ED 383 599   SC 024 836

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TITLE   "Advanced" Ideas about Democracy: Toward a Pluralist
                Conception of Citizenship Education.
PUB DATE   94
NOTE   29p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
                National Council for the Social Studies (Phoenix, AZ,
                November 1994).
PUB TYPE   Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports -
                Descriptive (141)

EDRS PRICE   MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS   Citizen Role; Citizenship; *Citizenship Education;
                Citizenship Responsibility; *Civics; Community
                Attitudes; Cultural Awareness; *Cultural Pluralism;
                *Democracy; *Democratic Values; *Freedom; Global
                Education; Social Values

ABSTRACT
        This paper suggests that the concept of "democratic
citizenship education" must be expanded and deepened. The
conventional conception excludes the key ideas of the social and
cultural dimensions of citizenship and the central tension of social
life--unity/difference. The paper features the following areas: (1)
"Essentially Contested Concepts"; (2) "The Dominant Conception of
Citizenship Education: Difference as Dissolution"; (3) "'Advanced'
Ideas about Democracy"; and (4) "Conclusion." Ideas promoted as
"advanced" include path/accomplishment and pluralism/assimilation.
Historical examples and literature are used to support the points
raised for consideration. Contains 63 references. (EH)

"Advanced" Ideas About Democracy:

Toward a Pluralist Conception of Citizenship Education

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"Advanced" Ideas About Democracy:
Toward a Pluralist Conception of Citizenship Education[1]

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I will suggest a deepened and expanded meaning for an old idea in American education--democratic citizenship education. My concern is that much is excluded by the conventional conception, two things especially: the social and cultural dimensions of citizenship and the central tension of social life--unity/difference. After these exclusions, we are left with a feeble conception, one that mirrors a longstanding confusion in the United States over the meaning of one of its chief mottos, the one it has put on its coins, e pluribus unum.

Before proceeding, let me place my effort here against recent events on the democratic landscape. Picture three scenes. The first, set in eastern Europe, portrays the submersion of democratic activist women in Poland following the fall of the socialist state. Elzbieta Matynia, now of the New School for Social Research in New York, returned to her native and "already virtually 'post-Communist' Poland" after an eight year absence. What struck her was the

> almost total absence of those capable women who had played such an active and
> essential role in the clandestine operations of the pro-democratic movements of the
> '70s and '80s. I knew many of them well and had been active along with them,
> but, like them, I had never defined the crucial problems in terms of gender. The
> primary objective of every social protest and movement then was to fight for the
> political rights of all members of society. All other issues seemed to be of

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secondary importance; it was felt that these problems could be dealt with after the final battle for democracy had been won. But now, watching the free-wheeling debates in the new Parliament and reading about those newly created democratic institutions, I found myself wondering where all the women were. (1994, p. 351-352).

The second scene, also set in eastern Europe, is the triumphant one atop the Berlin Wall when democratic activists, having toppled the East German regime, took sledge hammers to its singular symbol. Shortly thereafter, however, they watched in despair as their democratic revolution was ousted from the streets of Berlin only "to become enmeshed in the monopolistic party politics of the Federal Republic" (Green, 1993, p. 18). The upsurge of direct democracy was over. Nominal, representative, interest-group demo-bureaucracy, or what we know in the United States as Beltway Politics, had set in.

The third scene, set on another continent, summarizes the first two. Among the unforgettable moments from Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989 was one reported in Vincent Harding's meditation on the Civil Rights Movement: Hope and History: Why We Must Share the Story of the Movement (1990). One young woman in the square on the evening before government troops crushed the uprising told a Western television reporter that what Chinese students and intellectuals wanted from the United States was its "advanced technology." Eyeing the mock Statue of Liberty constructed in the Square, the reporter asked if they were not interested also in any American ideas, such as democracy. Her response came quickly: "Yes, but only if they are advanced ideas about democracy" (p. 33).

Each scene expresses the double failure of formal, institutionalized democracy to address its own substantive shortcomings while at the same time believing itself to be fully

developed, a sort of final solution to the puzzle of living together.[2] Against this horizon, it
is timely to ask if citizenship education in the United States should continue to roll along as
it has for a century, relying on rituals and slogans that belie the pathetic state of public life
in this society; it is timely to ask if citizenship education, both as a curricular platform and a
school mission, must continue to ignore yearnings for a kind of democratic citizenship that
serious democrats could embrace. At issue is a conception of citizenship that is narrow and
defensive, superficial and exclusive. It could be called "modern." Modern citizenship was
constructed in a way that made the development of modern democracy possible, to be sure,
but at the same time an obstacle to its own possibilities--to what Chantal Mouffe (1992)
calls a deepening and widening of the democratic revolution.

My plan is as follows. First, I qualify this effort, paying attention to the special
kind of conceptual terrain underfoot. Following this I portray the dominant conception of
democratic citizenship education, concentrating on what it emphasizes and what it
minimizes. Finally, I delineate three "advanced" ideas, borrowing the Tiananmen Square
usage. These ideas, I argue, are building blocks for a more satisfying conception of
democratic citizenship and, in turn, democratic citizenship education.

Essentially Contested Concepts

Three qualifications are in order: the first an assumption, the second a reason for
new work on this old topic, and the third a brief explanation of the sort of concepts we are
dealing with here, hence, the sort of theory-building in which I am engaged.

I assume that democratic citizenship education is an aim of public schools generally
and the social studies curriculum in particular. This is a safe assumption. One has a hard
time finding a state or school district curriculum document that does not trumpet "the
preparation of students for informed citizenship in our democratic society," or something to

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[2]Francis Fukuyama explicated this heroic belief when he called liberal democracy "the end of history" and
the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" (1992).

this effect. As well, we know that democratic citizenship is a common aim of the schools generally and the social studies curriculum in particular (e.g., Cremin,1989; Parker, 1991). Yet, the assumption is not without problems. The well-known gap between school aims and practices is one ; the relationship of the purposes of a single school subject to those of the whole school is another.

Second, the attempt to specify the meaning of democracy for curriculum purposes is not new. Dewey (1916), Rugg (1939), Hanna (1936), Griffin (1942), Hunt and Metcalf (1968), Engle (1960), Oliver and Shaver (1966/74), Newmann (1975), Butts (1980), the authors of Civitas (1991) and, most recently, Ralph Nader (Isaac, 1992) all have done it, sometimes quite well.[3] Contemporary work is needed, however, for at least two overlapping reasons. One has to do with new insights, the other with old blind spots. As for the first, there has been a surge of new theorizing on citizenship since the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The literatures on which citizenship educators might draw--from political science, sociology, philosophy, literary criticism, and linguistics, from social theory in general--have all changed dramatically in recent decades. Nationalism and anti-totalitarianism took up the major part of the citizenship literature in the 20th Century. Following suit, citizenship educators developed curricula on propaganda resistance, critical thinking, and the mechanics of republicanism, basing them on the foundational values of "individual freedom and human dignity" (Oliver and Shaver, 1966/74, p. 9). These emphases are vitally important and must be retained as bearing walls of whatever conception educators might now try to build. They no longer are of sufficient power, however, to compose the whole structure. They can no longer take up all of what Jane Roland Martin calls the "curriculum space" (1994), for they are too easily appropriated by the individualistic obsession with rights ("negative liberties"), self-interest, and the concept of universal human nature or sameness.

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[3]See Parker (1991 & in press-A) for reviews of this work.

A second reason for doing contemporary conceptual work on democracy for curriculum purposes is the emergence of challenges to blindspots in mainstream theorizing on citizenship and citizenship education. The newer fields of women's studies and critical race studies are disclosing the extraordinary depth and breadth of the assimilationist ideology that undergirds public education still today. Education policy makers working in the 19th and most of the 20th centuries were mostly native-born, white, middle and upper-middle class, and male. Generally, they took their own vantage point for granted, assuming it to be neutral and universal. They did not "think of themselves simply as one group among many--nonbrown, nonfemale, nonimmigrant, nonpoor--but instead regarded their own values and interests as the standard" (Tyack, 1993, p. 11). This is not surprising. As David Wellman, writes,

> Given the racial and class organization of American society, there is only so much people can 'see.' The positions they occupy in these structures limit the range of their thinking. The situation places barriers on their imaginations and restricts the possibilities of their vision. (1977, p. 235)

Here is the tendency of privileged groups to believe genuinely that they are "the inclusive kind of human...the norm and the ideal" (Greene, 1993, p. 215). Estimable work on democratic citizenship education has been done, to be sure. Some extraordinary school programs have been developed; however, this work did not always reflect on its own subject position or explore fully the articulation of difference and "the specificity and multiplicity of democratic demands" (Mouffe, 1989, p. 7). Now that new literatures are blossoming and older ones are being challenged by new perspectives and incursions, citizenship educators are in a position to reconsider what they mean when they say "democracy," "citizenship," and "multicultural education."

The third qualification concerns concept development work itself. Even when terms such as "democracy," "citizenship," and "multicultural education" have been clarified somewhat in a particular speech community, and its members therefore share with one

another some common sense of what it is they are talking about, even then meanings
proliferate and battle with one another. When diverse speech communities interact, the
contestation can only increase. Debate, coercion, silencing, insisting, negotiating, and the
like; with these we enter the region of conceptual work composed of what W. B. Gallie
(1955-56) called essentially contested concepts (ECCs).

Any reasonably well-clarified concept is, of course, open to argument, even "chair"
or "pencil." Ideas are made, not found, and their making involves social conditions,
conventions, and power relations. ECCs are unique among the universe of concepts not
because they are constructed but because the problem of their proper usage is marked by
continual debate. This is a slippery distinction, but helpful. Ideas such as "social studies"
and "morality" and "art" probably for the whole length of their usage have been ECCs, at
least among some users. "Race," on the other hand, and "sexual orientation" only have
more recently become ECCs. We thought we knew what they meant, now "we" are not
sure. Such concepts are dynamic hybrids, McCarthy and Crichlow (1993) observe, "the
product of encounters between and among differently located human groups...the product
of human interests, needs, desires, strategies, capacities, forms of organization, and forms
of mobilization" (p. xv).

The social construction of meaning in any moment and place occurs more openly
and vigorously on some subjects and topics than on others. Where it is more so, we have
ECCs. Where it is less so, we have stabilized meanings, perhaps even essentialized
meanings that seem to be natural, like water, not made, like a castle. It follows that politics
pervades debates on ECCs. Some mix of negotiation and coercion is involved. Through
negotiation among more-or-less equal players a particular meaning takes shape and wins
agreement. Majority and minority opinions emerge. With power, however, persons and
groups can impose meanings without debate or negotiation. This is not uncommon.[4] For

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[4]Foucault's main disclosure, was that the imposition of meaning by force is the norm (1984). Hence, a
search for a term's meaning becomes quickly a descent through successive layers of power relations.

example, those who define the ECC "multicultural education" as tribalism or try to persuade their audiences that it is equivalent to Afrocentrism or a self-esteem movement for students of color have had more power, money, and influence than moderate, mainstream multicultural scholars who define it much differently but lack the means to launch their definitions into parlance. The former have been able, therefore, "to set the agenda for the debate and to define and popularize the key terms" (Banks, 1993, p. 39).

Meanings are anything but inert. They double as aims, platforms, and projects. Contestants want to appropriate ideas for their own use, and as Kekes (1977) points out, each party realizes that the others want to do the same. This is much the case with the present work.

The Dominant Conception of Citizenship Education:
Difference As Dissolution

In The Federalist No. 2, John Jay wrote that Americans were one ethnic group-- "descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs...." They were, he said, a "band of brethren." The brethren faced a common danger, he wrote, which was their dissolution into "a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties." These words were written, recall, on behalf of winning approval for a document that was aimed, as the Call for the Federal Constitutional Convention in February of 1787 put it, at overcoming "defects in the present Confederation (and) establishing in these states a firm national government...."

Jay's assertion reveals that the United States' longstanding difficulty negotiating the unity/diversity tension was present at the creation, so to speak. The conflict between the one and the many goes all the way back. More central to my purpose than showing this tension to be an old one, however, is showing that its meaning is oblique. The tension between unity and difference or "oneness" and "manyness" (Walzer, 1992a) is not a

transparent one between a desire for enough community to satisfy common needs (e.g., safety, heat and lights, trade, sewage disposal) while otherwise leaving people free to flourish. Rather, it is skewed off to one side, the unity side, while defending against the other, working hard to minimize the range of allowable difference. On this conception of unity/difference, attention to differences of the political kind are sanctioned to a greater extent than differences of the social and cultural kind. For example, differences of opinion on matters of public concern (i.e., parliamentary differences) receive a great deal of attention while differences of religion, language, race, ethnicity, and gender are moved to the side in the name of "color blindness" or neutrality.

I will elaborate the neutrality premise later, but let us first pursue a bit further the narrow conception of unity/difference. Recall that European-American men without property along with all women were disenfranchised at the creation--both in the document being revised (the Articles of Confederation) and in the new Constitution, and that African-American men and women were regarded in both formulations as chattel. Native peoples were simply a scourge to be contained or assimilated and, in these ways, eliminated, or killed off outright. The brethrens' response to these Others makes it clear that the working conception of difference at the creation attended more or less exclusively to just one kind of difference: differences of opinion among insiders on matters of common concern. A more inclusive conception of difference, one that might include gender or race, for example, was not necessary at the top of the status hierarchy, in the realm of governance, for such difference generally was not to be found there.

The narrow conception is disclosed in James Madison's argument in The Federalist No. 10. The chief advantage of a "well-constructed Union," Madison wrote, was its ability to "break and control" factions. By faction, he meant "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the

permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This was man-to-man talk, male citizen to male citizen, insider to insider.

The narrow conception holds today, I believe. It pervades the conventional conception of citizenship education and explains at least some of the failure of both citizenship education and multicultural education to be grappled with seriously in many school settings (Sleeter, 1992). It is a conception that seeks to control the expression of political diversity, holding it at bay, while more-or-less ignoring or opposing the vigorous expression of social and cultural diversity. If the conception had a motto, it might be this: Contain political diversity; constrain social and cultural diversity.

Ironically, this is the meaning of the real motto, e pluribus unum. It is interpreted generally to mean "from manyness, oneness." Not alongside manyness, but from manyness. We are talking about the transcendence of difference, the conquering or overcoming of difference. Perhaps it should be tolerated, yes, and tolerance is sometimes valued as a civic virtue. But there is a withholding, reluctant quality to it. This reluctance can be seen not only in Jay's "brethren" discourse but in the recent spate of communitarian longing for homogeneous, organic community (e.g., Sandel, 1982; Etzioni, 1993). Both the Federalist and communitarian views shy from social heterogeneity, regarding it a danger. Both avoid and seem not to have considered a substantively different conception of the relationship of unity to difference, one in which political oneness exists with (alongside) social and cultural diversity. Diversity does not need to be conquered or colonized, not even transcended. On this conception, it can be fostered.

Citizenship education. The narrower conception, I believe, generally undergirds the citizenship education literature in the United States. This is true on both its traditional and progressive wings. I turn to these now and, in drawing this distinction, introduce the first of what I consider to be three "advanced" ideas on democratic citizenship.

On the traditional wing is the familiar values-knowledge-skills theme advanced by R. Freeman Butts (1980) and others. Citizenship education, he wrote, "embraces the

fundamental values of the political community, a realistic and scholarly knowledge of the working cf political institutions and processes, and the skills of political behavior required for effective participation in a democracy" (p. 122). Emphasized mainly is teaching the young to hold the "office of citizen," meaning one who votes, develops opinions on matters of public concern, holds dear commitments to liberty and justice, and has a deep understanding of what happens in democratic government, from its three branches to its protection of individual rights. Harry Boyte (1994) calls this "mainstream civics," and criticizes the new CIVITAS curriculum framework (1991) for not reaching beyond it. That 600-page text expresses the traditional wing's bias that politics is what politicians and government officials do while citizens mainly study and watch what they do.

William Bennett's James Madison Elementary School is another expression of the same bias. His 8th-grade course lists the conventional topics.

> Study of the U.S. Constitution and discussions of the
> political structures ad principles it establishes: separation of
> powers, checks and balances, and republican government;
> duties of congressional authority and its limits; national
> elections and the electoral college; the president and vice
> president, their terms of office, and their responsibilities; the
> system of federal courts, due process, and judicial review;
> and provision for amendments.

Scholars on the progressive wing do not denigrate this knowledge base or wish to do away with knowledge bases. They are not generally fixated on "processes" and "skills" as their traditionalist detractors like to claim. Scholars on this wing spend a good deal of time specifying the knowledge base, but they work also on developing the "intellectual framework (that) will be used to guide the teacher and, in turn, the student in handling these materials" (Oliver & Shaver, 1966/74; see also Oliver, 1957, and Stanley & Nelson, 1994). Perhaps the fact that any serious attention at all is paid to an "intellectual

framework" for using and interpreting data distinguishes this wing. A more sharply distinguishing characteristic, however, speaks directly to the concerns raised in the opening three scenes of this paper: Progressives want a more participatory, direct form of citizenship. Direct democracy emphasizes all the ways people can behave in the citizen role other than by being a legislator or voting and campaigning for or against a legislator. Emphasized is the development of "public agency--people's capacities to act with effect and with public spirit" (Boyte, p. 417)--along with rehabilitating citizens' capacity for phronesis or practical reasoning. Here is Fred Newmann's citizen action curriculum (1975), Shirley Engle's decision making model, (1960), Paul Hanna's Youth Serves the Community (1936), Oliver and Shaver's jurisprudential framework (1966/74), Kohlberg's "just community" discussions (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg, 1989), Howard and Kenny's school-wide governance programs (1992), and Vivian Paley's remarkable model for moral discourse in kindergarten classrooms (1992).

There are philosophical roots to the divergence of the two wings. At the heart of the progressive critique of traditional citizenship education is disappointment with orthodox liberalism. Liberal democracy celebrates the civil and political rights of individuals and representative/republican government. Meanwhile, it renders participatory citizenship superfluous and creates what Anne Phillips calls liberal democratic minimalism (1993). Made into spectators rather than citizens, adults are left to preoccupy themselves with the former: their rights. Consequently, the public space for civic discourse is taken up by "rights talk" (Glendon, 1991) and phronesis is replaced by dependency on experts.

Traditionalists want more study of liberal democracy, progressives want more practice. Traditionalists concentrate on knowledge of the republican system, progressives on civic conversation, deliberation on public issues, civic journalism, problem-solving/community action groups that bring together people of various identities, and other forms of direct and deliberate participation in what could be called "the middle sector" or what traditionally is called "civil society" (e.g., Walzer 1992b). This is the public space in

between government and private interests. Progressives, then, are more demanding in their interpretation of popular sovereignty. They oppose limiting citizenship activity to voting for representatives who, in turn, are the only people who think and behave like citizens. "People who simply drop scraps of paper in a box or pull a lever," writes community organizer Karl Hess (1979), "are not acting like citizens; they are acting like consumers, picking between prepackaged political items" (p. 10). Traditionalists are content with this scheme for it is integral to the faction-controlling, dissolution-fearing, republican vision articulated by Jay and Madison.

Despite the progressive wing's expectation that citizens act like citizens, still it minimizes social and cultural heterogeneity. Both wings believe that what matters most are the civil and political relations among the brethren--those citizens who are reasonably well-secured within the unum and whose differences, therefore, are disagreements on matters of common concern. By minimizing or distancing matters of race, gender, and ethnicity from the central concerns of governmental and direct democracy, the narrow view is limited in its ability to advance contemporary thinking about the unity/difference tension or what is arguably the central citizenship question of our time: How can people live together justly, in ways that are mutually satisfying, and that leave their differences, both individual and group, intact and our multiple identities recognized?

The narrow conception has at its center only one real approach to the unity/difference tension, and that is assimilation. Assimilation is thus built into the common sense of citizenship education as one of its bearing walls. Whether one elaborates the construct in progressive or traditional ways, still a "band of brethren" vision dominates the citizenship construction site. Social and cultural diversity, having been driven away from this site, has had to find attention in what, remarkably, has become an altogether different literature: multicultural education.

"Advanced" Ideas about Democracy

A more fully articulated conception of citizenship education would need to incorporate the ideal of citizen action and practical politics, that is, direct democracy, which the progressive wing has done quite well. But this alone would not widen the scope of the conception sufficiently to include social and cultural difference or what has been called "the new cultural politics of difference" (West 1990) or the "politics of recognition" (Taylor, 1992). To accomplish this, it should be helpful two bring two additional ideas to the site. Both are tensions, one concerning the democratic work that needs to be done now by contemporary citizens, the other the tension between pluralism and assimilation.

Path/Accomplishment

Tied to the participatory ideal is a view of democracy as a path or journey. Dewey called this creative democracy, by which he meant that democracy is a way of individual living with others, a way of being. It has no end other than the path itself. Ends arise on the path, "right within the process of problem solving, not prior to it" (Lee, 1965, p. 129). It follows on this view that there is "no period, either in the past or the present, that serves as a model for democracy" (Phillips, 1993, p. 2). Viewed as a creative, constructive process, democracy is not already accomplished, in which case citizens today need only to protect it, but a trek that citizens in a pluralist society try to make together. It is the path that unites them, not a culture, language, or religion. The ratification of the Constitution and the several democratic struggles that followed hardly closed the book on democracy in the United States; they hardly dispensed with its possibilities. Democracy is not now "done." The "miracle of Philadelphia" was an important step on the path, ending slavery another, extending the franchise to women and persons without property another, the Civil Rights Movement another, but, and this is the point, the work continues. The Fourth of July celebrates the founding of the nation on one view, the path on the other.

The path notion in no way mitigates the importance of tradition and celebration. At the same time, it holds a dynamic view of the traditions involved. Richard Rorty exemplifies this point with his pragmatic hope that children will be taught to consider themselves "heirs to a tradition" that sponsors a continual deepening of democracy and a rethinking of its tenets. He calls this a tradition "of increasing liberty and rising hope." Children should think of themselves

> as proud and loyal citizens of a country that, slowly and painfully, threw off a foreign yoke, freed its slaves, enfranchised its women, restrained its robber barons and licenses its trade unions, liberalized its religious practices and broadened its religious and moral tolerance, and built colleges in which 50 percent of its population could enroll--a country that numbered Ralph Waldo Emerson, Eugene V. Debs, Susan B. Anthony, and James Baldwin among its citizens (1989, p. 22)

This is a tradition that asks democrats to "live out the true meaning of their creed," as King said. This involves continually working to close the gap between the real and the ideal, but also viewing the gap as a perennial one out of which reformulations of the creed arise. Therefore, the path is never-ending, and both the real and the ideal continually are reformulated. This does not mean that democratic citizens do not pursue specific social and economic ends. Of course they do, for this is what politics is. The path should not be viewed as a "pure land" or "city on the hill" or "common utopia" without clatter and rancor. We are disagreeable people, and the democratic path is no way out of that. But at the same time the democratic vision is more than this. Mary Dietz writes precisely about this:

> "Perhaps it is best to say that this is a vision fixed not on an end but rather inspired by a principle--freedom--and by a political activity--positive liberty. That activity is a demanding process that never ends, for it means engaging in public debate and sharing responsibility for self-government" (1992, p. 77).

The principle cuts the path, making it a democratic path. It guarantees certain individual freedoms, commits the pathfinders to written law and limited government, stipulates that everyone is to be regarded as equal to everyone else and in possession the fullest measure of human dignity, makes rule-making and enforcement the shared task of some (or all) citizens, and requires a measure of restraint so that change can be accomplished without leaving the path altogether. Beyond these defining attributes, the path relies on good sense, practical judgment, civility, deliberation skills and dispositions, and the like--what might be called civic competencies. These things are evidently not natural in humans, hence the necessity of education.

Pluralism/Assimilation

I have sketched two "advanced" ideas so far. The idea of participatory citizenship favors wider and deeper forms of popular sovereignty; the path view of democracy sees it as an ongoing way of life rather than a sacred attainment needing protection but no development. The third idea concentrates on what is perhaps the most crucial intersection in this problem space, which is the juncture of democracy and diversity. It brings to the first "advanced" idea the questions, Who is and is not participating, and on whose terms? And to the second, How wide is the path?

Fueling the third idea[5] is the new pluralism that has swept through democratic theorizing, effectively replacing the longstanding assumption that traditional democratic institutions had solved the "problem of diversity." Much of the new work stems from the postmodern and post-structural literatures that press beyond tolerating difference to fostering it. Much of the newer work acknowledges the fact of particularity and the wishful thinking of universalism, and resists the basically theistic urge to respond to the modern condition by trying desperately to gather everything into one. The newer work is

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[5]This section draws on Parker (in press-B).

particularly relevant to the effort at hand because it contains articulated conceptions of difference that are not grounded simply and reactively in the fear of dissolution. Obviously, this a sharply different terrain from Jay's Federalist No. 2. I am referring especially to recent analyses of race relations and racial formation (Anzaldua [1987], Code [1991], hooks [1989], Omi & Winant [1986], Said [1978], and West [1993]) and feminist critiques of the patriarchy that has suffused liberalism and Marxism alike (Collins [1990], Dietz [1992], Fraser [1993], and Fraser & Nicholson [1988]). All this work is not new. T. H. Marshall's great work on citizenship, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (1964), argued that "citizenship has itself become, in certain respects, the architect of social inequality" (p. 70).

This third idea contests the ability of liberal democracy to hold pluribus as a central tenet while at the same time denying, punishing or, at best, tolerating so much diversity. According to the principles of liberal democracy, unity arises from diversity. Yet, in "actually existing democracies" (Fraser, 1993), numerous groups live on the outskirts of the political community and are not by any stretch of the imagination included in the unum. While people of color, women, the poor, gays, and lesbians are marginalized, liberal democracy celebrates pluralism as a present, continuing, and necessary feature of a democratic state.

How is the contradiction managed? In the first place, according to the myth's supporters e pluribus unum is not so much a path as an accomplishment, the key benchmarks of which include the Federalists' brilliant constitutional accommodation of political factions and numerous 18th and 19th century accommodations of difference of religion and national origin (Fuchs, 1990). Any serious attention to diversity today, the argument goes, now that the the deal is done and the envelop pushed as far as it can go, will result in what Arthur Schlesinger (1991) calls "the disuniting of America." This is a fantastic misconception. Contradicting the second "advanced" idea, democracy as a creative path, it construes the status quo becomes an already united jewel not to be

disturbed. Second, liberal democracy's individualism is highly abstract and impersonal. It is necessarily "difference-blind" (Taylor, 1992). Its citizen is a character of indifferent sex, race, social class, religion, national origin, and, in some polities, sexual orientation. This is liberal democracy's neutrality premise. In societies where group identities are politicized, however, and matter greatly in the conduct of public affairs, indifference will serve especially the interests of whichever groups presently enjoy positions of power. That is, formulations that pretend neutrality reproduce the status quo, and the failure to acknowledge this fact only intensifies its effect.

Liberal democracy's basic tenets of individual liberty, human dignity, equality, and popular sovereignty need to be preserved, but extended and deepened. Accordingly, a new sense of citizenship needs to be forged that embraces individual difference, group difference, and political community all at once. In order to do this, democrats will not be able merely to replace liberalism's excessive individual self-interest with a new politics of group self-interest. That would be no gain. Pluralism itself needs to be reformulated in order to avoid the essentializing tendencies of much radical thinking about diversity that considers men to be such and such because they are men, and Japanese to be so and so because they are Japanese. In the same way, women are..., blacks are..., Hispanics are..., lesbians are..., and so on down a stereotype-littered civic back alley from which no one escapes.

The perilous challenge is to recognize individual and group identities without etching them in primordial stone,[6] and to unite them horizontally in a democratic moral discourse that is capable of embracing more than mere "rights talk." Here is Dewey's (1927) vision of a "larger public" that embraces the "little publics." The larger one is not, let us be clear, a broad-based cultural comradeship. In modern, culturally diverse states,

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[6]Anne Phillips (1993) notes that the point has always been rather easily grasped where social class is concerned, for modern people do not generally believe that one's social class is fixed or natural. This is why people can at least imagine the elimination of class distinctions. Ethnicity, race, and gender, however, are not so protean, and the tendency has been to reify them.

this is unrealistic and undesirable. When pursued by dominant groups, the wish for cultural homogeneity becomes assimilationist or, pulling all stops, a repressive, totalizing campaign. "The problem that lies at the heart of totalizing theories," writes Ruthann Kurth-Schai, "is the attempt to address difference by subsuming it within a greater whole...(and) the acceptance of diversity as a state to be transcended" (1992, p. 155). The Holocaust, Czarist Russification and American "nativist" campaigns are vivid examples on the right and middle, and from the left, Stalin, Mao and the Kmer Rouge provide additional monstrous examples of "transcendence" gone mad.

Dewey's vision of the larger public is an approach to democratic life that strives to construct a grid that binds citizens together in a broad political, not cultural, comradeship. It is one that not only tolerates diversity (the little publics) but actively fosters it as a democratic virtue. This is the civil society argument. Civil society is a collection of little publics--voluntary associations based on religion, ethnicity, race, hobbies, community service, interests of all sorts. The state is the larger public. The state and the little publics are formally distinct. "For support and comfort and a sense of belonging, men and women look to their groups" (Walzer, 1992a, p. 67); but for their rights, their mobilities, and their freedom to change their associations, they look to the state. The democratic project in a pluralist society, then, requires the development of a disposition to foster "a unity of individuals alongside the diversity of groups" (p. 68). That project will need to include a critique of the forms of liberalism that make genuine pluralism impossible (those that limit the meaning of democracy to "rights talk" and the meaning of difference to political disagreements among insiders) and also of those forms of pluralism that make political community impossible (e.g., the extention of "rights talk" to groups; refusing to cooperate on a common democratic path). This will not be easy work. It may well prove too difficult.

Conclusion

I am not concerned to pin down a definition of any of the key concepts involved, whether democracy, pluralism, or citizenship. I want to contribute to discussions, not a dictionary. The discussions I have in mind are actual ones, not hypothetical,. They involve teachers, principals, curriculum coordinators, and parents who are wondering what it might mean to educate students for democracy.

If I have succeeded in sketching the contours of a deepened and expanded conception of democratic citizenship, then the following summary should make some sense. The education literature contains a conventional conception of democratic citizenship and citizenship education, and of the unity/difference or oneness/manyness tension in particular. That conception is limited in two ways. First, there is its liberal-Federalist emphasis on containing political difference in such a way that the political world of the brethren--those inside the *unum*--is stabilized; second, there is its tendency to minimize social and cultural diversity, as though it were a different matter entirely. This is a nominal and exclusive notion of democracy, one driven by fear of dissolution and difference. It is not without consequences.

Among them are three that should be of particular interest to educators: a tenacious bias for assimilation; an expectation that citizens, even those in the brethren's circle, become little more than interested spectators who watch other people (elected representatives) act like citizens; and an inability to regard democracy as a living creed. On my interpretation, this is the conception found wanting by democratic activists in Tiananmen Square, Warsaw and Berlin, not to mention Minneapolis, Selma, Bangkok, and Tel Aviv.

It is possible to broaden this conception by working with three tensions or "advanced ideas." These are building blocks for a more fully articulated conception that takes both difference and democracy seriously (Figure 1). One of these building blocks concerns the kind of participation for which citizens need to be educated. This is the

tension between direct involvement in public life and spectatorship. Contested here is the meaning of popular sovereignty. The "advanced" idea retains representatives but asks citizens to do more than merely elect them and then lapse into dormancy for another four years. It opens up a new civic space for active, cooperative involvement in public life. Another very closely related building block concerns one's outlook on democracy. This is the tension between viewing democracy as an attainment needing only protection and as an always unfinished way of life that a people undertake together. Contested here is the very meaning of public life and the "selves" that compose it. The "advanced" idea is that citizens need to think of themselves as having a public life in which they manifest as democrats. They need to reflect on public life and form it anew, again and again, in community service, social action, and deliberation. Here lies the possibility of a popular sovereignty in which "average citizens" participate ongoingly. The third building block is the tension between pluralism and assimilation. Contested here is whether the "little publics" are a threat or an aid to the larger public and, hence, the desirability of fostering as opposed to tolerating them. Contested, in brief, is the meaning of e pluribus unum. The "advanced" idea is that it can mean something other than shying away from (or outright opposing) difference in the name of unity. It can mean alongside the cultural many, the political one. With this meaning, difference ceases to be a threat to community.

place figure 1 about here

The implications of a deepened and expanded conception of democratic citizenship for citizenship educators can only be imagined, for that is its own democratic path. The citizenship curriculum in the schools, to the extent one has been articulated or implemented, typically emphasizes teaching the documents, ideas, and procedures of republican government. Assimilation, protectionism, and citizen passivity together undergird the treatment. Persistently avoided, with few exceptions, is sustained curriculum and

instruction on the deliberative arts, on reasoning together, on cultural differences within societies and the consequent tension between oneness and manyness, and on school life as a laboratory for democratic living. In a reconceptualized citizenship education curriculum, this largely avoided realm would be explored alongside the documents, ideas, and procedures. Fortunately, educators need not start from scratch, as promising curriculum work has been done on each aspect of the avoided terrain. It is the conceptual discussion that is needed most critically, however, the rationale building and clarification of meanings without which even the best curriculum work has no value.

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direct /spectatorship

Participation


path/accomplishment

Outlook

pluralism/assimilation

Difference

Figure 1:

Building blocks in a pluralist conception of citizenship