DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 388 133 HE 028 675

TITLE	Exploring Our Identity: Catholic and American [and] Our Identity: Invitations and Reflections.
INSTITUTION	Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, Washington, D.C.
REPORT NO	ISBN-1-55833-136-0; ISBN-1-55833-147-6
PUB DATE	95
NOTE	92p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, Suite 650, One Dupont Circle, Washington, DC 20036 (1-9 copies, $6 each; 10 or more copies, $5 each).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Serials (022)
JOURNAL CIT	Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education; v15 n1-2 1994-95
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC04 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Administrator Attitudes; Awards; Catholic Educators; Catholics; *Catholic Schools; *Church Related Colleges; College Instruction; Conferences; *Educational Attitudes; *Educational Objectives; *Educational Quality; Ethics; Governance; Higher Education; Institutional Mission; Organizational Objectives; Religious Factors; Traditionalism; Values; Women Administrators
IDENTIFIERS	Canon Law; Roman Catholic Church; Theology

ABSTRACT

These two issues of "Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education" are devoted to the theme of what it means for a university or college to call itself Catholic. Many of the articles were presented at the 1994 and 1995 annual meetings of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (ACCU). Articles include: (1) "A View from the Circle" (Benito M. Lopez, Jr.); (2) "The Role of Religious Academic Communities" (Douglas Laycock); (3) "The Two Pedagogies: Discipleship and Citizenship" (John A. Coleman); (4) "Keynote Address" (J. Bryan Hehir); (5) "Homily: What Is Needed Is Trust" (James W. Malone); (6) "Implementing Ex Corde Ecclesiae" (Alice Gallin); (7) "Ex Corde Ecclesiae: A Conversation with the Bishops" (John J. Leibrecht and James W. Malone); (8) "Hesburgh Award Response" (Raymond C. Baumhart); (9) "Homily" (Franklyn M. Casale); (10) "No Sleep for the Lions: Women's Leadership in Catholic Higher Education" (Patricia A. McGuire); (11) "The Analogy of the Catholic University" (Leo J. O'Donovan); (12) "Who Will Speak for the Religious Traditions?" (Robert L. Wilken); (13) "Becoming a Great Catholic University" (Craig S. Lent); and (14) "The Church's Presence in the University and in University Culture" (Pio Laghi and others). (MDM)

Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education

Exploring Our Identity: Catholic and American

Our Identity: Invitations and Reflections

VOLUME 15, NUMBER 1 AND 2
1994-95

Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education



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Summer 1994

ISBN 1-55833-136-0

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ANNUAL MEETING
1994

A View From The Circle

"Fear is useless. What is Needed is Trust." Mark 5:36)

Benito M. Lopez, Jr.

Much of this summer issue of *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education* is focused on the proceedings of our 1994 annual meeting, which opened with a celebration of the Eucharist at which Bishop James Malone of Youngstown, Ohio, presided. Drawing his homily from the lectionary readings for the day, Bishop Malone notes that, when we confront the difficult issues we would later be called upon to visit, we will need to follow the example of the woman who seizes Jesus' cloak, and of Jairus, who, while his daughter dying, put his trust in the Lord. We will have to put our trust in the Lord (and perhaps in each other).

In his keynote address, Father J. Bryan Hehir responds to our request that he "explore the meaning, the possibilities and the challenges contained in Pope John Paul II's mandate to Catholic higher education." Father Hehir draws a road map describing his understanding of "the meaning, the conditions, and the content" of the dialogue between Gospel and culture in which the Holy Father calls our colleges and universities to engage.

As we began our planning for the theme of our next annual meeting, which will address issues of leadership in the changing environment in which our institutions function, we realized that our concerns for leadership flow from the mandate Father Hehir defined in February. So he will be with us at our next annual meeting to participate in a keynote panel with two other experts to focus on responses to the demands on leadership as our institutions prepare for the new millennium.

In her paper on the dialogue on *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Alice Gallin, OSU, captures the importance of this landmark discussion in which, for the first time, members of the hierarchy and the presidents of our colleges and universities engage in public discourse on the implementation of the requirement imposed on the bishops to develop ordinances to apply the norms in part two of the apostolic constitution in the United States.

More on the Apostolic Constitution

Within a week of our annual meeting, the Committee for the Review and Implementation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* held a previously scheduled meeting to chart the course the group will pursue. The tone of the discussion was markedly changed, and *communio* seemed to become a comfortable objective. Wider dialogue was promised and the committee agreed to identify and engage a staff person to facilitate its work. The staff person has now been identified, and an announcement awaits only the completion of arrangements for financing expected from several philanthropic sources.

More and wider discourse must be the first priority as the committee resumes its work. To be effective, the dialogue should not be limited to intra-diocesan/province meetings of bishops and presidents, because it is important that all who participate are fully aware of the concerns of all who will be affected by the ordinances. ACCU will be pleased to perform in any supporting role that might facilitate this process.

As I wrote to the presidents of ACCU member institutions recently, although the sessions with Cardinal Pio Laghi and Monsignor Edyvean during the General Assembly of the International Federation of Catholic Universities at Notre Dame were somewhat disappointing, we need to remember that they were addressed to a global audience and peppered with comments from a few very vocal rectors who are not at all empathetic with the concerns of the presidents of our institutions, concerns that are shared by rectors in other countries.

On the U.S. Department of Education

The National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities has informed its members that on August 1, the U.S. Department of Education notified more that 1,000 public, independent, and proprietary institutions that, according to its data, have been triggered for state postsecondary review under Part H, Subpart 1 of the 1992 Higher Education Act. Included in the 1,000 are more that 100 independent institutions, some of which may be Catholic. Any institution that receives such a notification and wishes to appeal it must act within seven days.

We urge any of our members that are notified, now or in the future, to be in touch with NAICU. We would

appreciate your furnishing a copy of the notice to ACCU so that we may monitor the impact of Part H on our institutions. ACCU is pleased to help in any way you may request.

And on Other Matters

In John Coleman's essay "The Two Pedagogies: Discipleship and Citizenship," one of the prescribed readings for the recent Justice and Peace Education meeting sponsored by ACCU and held at John Carroll University, the author, among other things, explores the tensions between the two and the nature of each, and suggest that a church that teaches discipleship must also teach citizenship.

In "The Role of Religious Academic Communities," Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research at the University of Texas Law School, calls attention to the phenomenon that, in secular academic communities, positions flowing from religious beliefs are not acceptable and suggests that it may be invading sectarian academic communities as well. The author suggests responses to this phenomenon, acknowledging that at least one of his positions may not enjoy constitutional or legislative protection.

And a Second Invitation

We welcome any comments in response to the articles that appear in "Current Issues" as well as suggestions on content, focus, style or any other concern.

Benito M. Lopez, Jr.
Executive Director

The Role of Religious Academic Communities

Douglas Laycock

Controversy continues over the right of governments and of academic associations to enforce the full secular scope of academic freedom at religiously affiliated universities. On many issues, but especially on this one, I am struck by the extraordinary gulf in understanding between most secular academics and most seriously religious citizens, including seriously religious academics. Sitting in the middle and talking to both sides, I have the sense that religious academics have some understanding of the secularists, maybe because they are exposed to so many more of them. But I also have the sense that many of the secularists have no understanding whatever of the believers.

I. THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS UNIVERSITIES

Two aspects of most believers' religious commitments are central to the role of religiously affiliated universities, and Judge Noonan's article in this issue of *The Journal of College and University Law* touches on both of them.[1] First, for most believers, part of the individual exercise of religion is to form and join in communities of faith exercising the same religion. I do not think it matters whether we conceive of religious exercise as a group right or an individual right. I think it is both, as Judge Noonan has said. But even if one conceives of it only as an individual right, part of that individual right is the right to form a religious community.

Second, most serious believers believe that the religious aspects of their lives cannot be segregated or isolated from the other aspects of their lives. They believe that their religious commitments are relevant to their other roles. They reject the model of religion as something private, reserved for Sunday morning or Friday night, and irrelevant to the rest of the week.

Thomas Shaffer[2] and others[3] have created a serious literature on what it means to be a Christian lawyer or a Christian law teacher. It is a sophisticated and nuanced literature. Of course there are religious polemicists and absolutists, but little of this literature is in that genre. Most religious law teachers recognize that their roles sometimes conflict–that they owe duties to students, colleagues, clients, and employers, many of whom do not share their religious commitments. If there is an absolutist position in this debate, it is the position of many secular academics that every institution must follow exactly the same rules with no exceptions, however minor.

The combined effect of the commitment to religious communities and the commitment to integrate religion with all aspects of life is that some of the religious individuals in academia will be attracted to religiously affiliated institutions of higher education. That is true for law teachers as well as for faculty in other disciplines. Their religion is important to their understanding of law, to their conduct as lawyers, and

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Douglas Laycock holds the Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law at the University of Texas Law School. *This article first appeared in* The Journal of College and University Law, *summer 1993.*

[1] John T. Noonan, Religious Law Schools and The First Amendment, 19 J.C. & U.L. 43 (1993).

[2] See Thomas L. Shaffer, *Faith and the Professions* (1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, *On Being a Christian and a Lawyer* (1980); Thomas L. Shaffer, *Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?*, 23 GA. L. Rev. 1021 (1989); Thomas L. Shaffer, *Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics*, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 877 (1982); Thomas L. Shaffer, *Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility*, 48 S. CAL. L. Rev. 721 (1975).

[3] See Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd, *The Role of Religious Convictions in the Teaching of Law Students*, 17 J. Legal Professions--(forthcoming 1992);--(forthcoming 1992); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., *The Gospel in the Law: The Jurisprudence of Pastor Neuhaus*, 12 Val. U. L. Rev. 15 (1979); Rex E. Lee, *The Role of the Religious Law School*, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1175 (1985); John T. Noonan, *A Catholic Law School*, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1037 (1992); Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert E. Rodes, Jr., *A Catholic Theology for Roman Catholic Law Schools*, 14 U. Dayton L. Rev. 5 (1988). the Shaffer & Rodes article is accompanied by brief responses from James L. Heft, Richard B. Saphire, and Susan Brenner. For shorter essays on there themes, by academics and practicing lawyers, pick up almost any issues of the *Christian Legal Society Quarterly*.

to their conduct as law teachers. Given the opportunity, many religious law teachers would pursue that interaction in a like-minded community.

It follows that schools such as Brigham Young, Notre Dame, Baylor, Pepperdine, Valparaiso, and Cardozo are, in significant part, exercises of religion. Each of them is a faith community in pursuit of a common project. The nature of that community is both religious and academic, and the balance between the two commitments is both delicate and precarious. If the school becomes wholly religious, it will lose its academic standing, and if it becomes wholly academic, it will no longer be religious. The difficulty of maintaining the balance is illustrated by the very large number of American schools that have failed to maintain the balance. Examples include Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Northwestern, Vanderbilt, Boston University, and Southern Methodist. Some of these schools retain vestiges of their original religious commitment, perhaps more than an outside observer can see, but none of them appear to remain religious institutions in any sense that affects the daily lives of students and faculty. There are other religious universities that are not so obviously secularized but seem well along the way, where some students and faculty complain that the religious element has become too attenuated.[4]

But a few institutions have successfully maintained a community that is both seriously religious and seriously academic. I want to provide some feel for the role that these institutions play in the lives of religious academics. To do that, I will do something that is not my usual style, but is the style of other legal academics these days. I will tell some stories about the importance of these communities to individuals. Some of the stories involve law professors; some involve professors in other disciplines.

I will start with another discipline. This professor is a blue-chip All-American scholar. She publishes prize-winning books. She is a member of the most exclusive research association in her discipline. She advises the federal government at the highest levels in her discipline. She wins teaching awards. She has held important administrative positions and served on key committees; she is trusted and respected by her colleagues. She has obviously belied the prediction of her dissertation supervisor, who told her that she could not be good in her academic discipline and also be a good Catholic.

She is at an elite public institution, but she often wishes she were at Notre Dame. Notre Dame is quite respectable in her field, but not so prestigious as the school where she is now. But she says:

> When I'm at Notre Dame, I'm a whole person again. When I'm at Notre Dame, I don't have to suppress the most important part of my life and conceal it from my colleagues. When I'm at Notre Dame, there is a community that I'm comfortable with and that I can relate to.

If Notre Dame made an offer, and if she were not tied down by family obligations, she would sacrifice the prestige and move in a minute.

My second story deals with another highly successful teacher and scholar, an Episcopalian teaching at an elite public law school. Episcopalians are not a denomination usually thought to be alienated from elite American culture. Episcopalians are sometimes derided by conservatives as not religious enough to count.[5] This law teacher once said to me:

> I get so tired of the pervasive commitment to secularism in this place. There are things you cannot say. There are things that make perfect sense to say at church that make no sense to say in this law school—that no one *would* say in this law school.

The third and fourth stories involve the same analogy. I have heard it twice, from sources in different parts of the country; I suspect it has circulated widely among religious academics. One of my sources is an evangelical Protestant teaching at a non-elite religious law school, who quotes a friend teaching in some unidentified state law school. The friend contemplates what would happen if he were ever to say in a faculty meeting, "This is a difficult issue. Let's meet again in two days. I want to pray about this before I vote." My other source is a member of a small Protestant denomination, who teaches in another discipline at an

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[4] On the problem of preserving both religious and scholarly commitments throughout the institution, see James Tunstead Burtchaell, *The Decline and Fall of the Christian College (II)*, 13 *First Things* 30 (May 1991); James Tunstead Burtchaell, *The Decline and Fall of the Christian College*, 12 *First Things* 16 (Apr. 1991); Lee, *supra* note 3, at 1175; David W. Lutz, *Can Notre Dame Be Saved?*, 19 *First Things* 35 (Jan. 1992); George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University*, 9 *First Things* 34 (Jan. 1991); Leonard J. Nelson, III, *God and Man in the Catholic Law School*, 26 Cath. Law. 172 (1981). For essays on the secularization of both public and church-affiliated institutions, see *The Secularization of the Academy* (George M. Marsden & Bradley J. Longfield, eds., 1993).

[5] See Richard Brookhiser, "Are There Episcopalians in Fox Holes? What in Heaven's Name is Happening to the Episcopal Church?", *National Review*, July 29, 1991, at 24.

elite private school. He describes the reaction when he actually did say, in a seminar on ethical issues, that Christian theologians had said something about the issue under discussion.

The law professor imagining the reaction, and the other professor reporting the actual reaction, both use the same analogy. "It would be (It was) as though I had farted." The only response to such inappropriate behavior is to silently ignore it, and to go on as if nothing had happened.

Three of these stories are about concealment--about hiding a central part of one's identity from scholarly colleagues. They are like the stories of gays and lesbians who are still in the closet. The last story--the professor who spoke up at the ethics seminar--is a story of coming out of the closet. The response did not make him glad that he had come out. These stories help illustrate the unadorned conclusion of a fifth informant, a scholar with two Ivy League degrees who is now teaching at a school with strong religious commitments. He says one reason for joining that faculty was that, given what he wanted to work on, his academic freedom would be better protected there than at any secular school of comparable quality.[6]

All these informants are people who feel the need for the kind of combined religious and academic community that only a place like Brigham Young or Baylor or Notre Dame or Cardozo can provide. There are very few of those places left. The ones that remain cannot survive without careful nurturing of the balance between their religious commitments and their academic commitments. A large number of small undergraduate colleges have maintained serious religious and academic teaching commitments, without much in the way of research programs or academic prestige, and we have data on the practices of these schools.[7] They perform a valuable function, but they are usually not an option for scholars committed to research.

II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED LIMITS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Much of the nurturing of a religious university's dual commitments will be informal. It will be social and communal. It will be wholly consistent with the most rigorous understanding of academic freedom. But at least some of that nurturing must depart from the conceptions of academic freedom that we apply in secular institutions.

At the very least, these schools must indulge a hiring preference. They must be free to take into account their need to maintain the necessary core of Catholic faculty or Mormon faculty or whatever. Given the realities of the teaching market, they will get plenty of applications from non-Catholics, from non-Mormons, from people who are not attracted to the institution but want some teaching job somewhere. Some of these applicants, if hired, will be committed to changing the institution, committed to turning Notre Dame or Baylor into North-Western or Vanderbilt. The institution has to be able to take account of the religious part of its needs at the hiring stage.

The problem is not that religious ideas cannot survive in competition with secular ideas.[8] Religious ideas have always seemed compellingly true to some and incomprehensible to others, and that is unlikely to change. The religious minority among academics is in no danger of disappearing. But religious universities

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[6] *Cf.* Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), *cert. denied*, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992) (university forbade "1) the interjection of religious beliefs and/or preferences during instructional time periods, and 2) the optional classes where a 'Christian Perspective' of an academic topic is delivered." *Id.* at 1069). A survey of very small evangelical colleges affiliated with the Christian college Coalition also found a widespread view that "freedom for faculty members to view data within Christian assumptions and to witness (non-coercively) to Christian commitments" would be restricted at many secular institutions of higher education. Barry L. Gallen, Faculty Academic Freedom in Member Institutions of the Christian College Coalition 135 (1983) (Unpublished, D.Ed. dissertation, Indiana University).

[7] See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. & Philip R. Moots, *Government and Campus: Federal Regulation of Religiously Affiliated Higher Education 8-10* (1992). Gaffney & Moots report a 1978 survey or religiously affiliated colleges and universities. The survey was sent to 801 schools, of whom 226 responded, from which sixteen seminaries and bible colleges were eliminated. thus, the data reflect the responses of 210 schools offering education in secular subjects. Only twenty-eight of these schools had more than 3,000 students, and only six of those had more than 7,500 students. Other data from this survey is reported *infra* notes 9 and 39.

[8] See Judith Jarvis Thomson and Matthew W. Finkin, *Academic Freedom and Church Related Higher Education: A Reply to Professor McConnell. Freedom and Tenure in the Academy* 419, 421 (William W. Van Alstyne, ed.) (1993), for this misunderstanding of the need for limitations on academic freedom. The article to which Thompson and Finkin are replying was quite clear that its principal concern about survival of religious institutions was the risk of random distribution of faculty among institutions. Michael W. McConnell, *Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities*, 53 Law & Contemp., Probs. No. 3 at 303, 313 (Summer 1990).

cannot survive if the religious individuals are scattered randomly among all the faculties. To gather a critical mass of religious academics in a single community, the institution must take account of religious commitment in hiring. At least as of fifteen years ago, most religiously affiliated colleges and universities reported religious preferences in hiring for at least some faculty positions, and nearly half reported such preferences for all faculty positions.[9]

Limitations on the academic freedom of incumbent faculty are far more controversial both within and without religious universities, and for that reason they are rarely imposed, especially in institutions that take their academic commitments seriously. But all religiously affiliated institutions must have the constitutional right to interfere with the academic freedom of their incumbent faculty. The rare cases in which it is thought necessary to exercise this right usually arise in theology departments; I do not know a single example that has actually arisen in a law school. There is an actual dispute in law schools over codes of moral behavior, triggered when the Association of American Law Schools repealed the religious exemption from the ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.[10] But even this so far appears to be a passionate argument over principle and policy; I know of no disputes over actual application of the competing principles.

Even so, genuine academic-freedom controversies are at least imaginable, even in law schools and even with respect to teaching and writing that is clearly within the usual scope of academic freedom. There may be issues of intense religious commitment and deep symbolic importance, with respect to which the self-definition of the community requires unanimity or at least acquiescence among faculty and administrators. With respect to these few issues, a faculty member who actively disagrees will have to move elsewhere. For example, I do not think we can expect, in the name of academic freedom, that a faculty member at Notre Dame can litigate law-reform abortion cases on the pro-choice side. It is entirely appropriate for academics to be involved in the abortion issues on either side. But it is also entirely appropriate for Notre Dame to say that is faculty cannot use Notre Dame as a platform for abortion rights, or commit Notre Dame's name and facilities to pro-choice activism. I suspect that Cardozo would face similar problems of institutional identity if it had a faculty member writing that the holocaust was a legitimate response to provocation or disloyalty.

In the extreme case, a religious university must have the legal right to discharge such a faculty member, even one with tenure. Obviously, such a discharge imposes hardship on the faculty member, and the institution would be aware of that. It is nearly as obvious that such a discharge imposes serious costs on the institution. An institution that wants any respect for the academic part of its mission will be extraordinarily reluctant to restrict the academic freedom of its faculty. Both faculty and administration must know that they will pay an enormous price in terms of the respect of their peers at other institutions, and in terms of their capacity to recruit new faculty. The Catholic University of America will pay for years in the academic marketplace for its decision to restrict Father Curran's teaching.[11] There are enormous incentives not to impose any sanction likely to come to public notice.

If, notwithstanding these costs, Notre Dame were to decide that as a matter of self-definition, as a matter of keeping faith with parents who want a Catholic education for their children, or for whatever reasons that might arise within the Notre Dame community–if Notre Dame were to decide that it simply cannot retain a faculty member leading the pro-choice movement, the state and the larger academic community would have to respect Notre Dame's right to act on that decision. I do not know what Notre Dame would actually decide in such a case; I am confident only that there would be sharp debate within the Notre Dame community. Most religious universities proclaim their commitment to academic freedom, but if in the extreme case they found it necessary to make an exception for religious reasons, the Free Exercise Clause should protect them. If an academically respectable school denies or revokes tenure over a religious issues, the very fact that a good school would do it is powerful evidence that the issue is of supreme

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[9] Gaffney & Moots, *supra* note 7, at 34.

[10] See Ass'n Am. Law Schools Exec. Comm. Reg. 6-17 (available from the Association). For earlier examples, see Carl S. Hawkins, *Accreditation of Church-Related Law Schools*, 32 J. Legal Educ. 172, 174-74, 179-81 (1982); Sanford H. Kadish, *Church-Related Law Schools: Academic Values and Deference to Religion*, 32 J. Legal Educ. 161, 163, 169 (1982).

[11] For accounts of this controversy, see "The Catholic University of America," 75 *Academe* No. 5 at 27 (Sept.-Oct. 1989); for the legal resolution see Curran v. Catholic University, No. 1562-87 (D.C. Sup'r Ct. 1989).

importance to the school. I would defend their right to do it, just as I defended Catholic University's right to act in the case of Father Curran.[12]

When I say the religious university has a right to discharge in these situations, I mean that legislatures, judges, administrative agencies, and accreditation authorities are constitutionally precluded from imposing sanctions on the institution, or ordering reinstatement of the faculty member, or awarding compensation to the faculty member, on the basis of any alleged duty imposed on the institution from the outside. The only sanction I would permit is a suit for breach of contract if the institution had entered into a contract that was clearly written to be enforced in a secular court.[13]

I have been told that it is an extreme position to say that Notre Dame could fire a tenured faculty member. But that comment simply highlights the gulf between secular and religious understandings of religious institutions. The extreme position is to say that Notre Dame can be forced by legal sanction to retain and support the work of a faculty member leading the pro-choice movement, or that The Catholic University of America could be forced to retain and support the work of a dissident theologian. The Constitution protects the free exercise of religion from state interference; it does not protect the right of religious dissenters to use the name and facilities of religious institutions.

The examples I have offered do not exhaust the possible conflicts between religious values and academic or other important secular values. If religious universities are free to discipline or exclude sexually active gays and lesbians, as religious law schools contend in their current dispute with the AALS, why can they not forbid interracial dating or exclude African-Americans altogether? Fortunately, very few universities with religious affiliations, and none with both religious affiliations and even a pretense of intellectual quality, claim a right to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. We have a real issue with respect to sexual orientation at a small number of seriously religious high-quality schools. But I know of no issue at such schools with respect to race or sex.

We may have the problem at fringe schools. What should we do about It? If the school is a religious institution, and if religious institutions can discriminate on the basis of religion or sexual morality, then does it follow that they can act on their religious commitments with respect to anything else, even including discrimination on the basis of race? I have argued that they can, so long as they remain pervasively religious enclaves and do not take over a significant part of the function of public education.[14] But that is not the law, there is no apparent support for changing the law, and it is clear that we can distinguish race from homosexuality in defensible ways if we choose to do so.

The Supreme Court said in *Bob Jones University v. United States* that the interest in racial equality in education is a compelling interest that overrides any free-exercise right.[15] That was before the Court largely repealed the Free Exercise Clause in *Employment Division v. Smith*.[16] The nation can choose to accept the holding in *Bob Jones* and put race in a special category. As a polity we may want to say that race is special even for free-exercise issues, because race in this country has a special history, because we suspect that many religious claims about race are insincere

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[12] Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, *Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion*, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1455 (1988).

[13] This distinction is elaborated *id.* at 1467-73. The distinction between outside regulation and internal contract follows from a more basic point that I may have assumed without sufficient elaboration. Michael McConnell did elaborate the point, in an unpublished response to Thomas & Finkin, *supra* note 8:

> Professors Thomson and Finkin concede the value of religiously distinctive institutions of higher learning, but deny that "it conduces to the common good that they continue to exist at the cost of using coercion." (Citing *id.* at 423, 425-26, 429.) But who is coercing whom? A religious college is a voluntary institution, formed by like-minded scholars, benefactors, and students for the pursuit of knowledge within a particular tradition of thought. No one coerces anyone to join. Internal enforcement of the rules of a voluntary association is no "coercion." It more closely resembles freedom of contract.

[14] Douglas Laycock, *Tax Exemption for Racially Discriminatory Religious Discriminatory Schools*, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 259 (1982).

[15] 461 U.S. 574, 602-04, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).

[16] 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). For criticism of *Smith*, see James D. Gordon III, *Free Exercise on the Mountaintop*, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, *Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision*, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990); Douglas Laycock, *The Remnants of Free Exercise*, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. For a defense of *Smith*'s holding (but not of the opinion), see William P. Marshall, *In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism*, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991). See also Michael W. McConnell, *A Response to Professor Marshall*, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329 (1991).

anyway, and because even sincere beliefs in racial discrimination are less central to most religious traditions than theology or sexual morality. If that is what the polity believes, we can draw a line and explain it in terms of compelling interest, as the Supreme Court did in *Bob Jones*.[17] The line would even be a bright line: the Free Exercise Clause does not protect racial discrimination in educational institutions. Period.

Religious limitations on academic freedom may also have implications for teaching. Could a religious law school direct that certain cases not be taught, or that or strong it might be academically. Religiously committed law schools have every reason not to let their students be surprised by a "bad" case the first time someone cites it against them.

But let us assume the unimaginable, that a religious law school has a short list of cases that its faculty is forbidden to assign. So what? There is not case that the accreditation authorities require every law student in America to be taught, and I doubt there is any case that every law student in American actually is taught. I graduated from The University of Chicago Law School without being assigned to read *Marbury v. Madison*,[18] *Hawkins v. McGee*,[19] or *Pierson v. Post*.[20] The University of Texas Law School is about to begin graduating one hundred students per year to whom *Marbury* was never assigned;[21] it has long graduated a substantial number to whom *Roe v. Wade* was never assigned.[22]

If an idiosyncratic instructor omits a case that most of us think is central to a course, the conventional wisdom is to defend the instructor's academic freedom. The conventional wisdom does not change much if the instructor is teaching the only section of a required course. Colleagues might intervene in a sufficiently extreme case, but the accreditation authorities would not. If an individual instructor can withhold the case from the whole student body without attracting the attention of the accreditation authorities, it is hard to see why a religious law school cannot do so as a matter of institutional policy.

I think it far easier to conclude that a religious school could direct that certain cases be taught in particular ways that reflect the school's religious commitments. For example, a religious law school could direct its faculty that, when they teach *Roe v. Wade*, they have to teach that the sponsoring church believes the case is wrong, and they have to make sure their students understand the arguments supporting that belief. Teaching that *Roe* is wrong is not like teaching that the earth is flat; it is not merely a religious view; it is not a view inconsistent with a professional education. Having the institution rather than individual faculty make pedagogical choices is not in my view a good way to run a law school, but I would not withhold accreditation.

My standard for withholding accreditation for religiously-motivated policies is pretty simple. The standard should not be whether these religious law schools, because of their religious commitments, have departed from the norms we uphold for most of our institutions. The standard should be: Have these

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[17] I do not mean to imply that religious centrality is a threshold to any protection of free exercise. But I do believe that the compelling interest test is a form of balancing, with the scales titled heavily against the government, and that the centrality of a religious practice is relevant to the balance. Laycock, *supra* note 16, at 31-33. "What the compelling interest test should require is that the government interest in regulating religion compelling outweigh the resulting burden on religion, whatever the magnitude of that burden.

[18] 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). *Marbury* was a staple of Constitutional Law I; my classmates who took the course spent seven weeks on it--on a quarter system where class lasted only ten weeks. But I took Constitutional Law II and III and skipped Constitutional Law I. No constitutional law course was required at Chicago.

[19] 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). This case appeared in the casebook used at Chicago in 1970, but the damages issue that is the staple introduction to Contracts had been edited out. Friedrich Kessler & Grant Gilmore, *Contracts: Cases and Materials 111-12* (2d ed. 1970). To the best of my recollection, the part that remained was not assigned.

[20] 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This staple of first-year property casebooks is not mentioned in the casebook used at Chicago in 1970. Allison Dunham, *Modern Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials* (2d ed. 1958). I learned nothing of personal property, takings, or future interests; I was later shocked to learn that first-year students at Texas and many other law schools learn nothing of mortgages or the recording system.

[21] My colleague Sanford Levinson has decided not to assign *Marbury* in his section of Constitutional Law I. The hundred students randomly assigned to his section are unlikely to read the case elsewhere in the curriculum.

[22] Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. St. 705 (1973), is taught by two of the six faculty who most often teach the five sections of Constitutional Law I. All students must elect an additional constitutional law course, but many options are available. Students who elect a course in free speech or equal protection are unlikely to encounter *Roe* unless they got it in Constitutional Law I. I assume that *Roe* was the principal example Professor Hodes had in mind when he first asked this question about omitting cases for religious reasons.

schools departed in such a way that the education actually delivered is worse than that delivered at the worst secular law school that is currently accredited?

There were audible gasps in the room when I said that to an audience of officials of academic associations. Those gasps are significant. The gaspers know that we are not talking about quality of education in any of these disputes. The gaspers know that many of these religious schools have a long way to fall before their legal education would be at all comparable to that of the worst secular schools already accredited. There are a lot of weak schools, schools without adequate resources, schools that lose most of the good applicants to stronger competitors, schools that for whatever reason cannot deliver a legal education the accreditors consider excellent, or that cannot even meet all the formal accreditation standards. But the reasons for their failure are secular, and academics tend to be tolerant of secular failings. Perhaps more important, the authorities believe that these schools are incapable of substantial improvement, at least in the short term. If compliance is impossible, then coercion to comply is futile, and it would be impractical to disaccredit all the schools in such situations.

But academics are not so tolerant of religious institutions. More important, the authorities believe that religious schools could comply by making what seems to the authorities only a modest departure from religious commitments. Because compliance is physically possible, coercion seems feasible. So it has seemed to religious persecutors through the ages. But if the authorities are coercing religious schools to abandon their religious commitments, they must have a compelling governmental interest.[23] I do not think they can begin to argue about a plausible compelling interest until the quality of education falls below that of the weakest secular schools.

What the authorities say, sometimes explicitly and always in effect, is that the religious schools have to compromise, i.e., that they have to compromise their religious commitments. They can keep their religious commitment so long as it does not interfere with our secular standards, but they cannot depart from our secular standards in any way. That is no compromise at all. The secular authorities will compromise by letting religious schools exist if they submit to all the secular authorities' demands.

The compromise already in place, which the secular side should happily accept, is that the secular side controls 97% or so of the institutions. Can the three percent have some existence of their own? Can the three percent strike their own balance of religious and academic commitments? Or is the secular model so absolutist that it cannot tolerate a three percent minority with a different solution? That is the issue.

In these debates about academic freedom in religious institutions, I sense from many on the secular side hostility to the very nature of these institutions. Hostility is frequently expressed with respect to the two commitments with which I began, the commitments to religious community and to integration of religion with the whole person. The secular regulator often says something like: "Of course I respect your religious liberty, but this is not a religious institution. This is a law school." Such a regulator rejects the claim that there can be such a thing as a religious law school, and therefore implicitly rejects the view that religion can be integrated with the rest of one's life in a communal enterprise.

These rejections of basic religious commitments are often corollaries of what is not spoken, which is a tendency to reject religious faith outright as an incomprehensible survival of superstition.[24] But let us give our hypothetical regulator the benefit of the doubt and assume that she genuinely is not hostile to religion in what she conceives to be its proper place. She simply believes that controlling a law school is not the proper place. She says in complete good faith that you can practice your religion, but not communally and at the same time integrated with your work as a legal scholar. That is equivalent to saying: "You cannot practice your religion as you understand it. Rather, you can practice it only as I think I would understand it, if I understood it at all." That is not much of a concession to the free exercise of religion.[25]

Secular academics are obviously free to disagree about the benefits of maintaining institutions that are

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[23] Even after Employment Div., Or., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See *infra* note 27 and accompanying text.

[24] See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, *Outlaw Blues*, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1418, 1427 (1989) (reviewing Mark Tushnet, *Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law* (1988)) ("divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious nonsense"); Tony Pasquarello, *Humanism's Thorn: The Case of the Bright Believers*, 13 Free Inquiry 1 at 38, 39 (Winter 1992/93) ("And there lies our dilemma--that nasty set of incompatible propositions: 1. There are bright believers. 2. Bright people don't believe nonsense. 3. Traditional theism is nonsense.").

[25] For an example of this sort of argument, see Thompson & Finkin, *supra* note 8, at 425 n. 23 (arguing that no religious community needs colleges and universities, because some religious communities do not have them).

both religious and academic. The AALS and the American Association of University Professors are entirely within their rights to issue statements regretting the limitations on academic freedom at religious universities, and alerting potential students and faculty to those limitations. They can put the warning in terms that are respectful and tolerant, or vociferous and hostile, or even vicious and hateful. They too are entitled to the full protections of the First Amendment.

I would not suggest that they minimize their fundamental policy disagreement with religious limitations on academic freedom, or any of their other disagreements with religion. Those disagreements are important. But I think they would do well to put their disagreements in as tolerant and nonjudgmental a fashion as possible. One of the things we should have learned from the history of religious conflict is that however vigorous our religious disagreements, it is important to the welfare of the whole society that we contain those disagreements, that we respect other religious traditions even when we disagree, and even when we are trying to limit what we perceive to be the pernicious consequences of some of those traditions. Intense condemnation of religious minorities flares quickly into persecution, even in this country.[26]

My legal claim is only that it is unlawful to go beyond statements of disapproval and invoke the power of the state to coerce compliance to secular norms of academic freedom. If a religious school were to be threatened with disaccreditation because of its religious preference in hiring, or because it shut down the abortion-rights clinic, the threat would violate the Constitution. Even under *Smith*, this should be a hybrid right, involving the institution's rights of free exercise, free speech, and religious education of the young.[27] I agree with Judge Noonan that we should not have to talk about it as a hybrid. But at the moment, that is the way legal doctrine requires it to be argued.

Even if the religious university's claim were not a hybrid claim and *Smith* deprived the religious schools of all constitutional protection, that should not free the AALS or the AAUP to coerce religious schools. Religious liberty as understood by the AALS or the AAUP should not be limited to religious liberty as understood by Justice Scalia or Chief Justice Rehnquist.[28] The AALS and the AAUP do not take the Supreme Court's word for any other form of liberty. They do not believe that free-speech rights for public employees are properly limited by *Connick* v. *Myers*[29] to matters "of public concern."[30] And if the Supreme Court were ever to say, as the Eleventh Circuit recently said in *Bishop* v. *Aronov*,[31] that academic freedom in the public-university classroom is not a First Amendment right at all, because faculty are just agents of the state, the AAUP and the AALS would not accept that for a minute. We are equally obliged to make up our own minds about a proper conception of religious liberty. Moreover, our views on religious liberty should not be distorted by our views on religion. A central point of religious liberty is to reduce the effect of disagreements about religion.

Once the religious commitments of the individuals who form religiously affiliated law schools are understood, it follows that those law schools are an exercise of religion, and that the operation of those schools is within the proper scope of religious liberty for the religious-academic communities that constitute them. The academic community should respect religious liberty even if the Supreme Court does not force it to do so.

III. THE PROBLEM OF NOTICE

Even for readers who accept everything I have said, an important collateral issue remains. Do religious universities have either a legal or moral duty to warn potential faculty of religious restrictions on academic freedom?

In its 1940 Statement of Principles, the AAUP recognized that religious commitments might require limitations on academic freedom, but it insisted that these limitations should be fully disclosed in advance.[32]

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[26] See Laycock, *supra* note 16 at 59-68.

[27] See Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 (U.S. 872, 881-82, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990); *cf.* People v. DeJorge, 1993 Westlaw 206470, *3 + n.27 (Mich. May 25, 1993) (finding hybrid free-exercise right to educate children at home with uncertified teachers).

[28] The argument that the AAUP should take the Supreme Court's word for the scope of religious liberty is made in Thompson & Finkin, *supra* note 8, at 425.

[29] 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). For criticism of the case and its application to academic freedom, see Matthew W. Finkin, *Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment*, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1323 (1988).

[30] For general analysis and criticism of the public concern doctrine, see Cynthia L. Estlund, *Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category*, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990).

[31] 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), *cert. denied*, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).

[32] American Ass'n of Univ. Professors & Association of Am. Colleges, Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), In American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Policy Documents & Reports 3 (1990) ("Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or

Subsequent AAUP statements have attempted to interpret away this exception, which is commonly referred to as the "limitations clause." A 1970 interpretation asserted that "most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure."[33] A 1988 subcommittee announced that institutions that invoke the limitations clause forfeit "the moral right to proclaim themselves as authentic seats of higher learning."[34] The full committee on academic freedom rejected this report, and voted instead that invoking the clause "does not relieve an institution of its obligation to afford academic freedom as called for in the 1940 Statement."[35] In subsequent commentary, the committee's chair reported his view that this report held schools invoking the limitations clause to the same standards of full academic freedom as any school not invoking the clause, but that a majority of his committee described the report as a tautology that begged all questions.[36] Michael McConnell reads recent AAUP reports censuring religious institutions as de facto repudiation of the limitations clause and of any recognition of the needs of religious universities, whatever the ambiguity of the AAUP's formal statements.[37]

Whatever its view of the merits of the limitations clause, the AAUP presumably still believes that religious schools that limit academic freedom should disclose in advance. Ironically, by purporting to expel from the academic community any school that invokes the limitations clause, or to deprive schools of any benefit even when they invoke it, the AAUP ensures that few academically serious universities will ever disclose potential limits on academic freedom. The most notable questions.[38] Michael McConnell reads recent AAUP reports censuring religious institutions as de facto repudiation of the limitations clause and of any recognition of the needs of religious universities, whatever the ambiguity of the AAUP's formal statements.[37]

Whatever its view of the merits of the limitations clause, the AAUP presumably still believes that religious schools that limit academic freedom should disclose in advance. Ironically, by purporting to expel from the academic community any school that invokes the limitations clause, or to deprive schools of any benefit even when they invoke it, the AAUP ensures that few academically serious universities will ever disclose potential limits on academic freedom. The most notable exception is Brigham Young, which has recently completed a courageous effort to state as carefully as possible the limitations on academic freedom necessary to its mission.[38] Smaller, less prestigious colleges are more likely to state formal limits on academic freedom,[39] but there is reason to

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other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment."). This important document is reprinted in 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. No. 3 at 407 (Summer 1990) (Appendix B to Symposium on *Freedom and Tenure in the Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles*).

[33] American Ass'n. of Univ. Professors, 1970 Interpretive Comments, in Policies, Documents & Reports, *supra* note 32, at 6. This statement about the desires of church-related schools was written by Professor Sanford Kadish, who never taught in such a school and admitted that he had not consulted broadly with the leadership of such schools. Conversation between Sanford Kadish and Edward McGlynn Gaffney, summarized in letter from Gaffney to Douglas Laycock, December 20, 1992 (copy on file with author). Not surprisingly, small evangelical colleges disagree with Kadish's generalization. Callen, *supra* note 6, 134-35.

[34] Subcommittee of Committee A, *The "Limitations" Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles*, 74 Academe No. 5 at 52, 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1988).

[35] *Report of Committee A 1988-89*, 75 Academe No. 5 at 49, 54 (Sept.-Oct 1988).

[36] *Id.*

[37] McConnell, *supra* note 8, at 311.

[38] Statement on Academic Freedom at Brigham Young University (1992) (reprinted as Appendix to this Article.)

[39] About a third of the mostly-small church-affiliated colleges responding to a 1978 survey reported that a clause of their faculty employment contracts requires adherence to or respect for the beliefs or values taught by the affiliated church. Philip R. Moors & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., *Church and Campus: Legal Issues in Religiously Affiliated Higher Education* 73-74 (1979). Seven of the 210 schools had had occasion to enforce one of these clauses in the previous five years (1973-78). *Id.* Neither of the books based on this study describes these seven disputes. For a brief description of the survey, see *supra* note 7.

A 1983 survey of twenty-five small evangelical colleges found that eighteen had formal statements guaranteeing academic freedom, but that in all eighteen, "freedom was limited to some degree by the religious commitments central to the distinctive nature of these colleges." Callen, *supra* note 6, at 134. Callen concluded that the remaining schools had similar policies but not formal statements. A survey of 1327 full-time faculty at these schools, with 1024 usable responses, found a mean

believe that most of these statements are general and conclusory.[40]

The academic pressure against real disclosure is unfortunate, because it is clear that disclosure is better than nondisclosure. If an academic institution departs from the usual norms of academic freedom, prospective faculty have a strong interest in knowing that fact before they commit a part of their life to the institution. Relocation is always costly, and especially so in an age of two-career families. Full disclosure should be encouraged by statements that respect rather than deride the dual aspirations of religious universities.

But disclosure will never be easy, for the quite legitimate reason that the university's response to hard cases cannot be known in advance, and for the less attractive human reason that the faculty has strong incentives to dissemble. All faculties in a recruiting mode paint the best possible picture of their institution. When a departmental faculty at a religious university is recruiting a "hot" secular prospect, and the prospect asks if the institution's religious commitments are ever a problem for the faculty, there is great temptation to assure him that religious commitments will never affect him or make any demands on him. If religious demands are enforced only by social sanction and not by formal rules, the recruiters may convince themselves that they are not really demands at all, because dissenters are formally free to ignore them. But such recruiters would be lying to themselves and to the prospect; a new colleague who resents the informal religious demands will have an immediate sense of grievance.

Written rules and formal policies are easier to disclose, but they are likely to be vague and uninformative, and they may be neglected in the recruiting process. Even specific formal rules may go undisclosed if they seem routine and insignificant to the institution and the recruiting faculty members. But this is a serious mistake, because such rules may loom large to outsiders. An example comes from a recent incident at a university that asks all candidates for faculty appointment to disclose their religious affiliation. A candidate who declined to answer was hired as an assistant professor, and no representative of the university pressed the issue. But the university later insisted that disclosure of religious affiliation was an absolute prerequisite to tenure. For a faculty member with a principled objection to making that disclosure to an employer, this was an unconscionable entrapment. From the victim's perspective, the university lured people in by ignoring the rule, and then sprung it on them at tenure time, when they were maximally vulnerable.

Both administration and faculty at religiously affiliated institutions should disclose all formal policies and describe the informal atmosphere as honestly as possible. Egregious misrepresentations or failures to disclose might estop the institution from enforcing the misrepresented or undisclosed rules. But courts should be slow to reach this conclusion, both because it requires a holding that the institution waived its constitutional rights, and because faculty and administrators seeking to secularize the institution, or to increase its independence from the sponsoring church, have both motive and opportunity to attempt to waive the institution's rights without authority.[41]

The most important reason disclosure is necessarily limited is that the institution cannot decide what to do about the hard cases until they arise. This limitation inheres both in the religious university's self-understanding and in the standard secular critique of religious universities. It is often suggested that the academic conception of truth is inconsistent with a religious conception of truth, because the academy requires an objectivity about all possible truth claims, and this universal objectivity is inconsistent with any religious claim of revealed truth.

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response that the school's published policies were halfway between "somewhat" and "very much" "adequate to clarify for faculty what religious viewpoints and classroom procedures are considered acceptable by the administration." *Id.* at General Report of Statistics, item 11. These faculty reported that between "none" and "very few" "faculty members have been treated unjustly by this college in matters related to academic freedom" "in recent years," and that between "very few" and a "large minority" of those cases "began primarily as a conflict" over religious commitments. *Id.* items 15-16. It is not clear what these faculty members would consider "unjust." they reported that protecting "the right of faculty members to present unpopular or controversial ideas in the classroom" was a goal of "medium importance" at their college, but that it should be a goal of medium to high importance (mean of 3.62, with standard deviation of .95, where 3 is medium and 4 is high). The strongest response on any question to these faculty was to the question, "[H]ow important is it that every full-time faculty member believe the central teachings of historic Christianity?" The mean response was 4.40, where 4 is "very much" and 5 is "completely." *Id.* item 6

[40] Conversation with Professor James Gordon, January 18, 1993, reporting his unpublished research as a member of the committee that drafted the Brigham Young Statement, *supra* note 38.

[41] Both points are discussed in Laycock & Waelbroeck, *supra* note 12, at 1470-73.

Certainly there is sometimes a tension between academic and religious conceptions of truth. An absolutist conception of either is inconsistent with preservation of the other. But the religious schools are committed to synthesizing the two and to preserving the essence of both. Such a synthesis may require some internal compromises at those schools. Many academics may not want such explicit compromises at those schools at their own schools (although most of them regularly make implicit compromises with the conventional wisdom at their institutions). But whatever the difficulties of synthesizing two conceptions of truth, that is what the religious schools are striving to do.

To say that the two conceptions are fully inconsistent and that there is no possibility of synthesis is to say that the religious schools are trying to do an impossible thing. It is to say that there can be no such thing as a religious university that does not entirely subordinate its religious commitments to its academic commitments. Secular bodies sometimes say exactly that.[42]

The more accurate response is to recognize that these universities are striving for a difficult synthesis, and the more tolerant response is to let them strive for it. Precisely because they are striving for a goal that is never fully defined, they cannot disclose in advance the details of their possible limitations on academic freedom. They share many of the same goals and ideals of academic freedom as the secular schools, but they also maintain a competing commitment. The effort to synthesize these commitments requires discussion and sometimes bitter debate within the institution and its sponsoring church. But this is an internal discussion; it need not be an external discussion and it should not be a search for compromise with outsiders. How the religious university ultimately resolves the occasional conflict between its dual commitments is not the legitimate concern of outsiders. And it may be that the most these schools can disclose is to say something like: "This is what we are striving to do. This is the way that we approach the world. We can usually reconcile our religious and our academic commitments. But sometimes, on really important issues, we may decide that our religious commitments may have to prevail."

The Brigham Young Statement is probably as full a disclosure as can reasonable be achieved. There are ten pages of explanation and context for the ultimate standards, an explanation of the university's academic and religious commitments, a clear statement that individual academic freedom is "broad" and "presumptive" while restrictions are "exceptional and limited."[43] But the statement could not avoid ultimate reliance on standards of degree and of subjective states of mind. Brigham Young claims the right to limit faculty behavior or expression that "*seriously* and *adversely* affects the University mission or the Church,"[44] or in another formulation, that "offer[s] *compelling* threats to BYU's mission or the Church."[45] Examples include expression in public or with students that "contradicts or opposes, rather than analyzes or discusses, *fundamental* Church doctrine or policy," or that "*deliberately* attacks or derides the Church or its general leaders."[46] An important safeguard of the Brigham Young policy is a requirement of fair warning: "A Faculty member shall not be found in violation of the academic freedom standards unless the faculty member can *fairly* be considered aware that the expression violates the standards."[47] But even this may depend on states of mind and matters of degree.

At any school of any quality, the religious commitment will not lead to discipline or discharge of a tenured faculty member unless the issue is of extraordinary importance to the institution. On issues that are so central to the religious mission that a school of any quality will be moved to discharge, the discharged faculty member will not be unfairly surprised. Charles Curran could not reasonably have been surprised when he was told that he could not continue to attack the church's teaching on sexual morality from his position as a professor of theology at The Catholic University of America. He could not know the exact point at which he would provoke the university to discharge him; the university could not

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[42] See the AAUP subcommittee statement quoted in text at note 34; "Honor Society Rejects Membership Bid," *Chron. of Higher Educ.* A4 (June 3, 1992) (reporting that the honorary society Phi Beta Kappa has rejected Brigham Young for membership, and that the society apparently demand that BYU renounce even the barest creedal statement that education should emphasize salvation through Christ). Both the AAUP subcommittee statement and Phi Beta Kappa's exclusion of Brigham Young were within the rights of these private organizations. But I believe that each organization behaved inappropriately, intolerantly, and counterproductively.

[43] BYU Statement, *infra* at 41.

[44] *Id.* at 40 (some emphasis deleted).

[45] *Id.* at 41 (emphasis added).

[46] *Id.* at 40 (emphasis added).

[47] *Id.* at 41 (emphasis added).

know that either. But he knew or should have known from the beginning that he was testing the limits and running serious risks.

CONCLUSION

For the state or academic associations to protect academic freedom at religious universities would require a secular intrusion into the central deliberative processes of a religious institution. To decide what innovations a religious tradition can and cannot tolerate is to decide the future content of the faith. It is of the essence of religious liberty that such decisions be made by the religious community, and never by secular authority. Religious limitations on academic freedom may be wise or foolish, and they may be administered well or badly. The questions raised by such limitations are the subject of serious debate within religious universities. That is where the debate should be conducted, and the Constitution should protect whatever answers emerge.

The Two Pedagogies: Discipleship and Citizenship

John A. Coleman, SJ

My focus in this essay is on the role of the church in educating for discipleship and citizenship. Both of these main topics are too large, complex, and multifaceted to be encompassed in one mere essay. Thus, of necessity, what follows will contain abbreviated formulae, truncated arguments and theses, some of them quite controversial. The essay contains eight subtopics:

1. Citizenship and Discipleship
2. The Meaning of Discipleship
3. The Meaning of Citizenship
4. Neighbor and Social Companion: Citizenship and Discipleship as Two Semiautonomous but Interrelated Zones
5. What Citizenship Adds to Discipleship: A Wider Solidarity, a Humbler Service, a New Reality Test for Responsibility
6. What Discipleship Adds to Citizenship: Utopia, Counterculture, Vocation
7. Some Central New Testament Texts on Citizenship and Ethics: Mark 12:13-17; Romans 13:1-7
8. Educating for Citizenship-Discipleship: *Vamos Caminando: A Peruvian Catechism*[1]

Introduction: Three Theses

I propose three major theses concerning discipleship and citizenship. First, each concept points to semiautonomous yet interrelated zones of life. It should come as no surprise that, from both sides, there exists an irreducible tension between the moral practices and demands of citizenship and discipleship.

In sections 1, 2, and 3 of this essay on the *aporiae* (i.e., the perpetually unresolvable tensions or problematics) of citizenship and discipleship, I will explore some of these tensions, suggest the meanings of the two terms, and give some reasons why the two zones are both semiautonomous (neither reducible to nor subordinated to the other) yet interrelated. In a summary way I will be attempting to state the correlation between what Paul Ricoeur has called the two pedagogies: the pedagogy of power and the pedagogy of nonviolent discipleship.[2] Behind this notion of the two pedagogies lies the classical ethical dialectic postulated by Max Weber, who spoke of a tension between an ethics of responsibility (for political life) and the ethics of absolute ends typified by the Sermon on the Mount.

Second, my thesis is that the church that educates for discipleship must also concern itself with education for citizenship. As I see it, worldly address and social-political responsibility are constitutive demands of church membership. In section 4, by focusing on the three notions of ecclesial utopia, evangelical counterculture, and constructive vocation, I will be defending my third thesis, succinctly worded by D.W. Brogan in his book of essays, *Citizenship Today*: "A Christian citizen has more duties than and different from those that the state defines and demands."[3]

Sections 5 and 6 assume a genuine dialectic between discipleship and citizenship. In section 7, I signal several sets of central New Testament tests concerning citizenship: Romans 13:1-7 (which needs *always* to be juxtaposed with Revelation 13), Mark 12:13-17 on tax tribute to Caesar, and Pauline texts on New Testament ethics. In this section I will maintain that Romans 13:1-7, read in its full context, confirms Brogan's thesis that Christian citizens have more duties than the state defines. They must exercise their citizenship precisely as discipleship, "in the Lord," thus transforming the meaning of citizenship. I will also maintain that Christian ethics always presupposes, as

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Father Coleman is a professor of social ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley, California. *This article first appeared in* Education for Citizenship and Discipleship, *Pilgrim Press, 1989.*

[1] I am fully aware that hidden behind the two seemingly innocent concepts of citizenship and discipleship lies a whole series of controverted sociological and theological disputes about the correspondence between salvation or grace and history, the relation of church and state, and the locus of ethics and the discernment of God's purposes for history in the church and/or in the greater "secular" orders of creation.

[2] Paul Ricoeur, *Politiek en Geloof: Essays van Paul Ricoeur*, ed. Ad. Peperzak (Utrecht: Ambo, 1968), p. 71.

[3] D.W. Brogan, *Citizenship Today* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), p. 123.

the ground material on which it works toward transformation, an already given cultural ethic. In modern society this is the ethics of citizenship.

Finally, in section 8, I will look very briefly at one relatively successful attempt to relate the concepts of citizenship-discipleship in church education: *Vamos Caminando: A Peruvian Catechism*, compiled by the pastoral team of Bambamarca, a city in the northern Andes of Peru.

I am more than aware that in a society as religiously pluralistic as the United States, my way of construing the relationship between discipleship and citizenship will not mirror other Christian choices. I opt for an account that combines, in some tension, H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ against culture and Christ transforming culture models, mirroring the New Testament tension between Paul and the Johannine Revelation.[4] I have not tried to speak of a unitary Judeo-Christian view for several reasons. Discipleship is not a general Jewish ethical concept. Although Christians feel bound to the Hebrew scriptures as constitutive of their self-understanding, many from the Jewish community resent the term a Judeo-Christian ethic as patronizing or a species of Christian imperialism.

As these remarks make clear, the moral concept of citizenship in a religiously pluralistic world will have to be based on a wider notion than discipleship–probably, at root, on a nontheological understanding of the rights and duties of membership in the commonwealth or the tradition of civic republican virtue. As Robin Lovin has sanely remarked, "Theological affirmations make poor premises for public moral arguments because they are held by a limited group of the faithful."[5] I agree fully with Robert Bellah and his associates in their *Habits of the Heart* that a renewal of both discipleship and the more secular notion of republican virtue in the classic concept of republican citizenship would be necessary for any vital public philosophy in America today, although I do not give the two notions the equal weight they give them.[6]

1. Citizenship and Discipleship

In his book *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975), J.G. Pocock comments that the saints almost always wear their mantle of citizenship lightly. No earthly home mirrors the New Jerusalem. Michael Walzer catches this tension between saints and citizens when he claims for citizenship, almost in relief, that "the standards are not all that high; we are required to be brethren and citizens, not saints and heroes."[7] Even more strongly, from the perspective of the Christian moral ideal of discipleship, the alternative morality of citizenship often contains serious temptations. Hence my initial thesis: There is an irreducible tension between citizenship and discipleship.

To begin with, every politics, undeniably, includes a potentially demonic charismatic ingredient. Hitler and Stalin were not pure aberrations, mere sports in history. As Plato argues in his *Gorgias*, power and sophistry, tyranny and flattery, might and untruth usually march hand in hand. Moreover, at crucial points, effective political power needs mastery over secrecy and control over the techniques that shape consensus and public opinion. Effective state action for the common good demands a certain centralization and concentration of power to ensure decisiveness and direction. Concentrated power, however, inevitably resists the needed participatory access that controls, monitors, and checks abuses of power, so that power can be used to further the common good rather than particular interest. If even Christian disciples reconcile themselves to citizenship, *in an actually functioning state*, it could only be with some critical and serious reserve.

Like God, politics can be, at times, powerful, creative, willfully decisive, character-shaping, nation-forming, an active agent in history. It determines collective destinies, teleologies, and purposes. Emile Durkheim may have been incorrect in, seemingly, equating God and society, but his insight concerning the godlike control over citizens' lives by society captures a decisive reality–and perennial temptation–of the polis. As the French political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel remarks in his classic, *On Power*, power obeys the law of the Minotaur.[8] Ever expansive, indeed sometimes devouring, power seeks, like a god, to become all-powerful. For the Christian, every

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[4] H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951).

[5] Robin W. Lovin, *Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of Barth, Brunner, and Bonhoeffer* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), p. 3.

[6] Robert N. Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

[7] Michael Walzer, *The Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p.278. the essay "The Concept of Citizenship," on which I draw in this essay, is contained in Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, Wars, and Citizenship* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

[8] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 37.

politics courts idolatry, the displacement of the sovereign God by a sovereign collective societal purpose (a "general will" which, heretofore at least, has almost always been exercised, disproportionately, by a particular elite group within the commonwealth). A maxim suspicious of the political but appropriate to discipleship thus runs, following Lord Action: Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

The inescapable political temptation toward narrow patriotism or uncritical nationalism stands in stark contradiction to universalism–a God, who sits in judgement over *all* nations, including our own. For Christians, by definition, no nation can function as their only home and matrix of culture.

Paul Ricoeur has decisively caught the primary tension between citizenship and discipleship in several of his essays on political ethics, especially in his extraordinarily evocative essay "The Paradox of Power."[9] Ricoeur notes that state political power, in its actual constitution and exercise, almost always took its origin out of violence (war, revolution). Moreover, state political power includes a paradoxical mixture of violence and rationality in its ongoing operation and enjoys a monopoly control over violence so as to sanction the legitimacy of its political decision. It stands ever poised to resort to violence, if need be, through army or police force, judges, law courts, and prison guards.

As Ricoeur sees it, the paradox of political power, rooted in and relying on violence, has been that it nevertheless represents an instrument of genuine historical rationality and justice. Yet, as Ricoeur notes, the element of rationality in power remains partly extrinsic. As he sees it, power, strangely, knows no history. The crude mechanism of tyranny is as likely to appear in the twentieth century–often more brutally because of advances in technical rationality–as in the first or the sixteenth.[10] Equally paradoxical, membership in a nation-state or a people is necessary for the development of culture, a sense of self and collective access to power, one is deprived as well of any deep sense of oneself, of a decent self-regard. This has prompted a number of twentieth-century politicians and writers to reverse the famous Acton maxim to read: Power corrupts, but the lack of power corrupts absolutely.

In the modern state, the decisive central governing organs exercise commanding control to shape, limit, and, in boundary situations, totally control information, the media, ideology, and the worldview of its citizens. This seems, whatever the important differences in degree, as true of the administered state in democratic regimes as in authoritarian societies. This has led many thoughtful Christian observers to fear the loss, corruption, leveling, or co-optation of the distinctively Christian moral voice of discipleship. They fear its total incorporation into the ongoing cultural project of citizenship. Hence, the frequent cries of a cultural captivity of the churches, a watering down of the heady Christian wine.

These authors, such as Stanley Hauerwas and Richard John Neuhaus, are concerned about a blurring of the distinctive face of discipleship by too close amalgamation of discipleship to citizenship. They endorse, a version of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's notion of the necessity of a "secret discipline" of discipleship, that is, a discipline that is not publicly, societally controlled, although–it should be noted–in another sense this discipline is public. This secret discipline, the pedagogy of discipleship, takes shape in specifically ecclesial prayer, community, moral discernment and discourse, action, and service and worship. Without such internal church discipline as a counterpedagogy to the societal project the danger remains acute that the church's voice will be neither distinctive nor, in any specific sense, Christian. It will, instead, be a mere echo of the culturally prevalent voice.[11]

Finally, a substantive vision of human life and society subsists in the notion of discipleship. Christians see themselves, however fallibly, following, indeed rendering present in history, the dictates of God's purposes for creation. In some sense, however nuanced and attenuated, they imagine themselves as partaking in "the will of God." Christians assume that discipleship includes a substantive–not merely procedural–view of the social good (embracing, e.g., peace based on justice; the rights of the poor; a specific sense of freedom which is not license; the image of God's covenant justice which vindicates the most marginal). They propose a determined anthropology of the human being as God's image. In this vision, social goods have a substantive and determinate content related to the biblical utopian concept of the realm of God. Disciples are neither agnostics nor "repressively

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[9] Ricoeur, *Politiek*, pp. 32-51.

[10] Ibid., p.32.

[11] In this regard, it may be important to note that most sociological pleas for a vigorous civil religion as a cement for public consensus rest on utilitarian social arguments. Religion is celebrated and used for the purposes of–an admittedly often truncated - citizenship with scant regard to its deeper purposes and meanings which transcend citizenship.

tolerant" of every competing definition of the social good or the *humanum*. Even granted a certain humility among some Christians concerning the extent to which they have any detailed knowledge of the social good, in general complete agnosticism in these matters would be totally foreign to the Christian tradition.

Notoriously, democracies are agnostic. Democratic citizenship, it is usually argued, must be blind to all substantive arguments concerning social goods. Fair procedure, equal access, societal peace and consensus, the art of the possible take precedence over substantive visions. As Michael Walzer puts it, "The state does not nourish souls." He hastens to add, "Nor does it kill them."[12] It is an axiom of modern democratic government that governments cannot adjudicate between truth claims, whether religious or secular. In Elizabeth I's fine phrase, "The government may not build windows into men's [or women's] souls." This decisive division between the moral ideals of citizenship and discipleship entails a permanent distinction between any community of disciples and a genuinely political and democratic commonwealth of citizens.

On the other hand, history attest to the dangers and societal destructiveness of Catholic authoritarian state rule in the name of divine sanction or a Calvinist rule of the saints. The Inquisition, Calvin's Geneva, Puritan New England, and Cromwell's England rightly lack effective contemporary champions. We have learned, at great cost, to decide, against Cromwell, that divine grace carries no specific political weight. Again, Walzer states the point succinctly:

> Democracy is a way of allocating power and legitimating its use.... Every extrinsic reason is ruled out. What counts is argument among the citizens. Democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical skill. Ideally, the citizen who makes the most persuasive argument–that is, the argument that actually persuades the largest number of citizens–gets his [or her] way.... It is not only the inclusiveness, however, that makes for democratic government. Equally important is what we might call the rule of reasons. Citizens come into the forum with nothing but their arguments. All non-political goods have to be deposited outside: weapons and wallets, titles and degrees.[13]

And, I would add, "creeds or ethics of discipleship." As Walzer trenchantly notes, "If enough people are committed to the rule of the saints, then the saints should have no difficulty winning elections."[14] The game of citizenship constrains the saints' language system. *Whatever their background revelational foundation, disciples can make their case as citizens only in a discourse of secular warrant and public reason.* Clearly a realm of pluralistic "values," life aims, and discourse is but a pale shadow of the reign of God. For this reason, as Walter Brueggemann argues in his essay in this volume, disciples need to be bilingual to translate their appropriate language into the categories of citizenship.

Christian theorists of discipleship have complained, then of the leveling character of this ideal of citizenship, its introduction of a relative notion of morality or truth into the common life (perhaps, even, its claim to permit, for the sake of common life or peaceful consensus, behavior that the disciple judges repugnant and seriously sinful). The rules of the game of citizenship substitute an arena of *opinion* for an arena of substantive truth. Some disciples see and decry this citizen arena as a purely "naked public square."[15]

Theorists of citizenship, for their part, have not lacked legitimate complaints about the deleterious intrusion of the ideal of discipleship into the commonwealth of citizens. The brutal and passionate wars of religion spawned the Enlightenment ideals of secular reason and religious tolerance. Even today, Northern Ireland, India, and Iran can serve as case examples of the violence and dangers of sectarian religious politics.

The litany of complaints against the intrusion of discipleship into citizenship reaches back to Roman times. A typical rebuke–voiced strongly by Rousseau–is that the Christian ideal of a universal solidarity undercuts urgent commitment to *this* particular nationally defined sovereignty and general will. Alexis de Tocqueville captures Rousseau's complaint in these comments:

> Christianity and consequently its morality went beyond all political power and nationalities. Its grand achievement is to have formed a human community beyond national societies. The duties of men among themselves as well as their capacity as citizens, the duties of citizens to their fatherland, in brief, the public virtues, seem to it to have been inadequately defined and considerably neglected within the moral system of Christianity.

[12] Walzer, *Spheres*, p. 246.

[13] Ibid., p. 304.

[14] Ibid., p. 247.

[15] See Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984).

To his administrative assistant, Arthur de Gobineau, Tocqueville remarked, "Because the French clergy emphasizes only private morality, the nation at large has not been taught the duties of citizenship."[16]

It seems to me that Tocqueville is right; it is undeniable that Christianity lacks a coherent, fully developed, Christian theory of citizenship, a specifically Christian sense of any sacredness or vocational meaning of membership in a particular nation with its own national character type and historic goals and challenges.

Other complaints by citizens to the disciples, besides this Tocquevillean rebuke of privatization–as if personal honesty, truth telling, promise keeping, or sexual integrity exhaust or even adequately express a truly *public* morality–have noted the otherworldliness of the Christian ideal, its lack of seriousness about the historically-contingent. For their part, the Marxists have documented the ideological misuses of religion to compensate the suffering of the poor or to legitimate the wealth of the dominant. A final rebuke notes the way Romans 13:1-7 has, generally, been interpreted to legitimate a mere dutiful citizenship, a Lutheran two-kingdom passive obedience rather than that more active, critical engagement of citizen-politicians espoused eloquently by Michael Walzer. As Walzer contends, "The citizen/voter is crucial to the survival of democratic politics; but the citizen/politician is crucial to its liveliness and integrity."[17]

Power is ambiguous. It remains an inscrutable reality and, inexorable, a force both for rationality, equality, and personal empowerment or enhancement and, as well, for violence, manipulation, and domination. Generally, Christian theorists of discipleship either avoid the issue of power, lament it, and point exclusively to its dangers or restrict themselves to a pedagogy of nonviolence not fully coherent with the political, the realm of power and possibility within constrained contingency. Like the theology of citizenship, a developed theology of power is conspicuously lacking in the libraries or minds of most disciples. This lack led Max Weber to postulate a stark–almost unbridgeable–division between an ethics of discipleship and an ethics of power, between disciples and citizens.

Paul Ricoeur, who exhibits much sympathy for Weber's dilemma, states again the core of this *aporia* between citizenship and discipleship.

> It is not responsible (and is even impossible) to deduce a politics from a theology. This is so because every political involvement grows out of a truly secular set of information, a situational arena which proffers a limited field of possible actions and available means, and a more or less risk-taking option, a gamble, among these possibilities.[18]

Politics remains more art than science, an art, moreover, exercised in a world not yet redeemed and transformed by grace in that paradoxical arena which mingles coercive dominance and violence with rationality and justice. The disciple neither knows better than the unbeliever nor necessarily loves more that truly political common good which might be genuinely possible.

From the Christian vantage point, both a theology of citizenship (as membership in a limited, historically contingent nation-state community) and a theology of power remain as glaring lacunae for any project of correlation between discipleship and citizenship. Both the nature of power (as a paradoxical mixture of violence and rational justice) and the nature of the political (as shaped by a conjuncture of intractable forces, movements, boundaries, and limited, even at times determinate, possibilities) suggest that no simple formula in either praxis or theory will ever truly remove the *aporia* tension between citizenship and discipleship. Perhaps–just perhaps–as Max Weber once hinted in his classic essay on politics as a vocation, there may be moments when the tension between an ethics of discipleship and an ethics of responsible citizenship yields to a creative historical fusion. Between those moments, however, we do well to define our terms and map the two as decidedly separate terrains and life games.

2. *The Meaning of Discipleship*

Christian discipleship takes on a narrative form. One models the Christian life on (1) the decisive dispositions of Jesus (e.g., surrender to God, gratitude, readiness for service and self-sacrificing love, a preferential option for the poor); (2) crucial paradigmatic actions in Jesus' life (the cross, foot washing, prayer, outreach to those excluded from the community, healing, forgiveness, love of enemies, consistent nonviolence); and (3) a utopian teaching related to the realm of God (e.g., the Sermon on the

[16] The two Tocqueville citations are from his correspondence with Madame Swetchine and Arthur de Gobineau in *Opera Omnia*, vol.5, as cited in John A. Coleman, "The Christian as Citizen," *Commonweal* 110, no. 15 (9 September 1983): 457-62.

[17] Walzer, *Spheres*, p. 308.

[18] Ricoeur, *Political*, p. 82.

Mount) caught in parables, narratives, and teaching sayings. Discipleship involves a *paideia* pedagogy of assimilation to the pattern of the nonviolent life and spirit of the teacher who serves as model.

In no way, however, does discipleship entail a mere mechanical imitation of the historical Jesus. Discipleship implies a metanormative ethic. That is, an ethics of discipleship attempts to differentiate norm from context and to apply, in a completely new context, the normative paradigms or models of a life rather than specific culturally bound norms or mores. Discipleship is primarily a "way" and a praxis, rooted in a determined past historical life, to be sure, but meant to transform present lives and structures.

Christianity conceives of itself as a praxis, that is, "The Way." The praxis of following Jesus must mediate between the past historical life of the person, Jesus, as contained, in some sense, in the Gospel narratives, on the one hand, and, on the other, present discernment of analogical parallels to the model of Jesus' (historically and contextually limited) unrepeatable life. As Jon Sobrino has noted, for the Christian imagination, the Christ of faith continues to act in history. "To say that Christ ceases to unleash a Christian reality and a Christian history is formally to deny that he is a Christ."[19] The Christian expects the decisively new in history. Moreover, the pedagogy of discipleship is also future-oriented. "Christological reflection must be oriented toward the future of God and [God's] kingdom."[20]

The narrative structures concerning the life and teaching of Jesus keep an ethics of discipleship from remaining a merely empty cipher capable of taking on any possible content. The narrative and teaching highlight and prompt toward certain directions, dispositions, and actions and interdict others. Discipleship today means "discerning the signs of the times," that is, reading in present events significant analogues for which the character, life, and teachings of Jesus serve as model, as well as the future directionality of discipleship where the reign of God stands as paradigm for *every* human community (not only the church). Thus, discipleship cannot be legitimately reduced to a fundamentalist, slavish imitation of the historically situated Jesus. An effective pedagogy of discipleship thus roots itself in ethical model-thinking, alert to the historical-contextual specificity of Jesus' time, culture, and society as well as to our own. An ethics of discipleship presupposes the well-known tensive sense of eschatology-messianism (the famous "already and not-yet" arrival of the reign of God). The not-yet character of this eschatology creates dissatisfaction with a secure repose in any ethics of the presently politically possible, of mere compromise, consensus. Inescapably, an ethics of discipleship contains idealistic, utopian elements which no actual church community, let alone political society, can enact.

An ethics of discipleship involves, then a *paideia* pedagogy of assimilation and reappropriation–not mere reproduction–of Jesus' human dispositions, actions, character, and way. Jesus' way involves a generous covenant response to God's love and will. As Jon Sobrino persuasively contends, this father of Jesus is not an abstract, horizon concept but precisely the God of the idealized kingdom covenant in Jewish messianic and apocalyptic thought.[21] In Jesus' life, that kingdom and covenant enter history as humanly realized. Jürgen Moltmann notes that for the Christian the kingdom of God is rendered present in history precisely by the praxis of the followers of Jesus.[22] "The Way" involves putting into practice the ideals of that kingdom, the proleptic anticipation of its contours and structures of non-violent communication in love and service to widows, orphans, the poor, the stranger in the land, the neighbor.

Without in any way endorsing the entirety of Moltmann's theological construal, I would contend that it is undeniable, as John Howard Yoder argues in his *The Politics of Jesus*, that discipleship to Jesus entails a principled commitment to non-violence. Yoder sums up the main elements in an ethics of discipleship: a critique of power, a sense of the meaning of suffering, a search for authenticity, a visible and voluntary community, a universal vision.[23] In Yoder's view, the primary category for grounding an ethics of discipleship is less rational deliberation and public discourse about "secular warrants" than obedience. This ethics of discipleship becomes "public" in and through the church, which functions as a particular community of discernment (with an education toward discerning discipleship in a "secret discipline" of prayer, ethics, and service). It serves as well as a contrasting model to the state or merely secular notions of citizenship. In

[19] Jon Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978), p. xxii.

[20] Ibid., p. xxiii

[21] Ibid., p. 91.

[22] Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

[23] John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972).

the final analysis, in Christian ethics we are called to be saints and not merely citizens.

Sobrino contends that the directionality of an ethics of discipleship can be found in the Old Testament ideals of covenant and kingdom: care for widows, orphans, the stranger in the land, the poor; and in the New Testament ideal of neighbor love (expressed strongly in the parable of the good Samaritan [Luke 10:25-37] and the last judgment in Matthew 25) where each person in need–even the stranger or the enemy–becomes the neighbor. Unlike Yoder, Sobrino postulates that an ethics of discipleship can serve as a rightful criterion not only to judge from outside but also to transform political action. The rights of the poor, as the early church writers expressed, become the criterion for right government.[24] Critics have assumed that an ethics of discipleship perforce lacks explicit political intent because it is primarily personalistic or individualistic–in my eyes, a gross misreading of the communal thrust of biblical thought. Others see it as, at best, an exclusively ecclesial ethic. As they judge, in biblical times Christians were never concerned directly with social structure, which they simply took for granted. Responding to this objection, Edward Schillebeechx has argued that the New Testament does not ignore social structures but tended, for historical reasons based on expectations of the imminent second coming and the limited access to societal power, to build alternative structures alongside, rather than within, Roman society. Early Christianity conceived these structures of the church, however, not as pure "eschatological witness," but as the concrete embodiment and model for *any* genuinely righteous society, wherever it was found. Schillebeechx contends that it is difficult to construct a consistent ethic of two separate kingdoms (in Luther's sense) on this biblical vision.[25]

In the New Testament view, the best that can be said for state power and citizenship is that, although they are merely provisional, they can be used as an instrument of God's righteous purposes. Alternately, they represent the embodiment of antigod and injustice. There is no exalted or developed notion of citizenship in the New Testament material. On the other hand, it seems clear that the New Testament does not restrict metanoia (deep conversion) to purely inward personal conversion, nor does it see church life as a merely separate eschatological enclave with no relevance for societal life. There is little evidence that early Christians failed to use the ethics of discipleship as a measure for judging secular citizenship; their ethics served as its judge, model, and, ideally, if the situation was ripe, its tutor. In this sense, an ethics of discipleship includes a political intent. On that point Yoder's *The Politics of Jesus* is convincingly persuasive.

Yet even struggling saints must know that no state, short of the reign of Christ, will embody the structures of the reign of God. This realization led Reinhold Niebuhr to describe the ethics of discipleship as an "impossible ideal." Niebuhr contended that it is both necessary and possible to make discriminating judgments among competing contenders for worldly citizenship and rough justice here below. Hence Niebuhr rightly argued for the need for some independent notion of citizenship and justice in a society not populated by saints and heroes. Niebuhr, however, continued to hope for a paradoxical and dialectical tensive correlation between discipleship and citizenship.[26] We need, then, to consider now the meaning of citizenship.

3. *The Meaning of Citizenship*

Ours remains a decidedly pluralistic political world. We need to distinguish, then, widely divergent groundings for the moral ideal of citizenship. Michael Walzer in his "The Concept of Citizenship" postulates three quite different foundations of citizenship. Walzer rejects a purely passive-servile notion by which citizens are duty-bound to civic obligations because they are recipients of benefits only the state can provide. As Walzer notes, we are fundamentally citizens because of our membership in a determined society that precedes and dictates, to a large extent, the form of the polity. Society precedes the state. Walzer argues that the citizen is not primarily bound to the state authorities at all but to other citizens. In this view, Walzer rejects a Hobbesian or even the more benign Lockean concept

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[24] Theological differences about the extent to which structures of sin have been surmounted in Jesus' resurrection, and the power of grace actually to transform persons and structures, lie behind the different positions of Sobrino and Yoder. Yoder's "Christ against culture" model assumes little real transformation in and through the resurrection and lays a stronger accent on the not-yet quality of the breakthrough of the kingdom than is true of Sobrino's "Christ transforming" model.

[25] Edward Schillebeechx, *Gerechtigheid en Liefde: Genade en Bevrijding* (Bloemendael, The Netherlands: H. Nelissen, 1977), pp. 514-20. Cf. the Pauline doctrine of a struggle with the power in Ephesians 6:11-12 and Revelation 13, where, manifestly, the "powers" find incarnation in states and regimes.

[26] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947 and 1955).

of a social contract. Walzer roots his notion of citizenship implicitly in some idea of a common good greater than particular interest and civic benevolence as members of a common historic people. Citizenship rights, at base, are membership rights in a historic community. Walzer also argues that passive-servile concepts of citizenship yield little protection against despotic majority rule or the tyrannical state. We do not do well to hypothesize a Leviathan State or some abstract "general will."

Although Walzer finds the unmediated active democratic citizenship of the Athenian polis a congenial model, he notes that, in modern complex societies, the citizen will lack both sufficient time and expertise to direct administration effectively or to determine the common good to a particular enactment in law that foresees and regulates fairly wider societal consequences, trade-offs, and political possibilities. In the earlier Athenian ideal of citizenship, citizens obeyed the laws, since they were an expression of their own active agency and will. Walzer opts for a pluralist notion of citizenship carried by associations active in the common interest. This notion is akin to Athenian citizenship but recognizes the impossibility of face-to-face direct democracy. The associations active in the common interest that Walzer has in mind are different from pure single-issue political action committees. They look to the common rather than to the particular interest. Walzer envisions something other than a citizenship based on a neutral state regulating plea bargaining between purely private interests. He assumes that a modern, active, and critical citizenship will entail some expenditure, beyond mere suffrage, of the citizen's time, money, and personal engagement in setting policy and the terms for public argument. Membership in associations concerned with the public welfare mediates the active Athenian role of citizen-politicians.

Walzer comments that, in this present age of media politics and primary elections as beauty contests, "voting is lifted out of the context of parties and platforms; it is more like impulse buying than political decision making." In contracts, Walzer sets out the ideal of an active democratic citizenship where "every citizen is a potential participant, a potential politician."[27] Unlike discipleship, which is an exclusionary concept, citizenship points to an inclusive membership category. Walzer remarks to this effect that "it is only as members somewhere that men and women can hope to share in all the other social goods–security, wealth, honor, office and power–that communal life makes possible."[28]

Whoever genuinely participates in the economy and law of a society, Walzer argues, should be regarded (and ought to be able to regard themselves) as potential or future participants in politics as well. He rejects any notion of a semipermanent alien category such as the guest-worker class in European nations. All members of society enjoy a range of citizen rights and duties in respect to security, welfare, and equality of access to public office and to the basic equal education of citizens. Citizens must enjoy equal rights to exercise minimal political power (voting rights) and to try to exercise greater power (speech, assembly, and petition rights).

As I have already noted, Walzer exhibits ambiguity about any substantive notion of justice. Indeed, he assumes that the root meaning of equality is negative, the freedom from extrinsic domination. He eschews any appeals to anthropological constants in the *humanum*. His is a pluralist, procedural notion of distributive justice based on the concept of complex equality where "different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents."[29] Walzer is also a social relativist. "All distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake."[30] Social meanings, in turn, are radically historical, changing over time. As he states it, "Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local account."[31] Some empirical overlap may occur in a conception of social goods across human societies. This overlap, however, allows no legitimate philosophical generalizations as in a species of natural law or natural rights.

Walzer's genuinely rich notion of differentiated spheres of justice, as we have seen, entails a strong separation of citizenship and discipleship. Rough justice envisions a citizenry vitally concerned with monitoring the boundaries between the differentiated spheres of property, work, love, religion, politics, and status. Walzer's scheme leaves little room for an integrating vision of society above (and, presumably, respectful of) the differentiated spheres of justice. Like Ricoeur, Walzer sees keenly the essential ambiguity of state power:

It is the crucial agency of distributive justice: it guards the boundaries within which every social good

[27] Walzer, *Spheres*, p. 310.
[28] Ibid., p. 63.
[29] Ibid., p.6.
[30] Ibid., p. 9.
[31] Ibid., p. 314.

is distributed and deployed. Hence the simultaneous requirements that power be sustained and that it be inhibited: mobilized, divided, checked and balanced. Political power protects us from tyranny... and itself becomes tyrannical. And it is for both these reasons that power is so much desired and so endlessly fought over.[32]

If, as Walzer argues, good fences make for good justice and good neighbors, he leaves little room for a concept of citizenship that might at least approximate that neighbor love which is the key to any correlation between discipleship and citizenship.

In Walzer's understanding, vital democratic citizenship depends on a differentiated conception of social goods. Democracy is less a tradition of substantive justice than a sustained, procedurally fair argument about policy among those with, presumably, radically divergent substantive visions of virtue, justice, the integrated life, and the social good. Efficiency in arguing one's case (whether the argument is true or not) and voting function as the only legitimate ways to distribute and judge political power. Although, in one place only, Walzer speaks of "citizenly virtue," his conception of virtue is curiously vacuous. He lacks the Aristotelian notion of public education as character formation in a polis to produce the type of virtuous activity essential to sustain a determined state constitution. Justice is a culturally relative term, "rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sort, that constitute a shared way of life."[33] Thus, in the end, Walzer's argument for citizen justice in our own society is, primarily, a story of societal and procedural arrangements:

> A decentralized democratic socialism; a strong welfare state run, in part at least, by local and amateur officials; a constrained market; an open and demystified civil service; independent public schools; the sharing of hard work and free time; the protection of religions and familial life; a system of public honoring and dishonoring free from all considerations of rank or class; workers' control of companies and factories; a politics of parties, movements, meetings and public debate.[34]

Eternal vigilance, guaranteed through an education for citizenship, is the price we must pay for both liberty and complex equality. The vigilance looks to transgressions of the boundaries between spheres of justice. It lacks any substantive vision of the good and the integrated life.

Despite Walzer's disclaimers to any substantive anthropology or "natural law," I do not think that his attractive conception of an active and vigilant citizenship can ultimately be sustained on his culturally relativistic grounds. In the absence of a more substantive anthropology, Walzer ends up espousing what Bellah and his colleagues in *Habits of the Heart* call a "politics of interest," where "politics means the pursuit of differing interests according to agreed-upon, neutral rules."[35] Bellah and his associates contrast this purely procedural notion of citizenship with two other concepts of politics: (1) the politics of making operative the moral consensus of the community reached through free face-to-face discussion and (2) a politics of the nation expressed in the language of national purpose.[36]

Bellah and his associates root their more substantive concept of citizenship in a deep sense of a certain kind of human character. They postulate that justice is the guiding end of citizenship.[37] Like Walzer, they see that citizenship is a cooperative form of life wherein "the individual self finds its fulfillment in relationships with others in a society, organized through public dialogue."[38] *Habits of the Heart* argues, however, to a notion of the self sustained only by practices within communities of memory that engender habits of substantive commitments and virtue. In the end, a socially unanchored self lacks any meaning, larger purpose, or a narrative framework to make sense of suffering, death, the struggle for justice, love and commitment, and citizenship itself. Against cultural relativism, *Habits of the Heart* argues that, perhaps, "there are practices of life, good in themselves, that are inherently fulfilling."[39] Its authors can speak–in categories that break the differentiated spheres whose fenced-off boundaries are so crucial to Walzer–of citizenship as "civic friendship" and indispensable social practices that are "ethically good in themselves."[40]

Concerning the contribution of religion to citizenship, Walzer attempts, primarily, in a negative injunction, to keep the religious sphere from influencing or contaminating the notion of citizenship. Bellah and his associates, on the other hand, assume, following Alexis de Tocqueville, that religion remains the first of our political institutions. Religion has political impact not because it directly intervenes in politics-

[32] Ibid., p. 281.
[33] Ibid., p. 314.
[34] Ibid., p. 318.
[35] Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart*, p. 200.
[36] Cf. ibid., pp. 200-203.
[37] Ibid., p. 217.
[38] Ibid., p. 218.
[39] Ibid., p. 295.
[40] Ibid., p.335.

this is avoided through our constitutional separation of church and state–but as supportive of those mores which alone anchor a republic and make democracy possible. To allow the state a monopoly in forming national character would be to court tyranny. The church, institutionally set off from direct intrusions in politics or the intervention of the state in its sphere, is not separated from *society*. Unless the religious community can maintain itself as a vigorous community of memory, it will have little to add to citizenship. The authors of *Habits of the Heart* see keenly that citizenship will degenerate into an empty category in the absence of vigorous religious communities of memory. This argument is central in classic political thought: Without virtuous citizens, no republic can withstand tyranny; without vial religion, no virtuous citizenry.

Walzer and Bellah and his associates remind us that the notion of politics and citizens contains positive elements concerned, at the least, with the secular human minimum, a Platonic shadow of what Christians would call justice, human dignity, a flourishing diversity mirroring the polyvalent God. In its highest forms the civic republican tradition (partly itself shaped under Christian influence) embraces something akin to compassionate neighbor love, a redemptive suffering service, communal enlargement, and sustaining commitments in practices of the good. Christians are not well served to bring *only* suspicions to the notion of citizenship. If all secular notions of citizenship fall far short of discipleship to the way of Jesus, some bear at least a faint analogical resemblance to the high notion of discipleship. Such notions offer a point of contact for correlation between the two ethics.

Neither Walzer nor the authors of *Habits of the Heart* are blind to the temptations of politics to foster cupidity, narrowness of spirit, greed, and dominative power. On their part, Bellah and his associates come close to invoking the Christian language of sin to describe political corruption or narrow individualistic narcissisms. Yet neither Walzer nor Bellah and his associates, in my view, in their highlighting of the ways in which political power can further rationality and justice, pay sufficient heed to the intrinsic paradox of state political power as involving, *inextricably* interwoven, both rationality and violence. *Habits of the Heart* seems to give complete equal weight to discipleship and civic republican virtue in ways that miss the Christian correlation of the two from the starting point of discipleship as the *determining* partner in the dialogue. Still, *Habits of the Heart* serves important notice to Christians that, in a culture dominated by what its authors refer to as "utilitarian" and "expressive" individualism, Christians find it very difficult to speak their own appropriate language of discipleship. This would seem to me to point to the urgent need for fostering a distinctively Christian pedagogy of discipleship that approaches its bilingual conversation with citizenship in clear command of its own vocabulary. If I understand correctly the argument of *Habits of the Heart*, Christians will not educate successfully for citizenship for a better and more just world unless they first induct members of the churches into a vigorous community of memory whose special and particular memory is that of disciples who follow the practices of Jesus.

4. *Neighbor and Social Companion: Citizenship and Discipleship as Interrelated*

Violence is the decisive factor that grounds the distinction between citizenship, even at its best, and discipleship. Discipleship, in principle, looks to the enactment of the utopian, nonviolent reign of God, an arena of undistorted communication without domination (to use Jürgen Habermas's categories), founded in neighbor love. Citizenship grows out of membership in a community whose political authority necessarily rests, at crucial points, in coercion and, at times, domination. When necessary, the state claims the right to resort to violence. This element of violence, however, is never or rarely pure. Rather, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, "the state is a great mystery. The state represents an unresolved contradiction, lying always midway between rationality and coercion."[41] Thus, as Ricoeur goes on to state, "There is no such thing as a christian politics, only the politics of Christians who are also citizens."[42]

Yet, in the actual empirical functioning of church and state, it would be a serious mistake to draw sharp divisions between he two realms as empirical realities. Edward Schillebeeckx alerts us to the danger of any easy "good guy-bad guy" images. "We should also realize that precisely because the religious is always a dimension of the total culture, every religion (Christianity included) inevitably has both liberating *and* alienating effects."[43]

Citizenship and discipleship, while distinct, are also closely interrelated. As I noted, a strong tradition in political thought maintains that religion fulfills an indispensable role in character formation in society.

[41] Ricoeur, *Politick*, p. 82.
[42] Ibid., p. 87.
[43] Schillebeeckx, *Gerechtigheid*, p. 65.

the development of citizens who embody specific virtues, discipline, purpose, and commitment to communal solidarity beyond self-interest. Just this indispensable civic role of religion in instilling habits of the heart and character traits (*les moeurs*) essential for the survival of a republic prompted Alexis de Tocqueville to see it as the first of America's political institutions.

Ricoeur and Schillebeeckx can help us see why disciples will also concern themselves with citizenship. Both authors rely on a sense of the social and of culture as mediating the *humanum* for Christian anthropology. Both rely essentially on a theology of creation. God loves the created order and the creaturely human which coshapes every human order and invests it with human purposes. Relying on this strong social sense, Ricoeur comments, "Every access to the human condition depends on and presupposes access to citizenship, and citizens, in their turn, come to their citizenship through membership in the state."[44]

Schillebeeckx evokes the great symbol of the human as *imago Dei*, the one permissible image of God that is not an idolatry. Noting that the Book of Revelation represents a permanent resource for a Christian liberation theology and for Christian hope for the struggle for justice in a history that might be best described as "an oecumene of suffering," Schillebeeckx argues that the central image of God presented in Revelation is of the one who champions every good and fights every evil.

> For the believer, the *humanum*, in this world, represents the foundational symbol of the holy, of God as the champion of every good and the challenger of every evil. Humanity, then, in the arena where that struggle against good and evil actually takes place, represents a potent revelation of God as grace and judgement.[45]

While no actual politics is totally pure or free from the corruption of coercion and violence, politics represents a privileged arena where the argument and struggle between good and evil occurs in concrete terms and around determinate policies and legislation. Politics in the broad sense (not just that waged by political parties but also that carried by social and cultural movements) represents the place for discernment of emerging good and evil in history. Few can doubt the centrality of the political for good and evil. For political power, as Walzer tells us, regulates every social good. The concrete face and fate of the *humanum* is being determined every day in political struggle and concurring agreements that reach toward consensus. Destinations and human risks are what politics is about, and power is the ability to settle these questions. As Walzer puts it, "Politics is always the most direct path to dominance, and political power (rather than the means of production) is probably the most important, and certainly the most dangerous, good in human history....However it is had and whoever has it, power is the regulative agency for social goods generally."[46]

Is should be obvious, then, why the church in its education for discipleship cannot ignore citizenship. The tangible and accessible image of God, the *humanum*, and the very concrete, culturally mediated struggle for the good and fight against evil take place in the everyday arena of citizenship and politics. Ricoeur details the ways in which neighbor love gets embodied through social institutions and the texture of social roles. He notes that, at times even the appropriate object of neighbor love is revealed to us only when we see our neighbors in and through their collective social existence and vast collective ills and suffering: race discrimination, unemployment, colonial and neocolonial domination, systematic genocide and torture. Political and social structures often seem abstractions. Yet the abstract protects and nurtures the concrete. Only healthy social conditions, even if they seem far removed from the intimacy of concrete, interpersonal encounter, allow for a genuine continuing intimacy. [47]

Ricoeur invokes the minority status of Christian in the world and notes that "the world" is a biblical symbol as the eschatological horizon of salvation, liberation in Christ and grace in history. Ricoeur argues for a direct preaching to the world that does not take place just in and through the church. "If the church has any good news for the world concerning the political problems of our world, then, in a certain sense [its] religious message needs to be preached over the heads of believers to the world as such."[48]

In summary, I propose my *second theses* concerning discipleship and citizenship: *The church that educates for discipleship must also educate for citizenship.*

The Synod of Roman Catholic Bishops meeting in Rome in 1971 prepared a document entitled "Justice in the World" which strongly supports this thesis. These bishops caught in their pronouncements the important

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[44] Ricoeur, *Politiek*, p. 35.

[45] Schillebeeckx, *Gerechtigheid*, p. 715.

[46] Walzer, *Spheres*, p. 45.

[47] Chap. 1, "Medemens en Naaste," in Ricoeur, *Politiek*.

[48] Ricoeur, *Politiek*, p. 158.

nexus between discipleship and citizenship: "Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of preaching the Gospel or, in other words, of the church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive structure."[49] The synod went on to say, "The mission of preaching the gospel dictates...that we dedicate ourselves to the liberation of humans even in their present existence....For unless the Christian message of love and justice shows its effectiveness through action in the world, it will only with difficulty gain credibility in our times."[50]

A similar note can be heard in the stirring documents from the bishops of Latin America at their general conferences at Medellin (1968) and Puebla (1979) and in recent papal pronouncements. Representative are the balanced remarks of Pope Paul VI in a general audience not long before his death: "There is no doubt that everything which touches human promotion, that is, the work for justice, development and peace in all parts of the world ought also be an integral part of the message [of the Gospel]....Do not separate human liberation and salvation in Jesus, *without however identifying them*."[51]

5. *What Citizenship Adds to Discipleship*

The Christian doctrines of creation and incarnation subsume a belief about an intrinsic relation between God and the world, between God and humanity. Christians believe that God is in the world and that the world is with God, yet they in no way reduce God to the world or the world to God. Christians claim that no area of life, in principle, falls outside the reach of the gracious action of God. Hence, Christians cannot maintain that politics can be totally isolated or separated from the religious sphere of life.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Christians have no privileged access to social-political questions, no special blueprint for the economic and social order, no substitute access to political technique and the density of political experience which comes only from sustained engagement in political movements.[52] As we saw Ricoeur put it, there is no specifically Christian politics. As a result, a specifically Christian political party involves a dangerous strategy. It may be a pretentious illusion, in principle even a contradiction of terms.[53] Christians must wager their political bets and conduct political strategy simply in their capacity as citizens. As Christian "materialists" in their response to the incarnation and creation, they must respect the integrity and opacity of the "material" of political forces, constraints, and historical possibilities that comprises every determinate social order.

I would propose that citizenship adds three qualities to discipleship. First, it *widens the reach of Christian solidarity* to include all other citizens in its range, thereby reminding Christians that God's grace reigns outside church borders. This wider solidarity shown by Christian concern and co-stewardship with fellow citizens for the political keeps vividly alive the important ecclesial truth that Christian preaching and witness, indeed the church itself, exist *for* the world. "The world" serves as an eschatological symbol of the church's mission which must extend to all times, places, peoples, and spheres of life, "even to the ends of the earth." The duties of citizenship protect the church from narrow parochial introspection. They provide a deeper sense of mission and of the scope of neighbor love. Finally, solidarity as citizen-disciples can focus the Christian worship of God on God's only accessible image, the *humanum*.

A second note that citizenship adds to discipleship is a *humbler service* in the often intractable day-to-day reality of politics. By recognizing the arena of politics as a field of contradiction between rationality and justice, power and violence, the goal of this Christian service in the political arena will be, in the words of Ricoeur, "simultaneously to improve the political institutions in the sense of the achievement of greater rationality and to remain wary of the abuse of power that is ingredient in every state system."[54] Ultimately, the temptation to abuse of power can be undercut only be dividing power. Power, in turn, can be divided only if it is controlled and kept on a human scale. Christians claim to carry a special vision of what constitutes the *humanum*, to be, in Pope Paul VI's fine phrase in his address to the United Nations, "experts in humanity." They disclaim any special expertise in the techniques, use, and creativity ingredient in political power. Through a common struggle with other citizens to tame

[49] "Justice in the World," par. 6, in *Renewing the Earth: Catholic Documents on Peace, Justice and Liberation*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Image Books, 1977).

[50] "Justice in the World," par 35.

[51] Paul VI, in *Documentation Catholique* 74 (1977): 307.

[52] For a broader discussion of the issues in these paragraphs, see Dermot A. Lane, *Foundations for Social Theology: Praxis, Process and Salvation* (New York: Paulist Press, 1984).

[53] On Christian political parties, see Schillebeeckx, *Gerechtigheid*, pp. 718-28.

[54] Ricoeur, *Politick*, p. 86.

and channel power to creative use in the service of their guiding vision of the human, they learn the humble way of shared responsibility and solidarity in history.

Finally, the political represents *a taxing reality test*, an experiential proving ground for Christian claims for a this-worldly, liberative, regenerative potential in grace and redemption. As Schillebeeckx forcefully argues, the central Christian truth claims remain also experiential concepts, subject to evidential test in praxis and history.[55] Hence, the taxing reality test of discipleship in citizenship is not a luxury on Christian grounds. In and through this reality test, Christians put flesh on their hopes for a transformed future based on the already achieved and transforming power of Christ in history. This is an evidential claim.

In the political order, human beings dissect reality, discern countertrends and movements, and touch their deepest desires for a more human community and future. If a cleavage between discipleship and citizenship, between Max Weber's ethics of absolute ends and ethics of responsibility, remains until the end times, there can be moments when, asymptotically, they approach a genuine correlation. The German Lutheran martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer caught this truth when he argued that Christians must risk what he calls a civic "venture of responsibility" in which they act, as Christians, on behalf of those without power, using whatever power they have for the protection of the powerless. Robin Lovin describes the meaning of this citizen venture of responsibility: "The specifically Christian marks of obedience are largely absent from the venture of responsibility. It is an act based on a sound reading of the facts and a type of civil courage which can and must be shared with other; and yet, properly understood, the venture involves a risk of personal corruption.... Only one who believes in the power of Christian grace is likely to undertake it."[56]

Discipleship–rendering present, at least in fragmented anticipations, the reign of God - depends on what Christians call "reading the signs of the times." One cannot discern the signs of the times–what Paul Lehmann refers to as "finding out what God is doing in history"–without simultaneously venturing the risk of fully entering, with fellow citizens, the times whose shape, promise, and future direction will largely depend on what citizens do together within their political order.

[55] Cf. Schillebeeckx, *Gerechtigheid*, pp. 34-56.

[56] Lovin, *Christian Faith*, p. 139.

[57] Louis van Bladel, S.J., *Christelijk Geloof en MaatschappijKritiek* (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1985).

[58] Ricoeur, *Politiek*, p. 198 (my trans.)

6. *What Discipleship Adds to Citizenship*

In a recent book on Christian faith and social criticism, the Flemish Jesuit scholar Louis van Bladel suggests the traid: (1) the Gospel as promise: utopia; (2) the Gospel as judgment: counterculture; and (3) the Gospel as vocation: the construction of a new order.[57] I wish to draw upon van Bladel in developing my third thesis, namely, that a Christian citizen's duties are greater and different from a citizen's duties as the state understands them. Specifically, I want to propose that the special contribution of discipleship to citizenship can be found in these three notes: *utopia*, *counterculture*, and *vocation*.

We have come to recognize the crucial importance of utopian vision for politics. It breaks the *strangle hold* of currently reigning paradigms, frees our imaginations to consider alternatives, and functions against every determinism to remind us that politics is a human game, the product, ultimately, of human choices and the limitations of human hopes and dreams. We ourselves construct the social world which in turn constrains us and hems us in. Van Bladel suggests the power of symbols of healing, forgiveness, and integrity to unleash new moments of political imagination. The impossible, outside the range of the art of the politically imaginable, nonetheless suddenly becomes possible. The previously unimaginable and unthinkable captures, at certain moments in history, the minds and hearts of citizens. So began the civil rights movement, the abolition of slavery, the raise of labor unions, feminist struggles for suffrage, and equal opportunities in our American social history.

Ricoeur, on his part, notes that this utopian imagination diminishes the chasm between the violent pedagogy of the state based on power and force and the nonviolent pedagogy of neighbor love. Paradoxically, he comments, at times, the nonviolent resister steps outside the range of legally authorized behavior and, in so doing, calls the state back to its true vocation by reminding it that it only exists to bring human beings to freedom, equality, and conditions of dignity. The nonviolence of nuclear pacifists, movements of Franciscan poverty, the Greens (an ecological movement in Germany, Holland, and Belgium), and ecologists serve notice that the state exist for the welfare of human beings, and not vice versa. In a fine phrase, Ricoeur evokes a "salvation through imaginative power." He comments: "Every conversion, in the first instance, involves a revolution in the images that guide our lives. By changing their self-image, human beings change their existence."[58] Every revolution in history has begun with a call for

new patterns of human interaction. Ordinary politics, by focusing on the presently possible, tends to deaden or narrow our political imaginations. Disciple-citizens, taking inspiration from the Gospel utopia, can keep that imagination open.

The Gospel also "convicts of sin." Van Bladel draws on a rich set of social science resources (Karl Marx, Herbert Marcuse, Jean Baudrillard, René Girard) to map the social-structural terrain where we are politically and culturally unfree, unjust, and lacking in hope and love in our modern, technico-rational consumer societies. Appealing to the New Testament stress on the battle against "the powers" which dominate and suffocate human beings, van Bladel combines evangelical inspiration with the social-critical thought of the human sciences to outline what Gospel judgment might mean in advanced, technical societies.[59] In van Bladel's view, Christians are called to be countercultural to everything in our society that stands for death, unfreedom, and injustice.

Finally, Christians view their life as a vocation, a calling to construct–using the only political materials we human begins have at hand–at least an approximation of that undistorted communication in neighbor love envisioned by God's new community. Hence, for van Bladel, beyond critical negativity, beyond eschatological reserve against every historical social achievement, and beyond countercultural refusals discipleship must also unleash the constructive power of vocation to build, in and through the present structures, a more habitable commonwealth through what Bonhoeffer called the "venture of responsibility."

In several places in his political writings, Ricoeur echoes these same themes of utopia, counterculture, and constructive vocation. Against the dangers of power, he poses the Christian nonviolent counterpoise; against the temptation to greed or the alienation of commodity fetishism in possession and property, he suggests Franciscan movements of simplicity and the Calvinist sense of careful stewardship of earthly goods which really belong to all; against culturally restricted values he proposes catholicity, keeping alive a human project that envisions a global unity transcending national boundaries. It is not that Christians have any pat answers. Rather, the task of the Christian in politics, accordng to Ricoeur, is "so to act that in society the issues of the use and meaning of power, or pleasure principle and human autonomy as a value can be brought at least, once again, into serious public discussion."[60]

In discussing the interconnection and tension between neighbor and social companion, Ricoeur shows the peculiar relevance of discipleship to citizenship:

> The theme of neighbor-love contains a permanent criticism on larger social bonds and inter-actions: according to the measure of neighbor-love, the larger social nexus is never intimate enough and never sufficiently inclusive. Social structures are never intimate enough because structurally mediated social inter-actions can never be the equivalent of an unmediated presence and meeting in personal dialogue. They are never inclusive enough since social groups can only achieve their distinct identity by contrasting themselves to out-groups. Hence, they fall back into self-enclosure in their own enclave. Christian neighbor-love involves the double demand of being simultaneously close and far away. The Samaritan represents being close because he came close-by and yet he represents being far-away because as a non-Jew, on a given day, he stayed with an unknown stranger who had been attacked by the wayside.[61]

Thus, neighbor love functions to bridge the chasm between citizenship and discipleship by serving as a permanent reminder that the ultimate purpose of any politics and citizenship is the service that political structures render to concrete human beings in their material and spiritual needs. Ricoeur concludes his reflections with the remark, "What the final judgment implies, it seems to me, is that we will be judged by what we did in very abstract institutional settings and structures to make them serve neighbor-love, often without being personally conscious of how our actions in these social structures actually impacted on the lives of the individual human beings touched by them."[62]

7. *Some Central New Testament Texts on Citizenship and Ethics*

It will not be possible to develop, at any length, an expanded exegesis of the set of New Testament texts that treat the topic of citizenship. Despite its importance as a permanent counter-weight to Romans 13, I will leave aside the teaching of Revelation 13 (and elsewhere), which represents a powerful religious critique of the absolute, arbitrary, imperial power that

[59] Cf. van Bladel, *Christelijk Geloof*, chap. 6, "Maatschappelijk-Ethische Beleving van het Christelijk Geloof."

[60] Ricoeur, *Politick*, p. 103

[61] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[62] Ibid.

the Book of Relevation sees as an embodiment of Satan. Against the Roman cry of "Imperator Victor," it is Jesus who is proclaimed "Victor" in the struggle. "He has overcome" (Revelation 5:5). Nor will I deal with the important and nuanced theory of civic obedience in 1 Peter with its insistence that the state is a mere human creation (*ktisis*; cf. 1 Peter 2:13). 1 Peter suggests that the imperial power often acts as an antichrist (cf. 1 Peter 3:14-17; 4:12-19; 5:13). Yet 1 Peter calls for a free obedience to the state authorities (1 Peter 2:16), in hopes that the good behavior of Christians will clear up misunderstandings (including the misunderstandings after 66 C.E. that early Christian might be connected with the Palestinian Jewish revolutionaries) and reduce injustice. In contrast to Romans 13:7, which calls upon Christian to show a "reverential fear" for both God and emperor, carelessly using the same religious term, *phobein*, for both, 1 Peter 2:17 uses two different words, thus enjoining two quite specifically different acts: "Reverence God with fear and respect the emperor" (*ton theon phobeisthe, ton basilea timate*). Everywhere the New Testament rejects any Christian participation in the imperial cult.

Mark 12:13-17 concerning coin tribute to Caesar, and Romans 13:1-7 need special comment and exegesis because of their frequent use and misuse as a common proof texts concerning discipleship and citizenship. Many have, mistakenly, considered the famous proverb, "Pay to Caesar the tax that is due him and give to God what belongs to God," as settling, in one fine formula, the permanent demarcations between religion and politics. The literary genre of Mark 12:13-17 is that of a contestation-debate saying between Jesus and his enemies. Throughout Mark 12 the deadly conflict between Jesus and certain Jewish leaders unfolds: the high priests, scribes, and elders (Mark 11:27), the Pharisees and Herodians (Mark 12:13), the Sadducees (Mark 12:18), and finally again the scribes (Mark 12:28), though, as in all the Gospel accounts, these texts are layered with the late conflicts between Jewish leadership and Christians in the final third of the first century.

Mark is absolutely uninterested in providing information about Jesus' own position on the state, as his use of the genre contestation-debate shows in this pericope. Whatever that position may have been lies outside Mark's intention in Chapter 12. Rather, the narrative relates how, when some of his fellow Jews, in positions of authority, pose a trick question, Jesus sees through it. He counters with a question that foils their attempts to pin him down. Jesus asks them whose image is on the coin of the realm. The authorities produce a coin, already a sign that they themselves stand within the Roman system as a de facto reality. Jesus produces no coin himself. Jesus plays with their foil by trapping them within the framework of their own question. "Since you yourselves already obviously stand within the system, well, then, pay your taxes [the technical meaning of *apodidonia*] to Caesar and give God what is God's due."

That this is a contestation saying is clear from the finale in Mark 12:17: "And they remained amazed at him." Jesus successfully avoided the trap set for him without having really to commit himself on the question by which, whichever way he answered, he would be compromised. As Schillebeeckx notes, "The literary genre of the contestation-saying does not allow us to see Mark 12:13-17 as a teaching-saying of Jesus (which follows another literary genre) concerning faith and politics."[63] The exegetical misreading of Mark 12:13-17 by taking his contestation–saying out of its appropriate context and absolutizing it as a principle of Christians in politics is not valid. Moreover, the usual interpretation of the saying as postulating a rigid cleavage between the social-political and religious is foreign both to Mark and to the whole of the New Testament. As Matthew's Gospel states in a genuine teaching saying: one cannot serve two masters, God and mammon (Matthew 6:24; cf. Luke 16:13). For the Christian the world of politics and money must also be seen in relation to God. This means that the Christian must also be seen as facing religious decisions on these issues too.

If it is impossible to find in Mark, 12:13-17 any indication of early Christianity's attitude toward the duties of citizenship, Romans 13:1-7 serves as the primary text enjoining civic obedience. This text, too, suffers from frequent reading out of context. We need to pay attention to several factors crucial to understanding the Pauline text. No doubt there existed among certain New Testament writers an apologetic concern to down-play any sense of Christian disloyalty to the state or any Christian connection with Jewish zealot revolutionaries after about 66 C.E. Paul, particularly, would be favorably disposed toward Rome as both a Roman citizen and as a diaspora Jew. The latter status, especially, determines the meaning of Romans 13. From the time of the diaspora, Judaism faced the need to distinguish the political state from the believing community. Diaspora Judaism showed a certain benevolence toward heathen political power. Thus Deutero-Isaiah could refer to the Persian king as

[63] Schillebeeckx, *Gerechtigheid*, p. 534.

"anointed of God" (Isaiah 45:1) and even see Cyrus as "servant" of God's will. In this view, political power could serve as an instrument of God's purposes, but its religious weight was only in terms of what it could do *in respect to the community of Israel*. Absolutely no religious significance was accorded to political sovereignty in its own right.

It is important to note that Paul neglects any directly christological allusions in Romans 13. He simply takes over the position of diaspora Judaism and repeats it for the church. Thus Romans 13:4 can speak of the Roman authority, like Cyrus, as God's servant (*diakonos*). But there is no distinctively Christian element in the entire pericope. Paul's advice to the early Christian community in Rome is simply that it should follow the Jewish model. The community follows its own church order in internal relations (cf. 1 Corinthians 5–6). An internally organized religious community, the diaspora Jewish rule, in respect to pagan civil authority, holds (1) an attitude of civil loyalty, (2) passive but stubborn resistance to any religious persecution; and (3) a positive enactment of ordinary civil duties (e.g., taxes).

Christians seek no special privileges in the pagan state, as a result of their belief. They share the same civil duties as any other citizens, although they deny any sacral significance to the state as such. Indeed, civil duties as such involve an ethical, not a religious, question (cf. Romans 13:5, "It is necessary to obey .... *as a matter of conscience*" [emphasis added]). Citizenship is an issue of ethical, not specifically Christian, duty. The genuine Christian duty enunciated by Paul surpasses citizenship: Have love for the other, since the one who loves the neighbor fulfills the whole law (Romans 13:8-10). Romans 13:8-10 is a necessary context for a correct reading of vv. 1-7, as is 12:9-21, which precedes the pericope, containing the great Pauline hymn to love and the appended virtues of self-sacrificing neighbor love. The full context of Romans 13:1-7, then, suggests that in the question of duties of citizenship, Christians have the same duties as other citizens. Citizenship as such has no sacral meaning. It belongs purely to the realm of ethics, a matter of conscience (Romans 13:6).

But on either side of the Romans 13 pericope lies the greater and different duty of Christians in their worldly life: a neighbor love that surpasses what mere civil law can enact or demand. Since Christians find themselves in a situation similar to diaspora Judaism, they should seek the benevolence of the authorities which, quite unwittingly, may be used by God, as Cyrus was for the exiles in Babylon, for the benefit of Christians. In this narrow sense, civil authority is from the hand of God (as indeed all authority falls under God's supreme authority).

The background of diaspora Judaism as a key to understand Romans 13 becomes much clearer if we juxtapose it with the other Pauline saying on civil authority (1 Timothy 2:1-15) which enjoins Christian prayer for the authorities (as diaspora Judaism prayed), "so that we might be able to live an undisturbed life in peace, with piety and uprightness." In sum, the proper reading of the teaching of Romans 13:1-10 (putting vv. 1-7 in its fuller context) is as follows:

> As citizens you should faithfully fulfill the ordinary civil duties as a matter of conscience. As Christians, of course, you are bound to much more: genuine love for the other modeled on God's covenant love. Fulfill your civil duties in the context of your discipleship, as a portion of this wider neighbor love which forms the necessary context for understanding citizenship.[64]

This exegesis of Romans 13 raises the larger question about a distinctive Christian ethic for worldly behavior. It would take us too far afield to defend, fully, the position I want to argue here. Thus I will merely state my position and draw its implications for the issue of correlating discipleship and citizenship.

In general, I want to maintain that the New Testament ethic is a transformative ethic which always presupposes another given, underlying societal ethic as the material on which it works the Christian transformation. Although almost half of the Pauline material consists of ethical casuistry or teaching, I would argue that the general pattern followed in the New Testament is the pattern found in the Pauline *Haustafeln* (see Colossians 3:18–4:1; Ephesians 5:22–6:9; 1 Timothy 2:1-15; 6:1-2; Titus 2:1-10; 1 Peter 2:13–3:9). My thesis is that all directly normative material in the New Testament is taken over from earlier Jewish or Roman-Greek stoic material (none of which, except for the religious basis of Jewish ethics in the Old Testament, has a religious ground). Thus there are no specifically Christian norms besides the cultural norms of the societies within which Christianity lived (and now lives). In the New Testament, Christians are urged to live moral lives in accord with the highest available societal ethical codes. Rather than a separate set of norms, Christians are urged to live and transform the available ethos of their societies, "in the Lord" (cf. Ephesians 5:22-33; 1 Peter 2:13-14). Discipleship, as we have seen, is primarily

[64] Cf. ibid., pp. 524-27.

an ethics of following the pattern of Jesus' dispositions, paradigmatic actions, and utopian teachings in the new, different context in which we live, not a slavish reconstruction of the context (and underlying ethos) of early Palestinian Jewish society or the Hellenistic world.

In the sense, as Schillebeechx agues, "the New Testament was always searching for the appropriate correlation between salvation in Christ and ethics."[65] The key to this correlation is found in having the attitude of self-sacrifice and love, "the same attitude as Jesus had" (Phil. 2:5). With that attitude the first Christians were urged by the New Testament to internalize the best of the received Jewish or, in gentile Christianity, Hellenic Stoic cultural ethos and enact it, "in the Lord." After all, as a new sect, early Christianity had no cultural ethos of its own.

If my thesis here has merit, it would suggest another motive for the correlation of discipleship and citizenship. Christians claim no transcultural, normative ethos of their own unrelated to or in permanent tension with the citizenly ethos of their host societies. Rather, they internalize and enact the set of virtues necessary for a good society in their host cultures and live them, in a transformative manner, as disciples, "in the Lord." In that sense, like the Christians of the New Testament, today's Christians are always seeking the appropriate relationship between discipleship and citizenship. No pat formula solves this relationship once and for all. It remains *aporia*. Yet the nature of political power means that there will always be two distinct pedagogies: the assimilation to the nonviolent Jesus, servant of God and of "the least" in our midst, and a pedagogy of violence and worldly prudence in the state of which citizens are members. Christianity will remain a religious movement engaged in creative ethical and cultural work in each culture in which it finds itself only as it embraces both pedagogies simultaneously. But it starts and ends with the one pedagogy that defines its existence: discipleship. It will live and enact the best of its host society's culture and sense of citizenship, "in the Lord." In no other way can we educate future generations to work for the betterment (Christians would say "sanctity and righteousness") of the world.

[65] Ibid., p. 539.

[66] Pastoral team of Bambamarca, *Vamos Caminando: A Peruvian Catechism*, trans. John Metcalf (London: SCM Press, 1985).

8. Educating for Citizenship-Discipleship: Vamos Caminando*: A Peruvian Catechism*

Is it possible to teach ordinary Christians this sophisticated sense of discipleship-citizenship? I am convinced that it is just that toward which Paul's catechesis aims in the Pauline letters. Closer to our own time we have the splendid catechetical work of the pastoral team of Bambamarca (a city in the northern Andes of Peru), *Vamos Caminando*, to convince us that it is possible to combine the two pedagogies of discipleship and citizenship without losing or submerging the distinctive Christian voice.

I am not an expert in religious catechesis. Nor am I a specialist in the culture of the Peruvian Andes, although I have spent an extended time in the *altiplanos* of Bolivia and Peru. Yet I was stirred and moved to make applications to my own society and life as I read *Vamos Caminando's* social analysis, pictures, probing questions, scriptural narrative, Peruvian anecdote, and poetry.[66]

No one can mistake the implications for an active, critical self-determining citizenship based on a cooperative sense in themes: We are *Campesinos*. We work the land–but who benefits? Our community. Lima and the other cities exploit us–what can we do? Wanted: persons of determination. And you–have you made your decision yet? *Vamos Caminando* is replete with every-day stories about taking the bus to Lima, going to market, a bribe for the justice of the peace, community health, a wake service, fiestas, market prices, attempts to found cooperatives and do community organizing. These stories of civic work are woven into a concatenation of major Peruvian literary voices such as José Carlos Mariátegui and the novelist José Maria Arguedas as samples of the highest Peruvian ideals of citizenship and community. Nor does anyone miss the extent, in the stories and questions, and in the pictures and anecdotes, to which Peruvian society runs on the motor of dominative power and violence or the hints of how, at times, this power achieves some modicum of rational justice. The realities, dilemmas, and highest hopes of citizenship come fully to the fore in the text, rooted deeply in Peruvian culture.

This is the catechism for and from liberation theology. But does it reduce Christianity to a social movement? In a sense, much of the Old and the New Testament is read in the process of studying each of fifteen major units. In each chapter, a situation from real life, a dramatic Peruvian story, is constantly counterpoised with selections from the psalms, the prophets or the wisdom literature of the Old Testament,

a Gospel narrative, or the letters of Paul. Each chapter moves the reader to a section entitled "Talking Points," which drives the respondent to move back and forth between the world of the New Testament and the everyday exercise of life and citizenship in the Peruvian *altiplano*. In addition to scripture texts, citations from church hymns, episcopal and papal social teaching all help the respondent to situate discipleship-citizenship in its rich ecclesial context of word and sacraments, community and service, worship, deep prayer, and thanksgiving.

In some units, the movement of the lesson plan goes from scriptural narrative to real-life situation, although most often, following the Latin American experience of Bible study and its application to real life in base communities, the directionality of the movement begins with real-life situations that evoke such feelings as puzzlement, anger, gratitude, wonder, joy, and outrage at injustice. This, after all, was the way Jesus taught. From real-life situations, not in a sacral language, Jesus moved to the heart of his Jewish tradition. As Carlos Mesters has argued, this pedagogical directionality is more likely to bring about the desired correlation between the ideals of discipleship and lived experience in citizenship than an alternative route of beginning in the scripture text itself, although Mesters does not absolutize the point.[67] Necessary for the success of this move from real-life anecdote and situation to the illumination of life by scripture is a rich sense and availability of the varied stands, themes, and texts of scripture which *Vamos Caminando* abundantly provides. Catechism for discipleship-citizenship, as with the liturgical year of worship, must see to it that the wide cycle of the whole of the scriptures is followed.

Like any good pedagogy, *Vamos Caminando* expects its readers to take time to ponder and puzzle over pictures (accompanying each subunit), to appropriate the scriptures and their application to real life and to the real-life cases which test the mettle of discipleship. Finally, the key to pedagogy is application to our lives. Hence the importance of the anecdotes from real life which lie close to our own experiences. Finally, the full pedagogy moves toward dialogue within a believing community. It evokes an old and tested way of Christian pedagogy for a discipleship that shapes real life: *see* the real-life situation, *judge* it in the light of and according to the criterion of the scriptures, *act* accordingly in a praxis of discipleship. The pedagogy of Cardinal Cardijn's movement of Catholic workers and students in the period before and after World War II in Europe has been appropriated by Peruvian liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutiérrez who began their ministry as chaplains in the Cardijn movement.[68]

There is little doubt in my mind about either the orthodoxy or the governing ideal of discipleship which controls the approach to social issues (utopian imagination, countercultural criticism, and constructive vocation) in *Vamos Caminando*. The guiding notes of the discipleship themes are clear in the chapter titles: "He died for us"; "Without love I am nothing'"; "'Don't stand staring up at heaven!'"; "Awake!"

Because it succeeds so brilliantly in bringing the New Testament to bear on ordinary Peruvian social realties, *Vamos Caminando* (like the New Testament itself) is, I presume, considered a dangerous document in Peru, evoking the opposition of both state authorities and elements in the church. As we have seen, discipleship is a way, an orthopraxis. It is also a doxology, and orthodoxy, a giving of praise and a worshiping of the true God whose delight is in humankind come fully alive (Irenaeus) and who rejoices in seeing widows, orphans, strangers, and *campesinos* in the land being brought into full citizenship rights as members of the community. I suspect that if we ever succeeded as religious educators in joining the two predagogies of discipleship and citizenship in our own nation as well as does *Vamos Caminando*, we too would be forging a liberation theology for North America. Our pedagogy as religious educators would probably be seen as dangerous.

Ultimately, if we ever really put together the dangerous memory of Jesus and the dangerous memory of "the oecumene of suffering" which comprises the bulk of human history, even today, our form of citizenship would be creatively new, an ethical synthesis that would transform our society and its ordinary expectations. It would be one of the moments of *kairos* when the two pedagogies, like the lion and the lamb of the prophet, came together in peace. We deceive ourselves if we think we have any less dangerous goal in mind when we converse together as Christian educators about what we can do to educate the next generation of Christians to work for the betterment of the world.

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[67] Carlos Mesters, "The Use of the Bible in Christian Communities of the Common People," in *The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities*, ed. Sergio Torres and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1981), pp. 197 - 213.

[68] I am indebted for the information about Gutiérrez's connection with the Cardijn movement to an interview held in Bolivia with a colleague of his in the 1960s in Peru, Sister Barbara Hendrix, M.M.

ANNUAL MEETING
1994

Keynote Address

J. Bryan Hehir

Thank you very much. It is a great honor and privilege to be here tonight. I look around the hall and see friends at almost every table, most of whom I have met on your home ground at various campuses around the country. I couldn't be more proud than to share the platform tonight with Monika Helwig and Bishop Jim Malone, both of whom I have been privileged to work with.

I must in all honesty address the introduction that I just received. It was of course, exceedingly generous. I get introduced about a hundred times a year for various functions, and the part that I always have to make clear is that no matter how generous the introduction, there is a part of my life they miss. I worked for several years here in Washington at the Bishops Conference, and like any staff person in a large organization I wrote a lot of speeches that other people gave.

In Washington, that's a growth industry. There are a lot of us that write speeches that other people give. There are particular characteristics to that vocation. And the Washington vocation of speech writer is best exemplified by a good friend of mine, whom I knew all my time here, who wrote for a senator for five years.

During the course of the five years, the senator not only never thanked him for a speech, the senator never read a speech before he gave it. So my friend decided at the end of five years that he would manifest his pentup frustration with the senator. He came in on a Friday afternoon, picked the speech up off the desk, headed for National Airport; stepped into a hall in the Midwest and began the speech.

He said, "Ladies and gentlemen, I know you have declining faith in government and I know you think we can be neither efficient or effective. I'm here tonight to tell you we can be both, efficient and effective. I'm here to tell you that we can hold down the arms race and not sacrifice the security of the country. We can make new friends among the Arabs and not sacrifice our relationship with Israel. We can hold down unemployment and not do it at the price of rising inflation. My task tonight is to tell you exactly how government can do these things for you." He turned to page two and at the top of the page it said, "Good luck buddy, you're on your own." I never did it to a bishop yet.

The ACCU bulletin that went out to announce this meeting accurately defined Ben Lopez's request to me. That request was that I explore the meaning, the possibilities and the challenges contained in John Paul II's mandate to Catholic higher education. As you know, the pope asked in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* that universities and colleges become what he called privileged places of dialogue with the culture and the society in which those institutions exist.

The papal text is clear in its mandate, but it is necessarily very general about the conditions in which that dialogue is to be conducted and the message by which that dialogue is to be facilitated.

So my task tonight is to attempt to specify and systematize precisely the meaning, the conditions and the content of the dialogue–at least from one person's perspective–as it might take place here in the United States.

What does it mean for an institution of higher education in the Catholic tradition to carry on what the pope calls a fruitful dialogue with the society and culture of which it is a part?

I would like to examine the dialogue in three steps, first to look at the context within which this dialogue occurs in the United States between Catholic institutions and the wider society. Second, I would like to point to some issues that exemplify the possibilities of dialogue. And finally, I would like to turn to the resources we possess, the posture and policy we might assume in carrying forth this dialogue.

First, the context in which the dialogue occurs. I think to grasp this one has to look at the social location of the church in the United States, the theological foundation for dialogue between the church and society, and then the character of the dialogue as it occurs.

A word on the social location of the church. For the church in the United States to carry on dialogue

Father Hehir is a member of the faculty at the Harvard Divinity School.

with the society in the 1990s I think one must begin with the recognition that we are now a church at the very center of this culture, for good or for ill. We have moved in a long historical journey from the margin of American society to its very center. We are in a different place, for example, socially, a very different place than we were in when John Tracy Ellis wrote his famous essay in the early 1950s.

As I prepared this talk, it struck me that we are in a very different place in terms of social location than Catholics were when John Courtney Murray wrote "We Hold These Truths" in 1960, not so long ago. But much has changed. Look out at the United States from this city. Looking through the prism of Washington, you get a sense of the social location of Catholics.

On Capitol Hill, Catholics outnumber other religious communities, by 2 or 3 to 1. Go down through the list of the chairmanships of the major committees in the U.S. Congress where decisions are made that touch the faith and future of this country, and it is filled with Catholic names. Move from the city of governance to the city of commerce, New York City, and find more Catholic CEO's than any other religious community.

We have always been in the union movement, and while I suspect none of us would be willing to say we are yet where we need to be, in all the fullness of our potential and higher education, we are certainly in a very different place than when John Tracy Ellis told us we were almost no place.

So it is a church at the center. The social location from which the dialogue with the society takes place is not from an immigrant church struggling to be recognized. Being at the center may be more of a risk to our souls than we are willing to acknowledge, but we have to at least deal with that fact.

Now, from that position of a social location at the center of American society, by what theological vision will we undertake dialogue with the society? That is to say, how do we think about this task we have been invited to perform?

I think that to grasp the theological vision that undergirds the pope's mandate one needs to go behind *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* to the document *Gaudiam et Spes* of Vatican II. Henri deLubac, the great French Jesuit who had so much to do with shaping the path to Vatican II, once said of John Paul II that he is a man of *Gaudiam et Spes*. And I think what that means is that that document, more than any other at the Vatican Council, was the document that this pope was directly involved with.

Now, what the theological vision of *Gaudiam et Spes* says in terms of the church's role in society is, I submit, a classically Catholic understanding, classically Catholic in the sense that we are to be basically at home in the world, in the world of ideas and in the world of social institutions. The classical Catholic notion is never sectarian.

The classical Catholic notion is governed by what Charles Curren once called the Catholic "and." It is always faith *and* reason, not faith or reason. It is always nature *and* grace, not nature or grace. And it is always church *and* world, not church or world.

The fundamental position, in principle, that we are to hold *vis-a-vis* civil society--whether it be the world of culture, the world of politics or law or economics--the fundamental position is a careful, cautious posture of collaboration.

In principle, we are meant to be in constant collaboration with the wider ambit of society in the service of the human person. Now, to be fair, in a world that is marked by sin, collaboration is not an easy posture to maintain. At times, collaboration, if it is to be authentic in the spirit of the Gospel, will mean confrontation. At times, there will be criticism of the wider society, lest we move from collaboration to simply cooptation, where we are possessed by the society. But in principle, we do not see ourselves in a kind of inevitable all-out conflict with the world.

The Catholic view is more nuanced, more positive, more hopeful than that. We do not think there is a chasm between what we can know by grace and revelation, and what we can ascertain by dint of human intelligence and reason. As Murray taught us, in the Catholic tradition at its best we write "reason" with a capital "R" and still believe that the horizon of faith can move us even further into knowledge and wisdom, but never away from reason.

If collaboration is our basic posture and expectation for the dialogue, the method of dealing with society is precisely to be dialogical, and the dynamic of the dialogue is to be dialectical. That is to say, the posture of dialogue means, in the spirit of *Gaudiam et Spes*, a church that believes it has something to teach and something to learn--a posture of what I would call confident modesty. That is to say, courage enough to be modest, and confident enough not to be overwhelmed. Confident modesty, a posture that will keep us diligent in the world of ideas in pursuit of truth wherever it is; confident modesty, a profound conviction that the word of God, the grace of the Spirit, and the transforming life of Christ is meant for the world in which we live.

In a spirit of collaboration and with a style of confident modesty, the dynamic of the dialogue is, I

submit, always dialectical. Dialectical in the sense of *sic et non*. There are some things we can share and there are other things we dare not share at the price of our own soul and society's better life.

Dialectical in the sense of that shifting, winnowing, discerning that our tradition takes as essential for personal life and necessary for a healthy public life. This I submit is where we start the dialogue from. A church which is factually at the center in its social location and a church which is theologically at home in the world, but not too at home. That's the trick, to remind ourselves that we should not be comfortably at home.

We have, I submit, two different voices we need to listen to at the center. The social pastoral voice is the reminder that while we have moved from being an immigrant church we have not moved away from support of an immigrant population.

We are a church at the center, but that is not our whole life. We are now a church at the center and back out at the edge again in a kind of fascinating network of American Catholicism. The immigrant of the 19th century possess the center today.

But the immigrants of the wars of Southeast Asia and Central America and Latin America are on the edge of our society. And they are every much a part of our community as those of us who claim heritage over a hundred years old.

That voice and the persistent voice of an urban church, an immigrant church and an urban church in the late 20th century, we are still that. Those two voices will remind us that not everyone in our community is at the center. And certainly, not everyone in this society is at the center. And the test of a religious vision is how those at the center have an eye for the edge. We cannot be too at home in the center.

Even if this were not the case, the liturgy we celebrate and the theology that we learn in our universities would remind us that no center is stable and enduring. No city is lasting. We are always on the way. And to live at the center and remember that you are on the way is quite a trick in the life of the spirit.

Factually at the center, theologically at home in society, but not too at home. From this posture, we are invited to dialogue.

What is the character of this society that we are invited to dialogue with? Whether it be our faculty that undertake research, our students whom we are entrusted with to help understand this society in which they live and the responsibility of being a church at the center, what kind of structure do we address?

I submit that to take up the pope's mandate in this society is to recognize that we are a church faced with a secular state, a pluralistic society, a capitalist economy and a post cold war world. Now, if you notice, each one of those characteristics is for us a challenge and an opportunity.

Each one of those characteristics is an element that Catholic teaching has addressed in our time. The secular state is our constitutional heritage. The secular state tells us in this society that any church will be as good as its witness and no better.

There will be no special help to any religious community. There also should be no special discrimination against any religious community. How do we as Catholics feel about a secular state? Well, thanks to Vatican II, we are more comfortable with it than we would have been 40, 50, 60 years ago.

We expect no favoritism, only the freedom to function. And with that one demand on the secular state we accept the bargain that in this society we will be as good as the quality of our witness and no better. There will be no special help.

Surrounding the secular state is a religiously pluralistic society, another kind of challenge. And we as Catholics, 25 years after Vatican II, have a different view of this question also.

For most of the 19th century, the church's response to religious pluralism was to seek to deny it, or at least to limit it as much as possible. The council accepts the religiously pluralistic society as the given context for the church's ministry. What that means is to enter dialogue with this society about the problems that shape the society as a whole; it means that we come with a religious vision, but we can't stop with a religious vision.

It puts an enormous stress on the creativity of the religious intellect to stay rooted in a religious vision and to transform the moral wisdom of that vision into something that a wider civil community can find intelligible, wise and convincing. Notice how the two intersect. A secular society says there will be no special help. You are as good as the quality of your witness. A pluralistic society says you will be only as effective as you are morally convincing.

We may be profoundly convinced on the grounds of religious conviction of this or that issue. Our capacity to shape society by that conviction depends on our ability to transform our profound conviction into a kind of usable wisdom that captures the imagination and the intellect and the heart of those who do not begin where we begin–in faith.

A capitalist economy. Like the secular state, we have struggled with this for a long time. And most recently, in the teachings of this pope, we are told that we should measure it the same way we measure the secular state.

It is neither to be blessed nor to be totally spurned. It is to be measured, restrained, complemented by other measures. For as he has told us, the law of the market may give you efficiency, it will not automatically give you justice. And if we are concerned about those at the edge, we learn to appreciate the law of the market for what it is worth and to understand what it leaves undone.

In all three cases, the secular state, the pluarlist society, the capitalist economy, if you really think about engaging a body of students so that they have the capacity to both understand those three realities and measure them, to work with them and not be possessed by them, that's a fairly burdensome weight on any curriculum.

And finally, as if we didn't have enough here, we stand full square in a post cold war world. And to be in this society, at the center of this society, is to face that fact with special kinds of responsibilities. Once again, this pope, normally defined as a kind of inveterate conservative, has a conception of international responsibility that he urges on this country that places him so far ahead of the existing political dialogue it would be hard to put him in the same room with anybody else.

And we are invited to accept that conception and to invite others to accept the notion of citizenship that involves a certain kind of conviction about the fate of the human family and what it means to live in the center of the single most influential country in the world. Now, that's just the context.

Dialogue here is dialogue with the secular state, dialogue in a pluralist society, dialogue about the limits and values of a capitalist economy, and dialogue about the future of this world that we have now just entered.

To push further beyond the characteristics of the culture, let me propose an argument that says that this is a good moment for the Catholic public vision. These days when I say that, quite honestly, I have to admit to audiences that we do not want to confuse the church's publicity with its public vision.

We are not in our best moment with much of our publicity. All the more reason we need to keep hold of the fact that there is an intrinsic public vision, that for all our internal problems in the church we dare not become totally captivated with those and lose the sense of what this public vision has to offer. For if you are going to impact a pluralistic society of the complexity of ours, it isn't just the willingness to dialogue that counts. One must have something distinctive to say.

This is a tough society to get air time in. This is a tough society to help shape a vision that carries a country as large, diverse and complicated as ours.

But I submit there are always fault lines in the public debate. Cracking the public debate in the United States is like hitting a diamond. You hit it square on and it will not yield. But you find the fault line and you can break it open.

The fault lines in the public debate these days are not least about religious vision and moral values. Lincoln once said we were a society that was afraid of faith and terrified by our skepticism. His words ring rather true, I think, now. You find a quest for the life of the spirit in the strangest places. The fault lines are there in the debate where religious value and moral principle can make a difference.

I submit that in certain key areas, the Catholic public vision is intellectually credible, socially significant, and mostly unknown. And therefore, the capacity for dialogue and the invitation to dialogue mean appreciating the strength of what we can bring to the debate and trying to think hard about the strategy of finding the fault lines.

Now, I do not think that this public vision is a ready made product.

It is not just there to be delivered. And that is precisely where institutions of higher education stand. For in my view, we have an intellectually interesting and socially credible view on a set of issues, but on each of these issues it is yet an unfinished agenda.

The university ought to stand at that boundary, I suggest, between where the public vision of the church is shaped and where the public vision of the church is shared. A university ought to be doing the internal work of structuring, digging, shaping that vision at precisely its points of vulnerability. And it ought to help Catholics who are at the center in so many other fields to share that vision.

Let me look very quickly at my proposition. My proposition is that there are aspects of the Catholic public vision that respond nicely to major debates in our society.

Take three different issues, the vision of society by which we live, bioethics as it affects us from birth to the grave, and the direction of American policy in the post-war world. You will be glad to know I'm going to do none of these in any detail.

What I want to do is to identify questions that may make a difference in this county and argue that we have

something to say to the question, if not everything that needs to be said. Universities stand right at the point of where some of the saying can be done and where much of the work that needs yet to be done can be carried on. There is today a rather raging debate about how you understand our social fabric, the way we relate to one another.

It goes under the title of the limits of liberalism debate. And what it really is about is a culture that is thoroughly shaped by a liberal philosophy, and from within that philosophy today there comes a critique about its limit. A critique, not a disowning of it.

Catholicism has been an age-old adversary of the liberal vision. In 1960 John Courtney Murray laid it out with some passion. We disagreed with the liberal premise about the nature of the person, disagreed with the liberal conclusion about the shape of society and disagreed about the liberal conception of the role of the state.

The classical liberal vision saw the person as individualistic. We saw the person as social. The classical liberal vision saw the society as mechanistic. We saw it as organic. The classical liberal vision said the state that governed least, governed best. We said the state had moral responsibility, especially to the vulnerable.

What is interesting, though, today, is that in the centers of liberalism the classical vision is under critique. Liberals who want to hold the liberal vision want to talk about duties as well as rights, social fabric as well as individual freedom, and a conception of the state that is more than an umpire.

Interestingly enough, from the Catholic side, beginning with John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris*, we have refashioned the organic conception. We now talk about rights and do it comfortably. We did not always do so. We now talk about the secular state and are not uncomfortable with it. It was not always so. We now understand, too, that freedom is as much of a value as justice and order, and so what you find is a kind of interesting debate about the very fabric of the society in which we live. And we are one of the contending parties trying to find some middle ground.

For the vision that we are social in nature is precisely what interests people today. There is much to be done in refashioning our vision and in understanding the limits of the liberalism debate. But we should not be uncomfortable there.

Turn to applied ethics and move to bioethics. Here's an issue that drives the society from the earliest days of marriage to the last days of people's lives. We are wondering what to do with the limits of life. We are struggling at times and at other times concluding too easily what we should do in expressing responsibility for life.

The Catholic position here is normally regarded as close to sectarian. Our conclusions on a number of fronts seem to separate us from the main line discussion. I submit that's too simple. I take you back to 1986 when the last major statement of the Catholic church on this range of issues from in vitro fertilization through experimentation on embroys to surrogate motherhood was made. In eight days, the *New York Times* ran four front page stories on that text. It published the entire text with all the footnotes, hardly a presidential document in the country that gets that kind of attention.

There was not universal agreement, but there was some fundamental respect about a vision that said two things. First, we are social by nature, and, therefore, decisions that appear to be radically private at the beginning of life and at the end of life may not be so private in their consequences. Second, technology has its own logic, but it does not have its own ethics and there is a need to set a moral framework over the technology we possess.

I submit those two basic premises are interesting additions to much of what gets debated at the beginning and end of life.

But notice that as you move from those premises to very specific conclusions the debate inside the church rises. And we need to be as aware of that as we are aware of the potential of the larger social dimension of the bioethical vision in Catholicism. Once again, a university stands at the point where you can conduct the internal critical debate, and not have to agree on everything, and still seek to share the fruits of a wider, social structural vision that has a good deal to say about how we think about life and our stewardship over it.

Finally, this question about where we stand in the world. There's no question we have gone through in the last five years what my colleagues in international affairs all agree is one of the transitional moments in modern history. The structure of the international system has changed, the substance of international politics has been radically transformed and we are in search of not just the policy, but a framework for understanding the world in which we are a part.

Once again, look at elements of what we might have to offer. We who believe that we are social in nature believe that the social responsibilities of our nature do not stop at national boundaries. The human community precedes the nation state. The nation state is valuable but of relative moral value. Once one says that, then the road is open to talk about what John Paul

Il calls solidarity–moral responsibility across national lines on issues as diverse as trade, technology and intervention.

Today, the hardest question we face is how to define what the limits of responsibility are and what the range of responsibility is. And the danger is that in a post cold war world where we face few people who can threaten us–few people whom we basically need–there is an enormous danger that we may decide that if we don't need them, we have no responsibility to them. That conception won't fit this social vision.

On issues that are at the heart of what we are as a nation, this tradition has something to say. Confident modesty, not everything to say, not everything said well, but some things worth saying.

Now, let me conclude by asking what it means not to stand at the fault line in society but to stand on this boundary, where the church meets the wider society. A church factually at the center, intellectually at home but not too at home in the world, a church with a range of moral vision that runs from in vitro fertilization to intervention.

What does it mean to be the stewards of that kind of intellectual vision? I submit that it is precisely because we are now at the center that the question of identity runs–Catholic identity–through our debates.

We find it in our universities, we find it in our healthcare institutions and, if we are honest with ourselves, we should find it in every parish of the country. To stand at the center is risky business. But the identity question that the universities struggle with, I simply want to say, is part of a larger question of the church in United States today. How to be at home, but not too at home. How to be assimilated, but not dissolved. How to be modest, but not too modest. For we are expected to carry the power of a gospel that says there always is further to go than we have gone thus far. What kind of faith do we seek to transmit, to cultivate, to share?

I submit we need a faith that is marked by three characteristics: It is scriptural in its foundation, sacramental in its experience, and social in its conception of the meaning of life.

A faith that is scriptural, not simply biblical, but scriptural, meaning that it is about the word and that the meaning of faith includes an intellectual structure by which life can be measured. This to me in my 25 years of teaching in higher education, is the problem, the largest problem we face. Whether it's at Georgetown or at Harvard or at other places I've taught, I meet Catholics who are profoundly pious, genuinely generous, and often utterly lacking in any sense that there is an intellectual dimension of faith that should structure their life beyond their prayer and this generosity--a way of joining the fabric of the best of the imperical knowledge that they have with a vision that is wider than imperical knowledge but not alien to it.

A faith is about the word cultivated as a structure of intelligence which provides the fabric for professional vocation in the meaning of citizenship. But if faith is always about the word, it is never just about the word, and so the sacramental experience of being touched by the power of God, taken up in transcendent reality, must be joined to an intellectual structure of life. And if the scriptural and the sacramental ground people, then the social is the arena in which accountability is tested and in which we respond in generosity to others to a God who has been generous to us in his word and sacrament.

That, I submit is a kind of faith that might be equal to the task of carrying on the dialogue with a society like ours. That kind of faith requires institutional support and expression in universities; it requires an intellectual tradition in the university that keeps consciously alive the Catholic intellectual tradition as a central fabric–not the whole business of the university–that requires a faculty, a critical mass of people who know how to conduct that dialogue about that structure affair.

And finally, if institutional support and intellectual cultivation are present, then we can hope for a constituency of men and women who will take us into the next century, capable of carrying the tradition in confident modesty that is as old as the Gospel and as new as the Eucharist we celebrated tonight. Thank you.

Homily

What is Needed is Trust

James W. Malone

In today's Gospel (Mark 5:36), we meet two persons of trust and hope. One is a woman who remains nameless, yet has the spunk to push through the crowd and touch the cloak of Jesus. The other is given a name, Jairus, an official of the synagogue who entreats Jesus to heal his critically ill daughter.

Though we are introduced first to Jairus, it is the woman who seizes both Jesus' cloak and our consciousness. You know the story. We are given an ancient summary of her medical condition, told she has suffered without relief from a hemorrhage for a dozen years. We are told, too, that she has sought treatment from a number of doctors and exhausted her savings.

The implication? The latest in first century technology has been powerless to cure her condition. Further, we might assume that the woman had become desperate, grasping at whatever possible treatment might bring her relief and presumably save her life.

Finally, we see her as she approaches Jesus. Was this the last hope that she had for her life and health? In any case, with nothing more to hope in, she placed her trust in the power that Jesus had. We see her pushing through the crowd surrounding him as the whole gathering proceeds with Jesus to the home of the synagogue official Jairus.

Mark captures a marvelous moment of humanity, a totally believable "slice of life" snapshot as he describes her impatience. Regardless of what is on Jesus' agenda, the woman has waited long enough for life and health; she is determined to have her needs addressed. She summons the courage to push through the last several people until she reaches Jesus himself. Without trying to stop him and speak to him, she simply trusts with all her might and grabs hold of his cloak. What happens then is a "power surge." The woman immediately knows that she has been cured; she feels strength that she hasn't known for 12 years.

Jesus knows she has been cured, for her trust has tapped his power. Trust is the key. For her trust has unlocked hope for the future, given her back her health, and opened up a new life.

Bishop Malone is the bishop of Youngstown, Ohio.

That, however, is not the end of the story. Jesus calls her out of the crowd. He points out her trust to illustrate for all the "power surge" that letting go and trusting brings. The scene leaves us breathless, but we hardly have the chance to assimilate it before messengers come for Jairus.

Their news is predictable. No doubt, Jairus himself thought it might happen, though he tried not to acknowledge the inevitable. They bring word that Jairus' sick daughter has passed away. Did some people try to explain to Jairus that this would happen anyway? Were there friends or relatives who pulled him aside to tell him that he should not go chasing after miracle workers, that he should stay by his daughter's side because the end was too near? At a time of such shocking grief, Jesus turns to Jairus. He offers not condolences but hope, counseling Jairus to cling to faith. To trust, Jesus says: "Fear is useless. What is needed is trust."

Indeed, fear is often useless. Like an alarm or siren, fear alerts us to danger. Fear helps us to focus our attention where our survival may be at stake. But beyond that, like an alarm or a siren we can't shut off, fear becomes destructive. When we continue to focus on fear, it paralyzes us. Once our attention is alerted and our minds are focused, we must "cast off" fear.

What we need then is hope and trust. Fear and despair could have stopped the woman with the hemorrhage and also Jairus in their tracks, but their trust in Jesus and their hope that he could help them kept them going.

Hope and trust must keep us going too. We meet at a time of--shall we call it a crisis?--when we must deal with ordinances for Catholic colleges and universities in the United States that some would like to implement and others would like to scuttle. As has been the case with many issues of conflict in our history as the community of Jesus, we may feel concern, perhaps even fear, over the direction in which we are going.

As suggested, fear and concern are useful insofar as they alert us to dangers. But once our attention is focused and our energy directed towards the matter at hand, fear is no longer useful.

What is useful is the trust we place in the holy spirit to guide us through all crises and dangers. It is on the basis of that trust in the spirit that we find new hope for the future. Can I guarantee that we only need to trust and all will automatically be well? No. But trust will make us well, and when we are well, when we feel the power surge tapped by trust, then we will be most capable to address the problems at hand.

The words of Jesus call to us down through the centuries and challenge those of us both in chancery and in academe both professionally and personally: "Fear is useless . . . what is needed is trust."

Implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiæ*

Alice Gallin, OSU

As part of the consultation initiated by the NCCB Committee on Implementing *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* a session of the annual ACCU meeting was devoted to commentaries on the proposed ordinances. It was a tremendous opportunity for the bishop members of the panel to hear directly from the 200 or so presidents of Catholic colleges and universities. It was also a unique moment for the gathered presidents to attend to the expressed concerns of the bishops and to be informed directly about the work of the committee and the reasons behind the ordinances.

The opening remarks of Bishop John Leibrecht, chair of the Committee for Implementation, set the stage for a respectful and honest discussion. He listed the assumptions that he believed were common to most bishops:

1. They recognize and appreciate the contribution of Catholic colleges and universities to the church and to the country.
2. They realize the role of the many religious communities in founding and funding most of these institutions; they recognize the role of lay men and women as well. They hope to work with the colleges in maintaining their Catholic identity in the face of the challenges offered by the forces moving toward secularization.
3. The bishops believe that the vision of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* is generally welcomed by Catholic colleges and universities.
4. The bishops have the responsibility to implement the norms of Part 2 of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* which call for ordinances.
5. The basic relationship of bishops to Catholic colleges and universities should remain informal and dialogic in nature.
6. *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* clearly states that the bishop is not related to the internal governance of the Catholic college or university.
7. The relationship of the bishop to the college/university is one of communion and not control.
8. They recognize relationships with accrediting agencies, AAUP, NCAA, etc., and assume that their relationship will not interfere.
9. Ordinances must respect an environment which values academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
10. The diocesan bishop has a special role in guarding authentic Catholic teaching.
11. Internal academic procedures for dealing with unauthentic Catholic teaching and practice are too little known and some bishops question their effectiveness.
12. Bishops recognize the difficulty concerning the mandate and need much assistance relative to Canon 812.

Bishop Leibrecht then identified four guidelines that would need to be kept in mind by the committee:

1. The number of ordinances should be limited.
2. The ordinances must be acceptable to the NCCB, the Catholic colleges and universities, and the Holy See.
3. Local implementation is preferable to national because of the great diversity of institutions.
4. The process should provide for review and amendment.

This over-view of the work of the committee set the context; the next speaker was Archbishop Oscar Lipscomb who addressed the reasons why *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* had been promulgated and why the ordinances must be specific and effective. Internal corrective procedures among Catholic theologians are not seen as sufficient to give assurances that the faith is being transmitted to the next generation in an authentic way. He dealt with the role of the magisterium in authenticating Catholicity in theological teaching. Archbishop Lipscomb pointed to the changed situation of the academic theologian whereby he or she is the instant expert of the media–more so than the bishop–and thus their role is influential in a pastoral sense. He

Alice Gallin, OSU, is a visiting scholar at The Catholic University of America and a past executive director of ACCU.

urged further dialogue to clarify the role of the bishop and/or the magisterium in theological teaching.

Bishop Malone then reflected on the content of the consultation as he had heard it. All the respondents were positive about the vision of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the collaborative process that led to its final form. On the other hand, many objected to the legalistic tone of the ordinances which seemed to be requiring a substantive realignment in the relationship of bishops to colleges and universities. He thought that the mandate of Vatican II to the bishops to develop more fully the theology of the mission and ministry of diocesan bishops may have resulted in the overly-episcopal coloring of the ordinances. The mission and ministry of the bishop needs to be explored in conjunction with the renewed sense of lay mission and ministry, and for this task more time and patience are required. Bishop Malone therefore suggested an extension of the time line, an expansion of the number of participants in the process, and a conscious effort to build on *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*.

The three presidents from the Implementation Committee, Raymond Fitz, SM, Karen Kennelly, CSJ, and Rev. Donald Monan, SJ, then gave briefer comments. The main problem was identified as the mandate and how it could possibly work in the practical order of things without infringing on the autonomy of the institution. Brother Fitz suggested that there was a deeper question behind it–what is it trying to achieve? He expressed the fear that such an ordinance would marginalize Catholic theologians and have a major negative influence on the role of Catholics in the intellectual life of the USA. He urged an expansion of the committee, additional staff, and the substitution of a pastoral letter for ordinances. The on-going dialogue should be continued and perhaps in ten years we could develop some guidelines.

Sister Karen Kennelly underscored the need for further dialogue, basing her remarks on two fundamental aspects of the dialogue that had been missing up to now: 1) the historical dimension which would explicate the role of religious communities; and 2) the need to define due process and how it would be incorporated.

The final panelist, Father Donald Monan, expressed his evaluation of the process thus far by saying that if he thought we were at the "end" of it he would have to say we were at an impasse. However, he thinks we are not at the end and favors moving forward with the dialogue attempting to develop trust between the parties to the debate. He pointed out that we are now on a collision course: Presidents proud of professionalization and of the development of autonomous governing structures which enable us to contribute to the church and society, while the bishops are pressured by canon law and other forces to extend legal structures as a way of controlling the teaching of theology. Part of the difficulty stems from a lack of clear understanding of the problems of secularization.

Because of time constraints, the process of table group discussion was eliminated. In general, speakers from the floor favored continuing and widening the conversation paying attention to some of the "real" problems faced in trying to hand on the Catholic tradition, problems that would not be solved by mandates. Agreement was expressed with Bishop Leibrecht's goal of developing communion, not control, but it was suggested that the ordinances fell under the rubric of control more than of communion. There was a need, it was pointed out, to study the question of secularization and try to use the term in a carefully defined way. The multicultural world that we now find on our campuses creates new questions about our willingness to be open to other cultures, and this, in turn, can be the source of tension with our determination to preserve our Catholic identity. Is secularization another word for inculturation? This needs further study and discussion.

On the international level, this same diversity of culture can be seen as a positive way of experiencing our Catholicity–for example in the International Federation of Catholic Universities. Working with that organization helps us appreciate our uniqueness in the USA and also helps us experience our common bonds. Realistically, the questions need to focus on how those who are in control of the university can promote the Catholic identity of their institution, and this process will be hindered rather than helped by ordinances.

With these comments the meeting had to conclude because of time limitations. It seemed as if all those present desired to keep the conversation going so as to reach a point of mutual understanding. Bishops and president, indeed, have had an instrument for on-going dialogue since 1974 when the Bishops and Presidents' Committee was formed under the joint action of the NCCB and the ACCU. For twenty years these representatives of the two organizations have met bi-annually discussing common educational concerns and developing a good sense of fellowship. This group was instrumental in the preparation for the meetings

preceding the promulgation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and had conferred frequently concerning their responses to earlier drafts.

However, for the wider audience, the group of some 200 presidents, such dialogue on a national level with bishops was an unknown. Episcopal relations have generally been developed only with the local ordinary, and so this forum on February 2nd had great significance. Presidents were reassured by the bishops on the panel as to their appreciation of the work of Catholic colleges and universities and their understanding of the important nuances in their relationships with the church. They also came away with a clear notion of the need for further dialogue. The bishops, in their closing remarks, also indicated a reluctance to proceed further with the ordinances in their present form and expressed the hope that the dialogue based on the national consultation done in 1993 would be continued.

Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities
(A Department of NCEA)
Suite 650 One Dupont Circle Washington, D.C. 20036

Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education is a publication of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities. It contains original articles and reprints of articles of interest to colleagues in Catholic higher education. Editor: Benito M. Lopez, Jr., Managing Editor: Paul J. Gallagher. Editorial offices: ACCU, Suite 650, One Dupont Circle, Washington, DC 20036. Additional copies $6.00 each (1-9 copies); ten or more copies $5.00 each: prepaid.

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

Our Identity: Invitations and Reflections

Volume 15, Number 2
Winter 1995

ISBN 1-55833-147-6

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Introduction

At its annual meeting this year, the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities was privileged to provide the opportunity for our presidents to engage in discussion with two members and staff of the United States Catholic Conference's *Ex corde Ecclesiae* Implementation Committee. The occasion, an enthusiastic and positive session, was the most recent of ACCU's efforts to facilitate the dialogue between our colleges and universities and the bishops' committee.

It should be no surprise, then, that the publication of this issue of *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education* has been delayed in order that we can include in it the remarks made at that meeting by the chair of the Implementation Committee, Bishop John J. Leibrecht, and his colleague on the committee, Bishop James W. Malone.

Included also from the meeting are the remarks made by Jesuit Father Raymond C. Baumhart upon receiving the association's Theodore M. Hesburg, CSC, Award and the text of the homily delivered by the presider at our liturgy, Monsignor Franklyn M. Casale.

The remaining five pieces published here serve to further stimulate the discussion of what it means for a college or university to call itself Catholic.

Two of our authors, presidents of quite different kinds of institutions in Washington, DC--Trinity College and Georgetown University-- speak to leadership and to the wonderful diversity that generations of leaders have given to the shape of Catholic higher education.

Robert Wilken discusses the vocation of scholar and the intellectual climate that can encourage the scholar in speaking as a member of a religious community, while Craig Lent examines the university's responsibility for creating and sustaining the presence of a lively Catholic intellectual community.

Finally, we have reprinted here a joint text of the Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education and the pontifical councils for laity and for culture. The text discusses the dialogue between faith and culture and the presence of the church in university culture.

P.J.G.

Ex corde Ecclesiae

A Conversation with the Bishops

MOST REVEREND JOHN J. LEIBRECHT

The last thirty years have seen many changes in Catholic colleges and universities. Enrollments increased dramatically so that now more than 600,000 students, almost two-thirds of them full-time, participate in Catholic higher education. Governance shifted in many cases from religious communities to boards that include lay men and women. The ratio of religious to lay faculty moved toward a significant lay majority. Catholic colleges and universities are perceived today as mainstream and academically solid.

What will Catholic colleges and universities be like years from now? That question is occasioned, in part, by *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, in which Pope John Paul II gives his vision of Catholic higher education. In particular, the pope wants colleges and universities to continue as specifically Catholic. That same hope is shared, I am sure, by all of us at this annual meeting of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities.

Many of us here will not be participating in Catholic higher education thirty years from now. New generations of presidents, trustees, deans, and faculty members will replace us, and each other, between now and then.

Is there anything that can be done now to ensure Catholic identity thirty years from now? *Ex corde Ecclesiae* offers us a timely opportunity to influence Catholic higher education as we look ahead. Without deliberate action, some of our institutions may drift away from an effective religious dimension. Some colleges and universities in this nation identified decades ago as Protestant no longer have a perceptible presence of religious values affecting their institutional lives. Those colleges did not lose their religious identity suddenly. Rather, change resulted from a gradual process that involved successive presidencies, new trustees, and different faculties. My belief, and that of the *Ex corde Ecclesiae* implementation committee, is that we have a unique opportunity to ensure the Catholic identity of our institutions for the future.

Today I would like to report on three themes that the *Ex corde Ecclesiae* implementation committee suggested to presidents and bishops for dialogue in the fall of 1994: Catholic identity, the relationship of faith and culture, and pastoral ministry on campus. (Bishop James Malone will address other themes from the dialogue.) Dialogues between bishops and representatives of Catholic colleges and universities will take place in the spring of 1995 on the canonical mandate about teaching theological disciplines and related matters. Materials for those discussions will be sent to you within the next two weeks.

The implementation committee clearly heard the concerns expressed regarding the first draft of ordinances sent to you in May 1993. Those ordinances have been taken off the table. New ordinances, in a new format, will be sent for review after the implementation committee studies the reports from the dialogues held this academic year between bishops and representatives of Catholic colleges and universities.

Ex corde Ecclesiae refers to four characteristics of a college or university that identify it as Catholic (#13). It has a Christian inspiration of the university community as well as of individuals; it reflects on human knowledge in the light of faith; it remains faithful to the Christian message as it comes to us through the church; and it has an institutional commitment to service. These are not the only possible characteristics, but Pope John Paul II identifies them as central. While common among all Catholic institutions of higher education, these characteristics take diverse forms depending on the size, programs, geography, faculty, student body, and other variables at each institution.

The general norms of *Ex corde Ecclesiae* indicate that the college or university itself is the agent responsible for Catholic identity (GN #4, 1). Within the institution, that responsibility is to be shared by the board of trustees, the president, deans, and faculty. The bishop's role is to promote and assist the preservation of Catholic identity (#28). *Ex corde Ecclesiae* states that the relationship of the Catholic college and university to the church is essential for its identity (#22). The Catholic university is linked to the church by a statutory bond or an institutional commitment (GN #2,2).

Early dialogue reports from around the country indicate that at some colleges and universities a person, or team, has been appointed to promote Catholic identity. In some institutions, the founding religious community remains the primary agent responsible for Catholic identity. Such individuals and teams are similar to mission effectiveness personnel in Catholic medical centers.

One ordinance suggested more than a year ago by the *Ex*

These remarks were delivered at ACCU's annual meeting in Washington, DC, February 1, 1995.

corde Ecclesiae implementation committee called for a review of Catholic identity every ten years. Such a review could for instance, be part of an accrediting association self-study or done at another time. Further consultation on this matter will be helpful.

The relationship between faith and culture is a second theme from the recent dialogue. *Ex corde Ecclesiae* asks that the university help the church understand the positive and negative aspects of various cultures (#44). The church looks to the college and university to lead the dialogue between Christian thought and the sciences (#46). Religion offers insights for reflection on human life, justice, family life, the environment and nature, peace, and political stability (#32). *Ex corde Ecclesiae* also asks that Catholic colleges and universities promote ecumenical dialogue.

One dialogue report doubted that objective judgments called for by the pope's apostolic constitution are possible. Such a statement, it seems to me, invites further conversation. The pope believes that a faith that places itself on the margin of culture is "a faith in the process of self-annihilation" (#44).

In any effort to relate faith to culture, it would not be correct to assume that all Catholic faculty are well informed about the Catholic faith. Because of their academic credentials and a familiarity with Catholicism, faculty who are not Catholic can definitely play an important role in relating faith to culture. One dialogue report suggested than an effort among all Catholic colleges and universities to develop better interviewing procedures for the hiring process might be helpful.

Several dialogue reports indicated that assisting students to relate faith to culture has become difficult because of religious illiteracy among many students, including Catholic students. How might that situation be addressed? How might a relationship between faith and culture be addressed in the case of students who are not Catholic?

A third theme from the recent dialogues was pastoral ministry. *Ex corde Ecclesiae* describes this ministry as integrating religious and moral principles with academic study and nonacademic activities (#38). Pastoral ministry involves both faculty and students, especially those who are Catholics (GN #6, 1).

Comments that the implementation committee has received on this theme have been brief. The main challenge is to integrate pastoral ministry with the entire life of the college or university. Several reports indicated that pastoral ministry sometimes seems to be separated from the rest of life on campus, particularly its academic programs. Many fine pastoral ministry programs exist, but they can benefit from additional attention.

Now I would like to invite Bishop James Malone to share some thoughts with you about the two themes of *communio* and the relationship of the bishop to the Catholic college and university. When he completes his remarks, we will have a conversation with you on any matters suggested by the dialogue themes. I have asked Father Terrence Toland, project director of the implementation committee, to participate with Bishop Malone and me in our discussions.

MOST REVEREND JAMES W. MALONE

Since the last time we were together a year ago, a decision was made to extend the time frame of our deliberations in the United States on the implementation of *Ex corde Ecclesiae*. At our bishops' November 1994 meeting, I recall two bishop members who asked for more time--Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua of Philadelphia and Bishop John D'Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend.

More important, I think, we also began an expanded process of consultation and dialogue between the bishops and Catholic higher education people back in their own home towns, expanded both in content and in participation. That means, for example, that participant in many dialogues included presidents, sponsoring religious communities, faculty members, and trustees.

The focus and purpose of these local dialogues across the country is to discover what is the common ground that we all can use as a basis for developing a program of implementing *Ex corde Ecclesiae*--an implementation that is faithful to both *Ex corde Ecclesiae* and to the experience of United States Catholic higher education.

Before moving to the two items I am briefly to talk about, I do want to say that our latest meeting last week, the meeting of the implementation committee, composed of some eight bishops and some eight consultants (college and university presidents), was an upbeat meeting for me. Others remarked on it as well as our meeting ended, including Father Don Monan and Sister Karen Kennelly. When the day-long meeting came to a close, I boarded my plane for Ohio with a lighter heart and with renewed enthusiasm for the ultimate success of our efforts to implement *Ex corde Ecclesiae* together.

In that connection, I remind you that the two topics for this current ACCU session are "Where are we now?" and "Where are we going?"

Where are we now? I think we are moving forward together, talking to each other, respecting one another. On *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, I think we are farther along the road we need to walk than we were a year ago. The time we are spending together--bishops and Catholic higher education people--is paying dividends.

Last evening at a reception, in conversation with Father Monk Malloy (Notre Dame) and Professor Vincent Hanssens (Catholic University of Louvain), I was reassured to hear Professor Hanssens say, "Like you in the United States, so also we in Belgium need time to get acquainted, we university people and our bishops; and then we can move forward on our *Ex corde Ecclesiae* topics."

But even as I repeat that remark to this audience, I hurry to add that I know that many of you in leadership posts at our Catholic colleges and universities have already put a lot of your time and energy into dialogue and bridge building to many of your publics. But at this point of our *Ex corde Ecclesiae* dialogue, I earnestly ask that together we keep on with dialogue despite your fatigue and sense of *deja vu*. Do not let other demands get in the way. Take advantage of this

opportunity to dialogue on *Ex corde Ecclesiae*. Give it time.

And also our program today asks: Where are we going, we bishops and Catholic higher education leaders?

As I shall say again later in these remarks, I think we are going to find some new insights on the topic of *communio* that can help us get a better grasp on our mutual responsibilities, as bishops and as academic leaders, in this endeavor.

Of great help to us all will be Father Terry Toland, SJ, the new staff person of our implementation committee. Father Toland is experienced, insightful, hard-working, encouraging, and humorous. He has related well to bishops and presidents on our committee and to many local people in the dioceses and academic communities that he has visited.

Now in the few minutes I have I would like to do two things. First, I would like to re-present to you some newer insights on *communio* that emerged from my reading of the reports that were submitted from your discussions. I was especially impressed with the rich promise of the *communio* idea as it was lifted up in some of your reports. Second, I will offer some reflections that flow from what I heard you saying in those same reports.

First, then, *communio*. In a sense, Bishop John Leibrecht anticipated some of what has now transpired in the dialogues. He wrote last summer that *communio* is a "rich and complex concept having many analogous forms of realization." In the responses that I read, I found that many of your responses held that same notion about *communio*. You suggested that it is the manner in which we understand *communio* that will guide or even determine the way in which we will approach the relationship between Catholic colleges and universities and the pastoral office of bishop, the "personal and pastoral" relationship importantly described in paragraph 28 of *Ex corde Ecclesiae*.

I was particularly helped by one analysis that gave me a new insight about *communio*. This analysis pointed out that the popular understanding of *communio* presumes that the word *communio* is a combination of the words *common* and *unity*, with the emphasis on unity rather than on commonality. This is said to be the usual understanding of *communio*. But then this newer analysis went on to propose that the real root of *communio* is not *unio* (union) but *munus* (office, function, or duty): *com-munus*. The focus is on shared responsibility, shared duties, *com-munus*.

The Latin *communis* indeed means "shared, common, general." In community, we are about common functions, common duties, and common offices. The source of this common life is the unity that flows from our participating in the life of the triune God. I suggest we link this common life to the underlying reason for the "mutual respect" noted in paragraph 28.

In this expansive understanding of *communio*, there is suggested also a reciprocity that ought to exist between us who share common responsibilities. This newer notion moves us to say that the church does not belong to the bishops nor does the church belong to the colleges and universities. Similarly, colleges and universities are not instruments of the hierarchy, nor do these institutions themselves exist as independent, self-defining entities. This newer notion of *communio* is theological, speaking to us about a reciprocity rather than a notion of *communio* that is institutional or sociological. In this new approach we can think in religious or theological categories about our relationships as bishops and presidents.

Thus we do not think about *communio* in canonical or jurisdictional language, which reflects a narrower understanding of *communio*. On the other hand, this theological or religious mindset of *communio* can envision a unity that allows for an appropriate plurality.

Now it seems to me that flowing from this expanded perspective of *communio* as meaning "shared duties" is the proposal that our own best context for carrying forward such an understanding is one of dialogue between bishops and colleges and universities. I would describe it as a dialogue that would avoid suspicion and mistrust between us, a dialogue that would be motivated by a search for what is mutual and common between us.

Such dialogue would involve us bishops and Catholic higher education people in an openness to learning as well as encourage us in an expression of the bonds that tie us together, university people and bishops. Again, we can think of paragraph 28, which speaks of continuing dialogue.

Now to my second point: my reflection on your reports to our implementation committee about your dialogues at your home places.

> 1. Briefly stated, as regards your reports, I was impressed by their content, encouraged by their candor, and reassured that most participants considered their time on them well spent.
>
> 2. For myself, I am convinced that the time we are now giving to our dialogues is preparing us for more and better dialogue in days ahead. By our talking together, we are not, I think, merely marking time. Rather, I am persuaded that we are moving forward together toward goals that *Ex corde Ecclesiae* offers to us.
>
> 3. At the same time, I want to be realistic about the obstacles to our dialogue. Obstacles exist on both sides, and they must be acknowledged and addressed.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle we face is in deciding how we can move from the level of "*communio* theory" to that of "*communio* practice": Here we are without any clear guideposts. In a sense we are in a creative process when it comes to applying the *communio* theory. This will be our challenge in the next phase of our discussions.

We bishops and Catholic higher education people will have to discuss in concrete terms how we live out our

mutual participation in the life and mission of the church. For example, how does the bishop respect the distinctive way in which a Catholic college or university fulfills its unique pastoral role? How does the institution experience its legitimate autonomy and its integral responsibilities within the larger community that is the church? And also, how does a college and university respect the "presiding and overseeing" role of the diocesan bishop, who is the visible source of unity of the community of faith that is a local church and, as such, is present to and participates in the life of the college or university community?

Obviously these are questions to be pursued. As bishops, we cannot come here today and give answers. It is important, however, that we all realize that together, as bishops and leaders in Catholic higher education, we must move on to some conclusion, however provisional. The purpose of the dialogue process we have entered upon is to develop a clear sense of direction so that, with fidelity and integrity, we together can respond to the expectations that come to us from the one who exercises the Petrine ministry that binds us together as a universal community of faith.

In conclusion, dear friends, I am confident that through honest labor and renewed openness to the promptings of the Holy Spirit we can move toward these outcomes.

Hesburgh Award Response

Raymond C. Baumhart, SJ

I am very grateful and proud to receive this award. Ted Hesburgh is one of my administrator-heroes. I thank those who nominated me and the persons who selected me. They and you are my peers, persons who understand better than others the value of the work I did. That you think me deserving of this honor pleases me. Your presence adds to my joy.

My presence proves that there is life after the presidency. I have been pleasantly surprised at the transferability of skills from a university to an archdiocese--skills like chairing committees, strategic planning, and, of course, budget-cutting.

My self-image is that of a problem solver, a decision maker, a servant-leader. So that's where my remarks this evening will come from. I address them to the presidents and future presidents who are present. Much of what I say will not be new to you. However, I know that I am not always ready to learn what I hear. Perhaps this evening one or another of you will be ready to accept and to act on something I have to say that you have heard before.

You are educators; you believe in education. You are also administrators, and administration is part science. Are you sufficiently educated in administration? I would say that the president who has stopped learning should stop being president.

Your institution can be no better that the team at the top--your vice-presidents, deans, and the other persons with whom you work closely. Do you thank and praise and gift them adequately? Some of the strongest, brightest, most productive persons I know have a deep and daily need to be appreciated.

Do you occasionally take a hard look at how you invest your working hours? Many of us spend too much time doing what we like to do (it's typically what we do well) and working on matters about which we are well informed, rather than on the most significant problems confronting our institution. That's why some good chairpersons are bad deans, and why some good deans are bad presidents.

Have you really accepted the fact that fund-raising is an essential part of your job? It helped me to think through and to pray over the responsibility of the president for obtaining funds. Then I realized that I wasn't asking for anything for myself and that my pride was getting in the way. Then I understood that I was the designated beggar for the university community, designated to ask other members of that community to support a university in which we all believed. Things went better after that.

I rarely fired a person as early as I should have. Do you take action on hard decisions as soon as you are sure you are right? Or do you delay a year before closing a program or a department? CEOs are champions of the common good. Sometimes that requires hurting an individual or a group. I found some solace in the words of playwright Robert Bolt: "If you can't make it all right, make it as little wrong as possible."

One story about Loyola's director of student recruiting: I had praised him because applications for undergraduate admissions were *up* 12 percent over the previous year. He beamed at this recognition and asked if I would like him as much if applications were *down* 12 percent. I told him that I would like him as much, but I would miss having him around. God rewards good intentions, but presidents must insist on good results. On page one of my book of administrative principles is: It's the results that count.

Do you understand the benefits of borrowing money? Especially over long periods? Not-for-profit institutions have some advantages over other borrowers and investors. When I became president at Loyola, one of my goals was to pay off all its debt. Then I grew in financial knowledge and sophistication. Now I look back on the issuance of more than $125 million in tax-exempt bonds as one of the best things that happened during my tenure.

A suggestion: If you have not already done so, employ a full-time lawyer, a general counsel. If you pick a good one, he or she will save you a lot of time, trouble, and money in our litigious society.

I conclude with a personal question: Do you pray enough? Education is a privileged work. Few professions or occupations are as fundamental or as necessary to society and the church as education. We who are educators have been given this wonderful opportunity to love our neighbor by sharing our knowledge and by advancing it. In a Catholic college or university, we also share our faith and promote justice. That's God's work, so we'll do it better if we are in touch with God through regular prayer.

I thank God for many graces during my career in education and ask God to bless you abundantly in your careers.

This acceptance was delivered at the ACCU' annual meeting award dinner, January 31, 1995.

HOMILY

Franklyn M. Casale

In the beginning of his public ministry, Jesus called fishermen to follow him from the beautiful Galilee region in Palestine. Then he led them up a high mountain and gathered a great crowd around him and began to teach them.

> Blessed are the poor in Spirit, for theirs is
> the Kingdom of Heaven
> Blessed are those who mourn
> Who are meek
> Who hunger and thirst for righteousness
> Who are merciful
> Pure in heart
> Peacemakers
> Who are persecuted for righteousness'
> sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven
> (Matthew 5:3-10).

Those who followed the teachings would be compared to salt, light, and a lamp.

In the same region for centuries people have eaten a cat fish they call St. Peter's fish. It is supposed to be the kind Peter took from the water to pay the tax to Caesar. St. Peter's fish has black marks under its gills the size of a thumb print. The legend is that these are the marks Peter left when he held the fish that gave up the coin. Who knows how accurate that is, but we do know that it suggests a truth of life. Anything anyone touches in life bears an imprint of that person.

Many a graduate of a Catholic college or university carries a mark made by the imprint of a disciple of Jesus. Catholic education goes far behind training in liberal arts and professions. The mission has all to do with the words of Jesus when he taught on that mountain and in the plains, and cities and towns. Many of our students have indeed become the salt of the earth, the light of the world. The fact of the matter is that the most successful students are those who carry the mark of discipleship with them into the marketplace.

Pope John Paul II states it clearly in *Ex corde Ecclesiae*: "They should realize the responsibility for their professional life, the enthusiasm of being the trained 'leaders' of tomorrow, of being witnesses to Christ in whatever place they may exercise their profession."

I was struck on a recent weekend when *The Miami Herald* entitled a lead story "Pull Out The Gold; Materialism Is Back" and the *New York Times* simultaneously ran an article about the revival of the "arrogant greed" syndrome.

Does it not seem more urgent than ever to insure that we continue to teach in fidelity to our mission and our charisms?

Unfortunately, though, we find ourselves facing so many other distracting challenges that take precedence and strain resources.

Expenses are out of hand. Tuitions go up faster than any index. Our students come with an increasingly growing set of needs--academic, social, financial, physical, and emotional--creating what might be called a new acuity factor. Technology rapidly threatens a continuing de-personalization of education.

Add to these challenges the mood of the electorate and the composition of Congress and state legislators, and the picture could be bleak for people of less faith than those who gather around this altar.

It would be wonderful if provosts or finance vice presidents could go down to the river, pull out a fish, and come up with enough coin pay for all the bills that would cure the problems. But unless you have St. Peter on staff that is hardly likely.

Ten or fifteen years ago our colleagues in health care--many members of communities and congregations to which some of us belong--found themselves in a similar position. Expenses were out of hand. Patients were more acutely ill because of age or intensity of disease, and technology galloped. A new model was actually forced on that industry--a simple model: the model of working more closely together.

Whether we call the new model an alliance, a network, a vertical integration of service, a merger, or an affiliation, the result was in many respects Gospel-based. The model ideally turns separate institutions into a genuine Christian community in which people establish more respectful, efficient, and caring working relationships.

Paul said it in the first reading of this mass:

> Make every effort to maintain the unity of
> the Spirit and bond of peace. There is one
> body and one Spirit, just as you were
> called to the one hope of your calling, one

Monsignor Casale is president of St. Thomas University in Miami. He delivered this homily at the ACCU annual meeting liturgy on January 31, 1995.

Lord, one faith, one baptism (Ephesians 4:1-6).

The teachings of Jesus always urge models of sharing.

Might it not be wise now for leaders in higher education to look at a new Catholic model. Should not the educational community be a comprehensive community of disciples as well as a community of scholars and Catholic associations. We need to work together--one institution with another. Does it make sense for us to be in the same city, same state, same region, and hardly community, let alone share?

Discipleship always involves sacrifice. The sacrifice may mean the re-examination of niches, the elimination of competition, and the sharing of institutional resources among a universe of institutions across institutional lines.

Most here know sacrifice very well. So many can point to the time when the sweat and blood of dedicated members of our communities kept schools alive. But more than that, perhaps we need to become more like our Lord himself who sacrificed his very life for us. In giving up we gain strength.

Again, Paul:

> The gifts he gave were that some would be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to equip the saints for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ, until all of us come to the measure of the full stature of Christ (Ephesians 4:11-13).

No Sleep for the Lions: Women's Leadership in Catholic Higher Education

Patricia A. McGuire

In the peaceable kingdom foretold by the prophet Isaiah, the coming of the messiah spells a new age of wisdom and understanding, a time of transformation in which "not by appearance shall he judge, nor by hearsay shall he decide, but he shall judge the poor with justice."[1] And in this golden era, the lion shall lie down with the lamb. Of course, as we know from experience, in this scenario the lamb doesn't get much sleep.

Gathered as we are under the general rubric of women in Catholic higher education, the idea of the lambs wandering about the lions' landscape echoes through this audience with a morbid, even wicked, fascination. Who among us has not dared to tempt fate by dashing nimbly across that forbidden landscape, hearts pounding with a mixture of excitement, bravado, and terror at the thought of the crushing fate that might lurk in the dark corners of the cage? We sleep with our eyes wide open.

We, of course, have automatically assumed that we're the poor lambs, the little victims living on our wits and guts, trying to outsmart the fearsome lions. But are we? Aren't we being a little facile to identify so readily with the victims, to deny that we have within us the great roaring ability to be equally the aggressors?

My theme posits a new twist on the old metaphor. I come here not to talk about victims, but heroes. I come to talk about lambs who walk in the image of Daniel, not cowering in fear but towering in faith, a faith and courage so strong that it ensures no sleep for the lions. Such was the heroic leadership that women gave to the past of Catholic higher education. Such must be the faith and courage of the women who will lead the future of Catholic higher education.

And just who are the lions?

As our friend Isaiah notes, let's not be quick to judge on appearance. (And, by the way, where did he get such a politically correct idea in the eighth century BC? Not judging by appearance? Perhaps the ideal of justice is not just a passing fancy of liberals in America!) As the tale of women's leadership in Catholic higher education unfolds, we find that the lions are not at all those who some might suspect on quick glance. Oh, it would be deliciously easy to spend this time savaging the usual suspects—and I just might have a few choice words for them later on. But they are actually lambs, too. Let's remember that we're all Christians in this coliseum together. We might have times when we don't like each other very much, but we need each other desperately. The lions are *not* the others who share our faith, not at all, not even those with whom we might disagree vigorously at times.

No, the lions are far more terrible to contemplate, because we cannot see them, we cannot put a real name on them, we can only imagine their evil faces, we can only see the consequences of their loathsome behaviors. The lions appear in the faces of ignorance, hatred, despair, contempt for human life, contempt for God, sheer evil devouring millions of helpless lambs each day, wasted little lives trapped in their crushing jaws of poverty, racism, sexism, tyranny, crime, violence, greed—the endless list of human horrors.

And who will combat these lions? Who will be the heroes of the lambs? Where will they find the faith to give them the courage to give the lions no rest, no sleep, until we reach that elusive peaceable kingdom, the place of redemption for lions and lambs alike?

Such are the real questions confronting Catholic higher education today, questions deeply rooted in thoughts of our mission together. Of course, it would be arrogant and foolhardy to suggest that our Catholic colleges and universities are the miraculous fonts of such heroism. Heroism cannot be purchased or acquired from someone else, but only discovered in the depths of one's own soul in the dark moments of greatest danger. However, it is equally disingenuous and ultimately perverse to claim that Catholic higher education is only a spectator sport, a derivative shadow of the secular model of higher learning, perhaps embroidered at the edges with some arabesque idiosyncrasies like theology requirements or campus ministry teams that, if they had an NCAA division for them, would surely be in the final four most of the time.

If that's all we're about, the lions would have devoured us a long time ago!

Patricia A. McGuire is president of Trinity College in Washington, D.C. *This paper was delivered at the June 1994 meeting of the National Association of Women in Catholic Higher Education.*

1. Isaiah 11.3-4

We are not *merely* Catholic because we happen to have that name somewhere in our mission statements, because we happen to have been founded by religious congregations, because we inherited those trappings of curriculum and program that symbolize the cultural and intellectual traditions of our faith, because we don't have any better ideas about what to do with these places we call Catholic colleges.

Because we *dare* to call ourselves Catholic, because we *dare* to tempt fate on the fields of the lions, because we *dare* to disturb their sleep, we are called to be heroes, and to empower our students in the discovery of their own heroism in faith. This is our mission in the church and in Catholic higher education.

But didn't you come to hear about women in Catholic higher education? Aren't we supposed to be talking about that letter on ordination and the ban on dissent and the latest word from Rome on this new theory of American feminism as a kind of cultural imperialism?

Sorry, my friends, but I didn't come to lick wounds with the lambs. Oh, I could tell you stories! But to what end? I came to talk about the future of women's leadership in Catholic higher education and the heroism it requires. Sometimes heroism requires putting aside our personal hurts for the sake of the larger mission.

Heroic leadership requires us to confront not only the lions but ourselves as well. This is really our first challenge. In the words of one writer on Catholic higher education, "We are shrinking into ourselves, narrowing lines of communion, trembling at freedom of thought, and using the language of dismay and despair at the prospect before us, instead of, with the high spirit of the warrior, going out conquering and to conquer. . . . "[2] Our need for heroic leadership is not new. John Henry Newman wrote those words nearly 150 years ago! And yet, we still tremble rather than conquer.

Today we confront a great and growing leadership crisis in Catholic higher education, a crisis that has been evolving for nearly a quarter of a century, a crisis that has the potential to become cataclysmic with the generational turn of the next century. This is a crisis not simply for Catholic colleges and universities, but indeed, for the church herself. This is not simply a crisis of personnel, issues of male or female, religious or lay, theologian or financier. This is truly a crisis of mission and vision, the essence of all leadership, as well as a crisis of confidence in the possibility of that mission and clarity of that vision. This is a crisis that cries out for heroes.

2 *John Henry Newman, as quoted in Joseph A. Komonchak, "The Catholic University in the Church," John P. Langan, ed., Catholic Universities in Church and Society: A Dialogue on Ex Corde Ecclesiae (Washington, Georgetown University PRess, 1993)*

3 *Cited by Cather in I. McNamee, CSJ, president of the National Catholic Educational Association, in* Momentum, *September 1990, p. 3.*

The crisis can be stated in the starkest of vernacular terms: If things keep heading in the direction of the last few years, who will want these jobs, anyway? And if you are reckless enough to want the job, isn't that proof positive that you're too dangerous to have it?

Some of us already may well be too reckless and too dangerous, although prudently so. That's why we're good at what we do out there on the forbidding landscape of the modern American culture.

Leaders of Catholic higher education today shepherd large and unruly flocks of increasingly diverse sorts of lambs, and such a flock requires very different kinds of shepherds indeed. These are not shepherds who fear wandering along the perimeter to save the lost ones; these are shepherds who know that, at times, they must cross over into the lions' lair on impossible rescue missions. The last thing these shepherds want or need is some sanctimonious lamb standing safely in the middle of the field bleating cries of disapproval while refusing to join the search.

We need heroes with vision and courage to lead the future of Catholic higher education. Let's consider our mission.

MISSION

The theme of this conference, "Claiming the Past, Shaping the Future," gives us a chance to tell, once again, the story of the fidelity of women to the mission of our church and its institutions. Nowhere is that story clearer or more eloquent than in the leadership of women, women religious in particular, in the mission of church through Catholic education.

Great women gave great and animating life to the mission of Catholic education at all levels in this nation. The stories of Katharine Drexel, Elizabeth Seton, Catherine McCauley, Cornelia Connelly and others are well known for the gifts they brought to the formation of two centuries of American Catholics in elementary and secondary schools. Great women are still the predominant force in Catholic elementary and secondary education, where more than 90 percent of the teachers today are women.[3]

Less well known, perhaps (although their names should be right up there with John Carroll and Ted Hesburgh), but of vital importance at this moment in Catholic education, were the women who gave life to the mission through the establishment of a vast network of colleges, more than 125 in all—the Julia McGroartys (Trinity) and Pauline O'Neills (St. Mary's) and Antonia McHughs (St. Catherine). Among them, the Catholic colleges devoted to the education of women had an especially profound impact not only on our church but on our larger society as well.

The writer Abigail McCarthy has paid eloquent testimony to these visionary women: "From the beginning, the institutions founded by women religious were a testimony to the worth of woman in herself; their existence meant that she had worth apart from her biological function and apart from her ability to give pleasure to, and to sustain men.... The

ancestors of today's women religious poured out of the towns and villages of France, Italy, and Germany in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, intent on educating girls and women, intent on the mission of the church. They came to America and what they accomplished was prodigious . . . they built the most far-flung and accessible system of higher education for women the world has ever known."[4] They are truly heroes for all time.

Shy these women were not! With a passion we would be hard pressed to match today, the founders of the Catholic women's colleges were both astonishing and tireless in pursuing their vision. By the end of the nineteenth century, not content with simply being "allowed" to establish colleges out of academies for the education of teachers, the Sisters of Notre Dame set about creating the first Catholic college for women founded specifically as a college, with a rigorous and broad intellectual framework, the women's answer to the male Catholic University that had been founded ten years earlier. One of the founders of Trinity College, Sister Mary Euphrasia Taylor, was so bold as to write to her superior, Sister Julia McGroarty, with this vision for the project:

> I have thought in reference to the subject of higher education itself, that though in the the beginning God chose for the work of converting the world, twelve simple and ignorant fishermen, yet when the time came for them to begin their labors, by a miracle He transformed them into brilliant intellectual orators . . . How necessary it is, then, that our influential Catholic women should be trained to give to society, not only the force of their example, valuable though that must ever be!—but the benefit of a more enlightened knowledge . . . [we are] considering the undertaking of a work that will meet the need of the Church today![5]

I have always said that the most feminist, most revolutionary event to occur on Trinity's campus was her founding! Of course, it was exactly such talk about mission that first stirred a few disparaging bleats from the old lambs at the center of the flock. Perhaps the earliest documented opposition to the role of women in Catholic higher education can be found in the history of Trinity College. A conservative Catholic movement almost succeeded in stopping Trinity, with certain writers attacking the "dangerous" ideas of the Sisters of Notre Dame. After Sr. Julia McGroarty replied to an article in one paper attacking the idea of Trinity, the editor wrote, "[Her] long communication strengthens us in the old-fashioned conviction that . . . man's world should stand at the pinnacle of learning, that the female sex, with very rare exceptions, is called to be man's helpmate, not his ruler. . . ."[6]

Of course, the trouble started because Sr. Mary Euphrasia had the lack of good sense to announce that she was educating women in the image of the apostles—now she's done it! Good heavens, not merely disciples, but *partners* in this business of evangelization. She even visited with the papal nuncio to argue the point. It's a wonder that Trinity ever saw the light of day! But such was the freedom and daring of the early years of Catholic higher education.

The crisis of leadership in Catholic higher education today arises, in some part, out of the loss of the sense of freedom that seemed to empower the creativity of our early days, a freedom that made us be joyfully Catholic while also thrilling to the joust with the lions. Our early days appear to be, in historical comparison, not sombre but celebratory: With few canons or constitutions to limit our imagination, we were free to embrace mission with the reckless abandon of adventurous youth. We wanted Catholic colleges, by God, because we wanted Catholics to be able to take their rightful place in the pantheon of civic and social leadership in this nation. We succeeded because we believed so deeply in our mission, and we had a vision about how to achieve it.

A century after those heady days, Catholic higher education finds itself embroiled in a new set of controversies about mission, but these lack the vigor and confidence of Julia McGroarty's and Mary Euphrasia's prudently reckless words and deeds. Perhaps some future historians will find more life than is apparent in today's "mission wars" as they examine the entrails of the dialogue surrounding *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the mountain of paper written in response.

In *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* we find the contemporary official definition of the four mission characteristics of a Catholic college or university: a Christian inspiration in individuals and community; reflection of knowledge in the light of the Catholic faith; fidelity to the Christian message as it comes from the church; and an institutional commitment to the service of the people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal which gives meaning to life.[7]

That's very nice, some commentators have written, but how does it work in reality? How *can* it work if not everyone is permitted to participate equally? Is this a mission only for a chosen few, or is this a mission that can live broadly among many diverse people?

4. *Abigail McCarthy, "A Luminous Minority, " in Pearson, Shavlik, and Touchton, eds., Educating the Majority (Washington: MacMillan for teh American Concil on Education, 1989), pp. 176-177.*

5. *Sister Mary Euphrasia Taylor, SND, May 25, 1897, letter to Sister Julia McGroarty, SND, as quoted in Sister Columba Mullaley, Trinity College: The First Eighty Years (Washington: Trinity College, 1987), p. 29.*

6. *J.N.F., "The New Woman at the University" in Der Herold des Glaubens, August, 1897, as quoted in Angela Elizabeth Keenan, SND, Three Against the Wind Maryland: Christian Classics, 1973), p. 109*

7. *Pope John Paull II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, pp. 13-14*

The question is not so much whether our mission is to forge the dialogue of gospel and culture, but whether, in a very pragmatic sense, that dialogue is possible in a climate that increasingly reflects a great, profound hostility between both.

We are called to live the gospel itself, not as a sectarian occupation, but as a whole life. We are charged to bring gospel and culture together, and in that act, we sometimes will do things that make some people very nervous. If we are to be heroes to our lambs, we sometimes have to wander out to the edges where the lost lambs go. Even more, sometimes we have to walk right into the lions' den and appear to make ourselves at home. We cannot confront the foe we refuse to acknowledge, we bar from our consciousness, we keep off our campus. We cannot transform that which we do not touch.

The greatest danger facing the mission of Catholic higher education today is that, at the moment of our greatest opportunity for genuine transformation through engaging with our culture, we will retreat from the very culture we must engage in the name of faith. For some of the lambs, the risks are too great. If we shrink from that engagement, as some argue we should, the lions will surely be upon us shortly. And when we are gone, who will really care? Who will even know that we were here? If we don't care about the lives of our lambs, no one else will!

VISION

We can no longer speak of this mission in the abstract. While the mission of Catholic higher education has a certain indisputable, timeless quality about it, the vision has changed dramatically over time. Changes in the culture and changes in the participants have forced changes in the institutions, and those changes have raised questions about whether the mission can be accomplished when the actors and audience are completely different from those who claimed this stage not so long ago.

Our future leaders must create a whole new idea of the university. The nineteenth century is long over, and soon, too, the twentieth. The model of the last 150 years no longer works, neither for secular purposes nor for religious. The mission requires that we envision an entirely new institution, one that reads the signs of the times more faithfully, without losing the faith; an institution that embraces previously-unimaginable diversity without losing the common bond that keeps up together; an institution that is large enough for all of us but intimate enough to know us one by one, the alma mater of Newman's ideal.[8]

The vision for the future of Catholic higher education must accommodate these changes with fidelity to mission if we are to continue to have a role that is relevant in our society. This vision is already an emerging reality on some of our campuses. This emerging reality holds fast to our mission in the dialogue of faith and culture in an ever more diverse environment. At Trinity, and at colleges like New Rochelle and Notre Dame of Maryland, the population of adult learners, people of color, and believers from other faiths is growing dramatically. Colleges like ours are already developing models for the future of Catholic higher education.

Incidentally, it's also important to note that the most dramatic changes are occurring among those institutions that were always somewhat on the edge, the Catholic women's colleges. The population of women—majorities in many cases—is rising on all of our campuses. Indeed, the feminization of Catholic higher education is one of the unspoken fears, along with the fear of a lively spectrum of color among our future populations—including, we hope, our leadership population.

Some colleagues find the vision of transformed institutions of Catholic higher education difficult to accept, impossible to reconcile with mission. Last year, at the ACCU annual meeting, one college president asked me, "How can your college still claim to be Catholic when you have so many minority students?"[9] This question, shocking for some, belies the complexity of our challenge to reconcile mission and vision. Indeed, we cannot understand our mission to be limited to one faith, any more than we can understand it to be limited to one race or age group.

Our mission, in communion with all of the church, is a redemptive mission for all humankind, and as such, within the context of our institutions, we must have room for all persons. Our vision cannot be Catholic as sectarian, but catholic as universally embracing. This vision, by the way, is not a departure from tradition for many of us, but rather a reinforcement of the congregational missions of many religious orders of women, who did not limit the redemptive gift of their teaching to Catholic children only.

In short, our mission cannot live in the future without a vision of wholly transformed institutions, including the institutions of leadership and governance. The vision that implements mission is rife with challenges of enormous proportion: religious and racial pluralism; the impending century of the laity; the transformation of religious life and the meaning of vowed commitments in the future; the role of religion and faith in professional life; the question of the future possibility of the dialogue of faith and culture. This is not a vision for quivering lambs. We need heroes—lots of them—to make sense of this enterprise if we are to take it into the new millennium.

8. John Henry Cardinal Newman, The Idea of the University: "A university is an alma mater, knowing her children one by one. Not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill."

9. I had mentioned during a roundtable discussion on diversity in Catholic higher education that Trinity's total student population in 1993-1994 was 49 percent minority, including 40 percent African-American. This brought shocked looks around the table.

LEADERSHIP

And so, we finally come to the question of the leadership that will shape the future of Catholic higher education. Just as we need a new vision of our institutions, so, too, we need a new vision of our leadership. To form this vision, we must think about expectations, persons, and our own obligations today.

First, consider leadership expectations. The dialogue of faith and culture in this rapidly changing societal and ecclesiastical context requires leaders with fairly strong constitutions, as well as the gift of prudent recklessness mentioned earlier. The list of what is expected of such leaders for the future of Catholic higher education might even make Ignatius of Loyola think twice! Our future leaders must be expected to, among others things:

> 1) restore belief in the possibility that faith and culture can be in dialogue on the campus of American Catholic colleges and universities without distrust, hostility, suspicion, or fear that the lion will devour the lamb;
>
> 2) restore credibility broadly among believers and nonbelievers alike in the wisdom and necessity of the mission of Catholic higher education as proudly distinctive and different from secular higher education, not marginal or irrelevant, but rather, central in the development of a healthy society as well as a healthy church;
>
> 3) revivify our mission as not narrowly sectarian but truly catholic, universal, accepting, welcoming, and leading in the new age of the pluralistic society, campus, and church;
>
> 4) create new roles of governance, stewardship, and leadership for transformed institutions with new and different dynamics of religious life, lay participation, and ecclesiastical relationships;
>
> 5) develop the next generation of leadership in the church and in Catholic higher education.

And, oh yes, rescue the crumbling infrastructure, quadruple the endowment, balance the budget, build a new building or renovate an old one every year, develop a world-class faculty, increase enrollments, keep the campus safe from crime, get the basketball team to the final four, understand subpart three of subpart H of Title IV, keep the alumni happy, dialogue with the local ordinary, travel like a politician, talk like a scholar, think like a gambler, preside like Solomon, enjoy the company of lawyers, know every student, talk to the gardeners, and never, ever, appear to be controlling, impatient, directive, content, angry, or tired.

And, by the way, don't expect those noisy sanctimonious lambs in the middle to rush to your aid when the roof leaks and the aging boilers give up the ghost and your students' need for scholarships far outstrips your meager endowment. Be ready for the great silence that descends when you sit alone at night with the tiny budget and large demands and wonder what's going to happen to the aging sisters who are growing older each minute in your cold and leaking building, the magnificent edifice of their foremothers.

Such are the expectations. But what about the persons? Who will be the leaders? Who are the leaders who will be not only able but willing to take on such an ambitious agenda? Where will they come from? Who will prepare them? How will they be chosen? What support will they receive? Will we recognize them when they come? Will we prepare their way today?

We might be tempted to ask, who would want such a job? We must pray that not only someone, but many someones, will want such a job.

We already know a few things about the characteristics of our future leaders in Catholic higher education. Our future leaders will be less likely to be called "Father" or "Sister," more likely to be lay persons rather than professed religious. Our future leaders will be less and less likely to have professional backgrounds in theology. (And, worse, many will most likely be lawyers. . . .)

Our future leaders will be more schooled in theory and practice of transformational leadership and quality management and modern business practices. And they will be more literate in technology and more eager to adopt new delivery systems for teaching and learning.

Our future leaders will be more engaged than ever with government and regulation in an environment in which government has less and less respect for the distinctive nature of private and religious education.

Our future leaders will hold positions through the institutions, not just at the top of pyramids that will no longer exist. In true transformational fashion, they will lead at the center as well as along the edges of interlocking circles across the spectrum of institutional encounters with students and faculty and staff and other constituents.

Our future leaders are increasingly likely to be female *outside of* the traditional female institutions.

These predictions, of course, pose great challenges for our church. Perhaps the greatest challenge will be to get over some old phobias. Can we have a lay president and still be Catholic? (Good Lord, I hope so!) Can we still be Jesuit if the president is not? (Maureen Fay has done it at the University of Detroit-Mercy.) And with women now leading Duke and the University of Pennsylvania, how long will it be before a true image of Notre Dame sits in her president's office? (Now *that*'s enough to get a few lions roaring!)

Let's talk about women leaders in Catholic higher education. Women have always been great leaders in Catholic education, and this great past sets the pace for our future. We were presidents and CEOs long before it was fashionable to talk about women college presidents generally. In shaping our future, let's not forget to take the best lessons of our past. Let's remember Sr. Mary Euphrasia's bold

letters proclaiming our work to be in the image of Christ, the preparation of apostles.

The problem for women as leaders in Catholic higher education, of course, relates directly to the problem of women as leaders in our church. While women in the secular universe still experience many barriers, each day brings news of glass ceilings shattered. But, sadly, not in the church.

This reminds me of those feelings we Catholic school girls used to get in the company of "the publics"—you know, the girls from the local public schools who wore their hair long and wild while ours was tied-up in neat blue ribbons, the girls who were so cool with their eye shadow and lipstick and earrings, and we felt so dorky in our jumpers and peter pan collars and bow ties and beanies. The good sisters told us that they were pagans, and we were saved; but even as we prayed for them, we felt great stabbing pangs of jealousy for their ability to wear stockings when we were still putting rubber bands around our knee socks. Not much has changed today: they get Janet Reno and Hillary Clinton; we get, heaven help us, altar girls and a muzzle.

The more secular barriers women surmount, the more we get the feeling that the sandbags are being piled even higher around the moat of our dear mother church. The negative press on women who aspire to be apostles grows louder and more insistent, rather than more welcoming and visionary.

How can women in Catholic higher education be effective leaders at a time when the very idea of the presence of a woman in high leadership circles of the church seems to generate appalling levels of fear and loathing? Our anger and despair can be great. We cannot let those feelings prevail. We are called to be heroes.

This leads me naturally to the third point about leadership: the obligations we have today to prepare the way for the future leadership of Catholic higher education. In particular, the obligation we as today's women who lead Catholic colleges to ensure that future women will have even greater opportunities to be heroes to the lambs. What must we do to prepare the way for them?

First, we must keep our credibility. We simply won't get there by playing the role of outsiders or by being victims. Tempting though it may seem at times, we must be very careful in sharing our pain to be sure we do not let it overwhelm and cripple our own futures. We cannot be of any help to the future women leaders if we destroy ourselves in our own anger and despair at the injustices we confront each day. Remember, we must be heroes, too, and heroes cannot let their own wounds get in the way of saving others.

Keeping our credibility, by the way, does not mean silence at all. In fact, it means quite the opposite: we must be at the table, and we must speak up with intelligence and credibility. We cannot be credible if we stay on the outside; if we want to create change, we must do it from within.

Second, we must be proud to be aggressively Catholic. Let's remember that we do not lead for ourselves, but for our church. We *are* church. We must never forget our obligation in *communio*, the gathering of all the faithful, and our leadership on behalf of the whole; we collectively form church every day.

Third, we have to accept the inherent dangers of heroism among the lambs, and know which risks are acceptable and which risks are repugnant. As women leaders, we do have some very special issues that are important not just for us as individuals, but because they impact *communio*, they are at the core of the dialogue of faith and culture; they are central beliefs and they cause more lambs to stray than we can count. As leaders, we can't just stand at the center and wring our hands and bleat with the sanctimonious. Nor can we in conscience go out to the edge to join the reckless wanderers if we have no intention of bringing them back to safety.

What do we do with these most difficult of leadership issues for women in Catholic higher education? We must use all of our intellectual power, and pray for the illumination of faith—along with a little wisdom of the spirit. What are these issues? At some point, we must give the lions a name. Two examples illustrate the dangerous edges of our lives.

We cannot dispute that abortion is a grave moral evil to be confronted daily, and we have a grave moral obligation to ensure the clarity of this teaching on our campuses. But, at the same time, we cannot simply abandon those freedoms that also give grace and dignity to our lives on this earth, the freedoms to think, to speak, to vote our conscience. We must be heroes to our faith and heroes to our country, and find ways to make both work.

The second example: As Catholics, we must respect the authority of a magisterial teaching that tells us that the ordination of women is a settled matter. But we would surely give up something of our God-like intellect if we blindly accepted a corollary that we can no longer question this matter intelligently. So, if we can no longer debate ordination, then let's debate about dissent!

We cannot call our institutions "colleges" if we stifle expression, and we are not faithful to the best of our Catholic tradition if we try. Even Cardinal Newman argued in favor of a certain "elbow room" for thought and expression. If our faith is as strong as we claim, then no expression will defeat it.

The greatest risk to our conscience, our moral position as leaders, our credibility, and our hope for those we lead lies in the needless trivialization of the competing truths that confront us each day. We cannot sacrifice one for the other; the hardest challenge we face is keeping all of the lambs together on the same narrow ledge.

Fourth, we must never forget that we are educating the next generation of leadership for our church. Whether we have permission to think these dangerous thoughts or not, we know that this future leadership will be different, and therefore, our methods of preparing them must be different as well. The roles of men and women, religious and lay, are changing rapidly. What is unthinkable today might be commonplace fifty years from now. We must prepare *all* of our students for *all* leadership roles, so that they will be ready when the call comes. We must show them the way in

our own role models.

One example of such new forms of preparation is emerging in community service activities that lead to postgraduate commitments such as the SND volunteer program. In thinking recently about this program with Sr. Seton Cunneen, our campus minister, we reflected on the women who have gone on from Trinity to devote their lives to mission work, and yet they have not joined the religious order. In a former time, perhaps they would have done so. Perhaps we are seeing signs of the times. Perhaps the future of religious life is emerging in faint lines already among the choices of laypersons on our campuses. Perhaps the so-called "decline in vocations" has not yet been recognized as simply a "substitution of vocations." Perhaps our thinking about future leadership, the role of professed religious and lay persons, might also be open to new ideas about commitment and vocation altogether.

Fifth, we must never lose faith. We must own our faith, and celebrate it daily, joyfully, and with courage. In our faith, we will find the instinct for heroism within ourselves. In our faith, we will find the capacity to transmit this instinct for heroism to new generations of leaders, those who will guide this flock when we are long gone.

Let them remember us as leaders with passionate vision and deep commitment to our mission.

Let them remember us as shepherds who were not afraid to search among the lions for the lost lambs, who walked the perimeters daily to keep our flock together.

Let them remember us as lambs who became heroes, not through great and dramatic works, but through the small acts of faith and courage that give life to our mission each day.

Let them remember us as the women who ensured no sleep for the lions.

The Analogy of the Catholic University

Leo J. O'Donovan, SJ

In late July of 1994, *The New York Times* carried an article that noted the silence of university presidents in the United States over recent years. Recalling the prominence of such presidents as Robert Maynard Hutchins at the University of Chicago or Nathan Pusey at Harvard, the *Times* reporter commented that few university administrators today seem to have time or ambition to address major social issues of the day. Meeting at the University of Notre Dame in early August, on the other hand, delegates to the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU) at least recognized such an opportunity when they chose as their theme "The Catholic University in Shaping a New Society."

The broad and admittedly rather general theme was addressed in subthemes dealing with the place of values in university teaching and education, human priorities in the research function of the Catholic university, and commitments to the service both of civil and ecclesial society. Some presentations were admirable in their concreteness, particularly an international panel dealing with environmental issues, immigration and refugees, the role of women in church and society, and the interrelation of family and demographic issues. Workshops and case studies offered participants from every continent an opportunity to exchange educational experience. And Cardinal Pio Laghi, Prefect of the Congregation for Catholic Education, accompanied by Monsignor Walter J. Edyvean, welcomed a wide-ranging dialogue with participants on the first full day of the meeting.

IFCU is just what its name suggests, a valuable international network of Catholic institutions that range from relatively small colleges to large universities, from theological and philosophical faculties to complex institutions that include undergraduate and professional education. With its headquarters in Paris, the organization now numbers more than 182 members, of whom some 111 were represented this August, sending 360 participants all told. There were some unfortunate gaps in representation: there is only one Catholic university in Germany and it was not represented, while only two participants came from Eastern Europe, and one each from Poland and the Czech Republic. But otherwise, strong delegations attended from North America, Latin America, Asia, and Europe.

Father O'Donovan is president of Georgetown University.

Notre Dame proved an ideal location, and participants greatly appreciated the generosity of its campus and the grandeur of the liturgies it helped them to celebrate. In both formal sessions and informal gatherings, discussion of the general theme and of university practice in different parts of the world was accompanied by considerable discussion of Pope John Paul II's "Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities" (1990). "A Catholic university, as any university," the apostolic constitution had stated, "is immersed in human society; as an extension of its service to the Church and always within its proper competence, it is called on to become an ever more effective instrument of cultural progress for individuals as well as for society." It went on to say that "the Christian spirit of service to others for the *promotion of social justice* is of particular importance for each Catholic university, to be shared by its teachers and developed in its students." The wisdom of the text served through the week to help in developing a situational analysis of what one prize-winning student from Africa had called "our planetary civilization." (Happily, students were able to be present from Canada, Ecuador, France, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States.)

Among the enduring lessons of the assembly was the renewed experience of the "analogy" of the Catholic university. However much the institutions represented have in common as regards both identity and mission, there are also such significant differences that no univocal definition of their reality is possible. Perhaps the best example was given by Father Giuseppe Pittau, SJ, rector of the Gregorian University in Rome, when he contrasted his experience as rector of Sophia University in Tokyo with his present position. The Gregorian enrolls almost exclusively Catholic students and has an almost exclusively Catholic faculty, while only 2 percent of the students enrolling at Sophia are Christian and 60 percent of its faculty come from backgrounds other than Catholicism.

Not only in terms of religious background but culturally as well, our universities exist in vastly different social situations. For many, especially in the West, the great quest is for meaning in a secularized culture. For many others, and especially in the Third World, the more prevailing cry is for justice in the society around them. While neither theme is separable from the other in human experience, the emphasis on one or the other is often discernible and significantly affects the life of an institution. It seems

crucial, then, to recognize that all efforts to find a single, univocal formula for Catholic education, or to treat it reductively, would be greatly misguided.

A second and associated lesson is what I would call the local university of the church. While the church is one and Catholic, universal across the globe and throughout time, it must realize itself through the many local churches. "In and from such individual churches," as *Lumen Gentium* says, "there comes into being the one and only Catholic Church." Just as human questioning may indeed be a universal characteristic and science may strive for uniformity, "the whole Christ," in Augustine's phrase, is concretely universal through his presence in the local churches. And this was the experience not only of university life but of the church itself for many IFCU delegates.

A third lesson was reacquaintance with our fragility and weakness both as believers, (members of the church), and as university women and men (members of society). In both respects it behooves us to recognize more clearly our limitations not just in resources, which we all bemoan, but also in our efforts as scholars, teachers, servants. At a meeting such as this, striving to assess the full human situation of our contemporary world, educators do well to look for signs of humility about what we can really accomplish, and even on occasion to admit our waywardness.

This lesson is nothing new, of course, but it is helpful to recognize its truth once again among university colleagues. As educators but also with the church, we must be willing to change, to admit error, to recognize the limitations of our achievements. In a time of rapidly expanding, indeed exploding and fragmented knowledge, the church does well to hold up for us the ideal of integral truth, the *splendor veritatis*. But we must recognize how rarely and with what difficulty such integration is realized. As realistic educators we all know how tentatively we attain a full integration of knowledge, how much more regularly that remains an ideal. In the words of one of the homilists during the week, reflecting on Jesus' question, "Who do the people say that I am?" we should perhaps be seeking to provide not so much an answer to that question as the space in which to reflect on the answer.

In that regard, there were also important lessons of language to be learned from the delegates' time together. As is now common throughout the world, we spoke generally of a university as a community that seeks *to teach, to pursue research*, and *to serve*. But at the root of these different endeavors is a deeper unity of experience: a community of learning and inquiry underway to wisdom, uniting the three elements from the start and not simply adding them together. In such a journey of exploration, the common experience of *seeking* wisdom can be one of the most liberating elements university people share.

Second, as regards the very word "church," it was noticeable that the IFCU delegates tended to speak of the church in the rich, full sense retrieved by the Second Vatican Council. Father Joseph Komonchak has exactly interpreted the apostolic constitution in this regard: "I have found no statement in this document in which 'the Church' clearly means only the hierarchy. Obviously, the role of the hierarchy is everywhere presumed and at times stressed, but 'the Church' of this document is the whole community of the faithful, owing its existence to Jesus Christ and engaged in the task of bringing his light and power to redeem human history." In his view, as well, "The presupposition of the whole text of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* is a non-sectarian view of Christianity and of the Church."

A third linguistic point of importance has to do with the way we speak of the university "in" the church or as "part of" the church. Here I would caution against a spatial fallacy that simply locates the university within the church. For universities surely exist in society as well, often as much a part of the world as of the church, struggling even to state clearly the questions people have in various walks of human life.

Fourth, in speaking of the relationship between gospel and culture, it seems advisable to be wary of objectifying or reifying either term. The gospel is indeed good news entrusted to the church for proclamation, but it also surely calls for reflective understanding and appropriation. Likewise, human cultures everywhere have raised questions and have embodied religious dimensions that should not be considered simply foreign to the gospel. Even in H. Richard Niebuhr's classic, *Christ and Culture*, the terms of his title are noticeably asymmetrical—though persuasively intelligible thanks to Niebuhr's breadth of learning and sympathy.

Michael Buckley, SJ, writing on the inherent integrity of academic inquiry and religious faith, expresses well the sort of differentiated understanding we need. "A fundamental proposition of the Catholic university," he argues, "is that the religious and the academic are intrinsically related. Any movement toward meaning and truth is inchoatively religious. This obviously does not suggest that quantum mechanics or geography is religion or theology; it does mean that the dynamism inherent in all inquiry and knowledge—if not inhibited—is toward ultimacy, toward a completion in which an issue or its resolution finds place in a universe that makes final sense, i.e., in the self-disclosure of God—the truth of the finite. At the same time, the tendencies of faith are inescapably toward the academic. This obviously does not suggest that all serious religion is scholarship; it does mean that the dynamism inherent in faith—if not inhibited—is toward its own understanding, toward its own self-possession in knowledge. In their full development, the religious intrinsically involves the academic, and the academic intrinsically involves the religious." The gospel has never been spoken without a cultural context, one might say, nor has any culture ever existed without a search for good news.

A final lesson of language had to do with "evangelization," about which the apostolic constitution, developing the thought of Paul VI, speaks so eloquently, especially in its final paragraphs. Clearly the pope, carrying forward the reflection of his predecessor, understands evangelization in a broad and nuanced way. It is not indoctrination, nor

merely catechesis, but the broadest ministry to the gospel so as to shape and reshape human experience in the light of Christ.

But we must also recognize that no metaphor for the mission of the church can be absolutized, whether it be evangelization, sanctification, redemption, liberation, or whatever. If we want to speak of evangelization in the university, then surely we must also address the inculturation of the university, as in fact the apostolic constitution does, again quoting Paul VI. One experienced observer commented at the assembly that the language of evangelization is probably much more easily understood and acceptable in Italy than it would be in the United States—because of our fundamentalistic "evangelical" sects, not to mention TV "evangelism." And the point, of course, is not only the clarity but the effectiveness of our language.

Finally, I interpret the Notre Dame meeting as setting a new stage of reflection on the apostolic constitution, its reception, and its appropriation throughout the world. More clearly even than at the last General Assembly in Toulouse in 1991, the wisdom and liberating spirit of the document was broadly acknowledged. Now the task is to bring its light to bear on the countless questions of contemporary life that our universities address in their various cultures. In good measure this amounts to saying that we continue the journey of realizing the vision of Vatican II's *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, becoming a church that witnesses transformatively to the gospel in the world. Indeed, for universities as well as for the entire church, we seem to be at a new stage in the reception of Vatican II as a whole, newly experiencing the word of God borne to us through time, the special vocation of lay people in their local churches, the full reality of a church learning and listening as well as teaching.

It was a significant advantage to have the representatives of Rome's Congregation for Catholic Education present for almost the entire meeting. The congregation's responsibility for the promulgation of the apostolic constitution is clear, and there were many opportunities during the assembly to see how seriously it was being taken throughout the world. One the other hand, there seemed to be significantly different understandings about the formulation of ordinances by local episcopal conferences. Many delegates reported that their conferences gave no support to drafting ordinances of a narrow juridical nature, while at least some indications from the congregation suggested a more uniform process of implementation.

In any case, it was widely though perhaps not universally assumed among the delegates that it would be counterproductive in the church and also vis-a-vis society at large to attempt to reintroduce, through proposed ordinances, the legal rigor and narrow perspectives that were evident in earlier drafts of the apostolic constitution. Whatever form local, concrete applications of the Constitution may take, and however much the different episcopal conferences deem it advisable to draw on the text effectively, it will be crucial not to fall back to a perspective that discussions of the Constitution's drafts, over many years, clearly passed beyond.

Such questions, and undoubtedly many new ones, will certainly arise when IFCU meets for its next General Assemble in Santiago, Chile, in 1997. There, in the view of many participants this year, the Council organizing the meeting will be well advised to plan fuller theological reflection on issues such as feminism, interreligious dialogue, and the place of Islam in the contemporary world. One commentator remarked how little attention had been paid this year to the continuing, urgent question of armaments and world peace. With the help of preparatory task forces it might also be possible to bring more action-orientation topics to the meeting for discussion, while carefully assuring, of course, that no prior agenda is forced on the assembly as a whole.

Personally, I hope to meet again in Santiago the delegates' *gaudium de veritate*, the "joy that comes from the truth," as Augustine so fondly put it, a joy that happily enlightened much of the discussion in early August. Still more important will be final reliance on the Holy Spirit—invoked in the opening liturgy at Notre Dame, presided over by Bishop John D'Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend. That spirit of wisdom and understanding, our great gift as believers and citizens, is also a great fire, testing our educational projects and ambition far more searchingly than any questions or directives put to us in human language.

Who Will Speak *for* the Religious Traditions?

Robert L. Wilken

The first year I began studying Greek I recall the instructor passed out a diagram illustrating the meanings of the many Greek prepositions. At the center of the sheet was a circle and the prepositions were located at different points in relation to the circle. One preposition was *in* the circle, another *outside* the circle, one sat on a line *through* the circle, others were *alongside* it, *above* it, or *below* it. Prepositions, we learned, signified relations between things, persons, and ideas, and without a clear grasp of how the prepositions worked it was impossible to understand Greek or any language.

Prepositions are the joints and hinges that hold together conceptions about scholarship and teaching in the field of religion, as can be seen in the expressions we use to depict our common intellectual endeavor. I am referring of course to the phrases: the study *of* religion and teaching *about* religion. These expressions have become so commonplace that it is easy to forget that they have a history and have achieved canonical status only in recent times. Underneath them lie notions about religion that are relative newcomers to our intellectual life. Western thinkers, writes Jonathan Z. Smith, have only "had the last few centuries in which to imagine religion." In this view, religion "is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the scholar's analytic purposes . . . by imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the study of religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly self-conscious . . . . For the self-conscious student of religion, no datum possesses intrinsic interest. It is of value only insofar as it can serve as *exempli gratia* of some fundamental issue in the imagination of religion" (Smith: xi).

Viewed in this light the phrases "study of religion" and "teaching about religion" signify more than the adoption of a new vocabulary to designate a traditional area of inquiry.[1] The prepositions "of" and "about" portend a profound redefinition of the subject matter that requires in turn a new relation between the scholar and the thing studied. Consider, for example, some common expressions. In speaking of the teaching and study of literature or history in the colleges and universities, we say "she is studying Chaucer" or "teaching the American Revolution" or "he is an English teacher." Likewise in speaking of religious topics, it is customary to say that someone "studies the Quran" or "teaches the Bhagavadgita." However, if we say someone is a "religion teacher" or "teaches religion" the expressions carry unwelcome overtones, at least for the scholarly community. I am sure that some of you have had the experience at one of these meetings of stepping into a taxi with a chatty cabdriver. When the cabdriver heard what we do, he said: "So you are religion teachers?" There was an embarrassed silence and in chorus the group answered, "Oh, no, we are teachers *of* religion."

In ordinary speech the terms "teach" and "study" imply another term "learn." What one means by "learning" will of course vary depending on the subject matter. To learn calculus requires that the student understand a system of thought as well as master certain skills, whereas for the student of ancient Rome the acquisition of skills is secondary to the understanding of a historical period. On the other hand when we speak of "teaching Spanish" or "studying French," presumably the student's goal is to learn to speak Spanish or read French. No doubt it is this ambiguity in the meaning of the terms "teach" and "study" that has led us to embrace new locutions in the field of religious studies and explains why we seldom use the term "learn." The prepositions "of" and "about" have not been admitted into our discourse without reflection. They dig a tiny moat between teacher and subject matter, signaling to ourselves and especially to others that there is a salutary distance between the teacher and what is taught. In the context of the modern university they make a necessary and useful distinction.

In an effort to put space between ourselves and the things we teach, however, we may have created an unbridgeable chasm. And it is for this reason that I invite you to consider

Robert L. Wilkens is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of the History of Christianity at the University of Virginia. *This article, the AAR presidential address, originally appeared in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Winter 1989.*

1 For a brief history of the shift in perspective see Remus, Tushy, Tober, and J. Samuel Preus. For lively discussion of the issues see the exchanges in Studies in Religion by Alton, Davis, Dawson, Penner, Riley, Slater, and Wiebe.

another preposition, the "for" in the title of this address. If the prepositions "of" and "about" dig a moat between the teacher and subject matter, the preposition "for" casts a tiny drawbridge over the moat. Although it is possible to say "who speaks for religion?" the more concrete phrase "religious tradition" works better as the object of "for." It is easier to let down a drawbridge over the moat that separates scholar and subject matter if we speak about Buddhism or Christianity or Judaism or Islam, not the imagined "religion" that has its home only in the academy.

Now the preposition "for" is elusive. Like the terms "teach," "study," and "learn," its meaning fluctuates. To speak "for" a religious tradition may mean to be a spokesperson or an advocate for its beliefs and way of life. One answer then to the question "who speaks for the religious traditions" is bishops, ministers, imams, priests, lamas and others who are the leaders and official representatives of the religions. But such an answer is imperfect and misleading, and deflects us from our topic. For though there are among us priests and rabbis and ministers and imams, we gather here as a company of scholars. It is to scholars that the question is addressed: "who will speak *for* the religious traditions?"

So we must search for another sense to the preposition "for" than "on behalf of." My attention was first called to the importance of prepositions in religious studies in Wendy Doniger's presidential address several years ago. She used the phrases "care for" and "care against." Just as she took some license in using the oxymoron "care against," I take some liberty in using "care for" as a way of rendering "for." She wrote: "Though it is deemed wrong to *care for* religion, it is not wrong to *care against* religion." Since the Enlightenment "hatred of religion has been a more respectable scholarly emotion than love, particularly hatred of one's own religion" (O'Flaherty: 23). What Doniger calls hatred of religion is a picturesque way of portraying a familiar friend, critical reason, and the intellectual style it has fostered. Though most would eschew the emotional overtones of "hatred of religion," her observation is accurate. Criticism is the oxygen that quickens the academy. Without an analytic and inquiring disposition, without spirited skepticism and muscular toughmindedness, we would not be gathered together in this society as a company of scholars engaged in the study of religion in its kaleidoscope of forms and expressions.

It is, however, two hundred years since the Enlightenment lit up the dull sky of western Europe. It has come time to ask whether "critical" reason as defined by the Enlightenment is the only intellectual trait we should honor, the only song we must sing. If "hatred" of one's own religion is a virtue must love be a vice? To be sure, critical reason at its best is never "hostile" or "against," yet the Enlightenment taught us to esteem detachment (thereby excluding love), and in its wake it has been easy to identify critical thought with stepping back or stepping away from the object of our study as well as from inherited ways of thinking.

In his essay "What is Enlightenment," Immanuel Kant distinguished two roles of reason. The first he called public reason, the critical and analytical use of reason by a scholar before the reading public. The second he designated private reason, reason put at the service of religious or civil institutions (Kant, 1959: 86-87). In his view public reason alone bestowed enlightenment. Propelled by the spirit of free inquiry, it examined, tested, and criticized without regard to the dictates of others, i.e., the official representatives of the religious institutions or of tradition. "Our age, is in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit" (Kant, 1956: 9). Public reason was thought to be autonomous, private reason subject to a "self-incurred tutelage."

On the claim of liberating reason from its "tutelage" to authority, the Enlightenment sought a new public forum free of external constraints. This quest has met with uncommon success. Over the last two centuries, critical reason has not only won independence within society, it has created its own empire with peculiar institutions, traditions, language and authorities. So profoundly has this new world altered the protocols of our intellectual life that one is minded to ask with George Steiner: "To what, save pride of intellect or professional peerage, is the reviewer, the critic, the academic expert accountable?" (Steiner: 8) Comfortable and content in its own home, "critical" reason is embarrassed to be associated with the very institutions it was expected to serve by its new freedom. For, according to Kant, one of the tasks of the public reason of the scholar was "to make suggestions for the better organization of the religious body . . ." (Kant, 1959: 88).

Within principles inherited from the Enlightenment, then, it is not out of place to ask whether other prepositions come into play in our scholarly life than "of" and "about." To be sure, no one preposition can define the many and varied relations that are formed in the life of a scholar and intellectual. Even the most singleminded among our company is tugged in several directions by reason of circumstances or sensibility. No thinking is wholly detached from its object; all thought stands in the midst of things seeking to correct or change course. Accordingly we must expand the repertoire of prepositions that define our common endeavor to include "for," in the admittedly imprecise sense of "care for." For too long we have assumed that engagement with the religious traditions is not the business of scholarship, as though the traditions will "care for" themselves. In the eighteenth century, when the weight of western Christian tradition lay heavily on intellectuals, there was reason to put distance between the scholar and the religious communities. Today that supposition is much less true and we must make place in our company for other scholarly virtues.

Of course, the vocation to "care for," however defined, will only be one task among many and one that applies most especially to students of the living religious traditions, and not of course to all students of these traditions. There are some in our company whose scholarly mission leads them along quite different paths. But that is hardly reason for all

approach "religion" as though it were the "creation cholar's study" or as if it existed only in the past. As Troeltsch reminds us, it makes a difference for an eter whether one is simply engaged in decently ng a corpse or dealing with a reality that has a future as past (Troeltsch: 156-9).

ether one is speaking of the career of a politician, the of a share on the stock market, the bond between ged lovers, or the life of a religious idea, it makes a nce whether something has a future. The politician political life seemed at an end may be reelected, the who parted may find each other again, the religious ay one day light the path of one's life. What has a has life and can become part of *our* future. I was ded of this several years ago shortly after I had moved University of Virginia. I was teaching a large survey on medieval Christian history and a young woman nto my office to say she wanted to major in religious s. Since I was new to Virginia, I was curious as to what her to our department. She told me she had been ng for some time about her life after graduation, but not until the previous summer that she realized what anted to do. One morning while on vacation with her s, she awoke and announced to her family: "I am to major in religious studies and become a social r!"

he mind of this young woman the study of religion d more than an understanding of another field of n knowledge. The stories she heard and the ideas she ned set in motion her own imaginings about the ends urposes of human life, tacitly illuminating the choices as making about the conduct of her life. Studies in on spoke to her not only about the past or about what s say or do but about her future and what she might do ay. She was not simply a bystander. Translating her s into the vocabulary of classical antiquity, we might hat for her the study of religion was (among other s) a search for wisdom. And wisdom, not only in rn antiquity, but in other cultures as well, has always a practical as well as a theoretical quest whose goals moral and spiritual, not simply intellectual. In the s of Seneca, the Roman philosopher, wisdom's lessons not for the classroom but for life" (*Epistulae morales* 2).

sdom is an *ars vivendi*, hence the Romans spoke about *m sapientiae*. The term "studium" is of course the root r modern English word "study." However, the Latin *m* does not mean "study" or "investigation" but a us pursuit or earnest quest. On occasion, the modern sh term "study" carries these overtones, as in the ecular expression "study war no more." Hence *studium ntiae* is best translated with phrases that carry over- of resolve and conviction, "pursuit of wisdom" or for wisdom." You will recall that when Augustine read Cicero's *Hortensius*, the book that planted in him the love of wisdom, it taught him not simply to "admire" this or that philosophy, but to "love wisdom itself, to search for it, pursue it, hold fast to it, and embrace it firmly" (*Confessions* 3.4.3.)

Inevitably the study of religion, if it is not delivered into the hands of scholarly undertakers, has "sapiential" features, if not in the mind of the instructor, certainly in the mind of students. For the religious traditions speak about suffering, happiness, love, death, faith, doubt, hope, transcendence, enlightenment, appearance and reality, sin, reconciliation, wholeness, peace, the end of human life, God, in short about wisdom. The pursuit of wisdom can move the will and inflame the heart as well as excite the mind. There are reasons, then, why scholars and teachers shun the "sapiential" character of religious studies. The most obvious is the pluralism of our society (and our classrooms). The lecture podium is neither a *minbar* nor a pulpit, nor is the seminar room a *yeshiva*. Another reason is the broad interpretation our courts have given of the constitutional constraints on the establishment of religion. In this context it is understandable why the expression "teaching about religion" has gained currency in the academy. The impressive gains of recent years would not have been possible without fresh conceptions of the nature of religious scholarship. No one can be a member of a contemporary department of religious studies without appreciating how profoundly our intellectual life has been enriched by this new environment.

Nevertheless there have been losses. I can illustrate the point by an editorial that appeared in the *Washington Post* a year ago. The Post wrote: "The study of religion in the public school curriculum has always been an educational hot potato—even though, in contrast to unconstitutional religious practices in the schools, such as prayer, learning about religious traditions and conflicts is essential to understanding culture and history." The editorial cites the recent proposal on teaching religion entitled "Living with our Deepest Difference." The premise of this program, opines the Post, is that one way to teach "about religion without offending sensibilities or the Constitution is to focus on the concepts of religious liberty and pluralism themselves" (*Washington Post*: A22).

What first caught my attention in this editorial was of course the phrase "teaching about religion." (These prepositions have been rattling around in my head for some time.) I was also intrigued by the announcement of a new series for teaching religion in the schools with the superb and insightful title "living with our deepest differences." The headline over the editorial, however, read "Teaching Religious Toleration," and this struck me as an odd way of putting things. For teaching religious toleration and teaching about religion are not the same thing. The confusion is not accidental. Teaching about religion, especially in the American context, is too easily translated into teaching about something else; and that is the subtle shift that takes places in this editorial. As the *Post* puts it, one way of teaching about

religion is to "focus on concepts of religious liberty and pluralism." Here the teaching of religion is put at the service of instruction in the constitution, education in civic virtues, or a philosophical discussion of the principles of religious liberty. No matter how dear "religious liberty" and "pluralism" may be to a liberal society, they are hardly at the center of the great religious traditions (at least not until recently), and comprehending these principles will do little to help us understand our "deepest differences." The study of religion, it seems, can ignore the very things that religious people care about most deeply.

In a more sophisticated way similar assumptions undergird the scholarly study of religion in the university. In his fascinating book, simply entitled *Religion*, but with the subtitle "If There is no God . . . . On God, the Devil, Sin and other Worries of the so-called Philosophy of Religion," Leszek Kolakowski addresses what he calls the epistemological foundation of the academic study of religious myths. Studies of the social, cognitive, or emotional value of myths imply that "the language of myth is translatable into a 'normal' language—which means, into one which is understandable within the semantic rules the researcher . . . is employing . . . . These codes help to disclose the hidden, 'profane' sense of mythical tales . . . ." Such study, continues Kolakowski, has two presuppositions. "First, it is assumed that myths, as they are explicitly told and believed, have a latent meaning behind their ostensible one and that this meaning not only is not in fact perceived by those sharing a given creed, but that of necessity it cannot be perceived. Secondly, it is implied that this latent meaning, which is accessible only to the outsider-anthropologist, is the meaning par excellence, whereas the ostensible one, i.e., the myth as understood by the believers, has the function of concealing the former . . ." (Kolakowski: 15).

Strong words these. Perhaps Kolakowski overstates his point, but the target of his criticism is apparent. His choice of terms, particularly the phrase "ostensible meaning," is somewhat distracting, especially in a field where meaning is seldom stable and multiple senses are rife, yet the point is clear enough. The academy tolerates a linguistic hierarchy that subjugates religious discourse to the hegemony of a fictive outsider, to the "semantic rules of the researcher." We have welcomed into our midst a leveling contemporary idiom without roots in history or experience, a speech that is contrived, abstract, ephemeral. This is not to deny the necessity of studying the "latent" meaning of religious discourse. In the last decades of the twentieth century it requires no great insight to recognize that the users of religious language say more than they intend, or more cynically, as much as they intend. But it does not take students of religion to see that. For that very reason Kolakowski's argument merits our attention. He alerts us to the tenacity of what I have called the "sapiential" features of religious language. In his words: "what people mean in religious discourse is what they ostensibly mean" (Kolakowski: 16).

In his recent book *Real Presences* George Steiner addresses, from a quite different perspective, a like set of problems. He too is impatient with the "mandarin madness of secondary discourse" that "infects thought and sensibility," and he imagines, somewhat wistfully, a society "devoid, to the greatest possible extent of 'meta-texts,' this is to say, of texts about texts . . . ." Of course, if Steiner had his way most of us would be put out of business! The parallels to the study of religion are inexact. He is thinking of a city of poets, composers, painters, choreographers and the like. Yet, one of his purposes in writing the book was to rescue critical thinking from its domination by a "grey morass" of second order discourse and to defend a view of criticism that makes place for engagement with the subject matter itself, in Steiner's words, for "ingestion," and which allows the interpreter to invest "his [or her] own being in the process of interpretation." Hence the play on the words "real" and "presence" in the title of his book. Genuine criticism makes "the past text a present presence," a living reality, and allows it to make claims on the future (Steiner: 13).

What I draw from these three disparate illustrations, the editorial in the *Washington Post*, the passage from Kolakowski, and the remarks of George Steiner, is the following: if we allow the "ostensible" meaning of religious language to be taken hostage to the etiquette of disinterested secondary discourse, or to things that have only a tangential relation to the things religious people care about, not only do we prune the list of things we talk about, we also narrow the circle of people we will talk to, or better, of those who will talk to us. And that is a great loss, a kind of self-imposed deafness. Where there is not one to answer, we are deprived of a precious intellectual gift—resistance. I am thinking not only of contemporaries. Let it not be forgotten that the great religions of the world are traditions of learning as well as of faith. Alongside of the practice of religion flourish lively intellectual traditions, philosophical, historical, exegetical, legal, created and nurtured for the purpose of understanding and interpreting the very things we study. Within the present intellectual climate it is easy, all too easy, to exclude from our circle of discourse the great scholars of the past, the likes of Maimonides or Averroes or Thomas Aquinas or Origen or Bukhari or Rashi. If the "ostensible" meaning of the myths and stories and doctrines is ancillary to the goals of the academic study of religion, we consign these thinkers to footnotes, transforming them into historical sources invoked for the purpose of documenting an idea or illustrating a theory. No longer welcomed as partners in a living dialogue, the lively voices of the dead fall silent as we turn our backs to them. The consequence is not only a loss of depth but also a sacrifice of memory.

III

At times it seems as though the ticket of admission to religious studies is a forfeiture of memory. And that is too high a price to pay. You may recall the touching scene at the end of *The Brothers Karamazov*. The boy Ilyusha has been buried and his friends are gathered at the grave. Alyosha

speaks to them. "Let us agree here at Ilyusha's stone, never to forget, first, Ilyusha, and secondly, one another." He explains, "My dear children, perhaps you will not understand what I'm going to say to you now, for I often speak very incomprehensibly, but I'm sure, you will remember that there's nothing higher, stronger, more wholesome and more useful in life than some good memory . . . ." You are told a lot about education, he says, "but some beautiful, sacred memory, preserved since childhood, is perhaps the best education of all. If a [person] carries many such memories into life with him, he is saved for the rest of his life. And even if only one good memory is left in our hearts, it may also be the instrument of our salvation one day" (Dostoevsky: 910-11).

Dostoevsky is speaking about personal memories. But all memory, even individual memory, rests on the communal experience of those who surround us, not on the private reminiscences of solitary persons, as the French social-anthropologist Maurice Halbwachs has taught us. "A remembrance is gained not merely by reconstituting the image of a past event a piece at a time. That reconstruction must start from shared data or conceptions" (Halbwachs: 31). Cut off from collective memory it is easy for scholars to construct an entire framework of interpretation that has no relation to actual human experience or aspirations. We need to be reminded that scholarship on the living religious traditions cannot exist in isolation from the communities that are the bearers of these traditions, as though those who transmit and practice the things we study have no say, indeed no stake, in the interpretations we offer. This question was addressed rather effectively centuries ago in a dispute recorded in the Babylonian Talmud. The question arose about the role of the living tradition (the "oral law" in the language of the Talmud) in settling a dispute. If one ignores the "oral law," one teacher responded, it would be as though the Torah was "rolled up and left in a corner, and whoever wishes to study it can study it." (Babylonian Talmud Kiddushin 66a). The metaphor is hauntingly apt in our scholarly milieu. The things we study, it is assumed, belong to no one; they are simply lying there waiting for whoever wishes to study them to study them and in whatever way one sees fit.

Without memory the language of scholarship is impoverished, barren and lifeless, a tottering scaffold of secondary creations in which "words refer only to words."[2] If we keep a cool distance from temporality and history, we make the task of understanding more not less difficult. The image of stepping back is misleading if for no other reason than it assumes there is a place to step back to, as though we could grasp something on its own terms unrelated to who we are or where we stand.[3] Autonomy is not a precondition for understanding; quite the contrary, as reason penetrates more deeply into things its imaginative and critical powers are unleashed. In so far as memory aids in this work its role is not only prophylactic but constructive.

In Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment," however, it was the liaison with tradition, with memory if you will, that obstructed the path to enlightenment. Affiliation with a particular tradition meant making a contract with an "unchangeable symbol" that "shut off all further enlightenment from the human race" (Kant, 1959-89). From this was drawn the conclusion: judgments and convictions derived from tradition or the shared history of a concrete community have no place in the public forum. In the marketplace of ideas, particular commitments are limiting and restrictive.

But is it really the case that identification with a particular tradition narrows the horizon of a scholar (any more than language or education or class or geography), or that it shuts one off from further enlightenment? Thirty years ago Hans-Georg Gadamer posed a similar question: "Does the fact that one is set within various traditions mean really and primarily that one is subject to prejudices and limited in one's freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms . . ." (Gadamer: 245). If the leaden prose of *Truth and Method* is too dense for this time of the evening, perhaps the same idea can be expressed in a more sprightly fashion by an aphorism of Cynthia Ozick. She said: "You have to blow through the narrow end of the shofar if you want to be heard far" (Ozick: 177).

IV

In the religious traditions I know best, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, conviction and rational justification[4] have been complementary, seldom adversarial. The traditions preclude *mere* identification with themselves by presupposing general conditions of validity for their claims. The most impressive evidence for this is the readiness of religious thinkers to take their places in the public forum, subjecting their ideas to analysis, criticism, and correction, and testing their convictions by norms that are rooted

2. *The phrase is from Czeslaw Milosz's* The Witness of Poetry *(49). He speaks there of the alientation of the poet from society and the loss of a "community of beliefs and feelings which unite poet and audience" (65). In his Nobel Prize-lecture he wrote: "Memory is our force; it protects us against a speech entwining upon itself like the ivy when it does not find a support on a tree or a wall" (21).*

3. *See the interesting observation on this point in* Time and the Other *by Johannes Fabian. Conceptions of time, he writes, are made "for the purpose of distancing those who are observed from the Time of the observer" (25). There is a "systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse" (31). On "stepping back" see Ricoeur: "Anyone who wished to escape the contingency of historical encounter and stand apart from the game in the name of a nonsituated 'objectivity' would at the most know everything, but would understand nothing" (24).*

4. *On the conflict between conviction and rational justification, see Alasdair MacIntyre (6).*

within the tradition *and* by principles shared with other thoughtful people. Origen of Alexandria challenged his Greek critic Celsus to judge his views by the "common notions" that were accepted by other thinkers (Contra Celsum 3.40). It was the enlightenment, and historiography since that time, that promoted the idea that "traditional" religion was based solely on "faith" independent of the claims of reason. "The great religions of antiquity," it was said, "all bear this character: they were not reasoned about; they did not require proof and hence could not be disproved (Gay: 90).

As I have already observed the great religious traditions of the world are not only communities of "faith," they are also traditions of learning. Now the phrase "tradition of learning" can mean several things depending on which religious tradition one has in mind. For the "civilizational religions" it means at least that books have been one of the media of transmission, and the reading of old books has often been the agent of change and innovation. Judah ha-Nasi codified the Jewish laws in the Mishnah, the Amoraiim read the Mishnah and their debates are recorded in the Talmud. Rashi and the Tosaphists commented on their discussions, and later editions of the Talmud incorporate all these opinions in the margins of the text so that the contemporary students can enter into a discussion that has been going on for centuries. Because books are foundational all the activities associated with the transmission and interpretation of books have occupied a large place in the intellectual agenda of these traditions: the copying of manuscripts, the study of grammar, the analysis of words and concepts, the writing of commentaries.

Religious scholarship, however, has never been simply a matter of copying texts, of parsing sentences, of analyzing and explaining words and phrases. It has always been a work of *critical* intelligence. Peter Abelard wrote: "For the first key to wisdom is called *interrogation*, diligent and unceasing questioning . . . . By doubting we are led to inquiry, and from inquiry we perceive the truth." Abelard surely believed the biblical maxim, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," nevertheless he begins with "questioning," even doubt. To support this view he first cites Aristotle: "In doubting we come to investigation and in investigating we perceive the truth." Then he quotes a saying of Jesus of Nazareth: "Seek and ye shall find." Even as a child, according to Abelard, Jesus understood the importance of questioning in the quest for wisdom. When he was taken to the temple with his parents Jesus questioned the learned doctors of the Law. Whether biblical scholars will applaud Abelard's exegetical inventiveness is not our business: Abelard believed that he had found warrant for his theological method in the example of Jesus.

Abelard's observations on doubt and questioning are taken from his book "Sic et Non."[5] This work was a collection of traditional authorities arranged according to a catalogue of philosophical, theological, and moral topics. What gave the book its pungency was that it offered opinions on either side of each issue; some writers said "*sic*" and others said "*non*." In the course of the book Abelard was able to display notable differences among Christian thinkers on key points of faith and morals. The form of the book is unique in the middle ages, but the principles that underlie it were commonplace; for medieval thinkers, the path to enlightenment led necessarily through rigorous and relentless questioning.

I choose my illustrations from the middle ages because that is one period in the history of our civilization when Christianity, Judaism, and Islam engaged in lively and fruitful religious dialogue with each other. The middle ages may be called an "age of faith," but its most original thinkers seldom spoke solely to members of their own communities. Often their discussions were three-cornered, or perhaps one should say four-cornered, because the intellectual impetus for religious and philosophical thought came from Aristotle, whose works, read by Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike, presented the three traditions with a common set of problems. Muslim philosophers had translated Aristotle into Arabic, and Maimonides, who lived in Cairo, first read Aristotle in Arabic. These Arabic versions were in turn translated into Latin and read by Albert Magnus, Thomas Aquinas' teacher, in Paris and Cologne. As Maimonides' ideas became known in the west his books were translated into Latin. Without Maimonides' philosophical rationale for the proofs of the existence of God or his defense of a temporal creation, Thomas' task would have been immensely more difficult. Conversely, Thomas Aquinas' synthesis of faith and reason make it easier for Jewish thinkers in western Europe to respond to the arguments of Averroes. Hillel of Verona, a contemporary of Thomas, translated his *De unitate Intellectus* into Hebrew for the purpose of answering Averroes' attack on the idea of personal immortality. In the fifteenth century Joseph Albo, a Jewish philosopher living in Spain, drew on the works of Thomas to offer a reasoned presentation of Judaism.[6]

Now before I become mired too deeply in medieval intellectual history, let me return to the point of these observations. In saying that the civilizational religions are traditions of learning as well as of faith, I mean that they have fostered a critical spirit, and that the ideas they have embraced and the doctrines they have confessed, as well as the stories they have told, have been the subject of rational and philosophical scrutiny for centuries, not only by those within the traditions but also by outsiders. Religious convictions do not operate outside of warrants in use in other areas of thought and experience. Augustine wrote

5 Sic et Non *has not been translated into English. For the passage discussed here, see Boyer and McKeon,* Peter Abailard Sic et Non *(103-104)*

6. *In the introduction to his classical study of Thomas Aquinas Gilson wrote, "Christian thought, Jewish thought, and Muslim thought acted and reacted on each other as we know, and it would not be at all satisfactory to study them as so many closed and isolated systems" (1).*

long ago: "No one believes anything unless one first thought it to be believable. . . . Everything which is believed should be believed after thought has preceded . . . . Not everyone who thinks believes, since many think in order not to believe; but everyone who believes thinks . . ." (*pred. sanct.* 2). Religious convictions, to use a Buddhist phrase I have learned from my colleague Jeffrey Hopkins, are based on "valid cognition."

Let us then make place in our company for those who come toting their shofars or trumpets or french horns or tubas—they will make our assembly a more tuneful gathering. There is no reason for the scholar as scholar to shed her or his convictions to exercise the vocation of scholar. No doubt there are fields in which one's religious convictions may appear irrelevant or intrusive (in the social scientific study of religion for example), but in other fields that is surely not the case. We have created, it seems an intellectual climate that discourages, if not prohibits, the scholar from speaking as a member of a religious community. We continue to perpetrate the eighteenth-century view that religion is "inevitably sectarian" (Marty: 1)[7] or the more recent notion that faith designates a private world of feelings and emotions impenetrable to the outsider. But fideism, though it may be rife in certain circles, is a caricature of the great religious traditions of the world. Rationality is not synonymous with detachment, and particular commitments can be the vehicle of enlightenment, as Flannery O'Connor shrewdly observed: "There is no reason why fixed dogma should fix anything that the writer sees in the world. On the contrary, dogma is an instrument for penetrating reality" (O'Connor: 178).

V

Until a generation ago most religious scholarship took place within institutions affiliated with the religious traditions, in seminaries and divinity schools, in rabbinical colleges and yeshivas, and in madresehs. Within a very short time, in this country, and to a growing extent elsewhere in the world, scholarship in the field of religion has shifted to the colleges and universities. The department of which I am a member now has twenty-two members; twenty-five years ago it had one member. To be sure the universities and colleges are not the only centers of religious scholarship; outstanding scholars on whose work we all depend are found in these institutions. Unfortunately, within the profession there is a pervading sense that the community that matters is the university.

There can be no doubt that this move to the university has been a great boon for scholarship in the field of religion. In the course of its history religious scholarship has had many homes: the talmudic academies, the monastic universities of Tibet, the cathedral schools and monasteries in medieval Europe, seminaries and divinity schools, the madresehs, et al. Even within specific traditions the setting of religious scholarship has peregrinated. In the early centuries of Islam learning was transmitted wholly through individual teachers and informal discussion, often in the courts of the wealthy where learned men were "thrust into each other's presence by a bored or curious monarch" (Motahhedeh: 89). Students wandered from place to place seeking out a teacher, learning what he had to offer, then moving on to another teacher. In time this practice was displaced by the "madreseh," a formal school located at a particular place organized around a company of scholars, a uniform curriculum, and of course fixed fees and paid teachers. These schools generated a whole new range of intellectual concerns, e.g., treatises on logic, and later, works on philosophy.

As the establishment of madresehs within Islam had unforeseen, yet fruitful, consequences for the development of Islamic thought, so the move to the university has invigorated scholarship within many religious traditions. Whether one points to the acquisition of new philological skills, to awareness of social factors in religious history, to demythologizing of religious ideology, to sophistication about questions of method, to more intimate acquaintance with the religious traditions of the east, there can be no doubt that the academy offers opportunities for scholarship in religion that are without precedent in the history of religions.

Nevertheless, as the prepositions "of" and "about" signify, the academic study of religion has altered the relation between the scholar and the thing studied in subtle ways. Prepositions, as I noted at the outset, have to do with relations, and it would be a great loss for the university and the society (as well as the religions themselves) if scholarship on the learned religious traditions was tolerated only within the astringent precincts prescribed by the "study of religion" and "teaching about religion." If love is no virtue and there is no love of wisdom, if religion can only be studied from afar and as though it had no future, if the passkey to religious studies is amnesia, if we can speak about our deepest convictions only in private, our entire enterprise is not only enfeebled, it loses credibility. For if those who are engaged in the study of religion do not care for religion, should others? Without "living sympathy" and a "certain partisan enthusiasm," Goethe once wrote to Schiller, "there is so little value in our utterance that it is not worth making at all. Pleasure, delight, sympathy with things is what alone is real and what in turn creates reality; all else is worthless and only detracts from the worth of things" (Goethe: 33).

7. *The phrase is from the Rockfish Gap Report written by Thomas Jefferson.*

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Becoming a Great Catholic University

Craig S. Lent

Angels, as far as I understand, do not have universities. Universities are for humans. The doctrine of the incarnation is perhaps surprisingly relevant to an understanding of what a great Catholic university might be about.[1] Jesus came in the flesh to redeem not just human souls but all that is authentically human. We are not, as the Gnostics thought, spiritual flames trapped in fleshly bodies. Through the incarnation Jesus validates our humanity as corporeal, finite, and limited. We need to learn the truth; it is not implanted within us. Jesus presumably learned to read by being taught. In a Catholic view, human cultures, our learning, arts, and sciences, are part of our humanity and objects of the redemption of Jesus (and in need of redemption because of the effects of sin.) A Catholic university is a human activity, a creative intellectual activity of teaching and learning, that is dedicated to God. As is so true, dedication to God means working for the betterment of others—our students, our colleagues, the church, and society.

When I came to Notre Dame as a postdoctoral fellow in 1984, I did not think I was coming to a Catholic, or even Christian, university in any important sense. I thought Notre Dame was a post-Christian university with some vestigial trappings of faith, now relegated mostly to student residence halls and ceremonial events. It was, I assumed, on the same path to secularization that Princeton, Harvard, and Duke had taken, just moving a little slower because of the pace to which Catholic institutions were accustomed. I have been delighted to discover that I was wrong in this assessment, though others will argue it was merely premature.

I awakened to possibilities not yet extinguished through working on a large, long-range planning project called the "Colloquy for the Year 2000." My principal focus was on upgrading the infrastructure required to enable serious research and scholarship to progress at Notre Dame, a task to which I remain committed. In the course of attending the many meetings of the Academic Life subcommittee, however, I noticed that a few people around our very large table spoke about the Catholic character of Notre Dame seriously and in the present tense. One even mentioned the Holy Spirit as an agent actively at work on our campus.

As part of the information gathering phase of the colloquy, the Academic Life subcommittee launched a series of task forces to gather input from the various departments and units of the university. As a member of two such task forces, I had the opportunity to visit each department in the colleges of science and engineering. Aside from gathering valuable comments regarding the state of the research infrastructure, I was struck by the potential that still exists within the faculty for realizing a genuinely Catholic and Christian university. A great number of committed Catholics and other Christians are here.

Interestingly, they understand their faith to be entirely irrelevant to their life at the university. It is, for them, a private matter, much as it would be if they worked for any large corporation. That the Catholicity of the university is a matter for others—in residence halls, in the theology department, and in the administration building—is what many faculty members have understood the leadership of the university to say. They have no part in it because, as everyone knows (correctly), there is no "Catholic physics" or "Christian mathematics." Yet given a glimpse of the vague possibility of some sort of integration of their personal commitments with their professional lives, many warmed to it immediately.

Still, many on the faculty are "uncomfortable" with the resurgence of talk about the Catholic character of Notre Dame. Some state unequivocally that the university should secularize, that entanglements with "religion" are entirely inappropriate for a modern university. Others see, not without reason, concern about Catholicism as an excuse for turning back from an emphasis on serious research and scholarship toward a level of comfortable mediocrity. Some are convinced that the whole discussion is a cloak for a power struggle between the Congregation of Holy Cross and the predominantly lay and newly energized faculty.

In this interesting environment, several of us in the spring of 1992 sent around a letter inviting faculty whom we had reason to believe might be interested to meet and

The author is an associate professor of electrical engineering at the University of Notre Dame. *This article first appeared in* The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University (*University of Notre Dame Press, 1994*).

1. For an interesting discussion of this connection, see John F. Crosby, "Remarks on the Christian Humanism of a Catholic University," Fellowship of Christian Scholars Newsletter, *June 1993*

discuss these issues. Our intent was to have an unsponsored and unofficial conversation among Notre Dame faculty on the topic of the Catholic character of the university. We were surprised to find that in response more than sixty people appeared on a Wednesday night during finals week. The group decided to have monthly meetings with somewhat formal presentations followed by a lengthy and lively discussion period. These meetings have continued, frequently drawing more than 130 participants, and remain ad hoc and unofficial. I am deeply indebted to all those who have participated in them; I have learned a lot and continue to learn from these discussions. My contribution to this volume I view as an opportunity to reflect on some of what I have learned so far from conversing with my colleagues.

EDUCATION AT A GREAT CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A PARENT'S PERSPECTIVE

We humans are not born with enough preprogrammed instincts to allow us to survive without contact with other humans. We must rely on others to teach us. Parents are, of course, the primary educators of the next generation. We also learn from others in the community in which we grow up. We learn skills and techniques, we learn what our obligations are, and we learn some of what other people have discovered and thought. Through this we acquire a sense of place in our society and in our history. That we may subsequently call these into question presupposes our initial acquisition of them.

The fact that our brains hold more information than our genes is an aspect of our created nature. In this we see that our creator designed us for this sort of dependence on the previous generation and our responsibility toward the next. This is another aspect of God's design in creating humans to live socially, in community with one another. In a sense, part of God's creative act in forming each individual is still unfinished at birth. God's creativity is mediated through the ongoing nurturing and education of parents and the broader community. Moreover, as individuals we ourselves participate in this cooperative process with God, increasingly becoming more responsible for our own formation.

Our obligation to listen to preceding generations and teach subsequent generations is an aspect of our created nature that we must take seriously. Catholic Christians have responded to this responsibility in part by forming Catholic schools, colleges, and universities as instruments through which we can better fulfill our obligation as a community to educate our children. Such Catholic institutions are on the one hand an extension of the parental task of education and on the other hand represent the involvement of the community as a whole toward this end. In universities, students with requisite abilities can pursue advanced learning, appropriating what has been discovered by others and learning to think clearly and creatively and to communicate effectively. The Catholic university must be understood to be first and foremost a response to this intergenerational obligation which has as its source the one whom we call Father.

In our day, the university experience has to do with more (but not less) than education traditionally conceived. The four years of undergraduate work function as a transitional phase in the passage of young adults from more or less complete dependence on their parents to a state of financial and personal autonomy. At the university they enjoy more independence than when they lived under their parents' roof but less than they will have once they leave and begin adult careers and responsibilities. It is a time of maturing, testing, and setting up one's approach to life. When I look back on my time as an undergraduate, it was clearly a period when many of my own basic approaches to life crystallized. I came to some important conclusions which I still hold today, took some paths and foreclosed others, formed some intellectual commitments which are still in place; and even when issues were not resolved then, that is when they were framed. This process is of course part of education in the broadest, and perhaps best, sense.

A Catholic university offers its students the opportunity to work through this pivotal phase in intellectual and moral development in the context of a community whose fundamental commitments are those of Catholic Christianity. This has innumerable consequences, small and large, for the way undergraduate life is experienced. This is a community which worships and prays and does so in the open. Masses in the student halls are part of the normal rhythm and are well attended. When a student dies, the community grieves in the Basilica of Sacred Heart—we bring our grief to God. Campus Ministry conducts a variety of seminars and programs and does an excellent job. Problems exist, certainly, but they are more or less those that beset any college-aged group. As a parent I would be pleased to send my children to study and learn in such a faith-filled environment.

But as a parent I also know that the faith my children leave home with will not alone be enough to sustain them as they enter the adult world. I want them to be armed with strong and disciplined minds. They will need to be able to think, to think carefully and rigorously, to discern the subtle distinctions and uncover the subtle lies the world will throw at them. I want them to think as Christians. I want them to develop an attraction to what is good and true and beautiful. They must, to a greater extent than when they lived in my house, take responsibility for forming their own character. What I want for them is an environment in which their minds are fully challenged and engaged, sharpened to their fullest potential, and formed by the bedrock truths of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

At Notre Dame, people with serious intellectual "credentials" still speak openly about Jesus Christ, not just as an interesting historical religious figure but as Savior and Lord. This is a community that takes faith seriously, not just as a private and personal source of solace, but as intellectually consequential. Here a world-renowned scholar can be heard to say that "the Catholic faith is the best thing that ever happened to the human mind because Jesus is the best thing that ever happened to humanity." It is important that

such a statement could be made here, but also essential that it was an intellectual heavyweight who made it. It will not do to settle for intellectual mediocrity or for intellectual secularization.

The promise of Notre Dame is that it might become at the same time a first-rate university and a vibrant Catholic intellectual community. Only in such a community, constantly challenged by the twin demands of academic excellence and faithfulness to the gospel, can generations of young Christian minds be formed to engage and leaven the world. To such a university I, and many others, would like to send our children.

RESEARCH AND THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE AT A GREAT CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY: A FACULTY PERSPECTIVE

If the educational mission of a great Catholic university requires the presence of a lively Catholic intellectual community, how does one create and sustain one? Here the faculty is certainly the key.

In the hands of the faculty rests directly the task of teaching students. Teaching I understand to mean inviting students into a fuller life of the mind, introducing them to the thoughts and accomplishments of the past, and engaging them in the present inquiry. It is through the faculty that students make contact with the ideas of Aristotle, the art of Picasso, the theories of Maxwell and Heisenberg. While students are finally the principal agent of their own education, the faculty synthesize and present a coherent framework in which that education can proceed. Great teaching entails presenting the known to students in such a way that they not only can comprehend what has gone on before but also are drawn on to new investigations. A great university requires excellent teachers.

Universities are characterized by more (but not less) than great teaching. A university is about learning and it is in the nature of a university that the faculty are learners as well as teachers. *Research*, the name we give to learning at this level, is as central to the concept of the university as in teaching in the classroom. Research and scholarship are not just faculty perquisites. To be a great university, Notre Dame must have a faculty of the highest caliber, capable of advancing knowledge, not simply transmitting it.

In fact, the synergy between research and teaching is one of the most exciting dynamics of university life. It should not be eclipsed by the occasional abuses or apparent tensions that receive sometimes excessive attention. As an undergraduate I chose to attend a research university despite the fact that I knew the classes would be larger and the professors less accessible than at a four-year college. I went because I wanted to be close to those people who were actually on the cutting edge of their discipline, to learn how they thought. Even though the undergraduate curriculum was fairly standard for my field (at that time, physics), there is no doubt in my mind that I got what I was seeking. I learned how to think about physics from people who did physics. They were practitioners. Their excitement at the subtle insights that their field afforded was clear and contagious. As a parent, I want my children to have that kind of opportunity also. A great university requires excellent teachers who are also excellent researchers.

Having assembled a group of first-rate teachers and researchers, one does not yet have the faculty of a great university, much less a great Catholic university. If the students are indeed to be invited into the life of an intellectual community, a community must be functioning. If each excellent professor interacts only with his or her students but not with other faculty, then there is no intellectual community. The fact that the university brings people together in physical proximity is then just a matter of convenience. Then we might just as well all be in separate scattered institutions, were it not for the difficulty of getting to class on time! To have a community, even an intellectual community, there must be some glue that binds us together.

Three elements seem to me to be essential to forming any community. Let me illustrate these using as examples at two extremes, the community of stamp collectors in South Bend and an Amish community in northern Indiana. The first essential element is that something is held in common by all members of the community. For the stamp collectors this is a common interest in stamps; for the Amish, a common set of beliefs about how to live an authentically Christian life in the modern world. The second element is that the community members gather and associate with each other. Stamp collectors meet at stamp shows and exhibits; the Amish, in regular religious assemblies. Without gatherings, each would just become a set of individuals with (accidentally) common interests. The third element is some form of obligation that is binding for the community members' behavior. For stamp collectors, this is simply civil and fair dealings with one another; if counterfeiting, cheating, and theft were prevalent, the community would disintegrate. For the Amish, the obligation takes the form of comprehensive financial and familial commitments to live life together, aiding each other and working for the common good.

For a university faculty an intellectual community consists of similar elements. The faculty hold some intellectual commitments in common. These are minimally a commitment to the goals of education and research and to the academic virtues of honesty and intellectual integrity, without which a university cannot function. The faculty assembles as a whole on various annual occasions and in departmental and group meetings at many levels. The meetings serve both pragmatic and symbolic ends. The obligations undertaken by faculty are, in addition to those directly related to job performance, summarized in the notion of *good collegueship*. A good academic colleague is one who can be counted on to listen to ideas and discuss them, to interact creatively and fairly, and to contribute to the commonweal. We have all known people whom we might describe as fine teachers and fine researchers but poor colleagues.

The intellectual community at the center of a Catholic

university is characterized by holding in common a certain respect for Catholic intellectual tradition. One would expect many members of such a community to be Catholics. As has been said often, however, the essential requirement is not a particular creedal affiliation but a respect for Catholic intellectual tradition. Absent such respect, the whole enterprise of a Catholic university must appear foolish. Many have observed that much of the on-campus hostility to the discussions of the Catholic character of Notre Dame comes, not from non-Catholics, but from Catholics who view Catholic intellectual tradition as oppressive and dangerous.

What we hold in common enables us, faculty and students, to engage in a conversation. Without some common ground, conversation is impossible. This conversation links the participants together into a genuine intellectual community. It is a conversation about everything—about nanoelectronics and political development, about diplomatic history and insect navigation, about truth and error, justice and injustice, vector computation and groundwater contamination. It is a conversation about right and wrong, about beauty and ugliness, about the human good and human debasement, about Aristotle and Aquinas and Ross Perot and Irwin Schrodinger and Jesus. This conversation is surely animated by particularly Christian and particularly Catholic concerns. But it just as surely includes all who are interested, and all are invited to be part of it. The character of this conversation is the hallmark of a great Catholic university. The conversation is the core of the intellectual community. What we should look for in prospective faculty members, in addition to excellence in teaching and research, is a desire to be a part of *this* conversation. Holding a common respect for Catholic intellectual tradition is not insignificant, it means we can have a conversation in these terms. We can talk about virtue and creation, about sin and redemption, about right and wrong. As Norman Mailer is said to have observed, "Notre Dame is the only university where one can use the word *soul* without blushing."

The Catholicity of Notre Dame should be a positive factor in the intellectual life of each faculty member. If it is a difference that makes no difference in the concrete experience of the faculty, then the Catholic character of Notre Dame becomes at best only a description of the religious residential experience of undergraduates and at worst, false advertising. If the intellectual life of a faculty member is not enriched by being at a Catholic university, why come here? Excellent scholars who are Catholic seem often to choose to take university positions elsewhere. This is entirely understandable if Notre Dame in fact offers faculty an intellectual life essentially identical to that at other universities of our size and stature. We then compete for talent in the same way other schools do. If instead Notre Dame was perceived as a unique, interesting, active Catholic intellectual community, we would attract far more highly qualified people. There is no "Catholic physics" or "Catholic mathematics" but there are physicists, mathematicians, historians, and engineers who would like to do their work as part of a vibrant Catholic intellectual community.

One key to understanding how the Catholic character of the university might contribute to making the faculty experience distinctive is the Catholic conception of the unity of truth. Catholics believe God is the author of all truth and the creator of reality. Further, the rational capacity of humankind has not been so corrupted by the Fall that it is incapable of apprehending truth. In uncovering each small truth we can discover something of the fingerprints of its creator. Each act of intellectual creativity mirrors the boundless creativity of the God in whose image we were made. Human knowledge, which in other contexts appears hopelessly fragmented and disconnected in the postmodern landscape, has in the Catholic view an integral wholeness and connectedness.

This intellectual coherence should have consequences in the intellectual life of faculty at a Catholic university. While the demands of specialization are real, there should be opportunity for a broader life of the mind than research in one's specialty. As one mathematics professor said to me, "I am a mathematician but not a mathematical machine. I am a human being. I have other intellectual, and even spiritual, interests as well." I am not suggesting a faculty of would-be renaissance men and women, or, worse, of dilettantes. There should simple be some counterweight to the centrifugal forces of specialization which pull us away from each other and deeper into our own sub-sub-sub fields. Life at a Catholic university should offer the opportunity for a measure of reintegration of one's intellectual life. Actually, what may be the most helpful program in this regard is already in place. I have twice now availed myself of the opportunity to take a course in the summer. My wife and I took an evening course on the Gospel of John which was taught by the renowned biblical scholar Raymond Brown. Another summer I took a short course on Plato and Aristotle. It was at the undergraduate level, but did me more good than I can say. Neither was a great drain on my normal summer regime of research, conferences, and proposal writing. Both have enabled me to converse with more understanding with my colleagues in other departments. The integrative role of philosophy and theology in the intellectual life of the university was pointed to by Newman and is reflected in the governing statutes of Notre Dame.

THE ANIMATION OF CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL LIFE

A great university has a role in seeking truth and understanding that goes beyond its immediate sphere of faculty and students. It has a role in the larger society as a place where new ideas are developed and old ideas reexamined. The way universities have an impact on the intellectual climate of a nation, its politics, self-understanding, and aspirations, is complex and subtle, yet substantial. Ideas are still more powerful than armies.

A great Catholic university can leaven in a unique way the

thought of a society with the perspective of the gospel. This happens in two ways—through its graduates who move into positions of responsibility in society, and through the force of its own intellectual culture on the climate of thought. Only a few universities are in a position of leadership in intellectual circles which lends them this kind of weight. None are Catholic. To put it most crudely, we should have *our* "talking heads" on MacNeil-Lehrer, on David Brinkley's show, and on CNN; *our* experts writing on the editorial pages of the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*.

Not too long ago it would have seemed unlikely that a university committed openly to Christianity would have been taken seriously by its intellectual peers (assuming it had attained peer status). This seems no longer to be so. In the current climate, having clear up-front commitments, be they Marxist, feminist, or progressive, is perceived by many as appropriate, even necessary. This may be transitory or may simply be a delayed realization of the fact that to ask a sensible question one must at least provisionally accept some things as settled. We may be at an opportune point in history for the emergence of a great Catholic university and a renaissance of Catholic intellectual life.

Nor is the task so herculean as to seem impossible. The effect of a few individuals in forming whole new intellectual movements is remarkable. Of one of my colleagues I have heard it said that he virtually single-handedly recreated the field of Christian philosophy (and this from a definite non-fan). Another has been credited widely with restoring to respectability the whole theory of virtue. I submit that one does not need to be a large university to have a very large influence.

How does one transform a Catholic college into a great Catholic university? I think several steps that are clearly necessary have already been taken. The first is the professionalization of the faculty. Much of the improvement of the past twenty years, which has been considerable, is due to increasing faculty salaries and aggressively recruiting outstanding candidates both for junior positions and for chaired professorships. (In applauding these developments I in no way want to minimize the remarkable accomplishments of earlier decades.) A great university also must have an infrastructure capable of supporting research and scholarship at a world-class level. I would say we are in the middle of this process now. It involves upgrading library resources, laboratories, grant administration, technical support staff, computing facilities, the bookstore, and a host of other areas. It takes all this just to get in the game of serious university-level academics. There is a justified concern that teaching, particularly at the undergraduate level, not be undervalued as the stakes in research and graduate education are increased. As might have been anticipated, all this activity may have diverted attention from a focus on the Catholic character of the university, at least as far as the faculty is concerned. At this critical moment, we must reanimate that discussion at a new level. The notion of the Catholic character must be appropriated by the faculty if it is to survive. Without retrenching in any of the areas of academic excellence where so much progress has been made, we must flesh out what it means for a faculty to be part of a Catholic intellectual community.[2] Perhaps we have some clues from the ideas of the unity of knowledge and the metaphor of conversation. Admittedly these ideas, at least as I have been able to articulate them, are somewhat vague and tentative now. But a conversation is always a work in progress.

The human search for truth, propelled as it is to questions of ultimacy, is most at home in a community of inquiry open to discussing those ultimate questions. The human intellect is drawn in both directions: toward the particular and detailed, and toward the broad and fundamental. We want to understand truth in its specific and concrete forms and yet are also moved to questions of purpose and meaning. A great Catholic university could be an intellectual community engaged in the search for truth in all areas of human understanding, teaching and learning in the light of the gospel and our Catholic intellectual heritage. A great Catholic university would be a unique gift to the world, to the church, and to our children.

2. *The climate for this project is not helped by recent well-intentioned, but potentially disastrous, moves by the American Catholic bishops to insert themselves into university governance.*

The Church's Presence in the University and in University Culture

FOREWORD

NATURE, AIM AND INTENDED READERS

The university and, more widely, university culture, constitute a reality of decisive importance. In this field vital questions are at stake and profound cultural changes present new challenges. The church owes it to herself to advert to them in her mission of proclaiming the Gospel.[1]

In the course of their *ad limina* visits, many bishops have expressed their desire to find help in meeting new and serious problems that are rapidly emerging and for which those responsible are at times unprepared. The usual pastoral methods often prove ineffective and even the most zealous are discouraged. Various dioceses and bishops' conferences have undertaken pastoral reflection and action that already provide elements of response. Religious communities and apostolic movements are also approaching with fresh generosity the new challenges of university pastoral action.

For a sharing of these initiatives and a global assessment of the situation, the Congregation for Catholic Education, the Pontifical Council for the Laity and the Pontifical Council for Culture undertook a new consultation of the bishops' conferences, of religious institutes and of various ecclesial bodies and movements. A first synthesis of the replies was presented on Oct. 28, 1987, to the Synod of Bishops on the vocation and mission of the laity in the church and in the world.[2] This documentation has been enriched in many meetings and also by the reactions of the institutions concerned to the published text and by the publication of studies and research on the action of Christians in the university world.

It has been possible in this way to ascertain a number of facts, to formulate questions in precise terms and to indicate certain guidelines on the basis of the apostolic experience of people involved in the university world.

The present document, drawing attention to the more significant questions and initiatives, is intended as an instrument for study and action at the service of the particular churches. It is addressed in the first place to the episcopal conference and, in a special way, to bishops who are directly concerned due to the presence in their dioceses of universities or institutes of higher studies. But the facts and the orientations presented here are intended, at the same time, for all those who take part in university pastoral action under the guidance of the bishops: priests, lay people, religious institutes, ecclesial movements. The suggestions made for the new evangelization are meant to inspire deeper reflection on the part of all those concerned and a renewal of pastoral action.

AN URGENT NEED

The university was in its earliest stages one of the most significant expressions of the church's pastoral concern. Its birth was linked to the development of the schools set up in the Middle Ages by the bishops of the great episcopal sees. If the vicissitudes of history have led the *universitas magistrorum et scholarium* to become more and more autonomous, the church nevertheless continues to nourish the same concern that gave rise to this institution.[3] The church's presence in the university is not, in fact, a task that would remain, as it were, external to the mission of proclaiming the faith. "The synthesis between culture and faith is a necessity not only for culture, but also for faith . . . . A faith that does not become culture is a faith that is not fully received, not entirely thought through and faithfully lived."[4]

This article first appeared in Origins, *Vol. 24, No. 5 (June 16, 1994).*

1. This pastoral concern is evidenced in the church's magisterium, for example in the addresses to university people of Pope John Paul II (cf. Giovanni Paulo II: Discorsi alle Universita, Camerino 1991*). Of particular significance was the pope's address of March 8, 1982, for a work session on university apostolate with the clergy of Rome (cf.* L'Osservatore Romano, English edition, May 3, 1982, pp. 6-7*).*

2. This synthesis, presented by Cardinal Paul Poupard on behalf of the three dicasteries, was published March 25, 1988, and reproduced in several languages (cf. Origins, *Vol. 18, No. 7, June 30, 1988, 109-112;* La Documentation Catholique, *June 19, 1988, 623-628;* Ecclesia, *July 23, 1988, 1105-1110,* La Civilta Cattolica, *May 21, 1988, N. 3310, 364-374.*

3. Cf. John Paul II, Ex corde Ecclesiae, *Aug. 15, 1990, No. 1.*

4. John Paul II, letter instituting the Pontification Council for Culture, May 20, 1982, AAS, *74 (1983), 683-688..*

The faith that the church proclaims is a *fides quaerens intellectum* that must penetrate the human intellect and heart, that must be thought out in order to be lived. The church's presence cannot, therefore, be limited to a cultural and scientific contribution: It must offer a real opportunity for encountering Christ.

Concretely, the church's presence and mission in university culture take varied and complementary forms. In the first place, there is the task of giving support to the Catholics engaged in the life of the university as professors, students, researchers or nonacademic staff. The church is concerned with proclaiming the Gospel to all those within the university to whom it is still unknown and who are ready to receive it in freedom. Her action also takes the form of sincere dialogue and loyal cooperation with all members of the university community who are concerned for the cultural development of the human person and of all the people involved.

This approach requires pastoral workers to see the university as a specific environment with its own problems. The success of their commitment depends, indeed, to a great extent on the relations they establish with this milieu and which at times are still only embryonic. University pastoral action often remains in fact on the fringe of ordinary pastoral action. The whole Christian community must therefore become aware of its pastoral and missionary responsibility in relation to the university milieu.

I. SITUATION OF THE UNIVERSITY

In the space of half a century, the university as institution has undergone a notable transformation. One cannot generalize, however, about the features of this transformation in all countries. Such changes do not apply equally to all the academic centers of a single region. Each university is marked by its historical, cultural, social, economic and political context. This great variety calls for careful adaptation in the forms that the church's presence will take.

1. In many countries, especially in certain developed countries, after the confrontation of the years '68-'70 and the institutional crisis that threw the university into a certain confusion, several trends, both positive and negative, emerged. Clashes and crises, and in particular the collapse of ideologies and utopias that were once dominant, have left deep marks. The university that was formerly reserved for the privileged has become wide open for a vast public, both in its initial teaching and through continuing education.

This is a significant feature of the democratization of social and cultural life. In many cases, students have come in such numbers that the infrastructures, the services and even traditional teaching methods can prove inadequate. In certain cultural contexts, moreover, various factors have brought about crucial changes in the position of the teaching staff. Between isolation and collegiality, diverse professional commitments and family life, they see a decline in their academic and social status, their authority and their security.

The concrete situation of the students is also a cause of anxiety. Structures are often lacking for welcoming and supporting them and for community life. Many of them, transplanted far from their family to a strange town, suffer from loneliness. In addition, contact with the professors is often limited, and the students find themselves without guidance in face of problems of adjustment which they are unable to solve. At times they have to enter an environment marked by the influence of attitudes of a sociopolitical kind and by the claim to unlimited freedom in all fields of research and scientific experimentation.

Finally, in some cases the young university students are confronted with the prevalence of a relativistic liberalism, a scientific positivism and a certain pessimism caused by the insecurity of professional prospects in the current economic crisis.

2. Elsewhere the university has lost part of its prestige. The proliferation of universities and their specialization have created a situation of great disparity. Some enjoy unquestioned prestige, while others are barely able to offer a mediocre standard of teaching. The university no longer has a monopoly of research in fields where specialized institutes and research centers, both private and public, achieve excellence. These institutes and centers are part, in any case, of a specific cultural context of the "university culture" that generates a characteristic *forma mentis* or mind-set: the importance attached to the force of reasoned argument, the development of a critical spirit, a high level a compartmentalized information and little capacity for synthesis, even within specific sectors.

3. Living in this changing culture with a desire for truth and an attitude of service in conformity with the Christian ideal has at times become difficult. In the past, becoming a student, and even more so a professor, was everywhere an unquestionable social promotion. Today the context of university studies is often marked by new difficulties of a material or moral order that rapidly become human and spiritual problems with unforeseeable consequences.

4. In many countries, the university meets with great difficulties in the effort for renewal that is constantly required by the evolution of society, the development of new sectors of knowledge, the demands of economies in crisis. Society aspires to a university that will meet its specific needs starting from employment for all. In this way, the industrial world is having a notable impact on the university with its specific demands for rapid and reliable technical services. This "professionalization," with its undeniable benefits, does not always go together with a "university" formation in a sense of values, in professional ethics and in an approach to other disciplines as a complement to the necessary specialization.

5. In contrast to the professionalization of some institutes, many faculties, especially of arts, philosophy, political science and law, often limit themselves to providing a generic formation in their own discipline, without reference to possible professional outlets for their students. In many countries of medium development, government authorities

use the universities as "parking areas" to reduce the tensions caused by unemployment among the youth.

6. Another inescapable fact emerges: Whereas the university, by vocation, has a primary role to play in the development of culture, it is exposed in many countries to two opposing risks: either passively to submit to the dominant cultural influences or to become marginal in relation to them. It is difficult to face these situations because the university often ceases to be a "community of students and teachers in search of truth," becoming a mere "instrument" in the hands of the state and of the dominant economic forces. The only aim is then to assure the technical and professional training of specialists, without giving to education of the person the central place it has by right. Moreover—and this is not without grave consequence—many students attend the university without finding there a human formation that would help them toward the necessary discernment about the meaning of life, and about the bases and development of values and ideals; they live in a state of uncertainty, with the added burden of anxiety for their future.

7. In countries which were or still are subjected to a materialistic and atheistic ideology, research and teaching have been permeated by this ideology, especially in the fields of the human sciences of philosophy and history. As a result, even in some countries that have passed through radical changes on the political level there is not yet sufficient freedom of thought to discern, where necessary, the dominant trends and to perceive the relativistic liberalism that is often concealed within them. A certain skepticism begins to arise concerning the very idea of truth.

8. Everywhere one notices great diversification in the fields of knowledge. The different disciplines have succeeded in defining their specific field of investigation and truth claims, and in recognizing the legitimate complexity and the diversity of their methods. There is a danger, becoming more and more evident, that research workers, teachers and students will close themselves within their specific field of knowledge, seeing only a fragment of reality.

9. In some disciplines, there is emerging a new positivism, with no ethical reference: science for the sake of science. Utilitarian formation takes precedence over integral humanism, tending to neglect the needs and expectations of persons, to censure or stifle the most basic questions of personal and social existence. The development of scientific techniques in the fields of biology, communications and automation raises new and crucial ethical questions. The more human beings become capable of mastering nature, the more they depend on technology, the more they need to protect their own freedom. This raises new questions about the approaches and the epistemological criteria of the different disciplines.

10. The skepticism and indifference engendered by the prevailing secularism exist together with a new and ill-defined searching of a religious kind. In the climate of uncertainty that characterizes the intellectual horizon of teachers and students, the university at times provides a context for the development of aggressive nationalistic behavior. But in some situations, the climate of confrontation gives way to conformism.

11. The development of university education "at a distance" or *tele-education* (correspondence, audiovisual techniques, etc.) makes information more widely accessible; but the personal contact between teacher and student is in danger of disappearing, together with the human formation bound up with this indispensable relationship. Some mixed forms are a judicious combination of tele-education and occasional contacts between teacher and student; this could be a good way of developing university formation.

12. Interuniversity and international cooperation shows real progress. The more developed academic centers can help the less advanced; this is at times, but not always, to the advantage of the latter. The major universities can, indeed, exercise a certain technical and even ideological "domination" beyond their national frontiers, to the detriment of the less-favored countries.

13. The place women are taking in the university and the general widening of access to university studies already constitute a well-established tradition in some countries. Elsewhere they come as a new development, offering an exceptional opportunity for renewal and an enrichment of university life.

14. The central role of universities in development programs brings with it a tension between the pursuit of the new culture engendered by modernity and the safeguard and promotion of traditional cultures. In responding to its vocation, however, the university lacks a guiding idea, an anchor for its multiple activities. This is at the root of the present crisis of identity and purpose in an institution that, of its nature, is directed toward the search for truth. The chaos of thought and the poverty of basic criteria sterilize the process that should produce educational proposals capable of meeting the new problems. In spite of its imperfections, by vocation the university with the other institutions of higher education remains a privileged place for the development of knowledge and formation, and plays a fundamental role in preparing leaders for the society of the 21st century.

15. A renewed pastoral effort. The presence of Catholics in the university is, in itself, a question and a hope for the church. In many countries this presence is indeed, at one and the same time, numerically impressive and relatively modest it its effect. Too many teachers and students consider their faith a strictly private affair or do not perceive the impact their university life has on their Christian existence. Their presence in the university seems like a parenthesis in their life of faith. Some, among them even priests or religious, in the name of university autonomy, go so far as to refrain from any explicit witness to their faith. Others use this autonomy to spread doctrines contrary to the church's teaching. This situation is aggravated by the lack of theologians with competence in the scientific and technical fields, and of professors specialized in the sciences who

have a good theological formation. Obviously, this calls for a renewed awareness, leading to a new pastoral effort. Moreover, while appreciating the praiseworthy initiatives undertaken in various places, one cannot fail to see that the Christian presence often seems limited to isolated groups, sporadic initiatives, the occasional witness of well-known personalities and the action of one or another movement.

II. PRESENCE OF THE CHURCH IN THE UNIVERSITY AND UNIVERSITY CULTURE

1. PRESENCE IN UNIVERSITY STRUCTURES

Sent by Christ to all human beings of every culture, the church tries to share with them the good news of salvation. Having received through Christ the revealed truth about God and humankind, she has the mission to provide, through her message of truth, an opening for authentic freedom. Founded on the mandate received from Christ, she seeks to cast light on cultural values and expressions to correct and purify them, where necessary, in the light of faith in order to bring them to their fullness of meaning.[5]

Within the university, the church's pastoral action, in its rich complexity, has in the first place a subjective aspect: the evangelization of people. From this point of view the church enters into dialogue with real people: men and women, professors, students, staff and, through them, with cultural trends that characterize this milieu. But one cannot forget the objective aspect: the dialogue between faith and the different disciplines of knowledge. In the context of the university the appearance of new cultural trends is, indeed, closely linked to the great questions concerning humanity: the value of the human person, the meaning of human existence and action, and especially conscience and freedom. At this level Catholic intellectuals should give priority to promoting a renewed and vital synthesis between faith and culture.

The church must not forget that her action is carried out in the particular situation of each university center and that her presence in the university is a service rendered to the people concerned in their twofold dimension: personal and social. The type of presence is therefore different in each country, which bears the marks of its historical, cultural, religious and legislative tradition. In particular, where the legislation permits, the church cannot forsake her institutional action within the university. She seeks to support and foster the teaching of theology wherever possible. At the institutional level the university chaplaincy has a special importance on the campus. By offering a wide range of both doctrinal and spiritual formation, it constitutes, in fact, an important source for the proclamation of the Gospel. Through the stimulus and awareness given through the chaplaincy, university pastoral action can hope to achieve its aim, that is, to create within the university environment a Christian community and a missionary faith commitment.

Religious orders and congregations brings a specific presence to the universities. By the wealth and diversity of their charism—especially their educational charism—they contribute to the Christian formation of teachers and students. In their pastoral options, these religious communities that are much in demand for primary and secondary education should take into consideration what is at stake in their presence within higher education; they should be careful not to draw back in any way under pretext of entrusting to others the mission corresponding to their vocation.

To be accepted and influential, the church's institutional presence in university culture must be of good quality. Often there is a lack of personnel, or at times of the necessary financial resources. This situation calls for creativity and an adequate pastoral effort.

2. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Among the different institutional forms of the church's presence in the university world, emphasis must be placed on the Catholic university, itself an institution of the church.

The existence of a large number of Catholic universities—differing greatly according to regions and countries, from a large number to a total absence—is in itself a richness and an essential factor of the church's presence within university culture. However, this investment does not always produce the fruit for which one might legitimately hope.

Important indications for the specific role of the Catholic university were given in the apostolic constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, published Aug. 15, 1990. The constitution points out that the institutional identity of the Catholic university depends on its realizing together its characteristics as *university* and as *Catholic*. It only achieves its full identity when, at one and the same time, it gives proof of being rigorously serious as a member of the international community of knowledge and expresses its Catholic identity through an explicit link with the church, at both local and universal levels—an identity which marks concretely the life, the services and the programs of the university community. In this way, by its very existence, the Catholic university achieves its aim of guaranteeing, in an institutional form, a Christian presence in the university world. From this stems its specific mission, characterized by several inseparable features.

In order to carry out its function in relation to the church and to society, the Catholic university must study the grave problems of the day and propose solutions that express the religious and ethical values proper to a Christian vision of the human person.

Next comes university pastoral action in the strict sense. In this respect, the challenges the Catholic university has to

5. Cf. John Paull II, encyclical Veritatis Splendor, 30-31

meet are not substantially different from those confronting other academic centers. However, we should stress that an academic institution which defines itself as Catholic is committed to university pastoral action at the same depth as the goals it sets for itself: the integral formation of the people, men and women, who in the academic context are called to active participation in the life of society and of the church.

A further aspect of the mission of the Catholic university is, finally, a commitment to dialogue between faith and culture, and the development of a culture rooted in faith. Even in this regard, if there must be concern for the development of a culture in harmony with faith wherever baptized persons are involved in the life of the university, this is still more urgent in the context of the Catholic university, called to become in a special way a significant interlocutor of the academic, cultural and scientific world.

Clearly the church's concern for the university—in the direct service of people and the evangelization of culture—necessarily has a point of reference in the Catholic university. The growing demand for a qualified presence of baptized people in university culture becomes, in this way, a call to the whole church to become more and more aware of the specific vocation of the Catholic university and to facilitate its development as an effective instrument of the church's evangelizing mission.

3. FRUITFUL INITIATIVES ALREADY IMPLEMENTED

In response to the demands of university culture, many local churches have taken appropriate action in various ways:

1. Appointment by the bishops' conference of university chaplains with an ad hoc formation, a specific status and adequate support.

2. Creation, for university pastoral action, of diversified diocesan teams that show the specific responsibility of the laity and the diocesan character of these apostolic units.

3. First steps in a pastoral approach to university rectors/presidents and faculty professors, whose milieu is often dominated by technical and professional concerns.

4. Action taken for the setting up of "departments of religious sciences," capable of opening up new horizons for teachers and students, and compatible with the mission of the church. In these departments Catholics should play a prominent role, especially when faculties of theology are lacking in the university structures.

5. Institution of regular courses on morals and professional ethics in specialized institutes and centers of higher education.

6. Support for dynamic ecclesial movements. University pastoral action achieves better results when it is based on groups or movements and associations—at times, few in number but of high quality—that have the support of the dioceses and bishops' conferences.

7. Stimulus for a university pastoral action that is not limited to a general and undifferentiated pastoral action for youth, but which takes as its starting point the fact that many young people are deeply influenced by the university environment. It is there, to a great extent, that they have their encounter with Christ and bear their witness as Christians. The aim is therefore to educate and accompany the young people, enabling them to live in faith the concrete reality of their milieu and their own activities and commitments.

8. Facilitating dialogue between theologians, philosophers and scientists for a profound renewal of attitudes and to create new and fruitful relations between Christian faith, theology, philosophy and the sciences in their concrete search for truth. Experience shows that university people, priests and especially lay people are in the forefront in maintaining and promoting cultural debate on the great questions regarding humanity, science, society and the new challenges for the human spirit. It is for Catholic teachers and their associations, in particular, to promote interdisciplinary initiatives and cultural encounters inside and outside the university, combining critical method and confidence in reason, in order to bring face to face in the language of the different cultures metaphysical and scientific positions and the affirmations of faith.

III. PASTORAL SUGGESTIONS AND GUIDELINES

1. PASTORAL SUGGESTIONS FROM LOCAL CHURCHES

1. A consultation conducted by the ad hoc episcopal commissions would make it possible to have a better idea of the different initiatives for university pastoral action and for the presence of Christians in the university, and to prepare guidelines to support fruitful apostolic undertakings and to promote those seen to be necessary.

2. The setting up of a national commission for questions related to the university and to culture would help the local churches to share their experiences and their capabilities. It would be for the commission to sponsor a program of activities, reflection and meetings on evangelization and culture, intended for the seminaries and the formation centers for religious and laity; one section would be devoted explicitly to university culture.

3. At the diocesan level, in university towns, it would be good to encourage the setting up of a specialized commission composed of priests and Catholic university people, teachers and students. The aim would be to provide useful indications for university pastoral action and for the activity of Christians in the fields of education and research. The commission would be a help to the bishop in the exercise of his specific mission of promoting and confirming the various initiatives in the diocese and facilitating contact with national or international initiatives. By virtue of his pastoral task at the service of his church, the diocesan bishop bears

the first responsibility for the presence and pastoral action of the church in the state universities as well as in the Catholic universities and other private institutions.

4. At the parish level, it would be desirable for the Christian communities—priests, religious and lay faithful—to pay greater attention to students and teachers, and also to the apostolate of the university chaplaincies. The parish is of its nature a community, within which fruitful relationships can be established for a more effective service of the Gospel. It plays a considerable role through its capacity to welcome people, especially when it facilitates the setting up and functioning of student hostels and university residences. The success of the evangelization of the university and of university culture depends to a great extent on the commitment of the whole local church.

5. The university parish is, in some places, an institution more necessary than ever. It supposes the presence of one or more priests with a good preparation for this specific apostolate. The parish is unique as a milieu for communication with all the variety of the academic world. It makes possible relations with people from the fields of culture, art and science; at the same time it allows the church to penetrate into this complex milieu. As a place of meeting and of Christian reflection and formation, it opens to young people the doors of a church hitherto unknown or misunderstood, and opens the church up to the students, their questions and their apostolic dynamism. As a privileged place for the liturgical celebration of the sacraments, it is above all the place of the eucharist, heart of every Christian community, source and summit of every apostolate.

6. Wherever possible, university pastoral action should create or intensify relations between Catholic universities or faculties and all other university milieus in varied forms of collaboration.

7. The present situation is an urgent call to organize the formation of qualified pastoral workers within parishes and Catholic movements and associations. It urgently demands the implementation of a long-term strategy. for cultural and theological formation requires appropriate preparation. Concretely, many dioceses are not in a position to set up and carry out a formation of this kind at university level. This demand can be met by sharing the resources of dioceses, specialized religious institutes and lay groups.

8. In every situation the presence of the church must be seen as a *plantatio* (planting) of the Christian community in the university milieu through witness, proclamation of the Gospel and the service of charity. This presence will mean growth for the *Christifideles* (faithful) and a help in approaching those who are far from Jesus Christ. In this perspective, it seems important to develop and promote:

—A catechetical pedagogy characterized by a sense of community, offering a variety of proposals, the possibility of differentiated itineraries and responses to the real needs of concrete persons.

—A pedagogy of personal guidance: welcome, availability and friendship, interpersonal relationships, discernment of the circumstances in which students are living and concrete means for their improvement.

—A pedagogy for the deepening of faith and spiritual life, rooted in the word of God, shared in depth through sacramental and liturgical life.

9. Finally, the presence of the church in the university calls for a common witness of Christians. This ecumenical witness, inseparable from the missionary dimension, is an important contribution to Christian unity. Without prejudice to the pastoral care of the Catholic faithful, ecumenical collaboration will take the forms and respect the limits established by the church. It supposes an adequate formation and will be particularly fruitful in the study of social questions and, in general, of all questions related to humankind, to the meaning of human existence and activity.[6]

2. *DEVELOPING THE APOSTOLATE OF THE LAITY, ESPECIALLY OF TEACHERS*

"The Christian vocation is, of its nature, a vocation to the apostolate."[7] This statement of the Second Vatican Council, when applied to university pastoral action, is a resounding challenge to responsibility for Catholic teachers, intellectuals and students. The apostolic commitment of the faithful is a sign of vitality and spiritual progress for the whole church.

Developing in university people this consciousness of the duty of apostolate is consistent with the pastoral orientations of Vatican II. At the heart of the university community, faith becomes in this way a radiating source of new life and of genuinely Christian culture. The lay faithful enjoy a legitimate autonomy in the exercise of their specific apostolic vocation. Pastors are invited not only to recognize this specificity but to give it warm support. This apostolate starts and develops from professional relationships, common cultural interests and the sharing of daily life in the different sectors of university activity. The individual apostolate of Catholic lay people is "the starting point and condition of the whole lay apostolate, even in its organized expression, and admits of no substitute."[8] Nevertheless, it remains necessary and urgent for the Catholics present in the university to give a witness of communion and unity. In this respect, the ecclesial movements are particularly valuable.

Catholic teachers play a fundamental role for the church's presence in university culture. In certain cases, their quality and generosity can even make up for imperfections in the structures. The apostolic commitment of the Catholic teacher who gives priority to respect and service for individuals—colleagues and students—offers the witness of the

6 *Cf. Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity*, Ecumenical Directory, 1993, Nos. 211-216

7. *Vatican Council II*, Apostolicam Actuositatem, 2

8 *Ibid*., 16.

"new man, always ready to render an account to anyone who asks for the hope that is in him, and to do it with courtesy and respect" (cf. 1 Pt. 3:15-16). The university is certainly a limited sector of society, but qualitatively its influence is in greater proportion to its quantitative dimension. By contrast, however, even the figure of the Catholic intellectual seems to have almost disappeared from certain university contexts where the students feel painfully the lack of genuine mentors whose constant presence and availability would provide a "companionship" of high quality.

This witness of the Catholic teacher certainly does not consist in filling disciplines that are being taught with religious subject matter. Rather it means opening up the horizon to the ultimate and fundamental questions, with the stimulating generosity of an active presence for the often inarticulate demands of young minds in search of points of reference and certainties, of guidance and purpose. Their life tomorrow in society depends on this. Even more do the church and the university expect from priests teaching in the university a high standard of competence and a sincere ecclesial communion.

Unity grows in diversity, resisting the temptation to unify and formalize activities. The variety of apostolic initiatives and resources, far from opposing ecclesial unity, requires and enriches it. Pastors will take into account the legitimate characteristics of the university spirit: diversity and spontaneity, respect for personal freedom and responsibility, resistance to any attempt at imposing uniformity.

Catholic movements or groups should be encouraged to multiply and to grow; but it is important also to recognize and to vitalize associations of the Catholic laity that boast a long and fruitful tradition of university apostolate. The apostolate, exercised by lay people, is fruitful to the extent that it is ecclesial. The criteria for evaluation of the different commitments include doctrinal consistency with Catholic identity, together with an exemplary moral and professional standard, ensuring the radiating authenticity of the lay apostolate, of which spiritual life is the guarantee.

CONCLUSION

Among the immense fields of apostolate and action for which the church is responsible, university culture is one of the most promising, but also one of the most difficult. This particular milieu has so great an influence on the social and cultural life of nations, and on it depends to a great extent the future of the church and that of society. Within it the church maintains an apostolic presence and action at both the institutional and the personal levels, with the specific cooperation of priests and lay people, administrative staff, teachers and students.

Consultation and meetings with many bishops and university people have shown the importance of cooperation between the different ecclesial bodies concerned. The Congregation for Catholic Education, the Pontifical Council for the Laity and the Pontifical Council for Culture express again their readiness to facilitate exchanges and to promote meetings at the level of bishops' conferences, Catholic international organizations and of commissions for teaching, education and culture acting in this particular field.

Service of the individuals involved in the university, and through them service of society, the presence of the church in the university milieu enters into the process of inculturation of the faith as a requirement of evangelization. On the threshold of a new millennium, of which university culture will be a major component, the duty of proclaiming the Gospel becomes more urgent. It calls for faith communities able to transmit the good news to all those who are formed, who teach and who exercise their activity in the context of university culture. The urgency of this apostolic commitment is great, for the university is one of the most fruitful centers for the creation of culture.

"Fully aware of a pastoral urgency that calls for an absolutely special concern for culture . . . the church calls upon the faithful to be present, as signs of courage and intellectual creativity, in the privileged places of culture, that is, the world of education—school and university—and places of scientific and technological research, the areas of artistic creativity and work in the humanities. Such a presence is destined not only for the recognition and possible purification of the elements that critically burden existing culture, but also for the elevation of these cultures through the riches which have their source in the Gospel and the Christian faith."[9]

Vatican City, Pentecost, May 22, 1994.

Cardinal Pio Laghi, Prefect, Congregation for Catholic Education;
Cardinal Eduardo Pironio, President, Pontifical Council for the Laity;
Cardinal Paul Poupard, President, Pontifical Council for Culture.

9. *John Paul II*, Christifideles Laici, Dec. 30, 1988, No. 44.

Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities
(A Department of NCEA)
Suite 650 • One Dupont Circle • Washington, D.C. 20036

ERIC Clearinghouse - 1
One Dupont Circle, Suite 630
Washington, DC 20036

Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education is a publication of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities. It contains original articles and reprints of articles of interest to colleagues in Catholic higher education. Editor: Benito M. Lopez, Jr., Managing Editor: Paul J. Gallagher. Editorial offices: ACCU, Suite 650, One Dupont Circle, Washington, DC 20036. Additional copies $6.00 each (1-9 copies); ten or more copies $5.00 each prepaid.