ED 391 765 SO 026 006

AUTHOR Zurmuehlen, Marilyn, Ed.

TITLE Working Papers in Art Education, 1983.
INSTITUTION Iowa Univ., Iowa City. School of Art & Art

History.

PUB DATE 83

NOTE 113p.; Published annually. For volumes covering

1981-1987, see SO 026 005-010.

AVAILABLE FROM Working Papers in Art Education, 13 North Hall, The

University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.

PUB TYPE Collected Works - Serials (022)

JOURNAL CIT Working Papers in Art Education; n2 1983

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC05 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS *Aesthetic Values; Art Activities; *Art Education;

Attitude Measures; Attitudes; Childrens Art; *Concept

Formation; Elementary Secondary Education; Environmental Influences; Research Methodology;

Student Attitudes; Studio Art

ABSTRACT

Papers by graduate students, and occasionally papers from their mentors which establish a context for the student papers, are organized by sponsoring University. Student papers presented are: (1) "An Overview of the Development Stages in Children's Drawings" (Jeralyn Hufford); (2) "Theories and Activities of Conceptual Artists: An Aesthetic Inquiry" (Luise Morton); (3) "Works of Art, Duration and the Beholder" (Andrea Fairchild); (4) "Arthur Lismer: A Critical Analysis of His Pedagugy in Relation to His Use of the Project Method in Child-Cantered Education" (Angela Grigor); (5) "The Distribution of Talent" (James Stewart); (6) "Comparative Case Studies of Two Visually Impaired Students and Their Art Experiences in the Public School" (Carol Becci); (7) "The University Art Style: A Phenomenological Examination of Dominant Painting Styles and the Effect of Ideology on M.F.A. Candidates in Selected Departments of Art" (Laurence Montalto); (8) "Art Education as Apprenticeship: The Art of Making a Chair" (Cynthia Schwarz); (9) "Anxiety and Art Learning" (Amy Phillips); (10) "Printing Poetry in Blissymbols: An Arts-of-the-Book Apprenticeship for Four So-called Moderately Mentally Retarded Fersons" (Douglas Blandy); (11) "A Formal Approach to Curriculum Theory Analysis" (Graeme Sullivan); (12) "Heideggerian Ontology: A Philosophic Base for Arts and Humanities Education" (Dian Fetter); (13) "How Young Children Construct Meaning in Everyday Situations" (Priscilla Fenton); (14) "Authenticity and Everydayness" (Christine Thompon); (15) "Case Study: Aesthetic Attitudes and Values of Selected Urban Appalachian Youths" (Bonnie Southwind); (16) "Adolescents' Metaphoric Interpretations of Paintings: The Effects of the Clustering Strategy and the Assessment of Referential Adequacy" (Lois Stockslager); (17) "Educational Implications of Tactility of Art" (Marilyn Wolf); (18) "Relationship, Insights, and Visions: Toward an Understanding of Aesthetic Response of Children"; (19) "Cybernetics and Thematic Actualization in the Visual Arts" (Eric Purvis); (20) "Information Theory Applied to Perceptual Research Involving Art Stimuli" (Kerry Freedman); (21) "The Visual Arts and Ethnic Transmission" (Arlene Renken). (MM)



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CART EDUCATION

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is published by the School of Art & Art History of The University of Iowa. Manuscripts by graduate students, along with papers from their mentors which establish a context for the student papers are welcomed. They should follow the form of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (2nd ed.) and "Publication Manual Change Sheet 2," June, 1977. Send an original and one copy to: Dr. Marilyn Zurmuehlen, Editor, Working Papers in Art Education, 13 North Hall, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.



Oworking Papers in Art Education, 1983.



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Preface

This issue of Working Papers in Art Education presents the works-in-progress of twenty-one graduate students in art education from thirteen universities in North America. The students' "developmental stages" range from those who are beginning to discover their research directions by exploring the literature in art education, philosophy, sociology, history, and psychology to others who nearly have completed marking off a special place in their research lives for the project that we call a dissertation. A simple reading of the list of Contents indicates the richness of their topics for intellectual inquiry; reading the specific papers confirms an equally gratifying diversity is the forms through which they carry on this searching.

At the NAMA conference in New York City, during a session for those involved with using the first edition of <u>Working Papers in Art Education</u>, it was recommended that mentors be asked to provide information about the circumstances in which their students' works are grounded. Accordingly, the mentors for the graduate students in this issue were asked to write introductions which attempt to set intellectual and/or life contexts for the research papers of their students.

Buber wrote that "The relation in education is one of pure dialogue." Certainly, the spirit of dialogue in which these graduate students related with one another is in the finest tradition of what we conceive of as education. The University of Iowa is pleased to extend that dialogue to readers at graduate institutions throughout North America.

Perhaps this publication may nurture yet another purpose which has been held in abeyance. At the meeting of the Seminar for Research in Art Education which convened during the NAEA conference in Houston, Evan Kern, Larry Kantner, and I were asked to draft a statement on information of value to potential doctoral students in choosing institutions for their graduate studies. We recognized that the conceptions of prospective students are based on publications, papers, political activity, gossip, recommendations of those they trust, and a myriad other sources. Because such questions as, "How will I feel about three or four years in this program?: or "How will I feel about this kind of study after I've completed it?" are the basis for life decisions they are cich with ambiguities. Ambiguities are most authentically manifested through concrete instances. While the individuals whose papers appear on the following pages cannot fairly be expected to symbolize all that is possible at their respective institutions, they do reveal something of each particular person's experience at a specific university. Thus, they suggest the possibility of following Husserl's admonition, "To the things themselves."

Finally, I extend my gratitude to these twenty-one students for their intellectual curiosity, for their excitement about the research of other students (as well as for their own work), for their commitment to reflection



and doubt, and, of course, to their mentors who have nurtured these qualities to the benefit of us all. In reading these papers I hope you will find that such people bode well for the future of our profession.

Marilyn Zurmuehlen



Mentor's Introduction

REX DORETHY Ball State University

Jeralyn Hufford is interested in understanding the developmental stages of children's drawing. She thought there might be parallels in the learning processes of young children who are handling spatial and symbolic information to those of college students who lack the skills required to translate spatial information into a drawing.

Research for the dissertation investigates a teaching methodology that can be used to teach basic perceptual skills in drawing to college students. The ability to recognize values, contours, and compositional elements seems to be a problem for some of the students with whom she works. Through the use of a grid (explored but not researched by Da Vinci and others) the students' attention is focused on the individual squares that contain visual information; values and contours, apparently are easier to discern and to handle through the use of this device. The operable factors are probably isolation of key information, and lack of redundancy in the visual array.

Jeralyn has had an interest in the expressive aspects of drawing for several years. Spontaneity and directness are important elements in the process of a drawing, but she believes that competency in handling and understanding basic skills is necessary before aesthetic competence can be fully achieved. The research interest grew from a need to help students handle visual elements with greater acuity; therefore, producing better drawings.

Luise Morton has been a doctoral fellow in Art Education at Ball State University for three years. She received a B.F.A. degree in painting and drawing as well as an M.A. degree in art history from Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Prior to coming to Ball State, Ms. Morton served as an art consultant for the city of St. Louis, spent a year as artist-in-residence for University City, Missouri under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, and taught art history at several universities. Her area of specialization has been 19th and 20th century art history.

At Ball State University, Ms. Morton's doctoral studies have been in five areas: art education, philosophy, sociology, educational psychology, and educational foundations (history and philosophy of education). Her present research—an historical, philosophical, and sociological analysis of Conceptual Art and its impact on art education—is an outgrowth of her cross-disciplinary interests, training, and the fact that among the studio faculty at Ball State are several who are interested and/or involved in Conceptual Art.



1

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES IN CHILDREN'S DRAWINGS

Jeralyn Hufford

The primary emphasis in this paper will be to investigate the development of drawing in young children and a possible relationship between this development and various art related elements such as creativity and expression. Emphasis will lie with the stages and development in the drawings of children, but through the analysis of the stages, aspects which seem to lend themselves to utilization of creative or expressive qualities will be singled out. Even though there are certain developmental stages of children's art which appear to be quite natural or sequential if allowed to develop, there are times at which the experience could be enhanced in such a way that the subsequent qualities of creativity and expressiveness could be encouraged.

Through looking at the drawings of children one can gain new ways of seeing, understanding, testing and verifying ideas that are indicative of the nature of thought and problem-solving. Since a great deal of thinking and communicating takes place visually, analysis of the drawing process can begin to lend itself to the understanding of "how we know" or process certain information (Goodnow, 1977).

According to Goodnow there are three lines of study that lend themselves to the application of understanding children's drawings, these are: the analysis of patterns, attention to sequence, and study of questions of equivalence or the nature of same and different.

There is a relationship between visual elements such as dots, lines, circles, squares, blobs, masses, etc. as they appear in the drawings of children. Depending upon the readiness of the child there will be a variety of solutions dealing with the arrangement of these visual elements to produce a sense of balance, unity, rhythm, movement, or surprise. Arrangement or composition is also dependent upon the choice a child makes in placing pattern around a reference point, multiple relationships, or the boundaries that exist visually or behaviorally within the child or her drawing.

The sequence that occurs in the drawings of children refers to a routine in the placement or making of visual elements. At times children will set constraints for themselves and the ability to recognize this aspect of the drawing process lends itself to the understanding of features in the drawing. Constraints have to do with the way children see later parts of a drawing keeping in relationship with earlier parts of the drawing. It appears that this is a method of learning to depict visually some thing with a safety net thrown in, so to speak.

In conjunction with Piaget's developmental theories it should be



noted that he acknowledges an interaction between the child and his environment—out of the interactions develop structures of thought, each one more complex, and more inclusive than the previous one (Pulaski, 1971).

For Piaget adaptation or the ability to organize sensations and experiences into a semblance of order is of a dual nature. The duality consists of assimilation which is defined for Piaget's purpose as the taking in process by which one incorporates things, and accommodation which is the adjusting process of reaching out to the environment. For Piaget these two processes function simultaneously.

The child's mind seeks equilibrium between what is understood and experienced in the environment. The process of equilibrium, attaining a balance between assimilation and accommodation, is considered the mechanism for growth and transition in cognitive development.

For Piaget as well as for Eleanor Gibson the baby is not seen as a passive organism, but as an active entity. Gibson (1969) felt that perceptual learning was functional, an interaction between the organism and the environment and that a modification of behavior was indicated because of the concern with learning; but because for her, perception was of primary concern, her investigations dealt with the ability of an organism to modify and extract information from the stimulation in the environment.

The phenomenal aspect of obtaining information from the physical world dealt with the awareness of events occurring in immediate surroundings, and the responsive aspect of perception entailed discrimination, a selective response to the environment (Gibson, 1969).

In the area of perception an increased ability to extract information from the environment is the result of experience, practice and interaction with the environment. In the area of cognitive development Piaget's second factor of experience helps to explain that aspect of cognitive development through a child's direct sensori-motor experiences that are encountered in ideal childhood situations. The uniqueness of experience both physical and empirical seems to play an important role in the readiness of children for the learning of a variety of tasks, and the perceptual development in children is related to the aspects of cognitive development and maturation.

Multiple relations in drawings, such as a chimney to a house, seem to depend upon the growth of Piaget's stages of operation which are concerned with the capacity to deal with change or transformation in one's mind rather than in physical reality.

Learning that symbols stand for or correspond to objects or events deals with the learning of equivalents. The invention of equivalents appears to be related to the modification of previously learned equivalents. The result being that children are actively engaged in observing the world, and in learning and abstracting rules and principles.



One begins to gain some insight into how equivalents develop in children's drawings through observation of said drawings. It should be recognized that drawings are ambiguous and vary in their relationships as to what things stand for, but a particular equivalent can be requested and observations made as to how a problem of equivalence is solved (Goodnow, 1977). It appears that the underlying learning of equivalents is a matter of discovery and extension or modification of already known or available equivalents.

When drawings are analyzed according to pattern development a search for order is of the utmost concern. Design becomes an essential aspect in the child's drawing.

Drora Booth, who worked with Australian nursery school children, was able to divide pattern development into three categories: scribble; topology, which was concerned with colors that were separated in masses or spots without clearly defined order; and pattern. The most common progression was from the scribble to topology to pattern stage of development, but shifts back and forth with color, idea, and techniques were explored. Between the use of lines and dots, lines were usually discovered first, and where repetition occurred, line was typically that mark first used (Goodnow, 1977).

An important aspect of Booth's observations was the cultural stress placed on realism versus decoration or the decorative unit in art. Perhaps this cultural preference for realism lends itself to the eventual development of certain art styles and that which is seemingly reinforced as "good art." Booth seemed to think that the invention of patterns should be understood in its own right.

In describing the units of children's drawings regarding organization the following criteria are of importance: repetition, economy, symmetry, rotation around a point, and arrangement to fit within certain proportions. The principles that underlie the arrangement of units are concerned with a search for order and balance, the effect of earlier stages, a preference for particular shapes and transformations, and the relative difficulty of transformations.

According to Goodnow children seem to operate with two general principles, one dealing with the importance of boundary within a drawing and the second concerned with the space involved in the drawing. "To each its own boundary" deals with embracing lines that depict an image not in just a series of units or parts, but as a means of presenting interacting relationships between parts. This is usually related to age and it is an intellectual and an artistic endeavor. Children move from early use of separate lines to the use of continuous or all embracing lines usually at the age of seven.

When children are utilizing all embracing lines, the finished or completed drawing may appear to adult viewers to be bizarre, or they may misinterpret the child's drawing -- attributing to the drawing some psychological or emotional construct which real; / is not accurate. What in effect may have happened is that the child in trying to solve a visual and intellectual problem on paper has had to deal with the difficulty of anticipating problems that each new line has begun to create.

A very good point made by Goodnow is that of relating a drawing to intelligence, and the importance of being cognizant of the purpose of the child's drawing. In other words the observer should be careful when analyzing drawings and be as certain as possible that she is aware of the myriad of explanations that could be applied to the work before a final evaluation is made.

"To each its own space" is in effect a process concerned with problemsolving. When children decide to meet one goal they often have to sacrifice another, and the problem has been overcome by redefining the initial constraints.

The concept of sequence as it exists in children's drawings is evidenced by the order that is depicted. In pre-school age children there is a preference for a <u>right-left</u> sequence which seems to be related to writing.

A second order that is observed in drawings is the <u>paired and radial sequences</u>. The radial order is usually the earliest form, followed by the paired orders. Practice with shapes, an awareness of general body concepts, and the beginnings of general concepts about left and right are factors that should be kept in mind when deciphering children's work.

A third sequence that children utilize is that of top-to-bottom orders. These usually start with a circle which seems to come from experience: after the initial circle, the sequence follows a top-to-bottom procedure and then a child often returns to add details. "Returning to details means that we have to overcome 'he sense of having finished. It also means that we have become adept at monitoring, at running a critical eye over a finished piece of work to see if all the pieces are there that should be there" (Goodnow, p. 55, 1977).

The final sequence is that of <u>core to accessories</u>. These sequences usually contain fairly large units in which more than one sequence exists. An example of this could be the body with clothing. Most children draw the body/figure first with the clothing drawn over the first phase of the drawing. The aspect of advanced planning in order that the figures woud not look like X-ray type drawings is usally not regarded as a solution: perhaps it is because they are unable to make the modification required in the standard drawing of the figure.

When children are working with shapes it becomes apparent that one shape can stand for something else. By exploring the question of "same" and "different" in drawings or equivalence researchers may gain some insight into how children learn about shapes as well as insight



into some of the more general aspects of learning.

The shape of a mouth, the position of pupils, the placement of ground to sky, for instance, or the ability to imply distance are some of the more common equivalents children use. Some of the equivalents have a relationship to the real world, while some stand for metaphors. The deciphering of metaphors and/or the understanding of pictures varies both individually and culturally. There is frequently an ambiguity in the drawing: more than one way of interpreting it may exist due to the way we perceive the image.

When the developmental stages of children's art are recognized and understood in conjunction with the various styles of learning, then some of the approaches used in art education could be applied. If artistic development is not an automatic consequence of maturation, but rather a process that is affected by the type of experience a child has (Eisner, 1972) then an art program should be able to help develop some of the potential skills of children.

The ability to perceive the environment and to imagine visual possibilities would appear to be most relevant to art education. The child needs to learn how to see the forms he or she creates as part of a total, and to make decisions regarding these relationships; but, it is also of the utmost importance to be aware of the intellectual dimensions of childhood maturation and not to neglect this aspect. Perhaps one of the areas that can be addressed in art education is that of helping the child see or understand shape relationships as well as achieve the ability to perceive that which is subtle.

If the ability to perceive relationships develops as learning occurs in children, and this ability is affected by the variety of experiences they have (Eisner, 1972) then the arts can play a significant role in this aspect of education.

An art program that is sensitive to the needs of children at various stages of development could provide the types of situations necessary for learning to occur in the area of art. A program that assists development through the type of art experiences offered might help children develop the ability to perceive concepts, refine them, and relate them as they are directly related to art education, and for that matter perceptual awareness in general.

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Luise Morton

Of the various art movements which emerged in the late 60s and early 70s, Conceptualism is among the most radical in its attack on traditional theories of art. As a movement, Conceptualism has been syncretic, comprising many groups and individuals with different, often conflicting, theories and practices. The movement has been international in scope, and artists in Europe and America have contributed various interpretations of and emphases to the postulates of Conceptualism. In general, however, Conceptual artists have centered on two questions: "What is the nature of art?" and "What is the function or usefulness of art?" The purpose of my research is an aesthetic inquiry into the theories and art work of Conceptual artists.

Conceptualist theories can be roughly divided into two main categories: those relating to the nature of art and those which center on the purposes of art. In respect to the first question, Conceptualists claim that art lies not in the object itself but in the artist's idea of how to form it. Art products are therefore considered superfluous and among the commonly accepted essentials of art--content, form, and aesthetic quality--only the first has been retained by the Conceptualists as a significant factor in artistic creation. Focusing on the artist's intention, combining social, political, and economic issues as content, Conceptual artists have attacked the prevailing aesthetics of modern art. Their asserted goal has been to eliminate the need for form in art.

In response to the second question, viz., the purpose of art, Conceptual artists have rejected sensory pleasure and focused instead on the perceptual education of the public. They have taken art out of the context of museum and gallery. Assuming the role of critic as well as artist, Conceptualists merge theory with art and themselves explain their work. A considerable part of their creative effort is directed first towards coaxing potential spectators into taking note of art and second, towards expanding the public's visual awareness. As a consequence, Conceptual art takes on the character of an activity rather than a product.

Questions as to the nature and purpose of art are central to most, if not all, recent avant-garde art movements. Moreover, there is considerable overlap in the solutions presented by various art groups to these issues. What makes the Conceptualists' response the most extreme among these solutions is their rejection of aesthetic form as a necessary component of visual art and of sensory pleasure as a necessary purpose.

In rejecting the traditional art object, Conceptual artists are left with two alternatives for conveying meaning, viz., language and action. They have explored both of these possibilities in their "art."



The logical consequences of the Conceptualists' use of language and action as the materials of visual art would seem to be the elimination of distinctions between art and information and between art and life. We are left with artist and audience, with no special entity that can be labeled "art". In order to examine specific examples of Conceptual art works, therefore, we must resort to documentary evidence—verbal and/or visual—that has recorded the actions or ideas of the Conceptual artist.

Although the artistic activities of the Conceptualists are both radical and diverse--and therefore difficult to classify, two modes of expression take precedence; documentation of an act or event; and declaration of intention or idea. These two modes provide a key for the analysis of Conceptual art.

Literature relevant to an analysis of the Conceptual art movement comes from a number of sources, including published statements and other forms of documentation by the artists themselves, catalogues of exhibitions, articles in journals by contemporary art critics, and outlines or summaries by historians of art. Also pertinent to such a task are modern studies on aesthetics by philosophers and sociologists. Because art and theory for the Conceptualist are one and not two, the primary sources, viz., statements by the artists themselves, serve both as examples and as interpretations of Conceptual art.

Modern Theories Of Art

Basic to all traditional theories of art is the assumption that the domain of the aesthetic includes both attitude and object. Present-day theories emphasize various aspects of the relationship between the two terms--some focus on attitude, others on object. One view commonly held is that any object towards which a person takes an aesthetic attitude can become an aesthetic object (Dickie, 1971). Together, attitude and object comprise the aesthetic experience. The fact of aesthetic experience, as Hospers (1946) points out, is the starting point of all theories of art, traditional or modern. What characterizes this experience and distinguishes it from other modes of experiencing is the suspension of our practical responses towards objects in our environment.

Despite major differences, what most modern and traditional views hold in common is a concern with problems of <u>appearance</u>--viz., perception, representation, image, form, surface--and with problems of <u>meaning</u> or expression. Problems of meaning in traditional theories of art have customarily been of two kinds. They include (1) what the artist intended to express and (2) whatever effects the work of art evokes in the observer. Artistic meaning is therefore ambiguous, for in respect to any particular work of art these two kinds of meaning are not necessarily the same. Of the two kinds of meaning, however, the latter traditionally has been viewed as the more significant.

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Conceptualist Theories

Conceptualists have approached the problem of meaning from the single perspective of the artist's intention. The work of art from this viewpoint is seen as the principle cause of ambiguity in artistic meaning, for the Conceptualists assert that there should only be one kind of meaning—that which the artist intended. They challenge the traditional assumption that making art objects is a necessary condition for making (visual) art. Instead, they argue that the idea of the artist is information to be conveyed by artist to observer with the most direct means available, whatever they may be.

One of the chief apologists of Conceptual art theory is Joseph Kosuth, who represented his arguments in an article entitled "Art After Philosophy" (printed in Meyer, 1972). Roughly the main tenets of his viewpoint are as follows:

- 1) Being an artist today means to question the nature of art.
- 2) The nature of art is no longer a question of morphology (or gross descriptive features) but of function.
- 3) It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetic considerations are "always extraneous to an object's function" (p. 159).
- 4) The value of a painting (or any original work of art) is equivalent to the value of an original manuscript of an author, i.e., they are both "historical curiosities" (p. 163).
- 5) A work of art is an analytic proposition—it operates on logical and linguistic principles and provides no information about matters—of—fact. The truth or falsity of art assertions is not empirically verifiable.
- 6) Synthetic art propositions—i.e., those verifiable by the world—are unnecessary. Experience has its own intrinsic worth, and art cannot compete with real-life experiences.
- 7) An object is art only when placed in the context of art.

The conclusion that Kosuth derives from these basic premises is a simple identity statement: art is art. While tautologies are always true, they are trivial and convey nothing new. Moreover, some of the premises Kosuth asserts are unsupported by common sense, logical argument, or empirical evidence.

Conceptualist Activities

Among Kosuth's <u>artistic</u> presentations of his theoretical investigations, the <u>Information Room</u> (which was on exhibit in 1970 at the "Conceptual Art and Conceptual Aspects" show in the New York Cultural Center) serves as an example of his endeavor to exemplify, by means of art, art's linguistic basis. The <u>Information Room</u> contained two large tables randomly covered with books, primarily on linguistic philosophy.

Also randomly placed were chairs for the spectators to sit down and read the artist's selections. According to Kosuth, the <u>art</u> of <u>Information Room</u> consisted not in the arrangements of objects but "in the artist's conception of art to which the objects are subordinated" (Meyer, p. X1).

An obvious question presents itself: How are we, the audience, to know from reading articles by philosophers selected by <u>any</u> artist what that artist's conception of art is? However, what can be gained from such an "art condition," to use Kosuth's ambiguous phrase, is 1) that we find something of interest in the articles themselves and 2) that we ask some questions as to what is the meaning of all this.

Theory As Art

Foremost among the British artists using language as art is Terry Atkinson, one of the founders and editors of <u>Art Language</u>, a journal devoted entirely to Conceptual art and theory. In an editorial to the first issue, Atkinson raised two questions: 1) Can a treatise on the principles of Conceptualism stand as a work of art? and 2) Can Conceptual art count as art theory? His answer to both questions was that the <u>intention</u> of the artist determined its classification as art and/or theory.

Atkinson further suggested that for the Conceptual artist the crucial problem is one of <u>recognition</u>. For an object to be recognized as art, an artist may use one of four techniques: (1) constructing an object with all the physical attributes established as necessary to count as artwork; (2) adding new characteristics to older established ones; (3) placing an object in a context where the observer <u>expects</u> a recognized art object; and (4) <u>declaring</u> an object to be a work of art. According to Atkinson, these last two are the techniques of Conceptural artists, although the <u>object</u> for them is often no more than a piece of writing.

Conclusion

Art traditionally has been viewed in terms of expression: as self-expression; as the reflection or expression of a social environment; and as communication—a form of expression wherein action of artist, the work of art itself, and reaction of audience are necessary components (Pelles, 1963). Those who view art as expression, however, are faced with a dilemma: how do we ascertain that what is expressed in a work of art is the same for artist and public?

This problem the Conceptualists have taken as their chief concern. They have focused on the artist's idea (intention) as the key element in the creation of works of art, and they have questioned the traditional assumption that, in visual art, art objects are necessary to convey artistic meaning (Kosuth, 1969). In short, Conceptualists seek to reduce the essential components of artistic expression to artist and audience.



With the disappearance of the art object from the creative process, formal concerns in the traditional sense no longer apply. Instead, theoretical questions concerning the nature and purpose of art provide Conceptual artists with a framework for their creative efforts. In attempting to establish art theory as art, however, a new dilemma arises, namely, how an artist's idea or theory is to be recognized by the public as art (Atkinson, 1969). Two solutions are provided by the Conceptualists: (1) documenting an idea and placing the documentation in a context where visual art is expected; and (2) declaring an idea, action, situation, etc. to be art.

Are these solutions successful? Can Conceptualists in fact eliminate formal elements from the creative process and still retain an entity that is art? What happens to the notion of style when formal concerns no longer obtain? These are questions yet to be explored in the analysis of Conceptual art.

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Mentor's Introduction

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The immediate context from which this work grows is puzzlement and problem solving. The researcher's puzzlement is about the contrast between her interest in works of art and her students' seemingly limited interests. She has speculated that the students experience little of the richness and open-endedness she experiences, and she has reflected on the role of her past experiences with art in making this involvement possible. She has addressed the students' involvement and apparently limited reflection as problems to be understood and resolved. In doing this she draws on disciplines, primarily art history and philosophy, that may provide insights and contribute to a solution. This approach is interdisciplinary, or even what Meeth (1978) calls "transdisciplinary" and reflects what Gardner and Goodyear (1977) see as researchers' growing impatience with boundary lines drawn around traditional fields.

Since this work is based on the researcher's reflections and results in revisions of her interpretation and approach, the work is what Aoki (1978) calls "critical-interpretative." It also would be categorized by Beittel (1982) as "humanistic" research which he sees as an important current development in the context of art education.

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13

Andrea Fairchild

An art object exists in Space and Time. It is easy to understand its existence in Space as every object has length, breadth and mass. Until fairly recently, it was thought that Space and Time were philosophically opposing ideas. But in the 20th century, with the work of Einstein and other mathematicians, as well as the new concepts in psychology, philosophy and art, these ideas were no longer seen as irreconciable.

Time affects the creation of an art object in two ways. Firstly, the artist shares with the others of that culture a specific Time in history. This we can call group or collective Time. The artist also has spent a certain period making the work--looking, adjusting, evaluating, and judging ... in other words the lived Time of the creative process. This we can call inner or subjective Time which operates quite independently of Time in the outside world. This was called "La duree", or Duration by the French philosopher, Henri Bergson.

But a work of Art is also an object that transcends the specific historical time in which it was created. It exists in a stream of time from the moment of its inception to the moment in which it is being looked at by another person—the Beholder.

Beholders also bring to the act of looking their inner experiences, their knowledge and desires, their Duration, as well as the collective Time of their specific culture. Thus, the art object is the focus of these two kinds of Time (collective and subjective) from two different directions (the artist's and the Beholder's).

The area of collective time concerning the art object's creation is properly the study of Art History. To understand the multidimensionality of a work of art is the realm of Philosophy and Psychology. To develop guidelines and methods on how to enrich and extend this interchange is the province of Education.

Henri Bergson was a late 19th century philosopher who was the first since the ancient Greeks to deal extensively with the notion of Time. He postulated two kinds of Time: a chronological, homogeneous time which is used in the physical world of scientists and a subjective, inner time which he called Duration. Duration "is qualitative reality. It is not open to measurement." (Meissener, 1967, p. 135).

Bergson maintained that for us to understand any of the important questions about Life, Art and Philosophy, was only possible by an effort of intellectual sympathy or Intuition. This statement has made him pre-eminently the philosopher of artists who have always held that a work of art was more than the sum of its parts. For example, to



enumerate the various parts of Picasso's <u>Guernica</u> does not begin to explain the impact of the whole.

A fully formed concept of Duration, for Bergson, is:

identical with spiritual existence. It is the stuff of life. It is the continuous progress of the past, gnawing away at the future and increasing in bulk as it advances...(Stewart, 1911, p. 213)

But how does a person viewing an art object recapture this "stuff of life"? Can anyone do it, even children?

When studying the works of Piaget, we find that children before the age of 7 - 8 years have a poorly developed notion of Time. They grasp Time in a spatial way; they cannot arrange objects in correct chronological series. They are frozen in the present, as Time for them is discontinuous and tied to growth. So, it would be impossible for children to make that leap in understanding another's inner life experiences as they scarcely can remember their own inner experiences. Their notion of both kinds of Time will be long in developing.

But for an adult, the ability to apprehend and to share in the experiences of the creation of a work is definitely possible. For according to Dewey, the Beholder has an active role to play as well. The Beholder perceives the work in its entirety. There is a fusion of the Beholder's perceptions, and inner life experiences with the work of art which is a summation of a creative process. This is the aesthetic experience. A work of art does not by itself have aesthetic quality, it needs interaction with a viewer who will share in the experience. After the initial encounter, the Beholder can initiate a process of analysis, evaluation and judgement which will enrich the experience.

The whole of the History of Western Art is a tracing of the development of different artists' skills in using illusion to depict reality. What we must also understand is that these skills were matched by an equal development in the perceptual skills of the viewers. The creation of a work of art and its deciphering developed more or less in a parallel fashion.

As we get closer to our own era, Gombrich (1960) points out that:

The artist gives the Beholder increasingly more to do, he draws him into the magic circle of creation and allows him to experience something of the thrill of making which had once been the privilege of the artist. (p. 165)

There is a tendency to move away from the sensuous art object towards installations and performances...all of which require greater participation and effort of intellectual sympathy from the Beholder.



As an art educator involved with museum education, I am concerned in fostering this intellectual sympathy in viewers. There are many different educational strategies which currently are used in museums to encourage participation in the aesthetic experience. Do these, in fact, help people to understand better some of the issues and concerns of an artist? Are some more effective than others? How can a museum develop programmes which engage the Beholder in meaningful sharing of the aesthetics of an art work?

I decided to document what several museums were doing in their education programmes. To focus more specifically on the public's reaction to games and other hands-on activities. As a pilot project, I observed a series of 2 and 3-dimensional games which had been developed by university students in conjunction with the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts. It had been decided that gaming, as a means of simulating an experience which an artist might have had, was a valuable tool.

The artworks used were 20th Century Canadian landscapes from the Group of Seven. The objectives of these games were firstly to understand how an artist changes a three-dimensional scene to a two-dimensional surface; secondly, to learn what are the main components of a landscape and how the artist uses these in a plastic language. A covert objective in all cases is to extend viewing time.

Being in the midst of this project, it is very difficult to come to many conclusions. Certainly, it can be noted that the objectives of the games are met quite easily. People will spend a long time looking intently at paintings to reconstruct them in a game. While doing this, they enter in a dialogue with the guides about the problems they have encountered. This will lead into more general issues about the artists intentions and the manner in which these intentions were carried out.

Above all, what is quite clear is that perception and empathy for an art work and an understanding of the creative process, require real effort from the Beholder. Meaningful interactions are not easily come by. People have to learn how to look and how to trust their feelings when they are engaged in active looking. Then it might be possible to have a shared aesthetic experience. From these observations in museums, I hope to discover whether it is indeed possible for the Beholder to live in a simultaneity of shared experience with the artist.

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Mentor's Introduction

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In Canada, the determination of educational policy is provincially based; that is, an individual province ascertains the specific needs of its population and implements educational structures which hope to address those needs. Rarely does the federal government encroach upon this historical procedure. Thus, the lack of any centralization of educational policy making has given rise to a great deal of diversity as to the manner in which education is carried out across Canada's ten provinces.

Given such diversity in general educational milieu, it is not surprising to discover a similar occurrence in the practices of art education as well. Throughout the early years of the introduction of teaching art as part of provincial education, whether it be in the public or private sector, individuals, by means of experimentation rather than by government fiat have influenced the manner in which art is to be taught. Arthur Lismer was such an individual.

A. Grigor's research concentrates upon the given that Arthur Lismer had a tremendous impact upon the practices of art education in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, and sets out to explain the pedagogical antecedents of his particular method of teaching art.

One of the more interesting facets of this type of historical research is that Lismer's immediate influence ended relatively recently, in 1967. His secondary influence however, continues to this day through the work of his students and here is where the historical researcher plays an invaluable role, for it is through the primary sources that an understanding of Lismer's pedagogy is achieved.

Angela Grigor, using techniques employed by the oral history researcher as well as those of the Archivist, explains the difficulty of an individual who attempts to wed theory and practice and who, in this process of experimentation, changed the manner in which art education evolved in Quebec.



17

Angela Grigor

Arthur Lismer was an outstanding Canadian painter and art educator who was born in 1885 and died in 1969. He is best known for his work as a museum educator, where he was able to influence generations of children in his Saturday Morning Art Classes. The study which is outlined in this paper was concerned with his work in the Saturday Classes and the conflict which is evident in his pedagogy between his theory and his practice.

Lismer was born in the English industrial town of Sheffield. He left school at the early age of thirteen when he became apprenticed to a firm of engravers, and attended the Sheffield School of Art in the evenings, where he had a scholarship.

In 1911 at the age of 26 Lismer emigrated to Canada hoping to find employment which would also enable him to continue his painting. At the "Grip," a commercial art studio Lismer met other young men with similar ambitions. This was to be the nucleus of the Group of Seven, who became celebrated for their paintings of the Canadian north, and for their aspirations to develop a uniquely Canadian spirit in their work.

Two years after his arrival in Canada, Lismer, who was newly married and in need of funds, began to teach at the Ontario Summer School. With no previous training in the field of art education he based his pedagogy on trends in art education as well as on the progressive educational philosophy of the period.

During the 54 years in which he was active Lismer held several important teaching positions. In 1927 he was appointed the Educational Director at the Art Gallery of Toronto, eventually moving to the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts in 1940 where he remained until his retirement in 1967 at the age of 82. During his long career Lismer travelled across Canada many times on lecture tours, also journeying to Europe, South Africa and Australia promoting his philosophy of child-centered art education.

Three years after he joined the Art Gallery of Toronto Lismer started his Saturday Morning Art Classes. Hundreds of children came every week and Lismer chose young art students whom he had known at the Ontario College of Art to be his teaching assistants.

The children began by copying the Gallery exhibits, but after six months Lismer was dissatisfied with the results and changed his approach. He chose to use a version of the Project Method, a cooperative way of teaching developed from Dewey's theories. The children were given a topic by their instructors and were expected to gather information on their own to be shared with the group. There was much additional infor-

mation given by the instructors in the form of films, prints and photographs. This was necessary because the topics were sometimes outside the experience of the students, often being historical or geographical. The children were kept busy for weeks, and often months, making costumes, props and scenery in which the work was shared, frequently several children worked on the same piece. At the end of the season a performance was given to parents, public and press. At Christmas this consisted of a series of tableaux, and in Spring there was a grand pageant described by one student as being "quite glorious" (Yanover, 1980, p. 20). This was an occasion for music, dancing, and acting and Lismer who always had been interested in the theatre enjoyed his role as producer. He acted as "impressario, overall director...he ran a sort of structured chaos" (Yanover, 1980, p. 20). These affairs were a tremendous social success, and served to publicize Lismer's work at the Museum.

However, Lismer's method of working was inconsistent with his theory of art education. The emphasis in his practice was on social cooperation within the group; his theory, however, stressed the importance of freedom for the child in the art room. This contradiction can be explained partially by his admiration for the work of two men with very different philosophies: John Dewey, the American educational philosopher, and Austrian Franz Cizek, the father of 20th century art education. Dewey was concerned with designing an educational system which would serve to integrate society. Cizek, in contrast, was interested only in the development of the individual with as little outside interference as possible. He believed that art expression must come from the subconscious, and that it is inhibited by conscious intellection (Entwistle, 1970, p. 56). He said, "Art more and more dries up because it is supplanted by intellect" (Viola, 1944, p. 33).

Dewey's orientation on the other hand, was towards, "The scientific mode of enquiry and the systemization of human experience (Archambault, 1964, p. 153). He (1916) was highly critical of Cizek's way of working and called the development of what is "inner" that which does not connect with others. "What is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile with something rotten about it" (p. 122).

Lismer, who inherited his social idealism from the 19th century, was inspired by the breadth of Dewey's theory and its practical application to education. He adopted the Project Method as a conscious effort to integrate his students into a cohesive group, but seemed unable to relinquish Cizek's notion that "The unspoilt child is tremendously creative" (Viola, 1944, p. 27).

Lismer's admiration for the work of both Dewey and Cizek placed him in a position between two different modes of thinking, the intuitive and the intellectual. The theories he adopted were concerned with art which came from the child's spontaneous expression and therefore originated in the sub-conscious non-intellectual faculty. In contrast, the method he chose to use encouraged art-making which was supported by research and which was therefore designed to improve intellectual capacity. Contemporary research suggests that the brain processes



information in two different ways, one analytical, the other relational (Fincher, 1976). Lismer was supporting one while using the other. These and other factors would have made it impossible for Lismer to integrate his theory with his practice.

He was gregarious by nature, and enjoyed being with children, drawing pictures for them, and making suggestions for their work in the pageants. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for him to have adopted a passive position in the art room.

Undoubtedly Lismer enjoyed his position as Canada's leading art educator, however it is possible that his reputation was also involved in the production of the pageants. This study suggests that it was understood that some measure of control over the children's work be maintained.

Lismer's problem is not unique; art education has long been vulnerable to theories which do not harmonize with practices. In fact, Lismer's way of working suited the situation at the gallery where hundreds of children congregated and had to be kept occupied. These practical considerations and Lismer's social concerns seem to have outweighed his preoccupation with child-centered theory, which in the final analysis appears to have been the least important of his concerns. Like Cizek, Lismer was particularly interested in the pre-school child, and this may account for his promotion of a theory which is mainly of relevance to the very young.

There is no doubt that he brought much richness into the lives of his students, many of whom went on to become prominent in the arts, while others hold positions of importance to the arts. Norah McCullough, his assistant for many years said: "He has illuminated the arts for more than two generations of Canadians and as one of them I will not forget how much I owe him" (Ballantyne, 1964, p. 336).

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James Stewart

This is a brief overview of a proposal submitted for funding at Indiana University. It is an effort to investigate talent as a normally distributed attribute. It is based on the observed use of the concept rather than on theoretical or ideological use, though it is derived initially from the work of Clark suggesting that talent is normally distributed. It is intended not to define talent, but to put to the test the way in which term is commonly used informally, and to develop that into a conception of talent that is analogous to that of intelligence.

The question of who is talented and who is not is relevant to art education since it is commonly assumed that those who do art well are characterized by some personal difference that we call talent. Monies are appropriated for the education of the talented and schools are called upon to decide who is talented.

There are two common conceptions of talent. In the one, talent is attributed to a few, but not to others. In this conception talent can be said to be normally distributed; either you have it or you do not. In the other, talent is evenly distributed. All have talent and the job of art teacher is to bring out the talent hidden in every student. The literature of art education generally depends on one conceptualization or the other.

A few people have suggested that talent is normally distributed. In this conception talent is something that people have in varying degrees, a few having a lot, and few having little, and most having some amount in between. Suggestions along this line have been made by Goodenough, Burt, Munro, and Clark. It also may be noted that our use of the term talent seems to be derived from the Gospel of Saint Matthew in which servants are entrusted with quantities of money called, in older translations, talents. The talents were entrusted by the master in varying amounts, and the servants returned varying amounts of profit to the master on his return.

If we ask someone to determine from a set of drawings which children are talented we find the results predictable and interesting. If we give someone a set of drawings by children of the same age and ask them to sort them according to talent we find that those judged as most talented are those who produce drawings that correspond to higher levels of development, while those judged as least talented produce drawings that correspond to lower levels of development. If we ask people to sort the drawings by developmental level we get similar sortings. This suggests that people judge talent and developmental level according to similar criteria.



This conception of talent is strikingly similar to that of intelligence as it is measured in IQ tests, a comparison of developmental level with age norms. Talent may well be, therefore, an analogous concept. If we can consider it so, then since we know that intelligence is normally distributed, we would expect that talent also is so distributed.

If we want to test this expectation we could develop criteria for sorting the drawings. To do that we would have to look at the drawings judged as representative of high and low talent to define the features in them that distinguish the two groups. We would note such things as the representation of space, complexity and specificity of form, and expression. Such features are known to be, or believed to be, related to development.

There is a considerable literature on the representation of space in children's drawings. The famous "Draw-a-Man" test is based on complexity and specificity of form. Arnheim describes the development of representation in terms of increasing specificity of form. The subject of expression is somewhat more contentious, but a scale of expressiveness could be devised based on the work of Piaget and others using the concept of expression as defined by Nelson Goodman in terms of exemplification. In such a scale we would be concerned with what qualities of the subject matter are exemplified by the picture, ranging from topographic to metaphorical.

Drawings could be sorted by the criteria developed to determine the distribution overall, and to compare the sorting by different criteria of the same picture. If talent is related to all these different features of the drawings we would expect the sortings to be the same.

Such a test would also be useful in developing a test of talent based on production rather than appreciation. If you look at schools that have attempted to determine which students are talented you find that in practice they are asking the children to make drawings and then choosing the best drawers by obscure criteria. The selecting is being done by professional judgement. As suggested above, the sorting of these children's drawings is likely to be made on the basis of developmental level. While professional judgement is probably reliable, it would seem useful to have a scale of sorting criteria by which such judgements could be made in a systematic and replicable way.

If such a scale were developed and applied to a set of children's drawings we would have some support for the concept of talent as a normally distributed attribute, and be in a better position to tell which qualities are most indicative of talent in drawing.

Mentor's Introduction

JAMES VICTORIA Michigan State University

Ms. Becci's study has grown out of her teaching situation in Junior High School. The State of Michigan, as in many others, promotes the mainstreaming of impaired children into as many regular classrooms as possible. Usually art classes, because of the nature of their structure and content, are the most easily accessible to impaired students.

General Art classes in Ms. Becci's Junior High School are comprised of sixth, seventh and eighth grade students. These classes meet one hour each day through out the school year. In two of these General Art classes Ms. Becci had a visually impaired student. One student has been classified as blind from birth, the other classified as visually impaired with a visual accuity of 20/200. The blind student was in grade six, the visually impaired student was in grade eight at the time of the study.

Ms. Becci's study would attempt to discern the differences, if any, between the art behaviors and social behaviors of the blind child and the visually impaired child, as well as their sighted peers in the two art classes.

An evaluation scale for each art unit comprising the school year was developed. The scale utilized criteria based on student effort, skill with process/media, creativity and socialization factors. These were measured against the student's peer group as a whole, a particular sighted peer and the student's prior performance. Both two-dimensional and three-dimensional art experiences were provided. The duration of the study was to be for one school year.



23

Carol Becci

Blind children, as do all other children, have a need and desire for artistic expression. Many art educators, however, approach mainstreaming experiences of blind students with apprehension and confusion because they regard the sense of sight as the decisive factor of artistic experience and ability. Quite to the contrary, imaginative activity and artistic experience for any person does not have to be an experience of the visual, or depend on the capacity for observation. This study closely examines the artistic expression of blind children along side children whose sight is normal. Through these comparative case studies it becomes apparent that all children, both blind and normally sighted, make and experience art in almost the same manner.

The two blind students in the study are both male. One is 12 and the other is 14. The 12-year-old has been blind since birth, and never had a formal art experience before. The 14-year-old, although legally blind, can see objects if they are held up two inches from his eyes. This is his second experience in an art room. Therefore, before the actual school year began, I assumed that the 14-year-old would encounter fewer problems than the 12-year-old since the 14-year-old has some degree of sight and already had a previous art experience. I also assumed the 12-year-old would create art in a haptic manner because he is totally blind, and that the 14-year-old would create art either in a visual manner or haptic manner, or in both. I was soon to find out, only three weeks into the school year, that both my assumptions were wrong. The 14-year-old, although having the ability to see, refused to use the small amount of sight he had and also refused to use his sense of touch. Any art experience that required more than a pencil and paper presented tremendous problems and anxiety for the 14-year-old. The 12-year-old, on the other hand, was having success after success with each art project. Many times even more success than the sighted students. He also seemed to create in a visual manner although he never had the ability to see. I was beginning to find that sight was not a critical factor for the making of art.

I began looking for other research that might support what I was discovering with my blind students, and the material I found at first was very scarce and limited in content. I then came across The Nature of Creative Activity, by Viktor Lowenfeld (1959). This book provided a sound philosophy of children's art, the handicap of blindness, and how all children, both blind and sighted, make and experience art. This resource provided a sound philosophy that helped to clarify the facts I was finding, and to approach art education of the blind with confidence and certainty.

Before teaching art to blind students, one must become familiar with the implications of blindness upon the individual's life. Two



individuals with the same degree of phsyical handicap may differ widely in their detachment from the environment. This detachment may be classified into 2 kinds: Objective Detachment, which is the degree of the individual's handicap, and Subjective Detachment, which is the degree by which an individual suffers from her or his handicap. For example, blindness can mean a serious handicap for someone who is longing for sight and so remains unaware of her or his own qualities. This description is similar to the 14-year-old in my case study. Although he does have some degree of sight, he scarcely uses it. To complicate matters he has allowed his loss of sight to overcome him and is desensitized to some of his other senses, especially touch. In contrast to blindness that becomes a serious handicap for some, for another blindness can become part of the personality. This type of person adjusts to her or his blindness and uses all opportunities to enrich life as subjective detachment ceases to exist. This description is similar to the handicap of the other blind student in my comparative case study. Although the 12-year-old has been completely blind since birth, he uses all of his remaining senses to their utmost to enrich life. He actually has turned his blindness into a positive asset in his life.

Thus, if one has the opportunity to live or work with these two types of blind individuals, it becomes apparent that blindness can become a secondary handicap in a person's life. If the blind person accepts her or his blindness as a trait, and develops other senses and skills, that individual will live as a normal person.

Sighted individuals usually underestimate the capabilities of the blind, and educators of the blind, especially in the elementary and secondary grades in public schools, must be especially careful not to underestimate the abilities of the blind. When I began my study, as previously stated, I believed the 14-year-old would have a much easier time creating art since he has some degree of sight. I assumed the 12-year-old would pose a greater problem since he is totally blind. After just three weeks the reverse of my assumptions was observed. It was becoming apparent that the ability to see would not affect the ability to create art.

Lowenfeld supported these findings in his book, The Nature of Creative Activity. Many case studies of the art of blind children and the art of sighted children are presented which helps demonstrate this fact. He described two kinds of techniques employed when making art, haptic and visual. The visual artist is one who depends entirely on the capacity for observation and the visual experience when making art. The haptic person, however, uses the eyes only when compelled to do so. Otherwise, the person reacts as a blind person who is entirely dependent on touch, smell, emotion, and other body sensations. When a haptic minded person makes art, the eye does not mediate between reality and the concept.

Most children, whether blind or not, create art in a haptic manner. Values, subjective attitudes, and experiences of the self are the main factors of the child's art instead of visual accuracy. Schematic child



drawings can originate in non-visual experience, and have non-visual origin because we see the same formations in drawings of weak-sighted children and in drawings of normally sighted children. Early schematic representations of the child are bound up within the individual self and individual circumstances. Proportions and changes of objects from drawing to drawing are mostly dependent on the subjective attitudes called out by the child's experience. In the 11th year of age the haptic creativity is at its height. By the 12th year the intensity of desire for visual art experience begins to overcome haptic expression in some children. By the 14th year of the child's development, the type of art experience the person employs usually remains constant. Blind children who have never made art before will work through all of the schematic stages of a child regardless of their age. The 14-year-old in my case study is now producing drawings typical of a 3rd grader although he is in the 8th grade.

After reviewing material on visual and haptic artists, an art teacher can approach teaching art to the blind with more confidence and ability. As the art teacher realizes that probably half of an art class will create art in a haptic manner whether they are blind or not, techniques one uses with sighted haptic students can be applied to blind haptic students. The reverse is also true. Art educators can apply techniques used in teaching visually sighted students to visually blind students. In this manner, all of the art students can experience the same art curriculum without making exceptions for students because they cannot see.

The teacher must also be careful not to assume that all blind students will make art in a haptic manner. Many blind students will make art in a visual way, methodically scrutinizing the details, proportions, etc. of the art object they are making. It would disturb a visually minded person to be stimulated by only haptic impressions. The reverse is also true. "Seeing" also may be an inhibitory factor when forced upon individuals who do not use their visual experiences for creative work. Many people with full sight must be classified with the non-visual people, and many people without sight must be classified with visual people. To consider the organ of sight alone is quite insufficient to give us insight into productive creative activity.

Using Lowenfeld's information on visual and haptic types, art teachers can give equally enriching art experiences to all students, whether blind, normally sighted, or of any other handicap. What children cannot always achieve in their lives, they can do in their creative art work. Through continuous contact with themselves and their art work, children not only grow emotionally, but mentally. Children face themselves through their art work gaining self confidence and emotional Schematic representation and overall art expression of the child are influenced by numerous circumstances unique to the child's world. The teacher should never assume that a child is haptic because he or she cannot see, nor that a student is visual because the ability to see is lacking. The teacher should never force a specific method of expression on the child. It must be realized that even the most

primitive, creative work born in the mind of the individual, and produced by her or his own hand is of greatest value.

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Mentor's Introduction

DAVID ECKER New York University

The aim of research, we say, is to make a contribution to knowledge. Setting aside the epistemological question of how this is possible, I can best describe how it is done at N. Y. U. by anecdote and example. This is because those of us who are engaged in the multifarious activities collectively called "the doctoral program" tend to be preoccupied with the tensions arising out of what may well be a necessary conflict between the requirements of an institution, discipline, or profession on the one hand, and personal values and expectations on the other. For me the only acceptable resolution of this conflict is the successful completion of a dissertation with the student's professional and personal identity not only intact but enhanced. And this continues to be my aim as doctoral adviser in the Department of Art and Art Education to hundreds of students over the years. Our students, many of them already launched on successful careers in art and art education, bring with them an enormous range of competencies, accomplishments, and insights. To help them shape these into formal research proposals leading to "contributions to the field of specialization" is my daily responsibility and privilege. My colleagues on the faculty are inordinately proud of our many graduates and current students. I am especially pleased with the progress of the two persons presenting their ongoing research in the following pages. Cynthia Schwarz and Laurence Montalto would be considered outstanding doctoral candidates in any university. But I must withhold praise as their advocate. They are quite capable of speaking for themselves.

THE UNIVERSITY ART STYLE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF DOMINANT PAINTING STYLES AND THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY ON M.F.A. CANDIDATES IN SELECTED DEPARTMENTS OF ART

Laurence Montalto

As the title suggests, the focus of my research is to see whether selected departments of art may be identified by a distinctive art style; to establish whether selected departments of art may be identified by a distinctive ideology; and to what extent the art styles and ideologies are reflected in the works and beliefs of Master of Fine Arts candidates in painting. As a result, my study will examine the nature of the education of the contemporary American artist and answer two underlying questions: are college and university M.F.A. programs distinguishable by the kinds of students they produce and are there distinctive, identifiable qualities among leading programs that generate success for a large number of their graduates.

My research interest was generated by both informal observations of Master of Fine Arts programs in general and as a faculty member at several universities in the Northeast in particular. Hilton Kramer (1959) identified part of the problem when he wrote:

. . . when one has the occasion to see the work being produced in some college art departments nowadays, one cannot help being struck by the fact that a roomful of such painting often looks like last month's gallery pages come to life. . . (p. 15)

All one has to do is visit a few college art departments to bear witness that Kramer's arrow may have hit the mark. But is this really new? Most students appear to be aware, at a very early age, that they are to produce a kind of art on demand. It is possible that the real impetus for this investigation began many years ago when, at the suggestion of my elementary school teacher, I changed the color of the dog, just drawn, from blue to a more reasonable brown. Little had I known, but at the early age of five, I received my first commission in the world of art.

Further development of this as a researchable problem was fostered by the realization that this phenomenon is not limited to any particular level of education or department and is characterized by many nicknames. In the lower grades, Arthur Efland (1972) discusses "school art" and describes it as a game-like, ritualistic, rule-governed process that uses conventional themes and materials. In addition to producing an art different from what children would do on their own, it creates artifacts that serve the rhetoric of a particular institution which take the form of free, creative, and humanistic looking works.

On the college level, Henry Raleigh (1964) has suggested that the study of art is quite a frustrating experience for, in spite of all good intentions, the modern student copies from his immediate environment and "style milieu" resulting in "less" accomplished works of his moment in



time and space." It should be noted that the students' alternatives, $\underline{e.g.}$, borrowing clues indirectly from their teachers own work; using the style preferences of the institution; or adopting the forms that exist about them, lead to equally frustrating conclusions.

McNeil Lowry (1962) observed the graduate level in which he identified the "new academic" style.

. . . this style in painting particularly lends itself to intellectual and technical imitation . . . The result is that we now have a "new academic" style that has spread throughout college and university studios almost without check. (p. 236)

This phenomenon is undesirable, not only because it excludes the student from the decision making process in education, but also because it reduces the educational experience to training. Of course, some amount of training is essential, but any program based upon training, by necessity, leaves out education. This would be comparable to the apprenticeship system, where imitation of the master was desirable and artists were trained in the "tradition" according to doctrines associated with each institution.

If the education of the artist, in view of all the research in art education theory and practice, has been reduced to training, then the M.F.A. degree has become, inadvertently, one in vocational training rather than education in the fine arts. These practices may be instructional, but surely not educational.

By virtue of what will be examined, my study cannot be scientific in the formal sense as Elliot Eisner (1981) described elsewhere, but qualitative and will employ procedures that are both aesthetic and descriptive. Accordingly, my research methods must be formulated qualitatively, and since within aesthetic inquiry all aesthetic knowledge must derive from an accurate description of our responses to art objects and events, a critical analysis will be used drawn from a taxonomy for aesthetic inquiry outlined by David W. Ecker and Eugene F. Kaelin (1972). They introduced a model in which the creation or appreciation of the object or event is at the first level of inquiry; criticism of the object or event is at the second level; analysis of the criticism (metacriticism) is at the third level, theory is at the fourth and analysis of theory (metatheory) represents the fifth level. The Ecker/Kaelin model is appropriate for my study, since the research will focus upon objects and events and a critical examination of those events. 1 Metacritical techniques will be employed to determine from the data, ideological convictions.

The method of criticism will incorporate aspects of phenomenology, notably phenomenological description based upon the ideas of "bracketing," "phenomenological reduction," and "counters" (1970). This technique, consistent with Husserl's advice to return "to the things themselves," avoids to the extent reasonably possible, the predispositions of the researcher, and suspends dogmatic attitudes of prior philosophies,

historical and possibly irrelevant knowledge.

In looking at the data relevant to art styles, phenomenology in conjunction with a comparative method of noting similarities and differences is well suited for my study. A method of comparison alone. which requires "a priori" criteria, is not solely sufficient for our purpose. While this method may be appropriate for the art historian in seeking a common denominator to discuss works of art, it reduces each piece to less than what it is and cannot be an aesthetic judgment. Ecker (1967) argues that comparison may be used as a secondary judgment, but that such comparative judgment must always be ". . . dependent upon initial aesthetic judgments of particular works of art" (p. 8). He goes on to state that ". . . to reduce the meaning of aesthetic judgments to those of secondary and comparative judgments is to reduce the aesthetic to the cognitive domain and thus to violate the primary significance of particular works of art" (p. 8). Therefore, since phenomenology is an adjunct method to that of comparison in this study, the results and conclusions will be grounded phenomenologically by describing each artwork autonomously and then comparing the results to determine their similarities and differences.

In conclusion, any artists' education that leaves out experientially based aesthetic inquiry, reduces the creative spark that is at the root of all works of art. This can only produce less accomplished works which derive from taking already existing answers and is not the result of autonomous inquiry into real problems and issues. My study may not only support the foregoing ideas, but will examine some of the basic notions of art education on the graduate level. It may also help to identify sound educational practices that a department would want to pursue in an effort to strengthen its program. Moreover, I hope my study will contribute to initiate further research of M.F.A. programs, which at the present time is considerably lacking.

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
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FOOTNOTE

¹For a discussion of the problematic nature of other modes of inquiry see Ecker and Kaelin, "The Limits of Aesthetic Inquiry," <u>Passim</u>.

ART EDUCATION AS APPRENTICESHIP: THE ART OF MAKING A CHAIR

Cynthia Schwarz

As the focus of my dissertation research I have been learning how to make a Windsor chair. The subject began to take shape two years ago in the first course in <u>Living Traditions in Art</u> taught by David W. Ecker at New York University. In that class were graduate students from all over the world--Lebanon, Thailand, Israel, Brazil--who brought with them traditions in art that were in danger of dying out. We were encouraged as artist-researchers to do something about it. Documentation of artistic processes was a central activity; yet we saw that the most direct way of preserving and advancing these traditions is to learn the processes themselves. The model for such learning is also the oldest: art education as apprenticeship.

But for some of us a problem arose. Such traditional arts as ceramics and textile design have been accepted in American schools as art, while other traditions have not. And why not lace-making for example, or knife-making or chair-making? Indeed, American artists are to be found knotting ropes, forging knives, and constructing furniture. The subject becomes highly controversial when attempts are made to classify these activities as art, to differentiate between art and craft, to distinguish the products of the creative imagination from the products of labor. The argument, therefore, is not with the object, but with the verbal explanation or concept of what art is supposed to be. For example, can an object be both a fine art and a craft object? How are we to classify the "primitive" artifact, which we gaze at in a museum, when we do not know what it was used for or why it was made? Does an object lose its "fine art" quality once we know its use, or even worse, once we see it being used? How did the "art" get into the art object which we find aesthetically pleasing? Since these are the kinds of questions I am researching, I thought I would turn "to the things themselves". I would learn how to make a Windsor chair with hand tools in order to understand the process. By this phenomenological/ hermeneutical approach I hope to describe and interpret the meaning of artistry within a specific tradition.

The first Windsor chairmaker I heard about was Michael Dunbar of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He has "reclaimed" and extended this tradition which seemed to have petered out in the late 19th century. There have always been craftsmen who make copies of antiques. These "period pieces" may well exhibit identical baluster and ring turnings on a leg according to the exact measurements of a particular chair from a documented date. But no personal decisions are made beyond the technical ones regarding the unseen details of construction. Dunbar, on the other hand uses the traditional woods, tools and hand methods of construction much as the early chairmakers did, to make chairs that are uniquely his own. He has discovered the early methods of construction by researching the documentary evidence and by "reading" old



Windsors that have come to him for repair or restoration. Actually, the chair that is beyond repair is the richest source of information, for it can be taken apart and "read" for tool marks and techniques.

Chairmaking, as with other traditional arts, continues even today on the basis of a master-apprentice relationship. I spent a week at Dunbar's woodworking school (held each summer in Hiram, Ohio) learning how to use the tools and how to construct a bow-back Windsor. But learning cannot be completed within the time it takes to construct one chair. So this spring I will visit Dunbar at his home-shop in Portsmouth, to add to, and, if necessary, to revise, what I have learned so far. Moreover, the complexities of Windsor chairmaking are best appreciated by observing more than one woodworker in order to see the subtle differences, the characteristic approaches and ways of performing technical operations that occur in each one's methods. Last summer, in South Woodbury, Vermont, I observed how David Sawyer, another extender of the tradition, makes a continuous-arm Windsor. In Baltimore John Alexander demonstrated how he constructs his post-and-rung, or ladderback chairs from green wood, and how he makes his conscious decisions about the art of his work. Wendell Castle, who exemplifies the "fine" art of furniture-making, was interviewed at his school and workshop outside of Rochester, New York. Since Dunbar's book, Windsor Chairmaking, first came out in 1976, more than a dozen Windsor chairmakers have appeared in New England alone to extend the living tradition, while the possibilities of chairmaking have inspired architects and even sculptors. I intend still to interview other Windsor makers, a desigrer of chairs, a sculptor, and someone who "just makes a chair".

One can readily perceive why the Windsor was the most popular chair made during the hand tool era. It is constructed generally from three kinds of wood: oak for the supple parts, maple for the support pieces and pine for the sculpted seat. Because of the woods used, and the method of wedged supports, green wood drying over dry wood and the lightness that the steaming of the bow back allows, this chair endures and holds together through generations of stress and wear.

Although my research is grounded in hand tool processes, there is not time to describe more than the use of one tool, in one procedure, which shapes the billets of wood after the logs have been riven into workable size. A drawknife has two handles at right angles to the blade between; it is worked through traction rather than percussion or thrust. It does not split or tear apart the fibers of the wood for that is where the strength of the wood lies - where its means for resisting stress are the greatest. Instead, the sharp, thin edge of the blade shaves off the excess wood by following the natural line of the fibers. But what is happening when the woodworker uses the drawknife to shave down the billet into a piece shaped to serve as part of the chair he is making? The billet takes shape; the shavings scatter and pile up on the floor. The tool can be seen to be brought down on the wood in what appear to be repetitive movements: the woodworker's arms are bent, his head is down and he bends over the shaving horse as if he had made himself the driving shaft of a jointed mechanism. It requires complete concentration. One

of the chairmakers said, "A blind man could do it better!" He wanted to emphasize the fact that such woodworking is done through feel rather than just watching shape take form. This is non-verbalized activity that must be described in a manner that can be understood in order to interpret and communicate it.

Edged tools, such as the drawknife, the spokeshave, the adze, and various planes and chisels all leave their own mark on the chair parts in this kind of rough workmanship. Each chairmaker, however, has a different pressure, a different slant to his woodworking much as in handwriting. These cuts into the wood that shape it while thinly slicing it away, might be called the "marks of the maker". The chairmaker also must decide the cant of the back, the width and bend of the bow back and the angle of the legs in proportion to the rest of the chair. These are the decisions he makes when he stands back to look at his work, what he calls "eyeballing it". They also might be called the "marks of the maker".

The questions that this research hopes to provide some answers to are suggested by all of the above. What are the differences between art and craft, and what do they share in common? How does art get into the work of art, and do we have a theory of art for our time? How does one communicate non-verbal techniques and thinking? Do the politics, economics and social attitudes of an era effect the making of chairs? What is the relationship between technical dexterity and the quality of being aesthetically pleasing? What do we mean by "hand work", power tools, finish and "make-do"? What is the relationship between the tool, the woodworker and the wood when a chair is being made? And, finally, what is the art of chairmaking?

Wood can be an exciting medium to work in; it has a texture and a structure that humanity has always found satisfying and useful. In Vermont I saw a maple tree felled. The widest, unknotted parts of the trunk were used for chair legs and stretchers, while the remaining logs and branches were stacked in the log pile to be burned in the wood stove for heat that winter. Hand work traditions make use of what is close at hand. The tool, whether chisel, needle or blacksmith's hammer, is worked by the hand. It becomes an extension of the hand transferring the maker's touch to the material he is working in whether it is whale bone, berry-dyed flax or red-hot iron. Making a Windsor chair is an early American tradition, but all over the world there are traditional art activities which are in danger of being lost to industry-produced goods or choked out of the production of tourist-trade objects. I am a member of an organization, ISALTA (International Society for the Advancement of Living Traditions in Art), whose artist-researchers are attempting to preserve, document and learn these traditions. If the objects of these activities give aesthetic satisfaction to their users, why should not such traditional art practices be learned in our art departments? Learning these traditions should also help to open up that over-settled tract that was delimited for us by words and attitudes a long time ago.

Mentor's Introduction

ELLIOT EISNER - Stanford University

Amy Phillips is a doctoral student in art education in the School of Education at Stanford University. Her research interests focus on the role of anxiety in the teaching of art, a subject that has not received much attention in the literature of art education. Her efforts to understand anxiety are primarily theoretical. Her major thrust is to conceptualize the varieties of anxiety that manifest themselves in the creative process, some of which facilitate, while other types hamper the perception and creation of art. Art educators need to develop conceptual clarity in a field so complex as anxiety and art. Phillips' is an important first step in the conduct of those careful empirical examinations that will illuminate the connections between what children and adolescents feel and what they are able to do in the field of art education

ANXIETY AND ART LEARNING

Amy Phillips

CBS news recently reported the latest case of "chemical anxiety." A popular mail-order catalog has the answer to "fear of sewing machines." Articles on stress and anxiety are ubiquitous. Even the medical profession is beginning to agree that anxiety, "the prime characteristic of Western civilization" (Willoughby in May, 1977) can even make us sick.

Anxiety also has been important in educational research. Study has ranged from the anxious person's performance and attitudes in school settings, to specific anxieties arising under one or another condition (such as Math, Performance, Computer, Text, or Flight "Anxiety"), to education for chronic stress.

What next? One phrase we have not heard is "art anxiety." It may be a blessing that art educators have not hitched up to the fad-anxiety bandwagon. Still, the relation between anxiety and art has a long and distinguished history, has been of direct and indirect concern to twentieth century art education, and is well worth understanding for teachers and students alike. In this brief paper I will discuss theories about anxiety in the context of art; often issues such as these are neglected in educational anxiety research.

First, then, what is anxiety? The sort of 'anxiety' we hear so much about today is only one form, a kind of stress-response brought on by a stressful environment and ineffective habits of coping with its threat. It is possible, and even useful, to see the art classroom and school setting as potentially stressful (e.g., lack of privacy, too little time, unfamiliar demands). My emphasis is not on this sort of "art stress," but on anxiety as a complex affective and cognitive state with many faces, serving many functions, and resulting in many ends.

Anxiety means an uneasy disquiet (I am anxious about), but also an eager desire (I am anxious to). Apprehension means both taking in a perceiving and fear and distrust (another kind of art anxiety, I suggest, is "apprehension apprehension"). Anxiety is like a collection of two-edged swords. For anxieties, including those we may feel when studying art, can be debilitative or facilitative -- unnecessary, as well as normal and inevitable.

Often, both the creative and destructive sides of anxiety operate at one and the same time. For example, in art study one needs to learn one's own patterns of anxiety response to the threat and promise of art's challenges. Debilitative anxiety about art can have many causes, not the least of which is a misunderstanding about the normal presence of creative anxiety at various stages of the creative process. This creative anxiety can range from an aroused, poised, imaginative curiosity to 'those endless hours where beauty was born out of despair' as W. B. Yeats said.



How one interprets this anxiety often determines whether it will be facilitating or debilitating. As Gaitskell and Hurwitz say (after Dewey's How We Think), there are normal periods of "hesitation and doubt" in any art project (Gaitskell, 1975). This can be interpreted as a signal to a oid (a common anxiety defense) rather than to push on. The experienced recognize this hesitation as a signal that one's interest is engaged. Even the physiological signs of creative arousal are very similar to anxiety states, and may well be mistaken by the inexperienced for them (May, 1977).

Another two-edged sword in anxiety and art making is the challenge and threat of using stuff from the often avoided 'preconscious,' or 'unconscious,' or realm of the 'mytheopoetic imagination' (Jung). As Goethe said: "Now let me dare to open wide the gate/ Past which men's steps have ever flinching trod."

We can learn to trust encounters with these sources of imagination, in part, through arts education. There is then less "dread in the face of freedom" (Kierkegaard's definition of anxiety). One may be more anxious to do art than anxious to avoid it.

However, one also learns to respect the depth and power of the mind and to understand that anxiety has a place in the process of growing more aware. Anxiety about art may, in part, be a response to "invasions from the unconscious and the archetype" - Jung's definition of anxiety (May, 1977). In the art class, anxiety may result from assignments that call for some encounter with this realm.

I will just mention a few other important areas in anxiety theory and art. The lives and working styles of artists offer teachers and students insights into coping with art anxiety with, so to speak, the novice-effect removed. Art therapists hold that doing art can assuage personal anxiety: "Had I left those images hidden in the emotions I might have been torn to pieces by them" (Jung, 1963). Art is also a cultural and personal response to the anxiety of existence, a way to make marks we can control and own in the face of fate.

What about anxiety in art education? Anxiety has been both an acknow-ledged and silent partner in modern art education. Some of our concern for appropriate curriculum, teaching, and self-expression has been so that the anguish of Walter Smith's proverbial little girl "who simply turns and thrashes me when I point out a faulty line" might be a thing of the past. In Lowenfeld's little book, "Your Child and His Art," sections such as "Shall I Correct Wrong Proportions" and "My Child is Afraid to Put Pressure on His Crayon, or to Paint Freely" encouraged parents to understand their children's art so they would not be worried by what and how their children painted, and children would not be disturbed by their parents' miscorceptions.

Anxiety even accompanies development and artistic development. The child Lowenfeld wanted us to respect, says Klein, develops powerful attachments to his or her symbolic productions (as seen in play and art). She says inappropriate interpretation of these (still not uncommon), can lead



to serious anxiety, both for the child, and about the symbolic expressions. Proper interpretation and support helps children develop healthy attitudes about themselves and their work (Klein, 1960).

Kierkegaard's cogent phrase, that "anxiety precedes a leap into a higher stage of life" suggests that anxiety is normal and even necessary in development (e.g., of artistic sophistication). It can also handicap us -- transitions are by no means always smooth and inevitable; anxiety can even short-circuit further growth.

Sullivan said that anxiety develops due to the "apprehension of disapproval" from significant others. He says this anxiety restricts the growth of "interests and inclinations" that oppose these other's opinions (May, 1977). We might then ask about the effect of youngster's peer-groups, often uninterested in art, and the lack of support for art in many of our culture's schools and homes. Is this an additional explanation for the tendency to stop doing art during late childhood?

Even in curriculum, anxiety stands in the shadow of design. There is a well-known distinction between two types of curriculum, the technically-centered and expressivity-centered (the dichotomy goes back as far as Appolo and Dionysus). In art education of late, we recognize these as a dynamic pair in creativity itself: Spontaneity can be a technique, techniques becomes spontaneous. Yet, as the experienced teacher knows, students may well feel anxious if a curriculum style is emphasized at the wrong time, or with the wrong students. I recall my own mis-step of fingerpainting with adolescent girls (on the over- Dionysian side), as well as Walter Smith's agitated three-year-old told to draw "correctly" (on the over-Appolonian side).

But in another of anxiety's two-edged swords, proper choice of curriculum also helps students deal with anxiety about art. Many high school teachers insist youngsters learn technique. As one pointed out, this enables them to face the fear of that "blank page," of that uncharted territory. Some curriculum, based on the seminal work of Nicolaides (such as gesture and contour, drawing without looking and without worrying about the result, etcetera) are said to help people who have blocks and rigidly inadequate drawing styles (see Edwards, 1979). Whether or not they tap the right side of the brain, these exercises are naturals for relaxation and anxiety reduction.

In my own work I discuss how educators can prevent students from developing debilitative anxiety about art, can teach them to recognize normal and inevitable anxieties that are part of the creative process, and can even encourage students to welcome some of this anxiety, perhaps by reinterpreting it as creative arousal. Field quotes a conversation between William Blake and Samuel Palmer about Blake's Dante designs:

He (Blake) said he began them with fear and trembling, I said, "O, I have enough of fear and trembling." "Then," he said, "you'll do." (Field, 1983).



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Mentor's Introduction

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Who is the student and who the master? At the Ph.D. level this is a real question for me. But when presented with a proposition that I held to be highly questionable by a young Mr. Blandy, I was soon convinced that this relationship would be a partnership in which I might well become the jumior member. His conviction about the capabilities of a group of human beings (the allegedly retarded) that are typically consigned to the garbage heap of education was so genuine that I knew this was the chance to test my own prejudices.

Fortunately (coincidence is the heavenly manna that provides sustenance for many of our enterprises) we had a facility (our Logan Elm Press) which could be used and a vehicle (Blissymoblics) to carry the investigation. We were both disappointed (a euphemism for disgusted) with the literature which prescribed learning activities better designed for training animals than for educating humans of whatever capabilities. My "advice" became encouragement to take on the field and to employ a research methodology appropriate to the questions being asked and the circumstances of their asking.

It took Blandy's courageous imagination to take advantage of the conditions presented in order to design and carry out a study which eventually showed that four human beings had been erroneously tagged by our system, and that with an attitude that aims for normalization rather than ghettoization they could achieve goals the system said they shouldn't. Humanism isn't a research method, but it is an attitude about research that can pay off when tied to a speculative mind.



PRINTING POETRY IN BLISSYMBOLS: AN ARTS-OF-THE-BOOK APPRENTICESHIP FOR FOUR SO-CALLED MODERATELY MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS

Douglas Blandy

INTRODUCTION

On January 7, 1982 four persons labeled moderately mentally retarded by the Franklin and Fairfield County, Ohio, Boards of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities began an apprenticeship in the book arts (typesetting, printing, papermaking, binding) at The Logan Elm Press and Paper Mill. This workshop is the arts-of-the book laboratory of The Ohio State University Department of Art Education. At Logan Elm these apprentices work with book artists, designers, graduate/undergraduate students in Art Education and Special Education for the purpose of publishing literature which is accessible to persons who cannot read the alphabet. Two problems in Art Education and Special Education encouraged the participation of this group. These problems will be the subject of this paper.

THE PROBLEMS

Poet Robert Graves, in his autobiography Goodbye To All That, remembers a visit to a twenty thousand volume library in Quar Abbey, England. The librarian asked Mr. Graves if he would like to read history, botany or engineering. Mr. Graves asked for poetry. This librarian replied that poetry was not a part of his library for it cannot be regarded as "improving". This response indicates that this librarian's stacks were lined with books meant for the practical improvement of the individual rather than for enlightenment. The liberal arts were not to be found on this library's shelves.

The content of the education often designed for the so-called mentally retarded person is similar to the book collection of the Quar Abbey Library because it also tends only to be practical and useful. Definitions of mental retardation, like the American Association of Mental Deficiency definition, which stress a lack of intelligence and deficits in adaptive behavior have contributed to this narrowly practical emphasis in the curriculum. For example, the National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped's Arts for Learning Curriculum promotes not art education, but social skills development, conceptual skills development, perceptual motor integration, sensory motor integration, gross motor development and language development. Art activities are prescribed to reinforce development in these learning areas. An unsettling analogy can be drawn between the use of the arts in this curriculum and the use of edibles in some behavior management schemes.

Curricula, like this one developed by the National Committee, are inherently flavored for through them teachers attempt to reinforce practical learning without a foundation in liberal arts concepts. At best this is unintentional wrong-headedness and at worst it reflects a

discriminatory attitude based upon a perception of those persons called mentally retarded as incapable of enjoying or cultivating the liberal arts experience.

A transformation in the basic structure of the current non-liberal arts education of those called mentally retarded is necessary. This is a transformation which will be plagued by problems, one problem being that at present many liberal arts forms are not easily accessible to the mentally retarded person because of handicaps associated with that disability. Poetry and the book arts are two of those forms.

For example:

who are you, little i

(five or six years old)

peering from some high


window; at the gold

of november sunset

(and feeling: that if day

has to become night

this is a beautiful way)







Fanny Norris drew this picture following the recitation of "52" to her by Lisa Russell an OSU Art Education Department student. Norris' picture translation of the poem demonstrates her understanding of it. The drawing is consistent with the poem's reference to a location in a "high window" and the feeling of "day" becoming "night." Norris represents the beauty of this transition by rendering the sun radiant, smiling to a crescent moon surrounded by stars which twinkle. This drawing does not indicate Norris' understanding of each and every word or phrase of the poem. It represents a general comprehension.

Norris is a student in the Franklin County, Ohio Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities school age program for the moderate, severe and profoundly mentally retarded. She cannot read "52" without great labor and verbal prompts from a friend. Her reading lacks joy; however, Norris' drawing does indicate that the content of this poem can appeal to, and be understood by her, if presented in an accessible format. Norris demonstrates the truth in A. E. Housman's belief that "meaning is of the intellect, poetry is not" (1952, p. 86).

Housman, and my own experience tell me that the comprehension of poetry is a matter of being sympathetic or empathetic to the feelings communicated by the poet. The degree to which one is in sympathy or empathy to another may be last of all known to the intellect. Yeats (1952) writes that our thoughts may first ". . . rush out to the edges of our flesh" (p. 106). I have never met anyone who was not in some way capable of being sympathetic or empathetic. For this reason the comprehension and appreciation of poetry is not unique to some and impossible to achieve by others. However, I have met many people who are unable to be sympathetic or empathetic in certain instances because of the use of an inaccessible means of communication.

Problem One

So-called moderately mentally retarded persons can comprehend the concepts of recited poetry; however, they cannot read a poem when printed in a phonetic alphabet. A contradiction exists between the ideas that these persons can grasp and the form in which those ideas are presented.

About the moderately mentally retarded and their reading, Kirk (1973) writes: "In general, trainable children do not learn to read from even first grade books. Their ability is limited to reading and recognizing their names, isolated words and phrases, common words for protection and other signs which they counter in a community." Kirk's observations must, in part, be based upon the effect of his subjects' stage of cognitive development on their capabilities for reading. From a Piagetian point of view the moderately mentally retarded person reaches a stage of cognitive development equal to the child of six or seven years. This is referred to as the stage of preoperations.

Reading requires the derivation of meaning from written signs. To do this an individual must be able to recognize written words as signs which bear no verbal or visual relationship to what they present. This usually is not achievable until the stage of concrete operations at about age seven or eight. Because signs are phonetically constructed they require the individual to be adept at classification. For instance, each vowel has a number of different pronunciations which are classifiable as rules or exceptions to the rule. This skill also is not characteristic of children under seven (Wadsworth, 1978).

However, to only experience poetry through an oral or signed performance is not an acceptable situation because not every poem is best encountered through recitation. Cummings' "52" ceases to be a Cummings' poem without the eccentricities and idiosyncracies of its written form. Further, the performed poem provides a very different experience than the poem read. "52" will become as varied as the number of instances of its performed interpretation. The listener is denied the opportunity to consider his own interpretation. The relative neutrality of the printed poem allows for this. The printed poem promotes repeated readings and is a subject for study and contemplation at the reader's convenience. This is without the contamination of a performer's interpretation. Finally, the recitation of poetry is not appropriate for every time and place. Audio and video tapes are not always available. The gleeman does not fit easily into the back pocket.

Despite the oral tradition of poetry there can be no denial of the importance of its written form. An alternative to phonetic reading material must be explored to negate the contradiction that exists between the oral, signed and written presentation of poetry for Ms. Norris and persons like her. Logographs offer one area of exploration. This exploration in poetry would not be totally unfounded. Ernest Fenollosa (1968), in The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry, argues for the use of logographs to notate poetry because of their richness as opposed to the "poorness" he saw in the alphabetic system. Charles Olson uses hieroglyphics and ideograms in his poetry to resist the contamination of meaning in contemporary language (Rothenberg, 1981). Poet/printer Clifford Burke's idiosyncratic poetry is based upon the logographic symbols of ancient native American petroglyphs.

Logographic symbol systems have proven to be accessible to children with reading difficulties (Rozin, Poritsky and Stotsky, 1971). A study by Howse, Hanley and Magid, 1980, indicates that the moderately mentally retarded can learn to read logographs. Blissymbols were one such system mentioned by the researchers as needing further exploration. These standardizes symbols are the focus of international research and resource centers. Blissymbols are currently being used by physically handicapped and mentally retarded individuals who cannot speak or sign.

Problem Two

Many so-called moderately mentally retarded persons, because of their inability to read, are unfamiliar with books (except those easy vocabulary books designed for the pre-school youngster which should hold little or no interest for the youth or adult), the book arts and "fine printing." The





book arts consist of papermaking, hand typesetting, printing, and binding. "Fine printing" is the successful manipulation of these arts in combination. On "fine printing" poet/printer Clifford Burke (1975) writes: "Looking at fine printing involves all of the senses, and we 'see' a well made book as an integrated object bringing together the kinetic sense of weight and of pages turning, the feel of the pages and of binding material, the subtle dent of type impressed into paper and many other sensory discretions . . . " The book, and the arts it combines, can be viewed as a multi-sensory object providing a multi-sensory/reinforcing aesthetic experience for any person who experiences effectively through a multi-sensory approach. Therefore, the book and the book arts can be a very appropriate source of contemplation and participation.

Fine printing is the work of the non-commerical small press like The Logan Elm Press. Some of these presses are located in public and private schools, colleges and universities. These small operations are often directed by people with a willingness to print publications for discrete and specialized markets. Published titles tend to be diverse and experimental. Poetry is one staple of the small press; however, American small presses are almost universal in their reliance upon the phonetic alphabet. Only a very limited number of writers are working with logographic systems.

The exploration of an alternative to the phonetic alphabet, for a discrete market of persons, is an expansion a small press could comfortably pursue, one reason being that it would expand its patronage to an untapped population. In addition, it would also bring attention to those others who are experimenting with logographs for an uncertain audience.

The mentally retarded can be involved in this expansion of the small press. The intellectual and motor skills involved in making paper, setting type, printing, binding and other support services are not more difficult than many jobs mastered by the retarded persons in existing vocational and pre-vocational programs. Many industries which employ mentally retarded persons are currently seeking and developing cottage industries to augment inconsistent and vanishing contract work from outside sources. Running a small publishing operation and/or a handmade paper mill is an alternative, to the outside contract, that these industries could consider.

It is conceivable that a small press could include persons called mentally retarded in their operations. If these operations were devoted to printing literature in a form accessible to these persons this would offer a unique opportunity. These individuals would not only be in contact with accessible writings, but also the craft through which that literature is communicated.

CONCLUSION

These problems in Art Education and Special Education demanded that Fanny Norris, and three others called moderately mentally retarded, be apprenticed at Logan Elm. In the context of this Press the labels that they brought to it now mean very little. Ms. Norris currently assists

student teachers in the Art Education Department Saturday Book Arts Workshop and another apprentice is being considered for admittance into a graphics communication vocational training program. The Blissymbol books of poetry that they helped produce are being distributed internationally to non-alphabetic readers.

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Mentor's Introduction

ARTHUR EFLAND The Ohio State University

Graeme Sullivan's Masters thesis examined a document that I prepared for the Ohio Department of Education in 1977. The formal conceptualization was more or less complete by 1975 but the publication was delayed two years. Thus the material that Sullivan analyzed is a view of art education curriculum I held several years back. Interestingly enough N.A.E.A. has granted it an award of excellence at the 1983 conference, and thus it is appropriate that some critical work be done on the document, especially since it is likely to be more widely distributed than before.

Though the granting of the award was an unexpected honor, Sullivan's analysis should be useful in alerting the reader to some of the problems with the document. I should add that his analysis also reveals some of the document's strengths as well. However, the analysis was most useful to me in helping me form my thoughts on curriculum in art education. A forthcoming paper called <u>Curriculum Inquiry in Art Education</u>: A <u>Models Approach</u> represents my current views on the matter, views that were helped along by this analysis.

Special attention should be focused also upon the methods of analysis used by Sullivan. To do so in full will necessitate reading the thesis as well as the abstract. Graeme Sullivan showed a degree of courage in deigning to criticize the work of his graduate advisor for which I congratulate him.

Graeme Sullivan

When analytic thought, the knife, is applied to experience, something is always killed in the process. That is fairly well understood, at least in the arts. Mark Twain's experience comes to mind, in which after he had mastered the analytic knowledge needed to pilot the Mississippi River, he discovered the river had lost its beauty. Something is always killed. But what is less noticed in the arts something is always created too. Robert Pirsig

One of the most tangible attempts to bridge the gap between that cliched chasm, theory and practice, is the development of curriculum models and guidelines for instruction. Models of practice for art education need to have a theoretical basis that is conceptually sound and adequacy of practice can be seen as a correlate of adequacy of theory. To assess adequacy involves the dual process of reviewing theoretical structures and the analysis of the methods of implementation advocated. This concern is critical when viewed within the context of education where curricula become the vehicle for translating theoretical descriptions into prescriptions for practice.

In her analyses of educational inquiry Steiner (1972, 1976, 1977) provides a clear articulation of the relationship between theory and practice by bringing into distinction three areas of inquiry: Research; Development; and Practice. Educational research is directed toward answering questions of "what is?" and gives rise to curriculum descriptions that produce principles or facts. Development is directed toward answering questions of "what should be?" and gives rise to curriculum prescriptions that produce policies or programs. The subsequent translation of these programs into specific "performances" provides the third area of inquiry, that being practice, which answers questions of "what is effective?" These categories provide a way of considering the relationship between educational means and ends. This focus on effective practice, or <u>Praxiology</u> as Steiner calls it, is seen as a way of bringing together quantitative areas of research and qualitative areas of development. Steiner thus brings into distinction components of educational inquiry and provides a classification that allows for the discussion of the characteristics of teaching and learning, consideration of the value dimension, and the adequacy of practice.

While Steiner offers a conceptual framework for inquiry, Zimmerman (1979, 1982) extends this rationale and applies formal methods of analysis in the explication of selected theories in art education. In considering the need for a critical analysis of the adequacy of the theoretical foundations of curriculum this study used Zimmerman's method of formal analysis in a critique of an extant curriculum model. The curriculum model analyzed, Efland's <u>Planning Art Education</u> (1977), was



selected in view of its adherence to a conception of art education that was representative of contemporary development in the field.

Method

In the analysis and construction of theory Zimmerman uses formal methods of <u>definitional analysis</u>, <u>classificatory analysis</u>, and <u>digraph analysis</u>. These procedures help identify theoretical inadequacy and allow for additional concepts to be incorporated to substantiate the theory.

Definitional analysis involves the critique of terms contained in a theory to check if definitions are meaningful, coherent and that no contradictions exist. A general requirement is that terms be expressed in both conceptual and operational form. Zimmerman notes that terms have conceptual meaning when adequate descriptive definitions are presented. While the expression of terms in operational form as described by Kerlinger (1964) is a prerequisite for research, the application of such procedures in the educational domain, where decisions based on values dominate, requires less of a reliance on the quantification of variables and more emphasis on the expression of consistency of meaning between descriptions and explanations. To determine the compatibility between the conceptual framework, which describes desired outcomes, and the operational structures, which prescribes implementation strategies, the curriculum definitions need to exhibit both conceptual and operational adequacy.

Classificatory analysis is directed toward the criteria of completeness. This involves dividing the knowledge base of a field of inquiry into components that include all the known dimensions. Steiner for example partitions educational inquiry into the categories of teacher, curriculum, students and setting. The implication is that for a theory to be adequate it must include descriptions and explanations of all properties in all categories. The use of classificatory analysis in a review of the theory contained in Planning Art Education needs some qualification in that Efland's intention is not to present a theory of art, but to focus on matters of curriculum. Steiner's classification of teacher, student, and the setting, however, provide categories for checking the exhaustiveness of the curriculum theory.

Digraph analysis provides a means for identifying the structure of a system and giving meaning to the relations between components. Graphic symbols are used whereby diagrams of points and lines are constructed to represent patterns of relationships among abstract elements. These diagrams show direct relationships and are called digraphs (Mullins, 1971). The underlying notion is that if two concepts are related a digraph may be drawn indicating that association. Zimmerman (1982) explains:

Theories that are presented in narrative form can be represented formally through digraph analysis by identifying key terms in the narrative and treating these as components. Application of digraph analysis to terms of



a theory results in the generation of a network of determinant relationships that can be analyzed for coherence and completeness. (p. 39)

Summary of Analysis

The initial requirement in the analysis of the curriculum theory contained in <u>Planning Art Education</u> was that the definitions and terms used by Efland be organized into categories that summarize the major constructs. As a result the definitions of the goals of art education were seen to be logically consistent with the aims of education, giving support to the instrumental value claims of art education presented. The intrinsic value of art education was described in terms of the involvement in artistic experience that utilized the unique content of art. The definition of artistic experience as involving expressive and responsive means of participation was seen to be unduly simplistic as an aesthetic foundation for art education (Kaelin, 1964; Stumbo, 1970). This also was evidenced by the concept of appreciation presented with the reliance on the description-interpretation-judgment model seen as limited quasi-operational definition of aesthetic responses (Chapman, 1978).

The use of the artist, historian, and critic as exemplars for study approaches, while indirectly advocating formalistic methods of inquiry, when viewed in relation to other components of the theory encourage a breadth of teaching and learning strategies. The study approaches when grouped in accordance with the aims of personal development, artistic heritage and art in society, loosely correspond to models of the teaching outlined by Joyce and Weil (1972) viz.: personal models, aspects of information processing models and social interaction models. The translation of the study approaches into a variety of learning and teaching situations and the subsequent accommodation of individual differences and teaching styles is hinted at but not fully explained by Efland.

The definition of art content was found to provide a broad conceptual base on which art programs could be developed (Barkan and Chapman, 1967; Chapman, 1969). The classification of art content into the areas of subject, theme, medium, product, function, design and style was found to be particularly comprehensive in defining the domain of knowledge in art education.

Efland is methodical and consistent in operationalizing elements of the art curriculum theory presented. Initially this describes strategies for planning and implementation that conclude with a comprehensive approach for evaluating the quality of the art program. The strategies proposed are consistent with the goals espoused and mindful of the setting. An inconsistency was noted in terms of goal evaluation in that the method prescribed for evaluating goals was at variance with the stated aims. While the rationale for goal evaluation acknowledges a philosophical allegiance to Stake (1975), the use of consensus as an evaluation method is inconsistent with the responsive view of cultural pluralism (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). The methods presented for evaluating program goals, content, quality of instruction, student programs, and the shoool setting provide a broad dimension for assessment. An analysis of the instruments for evalu-



ation reveal a dominance of nominal and ordinal scales which depict qualitative differences and relative order rather than providing precise quantitative information. The diversity of evaluation procedures, and a consideration of factors such as formative and summative evaluation, however make these methods appropriate in view of the normative nature of education.

As an example of curriculum theory, Planning Art Education was shown to satisfy the criteria of classificatory analysis by considering all the dimensions of the teaching-learning process. The categories of the teacher, student and setting, while given varying degrees of emphasis, were considered within the theoretical framework.

The use of digraph analysis illustrated the structure of the curriculum components of Planning Art Education (See Figure 1). The network of concepts and their determinant relations were described in a series of digraphs. In example the instrumental and intrinsic value of art education was clearly expressed when presented in digraph form. Digraph analysis also was used to extend the concepts of goal evaluation in the direction of adequacy with the inclusion of additional elements that made the procedure more consistent with the stated aims.

Conclusion

The variety of criteria addressed by the formal methods of analysis constitute a dimension of inquiry that is particularly comprehensive and appropriate for the study of educational phenomena. Within the educational domain where curriculum theory confronts the dual issues of justification and prescription, theory construction and analysis demand consideration of both conceptual and pragmatic concerns. Formal methods of analysis can assist in the determination of the adequacy of theoretical descriptions in relation to curriculum prescriptions. In a field such as art education where curriculum theory, curriculum development and curriculum practice can be seen as means to bridge the gap between theory and practice, the need for a methodological structure for checking for adequacy seems imperative.

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
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Description of the Curriculum Theory of Planning Art Education Figure 1.

Instrumental

Teacher, Student and Setting as Factors of Consideration:

Values:



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Mentor's Introduction

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To provide a context for Dian Fetter's thesis is more than can be expected of an advisor, especially where that context is composed of the philosophy of Heidegger, the mystery of art, and long meditation on their relationship. It is alleged that the power to acceptably paraphrase a partner's meaning is one of the signs of authentic dialogue. But this research admits to a special language, one where to think it is already to speak it. Though one authentically "speaks" this language in the true making of art, that "silent voice" will not provide an introduction here, unless I celebrate it truly by a poem, a pot, or the like, which would be ostensively representative of all this—that is, a hand clasped over the mouth, finger pointing, and the pointing leading to that "there being" which is "the place where Being can be...Being have been there." [There, I've done it again, speaking rather than have you follow my pointing finger!]

The art, then, would be the place where Being can be. As Dian says, the art work is thus at once "The locus of meaning, as well as the renewal there-of." As she also says "The ontological priority of the art work...is pre-ordained...we are most like it is...we are given There." We are taken back to the early Greek Representation of truth as "unconcealment." In Heidegger's words: "It is Being which first allows things that are to appear within the open realm," where we may not so much behold them as hear the call of Being, to which we and our art are a response. We, then, collaborate by letting being be, we experience truth of Being in art, that "gift-given-thanks-giving-under-standing of Being." [Again, Heidegger and Dian have affected my speech!]

Back, then, to Heidegger: "All art is in essence poetry. Whenever art occurs, only then does history begin." And back at last, to Dian's thesis, to which let this be a pointer.



HEIDEGGERIAN ONTOLOGY: A PHILOSOPHIC BASE FOR ARTS AND HUMANITES EDUCATION

Dian Fetter

On the Import of Philosophic Presuppositions

In a very originative sense, though their specific modes of realization differ, each particular metaphysical system [or model] has traditionally sought to explicate and similarly understand man's being by abstracting his essence from the ontic order or "world" structure it [the system] projects -- precisely, in terms of entities, or the totality of entities [beings]. In sum, human "being" has been determined, categorized, defined according to - and necessarily made to fit - the already [or pre-] determined postulate and interpretation of "nature" and its ground. From this basis each philosophic position or system suggests and necessarily yields, in respective accordance to its primary postulates, a different set of educational practices - as well as aesthetic theories similarly derivative of their, respectively, pre-established ontic orders. Such concepts and theories then do not spring essentially from man's experience or existential condition, nor the consideration thereof - but from the abstract system which is both their definition and their source. They are, as such, and in all cases, fundamentally prescriptive. By extention, they must necessarily, logically, function [practice] in like manner. In consequence, the converse follows evidently - that is - underlying each educational judgement, attitude, practice, etc., there is a realized or unrealized metaphysical/philosophic assumption which further supports broad practical and theoretic implications.

It is precisely these issues that inhere in the realization that all theories of art, art criticism and arts education-in accordance with their tenents-presuppose a certain conception of man and the world in which he lives.²

In sum, the relationship between philosophy and education is irrefutable; (1) in that one's conception of education is grounded in, thus formulated by a particular philosophic orientation; (2) in that one's conception of what education is, what art is, as well as what man is, determines how and what one is going to teach; and (3) in that the former are contingent on the latter more fundamental distinction and conception, i.e. what human being is.

Precisely because [as exemplified] there is a direct relationship between theories and presumptions of what human nature is, to be pedagogical considerations it thereby subsumes, I believe that arts/humanities/education, if it is to found a pervasive, working alternative to the technological construct and mentality must distinguish, philosophically, its own ground.

If this alternative position is to reverse the negation of individual meaning, it must explicate the conditions and limitations of the objective



perspective and scientific world-interpretation - and lay open the <u>image</u> of <u>man</u> locked in its dimension.

If it is to eradicate the inherently deprecative position assumed in the designation of so-called "subjective" realms, it must transcend the traditional metaphysical subject-object dichotomy wherein these realms of experience are accordingly discounted, use-less in their status as unstable truths and isolated relativism. Most importantly, their being reduced to those compromises we have not only ignonomously accepted but espoused - i.e. self expression and freedom of the will.

If then art is to retain import, justified existence, in a world determined by metaphysically conditioned concepts of man, by the concept of labor and the power of technology, its relevance must be circumscribed in a manner which apprises these circumstances, and recognizes its [arts] own distinction as a fundamental source of explication; i.e. of man's relationship to world - how and what it means to be.

But this then transcends the boundaries of traditional aesthetics, its predicates and conditioning. That is, traditional theories of art, aesthetics and art criticism are similarly grounded in, determined by and subordinate to, metaphysical convention and its corre; atove conceptions of truth; all respectively functioning in relation to, and in determination of, the work of art. In sum, predicated by the self-delineated and delineating schemata resident in each philosophic orientation, the nature of art and inquiry in regard to it, founds its thus derivative form, means and conceptual ediface. "Application" is similarly wrought, education proceeds accordingly.

Therefore, as it pertains to the disclosure and elucidation of the origination of these boundaries, we thus call to question the traditional aesthetic-theoretic ediface as it has evolved out of the history of metaphysics, most especially in its inability to circumscribe the essential significance of the work of art for the disclosure of truth; what the work of art is in truth. If we then further qualify its basic inability to do so through its determination of the truth of a work as a correctness that can be gauged by the criterion of objectivity, we come, subsequently, to the original paradoxes which attach to any ontology that takes its orientation from thingly reality - as aesthetic theory does.

There are then three traditional prescriptions as to what makes a thing a thing. Ironically, in our analysis of these positions, it becomes evident that traditional philosophic thought is unable to answer the question as to what makes a thing a thing, and cannot, in any of its forms thus serve as a guide to understanding the work of art. Yet it is to one of these schemata that indeed traditional aesthetics applies whenever there is question of such understanding. It is accordingly that the [cited] establishment and delineation of the work of art by means of its "thingly" character, in all cases thus subsumes the art work as "object" in theoretic determination. Truth so postulated refers then to the theoretic, ideational truth of propositional assertion and representation. Its locus is thus necessarily relegated to judgement and defined by the criterion of objectivity.



Yet, in isolation of its constitutive factors, we find that this corespondence theory of truth utilized by aesthetic theory fails to accommodate the "what is" of truth in art. More widely conclusive, is that its origins in the categorical delineation of things, compounded historically within the structure of meta-physical conditions, thus correlates with the predominance of technocracy, and the scientific, dichotomized "World-view." Nost profoundly, that this scientific, objective and thus, aesthetic truth is not an original incarnation of truth, but merely the elaboration of an already overt realm: it is thus, and in all cases, ontic and not ontological.

What must follow from these conclusions? Precisely, that the nature of art abides in a dimension disregarded by traditional aesthetics and ontology, that the specific nature of artistic and poetic truth has not therein been disclosed, that it lies then, not in traditionally determined aesthetic, but [newly conceived] ontological, reflection.

Propositions and Intents

The commitment which is thus central to my work is the theoretic expostulation of hermeneutics as the philosophic basis of education in the arts and humanities; which takes, in accordance with the Heideggerian tradition [its originative source of inquiry], its position in the life world. Its rationale is thus propounded: man's being in the world, supporting ontological discourse into the realm of art and its educational dimensions. By extention, art becomes irrevocably bound to the human historical-experiential core, its modes of unification. So designated, it projects as basic proposition, that that which comes to expression in the work of art is the possibilities resident in Being. More precisely, that the art work is not primarily aesthetic but ontological; and, that there is continuity between the self-understanding potentially attained from the work of art and the self-understanding in and through which we live. The working of the work is thus synonomous to the disclosure of human possibility.

If to the above, one adds the realization that Heidegger's position and intent accomplishes and encompasses the move beyond traditional metaphysics, that what forms and transforms the Heideggerian perspective is the continuity of question as regards the relationship of Being and man, that Heidegger consistently over-comes static categories in designation of the historic or event character of Being: that the former [categories] are those in which we are not only disposed to think but live: we come then to understand that in such 'overcoming,' Heidegger offers us a more authentic mode of being. It follows from the core of meaning and human significance within its circumference, from its ground already present in the human situation, the consequence of hermeneutice as theoretic foundation relevant to education in the arts and humanities is thus preordained. In sum, we are being concerned with our own meaning. It is for the "humanities" to explicate and articulate what science cannot: man's relationship to Being: How and what it means, to be.

Philosophic Ground and Foundation of the Study

Instructive to the present purpose, it becomes necessary to note that the phenomenology of Husserl and the phenomenological hermeneutics of Heidegger are significantly different. Husserl emphasized the rigor of a presuppositionless philosophy, which, by means of the epoche, bracketed out the naive attitude and the empirical ego. In turn, he posited the transcendental subjectivity, the transcendental conscious, functioning as the basis of analysis and description of essences, and thus, absolute subjectivity as the source of meaning; the transcendental conscious, thus constituting meaning, becomes the source of apodictic evidence and the ultimate justification of theoretic knowledge. Significantly, in Husserl's work, consciousness = Being.

Conversely, Heidegger begins not in the realm of pure consciousness and transcendental subjectivity, but in the radical temporality of man and world; the facticity of being as more fundamental than human consciousness or human knowledge; man's life and the world as essentially historic and finite; being in the world as the source of man's understanding.

Specific to these fundamental distinctions and the purpose of choice, it is thereby instructive to note that for Husserl "knowing" the <u>Lebenswelt</u>, as lifeworld, necessitates doing so theoretically - i.e. thus not originating from the historical-experiential dimension of the <u>Lebenswelt</u> itself, but from the transcendental vantage point. In this request, his presuppositionless position negates, via a process of reduction, the historicality of man's understanding within the finite, historic world.

In consequence, the phenomenological method formalized by Husserl, is rethought in the Heideggerian purpose and perspective - not toward a laying open of consciousness, but as a means of disclosing Being in its facticity and historicality. The hermeneutic dimension is conceived philosophically, as synonomous to philosophy itself; thus the basis of accounting for man's understanding not as subjective processes, but as our essential way of being. This, the hermeneutic element in Heidegger's phenomenology, distinguishes a decisive thrust from the world of Husserl.

Deferring the particulars of Heideggerian thought within its structure and development, the thus cited work has sought to acknowledge its derivation from this revolutionary source, nucleus, and referential necessity its foundation in the Heideggerian tradition.

FOOTNOTES

¹This is the primary concern of Martin Heidegger's criticism of the traditions, which, by virtue of its emphasis on beings is synonomous to the forgetfulness of Being.

²Moreover, it is again these very fundamental issues and conceptions whose status is often accepted as self-evident or "given", or are otherwise unconscious, unexamined assumptions which ask - by virtue of their import to everything that follows from them - for detailed critical reflections. As an evident extension of these considerations, the relevance attached to



our critical knowledge of traditions of thought is again circumscribed, i.e., as giving substance and meaning as well as philosophic clarity to the concepts we hold.

Mentor's Introduction

MARILYN ZURMUEHLEN The University of Iowa

Walker Percy (1960) wrote: "The search is what everyone would undertake if he were not stuck in the everydayness of his own life. To be aware of the possibility of the search is to be onto something. Not to be onto something is to be in despair" (p. 13). The epigraph Percy chose for this novel is about Kierkegaard's despair—the condition of existence in which a person is not one's true self. Ideally, the search in which every graduate student engages, whether in reading, in reflection, in writing, in making art, or in the formal project we call a dissertation, is for the possibility of that true self.

Priscilla Fenton and Christine Thompson came to graduate study with rich and satisfying lives as artists who shared the experiences of art with children and adolescents through their teaching in elementary and secondary schools. Is it then disparaging even to consider that such lives might be "stuck in everydayness"? I think Percy is more graphically describing that stance which Schutz (1970) characterized as the "natural attitude" -- one in which we go about the routine pursuits of our daily affairs and we take for granted that we understand the objects and events and people that we encounter. Certainly, we can recall some of those "routine pursuits" in teaching art: the ideologies accepted from our undergraduate education and from school authorities and teaching colleagues, the concrete objects and supplies to be maintained in an ongoing art situation, the nearly constant sense of time as external (whether in the designated class "periods" of a school day, or "grading periods," or semesters, or even academic years), and, of course, in the numbers (although not the persons) of students that Buber (1965) pointed out we cannot select, but who, year by year, are our destiny.

What can students be "onto" in graduate school that raises the possibility of the search? Time, for one thing. Time to reflect and interpret and so to establish meaning from the sedimentation of their previous experiences. Time to discover ideas and writings that they had never thought to think about wanting to know. Time for Ms. Fenton to work in fibers, to investigate children's responses to fiber materials, and to wrap "mummies." Time for Ms. Thompson to do calligraphy, to study what her former students found valuable in their own art work, and to make paper. New students for another thing: undergraduate students planning to be elementary teachers, art majors teaching community children on Saturday mornings, and art student teachers in elementary and secondary schools.

They eloquently acknowledge their intellectual heritage—those individuals about whom Buber (1965) wrote: "Because this human being exists, meaninglessness, however hard pressed you are by it, cannot be the real truth" (p. 98). What can I say of their mentor's role? Well, we share much of that intellectual heritage, and, certainly, we share the search for meaning. I try to nurture what Coles (1964) called "the chance to translate the possible into the actual" (p. 332). Finally, I hope they not only will come to recognize their questions but also to follow the



poet Rilke's wise counsel: "Try to love the questions."

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HOW YOUNG CHILDREN CONSTRUCT MEANING IN EVERYDAY SITUATIONS

Priscilla Fenton

This investigation attempts to understand how meaning is constructed by young children in everyday situations. Young children between the ages of three and six generate constructions of meaning through their conversations, movements, play and selections. These meaningful constructions may surface through young children's encounters with art materials and experiences. Art experiences allow meaning to become active, processual, inventive, contextual and expressive. As an artist who employs yarns, threads and fabric, I feel that encounters with fiber materials offer a special focus through which insights into how meaning is constructed by young children may be revealed.

Meaning is constructed by individuals in social environments. Martin Buber (1970) presented ideas concerning uniqueness, relatedness and dialogue that suggest an approach to the nature of meaning and how it is constructed by young children. The phenomenological stance of Alfred Schutz (1967) contributed to the way meaning is constructed through the act of reflection. George Herbert Mead's (1974) theoretical insights implied that meaning is a mobile construction within a contextually elaborate social interaction. The phenomenological method as conceived by Schutz and Maurice Natanson (1973) introduced a special participant observer that reflected aspects of anthropology and social psychology. Intersubjectivity as developed by Schutz suggested that meaning can be shared, therefore insights are accessible to a participant observer. Kenneth R. Beittel (1973) described anthropological immersion, phenomenological bracketing and observer-actor reciprocity as characteristics of a special participant observer who constructs microethnographies.

I am interested in collecting microethnographic evidence about individual young children and how they construct meaning. In my relationships with young children, I became intrigued with their intense commitment to making sense of their environments and of their interactions with adults and other children. These attempts at making encounters meaningful to themselves created some differences between adult expectations and the children's intentions. Hans Peter Dreitzel (1973) and Robert Mackay (1973) approached similar concerns regarding childhood socialization from a phenomenological position.

Robert Coles (1964) interpreted participant observation in a way that seemed to respect aspects of individual children and their specific environments while encouraging reciprocity of feelings and ideas. The depth of these relationships provided a guide to gain access to the importance of specific persons, places, things and events. Sometimes the importance is revealing and unexpected. I



was washing dishes at my mother's house when I accidently allowed a "good" spoon to fall into the garbage disposal. Moments later my niece, Stephanie, called on the telephone. I told her about the accident. She seemed sympathetic, but alarmed when she lamented "...not the tweety-bird spoon!" I assured her that the tweety-bird spoon was safe and intact, as I realized that our notions of a good spoon differed, but they were consistent with our individual biographies.

When our lives run parallel, we share experiences. What happens between us provides the life matter, the stuff of living. I record the encounters in a journal and when I reread the descriptions and re-examine the documents, a reflective stance allows recollective editing to commence. Connections surface and insights reveal themselves. Sometimes an event, thing or person will spring the recollective editing spontaneously. The good spoon incident made me halt and flip back through my relationship with Stephanie to search for verifying evidence in our past together that indicated the spoon's importance.

As an artist, I am concerned with meaning as an expressive construction that is a residue of my lived life. Beittel provided an approach to meaning within an art making and viewing context. He suggested that the participant observer assumes the role of a nurturant teacher. This mentorship seemed to accommodate the materials, experiences and environments that I explored within the context of the lives of young children.

As an artist-researcher, I found a dialogue emerging when I encountered young children and art materials simultaneously. As the dialogue developed between the children and me, our individual dialogues with the art materials evolved as well. The nature of the children's encounter with the materials was not the same as mine, but a dialogue was emerging that engaged the special presence of the fiber materials. The relationship assumed a reciprocity of thoughts, images and feelings. The three participants were fully active in the shared triad, since the materials were transformed from it into You by the children and me. Although we were individuals and unique, we seemed able to reciprocate and understand each other within the many layered conversation.

The dialogues and encounters were recorded in a journal that begins the attempt at understanding how meaning is constructed in everyday relationships with people and things. The journal assumes an autobiographical and literary form that implies a documentary. Wassily Kandinsky (1964) recalled the relationship with his aunt and how art was important for them when he was young. He remembered his fascination with art materials at 14.

Thus these sensations of colors on the palette (and also inside the tubes, which resemble humans, spiritually powerful but unassuming in appearance, who suddenly in time of need reveal and bring to bear

hitherto concealed powers) became experiences of the soul. (p. 35)

Reflection on the past events brings meaning to present conditions. As we share individual recollections among ourselves our lives come together rather than contradict and separate. Mary Catherine Bateson (1983) explained that understanding of our worlds is enlightened by a myriad of personal contributions.

We know now that any society is seen differently by those in different positions within it, and that presidents, shahs and talking chiefs are all cocooned in their incomplete versions of the wider experience. (p. 16)

The children in my study share life experiences with me. They see things from the advantage of childhood which is different from my present condition. So we bring our views together in an attempt to understand each other. Perhaps as these children grow older, they will write about our time together and new insights will elaborate my impressions.

The materials that I bring to the children focus on a collection of fiber items. These items seem to organize themselves into three groups. The linear materials consist of threads, yarns, strings and ropes. Sheets of fabric, plastic, paper form the planular group, whereas paper tubes, chunks of fiber fill, wool batting and foam have three dimensional qualities in common. Sheets of drawing paper (18" x 24") and a plastic tackle box filled with crayons, tape, markers, scissors, pens, pencils and glue are available during the encounters.

I ground myself into the everyday condition of their lives. I temporarily set aside or forget what I have been told about children and open my eyes very wide to their conduct, talk, interests, values, possessions, struggles and desires. I become part of their life-worlds. I wait for that which is to be presented to me. The encounter has the appearance of a babysitting episode, but that is only the thinnest description of what happens between us. The thick description (Geertz, 1973) is an account of the We-relationship, the social act and the intensity of relatedness. Robert Coles seemed to know about this intensity of relatedness.

By direct observation, I mean talking to people, listening to them, watching them - and being watched by them. By sustained observation, I mean taking a long time; enough time to be confused, then absolutely certain and confident, then not so sure but a little more aware of why one or another conclusion seems the best that can be argued, or at least better than any other available. (p. 4)





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AUTHENTICITY AND EVERYDAYNESS

Christine Thompson

Apart from the pulling and hauling stands what I am, Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary.

Looks down, is erect, bends an arm on an impalpable certain rest,

Looks with its sidecurved head curious what will come next,

Both in and out of the game, and watching and wondering at it.

(Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass)

It is possible that everydayness has presented a problem to human beings since the second day followed the first. In the sixth century B.C., the philosopher Heraclitus recognized the paradox of the everyday: "We are estranged from that with which are most familiar" (Olson, 1970, p. 3). The everyday is as convenient and comfortable as a well-worn pair of blue jeans, and as unlikely to merit our attention.

The term "everydayness" refers to the mode of being, the attitude toward reality, which typifies our "normal" participation in the life-world. Much of daily life is bound to the routine and the habitual, the customary and the obligatory. We live unreflectively in the everyday, easily and complacently conforming to those canons of behavior deemed suitable by popular consensus. We accept the validity and realiability of habit, convention, folk wisdom. People and events seem self-evident, perfectly clear, absolutely unremarkable in their predictability. We lose the inclination to wonder: "the power," as Bertrand Russell wrote, "of asking <u>questions</u> which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life" (Matthews, 1980, p. 2). Yet it is alongside and within this mundane reality that those experiences which define human possibility become available to us. The life-world is the milieu in which we have our lives, the place in which we meet others and find ourselves through simple acts which modify the world.

The precarious nature of our relation to the familiar has preoccupied twentieth-century thinkers. Everydayness has been interpreted
positively as the ground of being, as source and sustenance, and negatively as the trivialization of our being-in-the-world. Among those
who have considered the everyday and the possibility of finding meaning
in lived experience are the sociologist, Alfred Schutz, and the philospher, Martin Heidegger. Set in juxtaposition, their phenomenologies
illuminate the essential ambiguity of our tenure in the life-world and
the necessary dialectic which exists between the everyday realities and



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the authentic possibilities of existence.

According to Schutz (1970), we find ourselves in a complex, socially mediated and biographically determined situation, both common to all and unique to each. Our "stock of knowledge," which functions as our scheme of interpretation, is largely socially derived; only a minor portion of what we know has come to us through direct experience. This combined communal and personal knowledge results in a "sedimentation" of meanings, deposited like geological strata, which determines our resources for dealing with the present and our anticipations for the future. This pool of knowledge is limited and pragmatic: incoherent, amorphous and inconsistent, yet sufficient for most purposes.

The same limitations obtained to the social heritage of the group, the folk-ways and system of knowledge by which the group defines its situation. For the group, as for the individual, the communal stock of knowledge assumes the appearance of sufficiency and clarity and functions as a guide. This "cultural pattern" of "thinking as usual" provides recipes or typifications, behavioral norms, which absolve members of the need to examine the world or to search for truth. It eases life by reducing its complexity. This "relatively natural conception of the world" (Schutz, 1970, p. 81) remains in force as long as the assumptions which support the system remain in equilibrium: as long it appears stable, reliable, sufficient, and shared.

Natanson (1973) has pointed out that Schutz, in his concern for the structures of the social world, practiced a form of phenomenology firmly implanted in the natural attitude, close to the preoccupations and predispositions of "ordinary" life. Schutz considered the typifications, which control so many of our acts, not only inevitable but enabling, the necessary and essentially benign residue of socialization. In some sense, Schutz seems to have regarded typifications as sedimented interpretations, i.e., intuitions of the essential characteristics of phenomena, grown dusty with time and neglect. Our ability to recognize essences, to see the universal qualities in the particular case, is fundamental to our ability to make sense of the world: nothing is knowable, after all, in a "world in which things. . .appear to be absolutely incomparable" (Vandenberg, 1974, p. 201). The typifications made available to us through our everydayness constitute our frame of reference, the perspective through which the world appears to us.

Heidegger portrayed everydayness in a more subdued light, as the less-than-ideal consequence of our placement in a world inhabited by others. There is no contradiction of Schutz's characterization of the natural attitude in Heidegger's contention that we have "grown up in and into a traditional way of interpreting" (1962, p. 41) ourselves, an understanding of being which discloses and regulates our possibilities. Yet Heidegger viewed everydayness <u>primarily</u> as a limitation of being, an inauthentic or fallen state in which the individual abdicates responsibility for choice in all but the most trivial matters, seeking refuge in the anonymous "they." Heidegger's descriptions of our insatible appecites

for distraction, our craving for the novel and the bizarre, and our fascination with idle talk resonate in many of the most unforgiving critiques of popular culture. For Heidegger, everydayness is omnivorous and oppressive, a barrier between human beings and their realization of self and world.

Both Schutz and Heidegger trace the possibility of meaningful knowing to the gap between everydayness and authenticity; both acknowledge the existence of a jumping-off place where our recipes for living simply fail. Our questions arise as we confront impediments to our thinking-as-usual: contradiction, strangeness, violation of expectations. We are invited to interpret, to reflect upon what we ordinarily would accept without hesitation, by our encounter with neqativity, our experience of doubt. We are led to examine the everydayness, in order to recover or discover the authentic nature of men and situations. Heidegger considered such authentic contact with the "things themselves" the most essential and elusive goal of human existence, a "disclosure" of Being, "always accomplished as a clearingaway of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 167). For Schutz, the boundary between authenticity and everydayness seems less impenetrable; "Meaning," he maintained, "is a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's own experience" (1967, p. 42).

The everyday may be considered the inversion of the authentic rather than its opposite. Our experience and thinking fluctuate between the two. Everydayness may provide the assumptions which make meaning possible for us, yet the experience which originally prompted our convictions tends to be obscured and diminished by time. Our everyday being-in-the-world necessitates continual recovery of contact with the things themselves, accomplished through reflection on our lived experience and in dialogue with others who share our life-world.

In my research, I am concerned with the everydayness of beginning art teachers and with the reflection on experience which may lead them to an authentic understanding of art education and of themselves as art educators. Burkhart and Neil note that "The first step in becoming a teacher is making the choice to think of oneself as a teacher" (1968, p. 9). The undergraduate students who enroll in the Methods: Art class at The University of Iowa plan and teach nine-week courses to area children in the Saturday art workshop program. For some of these students, the Saturday classes provide their first opportunity to think of themselves as teachers.

Art students in the process of becoming art teachers encounter a situation in which their interpretive schemes are simultaneously called forth and confronted. The "personal" histories of art and of education which they bring to their experiences are fundamentally intersubjective, derived from social attitudes and opinions collected in the process of growing up in this culture. The typifications and idealizations familiar to beginning art teachers often prove to be inadequate guides to the problems they confront as they assume responsibility for others' learning. In particular, their socialization as students and as artists seems to

complicate the expansion of identity required by their decision to teach. Faced with situations for which they can summon no facile response, they are forced to experience their marginality, their "otherness."

It is such moments of uncanniness and displacement which may, if we heed them, lead to those questions which Burkhart and Neil cali "life sources" (1968, p. 3). As Schutz and Heidegger demonstrated, experience becomes meaningful only in retrospect, through our reflection on and interpretation of what has transpired. In asking beginning teachers to keep journals in response to their teaching experiences, I am asking them to take the reflective turn toward their experience which will allow their own meanings to emerge: to describe, interpret, and come to understand what they otherwise might simply live.

Among the most essential acts of teaching, according to Buber (1965), are the teacher's presentation of self as a person authentically attuned to life and its requirements, wholly alive in the vivid present, and the selection of the effective world, of that portion of human thought which the teacher values, embodies, and strives to share. Reflection on the everydayness of teaching plays a crucial role in the development of personal authenticity and the understanding of the meaning of the project of art education. The concerns expressed by beginning art teachers in the journals kept during the nine weeks of their teaching in the Saturday children's classes provide concrete instances of the attempt to find meaning and significance in lived experience. The recurrent themes which emerge in these journals are especially important, for these insistent questions about art, education and identity indicate the structure of the intensely personal and intersubjective process of becoming an art teacher.

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Mentor's Introduction

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Bonnie Southwind began her doctoral studies with a particular interest in the problems of rapport that face a teacher whose students come from differing ethnic and/or cultural backgrounds. Recognition of the problem is commonplace; various approaches have been elaborated by Chapman, Lanier, McFee, Natalie Cole, and others.

One of Southwind's first efforts was participation in a research program studying the linguistics of urban Appalachian families. A more promising conceptual framework began to develop as ethnographic studies were linked to work in art education courses, particularly in Aesthetics and Criticism in Art Education and in Socialization of Values in Art. In the former, it was held that the values identified in the various traditional theories of art must be recognizable in the every day aesthetics of most Americans. In the latter, the processes of enculturation gained special focus in Herbert Gans's distinction of pluralistic "taste-cultures," all of which have validity in so far as aesthetic experiences of any kind meet authentic personal needs.

By this time Southwind's own experience as an art teacher had gained a solid new dimension, through employment by the Cincinnati Recreation Commission as director of programs in community centers. In her neighborhood art projects, Southwind attracted more or less interested adolescents for whom the systematic school experience often was intolerably frustrating - youths, nevertheless, who could bring a modicum of talent together with energy, persistence, and ingenuity to achieve a rewarding product. With some of these "second generation Appalacian" youth, Southwind developed an enduring and trustful rapport.

These, then, were the components of the research reported by Southwind: the broad need in education for understanding and mutual respect; an urban context for the understanding of traditional aesthetic theories; a sociologically grounded validation of diverse cultural patterns; and a professional experience that seemed to undergird theoretical contributions of doctoral study.



CASE STUDY: AESTHETIC ATTITUDES AND VALUES OF SELECTED URBAN APPALACHIAN YOUTHS

Bonnie Southwind

The worst case of staring at a blank piece of paper must be a graduate student looking for a topic for her doctoral dissertation. In a way, I was lucky. Some time ago I had the opportunity to become the art director for a recreation center that serves an area of Cincinnati which has an urban Appalachian population. I had always been interested in the rural Appalachian culture, and I had opportunities to observe this culture while living in the South. However, this position gave me the opportunity to work with urban Appalachian individuals, individuals I soon found to be uniquely different from their rural counterparts. This opportunity presented a real challenge in that it forced me to re-evaluate the more traditional attitudes and values that I held about these individuals.

I also was interested in teacher-student rapport. From my earliest experiences with art classes, first as student and then as a teacher, it was obvious to me that not much teaching is going to take place unless there is a good rapport between student and teacher. This feeling was reinforced strongly by an exploration of linguistics I undertook at any early stage in my research. The questions and methods of linguistics served to focus strongly on issues similar to the ones I had felt. Linguistics asks, "What is this person's language like?" not "How should this person be talking?" It takes the attitude that the person being studied is the one who knows about her language and that the job of the linguist is to understand and describe as accurately as possible what the language is like.

It became clear to me, reinforced by this philosophy, that rapport could best be established by coming to understand the validity of my students' positions, whatever they may be. I had a head start on this understanding from my previous knowledge of the Appalachian craft tradition and from the respect for Appalachian people I had developed through my close contact with them.

I obtained additional support for this approach from two sources: Herbert J. Gans' <u>Popular Culture</u> and Jerry Morris's dissertation. From Gans I clarified the notion of a "taste public", a concept that was useful in the design of my study. That was valuable in itself, but far more valuable was Gans' emphasis, first, upon need fulfill—ment as a way of understanding the aesthetic preferences and behaviors of these publics and, second, upon an acceptance of any taste preferences as valid for those who hold them. Morris's work gave particular insight into what those needs might be in the case of urban Appalachians. An Appalachian himself, Morris emphasized that the rural Appalachian has almost no experience with art but lives by a "life-aesthetic" that gives a flavor of art to everyday experience.

The topic and design for my dissertation, therefore, came directly out of my work as an art teacher and my conviction that I could do that job adequately only after having established a strong rapport with my students. It became clear that I would be able to bring them to an understanding and appreciation of traditional art only if I started with them where they were. The fundamental questions of my thesis, then. became: "Where are the aesthetic values of these urban Appalachian youth?" and "Where do these attitudes and values come from?" On examination, these turned out to be questions that called for qualitative, rather than quantitative methods. Studies designed to produce statistical results can predict how a person might respond, just as an examination of their cultural history can, but the kind of information that art teachers need is about the particular living person they are dealing with. Thus, a large part of the energy I devoted to this thesis was spent in developing the design and methodology of the study. Professor Wygant led me to a number of aesthetic theories that elaborated Gans' acceptant approach to individual aesthetic experience, as well as to some very relevant articles on qualitative methods of research in art education.

These led directly to a consideration of "ethnographic" methods employed in anthropology and sociology. In these methods, I spent a substantial amount of time with my subjects, trying to see their world as they see it, and reporting my findings in an almost literary prose. Robert Coles' classic studies of Southerners is a model of this kind of enterprize. Ethnographic methods, modified to fit the requirements of a thesis in art education, proved to be especially appropriate. By the time I started the actual field work of this study, I had interacted on a daily basis with the population I was studying for some five years. This interaction, further, was not so much as an art teacher, since the art program at my center was informal and purely voluntary, but more as an interested friend and confidant.

From this population, I chose three young men in their late teens with whom I had developed a close rapport at the center. I had, as a part of my program, provided a number of experiences with art for these subjects, and they seemed to perceive the actual field work of my study as merely a different kind of experience. A central part of my research was a visit to the Cincinnati Art Museum. My subjects seemed to react to this experience as a pleasurable outing, one which they expressed a desire to repeat.

In addition to the museum visit, I included a viewing of an episode of "The Dukes of Hazzard" as an example of popular art, and, for the Appalachian tradition, a visit to Cincinnati's annual Appalachian Festival.

One particularly interesting thing that came out of these different experiences was that their responses to the paintings in the art museum were very positive, in general more positive than to the "Dukes", which they seem to have outgrown, and to the traditional Appalachian craft tradition, which interested them a great deal less than the youth cul-



ture they shared with people their age from all backgrounds. Two things in particular emerged from the museum visit: first, they responded to the excellent technical execution of the paintings with something approaching awe. "That seems impossible", was the comment of one of them as he examined the detail of a Van Dyck portrait. And second, given a choice of early Modern American paintings, they all chose paintings that spoke very clearly of their own experiences. One chose a Hopper street scene because it looked like his neighborhood in better days. One chose a landscape by none other than Maxfield Parrish because it reminded him of Pine Knot, Kentucky, his favorite vacation haunt. And the third chose a portrait of a pensive little girl by Robert Henri, apparently for more complex reasons relating to personal sadness of his own, which he did not seem willing to express directly.

Their responses to the paintings of their own choice were rich enough to suggest that students in art appreciation courses might make faster headway if allowed a freer rein in choice of works to discuss. It was especially pleasant to listen to the subjects describing their responses, prompted by my questions. It is well known that one way to develop good rapport is by listening to the other person.

After collecting all this data, my final task is to draw from it the answers to the basic questions of my study:

1. What are the aesthetic and art-related attitudes, perceptions,

and values of these three young men?

2. What is there in their cultural, social, and physical environment that has influenced these factors (attitudes, perceptions, and values)?

. What needs are being satisfied by the aesthetic experiences they

seek in their culture?

4. How do their "life-aesthetic" and their connection with popular and Appalachian traditions affect their responses?

So far, it's clear that the best way to proceed is to begin with what is already known. This applies equally to the task of helping students enrich their responses to art and to the task of settling on a topic for your dissertation.

Mentor's Introduction

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This proposed study, in its pilot form, grew out of Ms. Stock-slager's interest in metaphor and her participation as a judge in one of my recent studies, "The metaphoric interpretation of paintings: Effects of the clustering strategy and relaxed attention exercises" (Studies in Art Education, in review).

The two studies are similar in two major respects. The theoretical framework is drawn from art, philosophy, and social psychology. Certain components of my study will be used and re-tested, e.g., the effects of the clustering strategy and the reliability of the literal-metaphoric assessment scale. There will be a number of dissimilarities. Although I tested the variable, relaxed attention exercises, it will not be tested in the proposed study. Rather, Ms. Stockslager will design and test a new instrument which will assess the referential adequacy of metaphoric interpretations. Whereas the population in my study was college students who were taught to metaphorically interpret realistic, abstract, and non-objective paintings, the population in her study will be adolescent students who will be taught to metaphorically interpret realistic paintings.

Why adolescents? Why realistic paintings? Typically, the stage of adolescence is marked by the abandonment of metaphoric thought in favor of literal thought. Options for a full range of thinking are curtailed. Realistic paintings usually elicit literal interpretations. The use of realistic paintings as stimuli for metaphoric interpretations may serve to expand the range of thinking in youngsters.

Expanding the range of thinking to include its metaphoric component is a substantive and timely concern. We are now in the midst of a metaphor resurrection. In the past four years there has been a plethora of journal articles and books published on the subject. This interest, I would argue, will not be just a passing fad. Metaphor was once considered by many to be at best an ornamental linguistic device, at worst a deviant of grammer and semantics. Now, philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and those working in the neurosciences are realizing that our conceptual system--the way we think--is fundamentally metaphoric in nature, and that the metaphoric products of that thinking contain truth-bearing content. These ideas were advanced by Susanne Langer and, of course, by others before her. In the 1950's she argued that metaphor is both process and product of thought and that art, as developed product of thought, is metaphor. If we accept these propositions, then we, as art educators, are charged with teaching students how to decipher art metaphorically. This proposed study will attempt to do just that with an adolescent population, using the clustering strategy, and reclistic paintings.



ADOLESCENTS' METAPHORIC INTERPRETATIONS OF PAIRTINGS: THE EFFECTS OF THE CLUSTERING STRATEGY AND THE ASSESSMENT OF REFERENTIAL ADEQUACY

Lois Stockslager

If one concurs with Langer's thesis (1957) that art is a metaphor for what the artist knows about the life of feeling, then the study of metaphor is significant for Art Education not only for making art but also for responding to art.

Response to the environment may be understood as Symbolic Interaction, a theory posited by certain social psychologists (Manis and Meltzer, 1978). People, they claim, act on the basis of assigned meanings rather than acting in direct response to stimuli. New meanings can be formed and new courses of action taken when ability to select and interpret stimuli in the environment is developed. Since art is a vital part of the environment, this study proposes that response to art may be considered as Symbolic Interaction. Responses may be examined in terms of literal and metaphoric meanings that individuals construct in the process of interpreting art.

In translating Langer's idea of art as metaphor and the theory of symbolic interaction into the practice of teaching, it is important to consider some research in child development. In the field of Developmental Psychology, objections have been raised to some of Piaget's ideas from a contextualistic stance (Brainerd, 1983). The formal operational stage, occurring at adolescence, also is criticized for singular attention to sequential thinking and hypothetical reasoning as well as a Western bias (Dasen, 1973).

Gardner, a cognitive developmental psychologist, has similar concerns but with respect to adolescents' artistic activity. He describes a U-shaped model (1980) for understanding that artistic activity frequently is arrested at the formal operational stage. Gardner and Winner (cited in Strauss, 1982) compared developments of adolescents' metaphoric language and the production of drawings and paintings. The results of their work show that adolescents possess cognitive capability for metaphoric construction but negative influences induced by motivational factors hinder metaphoric use and development. Adolescents characteristically abandon metaphoric language while favoring realistic representation and literal language.

In the field of linguistics, language and its structure of transformation plays an important part in the way thinking is shaped (Vygotsky, 1962; Chomsky, 1968; Slobin, 1971). Metaphoric language subsumes literal language (Feinstein, 1982) and thereby expands meaning through the generation of multiple evocative referents. Metaphoric meaning, then, offers more options for symbolic interaction with visual forms.

Clustering is a strategy for constructing metaphoric meaning in response to art. Feinstein (1983, in review) developed and tested



this strategy with the interpretation of paintings. The results of her work show that by using the clustering strategy, metaphoric interpretations of paintings are increased.

The clustering strategy reflects some aspects of phenomenology (Husserl, 1952; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), and the philosophical base of Symbolic Interaction Theory (Manis and Meltzer, 1978). Adherents of phenomenology hold that it is possible to obtain insights into the multiple meanings of a phenomenon by first bracketing preconceptions and then investigating the phenomenon through systematic imaginative variations. When using the clustering strategy, students suspend preconceived notions of what the work means to be receptive to what else the work conveys. Feinstein (1983, in review) describes the clustering strategy in relation to the interpretation of paintings:

...the painting is scanned quickly for a dominant impression which is written as a word or phrase and circled. Radiating outward from the circled word(s) are clusters of other words, reflecting the paintings' qualities and feeling tones evoked. From the original dominant impression and clusters, a metaphoric phrase or statement is written which captures the interpretation of the painting.

The clustering strategy utilizes the concept of referential adequacy (Pepper, 1945). Interpretations are referentially adequate when they have referents to qualities of visual organization found in the art work. The use of referential adequacy focuses attention on visual qualities so that artistic, historical, cultural and interpersonal values embedded in metaphor may be revealed.

The purpose of the study is to teach adolescents a strategy for interpreting paintings metaphorically and to develop an instrument for assessing the referential adequacy of their interpretations. Two hypotheses are formulated: (a) if subjects are told to write interpretations of realistic paintings, their interpretations will be more literal than metaphoric; (b) if subjects are taught the clustering strategy, their written interpretations will be more metaphoric and more referentially adequate than subjects who are not taught the clustering strategy but are given an explanation of metaphor instead.

Method

Subjects

The subjects will be 120 eighth grade students enrolled in elective art classes at two middle class junior high schools.

Procedure

All subjects will view slides of four realistic paintings and write interpretations. Subjects will then be randomly assigned to groups for instruction, to be given by the experimenter. The experi-





mental group will receive instruction in the clustering strategy and the control group, an explanation of metaphor. Subjects will then view four additional slides of realistic paintings and write interpretations. A total of eight responses per subject will be rated by a panel of trained judges. They will view slides used by subjects while rating all responses. Feinstein's literal-metaphoric scale will be used for rating. Another instrument, to be developed by the experimenter, will be used to assess referential adequacy of responses.

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Mentor's Introduction

PAUL EDMONSTON University of Georgia

Marilyn Wolf earned her art education degrees at Ohio State University (B.A.), Florida Atlantic University (M.A.), and is in the second year of her Doctoral program at the University of Georgia. During the twelve year period that she resided in Florida, Marilyn taught art for two years at the middle school level and eight years at Prospect Hall Junior College. In addition, she also worked two years as a free lance artist. Making the decision to combine studio work with her love for teaching by earning her doctorate at the University of Georgia, she has set as a goal teaching at the university level.

As a weaver, Marilyn developed an interest in those tactile experiences an artist-craftsman enjoys. The artistic experience and this interest developed into the topic for her current research for her dissertation.

While in Athens, Marilyn has coordinated Athens' first tactile art exhibition, exhibited her work in several galleries and has been instrumental in opening an exhibition gallery at the Clarke County airport. She also has designed an art program for children at the local YWCO, been president of the local chapter of GAEA for the 1982-83 school year, and has worked as a graduate teaching assistant in the University of Georgia Art Education Area in the Department of Art.



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Marilyn Wolf

Tactility, the responsiveness to stimulation of the sense of touch, has been given minimum recognition as it relates to art and education. It is the visual sense that is more often given priority. In fact, we refer to painting and sculpture as the "visual arts".

My interest in the subject of tactility was probably first motivated by past difficulties in learning through the traditional classroom methods. This was particularly true at the middle and high school levels. I was able to grasp concepts best through the problem solving challenges presented to me in my art classes. It was this experience in the art class, my empathy for those who find learning difficult, and an unsolved dilemma that I have personally battled through the years over my natural urge to touch everything while trying to observe cultural taboos, that led me to this area of study.

Our western culture is visually oriented. Consequently, so is our education system. Visual exercises in reading and writing fill the majority of class time through the school years, forcing children to adapt as best they can to that single approach to learning. Not all students, however, are able to learn by using this sense alone. Viktor Lowenfeld wrote in his discussion of visual and haptic learning types that,

"Seeing may...become an inhibitory factor when forced upon an individual who does not use his visual experiences for creative work." (1957, p. 262)

Research shows that, given the opportunity to use and develop other senses, students of all ages are able to learn more easily. (Baney 1980, Moholy Nagy 1947, Lowenfeld 1957). Why then, has so little recognition been given to the tactile sense as a means to greater learning and expression? It can be attributed to several things. Our cultural taboo toward touching is one. Churchill (1970) suggests that its psychological tie to eroticism is too strong for our culture to permit exploratory touch. A second reason is the adolescent reversal of the sequential development of the human senses. (Montague, 1978) The first sense to develop is the tactile sense, the second is auditory, and the third is the visual. But, states Ashley Montagu, the order of precedence reverses as the child approaches adolescence.

"It is much more important to experience tactile and auditory stimulations in the developing years than it is to experience visual ones. As soon, however, as one has developed through one's tactile and auditory senses, the know-how of being human, vision becomes by far the most important of the senses." (p. 249)



Frances Herring's (1948-49) research into this problem offers three explanations for the lack of recognition given to the tactile sense. 1) Touch, like taste and smell is predominantly utilitarian in function, 2) there are no intrinsic principles of order in tactile sensations, and 3) touch, unlike sight and hearing is incapable of expressing the larger and deeper life experiences, of expressing values.

It is my belief, however, that the visual sense and the tactile sense cannot be separated. The two-dimensional sense of vision is given tridimensionality through touch. Sight gives information of distance, while touch gives information of proximity. Use of the familiar phrase, "Let me see it," actually means, let me touch it, let me validate its existence. Montague points out another aspect of the visual and tactile sensory modalities:

"The tactile quality of vision is apparent in the touching of another with the eyes. Hence one avoids looking or staring at strangers except in certain... acceptable situations." (p. 248)

The visual and tactile get bound up in one another. The mere visual appearance of an object is sufficient to stimulate clear images of temperature, texture, weight, and resistance. (Parkhurst, 1930) Berenson (1953) called this physical reaction to what is seen, "ideated sensations", something an artist seeks to elicit from the observer with his work.

Through art, an individual expresses what he or she sees and feels. In the act of creation, the artist uses both sight and touch. The observer is most often limited to using the visual sense in viewing the artist's work. But the artist who is successful, will stimulate tactile sensations in the observer, making the act of observation more complete.

I believe that a greater emphasis on tactile learning in conjunction with visual learning, through art education in the schools, would offer new approaches to teaching. This would be particularly beneficial to upper level elementary and middle school level children who lack tactile experiences in learning. Rudolph Arnheim explains:

"Our entire educational system continues to be based on the study of words and numbers. In kindergarten, to be sure, our youngsters learn by seeing and handling handsome shapes, and invent their own shapes on paper or in clay by thinking through perceiving. But with the first grade of elementary school the senses begin to lose educational status." (1969 p. 2).

Tactile approaches to learning would assist those who have difficulty acquiring knowledge visually as well as offering one more means to learning for those who are able to acquire knowledge successfully through visual means (Lowenfeld, 1957).



My research is presently in the beginning stages and is somewhat philosophical. As a preliminary step, I coordinated a fairly large tactile art exhibit in Athens, Georgia, and gathered data concerning observer reactions to having touched the sculpture on exhibit. I found that the pieces which had been touched were remembered more clearly than those which had not. Tactile observers took a greater interest in the art work, and generally took a longer time inspecting each piece of work touched, as compared to those pieces that were only observed visually. I now feel that my next step must be to develop an instrument that will measure tactile perception.

As a base from which to develop my work, I am using information gathered from recent studies such as that of Baney (1980) who attempted to show that the use of both the visual and tactile senses results in better replication of form, and Berieka, who examined the relationship of tactile perception ability to intelligence and reaching achievement in first and third grade children to predict later reading achievement.

Others have begun the task of demonstrating the value of recognizing the tactile sense in art activities and in general education. I hope my research will enable further recognition of the values of tactility in both.

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Mentor's Introduction

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When graduate students in art education encounter the possibilities of research, an expected question and/or concern will be: What is good research and how do I do it?

The multi-disciplinary aspects of art education, coupled with an array of research methodologies, put the student in a quandary. Various writers have suggested priorities for research and preference for styles of inquiry. Such information can give limited guidence to the student, however, not necessarily the insights and personal motivation that are central to the question.

Vincent Lanier, in his paper, "Conception and priority in art education research," listed several popular areas of research--creativity, perception, artistic behavior and curriculum. He also suggested possible problem topics for research--weakness in judgmental procedures, errors in the selection of population, matching of research design to research strategy. However his major concern is found in his summary:

The most acutely critical and virtually unnoted problem of art education research is that the theoretical frameworks of our studies are largely either improperly conceived or inadequately ordered as to priority. Until these two aspects of this problem are appropriately dealt with, art education research is and will be, for the most part, unnecessarily wasteful and inadequate for our education needs, no matter how precise its procedure or elegant its design. (Lanier, '74-'75, p. 30)

Given this concern, educators must consider the most appropriate means for working with students as they confront the dilemma of research.

I am of the opinion that in order to develop the necessary theoretical framework, a student must first be encouraged to assimilate her or his experience through readings and dialogues. In this way the student will be able to come to grips with the inconsistencies, knots and tieups involved, and provide the personal connections that are meaningful to the individual. What will emerge is an integrated personal myth of research—a binding of experiences and beliefs. For the student, the personal value obtained is the prime factor in being involved in the research. Student researchers should be provided the opportunity to make their own connections, to search out writers and researchers who validate and extend what the student feels and believes. As a student of mine stated: "... I would like to think that it (the research) might confirm things other people are thinking and perhaps help me to understand our commonalities of 'wiring'."

The two papers that follow represent the un-going endeavors of two students and their "re-searching."



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Lanier, Vincent, Conception and priority in art education research, STUDIES IN ART EDUCATION, 1974-75, 16 (1), pp. 26-30.

Susan Hood

Introduction

The following is a re-examination of my own research paper written in the summer of 1982. In the spring of the preceding year, while presenting an art history losson to twenty-six fourth grade students, I asked them to list at least ten important things about the lesson and draw a picture of Mary Cassatt, the subject of the lesson. My original hypothesis was that the written comments would fall into several broad categories such as historical fact, comments about media, or terms associated with formal analysis. They didn't.

But there was a great deal of "agreement" among the students' comments, in that over half of them responded with the same ten items. These ten items were sentences and phrases which referred to the artist as a person, specifically, Cassatt's youth, background, family and friends, and vision problems in later years. I interpreted this as an indication of the students' desire to know the artist as a human being. Changar's inquiries (Hurwitz & Madeja, 1977, p. 260-261) confirm this with respect to what children want to know about living artists.

In examining the students' list more closely, two of the many items of reponse were particularly interesting. Almost half of the students included the Louvre and the Paris Opera in their lists of important things. While I found this pleasing, it was still difficult to explain why these two placess—so distanct in time and place as presented in Cassatt's work—should appear with such frequency in the students' lists.

It was this question which prompted the present inquiry. In attempting to answer it, a number of other questions arose--some seemed very far-removed from what happened in the classroom when the responses were collected. However, answering these questions was necessary to re-define the original question and find its answer. In this process, I was introduced to the interpretation theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer through Brooks' (1982) example. The reason why Gadamer's theory became meaningful to me is the real content of this paper--this becomes the answer to the original question.

Relationships

Reading for pleasure resulted in my introduction to two fictional characters who seem to represent differing ways of looking at and interpreting the events surrounding them. The first, Nekhludoff, in Tolstoy's Resurrection (1899) cannot understand why the heroine, Katushka/Maslova, does not wish to be rescued from her way of life and prison sentence. As the narrator explains, she has changed, because:



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Everybody, in order to be able to act, has to consider his occupation important and good. Therefore, in whatever position a person is, he will be certain to form such a view of the life of men in general which will make his occupation seem important and good. (p. 172)

Nekhludoff cannot understand how or why a prostitute sentenced to Siberia for murder could construct a world which he and his moral sense cannot penetrate.

The second character, Betteredge, in Wilkie Collin's <u>The Moonstone</u> (1868) has few problems of interpretation. <u>Robinson Crusoe</u>, as script and oracle, places the events of his life in perspective. Nothing surprises Betteredge, even the news brought to him by the young protagonist at the end of this remarkable tale. It was all there, in <u>Robinson Crusoe</u>. Betteredge cautions the reader in parting:

You are welcome to be as merry as you please over everything else I have written. But when I write of Robinson Crusoe, by the Lord, it's serious--and I request you take it accordingly. (p. 364)

Somewhere between Nekhludoff's lack of understanding and Betteredge's comprehensive but exclusive understanding must lie a middle ground. We who seek this level of understanding are cautioned by the example of Nekhludoff and Betteredge. But Katushka/Maslova cautions us as well, because when we seek answers to our questions, we are operating within a construction of our own making, built upon our interactions with others (Schutz, 1970). This construction either becomes part of the question or part of the answer.

Or so I thought—that it might become both, and that this might be far more desirable than either alternative is a concept that grew out of my consideration of the relationships within which the original research took place. Burton (1978) summarizes these relationships and his attitude toward them when he states that art education "primarily (and happily) rests on the relationships of interaction and intersubjectivity" (p. 40). My own understanding of these relationships is tempered by an appreciation of their dual nature: their strength is almost literal, but their fragility lies in their potential for developing "knots" (Laing, 1970). It is understanding which directs me to approach the student with Beittel's (1979) words, "I am treating you as a whole so that you may become whole" (p. 19).

In this spirit, I cannot presume to understand everything each child in my classroom brought to the art history lesson, but it is important for me to seek a better understanding of the things each of us took from the lesson. For within the interlocking network of these relationships, each of us finds meaning. It is then, not incompatible with this spirit of thought to view the majority of student responses from an existentialist viewpoint—the students' desire to know the artist as a person may be a means of confirming their own existences. We're not supposed to be objects to ourselves.

It is them, appropriate for me to turn to my own assumptions and beliefs to better understand the "unexplained" responses which involve the Louvre and the Paris Opera. The assumptions and beliefs are the things which I brought to the experience. I approach teaching with two of these: first, that "art knowledge is self-knowledge," and second, that "learning is learning to ask the right questions." My first indication that Gadamer's (1975) interpretation theory might be meaningful to me was the following statement in the preface to Truth and Method:

It is true that everyone who experiences a work of art gathers the experience wholly within himself: Namely into the totality of his self-understanding, within which it means something to him. (p. xviii)

The second indication was provided by Brooks' description of the vnderlying flow of Gadamer's process:

Through the movement of question and answer the interpreter experiences the disclosure of the meaning of the text as a relative other, as well as the meaning of his or her own horizon and the stream of tradition in which the horizons mutually exist. (p. 45)

The "act of faith" in Gadamer's process is the interpreter's admission that he or she does not know the answer. From then on, the interpreter operates within a dialectic, "answers" are fusions or horizons—and in this way, the answer becomes part of the next question. Gadamer's interpretation theory can be a way of finding one's place within the network of relationships through which we interact. And what is one's "place"? Knowledge, as historical consciousness.

Realizing that my own conception of this may not necessarily be what Gadamer conceived, it is, nevertheless, this kind of knowledge that has become increasingly important to me as I continue to teach. Because insights and visions which arise from this knowledge are so seductive, it is difficult for me to imagine my existence as a person without the aspect of my teaching. Returning to my notes, transcript, and lists, I found a number of answers in my own commentary on Cassatt's images. I had communicated far more than I suspected to my students. In showing Cassatt's portrait of Lydia at the Paris Opera to them, I talked about why I had gone to France, as had my own teacher, to paint and to learn more about art. Having seen so many Impressionist paintings of similar scenes at Garnier's marvelous opera house, it was important for me to go there, too. Watching a performance from a tiered box overlooking the stage—the same setting Lydia occupied—became part of my experience.

In showing Degas' etching of Cassatt in front of the Etruscan sarcophagus at the Louvre, I told the students the "story" behind the print. Degas—in one sense a "teacher" of Cassatt—may have placed her there because he felt she belonged there, by virtue of her ability as an artist. This "story" may well not be authentic—but I would like to believe it—because it reminds me of one's "place" as historical consciousness and its relationship to teaching. As such, it is Degas' "interpre—



tation;" while the portrait of Lydia is part of mine.

At this point, it is less difficult to understand why the Louvre and the Paris Opera appeared with such frequency. Part of what I communicated in my commentary was my own conception of the importance of historical consciousness—a relationship in itself, arising out of relationships which underlie the teaching and making of art. In this sense, even if the students wrote down the names of those distant places simply to please me, that's not such a bad thing, either.

Insights

What I possess that I view as historical consciousness has been acquired over a long period of time. The discovery of Gadamer is particularly pleasing to me because it seems to make the process of acquisition easier—it is very tempting to say that I wish I had been more aware of his work sooner. But this isn't really the case—the important step in the process for me was my work with elementary school children, even though my own search began long before that time.

My undergraduate education in studio art, while providing me with a strong foundation in the academic tradition, left me with little more than a few names and dates from art history. Some years later, returning for a graduate degree in art history, I began to gain an understanding of the nature of the questions. Art historical inquiry was open to a variety of modes of inquiry—there were alternative ways of knowing—one way wasn't necessarily better than another, but might be more appropriate in a given situation.

I can remember that upon choosing an area in which to work, I wanted to immerse myself as completely as possible in the historical period. At this point, Gadamer certainly would have been helpful, as I might have realized the fallacy behind this approach sooner. As it was, the teaching of art history and studio courses corrected my thinking and served to move it toward its present stance.

Teaching elementary school children may have been especially important for me becuase the making process is not separated from the "appreciating" process as it is in the college teaching—and rightly so, in each case. I would like to think that what I learned from teaching young children was some understanding of what children and their relationships with art represent.

Although I may appear overly critical of Betteredge in The Moonstone, I too have my "Robinson Crusoes" and they function for me in such a way that I am just as serious as Betterredge was about them. The ironic humor in a hermeneutic sense, as Robinson Crusoe was Betteredge's "Bible," is a useful check on my own intuition, imagination, and reflection. Even with this tempering effect of humor, Poincare's (1908) "Mathematical Creation" and Thomas Mann's (1903) novella, Tonio Kroger, still function as "Robinson Crusoes" in my own thinking.

In this sense, the following statement by Kroger expresses my own



feelings about what I learned from working with children:

There is such a way of being an artist that goes so deep and is so much a matter of origins and destinies that no longing seems to it sweeter and more worth knowing than longing after the bliss of the commonplace. (p. 132)

Kroger's statement is a disclosure, brought about through contact as an adult with the "realities" of his own childhood. I believe that the "origins and destinies" about which he speaks may be common to us all, not always as adults, but certainly as children. It is a shared seeking, and may be implicit in the process of finding meaning in our lives. I suspect that, for these origins and destinies to manifest themselves in a meaningful way, what Gadamer speaks of as knowledge is very important. Tonio Kroger's disclosure is very similar to Cassirer's (1944) statement about meaning:

In language, in religion, in art, in science, man can do no more than to build up his own universe--a symbolic universe that enables him to understand and interpret, to articulate and organize, to synthesize and universalize his human experience. (p. xii)

In considering this, the most exciting insight which I have gained from this study is a much greater appreciation of research in art education which aims at discovering the ways in which children find meaning through symbolization.

<u>Visions</u>

I would like to imagine that one day, we will better understand this process and look beyond the one flaw in Poincare's thinking which Papert (1980) indirectly addresses. Papert's research with children and computers is intriguing both because it reaches its conclusion through structuralist pathways, and because Papert was working against the same kinds of cultural impediments that face art education, for:

It is deeply embedded in our culture that the appreciation of mathematical beauty and the experience of mathematical pleasure are accessible only to a minority, perhaps as very small minority, of the human race. (p. 190)

Chapman's (1982) insights and arguments make this problem very clear. Perhaps some aspects of Papert's research may also be applied to inquiry in art education. Papert's use of the word "remembering" in the following statement seems particularly important:

Not until Bourbaki's structuralist theory appeared do we see an internal development in mathematics which opens mathematics up to "remembering" its genetic roots. This "remembering" was to put mathematics in the closest possible relationship to the development of research about how



children construct their reality. (p. 207)

If intelligences are "appreciations of appropriateness" (Gardner, 1983) knowledge as historical consciousness is a very important kind of knowledge. In a metaphorical sense, time "heals and cures," time "illuminates." It is appropriate for a certain kind of understanding. I can find similarities for what Cezanne does in his painting with some aspects of programming and interacting with a computer. Time and space are "bracketed" again and again to achieve a larger whole as Cezanne does "Poussin again after nature" (Canaday, 1959, p. 343).


It is for its possibilities that I value Gadamer's interpretation theory so much. It helps to clarify the pathway which my own thinking has followed. Ultimately, that pathway is circular, and must return to some "roots." I cannot help but think of Louis Sullivan's (1900) insertion into one of his theoretical writings: "Some of these words are very old--They still cry with the infancy of the race " (p. 218). Perhaps when they do, that is all the more reason to listen to them.

NOTES

The first statement was expressed by Al Hurwitz in a talk for museum docents delivered at the UMC Museum of Art and Archaeology, and made an impression on me, because it was something I strongly believed; the second, was so often repeated by Edzard Baumann during my graduate work in art history, that it became an important aspect of my own teaching. Chapman integrates them.

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Eric Purvis

Cybernetics has provided us with many discoveries for the arts, primarily in the area of expressive production. Art education however, has its own characteristics and needs.

In a period of such extraordinary advances in computer technology which require individual and social changes the educational system is in need of redirecting its efforts to the new technological realities. This evolving process has begun but because of the rapid advances in computer technology it has become not a system to change but rather a system of change. Every advance in the computer field gives rise to another advance which gives rise to another and so on.

Computers currently are used in general education for such purposes as: computer assisted instruction, computerized library function, information storage, information flow, and integrated records and procedures. Certainly the easy storage and rapid access of information has solved many time consuming problems of administration, but as educators the problems of providing quality instruction must still be the priority. In art education cybernetics holds much instructional potential but only the surface has been scratched.

Computers already have provided us with many discoveries for the arts in education, primarily in the areas of computer generated graphics, computer accessed curriculum, and record keeping. The search for what can be used is an important aspect of any teaching and learning process. The introduction of the computer into the classroom provides a base upon which the creative teacher can enhance the experiences of the learner. This is not a claim that the computer is intended to replace the teacher but rather that it is to be a supplement to an art program.

From a practical viewpoint a good number of computer assisted learning programs deal with quantitative concepts and deductive techniques of instruction. However, seeking what potential is available for computer use in the art classroom and the instruction of design concepts I have turned attention to the more qualitative nature of art and to the ingredients of what Robert Smith (1967) calls "influence" and "inference" as aspects of the inductive process which involves experimentation, discovery, evaluation, and assimilation of information.

The employment of cybernetics as a practical and mechanical instructional tool for aiding in altering perceptual tendencies can also serve some usefulness. It can be difficult for students to see beyond the image of a work of art and delve into the perceptual concepts or latent content but cybernetics provides control which may be useful in this area of concern. Cybernetics could be used to maintain direction of exploration for the learner in the art education environment.

Possibilities include exercises in visual thematic approximations of verbal concepts through organizational efforts by the learner. The exploration addresses perceptual tendencies and skills by thematic actualization; the learner seeking a reasonable or individually optimal solution to a design problem.

Themes in art may be literal or subjective in nature. For the purpose of this paper I refer more specifically to subjective themes supportive of the ideas, feelings, or images expressed through symbols generated by the artist. For example, the verbal concept of "swing" can have visual approximations which are not representational of the image of a swing. The brush strokes and/or shapes alone can make inferences about the concept of "swing."

Kandinsky (1974) suggested:

Form alone, even though abstract and geometrical, has its internal resonance...

...we have a subjective substance in an objective sheath. (p. 47)

Langer (1953) in discussing this topic stated:

An image is indeed, a purely virual 'object.' Its importance lies in the fact that we do not use it to guide us to something tangible and practical, but treat it as a complete entity with only visual attributes and relations. It has no other; its visible character is its entire being. (p. 48)

It may seem natural in the visual arts for the artist or appreciator to first reflect on literal relationships between the image and its referent object. But, as illustrated by Langer and Kandinsky, we realize that the measure of artistic creation is not realized through imitation. The ideas or feelings expressed by the artist about, or apart from, some referent object are visual themes which he or she is actualizing through expressive production. These organizational efforts are a reflection of the temperament of the artist and give direction over what is intended to be expressed.

In the teaching of design concepts the instructor is confronted with a variety of tasks, among which include the presentation of principles of design and their application. The teaching of these concepts involves making the implicit explicit. That is, what the mind feels or thinks about the meaning of symbols apart from their label or external representation. Those of us in the arts are quite aware of the relationship between perceptual principles and design concepts and that perhaps by their subjective nature they are a special area of concern. If learners are to "read" art works they must first be able to read and understand visual language. Eisner (1970) stated that if we are to experience the art forms we must have the ability to "decode" what the artist has expressed or "encoded." "Pictures need to be 'decoded' and comprehended in

ways that are not unlike language, especially if they are works of art. (p. 112)

There are a variety of types of encoding which are dependent on the symbol used, e.g. figurative, metaphorical, conventional, or nonobjective. This encoded meaning is also subject to the organizational arrangement of the symbols as well as the selected media. Consider the arrangement of words as an example. "John loves Mary" and "Mary loves John" are two completely different sentences in terms of meaning. Simply by rearranging the order of the words the meaning has completely changed. So it is with visual design, the syntax or ordered arrangement of the images or symbols can change the visual meaning. There is a relationship between images, their arrangement and what is intended to be expressed.

The learner has three systems which Briggs (1964) has termed making, perceiving, and feeling. The interaction of these systems is evidenced in the production of art as perceiving involves affects which then encourage reactions. The visual perceiving system at first is attentive to the general properties of the visual field after which it may attend to the more specific internal and external distinctions. Perceiving may be automatic but is also learned. Bruner (1973) indicated that learning to perceive involves learning the relationships or interactions contained in the properties of the objects and that it is a matter of categorization. That is, the learner makes inferences about appropriate stimuli input and answers or responds by submitting the input to an appropriate category.

The non-objective or qualitative symbol, as Langer (1953) refers to it, is a symbol which may be respresentative of some idea, image, or feeling which the artist is using to communicate and has no assigned meaning or may be applied apart from their objective embodiment. The experience or meaning of these symbols in evoked by the expressive character of the symbol from its environment but sees it in terms of interactive forces as it relates to the format in which it resides. In thematic actualization the use of the qualitative symbol can be used in a cybernetically controlled learning situation to assist in altering or enhancing perceptual skills. In this way learners are referring to their understanding and interpretation of a verbal concept rather than attending to a referent object as the subject in a deisgn problem.

A program design, especially in the intial stages, would need to remove the distractors. One solution to this problem is to present qualitative symbols on a proportional format using a computer digitized grid system to reduce the learner distractions of hedonic tone and the preparatory stages necessary to address the problem in a conventional way. The learner's attention may then be directed toward the specific nature of the problem and the judgements of the learner may then be fixated on the thematic solution by manipulation of the fixation symbol within the format and the non-verbal behavior may be elicited by a stimulus based on the concept of the thematic problem and the solution that represents it.

As this applies to the thematic solution of a design problem the learner first attends to the manipulation of the fixated symbol and its



general relation to the format at which point the learner will be able to make finer discriminations or distinctions. Since no truely optimum solution is established as standard this allows for individual differences and the goal of the program is to encourage visual discrimination skills through exploration and discovery learning.

The expected output of the lear er cannot be maintained rigidly. It is in effect a non-transferable sensuous interpretation of a concept that learners may actualize which would demonstrate their efforts in understanding aesthetic development or the artistic process.

In considering a possible program which is suited to the instruction of this qualitative encoding system through design problems, the question is not "What is it?" but rather "What does it do?" The program is designed to encourage the learner to apply perceptual principles to solve verbal thematically induced problems. The ability to solve problems is at least to some degree, according to Briggs, enhanced by "relatively unprompted guided discovery"(p. 2). Since rote memorization, understanding of principles, and application of principles are three kinds of learning, a learning well suited for any one of these three kinds of learning is unlikely to be well suited for all three. A linear format is unlikely to be effective here since memorization, active review and rehearsal are not present. However, the use of a machine to control and communicate may have certain favorable characteristics. Since cybernetics deals with forms of behavior that are consistent with "regularity," or are "determinate," or "reproducible" (Smith & Smith, 1966) it offers the possibility of experimentation with new formats and procedures consistent with servomechanical functions.

The preliminary work in this phase of the project also includes development and design strategy of some of the materials used in the experiment. Since the system deals with the application of principles, the student at this point will be in control of the instruction so as to evaluation, speed, difficulty in terms of discrimination, freedom to accept or reflect their own strategies, and discovery through experimentation. Then they will be responsible to some degree for their own performances.

The program does not, and is not intended to, teach design concepts and principles directly but rather affords the learner the opportunity to apply the concepts to the principles within a cybernetically controlled situation with verbally induced stimuli.

The use of cybernetics in simulation games generally acts as a control system that is sensitive to feedback in terms of discrepancies between what is desired and what exists and responds to feedback through corrective measures. This program, however, is an experimencal format which represents a break from conventional program formats and since there is no "wrong" answer in this subjective creative problem solving situation the computer is directly controlling, not by evaluation, but through maintenance of constraints and visual feedback and adaptability for evaluation. The learner has received the appropriate verbal theme and symbol and responds through manipulation of the symbol. As the learner manipulates the symbol he/she is able to "hone" in on a suitable response much the same as one would tune



a stringed musical instrument constantly receiving feedback and responding.

With the assistance of a digitized computer grid system to help remove the hedonic tone the learner may actualize the theme and then "drop" out the grid to evaluate the format and symbol relationship with the corresponding theme. On response from the learner the computer monitor will bring back up the grid for further manipulation and discrimination.

Perceiving, thinking, and acting (or forming) are interactive. As one of these systems is attended to in the arts others cannot be neglected. As perceptual skills may be the focus of this cybernetically controlled plan none of the three areas is neglected. This plan is to encourage the learner to strive for the best possible solution in his own direction, use his fullest potential through exploration and discovery.

Rudolf Arnheim (1969) stated that "we are heirs to a culture situation in which "our eyes are being reduced to instruments by which to measure and identify" and that mere exposure to art is not sufficient to reawaken our eyes. (p. 1) If one is working with the principles of design then the ability to measure and label is insufficient and the awareness of the visual syntax and its relation to the intended idea or emotion is essential.

In exploring the potential of the cybernetically enhanced instructional programs we must capitalize on the advantages of the computers in instructional management. We cannot assume that the possibilities of computer assisted instruction exist only for quantitative content. As art educators we need to examine cybernetic applications to qualitative content as an essential part of the exploration of computer instructional resources potential.

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Mentor's Introduction

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Perhaps, one might be puzzled by the diverse approaches represented in the studies of Kerry Freedman and Arlene Renken coming as they do from the same institution. Arlene's work is set within the broad traditions of value transmission from an anthropological perspective in which ethnic art functions to preserve cultural values. Kerry's work, on the other hand, is sharply focused towards the perception of art from an information theoretic position. Both approaches are valid and important in extending the literature contributing to understanding aesthetic behavior. While my own work is more closely associated with one of these approaches, I firmly believe that the investigations of mature graduate students cannot be forced into one mold. Students at doctoral level studies bring with them a set of beliefs, values, and experiences that provide a foundation for extending inquiries into aesthetic behavior from several perspectives. It is extremely important, however, that appropriate resources be available if an advisor is not working in one of the selected research directions. If quality research is to be done, that which extends the aesthetic literature, the students must be aware of the state-of-the art methodology in whatever the area. Although Arlene and Kerry are working within differing disciplines, their work, each in its own way, profits from the application of contemporary methodology. In effect, the qualitative dimension in graduate art education research represents a level of conceptualization and execution that contributes to the field as opposed to defining qualitative solely by the focus of study.



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Kerry Freedman

The contents of this paper are a discussion of the utilization of information theory in discovering information about aesthetic behavior. The sense in which aesthetic behavior will be referred to in this context is in terms of apprehension of aesthetic stimuli, rather than the production of art objects. In looking at this topic, consideration of this sense of behavior assumes that the apprehension of aesthetic stimuli is an active rather than a passive state, and that behavior is examined in the overt responses of subjects involved in research based on information theory perspectives, where collected data is used to infer about this aesthetic apprehension and the behavior or others.

There are two fundamental ways that information theory based investigations have led to a further understanding of aesthetic behavior. The first is that through the development of information theory, a metric has been provided that enables researchers to study the effects of independent stimulus dimensions thought to be aesthetic on the responses of viewers. The use of information theory in this context is not primarily concerned with internal processes.

The second way information theory has enabled further understanding of aesthetic behavior is that it has led to the field of information-processing. This utilization has caused researchers to theorize about cognitive processes which are basic to concept formation resulting in the study of areas such as visual search (Neisser, 1963) and memory search (Sternberg, 1966).

An information-processing approach to research in aesthetics can be useful in three ways. First, as mentioned, it enables the systematic dissection of aesthetic stimulus dimensions in order to study their effects on the human system. Second, this perspective forces the realization that processing of an aesthetic object is a temporal experience that may be directed in a sequential manner by channels that influence the processing of information gained from these dimensions. Third, this theory enables the experiencing of an aesthetic object to be seen in terms of stages of processing that, although they are considered separable time intervals, are interacting and influence the resulting aesthetic behavior.

The history of information theory is relevant here because it has gone through some definitive changes that have affected the study of perception. Near the end of World War II, Weiner (1948) published a book on cybernetics. This view that there are similarities between biological and mechanical control systems was a fundamental seed in the development of the use of information theory in psychology (Simon, 1981).

The technological events that led to the use of information theory in studies of perception and behavior were two major theoretical contri-



butions to the ongoing cybernetic perspective. One important event was the universal communication theory and re-definition of information devised by C. E. Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). This communication theory provided a model that involved limited capacity channels over which messages were transmitted. The second occurence that forced the development of information theory was the advent of analog digital computers. Because of their apparent simulation of human cognitive processes, theorists saw in computers the potential for studying human information processing.

There have been a number of criticisms of the use of information theory in the study of perception (cf. Green & Courtis, 1969). One of the major concerns has been the early definition of information by Shannon. This definition dealt only in terms of the uncertainty of physical dimensions of the message, not in terms of the receiver of the message. However, this early definition of information is considered by many to be outdated, and a new view of information has evolved.

Some of the seminal publications that have aided in the theoretical development of psychological research utilizing information theory have included: G. A. Miller's (1956) and W. R. Garner's (1962) reviews of research, F. Attneave's (1959) book, Applications of Information Theory to Psychology, the work of C. Cherry (1953) and D. E. Broadbent (1958, 1971) in dichotic listening and selective attention, and Sperling's analysis of iconic, short term and long term memory. The revival of F. C. Donder's subtractive reaction time methods, work by Posner and Mitchell (1967) on matching by visual features versus matching by name, and finally, Tanner and Swet's (1954) explanation of Signal Dection Theory have further impacted the development of the use of information theory in studies of perception and have influenced the shifting meaning of information.

The perspective that information theory can be used to investigate aesthetic response is the basis for an influential body of works by D. E. Berlyne and his students and colleagues (Berlyne, 1977, 1974; Day, 1981). Berlyne was a classical Hullian behaviorist (Furedy & Furedy, 1981) and combined these two theoretical approaches to study the effects of structional aesthetic stimulus dimensions on behavior.

Although Berlyne and his associates have done much through the use of information theory to discover aspects of aesthetic behavior, two concerns must be mentioned. The first was raised by Heckhausen (1964), that very simply, the long term phenomenal effect of Berlyne's stimuli may not be in accordance with its information-theoretic analysis of complexity. Heckhausen believed that length of viewing time and viewing situation influence "complexity as perceived" (p. 168).

The second concern is that Berlyne's behavioralist tradition views internal events in terms of associationistic correspondence assumptions. Although not of the most strict behavioral beliefs, for he has made inferences as to some of the interior events resulting from behavioral responses to stimuli, Berlyne's view is that the human nervous system is wired such that a one-to-one correspondence is caused by particular stimulus

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dimensions, rather than considering the process as being cognitively ongoing and interactive. It seems probable that there is not such a correspondence between the stimulus dimensions of a work of art and Berlyne's hypothetical neural system when considerations of learned concepts, such as values, are seen in their relation to perceived pleasantness or unpleasantness.

The study of human information processing is now included in the theory of cognitive psychology. It has become a conjunctive derivative of information theory available for use in the study of aesthetic behav-In some respects, it is a revival of the initial historical topics of psychology, but with an alternative methodology. An important part of that methodology is seen through the use of computer based vocabulary and flow diagrams in the explanation of the processing of information by humans. Although these relatively linear, two-dimensional representations are realized to be overly simplistic attempts to understand the processing of human functioning, two positive aspects of the development of this approach, as mentioned earlier, are illustrated: (a) perception and higher processing such as attention and memory is temporal and occurs in stages or levels that have unity and interact; (b) processing is limited by the capapcity of the channel that selectively handles information that changes during recoding. The connections between these processing components and the changes that occur as information is recoded are probably the central concern of information-processing research.

When confronted with an aesthetic object, we detect and integrate features of the object attended to in terms of their relevancy in memory. These physical features are parts of larger structural dimensions, such as collative properties, that can be measured through levels of uncertainty. Uncertainty, since it involves the human functions of prediction, has also to do with interior structural formations, such as concepts and images, which are retained relative to their interactive character. Further, these aspects of information-processing may change as development occurs.

The information-processing approach has been criticized for being too much concerned with the atomization of our perceptions in restrictive laboratory situations that have limited reference to the real world, and being too little concerned with the acquisition of meaning. It is true, that we generally do not see things in terms of patches of color or shapes, although that is how the information reaches our retinas. Rather, we very quickly interpret those sensations, whenever possible matching them to a prototypical mental structure in abstract memory. However, it is possible that developing information-processing theory may help provide a "methodology which adequately considers the interactive nature of aesthetic object and aesthetic response" (Crozier, 1981, p. 433). Some students of Berlyne feel that his approach falls short of considering this interactive aspect.

Already an indication of the transition toward studying functions of meaning has begun. Posner (1978) has suggested that looking at processing in regards to levels would be more appropriate than to refer

to it simply in terms of stages. Research by Garner, Podgorny, and Frasca (1982) has shown support for this conceptualization. Their studies indicate that cognitive dimensions (such as familiarity) may override physical dimensions and may be used to sort stimuli even when cognitive dimensions conflict. These results indicate that functional roles of dimensions may be processed in parallel after initial processing of physical features. These studies and others show possible views of processing mechanisms that handle aesthetic dimensions such as referents to style, and cognitive dimensions such as preference and value in parallel, which could be useful in the study of aesthetic behavior.

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Arlene Renken

Introduction

The content of this paper addresses one facet of multi-culturalism, that of ethnic identity, which is only one form of identity that people experience. More specifically, this paper derives from a study of how the arts of an ethnic group symbolize the core values of the group and thus become instrumental in transmission and continuity of ethnic identity from one generation to the next. The investigation proceeds from field studies methods, with ethnographic interview being the primary field work approach.

The ethnic group selected for the study are descendents of Finnish immigrants who arrived in this country at the turn of the century and settled primarily in the northern tier of states from east to west coast. American Finns have thus experienced three or four generations of assimilation into mainstream culture.

My long-standing interest in Finnish-American ethnicity stems from a Finnish parentage and an upbringing rooted in a Finnish heritage. My study, then, is an outgrowth of a close association and familiarity with the Finnish-American culture.

The emigrant movement took place at a time when a strong craft orientation existed in Finland, particularly in rural areas from which the primary exodus occurred. Of the imported crafts, rug weaving and log construction have survived and are still practiced by descendents of Finnish immigrants; together they provide the central element on which the study is based.

Art and Ethnicity

The art that is associated with an ethnic group is not usually learned in school; it is transmitted informally within the social group through kinship and other transmittal patterns. The cultural knowledge that is inherent in art and conveyed through art in the transmission process can be explicit in terms of skills, procedures, processes, information or images. Art is also a means of passing on implicit or tacit cultural knowledge. The latter relates to more subtle understandings such as the acquisition of values and attitudes, and the meanings attached to art objects by members of a social group.

Art objects then have characteristics that are visible or explicit and qualities that are hidden or implicit. An art object is, to quote Redfield (1959), "a body in which two souls dwell."

In cultures where a strong imagery pattern exists, symbolic meanings



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in works of art and their significance in preserving value systems over time may be more easily discerned. But in cultures that lack a strong visual imagery tradition, the symbolic significance of art objects may be rooted in social patterns that are external to, but connected with, the art objects, as in the case of Finnish-American handicraft traditions.

Two questions provide the framework for analysis of collected data in this study: How do art traditions reflect core values of a social group and thus help to sustain ethnic identify? and What alternative forms of education contribute to survival and transmission of ethnic traditions over time?

Implications for Art Education

Today's schools are functioning on a philosophical orientation based on cultural pluralism. Studies of ethnicity in relationship to art point out a need for examining instructional practices that relate to ethnic content of art. Too often such practices are directed to superficial, external qualities of the art of different cultures without consideration of the social context in which the art was created. At the elementary level especially, students sometimes acquire wrong impressions about cultures from superficial attempts at replicating art objects of different cultural groups.

An investigation of alternative forms of art education provides a broader base from which to evaluate formal art teaching methods. It points out that different ways of learning and teaching have occurred through history to successfully transmit art knowledge. If cultural values are at the root of ethnic art survivals, art instruction in a formal school setting is also based on a value system. For effective teaching and learning, the value structure underlying contemporary formal art teaching practice needs to be uncovered and its viability in 4 multicultural society examined.

Studies of acculturation in art education are rare. Investigations such as this promote an awareness of the effects of acculturation on the art development of children who enter the mainstream culture of our schools from other societies, and a greater sensitivity to differing cultural values.

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