoing project conducted by The Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw)

Warsaw, 1995

The program, "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland," is conducted with support from:

The Ministry of National Education
The Ohio State University
The Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw

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The content of this document does not reflect the opinions of the above-mentioned institutions.

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Acknowledgments

The lessons contained in this publication were developed within the framework of the Polish-American project, "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland." No new lessons would have appeared without the inspiration and care of Dr. Jacek Strzemieczny, Director of the Department of Teachers' Education at the Ministry of Education, and Dr. Richard Remy, Director of the Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program at the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.

We are extremely grateful to outstanding Polish experts for their inquisitive remarks on particular chapters of the book.

Dr. Piotr Gliński, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Science.

Dr. Edward Halizak, Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University.

Professor Jacek Kochanowicz, Department of Economics, Warsaw University.

Barbara Lewenstein, Institute of Applied Social Science, Warsaw University.

Professor Mifoslawa Marody, Institute of Social Studies, Warsaw University.

Dr. Ewelina Nojszewska, Department of Economics Trade School, Warsaw.

Dr. Marek Nowicki, Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights.

Maryla Nowicki, Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights.

Dr. Krystyna Plaza, College of Local Government and Administration Foundation in Support of Local Democracy in Łódź.

Jarosław Robak, Teacher Training Department, Ministry of National Education.

We are also grateful to those who work at the Legislative Bureau of the Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland for their remarks on the institutions of a democratic state.

Repeatedly, we have been assisted by Witold Monkiewicz, from the Ministry of Education, Jacek Kowalski and Jacek Królikowski from the Warsaw Center for Civic and Economic Education, affiliated with the CODN in Warsaw.

We also wish to express our gratitude to American experts who have, in a significant way, contributed to the production of the present course on civic education:

Dr. Richard C. Remy, Mershon Center of The Ohio State University, served as Director of the Curriculum Seminar held at Mershon that prepared the first draft of this course. Dr. Remy designed the Seminar and organized the work of the American scholars and educators who contributed to the development of this course.

The following lecturers assisted in conducting seminars and reviewed particular chapters of the book:

Dr. Steven Miller, The Ohio State University

Dr. David Naylor, University of Cincinnati

Dr. John Patrick, Indiana University

Dr. Sandra Stotsky, Harvard University

Dr. Robert Woyach, The Ohio State University

Anna Doroszewska supervised the linguistic correctness of the texts, also contributing many substantial remarks.

Władysław Kunicki-Goldfinger, a historian and education activist, has also contributed to the second edition of the book.

Iwona Pikulska, who has edited the whole text, the proofreader **Eulalia Laskawiec**, **Magdalena Zdrojewska**, and **Jacek Herman**, who computerized the composition and illustrations for the book, have all shown patience and dedication.

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2000

**The School in Democratic Society:
A Course Plan for Poland's Future Teachers**

by
Krzysztof Broclawik
Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz
Marek Simlat
Marta Zahorska-Bugaj
Elzbieta Zuchowska-Czwartosz

Edited in Polish and Translated to English
by
Barbara Malak-Minkiewicz

Edited in English
by
Gregory E. Hamot

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Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program

A Note to Readers of English

This document is the English translation of a two-volume course plan developed for use in Poland. It represents new ground in Polish teacher education— a course designed to highlight the role of school in a democratic society. To our knowledge, it is the first of its kind in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. With this in mind, we would like to congratulate the five Polish social scientists who developed this breakthrough toward realizing the democratic ideal in post-communist teacher education.

Gregory E. Hamot
Assistant Director

Richard C. Remy
Director

Columbus, Ohio
May, 1994

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Introduction

A course entitled "The School in Democratic Society" was prepared between September, 1992 and December, 1993 as the result of a cooperative effort between **The Polish Ministry of National Education** and **The Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University**. The Mershon Center is an interdisciplinary organization that is recognized internationally for its work in curriculum design, developing instructional materials, and teacher education. The project was funded partially by **The Pew Charitable Trusts** of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The authors of the syllabus (one political scientist, one sociologist, one educational psychologist, and two social psychologists), with consultation from American specialists in education, spent four months (September - December, 1992) at the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University working on the first draft of the Syllabus. The primary specialists were **Dr. Luvern L. Cunningham**, Professor Emeritus of Education and former Dean of the College of Education at The Ohio State University, and **Dr. Richard C. Remy**, Professor of Education, Associate Director of the Mershon Center, and Project Co-Director.

This first stage of work was devoted to defining the main aspects of the school's operation in a democratic society and their relevance to Poland's present and future needs. Additionally, some new teaching methods were explored. The second phase took place in Poland, where detailed suggestions for the content of the course and teaching methods and procedures were developed.

Appendix 3

The Education System in Poland: A Brief Overview

Education in Poland reflects the enormous changes in the political, social, and economic structures in society since 1989. While centralized control of schooling and curriculum issues remains prevalent, recent efforts to increase localized control in these areas have resulted in significant changes in both content and administrative structures. As a result, schools in Poland are in a state of transformation. While these reforms are having important impact on what is taught and who makes these decisions, the grade levels and types of school have remained relatively constant.

Primary Schools

Polish schooling typically begins at six years of age when a majority of children enroll in one year of preschool. Compulsory schooling begins at age seven and continues for eight years with attendance required until students are seventeen or complete their studies. Primary schools, "the pillar of the Polish school system," provide a broad overview of subject matter in order to provide students with a general education that prepares them for one of three types of secondary schools. Divided into two phases, the first phase of primary school covers years one through three and helps to provide basic knowledge and skills (reading, writing, arithmetic). The second phase, from years four through eight, builds on the skills acquired in phase one. During this second phase, studies focus on knowledge of basic academic subjects (history, physics, chemistry) as well as other areas of activities (art and physical education). In the past, centralized control over curriculum and textbooks was strictly enforced. Current changes have led to increased flexibility for alternative programs as long as minimum curriculum standards are met.

The vast majority of primary school teachers are trained at Pedagogical Institutions. The outline for syllabi at these "teacher colleges" are established by the Ministry of Education and concentrate on teaching methodology, psychology, and philosophy of education. Entrance into the two- or three-year training courses requires a secondary education graduation certificate, a good state of health as evidenced by a medical certificate, and a passing score on an entrance exam.

Post-Primary School

Post-primary school involves three possibilities: Secondary schools of general education (28% of students), full secondary vocational schools (28% of students), and basic vocational schools (39% of students). The remaining 5% constitute those students involved in special education programs that are conducted at special schools in Poland. These schools vary in length from three to seven years. Secondary schools of general education and full secondary vocational schools require successful completion of an entrance exam for admittance. Upon completion of these two institutions, students receive a secondary education graduation certificate ("matura"). This certificate is required for the 18% of students who pass another entrance exam and continue for five years of study at institutions of higher education.


The curriculum in the secondary schools of general education involves further and more rigorous study in the content areas introduced in the primary schools. While traditionally these schools have been characterized by rigid curriculum requirements and teacher-dominated instruction, reforms in this area are altering both the content and teaching methodology of lessons. In addition, a trend toward increased enrollment in these schools and decreased enrollment in the basic vocational schools reflects the changing economic and social conditions in Poland; given the expanding opportunities in Polish society, students are opting for a more comprehensive preparation and the possibility of continuing their studies beyond secondary school.

The curriculum in the full secondary schools of vocational education meets the same basic requirements as the secondary schools of general education. While less in-depth study is provided in some academic areas, course work in specific skills which prepare students for vocational trades is included. Graduates of these schools have the option of continuing their education at institutions of higher education if they achieve a passing score on an entrance examination. Basic vocational schools concentrate more on the development of skills in a particular vocational area and do not meet the general education requirements for continuing on to higher education.

Teachers in these institutions complete a university degree in a content area. A five year specialized study program provides them with a strong foundation in a particular subject but little orientation for teaching methodologies or educational psychology.

The information presented here is a synthesis of a document, *Education in a Changing Society*, prepared and published through support from the Ministry of National Education, the Republic of Poland. Editor in Chief: Ireneusz Bialecki. Warsaw, 1995. This synthesis was written by John Fischer and Dawn Shinew of the Mershon Center.

The Education System in Poland



ERIC Resources

The documents and journal articles found in the following list can be obtained through ERIC. These items in the ERIC database can be identified by the ED and EJ numbers that appear at the beginning of the citations.

Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) is a nationwide educational information system operated by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the U.S. Department of Education. ERIC documents are abstracted monthly in ERIC's *RIE (Resources in Education)* index. RIE indexes are available in more than 850 libraries throughout the country. These libraries may also have a complete collection of ERIC documents on microfiche for viewing and photocopying.

Some ERIC documents may be purchased from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS), 7420 Fullerton Road, Suite 110, Springfield, Virginia 22153-2852, in microfiche (MF). Some documents may also be available in paper copy (PC). The telephone numbers are 703/440-1400 or 800/443-3742. The FAX number is 703/440-1408. When ordering by mail, be sure to include the ED number, specify either MF or PC, if available, and enclose a check or money order. Information about prices may be obtained by contacting EDRS.

The ERIC documents included in this publication are merely a few of the many curriculum materials and background papers that can be found in the ERIC database on the democratization of Poland and other former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The annotations of journal articles in the ERIC database represent an extensive sample of articles written on this important topic. All of the annotations appear in the *Current Index to Journals in Education (CIJE)*, which is published monthly and is available at larger libraries throughout the country. The annotations are intended to briefly describe the contents of the articles in general terms. Therefore, it is suggested that the reader locate the entire article in the journal section of a larger public or university library. Reprints of the articles may be available from UMI InfoStore, 500 Sansome Street, Suite 400, San Francisco, CA 94111-3219, 800/248-0360.

Readers are encouraged to complete their own searches of the ERIC database to discover new documents and articles which are constantly being added to the system. Educators will find these materials a valuable resource for fostering understanding, application, and evaluation of the democratization process in Poland and other former communist countries.

This annotated bibliography was compiled by Vickie J. Schlene, Coordinator for User Services and Products, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education.

ED 362 441

Birzea, Cesar, and others. **THE REFORM OF EDUCATION IN ROMANIA: CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS**. Bucharest, Romania: Institute for Educational Sciences, 1993.

This document analyzes the Romanian education system since the political changes of 1989. The analysis states with the premise that after many years of underestimation and lack of sufficient financial resources, Romanian education has reached a critical level beyond which the cultural and training level of the nation is threatened. This document states that education must become a key factor of social change.

ED 379 223

Birzea, Cesar. **STRATEGIES FOR INTERCULTURALLY-ORIENTED CIVICS: TEACHING AT PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEVEL (TEACHER TRAINING SEMINAR, TIMISOARA, ROMANIA, DECEMBER 17-20, 1993). SEMINAR REPORT**. Strasbourg, France: Council for Cultural Cooperation, 1994.

This report presents themes in the integration of intercultural civics instruction into elementary and secondary curricula. Themes emerged as points of disagreement and discussion at a teacher training seminar held in Romania.

ED 361 263

Broclawik, Krzysztof, and others. **SCHOOLS AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: A COURSE SYLLABUS FOR POLAND'S FUTURE TEACHERS. RATIONALE**. Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, 1992.

A course entitled "Schools and Democratic Society" was prepared between September 1992, and March 1993 as a result of a cooperative effort between the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University. This document presents the rationale for the course. As Poland moves through the transition from communism to democracy, it is clear that the role of the school must change. The purpose of the course is to empower prospective teachers to take on the challenges of change toward democracy in the Polish school system. The course is organized around seven features of the educational system: (1) the position and role of the teacher; (2) student rights and responsibilities; (3) parent participation in schools; (4) school and local community; (5) distribution of resources for education; (6) school as an organization and as a community; and (7) the role of schools in a democratic society.

ED 369 683

Brzkalik, Krystayna, and others. **LIFE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: A PRIMARY SCHOOL CIVICS COURSE FOR POLAND**. Warsaw, Poland: Ministry of National Education; Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, 1993.

This document summarizes a civics course for primary schools in Poland, grades 6-8. The curriculum was developed as part of the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland Project, a cooperative effort of the Polish Ministry of National Education and the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University (United States). The project aims to help schools and teachers educate succeeding generations of Polish youth to be active, competent citizens committed to democratic values. The curriculum includes over 80 detailed lesson plans. The document is divided into two sections. The first consists of unit and lesson titles, and lesson abstracts. The second part is made up of sample lessons. The curriculum has seven units: (1) local government, which includes fighting unemployment, different interest groups, water, garbage, influencing decisions, day care, budget decisions, neighborhood, local campaigns and elec-

tions, problem solving and responsibilities of local government; (2) principles of democracy including majority decisions, decision risks versus non-decision, compromise, conflicting values, everyday democratic principles, freedom of speech and artistic expression, democracy vs. dictatorship vs. anarchy, nation vs. state, and patriotism vs. nationalism; (3) human rights and freedom, including what they are and who is entitled to them, basic documents, children's rights, extra-governmental protection of human rights, rights of ethnic minorities, citizen responsibilities, and Amnesty International; (4) institutions of the democratic state; (5) citizen participation and public opinion; (6) free market economy; and (7) Poland, Europe, world, and current problems.

ED 371 966

Crisan, Alexandru. CURRICULUM REFORM IN ROMANIA. Bucharest, Romania: Institute for Educational Sciences, 1992.

This document defines curriculum reform in Romania as the elaboration and progressive setting up of a new educational paradigm unaltered by the outlooks and consequences of the communist era. Although the strategic and technical aspects of implementing the new reality are still at the stage of advanced working hypotheses, the essential objective and long-term target of the reform is giving up the centralist-demagogic model of education, and the gradual passing to an essentially realistic and dynamic model.

ED 372 021

Dostalova, Radmila. HUMANISTIC AND DEMOCRATIC GOALS IN THE CZECH SECONDARY SCHOOL (AIMS AND OUTLOOKS). Czechoslovakia, 1993.

Although the humanistic and democratic practices in the Czech Republic secondary schools are currently insufficient due to the communist regime prior to 1989, a tradition exists in the Czech cultural background for humanity and democracy in education, and those values can be incorporated into the school environment again. Czech participants in discussions on the content of civic education agree that the central aim of civic education is to provide students the skills for individual responsibility and social participation.

ED 361 513

Field, John, ed., LEARNING CITIZENSHIP: PERSPECTIVES FROM SWEDEN, POLAND AND BRITAIN. DISCUSSION PAPER IN CONTINUING EDUCATION, NUMBER 1. Coventry, England: Warwick University Department of Continuing Education, 1991.

This collection of papers examines the role of adult education in encouraging active citizenship throughout Europe. "Introduction: The Project" (John Field) discusses the context in which the other papers were written and briefly discusses citizenship education and research in Great Britain. "Learning, Education, Citizenship: What Connections?" (Chris Duke) discusses the relationships between education and citizenship, the British experience in citizenship education, and possible strategies for adult educators to use to help produce competent citizens. "The Future as a Challenge and the Role of Adult Education—The Example of Poland" (Mieczysław Malewski) discusses the relationship between citizenship education and the consciousness of Polish society. The historical development of citizenship education in Sweden, current practices in adult education programs, and a methodology and theory for further research are examined in "Education for Citizenship in Sweden" (Agnieszka Bron-Wojciechowska). "Education: A Resource in Social Movements?" (John Field) outlines a resource mobilization theory, discusses the concept of education as a resource, and presents

a case study of the use and development of educational resources for purposes of citizenship education.

ED 369 685

Kowalski, Jacek. CENTER FOR CIVIC AND ECONOMIC EDUCATION (WARSAW).

Warsaw, Poland: Center for Civic and Economic Education, 1993.

Poland's Center for Civic and Economic Education was established to improve teachers' ability to instruct students in civic education in the newly democratized Poland. The Center seeks to improve teacher skills, to gather information on effective teaching methods and curricula, and to pursue other activities to heighten civic education in Polish schools. During 1993 the Center held workshops and seminars to promote these goals. At the same time, other Polish and international institutions held conferences that helped promote the Center's activities, while the Center worked to foster the educational aims of other groups. The Center has been conducting youth forums on various subjects, aiding in the publication of books and other materials that encourage teaching about democracy, and gathering library and database materials for use by educators. In 1994 the Center planned to hold more teacher workshops, one-day "current issues" meetings for teachers, youth forums, and more programs in cooperation with other institutions.

ED 380 364

Kowalski, Jacek, and others. CIVIS POLONUS. 1994 PROJECT EVALUATION. Warsaw, Poland: National Inservice Teacher Training Centre, 1994.

This document describes a Polish program that enables students and teachers to experience state government on a personal level. Fifty students and ten teachers were invited to Warsaw (Poland) for five days to participate in didactic games, simulations, and meetings with social activists, politicians, civil servants, and journalists. The project's evaluation examined these experiences closely, describing activities and reactions from participants along with shortcomings of the project.

EJ 441 968

Kozakiewicz, Mikolaj. "Educational Transformation Initiated by the Polish *Perestroika*."

COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW 36 (February 1992): 91-100.

A snapshot of the changing Polish educational system focuses on elimination of uniform curriculum requirements, return of religious instruction, emergence of private and religious schools, removal of overtly ideological materials from history and literature curricula, and fears of a power struggle between the present post-communists and new reformers.

ED 352 344

Krull, Edgar. UPDATING THE THEORETICAL CONTENT OF TEACHER PREPARATION PERTAINING TO EDUCATIONAL SUBJECTS: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTONIA. REPRINTS AND MINIPRINTS NO. 754. Paper based on a lecture given at a Swedish-Baltic Seminar (Malmö, Sweden, October 7-11, 1991).

Fifty years of Soviet occupation in Estonia has damaged social and economic life. One issue for further development of Estonian society is the need to reform teacher education programs. This paper outlines some of the main problems concerning the content of theoretical preparation of future teachers in educational subjects at Tartu University (Estonia) and offers some solutions for improving the present situation.

EJ 430 541

Melosik, Zbyszko. "Poland in the 1990s: The Role of Education in Creating a Participatory Society." *SOCIAL EDUCATION* 55 (March 1991): 191-93.

Explores present educational needs for implementing a democratic society in Poland. Challenges education to identify the tasks and values of democratic education. Contends that education formerly confirmed the role of socialism and Communist ideology. Argues that the current thrust is the ideal of a participatory society. Lists skills necessary to raise global European awareness and limit nationalist tendencies.

EJ 464 779

Niemczynski, Małgorzata, and Adam Niemczynski. "Perspectives from Past and Present on Moral and Citizenship Education in Poland." *JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION* 21 (1992): 225-33.

Compares contemporary issues related to moral and citizenship education in Poland with similar issues in the late eighteenth century. Describes an educational reform effort that began in 1773 and was based on nationalistic and romantic literature of the time. Contends that the moral values that were derived from this literature are essential for the development of democracy in modern Poland.

EJ 436 859

Niemierko, Boleslaw. "Educational Testing in Poland." *EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT: ISSUES AND PRACTICE* 10 (Fall 1991): 27-32.

The experiences of Poland in educational testing are reviewed from 1918 to 1990. Trends affecting the future of educational testing in Poland are considered. Current economic and political conditions in Eastern Europe may keep educational testing in a relatively minor position as more vital national needs are addressed.

ED 374 056

Patrick, John J. *CIVIC EDUCATION IN FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE*. Bloomington, IN: Social Studies Development Center, 1994.

This paper discusses the efforts of educators in the former communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly those of Estonia and Poland. In spite of diverse histories and cultures, each of these nations has shared a legacy of totalitarian communism imposed by the former Soviet Union. This inheritance has afflicted all former communist countries of this region with handicaps that fundamentally obstruct their march toward authentic constitutional democracy. This paper discusses three common problems in the way of reconstructed civic education for liberal constitutional democracy: (1) conceptual confusion or different meanings, often subtle shades of difference, attached to key words by civic educators from the West and their counterparts from former communist countries; (2) constitutional cynicism or an undervaluing or skepticism about constitutions as effective instruments for the rule of law and protection of human rights; and (3) democratic ethnocentrism or a blend of fervor for democracy and ethnicity that can be linked both to conceptual confusion and the residue of Soviet and Russian imperialism. This third problem is a tendency to view democracy simply or primarily as the will of the country's ethnic majority, irrespective of the wishes of particular individuals or groups who do not or cannot identify with this monolithic and permanent majority faction. A deep commitment to constitutionalism as protection against any form of tyranny and guarantor of human rights can contribute much to the resolution of this third problem.

ED 374 022

POLAND. A SELECTION OF TEACHING MATERIALS. Washington, DC: American Federation of Teachers, 1990.

This document is a collection of supplemental classroom materials on Poland to be photocopied for use in secondary schools in conjunction with the Education for Democracy's Classroom-To-Classroom project. The materials offer an historical framework for considering current events, as well as some insight into the events, ideas, issues, and personalities that have propelled Poland's successful movement towards democracy. A timeline and maps are included to give a basic historical context. Editorial cartoons, a resource guide, and suggested classroom activities also are included. The three maps included are: (1) Central Europe, pre-World War I; (2) Central Europe, post-World War II; and (3) Poland's shifting frontiers. The timeline stretches from 966 AD to 1991. Readings, grouped in five sections are: (1) a short history "The People Versus the Party" (Leopold Ungr); (2) excerpts from two histories on Solidarity: "The Polish Revolution: Solidarity" (Timothy Garton Ash) and "Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland" (Norman Davies); (3) four "Notes from the Underground" from 1982; (4) Voices: "The Books of the Polish Nation" by national poet Adam Mickiewicz, "Poem for Adults" (Adam Wazyk), "If You Insist on Screaming Do It Quietly" and "Write Legibly" (Stanislaw Baranczak) and "Report from the Besieged City" (Zbigniew Herbert); (5) Change is comprised of five articles dealing with the internal forces that make change possible: "A Negotiated Settlement" (Jackson Diehl), "The Polish Kaleidoscope of 1989," in "Captive Minds: A Journal of Information and Opinion on Eastern Europe," "The Age of Solidarity" (Adrian Karatnycky), "Missing the Vote" (Maria Balinska), and "Polish Politics: Wałęsa Runs for President (Adrian Karatnycky). Contains 28 references.

ED 361 251

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE 1990'S: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS. New York: Institute of International Education, 1993.

This document features writings and curriculum projects developed by teachers who traveled to Poland and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1992 as members of a Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar. The following items are among those included: "Curriculum Project: Women and Work: A Global Perspective," "The Community College and Eastern Europe: Possibilities for Academic Exchanges," "The Architects of a New Era: Lech Wałęsa, Vaclav Havel, and the Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe," and "The Impact of Political and Economic Systems on Spatial Organization and the Landscape: Poland and Czechoslovakia in Transition from Socialism to Democracy and a Market Economy."

ED 370 863

PROJEKT PROGRAMU NAUCZANIA KSZTALCENIA OBYWATELSKIEGO (PROPOSED CIVIC EDUCATION CURRICULUM FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS). Warsaw, Poland: Ministry of National Education, 1993.

This document consists of three documents in a packet that make up a curriculum guide that presents objectives, content outlines, sample lessons, and background readings for the development of a primary school and a secondary school civics course in Poland. The documents are: (1) Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools; (2) Proposed Civic Education Curriculum for Primary and Secondary Schools: Sample Lesson Plans; and (3) Selected Supplementary Materials for Civic Education Teachers. The first document is divided into two parts, one on primary schools, the next on secondary schools. The

curriculum for grades 1-5 is on life in society and focuses first on the individual and others, then on people and nature. The curriculum for grades 6-8 is on life in a democratic society, focusing on the group, economic activity of the individual and society, and individual citizens and the government. The part on secondary schools is divided into chapters on people as individuals, social groups, society, nation, economy, the place of Poland in the world, protecting the world, and selected problems of the contemporary world. The second part of the curriculum guide provides sample lesson plans developed by the Polish primary and secondary school educators who developed the outline of the first section. The section consists of eight lesson plans for primary schools and eight for high schools. Topics include group leaders, decision-making, children's rights, and economics. Only the titles are included in this document. The third section of the curriculum guide is a table of contents listing supplementary articles by prominent scholars throughout Poland.

EJ 433 654

Ravitch, Diane. "A Report from Eastern Europe." *SOCIAL STUDIES* 82 (March-April 1991): 49-55.

Presents a paper delivered in Poland in 1989 and in five additional Eastern European cities in 1990. Defines democracy and suggests ways to teach about democratic government. Explores education's role in a democracy. Encourages student participation in student government, classroom discussion, community service, and research projects to give them experience in democratic practices and to teach democratic values.

ED 370 833

Remy, Richard C., and others. *BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION IN POLAND'S SCHOOLS. FINAL REPORT.* Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, 1993.

This document is the report of a project to strengthen democratic reforms in Poland by enhancing student and teacher understanding of citizenship in a democracy. The goal of the initiative is to promote the development of democracy in Poland by instituting a new citizenship curriculum in Polish schools. The immediate goal of this project was to develop curriculum guides for an eighth grade course and a secondary school course on citizenship for democracy. The project has met all of its key objectives including: (1) developing and publishing a three-volume curriculum guide for courses on citizenship in a democracy that will be used in subsequent curriculum development and teacher in-service programs; (2) introducing Polish teachers to new instructional strategies and materials of particular value in education for democratic citizenship; (3) mobilizing and training a core group of Polish teachers who now have experienced a process of democratic reform and who can play leadership roles in disseminating the new approaches and materials throughout Poland; and (4) laying the foundation for ongoing working relationships between the Ministry of National Education and the National Center for Teacher Training in Poland and key citizenship education centers in the United States. The project has contributed to the understanding of how best to serve the special needs of citizenship educators in countries like Poland which are trying to overcome the legacy of Communist rule. The report recognizes a need to teach about democracy in ways that overcome popular skepticism about the efficacy of democratic ideals and formulas, and to incorporate economic education into civic education.

ED 377 120

Remy, Richard. TEACHING DEMOCRACY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: THE CASE OF POLAND. Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, 1994.

This digest describes one of the largest, most comprehensive projects in civic education involving cooperation among American and Central European educators, "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland." The project's five major activities are discussed and a list of additional activities is included.

EJ 413 151

Skwarnicki, Marek. "Emerging from the Darkness." AMERICAN SCHOOL BOARD JOURNAL 177 (September 1990): 28-30.

Written from a Polish immigrant's viewpoint, this article focuses on the moral and spiritual aspects of the political upheaval beginning in Poland in 1980 and culminating in the toppling of East European totalitarian regimes. Poland will eventually achieve a strong free-market economy and democracy, aided by school reform and teacher re-education.

EJ 460 326

Tobacyk, Jerome J. "Changes in Locus of Control Beliefs in Polish University Students before and after Democratization." JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 132 (April 1992): 217-22.

Examines a study of the effects of sociocultural change on an individual's beliefs concerning control over personal and political events. Explains that Polish students' political control beliefs significantly shifted from external sources (the government) to internal sources (the individual) after democratization of their country. Reports that personal belief systems did not change.

ED 374 054

Valdmaa, Sulev. CIVIC EDUCATION CURRICULA FOR THE FORMS IX AND XII. AN EXTRACT FROM THE FRAME CURRICULA FOR THE BASIC SCHOOL OF THE ESTONIAN EDUCATION CENTRE. Tallinn, Estonia: Jaan Tonisson Institute, 1994.

This document discusses the framework for civic education in Estonia. Objectives of civic education in Estonia come from the traditional beliefs of Estonian society, the new demands for social change, standards established by the Council of Europe, and experiences of neighboring countries. The main objective of civic education is to teach a new generation, regardless of their nationality, to become citizens of the world and to be loyal to the democratic Republic of Estonia.

Contributors

CHARLES F. BAHMUELLER is Director of Special Projects at the Center for Civic Education in Los Angeles. He received his undergraduate education at the University of California at Berkeley and his doctorate in political science from Harvard University. A participant in many international conferences on democracy and civic education, he served as a consultant to the project on "Education for Democratic Citizenship" in Poland and has also given seminars on democratic ideas for educators in Lithuania. He has written and edited books and articles in the fields of civic education, political science, political philosophy, and history, and has held appointments teaching political science and history. He has also done historical documentary editing at universities in Britain, Canada, and the United States. He was project director and general editor of *CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic Education* (1991), now in use in 28 countries around the world. A Lithuanian language edition of the work was published by the Lithuanian government, with support from the United States Information Agency, in 1995. Most recently, he was a principal writer and researcher for *National Standards for Civics and Government* (1994).

GREGORY E. HAMOT is Assistant Professor of Social Studies Education in the Division of Curriculum and Instruction at The University of Iowa. He also serves on the International Education Committee in the College of Education. From 1993 to 1995, he served as Assistant Director of the *Citizenship Development for a Global Age* Program at the Mershon Center of The Ohio State University. During his doctoral studies at The Ohio State University, he served as Project Coordinator for "The School and Democratic Society" project. As Project Coordinator, he edited the English version of "The School and Democratic Society" course plan, and he has presented at several course plan workshops in Poland. His background includes 15 years as a secondary social studies teacher in Chicago. He wrote and produced several media packages for high school social studies, including the award winning *The Legal Process: A Teen's Experience*. In 1995, he led the Ohio delegation to the Civitas@Prague International Conference on "Strengthening Citizenship and Civic Education, East and West."

A. E. DICK HOWARD is the White Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. A Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, he was the chief architect of the current Virginia Constitution. His books include *The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America* and *Constitution Making in Eastern Europe*. He has consulted with drafters of new constitutions in various countries, including Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the Russian Republic.

JACEK KOWALSKI received his Master's Degree from the Department of History at Warsaw University in Poland. He is currently employed as the Deputy Director of the National Center for Teacher Training and is a former director of the Center for Civic and Economic Education. He has been involved in the "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland" project as a member of the Primary School Team. He is a co-author of the new civic education curriculum and book of lessons for teachers. Currently, he is also a teacher trainer in civic education and a member of the Center for Citizenship Education Advisory Board. His main interests lie in the areas of new trends in the educational system, civic education and Polish foreign policy, the role of local government in Poland, and management.

BARBARA MALAK-MINKIEWICZ comes from Warsaw and is a psychologist by training. She received her Ph.D. from the Department of Psychology at Warsaw University. She was employed by that Department after graduating until 1989 when she moved to Amsterdam for personal reasons (marriage). Her principal interest is in the area of social psychology, which she taught while employed at the university. Her research focused on interpersonal and intergroup aggression as well as early childhood and youth socialization. After Solidarity came into being, she was involved in union activities and work aimed at reforming the Polish educational system. She was interned after martial law had been introduced in Poland. After her release, she was active in the union underground, including the so-called Committee on Independent Learning whose goal (in cooperation with the Committees on Independent Education and Culture) was to promote all activities for independence in those areas (providing funding for research prohibited by the government, underground publication of work censored by the authorities, preparation of educational programs at different levels, fellowships for persecuted students, etc.). In 1991, she came to Poland and worked as a spokesperson of Solidarity branch in Gdansk. She then returned to Amsterdam and began her cooperation with the Polish Ministry of Education. One outcome of this cooperation was the project described in this book. Currently, she is cooperating with the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw, the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, and International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) located in The Hague, being involved in the preparations of a comparative research project concerning civic education in different countries.

STEVEN L. MILLER is Associate Professor of Social Studies and Global Education at The Ohio State University. Economic education is among Miller's areas of specialization. He started the Central Ohio Center for Economic Education at OSU in 1978, served as its director until 1993, and remains Senior Faculty Associate of the Center. Miller, a former teacher of high school economics and government, has considerable experience in instructional methodology and developing curriculum in the social studies, especially economics. Among his publications are *Economic Education for Citizenship: Implications for Curriculum, Instruction, and Materials*; *Economics and National Security* (editor and co-author); *Economics Master Curriculum Guide, Part II: Teaching Strategies for High School Economics Courses* (co-author); and *The Study and Teaching of Economics* (co-author). His recent research interests include novice and expert problem solving in economics. Dr. Miller has been a Senior Faculty Associate at OSU's Mershon Center, an internationally known interdisciplinary center for policy analysis, education, and research on international affairs. Miller has played a key role in Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland, a program to reform civic education in Poland conducted by the Polish Center for Citizenship Education and The Ohio State University. Miller has been to Poland nine times, teaching, planning, and evaluating parts of this program. He has twice led teams of academic specialists to Lithuania as part of a civic education project in cooperation with the Lithuanian Ministry of Education and Science. This project is titled Education for Democratic Citizenship in Lithuania. Miller has also worked with educators in Bulgaria as part of an economic education program conducted by the Ministry of Education of Bulgaria, the University of Delaware, and the University of Cincinnati.

JOHN J. PATRICK is Professor of Education at Indiana University, where he is also the Director of the Social Studies Development Center and the ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education. He has served as Senior Consultant to the project on Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland and as a member of an Academic Advisory Panel on Civic Education Curriculum Reform in Central and Eastern Europe of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Patrick has been involved in a civic education project in Estonia sponsored jointly by the Jaan Tonisson Institute of Estonia and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems of the United States of America. In addition, he has served as a consultant for the USIA to the Democracy Advancement Center of Latvia. He is Director of the International Civic Education Exchange Program for Latvia and the U.S.A., a project of the Social Studies Development Center in cooperation with the Center for Civic Education. He has written many published pieces on American history, civic education, government, and principles of American constitutional democracy and is co-author of *American Political Behavior*, *Civics for Americans*, *Lessons on the Constitution*, and *History of the American Nation*. His latest books are (1) *The Young Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States*, published by the Oxford University Press in 1994, and (2) *Founding the Republic: A Documentary History*, published by Greenwood Press in 1995.

RICHARD C. REMY is an Associate Professor of Social Studies Education at The Ohio State University, where he also directs the Citizenship Development Program at OSU's Mershon Center, a multidisciplinary organization concerned with national security, world affairs, and democratic citizenship. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University, has taught in the Chicago public schools, and has co-directed several national and international curriculum development projects. He has served as a member of an Academic Advisory Panel on Civic Education Curriculum Reform in Central and Eastern Europe of the United States Information Agency (USIA), as a consultant to the Education for Democratic Citizenship in Lithuania project, and as Director of the International Civic Education Exchange Program for Poland and the U.S.A. in cooperation with the Center for Civic Education. His books include *Teaching About International Conflict and Peace*, *Approaches to World Studies*, *Teaching About National Security*, *American Government and National Security*, *Civics for Americans* (co-author), *Lessons on the Constitution* (co-author), *Citizenship Decision Making*, and *United States Government: Democracy in Action*. Dr. Remy is co-director of Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland, a cooperative effort of The Ohio State University and the Center for Citizenship Education, Warsaw. He serves on numerous national advisory boards including the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship.

GOLDIE SHABAD is an Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. Her research interests focus on European politics, democratization, and nationalism. She has been a co-principal investigator on two major NSF-funded research projects on democratization in Spain. Currently, she is a co-principal investigator, together with Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, on a project funded by the National Council on Soviet and East European Research on the politics of economic transformation and value change in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. She recently completed a five-year term as co-editor of *International Studies Quarterly*. In addition to numerous published articles on ethnic nationalism and democratization in Spain and on political participation in the former Yugoslavia, she is co-author of *Spain After Franco: The Birth of a Competitive Party System* published by The University of California Press in 1986.

KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI received a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Warsaw in 1971. In 1981 he received a post-Ph.D. degree, Dr. Hab. in sociology, from the University of Warsaw. He is a specialist in cross-national comparative analysis, area studies of Eastern Europe, social structure and personality, and methodology of social sciences. He moved from Poland to The Ohio State University in early 1989 to accept an appointment as a Professor of Sociology. He is also affiliated with the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, and the Mershon Center. Professor Slomczynski's monographs, published by the Polish Academy of Sciences in English, include: *Investigations on Class Structure and Social Stratification in Poland, 1945-1975* (1977, with W. Wesolowski), and *Social Structure and Mobility: Poland, Japan, and the United States, Methodological Studies* (1989). He also co-edited, with T. Krauze, *Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland* (1978, Sharpe) and *Social Stratification in Poland: Eight Empirical Studies* (1986, Sharpe); and, with W. Wesolowski and B. Mach, *Social Mobility in Comparative Perspective* (1978, Ossolineum). His most recent book, co-authored with M.L. Kohn, is *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland* (1990, Blackwell; 1993 paperback edition). In recent years, he has published articles, research notes, and reviews in the *American Journal of Sociology* (1990, 1987, 1985); *American Sociological Review* (1987, 1984); *Current Sociological Perspectives* (1983); *European Sociological Review* (1988); *International Journal of Sociology* (1986); *Social Forces* (1985); *Sociological Forum* (1986); and *Sociological Methods and Research* (1986).

SANDRA STOTSKY is a Research Associate at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, where she is Director of the Summer Institute on Writing, Reading, and Civic Education funded by the Lincoln and Therese Filene Foundation. She has served as a consultant to the project on "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland" and its companion project in Lithuania, as well as to an American studies program in Lithuania for the United States Information Agency (USIA). She has written many published articles on the uses of writing for learning and citizenship, and on the civic content and thrust of the literature and reading programs in American schools. Her most recent article is "Changes in America's Secondary School Literature Programs: Good News and Bad," in the April 1995 *Phi Delta Kappan*, and her most recent book is *Connecting Civic Education and Language Education: The Contemporary Challenge*, published by Teachers College Press in 1991. She currently serves as editor of *Research in the Teaching of English*, the research journal sponsored by the National Council of Teachers of English.

JACEK STRZEMIECZNY is Co-Director of the "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland" project. Currently, he serves as Director of the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw, Poland. He received a Ph.D. from the Institute of Educational Research in Warsaw. He was active in the dissident movement in Poland in the 1980s. He served with distinction as a Director of Teacher Training in the Polish Ministry of National Education between 1989 and early 1994. While at the Ministry, he was involved in activities aimed at reforming and decentralizing of the Polish educational system. Dr. Strzemieczny left the Ministry in May of 1994 to establish the Center for Citizenship Education in Warsaw.

PHILLIP J. VANFOSSEN is Assistant Professor in the School of Education at the State University of New York College at Geneseo where he teaches undergraduate courses in social studies methods and graduate courses in research design and evaluation and models of instruction. Dr. VanFossen earned his Ph.D. in Social Studies Education (with a cognate area in Economics) from The Ohio State University. Prior to graduate studies, Dr. VanFossen taught social studies at both the middle school and high school levels. He is currently a Field Representative for the New York State Council on Economic Education and a Faculty Associate at The Ohio State University's Mershon Center. Dr. VanFossen has published articles on economic and social studies education and research in *Theory and Research in Social Education*, *The Senior Economist*, *The Southern Social Studies Journal*, and *Economics for Kids*, and served a two-year term as Technical Editor for the latter. His research interests lie in expert problem solving in economics and multicultural teacher education. As part of a collaborative project with the Polish Ministry of National Education, Dr. VanFossen has also spent a significant period of time working with economic educators in Poland. Recently, Dr. VanFossen has been a consultant to a similar project in Lithuania.

MARTA ZAHORSKA-BUGAJ is Professor of Sociology at the Warsaw University in Poland, where she is employed in the Department of Sociology of Education located in the Institute of Sociology. She has been actively involved in research on political socialization and civic education of the Polish youth. She has also participated in the "Education for Democratic Citizenship in Poland" project organized by the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University in the capacity of a member of a group of scholars and educators preparing a "School in the Democratic Society" syllabus for teachers. She has authored numerous articles on the history of the Polish intelligentsia and the recent changes in the Polish school system.

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