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ABSTRACT

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MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS -- From Obscurity to Overkill

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ABSTRACT

This paper traces the origins of international mobile satellite communications, identifies those mobile satellite services available today and compares the various proposed global Personal Communications Networks (PCNs), including "INMARSAT-P" and the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite systems known as Motorola's "Iridium" and Loral/Qualcomm's "Globalstar" systems. The paper also reviews the current regulatory environment for these services, especially in the United States where market access is critical for success. The paper is intended to establish a foundation for future research, and suggests a number of potential research opportunities in the areas of diffusion of technology, mass media usage, and marketing. It recommends an economic evaluation of the industry, suggesting that if all of the organizations that say they will be providing mobile satellite services in the future actually become operational, profit margins may shrink to a point that the services will ultimately become commodity-like, driving some would-be providers out of the industry.

MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS --
From Obscurity to Overkill

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

A number of changes in international satellite communications have occurred over the past five years that will have far-reaching affects on the way people communicate in the future. These changes include a shift from the 1980's model of relatively stable, but high, prices; few competitors; and limited technology options, to a new era of price competition, rapid growth in the number of international service providers, and the implementation of digital mobile satellite technologies that have already dramatically reduced the size and cost of satellite equipment and created significant improvements in system capacity. These changes will also allow for the introduction of a satellite-based global personal communications service before the end of this decade and, potentially, several competing communications systems in operation by early in the next decade.

The interest in this technology has sky-rocketed within the last few years, with nearly every major telecommunications organization in the world announcing intentions to adopt some form of mobile satellite communication within the decade (Cochetti, 1994).

This paper explores the origins of mobile satellite communications and highlights a number of questions and potential stumbling blocks to the implementation of this technology. It is primarily concerned with legal and regulatory hurdles within the

United States, addressing two primary questions:

"Can Inmarsat services legally be used in the United States today, given that the FCC considers it an 'international' service?" and

"Can COMSAT participate in future Inmarsat personal communications services, since they go beyond the maritime market for which COMSAT was initially authorized?"

The paper also addresses some marketing and economic issues that may threaten the success of this highly touted technology.

Primarily, the paper reflects a legal research methodology, and, therefore, it is descriptive and non-theoretical. Since there is little existing published literature on this new technology, the source documents for most of the material were Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rulings, government documents and corporate legal filings, transcripts of Congressional testimony, the text of corporate speeches and press releases, articles from the news media, and marketing and financial materials published by the various organizations being researched. In some cases, actual interviews were conducted with executives from the organizations being researched.

The paper is intended to be a foundation for future research into this subject, suggesting some areas of potential theoretical study that should be explored in the near future as private corporations and government entities continue to significant resources in this technology.

GROWTH OF MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

The world's largest and most powerful satellite organization, the 124-member, Washington, D.C.-based International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), began the decade of the 1980's with a virtual worldwide monopoly on international video and telephony satellite transmissions. But it ended the decade facing an uncertain future, due, in large part, to a regulatory and competitive onslaught of newly authorized, privately-owned competitors, such as PANAMSAT and Orion. The organization, its signatories, and government participants focused most of their attention on this issue as well as new threats created by AT&T's 1989 completion of TAT-8, the first of many planned transoceanic fiber optic cables, and a significant capacity shortage that was caused by the slow-down in launches following the 1986 shuttle disaster.

Interestingly, one of the most significant changes in the satellite industry in the 1980s went relatively unnoticed by the large fixed satellite system operators and end-users. That was the birth and gradual development of an international mobile satellite network headquartered in London and known as Inmarsat.

That organization, originally called, the International Maritime Satellite Organization, but now referred to only by its acronym, Inmarsat, had as its original mission to improve safety of life at sea on large ocean-going vessels. There was little fanfare in the business world for the birth of this technology because its market was limited to international maritime fleets. In fact, from 1979 to 1989, in the first ten years of Inmarsat's existence, fewer than 10,000 users purchased equipment capable of operating within the Inmarsat system[1].

But in the subsequent five years, the number of Inmarsat users jumped to more than 50,000, and the organization is predicting usage in the hundreds of thousands by the end of this decade[2]. The reason for this growth is the implementation of new digital technologies and the launch of a second generation of satellites that allowed for significantly smaller and less costly mobile terminals and a more efficient use of the limited capacity of the system. This has allowed a reduction in the once stable, but very high service price of $10.00 per minute, to today's prices, which have dropped to lower than $4.00 per minute for certain services and which are predicted to approach $1.00 per minute by early in the next decade. In addition to lowering prices, the technological changes have also expanded the organization's capability to provide communications services virtually anywhere in the world on ships of any size, trucks, airplanes, and in transportable suitcase and briefcase-size units that can be carried to remote regions of the world on a moment's notice.

It was this capability that finally brought the organization out of its relative obscurity and caught the imagination of a number of

[1]From internal corporate documents of COMSAT Corporation, the U.S. signatory to Inmarsat.

[2]Information provided in Inmarsat press releases explaining its new Personal Communications Service (PCS), Inmarsat-P.

communications experts who have now heralded the concept of mobile satellite services as the future of international communications.

The first widespread public display of the technology's effectiveness was during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when CNN correspondents used an Inmarsat terminal to report live from a hotel balcony in Baghdad, despite all of the other communications systems being either down or under the control of the Iraqi government.

This live coverage -- the *only* live coverage from Iraq -- was not brought to the world via the sophisticated INTELSAT system, which had millions of users and operated with huge fixed satellite antennas located around the world. It was transmitted from a small umbrella-like antenna and land-mobile terminal the size of a suitcase over the Inmarsat satellite system, which at that time, had fewer than 15,000 users in the entire world, and all but a few of them were on ships at sea.

Following the CNN broadcast from Iraq, COMSAT Corporation, the U.S. signatory to Inmarsat, was flooded with requests for service from every major broadcaster, wire service and print news organization, while Inmarsat saw its user base increase five-fold.

There are a number of advantages for news organizations and international travelers to use the mobile satellite services offered by Inmarsat, despite its relatively high cost and low capacity and data speeds (compared to INTELSAT)[3]. Inmarsat's key advantage is that it offers "demand-assigned" service that requires no transponder leasing, coordination efforts, or monthly fees. It is a transportable, pay-as-you-use-it service that allows the user to make or receive telephone, data, or facsimile calls to anywhere or from anywhere in the world, by-passing local terrestrial telephone systems. Newer Inmarsat terminal models also offer a 56/64 kbps transmission capability that permit broadcast quality audio, computer data and photo transmission, and compressed video signals.

The following excerpt from a 1993 joint-FCC filing by Capital Cities/ABC, CBS, NBC and TBS shows the value that the broadcasters currently place on the service:

> Because even the current generation of Inmarsat terminals are small and light enough to be transported by a single individual, they are especially well-suited to be used for Satellite Newsgathering operations and for providing coordination and control communications from the remote site to the satellite operator's International Operator Center (IOC) and the broadcaster's network control center.
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> Over the past few years, and particularly since the coverage of the Persian Gulf War, the Networks' usage of the Inmarsat satellite services has increased dramatically (200-400%).

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[3]Inmarsat currently handles only 250 simultaneous calls in an entire ocean region vs. 18,000 on just one INTELSAT satellite, and it is not capable of transmitting broadcast-quality video signals.

For example, Inmarsat mobile terminals have been used extensively by the Networks in Somalia and Bosnia in bringing the American public coverage of news events in those locations. The use of such terminals accessing Inmarsat services is expected to continue increasing significantly for the foreseeable future..."[4]

Given the relative obscurity of mobile satellite technology prior to the early 1990's, it is somewhat astounding to note the amount of interest in mobile satellite communications today -- and not just in those services offered by Inmarsat. Dozens of companies have announced plans to move into the next phase of mobile satellite technology: Low Earth Orbit (LEO) systems. Several of these companies, most notably Motorola, Microsoft Corporation, Loral Corp., Sprint, Lockheed, Mitsubishi, France Telecom, IBM, Westinghouse, and Bell Atlantic have already announced partnerships committing billions of dollars to build and launch complex LEO (or medium earth orbit -- MEO) systems to interconnect with terrestrial cellular networks around the world to create what is referred to global Personal Communications Networks, PCN[5] (Cochetti, 1994).

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[4]Reply Comments of Capital Cities/ABC, CBS, NBC and TBS in the matter before the FCC, File No. ISP-94-001 of Motorola Satellite Communications, Inc. Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Concerning Participation by COMSAT in a New Satellite System Being Developed by Inmarsat to Provide Personal Land Mobile Communications Services.

[5]In this paper, we refer to the satellite-based systems that will interconnect with cellular systems as global PCNs in contrast with PCS, Personal Communication Service, which we use

THE PLAYERS AND THEIR HISTORY

Before exploring these proposed global PCN systems and the regulatory environment that could have an important impact on their future development, it is first necessary to understand the current status of mobile satellite communications -- who the key players are in the industry, how they became players, and what their relationships are to one another. This is especially important because almost daily, we see new regulatory policies, new partnerships, new competitors, and new technologies being introduced. Having some foundation in the roots of the system may help future analysts gain a better understanding of the complexity of the industry and the challenges that it will face in the future.

Comsat Corporation:

COMSAT, which stands for Communications Satellite Corporation, is a Bethesda, Maryland-based, publicly-traded (NYSE) company that was created by an act of Congress in 1962 to help the United States develop an international satellite system. The company played an instrumental role in developing and launching the first commercial geosynchronous satellite and in establishing the international satellite consortium, INTELSAT, in the mid-1960s. Ten years later, it played a similar role in developing the first mobile satellite service and in creating the mobile satellite consortium, Inmarsat. Today the company is the sole U.S. Signatory to and largest

to refer to the U.S. domestic terrestrial-based cellular networks that are currently being auctioned by the FCC.

owner in INTELSAT (with a 21% share) and in Inmarsat (with a 24% share). Despite its relatively small size -- COMSAT's $825 million annual revenues[6] seem almost meager compared to the giants of the communications industry -- the company's expertise, not only in satellite technology, but in international politics and diplomacy will make it a formidable player in the development of future mobile communications systems.

Inmarsat:

The Inmarsat organization is the direct result of COMSAT's starting the mobile satellite industry with its launch of three L-band MARISAT satellites in 1976. Until then, only fixed satellite technology, like that used by INTELSAT, was used for commercial communications. The use of L-band and the new mobile satellite technology allowed the use of much smaller antennas that no longer needed to be "fixed" in place. The antennas could be stabilized like a gyroscope and could also point to a satellite while moving through the satellite's footprint.

Because of the international nature of the communications, it was decided that a private corporation representing the interests of one country would have little chance of success (Tedeschi, 1989). Therefore, an international consortium, initially made up of ten

[6]Revenues from COMSAT's 1994 Annual Report.

countries, was created.[7] The result was the formation of Inmarsat, organized as an intergovernmental treaty organization whose function was to support a communications capability for the protection of life and property at sea.

The U.S. Congress passed the International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications Act in 1978[8] designating COMSAT as the "sole operating entity of the United States for participation in Inmarsat, for the purpose of providing international maritime satellite telecommunications services."[9] (As we shall see later, the specific words, "maritime" and "international" have stirred a great deal of controversy about both Inmarsat's and COMSAT's plans to provide domestic land mobile services in the United States.)

Today Inmarsat membership stands at 76, with the largest participants being the U.S., the U.K., Norway, Japan, France, and the Russian Federation. COMSAT Mobile Communications acts as the U.S. Signatory to Inmarsat and sits on the Inmarsat Council, which acts as its governing body. Despite its maritime beginnings, in 1989 Inmarsat

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[7] From a speech entitled, "Frontiers Without Borders: Competitive Satellite Communications for the 21st Century," by Bruce L. Crockett, President and CEO, COMSAT Corporation, delivered February 10, 1994, at the Satellite XIII conference in Washington D.C.

[8] 47 USC 751 Amendment to the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Public Law 95-564, 95th Congress.

[9] 47 USC 752, Sec. 503 (a) (1).

adopted amendments to its Convention and Operating Agreement[10] to allow it to provide land mobile satellite services, and a number of manufacturers now offer the necessary land transportable terminals. While there continues to be some limitations on the use of the service in various countries (including the United States) because of fear of bypassing local telecommunications authorities, temporary licenses from local governments can usually be obtained for emergencies and fast breaking news stories.

AMSC:

As mentioned, the Inmarsat service was designated an international service. COMSAT's ground stations were located in the United States (in Southbury, Connecticut, and Santa Paula, California), but its role was to interconnect these stations with mobile terminals outside the United States to provide an international service to and from the U.S.

The American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC) was an outgrowth of a 1989 FCC decision to create a domestic consortium for the provision of mobile satellite communications services *within* the borders of the United States. This decision came about after twelve separate applications were made for the limited frequencies that had been set aside for domestic mobile satellite communications. The FCC

[10] Inmarsat adopted the land mobile amendments to its Convention and Operating Agreement at its Sixth Extraordinary Assembly of Parties meeting held January 17-19, 1989. Ratification of the amendments requires approval by two thirds of its membership. While the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Party to Inmarsat, has indicated its willingness to approve the amendments, it has not yet done so.

requested that the twelve applicants merge their license applications into one. Eight did so, with some later dropping out. Today, the three largest owners in AMSC are AT&T/McCaw Cellular (recently merged), Singapore Telecom, which increased its ownership share to 13.67 percent after entering AMSC as a minority investment partner in MTEL Corporation (a 7 percent owner in AMSC and owner of Skytel paging, which is applying for a domestic PCS license), and Hughes Communications, Inc. (a division of General Motors and a U.S. domestic satellite operator and sister unit to the Hughes subsidiary that is currently building the AMSC satellites).

The AMSC system offers voice and data services using its own dedicated L-band geosynchronous satellite, which was successfully launched on April 7, 1995, from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. Although it is authorized to deploy three satellites, it currently plans to operate just one and use for backup the mobile satellite being launched in late-1995 by the Canadian mobile satellite service licensee, TMI Communications Company. Ltd.

The organization is currently distributing its services through three distribution channels: a direct sales force targeting the trucking and commercial transportation marketplace; a value-added reseller market targeting the maritime and trucking markets; and a cellular dealer network targeting cellular users who roam out of cellular range[11].

PROPOSED PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS:

"Global PCN" is the next phase of mobile satellite communications, which will tie directly into digital cellular services to create an international telecommunications network that uses small, hand-held telephones and other personal communication devices anywhere in the world at any time. Constellations of small, low orbiting satellites will interconnect with terrestrial-based cellular networks to create seamless connections around the world.

In January 1995, there were five Global PCN hopefuls who applied to the FCC for one of the licenses to develop voice service using low-earth orbiting (LEO) or middle-earth orbiting (MEO) satellite constellations: Iridium, GlobalStar, Odyssey, Aries, and Ellipso. According to *Telephony* Magazine, Motorola's Iridium system, Loral/Qualcomm's GlobalStar system, and TRW's Odyssey system were the only three potential global PCN systems that received one of the five available licenses. "The FCC deferred the applications of two other companies, Constellation Communications' Aries system and Mobile Communications Holdings' Ellipso system, until January 1996 on financial grounds, giving them the opportunity to improve their financial qualifications."[12]

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[11]AMSC satellite operational information and marketing strategies were provided by AMSC corporate executives and published marketing materials.

[12]***Telephony***, February 6, 1995 (p. 12).

Summaries of each of the proposed systems are as follows:[13]

Iridium: In June 1990, Motorola Corporation's Iridium system was the first to propose a low earth orbit satellite network to interconnect with terrestrial cellular networks around the world. It's architecture consists of 66 LEO satellites (11 satellites in each of six orbital planes). Iridium investors will own and operate Iridium gateway stations within their territories for interconnection to the public switched telephone network. The cost of the system is estimated to be $4 billion, and the following investors have already signed partnership agreements to help foot the bill, with $1.5 billion in funding coming from: Bell Canada, Sprint, Lockheed, Raytheon, Khrunichev Enterprises (one of the largest rocket and aerospace ventures in Russia), DDI (a Japanese communications company), STET (which owns most of Italian telecommunications service providers), Sony, Mitsubishi Corp., the China Great Wall Industry Corp., VEBA AG of Germany, Korea Mobile Telecom, and a group of South American companies.

GlobalStar: The second most prominent potential entrant is the Loral Corp. and Qualcomm GlobalStar system, which proposes a constellation of 48 satellites and which has recently announced partnership arrangements with Alcatel, Dacom Corp. of Korea, Deutsche Aerospace, France Telecom, Hyundai Electronics Industries Co, The

[13] Specifications for the global PCN systems were obtained from the November 1994 issue of VIA SATELLITE Magazine, "Mobile Satellite Services: An Overview of Major GEO, LEO, MEO and HEO Systems," by Roger J. Cochetti.

Vodofone Group of England, Alenia Spazio, Space Systems/Loral and AirTouch Communications (formerly PacTel Corp.).

Odyssey: Third is TRW's Odyssey system which proposes using a Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) constellation of 6 - 12 satellites, and recently announced that Teleglobe Inc., Canada's international communications carrier, would invest in the $2.5 billion system.

Aries: Fourth is Constellation Communications's Aries plan, which announced on November 17, 1994, that it has teamed with Bell Atlantic Corp., E-Systems and Telecomunicacoes Brasilleiras SA to build, launch and operate a global 46-satellite system.

Ellipso: Fifth is the Ellipso system, proposed by Mobile Communications Holdings, Inc., which would operate with 14 to 24 small satellites deployed in three elliptical orbits. Its partnering team consists of Fairchild Space & Defense Corp., Harris Corp, Westinghouse Corp., IBM Corp. InterDigital Corp., and Israeli Aircraft Industries.

AMSC: A sixth LEO entrant, AMSC (which, like Inmarsat, currently operates a mobile satellite system using geosynchronous satellites) deferred disclosing its financial arrangements until 1996, and according to a recent WALL STREET JOURNAL article[14] won't be eligible for an FCC license until it does so. Because the FCC had only five licenses to potentially hand out in January and had five applicants with completed financial information, AMSC's deferral meant

[14] The WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, November 18, 1994, "FCC, Clinton Administration Both Move To Spur Satellite Network Competition," by Mary Lu Carnevale.

that the FCC could avoid auctioning the licenses. AMSC officials said their service could be accommodated later through spectrum-sharing arrangements.

It was reported that all of the applicants for the licenses "had held their breath, concerned that six complete applications would necessitate an auction. That, in turn, could easily have led to other countries deciding to conduct similar auctions, boosting costs and extending for years the rollout of the new services."

International Competition:

A recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce[15] stated: In addition to their financial, regulatory, technical and commercial challenges, the U.S. LEO proposals also face competition from a growing number of international LEO proposals. Consortia in France, Mexico, Russia, and Belgium are all considering separate proposals to launch or develop small satellite technology, but none is considered as far along as U.S. entrants in technical or financial planning. Inmarsat took itself out of the LEO field at its August 1993 Council meeting, ruling out a LEO configuration for Project 21.[16]

[15] ***1994 U.S. Industrial Outlook***, Chapter 29, "Telecommunications Services" prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

[16] According to the November, 1994 issue of VIA SATELLITE Magazine, the Inmarsat Council decided to stop exploring the potential for a LEO system and to pursue an intermediate circular order (ICO).

Inmarsat-P: While not a LEO system, Inmarsat is pursuing its own PCN service. This new service, previously referred to as Inmarsat's "Project 21" and more recently called "Inmarsat-P," will utilize a constellation of 12 S-band satellites (ten operational and 2 spares) in an intermediate circular orbit (ICO) of 10,300 km., costing approximately $2.6 billion. The satellites will relay calls between the user and a Satellite Access Node (SAN) within the satellite's view. SANS will be interconnected using terrestrial facilities to form a network --called the P-Net -- and will be linked through Gateways owned and operated by third parties, to public terrestrial and cellular networks."[17] Inmarsat expects to be in service with its PCN system in 1999 and to be fully operational by 2000.

Inmarsat-P currently has 38 affiliate investors from countries spanning six continents. They are all current Inmarsat signatories or participants and have already provided $1.4 billion to fund the project. It is likely that this head-start will put them in the market before any of the other global PCN contenders. In addition, Inmarsat is able to provide service today using its existing geosynchronous satellites. While existing service is more expensive and requires larger communications terminals than the future PCN systems, there may be a marketing advantage to establishing early business relations with the large organizational users of the international mobile services.

[17] According to a January 23, 1995, Inmarsat press release.

That is why, despite its not pursuing a LEO system, the other global PCNs tend to look at Inmarsat as their most direct competitor and potential blockade to their future success. Consequently, some of them, especially Motorola, initiated legal proceedings within the FCC to keep them out of the competition.

REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT:

The first question raised was, "Can Inmarsat services legally be used in the United States today, given that the FCC considers it an 'international' service?"

The answer to this question is "yes," but currently FCC authority must be given for each use. Although only authorized for use in the United States under special circumstances, current Inmarsat services have proven invaluable to the U.S. Forestry service during major forest fires, and were used extensively by the Red Cross as well as news organization during Hurricane Andrew, the San Francisco and Los Angeles earthquakes, and several devastating floods over the past few years.

Because of the widespread interest in using Inmarsat services in the United States, the FCC issued an Order in February 1992[18], authorizing the "interim use" of Inmarsat in the United States "until such time as the AMSC system becomes operational." The Order states:

[18] FCC Order and Authorization, FCC 92-26, adopted January 21, 1992, and released February 4, 1992, page 3.

> The interim service authorized herein is a domestic service, not an international service, and is an exception to the traditional rcle Inmarsat has played within the U.S. telecommunications policy -- that of providing satellite capacity for communications that are international in character... We wish to emphasize that our decision herein (and in a companion order involving aeronautical service) is also based on the unique need for the development of mobile satellite service within the United States and the specific circumstances surrounding it. While future additional domestic uses of Inmarsat might be found to be in the public interest, Inmarsat should not generally be viewed as an available option for other interim domestic services within the U.S. while the permanent structure for those services is being developed.

At AMSC's request, that Order was modified in the summer of 1993 to require any user of Inmarsat equipment to show how they will transition to the AMSC service within 180 days after that system is operational. While causing some alarm among Inmarsat equipment manufacturers, who know that the equipment is not compatible with the AMSC system, many believe that because of the high-speed data (56/64 kbps) capability of the Inmarsat services, which will not be matched by AMSC, users will continue to be granted the special 214 "Temporary Authority" that they always have. The FCC has not been explicit about how it plans to handle these requests now that AMSC is fully operational, but they have already granted the U.S. military an exception to the requirement to transition off of the Inmarsat system[19].

The second question raised was, "Can COMSAT participate in the future Inmarsat-P services?" (or translated, "Will the U.S. market be open to the future Inmarsat personal communications services?") This question was actively debated throughout 1993 and 1994 and finally reached a conclusion in 1995.

Remarks made by Bruce Crockett, COMSAT President and CEO, on May 20, 1993, before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, outlined COMSAT's and Inmarsat's plans for Inmarsat-P and its global PCN services. These remarks drew very heated comments from a number of other telecommunications executives also testifying at the same hearing, because they felt that COMSAT and Inmarsat have overstepped their authority to provide service outside the international maritime arena. The most vocal of these opponents was Mr. Rene Anselmo, President of PanAmSat, and Mr. Durrell Hillis, Corporate Vice President and General Manager of Motorola, Inc. Satellite Communications Division (COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, May 24, 1994).

[19] The U.S. military, concerned about the FCC ruling requiring a transition off of the Inmarsat system, requested a special FCC ruling to allow them to use the INMARSAT system indefinitely for training and various purposes. On October 12, 1994, the FCC approved an Inmarsat/AMSC transition document submitted by the U.S. government spectrum coordination group known as IRAC, which exempts the U.S. government from the domestic use rules.

Following the hearing, Motorola filed a Petition for a Declaratory Ruling[20], asking the FCC to declare that 1) COMSAT does not possess the statutory authority to participate in the global PCN service proposed as Inmarsat P, primarily because the International Maritime Satellite Act and subsequent FCC rulings allowed only for the provision of non-maritime services that were "ancillary to and supportive of its maritime services."; and 2) "the U.S. public and national interests neither support such participation through an intergovernmental treaty organization, nor justify granting Inmarsat access to the United States market for Inmarsat-P services."[21]

The Motorola Petition stated that "the U.S. Government should insist that if COMSAT and other interested Inmarsat Signatories proceed with global handheld MSS (mobile satellite service), they must compete on a truly level playing field. At a minimum, they must establish a new a separate entity which would: (1) permit private competitors to have equal access to foreign markets; (2) have built-in safeguards against cross-subsidies; (3) shed Inmarsat's governmental privileges and immunities; and (4) compete for scarce spectrum on an

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[20] File No. ISP-94-001, before the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., Petition of Motorola Satellite Communications, Inc. for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Participation by COMSAT Corporation in a New Inmarsat Satellite System Designed to Provide Service to Handheld Communications Devices.

[21] Motorola's Reply Comments in Support of Petition For Declaratory Ruling, dated December 23, 1993, in the matter before the FCC: The Participation of COMSAT Corp. in an Inmarsat Program for a New Satellite System to Provide Personal Land Mobile Communications Services, File No. ISP-94-001, pp.i.

equal footing. The Commission should condition access to the U.S. market by such an entity on compliance with these principles." (pp. 3 & 4).

Perhaps to Motorola's surprise, COMSAT's Bruce Crockett and COMSAT Mobile Communications Division President Ronald Mario set off in late 1993 and throughout 1994 on worldwide speaking tours to convince their Inmarsat partners that they should do just what Motorola suggested. At an Asian conference in December 1994,[22] Mr. Crockett said, "The world is becoming economically interdependent and more competitive. Nations can no longer steer their economic courses within their own borders and shield themselves from international commercial rivalry." Even more controversially, he said "Inmarsat can't shield itself from competition. It can no longer steer a course based on a committee of conflicting captains who must first reach a protracted consensus before issuing a heading. It can no longer afford to be the United Nations of satellites." Acknowledging Motorola's powerful arguments, he said, "The privileges and immunities granted by the Inmarsat Convention and Operating Agreement are to competitors like a red flag in front of a bull... Motorola has attacked Inmarsat for having unfair advantages with customs authorities, tax-exempt status and immunities from liability. COMSAT has expended considerable time and effort explaining itself to the government when we'd rather be out competing in the marketplace."

[22] In a speech by Bruce Crockett before the Mobile Satellite Communications in Asia Conference, December 6, 1993, Hong Kong.

The COMSAT lobbying campaign, half aimed at other Inmarsat signatories and half at the U.S. government, apparently worked. The signatories with majority ownership in the Inmarsat system recently agreed to proceed with the Project 21 handheld system falling under the purview of a separate Inmarsat affiliate that will own and operate the satellites and provide service to consumers. According to VIA SATELLITE Magazine[23], the affiliate, "which is expected to be owned partly by Inmarsat signatories and partly by Inmarsat itself, may well be opened to outside investors in the future." Regarding the U.S. government's response, The WALL STREET JOURNAL reported in November 1994 that the Clinton Administration had signaled that it was willing to allow the Inmarsat mobile-phone service, but for it "to be kept fully separate from the consortium's existing maritime-phone service."

The most recent confirmation of the U.S. government's acceptance of the Inmarsat-P system and its willingness to allow it to operate within the United States comes from a "Statement by the Representative of the Party of the United States of America"[24] released in January 1995 following the December 1994 Inmarsat Assembly of Parties' bi-annual meeting. In that statement, the government said, "The United States welcomes the competition that will be offered by Inmarsat-P services and will work to assure that these services can be provided under fair and open competitive conditions to persons in

[23] *Via Satellite* Magazine, November 1994, (p. 38). Phillips Publishing.

[24] COMSAT public document: Assembly/10/Report, Sec:S10RA.

the U.S." The statement went on to say, however, that "our support for the affiliate is contingent upon maximum separation between Inmarsat and the affiliate." and "there should be no cross-subsidization between Inmarsat and the Inmarsat-P Affiliate."

Attendees at the Assembly of Parties' meeting noted that while the larger signatories rejoiced at the outcome, smaller countries (most notably Cameroon and Columbia, which filed statements of dissent) were very disturbed by the current state of affairs and will mourn the loss of what Mr. Crockett calls the "United Nations of Satellites."

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES:

Based on the events of the past five years, there is little doubt that the mobile satellite communications industry will continue to grow at a significant pace over the next few years and that the new Inmarsat PCN affiliate company will play an important role. By the beginning of the next decade, as new PCN satellite systems are launched, the industry will grow exponentially. There are, however, a number of factors that must be taken into account before one should blindly accept COMSAT'S market prediction that industry revenues will run as high as $10 billion annually within ten years.[25]

First, is the general question of adoption of the new technology. Research should be undertaken from both a social science and marketing

[25]Ron Mario quote in COMSAT press release, dated January 23, 1995.

perspective to explore this question. In the social science arena, researchers could use such theoretical models as Diffusion of Innovation (Rogers, 1983), which predicts that media use is influenced by five factors: its relative advantage (how superior it is perceived to be over the practice it replaces); its compatibility with prior experiences, beliefs, and values; its complexity; its triability; and its observability. The Social Information Processing model put forth by Fulk, Steinfield, Schmitz, and Power (1987) might also be an interesting research perspective on this technology. It posits that media use is an outcome of objectively rational choices, but also partially determined by information embedded in the social context and by one's own behavior.

From a marketing perspective, researchers might explore some of the more current marketing theories concerning high technology products (Gatignon and Robertson, 1989; Glazer, 1991; and Weiss and Heide (1993) and how the rate of technological change affects buyers' decision-making processes. An interesting perspective might be to apply Weiss and Heide's hypothesis that when there is a high level of technological heterogeneity (characterized by multiple technological options, rapidly changing product features and standards, and uncertainty about when and which dominant design will eventually emerge), buyers will increase their search efforts and the overall duration of their search process, delaying a decision on the adoption of a particular technology until a dominant design emerges (p. 222).

If this hypothesis should hold true for the global PCN market, a number of proposed entrants may not have the financial stamina to see their projects to completion.

Even assuming that the technology is widely adopted and the demand for services will be as great as the future PCN providers hope, there are economic questions for researchers to explore. There is a basic tenant of economic theory that says, "In competitive industries, entry by new firms takes place until excess profits are reduced to zero, and only sufficient profits are earned to return the market price of capital and other inputs." (Omen & Wildman, 1992)[26] Applying that theory to this industry suggests that, while there are very high profit margins[27] today for existing Inmarsat services (because users have few options), these margins could begin to disappear as new service providers enter the market and price competition intensifies.

Additionally, the theory of monopolistic competition suggests that a method for maximizing profits is to differentiate products. However, it may be difficult to differentiate the global PCN services in the future, since cellular operators may be looking for a simple "pipe" to carry their traffic. If differentiation is not possible, the services will likely become commodities sold on price and availability alone.

Another economic consideration to be explored is the fact that the building and launching of satellites is a very expensive and risky

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[26]Bruce Owen and Steven Wildman, *Media Economics*. Sage Publications, Newbury Park (1992), p. 15.

[27]Reported by the FCC in 1993 to be in excess of 35 percent.

activity. Motorola has said that its system will cost in excess of $4 billion. Inmarsat's will cost in excess of $2.6 billion. There is a strong motivation on the part of the cellular companies to find or develop other less expensive options for obtaining the same type of service. One cannot help looking back at the mid-1980s and the clamor for the domestic mobile satellite licenses that ultimately forced the FCC to merge them into one license and form AMSC. That organization, as it began construction on its satellite, looked forward to serving the vast rural areas that did not have any cellular coverage. Today, with advances in cellular technology, those areas are already being widely served by seamless terrestrial networks and are becoming more so every day. Consequently, AMSC has had to create new strategies to fill its satellite, such as lowering prices and selling at wholesale to resellers, as well as moving beyond the domestic land mobile markets to selling to ships at sea in international waters, and that strategy will certainly have repercussions for COMSAT and Inmarsat in the future.

An economic evaluation of the industry should be undertaken to study these factors and their potential impact on industry profits. If all of the organizations that say they will be providing service in the future actually become operational, profit margins may shrink to a point that many organizations may no longer find it profitable to enter the mobile satellite communications market. The jury is out on how many systems the market will be able to support. For those that get in early, there appears to be a huge demand and significant profits to be made. But those who arrive late may wish they had not come at all.

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Does Television Cultivate the Image of America in Japan?

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Abstract

This article addressed the issue of whether television in Japan had negative impacts on the perceptions of U.S. society. When respondents were asked whether they saw Japan as advantaged over the U.S. in the five aspects, heavier viewers did not always show more nationalistic views. Although heavier TV viewing was modestly associated with nationalistic views in some subgroups (e.g., the highly educated), heavier TV news viewing showed a negative correlation in the young respondents, suggesting a possibility that TV news viewing may cultivate a positive perception of the U.S. Results also indicated that compared to other factors such as age, education and interpersonal communication channel, the predictive powers of television exposure measures were weak. The study also provided some evidence of mainstreaming, implying that heavy consumption of television news might contribute to a homogenized view of U.S. society in Japan.

Does Television Cultivate the Image of America in Japan?

This paper explores the relationship between television viewing and perceptions of American society in Japan. Specifically, the paper is concerned with whether Japanese television contributes to the formation of unfavorable perceptions or images of the U.S. The underlying motivation of this study derives from the following.

Mass media both in the U.S. and Japan often report that there is a growing feeling of dislike or distaste toward America in Japan, and that a new form of anti-Americanism is especially strong among the young generation (e.g., Honma & Eto, 1991; Rapoport, 1991, Weisman, 1991). There have been ups and downs in the perception of America in Japan, but it is said that we now face the deepest split between the two countries since World War II. Suzuki (1992), however, called such a situation "a pseudo-crisis," which is created and amplified by the mass media. Although there really exist some tensions and conflicts between Japan and the U.S. over the issues of trade imbalance and the U.S-Japan security treaty, some prominent journalists claim that the mass media put too much emphasis on the negative aspects of the U.S.-Japan relations, thereby contributing to the creation of negative images of America people and society among the Japanese audience (e.g., Ando, 1991; Suzuki, 1992).

Since many of Japanese still have limited direct contact with America and Americans, most beliefs and conceptions many Japanese hold in common about America can be considered to be formed by exposure to portrayals in newspapers, magazines, and, above all, television.

An important question arises: Does the Japanese media, particularly television, really contribute to the formation and maintenace of negative or unfavorable images of American people and society? This article is based upon a larger study addressed this issue. Because of limited space, this report can deal with only one set of questions about images of the U.S. among many items assessing a variety of aspects. The relationship between television exposure and other aspects of perceptions of America and Americans has been partially reported elsewhere (Saito, 1994, 1995a).

Literature review

Research concerning television's contribution to our perceptions of social reality has often been guided by cultivation theory for more than two decades (e.g., Gerbner, 1973; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980, 1986, 1994; Hawkins & Pingree, 1980, 1981; Matabane, 1988; Morgan & Shanahan, 1991, 1992; Potter, 1986). Cultivation theory postulates that the more time people spend watching television, the more likely it is that their conceptions of social reality will reflect what is seen on television. Furthermore, the theory contends that heavy consumption of television contributes to a homogenized view of the real world.

Several researchers have questioned or challenged Gerbner et al.'s conceptual assumptions, methodologies, and findings. While an extensive review of such criticisms is beyond the scope of this article, the following is a brief review of literature which is most relevant to the present study. For a more extensive review of this research area, see Hawkins and Pingree (1982), Ogles (1987), Potter (1993) and Saito (1995b).

While many studies concerning cultivation theory focus on TV violence, the theory has also been applied to a wide variety of topics including images of America (Weimann, 1984; Tan, Li, & Simpson, 1986; Tan & Suarchavarat, 1988; Tamborini and Choi, 1990).

Weimann (1984) reported that heavy television viewers in Israel demonstrated a strong and consistent tendency to paint a rosier picture of life in the U.S., while other researchers have found that negative images of the U.S. were also cultivated by made-in-the U.S.A. programs. Tan, Li, and Simpson (1986), for example, asserted that some American programs in Taiwan and Mexico might cultivate unfavorable images of Americans. According to them, the influence of American television programs "can either be positive or negative, depending on which programs are watched, and the symbols present in these programs" (p. 810), because conflicting images of Americans are presented in different programs. Tan and Suarchavarat (1988) reported similar findings for their Thai student sample. They mentioned that American television was a major source of social stereotypes about Americans, and that their images were mixed and included both positive and negative traits.

Tamborini and Choi (1990) reported complex results. They studied the impact of American Armed Forces Television Network (AFKN-TV) to Korean college students in terms of various perceptions about crime, drug abuse, sexual permissiveness, and affluence in the U.S. Their findings show "while AFKN-TV crime/adventure show viewing was a relatively good predictor for 'mean world' perceptions of U.S. society, several other AFKN-TV viewing measures (i.e., total viewing, information program viewing, entertainment program viewing) showed no association with perceptions of crime in the United States" (Tamborini and Choi, 1990, p. 167).

The existing cultivation studies that focus on images of American culture and people deal with the impact of U.S. programs on a non-American audience, because television programs in the investigated countries consist largely of programs imported from the U.S. For example, Weimann (1984) reported that in Israel more than 60 % of broadcasting time was allocated to imported (mostly American) programs. Throughout its forty-year history, however, Japanese TV's reliance on imported programs has been low. This has been especially the case since the 1970's: imported programs consist of only 5 % of total broadcasting time (Kawatake, 1988, 1994). As will be discussed later, domestic programs in Japan often depict America and Americans. Thus not only U.S. programs but also other type of programs on Japanese TV may have some impact on the formation of American images.

Depictions of America on Japanese Television

The mass media in Japan often report in great detail about foreign countries and people. However, the media coverage of foreign countries is disproportionately slanted toward the United States. For example, Hagiwara, Midooka and Nakamura's (1987) content analysis of TV programs about foreign countries and people indicated that Japanese TV portrays the United States much more frequently than other countries. Similarly, Akiyama and Amano (1988) pointed out that major Japanese newspapers report more news about the United States than about other countries. They also stated that the same tendency of heavy American-biased media coverage may be found in other media such as movies, magazines, or literature. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that "foreign country" in the Japanese mass media usually means "America."

American portrayals on Japanese TV consist of two broad categories: the imported programming such as American drama and movies, and the domestic programming such as news, documentaries and commercials. To examine how foreign countries and people are portrayed on television, Hagiwara et al. (1987) did content analysis of TV programs broadcast during the first week of June in 1985 which contained any kind of foreign elements. The genres analyzed in their study were documentaries, quiz shows, dramas and TV movies. Of 66 programs analyzed, 37 were fictions and 29 nonfictions. While all of the fictions were made outside of Japan and 32 of them were dramas or movies imported from the U.S., all of 29 nonfictions were produced in Japan.

Imported programs

Dramas and movies imported from the United States were popular in the 1960s in Japan. According to Kawatake (1994), over 50 American-produced programs were broadcast every week during 1961 to 1964, and those dramas were mainly shown in prime time. The popularity of the American programs, however, declined during the 1970s. Since then, Japanese TV's reliance on imported programs has been very low. In 1971, imported programs consisted of only 5 % of total broadcasting time, and the situation has been almost the same in the 1980s and 1990s (Kawatake, 1994). In recent years, only few American dramas and movies have been shown on Japanese television. Programs that are shot in foreign countries by Japanese producers, featuring Japanese actors and reporters, are more popular.

Kawatake (1988) speculated that because they have been relatively unpopular in recent years, TV dramas and movies imported from the U.S. might not contribute much to the formation of American images among Japanese viewers. He stated that rather than American-produced programs, it is TV news, documentaries, and commercials made in Japan that might take over the role of introducing America and Americans to the Japanese. However, we should not underestimate the possibility that some U.S. dramas or movies may have a strong impact on the perceptions of American society among the Japanese audience, because messages from some U.S. programs could be most salient.

While their broadcasting time is not substantial on Japanese television, most of the imported programs consist of American drama and movies. According to Kawatake and Hara (1994), 72.8% of the total imported programs aired during June 1993 and December 1993 were U.S. produced, followed by British produced programs (9.3%) and French produced programs (4.1%). Eighty eight percent of those American programs were dramas or movies, and about 60% of the American drama and movies were action/adventure or thrillers. Among all of the imported programs, 18 of the top 20 in audience rating were Hollywood-produced blockbuster movies, such as *Terminator 2, Commando, Back to the Future 3,* and *ET.*

According to Hagiwara et al. (1987), the American dramas televised in June, 1985 were mostly action/adventure and crime dramas like "Starsky and Hutch," "Hart to Hart" or "Kojak." Most of them were reruns that had been aired in the past, and received low audience ratings. They pointed out that these shows were quite similar in substance and stereotypical in that (1) the stories occurred in big cities; (2) major characters were whites; (3) upper-class family were central in the stories; and (4) women did not play important social roles.

News

In news programs about foreign countries, Japanese TV frequently deals with the United States. For example, Kawatake's study (1988) revealed that nearly half of all TV news in Japan included some reference to foreign countries, and 45 percent of all foreign news was related to the United States. A more recent study conducted by NHK and the Mansfield Center for Pacific

Affairs (Kohno, Hara, & Saito, 1994) showed that about 33 percent of all international news in Japan dealt with the U.S. or U.S.-Japan relations. This figure is slightly lower than that of Kawatake's, but still relatively high. It thus can be argued that TV news is a very important element in forming images of America among the Japanese audience.

The study by NHK and the Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs content-analyzed TV news programs both in Japan and the U.S. that were broadcast during the middle of September 1992 to the end of May 1993 (except January, 1993). The TV news analyzed in their study were the major network news programs in prime time. The study showed that TV news in Japan covered a wide variety of aspects of the U.S. For example, among the news including some depictions of the U.S. or U.S.-Japan relations, 45.4% reported societal issues and events (e.g., violence and crime); 34.3 % cultural aspects (e.g., education); 31.3 % international issues (e.g., U.S.-Japan relationship); 30.2% people's lives; 29.3 % activities involving government, politicians and political parties; 27.6% social issues (e.g., public health); 20.1 % economics and business.

The study revealed that TV news in Japan tended to report negative aspects of the U.S. For example, although much of the TV news did not convey either positive or negative images, about 13 % of the news items analyzed in the study showed some negative pictures of the U.S. (only 4.3% conveyed positive pictures) (Kohno, Hara, & Saito, 1994).

Using a thirteen pair of bipolar adjectives, the study also examined whether TV news in Japan portrayed the U.S. (or Americans) as: (1) fair/unfair; (2) trustworthy/untrustworthy; (3) responsible/irresponsible; (4) diligent/lazy; (5) corrupt/honest; (6) friendly/hostile; (7) open /closed (or accepting/insular); (8) demanding/reasonable; (9) racist/non-racist (or discriminatory/non-discriminatory); (10) violent/peaceful; (11) cohesive/individualistic; (12) advancing/declining; (13) arrogant/not arrogant. Although many of the news items did not portray the U.S. images of these adjectives, the study revealed that Japanese TV news tended to depict the U.S. negatively rather than positively. In particular, negative images such as violent, hostile, corrupt, declining, or demanding were portrayed in some of the Japanese TV news.

Research Questions

This study is guided by the following research questions.

(1) *Does television in Japan have negative impacts on perceptions of American society?* This is the most fundamental question in the present study. As mentioned earlier, some social critics argue that mass media in Japan may have negative effects on the Japanese audience's perceptions of the U.S. because it emphasizes unfavorable aspects of U.S.-Japan relations or U.S. society. This study attempts to shed some light on this question.

(2) *What element(s) of television has (have) the most measurable impact on the perceptions of America?* This is a subquestion of the first one. It addresses the issue of whether it is total television viewing time or the viewing of some specific genres that has a greater influence on the perceptions of American society.

(3) *Compared to other relevant factors, how important a role does television viewing play in forming the perceptions of America?*
It is highly likely that not only mass media depictions but also some other factors such as direct experience and information from others (friends and family members) may have some impact on the formation of images and

beliefs of the United States. A question is, "what is the relative importance of TV viewing on the formation of the perceptions?"

Method

The sample of this study was drawn from Sendai, the largest city in the northeastern region of Japan. Five hundred people of 20 years old or over who lived in Sendai city were selected using a stratified sampling method. Questionnaires were administered in person by trained interviewers from April 17 to April 30, 1993[1]. The final sample comprised 403 completed interviews; the response rate was 80.6 %.

The sample included 48.1% males (coded 1) and 51.9% females (coded 0). Respondents ranged in age from 20 to 82 (M=48.0, SD=16.8): 36.5% were 20-39 years old, 31.75% were 40-59 years, 31.75% were 60 year old or over[2]. As to the level of formal education, 11.0% were junior high school graduates, 45.1% were senior high school graduates, 25.4% were junior college (or the equivalent) graduates, 17.5% were college students or graduates, and 1.0% had attended graduate school.

The questionnaire was lengthy and contained items assessing a variety of opinions and beliefs about America, and about media habits. This paper analyzes the following items:

Direct experience of visiting the United States

Respondents were asked if they had visited the United States (coded 1 for yes; 0 for no) and how long they had stayed there (if yes). Only 13.4 % of the sample have some experience of visiting the United States (except Hawaii). 44.4% of those with some experience had stayed in the U.S. for less than one week. There were only six respondents who had stayed in the U.S. for more than three months. Most of the sample thus do not have substantial direct experience in the U.S. On the other hand, 90.1% of the respondents said the U.S. is the most important foreign country to Japan.

Information from others (interpersonal communication channel)

Respondents were asked if, among their close friends or family members, there were persons who had visited the U.S. If yes, they were also asked how often they talked with them about the U.S. For subsequent analyses, the respondents were divided into two groups (dummy coded): (1) those who talked about the U.S. with others who had U.S. visiting experience (coded 1); (2) those who did not have close friends or family members with U.S. visiting experience *or* those who did not talk about the U.S. with others who had U.S. visiting experience (coded 0).

TV Exposure Measures

The amount of total television viewing was measured by two questions asking respondents to indicate: (a) how many hours of television they usually watch on weekdays, and (b) how many hours of television they usually watch on the weekend. An index of viewing level (total TV viewing) was constructed by averaging the weekday and weekend viewing hours ($\underline{M}$=3.2, SD=1.6 per day). The amount of TV news viewing was measured by the question of how much time they usually spend watching TV news ($\underline{M}$=1.2, SD=0.8 per day). Respondents were also asked to indicate how often they watch U.S. programs (dramas or movies) on TV on a 6-point scale ranging from "almost never" to "more than 4 times a week." Thirty five percent said they don't watch U.S. programs, 32% just once a month, 12% 2 to

3 times a month, 13% once a week and only 8% are those who watch them more than 2 or 3 times a week.

Total TV viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are the three most important predictor variables in this study[3]. For some analyses, respondents were divided into groups by an approximate three-way split. The categories were as follows: (1) for the total TV viewing measure, light viewers (less than 17 hours per week), medium viewers (17 to 26 hours per week), and heavy viewers (27 hours or more per week); (2) for the TV news viewing measure, light viewers (30 minutes or less per day), medium viewers (one hour per day), and heavy viewers (one hour and a half or more per day); (3) for the U.S. program viewing measure, non viewers (almost never), light viewers (once a month), and frequent viewers (2 to 3 times or more per month). Continuous data are also used in other analyses such as partial correlation or regression analyses.

Measures on perceptions of the U.S.

Because of the limited space, this article focuses on only one set of questions. Respondents were asked how they compare today's Japan and the United States in various aspects on a five-point scale: (a) educational standard; (b) technological standard; (c) national economic strength; (d) standard of living; (e) level of democracy. The scale was: 5=Japan is superior to the U.S.; 4=Japan is somewhat superior to the U.S.; 3=about the same; 2=The U.S. is somewhat superior to Japan; 1=The U.S. is superior to Japan. This set of questions was dependent variables in this paper. These items were analyzed both separately and as an index form.

In order to confirm that these five items consist of a single dimension, a factor analysis was performed. Only one factor accounted for a substantial amount of the common variance (44.2%). The factor loadings of all of the five items on the first factor were .55 or larger. Therefore these five items were combined into a single scale. A reliability coefficient (α=.68) was moderate but acceptable. The index scores range from 5 to 25 (M=15.7, SD=3.9). The higher scores correspond to more nationalistic view (i.e., Japan is superior to the U.S.).

Results

As the first stage of analyses, cross-tabular analysis was conducted for each question, respectively. This analytical method is the most simple yet important feature of Gerbner et al.'s cultivation analysis. Contingency tables compare responses of light, medium, and heavy viewers in various control conditions, which provides baseline information.

Tables 1 to 5 show the results of the cross-tabular analysis. These tables show the percentages of respondents who said that "Japan is *superior to* or *somewhat superior to* the United States" in those five aspects. The tables also provide the Cultivation Differential (CD), which is defined as the difference between heavy and light viewers. Statistical significance was measured by chi-square test. The strength of association between TV exposure and the perceptions was measured by gammas.

Table 1 shows the results for the item of educational standard. Among those 40 to 59 years old, heavier viewers (both total TV and TV news) hold a more nationalistic view. For example, while 75% of heavy TV news viewers in this age group said that Japan was superior or somewhat superior to the U.S. in educational standard, the corresponding figure among light TV news viewers was 40% (CD=+35, $p<.01$; gamma=.34). Dividing the respondents by the level of total TV viewing, a similar tendency appeared: 67% for heavy total TV viewers vs. 44% for light total TV viewers (CD=+23, $p<.05$;

gamma=.23). Although it was not statistically significant, the reverse tendency was observed when U.S. program viewing was used as the predictor. While 52% of frequent U.S. program viewers said Japan was (somewhat) superior to the U.S. in educational standard, 70% of non-U.S. program viewers said so (CD=-18; gamma=-.29).

Insert Table 1 about here

As Table 2 reveals, the level of TV news viewing appears to be an important predictor variable for the item of technological standard. The table shows that heavier TV news viewers were *less* likely than lighter viewers to regard Japan as advantaged over the U.S. in technological standard. The percentages of those who said, "Japan is superior to the U.S." were 25% in heavy TV news viewers and 41% in light TV news viewers (CD=-16, $p<.01$; gamma=-.23). Most of the subgroups showed the same tendency.

Insert Table 2 about here

As shown in Table 3, heavy total TV viewers tended to have slightly more nationalistic views about national economic strength than light viewers. Some subgroups showed significant associations. For example, 71% of heavy TV viewers among male respondents chose "Japan is superior to or somewhat superior to the U.S.," but the corresponding figure in light TV viewers was 46% (CD=+25, $p<.05$; gamma=.30). Similarly, in the middle age group (40 to 59 years old), while 70% of heavy TV viewers thought Japan was ahead of the U.S. in economic strength, only 46% of light viewers hold such a view (CD=+24, $p<.10$; gamma=.34).

Insert Table 3 about here

Table 4 reveals that there was only weak association between the TV exposure measures and the perception about standard of living. In most of the subgroups, the association (measured by chi-square test) was not significant. But there was one clear example of TV's impact. In the highly educated, heavier total TV viewers were more likely to see Japan as superior to the U.S. in standard of living (CD=+31, $p<.01$; gamma=.31).

Insert Table 4 about here

Table 5 provides the results for the item of level of democracy. This table shows that there is a weak tendency for heavier TV news viewers to be more likely to regard the U.S. as more superior to Japan in level of democracy. For example, female respondents showed a significant negative association (CD=-11, $p<.05$; gamma=-.27).

Insert Table 5 about here

Overall, all of the TV exposure measures (total TV viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing) showed only weak associations with the perceptions of the U.S. as compared with Japan. The CDs and gammas were relatively small with a few exceptions. However, there were a few points that should be noted. For example, as a general tendency, heavy total TV viewers among the highly educated group were more likely than light total TV viewers to think that Japan was superior to the U.S. A similar tendency was observed among the middle-aged group (40 to 59 years old).

Although it provides baseline information, cross-tabular analysis does not fully guard against spuriousness. Thus this study further employed multiple regression and within subgroup partial correlation analyses.

To examine the relative predictive powers of television exposure measures, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. In addition to the level of TV viewing, predictor variables include age, sex, level of education, direct experience, and frequency of talking about the United States with friends or family members who have visited the U.S. Sex (male=1, female=0), direct experience of visiting the U.S. (yes=1, no=0), and talks about the United States with friends or family members who have visited the U.S. (yes=1, no=0) were dummy coded. Demographic variables (sex, age, and education) were entered on the first step to control for any variance on cultivation effects. Information from direct experience and talks with others was entered on the second step. Because this study predicts the impact of television viewing, TV exposure measures were entered on the third step.

Table 6 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. On the first step, sex, education and age were all significant positive predictors. On the second step, these three demographic variables remained significant and talk with others also became a significant predictor. In the final analysis, significant predictors were: age ($b=-.16$, $p<.01$), sex ($b=.12$, $p<.05$), talk with others ($b=-.14$, $p<.05$). Education was margianlly significant ($b=-.10$, $p<.08$). None of the three TV exposure measures were significant. The final equation accounted for only 6.1 % of the variance.

Insert Table 6 about here

The multiple regression analysis revealed that the younger respondents, the male respondents, the less educated, and those not talking with others about the U.S. tended to hold slightly more nationalistic views of the U.S. None of the three TV exposure measures explained much of the variance. Other factors such as age, sex and talks with others were more important predictors than TV exposure measures for the perceptions of U.S. society as measured in this paper.

However, we should not ignore a possibility of subgroup variations. There may be significant, meaningful, and nonspurious associations within specific subgroups. In other words, the relationship between TV exposure and the perception might be stronger in some subgroups. To examine this possibility, within subgroups partial correlations were computed between the TV exposure measures and the index scores.

Table 7 summarizes the results of the partial correlation analysis. The results revealed that there were some variations in terms of the size of partial correlations, depending upon subgroups. For example, while the overall partial correlation between total TV viewing and the index scores was not significant, the association in the highly educated reached statistical significance (4th-order partial $r=.20$, $p<.001$). Similarly, the partial correlation was marginally significant ($r=.13$, $p<.10$) among the middle-aged group. Therefore in these subgroups heavier total TV viewing was associated with nationalistic views of the U.S. On the other hand, when TV news viewing was used as the independent variable, the young respondents showed a small but negative correlation (4th-order partial $r=-.12$, $p <.10$). Thus TV news viewing was weakly correlated with the view of seeing the U.S. as advantaged over Japan.

Insert Table 7 about here

A close look at subgroup variations shown by the cross-tabular analysis also revealed an intriguing pattern among different age subgroups. Except for one item (level of democracy), the "mainstreaming" was observed in four items with TV news viewing. Mainstreaming means that heavy consumption of television contributes to a homogenized view of the real world. Morgan (1990) explained its underlying reasoning as "people who spend great amounts of time watching television are likely to be exposed to a more centralized, consistent, standardized ideology and world view; hence, they should be more like each other than they are like the members of their groups who watch less" (p. 244).

For example, while 62% of young light TV news viewers said Japan was superior to the U.S. on the question about national economic strength, the corresponding figure was 36% in older (those 60 years old and over) light TV news viewers. Thus there was a 26-point difference between these two age groups. But the difference was greatly lessened among heavy TV news viewers (only 9 points). Similarly, a 26-point difference between younger and older light TV news viewers on the question about standard of living was 11 points among heavy TV news viewers.

Discussion

Before discussing the implications of the findings, it should be noted that although the content analysis studies reviewed in this article reveal some aspects of the depictions of the U.S. on Japanese television, data on the details of the content of American images on Japanese television is limited and thus the direction of cultivation of the perceptions of the U.S. is ambiguous. As Morgan (1990) stated, it is difficult to conduct meaningful cultivation analysis without reliable and comprehensive content analysis data. But at the same time, we should keep in mind that "message system analysis is an extremely expensive and time-consuming undertaking; ...the absence of message data should not prevent cultivation researchers from taking advantage of special data collection opportunities" (Morgan, 1990, p. 243). Morgan also pointed out that, for certain types of research questions, especially those related to mainstreaming, "message data (while always desirable) are less essential" (p. 243).

The results of this study indicate that, as opposed to the contention by some Japanese social critics, television in Japan may not necessarily cultivate negative perceptions of American society as measured in this article. When respondents were asked whether they saw Japan as advantaged over the U.S. in the five aspects, heavier viewers did not always show more nationalistic views. The cross-tabular analysis showed that when respondents were asked to compare the two countries' educational standard and economic strength, heavy viewers in some subgroups were more likely to say that Japan was superior to the U.S. But in regard to technological standard and level of democracy, heavier TV news viewers in some subgroups were *less* likely to show nationalistic views.

When analyzing the items as the index form, heavier TV viewing was moderately associated with nationalistic views in some subgroups such as the highly educated. One the other hand, heavier TV news viewing showed a negative correlation with the index scores in the young respondents. Thus the results suggest a possibility that whereas heavy total TV viewing may lead some of the audience to more nationalistic views of the U.S., TV news viewing may cultivate a positive perception of the U.S. among some subgroups (e.g., the younger generation), although more work is required to confirm this.

In this study, total TV viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing were used as the separate independent variables to examine what element(s) of television have the most measurable influence on perceptions of the U.S. The results indicate that the measures of TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing could be better indicators than the total television viewing measure. This finding provides evidence supporting the argument suggested by some cultivation researchers that not only the amount of total TV viewing but also the amount of a specific genre viewing may be a good predictor variable (e.g., Hawkins & Pingree, 1981; Potter, 1993).

The results also showed that compared with other relevant factors such as demographic variables and interpersonal communication, the television exposure measures were not better predictors of the dependent variables. Regardless of the direction of television's influence, none of the three TV viewing measures in this study had strong predictive powers. It should be also noted that in the regression analysis, the variables used in this study explained only a small amount of variance. Future research is needed to explore other possible factors that contribute to the formation of images of the U.S.

While the results of this study did not present clear-cut evidence showing television's negative influence on the perceptions of American society, they imply that television might exert a homogenizing influence on some aspects of American images in Japan. Some between-group comparison revealed instances of mainstreaming, although the evidence was relatively moderate.

The results in this study showing only weak associations between the TV exposure measures and the perceptions can be interpreted in two ways: TV exposure might have little influence on the perceptions of the U.S., or the plurality of the images of the U.S. on Japanese TV blurs the influence. To pursue this issue, we need comprehensive content analyses to say unequivocally what the media are presenting. At any rate, although the sizes of the effect found in this study were modest, "we should not dismiss what appear to be small effects, because small effects may have profound consequences" (Morgan & Signorielli, 1990, p. 20).

Finally, the study reported here is characterized as a exploratory one, therefore further studies are needed to examine the relationship between TV exposure and the perceptions of the U.S. in Japan.

Notes

1. The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the Hoso Bunka Foundation in Japan. The survey was conducted by Survey Research Inc., Japan.
2. The elderly were slightly over-sampled and the younger people were slightly underrepresented in this sample. This was presumably because the elderly were more likely to spend much of their time at home. Although this effect would be unfortunate if one were interested in estimating population values for the measures that were taken, it was less relevant in this study, where we were interested in the relationship between television viewing and perceptions of America.
3. Intercorrelations among these three were: (a) r=.386, p<.001 for total TV viewing and TV news viewing; (b) r=.217, p<.001 for TV news viewing and U.S. drama/movie viewing; (c) r=.183, p<.001 for total TV viewing and U.S. drama/movie viewing. Although these three variables are positively correlated, the correlations of these sizes do not guarantee that these three exposure measures are interchangeable. Thus these three exposure measures could be different independent variables.

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Table 1. Percent of respondents who say "Japan is 'superior to' or 'somewhat superior to' the U.S. in educational standard" by amount of total TV viewing, TV news viewing, and U.S. program viewing

		Total TV				*TV News*				*U.S. programs*			
	Total % (N)	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Never %	Frequent %	CD	Gamma
OVERALL:	63 (403)	59	65	+6	.03	62	66	+4	.01	67	62	-5	-.11
Controlling for:													
SEX:													
Male	68 (194)	61	71	+10	.13	65	72	+7	.04	70	67	-3	-.10
Female	58 (209)	56	61	+5	.01	60	62	+2	.01	64	58	-6	-.12
AGE:													
20 -- 39	70 (147)	68	70	+2	-.02	78	65	- 13	-.23	70	67	-3	-.08
40 -- 59	57 (128)	44	67	+23*	.23	40	75	+35**	.34	70	52	-18	-.29
60 or over	60 (128)	64	59	-5	-.06	55	57	+2	-.01	63	68	+5	-.02
EDUCATION:													
Low	60 (225)	58	60	+2	-.01	54	64	+10	.09	65	66	+1	-.08
High	65 (176)	60	75	+15*	.13	73	69	-4	-.09	71	57	-14	-.21

Note: Total television viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are divided into light, medium, and heavy viewing based on even 3-way split. For purposes of space, medium viewers are omitted from this table.

CD=Cultivation Differential; Percent of Heavy Viewers (or Frequent Viewers) giving response minus Percent of Light (or Non) Viewers giving response
# $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (significance for X^2 test).

Table 2. Percent of respondents who say "Japan is 'superior to' or 'somewhat superior to' the U.S. in technological standard" by amount of total TV viewing, TV news viewing, and U.S. program viewing

		Total TV				*TV News*				*U.S. programs*			
	Total % (N)	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Never %	Frequent %	CD	Gamma
OVERALL:	33 (403)	34	36	+2	-.02	41	25	-16**	-.23	31	38	+7	.03
Controlling for:													
SEX:													
Male	37 (194)	39	43	+4	-.03	45	25	-20*	-.28	31	39	+8	.03
Female	30 (209)	29	32	+3	.00	37	25	-12	-.20	31	37	+6	.02
AGE:													
20 -- 39	39 (147)	44	38	-4	-.11	53	23	-30**	-.30	43	33	-10	-.13
40 -- 59	27 (128)	27	27	0	-.02	30	19	-11*	-.30	18	40	+22	.22
60 or over	33 (128)	27	39	+12	.05	27	33	+6	-.05	32	45	+13	-.01
EDUCATION:													
Low	32 (225)	35	31	-4	-.09	38	24	-14#	-.23	29	38	+9	-.05
High	35 (176)	33	47	+14	.11	43	26	-17#	-.22	35	37	+2	.08

Note: Total television viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are divided into light, medium, and heavy viewing based on even 3-way split. For purposes of space, medium viewers are omitted from this table.

CD=Cultivation Differential; Percent of Heavy Viewers (or Frequent Viewers) giving response minus Percent of Light (or Non) Viewers giving response

# $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (significance for X^2 test).

Table 3. Percent of respondents who say "Japan is 'superior to' or 'somewhat superior to' the U.S. in national economic strength" by amount of total TV viewing, TV news viewing, and U.S. program viewing

		Total TV				*TV News*				*U.S. programs*			
	Total % (N)	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Never %	Frequent %	CD	Gamma
OVERALL:	57 (403)	49	61	+12	.14	54	58	+4	.05	52	58	+6	.06
Controlling for:													
SEX:													
Male	58 (194)	46	71	+25*	.30	53	62	+9	.13	48	62	+14	.17
Female	56 (209)	53	56	+3	.02	54	56	+2	-.02	55	54	-1	-.04
AGE:													
20 -- 39	60 (147)	58	60	+2	.02	62	58	-7	-.10	58	57	-1	-.04
40 -- 59	59 (128)	46	70	+24#	.34	57	63	+5	.12	55	60	+5	.06
60 or over	51 (128)	36	57	+21	.17	36	54	+18	.16	46	55	+9	.10
EDUCATION:													
Low	56 (225)	49	59	+10	.10	52	59	+7	.08	53	59	+6	.07
High	57 (176)	48	67	+19#	.21	55	57	+2	.01	50	56	+6	.03

Note: Total television viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are divided into light, medium, and heavy viewing based on even 3-way split. For purposes of space, medium viewers are omitted from this table.

CD=Cultivation Differential; Percent of Heavy Viewers (or Frequent Viewers) giving response minus Percent of Light (or Non) Viewers giving response

# $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (significance for X^2 test).

Table 4. Percent of respondents who say "Japan is 'superior to' or 'somewhat superior to' the U.S. in standard of living" by amount of total TV viewing, TV news viewing, and U.S. program viewing

		Total TV				*TV News*				*U.S. programs*			
	Total % (N)	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Never %	Frequent %	CD	Gamma
OVERALL:	37 (403)	33	42	+9	.06	40	33	-7	-.12	30	45	+15	.06
Controlling for:													
SEX:													
Male	41 (194)	37	43	+6	.05	39	40	+1	-.03	33	52	+19	.15
Female	34 (209)	29	42	+13	.09	40	28	-12	-.20	28	38	+10	-.02
AGE:													
20 -- 39	46 (147)	42	57	+15	.06	50	38	-12	-.15	35	47	+12	.04
40 -- 59	34 (128)	23	42	+19	.20	37	27	-10	-.16	35	42	+17	.01
60 or over	29 (128)	30	32	+2	.05	24	35	+11	.05	24	45	+21	.03
EDUCATION:													
Low	36 (225)	39	36	-3	-.07	38	31	-7	-.14	29	47	+18	.09
High	38 (176)	27	58	+31**	.23	41	35	-6	-.09	33	41	+8	.04

Note: Total television viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are divided into light, medium, and heavy viewing based on even 3-way split. For purposes of space, medium viewers are omitted from this table.

CD=Cultivation Differential; Percent of Heavy Viewers (or Frequent Viewers) giving response minus Percent of Light (or Non) Viewers giving response
# $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (significance for X^2 test).

Table 5. Percent of respondents who say "Japan is 'superior to' or 'somewhat superior to' the United States in level of democracy" by amount of total TV viewing, TV news viewing, and U.S. program viewing

		Total TV				*TV News*				*U.S. programs*			
	Total % (N)	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Light %	Heavy %	CD	Gamma	Never %	Frequent %	CD	Gamma
OVERALL:	20 (403)	18	27	+9	.07	24	16	-8	-.19	18	22	+3	-.04
Controlling for:													
SEX:													
Male	22 (194)	17	31	+14	.11	22	19	-3	-.09	19	26	+7	.07
Female	19 (209)	20	24	+4	.05	26	15	-11*	-.27	17	18	+1	-.14
AGE:													
20 -- 39	20 (147)	20	27	+7	.00	24	15	-9	-.21	18	19	+1	-.01
40 -- 59	23 (128)	15	33	+18	.15	27	21	-6	-.12	20	27	+7	-.01
60 or over	17 (128)	18	22	+4	.12	21	13	-8	-.24	17	19	+2	-.17
EDUCATION:													
Low	23 (225)	25	24	-1	-.06	26	15	-11*	-.24	19	28	+9	.02
High	17 (176)	11	33	+22*	.17	22	20	-2	-.15	17	16	-1	-.08

Note: Total television viewing, TV news viewing and U.S. program viewing are divided into light, medium, and heavy viewing based on even 3-way split. For purposes of space, medium viewers are omitted from this table.

CD=Cultivation Differential; Percent of Heavy Viewers (or Frequent Viewers) giving response minus Percent of Light (or Non) Viewers giving response
# $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (significance for X^2 test).

Table 6

Hierarchical Multiple Regression Summary

	Step entered	Multiple R	R^2	R^2 change	Final β	*p*
Demographics	1	.181	.033	.033		.004
Age					-.159	.004
Sex					.120	.018
Education					-.100	.073
Information	2	.232	.054	.021		.013
Direct experience					-.002	.975
Talks with others					-.136	.010
TV exposure	3	.247	.061	.007		.381
Total TV					.081	.157
TV news					-.075	.167
U.S. drama					.013	.801

Step 1: $F(3, 397)=4.48$, $p<.01$

Step 2: $F(5, 395)=4.49$, $p<.001$

Step 3: $F(8, 392)=3.19$, $p<.01$

Note: Betas are standardized beta weights when entered at a step 3. Sex, talks with others, and direct experience were dummy coded. Scores range from 5 to 25 (M=15.65, SD=3.94). The higher score indicates that Japan is more superior to the U.S.

Table 7
Within-group partial correlations between the three TV exposure measures and the index scores

	Overall	*Sex*		*Age*			*Education*	
		Male	Female	20--39	40--59	60 or over	Low	High
TV overall	.05	.10#	.00	-.01	.13#	.04	-.03	.20*
TV news	-.04	-.01	-.07	-.12#	.04	-.03	-.03	-.07
U.S. programs	.02	.06	-.01	.00	-.04	.13#	.03	.01
(Final d.f.)	(394)	(186)	(203)	(141)	(121)	(121)	(219)	(170)

Note: The data are fourth-order (fifth-order for Overall) partial correlations controlling for sex, age, education, talks about the U.S. with those who have visited the Unites States, and direct experience in the U.S. Sex, talks with others, and direct experience were dummy coded.
# $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.01$,

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

Linking International News to U.S. Interests: A Content Analysis

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Presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., August 1995.

Linking International News to U.S. Interests: A Content Analysis

In Main Street America and the Third World, John Maxwell Hamilton warned that "Americans cannot choose to isolate themselves from the rest of the world."[1] Pointing to the importance of questions about global economic interdependence, he concluded that it is up to journalists to "put such questions on the public's agenda."

This study explores how foreign events are linked to U.S. interests--because they involve or affect Americans--in international news coverage. Defining and reflecting an event's newsworthiness and helping it pass multiple news gates, linkages impact reader and policymaker attention to foreign affairs.[2] They help place events on the public agenda Hamilton cited.

Background

Newspapers have been criticized for contributing to a "rising level of ignorance about the world"[3] among Americans by "relying on news formulas that stress the-world-doesn't-matter-to-us-parochialism."[4] Their alleged sins include failure to provide enough foreign news and specific foreign news that affects people's lives.

Studies show the foreign newshole is indeed shrinking,[5] due to the cost of foreign news[6] and perceived reader preference for television news.[7] But what about the charge that newspapers fall short in covering news that affects readers? Do they indeed fail to link events to U.S. readers' lives?

Some linkage is unavoidable. As Weaver and Wilhoit[8] and

Ramaprasad[9] reported, approximately 19% of wire service foreign news and 26% of television foreign news[10] involves U.S. actors (e.g., government, citizen, business, etc.) but occurs overseas. The linkage of those events to the U.S. is self-evident, with their newsworthiness pivoting on the actors' identity.

But a broader definition (subsuming this "actor-centered" one) of linkage seems in order, and guides the present research.

That is, some foreign events do not involve U.S. actors, even though the events may directly or indirectly affect Americans. In covering these events, sources or reporters explicitly (in the text) link or interpret the events in terms of consequences for U.S. interests. Thus, the outcome of an OPEC meeting is linked to U.S. industry, a nation's purchase of Soviet weapons is tied to U.S. military strength or deployment, or terrorism is viewed in the context of the U.S. tourism industry.

Is this sort of linkage symptomatic of a nationalistic ideology that pervades American media? Said argues that foreign news is "framed" by a "consensus apparatus" (including elite media, corporations, defense and intelligence communities, and the executive branch) and defined for the public in terms of strategic importance or U.S. policy.[11]

On the other hand, Hachten concludes that reporting foreign news from such a viewpoint is due simply to "the unsurprising fact" that "events abroad are of interest to readers in proportion to the ways their own national concerns are involved."[12]

Ideological perspectives notwithstanding, linkages--whether defined as involving U.S. actors or impacting the U.S.--would obviously affect an event's news or publication value for reporters and editors.[13] In an era of declining foreign coverage, they may even determine which items are carried in a shrinking foreign newshole. One of Galtung and Ruge's[14] "news factors" that affect selection or rejection of news stories is "cultural proximity or relevance" of the event for the audience's interests. And, in his model of international news flow, Hester[15] also emphasizes the importance of the linkage of distant events (particularly events with economic consequences or that represent threats to U.S. interests) to newsworthiness. A survey of newspaper editors by Chang and Lee[16] showed the importance in news selection of linkage or "relevance to the United States," operationalized as U.S. involvement in the event, threat of the event to the U.S., cultural relevance to the U.S., or a country's involvement in U.S. trade. U.S. involvement in the event was rated "very important" to news selection by 43% of editors, while threat to the U.S. was so rated by 59%.

And linkages may help readers distinguish events that are <u>important</u> from those that are merely news. Readers are cued to an event's importance, and public opinion may be influenced.

Hypotheses and Rationale

H1: Over time, the percentage of international news stories linked to U.S. interests will increase.

The gatekeeping literature[17] suggests that, all other things being equal, a gatekeeper forced to reduce international coverage is more likely to spike an item of no direct consequence to readers than one which does have clear consequences for readers. Thus, while the total number of international news items (the denominator) decreases with the "shrinking foreign newshole," items with a U.S. linkage (numerator) might come to represent a larger percentage of the total. In effect, this news value--linkage to U.S. interests--might become increasingly important in discriminating among news items.

H2: News stories about Western industrial nations will more often be linked to U.S. interests than stories about communist and developing nations.

Similar geopolitical designation (e.g., "Western industrial" or the outdated, "First World") reflects common characteristics (e.g., an industrial economy). Because of that commonality, U.S. actors will more often be involved in events in Western industrial nations and events in those nations more often reported in terms of their impact on the U.S. Coverage of nations least similar to the U.S. will contain fewer linkages.

However, geopolitical differences may be compounded by topic differences.

H3: News stories about Western industrial nations' economic affairs will more often be linked to U.S. interests than will economic stories about communist or developing nations.

Of course, Western economic news reflects both direct American actor involvement and consequences of events for Americans.

H4: News stories about communist nations' international relations will more often be linked to U.S. interests than will international relations stories about Western industrial and developing nations.

The world has been dominated since the beginning of the Cold War by superpower efforts to extend global influence. "Second World" or communist nations' relations with other nations will be linked to U.S. interests and framed in the context of U.S. policy.

H5: News stories about developing nations' internal stability (politics and internal conflict) will more often be linked to U.S. interests than will internal politics and internal conflict stories about Western industrial and communist nations.

Because of the impact developing nations' domestic stability has on vital resources and regional or world peace, stories on that stability will also be framed in the context of U.S. policy.

Method

The hypotheses were tested on international news in The New York Times, an opinion leader among media and policy makers.[18] All international news (excluding opinion items) was coded (from microfilm) for two constructed weeks[19] (two randomly selected Sundays, Mondays, etc.) per year for 1980-1990 inclusive (154 total issues). An item was international news if the dateline and lead indicated that the event did not occur on U.S. soil.

Item focus (country where the event occurred) was collapsed into categories of Western industrialized nations and Japan, communist nations and developing nations.[20]

Fourteen topic categories were used: internal politics, internal conflict, internal economics, social policies, science and technology, arts and media, between-nation relations, between-nation conflicts, between-nation economics, displaced persons/refugees, miscellaneous "bad news" (crime, accidents, disasters, etc.), sports, human interest and religion.

Linkage required explicit reference to actors' ties to the U.S. or the event's effect on the U.S. or U.S. citizens. After training, ten coders' average agreement on topic, linkage and focus was .70, .78 and .86 respectively.[21]

Findings and Discussion

The 154 sample days located 3,815 news items (see Table One), with the most (392) in 1983 and the fewest (307) in 1987. While 1980-83 data suggest growth, reductions beginning in 1984 yielded a significant overall trend[22] of fewer items (tau=-.56, p=.01). The foreign newshole was indeed shrinking.

Over a third (39%) of the items contained linkages, more than the 19% in two weeks' wire copy,[23] and the 21% in eight weeks of TV news.[24] Those wire and TV percentages reflect overseas events involving U.S. actors, while this study also included others not about U.S. actors but linking a foreign event to the U.S.

In sum, 39% of the items would--by the distinction offered earlier--qualify as important to readers, while 61% were "merely" news. Of course, we can't infer that readers would skip a story lacking linkage. Much international news is read on the basis of news values other than impact. And with some individual stories, importance for readers is implicit; in a long-running event like the Iran hostage story, not every item contained explicit linkage as operationally required here.

Linkage was also related to another measure of importance--

front page treatment. Of the nearly 1,500 linked stories in the sample, 15% of linked stories were on page one of the Times, but only 7% of stories lacking explicit linkage were on the front page. Chi-square for the analysis of linkage and front page treatment was significant (57.60, with 1 d.f., $p<.0001$).

How stable were the annual percentages of linked items? The largest percentage was 1989's 44.7%, which was followed by a significant 11% decrease (two-tailed Z-test for differences between proportions, $p<.05$). The smallest was 1982's 28.6%, which was significantly different from the year before and after it ($p<.05$). Despite that range there was no significant overall trend of increase or decrease (tau=.16, $p=.24$).

As a result, H1, predicting an increase in linkage over time, was not supported. The foreign newshole shrank, but there was no evidence that items containing U.S. linkage were spared. At a time when media were being criticized for not covering the world effectively, and when the foreign newshole was shrinking, there was no evidence that Times gatekeepers gave more importance to U.S. linkage in deciding on events to cover in that newshole.

H2 predicted events in Western industrial nations would more often be linked to U.S. concerns than would events in communist or developing nations. As Table Two reveals, the hypothesis was supported: 42.6% of Western industrial nation stories contained U.S. linkage, significantly more than the 34.5% and 37.2% for communist and developing nation stories (one-tailed Z-tests for differences between proportions, $p=.01$).

Of course, H2 ignores year-to-year change within blocs. One might anticipate such changes; late-1980s events in the communist bloc, for example, might increasingly have been framed in terms of U.S. policy implications.

However, Table Two also shows that while number of communist nation items increased monotonically after 1985, the percentage including linkage actually peaked in 1984. Across all 11 years, the trend was non-significant (overall tau=.20, p=.20).

Meanwhile, Western industrial nation news items decreased significantly over the 11-year period (tau=-.55, p=.009), but linkage did not (tau=-.02, p= .47). But the trend for developing nation linkage increased significantly (tau=.40, p=.04), even though items from those nations decreased significantly (tau=-.59, p=.006). There was less news about that region, but more of it was linked to U.S. interests, as the decade passed.

Recall, though, that the Western nation percentage (42.6%) was, overall, significantly greater than for the other two regions. In 1983, over half of Western items contained linkage.

Table Three data show which topics most often featured linkage. The largest percentage (66.7%) occurred in between-nation economic items. When nations' economic affairs were reported, they tended to be framed within a context of U.S. interests or involvement (the second party or actor in some Times between-nation economic items would obviously be American). The other between-nation topics (relations and conflict) also had high percentages of linkage.

By contrast, linkage was in a fourth of items on clearly domestic topics (internal politics, conflict and economics).

H3, predicting that stories on Western economic affairs would more often be linked to U.S. interests than communist and developing nation economic stories, was tested with both internal and between-nation economic news (see Table Four).

Neither test supported it fully. Western nations' internal economic news (24.7%) had significantly more (Z-test between proportions, p=.05) linkages than communist nation stories (13%), but less (not significantly) than developing nation stories (30%).

And while two-thirds (68.5%) of Western between-nation economic stories contained linkage, 55% of communist and 65.1% of developing nation stories also did (the differences were not significant).

H4, predicting more linkage in communist nations' between-nation relations stories than in those stories from Western or developing nations, was also not supported statistically. Similar percentages of communist (61%) and developing (61.4%) nation stories on this topic contained linkages, while fewer (though not significantly) Western (54%) stories were linked.

H5, predicting more linkage in stories on developing nation internal stability (internal politics and conflict) than from Western and communist nations, was only partially supported. Significantly more developing country internal politics stories (28%) contained linkage than did communist nation stories (15%), but not significantly more than Western stories (22.3%). Significantly more developing nation internal conflict stories (22.7%) contained linkages than did Western stories (15.4%) about internal conflict.

Conclusions

This study is limited by its examination of only The New York Times. But the Times is a leader in international coverage. We also lack normative data to compare to the observed 39% linkage. Is 39% high?

Other possible limitations center on the construct validity of explicit linkage: Is it appropriate to lump stories with U.S. actors with cases without U.S. actors but where a reporter--or gatekeeper--has gone the extra mile to report an event's impact? Moreover, how important is linkage--reporting involvement of U.S. actors or citing impact on the U.S.--in readership of a story? One need only consult Galtung and Ruge,[25] Hester[26] or a basic reporting text to realize there are many "news values" other than consequence.

Further, does it matter who inserts that linkage--a source, reporter or editor? Is it fair to assume either that inclusion of explicit linkage represents a conscious effort to alert or inform readers about an event's importance, or that readers note that cue and assign more salience to the event?

These questions defy easy answer; future research might address them.[27] It is true, however, that whatever the reason for inclusion of linkage, some stories on some topics from some nations more often contain those cues.

Of course, many readers would presumably recognize that some events in some places would or would not affect the U.S., regardless whether explicit linkage was present. And, as noted, a sampled story on a long-running event follows previous items which may have already established linkages for readers.

On the other hand, there are obvious instances--first-day coverage or the truly unexpected and unique occurrence--in which readers look for cues and clues on the impact of a story on their own lives.

Despite these limitations, the percentage of stories with linkages seems problematic, given concern about Americans' narrow world view, the alleged failure of media to make readers see the effects of world events, and the shrinking foreign newshole.

"(T)he flow of international news is highly selective, and the number of items selected is decreasing because the foreign newshole is shrinking."[28] There are many bases for that selection, of course, but a seemingly important one is impact on readers. One would anticipate that items linked to U.S. interests would constitute a growing proportion of items in the shrinking newshole. Yet they did not.

The foreign newshole was indeed shrinking, but even as the foreign newshole shrank, there was no evidence that items of greatest apparent import to U.S. readers survived the shrinkage, unless they involved events in developing nations. Such news was increasingly reported within a context of U.S. interests; the percentage of items with linkage increased even though developing nation coverage decreased.

Still, events in Western industrial nations in general were more often reported within a U.S. context than were stories from other geopolitical blocs. International economic news was more often framed in terms of U.S. interests or involvement than were other topics. Those topics seen as reflecting domestic stability--particularly in developing nations--were far less often linked to U.S. interests than anticipated.

Nor was there a tendency for communist nations' between-nation relations stories to be reported within the context of U.S. interests, even though the data were from a period in which U.S. and Soviet policies were confrontational and competitive.

Having noted these patterns, we are left to return to the question of norms. Is the 39% observed linkage high or low? Should we anticipate a higher level in Times reports? Would it constitute better journalism if every story was interpreted for readers in terms of those readers?

Or does framing events in such a context perpetuate the myopic, "Americentric" view of events condemned by critics? Is this study's finding of increasing linkage in developing nation news to be viewed positively (i.e., readers will learn that "unsolvable problems in unpronounceable places"[29] do affect them) or negatively (i.e., other nations' people, politics and culture will be trivialized or objectified in terms of U.S. interests)?

Unfortunately, the answer lies beyond the data. Whether more linkages would improve reader understanding of foreign affairs or perpetuate a parochial world view is problematic.

It is clear, however, that currently--and increasingly in some types of news--fewer than half the stories are provided with one type of clue that could help readers understand why or how an event affects them. Americans may be receiving not only less foreign news, but fewer items that carry evidence of relevance.

Notes

1. John Maxwell Hamilton, Main Street America and The Third World (Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press, 1986).

2. Carol H. Weiss, "What America's Leaders Read," Public Opinion Quarterly, 38 (1974):1-22; Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); and W. Phillips Davison, Donald R. Shanor and Frederick T.C. Yu, News from Abroad and the Foreign Policy Public (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1980).

3. Michael Emery, "An Endangered Species: The International Newshole," Gannett Center Journal, 3 (Fall 1989):151-164.

4. John M. Hamilton and George A. Krimsky, "'Juju' News from Abroad," Gannett Center Journal, 3 (Fall 1989):137-150.

5. Most recently, Emery, "An Endangered Species."

6. Hamilton and Krimsky, "'Juju' News from Abroad."

7. George Garneau, "Foreign News Grows, but It Is Reported Here Less," Editor & Publisher (February 10, 1990):18. See also Philip S. Cook, Douglas Gomery and Lawrence W. Lichty, The Future of News (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xv.

8. David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, "Foreign News in the Western Agencies," in R. Stevenson and D.L. Shaw, eds., Foreign News and the New World Information Order (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1984), 153-185.

9. Jyotika Ramaprasad, "Content, Geography, Concentration and Consonance in Foreign News Coverage of ABC, NBC and CBS," International Communication Bulletin, 28 (Spring 1993):10-14.

10. This involved interpolation of both studies. In the case of Ramaprasad's, for example, she coded three types of international news: foreign (no U.S. presence, n=421), foreign at home (about other countries but occurring in the U.S., n=139) and domestic abroad (about the U.S. but occurring in other countries, n=148). For comparability with the present study, only the first and last of these were assessed, with "foreign at home" dropped because it occurred in the U.S. Thus, of the coded events that occurred in other countries ("foreign" and "domestic abroad" combined, n=421 + 148, or 569), domestic abroad accounted for 26%.

11. Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

12. William A. Hachten, The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies, 2d edition (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1987), 126.

13. Studies indicate the importance for foreign news gatekeepers of potential reader impact. See Sophia Peterson, "Foreign News Gatekeepers and Criteria of Newsworthiness," Journalism Quarterly, 56 (Spring 1979):116-125; and Tsan-Kuo Chang, Pamela J. Shoemaker and Nancy Brendlinger, "Determinants of International News Coverage in the U.S. Media," Communication Research, 14 (August 1987):396-414.

14. Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research 1 (1965):64-90.

15. Al Hester, "International Information Flow," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill (eds.) International and Intercultural Communication 2nd. ed., 242-250.

16. The authors distinguish between context-oriented and content-oriented approaches to influences on news coverage. "The former looks at the origin of a foreign news event and its relationship with such contextual variables as trade relations, cultural relevance, political involvement and geographical proximity," while "the content-oriented approach focuses more on the characteristics inherent in the foreign event itself regardless of the external setting," such as timeliness, impact or consequence, human interest and conflict. See Tsan-Kuo Chang and Jae-Won Lee, "Factors Affecting Gatekeepers' Selection of Foreign News: A National Survey of Newspaper Editors," Journalism Quarterly 69 (Fall 1992)554-561.

17. David Manning White, "The 'Gate Keeper': A Case Study in the Selection of News," Journalism Quarterly, 27 (Fall 1950):383-390; Pamela J. Shoemaker, Gatekeeping (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991); Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger, "Determinants of International News Coverage"; and Peterson, "Foreign News Gatekeepers."

18. Weiss, "What America's Leaders Read"; and Warren Breed, "Newspaper 'Opinion Leaders' and Processes of Standardization," Journalism Quarterly, 32 (Summer 1955):277-284, 328.

19. Two constructed weeks is the optimal sample for annual estimates of newspaper content. Sampling across 11 years permitted reliable subanalyses. Daniel Riffe, Charles F. Aust and Stephen Lacy, "The Effectiveness of Random, Consecutive Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis," Journalism Quarterly, 70 (Spring 1993):133-139.

20. While we use the terms "Western industrial" and "developing," the World Bank classification scheme we used reflects the old "First, Second and Third World" categorization.

21. If, on the other hand, the "composite coefficient" is used, the figures are .96, .97 and .98. Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969), pp. 137-140.

22. An econometric non-parametric test for trend was used. Ranks are assigned to years, with the most recent ranked "1," and a second set of rankings is assigned on the basis of a second variable (e.g., the year with the most linked stories would be ranked "1"). Kendall's tau is computed for the two ranks. Positive values indicate increases in the key variable over time. See Jean Gibbons, Non-parametric Methods for Quantitative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), 295; Gerhard Tintner, Econometrics (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1952), 211-215.

23. Weaver and Wilhoit, "Foreign News in the Western Agencies," used one composite and one consecutive week sample in looking at wire copy.

24. Ramaprasad, in "Content, Geography, Concentration and Consonance," used eight five-day composite weeks in looking at television news.

25. Galtung and Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News."

26. Hester, "International Information Flow."

27. Of course, there has been some research addressing the effect of exposure to international news on knowledge or attitude toward other countries or inferences drawn about those countries. However, salience of the events for experimental subjects, in terms of the types of linkage examined here, has not been explicitly examined. See Felipe Korzenny, Wanda del Toro and James Gaudino, "International News Media Exposure, Knowledge, and Attitudes," Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 32 (Winter 1987):73-87; John T. McNelly and Fausto Izcaray, "International News Exposure and Images of Nations," Journalism Quarterly 63 (Autumn 1986):546-553; and David K. Perry, "News Reading, Knowledge About, and Attitudes Toward Foreign Countries," Journalism Quarterly 67 (Summer 1990):353-358.

28. Daniel Riffe, "International News Borrowing: A Trend Analysis," Journalism Quarterly, 61 (Spring 1984):142-148).

29. Time Magazine's Thomas Griffith, quoted in Frank L. Kaplan, "The Plight of Foreign News in the U.S. Mass Media: An Assessment," Gazette, 25 (1979):233-243.

TABLE ONE

Percentage of New York Times International News Stories with U.S. Linkage, by Year

YEAR:	Linkage Present %	(N)
1980	39.4	(350)
1981	39.9	(366)
1982	28.6	(385)
1983	44.4	(392)
1984	38.0	(371)
1985	38.5	(348)
1986	40.4	(332)
1987	38.8	(307)
1988	43.4	(325)
1989	44.7	(311)
1990	33.8	(328)
TOTAL	39.0	(3,815)
trend *tau* =	.16	-.56
prob. =	.24	.01

NOTE: a horizontal line between percentages indicates a significant between-year change ($p<.05$, by the Z-test between proportions, two-tailed test).

TABLE TWO

Percentage of New York Times International
News Stories with U.S. Linkage, by
Geopolitical Bloc and Year

	Linkage Present %	(N)
GEOPOLITICAL BLOC:		
Western industrial	42.6[a,b]	(1,530)
Communist nations	34.5[a]	(560)
Developing	37.2[b]	(1,725)

[a,b] Percentages with a common superscript are significantly different (p=.01) by Z-test for differences between proportions.

	Western		Communist		Developing	
YEAR:	%	(n)	%	(n)	%	(n)
1980	48.9	(135)	23.5	(51)	36.6	(164)
1981	44.9	(147)	29.0	(62)	39.5	(157)
1982	27.7	(159)	32.6	(46)	28.3	(180)
1983	50.3	(161)	36.0	(50)	41.4	(181)
1984	41.3	(143)	47.9	(48)	32.8	(180)
1985	42.5	(146)	41.7	(36)	34.3	(166)
1986	46.2	(132)	37.8	(37)	36.2	(163)
1987	42.6	(129)	35.0	(40)	36.2	(138)
1988	49.2	(128)	39.7	(58)	39.6	(139)
1989	48.3	(118)	36.5	(63)	45.4	(130)
1990	28.8	(132)	26.1	(69)	43.3	(127)
TOTAL	42.6		34.5		37.2	
test for trend						
<u>tau</u> =	-.02	-.55	.20	.16	.40	-.59
prob.=	.47	.009	.20	.24	.04	.006

TABLE THREE

Percentage of New York Times International News Stories with U.S. Linkage, by Topic

TOPIC:	Linkage Present %	(N)
Internal		
politics	23.7	(628)
conflict	21.4	(566)
economics	24.8	(371)
Social policies	33.8	(68)
Science and		
technology	41.1	(85)
Arts and media	50.8	(124)
Between-nation		
relations	58.6	(474)
conflict	49.5	(428)
economics	66.7	(300)
Refugees, dis-		
placed persons	41.0	(83)
Miscellaneous		
"bad news"	24.6	(293)
Sports	62.8	(242)
Human interest	38.8	(121)
Religion	28.1	(32)

TABLE FOUR

Percentage of New York Times International News Stories with U.S. Linkage Present, by Geopolitical Bloc and Topic

TOPIC:	Western %	(n)	Communist %	(n)	Developing %	(n)
Internal						
politics	22.3	(179)	15.0[a]	(127)	28.0[a]	(321)
conflict	15.4[a]	(117)	24.5	(53)	22.7[a]	(396)
economics	24.7[a]	(215)	13.0[a,b]	(46)	30.0[b]	(110)
Social policies	42.9	(21)	18.8	(16)	35.5	(31)
Science and technology	44.2	(43)	43.5	(23)	31.6	(19)
Arts and media	52.7	(74)	57.9	(19)	41.9	(31)
Between-nation						
relations	54.0	(163)	61.0	(100)	61.4	(210)
conflict	58.8[a]	(97)	47.2	(36)	46.6[a]	(294)
economics	68.5	(197)	55.0	(20)	65.1	(83)
Refugees, displaced persons	30.8	(26)	45.5	(11)	45.7	(46)
Miscellaneous "bad news"	20.9	(115)	15.7[a]	(51)	31.5[a]	(127)
Sports	64.4	(205)	62.5	(24)	38.5	(13)
Human interest	41.7	(60)	44.8	(29)	28.1	(32)
Religion	26.7	(15)	20.0	(5)	33.3	(12)
TOTAL	42.6	(1,530)	34.5	(560)	37.2	(1,725)

[a,b] Percentages sharing--horizontally--a superscript are significantly different (p=.05) by the Z-test for differences between proportions.

Colonial Interventions and the Postcolonial Situation in India: The English Language, Mass Media, and the Articulation of Class

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Colonial Interventions and the Postcolonial Situation in India: The English Language, Mass Media, and the Articulation of Class

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> I manage to wriggle into a crowded bus loaded with people. Knowing my journey was going to be a long one, I stood with my back against a pole and optimistically opened an issue of *India Today*, an English-language news magazine. I thought I would pass the time by browsing through it. A little boy, obviously poor, shyly smiled at me and said in Telugu, " Are you reading in Englees, Akka (sister)? I smiled back and said, "Yes , do you want to look at this? He eagerly took the magazine and replied, "Yes, my father says rich people read Englees so if I can read Englees I can be like you right?

This incident is only one among numerous painful encounters I have had in India, encounters that brought alive for me the realization of my own privilege as an upper-caste, middle-class *English-educated* urban Indian. Describing a similar incident that took place in India, Gauri Viswanathan (1992), a literary scholar, vividly recalls her encounter with a young construction worker, a woman, on her way back and forth from home to the library. One day the construction worker, curious about the books Viswanathan was carrying, stopped to ask her if she knew English. When Viswanathan replied in the affirmative, the young woman asked her if she would be willing to teach her English. Surprised by her request Viswanathan asked the young woman the reason for her desire. The woman promptly replied, "Because I want to live in these houses rather than help build them" (p. 40-41).

I describe these two incidents to point to the question of English, a colonial language, and its relation to economic and social power in postcolonial India. The question of English as a language of power, command, and upward mobility in a country like India with an uneven development of capital, vastly different linguistic formations, and a hierarchical social system like the caste system is a complex issue that reveals the influence of the colonial in the postcolonial situation. Despite the Indian government's efforts to revitalize India's languages since independence, English has continued to live tenaciously in urban India where its usage is linked with the path to modernity and progress.

English, a Western import in India, is one of the most visible and tangible indicators of the influence of British colonialism. The British, who introduced English in India for complex reasons, irrevocably altered the nature of social life; the ideological uses English was put to in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries interacted with indigenous social formations to alter pre-existing hierarchies. The upper/middle-classes and castes, who were privileged to receive English education, were influenced by their intimate contacts with the colonized and through their exposure to Western science and rationality.[1] The ramifications of the introduction of English during colonialism can be seen today in the consolidation of a middle-class, entrenched in power, and in the marginality of those who have no knowledge of English. The introduction of English in India has thus created a discursive space that needs to be analyzed beyond its colonial roots.

Stressing that English cannot be rejected or debunked in India in an ahistorical fashion, Aijaz Ahmad (1992) rightly points out, "One cannot reject English now, on the basis of its colonial insertion, any more than one can boycott the railways for that same reason" (p. 77). It is critical, however, to examine the domination and power brought into play in contemporary India by English as a colonial intervention and to understand how discourses in the colonial language legitimate dominant ideologies. It is useful here to draw on Ahmad's suggestion for the spirit in which the issue of English in India can be approached:

> English is simply one of India's own languages now, and what is at issue at present is not the possibility of its ejection but the mode of its assimilation into our social fabric, and the manner in which this language, like any other substantial structure of linguistic difference, is used in the processes of class formation and social privilege, here and now (p. 77).

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[1] As Hemant Shah (1994) points out, caste and class are for the most part interchangeable categories in India and caste, a hierarchical structure primarily identified with Hinduism, historically arose out of one's occupation or livelihood and is a permanent marker of social status. Hemant Shah (1994) writes, "Caste and class coexist in modern India" (p. 27). There are certainly poor people among the forward castes in India and rich people among the backward castes, however, the forward castes due to their dominance for a long period of time continue to be higher up in the economic strata.

Taking the analytical direction pointed out by Aijaz Ahmad, this paper interrogates the relationship between English, class formation, and social and economic power in India.

One of the ways in which English is widely used in India is in the mass media, especially in newspapers, magazines, commercially produced news videos, and popular fiction. While radio and television in India are government controlled, the print media and news videos are privately produced for commercial consumption, the consumers primarily being the urban, English-educated upper/middle-class. Since privately produced English-language media circulate within groups that have power it is the intention of this paper to examine how "news as a cultural discourse . . . exists and has meaning only in relation to other institutions and discourses operating at the same time" (Hartley, 1982, pp. 8-9). I am particularly interested in analyzing how the English-language media in India articulate and support the interests and ideology of the upper/middle-classes, who as a consequence of colonial interventions seek Westernized popular cultural forms.

The paper begins by historicizing the presence of English in India; I provide details of its introduction by British colonizers during the nineteenth century and its subsequent development as an integral element of class formations. I discuss the links between English and economic and social power in contemporary India and highlight its embeddedness in institutions and locations of power. I then briefly discuss the role of English and the English-language media in enabling the formation of an urban, upper/middle class "imagined community" and explore how the representational politics of the media support the class interests of this community. I explore the articulation of the politics of class in the English-language media by examining media coverage of certain controversial moments in India's social and political scenario. I analyze media coverage of these events in the English-language media by drawing on examples from previous scholarship and by bringing to the foreground connections between class, language, colonialism, and media which were hitherto not made. Finally, I conclude by drawing the reader's attention to the implication of colonial legacies within contemporary situations in countries like India, situations which raise important questions for communication scholars on media and modernity in similar postcolonial situations.

As a paper that is a beginning effort to historicize the English language and the English-language media in terms of India's British colonial history, this paper has certain limitations. I have focused on the English-language media and therefore devote very little discussion to India's vernacular press. Since I am primarily interested in how the mainstream media relate themselves to the class interests of their audiences, I also do not touch upon oppositional discourses that exist in alternative English-language media, specifically the Socialist press. In the four examples of media coverage that I discuss in the third section, three deal with the press, while only one deals with the electronic media—news videos—and therefore the term "mass media" in the title of the paper may be a trifle misleading. In addition, my reliance on secondary research for these examples of media coverage can in a sense be seen as a weakness. However, this paper must be viewed as a step towards future work I intend to do in India on English-language media and their audiences and therefore the examples I draw on must be seen as literature that will help me build the theoretical and historical framework for my future work.

Colonialism, English, and the Stratification of Indian Society

The history of the rise of English in India is intimately tied to the ideological imperatives of British colonialism. The complex and interlocking relationships between empire and colony in the nineteenth century engendered the introduction of English in India. Even before English was introduced, British colonialists were actively intervening in the sphere of indigenous knowledge production by translating, classifying and standardizing Indian vernacular and classical languages to facilitate colonial administration (Sunder Rajan, 1992, pp. 10-11). The restructuring of Indian languages, an exercise in colonial power, was to facilitate communicating with the natives and to construct an India that was authentic and packaged in an easily comprehensible form. Simultaneously in Britain, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "English" as a field of study was being constituted as a recognizable body of knowledge and as "literature" symbolic of the higher moral order and glory of the British empire (pp. 9-10).

It is the firm belief in "English" as a civilizing force and in homogeneity and standardization that led to the establishment of English in India, the "Jewel in the Crown" of the British empire. Before the creation of official colonial policies that would encourage the spread of English, there were British missionaries in India who, in their proselytizing efforts, had set up schools where the medium of instruction was English (Sridhar, 1977, p. 16). It was, however, only with the formal insertion of English into educational policies by the British that its role as a strategy of containment and as a form of indoctrination became well-defined. While it is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment when English became a part of the official apparatus, it is with the passing of the famous Macaulay's minute on March 7, 1835 by Lord Macaulay, a member of the Supreme Council (the law-making body), that the official colonial machinery began concerted efforts to introduce English to the natives (Sridhar, 1977; Khubchandani, 1991; Sunder Rajan, 1992). Intending to expose the upper class of natives to English first, Lord Macaulay envisaged, ". . .a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions who govern . . . a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect" (Sharp, 1920 as quoted by Sridhar, 1977, p. 18).[2] The imperial mission was to introduce English to the vast number of Indian colonial subjects by "converting" the native elite who in turn would act as a filter for the percolation of English to the masses (Sridhar, 1977, p. 18).

British efforts to strengthen and consolidate their rule in India can by no means be conceived of simply as a diabolical and direct form of domination over the natives. Gauri Viswanathan's detailed and theoretically sophisticated work on the colonial conditions that enabled the rise of English studies in India avoids precisely this simple model of domination as direct control and instead begins from the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which allows for ideology to be understood as a form of "masking" or illusion.

2Discussing this declaration by Lord Macaulay to expose the "natives" to English education, Homi Bhabha (1994), the postcolonial theorist, suggests that it was the intention of the British to create out of the colonized "mimic men." Bhabha describes the "mimic man" (the British construct) as one who can be Anglicized but can never be "English" like the British themselves.

Arguing that cultural domination often works by consent and in the colonial context by persuading the natives of the moral superiority of the colonialists, Viswanathan cites a minute issued in the Bombay Presidency which stated, "The Natives must either be kept down by a sense of our power, or they must willingly submit from a conviction that we are more wise, more just, more humane, and more anxious to improve their condition than any other rulers they could possibly have." The British thus felt the need to turn to subtle and ideological forms of control to consolidate white prestige and to assert their authority. The decision to fortify their position as colonial rulers—and to quell rebellion—through English emerged not only out of strong ethnocentric assumptions of superiority, rather it also revealed an instrumental, administrative application of language, ultimately motivated by a sense of frality in the colonial position. Stressing the proposition that British educational measures were introduced out of a fear of rebellion by illogical, unstable, and irrational natives, Viswanathan writes:

> The vulnerability of the British, the sense of beleagurement and paranoid dread, is reflected in defensive mechanisms of control that were devised in anticipation of what British administrators considered almost certain rebellion by natives against actions and decisions taken by the British themselves (p. 11)

To the British who inhabited this world of "imminent rebellion and resistance," English became a way to contain rebellion; by masking and concealing economic exploitation and racial oppression under the benevolent guise of introducing them to the world of wise Englishmen, the British hoped to inculcate awe and wonder of the Raj (Viswanathan, 1989, p. 11).

Viswanathan's critical approach resists providing any simple explanation that would cast English as an unproblematically applied instrument of overt colonial control. She skillfully draws out the tensions between various agencies such as the missionaries, the East India Company, the Parliament, and the Indian elite classes, which contributed to the rise of English in India. Her work, however, due to its focus on the British does not really give us the total picture--her account of English education as a disguised form of control is partial and does not consider the aspirations of the dominant elite groups within Indians who also played an important role in the consolidation of English. Describing and analyzing the formation of English Studies in India, Svati Joshi (1991) insists that discursive forms are produced through multiple sites and determinations. Criticizing Viswanathan for the partiality of her work, Joshi writes:

> The discursive forms and ideological configurations of colonialism are not produced monolithically but inevitably in the mesh of collusion and contradiction between the colonizers and the colonized. It is important to recognize this in order to see not only differences and opposition but also affiliations and overlaps between colonial and indigenous interests and perceptions as they have a significant bearing on our subsequent history and cultural formation (p. 10).

When colonial practices intersected with pre-colonial indigenous, social, economic, and political formations, they often solidified and made more rigid existing hierarchies and divisions in the indigenous populations. In the case of India, English served to do precisely this by widening the gulf between the upper castes/classes and the lower castes. Although Lord Macaulay intended that English education would eventually encompass the entire Indian population, when this did not take place as rapidly as they expected, the British decided instead, barely two decades later, to concentrate on training the elite groups among Indians to assist them in administration. Accordingly, Sir Charles Wood's despatch, outlined in 1854 in the British parliament in India, departed from existing policy and stressed that western higher education through the English language would focus on the elites who could then be given "offices of trust" (Raina, 1991, p. 275). The introduction of such education to elite Indian classes would also secure for the British a group of natives who would not only ensure the supply of raw material necessary for manufactured goods, but would also, due to the desire for a western lifestyle as a consequence of their education, be consumers of British goods (Raina, 1991, p. 275; Viswanathan, 1989, p. 146).

The British policy to extend the use of English as the language of commerce and administration had far reaching consequences--it led to the linguistic stratification of Indian society, separated the elite classes from the lower castes and classes, and divided the urban populations from the rural (Sridhar, 1977, p. 20; Viswanathan, 1989, p. 116, Joshi, 1991, pp. 22-23). Enamored of the advantages of English education since it promised access to the corridors of power and intimacy with the powerful, Indian members of the upper castes and classes themselves began to seek an English education. Kamal Sridhar (1977) observes that one of the important factors that contributed to the spread of English as a medium of instruction in the educational system was the desire of groups of Indians themselves to acquire knowledge of Western science, technology, and culture (p. 16). Religious reformers like Raja Rammohun Roy and Dwarka Nath Tagore viewed English education as a means to combat ignorance, superstition, repressive social practices and finally to emulate Europeans who they felt had knowledge that had "raised them above the inhabitants of other parts of the world" (Sridhar, 1977, p. 17).

English thus provided for affiliations and overlaps between colonial and indigenous interests and led to complex alliances between the colonial rulers and colonized subjects. Ashis Nandy (1983), in his pioneering study of postcolonial consciousness in India, describes two forms of colonialism, one that was carried out without a civilizing mission, but with crude concepts of racism and *untermesch* and the other with the express purpose of conditioning the minds of colonial subjects not only to accept colonization, but to internalize the values of the colonizers. Nandy (1983) finds the second form of colonization much more dangerous than the first:

> This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all. In the process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category (p. xi).

Nandy's contention about the second form of colonization is particularly illuminating in the case of English in colonial India; English in many ways induced Indians through socioeconomic and psychological rewards to accept new social norms and cognitive categories.

Ironically enough English education, which initially created a class of Indians closely affiliated with and loyal to the British, later played an important role in bringing together a community of nationalist Indian elites who resisted British rule. Upper-class intellectuals who spoke different languages and were scattered across the country could now speak a common language. Kamal Sridhar (1977, p. 110) points out that some of the top nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Subash Chandra Bose, Mahatma Gandhi, and Sardar Patel received education in India in English and then lived in England to pursue higher education. Aijaz Ahmad (1992) writes that members of the English elite of India, who were active in the nationalist movement to overthrow British rule, arose from sites closest to the institutions of colonial power--"administration, law, commerce, English-language journalism, teaching staffs of colleges and universities" (p. 76). Thus the English language produced and co-opted a new kind of middle class in India, a "national" middle class whose cultural priorities were irrevcably altered by the colonial language and Western culture.[3]

The history of English in India is thus composed of several conflicting and diverse strands of events. The forces behind its introduction and rise, as we can see, have been the ideological imperatives of British colonizers, the compulsions of indigenous upper-class elites in a hierarchical society, and its paradoxical and intimate connections with the nationalist movement.

English in Contemporary India: Class, Language, and Dominant Ideologies

The legacy of the colonial language, one among several problematic legacies bequeathed by colonialism in Third World nations, has created enormous problems. Describing the chaos caused by the disruption of pre-existing linguistic formations by the colonial language, Khubchandani Lachman(1983) eloquently writes:

> Following the departure of the imperial powers, Asia and Africa have undergone a linguistic and literary upheaval. Battles for linguistic succession have come to life in India as they have elsewhere in Afro-Asia. One notices an evident contrast between the effects of the external direction of language matter under the colonial rule until 1947, directly or indirectly prescribing "elegant" solutions in the name of rationalistic modernization of underdeveloped (primitive) societies, and the effect of "haphazard," flexible behaviour of language-interest groups after independence in the newly emerging pluralistic decision system (p. 67).

[3]Here it is important to note that Western rationalism, linear thinking, and other ideas of the Western liberal tradition did not seep into Indians in a simple osmotic fashion—the picture is much more complex than that. Describing the contradictory and complex responses of Indians to colonialism, Ashis Nandy (1983) "rejects the model of the gullible and hopeless victim" and argues that it is important to look for ways in which Indians even if they accepted Western rationalism for their survival, somehow changed or altered its precepts. In examining the impact of English education on Indians it is important to keep in mind this flip side of colonialism—the colonized as the resisting victim—to capture the complex effects of colonialism. I cite Nandy's work to point out the limitations of this paper which does not examine how Indians resisted the effects of colonialism.

In the case of India, where the official Indian census lists about two hundred classified languages and fifteen of those as major "national" languages (Khubchandani, 1983, p. 3), the colonial imposition of English has led to acrimonious debates over language policies and bitter rivalries over the linked issues of a national language, nationhood, and national identity. Following independence, when confronted with a multi-lingual and pluralistic society, it was decided that the Indian nation would be divided into twenty four states based on linguistic stratification (p. 3). While the division of the country into states on a linguistic basis was not difficult to achieve, it is in prescribing a national language, in setting up a language as the standard medium of instruction in education, and in establishing a language as the link language of commerce and government administration that the Indian government has faced insurmountable problems.

The debate between Chinhua Achebe and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, African writers and intellectuals, over the use of English in the context of Africa is an excellent illustration of the colonial predicament in India. Nigerian writer and critic Chinhua Achebe (1993) favors the adoption of English by African writers; examining the creation of nation states by the British in Africa, he argues that for better or worse English is the national language of many countries in Africa and it can be fashioned and molded by African writers to carry their particular cultural experiences. Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1993), the exiled Kenyan writer, writing in the 1980s, reverses Achebe's argument and refuses to see the history of European colonization as an irreversible factor in contemporary African culture. In the strong presence of English in Africa, Ngugi sees the cultural hegemony of Europe and neo-colonialism--he argues against English, which is the language of the ruling class African minority and recommends the use of African languages, which are used by the majority of the African population. Similarly in India, the debate over English has been intensely waged over issues of identity, nation, and culture, as a consequence of which the government's role in standardizing and imposing the national language, has been marginal.

Hindi, one of the Indian languages spoken by the largest group of Indians (about 30-35% of the population), is the declared official federal language of the country with English as the associate official language. The debate over the national language, a debate that is very much alive even today, continues to be a located within conflictual social dynamics. Succinctly summarizing the language debate in postcolonial India, Sunder Rajan (1992) identifies the chief parties in the conflict over the national language: "the first is between the opposed advocates of a national language, the second is between linguistic regions, and the third is between the privileged and less-privileged classes (p. 14)." For those who support Hindi, the use of English is seen as slavery to colonialism and as anti-national due to its Western origins; for the linguistic regions where Hindi is not spoken and whose people are familiar with English, English is preferable to Hindi as the "lesser evil"; and finally for the English-speaking upper-classes, loss of English would imply loss of power (pp. 15-16).

Kamal Sridhar (1977) and Khubchandani Lachman (1983) outline in detail the language policies of the Indian government and the outcomes of the commissions adopted since 1947 to assess the linguistic situation and suggest recommendations. The three-language formula, which exists today as a consequence of numerous official deliberations over the issue of a "national language" and medium of instruction, recommends education at the primary stage in the mother tongue, knowledge and familiarity with Hindi and English in middle and high schools, and finally university education in English or in any of the modern Indian languages.

By providing such a brief summary of the existing language policy, I have no doubt ignored or swept aside important aspects of the history of India's three language formula. But as Sridhar Kamal (1977) points out, government interventions and decision-making on language affects only the disadvantaged urban populations and rural poor who are forced to get their education in government institutions. In the urban areas, the upper classes continue to send their children to institutions where English is the medium of instruction and universities, which are still firmly entrenched in the grip of elitism and the colonial ethos, and continue to offer education predominantly in English. The elitism of English; its strong association with colonialism and with the postcolonial nation;" and its intimate links with the urban, upper and middle-classes[4] have been

[4]Discussing the influence of colonialism in India Ashis Nandy (1983) writes, "In spite of the presence of a paramount power [colonialism] which acted as the central authority, the country was culturally fragmented and politically heterogeneous. It could, thus, confine the cultural impact of

noted and discussed by several postcolonial scholars and intellectuals (Sunder Rajan, 1992; Khubchandani, 1983; Sridhar, 1977; Joshi, 1991; Ahmad, 1992; Sheth, 1990; Nandy, 1983).

Aijaz Ahmad (1992) identifies the strong presence of English in India in the dominant systems of administration and education with a "profound--almost genetic--cultural link between the colonial and post-colonial phases of the bourgeois state. He observes that the inability of the Indian state to invent or devise forms of unity that may be more appropriate than the colonial model, given the plural and complex nature of Indian society, has meant that "those earlier semiotics of administration and profession, with English at their epicentre, have merely reproduced themselves on an extended scale." Connecting the expansion, consolidation, increased leisure, and increased sophistication of the bourgeois middle classes, who inhabit locations of power, with the expansion of English, he writes:

> Among all the countries of Asia and Africa which gained their independence after World War II, India has numerically by far the largest professional petty bourgeoisie, fully consolidated as a distinct social entity and sophisticated enough in its claim to English culture for it to aspire to have its own writers, publishing houses, and a fully fledged home market for books (p. 75).

Noting the proliferation of English in urban India, Svati Joshi also makes similar links between the growth of English and the "increasing concentration of the privileged English-speaking class with greater leisure in the metropolitan cities (p. 21)." The spread of English is also connected to "the job market, social mobility, and cultural superiority" (Joshi, 1991 p. 21) and people who speak/write only in Indian languages strongly associate knowledge of English with material success (Lukmani, 1992).[5] English, despite government policies to promote regional languages remains the language that provides access to higher education and economic benefits (Khubchandani, 1983, p. 67; Joshi, 1991, p. 2).[6]

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to its urban centres, to its Westernized and semi-Westernized upper and middle classes, and to some sections of its traditional elites" (p. 31-32).

[5]Yasmeen Lukmani (1992) who tested the attitudinal orientation of college students, educated in Marathi until high school, towards studying English, found that they wanted to learn English primarily to achieve material success and that their perceptions of the English-speaking community as well-to-do and comfortable motivated them to pursue English in college.

[6]The growing presence of multinational corporations in India, India's steady integration into the world market, and India's increasing dependence on global technology and capital when

D. L. Sheth (1990), an advocate for increased use of Indian languages in institutional locations, finds that the expanding English-educated upper/middle classes have managed to tighten their hold on power at the national level by controlling the higher echelons of politics, bureaucracy, armed forces, corporate business and professions. Discussing the nature of the lifestyle of urban upper/middle classes, which is in tune with the global metropolitan world, he comments:

> Being uprooted from regional cultures, the new pan-Indian elite articulates it nationalism in unitary terms and their idea of the state as a centralized and hegemonic political entity. It sees a close connection between knowledge and power and uses English as a means of exclusion and an instrument of cultural hegemony. This makes it possible for them to defy the logic of numbers and to continue their hold over levers of power at the national level (p. 36).

To intellectuals and scholars in the West, who associate with the English-educated powerful national intelligentsia and the large sectors of urban upper/middle classes in India, products of English-writing in the cities of India become the "national literature." The links to global metropolitanism and the distance between the national elite and the rural and poor urban Indians means that the relationship between nation and region is being conceived of in pure, dichotomous terms and no longer "perceived as a continuum running through spaces . . . whose validation is to be sought through a public discourse which is open and accessible to all (Sheth, 1990, p. 36). As Aijaz Ahmad succinctly puts it, "...the dominant language of society, like the dominant ideology itself, is always the language of its ruling class" (p. 78).

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juxtaposed with the rising class of Westernized urban middle class groups ensure the dominance of English (Joshi, 1991, p. 2). For example, huge publishing companies in U.K. and the U.S.A find India an ideal market for their books since India has greater English-language book-buying potential than any other country in the world (Subramanian and Taylor, 1991, p. S42). Links between Indian publishing companies, established during colonialism, and publishing companies in the West are strong; the association with huge corporations ensures that English-language books are the most visible and that English-language bookstores dominate.(Taylor, 1991, S38). Films from Hollywood in the U.S.A and from U.K., produced in English and very popular with the middle-classes, also form an integral part of the transnational class alliance. The presence of a fairly large number of English-educated class of Indians is also attracting the attention of foreign investors; describing India as the rising economic superstar, Howell Llewellyn (1993) comments: "president Clinton and American businessmen should pay more attention to India. India, the world's largest democracy, has the third-largest economy in Asia, a Western-oriented class of English-speaking entrepreneurs, and a skilled and well-educated human resource base" (p. 37). Thus the fact that English is a world language and the language of international commerce has led to the nexus between the expanding urban bourgeoisie and multinationals.

The dominant position of English has not gone unchallenged, however, the opposing position which criticizes the growth of English as a form of cultural imperialism is not without its own problems. The strident and vocal critics of English in India today are the advocates of "Hindutva Nationalism," a nationalism that is based on Hindu fundamentalism and a return to India's glorious Hindu heritage (Sunder Rajan, 1992, p. 28). These nationalists who envisage a pure India unsullied by Muslim and British rule often employ a rhetoric that marginalizes other religious minorities and suggest solutions that are unrealistic and ahistoric.

The "English question" in India is not one that can be resolved easily--India's situation with regards to English is shared by many postcolonial nations across Asia and Africa. Since our independence from the British, the rise of English in India is intertwined with the consolidation and increase of urban Westernized upper-class elites, the growing transnational economy, the strong presence of English-educated elite at the national level, the weak interventions of the Indian government to redress power imbalances, and private corporate and business structures that ensure the continued vigor of English.

English-language Media and the Politics of Class Representation

English, as we have seen from the first section of this paper was initially introduced in India by the British to facilitate administration by homogenizing and standardizing communication with the Indian population. When this strategy proved unsuccessful, the British changed their tactics and decided to instead focus on providing English education to the native elites alone who would then assist the British in communicating with the rest of India's population. English education thus was a critical component of the ideological apparatuses of colonialism, that is, it helped to constitute and reproduce a social class that would serve the ends of the colonial state. Discussing the role of state apparatuses in the "existence and reproduction" of social classes, Nicholas Poulantzas (1975) writes:

> Political and ideological relations are materialized and embodied, as material practices, in the state apparatuses. These apparatuses include, on the one hand, the repressive state apparatus in the strict sense and its branches: army, police, prisons, judiciary, civil service; on the other hand, the *ideological state apparatuses*: the *educational apparatus*, the religious

apparatus (the churches), the *information apparatus (radio, television, press)*, the *cultural apparatus (cinema, theatre, publishing)*, . . (p. 25). [my emphasis]

The *educational apparatus* and the *media* (which form part of the information and cultural apparatus), both part of the larger ideological state apparatus have an intimate link; an English education and exposure to Western science created the conditions of possibility during colonialism for upper-class Indians to become consumers of English-language media. While it is not possible within the scope of this paper to explore in depth the history of the media in India, specifically the Indian English-language press, it is important to briefly touch on the development of the press to indicate its strong connections to colonial rule, English education, and class formation.

Since the British ruled India for a considerably long period, that is, over two hundred yeatrs (much longer than their rule in their colonies in Africa), it was inevitable that an English-language press would develop in due course of time. In 1790, during British rule, the first daily newspaper, the *Bengal Gazette*, was printed in Calcutta in English by James Augustus Hicky (Aggarwal, 1988, p. 7). The first Indian-owned English daily, also called *Bengal Gazette*, published in 1816 did not last long and therefore it was only 38 years after Hicky's *Gazette* was published that a newspaper with a sustained readership was published by an Indian in an Indian language (Ghosh, 1991, p. 51). The initial development of the English-language press in India during the eighteenth century, a press primarily owned and managed by British journalists and entrepreneurs, saw the establishment of newspapers in the large cities of Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay, and Madras (Parthasarathy, 1989, p. 26). Later, during the nineteenth century, the growth of the nationalist movement contributed to the rise and spread of newspapers in English and in the vernacular languages all over India, but mostly in cities and adjoining towns. The English-language newspapers owned by Indians during this period became a vehicle of disseminating nationalist ideas that were subversive of colonialism (pp. 86-109). Some of India's largest newspapers go back to the nationalist period; the *Times of India* began as an English Weekly in 1838, *The Statesman* was started in 1875 and the *Hindu* in 1878 (Hachten , 1993, p. 62). The spread of English education and the increasing consumption of English newspapers in nineteenth century India among educated Indians marked the creation of what Benedict Anderson (1983), a pioneering scholar on nationalism, calls an "*imagined community*."

Anderson (1983) begins his book by contrasting the "sacred imagined community" of medieval Europe with the emergence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of multiple national consciousness, each the product of "print capitalism," an explosive new combination of authors, printers, publishing firms, and book merchants developing a reading audience in the vernacular as well as Latin. *Print capitalism* encouraged speakers of particular vernaculars to identify with each other, gave a new fixity to language, and created "languages of power" from certain dialects. The onset of the age of nationalism in the early nineteenth century thus coincided with the golden age of vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, litterateurs, and folklorists. Equally important were *newspapers*—"one-day best sellers" consumed simultaneously, self-consciously, and anonymously by a secular imagined community.

Anderson describes the introduction of certain vernaculars as the language-of-state by Eurpoean dynastic rulers during the mid-nineteenth century. From this, he argues, came "official nationalism," the deliberate merger of dynastic empire and nation, whereby "Romanovs discovered they were Great Russians, Hanoverians that they were English, Hohenzollerns that they were Germans" (p. 82). In India, where several languages are spoken, the creation of English as the official language, as the "language of power," by the British administration and the rise of English language newspapers, or in other words, a form of print capitalism brought people with diverse linguistic, religious, and regional differences together; it made possible the formation and consolidation of a class of English-speaking Indians who began regarding themselves as *a fairly cohesive and secular community*. While Anderson's persuasive effort to link literacy, media use, and nationalism cannot be seen in isolation from other factors that engendered nationalism such as music, flags, parades, monuments, etc., nevertheless his argument in the case of India is particularly illuminating to understand the role of media in the creation of social formations.

The English-language press hence served to foster and strengthen the nationalist discourse that was opposed to colonialism in the decades during the late nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. With the achievement of independence and the ushering in of democracy and capitalism, the character of these newspapers underwent a change as English-language newspapers became profit-making enterprises (Chakraborty and Bhattacharya, 1989, pp. 9-30). For many of the large newspapers, which had an established clientele, this meant soliciting the support of advertisers and catering to an increasingly consumerist audience. By the time India achieved independence, English had been in use for over two centuries and the British had also left behind well-entrenched commercial and educational structures that were English-based. As a consequence in postcolonial India, it was not an issue whether English would ever be abolished, it was only a question of which Indian language should be promoted along with English, a situation which meant that English-language papers would be assured of an audience with buying power that would only increase over time.

It was but inevitable that English-language newspapers in the postcolonial capitalist state modeled themselves after Western newspapers--after all even during the nationalist period, Indian-owned English language papers adopted many of the journalistic practices and principles of the newspapers run by the British. When India in following the global trend began pursuing dramatic economic liberalization policies with the objective of promoting middle class consumption as the means to national prosperity, the media, including television, began targeting the " . . urban, educated well-off viewer" (Rahman, 1992, p. 28).[7] To describe the middle-class that the English media in India cater to it is useful to draw on anthropologist Arjun Appadurai's (1988) description of this growing consumer class:

> It [the middle class] includes civil servants, teachers, doctors, lawyers, clerks, and businessman, as well as film stars, scientists, and military personnel. Some of these persons belong to the upper middle class and a few to the truly wealthy. This middle class

[7]Robin Jeffrey (1994) who monitors the growth of advertising in the Indian press notes that one of the strong indexes of the flourishing of capitalism and consumerism in India is the changing character of newspapers since 1947. He examines newspapers and the institutions set up to monitor them: "By scrutinizing these institutions, we are able to identify the presence of Indian capitalism in the 1940s and its survival, the nature of state intervention as it arose in the 1950s, and *the mushrooming of capitalism and consumerism in the 1980s* (p. 748). [my emphasis] William Hachten (1993) also writes that the expansion of the print and broadcast media in India is aided by the growth of consumer goods: "So here again is evidence of a media system 'floating upward on a rising tide of economic development'" (p. 69).

> is largely to be found in the cities of India, which include not only the international entrepots such as Bombay and Calcutta, and the traditional capitals like Delhi and Madras, but also smaller industrial, railroad, commercial, and military towns of varying orders of size, complexity, and heterogeneity (p. 6).

With increasing industrialization and the upsurge in the number of corporations, businesses, and factories being opened in the last few decades, this middle class is steadily expanding all over India:

> This spatially mobile class of professionals, along with their more stable class peers in the cities and towns of India, creates a small but important class of consumers characterized by its multi-ethnic, polyglot and Westernized tastes (Appadurai, 1988, p. 6).

Appadurai writes that this emerging middle class are "nationally linked by their tastes in magazines, clothing, film, and music, and by their interpersonal networks in many cities" (p. 6). I argue that the English-language media, which link the urban upper/middle classes, often position themselves as the national media since English in the context of India is the only language that can be read and understood by people all over the country. Salamat Ali (1985) writes of the "national" character of the English-language papers:

> Since English alone remains the language acceptable to all regions, publications in that language form an elite group that condescendingly describes its competitors in Indian languages as the "language press" as opposed to the "national press"—a term it reserves for itself (p. 38).

In a study of news content homogeneity among elite Indian daily newspapers, Mazharul Haque (1986) chooses to analyze seven major Indian newspapers, out of which five were English-language newspapers. He justifies his focus on English-language papers: "The English dailies are believed to exercise a disproportionate amount of influence among the educated and articulate segments of the population, compared with the vernacular press" (p. 829). The English media in India thus operate within the discourses of power that underlie "English" and its strong associations with colonialism, class, Western lifestyles, and upward social mobility. The media ultimately signify the power of a certain language because the language becomes visible by its uses in "those more powerful sections of the media which are considered 'national'..."(Ahmad, 1992, p. 77).

Discussing the English-language media which have witnessed a steady growth since independence, Sunder Rajan (1992) writes, "Beyond the influence of the high cultural product--literature--there is also the widespread use of English in journalism--a fifth of all newspapers are English-language dailies; and in academic publications--a third of all Indian publishing is in English (p. 17)." Although newspapers and periodicals are published in about seventy Indian languages, Hindi and English claim a major share of the total number and the circulation of dailies and periodicals in the country (Ali, 1985, p. 38). For instance in 1981, there were 104 English-language dailies with a circulation of 3.35 million and 409 Hindi dailies with a circulation of 3.68 millions (p. 38). While the Hindi newspapers outnumber the English newspapers, they are confined to certain regions in North India unlike the English newspapers which cater to a pan-Indian readership spread all over India. Since the broadcast media, both radio and television, are owned and run by the government, it is the print media that are almost exclusively in the hands of private ownership; in 1981, the highest number of papers [4, 186] including dailies, weeklies, and other publications were owned by individuals (most of them industrialists) followed by societies and associations [1, 427] (pp. 36-37). Some recent developments on the media scene in India over the last decade include the appearance of several English-language newsmagazines, which have become immensely popular (p. 36), and the production of English language news videos (Ram, 1994). Since the electronic media are under government control, English-language news videos have become an alternative source of privately produced news for middle-class audiences. The English-language press, including newspapers and newsmagazines, books written in English, and English-language news videos are therefore one of the primary means by which the English language becomes a visible part of the everyday lives of urban upper-class Indians.

For this historically constituted "imagined community," the English-language media present a forum to express, circulate, and exchange opinions and ideas on politics, economics, and culture. The fact that the English-language media are part of an elite audience raises an important question with reference to this paper's focus regarding the media's relation to social formations: How do the English-language media operate as a cultural discourse in relation to the class politics of their readership? To gain an understanding of how the media establish class solidarities, I draw on Stuart Hall's assertion regarding the power of the media when he argues that the representational politics of the media become particularly visible during moments of "intense political instability" (Hall, 1982, p. 69). In the rest of this paper, I describe the representational politics of the media with reference to class by looking at how connections between class and the English-language media became obvious in the media's response to controversial events.

An issue which continues to be an area of bitter and acrimonious political debate in postcolonial India is that of establishing and promoting an Indian language as the language of state and federal administration. For instance, in July 1990, when the chief minister of one of the Indian states, Mulayam Singh Yadav, decided to establish a regional language as the language of administration and medium of instruction, the English-language press viciously attacked his policy in their editorials. Remarking on the consolidated attack launched against Yadav's policy, D.L. Sheth (1990) writes, "What is remarkable is the unity of opinion in support of the English language expressed by all shades of commentators across the board, irrespective of their radically different ideological backgrounds (p. 34)." The opinions expressed in columns, features, and letters to the editor in the English newspapers were fairly homogenous in their disavowal of Yadav's policy and their support for the promotion of English:

> Even such issues as Sati, violation of human rights, threats to our environment and to the livelihood of the poor through the so-called development projects or even something like Bhopal or the Kashmir issue have failed to achieve such a unanimity of opinion and commonality of attitude in the press as is reflected on the issue of importance of the English language (Sheth, 1990, p. 34).

Many of these writers, who were from the middle class, were convinced that in promoting English they were promoting the "noble cause of development and national integration" (Sheth, 1990, p. 34). Arguing that the English-language press failed to take note of and treat seriously the arguments that *supported* the introduction of Hindi as the language of administration, D.L. Sheth observes that the inclusion of such a perspective would have meant that the media would have to risk displeasing their audience. The close connections between the English language press and the urban middle-classes and their vested interest in advocating the use of English in the cause of nationalism becomes apparent in the controversy over Yadav's policy.

The politics of caste, class and "Westernized media" become evident in yet another case which deserves to be examined in detail since it exemplifies the mobilization of horizontal class alliances between the upper-middle caste/classes and the English-language media. In August 1990, the Prime Minister of India V.P. Singh announced his intention to implement the recommendations of the Mandal commission, a ten-year old document, which advocated the reservation of jobs for socially and educationally backward castes/classes. In the past, several states in India had implemented much larger policies of affirmative action for the lower castes/classes, but the Mandal commission would establish the most extensive reservation policy at the government level--27% of national government jobs would be reserved for the 52% of India's population classified as "backward classes" (Shah, 1994, p. 6).[8]

In India, the model of democratic development, set up by nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru (the first prime minister of independent India) who were English-educated intellectuals, is based on a Western model of democracy and Western notions of equality and freedom. However, the government has also attempted to redress problems of economic, caste, and class inequality by blending the Western democratic model with some of the normative principles of socialism. Thus the Government of India has allowed for mechanisms in the Constitution of India to make reservations for jobs in government organizations and for admissions in state-run educational institutions. State reformist attempts at "promoting substantive equality in a deeply inegalitarian society" (Guhan, 1992, p. 1657) have been largely opposed by upper caste/class interests in the name of reverse discrimination and issues pertaining to freedom of the individual. Tensions arise

[8]The government in the past has had reservation or affirmative action policies for government jobs in place for the lowest castes called the scheduled castes. The backward classes who are not considered under this category have been unhappy with the existing scheme of reservations (Shah, 1994, p. 5).

between the often contradictory notions of substantive equality and negative freedom since policies which favor equality of opportunity are seen as opposing the rights of the individual.

It is precisely such a tension that manifested itself in the controversy over V.P. Singh's reservation policy. Singh's policy met with immediate resistance from the forward or upper/middle castes who rallied to form the anti-reservation movement--college students who led the agitation against the implementation of Singh's policy were quickly joined by forward-caste journalists, doctors, college professors, and others (Shah, 1994, p. 6). The battle against the Mandal commissions recommendations was waged on a national level with rioting and demonstrations that took place all over the country. Meanwhile the pro-reservationists consisting of the lower/ backward caste students, politicians, and other people who would benefit from the reservation policy launched a counter attack against the anti-reservationists; nearly 200 people died in the violence that ensued Singh's announcement (p. 7). On October 1, 1990 the implementation of the policy was stayed indefinitely in order to study it further and on November 7, 1990, barely a month later Singh was forced to resign as prime minister due to this controversy (p. 7).

In looking at the English-language media coverage of the Mandal Commission demonstrations it is useful to draw on Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus. For Bourdieu (1986), habitus is ". . . the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, [which] produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principles . . ." (p. 78). Bourdieu allots a central role to class habitus as the dispositions that orchestrate class unity and he argues that the habitus is a principle that produces practices. The habitus of the English-speaking upper/middle class urban Indians is constituted and formed by a range of institutions--educational institutions, specific forms of mass media, the caste structure, corporations--that intersect in a symbiotic way with the habitus to generate and reproduce one another.

A critical actor in the propensity of the habitus to generate practices is history, " . . the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history in accordance with the schemes engendered by history" (p. 82). In the case of India, the history of

British colonialism and the establishment of English as we have seen are strongly linked to the formation of an urban elite who had been exposed to Western writing and ideas through an English education--the use of English and English-language media therefore becomes a marker and delineator of class formation to a significant extent. The English-language media are thus embedded within the habitus of the English-speaking urban elites, who are the products of the complex interactions between colonial history and pre-colonial history.

Two examples of English-language media that covered the riots and violence that followed Singh's announcement in August 1990 illustrate well how the politics of upper-class domination get played out in the media. The first one is Hemant Shah's analysis of "all news stories about Singh's policy and the resulting social unrest" that appeared in the *Times of India* during August and early September (Shah, 1994, p. 7). Shah rightfully contends that the *Times of India*, an English-language daily is recognized as one of India's top newspapers, that most newspapers in the country follow its lead, and finally that Indian elites like officials, legislators, and educators draw on it as a reliable source of information. Shah finds that the coverage of the *Times of India* showed considerable sympathy for the urban upper-class anti-reservationists, especially the protesting students, and portrayed the members of the backward/lower classes as incompetent. The paper downplayed the destructive violence of the anti-reservation agitation and portrayed their battle as political resistance: "*Times of India* coverage portrayed resistance to Singh's policy as being in the national interest rather than in the interest primarily of the forward castes (Shah, 1994, p. 15)."

One of the important factors, Shah suggests, for the sympathetic coverage of the upper-caste agitation in *Times of India* was the "sense of solidarity among members of the forward castes (p. 22)." Most of the reporters and editors of *Times of India*, who belong to the upper castes themselves, relied on sources that belong to the upper castes/classes for information. Shah finds that even though journalists did not agree that their caste/class alliances and cohesion guided their coverage, it was likely that news coverage was influenced by the domination of the upper-castes in the newsroom. At the end of his analysis Shah writes of the connections between elite media and conceptions of the nation:

> To the extent that mainstream news media in all cultural contexts are tied to power centers (e.g., corporate, religious, or political elites) and try to preserve elite-defined ideas of nation--thus perpetuating notions of who belongs and who does not, who stands for national integrity and who represents national threats--the *Times of India* is probably a representative case (p. 22)."

Shah fails to examine the *Times of India* as an English-language daily catering to an English-educated audience; he does not take into account the connections between colonialism, class, and the English language, which shape the way elitist concepts of the "nation" are formed. He summarizes some of the important reasons behind the *Times of India*'s biased coverage:

> In this study, certain interpretations and applications of the routines related to meeting deadlines, determining "real" news, objectivity, and standardized application of news values seem to explain publication of news stories that helped preserve the existing social practices related to reservations (p. 22-23).

All the reasons cited above undoubtedly had a critical impact on coverage of the Mandal Commission controversy, however, Shah neglects to mention the impact of the class affiliations of the *Times of India*'s audience and the pressures that this audience exerts. As John Fiske (1989) writes in his analysis of "popular news" in the West, "If there are no relevances between a text and the everyday lives of its readers, there will be little motivation to read it, and less pleasure to be gained from doing so" (p. 187). The English-speaking and writing audience of the *Times of India*, a historically constituted power group, influences the way the media treat those events where the power of this group is threatened. Coverage of these events in the media in support of the class interests of this audience in turn structures and shapes the sensibilities of the audience. To gain a finer understanding of this kind of a symbiotic relationship between the English-language media and their historically constituted audiences it is thus useful to examine how this audience came *to be* in the first place. Hemant Shah's analysis of the *Times of India* does not provide us a glimpse into the role India's colonial history played in the formation of certain socioeconomic groups which form the audience for elite media. However, his analysis is valuable for clearly demonstrating the potential for studying the articulation of the English-speaking upper-class solidarity through elite English-language media.

The second example I discuss is that of *Newstrack* video's coverage of the same controversy--the Mandal Commission controversy. *Newstrack* videos are monthly English video news programs privately produced by the owners of one of India's major newsmagazines *India Today*. In the context of government-controlled electronic media, privately produced news in the form of videonews along with newspapers which are privately owned often position themselves as anti-state and as oppositional forms of discourse. The example of *Times of India*'s coverage of the Mandal Commission controversy highlighted the paradoxical form resistance to the state may take in postcolonial nations--that is resistance may appear to challenge the hegemony of the state when in fact it is articulating the solidarity of the hegemonic forces in society who feel threatened by measures to redistribute power.

The very fact that *Newstrack* is produced in English, is a monthly videotape that needs to be purchased or subscribed to, and that a person needs a VCR to watch it establish it as an elite medium; the producers who are well aware of their audience tailor their programs and commercials for this viewership (Ram, 1994, p. 9). For an audience that is English-educated and Westernized, *Newstrack* carries commercials that promote expensive products that emphasize transnational culture and appeal to specifically high consumerist tastes--for instance they feature commercials for airlines like Cathay Pacific; Palmolive, the international shaving cream, and Zodiac Shirts worn by young men in a Mercedes (p. 10).

Borrowing heavily from Western television news formats, *Newstrack* features two anchors, often promises viewers that they were there first, that viewers are getting "exclusive" footage and information, and tries to convey a sense of informal intimacy with the audience (pp. 12-13). Shekar Ram (1994) who analyzes Newstrack's coverage of the riots and violence during the months of August and September 1990 writes, "The 'popular pleasure' of the Indian English-speaking bourgeoisie in terms of *Newstrack*, translates into a fast-paced, anti-authoritarian, anti-state, individual-oriented, current affairs program (p. 12). Ram asserts that *Newstrack* which is a popular form borrowed from the West becomes an elite form in the Indian context (p. 12).

Newstrack not only valorized the upper class anti-reservation student demonstrations as a morally justified battle, but it also attempted to convey the impression that the students' demands were supported by people across the country thus giving the viewer the impression that the "nation" was up in arms against the prime minister (Ram, 1994). Such a depiction of the issue as a "national" problem enabled Newstrack to construct an atmosphere of "moral panic," an atmosphere that allowed the setting up of a scenario where the government's policy could be seen as a threat against the brave students who were fighting to preserve their future. Suggesting the impact of this depiction, Shekar Ram (1994) observes:

> By positioning its audience to assume the plight of the upper/caste/class student as a universal condition of oppression reinforced by images of the "average" citizen sympathizing with the students' cause, *Newstrack* attempts to appear counter-hegemonic when it is in fact reinforcing hegemonic value and practices in Indian society (p. 23).

Following the lead of the printed media like the *Times of India*, *Newstrack* drew on upper class experts--academics and politicians--who were quick to point out the deficiencies of the policy without ever discussing the hundreds of years of injustice that the backward classes had suffered. *Newstrack* did not historicize the Mandal Commission recommendations, which were attempting to ameliorate the conditions of the backward classes who had suffered the dual oppression of colonialism and the caste system. Unlike Hemant Shah, Shekar Ram gives us a brief, nevertheless important, indication of the connections between the audience for *Newstrack* and the English language when he says, " . . . a production like *Newstrack*, an English video news program has a specific target group due to the medium, the elite language, and the news content" (p. 9). While he does not develop this any further, he at least draws the reader's attention to the links between class, language, and media.

English-language media like *Newstrack* and the *Times of India* are thus good examples of how the representational politics of class get manifested in the media at times when the social and economic power of the English-educated class gets threatened. One more example would serve to enhance this paper's exploration of the connections between language, class, media and Western ideologies--*India Today*'s coverage of the bitter and bloody fight between Hindus and Muslims when in December 1992 Hindu "fundamentalists" brought down a Muslim mosque, the Babri Masjid, in Ayodhya. The Hindus tore down the mosque claiming that it was the original birthplace of the Hindu god Rama. *India Today*, a fortnightly, is one of India's leading English news magazines and its format is very much like *Newsweek* and *Time*

Shanti Kumar's textual analysis of *India Today*'s coverage of the issues involved in the Hindu-Muslim struggle focuses on one particular creative project that *India Today* launched to address the Ayodhya problem (Kumar, 1994). Departing from the traditional journalistic role of observing and analyzing, the magazine solicited contributions from readers regarding their suggestions for solutions to the Ayodhya problem--"the solutions received were a blend of the religious, spiritual, humanitarian, scientific, naturalist and so on" (Kumar, 1994, p. 143). Religious solutions included the building of a temple-mosque complex, a building which had shrines for all of India's six religions, and a shrine to saint Ramdev who is worshipped by both Hindus and Muslims while secular solutions included the setting up of a hospital, school, a resource activity center, etc.

Kumar finds that *India Today* in summing up readers' responses received until April 1993 emphasized the secular solutions while marginalizing the religious solutions. Suggesting a possible explanation for *India Today*'s bias toward the religious responses Kumar writes, "The collusion and collision of the regimes of Western colonialism, and the modern regimes of nation-state, science, and history have engendered the myth of a rational, secular, hypermasculine, adult male as the ideal selfhood for the modern Indian (p. 144). For the English-language media whose audience is upper/middle class urban Indians who have been historically constituted by colonialism, secularism and scientific progress seem obviously preferable options to religious alternatives. Without giving the religious suggestions, which may in fact work better to address the Hindu-Muslim conflict, due consideration, *India Today* instead decided to privilege solutions that would seem more appropriate for a English-language magazine to advocate. Supporting solutions stemming from religion in a country where today the elite see religion as only belonging in the private sphere would not be the right strategy for *India Today* to appeal to its audience.

Thus the English-language media as we have seen in their coverage of the controversies discussed expressed upper/middle class views during those moments when the hegemony of these classes is threatened. These media showed their solidarity with the upper/middle castes and paradoxically gained legitimacy for their views by positioning themselves as counter-hegemonic voices--such is the postcolonial predicament.

Conclusion

This paper, an effort towards understanding the presence of the colonial in the postcolonial situation, began by describing the introduction of English in colonial India by the British in the nineteenth century. I then looked at how this colonial intervention divided the upper and lower classes in Indian society in new and different ways and examined the strong presence of this class division and the configurations of power associated with this division that continues to exist in modern India. Subsequently, the focus of this paper was on describing how the English-language media contributed in part to the creation of an "imagined community" and played a critical role in sustaining and maintaining the upper-class hegemony of this community, especially when the lower classes begin powerfully articulating their interests.

The expression of upper/middle class hegemony, which often takes a counter-hegemonic tone in the media, serves to reinstate the "common sense" of the upper/middle castes. Hartley (1981) writes that the media in modern society often serve a bardic function and " unlike the human bardic action . . . the media don't so much remind us of commonsense notions and classifications that we already have, rather they produce and reproduce them out of "raw" materials selected from the culture and linguistic environment (p. 105). From Hartley's assertion we can see that the media constitute one of the critical elements that shape and reshape the texture of our society. Commenting on the processes of change in India and the implication of the media in these processes, Hemant Shah (1994) writes, "Through this ongoing process of challenge, repression, and change, India will continue to produce and reproduce herself (p. 24).

To recapitulate the main point raised in this paper, we see that cultural phenomena such as the English-language media in India appear at the intersection of several sites such as class, language, and caste. This paper is one attempt at examining the link between colonialism, English and social formations in India, that is, the link between language and class through an analysis of the representational politics of the English-language media. The first two sections of this paper dwelt at length on the historical circumstances surrounding the introduction of English and the impact of these circumstances on social stratification in contemporary India. A critical purpose of these lengthy discussions was to make an effort towards historicizing the presence of the English-language media in India. I argue that any discussion of the audience of English-language media in India will have to take account not only the affiliation of English with colonialism, but also the way in which English itself operated since colonialism to constitute class formations. Studies of cultural imperialism in India, for instance, will have to examine carefully the history of audiences and their inscription within Western values long before the arrival of certain forms of imperialistic media themselves. In my own proposed work on romance reading among young, middle-class Indian women, the question of this audience reading Harlequin romances produced in the West and exported to India will *have* to discuss how these women became capable of reading fiction in English in the first place. The location of the English-language media within postcolonial situations like India will therefore have to, even if only briefly, examine the colonial history of English itself.

Urging further work on the question of English in India, in a collection of essays by Indian scholars on English and its embeddedness in ideological configurations, Svati Joshi writes:

> We need to contend with several questions such as the constitutive agency of English in the restructuring of social and political power; the reconstitution of literary and linguistic formations as well as critical and pedagogical practices through the changing ideologies of class, colony, empire, and nation; the uses of English in the centralization of culture and knowledge through the state apparatuses, especially through the institution of education; and its relation to the global imperial culture. We need, in other words, to confront the

larger issue of the recasting of our complex and heterogeneous world with differences, contradictions and conflicts into homogenizing discourses (p. 28).

I cite Svati Joshi at length to indicate the rich potential that the question of English in India has for future work by communication scholars; for instance the direction taken by this paper could well be used to also look at other English cultural products in India such as popular fiction, Hollywood films, MTV, popular magazines, popular Western music, etc.

From the research presented in this paper on the English-language media coverage of certain events we can see the connections between culture and ideology and the intersections of knowledge and power in the colonial and postcolonial situations. "Indian culture" is thus not a seamless unified whole, but is in fact constituted by the struggle over meaning between the powerful and the powerless (Hall, 1981). One of the important sites where the struggle over meaning occurs is in the arena of popular culture. By interrogating dominant ideologies in this arena, communication scholars can pave the way for a "cultural heterogeneity that is grounded in differences of social relations and modes of perception of various collectivities" (Joshi, 1991, p. 27).

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Recent Developments in Freedom of Information in Great Britain: A Preliminary Appraisal of the Government's "Code of Practice"

A research paper presented to the
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Recent Developments in Freedom of Information in Great Britain: A Preliminary Appraisal of the Government's "Code of Practice"

> The time has come for us to recognise the wisdom of Thomas Jefferson between whom and the Freedom of Information there flows an apostolic line. The want of freedoms which the Americans receive ... has always been a British deficiency.[1]

To Americans frustrated by the sometimes cumbersome Freedom of Information Act, it may come as a surprise to learn that there is a certain amount of envy and admiration in the mother country for what the FOIA can do for the patient citizen who takes the time to put it to use. The quotation above is, we think, a fair appraisal of the state of freedom of information in Great Britain. Frustrated by access barriers, British writers often find information in U. S. documents to shed light on British politics. In a recently-published book titled The Fall of Hong Kong, dealing with the imminent departure of the British from that colony and the events leading thereto, author Mark Roberti leaned on American documents to build a case for what he calls "Britain's betrayal."[2] The reviewer noted that a good deal of the

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[1] Edward Pearce, New Statesman, 22 January 1988, 8.

[2] Martin Booth, "The Last Signing" (review), The Sunday Times (London) Books, 13 November 1994, 6.

background to the withdrawal agreement was well hidden from the British public.

> Much of this is unknown to the British people; the Thirty Year Rule conceals the documentation. The U. S. Freedom of Information Act, on the other hand, has already put many of the facts into the public domain; it is from this source that the author has drawn extensively.[3]

A recent issue of Secrets, publication of the Campaign for Freedom of Information, a rough equivalent to the Washington-based Reporters Committee, amplifies the curious circumstance described above, including information about cleanliness on British cruise ships, pesticide data unavailable in England and environmental problems at an American air base in England -- all taken from documents obtained by using the U. S. FOIA.[4]

It is accurate to describe the legal state of affairs vis a vis open records at the national level in Great Britain as lagging behind the United States, but the persistent zeal for openness there is on a par with the freedom of information movement in the United States. The collective effort of British journalists and

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[3] Ibid.

[4] "What the American FOI Act Reveals about Britain," Secrets, July 1991, 1, 2, 4, 5.

other interested groups has not yet led to legislation. But, it did lead to the establishment of an Open Government Code of Practice in April 1994.[5]

This article will (1) summarize some of the fundamentals in the British political culture that affect freedom of information, (2) review the history of the freedom of information movement in Great Britain, (3) describe the unsuccessful attempt to pass a national freedom of information law in Great Britain that led to the government's adoption of a Code of Practice and (4) summerize use of the Code in the period from April to December 1994.

Readers should note that there has been considerable success in working toward openness at the local government level in Great Britain, in terms of access to both records and meetings. These advances in law, roughly equivalent to the 50 sets of laws governing openness at the state level in the United States, are not the focus of this artcle.

The British Political Culture and Openness in Government

Those who seek more government openness in any nation-state must work within the political culture. Commentators in Great Britain who have tried to explain the difficulty in effecting change must confront the question of "...why

[5] "Testing the Open Government Code of Practice," Open Government Briefing No. 1. (London: Campaign for Freedom of Information, May 1994), appendix.

Britain's tradition of governmental secrecy has proved so durable."[6] Professor A. P. Tant's summary of the British political tradition and its effect on secrecy is a useful one.

Old Tory theory saw a King as the earthly leader of a heavenly ordained society, holding the initiative in policy making. The English Civil War overturned that view and replaced it with a Whig "balanced constitution" that put Parliament and its members at the center of policy making. The result was not a purely people-centered democracy, but one that dealt with a system of checks, balances and patronage involving the King, Lords and Commons. Parliament took on a coloration that was more deliberative than representative, though it was the latter as well. The result "institutionalized a narrow, elitist concept of representation."[7] The elected representatives thus set themselves apart from those they represented as an independent authority. Professor Tant argues that this has led to an elitism in British governmental theory that seems

[6] A. P. Tant, "The Campaign for Freedom of Information: A Participatory Challenge to Elitist British Government," Public Administration 68 (Winter 1990):478.

[7] Tant, 479.

"highly questionable in a democratic era,"[8] and unquestionably bears on the matter of official secrecy.

Cabinet ministers, plucked from the House of Commons when a government is formed, thus become charged with the responsibility for seeing that government pursues a wise policy, whether or not it meets with immediate public approval.

> Strong, centralized, decisive and <u>independent</u> government is thus again emphasized, with the assumption that good government is not founded upon what the people want, but rather, upon what their governors consider to be right.[9]

Responsibility in this scheme of things is to the Parliament, rather than popular opinion. Ministers must be ready to resign when mistakes are disclosed, "rather than when they are <u>discovered</u>."[10] Undisclosed mistakes do not pose a constitutional problem, and ministers thus have a strong incentive to keep a lid on information release. Leaking is not only irresponsible but a breach of trust and duty, and undermines public confidence and support. "Since government is not (directly) accountable to the people, there is little

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Tant, 480.

[10] Ibid.

need for the people to be well-informed about the details of public policy."[11]

Responsiveness is not an obligation. All this identifies

> ...an idea central throughout the whole of the British tradition, and upon which official secrecy rests. That is, that government -- whatever the form or ideological justification -- is the sole arbiter of the national interest/public good.[12]

Another commentator posed the difficulty in a slightly different way: "Open government depends upon a justification grounded in moral rights which contradicts the received theory of constitutional law in the United Kingdom."[13] Under the received theory, "...the State is the Leviathan and open government has no place in the Leviathan. The Leviathan is all-powerful, sovereign, and open government implies a sharing of power in the act of knowing and the right to know."[14]

This summary of British political theory and its application to government openness may, to the cynic, seem to be a carbon copy of what is operative on the American side of the Atlantic. Citizens and journalists have long struggled

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 481.

[13] David Galbraith, "Official Sescrets, Security and Open Government," in Freedom of Speech: Basis and Limits, Garry Maher, ed. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden Gmbh, 1986), 64.

[14] Ibid.

against oppressive methods of controlling information in the United States. But, without reviewing two hundred years of American political theory, there is an obvious and fundamental difference in a nation which rejected imperial control in favor of a system that picked its governors from among the people at the outset. Accountability resides in the elected official, and Americans have never been shy in going directly to those officials for answers. Truth and full disclosure are not easy or guaranteed, but the distance between the governed and the government seems much closer than in Great Britain. To sum up:

> The official mind in Britain has an exaggerated regard for tradition. Tradition consists largely of the accumulation of precedents. In the establishment canon precedent is overwhelmingly on the side of 'discretion' and 'confidentiality.' Both terms signify values which are deeply rooted in ruling British political culture.[15]

The Freedom of Information Movement in Great Britain

Observers date the contemporary campaign for freedom of information in Britain to the 1960s. Into the 1970s the movement is described as "no more than a loose association of bodies and individuals sharing a common position on

[15] Martin Smith, "Open Government and the Consumer in Britain," in Freedom of Information Trends in the Information Age, Tom Riley and Harold C.Relyea, eds. (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1983), 125.

a single issue, and working together informally to further parliamentary bills."[16]

The "loose association" included many press and consumer groups, some carrying the imprimatur of the legal establishment. In 1978, for instance, a committee of Justice, the British section of the International Commission of Jurists, issued a pamphlet titled, Freedom of Information.[17] It was edited by Anthony Lincoln, Q. C., representing the Justice council including lawyers, jurists and legal scholars. It succinctly set forth a rationale for more openness in government. It recognized the basic difficulty in defining the term, "freedom of Information," and the fact that universal openness was a pragmatic impossibility. But it insisted that "too little information is furnished to the public by government in the United Kingdom and its agencies and that unnecessary secrecy surrounds many aspects of the administration and the legislative process."[18]

The committee suggested that it was time to go beyond stating the need for more information by moving to concrete action. They recommended a

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[16] Tant, 481.

[17] (London: Justice, 1978).

[18] Ibid., 1.

Code of Practice that would establish an affirmative framework for openness as well as a set of rules within the Code. This included a requirement to provide information or documents on request, unless there was an exception or exemption. The exemption list was remarkably short and reasonably precise: (1) defense, national security and internal security, (2) law enforcement, (3) litigation material otherwise protected by privilege, (4) material entrusted in confidence to an agency or authority, (5) matters concerning individual privacy and (6) material which would expose an individual to a defamation action.[19] The exemptions were not foolproof, and there was no enforcement mechanism inherent in the proposed code, but the document added prestige and commitment to the FOI movement.

Attempts to legislate openness at a variety of levels increased. A 1979 bill unsuccessfully introduced in Parliament by Clement Freund sought access to advice and information that had been available to ministers, making "factual advice" available without delay, thus separating it from the more sensitive "policy advice."[20] Without the support of the government -- including a

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19 Ibid., 17-18.

20 Tant, 482.

long period of time when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a stubborn opponent of openness, was in power -- most attempts at change led nowhere.[21]

The ingathering of a variety of organizations under an umbrella organization in the early 1980s was a critical milestone in the FOI campaign. The 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information brought together what might best be described as a diverse and interesting group of organizations, which numbers at least 81 at present.[22] The organizations range from the predictible (Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, National Union of Journalists and Institute of Journalists) to the unpredictible (Church of England Board for Social Responsibility, Greenpeace and the Vegetarian Society), at least by American freedom of information standards. (The Orwellian "1984" has since been dropped from the title, and a three-member staff headed by director Maurice Frankel works out of a compact -- 20 by 20 -- but efficiently organized office at 88 Old Street, London.)

The unified campaign produced its first major legislative success with the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985. The bill legislated openness of subcommittees to the public and amended a 1960 open meetings

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21 Ibid., 483.

22 "The Campaign's Supporting and Observer Organizations," Secrets, August 1993, 8.

law to redefine vague closure provisions for reasons of "confidentiality" and "public interest." Minutes were to be made available along with government information assembled for governmental use. Publication of the public's right of access to information was also required in the new law. Passage of the law represented an instance in which the Thatcher government did not oppose a private member's bill, and required only some modification to give the support needed for passage.[23]

Other successes short of a national freedom of information bill followed, including laws providing individual access to personal files (1987) and medical records (1988). Some observers regard these as only minor triumphs, without denigrating the level of difficulty required, in that they made little or no dent in the larger circle of secrecy drawn around Westminster and Whitehall by political tradition and laws such as the Official Secrets Act.[24]

The (Failed) Attempt for a Freedom of Information Bill

In 1991, the Campaign for FOI launched its most important effort, a move for national legislation covering access to major organs of government, roughly equivalent to the U. S. Freedom of Information act. A 165-page

[23] Tant, 483-4.

[24] Tant, 484-5.

document[25] was published in November 1991 that contained a draft bill and commentary.

The authors described the draft bill as accomplishing the following:

1. Creating a "general public right of access to government records."

2. Defining exempt classes of information.

3. Preventing government from withholding records "unless it can demonstrate that their contents are exempt."

4. Establishing a review body -- a Commissioner and Tribunal -- with power to examine records and require disclosure.[26]

Exempt information was designed to "protect information where a genuine case for preserving confidentiality"[27] existed, and would permit withholding if significant damage would be done to specific interests: defense, security and intelligence services, foreign relations, law enforcement, the economy, commercial activities of a public activity or a third party, privacy

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[25] A Freedom of Information Act for Britain: A Draft Bill and Commentary (London: Campaign for Freedom of Information, 1991).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

invasion, policy advice (but not expert advice) and legal advice related to possible litigation.[28]

The Commissioner and Tribunal arrangement was designed to expedite review where denial resulted and be less expensive and more informal than the courts; a body of case law would be built up over time.[29]

The Introduction argued forceably and directly that the law was not an attempt to undermine traditional parliamentary accountability, but only opened up access on the part of both Members of Parliament and the public. That it would change Ministers' ability to withhold information was acknowledged but found no reason to use this as an argument for opposing the law. The introduction also cited the experience of other democracies -- particularly Commonwealth nations such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- which had modified their own parliamentary systems by passage of open records legislation; none of those countries examined reported a weakening of traditional power and authority beyond the increased openness. The advantges far outweighed any perceived disadvantages.[30] Any person

[28] Ibid., 1-2.

[29] Ibid., 2.

[30] Ibid., 5-7.

would have a right of access to information not exempted, and fees would be minimal and predictible. A thirty-day response time was set for agencies. Procedures for appeals through the Tribunal were simply and clearly outlined.

The bill was introduced by Labour Party MP Mark Fisher as a private member bill in 1992. It survived into a second reading and a five-hour debate on the floor of the House of Commons 19 February 1993, and was voted into committee 168-2. That there was enormous support seemed evident, and comment wide ranging. Glenda Jackson, Labour Party MP and actor, noted that Sweden had had an FOI law for two hundred years as did the United States, "which had more paranoia than most about internal and external threats to its security."[31] A Conservative MP, Alan Howarth, said "the great prize" in FOI was the improved opportunity it would give the press for serious discussion of important issues. Decision making would be improved if the advice of experts was "tested by being exposed to the scutiny of common sense and of alternative experts."[32]

In the end, the naysayers prevailed and the bill died in committee, because of a lack of support by John Major's government. Conservative MP

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[31] "The Commons Debate: What MPS said," Secrets, August 1993, 3.

[32] Ibid.

Bernard Jenkin said the bill represented a "blunderbuss approach" to increased openness.[33] The government's spokesman, William Waldegrave, said that information sometimes must be kept secret, that governing involved negotiation at many public and private levels where "one cannot always have all the cards face up."[34] The proposed bill went further than legislation in other countries, he claimed. And, he asked, was it right that public authorities should provide access to internal papers in what might be a "fruitless diversion of effort."?[35] He promised a White Paper on openness before the end of summer, 1993.[36]

That is just what happened. The position paper, simply titled Open Government[37], was the government's non-legislative response to the failed open records bill. Commentators found both good and bad in the government's proposals. Professor Charles Raab said it "ambitiously and creditably encompasses issues that constitute a broadly-based agenda for information policy. It brings together measures concerning public access to information

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Cm 2290, Open Government (London: HMSO, 1993).

about the current workings of government..."[38] There was in the document the possibility for "modest but achievable change that builds upon recent laws and initiatives."[39] On the other hand, Professor Raab continued, the implementation of a Code of Practice was heavily dependent on personality and persuasian without an enforcement mechanism within the law. Discretion was still broad and vague. "Whilst the White Paper grasps the importance of openness as a democratic principle, it blurs it through uneven and arbitary application to different objects."[40] While opening access to information, the White Paper denied a right to documents. The Justice report of 1978[41] was incorporated in the Code, without permitting access to documents as suggested in the Justice report.[42]

The Campaign for Freedom of Information was less approving than the scholarly analysis provided by Professor Raab. The lead story in their publication said it directly with its headline, "Code of Practice Falls Short of

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[38] Charles D. Raab, "Open Government: Policy Information and Information Policy," Political Quarterly 65 (July-September 1994): 340.

[39] Ibid., 341.

[40] Ibid.

[41] See footnote 17, supra.

[42] Raab, 342-3.

Right to Know."[43] The Open Government document contained some positive aspects, but "stops a long way short of delivering freedom of information." The good news was that there was a "foot in the door" but the failure to provide access to documents (as opposed to information) was disappointing. Despite concessions, "the need for genuine freedom of information is as pressing as ever," the organization argued.[44]

What then, is this "Code of Practice" which the government initiated and implemented on its own in the wake of the unsuccessful open records legislation? In a document urging the citizens use the code, which went into effect in April 1994, the Campaign for Freedom of Information outlined what the Code offered:

*A government promise to release information unless it was exempt by one of fifteen broad classes of exempt information.

*A government response to requests within twenty working days.

*An appeal mechanism. The citizen can ask the department to review its decision and then request review through the Parliamentary Commissioner for

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[43] Secrets, August 1993, 1.

[44] Ibid.

Administration (the Parliamentary Ombudsman), an action which has to be initiated by a Member of Parliament.

*Publication of departmental internal rules and manuals.

*A general commitment to explain to citizens administrative decisions which affect them.[45]

The defects remained, however: supplying information but not documents, too many exemptions vaguely worded, an uncertain and probably overpriced fee system, limited coverage of governmental bodies, no authority to compel disclosure, no direct, citizen appeal to the Ombudsman.[46]

A copy of the pamphlet published by the government to explain the Code and its use is appended to this article.[47] It is a simply written document in question-and-answer style that describes how the citizen may use the Code, and which government departments are covered by it. The Campaign for FOI urged that the Code be used, despite its shortcomings, and asked for feedback on problems.[48]

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[45] "Testing the Open Government code of Practice," May 1994 (London: Campaign for Freedom of Information, 1994), 1-2.

[46] Ibid., 2-3.

[47] "Open Government: Access to Government Under the Code of Practice," 1994 (London, n.p., 1994).

[48] "Testing," 3-12.

The first comprehensive report on the effect of the Code was issued 9 November 1994 and seemed to bear out the worst fears of those in the freedom of information campaign.[49] The two key problems were wildly varying charges for information and searches, and differing interpretations of how the Code should be applied to requests.

The worst case of photocopying charges was found in the National Rivers Authority, which required £50 a page for regular size photocopies and £100 per oversize page, roughly equivalent to $80 and $160, respectively. The Public Health Laboratory Service said it would charge between £2,000 and £3,000 to name local authorities who reported salmonella food poisoning incidents since 1988. Some agencies asked for a flat £15 application fee paid in advance, nonrefundable even if no information was forthcoming.[50]

There were some bright spots. The Cabinet Office, the Department of National Heritage, the Lord Chancellor's Department, the Scottish Office and most of the Northern Ireland Office were waiving charges for the first five

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[49] "Cost of Information 'Prices Right to Know out of Public's Reach,' " (news release, Campaign for Freedom of Information), 9 November 1994.

[50] Ibid.

hours of work. The Department of Trde and Industry and the Welsh Office also did not charge if costs were under £100.[51]

The media have been supportive in the campaign and in reporting most developments in the implementation of the Code, according to director Maurice Frankel.[52] For instance, both the Times and the Guardian carried succinct summaries of the Campaign's report on the code[53] and the Times editorialized strongly that the application of the Code was being undermined by uneven application and exhorbitant fees.[54] The media response is predictably uncertain, Frankel says, and some reports on specific agency responses to requests have been ignored by newspapers.[55]

It is too early to assess the effectivness of the Ombudsman in supporting the code, but a few gains in access were reported late in November. William Reid, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, said both the Department of Health and the Minister of Transport had disclosed information after an appeal to his office

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[51] Ibid.

[52] Interview, Maurice Frankel, London, 18 November 1994.

[53] "Whitehall Data Fees 'excessive,' " Guardian, 9 Novembesr 1994, 6; "L100 a Photocopy is Price of Public's 'Right to Know,' " Times, 9 November 1994, 8.

[54] "Glasnost for Sale: Freedom of Information Requires Reasonably Low Fees," Times, 9 November 1994, 19.

[55] Frankel interview.

was carried to the departments concerned. He reported only twenty-one complaints to his office by the end of November, but said they demonstrate "the way in which information, which the Government had been reluctant to release, can be obtained under the Code."[56]

Summary and Conclusions

With less than a year of experience of using the Code as this was written, it is premature to assess it as a success or failure. What has been reported so far reminds us of the early years of the U. S. Freedom of Information Act, where response time was uncertain, the appeals process nonexistent and the fee structure capricious. A certain amount of realism about freedom of information has been urged by one commentator.

> The experiences of Freedom of Information in the USA, and support for the Local Government (Access to Information) Act in [Great Britain], support the contention that open government is a minority interest. Nevertheless, the lesson from all aspects of politics is that action is ultimately determined by the powerful, not by the majority.[57]

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[56] "Ombudsman Flexes Muscles," Independent,24 November 1994, 12.

[57] M.C. Hunt, Open Government in the 1980s (Sheffield, England: PAVIC Publications, Sheffield City Polytechnic, 1988), 10.

It is safe to say that the Code as government response to blunt the freedom of information movement will not satisfy the individuals and organizations who have worked in recent decades to change deep-seated resistance to openness. Although the level of legal openness in Great Britain may indeed be below that which is enjoyed in the United States, the commitment to improve, change and educate is neck-and-neck. The British government can expect no respite in the years ahead from those committed to open government.

...ic and Social Research Council
...on, Department for
Education Assets Board
Educational Visits and Exchanges, Central Bureau for
Education and Training in Social Work, Central
Council for
Standards in Education, Office for
Electricity Regulation, Office of
Employment, Department of
Engineering construction Industry Training Board
English Tourist Board
Environment, Department of
Equal Opportunities Commission
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Fair Trading, Office of the Director General
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Forestry Commission
Friendly Societies, Registry of
Friendly Societies Commission
Gas Supply, Office of
General Register Office, Scotland
Health, Department of
Health and Safety Commission
English Heritage
Health and Safety Executive
HM Chief Inspector of schools in England
HM Chief Inspector of Schools in Wales
Home Office
Horserace Betting Levy Board
Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board
Housing Corporation
Housing for Wales
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
Inland Revenue
Valuation Office
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce
Land Registry
Legal Aid Board
Legal Aid Board, Scottish
Lighthouse Authorities:
(a) The Corporation of the Trinity House of
Deptford Strond
(b) The Commissioners of Northern Lighthouses
Lord Chancellor's Department
Lord President of the Council's Office
Medical Practices Committee
Medical Research Council
Scottish Medical Practices Committee
Museums and Galleries Commission
National Debt Office
National Heritage, Department of
National Heritage Memorial Fund, Trustees of
National Lottery, Director General of
National Rivers Authority
National Savings, Department for
Natural Environment Research Council
Nature Conservancy Council for England
New Towns, Commission for
New Towns, Development Corporations for
Northern Ireland Court Service
Northern Ireland Office
Ordnance Survey
Passenger Rail Franchising, Director of
Population Censuses and Surveys, Office of
Rail Regulator
Registrar of Public Lending Right
Public Records Office
Public Service and Science, Office of
Racial Equality, Commission for
Red Deer Commission
Registers of Scotland, Department of
Residuary Bodies
Rights of the Trade Union Members, Office of the
Commissioner for
Royal Mint
Rural Development Commission
Science and Engineering Research Council
Scottish Courts Administration
Scottish Homes
Scottish Natural Heritage
Scottish Office
Scottish Records Office
Scottish Sports Council
Scottish Tourist Board
Social Security, Department of
Child Support Agency
Social Security Contributions Agency
Social Security Benefits Agency
War Pensions Agency
Sports Council
Sports Council for Wales
Stationery Office
Protection against Unlawful Industrial Action,
Office of the Commissioner for
Telecommunications, Office of the Director General
Board of Trade
Trade and Industry, Department of
Traffic Director for London
Transport, Department of
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency
Treasury
Treasury Solicitor
Urban Development Corporations
Urban Regeneration Agency
Rural Wales, Development Board for
Water Services, Office of
Wales Tourist Board
Welsh Language Board
Welsh Office

As well as other government agencies not mentioned in the list

Open Government

On 4 April 1994 a new Code of Practice came into effect to provide greater access to government information. This leaflet explains how it will operate.

ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
UNDER THE
CODE OF PRACTICE

CITIZEN'S CHARTER

What will the Code of Practice Mean

The Code of Practice is based on Citizen's Charter themes of increased openness and accountability. It will support informed policy making and debate and efficient service delivery. It will make information about the policies, actions and decisions of Government departments, agencies and public bodies more widely available.

The Code includes five commitments:

- to give facts and analysis with major policy decisions;
- to open up internal guidelines about departments' dealings with the public;
- to give reasons with administrative decisions;
- to provide information under the Citizen's Charter about public services, what they cost, targets, performance, complaints and redress;
- to answer requests for information

Which bodies are covered by the Code?

Central government departments and their agencies as well as many other public bodies which are subject to investigation by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. A list appears in this leaflet. Similar Codes are being prepared for the National Health Service and local authorities

Will all government information be available?

The presumption is in favour of the release of information. But the Government must honour personal privacy and commercial confidences, and will not operate the Code in a way which undermines good management and internal decision making, or such functions as law enforcement and defence. A list of exemptions is included in the Code.

How do I apply to see information?

The first step is to contact the relevant department, agency or body. Write to them explaining what information you are looking for. Being as precise as possible will help the department to answer your request more quickly. You do not have to specify particular files or documents, and the Code does not entitle you to see them. It is the Department's responsibility to find and provide the information you are seeking.

How long will it take?

Departments have set themselves a target of twenty days in which to deal with simple requests. If they are going to need longer to reply, they will let you know and give you a new deadline by which you can expect to see the information.

What will it cost me?

Much information will continue to be provided free of charge, especially where this is necessary to explain:

- benefits, grants and entitlements;
- the standards and performance of services;
- the reasons for administrative decisions made in your case;
- the way in which you may exercise rights to appeal or complain about a decision;
- regulatory requirements bearing on your business.

To ensure that the Code does not create extra burdens on the taxpayer there may be a charge for information if a request does not come within one of these categories and causes additional work. Charges may consist of an initial flat rate to cover straightforward requests, with the possibility of an additional payment if your request causes significant extra work,

but this will always be notified in advance so that you can confirm you are willing to pay before work is undertaken. Charging schemes vary, so contact the Department or agency for details.

What if I have a complaint?

If you believe that your request has not been answered properly, or that a response has taken too long to come, or if you think that you have been charged too much, then you may ask the body who provided the information to review its decision. You will be given details about internal review along with the response to your request.

What if I am not satisfied with the outcome of the internal review?

The next step would be to approach the Ombudsman through an MP. He is an independent officer of Parliament who has the power to see papers relevant to each case and will be able to test decisions against the Code of Practice. The Ombudsman has produced his own leaflet explaining how he can help the public in these and other matters. This is available from Citizens' Advice Bureaux, public libraries and the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Millbank Tower, Millbank, London, SW1P 4QP.

Where can I get a copy of the Code?

To order a copy of the full Code of Practice either call 0345 223242 or write to:
Open Government
Room 417b
Office of Public Service and Science
70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS.

Does the Code affect my statutory rights?

No. You already have some statutory rights to personal information held by local authority housing and social services departments, and to certain education, health and medical files. The Data Protection Act creates rights of access to personal information held on computer, the Environmental Information Regulations to certain environmental information and the Consumer Credit Act to credit reference records. The White Paper on Open Government proposed that there should be new rights of access to personal files and health and safety information; these are subject to Parliamentary approval and are not yet in place. There are also requirements in law that certain personal and commercial information must be kept confidential. The Code does not cut across these.

List of bodies covered by the code of practice

Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
Agricultural and Food Research Council
Agricultural Training Board
Agricultural, Fisheries and Food, Ministry of
Agricultural Wages Committees
Arts Council of Great Britain
British Council
British Film Institute
British Library Board
Building Societies Commission
Central Office of Information
Central Statistical Office
Certification Officer
Charity Commission
Construction Industry Training Board
Co-operative Development Agency
Countryside Commission
Countryside Council for Wales
Crafts Council
Crofters Commission
Crown Estate Office
Customs and Excise
Data Protection Registrar
Defence, Ministry of

Insurgent Technology:
The Political Ramifications of the Internet in Africa

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Insurgent Technology:
The Political Ramifications
of the Internet in Africa

According to recent estimates, about 20 million people use the Internet. But then again, who can keep track? Thousands more join every month.[1] Most users live in the United States or western Europe, where the Internet is steadily introducing a radical new structure of relationships and even language. New words like *cyberspace* and *e-mail* have been invented, and traditional rhetorical methods have been altered with computer-based organizing techniques, such as *hypertext*. The Internet has made the information revolution a reality in much of the western world.

Nor has the Internet gone unnoticed by the rest of the world. Countries in Asia and South America are gradually tying in, and eastern Europe is scrambling to overcome cold war fears of its computer connectivity. As in so many other measures of development, however, Africa lags behind. In 1991, for instance, FidoNet (an amateur network system) had thousands of nodes in the

[1]John W. Verity and Robert Hof, "The Internet: How It Will Change the Way You Do Business," *Business Week*, 14 November 1994, 80.

United States. There were just six nodes in subsaharan Africa--three in Botswana and three in Zimbabwe.[2] There were no Internet connections.

Africa's isolation from the Net will not last forever. Already several South African universities and commercial services are connected. LDDS Metromedia Communications, a Mississippi-based telephone company, now offers a phone card called the "Mandela PhonePass" because the South African president's picture appears on the card. This card offers access not only to an array of conventional telephone services such as voicemail, but also to the Internet.[3] Universities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) across the rest of Africa are also looking for ways to link up.

As with the introduction of any new technology, the Internet has not come without controversy. But to this point the problems described have been largely technical. Some, arguing in favor of the Internet, have begun to outline the benefits of the Net in terms of national development, particularly in an economic framework. Few, however, have looked in depth at the political ramifications of the Net in Africa. These political factors may justify or undermine the Internet from its earliest stages.

[2] R.R. Ronkin, *Global Cyberspace: Who Needs It?* Paper submitted for the Resource Book of the meeting "Civilizing Cyberspace: Minding the Matrix," Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Washington, DC, 26-27 June 1991. Obtained from Volunteers in Technical Assistance via FTP 155.135.1.1.

[3] Tracy Miller, "Mandela phone card to aid South Africa," United Press International, 3 June 1994, BC cycle.

The Internet and National Development

Before considering the political impact, several general questions about the Internet must be answered. Most significantly, how does the Internet fit into current models of national development? Is this simply another inappropriate technology being transferred to the Third World, resulting in yet another cycle of dependency? Will this new technology benefit the truly needy, or will it result in further polarization of elite and masses? If general benefits are presumed, what form will they take? The answers to these questions will influence the political outcomes to be considered later.

Early national development schemes emphasized a top-down, one-way flow of information and technology from the western nations to the Third World. Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm were among the first to propose theoretical models for development, and they focused on development at the macrosocial and infrastructural level. Following this model, large-scale projects including roads, dams and industrial plants were built. Although many of these projects benefitted only a few initially, the effects were expected to trickle down to the entire population.

In the 1970s, however, the failure of the top-down plan to lead to broad-based development became increasingly obvious. Following the lead of Paulo Freire, theoretical models began to emphasize development at the grassroots level, characterized by high levels of conscientization and participation.[4] Development was now to be driven by empowering local people to critique their own societies and respond to their own needs. As Melkote has pointed out, however, the model of bottom-up, participatory development has been difficult to operationalize.[5]

The case of the Internet's introduction to Africa sheds light on the problem. On the one hand, the Internet is technology intensive, requiring significant amounts of capital as well as technical skills. For the most part, it relies on an infrastructure of telephones and electricity. Almost none of the equipment needed is currently manufactured in Africa, and both software and training come from overseas. From this perspective, the Internet is yet another example of the one-way flow of goods and information from the core to the periphery. Third world countries are kept economically subservient by their need for western equipment and expertise. Unable to produce manufactured goods for sale in the west, they must sell lower-value raw materials in exchange for value-added products from the core countries.

This view of computers has led to concerns such as those voiced by Ali Mazrui:

> *We must first redefine development in the Third World to mean modernization minus dependency.* Some of the gaps

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[4]Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Continuum Publishing Company).

[5]Srinivas R. Melkote, *Communication for Development in the Third World: Theory and Practice* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1991), 236-237.

> between the West and Africa have indeed to be narrowed--*but this narrowing must include the gap in sheer power.* To narrow the gap in, say, per capita income in a manner that widens the gap in power is to pursue affluence at the expense of autonomy. To narrow the gap in the utilization of computers while increasing western technological control over the Third World is to prefer gadgetry to independence.[6]

On the other hand, as it has developed in the West, the Internet functions in a highly *participatory* manner. Electronic mail, listservers and other forums invite all comers, allowing discussion among disparate group members. Bellman and Tindimubona have already observed some of the benefits of the Internet's participatory function in Africa. In their experience, the anonymity of the medium promotes critical discussion, while the connectivity fosters a friendly attitude toward others engaged in the discussion.[7]

Furthermore, computer technology need not doom Third World countries to dependence forever. One of its primary strengths is its flexibility. Doris Schoenhoff, discussing how computers can be adapted to reflect non-western knowledge patterns points out:

> The computer is a unique tool because its purpose is constantly being reinvented by its users. Its power consists

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[6] Ali A. Mazrui, "Development Equals Modernization Minus Dependency: A Computer Equation," in D.R.F. Taylor and R.A. Obudho, eds., *The Computer and Africa: Applications, Problems, and Potential* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 281-282.

[7] Beryl L. Bellman and Alex Tindimubona, *Global Networks and International Communications: AFRINET*. Prepared for Panel on "Electronic Bulletin Boards and Computer Networks: Africa and African Studies in the Information Age" at the 34th Annual Meetings of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, MO, Nov. 23-26, 1991. Obtained from Volunteers in Technical Assistance via FTP 155.135.1.1.

> in the fact that it is a symbol machine, and its symbols and their interpretation can be altered.[8]

While the computer carries with it western values and the portent of economic dependency, it retains the potential to be used for new purposes reflecting African values and realities. Clearly an important first step would be to begin developing software for Africa by Africans.

On balance, then, the Internet can be seen as an ambiguous technology, raising concerns about economic and cultural domination, while promising new possibilities to achieve the kind of dialog theorists suggest is necessary for real development. Indeed, its effects in the West have been ambiguous as well, promoting academic, scientific and social communication while providing yet another medium for the spread of pornography. French sociologist Jacques Ellul has pointed out this duality inherent in all technology, and noted that technology promises more than it can deliver and costs more in human terms than just economic terms.[9]

In today's global society, the countries of Africa will have difficulty keeping out the Internet even if they want to. The challenge, then, is to understand the potential of the technology and to drive it toward positive development ends.

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[8]Doris M. Schoenhoff, *The Barefoot Expert: The Interface of Computerized Knowledge Systems and Indigenous Knowledge Systems* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 76.

[9]Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Bluff* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990).

The Internet and the Politics of Development

Paulo Freire's concept of conscientization was self-consciously political--the problems of the peasants as rooted in the power structures of society. Therefore, when the people became aware of their subordination, they would respond with political force.

In contrast, David Goldsworthy suggests that many development plans initiated by western donor countries have failed to adequately consider political factors.[10] These factors sometimes override the good intentions of the donors, so they should be carefully considered in the planning of any development scheme. He proposes three dimensions for evaluating the impact of politics on development projects: values, interests and power. In his model, values represent the beliefs and moral attitudes that are prevalent in a given society, and interests are the material resources available. The application of values to interests leads to questions of power--whose interests are at stake or are benefitting, who determines how values are applied, and so on.

The introduction of the Internet to Africa will have political implications on several levels, affecting the political structure of African countries both internally and externally. It will influence culture and drive political change for better or worse. Goldsworthy's model can be used to evaluate the benefits and potential pitfalls of the Internet in Africa.

[10] David Goldsworthy, "Thinking Politically About Development," *Development and Change*, 19 (1988), 505-530.

Values

Technologies by their nature reflect the values of the cultures that created them. They are responses to the felt needs, thought patterns, even worldviews of those particular cultures. At the same time, they transform cultures, even the ones that gave them birth. Following are a few value ranges that might be important to consider when determining the political impact of the Internet in Africa. This list is not comprehensive, but suggests some starting points for uncovering the underlying values of the technology and how those may conflict with existing cultural values.

A commonly recognized distinction between the West and Africa is the emphasis on individualism versus community. Not surprisingly, the computer tends to promote individualism. Each machine can be custom configured and is used by one person at a time. As a stand-alone machine, the computer is inherently individualistic. The Internet, however, links individuals together into an electronic community. Though the interface of the computer monitor is impersonal, the communication link creates a personal effect that can override the inherent impersonality.

The political implications are evident: if African cultures stress community over individualism, the Internet may drive the introduction of computers. In the United States, on the other hand, computer sales were already strong when on-line services became available. Organizations seeking to promote the Internet in Africa, then, should emphasize the community-building aspect of the technology rather than pointing out the files and information available, which is the typical American approach.

Similar to individualism versus community, a second value range runs from reductionist to holistic. In her book on computerized expert systems, Schoenhoff points out that Western science tends heavily toward reductionism rather than holism.[11] This is reflected in computer technology. Databases, for instance, divide information into fields and records, and printers use dot matrices. Many African cultures, in contrast, take a more holistic approach to the world, and see systems more organically. In this case, the multifunctioning of computers might be cultivated. The computer would not be limited to just word processing or number crunching. Instead, the value of computers in a wide range of activities would be emphasized. This would help to counteract the reductionist tendencies of the technology.

Another key value range runs from the primacy of local culture versus global culture. As the world continues to shrink, cultural impacts become all the more significant. Peter Judge, reporter for *The Guardian,* notes:

> There is a price to be paid by newcomers to the Net: they have to adopt American technology and the English language. For the majority of the world, even the alphabet on the keyboard is foreign. But most countries are ready to pay

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[11]Schoenhoff, 28-29.

> this price, for without telecommunications, they will be excluded from business in the 21st century.[12]

Still, most countries are concerned about protecting as much local culture as possible. Paradoxically, Schoenhoff points out that "the computer is a unique tool because its purpose is constantly being reinvented by its users. Its power consists in the fact that it is a symbol machine, and its symbols and their interpretation can be altered."[13] In other words, both local and global culture could potentially exist simultaneously in the computer.

Politically, then, the pressure to produce software in the Third World is not just economic, to prevent spending foreign exchange. Impetus also comes from the desire to protect local culture by producing software that displays in local languages and organizes in locally recognized categories. The Internet will probably remain English-based, because of the need for a global trade language. But local networks and programs need not be restricted to using a foreign language. Already computer operating systems run in several European languages, Arabic and Japanese. Multilingualism should become more common as software develops.

Finally, a value range that receives little academic attention runs from secular to spiritual. Western society tends to be highly secular, while much of Africa is religious, whether

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[12]Peter Judge, "Superhighway Robbery? Life at the Thin End of the Net," *The Guardian* (New York), 7 July 1994, 4.

[13]Schoenhoff, 76.

that religion is indigenous, Christianity, or Islam. Bernard Woods, Director of Communications Technologies for Development Ltd., describes African spiritualistic thinking as an expansion of holistic thinking, and part of "`the reality of Africa' which few westerners comprehend."[14]

The computer, then, may have spiritual significance in Africa that it does not have in the West. For instance, few Christians in the United States see the computer as threatening to their religious beliefs. Even here, though, the Internet does present a challenge to religion and its moral values. One widely publicized example is the use of the Net as a vehicle for pornography.

Questions of morality are compounded by issues of authority. In the Middle East, the availability of the *Qu'ran* and *hadith* on compact disc has allowed nonprofessional theologians to mount religious arguments over cultural issues.[15] Politically speaking, then, the power of some religious clerics may be threatened by the introduction of new technology that imports new ideas and new rhetorical weapons.

Interests

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[14]Bernard Woods, *Communication, Technology and the Development of People* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 50.

[15]Ziauddin Sardar, "Paper, Printing and Compact Disks: The Making and Unmaking of Islamic Culture," *Media, Culture and Society* 15 (1993): 55-56.

A second dimension of politics that Goldsworthy recognizes surrounds material interests. Who stands to gain or lose from the introduction of a new technology? How is technology harnessed to economically benefit those in power? The Internet presents a struggle over the control of technology, the opportunity to generate revenue, and social stratification.

One reason computer networks have not spread into Africa and other Third World countries is the lack of infrastructure. In Harare, Zimbabwe, for instance, the Posts and Telecommunication Corporation has a backlog of nearly 100,000 applications for connections, according to 1992 estimates.[16] In other countries and cities, phone service may be unreliable or nonexistent. Superficially this appears to be a mere technical problem. In fact, it has a strong political dimension. Regardless of the potential long-term benefits of Internet connection, the system requires a sizeable initial capital investment. While economists may argue that e-mail is less expensive than fax service, African governments are understandably hesitant to spend scarce foreign currency on projects that lack tangible economic returns. This sets up several political confrontations.

One conflict develops between business and the government. Much of the impetus for developing networks comes from companies

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[16]Rob Borland, *University of Zimbabwe Electronic Mail Systems*. Prepared for the African Academy of Sciences/American Association for the Advancement of Science Workshop on Science and Technology Communication Networks in Africa held in Nairobi, Kenya, August 1992. Obtained from Volunteers in Technical Assistance via FTP 155.135.1.1.

that need connection, often outside the country. In West Africa, for example, packet-switched networks have developed largely because foreign oil companies need to link their remote operations with home offices outside the country.[17] In some cases, the government views these business needs as an opportunity to generate revenue, and attempts to impose licensing fees on services such as electronic bulletin board services (BBSes).[18]

This policy approach is antithetical to current World Bank goals for development, which place high importance on telecommunications.[19] The second political conflict, then, comes between development agencies and national governments. Rather than dampening the growth of computer networks in Africa, development agencies and businesses both suggest that governments should actively promote Internet connections. They point to benefits such as increased investment by companies that use computer networks and to the possibility of computer-related jobs being created in countries where labor is cheaper.[20] These arguments, however, seem remarkably similar to ones used to introduce the large-scale, capital-intensive projects of the

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[17]Vineeta Shetty, "African Net Quality Tests Users' Mettle: Dearth of Digital Facilities, Subpar Conditions, Costs Pose Obstacle to Users Extending Nets to Continent" *Network World*, 8:41 (14 Oct. 1991): 33-35.

[18]Judge, 4.

[19]Shetty, 33-35.

[20]Ronkin.

past, which failed to have the promised trickle-down effect to the poorest segments of society.

Clearly the political struggle here is between elites. Whether national governments tap computer-based communication as a source of revenue or provide it as a basic infrastructure for business, it seems unlikely that the common people will soon benefit directly. Experimentally, computer-based communication is already being put to use even in rural sites, using packet radio, satellites and solar power. But until the benefit of a widespread computer infrastructure can be demonstrated in concrete economic terms, it will probably remain the domain of business and government.

If computers are controlled primarily by the elite, the technology will have introduced yet another cause of social stratification. This is not a new phenomenon: in the past, capital-intensive development projects benefited the elite more than the common people. Rather than initiating a trickle-down effect, such projects actually increased the gap between the rich and the poor.[21] Computer networks are clearly a capital-intensive technology. Woods, for instance, estimates that cordless computer terminals could eventually cost less than $1,000.[22] It is difficult to see how computers will spread to the common people in the countries of Africa, where the annual per capita income is usually far less than $1,000. Furthermore, this price represents

[21]Melkote, 124-130.

[22]Woods, 111.

a pre-tax estimate. Governments are likely to impose customs and sales taxes on computers, pushing the price of a computer even farther out of reach for the common person.

In response, network developers usually suggest that the Internet would be less expensive to develop as a public utility than traditional communication systems such as telephones and especially faxes. The computer could not be expected to replace those media, but could supplement them and be installed first, as a precursor to more adequate systems.[23] Such a system would probably be based in local post offices, much as telex equipment is now. It would offer better reliability and connectivity than those systems, however.

Woods conceives of a more comprehensive, school-based network system. As for the economic base, he argues:

> One's first reaction may well be that the technology's costs and sophistication will exclude the poor and further benefit the better off. In fact, the outcome may be very different. An electronic delivery system can, for the first time in history, make the same information, knowledge, advice and high quality instructional materials available to rich and poor alike and can tailor information and instructional materials to the needs and perceptions of the poor and the uneducated. . . . The technology has the capacity to help people--all people! It permits mass personalization of information regardless of location, level of education, social background or economic status.[24]

The informational possibilities Woods cites as reducing the effects of stratification still do not address the financial

[23]Albert Langer, *Notes on Computer Communications in Developing Countries*. Posted to INTF listserv, October 25, 1991. Obtained from Volunteers in Technical Assistance via FTP 155.135.1.1.

[24]Woods, 111-112.

costs of the systems. Instead, they raise another possible axis of stratification along the line of education and literacy. Woods argues that the medium is not inherently text-based--that icons and multimedia presentations make the computer accessible even to illiterate people. In any event, Albert Langer points out, "literacy is relatively widespread in developing countries compared with the overall level of development, and especially compared with telephone penetration."[25]

A third stratification that may develop is age-based. In the United States, computers have become associated with young people, who learn to use them in school. The older generations often find themselves trying to catch up on technology already familiar to younger people. If computer networks were introduced in Africa through the educational system, as they have been here, an age-based stratification could be created. It seems unlikely, however, that the young people of Africa will have priority in getting computers. Most African cultures are elder-oriented rather than youth-oriented, as American culture is. Thus innovations tend to be adopted by adults and spread downward, rather than being adopted by children and spreading upward. For example, both radios and televisions were first adopted by older males before spreading to younger people and women.

If computer networks are to become tools of ordinary people, significant economic and educational problems must be overcome. Clearly, technical optimists such as Woods and Langer believe

[25] Langer, n.p.

these difficulties can be addressed successfully. In the short run, however, it seems likely that computerization will create yet another source of friction between the haves and the have-nots.

Power

The third dimension of politics that Goldsworthy describes is perhaps the most recognized--power. Issues of control are directly related to defining community values and to allocating economic resources. But power also exists as a political end in itself. Governments, whether democratically elected bodies or strongman dictatorships, seek to wield power not just for personal economic ends but also for prestige and the egotistical human drive for power.

In modern democracy, controlling information is the primary means of controlling people. It is not surprising, then, that the 1982 coup attempt in Kenya nearly succeeded because the rebels controlled just one particular building in the country--the national radio station. It also explains the pervasive censorship of the press throughout much of Africa.

The introduction of the Internet could upend the current patterns of information flow. In the process, the power of certain groups and individuals will be threatened, perhaps even undermined. Thus computers present not only a commercial revolution, but the possibility of a political revolution as well. Analyzing the power structures that stand to gain or lose power because of computer-based communication allows the lines of potential struggle to emerge. For example, Gladys Ganley has described how the Internet was used by Chinese students during and after the Tiananmen Square crisis of June 1989.[26] Students were able to conduct fund-raising and to lobby for United States government protection. They also pressured the Chinese government by posting lists of the children of officials studying in the U.S., carrying an implied threat.

National political power can be described according to two basic domains--the control of the government over internal affairs and the influence of the nation in international affairs. A national government, then, has to control the information circulating within a country, as well as information crossing its borders.

Internal information control has a long history in Africa in the form of press censorship. The press, for its part, has not been docile and has continued to push for increased freedom. Progress is slow. In Kenya, for instance, journalist David Makali recently spent four months in jail, where he was beaten for charging that President Daniel arap Moi had interfered in a court ruling. Even after Makali was released, however, he refused to rescind his claims. The fact that he was not immediately

[26]Gladys D. Ganley, *The Exploding Political Power of Personal Media* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1992), 157-159.

rearrested was taken as a sign that press freedom was expanding, if only by fits and starts.[27]

Some governments' distrust of the press has carried over to BBS operators, whose systems provide a precursor to full Internet connection. The operator of one African BBS expressed the difficulty of getting a system running: "If the government found out what we were doing, it would shut us down."[28] The key, for now, is that the government does *not* know, and this provides one important reason why computer-based communication presents such a politically potent force.

The strength of the Internet is its decentralization. Even a system as simple as a BBS, which serves as a basic network, is relatively difficult to monitor and control. Central offices and heavy equipment are not required. Unlike newspapers and magazines, electronic publishers do not rely on imported paper, a resource commonly denied to recalcitrant opposition papers in many African countries. By contrast, in Kenya for example, there are an estimated 10,000 computers,[29] almost any of which could potentially be used for dial-up services, and all of which could be used to generate and store information the government might find threatening. The Internet, then, could allow effective opposition to the ruling powers.

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[27]Donatella Lorch, "Kenya Writers and Editors Speaking Out on Censors," *The New York Times*, 9 October 1994, 10.

[28]Judge, 4.

[29]Beryl L. Bellman and Alex Tindimubona, n.p.

Computer-based communication is not merely destructive of the reigning order, however: it also provides constructive possibilities for new orders. In the United States, for instance, some journalists have found that the Internet provides greater access to government officials, who take part in on-line discussions of issues.[30] If computer networks became widespread in Africa, a similar phenomenon might be expected. The computer would thus open channels of discourse between government officials and local people.

Such dialog can also break down divisions within countries, such as tribal animosities. Bellman and Tindimubona, for instance, noted that computer-mediated discussions fostered friendly attitudes toward other participants.[31] Others suggest even more extensive effects. Financier George Soros, for instance, has supported the spread of the Internet into eastern Europe. He believes "the Internet is the prototype of an open society,"[32] which will break down internal divisions like the ones that have resulted the war in Bosnia. Ken Spicer, chair of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, says the Internet provides a forum in which the marketplace of ideas can become a reality. In his view, the presence of alternate views would prevent any one source, such as the

[30]Gary Gach, "The Internet for Journalists: The Fourth Estate in Cyberspace" *Computer-Mediated Communication Magazine*, Vol. 1, No. 6 (Oct. 1, 1994), 7.

[31]Bellman and Tindimubona, n.p.

[32]Judge, 4.

government, from dominating by virtue of exclusion.[33] Since the Internet will lessen the power of the government, though, it is likely that most African governments will allow connection only after prodding, either from within or from outside.

Computer networks promise new possibilities in internal communication, but their connection to the outside holds opportunities for involvement in world affairs. Networks operate through diverse and diffuse connections--via telephone lines, packet radio or satellite links, for instance--that make it difficult to control by centralized government agencies. Computer-based communications can handle virtually unlimited amounts of information and diversity of news, opening the door to highly specialized audiences spread over vast geographic areas. These features of the Net have profound implications for journalism and international politics.

The Internet, for example, is currently being used to electronically publish China News Digest, a compilation of news briefs and articles on China from around the world. A staff of 40 volunteers produces the Digest, which is distributed to 30,000 subscribers daily.[34] The Internet provides an economical means to reach a large, specific audience.

A similar project is being undertaken by the Pan African News Agency (PANA). The agency, founded to counterbalance the

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[33] "Peacekeeping: Try Words, They Come Cheaper," *The Economist* (London), 3 September 1994, 47.

[34] Gach, 7.

perceived dominance of western new sources, has found the Internet to be a more reliable means of distributing its stories. Connected to the Net by satellite link, PANA has direct access to newspapers around the world without relying on the local infrastructure in Dakar, Senegal.[35] Not only is the system less prone to failure than traditional media such as fax and telephone, but the direct outside access reduces the possibility of local government pressure.

Spicer suggests that such outside access should result in a freer press and a reduction of human rights violations. Connection to the Internet would provide a reliable, decentralized link to international government and press agencies. If a national government tried to censor the local press, then, the outside world could be notified and pressure could be brought to bear in favor of freedom. Likewise, human rights abuses could also be reported to the outside world more efficiently and immediately, again allowing outside intervention.[36]

Two unanswered questions remain, of course. First, given the capital consideration of Internet connection, does the West care enough to help financially? And second, even if the system were eventually put in place, would the outside world care enough to listen? Spicer admits that financial backing will be difficult to

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[35]Howard W. French, "Linked to Internet, Could Africa's Voice Be Heard?" *The New York Times*, 1 October 1994, 2.

[36]"Peacekeeping," 47.

obtain, since toleration and human rights do not have an obvious economic return. And even if the Third World does gain access to the Net, Schoenhoff doubts the West would really be influenced significantly. "The aspirations of the Third World community for power and equality in the international arena of money and politics are largely futile . . . since the nations of the West have never intended power to be transferred with their technology."[37]

Prospects for the Internet in Africa

The ultimate conclusion, then, must be that the Internet will grow only slowly in Africa. Despite the promises of greater freedom and access to the global economy, and despite the backing of the academic and scientific communities, powerful political forces are threatened. Neither western nor Third World governments have significant stakes in implementing a worldwide network, and in fact both stand to lose some degree of influence. Thus both are likely to oppose the development of such a project. Furthermore, United Nations and World Bank efforts to promote the Internet will probably be only marginally effective, since the UN is only as influential as member nations allow it to be. It has no authority to impose values such as freedom of information through computer networks.

The Net will continue to grow in Africa, however, primarily because of business needs. Companies with large interests already

[37]Schoenhoff, 81.

in place will have the incentive to invest in the Internet, even without the support of local governments. Those governments will find it difficult to resist corporate aims for fear of losing much-needed foreign investment, but at the same time, governments will probably not invest much in the Net themselves. Local business, especially the local press, will be effectively blocked out of the Internet world.

African universities will be another driving force for the Net just as they have been in the United States, but unlike here they will take a back seat to business. Professors see the value of the Net to academic pursuits, but governments hold the purse strings. Many governments are automatically suspicious of universities as breeding grounds of dissent, so they are unlikely to move quickly to attach the schools to the Internet. But linkage will eventually exist if only by the sheer willpower of the academic community.

Finally, the Internet will probably not spread quickly to rural areas or to the masses of common people. Neither African governments nor business have much incentive to make the Internet available inexpensively to the public. The best hope for this kind of development is through the universities and NGOs committed to grassroots development. As these organizations gradually tie into the Net, the power of computer-based communication will become available beyond the offices of government officials and business elites.

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JAPAN'S CLOUDED WINDOW:

NEWS ON NHK AND TBS TELEVISION, 1993

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ABSTRACT

Analysis of 426 stories on 30 randomly selected newscasts revealed the noncommercial "educational" NHK network to be more insular and male-dominated than commercial TBS. "Pure" foreign news (news having no Japan angle) accounted for 15.7 percent of stories on TBS and 14.5 percent on NHK. Women reported only one domestic story on NHK (vs. four on TBS). Emphases on news topics differed significantly between the two networks.

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JAPAN'S CLOUDED WINDOW: NEWS ON NHK AND TBS TELEVISION, 1993

I. INTRODUCTION

Who can deny the importance of Japan on the world stage? The Japanese $3 trillion economy and the U.S. $5 trillion economy together make up 42 percent of the world's GNP. In 1993, the United States bought nearly $105.5 billion in goods from Japan, as against about $55 billion in U.S. goods bought by Japan. That year, 29.2 percent of Japanese exports went to the United States, Japan's largest single export destination.

Besides goods, the unbalanced two-way flow includes people and information. In 1990, more than 236,000 Japanese nationals lived in the United States, but only about 38,000 U.S. nationals lived in Japan. Similarly, while 356,000 foreign students were enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities (1988), only 31,000 foreign students studied in Japan (1989). In the realm of information, by 1985 Japan exported more than it imported (Ito 1990).

Beyond the pragmatic business reasons for understanding Japan's information systems, Westerners can benefit from a look at a developed information society different from their own--a challenge to our predictions about how societies evolve (Fallows 1989). As a case in point, the Japanese stay glued to the TV tube (see below), but Japanese children score better on standardized tests than U.S. children; furthermore, Japan's high school drop-out rate was a mere 2.2 percent in 1989, compared to the U.S. rate of 28.4 percent. Japan belies any easy assumptions about television's corrupting influence on young people.

Unfortunately, interchange for mutual benefit has hit some raodblocks. According to van Wolferen (1993, 6), "The communication gap, dating from the early 1970s, that separates Japan from the West . . . appears to be widening." Each society, he believes, belongs to "an altogether different frame of reference" (van Wolferen, 1993, 11).

Values and Mass Communication

The values that characterize Japanese behavior affect the way its mass media function. For example, Confucianism, which dictates separate roles for women and men (Cooper-Chen, Leung and Cho 1995), influences the almost total male domination of reporting as a profession. Hofstede (1984) explored cross-cultural differences in thinking and social action by surveying 116,000 employees of a large multinational corporation in 1968 and 1972. On his Masculinity Index, Japan ranked highest of the 40 countries studied, with a 95 score. By contrast, the United States scored a middle-range 62, while Norway (8) and Sweden (5) scored lowest. In high masculinity cultures, women and men occupy different places; few women hold professional and technical jobs, and they tend to be segregated from men in higher education (Hofstede 1984, p. 177).

Furthermore, Japanese tend to stress harmony between the individual and society. Personality attributes such as independence, assertion and outspokenness, often positive values in the West, are deemphasized in favor of working smoothly with others, self-restraint and reticence. Individualistic values create disrputive, difficult-to-handle situations (DeVos and Bock 1974, 20). Thus the maverick investigative reporter finds minimal respect and encouragement in Japan.

If little muckraking occurs at home, social values also militate against in-depth reporting from overseas. Japan lies in the Pacific Ocean 100 miles from Korea and 500 miles from China--in ancient times, truly at the end of the earth. Today, the Japanese "face no problem of national identity" (Reischauer 1981, 6), but they carry a negative image as a closed, exclusionary society. Antagonism towards outsiders derives from scarce land and high population, believes Nakane (1988). Who wants to share one's meager piece of the pie?

To counteract Japan's geographical and psychological insularity, kokusaika ("internationalization") has "become a sincere goal of Japnese governmental, cultural and educational leaders" (Wray 1990, 17). But, as Nakane (1988, 6) puts it, constant harping on the need for internationalization is "a sure indication that Japan is still a closed society." Despite a large overseas press corps (USIA 1993), for example, little overseas coverage reaches the small screen, as the next section will show.

Considering the voracious Japanese TV appetite, an insular world view on television has implications for Japan's future international role. Each Japanese spends an average of three hours and 32 minutes per day watching television, including one hour and two minutes with NHK and 2.5 hours with commercial stations (NHK survey in June 1993). In the United States, the average person watches less: two hours, 26 minutes a day (Nielsen survey in May

1993). In Japan, according to Kato (1988, 315), "intellectual snobbery is almost nil. . . conspicuous non-ownership of television. . . is totally alien in Japanese society."

Why did television find such ready acceptance in Japan? Kitamura (1987, 145) believes the dichotomy of uchi ("family") vs. soto ("outside") plays a role: "television provides a convenient medium to see the dangerous soto from within the comfortable insulation of uchi where one is surrounded by a psychologically attached family."

Furthermore, the visual orientation of the Japanese made television's acceptance smooth and enthusiastic (Head 1985, 22; Kitamura 1987, 144). The ideographic writing system, the rich tradition of painting and woodblock printing, the variety of ceramic and fabric designs, the importance of artistic food arrangements, the attention to packaging-- all underscore the observation that "of the five senses, sight is most important in Japan" (Kitamura 1987, 144).

Broadcasting in Japan

The Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) radio service, unabashedly modelled on the BBC when it was established in 1926, became a military propaganda tool during World War II. After the war, in 1950, the Occupation forces approved the licensing of private, commercial radio stations, giving Japan the mixed system it has today. NHK's radio coverage now far exceeds that of commercial broadcasters.

Television began in 1953 after the Occupation ended. The autonomy of NHK derives partly from its ability to set and collect its own fees, although the legislature does review fee proposals. Moreover, NHK has complete freedom in programming; the government can neither include nor exclude content.

A typical viewer in the Kanto (Tokyo metropolitan) area has a choice of two NHK channels (educational and entertainment); five commercial channels (Nihon TV, TBS, Fuji TV, TV Asahi and TV Tokyo); UHF channels with in-school programs and local news; two NHK satellite channels (requiring purchase of a small dish); and Wowow, a pay-TV channel.

Television surpassed newspapers in 1975 as the mass medium with the largest amount of advertsing revenues. By 1989, television was taking 28.8 percent of ad expenditures, while newspapers took 25.1 percent.

In entertainment TV programming, Japan exports animated cartoons and imports major movies; however, it has virtually stopped importing regular TV series, meaning that it must shoulder its production burden alone (about 150 hours a week for most stations). Considering only one genre, the quiz show, viewers have a choice of 32 domestically produced weekly programs that differ markedly from game or quiz shows anywhere else in the world (Cooper-Chen 1994, 220-238).

As for the future, already existing TV saturation (one set per 1.8 people) means NHK cannot expect increased revenues from new customers. Nor can TV advertisers expect much more attention to their messages, since the average Japanese already watches 3.5 hours a day. Indeed, domestic channels may see falling audience shares as STAR TV enters on the heels of expected legal liberalizations regarding international broadcasting. So far, NHK has had the satellite field all to itself.

In Japan, the popularization of pay-TV by communication satellites, broadcast satellites and cable TV lags far behind that of the United States. Japan has 149 multi-channel cable systems, with 1.07 million households as subscribers (as of March 1993). By contrast, the United States had 11,385 cable systems in 1993; in 1992, 61.5 percent of households had cable service (more than 57 million subscribers). Clearly, "the multi-media, multi-channel era is slow coming in Japan" (Nishino 1994, 116).

Purpose of Study

This paper will explore the relation of social values to the content of that very "Japanese" medium, television. Whereas U.S. researchers can omit low-rated PBS newscasts, the high viewership of NHK supports its inclusion in most previous Japanese studies. But Japan's dual system argues for attention to at least one commercial network as well. A study of NHK and one commercial network should give a fairly complete picture of Japan's TV landscape.

Commonly asked questions in TV news studies include:

1. How prominent is international news vs. the country own news?
2. Within international news, what geographic areas predominate?
3. What is the role of women reporters and anchors?
4. What topics/ categories predominate in the news content?

This study will update previous research by looking at the four questions above in a 1993 study of NHK and TBS nightly news in Japan.

II. RELATED STUDIES

The joho shakai ("information society") concept began independently in Japan and the United States in the 1960s--about 10 years earlier than in Europe. While Machlup (1962) in the United States discussed "production of knowledge," Umesao's (1963) writing on "information industries" spurred Japan to enter an "information society boom" of thinking and planning (Ito 1991). Later, Bell (1973) developed the idea of the "post industrial society," while still later in Japan, Sakaiya (1985) predicted a revolution whereby economic growth would derive from information and chika ("intangible value").

Despite the value of Japan as an alternative model of communication development, little sharing of research occurs. Many of the handful of Western scholars interested in Japan do not even speak--let alone read-- Japanese. And few Japanese scholars publish in English.

Japan stands nearly alone in East Asia in its isolation from the American academy. For example, at conferences of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) over the past five years (1990-94), 23 papers were presented on mass media in mainland China and Taiwan, but only seven on Japan.

This dearth of Japan scholarship derives partly from the Japanese academic system, which does not stress mass media as a discipline for either professors or students. Since only a handful of Japanese study mass media in the United States, almost no papers appear at U.S. conferences and in U.S. journals. Furthermore, the existence of lifetime jobs and absence of a "publish or perish" ethos means "Japanese research has not been as impressive as Japanese industrial products" (Ito and Tanaka 1992, 28). However, considering TV news content, a few studies have analyzed Japan only and Japan compared with other countries.

Japan-only TV Studies

Ishikawa and Kambara (1993) found in a study covering March 2-8, 1992, that news/current affairs was 17.5 percent of TBS content and 41.8 percent of NHK content (whole day). NHK news, as noted above, operates free from commercial pressure and might be compared to the "MacNeil Lehrer P ort" on PBS. It is often studied.

Miller (1994) analyzed 157 stories on NHK and the commercial network NTV's 30-minute evening newscasts for a composite week in May and June 1992. NHK reported a total of 92 stories (excluding daily sport scores and weather reports), while NTV reported 65 stories. NHK reported an average of 18.4 stories/newscast compared to an average of 13 stories /newscast at NTV.

Consistent with the findings from news studies of other countries (e.g., Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; Stempel, 1985; Straubhaar, et al., 1986), "politics and government" heads the list with the most number of stories reported at both stations. Both networks had the same top four categories ("politics and government," "economics, business, finance," "disaster/accident," and "crime"), but the rank order differs because of NTV's greater emphasis on crime reporting. In sum, concludes Miller (1994, 83) "the national news reports at the two Japanese networks, NHK and NTV, offer a distinct difference in coverage."

The issue of anchor and reporter gender, focus of much U.S. research since the early 1970s, "may not appear as important in

Japan where almost all newscasts are co-anchored by a female and a male" (Miller 1994, 89). However, that apparent example of gender equality was belied by the virtual absence of female reporters: for NHK, males reported 100 percent of all on-location stories; for NTV, males reported 94.7 percent (only one location story was female-reported). In a related finding (Saito 1994), heavy TV viewers in Japan associated the United States with a positive image of gender equality.

In studying internationalization, Miller (1994) found that NTV had fewer stories with a foreign dateline than NHK, but more widely distributed geographical locations: Asia--three stories; United States--three; Western Europe--four. At NHK, seven of the foreign news stories originated from Asian countries. Miller (1994) further found on NHK four stories identified as "home news abroad" and 13 identified as "foreign news abroad" (14.1 percent). For NTV, three were identified as "home news abroad" and 10 as "foreign news abroad" (15.4 percent). Miller (1994, 95) states:

> Despite the subtle differences in forelgn reporting at NHK and NTV, in general, both networks report relatively few international stories. In a nation that produces much of the world's electronic news gathering equipment and has many foreign correspondents, international reporting is low.

Comparative Studies

In the most far-ranging comparative research, Kodama et al. (1986) began in 1974 to study coverage every 10 years on NHK and CBS. A comparison of 1974 and 1984 results (Shiramizu 1987) will be enlarged upon completion of the 1994 segment. Three non-contiguous weeks during October-November 1974 and November- December 1984 were studied.

The top three news categories and the split between domestic and international news (Shiramizu 1987) were as follows:

	CBS		NHK	
	1974	1984	1974	1984
Politics	42.6%	16.0%	31.8%	23.3%
Economy	23.6%	9.3%	20.7%	16.0%
Society	13.8%	50.3%	12.2%	37.6%
Domestic	71.6%	58.0%	69.5%	82.6%
Home/int'l	17.8%	26.8%	25.3%	8.0%
Other nations	10.6%	15.3%	5.2%	9.2%

This longitudinal study shows the near invisibility of nations outside Japan unless the story has a Japan connection (home/international).

Kitatani (1981) found that British television spent the most time on international news and Japanese the least, with U.S. networks falling in between. All three nations differed in how they treated foreign subjects; for example, U.S. networks emphasized politics, crime, armed conflict and economics.

Straubhaar et al. (1986) analyzed TV newscasts aired June 7-14, 1984, in the United States, Japan and six other countries. They found that the most prominent topics in all eight were politics, economics, military and social issues and the United States was by far the most covered country. The average number of stories per newscast in Japan (NHK) was 9.2 and in the United States (ABC, NBC), 10.

Analyzing the United States, Japan and three other nations' newscasts for Sept. 1-5, 1986, Cooper-Chen (1991) found that Japan's NHK paid the least attention to foreign news (22.6 percent of total stories reported). Only violent international events made their way past NHK gatekeepers: a ship collision, a plane crash and a war. NHK did not even mention the two biggest stories of that week: the non-aligned summit and South Africa.

Furthermore, Japan (NHK) was the least congruous of the five nations. It had the lowest number of matches in attention to stories and the lowest number of coverage/non-coverage matches. Japan and the United States had the least congruous "world view" of all the 10 pairs of nations studied.

The same data set (Cooper 1988) revealed that both Japan and the United States make little more than token use of women TV journalists. NHK featured the same male-female anchor team every night, but no women reported any stories outside the studio. While no country had female foreign correspondents, in every country but Japan, women reported at least some domestic stories.

When studying the role of women on CBS and NHK, Kodama (1991) found a situation of mirror opposites. In 1984, on CBS women reported 20.2 percent of news items, but had no role in anchoring. NHK had a woman coanchor, but had no women reporters, either in Japan or overseas; moreover, NHK had no women directors or producers. Kodama (1991, 37) points out that "the primary qualification of the Japanese news anchor is that he or she be an excellent reader; his or her journalistic qualifications are not at issue."

III. METHOD

The main evening newscasts of TBS (6 p.m.) and NHK (7 p.m.) were both watched on five randomly selected weekdays during January, February and March 1993. Thus the sample included five days per month per network, for a total of 30 30-minute newscasts.

Both networks provided live simultaneous English translations on specially equipped TV sets. For each newscast, the author made a summary of story contents, timed each story's length and noted delivery mode (anchor or reporter). If a reporter delivered the story, the gender and physical location of the reporter were recorded.

The unit of analysis was the story. Two graduate students did the coding, using categories developed for a project that analyzed foreign news in 29 countries for a continuous and constructed week in 1979 (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1984). The same categories, somewhat revised, are being used for a 1995 study of 70 countries.

Any story reporting events within Japan was coded as "home news at home" (domestic). Any story reporting events outside Japan was coded as either "home news abroad" (a story about a Japanese national or a Japan-related event in a foreign country) or "foreign news abroad" (overseas story with no Japanese involvement); the location if outside Japan was noted.

In addition, 20 topics developed for the 1979 study were noted for presence in a story. (See Appendix 1.) Each story could have one main and one secondary topic.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study analyzed 426 randomly selected stories on Japanese TV newscasts during January, February and March 1993--248 on NHK and 178 on TBS. NHK averaged 16.5 stories/broadcast, while TBS averaged 12; TBS aired five minutes of commercials per newscast, accounting for the smaller number of stories. Similarly, Miller (1994) had found 18.4 stories for NHK and 13 for NTV.

A third graduate student recoded two randomly selected NHK and TBS newscasts, for a total of 55 stories. The author then used Holsti's (1969) formula to calculate intercoder reliability:

$$\frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

where M = number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and N_1 and N_2 refer to the total number of decisions by the first and second coder. Reliability was, for story type, 92.7 percent; for location, 96.4 percent; topic, 94.5 percent; subtopic, 94.5 percent; and theme 87.3 percent.

1. International news vs. Japanese news

Because both NHK and TBS concentrate so heavily (about two-thirds of stories) on domestic news, Table 1 shows no significant difference for story tyupe. But looking only at "pure" foreign news (foreign news abroad), we see it amounted to 14.5 percent for NHK and 15.7 percent for TBS. The internationalization push seems to have had some effect in changing the near absence of the outside world to at least an acknowledgement of its existence. Figures for NHK are:

1974 - 5.2% (Shiramizu 1987)
1984 - 9.2% " "
1992 -14.1% (Miller 1994)
1993 -14.5% (present study)

By way of comparison, figures for the three U.S. networks' foreign news abroad content were higher (Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson 1991):

1972 - 20%
1982 - 22%
1989 - 24%

Considering Japan's trade-based economy and ranking as the world's No. 2 industrial power, the figures for foreign news for both networks seem low.

2. Predominant geographic areas

Again, because of the overwhelming presence of Japan as a story location (about 70 percent of stories), Table 2 shows no signficant difference between networks. It reveals that Europe and North America combined account for a larger proportion of stories (NHK - 10.0 percent; TBS - 9.6 percent) than South/Southeast/East Asia combined (NHK - 6.8 percent; TBS - 6.7 percent). Remarkably absent from the TV "map" are Latin America, Africa and the Middle East; television excludes Third World countries except some in Japan's own Asian region. NHK reported only one story from "other countries" (Latin America, Africa, Middle East plus Australia); TBS reported many more (eight).

Miller (1994) similarly found, for NHK, no stories from Africa or the Middle East and just one from Brazil (the 1992 Earth Summit-actually an international rather than Brazilian story). Asia, Europe and the United States dominated NHK and NTV coverage.

By way of comparison, Gonzenbach, Arant and Stevenson (1991) found for U.S. networks, 1972-89, the following:

U.S. domestic	64.4%
Global	10.5%
W. Europe	5.8%
Middle East	5.5%
Asia/Pacific	4.6%
E. Europe	3.7%

Lat. Am./Carib.	2.9%
Canada	0.7%

Thus Japanese newscasts present an even more clouded window than the distorted U.S. TV view, which leaves out Africa but acknowledges Latin America and the Middle East.

3. Role of women reporters and anchors

Table 3 shows the virtual absence of women reporters on both Japanese networks (thus no significant difference emerges). Although both NHK and TBS newscasts had male-female anchor teams, outside the "safety" of the studio, women reported only one story on NHK and four stories on TBS. Confirming Cooper's (1988) and Kodama's (1991) findings based on 1980s data, women in the 1990s are still completely absent as foreign correspondents and nearly absent as domestic correspondents.

4. Topics/ categories in the news

Table 4 shows that non-commercial NHK and commercial TBS have significant differences in topical emphases. They shared the choice but not order of the top three topics: economy; crime/ judicial/ legal; and domestic politics. NHK's third topic was post- Cold War matters, while TBS's was sports-related. (Sports was fourth on NHK. National network newscasts in Japan include sports every night.)

Confirming Miller's (1994) findings, the commercial network paid more attention to crime/legal matters than NHK; TBS had crime/legal as its top-ranked topic (the main topic in 16.2 percent of stories). In a major contrast between the networks, NHK put extreme emphasis on economic matters (the main topic in 25.8 percent of stories); it gave relatively light attention to crime/legal matters (the main topic in only 11.3 percent of stories).

V. CONCLUSIONS

During January-March, 1993, the big domestic stories included the engagement of Japan's crown prince to commoner Masako Owada; the broken engagement of entertainer Rie Miyazawa and sumo superstar Takahanada; the elevation of Hawaiian Chad Rowan (Akebono) to the highest sumo rank of yokozuna; the political corruption involving "kingmaker" Shin Kanemaru; and the rising value of the yen. International stories included the Bosnian civil war; Israel/ Palestinian peace talks and unrest; change in South Africa; the Branch Davidian violence in Texas; and the New York World Trade Center bombing.

This study of 426 news stories on two Japanese TV networks revealed that Japan shares certain similarities with other countries' news values, such as the high profile of political, economic and crime news, with a deemphasis on culture, ecology and social services news. At the same time, the study reveals certain distinctive traits about Japan and its media system.

Internationalization vs. domestic concentration

The extremely low percentage of international news on both networks, combined with the ignoring of most of the world's regions, speaks to the failure of kokusaika ("internationalization"). The personnel and budget exists to cover the world; the will to do so does not.

For example, the U.S.-based Japanese press corps, largest from any country in the world (Germany runs a close second), operates out of 110 bureaus. The corps includes 52 media outlets having bureaus or representation in New York, 25 in Washington, D.C., 29 in Los Angeles and four in Chicago. Bureau size ranges from Fuji

TV's 16 correspondents (not including support staff) in New York to many one-person operations, such as Focus Magazine in New York and the Yomiuri Shimbun in Chicago (USIA 1993). At an average of three correspondents/ bureau, Japan has more than 300 persons covering the United States. Yet despite technical capabililties, kokusaika ("internationalization") remains largely a myth in terms of news.

Domestic minutiae often swamp important overseas stories. The ya-gamo ("arrow duck") saga is a case in point. In a park in Tokyo, a reporter spotted a duck that someone had shot with an arrow that pierced the duck in such a way that it missed vital organs and spared the duck's life; it was even able to fly. As officials tried to capture the duck, the story grew bigger and bigger, often leading the national news. On Feb. 12, 1993, one of the days randomly selected for this study, the duck was captured and the arrow successfully extracted. TBS lead its national newscast with a five-minute report of the incident, including models of the duck, x-rays of the arrow and two on-location reporters. Second to this story was that of an attempted Lufthansa hijacking at JFK airport, running less than two minutes (including interviews with Japanese passengers).

NHK had the yagamo as its sixth story on Feb. 12, giving it a generous two minutes, 16 seconds. On Feb. 15, another randomly selected day, TBS devoted one minute, 34 seconds to video of a cat who injured its foot when it got caught in a trap--possibly as an echo of the injured duck story. On Feb. 15, no news from anywhere outside Japan appeared on TBS.

Miller (1994 p.100) explains TV's insularity in terms of the high level of newspaper readership, which "means the broadcast networks leave international reporting to the print media." But surely some of the explanation lies in Japan's uniqueness and homogeneity, which television can more easily speak to than change. Modern Japan "constitutes what may be the world's most perfect nation-state: a clear-cut geographical unit containing almost all the people of a distinctive culture and language and virtually no one else" (Reischauer 1981, 8).

NHK and the commercial networks

Japan boasts a strong dual TV system (imagine the PBS "MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour" ranking as high in the ratings as ABC's evening news with Peter Jennings). The differing order of topics and themes this study discovered corroborates Miller's (1994, p. 83) finding that "NHK and NTV, offer a distinct difference in coverage." NHK's freedom from commercial pressures lets it tackle stories involving economists rather than criminals.

NHK could also be free to educate viewers about the world beyond the archipelago and challenge the status quo. But it does not. NHK's "educational" label is a misnomer, if by education we mean expanding viewers' mindsets and enlarging their view of the world. NHK's low emphasis on international news and high attention to domestic minutiae point to a mission of Japan-ifying its viewers rather than pulling them out of their comfort zones.

NHK's failure to provide an alternative to the commercial networks takes on added importance in view of the low cable penetration and limitation of satellite dishes to NHK reception. Hong Kong's STAR-TV, available in much of Asia, is prohibited in Japan. With only 14.5 percent of its stories international, NHK emerged as more insular than TBS (15.7 percent international), although NHK had a hgher number of international stories (3`) than TBS (28). Moreover, NHK had a much more traditional attitude towards women reporters than TBS.

Role of women

The male-female anchor teams at NHK and TBS convey a false aura of equality. Both networks still abide by the separate, unequal spheres for men and women that Japanese society ordains. In the world of televsion, woman's place remains in the studio, not out reporting the news--especially at NHK. This study found that NHK had only one story reported by a woman, while TBS had four (one of them the arrow-duck story). Although freed from commercial pressure to conform to the status quo, NHK showed less willingness to provide alternative role models than TBS. As with its emphasis on domestic stories, "educational" NHK reinforces rather than challenges the status quo, which treats women as second-class citizens.

In Japan, high earning potential, lifelong employment and virtually all politcal powers still belong to men. In 1988, 45 percent of Japanese women of all ages were in the work force; however, they earned half of what men did (for U.S. women, the figure was 70 percent). Laws barring sex discrimination carry virtually no penalties and are routinely ignored (Kodama 1991).

Changes in the status quo

Women are changing the status quo in their own way by refusing to bear children; fertility now stands below replacement levels at 1.7 children per female (even though the pill is illegal in Japan). Another social change more abrupt in nature occurred March 20, 1995, when sarin nerve gas planted in the Tokyo subway system

TABLES

Table 1
STORY TYPES:
NHK and TBS newscasts, January – March 1993

	NHK		TBS	
home news at home	161	(64.9%)	117	(70.1%)
foreign news abroad	36	(14.5%)	25	(15.0%)
home news abroad	27	(10.9%)	13	(7.8%)
other or uncertain	24	(9.7%)	12	(7.2%)
total news stories	248	(100.0%)	167	(100.1%)

note: totals may not equal exactly 100% due to rounding

X^2 N.S. $p \leq .05$

killed 12 and sent thousands to the hospital, "an ominous and unprecedented act that rocked the 'myth' that Japan is a safe country" (NSK 1995, 11).

In the realm of politics, shortly after this study's time period, on July 18, 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party lost the majority in Japan's Diet that it had held for 40 years. In 1994, the government changed again. Then on Jan. 17, 1995, more than 5,000 people died when a 7.2-level earthquake hit Kobe; the government rescue response was criticized for its inadequacy and slowness.

In the realm of economics, at this writing, the Clinton administration planned to impose import tariffs that would double the price of Japanese luxury cars to try to force Japan to open its markets. Having recently been a consumer in Japan, land of terminal sticker shock, this writer wonders why consumers don't demand open markets so they can enlarge their choices beyond the high -priced product and the very high-priced product.

As the 50th anniversary of VJ Day approaches, the political, economic and social bases upon which Japan's comfort, wellbeing and stability have rested since the end of the war have been shaken. Future studies could track whether TV news has reflected any of these changes and whether "educational" NHK newscasts have begun at last to expand their viewers' horizons.

Table 2
STORY LOCATIONS:
NHK and TBS newscasts, January – March 1993

	NHK		TBS	
Japan	172	(69.4%)	121	(72.5%)
* international	23	(9.3%)	7	(4.2%)
Europe	14	(5.6%)	8	(4.8%)
North America	11	(4.4%)	7	(4.2%)
South/Southeast Asia	9	(3.6%)	6	(3.6%)
East Asia	8	(3.2%)	7	(4.2%)
United Nations meeting	3	(1.2%)	2	(1.2%)
** other countries	1	(0.4%)	5	(3.0%)
uncertain	7	(2.8%)	4	(2.4%)
total	248	(99.9%)	167	(100.1%)

note: totals may not equal exactly 100% due to rounding

* "international" refers to stories involving countries from at least 2 of the other regions listed
** "other countries" include Latin America, Africa, Australia, and the Middle East

X^2 N.S., $p \leq .05$

Table 3

REPORTER GENDERS:
NHK and TBS newscasts, January – March 1993

	NHK		TBS	
male reporters	19	(95.0%)	39	(90.7%)
female reporters	1	(5.0%)	4	(9.3%)
total reporters	20	(100.0%)	43	(100.0%)

X^2 N.S., $p \leq .05$

Table 4
NEWS STORY TOPICS AND SUBTOPICS:
NHK and TBS newscasts, January – March 1993

	NHK TOPICS N=248	TBS TOPICS N=167	NHK SUBTOPICS N=248	TBS SUBTOPICS N=167
economy	25.8%	12.6%	10.1%	4.2%
crime, judicial and legal matters	11.3%	16.2%	2.4%	6.0%
politics within units	12.5%	13.2%	4.0%	2.4%
diplomatic/political activity between units	5.6%	4.2%	5.6%	5.4%
sports	5.2%	12.0%	0.0%	.6%
human interest	5.2%	7.2%	5.2%	10.2%
science, technology, medicine	3.6%	2.4%	1.6%	2.4%
education/student issues	3.6%	1.2%	0.8%	2.4%
military and defense	2.8%	5.4%	2.4%	2.4%
accidents	2.4%	4.8%	0.0%	1.8%
natural disasters	2.4%	3.6%	0.8%	0.0%
culture, arts, history, language	2.0%	0.6%	0.4%	1.2%
ecology	1.6%	0.6%	1.2%	1.8%
social services	1.2%	2.4%	1.2%	2.4%
entertainment (excluding personalities)	1.2%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%
international aid	1.2%	0.0%	1.6%	1.8%
personalities (excluding politicians)	0.8%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%
religion	0.8%	0.0%	0.4%	1.2%
other	0.4%	1.8%	0.4%	0.6%
weather	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%
uncertain	9.7%	9.0%		
total	99.7%	100.2%	38.5%	47.7%

$X^2=35.53,\ p<.005$ $X^2=62.95,\ p<.001$

note: totals may not equal 100% for topics due to rounding; totals do not equal 100% for subtopics as not all stories had a subtopic.

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APPENDIX 1

Operational Definitions for the Japanese Broadcast News Coding Categories

1. Serial No. — Continuous, such as 1,2,3,......and so on.

2. Date — Month/Day/3 (since coding done only for 1993). For eg., 1/29/3 for January 29, 1993.

3. Time — 7:00:00 for seven o'clock, 7:01:46 for one minute and 46 seconds past seven and so on.

4. Story - Event Based — The event the news story is based on. Describe in a couple of words. Code '0' if not event-based.

5. Story Type — 1 through 4.
    1. Home news abroad
    2. Home news at home (domestic)
    3. Foreign news abroad
    4. Other or uncertain

6. Location — Place (country) where the immediate news event took/will take place. Meetings of the U.N. should be coded as 'U.N.' Code '0' for uncertain cases. Code 'L' if the story is on location and 'S' if it is reported by the anchors in the studio (Put the 'L' or the 'S' in parenthesis).

7. Topic — Choose the appropriate topic for the main event or situation of the story from the following categories:

    1. Diplomatic/political activity between states/countries/other similar units.

    2. Politics within states/countries/other similar units: internal conflict or crisis; elections, campaigns, appointments, government changes, bills; other political including legislation.

    3. Military and defense: armed conflict or threat of; peace moves, negotiations, settle ments; other including arms deals, weapons, bases, excercises.

    4. Economic matters: agreements on trade, tariffs; other international trade, imports, exports, trade balance; capital investment, stock issues, state investments (not aid); stock exchange, share prices, dividends, profits (not new stock issues); other eco nomic performance, output, growth, sales (for economy as whole or particular enter prise); prices, cost of living, inflation; industrial projects, factories, dams, ports, roads; agricultural matters, projects, crops, harvest; industrial/labor relations, disputes, negotiations, wages, employment/unemployment; monetary questions,

exchange rates, money supply; other economic.

5. International aid: disaster or famine relief; aid for economic purposes, eg., industrial aid; military aid, weapons, advisers, training; other aid, eg., for education, family planning, medical.

6. Social services: social problems, generally health, housing, illiteracy, etc; educa tional provision; health provision (not family planning); family planning; status of women; other social services and social welfare matters.

7. Crime, police, judicial, legal and penal: non-political crime, police, judicial and penal activity; political crime, as above; non-criminal legal and court proceedings, e.g., claims for damages; other crime/legal.

8. Culture, arts, archaeology, script, history, language.

9. Religion.

10. Scientific, technical, medical.

11. Sports: International; non-international.

12. Entertainment, show business (except personalities).

13. Personalities (not politicians): sports, entertainers; others.

14. Human interest, odd happenings, animals, sex.

15. Student matters, education.

16. Ecology: energy conservation, pollution; other.

17. Natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, drought).

18. Other.

19. Weather.

20. Accidents.

8. Subtopic — If the story has a secondary subject matter to it, code for a subtopic. Choose from the same 20 categories used to code for "topic."

9. Correspondent (Gender) — Code 'R' in case a reporter is present in the story. Code the gender of the reporter in parentheses (M or F).

Media Imperialism Revisited: The Countercase of Asia

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Running head: Media Imperialism Revisited: The Countercase of Asia

Abstract

The media imperialism thesis has long argued that expansion of Western media products into the developing world engenders the destruction of its indigeneous cultures. This paper examines the tenability of this claim with regard to Asia. Delineating the region's media developments,it identifies forces such as national gate-keeping policies, audience preferences and market-place competition that restrict Western media inflow and on the basis of this empirical evidence, suggests that the thesis appears inapposite in the Asian context.

Media Imperialism Revisited: The Countercase of Asia

The Theoretical Framework

The debate over the implications of Western dominance over the international media export trade has been a long-standing one in the field of communications research (Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974, Varis, 1988). Lately, due to the increasing emergence of globalizing tendencies within the media, particularly in terms of the growth of new and powerful technologies of distribution, this discussion has gathered new momentum. On the one side of this debate, are those who drawing on the developmentalist tradition in communication, define the spread of Western media into the developing world in largely positive terms, and view such media as not only fulfilling entertainment needs and providing information but offering enhanced possibilities for pluralistic and democratic communication (Read, 1976). On the other hand however, there are the dystopians who look upon the globalization of the media with considerably less enthusiasm and instead argue, that the expansion of Western trans-national media entities into the developing world, creates a situation that combines both the element of power imbalance as well as the element of cultural invasion between the countries concerned (Schiller, 1969; Boyd-Barrett, 1977).

Typically, these are scholars who draw theoretical sustenance from the tradition, loosely termed media imperialism (Tomlinson, 1993). This discourse, historically speaking, first emerged in the 1960s and essentially crystallized in the early 70s, when the UNESCO sponsored study of international media trade, conducted by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis demonstrated that there in effect operated a "one way flow of cultural production from the developed to the developing world," (Nordenstreng & Varis,1974). Drawing on this study, scholars such as Cees Hamelink, Armand Mattelart and Herbert Schiller among others, developed an initial critique of Western transnational media organizations and institutions (Schiller, 1976; Hamelink, 1983). Since then these scholars, have consistently questioned the excessive domination of the U.S. and other First World countries over international media exports and have emphasized the economically and culturally detrimental implications of this pattern of media flow (Wells, 1977; Real, 1986).

More specifically, theorists of this persuasuasion, have asserted that this iniquitous or "one way" media flow forms part of the global capitalist system's strategy to penetrate and hegemonize the developing world and to generate ideological support for its economic agenda, namely the creation and extension of a consumer society (Hamelink, 1983; Schiller,1976; Wells, 1977). In other words, these scholars assert that the small group of source countries in the North Atlantic basin not only control the international flow of media exports but use it to transmit cultural products that reflect their particular values, to large numbers of recipient nations around the world.

Thus, this flow of moving images in their opinion, while purporting to be a carrier of wholesome entertainment, contains implicit messages and acts primarily as a mechanism for the wholesale transfer of meaning and values to the Third World, causing not only the transformation of the region's indigenous cultural milieux but its refashioning in the cultural likeness of its dominators (Hamelink, 1983). Consequently, fears of "cultural homogenization" and "cultural synchronization" (Hamelink,1983) have frequently been voiced by proponents of the media imperialism thesis and arguments made for a Third World "cultural disassociation" as the only way to protect vulnerable indigenous cultures that would otherwise almost certainly be effaced (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991).

As a theoretical model thus, media imperialism essentially posits a vision of western cultural dominance and imposition, created by a ceaseless flow of western cultural products. A flow, that according to it, has grown exponentially with the emergence of new global media systems. As Herbert Schiller, the most long-standing exponent of this position sees it, even though the historical era in which the thesis was formulated has disappeared, the process of cultural domination continues to flourish. In his words:

> The global arena of media domination has not diminished in the 1990s, reinforced by new delivery systems-satellites and cable networks, the image flow is heavier than ever...the corporate media-cultural industries have expanded in recent decades and now occupy most of the global social space and the developing world continues to be under siege...facing the relentless flow of western media," (Schiller, 1991).

This is clearly a powerful claim and what this paper will attempt to do is to examine the extent to which it is empirically tenable with regard to the developing world, focusing specifically on media developments in Asia, particularly those parts of it that have a significant degree of television and satellite penetration, ie. countries in East and South East Asia and India. The fundamental reason for undertaking this study in an empirically based manner is that most of the evidence cited in the media imperialism debate, especially by its proponents, has tended to be fundamentally impressionistic in nature and empirical information on the implications of Western media exports into developing countries has remained sparse (Tracey, 1988). Not surprisingly, this has created a gap in our understanding of communication processes and structures in the developing world, and what this paper attempts to do is to remedy this omission by examining Asia.

The Regional Dynamics

The choice of Asia as geographic referrent is however not arbitrary. Asia has been chosen because it combines a variety of significant characteristics. First, it comprises a very substantial portion of the geo-political unit termed the "developing world," which is widely identified as being critically threatened by western media domination (Schiller, 1991). In fact, scholars have repeatedly asserted that due to structural conditions of dependency, such as low per capita incomes, lack of industrial infrastructure, lack of support by governments as well as limited technological and production skills, developing countries are unable to produce full schedules of programming, and are therefore particularly susceptible to the dominance of western imports with their lower costs and comparatively superior production values (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988; Straubhaar, 1991).

Moreover, besides its location in the "at risk" developing world, this area has been experiencing extensive economic deregulation and privatization, whereby many regional governments have begun to dismantle their monopolistic control over industries including the electronic media, resulting in the increasing commercialization of the latter (Karthigesu, 1994). But what makes Asia truly significant media wise, is the fact that it has recently witnessed a tremendous growth in foreign satellite delivered programming and is in fact being recognized as the largest market for such programming world-wide (Chan, 1994). For this characteristic, combined with the others, seems to create precisely the type of situational matrix within which media imperialism is theoretically believed to arise. Indeed, proponents of the view have theorized that given Asia's defining characteristics, namely--its location in the developing Third World, its increasingly deregulated economies and the influx of satellite delivered programming, such a development is inevitable, if not ongoing (Bhatia, 1993; Menon, 1993).

However, such general formulations notwithstanding, on the ground Asia, especially its Eastern and Southeastern parts- which are also the areas with the greatest televisual and satellite penetration-presents a rather different picture. First, in purely economic terms, it is not the dependent structure described by theorists. In fact, in 1993 itself Asia minus Japan out-performed the world's leading industrial economies by more than six times with regard to total output and economists believe that by 2050 the area will account for 57 percent of the world's economy (Zukerman, 1993). Moreover, Asia has $250 billion in foreign reserves, $ 600 billion in cash reserves and a gross domestic product that exceeds $ 2 trillion (Engardio, 1993).

Thus, economically at least, the region is clearly in a position to restrict foreign media flow by developing indigenous media production (Waterman, 1994). And while it can no doubt be argued that such production is still evolving and is therefore vulnerable to pressure from the more established Western media organizations, it is however essential to realize that indigenous media development in Asia is by no means entirely subject to market forces. Indeed, even though the region is characterized by a wide-spread acceptance of Western-style free market economics, in cultural terms, however Asia displays a manifest desire to preserve the specific values and traditions of its indigenous societies (Vatikiotis, 1994). In other words, the present economic laissez faire does not extend to the cultural domain where the necessity of "protecting the unique Asian heritage" from invasive western influences is a constant motif within the public discourse

(Vatikiotis, 1994). This attitude was most clearly reflected in a recent statement at the G-15 Summit where Asian leaders emphasized that they proposed to give befitting response to the cultural challenge posed by the invasion of western media. (Vatikiotis, 1994). As their collective statement put it:

> Asia has been invaded many times in its history by colonialists and imperialists. We have been subordinated politically and economically. Inspite of all this our culture and values have remained intact. We cannot not allow the Western media to destroy our heritage and are prepared to take action to combat its influence (Vatikiotis, 1994).

Given this regional ethos,it is then hardly surprising that what we see in Asia is not the relentless onslaught of media imperialism but rather a multiplicity of counter forces that inhibit its emergence, ranging from national gate-keeping policies and the dynamics of audience preference to the forces of marketplace competition, all of which will be examined in turn.

National Gatekeeping Policies

Manifest in forms, that range from explicit bans on foreign programming, and equity restrictions on foreign investment in the media to ceilings on imports and active support of indigenous programming, such policies have traditionally been deployed by states to mediate transnational electronic broadcasts. Underlying these actions ofcourse is the perception that the mass media constitute the cultural arm of nation building. That they provide a focus for the political and cultural integration of the nation by acting as a source for common meanings, agendas and imagery. Indeed, according to Michael Schudson, states have always viewed broadcasting as a powerful mechanism of political and cultural control, and have therefore tended to develop extensive policies to regulate both its internal and external manifestations across the world (Schudson, 1994). It is then hardly surprising that in post-colonial Asia where nation-buliding is a critical issue, that states have adopted a variety of gate-keeping mechanisms to restrict foreign media flow.

For instance in China- the largest potential market for global media conglomerates-the government has recently strengthened a ban on receiving foreign broadcasts and has imposed severe restrictions on ownership of satellite dishes. Indeed in a marked reassertion of social control, in an era of relative openess, the state has articulated Proclamation 129, under which owners of satellite dishes have been given six months to register their equipment with the appropriate authorities and those found with unauthorized dishes are liable to be fined and their dishes confiscated (Karp,1994).

Further, resurrecting the old Maoist adage about "spiritual pollution," the Chinese government has also prohibited TV stations and cable TV operators from using foreign satellite TV programs and has actively moved to close existing loop-holes that allow the sale of foreign programming to Chinese cable TV stations (Poole, 1994). According to new regulations cable networks are required to limit foreign programming to no more than one-third of their total programming (Lu, 1993). In addition, to fend off western ideological influence the Chinese Ministry of Radio, TV and Cinema is also working to limit western media products on domestic network channels by introducing ceilings on foreign imports and although these have not yet been clearly articulated, according to a government spokesman they could be as low as 800-1000 hours, per year for all of China (Karp, 1994).

While strategies of cultural protectionism are thus clearly a critical dimension of China's response to the efflorescence of Western media in the region, the country has however also deployed another method to confront the inflow of foreign media, namely the encouragement of domestic cultural production. In fact, to reduce its so-called "cultural deficit" (Chan, 1994), China has undertaken efforts to double its domestic media production in the decade 1990-2000 (Ai, 1991). Moreover, China has also developed plans to increase the international sales of its media products and to launch its own satellite television service (Ai, 1993).

While China in keeping with its political tradition of restricting foreign influence, is thus employing the most extensive compendium of national gate-keeping policies in the region, other countries such as India are not far behind. Like China, India is facing a considerable challenge from the unregulated entry of satellite delivered foreign programming services, such as Rupert Murdoch's STAR TV and countering this "invasion from the skies" has similarly emerged as a major governmental priority (Deo, 1993). To do this, at the level of explicit regulatory action, the state has recently issued a Cable Television Regulation Bill which not only restricts foreign equity ownership in cable networks and requires all cable operators to be Indian citizens, but also prohibits foreign broadcasters to uplink from the country (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1994). Further, the bill that was introduced only days before STAR TV launched its pay TV channel, also provides for the mandatory transmission of two channels of the state-run national network and contains a stringent programming code that prohibits the transmission of foreign programs and advertisements that are deemed violent, indecent or otherwise objectionable, and allows it to cancel the licenses of broadcasters who do not comply (Manchanda, 1993).

In addition to restricting imported programming through the establishment of such policies, the government is also actively supporting domestic television programming. Doordarshan, India's government controlled television network, has substantially increased its channel capacity, introducing five new channels that have been designed specifically to compete with the foreign satellite delivered programming. Transmitted both terrestrially and via the country's largest multipurpose satellite Insat 2B, these channels primarily carry subsidized and domestically produced news, sports and entertainment programs, with foreign programming being restricted to a quota of less than 10 percent of the total schedule (Sarkar, 1993). Besides the expansion of the Doordarshan channels, the Indian government has also established a separate satellite channel, to further stimulate indigenous programming. Known as the

Metro Channel, this functions basically as a private commercial station, with producers being allowed to buy dayparts and transmit programs with only one stipulation--that the programs be domestically produced (Agarwal, 1994). Finally and most recently, the Indian government has announced incentives for advertisers on national channels (Agarwal, 1994). Hence in a relatively short period of time, gate keeping has made the Indian broadcasting environment significantly more difficult for foreign media entities.

A similar climate is also developing in Indonesia, foreign satellite delivered programming, is being restricted in a variety of ways. First, the government monitors all satellite broadcasts and filters out those deemed politically, socially or culturally sensitive (Stewart, 1993). Further, it has imposed severe quota restrictions on imported programs as a result of which broadcasters, both satellite and terrestrial are not allowed to air western programs beyond a specified maximum of 30 percent of their total schedule and those who do so are liable to have their licences cancelled (Cohen, 1993). However, such restrictive practices notwithstanding, the principal gate-keeping strategy espoused by Indonesia, like India has been the extensive governmental support of indigenous media production.

Indeed, over the last three years, the Suharto government has aided the establishment of as many as four private channels in which foreign equity participation is prohibited. These channels which receive considerable government subsidies operate under a mandatory requirement to broadcast at least 70 percent indigenous programming (Cohen, 1993).

Such parameters that constrain foreign programming are even visible within the smaller Asian nations. For instance, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei all prohibit the private ownership of satellite dishes, on the grounds that these are likely to create a cultural invasion (Shenon, 1993). Indeed, in these countries western satellite delivered programming is only available in the form of censored rebroadcasts over tightly controlled government owned cable television (Shenon, 1993). Moreover, foreign media products are also restricted in Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and South Korea through quota restrictions on western imports on television, which do not however apply to regionally produced programming (Dennis & Vanden Heuvel, 1993).

For instance, in South Korea only 20 percent of television programming can imported, while in Vietnam, the figure is about 30 percent (Dennis & Vanden Heuvel, 1993). But apart from the adoption of such regulatory regimes, like other nations in the region, gate-keeping policies in these countries also include a fostering of local cultural production. Singapore, for example has developed its own satellite broadcasting service. The new service, Singapore Cablevision (SCV), began transmitting in 1992, and carries mostly domestically produced programming in Mandarin, English and Malay (Hanson, 1994). In Malaysia too, indigenous production is being encouraged by tax incentives and subsidies to local producers (Hui, 1993).

Thus, we find that a variety of gate-keeping policies that range from censorship and imposition of quotas on imported programming to the active fostering of indigenous cultural production, are being used across Asia to restrict the flow of foreign media products. More importantly, these are in fact also proving to be successful. In China-the widely touted market of the future-such policies have not only succeeded in eliminating "politically unsuitable" Western programs such as the BBC World Service Television but in restricting imports overall (Karp, 1994). Similarly, in the the large Asian market of India, STAR TV the primary foreign broadcaster in India that reaches approximately 7 million television households, has seen little new growth while, on the other hand new local channels which started less than a year ago, have expanded their reach to over 7.5 million homes and this number is believed to be increasing rapidly (Agarwal, 1994). Further, in countries like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, the once ubiquitous American sitcoms and series that once dominated the televisual scene are significantly less visible and the maximum percentage of airtime is now occupied by locally and regionally produced programming (Hashim, 1994 ; Dennis & Vanden Heuvel, 1993).

However it is in dollar terms that the restricted nature of Asian markets and the evident effectiveness of gate- keeping measures is best revealed. Indeed, over the last two years the revenue from the Asian market earned by Hollywood has declined continuously, falling from $45 million in 1992 to a mere $ 30 million, (out of a total foreign revenue of 6.9 billion), in 1993

(Groves, 1993a). As Wayne Broun, VP Warner Bros. TV International puts it:

> There is no boom for the US in Asia...and the national barricade policies have made the local markets increasingly inaccessible. Governments everywhere are trying to prevent foreign media from entering their domains. It's becoming difficult to sell anything at all (Groves, 1993a).

What we find in Asia thus, is a powerful restatement of state power in the cultural domain. Indeed, despite rhetoric regarding the increasing influence of global media and the concomitant erosion of governmental authority, national political systems in the region continue to play a determinant role in local media developments, particularly in terms of restricting foreign cultural production.

The Dynamics of Audience Preference

While national gate-keeping policies have thus emerged as a substantial restriction to the inflow of foreign media, and the consequent emergence of media imperialism, it is however necessary to recognize that the growth of the latter is also restrained by a second force, namely audience preference. Indeed, despite widespread claims cultural homogenization and the destruction of indigenous cultural subjectivities, cross-cultural studies almost uniformly indicate whenever given the option, viewers tend to actively privilege national or regional programming over its imported counterpart and in fact rarely turn to imported programming when local alternatives are available (Straubhaar, 1991; Singhal & Rogers, 1988; Tracey, 1988). Hence, the dynamics of audience preference thus play a critical role in limiting foreign media products and in Asia where local cultural production exists, it operates as a demonstrable force.

According to a recent survey of the respective positions of local and overseas programs in the top 20 programs, in the majority of the Asian countries, the former occupied well over 90 percent of the top-20 list in 1992 (Wang, 1993). For instance in China where foreign broadcaster STAR TV claims penetration of 30 million households, the most popular programs are the locally or regionally produced Mandarin and Cantonese soap operas and period drama series, which are usually transmitted via the governnment controlled China Central Television or CCTV (Hachten, 1993). In neighboring Taiwan , which is considered one of the largest markets for STAR TV, similar series, local Chinese series routinely draw the highest viewership (Dennis & Vanden Heuvel, 1993).

In Indonesia and Malaysia too, despite the existence of a multi-lingual viewership, the most popular programs are either locally or regionally produced (Sen, 1993). In South Korea and Singapore as well, local programming dominates the ratings, drawing 85 to 88 percent of the television house-holds, while foreign programming, both satellite delivered and terrestrial, rarely attracts more than 15 to 20 percent of the viewers at any time (Clifford, 1993). In fact in comparative terms, local programs are usually seen by almost twice as many viewers, than imported ones (Hachten, 1993). Even in cosmopolitan Hong Kong, not only do the Cantonese language programs broadcast by TVB's Jade Channel draw over 90 percent of the primetime audience, but last year despite the presence of STAR TV and its entertainment channel STAR Plus, the program that sent the local ratings index soaring was "Pao the Judge," a period drama series about an "honorable judge from 19th century China," (Hughes, 1994). Similarly, in India, a market where STAR TV reaches over 3 million households it is the Saturday evening Hindi film , weekly music program Chitrahaar and mythological drama series that attract 45 to 50 percent of the viewers, while the American-made Santa Barbara and Wonder Years, draw a meagre 1 to 2 percent of the total audience (Agarwal, 1994).

In causative terms, this widespread audience preference for local media products arises at least partially as a result of linguistic reasons. This is because while foreign programming tends to be in English, the latter is not the language of choice across much of Asia. In fact, other than a very small percentage of westernized English speaking elites, the majority of Asians are unfamiliar with English and communicate primarily in local languages, (Chan,1994). Consequently, they tend to opt for national programming, which is usually in a language that they comprehend (Hachten, 1993). However, audience preference is not simply predicated on linguistic concerns, as is demonstrated by the case of India, where despite the presence of a relatively large English speaking population, local programs remain more popular than imported variants (Sen, 1993).

On the contrary, viewer choice in Asia is equally mediated by cultural considerations. Indeed, myriad cross-cultural studies suggest that processes of viewing are crucially mediated both by discourses rooted in language, class, gender, ethnicity and social experience (Schlesinger, Dobash, Dobash & Weaver, 1992), as well as by the existence of "cultural discount" or the tendency of audiences to resist content originating outside their own culture (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988). In other words they indicate, that audiences tend to naturally gravitate towards programming that appears "proximate" or "relevant" to their particular cultural context (Straubhaar, 1991),
and away from that which does not. In the case of Asia this is evidenced clearly by the fact that not only do audiences actively choose programming, such as mythological drama series that affirm their cultural and religious traditions as in the case of India (Rajagopal, 1993) but even reject media products - notably Dallas- on the grounds that these do not conform to the basic norms and values of their cultural universe (Dennis & Vanden Heuvel, 1993).

In other words, as media consultant Sarah Rechin explains,

> It is language and culture, in varying degree that determine what Asian audiences will or will not choose to watch. People basically watch whatever seems closest to their lives and makes the most sense to them in terms of their own culture...This is particularly the case in Asia (Karp,1994).

But proportion notwithstanding, the eventual result we find, is an identifiable pattern of audience preference that privileges local programming and thereby restricts foreign imports.

Market-place Developments

While audience preference, like national gate-keeping, thus represents a relatively established restriction vis a vis foreign media, in Asia the latter is however also increasingly restrained by market-place developments, such as the rise of indigenous media organizations. Indeed, the emergence of such organizations is particularly significant for they combine a variety of critical attributes. Firstly, they possess many of the elements on which the "international comparative advantage" of foreign, especially American media corporations has traditionally been based (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988). For instance, like their foreign competitors, these organizations have sizeable domestic markets as well a large regional market that contains 35 percent of the world's television sets (Bhatia, 1993) and are therefore able to benefit from similar economies of scale. Further, like their competitors, these media organizations, have also been successful in generating advertising revenue. In fact, in 1993 these home-grown organizations garnered almost $ 3.6 billion in advertising revenues and according to analysts this figure is expected to increase to as much as $6 billion within the next two years (Groves, 1994b).

Moreover, while perhaps not as established as Western entertainment conglomerates, Asian media companies do however, enjoy additional advantages that are not available to foreign media corporations. For a start, the former tend to have close political connections with regional governments. A fact that gives them considerable operating leverage, despite the introduction of stringent regulatory policies across the region (Economist, 1994). Secondly, these media organizations are in a position to provide large quantities of local programming, which wherever available, proves consistently and significantly more popular than its imported counterpart (Sen, 1993; Hachten, 1993). In other words, they are far better equipped to give audiences what they clearly seem to prefer. Consequently, such organizations are in a unique position to compete against, and restrict western media operations in Asian markets.

Foremost among the media entities actively engaged in this task, is the Hong-Kong based Television Broadcasts or TVB as it is better known. Originally, a local broadcaster in the colony, TVB now has a superstation that transmits its programs by satellite either in the original Cantonese or in dubbed form to as many as 40 countries, among them Thailand, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and even China where its programs are transmitted by government-owned television stations (Kraar, 1994). Furthermore, the organization has launched a new Mandarin language free channel (TVBS) aimed primarily at Taiwan, as well as a new Southeast Asian channel, which in addition to core programming in Mandarin, also provides local language programming for Southeast Asia (Groves, 1994c).

But it is not simply ubiquity that makes TVB the potent force that it is. Indeed, its real strength is its ownership of the the world's largest library of Chinese-language programs and its ability to regularly produce over 6000 hours of popular local programs every year (Economist, 1994). For it is underpinned by such programming, that TVB has emerged as a formidable competitor to the principal foreign broadcaster in Asia, namely STAR TV. In fact, since it began broadcasting to Taiwan last September, TVB has not only equalled STAR TV's audience penetration in Taiwan, reaching 2.8 million homes but this number is believed to be increasing rapidly (Shu-Ming, 1994). Moreover, using the Indonesian satellite Palapa B2P, TVB's South East Asian channel has also begun transmissions to large audiences in Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia, overtaking western broadcasters such as STAR TV who have been unable to enter this region (Shu-Ming, 1994).

However, it is in the vast Chinese market, that TVB 's lead over its foreign competitors is becoming increasingly apparent. Indeed, while STAR TV claims an audience of 30 million households, TVB 's programming, both in the form of direct broadcasts via its Jade Channel as well as sales to the Chinese television, reaches an estimated 100 million Chinese tv homes (Shih, 1994). Further, while STAR TV and other foreign broadcasters are finding themselves restricted by regulatory policies, TVB on the other hand, due to the political connections of its owners, Sir Run Run Shaw and Robert Kuok, is under no such pressure (Shih, 1994). In fact, even the recent Chinese ban on foreign satellite transmissions has not touched Hong-Kong based TVB, which has actually received permission to directly beam its TVBS channel into large parts of China, via the new satellite Apstar1--a move that will in all likelihood will boost its Chinese audience to one billion or more (Shih, 1994). A figure far in excess of STAR TV or any other western broadcaster in the region.

While TVB has thus emerged as the most visible challenger to western media in the Asian markets, it is however not the only combatant in this struggle. Indeed, an evolving force in the Asian media context is the Hong-Kong based Wharf Cable. The only 24-hour pay TV broadcaster in the colony, Wharf recently launched three new channels in Hong-Kong and is in the process of extending its subscription channels to other parts of Asia as well (Staff, 1994). Like TVB, Wharf's strength also lies in its ability to produce and supply its own local programming. Indeed, unlike other cable companies that simply distribute programming, Wharf generates its own programs that range from films, news magazines and cartoons to drama series and Cantonese music programs (Staff, 1994). And on the basis of these, Wharf has not only succeeded in penetrating over 45 percent of the Hong-Kong audience, but has moved into the Chinese pay TV market, actively entering into joint ventures with cablecasters in the provinces of Sichuan, Guangdong and Guangzhou- successfully edging out established western broadcasters (Karp, 1993).

Aside from TVB and Wharf Cable which represent the relatively developed competition to western media in East Asia, the latter however also has other potential competitors. Significant among these is newly established Chinese Entertainment Television Broadcast Ltd. or CETV. Owned by video magnate Robert Chua, this 24-hour Mandarin service which is aimed at 1.25 billion mainland and overseas Chinese, will be transmitted later this year via Apstar 1, the Chinese government satellite (Covington, 1994). And although the success of this venture obviously remains an open question, given the popular preference for local programming and Chua's experience in providing it, the service is more than likely to take off. Thereby creating, yet another competitive force for western broadcasters to contend with in this part of the world. Such competition is also increasingly manifest in the South Asian sector of India where despite the lack of large TVB style conglomerates, large numbers of smaller producers have emerged. In fact, the successful Metro Channel that has played a critical role in limiting the growth of STAR TV, principally operates on the basis of their programming (Agarwal, 1994).

Hence, there would appear to exist considerable indigenous competition and resistance to western media across the Asian continent, with home-grown media organizations witnessing growth both in terms of audience penetration as well as financial returns. This is amply illustrated by both TVB and Wharf Cable, which have seen their audiences grow and their profits soar 42 percent and 21 percent respectively, (Covington, 1994). Moreover, not only did indigenous producers supply over 75 percent of all Asian programming (Waterman, 1994), but in what would appear to be almost a case of "reverse cultural imperialism," many of them have begun to target populations in overseas markets. TVB, for instance has moved into North America, acquiring stakes in two Canadian-cable services serving 115,000 Chinese subscribers, besides operating cable channels in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas (Tanzer, 1993). Similarly, the Korean broadcaster MBC has established a channel aimed at Koreans in the United States (Clifford, 1993), while the Indian film industry is exporting its products to over a hundred countries (Sen, 1993). In fact, as George Kuo, Singapore's Information Minister puts it "with these developments Asia is rapidly emerging as a media force to be reckoned with,''(Karp, 1993).

Media Imperialism: Problematic Prophecies

While Kuo's statement is of course rhetorical, it is nevertheless obvious from this exposition, that Asia seems to present relatively little evidence of the destruction of its indigenous cultural subjectivities and cultural production, by a lava stream of programming from the mouth of the volcano that is Hollywood. In fact, not only do we not perceive a take-over by the forces of western cultural domination, but it is even possible to discern a pattern of local resistance, arising out of the complex interplay of national gate-keeping policies, audience preference and market-place competition, to such a development. In other words, the threat of imminent cultural doom foreshadowed by the prophets of media imperialism, would thus appear to have been significantly exaggerated.

However, the issue here is not simply one of prophecy gone awry For indeed it would seem that at least in the context of Asia, the very notion of media imperialism is problematic. Firstly, implicit within the notion is the presumption of a structural stasis within the developing world in general and Asia by extension. In fact , the region is almost always defined as "a dependent entity", that lacks the industrial infrastructure, financial means, governmental support and technological skills to undertake indigenous media production and is therefore susceptible to domination by western trans-national cultural industries (Schiller, 1991; Hamelink,1983). Epitomizing this position, Herbert Schiller for example writes,

"the condition of the Third World vis a vis the the North is one of near desperation. Most of the Third World seems more helpless than ever and the general situation reveals its continued vulnerability to transnational media domination," (Schiller, 1991, p.16).

Hence the developing world in this discourse, is conceptualized essentially as an unchanging terrain that is permanently devoid of the resources and ability to combat the unidirectional media flow from the Western hemisphere, even though the evidence indicates that it is a complex and internally differentiated entity, parts of which such as Asia, display considerable dynamism and resistance to the influx of foreign media. However, even more problematic than this tendency, is the theory's profound mediacentricism, reflected in its assumption about the power of the media to influence subjectivities and homogenize culture. For this position where the media is perceived as a force that can "imprint itself like a colossal seal on the soft wax of the global mind," (Tracey,1988) leads to an elision if not negation of the affective and structural determinants that clearly mediate the processes of cultural consumption. In other words, this assumption prevents the cognition not only of language, culture and values but of state action, all of which influence media inflow within Asia, so that both states and viewers appear as devoid of any sense of agency or intentionality. And by operating with this assumption, not only does the media imperialism thesis, create a representation that is inaccurate, but it reveals that even as it claims to speak for the periphery, its own stance remains almost metropolitan.

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Media and the Politics of Citizens' Press Movement in Korea, 1985-1993

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Media and the Politics of Citizens' Press Movement in Korea, 1985-1993

I. Introduction

With the tide of political democratization in the late eighties, new social movements have flourished in various sectors of the Korean society. For instance, "citizens' press movements" have challenged the mainstream media. Those movements represent attempts at the grass root level to reform problems of the press. On the theoretical level, the notions of the civil society and new social movement became hot issues among social theorists in Korea (e.g., Korean Sociological Association & Korean Political Science Association, 1992). However, most literature remained on the abstract level, and failed to examine the concepts empirically in Korean context.

This paper traces the trajectory of citizens' press movements and delves into the characteristics of those movements and, more fundamentally, the civil society in Korea. This paper also explores whether the Western notions of the civil society and new social movement are applicable in the historical circumstances of the Korean society. To what extent citizens' press movements in Korea are similar to new social movements? What makes the Korean phenomena distinct from their counterpart in the Western hemisphere? Where do such differences come from? Given the nature of the issue, this paper relies on exemplary historical instances and speculates on their impiications.

II. The Concepts of the Civil Society and New Social Movement.

The unfolding of social movements reflects particular characteristics and problems of the societal structure in which they take place. More specifically, one has to understand citizens' press movements within the structural context of the state, the civil society, and the market with which the press is closely associated. The trilogy of the state, the civil society, and the market has been a useful conceptual framework for analyzing the media.

However, those key concepts derive from the historical experience of the European societies, making applications to Korean society theoretically problematic. What complicates the matter further is the fact that some essential concepts have diverse meaning, depending on the context. For instance, the civil society refers often to the realm of the economy or market, while in other context it may also suggest the non-state arena, including the market(Shin, 1991). In this paper, however, I would like to define the civil society as a realm, akin to what Juergen Habermas(1974) calls "the public sphere." In the civil society, the quest for common good or universal values takes place, but neither the institutionalized political action prevails as in the state nor the private-interest seeking as in the market.

In the West European societies, the civil society is to a certain extent a historical entity closely associated with the advent of liberalism. The press represents a good historical example of such an area. However, the notion of the civil society is more useful as a "normative" concept than a historical phenomenon. The conceptual trilogy of the market, the civil society, and the state not only provides ways of analysis, but also implies a diagnosis of problems and prescriptions. Consequently, the framework might be infeasible in the circumstances of Korea. For instance, the state and the market represent two major forces, which have undermined the possibility of the media as a potential realm of the civil society or public sphere. Primarily in the European context, John Keane(1991) suggests the market as the primary cause for the disappearing public sphere.

Because Korea has rapidly grown up as a capitalist society under a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the civil society, including media, has failed to maintain autonomy from the state and diversity of ideas. With the inception of a legitimate civilian government in 1988, market competition and deregulation, under the rhetoric of "globalization," have emerged to replace the state control as a potentially threatening force to the civil society. However, the problem is not that simple. In Korea the market is not necessarily the primary force that undermines the autonomous, critical, and public nature of the press as a part of the civil society. Despite the end of authoritarian government, the press is still blamed with being extremely conservative and maintaining symbiotic relations with the state. The lack of the tradition of critique and autonomy has plagued the Korean press even after political democratization brought power to the press.

The problem might derive from within the press, as well as outside. For instance, in Korea, the press has been not only a commercial business but also a political institution involved in power-distributive process. For instance, many local newspapers fail to represent diverse minority voices, and instead are closely intertwined with the interests of dominant elite groups at the local level. In a sense, the press, large or small, has become a conservative interest group on its own. Although the commercial press system has been prevailing principle, the market mechanism has revealed serious problems of market failure without sustaining the efficiency of competition. For example, daily newspapers, which are purely under the market system, often break rules on the fair business. The business relations between the press and advertisers are also asymmetrical; newspapers often yield their power to draw more subscription and advertising.

In sum, the locus of the press in Korea may seem idiosyncratic within the framework of the state-civil society-market trilogy. The structural problems of the Korean press may be somewhat different from the European cases. Consequently, social movements arising from such particular circumstances may well have unique aspects.

The notion of new social movement is based on historical experience. In the West, new social movements followed old social movements, after whose issues were incorporated and institutionalized as a part of the political process. In old social movements, marginal social groups within the hierarchy of power attempt to represent their material interests in the polity. Labor movement is a typical example of old social movements. On the other hand, new social movements are in pursuit of universal values, which are excluded in the existing political process. Table 1 shows a general comparison of both types of movements (Offe, 1985, p.832; Scott, 1990, p.19).

TABLE 1. Comparison of Old and New Social Movements

	old	new
actors	socioeconomic groups acting as groups(in the groups' interest) and involved in distributive conflict	socioeconomic groups acting not as such, but on behalf of ascriptive collectivities
location	increasingly within the polity	civil society
aims	political integration, economic rights	changes in values and lifestyle, defense of civil society
organization	formal, hierarchical	network, grass roots
medium of action	political mobilization	direct action, cultural innovation

Social movements developing within specific circumstances may betray the theoretical typology based on the historical experience of the Western society. This paper attempts to uncover such idiosyncrasies and their implications for cultural politics in Korea. This paper also addresses the question of whether it is possible to regard citizens' press movement as a form of new social movement.

III. Characteristics of Citizens' Press Movement

1) Actors

Citizens' press movement is a rather ambiguous term, which gained currency in Korea around the turn of the decade. It is a form of press reform movement at the grass root level. But it is distinct from alternative media movement and partisan journalism based on the class politics, in that citizens' press movement, as with new social movements, claims to have its base on non-class coalitions ranging over diverse social groups. The origin of citizens' press movement goes back to the 1960s. In 1964, for example, civilian groups rose to repeal a bill of press ethics council, which the government introduced presumably to control newspapers. However, such intermittent movements developed into more consistent and organized "audience movements" in the 80s. License Fee Boycott Campaign in the mid-eighties was a nation-wide movement against commercialism and biased reporting of the public television, i.e., Korean Broadcasting Station(KBS). After the Council of Women's Organizations initiated a media monitoring group in 1984, many organizations opened similar programs.

A few organizations, e.g., the Council of Democratic Press Movements(CDPM) or the Citizens' Group for Audience Movement (CGAM) of YMCA, have specialized in issues regarding media. But citizens' press movements have mostly taken place as subsidiary activities of existing organizations established for other causes. Especially, religious groups, including Protestant, Buddhist, and Catholics, or women's organizations have been instrumental in citizens' press movements. In Korea, religious groups represent a few arenas, which have maintained autonomy even under the authoritarian government. In a sense, religious groups continue the tradition of democratization movement since the 1960s. In the eighties, women's groups have increased in number and have played more central role in citizens' press movements. Another distinctive feature is that most organizations are either nation-wide or concentrate in Seoul, the capitol of Korea. Local organizations in other areas are rare.

When major issues broke out, individual organizations combined to form temporarily a broad coalition. Table 2 shows examples of coalitions in citizens' press movements (Koo, 1992, p. 21; Kim, 1991, pp.242-243; CSERW, 1993, pp.72-73; CCFCEC, 1992; ACSNT, 1993, pp.71-72; KFPU Newsletter, Dec. 2, 1991; ASBR press release, Sept. 20, 1993).

TABLE 2. Temporary Coalitions in Press Movements

Coalitions	Participating Organizations	Period
Christian Movement for License Fee Boycott	Protestant churches	Jan. 20, 1986-?
Joint Commission for License Fee Boycott and Free Press	catholic & Protestant churches, opposition party, non-party politicians' group, women's' organizations. CDPM	Sept. 15, 1986-?
Women's Coalition for License Fee Boycott	17 women's organizations	May 15, 1987-?
Citizens' Movement for License Fee Boycott	catholic and Protestant churches	Sept. 20, 1988-?
Joint Commission against Obscenity and Violence of Sports Newspaper	17 Christian organizations, Seoul YMCA, catholic youth organization	Nov. 9, 1990-December 20, 1990

Anti-payola campaign	3 Christian organizations, YMCA, a women's' organization, CDPM, Korean Media Research Group(KMRG, a critical communication researcher group), National Association of Student Journalists.	Nov. 26, 1991
Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch (CSERW)	CDPM, KNCC Press Commission, KMRG, a women's organization, catholic & Buddhist press committees.	Feb. 20, 1991-?; Sept. 4, 1992-Feb. 9, 199
Citizens' Coalition for Fair and Clean Election Campaign (CCFCEC)	57 civil groups including YMCA, Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, YWCA, Korean Association of Trade Unions, National Commission of Farmers' Organizations.	first half, 1992
Audience Commission for Say No to Television (ACSNT)	42 organization, including those of women, parents, senior citizens, Christian, catholic, handicapped, and local YMCAs.	June 28, 1993-July 10, 1993
Audience Solidarity for Broadcasting Reform (ASBR)	11 organizations, including those of women, Christian, catholic, Buddhist, YMCA, KMRG, CDPM.	Sept. 20, 1993-?

Until political democratization in 1988, citizens' press movement remained a part of broader social movements for political democratization. For instance, License Fee Boycott Campaign around 1986 proceeded under the leadership of Protestant churches. The organization expanded soon to subsume broad range of social groups, regardless of political lines, such as an opposition party, non-party politicians, various religious groups, and women's organizations. However, a nation-wide political movement turned gradually into a specialized press reform movement after 1987. With the democratization of institutional polity, activists with a career of political struggle joined parties or a newly founded opposition newspaper. Consequently, participants in the press movements began to be de-politicized.

As with new social movements in the West, citizens' press movement in Korea seems to be hardly based on class politics. Major actors consist mostly of young women in their twenties and thirties, and students and religious groups still occupy considerable part. For instance, female predominance in press movements might be due to the fact that women have more time for social activities and are in a position to feel sensitively problems of media in relation to their everyday life. But it is also due to the patriarchal structure that has circumscribed career opportunities for well-educated women in Korea.

In terms of organizations, citizens' press movements in Korea are quite distinct from the grassroots-network type of new social movements. Intellectuals and celebrities play pivotal role rather than professional activists or well-organized grassroots network, in the process. Press movement organizations in Korea tend be a hierarchy working downward from above. Furthermore, although many organizations emphasize uniqueness of their activities, their issues and political lines are not quite divergent. Nevertheless, attempts to form a broad coalition among diverse groups around crucial issues often broke up at the final stage. The trial to forge the Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch in 1992 ended up with separate small coalitions. It is presumably due to the struggle for internal hegemony (Lee, 1992, p.2). Of course, the grassroots nature of new social movements might make it difficult to organize heterogeneous forces on a broad range, but the celebrity-centeredness might have aggravated the potential split. Interpersonal networks or connections among leaders, rather than differences in political orientation, might have been more influential in the specific formation of organizations.

2) Major issues

New social movements generally address issues, which are not directly related to class interests of participant groups. In this respect, citizens' press movements in Korea are not quite exceptional. Table 3 shows major issues of citizens' press movements (Kim, 1991, pp.240-249; Constitution of ASBR; ACSNT, 1993, p.66; CSERW, 1993; CCFCEC, 1992; KFPU Newsletter, Dec. 2, 1991.).

TABLE 3. Issues of Major Press Movements[1]

Movements	Instrumental goals	Intermediate goals	Final goals
License Fee Boycott Campaign (1986-88)	-to boycott television license fee	-to stop biased reporting -to stop advertising in the public television -to stop sensationalism -to stop pro-government attitude	-democratization of broadcasting -political democratization
Anti-yellow newspaper campaign(1990)	-to request sports newspapers to stop obscenity, violence of content -to boycott products of advertisers	-to reform sensationalism of newspapers	-to restore social responsibility of journalism
Anti-payola("chonjie") campaign (1991)	-citizens' watch for chonjie -to support good journalists	-to stop chonjie-taking practices among journalists	-to encourage uncorrupted journalism -to restore autonomy of journalism
Citizens' Solidarity for Election Reporting Watch (1992)	-to watch and indict bias, distortion, unfairness of election reporting		-to encourage fair reporting by the press
Citizen's Coalition for Fair and Clean Election Campaign (1992)	-to watch election reporting		-o encourage fair reporting by the press
Turn Off Television Today Campaign (1993)	-turn off television for one day	-to publicize about problems of television -to exercise pressures on broadcasting companies -to activate audience movements through the experience of coalition	-to restore the social responsibility and public status of broadcasting

[1] The typology of goals is taken from Kim(1989, p.154).

Audience Solidarity for Broadcasting Reform (1993)		-to prepare policy alternatives in financing, audience participation, broadcasting laws -to watch for the program quality	-to encourage publicness, fairness, autonomy, diversity -to prevent commercialism of the public broadcasting. -to keep commercial broadcasting healthy -to affirm the audience sovereignty

The most conspicuous agenda of press movements in the 80s include sensationalism, violence, and biased reporting of the media, especially television. The values underlying these issues may be summarized as "fair reporting," public responsibility of media, and anti-commercialism. In that the critiques underscore the autonomy and social responsibility of the press, they suggest what are close to social responsibility theory. Although anti-commercialist tendency is recurrent in most cases, the market system itself is not denied. In a word, citizens' press movements hardly propose alternative values alien to the status quo. While criticizing the established media, the critiques tend to emphasize reforms within, rather than groping for alternative modes of media.

In Korea, the notion of media as a public realm distinct from the market seems to have secured legitimacy among the public, as well as in official discourses on media. Such a notion is distinctive in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon notion of the freedom of the press which is closely related to property rights. In ideological terms, citizens' press movements are not quite aberrant from what the status quo advocates. In a sense, the ideological struggles between both parties have proceeded with recourse to similar discursive resources. Not surprisingly, what has distinguished citizens' movements from the status quo may be virtues and moral legitimacy of actors rather than ideological spectrum.

Same issues may have diverse implications, depending on the context. License Fee Boycott campaign took issue of biased reporting and sensationalism of media, but under authoritarian government helped undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, thereby expanding to a political movement. However, after 1988, similar agenda came to have different implications.

First, in 1992, two coalitions of citizen's groups initiated campaigns of election reporting watch. These organizations monitored election reporting and made an issue of problematic cases. These campaigns have taken advantage of the legally legitimate space, which has enlarged with the official democratization of the state. This issue indicates that, despite the official claim to the democratization, the infrastructure and political practices of the state still remains considerably undemocratized.

Second issue involves a reaction against sensationalism of media. Typical examples include the crusade against obscene and violent content of sports newspaper in 1990, and Turn off Television Today campaign in 1993 (see Kim, 1991; Kim, 1993). These movements remain in the tradition of License Fee Boycott campaign, but unlike their precursors they are mostly de-politicized. These cases reflect everyday-life concerns of the middle-class as media consumers. Except intermittent collective action, most activities consist primarily of monitoring television. The criteria of monitoring emphasize the public responsibility and educational role of media, and tend to be conspicuously moralistic.

These campaigns pursue changes in particular programs or practices, without any institutional, structural reforms. Major participants are middle-class women, i.e., the target of consumer product advertising. In some cases, attempts to boycott particular products, which sponsored programs in question, led television stations to cancel or change the target programs. Although new social movements are not necessarily accompanied by visible results, press movements in Korea sometimes led to an immediate response, or even a "surrender," from the mainstream media, be it mostly a symbolic one.

Third issue is a "desirable" video culture campaign, such as "Gun-Be-Yeon"(Citizens' Group for a Healthy Video Culture) or Video Shop Owners' Group for Good Video Culture of YMCA. Both represent efforts to keep youths and children from watching obscene and violent videos, and encourage the audience to see wholesome videos.

The issues raised by press movements are not deemed as illegitimate even within the official political sphere. Although the commercial system is the major backbone of Korean media, regulatory devices over the market mechanism have already been institutionalized. Especially the broadcasting sector is close to a public system, but except the state and capital, various political forces and civil sectors are virtually excluded from the "public" decision-making process. Political democratization failed to entail substantial changes in the state monopoly over the broadcasting sector. In a sense, press movements in Korea are officially legitimate claims expressed outside the official sphere.

While issues of press movements diversified after political democratization, class-wide and nation-wide concerns, as before 1988, have virtually disappeared in major political events. Given the fact that the state secured political legitimacy, it became much less feasible for the government to make a politically disastrous blunder as to provoke public reaction on a national scale. While some movement groups have tried to form nation-wide coalitions in vain, small-scale campaigns based on everyday life concerns of the middle-class got popularity. Citizen's press movements in recent years began to reflect the particular concerns of major participants rather than "universal" values. Consequently, in this context, Kang(1993) argues convincingly that citizens' press movements should make a strategic turn to decentralized movements in various social arenas.

Another feature of citizen's press movements is its lack of institutional or structural issues. Press movements have aimed at resolutions of visible short-term conflicts rather than structural contradictions which generate those symptoms. Above all, the myopic tendency of strategic goals might come from inherent limitations of grassroots action. In order to mobilize heterogeneous groups into action, the agenda might well be limited to short-term goals. However, the amateurism of celebrity leaders might be another reason for the ambiguity of directions. This interpretation is consolidated by the fact that citizens' groups failed to have any voice in the major policy making process in broadcasting sectors. In other words, the leadership has succeeded in developing newsworthy events, but failed to develop clear ideological blueprints or alternatives. Another reason might be politically conservative nature of press movement, which rarely goes beyond the given institutional framework. While struggles remained within the ideological and institutional confine of the system, ironically, the impacts of those movements on the system are hard to notice.

In sum, citizens' press movements have raised issues and conflicts, which are not based on class interests of specific social strata and may not be resolved within the given polity. They apparently have much in common with new social movements in the West. Nevertheless, press movements in Korea hardly challenge the dominant value system of the status quo. Instead, they make efforts to "normalize" the inherent functions or roles of the state and the market. In a word, the political orientation of citizen's press movements in Korea is moderate conservatism.

3) Medium of action and expression

In general, citizens' press movements have employed non-violent, peaceful ways of expression within the legally permitted limit. Citizen's press movements have depended primarily on modes of symbolic action and expression, such as media events. Direct actions, such as boycotting license fee or advertised product,[2] are exceptional cases. Nevertheless, specialized activities, such as legal consulting, election issues, or lobbying to the Legislative, have been rare.

Citizens' press movements mostly took advantage of the legal space, instead of challenging it. License Fee Boycott campaign under the authoritarian government got into conflict with the state. But the confrontation has ended with political democratization. It was not uncommon for representatives of movement groups to show up as participants in televised debates, or to join official institutions as representatives of citizen's groups. Their leadership in movements made them a sort of celebrity(or vice versa), and they might provide a potential pool for recruitment to government or political organizations. Despite the active liaison with the polity, it is surprising that movements hardly led to visible institutional reforms. However, press ombudsman established by most major newspapers and broadcasting companies have to be considered as accomplishment of citizen's press movements.[3]

For channels of publicity, press movements depended on mainstream media rather than establishing their own. Except the target media, mainstream media have allotted space for reporting developments of movements. Since 1988, newspapers assigned even a fixed page

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[2] Product boycott was pronounced in Licence Fee Boycott campaign and anti-yellow newspaper campaign. But it was never put into action.

[3] For instance, television companies began hours for audience opinions, such as "TV in TV," but in early Sunday mornings when few people watch.

for media, where they had extensive coverage of press movements. For instance, major newspapers reported in detail on License Fee Boycott campaign.[4] In Anti-yellow newspaper campaign, major broadcast networks gave coverage of statements and proceedings(Kim, 1991, pp.245-246). In the West social movements have been deemed hardly newsworthy by major media and consequently attempted to develop "media events" to attract the attention of the mainstream press. On the contrary, mainstream media in Korea, especially those in direct competition with the target media, contributed considerably to press movements. In a sense, citizens' press movements became a big event business through which various groups and celebrities get publicity. This might be one of the reasons why the initiatives of newsworthy celebrities, rather than organized activities, became a major trait of citizens' press movements in Korea.

4) Pros and Cons

One of the clues to understanding social movement is who are the pros and cons. Not surprisingly, they might vary depending on what the issues are and how broad the coalition is. Which groups are in direct conflict with press movement groups? The following table shows a few examples of strategic relations of conflict and cooperation in major movements.

[4] In the case of Turn Off Television Today campaign, 83 articles appeared in national dailies. ACSNT, 1993, p.86.

TABLE 4. Strategic Relations of Cooperation and Conflict

Issues	Pros	Cons
License Fee Boycott campaign	newspapers; opposition parties; political forces outside the polity	the government; broadcasting network; broadcasting advertisers
Anti-yellow newspaper campaign	broadcasting network; other newspapers	sports newspapers; newspaper advertisers
Election Watch (CSERW, CCFCEC)	opposition parties	the ruling party; newspapers; broadcasting networks
Turn off Television Today campaign	newspapers	television networks; television advertisers

What is notable is the relation between the state and movement groups. In the License Fee Boycott campaign, the government's lack of political legitimacy led even ideologically moderate movements to direct confrontation with the government. In later instances, however, conflict disappears. The election watch, for instance, could undermine the de facto benefits of the ruling party, but the campaign hardly provoked manifest reaction from the government. Under the civilian government, moreover, the need for reforms made possible the strategic cooperation between press movement groups and the state. In some cases, press movement groups took partial aid from the state.

It is also highly suggestive to look at how strategic relations among different movement groups are formed. Because press movements since the 1980s have rarely involved issues controversial among political lines, informal factors have exerted influence in forming coalitions. Above all, interpersonal networks, as well as differences in political orientation, have played considerable role in Korea. For instance, radical groups and unions tend to consider citizens' groups as "middle-class" reformism. Regardless of issues in question, some of citizen's organizations are allergic to groups with the history of political struggles.

Such difference in organizational sentiment has often affected even activities on the official level.

On-going changes in political situation might trigger potential conflict within the press movements as well. In the eighties, the undifferentiation of issues encouraged heterogeneous social groups to gather under one banner of common cause, which is irrelevant to material interests. However, if issues become more specific in the near future, heterogeneity of political orientation and material interests among movement groups might emerge to the surface. While, as with new social movements, citizens' press movements hardly rely upon class-interests, they reflect the peculiarity and limitations of participating strata.

IV. Trade Unionism as New Social Movements?

In general, labor movements pursue class-specific interests. However, press labor movements in Korea reveal some features of new social movements. Most trade unions in major Korean media underscore as the primary goal of organizational activities the cause of the freedom of the press, which is similar to what citizen's press movements have pursued. Specifically, not only the monetary concerns but also the issues of "editorial rights"[5] and fair reporting have been central agenda in labor disputes. The view of press labor movement as a form of new social movement is not only a "normative" claim, but also in part a political reality in Korea(for a similar view, Kang, 1993).

[5] The notion of "editorial rights" in Korea is concerned with who are the subject of the freedom of the press. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon culture, journalists have argued that the right should rest with the shop floor journalists, not with owners or executives. The genesis of this notion is rooted in the public perception of media as public property, and at the same time reflects the public distrust of the media owners and management who have failed to maintain autonomy from the external pressures in the political "Dark Age."

Even in the market system, historically, the press has been a special realm distinct from other businesses. But the peculiarity of the socio-political context has also influenced the specific trajectory of trade unionism in Korean media. Since the first establishment of press unions in 1987 and the subsequent legalization of the Korean Federation of Press Unions(KFPU), regular channels of negotiation have been established to resolve labor disputes. However, some conflicts went beyond the boundary of the shop floor dispute and expanded to nation-wide concerns. Then, the management-labor conflict turned into a confrontation between a coalition of union/citizens' groups and that of the press and the state. In this case, each side attempts to relate the case to a kind of a "common cause." The following table shows prominent cases, which extended to larger social movements ("Media chronicles" Journalism, Spring-Summer 1990-Winter 1992; KFPU, 1990; 1994).

TABLE 5. Labor Disputes Which Became Social Issues.

Issues	Participant groups	Medium of action
For a minor misdemeanor, the government fired the president of KBS, who was the first elected by employee voting. The police dispersed and arrested union members, who went on a sit-down strike. (1990.2-5)	National Council of Trade Unions; National Council of College Student Organizations; Korean Association of Journalists; Lawyers Group for Democracy; CDPM; Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice, Council of Women's Organizations; National Council of Christian Women, YMCA, Citizen's Group for Consumer Affairs; Federation of White-Collar Unions; Journalism Professors Group, National Federation of Farmers' Organizations, National Federation of Artists, et al	demonstration; issued statements; formed a joint organization; protest visit to the prime minister; sit-in strike by other industry unions; public campaign

The government proposed an amendment of the Broadcasting Act, in order to introduce a commercial television. (1990.6)	KNCC, opposition parties, Faculty Council for Democratization(Jun-Book province), Union of Christian Social Movement(Jun-Book Province), Council of Dismissed Journalists, Journalism Faculty Group, and other journalists' organizations.	formed a joint organization; issued statements.
In labor negotiations, the management of MBC television network demanded the abolition of major agreements of previous years: the direct election of major officers and joint council for fair broadcasting. The management then terminated negotiations without consent from the union. The labor took this as a threat to the union and went on a strike. Police arrested union members. (1992.8-9).	Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, KNCC. Faculty Council for Democratization, National Council of Trade Unions, YMCA, National Union of Women's Organizations, Pharmacist Association for Healthy Society, Journalism Faculty Group, et al	formed a joint organization; public hearings on the issue; outdoor assembly; signature campaign; campaign for fund-raising

These instances are concerned with broadcasting. It is presumably because there is a general consensus on the status of broadcasting as a "public" resource and a realm independent of the state and market. Not surprisingly, the apparently diverse sources of the above disputes converge on a common concern, i.e., the autonomy of broadcasting from the state. Social groups involved in the protest interpreted the instances as government's strategy for extending influence on the broadcasting sector.

Such an interpretation may be attributed to the structural problem of the media system in Korea. Broadcasting in Korea is two-tiered system of the public and commercial networks. Even in commercial broadcasting sector, i.e., MBC, any monopoly by particular capital or social groups is strictly prohibited. In reality, however, the state has seized both the public and private sectors, and other forces have been excluded from the broadcasting sector. In other words, despite the trend to "deregulation," the state power has not diminished in Korea. It is inevitable that such a monopoly may cause social conflicts in major media issues.

With a few exceptions, most labor disputes remain within media organizations. But especially in major media, even internal issues tend to focus on "non-economic" issues(see Kang, 1989). This phenomenon, bizarre in labor-management relations, may be attributable to the peculiar circumstances of the Korean media in the 80s. First of all, since the 1980s, the wage level of media employees has been considerably high in comparison to other white-collar jobs. In 1980, the state intervened in the media market and restructured it by force to an artificial structure of oligopoly in broadcasting and national dailies, and regional monopoly in local dailies. The absence of competition drove the industry to rapid growth. The state solicited the management to improve wage levels and fringe benefits of media employees dramatically, to appease their discontent. The material compensation came from the extra-profits, which the monopolization of the industry yielded.

It is also discourses regarding the role of media in Korea that prevent labor movements from pursuing monetary concerns. The traditional discourse on journalism has emphasized the "public service" role of journalists. In addition, the memories of "dark" years of the 80s forced press unions to hold fast to recovering "legitimacy" even at the minor sacrifice of material benefits. The taboo on the secularization of press movements is further constrained by the Korean culture, which discourages people from expressing their secular interests in public.

Nevertheless, in the long run, mundane interests of workers might have determining impact on labor movements(see Chang, 1992). In Korea, press unions are motivated not only by individual gains of workers but also those of the company as a whole. One may find a few examples even in the short experience of press labor movement. For instance, in April 1990, the Korean Federation of Press Unions decided to go on an industry-wide strike as a protest against the government intrusion into the labor dispute of KBS, but few local unions followed it. In this case, the collective benefits of the company took precedence of private gains of individual workers. In reality, as the romantic enthusiasm for labor movements faded out increasingly, union members began to lose interest in the issues, which have no tangible material substance. In the future, unionism is expected to underscore shop floor concerns, such as improvements of working conditions.

Despite internal limitations, press unions will play important role in press movements in Korea. By tradition, the occupational culture of Korean journalists has valued highly fights against the government encroachment of their autonomy. The tradition of heavy government intervention may not discontinue in the near future, and may trigger conflicts with press unions. Besides, press unions inevitably will take strategically important role in struggles for securing civil spheres, which have not grown properly in the presence of the strong state.

V. Conclusion

Citizens' press movements in Korea, ranging from the mid-80s to early 90s, reveal typical characteristics of new social movements. However, unlike their counterpart in the West, old and new social movements are not clearly distinguished in press movements in Korea. Despite much divergence, both pursue similar goals to a certain extent. At this historical point, press unionism in Korea has much in common with new social movements.

For political circumstances in Korea render the differentiation of press movements infeasible. The media in Korea not only show symptoms of the market failure, but also failed to perform the role of the civil society. The media often ignore rules for fair competition or rational business practices; they hardly represent diverse voices of the society as well. The source of problems lies in the state. The media in Korea, especially broadcasting, have claimed to the status of a public realm, but the tradition of strong state has alienated all social groups, except the state and the capital, from the area. Nevertheless, problems of commercial system, such as sensationalism, are to be felt widely. The problem is two-fold: expanding "deregulation"(or commercialization) of media under the highly regulating state. Under the current civilian government, where discourses of "deregulation" and "globalization" prevail, this double-sided problem becomes more conspicuous. The discourse of deregulation in Korea does not imply small government. Although deregulation entails expanding power of the capital, the state is expected to play a still dominant role.

In Korea, citizens' press movements represent the voices and complaints of various social groups, which have been resolved neither through the market nor the political process. However, citizens' movements in Korea try to render the system of the status quo function properly, instead of groping for alternative values and blueprints. In a word, their political orientation is basically moderate and conservative.

However, even though the scope of citizens' movements widened, their action failed to lead to tangible institutional changes. In a sense, the booming movements in effect might legitimize the civilian government, whose claim to democratic reforms scarcely yielded much visible results. The state in Korea hardly developed institutional framework, through which the voices of the civil society and interest groups are converged into the system. In a word, despite political democratization, the civil society in Korea is extremely fragile, in comparison to the strong state.

In spite of the subsistence of the authoritarian state, a nation-wide movement of the last decade is not feasible in the future. The establishment of the civilian government with political legitimacy deprived citizens of interest in issues, which are not directly related to their everyday-life concerns. While issues surrounding the freedom of the press in press union movements is at a low ebb, good video campaigns by YMCA has been successful. Citizens' press movements might shift to decentralized small-scale activities, based on particular concerns of various social groups.

Nevertheless, there is still possibility for a class-wide social movement, such as strategic cooperation between press unions and citizens' groups. For struggles against the state, both need the advantages of each other: union maintains an organization with immediate efficacy, and citizens' groups have a better position in securing legitimacy.

Citizens' press movement may take advantage of strategic cooperation between citizens' groups and the state established under the civilian government. The state is not a unified whole. Instead, it may be called a "dominant power bloc"(Freiberg, 1985), which consists of heterogeneous interest groups. Within the civilian government who took power through a merger of three major parties, the ruling minority wants to make the most of the press for the internal control of the power bloc. The sect also needs the cooperation of citizens' press movement in order to reform the established media. Although the mainstream media are in symbiotic relations with the dominant class, the market situation of intra and inter-media competition makes them assist citizens' movements in consequence. Insofar as citizens' movements provide the media with newsworthy events, the former may secure channels of publicity. If the movement group takes advantage of strategic ties with the state, it may also expand the legal space within which it may maneuver legitimately.

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