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ABSTRACT
                This paper addresses the potential of various
proposals to reform a broad group of human-service organizations. It
challenges two reform strategies that currently receive considerable
attention. One strategy promotes collaboration among human-service
organizations in an effort to deliver services to clients more
efficiently and effectively. A second approach relies on a
marketplace model to give consumers of services greater choice in an
effort to make organizations more responsive to people's needs. It is
argued that these two reform strategies focus too much on
process--collaboration and consumer choice--and fail to give adequate
considerations to outcomes and goals. They both take for granted the
goal of increasing the independence of individual clients or
consumers. They fail to address the collective needs of people and
communities and do not recognize membership in a community as a
resource. In contrast, the paper argues that the goal of human
services should be to foster interdependence among people through the
development of "social capital"--strengthening the organization of
families, neighborhoods, and communities. New York City's Beacons
program, in which citizen participation is a norm, is described as a
promising example of the school-centered, citizen-participation model
of institutional reform. (LMI)

# CITIZENS, CLIENTS, AND CONSUMERS: BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL

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May 30, 1995

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# CITIZENS, CLIENTS, AND CONSUMERS: BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL

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Many children are growing up in conditions that promise them nothing but dismal futures. The specter grows of a whole generation of youth woefully under-educated, lacking stable families, and without the social and economic opportunities that our culture has long promised. In the face of low academic achievement, high dropout and teen pregnancy rates, the increasing incidence of single parenthood, and a general rise in violence, our society has begun to fear for its collective future.

Public policy seems at a loss for how to address these problems. Public and private institutions concerned with education and social welfare appear besieged--their traditional policies and practices of support and intervention in the lives of troubled youth no longer seem effective. The result has been a call for reform, restructuring, and even radical change in a whole set of institutions that have responsibility for the welfare of youth and families. A central issue now facing our society is how to define and shape such institutional reform to improve the quality of life not only for individuals but for whole communities.

The major purpose of this paper is to address the potential of various proposals to reform a broad group of human service organizations. Our analysis challenges two reform strategies that currently receive considerable attention. One such strategy promotes collaboration among human service organizations in an effort to deliver services to clients more efficiently and effectively. A second, quite different approach, relies on a marketplace model to give consumers of services greater choice in an effort to make organizations more responsive to people's needs.

In our criticism of these two reform strategies, we argue that they focus too much on process--collaboration and consumer choice--and fail to give adequate consideration to outcomes and goals. They both take for granted the goal of increasing the "independence" of individual clients or consumers. In contrast, we argue that the goal of human services should be strengthening "interdependence" among people through the development of "social capital;" i.e., strengthening the organization of families, neighborhoods, and communities. To illustrate how human services might build social capital, we describe one promising strategy centered in schools that emphasizes broad participation. We call it the "citizen participation" model of institutional reform.

## Social Capital: A Reform Agenda

Social capital is one of the basic building blocks of communities along with financial capital and human capital. Building social capital requires strengthening the social connections among people in a community, connections that are necessary for people to organize themselves and to address their collective needs and problems (Coleman, 1987; Putnam, 1993). Social capital is an essential element of a strong community, and it plays a key role in the education and socialization of children by inducting them into the norms and expectations of family, group, and community life.

James Coleman (1987) described social capital as embedded in the relations between persons. It consists of

> the kinds of social structures necessary to make possible social norms and the sanctions that enforce them. They do not benefit primarily the person or persons whose efforts would be necessary to bring them about, but benefit all those who are part of such a structure. (p.228)

Coleman's point that all who participate in these social structures receive benefits, regardless of what they contribute, is central to our understanding of the special value of social capital. Unlike financial and human capital, social capital is not the private possession of a single individual. Social

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interaction among people around shared norms and expectations benefits whole groups of people, especially children as they develop into young citizens.

Social capital has power because it facilitates collective action. In organizing themselves toward common purposes, people use communication networks and draw upon the trust that has been established within networks. Activities around shared norms and expectations contribute to trust among participants and make functional communities possible. Trust and reliable communication networks serve as the glue that holds people together to allow them to use human and financial capital.

Development of all three kinds of capital--social, human, and economic--must receive attention if communities are to address the serious issues of crime and the underlying problems of poverty. However, from our perspective, the development of social capital has been largely ignored in proposals for addressing the social issues of contemporary society.

Calling attention to the importance of social capital creates a tension for the human services over the needs of individuals and groups. Human service organizations tend to define their mission as addressing dysfunctional individuals and families, yet "helping" such individuals can also undermine the qualities that build functional communities. To the extent the focus is on individual dysfunction and pathology, human service organizations fail to build on community strengths. At its worst, an individual focus tends to reproduce a cycle of dependency in which institutions become permanent care-takers of the "needy."

We contend that in the long run the first priority for social policy should be to promote reforms that

build social capital; i.e., to help groups of citizens develop their capacity to organize themselves to address community problems. Yet, most reform proposals begin with the premise that the issue is how to make human services respond more efficiently and effectively to individual clients or customers. The failure of social policy, in general, and the human services in particular, to address the need to build social capital has led to neglect and decline of communities, a serious issue in contemporary society.

Reforms featuring the language of clients and customers continue to deflect our attention from the needs of people as members of groups and functional communities. In part, this deflection results when the language of reform is couched in terms of "dependence" and "independence." This dichotomous, oppositional language is used to argue that dependence is dysfunctional and independence is functional; i.e., people should become independent actors rather than dependent. However, such analysis fails to take account of the inherent interdependence of citizens in communities. If social policy intends to advance people's ability to organize in ways that allow them to address common needs and goals, then reform must be couched in the language of social interdependency. Theoretically, the most powerful way of recognizing such interdependence is through the concept of social capital.

In presenting a social capital framework, we hope to redirect the conversation about institutional reform by recognizing the importance of functional communities and the responsibilities of citizens to take collective action. Pushing social policy in this direction implies a need to reconsider the allocation of resources currently controlled by human service organizations. A social capital agenda would require the reallocation of resources and participation by a broad spectrum of citizens in their use, including people who are now seen as passive clients and dependent recipients of social services.

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In the next section, we describe one organizational strategy to incorporate a broad cross-section of citizens in helping one another build a stronger community.

## The Citizen Participation Model: New York's Beacons

By creating an organization that actively encourages community members to serve as resources for one another, the Beacons program of New York City has the potential for social capital development. The Beacon model was developed as a mayor's initiative to revitalize neighborhoods. The Beacon design calls for management by a local non-profit organization, a private sector organization that has a successful history and deep roots in the community. Criteria for determining who should initially organize and run the organization privileged membership in the community over professional credentials. Ties to their communities by organizers appeared essential to successful organizing.

All Beacons are located in schools, thereby making schools into community centers. Unlike typical schools, the Beacons keep extended hours during the week and on the weekends. As community centers, they provide a "safe haven" as well as "a combination of supportive services and opportunities which enable youth and their families to make contributions to their own development and the revitalization of their neighborhoods." (Beacons, p.i) Many activities are led by community members because they have expertise in counseling, nursing, parenting, or coaching. Parents, community members, and older teens are encouraged to see themselves as a resource for other participants.

While Beacons programs take advantage of professional expertise and the resources social service systems have available, decisions about their use were controlled by the local organization and the people using the services. Providing local control over services and activities was an expression of

concern for "customer satisfaction." However, "customers" participated in a forum for collective decision-making before deciding which services to purchase. Through advisory councils, center participants established shared goals for the organization, working together to identify indigenous resources in the community and to avoid having to purchase them from agencies.

Brief sketches of three of the Beacons organizations are presented based on site visits and interviews with organizers and participants. Two of these sites were recognized by city leadership as exemplary programs, the third was a new but promising organization, in place less than a year at the time of our visit. We have identified several themes that appeared to be important to the success of these organizations.

At two of the three sites, the local community-based organization that managed the Beacon had a long history in the community. Front-line organizers for these two projects said this was a crucial asset in building a successful program. At one of these sites (I.S. 143), Alianza Dominicana was the community based organization running the program. Alianza was a name recognized throughout the city as successful in community organizing. The area around I.S. 143 was the port of entry for over ninety percent of Dominican immigrants to the United States, and Alianza had long been a resource for this community. The majority of the Beacon's staff was Dominican, with almost every staff member speaking Spanish. The director of the program noted, "Every time we walk in the neighborhood, people identify us with Alianza. We are part of the community--we are the community, that's our hook."

The director of the Beacon was particularly anxious to illustrate the difference in character between the program offered through Alianza and more traditional services provided by social agencies from

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the city. He noted, "'Participant' or 'member' is the word, not 'client.' On the street we see them as friends. We go to the pool room and play with them . . . a dialogue happens. They tell us what they don't like."

Similar sentiments were voiced by staff at the new Beacon at I.S. 200 in the South Bronx. Here the Phipps Community Development Corporation served as the local community organization. Phipps had a long history of running programs and services at Lambert Houses, a local community development project. Phipps had a practice of hiring neighborhood residents as staff and this tradition continued in organizing the Beacon. The director, while not herself a resident of the community, had worked in Phipps projects in the neighborhood for five years. She immediately built a staff of young people from the surrounding community. Of about forty staff, approximately eighty-five percent were under the age of twenty-one, and of the forty only two came from outside the immediate neighborhood. The staff had a particularly strong commitment to their Beacon; they saw it as their project from the outset and gave credit to Phipps as "backing them" in their appeal to the city for a Beacon project.

Front-line staff that we interviewed at I.S. 200 were all recent high school graduates recruited by Phipps. They described their "street outreach" approach as central to their success, and they also contrasted it with the approach of traditional social services. Outreach served two functions: first, it provided a strategy for needs assessment by going into the community--the local housing project, street corners, and other hang-outs--to identify problems and issues. Second, community members, whether in need of services or not, were invited to use the Beacon facilities and programs. In doing this, the Beacon was framed as a community center, much more than just a place for the "needy." The success of the street outreach strategy can be gauged in part by the fact that, though open only

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four months at the time of our visit, each evening the center was used by an average of three hundred participants.

One staff member's comments illustrated the importance of community membership in the outreach strategy:

> Well you can't really have anyone else come into your neighborhood, you know, look through your neighborhood for maybe a week or a month, and say, 'OK, these are the problems we've seen. OK, this is what this neighborhood needs,' without asking for the community's input and things like that. Other organizations I've seen—they have this whole elitist attitude. Like, we've gone through this training, we have this knowledge. We're coming into this community: 'You don't know anything you're doing, that's why your community is like this, so we're just going to like do everything for you. You're just going to sit back and we're going to take all the glory.' But what is different about the Beacons is that no decisions really are made within the Beacons without the community's involvement.

Another staffer saw participation by community members in assessing their own needs as central.

> I think it's crucial that the community does its own needs assessment. You can't have someone come in from 'bourgeois town' up there and say, 'Well listen, I heard, I read the papers, I heard you are having this kind of problem. I think this is the solution, this is great, look at my program.' I think the community really needs to say, 'well listen, I know that this guy is on the corner everyday . . . .

The implication here was that, as community members, staffers had a familiarity with the needs of "the guy on the corner." Familiarity with the community and a relationship of trust between staff and the community members was a prerequisite to the accurate assessment of needs in the community.

Trust was a resource that was further cultivated in the context of shared community membership. Trust was fostered by being in the community, by showing an interest in people, and by showing respect for community members. Outreach workers were successful in positioning themselves not as professionals who knew what was good for the community, but rather as fellow community members. One outreach worker described what he did this way:

> (You have to) get the person comfortable to know that you're not going to go, 'I'm here, I'm an outreach coordinator, Youth Department Services. What do you need?' No, you go out,

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get acquainted, and you tap into what this person is feeling or where this person is at. What does this person want to do?

The director at one site suggested that "the sick community thesis" was often embedded in projects sponsored by agencies; funding guidelines required involvement of certain agencies and required budgeting for particular services that assumed traditional professional/client relationships. According to the director, "Everything filters down. If the design assumes pathology, that filters down. If you hire outsiders, you're not sending the message that the help is here in the community."

In contrast to a traditional community portrait which maps the pathologies in a community, one Beacon staffer offered this description of his community:

> I would describe it as a really colorful community. There is a list of different types of people that live here. There is the working class. There are people who are struggling with school and with children. There are people who go to church daily. There are people who hang out on corners and just play cards or dominoes, stuff like that. Besides that, there is a list of problems within the community, not unlike any other community. You have the drug problem, a crime problem. You have your rifts with this block and that block. You have your teen pregnancy and your racial problems . . . .

This description is revealing because it says that the community is comprised of different types of people; some are beset with serious problems, but some are not. It offers a view of the community not based wholly on terms of pathology; the community is described as "colorful" and its problems are understood as "not unlike any other community." Of course, this perspective could be challenged; maybe the problems were more numerous and serious than this outreach worker understood them to be or was willing to admit. Nevertheless, the point is that to the extent this kind of approach and perspective characterizes the staff at the Beacons, it clarifies why staff are able to build trust between themselves and participants, an essential condition for building social capital.

In contrast with the other two sites, a third Beacon (P.S. 194) is located in a neighborhood that lacked an initial community-based organization from which to build. However, Rheedlens Center, a non-

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profit organization with a long history of working with children and families, proposed to run the new

Beacon because of the neighborhood's pressing needs (for example, seventy percent of the children in

the area were living in poverty). Initially, in organizing the Beacon, Rheedlens' staff had to deal with

suspicions about the project. According to one staff, "At first, people thought we were a kind of

'Starsky and Hutch' operation . . . . Proving oneself takes time—trust takes time." The fact that the

staff was African American allowed for some identification and connection. Part of forging the

connection with the community was hiring additional staff from the community (At the time of our

study, over sixty percent of the staff were from the immediate neighborhood.) Though the organizers

were initially "outsiders" in the neighborhood, the co-directors stressed the importance of identifying

with the community. They saw themselves as "People just like or very much like those in the

community. If anything positive is going to happen we have to have the community feel comfortable

with us."

As in the other Beacons, the directors and staff contrasted their Beacon with the traditional

professional-client model of service delivery. A co-director commented that such a model was sure to

set up an "us versus them" situation. The Beacon staff even worked with the school staff to help

them see parents as "equal players" in the education of their children. Another of the staff resisted

even the language of "empowerment" because he said that it made it sound like the power wasn't

already there in the community.

The Adult Activities Coordinator for the Beacon, a minister and resident in the community, stressed

the need to give the community opportunities to do for themselves.

> They know what they need in the community. The point of the group is to get them involved
> so that they help one another work together. We're here to support them not to judge them.
> You have to focus on what are their gifts—you help to bring that out. To build a healthy
> community you can't let them believe they're dependent on us. We help to develop the

power which is already in them.

In her role as Adult Activities Coordinator, she helped to recruit and hire several parents as staff to develop workshops for other parents in the neighborhood. For adults, workshops ranged from help in parenting, to recovering from alcohol and drug abuse, to crafts and reading groups. For youth, activities included martial arts classes, after-school homework help, and tours of local colleges and universities, most led by community residents.

Beacons programs placed a strong emphasis on teens as role models for their younger peers. Teenagers often organized and taught classes for younger participants in art and dance. They also organized sports programs, served as chaperons on trips into the city, and conducted peer counseling and tutoring sessions. Discussions with participants who became staffers suggested that encouraging teens to see themselves as role models in the community, as respected members of the community, was critical to them feeling responsible to the community. Many of the Phipps staff, eighteen and nineteen years old, put in sixty to seventy hours a week—many more hours than they were paid for— because they felt a responsibility to the Beacon and to the community in which they lived.

The participatory role of community residents in setting an agenda, creating a forum, and implementing programs has the potential for developing social capital. For example, rather than bringing in a social worker to discuss pregnancy prevention, Rheedlens got a group of teenage girls involved in making a video about how to deal with peer pressure, relationships with boys, and self-esteem issues. The girls wrote the script, shot the video, acted in it, and edited it. One staff member who had some expertise in video production spent time teaching the group. On the day we visited the Beacon, two teen representatives from another Beacon were there to learn about video editing, and it was largely the girls from Rheedlens doing the instruction.

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To summarize, the following features seemed essential for the success of the Beacons: staff were drawn from the community or worked hard to become trusted members of the community; residents had a voice in deciding which professional services were used; to the extent possible, indigenous resources were also used to address needs; the organizations promoted the norm that members of the community had an obligation to participate in activities that promoted the community's welfare.

Have the Beacons succeeded in building social capital as well as addressing the concrete needs for support of individuals? Without much more careful study, we can't answer the question. However, by providing a structure for citizen participation, the Beacons offered opportunities for people to build on old and new networks, to establish trusting relations, and to strengthen the norm of helping each other, all defining characteristics of social capital. The scenarios of collective effort in the Beacons contrast sharply with traditional professional-client relations.

In the next section, we describe an effort to restructure the professional-client model through collaboration among human service agencies. We compare collaboration among agencies with the citizen participation model found in the Beacons, and we indicate why we believe collaboration is unlikely to be an instrument for social capital development.

**Restructuring the Client Model: Collaboration**

Recognizing that schools and social service agencies have become less than effective in responding to the problems of young people and their families, a number of communities have undertaken major efforts to restructure these systems. Some communities have formed school-human services collaborative organizations in an attempt to reform schools and promote the coordination and integration of services to better serve children and their families (Davies, et al, 1993; Koerner, 1993;

Bruner Foundation, 1993; Melaville and Blank, 1991). At its best, a collaborative is intended to not only improve the delivery of services but also to become the source of policy around youth issues for a community.

The major premise behind these new collaborative organizations is that schools and youth-serving agencies need to close the "cracks" or gaps in services through which at-risk youth fall. These cracks are created by the fact that organizations involved in education and welfare operate as semi-autonomous bureaucracies with professionals separated by their clearly defined roles and responsibilities with respect to the services they offer. In part, the separation of organizations is forced by categorical legislation and funding of programs, and in part it is produced and sustained by professional specialization. As a consequence, fragmentation of services to children and families is the norm. Problems associated with youth at risk are addressed separately and even haphazardly by a number of different organizations.

Typically, a city or county may have fifty different funding streams from state, federal, and private sources to finance various social programs and services, each with its cadre of professionals. At one point, the Government Accounting Office indicated that the federal government funded ninety-three separate youth programs that were available to communities. In the past, coordination of policies and programs based on such fragmented funding has been absent, even unthinkable. In fact, rather than cooperating, agencies from the public and private non-profit sectors often compete with one another for winning grants and gaining access to youth. This fragmented structure gives professionals from different organizations serving the same client little incentive to coordinate their efforts. For example, a child may be doing poorly in school because of a disorganized home environment, but the child's teacher and social worker never interact over the case. The teacher may be unaware of

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conditions in the home, and the social worker may be unaware of the child's school behavior. As a result, the existence of tutorial, counseling, and other forms of intervention may go unused because of this lack of coordination among professionals.

In order to close the gaps between organizations and to build coordination and communication among professionals, collaboration among organizations is required. As one guide to forming collaboratives states, the purpose of collaboration is to create a partnership that involves "THE RIGHT PEOPLE" (Melaville and Blank, 1991; emphasis in original). The "right people" are the professionals with expertise and institutional resources at their disposal. Collaboration is a mechanism designed to enhance professional and institutional leverage with the intent of providing more efficient and effective services to clients.

At least three important assumptions are embedded in the argument for collaboration. First, advocates of collaboration believe that the problems of at-risk youth such as poor academic achievement, dropping out, and teen pregnancy can be solved by professionals who have expertise and programs at their disposal. It is taken for granted that the "diagnosis" and "prescription" coming from professionals are valid, and that the services offered by professionals are powerful enough to solve clients' problems. A second assumption is that professionals have been prevented from solving clients' problems because of a lack of coordination among themselves. If all the "right people" could coordinate delivery of their services, such timely action would have great impact on clients. Third, advocates of collaboration assume that organizations have a desire, or at least a stake, in working together. A consensus can be easily forged among agencies on what collaboration means and how it is operationalized; the result will be to sharply limit competition, conflict, and fragmentation among professionals and agencies.

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As it turns out, each of these assumptions is questionable in practice. To illustrate some of the flaws in these assumption, we turn to the example of the New Futures Initiative carried out between 1988 and 1993.

**The New Futures Initiative**

The Annie E. Casey Foundation selected five cities--Bridgeport, CT, Dayton, OH, Little Rock, AR, Pittsburgh, PA, Savannah, GA--to implement a version of collaboration called "New Futures." This initiative was conceived around the need to reform youth-serving institutions by coordinating their policies and practices. A Casey Foundation document (1988) stated:

> In a sense, New Futures begins in a rejection of the notion that academic failure, teen pregnancy and dropping out have to be seen exclusively as the consequences of aptitude, character or even the constraints of class, ethnicity and family status. Instead, New Futures views many of these youth problems in terms of the failure of community institutions to do what they can do to equip youngsters with the expectations, opportunities, supports, and incentives they need to become aspiring, responsible and successful adults. (p.3)

A major requirement of the New Futures Initiative in each city was the formation of a new organization -the community collaborative-- comprised of representatives from all the major family and youth-serving agencies. In addition, each local collaborative included the school system (represented by the superintendent and/or school board members), representatives from local government, and the business community. It was also expected that representatives from minority and disadvantaged groups would also serve on the collaborative board. The main purpose of the collaborative board was to use its collective wisdom, financial resources, and political strength to bring about institutional reforms, strategic planning, and coordinated human service delivery systems that could address the needs of at-risk youth.

After five years, and more than fifty million dollars, at least two of the five cities--Savannah and

Little Rock--could claim that their effects at collaboration had shown some success. The Casey Foundation was sufficiently impressed with the progress these two cities had made that it committed to some additional funding of their collaboratives. In Savannah, a representative of the United Way said that she was extremely "encouraged and optimistic about the leadership development" resulting from New Futures. She suggested that the collaborative had forged a consensus among agencies on the need to work together. She was particularly excited about the cooperation of private and public agencies and suggested that they would never go back to the uncoordinated division of social service systems that had existed previously. She concluded, "what we've done best will last the longest--it's how we do business. It wasn't just another initiative it was an environmental change." Many collaborative board members in Savannah echoed her sentiments.

From the vantage point of board members, collaboration was working. In fact, one could argue that social capital was developed, but it was generated for the board members, not the target population of disadvantaged children and their families. The heads of organizations, such as the county health commissioner, the superintendent, the city manager, and business executives were able to meet regularly and build bonds of connection. They were given an occasion to communicate about issues important to them as professionals and managers as they sought to integrate and coordinate services to at-risk youth.

Yet, while collaboration felt good to leaders, managers, and some professionals, evidence indicated that, for the most part, the assumption that such collaboration would result in substantially improved outcomes for at-risk youth went unrealized (Wehlage, et al, 1992). For example, in Savannah, outcome data for students reflecting the four New Futures goals--higher academic achievement, lower dropout rates, lower teen pregnancy, and increased youth employment after high school--did not

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improve over the five years of the initiative. In fact, Savannah's middle school dropout rate increased from 8.5 percent to 9.3 percent over five years; and the high school rate went from 13.1 percent to 15.3 percent in the same period (Center for the Study of Social Policy, forthcoming).

While changing important outcomes is undoubtedly a difficult task, one that probably takes more than five years, it seems reasonable that some intermediary goals could have been met in the short run to indicate the promise of collaboration. For instance, collaboration promised to close the "cracks" through which kids were said to be falling. Did this happen? Interviews with collaborative board members suggested that cracks were being closed, but discussions with front-line workers indicated otherwise. Many of the case managers placed in schools, for example, confronted conflicts with school personnel over sharing information, program responsibility, and accountability for student outcomes. Further, the relationship between New Future's case managers and their counterparts administering Aid to Families with Dependent Children revealed that high level agreements to promote collaboration rarely filtered down to inter-agency cooperation at the front-line. Inter-agency conflict was often produced by tensions between front-line professionals who now had a new demand placed on them by their managers--collaborating with other professionals from other agencies (White and Wehlage, in press).

The new demands of collaboration made life more, rather than less, difficult for street-level professionals and tended to undermine their desire to collaborate. Although collaboration was achieved at the highest levels among organizational leaders and managers, it did not result in important changes in the delivery of services In fact, sometimes the opposite happened as mistrust arose and workers squabbled over the implications of collaboration in their daily lives.

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## Limits of the Professional-Client Model

We contend that collaboration of the kind envisioned by New Futures experienced something more than mere implementation problems. The traditional "cracks" between agencies seem a necessary outcome of a model of social services rooted in a professional-client model. Collaboration is a more sophisticated, rationalized form of professionalism and bureaucracy, the roots of which are found in the tradition of scientific knowledge and management. Professionalism means that such knowledge is highly specialized and technical; it is not easily shared or acquired by others. Moreover, the expertise of professionals is often at odds with the task of building social capital, a kind of wealth that is not generated when control of resources and decisions is in the hands of experts who provide service to a class of clients. The professional-client model of service delivery reduces care-taking to a matter of contractual obligation between professionals and their employers; nothing in the model suggests moving toward a norm of mutual care-taking between fellow community members.

Training, specialization, and expertise are the touted strengths of the professional model, but such rationalization also creates horizontal divisions between experts in various fields as well as a vertical divisions between experts and those they serve as clients. Expert knowledge becomes the primary means of legitimizing specialized organizations that employ those with credentials certifying their expertise. Clients in this model seem inescapably dependent on experts for help. Client status gives professionals legitimate control over the relationship and organizational benefits. Professionals continually reinstate their authority over the life of dependent clients and, probably unintentionally, create a cycle of dependency.

Dependency on experts prevents people from organizing themselves and undermines efforts to build relations among citizens that strengthen group norms, expectations, and communication. Dependency

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prevents people from building social capital because it means that they lose opportunities to participate in the process of solving community problems. Nothing in the current proposals for collaboration among human services challenges or modifies the client's status as a dependent served by professionals, and failure to address this issue is a serious flaw in all proposals for collaboration and integration of human services.

Collaboration, as currently conceived, not only fails to promote the development of social capital, it also promotes a language of invidious comparisons. The labels "dependent" and "independent" reflect the disadvantage of being a client of human services. Borchorst and Siim (1987) capture the politics of this distinction:

> (T)here is a fundamental difference between being dependent as consumers of public services or being dependent as clients on social welfare. The status of client is often associated with economic dependency, control and social stigmatization. The crucial thing is public control over the client which is often more severe than the control with wage earners or consumers. (p. 146)

Criticism of the dependency factor cuts across conventional political cleavages. Some conservative critics are concerned about the economic costs of dependency for taxpayers. Others see welfare dependency as one more symptom of a wider pattern of "moral decay," for which the single mother on welfare has become the symbol. Yet even those on the political left who generally advocate welfare-state programs are critical of current versions of such programs, primarily because of the disempowering effect of state paternalism that seems inherent in the system based on professional-clients relations.

The politics of such paternalism is said to have a stigmatizing quality. As Fraser and Gordon (1994) noted:

> Thus, the poor solo mother was enshrined as the quintessential welfare dependent. That

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designation has thus become significant not only for what it includes but also what it excludes and occludes. Although it appears to mean relying on the government for economic support, not all recipients of public funds are equally considered dependent. Hardly anyone today calls recipients of social security retirement insurance, dependents. (p. 323)

It is not merely the act of receiving public support from the government that makes one dependent.

Obviously, in some form or another we all derive some economic support from the government

whether it is through a federally insured housing loan or the highway system. Rather, it is the

politics of the process of ascription that makes the term "welfare dependent" into an undesirable social

status. Dependency suggests a sense of "undeservedness."

By contrast, those receiving unemployment compensation are said to be deserving because they were

once employed. Social security recipients are entitled to their checks each month because they

contributed to the fund. The Chrysler Corporation is bailed out of its financial difficulties, and

although the policy had its detractors, Chrysler can hardly be said to have been stigmatized by this

assistance. In the political world, entitlement to benefits is a function of one's implicit contribution as

an "independent" wage earner or an industry's perceived social value.

While some citizens "earned" or are "entitled" to their benefits, welfare mothers, for example, are

stigmatized by theirs. This stigma has its main effect by legitimating further control by agencies and

professionals over those labeled dependent. Breaking this "cycle of dependency" is not likely to be

achieved by a more efficient system of coordinated services delivered by professionals. In fact, such

collaboration may actually enhance paternalism and control over clients. Rather, the challenge of

reform is to find ways of reestablishing people's initiative by providing them with opportunities and

resources to organize and address their needs and interests.

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If it is correct to argue that consumers have a different, more desirable status than clients, then we would expect human services offered through a market system to be an improvement because "choice" gives clients the status of "independent consumers." In the next section, we examine the proposition that clients should become consumers in a market place of services.

The Consumer Model: Reinventing Government

The call for "reinventing government," a phrase popularized by a book with the same title, suggested many strategies for reorganizing government bureaucracy, but central was the notion of an "entrepreneurial government." Osborne and Graeber (1993) argued that "the central failure of government today is one of means, not ends." They found hope, however.

> Slowly, quietly, far from the public spotlight, new kinds of public institutions are emerging. They are lean, decentralized and innovative. They are flexible, adaptable, quick to learn new ways when conditions change. They use competition, customer choice and other nonbureaucratic mechanisms to get things done . . . . (p. 2)

The critique of bureaucracy raised by these authors parallels many of the comments we heard from Beacons and New Futures staffers about bureaucratic ineffectiveness. Osborne and Graeber even talk about the need to empower citizens rather than serve them. One way this might be done, they suggested, was to separate the "task of steering from the task of rowing." They advocated separating decision-making from "doing" in order to allow government to select the most efficient "rowers" while still retaining the power to "steer" the boat.

Separating the tasks of steering and rowing offers entrepreneurial opportunities in the sense that it would convert many of those tasks currently performed by bureaucracies to jobs bid by private sector organizations. But several questions arise immediately when confronted with the metaphor of steering and rowing. It was exactly the separation of policy making from front-line action in the New Futures

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cities--separating rowing from steering--that allowed collaborative board members to claim success at collaboration, while front-line workers still struggled with gaps in services to children. And Beacons' staff claimed that it was bringing together steering and rowing by members of the community that was critical to their organizations' success. While the metaphor presents problems, the central propositions offered by Osborne and Graeber have become part of a growing literature advocating privatization of government activities. Their argument parallels the one made by advocates of school choice, such as Chubb and Moe (1990), who have contended that the best way to ensure better services is to reduce the role of bureaucracy by replacing it with a market in which consumers are empowered through the expression of their independent preferences.

A consumer model promises fundamental change because the market alters relations with the entrenched interests of the professional bureaucracy. Advocates argue that by relocating authority, power, and accountability, professionals will look toward their customers instead of within the bureaucracy for direction. As a structure, the market is said to offer incentives for bureaucrats to be responsive to those receiving services. Power ends up where power belongs, in the hands of consumers of educational and social services.

But what does it mean in practice to transfer power to the consumer? Osborne and Graeber suggest the following ways for organizations to listen to the voice of the consumer: customer surveys and follow-up reports to obtain feedback, customer advisory councils, and community surveys of people's needs. As the scenario unfolds, it becomes clear that marketplace metaphor implies a clear division between customers and providers. Consumers are limited to the role of individual respondent and little opportunity exists for them to participate in design, planning, and governance of services.

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School choice is an example of the customer in a respondent's role. Schools offer an agenda and consumers choose from the available menu. Although choice programs continue to be touted as a strategy for empowering parents and students, critics have raised doubts about the extent of such empowerment. The view of parents as rational consumers suggests an array of genuine alternatives and access to high quality information about schools, curriculum, and teaching. That information is sometimes not available to parents, or is often differentially available to parents based on socioeconomic status, raises serious questions about choice.

For the most part, school choice has remained small in scale involving limited numbers of families, and data to assess the impact of choice is largely lacking (Clune & Witte, 1990; Lee, Croninger & Smith, 1994; Moore, 1990). A few programs of choice in several large cities have been coupled with efforts to make information about schools available to all parents, but the success of these mechanisms has been debatable at best (Alves & Willie, 1990). Further, creating such information centers, basically controlled by professionals, may simply produce another variation of the bureaucracy that now characterizes school systems. It is questionable whether such centers could take on the objective qualities of a "consumer report" on schooling.

In some cities, a form of choice has been available through magnets, specialty schools, and "options" that provide a taste of full-blown choice systems. Moore (1990) found that high quality "options schools" in several major urban systems offered decidedly unequal opportunities for admission. These opportunities were limited by informal constraints such as the complexities of the admissions application process and inadequate information about this process. In addition, formal constraints such as substantial admissions requirements in the areas of achievement, attendance, and behavior were common even in schools that officially were open to all students. Moore writes that

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...white families and middle-class families of all races, who were best positioned to exert political influence in these cities and who saw options high schools and programs as an avenue for providing a good education for their children, worked diligently to structure the options system in a manner that gave their children a competitive advantage in securing admissions. (p. 189)

Moore's research concluded that mechanisms for participation in the market place of choice may be formally open, but informally closed. This situation suggests that equality of access and outcome will not necessarily result from the exercise of purchasing power in the market. Thus, where lack of information or unequal access, individual purchasing power as a mechanism for empower will always fail some, often those who are already most disenfranchised. Whether such people will fair worse in markets than they are failed now with public schools run by professionals is a question that remains to be answered.

Henig (1994) in his analysis of choice agreed that inequities were one limitation of the market metaphor, but he raised another concern that in light of our focus on social capital strikes us as even more serious. Choice and privatization tend to short-circuit public discussions over our collective vision of education in a democratic society. Henig argued,

> Participants in the privatization and education-reform movements see the link differently than I do. They see the turn toward market-based ideas and processes in both instances as stemming from a common cause: the failure of government institutions to meet individual needs. I, too see common roots, but I stand their causal argument on its head. The problems we face in our schools today, like the problems we encounter with many of our public programs, can be traced in large measure to our failure to develop and sustain a vision of collective purpose. This failure --in part one of intellect, in part one of political capacity and societal will--is something for which the privatization movement itself deserves considerable blame. (p. 7)

Markets stress individual autonomy but social capital requires collective purpose. While a community's collective vision about schooling may change over time, and while it may be the subject of conflict and controversy, the pursuit of such a vision cannot be conceded to the individualism that dominates the language of market places. Those who argue for individual choice lead us away from a

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public consideration of how schooling contributes to the kind of society we want.

We began our discussion of the consumer model by referring to the claim by Osborne and Graeber that it is not the ends of government but the means which they want to challenge. We believe this separation is inappropriate; that the vision of where our society is headed and the process of getting there are integrally related. Further we argued that a new vision--one focused on community--should steer us toward building social capital, something that the market metaphor does not promise.

## Conclusion

From proposals for school choice to reinventing government, from site based management to school-community collaboration, the restructuring of social institutions has been an over-riding theme in recent reform literature. Our analysis indicated that proposals for collaboration and consumerism based in a language of individualism fail to address the collective needs of people and communities. Reforms focused either on delivering professional services to individual clients more effectively or empowering individual consumers of services to have choices have constrained public discussion. Such language has limited our thinking about institutional possibilities. Further, these reform proposals have focused on mechanisms and processes to improve the delivery of services. Neither collaboration nor markets has recognized membership in a community as a strength and resource. Neither strategy has considered the goal of building stronger communities. We think these reforms are a serious mistake because they fail to recognize that the quality of life of individuals is largely dependent upon the strength of the communities in which they live.

From an empirical and theoretical perspective, the case of the Beacons programs offers some optimism for a social capital agenda. The Beacons suggest that communities weak in social capital

can begin to rebuild it and take advantage of resources and opportunities. As opposed to the metaphors of "client" and "consumer," the Beacons provide a "citizen" model, where citizen connotes membership in a community with rights and responsibilities, and where participation becomes a norm. Building on the citizen metaphor requires attention to community membership, trust, and participation. Trust may be the starting point in this process. As Govier (1992) noted,

> Ultimately the most profound trust issue is a practical one; given that we cannot successfully communicate and cooperate without at least a moderate level of trust, and given that so often in so many ways, there are compelling grounds for distrust, how can we progress from a situation of warranted distrust to one of well founded trust? (p. 18)

She raises a difficult question. How do communities establish the trust necessary to communicate and to organize toward common ends? Recognizing that trusting across community boundaries can be particularly difficult, every effort should be made to create public dialogue among groups, something that neither the professional nor market models tend to encourage.

The goal of building social capital appears difficult for a number of reasons. Social capital is elusive and complex; it entails both processes and goals, means and ends. Communities must pay attention to fostering the processes of participation while keeping their eye on collective purposes. While doing all this, communities have a need to also promote the development of economic and human forms of capital. Some transfer of economic resources may well be necessary in communities where the disadvantage is great. Even neighborhoods with the strongest norms of communal responsibility will find it difficult to act on a sense of responsibility without access to resources. The way in which resources are distributed to such communities, the uses to which they are put, and the issue of accountability for their use need to be dictated by collective forums within the community rather than the forces of expertise and ownership outside it.

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