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AUTHOR	Shapiro, Joan Poliner; Stefkovich, Jacqueline A.
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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that at the heart of administration, there lie moral dilemmas in need of resolution. In the field of educational administration, no graduation requirement exists for completion of an ethics course. This paper describes an ethics course designed for doctoral cohorts in educational administration. It is argued that educational administrators must take the time to work through their personal and professional codes and also spend considerable time comparing and contrasting them. The course exposed graduate students to traditional and nontraditional ethics, giving them the opportunity to place their own codes in perspective. The paper also highlights the pedagogical implications of teaching an ethics course in educational administration and the different approaches used by two different instructors for the same course. The paper provides a brief overview of the course content and describes the two professors' backgrounds and teaching pedagogies. The course was based on self-reflection, peer review, and careful content analysis, and dealt with a combination of liberal democratic ethics, liberation theology, critical theory, and feminist ethics. (LMI)

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Towards the Preparation of Ethical Educational Administrators for Diverse Communities: Exploring "Self," Content and Pedagogy

by

Joan Poliner Shapiro
Associate Dean and Associate Professor
Temple University

and

Jacqueline A. Stefkovich
Associate Professor
Temple University

Paper presented at the national conference of the University Council for Educational Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 29, 1994.

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Towards the Preparation of Ethical
Educational Administrators for Diverse Communities:
Exploring "Self," Content, and Pedagogy [1]

by

Joan Poliner Shapiro
and
Jacqueline A. Stefkovich[2]

> **Each administrative decision carries with it a restructuring of a human life:** this is why administration at its heart is the resolution of moral dilemmas. (Foster, 1986, p. 33)

Introduction

Many professions, such as law, medicine, dentistry, and business, require their graduate students to take at least one ethics courses before graduation. Such courses are thought to be essential for the socialization of an individual into the profession and important to inculcate basic professional values. In the field of educational administration, no such requirement exists. Cambron-McCabe and Foster (1994) have explained this omission this way:

> Positivistic science deflected our attention from moral questions related to purpose and values. As a science the field has emphasized the quantifiable. If it is not quantifiable, it is not real. Thus we tend not to address such things as values, commitment, and character. (p. 59)

Of late, there are a number of scholars in educational administration, such as Beck (1994), Cambron-McCabe and Foster (1994), Greenfield (1993), Starratt (1994) and others, who advocate the importance of ethics as part of the preparation of

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[1] This paper is based in part on the article "Personal and Professional Ethics for Educational Adminstrators: Nontraditional and Pedagogical Implications" by Jacqueline A. Stefkovich and Joan Poliner Shapiro which has been recently accepted for publication in the <u>Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science</u>. (Anticipated publication date: Spring 1995).

[2] Joan Poliner Shapiro is Associate Dean at Temple University's College of Education and Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies where she teaches ethics and action research. Jacqueline A. Stefkovich is an associate professor of ethics and school law at Temple University's College of Education, Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies.

educational leaders. Whether required or not for entrance to the profession, our rationale for this type of preparation extends beyond the basic assumption that an educational administrator should be aware of professional ethics.

Much like Foster, in the introductory quote to this paper, we believe that at the heart of administration, there lie moral dilemmas in need of resolutions. Although various organizations connected to aspects of educational administration, such as the National Educational Association, the American Association of School Administrators, and the Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development, have provided us with professional codes, we believe that remote codes, devised by others, will not suffice.

Since moral dilemmas are so central to administration, they require more than a superficial acceptance of prescribed codes. What is required, we believe, is that educational administrators take the time to work through their personal codes and professional codes and also spend considerable time comparing and contrasting them. Such a process requires reflection and an understanding of ourselves as well as of others.

Thus, we believe that in Colleges and Schools of Education which prepare educational administrators, both students and their professors need to come to grips with: who they are; how they make decisions; what they perceive to be right or wrong and good or bad. And, above all, they must analyze why they make the final decisions they do.

However, the thinking through of personal and professional codes cannot be carried out in a vacuum. In this paper, we discuss an ethics course designed for doctoral cohorts in educational administration. The course exposed graduate students to not only traditional ethics, but to non-traditional ethics as well, thus enabling them to place their own codes in some sort of ethical perspective and to modify them if need be.

We also highlight the pedagogical implications of teaching an ethics course in educational administration. To illustrate these implications, we focus on a course that the two of us taught independently using basically the same syllabus and resources. And yet, each of us privileged different readings, and when we taught the same material, we tended to teach the readings from different perspectives.

Upon analyzing why this was so, we discovered that it had much to do with our own personal and professional codes of ethics. These codes rested on our own backgrounds and the critical incidents that shaped us as educators. In this paper, we stress the need for professors of ethics in educational administration programs and their graduate students to not only

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deal with both traditional and non-traditional ethical writings, but also to spend time analyzing their own backgrounds. This consciousness-raising should hopefully lead to understandings and insights and enable professors and students to develop both meaningful personal and professional ethical codes that will have a positive impact on those lives that educational administrators touch.

Brief Overview of Course Content

John Dewey (1902) has characterized ethics as the science that deals with conduct in so far as it is considered right or wrong, good or bad. Ethics comes from the Greek word "ethos" which originally meant customs or usages, especially belonging to one group as distinguished from another. Later it came to mean, disposition or character -- customs, not just habit, but approved way of acting. However, this definition raises certain questions. One might ask: Ethics approved by whom? Right or wrong according to whom? Should the group in power have the right to determine what is right and what is wrong? And then, what happens when the group in power changes?

In traditional liberal democratic ethics, at least from a Eurocentric perspective, the work of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Kant, and Mills, to name but a few, have prevailed. Each of these thinkers have dealt with such issues as the nature of the universe, the nature of God, fate versus free will, good and evil, and the relationship between human beings and their state. In the liberal democratic tradition, liberalism is defined as a "commitment to human freedom," and democracy implies "procedures for making decisions that respect the equal sovereignty of the people." (Strike, 1991, p. 415)

Abstract justice, rights, and law have dominated under the rubric of traditional liberal democratic ethics. Arguments are set up in such a way that they tend to be perceived as objective, remote, impartial. Feelings, all too often, are left behind when one views ethics from a traditional perspective. Usually, when traditional ethics is taught, a framework is provided that asks one to think in a limited, step by step, manner.

A good example of this highly structured view is illustrated in a book by Strike, Haller, and Soltis (1988). We asked students to use this text as a vehicle to discuss some cases appropriate to educational administration. The framework for analysis of those cases, as designed by the authors, required students to read a case, define the dispute, analyze the dispute and reach a rational conclusion.

However, there are a number of educational ethicists who are not pleased with this rational, step by step process or with the

focus on abstract justice, rights, and law inherent in the liberal democratic tradition. While difficult to categorize, some of these scholars tend to borrow their beliefs and ideas from liberation theologists who turn to varied and innovative interpretations of traditional religions as a basis for a just society; some are critical theorists who challenge the status quo and see many paradoxes, dilemmas within society; and others are feminists who challenge the patriarchal laws and dominant ethics of our society.

Out of these diverse groups emerge non-traditional voices of critique and possibilities and of care, concern, compassion and connectedness over time. Some of these non-traditional ethicists speak of social justice while others speak of solving the problems of injustice. Whatever their interpretations or frames of reference, these non-traditional ethicists provide other ethical options for analyzing and dealing with the problems that face our schools and our society.

In our ethics course, we not only took into account the voice emanating from the liberal democratic tradition, but we took seriously the voices of the non-traditional educational ethicists. Although one of us tended to privilege the non-traditional voices more than he other, we both, in varying degrees, made certain to hear other voices -- frequently of the "underdog" or the groups who have long been out of power, silenced and ignored. Through the use of non-traditional ethics, we asked: Who has been omitted? Who has been silenced?

Before we discuss our course and its pedagogical implications in more detail, we would like to spend a little time providing an overview of our backgrounds and a few critical incidents that shaped our lives. After considerable reflection, we believe that these stories have led to the development of both our personal and professional ethical codes. We also believe that such self-disclosures are needed to assist us in better understanding our pedagogical approaches and how we affect our students.

Thus, we agree with Foucault (1985) and his focus on "care of self." We are aware that analyzing ourselves and our techniques related to the "self" is difficult. We take Foucault's (1983) cautions to heart:

> First, the techniques of the self do not require the same material apparatus as the production of objects, therefore they are often invisible techniques. Second, they are frequently linked to the techniques for the direction of others. For example, if we take educational institutions, we realize that one is managing others and teaching them to manage themselves. (p. 250)

The Professors' Stories

In this secular age, with all of the problems that face us, we think it is extremely important for us as professionals and as educational leaders, to have a sense of who we are and what we believe in personally and professionally. Therefore, as we have previously mentioned, we have found an important exercise for students has been to pull together personal ethical codes, based on life stories and critical incidences, and then develop professional codes, based on the experiences and expectations of ones working life thus far. It is also important to compare and contrast personal and professional ethical codes looking for consistencies and inconsistencies.

In our case, we realized that since we had asked our students to embark on such difficult soul-searching assignments, then it was important that we do the same. Further, as two professors who have taught basically the same content in an ethics course in different academic years to similar educational administration doctoral cohort groups, we felt that such explorations might have profound effects, enabling us to compare and contrast how we teach such a course and why we choose to teach it in the ways we do.

We tend to believe what Witherell and Noddings (1991) have written: "To educate is to take seriously both the quest for life's meaning and the meaning of individual lives." (p. 3)

We have been affected by the works of Belenky, Clinchy, Golberger and Tarule (1986), Beck (1994), Gilligan (1982, 1988), Noddings (1984, 1992), Shapiro and Smith-Rosenberg (1989) and others who have stressed the importance of developing a voice and have come to realize that life stories and personal experiences can be powerful. Such stories can help to determine who we are today both personally and professionally.

We have also been affected by the work of Bakhtin (1981), Freire and Shor (1987), Kohlberg (1981, 1984), Purpel (1989), and others in their quest for dialogue and knowledge of "self" in relation to others. Difficult dialogue leading to self-disclosure can be a most trying process, but it can also assist us in making our once hidden ethical codes explicit. Further, it can take what might be deemed to be a selfish process of focusing on the "self" and use it as a way to serve and care for others by helping them find their voices and their values.

On the surface the two of us seem to be somewhat similar. We are both white females; we are both from the Northeastern seaboard; we both have doctoral degrees in educational administration from Ivy League institutions; and we are both middle-class and about the same age. However, that is as far as our similarities go.

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In fact, we are very different individuals. For example, viewing our formal education, one of us has had been prepared as a school counselor and lawyer while the other has been trained as a secondary school teacher and as a higher education administrator. But our formal education and its socialization does not tell enough. Our stories and the critical incidents within them have tended to shape who we are.

Since we ask our students in the ethics course to develop their own personal codes, based on their own lives, we will now set the stage by providing some of our own stories as their teachers. We have chosen parts of our lives that we feel have had an impact on how we came to approach the same ethics course in different ways. Rather than pretend that we came to the course with open minds, we think it is important to indicate some of the experiences and perspectives that we brought with us.

Joan's Story:

When I reflect upon my own personal ethical code, I know that I have been shaped by my religious roots, as a Jew, and by the area where I grew up in the Northeastern part of the U.S. which stressed the Puritan work ethic and a form of social Darwinism in which individual hard work and competition were thought to be healthy values. The notion seemed clear at that time, growing up as a middle-class child in Connecticut, that we all had opportunity, if only we worked hard.

However, I know that my code of values and ethics has been deeply shaped by the years I spent in College -- a time when the Civil Rights movement was very active. While in College, I gave considerable thought to the concept of discrimination, and I remember many a holiday having verbal battles with my parents about the Civil Rights movement and civil disobedience. In fact, soon after graduation, during my honeymoon, my new 18 year old British brother-in-law accompanied my husband and me singing peace and Civil Rights songs. The three of us were so keen that we were the only whites attending a rally in Washington D.C. in which Martin Luther King spoke -- my family and friends thought that I had had a very strange honeymoon indeed.

My ethical code was also shaped by teaching British history in London, England, for a few years to working class children who had little chance to advance because they had not passed the 11# exam -- an exam that determined if they were university material or not at the tender age of 11 or so. I taught in a Secondary Modern all girls' school composed of students who were either from working class white Anglo-Saxon families or from working class families of color from diverse Commonwealth countries. For my students in this school, their options were generally to become hairdressers, shop assistants or at best secretaries in

the high road nearby. Even when we "went comprehensive," under the labor government, a tracking system prohibited my students from having opportunities to move towards higher education. In England's secondary schools, I saw injustices primarily based on the intersection of social class with race and/or ethnicity.

Some years later I returned to the U.K. to spend a postdoctoral year at the University of London's Institute of Education. There I was exposed to the rich tradition of the philosophy of education that seemed to permeate all of education. The philosophical works of R.S. Peters (1966) and P.H. Hirst (1974), for example, were held in high regard. Peters and Hirst were able to combine not only the liberal tradition of justice, but they added to it more of an emotional and caring quality. This respect for both the cognitive and affective domains had an effect on me.

Most importantly, beyond the formal classroom, during the four years I lived in the U.K., I was impressed with British society's ability to combine socialism with the "noblesse oblige" spirit that still existed from the Middle Ages. National health care, generous university grants for poor students, and welfare that was not perceived to be a stigma for those less fortunate, had a very real effect on me. Unlike many Americans, schooled in Social Darwinism, I began to feel that the society had an obligation to look after its people in appropriate ways, if at all possible, from the cradle to the grave.

Thus far in my life, my consciousness had been raised in the areas of religion, race, and social class, but it took a critical incident for me to focus on the category of gender discrimination. It was Uncle Max's funeral that was the turning point for me in the category of gender.

Uncle Max's funeral took place in the Northern part of England, in which a very fundamentalist sect of Jews dwelled. When my husband and I arrived at Uncle Max's home, the women were moaning and wailing around a hearse that waited outside the door. This seemed strange to me as Uncle Max was well into his 80's and had not suffered unduly before his death. With my husband, I went to the burial ground for the ceremony. At the grounds, much to my surprise, I turned out to be the only woman present and was told not to leave the car. Apparently, women were not allowed on the burial grounds lest they sully the soil.

This was a painful experience for me as I had only recently buried my father, in the conservative Jewish tradition, and my mother, sister, and I had been free to mourn publicly and on the cemetary grounds. It seemed to me that the humiliation for women continued that day when the Rabbi told Auntie Minnie, Uncle Max's wife of 45 years, that she missed an excellent speech he had given on behalf of her husband on the burial grounds. All the

women around me seemed to accept, without comment, what I perceived to be an insult, but I was never the same. Gender became an overriding category of difference and discrimination in my life making me into a feminist.

Ten years of co-directing a Women's Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania continued to raise my consciousness towards injustices -- not just in the area of sexism but in the realms of race, ethnicity, social class, sexual orientation, and disability. In reflecting on patriarchy, power, and hierarchy, I began to realize the great impact of society and how it can manage to keep diverse groups in their place. Dealing with issues of oppression, victimization, and difference, I began to understand how groups have been socially constructed by those in power and the effect of that construction on individuals within the group. Collectivity, social responsibility, and care of others were concepts that struck a chord with me, moving me away from "rugged individualism" and Social Darwinism. Thanks to studying feminist scholarship, I began to question abstract justice, rights, and law.

My background, the numerous critical incidents in my life, the years I spent in England and in the area of Women's Studies led me to focus heavily on the "underdog" in society. I seem to care deeply about injustices of all kinds. I constantly ask: Who has been omitted? Whose voice is missing? Whose ethical values am I privileging? Whose ethical values is society privileging? I often think about the good of the whole community as well as the good of different groups within the community.

However, my code of ethics, I now realize, is not simplistic. On issues related to one's body and one's life, I am very much committed to individual liberty and privacy. Thus, in all cases, I do not disdain the rights of the individual. I am then a situational ethicist, who leans towards a belief in our need to have a moral commitment beyond self towards those less fortunate and those who are different from ourselves -- towards the concept of social responsibility.

Jackie's Story:

My own values and ethical code have evolved through the years. I was raised in a Catholic working class family in a rural community in Western Pennsylvania. It was here that I learned the importance of honesty, respect for others, and hard work. Mine was the first generation in that town that went to college and my family viewed an education as the most important goal that one could achieve -- both as an end in itself and as a way up and out of a tough life.

In the 1920s, the community where I grew up had been a bustling coal town, but the great depression hit hard and the mines closed. Most of the men in the town -- those of my parents' generation -- turned to labor jobs in neighboring steel mills while their wives stayed at home raising the children. The men of my generation -- if not college bound -- took on the hard, and often dangerous life of an iron worker. The women married young and became hairdressers or, if they were lucky enough to be educated, teachers.

There was a definite pecking order in this town. Those who had been fortunate to immigrate first, the English and the Welsh, owned farms with large houses and a great deal of land. The Irish came next and often had jobs working for the township. At the bottom of this ladder were those who carried with them the stigma of long, funny last names -- the Italians and the Eastern Europeans. These were the majority and I was one of them.

"You have really got to get that name changed," the town pharmacist said to an eleven year old me as he stumbled over the name while filling my prescription. "Perhaps you will marry someone with a shorter last name." That was the first time that I remember the sting of discrimination. It always struck me odd that my grandmother who came from Czechoslovakia in 1916, played the piano, spoke five languages, and raised seven children alone after her young husband was killed in a mine cave-in was somehow inferior because she carried the badge of a long last name. And, I also shared that disdain of others -- and that limitation -- because of my name and my ethnicity.

This was only one of a number of similar childhood incidents, but it remains most vivid in my mind because it was the first time that I came head to head with the painful realization that I might be limited because of something I could not help -- because of who I was. Even at eleven, I realized that to be as good as other people, I would need to do more than change my name, I would need to deny my identity, my culture, my background, and my family.

This denial of self was something that I have never been prepared to do -- neither then nor now, decades later. But I always carried that memory with me and vowed that I would never -- at least intentionally -- impose that pain or this stigma on any other human being. It was not until I attended college in the late 1960s that I was exposed to people of other races and other cultures and, after hearing their stories, realized how insignificant my pain must have been compared to that of so many others.

Thus, a respect for human dignity and a focus on the worth of each person as a unique individual has always been an important value for me. This value began early on, but took

shape during my college years. I began as an English major at a time when a liberal arts education was deemed important for a well-rounded education, so I had my share of courses in history, philosophy, and the social sciences. It was after I got a "C" in my first English composition course that I changed my major to psychology.

In light of my current views and position as a teacher of ethics and law, it seems ironic to me that I got so discouraged from that very average grade in one English course and also that I just happened to attend one of the few universities in this country that approaches psychology from the European tradition of existentialism. So, instead of running rats in mazes, I studied Kant and Sartre and pondered the meaning of existence, something that, at the time, seemed quite exotic for a first generation college-educated female from a blue-color background. Nonetheless, this experience greatly influenced my present view of life as well as my approach to teaching.

Formal education as a personally enriching experience, as a key to open doors of opportunity, and as a compensation to counter perceived shortcomings (with regards to ethnicity and gender) has always figured largely in my life. I earned a masters' degree in counseling immediately after undergraduate school and, after some thirteen years of working in public schools and in state bureaucracy, I quit what my family perceived as a "good" (meaning "stable") job to attend graduate school fulltime. During the next seven years, I completed a doctorate in educational administration as well as a law degree.

Each of these educational experiences taught me important lessons and each shaped my values in different ways. It was through my counseling program that I learned the meaning of empathy, a key concept in the profession. "It's not the same as sympathy," I remember my professors saying. "It's being able to put yourself in someone else's shoes, to feel as they feel." It is no wonder that today one my favorite contemporary philosophers is John Rawls who believes that a just outcome is one that a person would arrive at having no idea which role he or she played in any given moral dilemma.

As part of my doctoral program in educational administration, I took an elective with Larry Kohlberg and learned about the longitudinal studies which gave rise to his theory of moral development. It was here also that I was first exposed to the works of Carol Gilligan. It was in this program that I wrote a doctoral dissertation on students' privacy rights and, in my first school law class, began to understand both the limitations and the power of the law in remedying social inequities. I learned about issues of equity -- and inequity -- and about the obligations that we as educated people have to right these wrongs.

At law school, I learned about justice or at least what I have come to realize as a man-made version of justice. I took courses with Lani Guinier and worked as her graduate student studying the Voting Rights Act and pondering the mechanisms of our democratic system. It was also in law school where I began to realize that my long-held beliefs in individual rights could come into conflict with my concerns about equity. This intersection of civil liberties and civil rights continues to influence my teaching, my research, and my personal and professional values. I see the conflict between the two as a source of concern, as a mystery yet to be solved.

While I have alluded to gender, I mention it this late in my story because I never perceived it as an influential or limiting factor in my early years. I was the oldest of two children -- three and one half years older than my brother -- and, in many ways, was my father's first son. Thus, expectations for me, as for all first children, were high. I often teased my parents saying that they wanted a son so badly they named me "Jack," something that my mother -- who chose my very feminine first name (Jacqueline) and who spent a great deal of her twenties searching out frilly dresses for me and curling my straight hair -- denied vehemently.

The upshot of this juxtaposition between Jack and Jacqueline, between the identity of first-born son and "Shirley Templesque" daughter, was that I grew up seeing myself as androgynous. Obviously, I was female, but I never viewed it as a limitation. I felt competent and respected, both at home and at school. When I read about male heroes, I always identified with the main character. When I watched my favorite swashbuckler movies -- *Robin Hood* and *Captain Blood* -- I was Robin Hood as much as Maid Marian. I was Errol Flynn as much as Olivia de Havilland. To me, neither role seemed inferior; they were instead, complementary.

My parents' attitudes about hard work and education as a way to improve social class influenced me deeply. These aspirations affected me no less, and possibly more, than my brother because I was the first born and also more interested in academics. It was only as I grew older and entered the workforce that I saw my gender as a limiting factor. It was with some dismay, and a great deal of incredulity, that I realized an individual's worth could be diminished and opportunities determined solely because of x and y chromosomes.

Thus, I enter the teaching of ethics coming from a background in psychology and law that stresses a traditional, liberal democratic philosophy combined with values that have shaped my thinking. The latter include, above all, a respect for each individual's worth and contribution, a desire for justice, fairness, and equity, and a high regard for the ability to

empathize. How these values are translated into my teaching is probably best reflected in what I privilege, i.e., what I emphasize in the classroom, just as Joan's values influence what she privileges. These discussions come later in this article, but first, is a description of the ethics course taught at Temple University.

The Ethics Course

At Temple University, in the College of Education's Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, ethics is a required course for students in the doctoral cohort. In the first year of their program, these doctoral students travel as a group, of about twenty-five in number, through a prescribed set of three courses (nine credits) per semester. Ethics is offered the second semester as half of a course called "Analytical Studies in Educational Administration." Hence, the students meet for seven sessions of two hours and forty minutes each.

It was Joan who designed the ethics course, who convinced the department that the course was needed, and who wrote the syllabus. As stated in this syllabus:

> The course focuses on ethics primarily from an analytical perspective. It is designed to explore the moral and ethical dimensions of the work of school administrators and to assist them to resolve ethical dilemmas in more reflective, intelligent, and principled ways.

The course has three purposes. They are: to examine traditional ethics which emphasizes consequentialist and nonconsequentialist approaches and then to examine alternative forms of moral development including critical theory as applied to justice and feminist ethics; to compare and contrast ones own code of ethics with that of a professional code of ethics; and to explore approaches to moral and ethical reasoning and use these approaches to work through ethical dilemmas related to the practice of educational administration.

In teaching the course, the traditional approaches were represented by a brief overview of the works of Bentham, Kant, and other liberal democratic ethicists and in an article entitled, "Morality, Ethics and Ethical Theories" (Bauchamp, 1984). Throughout the course, traditional ethics were also discussed in the interpretations of the case studies borrowed from *The Ethics of School Administration* (Strike, Haller, and Soltis, 1988). Alternative forms of ethics were captured primarily by readings from *The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education* (Purpel, 1989); *Paradigms and Promises* (Foster, 1988); *In a Different Voice*, (Gilligan, 1982); and from a study on feminist ethics entitled, "The 'Other Voices' in Contemporary

Ethical Dilemmas" (Shapiro and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 1989). Additionally, the concept of professional ethics was introduced in an article on the ethics of university administrators, "Toward a Code of Ethics for University Administrators," (Worsfold, 1984) and in chapters from *The Ethics of School Administration*.

Throughout the course, students were expected to keep journals. The journals were meant to be both reflections on the class and critical analysis of the readings. Students were also expected to write their own personal and professional codes of ethics. In a final assignment, each student was expected to write his or her own ethical dilemma in a case study format, analyze the dilemma and provide possible solutions, and then orally present the dilemma and analysis to the rest of the class.

Joan taught the course for three semesters; Jackie taught it twice. Basically, we used the same syllabus (with a few minor alterations) and the same materials. We also required the same assignments. We each began the class with a brief (20 minute) lecture and then moved towards discussion and group activities.

The classes were generally set up in semi-circles for the lectures and large group discussions which were often during the first 45-60 minutes of the class. The remainder of the three hours was taken up usually with small group work. This tended to focus on a case study with a student as facilitator keeping the group on task and a student as recorder pulling together the thoughts of the group. The end of the class frequently turned to a summary of the group activities. Yet, even with all these similarities, how Joan and Jackie taught the course varied dramatically. These differences in pedagogy were affected by our own experiences, values, and approaches to moral conflicts, i.e., our own stories.

Joan's Pedagogy and What She Privileged:

Pedagogy

> A critical pedagogy also rejects a discourse of value neutrality. This is a pedagogy that rejects detachment, though it does not silence in the name of its own ideological fervor or correctness. It is a critical pedagogy that acknowledges social injustices but examines with care, and in dialogue with itself and others, how such injustices work through the discourses, experiences, and desires that constitute daily life and the subjectivities of the students who invest in them. (Giroux, 1994, p. 43)

This is what I strived for in my ethics class -- the avoidance of neutrality and yet the acceptance of differing perspectives. Up front, I stated I was a feminist and indicated

what my brand of feminism meant. I spoke not only of equity issues but of injustices. I indicated my interest in helping oppressed groups find their voice. I was honest about desiring choice on the abortion issue and indicated that I felt that a woman's body was her own. In turn, I expected honesty from my students. As they analyzed who they were through the development of their personal and professional codes and through the readings and discussions, I was accepting of their beliefs as long as they could explain them in a meaningful way, appropriate to the dilemmas and cases discussed.

Privilege

> Leaders need to be deeply reflective, actively thoughtful, and dramatically explicit about their core values and beliefs. (Bolman and Deal, 1991, p. 449)

Initially, I tried to make certain that the graduate students in this ethics course had some introduction to traditional ethics. I provided an overview of the major Western thinkers in the field focusing on such philosophies as utilitarianism, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theory, and basic liberal tenets of Western philosophy based on individual rights.

The language of rights was further discussed as we sorted out moral dilemmas raised by Strike, Haller, and Soltis (1988), and I asked the students to use the step by step process advocated in this book. This process moved from the presentation of a case, to the establishment of the dispute, to the setting forth of different arguments, and finally to the resolving of the dilemma. Although this framework was used, I spent considerable time critiquing the arguments put forth in this ethics book. It seemed to me important for students to see that a basic text was not the gospel and that there were other ways to answer the dilemmas raised in the book. In many ways, I sought to raise questions that would challenge the liberal democratic philosophy espoused in this text.

Although I did not leave out the language of rights, justice, and law, I had my students listen to other voices and turn to the language of critique and possibilities as well as the language of care, concern, and connectedness over time. These forms of ethics are presented by alternative ethicists.

In particular, to introduce the students to alternative forms of ethics, I spent considerable time in class focused on the work of Purpel (1989). In his book, *The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education*, Purpel described a complex form of ethics that made an excellent bridge from traditional to nontraditional

ethics. Purpel himself indicated that he borrowed from "two ancient traditions, the Socratic and the Prophetic and two theological movements: Liberation Theology and Creation Theology" (xi). This mix enabled students to move from liberal democratic ethics focused on law and justice to areas of social justice and compassion.

Throughout his work, Purpel challenges us to deal with the complexities and the contradictions of the modern world and leave behind any simplistic notions of right and wrong or good and bad. In his book, he presents paradoxes such as that represented by the concepts individuality/community; worth/achievement; equality/competition; compassion/sentimentality.

One such illustration centers on the paradox of Control/Democracy. On the one hand, Purpel argues, we wish to control our destinies, perhaps more now than ever with the continuing fear of nuclear bombs, economic depressions, famines, pollution. In our bureaucratized, computerized culture, we value work, productivity, efficiency, and uniformity often over play, flexibility, diversity, and freedom. We want control; accountability clearly meets that need and, with accountability, there is a focus on policies and on discipline.

On the other hand, we strongly believe in democracy. Because of our emphasis on democracy, our political system sharply conflicts with this focus on control. Debate, dialogue, discussion, and critique are what our democratic system stresses with everyone having a voice.

Throughout his discussion of paradoxes, Purpel moves from the nation to the schools. In the case of accountability, he discusses how the schools have stressed discipline and school policies. Raising standards and test scores continue to figure prominently in schools. All too often, student government is hardly active and service is not emphasized. Schools can and should be the way to encourage democracy and teach young people to be good citizens, and yet that is not always the case. Unfortunately, citizenship education too often lies dormant.

Purpel raises important and meaningful dilemmas or paradoxes and, in so doing, he critiques the system. Although he does not classify himself as a critical theorist, he does create a bridge for those who challenge the current system, and he makes us rethink the important concepts of democracy, social justice, privilege, and power. Through Purpel's work, I was able to turn to the work of those in the area of critical theory. The class and I could then begin to discuss the writings of Giroux (1994) who not only challenged the system, but offered us the concept of "the language of possibilities."

Under possibilities, a number of critical theorists recommend activism and social change. Collective effort, learning through service, and involvement in ones own community -- what Welch (1985) might call working towards solidarity within ones own community -- are parts of the message. In many ways, Purpel, as well as the critical theorists, have moved away from the remote, neutral, seemingly objective, rights, law, and justice ethical arguments of the traditional liberal democratics and towards more feeling, emotion, and compassion related to ethics.

Other non-traditional education ethicists I tended to privilege when I taught the course are feminist ethicists. To illustrate feminist ethics, I turned primarily to the work of Gilligan (1982, 1988) and also to work carried out when my colleague, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, and I taught a Women's Studies ethics class (1989).

Prior to examining the works of feminist ethicists, in particular, Carol Gilligan, I spent time discussing the writings of her professor, Lawrence Kohlberg, at Harvard's Graduate School of Education. I discussed Kohlberg's groundbreaking work based on an analysis of 84 children's (boys') responses to moral dilemmas over a 20 year period and his development of six stages of moral development.

While I admire Kohlberg's work, I tended to use his scholarship as a way to introduce Gilligan and her inclusion of girls into the moral development stage theory. I then turned to Gilligan as a scholar who was able to critique Kohlberg's stage theory. In so doing, she came upon other voices and responses, not taken into account by Kohlberg. She introduced us very clearly to the voice of concern, connectedness, relatedness over time, and caring. She felt this voice to be important and yet, in Kohlberg's stage theory, it was invisible -- hence, many girls, and boys as well who are caring young people often received low scores using his stage theory.

Gilligan's critique and the work of scholars such as Noddings (1984, 1992), Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986), and many others made us realize that all voices need not be categorized in traditional ethical ways focusing on justice, law, and rights. There are indeed other voices that are important in this society and should be valued. My own experiences in the three years I taught ethics to undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania with Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, led me to believe that what Gilligan, Noddings, and others had written had meaning.

Further, in a paper Carroll and I (1989) wrote, we discovered in our own classes many illustrations of alternative ethical thinking. We were able to give examples of students'

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approaches to solving moral dilemmas through their writings in journals that showed how powerful the voice of care, concern, and connectedness was within our Women's Studies classroom.

Upon reflection, then, it seems clear to me that I tended to privilege the voice of critique and possibilities and the voice of care, concern, and connectedness over the voice of abstract rights, law, and justice. Nevertheless, it also became clear to me that while the majority of graduate students could hear all of these voices, some could not. This proved to be somewhat disappointing. However, judging from the course evaluations, the journal entries, the personal and professional codes, the ethical dilemmas, and the comments in and out of class, overall, I would have to say that most of the graduate students did come to at least stand back and reflect upon the concepts of the "rugged individual," individual rights, and abstract justice concepts that previously many of them accepted as the norm.

For some years now, I have taught ethics courses at the postsecondary level. For three years, I taught ethics to University of Pennsylvania undergraduates in a course. The course was an introductory course in Women's Studies and managed to reach a great number of students, both female and male. While at Penn, I also had the wonderful opportunity to meet monthly with professors from all over the university who taught ethics courses -- in the Dental School, Wharton School, Law School, Medical School -- and we shared our differing views on ethics. I then had the opportunity to teach ethics again, in the College of Education, to doctoral students in Temple's Educational Leadership and Policy Studies program, in the course on professional ethics that is the focus of this paper.

Throughout these diverse experiences, I have been struck at how different ethics is to different people, based on their family backgrounds, fields of specialization, work experience, and social interactions. It is clear to me that our ethical values are shaped throughout our lives and are often based on our religion, ethnicity, race, social class, gender, and education. Further, they tend to also be based on critical incidents in our lives.

<u>Jackie's Pedagogy and What She Privileged</u>:

<u>Pedagogy</u>

. . . [I]t is enigmatic and inexhaustible that I am I, that I cannot be forced out of myself, not even by the most powerful enemy, but only by myself, and even that not entirely; that I cannot be replaced

even by the noblest person; that I am the center of existence, for I am that, and you are also that, and you yonder . . . .

(Guardini, 1965, p. 119)

The above quote by Guardini, a priest and an existentialist, was one that I used in most of my undergraduate papers. I always liked this quotation because it captures how I feel about human worth and dignity, about respect for the individual. It seems to me that if everyone respected herself or himself and transferred this sense of respect to others, then there would be no need for group action. Granted, I know that this approach is idealistic, and I certainly do not mean to downplay the importance of social movements such as civil rights or feminism; they had to happen to get us where we are. I just feel that it is a pity that our society has been so unenlightened that such movements have been necessary.

In my "other life," as a professor of school law, I teach a great deal about equality and equity and individual rights. I have written articles on discrimination and it is an area of the law that interests me greatly, but the major thrust of my research focuses on students' rights in public schools, particularly privacy rights. Thus, a profound respect for the individual drives my approach to teaching as well as to life. This is the focal point of my pedagogy, a respect for each student's opinion.

Consequently, in my pedagogy, I was careful to be neutral, not to reveal much about myself. I did not want my students to be overly concerned with trying to figure out what I wanted or to think that if they had backgrounds or ideas similar to mine that they would be favored. And, I certainly did not want any "Jackie clones." I enjoy diverse views and, in all my classes, I have wanted my students to think critically as adults and to know that, whatever their views, they would be accepted.

I inherited the ethics course in my first year of teaching; Joan had been busy with administrative duties and needed someone to relieve her. I had taken many undergraduate courses in philosophy because of my liberal arts background and my existential psychology major. I had also taken a graduate course in philosophy of education in my counseling program, but all this training had been many years ago and all the courses had been taught by white males from a traditional perspective.

My most recent training came from Larry Kohlberg when I sat in his class at Harvard in 1982 and from a legal ethics course that I took in 1989 while in law school. In addition, I am required to complete five hours of ethics training each year to maintain my credentials to practice law in Pennsylvania. I

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found, however, that these legal ethics courses were of little help in teaching my own ethics course in that they focus almost exclusively on interpretation of state and federal codes of ethics and, consequently, are very rule bound.

Thus, I was not quite sure how to approach the course. I saw this teaching as temporary -- as Joan's substitute for the semester and, therefore, I made little effort to change the materials. It was not until the second time I taught the course that I began to modify it -- ever so slightly -- and to find my own voice. I still struggle with the latter.

Moreover, I had to confront the difficult issue of what I expected students to get from this course. Perhaps because of my existential background and the short time period involved -- the class was only seven weeks long -- I settled for awareness and introspection. I hoped that thoughtful reflection would at least sensitize students to the issues if not change behavior.

Privilege

> Ethical education is not a simple training in the predisposition to be ethical, the lessons of which, once learned guarantee an ethical adulthood. Ethical education is lifelong education. It takes place simultaneously with our efforts to be human.
> (Starratt, 1994a, p. 135)

I began my class much as Joan had with an overview of traditional ethics and an exploration of the concepts of utilitarianism as well as consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories. In the beginning, my students were confused when we discussed traditional ethics; they asked for more -- more readings, more clarification, more discussion. After all, we had condensed the whole of Western philosophy into one or two short lessons. To compensate for what I saw as an overly brief introduction and to make sure that the students would feel grounded in the traditional approach, I stressed these theories throughout the course and tried to reinforce their significance in relation to the more modern, less traditional, works of Gilligan, Foster, and Purpel.

I also used several dilemmas set forth by Strike, Haller, and Soltis (1988) as a starting point for discussion. Unlike Joan, I did not follow the step by step process set forth in the text, but instead made up my own questions. These inquiries generally focused on issues of "What does all this mean?" and "What does it mean to you, personally?" This approach to ethics is advocated by Starratt and articulated in his recent book, *Building an Ethical School* (1994a).

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While Strike comes from the same type of liberal democratic tradition that I espouse, I had mixed feelings about using his book. I liked the problems he presented, but felt uncomfortable with the way he constructed the scenarios; they seemed a bit contrived to me. For instance, one dilemma involved a principal stopping by a bar on the way home from a meeting only to find his prim English teacher working there as a topless dancer to support her sick mother. The principal was not even sure that it was she until the teacher came up to him later to talk, still dressed in her "costume," a sequined G-string.

While the overall situation seems conceivable, this type of "Marian the Librarian" story in which a woman sheds her conservative clothing and turns into a vamp, while interesting, struck me as lacking verisimilitude. And, as a number of students in my class pointed out, Strike neglected to broach the ethical issue of what the principal was doing in a topless bar. If there was an ethical problem here, was not the principal as ethically bound as the dancer? Would the situation have been different if the principal had been a woman and the teacher a man? Granted, Strike may have left these points out on purpose to stimulate discussion. If so, the strategy worked.

I was fascinated with some of Strike's dilemmas because they were very close to legal cases that I have taught in my school law class. For instance, one such scenario involved a teacher writing a letter to the local press which criticized the school. "That's the *Pickering* case," I thought -- or at least a modified version of it. Indeed, Strike points out that ethical problems and legal problems are often the same. When I first read this statement, it did not ring true to me; but I was not sure why. However, after thinking long and hard, I have come to at least a tentative solution.

Court opinions often talk about justice, a concept that Kohlberg characterizes as a higher stage of moral development. Indeed, the symbol for the legal system is a blindfolded woman holding evenly-balanced scales. Consequently, legal opinions handed down by the courts are considered to be just decisions. This interpretation makes sense to me in relation to Strike's statement. As a lawyer as well as an educator, I believe in the power of the law and witness its justice. I see the good that has come from important legal decisions, such as *Brown v. Board of Education (1954)*, the United States Supreme Court's famous school desegregation decision, and *Brown*'s progeny, as well as subsequent federal legislation, which secured the rights of women, linguistic minorities, and persons with disabilities.

However, as Starratt (1994b) pointed out in his comments in a recent session at the annual conference of the American Educational Research Association: "What happens when the law is wrong?" Indeed, the law *is* sometimes wrong as evidenced by the

Jim Crow laws requiring racial segregation and the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision which upheld the notion that separate is equal. Moreover, sometimes the law is left open for considerable interpretation and consequently leaves government officials, i.e., public school administrators, with a great deal of discretion in carrying out legal mandates. Hence, I question the simplicity of Strike's comment, agree with Starratt, and ask a related question: "What happens when the law does not go far enough?"

This last question is one that I posed to the second ethics class I taught in one of their final lessons. Here, I diverted from Joan's original syllabus and added the facts only (not the legal analysis) of *Cornfield v. Consolidated School District No. 230*, a court opinion that I often include in my legal research. This case involved a total nude strip search of a male high school student for drugs. I gave my class the following instructions: "Here are the facts of a recent court decision. Assume the actions the school officials took were legal. (The federal appeals court for the seventh circuit said they were legal in that jurisdiction.) Are they ethical? And, given similar circumstances, how would you act if you were the school administrator?"

Because this exercise was presented late in the course, I was able to use it as a vehicle to encourage the students to explore traditional conceptions of justice as well as to apply nontraditional views such as feminist and critical theory. Unlike Joan, I spent little time lecturing on critical theory. While I assigned the same chapters in Purpel's and Foster's books that Joan did, I only used them as starting points for discussion of students' personal and professional codes and ultimately for analysis of the strip search case.

Conversely, I spent a good deal of time on Carol Gilligan's work, but I approached it only after an extensive overview of Kohlberg's theory and his stages of moral development. Probably because of my earlier training in psychology, I liked the idea of developmental stages. Also, as I mentioned before, I had taken a course with Kohlberg and have always respected his work. Thus, I presented his theory in some detail, noting that his research was seriously called into question as it relates to women because his sample consisted only of men.

As my feelings toward the Strike text had been mixed, I felt similarly toward Gilligan's work. I respect Gilligan because I feel she included a voice that desperately needed to be heard. I had difficulties with the selection on abortion -- possibly because of my Catholic background -- and also because I felt that her analysis stereotyped women. Granted, she spoke for some women, but not for all and not for me. Her voice was not my voice. I like her concept of caring very much, but feel that it

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is important to both genders -- an androgynous characteristic. Thus, if I had changed the course more to my liking, I would probably have used some of Gilligan's later writings on topics other than abortion and added the work of other feminists such as Nel Noddings.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have focused on the professors of educational administration and the need for them to reflect upon their own personal and professional ethical codes. We believe that it is essential for faculty to think through their own lives and the critical incidents that shaped them in order to deal openly with those they teach. This process is not an easy one and calls for self-reflection.

If at all possible, we also recommend a sharing process, that in some ways resembles a form of peer review. The process that we describe asks that each of us work through our life stories and critical incidents with other colleagues -- hopefully colleagues whom we trust and respect -- in order to determine who each of us is and what has shaped us.

Beyond this, we stress the importance of careful content analysis of what readings and resources are privileged by those of us who teach ethics as well as identify what pedagogical approaches we employ to make certain that the content is delivered to the learner. We feel that this type of analysis will help us to assess what voices we tend to emphasize -- the voice of justice, rights, laws; the voice of critique and possibilities; the voice of care, concern, connectedness; or a combination of these voices. Such difficult dialogue and analysis, we believe, is important as the combination helps us to be more honest with those we teach and enables us to decide if the pedagogical approaches we select are appropriate to the material to be taught. This combination also models for students a way to carry out moral self-assessment.

Although not explicitly stated, yet underlying this paper, is the premise that ethics courses are essential for the preparation of educational leaders. Currently, in many colleges and schools of educations, there is a void in the curriculum as these types of courses do not always exist. It goes without saying that we believe that this void should be filled. We feel that educational leaders must be exposed to ethics because, as we have previously mentioned, at the heart of administration lie moral dilemmas. Thus, on a day to day basis, educational leaders must be able to recognize such dilemmas, think through options for handling the dilemmas, and then attempt to resolve them.

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In this paper, we are not advocating the need for ethics courses that solely rely on liberal democratic values. Instead, we have described a course that deals with a combination of liberal democratic ethics, liberation theology, critical theory related to ethics, as well as feminist ethics. In the 21st Century, with all the paradoxes and diversity that face leaders, we believe it is essential that the exposure to ethics be comprehensive and encompass not only traditional ethics but nontraditional ethics as well.

In this era, schools have been asked to shoulder many of the responsibilities of society. This trend does not look as if it will cease and it probably will grow. With this trend comes more paradoxes and dilemmas. Ethics courses are not the panacea, but the process of working through ones' beliefs cannot help but make a difference. Exposure to alternative ways of handling dilemmas are important and provide school administrators with viable options. If nothing else, an educational leader can turn to both personal and professional codes for reference. Resolutions can be made that are hopefully consistent with those codes. If the inconsistencies exist, then the educator is at least able to determine where the difficulties may reside.

However, a code developed at one stage of life need not be the same over time. The process that we have described in this paper assumes that the discussion of life stories, critical incidents and the analysis of the content and pedagogy will continue in the future. It is our hope that such a process has the possibility to benefit not just faculty who teach ethics, but that it may have an impact on other faculty members as well. At the very least, such a process can begin the kind of difficult dialogue needed to go beyond the traditional and deal with nontraditional ethics.

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