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ABSTRACT
        The study examines one component of the system of
complementation in Palestinian Arabic. It is argued that the
complementizer in question has an inherent semantics capable of
influencing the meaning of sentences in which it is embedded.
Specifically, its presence in a complex sentence communicates modal
meanings distinct from those communicated by analogous sentences
lacking it. This analysis challenges traditional assumptions about
the functional importance of complementizers. It is hypothesized that
the function of this complementizer is to lessen the degree of the
matrix subject's commitment to the proposition embodied in the
complement clause and to weaken the semantic and syntactic dependence
of the clause. Examples are drawn from a number of complement clause
types: with subjunctive and indicative complements, after perception
verbs, and before direct quotations. Contains 10 references. (MSE)

1

Commitment and Evidence in Arabic Complementation*

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1. INTRODUCTION. In this paper I investigate one component of the system of complementation in Palestinian Arabic—the complementizer *?inna*. I argue that this complementizer has an inherent semantics capable of influencing the meaning of sentences in which it is embedded. Specifically, I show that the presence of the complementizer *?inna* in a complex sentence communicates modal meanings distinct from those communicated by analogous sentences lacking the complementizer. By way of illustration, compare the following minimal pair (treated in more detail in §5). These sentences differ only in the presence versus absence of the complementizer.

1. *smiʕna   l-wlaad   bilʕabu   maʕ   il-xurfaan*
   we.heard the-children they.play with   the-sheep
   'We heard the children playing with the sheep.'
2. *smiʕna   ?inna l-wlaad   bilʕabu   maʕ   il-xurfaan*
   we.heard that   the-children they.play with   the-sheep
   'We heard that the children are playing with the sheep.'

Both sentences contain the embedded assertion *l-wlaad bilʕabu maʕ il-xurfaan* 'the children play with the sheep'. Ex. 1 indicates that the speaker's source of evidence for this assertion is direct auditory perception, as suggested by the English translation. Ex. 2 indicates that the source of evidence is indirect. The source of evidence in 2 is hearsay. Ex. 2 shows that the complementizer *?inna* codes the evidential basis on which the speaker asserts the proposition *l-wlaad bilʕabu maʕ il-xurfaan*. The data presented in 1–2 indicate that an appropriate analysis of the complementizer must make reference to the meanings that it contributes to assertions in which it is embedded.

The present analysis challenges traditional assumptions regarding the functional import of complementizers. Some linguistic approaches have regarded complementizers as grammatical morphemes (functors) devoid of semantic content, whose main function is to signal the subordinate status of the following embedded clause. This assumption is succinctly captured by Noonan 1985:44–5: 'Complement types often have associated with them a word, particle, clitic, or affix whose function it is to identify the entity as a complement. Such forms are known as COMPLEMENTIZERS.' It is clear from 1–2 that the complementizer signals more than simply the subordinate status of the complement clause. But supposing that it is true that the complementizer in 2 serves to 'identify the entity as a complement', why is there not a complementizer in 1 to perform such a function?

Exx. 1–2 raise another theoretical issue. A substantial number of studies on complementation have claimed that the type of complement clause or the choice of a complementizer is largely predictable from and triggered by the matrix verb. Thus Noonan writes: 'Complementation is basically a matter of matching a particular complement type to a particular complement-taking predicate. The basis of this matching is the semantic relation between predicate and complement that is inherent

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in the meaning of the CTP' (90–91). Thus in this approach, complement and complementizer choice is dictated by the requirements of the main verb.

An early counterproposal to this approach is found in Bolinger 1968, who states that complementizers have semantics of their own: 'the complementizers are chosen for their own sake, not as a mechanical result of choosing something else.' Exx. 1–2 above illustrate Bolinger's point. In both sentences, the main-clause verb *smiʕna* 'heard' is the same, yet the complements are different in form (and of course in meaning); in one we have a complementizer, and in the other we do not. To varying extents, Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1979, Kirsner & Thompson 1976, Givón 1980, Ransom 1986, Frajzyngier & Jasperson 1991, and Frajzyngier 1995 are elaborations on Bolinger's proposal. The aim of the present study is to explore the semantics of the complementizer *ʔinna* in the spirit of these studies.

The meanings that *ʔinna* contributes largely fall under the rubric of epistemic modality as defined in Palmer 1986:51: 'the term "epistemic" should apply not simply to modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says. In particular, it should include evidentials such as "hearsay" or "report" (the Quotative) or the evidence of the senses.' Palmer's definition makes clear that evidential functions such as the ones indicated in 1–2 fall within the realm of epistemic modality, and so do the notions of 'hearsay', 'report', and 'commitment', notions which are taken up later in this paper.

Against the background given above, this paper aims to provide a semantic/functional motivation for *ʔinna*. The hypothesis of this paper is that the function of the complementizer *ʔinna* in Palestinian Arabic (hereafter PA) is at once to lessen the degree of the matrix subject's commitment to the proposition embodied in the complement clause and to weaken the semantic and syntactic dependence of the complement clause. The support for this hypothesis will consist of showing the following:

- The occurrence of *ʔinna* in subjunctive complements that allow it lessens the degree of commitment of the matrix subject to the proposition contained in the complement (§3).
- In indicative complements, *ʔinna* sets up the embedded clause as one that is semantically and syntactically more self-contained (i.e. less dependent) than one not introduced by *ʔinna* (§4).
- When *ʔinna* introduces complements to main-clause perception verbs (e.g. 'see', 'hear'), it indicates that the propositional event in the embedded clause was a result of indirect evidence (thus entailing less speaker commitment) when compared with the same but without *ʔinna* (where perception is direct, thus entailing more speaker commitment) (§5).
- In natural conversation data, when *ʔinna* introduces direct quotes it indicates low speaker commitment to the quoted utterance (§6).

In §2 the two complement clause types in PA—indicative and subjunctive—are introduced to set the stage for §§3–4.

2. COMPLEMENT CLAUSE TYPES. An examination of the morphosyntactic structure of complement clauses in PA reveals two types of complements: indicative and subjunctive. The difference between the two types can be seen most transparently in the form of the embedded verb: the indicative verb is inflected for both tense and person, whereas the subjunctive is inflected for person only; it is not marked for tense. The following are examples of indicative complements:

3. kaal-at   (ʔinna)   iṭ-ṭakṣ   tḥassan
   say.PERF-3FS   (COMP)   ART-weather   improve.PERF
   'She said that the weather got better.'

4. ʔiktaʃaf   (ʔin-ha)   zaar-at   koloraado
   discover.PERF.3MS (COMP-3FS) visit.PERF-3FS Colorado
   'He found out that she visited Colorado.'

5. fakkarit   (ʔin-na)   zaar   koloraado
   think.PERF.1S (COMP-3MS) visit.PERF.3MS Colorado
   'I thought that he visited Colorado.'

All of these complements are object complements (PA is SVO). The complement clauses are all optionally introduced by the complementizer ʔinna 'that' (variant: ʔin- + enclitic pronoun if the complement clause lacks a nominal subject NP),[1] and they all imply statements of fact. All the verbs in the embedded clauses—tḥassan, zaarat, zaar—are inflected for the perfective aspect. Contrast these with the subjunctive complements in 6–7:

6. ʔamrat-a   yiṭlaʕ   min   is-sayyaara
   order.3FS-3MS exit.SUBJ.3MS   PREP   ART-car
   'She ordered him to get out of the car.'

7. ʔaqnaʕ-ha   timʃi
   persuade.3MS-3FS walk.SUBJ.3FS
   'He persuaded her to walk.'

In 6–7, the complementizer is disallowed. Furthermore, and crucially, the embedded verb form is in the subjunctive.[2] To see that the clause in 7, for example, is in fact a subjunctive complement, contrast it with the following two indicative complement examples:

8. ʔaqnaʕ-ha   (ʔin-ha)   maʃat   fi   noom-ha
   persuade.3MS-3FS (COMP-3FS) walk.PERF.3FS PREP sleep-3FS
   'He convinced her that she sleepwalked.'

9. ʔaqnaʕ-ha   (ʔin-ha)   btimʃi   fi   noom-ha
   persuade.3MS-3FS (COMP-3FS) walk.IMPERF.3FS PREP sleep-3FS
   'He convinced her that she sleepwalks.'

In 7, the complementizer is disallowed; thus the following strings are unacceptable:

10. a. * ʔaqnaʕha ʔin(-ha) timʃi
    b. * ʔaqnaʕha ʔinna   timʃi

The preceding discussion shows that the crucial difference between indicative and subjunctive complement clauses lies in the form of the embedded verb itself.

A survey of a wide range of complement-taking verbs in PA reveals that verbs that can be categorized as manipulative or emotive in nature, such as:

ʔaǧbar 'oblige, force', ʔamar 'order', faḍḍal 'prefer', ḥabb 'like', ḥarram 'forbid', manaʕ 'prevent', naṣaḥ 'advise', samaḥ 'allow', ʃaǧǧaʕ 'encourage', tʔammal 'hope', ṭalab 'request', tmanna 'wish', waʕad 'promise', xaaf 'fear', xalla 'make, let'

typically (but not always—see §3) occur with subjunctive complements, whereas verbs that may be said to belong to the cognitive or communicative domain, such as:

> *ʕirif* 'know', *ʔaʕlan* 'declare', *ʔakkad* 'assert, assure', *ʔankar* 'deny', *ʔaθbat* 'confirm, prove', *iʕtaraf* 'confess, acknowledge', *iftaraɖ* 'assume, suppose', *iktaʃaf* 'discover', *istantaʤ* 'conclude', *ittaham* 'accuse', *fihim* 'understand', *ħilim* 'dream', *ʤaawab* 'answer', *kaal* 'say', *ʃakk* 'doubt', *fakkar* 'think', *saddak* 'believe'

typically occur with indicative complements. In §§3–4, we examine environments involving these kinds of verbs to see where *ʔinna* is allowed and disallowed, and what semantic contribution this complementizer makes.

3. *ʔINNA* WITH SUBJUNCTIVE COMPLEMENTS. As we have seen, some indicative complements can either occur with or without *ʔinna* (e.g. 3–5). Is this choice also available for subjunctive complements?

Some of the manipulative verbs listed in §2 (e.g. *ʔaʤbar* 'oblige, force', *ʔamar* 'order', *manaʕ* 'prevent', *xalla* 'make, let') never allow the occurrence of the complementizer in their complements. Thus in the following set of examples, *ʔinna* cannot appear anywhere:[3]

11. *layla   ʔaʤbar-at   xaalid   yruuħ*
     Laila   force.PERF-3FS   Khalid   go.SUBJ.3MS
     'Laila forced Khalid to go.'
12. *ʔaʤbar-et   xaalid   yruuħ*
     force.PERF-1S   Khalid   go.SUBJ.3MS
     'I forced Khalid to go.'
13. *layla   xall-at   xaalid   yruuħ*
     Laila   make.PERF-3FS   Khalid   go.SUBJ.3MS
     'Laila made Khalid go.'
14. *xall-eet   xaalid   yruuħ*
     make.PERF-1S   Khalid   go.SUBJ.3MS
     'I made Khalid go.'

On the other hand, emotive verbs (e.g. *ħabb* 'like', *xaaf* 'fear', *tʔammal* 'hope', *tmanna* 'wish') do allow *ʔinna* in their complement clauses if the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the embedded clause are non-coreferential. If the two subjects are coreferential, the complementizer is disallowed. Thus 15–16 are well-formed, but 17–18 are not:

15. *ħabb-eet   aruuħ*
     like.PERF-1S   go.SUBJ.1S
     'I liked to go.'

16. *ħabb-u*   *yruuħ-u*
 like.PERF-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
 'They liked to go.'
17. * *ħabb-eet* *ʔin-ni* *aruuħ*
 like.PERF-1S COMP-1S go.SUBJ.1S
 for: 'I liked to go.'
18. * *ħabb-u*   *ʔin-him* *yruuħ-u*[4]
 like.PERF-3PL COMP-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
 for: 'They liked to go.'

The picture that is emerging with respect to subjunctive complements to matrix clause emotive verbs is that these complements typically do not allow *ʔinna* except under the condition that the matrix and complement subjects are non-coreferential. Manipulative verbs (see 11–14) are excluded from this statement by type. These verbs do not allow *ʔinna* under any circumstances, possibly because of a lexically-specified constraint that they must have non-coreferential subjects since one normally makes, forces, prevents etc. others, not oneself. With these verbs, the question of the occurrence of *ʔinna* does not arise; *ʔinna* never occurs with these verbs.

 But the picture with respect to emotive verbs is a little more complicated than painted thus far. Whereas it is true that the presence of the complementizer is the norm if the subjects of the main and embedded clauses are non-coreferential, as in 19, the absence of the complementizer MAY be acceptable; hence the marginal acceptability of 20. Ex. 20 is, not as well-formed as 19, but it is not outright ungrammatical.

19. *ħabb-eet* *ʔin-him* *yruuħ-u*
 like.PERF-1S COMP-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
 'I liked them to go.'
20. ? *ħabb-eet* *yruuħ-u*
 like.PERF-1S go.SUBJ-3PL
 'I liked them to go.'

I would like to suggest that the phenomena represented in 15–20 can be explained in the light of the notion of commitment, in the following sense. The matrix and embedded clauses each have one proposition consisting of a subject and its predicate, and a relation holds between the two propositions such that the second proposition (the embedded proposition) is predicated upon the first (the matrix proposition). If the agent of the second predicate is the same as that of the first predicate, the agent has more control in bringing about the action or event in the complement than if the agents of the matrix and complement were different. Thus in 15–20 one can be committed to and responsible for one's own actions (i.e. going) but not (necessarily) so for the actions of others. Admittedly, it is not clear what is responsible in 19 for the lack of commitment—whether it is the presence of the complementizer or the non-identity of the subjects in the main and embedded clauses. If it turns out that there is in fact a clear preference for 19 over 20, then we may be more confident in concluding that it is the complementizer—rather than the non-identity of the subjects—that is responsible for the low commitment. We will return to this issue presently.

The complement-taking verb *ʔaṣarr* 'insist' is one that allows both indicative and subjunctive complements. When *ʔaṣarr* is followed by an indicative complement, the complement must be introduced by the complementizer, regardless of coreferentiality:

21. *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *ʔin-ni*   *ruħit*
     insist.PERF-1S   COMP-1S   go.PERF.1S
     'I insisted that I had left.'
22. * *ʔaṣarr-eet   ruħit*
23. *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *ʔin-him*   *raaħ-u*
     insist.PERF-1S   COMP-3PL   go.PERF-3PL
     'I insisted that they had left.'
24. * *ʔaṣarr-eet   raaħ-u*

On the other hand, when *ʔaṣarr* is followed by a subjunctive complement, we get a phenomenon very similar to the one observed in 15–20, namely, if the matrix and embedded subjects are coreferential, the complementizer is disallowed; but if the matrix and embedded subjects are non-coreferential, the complementizer is obligatorily present. Exx. 25–30 are parallel to 15–20.

25. *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *aruuħ*
     insist.PERF-1S   go.SUBJ.1S
     'I insisted on going.'
26. *ʔaṣarr-u*   *yruuħ-u*
     insist.PERF-3PL   go.SUBJ-3PL
     'They insisted on going.'
27. * *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *ʔin-ni*   *aruuħ*
     insist.PERF-1S   COMP-1S   go.SUBJ.1S
     for: 'I insisted on going'
28. * *ʔaṣarr-u*   *ʔin-him*   *yruuħ-u*[5]
     insist.PERF-3PL   COMP-3PL   go.SUBJ-3PL
     for: 'They insisted on going.'
29. *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *ʔin-him*   *yruuħ-u*
     insist.PERF-1S   COMP-3PL   go.SUBJ-3PL
     'I insisted that they go.'
30. ? *ʔaṣarr-eet*   *yruuħ-u*
     insist.PERF-1S   go.SUBJ-3PL
     'I insisted that they go.'

From these examples we may conclude that it is the complementizer—not the like/unlike subjects—that is responsible for lessening the commitment of the main-clause subject to the event in the embedded clause when the main and embedded subjects are non-coreferential. In the ungrammatical 17–18 and 27–28, where the main and embedded subjects are coreferential, the introduction of *ʔinna* creates a distance, iconically represented, between the controlling main verb and its subject and the achievement of the event in the embedded clause. The interpretation of the subjunctive verb cannot be properly understood without the emotive matrix verb on which it depends. Thus main-subordinate status with subjunctive complements is blurred, and the two clauses are semantically more unified than in the *ʔinna* clauses.

In fact, this dependence is seen in the syntax. Compare the complements in 31–32, which are extracted from 23 and 29, respectively:

31.   *raaħ-u*
           'They went.'
32. * *yruuħ-u*

   4. *ʔINNA* WITH INDICATIVE COMPLEMENTS. The examples in this section show that the presence of *ʔinna* in indicative complements serves to lessen the degree of subordination of the embedded clause (i.e. to weaken the bonding between the main and embedded clauses) and to lessen the commitment of the main-clause subject to the proposition in the embedded clause. Let us begin with the following examples:

33.   a.   *bifakkir   biʕrifni*
                he.thinks   he.knows.me
                   'He thinks he knows me.'
         b.   *bifakkir   ʔin-na   biʕrifni*
                he.thinks   that-he   he.knows.me
                   'He thinks that he knows me.'

On the face of it, there does not appear to be a discernible semantic difference between these two examples. However, if one tries to follow the sentences with the clause *bas ma-aðinnii-ʃ* 'but I don't think so', an interesting contrast can be observed:

34.   a.   ?? *bifakkir   biʕrifni,   bas   ma-aðinnii-ʃ*
                he.thinks   he.knows.me   but   NEG-I.think-NEG
                   for: 'He thinks he knows me, but I don't think so'
         b.   *bifakkir   ʔin-na   biʕrifni,   bas   ma-aðinnii-ʃ*
                he.thinks   that-he   he.knows.me   but   NEG-I.think-NEG
                   'He thinks that he knows me, but I don't think so.'

Ex. 34a is only marginally acceptable. The reason for this appears to be that the clause *bas ma-aðinnii-ʃ* 'I don't think so' is doubting not the embedded clause *biʕrifni* 'he knows me' but rather the main clause *bifakkir* 'he thinks'. But the main clause *bifakkir* is what the speaker is asserting and conveying as her/his belief. This assertion is being doubted in the clause *bas ma-aðinnii-ʃ*. One cannot doubt one's own assertion, and hence the marginality of 34a. In 34b, on the other hand, *bas ma-aðinnii-ʃ* doubts the embedded clause *biʕrifni*, a reasonable doubt. One may conclude from the above examples that the complementizer in such sentences is a marker whose function is to lessen the degree of dependence of the embedded clause. The examples in 35 further illustrate this point.

35.   a.   *fhimit   kasrat   is-saaʕa*
                I.understood   she.broke   the-watch
                   'I understood she broke the watch.'
         b.   *fhimit   ʔin-ha   kasrat   is-saaʕa*
                I.understood   that-she   she.broke   the-watch
                   'I understood that she broke the watch.'

c. *fhimit* *ʔin-ha* *kasrat* *is-saaʕa,*
 I.understood that-she she.broke the-watch,
  bas *ma-aðinnii-ʃ*
  but NEG-I.think-NEG
 'I understood that she broke the watch, but I don't think so (i.e., I
  don't think that she broke the watch).'

d. ?? *fhimit kasrat issaaʕa, bas ma-aðinnii-ʃ*
 (Doubting *fhimit.*)

It is interesting to note that 35a implies a stronger sense of understanding than 35b. Ex. 35a may be uttered if the speaker had been witness to some deliberation were evidence—or a confession—was presented, whereas 35b may be uttered if the speaker came to her/his understanding through indirect sources. One would expect, therefore, that in 35b the speaker would not be as committed to her/his assertion as in 35a. The claim here is that it is the complementizer that is responsible for this lower commitment.

  To argue further that the function of the complementizer is to set up the embedded clause as one that is less subordinated to the main clause, one which is introduced as an assertion that becomes available to be questioned or doubted, can be seen in the following examples:

36. a. *bitsaddik* *ʃufit* *zalama* *buħluk* *la* *kalba?*
 you.believe I.saw a.man he.shave PREP his.dog?
 'Do you believe I saw a man shaving his dog?'

 b. *bitsaddik* *ʔin-ni* *ʃufit* *zalama* *buħluk* *la* *kalba?*
 you.believe that-I I.saw a.man he.shave PREP his.dog?
 'Do you believe that I saw a man shaving his dog?'

What is in fact questioned in 36a is the surprising nature of the event in the embedded clause. The speaker in 36a is inquiring whether the hearer shares in the speaker's surprise about the event. A paraphrase of 36a is something like 'Do you believe this surprising thing ... ?' An appropriate response to 36a might be *ballaahi ʕan ʤad?* 'By God, really?' In contrast, 36b—with the complementizer— introduces the embedded clause as a kind of statement. A paraphrase of 36b is something like 'Would you believe the statement that ... ?' or 'Would you believe it/me if I tell you that ... ?' An appropriate response to 36b might be *la? basadkiʃ* 'No, I don't believe it.'

  5. ʔINNA AFTER PERCEPTION VERBS. Related to the hypothesis that the function of the complementizer *ʔinna* is to weaken the commitment of the subject of the main clause to the propositional content of the embedded clause is the sub-hypothesis that *ʔinna*, when it introduces an embedded clause following a main-clause perception verb, functions as an evidential marker, a marker of indirect (or less-than-direct) evidence. Commitment and evidence are correlated in the following way. If one's evidence for a proposition is indirect or second-hand, one would be less committed to the proposition than to a proposition that contains an event the evidence for which is attained through direct experience. The following examples illustrate this point:

37. a. *smiʕna   l-wlaad   bilʕabu   maʕ   il-xurfaan*
    we.heard   the-children   they.play   PREP   the-sheep
    'We heard the children playing with the sheep.'
       Or: 'We heard that the children are playing with the sheep.'
  b. *smiʕna   ʔinna   l-wlaad   bilʕabu   maʕ   il-xurfaan*
    we.heard   that   the-children   they.play   PREP   the-sheep
    'We heard that the children are playing with the sheep.'

Ex. 37a has two interpretations. For the first interpretation, the evidence is direct auditory perception. In 37b, on the other hand, the subject most likely was TOLD that the children were playing; i.e., the evidence in 37b is indirect—hearsay.
    With the verb *ʃufit* 'see', *ʔinna* also functions as a marker of indirect evidence:

38. a. *ʃufit   is-safiina   yirkit*
    I.saw   the-ship   it.sank
    'I saw the ship sink.'
       Or: 'I saw that (i.e. realized) the ship had sunk.'
  b. *ʃufit   ʔinna   is-safiina   yirkit*
    I.saw   that   the-ship   it.sank
    'I realized that the ship had sunk.'

Ex. 38a has the same sort of ambiguity associated with 37a. On the other hand, 38b, with the complementizer, is not ambiguous. The evidence for the event coded in the embedded clause in 38b is perforce indirect, as can be seen from the use of the word 'realize' in the English translation, an indirect evidence verb by definition. Exx. 39a–b are the pronominalized versions of 38a–b, respectively:

39. a. *ʃufit-ha   yirkit*
    I.saw-it   it.sank
    'I saw it sink.' (Direct perception only)
  b. *ʃufit   ʔin-ha   yirkit*
    I.saw   that-it   it.sank
    'I realized that it sank.' (Indirect evidence only)

    The examples in 40 provide more support for the hypothesis that the function of *ʔinna* with perception verbs is to mark indirect evidence. If we look at the imperfective counterpart of the embedded perfective verb *yirkit* in the four sentences in 38 and 39, we find that only the imperfective counterparts of 38a and 39a (i.e. the direct perception sentences) are acceptable, whereas the imperfective counterparts of 38b and 39b are infelicitous. Note that the unacceptable strings 40b and 40d are the ones that contain the complementizer.

40. a. *ʃufit   is-safiina   btiɣrak*   (Counterpart of 38a)
    I.saw   the-ship   it.sink
    'I saw th⁻ ship sinking.'
      (Direct perception only)
  b. * *ʃufit   ʔinna   is-safiina   btiɣrak*   (Counterpart of 38b)
    I.saw   that   the-ship   it.sink

c.　*ʃufit-ha　bti_xrak*　　　　　　(Counterpart of 39a)
　　　I.saw-it　it.sink
　　　　'I saw it sinking.'
　　　　　(Direct perception only)
d.　* *ʃufit　ʔin-ha　btiɣrak*　　　　(Counterpart of 39b)
　　　I.saw　that-it　it.sink

In some sense, there is a strong interaction between tense/aspect and the visual modality in the examples in 40. The infelicity of 40b and 40d seems to be associated with the incompatibility of perceiving an event directly simultaneous with the presence of a marker that indicates indirect evidence: One can only see directly when the ship is sinking but cannot 'realize' indirectly that the ship is sinking at the same time one is seeing it sinking. Put differently, if one has direct visual access to an event, it is contradictory to introduce a device (i.e. *ʔinna*) to mark one's evidence as indirect.

In another sense, there may be no interaction between tense/aspect and modality in 40. In the context of a sinking ship where the verb 'to see' is involved, it is hard to resist the interpretation of the event of the sinking ship as not having resulted from direct visual perception. But a direct perception interpretation is not available for 40b or 40d under any circumstances. However, there may be contexts where the knowledge of the event of the sinking ship may have resulted from non-visual or indirect evidence with tense/aspect playing no part. One could, for example, imagine the following scenario. A woman who is driving back home from work on road X near a seaport sees a crowd of onlookers and rescue teams and decides to make a turn and take road Y instead. The next day she hears on the radio that a ship had been sinking at the time when she saw the crowd and took the alternative route. She later relates the experience to her friend saying:

41.　*ʃufit　ʔinna　is-safiina　btiɣrak,　fa-ʔaxað-et　ʃaariʕ　θaani*
　　　I.saw　that　the-ship　it.sink,　so-took-I　road　another
　　　　'I saw that the ship was sinking, so I took another road.'

Now the string in 40b has become well-formed. At no time, however, did the speaker have direct visual perception of the sinking ship.

6. *ʔINNA* BEFORE DIRECT QUOTES. It is unusual and unexpected to find instances in any kind of writing, including very informal personal letters etc., in PA (or for that matter any Arabic dialect that has the equivalent of *ʔinna*) of the complementizer introducing direct discourse. This is also true in formal written Arabic (as well as in English). However, in a corpus of recorded natural conversation, several occurrences were found of the complementizer preceding direct quotes. Here are two examples:

42.　*bitkuul　ʔinna　'maa　tkuul　ʔin-ni　ana　layla'*
　　　she.says　that　'NEG　you.say　that-I　I.am　Laila'
　　　　'She says, "Don't say that I am Laila."'
43.　*nashat-ni　ʔinna　'maa　tkuul　la　xaaltak*
　　　she.advised-me　that　'NEG　you.say　PREP　your.aunt
　　　　wa-la　la　hada'
　　　　and-NEG　PREP　one'
　　　'She advised me, "Don't tell your aunt or anyone else."'

These examples were uttered by a speaker who was narrating events that had taken place several years earlier, and so it is reasonable to expect that the speaker was not vouching for the accuracy of the quotes. If this is true, ʔinna seems in such examples to be employed as a device for the speaker to introduce the quotes as tentative/constructed, not as genuine/actual. That is to say, the quotes in 42–43 are not exactly what was said, but rather the speaker imagines the quotes to have been similar in content to the ones reported, and the speaker indicates by the use of ʔinna that he is not fully committed to the quotes, that the quotes are reconstructed approximations. (Awad 1995 discusses a parallel phenomenon involving the West Chadic language Bolanci.) A larger database must be examined before this hypothesis can be confirmed, however.

7. CONCLUSION. An outstanding issue not directly tackled in this paper but which deserves serious consideration concerns the role of ʔinna with those indicative complements where it appears to be completely optional—i.e. where ʔinna does not seem to make any semantic contribution whatsoever—e.g. examples 3 and 9. This issue notwithstanding, it is clear that ʔinna plays several functional roles. First, it creates a conceptual, semantic distance between the main clause and the embedded subjunctive clause when the subjects of the two clauses are coreferential. In a sense, ʔinna blocks the control that the matrix subject has over the achievement of the event/action in the embedded clause. Second, ʔinna sometimes functions as a device to lessen the matrix subject's commitment to the proposition in the embedded clause; this includes phenomena involving the so-called direct discourse as well as phenomena involving subjunctive, and to a lesser extent indicative, complements. Third, with indicative complements it sets up the complement as one that is semantically more self-contained or less dependent than otherwise. And fourth, with perception verbs it functions as a marker of indirect evidence. All these functions are significant communicative functions. The evidence presented in this paper at the very least suggests that the complementizer has an important semantic component, again a *communicative* function. It is not a formal functor whose purpose is merely to signal the subordinate status of the following clause.

NOTES

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[1] The unmarked complementizer ʔinna 'that' should not be confused with its identical looking 3MS-marked variant ʔin-na 'that he' in ex. 5.

[2] The subjunctive mood in PA, which only occurs in embedded clauses, expresses deontic modalities such as obligation, permission, and prohibition as well as modal categories like unreality and possibility.

[3] In PA, the subjunctive occurs only in embedded clauses.

[4] This sentence would be acceptable if the subject of the main clause and the subject of the embedded clause are interpreted as non-coreferential.

[5] This sentence would be acceptable if the subject of the main clause and the subject of the embedded clause are interpreted as non-coreferential.

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