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ABSTRACT
                Three pieces make up this publication. The first,
titled "Absent without Leave: Solitude and the Scheme of Schooling"
(Craig B. Howley), argues that education requires both a measure of
solitude for students to form opinions and a healthy respect for the
privacy of students' minds from educators. The second essay, "A World
Came to Life: Reflections on Perspective and Its Power (R. Wayne
Shute), is built around a number of reflections about perspective or
personal world view, the ideological force which shapes and drives
all actions and behaviors. It is claimed that current educational
practices, to which most educators subscribe, are born of control,
compulsion, and force, and that true learning can only occur in an
environment of freedom and responsibility. To mitigate these effects,
thoughtful education, a practice which allows students, in an
atmosphere of freedom, to make sense and meaning of the world around
them is recommended. The final presentation, "Forget Leadership for
Reform; Forget Leadership for Restructuring; Forget Leadership for
Renewal; Think Leadership of Self" (Clark Webb), draws attention to
the idea that leaders who choose to influence but one
person--themselves--may be more educationally beneficial in the long
run than those who try to influence whole systems. (LL)

Thoughtful Leadership

Proceedings of the Third Conference on Thoughtful Teaching and Learning

July 1993

Sponsored by

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CONTENTS

About the Authors

Craig Howley directs the ERIC Clearinghouse on Rural Education and Small Schools. He has taught, at least a little, at all levels from kindergarten through graduate school, and he imagines that schooling ought to make room for the life of the mind. He likes to garden, to build furniture, and to write, but would give a leg to science if he could just play the piano a whole lot better. His kids have turned out to be people he likes.

R. Wayne Shute is Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership, Brigham Young University. He is director of the Summer Residency Doctoral Program, and his principal academic interest is "educational leadership," particularly as it pertains to world views and educational reform. He jogs an incredible distance each week.

Clark Webb is Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership, Brigham Young University. He teaches graduate classes in "teaching learning," "educational change," and "educational leadership." His hobbies are primitive hiking and camping and reading non-mathematical accounts of quantum physics.

Preface

In July of 1993, for the third consecutive year, the Department of Educational Leadership at Brigham Young University sponsored a conference on "thoughtful teaching and learning," this time centering on the theme of "thoughtful leadership."

As was the case in the previous conferences, the department invited a guest "teacher" to provide mindful ideas for participants. For this year's conference, Frank Smith, the well-known Canadian educator and writer, joined classroom teachers, masters and doctoral students, and university faculty for two days of sessions. The engagement of participants—both with each other and with ideas— was productive and thought-provoking.

A decision was made to provide "proceedings" of the conference to participants and to others who might wish to read them. The term "proceedings" is a bit misleading because Frank Smith's remarks are not included. The omission has a two-fold cause. First, he was asked to speak "off the cuff," that is, to respond to the flow of the conference, rather than to offer formal, prepared lectures. Second, certain contractual provisions forestalled inclusion of his remarks.

Three pieces make up this publication: An article by Craig Howley of the ERIC Clearinghouse on Rural Education and Small Schools facility at the Appalachia Regional Laboratory, Charleston, West Virginia and transcripts of talks given by Wayne Shute and Clark Webb, both of the Department of Educational Leadership at Brigham

Young.   Mr. Howley's article resulted from an invitation from members of the Steering Committee for the 1993 conference and was distributed to participants prior to the conference.

Absent Without Leave: Solitude and the Scheme of Schooling

Craig Howley
Appalachia Educational Laboratory
ERIC Clearinghouse on Rural Education and Small Schools

Epigraph

The highest function of education . . . is to help people understand the meaning of our lives, and become more sensitive to the meaning of other people's lives and relate to them more fully . . . . We must be able to read, and to know where what we read fits into the structure of human experience; and to write with enough subtlety and complexity to convey the special quality of our mind to others. . . . I do not, of course, suggest that this is or has been the primary function of education in the United States or any other major industrial country. On the contrary, . . . [our systems of] education subvert this function (pp. 221-222).

The society that prefers the kind [of person] who has never examined the meaning of his [or her] life against the context in which he [or she] lives is bound to believe that it has a youth problem. For its own sake, and the sake of its social future, one can only pray that it really does (p. 25).

The explicit values of the juvenile gang are taken from the adult world; they, too, covet status and success, and do not imagine that these could be conceived in terms more compelling than those they find familiar (p. 5).

--Edgar Friedenberg, Coming of Age in America

From a period of my life when fiction somehow figured as more possible, the inclinations of Heinrich Boll have remained a lingering influence. One of Boll's recurrent themes and the title of one of his stories is "Absent Without Leave." Of course, the details of this particular story no longer come clear, because my head is now so crammed with lethal facts, bits of information in themselves without much meaning and which, piled high, induce a state of terminal forgetfulness ("Lethé").[1]

But I do seem to recall the details of a related novel titled End of a Mission. The crisis around which the author's discourse circulates is a soldier's arson, specifically the burning of a military jeep on a deserted stretch of country road. The act constitutes a deeply personal statement of resistance, enacted in a solitude that helps mark it as principled. Well, a lot of this sort of thing was going on during the historical period of this novel—say, 1970.

And as I also recall, the soldier and his father—who comes to the aid of his son—have a little Catholic refrain, which they sing as the jeep burns (and thereafter in moments of trial), the ora pro nobis ("pray for

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[1] Not all facts are meaningless, of course. Not all facts are taught to induce forgetfulness. All memorable facts, however, are attached to some meaning and to one another through that meaning. This connectedness, perhaps, makes them both meaningful and memorable. I'm very happy to know, for instance, that Brahms was born in May of 1833, a fact that becomes meaningful only on account of my affection for and understanding of the music, the sense of what Europe was like at the time, and the relationship between classical and romantic conceptions of expression—so important in the case of Brahms. It helps to know, too, what the Europeans were doing to one another and to, say, the Chinese, Indians, and Africans about this time.

us"). It may well be time for some of us to take up this refrain, whether or not we believe anyone is listening.

This essay will suggest that, lacking scope for solitude, the educated person is becoming--rather like my recent non experience of fiction--increasingly less possible. Boll's fictional soldier "was provided" an education in the army (one, of course, paralleling the author's lived experience of the Wehrmacht circa 1941-45), but an unintended one that far transcended the training in killing so appallingly prevalent in such organizations. The soldier took this course--this education--largely by being absent without leave, being alone, for example, with his thoughts about his training. The ethical outcome in this case was the act of sabotage and refusal to serve further. "How deplorable," said the fictional authorities, "unbalanced, surely."

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We do not want students to think or feel quite so deeply. Let them stick to the given facts, we affirm, however lethal. We much prefer to enlist them in a crusade of economic salvation. Burning jeeps just won't suffice, any more than fiction. Ora pro nobis.

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Our practices of schooling, therefore, have much in common with military practice. Schooling "provides" an education in about the same way that the military "provides" defense--that is, hardly at all, but at great expense. Such provisioning of individuals and society is vain:

narcissistic, presumptuous, and bootless. There is little security in this world, certainly no security from bureaucracies dedicated to literal murder. And there is no educating except when individuals realize themselves--with assistance from those who care that they should do so, and who respect their capacities to engage that struggle.

But look at the similarities of practice: We gather all the children of a particular residential area together, then segregate them by a complex system of rank. Ranks are based on such things as age, skin color, parental "choice" in housing, and so these qualities must be essential features of the sort of education we (ora pro nobis) wish to "provide."

We impose the discipline of the crowd on them, at all ranks, at an early age, and shuffle them from room to room (worksheet to worksheet, textbook unto textbook, dust unto dust) with admirable, if not thoroughly problematic, efficiency, until each has been fully. provisioned, just so, according to the privileges of rank.

There is not a moment to spare when it comes to wasting the time of children. Like soldiers, they are bored: "Hurry up and wait." Students and soldiers alike are able to acknowledge the futility of their servitude. The fate of students, though, is more unfortunate.

The entire populace, we are in fact told, now comprises an army of sorts. The objective of the holy war that politicians and bureaucrats and business people would engage this army, is the restoration of a secure American dominion over all the other national economies on

planet earth. Schooling is interpreted as a kind of boot-camp in which conscripts can be whipped into shape for global economic battle. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 was among the first initiatives to proclaim the new dominion over schooling, but its roots go back at least to the beginning of the century, and perhaps to Horace Mann-- according to Christopher Lasch (1991), anyhow.

This army is best served by a bastardized knowledge that seeks to limit the possibilities of thought. Knowledge becomes simple "information," construed as the ultimate weaponry of global economic competition in the postmodern era. All truth is become quite relative, but informative: Oh, it has the utility of money during its short half-life. No wonder people like to say that the distinction between physical capital and knowledge ("human capital") is disappearing.

For the worth of knowledge thus debased lies not in its representation (its intellective and imaginative reconstruction) of the human condition and its most ultimate interests, but in its temporary instrumentality in the process of accumulating still more money capital. In the words of educational philosopher Tom Green, we have "evacuated value" from knowledge. If science was the modernists' knowledge of most worth, then in the postmodern era the knowledge of most worth is the hot tip, the insider news, and the merest bit of gossip. Now, with us, the truest measure of the worth of knowledge lies not in that it means for the long term, not even in the utility of its general method (as with science) for the near term, but only in that its

brief--preferably exclusive--possession does allow us to beat the competition out of a few bucks.

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If the hot tip is the height to which intellect aspires, no wonder we hold the pornographic image in such high and widespread regard. The standards of truth, after all, have an odd way of setting the standards of beauty.

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But let's face it. With all those children crowded together, keeping them occupied in a project of forgetfulness forestalls some (but not all) outbreaks of the inevitable unrest that motivates all troops. Schooling has value as containment, a prop for social stability. We wouldn't want anything to jeopardize our ability to process hot tips, would we (ora pro nobis)?

Many schools, of course, do not "succeed" in disciplining their recruits very well. But, hey, the military does have stockades, and every army has disorganized, demoralized battalions bent on rape and pillage. So some schools are like stockades, and some house shock troops. You think members of the SS, for instance, all came from nice middle-class homes? Don't kid yourself.

The technology of schooling, too, dominated as it is by objectives and campaigns of one sort and another (literacy, dropout prevention, and putative excellence among them), suggests military strategizing. The previous administration marketed its America 2000 program as a

"crusade," a national jihad of school improvement, under the particular banner of business interests.

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Students, we now hear, need to become lifelong learners (of those skills and attitudes required for jobs, primarily), they need to be problem-solvers (of those problems one encounters in jobs, primarily), and, as always, they need to be team players (of the games people play in jobs, primarily). They need all these skills and attitudes, one supposes, so that they will know exactly what to do with hot tips.

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One volunteers for military service; going AWOL from time to time is tolerated as a way of life in the military. Schooling, however, conscripts the entire universe of five-year-olds. Principled or desperate absence without leave is not even within their capacities. Schools do not tolerate absenteeism among kids under 16; after the age of 16 one may absent oneself with leave, but with increasingly great stigma and official disgrace. In my state, you can't get a driver's license between the ages of 16 and 18 if you're not being schooled. At what price freedom? In my state, the answer is immobility.

Dropping out (absence with leave) is un-American. By such absence, one diminishes the nation's human capital. Dropping out is rather akin to a dishonorable military discharge, though even high school completion is becoming increasingly un-American on a number of counts. One's patriotic duty obliges one to submit to as much

schooling as one can stand, in hope of a substantial private return on the investment, thereby doing one's part to secure America's manifest global destiny. It may be treason not to submit to this regimen.

Of course, the unflattering comparison of schooling with militarism is quite uncommon these days; the metaphor of the factory is more familiar and more satisfying, especially to business people. It was their creation, after all.

But the comparison of schools with the military is not too far-fetched to contain elements of familiar truth. Schooling is hazardous duty, often for the body in some schools, but almost always for the mind. Intellectual death as a result of schooling is, in fact, so commonplace that we have become able to ignore the stench. Indeed, many of our colleagues are inclined to view the life of the mind as an elitist and fundamentally antisocial conspiracy. Let us stick to hot tips and pornography.

Such colleagues are also likely to be well represented among those who testify to the great good of forging "business partnerships." ("Start a business partnership program," in fact, was a hot tip not so long ago.) In such partnership, a school may get a bit of money from business, but everyone agrees that the real benefit of these partnerships is that businesses learn what it takes to run a school; more particularly they learn that school people are willing to do just about any accursed thing to prepare future job-holders just the way business wants.

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Of course, we all now agree--myself most certainly included--that the modernist "factory model" of schooling is a great evil. It suited "us," of course, just fine until about 1970. What happened then is that the economy began to jump into its postmodern phase, with flexibility, decentralization, automation, and systems-thinking-service-as-quality just coming into view over the good old technological horizon.

Think where we'd be now, if school bureaucracies had just realized the same thing that electrical engineers were realizing in 1970. According to one dozen of the business crowd, getting a high school diploma or a bachelor's degree would take five minutes and cost just five cents (Perelman, 1992). How's that for an educational objective? Stick that in your goals, Mr. Bush and President Clinton, if you dare! Visionary thinking indeed! Gimme a Ph.D. in, say, genetic engineering for a dime and ten minutes.

Anyway, that year 1970 was also the first in which I learned about computer chips. Acquisition of this hot tip was amazing for a nearly unemployable former English major. What did I do with it? Nothing. Thus began my descent from fiction and the growth of my susceptibility to lethal facts. Our friends in the business world, however, do not really want to discard the factory model; rather, they want to bring schooling into line with postmodern management thought--substitute "total quality management" circa 1992 for "scientific management" circa 1912, and things will once again be fine. We still need factories--no question; but that's not really the point. The

point is: What's good for GM is good for America, more than ever. America, however, is no longer a nation. It's just a collection of stupefied fools within a chain-link fence; or, it's like some impossible fiction now long out of reach.

The only difference now is that you and all your colleagues really have to believe. In 1992, the corporate entity has got religion. Back in 1912, it was enough for management to chop off your head, attach a clock to your neck, and send a thousand widgets in your direction. Now you must believe that capitalism has a human face, that multinational corporations enhance national sovereignty, that the millennium will usher in a great and good New World Order. Nothing compels belief like lack of evidence, unless it be lies. Forgetfulness and stupefaction help.

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The postmodern return to spirituality is surprisingly vengeful.

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Thoughtful business people have a better plan for schooling than the old-fashioned, modernist factory model. They complain (as they always have) that schooling costs too much; they complain--quite rightly--that we could accomplish more[2] --faster, better, and cheaper.

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2 Their "more," of course, is the defense of the global dominion of a fictional nation-state by team-playing, life-long learning, and problem-solvers armed to the teeth with hot tips.

Lewis Perelman (1992) has given a name to this vision: "hyperlearning." Here are some of the elements of Perelman's high-tech view of the American dilemma of schooling:

"Capital" and "intellectual capital" become ever more the same thing. The creation of knowledge through learning and the embodiment of knowledge in software now hold the keys to wealth (p. 2).

The real threat posed to our economy by public education--colleges as well as schools--is not inadequacy but excess: too much schooling at too high a cost (p. 3).

There is no meaningful distinction between "education" and "training"; the most effective learning follows the process of apprenticeship. But that process is increasingly inherent in modern HL [i.e., hyperlearning] media; apprenticeship programs are superfluous (p. 5).

Expertise is more in the network, less in the person. With knowledge doubling every few years, expertise is . . . not something one person can master (p. 5).

The right goals can be summarized in four simple words: more, better, faster, and cheaper. . . . HL technology already exists and is achieving these productivity goals in the segments of the national learning enterprise that are compelled by competitive forces to seek more and better learning in less time at lower cost: notably, in corporate and military organizations [last emphasis added] (p. 6).

Ora pro nobis. I couldn't have done better if I had made this stuff up, fiction-wise.

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Count me out. And count my kids out, too.

Of them, my spouse says: "The kids believe that schools should serve them, not that they should serve the schools." Ditto for business "interests," or the totalizing state, or the project of global economic dominion.

Our kids believe that sharing knowledge (rather than coveting hot tips) is rather a good thing; two of them may even become teachers.

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Perelman's "vision thing" reveals a number of appalling assumptions to warrant this new, despicable scheme for defrauding the young:

- It construes knowledge largely as the expertise required to engineer software, a commodity whose value is defined by its capacity to produce wealth: the hot-tip view of knowledge.

- The vision dismisses liberal learning--reflection, thought, and intellect--as vain and counterproductive. Dabbling about with meaning, in this view, is just too damn expensive. Let students indulge this vanity on their own sweet time, not "ours."

- It construes the interests of all humans (great and small) as coincident with those of corporate might. The injunction is to love your company; absence of any sort is not permitted—so the familiar jingoism, "Love it, or leave it," no longer applies. No exit. Ora pro nobis.

- And, finally, this view of schooling—like the current scheme—denies an educative role for privacy and solitude (fundamental to reflection, thought, and intellect).

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Becoming educated has always seemed to require from students a measure of solitude. From educators it would seem to require a healthy respect for the privacy of students' minds, because intellectual development is a profoundly private act, all our vanities about the constitution of the mind to the contrary. Contrary, also, to the assumptions of military or corporate training, we cannot "provide" intellectual development any more than we can "provide" character, self-esteem, or virtue. If we think otherwise, we'd better ask someone to provide a prayer for us, because our good intentions make great cobblestones on the road to hell. But, as I've indicated, our intentions stink.

Solitude, however, and privacy are circumstances that schooling might legitimately provide. We might also attempt to cultivate students' ability to take what is important from their surroundings and

from it fashion the meaning of their lives, linking up facts and ideas, doing--in short--the work of the mind. This dedication would "provide" absolutely nothing. Rather, it would have young people unfold what is already only partly evident to themselves: in themselves, and in the world. This is what is meant by "education," and the people who find this distinction irrelevant are dangerous to us all, to our great great grandchildren, and to our ancestors. They will train us to forget, and they will educate not at all.

What we pretend to do instead of what we should do; what we say we do in our dreadful curriculum guides and tedious lists of even ungrammatically written "learner outcomes," now so tidy and irreproachable on the hard drives of our laptop computers that we hardly think of them at all; and what we do instead is remarkable. We do a dump.

We "have" the skills they must possess; we "have" the attitudes, the facts, and--yea, verily--the problems that they, too, must one day inherit. A simple information transfer. Obviously, such transfers can now take place better, faster, and cheaper. Hyperlearning--or any of its legion of relations--is the answer.

There's one glitch: poor planning. We haven't yet installed hard drives in our students' heads.

Maybe progress will take care of that oversight. Maybe some clever student, going on to a successful engineering career, will fix this little problem some sunny day in the future. The issue won't have

been resolved though, because this is the same fill-'er-up pedagogy that so steamed Paul Goodman, Maria Montessori, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Socrates. Are we to suppose that these good people merely objected to the fact that the fill-'er-up pedagogy didn't work? That's what we will be told; that's what we already hear from the likes of Perelman. Technology will do the trick: hyper(learning).

Hey, so long as there's money in it! Little of the human technology of the last 200-odd years has contributed very much to the well-being of this planet, but look at our military and our corporations--surely they have discovered, in the words of corporate guru Peter Senge how to be "learning organizations." What better models for schooling?

Wrong. Ora pro nobis. Not understanding the past, we are being condemned--yet again--to repeat it. Note, however, that we ourselves, yes, we might do a bit more of the understanding for ourselves, smack in the face of others' attempts to have us rehearse this pitiful charade once again. There are tools almost at hand, but we deny them to ourselves and our students. Ora pro nobis, indeed.

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Failure to respect students' privacy--and in consequence to permit the solitude that might productively use it--is abundantly evident in the organization of schooling--both as we practice it and as Perelman would reform it.

The impossibility of being absent without leave illustrates the point; but it is equally true that while children are in school, they submit to constant surveillance. Surveillance, one should note, comprises not nurture (the birthright of beloved children), but oversight (the birthright of slaves).

"Oversight" is a marvelously ambiguous word. First, the term refers to the intrusion of scrutiny that breeches privacy. This usage casts the teacher in the role of overseer, of task-master. Second, the term refers to the neglectful regard of the overseer's scrutiny (e.g., as in "pardon the oversight"). The term captures the impersonal carelessness that schooling implements so well. This feature is not just an accident of bureaucracy, it is the essence of pedagogical practice.

Many classroom routines (e.g., worksheets, the fetishism of the textbook, debasement of understanding with pointless facts) require that if children are to learn, they should teach themselves. Some students "get it," whereas many do not. Oversight (as the combination of scrutiny and neglectful regard) cultivates a kind of pedagogical social Darwinism, the war of each against each, enacted under the supervision of the teacher. The point of such combat, of course, is to enable students to sort themselves in accord with their probable destinies, the birthright of slaves whose social standing is awarded at conception.

All students, of whatever rank, take part in this lonely struggle-- which can thankfully be implemented equally well in orderly and in

disorderly classrooms--not in solitude, certainly, but in the scrutiny of public view, such that both failures and successes are woefully exaggerated. And this exaggeration is what is most important in schooling, whether resistance (e.g., defiance of the teacher, denial of intellect, or both) or compliance (e.g., pleasing the teacher, "earning" good grades) constitutes the public demonstration. Whatever performance a student enacts, its implications are exaggerated.

Solitude, however, would deny this exaggeration of performance to schooling, one reason solitude is impermissible. The best protection available to students, otherwise, is to maintain that nothing meaningful takes place in school. The professional literature calls this sort of figurative absence (which cannot easily be prevented) "student apathy," as if it were some sort of emotional problem, or perhaps a particularly widespread character flaw, a question of low self-esteem.

Alienation--which is a lot more complicated than apathy--becomes loosely synonymous with non-participation in extracurricular activities. Few people--thanks in large measure to their schooling--are equipped to understand the fact that alienated schooling is the prologue to alienated labor and willing complicity in the acceptance of and life-long tolerance for work not worth the doing. Indeed, one often hears that since students are bound to lead monotonous lives, they had better get used to boredom in school. This ubiquitous view is seldom reported in the professional literature, however, where it

would be considered to constitute the bad taste of teacher-bashing, yet another misconception.

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Where in writings about schooling can one find much consideration of solitude? ERIC is my ouija board in many cases: With its ominously named "controlled vocabulary" of descriptors, it serves nicely as the font of all terms in the normatively mannered discourse of professional educationists (of which body I am now a member). ERIC, I find, is wondrously useful for pinning down the extent of silence on ideas that might occupy our attention if we prized educative purposes more fitting to the human condition than those we do.

Here's what I discovered about the idea of solitude.

ERIC has no descriptor for "solitude," but it does have an identifier. Any abstractor can make up an identifier in the absence of a suitable descriptor. Then the identifier goes into a list shared with all abstractors. If abstractors use it a lot, it can become a descriptor.

Of approximately 250,000 articles and documents indexed by ERIC between January 1982 and January 1993, two had been indexed with the identifier "solitude." No kidding. But only one of these two was related to schooling (the other concerned the education of old people).

Clearly, solitude isn't doing too well in normative discourse.

Still, there were some 29 additional articles and documents in which the word "solitude" appeared somewhere in the abstract. I

examined the résumés to see if I could distinguish positive, neutral, and negative references.

My approach was pretty conservative. If in doubt, the item went into the "neutral" category, which, therefore, got the most tally marks. By this crude reckoning, 10 of all 31 items implied a positive outlook on solitude: Five concerned the writer's need for solitude; two concerned wilderness experiences; two concerned gerontology; and just one--a short article published 10 years ago--commended solitude to educators generally. (This was the single article about K-12 schooling indexed in the last 11 years with the identifier "solitude.")

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I even thought about the act of writing as I considered the fact of the pathetically few results of thinking about solitude in school. When you consider how little writing takes place in school, how very seldom school children visit wilderness areas, and how very few octogenarians pursue a K-12 course of study (I'm not saying none, mind you, because the incidence rate might well exceed the incidence rate of the identifier "solitude" in the ERIC database.) You get the picture: no place to hide.

Maybe we've got a workable hypothesis here, though: Writing instruction languishes in our schools because we'd have to give the little critters a bit of peace, get off their backs for hours at a stretch. Clearly an unworkable proposition: Scratch actual instruction in writing.

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Where in pedagogy can one find much consideration of solitude? Virtually nowhere.

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Clearly, there is a conspiracy of silence here. A reactional person, taking issue with this assertion, might well counter that my view is twisted; that learning is principally a collaborative process; that schooling aims to socialize children; that solitude is not useful (a crude ploy); that it is pathological (a more subtle deflection); or that it is narcissistic (a serious charge). This inquisitor might assert, "Of course, you fool, educators don't write about solitude and, of course, solitude has no place in schooling, because no one finds it of much worth; the most peculiar thing here is your sadism toward this dead horse. Who gives you the right?"

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As one distinguishes solitude from loneliness, its usefulness comes clear.

Loneliness is rather a state of longing for someone else. Loneliness figures as an imposed and undesired separation, the want of a companion.

On the other hand, solitude--in the words of the plucky wilderness educators--constitutes (intentional) "solo experience." These folks are optimists--they actually think a person can survive a "solo experience." The trick in our society is not only how to be alone without being lonely, but how to be in a crowd without being lonely

(pace, David Riesman). We devote much time and energy to this project.

Why are we so afraid of singularity, such an essential feature of the human condition? One can ask the same question about plurality.

The reason is ideological. Liberal democracy--that's code for corporate plutocracy--requires a war of all against all (the same one enacted in classrooms under the teacher's oversight). Any bonds with others most typically rest, not on a tradition of shared meaning (or on any meaning at all), but on inchoate preferences. The test of the durability of our relationships with those whom we seek desperately to cherish is our deftness in juggling supposedly self-defined roles that are nonetheless antagonistic: parent and job-holder, for example. Boss and lover, expert and ingenue, seer and cripple: We've got to play them all in our time because each has economic value. We live in constant fright, therefore. So, with us, "visiting a wilderness area" makes sense as an approach to solitude. We eliminate crowds, and we get to stand in awe of creation—not a bad thing at all. The only problem is that this sort of experience is just another commodity.

Anthony Storrs has written a rather disappointing book about solitude—disappointing for my purposes, at any rate. It's disappointing because the focus of the work is therapeutic. At least Storrs' defense of solitude makes clear the utility of solitude: (1) self-cultivation requires solitude; (2) solitude (e.g., relaxation and meditation) is good for your health; (3) solitude "restoreth the soul," as after a loss or in prospect of

other great change; (4) creative activity requires solitude; and (5) solitude is good for old people.

Most of these points cropped up in my ERIC search. I think the last one, though, is a warning: "Solitude is coming your way, and you'd better get used to it."

Storrs is a psychiatrist, so he has a lot to say about the pathology of people who crave solitude. According to him, two sorts of creative people have neuroses that thrive on solitude: People who were never loved and people who think love won't last--schizoids and depressives. Philosophers and scientists belong in the first, fiction writers and musicians in the second--according to Storrs. Like a lot of people, I fall into one of these categories. It's one of the reasons I write, and it's one of the reasons I'm writing about solitude. How's that for depressing?

This symbiosis of solitude and neuroses, of course, seriously distresses me. But Storrs' point is that the neuroses and the need for solitude are, in fact, separate. Moreover, he claims that more people ought to see the method inherent in the madness of those who know best the value of solitude.

> One might argue that people who have no abiding interests
> other than their spouses and families are as limited
> intellectually as those who have neither spouse nor children
> may be emotionally. . . . Perhaps the need of the creative person
> for solitude and his [sic] preoccupation with internal processes of
> integration, can reveal something about the needs of the less

gifted, more ordinary human being, which is . . . neglected
(Storrs, 1988, pp. xiv-xv).

In Storrs' view, we freight our "interpersonal relation-ships"
with burdens they cannot, and never could, sustain. Solitude, in his
view, is an overlooked resource. There are lots of people who agree:
Bellah and colleagues in Habits of the Heart, Christopher Lasch in both
The True and Only Heaven and The Culture of Narcissism, Jacques
Barzun in The House of Intellect and the much more recent The
Culture We Deserve, and Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition.
These folks hold different views--some quite divergent--on politics,
culture, and economics. The point is: I'm ready to accept Storrs'
statement as a fact, a meaningful, memorable fact, one that might, in
fact, lead one back to fiction.

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So far as pathology goes, Storrs is rather more convinced of the
communal pathology in our quest to avoid loneliness--particularly in
the absence of commitments to ideas, works of various sorts, and
projects of self-creation--than of any pathology inherent in the desire of
solitude. Storrs' book is, in large part, an argument with colleagues,
colleagues in the head-shrinking business who are as unconcerned
with solitude as are our colleagues in the lethal stupefaction business.

Missing from Storrs' therapeutic consideration, therefore, is any
notion that the world has actually been engineered in this way, for one
purpose or another. The possibility that this sort of social engineering

may advance an efficient political economy devoted to obscene and grossly unequal private accumulations of wealth does not figure in Storrs' account. It's the whole point, though. An economic and cultural deadweight presses upon us, a whole series of expectations for how we behave; how we accumulate and spend; how we misconstrue our selves, our loved ones, and those who might otherwise be our brothers and sisters; and how we ignore devotions and commitments not based on enlightened or benighted self-interest.

In consideration of these facts, then, solitude has surprising utility, if we can just beat back the sense of overwhelming loneliness--anomie, alienation, separation, exclusion, rejection--with which the contemporary social structure endows our all-too-short lives. But let's admit it, the utility of solitude is of an order entirely different from the utility of the hot tip of whatever sort.

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Many children watch over six or more hours of television every day, after languishing for about the same number of hours in school. Is this just lousy parenting? Weakness of the will among small children? Is this some sort of accident?

Maybe not. There's a rather strong negative correlation between this amount of self-inflicted stupefaction and socioeconomic status.

Maybe not. It keeps the most dangerous citizens--the dispossessed--divided from themselves. With a television, one need

never feel loneliness quite so sharply. One need hardly think. Ora pro nobis. Get thee to a wilderness, if thou canst afford it.

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Narcissism may be the most serious threat to the claimed worth of solitude, but not because solitude engenders narcissism. Rather, solitude may be so uncommon because, with us, narcissism substitutes for solitude.

In Storrs' formulation, the utility of solitude is that it permits one to pursue "impersonal interests," by which term he refers to the full range of intellectual and aesthetic occupations, anything the experience of which raises abstract, theoretical, or "spiritual" qualities: fishing, writing, woodworking, making music, or just musing alone by the literal or figurative fire. Storrs notes that some people like to drive simply because it is one of the few opportunities for solitude (though cellular phones are now invading the scant privacy of one's own car).

Narcissism differs from solitude on such grounds, since its object of interest is anything but "impersonal." Rather, its object is personal regard--regard, in fact, of one's own person. In that regard, however, lurks the gaze of others, a gaze that is mostly unrecognized because it is implicit. Writing at the end of the 1950s, for instance, Roland Barthes, in an essay in Mythologies, considered the case of women's magazines. Though not a man could be seen in the pages of these magazines, he wrote, the whole enterprise was structured by the invisible gaze of men.

Narcissism, therefore, also consists more of negative than positive self-regard, with dissatisfaction the foundation of narcissistic esteem. The industry scrutinized by Barthes, for instance, cultivates close attention to the supposed "flaws" of body and face defined in its pages. Victims of this sort of narcissism--and this includes us all-- seldom understand that they (we) have been manipulated. They (we) are likely to be completely in the dark about the circumstances of their (our) lives that make them (us) such easy prey.

Retracing the evolution of Freud's thought on the subject, Christopher Lasch specifies narcissism as a mechanism of defense against aggression (perhaps the anomie and alienation that consume us), not as love of the self. In Lasch's account, narcissism is the most common presenting feature seen in clinical practice:

> a type of personality . . . immediately recognizable . . . to
> observers of the contemporary cultural scene; facile at managing
> the impressions he gives to others; ravenous for admiration but
> contemptuous of those he manipulates into providing it;
> unappeasingly hungry for emotional experiences with which to
> fill an inner void; terrified of aging and death . . . chronically
> bored, . . . the narcissist is promiscuous. . . . He uses intellect in
> the service of evasion rather than self-discovery (Lasch, 1979, pp.
> 82-86).

Narcissism, then, constitutes an evasion of solitude. The fears that motivate narcissism bear a surprising resemblance to the fears that inhibit solitude--the incapacity to entertain interests of one's own and

the discomfort of what may emerge without "proper" or "duly constituted" oversight.

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A good educationist is supposed to conclude any discourse with a bit of practical advice. This sort of exercise often consists of a list; I know because I've done this sort of thing too often myself. Usually under duress. "Tell us what to think," my colleagues clamor. No kidding--I've been told just this.

Such advice in this instance would really miss the point. I'm not advocating more study halls, a system of tutors. I'm not advocating the Dalton Plan and I'm not railing against cooperative learning.

So, here's the first part of my practical pitch: It would be a good thing if we separated the custodial from the educative function--baby-sitting from teaching. We've got to keep our kids safe and we don't need to drill forgetfulness and stupefaction into their heads six or seven hours a day. Three hours of instruction a day ought to do it: It works in higher education; there are secondary schools--good ones--that adopt this scheme. We'd have to figure out what to do with the kids the rest of the time, though; letting them watch television ought not to be an option.

I've got one kid left in public school, and the amount of television- and movie-watching that goes on in her school is, well, curious, to say the least. They watch The Simpsons weekly--no

kidding. This is a rare treat, usually verboten, in our household: too smug, too faddish, and too addictive. All this opposition is to no avail, thanks to in loco parentis.

I don't make a point of this misuse of time, because I recognize that there is no time to lose when it comes to wasting the time of children, as I've said. And, it's the art teacher--that gravitator of the tired, huddled masses of students yearning for something purposive, meaningful, productive, and beautiful in school--who shows the Simpson tapes on Fridays. In his desperate way, I know, he tries to do what's possible. What really burns me is the Spanish teacher who shows the same old instructional film twice to each of her classes each year. You can see this film eight times--maybe memorize it--if you're a really dedicated Spanish student. The film's in English, of course.

Students--all of us, indeed--require solitude to form our own opinions. Opinion may have such a bad reputation, in fact, because it is so seldom formed in solitude and so often lacks principle. With us, opinions are more like an infectious disease than an outcome of thought. Never alone with our own thoughts, having fewer and fewer of them, and schooled in stupefaction and forgetfulness, our resistance crumbles. We succumb. We need more education, certainly, but we need much less training in stupefaction and forgetfulness. How come, really?

I'm going to let somebody else tell you—it's another bit of fiction that weaves education and military life together. It's from Kurt Vonnegut's Hocus Pocus.

Most of the company's employees were content to do what they were told, and incurious as to how it was, exactly, that they had worked the miracles that somehow arrived all packaged and labeled on the loading docks. I'm reminded now of dead American soldiers, teenagers mostly, all packaged and labeled and addressed on loading docks in Vietnam. How many people knew—or cared—how these curious artifacts were manufactured? A few (p. 31).

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"A World Came to Life":

Reflections on Perspective and Its Power

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Introduction

The title of this paper comes from a book chapter written by Karl Pribram (1985) in which he observes that Helen Keller's "world came to life" once she acquired language with which she could make meaning of the world around her. He quotes from Helen Keller's own story as follows:

> I knew then that w-a-t-e-r meant that wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, and set it free! There were barriers still it is true, but barriers that could, in time, be swept away. I left the well-house eager to learn. Everything had a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. As we returned to the house, every object which I touched seemed to quiver with life. That was because I saw everything with a strange new sight that had come to me (pp. 701-702).

Pribram follows this quote with the note that Helen Keller "became aware of her thoughts at the same moment that she was able to name objects." He notes also that at that moment, "propositions were formed, remembrances, repentances, and sorrows could be entertained. Subject could be responsible for object, cause could lead to effect" (p. 702). In fact, Helen Keller, with the advent of language into her life, began to see the world differently; she would now be driven by a different view of the world around her.

This paper is built around a number of reflections about perspective or personal world view, that ideological force which shapes and drives all of our actions and behaviors. Personal perspective is powerful and pervasive. It is developed during formative years when we allow ideas, mostly unwittingly, to form and shape our thinking to a point that eventually we take those ideas for granted. Dilthey (1978) teaches us that our life experience "consolidates into an objective and generalized knowledge" (p. 22) which occurs when our self meets with the surrounding world. It is our way of finding our individual stability in an "invisible world."

> . . . As men live with fellow men and with others before and after them, the regular repetition of particular experiences forms a tradition of terms describing them, which after a while becomes more and more accurate and certain. Their certainty rests on the ever-increasing number of cases from which we draw our conclusions, also on a habit of subsuming cases under existing generalizations, and on constant re-examination. . . . All that dominates us as habit, usage or tradition is founded on such generalized life's experiences (p. 22).

As our lives proceed, we continue to re-enforce our view of the world-- it is ever present, lurking in the background of our minds, taken for granted, and accepted "without due acknowledgment" (Reader's Digest, p. 732). In a real way,

> . . . the world and our relations to it hem us in, oppress us in a manner which we cannot overcome, and they restrict our intentions unexpectedly and beyond our control (Dilthey, p. 23).

Rifkin notes that our perspective, or in his words our "frame of reference" (p. 5), is so ingrained and powerful that, for the most part, it simply goes unquestioned throughout one's life. In fact, perspective is so taken for granted that of it, Ortega y Gasset (1958) observed, "We do not know what is happening to us, and that is precisely the thing that is happening to us—the fact of not knowing what is happening to us" (p. 119).

In point of fact, we go about our lives, day by day, without giving much thought to the fundamental world view which is behind our actions. In schools, for example, school administrators go off to work each day not usually paying much attention to the underlying perspective which determines their educational decisions. And teachers rarely consider what ideological underpinnings there are to their practice. They are, in a sense, unwitting victims of their taken-for-granted world views. Take, for example, the way they put their lesson plans together.

> In nearly all teacher preparation programs, students are taught that in planning lessons and units they should first identify and list their objectives, then select content and materials, then choose appropriate methods, and then decide on evaluation procedures. Students are also taught as guiding principles that children's learning proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from the known to the unknown, from the simple to the complex, and from active manipulation to symbolic conceptualization (p. 1).

Egan (1986) argues that this kind of model, clearly and widely accepted as the way to teach, is "inappropriately" a mechanistic way of thinking about teaching. He goes on to say that there is an alternative to this model, one that encourages us to "see lessons or units as good stories to be told rather than sets of objectives to be attained" (p. 2). In this way, we would put meaning center stage and stimulate children's imagination by "providing children with access to and engagement with rich meaning." Frank Smith (1990) says essentially the same thing,

> The stories that we construct are not a special way of perceiving the world or of making sense of everything we hear or read. It is the only way we can make sense of the world, of literature, and of art; it is also the way our fantasies make sense to us (p. 64).

Behind these interesting ideas is a view of teaching and learning that is radically different than the prevailing view that drives education in the Western world. And what is particularly interesting to me, is the fact that most teachers and school leaders are unaware of this prevailing view, this ideological force that shapes their practices.

Because we are usually unaware of the perspectives which power our lives, we usually are unable to clearly consider the relative value of information which comes to us, moment by moment. This may explain why we as educators are such a fickle lot--we simply jump on bandwagons with no apparent sense as to the fundamental views which the bandwagons represent. I remember examining a doctoral student who was a school counselor. I asked her, in an oral interview,

to point out an impressive idea which she had learned during her studies. She said that she was very impressed with the "stewardship" idea which, incidentally, seems to impress many of our students. I probed a bit and found that she liked the idea of each person, including children, having the right of choice in education but all the while facing the consequences of that choice. I then asked, "In your educational practice, how do you implement the stewardship idea?" She said, without hesitation, "Oh, through behavioral modification."

A Few Personal Reflections About World View

With these brief preliminary thoughts about the nature of personal world view, I would like, in this paper, to share with you a few reflections about it and to formulate one or two implications they may have for thoughtful educational leadership.

A year ago, I was asked to attend a conference in Canterbury, England. It was a small conference--18 invited people: three Americans, three Poles, one Welshman, the rest English all of whom were prominent intellectuals--I was the least among them by far. We were to read a number of papers prior to the conference (much like this conference), then we were sequestered for two full days of discussion focused, naturally, on the papers. During one of the sessions, some of the British intellectuals made special note of the cultural superiority of the West, particularly of England. They claimed that it is to the English that the rest of the world must look for the best in cultural tradition. A few of these scholars derided, particularly, the third world countries of

the former British Empire, claiming that, in addition to having made little contribution to the world's progress, they have little in the way of culture that is of much value.

I sat in amazement, thinking about the many years I had spent in Deep Polynesia, in Western Samoa. I wondered what cultural contributions the British have made that would improve on, say, the Samoan way of laughing at unexpected difficulty, or of sharing with neighbors a catch of fish, or of children showing respect for the elderly. I fancied that I would take a Samoan smile over a British stiff upper lip any day of the week.

I have reflected a great deal about this experience and have concluded that these intellectuals have a view of the world which they and their predecessors have taken for granted for centuries. A view of the world, born in the words of Shakespeare among others, which continues to this day. Please listen to these famous lines:

> This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
> This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
> This other Eden, demi-paradise,
> This fortress built by Nature for herself
> Against infection and the hand of war,
> This happy breed of men, this little world,
> This precious stone set in the silver sea,
> Which serves it in the office of a wall
> Or as a moat defensive to a house
> Against the envy of less happier lands,
> This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this
> England (Act II, Scene 1).

These are Shakespeare's words spoken through John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, in the play <u>Richard the Second</u> which have, in part, fashioned the English perspective as to their "superior" place in the world, at least culturally.

And what a world view this. It is not difficult to understand the reason for the British conquest of the world--they carved a vast empire believing, I am sure, that this "blessed plot" was the "envy of less happier lan's." And now, even though Britannia no longer rules the waves, it is also not difficult to understand that behind the modern-day British sense of superiority, there is a world view that bred it. Imagine believing that this "earth of majesty" is virtually invincible, "a demi-paradise," a fortress built by "Nature herself against infection and the hand of war."

I personally love this "blessed plot"; however, we must face the fact that England is not what it used to be. And yet in some circles, at least, the world view that drove Shakespeare in sixteenth century England and right up to and including the twentieth century, at least through the Second World War, lingers on. England lives on, but a "seat of Mars"?

This wonderful perspective powered in part Churchill's (1949) resolve to never surrender to Nazi forces. Please listen to his words of 18 June 1940 sent by way of letter to the British Parliament:

> I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this
> battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it
> depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our

institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will say, "This was their finest hour" (pp. 225-226).

This marvelous speech rallied the British to extraordinary resolve in their fight against the Germans. And they won the war. But isn't it interesting that his view of the world, which was subscribed to by the vast majority of English, allowed the real possibility that the British Empire and its Commonwealth could last a thousand years when, in fact, just a short few decades later it's all but history.

No, England is not immune to the infections of world economic, social, and cultural fluctuations and difficulties, and I must admit that the British world view about their place in the world is obviously changing--albeit by force--as a result. But change of world view comes slowly--being much like a powerful locomotive roaring uncontrolled down a track--it is very difficult to slow and stop.

Personal World View: Difficult to Change

I suggest that just as it is extremely difficult for the British to change their perspective of the world, so, too, is it difficult for

professional teachers and leaders, to change their perspective. It is, after all, the perspective that is the problem, yet it is so confounded difficult ') change especially when so many people "buy" into it. Those of us who believe that the perspective which powers thoughtful school leadership is the only way to save the present day school system, ought to remember that perspective is pervasive, powerful, and not amenable to a quick fix. It will take inspired leadership, the kind of leadership that Dean Patterson refers to as prophet/poet leadership. But this leadership must be focused at the perspective level if any change is to occur, a focus most reformers of education never seem to take into consideration.

To validate my claim here, I would like to tell a story about my wife, Lorna, and me. Just after we were married, as is common I think in most households, we shared the same tube of toothpaste. I must admit that it was quite a shock for me to discover that instead of neatly rolling the tube from the bottom (in those days tubes of toothpaste were made of soft metal) Lorna had the maddening habit of squeezing the tube, and I often found the tube rather mutilated with deep finger impressions in it. I was troubled by this and called for a summit meeting, hoping to head off a rather serious clash. To my amazement, she saw nothing wrong with squeezing the tube. "But," I argued, "by any convention, rolling the toothpaste tube from the bottom is the neat and orderly thing to do." She said simply, "I can't and I won't." By this time, I was searching for a compromise and suggested that we both

have our own tubes of toothpaste and squeeze or roll as we wish. To this day she mutilates and I neatly roll. Incidentally, our nine children are about evenly divided—we have five squeezers and four rollers. You should know that I also keep a very neat desk, which drew a comment one day, to my surprise, from my colleague Darwin Gale, who suggested that a neat and clean desk is the result of a sick mind. It's obvious, by looking at his desk, who has the sick mind. His view of the world is obviously powering very strange behaviors.

Perspective--Sometimes Illusive

At a small conference in Poldusk, Poland a couple of years ago, I was delighted, being a vegetarian, to discover that, out of the twenty-five participants, there were several vegetarians. During one lunch I sat by a very prominent English philosopher who was also a vegetarian. Our conversation turned to philosophy and his latest attempt to write a book on the ineffable. I found myself staring into space wondering what manner of mortal would try a book on the ineffable. Well, aside from that, he was very interesting. After the meal was over, he leaned back on his chair, took out a cigarette, and lit it. I was startled and asked, "Good grief, Richard, how can you be a vegetarian and smoke? You must realize that smoking is very harmful to your health." "Oh," he said, "I'm not a vegetarian for dietary reasons as you, I'm a vegetarian for philosophical reasons." He then proceeded to explain what his philosophical reasons were.

Sometimes, it is difficult to determine a person's view of the world, let's say a teacher's, and yet without knowing the view of the world he or she may hold, it is difficult to examine and validate carefully their teachings. An important implication here is that we ought to develop the ability to examine what perspective is behind the behaviors of people, especially teachers.

Reductionist Research Modalities

I have also taken the opportunity in recent months to reflect on the problem of reductionism with which we must contend in education and to consider the world view which drives it. I would like to share a few thoughts on the subject with you today.

When we consider educational research, we have a very fruitful field for study of perspective. To begin with, our educational research, naturally, reflects the current perspective about teaching and learning. This perspective drives, in other words, the kind of research in which we engage and the very modalities we use. And as you know, these modalities are fragmented and mechanistic, quite naturally reflecting the mechanistic and fragmented spirit of our times. We have neglected, in much of our educational research, more human and therefore more holistic views of people and things. Polkinghorne (1988) is right when he says that the traditional research model is limited when applied to human beings which, ironically, we must remind ourselves is the focus of teaching and learning. While defending the contribution of some social science research, he finds

that our traditional research model, adopted from the natural science research, is limited when applied in the study of human beings. I do not believe that the solutions to human problems will come from developing ever more sophisticated and creative applications of the natural science model, but rather by developing additional, complementary approaches that are especially sensitive to the unique characteristics of human existence (p. x).

Our mechanistic, fragmented research models will never lead us to a holistic view of what teaching and learning should be about.

Reductionism: A Modern Intellectual Convention[1]

And what are the limitations of fragmented research when applied to human existence? Allow me to answer by suggesting that separating activity from meaningful context is at the root of the limitation and is the final step in the evolution of the Cartesian convention of separating wholes into component parts for the purpose of solving complex intellectual problems.

Descartes (Capra, 1982) introduced the analytic research method into Western thought. This research method

... consists in breaking up thoughts and problems into pieces and in arranging these in their logical order. This analytic method of reasoning is probably Descartes' greatest contribution to science. It has become an essential characteristic of modern scientific thought and has proved extremely useful in the development of scientific theories and the realization of

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[1] Many of the ideas and some of the language used in this section are adapted from a doctoral dissertation prospectus presently being developed by Rowena Massey-Hicks.

complex technological projects. It was Descartes' method that made it possible for NASA to put a man on the moon (p. 59).

So long as each part is viewed in the context of the whole, the parts will be seen as necessary components of it, and the convention of separating the whole into particular parts remains simply a useful problem-solving convention. However, when the context of the whole is overlooked and each part is viewed as an entity in itself, we ultimately reach the point where we cannot view the whole at all. Polanyi (1959) has reminded us that "we cannot see the whole without comprehending the parts, but we can see the parts without comprehending the whole." When this happens, the purpose of the original whole, its relationship to other wholes, the functioning and inter-relatedness of all its subsidiary parts, the principles that directed it, and the values that surrounded it are no longer considered. The meaning of the original whole slips from view because, in Capra's words, an

> overemphasis on the Cartesian method has led to the
> fragmentation that is characteristic both of our general thinking
> and our academic disciplines, and to the widespread attitude of
> reductionism in science--the belief that all aspects of complex
> phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their
> component parts (p. 59).

Acceptance of the reductionist mode of reasoning encourages thinking that concentrates on fragments or parts rather than on wholes. For example, let us suppose a traveler is planning a trip to Israel. He decides to learn Hebrew by beginning with the letters of the

alphabet and arrives in Israel without learning anything beyond the consonants and vowels of the language. Let us also suppose that the first expression he encounters upon arrival in Israel is "hakol b'sader." He is able, by reducing the expression to its component parts to pronounce "ha-kol-b-sa-der" and to recognize and to repeat the expression. However, he is not able to use it in a sentence, to answer a question in which it is used, or to explain its meaning--he can only reduce the expression to its component parts. Thus, he can only interact with the word in a limited, mechanistic way by repeating it, writing it, or sounding it. The foolishness of such an approach to learning language is obvious. Similarly, when researchers only take into consideration fragmented parts of wholes without "viewing" wholeness, the result is equally foolish. The meaning, the underlying principles and the overall inter relatedness--the very purposes for looking at the parts in the first place--are lost. Interaction with the form of the whole rather than with its meaning is all that is possible. Thus, reductionist approaches evoke partial and mechanical meaning only. Sadly, what started out as a useful convention for problem-solving has led to the creation of a habit of mind, or a view of the world that fragments reality and reduces man's interactions with his world to the level of a machine.

Toward Oneness and Humanness

Viktor Frankl (1969) tells of an experience he had when in junior high school. He says he well remembers

how our science teacher used to walk up and down the class, explaining to us that life in its final analysis is nothing but a combustion and oxidation process. In this case reductionism took actually the form of oxidationism. On one occasion I jumped to my feet and asked him: 'Dr. Fritz, if this is true, what meaning, then, does life have?' At that time I was twelve. But now imagine what it means that thousands and thousands of young students are exposed to indoctrination along such lines, taught a reductionist concept of man and a reductionist view of life (pp. 398-399).

Frankl goes on to describe reductionism as a "kind of projectionism." It "projects human phenomena into a lower dimension," resulting in a distorted view of the whole. Such reductionism, he says, "must be counteracted by what one might call dimensionalism . . . in order to preserve the one-ness and humanness of man in the face of the pluralism of the sciences." He goes on to say that this pluralism, after all, is the "soil on which reductionism flourishes."

Figure 1

Frankl illustrates (see Figure 1) his notion of dimensionalism by projecting, out of its own dimension into a lower one, a phenomenon, in this case, a cylinder. It is projected onto two planes, horizontal and vertical, and yields pictures "that are contradictory to one another." On the horizontal plane we have a circle and on the vertical plane there is a rectangle--an evident contradiction. He notes, what is more, that if you imagined an open vessel, the "openness of this vessel completely disappears in the projections into the lower dimensions. The circle as well as the rectangle are closed figures rather than open vessels" (p. 404).

It is evident that if we study the projections rather than the actual object, real distortions are possible. He illustrates a second phenomenon (see Figure 2) in the form of a cylinder, a cone, and a sphere which are projected, once again, out of their own dimension into a dimension lower than their own. "The shadows of these different spatial figures, are equal, interchangeable, you can never infer what it is that has cast the shadow" (p. 404).

Figure 2

What does Frankl make of these projections? He says,

> If you project a human being into a purely biological frame of
> reference, and/or into the frame of psychology, then in the first
> case you obtain somatic data, while in the second you obtain
> psychic data. There is again a contradiction. What seems to be
> even more important is that there was an open vessel and this is
> depicted as a closed system.

Well, of course, human existence is characterized by its
openness; therefore, it seems appropriate to study it in such a way as to
maintain the integrity of its openness or in Frankl's words, its
"oneness and humanness" (p. 403).

It seems to me that there are important implications of Frankl's
projections for educational leadership, the most important being the
realization that much of what we do in education is fragmented. And
if we are not careful, we may go about our work viewing human beings
(children) as technocratic entities, mere robots subject to external
manipulations and control. It is quite easy in our reductionist world to
separate the knower from the known.

The Prevailing Educational Perspective

Lorna and I have had a number of experiences as our children
have gone through junior and senior high schools which have taught
us the power of perspective. For instance, I had learned, having gone
through a "teacher training" institution, that children whose parents
were active in support of school activities--PTA, etc.--achieved at
higher levels than those children whose parents didn't participate. So,

being a concerned father, I trudged off on what was to be, over the years, an annual ritual--"Parents in School Night." These are the kinds of evenings where parents meet with the various teachers--math, science, social studies, music, etc.--and move from class to class every five or six minutes according to your child's daily schedule.

On the first of these experiences, after each teacher had announced the usual elaborate numbering system by which the children were to be graded which included, of course, how children were to earn bonus points, and after they had briefly discussed what the children were supposed to be doing in their classes, they would conclude each session with a pleasant "thank you for supporting your children in school." At first, I accepted the expression of gratitude with a "you're welcome" even though I sensed that something was screwy here. The longer I thought about the matter, I realized that these teachers shouldn't be thanking me for supporting my own children. I'm sure they were being polite in perhaps an awkward situation, but I'm responsible for my children--I'm responsible for their education. The "thank you's" clearly suggested that the teachers had assumed, unwittingly, that they were responsible for my children--and that assumption was and is clearly untenable for both of us.

The teachers and school administrators whom I have known over the years aren't evil people grabbing for power and control. They are, for the most part, honest, hard working, dedicated professionals who mean well for my children and yours. What, then, is there about

this system that controls and forces parents and teachers and leaders into behaviors that they don't particularly buy into? My answer is that the system which we have in place at present is driven by a prevailing perspective, about education--its delivery, its fashion, its everything. Let me explain.

When I began my study of professional teaching, a prevailing perspective of the world was instilled in me. I don't recall that there was ever much said about it overtly, it was simply accepted, taken for granted. And, what was then and now the prevailing perspective? Well, it was a view of the world that Pribram calls "radical behaviorism" with its stated aim to "mathematize, to develop laws in the image of the mechanistic physics of Newton" (p. 704). According to this perspective, man is seen as a pliable animal who can be shaped as society demands. And teaching, therefore, is the process of shaping a child's behavior to conform to the expectations and needs of society. In short, the perspective reduced itself to a stimulus/response mentality designed to control the behavior of children. In

B.F. Skinner's words,

> the real issue is the effectiveness of techniques of control. We
> shall not solve the problems of alcoholism and juvenile
> delinquency [for example] by increasing a sense of responsibility.
> It is the environment which is "responsible" for the
> objectionable behavior, and it is the environment, not some
> attribute of the individual, which must be changed (p. 70).

These are words of control. And, I never questioned this prevailing perspective—I may have questioned, from time to time, the practices which were linked to the perspective, but I never questioned the perspective itself. It was simply accepted, it went unquestioned. And out of the perspective came certain teaching practices with which we are all well acquainted.

1. That methods, procedures, strategies, etc., are central keys to teaching and learning. This meant that, as a teacher, for example, if I had the right strategy, if I had the "right" plan, or if I could marshal the right stimuli, I could "get" the students to behave properly and to achieve intellectually the way society has determined that they should.

In addition, there was also instilled in me the belief that I had the power to motivate students. That is to say, once again using external stimuli, that I could "get" students to make the effort to learn or whatever else I wanted them to do.

2. That curriculum guides, curriculum programs and outlines were essential in giving to children a complete and rich education for not only the benefit of the child but also for the benefit of the state. The guides were, after all, put together by the state. They were made of materials which had to be "covered" in certain blocks of time and if they weren't, some sort of major transgression would be committed. In addition, good teaching was determined by how well teachers transmitted the information, naturally, in the most efficient way.

And, as a part of the curriculum, children must be taught certain skills including language "skills," learning "skills," etc. These skills were considered to be like any other skill, such as stroking a tennis ball.

4. That there was always present a kind of chance about learning--you put the right teacher with the right strategies, with the right students at the right time, and "presto" you have learning--nothing to it--it's easy. Said another way, if the conditions were right, learning would be "facilitated," that somehow or another little concerted thought need be put forth to grasp an idea or to understand something.

5. That learning could be accurately measured by appropriate testing. That is to say, I as a teacher had the responsibility and the "know how" to assess student academic achievement as well as social and other kinds of achievement. In addition, I could, based on the testing, pretty accurately determine a grade for my students which grade would indicate where they stood in relation to others as established by certain norms.

Well, these among other practices associated with teaching and learning were instilled in me as I "trained" to be a teacher and administrator. I say trained, because I was simply programmed to adopt and obey them--I never questioned them.

A Personal Awakening: A New Perspective in the Making

Intuitively, I suppose I knew that these practices were wrong but I, nevertheless, was an embodiment of the prevailing world view that I

had unwittingly adopted and which determined the practices. And, if I wanted to change the practices I would have to change the world view which drove them.

As it turned out, my journey to change my world view (there was no way I was going to change the prevailing world view) and the practices which derived from it came slowly. After all, personal perspective is powerful, it doesn't change easily. But gradually, I came to see that I was controlling people's lives and I was quite uncomfortable doing that. I began to ponder, consider, weigh, and judge issues pertaining to world view and the forces that were at work on me. The more I learned about perspective, the more I realized that mine needed to change.

A number of people who influenced me greatly helped me to see not only the power of perspective, but also the evil of the one to which I had unwittingly subscribed. I had a number of experiences during this time of contemplation which influenced me. Let me describe one of them. Four years ago, I invited Dr. Milowit Kuninski from the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland to come to lecture to the Summer Residency Program students. This was before the free elections while the communists were still in power. In his first lecture, he described the typical communist educational system. I remember sitting in the back of the room behind the students. Milowit was about fifteen minutes into his lecture when I noticed some of the students squirming in their seats, whispering to each other. I overheard one

student, a school superintendent, say, "He's describing our system of education." The communist system was one of control--much like ours. Did you know that at the height of the communist influence, the local people had at least twenty-five percent control over curriculum? We don't have that much control over local curriculum and this is a land of freedom.

From this and other experiences, my perspective of teaching and learning, over time, slowly began to change to a thoughtful one. A thoughtful perspective of teaching and learning can be characterized as follows (Webb, Shute and Grant):

1. Humans are always potentially more than they are actually. Everyone can learn and grow--always. Such growth is possible because we are moral agents. Our choices in life either promote or inhibit our development.

2. The choices we make--whether they are releasing or inhibiting of potential--arise from our efforts to create coherent personal meaning out of our lives. "Meaning" is a "crucial organizing principle of human behavior. It is a structure which relates purposes to expectations so as to organize actions--whether the actions are taken or only thought about" (Marris, 1986, p. vii).

This perspective is manifest in what Wayne Brickey calls dispositions of thoughtfulness. These are not practices necessarily, but have important implications for practice. Let me explain.

The Brickey Dissertation

He wrote a dissertation recently (1992) entitled: <u>Inclined to Understand: Dispositions for Thoughtful Learning</u>. Wayne Brickey

tackled the problem brought on by our society-wide technical imperative and its offspring, the mechanical transmission metaphor in education which promotes the ingestion of information only and suppresses and neglects learning for understanding. He speculated that there must be some natural disposition(s) behind a child's powerful motivation to want to understand or to make meaning of the world rather than simply ingest information.

He rejected, as have many others, the dominant image of schooling in America described by Eisner (1985) as follows:

> The dominant image of schooling in America has been the factory and the dominant image of teaching and learning the assembly line. These images underestimate the complexities of teaching and neglect the differences between education and training (pp. 355-356).

Wayne found that there is a flood of suspicion and allegation to the effect that the schools are "places where the enormous potential of the human brain is systematically eroded, and possibly destroyed" (Smith, 1986, pp. 44-46). For example, Dillon (1990) observes that newly-trained teachers are

> overwhelmed by the prevailing view of teaching as a mechanical, technical function rather than a moral enterprise inducing the young to the good. Their own education has left them untouched in spirit, in mind, in heart, while their entrance into teacher education programs seems a stage of vocational training, in service of occupational achievement.

He further notes that this technical mindset is a "killing field" for thoughtful learning. In Gibboney's (1990) words,

The technological mindset is the killing field of reform. Like a machine, education in the spirit of the technological mindset can only endlessly repeat its built-in and ordered sequences based on technique, whose end is more technique, because a machine's predetermined end is to run and run. . . . Might it be that we are slowly losing our sense of human possibility in an age of science and technological marvels . . . because the utopian myth of the machine too much grips our soul? (p. 7)

Brickey claims that if one rejects the perspective or world view noted above, and adopts one that fosters meaning and understanding of the fragmented bits and pieces of information that we take into our minds, then one will discover dispositions which can be encouraged. Well, instead of finding one natural disposition of learning, Brickey identified three, viz., the integrative disposition, the interrogative disposition, and the "integritive" disposition.

The integrative disposition means that by nature we are inclined to want to integrate facts and information into a mind-picture, which we are forever enlarging; that the mind does not like disconnected bits and pieces of knowledge, rather it likes to see wholes. Arendt (1971) has argued that "we are what men always have been--thinking beings." She meant by this "no more than that men have an inclination, perhaps a need, to think beyond the limitations of knowledge . . ." And Whitehead (1929) characterized "the art of education" as the "training of human souls," and insisted that it requires the "exhibition of the general in the particular" (p. 52). To bring this idea to the teaching setting, genuine teaching "transforms knowledge" from "bare

fact" into imaginative comprehension (pp. 92-93). Brickey includes a very long list of validating references to support this claim.

He notes, too, that if a teacher desires to teach for integration, that the best, actually the only way to do this, is by example—it is best demonstrated, radiated, dramatized in the teacher. Subject matter then comes alive, and has the best chance of being whole for the student.

The interrogative disposition means that by nature we are inclined to find the source of discrepancy when things don't integrate or fit, when wholeness is not evident. In short, if one cannot integrate or fit knowledge into one's mind-picture of reality, one becomes perplexed, bewildered. Then the interrogative disposition is unleashed, when one must push one's learning journey to a higher level of understanding—which may be aided by a wise teacher, but which must be launched and persisted in by the student's own interrogative spirit.

Brickey notes that questions must be formed by the learner. If the mind is not seeking, it cannot find, even by happenstance, the elevations of wholeness or wisdom. When the mind seeks and finds, the learner is transformed into a new creature.

Do you sense the journey metaphor in this? Both the learner and the teacher are on a journey to understanding. It is the learner's journey to be sure, yet the teacher is well-acquainted with the path and its pains. For example, teachers would never be disrespectful toward a question which the student might raise, even though they (the

teachers) may have heard the question countless times before. The truly great teachers are those who create an atmosphere in which the mind of the student may make its own interrogative journey.

Finally, we come to the third disposition of thoughtful learning--the "integritive." Brickey asserts that the search for answers to questions demands the ultimate honesty of rejecting impertinent or inaccurate or inadequate information in preference to that information which truly matches the inquiry. To conjoin honest, complete answers with personally significant inquiries enables the mind to eventually find wholeness, and it is, after all, only in the interest of such wholeness or wisdom that the thoughtful learning odyssey is made. The overriding inclination for understanding seeks nothing more than this, but it also seeks nothing less.

Summary

I believe that the current view behind our educational practice to which most educators have subscribed is born of control, compulsion and force, and since true learning can only occur in an environment of freedom and responsibility, is, therefore, oxymoronic. However, it is the world view to which our society has subscribed, and we, unfortunately, must live with it. But we can be intelligent, in our own way, in trying to mitigate its influences, for it is only when we mitigate its influences that we will be in a most favorable position to bless students and colleagues.

My way of mitigating the effects of the current world view is fostering what we are calling thoughtful education which allows students, in an atmosphere of freedom, to make sense and meaning of the world around them; to make sense of the bits and pieces of fragmented information which are thrown at them in schools; to integrate these bits of information into a coherent picture of the world, a world where much truth and coherence has been lost. We surely aren't going to find the truth if we don't encourage the dispositions which a thoughtful education would foster.

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Forget *Leadership for Reform*; Forget *Leadership for Restructuring*;

Forget *Leadership for Renewal*; Think *Leadership of Self*

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My wordy title was inspired (would that be the right term?) by Jacques Barzun's admonition: "Forget EDUCATION. Education is a result, a slow growth, and hard to judge. Let us talk rather about Teaching and Learning, an . . . activity that can be provided for." (1991, p. 3). As Barzun would have us be less lofty and more practical about aims for the public schools, so I would have us be less concerned about the regeneration of vast enterprises and more practical about the aims of leadership.

I will draw your attention to four ideas through this paper:

1. The aim of schooling is from time to time misconceived by educational leaders.

2. The **practice** of school leadership will correspond to the leader's assumed **purpose** for schooling: "Perspective drives action," in the phrase that Wayne Shute and I have adopted.[1]

3. Educational "leaders" who misconstrue the **aim** of schooling will, logically, form a second misapprehension about its **leadership.**

4. Leaders who choose to influence but one person—

Edited version of a talk given at the third Conference on Thoughtful Teaching and Learning: Thoughtful Leadership, at Brigham Young University, July 29-30, 1993.

[1] I do not develop this idea due to constraints of time. It has been examined in educational settings by Argyris & Schon (1983; 1987; 1989), and by Srivastva et al., (1990).

themselves--may be more educationally beneficial in the long

run than those who try to influence whole systems.

The Purpose of Schooling

So I examine first the purpose of schooling. That purpose ought

to be at least congruent, if not coincident, with the meaning of the

larger term, "education," which I take to be the process of being led out

of one's undeveloped self. Therefore, I propose the aim of schooling to

be **the fostering of coherent personal meaning by individual minds.** I

know that my "ought" in that earlier sentence is a moral

pronouncement. I come to it through the following reasoning.

First, humans are always **potentially** more than they are actually.

I have learned that, as you have, through simply living my life as well

as through being a part of, and raising, a family. Everyone can learn

and grow--always; it is a matter of exercising a power that we all have,

namely, agency, the capacity to make choices of consequence, choices

which either promote or inhibit our development. Next, those

choices, whether they release or inhibit potential, arise from our efforts

to create coherent personal meaning out of our lives. Further, the

locus of that effort is the **mind,** which I understand as the mechanism

of brain joined with moral agency. The brain is not an organ for

"processing information," in spite of the mindless repetition of the

phrase these days; rather, it provides the power for us to construct

meaning for ourselves. As Frank Smith writes in to think: "The brain

does not seek or respond to information in the world--the brain **imposes** meaningfulness on the world" (p. 47).

Thus, through this reasoning we come to an idea that receives very little attention in educational journals. I phrase it as follows: Since meaning is inextricably bound up with our "being," being itself cannot be disentangled from the work of our mind.[2] It is explicit in Mitchell (1987) and implicit in Solway (1989) and in Frank Smith's <u>to think</u> (for example, when he writes on page 12 that "experience is what thinking makes possible"). It is the understanding back of Ann Berthoff's interesting sentence: "The correct name for our species is **Homo sapiens: the creature who knows that he knows**" (1990, p. 93; author's emphasis).

Since human possibilities are released through the decisions of the meaning-making mind, schools (as other social agencies) have an obligation to help the pupils, teachers, and leaders in them to use their mind. That help is best given by providing "occasions of education," as Richard Mitchell calls them in <u>The Gift of Fire</u>. In its essence, an occasion of education consists of an opportunity for a mind both to receive knowledge (or perhaps information) and to go beyond it. While the going beyond is impossible without the registering of initial facts or simple concepts, it is the going beyond that is central to the release of potential.

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[2] I do not intend by the term, "being," simply "brute existence," but anything above that, anything more than vegetative life.

As we go beyond what is given, as we interpret our interpretations and know our knowledge (in Ann Berthoff's phrase), a significant transformation in our understanding of "knowing" itself occurs: We begin to see it not as simply an accretion of facts about things in the world outside of us, but as knowledge **about us in relation to things outside of us.** "We can know ourselves," writes Mitchell (1987, p. 23), "unlike the foxes and the oaks, and can know that we know ourselves." As he notes later in The Gift of Fire, true education "calls for . . . the ability to know and judge the self and to do something about it" (p. 145).

That, I take it, is the great knowledge--the knowledge that constitutes our very humanness. Quoting Mitchell again, "Self knowledge is the one great power of thought that is the mother of all others . . . the beginning of all thoughtfulness" (p. 59, emphasis mine).[3]

When we misapprehend that fundamental aim of schooling-- the effortful development of a mind that can and will take the grasp of itself; when we disavow the supremacy of knowledge of the self, we must then invoke the only other aim available (at least the only other knowledge-centered aim), namely, knowledge of the world. For only

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[3] Self-knowledge is not to be confused with self-esteem or self-concept. One's self-concept is said to be constituted more of feelings than of extensive knowledge, which is obviously not the case with self-knowledge. The distinction is something like that between genuine happiness--a moral condition--and what may be produced in a reader by the list in 14,000 Things to be Happy About (an actual published book), two examples of which are "timecards" and "hospital gowns." The mind reels.

I imagine few in this audience would be surprised to learn that if one looks up "self-knowledge" in the 1992 ERIC thesaurus, one is told to use the term "self-concept."

self and world can exist for us.[4] And the relationship we **choose** to establish between self and world is of incalculable significance, not only for us in our life journey, but for others with whom we establish relationships--such as colleagues, students, constituents, and so on.

A number of commentators, Frank Smith among them, have noted the schools' displacement of the goal of the thoughtful self and the substitution of a more externalized one. For example, Parker Palmer writes, "We value knowledge that enables us to coerce the world into meeting our needs--no matter how much violence we must do" (1983, p. 23). By highly valuing that knowledge, then, we would be led to undervalue knowledge that enables us to **understand** the world, not merely to violently dominate it.

The observation is a common one. David Solway, in <u>Education Lost</u>, points out that the "definitive meaning of education" is "the sense of quest and the exactions of achieving an identity . . ." (p. 80). He notes that we have substituted for a thoughtfully-comprehended self the externally-provided aim of training or of efficient technique.

Neil Postman's assertions about the issue--perhaps extreme, certainly thought-provoking--are not unknown to this audience. He holds that far from evincing a concern with human meaning, the school aims of today feature the virtues of technological invention so dear to the nineteenth century mind: "objectivity, efficiency, expertise, standardization, measurement, and progress" (1991, p. 42). Such aims

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4 By "world" I mean everything that is not-self, not merely things of the earth.

are inadequate, however, because they exalt external technique at the expense of the thoughtful maturing of our humanness.

One of the most virulent critics of a schooling centered on world-control, rather than on self-control, is Arthur Wirth. In Productive Work--in Industry and Schools, he accuses the schools of mindlessly accepting a description of learning as a collection of unrelated fragments--a textbook picture; a verbal statement; a recitable fact. What is wanted, in Wirth's estimation is, rather, **understanding,** a substantively different accomplishment, which is "rooted in the power of reflective self-understanding--in the capacity for appropriating the meaning of events for the purpose of directing the formation of our own selves and society" (1983, p. 138).

I conclude this first point by borrowing from Richard Mitchell: "Education, real education, and not just the elaborate contraption that is better understood as 'schooling,' can be nothing but the nourishment of [moments of thoughtfulness]" (1987, p. 22), since these unlock our potential self. But, perversely, schooling is instead dedicated to "labors directed completely toward the consolidation of the mundane through the accumulation of the trivial" (p. 26).

The Purpose of Leadership

Now, to my third point (without having justified the second one, namely, that perspective drives action). Educational "leaders" who have misconstrued the **aim** of schooling will, logically, form a second misapprehension about its **leadership.** Thus, a predominant

perspective considers that school by and large is an environment to be arranged such that pupils acquire bits of knowledge, perhaps in (imagined) service to vocationalism. It is, therefore, natural to believe that the directing of human efforts--leadership--in such a place is principally a matter of arranging environmental contingencies to "produce" certain "outcomes." In other words, since **pupils'** improvement--their learning--is assumed to result from rationally arranging the appropriate contingencies, so **school** improvement, by analogy, is to be secured through external influence, that is, through the imposition and implementation of "outcome"-oriented programs. This rational approach to school betterment inevitably raises the issue of **control** and, as John Ralston Saul (1992) has made devastatingly clear, for two hundred years the resolution of the issue has been in favor of the controllers.[5]

That perspective keeps those who hold it comfortably aloof from introspection, from thoughtful self-awareness: When the regnant paradigm prescribes externally-originated, rational and technical decisions for all human endeavors, who is going to get exercised about the difficult task of coming to grips with one's integrity? The condition in turn makes it more likely that the non-self-examining leaders will seek to change **others**. Certainly, the passion for molding others in our image of a Better World is strong these days.

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5 This idea resonates to the burden of Howley's piece in these Proceedings.

The vital question is, What are the change agent's intentions in this endeavor? Here's how Richard Mitchell (1987) casts the question: "If it is my appetite for admiration and self-esteem that has seized me, . . . how likely am I to remember, as a [leader] should always remember, that I am standing between my [followers] and the light? I am not that light, and it is my job to open my [constituents'] eyes to the light, not to the flash of my own cleverness."

Thus, although a strong commitment to the cliché, "leadership for excellence," can easily be voiced by leaders, that ubiquitous word "excellence" will not be defined necessarily to include leadership for self-knowledge. What it **will** include, almost certainly, is "the recitation of precepts, perhaps with footnotes" (Mitchell, 1987, p. 98).

Here is an example, from an actual curriculum, of a mind (well, of the **committee** version of a mind) in the grip of thoughtlessness. In this case, while the centrality of human development is **proclaimed** as a goal, in fact behavioral training is the chief value: (Transparency = "Date taught . . . Date mastered"; see appendix).

My question to you is, When a school leader--the principal, say-- accepts the approach to learning illustrated in the transparency as worthy pedagogy and offers her leadership on behalf of that goal, what will she actually do? Will she say to her **self,** "I believe that personal integrity is as important as we have represented it to be to students in this curriculum; therefore, it behooves me to make sure that I am honorable in my work with faculty, staff and students--that I act

congruently with my deepest beliefs"? No, she will say instead, "I've got to make sure that the teachers get the proportion of integral, sincere, and humane children up to 70% because the district office is pushing me on this."

Unless the development of the self is genuinely present in curriculums, not merely espoused, leaders will be unable to resist the lure of the technocratic mindset. Thus, they will convince themselves that good leadership consists in determining some objectives that can be measured, mandating the practices that supposedly constitute the means for achieving the objectives, and arranging the external conditions of the teaching-learning setting to bring about the practices in staff members. Having done that, they will be able to tell colleagues (or parents, or lawmakers) that they are "into" school renewal (or restructuring, or reform).

If all of this sounds suspiciously moral, that's because you've been listening. It is true, I agree solidly (at least on this point) with Christopher Hodgkinson that leadership is a "moral art"--the title of one of his books (1991). And I think he has it right when he notes, "It is quite remarkable that so much of the literature on administration and organization including the canonical work of Max Weber in bureaucracy, makes little or no reference to the problem of the moral character of the incumbent of administrative office" (p. 60).

I offer the following question: Is it possible, is it just conceivable, that some "leadership" proffered ostensibly to improve schools

through large-scale change, that is, through renewing, restructuring, or reforming, is in fact a smoke screen to cover an unwillingness to improve a more intransigent setting--namely, oneself?

Self-Leadership

Finally, my fourth point: Getting one's own educational life in order, while considerably less glamorous than attempting to restructure an enterprise, will, in the long run, be of greater benefit. That is so because of what appears to me to be the fundamental law of the universe: **You don't get something for nothing.** None of us can improve others unless we ourselves are improving. All of the rational programs and all of the technocratic efficiency in the world cannot contravene that law.

So, I am a thorough-going pessimist as to the likelihood of large-scale, systemic change in schools. On the other hand, I am a cheerful optimist as to the likelihood that a person—I, for example can choose to teach or learn more efficaciously.

As unlikely as it may appear from our present experience, leaders **could** decide--one person at a time, of course, because it can't be done any other way--that renewing or restructuring or reforming a system is more than they ought to bite off. They could decide that prior to improving others they will concentrate on their **own** betterment, on the improvement of their **self**. And that effort can mean nothing less than paying attention to the degree of coherence between two realities: what one does and what one espouses.

And if it came to be that school or district leaders genuinely valued (and not merely professed) their own integrity, **self-knowledge** would surely become the educational purpose of choice and would be both taught and learned in that school or district. It could not be otherwise, because integrity is achieved only through actual practice on the foundation of meaningful choices--something that only a self can do.

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CHARACTER EDUCATION

OBJECTIVES

	Date Taught	Date Mastered
8000-0706 Practice personal integrity in all aspects of life and understand there is a consequence for every decision and action.		

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