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ABSTRACT
         A discussion of Hungarian spoken discourse focuses on
the role of two pragmatic connectives, "hat" ("well, so (after all)")
and "mert" ("because"). Introductory sections discuss the
classification of utterance-types as a prerequisite to analyzing
discourse and the utterance-type as defined by pragmatic functions. A
third section discusses the examination of discourse coherence
relations between utterance-tokens. Four elements of this analysis
are defined: basic operation of the discourse segment (additive or
causal); source of coherence; order of segments (basic or non-basic);
and polarity with its positive or negative relations. The role of the
two connectives in Hungarian in indicating relationships between the
discourse segments is then described in terms of those four elements,
and illustrated in specific utterances. Contains 17 references.
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On the role of pragmatic connectives in Hungarian spoken discourses

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0. Introduction

The organization of my paper is the following: In the first section I begin with a brief sketching of the theoretical background necessary to my research. Then in the second section I give the definition of the utterance-type which is the abstraction from the concrete utterance-tokens. In the third section I deal with some questions of relevance and discourse coherence, especially concentrating on four cognitive primitives combinations of which characterise coherence relations between the utterance-tokens of discourses. Then in the fourth section I investigate the role of two pragmatic connectives (*hát* 'well, so (after all)', *mert* 'because') in Hungarian spoken discourses. Finally, in the fifth section I try to summarize the results and try to give an outlook of what questions have to be answered in future studies.

1. Initial theoretical considerations

Some current trends in linguistics, psychology   y to explain cognitive phenomena in terms of modules, separate systems of knowledge. One of the modules of human mind is grammatical competence. One of the tasks of a linguistic theory is to model grammatical competence with constructing explicit grammars (Chomsky 1986:3). An explicit grammar is a concrete grammar of a particular language which generates the

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well-formed sentences of that language by means of its rules. Therefore, we can see sentences as the units of grammatical competence. Another module of human mind is pragmatic competence (Kasher 1991), which is the faculty of using knowledge of language to reach different human purposes. Besides modeling grammatical competence another task of a linguistic theory is to model pragmatic competence. A third task of a linguistic theory is to give an adequate performance model which characterizes the particular realization of concrete language uses in particular linguistic and non-linguistic contexts taking into consideration the interactions of grammatical and pragmatic competences with other systems of knowledge, memory and perception. The most prominent form of concrete language use is the communicative one which can be described by analysing discourses.[1] To construct an adequate discourse model one has to know the common substantial features of the utterance-token sequences of which the coherent discourses as performance phenomena consist. These features can be formulated postulating the utterance-types, which disregard particular contextual information and consider the categories of communicative interaction. Therefore we can see the utterance-types as the units of pragmatic competence.

2. Definition of the utterance-type

(1) $u_t = (ins (pu, c, p, t))$

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[1] In my view the term *discourse* without any adjectives means not only spoken and written discourse but also all types of verbal communicative product, e. g. monologic discourse, dialogic discourse, conversation.

The utterance-type u_t is an inscription *ins* that a person *p* relates to a pragmatic unit *pu* at a time *t* in a context *c* (cf. Németh T. 1991). The definition is neutral with respect to the interpretation and production of *ins*, it says only that an utterance-type is a product of some cognitive activities. The utterance-type must be characterized from the linguistic and the pragmatic points of view. The linguistic description can be made by relating the utterance-types to the well-formed sentences. There are two basic classes in this regard: the members of the first class have complete or elliptical linguistic structure *ls*. The members of the second class have not any linguistic structure, they consist of only one lexical entry le_{int}, namely interjection or idiom-like interjection. The pragmatic description of the utterance-type can be made by defining pragmatic functions *pf*, which the utterance-types play in the use with respect to a given physical c_{phys} and cognitive context c_{cog}.

(2) $pu = (\{ \begin{smallmatrix} ls \\ le_{int} \end{smallmatrix} \}, pf)$
(3) $c = (c_{phys}, c_{cog})$

In the communicative language use the pragmatic functions of the utterance-type which have appropriate values in the concrete utterance-tokens of discourses are the following: function of literalness f_{lit}, interpersonal function f_{ip}, illocutionary function f_{ill} and attitudinal function f_{att}.

(4) $pf = (f_{lit}, f_{ip}, f_{ill}, f_{att})$

Summarizing the foregoing and taking into considaration (1)-(4) the utterance-

type of the communicative language use can be defined as (5):

$$(5) \qquad u_t = (ins \ ((\{ \underset{tend}{l e} \}^{ls}, (f_{lit}, f_{ip}, f_{ill}, f_{all})), (c_{phys}, c_{cog}), p, t))$$

3. Coherence of discourses

Communicators constructing discourses make an effort to be relevant and coherent. To be relevant means that every utterance-token of the actual communicators comes with its own guarantee of relevance (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986). That is the communicators try to produce the utterance-tokens in such a way, that communicative partners could infer the intended cognitive representations, which have to reach the largest effects possible with the less effort. The utterance-tokens are produced and interpreted according to the background of mutual cognitive context and the shared intentionality of communicators and communicative partners.[2] The background, shared intentionality and the presumption of relevance help communicators to construct coherent discourses in the course of production and communicative partners to make coherent representations of them in the course of interpretation. Investigating the coherence relations Sanders et al. (1993) argue that coherence is not only a property of the discourse itself but also of the representation people have or make of it. Coherence relations are the means of combining elementary discourse segments into more complex

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[2] By Searle and his critics (cf. Searle et al. 1992, Brassac 1994) the background and shared intentionality has very important role in the organization of conversation. I think, this is true in other discourse types too. The mutual cognitive context is synonymous with Sperber and Wilson's mutual cognitive environment, which consist of mutual assumptions and is weaker concept than mutual or common knowledge. The assumptions are the thoughts treated by the individuals as representations of the actual world.

ones making links between these segments. The authors take the clauses as the elementary discourse segments and investigate coherence relations between them. On the contrary I think that the elementary units of discourses are the utterance-tokens, which may consist of one or more clauses (or none of them in the case of utterance-tokens consisting of only one interjection or one idiom-like interjection). Therefore coherence relations must be analysed between the utterance-tokens. The relations between clauses within an utterance-token – I consider – belong to the well-formedness of syntactic and semantic structures of the sentence realization of which the utterance-token is. In Sanders' et al. opinion we need four primitives to establish coherence relations between discourse segments. These primitives are the proporties of coherence relations and consequently they are the criteria for identifying the coherence relations. They concern the relational meaning of the coherence relations and the informational surplus that the coherence relations add to the interpretation of the discourse segments in isolation. The first primitive named basic operation concerns the operation that is to be carried out on the discourse segments. The basic operation can be additive or causal. In the case of an additive operation – as Sanders et al. claim – the relation between two discourse segments is simply that of logical conjunction (P&Q), in the case of a causal operation an implication relation can be deduced between two segments (P→Q). If basic operations are stated to be exclusively logical we consider only propositional contents of the segments and forget their pragmatic proporties. Taking into account the pragmatic functions of the utterance-tokens we need not only logical conjunction and implication, but also pragmatic addition and some other kinds of implication to describe coherence relations in discourses. In my view the pragmatic addition simply conjoin

interpersonal, illocutionary and attitudinal values of the subsequent utterance-tokens marking the communicator's intention to continue the discourse. With regard to the other types of implication I follow Sperber and Wilson's suggestions (1986:65–118) on operation of the human deductive device.

The second primitive is the source of coherence. It has two values, a semantic and a pragmatic one. Sanders et al. speak about semantic relation if the discourse segments are related because in their propositional content and about pragmatic relation if the discourse segments are related because in the illocutionary meaning of one or both of the segments. Earlier in the second section we saw that the pragmatic function of an utterance-token was not confined to the illocutionary force. The utterance-tokens have other pragmatic properties, for example interpersonal and attitudinal functions playing an important role in the coherence of discourses. Therefore the pragmatic value of the second primitive pertain not only to the speech act satus of an utterance-token, but also to the interpersonal and attitudinal function.

The third primitive is the order of segments, which r.ay be basic or non-basic. The discourse segments are presented in basic order if the first segment refers to the antecedent of the causal basic operation and the second segment refers to the consequence. If the first segment refers to the consequence and the second segment refers to the antecedent of causal basic operation it is the case of non-basic order. Because of their syntactic valency the connectives marking different relations linguistically put specific constraints on the order in which segments can be realized.

The fourth primitive is the polarity with its positive or negative relations. If the two discourse segments function directly in the basic operation the polarity is positive.

If not the discourse segments themselves but their negative counterparts function in the basic operation the polarity is negative. Let's see (6) and (7)![3]

(6)   Theo was exhausted, because he had run to the university.
(7)   An ostrich is classified as bird, although it cannot fly.

In (6) the polarity is positive and need not any further comments. In (7) the polarity is negative, because it refers to the instantiation of the basic operation linking the antecedent "not being able to fly" with the consequence "not being classified as a bird" and the first clause expresses the negation of the consequence in the basic operation. Note that the order of the segments in this example are non-basic.

The coherence relations mentioned above may be marked or unmarked, i. e. may be either explicit or implicit. Connectives are very important means of linguistic marking. The coherence relation assumed between the utterance-tokens must be compatible with the semantic meaning and pragmatic functions of the connectives and with the semantic meaning and pragmatic function of the utterance-tokens. Besides marking the coherence relations in discourse organization and guiding their interpretation conn ctives give instructions on how to find the most relevant interpretation of the utterance-tokens with the help of selecting an adequate context.[4]

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[3] I take these examples and account for them from the paper of Sanders' et al. (1993:99–102).

[4] In the relevance theoretical framework many papers deal with the role of connectives in guiding relevant interpretation of utterance-tokens. See e. g. Blakemore 1987, 1988; Carston 1993; Jucker 1993; Moeschler 1993; Watts 1988.

4. The role of pragmatic connectives in Hungarian spoken discourses

In this section of my paper I try to show how connectives work when conjoining the utterance-tokens in Hungarian spoken discourses. On the basis of a 310 minutes long Hungarian spoken corpus I have studied the role of 16 connectives. Since in the investigated examples these connectives behave mainly pragmatically, that is they neither affect the truth conditions of the utterance-tokens nor add arything to the propositional content of the utterance-tokens, I call them pragmatic connectives henceforth. Analysing the different possible uses of *well* Jucker (1993:436) cites Hölker's basic features that characterise discourse markers.[5] The first two features (i. e. they do not affect the truth conditions and they do not add anything to the propositional content) are used by myself to decide that a connective operates as a semantic or as a pragmatic one. According to the third feature discourse markers are related to the speech situation and not to the situation talked about. And the fourth feature is that the discourse markers have an emotive, expressive function rather than a referential or cognitive function. With regard to the third and the fourth criteria I have two remarks. Firstly, in the case of the attitudinal markers (see e.g. Kiefer 1988) we can not exclude relating to the situation talked about. Secondly, since Hölker and referring to him Jucker do not say exactly what they mean by emotive, expressive, referential, and cognitive functions I could not accept the fourth feature in the presented

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[5] The class of discourse markers, pragmatic markers or metapragmatic terms includes the pragmatic connectives among other things. These latter terms are more or less synonymous. Hölker's referred paper is the following: Hölker, Klaus. 1991. "Französisch: Partikelforschung". *Lexikon der Romanischen Linguistik*, Vol. V. 1: 77–88. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

form. Taking into consideration my definition of the utterance-type the pragmatic functions have to be considered to distinguish the semantic and the pragmatic uses of the connectives. However, there is another property which helps to identify pragmatic connectives: they usually begin utterance-tokens, they have their own intonation and there is a pause after them (cf. Dijk 1979, Schiffrin 1987, Németh T. 1991).

From the above mentioned 16 Hungarian pragmatic connectives I try to show two, namely *hát* 'well, so (after all)' and *mert* 'because'.

4.1. The pragmatic connective *hát*[6] has three basic uses. Firstly, it can be used to introduce questions, secondly, it is a general answer marker and thirdly, it can occur in the speech of one and the same communicator as the marker of self-correction or explanation.

4.1.1. The first use of *hát* have not appeared in my spoken corpus, therefore I try to illustrate this role relying on the paper of Kiefer (1988). Studying the Hungarian modal particles as discourse markers in questions Kiefer states that *hát* very often occurs at the beginning of so called open-questions, which can be referred as a special type of wh-questions. The answer of an open question is not categorially defined as in (8a–b).

(8)(a) *Hát* én? 'And me?'/'And what about me?'
   (b) *Hát* mi újság nálatok? 'And what is the news with you?'[7]

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[6] The English equivalents of *hát* are considered e. g. by Schiffrin 1987, Blakemore 1987, 1988, Jucker 1993.

[7] The examples are in Hungarian, followed by an approximate English translation. If it is needed the context would be explained in parantheses.

In both cases *hát* can be replaced by the conjunction *és* 'and' and indicates the continuation of the previous discourse. Unfortunately, Kiefer does not give the preceding utterance-token(s), therefore it is a little difficult to establish exactly what pragmatic function is considered. But it is obvious, that illocutionary (to continue a speech act sequence) and interpersonal (to maintain the communicative interaction) functions are important. As to the coherence relation existence of which *hát* signals, this can also be characterized with the help of our cognitive primitives. The basic operation is pragmatic addition, the source of coherence is pragmatic, the order of the utterance-tokens cannot be defined because of the lack of a preceding utterance-token and the polarity is positive.

Consider these examples (Kiefer 1988:114):

(9;⁄) *Hát* megjöttél? 'So you are here?'
   (b) *Hát* meg akarsz teljesen őrjíteni? 'So you want to drive me completely crazy?'

Kiefer claims, that (9a–b) are rhetorical questions, which need not be answered. However, the rhetoricity of these questions is not brought by *hát*, the questions without it are already rhetorical. The contribution of *hát* to these questions seems to be emotional. Against Kiefer I think that *hát* contributes to the rhetoricity of these questions strengthening it in the large extent. The rhetoricity and the emotional colour of *hát* concern its interpersonal function. As to the characterization of the coherence relation this use of *hát* has the same values as in (8a–b). Let's see two examples in which *hát* has a modal function.

(10) (a) *Hát* megölték? 'So he was killed after all?'
(b) *Hát* találkoztatok már? 'So you have met before?'

In (10a–b) *hát* modifies the propositional content. According to Kiefer the speakers's attitude can be paraphrased as follows: The communicator held the belief that not-p, but he got some evidence to believe that p is the case.[8] In this modal interpretation *hát* has attitudinal function, there is a modification of the communicator's earlier belief. The illocutionary and the interpersonal function of *hát* can be derived from this attitudinal interpretation. The illocutionary and the interpersonal function now may be characterized together as to ask for confirmation of the communicator's belief and this is a request for maintaining the communicative interaction at the same time. In (10a–b) *hát* marks such a coherence relation, in the case of which the basic operation is pragmatic addition, the source of coherence is semantic and pragmatic, the order of the utterance token cannot be established and the polarity is positive.

4.1.2. The second main use of *hát*, as a general answer marker can be well illustrated on the basis of my spoken corpus. Consider (11) and (12):

(11) – Volt valami terved a balettal? 'Did you have any plan on ballet?'
– *Hát* igen. Szerettem volna tovább vinni, de ez sajnos ez nem sikerült.
'Well, yes. I would have liked to dance further, but unfortunately I faiied in this.'

(12) – Mesélj valamit a gyerekkorodról! Testvéreidről, családodról! Mit szoktatok csinálni,hogy játszottatok, iskolába jártatok?
'Tell me something about your childhood. About your brothers, systers. What did you usually do, what did you play, how did you go to the school?'
– *Hát* a mi gyerekkorunk az még egész más volt mint a mostaniaké, illetve a mai

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[8] p is the propositional content of the question.

gyerekeké, nekünk még volt gyerekkorunk.
'Well, our childhood was very different from the present-day children's, or rather from the childhood of today's children, we did have childhood.'

In (11) *hát* begins the answer in the yes-no question–answer sequence and in (12) it begins the answer in the request–answer sequence. In both cases *hát* has illocutionary and interpersonal function, it marks the second me: .ber of the speech act s· ·nuence and marks the intention of the communicative partner to maintain communicative interaction politely. In the coherence relation marked by *hát* the basic operation is pragmatic addition, the source of coherence is semantic and pragmatic, the order of the utterance-tokens is basic and the polarity is positive.

4.1.3. In the third basic use *hát* occurs in the speech of one and the same communicator as the marker of self-correction or explanation as in (13).

(13) – Iskolába hol tetszett járni? 'Where did you go to the school?'
      – Én a Szegeden a zárdába jártam iskolába. És utána férjhez mentem tizenkilenc éves koromban. *Hát* zárdába, hát akkor akkor zárda volt még ugye.
      'I went to school in Szeged, to convent school. And then I got married, when I was nineteen years old. Well, to convent school, so at that time at that time there were convent schools, you know.'

In this example the most important pragmatic role of *hát* is illocutionary, *hát* introduces an explanation to a preceding statement. Besides this function it has the interpersonal function to maintain the communicative interaction. This kind of explanation (or self-correction) is a polite act, because it helps the communicative partner to interpret the preceding utterance-token more easily and more exactly. The values of primitives of coherence relation have made explicit by *hát* in (13) are as follows: the basic operation

is causal, the source of coherence is semantic and pragmatic, the order of the utterance-tokens is non-basic and the polarity is positive.

4.2. The pragmatic connective *mert* usually introduces utterance-tokens with use of which the communicator would like to give the justification or to show the motivation of the preceding illocutionary act(s).[9] Consider:

(14)   – És édesanyád, ő meg akkor ilyenkor ott van nálatok?
         'And your mother, is she there then at your home?'
         – Nem. Szóval hát kertszomszédok vagyunk.
         'No. So well we live next garden.'
         – Igen. *Mert* én nem tudom ám, hol laktok.
         'Yes. Because I don't really know where you live.'

(15)   – Mi lesz a neve? Gondolkodtatok már rajta?
         'What will be his/her name? Have you thought about it?'
         – Hát kislány Eszter. A kisfiút meg még nem tudtuk, hogy apja neve lesz-e.
         'Well, the girl's name Eszter. The boy's name we have not known yet, father's name or else.'
         – Aha. 'I see.'
         – *Mert* a kislánynak anyja neve lett.
         'Because our daughter has the mother's name.'

In (14) *mert* introduces an utterance-token which gives the motivation for the previous question (illocutionary function), *mert* maintains the communicative interaction to give the possibility to the communicative partner to understand more of the communicator's intention (interpersonal function). In (15) *mert* begins an utterance-token which gives an explanation to the answer after a question-answer sequence (illocutionary function)

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[9] *Parce que* the French equivalent of *mert* has been studied by Moeschler (19^3). He has established very similar functions of *parce que* to functions of *mert*. But *parce que* has an interesting u.. yet: it can be used to restart the conversation. About the English *because* Fraser (1988:26) clames, that it must be excluded as a discourse marker. In Fraser's examples *because* really has a semantic role, but I think, that in the occurences like to French *parce que* or Hungarian *mert* the connective *because* also has pragmatic functions.

and maintains the communicative interactions helping to th: cor: nunicative partner to interpret the preceding information more precisely (interpersonal function). The basic operation in this type of coherence relation is causal, the source of coherence is pragmatic, the order of the utterance-tokens is non-basic and the polarity is positive.

5. Conclusion and outlook

Taking into account the theoretical considerations presented in the first three sections of my paper I have tried to show how two Hungarian pragmatic connectives function in spoken discourses. Using the illocutionary, interpersonal and attitudinal functions and the four cognitive primitives of coherence relations I could characterize the pragmatic role of these connectives with the same categories. The future task will be to define plausible core meanings of these connectives from which every kind of use would be derivable.

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