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ABSTRACT
                 The Foreign and International Media section of this
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papers: "Cultural Orientation in Turkey: Are The Theorists Right
about the Effects of Imported Cultural Products?" (Christine Ogan);
"The Role of Mass Media in a Newly Emerging Democracy: The Latvian
Case Study" (Bruce J. Evensen); "Global TV News in Developing
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the 1990s" (David Weaver and others); "The Price Was Right--Or Was
It? The 1991 British Commercial Broadcasting Franchise Auction and
the New ITV" (Susan Q. Johnson and Joe S. Foote); "Goodbye to the
Global Village: Entertainment TV Patterns in 50 Countries" (Anne
Cooper-Chen); "U.S. Communication Policies Regarding Foreign
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Images of Disability: Indian and European Comic Art Traditions"
(Aruna Rao and Beth Haller); "'Newstrack'-Video News in India: Elite
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Class" (Pauline Chakravartty); "Class, Race and Poverty: Constructing
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Reconsidered: The Human Rights to Communicate and Intrusive
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Yan); "Interpersonally Rich and Media Poor: A Descriptive Study of
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Cneng); "Emergence of a Private Press in Socialist Tanzania: A Study
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Lee); "Press and Political Liberalization in Taiwan" (Kuldip R.
Rampal); "The Sinking of La Cing, France's First General Commercial
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FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA,

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CULTURAL ORIENTATION IN TURKEY:

ARE THE THEORISTS RIGHT
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF IMPORTED CULTURAL PRODUCTS?

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Cultural Orientation in Turkey:
Are the Theorists Right About the Effects of Imported Products?

Abstract

Scholars of cultural imperialism have long claimed that the transfer of cultural products from the West to developing countries has devastating effects on indigenous cultures. But there is little empirical evidence to prove this assertion. This study, based on in-depth surveys of 192 families living in urban Istanbul and a small town outside the capital of Ankara explores the basis for some residents being oriented outside their culture and others having little attraction to foreign cultures.

The data for this study were both qualitative and quantitative, and the qualitative findings somewhat conflicted with the quantitative findings. The quantitative analysis of the data show that there are relationships between certain attitudes held about domestic and foreign cultures and the economic and social status of the respondents. Other relationships between the consumption of mass media products and those attitudes were also established. The time spent outside Turkey and the frequency of cinema attendance were primary predictors of the level of foreign film consumption, as measured by respondents' preference for native films; dubbed, subtitled or original format in foreign films. However, none of the demographic variables and no pattern of media use variables predicted a foreign cultural orientation.

About 14% of the youth in the study who completed a set of more extensive questions say they have plans to live their lives in a foreign country. Evidence from the qualitative data indicate that these respondents prefer foreign film stars, prefer foreign-made clothes and shoes, choose pizza and hamburgers over native foods and read Stephen King more than any other author.

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Cultural Orientation in Turkey:
Are the Theorists Right About the Effects of Imported Cultural Products?

Since the fall of communism in most parts of the world, the discussion of a new world order in communications has been less related to the demands articulated by the New World Information Order that came out of the 1970s, and more to the opening of new market economies that will reap profits for U.S. and Western European communication industries. The change in focus of the world order has also meant the fading of the discussion of cultural imperialism so central to the calls for a restructuring of the control of the cultural industries.

But the collapse of one of the world's superpowers has not altered the plight of a great number of struggling economies in what has been known as the Third World—economies that may have given up attempts to fight off the cultural effects of a Western invasion, and instead focused on the profit that can be had from hosting a multinational company within their borders. So the question of cultural imperialism by the West becomes more important to explore in the era of a more monolithic culture being spread by Western multinationals. And this Western culture may now be less specifically identified as U.S. culture, and more as the culture of the global corporation.

The problem with determining how citizens of one country might be affected in the process of consuming cultural products from other countries remains unsolved in spite of some limited empirical studies to explore the impact of *Dallas* on groups of Israeli Arabs,

immigrants to Israel from Morocco and Russia, and Israeli Kibbutz members [1]   Though

Tomlinson says that such research has shown that audiences are "more active and critical,

their responses more complex and reflective, and their cultural values more resistant to

manipulation and 'invasion' than many critical media theorists have assumed,"[2] he also

notes that it may be impossible to ultimately prove or disprove the cultural imperialism

argument with empirical evidence[3]. The evidence Katz and Liebes produced came out of

focus group discussions with small numbers of respondents following the viewing of

particular episodes of *Dallas*. Although the sample size could be increased and the study

expanded to more television programs, it would never be possible to generalize about the

impact of texts produced in the United States on viewers in other countries.

And of course the cultural imperialism effects are much broader based than the

effects of a number of television or film texts on a group of individuals. Sorting out the

effects of one or more television programs or film texts from other imported content

appearing in the form of advertising, news, magazines and books could never be

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[1]E. Katz and T. Liebes "Mutual Aid in the Decoding of Dallas: Preliminary Notes from a Cross-Cultural Study," in P. Drummond and R. Paterson, Eds., Television in Transition: Papers from the First International Television Studies Conference, London: British Film Institute, 1985. See also, I. Ang, Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination, London: Methuen, 1985.

[2]J. Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, pp. 49-50.

[3]Ibid, p. 55.

accomplished[4].

With these problems in mind, this study begins its investigation at a different place. It assumes that people consume varying amounts of imported media and that those people will not be equally affected by that content. Other factors will play a role in producing a cultural orientation. The main question for the study is as follows: what causes some individuals to be oriented outside their culture (toward Western cultures) and others to be oriented more inwardly? In keeping with Tomlinson's view that cultures involve interactions between representations (or mediated experiences) and lived experiences, this study tries to determine what media use factors and other factors may work together to produce the cultural orientation of the individuals living in a particular society.

In this case, that society is Turkey. Because the Turkish culture is relatively homogeneous in many respects, it is a particularly good place to begin a study of cultural orientation. Most Turkish people speak a single language (90% speak Turkish as their mother tongue), adhere to a single religion (99% are Muslim, mostly Sunni) and have migrated to their present geographic location from the same central Asian region. A policy of statism, or state-controlled economic development, established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1930s, kept foreign industry from Turkish soil until Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel began to encourage foreign investment as a way out of economic difficulties in the

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[4]S. Chaffee, however argues that continued empirical research conducted over time and across populations will help build the theoretical case for the media imperialism thesis. "Search for Change: Survey Studies of International Effects," in F Korzenny, S. Ting-Toomey and E. Schiff, Mass Media Effects Across Cultures, Newbury Park, Calif., 1992, pp. 52-53.

late 1960s. In the 1980s, then Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, following the lead of Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, began to increase the role of private industry, selling off certain state economic enterprises and making a more hospitable environment for the multinational corporation. Turkey is also home to a well developed media system with a thriving independent press and publishing industry, a film industry that in its heyday in the late 1960s and early 1970s produced as many as 250-300 feature-length films a year[5], and a sophisticated television program production industry. In such an environment, one would expect the citizens to be oriented more to Turkish cultural products than to imported ones.

And yet, a walk down Bagdat Street, the site of a major shopping district on the Asian side of Istanbul and the location for part of this study, reveals a very large group of foreign-owned establishments--McDonald's, Pizza Hut, Bally, Rolex, and Benetton mixed in with Turkish-owned boutiques, cafes, restaurants and department stores.

About the Study

The data for this study were collected in the summer of 1990 in two geographical areas in Turkey. Though the sample was not intended to be representative of the Turkish population, some effort to interview people from different geographic regions and different socio-economic levels was made. One hundred families in the urban Istanbul area, both from the European and Anatolian sides of the city; and one hundred families from a small town, Golbasi, about 20 kilometers outside the capital city of Ankara, were interviewed. Since the study aimed to examine cultural orientation within families as well as across

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[5]Attila Dorsay, "An Overview of Turkish Cinema from its Origins to the Present Day," in Christine Woodhead, ed., Turkish Cinema: An Introduction. University of London: Turkish Area Study Group Publications, April 1989, pp. 21-33.

families, we tried to interview all members of each household aged 14 and older. At the time of the interviews, Turkish television was confined to five national channels, all government owned and operated, with many programs repeated from channel to channel. Since program diversity was limited on these channels, we selected only households owning video cassette recorders[6]. A wide variety of imported films and television programs along with Turkish films is available in video shops across the country, so ownership of a VCR allowed for a large choice of video-based content[7] All interviews were conducted in Turkish. The questionnaire was designed in English, translated into Turkish, and back-translated to check for accuracy. A pre-test was conducted in both egions and the questionnaire was revised to address problems identified in the pre-test. In all, 191 family interviews were completed. Part of the study consisted of fixed response questions directed to individual family members. The rest of the questions were open ended and asked of the entire family as a group or of the older children in the family. The open-ended part of the survey was tape recorded and later translated and transcribed. Most of the open-ended questions were analyzed qualitatively, though a few were content analyzed

[6]Ownership of a VCR did not exclude lower income households. Other forms of entertainment are limited in Turkey. Before the expansion of television channels, people viewed the purchase of a VCR as a low-cost investment in family entertainment. In 1990 the VCR penetration in Turkey stood at 36.5%. "World VCR Survey: One in Three TV Homes," Screen Digest, June 1991, pp. 129-136.

[7]Since the time of the study, Turkish broadcast media have been vastly expanded through several satellite television channels beamed into the country from Germany and so many new turnkey radio stations that they are impossible to keep track of. All these stations are illegal under the current constitution, but the government is attempting to write new law to allow for private broadcast station ownership.

and entered with the rest of the quantitative data in an SPSS program for statistical analysis. Both parts of the survey will be analyzed here, although much of the qualitative data will be used in an expanded version of this study.

Background for Research Question

In earlier studies of video cassette rental conducted in Turkey and in the United States, limited support was found for the hypothesis that an orientation outside one's culture led to greater interest in use of cultural products originating in other countries[8]. In particular, the degree of mastery of foreign languages and extent of foreign travel led to greater interest in viewing foreign films in their original (rather than dubbed or subtitled) format.. The Turkish study was based only on surveys of products available in video rental shops in low and high socioeconomic neighborhoods, and the U.S. study was based on a survey of customers in a video rental establishment in a medium-sized midwestern town.. This study extends the previous work by interviewing a range of families in varying socioeconomic conditions. In the U.S. study, cultural orientation predicted foreign film viewing[9]. This study collected additional data to see if variables that predicted cultural orientation could be identified, and if certain media use variables were among them. The current study also includes a much wider range of qualitative data concerning the media

[8]Christine Ogan, "Media Imperialism and the Videocassette Recorder: The Case of Turkey," Journal of Communication 38(2), Spring, 1988, pp. 93-106; and Christine Ogan, "The Audience for Foreign Film in the United States," Journal of Communication 40(4), Autumn, 1990, pp. 58-77.

use habits, restaurant and food choices, film and music star favorites, attitudes toward Turkish and U.S. cultures and people, and plans for the future. In-depth qualitative data were collected to better understand the concept of cultural orientation.

Descriptions of Respondents and their Media Use

As might be expected, it was difficult to arrange interviews when all members of a family were at home. Interviews were conducted in the evenings and on weekends to maximize the number of people interviewed, but complete family data collection was not possible. Of course, some households consisted of only a husband and wife, and others had only a single person. However, in Turkey, there are many fewer single person households than in the West. Both cultural and economic constraints lead children to live with their parents until marriage, and sometimes after that time.

A total of 171 male and 183 female heads of household and 158 children were interviewed in the 192 households. Though a wide range of ages and occupations were represented (See Table 1), the sample was better educated and more affluent than the general population in the country. World Bank data taken from the 1990 census for Turkey shows that the per capita income was $1630 and the literacy rate was 81% with 13% of the population enrolled in post-secondary educational institutions[10]. However, in this study, 36.8% of the male and 18% of the female heads of household held college degrees. Only 18.2% of the adult males and 35% of the female heads of household had fewer than nine years of education (See Table 1). And their incomes were higher than those of the general

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[10]The World Bank, World Development Report 1992, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 218, 274.

population. Although we did not ask respondents for their income, we made a general estimate based on several unobtrusive measures coupled with information on the occupations of the heads of household. About 41% of the families were considered lower middle class, while 36% were middle class and 14% upper middle class. By any measure of comparison, the middle class respondents earned more than per capita income given for Turkey by the World Bank. Consistent with the general population, the respondents were overwhelmingly Muslim. However, they did not report practice of that religion in any systematic form. Nearly half of the adult males and three-fourths of the adult females and children neither pray regularly nor attend services at the mosque (See Table 1). In the Muslim faith, however, women only infrequently attend formal religious services. And in Turkey, where mostly the Sunni Muslim religion is practiced, urban citizens have tended to practice their faith less than in some other Muslim countries, particularly those where there is no separation of church and state as there is in Turkey.

The greatest media use reported by the respondents was for newspaper reading. They reported reading the newspaper almost every day and spending from a half to a full hour with the paper each day. (See Table 3) They reported watching television just under 3 hours per day during the week and about 3 1/2 hours on the weekend. Only about 40% of the adult heads of household ever go to the movies while about 35% of the kids go three or more times a month[11]. Neither adults nor children report reading many magazines or

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[11]This is consistent with data from other European countries. Weekly cinema viewing in the United Kingdom for audiences in the 45 or older categories ranged from .01 to .04 hours per week, while visits per person per year across 14 European countries ranged from 1.4 in Portugal to 2.7 in Sweden. When broken down by age group, the highest attendance was reported in the under-24 age group. Taken from: "European Audience Profiles: Age

books, though reported reading frequency is higher for the kids than their parents (See Table 3). Videos are selected for family viewing most often by the kids alone (29%) or the fathers alone (20%). And television and video viewing has signaled a decline in visiting friends and family. Before television was introduced in Turkey in 1969, regular visiting of neighbors, friends and family was an important part of Turkish social custom. In the open ended discussion of changes in habits since the introduction of television, respondents frequently cited less frequent visiting. Indeed, about 38% of male heads of household and 27% of female heads of household say they visit their friends or family less often than once a week.

Operationalization of Cultural Orientation

To help determine whether respondents were oriented more toward their own culture or toward a foreign culture they may never have visited, we asked a series of open-ended questions that were later content analyzed on five-point scales to supplement information on foreign travel and foreign language competency. We asked them to tell what they thought about life in the United States from what they read in magazines, newspapers or books, or what they had seen on television or at the movies. Adults and children had similar attitudes about the United States--more than 30% of each group saying negative or mostly negative things about the United States, and 38% of the parents and 43% of the children saying positive or mostly positive things about the United States (See Table 4). When asked to describe what they liked or disliked about Turkey, 67% of the parents and

and Social Factors," Screen Digest, February 1993, pp. 33-35.

86% of the kids had negative or mostly negative things to say about their country. But when asked how they would describe a Turk to a foreigner, 74% of the parents and 50% of the kids would describe a Turk with positive or mostly positive adjectives. Greater differences between parents and children came when respondents were asked to cite the Turkish customs they liked and disliked. About 46% of parents mostly or only cited customs they liked , while only 27% of the kids only or mostly listed customs they liked. At the other end, 20% of the parents and 43% of the kids mostly or only cited Turkish customs they disliked. Finally, we asked whether respondents felt a sense of belonging to the neighborhood where they lived as another indicator of cultural orientation. Despite a mean length of time in their present home of more than 5 years, 34% of the respondents said they did not feel like they belonged to the neighborhood where they lived. Details on the responses to the open-ended questions related to these and other attitudes and behaviors will be provided in a later section of this paper

Predicting Cultural Orientation

The variables used to measure cultural orientation were selected on the notion that an individual who was oriented more outside his or her culture would see more positive things in foreign cultures and more negative elements in the native culture. As described above, a certain amount of dissatisfaction with Turkey was expressed by all respondents (adults and children) and less dissatisfaction with Turks themselves. Adult respondents cited more positive Turkish customs than did their kids. However, when these variables were placed in regression equations, either singly or as a computed scale, none of the expected demographic and other variables (such as frequency of religious practice, media

use foreign travel and foreign language competency) predicted to these attitudes.

Some of the orientation variables did correlate with specific variables entered in the regression equations, but there was no pattern to these relationships across family members. The adult male heads of household who practiced their religion more frequently held a negative attitude toward Turkey ($r=-.33$; $p=.01$) (See Table 5). Since religion is such a pervasive part of Turkish culture, it would seem that those who practiced religion more would express more favorable attitudes about the country. However, since fundamentalism is on the rise in this country with a secular government, it may mean that the more religious the respondent, the more upset he was with government policies that did not move Turkey closer to becoming an Islamic state. This relationship did not hold up for women, however. Adult females reporting frequent religious practice expressed positive attitudes toward Turkey. And analysis of the responses of the oldest child revealed no significant relationship between these variables.

It was expected that respondents who frequently attend the cinema would hold negative attitudes toward Turkey, since film viewing exposed respondents to Western cultural values. For the adult males, high cinema attendance was correlated with a negative attitude about the country ($r=-.24$; $p=.05$) and this was also the case for the female head of household ($r=-.19$; $p=.05$) and oldest child in the family ($r=-.39$; $p=.01$)[12] (See Tables 5,6,7)

Other significant relationships between attitudes about the country and about the

[12]Responses for the children were entered by birth order. Too few second and third children were interviewed to be able to conduct any statistical analysis of their responses.

U.S. and variables entered into the regression equation included the following: For female heads of household frequency of television viewing was positively correlated with the identification of more Turkish customs the respondent liked (r=.31; p=.01) as was radio frequency listening with citing more Turkish customs that were liked (r=.45; p=.01). But adult female respondents who reported frequent radio listening also expressed positive attitudes toward the United States (r=.24; p=.05).

Unexpected was the relationship between educational level and a negative attitude toward the United States (r=-.31; p=.05) for women. Also unexpected was the relationship between income level and a negative attitude toward the United States (r=-.18; p=.05) (See Table 6).

We asked how the respondent would describe a Turk to a foreigner. Although that description was not related to any of the media use or demographic variables for the adults in the study, oldest children with high cinema attendance described Turks in positive terms (r=.48; p=.05). Higher income was also related to positive descriptions for Turks by the oldest child (r=.66; p=.01). (See Table 7)

So for this study, aside from several significant correlations among variables, there was no pattern across variables and across respondents that revealed what impact exposure to mass media and high socioeconomic levels had on the formulation of positive or negative attitudes about Turkey, the Turkish people and their customs, or the United States. If cultural orientation can be at least partially measured by an individual's view of his country, this study did not find that more exposure to mass media necessarily caused people to hold critical views of their country. This would not support the media imperialism

assertion that continued exposure to Western-produced media content leads people to have a diminished view of themselves.

Film Format Preference

In the survey of U.S. videocassette renters[13], respondents were asked about whether they had ever rented foreign films on video. If they had viewed foreign films, they were asked to list their preference of format for those films--dubbed, subtitled or the original language without subtitling. In that study, marital status (being single), number of trips and time spent abroad, and number of foreign languages spoken and reported degree of fluency in those languages were predictors of the level of foreign film consumption[14] Income, education, occupation, age and sex were not significant predictors of consumption.

In this study, a somewhat similar pattern emerged for the male heads of household, but not for the women and children in the study. The primary predictors of level of foreign film consumption for the adult males were the reported length of time spent in foreign countries and the frequency of cinema attendance. (See Table 8) The level of foreign language fluency proved not to predict whether respondents watched foreign films and what format level they preferred. For this group of respondents then, length of physical contact with a foreign culture was the primary predictor of interest in the cultural products produced outside the country. For the women and oldest children, only foreign language fluency was an important predictor, but no regression equation could be established in the

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[13]Ogan, op cit., 1990

[14]No foreign films viewed was the lowest level, dubbed format was the next, subtitled was next, and foreign films in their original format was the highest level of consumption.

listwise procedure.

Part of the difficulty in predicting level of foreign film consumption was based on the limited sample size. Although 192 family questionnaires were completed, missing data on particular family members (because they were not present at the interview or did not answer particular questions) caused many cases to be excluded when listwise deletion method was used for including variables in the regression equation. But more importantly, measuring complex phenomena like cultural orientation and cultural product preference turns out to be exceedingly difficult with the survey method--even with such an in-depth survey as this.

Qualitative Evidence for Cultural Orientation

But there is evidence from responses to open-ended questions that respondents were dissatisfied with their native culture, in some cases even to the point of saying they planned to leave the country. As part of the extensive interviews for this study, some of the teen-age and older children answered an additional set of questions in greater depth. These questions were designed to understand the cultural preferences of the older children in these families. A total of 71 of the respondents completed this part of the questionnaire. All questions were open-ended and related to consumer choices, film and television star favorites, leisure-time preferences, etc. The last question asked the respondents to identify goals for their future. Most mentioned professional goals, either specific professions they wished to enter or general professional goals, such as "being successful in my profession." Others mentioned material goals--"I want a life like I have now, a comfortable life," said one respondent who lived in affluent conditions. Some could not think past their

educational goals. "I want to finish university. I have not thought further than that," said a 20-year-old Istanbul male. Another respondent's vision was even closer to home. "I n the short term, I would like to increase my GPA and get a master's degree. But in the long term I would like to have a job where I can use my abilities and I would like to have a pleasant life," was the response of a 21-year-old Istanbul female. Of course marrying and having a family was also cited by several respondents. And one 14-year-old young lady put all these goals together. " . ,ant to be a lawyer. I want a late marriage and a comfortable life. I want a car, a house, a good husband and only one child. I want to see Italy and Korea," she said.

These are the sorts of answers we might expect from young men and women in this age group who live in the United States.. But what might not be expressed by the youth of America is a desire to leave the country. Out of 72 respondents to this part of the survey, 10 or 14% said they wanted to live abroad. Another four said they wanted to go abroad for language study. A 28-year-old young woman who still lived v..'h her parents said, "I want to make good progress in my job, make a lot of money and leave Turkey." A 20-year-old male said he "wanted to go to the U.S.A., to learn the language and then work for a company there." A younger girl of 14 said she "wanted to live in a foreign country, make money and be happy."

Others were a little more specific about their plans. A 20-year-old Golbasi male said, "I would like to be a graphologist and practice my profession in a foreign country. I would like to meet someone and get married." He didn't specify whether the marriage partner would be Turkish or foreign, however.

The evidence from the quantitative analysis didn't tell us what predicted an orientation outside the Turkish culture, but the answers to this question indicate that a substantial number of the young people in this study have given some thought to leaving their native culture and settling abroad. Whether those are just dreams of youth or are more serious statements of future plans cannot be determined from the data, but there are hints that these ideas have some basis in other interests and attitudes of these respondents. The young people's preference in film stars includes Meryl Streep, Kim Basinger, Bruce Willis, Tom Cruise, Dustin Hoffman, Alain Delon, Woody Allen, Mel Gibson, Steve Martin, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Michael Douglas, Don Johnson, and Daniel Day Lewis. Mentioned less often were the most popular of Turkish stars--Sener Sen, Hulya Kocayigit, Turkan Soray, Orhan Gencebay and Ibrahim Tatlises. Their preference in food is headed by pizza from Pizza Hut and hamburgers from McDonalds--though they also list local foods-sish kebab and kofte (meat balls). Their preferred clothing and shoe brands included Adidas, Levi's, Lee Cooper, Benetton, Reebok, and Converse alongside the local upscale Beymen. Far and away their favorite author is Stephen King.

There is also evidence of dissatisfaction with the Turkish culture in other responses given by this group of people. One 18-year-old Golbasi girl said that Turkish families should be more open-minded. She sees problems in the education system and an increase in unemployment. Another young woman is concerned about the rise of religious fanaticism in the country. This respondent is also dissatisfied with the lack of total democracy in the country, and with the fact that the government has control of such things as the type of television programs that are aired. By contrast, she looks to the United

States as a world leader, and likes the idea that democracy thrives there. A 20-year-old Istanbul woman criticizes Turkish customs for preventing communication in a family. She dislikes the conservatism in the country--a conservatism that causes families to hide their differences, that leads parents to discipline their children for holding more liberal ideas. Perhaps this woman sees the cultural comparisons more clearly since the family had spent 10 years in Germany.

Taken together, the cultural preferences and the critical positions regarding the country still only provide an indication of the basis of the stated life goal to leave the country. But it is clear that the presence of so many foreign cultural products and ideas contribute to the development of a plan to leave. Although this study did address some of the problems of trying to determine the origins of such a complex process based on fixed-response answers to survey data, continued in-depth study must be conducted to understand cultural orientation. Perhaps an ethnographic inquiry is the next step to take.

Ideas About the United States

Of the adult heads of household in the survey, 36% of the men and 60% of the women had never traveled outside Turkey's borders. Only 11 men and 8 women had ever been to the United States in those travels, so ideas about the United States were developed through vicarious experience through the media. The news media may be the primary carrier of information about the United States, so we asked respondents to tell us what they know about the lifestyle of Americans based on their viewing of television and films and their reading of books and other information. Almost everyone had some idea about life lived in this country, and it wasn't all positive. The following include a good

sample of the ideas expressed:

It is a wealthy country; the living standard is high. However relations among people, like those between friends and neighbors are not as good as the ones in Turkey. Loneliness can be a real problem.

They are degenerates. They do not have traditions.

I think it is very bad. There is a drug problem and many immoral women.

Life is easy. People don't have many problems. The things that are considered to be unreachable in Turkish society are normal and a part of everyday life there. This may be as a result of better economic conditions that are present in the U.S.A. Some films may be closer to reality in which problems or gaps among social classes are being reflected. However, in most films American life style is shown as a pleasant one.

They do not have a long history. Therefore they can adopt a modern life style. Turkish culture is different. It has existed for a long time. We have customs that are highly effective. It is hard for us to accept their life style. The new generation has been trying to adopt American life style. However, our social structure is different and it takes time to change certain things. American life style and way of thinking is different. We are getting exposed to it through films and starting to adopt it.

Even poor people have many opportunities. They have televisions and maybe even a satellite antenna which is placed on top of the apartment.

There is a big difference economically among different social classes. Fifty percent of the population may be living in better conditions, but the rest may be living in worse condition.

It is a very comfortable country. Half the population lives in luxury while the remaining half imitates and envies the rich people.

You cannot compare it to our life. For example, my daughter is in England now. She can go out every night. We cannot let her do that here because life is different. If we allowed her to go out in the evenings here, people would criticize us. People are more flexible there. Economic and technical conditions are better. For example, we spend our whole evening in the kitchen preparing dinner. However, they take it easy; they are more practical.

I do not like it--it is scary. There are extremes--violence and poverty. They people have lost their humanity. They are very lonely because of the high

technology. Family relations and friendship are lacking. They have lost their morality.

Several themes run through the various responses to this question. Frequently mentioned is the life of ease, of economic affluence in the United States. But respondents see the downside in the violence, drugs, and breakdown of the moral fiber of society. There is also frequent mention of racism and mistreatment of the poor in America. It is easy to understand how these ideas would develop from the export of entertainment as well as news and information about the United States. Perhaps these respondents focus on the contrast in lifestyle in the United States to be able to see their own lives and conditions in their society in a more pleasant perspective. And there isn't any clear pattern of positive descriptions of the United States to be found in the responses by the kids who have plans to leave Turkey.

Conclusion

This study started out to try to determine what role the export of cultural products to Turkey had on the cultural orientation of the consumers of those products in Turkey and to understand if greater consumption of those products led to an orientation outside the Turkish culture. Only a partial picture of cultural orientation could be determined from the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data from in-depth family surveys across groups of differing socio-economic status and age and in different geographic locations. What we have learned is that cultural orientation is a more complex concept than we could measure with extensive family interviews. The quantitative analysis of the data illustrate that there are relationships between certain attitudes held about the domestic and foreign cultures and the economic and social status of the respondents. There are other relationships

between consumption of mass media and those attitudes. But the only well established relationships were for the adult male respondents. The time they spent outside Turkey and their frequency of cinema attendance were primary predictors in their level of foreign film consumption. However, none of the demographic variables and no pattern of media use variables predicted a foreign cultural orientation.

The greater value in this study lies in the open-ended responses that form the qualitative data. Examination of that data has already shown that a group of young people are so oriented outside their culture that they say they are making plans for a future in another country. However, much of the qualitative data is still in the process of being analyzed. In open ended questions, respondents talked a lot about the problems of their country and expressed feelings of concern about the changes in the social fabric of Turkey. They reflected on the breakdown of the family; they looked back to an era when the visual media didn't exist and families spent more time talking with one another. Some of their criticisms of the problems in the United States appear to be expressed out of fear that those problems may already have spread to Turkey, and that what they perceive to be unique features of their culture have been contaminated by continued exposure to the West. So there is concern over changing cultural orientation, even if the older respondents are not attracted by the new ideas and values. Continued analysis of the collected data will provide a more complete picture of the cultural orientation of this group of Turkish residents. And another study currently being conducted in Hamburg, Germany should provide a comparative look at this process.

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTION OF TURKISH FAMILIES IN ISTANBUL AND GOLBASI

	Male Head of Household N=171	Female Head of Household N=183	Oldest Child N=109	2nd Oldest Child N=134
Age (Mean)	45	40	19.7	18.6
(Range)	29-66 Years	20-63 years	14-40 Years	13-27 Years
Occupation				
Commerce/Sales	18.1%	2.2%	72% Students	73.5% Students
Civil Servant	9.0	7.2		
Skilled Worker	21.7	7.2		
Managerial/Prof	44.6	13.8		
Works at home	0.0	64.1		
Retired	6.6	3.3		
Distance From Work (Mean)	15.5 kilometers	13.7 kilometers		
Religion				
Muslim	97.0%	97.2%	99.0%	97.0%
Religious Practice				
Doesn't Pray or Go to Mosque	46.1%	73.9%	78.0%	70.6%
Attends Holidays Only	38.9	8.0	17.0	26.8
Prays and Attends Holidays or Regularly	15.0	6.2	2.0	0.0
Prays but Never Attends	.ó	11.9	3.0	2.9

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TABLE 1 (cont.)

	Male Head of Household	Female Head of Household	Oldest Child	2nd Oldest Child
Education				
No Formal Education	.6%	4.4%		
Less than fifth grade	1.2	1.6		
5th-8th grade	16.4	29.0		
9th to Lise 3	1.8	5.5		
Lise/Voc. Grad	18.1	35.0		
Some College	25.1	6.6		
University or more	36.8	18.0		
Type of Post-Secondary Education				
Scientific or Technical	48.1	25.5		
Business/Economics	25.5	17.0		
Law	3.8	4.3		
Medicine	6.6	12.8		
Liberal Arts	10.4	19.1		
Education	3.8	14.9		
Arts	1.9	6.4		
Foreign Language Capability				
No Foreign Language	24.1	55.6		
Very little ability	36.5	23.3		
Some ability	16.5	8.3		
Fluent-one or more lang.	22.9	12.2	28.0%	20.6%
Language of Greatest Fluency				
English	55.0%	71.9%	71.9	78.6

TABLE 1 (cont.)

	Male Head of Household	Female Head of Household	Oldest Child	2nd Oldest Child
Foreign Travel (Mean)	2.2 Trips	1.2 Trips	1 Trip	.46 Trips
Place of Foreign Travel				
Germany	15.7%	23.5%	22.0%	20.0%
Other European	67.6	61.8	65.9	80.0%
U.S./Canada	10.8	11.8	9.8	0.0%
Other Asian	5.9	2.9	2.4	
Total Time Spent Abroad (Mean)	6 months	6 months	2-6 months	2-6 months

TABLE 2

FAMILY DATA FOR RESPONDENTS
IN ISTANBUL AND GOLBASI

Relative Living Abroad	(N=169)
None	45.6%
Immediate Family	20.7%
Aunt/Uncle/Cousin	28.4
More Distant Relative	5.3%
Location of Relative Abroad	
U.S./Canada	13.5%
Germany	51.7
Other European Country	30.3
Other	4.5
Length of Time in Present Home	
One Year or Less	7.6%
2-5 Years	37.6
6-10 Years	22.9
11-20 Years	25.3
More than 20 years	6.5

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TABLE 3

MEDIA USE OF RESIDENTS OF ISTANBUL AND GOLBASI

	Male Head of Household N=171	Female Head of Household N=183	Oldest Child N=109	2nd Oldest Child N=13
Newspaper Reading				
Number of days per week (mean)	6.5 days	5.8 days	5.4 days	5.4
Number of minutes spent per day (mean)	58 minutes	43 minutes	33 minutes	39 minutes
TV Viewing				
Weekdays (mean)	2.6 hours	2.8 hours	2.6 hours	2.5 hours
Weekend (mean per day)	3.7 hours	3.6 hours	3.5 hours	3.2 hours
Radio Listening (mean per day)	2 hours	3 hours	1.9 hours	1.5 hours
Magazine Reading (mean number regularly read)	.83	.7	1	1
Book Reading (mean number read in last six months)	1.1	1	1.7	2

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TABLE 3 (Cont.)

	Male Head of Household	Female Head of Household	Oldest Child	2nd Oldest Child
Cinema Attendance				
Never Go	63.3%	60.7%	26.0%	20.6%
Less than 1/month	14.5	18.5	2.9	11.8
1-2/month	14.5	12.4	34.6	32.4
3-4/month	4.8	6.7	28.8	32.4
More than 4/month	3.0	1.7	7.7	2.9
Changes in Cinema Attendance since VCR				
Go less often now	31.5%	32.4%	18.6%	33.3%
Go more often now	___	.6	3.9	6.1

FAMILY MEDIA USE

Who Chooses Videos

Kids Alone	29.0%
Kids with one parent (either father or mother)	15.5
Father alone	20.4
Mother alone	5.0
Family together	9.9
Varies with the film	13.3

Video Viewing
(mean number per week)   2.90 videos

11 % rent as many as 5 per week

16.2 %   rent 4 per week

TABLE 4

MEASURES OF CULTURAL ORIENTATION

	ADULTS (N=166)	KIDS (N=67)
Attitudes About U.S.A.		
Negative or Leaning Negative	31.4%	32.8%
About Equal Mixture of Positive and negative statements	30.7	23.9
Positive or Leaning Positive	38.0	43.3
Attitudes About Turkey		
Negative or Leaning Negative	68.6	86.1
About Equal Mixture of Positive and Negative Statements	16.3	9.3
Positive or Leaning Positive	15.0	4.7
How Respondents Would Describe A Turk to a Foreigner		
With Mostly or Only Positive Adjectives	73.5	50.0
With Mixture of Positive and Negative Adjectives	15.4	26.3
With Mostly or Only Negative Adjectives	11.1	23.7
What Kinds of Turkish Customs Respondent Likes and Dislikes		
Mostly or Only Positive Customs Cited	46.3	27.0
About Equal Mixture of Positive and Negative Customs Cited	33.3	29.7
Mostly or Only Negative Customs Cited	20.4	43.2
Sense of Belonging To the Neighborhood Respondents Live in		
Feel like They Belong	62.3	
Neither Belongs nor Doesn't Belong	3.6	
Doesn't Feel like They Belong	34.1	

TABLE 5

ORIENTATION RELATIONSHIPS FOR MALE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD

Correlations	Pearson's corr	Sig
Age with Number of Trips Abroad	.41	.01
Age with Income	.28	.01
Education with Language Fluency	.48	.01
Education with Time Spent With Newspaper	.21	.05
Education with Frequency of Newspaper Read.	.27	.01
Education with Cinema Attendance	.27	.01
Education with Religious Practice	-.30	.01
Education with Frequency of Visiting	.29	.01
Language Fluency with Number of Trips Abroad	.29	.01
Language Fluency with Length of Stay Abroad	.45	.01
Language Fluency with Frequency of Visiting	-.25	.01
Language Fluency with Cinema Attendance	.29	.01
Religious Practice with Cinema Attendance	-.33	.01
Religious Practice with Attitude Toward Turkey	.26	.05
Cinema Attendance with Description of Turkish Customs	-.24	.05
Film Format Choice with Education	.23	.01
Film Format Choice with Language Fluency	.48 TABLE 6	.01

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ORIENTATION RELATIONSHIPS FOR FEMALE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD

Correlations	Pearson's corr	Sig
Age with Cinema Attendance	-.36	.05
Age with Newspaper Reading Frequency	.31	.01
Age with Time Spent with Newspaper	.19	.05
Education with Language Fluency	.50	.01
Education with Time Spent With Newspaper	.39	.01
Education with Newspaper Reading Frequency	.28	.01
Education with Cinema Attendance	.34	.05
Education with Attitude Toward U.S.	-.31	.05
Education with Income	.34	.01
Education with Number of Trips Abroad	.20	.05
Language Fluency with Number Trips Abroad	.44	.01
Language Fluency With Time Spent Abroad	.60	.01
Language Fluency with Cinema Attendance	.30	.01
Language Fluency with Time Spent With Newspaper	.22	.05
Religious Practice with Attitude Toward Turkey	.30	.05
TV Viewing Frequency with Positive Attitude Toward Turkish Customs	.31	.01
Radio Listening Frequency with Positive Attitude Toward Turkish Customs	.45	.01
Cinema Attendance with Attitude Toward U.S.	-.19	.05
Cinema Attendance with Attitude Toward Turkey	-.19	.05
Foreign Travel with Attitude Toward Turkey	-.19	.05
Radio Listening Frequency with Attitude Toward U.S.	.24	.05
Radio Listening Frequency with Attitude Toward Turkish Customs	.23	.01
Frequency of Visiting with Attitude Toward U.S.	-.20	.05
Income with Frequency of Visiting	.35	.05
Income with Attitude Toward U.S.	-.18	.05
Income with Cinema Attendance	.26	.01
Family Living Abroad with Amount of Foreign Travel	.19	.05
Film Format Choice with Language Fluency	.45	.01

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TABLE 7
ORIENTATION RELATIONSHIPS FOR OLDEST CHILD

Correlations	Pearson's R	Sig
Education with Language Fluency	.61	.01
Education with Time Spent with Newspaper	.62	.01
Education with Cinema Attendance	.52	.01
Education with Preferred Format of Foreign Film	.60	.01
Language Fluency with Cinema Attendance	..63	.01
Language Fluency with Religious Practice	-.49	.05
Language Fluency with Income	.48	.05
Language Fluency with Film Format Choice	.69	.01
Number Trips Abroad with Income	.53	.01
Cinema Attendance with Description of a Turk	.48	.05
Cinema Attendance with Income	.50	.01
Cinema Attendance with Attitude Toward Turkey	-.39	.01
Cinema Attendance with Preferred Format of Foreign Film	.72	.01
Income with Description of a Turk	.66	.01
Description of a Turk with Preferred Format	.52	.05

TABLE 8

MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CHOICE OF FOREIGN FILM FORMAT

MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

Predictor*	Beta	Sig
Length of Time Spent in Foreign Countries	.38	.001
Frequency of Cinema Attendance	.23	.05

R Square=.25
Adjusted R Square=.22

*Variables accounted for, but not entered into the stepwise equation included: age, education level, foreign language fluency, degree of religious practice, time spent with the newspaper, frequency of television viewing, and family income

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THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN A NEWLY EMERGING DEMOCRACY:

THE LATVIAN CASE STUDY

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At ten minutes past nine o'clock on the evening of January 20, 1991, Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis was halfway through his televised report to the nation, claiming "a crisis has been averted" in the country's drive for independence within the rapidly disintegrating Soviet Union. Just then, a Moscow cameraman in Riga to photograph the standoff between pro-democracy and Communist forces at Latvia's Interior Ministry building, burst into the studio and on to the set. The speech by Godmanis abruptly ended. Technicians rushed on to the air unedited video tape of an assault by Soviet security forces on journalists guarding a bridge leading to the ministry building. The pictures showed traces of gunfire and the bloodied bodies of the first martyrs to Latvian independence.

Today, memorial wreaths crown polished granite markers where five people were killed and 14 wounded the night the "Black Berets" occupied the communications center of the Interior Ministry. Two of the dead and two of the wounded were journalists. Cameramen Gvido Zvaigzne and Andris Slapins, both killed in the clash, appear to have been particularly targeted by Soviet forces. Eight days before they had photographed the Black Beret assault on neighboring Lithuania's Broadcast House, an attack in Vilnius that killed 15 and wounded 79 others. The worldwide publicity generated by broadcast of the video tape had profoundly embarrassed Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who disavowed any advance knowledge of

the attack. Now, dramatic events in Latvia would take their course and journalists would both record and lead the country's desperate struggle toward independence.

This article analyzes the role played by the Latvian mass media in the country's independence movement between October, 1988, the date the first independent newspaper appears in Latvia, and August, 1991, the month in which a failed coup in Moscow, led to worldwide recognition of the independence of the Baltic republics. The research also examines the part played by Latvian mass media in encouraging the development of democratic institutions since independence.

Method

During October through December, 1992, thirty interviews were conducted with present and former Latvian journalists, journalism educators and political party members. Respondents were asked if they considered Latvian mass media a major or minor player in the country's independence movement. They were also asked if they considered mass media a major or minor player in the difficult task of building democratic institutions in the year since independence. Those interviewed were nearly uniform in maintaining that the Latvian mass media played a major, and perhaps leading role, in the nation's effort to rid itself of 50 years of foreign rule. They were far more critical, however, of the performance of mass media in the period since independence, 16 months that have marked mounting problems in the country's fragile economic and political

climate.

Content analysis was also conducted on relevant editions of four major Latvian newspapers having different constituencies. Lauku Avize is a popular weekly serving Latvia's Russian-speaking agricultural community. First issued by the Communist Party Central Committee, the paper broke with the party months before the Interior Ministry attack, and became an outspoken critic of Latvia's Soviet-backed leadership. Atmoda was the first truly independent paper published in Latvia. It was the mouthpiece of the Popular Front, the organization around which various independence forces coelesced. Neatkariga was the major alternative pro-independence newspaper. It is aligned to the Latvian National Indepedence Movement, an organization convinced that the Popular Front had been taken over by the Soviet secret police. Finally, Diena, which began life on November 23, 1990, was analyzed. It was launched by publishers of the Swedish Express as a Western-style journal of record whose purpose was to chronicle Latvia's uncertain course to indepenedence.

Analysis focused on coverage of two turning points in Latvia's recent history---the bloody attack on the Interior Ministry building in January, 1991 and the aborted Moscow coup attempt of seven months later. Interviewees signalled these two events as crucial to the country's independence effort. Seventy relevant editions were analyzed at the National Library of Latvia in Riga with translation provided by Inta Brikse, chairperson of the Department of Journalism and Communication at the University of Latvia.

Although copies of state radio and television broadcasts of crucial moments in the drive toward independence were not available, a 31 minute summary of these events, focusing on the fight over the Interior Ministry, has been produced by veteran Latvian broadcaster and commentator Abrams Klockins. It captures as do the newspaper articles the role of Latvian mass media as a self-conscious promoter of national independence. It was a freedom first forged in the aftermath of the First World War and brutally lost under Hitler and Stalin.

Background

During its interwar independence, Latvia nurtured a ric media environment. The press published in ten languages. Readers could sample a range of political viewpoints in 106 newspapers and 198 magazines, making the country Europe's fourth per capita consumer of news. Press censorship, long a feature of Russian and then Bolshevik occupation, was swept aside by the newly democratic Latvian nation of February 12, 1924. The country's press law gave wide latitude for the operation of "a free press," regarding it as crucial to the preservation of an independent state.[1]

A right wing coup, staged by Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis on May 15, 1934, led to the dissolution of the Latvian Parliament, the disbanding of political parties and the issuance of a new press lawon February 14, 1938. The law required all publishers to "support the will of the people for unity and single-mindedness." One hundred two Latvian periodicals, including 59 of its

newspapers, were closed, many failing to pass the administration's registration requirement. Survivors were reined in by the Ministry of Societal Matters to "promote the work of the government."[2]

The forcible incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union in 1940, followed by German occupation a year later, led to the liquidation of all newspapers and magazines failing to propagate the ideas of the country's totalitarian masters. Only 22 newspapers and eight magazines were left standing after the Soviet run Central Board of Literature banned all but the Communist press. Nineteen newspapers and 11 magazines were produced during a three year Nazi regime. The return of Soviet forces in September, 1944 led to another ideological shift and a battle over the airwaves. Nazi and Soviet stations transmitted until the end of World War II, each warning audiences that listening to "forbidden programming" was punishable by death.[3]

Under the Communist System

The four decades that followed the Soviet takeover found Latvia mass media in the stern grip of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, the KGB and the censorship apparatus of the Soviet state. All newspapers were read and evaluated for their ideological purity. Press reviews and publishing guidelines perscribed how news was to be reported and broadcast. Coverage plans had to be submitted and approved a month in advance by government censors. The post-Stalinist period saw a brief relaxation in authoritarianism, but the Brezhnev era reimposed the

pattern of the past. Obligatory "information days" at the party central committee were designed to "educate" reporters and their editors. The "ultimate crietria" was that nothing should be reported that reflected "negatively" on the party or its members.[4]

The death of Brezhnev in 1982 and his two hardline successors months apart contributed to a crisis in the Soviet system. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika and glasnost, first articulated in 1985 and 1986, attempted to restructure and liberalize Soviet life while preserving the Communist Party's monopoly of power. The Baltic peoples were the most determined and best placed to exploit these new conditions.[5] When the Council of Ministers banned the magazine Auseklis (Morning Star) in 1986, the editorial staff published the magazine in Stockholm and smuggled it into Latvia. It was the beginning of an independent press in Latvia. Staburags, a year later, published without censorship articles on ecology, history and culture, subjects considered politically off limit until then. The alternative press grew in early 1988 to more than a dozen publications. They appeared irregularly at first and to small circulations. But their political role in legitimizing dissent cannot be exaggerated.[6]

The appearance in December, 1988 of Atmoda (Awakening), a weekly newspaper of the Latvian Popular Front, was the first opposition newspaper to be legally licensed in the Soviet Union. Its enormous popularity triggered the creation of 20 regional papers or "small awakenings" that brusheds aside local party censors in celebrating a wave of patriotism and new nationalism gripping the country. The sentiment reached its peak on August 23,

1989 when one million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians joined hands in a human chain extending from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Ribbentroff-Molotov agreement that brought the Baltics under foreign rule. Atmoda's leadership considered the protest "a tremendous achievement" in Latvia's drive to independence.[7]

Atmoda's appearance coincided with a crusade by broadcast journalist Dainis Ivans to block construction of a hydroelectric plant on the Daugova River and a pree-led campaign to prevent the building of a subway in Riga. These efforts demonstrated the power of the press to mobilize public fears that the importation of Russian work crews would lead to a further Russification of Latvia.[8] Ivans and fellow dissidents had a self-conscious sense that they were "living through" and "making" history.[9]

There is considerable current conjecture that the Popular Front and Atmoda were either the instrument of or were infiltrated by the KGB in an effort to control the national insurgency in Latvia. If this was the case, it was a gross miscalculation. The movement's membership grew to 200,000, eclipsing that of the Communist Party. By early 1990, half a million Latvians were organized through citizens' committees and were heeding Atmoda's call to vote for an independent Latvian state.[10]

Competing papers that once mouthed the party line saw which way the political wind was blowing and did an about face. Lauku Avize celebrated Parliament's May 4, 1990 independence vote by telling its countryside readers that "this is a period of national exhilaration, a time of flowers and singing." The decision of the

Latvian Supreme Soviet to reinstate the Latvian constitution of 1922 with its pledge of press freedom made a cartoon character out of Mikhail Gorbachev. He is shown at the bottom of an hourglass, unable to stop the flow of sand representing the crumbling of the U.S.S.R.[11]

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of restructuring and openness, designed to perpetuate the Communist Party in power, had the effect of accelerating the party's fall from pre-eminence in the Baltic republics. Latvian fears over Russification found their expression in a suddenly "awakened" mass media which succeeded in legitimizing the right of dissent. Even mass media supporting Communist Party policies quickly adapted itself to the outpouring of patriotic fervor and joined its voice to those decrying a January, 1991 attack on the press that would become known as "the first coup."

The First Coup

The determination of the Latvian Communist Party to retain its preferred position in national life brought it into direct conflict with the country's newly liberated media. On the evening of January 2, 1991, forces loyal to Communist Party chief Alfreds Rubiks occupied the nation's press house, claiming the building was party property. The clumsy attack on Latvian civil liberties failed to muzzle the press. Atmoda published from Siaulai, a provincial town 100 kilometers from Riga. The opposition press followed Atmoda's example, collecting more than one million rubles (nearly $77,000) to keep their newspapers and magazines before their readers. Most

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newspapers began appearing irregularly on poor quality paper in four to eight page editions, but they continued to criticize the Rubiks regime.[12] Diena proudly announced press house typographers would not work for Rubiks and had gone home, taking their equipment with them. Neatkariga demanded a United Nations investigation. Lauku Avize predicted "a united mass media" would foil efforts to return Latvia to "dictatorship."[13]

The occupation of the press house put into operation a carefully crafted continguency plan at state radio. An emergency network of nine relay stations located at remote sites across the country began transmitting 24 hours a day. Young and unmarried staff announcers, working eight and 12 hour shifts, broadcast developments in four languages to audiences inside the Baltic republics and the West. They reported the Soviet attack on Lithuania's broadcast facility at one in the morning on January 13, 1991, a bloody assault that led to the spontaneous massing of trucks, building materials and human barricades around broadcast center in Riga's Doma Square.[14]

Inside the radio building, barricades were built. Tables, desks and chairs blocked entrances. The human barricade outside the building swelled to 20,000, all the square could hold, with only deliveries of food, coffee and tea permitted through the cordon. Interviews, commentaries and special programming focusing on the test of nerves were broadcast on large speakers across the square and throughout the nation. On the morning of January 14 transmission lines to Moscow were cut, severing Radio Latvia's shortwave signal to the West. The crowd guarding the radio building

linked arms. One defender remembered thinking, "Let them kill us if they will."[15]

The attack came six days later on the evening of January 20, 1991 at the Interior Ministry building when Soviet Black Berets, or "Dark Forces" as they were often called, shot their way through a coterie of journalists and supporters manning one of the bridges leading to the nation's security center. The assault, which targeted Latvian reporters and cameramen, was captured by Latvian, Russian and Finnish camera crews, who rushed their video on the air. As soon as the video appeared, Latvians began streaming to the Interior Ministry to retake the building. People from the countryside were reported on their way to Riga. But the Latvian mass media urged caution. Now was a time for mourning, commentators claimed. The future of democratic Latvia required the "calm courage" of its people. "We are too used to freedom to give in to ultimatums now," a Neatkariga editorial argued. "We are paying a price for freedom, but we are not alone."[16]

The burial of the five victims of the Black Beret assault on the Interior Ministry marked a new maturity in the media's coverage of the independence struggle. Published eulogies were restrained and understated. "In a country the size of Latvia," one journalist later commented, "losing a colleague was like losing a member of your own family." But the press counselled restraint and helped rationalize the nation's response. "I think this was the Latvian mass media's greatest moment," Inta Brikse remembers, "because if they had asked us to fight, we would have fought and a lot of people would have been killed."[17] Instead, the barricades remained

up, the standoff continued, and what the press was calling "X-hour," the hour of decision, would wait until another day.

X-Hour, The Second Coup

At 6:40 in the morning on August 19, 1991, an ashen looking announcer in a trembling voice reported on Moscow television that Mikhail Gorbachev was ill and had been relieved of his duties by the ruling council. Sergei Kruks, a veteran of January's broadcast marathons, could not believe his ears. "We all felt that we were in a time warp," he says. "It sounded like something out of the 1950's."[18]

The Dark Forces in Riga acted swiftly by occupying the TV Tower. Razukas Ramalts, a journalist and Parliamentary leader, panicked. He went on radio urging the people to rush Doma Square and "save your government." The movement of civilians spooked armed Black Berets who congregated outside the radio building threatening violence. "We were all animals in a trap," Kruks remembers. "We were uncertain how it would turn out and feared for our future."[19]

Kruks knew, as did his colleagues, that the KGB had been closely monitoring their pro-democracy activities. This meant that if the Dark Forces succeeded in their coup, he could expect "jail or worse." State Radio, however, continued to operate through its emergency network during the crisis largely because KGB agents never discovered the transmitter switch that would have knocked them off the air. By three o'clock in the morning on August 21, Kruks was able to pick up a Radio Liberty newscast reporting cracks

in the coup. Boris Yeltsin, the democratically elected Russian president, had appeared atop an armored personnel carrier and Moscow was seen rallying to his side.[20]

"X-hour has come," Diena told its readers, as it reported a Black Beret shooting spree on Doma Square and on bridges over the Daugova River. Special issues of the paper reported the move of personnel carriers to Parliament Square and celebrated with banner headlines the proclamation of an independent Latvia. When coup plotters appeared on Moscow television, Lauku Avize reported that it only increased the "quiet confidence" of Latvians that "democratic forces" would prevail. Neatkariga published a patriotic poem on page one urging Latvians to make fires throughout the country as a sign of solidarity.[21]

At four o'clock in the afternoon of August 21, 1991, the third day of the coup, a commentator appeared on Moscow television. "Everything has ended," the commentator reported. "We have regained our microphones and studio and will now tell you the truth about these events." The collapse of the coup in Moscow, the retreat of security forces from Doma Square and the broadcast center, and the arrest of Alfred Rubiks triggered a wave of rejoicing in Riga. Iceland became the first non-Baltic state to recognize Latvian independence and was qickly followed by Yeltsin's Russia and the world community of nations. Atmoda, whose appearance three years earlier had legitimized dissent and given a voice to the independence movement, ran a four column front page picture of a crane lifting a statue of Lenin from its moorings. The caption read, "Lenin Bids a Final Farewell to Riga."[22]

Years of political agitation, led by an articulate and often courageous mass media, had culminated in Latvian independence. As the formerly banned maroon and white stripe flag was unfurled over the national parliament and Hall of Congress, normally taciturn Latvians were seen to openly weap. It had been 50 years since a deal clandestinely struck by two totalitarian forces had cost the state its independence. Now the struggle appeared over. As Latvians gathered at their Freedom Monument on November 18, 1991 to commemorate the birth of the first republic 70 years before, they could hardly have imagined the ordeal that lay just ahead.[23]

After Independence

"Our biggest mistake was to imply that independence was the end of political struggle," says Dace Duze, a lecturer in journalism at the University of Latvia. "Instead, we should have said, it is the end of one struggle and the beginning of another."[24]

A year and a half after Latvia achieved independence, its economic and social life lies in tatters. The country's parliament, led by inexperienced politicians and "former" communists, has postponed consideration of who has the right to Latvian citizenship. This has left property rights undetermined and deepened the divisions between ethnic Latvians and Russians, a quarrel now the subject of a U.N. human rights inquiry.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has refused to withdraw 26,000 Russian troops on Latvian soil until "minority rights" within the

country are guaranteed. His decision to charge the Baltic republics world prices for Russian oil has plunged Latvia into economic chaos. Petroleum is rationed. Home heating is sporadic. Schools and businesses are threatened with shutdown because they cannot heat their plants.[25]

In July, 1992 the treasury began issuing bank notes under terms of an agreement signed with the International Monetary Fund. The first installment of a $21 million loan was spent without a tax or monetary policy in place. The failure of government officials to develop a detailed economic recovery program has pushed the country to the brink of fiscal collapse. An estimated 20 percent of Latvians receive a minimum wage of $10 a month. Most professionals only make three to four times that amount, including reporters and university professors.[26]

Amidst this economic turmoil, the blame game has become a national past-time. Ten splinter parties left the Popular Front coalition, charging it is "ideologically narrow." Three political parties now call themselves the Popular Front and each claims to be the sole legitimate heir to the independence movement. Political leaders are routinely charged with complicity during the Communist period. One veteran journalist remarked, "No one wants to assume responsibility for the mess we're in."[27]

Mass Media Under Attack

In the runup to Latvia's 1993 parliamentary elections, the University of Latvia's Department of Journalism and Communication

and the U.S. Information Agency staged a four day conference designed to clarify the relationship of Latvia's mass media to the country's infant political parties. The sometimes stormy meetings, televised November 19, 1992 on state television, underscore the division of opinion on the future of mass media within Latvia's newly emerging democracy. A majority of party spokesmen continue to see mass media as an instrument of party propaganda. A particularly bitter quarrel between the Popular Front and Atmoda has led to a vitriolic court suit and a division of assets. "It had all the pain of a divorce," says Valdis Berzins, the paper's foreign news editor.[28]

Turbulent economic times have given press calls for "journalistic independence" and autonomy a hollow ring. Papers such as Diena have cultivated relations with "rich uncles" like the Swedish Express to stay financially afloat. Commercial advertising is so scarce Independent Television had to drop ITN's 10 minute daily news feed from London because it could not find $10 a day in advertising to pay for it.[29] Nevertheless, mass media has been roundly accused of "corruption," of shaping news and editorial policy in favor of "commercial pals" whose identities remain hidden from audiences.[30]

Nearly everyone agrees that the media's economic problems are compounded by its lack of professionalism. One press critic charges that there are only two kinds of journalists working in Latvia today---"those with no talent and those who are bought." Veteran journalist Abrams Klockins notes that the collapse of Communism has left Latvian journalists with no ethical scheme within which to

work. Those reporters who take their work seriously have no background in investigative reporting. One editor confided that there were not ten journalists in the entire country capable of "serious writing and detective work."[31]

Authoritarian attitudes die hard in Latvia. Days after the country had won independence, its governing council, joined by journalist Dainis Ivans, an early hero in the Popular Front movement, ordered mass media to make no mention of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Riga. A blank space appeared on Diena's front page of August 30, 1991 at the center of which was a picture of a pair of scissors, a silent protest to the government policy. In November, 1992, Janis Skapars, a former journalist, acknowledged the government was "working on a law to proetct state secrets," but it is "so secret we can't tell you anything about it."[32] Late in 1992, the supreme council banned a newspaper critical of government policies. The action failed to provoke significant comment in the mass media, illustrating not only the authoritarian tendency of Latvia's government but the passivity of much of its press.[33]

Defenders of Latvia's mass media are today among its sternest critics. They charge it with failing its great task of encouraging the formation of democratic institutions that will secure the country's fragile political future. A profession that once gave an independence movement its legitimacy and voice, now abused this public trust in an unprincipled policy of "survival at any cost."[34] This has opened the media to charges of corruption and a failure to meet its responsibilities in a post-totalitarian state.

Conclusion

The sunny optimism that greeted Latvia's sudden, and almost bewildering independence, in the summer of 1991, has now given way to disappointment and not a little recrimination. Living under the Soviet hammer and sickle for half a century had both humiliated and brutalized the Latvian people. But economic and social conditions a year and a half after independence were in many respects more onerous than they had been during the long occupation.

Twenty-six thousand Russian troops, a legacy of Moscow's imperialism and paternalism, remain in Latvia. Ethnic Russians who reluctantly went along with independence now fear statelessness as the country lurches toward its most overwhelming and delicate political task---determining who has the ultimate right of citizenship in Latvia's newly emerging democracy.

Mass media, which served as a catalyst in the early independence movement, has seen its role recede in the economic and professional uncertainty of the post-independence period. "If you have no confidence in tomorrow," Klockins observes, "you get a journalism of everyman-for-himself."[35] Nor are the media's problems over professionalism likely to ease anytime soon. "Serious political commentary is being displaced by a kind of adolescent entertainment," Valdis Berzins, of Atmoda for Leisure notes. The media's greatest role during the independence period was that it served as instigator and educator for political change," observes Gundars Kings, executive director of the Baltic Academic Center. "Today's mass media leaves our people totally uninformed," says

Ilze Sulmane. "That's the tragedy of our current failures."[36]

The purpose and direction of mass media since the heady days of the independence movement appears to have lapsed into indirection and not a little confusion. A mass media with no habit of operating in an open and competitive market environment, has itself taken refuge in old authoritarian shelters. An _Atmoda_ editor favors the creation of a special prosecutor to investigate "truth and falsity" in mass media reporting.[37] Journalists who are now part of the government justify a party-controlled press by observing "history will record the correctness of our position."[38] Even journalism eductors concede that the paternalism of political authorities to mass media and the public may be necessary "because of a lack of sophistication among Latvian voters."[39]

Nor is the immediate outlook in journalism education particularly encouraging. Today, the acute financial strain of higher education in Latvia threatens various universities and training centers with temporary closing and greatly curtailed budgets. The word from deans to department chairs is that state subsidies have dried up and individual departments must think of how to be "money-makers" to survive.[40] Lack of resources, antiquated facilities and student apathy compound the problem of journalism educators in developing a standard of professionalism designed to reinvigorate journalism instruction and performance.

Latvia's ongoing independence struggle reflects journalism's twin responsibility within a newly emerging democracy. If the first is to serve as a legitimator of dissent and a catalyst for political change, the second is to eduacte readers and listeners to

the ongoing work of democracy in a post-totalitarian state. The greatest failure of Latvia's mass media is that it portrayed political independence as the end of national struggle, rather than the beginning of a new and longer struggle. Just as the freedom of the press is a continuing battle, the role of mass media in democracy is an ongoing responsibility, linking policy makers to the public, while empowering voters with the information they need to make the choices that make democracy possible.

NOTES

1. Richards Treijs, "Press Law in Latvia," in Svennik Hoyer, Bjarne Skov and Line Sandsmark, eds., <u>The Role of Media in a Changing Society: Papers from the Baltic-Norwegian Conference, October, 1991</u>, pp. 103-105. Also, Inta Brikse and Sergei Kruks, "The History of Journalism in Latvia," unpublished manuscript, pp. 35-36. For background on the development of Latvian nationalism and the struggle of its intelligentsia under waves of foreign domination, see David Kirby, <u>Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World, 1492-1772</u> (London: Longman, 1990) and Edward C. Thaden, <u>Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870</u> (Princeton: Princeton University, 1984).

2. For Ulmanis's justification of a controlled press, see Papers of Karlis Ulmanis. Ulmanis Collection and Exhibition. Institute of the History of Latvia. Riga Castle. Riga, Latvia. Also, Epp Lauk, Inta Brikse, Ainars Dimants and Tina Kaalep, "Freedom of the Press and Government Interventions in the Independent Baltic Republics: 1918-1940," unpublished manuscript. On the rise of fascism and authoritarian rule in the Baltic Republics, see Tonu Parming, <u>The Collapse of Liberal Democracy andf the Rise of Authoritarism in Estonia</u> (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975) and Leonas Sabaliunas, <u>Lithuania in Crisis: Nationalism to Communism, 1939-1940</u> (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1972). See also, Marju Lauristan and Peter Vihalemm, "The Baltics---West of the East and East of the West," in Svennik Hoyer, ed., <u>A Story on Many Levels: Baltic Perspectives on History and Media</u> (Oslo: Oslo University, 1993), pp. 6-22.

3. Epp Lauk, Inta Brikse, Laimonas Tapinas and Jonas Bulota, "A Somber Interlude: The Two Occupations from the Summer of 1940 to the Fall of 1944," unpublished manuscript. Richards Treijs, "The Chronological History of Latvian Journalism," pp. 13-16. Unpublished manuscript. Ingrida Kalnins, A Guide to the Baltic States (Merrifield, Va.: Inroads, 1990), pp. 161-162.

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4. Interview with Maiga Lejiete, former chairperson of the Department of Journalism, University of Latvia, and an 18 year veteran reporter and editor of youth and women's magazines. Interview conducted October 26, 1992 in Riga. Also, Treijs, "Press Laws in Latvia," p. 108. Inta Brikse, "The Struggle of the Latvian Press: Current Development Tendencies," p. 8, of unpublished manuscript. Adolfs Silde, "The Destruction of the Latvian Republic," in Vito Vitauts Simanis, ed., Latvia (St. Charles, IL: The Book Latvia, 1984), pp. 185-209.

For background on the deterioration of civil liberties under four decades of Soviet occupation and dissident activities during this period, see Andus Kung, A Dream of Freedom: Four Decades of National Survival Versus Russian Imperialism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1940-1980 (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1981). Romuld Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1980 (Berkeley: University of California, 1983). I. Joseph Vizulis, Nations Under Duress: The Baltic States (Port Washington, NY: Associated Faculty Press, 1985).

5. John W. Hiden and Patrick Salmon, The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 20th Century (London: Longman), pp. 147-151. Also, interview with Abrams Klockins, 30 years veteran of Latvian and Russian language radio, television and the press. Interview conducted October 12, 1992 in Riga.

6. Interview with Inta Brikse, chairperson of the Department of Journalism and Communication, University of Latvia. Interview conducted on October 21, 1992 in Riga. Also, interview with Alexander Mirlins, Latvian broadcast journalist and news editor. Interview conducted on October 21, 1992 in Riga.

7. Interviews with Elita Veidemone, editor-in-chief of Atmoda for Leisure, and Valdis Berzins, the paper's foreign news editor. Interviews conducted on November 2, 1992 in Riga. Also, interview with Karlis Streips, former staff reporter at Atmoda, and current news director for Independent Television in Latvia. Interview conducted on October 20, 1992 in Riga. See also, "The Baltic Way," in Atmoda for a Free and Independent Latvia, 1989, otherwise undated. The copy of this edition of the paper is in the National

Library of Latvia. Riga, Latvia.

8. The fear of Russification is reflected in Latvia's census figures. Barely 52 percent of the 2,680,000 people living in the country are ethnic Latvians. The largest minority living within the country are Russians, followed by Ukrainians and Georgians. Many Latvians are certain an actual count would show they are a minority within their own country. This belief is all the more painful due to the deportation of 16,000 Latvians, mostly of leadership quality, on the evening of June 13, 1941 to Siberia. See Laimonis Streips, "The Seizure and Destruction of Latvia by the Soviet Union," in Simanis, pp. 182-204. Figures for the January 12, 1989 census appear in The Baltic States: A Reference Book (Tallinn: Estonian Encyclopaedia Publishers, 1991), pp. 91-92.

Interviews with Karlis Streips in Riga on October 12, 1992, Alexander Mirkins on Octobver 21, 1992, Sergei Kruks, a broadcast journalist, on October 25, 1992, and Inga Helmane, a reporter for Latvian Youth, on October 26, 1992, point to the importance of Ivans's campaign in legitimizing dissent.

9. Interview with Dainis Ivans on November 9, 1992 in Riga. Kruks explains the work of journalists in this period as "giving the people the feeling that they could criticize the regime." Mirlins sees this as "fundamental to the destruction of a totalitarian system."

10. The charge that the Popular Front was infiltrated by the KGB is generally supported in interviews with Streips on October 12, 1992 and October 20, 1992. It is also the claim of Gatis Lidums, a reporter for Steps, an independent magazine, and a correspondent on Latvian State Radio. Lidums is among those journalists who broke with the Popular Front to form the National Independence Movement. The interview with Lidums took place on October 18, 1992 in Riga. See also, Janis Skapars, "The Opinion of the Popular Front on the Coming Municipal and Supreme Soviet Elections," Atmoda, December 19, 1989, p. 1. Skapars was a journalist who played a leading part in the Popular Front, later serving in the country's governing Supreme Council.

11. Lauku Avize, May 4, 1990, pp. 1-3 and May 11, 1990, pp. 1-3. Neatkariga, May 4, 1990, pp. 1 and 3 and May 11, 1990, p. 1. Atmoda, April 30, 1990, pp. 3 and 8 and May 31, 1990, pp. 3, 7 and 8. Also, Ilze Sulmane, "Mass Media in Latvia," in Hoyer, pp. 35-37. Interview with Dace Duze, lecturer in journalism at the Department of Journalism and Communication, University of Latvia, on October 27, 1992, in Riga.

12. Interview with Valdis Berzins, foreign news editor of Atmoda. Interview conducted on November 2, 1992 in Riga. Also, interview with Eriks Hanbergs, editor of Neatkariga Cina ("Struggle"), conducted in Riga on November 10, 1992. Interview with Sarmite Elerte, editor of Diena ("Day"), conducted in Riga on November 9, 1992.

13. <u>Diena</u>, January 4, 1991, pp. 1 and 2 and January 5, 1991, p. 1. <u>Neatkariga</u>, January 9, 1991, pp. 1 and 2. <u>Lauku Avize</u>, January 16, 1991, p. 1.

14. Interview with Sergei Kruks on October 12, 1992 and October 22, 1992. Also, interview with Aija Calite, reporter/producer on state radio and television. Interview conducted on November 9, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Ieva Upleja, producer of state television's "Panorama." Interview conducted in Riga on November 9, 1992.

15. Kruks interviews of October 12, 1992 and October 22, 1992. The quote is from Gunta Kaurate, an English teacher. She was interviewed in Riga on October 14, 1992. Aldis Lint, a Latvian salesman, interviewed in Kaunas, Lithuania on November 1, 1992 said radio "not only talked to the nation" during the seige of Dona Square, but was "the nation's voice."

16. Abrams Klockins interview on October 12, 1992, October 19, 1992 and November 9, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Zalmans Kats, editor of Russian language <u>Baltiskaya Gazeta</u>. The interview was conducted on November 11, 1992 and November 13, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Viktors Avotins, Latvian Writer's Union representative, conducted on November 11, 1992 in Riga. See also, <u>Lauku Avize</u>, January 25, 1991, pp. 1 and 2. <u>Neatkariga</u>, January 23, 1991, pp. 1 and 3 and February 6, 1991, pp. 1 and 2. <u>Diena</u>, January 16, 1991, pp. 1, 3 and 4; January 17, 1991, pp. 1 and 3; January 18, 1991, p. 1 and January 22, 1991, pp. 1 and 3.

17. Interview with Inta Brikse on November 3, 1992 in Riga.

18. Interview with Kruks on October 22, 1992.

19. Lejiete interview of October 16, 1992. Mirlins interview of October 21, 1992. Interview with Juris Rozenvalds, of the Democratic Workers Party of Latvia on November 10, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Kruks on October 22, 1992.

20. Kruks interview of October 12, 1992 and October 22, 1992. Interview with Karlis Leiskains, Conservative Party member, on November 11, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Jacobs Ceburs, press attache, Christian Democratic Party, on November 10, 1992 and November 12, 1992 in Riga.

21. <u>Diena</u>, August 20, 1991, p. 1 and August 21, 1991, pp. 1-3. <u>Lauku Avize</u>, August 27, 1991, p. 1. <u>Neatkariga</u>, August 22, 1991, pp. 1 and 2.

22. Krucks interview of October 22, 1992. Mirlins interview of October 21, 1992. Interview with Andris Jakuleans, editor-in-chief of <u>Independent Cina</u>, conducted on November 12, 1992 in Riga. Interview with state television commentator Emile Meskuns on November 12, 1992 in Riga. Also, <u>Atmoda</u>, September 1, 1992, p. 1.

23. <u>Atmoda</u>, November 19, 1991, p. 1. <u>Diena</u>, August 23, 1991, p. 1; August 24, 1991, p. 1 and August 26, 1991, p. 1. <u>Neatkariga</u>, August 29, 1991, pp. 1, 2 and 8.

24. Interview with Dace Duze on November 12, 1992 in Riga.

25. Broadcast of Independent Television news on November 5, 1992. <u>Diena</u>, November 11, 1992, p. 1. Interview in Riga on November 11, 1992 with Juris Dobelis, member of the Popular Front of Latvia.

26. <u>Diena</u>, November 12, 1992, p. 1. Interview with Dobelis on November 12 in Riga. Interview with Ints Calitis, Democratic Center Party member, on November 12, 1992, in Riga. Interview with Inta Brikse on November 6, 1992 in Riga. Interview with James Kinney, U.S. Information Agency representative, on November 6, 1992, in Riga.

27. Interview with Sarmite Elerte, editor of <u>Diena</u>, on November 12, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Janis Skapars, a representative on the Latvian Supreme Council, conducted on November 10, 1992 and November 12, 1992 in Riga. Interview with Karlie Streips on October 20, 1992. Interview with Abrams Klockins on November 9, 1992.

28. Interviews with Zalman Kats, editor of the <u>Baltikskaya Gazeta</u>, on November 11, 1992; Juris Rozenvalds of the Democratic Works Party of Latvia, on November 10, 1992; Janis Skapars, Republic of Latvia Supreme Council member, on November 10, 1992; Karlis Leskains, Conservative Party member, on November 12, 1992; Ints Calitis, Democratic Center Party representative, on November 11, 1992; Juris Dobelis, Latvian Popular Front leader, on November 11, 1992 and November 12, 1992; and Jacob Ceburs, press attache to the Christian Democratic Party, on November 10, 1992 and November 12, 1992.
　　　Interviewed on the bitter separation between <u>Atmoda</u> and the Popular Front were Elite Veidemane, <u>Atmoda for Leisure</u> editor-in-chief, on October 27, 1992 and November 2, 1992; Valdis Berzins on November 2, 1992; and Ainars Vladimirovs, <u>Atmoda</u> editor, on November 9, 1992 and November 12, 1992, in Riga.

29. <u>Diena</u>'s financial arrangements were explored with its editor Sarmite Elerte on November 10, 1992 and November 12, 1992. Independent Television's financial problem with the ITN feed were discussed with station news director Karlis Streips on October 29, 1992.

30. Charges of "corruption" dominated exchanges between the media and political leaders during meetings of November 9, 1992 through NOvember 12, 1992. Dobelis observed that it was not that the press was "bought" that so disturbed him, but the "shrill nature" of its attack on political enemies.

31. Interview with Vladimirovs on November 9, 1992. Interview with Klockins on November 10, 1992.

32. <u>Diena</u>, August 30, 1991, p. 1. Interview with Skapars on November 10, 1992.

33. Interview with Karlis Streips on November 10, 1992. Interview on November 4, 1992 with Ilze Sulmane, journalism professor at the University of Latvia, in Riga.

34. Mirlins points out that the average Latvian family that once could afford to buy three or four newspapers, can barely afford one today. The result is the collapse of many papers and "and an effort to entertain audiences" as a means of building subscribers. Interview with Mirlins on November 12, 1992.

35. Klockins interview on November 9, 1992.

36. Berzins interview on November 2, 1992. Gundars Kings interview on October 19, 1992 in Riga. Sulmane interview on November 4, 1992.

37. Interview with Ainars Vladimirovs on November 10, 1992.

38. Interview with Janis Skapars on November 10, 1992.

39. Interview with Abrams Klockins on November 9, 1992. Klockins explains that Latvian voters "may not yet be ready to accept the responsibility of democratic citizenship."

40. Interview with Inta Brikse on October 22, 1992. Interview with Dace Duze on October 27, 1992.

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GLOBAL TV NEWS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CNN'S EXPANSION TO EGYPT

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ABSTRACT

Since 1983 when the Cable News Network (CNN) began an international service, global television news has spread to more than 125 countries. Today, both CNN and the BBC World Television Service are growing rapidly, serving as an information source for elites in government, business, and journalism, mostly in the industrialized world. At a much slower pace, global news networks are moving into developing countries trying to build an audience for their product at a price the market will bear. While the potential markets for such a service are huge, the obstacles to success are formidable. This paper is a case study of the efforts to bring the Cable News Network to a developing country in the middle east--the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This study examines the introduction of CNN to Egypt in 1991, first as a test signal available to all viewers during the Gulf War and secondly as an encrypted subscription service. It traces the development of Cable News Egypt (CNE), the Egyptian-controlled company founded to bring CNN to Egypt, and explains how the presence of CNE prompted changes in the format and journalistic standards of Egyptian television news.

GLOBAL TV NEWS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

CNN'S EXPANSION TO EGYPT

As television news increasingly crosses national boundaries, the effect of transnational communication on news institutions, news sources, and audiences becomes more important. When a broadcast news organization can reach audiences throughout the world, the impact can be particularly significant. Within the next decade, as many as four global news networks could become the world's primary broadcast information sources, eclipsing the power and prestige of major national networks. The emergence of these global electronic powers will have significant ramifications for the way news is gathered, transmitted, and received. They will also influence the behavior of the national and international institutions they cover.

Currently, global news networks are in their first phase of maturation, serving as an information source and "party line" for elites in government, business, and journalism. It is in this infant phase that global networks facilitate diplomatic contact by acting as conduits for the flow of high level information. Major international events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre, the fall of communism in eastern Europe, the Gulf War, the failed Soviet coup, and superpower summitry have provided ample evidence of how governments have used the global reach of the Cable News Network to communicate their messages to each other. Global news networks also link together elites in business and other fields where access to instantaneous information is at a premium.

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Today, two established news networks, the Cable News Network (CNN), and the British Broadcasting Service World Service Television (BBC), have global reach. Together, these networks already reach, in at least a limited way, more than 125 countries of the world. In 1993, the Euronews service is scheduled to be launched serving eleven European countries. The purchase of UPI by the London-based Middle East Broadcasting Centre signals the possibility of a global network emerging from the Middle East.

A more interesting and challenging phase of global news broadcasting will occur when global news networks expand their reach beyond the elites to mass populations in developing countries. It is in this more mature phase that global networks will have their most profound impact, providing mass audiences with instantaneous access to breaking news.

Because this blizzard of information will come mostly from industrialized countries, charges of cultural imperialism will surely abound. Already, leaders worry about the breakdown of nationalism in a transnational communication environment. There is also the fear that global networks will change the entire broadcasting structure of the country, limiting the influence of government-controlled national channels.

In Greece and Pakistan, CNN is available via over-the-air television for all viewers to see. We can get an important glimpse of the impact global news networks might have on the world in the next century, especially in countries where viewers have previously had access to only one, government-controlled channel. In such environments, viewers are exposed not only to

their first international signal but their first alternative to the national status quo.

This paper examines the impact of a global news network signal on a developing country--the Arab Republic of Egypt--where CNN was given for a limited time to all viewers. It will trace the development of the Cable News Network's expansion into Egypt, examine the formation, development, and economic viability of Cable News Egypt (CNE), explore the effect of CNE on television audiences in Egypt, and document how the arrival of CNE changed the standards of journalism on Egyptian television. The study will also provide a brief history of global journalism and the development of CNN International.

Information for this paper was collected mainly through a series of personal interviews in Cairo during 1991 and from articles published about CNE in the Egyptian and American trade press. Feasibility reports and proposals for CNE were made available to the authors by Abdullah Schleifer, Director of the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo. Material in this paper attributed to Schleifer but not footnoted came from comments he made on a draft of th paper in June 1992.

Global News Background

While the trend towards global media has been growing throughout the twentieth century, particularly with wire services, magazines, and newspapers, the advent of global

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television in the 1980s rapidly accelerated that trend. As more countries opened their borders to imported signals, both news and entertainment, the issues associated with global media took on greater importance.

Communication satellite networks, however, were no panacea for worldwide distribution; economic, political, and cultural barriers were inhibitors to global growth. As with all new media penetrations, economies of scale, transmission spectrum limitations, high start-up capital requirements, and regulatory problems can impede development.[1] Direct broadcast satellite technology was expensive and difficult to sell to the consumer. The most attractive option was to market the signal to individual cable companies, hotels, and businesses, but this approach required negotiating individual marketing agreements with each entity in the global marketplace, a tedious prospect at best.

There was also the problem of global signals invading the turf of a country which had but one national signal. Only when privatization captivated Europe in the 1980s did the government-controlled national channels begin to yield ground to new outlets. The ripple effects of the European privatization were felt throughout the world as countries with single-channel broadcasting systems began to rethink their policies. This move towards privatization created a market for increased amounts of foreign programming, including global networks. Almost any nation that had multiplied its channel capacity was receiving a megadose of imported programming, mostly from the United States.

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There was considerable uncertainty concerning who would control these global networks and whether they would lead to a monopolistic system in which few diverse voices were heard. As a consequence of the rush toward globalization, many smaller and less powerful nations worried that the growth of huge, global entities would be at their expense and to the peril of their ethnic and political pluralism.

Anthony Smith asked whether the globalization of media by a handful of giant purveyors was a move towards the end of the nationalist phase of world history and whether the anxiety over that trend was based on a "nostalgic, sentimentalized and patronizing view of popular culture":

> Such an anxiety is rooted in the belief that the world is losing its logic of indigenousness and therefore a kind of authenticity; that, where our hope was that the media would act as a means of reconciliation, they are turning into instruments of homogenization; and that technology will, in the forms it has actually taken, deprive us of a home under the pretense of giving us a larger one.[2]

In the debate concerning global media, there is the inherent notion of a seamless network signal blanketing every household in the world simultaneously. Yet, the state of global media leaves us far short of that reality. In this infant stage of international media, the greatest challenge now is how to forge the structural links to make them operable according to what is "technologically possible and industrially congenial."[3] Global media are spreading city by city, country by country and facing significant impediments along the way.

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The Competitive International Environment

By the 1980s, the world had developed a ravenous appetite for television programming of all kinds, including news and information. Into that void stepped Ted Turner who took his fledgling Cable News Network international in 1983. What began as a lease of its signal to a broadcaster in one country and the carriage of CNN by a few hotels in another led to a worldwide empire in less than a decade.

Analysts believe that by the year 2000, CNN International will have eclipsed its parent service in both revenue and viewership, becoming the crown jewel of the Turner empire.[4] CNNI posted its first profits in 1991 and is preparing an ambitious four-pronged effort to keep its domination of global news broadcasting. CNNI has announced plans to expand its internationally-oriented programming, upgrade its satellite carriage, expand its newsgathering capabilities, and reorganize its sales force.[5]

With CNN, the era of the global news networks had begun. Rupert Murdoch's SKYNews channel was launched during the late eighties, but the service had a small subscriber base limited to the United Kingdom and Europe. The strongest competitor to CNN appeared in November 1991 when the British Broadcasting Corporation launched its 24-hour service in Asia. The BBC had previously run a limited European service, but the Asian initiative made it a full-fledged competitor to CNN. Rather than

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investing its own money in a distribution and marketing service, the BBC contracted with STAR-TV, a direct satellite broadcasting service originating in Hong Kong that also offered music, entertainment, and sports channels.[6] The BBC's alliance with STAR-TV had the dual advantage of giving the BBC instant exposure throughout Asia and avoiding any capital risk. In its first year of operation, STAR-TV had a circulation of 500,000 homes.[7] By 1992, the BBC World Service had expanded its reach to Africa through an arrangement with a South African-based Pay-TV operator, part of the M-Net group,[8] and to Japan with Nissho Iwai as a partner.[9]

The European Community was scheduled to launch its own news network called Euronews in 1993. Euronews will be headquartered in Lyons, France and be supported by broadcasters from France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Finland, Monaco, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The European Community will provide a quarter of the budget with the balance coming from advertising and sponsorships.[10]

In June, 1992, The Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), based in London, purchased UPI for $3.95 million.[11] It was widely speculated that MBC would use the resources of UPI to strengthen its newsgathering capability as the forerunner for a global television news channel.

Japan's NHK proposed an ambitious global news network in 1990 as a consortium with a European and American partner, but that idea died when NHK's Chairman who promoted the idea became

involved in a personal scandal and resigned in 1991. Other
efforts at global news broadcasting included a spanish language
service called Galavision owned by the Mexican network Televisa
and a German-owned 24-hour news network.

Although the audiences were quite small and heavily skewed
towards a high socio-economic group of elites, competitors saw
visions of a vast untapped international market. The rest of the
world's broadcasters were not going to cede world leadership to
Ted Turner and his CNN band. An age was beginning where the
transcendence of sacred national boundaries to carry global
information would become an ordinary occurrence. The way the
world perceived news and information had been irrevocably
changed.

Egyptian Initiative

Until the 1990s, the spread of CNN was confined to the
industrial world with Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific rim
the principal markets. Developing countries were thought to have
positive symbolic value but little immediate profit potential.
CNN's early success in Central and Latin America and STAR-TV's
impressive circulation figures in South Asia, however, showed
that distribution of global signals in developing countries could
be viable economic enterprises.

By the late eighties, CNN executives were ready to take a
fresh look at secondary markets where growth might be slow, but

long-term rewards great. Such was the case with Egypt, a nation with close ties to the United States and a huge tourism industry. The impetus for bringing CNN to Egypt came from a small group of entrepreneurs who began to court CNN International executives in the fall of 1988. The project appeared feasible because of demand for the service from the expatriate and tourism community and because Egypt's state-run broadcasting system had spare transmitter capacity that could be used to send CNN over the air using a scrambled signal from Cairo. Egypt was to become the first nation in the Arab world to have access 24 hours a day.

CNE Development

Government Approval

The driving force behind CNN's Egyptian initiative was Abdullah Schleifer, an American who headed the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo. Schleifer first approached CNN's Vice President for International Development, Robert Ross, in London about the feasibility of bringing CNN to Egypt.

Having been encouraged by CNN, Schleifer, who had previously been NBC bureau chief in Cairo for many years and was politically well-connected, floated the idea informally in Egypt. Schleifer understood the culture and politics of the middle east well, especially the risks involved with importing an American news channel into a predominately Muslim country sensitive about cultural imperialism. Despite Egypt's strong tradition of tight

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media control, both the American Ambassador and high-ranking Egyptian officials encouraged Schleifer to go forward with his idea.

Schleifer at first discussed providing CNN to hotels only, but was surprised to find that the Egyptian government was not as opposed to consumer distribution as he had thought. In October, 1989, after several months of negotiations, Schleifer and his partners reached an agreement with the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) to support the distribution of CNN publicly. Under the preliminary agreement, Cable News Egypt (CNE) would be granted a license to receive and distribute the news service in Cairo. The original proposal limited ERTU's share to 40%, giving control to the Egyptian and American investors. The final ownership percentages, however, were as follows: ERTU (50%); The Egyptian Company for Investment Projects (ECIP) (20%); Tetrad International Corporation represented by Schleifer (TIC) (20%) and a private Egyptian investment company (10%). Later, the agreement was changed to increase the percentage owned by TIC from 20% to 35%, reducing EICP's share to only 5%. Under the agreement, CNE would pay CNN 20% of gross sales during the first four years of the contract and 25% of gross sales during the final four years.[12]

The ERTU preliminary decision was but one of many that would have to be made in a highly centralized Egyptian bureaucracy not known for receptiveness to controversial new ideas. The entire process would take nearly three years and moved, according to one

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journalist, at the pace of a "dyslexic pharaonic scribe."[13]

The chief external strategist in the struggle was Safwat Sherif,

Egypt's Minister of Information, who ran what Schleifer called a

"one-man educational campaign" in the media and at the cabinet

level on behalf of CNN's introduction to Egypt.

CNE Advantages

Much of Schleifer and Sherif's arguments appealed to the

pride Egyptians had in a broadcasting system they believed far

surpassed any in the Arab world. Egypt had long considered

itself the film and television capital of the Arab states and

frequently trained broadcasters from other countries. Government

officials reasoned that if a significant technological innovation

were to be made, Egypt was the country destined to begin it.

Sherif particularly liked the idea that the staid Egyptian

television news service would have competition. Abdullah

Schleifer said this competitive aspect appealed to Sherif from

the beginning:

> It's quite clear in my mind that the minister was
> encouraged to support CNN because he realized that it
> would be an incentive for improving the technical and
> editorial level of local television services. That's
> not a unique insight, but the government should be
> given credit for having had tha insight from the very
> beginning.[14]

Another important reason for having CNN in Egypt was to

promote tourism. Egypt knew that American tourists could receive

CNN in hotels in virtually every major tourist destination except

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Egypt. They saw the presence of CNN as a selling point to promote the country's chief industry. Schleifer sweetened the deal by promising four minutes of free advertising on CNN to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, a move that could greatly enhance tourism in the country.[15]

Schleifer argued that tourists and visiting businessmen would be psychologically reassured by the familiar presence of CNN in their hotel room. In his 1988 proposal, Schleifer said, "To put it as frankly as possible--the presence of CNN in his Cairo hotel room, reassures the foreign investor that he is still in the free world."[16]

While the tourism argument carried great weight, it was not without critics. Hamdi Kandil, former director of UNESCO's division of free-flow of information and communication policies, disputed the notion that having CNN in hotels would enhance tourism, saying that tourists do not come to Egypt to sit in hotel rooms and watch television and that no tourist would make a decision on whether to visit Egypt based on the availability of CNN.[17]

A third argument for having CNN was that the financial incentive to the CNE majority stockholder, the ERTU. Subscription royalties would be a much-needed antidote for the ERTU's emerging financial problems. ERTU was operating on a fixed allotment from the government, but faced rising programming costs. If Egyptian television journalism was to be competitive with western news sources, it would have to have a comparable

budget and there was little other place to find new revenue
sources than the CNN project.

While momentum from these arguments propelled the CNE
proposal through the bureaucracy, many in the government thought
the last thing Egypt needed was a neo-colonial intrusion to stir
up its people and threatening the status quo. Others in Egyptian
broadcasting were not enthusiastic about their work being
compared with a global news network. Some thought too much
effort and money were being wasted on a service that would serve
only the needs of foreigners and an Egyptian elite.

Turner Influence

The CNE project got a significant boost when CNN founder Ted
Turner visited Cairo in July 1990. By this time, Turner was a
celebrity figure who could command attention at the highest
levels. At a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, Turner
assuaged critics of CNN with conciliatory overtures conceding
that "third world countries feel alienated because most of the
influential news agencies are controlled by the West."[18] Turner
assured his hosts that his network would never try to force a
point of view on Egyptian audiences, "A news organization is good
if it is credible and reputable, but if we were to depart from
our current format of fairness and honesty we would be thrown out
of the market."[19]

Turner eloquently spoke about the importance of all the
world receiving news and information instantaneously and how

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badly he wanted to bring to Egypt what the rest of the world already had. Asked why if access to CCN was so important he had delayed it reaching Egypt by more than a decade, Turner deftly replied that he had concentrated on the United States and the Soviet Union for the first few years because of the nuclear arms race: "I was afraid they would blow up the world before I got to the Middle East."[20]

One tangible accomplishment Ted Turner could show to the third world as proof of his commitment was "CNN World Report," the program based on an international news exchange where CNN broadcasts a country's reports unedited. Egypt had been a steadfast contributor to this innovative programming and took great pride in having its reports shown around the world.

Over time, the quality of reporting on "CNN World Report" had improved to the point where the best reports were broadcast in a daily, mini-version of the program. Often, the Turner organization used the goodwill it engendered through "World Report" to scoop the international competition that did not have comparable grass roots connections and loyalties. During the early days of "CNN World Report," nearly all of the Egyptian contributions came from graduate students at the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo.

Government Support

Regardless of how positive an impression Ted Turner made, CNN was likely to go nowhere in a highly centralized country like

Egypt without the support of the President. Fortunately for CNE advocates, they had both the ear and sympathy of President Hosni Marbarak. The President had reportedly been viewing CNN International for some time from a private dish and frequently alluded to CNN news reports. According to Abdullah Schliefer, Mobarak provided "quiet behind-the-scenes support for the proposal from the beginning."[21]

In June 1990, when the Higher Investment Authority gave provisional approval for CNE's operations, President Marbarak took a rare turn as presiding officer over the meeting. CNN's chief international strategist, Robert Ross, believed there were several high level government officials familiar with CNN:

> I believe that CNN was viewed by government officials
> for some time before we started negotiations. It's
> viewed everywhere because government officials need
> access to world news quickly. A by-product of using
> CNN as a news source was that they had an opportunity
> to observe first-hand the nature of its coverage and to
> make an independent decision as to whether it was
> compatible with their national interests or not.[22]

Egyptian news reports said officials watched CNNI for more than a year before making a decision. They reportedly had opposed CNN earlier for fear that the network would carry programs offensive to Egyptian culture and that there would be news that might conflict with the prevailing political system.[23] Abdullah Schleifer claimed that the receptiveness to CNN was part of an ongoing move towards openness that began in 1974 when Egypt lifted censorship for foreign correspondents and continued when Egypt was the first country to allow an opposition press.[24]

In the end, CNN was probably the least offensive signal the

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Egyptians could import. Certainly, MTV and other entertainment programming laced with American-made sex and violence posed a greater threat than a global news channel already seen in more than one hundred countries. In fact, a conference on The Arab Media and Direct Broadcasting held in Cairo in 1990 had awarded CNN the distinction of being the "least offensive" of potential offerings.[25]

CNN had made a special effort to provide a broadcast light on sexual and violent material and was more sensitive than most news organizations to cultural considerations. While the majority of CNNI material was originally prepared for an American audience, efforts were being made to include greater amounts of material targeted for the international audience. Having raised his own sensitivity to the rest of the world, Ted Turner even threatened to fine employees who used the word "foreign" rather than the preferred "international."[26]

ERTU Control

If the Egyptian government allowed an alien signal into the country, they wanted to insure some control and share in the profits. Egyptian investment laws stipulated that any foreign enterprise should be a joint venture with an Egyptian company. With ERTU being the majority stockholder in CNE, the government felt reasonably sure of its ability to retain control over its operations.

Some in Egypt equated the presence of ERTU with censorship.

They envisioned ERTU pulling the plug on any controversial report from the Middle East or any content not conforming to the cultural tastes of the nation. Schleifer contended that it would be impossible to censor CNN because of the nature of its live programming. ERTU Chairman Fathi el-Bayoumi claimed that the licensing agreement explicitly prohibited censorship and even if ERTU intervened everyone would know instantly what was happening.[27]

Still, El-Bayoumi acknowledged that there would be times that CNN reports would clash sharply with the Egyptian government party line. He said, "If they (CNN) say something which is not right, we can comment in our Egyptian news."[28] Hamdi Kandil, former director of UNESCO's division of free-flow of information and communication policies, said it would be stupid for Egyptian TV to respond to a story on CNN because they would reach an entirely different audience, "CNN will talk to 10,000 viewers and the ERTU's reply will reach 10 million viewers--who will then all know what CNN said."[29]

CNE Structure and Operations

In October, 1990, the Egyptian government formally approved the establishment of Cable News Egypt as a corporation for a period of 25 years. The estimated capital for CNE was L.E. 1,608 million (the equivalent of $500 million plus in U.S. dollars) to be paid in both local and hard currency.[30] Table

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One shows the distribution of shares among the three partners. Table Two shows the distribution of capital.

Tables One and Two

In July, 1991, the Board of Directors increased the company's capital to L.E. 25 million ($7 million) for two reasons: (1) the addition of new services such as a sports channel; and (2) increases in land, building, equipment prices, currency exchange rates, and the creation of a sales tax.[31] In increasing this capital allocation, the ERTU had to be careful that its input did not affect the state budget or the regular operation of Egyptian broadcasting.

Under the structure of CNE, the ERTU Chairman also became Chairman of CNE. There were seven members of the board of directors: four representing ERTU; two from ECIP; and one from TIC. Each member of the board was required to own L.E. 5,000 ($1,557) worth of CNE stock or its hard currency equivalent.[32]

CNE was divided into three main departments: (1) marketing, responsible for advertising for decoders, selling them, and writing contracts between the company and the subscribers; (2) engineering, responsible for connecting the decoders to subscribers' television sets and also for equipment related to receiving or transmitting the signal; and (3) finance, responsible for handling the budget and projecting revenues and expenditures.[33]

Technical Operations

CNE operates over a UHF channel controlled by the ERTU and has a satellite receiving station in the Giza area and a TV transmitter at Mokattam. CNE's signal currently comes from the Russian C-band satellite "Gorizont." By mid-1992, the CNN signal was scheduled to be delivered by the Ku band Arabsat satellite from which individual consumers could receive the signal direct.

Under the CNE operations plan, decoders cost $200 plus L.E. 260 Egyptian pounds ($81). CNE arranged to import 2082 standard decoders and thirty professional ones.[34] CNE also used the Video Link System to scramble its signal.[35] The initial capacity of the system was 100,000 subscribers. Subscription fees were set as follows:

$112 annually for Egyptians at their individual homes.
$120 annually for foreigners at their individual homes.
$250 annually for embassies, banks, international organizations, language schools and foreign institutes.
$3500 annually for newspapers.
$.08 cents per room for five star hotels
$.07 cents per room for four star hotels[36]

While the Egyptian individual subscription fee was heavily subsidized, all except the most wealthy Egyptians were priced out of the market, in effect, limiting the service primarily to expatriates, foreign businessmen, news organizations, and tourists in luxury hotels.[37] The hotel rate included a standard discount to allow for less than full occupancy.[38]

CNE Debut

After nearly three years of political wrangling,
bureaucratic obstruction, and high profile debate, CNE went on
the air on January 10, 1991, just six days before the start of
the Gulf War with a free trial service for four hours each day
for all Egyptian television viewers to see. On January 16th and
17th, CNE broadcast 24 hours a day before falling back to eight
hours daily after the 17th. The inauguration of CNE, delayed by
several months, proved highly auspicious when it coincided with
the beginning of the Gulf War. For two and one-half months, from
January 10th through March 31st, the unencrypted signal was on
display for all to see, providing an eager public with round-the-
clock coverage of events that vitally affected the life of every
Egyptian.

No one could have conceived of a better promotion for CNE.
Egypt had connected itself to the broadcast journalism mainstream
at precisely the time that this linkage assumed extraordinary
importance. While there was frustration with the decidedly
American tilt to CNE's coverage of the Gulf War, the immediate
access to multiple information sources simultaneously largely
made-up for the network's ethnocentric shortcomings.

Despite the auspicious beginning, CNE founder Abdullah
Schleifer worried about the possibility of letdown of interest in
CNN after the war, "Once the Gulf crisis has been resolved, how
many Egyptians will be interested in what's happening on an
ordinary day in the Middle East, China or Ecuador? Not too
many."[39] Schleifer was hoping for a residual appetite for CNE

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among Egyptians that would push them to subscribe when the encrypted service began later in the year.

Schleifer believed that the long delay by the ERTU in getting CNE on the air greatly hurt its financial viability. He said that the free test should have come long before the Gulf War with the encrypted service beginning in mid-1990.[40] Had this occurred, CNE would have been enticing paid subscribers at just the height of interest in having a global news service in Egypt.

Economic Forecasts

Initially, the business prospects for CNE were highly optimistic; the consensus was that it would be financially successful. While the debate flourished among Egyptians about the effect of the service on their country, it was the affluent foreigner who would make or break this venture.

ERTU chairman Fathi el-Bayoumi forecast in September 1990 that CNE would have between 60,000-100,000 subscribers (including 10,000-15,000 expatriates) and an additional 10,000 hotel rooms. Abdullah Schleifer's forecast was equally optimistic. Hamdi Kandil predicted that individual subscriptions would peak at around 20,000 and then decline:

> The novelty element is more important than any other element in a foreign channel. After the novelty loses its impact, in the final analysis, people go back to their own national channels, which deal with local issues--problems close to their own heart--in their own language. CNN won't even have the influence of video recorders, which I think have a penetration of almost 40 percent of television receivers in greater Cairo.[41]

CNNI's Robert Ross acknowledged that the viewers will "be

measured in the tens of thousands" and that there would be a surge to buy the service followed by a drop-off followed by a promotional campaign to attract a second tier of viewers, perhaps non-American ex-patriots.[42] Language and economics would be two powerful constraints limiting the success of the service even if interest ran high. The hotel market would be more stable than the subscriber market. Most major western hotel chains had already bought into the CNN package worldwide. CNN research showed that increasingly the business traveller preferred hotels where the cable news service was available.

CNE investors assumed the financial risk of the enterprise, but the majority partner ERTU had the most to gain financially from CNE. ERTU officials were anxiously awaiting an attractive financial return to relieve the Egyptian TV deficit which was becoming more onerous by the year. Although there would be grumbling about CNE from the rank and file at the ERTU who saw CNN as an intrusion into their monopolistic world, the leadership clearly saw the economic windfall outweighing any negatives the new channel might bring.[43]

CNE was very successful in bringing in 17 of the 18 five star hotels as subscribers and a large percentage of three and four star hotels. CNE's encrypted service for home subscribers, however, which began in the greater Cairo area on August 1, 1991, has never had more than 3,000 subscribers. Subscribers were limited mainly to embassies, expatriates, and a very small percentage of Egyptian elites. Schleifer said:

We lost our novelty. After the Gulf War, there was no
more excitement, no crisis. Unless the news is very
hot, no one cares. I overestimated the number of
subscribers.[44]

In addition to environment setbacks connected with the

launch of CNE, Abdullah Schleifer saw several technical and

service factors that hurt the financial success of CNE: (1) the

long delay in delivery of decoders; (2) the high cost of

decoders; (3) the use of a fading Russian satellite to deliver

the signal; (4) poor transmission quality of the signal; and (5)

poor maintenance by the company doing installation and repair.

Schleifer said that the switch by CNN to a better satellite and

CNE's efforts to improve the transmission of the signal would

result in greatly improved service.[45]

For a variety of reasons, CNE did not prove to be the

financial bonanza backers anticipated. Within weeks of CNE's

launch, CNE organizers were discussing the need to bring in

additional channels to the subscription service to make it more

attractive. Backers believed that the presence of a sports

channel and an entertainment service acceptable to Egyptian

standards would provide enough incremental value to entice

reluctant potential customers to subscribe. CNN could no longer

be considered a powerful draw by itself; it would have to be

bundled with other services to make it attractive to a broader

Egyptian community. The sport channel looked particularly

attractive because its success did not depend on a relatively

high level of fluency in English.

CNE Impact on Egyptian Television News

A not-so-hidden agenda for bringing CNN to Egypt was to
provide a competitive impetus to improve the quality of news on
Egypt's state-run television. As with many broadcasting systems
with no competition, Egyptian TV's news operation was lacking.
Formats were outdated, coverage had become limited, stories
followed rigid, pedestrian formulas, and visual appeal was weak.
The Dean of the Faculty of Communication at Cairo University
Gehan Rachty forecast that the "availability of CNN in Egypt will
lead to a significant development in Egyptian journalism" and
prompt journalists into more investigative journalism.[46]
Abdullah Schleifer believed that improvement of Egyptian news was
an incentive for bringing CNN to Egypt:

> It's quite clear in my mind that the minister was
> encouraged to support CNN because he realized that it
> would be an incentive for improving the technical and
> editorial level of local television services. That's
> not a unique insight, but the government should be
> given credit for having had that insight from the very
> beginning.[47]

The dissatisfaction with the quality of news on Egyptian
television was not limited to academics and media critics. There
were even rumblings of discontent within the Egyptian
broadcasting service. The Head of News Readers at ETV, Mahoud
Sultan, said, "We are still using slow rhythm, long
introductions, un-needed shots, and we never go straight to the
point. The order of the news items is the same since 1960 and
some items take from 5-10 minutes and even more."[48]

The public test broadcast of CNE from January 10th through
March 31st in greater Cairo set off considerable debate
concerning the quality of Egyptian TV news and prompted several
changes in appearance and substance. When viewers saw
differences in production values and journalistic performance
between ETV and CNN, Egyptian television personnel felt
considerable pressure to change.

Format

Perhaps the most noticeable change was in format. Ismail
El-Nakib, a journalist with Al-Akhbar, said that the ranking of
the news became better and the length of individual stories was
shortened.[49] Egyptian TV news also took on a newer, slicker
look. ETV purchased four pieces of new equipment to enhance its
capability to use special effects and provide better tele-
prompters, bringing ETV into a new technological age. Soon, ETV
was using many of the same production techniques seen on CNN. The
technological initiatives, however, were not completely
successful. Samir El-Touny, Head of News Programs for ETV, said:

> Since we began receiving CNN, we tried to attract our
> audience using similar techniques. We changed the news
> background using chroma and the monitors in the control
> room appeared, but this kind of imitation failed
> because we only have a few monitors in the newsroom and
> the improvement looked awful.[50]

ETV also altered the scheduling of news, providing short
newsbreaks between regular news bulletins. This innovation was
especially important during the Gulf War because viewers did not
want to wait hours between news bulletins when information

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important to them and their families was being made in the interim. Had ETV not begun the newsbreak programs, it would have issued an open invitation for viewers to defect to CNN.

There was also a greater willingness at ETV to interrupt programs for breaking news stories. CNN's example showed that some stories were important enough to eclipse all others on the news and that it was sometimes necessary to stay with a story far longer than the time allotted for a regularly scheduled news bulletin.

The Gulf War gave ETV a perfect opportunity to experiment with extended, ongoing coverage. This was an event for which there was a huge public appetite. Thousands of Egyptian troops were stationed in the Gulf and the Egyptian President was a key player in the allied power structure. With CNN going out to all Egyptian viewers free, ETV felt a strong compulsion to offer a product to compete with their new rivals. A Visual News Center was created that allowed Egyptian television to receive and transmit reports from the field, greatly increasing their ability to follow breaking news.

Journalistic Behavior

CNE also affected the way Egyptian journalists approached their work. Egyptian television news had been one dimensional and repetitive. A minister would dedicate a facility and an ETV camera crew would cover it. On the news that evening would be a long voice-over report with a small sound bite of the minister

speaking. This formula rarely varied. The locations changed, but the story line was basically the same.

ETV was generally seen in a reactive posture, usually commenting on second-hand news. As ETV's Mahmoud Sultan said:

> CNN makes news while here we only comment on the event. Our correspondents do not cover the event. They either analyze, comment or desciibe public reaction. We rebroadcast what we receive from CNN and similar channels; this differs drastically from what happens on CNN.[51]

With exposure to CNN, journalists developed a more varied repertoire. CNN offered more complex story formats with the integration of sound on film, interviews, voice-overs, and stand-ups in a compelling, interesting way that fit the nature of the story. Four or five persons might be interviewed, each offering a specific viewpoint. Voice-over video was held to a minimum. Whenever possible, CNN used live sound and action footage. The soundbites on CNN were not merely wallpaper, but provided substantive content to the story. The narration was but a linkage to the pictures and interviews that flowed together seamlessly.

Professor Heba El-Semary of Cairo University believed that CNN helped the Egyptian journalists to "learn how news is made" by relying more on anchors to provide substantive introductions to reports and to rely more heavily on field reports.[52] Like CNN, ETV started to veer away from the sterile voice-over approach to inject more of the reporter's viewpoint into the story and take the initiative to cover original news. Interviews became a more central part of the story. Video became better

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integrated with the story line. Reporters attached themselves to the story line.

Objectivity Emphasis

Inherent in preparing reports with more diverse components was a greater emphasis on balanced reporting and objectivity. To a limited extent, stories emerged from Egyptian television that provided two sides to a controversial issue or occasionally broadened the context of the one-dimensional government line. Still, Egyptian journalists were conscious of the fact that they were working for a government-run television station where sensitivities often ran high. As former UNESCO official Hamdi Kandil said, "They can't have views opposite to the those of the minister; they are employees."

ETV's Mahmoud Sultan, however, believed that the problem was not as much with the government as with the journalist's perception of the government:

> They can't believe the climate of freedom we are living in now. They are afraid to express their own views although nothing will happen if they did. On the contrary, everybody will congratulate them on the courage to achieve such improvements.[53]

It was clear that greater press freedom would be more difficult to attain than technological sophistication. Egyptian journalists had labored for years under significant constraints. Yet, the government of President Mobarak was on a steady trend of greater democratization and openness which would eventually be reflected in greater freedom and objectivity.

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Reaction to Change

While ETV news underwent a metamorphosis after the appearance of CNE, it was not an easy transition. There was considerable disagreement within ETV over the merits of change. Younger, more ambitious journalists strongly advocated formats and journalistic standards that would compare with international newsgathering standards. Older, more entrenched ETV staffers saw no reason to stampede towards change just because a foreign broadcaster had moved next door. Some even saw the presence of CNE as a negative influence on a journalistic system that had evolved naturally from Egyptian culture for Egyptians.

Almost everyone realized that the best antidote to CNN mania was stronger local news. Although CNN dazzled viewers with its coverage during the early days of the Gulf War, the one thing CNE could not deliver to its audiences was local coverage; only ETV could provide this service and it was a powerful advantage.

The question remained whether ETV was up to the challenge. Eventually, the debate revolved around resources and expertise. ETV Chief Editor Wafai Shalaqamy blamed the lack of equipment and expertise for the failure of ETV news, but others like Al-Ahram journalist Abdou Mobasher said that ETV is to blame for the staff's lack of expertise, "They should train talented students and graduates and give them the chance to work and see the results."[54]

Despite the finger pointing, it was obvious that ETV news could and should improve. It not only needed to improve the

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quality of its reporting, but include more news from the rest of Egypt and from the Islamic world. When the Gulf War ended, the immediate pressure on ETV subsided, but reformers in Egyptian television emerged in a much stronger position to change the internal structures that affected news coverage. There was clearly much less patience with the status quo than before the arrival of CNE.

Cultural Imperialism

In the industrialized world, the introduction of a television channel would be back-page news, but in a developing country like Egypt, the arrival of CNE stimulated considerable interest. Before the CNE service began, a lively debate over the benefits of CNN took place involving academics, government officials, and media critics.

The most prominent concern was that of cultural invasion. Egyptians had never been subjected to alien television signals and many feared the worst. There was not as much objection to CNN as there was to opening the door to foreign influences that might pollute the culture, especially western entertainment channels. Cairo University Communication Dean Gehan Rachty, reflected the sentiments of many Egyptians who feared the bombardment of foreign programs:

> This foreign culture trespasses the sanctity of national cultures, norms and values, not only in its large dose of sex and violence but also by weakening the bond between family generations, encouraging

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teenage promiscuity and fostering a libertine attitude
towards sex. The threat is posed directly at our
teenagers who can easily be brainwashed into adopting
western attitudes, even in their dress, eating habits
and dealing with people.[55]

Journalist Ismail El-Nakib said that the greatest impact
would be on the lower classes if they were exposed to foreign
content.[56] Yet, Nagwa El-Fawal believed that if there is any
effect it will be on the elites who are the prime consumers of
foreign programs.[57]

Abdou Mobasher believed that the fears of sex and violence
were exaggerated, but said that foreign programs could be very
effective over time in subtlety altering attitudes.[58] Abdullah
Schleifer dismissed most cultural invasion charges, but
acknowledged that the public's fear could stir up considerable
religious fundamentalist sentiment, "The immoralities in these
programs would be a good target for fierce criticism by
fundamentalists and that may erupt into a massive social
unrest."[59]

Others among the intelligentsia said that Egyptians had
nothing to worry about the arrival of CNN or any other foreign
programming source. ERTU Trustee Saad Labib was indignant about
the idea that Arab culture was fragile, easily uprooted by the
mighty western culture. He said that instead of opposing direct
broadcasting, the electronic signals should be an incentive for
local television producers to upgrade their own programs. Labib
said, "What is the harm in watching a good television production
of drama, documentary films, news, operas, and music shows?

Shouldn't this also improve the taste of the viewer?"[60]

Former UNESCO official Hamdi Kandil said, "The real danger is from 'internal cultural invasion.' Look at the films produced which offer awful models of the Egyptians. These films are bound to affect our culture more than any foreign programs." While discounting the cultural invasion charges, Kandil said that a steady diet of western news, even from a relatively unbiased source such as CNN, would provide a distorted view of reality with no countervailing source of news from another perspective. Above all, Kandil saw CNE as an exclusive service for powerful elites in society and questioned the importance of the issue in light of pressing economic problems that would affect all Egyptians.[61]

Despite all of the public apprehension concerning the arrival of CNN, that sentiment subsided when the CNE signal was encrypted and limited to subscribers. CNE's biggest problem today is lack of interest. Journalist Ismail El-Nakib said he would have paid any price to receive CNN during the Gulf War, but "now there is nothing on it. I virtually do not feel its existence."[62] The fear of cultural invasion remains, but CNN is no longer the object of that immediate fear which will be saved for other invading foreign channels.

Conclusion

The transformation from a one-channel government television

system to a multi-channel environment with foreign news programming that occurred in Egypt in 1991 is one that will likely be repeated in dozens of developing countries during the rest of this decade. For Egypt, which was not prepared to allow unlimited signals through direct satellite broadcasting, the UHF subscription broadcast was the least risky alternative. The CNE prototype also conformed to Egypt's highly centralized tradition in mass communication. The system allowed the government maximum control with little financial risk. CNE investors, meanwhile, received exclusive entree into a market ripe for alternative media.

Despite clear dissatisfaction with the quality of Egyptian television and the impetus gained from the Gulf War, CNE was not a financial success early on. Investors and government officials badly misjudged the demand for the CNN product. Financial and language constraints were more formidable than expected. Fortunately for CNE, Cairo offered a strong expatriate base to serve as a core until the indigenous population could be cultivated.

What started as a means to deliver CNN to the Egyptian public will now be transformed into a multi-channel subscription service offering sports and entertainment as well as CNN. One could argue that investors would have never convinced the Egyptian government to start a news, sports, and entertainment service, but CNE's initial setback forced the ERTU into a broader service to recover its investment. Having ERTU as a principal

stockholder gives CNE a major advantage until direct satellite broadcasting grows in Egypt.

While CNE may not have debuted as a huge financial success, it made a spectacular editorial entry. Having CNN live during the Gulf War was a windfall for the Egyptian people. They received Western-style television and a griping human drama all in one package. That the service reached every television household in a major world city was a significant step forward for global journalism which had largely been confined to the worlds' elite.

The contrast between CNN's Gulf War coverage and ETV's news product was lost on neither the Egyptian people nor the broadcast journalists who produced the local news. Almost immediately, Egyptian television responded to the competition by altering their programming, technological tools, and journalistic routines. While Egyptian television news is still heavily constrained and underfunded, the quality of the news product appears to have been well-served by the arrival of CNE.

Egypt has now been exposed to two versions of CNE—one that dominated the public environment for several tense weeks during an international conflict and another which remains the province of the expatriate community and wealthy Egyptians. It will be interesting to see whether there is pressure on the ERTU to bring back CNE in unscrambled form. It could be in CNE's best financial interest to whet the consumer's appetite by offering a limited free service for a few hours each day. If CNE becomes

financially viable through the addition of other subscription services, CNN could become an attractive loss leader for the masses.

In the end, each developing country must cope with the question of foreign television programming, facing the cultural invasion question and the economic implications head-on. Most countries' exposure to foreign channels will likely come via direct broadcast satellite, but the Egyptian example of a government/private sector partnership using the broadcast spectrum could be an attractive alternative in some countries.

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West German and U.S. Journalists:
Similarities and Differences in the 1990s

by

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West German and U.S. Journalists:
Similarities and Differences in the 1990s

More than ten years have passed since representative data on
West German journalists' backgrounds, methods of work, job
situations, attitudes and motives have been collected (Donsbach,
1982, 1983; Koecher, 1986). If one takes into consideration the
tremendous expansion and the structural changes of the German media
system in recent years, the lack of representative studies on the
employees in this media system is particularly noticeable.

Likewise, it has been ten years since a representative national
survey of U.S. journalists has been completed (Weaver and Wilhoit,
1986). That study, conducted in late 1982 and early 1983, not only
described the backgrounds, education, job conditions and
professional attitudes of U.S. journalists, but also compared some
of their opinions on reporting practices with those of British and
German journalists surveyed in 1980-81 by the Institut fuer
Demoskopie Allensbach, the Institut fuer Publizistik at the
University of Mainz, and the Centre for Mass Communication Research
at the University of Leicester in Britain.

During the summer of 1992, however, major national telephone
surveys of U.S. and West German journalists were completed by the
authors, with funding from the Federal Press and Information Agency
in Bonn and The Freedom Forum in Arlington, Virginia. Many of the
questions asked were similar, because of prior discussion of the
questionnaires in May 1992. This paper reports the first
comparative findings from these two surveys on the demographics,
employment patterns, educational backgrounds, and opinions on
reporting methods of West German and U.S. journalists.

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Related Studies

Although systematic comparative research on journalists dates back to at least the 1960s, when McLeod and Rush (1969) compared Latin American and U.S. journalists, there have been many more studies of journalists within individual countries than comparative studies across countries. This is not surprising, given differences in culture, language, and the relationship of journalism to other institutions of the society--not to mention the logistical difficulties of conducting such studies--but this pattern has limited the comparisons that can be made in most studies of journalists to those within a given culture or country -- such as differences in ownership, size, type and structure of media organizations, and age, gender and race of individual journalists.

Donsbach (1990: 6) argues that only through comparison of the results of a single-country study of journalists with those in other comparable countries "can we obtain some external criteria which enable us to see either the national peculiarities or the cross-cultural similarities of the journalistic profession."

Another value in studying journalists and journalism across national boundaries is that much can be learned about national differences. Koecher (1986: 43) cites Hale (1964) in arguing that "there is no other social institution where national distinctions show up as clearly as in the organization and practice of the media."

In their 1960s study, McLeod and Rush (1969) found Latin American journalists receptive to much stronger professional enforcement of journalistic standards than U.S. journalists were willing to accept. They concluded overall, however, that there were more similarities than dissimilarities between the two groups.

Donsbach (1981) compared German and Canadian journalists with the findings of McLeod and Rush. He found that Latin American journalists regarded political power as less important than did journalists from the other countries, especially those from Germany. The Latin Americans also seemed less concerned with their individual careers and prestige than did the journalists from the other Western societies studied.

In his analysis of the results of a 1980-81 cross-national study of West German and British journalists, Donsbach (1983) argued that German journalists emphasized their political power, whereas British journalists concentrated on the information function as their most important perceived role. Based on his earlier analysis of data from American and Canadian journalists, Donsbach concluded that journalists from Germany were different from those in other democratic societies in this emphasis on political influence as opposed to simply providing information to the public.

Weaver and Wilhoit (1986), in their 1982-83 national survey of 1,001 U.S. journalists, included some of the same questions on reporting practices that were included in the 1980-81 study of British and West German journalists. They found that the percent of journalists willing to say that certain questionable practices (using confidential documents, paying for information, using false identification, etc.) might be justified varied substantially among the three countries, with British journalists being the most willing to see such practices as sometimes acceptable and German journalists least likely (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986: 137-143). The U.S. journalists were closer to the German journalists than to the British on three of the seven practices and between the more reluctant Germans and the more willing British on three other

practices. Based on these findings, Weaver and Wilhoit concluded that American journalists seemed to be more in agreement with German journalists than with those in Britain on the acceptability of questionable reporting practices.

But Koecher (1986: 62), who also compared the British and German journalists' opinions on these reporting practices using the same data from the 1980-81 study, concluded that the results "show the immense ambition of British journalists to get information -- almost at any price", whereas the majority of German journalists "reject each of these methods and do not approve of them under any circumstance." Her conclusion was that British and American journalists "agree to a great extent" on reporting methods, whereas German journalists' opinion "is completely different."

In a more recent paper examining the role perceptions and professional norms of journalists from a comparative perspective, Donsbach (1990) reanalyzed the data of the studies of German, British and U.S. journalists mentioned above (as well as a 1988 survey of 1,200 U.S. daily newspaper journalists conducted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors). He concluded that German journalists see the role of journalism as more active, critical and participatory than do their British and U.S. counterparts, who show much more willingness to carry out investigative reporting even if they have to employ questionable reporting practices to do so.

Donsbach argues that in Germany journalists try to maintain a more active and critical role through subjective reporting, whereas in the U.S. journalists try to do so through tough practices of news gathering at the fringes of ethical standards, and in Britain journalists employ both options.

Donsbach (1990) explains these differences in terms of six historical developments: (1) The domination of Germany's press by partisan newspapers linked to political parties or churches until the 1930s; (2) The lack of a strong culture of "objective journalism" in Germany; (3) The development of the press as a business in the U.S. and in Britain with the aim of reaching large audiences under more liberal political systems than existed in Germany; (4) The assignment of a "re-education" role to the German press after World War II by the Western military governments, making it legitimate to influence public opinion; (5) The licensing of journalists in the German press after WWII that limited journalists to those with mainly leftist, activist views; and (6) The tendency for many student leaders of the student movement of the 1960s to go into journalism to change the system from within.

Without trying to resolve whether the American journalists were more similar to the Germans or the British in the early 1980s in their views on reporting methods, we can still ask whether the differences in the opinions of West German and U.S. journalists found then have persisted during the past decade, in spite of the conservative trends in their governments, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have asked the questions on reporting methods in the same way that they were asked in these earlier studies, but we don't have data on British journalists in the early 1990s to compare with our findings from U.S. and German journalists (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1992; Schneider, Schoenbach and Stuerzebecher, 1993).

Methods

<u>West German Study.</u> In Germany, a representative sample of 983 permanently employed journalists were interviewed by telephone between July 29 and September 29, 1992. The study was funded by the Federal Press and Information Agency in Bonn. The standardized questionnaire of this study was designed to be comparable with the last representative survey of West German journalists in 1980-81 (Donsbach, 1982, 1983; Koecher, 1986) and with the 1982-83 study of journalists in the United States (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986). With close cooperation of the authors, it was possible to make important sections of the German and the American questionnaires similar.

The social situation of journalists was a central issue in the German interviews, including their job security, their financial situation, the attractiveness of professional alternatives, and unemployment and its causes. Additionally, demographic data were collected, such as sex, age, marital status, education, size of the household, income and membership in professional associations.

In addition to this, information the about specific tasks of the respondents and their working situations was collected. West German journalists were asked about their training as journalists, about changes in their jobs, their present professional position, task priorities, their career plans, job satisfaction and about their information behavior. Also, different types of journalism training were evaluated.

Another focal point of the German study was the professional self-image of journalists: What are the important functions and tasks of journalistic work? Which advantages and/or disadvantages do they see in their profession? What do they think about their audience? How important is ethical behavior?

The sample of the German survey presented here was based on permanently employed journalists in newspapers, magazines, broadcast companies, and news agencies located in West Germany including West Berlin. Results of a simultaneous East German survey with another 600 respondents are not reported here for comparative reasons (Schoenbach, 1992).

Print magazines were included in the West German sample if they were not geared toward a specific expert audience, if they appeared at least once a month and if their copies were sold. The number of employees in each enterprise was gauged by direct contacts with the employers or by using professional handbooks. In a stratified sampling procedure, a sample of media enterprises was drawn according to their size. The number of persons to be interviewed in those organizations was determined in a second step. In the case of local newspapers, we made sure that about a third of the respondents worked for the local news sections of those papers. In a last step, several precautions were taken to ensure a random sample of the number of people to be interviewed by phone in each organization.

U.S. Study. Because the U.S. study was intended to be a follow-up to the 1971 and the 1982-83 national telephone surveys of U.S. journalists, we followed closely the definitions of a journalist and the sampling methods used by these earlier studies to be able to compare our 1992 results directly with those of 1971 and 1982 (Johnstone, Slawski, and Bowman, 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986). We also used many of the same questions asked in these previous studies, including some asked in the 1980-81 study of British and West German journalists, but we added some new questions to reflect the changes in journalism and the larger society in the past decade.

Unlike the previous two studies, however, we deliberately oversampled journalists from the four main minority groups—Asian Americans, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans and Native Americans—to ensure adequate numbers for comparison with each other and with White journalists. We kept these oversamples of minority journalists separate from the main probability sample when making comparisons with the earlier studies and with the West German study reported here.

The findings that we report here come from 45-minute telephone interviews with 1,156 U.S. journalists working for a wide variety of daily and weekly newspapers, radio and television stations, and news services and magazines throughout the United States. These interviews were conducted by telephone from June 12 to September 12, 1992, by trained interviewers at the Center for Survey Research at Indiana University's Bloomington campus.

Journalists in the main probability sample of 1,156 were chosen randomly from news organizations that were also selected at random from listings in various directories.[1] The response rate for this sample was 81 percent, and the maximum sampling error at the 95% level of confidence is plus or minus 3 percentage points. It is, of course, higher for the individual media groups.

[1]These directories include the 1991 <u>Editor & Publisher International Year Book</u>, <u>The Broadcasting Yearbook 1991</u>, the 1991 <u>Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast Media</u>, and the Summer 1991 <u>News Media Yellow Book of Washington and New York</u>. We used systematic random sampling to compile lists of 181 daily newspapers (stratified by circulation), 128 weekly newspapers, 17 news magazines, 28 wire service bureaus, 121 radio stations, and 99 television stations, for a total of 574 separate news organizations. Unlike the earlier studies, we did include photojournalists and network television journalists.

In drawing these samples, we had to make estimates of how many full-time journalists were working in general interest mainstream news media in the United States. We compared our final main sample percentages with the overall workforce percentages from these estimates, and found that we had slightly undersampled radio and television journalists by deliberately oversampling wire service and news magazine journalists to have enough from the wires (58) and news magazines (61) to analyze. But no group was either under or oversampled by more than 6 percentage points.

Findings

Gender. Three quarters of all journalists in West Germany in 1992 are male, compared with two-thirds in the United States. Particularly few women work at German news agencies (19 percent) and at U.S. wire services (26 percent), whereas noticeably more are employed at news magazines (35 percent in Germany and 46 percent in the U.S.). Even though there are considerably more women journalists in the U.S. (a good third) than in West Germany, the distribution by the different media is mostly the same as in West Germany with one exception: In the U.S. the newsrooms of television obviously remained mostly male-dominated. The share of women there is even a shade lower than in West German television.

Table 1
Proportion of Women in Different Media

News Medium	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Newspapers	23%	34%
Magazines	35%	46%*
		44%**
News Agencies	19%	26%
Radio	22%	29%
Television	26%	25%
All journalists	25%	34%

* News Magazines
** mostly local weekly newspapers

In both countries, the number of female journalists decreases with the duration of employment, although more quickly in West Germany than in the United States. In West Germany, 41 percent of the journalists are female among those employed less than five years, but this proportion drops to only 14 percent among those having worked for 20 years and more in journalism. In the U.S., however, female journalists obviously succeeded much earlier in getting into the profession. The share of women journalists among those who have worked in their job for up to nine years is more than 40 percent, and this figure drops to 24 percent for those employed as journalists from 20 years and beyond.

Table 2
Proportion of Women in Journalism By Work Experience

Length of Employment as a Journalist	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Less than 5 years	41%	45%
5 - 9 years	30%	42%
10 - 14 years	21%	34%
15 - 19 years	16%	30%
20 years and more	14%	24%
All journalists	25%	34%

Job Experience. Table 3 also reveals that women in the U.S. have been employed in journalism longer on the average than have women in West Germany. Women journalists in the U.S. deviate much less from the overall average length of employment (13.9 years) than in West Germany. More than half (56 percent) of all U.S. female journalists have at least 10 years of experience in journalism compared to only about a third of the women journalists in Germany.

Table 3
Duration of Employment as a Journalist

Length of Employment as a Journalist	West Germany (n = 983)			U.S.A. (n = 1156)		
	Total %	Male %	Female %	Total %	Male %	Female %
	n=983	n=735	n=248	n=1156	n=760	n=392
Less than 5 years	22	17	35	14	12	19
5 - 9 years	25	24	30	21	19	26
10 - 14 years	18	19	15	24	24	24
15 - 19 years	9	10	6	18	20	16
20 years and more	26	30	15	23	27	16
Average years of experience in journalism	12.1	13.4	8.2	13.9	14.9	11.9

Age. In 1992, the age profile of West German journalists resembles closely that of their American colleagues, but the average age of U.S. journalists (36 years) is a bit lower than that of West German journalists (38.5 years). If we look at age groups, however, there are striking similarities, especially for those journalists 35 and younger and those 55 and older. Only in the 45-54 age group do we find the discrepancy that leads to the lower average of the American journalists.

Table 4
Age Structure of Journalists in West Germany and in the U.S.A.

Age category	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Under 24 years	4%	4%
25 - 34 years	39%	37%
35 - 44 years	30%	37%
45 - 54 years	20%	14%
55-64 years	8%	7%
65 years and older	*	2%
Average age of All journalists	38.5	36

* indicates less than 0.5%

Education and Training. A university degree seems to have become the standard in most German media. Almost half (45 percent) of all journalists in West Germany have a university degree, considerably more than at the beginning of the 1980s. Almost nil, on the other hand, is the number of editors who have not at least graduated from high school. All this applies for women and men equally.

The share of college graduates among U.S. journalists, however, is still considerably higher. As the two educational systems are only partly comparable, we compared a college degree (82 percent of the American journalists) with having at least attended a university program (with or without degree -- 62 percent of the German journalists).

In both countries, the highest proportion of journalists with college educations work at news agencies. For other media there are great differences. Whereas in Germany the percentage of college educated magazine and newspaper journalists is below average and that of television and radio news people is clearly above average, in the U.S. daily newspaper and news magazine journalists are above average and radio journalists have the least formal education.

Table 5
College Educated Journalists in West Germany and the U.S.

News Medium	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Newspapers	59%	84%
Magazines	54%	95%*
		77%**
News Agencies	91%	95%
Radio	67%	59%
Television	73%	83%
All journalists	62%	82%

* News Magazines
** mostly local weekly newspapers

Not only is the share of journalists with a college education considerably higher in the U.S. than in Germany, but an even more important difference concerns academic journalism training in particular. Whereas 39 percent of the American journalists in 1992 were journalism majors, only 10 percent of all West German journalists had studied mass communication or journalism as a major. Their proportion is particularly high in television. In the U.S., however, the share of journalism majors in television is the lowest, less than half of that in daily newspapers, partly because those who majored in telecommunication or mass communication are not included in the U.S. percentages.

Table 6
Journalists Majoring in Journalism in West Germany and the U.S.

News Medium	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Newspapers	9%	49%
Magazines	5%	22%*
		34%**
News Agencies	3%	38%
Radio	9%	22%
Television	23%	20%
All journalists	10%	39%

* News Magazines
** mostly local weekly newspapers

Income. In 1992, 41 percent of the West German journalists made more than 4,500 DM a month. The average monthly net income for this profession is about 4,600 DM (roughly about $35,000 per year). There are differences, however, between the media. Television paid best -- more than half of all journalists earned more than 4,500 DM a month. Compared to this, only about a third of newspaper journalists were able to make that much.

The data on the income of the U.S. journalists are only partly comparable to these results. For one thing, the American

journalists reported their annual gross income, and this cannot be

precisely converted to the net income amounts in Germany because of

manifold factors such as social security, taxes and purchasing

power. What we can state, however, is that in West Germany, less

extreme differences in salaries between the media occur. American

news magazine journalists by far make the most money but only about

a third of their average annual income is earned by radio and

television journalists. In Germany, however, the broadcast

journalists have the highest income and differences from their

colleagues in the print media are much less dramatic.

Table 7
Journalists' Income by Media in West Germany and the U.S.

News Medium	West Germany (n = 983) (% with monthly net income > 4,500 DM)	U.S.A. (n = 1156) (median annual income in $1,000)
Newspapers	35	35.2
Magazines	42	66.1*
		20.9**
News Agencies	44	43.7
Radio	48	20.4
Television	54	25.6
All journalists	41	31.3

* News Magazines
** mostly local weekly newspapers

In Germany, the income difference between men and women is

particularly striking: 80 percent of the female journalists have a

monthly net income of under 4,500 DM, whereas only half of the men

are paid such a low salary. In the United States, too, women

overall make a somewhat lower salary than men, but the discrepancy

is never as high as in West Germany. Men make more money as job

beginners, but the salaries of women and men become more and more

similar as their job age progresses. This is also generally true in

the U.S. as well, where women in journalism are not only more

numerous, but have also reached a higher level of financial equality with male journalists.

Organizations and Social Contacts. Journalists in West Germany are a well-organized professional group. In 1992, more than half (56 percent) of the respondents were members of a journalists union. In the United States, only 36 percent belong to an organization of journalists, and considerably less to a national journalism organization of any kind.

Journalists have been called a particularly self-sufficient, "in-bred" group of people restricted even in their social contacts to friends and acquaintances involved in journalism or the media. In Germany, the estimated average proportion of people "connected in some way with journalism or the communications field" among people one sees socially is only 28 percent (see, e.g., Donsbach, 1982). In the U.S., this figure is somewhat higher at 36 percent. Women journalists in West Germany (33 percent) and above all in the United States (42 percent) see considerably more journalists socially than their male colleagues.

Opinions About Reporting Practices. As was true in the early 1980s, American journalists in 1992 are generally more willing to say that questionable reporting methods may be justified on occasion than are the West German journalists. German respondents were more likely to say that only two of these practices may be justified than their American colleagues -- "paying people for confidential information" and "claiming to be somebody else."

Table 8
Journalists' Opinions on Questionable Reporting Methods in 1992

May be justified on occasion	West Germany (n = 983)	U.S.A. (n = 1156)
Using confidential business or government documents without authorization	75%	81%
Getting employed to gain inside information	46%	63%
Paying people for confidential information	28%	20%
Claiming to be somebody else	28%	22%
Using hidden microphones or cameras	22%	63%
Making use of personal documents such as letters and photographs without permission	10%	47%
Badgering unwilling informants to get a story	6%	49%
Agreeing to protect confidentiality and not doing so	3%	5%

In the early 1980s, West German journalists were also slightly more likely to say that claiming to be somebody else might be justified (22% vs. 20% of the U.S. journalists), but the West Germans were slightly _less_ likely to approve of paying for confidential information (25% vs. 27% of U.S. journalists). In the decade that has passed since the early 1980s, U.S. journalists have not changed much in their willingness to endorse these ethically questionable reporting methods, except for dramatic increases in the proportions willing to justify the use of confidential business or government documents (from 55% to 81%) and the use of personal documents without permission (from 28% to 47%) (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1992).

The proportion of West German journalists willing to say that these methods may be justified has increased from 1980-81 to 1992 for every method, however, except for badgering unwilling informants

(from 8% to 6%). (We do not have 1980-81 data on using hidden microphones or cameras.) This increase is especially striking for the methods of "using confidential business or government documents without authorization" (from 57% to 75% presently) and for "getting employed to gain inside information" (from 36% to 46%).

These trends suggest that West German journalists are becoming more like U.S. or British journalists in their willingness to use tough (and ethically questionable) investigative reporting methods, but these changes over time may also be interpreted as indicating that both West German and U.S. journalists are becoming less ethical with respect to certain reporting practices.

Conclusions

In 1992, journalists in West Germany were mainly male, young, well-educated, unionized, with a relatively high net income and highly satisfied with their profession. West German journalists in 1992 seem to resemble their American colleagues more than they do their own earlier generation of 1980-81. There is evidence that journalism in West Germany is undergoing the changes that the Americans had gone through by 1982-83: a significant increase of journalists together with a considerable rejuvenation of the profession and -- above all -- an increase in women's participation.

For West Germany, all these changes are surfacing as late as 1992. Should German journalists undergo the same development the Americans have, predictions for Germany would be ambiguous. The increase of women and more highly educated persons in journalism would be positive. On the other hand, however, we fear that "bloodhound journalism" (Koecher, 1986) will spread. Even though West German journalists are more willing in 1992 than a decade ago to justify most controversial methods of getting information, the

U.S. journalists are still much more willing than West Germans to
say that some reporting methods may be justified on occasion,
especially those that violate the privacy of individuals, such as
making use of personal documents without permission, badgering
unwilling informants to get a story, and using hidden microphones or
cameras.

Some of these methods are less likely to be seen as acceptable
by the general public in the U.S. as by journalists (Weaver and
Daniels, 1992), and the same is true in Germany as well. Use of
such methods may produce attention-getting investigative reporting,
but it probably will not help the credibility or reputation of
journalists and journalism in either country. Whether it will
produce less ideological reporting of information that citizens need
to know to make informed decisions about public affairs is also open
to question.

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
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The Price Was Right--Or Was It?

The 1991 British Commercial Broadcasting Franchise Auction and the New ITV

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The Price Was Right--Or Was it?
The 1991 British Commercial Broadcasting Franchise Auction and the New ITV

Since the beginning of commercial broadcasting in the 1920s, governments have taken an active role in regulating the public airwaves spectrum. An important part of the governmental role has been the allocation of licenses to broadcasters. The use of a scare resource in a regulated environment that limited competition became a valued acquisition that allowed significant opportunity for generation of revenue. From the beginning, the United States adopted a policy that assigned licenses without charge for a specified period of time. Outside the United States, franchise fees became a means to raise revenue in the process of allocating frequencies. In the United Kingdom, for example, commercial broadcasters have paid franchise fees since the system began in the mid-1950s.

The U.K's experience with franchise allocation was largely uneventful until the early 1990s when a franchise auction became politicized and highly controversial. On January 1, 1993, independent television in Britain underwent significant upheaval when the results of the 1991 franchise auction were implemented. On that date, four previous franchisees lost their licenses and three others entered the marketplace under bids that were deemed economically questionable. The 1993 implementation capped more than three years of turmoil and uncertainty that threatened to destablize the independent sector of the British broadcasting economy. The entire process, a product of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's drive towards a freer market, became one of the most controversial in British broadcasting history. This paper reviews the

history of the franchise process for independent television in the United Kingdom, examines the 1991 auction, and discusses the implications of these changes for the future of independent television in Britain.

History of the ITV Franchise Process

The BBC's television monopoly ended with the Television Act of 1954 which created a structure for commercial television. The Act allowed for one commercial channel that would be programmed by several independent companies each representing various geographic regions of the country. The Independent Television channel would be called ITV and be regulated by the Independent Television Authority (later changed to the Independent Broadcasting Authority).

The initial allocation of ITV franchises took place in 1954 with the awarding of four contracts (Associated-Rediffusion, Associated Television (ATV), ABC Television, and Granada). The franchisees were guaranteed national access for their programming while competing with their rivals for advertising revenue. They were bound to "quality" content requirements by the Independent Television Authority (ITA) which regulated the industry. The early winners suffered a near-disastrous first year. Viewers took a "wait and see" attitude about the new service before converting their television sets to receive the ITV signal. Only 3 percent of British households initially converted which resulted in catastrophic financial loses for the big four (Seymour-Ure, 1991, p. 3). Had it not been for the financial backing of banks, pension funds, and conglomerate organizations representing show business, the press, and consortia representing the interests of the franchise area, ITV may not have survived.

While ITV's future appeared precarious in the early days, the monopoly structure of the regional franchises, the rapid diffussion of television in the United Kingdom, and the explosion of demand for television advertising soon gave commercial television in Britain a strong and expanding base of revenue. Commercial television revenues had grown so fast that by 1964, the Pilkington Commission had condemned the ITV for its large financial surplus. The Government imposed a variable levy of 45 percent of the ITV companies' advertising revenue which was changed to a levy on profits in 1974. It was obvious that the Government would compensate for the operators' monopoly licenses by taxing their profits heavier than any other industry.

The reallocation of the ITV television franchises occurred in 1964, 1967, and 1981. The 1964 franchisees were awarded three year contracts with no challengers to the contracts. In subsequent rounds, the Government preference was to renew contracts. In both 1967 and 1980, franchises were awarded mostly to a "magic circle" of broadcasting insiders. In 1967, TWW lost its license in a competition in which seventeen groups vied for the franchise. In 1980, 42 applicants vied for contracts, but only two franchises changed hands. Disenfranchisement presented monumental financial risks; all parties seemed to favor continuity over change.

A succession of mergers or "forced marriages", such as ABC and Rediffusion into Thames TV, reshaped the ITV network over the years. A statuatory rule forbidding ownership of more than one franchise company caused changes in ownership between franchise rounds. By the 1980s, there were fifteen regional companies making up the ITV, two in London split between weekday and weekend broadcasting and fourteen for the rest of the country. A new independent company was created to produce ITV's entry into

the breakfast television market. A second commercial service, Channel 4, was financed by ITV revenues to serve as a minority channel similar to BBC 2.

Within the ITV structure, there were varying degrees of financial muscle and production capability. Most of the responsibility for making product for the network fell on the biggest and wealthiest franchisees such as Thames, Granada, Central, and London Weekend. They drove decision-making at the ITV table. Yet, even the smallest ITV companies were stable and profitable.

Events Leading to the Franchise Auction of 1991

Because of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's passionate belief that "free enterprise and competition" were the "engines of prosperity," Britain became embroiled in the issue of deregulation in the 1980's (Time, December 3, 1990, p. 66). Privatization involved the outright sale of assets whenever possible, particularly when the assets were located in a competitive industrial environment. There was a drive to weed out monopolies and to usher in a new age of increased consumer choice. The Prime Minister's policies radically changed nationalized institutions like British Airways, British Telecom, and British Gas (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). To implement these changes, Mrs. Thatcher kept a tight rein on the Treasury, built a free-market economy, and courted foreign investors. Her policies pulled Britain temporarily out of economic decline, and the Tories "swashbuckling era of privatization" gave England a growth rate unmatched anywhere in Europe (Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1992).

The television industry with its guaranteed regional monopolies was not spared (Economist, May 18, 1991). Viewing the ITV companies as complacent, inward-looking, and ill-equipped to compete in the global environment,

Thatcher tried to dislodge one of the last bastions of restrictive practice in Britain by creating a hybrid free-market system of franchise allocation. The intention was to create a wider variety of programming and a greater participation by the independent production sector.

The Peacock Committee, commissioned by Thatcher in 1985, failed to find an alternative for funding the BBC, but zeroed in on the ITV. In 1987, the government mandated that the ITV (and the BBC) take 25% of their programming from independent producers by 1992. In 1988, news and current affairs were deleted from the formula (The Economist, September 15, 1990). A government white paper entitled "Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, Choice and Quality" published in November 1988 became the working framework for planned legislation on broadcasting (Wallis & Baran, 1990, p. 59).

Among the White Paper's recommendations was the government's intention to subject the 16 ITV franchise companies to what it called "a competitive tender" at the next franchise round in 1991. Considerations of quality and programming standards would be made before a short list of bidders was completed, but, in the end, the contender with the "deepest pockets" would win each franchise. In keeping with Thatcher's determination to open up commercial broadcasting to the winds of change, the paper posited that the Government should make ITV more competitive by placing a market value on it as a public asset.

The reaction from ITV franchisees was immediate and sharp. They believed that the auction could not only degrade program quality, but throw a stable and productive system into unnecessary turmoil. Opponents argued that "proposals to deregulate British television would lead to a dramatic fall in standards" (Variety, June 21-27, 1989, p. 43). There was also a fear that industrial conglomerates and foreign investors might overwhelm the process even though

there was a 25 percent outside owndership limit. A few ITV companies like Granada took a proactive approach to the Government's White Paper, issuing its own detailed and well-reasoned rebutal while recognizing some of the Government's points about ITV as legitimate.

Out of the White Paper recommendations came a bill introduced in Parliament in December 1989. The Broadcasting Bill of 1990 proposed:

1. The 16 commercial ITV franchises would be auctioned off to the highest bidders. The new ITV network was named Channel 3.

2. A new national commercial Channel 5, would be established to be auctioned in 1993.

3. Channel 4's link with ITV would be severed and Channel 4 would be required to sell its own advertising time, placing it in direct competition with ITV companies for advertising revenue. Previously, ITV handled Channel 4's advertising in exchange for funding the channel.

4. The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the regulatory body of ITV, would be replaced by the Independent Television Commission which would assume responsibility for the whole range of commercial television, including cable and satellite services. It would be granted wide discretionary powers, but would employ a"lighter touch" in regulation than its predecessor, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) (Marketing, December 14, 1989, p. 4).

5. A new television watchdog, the Broadcasting Standards Council, would be created to regulate portrayals of sex and violence on television.

The ITV companies fought the legislation, urging the Government to modify its proposals. There was heated debate in the House of Commons, but the Broadcasting Bill of 1990 passed. Andrew Quinn, the Chief Executive of Granada TV, called the Act a "camel created by four years' debate on how to build a racehorse. It can't succeed, but it's illegal to stop it failing" (Marketing, March 1, 1991, p. 12).

The drafters of the bill conceptualized a new type of broadcaster, patterned after those in the United States that buy most of their programming from program producers. This idea would propel some of the new franchisees, particularly Carlton and Meridian, into the major role of "publisher-broadcasters." The Act called for massive fines and franchise withdrawal if contractors backslid on their franchise promises. Critics pointed out that withdrawal of a franchise raised the question of who might take up the "apparently poisoned chalice" (Marketing, January 17, 1991, p. 11).

The contenders were expected to submit blind bids for the 10-year franchises. Opponents objected to the blind-bid auction, saying it would "suck too much money out of the system and potentially allow powerful media conglomerates to muscle their way into British television" (Variety, December 6, 1989). The risk, they speculated, was that profits would be eaten up by high annual payments to the Treasury. There was a concern that some companies which overbid would be forced to reduce program costs significantly to meet their bidding commitments. They believed that the cash needed to mount a successful bid would have to come from program-making budgets.

Critics posited that the auction presented insuperable problems for bidders to guesstimate the average growth of television advertising in the 1992-2002 period, a time of extraordinary dynamism in the industry. Assessing the value of a regional television franchise and forecasting revenue for the next ten years,

they asserted, was impossible. Andrew Quinn, CEO of Granada TV, expressed the sentiments of most British broadcasters by commenting that "the new tv system will deliver audience fragmentation and increased costs for advertisers" (Daily Times, March 15, 1991, p. 2).

The ITV Franchise Auction of 1991

The criteria for making bids were that contenders had to project (a) the trends in the economy and advertising over the impending 11 year period; (b) the degree of penetration of cable and satellite broadcasting; and (c) the terrestrial capability of the proposed Channel 5 in 1994. In addition, it was essential for them to evaluate their own competitive talents to live up to their promises.

On the auction block were 16 commercial ITV franchises with annual revenues of about $2 billion. The bids were due by May 15, 1991. Bidders had to meet the most stringent programming and financial standards to qualify for the straight cash bid auction (Broadcasting, October 21, 1991). Because the Broadcasting Act called for massive fines and franchise withdrawal if contractors reneged on their franchise promises, it became imperative for contenders to project accurately what they could deliver. Forty groups who met the governmental requirements vied in the sweepstakes; winners were announced on October 16, 1991.

Auction Outcomes

Twelve of the 16 companies reclaimed their turf while four of Britain's commercial broadcasters were unseated (see Appendix C). Westcountry TV replaced Television South West (TSW); The Sunrise consortium ousted TV-am (the national breakfast franchise); Meridian outbid TVS; and Carleton replaced Thames. Of the 16 ITV franchises, one had four bidders, seven had three, and

three had just one (The Economist, September 15, 1991). Two incumbents, Scottish TV and Central, went unchallenged. In the loser's circle were eight of the highest bidders in their regions. Of the sixteen ITV franchises awarded, only half went to highest bidders. (Variety, October 21, 1991).

There was a gross disparity in the winning bids. Carlton TV entered the highest of all bids, £43,170,000, and won. The mean bid submitted for the 16 franchises was £11,567,250 (see Appendix D). Two incumbents, Scottish TV and Central TV, guessing that they would have no competition, bid the minimum £2,000 per year and were renewed.

Central, which also had a 20% stake in Meridian, was forecast to have immense profits (projections were approximately $50 million) and was in the enviable position of being the most financially secure and richest of all of the ITV companies. Scottish TV, unchallenged in its £2,000 bid, was also destined for profitability. It also had a 20% stake in the consortium which included LWT and a stake in the new Sunrise TV franchise, the nationwide morning news show. The auction created anomalous situations where neighboring franchisees such as Central and Yorkshire, would pay wildly different franchise fees. Yorkshire, with its nearly eighteen million pound bid would be competing with Central which paid only two thousand pounds.

The companies that bid low and won--Central, London Weekend, Granada, and Scottish emerged as the "haves" of the new ITV network. The projected financial success of their franchises placed them in a position to expand their enterprises via acquisition of floundering rivals. If the broadcasting climate allows for only a modest profit for the richer regions, the poorer franchisees would be vulnerable to hostile takeovers in 1994 (Marketing, September 20, 1991).

Non-European community groups were not allowed to control an ITV franchise (Variety, May 13, 1991, p. 66), but could hold up to a 25% interest. Yet, the only foreign ownership went to the American-based Disney Studios, a 15% shareholder of the consortium which captured the TV-am franchise. Losing bidders with foreign interests, included HBO which proposed to own 21.6% of TVS, NBC which owned 15% of Daybreak TV that bid for the morning news franchise, and United Artists Cable which owned 20% of C3W which bid for the Wales franchise.

Dethroning four incumbent companies, including the mighty Thames, plunged the industry into chaos and put 2,200 people out of work (Mediaweek, October 21, 1991). Thames, a 23-year veteran broadcaster on ITV, provided nearly half of ITV's program schedule between 6:30 and 10:30 P.M. (The Economist, October 19, 1991). Like Thames, TVS (South Country), TSW, and TV-am were surprise losers. TVS put in the highest of four offers worth £59.75 million--an offer that the ITC judged to be too excessive to allow the company to maintain the service it proposed [Variety, October 21, 1991]. TSW, the Plymouth-based ITV company, cast a bid almost twice as high was Westcountry's and lost, but won the right to have a judicial review of the ITC decision to deny it a license. TSW pursued its legal challenge to the last opportunity, but lost out ultimately because its move to place distance between itself and the competition was totally unrealistic. Perhaps the most controversial loser was TV-am, Britain's first national commercial breakfast TV operator and the most profitable of the companies broadcasting on Channel Three. TV-am had produced a strong, popular program, but was tossed aside in favor of another bid.

New Franchises

In addition to 12 incumbent winners, four new players won the right to broadcast on Channel Three for ten years starting January 1, 1993: Sunrise TV,

Meridian, Westcountry, and Carlton. Carlton, founded and managed by Michael Green, was no broadcasting newcomer. It had a 20% stake in Central TV and, in 1985, attempted to take over Thames TV, before being stopped by the IBA. Its consortium includes the Daily Telegraph group (5%) and Italy's RCS Video (5%). Under it's plan, all of Carleton's programming was to be commissioned from independent and network acquisitions (Variety, January 6, 1992). Because of Carlton's broad association with 30 of the leading independent producers in the U.K., it stood to be a key supplier of primetime programming for the ITV network.

Meridian, already involved in deals with 25 independent producers (including SelecTV, one of the largest independent producers in the U.K.), also had an advantage in its new franchise role as a publisher-broadcaster. Both Meridian and Carlton, backed by the consortium MAI, planned to operate as "publisher-contractors," buying most of their output from independent producers (The Economist, October 19, 1991). It was projected that Meridian and Carlton would control a quarter of the ITV advertising revenue by the end of 1993 (Variety, October 21, 1991).

The Sunrise consortium's investors, Scottish TV, London Weekend Television (LWT), The Guardian Newspaper group, and Disney bid £34,610,000, more than twice that of incumbent TV-am. Westcountry TV investors were Associated Newspapers, the Southwest Water Authority, and Brittany Ferries-- all concerns with deep pockets and strong interests in the region. Their £7,815,000 tender had insiders wondering if they could generate the kind of advertising revenue to sustain their obligations, but the bid was certainly more moderate than that of their adversaries.

The Quality Threshold

The Thatcher government proposed that candidates for television franchises be required to pass a "quality test".   The Broadcasting Act built in a series of "quality hurdles" designed to "guarantee that program quality would not suffer because of overly optimistic financial projections and whimsical program proposals" (Variety, May 13, 1991, p. 66). Potential licensees were required to commit to provide "a reasonable proportion of high quality programs" as well as a "diverse program service" (Variety, June 21-27, 1989, p. 43) and the winning franchisees had to post a performance bond which would be forfeited if they failed to live up to their proposals.

This requirement gave broad powers to the ITC in its awarding of franchises. The "quality threshold" had a two-pronged test based upon (a) a bidder's proposed programming and (b) the viability of its business plan. This test was widely critisized as overly subjective on the part of the ITC regulators (Marketing, December 14, 1989). The ITC excluded 14 of the 40 bidders in the auction based on "quality grounds" (TV World, December 1991).

Critics of the Broadcasting Bill argued that the proposals would force commercial television to "jettison quality programming in a drive for ratings" (Variety, December 6, 1989, p. 119). Richard Dunn, Managing Director of Thames TV and head of the ITV Association said, "The case against auctioning is that big money can outbid good quality; it catastrophically destabilizes the industry for at least two years before and two years after the auction, and the likelihood of overbidding will impact adversely on the investment needed for quality programs" (Variety, June 28-July 4, 1989, p. 45).

The ITC also had the power to opt for a lower bid under an "exceptional circumstances" clause to deny a license application. The clause generated an outcry because of the vagueness of the guidelines. If the ITC invoked this power, however, it was required to make public the reason for its decision, and the

aggrieved bidder could contest the decision in court. Several incumbents retained their franchises although they were outbid. There appear to be two concise reasons why the ITA opted for a lower bid--they were of "exceptional quality" and there was a "need to maintain continuity" (Marketing, March 22, 1990, p. 5). However, if continuity were preferred, there would be no reason for the auction because continuity favors incumbent ITV companies.

Auction Consequences

The most immediate consequence of the ITV auction was the sorting out of winners and losers. The winners, of course, were those who bid low and won like Central, Scottish, and Granada. The losers were those who bid high and won. Media analysts forecast probable doom for those companies hobbled by huge payments to the treasury. Tyne Tees' stock, for example, fell 29 percent after the auction (Ilott, January 25, 1993). By the time the new franchises were implemented, two of the most burdened companies, Yorkshire and Tyne Tees had merged.

The ITV sweepstakes was intended to expand the Treasury's coffers by £450m. Instead, the auction will add only about £68 million to the fund because of the failure of the legislation to spell out minimum bids. Part of the franchisees obligation for television rights will be offset by a franchise fee write-off on their tax bills (TV Digest, October 21, 1991). After ITV called for an end to a levy on profits, the government decided to drop the requirement and dispense with a plan to license night hours on the Channel 3 network separately. Instead, the ITC will set a fixed percentage of net advertising revenue (up to £150m per year of a franchise's revenues) as the minimum sale price for each franchise (Marketing, June 15, 1989).

Competition for revenues and audiences should intensify throughout the 1990s. After six years, the winning companies can apply for a second 10-year franchise and be renewed without going through the tender process again (Financial Times, December 19, 1991). A moratorium on takeovers of ITV companies exists until 1994, at which time interests in franchises will be allowed on the stock market. Financially strapped companies may be vulnerable to U.K. predators as well as others from continental Europe. Insiders predict that the number of ITV companies could fall to six by the next franchise round in 2002.

Two of the franchises strapped with the heaviest franchise fees, Yorkshire and Tyne Tees, merged by the time the new ITV began. In May, 1993, London Weekend took a 14 percent stake in Yorkshire Tyne Tees television for $21 million (Bell, 1993). The following month, Granada TV acquired a 15 percent stake in London Weekend Television which it latter upped to the maximum 20 percent (Amdur, 1993). Clearly, the strongest companies were wasing no time in consolidating their power.

Three of the most vulnerable ITV companies, Anglia, HTV, and Meridian, anxiously petitioned the Government to delay the date for takeovers until 1996 (Snoddy, 1993). Three of the powerful companies (Central, Carlton, LWT, and Granada), however, argued that it was better to allow ITV companies to merge with each other than be gobbled up by outsiders and that there might be $150 million in savings in operating costs to be gained by mergers (Dawtrey, 1993). Until 1994, the ITV companies were limited to 20 percent stakes in other ITV companies except the six smallest companies.

The turmoil of the auction opened important doors for competitors to take advantage of a weakened independent broadcasting sector. During this period of uncertainty, satellite television made significant gains. Symbolic of the ITV decline was BSkyB winning the top league football contract from ITV in

1992. Cable also thrived during this period. Some would argue that the opportunities given to satellite and cable from 1988 through 1993 were positive, intended consequences of the auction process, eroding a monopoly and increasing competition in the marketplace

From the time the Peacock Commission made its report until the beginning of the new ITV in 1993, the British media marketplace expanded greatly. By 1993, there were more than 3 million satellite dishes in the U.K. and cable penetration, while low by American standards, was growing rapidly (Checketts, January 25, 1993). Satellite penetration was 12.5 percent and cable penetration had grown to 1.7% (U.K. Facts and Figures, February 15, 1993). This meant that over-the-air broadcasting was not the only alternative for profitable mass communication. Competition was growing at a rate fast enough to put the move to establish a 5th terrestrial channel on the back burner. Rather than bid for a 5th commercial channel, for example, Thames launched its own satellite channel in coopoeration with the BBC, U.K. Gold, as an outlet for its vast entertainment library. As cable penetration grows, fueled by dual telephone/television services, further opportunities will be created. Likewise, the growth of satellite and cable will decrease the significiance bidding for ITV franchises, perhaps even obviating the need to run competitive tenders to allocate ITV frequencies. Revenues could be derived one day from subscription rather than advertising.

For those that did not overpay, the regional ITV franchises remain valuable properties. Companies like Central, Carleton, London Weekend, and Granada have tremendous power in the marketplace, both as regional broadcasters and program producers. Despite the difficult environment, they still have monopolies in their regions. Profits for the "have" companies during

the first half of 1993 were surprisingly good. These companies are looking forward to making further acquisitions within the ITV network.

If the ITV network can keep its ratings share from slipping below thirty percent of the British audience (in 1993, it stood above 40 percent), it will remain the prime commercial vehicle for television mass communication in the United Kingdom in the near term. Because the BBC is going through its own crisis in anticipation of its charter renewal in 1996, it is not in a strong position to take advantage of ITV's weaknesses. In the short term, programming changes made by the the new central scheduler should increase commercial opportunities and audience flow. These moves will be criticized as making the system more American, but they will have a positive impact on the bottom line. For example, a Sunday religious program has been switched from the early evening period to a less desirable time slot to make way for profitable entertainment programming.

For the ITV to regain its economic health, it must protect itself from internal as well as external competition. A major threat to the ITV may come from within. The risk of imposion became apparent just two months into the new license cycle when Granada started to use its venerable "Coronation Street" as a bargaining chip with the new ITV.

In February, 1993, Granada threatened to sell "Coronation Street" to satellite rival BSkyB unless ITV doubled the current price per episode of $112,970. Under the terms of the rumored arrangement, Granada would still be able to air "Coronation Street" is its own region, but would withold the product from the entire ITV network. Although the Granada move was widely viewed as a bargaining ploy rather than a serious threat, because of Granada's status part owner in BSkyB, the idea was not improbable (Dawtrey, 1993).

The Granada threat was symptomatic of the new order at ITV. Gone apparently were the collegial underpinnings that held the fragile confederation

together for nearly forty years. As one news account said, the auction "weakened the old ties of mutal self-interest that held the network together by creating a huge financial imbalance among the ITV companies" (Dawtrey, 1993). In the new order, powerful companies like Granada and London Weekend could muscle their way into dominance of their ITV fellows or threaten to sink the entire enterprise. While the division between rich and poor companies was fully expected, the risk to the network as a whole because of this reality had been underestimated.

Implications for Future Auctions

Like most governmental initiatives, the ITV auction presented distinct advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the auction forced independent companies to rethink their corporate strategies and plan for the future. It forced inefficient companies to make themselves over as efficient competitors. It provided the impetus for a long overdue centralization of the network's scheduling that included the hiring of a central scheduler. The process also greatly expanded the opportunities for independent production in British television for the next decade. Finally, the auction paved the way for a few strong ITV companies to emerge from the process ready to compete with the strongest of the non-broadcast competitors.

On the negative side, the auction had a huge and unnecessary destablizing impact on commercial broadcasting in Britain. The entire industry was thrown into chaos for at least a four-year period. The ITV was destablized both financially and operationally. Investment in new programming dropped significantly. Creative risk was almost non-existent in some companies. Morale sank to new lows. The companies that lost their licenses pulled back to

minimalist operating capacity during their final months, further destablizing the industry.

Serious flaws in the auction process created an uneven playing field for the ITV companies that began competing in 1993. The auctions widened the difference between the haves and the have nots. Some companies were guaranteed a profit while others' futures were doomed from the beginning, heightening the probability of takeovers of the weaker companies in 1994. The arbitrary and capricious way the Government conducted the auction did not inspire faith in the system. By not establishing floors for the bid, the Government lost considerable revenue and virtually gave away some of the most valuable franchises.

The auction also exposed how difficult it is to try to impose a quality dimension on a revenue-raising process. During the ITV auction, high bidders were rejected on both quality and financial grounds while low bidders were accepted using the same criteria, a system that inspired little confidence and is unlikely to be copied elsewhere. Ironically, the auction may have done more to degrade program quality than any other single action in the ITV's history. The process forced a commercial network that had adhered to a high public service broadcasting standard into a mode dominated by commercial considerations. The high bidders may have no choice but to lower programming standards to meet fiscal exigencies.

By trying to nudge independent television into a more efficient, market competitive environment, the Government might have destroyed the fragile unity that held the ITV together for four decades. Divisions between haves and have nots and between individual companies and the centralized ITV have grown progressively greater. Skeptics worry that the entire network will implode, leaving commercial broadcasting in ruin.

The British auction shows the perils of indiscriminately tinkering with a mass media system through the auction process. While the goal of raising revenue through spectrum leasing is a logical and efficient means of managing a commercial broadcast system, there are clear dangers in overlaying an economic or social policy on the process. The Government's intentional destablization of the status quo and its ambiguous criteria for achieving program quality and revenue added far too much baggage to the auction process. In the end, the Government not only failed to meet its revenue goals, but provided incentive for degrading program quality, and greatly weakened a system that stood as a model for public service broadcasting in the commercial sector.

It is ironic that the British Government took such ar active regulatory role in the commercial broadcasting area at precisely the time it had turned cable loose almost entirely. While imposing crisis on the ITV companies, the Government was opening the door to unlimited enterprise among American telephone and cable companies who were able to expand aggressively without a tight regulatory tether. There no doubt will be a battle during coming years concerning which type of regulatory environment is best that will be influenced by the ideology of the party in power. The disastrous result of the ITV franchise auction has already benefitted the BBC during its upcoming charter renewal which is seen to be largely immune from the severe government tinkering that characterized the ITV auction. If nothing else, the ill-fated auction has had a sobering influence on those policymakersintent on micro-managing communication policy.

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APPENDIX A

ITV Companies History

Name of Company/Region	Starting Date	Franchise Ended
Network Companies		
ABC (Midlands)	1955	1967
Associated-Rediffusion (London)	1955	1967
ATV (MIdlands)	1955	1981
Granada (North Country)	1956	
LWT (London)	1968	
Thames (London)	1968	1993
Yorkshire (North Country)	1968	
Central (Midlands)	1982	
Regional Companies		
Scottish (Central Scotland)	1957	
Southern (South Country)	1958	1982
TWW (S. Wales & West)	1958	1968
Anglia (East Anglia)	1959	
Tyne-Tees (North East)	1959	
Ulster (Northern Ireland)	1959	
Border (Borders)	1961	
Grampian (N.E. Scotland)	1961	
Westward (South West)	1961	1982
Channel (Channel Islands)	1962	
Harlech (S. Wales & West)	1968	
TSW (South West)	1982	1993
TVS (Southern)	1982	1993
TV-AM (Breakfast Channel)		

APPENDIX B

Provisions of the Broadcasting Bill

Regulation

- A new Independent Television Commission will take over the television responsibilities of the Independent Broadcasting Authority and the Cable Authority.
- A new Radio Authority will regulate the radio industry.
- The new regulatory body will not legally be the broadcaster, sub-contracting frequencies to contractors. Instead, they will license companies to broadcast.

Channel Three

- ITV's name will change to Channel Three. The new franchises, to start in 1993, will be awarded by competitive tender.
- As an initial stage, applicants will have to pass a quality threshold.
- Of those passing the quality threshold, the highest bidder for any franchise will win, unless a lower bidder promises exceptionally better quality.
- No company will be allowed to hold more than two Channel Three licenses.
- Restrictions on which two licenses may be jointly owned are yet to be announced.
- Channel Three licensees will be required to operate a network system. If they cannot agree on a system between themselves, ITC will have the power to impose a solution.
- There will be a moratorium on takeovers until one year after the new franchises begin operation.
- Sponsorship will be permitted for all programmes except news and current affairs.
- There will be no protection of listed events.
- ITV companies are to be required to divest themselves of 51 percent of ITN.

Channel 4

- Channel 4 will retain its remit for innovative programming. From 1993, it will have responsibility for selling its own airtime.
- If its revenue falls below 14% of total terrestrial net net advertising revenue, the Channel 3 contractors will be required to make up the difference, up to a maximum of two percent of NAR.
- If Channel 4 makes more than 14% of NAR, 50% of the surplus goes into Channel 4 funds and the other 50% to Channel 3.

Channel 5

- A new fifth channel is enabled in the legislation. Its operator will be determined by the same mechanism as Channel 3 licenses.

Radio

- The new Radio Authority is charged with licensing up to three national radio franchises: one on FM, two on AM. One of the services must be speech-based, another must be "non-pop".
- The licenses will be awarded to the highest bidder for each category.
- The local radio market is to be opened up, with many more licenses awarded. The Radio Authority is planning to offer 30 licenses a year.

Cross Media Ownership

- Cross media ownership is limited to 20%, so no newspaper proprietor may own more than 20% of a terrestrial or satellite channel.
- This does not apply to non-UK broadcasters.

Listings

- From March 1991, ITV and the BBC will no longer be allowed to operate their duopoly in the listings market.

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* From Media Week, November 2, 1990

APPENDIX C
New ITV Franchises: Bidding Statistics

WINNERS/CONSORTIUM	BID	1991 AD SHARE
CARLTON TV Carlton RCS Video/Daily Telegraph	£43,170,000	15.39
CENTRAL TV Carlton DC Thomson	2,000	14.44
LWT Institutions	7,585,000	11.62
MERIDIAN MAI, Central, SelecTV	36,523,000	11.47
GRANADA TV Granada Group	9,000,000	10.73
YORKSHIRE TV WH Smith Pearson	37,700,000	8.46
ANGLIA TV Local interests and financial instituitons	17,804,000	6.56
HTV Institiutions	20,530,000	6.22
SCOTTISH TV Institutions	2,000	5.47
TYNE TEES TV Yorkshire TV	15,057,000	3.39
WESTCOUNTRY TV Associated Newspapers/ Local companies	7,815,000	2.50
ULSTER TV Institutions	1,027,000	1.59
GRAMPIAN TV Local interests	720,000	1.24
BORDER TV Institutions/Local interests	52,000	0.61
CHANNEL TV Local interests	1,000	0.31
SUNRISE TV STV/LWT.DISNEY Guardian Newspaper	34,610,000	--

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GOODBYE TO THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:

ENTERTAINMENT TV PATTERNS IN 50 COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Entertainment TV content can reveal much about audience tastes. The nearly universal game show genre provides an ideal window for cross-cultural comparisons (it includes the world's most-watched TV program, "Wheel of Fortune"). An analysis of 26$\mathcal{L}$ game shows in 50 countries reveals the triumph of culture over technology. Although a global TV village has <u>not</u> come to pass, technology has enabled cultural "continents" to emerge: Western, East Asian and Latin.

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GOODBYE TO THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:

ENTERTAINMENT TV PATTERNS IN 50 COUNTRIES

> Television remains to this day a medium of entertainment,
> first and foremost, not only in the Western world but
> throughout the world.   Browne 1983, p. 193

> The technology of communication is, generally speaking,
> universal; but the contents and functions of communication
> are culture-bound.   Kato 1975, p. 6

I. INTRODUCTION

When McLuhan (1964, p.20) wrote that "electrically contracted,
the globe is no more than a village," he spoke in hypotheticals and
hyperbole, because television remained largely a developed-nation
phenomenon until the mid-1970s. Only recently has television
penetrated the Third World, where two-thirds of the earth's people
live. The Third World's share of the planet's TV sets increased
from 5 percent in 1965 to 40 percent in 1990.[1]   Part   of   the
dramatic increase resulted from China's and India's relatively late
expansion of television--in China after Mao Zedong's death in 1976[2]
and   in   India   after   the   Satellite   Instructional   Television
Experiment (SITE) broadcasts of 1975-76.[3] Today more than 1 billion
TV sets dot the globe, a 50 percent jump in just the last five
years (Lippman 1992, p. 2).

Recent   statistics   from   UNESCO   and   the   BBC   World   Service
confirm   what   Varis   (1984)   had   found   earlier: entertainment
constitutes the largest category of TV content almost everywhere in
the world.[4] For example, the percentage of TV time devoted to
entertainment in Mexico is 74.2 percent; former Soviet Union, 49.5

percent; and Portugal, 70.8 percent (Lippman 1992, p. 7).

The Gamely Genre

This paper explores the now-global phenomenon of TV entertainment. It compares popular television offerings in 50 countries[5] --an impossibly gargantuan task without a window to aid our understanding. The window we have chosen is the game show genre.

A TV game show may be defined as a program featuring civilian contestants who compete for prizes or cash by solving problems, answering questions or performing tasks following prescribed rules. The contestants may include celebrities, but these celebrities are "playing themselves" while participating in the game rather than performing. The prizes may range from astronomical sums of cash to little more than token mementoes.

Game shows have a "blank slate" quality that makes them ideal for comparing entertainment television across borders. Game shows can emphasize mental capacities or physical skills. They can test esoteric, "bookish" knowledge or "popular culture"/ common sense savvy. They can involve intense time pressure or proceed more leisurely. They can be based on skill or luck, or a combination of the two. They can humiliate losers or let them off easily.

Game shows can appeal to any age. They can encompass many subject areas or focus on one, such as rock music (MTV's "Remote Control"). They can spotlight dazzlingly high IQs (the BBC's erudite "Mastermind") or dazzling bodies (Germany's "Tutti Frutti"). They can limp along in mid-morning time slots or smash

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the competition in prime time (France's "La Roue de la Fortune").

Almost any country can afford to produce these budget-friendly shows. Five half-hour game shows cost about one-third the total of five half-hour soap episodes (Graham 1988, p. 7). Yet some countries choose to produce pricey game shows, such as Japan's "Let's Go! The World," which features a studio host and a travelling on-location hostess.

Despite vitriolic criticism (Himmelstein 1984, Fiske 1987, Holbrook 1993), game shows have endured since the beginning of television's history in many nations. Their noncontroversial, apolitical nature appeals to advertisers (Wally and Magiera 1990, p.4), while ratings attest that they likewise appeal to viewers. In Spain, four game shows regularly make the top 10-rated programs (More 1991, p. 42). In Germany, where game shows constitute "the fastest-growing programming area" on television, a recent hit record was titled, "Life Is a Quiz Show and We're Just the Contestants" (Lieb 1991, p. 38).

What makes the shows so compelling? Except for sports, nothing else on television offers the tension of an undetermined outcome. Talk shows, while real, lack movement toward a final climax. Dramas, while compelling, require suspended disbelief. But game shows offer both reality and drama. "Every game has a different cast of characters and a different progression of action," explains Paul Talbot (1990), whose firm controls about 75 percent of U.S. games that are licensed overseas.

Game shows "allow people to return to the playfulness of

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childhood" (Waters 1987, p. 64). The interactive shows, like "Wheel of Fortune," literally do let viewers "play along--they like to feel smart" (Fiance 1988). (Quick!! what's B_ _ _ B_ L_ _ S _ N _ B_ _ N_ G_ L_ _ S ?) On a "Nightline" program (1987), Merv Griffin, creator of "Wheel of Fortune," said games give audiences relief from the depressing nightly news.

For whatever reasons, "Wheel of Fortune" (debuted on CBS in 1975) has emerged as possibly the most-watched TV show in history (Tempest 1992), with a weekly audience of about 100 million who view some 25 local versions of the show. Including its local version of "Wheel," the Netherlands, with a population of only about 14.5 million people, boasted in 1990 an astounding 20 different game shows on its weekly TV schedule. Consider as well the 35 US shows a viewer could watch in the Columbus, Ohio, area (1990), and the 30 game/ quiz shows viewers could watch each week (1992) in Japan, which has about half the U.S. population. Surely his is a phenomenon worthy of study.

Purpose of Study

Content analysis constitutes a first step in understanding TV audiences. Comparative anlysis of entertainment TV content can help explain audience tastes in a way that news content analysis may not. It can also shed light on questions that single-country studies cannot answer (Edelstein 1982, p.76). To derive some meaning from a vast number of game shows broadcast in various languages, we can compare them quantitatively and qualitatively to isolate similarities and differences.

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II. RELATED STUDIES

Information vs. Entertainment[6]

If Wilbur Schramm "was the founding father" of the field of mass communications (McAnany 1988, p. 109), he also set the field's direction: political rather than popular or entertainment communication (Fisher and Melnik 1979, p. 2). Schramm worked during World War II with the Office of War Information, 1941-1943, and was involved with Cold War propaganda in the 1950s (McAnany 1988, p. 115). Yet even during the politically charged Cold War, White and Rosenberg (1957) tried to make the case for scholarly attention to popular culture.

Similarly, in the 1960s, a few voices reacted against the field's perceived biases. In The Play Theory of Mass Communication, Stephenson (1967 p. 206) argued, "Enough has been said to ask for far more serious regard of play, and not of information, as the primary concern of any communication theory." In Mass Entertainment, Mendelsohn (1966, p. 24) took on Schramm's (1961) "neo Calvinistic" attitude toward television, lambasting "the distinctions that Schramm and his assocates make between 'reality orientation' (substitute 'proper behavior') and 'fantasy orientation' (substitute 'improper behavior')."

This good vs. evil view of mass culture, recalls Ray Browne in Against Academia (1989, p. 2) was "a confrontation between the Past and the Present, the Old and the New, the Sleepers and the Wakers, the Knowers and the Learners." In 1965, Browne organized a popular culture conference at Purdue University; two years later, he

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etablished the Center for Popular Culture at Bowling Green (OH)

State University and launched the Journal of Popular Culture. In

1970, he founded the Popular Culture Association and established

the Popular Press.

Despite these beginnings, in the 1970s, Melnik (Fischer and

Melnik 1979, p. 2) still saw entertainment as an

> area of mass communication research in which there is an
> enormous deficit. . . . Such neglect was (and still is)
> perhaps due to the stigma attached to such products, a lack
> of awareness as to their possible functions and far-reaching
> significance and a lack of adequate and common conceptual
> tools (at least until fairly recently).

"One wonders," agreed Tannenbaum (1980, p. 2), who organized a TV

entertainment conference, "how it [television's entertainment

function] has been neglected so long." Tannenbaum's volume itself,

however, neglects TV entertainment other than drama and fiction

(the phrases "game show" and "quiz show" do not appear in the

index, nor does the title of any particular game/quiz show).

The 1980s saw several directions for entertainment TV studies:

optimistic, pessimistic and academic. In 1978, the Journal of

Popular Film had added "and Television" to its title. Other

academic journals continue to devote some space to TV studies--

news, practitioner and audience research in addition to

entertainment (e.g., about 10 percent of articles in the Journal of

Popular Culture and 15 percent in Journal of Communication).

Optimists or "celebrators" (Real 1989, p. 31) include the

enter-educationists (e.g., Singhal 1990), who in 1989 held a

conference in Los Angeles to explore the eduational uses of

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records, music videos, comic books, films and radio and TV soap operas. Like the Tannenbaum (1980) conference, this gathering did not discuss game shows--even though PBS television has successfully used games to teach math ("Square 1") and geography ("Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?").

The pessimistic view of TV entertainment is exemplified by Postman (1985, p. 87), who states:

> The problem is not that television presents us with entertaining subject matter but that all subject matter is presented as entertainment, which is another issue altogether.
> To say it another way: Entertainment is the supraideology of all discourse on television.

Other critics target game shows specifically. Fiske (1987, p. 271) sees game shows as "bearers of capitalist and patriarchal ideologies." Himmelstein (1984, p. 272) skewers both players who "want something for nothing" and "the viewers at home who must take a secret joy in watching greedy contestants lose." Holbrook (1993) decries the materialism and consumption ethos of "The Price Is Right."

But not all comment on the subject has such a negative tone (e.g., Lyons 1989; Meisler 1986). After all, as one former contestant pointed out on "Nightline" (1987), game shows "don't cause cancer and don't circumvent Congress."

Game Show Research

After the US quiz show scandals of 1958-59, the genre moved from prime time to daytime scheduling, to be watched mainly by women. In any early game show analysis, Glick (1962, pp. 128-129) isolated four types of the shows' appeals: the excitement of

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watching a competition; the vicarious identification with players; the fun of testing one's own knowledge; women's fondness for male hosts; and the release of relaxing as "giggling girls again." Later, some effects and audience studies reported data for game shows along with other program types (Barwise, Ehrenberg and Goodhart 1982; Tan and Tan 1986; Rubin and Rubin 1987).

The popularity of game shows in the mid 1980s and the current phenomenon of US-licensed shows overseas has attracted attention in industry publications like Ad Age (e.g., Wally and Magiera 1990) and Variety (e.g., Hardy 1992). Coverage by general publications (e.g., Ferry 1988; Revzin 1989; Tempest 1992) even included a Newsweek cover story (Feb. 9, 1987).

Communication specialists have analyzed game shows in coutries other than the United States, such as Australia (Fiske 1990), Brazil (Kottak 1989), France (Mandraud and Martinat 1990) and Japan (Cooper-Chen 1993). Non-academic writers have surveyed US game shows in detail (Fabe 1979; Graham 1988) sympathetically from a fan's perspective. But no study has compared the genre across cultures.

Comparative Research

Edelstein (1982, p. 14) defines comparative research as "a study that compares two or more nations with respect to some common activity." Schramm (Edelstein 1982, p. 7), called it "a promising field of study within the larger field of international communication." Schramm himself carried out one of the earliest comparative content studies (of the 1956 Hungary/ Suez crises).

Like the Schramm (1959) study, much comparative content

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analysis deals with news, either in print media or, less commonly, on television (e.g. Cooper 1992; Straubhaar et al. 1986) or even both print and television (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1980). Little deals with entertainment television, most of that with drama (e.g., Iwao, Pool and Hagiwara 1981). According to Rollin (1989, p.3):

> Since formal popular culture study is less than a few decades old, then, it is not surprising that the body of knowledge it has amassed contains a variety of lacunae. One of the more significant of these is comparative popular culture studies.

Not surprisingly, "theory is scant in the comparative field," stated Schramm (Edelstein 1982, p. 11)--and it is practically nonexistent in the entertainment TV subfield.

Donald Browne (1989, pp. 387-391) has begun to build thoery by suggesting five qualitative dimensions that characterize entertainment TV programs: pacing, appreciation of satire, tolerance for sentimentality, amount of action/ violence and roles of women/ minorities. Moreover, the quantitative dimension of scheduling that Browne (1989, p. 386) discusses can tell us whether the importance of a single genre differs from culture to culture. This study will apply Browne's ideas to a collection of data from 50 countries.

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III. METHOD

In fall 1985, just as the current U.S. game show boom was beginning, the author saw a short segment on "Entertainment Tonight" comparing various countries' game shows. That is how this project began. In December 1987 the author began collecting taped examples of TV game shows during a trip to England and France. She later got tapes from Australia, Taiwan, Tunisia, Japan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Germany, Switzerland and Poland.

In 1990, the collection shifted from tapes to monitoring, in order to increase the number of countries and decrease the costs to collaborators. A simple monitoring form and one-page letter were sent to personal contacts in about 60 countries. The author distributed many forms at the International Association for Mass Ccommunication Research convention in Bled, Yugoslavia, in August 1990.

Talbot/Fremantle International, which licenses U.S. game shows abroad, sent lists of current shows and a tape of 14 overseas program excerpts. King World International provided data on licensees of "Wheel of Fortune" and "Jeopardy." By spring 1991, information on about 250 game shows from 50 countries had been collected. As far as possible, the weekly schedule of each country's games for fall 1990 was reconstructed.

In summer 1992, during a trip to Brazil, the author watched and analyzed that country's shows more extensively. In fall 1992, while in Japan, she did likewise. The author taped and analyzed

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U.S. game shows every other year, in 1986, 1988, 1990 and 1992. In 1989 she travelled to California to try out for and attend tapings of shows, interviewing producers and contestants in the process.

Data were organized into six categories and judged along two qualitative dimensions, inspired by Donald Browne (1989) but adapted to the game genre. The two qualitative dimensions, pacing and tolerance for sentimentality, were subjectively determined. The six categories are: schedule placement (weekday strip, week day prime and weekend), program duration (n minutes), presence/ absence of celebrity panelists, gender of host, format origin (original or transferred from another country) and mode of play.

The four-game typology, derived from watching taped shows, includes interactive, spectator, knowledge and mixed format games. "Interactive" means that a home viewer can play along (e.g., guessing the phrase in "Wheel of Fortune"). "Spectator" means that contestants perform physical feats (e.g., running an obstacle course in "Double Dare") or "perform" talk (as on "Love Connection") for home viewers' enjoyment. "Knowledge" means that the average viewer at home, of the age level of the contestants, could answer only a few of the questions asked in the time allotted (e.g., England's "Mastermind," France's "Des chiffres et des lettres" or any nation's quiz kid/ College Bowl student faceoffs). "Mixed" means 1) a variety show that includes some game segments or 2) a game show with some interactive and some spectator portions.

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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A total of 265 shows from 50 countries were analyzed. All tables aggregate the 50 nations into 10 regions (see endnote 5).

Game Show Scheduling

Table I shows scheduling decisions made by TV programmers around the world. The weekday "strip" schedule familiar to U.S. viewers is favored as well in Northern/ Western Europe and in the Pacific (Australia/ New Zealand). However, in Europe, audiences in addition like their games in prime time. East Asia differs markedly, virtually ignorning the daytime strip approach in favor of weekend and primetime viewing. Almost everywhere, viewers prefer shorter rather than longer (more than 60 minutes) programs. However, Latin tastes differ; in that region alone, long shows prevail (indeed, Brazil's "Silvio Santos Show" runs 10.5 hours every Sunday).

Format Characteristics

Table II A again shows a similar preference pattern in Northern/ Western Europe, the Pacific (Australia/ New Zealand) and North America. The first three regions take two-thirds or more of their games as transfers, most of them from the United States. North America, the game source, does not show up as a recipient of game transfers on Table II, but the formats are nonetheless shared. (The United States accounts for 35 of the 44 games listed for North America). All other regions take about one-third or fewer of their games from elsewhere, preferring homegrown formats.

In most of the world, viewers willingly watch game shows

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without the added attraction of well-known personalities (Table II B). However, East Asian audiences prefer to see gliteratti rather than "plain folks" as players/panelists. Just as the U.S. dominates the North American region, we should note that Japan dominates East Asia, accounting for 32 of the region's 45 shows. Thus East Asia largely reflects Japanese tastes.

Furthermore, East Asia practices equal opportunity in game show hosting, having a woman as host or cohost on 51 percent of its shows (Table II C). Not obvious from Table II C is the fact that most Japanese shows have female cohosts. Latin America, by contrast, tends to have female hosts, not just cohosts; nearly two-thirds of Latin games have women in charge. Again, Northern/ Western Europe, the Pacific (Australia/ New Zealand) and North America share a trait--this time in common with the Near/ Middle East--of no or few female game show hosts.

Mode of Play

Table III shows the now-familiar pattern: Northern/ Western Europe, the Pacific (Australia/ New Zealand) and North America group together, liking the same kind of games: interactive. In this preference, East Asia joins the Western bloc.

By contrast, Latins avoid play-along formats in favor of spectator and mixed games. Only in Africa does the "knowledge" game (that highlights intellectual prowess) make a significant showing. The author believes that India has a tradition of radio IQ student quizzes, but available 1990 TV data do not show this.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

This study of 265 game shows in 50 countries confirms the "triumph" of culture over technology (Kato 1975). Writing in another context, Geertz (1973, p. 23) refers to anthropology's "deepest theoretical dilemma: how is such [cultural] variation to be squared with the biological unity of the human species?" The game show genre, which has spawned both the world's most-watched format ("Wheel of Fortune") and the world's first truly international TV show ("Sabado Gigante"), can shed light on that dilemma.

Entertainment programming shows us that cultural preferences follow patterns. Cultural continents--groupings of people that do not coincide with political borders--coalesce when one looks closely at scheduling, format and mode-of-play differences and similarities of game shows. To paraphrase Geertz (1973, p. 23), neither total unity nor total variability prevails.

Global Village/ National Towns: Two Myths

McLuhan's (1964) image of unity--at least in the sense of billions of eyes staring at the same TV content--has not come to pass. Judging from TV game show content, no format or style has touched audiences universally. "Wheel of Fortune"'s 25 markets represent only 14 percent of the world's national TV systems. Countries from China to Germany and France to Japan air dating shows, but modes of matching couples in a TV game are as diverse as these nations' cuisines. A number of nations air "educational" student-contestant quizzes, but anyone who sees "Where In the World

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Is Carmen Sandiego?" (PBS-United States) and "That's Perfect" (NHK-Japan) will find comparisons odious. Furthermore, many countries have opted NOT to run such shows (e.g., the Philippines, Taiwan, Germany, Brazil, Mexico and Egypt).

On the other hand, the United Nations' 180 members do not each represent disparate, atomized national towns, even though TV news studies overemphasize national uniqueness. TV news often reflects national political control or national issues (laws, currency rates, weather, border problems). TV news studies (e.g., Struabhaar et al) can tell us about within-border interests, while entertainment studies can speak about cross-border interests.

Cultural Continents

Specific shows like "Wheel of Fortune" and "Sadabo Gigante," can cross borders. Furthermore, certain approaches to TV entertainment cross international borders. Besides the three "game worlds" described below, we could point to a fourth, because many less-developed nations have yet to produce enough game shows for a pattern to emerge. The finding that African television airs many student "quiz kid" games may give a hint as to one facet of that emerging model.

The East Asia Model

Since Japan stands as the world's foremost game/quiz producer, with 31 such shows running in fall 1992, this model applies most specifically to Japan. However, Taiwan and Korea fit the model to some extent, both with their own shows and with formats imported from Japan. The following characteristics apply:

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*interactivity (home audiences can play along)
*emphasis on content and information rather than mode of play
*deemphasis on expensive prizes and huge cash amounts to be won
*celebrity players (from a finite stable) rather than civlians
*activist hosts (direct the action, give opinons, evoke laughter)
*women as co-hosts but also as silent assistants
*high cost, high technology, out-of-studio production values
*prime-time, once-a-week scheduling (weekdays and weekends)
*high tolerance for sentimentality
*moderate pacing (most shows do not use a buzzer)
*game-only formats (no variety acts intervene)
*length: 30 to 60 minutes (except for longer specials)

The Western Model

Almost every trait of the East Asian model finds its mirror
opposite in the Western model--except that they both share a love
for interactive games. The group includes the United States,
Canada, all of Western Europe, Australia and some border   states
(i.e., those that share some traits with the West but are not
located in in the West). One such nation, Israel, does not fit in
this group because it airs almost no games. Turkey, on the other
hand, has games more like the West than like the Arab Muslim world,
so its audiences have voted with their channel changers for a place
in this Western model:

*interactivity
*emphasis on mode of play (game moves in stages, usually letting
      the winner tackle a special endgame after regular rounds)
*emphasis on expensive prizes and huge amounts of cash to be won
*civlian players rather than celebrities
*facilitator hosts (move game along, explain rules, ask the
      questions, announce commercial breaks)
*women as silent assistants, not as hosts
*low-budget, high-profit, studio-bound
*strip scheduling (five days a week, same time slot)
*low tolerance for sentimentality
*quick pacing (use of buzzer and rewards for quick responses)
*length: 30 minutes (rarely 60 minutes; no specials)

The Latin Model

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Brazil is the prime example of this unique language-unified model (considering Spanish and Portuguese somewhat mutually intelligible). But Chile and Mexico, because of their roles in "Sabado Gigante," admirably fit as well. Peru and probably other nations not in this study share many of the traits below:

*spectator formats
*emphasis on mode of play (physical games)
*emphasis on expensive prizes and huge amounts of cash to be won
*civilian players
*dominant hosts (show rests on host's personality)
*women sometimes hosts and always as wiggling assistants
*weekend scheduling
*high-cost, high production values, in and out of studio
*frenetic, physically fast pacing
*high tolerance for sentimentality
*mixed formats: games alternate with variety performances
*length: one to 10 hours

The Future

Two particular game types can speak volumes about a culture's current social mores: dating shows and striptease games. In the future, we can track social change as audience tastes and comfort levels regarding courtship and nudity evolve.

Noting the rate of acceptance and locus of "Tutti Frutti" could make for an entertainment diffusion study of which Everett Rogers (Singhal and Rogers 1989) could be proud. This show, which features both civilian and professional female strippers, began in Italy as "Colpo Grosso." It then conquered Germany and subsequently Spain. Brazil and Turkey followed soon after. Although cable penetration in Japan is very low, some viewers in Japan can see the Italian-language "Colpo Groso" early Wednesday morning (2:15 a.m.) on one cable network.

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In the future, satellites may make control by individual countries of "offensive" shows impossible. Today most of Europe, including Eastern Europe, can watch the strip show's German version via satellite. "I don't understand much German," a Polish man told this author, "but for this show, who need words? It helps me relax. Life here is difficult. We need to relax."

By contrast, dating shows from another culture may hold little interest for audiences even if they could view them easily by satellite. Asia and the West have their own distinctive matchmaking shows, none of which could successfully transfer between regions. However, the subtle variations within the two regional cultures hold almost as much interest as their overriding similarities.

Both Taiwan ("Sparks Fly") and Japan ("Red Whale Tribe") have mixer shows for young people in their 20s. At the end of each, women stands passively as the young men ask for dates; women have the power only to accept or reject, not to choose. But not all Asian shows duplicate this format exactly. Korea once had a show that matched farmers with women from cities and towns. China's "Let's Meet Tonight" often features groups of singles from specific factories and unions.

Taiwan's "We Love the Matchmaker" has evolved dramatically from a control-from-above format in the mid 1980s (producers arranged the match beforehand and ended the show with a dramatic meeting of the young man and woman). By 1992, three men and three women participated actively in a mutual choice process. The parallels with Taiwan's evolving political freedom make for

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intriguing speculation.

The change of U.S. dating shows from the innuendo of "The Dating Game" to more explicit cocktail-lounge conversation has not occurred in other countries. "Dating Game" clones were running in various Western nations even after the show had disappeared in its home nation.

Finally, technology can allow cultural continents to share not only program formats, but actual content. The Arabic- and Spanish-speaking worlds best represent language-unifed cultural continents. Already a Spanish-language game show not only exists, but has made broadcasting history.

"Sabado Gigante" ("Gigantic Saturday"), a classic Latin long-format weekend game/ variety program with a charismatic host, "is the first TV show produced in Spanish that has been successfully broadcast to the entire continent" (Silva 1991, p. 56). Viewers in 18 countries including the United States can tune in to the weekly program, which airs on the East Coast 7-10:30 p.m. (e.g., in New York City on Channel 41, WXTV) on the Univision network.

Univision, based in Miami, sells an international edition of the game/variety show without commercials. Using "Sabado" as a springboard, eventually Univision hopes to create a stable of affiliates by providing a whole slate of programs for which local staffs would sell local commercials. This Spanish-language network, which Hallmark Cards bought in 1988 for $600 million, would work like ABC, CBS and NBC--except for being international.

Even the production has international dimensions. Identical

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stage sets have been built in Miami and Santiago, Chile, home base
of the show's host Don Francisco.   When Francisco introduces a
segment that actually takes place in Miami, the Chilean studio
audience sees it on a screen. Francisco, whose real name is Mario
Kreutzberger, started "Sabado" in Chile in 1962. The total
"admiration/ subordination of the public to a star" as powerful as
Francisco may be cause for concern, believes Altamirano (1987, p.
179), even though his base is just a game show.

Altamirano (1987) had an uncanny prescience about the power of
TV personalities. In November 1989, game show host Silvio Santos
appeared tied for the lead with Fernando Collor de Mello in
Brazil's presidential race, according to a Gallup poll ("Brazilian
TV host . . ." 1989). Santos had to quit the race on a
technicality, leaving Collor to go on to victory. Considering the
trauma of Collor's 1992 impeachment due to corruption, a game show
host might not have been a bad choice.

I. TV GAME/QUIZ SHOWS IN 50 COUNTRIES, AUTUMN 1990: SCHEDULING

REGION	# OF SHOWS	TIME PLACEMENT				TIME DURATION			
		WEEKEND PRIME DAYTIME[1] (%)	WEEKDAY PRIME[2] (%)	WEEKDAY STRIP[3] (%)	NOT KNOWN (%)	15-45 MIN. (%)	46-59 MIN (%)	OVER 60 MIN. (%)	NOT KNOWN (%)
1. N. Europe	32	18.8	28.13	37.50	15.6	65.6	6.3	6.3	21.8
2. W. Europe	68	16.2	38.2	39.7	5.9	60.3	14.7	4.4	20.6
3. E. Europe	10	40.0	20.0	0.00	40.0	10.0	30.0	10.0	50.0
4. Nr./ MidE	11	36.4	18.2	9.1	36.4	63.6	9.1	0.0	27.2
5. Africa	18	38.9	22.2	5.56	33.3	77.8	5.6	0.0	16.6
6. S/SE Asia	16	62.5	25.0	6.25	6.25	50.0	31.3	12.5	6.3
7. E. Asia	45	53.3	44.4	2.22	0.00	37.8	37.8	6.7	17.7
8. Pacific	9	22.2	11.1	44.4	22.2	88.9	0.0	0.0	11.1
9. Lat. Am.	12	50.0	25.0	25.0	0.00	0.0	16.7	75.0	8.3
10. No. Am.	44	18.2	18.18	54.55	9.09	95.5	2.3	2.3	0.0
TOTALS	265	35.65	25.04	22.43	16.8	54.9	15.3	11.7	17.9

(1) Shows airing on Saturday and Sunday.

(2) Shows airing on one or more days, 7-11 p.m.; includes four late prime shows airing after 11 p.m. once a week as well as two early prime shows airing at 6 p.m. once a week.

(3) Shows airing on two or more days 7 a.m.-7 p.m.

II. TV GAME/QUIZ SHOWS IN 50 COUNTRIES, AUTUMN 1990: FORMAT CHARACTERISTICS				
REGION	# OF SHOWS	A. TRANSFERS (%)	B. CELEBRITIES (%)	C. FEMALE HOSTS/COHOSTS (%)
1. N. Europe	32	75.0	15.6	12.5
2. W. Europe	68	63.2	14.7	11.8
3. E. Europe	10	20.0	0.0	20.0
4. Nr./Mid E	11	36.4	0.0	9.1
5. Africa	18	16.7	5.6	22.2
6. S/SE Asia	16	25.0	18.8	12.5
7. E. Asia	45	2.2	62.2	51.1
8. Pacific	9	100.0	33.3	0.0
9. Lat. Am	12	8.3	33.3	58.3
10. No. Am.	44	11.4	6.8	0.0
TOTAL	265	35.82	19.03	19.75

III. TV GAME/QUIZ SHOWS IN 50 COUNTRIES, AUTUMN 1990: MODE OF PLAY						
REGION	# OF SHOWS	A. INTERACTIVE (%)	B. SPECTATOR (%)	C. KNOWLEDGE (%)	D. MIXED (%)	E. NOT KNOWN (%)
1. N. Europe	32				0.0	12.5
2. W. Europe	68				2.9	14.7
3. E. Europe	10				10.0	30.0
4. Nr./Mid E	11				9.1	18.2
5. Africa	18				5.6	22.2
6. S/SE Asia	16				25.0	12.5
7. E. Asia	45				13.3	6.7
8. Pacific	9				11.1	0.0
9. Lat. Am	12		3		75.0	0.0
10. No. Am.	44				6.8	6.8
TOTAL	265	41.5	18.8	21.1	15.9	12.36

NOTES

1. According to BBC statistics for 1989, television reaches at least 600 million of China's 1.1 billion population (55 percent); about 125 million of India's 880 million people (15 percent); and about 70 million of Mexico's 80 million people (87 percent) (Singhal 1990, p. 78)

2. In 1980 China had about 630,000 sets. By 1985, there were 12 million sets, and by the end of the decade, about 118 million (about one set for every 10 persons).

3. In India, between 1984 and 1985, the number of TV viewers jumped from 37 to 60 million, then increased again to 90 million in 1988. For those who still cannot afford the relatively high cost, the practice of community viewing increases access to television. By the year 2000, India will have an estimated audience of some 378 million people (Singhal and Rogers, 1989, p.67).

4. In 1983, Varis (1984, p. 150) found entertainment to account for these percentages of TV minutes: US, 40%; Canada, 36%; Latin America, 44%; Western Europe, 35%; Eastern Europe, 36%; Asia, 48%; and the Arab region, 42%. In only two areas, entetainment was the second rather than highest-percentage category: USSR, informative content, 30%/ entertainment, 27%; Africa, informative, 39%/ entertainment, 30%.

5. The 50 countries are: NORTHERN EUROPE--England, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland; WESTERN EUROPE--France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium; EASTERN EUROPE--Russia (USSR), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia; NEAR/ MIDDLE EAST--Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Dubai UAE; AFRICA--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Botswana, South Africa, Cameroun, Ghana; SOUTH/ SOUTHEAST ASIA-- India, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand; EAST ASIA--Taiwan ROC, People's Republic of China, Korea, Japan; PACIFIC--Australia, New Zealand; LATIN AMERICA--Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru; NORTH AMERICA- -Jamaica, Trinidad, Canada; United States.

6. "Information" as contrasted with "entertainment" content is in some senses a false dichotomy. The "myth that 'pure entertainment' exists is one that is slowly but surely being dismantled," say Fischer and Melnik (1979, p. xix). Decrying this false dich.tomy, Fischer and Melnik (1979, p. 145) note, "A documentary is or can be entertaining . . . Conversely, entertainment can be informative and can influence." The well-entrenched distinction between entertainment and informational TV programs has bureaucratic roots: first, the institutional division within commercial television; and second, the industry-wide division between commerical and non-commerical ("educational") television.

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U.S. COMMUNICATION POLICIES REGARDING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA OUTLETS AND PRODUCERS

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. communication policies regarding foreign ownership of broadcasting stations, cable systems, and film studios are examined by analyzing data from both government documents and trade publications. The study provides different perspectives toward and possible consequences of these policies, and the implication of globalization of media for future U.S. policies. It is concluded that the United States should remove its restrictions on foreign ownership of broadcasting stations and keep broadcasting, cable system, and film markets open to international competition. It is also concluded that foreign investment in film studios contributes positively to U.S. economy, and its cultural impact on American society still remains to be seen.

U.S. COMMUNICATION POLICIES REGARDING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA OUTLETS AND PRODUCERS

Introduction

Foreign investment in the U.S. mass media and telecommunication has developed rapidly during the past decade. The trend has raised concerns from the federal government, the media industry, and the general public. While some critics contend foreign investment in mass media has brought considerable danger to the economy, others believe that the foreign capital infuses the American mass media industry with new blood. Some policy makers are concerned that the purchase of U.S. mass media could enable foreigners to exercise improper influence over American public opinion. Others think those foreign-owned mass media could provide diversity of views in American society.

The implications of globalization of mass media ownership for mass communication research has become a new academic interest in Europe and the United States (Smith, 1991; Hachten, 1992; Hirsch, 1992). How will the rules and regulations regarding foreign ownership of the U.S. mass media outlets and producers change as foreign investment in American media industry and the U.S. investment in foreign media markets both increase dramatically? While U.S. policy restriction on foreign ownership of broadcasting stations has not been changed for more than fifty years, doubts have been raised on whether this policy should be kept in today's new environment of international communication. While the attempt to restrict foreign ownership of American cable

television systems brought debates in Congress in 1989 and led to conflict between the Congress and the Bush Administration in 1990, the dispute on which policy choice should be adopted is not settled yet.

This paper attempts to examine government policy regarding foreign ownership of electronic media outlets and producers in the United States. It is intended to compare and contrast U.S. government policies regarding foreign ownership of broadcasting stations, cable television systems, and film studios. The basic research questions include: How have these policies been developed? Why do official policies and regulations treat foreign holding of these three media differently? What are the current developments of these policies in response to the globalization of mass media ownership? What are the possible consequences and effects for the United States in keeping or changing these existing policies? By using primary sources from government documents and secondary sources mostly from trade publications, the paper examines the U.S. communication policies regarding foreign ownership of broadcasting stations, cable systems, and film studios in the United States. The implications of globalization of mass media for U.S. communication policies are also considered.

<u>U.S. Policies on Foreign Ownership</u>
<u>of Broadcasting and Communication Industry</u>

Since 1980, European and other international markets have

become increasingly fertile territory for U.S. entrepreneurial ventures, and primary among them are new broadcast facilities. Many American broadcast organizations already have staked minority claims in broadcast stations, from the United Kingdom to the former Soviet Union and to Japan, and seek even more financial interest as these countries became part of the global communication village ("Foreign ownership...," 1991, 36). In turn, foreign corporations want to invest in the U.S. media enterprises beyond the limits set forth in the Communications Act of 1934. This proposed quid pro quo reciprocity has raised questions about raising or lifting the limits on foreign ownership of broadcasting in the United States, and has caused concern over the economic, social and political consequences such changes might cause.

In the United States, the law regarding foreign ownership of broadcasting is Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934. It limits foreign ownership of broadcasting stations and common carriers and applies to direct as well as indirect ownership of communication properties. According to Section 310 of the Act, corporate licensees are limited to 20 percent alien ownership of capital stock while holding companies are allowed as much as 25 percent foreign ownership (House, 1989a, 1).

This restriction dates back to 1912, and it is grounded in the importance of the telecommunication network to national security. The 1934 Senate report accompanying the Communications Act reaffirmed the national security underpinnings of foreign

ownership restrictions by noting that the Radio Act of 1927 incorporated the lessons that the United States had learned before and during World War I from both the foreign dominance of the cables and the dangers from espionage and propaganda disseminated through foreign-owned radio stations (House, 1989a).

Currently there is no federal law prohibiting foreign ownership of wire-based telephone, telegraph, network television companies, book publishing, magazines, newspapers, and billboards. Nor is there restriction on ownership or control of any other medium of public expression except broadcasting, for such limits would be repugnant to the First Amendment. Some of the nation's leading journals of public opinion are in foreign hands. For examples, until 1986, New York City's third-largest circulation newspaper(the Post) and Boston's second largest circulation newspaper(the Herald) were owned by an Australian. Until 1987, the Houston Post was owned by a Canadian company. Dozens of newspapers in communities of all sizes are foreign-owned. For book publication, Bertelsmann, the largest German publishing company, owns Bantam Books, Doubleday and Dell, making it the largest trade publisher in the United States (Waz, 1988, 22). Current U.S. law also does not restrict foreign ownership of local cable television systems.

In the 1990s, some foreign investors have shown strong interests in the U.S. broadcasting markets (Darling, 1992). In December 1991, Mexican media baron Emilio Azcarraga, the owner of Mexico city-based Televisa, pleaded with the Federal

Communication Commission to lift restrictions on foreign

ownership of TV stations. He said that the FCC can and should

permit up to 49% foreign ownership. He held that the current

technologically advanced state of broadcasting, the breadth of

competitive video alternatives available to the U.S. public, and

the existence of the global communications market, have rendered

the U.S. alien ownership restrictions "anachronistic and

unnecessary." He argued that the relaxation of the restrictions

would benefit U.S. broadcasters by introducing new sources of

financing. This new financial source would in turn permit

broadcasting stations to enhance and expand service to the

public. Furthermore, he said, the restriction impairs foreign

broadcasters' rights to freedom of speech and limits the public's

access to a diversity of viewpoints (Jessell, 1992a, 52).

<u>Support for Foreign Broadcasting Ownership Restrictions</u>

Supporters of restriction are concerned with the economic,

political and cultural damage that foreign-owned broadcasting

might bring to the American society. "Foreign ownership of

broadcasting properties will do for our industry what the

Japanese did for the automotive industry. There are considerable

economic dangers involved in this, particularly among the

Japanese, because their payout terms are much longer than ours,"

said a broadcasting executive ("Foreign ownership...," 1991, 37).

Another school of thought is that ownership of broadcasting

facilities influences public sentiment, whether the owners are

American citizens or foreigners. The United States cannot allow control of the thought process to be transferred to foreigners, according to this view. Greater foreign ownership, investment, and the resultant control of the U.S. broadcast stations threatens fundamental American institutions and offers little real benefit to the U.S. broadcast industry, it is argued (Mckinnon, 1991).

In addition, strong foreign investments could further drive weaker U.S.-owned properties out of business. With foreign investment and purchase of production facilities, it remains to be seen whether these new owners will continue to allow distribution of historical films or productions critical of the owners' countries or lifestyle. Return on investment of foreign ownership will be important, but nationalist and philosophical ideas by such foreign ownership might shape the policies and thoughts of the United States. In fact, foreign investors, out to make money, care little about democracy or the First Amendment, critics charge (Mckinnon, 1991).

FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes said in December 1991 that he would support relaxation of the restrictions on foreign ownership of broadcasting stations, but only on a reciprocal basis (Jessell, 1991b). However, other FCC commissioners had different views from him. In January 1992, James Quello recommended keeping current foreign restriction. Sherrie Marshall said that she did not expect any changes of the restriction ("FCC reviews ...," 1992, 14).

Opposition to Foreign Broadcasting Ownership Restrictions

There have been increasing voices for reducing the foreign broadcasting ownership limits in the U.S. media industry. These arguments may be summarized as follows.

1. Section 310 is an outdated barrier to foreign competition. The statutory prohibition against alien ownership of broadcast stations was originally intended to protect against foreign control of domestic airwaves in wartime. It may have had some rationale 50 years ago when there were comparatively few radio stations and no television stations, when the power and pervasiveness of the broadcast medium were at their historical peak. Today, with about 1,000 commercial TV stations and more than 9,400 commercial radio stations in operation domestically, and with countless competing media outlets, the basis for denying a station license to an otherwise qualified foreign broadcaster no longer exists (Waz, 1988).

2. Section 310 prevents foreign capital from coming into the U.S. broadcast industry. "The law does not merely affect esoteric international trade relations, it also stymies broadcasters in their search for risk capital during financial crises" (Christensen, 1991, 16). Such investments could generate a vast infusion of capital, boosting not only the price of broadcast properties but also reducing the gargantuan imbalance in foreign trade ("Foreign ownership...," 1991). Today the broadcasting media face an unprecedented liquidity problem. The broadcast industry's financial markets are dysfunctional.

Declining advertising revenues, heightened regulatory scrutiny of bank lending, and increasing competition are forcing broadcasters to find alternative sources of capital. Financial distress is impairing the broadcasting industry's ability to serve the public interest. Therefore, restrictions of foreign ownership unnecessarily limit viewers' and listeners' program choices. (Christensen, 1991). The more opportunities there are to have people from other countries interested in radio, the better and more valued the radio industry will be ("Foreign ownership...," 1991, 37).

3. Even without Section 310, public interests would be well protected by FCC regulations. The FCC's system of licensing inherently provides ample protection to insure that the public interest would not be compromised by foreign ownership. Each broadcast license is subject to periodic review and renewal. Each licensee must demonstrate every five to seven years that its continued operation of the broadcast station will serve the public interest. In the event of national emergency, the government could as readily commandeer the airwaves of a foreign-owned station as an American-owned one (Waz, 1988).

4. Opening the U.S. broadcast market to foreign investment would help American companies' investment in foreign markets. Foreign media markets, especially in Europe, have been growing much faster than those of the United States. The U.S television industries have globalized twice as fast as the overall U.S economy (Keslar, 1993). American companies should seek more

opportunities to operate foreign markets.

.5. Foreign broadcasters deserve the same First Amendment right as foreign investors in other U.S. media, such as newspaper and magazine. According to a 1988 Broadcasting commentary, the argument may be made that because broadcasting is different from other media, in that it uses scarce, government-licensed spectrum space, restrictions unique to radio and television can be justified. But the restriction must advance some clearly defined government interest paramount to, or in furtherance of, the First Amendment. It is difficult to identify any such rationale here (Waz, 1988).

One commentary suggested the following amendment to Section 310(b): 1) Immediately exclude AM and independent UHF stations from its scope. 2) Immediately allow domestic broadcasters to form joint ventures with foreign partners--one to a market. Foreigners could buy up to 50% of one FM and one non-independent UHF television station in each market, with an option to buy the remaining equity in three years. 3) Condition acquisition of a controlling interest in any station upon reciprocal treatment of U.S. investors by the alien investor's government (Christensen, 1991, 16).

In summary, different views on lifting or raising foreign ownership restriction on broadcasting stations reflect a different economic judgment. The pro-restriction position reflects the public fear of loosing control of the American telecommunication system to foreign investors. The against-

restriction position emphasizes more the importance of the free trade and competition in the international marketplace. They see the benefits of opening the U.S. broadcasting markets over the possible negative impact it might have.

What is the position of public interest groups on this issue? What will be the possible consequences if the foreign ownership restriction on broadcasting is lifted? For example, what will be the local reaction to an incoming foreign station? It might depend on the specific local situation. If it happens in a major metropolitan area where there exists a large multiethnic population and a wide diversity of stations, a strong negative reaction from the public would be less likely. If it happens in a small town with few choices of programs, a negative reaction from the local community might exist. However, public attitudes toward this issue need more study.

Foreign Cable Ownership in G-7 Nations and in the United States

While there have not been many public debates on the foreign ownership of broadcasting stations, the issue of restriction of foreign ownership of cable systems, a more profitable business in the United States has gained more public attention. The attempt to restrict foreign ownership of U.S. cable systems, led by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) in 1989, brought debates in Congress and led to a fight between the Congress and the Bush Administration in 1990.

In the Group-7 countries which are the most industrialized

countries in the world and comprise the U.S. largest trading partners, the regulations governing foreign investment in cable television could be divided into two groups. The first group includes the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. They allow unrestricted international investment in their cable television systems and currently have significant foreign ownership of their cable stations. About 10-15 percent of the U.K. cable television industry was foreign-owned, of which between a third to a half was U.S.-owned. In Germany, CNN and Worldnet both operated German-language programming services and were fully owned by non-Germans. There was no U.S. investment in the French cable television industry (House, 1989a, 36).

The second group, Japan and Canada, restrict foreign ownership to 25 and 20 percent, respectively, although Japanese law allows a waiver for unrestricted ownership (House, 1989a). Japan also restricts foreign ownership of broadcast satellite properties to 20 percent. Canada passed a law in 1977 that imposes a 20 percent limit on foreign ownership of cable television system. At that time, 77 percent of the Canadian cable television system was foreign-owned (House, 1989a). The U.S. and Canada, each the other's largest trading partner, have entered into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) designed, among other things, to create more liberal investment relations between the two countries. A fundamental tenet of the FTA is that any investment measure enacted after January 1, 1989, must be consistent with the national treatment principle.

In addition, Italy has no cable television system and therefore imposes no restriction. South Korea, another U.S. trade partner, has restrictions basically banning foreign ownership in broadcast properties and their related technologies (House, 1989a, 44).

Up to 1990, U.S. cable systems with foreign investment had only 499,000 subscribers, out of a total of less than 1 percent of the industry. Foreign investment is mostly by a subsidiary of the Canadian firm Maclean-Hunter Limited, which has major publishing, broadcasting and cable television operations in Canada, the United States, and Europe. It serves over 1 million cable subscribers with 565,000 in Canada and 441,000 in U.S. systems in Michigan, New Jersey, and Florida (House, 1989a, 16). The only known European holding of U.S. cable was a small share by the Belgian communication firm Tractable in the U.S. company Prime Cable, which had systems in Atlanta, Las Vegas, North Carolina and Texas ("Cable not...," 1989). So, the U.S. cable industry was not concerned about foreign cable ownership because it is almost nonexistent.

Markey's Cable Foreign Ownership Act: Rationale

In 1989, Cable Foreign Ownership Act imposing limits of foreign ownership of cable was introduced by the House Telecommunication Subcommittee chairman Edward Markey (D-Mass.), with the cosponsorship of 16 House Democrats and a Republican. It contains a series of findings on curbs on U.S. ownership of

foreign cable systems by key trading partners and implications of
foreign dominance of US cable industry. The bill would have
limited foreign ownership in cable, direct broadcast satellite
systems (DBS) and multipoint distribution services (MDS) to 20%,
along the same lines that television and radio station ownership
is curbed by the 1934 act. Markey added reciprocal trade
questions to the bill by allowing the cap to vary, depending on
the foreign applicant's home coun; y barriers to U.S. ownership
of domestic cable, DBS and MDS properties ("Markey cable...,"
1989, 13).

In a hearing by the House Telecommunication Subcommittee on
foreign cable ownership on June 15, 1989, Markey said:

> "Current law does not apply to new technology such as cable,
> satellite and wireless cable properties leaving a giant
> loophole in our nation's communications policy....Currently
> 80 percent of our nation's households are passed by cable
> and approximately 55 percent of American households
> subscribe to cable service. In many areas, cable is the sole
> means of television reception. More than 2 million Americ: ns
> own satellite dishes and receive DBS signals. MDS licensees
> serve many areas not yet wired for cable or in competition
> with cable. These new technologies have become increasingly
> important as providers of new information and entertainment
> programming" (House, 1989a, 2).

According to Markey, the ever-increasing vertical and
horizontal integration in media industries created a new breed of
multimedia conglomerate. Those highly integrated, foreign-owned
corporations increasingly wanted to purchase U.S. cable systems
and "control the free flow of information to the American public"
(House, 1989a, 2). Therefore, the rationale for foreign
ownership restriction was that the functions performed by cable
systems had important implications for the national security and

economic interests of the United States. Its intent was to ensure that the U.S. "information highway can never b come subject to another government's agenda"(House, 1989a, 2).

Markey contended that the Cable Foreign Ownership Act was not a protectionist measure, and it was not inconsistent with the U.S. effort against European quotas on American television programming. This proposal was concerned with foreign control of the means of cable transmission, which in most countries of the world was retained by that nation or its citizens. The act did not seek to control or restrict cable programming content (House, 1989b, 85).

A second reason for this legislation was that the American cable industry in the future would be outside U.S. control without this foreign ownership regulation. Market said:

> "The only issue I would raise is whether or not we want to discuss it now or we want to discuss it after a recession in which cable systems in this country might be 75 or 65 cents on the dollar bargains for companies or countries that are cash flush at that time, and then we have a public policy question which we're addressing after all of the properties are basically in the process of changing hands and out of American control" (House, 1989a, 52).

Markey stressed that Asian and European governments and companies understood that economic success in the year 2000 would turn on dominance in telecommunications and electronics. The United States needed to develop and implement policies that would provide American industries incentives to look at long-term investment rather than short-term profits (House, 1989c, 2).

Reciprocity should be required for foreigners investing in U.S. cable. Markey was concerned that no U.S. company could bid

effectively for a Japanese or European firm of the size or importance of a Columbia or a MGM/UA. This was mostly because of barriers erected by U.S. trading partners (House, 1989c). Many U.S. cable broadcasters think reciprocity a reasonable requirement for foreign investors.

Another view supporting the restriction is that the ownership of the means of conduit could affect programming content. A business executive testifying in the congressional hearing stressed that cable operators could control programming content through program selections. As the law stands, a cable system operator can delete a single program or a single commentator from a satellite delivery channel which it carries, and thus has massive control over that kind of content (House, 1989a, 50).

Opposition to Cable Foreign Ownership Act

First, Canadian cable system operators in the United States expressed deep concerns about the proposed foreign cable ownership limits (House, 1989a). They saw a cable system as the highway which originated very little of its own programming. In their view, cable system had more characteristics in common with wired common carrier facilities than with broadcast television facilities. It was a closed-circuit system as opposed to an over the air system. An over-the-air system was going into everyone's home whether the viewer chose it to be there or not. Cable system had no such a power. Therefore, foreign cable ownership

cannot pose a threat to national security (House, 1989a, 22).

The chief executive officer of Canada's Maclean-Hunter Cable Television, Barry Gage, noted in his testimony in the House hearing:

> "To the extent that there is any risk of foreign dominance, it resides in foreign control of the companies engaged in program production but the proposed legislative prohibition would have no effect on ownership of program producers. It applies only to ownership of cable and other transmission systems"(House, 1989a, 17).

The second view in opposition to cable foreign ownership restriction was that national security justifications offered in support of foreign ownership prohibition were invalid. In fact, foreign ownership of the U.S. cable television systems declined from 3-4 percent in 1980 to 2 percent in 1987; it was argued, thus, neither the magnitude nor the trend in foreign ownership of U.S. cable television should arouse concern (House, 1989a).

The third view is that, since American companies' investment abroad in cable system far exceeded foreign investment in U.S. cable television, the foreign cable ownership bill may seriously harm U.S. trade interests and investors in foreign countries. While foreign investors had not shown a great deal of interest in U.S. cable systems, there was much interest among U.S. companies in acquiring foreign cable properties. For example, several U.S. companies have invested in cable properties in the United Kingdom, Brazil, and other nations. Many U.S. companies are examining the prospects for purchasing cable systems in other nations of European Community.

Finally, the Markey's proposal shows a contradiction between the U.S. policy at home and its opposition to European television quota regulation, it was argued. The U.S. government has often voiced its opposition to official policies in other nations that close foreign markets to the products and services of U.S. companies. The United States has objected to provisions of the television broadcasting directive adopted by the European Community Council in October 1989. This directive would restrict EC broadcasters from importing U.S. movies and television programs after 1992 (Briller, 1990). Therefore, the Markey's proposal counters the U.S. efforts against European television quota rules.

In summary, the attempt to restrict foreign ownership of U.S. cable systems represented by Rep. Markey and others, reflected a deep concern of some U.S. policy makers about the potential risk that the United States would face if its cable industry was in foreign hands. Reciprocity was a key concern of the Markey's proposal. It seems that the restriction of foreign cable ownership existing in many countries showed the legitimacy of the Markey proposal. But the U.S. cable industry in general did not share Markey's concern, since there was no sign of serious foreign interests in U.S. domestic cable industry.

FCC and Bush Administration's Opposition
to Foreign Broadcast and Cable Ownership Restriction

FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes said in December 1991, that he was

in favor of relaxed foreign cable ownership rules for countries
that reciprocated. He said the FCC may waive the 25% holding
company cap. The FCC was more likely to grant waivers of the 25%
cap for common carriers because, unlike broadcast stations, they
were not involved in defining American culture, he said (Jessell,
1991b, 37).

The FCC twice conducted in-depth analyses of the foreign
ownership issue and twice refused to impose restrictions on
foreign ownership in the cable television industry during the
70s. In 1975, the FCC voted unanimously against the imposition
of foreign ownership restrictions for the following reasons:

1) There were no threats to the national security.

2) Cable operators had only minor content control over the
programming they distribute.

3) Foreign ownership restrictions did not generally apply to
communications, e.g., television networks, newspapers, wire
services, etc. are not restricted.

4) Local jurisdictions were in the best possible position to
determine whether an individual operator's nationality would
prevent satisfaction of public interest obligations (House,
1989a, 40).

In 1979, the FCC again refused to impose foreign ownership
restrictions, stating:

> "[A]t this time it is difficult for us to perceive how the
> television viewing public would benefit in any way from the
> regulation requested. Rather it would appear that such a
> restriction would merely promote the self interests of the
> domestic cable television industry at the expense of
> additional competitive alternatives for the public in the

franchising process" (House, 1989a, 40).

The Bush administration opposed the proposed House bill restricting foreign cable ownership. The Office of Management and Budget wrote to the House in September 1990, saying that the measure "invites retaliation by other nations that could stifle the growing investment of U.S. firms in foreign cable systems and could hinder U.S. efforts to open foreign markets... it violates the U.S. international trade obligations" ("Controversial ...," 1990, 78). To them, instead of searching for trouble, keeping the current no-law situation would be a better choice.

On January 15, 1993, during President Bush's last week in office, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration released a report titled "Globalization of the Mass Media." This 200-plus page study suggests many relaxations of ownership limits, crossownership bans and foreign investment. It recommends that the FCC should launch a proceeding to allow for greater foreign investment in the parent company of a broadcast licenses "unless the public interest would be served by the refusal or revocation of such a license." It is also calling for either elimination or substantial relaxation of both the television and radio national ownership limits. It stresses that a total relaxation would open up foreign investment which is key for broadcasters' future survival (Flint, 1993, 113).

Foreign Ownership of U.S. Film Studios

Probably because of the scarcity of foreign investment in

the U.S. cable system, there have not been many public debates on foreign cable ownership restriction since 1990. In another area of mass media, movie industry, the situation was quite different. Foreign purchases in Hollywood since the mid-1980 have had an astounding result and created substantial public debates. What is the impact of foreign investment of Hollywood on the American society? How should the US policy response to this change? These are frequently raised questions in Congress and the press.

Since the mid-1980s there has been a major transnational ownership change reshaping the global entertainment industry. Efforts begun in 1985 by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation to form a fourth television network initiated a period of acquisition of U.S. entertainment interests by companies owned or controlled by foreign nationals (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1992).

The News Corp. used the deregulatory nature of the Reagan-era communications environment to pursue a synergy between its Twentieth Century Fox production studio, Metromedia television stations, and numerous newspaper, magazine, and book publishing concerns (Gomery, 1989). Murdoch's company purchased Fox for $575 million in 1985 and Metromedia's six major-market television stations for $1.5 billion in 1986 (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1992).

Several Japanese corporations have focused their attention on gaining greater equity interest in the software on which their products depend. Since 1987, more than one half of corporate Japan's total acquisitions in the United States have been in the entertainment industry (Alexander, 1991). Sony purchased CBS

Records for $2 billion in 1987 and Columbia Pictures for $3.4 billion in 1989. In November 1990, Matsushita purchased MCA for $6.13 billion. MCA owned, among other entities, Universal Studios, Universal Pictures, MCA Records, theme parks, and the Putnam publishing firm. So Matsushita and Sony control more than a quarter of the American movie industry. Japanese banks and investors have also emerged as the principal sources of financing for producers in the United States and Europe ("The changing face...," 1990).

As mentioned above, Murdoch purchased 20th Century-Fox in 1985, and MGM-Pathe of Italy acquired the former MGM/United Artists studio in 1990. Only Warner, Paramount, and Disney motion picture studios are still owned by American companies (Sanger, 1990; "The changing face...," 1990) (See Table 1).

Besides the film studios, four of the five biggest record companies in the United States are now foreign owned: Sony owns CBS Records, a German company owns RCA Records, a Dutch firm owns PolyGram Records, and a British concern owns Capitol/EMI (House, 1989c).

This trend may well continue because large international mass media entities need assured access to US products; feature films and programming produced in this country stimulate consumer demand here and around the world.

Support for Foreign Investment in Hollywood

Those favoring a foreign role in the film industry argued

that investment was the key to the economic future of the United States and its competitors. Foreign investment and foreign-based companies accounted for well under 10% of the corporate assets in the United States and less than 5 percent of the US employment, compared with between 15 and 30 percent of industrial bases of France, West Germany and Britain. For example, despite concentrated Japanese purchases in Los Angeles, Honolulu and Manhattan, up to 1989, foreign ownership of the U.S. real estate was about 1 percent (Fallow, 1989).

While Americans worked out their emotional responses to Japanese acquisitions and economists refined their measures of the risks and benefits of an enlarged foreign share of the U.S. economy, another more important investment trend was under way. The investments that would affect American future were not Japanese investments in the United States but Japanese investments in Japan, which were creating the most formidable economic competitor the United States has ever confronted. While Japan invested nearly one quarter of its gross national product in new capital equipment, the United States invested only about one tenth of its GNP (Fallow, 1989, 46).

Robert B. Reich, a professor of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and secretary of Labor in the Clinton Administration, said:

> "If the Japanese or Europeans want to come here and invest in American companies, buy American companies, build up the abilities and capacities of American workers, retool, retrain, I will say, 'Terrific.' Instead of regarding this foreign investment as somehow a favor that we are doing to them, what we ought to understand is that of all the options

we have, with regard to paying them back for all the money they are giving us in financing us, this is probably the best option we have, particularly if it is accompanied by investments in our future" (House, 1989c, 30).

As American companies had been all over the world working with foreigners, now foreign companies were in the United States working with Americans, he argued, and nationality of ownership was becoming less and less consequential. "The fundamental question is not who owns what, but who learns what," said Reich, "and how do we build up the American work force?" (House, 1989c, 30-31).

Some representatives of the U.S. telecommunication industry agreed in a House hearing in 1989, that foreign investment in vertical integration was really a function of a global economy. The government role would be to develop a set of policy initiatives to optimize the role of foreign investment and the role of the U.S. players in the American economy, taking a proactive point of view on it (House, 1989c, 61-62).

On October 12, 1989, The Washington Post quoted John E. Robson, deputy secretary of the Treasury, as stating that foreign investment in the United States, like Sony's investment in Columbia Pictures, was good for the United States and the world economy (House, 1989c, 16).

Frank Biondi, president of Viacom International, said that the movie industry's trends were toward vertical integration, consolidation, and foreign ownership. These changes would bring a more diverse and richer range of entertainment to more people

in more places on a more efficient basis. Public policies should continue to occupy its traditional role to ensure that competition is free and open and not hampered by anticompetitive and unfair business and trade practices (House, 1989c, 22).

Concerns about Japanese Investment in U.S. Studios

Just as American penetration of foreign media markets has caused concern abroad, the Japan's rapid and profound entry into a culturally sensitive industry in the United States has not been without its conflicts (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1992). Issues has been raised such as diversity of views as well as freedom of expression, creative sovereignty, cultural influence, monopoly and competition in the U.S. film industry.

The first protest that foreign ownership of U.S. studios would limit citizens' access to information was raised in Congress. In the House Telecommunication Subcommittee's hearing on globalization of the media, Rep. Matthew Rinaldo of New Jersey said:

> "There is a growing feeling that Sony's purchase of Columbia is only the first shot in another war, this time, over control of our media....The lifeblood of democracy is communications, because it gives our citizens access to the marketplace of ideas. Our concerns about foreign investment should become even more serious when that precious market is at stake....But few would argue that in the age of 'media without frontiers,' it's even more important that Americans maintain their First Amendment rights in the electronic media free from outside influence. Foreign ownership of large part of our media could limit or deny Americans that opportunity" (House, 1989c, 5).

A second concern regarded Japanese influence on U.S. business management in those Japanese-owned studios. From

Hollywood's perspective, Japan's money was welcome, but any interference in the management of the studios or any aspect of the creative process was off limits. Japanese owners have varied in their approaches to handling this problem. Shortly after Sony's acquisition of Columbia Pictures, Chairman Aiko Morita firmly pledged his company's noninterference in the studio's creative decision making. However, within two years, Sony faced an image problem after President Walter Yentikoff left Sony Music and Jon Peters vacated his co-chairmanship of Columbia Pictures. In September, 1991, the other co-chairman of Columbia Pictures, Frank Price, was forced to leave. Sony paid him $10 million in a contract buyout. Reports in the U.S. press suggested that Sony was an overspender, ignorant of Hollywood's inner workings (Reibstein, 1991; Weinraub, 1991).

A third concern was the influence of Japanese views on programming content. Matsushita President Aiko Tanii's reluctance to assert creative noninterference haunted his company as reported changes in the script for <u>Mr. Baseball</u>--a Universal film about an American player's struggles in Japan--indicated parent-company meddling in the studio's creative activity. In defending Matsushita, Universal Chairman Thomas Pollack denied any intervention and underscored the importance of not offending Japanese audiences, who comprise the second largest film market in the world (Weisman, 1991). The <u>Mr. Baseball</u> controversy reflects a major stumbling block of the current globalization trend: Which cultures or markets will be preferred when a

cultural product is not culturally neutral or lacks cross-cultural appeal? As McAnany and Wilkinson (1992) said, Sony's management and image concerns demonstrate another challenge of foreign media ownership: "What are the limits of laissez-faire when an owner holds the purse strings but not the know-how?"

Japanese direct investment in the United States was relatively small--amounting to no more than $50 billion, and accounting for about 1.5 percent of corporate assets in the United States and a somewhat smaller proportion of total employment. The British ownership of U.S. assets was more than twice that amount, over $102 billion (House, 1989c, 31). However, Japanese investment has had a lot of attention in the U.S. media in recent years. In comparing press reports of acquisitions by European versus Japanese investors, one could see a stronger strain of xenophobia when the Japanese were discussed. While the U.S. closer cultural heritage with Europe is certainly one root of the differences, there also is the memory of the World War II, Japanese success in penetrating the U.S. market in the 1970s and 1980s, and the public fear that another U.S.-dominated industry would fall victim to Japanese economic invasion (McAnany & Wilkinson, 1992).

A Policy Issue: Antitrust Law

Foreign investment in the U.S. film industry raised another policy issue. In 1989 and 1990, commercial networks and some congressmen held that existing U.S. antitrust law prevents

television network competition with foreign investors. In the

House hearing on globalization of mass media, Rep. Al Swift (D-

Wash.) said:

> "We were a self-contained economy: A lot of antitrust laws
> and other things that served good purposes, purposes that we
> probably do not want to abandon but which seemed to put
> American business at economic disadvantages in terms of
> competition when you start looking at a world economy...It
> seems incongruous to me that we have laws which would permit
> a foreign broadcast network to buy a studio in this country
> but rules which would prevent an American network from
> buying a studio in this country" (House, 1989c, 39).

After the Japanese purchase of Columbia Pictures and MCA in

1989 and 1990, commercial networks criticized the FCC's rule on

financial interest and syndication that limited their role in

producing and syndicating programs in the United States. In a

press conference on October 3, 1990, NBC President Robert C.

Wright said that foreign-owned Hollywood studios would supply

one-third of the U.S. network prime-time series that season after

Matsushita's purchase of MCA. Network executives attributed the

foreign holdings in Hollywood to the government rules. In his

letter to FCC head Alfred Sikes in October 1990, CBS Chairman

Lawrence A. Tisch wrote, "A continuation of U.S. regulations

protecting foreign-owned mega-studios from the competition of

American-owned networks... is ludicrous" (Burgess, 1990, E1).

However, cable program producers and distributors did not

believe that the antitrust law prevents television networks from

competing with foreigners. In a letter to Markey, Ralph M.

Baruch, president California's Program Producers and Distributors

Committee, wrote that "No U.S. rule prevents NBC from buying a

foreign or American studio." The only prohibition would be on
that studio's television programming being syndicated in the
United States. Cable program producers and distributors were
afraid that a network-owned American studio would in fact be far
more powerful than a Sony/Columbia or Time/Warner combination
through its ownership of television stations in U.S. major
markets. This would give ABC, CBS, and NBC a tremendous
advantage in launching programming, an advantage which Sony could
not duplicate because it is prohibited, as a foreign corporation,
from owning television stations (House, 1989c, 65).

The FCC was divided on the importance of foreign ownership
to the financial interest and syndication rule debate. FCC
Chairman Alfred Sikes made it clear in October 1990 that foreign
ownership of U.S. major studios would color his thinking in the
on-going proceeding to relax the financial interest and
syndication rules. But among the other four commissioners of the
FCC, only James Quello shared Sikes' view that foreign ownership
was important to the finance-syndication debate ("FCC
divided...," 1990, 104). In April, 1991, the FCC revised its
financial interest and syndication rule and allowed commercial
networks more freedom to compete domestically and
internationally. Among the new rules favorable to the networks
is the permission for them to syndicate outside-produced programs
overseas themselves ("FCC's fin-syn...," 1991).

In summary, the transnational media acquisitions were a
natural and expected result of the globalization of mass

communication. The U.S. government did respond cautiously to
this new change. What effects foreign investment will have on
U.S. communication law and regulation affecting monopoly,
competition, and diversity of views as well as freedom of
expression still remain to be seen.

Discussion and Conclusion

The examination of the U.S. communication policies regarding
foreign ownership in broadcasting, cable systems, and film
industries from various perspectives has shown the strengths as
well as the weaknesses of the existing American government
policies on this subject. The strengths include the stability
and flexibility of the policy-making process. Compared with
other industrialized nations, the United States remains the most
open nation in the world toward foreign investment and
international trade. The national policy makers as a whole were
cautious about the issues of foreign investment in Hollywood and
the foreign ownership of cable systems. Generally speaking, the
policy making process was flexible to the changing social and
economic environments. For example, the FCC's revision of
finance-syndication gave the U.S. networks more competitive power
in the international mass media marketplace. However, the
weaknesses of U.S. communication policies do exist. We will
discuss some issues relating to the U.S. policies on foreign
ownership of broadcasting stations, cable, and film industry.

First, the existing U.S. restriction on foreign ownership of

broadcasting station hinders the growth of the broadcasting business both domestically and internationally, and change is needed if the United States is to be able to compete internationally. Currently, U.S. law grants press freedom to other nations to publish books, newspapers and magazines, to operate cable systems and television networks, and to own film studios. Why should the same principle not be extended to broadcast stations? The national security concerns of Communication Act Section 310 that led to the imposition of a 25% cap on foreign investment in U.S. broadcast companies are no longer valid, given the new post-cold war international environment and the proliferation of broadcast media at home. Peace is breaking out all over the world. There is little chance that American remaining adversaries could subvert the national will by owning some of the thousands of stations across the country. Although much of the deregulation of the past 12 years has helped the communications industries grow, much is yet to be done to encourage foreign investment in U.S. companies and vice versa. Foreign financial input would boost a sagging radio marketplace and possibly even improve radio operations. U.S. broadcasters would have greater investment opportunities abroad if the existing restriction on foreign broadcast ownership were removed.

Second, introduction of Markey's bill to restrict foreign cable ownership in the United States seems premature. There have been more investments in media markets by U.S companies in Europe

and other parts of the world than that of foreign firms in the
United States in recent years. North American cable companies
and "baby Bells" appear to be more active on Europe than are the
Europeans themselves. For example, of the top 20 investors in
British cable ventures, 19 are from the United States or Canada.
Therefore, the proposed restriction on foreign cable ownership in
the United States would weaken the position of American
businessmen with respect to consolidation of the European and
other international markets.

There seems to be no immediate danger for the United States
to leave its cable television market unrestricted at this moment.
Even if, in the future, a dramatic increase in foreign ownership
of U.S. cable systems occurred, it is doubtful that the U.S.
cable industry would be vulnerable to being dominated by a
foreign voice or swallowed up by foreign interests. While cable
operators could have considerable control of programming content,
the local character of cable TV operations and the power of the
franchising authorities over the terms and conditions for such
operations provide adequate protection against attempts by any
cable operator to interfere with the functioning of the
democratic process.

In addition, imposing restrictions on foreign cable
ownership in the United States now would have a negative effect
on the accelerating trend toward vertical integration and
horizontal concentration in U.S. domestic cable television
industry.

Third, the foreign investment in U.S. film studios has provided positive contribution to the overall U.S. economy. As of 1990, foreign-based firms employed more than 10% of the U.S. entertainment industry's work force, up 553% since 1977, and twice the national average. Meanwhile, the U.S. film and television industry have globalized twice as fast as the overall U.S. economy. Net exports of U.S.-made films and television programming was $ 2.1 billion in 1991. From 1987 to 1991, net exports for the film and television industries rose nearly 200% (Keslar, 1993). The NTIA's report in January 1993 found that foreign ownership in media has for the most part been a net benefit to the U.S. economy, though it has sparked public controversy on issues such as, for example, foreign managerial control over some of the U.S. most visibly "American" products.

So far major concerns about foreign investment in film industry, especially Japanese purchase of Hollywood studios, are "protection" of American culture. Would Sony seek to alter creative activities in Columbia Pictures to suit Japanese cultural or political demands? Do the Japanese try to alter American culture? Precisely the same concerns have been expressed for decades throughout the world, with regard to the omnipresence of the American corporation, American products, and American advertising. In general, Japanese are probably not very different from other owners. "Sony would be crazy to try to make Columbia Pictures into a seedbed of Japanese culture. The value of Columbia Pictures lies precisely in its American cultural

base....Indeed, it is this Americanness that is the very essence
of Columbia Pictures around the world," said Reich (House,
1989c). According to Reich, if Sony cares about its investment,
it will wish to preserve and protect this Americanness. For
obvious reasons it can't do it on its own; it will defer to
American management. The talented people who comprise Columbia
Pictures, moreover, will remain with the company only insofar as
it remains a good and rewarding place to work.

Although the bad image of Sony's management and the change
of programming content in the MCA case raised concerns of the
impact of foreign ownership on American cultural production, it
is still too early to draw a conclusion. Will foreign investors
in film industry eventually find ways to use American movies and
television shows to promote their products and points of view?
What impact will the ownership changes in the Hollywood have on
the American society? These questions still remain to be
answered.

In short, no indication exists that the recent trends toward
consolidation of media ownership in the hands of transnational
corporations will soon subside or be reversed. The increased
globalization process will continue to challenge U.S. policy
makers to reevaluate their communication policies toward internal
and external forces and make adjustments to new international
political and economic environment. The newly released NTIA
report on globalization of the mass media during President Bush's
last week in office, suggests many bold relaxations of ownership

limits, crossownership bans, and foreign investment. Many of its recommendations were pursued unsuccessfully by former FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes. Whether the Clinton administration and a new Democratic chairman of FCC as well as the Department of Commerce will be open to the policies advocated by NTIA report will remain to be seen in the near future. By working out a more open, flexible, and well-articulated national communication policies toward foreign investments, the United States would be better off to enjoy the benefits of globalization and avoid the potential problems.

Table 1

Foreign Investment in Hollywood since 1985

Foreign investor	Production company	Year	Price	Percentage ownership	Business
Matsushita	MCA Inc.	1991	$6.6 bil.*	100	Film, music, book production
Pathe Commu -nications	MGM/US	1990	$3.3 bil.	100	Film, TV production
Pionner	Carolco	1990	$60 mil.**	10	Film, TV production
Canal Plus	Carolco	1990	$30 mil.	5	Film, TV production
GaGa Communi -cations	Fox/Lorber	1990	$2.7 mil.	58	TV and video distribution
Sony	Columbia Pictures	1989	$3.4 bil.	100	Film, TV production
Thames Television	Reeves Comm.	1989	$89 mil.	100	TV production
Australian Investment	Barris Indu -stries	1989	$35 mil.	24	Film, TV production
Television South	MTM Enter -prises	1988	$320 mil.	100	TV production
Sony	CBS Records	1987	$2 bil.	100	Music production
Bertelsmann	RCA Records	1986	$330 mil.	100	Music production
News Corp.	20th Century Fox	1985	$575 mil.	100	Film, TV production

Source: Adapted from "The Changing Face of Hollywood," Broadcasting (1990, October 22), p.63.

* Billion
** Million

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HISTORIC IMAGES OF DISABILITY:
INDIAN AND EUROPEAN COMIC ART TRADITIONS

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Disability has existed in society from the beginning of human existence. It quickly found its way into early forms of communication, such as drawing and art. In pre-literate societies, this form of representational communication was able to reach society as a whole. In looking at presentations of disability, it is crucial to examine these historic portrayals to gain an understanding of how the current stereotypes in the presentation of disability began. This paper undertakes a study of comic art representations of disability in pre-literate India and Europe.

The research in this paper fills a void in research about disability in history and in non-Western countries. Groce (1985) notes that most research on deviance and disability focuses on North America and Western Europe, and much of that has focused on disability related to institutionalization or public policy. In a historic sense, "we know relatively little about the disabled in our society and virtually nothing about them in non-Western societies" (Groce, 1985, p. 108). As mass media scholars, we also know little about the media representations of people with disabilities in a historic context.

It should be remembered that comic art is perhaps the largest iconographic field in the twentieth century, yet it is also the least examined. Theoretical views on caricature and comic art are few; it is an often ignored medium because of its commonness and lack of sophistication. Mass media researchers view it as a minor medium in a time when larger media have more impact, and art scholars ignore it because of its perceived lack of aesthetic merit. By doing so, however, they ignore the fact that comic art is an aspect of visual culture that can be traced back to a pre-technological and pre-literate world, and consequently can allow us to see the development of visual stereotypes that continue to be used in the media today.

Comic art encompasses caricature, cartooning, comic strips and other forms of popular

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art that use humor or exaggeration to comment on the human condition. It therefore provides a vast field in which to study historic representations of disability. Caricature, which was defined as a "loaded portrait" by the people who gave it its name, the 16th century Italian painters Annibale and Agostino Carracci, is especially significant to the study of disability because one of the characteristics of caricature is the use of physiognomy, or the belief that physical appearance reflects inner psychological reality. This has resulted in the use of physical deformity to comment on psychological qualities and is related to the art of the "grotesque," which Fingesten (1984) defines today as " a symbolic category of art which expresses psychic currents from below the surface of life, such as nameless fears, complexes, nightmares. Caricature was believed to carry the truth, the inner essence of its subject, by distorting its likeness to expose the inner truth. This meaning is still valid today, when the purpose of caricature is to expose the essence of its subject through exaggeration.

Caricature and its underlying effort to expose reality as seen by the caricaturist has been around for as long as human beings have been around. The effort to portray things as they really are, to reach for the essence of a subject, is not and has never been any one national or cultural characteristic. Literacy was (and still is) mostly a skill that only the elite had access to, while drawing and paintings, often accompanied by storytelling and song, were a widely accessible mode of entertainment in many oral cultures. Early woodcuts, sculpture, murals, scroll paintings and drawings show that caricature has been around for a long time as a popular form of mass communication (Lent 1985).

Therefore, caricature and comic art provide crucial insight into presentations of disability in the visual form of pre-literate society. Theoretically, numerous scholars tie the use of

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disability and illness in images and historic stories to psychological and psychoanalytic theory.

Psychological theory and images of disability

At the psychological level, some theorize that humans are uncomfortable with sickness and illness because it symbolizes the uncertainty of life; that life is not controllable and the randomness of nature has the last word (Kidel, 1988). Also, the human body is seen as "other," separated from the soul or mind. The body may be may be interpreted as a sometimes dysfunctional vessel for the soul. Based on Christian tradition of sin residing in the "flesh," health became associated with virtue and illness with sin. "'Falling ill' is perceived as a falling down into the physical, a kind of giving way to the lower (bodily) forces beyond the reach of the superior control of mind or spirit" (Kidel, 1988, p. 8).

This notion of physical impairment representing sin or evil or weakness has been used in other historic studies of medieval artists renderings of human "monsters" (Friedman, 1981) and side show "freaks" and others throughout history who are born with a physical deformity (Fiedler, 1978). Linveh (1980) theorizes that people fear disability because it represents a closer state to death. According to Linveh, Freud's ideas on religion and notion of totemism (1946) are germane to human discomfort with disability. At the sociocultural level, Freud drew connections between ancestral totem animals and future Judeo-Christian beliefs about the superiority of humans over animals or animal-like beings. "It is, therefore, this latent content with its threatening images of common past between man and animal that is surfacing and breaking through the barrier of repression when confronted with a person having animal-like skin, excessive facial hair, and contorted facial and bodily features. And it is not difficult to venture

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and assume that through the process of association the less severely disfigured individual is attributed with similar characteristics (Linveh, 1980, p. 282).

This notion fits with Hand's analysis of deformity and disease in folk legends (1980). He found that many societies, both primitive and civilized, view sickness and disease as a punishment handed down from God or ruling spirits or deities for the breaking of religious or more codes. "The gods mete out punishment in the form of physical malady" (Hand, 1980, p. 58). For instance, he cites an example from what is now Sri Lanka in which both Sinhalese and Tamil villagers consider infectious diseases such as measles and mumps to be sent by gods, and therefore refuse to take medicine.

This connection between religion and views on disability fits easily with concepts in the Hinduism of India. Hanks and Hanks (1948) have theorized that disability is viewed as a pariah in India because of religious beliefs. Physical disability is a threat to the family or social group because of the Hindu concept of karma, in which a person's current condition or social status stems from behavior in a previous incarnation. "Persons with defects or low social status have thus brought the result on themselves, and great sympathy for them is out of place among strict followers of the faith. . . .Physical handicaps may appear thus to be the inevitable result of the previous conduct of the individual and source of contamination for the protective group" (Hanks and Hanks, 1948, pp. 13-14).

The stress on deformity as evidence of immorality in most Indian art may be linked to a philosophical and religious tradition that stresses physical and mental "wholeness". Marglin (1977) notes that the emphasis on purity vs. pollution that characterizes the caste system in India is based on the concept of impurity as a lack of something. Wholeness of body and domain

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characterizes purity, so that ancient lawmaker Manu characterizes both a eunuch (missing something) and giving birth (losing something) as impure.

These psychological and religious concepts explain how notions of disability fit into societies such as India and how they fit with comic art traditions. Sherry (1986) explains how the "grotesque" or deformed person came to be a part of caricature traditions. He outlines a mode that he calls "grotesque" caricature, after the comprehensive collection of "grotesque" art by 18th century author Thomas Wright (1968). The purpose of this type of caricature is to explore the limits of the human by playing with ugliness, deformity, and disfigurement with the intention of arousing horror or disgust.

Ideas of good and evil and their relationship to disability remain in modern comic art. Weinberg and Santana (1978) have shown how the stereotype of the evil deformed person remains in modern day. They sampled 40 different superhero comic books and found that people with physically disabilities usually fell into two categories - either good or evil. In their study, 57 percent of the disabled people were considered evil, while 43 percent were considered good. None of the disabled characters fell into the neutral category.

Weinberg and Santana speculated that the disabled characters were seen as evil because of the phenomenon of spread. The imputation of one negative trait such as a physical difference spreads the whole persona. Therefore, characters with a physical disability may be portrayed as inferior in other ways as well. On the other hand, disabled characters may be presented as angelic because of an attitude that disabled people must be extraordinary to "overcome" the disability. Their findings relate to Goffman's notion of stigma (1963) in which a physical difference becomes a social stigma, discrediting the whole individual.

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The authors suggest that because these stereotypes are perpetuated in comic books, the images comics portray are even more crucial to address because they reach a large number of impressionable children. Continued stereotypes in comic books could damage any goals of society accepting people with disabilities, according to Weinberg and Santana.

Study of comic art traditions in pre-literate India and pre-literate Europe reveal how many of these representations of disability evolved.

Indian comic art

The western tradition of caricature has been explored in detail by scholars interested in the development of comic art, but non-western tradition have only recently been looked at. The economic strength of Japan today has resulted in an interest in Japanese culture among western scholars, and the tradition of Japanese caricature has come to light (Lent, 1985). India has not been similarly privileged. Indian art has been studied in detail, but often from the mystical perspective espoused by the early scholars who saw religion and spirituality as the essential components of Indian art. It is true that it is difficult to disentangle the religious and the secular in Indian art, but the Indian aesthetic vision allows for the simultaneous existence of the sacred and the profane (Siegel, 1987).

Classical Indian aesthetics outlines nine permanent rasas or flavors, of which the comic is one. Another view of Indian art, propagated by western travellers and missionaries till the recent past, is that of an art that creates monstrosities. The aesthetics of Hindu art are very different from the European one, and consequently sacred images were misperceived as caricature (Parton, 1877; Mitter, 1977). It is interesting to note that representation of the human

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form has to strictly conform to the notion of what is considered beautiful. Accepting that any departure from a realistic depiction is not caricature, examples that do constitute caricature may be examined more thoroughly.

Disability in Indian comic art

Little has been written on the subject of caricature and comic art that attempts to seriously define its scope and possibilities. Gombrich and Kris (1952) suggest that the reason that caricature developed comparatively late in human history is that any human likeness was believed to possess magical properties, so that any distortion of the image constituted an attack. Later, distortion came to represent a humorous mock aggression, which aroused laughter instead of fear.

Many of the comic elements in Indian art and literature center around deformity, discomfiture, trickery, and misogyny. Indian folk tales abound with the trickery of court jesters like Tenali Rama and Birbal, adulterous spouses and hypocritical Brahmans (Feinberg, 1971). Physical beauty is commonly associated with moral virtue, and ugliness or deformity with evil or stupidity. Deformity makes the person less than human, and therefore often the butt of jokes. Sometimes their lives are expendable, as they count for less than a "whole" human being. A sixteenth century story (Ayyar, 1957) is an account of a time when Tenali Rama, the famous jester of the kingdom of Vijaynagara, was to be executed when he offended the king. He was to be trampled to death by an elephant, so the executioners buried him up to his neck in the ground and went away to fetch the elephant. A passing hunchback was tricked by Tenali Rama into believing that particular spot was a site for the miraculous cure of his deformity. He took

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the jester's place and was crushed to death. Tenali Rama is then restored to the king's favor when he recounts this exploit, ending with the comment that the hunchback's wife was lucky to be rid of a deformed husband.

Hunchbacks are stock comic characters in most plays, especially old female hunchbacks. These misogynous representations are of old women as conniving beings, twisted, both physically and mentally, who are envious of others good fortune and plot to destroy them. In the Ramayana, the epic poem detailing the story of the god Rama, the person responsible for leading his stepmother to cast him into exile is an old hunchback. Harming or killing people who were deformed or ugly is not necessarily a heinous crime; Lakshmana, Rama's brother lops off the nose and ears of Shoorpanaki, a female demon who makes advances towards him, and is depicted as terrifically ugly.

Visual representations in folk painting make the distinction between good=beautiful, ugly=evil very clearly. A Kalighat painting shows an episode from the life of the god Krishna, when Krishna is nearly murdered by an evil wetnurse, Putana, who takes delight in poisoning her breast milk in order to kill babies. The exceptionally powerful infant bites down on her breast and kills her (See Figure 1). The painting shows her toothy, deformed face as she is killed (Archer, 1979). This depiction is part of a larger trend toward misogyny in these paintings, often derisively depicting the reversal of gender roles. The curious flip-side to this trend is that these painters made their livelihood by selling pictures of Kali next to the Kali temple in Calcutta. Kali is a female deity, often depicted as the personification of strength and violence, wearing a garland of human skulls and a skirt of hacked-up human arms. The Hindu pantheon of gods and goddesses often have extra limbs or heads, and are sometimes depicted as terrifying. However,

there seems to be a distinction between these awe-inspiring visual representations, and a merely human deformity. It is interesting that even in a culture where divine manifestations of deformity are acceptable, human deformity is not treated with empathy.

Secularism entered Indian art with the Islamic influence of the Mughal rulers, and caricature begins to become easier to identify. Welch (1976) notes that extreme physical conditions were often a subject of Islamic painting. Physical characteristics that depart from the norm are often caricatured as in Mughal psychological portraiture. Dervishes, or wandering holy men of the time, are often pictured as strange in mind and body in these portraits. Another series of mid-seventeenth century marbled paintings from the Deccan depict starving horses ridden by a grotesquely thin acetic (See Figure 2). Both man and animal are drawn with bones outlined against skin in almost anatomical detail.

One of the ways that grotesque caricature works is by violating expectations, for instance by juxtaposing the beautiful with the ugly. An example is a Rajput miniature showing a sad-looking old man being unsuccessfully seduced by an ugly woman. This painting is embarrassing in its depiction of fact that older people may not loose their sexual appetites gracefully. Another portrait of an obese Begum from the Deccan derives its humor by violating the expectation of what a noblewoman looks like.

Another genre of temple painting in Orrisa specialized in a "grotesque" caricature that depicted composite animals and fantastic creatures. For example, elephants and horses made up of human bodies, some of humans having sex are common motifs. This may have been a concept borrowed from Mughal art, where composite animals made up of demons, etc. were common. However, the use of the composite picture to create human vehicles was unique to Puri

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painting. Animals from mythological stories were given shape as in picture of a cow with a woman's head, or a bird with a tiger's head. Although the practice of depicting deities with animal heads is a common practice in Hindu iconography, these creatures are not common symbols, and are images that the painter has created for his own pleasure.

Disability in European caricature

The moral associations with physical deformity is evident in much of early European caricature too. Perhaps the most popular image of the effects of moral depravity in European caricature of the 15th to 19th centuries was "the cripple." A person with a missing leg or arm hobbling on crutches was a symbol of the effects of sinful living. Morality and disease and disability were seen as related: In the 1490's syphilis was wide spread, and women prostitutes, already believed to be capable of witchcraft, were seen as responsible for a whole host of illnesses.

An illustration to a poem entitled "Purgatory and Lament of the Roman courtesan" shows a disabled courtesan being wheeled around in a cart, flies hover around her syphilitic wounds (See Figure 3). Anyone who has been profligate is punished by disfigurement, eg. the syphilitic and "lame" former client of the harlot in "Mirror of the Harlot's fate", who is shown attempting to strike her even as she cowers beneath him.

By the eighteenth century some caricature moved from depicting disability as evil to making disabled people objects of pity. This move was part of the reformatory zeal of social satire as practiced by William Hogarth, the foremost caricaturist of the time. One of his engravings shows a disabled beggar being ignored as people celebrate a wedding. The story of

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John Bull, the soldier who returns disabled from the wars, was drawn by various caricaturists in a sympathetic fashion; he leaves for the war in the peak of his form, and returns on crutches with one leg and an eye-patch.

In the eighteenth century, much of European caricature also revolved around the belief in physiognomy, or that the distortion of human features indicated psychological features. Hogarth's study titled "Characters and caricatures" shows a series of heads in this style. Woodward's "Pigmy Revels" show hideously distorted dwarves as stock figures of the time, including the flogger preacher and the Negro slave.

Discussion

Clearly, disability figured prominently in comic art traditions of India and Europe. These representations of disability illustrate pervasiveness of notions about disability in two distinctive cultures and the similarity of stereotypes. Disability as an association with evil or as the butt of jokes crossed cultural lines. Also, the reformatory zeal present in eighteenth century Europe illustrates disability became associated with pity and a pathetic lot in life.

These historic artistic traditions give substance to the modern findings of Weinberg and Santana (1978) that comic books present people with disabilities as either good or evil. The comic art traditions of India and Europe also point up how little progress has been made in representations of disability. Stock characters today in literature, television, and film still many times rely on the "evil, deformed" person to add to the drama of the plot. For example, in 1981 Donaldson analyzed 85 half-hour time slots from prime time television, and found that although disabled people rarely appeared in television shows, when they did they were portrayed

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negatively rather than positively. The negative portrayal in the television programs showed people with disabilities as a danger to society or linked to evil. Donaldson concludes that TV may sustain stereotypes of disabled persons rather than assist in their acceptance by society.

The depictions of disability in Indian and European comic art provides information on the foundational base for these stereotypes that are still with us today in society. Editorial cartoons in newspapers today continue to use disability as a comic device. A Rocky Mountain News 1990 cartoon depicted NASA as a blind superman. A Trentonian (N.J.) editorial cartoon in 1989 contrasted a politician lagging in the polls with a blind beggar and a "crippled" beggar. Other newspaper cartoons have depicted the Nicaraguan Contras in a wheelchair and Pete Rose yelling at the statue of justice, "Whatareya, BLIND?!" (What are those cartoons saying, The Disability Rag, 1990).

Modern cartoonists have learned that it is inappropriate to use racial and gender stereotypes in their work, but using disability stereotypes seems still to be fair game. "Cartoonists work in a language of symbols. And disability is a convenient symbol, because it is universally understood to mean old and decrepit (ageism here, too), finished, vanquished, kaput" (What are these cartoons, The Disability Rag, 1990, p. 18). To confront these stereotypes and understand what it will take to change them, mass media scholars must consider what these comic art traditions mean to subsequent art, literature, and drama.

There is hope, however, for stereotypes in comic art to be overturned. Cartoonists with disabilities and enlightened non-disabled cartoonists are turning the table on images of disability. Cartoonist John Callahan draws some cartoons that poke fun at the inaccessibility of society for people with disabilities rather than at the "defect" of disability. However, this perspective has

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yet to consistently make it into mainstream media outlets for cartoons such as major newspapers and magazines. Mass media research, such as this one on images of disability in comic art traditions, can provide crucial ammunition for the re-education of modern day comic artists and for the dismantling of outworn stereotypes from the past.

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Figure 1.
Krishna killing Putana by Kalighat in 1865.
(Archer, 1977)

Figure 2.
Ascetic riding a nag, Bijapur, mid-17th century.
(Zebrowski, 1983)

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Figure 3.
Syphilitic prostitute in cart, Roman or Venetian, 1530.
(Kunzle, 1973)

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HISTORIC IMAGES OF DISABILITY:
INDIAN AND EUROPEAN COMIC ART TRADITIONS

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Abstract

In looking at presentations of disability, it is crucial to examine historic portrayals to gain an understanding of how the current stereotypes began. This paper undertakes a study of comic art representations of disability in pre-literate India and Europe. Disability has existed in society from the beginning of human existence, and it quickly found its way into early forms of mass communication, such as drawing and art.

Comic art is an aspect of visual culture that can be traced back to a pre-technological and pre-literate world, and consequently can allow us to see the development of visual stereotypes that continue to be used in the media today. The representations of disability in the comic art traditions of India and Europe illustrate the pervasiveness of notions about disability in two distinctive cultures and the similarity of stereotypes. Disability as an association with evil or as the butt of jokes crossed cultural lines. Also, the reformatory zeal present in eighteenth century Europe illustrates how disability became associated with pity and a pathetic lot in life.

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Newstrack-Video News in India:
Elite "Westernized Popular Culture" and the Representational Politics of Class

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Introduction:

Poverty in the "third world" is generally an unpopular issue for Western popular media. Images of starving brown and black children from television and print advertisements for aid agencies and news-stories on famines, are the closest likely references to a distant reality which has seemingly little relevance to life in the West. What relevance the misery of the "third world masses" has on *our* lives is easily evaded when poverty is viewed in a vacuum and the politics of poverty are safely overlooked. To pose questions about why abject poverty in exists in concentrated areas of the world threatens perhaps the most blatant contradiction within global capitalism: If the system works so well why does two-thirds of humanity not have enough to eat?

India falls into the broadly defined category of the "third world" in opposition to the Western "first world" This racially constructed cold-war metaphor between the "white/non-white, industrialized/non-industrialized" global formation is misleading in that India, like most other nations categorized in the "third world", is part of one "hierarchically structured global system in which locations of particular countries are determined...by the strengths and/or weaknesses of their economies"(Ahmad;1992;312). The structural conditions of domination between advanced capitalist states (with the USA, Japan and Germany being at the apex of power) and backward capitalist states (with a diverse range from semi-industrialized countries like Brazil and India, to virtual feudal states like Bangladesh and Chad) are based on post-colonial relations of unequal distribution of resources and unequal conditions of exchange. Poverty in India can be understood as a result of dramatic increases in class differentiation within a form of backward capitalism able only to absorb a small percentage of the country's population.

Two recent feature films produced primarily for Western audiences attempt to represent poverty in the slums and streets of urban India; *Salaam Bombay!* (1988) a Hindi language film with subtitles directed by Mira Nair, and *City of Joy* (1992) an English language film directed by Roland Joffe. In this paper I hope to examine the correlation between race and class through the representation of Indians and India in terms of "third world" poverty in these two popular films.[1]

Popular images of India and Indians are propagated, if conspicuously rarely, by both news and entertainment in the Western media to shape certain recognizable stereotypes. News stories on India are generally about poverty and disaster, political crisis with an emphasis on religious and ethnic tensions and "bizarre" human interest stories: stories of swamis and snake-charmers. Fictional characterization

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[1] By "popular" I am referring to the films' general appeal and mass marketability, not necessarily how they fared in the box office. Incidentally, *Salaam Bombay!* fared very well for a foreign-language film in Europe as well as North America. *City of Joy* is doing well on video release, although it was a flop in the box offices. Both films appeal to what can be considered a "middle-brow" audience with the appeal of *Salaam Bombay!* being more elitist as it is a foreign language film.

of India has a long colonial heritage of stereotypes ranging from the exotic native, the religious mystic to the subservient subject.

Essentializing India both as inherently exotic and inherently poor makes India and the Indian poor incomprehensible to the Western mind; a form of what Edward Said has termed Orientalism. Said's influential notion of "Othering" the Orient through cultural representation describes a form of racism (Orientalism) that has been widely accepted in Western critical theory as an all-encompassing critique of colonial and post-colonial racism.

I will argue that cultural racism towards the so-called "third world" has a class element that cannot be overlooked, for it changes the very meaning of racism as it applies to the "third world" poor. The questions I hope to answer in this paper relate to whether "Othering" is subverted effectively when the power to produce meanings changes racial hands? Does Indian born Mira Nair's representation of poverty in India in *Salaam Bombay!* constitute a difference in the ideological construction of race and racism as opposed to a non-indian produced and directed film by Roland Joffe in *City of Joy*? Which new stereotypes emerge and which ones remain unchanged? What are the ideological relations of power prevalent in these stereotypes, both old and new?

If we take into account *both* differences in race and class when looking at representation then racial re-appropriation, and/or cultural sensitivity do not subsume the potential to construct a "third world Other". By examining the two films in some detail, I hope to show that decontextualizing poverty from the material conditions of exploitation serves to perpetuate a deeply racially based rationale for structural inequality within the global capitalist culture.

I will first define racism in the context of these films with a discussion of the theoretical considerations relevant for this paper. An outline of my methodology will be followed by a brief discussion of the history and context of the representation of Indian poverty. The analysis of the films will include some of the themes in the interviews and reviews of the films from a few major US newspapers. And finally, I will close the discussion by examining the symbiotic relationship between race and class which forms the basis of racist representation of non-white poverty.

The Race/Class Matrix:

Edward Said's influent:_l book Orientalism contests the Western construction of an Oriental Other whose primary function is to formulate a sense of identity for the Western Self. Thus the exotic, backwards, irrational and essentially inferior Other is constructed as a means to perpetuate and rationalize Western hegemonic representational relations of power. In sharp contrast, "third world" authentic self-representation is seen to subvert Orientalism and thereby undermines Western representational dominance and power.

Marxist critics of Said's approach emphasize that Orientalism as an analytical category inadvertently essentializes "third world" authorship by privileging authenticity based on criteria restricted to race and ethnicity. Cultural theory critics like Aijaz Ahmad and Terry Eagleton remind

us that a historical materialist perspective not only situates the author (in the case of film the writer/producer/director) in terms of their ethnic or racial background, but also takes into account the socio-economic structures which shape the ideological content of the meanings they produce.

Ahmad argues quite convincingly that instead of valorizing a "third world" nationalist identity constructed by the ethnic spokespeople (based predominantly in the West) for entire nations, that a more useful conceptualization of representation should assume that "we live in not three worlds but in one".(Ahmad;1986;9) Racism that defines the way one part of the world regards another cannot be assumed as monolithic once the "first-world"/"third-world" dichotomy is replaced.

In this paper I am delineating between two forms of racism: within and between nations. Etienne Balibar contrasts "internal" racism (racism against immigrants and other visible minorities in a country) with "external racism". The latter has a colonial heritage and fits a metropolis-periphery model of the world where;

> ...the stereotypes of White racism (is kept alive by) the old idea that three-quarters of humanity are incapable of governing themselves...the replacement of the old world of colonizing nations and their sphere of manoeuvre by a new world which is formally organized into equivalent nations states but transversed by (a) constantly shifting frontier between *two humanities which seem incommensurable*, namely the humanity of destitution and that of 'consumption', the humanity of underdevelopment and that of overdevelopment.-My italics-(Balibar;1991;44)

In Balibar's work on new-racism in France against the Turkish and North African population, he argues that external racism serves to reinforce internal racism with the alarming rise of neo-nazi movements and the *Front National.* (Balibar;1991)

In the more complex American context, contemporary xenophobic racism against immigrant populations varies extensively depending on the ethnic minority group. South Asians in the US fall into the media defined category of "model minority" (Nakayama;1988), there appears little connection between the representation of the stereotypical successful, economically mobile Asian and her/his destitute native counterpart. The construction of a discourse on the supposed Asian "model minority" serves to maintain hegemonic ideals of liberal individualism and legitimates "status quo institutions", while simultaneously reinforcing an Asian stereotype which ignores geographical boundaries, cultural and class distinctions.(Nakayama;1988;72)

Aijaz Ahmad writes the recent wave of non-white Asian immigration to the USA represents a significant shift in class:

> Indian immigration into the United States was overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois and techno-managerial, while members of the Indian working classes went to sell their labour-power mostly in the Gulf region, secondarily in England. (Ahmad;1992;84)

This is not to deny the immigration of lower-income Indians in the USA, but rather to point out a predominant trend.

Thus the causal connection between external and internal racism which is found in the European example (with the Neo-Nazi movements against the North African and Turkish populations), is not necessarily evident in the US scenario, particularly in terms of "model minority" populations. The "model minority" discourse is inherently racist, however, the implications of that racism are fundamentally different from the implications of racist discourse against historically low-income minority groups like African Americans, Mexican Americans, etc.

Class therefore plays a significant role in determining the nature of the "internal" racist discourse. The "model minority's" ability to assimilate, if mainly economically, into the American mainstream serves as a model to "critique the experiences of other minorities" in the US (Nakayama;1988;70). In the same way, in the Indian case, it serves to distance the successful economically mobile "Non-resident-Indian"[2] in the US from the destitute Indian masses.

Since both films in this paper deal exclusively with poverty in India, there seems little explicit connection between internal and external racism as outlined by Balibar. However, when one considers class as a crucial determinant of external racism, Mira Nair's status as a Non-Resident-Indian in India and part of the 'model minority" in the US, does not preclude an essentialist representation of "third-world" poverty in Salaam Bombay!. Consequently, the question that becomes relevant in terms of external racism is how does this "model minority" discourse rationalize differences in class across national borders?

I should point out that I am not arguing that "class belongingness" necessarily leads to certain ideologies of class. This is not an argument for the identity politics of class-ie. only the poor can represent their poverty. However, I am taking into account the film-maker's representation of poverty as a reflection of "...certain class articulations of ideology" which through their films "might be actively secured".(Hall;1982;84)

Methodology- Mediated Analysis of Film as a Social Discourse:

Ryan and Keller in their book Camera Politica examine the ideological dimension of popular cinema at specific moments of history. They show how the ideological climate of a particular point in history determines parameters of subjectivity, especially in the commercial media. An ideological analysis situates the film in terms of its socio-political context "by and for specific social groups"(White; 1991;163). Ideological criticism analyzes both the "texts and viewer-text relations to

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[2] Non-Resident-Indian (NRI) is used colloquially in India to distinguish people of Indian origin, usually from the West or from countries with hard currencies. Although the legal definition of an NRI requires Indian citizenship, it is a term applied loosely with a significant degree of status attached to it, both financially and culturally.

clarify how the meanings and pleasures generated" by the film "express specific social, material, and class interests".(Ibid;173)

Ideological analysis of stereotypes, as Seiter points out, should force media critics to "...ask ourselves how different social groups will understand stereotypes, believe in them, laugh at them..."(Seiter;25); or in this case, how certain stereotypes make one feel sorry for "them" and make "us" cry.

Much of the criticism and praise for both films in this paper revolves around the issues of authenticity and accuracy. *Salaam Bombay!* received much critical acclaim in contrast to various scathing reviews received by *City of Joy*. Despite this common-sense dichotomy between authentic and counterfeit subjectivity, the issue at hand is not one of accuracy or realism. Both films in this context represent their directors' interpretations of a certain reality; the "reality" of the two films are infused with the reference to the "reality" of the "real" people represented by the films. Consequently, judging these, or any films on the basis of authenticity alone becomes difficult.

I will assume Bakhtin's formulation where "artistic discourse" can never be real, it is always a "...mediated version of an already textualized and discursivized socio-ideological world".(Stam;1991;352) An analysis of "narrative structure" and "cinematic style" enables one to be critical of a film without resorting to the language of authenticity; a debate which ends in an intellectual impasse.(Stam;1983;307) The "mediated version" of a particular film, or text, takes into account intertextual references which provide a framework for the placement of a certain film genre.

History and Context of the Representational Politics of Indian Poverty:

International depiction of poverty in India is largely opposed to by the Indian state as well as by many of its intellectual elite. Charges of racism, neo-colonialism and disavowal of progress and relative self-sufficiency are applied to outsiders looking in to India. Nevertheless, the fact that almost half of India's some 900 million people exist under conditions of abject poverty is an overwhelming fact which cannot easily be written off.

Representational issues over the depiction of this poverty invariably focus on the question of authenticity and distortion. It is hardly surprising that Indian film-makers are seen, at least by the critics if not by the state, as having a more authentic perspective on conditions of life in India. However, the fact that India has an impressive critical cinematic tradition which has for decades represented exploitation and poverty within the country is rendered insignificant in the Western context due to lack of exposure and popular appeal of these films.

There are few specific precedents for the two films discussed in this paper as far as the Western popular media are concerned. Colonial and post-colonial discourse which naturalized the superior role of the British Raj in opposition to the native subjects exemplifies both literary and filmic references of India for Western readers/audiences.(Hall;1981;39) The classic adventure film has occasionally used exotic India as a

backdrop, with the most recent example being *Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom.* The adventure genre allows the viewer to "encounter race without having to confront racism"(Ibid;42). In the case of *Indiana Jones,* India and Indians are mystified beyond comprehension whereby the exaggerated racist Othering is couched safely behind a veneer of sheer entertainment.

TV programs and films like *The Jewel in the Crown* (1982) and *A Passage to India* set during the decline of the British Raj embody a "liberal critique of colonialism". Nonetheless, the "nice whites" in these productions are resigned to a sense of failure in the face of indigenous chaos. The phrase "There's nothing I can do!" is "endlessly repeated" by the liberal whites in Paul Scotts's critically acclaimed *The Jewel in the Crown.*(White;1988;53)

In contrast, there *is* something the Western situated audience *can* do as they happen across the starving but lovable children in the Oxfam-type advertisements on TV and in magazines: they can feel pity and donate money. I would argue that these images are the predominant intertextual reference to filmic images of third world poverty for the Western situated audience. The viewer may be either saturated by these images of despair and hopelessness and change the channel or turn the page, or s/he may send money. In these advertisements, "third world" poverty is rectified without in any way disrupting the dominant status quo.

Philanthropic "development" organizations depoliticize the specific political realities of "third world" poverty thus signifying passivity and dependence on the West; "They are the Victims of (their own) fate"(Hall;1981;42). In a similar way, "Third world" news coverage of poverty and disaster generally naturalizes any sense of exploitation with the language of "development" and "backwardness", where the Western viewer is positioned as morally superior.(Dahlgren & Chakrapani;1982)

In terms of Balibar's definition of external racism, Western mass media serves, for the most part, to perpetuate the theme of "two separate hu.nanities" when it comes to the representation of "third world poverty". The Othering of the "third world" masses is based not only on the color of *their* skin, but also on *their* desperate conditions of life. Both films discussed in this paper are mediated within the liberal capitalist framework of development and dependency of the "third world" on the "first world".

The Films:

City of Joy is based on an internationally popular novel of the same title by French author Dominique Lapierre. The novel's success as a work of human compassion for the poverty-stricken lepers in the slums of Calcutta is recommended reading in most travel-guides to India, and even has the approval of the Pope himself who called it "a lesson of faith and hope for the world"(Lapierre;1986). Unlike the Pope, Indian and specifically Bengali intellectuals have been largely critical of both the book and the film. The novel is based loosely on a real Catholic doctor

(Dr. Paul Lambert), described as an ascetic Christian who dedicated his life to do the sort of work Mother Teresa is renowned for on a smaller scale. The criticism and protest invoked by the film concerned both the making of the film and its content.

The film version of the book that sold over 6 million copies worldwide was seen by its vocal critics as an even greater threat in its potential to depict poverty pornographically. Critics of this "new voyeurism" of watching "images of dying Indian babies", point to the blatant racism of this type of work; "In the book and in the film, the Indians are poor wretches who need cinegenic whites to give them succor."(Tharoor;1992;C5)

Focusing on the deeds of a white saviour figure, Indian critics contend, "implicitly den(ies) the sacrifice of thousands of Calcuttans" who donate their time and money to volunteer causes, including that of Mother Teresa whose "legions of volunteers" are largely Indian.(Ibid) As well, protesters of the film were angry over the elaborate and expensive set of a slum that was built in a city with no shortage of real slums. Roland Joffe's defense of his white protagonist was quite typical in that his claimed interest in the "interaction between the two cultures" is secondary to his comments on the necessity of a "familiar" white character "...because India can be a shock for people unfamiliar to it".(Turan;1992; F7)

In many ways City of Joy falls into what Claudia Springer has called the "third world reporter film" genre.(Springer;1991;166) Although in this case Patrick Swayze is not a reporter like Sam Waterson in The Killing Fields, but rather a doctor, in both films the narratives are ones of self-discovery.

City of Joy is a story of a young doctor from Houston who goes to Calcutta, India to escape from everything familiar as a result of a patient's untimely death at his hands. Why Calcutta?-we are never clearly explained, however, his plans to return to the US are postponed indefinitely when he is beaten and robbed by the mofioso thugs who are the villains of the film. As Springer writes;

> The narrative goal is to comprehend the unfamiliar and overcome inconsequentiality and thereby create a newly defined and stable ethnic, cultural, and gender identity defined as the white, Western, and male in relation to the third-world Other.(Ibid;172-73)

Meanwhile, a parallel story shows us the trials of a Bihari rural family who have come to Calcutta seeking their fortune after facing a drought in their village. Hazari, the father of the family, played by Om Puri, rescues the semi-unconscious Max and takes him to a medical clinic in a slum that is called "the city of joy". The clinic is run by a devout Irish Catholic nurse, Joan (Pauline Collins) who upon discovering that Max is a doctor attempts to recruit him as a volunteer. Despite his initial hesitation Max eventually commits to working at the clinic.

Hazari manages to get a job as a rickshaw-driver for the powerful neighborhood mafioso-character who is unoriginally called "the Godfather". Hazari and his family move into the "city of joy" slum where

his wife, Kamala (Shabana Azmi) becomes Dr. Max's assistant. Max becomes increasingly involved in life in the slum which revolves around dealing with the violence of the all-powerful mafioso that controls jobs, rents and runs a protection racket. When the clinic decides to expand in order to treat the lepers in the community, the godfather increases the rent. Max attempts to mobilize the community against the godfather's control, but the mafioso responds with intimidating violence and Hazari loses his precious rickshaw-driving job.

Hazari becomes resentful of Max's interference and his wife's independence; his only dream is to provide his daughter with a large dowry for her wedding. After an emotional conflict between Max and Hazari over victimization and accepting one's fate, the Indian character comes to his senses thanks to some American common-sense. At the end, the slum community unites against the godfather's manipulation and Hazari is able to throw a lavish wedding for his daughter who marries a boy she chooses from a wealthier family. Max tells Sister Joan "I'm glad to be here. I've never felt more alive.", a choral crescendo soundtrack closes the film to a picturesque sunset backdrop.

Thus the racial dynamics of the film correspond with Orientalist critiques of the construction of a racial Other. Max's growth through the film as a disillusioned Westerner learning to believe in community is juxtaposed with Hazari's growth in learning how to "fight back" as an individual and acquire material wealth.

In the film's most dramatic moment, a confrontation between Max and Hazari over the former's interference in the lives of the slum-dwellers ends with a frustrated Max shouting to Hazari who has just told him that he is a "small man":

> Small ain't the word for you man. You're a little, brown, illiterate, gutless victim. And you should keep locking up your wife and being suspicious. I didn't do this on my own. did I make you live in this shit-hole? So if you want to be pissed at me, fine! But you should get pissed at the people who are *really* using you. I think you should bow down so low that you don't have to get up!

Near the end of the film when Hazari is taken to court for inciting a rickshaw-drivers riot against the local mafioso, in his own defense he proudly quotes Max's words of the dangers of "bowing too low" and is happily released.

The film's objective according to its writer LaPierre, is to show that "human dignity would flourish under what most people would think (of) as impossible conditions".(NYT;1991;A15) In an interview with *The Los Angeles Times*, Roland Joffe explains his view of poverty;

> Whereas in the 18th century belief was that if you're poor you must be bad, the 20th century opposite view is that if you're a poor minority you must be good...Some people are good and some are bad.(Turan;1992;F8)

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An "objective" look at the lives of the poor in Calcutta positions the viewer to accept the human trauma in the film and feel reassured that although "they" are poor, "they" maintain "their" dignity. For instance, a young woman who is the healthy child of a leper couple is literally rescued from prostitution and violence by Max who repeatedly makes her promise to "go to school". Although Hazari's character is built up to be noble and "resilient" (an adjective Joffe used constantly to explain his film), both he and the community learn the concept of changing their accepted fate *from* Dr. Max.

Indian characters being given "positive images" in this film characterizes, as Stam puts it "...a bending-over backwards-not-to-be-racist attitude" which "betrays a lack of confidence in the group portrayed".(Stam;1983;305) The conscious effort in the film to show that the Westerners learn as much from the Indians as vice versa exemplifies what Barthes has accurately termed as "inoculation" -a metaphoric reference to the injection of the virus which threatens to "social body" most(Barthes;1972).

Positive images aside, both cinematically and through the narrative structure, the film reinforces that the people of the city of joy "need" Dr. Max. Like the "third-world reporter genre" films, Patrick Swayze's character is "politically uncommitted" at the beginning, but he "gradually invent(s) a new self by aligning (himself) with an individual and a cause".(Springer;1991;174)

The conventional camera work and predominantly Western soundtrack in this film attempts to create for the viewer, a familiar story in an unfamiliar setting. What is not so unfamiliar is the frustration felt by Max as he repeatedly states "I hate this place!", quite clearly reminiscent of the "nice whites" in the British Raj dramas.

An article in the *Washington Post* on *Camera Shy Calcutta*, a story on the filming of *City of Joy* perhaps best captures the Orientalist tendency transparent in the film itself. The journalist writes;

> A tiny man with bananas on his head has been turned in the proper direction, a fat shirtless worshipper has been told for the second time when to ring his bell to goddess Siva (sic), jute sacks, oil drums and carrot trays have been hoisted by dhoti-clad laborers, and now-for the briefest moment-Calcutta's madness is frozen in place. "Action!".(Coll;1992;D1)

The Irish nurse Joan, or Sister Joan as she is called by Max, is a martyr figure both removed from reality by her virtuous benevolence and put in her place by Max's blatant patriarchal control. In fact, the gender dynamics in *City of Joy* are remarkably archaic given its attempt to portray an affected fairness in terms of race. Whereas the two main male characters are supposed to balance off one another's short-comings, the two main female characters are completely subordinated.

The voyeuristic gaze of the camera is particularly evident in its positioning of the female characters: the only white woman is rendered helpless without her white male hero; the Indian women are doubly helpless and need direction from both Indian men and the white hero.

Max finally becomes part of the slum community when in one of the closing scenes of the film he is shown "giving away" Hazari's daughter at her wedding. Joan remarks to Max as they share a celebratory drink, "...bet you never thought you'd be giving up a daughter in the slums of Calcutta."

A self-conscious liberal critique of the excesses of consumerism is evident throughout the film with Max learning from Hazari that "Trust can't be purchased", something Max learns by becoming part of the slum community (although his leadership role is evident). However, the focus of the film in no way critiques the imbalances of the market economy, only its obviously grotesque excesses signified by the amoral godfather's son. Poverty for both the writer and the director of the film is represented by the impoverished individual who is "resilient" to her/his material conditions and thereby displays human dignity.

Hazari, a mere rickshaw-driver is able at the end of the film to afford an expensive sari and wedding for his daughter who gets married to someone from a wealthier family. Thus social mobility is possible as long as one works hard enough for it. Hazari's ultimate success is a result of both his "hard work" and his son's good fortune at having found a valuable gold medallion once belonging to Max. Liberal capitalist ideology is thus vindicated by the neat happy ending which makes common-sense to a Western situated viewer. Max's interference, both financial (indirectly through his gold medallion) and personal, saves the day for the hard working, dignified poor in the slums of Calcutta.

In Salaam Bombay! the poverty of street-children and prostitutes is not easily rectified by outside interference or a willingness to work harder. The film both begins and ends in helpless despair which might be interpreted as a more authentic look at the lives of the poor in India. The film features an all Indian cast, save two minor white characters whose roles are incidental. Unlike City of Joy which was filmed on a $30 million budget with a simulated slum and trucked in gallons of water for a recreated monsoon(Turan; 1992;F6), Salaam Bombay! was filmed in Hindi in actual slums and brothels with "real" street-children playing "themselves" in the film. While not succumbing to typical Hollywood melodrama, Salaam Bombay!'s seemingly unconventional narrative and documentary camera work can be interpreted as a rather conventional story in Hollywood's tear-jerker genre.

The story follows the life of a young abandoned rural boy who buys a train ticket with the only money he has left in the world to seek his fortunes in India's version of Los Angeles, Bombay. Once arriving in chaotic and overwhelming Bombay, Krishna (Shafiq Syed) is pursued by a mad man and almost run over by various vehicles. Krishna then literally runs into a street-child and Chillum (Raghubir Yadav), an older boy who will eventually both befriend and corrupt him. Krishna finds a job as a chaipau (tea-boy) at the train station hoping to make the 500 Rupees which will get him back to his village. He subsequently becomes a daily part of the lives of the women and children who work in a nearby brothel and befriends Rekha (Aneeta Karwar) a kind-hearted prostitute and her young daughter Manju. Along with Krishna the

brothel has another young resident, an abducted Nepalese virgin prostitute who is nicknamed *Solasaal* (Sweet Sixteen). The owner of the brothel and the resident drug-lord Baba (Nana Patekar) eyes the vulnerable young prostitute who also has the young Krishna's attention.

As the story unfolds, Krishna's older friend Chillum who is a drug-runner for Baba loses his job when he keeps all the profits of a particular drug sale. Chillum who aspires to things beyond his reach eventually dies of a drug overdose despite Krishna's attempts at saving him from himself. Krishna himself loses his chaipau job and is robbed of his only savings of 250 Rupees. One night as Krishna and his group of street-children friends serve as waiters at a posh wedding, he and Manju are picked up by local authorities who place them in a jail-like institution for homeless children. Little Manju becomes lifeless as her mother is unable to secure her release, but Krishna in a dramatic escape scene manages to get away. Returning to the brothel, Krishna finds that the beautiful Nepalese virgin is no longer, and has fallen in love with her conniving pimp, Baba. A depressed Rekha is packing to leave the brothel only to be stopped by Baba who insists he loves her and gives her his knife to prove his trust. She throws the knife away just in time for Krishna to grab it in order to stab Baba in the back. Rekha and Krishna leave the brothel running only to be separated by an unsettling crowd, and the film closes with Krishna sitting by himself unwinding his toy top with a close-up of his crying face.

The camera work throughout the film verges on a *cinema verite* resembling a documentary although the film is wholly fictional. In her portrayal of poverty Nair is very conscious of the role of authenticity in the film's success in the West. Nair's Indian background gives her a natural ability to represent India and Indians using much more believable stylistic conventions than *City of Joy*. The fact that the characters speak in Hindi as opposed to the English and the occasional hybrid pigeon Bengali-Hindi in *City of Joy* , immediately naturalizes *Salaam Bombay!* . In varicus interviews promoting the film Nair spoke of how she held workshops with the children and the prostitutes who gained her trust and respect as she consulted them regularly during the making of the film.(NYT;1988; C17)

Thus in contrast to the obvious Othering in the context of white/non-white dynamics both in the production and content of *City of Joy*, *Salaam Bombay!* subverts constructing a racial Other essentialized by their un-Western "Indian-ness". As a film depicting Indians as subjects and not objects of racial difference *Salaam Bombay!* is leaps and bounds more sensitive to racial and even gender subjectivity than *City of Joy*. However, how does *Salaam Bombay!* fare in its representation of poverty and its treatment of the politics of class? In these crucial aspects which are the defining features of an external racism, the film sadly resorts to an essentialization of the poor which is not so different from the sentimental *City of Joy*.

The dignity of the impoverished individual is at the heart of the narrative structure of *Salaam Bombay!*. Krishna's intrinsic "goodness" makes him the hero of pathos, the viewer is positioned to commiserate with the little boy's unfortunate fate but never to question what material

conditions leads to his fate. *Salaam Bombay!* exemplifies a "structuring absence"(Stam;1983;303) of confrontation between the rich and the poor, or resistance at any social level. Two sequences where class contradictions might have been explored are left untouched. In one scene Krishna and his young friends rob a trusting, wealthy older man and make off with his money for a debaucherous celebration with their newly acquired wealth. The narrative point of view hardly condones robbery for children who have been robbed of their childhood, when the countervailing victim is a helpless old man. The second sequence takes place when the children work as waiters at a posh wedding. Instead of providing any sort of a hint of a "critique of their overriding power" in society, the rich are portrayed with amused mockery(Bharucha;1989;1277).

Whereas confrontation in *City of Joy* leads to the mobilization and ultimate victory of the forces of good by the white protagonist against the forces of evil signified by the mafioso, confrontation in *Salaam Bombay!* leads simply to the futile killing of the pimp Baba by Krishna. The close-up long shot which closes the film with Krishna's face streaming with tears is followed by the film's dedication to "the children of the streets of Bombay". There is no happy ending. Thus the audience is not supposed to leave the theater feeling good about the non-resolution, but we *are* supposed to leave feeling good about having felt bad.(Bharucha;1989;1275)

A review of the film from *The Los Angeles Times* mentions that "the difference between sentimentality and sentiment (is) the difference between sincerity and authenticity". *Salaam Bombay!*, according to this reviewer,

> ...shows us these children clearly, not as blurry sociological stereotypes,
> it lets Nair preserve their humour and their pure spirits, even if their
> innocence is now long beyond preserving.(Benson;1988; C23)

Reviews of the film were not unanimously glowing, however, Nair's ability to represent these children as more than stereotypes captured both critical and public acclaim which almost always concentrated on the issue of "authenticity". Commodification of this "authenticity" invites Western praise for representation of the Orient constructed by an insider- a non-Other. However, if Mira Nair's role as one of the "gate-keepers" of Indian culture and Indian poverty is analyzed in terms of class, we find that her articulation of poverty is deeply susceptible to an Othering of the poor.

The seductive camera work in *Salaam Bombay!* much more than the transparent stylized version in *City of Joy* , is suspiciously reminiscent of the Oxfam-type advertisements mentioned earlier in the paper. The ubiquitous long close-ups on the children's' faces, particularly during emotional moments, appear to be granting "point of view shots" from the perspective of the subjects. However, these dramatic close-ups cannot be assumed as subverting conventional modes of representation.(Stam; 1983;312) These recurring close-ups elicit pity for these children who are objectified as the essential victims of a faceless

poverty. A "naturalistic illusion" provided by the documentary-style camera work reinforces a "reality effect"(Hall;1982;75) that evades questioning the structures of that reality.

Both films deal with poverty and suffering in present day India in an attempt to convey a humanist sympathy at a very personal level using a realist form to varying degrees. In both cases there are structural elements which endorse a sense of reality within the narrative. The humanist sympathy invoked by both films have a way of making us "feel good about the bad", particularly given *Salaam Bombay!*'s unresolved ending. As Bharucha eloquently writes,

> ...the humanism that does not confront its subject matter within the contradictions of its history, but rather, idealises its dehumanised subject so that it evokes the essential goodness surviving in the soul of men(sic), irrespective of their condition.(Bharucha;1989;1275)

The analysis of the two films point to certain discernible differences, most significantly, the stereotypical Othering of the servile, exotic natives in relation to the White protagonist in *City of Joy* as opposed to *Salaam Bombay!*'s non-essentialist depiction of Indian subjectivity in terms of ethnicity. What strikes me as more interesting than the differences are the similarities in the two films are the external racist rationalizations for the conditions of poverty in India under the guise of liberal individual humanism.

Neither film engages in the "removal of the poverty", but rather in "the endurance of humanity that survives through poverty"(Bharucha;1989;1279). Thus the paternalistic subtext of the films position the viewer to assume that the "humanity of destitution"(Balibar;1990;44) are potentially incapable of "endurance", "dignity" and "resilience". We are provided intrinsically *bad* characters like the godfather and his son in *City of Joy* and Baba the pimp in *Salaam Bombay!* with whom to compare the "resilient" characters with. The fact that they "make it", that they actually *do* manage to "rise above" their unfortunate conditions-despite the fact that they are poor and brown-makes them "just like us". In other words, it is not *their* poverty which is made comprehensible to the Western viewer only *their* innate goodness in the face of that poverty.

The portrayal of the idealized poor individual is at the core of both narratives evoking intertextual and extra-textual notions of dependency on the benevolent rich and further reinforcing essentialist rationalizations of poverty. Not only is "our complicity" denied in "their oppression"(Bharucha; 1989;1275), our generosity is sought out as the solution to their poverty.

City of Joy is explicit in its reference to developmental discourse with the video version beginning with an advertisement for CARE, a volunteer agency working with the "third world" poor. The makers of *Salaam Bombay!* are more subtle in making the connection, nonetheless, in the process of promoting her film Mira Nair widely publicized the fact that some of the proceeds went to set up two homes for street-children in Delhi and Bombay.(NYT;Dec.23.1990)

It is not the philanthropic authenticity of the film-makers which elicit criticism here, but rather the undeniable use of charities to sell the films on poverty, or sell poverty, as it were, which makes both films culpable in reinforcing stereotypes of external racism.

Filmic Representation and the Correlation Between External and Internal Racism:

Thus the main narrative strategy in both films personalize poverty, emphasize the "human dignity" factor and thereby essentialize both the conditions of poverty in India as well as the Indian poor. The colonial heritage of Twentieth Century external racism equates poverty with backwardness and rationalizes the racial dimension of this poverty with the "natural" moral superiority of development discourse. As we have seen, the two films are mediated within the framework of liberal capitalist ideology which by "exnominating" exploitation, naturalizes structural inequality.

In the same way, internal racist discourse against economically disadvantaged minorities consistently naturalize structural imbalances which might cause differences in class based on race. Personalization of poverty with the emphasis on the "dignified individual" is also evident in internal racist discourse in the US against economically disadvantaged minorities. One need only think of the average network news story on "ghetto unemployment" or "inner-city crime" where often you have a "good black person" who is constructed as a foil for the "criminal" or the "drug-addict"; emphasizing human dignity in the face of poverty thereby removing the problem from a social level to an individual level, while simultaneously demonstrating a paternalistic pride in "those blacks who have managed to retain their individual dignity".[3]

As described earlier India's development into an industrial form of backward capitalism displays stratified divisions in class comparable, if not exceeding Western class imbalances. Balibar defines societies with dual economies as those with "two modes of reproduction of labour-power":

> One is integrated within the capitalist mode of production, and involves mass consumption, general access to schooling, various forms of indirect wages and unemployment benefit...The other , however, leaves all or a part of reproduction up to pre-capitalist modes of production...unwaged modes of production that are dominated and destructed by capitalism; here there is an immediate relationship with the phenomena of 'absolute surplus population', the destructive exploitation of labour-power and racial discrimination.(Balibar;1991;178)

The poor depicted in both films discussed would fall into Balibar's second category. Whereas global capitalism has failed to absorb

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[3] References to *Horatio Alger* stories come to mind, as does the similarity of those stories to the *City of Joy* plot structure.

much of the world's population, popular representation of non-white poverty attempts to rationalize this very contradiction at all costs.

Moreover, the construction of a discourse on an Asian "model minority" functioning to reinforce status quo assumptions about success within liberal capitalist society is irreconcilable with the finite absorption capacities of world capitalism. Ahmad writes, "Where can India send the approximately five hundred million people for whom Indian capitalism simply cannot provide?"(Ahmad;1992;315) Thus the Indian "model minority" in the US is not much of a viable model for the majority of the population in India, not to mention other minority groups within the US who are at the bottom end of the American class structure as a result of structural social imbalances.

Conclusion:

External racism directed against "the humanity of destitution" by "the humanity of consumption"(Balibar; 1991;44) is evident in differing forms in both films discussed in this paper. As I have argued with *City of Joy*, the Indian poor are mobilized by the white male character to learn how to work together, and how to work harder. The film's conscious "objective" positioning of the audience to show that the Patrick Swayze character has his own flaws, hardly undermines the message of white racial authority and the infallibility of the capitalism in the long-run.

In *Salaam Bombay!* the "realist" representation of the Indian poor manages to avoid confronting the disparity between Balibar's description of the "two humanities". It is not the fact that the film disavows class confrontation that makes it open to external racist interpretation. It is *Salaam Bombay!*'s conscious commodification of poverty through its recurring images of the vulnerable and pitiful poor which positions the audience to deny the very contradictions within capitalism which leads to this poverty, reinforcing the above disparity.

In both films poverty is signified by the dignity of the poor individuals with whom we are to sympathize. The stereotypes of poor people who make us cry because they are at heart good people, invoked by both film-makers, reinforces the same ideology of liberal individualism which rationalizes racism against the non-white poor in the US as it does against the "third world masses".

The Othering of the Indian poor, although more blatantly apparent in the non-Indian production of *City of Joy*, is as evident if more disguised and therefore more insidious, in *Salaam Bombay!* It has not been my intention in this paper to point fingers at racist depictions of Indians or to prescribe a non-racist formulaic alternative. Despite the noblest of intentions, as I argued in the introduction, the logic of representing poverty in the "third world" in the context of liberal hegemonic ideology is inherently problematic.

If we were to take Mira Nair's representation of Indian poverty in *Salaam Bombay!* as an example of "model minority" discourse on differences in class across national borders, we would have to conclude that her essentialization of poverty in India is not very different in content from that of Joffe's *City of Joy*. Hence in this case, the Othering of the

Indian poor is not subverted by Mira Nair's Indian origin, and in fact, is in many ways much worse since her gate-keeper role legitimates a certain ethnic authenticity.

The stereotypes perpetuated by both films are racially based and therefore racist but also specifically anti-poor, in that race and class have a symbiotic relationship in racist discourse on non-white poverty. The absence of any apparent tension in representing acute poverty within the framework of the dominant liberal capitalist ideology as exemplified by both films discussed in this paper, demonstrates the efficacy of the constructed naturalization of "third world" poverty .

As we have seen, the intention of both films is to position the audience's sympathy towards the indiviudal dignified poor. We are to feel sorry for their miseries, but, we are to feel good for having felt sorry for them. This type of "feel-good movie" on, of all things, "third-world" poverty serves only to obscure the reality of why they are poor and reinforces a racially based rationale which substitutes a few tears for social justice.

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Class, Race and Poverty:
Constructing a "Third World" Other in Popular Films

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Democracy in its present form, like the cinema, is a relatively recent Wes' n import to India. Although initially meant primarily for elite consumption, both have, in a short span of time, struck roots in the hearts and minds of the Indian masses. While both are usually noisy, shallow, and gaudy, and often provide unintended cases of the theater of the absurd, both have, at times reached unscaled heights. (Bardhan, 1990, 214)

The parallel between cinema and democracy in India, both imports from the West transforming the vastly different conditions of India is telling of the country's unique political and cultural adaptability. India's political culture can be described as a hybrid mix of Western concepts and forms adapting to the country's linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity as well as to its socio-economically polarized society. India's variation of "backward capitalism" incorporates a small minority of its some 900 million people, leaving almost 500 million in conditions of abject poverty. Indian democracy can be broadly described as revolving around the political and economic interests of its heterogeneous "propertied dominant classes": industrial capitalists, white collar workers and professionals, and rich farmers. The state is "confined to regulatory functions" instead of "accommodating the interests of the majority of the population.(Bardhan,1984,71)

In the realm of communications, outside the massive film industry, the state has had a virtual monopoly on electronic media until the very recent proliferation of satellite TV. Approximately 80 percent of India's some 900 million people have access to television broadcasts. However, only an estimated 12 percent of the total population have access to TV sets, with video ownership estimated at approximately 1 percent .[1](Singhal & Rogers, 1989,60&145) Until very recently TV news was entirely under the monopoly of the state (Doordarshan-India's nationalized TV station),"...with daily broadcasts about state activities and policies, about ministers and their achievements, against all criticisms in the press...".(Rajagopal, 1992,102) In 1989 *India Today*, a popular weekly news-magazine which models itself on American *Time* and *Newsweek* , launched a privately produced video news program called *Newstrack*. *Newstrack* is a monthly, relatively fast-paced infotainment current affairs program available on video for purchase and rental. *Newstrack* had its peak of popularity between 1989 and late 1991 when it was the only alternate source of televised national news outside state control.

If we assume that "news as a cultural discourse... exists and has meaning only in relation to other institutions and discourses operating at the same time"(Hartley, 1982, 8-9), privately produced news which is critical of state policy in substance, and oppositional to state coverage in form is likely to appear subversive. Private TV news with its critical/oppositional role in a state that has a monopoly over electronic

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[1] Video viewership is difficult to estimate given the profusion of video rentals, video "parlors", video buses, etc. Suffice it to say that video as a medium reaches a significantly larger population than the one percent who are estimated to own video players.

media, is able to construct a counter-state representational reality which may appear counter-hegemonic, belonging to the "voice of the people". In a "backward capitalist" context like India, the crucial question is, of course, who are the people behind the voices? And, what does this type of pseudo-populist TV represent in a deeply inegalitarian society?

Despite the enormous levels of poverty, India today has "all the characteristics of a capitalist country" coupled with a "bourgeois political subjectivity" which "has been created for the populous at large".(Ahmad, 1992,100) *Newstrack*'s coverage of the 1990 Indian student demonstrations over the implementation of affirmative action policies, reflects a unified upper-caste/class bias acting against a reformist state-sponsored initiative in the guise of a sympathetic representation of "radical" forces in society.

The power of the media, the "... power to signify events in a particular way"(Hall,1982,69), can be crucial in moments of intense political instability. Television's visual authority to create a "naturalistic illusion"(Ibid, 76)- a window to the world-is of particular relevance during these unstable momen's. The legitimacy of one particular window is, of course, enhanced when all other televisual windows are shut. Hartley points out that;

> ...it is not the *event* which is reported that determines the form, content, meaning or 'truth' of the news, but rather the *news* that determines what it is that the event means: its meaning results from the features of the sign system and the context in which it is uttered and received.(Hartley, 1982,15)

My intention is to analyze this specific moment in India's recent political history which crystalized the socio-economic polarization between the dominant urban classes and the rest of Indian civil society. I hope to look at the representational politics of caste/class as exemplified by *Newstrack*'s 1990 coverage of the student demonstrations which, coupled with the rise of Hindu fundamentalist politics, ultimately led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister V. P. Singh and his minority government.

My interest in looking at *Newstrack*'s coverage of the student demonstrations is due to its popularity and influence on other forms of Indian mass media. *Newstrack*'s format has been replicated by another current affairs video program called *Eye Witness* , as well as a program called *The World This Week* which is presently shown on Indian national TV. As well, *Newstrack*'s video format allows for accessibility to Indian communities in the West. It is widely available through personal subscription, university video libraries, cultural centers, etc. in the US.

I will first briefly outline a theoretical framework in which to analyze the issue of "competing equalities"(Galanter, 1990) brought up by the Mandal Commission in order to contextualize *Newstrack*'s coverage. Secondly, I will discuss *Newstrack*'s role, on a theoretical level, as an elitist Indian form of "Westernized popular culture" within India's mass media conrext. I will also give a general description of *Newstrack*'s

regular format by looking briefly at the kinds of shows it produced in 1990 and 1991 so as to provide some reference for the two specific programs. Thirdly, I will use a textual analysis of news to look at the *Newstrack* coverage on two successive video programs from September and October of 1990. Finally, to conclude I will draw out how *Newstrack* was able to naturalize the anti-reservation demonstrations into a "common-sense" hegemonic discourse.

Indian Liberalism- Freedom, Equality and Poverty:

> The State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the equal .
> protection of the laws within the territory of India
> Article 14
> *Constitution of India*

Large-scale student demonstrations broke out as a response to V.P. Singh's minority government's announcement of its implementation of The Mandal Commission in August, 1990. The commission was a ten year old document which recommended, among other things, that 27 percent of national government jobs should be reserved for the 52 percent of India's population classified as "other backward classes". This affirmative action policy based on India's caste/class structure was announced just as "Hindu revivalism", led primarily by the rise of the fundamentalist right-wing Hindu *Bharatiya Janata* Party (BJP), was gaining popular support.(Omvedt,1991,15) Although various states have adopted much larger quota policies of reservation for "backward castes and classes", the Mandal Commission was the most extensive reservation policy which would have been implemented at the central government level.

The complexity of India's particular caste/class societal formation is not easily summarized in a few sentences. Nevertheless, we can define caste as ascriptive Hindu-based endogomous and community-specific social formations.[2] These community (village) based caste formations are hierarchical and thus act as contained vertical social formations. Beyond the level of the individual community, defining caste becomes much more difficult. The political fall-out of the Mandal Commission exemplifies the social polarity between the Upper Castes (Forward Castes) versus the Lower Castes (Backward Castes) and those who fall outside the caste system (The "Untouchable Castes"/*Dalits*, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes).

Official surveys of the country's plethora of castes were constructed during the colonial era when the British tried to delineate the various communities first for revenue purposes, and then to determine which castes were discriminated against within Hindu cultural norms. Since independence, government policies which paradoxically

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[2] Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, eds. have analyzed regional patterns of caste/class relationships, looking at horizontal versus vertical social formations in two volumes: <u>Caste, Class, Ethnicity and Dominance: Patterns of Politico-Economic Change in Modern India</u>.

assume a secular state and yet pursue affirmative action policies designed to provide "employment and education reservations" based on caste, have been inherently problematic. (Guhan, 1992,1658) Any policy based on caste quotas "exacerbates caste feelings" between communities.(Ibid, 1659)

State reformist attempts at "promoting substantive equality in a deeply inegalitarian society"(Guhan,1992,1657) have been largely opposed by upper caste/class interests in the name of reverse discrimination and issues pertaining to freedom of the individual. As in any liberal democracy, there is a tension in India between the often contradictory notions of substasntive equality and negative freedom. Policies which favour "the opportunity to be equal"-substantive equality- often oppose the rights of the individual in terms of her/his freedom.

Marxist criticism contends that the outcome of Indian democracy has led to an ideological construction of a "bourgeois subjectivity" for the population at large, despite the fact that most of its people live in conditions of poverty. (Ahmad, 1990) Thus at a cultural level, bourgeois values which serve the interests of the dominant classes, specifically the urban dominant classes, are constructed as the norm for all of India's population. This has given rise to the growing distance between the two competing normative values within the liberal paradigm, with negative freedom becoming of utmost significance in opposition to reformist attempts to secure substantive equality.

Hegemonic ideologies are "accomplished" through the media not by conspiratorial complicity, but rather "...by means of winning the active consent of those classes and groups who (are) subordinated within it".(Hall;1982;85) Upper caste/class dominance of "India's centers of social and cultural power" include the control of Indian media.[4] (Shah, 1992,8) The media's role in emphasizing the threat to negative freedom became quintessential in 1990, when national state policy favoured substantive reforms over the freedom of upper caste/class access to state jobs and seats in educational facilities.

In contemporar, India, particularly with the effects of modernization in an *urban* context, caste has little relevance in day-to-day life aside from marriage arrangements. I would argue that for the upper castes living in urban areas, caste issues become *politically* relevant only when substantive equality reforms impinge on upper caste socio-economic mobility. The fact that "India's newspapers are staffed mainly by reporters and editors belonging to forward (upper) castes"(Ibid,7) thus became relevant during the Mandal Commission demonstrations. The reaction to the Mandal Commission in 1990 represents the urbanized upper castes mobilizing as a a horizontal social formation through demonstrations and party politics, against state

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[4] Although *Newstrack*'s caste composition is not known to me, the significant factor is that it is a program produced by an elite group of people even within India's media context: Both the style and content of the program reflect distinctly Americanized format which will be discussed in the next section.

policies favouring lower caste interests, and can thus be analyzed as a "class for itself".

In other words, I am saying that the dominant urban upper castes can be understood using class analysis in respect to the Mandal Commission affirmative action issue. This issue, in fact, exemplifies the obvious divisions within a so-called "Hindu community" based on class, the existence of which the Hindu fundamentalists consistently deny.

Newstrack and Indian Media-A Theoretical Perspective:

The fact that *Newstrack* is produced in English automatically situates it as an elite class medium. The *Newstrack* viewer is likely to be from the highest of the Indian "middle classes" in that it is made for people who have access to video players out of the 3 percent of all Indians who are estimated to be conversant in English. Despite the seemingly tiny fraction of the country's population which uses English, the language plays a dominant role in both government and civil society. Aijaz Ahmad writes that;

> ...Among all the countries of Asia and Africa which gained their independence after World War II, India has numerically by far the largest professional petty bourgeoisie, fully consolidated as a distinct social entity and sophisticated enough in its claim to English culture for it to aspire to have its own writers, publishing houses, and a fully fledged home market for English books.(Ahmad, 1992,75)

Thus the English language in India creates a discursive space which must be analyzed beyond its colonial roots. As Ahmad writes, "One cannot reject English now, on the basis of its initially colonial insertion, any more than one can boycott the railways for that same reason.(Ibid,77)

In post-colonial India, "different classes" *do not use* "the same language"(Volosinov, 1973, 23) when it comes to English. The use of English in India, amongst the other 15 major languages of the country, can be seen as a class marker within society. This is not to say that the English print media in India acts as a "class for itself" as a matter of principle, only that the usage of English delineates class formation to a significant extent. This point is crucial to my analysis in this paper as I am looking at a particular elite form of Westernized popular culture in India.

Dual economies in countries with characteristics of "backward capitalism" have by definition polarized cultural forms which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. American soap operas broadcast on satellite TV have a viewership that crosses class lines as do the religious mythological shows on Indian national TV. However, a production like *Newstrack* , an English video news program has a specific target group due to the medium, the elite language and the news content.

In order to situate the Indian media context in relation to its Western counterparts, we can say that if TV in the West "represents itself as a mirror of society", in India TV "offers a mirror of the state"; representing the state "as it would like to be seen."(Rajagopal, 1992, 101-2) In an article on "national programming in India", Rajagopal argues that Indian "Prime time has been taken over, ultimately, by business interests catering to

middle-class audiences".(Rajagopal, 1992,109) India in following global trends, has under the Congress (I) governments pursued dramatic economic liberalization policies with the objective of "promoting middle class consumption as the means to national prosperity". This has resulted in Doordarshan's transformation into a "minority oriented public apparatus".(Ibid, 97) With the profusion of satellite TV, it is no surprize that the target audience is "...the urban, educated, well off viewer".(Rahman, 1992,28) The fact that 70 percent of all Indians live in rural areas is not of great concern for India's budding TV industry. Consequently the dominant class of "rich farmers"(Bardhan, 1984,71) does not fit into the cultural elite who are the ideal "target audience" with capital for luxury consumption. Therefore, for this urbanized elite in India, prosperity is intrinsically linked to issues of individual freedom.

Perhaps the most obvious evidence of this "minority orientation" is apparent in the advertisements on Indian TV. I would argue that these ads play an important role in the video viewing process as they are often more entertaining than the programs themselves.

Newstrack, has since its inception, appealed to specifically high consumerist tastes with an emphasis on transnational culture. The monthly videos run anywhere from 1 to 2 hours with at least 4 breaks for ads with a minimum of around 4 minutes for each break. As an example of an ad sequence, the September 1990 video which I will be looking at in more detail further on, features nine ads during the show's second commercial break. They are for:

1) **Liberty Running Shoes** signified by a fast American car; 2) **Zodiac Shirts** signified by a young man who owns a Mercedes; 3) **Limca**-a soft-drink-featuring a group of "hip" college boys; 4) **Palmolive**-the "international shaving foam"; 5) **Titan Quartz Watches** from an "international collection" with corresponding images of "elegant" Western cuisine and classical music; 6) **Royal Asian Paints** featuring an Indian millionaire dressed in traditional garb playing golf in his post-raj mansion; 7) **Cathay Pacific** with images of Westerners in exotic Oriental locales with the narrative "To help the new world of International travellers arrive in better shape."; 8) **Gwaliar Suits** with a polo-playing Indian celebrity and his movie-star wife enjoying a charmed life; 9) **TATA Steel** with the narrative "We make our resources work for the nation. We also make steel." (From Newstrack; Sept.1990)

These are "high quality" ads by Indian standards promoting, unsurprisingly, a Western lifestyle replete with sexual innuendos, teenage rebellion and the acquisition of things to gain freedom. As well, the ads focus on the dual themes of national industrial growth and international business interests.

Hartley writes;

...in a competitive capitalist environment, the news is seen as both a commercial undertaking in its own right and as a desirable vehicle for disseminating particular views...but these two criteria can be mutually exclusive.(Hartley, 1982, 49)

In the Indian context, when news becomes a "commercial undertaking", particularly in a specialized format like video, it is most profitable to appeal to the elite "minority market" within the larger polarized economy. The cultural tastes of this minority market is likely to be more Westernized or "Americanized" than the majority of the population. This is not to say that the Indian bourgeoisie acts as "mere passive receptacles, mechanically reproducing the norms, values and signs of transnational power"(Mattleart, 1983,17) Cultural forms adopted by the Indian bourgeoisie are distinctively Indianized through "resistance, adaptation, recuperation, offensives and mimicry" (Ibid) of the Western counterpart.

Despite the *Indianization* of these advertisements, I would agree with Ahmad's point that the result of transnational capitalism is not a nebulous space between homogeneity and heterogeneity of cultures; he states emphatically that *homogenization* is the inevitable cross-cultural outcome, even if in countries like India the homogeneous "cultural logic" is a defining factor for solely the small but powerful "urban bourgeoisie".(Ahmad, 1992, 105) In contemporary urban India, this homogeneous cultural logic defined in Western liberal terms by the Indian bourgeoisie can be seen as a form of "postmodernism". Frederic Jameson defines the contentious term "postmodernism" as "an erosion of the older distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture".(Jameson, 1983, 112) What becomes relevant in an increasingly internationalized world, for countries in stages of "backward capitalism", is *whose* culture we mean by popular culture?

The success of *Newstrack* as a Westernized form of "popular" news combines what Fiske calls "mid-level culture" which meets "the criteria of education and social responsibility" with "entertainment and popular pleasure".(Fiske, 1989,192) The "popular pleasure" of the Indian English speaking bourgeoisie in terms of *Newstrack*, translates into a fast-paced, anti-authoritatirian, anti-state, individual-oriented, current affairs program. Traditional cultural boundaries between the public and the private, as well as in terms of respect and distance for authority figures are transgressed in a program like *Newstrack* . *Newstrack's* conspicuously Americanized format is conducive to a "populist" form of representation with a "We're showing you what *really* happened!" as a recurring theme. It is this "populist" feature which makes it a part of Western "postmodern" culture. However, an analysis of this elite "Westernized popular culture" must take into consideration that it is not a cultural form *of* the majority of the Indian people. Rather, it is a borrowed "popular" form from the West that becomes an elite form once transplanted into the Indian context.

The format and setting are familiar to the Western viewer with two studio anchors welcoming the viewer to the monthly program. A brief description of "this month's stories" is followed with an inclusive "Let's go Newstracking!" which begins every installment. The title of the program along with this enticing introduction invites the viewer to "come see what we've found" as it were. The word "exclusive" is a constant, with "exclusive" interviews and footage promised on almost every program.

Since *Newstrack* is not live television but would like to relay a sense of urgency, it uses framing devices common to televised news-magazines in the West which creates a "sense of 'liveness' and 'nowness' (Fiske; 1990; 67) by taking us to the scene of each particular event. The anchors stress that "Our team was there first", recreating a sense of urgency by taking "us" through the dramatic events. The viewer is thus positioned temporally to participate in whatever monthly drama the "*Newstrack* team" is following. In August 1990, a month before the student demonstrations broke out, *Newstrack* went to Moscow with former Prime Minister VP Singh on his first visit to the Soviet Union. In the introduction of the August program "we" are invited along to witness this historic event.

Although *Newstrack* focuses on major political news, a sense of "intimacy" between the anchors and the viewers analogous to American morning TV shows is apparent. In research comparing morning American news shows to evening news Hallin found that the morning shows emphasized "positive" news with stories about heroes of everyday life", "news you can use", and stories with the emphasis on "what it will mean to you".(Hallin, 1986,16-17)

In a similar manner, *Newstrack* features at least one "positive" story in each video consisting usually of an interview with a celebrity at home as a "real person". Sensationalist, risque stories about sex and illicit affairs tend to be the focus of most personal interviews with the "stars". *Newstrack* entertainment and human interest stories feature a diverse range of guests ranging from Jyoti Basu (Communist Chief Minister of West Bengal) to British pop star Samantha Fox on the same episode.(Janurary,1991)

The fact that *Newstrack* is able to convey this sense of informal "intimacy" to its audience, be it with politicians, Indian film stars or Western celebrities, marks a significant shift from traditional Indian norms of public discourse. These stories of individuals defying Indian conventional norms of socially acceptable behavior are presented with a great deal of sympathy.

Whether a piece on the first Indian woman police-officer (Jun.1990), or a young film star who "wants to be India's sex symbol"(Dec.1991), *Newstrack* stories emphasize the strong motivated individual (often women) going against the traditional, patriarchal, authoritarian system. Within the liberal paradigm, the above themes reflect issues of negative freedom and formal equality; *Newstrack*'s ideal subjects are those who "make it" on their own and/or those who make the most of the equality of opportunities available in India's skewed democracy. Given the monopoly on state controlled news on national Indian TV, a "Westernized popular" news program is thus appealing as an anti-state, pro-individual cultural discourse for the disaffected Indian bourgeoisie.

The popularity of *Newstrack* amongst a certain class in Indian society reflects that Westernized cultural forms are relevant for the Indian bourgeoisie. The informal familiarity that the program constructs between interviewee and viewer breaks down traditional notions of

respect for authority figures diminishing the distinction between the private and the public. For instance, the June 1991 program following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi opens with the anchor (Madhu Trahern) saying that "we will be playing the music of Miles Davis as he was Rajiv's favorite musician." Addressing a former Prime Minister, especially a recently assassinated former Prime Minister as "Rajiv" in public is almost unthinkable for most Indians and points out how very "modern" "we"-the audience-are assumed to be.

Newstrack's Coverage of Mandal Commission Demonstrations:

The October cassette opened with the anchor (Madhu Trahern) stating:

> We dedicate this cassette to the young men and children who died in their protest to the Mandal Commission Report. We bring into your homes the violence and pitched battle between the police and the students hoping that you will understand the frustration of the students.(Oct.1990)

The coverage of the anti-Mandal demonstrations reperesents the news media's paradoxical role whereby it must both construct and represent "reality".(Hall et. al, 1981) This relates to the signification function of media where, in terms of news, it seems appropriate to ask whether:

> ...the events that get so much coverage (do so) because they already 'affect our lives', or do they affect our lives largely because they are constantly reported in the news?(Hartley, 1982,39)

Since the demonstrations in 1990, mainstream English newspaper and *Newstrack* coverage of the Mandal Commission have been criticized by the alternative Indian media.(*Mainstream* Magazine, *Economic and Political Weekly*, etc.) The media's role in constructing a "national threat" scenario when the demonstrations against the Commission were concentrated in urban areas, specifically in Delhi , no doubt profoundly affected the former Prime Minister's political fate.

In many ways private media discourse on the student demonstrations of 1990 resembled the construction of a *positive* "moral panic" scenario. A "moral panic" is defined as an event where:

> A condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.(O'Sullivan et. al., 1983,140)

In a conventional moral panic scenario, an anti-state group is constructed as "deviant" from the normative status quo, whereby the "signification" of an "initial event" which attracts media coverage is subsequently coded as eliciting the reaction of a societal moral panic. Societal "deviance" draws more news-worthiness if the crucial factor of violence is involved; "the special status of *violence* as a news value"

determines significant media coverage of these issues.(Hall et. al., 1981, 353). Since the state "has the monopoly of *legitimate* violence", counter-hegemonic violent resistance is in most cases, automatically coded by the media as illegitimate.(Ibid)

Quite to the contrary, in the case of the student reaction to the Mandal Commission in 1990, privatized Indian mass media constructed a societal moral panic which valorized its subjects: the students demonstrating against the government. The student violence (both self-inflicted and against the state) was, in this case, coded as *legitimate* by the mainstream English media. Signifying the student demonstrators as a legitimate force against the state is a crucial factor defining *Newstrack's* cultural discourse. This is in light of the fact that Doordarshan refused to show any evidence of the student demonstrations which were getting daily coverage by the national print media.(PUDR Report) *Newstrack* consequently began both its episodes on the student demonstrations prefacing the stories by vocalizing their sympathies with the student demonstrators and reaffirming their watchdog role of the state.

This version of a "positive" moral panic pits the government's policy as a threat to society *against* the valiant students demonstrating to preserve their future (and implicitly the future of the country). Reaction to the implementation of the report in the end of August was immediate. However, the large-scale student demonstrations and self-immolations did not happen until the end of September. Thus the September version of the program had a story on the reaction titled "Mandal Report: Violent Reactions on both sides". Even thought the majority of the piece was devoted to the *side* against the report (the anti-reservationists), the pro-reservationists are given some minor representation(two interviews/two vox-pops). In the October program, the Mandal piece called "Delhi Burns While V.P. Plays" made no reference whatsoever to the elusive "other side".

The October report began with the anchor reading the following:

> The country was plunged in an unimaginable backlash of violence as
> young men immolated themselves and took poison in a desperate
> deathwish against a deaf and blind government. In the capital Delhi, and
> at least seven states in the North were convulsed in an unreal kind of
> violence with people not knowing when or where yet another student
> would immolate themselves.

This summary is followed with more passionate words of support for the students as well as for the "brave" *Newstrack* news-team. Treharn accounts for the audience that *Newstrack* was filming in between "tear-gas and bullets". To conclude the opening narration we are told:

> Anyone who has stood next to an unarmed young person whose
> body has been senselessly riddled with bullets, can not remain
> untouched by the tragedy and wasted life.

The compassionate anchors of *Newstrack* are thus excusing themselves for being "touched" and it is quite evident that the "unarmed young

person" signifies the martyr for the cause against The Mandal Commission.

In an analysis of representation of class on television Fiske and Hartley write;

> ...In the world of television, division between *classes in themselves* are rarely if ever presented as such. Television articulates the responses of people to their class condition, not the class condition itself. Hence it is primarily a medium for the expression of *classes for themselves*. Here again, however, the expression is rarely one of oppositional solidarity of either the dominant or the subordinate class to one another. Rather television...exploits the competitive fragmentation among people who belong to what is objectively , the same subordinate class. (Fiske & Hartley, 1977,102)

TV's potential to "neutralize antagonistic class relations" naturalizes differences in class, transforming the "class subject into an "individual personality"; essentially TV translates issues of class to those of culture.(Hartley, 1981, 61) In covering the Mandal Commission, *Newstrack* personalized the issue by repeatedly positioning various individual students (the victims) and their supporters against V.P. Singh (the malevolent politician). *Newstrack* followed the lead of newspapers like *The Times of India* (Shah, 1992,22) in comparing Singh to Hitler[5] and Mohammed Ali Jinnah. By personalizing the issue and demonizing an individual, the class confrontation element of the issue at hand is neatly excluded.

In the October program, various interviews with highly emotional parents of students who had immolated themselves and were calling for a "judicial inquiry", was followed by interviews with individual immolated students. Rajiv Goswami[6] a university student who suffered 55% burns from his immolation attempt was asked by the interviewer why he committed such an act. Goswami replied: "The Anti-Mandal movement was dying out in Delhi...I wanted to bring new life to it".

Another interview with a 13 year old boy Chetan Gautam with severe burns who we are told died October 2nd, is also asked why he did it. His response is that he did it "for God". This is followed with the interviewer (rather manipulatively and in poor taste) asking the badly burnt child how he feels. "No question of repenting, I've done it for *Desh* (the nation)!" he responds. As advice to other students, Gautam says "non-violence...hunger strike not self-immolation. (Perhaps a) Dharna (sit-in) in front of VP Singh's house". The narrator of the piece then asks rhetorically what "VP Singh has been doing today in response to this?" which is followed with clips from Doordarshan showing Singh writing letters to Rajiv Gandhi, dealing with international affairs, etc.

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[5] With this type of characterization, V.P. Singh's public relations people no doubt regretted having invited the *Newstrack* team along for the trip to the Soviet Union only two months before!

[6] Rajiv Goswami is currently the president of a major student organization at Delhi University.(Chris Chekuri-personal communciation)

Thus *Newstrack*'s coverage clearly personalizes the social issues by translating issues of class into those of culture (highlighting differences in personality which elicits sympathy or outrage for/at certain persons). Furthermore, in both programmes, *Newstrack* negates class issues implicitly by emphatically criticizing the government's (V.P. Singh's) "dangerous" re-introduction of caste issues within the political arena. In the September program the narrator states:

> The final cure lies not in reservation, but in dissolving the caste "barriers".
> India needs Gandhi who could inspire reforms, instead we got the
> demagoguery of VP Singh who legitimates caste barriers and pushed
> India back several decades.

The narrator's statement is backed up by various clips of politicians and academics who reaffirm that "caste affiliation only fragments the Hindu polity".

In a crisis situation the media's "identification and contextualisation" of a story sets the ideological agenda limiting the parameters of discussion for a specific issue.(Hall et al, 1981, 337) Thus *Newstrack* followed the print media's lead in launching an attack on substantive equality issues under the pretext of protecting the nation from "casteist violence". Ironically, the media was careful not to mention the opposition parties' (The BJP and Congress) direct involvement in organizing student protests on the basis of upper-caste affiliation.(PUDR Report) Whereas V.P. Singh's implementation of the reservation policy was labelled as "politically expedient" by *Newstrack*, the politics behind the media-savy student demonstrations were neatly "exnominated"[7].

Newstrack's "primary definers"-spokespeople who act as experts on any given issue- (Hall et. al, 1981,344) were academics and politicians who were quick to point out the deficiencies of the reservation policy without ever mentioning the potential benefits or need for such affirmative action policies in India. The media quickly turned the issue of substantive equality into one of "meritocracy"; reservation policy thus threatened the *quality* of the potential doctors, lawyers and bureaucrats India would one day have.

In the September program, during a "man-on-the-street" interview, the interviewer asks a "backward caste student" if he "would like to be treated by a doctor who passed with a 50% grade and is one because of reservation-someone with life and death powers? The student sharply responds "I would also not like to be treated by a doctor who has passed with 50% and has gotten in because he has paid huge sums of money to get in. Is this meritocracy?"

Despite the cogent oppositional viewpoint, there is no mention made of this "backward caste student's" argument and the program continues to reinforce the potential for abuse and failure of affirmative

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[7] A term coined by Roland Barthes (1973) referring to the naturalization of ideological discourse by *not* naming the powerful. For example, in US news union views are normally nominated during a dispute whereas management views are exnominated, constructing a naturalized discourse whereby union "demands" appear in a political vacuum.

action policies. This can be seen as an example of what Barthes calls "inoculation", a metaphoric reference to the injection of the virus which threatens the "social body" most.(Barthes;1984) In the October program, which is much more dramatic in its construction of the student demonstrators as martyrs of an unjust state, such oppositional opinion is conspicuously absent.

In addition to the media's ability to define and limit discourse, news media's social control role articulates hegemonic viewpoints- actively securing the consent of the subordinated- by using the language of "common sense".(Hall et. al, 1981) Newstrack attempts to convey that the students' demands are supported by all members of Indian society. In the October program the narrator says that the student "cause has crossed class, age and sex barriers". Various shots of "regular people", housewives (albeit middle-class suburbanized housewives) and young children (the younger generation of the anti-reservation student demonstrators) attempt to establish the "normalcy" of the anti-Mandal movement. Images of demonstrating students are juxtaposed with those of the "mono-maniacal government".

To further establish a "common-sense" reference that student demonstrations in India are contextualized in terms of "American student movements in the 1970's"[8] and "Tienanmen Square". In the October program which "takes us back" to the "eight days of dramatic student demonstrations" between the 20th and 28th of September, we are taken to the fourth night when students held an all-night sit-in type demonstration in front of Rajiv Goswami's (pg.24) hospital. The narrator tells us that this is "much like a 70's political happening in the West...where students acted in unity", and "much like Tienanmen Square in China as the students are unarmed waiting for the police".

A "vox pop" of a student who says "There is a long struggle ahead!" is followed by a shot of medical students chanting: "We are one! Down with VP Sing! Down with Mandal Commission!"
The lighting is poor but we can make out a "charged crowd" as the narrator says that "by 2:45 AM over 2000 policemen with lathis (police-sticks) and teargas are arriving". At 3:00 AM the police are shown loading demonstrators into vans "along with students, women and children who had been singing kirtans (Hindu devotional songs) alongside students". A group of young children in school uniforms are shown with a group of middle-aged women shouting "We want justice!" This is followed with a few minutes of footage of demonstrating students being dragged away by the police.

The intertextual references to demonstrating students in China and the US serves to conflate the very different issues which define the upper-caste/class student movement in India. This is a particularly interesting tactic on Newstrack's part and coheres with the supposition

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[8] By "1970's" US student movements, I am assuming that they mean the anti-Vietnam movement and/or the Civil Rights movement. The latter reference is particularly striking given that anti-affirmative action is the defining feature of the anti-Mandal student demonstrations.

that as a cultural form *Newstrack* is able to present itself as a subversive and oppositional force within Indian society. By positioning its audience to assume the plight of the upper-caste/class students is a universal condition of oppression reinforced by images of the "average citizen" sympathizing with the students' cause, *Newstrack* attempts to appear counter-hegemonic when it is in fact reinforcing hegemonic values and practices in Indian society. The housewives singing devotional hymns of support for the students are surely not representative of the majority of Indian mothers whose children are systematically deprived of education as a result of poverty and discrimination.

Newstrack 's language of "police violence" as opposed to the "peaceful student demonstrators" positions its coverage as "objective fact"' against the brutal acts of a faceless state. The October story opens as the narrator tells us how "*Newstrack* (will take) us through the most violent days of student protest in New Delhi. The shot opens with "Tuesday, September 25th" on the screen; the bloody body of a 20 year old student is being dragged down the street by four policemen. We are told that the student was shot during a "stone-throwing incident" and that he died later that same day in the hospital. The hand-held camera follows the four policemen who seem confused as what exactly to do with the dying student and are shouting incoherent, contradictory commands at the ambulance driver.

The next shot is of angry students in the midst of a police attack; a male student cries "They're firing on us!"; a middle-aged woman-the mother of the dying student from the last shot-is shown crying. This incident takes place in an upper-middle class suburb called *Laxmi Bai Nagar* which the male narrator tells us has been transformed into "shooting grounds". An elderly woman says in Hindi that as a parent she wishes the police would "first shoot them, before their children". She then goes on to shout that "VP Singh should die!!".

Although *Newstrack* had no coverage of students actually setting themselves on fire, as did most of the major English print media during the demonstrations, this above dramatic "live" coverage caused a great deal of controversy over police brutality in dealing with the student demonstrators. In fact, *Newstrack*'s coverage of police brutality elicited an official apology from the Delhi Police Commissioner over the handling of the above young student's body.[9] (PUDR Report)

The October piece on the Mandal Commission demonstrations closes with Madhu Trahern (the anchor) stating in a somewhat self-satisfied manner, that the past few weeks reflects an "intense hatred for VP Singh in the country". A brief discussion of *his* "insensitivity", is followed with the ominous closing remark: "He has no idea what is happening in the country".

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[9] Police violence against lower-castes/classes in India is notorious and, unsurprisingly, under-represented by Indian mass media.

Making Sense of *Newstrack*'s Common-Sense Discourse:

Volosinov's theory of the "multi-accentuality" of signs purports that signs do not have fixed internal "meaning", but rather "meaning-potentials" actualized through use.(Volosinov, 1973, 22) Volosinov suggests that the "inner-dialectic quality" of signs is often suppressed in practice", whereby "the dominant accentuation" of the sign appears natural. Only in times of "social crises or revolutionary changes" do these "inner-dialectics" become apparent.(Ibid,22-3) What makes this particular case study interesting is that during a moment of social crisis in India, in contrast to the above hypothesis, Indian private media (newspapers and *Newstrack*) reinforced the "dominant accentuation" of signs appearing progressively critical (if not revolutionary), natural and inevitable

The above analysis of *Newstrack*'s coverage of the Anti-Mandal demonstrations attempts to analyze the upper-caste/class bias apparent in its representational politics, while simultaneously contextualizing the video news program's specific cultural discourse. Despite the fact that there is little pretext of objectivity in *Newstrack*'s coverage of the demonstrations, there is a definitive sense of resigned subjectivity given the "ludicrous " lengths V.P. Singh and his government have gone to: *Newstrack* has but *no choice* in supporting (and therefore glorifying) the students' position.

Of course, *Newstrack*'s choice is all too clearly one that serves an upper-caste/class "common-sense". Hartley writes that whereas news in modern society serves a "bardic function",

> ...unlike the human bardic function...the media don't so much remind us of commonsense notions and classifications that we already 'have', rather they produce and reproduce them out of 'raw materials' selected from the cultural and linguistic environment.(Hartley, 1981, 105)

The "raw materials" that *Newstrack* works from in order to make "common-sense" of the Mandal story is the liberal discourse of individual rights being threatened by governmental interference. *Newstrack*'s elitist but unorthodox "cultural and linguistic environment" facilitates a language of resistance, when it is *de facto*, a language of hegemonic control.

Conclusion:

It has been the intent of this paper to outline how *Newstrack* exemplifies a form of Indian elite "Westernized popular culture". I have argued that the adoption of an Americanized TV news format in India has, in the early stages of India's privatized TV history, led to the perpetuation and reinforcement of a distinctly "bourgeois subjectivity". uality.

An analysis of *Newstrack*'s coverage of the Mandal Commission demonstrations has shown the way in which the news program presented an admittedly biased version of the story, while attempting to maintain its legitimacy in its watchdog role in terms of the state. *Newstrack* did not act in a vacuum, and as has been mentioned earlier, was not so

different in its coverage than the country's English print media in regards to this specific issue.

Although this paper has not analyzed at length why the upper-castes/classes reacted so strongly against the Mandal Commission, suffice it to say that the affirmative action policy proposed by Singh's minority government did not pose so much a tangible threat to India's urban "dominant classes", as it did an ideological threat: a potential precedent for future state policy.[10]

In the final analysis, Newstrack's coverage of the Mandal issue can be seen as a probable precedent for future privatized TV news coverage in India. With the looming threat of satellite TV, Doordarshan (the national state owned network) is expected to launch its much-awaited privatized second channel in the very recent future. Newstrack will undoubtedly be absorbed into this new channel, or alternatively, it will be taken up by one of the competing satellite companies who are quickly introducing Indian programming to supplement their American and European coverage.

By presenting a version of reality that was vehemently critical of the state, the producers of Newstrack attempted to present themselves and the students with whom they sympathized as a counter-hegemonic force challenging the dominant status quo. This supposed attempt at counter-hegemony was both glorified and naturalized by the majority of the popular national print media and Newstrack. As a model of Western commercial popular television news in India, Newstrack shows a distinct upper-classs (and in this case upper-caste) bias.

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[10] Despite the initial 27 percent quota for the 52 percent of the Indian population termed "Other Backward Classes" (OBC's), the V.P. Singh governmental implementation would have only affected a relatively small proportion of all government jobs. Reservations for seats in educational institutions were eventually removed from the original report. In real terms, this would have meant that given the OBC's 15 percent quota as a current share in central government employment; "if staff grows at 1 percent per annum, a prospective 27 percent reservation will improve it...only to 18 percent in 30 years from now"!(Guhan, 1992,1661)

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How Local Editors View Their Changing Communities:
A Study of the Attitudes of British Weekly Editors

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ABSTRACT

In-depth interviews with a cross-section of editors of British weekly community newspapers were conducted in 1991-92. When describing their communities, editors often produced complex models, weaving together economic, demographic, historical, behavioral, attitudinal, and affective aspects of community. Geographic descriptions -- specifically circulation market limits -- reinforced the perception that community newspapers still see themselves as locality-based. Demographic descriptions, especially those related to the community's economic base, appeared frequently. The editors' overall perception of their communities as insular and inward looking meshes with their choice of focus for the news: extremely local and parochial.

Most editors said their communities were undergoing fundamental change. In describing the nature of the change, editors focused on community economics and infrastructure, and on residents' loyalties, lifestyles and interests. They believe that fundamental changes in local economies and work patterns, accompanied by population redistribution, are fragmenting local communities. They described their strategies for producing a general-circulation newspaper that will meet the needs of increasingly diverse audiences. The decline in residents' loyalty to the community frustrates editors, who see commitment as essential to the welfare and perhaps even the existence of the community, as well as to the newspaper.

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Introduction

For more than 250 years, the local newspaper has been as conspicuous a feature of the British social landscape as the corner pub or the parish church tower, symbolically reflecting elements of each. Yet the traditional community newspaper has been in sharp decline throughout much of this century. This study examines that process of change as it is perceived by the men and women who edit those newspapers.

British community life in recent decades has been characterized by growing conurbations and an increasingly centra'ized power structure. At the same time, local life has been affected by changes in residents' increasing mobility and variety of lifestyles. An analysis prepared by editors in one county bordering London noted:

> "Dramatic social and economic changes in the last decade have created (a) a less caring and stable society, (b) a more mobile and transient population, (c) a 'throwaway' and less materialistic society, (d) more widely based leisure opportunities..." (Hills et al., 1981, p.1)

The editors concluded that they were serving readers who were less committed to the community, less tied to the geographic area, and more likely to be newcomers; and who had a far wider choice of leisure activities than residents of previous generations. All the factors worked against interest in and loyalty to the traditional local weekly newspaper. While impressionistic, the report provides a useful summary of developments that undoubtedly were occurring throughout the United Kingdom.

Editors of paid-circulation weekly newspapers in the 1990s face a far different and perhaps more complex environment than their predecessors -- an environment marked by aggressive competition for local advertising, potential restrictions on decision-making imposed by group ownership, changing demographic patterns that affect newspaper readership, and communities that are no longer united by rural traditionalism or the stable cohesiveness of post-war Britain.

A British expatriate, reflecting upon what she considers a decline in traditional values,

commented, "I was thinking about the English villages of my childhood. Everyone knew everyone else. And if someone needed help, everyone rushed in to help" (Frisby, 1992).

That nostalgic and rose-colored glimpse backward typifies one major theme in a debate that has continued since Ferdinand Tonnies' pioneering theoretical work in 1887.(1) Sociologists as well as lay people have lamented what many perceive to be a declining sense of community in western culture, especially but not exclusively in urban settings.

More recently, newspaper executives both in Britain and the United States have joined the chorus, blaming declining readership of their newspapers in part on declining community identity. As one prominent U.S. media leader notes, "People who feel strongly connected to their communities are much more likely to be good newspaper readers" (Batten, 1990, p.4). (2)

The Decline of the Local Weekly

Indeed, newspapers should be worrying. Local paid-circulation newspapers in Britain have been losing both circulation and number of titles.

During the past ten years, nearly one-fifth of Britain's local paid-circulation weekly newspapers died (BRAD, 1991, p.v). If the long-term rate of decline continues, the last of Britain's remaining paid-circulation local newspapers will vanish within two decades.

The decline has been particularly severe in the period during and after World War II. However, the trend has existed for most of the 20th century.

The loss of hundreds of newspapers is significant because each of those titles reflects a connection with a specific geographic area -- village, town or small city. As titles have been combined or eliminated, the local focus has been diluted.

Typically, two or three papers, each serving a separate community, might be merged into one area or county paper, now stretched to meet the needs of a larger and more diverse area. A Scottish editor described the painful process of closing down three of his six weekly titles in 1983, merging them with their larger sister papers:

> "Our firm had always maintained that each rural community
> deserved its own paper. Yet here we were, merging three titles into one,
> and now advocating a philosophy which cut across such old parochial
> attitudes, urging readers to take a wider view..." (Smail, 1985, p.13)

In many cases, a community that once enjoyed the identity conferred by having "our own paper" has been submerged into a column of items appearing in the county paper or an occasional news story in the regional evening daily. Worse yet, a town may find that no publication has an interest in it at all.

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If the traditional weekly paper is considered to be not only the voice but indeed one of the central institutions of the local community, the decline is disturbing.

The decline of the "local" community

Some might argue that a location-based description of community is no longer accurate or useful. They will note the declining population and influence of traditional rural communities; the increase in urban conurbations with large populations of highly mobile people; the replacement of locally operated businesses and village-level governmental institutions with larger, more distant businesses and institutions; and the ubiquitous presence and pervasive influence of non-local media such as television and special interest magazines. More than two decades ago, a British government report observed:

"The definition of a community, or even a neighbourhood is increasingly difficult as society becomes more mobile and people belong to communities of common interest, influenced by their work, education or social activities as well as where they live." (3)

Plant pointed out that many theorists are willing to allow for "functional communities," based on a sense of identity that does not include locality (Plant, 1974, p.40).

"Modern life has raised some havoc with men's ability to identify themselves with the locality, to create a community in it," another report observed, continuing,

"This tendency raises interesting questions about the relationship of community and geographic place. It makes urgent the question of whether community can exist for man in meaningful ways without the locality as a nexus of loyalties. Must community, in other words, be place-oriented?" (Minar and Greer, 1970, p.47)

Editors do not find the question academic. The local newspaper's principal identification with the community is geographic; if that link becomes meaningless, what can the local newspaper offer in its place?

As editors struggle to maintain readership in changing communities, they search for the common themes that will attract disparate groups of readers -- rootless commuters as well as longtime traditionalists, and television-oriented young people as well as older loyal readers.

Newspaper editors must consider whether their papers can realistically help develop an atmosphere of shared values and concerns among the residents of a specific locality, or whether a "sense of community" is merely a nostalgic myth. If it is myth alone, they must determine how to successfully design and market the local newspaper to appeal to a diverse and perhaps divergent collection of special interest groups.

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Essential to this task is a question: How do editors themselves describe and define their communities? This study was designed to explore that question.

The Design of the Study

In 1991-92, I conducted in-depth interviews with more than 50 community newspaper editors in England, Scotland and Wales. The goal of the field research was to obtain the views of a representative sample of editors of British paid-circulation local weekly newspapers. Open-ended questions focused upon their work, their relationship to their communities, and their predictions about the future of local newspapers.

I defined "local newspaper" as a paid-circulation newspaper, published weekly (or in a small and diminishing number of cases, twice weekly) for a specific geographical community and carrying news primarily about that specific community.

This definition excluded provincial daily newspapers, both morning and evening, although they also carry local news and may consider a strong sense of community an asset. This definition also excluded local weekly newspapers that are distributed entirely or primarily without charge. It should be noted that free weekly newspapers have grown rapidly in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the editors of paid-circulation newspapers who took part in this study also have full or partial responsibility for free-circulation papers.

The sample was drawn from members of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors. The Guild is recognized as representing the entire provincial/local press in spite of a relatively small membership.

Nearly 80 per cent of Britain's paid-circulation weekly newspapers have circulations between 5,000 and 30,000. I eliminated the 23 larger and smaller papers from the selection group to focus on those most representative of the type, i.e., those with circulations between 5,000 and 30,000. The final selection group totalled 88.

My goal was to interview 50 editors chosen from the group of 88. I selected these by alphabetizing the group members, then randomly selecting all 88, assigning each a consecutive number in the order in which they were selected. The first 50 were designated as the interview sample. The remaining 38 were retained as a reserve list of substitutes in case some of the original 50 could not be interviewed. This proved necessary in four cases.

Open-ended interviews

The primary research tool was a lengthy open-ended personal interview with each editor. While this study does not replicate the methodology of Tunstall (1971), Hess (1981), Gans (1980), or McCracken (1988), it draws on these authors' applications of open-ended interviews, producing qualitative data that might be coupled with appropriate complementary quantitative data and analysis.

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It is a qualitative study designed to explore with some systematic procedural rigor the professional attitudes and understandings of a sub-group (weekly editors) within an influential group of opinion-leaders (journalists). In McCracken's words, such research can help "to gain access to the cultural categories and assumptions with which one culture construes the world" (McCracken, 1988, p.17). It is not designed to test or verify pre-existing hypotheses or to quantify results of the interaction of predetermined variables.

However, the sample of 50 interview subjects from an original group of 111 weekly newspaper editors seemed large enough (45 per cent) to permit drawing some conclusions that could be generalized over the whole group, as representative of British weekly editors as a whole. Moreover, it appeared at least possible that there would be similarities among local newspaper editors in the United Kingdom and their counterparts in the United States, permitting more widely applicable conclusions to be drawn.

To encourage candor, interview subjects were promised that the interviews would be conducted on a "not-for-attribution" basis: That is, no information from interviews would identify the sources of information specifically by name, newspaper or location. Therefore, I have removed identifying details from interview material and direct quotations. However, all such material is otherwise reported accurately and in context from the transcriptions of the interviews.

A lengthy questionnaire was used for all interviews. I describe the questionnaire as an "interview guide" because it was not a rigid form, but an "umbrella" document to assure that each interview would cover generally the same subjects.

Within this broad common framework, each interview generated some additional and different questions and followed its own unique path. Over the several months that the interviews took place, I added to the list some questions that resulted from insights gained during the interviews, and I dropped some questions that seemed consistently unproductive.

Interviews ranged in length from 60 to 100 minutes; the average interview lasted 80 minutes. Almost all interviews were held in the editors' offices.

I took extensive hand-written notes during the interviews, and nearly all interviews were tape-recorded. After the interviews, each set of notes was transcribed, using the tape recording for clarification, expansion or verification.

RESULTS

When editors described the role of the local paper, they most commonly used the metaphor of the mirror:

> "Any lady needs a mirror. We've got to mirror her in all her facets and imperfections, and move with the times."(4)

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Their claim that the local paper "reflects the community" implies that they have some perception of what the community is like. What do they understand "the community" to be? What models do they use? Do they consider the community's existence or non-existence to be important to their work?

To allow editors to determine the context for their description of the community, the interviews used an open-ended prompting question: "How would you describe your community?" or "Tell me about your community."

More than Territory

This paper segregates their responses into what appear to be the most significant themes, but the editors revealed a more sophisticated understanding of the complexities of community life than this approach might indicate. Their models were often complex, weaving together economic, demographic, historical, behavioral, attitudinal, and affective aspects of community. Note how this editor combined several aspects:

> "It's an end-of-the-line community. In some ways it's always slightly behind the times. It's a poor community, by and large, but it doesn't have the hallmarks of poor communities.

> "Politically, it is split relatively even three ways. The council, in their awful way, are their own men. There's quite a cross section of people: a strong artistic community; an 'old town' community that hasn't changed much in three or four centuries; and a mix of respectable lower middle class, with a substantial undertow of single-parent families and others really down on their luck. There's a lot of drug taking here.

> "I think of the old tramp who sat outside McDonald's, day after day: He was an accepted part of the community. It is full of eccentrics, there's a lot of tolerance for them. There's generally a sort of acceptance for people who don't fit in -- not an intellectual thing, but in real terms. It warmed my heart to the town."

In constructing a theoretical model of editors' attitudes, one risks smoothing out the overlaps, oversimplifying the complexities, and rationalizing emotional and intuitive thought patterns. It is important to keep in mind throughout the following discussion that community relationships are complex, and that editors have both an intuitive and intellectual sense of the complexity. Indeed, that complexity provides a good deal of both the frustration and the excitement of their work.

Informal Language

Only rarely did the editors use the formal shorthand of sociologists and bureaucrats

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that frequently appears in interpretive stories in the national quality dailies. "Upmarket" and "downmarket" were fairly common in their jargon, as are "white collar" and "blue collar." Editors also sometimes used standard British demographic statistical descriptors. One editor mentioned that one of his communities is a "richer, more upmarket, more conservative, higher AB type place," and another said he is fortunate to be editing for an "elitist" community: "We have 84 per cent ABC1 readers." A few similar examples were found, but on the whole, these were exceptions. The editors may have assumed that an American interviewer would be unfamiliar with the "ABC" terminology. (However, they showed no reluctance to use and explain other uniquely British language.)

More likely, their training and experience lead them toward down-to-earth, specific language, which is reflected in their writing and especially in their conversation, as these two examples show:

> "We still have people who live on country estates; and one of the local
> grammar schools, most of its pupils come from the homes of estate
> workers. And also the more sophisticated urban dweller, working in a
> high tech industry. It brings those very highly skilled and highly paid, a
> very urban culture, cheek-by-jowl with a very rural culture."

> "I've got to juggle a newspaper that appeals to the everyone from the guy
> that's running a 500-million-a-year company to the guy that sweeps up
> the car park. All things to all people."

The editors colored their descriptions with lively metaphors and specific examples. This reinforces descriptions of journalism as "story telling," related as much to finding meaning through myth as to rational exposition. For example, one editor illustrated the stability of his seaside town by noting, "We have the same families as we did three hundred years ago, and they're still smuggling. And the smugglers still have the same nicknames."

Another editor, discussing the inadequate infrastructure of his area, might have presented statistics, maps and planning documents. Instead he related,

> "I drive our main road at least once a week. And I think I'm making
> good progress, and suddenly here's an agricultural wagon, slow moving,
> blocking everything up. We need fast, fast roads. We always have a full
> hour before we join the rest of the world on the motorway; then fine --
> zap! -- you're going everywhere."

An editor described his difficulties in serving two neighboring but different towns:

> "That town is only three miles away from us. We are separated by the
> motorway; anyone who has lived there for any length of time will tell
> you it might as well be a 300-foot wall, because the difference in

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attitudes, in culture, just three miles -- you wouldn't believe it."

Editors had previously been asked what newspapers they edited and where the papers circulated, so this may have foreclosed the possibility that they would "tell me about the community" by describing only its physical borders. However, geographic considerations -- specifically circulation market limits -- clearly underlie their analysis and imagery:

> "The Review covers from _____ to _____, quite a big territory,
> really, 36 miles across. We also publish the Leader, which mainly covers
> the town of _____ within that larger area."(5)

The Economic-Based Community

After defining the geographic boundaries of their market, editors commonly introduced demographic factors. Most often, these led into an economic-based description of the community.

This observation reinforces three other factors, all of which push editors toward viewing their world through an economics-centered frame: (a) Editors recognize the corporate demands for them to be business managers as well as editors. (b) Local business conditions affect newspaper advertising, which controls the editor's financial resources and staff. And (c) job availability may affect circulation by not only determining the population but also affecting residents' willingness to pay for a weekly paper. In summary -- and not surprisingly -- the editors' "bottom line" question in any discussion is, "How will this affect the paper?"

For example, one editor traced the history of his coastal town's decline from a popular resort to a dingy last stop for retirees and single parents on Department of Social Services benefits. He concluded by pointing out the significance to the newspaper:

> "The better shops closed or moved away, and the little corner shops
> disappeared. Consequently, you have less to attract the visitor. And we
> have fewer advertisers to give us the size of paper we used to have."

These editors, asked to describe the community, also immediately linked economics and demographic factors to the newspaper's circulation:

> "It's mixed; we have some heavy industry, particularly _____ and
> _____. There's also an academic population, but the students don't
> buy more than 500 papers."

> "We must be one of the few newspapers surrounded by heather and
> water. Fish and sheep don't buy newspapers."

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Economic images appeared early and often in editors' discussions of community. One editor noted that "the community here has become very high tech," and another said, "It's a traditional mining community, which has suffered very, very badly in recent years with the closure of the pits, thousands of workers out of work." Another described his community as "hard working, highly skilled, prosperous rather than affluent," then immediately recites an inventory of the town's major employers, concluding, "Industry here is run very efficiently."

Socio-Economic Descriptions

Even while choosing an industrial or commercial foundation to describe the community, editors often enriched it with a more human perspective. They constructed an informal socio-economic analysis, sometimes with overtones of class structure:

> "It's very diversified. And it can be quite mobile. We are in a slightly
> upper crust type area, especially in some of the villages, for example,
> where some of the people are high fliers with (a major international
> firm), which is our biggest employer. A lot of the people will move in
> and move out.
>
> "But then a lot are just out-and-out, and I don't use this as a
> derogatory phrase, just working class, ordinary people who will be born
> in a street here and probably not move more than a hundred yards away
> from where they were born."

Another said his small city "is a close-knit, very cosmopolitan society." "There aren't any 'poor' people in the accepted sense of the word," he continues. "There are obviously some not as well off as others. It has been a trade center for centuries, and that's still the base."

A similar approach appeared in this editor's response:

> "It is a thoughtful, interesting, varied, inquisitive community; we have
> 2,000 quite bright people at a research firm here. They really do put a
> value on those things you'd call 'quality of life'."

A Demographic Key: The Age Factor

As the examples above show, editors divide their communities into a variety of groups. Sometimes these appear to be "interest groups" rather than demographic groupings.

Editors also drew upon demographics. In addition to employment and socio-economic status, editors expressed interest in length of residence, income and age. Length of residence is a central concern. In addition, age seems particularly important in editors' perception of their communities.

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One young trainee reporter, asked to describe the community in which she works, began with one simple, emphatic word: "Old." She added, "We can't write anything too young-oriented because of our target market." Her editor confirmed that a third of the population is retirees, "which could leave us to suggest that we should produce a sort of 'grey-power' type paper." But, he quickly added, two-thirds of the community has not yet retired.

Others share the marketing dilemma that his ambivalence implies. "There's a question of whether our paper is directed at the right socio-economic group," an editor mused.

"It's difficult to determine. We could go for the elderly, but we can't gear everything for that. A large proportion are people who came here to retire, a fairly intelligent retired person. But we are also aware that we also have a large community college. We might be able to direct the paper better in a place like Merthyr Tydfil."

On the whole, editors welcome the influence of retirees, especially if their resources strengthen, not weaken, the community's economic health:

"It used to be that people thought, 'Don't pander to the oldies, they've got no money'. Things are shifting a bit now; it's the old folk with some disposable income, and the young people have money tied up in mortgages and so on."

One editor said her community has attracted so many retired well-heeled newcomers that some people fear that the community could become a "geriatric ghetto.

Editors recognize that active, interested retirees bring other resources besides retirement checks to the community and to the paper. One editor went to a nearby village to give a talk:

"And I thought, I know this place, I know these people. There were about 30 people there. I was staggered by the questions I got. A fire chief, a retired industrialist. I had no idea those people were living there! What interested me was that they were avid readers of our paper, although we were small in bulk and circulation at that time."

Yet the differing expectations of the elderly -- who are among the newspaper's most thorough and outspoken readers -- and young people can also create tension:

"The older people want to go back to the good old days; the younger people want new industry."

Editors consider the age question a particularly urgent challenge because, as one notes,

"The older readers die; you try to catch a younger reader."

Institutions: Government Interference

One editor mentioned above commented on how a new city council re-directed the community. In general, however, when editors talk about what makes their communities, the institutions -- church, schools, and local government -- are conspicuous by their absence. In fact, with the exception noted below, they seem largely irrelevant to editors' descriptions of the community.

The absence of government is particularly intriguing, because editors consider coverage of local government one of the most important tasks of a community newspaper. Yet editors do not usually identify their community, their readers or their market with a particular set of political boundaries.

Where the community and the political boundaries coincided, editors may simply have taken the fact for granted and did not mention it in the interviews. However, responses in other parts of the interviews, together with the few specific references when they described their communities, point in another direction: A number of editors implied that government, especially through its structure, disrupts and even destroys the sense of community.

Several editors specifically mentioned the local government reorganization act of 1974, which removed a good deal of authority at the lowest levels of government. "There's a suspicion, if you like, of change," one comments. "Perhaps it's well founded.

"I mean, I've seen the wards closed in the hospital, I've seen them lose their borough status. They are wary of this sort of having less and less influence on what happens in their town."

The change also brought distinct communities -- independent, proud, and locked in rivalries with neighboring towns -- into uncomfortable "unions" under common district authorities:

"The problem is that _____ is the administrative district. Now the towns of _____ and _____ are split; there's a rivalry. So things like now, the location of the major hospital, get caught up in that. It's a big barrier."

The reorganization also affected local newspapers' coverage:

"The local government reorganization in 1974 was part of the decline of our fortunes. Our main communities had local town authorities; we could give detailed coverage of them. Our bread and butter for more than 100 years has been that we cover principally small towns and the villages."

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In addition to centralization, editors cited the impact of governmental decisions that graft massive new overspill estates onto older, established communities:

> "Large sections of this community are unemployed, especially on large outlying estates. What they lack, what happened, it seems to me, looking back, is that this population was brought in without the necessary infrastructure being in place. Community facilities are lacking. These are gradually being added, but ended up being disparate communities without a center, a heart.
>
> "We had problems, and still do have, with vandalism, crime, very high crime in those areas, drugs et cetera, because they were attached almost willy-nilly onto a very steady, indigenous population that had grown through inbreeding through many years."

Attitudes: Parochial and Insular

Editors often view their communities through the frame of their residents' attitudes, using phrases such as "There's no sense of belonging," "There's a lot of resistance to change," and "They will fight for their rights."

One important attitudinal model appears to be a defensive parochialism, expressed in an extreme version by an editor describing one "shanty town" segment of his community: "They regard themselves as very much the sort of beyond-the-tracks, forgotten people, and they maintain a chip on their shoulder." That same insight appears frequently in broader, though softer form. One could argue that editors see insularity as a central facet of community life:

> "It is an inward-looking community, a proud sort of community. I'm speaking as someone who has come from the outside in. A sort of defensive community. They will fight for their rights and what they want: 'This is our town. We don't want other people telling us what we need to do and what's going to happen to it'."

Editors also claimed that their readers' interest in local activities and people helps to define the community:

> "The town of _____ is much more a community. They want their own stories; that's why we put in the change pages. The lead story in their edition may be a much weaker story, but it is important to them. It's about their leisure complex or their parking problems, their people who are doing things."

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The editors' overall perception of their communities as insular and inward looking meshes with their choice of focus for the news: extremely local and parochial. One editor believes that in spite of the movement of political power away from the local community to district and higher levels, local newspapers are wise to "think small":

"People will become more parochial again because of the government's efforts to restructure social services to an enabling situation, instead of providing the service. This creates small groups in small areas, bringing people's attention down into very parochial things. So in that sense, there's a long term future for weeklies. But it will be different."

Attitudes: A Sense of Belonging

One major question of attitude provides a sort of watershed for editors: Do people feel as if they "belong"? The question not only defines community; it also captures the spirit of what may be the local paper's most critical task. It is a circular dilemma: If residents do not feel as if they belong to the community, they may be less interested in the local paper. And if they do not read the local paper, there seems to be less chance that they will feel part of the community.

The absence of commitment clearly frustrates editors, who see it as essential to the welfare and perhaps even the existence of the community:

"One of the major problems we have is that people who are new don't have a commitment. Many people, such as myself, with key positions don't actually live within the borough. Because the town is a shopping center, virtually closed at night, we don't feel a part of the town to any degree.

"But it's lacking something in the middle of town. You have the shopping center, and then people go off to the edges. It doesn't seem to quite knit together properly. Because people don't feel a part of the community, they don't have an affiliation with the paper."

Other editors saw the positive side of the same issue, speaking of "loyalty" and "like being in a big village."

"It's got a sort of sense of people knowing each other. The remains of an old village atmosphere. If you go out into the street, people know that you work for the paper and who you are, and they'll chat with you."

"It just grows on you; you feel your own community," one says. Another saw hope for capturing the loyalty of the newcomer:

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"No matter how many new people come to live in the community, given me, they sort of adopt the attitudes. They're sort of like chameleons, we sort of like to merge in with the locals, that's our nature. So it is sort of perpetuated in the newcomers."

Community as Historical Process
"In this county, they call you an off-comer till you've been here 30 years."

Not all the editors appreciate the sense of history and tradition that this editor sees as central to the life of his community and newspaper. Yet many discussed their communities in terms of historical process. The key for these editors is change and its effects on community life: "This is the way things used to be; then this happened to us; here's the result."

Some cited major cultural changes. One journalist blamed "the decline in religion and in speaking Welsh" as factors in the decline of small Welsh communities. Another described how the railway changed the lives of people and their communities in the West Country.

"Change" is a dominant theme for the many editors who see the devastating economic and social effects of a dying Industrial Age as the central fact of life for their communities:

"This region was dominated by the mine owner and the mine worker. We all had steel. There's no mining of any kind left. Who the hell wants to spend their lives underground? I can't think of a worse way to earn a living. But it's traditional: "My grandfather was down in the pits, and so was my father, and I will go down in the pits." But the more farsighted guys get away from that. They get away from these terrible industrial patterns of lifestyles."

Others were more local and specific in their historical review:

"When I came here eight years ago, this was a truly depressed looking area. It had been running down, it had an elderly district council who were reluctant to make changes. But they retired and died. And we got some younger councillors and officials, and what you see now is the result of seven or eight years of very hard work.

"And it's succeeded. It will never be what it was, but no Victorian industrial town will ever be what it was. Eight years ago, no one in his right mind would have come here; it's quite nice now."

Change is Fragmenting Communities

All but a handful of editors described their communities as changing in some

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significant way.

Local editors expressed no unanimity in their understanding of the roots and effects of change, let alone how they think they should respond. But I think that most would agree with my summary:

"Fundamental changes in local economies and work patterns, accompanied by population redistribution, are fragmenting local communities. The editor must produce a general-circulation newspaper that will meet the needs of increasingly fragmented audiences."

When editors describe how change has affected their communities, two elements stand out:

(a) Economic decline, including recessionary effects as well as a long-term loss of the traditional industrial base, is changing the nature of many communities.

(b) Many communities are struggling to integrate newcomers and commuters into previously stable patterns of social relationship.

Editors probably concentrate on these two factors because they relate directly to the newspaper's economic success. However, to describe editors as concerned only about advertising and circulation would paint a more cynical picture than I think is realistic, even though they are under extreme pressure to raise circulation and to produce a paper that advertisers will use.

The first factor, economic decline, damages local business and therefore advertising. Beyond the immediate effect on the newspaper, economic depression can create psychological depression as well, not only for individuals but for the community. The tone of editors' remarks sometimes reveals this spirit:

"We have fewer blue collar workers than before; manufacturing is closing
down rapidly. Increasingly, people are going to work out of town. I'd
be hard pressed to think of any major industrial development that has
been good news for this area in the last two or three years. And in that
respect, it's very depressed."

If large numbers of local people begin commuting long distances to find jobs, this may dilute residents' close identification with the community. But economic decline may also strengthen a town's sense of community, sharpening traits of defensiveness and solidarity.

The second major factor -- increasing heterogeneity -- appears to weaken community identification and solidarity in every case. Editors presume that weak community ties mean weak connections with the local newspaper.

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Three Community Models

As editors describe their communities, they create three prototypes:

(a) <u>The traditional community</u>: Changing, perhaps, but still characterized by stability and homogeneity; the kind of place where, as one editor said, "We're still basically talking to the whole community."

(b) <u>The fragmented community</u>: The dominant type, containing a variety of socio-economic groups and often marked by a large "overspill" or commuting population, grafted onto a traditional community. One editor commented that his town "was pulled out of the last century in some respects when the nuclear power station was built in early '60s. I think change sort of descended on the whole locality."

(c) <u>The complex community</u>: In these settings, some might question whether the word "community" applies at all. The idea of "communities of interest, not location" (Henley Centre, 1988) seems particularly relevant among these highly diversified, relatively rootless populations. As one editor notes,

"In the conurbations, they have less of a community. And this is a
problem for the bigger papers; being split by sort of lifestyle, or whatever
you like to call it."

While ideal types can help us make sense out of what otherwise might appear to be chaos, they can also oversimplify reality. None of these types is pure. Editors in traditional communities often recognize the presence of significant minority interests; and even in the most urban places, remnants or new forms of the traditional community of locality may be important.

The challenge to editors appears most dramatic when one compares the dominant form, fragmentation, with the traditional model, which still exists in predominantly rural areas and in some relatively isolated coastal towns. In such communities, one editor says, "Papers are like politics; you're sort of born with them."

Loyalty, Stability, Tradition

"This community is so insular, it's unbelievable...Our biggest problem is
interbreeding over many, many centuries. My deputy editor is related to
nearly everyone in town."

While inbreeding (mentioned by three other editors as well) carries the notion of "a close community relationship" to an extreme, a comfortable familiarity does seem to typify traditional communities:

"The faces you see in the newspaper, you'll see in the street. You tend to sort of bump into the local councillors and the mayor, doing the shopping."

Editors in more stable communities often spoke of the loyalty of their readers. One said his readers are "extremely loyal," and other editors would certainly envy aspects of his situation: The paper has 100 per cent household penetration in its core area. Here, as in some other towns, buyers queue at the news agents' stores to buy the paper on press day.

That sort of loyalty may discourage competition, but it does not necessarily encourage the newspaper staff to be creative, as an editor in rural Scotland pointed out:

"My mother stays in the circulation area of one of our sister papers. It's not the best of papers, and she's often complaining about the lack of news in it. But she still buys it."

Her attitude typifies the loyalty "that you might not get in the urban areas of England," he said.

Not surprisingly, change occurs slowly on papers like these: "We can't change too much or people will be up in arms.

"A lot of people here have been reading the paper since they were children; they're in their 60s and 70s now. In towns like these, weekly papers have been around for so long, readers know where to look for everything."

An editor in a small north-of-England town had to move the letters to the editor from their traditional page in one week's issue. "I got calls," he said. "What was it doing there? Why was it moved?"

Another editor, attempting to explain the sense of tradition shared by the newspaper and the community, mentioned the response to a nostalgia-oriented continuing feature:

"We get letters requesting copies of old photographs that we run; we got 30 letters on a feature about some of the old shops. Someone will send a letter asking, 'Can anyone help me trace my grannie?'"

Even these "traditional" communities may be more mixed than the anecdotes indicate. Some towns that editors describe as traditional have secondary sub-communities that differ sharply. These may be neighborhoods or demographic groups within the main town, or separate villages or towns within the main circulation area. For example, within one editor's territory are three closely knit traditional communities:

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"When I covered the area as a reporter, it was like being in a big village, not like a town or a collection of towns. People were related, they knew each other, there was a very good bush telegraph."

Yet the same editor serves these readers in a nearby town:

"Pensioners, a black spot of the region in employment, a failed holiday industry. A lot of transitory people, so they don't have the sort of links to the community they would elsewhere. You have to find the common denominators, and you'd say it's people, really."

Traditional "Model" Can Mislead

"Pure" traditional communities may be disappearing, but they do exist. They are distinctive enough to provide a baseline that can help measure the degree of fragmentation most editors encounter.

However, editors may mislead themselves if they see this traditional image not only as a baseline but also as an idealized model to be preserved. My own experience as a weekly newspaper editor in the United States illustrates this. As my once rural community was transformed into a suburb of a major city, I kept the focus of the newspaper on the traditional community core. Old timers, remembering the town as it had been and fighting to preserve a sense of community, encouraged me. As a consequence of my own identification with that core, I was unable to direct the paper to appeal to the lifestyles, work patterns and interests of the thousands of newcomers who came to live in and around our town. I feel a great sense of empathy with one editor of a traditional paper in a coastal town. His territory now includes many new commuters to London, about whom he said regretfully,

"We've got so many houses here, and haven't kept up the infrastructure. There are people I haven't met and don't even have a contact for. I could edit the paper for them, but it wouldn't be the same as before."

The comments of another editor near the east coast of Britain, watching the change in his own rapidly changing "patch," seem prophetic to me. His area's commuter population -- marked by increased mobility and what he calls the "vision" toward both London and the European continent -- is changing the sense of community:

"The heart of rural communities is far more jealously guarded, but by a far smaller number of people."

Fragmented Communities

Like this man, most editors now work in communities whose residents can be divided into major sub-groups by occupational type, socio-economic background, age, ethnicity, and --

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most important -- workplace and length of residence:

> "It's an odd sort of community; it's indescribable! I'd say it has three
> parts: the old timers who have been here for years and saw it as a small
> market town. We then had the influx of the London overspill people
> here in the 1960s and early '70s. And then in the '80s, we had an influx
> of high tech. So you've almost got three communities within the area."

In some communities, the local economy depends heavily on particularly transient attachments: holiday-makers and military bases. These also may provide huge numbers of people, which are tempting targets for papers struggling to add circulation. But local weeklies seem unable to reach these groups in any meaningful way. Editors in seaside towns do not assume that visitors, coming down to the beach for a fortnight, will be fascinated by reports of meetings of the local parish councils and clubs. However, they think visitors might be interested in special publications that focus on recreation and tourism:

> "We might do a wrap-around around our own paper in the summer and
> sell it at the holiday camps: listings, entertainment, what's on."

Although young soldiers can hardly be considered on holiday, editors find them "pretty well impossible" to reach for the same reason: Their roots are elsewhere.

> "Basically, they don't buy the paper. The officers, who live all over the
> district, buy the paper. But the squaddies are not interested in local
> news. It's been frustrating, because of the big potential sale."

Other groups offer more realistic though still difficult possibilities.

Overspill

One image-evoking word pops up frequently as editors describe how their communities have changed: "overspill." An area's population can grow or shrink gradually. The process may significantly change the nature of the place, but the likelihood of maintaining a sense of community is likely to increase if the process occurs over a number of years. The greatest problems for the infrastructure, for community relationships, and for the newspaper occur when the growth is explosive and not integrated physically or socially into the old community.

> "It's difficult here. Till the mid-'60s, this was a small market town.
> Then the local authority did a deal with Birmingham, which was bursting
> its banks, to take on a lot of overspill population. Lots of new estates
> were built on the edge of town. Now more than half our population is
> overspill."

The result, this editor said, is that the town has had difficulty with its identity, remaining largely the original market town with satellite estates around it. "There's been a very difficult process of marrying the two," he said, concluding hopefully, "I think that more and more there's a coming together of the two populations now."

On the whole, editors prefer growth to either shrinkage or a static population and economy. Many editors involve themselves actively in encouraging growth and attracting new businesses. Growth means more potential readers and more prospects for advertising, as well as a community that is generally perceived to be dynamic and progressive. Even while recognizing that rapid growth creates problems, most editors would probably rather deal with the problems of overspill than with the problems of a declining population:

> "(In spite of our economic problems) I'm not aware that there's been any
> great exodus of people. We have a sort of overspill situation. A new
> road opened last summer, which is one of the few good pieces of news
> we've had to report. Our neighboring town has profited from the
> overspill, in terms of housing and business. I think the hope is that in
> the longer term, that prosperity will spread along the road towards us."

The Language of Change

Nevertheless, for towns on the fringes of conurbations, overspill creates major challenges. While editors may use positive terms like "diversified," they are more likely to use negative phrases like "a divided community" and "split personality."

Editors' language may offer a more specific clue to their attitude toward overspill. They use two primary words to describe new residents: "newcomers" and "incomers." The Oxford dictionary reveals a shading of meaning that may be important. The dictionary defines a newcomer as "a new arrival"; it defines an incomer as a "visitor, immigrant, foreign resident," or an "intruder, invader." "Newcomer" seems more permanent and a good deal more neutral than "incomer." The frequent use of "incomer" may represent a subtle expression of uncomfortable distance as editors attempt to understand the needs of new residents, especially those in awkward "overspill" appendages. I found nothing in the context of editors' use to indicate that they consciously use "incomer" as a negative term, but the difference in language appears significant to me.

Whatever these new residents are called, they form an important and often perplexing challenge for editors of community newspapers:

> "This has led to a great extent to our decline. Those villages went from
> being self-contained units where everybody knew everyone else; with
> development and lot of incomers, our readership died. Actually, the
> whole structure of village life changed. Strangely enough, in the new
> commuter villages, this has not occurred."

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Dormitory Towns

The editor quoted above does not know why he found a different response from commuters, and the comments of other editors about their "dormitory" villages and towns provide little help. In general, they used the same framework to describe commuter dormitories as they did for incomers and overspill estates. The challenge appears to be almost identical; that is, capturing the attention of increasing numbers of residents who may be "traveling 'way out of the area" and who "haven't necessarily got their roots in the town":

> "Those chaps are on their career path, working in this area for awhile,
> then they are moving on and moving up, having been here a relatively
> short time."

Not only are they short-timers; they also focus their attention elsewhere.

> "How do we get into these areas? With difficulty, because they gravitate
> toward _____ both professionally and for their entertainment."

The common effect is separation, often physical and certainly social, which appears clearly in this description of a town that has "mushroomed in population over the last five years":

> "The people who've been living there for twenty or thirty years don't
> know these people at all. They just drive in to the houses and drive out
> again, don't even drive into the center of town. They probably don't
> even know that our paper exists."

Will New Residents Become Readers?

An editor noted that increasing mobility "is not in our interests at all." Paid-circulation weekly editors, he said, would prefer a community that is very settled and likely to remain there for generations. But reality is far different:

> "They have no real interests here. Occasionally they get to know the
> neighbors, the kids go to school, but they are not here long enough to put
> down roots. And off they go. And chances are that in the time they've
> been here, they've had their hometown paper posted to them. So they
> don't feel part of (this community)."

About that business of the hometown paper: Another editor said that although he has been in his present job for several years, he can identify with newcomers "a bit like myself."

> "I'm still reading avidly the births, marriages and deaths column of the
> paper in the town I left 20 years ago, when I go back. But I don't have

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the same affinity to the paper I worked on 10 years ago, even though I
was there seven years."

Frustration colored another editor's recital of efforts to attract newcomers, including
contacting new housing estates through the circulation department, writing feature stories
about new areas, and trying to develop personal contacts.

"But no matter how hard you try, a lot of these people won't regard
themselves as members of the community for some time."

Winning Them With Schools and Clubs

Editors vary in the degree of optimism they express about overcoming fragmentation
and attracting new residents to the community newspaper. But many think they have clues to
the sort of "swing points" that turn distant outsiders into community members.

Time alone will not accomplish it, but time is an essential building block: Editors say
that residents must stay around long enough to develop at least one social connection to the
community. How long is "long enough"? How long does it take for a "new" resident to
want to pick up the local paper regularly and find out what's going on? "Five years," says
one editor, who then reduces that, but only slightly:

"Their allegiance is to their previous local paper for several years. I
think it would take three or four years for them to get involved in the
local scene and to take an interest in the editorial side of the newspaper."

When I edited my American newspaper, I found that the "gestation period" was much
shorter for one small but significant group of newcomers. These people hardly took time to
unload the furniture before stopping by the newspaper office. A few British editors also
commented on those newcomers with an affinity for the community; they often emerge in a
relatively short time as the secretaries and chairmen of local clubs, then take on heavier
leadership tasks.

"Each community has a very strong nucleus of people who want to help
run their community, and they're interested in how the paper reports it.
For example, the mayors of the town used to be from the old families.
Now that's changed; we have our first minority mayor. He and his
colleagues, they all read the papers."

However, no paper in a fragmented community can bank on these relatively rare
super-committed newcomers for its survival. Local papers must find ways to reach masses of
seemingly unattached newcomers. While the task sometimes seems impossible, many editors
are betting heavily that many commuters and newcomers will gradually find at least one local
connection.

Regardless of the size or type of community, the struggle to turn newcomers into loyalists (who might also become loyal buyers of the paper) has become perhaps the major preoccupation for editors. Their success in reaching these potential readers and convincing them that they have some stake in the amorphous concept of "the local community" may play a large part, not only in the health of paid-circulation weekly newspapers, but also in the long-term health of the communities themselves.

# # #

Footnotes

(1) Ferdinand Tonnies's book, <u>Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft</u>, originally published in 1887, was translated by Charles P. Loomis and published by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, in 1955 as <u>Community and Association</u>.

(2) For other examples of media awareness of the relationship between a sense of community and the local newspaper, see Davison (1988, p.16), Morton (1990, p.57), and Ray (1989, p.8).

(3) Seebohm (1968, p.147) cited in Plant (1974, p.40).

(4) Editors specifically described the role of the paper in three ways: (a) Some volunteered roles without prompting. (b) The survey asked, "What are some of the things your newspaper does for this community?" (c) Editors were asked to choose the most important roles from a list. 31 per cent mentioned "mirror" or "reflecting" either voluntarily or in response to the question; an additional 47 per cent mentioned "mirror" when reviewing the list of role terms. In all, 78 per cent mentioned the metaphor of mirror or reflection, more than any other single idea.

(5) Unless otherwise noted, I have substituted pseudonyms for the actual names of newspapers cited throughout this paper.

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Constructing the Post-Colonial Woman in Kenya:
A Textual Analysis of Nairobi's <u>Daily Nation</u>

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Constructing the Post-Colonial Woman in Kenya:

A Textual Analysis of Nairobi's <u>Daily Nation</u>[1]

Recent work by feminist communication scholars has drawn on cultural studies theory to illustrate the ideological functions of mass media (Long 1991). Much of this work assumes that media take part in constructing both class and gender ideologies, which these researchers see as fundamental to female subordination. Similarly, some women-in-development scholars argue that analyses of African women's secondary status must account for how the public/private distinction imposed by Western colonials interacts with indigenous gender ideology to both serve the needs of capitalism and contribute to female oppression (e.g., Charlton 1984; Staudt 1984; 1986).

This paper integrates feminist and cultural studies work in mass communication with women-in-development scholarship on Africa in an analysis of a Kenyan mass media text. First, I summarize the theoretical agreement among works by feminist communication scholars, cultural studies theorists, and women-in-development scholars writing about Africa. I also note some disagreement among those works. Second is a brief methodology discussion. Third, a textual analysis of women's portrayals in a special issue of Nairobi's most popular newspaper, the <u>Daily Nation</u>, examines some of the ideological functions of women's

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representations in Kenyan mass media. Finally, I argue that
discourses such as those drawn from the articles analyzed here
support continued female subordination in Kenya, especially for
poor women.

Class and Gender Ideology in Media and Development Research

Few feminist analyses of Kenyan, or indeed African, media
content have made their way into the mass communication
literature.[2] Content analyses dominate the broader domain of
feminist work examining Third World[3] media portrayals of women.
Their approach has drawn fire on both theoretical and political
grounds. Content analyses focus on documenting and counting
demeaning or oppressive representations of women without
accounting for why such representations exist or why some are
contradictory (Jaddou and Williams 1981, Steeves 1987). Such
studies often "merely state and confirm the obvious" by
"discovering" that women's roles and their numbers are limited
(Jaddou and Williams 1981, 105). The political value of such
research rests on the assumption that the documentation of gender
inequity provides a rational argument that will spark change in
existing social structures. The structures themselves are not

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[2] A recent book examines gender representations in children's
textbooks (Obura 1991). Lent's (1991) international bibliography of
women and mass communication lists no studies that examine Kenyan
media representations of women. Neither does either of UNESCO's
(Gallagher 1981; UNESCO 1985) worldwide reviews.

[3] I use the term "Third World" for the sake of simplicity,
despite its inaccuracies and ethnocentricities, and with the
understanding that there is wide variation among the nations of the
South commonly associated with the term.

questioned, despite evidence that merely calling attention to their oppressive practices has had little emancipatory effect worldwide (Mahoney 1991, 16).

Researchers taking an ideological perspective of the media's relationship to female subordination draw on various integrations of Marxist and feminist theories, often explaining the contradictory nature of media content in terms of hegemony (Long 1991; Steeves 1987). In this view, media representations reflecting seemingly progressive or even subversive ideology are incorporated into the larger ideological system as a minor adaptation to social change, even though that adaptation contradicts the larger system (Dow 1990, 263). Thus, the hegmonic system is not monolithic, but somewhat fluid, changing gradually to resist radical transformation.

Feminist scholarship in both mass communication and women-in-development analyzes how institutions including the mass media perpetuate the Western public/private dichotomy, which associates men with the public sphere of politics and paid labor while women are linked primarily with the domestic labor of the private, family sphere (e.g., Bybee 1990; Dow 1990; Glazer 1980; McRobbie 1982; Rogers 1980; Staudt 1984; 1986; Steeves and Smith 1987; Valdivia 1992). Unseen and unpaid, female labor in this system is devalued despite its subsidy of male labor force participation and its contribution to national economies (Beneria 1981). Thus gender and class are seen as fundamental to female oppression, although the ways in which they interact is by no means clear cut

(Barrett 1980; Jaggar 1983).

Elizabeth Long (1991) cites numerous communication studies that explicitly link cultural studies and feminist theory to media research. However, since the conceptualizations of class in these studies reflect their Western origins, such works should be drawn on with caution by scholars examining the relationship between women and media in the Third World. For example, many of these works assume that a married woman's economic class is closely related to that of her husband. In the African context, however, such an association is much less tenable since financial resources are often <u>not</u> shared within households, marital relations can be transitory, and female solidarity organizations give African women strong ties outside the household (Staudt 1986, 198-99).

Some insight into the African context can be gleaned from women-in-development literature that traces the historical roots of the complex factors shaping African gender ideology. A number of studies focusing on sub-Saharan Africa draw on Ester Boserup's (1970) classic analysis of how colonial and development policies undermined the power women held in pre-colonial societies. Drawing heavily on data from East Africa, Boserup demonstrated a number of ways that Western gender ideology permeated colonialism and modernization. That ideology meshed with indigenous gender stratification, leading to greater female subordination: women were cut off from their extended families with urbanization; patriarchal legal structures designated men heads of households

and awarded them land titles; women's unpaid domestic labor
increased while men were trained in wage-earning skills needed in
the newly established cash economy.

More recent analyses by feminists studying women in Africa
confirm a number of Boserup's findings, but draw on Zillah
Eisenstein's (1979) concept of women as a "sex class" to argue
that Western and indigenous gender ideologies interact with
capitalist class ideology to reinforce women's secondary status
in Africa (e.g. Charlton 1984; Staudt 1984). Yet the role of mass
media in this process has received little attention.

John Hartley's (1982) framework for analyzing news is useful
for such an examination. Hartley advocates analyzing discourses,
the rules and regularities that make up news content and create
or reproduce a structure of meaning. Such research assumes that
media texts are a locus of power struggle; thus discursive
analysis is concerned with uncovering meanings that accord power
inequitably by making certain views seem natural and uncontested.
These meanings both create and reinforce ideologies in Stuart
Hall's (1991, 97) sense of the term, "frameworks of thinking and
calculation about the world--the 'ideas' which people use to
figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it
and what they ought to do" [emphasis in original]. From this
perspective the analysis of Kenyan mass media can provide insight
into how the colonial legacy of the public/private distinction is
constructed and maintained in Kenyan culture.

This research is carried out with two caveats. First,

despite attempts to minimize Western (and other) bias in this research, I acknowledge the flaws inherent in projecting Western theories on the problematics of female experience in Kenya (Pala 1977) and mass communication in Africa (M'Bayo and Nwanko 1989). As an American scholar, my perspective is quite different from Kenyans who would examine gender issues in their own press. Yet the dearth of literature in that area suggests my analysis is worthwhile, as does a recent call for more critical analyses of African media so we can better understand power relations in the African context (M'Bayo and Nwanko 1989). More broadly, in response to those who would question the value of textual analysis when communication research trends point toward audience/text interaction as the locus of meaning, Bonnie Dow (1990, 272) makes the important point that differences between critical readings and audience response likely reflect different types of insight, neither of which should necessarily be privileged.

Second, although this study integrates work in both cultural studies and feminist theory, it is with the understanding that points of disagreement between those two traditions remain. For example, Franklin et al. (1991, 180) note that while textual analysis provides a method for examining the reproduction of patriarchal relations, that method can be problematic for feminist research. In their view, the method may contribute to the objectification of women because feminist textual analyses necessarily focus on constructions of women as objects. The point

is well taken. However, given that theoretical work by both feminist and cultural studies scholars continues to outpace empirical studies, it is important that research be carried out to ground both traditions in practice.

Method

This study analyzes two articles featured in a special edition of Kenya's most widely circulated newspaper, the Daily Nation, which is published in Nairobi.[4] The special edition was published on October 20, 1992, in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of Kenyatta Day, when the British responded to the Mau Mau uprising by declaring a state of emergency in Kenya colony. Six men, including the nation's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, were arrested that day in 1952 for their role in the nationalist rebellion that preceded Kenyan independence in the following decade.

This analysis focuses on two related features that discuss women's status in Kenyan society 40 years after the rebellion: "The elite local woman happy with her own lot" (Mbugguss 1992a, 11-12) and "Thoughts from the other end of the pendulum" (Mbugguss 1992b, 13, 18). As the headlines suggest, the former is concerned with Nairobi's elite women while the latter describes life for the city's poor women. Both are written by a woman, Martha Mbugguss.

[4]The Index on Censorship (1992, 51) cites English-language Nation circulation figures of 250,000, as compared to 40,000 for the Kenya Times and 60,000 for The Standard, which are the Nation's competitors. The Index recommends that all circulation figures be treated with caution.

Since the two articles focus on women's progress over the past 40 years, the pieces provide an opportunity to scrutinize how Kenyan media frame discussions about women when women are the focal point of a story. I make no assumption that the articles are representative. My aim, rather, is to examine how their portrayals of women (and similar representations by other Kenyan mass media) compare with the experiences of most Kenyan women.

Due to Kenya's widespread poverty and illiteracy, an urban newspaper like the <u>Nation</u> should be considered a comparatively elite medium. Thus the following analysis should be read with the understanding that the <u>Nation</u>'s readers are likely to be urban, relatively affluent, and disproportionately male. There is also a Swahili edition of the paper, <u>Taifa</u>, which carries the same stories as the <u>Nation</u>, and therefore makes them accessible to a slightly broader audience.

The role of imperialism also must be considered when analyzing the relationship between Third World women's status and ideological institutions like the media (Mohanty et al. 1991; Steeves, in press). Western journalism education and foreign ownership are two imperialistic forces likely to influence the <u>Nation</u>'s content. Like other Kenyan journalists, those working at the <u>Nation</u> were trained in the tradition of Western journalism, including Western news values. Imbedded in those Western news values is the privileging of the scientific rationality associated with "hard news" over the emotional character of "soft news" often associated with "women's issues" when they are news

at all (Bybee 1990, 203). The <u>Nation</u> should also be viewed as a capitalist enterprise that recently sold public shares, although substantial control is still maintained by foreign interests (Maja-Pearce 1992).[5]

Beyond the broad goals of discovering how representations of Kenyan women in the two articles construct certain class- and gender-related discourses about Kenyan women, no categories were imposed at the outset of this research. I was concerned with arriving at an understanding of how the <u>Nation</u> constructs its own categories that legitimate certain meanings associated with women in Kenyan culture and make alternative meanings seem irrelevant or somehow deviant.

<u>Representations of Class</u>

Both the language and the visual layout used in the two articles stress class-related divisions among Kenyan women. Discussions about wealthier women are framed in terms of their increased access to the political arena while poor women's status is linked to their paid labor force participation. In many cases, class division is blurred in such a way that benefits enjoyed by elite Nairobi women seem to be shared by a wider cross-section of Kenyan women.

The first article ("The elite local woman...") suggests that "elite women" become so through their own hard work. The

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[5]A recent article reports that the new shareholders have not been revealed (Maja-Pearce 1992). If they are Kenyans, their ownership of the paper would distinguish it from the other privately owned newspapers in Kenya, which are controlled by foreign interests.

contemporary state, law, and church are portrayed as benign institutions (often due to recent, and apparently dramatic, transformation), open to women who display initiative. These institutions are personified as benevolent authorities in statements like "Kenya has encouraged her women" and "the Church now recognizes the resourcefulness of women."

Six individual success stories provide illustrations of and commentary on the many possibilities open to Kenyan women: two parliamentary candidates, the head of the Pan-African Christian Women [sic] Alliance, a counselor, an executive officer with the Federation of Kenya Employers, and an anti-rape crusader. Yet how these women reached these positions is never mentioned. Only the executive and the counselor are identified in terms of their paid labor force participation; the other four have achieved political stature and seem to be exempt from the financial or subsistence concerns that preoccupy poor women. Yet, in "Thoughts from the other end," poor women are always identified in terms of their ability to earn wages: "Njoki who sells eggs," "Peris Gichora who runs a fast food kiosk," "Teresia Nyambura, a vegetable vendor," "Mrs. Taiku...is able to run her business, selling traditional medicine," and "Margaret Wanjiru, a beggar."

"Women have not done badly for themselves," proclaims Rose Waruhiu, a parliamentary candidate. Waruhiu, whose position signifies her expertise in Kenyan politics, advises other women to take advantage of change, become politically active, achieve their goals through persuasion, and contribute money to women's

causes. Consistent with liberal political theory, she envisions great change on the heels of greater female participation: "If women were active in politics, it would cease to be a fight to go to Parliament." Waruhiu's optimism contradicts the political reality in Kenya (Weekly Review 1992, 16-17). Since Kenyan independence, only six women have been elected to parliamentary posts and only three have been nominated members since Kenyan independence. The highest government rank achieved by a Kenyan woman is Assistant Minister for Culture and Social Services, a post which two women have held.

Only passing attention is paid to the immense time constraints that prohibit many women from engaging in politics:

> As more opportunities become open to women, their workload will also increase as they still devote most of their time to their families, community and the nation.
> "That somehow constrains their participation in politics," [Waruhiu] says.

That this heavy workload is especially devastating to the political prospects of poor women goes unaddressed. Moreover, while women's organizations are mentioned as an avenue for female political activism, the issue of class divisiveness that permeates women's politics in Kenya is not discussed, nor is the elite bias of the groups listed in the article: Young Women [sic] Christian Association, Girl Guides, and Maendeleo ya Wanawake. Maria Nzomo (1989) points out that women's groups in Kenya tend to be dominated by relatively wealthy, urban women who are a vocal minority of Kenyan women, and that these groups serve least those who are most in need, poor women. Moreover, Maendeleo ya

Wanawake, Kenya's largest women's organization, has a mixed
record, and was, until very recently, closely aligned with the
government, which maintains "the position that Kenya women are
not discriminated against and therefore do not need to struggle
for rights they are already enjoying" (Nzomo 1989, 9).
Additionally, Maria Nzomo and Kathleen Staudt (in press) show
that many women's groups continue to ignore important economic
issues, such as the agricultural labor commonly performed by
Kenyan women, thereby depoliticizing those issues because of
class interests.

The vast ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity among
women in Kenya is masked by the frequent use of the monolithic
term "the Kenyan woman." The latter is variously described as "no
longer confined to the kitchen and drawing water from the river.
She has now joined the ranks of bread winners," "join[ing] the
working ranks in factories, offices, and other highly specialized
professions in ever increasing numbers since Uhuru [freedom] in
an effort to feed her family," and "hard working, which has
enabled her to form active women's groups and to attract funding
from the Government, and non-governmental organizations."

Only Mrs. Taiku's ethnicity, Maasai, is mentioned,
apparently because the reporter does not understand Kimaasai, so
Mrs. Taiku's husband must translate. Compliance with the
government's anti-tribalism campaign may be responsible for the
erasure of ethnic identity, since government censorship continues
to exert a strong influence on Kenyan media. Yet the near-absence

of ethnic affiliations in either article suggests that ethnicity is of little importance for understanding "the Kenyan woman," at least not once she has learned to speak English. Yet Mrs. Taiku's comments contradict that assumption, since she describes her experience in terms that do not seem to translate well:

> [She] says the Maasai have had "their eyes opened"...[Taiku] said through her husband that she could not quite explain what "opening eyes" really meant but trusted that people would understand.

While poor women are not necessarily to blame for their misfortune in the Daily Nation articles, no one else appears to be either, as two captions below photos of urban hawkers illustrate: "On the other hand, in her bid to help feed her family, the Kenyan woman has been forced to engage in businesses that put her on a collision course with the authorities" and "Local authorities fight an [sic] never-ending battle with hawkers to drive them off the urban streets." That the proliferation of women engaged in illegal trading in Nairobi is a symptom of their inequitable access to resources such as education and credit (e.g., Robertson 1993) goes unmentioned in "Thoughts from the other end of the pendulum."

In the jump entitled, "How the other half lives," some dissent is voiced by Margaret Wanjiru, a trader turned beggar. She and her colleagues complain they were unable to pay licensing fees required of produce vendors, and were continually harassed by local authorities: "'Do you think healthy women like us enjoy begging,' they asked. 'If that thing you are calling freedom ever existed, we would by now be running some business like other

people.'" Wanjiru, the most vociferous critic in either of the two pieces, is relegated to the end of the second article. Her comments are placed in opposition to descriptions of her various run-ins with the law, and, in a small way, do pose questions about justice for poor women in Nairobi. However, the issue is framed such that the problem seems to be one of bad licensing laws rather than larger systemic inequities.

Additionally, assertions of some poor women that hard work pays off dilute the dissent. Some of this "other half" apparently argue that one can feed oneself despite the bad economy, and that an increased number of women drivers signals an improvement in social conditions. That these poor women discuss improvements in terms of material goods, food and cars, distinguishes them from their elite counterparts who talk about political participation, but the underlying philosophy of individual achievement is the same.

Photographs and captions reinforce the notion of success predicated on individualism. Four mugshots of prominent women are featured, each with a caption giving the woman's name and her opinion on an issue. In contrast, poor women are nameless in captions; photos show them working alongside other women, hawking goods to potential customers on the street, and avoiding or being detained by police.

Similarly, headlines and layout promote the advances of Nairobi's elite women. The original headline, "The elite local woman happy with her own lot" grows from 46 to 60 points as the

article jumps to a second page. The jump head is less specific, "The elite woman happy with her lot," suggesting that the happiness may be more widespread. Additionally, more than twice as much copy is devoted to the article on elite women as there is to the one discussing poor women (almost 35 column inches for the former compared to just over 15 for the latter).

As noted above, poor women are labeled the "other" in both the original headline and the jump head. That label and the order in which the stories appear indicates poor women's status is measured against the standard of elite women, even though the majority of women in Kenya are poor. Morec'er, 88 percent of Kenyan women live in rural areas (Ruigu 1985, 13), a point which neither article acknowledges despite the many references to "the Kenyan woman," who is presented as typical. Instead, a few women who have penetrated the male-dominated public sphere symbolize the progress of Kenyan women in general.

Representations of Gender

The above discussion hinted at the contradictions posed by the strong ideological association between Kenyan women and the private, family sphere. A closer look at the Daily Nation's gender representations reveals that the public/private dichotomy cuts across the class distinctions articulated by the two features, but often carries meanings which are more ideologically damaging for poor women.

In both articles "the Kenyan woman" is confronted by her family responsibilities: feeding her family, acting as the

"binding glue" in the family, caring for people with AIDS, and taking care of orphans. Yet these issues receive relatively little attention since they belong to the depoliticized private sphere, assumed to be the province of post-colonial African women (Staudt 1984). As such, these tasks are not of concern to the state, businesses, or the general public; they are unregulated, unremunerated, and therefore devalued. However, the passing attention they receive in the <u>Nation</u> articles pays tribute to the fact that the unpaid "female" labor of caretaking subsidizes male wage labor in the Kenyan market.

Equally significant is the complete absence of a reference to women's agriculture in Kenya, even though over 75 percent of the nation's farming is done by women (Ruigu 1985, 14). Much of this work is subsistence farming, considered domestic work, part of food preparation. As domestic labor, it is invisible in economic and political terms, as is the produce that is traded informally (Charlton 1984; Staudt 1984). Additionally, women's issues that are politicized often lack substantial backing because women's late arrival in Kenyan politics forces them to vie against better-endowed groups for limited resources (Staudt 1986), a point that goes unaddressed in the <u>Nation</u> stories.

There are few references to men in the two articles, but they are generally represented by a simple dichotomy: good/bad. Good men are exemplified by Dr. Kiogora, a pastor and university lecturer who advocates male acceptance of female wage labor participation as a means of female "fulfillment:" "Sometimes, a

profession or occupation of her choice does the trick, and it should not be discouraged." That wage labor might be a necessity for subsistence or independence seems to have eluded Dr. Kiogora.

Bad men take a variety of forms, such as unnamed rapists and more specifically, Cardinal Otunga, who attributed some rapes to the way women were dressed. As with other issues, rape is more obviously politicized when it is discussed by an elite woman who targets the Cardinal, although her charge comes near the end of the first article, suggesting it is of relatively low importance. A poor woman, on the other hand, describes rape as a security problem she wishes the government "could do something about."

Men are almost always "authorities," regardless of whether they are good or bad. The link between maleness and authority is most explicit in a quote that refers to the aforementioned Dr. Kiogora: "Since he is a man, a pastor, a lecturer, I take what he says quite seriously." Similarly, Cardinal Otunga must be contended with because of his powerful position. Finally, the police are always referred to as "authorities," sometimes neutrally as men who must "fight the never-ending battle with hawkers," and sometimes adversarially as men who "harass" the hawkers.

More can be learned about the Nation's gender-related discourses by stepping back from the two articles and viewing them in the larger context of that day's newspaper. The copy surrounding the two articles contradicts much of what the two pieces say about Kenyan women's progress since Uhuru. For

example, women were absent from the front page and the editorial page that day. In general, female representation in the <u>Nation</u> could be described by Gaye Tuchman's (e.g., 1978, 8) useful concept, "symbolic annihilation," which describes how the mass media condemn, trivialize, and ignore women.

There is, of course, the obvious fact that these stories were presented as features or "soft" news somewhere in the middle of a special issue, suggesting that women's politics are not real politics, which belong on the front page Additionally, while "The elite local woman" story describes the many public sphere opportunities available to Kenyan women, the surrounding ads and news copy tell a different story. Banks, corporations, and co-operatives, where few Kenyan women can conduct business because they lack collateral, have purchased advertising space to congratulate Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi on Kenyatta Day.

The regular Tuesday "Business Week" section is inserted between pages 12 and 13, thereby preventing the two stories on elite and poor women from appearing together on the center spread. Thus, while elite women discuss female advancement on page 12, the male-dominated cover of "Business Week" shatters their credibility and conceals the poor women on page 13. The juxtaposition shows that the worlds of Kenyan economy, industry, finance, and agriculture march on without women. A single line, the third of five teasers on the business section's front page, promises to uphold the claims of the elite women: "Executive profile: Ann N. Mureithi" on page 4. Readers enticed to flip to

page 4 find the executive is "A cateress par excellence." Thus the vocation of the female executive bridges public and private spheres, thereby posing no threat to male dominance in the former and male authority over the latter.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates how a mass media text, consumed mainly by a relatively affluent audience in Kenya, constructs and reinforces certain meanings to perpetuate class and gender ideologies related to Kenyan women. If a sexual division of labor predicated on a combination of indigenous and colonial values is indeed a fundamental source of female oppression, then media representations such as those published in the Daily Nation on Kenyatta Day 1992 support that system of oppression. This analysis of two articles that seem to celebrate advances made by Kenyan women shows that such media representations actually reinforce class divisions between elite and poor women who might otherwise find some solidarity in their experiences of gender oppression. Similarly, the omission of discussions addressing the inequitable sexual division of labor perpetuates male privilege.

A central discourse employed upholding class division is that of personal success predicated on individualism. The Nation portrays elite women as capable achievers who have taken advantage of opportunities in a pluralist (albeit, recently so) society. Poor women can at least provide subsistence-level resources to their families if they work hard enough. In both cases, Kenyan women can succeed in the public sphere of politics

and paid labor when they apply themselves. The demands of the Third World double-day, which calls for women to provide subsistence for their families in addition to participating in wage labor, are minimized. In keeping with the public/private dichotomy introduced with colonialism, the Nation discusses women's achievements mainly in terms of their gains in the public sphere, thereby reinforcing the public (male) authority over the private (female) sphere of the household.

In seeming contradiction to the discourse of individualism, the Nation depoliticizes poor women's issues by blurring class, ethnic, and regional distinctions as the newspaper reports the improvements in the status of a monolithic "Kenyan woman." Such representations portray the experiences of wealthy, urban women as the reality of all Kenyan women, thereby minimizing the differences among women in Kenya and mitigating arguments charging gender inequity.

The ideology of male privilege is constructed through minimal discussion of gender politics and the discourse of male authority over females. First, individual men are portrayed as authorities. Second, women are largely absent from the wider context in which the two articles were published. Third, women's politics are either minimized or completely ignored.

If the two articles examined here are taken at face value, as part of "the 'ideas' which people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do" (Hall 1991, 97), then men and elite women ought to do

nothing to improve the lives of poor women in Kenya. The latter
need only work harder to improve their living conditions. When
the pieces are examined more closely in context, however, that
message contradicts the experience of most Kenyan women and
points to social inequities perpetuated by class and gender
ideologies. Thus the contradictory relationship between media
representation and other areas of culture can be seen as "another
link in the chain binding women in their particular relationship
to socio-economic structures" (Gallagher 1982, 78). That finding
reinforces the importance of contextualizing analyses of women's
media representations to understand the different forms female
oppression can take.

Although this paper breaks down media discourses into class
and gender categories, it is easy to see that they overlap, and
that they do not tell the whole story of how mainstream mass
media relate to female oppression in the Third World. It is
significant that the newspaper form is itself part of Western
imperialism in Kenya (Hachten 1993), a point which, no doubt,
accounts for at least some of its patriarchal nature.
Additionally, while this research provides an important link
between feminist work in communications and women-in-development
scholarship on Africa, much more research is needed to understand
how discourses that emerge from critical feminist analysis
compare with those taken away by readers, and how both relate to
gender oppression.

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National Sovereignty Reconsidered:
The Human Right to Communicate and
Intrusive International Broadcasting

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Abstract

This paper re-examines the international human right to communi-
cate and the claims of national sovereignty violations raised by
nations that oppose external broadcasts originated by other coun-
tries. The paper surveys the international legal instruments sup-
porting the right to receive and impart information, or the free
flow of information doctrine. The paper reassesses the validity
of the sovereignty claims made by nations with governmental
regimes that censor the media and curtail individual expression
to control the flow of information.

The paper is based on an analysis of the news values and tradi-
tional Islamic communication styles in the West African nation of
Mauritania. Many of the cultural greetings and ritualistic commu-
nication exchanges in Mauritanian society are similar to Western
news models and journalistic formulae. These news values and com-
munication styles suggest that censorship is incompatible with
the principles of Islam. Furthermore, the importance of individu-
al free expression and truth telling in Islam makes international
law supporting the right to communicate compatible with communi-
cation law and policy under a truly Islamic regime.

The paper also examines U.S. external broadcasts over the Voice
of America and Radio Free Europe to Czechoslovakia. The claim of
national sovereignty is evaluated in the context of the so-called
"Velvet Revolution" that ended Communist rule in Czechoslovakia.
The re-examination of the national sovereignty issue offers an
alternative perspective on using the right to communicate doc-
trine as a way to intervene in the political and cultural affairs
of sovereign nation states.

Introduction

Many people argue that external broadcasts from the U.S. and Western Europe were central in bringing down Communism and therefore, vindicated the free flow of information doctrine and the right to communicate as expressed in various international legal instruments. This paper re-examines the international human right to communicate and the claims of national sovereignty violations raised by nations that oppose external broadcasts from other countries that are aimed at them.

This paper is based on two case studies. One examines the U.S. external broadcasts over the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to Czechoslovakia. The issue of national sovereignty is evaluated in the context of the so-called "Velvet Revolution" that ended Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. The second case is an analysis of the news values and traditional Islamic communication styles in the West African nation of Mauritania.

The paper then reassesses the validity of the sovereignty claims made by nations with governmental regimes that abuse human rights, censor the media, curtail individual expression, and control the flow of information. The paper also discusses Islamic communication styles and religious principles which indicate that international law supporting the human right to communicate is compatible with communication law and policy under a truly Islamic regime. A re-examination of national sovereignty offers legal grounds for using the right to communicate as a way to intervene in the political and cultural affairs of other nations.

The United Nations (U.N.) has created a human rights regime that is now at the center of the new world order. The absolutely sovereign nation state is becoming less relevant in this new order that seeks to promote and vindicate individual rights regardless of political boundaries. The right to communicate is a critical part of this new international human rights regime. Western political views and the social values of rationalism and individualism elevate human rights as a virtue of the international order and subordinates the state to individual freedom and personal fulfillment. The human rights regime substitutes the protection of people for the protection of nation states as sovereigns.

The promotion of human rights has long been a part of U.S. foreign policy. But since the Jimmy Carter Administration, human rights have taken on even greater importance. With the urging of the United States, the U.N. has started to play a more aggressive and interventionist role in world affairs. In recent years, the U.N. has moved from serving a peace keeping function to disarming warring parties and organizing national elections in El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, and Cambodia. Human rights concerns have provided justification for the U.S. to intervene in Somalia to protect food aid shipments to a starving population. There is debate about whether the U.S. or the U.N. should, under the human rights umbrella, intervene in Bosnia to stop the ongoing warfare.

In order to carry out its new interventionary activities, the U.N. has had to regard these states as incapable of governing themselves. One senior State Department official who has been involved in these intervention operations said the Unites States

and other U.N. members have begun to "take government powers out of the hands of indigenous peoples."[1] The official said these actions were necessary despite international law and U.N. regulations requiring that the sovereignty and equality of nations be respected in international relations. According to the official, "It is fairly clear in some parts of the world that the nation-state is not an adequate expression of the political framework when minorities are automatically disenfranchised. To a large degree, we have to get away from the idea of total respect for sovereignty that was once sacrosanct."[2]

Critics of the human rights regime have said that such activism will lead to warfare and imperialism by stronger states. International legal experts Headley Bull and R.J. Vincent believe that "the promotion of human rights is at odds with the proper functioning of the states system."[3] Bull and others see intervention as something the U.S. has done as part of its foreign policy since World War II to help out "victims of human rights abuses abroad."[4] Some international experts warned recently that unwanted intervention can turn the U.N. into the colonial power of the new world order.[5]

Legal Regime Supporting the Right to Communicate

Communication researchers and legal scholars have argued that the free flow of information doctrine is aimed at exporting to the rest of the world, the lofty principles of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.[6] Since the early days of the crusade to export the First Amendment, the U.S. has been successful in getting the United Nations to accept a number of resolu-

tions and declarations that form a very loose legal framework establishing an international right to freedom of information and the human right to communicate.[7] Therefore, the legal regime for world communications greatly reflects the First Amendment which is the central principle of U.S. domestic communication policy.

The 1948 United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1975 Helsinki Accords are the foundation for the international legal regime supporting the right to communicate.[8] Embodied in these two documents is the notion that there is a human right to communicate. The right, as outlined in Article 19 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states that: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."[9] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which incorporates Article 19 is an internationally binding legal instrument guaranteeing the right to communicate.[10]

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) through its World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARC), and the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) is responsible for international broadcast regulation.[11] When disputes arise between nations, they are usually settled using the technical regulations promulgated by the WARC and IFRB units through which nations legally bind themselves to regional agreements for conducting their telecommunications.

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The ITU has been a U.N. specialized agency since 1947. The organization and the telecommunications activities of its 164-member nations are governed according to an International Convention which is periodically revised. The Convention was last revised in 1989 but the 1982 ITU Nairobi Convention still governs world terrestrial broadcasting done by conventional radio and TV transmissions.[12] The ITU also regulates some celestial transmissions, or satellite-based communication. However, such space communications are governed by eight major declarations and treaties.[13] But these instruments contain no clear provisions outlawing unwanted external broadcasts or for settling claims of sovereignty violations. In the absence of rules prohibiting cross border broadcasting, nations have relied on the right to communicate as the de facto law on such international transmissions.

U.S. Government External Broadcasting

The U.S. maintains that human rights and fundamental freedoms should be implemented through international broadcasting to facilitate the resolve of the parties to the U.N. Human Rights Declaration and the Helsinki agreements. The bulk of America's international communication is done through the United States Information Agency (USIA). The Agency operates information posts in U.S. embassies, libraries, and reading rooms throughout the world. The USIA also operates most of the government's official radio and television broadcasting stations that reach millions in the international audience.

The USIA is the parent organization for the Voice of America (VOA). Congress passed The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 creating the

VOA and setting up a charter for carrying out the government's peacetime overseas information program.[14] According to a 1991 government report, the VOA broadcasts 150 hours of daily programming in 44 languages to a worldwide audience of about 127 million regular listeners.[15] Most of the programs are produced in the agency's Washington, D.C. studios using information gathered by its 25 news bureaus around the world. The program signals are transmitted by satellite to 15 relay stations in the U.S. and 11 in other countries. The stations blanket the globe with 26.2 million watts put out by signals from nine medium wave and 99 shortwave transmitters.[16] The VOA also operates WORLDNET, the USIA television service.

The Cuban Broadcasting Service is a special division of the VOA. Radio and TV Marti are the newest broadcasting stations operated by the VOA. Radio Marti started broadcasts in May 1985 specifically aimed at providing "news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba."[17] Radio Marti broadcasts around the clock. Its news, public affairs information, music, and entertainment programs originate in Washington and are delivered by satellite to a medium wave transmitter in the Florida Keys where they are relayed to Cuba on the 1180 AM frequency.

TV Marti went on the air officially in February 1990 to broadcast much the same programming as Radio Marti on VHF channel 13.[18] TV Marti beams its signals to Cuba from a transmitter aboard a blimp tethered to a base on Cujo Key in Florida. The station was established in accordance with international law only

by transmitting from a balloon floating 10,000 feet above the U.S. territorial limits. The station's signal to Cuba had to originate within the borders of the U.S. according to international laws and conventions regulating broadcast transmissions.[19] The idea of using a balloon to house the transmitter came from the requirement that the station be based on U.S. soil and from the physical fact that a higher elevation was needed to get the TV signals to travel uninterrupted for 120 miles to reach Cuba.

The U.S. operates two additional external broadcasting services under the Board for International Broadcasting. The radio stations were originally created as surrogate stations for the nations behind the Iron Curtain. Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established in 1950 as a surrogate station to serve Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation, later renamed Radio Liberty (RL), was established in 1953 to broadcast to the Soviet Union.[20] "From their establishment in the 1950s until 1971, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were each funded covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency."[21] Congress investigated the administration and funding of the stations in 1971 and eliminated the CIA funding. The State Department financed the stations until 1973 when Congress enacted Public Law 93-129 (22 US 2871 et seq) and established the Board for International Broadcasting to act as an independent federal agency to fund and oversee the combined operations of RFE and RL.[22]

Based on the success of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in bringing down Soviet communism, the Berlin Wall, and ending the Cold War, the USIA has been encouraged to continue its inter-

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national broadcasting in the cause of freedom. There are plans for Radio Free China, a U.S. surrogate radio network modeled after RFE to promote change and democracy in China and in the other communist countries of Asia. In a December 1991 report, the President's Task Force on the U.S. Government's International Broadcasting recommended creation of the new station to pierce the bamboo curtain with additional propaganda broadcasts.[23] The new service would cost an estimated $110 million for construction and another $34 million annually to operate.

There is strong Congressional support for Radio Free China and the plan is now being studied by the congressionally mandated Commission on Broadcasting to Asia. However, many critics of the plan say it is an unnecessary and expensive duplication of programming already being provided by the VOA's China service.[24] Already there are 329 hours of programing available each day to the Chinese audience from the 29 foreign broadcasters who are targeting the country. Among the other major international broadcasters whose programs reach China and the rest of the world are the British BBC service, the German Deutsch Welle radio, and Radio France International.

Media Environment in Czechoslovakia

The U.S. used external broadcasting to Eastern Europe to conduct the Cold War on the airwaves. These ideological, or propaganda, broadcasts were aimed at countries like Czechoslovakia because governments controlled the media and denied the human right of citizens to communicate behind and beyond the Iron Curtain. As in all the former communist countries of East Europe,

the Czechoslovak press was controlled by the Communist Party and private ownership of any publication or mass media outlet was forbidden.[25] The Czechoslovak Press Agency, CSTK, provided news and information to domestic publications and broadcasters who subscribed to it. Several national-circulation newspapers were available but they were routinely censored by the government information office. However, the so-called Velvet Revolution of 1989 changed all that when dissident playright Vaclav Havel was elected president of the country.

With the fall of the communist regime, government censorship ended and private ownership of newspapers started. An estimated 800 new periodicals appeared in Czechoslovakia just six months after the end of communist rule.[26] In March 1991, the state ended its monopoly over broadcasting in Czechoslovakia. In September 1991, private radio started in the country with the "Europe 2" station, a joint venture with France, broadcasting music and short news programs. About 15 private statiors are now operating in the country.[27] RFE had bureaus in the Czech and Slovak republics and was broadcasting on domestic medium wave frequencies before Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries on January 1, 1993.

Despite improvement in the condition of the Czech and Slovak media since the end of communist rule, there is no direct public access to government information and records. Government officials don't grant interviews or talk directly with the media. Press agents release whatever inf rmation the media and the public get and bureaucrats always filter information through these

press agents. CSTK the state-owned news service no longer considers itself an "official" press agency. CSTK plans to go to a co-op or some other private ownership arrangement after dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In September 1992, CSTK was considering a joint venture with Radio France International (RFI) to broadcast news and information in Prague. The programs produced by the joint venture were to be made available all over Europe and Scandinavia on regional satellites.

Role of External Broadcasting in Czechoslovakia

External broadcasts have been available to the Czechoslovak audience from neighboring Austria and West Germany. The VOA and BBC international services also have sizable audiences in Czechoslovakia. American broadcasting has had an important historical role in Czechoslovakia. Although the RFE broadcasts were jammed extensively, there is evidence that the audience paid attention to them. The Czech public thinks U.S. government broadcasting is valuable and important for providing another view of the world and of their own country. They say the VOA played a part in the Velvet Revolution and in giving people hope by providing a view of the life of freedom in the U.S.[28]

In 1990, "When President Havel visited the Voice of America to pay tribute to its Czechoslovak broadcasters, his presence symbolized the value of more than forty years of American public diplomacy in Eastern Europe."[29] Havel told the VOA broadcasters, "You have informed us truthfully of events around the world and in our country as well, and in this way you helped to bring about the peaceful revolution, which has at last taken place. However,

by this I don't intend to say your work has now lost its meaning. On the contrary, it now has taken on new meaning. You will have to inform us about how to create a democracy...and we have a lot to learn."[30]

The European division of the VOA has started broadcasting cultural programs, mostly contemporary American music, on the domestic frequencies in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia.[31] But politicians and some of the general public opposed the regular VOA/RFE news and public affairs broadcasting as an external in-terference. They have said that they will protest to the U.S. if the content does not become more objective.

One outspoken opponent of U.S. external broadcasts is Slovak Minister of Culture, Dusan Slobodnik. Slobodnik said the VOA and RFE are biased against Slovakia and broadcast lies.[32] Slobodnik, whose ministry has jurisdiction over the Slovak media, protested what he said was the U.S. characterization of Slovakia as nation-alistic and fascist. He objected to VOA and RFE broadcasts about the pending dissolution of Czechoslovakia because they mentioned the history of the Slovak state under the World War II German regime and the expulsion of Slovakian Jews to Nazi death camps. Slovakian politicians said that the talk about nationalism was an attempt to raise international fears that an independent Slovakia would mistreat its Gypsy and Hungarian minority populations. Slobodnik said he could write a white paper on the abuses of the VOA and RFE. He said he has been monitoring the stations' broad-casts and plans to transcribe them and send them to the U.S. Con-

gress. Though Slobodnik criticized both stations, he did say that the VOA is a bit more objective than RFE.

Perhaps the most widely known instance of U.S. external broadcasting aimed at encouraging political change occurred just before the Hungarian revolution in 1956. The U.S. was accused of using RFE broadcasts to encourage Hungarians to revolt and overthrow the communist regime.[33] The broadcasts also suggested to the rebels that military help would be provided if they continued their resistance. "When no aid appeared from the West, a deep feeling of betrayal arose. The resulting disillusionment with the United States and its allies lingered for many years."[34]

Czechoslovaks staged a similar revolt against the communist regime in what has become known as the Prague Spring of 1968. The U.S. supported the political reforms that were going on at the time but "the directors of Radio Free Europe took pains to purge its broadcasts of even the slightest intimation that help from the United States was forthcoming."[35] The U.S. offered no military help to Czechoslovaks when Warsaw Pact troops suppressed the reform movement in August 1968.

The legality of such advocacy broadcasting is still a matter of international dispute and debate.[36] The morality of America's decision not to commit troops to defend those who acted upon the message of U.S. external broadcasts has also been questioned. The Prague Spring experience also raises legal and moral questions about whether the U.S. should continue external propaganda broadcasting in the post Cold War era while it still respects national

sovereignty enough not to intervene militarily in the countries that are targeted with these broadcasts.

Although there is general agreement that Radio Liberty ought to continue broadcasting to the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Office of Management and Budget recommended early cessation of the RFE service to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. However, the President's Task Force on International Broadcasting recommended that RFE broadcasting to these countries "now take on more of an educational role" that would explain the workings of the free market system, the free press, and other instruments of democracy which are fairly new to these countries.[37]

"Many East European leaders, including Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, have urged continuation of RFE while the information needs of their societies evolve. The radios have large audiences, contractual commitments, and a valid surrogate broadcasting mission while the possibility remains of reversing the current democratization and until their listeners have established free media alternatives."[38]

The Commission on Public Diplomacy advised that the mission of RFE might be completed if democracy continues in Eastern Europe and that plans should be made to transfer RFE equipment to the VOA. But advocates of external broadcasting said, "USIA is not a creature of the Cold War, its work now finished. The Agency's worldwide mission will become more, not less, important as bipolar military and ideological competition gives way to a world focused increasingly on economic, cultural, and communications issues."[39]

Sovereignty Claims and External Broadcasting

Many developing countries object to unwanted foreign broadcasts as a violation of international law and their national sovereignty. Leaders in these countries fear that foreign broadcasts will destroy their political and social order, economies, cultures, and ideologies.[40] These nations argue that prior consent is needed before foreign broadcasts are beamed into their territorial borders. Prior consent would require a sovereign state to regulate what programs are acceptable for transmission to its citizens.

The most recent example of these claims is present in Cuba's objection to incoming U.S. broadcasts over Radio and TV Marti. Cuba objected to the Radio Marti's foreign broadcasts as a violation of international law and its national sovereignty.[41] Even before the station was established, Cuba argued that the U.S. needed prior consent to beam its broadcasts on Radio Marti into Cuba. The Cuban delegation walked out of the second session of the 1981 ITU Conference on FM Broadcasting and denounced the United States for its plans to establish Radio Marti.[42]

At a later ITU conference on AM broadcasting in the western hemisphere, the Cuban delegation issued a declaration condemning plans by the U.S. to use broadcasting for aggression against other nations and to violate their sovereignty.[43] The U.S. ignored Cuba's claims and established the station. At the beginning of the Radio Marti operation, the Cuban government jammed Radio Marti and increased its interference with domestic U.S. stations.

The Cuban government also protested against the TV Marti broadcasts. Cuba tried unsuccessfully to gain support in the United Nations Security Council to condemn TV Marti. On March 27, 1990, the Cuban ambassador to the UN submitted to the Security Council a letter from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging the international community and the UN to "take decisive action to halt the United States broadcasting aggression against Cuba and avoid a worsening of this situation, which might undermine peace and security in the region."[44] Cuba filed a complaint with the ITU charging that TV Marti was an act of U.S. aggression which constituted "a violation not only of its sovereignty but of international law, specifically the ITU plenipotentiary conference convention and the ITU convention, to which both countries are signatories."[45]

Governments routinely jam and outlaw the reception of unwanted external broadcasts. Cuba has been jamming Radio and TV Marti's signals since the stations began broadcasting to the island. In fact, "The Cuban government began jamming the TV Marti broadcast 23 minutes into its first program and has done so ever since."[46] A 1990 government report stated that the Cuban military has a unit devoted to jamming TV Marti with specially equipped MI-17 helicopters.[47] A later report concluded that Cuba's resumed "jamming of Radio Marti's influential AM broadcasts in retaliation for TV Marti has reduced the flow of information to Cuba."[48]

Throughout most of its history, RFE was jammed by the former communist regimes. Citizens in Eastern Europe who dared to listen to this prohibited station, often did so at great peril. Accord-

ing to a USIA estimate, the former communist governments were spending on jamming "far more than all the major Western radio propaganda organizations put together spend on their programs behind the Iron Curtain."[49] During the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese government jammed VOA broadcasts and accused the VOA of "rumormongering and deliberately provoking violence during the demonstrations."[50]

Although the practice of jamming unwanted foreign broadcasts is prevalent, it is illegal under international broadcasting law. "Every convention of the International Telecommunications Union since 1947 has explicitly prohibited jamming" by including rules to avoid harmful interference with authorized stations operating lawfully.[51] Other resolutions against jamming have been adopted by the international community in the U.N. General Assembly and elsewhere. But they are considered non-binding and nations like Cuba continue jamming external broadcast signals they deem a violation of sovereignty.[52]

The accepted legal principle of national sovereignty appears to be in direct conflict with the universal right to communicate. Claims of a right to broadcast across borders to serve an individual human right to communicate despite a nation's objections are based on declarations and conventions that have not yet gained the status of customary international law.[53] Similarly, claims about sovereignty violations using telecommunications are also based on legal instruments that are not unanimously accepted as binding international law. However, recent legal documents of organizations managing the international telecommunications

regime indicate that "the majority of states support prior consent and advocate the concept that state sovereignty overrides the right to freedom of information."[54]

The Right to Communicate Despite State Sovereignty

Although sovereignty has historically been considered the most fundamental principle of international law, it is now being interpreted as a relative concept that is subject to limitations. Where sovereignty once meant that the leader of a nation state was the ultimate sovereign with sole control over all matters within the leader's domestic jurisdiction, that concept of the legal principle has changed under the new human rights regime. According to one legal commentator, the U.S. Constitution and "the American Revolution inaugurated the concept of the popular will as the theoretical and operational source of political authority."[55] From then on, the people became the ultimate sovereign and political legitimacy was derived from popular support based on their consent as expressed in free election voting.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ushered in an international legal regime which identifies democratic standards against which to judge the internal governance of all nations. "International law still protects sovereignty, but--not surprisingly-- it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty."[56] Under the human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty, "neither the United Nations Charter nor customary international law recognizes absolute sovereignty, since the Charter provides for interference with a sovereign mem-

ber state's policies if they endanger international peace and security or violate human rights."[57]

Many nations claiming their sovereignty has been violated by another nation, are attempting to operate on earlier interpretations of the legal concept. But the international community seems more concerned about vindicating the human rights and sovereignty of individuals, many of whom are being oppressed by the same governments asserting sovereignty claims. However, "In modern international law, sovereignty can be violated as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside force."[58] The Chinese government's massacre of protesters in Tiananmen Square, the Ceausescu dictatorship in Rumania, and Fidel Castro's mock elections in Cuba are recent examples of indigenous violations of the sovereignty of peoples around the world.

Champions of human rights in foreign policy argue that "the world is an imperfect place where many terrible abuses of state power occur." And "carefully confined interventionary missions can be beneficially undertaken even by strong states to alleviate some of the suffering."[59] Violations of human rights and the suppression of free expression offer justifications within the international legal framework for intervention in a nation state's affairs. Sovereignty "can no longer be used to shield the actual suppression of popular sovereignty from external rebuke and remedy."[60]

"In light of these limitations on absolute sovereignty, communications extending into foreign territories may not constitute violations of state sovereignty."[61] Supporters of intrusive ex-

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ternal broadcasting could argue that "these communications sig-
nify the need for further relaxation of sovereignty concepts as
technology continues to create a smaller, more unified, community
of nations."[62]

The suppression of speech is deemed particularly onerous be-
cause those being denied other rights are not able to make their
plight known to the rest of the world and therefore cannot ex-
press their plea for help. Without the right to communicate, the
means for peaceful and democratic political change is also
thought to be non-existent. The suppression of expression under
Czechoslovakia's former communist regime and the documented human
rights abuses in Mauritania's state-controlled media environment
represent instances where intervention would be justified. The
most limited form of direct intervention is providing external
broadcasts to those denied adequate information about the world
and about conditions in their own countries.

Background and Media Environment of Mauritania

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania is one of the largest
countries in west Africa. A former French colony, Mauritania has
a population of 1.8 million drawn from six ethnic groups. As a
result, the country is known for its distinctive mix of Islamic
and traditional African cultures. Virtually all Mauritanians are
Sunni Muslims who follow the Malike rite with the <u>shari'a</u> as the
law of the land.[63] Religious influences have far less impact on
the population than the distribution of power and resources among
the two major ethnic groups--the Arab-Berber Maures and the in-
digenous Toucouleurs.

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The Maures are approximately 70 percent of the population and they occupy most of the positions of power and wealth in the country. The Toucouleurs are made up of several indigenous ethnic groups including the Fulbe, Soninke, and the Wolof people. The relationship between the two groups can be characterized as one filled with the grossest examples of human rights abuses including forced servitude. The Maures continued to hold slaves, called black Maures, up until 1980 when the practice was outlawed.[64] There is evidence that "many Maures continued to hold slaves and exercise their traditional prerogatives even after official decrees outlawed these practices."[65] The Maure-dominated government has committed even greater human rights abuses against the indigenous African ethnic groups which it has effectively disenfranchised from political life in Mauritania.

Testifying before a congressional committee, one human rights official concluded:

> We see no evidence that persons dealing in slaves are prosecuted, we see no evidence that those persons who torture and abuse runaway slaves, who subject them to exemplary punishments that cripple and maim for life, we see no evidence that any such abusers or violators are ever brought to justice. We see no evidence that the government has taken any measures to try to assure freedom of movement and freedom of free speech to the black community that would help give them a sense of empowerment and allow them to break free of the economic slavery that persists in Mauritania.[66]

Mauritania has been able to cover up much of its political wrongdoings and human rights abuses because of the lack of free expression in the country and its dominant government-controlled

media. To begin with, the country has a low literacy level of about 30 percent. The majority of the population get their information from the state-owned and operated radio and TV services. There are 128 radio receivers per 1,000 Mauritanians. State radio broadcasts 48 hours a week in Arabic and 12 hours in French and other African languages.[67] There is no private commercial radio in Mauritania although the Senate started in August 1992 to debate whether it should issue licenses for such a service.[68] Television service is still very limited and there is only 1 TV set per 1,000 population.

The ministry of communication receives and censors the international daily wire services, the only independent sources of news coming into the country. The censored wire reports are then passed on to the government radio and TV station personnel for broadcast. The literate can now choose between the government-produced daily newspaper, Horizons, and several new independent publications that started in 1991. The government daily is also published in Arabic as Ach-Chaab.

Also important in the media environment are the opposition and subversive ethnic newspapers from Senegal that are circulated in Mauritania. Senegal with its majority Toucouleur population has been a base of support for the Mauritanian black minority most of who live just across the border. Before he left office in 1981, the President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, "directed a well-coordinated press campaign that sought to publicize the racial problems between the black and Maure populations."[69] Some of

the independent papers in Mauritania published by Wolof and Pulaar editors are now continuing that campaign by reporting on massacres and abuses carried out against the black population by the government.[70]

Unwanted external broadcasting from foreign nations has not been a particular problem in Mauritania. The neighboring countries share the same Islamic religious and cultural values with Mauritania. However, there were reports in 1992 that Toucouleurs deported from Mauritania were broadcasting destabilizing radio programs into the country from transmitters in Mali.

Islamic Communication Style and Western News Values

Despite the claims that incoming foreign news and information destroy the cultures of peoples in the developing world, some aspects of communication in the traditions and culture of these countries are very similar to the values and practices of Western journalism. The professional standards of journalism require truth and objectivity to guide all reporting. The journalistic reporting and writing formula is based on verifying facts before presenting news stories to the general public.

The most obvious similarity between Western journalism and Islamic communication is seen in the traditional greetings exchanged between Muslims and those practiced by people in most African countries. When Muslims meet they always ask and answer a series of questions: how are you? how's your family? how are your children? These questions are repeated in an elaborate and formal greeting that can take up to a minute to complete. The repetition is part of verifying the information and establishing that the

exchange is not just an indulgence in pleasantries but an attempt to communicate how they really feel and how things are going. For example, it is important to report when a family member is sick because others in the community are required by Islamic teaching to visit the sick.

Regional culture sometimes dominates the teachings of Islam and that is also reflected in the normal greeting. In many of the Islamic north African countries, when Muslim travelers meet or welcome someone who has just returned from a journey, in addition to the questions asked in the usual greeting, they will also ask, how's the weather? has it rained? do you have water? where's water? The nomadic people in these countries are particularly dependent on a truthful exchange of this type of information for survival in the desert and for the well-being of their livestock.

Many of the basic principles of Islam comport with the traditional news values and news formulas practiced in Western countries. Because the commands to do good and avoid evil are among the most important responsibilities and duties of Islam, it is important that individuals enjoy the right to free expression.[71] The individual must express his point of view in all circumstances in order to recommend good and forbid wrong or evil.[72]

Islam requires truth telling as a fundamental principle of acceptable behavior in all aspects of life.[73] Muslims are exhorted to follow the example of the Prophet by being honest and truthful in the dissemination of messages. They are to tell the whole truth and not embellish it, distort it, add to it, or subtract from it.[74] According to the Qur'an, "The Messenger's duty

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is but to proclaim (the Message). But Allah knoweth all that ye reveal and ye conceal."[75]

Islam also prohibits the spreading of falsehood, or libel. Muslims are admonished not to disseminate the truth by disguising it as a lie nor to hide the truth if they know what it is.[76] The Qur'an also commands the individual to speak good words and to avoid unpleasant truths.[77] To avoid evil, the Qur'an advises Muslims to say only what can be confirmed and to verify facts before reporting them. Those responsible for disseminating communication are to use reliable or confirmed sources of information to avoid spreading rumors and causing public panic or fear.[78]

It has been argued that adherence to these principles of communication would prevent a true Islamic regime from engaging in censorship.[79] Islamic regimes can also develop national communication policies that respect the principles of the Qur'an and the communication rights of individuals.

Islamic Law and the Human Right to Communicate

Although Islamic communication style greatly conforms to Western news values and practices, Islamic conceptions of freedom of expression are thought to be less compatible with international norms supporting the human right to communicate. The preface to the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights states that, "Human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory on all Muslim governments and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within the framework of that order."[80] The implementation of expression rights within this framework of Islamic order is somewhat

antagonistic to conceptions of the right to communicate under the international human rights regime.

For Muslims, human rights come from Allah, the origin of the laws of Islam, and not from the state.[81] Therefore, human rights should not be denied by human government, nor can they be surrendered by the individual. In Sunni Islam, truth comes not from human reason but by divine Revelation as expressed by the Prophet of God and set forth in the texts of the shari'a religious doctrines.[82] Therefore, shari'a laws supersede reason. They embody God's will and are necessarily just.[83] Based on this position, "Islamic thought tended to stress not the rights of human beings but, rather, their duties to obey God's perfect law, which, by its nature, would achieve the ideal balance in society."[84] Under the shari'a legal codes, the exercise of individual freedom must conform to Islamic standards so as to promote authority of the state and social cohesion.

The role of the Muslim press is to remind the people that only God is powerful and deserves worship.[85] Under a strict Islamic approach to the mass media, journalists should have the right to free expression and access to information sources because they take on the duty to inform and advance the principles of Islam by serving the community. Therefore, the rights guaranteed by national constitutions and by the international statist regime are always subordinated to the principles of Islam. Where conflicts arise between communication rights and adherence to religious principles, Islamic tenets and Muslim culture prevail.

This uncertainty about the right to communicate in Islamic countries exists because, "Muslims have taken many differing positions on human rights, including the unqualified endorsement of international human rights standards as fully compatible with their culture and religion."[86] However, the governments and political leaders in Muslim states adopted the formal position that the international human rights standards developed in the U.N. are compatible with Islamic law and that these legal principles are binding on their conduct.[87]

The Islamic nations have also issued their own declarations and resolutions aimed at protecting human rights. The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples was adopted in Algiers on July 4, 1976. The Declaration did not contain any provisions for a right to communicate. In 1981, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) was drafted under the auspices of the Islamic Council, an organization affiliated with the conservative Muslim World League. "The declaration was presented with great public fanfare to UNESCO in Paris, in a ceremony attended by figures such as Ahmad Ben Bella and Mukhtar Ould Daddah, respectively the former leaders of Algeria and Mauritania."[88]

The UIDHR recognizes the fundamental human rights described by the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights but it also applies Islamic law to qualify and restrict these rights. Article XII of the document includes the right to freedom of belief, thought and speech. Section D of the Article states that "There shall be no bar on the dissemination of information provided it does not

endanger the security of the society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the Law."[89]

The constitutions in several Islamic countries are based on the UIDHR. They are an attempt by Muslim nations to demonstrate that their leaders could devise a human rights system based on Islam. One might argue that these Islamic human rights documents do not protect rights but are rather instruments for limiting and denying human rights. The Islamic alternative to the international human rights regime uses religious and cultural challenges to deviate from international norms. "That is, they afford no means for protecting the individual against deprivations of the rights that are guaranteed by international law."[90] Rights in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, equality, and equal protection from discrimination are particularly susceptible to such cultural and religious challenges.

Perhaps the best example of this kind of abuse is illustrated by Iran's treatment of Salman Rushdie as a result of his book The Satanic Verses. The work was deemed a blasphemous attack on Islam, the Qur'an, and the Prophet. Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death sentence for Rushdie on Feb. 14, 1989. Despite Islamic recognition of free expression, the sentence was based on shari'a rules for penalizing those who deny and attack the faith. However, there was not unanimous agreement in the Muslim world that the death sentence was justified under Islamic law. It certainly cannot be reconciled with the international human rights concept of free expression.[91]

Under the Islamic concept of free expression, "a certain management or censorship of news in the public interest is called for where open propagation of news will demoralize the public."[92] What would be considered a violation of the free flow of information under international human rights norms is permissible and encouraged by Islam. For example, one verse of the Qur'an appears to give those responsible in the society the power to censor information, to disseminate only what is in the public good, and to keep strategic information from possible enemies.[93]

Iraq used this principle during the Gulf War against the Allied Forces to suppress the number of Iraqi battle casualties and how the nation's forces were faring in the war. Muslims would prefer to keep silent about such information rather than report bad news that would discourage support for a holy war.[94]

It might be argued that the general Islamic approach to bad news is also followed by all nations in times of war. In fact, the Allied Forces, and particularly U.S. Pentagon officials, adopted the same strategy of censoring "bad news" during the Gulf War with Iraq. It is also worth noting that Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows nations to limit the right to communicate (receive information) in order to protect national security and the public order.

At the time of the Gulf War, the U.S. was technically not bound to the provisions of the Convenant because it had not yet ratified the document. However, when the U.S. Senate ratified the Covenant in March 1992, it also included a declaration that the U.S. would operate under its Constitution which grants greater

protection to expression. The declaration was included "because of concerns raised in particular by representatives of the U.S. media over restrictions placed by foreign governments on the free flow of information and ideas."[95]

External Broadcasting and Sovereignty Reconsidered

Czechoslovakia is considered a showcase for the power of external broadcasting to achieve freedom and democracy. Supporters of RFE and the VOA say the Velvet Revolution is testimony that the U.S. has won the cold war of words to bring about a bloodless revolution in the former Communist Empire. Based on the political changes in Eastern Europe, it might also be argued that intervention by way of external broadcasting for freedom and democracy might be justified in other parts of the world. Mauritania with its government-controlled press and record of human rights abuses would be a justifiable target for external Western broadcasting.

As the situation in Mauritania shows, "Human rights are not, in the main, legal or moral abstractions." They are part of the historical process and "the ongoing anti-imperial struggle against political, economic, and cultural structures of international domination. This struggle can be conceived of as the quest for self-determination by population groups at the scale of the state. Deferred, by and large, is the related struggle for internal self-determination at the level of the nation, tribe, sect, or ethnic/religious minority."[96]

The Islamic regime in Mauritania is likely to raise religious and moral objections to such intrusive broadcasts because they are based on a Western statist international order that now

has little regard for absolute state sovereignty especially in the face of human rights abuses. Islamic principles are often interpreted as being counter to the human rights regime because of the primacy of the _shari'a_ law that is often used by tyrants to suppress the popular will of the people.

In many countries, the government does not represent the people but rather represses them behind the cloak of national sovereignty. In the international community, a nation acquires a certain political identity that might not be accurate if it is based only on government-controlled communication. In most instances, the people did not choose the domestic regime though it might present itself as having popular support. Perhaps most egregious is the international community's acceptance of the regime as legitimate because of the population's inability to express their opposition to it.

More current interpretations of sovereignty as protecting the popular will of the people would support intervention based on the human rights regime recognizing the right to communicate regardless of frontiers. On closer examination, even Islamic religious principles and communication styles would support the international human rights regime and the right to intervene via external broadcasting. "The free flow of information should be upheld, even at tremendous cost. Unle j communications are hostile and provoke aggression, or clearly violate established rules of conduct, a state like Cuba should neither be able to interfere with that communication, nor declare it illegal under international law."[97]

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10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).

11. Plowman, pp. 227-228.

12. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference: Issues for U.S. International Spectrum Policy--Background Paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1991), p. 50.

13. See Comments, "Legal Aspects of TV Marti in Relation to the Law of Direct Broadcasting Satellites," 41 Emory Law Journal (1992) at 553-564.

14. The Smith-Mundt Act is the short title for the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948; (P.L. 402), 80th Congress, Approved, January 27, 1948; 22 U.S.C. § 1461. The Act authorized the State Department to conduct international broadcasts via the Voice of America and to undertake other information activities and exchange of individuals to promote increased mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the rest of the world. For the legislative history of the Act see: <u>1948 U.S. Code Congressional Service</u>, p. 1011.

15. United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "1991 Report," (Washington, D.C.: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1991), p. 35.

16. "Voice of America Broadcasting for the 90s," VOA Newsletter (February 1990), p. 18.

17. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, Pub. L. No. 98-111, 97 Stat. 749, 749-753 (1983), 22 USC § 1465.

18. See <u>Report by the President's Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting 1989</u> (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990).

19. See <u>Foreign Policy Implications of TV Marti: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Operations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee</u>, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-27, 73-85 (1988) (Professor John Spicer Nichols claimed that the TV Marti proposal would violate Section 1, Article 30, Paragraphs 2665 and 2666 and Article 44, Paragraphs 175 and 176 of the 1982 International Telecommunication Convention. The Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba in its report, "TV Marti Feasibility and Background Studies," also acknowledged that TV Marti had to be designed to conform to international law).

20. See Wilson P. Dizard, <u>The Strategy of Truth</u> (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 81.

21. H. Rep. No. 97-398, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981).

22. H. Rep. No. 97-398, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1981).

23. See <u>Report of the President's Task Force on U.S. Government International Broadcasting: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations, House Foreign Affairs Committee</u>, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 4, 1992).

24. See Hans N. Tuch, "The Case Against Radio Free China," Foreign Service Journal, July 1992, pp. 23-28.

25. <u>Czechoslovakia A Country Study</u>, edited by Thor Gawdiak, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1989), p. 190.

26. "The Press of Change: Mass Communications in Late Communist and Post-Communist Societies," Owen V. Johnson, in <u>Adaptation and Transformation in Communist and Post-Communist Systems</u>, edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet, (Westview Press: Bolder, Co., 1992), p. 218

27. Information on the media environment was gathered from interviews with personnel at Czechoslovakia Radio and at the Czechoslovak News Agency in Prague on Sept. 28 and 29, 1992 before the country split into two independent republics.

28. Interview with journalist Miroslav Konvalina of Czechoslovak Radio, in Prague, Czechoslovakia (Sept. 28, 1992).

29. Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "Public Diplomacy in a New Europe," May 1990, p. 5.

30. Ibid.

31. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "1991 Report," p. 39.

32. Interview with Dusan Slobodnik, Minister of Culture of the Slovak Republic, in Bratislava (Oct. 2, 1992).

33. Ralph A. Uttaro, "The Voices of America in International Radio Propaganda," 45 Law and Contemporary Problems 103-122 (1982), at 113.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. See Uttaro, at 112; and Nikolai Ushakov, "Incompatible With International Law," New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs, No. 11, March 1977, pp. 14-15 (Discusses report by West German legal expert, Dr. Emil Hofmann, issued to all-European Conference in Helsinki arguing that RFE/RL violate international law and national sovereignty).

37. <u>Report of the President's Task Force on U.S. Government International Broadcasting: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations, House Foreign Affairs Committee</u>, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1992).

38. "Public Diplomacy in a New Europe," p. 13.

39. Ibid, p. 3.

40. For discussion of cultural imperialism see generally Thomas McPhail, <u>Electronic Colonialism</u> (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications Inc., 1981); and Chin-Chuan Lee, <u>Media Imperialism Reconsidered</u> (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications Inc., 1980).

33

41. See Kyu Ho Youm, "The Radio and TV Marti Controversy: A Re-examination," Gazette 48:95-103, 1991; and Laurien Alexandre, "Television Marti and International Law," Media Development, pp. 23-25, 3/1991.

42. Duffey A. Asher, "International Telecommunications: Radio Marti--Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, Pub. L. No. 98-111, 97 Stat. 749 (1983)," 25 Harvard International Law Journal 483-490 (1984), at 488.

43. "U.S. Satisfied With AM Conference Results," Broadcasting, May 12, 1986, p. 82.

44. UN Security Council, S/21210, 27 March 1990.

45. "TV Marti Takes Off--But Will it Fly?" Broadcasting, April 2, 1990, p. 50.

46. "TV Marti Fact Sheet," (Voice of America pamphlet, Aug. 31, 1990.); also see "TV Marti Takes Off--but Will it Fly?" Broadcasting, Apr. 2, 1990, p. 50.

47. Special Report by the Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting on TV Marti, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 5-7.

48. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "1991 Report," p. 42.

49. Allan A. Michie, Voices through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963), pp. 36-37.

50. Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "United States Public Diplomacy in China," Dec. 1989, p. 8.

51. Comments, 41 Emory Law Journal 541 (1992), at 566.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid, p. 567.

54. Ibid, p. 561.

55. Comment, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law," 84 American Journal of International Law 866 (1990), at 867.

56. Ibid, p. 869.

57. Comments, 41 Emory Law Journal (1992), at 548.

58. Comment, 84 American Journal of International Law 866 (1990), at 872.

59. Richard Falk, <u>Human Rights and State Sovereignty</u> (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 2.

60. Comment, 84 American Journal of International Law 866 (1990), at 872.

61. Comments, 41 Emory Law Journal (1992), at 548.

62. Ibid.

63. <u>Mauritania: A Country Study</u>, edited by Robert E. Handloff (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 58.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. <u>Human Rights in the Maghreb and Mauritania: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee</u>, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (June 19, 1991) (statement cf Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch).

67. <u>The World's News Media</u> (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 324-325.

68. Information on the Mauritanian media was gathered from personal interviews with government officials and independent journalists in the capital, Nouakchott, in July 1992.

69. Handloff, p. 161.

70. As one example, "Découverte d'une fosse commune à Sory-Malé," Mauritanie Nouvelles, March 21-18, 1992 carried a story and photos of three bodies found in a common grave near a Pulaar village. The victims were tourtured and murdered during the 1990 repression.

71. See the Qur'an; Sura 9, verse 71 (I was helped in developing the ideas about the relationship between Islam and Western news values by conversations with, and an unpublished paper by Ibrahima Sarr on Islam and communication. Sarr is a Mauritanian TV journalists who was dismissed by his government-owned station for speaking out against the government's human rights abuses).

72. Qur'an, 3:104.

73. Qur'an, 23:70-71 and 23:90.

74. Qur'an, 16:35 and 16:82.

75. Qur'an, 5:99.

76. Qur'an, 2:42.

77. Qur'an, 17:33 and 17:148.

78. Qur'an, 17:36 and 4:83.

79. Sarr, unpublished paper, 1992.

80. Islamic Law and Social and Economic Development: Papers and Proceedings of the Third Pakistan-France Colloquium (Islamabad, Pakistan: Idara Saqafat-e-Pakistan, 1982), p. 401.

81. Ibid.

82. The shari'a is both a religious and legal code drawn from Islamic oral tradition and texts. The primary Islamic text is The Holy Qur'an believed to be the infallible word of Allah revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. The Hadith, a companion text to the Qur'an, is thought to contain the sayings and acts of Muhammad who demonstrated how to live by the Qur'an.

83. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 49.

84. Ibid.

85. Sarr, 1992.

86. Mayer, pp. 11-12.

87. Ibid, p. 14.

88. Ibid, p. 27.

89. Text of Declaration reprinted in Islamic Law and Social and Economic Development:, pp. 409-410.

90. Mayer, p. 91.

91. Ibid, p. 181.

92. Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), p. 44.

93. Qur'an, 4:83.

94. Sarr, unpublished paper, 1992.

95. S. Exec. Rept. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1992).

96. Falk, p. 6.

97. Comments, 41 Emory Law Journal 541 (1992), at 579.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper traces the telecommunications development in
China in the last decades and captures the recent changes in
China's telecommunications since China promulgated the open door
policy. Among others, these changes are characterized by the
tendency toward decentralization in policy-making, the emergence
of market forces and competition, as well as the penetration of
foreign elements.

The paper discusses the implications of these changes for
China's telecommunications development. On the one hand, they
present a liberating of market force *vis-a-vis* the political
control in China's telecommunications. On the other hand, any
policy change in China is dictated by its powerful state
mechanism.

ABSTRACT

     This paper traces the telecommunications development in
China in the last decades. A policy-driven developmental model is
conceptualized in China's telecommunicaticns, in which
telecommunications development is subject to national interest
and government directives, thus dictated by politics.

     The paper also captures the recent changes in China's
telecommunications since the end of 1970s when China promulgated
the open door policy. Among others, these changes are
characterized by the tendency toward decentralization in policy-
making, the emergence of market forces and competition, as well
as the penetration of foreign elements.

     These changes have significant implications for China's
telecommunications development since they present a liberating of
market force *vis-a-vis* the political control in China's
telecommunications.

     But this shift toward market and technology mechanism is
dictated by China's powerful state mechanism because the Chinese
leadership wants only economic modernization but not political
transformation. Thus, it is uncertain to what extent the Chinese
government will consider a telecommunications with more choice
and competition instead of a highly politics-ridden one.

Telecommunications Development in China:
Recent Changes and Policy Implications

Introduction

Needless to say, China[1] is very backward in its
telecommunications, be it infrastructure deployment, equipment
manufacturing or service provision. Till 1990, its teledensity
(the number of telephones owned by 100 people) was only 1%.
Despite a steady growing trend, the investment rate in China's
telecommunications (that is, the ratio of its investment in
telecommunications capital construction as of its total
industrial investment) was below 2% by the end of 1990. This
ratio is even below the figure of 3-15% as suggested by the ITU
for developing countries.

China's telecommunications is also subject to strict
government control and intervention. As the Minister of the MPT
of China said, its basic task is to "serve the party, the
government and the military conscientiously, serve the various
department of the national economy and serve the people".[2]
Clearly, China's social system determines its own definitions
with regard to the structure and function of telecommunications.

Despite, the past ten plus years have witnessed the rapid
development in China's telecommunications. Against the backdrop
of economic reform and science and technology development under
the open door policy which was promulgated in the end of 1970s,
China's telecommunications, altogether with energy and

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transportation, has gained high strategic priority in policy-
makers' developmental planning. What it has shown is a double-
digit growth in its telecommunications during the last ten plus
years. As observed, the take-off of China's modernization efforts
in its communication and information industry has been one of the
most outstanding changes of the past short period in
international telecommunications.[3]

The changes, brought about by the striking and significant
efforts China has ever taken in its aspiration to catch up with
the advanced countries economically and technologically, not only
are reflected in the statistical growth, but have been taking
place in the basic structure of China's telecommunications.

This paper intends to trace the telecommunications
development in China during the last decades through the
perspectives of government policy, technology and market; to
capture the recent changes which are taking place in the many
fronts of China's telecommunications. A policy-driven
developmental model in China's telecommunications is
conceptualized and the economic and political implications of
these changes for the telecommunications development in China are
discussed.

POLICY PERSPECTIVE

Generally, the Chinese leadership sees telecommunications as
a means of national integration and bureaucratic networking, as
well as political control. It is only recently that

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telecommunications in China has come to be recognized as an economic sector having its own development logic rather than merely a governmental service sector. Undoubtedly, telecommunications in China has been highly valued, but usually politically rather than economically. This situation was very clear in the early stages of development of China's telecommunications.

Immediately after the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the governmental MPT was formally established in Beijing, on November 1, 1949, to reintegrate the national system. The MPT completed the basic national trunk network during the First Five Year Plan (FYP, 1953-1957), with Beijing as the hub linking the provincial capitals, major cities and important ports. Dramatic changes took place in China's telecommunications thereafter, with the communications center shifting from Shanghai to Beijing. Hence, a national communications network based on traffic flow was replaced by one based on the distribution of the administrative regions. Significant increases in telecommunications capacity were implemented during this period, with the teledensity rising from 0.05 in 1949 to 0.13 in 1957.[4] Once the basic network was in place, however, the central planners felt little need to expand telecommunications services. As a result, telecommunications capacity did not grow as rapidly as other infrastructures until the turn of 1980s.[5] As for international communications, it is doubtful whether the only projects attempting to link with the outside, including the

installation of three satellite earth stations in Beijing and
Shanghai and the layout of a submarine cable between Nanhui,
Shanghai and Riehoku, Japan, would have come into reality in the
early 1970s if diplomatic relations with America and Japan had
not normalized at that time.[6]

In a planned economy,
the investment rate in
different sectors is set by
the government and is thus
subject to political
variation. The distribution
pattern of China's capital
investment in
telecommunications during
the past nearly forty years,

Figure 1 Investment Rate of China's Telecommunications: 1952-1990*

* Data for the period of 1966-1971 are not available.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 1988-1991.
The Development of China's Transportation and Telecommunications. China Statistic press. 1989.

as shown in Figure 1, is commensurate with the political reality
of China. As shown, prior to 1981, 1958 and 1974 had a relatively
higher investment rate of 0.74 and 0.73 respectively. But this
can be accounted for wholly by the 'Great Leap Forward' movement
in China beginning in 1958 and the reiteration of the 'Four
Modernization' in 1974.[7]

Today, China's telecommunications is still dictated by
governmental policy. Even the progress it has made in the past
ten years can be attributed mainly to the government's
preferential policies toward telecommunications in investment
rates, tax and revenue retaining.[8] In the first place, since the

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sixth FYP (1981-1985), transportation and telecommunications have been a high priority in economic and public policy planning. Investment in telecommunications capital construction has increased from 0.384 billion yuans in 1980 to 2.669 billion yuans in 1990. Several times when China implemented rough measures against its over-rapid economic expansion, the MPT, as priority industry, escaped severe cuts in investment budget that other industries suffered. What is more, the MPT, from 1982 onwards, was permitted to retain 90% its profits and foreign exchange income for its own use, whereas by comparison the State typically collects 55% profits tax from other industrial enterprises.[9]

Generally, the public ownership characteristic of China's societal system determines telecommunications to be a public sector enterprise subject to government surveillance and intervention. In China, the reason for the PTTs monopoly has nothing to do with economic or market explanations, but with its political system and ideology. There is no natural monopoly in China's telecommunications. The economic arguments based on economy of scale and economy of scope are just not nonsense in the Chinese context. No distributional balance in telecommunications facilities and services across the country is achieved.[10] No social equity, in whatever sense, is secured. The limited development of telecommunications services in China has not been mainly for public users but for the strategic areas of commercial, bureaucratic, as well as military and naval communications.[11] An efficient communications network may be what

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the Chinese government needs, but not what it wants.[12]

TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVE

It is not surprising that research and development (R&D) in China's technology has long concentrated on defense technology. Accordingly, the technological development in telecommunications leant toward space technology. A domestic satellite communication network, consisting 22 large and small earth stations and three satellites, has taken shape.[13]

China may be able to compete in the international market in satellite launching now, but overall, it lags far behind other countries in new technologies deployment. Though China has used digital microwave, optical fibre and satellites in transmission, 80% of its telecommunications transmission is through open air lines. In switching equipment, Stored Program Control (SPC) switching occupies only 30% of the total switching capacity. Within a rather long time, China's technology in telecommunications network will be a hybrid of open air lines, coaxial and optic fibre cables, microwave and satellite links in transmission and of manual, mechanical (including step-by-step and cross-bar) and SPC in exchange switching.

In China, there is no technological dynamism in the innovation and diffusion of technology. The driving forces behind investment in new technology generally have less to do with "capturing protected surpluses or accepting greater risks in anticipation of high returns than with attaining a variety of

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more collective-type goals".[14] It is more than often for China to mobilize a highly selective number of qualified scientists and engineers to undertake some strategically important projects. As we see, this has resulted in some impressive technological breakthroughs which are of the highest world standard, e.g, in the fields of nuclear physics, space technology, aeronautics and superconductors, etc. While market pressures are weak, other innovative-generating forces, such as national prestige or military sponsorship are strong.[15]

Since most of the R&D activities were pushed by top-down decision making and strategic project selection, there have been few chances for technology to meet the market demand and serve the whole economy. The lack of links between technology and production further has led to the very technological backwardness in the whole economy and lack of dynamics in technological development. By far, technology is still the bottleneck in China's telecommunications development.

MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Since 'market mechanism' is new to China's whole economy, it is still early to claim the existence of market mechanisms in China's telecommunications, though a tendency toward decentralization and competition in some fronts has surfaced. Given its limited capacity for equipment manufacturing, slow technical progress, incapability to meet the vast service demand and to finance itself as well as other systemic problems, China's

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telecommunications could hardly survive itself without the government's vast subsidies and favorable policy.

Under China's centrally planned economy, the supply and demand in telecommunications manufacturing are largely 'arranged' by the Government between two major telecommunications equipment producers, the MPT and the Ministry of Machine Manufacturing and Electronic Industry (MMEI). Each of the two ministries controls its own factories and affiliates for production. To avoid competition, MMEI is assigned by the State Planning Commission as the primary telecommunications supplier while MPT the user with some manufacturing activities. Further, the equipments produced by MPT are mostly deployed in public networks while those by MMEI consumed by the military and private network operators.[16] Besides, the Government sets what a factory should produce. For example, the production of lightguide fibre is allocated to MPT factories in Shanghai and Wuhan, satellite earth stations to MMEI in Nanjing, pulse code modulation to MPT in Chongqing, etc.[17] The reason behind this is 'cooperation and harmonization', but by so doing no economies of scale and synergy of R&D can be attained and distortion in telecommunications market has resulted.

In telecommunications service, China's telecommunications has long been a money-loser, contrary to the common knowledge that telecommunications is a hugely profitable business. On the one hand, the price for public telephone services is almost the same nationwide and is kept at a far lower rate than the cost. On the other hand, rates for such new services as paging, mobile

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phones, etc. are surprisingly high. It was reported that many big users were scared away by the artificially 'over-increased' return on telecommunications services from the public network and were developing their own private network.[18]

These are but several aspects of China's central planning and monopoly in telecommunications. As shown, China's telecommunications development has been highly subject to national interest and government directives, thus dictated by politics. Parallel with such a policy-driven telecommunications system are the backwardness in this sector, the lack of dynamism in the innovation and diffusion of technology and the distortion in its market.

This system is facing serious problems in front of the rapid technology change, vast market demand, sector competition, financing constraints and not least the foreign entry into China's telecommunications market. It is more and more clear that China's telecommunications, driven by the government's policy and state-governed mechanisms, have to change to accommodate the emergence of new technology and new service, to generate a capital market, and to make use of the opportunities foreigners offer, if it wants to realize its vaunted objectives.

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The adoption of the open door policy and the change toward a 'market economy' in China was not only the result of the

intrinsic flaws of the centralized system, it also bears on the cumulative effects of the ongoing information revolution, the increasing integration of the world economy and the rapid expansion of multinational capitals. As for telecommunications, its significance in supporting economic activities, its high economic stake and the strategic role it plays in the transformation toward an information society called close attention of the Chinese leadership in the early 1980s.[19] Since then, with telecommunications becoming a strategic priority in the national economy and the furthering of economic reforms, changes in telecommunications have taken place in many fronts though the issue of systemic reform is yet to be brought to the table of the policy-makers. Among others, these changes include:

(1) The appearance of vast market demand in telecommunications. Besides the business telephone service, residential telephone has become to be regarded as much as an everyday necessity as color televisions and refrigerators in Chinese families. By the end of 1990, there are over 1 million telephone applications outstanding, more than those processed in the same year (see Figure 2). From 1983 to 1989, China's communications capacity met only about 50% of social

Figure 2 Telephone Installed and Outstanding in China: 1983-1990

Source: Chen YunQian, "The social economic benefits of telecommunications in PRC". China Telecommunications Construction. Vol.2. No.3. 1991.

10

demand. Actually, were not policy restrictions, demand for telephone services would be much more.[20]

In telecommunications equipment, the market is steadily growing. According to the Pyramid Research estimate, China had a US$720.7 million market for telecommunications equipment in 1988. The figure will rise to US$1.25 billion by 1993.[21] China's booming market in Private Branch Exchange (PBX) and Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) testified to the growing demand for telecommunications equipment from business firms, private networks and family users. The rising market demand has double-edged implications for the MPT, exerting pressures upon the MPT on the one hand, generating chances of development on the other.

(2) The tendency toward decentralization and local autonomy. This change is to a large extent the result of the financial constraints in China. The pouring of money into network modernization by the MPT, under the preferential policy of the Government, is more and more difficult to sustain because there are too many public sectors in China waiting for the care of the Government. In March 1989, the MPT announced that government investment in telecommunications that year would decline from about US$540 million in 1988 to US$270-450 million.[22] Before that, the investment by the MPT had already declined from 45% of the total investment in 1983 to 22% in 1987.[23] In order to divest the financial burden, a 'responsibility' policy in infrastructure construction has been adopted in China. That is, the MPT is responsible for the construction of grade-A trunk lines

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(including mainly the international telecommunications lines, lines between the national and provincial capitals), using money allocated by the state and raised through other channels; governments at the provincial level are in charge of the construction of grade-B trunk lines within their areas and between various localities.[24] With the decentralization of telecommunications financing and given the poor state of infrastructure and service provided by the MPT, many local governments, governmental ministries and large users are taking care of their own needs through direct investments in telecommunications, gaining more and more autonomy in decision-making. This will naturally lead to the competition between the centrality and locality and between the MPT and other governmental ministries.

(3) The emergence of competition among new services providers and between private network owners and the MPT. New services such as paging and cellular mobile phones have flourished in the past three to five years in wake of the technological development and market demand.[25] The lucrative market of these marginal telecommunications services was so attractive that there emerged various communications companies which design and construct telecommunications facilities and provide telecommunications services.[26] A letter circulated by the State Council, entitled 'Request to Strengthen the Communications Business and Conscientiously Put it in Order', claimed that some entities, which are authorized to own their own private networks,

used their facilities to illegally provide public services, and warned that the communications order in China has becoming seriously confused.[27]

It is almost natural in China for some big enterprises and ministries other than the one responsible for the public network to make investment in their private networks to meet their own business and institutional needs, given the staggering public services. Ministries of Coal, Water, Electric Power, Petroleum and Railways as well as the Army have long been private network owners. New communications systems, e.g., owned by the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television, the Xinhua News Agency, the Bank of China group , the State Planning Commission, and many other companies and enterprises, are mushrooming.[28] During the seventh FYP (1986-1990), the number of national private networks for long distance communications has reached more than 30. Most of them are better equipped than the public network and are very ready to run telecommunications services 'illegally'.[29]

This is why the above-mentioned letter issued by the State Council reiterated that 'The MPT is the country's prime authority for the management of communications, which has the responsibility to control all communications business throughout the country' and 'major communications services must be provided solely by the MPT and its subsidiaries'.[30]

(4) Reforms in the technology R&D. A series of measures have been taken to reform the technology system and to accelerate research in high-technology.[31] Particularly, market operations

were introduced into technology innovation and transfer to integrate S&T with production. As a result, several 'Silicon Valleys' appeared in China's big cities, with Beijing's 'electronic street' in Zhongguanchun the most successful. The latter has now approximate 150 non-governmental science and technology firms, becoming a powerful locus of technology dynamism.

But in strategic areas, guidance from the central government is still an important motive force behind science and technology policy. Several famous high-tech initiatives, such as the Spark Plan, the High-tech Plan (863 plan) and the Torch Plan are all planned, funded and led directly by the Government.[32]

(5) More and more foreign involvement in China's telecommunications. What the open door policy meant essentially is to welcome the inflow of foreign capital and technology as well as other kinds of economic cooperation. This predisposed the significant role of foreigners in China's whole modernization program. On the one hand, the insufficiency of production capacity, lack of self-sustaining technological progress, as well as the inability to accumulate capital to a great extent in China's telecommunications forced China to open its market in return for utilizing foreign capital and having access to outside technological sources. On the other hand, multinational business competed to crowd into China's giant market, giving impetus and providing resources for China to open its door.[33] Consequently, after China in 1979 announced the breaking of the last two

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remaining 'forbidden zones'--acceptance of government-to-
government loans and private foreign investment,[34] not only has
foreign trade in telecommunications soared and foreign capital
been solicited, but also more foreign stakes have been claimed in
China's telecommunications.

Table 1 shows that China's
foreign debts in PT are more than
domestic ones. From 1983 to 1989,
a total of 1.6 billion yuan of
foreign loans were used in
capital construction, 16.55% of
the total investment in PT
capital construction in the same
period. The source of foreign

Table 1 Loans in China's Telecommunications		
	Loans	Balance of Loans till 1989
Domestic (1982-1989)	2	1.63
Foreign (1983-1989)	3	2.41
Total	5	4.04

Unit: 1 billion yuan
Source: He Xia, "The comparison of ways of indebted financing in China's telecommunications". Telecommunications Enterprise Management. No.3, 1991, pp.8-9. (In Chinese)

loans include the soft and hard loans from the foreign
governments, loans from the multinational corporations in
telecommunications and from international banks.

Besides the money borrowed from the outside, much state-of-
the art technology was imported due to the limited domestic
production capacity. China has imposed fewer import controls over
such highly sophisticated equipment as SPC Central Office (CO)
equipment, digital microwave and optic fibre transmission
equipment, but more controls on products at the low end of
product spectrum such as CPE, in order to seek key technology
transfers and at the same time protect its domestic market in
less sophisticated products. The result is foreign occupation of

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China's telecommunications market in SPC exchanges, digital transmission equipment, digital PBX system and other fast growing markets, such as mobile communications, fax, etc. From Table 2 we can see foreign companies have set deep roots in China's telecommunications equipment market.

Table 2   Major Foreign Interests in China's Telecommunications Market

Equipmet Markets		Description
Central Office Switching: SPC		* A total of 6,167,713 lines were imported. The distribution of market share is: Alcatel (France) 30.1% NEC (Japan) 23.3% Fujitsu (Japan) 16.5% Ericsson (Sweden) 15.8% N. Telecom (Canada) 8.6% Siemens (Germany) 4.0% AT&T (US) 0.5% Others 1.0% * Three joint ventures producing SPC exchanges were established with Alcatel, NEC and Siemens in Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing respectively.
Digital PBXs		10 joint ventures were built up. Philips of Netherlands owns 3 joint ventures.
Transmission	Mircowave	NEC of Japan held 43% of this market.
Transmission	Optic Fibre	61% of the optic fibre terminal were imported. NEC and Fujitsu of Japan as well as Alcatel of France held the majority of the market.
CPE	Fascimile	Major equipments were imported from Japan.
CPE	Telex	Swizerland companies are the biggest providers.
CPE	Cellular Phone	Ericsson of Sweden occupies 70% of the market. Aother major provider is Motorola of USA.

Source: Lincoln Kaye, "Long march from chaos". Far Eastern Economic Review. June 4, 1992; China Telecommunications Construction. Vol.3, No.1, 1991.

The urgent and vast demands for more telecommunications services generated by booming businesses, the big profit involved as well as the needs of local companies to look for

foreign partners to provide necessary capital and technology, have also pushed the entry of foreign capital into China's telecommunications service market. But the foreign investment in services could only focus on marginal services such as paging and mobile communications and mostly came from Hongkong due to its special geographical and political status. For example, in paging service, the Hing Tat Investment Ltd.(HK) has since 1984 opened 48 paging stations in China with 350 thousand customers, constituting more than 40% of China's paging market.[35] Because of the policy limitation on telecommunications ownership in China, usually there is no equity share between the Chinese and Hongkong businesses. Instead, the joint provision of the paging, mobile and roaming services across the border is conducted in term of "cooperation".

Discussion

Telecommunications, by its very nature, involves technological deployment, market fulfillment and public policy making. Its development is thus a continuing process of interaction among technological, economic and political factors, in pursuit of technological feasibility, economic profitability and political desirability. But in China, as the above discussion shows, its telecommunications is under the strict control of the Government and almost wholly subject to government directives. But changes, characterized by the emergence of technology and demand market, a tendency toward decentralization in decision-

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making, partial and potential competition in telecommunications service provision as well as external pressures, are challenging the power of the MPT, the 'omnipotent' monopolist, as regulatory body, public service provider and equipment manufacturer.

These changes have special implications for the future development of China's telecommunications which, like other traditional PTTs dominated telecommunications worldwide, is heavily regulated and exempted from competition. Essentially, the changes, as characterized by the tendency toward decentralization in policy-making and competition in some services, present a tension between the political rent-seeking incentives and the unrelenting pressures of technological and market forces. They have special symbolic meaning in that they are pounding the market structure of China's telecommunications and are changing people's conventional attitudes toward telecommunications ownership. But the outcome of the balancing between the liberating of market force *vis-a-vis* the political control in China's telecommunications, or whether the Chinese government will consider a telecommunications model with more choice and competition or stick to the highly politics-ridden policy-driven model, is unknown given China's ideology and its political-economic context.

What the Chinese government is practicing now is a so-called double-track system, i.e., walking on the two tracks of plan and market economic system. Its essence is to strive for economic modernization without yielding political control which may be

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caused by economic reform. This necessitates the Chinese
leadership to perform a dedicate balancing act to ensure the
disjunction between the economic and political interests.

To see this point, we can look at the attitude of the
Chinese government toward the foreign vendors in China's
telecommunications. As shown, since China opened its door to the
outside and implemented economic reform, its interaction and
cooperation with the foreign telecommunications interests have
been particularly active. But China only wanted to open its door
on its own terms. It has its own standards and strategic plans in
telecommunications equipment trade, technology procuring and the
utilization of foreign capitals. First, in international trade,
China applies fewer controls over more sophisticated equipment
such as SPC switching, digital and optic fibre equipment, but
puts up more barriers to CPE in order to get access to key
technology and protect its domestic production. Besides, with the
competitive entry of international companies into China's market,
China is using a supplier financing strategy to dictate
technology choice, thus gaining more bargaining power. It is
interesting to note that the country leaders, namely France,
Japan, Canada and Sweden, in providing concessional loans to
China in the past are coincidently those whose national companies
(e.g., NEC and Fujitsu of Japan, Alcatel of France, Siemens of
Germany and Ericsson of Sweden) have claimed important stakes in
China's telecommunications market (see Table 2). Further, China
has in the past few years narrowed the field of central office

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switching suppliers to Alcatel, NEC and Siemens and established joint ventures with the above three to produce SPC exchanges.[36] In telecommunications service, several years ago, the Chinese side took back the 49% shares C&W(UK) once held in the only equity joint venture, Shenda Telephone Co., in China which provided local and long distance voice service. Last year, the MPT required that all Hongkong companies should first reach agreement with the central MPT before providing mobile service with the local telecommunications administrations and enterprises.[37] Thus, while on the one hand the Chinese leadership makes very friendly gesture to welcome the inflow of foreign capital and technology, thus integrating its telecommunications with the outside, on the other hand it keeps a close eye on the technology and market mechanisms in the sector and is ready to intervene in the market to ensure it remains in the Government's hands.

The strict control taken by the State notwithstanding, it is doubtful that this approach can work in face of the vast market demand, a trend toward decentralization, potential competition and not the least the increasing foreign involvement in China's telecommunications market.

What China's telecommunications face now is the need to select a 'developmental mechanism'. Against the backdrop of economic reform and the emergence of market forces in telecommunications, the systemic reform of China's telecommunications has become a hot issue recently. It is

generally agreed that there are serious problems with the system

of telecommunications: over-concentration of power, excessive

administrative rigidity, lack of autonomy in operating, reforming

and developing the sector of telecommunications, to name but a

few. It is thought impossible for China to return to the

completely centrally planned, quasi-military telecommunications

system practiced in 1950s and 1960s. It is, however, also

regarded as 'infeasible' for China to adopt a complete 'market

mechanism' in its telecommunications sector.[38] Telecommunications

in China will still consist of 'the integration of government

administration and economic enterprise'. Like the many ambiguous

policies in China, e.g., the two-track system in its economy and

the two-pronged approach in technological reform, i.e., relying

on both plan and market, this integration represents no more than

a surrender to the 'Chinese national reality' under which

prevailing political forces dominates market forces. The essence

of the integration of government administration and economic

enterprise in telecommunications thus lies in the balancing of

market forces and government control.

Endnotes

1.   For writing convenience, "China" will be used in the paper
instead of "People's Republic of China" unless otherwise specified.

2.   Yang Taifang, "Draw lessons from historical experiences and
accelerate the construction of a modern communications network of
the Chinese characteristics". <u>Post and Telecommunications
Management</u>. May 1989, pp.2-4. (In Chinese)

3. Oswald H. Ganley and Gladys D. Ganley, <u>To Inform or To Control? The New Communications Network</u>. Norwook: Ablex, 1989. P.185.

4. William H. Davidson, Wang Dongmin and Sandra C. Hom, "Telecommunications policy and economic development: Models for the People's Republic of China". <u>China Economic Review</u>. Vol.1, Spring 1989.

5. In Beijing, for example, from 1949-1979, water consumption increased 46 times, electric output 32 times, but telecommunications capacity only 7 times. See Davidson, Wang and Sandra, op. cit., F.J. Norman, "Development of telecommunications in South Asia and China". <u>Telecommunications Journal</u>. Vol.48, No.6, 1981. In Shanghai, the same imbalance existed. During the same period of 1949-1979, industrial capacity increased 26 times, but that of telephone system only 1.39. See Zhang Manjun, "The future of Shanghai's residence telephones". <u>Forecasting</u>. March 1987. (In Chinese.)

6. The first earth station for satellite communications used in China was a portable one and was brought from the US by the Americans to transmit the former American President Nixon's visit of China in 1972. The Chinese government later bought the equipment and began to research on satellite communications. China built up official diplomatic relationship with Japan in the same year.

7. In 1973, Deng Xiaoping, the leader behind the bamboo in China today, resumed his post of vice-Premier and other positions in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the protection of the former Premier Zhou Enlai. The 'Four Modernization', i.e., modernization in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology, was reiterated on the eve of the fourth People's Congress which was held in 1975.

8. Wang Zhenghu, "On the problems and strategies of China's telecommunications development". <u>Post and Telecommunications Management</u>. January 1992, pp.9-11. (In Chinese.)

9. Chris Brown, "Telecommunications". <u>The China Business Review</u>. July/August, 1982, pp.43-45.

10. Paul S.N. Lee, "Dualism of communications in China". <u>Telecommunications Policy</u>. December 1991.

11. During 1970s, because of the long ignorance of telecommunications construction and increasing demands from the industry sectors, many residential telephone lines were removed to reserve space for office telephone. The result was that, in 1970, there were only 960 residence telephone users in Shanghai, 1.9% of the total telephone users, compared to 36.6% residential users in 1949. Today, there are still disputes over the residential

telephone services. Some object to increase this kind of service because the present price structure in China makes it unprofitable. But others insist on furthering this service for the considerations of both social objectives and the market potential these users will generate. see Zhang Manjun, op. cit.

12. "Telecommunications in the Far East". <u>Datapro</u>. December 1990. p.103.

13. See <u>China Telecommunications Construction</u>. Vol.3, No.1, 1991, p.47.

14. Denis Fred Simon, "China's high-tech thrust: Beijing's evolving approaches to the process of innovation". <u>The China Economic Review</u>. Vol.1, Spring 1989, p.75.

15. Ibid.

16. Ken Zita, "Telecommunications: China's uphill battle to modernize". <u>The China Business Review</u>. November/December, 1989; p.20.

17. Ibid.

18. Wang Zhenghu, op. cit.

19. It was said that the former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, after reading Alvin Toffler's <u>The Third Wave</u>, introduced the idea of 'new technological revolution' in China in the early 1980s. Following that, discussions about 'information revolution' became heated in China.

20. In China, a prospective user of telephone service is usually required to pay an unreasonably high deposit and make other commitments, thus practically discouraging the usage of telecommunications services.

21. Jeggerey Sprafkin, and Ross O'Brien, "Keeping telecommunications on hold". <u>The China Business Review</u>. November/December, 1989; <u>Asia-Pacific Telecommunications</u>. August 1989; pp.10-11.

22. Sprafkin and O'Brien, op. cit.

23. William P. Wang, "China: Adapting to new needs". <u>1992 Single Market Communications Review</u>. Vol.3, No.2, 1991, p.68.

24. <u>China's Development in Post and Telecommunications</u>. op. cit., p.28.

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25.   More than 450 cities in China have opened paging service. The number of paging customers have passed 1 million. Besides, there are 20 cellular mobile telephone network with 70,000 users in China. Hongkong Economic Journal. May 8, 1992.

26.   Even such departments as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Radio Management Commission at various administrative levels could not help setting up businesses in telecommunications services. Hongkong Economic Journal. January 1, 1992.

27.   "The State Council's circular letter: The MPT must be the sole provider for all major P&T services". China's Telecommunications Construction. Vol.2, No.4, 1990, p.27.

28.   Brown, op. cit. and Zita, op. cit.

29.   Wang Zhenghu, op. cit.

30.   China Telecommunications Construction. Vol 2, No 4, 1990, P.26.

31.   Denis Fred Simon, "China's drive to close the technological gap: S&T reform and the imperative to catch up". China Quarterly, 1989.

32.   The Spark Plan is designed to help diffuse technological innovation in agriculture. The 863 program focus on seven high-tech areas, namely, aerospace, bioengineering, information, laser, energy, automation and new material. In information technology, specifically, five priorities were set, namely computers, telecommunications, software, integrated circuits, and sensors. The Torch Plan is devised to help diffuse these high technologies in production.

33.   Since the mid-1970s, what typified the changes in international investment patterns was the decline and severe reduction in the flow of FDI towards developing countries, but China and the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) were an exception in this. The reason, among others, is the giant lucrative market of the two areas. See Dieter Ernst and David O'Connor, Technology and Global Competition: The Challenge for Newly Industrializing Economies. Paris: OECD. 1990, p.30.

34.   Jia Liqun, "Self-reliance, external assistance and technological change in China: A critical review". Asian Economies. 1990, p.24.

35.   Hongkong Economic Journal. January 4, 1992.

36.   But it was said that an attractive finance package could facilitate a decision by China to bend the rule of buying only from the said three companies. William P. Wang, "China: Adapting to new

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needs". <u>1992 Single Market Communications Review</u>. Vol.3, No.2, 1991.

37. <u>Hongkong Economic Journal</u>. May 8, 1992.

38. It was reported that, in an academic seminar on China's telecommunications held in Shanghai, 1989, the experts and economists agreed that communications should be monopolistic; the privatization and nationalization wave in telecommunications emerging in the western countries was not applicable to China. See <u>Shanghai Economic Almanac, 1990</u>. pp.314-315. (In Chinese.)

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Interpersonally Rich and Media Poor: A Descriptive Study of the
Mass Media Use of "Occupationally Elite" Mexicans

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Abstract

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Much previous cross-cultural communication research
involving Mexico has focused on analysis of foreign news in U.S.
media, analysis of coverage of U.S. Hispanics, studies of Mexican
media content and investigations of the media behavior of special
populations within Mexico. This study, which falls into the
latter category, was designed to assist researchers in the
development of an information campaign targeted at
"occupationally elite" individuals in Guadalajara, Mexico. Among
other topics, researchers investigated mass media use (including
that of English language media) and perceptions of the
effectiveness of direct marketing communications aimed at this
special population.

Researchers found heavy use of English language media by
these individuals and high perceived effectiveness of direct mail
messages. They concluded that an effective information campaign
should have a strong print media/direct mail component to create
awareness and a strong interpersonal component to convince and
persuade. Further, they concluded that public relations,
advertising and marketing communications specialists developing
these campaigns will need to adopt techniques that fit the
cultural context of Mexico.

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the current activity involving the North American countries of Canada, Mexico and the United States is as old as recorded history: traders and merchants are venturing into foreign lands in search of economic gain and returning to their homelands with new customs, values and social behaviors in addition to goods for sale.

However, instead of Phoenicians sailing reed boats across uncharted seas or Egyptians leading caravans of camels across the desert, Canadian, Mexican and U.S. merchants are boarding airliners and jetting between the commercial centers of these respective countries exchanging goods, services and customs. This commercial activity is deemed so important by the governments of these three countries that negotiators are working to enhance it by ironing out differences in a proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in time for the treaty to be formally ratified by each country at the end of this year. If these negotiators are successful, the world's largest free-trade zone (with a market of 360 million consumers for goods and services worth $6 trillion annually) will be established.

In fact, even if NAFTA is not ratified, many experts believe trade and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Mexico, in particular, will increase dramatically as the next century approaches. One reason for this increase is that Mexico has already taken major steps to move toward an open economy (Koeppel, 1992). Many duties, taxes and regulations that made doing business with Mexico difficult for U.S. companies in the

past were eliminated when Mexico signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1988.

Another more fundamental reason that relations between the U.S. and Mexico will continue to thrive relates to the political structure of the two countries. Mexico has been engulfed in the wave of democratization that has swept Latin America which, from a social and economic standpoint, is considered no less important then the recent rejection of Communist governments in Eastern Europe (Reed and Burns, 1991).

Hence, if NAFTA is ratified and commercial activity increases, more than just goods and services will flow across the borders between these countries: there will be many cultural exchanges as well. But, because the U.S and Canada already have many shared cultural norms and values, as well as a shared language, the cultural exchanges between Mexico and the other two countries are likely to be disconcerting for citizens of all three countries.

For that reason, it is important for researchers to investigate these economic and cultural exchanges between Mexico and the U.S. with the aim of enhancing their effectiveness and reducing potential misunderstandings. Furthermore, because communication is fundamental to these exchanges, it is important to focus on variables related to the communication process.

Cross cultural researchers have long recognized the need to understand the role of interpersonal communication variables in multi-cultural experiences. For instance, research by McCluskey and Albas (1978) supported the cross-cultural hypothesis that

Mexican children viewed contradictory communication messages more negatively than Canadian children. They speculated that through "socialization and historical twists of fate the Mexican culture, language, or whatever may have become more emotional. . .," and "that (because of a greater sensitivity to verbal and tonal cues) Mexican children may be more aware and more vulnerable to contradictory messages. . .," (1978, p.176).

There is no less need to understand mass communication variables in the cross cultural process as well. This is particularly true in the case of Mexico. Commentators are suggesting, given the current economic and political climate in Mexico, that flourishing Mexican mass media are playing a central role in that country's economic development (Reed and Burns, 1991).

Prior Mexican or Latino mass media-related research that can help current cross-cultural communication researchers understand the dynamics of the Mexican mass communication process seems to cluster into four areas:

1. Research on foreign news--including that from Mexico--in U.S. media. Here, communication researchers like Perry and McNelly (1988) and Stevenson and Smith (1982) examine the coverage of Mexico and other countries in U.S. media, to draw conclusions not only about about the cultural values associated with that coverage, but also about the level of the audiences' knowledge and opinion about the country.

2. Studies of Latinos living in the U.S. and news coverage of these groups in U.S. media. Research in this area often

focuses on individual and interpersonal characteristics. For instance, Jankowski (1992) assesses political attitudes of Latinos living in three U.S. cities, while VanSlyke-Turk (1988) investigates complaints that newspaper reports about Hispanic Americans or Hispanic issues are biased.

3. Studies of Mexican media content and its possible effects on audiences. There have been a variety of investigations on this issue. For example, Osequera (1984) based a research project on the premise that Mexican mass media, particularly television, incorporates much U.S. programming which encourages poorer Mexicans to emigrate (both legally and illegally) to the U.S. Additionally, Montgomery (1983) examined Mexican newspaper editorials and columns, and, contrary to expectations, demonstrated that government policies and political figures were criticized by newspapers of all political persuasions. Further, Adler (1986) found that members of Mexican bureaucratic organizations use mass media content to learn about their organizations because "internal" information sources are limited.

Other studies of this nature have included investigations of the effects of media reporting of earthquakes on the general population (Palacios, 1986) and the portrayal of sex roles in Mexican television advertisements (Gilly, 1988).

4. Research investigating the communication and mass media behavior of special populations--particularly elites--within the Latino audience. Studies which are aimed at certain types of groups have also been prevalent. For example, Tims and Johnson (1984) examined the perceptions and communication behavior of

eight Mexican occupationally defined elite groups, while Dunn (1975) found five clearly identifiable subgroups within a Latino population that could be defined by clusters of social and personal characteristics as well as by media habits and preferences.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

This study builds on research that falls into the last category listed above: an investigation of the media behavior of special segments of the Mexican media audience. It is an exploratory and descriptive study designed to gather data to help communicators (particularly those in advertising, public relations and marketing communications) gain a greater perspective and understanding of the contemporary mass communication environment in Mexico.

While formal advertising, public relations and marketing programs have been established in Latin America for nearly 50 years (Ferber, 1989), the current open economic, political and communications climate that prevails throughout Latin America is responsible for strong growth in these communication areas (Griswold, 1990; Reed and Burns, 1991). This is especially true in Mexico where U.S marketers are currently focusing their attention.

However, these communication activities are not restricted to the private sector organizations. In Mexico, just as in the U.S, there is a need for sophisticated public relations, advertising and marketing programs to assist non-profit public

sector organizations in communicating with target publics.

This is particularly true in the field of education where a combination of governmental and other public sector efforts are underway in Mexico to satisfy the educational needs of this complex country. For instance, Alonso-Concheiro (1990) details "Mexico 2010," and calls it one of the most ambitious 21st century studies undertaken. Here, panels of 600 experts are focusing on Mexico's continuing economic development and the growing demand for formal education by its population.

Geyer (1992) reports that Mexico's major universities have begun to develop innovative programs to establish links with private industry and other world-wide academic institutions to encourage the technological development, research, education and training needed for Mexico to prepare for a competitive future in a global economy.

As in the U.S., an important component of any effort to develop educational programs in Mexico is the information campaign needed to create awareness of the educational opportunities for citizens. This research project, therefore, was designed to assist in the development of just such a campaign.

In September, 1991, a Mid-Western U.S. state university began offering a fully accredited Master's Degree Program in Guadalajara, Mexico. Offered in cooperation with Universidad Autonoma de Guadalajara, the program was designed to provide administrative and business training to individuals pursuing management careers.

Individuals enrolled in the program fit the Tims and Johnson

(1984) description of occupationally defined elite groups. Many of these individuals are executives with Mexican or multi-national firms, government officials or educational leaders. All are bi-lingual (Spanish and English) and many are fluent in three or more languages. In addition to being ideal candidates for this degree program, these individuals are representative of the "ideal consumer" likely to be courted by U.S. and Canadian marketers developing new ventures in Mexico (Baker and Walker, 1991; Perry, 1992).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In an effort to develop an effective information campaign designed to create awareness of this educational opportunity in Guadalajara, an investigation of the mass media behavior of this special population was undertaken in early 1993. Specifically, investigators were seeking answers to the following sets of research questions:

1. <u>Which mass media do members of this special population use and how much time do they spend with each?</u> In order to develop an information campaign tailored to this population, it is important to know which magazines, newspapers, radio and TV stations these individuals prefer and how much time they spend with each.

2. <u>Which English language media do they use and how much time do they spend with each?</u> This information is useful for two reasons. First, because courses in the U.S. Master's Degree Program are offered in English, it is important to target

messages promoting the program to English speaking Mexicans.
Second, from a broader perspective, researchers are interested in
the pervasiveness of English language media in this region of
Mexico.

3. Do members of this special population receive direct
marketing materials and do they consider these materials
effective? As Woods (1993) reports, international direct
marketing is gaining in significance because both large and small
organizations are using this communication technique to establish
a competitive edge in the global marketplace. In Mexico,
implementing a direct marketing campaign is not easy because most
such campaigns rely heavily on direct mail, and the Mexican
postal system is woefully inadequate. However, because of the
importance of direct marketing in information campaigns, it was
deemed important to investigate its possible use among this
special population.

4. How did members of this special population first learn of
the educational program and what do they think is the best way to
communicate with others like them? Here, researchers were hoping
to gain insight from an analysis of the promotional efforts that
resulted in enrolling the current students in the program.
Briefly, previous efforts to inform potential students about this
program can be characterized as "interpersonally rich" and "media
poor." That is, there was heavy reliance on personal contacts and
minimal placement of advertisements and other messages in local
mass media.

An additional goal of the researchers was to evaluate

systematically the opinions of current students regarding the best way to inform others about the educational program.

METHODOLOGY

To gather the data needed to answer the research questions, a brief questionnaire was developed and administered to 58 Mexican students enrolled in the Guadalajara Master's Degree Program. (A brief description of the sample is presented later.) The questionnaire was administered in Guadalajara during January and February, 1993, and data analysis was completed in March, 1993.

To collect data on print media use, respondents were asked how much time they spend reading newspapers and magazines each day. They were asked to list what newspaper and magazine they read most often, as well as to list what other newspapers and magazines they read on occasion.

To gather data on electronic media use, respondents were asked how much time they spend listening to the radio and watching TV each day. As with print media, respondents were asked to list the radio and TV station they listen/watch most often and what other stations they use on occasion.

As for English language media, respondents were asked to list the media (both print and broadcast) they use most frequently.

Respondents were also asked if they currently receive direct marketing advertisements and/or announcements in the mail at home and at work. Further, they were asked if they believe this was an

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"effective" way to communicate with persons like them.

Finally, respondents were asked two "open-ended" questions. First, they were asked to describe how they initially learned about this educational opportunity in Guadalajara. Second, they were asked to describe what, in their opinion, is the best way to inform others like themselves about the program. For the most part, these current students provided "short answer" responses to these questions which facilitated coding and evaluation.

As noted earlier, the 58 respondents may be considered social, cultural and economic elites of Mexico. A description of the sample is presented below.

DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE

Characteristics	Range	Mean	NCases
Age	22-54 Years	33 Years	58

	%Frequency	NCases
Gender		
Male	84	48
Female	16	10
Occupation		
Engineering	32	18
Administration	30	17
Manufacturing/ Production	17	11
Accounting	14	8
Teachers/Counselors	7	4
Education		
Undergraduate Degree	100	58
Graduate Degree	12	7
Other	9	5
Major		
Engineering	51	29
Business Administration	35	20
Other	14	9

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In general, they hold diverse managerial positions in a variety of organizations. Thirty-two percent of the respondents occupy engineering based positions, 30% are general administrators, 17% work in manufacturing, production, information systems or sales, and 14% are accountants. The remaining 7% are teachers, counselors or language specialists.

While the 58 respondents work for 28 different organizations, 70% work for organizations that can be classified as manufacturing, 18% are employed by service organizations (such as universities or hospitals) and 12% work for banks or financial institutions.

Approximately 84% of the respondents are male. Ages range from 22-54 years with an average age of 33. All respondents have undergraduate degrees (with representation from 18 different undergraduate institutions) and 12% have a graduate degree. Approximately 9% of respondents have obtained some additional graduate or professional education. With respect to major field of study, 51% specialized in engineering, 35% in business administration and the remaining 14% specialized in various areas such as communications, law and languages.

It should be noted that the researchers acknowledge that these respondents comprise a purposive, rather than random, sample of this special population. Therefore, caution should be exercised when generalizing the results.

RESULTS

MASS MEDIA USAGE

Data needed to answer the first set of research questions regarding media use are reported below. Whenever possible the names of Guadalajaran and Mexican media are reported in an effort to inform others fully of the current media situation in this section of Mexico. Responses to questions of a quantitative nature which reflect print media and broadcast media usage are summarized as follows:

MASS MEDIA USAGE

Media	Range of Time	Average Time	Number of Options
Print Media			
Magazines	0-120 Minutes	36 Minutes	39
Newspapers	0-90 Minutes	31 Minutes	17
Broadcast Media			
Radio	0-All Day	79.5 Minutes	12
TV	0-4 Hours	61.5 Minutes	14

Print Media

Members of this special population report reading magazines an average of 36 minutes per day with a range of 0 to 120 minutes. When asked which magazines they most frequently read, respondents listed 39 different publications.

Thirteen of these are English language publications that can be loosely classified as consumer or general interest magazines. Examples include Time, Newsweek, New Yorker, and Forbes. Eleven are English language special interest magazines such as PC Magazine, Byte, and Production Inventory Management.

Six are Spanish language consumer or general interest publications like Hola and Muy Interesante. Nine are Spanish

language special interest publications like <u>Business Mexico</u>.

Respondents listed 42 additional magazines when asked what other magazines they read on occasion. Nineteen of these are English language consumer magazines such as <u>Reader's Digest</u>, <u>National Geographic</u>, <u>Omni</u> and <u>People</u>. Eight are English language special interest magazines such as <u>The Journal of Metals</u>, <u>Harvard Business Review</u> and <u>New England Journal of Medicine</u>.

Nine are Spanish language special interest magazines such as <u>Epoca</u> and <u>Impacto</u>. Six are Spanish language special interest magazines such as the official publication of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico and the magazine of the Mexican National Council of the Construction Industry.

Overall, the most frequently cited magazines read by all respondents were <u>Time</u> and <u>Newsweek</u>.

Respondents read a newspaper an average of 31 minutes per day with a range of 0 to 90 minutes per day. Seventeen different newspapers were cited as being the most frequently read. Four of these are English language papers such as <u>The New York Times</u> and <u>The Wall Street Journal</u>. Eleven of these newspapers are Spanish language local and national general interest newspapers such as <u>Informador</u> and <u>Ocho Columnas</u>. Two of the most frequently read newspapers are special interest publications like <u>El Financero</u>.

Seven additional newspapers were listed by respondents as being read on occasion. Five of these are English language papers (four from specific cities in the U.S.--<u>Los Angeles Times</u>, Miami <u>Herald</u>, San Francisco <u>Chronicle</u>--and <u>USA TODAY</u>).

The most frequently read newspapers by respondents were <u>El</u>

Informador (a local Guadalajaran newspaper) and El Financero (a business newspaper that circulates nationally, much like the Wall Street Journal).

Broadcast Media

These Guadalajara residents listen to the radio an average of 79.5 minutes per day. The range was 0 minutes to "all day." Twelve different radio stations were listed as being listened to most frequently. All but one are FM stations and one is an English language station that carries National Public Radio programming from the U.S. Seven additional stations were listed as listened to on occasion. None of these is an English language station.

Not surprisingly, for respondents of this age and socio-economic status, the most popular radio station was "Stereo Rey" which has a contemporary format and plays current hits by both U.S. and Mexican artists.

The respondents report watching television, on average, for just over an hour (61.5 minutes). The range of TV viewing is 0 to 4 hours per day. Interestingly, these media consumers spend a lot of time viewing U.S. television programming. They watch broadcast/cable/satellite channels that carry HBO, Showtime, CNN, Cinemax, the Disney Channel and ESPN. However, the most frequently watched channel/station (out of 14 different options) was Televisa (Channel 2), a local Guadalajaran station.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE MEDIA USAGE

An analysis of data regarding the second research question, use of English language media, is summarized below.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE MEDIA USAGE

Media	%Frequency
Magazines	41
TV	30
Newspapers	13
Manuals	10
Electronic Mail	4
Radio	3

In particular, magazines are the most frequently used medium, accounting for 41% of the media listed. Television programming (including movie channels) accounted for 30%, newspapers accounted for 13%, and journals/technical manuals accounted for 10% of the English language media used by these individuals. Interestingly, 4% of the citations referred to English language electronic mail and computer system messages that respondents receive each day. Also, radio accounted for only 3% of English language media use.

DIRECT MAIL USAGE

As indicated earlier, one of the goals of this research project was to obtain a sense of the direct marketing effort in Guadalajara. As exhibited below, the data show that 73% of respondents receive direct mail materials at home and 70% receive these materials at work. As for perceived effectiveness, 62% believe direct marketing material sent to the home is effective and 66% believe the same type of material sent to the workplace is effective.

DIRECT MAIL USAGE

Location Received	%Frequency	%Perceived Effectiveness
Work	70	66
Home	73	62

KNOWLEDGE OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND MEDIA SOURCES

The respondents' answers to open-ended questions regarding their personal experiences with prior promotional efforts relating to the program and their opinions on how best to communicate with others, which was the last research question posed, were coded and analyzed as well, as shown below.

KNOWLEDGE OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES: MEDIA SOURCES

Source	%Frequency	Source	%Perceived Effectiveness
Co-Workers	40	Mass Media	39
Program Rep-		Interpersonal	36
resentatives	10	Direct Mail	26
HRM	8		
University/			
Chamber Rep-			
resentatives	29		
Mass Media	13		

Data indicate that 58% of these current program participants first learned about this educational opportunity from an interpersonal communication source (40% cited a friend or co-worker; 10% mentioned the U.S. program representative; and 8% identified their Human Resource Department manager). Twenty-nine percent of respondents first learned about this program through institutional sources, including the local university and the American Chamber of Commerce in Guadalajara. Only 13% of these respondents first learned of this program through the mass media.

As for respondents' opinions on the best way to inform their peers in Guadalajara about this program, 39% believe a mass media campaign (using newspapers, magazines, radio and TV, in

that order) would be the most effective. Thirty-six percent believe interpersonal communication methods are the most effective. These methods, in order of preference, include personal visits/presentations at the workplace and personal visits/presentations in other institutional settings, such as universities and civic organizations. Twenty-six percent believe a form of direct marketing would be the most effective. Here, they suggest either sending material directly to individuals at work/home or sending information to companies or associations for further distribution.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of this descriptive study which have both theoretical and practical implications.

First, it is clear that there is heavy consumption of English language mass media by members of this Mexican subgroup. Given that members of this group must be bilingual in order to enroll in the U.S. Master's Degree Program, this finding may not be surprising. However, to a large extent, the heavy English language media use by this subgroup may be a function of their occupational and social status in that they need the information contained in these media to carry out their functions in the workplace. Certainly this would seem to be true for much of the English language print media members of this group report using. Many of the newspapers and magazines these individuals read are specialized in nature and meet a "service journalism" need for

these persons (Culbertson, H.M., Jeffers, D.W., Stone, D.B. and Terrill, M., 1993).

However, even media used primarily for entertainment purposes may serve other functions for members of this subgroup. For instance, watching U.S. television programming and movies not only provides entertainment, but also helps to enhance English proficiency. With English being the international language of business, good English language skills enhance an individual's opportunities in a global economy.

The above analysis is consistent with Grunig and Hunt's theory of information processing which suggests that much communication behavior is purposive, rather than random, and is designed to be "problem solving" in nature. That is, audience members seek information that they believe will provide solutions to perceived problems (Grunig and Hunt, 1984). In this case, the problem may be locating a bit of technical information that is only found in an English language journal or learning how to incorporate current U.S. slang expressions into everyday speech in order to converse freely with colleagues and co-workers.

From a practical standpoint, the results of this study suggest that those wishing to communicate with members of this target market on a national level throughout Mexico should consider placing messages in the Mexican/Latin American editions of major U.S. magazines. However, on a local level, communicators can just as effectively reach members of this population through selected Spanish language newspapers. In the case of Guadalajara, this would be El Informador and El Financero.

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The second major conclusion that can be drawn from the results of this study is that communicators wishing to develop information campaigns aimed at this target population should consider incorporating a direct marketing/mail component. Those who have worked in Mexico know that this is easier said than done. Even in Guadalajara (the country's second largest city) the postal service is extremely inefficient. Yet, a high percentage of respondents report receiving direct mail messages both at home and work and consider them to be effective.

It may be that public relations, advertising and marketing communication experts will need to be innovative in their approach to using this communication technique. For instance, many members of this special population are accessible by fax machine. In addition, perhaps because of their engineering and technological occupations, many of the respondents in this study communicate via "E-Mail" and other computer based means.

A third conclusion is that, just as in the U.S., when promoting this kind of "product" (one that has high involvement, is complex and expensive) it is best to design an information campaign that relies on the mass media and direct marketing/mail to create awareness, but utilizes interpersonal channels to follow-up and persuade persons to adopt specific behaviors.

In this case, based on the analysis of data collected from current participants in the educational program, an effective information campaign would utilize Guadalajaran newspapers and direct mail pieces sent to home and work of prospective students to create awareness of this educational opportunity. This initial

effort at creating awareness would be followed-up by personal visits and presentations to prospective students by representatives from the program.

At first glance, it may seem that all U.S. public relations, advertising and marketing communications specialists need to do is shift their normal procedures south. Those experienced with working in Mexico know that isn't sufficient. Just as Culbertson, Jeffers, Stone and Terrill (1993) suggest, communicators will need to be sensitive to the social, political and economic contexts in which information campaigns are developed. If the results of studies such as these are shared with U.S. public relations, advertising and marketing communication experts, these cross-cultural sensitivities (not unlike those encountered by early Phoenicians and Egyptians) should be facilitated.

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Journalism Frustration: Caught Between the Two Masters

-- A Study of Critical Reporting in China

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Journalism Frustration: Caught Between Two Masters

Introduction

Every social institution needs some sort of mechanism to monitor its function and check its deviance. In the United States, it is the three separate and independent branches of government, the judicial, the legislative, and the executive, with the fourth estate, the media, watching over the three that keep democracy working. While it is not flawless, it at least does not allow absolute power.

In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the leading party and the National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest power of the state. The current political system does not separate the party from the government. In fact, the government is under the leadership of the party. Although, according to the Chinese Constitution, all power in China belongs to the Chinese people because they are the masters of the country, as China adopts a representative system whereby representatives of the people manage national affairs, ordinary citizens do not directly participate in decision making.

The political system by which China operates has few checks on the power of the party and government officials, and the nascent legal system is still applied largely on the basis of personal connections. The media are thus of crucial importance. They are expected to serve as a check on the government, keeping it clean and honest, to enhance democracy and achieve societal betterment by informing the public, stimulating the citizenry's political interest, rallying public opinion, and exerting a compelling force for social change.

While the public expects the media to act as a watchdog for them, the media may not be able to live up to those expectations. For one thing, Chinese media are not politically independent or neutral, but rather are political instruments. The media's social-control function in China is institutionally assigned under the leadership and supervision of the Communist Party because, in China, the press is first of all the mouthpiece of the party (Hu, Y. 1985). There is a

serious flaw in this kind of social control, however. Being restricted ideologically and structurally means that there can be no spontaneous discussion and criticism of crucial issues.

On the other hand, media criticism is indispensable to the Chinese Communist Party's prestige and China's struggle against corruption and bureaucracy. The reputation of the party and the public's support for the party depend on an open press, and the press must take the watchdog concept seriously, making careful investigations and revealing abuses of power to the public.

Given the situation, how much criticism is allowed in the media? What kind of criticism is allowed? Who are the targets of media criticism? Is media criticism of any effect? These questions are what we attempt to answer in this study.

Critical reporting, better known as investigative reporting in the United States, is reporting on political corruption, government inefficiency, or corporate abuses. This reportorial school combines strong social criticism with in-depth reporting. The classical examples are Seymour Hersh's revelations about My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's uncovering of the Watergate scandal in 1972-1974.

Investigative reporting is a grand tradition in American journalism. The modern-day version grew out of the "muckraking" reporting produced at the beginning of the 20th century. Today's investigative journalism is developed from the social responsibility theory of the press (Siebert, et al. 1956). The "socially responsible" press is committed to pursuing public enlightenment and to upholding standards of civic morality. The assumption that media supervision works for the social benefits lies in the belief that when the media exposes the wrongdoing of government officials, it exerts pressure on them and forces them to change. The press's duty is not just to its readers but also to the community and society as a whole.

The idea of the watchdog press receives considerable support from both working journalists and the general public. Surveys of news organizations in America show a strong belief in the need for journalistic exposes. The report

(Times Mirror, 1989) based on the 1989 survey findings reached this conclusion:

> There is ... a general consensus among the press, the public, and American leadership that news organizations play an important "watchdog" role, with large majorities of all groups sampled believing that press coverage of personal and ethical behavior of politicians helps weed out the kind of people who should not be in office.

In China there are not many systematic public opinion surveys on media functions. The one which is available is a survey of elites in the political and scientific circles in Beijing conducted by the Chinese People's University Research Institute on Public Opinions in 1988 (Yu, G. & Liu, X. 1989). The survey shows that 92% think there is too little of audience voice reflected in the media; 87% consider the degree of openness in reporting on government's affairs and decision making is not high; 77% think Chinese news media only propagandize and implement party's and government's policies, but never comment on pros and cons of these policies; 75.0% think Chinese news media have not voluntarily and actively criticize and supervise the leadership and work performance of the party and the government.

Important as media criticism is, this mechanism has not received enough research attention. Inkeles and Geiger (1952; 1953) were perhaps the first to study it through content analysis of letters to the editor in Russian newspapers. Other studies (Inkeles, 1962; Yu, F. 1964; Solomon, 1967; Hopkins, 1970; Hollander, 1972; & Chu & Chu, 1981) on mass media in the Soviet Union and China have also discussed it, but the general focus has been on letter contents, structures, and the manifest or latent functions of this mechanism as in the form of letters to the editor.

Research Method and Findings

The analysis so far leads to a modest theory of press criticism under the existing structures of CCP influence and authority. Criticism will be deflected away from the more powerful, the more specific, and the more personal toward targets less likely to give offense or lead to retaliation. Major incidents that might be construed to reflect unfavorably on the party or the government will be followed by a diminution of press criticism. From the perspective of the media,

this will be prudent behavior to avert crackdowns. From the perspective of the party and the government, this would avert furthering public alarm or harm abroad to their repute.

The Tiananmen Incident provides an opportunity to examine the current dynamics of press criticism. The incident lasted for about 50 days from April 15, 1989, when the death of Hu Yaobang triggered student demonstrations, to June 4, 1989, when troops took over the square. It satisfies the criterion of a major incident that would be expected to affect press criticism. Furthermore, the liberalizing atmosphere of the period preceding the incident provides a test of the supposition that in such periods press criticism increases.

The CCP, theoretically, has always promoted the watchdog function of the media in China. The most recent instruction from the top party officials was from Zhao Ziyang, then the general party secretary on the party's thirteenth congress in October 1987. Zhao insisted on the "supervisory" function of the press over the party, the government, and public officials. Despite the constant instructions from the party and strong support from the public for the media's role in keeping the party and government checked, the amount, latitude, and depth of criticism allowed to be published in the press are limited and subject to the political climate. We hypothesize, therefore, the following:

Hypothesis #1: There is more positive reporting than critical reporting at any given time.

Hypothesis #2: When critical reporting does get into the press, there is more press criticism of non-officials than that of party or government officials.

Hypothesis #3: There is more press criticism of lower-level officials than of high-level officials.[1]

Hypothesis #4: There is more press criticism of units[2] than that of individuals.

Hypothesis #5: There is more press criticism of instances with targets' names unidentified than with targets' names identified.

Hypothesis #6: There is more press criticism prior to the Tiananmen Incident than after the Tiananmen Incident.

This study considers press criticism published in *People's Daily* from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1990. The choice of *People's Daily* is based on its long-standing authority and wide circulation. Its editorials and commentaries

are often relayed by Xinhua, China's official news agency, radio stations, television stations, and local newspapers. The basis for selecting this particular period is that economic reform had entered its ninth year in 1988 with considerable success, whereas political reform was yet to come. Beginning in the spring of 1988, discussion of political reform started to appear in small circles among elite intellectuals and reformers. Press freedom, once a taboo topic, became widely discussed among intellectuals. Everything went well until the June 4, 1989 crackdown on the student movement. A study of the *People's Daily* during this changing period would help to demonstrate how the Chinese media experienced the changes of this historical period.

In this study, press criticism is defined as critical items published in the *People's Daily* that reveal instances of legal or moral transgressions by either public officials or private citizens. The critical items can take the form of letters to the editor written by readers or journalists, news reports, investigative reports, or commentaries as long as they are of critical nature. Excluded are editorials, theoretical or analytical articles, resolutions, circulars, announcements, and speeches or reports by party or government officials. These are, in a strict sense, not news reports and are often very opinionated. If an article criticizes more than one offence, the major one will be taken into account.

In order to get a precise picture of news reporting by the *People's Daily*, we conducted a census study instead of taking a sample. We literally scrutinized each critical item, be it of one sentence or several paragraphs.

For each critical item, a series of questions was posed: What is the content of the criticism? Who or what is the target of the criticism? If the target is a person, is he/she a CCP member, a party or government official? If so, what rank? Are names identified? What is the punishment, if there is any? When is the criticism published? On which page does it appear? What is the source?

Press criticism is coded into the following categories:

(1) *Corruption* (Officials)

-- Taking advantage of one's position for personal gains, using public funds for banquets or gift-giving, for building houses for oneself, dependents, or relatives; living lavishly on public money; squander of state money; indulgence in extravagance and waste; asking for and accepting bribes; graft; embezzlement; and nepotism.

(2) *Economic Crimes* (Non-officials)

-- Asking for and accepting bribes; graft; embezzlement; misappropriation of public funds; illegal profiteering; tax evasion, improper distribution of premiums or products.

(3) *Bureaucratic Maladministration*

-- Dereliction of duty; negligence; inefficiency; shirking responsibility and shifting blame onto others; incompetence; excessive conferences and meetings; empty talk with no action; numerous inspection delegations.

(4) *Policy*

-- Problems derived from inappropriate, incomplete, ineffective, conflicting, rigid or outdated policies, rules, and regulations.

(5) *Legal*

-- Infringing on citizen's rights; creating cases against innocent people; illegally arresting, detaining or beating people; protecting and covering up criminals, corrupt officials, dependents, or relatives; retaliating; abusing parents, women, or children.

(6) *Violation of Consumers' Rights and Interests*

-- Selling of spoiled, rotten food or faked goods; illegally increasing prices; arbitrary charging,[3] arbitrary fines,[4] and arbitrary levying;[5] forcing customers to buy things they do not want; poor product quality; nasty service.

(7) *Selfish Deeds* (Non-officials)

-- Stealing; pilfering; taking public properties, facilities, goods as one's own; taking advantage of one's working position for personal benefits.

(8) *Public Welfare*

-- Insufficient, deteriorating infrastructure and public facilities including transportation facilities, such as damaged roads or bridges, crowded buses, trains or ferryboats, libraries resources, research equipment, and public security.

(9) *Environment*

-- Polluting the environment, destroying forestry, hunting endangered species, destroying traditional and historical buildings, etc.

(10) *Bad Social Customs*

-- Practicing superstition; gambling; asking for and accepting excessive gifts for marriages, funerals, or other special occasions; spending extravagantly on those special occasions when one cannot afford to.

(11) *Ethics*[6]

-- Cheating, fraud, making exaggerated or fabricated reports to get an award,

funding, or other benefits; unwilling to help the old, the sick, or the weak.

(12) *Discrimination*

-- Discriminating against peasants, elementary school teachers, army soldiers, women, sanitary workers, or self-employed, small private business owners.

Findings

First, we identified the number of critical items appearing in the *People's Daily* during the designated period. The findings are presented in Tables 1 and 2. We find 1988 carried 1,052 critical items, 1989 carried 787 critical items, and 1990 carried 260 critical items.

The total number of news items published in a year (41,336) is obtained from a sample of a composite week which consists of consecutively one day from Monday through Sunday. They are randomly selected from each of the three years respectively.

Tables 1 and 2 support our hypothesis number 1 which says, "At any given time, there is more positive reporting than critical reporting." Hu Yaobang, the former general party secretary, specified in 1985 that the amount of critical reporting or "negative reporting" should not be allowed to exceed 20 percent of the day's reporting. Table 2 indicates that the percentage of critical reporting in daily news is, in fact, much smaller than allowed, 2.54 percent for 1988, 1.91 percent for 1989, and 0.63 percent for 1990.

It would be even more telling if we know that it is actually easier for national newspapers like *People's Daily* to conduct critical reporting than it is for provincial or local media to engage in such practice, because loca. publishers, directors, and editors-in-chief are all appointed by local authorities. Newspapers cannot comment on or challenge party and government leaders and their leadership at and above the papers' corresponding level. Therefore, if misconduct is found at the county level, only municipal or higher papers can disclose it; if misconduct is found at the municipal level, only provincial or national papers can reveal it. As Zhang Yong (1988) wrote in the *News Front* journal, the story that an official of Xiangyang prefectual party committee, Hubei Province, took more houses than he was entitled to was first

exposed by the *Economic Daily*, a national newspaper, and later was relayed by *Hubei Daily*. The scandal that the former vice-secretary of Taiyuan municipal party committee covered up his criminal son was first disclosed by the *People's Daily*. No local or provincial paper dare to touch the "tiger's butt" until a higher-level medium brings it to light.

Hypothesis number 2 says when critical reporting does get into the press, there is more press criticism of non-officials than that of party or government officials. Our study shows that of all the criticism articles published, only 331 articles (15.77%) were critical of officials, whereas 763 articles (36.35%) were critical of non-officials (See Table 3).

It is not easy for the media to muckrake evils, especially when high ranking officials are involved. *Pai cangyin, bu da laohu* "swat flies, but don't beat tigers" is the usual practice. The research findings show that press criticism of lower-level officials exceeds that of high-level officials. Table 4 indicates that of the 331 criticism articles of officials, 235 (11.20%) are of lower-level officials, and 96 (4.57%) are of high-level officials, although in 1990, there were more criticism articles of high-level officials than lower-level officials. A careful study of the critical articles published in 1990 revealed that the stories were simply too big to hide.

In the cases of institutions and individuals, we find more criticism of institutions (847, 40.35%) than that of individuals (534, 25.87%) (See Table 5). This is not surprising because it is always easier to criticize institutions collectively than persons individually.

Furthermore, when criticism is published, names of the targets are oftentimes omitted. Table 6 indicates there is more criticism with targets' names unidentified (1,276, 60.79%) than with names identified (823, 39.21%). Among those with names identified, 491 (23.39%) were institutions' names and 332 (15.82%) were individuals' names (See Tables 6 and 7).

In terms of page arrangement, we find that most of the criticism articles in 1988 appeared on page five where the Letter-from-the-Reader Column was. In 1989 and 1990, most of the criticism articles appeared either on page five or

page six due to the change of pages for the Letter-from-the-Reader Column from page five to page six on February 20, 1989, and then on July 1, 1990 this column changed back to page five. The second highest page for press criticism is page two where domestic economic news appeared before the change and domestic news appeared after the change (see Table 8).

With regard to sources, we find that the highest number of criticism articles came from letters written by readers which accounts for 62.79 percent (1318) (see Table 9). Those published letters from readers usually range from one-sentence to a few sentences. The main reason for this heavy concentration of source is that it is difficult for journalists to engage in critical reporting in China. There are constrains and obstacles in the way. To solve the problem and to accomplish the press role as a watchdog for the public without annoying the authorities too much, a clever way is to publish letters from readers. In China, each mass medium receives a large number of letters from readers, listeners, and viewers every day, and People's Daily receives about 1,000 such letters a day. The majority of those letters is of critical nature.

In this study, we also hypothesize that reform in China made the media increasingly more open and outspoken until the Tiananmen Incident. The liberalizing atmosphere preceding the incident and the tightening up after the crackdown provide an opportunity to examine the impact of the Tiananmen Incident on press criticism.

Our findings show that the difference between the means of critical items before the Tiananmen Incident (January 1988 to June 1989) and after the Tiananmen Incident (July 1989 to December 1990) is significant at $p< .05$ level by two-tailed t-test (See Table 10). This finding supports hypothesis number 6 which predicts that loosened political control permitted an open coverage of news and tightened political control discouraged a liberal approach to news coverage.

The Chinese Communist Party, as other political parties elsewhere, is very concerned about its public image and the amount of criticism allowed to be released by the press directly reflects its confidence level about itself and the situation in the country. When the party is confident about itself and the

situation in the country, the political control would be loosened, and as a result, media would become more open and more criticism would get into the press; when the party is not that confident about itself or about the situation in the country, the political control would be tightened and less criticism would be allowed. This is exactly what we find in our study.

With regard to the content of press criticism, we find the highest single category of criticism to be corruption for 1988 and 1989. For 1990, however, it is the selfish deeds which rank number one (See Table 11). The data may suggest that (1) corruption was indeed serious and rampant in 1988 and 1989, but it was curbed in 1990, or (2) there was no change in the occurrences of corruption, but a change in the political climate. Further study (a separate one) shows that the latter is the case.

Discussion

Our research findings indicate that critical reporting in China is limited: Of all the daily reporting, critical reporting on average only accounts for 2.54 percent in 1988, 1.90 percent in 1989, and 0.63 percent in 1990. We will examine the reasons behind this.

The Approval System

Administratively, there exists an approval system for gathering and publishing criticism articles. Although the approval system differs from place to place, in general, it includes the following aspects. First, permission is needed from higher officials in one's work place to gather information. Secondly, manuscripts exposing wrongdoing of officials at and above bureau level have to be approved by higher officials. Thirdly, manuscripts of criticism letters and articles have to be submitted to relevant departments at a higher level for examination and approval. Finally, criticism letters to the editor have to be double checked by both the editor and the corresponding officials before publishing. Therefore, editors have to pass through a succession of "red lights" before they can publish any criticism articles (Jia, 1989; Liu, B. 1988; Personal interview[7]).

It is important to note that the above rules are not spelled out in any concrete terms but are nevertheless understood and strictly observed by reporters and editors. In addition, the approval system is not meant to just check the facts (which is very necessary, of course), but also to see if the problems revealed are too sensitive and thus inappropriate for publication.

Two journalists in Xinjiang once wrote a report exposing an inspection team from Xinjiang Autonomous Region throwing lavish banquets wherever the team went. The report was checked several times and every detail was true. However, the local party committee did not approve it for publication because the article was critical of the highest authorities in the region. The report was killed as a result (*Boertala Daily*, 1988).

According to a national newspaper, the percentage of critical reporting that failed to pass censorship has risen from 70 percent to 90 percent in the last few years of 1980s. In addition, many criticism reports have been changed, modified, or watered down and crucial parts have been deleted (Jia, 1989). The amount of time involved to obtain an approval is also extensive. A depute editor of an influential southern newspaper said it took him three months to win a party approval to print a story critical of local police (Schweisberg, 1988). For investigative reporting, cooperation from relevant parties is even harder to obtain, and retaliation is not uncommon once a source is revealed (Ha, & Wang, T. 1989).

Zhao Chaogou, editor-in-chief of *Xinmin Evening News*, the most popular evening newspaper in China, complained during a panel discussion that journalists writing about scandals had to go through too many formalities (1980). He explained that because they had to get an advance approval from party committees for such reporting their articles usually "get watered down."

The problem of approval system rests on the structure of the broad system. Since there is no independent news medium in China, all news media are essentially organs of the party and the government. As the news media are under the leadership of the party and the party has absolute power, it is politically inappropriate to criticize the leaders. According to this reasoning, a newspaper

cannot criticize the party committee at or above its level because the committee at the same level is always the direct boss of that newspaper. The committee above the news medium is even more distant from criticism because it represents even higher authority. A newspaper can only criticize those below it.

Pressures from all Directions

In addition to the approval system, there are pressures from all directions on journalists who engage in critical reporting: pressures from those who are being criticized; from the leaders of those criticized; from authorities of the medium who do not want to invite trouble to their paper; from colleagues who do not want any inconvenience the critical reporting may cause for them; and from families and friends who are afraid of consequences.

First of all, reporters are often pressured by the people they have exposed after the cases have been made public. Once criticized, the targets of criticism will get furious and vehemently deny the accusation. Some will try to strike back in any way possible to ruin the journalist's reputation and estrange his editors.

Wei Jianye (1989), a high school teacher, concerned about the fact that there was no toilet in the entire school of several hundred students,[8] wrote an article together with another writer and asked for help. The article was published in the provincial paper and reprinted in a national paper. The school leaders, and in particular, county authorities were greatly angered by Wei's dislovalty. Wei was isolated, scolded, harassed, and threatened by anonymous letters. Although Wei was simply telling the true, he was considered throwing mud on the officials' face.

In an electricity company in Hebei Province, nine cadres and workers together wrcte a letter to the *People's Daily*, uncovering how the officials in the company abused the power for their own benefit. On the following day after the letter was printed, one of the criticized officials rushed into an office and grabbed Liang Guocai, one of the writers, by his neck and called his names; another criticized official broke into the room and scolded and rebuked Liang and another person who provided information (Wang, Y. 1988).

In Hunan, a reporter from the local television station tried to investigate

charges that the local commerce bureau was unfairly interfering with a private businessman, claiming that his new wealth was based on "smuggling." The journalist was convinced that this was a typical case of leftist ideology clashing with the reforms. Although the commerce bureau leaders refused to talk to him, the journalist persisted. In response, the bureau proceeded to send someone to tail him. He also received threatening telephone calls and letters (Shapiro, & Liang, 1986).

Wang Jianming and Zhao Jian (1989), two reporters from *Shanxi Daily* wrote a report on the two production lines imported from Japan by Jinyang Zhenzhi Factory. The story was to be in the press on December 30, 1988. But on the day before the scheduled date for publication, the leader from the Provincial Textile Bureau pressured the editor-in-chief of *Shanxi Daily* and finally made a deal with him. As a result, the story was killed.

In addition to pressures from those being criticized, there is also pressure from above. Many department leaders and cadres cannot tolerate even moderate criticism from the media and would go extremes to prevent the publication of an article which, in fact, may simply narrate a scandal which has for long been the talk of the community.

Although resistance to criticism is expected in any bureaucracy, the magnitude in China is impressive. One official was quoted saying: "What do you think we feed you journalists for? To throw mud at us?" (Roche, 1989). Some leaders of Wuwei City, Gansu Province, northwest of China, even ordered a confiscation of copies of an edition of the *Wuwei Journal* that carried articles critical of them (Jia, 1989).

Retaliation

It is not only difficult to have critical reporting published; those under fire are also quick to retaliate. Cases of verbal abuse, physical abuse, and mental abuse were not isolated. Reduction in pay, demotion in position, and self-criticism were also common.

Wang Yingxiu, a worker and a correspondent of a newspaper, wrote several articles disclosing local corruption (*Chinese Youth News*, 1989, January 7). One

article revealed that the county bank director loaned the relief fund (300,000 yuan) to his relatives, friends, and "connections," none of whom qualified for relief fund. The letter was checked and approved and then published on *Gansu Daily*, October 8, 1985. Wang did not use his real name but used a pen name. The county authorities launched an investigation to find out who this "Wu Chang" was. When Wang was suspected to be the writer, he was named and criticized on a county-wide cadres' conference. In February 1987, Wang wrote another article revealing how the county electricity department controlled electricity for its own benefit and cut electricity for public use at will. After checking that everything was true, the article was published on *China Hydro-Electra News*, a national newspaper, with editor's note highlighting the article. The county Hydro-Electra Bureau, however, ordered to confiscate all the copies of that edition within the county. No one was allowed to read it. September 23, 1987's *Peasants' Daily* carried another of Wang's articles on its front page, revealing the racketeering tricks of selling and reselling 500 tons of chemical fertilizer by some county officials. Wang was rewarded for his critical article by having several months of his pay checks kept on hold.

If Wang Yingxiu's experience was incredible, Wang Junfeng's is even more shocking. As a policeman in Wuhu City, Anhui Province, Wang loves drawing after work. Once he drew a cartoon depicting how power could bring extra apartments to the family members. This piece was by no means Wang's best cartoon, but it offended some authorities (Ha, & Wang, T. 1989). Within a few days after the publication, department leaders and brigade leaders came to ask Wang who gave him the right to draw this cartoon, what his motivation was, and why he drew bureau director Yang as his target. (Of course Wang did not draw Yang, his supreme authority. The cartoon was only a generic criticism of corruption.) However, the officials there insisted that they were the targets. This is what we say in China *zuo zei xin xu*, meaning "thieves have a guilty conscience." Later it became known that the officials were actually fighting for apartments among themselves when the cartoon was published. It was only Wang Junfeng's bad luck, because he had no idea what was going on since he was just a traffic policeman.

The cartoon was published in April 1985. Later that year, Wang was denied an opportunity to study art part-time at Anhui Teachers College. After Wang passed the entrance exam and was admitted to the program, the leaders said no. His work hours were changed or extended arbitrarily by the leaders. His pay was reduced and position bonus was suspended. In April 1986, Wang helped find a lost bicycle for a worker. To show his gratitude, the worker wrote a "compliment letter" and brought it to the police office. The answer he received was "There is no such person here." Then came an insulting nickname for Wang "mentally disordered" which was spread not only in his brigade but also to the entire public security circle in the city.

Wang could no longer live under ridicule, insult, and abuse, so he tried to seek help from higher authorities, only to be treated worse. On April 12, 1987, Wang was seriously beaten when he was trying to report what had happened to him to a higher official. Several police came under the order of this higher official to beat Wang. He was lying on the ground, bleeding and unconscious when the police left. On January 4, 1988 when the Tenth People's Congress of Wuhu City was in session, Wang went to hand deliver his appeal. He was dragged out and his police cap was hit off his head. What happened to Wang later was not clear, but what has happened to him was outrageous and unlawful enough.

The *People's Daily* (1980) reported that Ye Ruiyu, the deputy party secretary of Wenzhou City, took revenge on those who criticized him. Zhang Chengfu and Pan Baolu, the two commune cadres, wrote a letter to Tie Ying, the provincial first party secretary of Zhejiang, to express their concerns over Ye's inappropriate handling of cadres. Zhang and Pan asked a friend of theirs, Wang Aisheng, to hand deliver the letter to Tie Ying in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang, as he was going there for a business trip. But somehow Ye learned about this, and he sent people to break into Wang's hotel room and take the letter away. Wang, the messenger, was sent back under guard to his own town and was interrogated for seven days and eight nights for carrying a letter criticizing the leader. Several criticism meetings were held against him.

Eventually, the news reached the Central Party's Disciplinary Investigation

Committee. An investigation was organized and finally Ye was criticized and received a "serious warning inside the party."

In real life, exposing wrongdoing is fraught with obstacles. Under many circumstances, justice is not promoted, but the one who speaks out usually receives retaliation. Ying Guangnai, for example, was interrogated and his family history was scrutinized after he disclosed that some county officials in Leqing, Hubei Province, used public funds for lavish dinner parties (1988). Local officials threatened to cancel all the county's subscription to *Peiling Daily* when two of its reporters, Yang Qingwen and Guo Jie, were investigating a case where some local officials illegally beat and arrested several peasants. The officials there even spread the rumor that the reporters were arrested so that local peasants would not dare to cooperate (1989). Zhang Aijia was publicly humiliated and harassed when he uncovered corruptive activities in his county (1988). Dong Qisheng was isolated, threatened, and his personal mail was checked after he criticized some district officials who used relief funds for banquets and gifts (1988).

On a more general level, journalists, editors, and newspaper contributors find that their daily lives could be made miserable by writing and publishing critical reporting. If you criticize a train station, you would have difficulty buying train tickets; if you criticize a hospital, you would have difficulty seeing a doctor; if you criticize a school, your children would be harassed; if you criticize a cafeteria, you would be served with cold food or worse yet, leftovers; if you criticize an electric company, you would find yourself without electricity; if you criticize a food store, the food your work unit buys would be of poor quality; if you criticize a meat store, the meat supply for the whole work unit would be interrupted (Zhang, Z. 1989).

Suing Journalists Frenzy

Another strong indicator that shows how hard it is for the media to exercise supervisory power or simply to report is the increasing propensity to sue journalists for libel in recent years. In the first half of 1988, a total of 1,000 libel cases were brought to courts throughout the country. Of those 200

involved the media, which, as such, enjoy no legal protection whatsoever. (Liu, X. 1988). In Huangpu District alone, one of the eleven districts in Shanghai, there were thirty-six libel suits filed against the media in the first eight months in 1988 (Liu, J. & Zhang, X. 1988). National newspapers like the *People's Daily*, *Economic Daily*, *Guangming Daily*, *Workers' Daily*, *China Youth Daily*, *Legal Daily*, and *People's Political Consultative Conference Press*, all have been brought to the court once or more (Wu, 1989; Yao, S. 1989). Most of the charges filed condemn journalists for writing reports inconsistent with the facts, rumor-mongering, libel and infringement of their rights.

Although the number of libel suits against journalists and news media is impressive, especially when we are reminded that there were zero libel suits filed against either reporters or news media between 1949 and 1985 (Liu, X. 1988), many of the libel suits simply involve instances of critical reporting. This happens because of many reasons, but the most important one is perhaps that laws in China are not complete, and there are loopholes that people can take advantage of. Reporters are often pressured by the people they have exposed after the cases have been made public. The favorite and easiest threat, especially from people who have been fined or fired as a result of media coverage of their activities, is to brand the articles or reports as "libellous" and bring the case to the court. The reasoning that "It costs me only twenty yuan (less than four dollars) to make them [journalists] miserable for at least half a year. Why shouldn't I sue them?" was popular among plaintiffs (Ying, X. 1989). Some even reason that when their names are revealed by the media, they carry a bad name. In order to feel psychologically balanced, they have to drag the reporters to court. They do not care if they lose because they have nothing more to lose after being disclosed by the media. Some people are afraid of nothing but being named by the media. They consider revealing their names in the press to be the greatest punishment (Yang, J. 1989). They think once they are exposed by the media, they are humiliated, thus finished in terms of their political life, social life, and professional life.

On December 7, 1988, a woman carrying a 6-month old baby was crying on a

street in Beijing (Ying, X. 1989). The woman, later found to be Cui Fengling, a factory worker, told passersby that she was driven out from her home by her mother-in-law because she gave birth to a baby girl. She also claimed that her husband often beat her and demanded a divorce from her. Cheng Wenzhou, a reporter, happened to be on the scene and took a picture of it. The photo was published on the front page of the People's Daily three days later. After seeing the photo on the People's Daily, Cui's husband brought the case to the court, accusing the paper to be defamatory. The plaintiff charged the People's Daily for jeopardizing his reputation. He also complained that the paper did not get an approval from the family before publishing. This case brings up some questions about the approval system. Where should a newspaper go for an approval? For this case, should it be approved by Cui's husband? Cui's mother-in-law? Cui's work unit? Cui's husband's work unit? or the family's neighborhood committee? Some of them or all of them? If all of them, how long will it take? Another issue is that if the woman agreed to be photographed and swore that everything was true, but later changed her mind, who should be responsible? Since there are no libel laws, privacy laws, or media law, it is up to the court to decide how far a news organization has to go to protect itself from lawsuits.

While it is understandable that Cui, being a factory worker, might be ignorant of the responsibility she should have for her own behavior, it is hard to comprehend when Deng Wenjie, a former vice director of the First People's Hospital in Hongzhou, sued a reporter for an article which was approved by Deng himself. Deng was in charge of a construction project for the hospital while he was the vice director there. In order to complete the construction, he had to spend thousands of yuan to bribe the "connections" to get highly-demanded building materials. When the building was completed, Deng handed in his resignation because he said he was tired of this "back door" activity. Deng told this story to Ye Hui, a reporter from the Guangming Daily, a national newspaper geared towards intellectuals. Based on the interview, Ye wrote a report, praising Deng for his courageous decision. The report was published on the front page, first item, on Guangming Daily April 6, 1988, and won "Good News" award.

Contrarily to what Deng had expected, the report did not bring him fame but shame. People inside and outside the hospital ridiculed him and called him names. Even his long-time friends turned their backs on him. Unable to handle this pressure, he decided to charge Ye, accusing the report to be untrue, although he edited and approved the article himself (Quan, 1988).

A major newspaper in Zhejiang Province received a letter-to-the-editor one day in June 1988 (Zhou, D. 1988). This letter criticized two cadres of a village where serious cases of woman abuse took place. Cadres there simply ignored them. After reviewing the letter, the newspaper asked the letter writer to have the letter checked by the Office of County Committee, County Legislative Committee, and County Women's Rights Protection Committee. The letter was approved by all the three authoritative offices with stamps on it. However, when the letter was published, the two cadres who were the targets accused the letter to be seriously faulty and claimed their "private citizens' reputation" had been infringed upon.[9]

On July 26 1988, *Beijing Evening News* reported that flies were found gathering in Xinyuanzhai Soft Drink Factory. The factory director accused the report false, claiming there were only a few flies found there. The crucial issue for this case became whether a few flies could be said "gathering." Although the factory finally lost the case and paid twenty yuan, it cost the *Beijing Evening News* fifty days to deal with the case (Wang, A., & Ma, 1988). The *Beijing Evening News* was actually the luckiest to have a case settled within two months. Most of the media had to spend years in settling a case (Ying, X. 1989).

The fact that many journalists are becoming defendants shows that on the one hand, the public is becoming more and more legal oriented and the media cannot just publish whatever they wish. They have to be aware of their legal obligations and social responsibilities. On the other hand, it also shows that critical reporting, no matter how thoroughly the facts are checked, would inevitably offend some people and jeopardized their personal interests or reputations. This is not to say that reporters never make mistakes or news media are always correct. Reporters do make mistakes, sometimes serious ones. What is at issue here is how law-abiding citizens could be fully protected, and at the

same time journalists' right to report is not endangered. What is needed is a set of laws which specify what each party is expected to do to guarantee both rights.

China's long-awaited press law, which could have granted a stronger legal foundation to news media, has been shelved since 1989. Instead, conservatives have introduced new "ethical principles" for reporters that make them more vulnerable to party censure (Tyson, 1992).

Despite the increasing number of lawsuits against the news media, there are encouraging signs coming up here and there. Some ad hoc measures have been improvised: one court in Xian has laid down a set of principles to protect newspeople against accusations of libel (Guangming Daily, 1989, February 20, p. 1; People's Daily, 1989, February 20, p. 1); more prosocially the News Pictorial of Hunan province has established its "news hazard" fund for reporters engaging in critical reporting (China Youth Daily, 1989, February 11); Guanghan Wine Producer in Sichuan has set aside special fund to protect journalists and writers who suffer as a result of their crusade against wrongdoing (Zhang, Z., & Zhu H. 1988).

Self-censorship

Surmounting the obstacles to the exposé of the wrong consists of only part of the problem. In China, there exists another problem in conducting critical reporting: the protective self-censorship. Over the years, especially during the Anti-Rightist Movement (1957), journalists and editors who favored a free press and advocated public opinion supervision were castigated as "bourgeois rightists" and severely criticized. Open and frank comments on the party's work and well-intentioned criticisms were considered vicious attacks on the party. The events of 1957 produced a backlash whose effects lingered for decades. Even today there are journalists and editors who are afraid of revealing the truth. Personal humiliation, political burden on children, ruined careers, and broken families have devastated hundreds of intellectuals.

On a more general level, reporters have learned, over the years, what is appropriate to write and what is not. During an interview with a journalist from a major national newspaper, he made this comment: "If what you write has

constantly been cut out, modified, or censored, you naturally would develop a sense as to what is acceptable to your boss and what is not. Why bother putting in stuff which would later be cut out anyway? Over the time, you learn what to write and what to avoid. You don't even need editors to tell you what is unacceptable; you censor yourself" (Personal interview, 1991).

On a more practical level, editors, journalists or the media may decide to kill the stories themselves before the manuscripts reach censors. The apprehension that critical reporting may cause trouble, the long ordeal that reporters, editors and the media may have to go through, the constant threat that lawsuits may be brought against them, all serve as an effective deterrence on critical reporting. In order not to offend anyone so that their lives would not be made miserable, newspeople usually exercise their gatekeeping power in non-productive way (Zhang, Z. 1989).

On the other hand, journalistic conservatism is also the result of a traditional view among Chinese intellectuals of themselves as constructive critics of authority rather than as its opponents: for thousands of years, educated people sent memoranda to the emperor to help him become a more benevolent ruler. At a Congress of Writers and Artists, Xia Yan, an elderly but famous dramatist, expressed attitudes typical of most of the intellectuals:

> I was imprisoned for eight years and forced to write almost one thousand confessions. I need not mention the beatings and personal insults I suffered. A foreign friend suggested I describe these experiences. As a Communist Party member and a patriot, I felt I should not.... We must not follow the example of a certain writer from the Soviet Union who specialized in writing about political prison camps and went to the West to publish his works. Such a course of action is of no benefit to the Chinese people, nor does it strengthen our unity and stability.[10]

Over the years, journalists in China have been trained to sense what they may and may not write: "We rarely have to be told what or how to write because we develop an instinct for it," said one journalist on the People's Daily. Reporters who step out of line are expelled as was Liu Binyan (Branson, 1990).

Journalists are also afraid to bear political consequences since some of them have been accused of "damaging the party's name" (Yuan, J. 1989). Backlash of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution is still vividly remembered

by many journalists. Some are too circumspect, preoccupied and worried. One may be labeled as "counter revolutionary," "rightist," or "bad element;" may be dismissed from his job; may be expelled from the party (like Liu Binyan, Wang Ruowang, and Qin Benli); or may even be sent to jail (like Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming after the Tiananmen uprising).

In conclusion, critical reporting is a risky enterprise for journalists in China. It almost brought the *World Economic Herald* down in 1987, only at the intervention of Zhao Ziyang, then the Prime Minister, did the paper survive the crisis (Kristof, 1989). But it was shut down eventually when Zhao could not even protect himself in spring 1989.

Hopes for the Future

Journalists in China would like to think themselves as "Emperors without a crown." But in fact, they are servants serving two masters at a time. They are servants of the party and the people. When conflicts of interest between people and the party arise, the media satisfies neither.

Despite the dedication of newspeople to their supreme master -- the party, the party is not impressed with their performance. Liu Binyan, one of the best-known Chinese journalists, lost his job at the *People's Daily* and was expelled from the party again in 1987. Qin Benli, former editor-in-chief of the Shanghai-based *World Economic Herald*, was fired in April 1989. In the seven years from 1983 to 1990, the publisher of *People's Daily* has changed four times (Kristof, 1990). The editor-in-chief was purged after the Tiananmen uprising and replaced by a no-nonsense hardliner and a military deputy (Branson, 1990).

The lessons that can be learned from the past are many. The most crucial one, however, is that press is not independent from the party, and there is no real freedom of press. The cases of injustice which occurred over the years "find their root in the denial of people's right to freedom of speech and freedom of press" (Cheek, 1990). Just as a veteran communist journalist aptly puts it (Hsiao, 1990):

> Although the constitution states that citizens have freedom of
> speech and freedom of publication, ... usually when we bring up
> press freedom, we encounter this jeer: "What kind of freedom do you

want? Do you want bourgeois freedom or proletarian freedom? Do you want abstract freedom or concrete freedom? Do you want absolute freedom or relative freedom?" After this kind of taunting, you cannot say anything. In order to avoid suspicion of having a bourgeois character, no one mentions press freedom again.

The Chinese problem is fundamental and systematic. The encouraging sign is that reform is still on the agenda, but how far is the party committed to go remains to be seen. The voyage to democracy is uncharted and there remain numerous hidden rocks and dark holes along the way.

Table 1 Number of Critical Items by Month in Three Years

Month	1988	1989	1990
Jan.	70	90	12
Feb.	82	79	20
Mar.	73	88	14
Apr.	78	99	19
May	92	118	21
Jun.	58	37	16
Jul.	79	89	26
Aug.	103	66	39
Sep.	99	36	19
Oct.	115	30	25
Nov.	112	33	29
Dec.	91	22	20
Total	1052	787	260

1988 and 1989: For 11df, X^2 = 149.24, p<.001.
1989 and 1990: For 11df, X^2 = 378.18, p<.001.

Table 2 Average Daily Number and Percent of Critical Items by Year

Year	Total Number of the Year	Average Daily Number	Average Daily Percent
1988	1052	2.88	2.54
1989	787	2.16	1.90
1990	260	0.71	0.63

Total number of news items in a year: 41,336; average daily news items: 113.

Table 3 Comparison of Critical Items of Officials and Non-Officials

TYPE	1988		1989		1990		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Off	167	15.87	151	19.19	13	5.00	331	15.77
Non-Off	347	32.98	291	36.98	125	48.08	763	36.35[a]
N/A	538	51.14	345	43.84	122	46.92	1005	47.88
Total[b]	1052	99.99	787	100.01	260	100.00	2099	100.00

[a] Officials and Non-officials: df = 4, p< .05 by two-tailed t-test.
[b] Some total percentages may not equal 100% because of rounding.

Table 4 Comparison of Criticism of High- & Lower-level Officials

TYPE	1988		1989		1990		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
High	40	3.80	46	5.84	10	3.85	96	4.57
Lower	127	12.07	105	13.34	3	1.15	235	11.20[a]
Non-Off	347	32.98	291	36.98	125	48.08	763	36.35
N/A	538	51.14	345	43.84	122	46.92	1005	47.88
Total[b]	1052	99.99	787	100.00	260	100.00	2099	100.00

[a] High- and lower-level officials: df = 2, X^2 = 109.08, p<.001.
[b] Some total percentage may not equal 100% because of rounding.

Table 5   Comparison of Criticism by Institutions & Individuals

Type	1988		1989		1990		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Inst	482	45.82	292	37.10	73	28.08	847	40.35
Indiv	282	26.81	236	29.98	25	9.62	543	25.87[a]
General	288	27.38	259	32.91	162	62.31	709	33.78
Total[b]	1052	100.01	787	99.99	260	100.01	2099	100.00

[a] Institutions and individuals: df = 2, X^2 = 42.68, p<.001.
[b] Some total percentages may not equal 100% because of rounding.

Table 6   Comparison of Criticism with Names Identified and Unidentified

Category	1988	1989	1990	Total Number	Total Percent
Identified	457	330	36	823	39.21
Unidentified	595	457	224	1276	60.79[a]
Total	1052	787	260	2099	100.00

[a] Names identified and unidentified: df = 2, X^2 = 225.09, p<.001.

Table 7   Comparison of Names Identified Between Individuals and Institutions

Category	1988 N	1988 %	1989 N	1989 %	1990 N	1990 %	Total N	Total %
Indiv	163	15.49	150	19.06	19	7.31	332	15.82
Inst	294	27.95	180	22.87	17	6.54	491	23.39[a]
Uniden	595	56.56	457	58.07	224	86.15	1276	60.79
Total	1052	100.00	787	100.00	260	100.00	2099	100.00

[a] Names identified between individuals and institutions: df = 2, X^2 = 63.61, p<.001.

Table 8   Percent of Criticism Items by Page

Page	1988	1989	1990	Total
1	12.17	8.26	1.54	9.39
2	13.40	13.72	2.31	12.15
3	5.32	1.40	3.08	3.57
4	11.31	10.93	0.00	9.77
5	57.79	11.82/0.76[a]	0/55.38[b]	40.54
6	0.00	0/53.11[c]	34.23/0[d]	24.15
7	0.00	0.00	3.46	0.43
8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	99.99	100.00	100.00	100.00

[a] In Feb. 20, 1989, *People's Daily* changed its page arrangement. As a result, "Letters-from-the-Readers" Column was moved from p. 5 to p. 6. The slash indicates before and after the change.
[b] In July 1, 1990, "Letter-from-the-Readers" Column was moved back to p. 5 again. The slash indicates before and after the change.
[c] See Note a.
[d] See Note b.

Table 9 Number and Percent of Critical Items by Source

Source	1988		1989		1990		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Letters from Readers	593	56.37	489	62.13	236	90.77	1318	62.79
Letters from Journalists	14	1.33	16	2.03	0	0.00	30	1.43
Reports	414	39.35	254	32.27	18	6.92	686	32.68
Other[a]	31	2.95	28	3.58	6	2.31	65	3.10
Total[b]	1052	100.00	787	100.01	260	100.00	2099	100.00

[a] Other includes interviews, special columns, commentaries, photographs, and miscellanea.
[b] Some total percentage may not equal 100% because of rounding.

Table 10. Number of Critical Items Published before and after the Tiananmen Incident

Month Before	Number	Month After[a]	Number X
01/88	70	07/89	89
02/88	82	08/89	66
03/88	73	09/89	36
04/88	78	10/89	30
05/88	9?	11/89	33
06/88	58	12/89	22
07/88	79	01/90	12
08/88	103	02/90	20
09/88	99	03/90	14
10/88	115	04/90	19
11/88	112	05/90	21
12/88	91	06/90	16
01/89	90	07/90	26
02/89	79	08/90	39
03/89	88	09/90	19
04/89	99	10/90	25
05/89	118	11/90	29
06/89	37	12/90	20
Total	1563		536

[a] Before and after the Tiananmen Incident: $df = 16$, $p < .05$ by two-tailed t-test.

Table 11 Types of Critical Items by Year

Type	1988	1989	1990	Total
Corruption	291	235	23	549
Consumer	215	132	50	397
Selfish Deeds	114	128	77	319
Public Welfare	55	75	38	168
Legal	102	41	11	154
Bureaucracy	102	36	9	147
Environment	39	45	21	105
Economic Crimes	44	33	19	96
Bad Customs	32	32	8	72
Policy	44	24	3	71
Ethics	12	5	0	17
Discrimination	2	1	1	4
Total	1052	787	260	2099

Notes

1. Lower-level officials are defined as officials below bureau level; high-level officials are at and above bureau levels. The major levels of administrative hierarchy in ascending order are the "section" (*Ke*), the "division" (*Chu*) including county head, and the "bureau" (*Ju*), called *Ting* at the provincial level and *Si* at the ministerial level.

2. Unit, called *danwei* in Chinese and the closest equivalent in English would be institution, is one of the most important thing to a Chinese. All Chinese belong to a unit, each of which is organized to be as self-sufficient as possible.

3. Arbitrary charge usually involves administrative authorities, such as local traffic inspectors, market inspectors, licensing authorities and even the police, demanding arbitrary fees from enterprises and individuals for unnecessary services or for simply doing their jobs.

4. Arbitrary fines are similar to arbitrary charges. The only difference is that arbitrary fines involve the concept of punishment. The object of arbitrary fines is to fill the coffers of the local administration although sometimes the moneys find their way into the pockets of individuals as bribes or "bonuses." The roadblocks, although not confined to them, serve as a device to bolster regional protectionism by singling out outside vehicles and goods.

5. Based on the argument that the cost of public service should be shared by the public, arbitrary levies are made by state social institutions, in particular, schools and hospitals. These include sundry charges for services and privileges often more illusory than real. (*Legal Daily*, 1990, April 26, p. 1; *Nanfang Daily*, 1990, October 25, p. 3).

6. Ethics and morality is used interchangeably in this study.

7. The author conducted a series of interviews with journalists and editors from local, provincial, and national newspapers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan cities during the summer of 1991 and in the United States in 1992. As requested, their names would remain anonymous.

8. There was originally a toilet in school. but when a local company expended, it took over some of the school's land which included the space where the toilet was. As a result, the school was without a toilet for more than two years by then.

9. The concept of public official and private citizen is not legally defined in China. It seems anybody can claim for libel damage.

10. See *New York Times*, 1987, January 11 p. 3.

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Think global, act local: India's Bangalore technopolis

A case study of communication technology transfer in India's Silicon Valley

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Think global, act local:
India's Bangalore technopolis

*A case study of communication technology
transfer in India's Silicon Valley*

(Abstract)

With the global competition growing more intense, U. S. firms are increasingly looking to India for fast, inexpensive responses to their immediate manufacturing needs. This paper examines how innovations in new communication technologies, a continuing drive for higher productivity and a vast new pool of skilled workers available in India at lower wages have prompted multinational companies to set up facilities in Bangalore, a city of five million in southern India often referred to as India's Silicon Valley.

Based on research interviews in India and data collected by the authors this paper analyzes the growth of communication technology infrastructure in Bangalore and explores how multinational communication technology giants such as IBM, Texas Instruments and Motorola are using a global workforce to manufacture their products in India. The paper concludes with certain general lessons learned from technology transfer between Western industrialized nations and a Third World country like India.

Think global, act local
India's Bangalore technopolis

" ... Because technology is an extension of man, basic technological change always both expresses our world view and, in turn changes it. "

-- Peter Drucker, *The New Realities*, 1990

" People tend to focus on Third World as competitors and overlook the fact that these are also going to be major markets."

-- Irving Leveson,[1]
Senior Vice-President, Hudson Strategy Group

Multinational communication technology giants such as IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola, and others are increasingly utilizing a global workforce to manufacture products. Jobs in the communication technology sector are moving to many developing countries, including India, as companies seek to capitalize on the availability of a vast new pool of skilled workers available at lower wages. The emergence of a truly global work force is causing a fundamental shift in how and where the world's work gets done.

Consider the following illustrations of a fast emerging global workforce:

• In 1989 Digital Equipment Corp., the leading Massachusetts-based high-tech firm, invested in a U. S. $ 29 million production plant in the Yashwantpur industrial estate near Bangalore to produce 32-bit DEC MicroVAX computers. The company employs

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nearly 500 people and in December 1992 the plant rolled out of its assembly lines Indian-made Macintosh computers.

• Matching the flow of multinational investment, Indian-owned software companies like Infosys, with about 350 computer programmers, are performing tasks on behalf of major companies such as General Electric and Siemens. When asked whether Indian programmers are any good, the president of Siemen's U. S. subsidiary, said: " They are less expensive, but that's not why we went there. They do some of the best work in the world." 2

• In the late 1980s, 3M established a software programming unit in Bangalore. Encouraged by the managerial and technical talent it found in Bangalore, 3M began expanding its manufacturing operations. Its sophisticated plant in Bangalore employs 120 people and makes electrical connectors, chemicals and pressure sensitive tapes.

Bangalore, a city of five million in southern India, is fast earning a reputation as the Silicon Valley of India -- turning what was once a sleepy community into a bustling center of high-technology. This paper analyzes the growth of communication technology infrastructure in Bangalore and investigates the process through which multinational companies are increasingly getting involved in communication technology and product innovation in India. This paper also derives certain general lessons from technology transfer between western industrialized nations and a Third World country like India.

This paper is based upon the authors' several research visits to Bangalore in 1987, 1989, 1990 and 1992. A total of four person months were spent gathering data in Bangalore. More than 100 officials involved in the

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growth of the communication technology sector in Bangalore were interviewed. The interviewees included Indian government officials, communication technocrats, entrepreneurs, information workers, scholars, journalists, historians and citizens of Bangalore. Information also was collected on the role of the multinational companies through interviews with professionals from Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments, Motorola, 3M, Intel, IBM and other firms having major facilities in Bangalore. This study also draws upon a review of several newspaper and magazine articles on the emerging technopolis of Bangalore. (See Appendix I for location of Bangalore in India)

Since the mid-eighties, several multinational communication technology companies (over 30 firms) such as Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, IBM and Digital have set up facilities in Bangalore, driven by low labor costs and the availability of a highly skilled workforce.

U. S.-based Indian expatriates in Texas Instruments, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, and Digital Equipment Corporation played a pivotal role in establishing their company's operations in Bangalore. Despite complaints about the painful process of plodding through the Indian government's bureaucracy, executives of these companies are greatly excited about their company's prospects in India. " I think many corporations also understand that with a market of India's size, it's better to establish a major presence early in the game," said Shiv Nadar, chairman of HCL, India's top communication technology firm which now has a joint venture with Hewlett-Packard.[3]

Bangalore is today India's emerging *technopolis*. A *technopolis* is a geographically-concentrated high-tech complex which is characterized by collaborative relationships between the government, private firms and

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research universities, and by the presence of venture capital and entrepreneurial spin-off firms. (Singhal and Rogers, 1989) The largest and the most widely known technopolis is the Silicon Valley which has also been called the "world capital of the information society." (Roger and Larsen, 1984)

Technology transfer in technopolii

Researchers worldwide have been intrigued by the process of technology transfer in a technopolis, especially if it involves a multinational company and a local work force. Success in the transfer of technology may depend on overcoming many barriers to communication as encountered when individuals may use different vocabularies, have different motives, represent organizations of widely differing cultures, and when the referents of transactions may vary between highly abstract concepts or concrete products. [4]

Identifying the problems of technology transfer, Williams and Gibson[5] posited: " We consistently observe problems in communication transactions between individuals (such as scientist-scientist, scientist-client, manager-customer, manager-scientist etc.), within and among corporations, in university-industry collaboration and new R&D consortia, between government and industry, and in international technology transfer. In communication research literature, this viewpoint is often referred to as a *source-destination* paradigm.

While several studies have been conducted on the process of technology transfer in such technopolii as Silicon Valley (U. S.), Austin (U.S.), Cambridge (U. K.) and Tsukuba Science City (Japan), literature on technology transfer in the Third World experience with technopolii such as Bangalore is virtually non-existent.

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Bangalore : The Silicon Valley of India

Bangalore has achieved a reputation as the Silicon Valley of India[6] -- virtually transformed from what was once a sleepy urban community in southern India into a bustling center of high-technology. Bangalore provides a specialized infrastructure for high-tech communication technology industry: (1) an all-year salubrious climate, (2) a dust-free environment, (3) a high-quality of life, (4) a strategic military defense position, (5) an excellent research university, the Indian Institute of Science, (6) several engineering colleges and polytechnics, (7) available scientific and technical manpower, (8) political support from the Central and State governments, (9) the presence of six large pubic sector undertakings, (10) the presence of electronics ancillary firms and sub-contracting companies, (11) several high-quality R&D centers, (12) the presence of venture capital, (13) a favorable industrial climate, and (14) the presence of buyers and suppliers for electronic components.

Bangalore had an early start as India's scientific and technological mecca with the establishment in 1911 of the premier research institution, the Indian Institute of Science. A further boost in high-tech activity occurred after India attained independence from British rule in 1947 with the establishment of the aircraft plant Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Since then,. Bangalore witnessed a growth of both private and public-sector high-tech units including the Indian Space Research Organization, National Aeronautical Laboratories, Indian Telephone Industries, and Bharat Electronics Limited.

Today, Bangalore is India's fastest-growing city with a population of five million increasing at 8 percent annually. Large and small micro-electronics-based industries are increasingly agglomerating in Bangalore. In 1992, nearly 450 large and medium-scale industries, of which 40 percent were electronics companies, were located in Bangalore. In addition, over 2,600

small-scale electronics manufacturing and assembly companies were headquartered in Bangalore. Over 3,000 large, medium, and small-scale electronics companies in Bangalore employed an estimated 120,000 people, registering sales of U. S. $ 2 billion in 1992.

Bangalore is fast becoming India's version of Silicon Valley having uncanny parallels with its counterpart in northern California, for instance, steep housing prices, a fast-paced urban life and the runaway growth. Also, tree-lined avenues, a golf course, health clubs, fine restaurants, pubs and hotels contribute to a cosmopolitan ambiance similar to Silicon Valley.

There are other similarities too. As the Silicon Valley emerged around Stanford University, Bangalore is home to India's great universities and research labs, including the Indian Institute of Science and the Indian Space Research Organization. As Northern California's expertise in electronics grew amid the roots planted by Hewlett-Packard and Fairchild Industries, electronics in India grew around Bharat Electronics and Hindustan Aeronautics, two Bangalore-based firms established by the central government. These companies, and the others that soon followed catapulted Bangalore into high-tech prominence.

Tied to Texas by technology

Warranting Bangalore's potential for success as a high-tech center, the Dallas-based U. S. high technology giant, Texas Instruments (TI) set up an impressive software programming operation in Bangalore in August 1986. Says Richard Gall manager of TI (India) : " We came because of the amount of talent that was available here. We could not hire enough software designers in Europe to meet demand, and India was producing more than it could use."[7]

The top brass at Texas Instruments feel that its operation in India is important for TI's strategic presence in Asia. In the long-term, TI is interested in the larger markets of South and Southeast Asia as well as the Pacific. Although TI had to install its own electrical generators and satellite dishes in Bangalore to operate efficiently, wages and overhead costs are low enough that work still gets done for half of what it costs in the U. S.

TI (India) was set up as a wholly owned subsidiary of Texas Instruments and was incorporated under Indian law as a 100 percent software export unit. It was the first such unit set up in India. The unit operates entirely from its software park in Bangalore's plush office district and it does not provide "consultancy" services abroad to TI or other companies. TI(India)'s income (turnover) in 1991 was U. S. $ 4 million.

The TI (India) staff is housed in two buildings in Bangalore which provide a work environment at par with TI offices worldwide. TI(India) engineers enjoy a world-class computing and communications environment including high-powered Sun, Hewlett-Packard, and Digital Equipment Corporation engineering workstations as well as PC-class machines interconnected by a local area network. A satellite dish is the gateway to TI's global network for TI's semiconductor design engineers in Bangalore. Total investment in these facilities and equipment now exceed US $ 8 million.

All of the software, databases and designs produced by TI(India) are exported to TI in the U. S. via a dedicated 64KB satellite link between Bangalore and TI's unit in Bedford, England, for distribution and use by TI and its customers. The earth station at TI's premises in Bangalore is owned and operated by the Indian government's overseas communication enterprise, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited. This vital link gives TI(India)

access to TI's worldwide computer network for transmission of electronic mail as well as software programs and data.

The initial activity of TI(India) was the development and support of proprietary computer-aided-design (CAD) software systems used for integrated circuit (IC) design by TI's semi-conductor design centers worldwide. This activity, which remains the largest in TI(India), includes development of applications for simulation, testing, layout and verification of ICs. In 1988 a design center for linear ICs was established at TI India. Since then, TI has added many other activities to its service portfolio in India.

Why did TI choose India ?.

Texas Instruments chose Bangalore as its offshore location for six main reasons. The first reason was that the unit in Bangalore was a strategic move to enhance Texas Instruments' presence in the Asia-Pacific region which is projected to have one of the highest growth rates in electronics over the next 20 to 25 years.[8] A second reason was the " high quality of India's science and engineering education. This quality is seen in those students who come to the U. S. for graduate study and also in the high competency of Indian engineers currently working in Indian industry." A third reason was the availability of qualified labor. There are 167 colleges and universities in India which offer Bachelor's and Master's degree programs in engineering, with approximately 23,000 degrees granted annually in all branches of engineering. Additionally there are 369 engineering schools offering technician's diplomas, with some 77,000 diplomas awarded each year. Relative to its population Bangalore houses a disproportionate number of these colleges, polytechnics and technical training institutes.

A fourth reason was the widespread use of the English language in government, education, industry, and commerce, in India. A fifth reason was

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the relatively lower salaries in India. Indian software and computer engineers, earn an average 10,000 to 15,000 Indian Rupees, about U. S. $400 to U. S. $ 600 a month, which is even less than the minimum wage in the United States. Finally T. was impressed by the favorable attitude of the Indian government towaut foreign investment, particularly for software export.

Certain benefits directly accrue to India from TI's presence in Bangalore. Since TI (India)'s software products are exported 100 percent, it brings in foreign exchange. TI helps the local economy through purchase of supplies, payment of rent on the facilities, etc. and the Indian national economy through the payment of corporate taxes. Although TI(India) is a relatively small company, employing nearly 200 people, its presence does provide employment and growth opportunities for its employees. Certain indirect benefits also accrue to India as a result of TI's presence. India suffers the malady of brain drain in that its best-qualified engineers often leave the country to settle abroad. Increased multinational investment could perhaps help to stem this tide of brain drain. As the TI fact sheet concludes: "Hopefully, the number of these opportunities will increase with time. We hope to attract a number of the top academic recruits to accept employment with us and remain in India as opposed to going abroad and then being persuaded to remain abroad by attractive employment opportunities. Finally with the passage of time, the attrition of our technical staff will make a general contribution to the transfer of technical know-how to Indian industry. "[9]

When TI sought approval to establish operations in India, the government of India stipulated that TI should not recruit engineers already working in the Indian computer industry. The government feared that TI's

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higher salaries would siphon off the brightest engineers from Indian computer companies. To allay such fears, TI hired only fresh engineering graduates from Indian universities and research institutes. These recruits were sent to Dallas, Texas, and Bedford, U. K. (where TI has another software facility), for advanced training. They have since become the core of TI (India)'s operations and subsequent recruits have been trained in India.

Several Indian engineers (about 15 per cent) have left TI(India) to work for other computer software companies and a few have even spun off their own computer software companies. Despite the supportive work atmosphere, attractive salary and professional growth opportunities in TI, some employees have quit TI to meet family commitments or to find jobs in their home cities. These play an important role in transferring TI's technical know-how to Indian industry. [10]

To be successful, multinational firms such as TI and IBM need to build positive public images in their local markets. Their presence needs to be perceived as being beneficial to local economies, in terms of providing employment opportunities to local people or expanding their technical capabilities.[11]

Many multinationals in India have thus adopted the policy of hiring local citizens for their offshore subsidiaries. The advantages of hiring the local people are multiple: (1) the salaries of local employees are much lower than those of their U. S. counterparts, (2) the firms do not have to pay for moving and living expenses of U. S. employees, (3) local citizens know the language and culture in which the local businesses operate, and (4) the firms do not have to deal with cumbersome immigration processes. In this respect human resources are less easily mobile than technology. (Carnevale, 1989).[12]

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Big Blue re-enters India

India has long been a difficult nation to do business in. Wages are low, but so is productivity. It wants foreign investment and communication technology, but on its own terms. IBM left India in 1977 after the Indian government limited foreign ownership to 40 percent as per the Indian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1974. During 1992-93, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao liberalized investment rules to give foreigners automatic approval for buying as much as 51 percent of a company.

Proponents of economic liberalization believe that Mr. Rao is undoing some of the economic damage done to India by Colonialism followed by 45 years of the Indian road to socialism: Strangling regulations, government ownership and the suffocating bureaucracy that Indians call the " license raj."

One of the most talked about events in Indian corporate circles in 1992 was IBM's reentry in India in collaboration with India's leading industrial giant , the Tatas. The joint venture, headquartered at Bangalore, would manufacture the high end PS/2 models in India and develop software for the domestic and export markets. The venture would also source electronic components from India for IBM's manufacturing sites abroad and provide education to Indian engineers on various IBM computing platforms. The total IBM investment is to the tune of US $ 33 million. IBM is the third major U. S. communication technology firm in India which would jointly manufacture state-of-the-art computer equipment.

Apart from the attraction of a large domestic market in India, IBM is hoping to take advantage of India's vast pool of inexpensive engineering talent, especially for software development. According to a recent World Bank report, India's software engineers do more customer development of

software packages than any other nation's programmers. And according to India's National Association of Software and Service Companies, software exports from India grew 72 percent in the year ending March 30,1992 making it one of the nation's fastest growing export industries. An existing Tata software company in Bangalore, which already writes software for IBM laboratories around the world will expand its operations with IBM assistance both domestically and for the overseas market.

IBM's new venture in Bangalore fits the model of a similar IBM project launched in 1990 in China. The 50:50 joint venture with a Tianjin-based, state-owned computer maker also aimed at penetrating a relatively closed market by setting up manufacturing operations in the country. It had as a side benefit the easier access to cheap components for distribution to IBM's worldwide operations. The two projects highlight the lengths companies are being forced to go in the increasingly cut-throat international computer industry in their drive to cut costs and penetrate new markets.[13]

Motorola's lament

Often multinational communication technology firms have faced import quotas and capital controls as common impediments depriving them of unrestricted access to resources and markets in India. Bureaucratic impediments have stalled ambitious plans of Motorola, the U. S. electronics and communications giant. In 1991, when Motorola set up operations in India, it submitted one of the single largest foreign investment offers in India: A comprehensive package of six India-based projects worth U. S. $ 150 million. By late 1992, government clearance was given to only one software project worth U. S. $ 3 million. Other major proposals include clearance for establishing an electronic paging unit and technology collaboration in the field of radar manufacture and chip fabrication.

Motorola, being a global player, did not want Indian government clearance in bits and pieces, but instead wanted the entire package cleared. Frustrated with the "wait and watch" game in India, Motorola has already shifted projects worth U. S. $ 100 million to China. In a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao, the Motorola chairman expressed his disappointment over the bureaucratic wrangles despite the recent liberalization and deregulation policies.

The global workforce in India

With the global competition growing more intense, U. S. firms are looking to India for fast, cheap responses to market needs. Some feel that high-paying programming jobs in the U. S. may be undermined by the growth in software talent in India where a well-paid programmer earns about one-fifth of his/her U. S. counterpart. However, according to Dr. Sridhar Mitta, a senior vice-president at Wipro, a leading Bangalore-based computer firm, the Indian software developers do not compete with the American software engineers but complement their work.

Dr. Mitta explains that a 12-hour time difference between India and California means Indian firms can have 24-hour-a-day operations for any U. S. Company. "We can start crunching numbers when it is night-time in America, so in the morning we can have a solution."[14] Through their work in India, U. S. firms are discovering that Indian programmers offer skills as good as -- and sometimes better than those offered by the American software engineers. One reason why India's talent pool is so attractive is because Indian software engineers have years of experience using UNIX, the dominant computer operating system for programming on powerful work stations. This Indian expertise in UNIX was an accidental consequence of the government's decision in 1977 to banish IBM, then the dominant computer

firm. Without the IBM operating system for mainframes, Indi~'s nascent computer makers, were forced to turn to AT & T's UNIX operating system, which years later became the system of choice as work stations gained market-share.

Body shopping

Having bet on the right horse in UNIX, Indian software engineers are now reaping the rewards. For many U. S. firms, the relocation of software to India represents the logical succession to " body shopping," a practice whereby Indian software programmers came to Silicon Valley in the U. S. under contract for temporary assignments. Still on the payroll of Indian firms, they carried out projects for U. S. companies that hired them to solve specific software problems. In 1989, Microsoft recruited some fifty young Indian engineers for three years of training in the United States. On their return they will start Microsoft's software development center in Bangalore.

Companies from Japan and Europe are beginning to view Bangalore as a place where they can gain advanced software help. And Indian computer experts themselves -- as well as some U. S. analysts -- say the day will come when software written in India would compete with American made programs. This trend has potentially both positive and negative consequences for wealthy, industrialized nations.[15] India is not the only nation trying to cash in with the software. Ireland and Israel are the two other nations where U. S. firms have begun shopping for talented software developers. Beyond software production, multinational companies are also coming to Bangalore for higher productivity from a vast new pool of skilled workers available in Bangalore at lower wages. Digital Equipment Corp. began producing minicomputers in Bangalore in 1989 in a 40 : 60 joint venture with Indian computer manufacturer Hinditron. In April 1991, Hewlett-Packard and HCL,

India's largest computer maker joined forces to manufacture minicomputers and workstations in Bangalore.

Lessons learned about multinational participation in Bangalore

Many useful lessons have been learned about multinational participation in Bangalore especially from the viewpoint of technology transfer

1. Official inaction : Red tape and bureaucratic wrangles remain the major impediments restricting the entry of multinational communication firms in India. Most of these firms like Texas Instruments, IBM and Motorola have a mixed bag of experiences in interacting with the government.

2. Infrastructural impediments: Multinationals have many hurdles to overcome. Frequent power outages make it necessary for every computer firm to build its own power supply. It can take months to get telephones installed.

3. Political intervention: Though government leaders say they want to reduce intervention in business affairs, licensing regulations and red tape can hold up business decisions for months. For instance, Motorola's U. S. $150 million investment offer has been awaiting the response of the Indian government for over a year. If Motorola opts to completely withdraw, India will lose out to other developing countries competing for Motorola investment.

4. Cost benefits for multinational firms: Many U. S. multinationals are utilizing Indian software engineering skills to reduce development costs. This is part of a worldwide trend whereby data processing groups have been shifting hardware manufacturing to their base country while getting software

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design undertaken abroad where engineering skills are relatively inexpensive. For multinational firms in search of low-cost, high quality manufacturing and talent, India has one of the largest pools of well-qualified personnel. India has a strong educational system in theoretical sciences and engineering at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. This educational system supplies a large technical manpower pool which has the professional expertise to perform the sophisticated functions of communication technology firms. The superior talent of Indian engineers and relatively low salaries are attracting several other multinational communication companies to India.

5. Cutting edge of high-technology development: Multinationals bring to India the cutting edge technology development both in hardware and software. For instance, Motorola's major proposals in India include establishment of an electronic paging unit and technology collaboration in the field of radar manufacture and chip fabrication.

Nearly 10 years after information technology firms began shifting away from Silicon Valley in California for cheaper production sites across Asia, scores of multinational companies like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, 3M, Texas Instruments, Motorola, among several other high-profile companies, have set up facilities in India in search of low-cost, high quality manufacturing and talent.

The migration represents a massive transfer of cutting-edge technological competence and may some day pose a major competitive threat to the information workers and software engineers of Silicon Valley, where the employment base in computer and chip manufacturing continues to erode.

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6. **Local manpower gains world-class expertise:** Multinational communication technology firms such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard and 3M have all contributed to the enhancement of technological expertise of several local professionals. After an initial training period the multinational firm allows the local firm to assume management responsibility for its software products -- such as adding new features on a communications program or maintaining and updating an existing product. For instance, Texas Instruments found that in comparison to their U. S. counterparts, Indian engineers analyze problems more intensively before trying to solve them. Often, this leads to more sophisticated results.

The superior talent of Indian engineers and relatively low salaries are attracting several other multinational computer companies to India. According to Mr. Richard Gall of Texas Instruments (India),[16] : "As our problems in software design and integrated circuit design become more and more complex, we can increasingly utilize the natural analytical ability that seems characteristic to the Indian mind. "[17]

He added: " As designs and software get more complex, the cost advantage of India becomes greater. We've only scratched the surface of what could happen here. Industry estimates expect a further shift of computer programming to offshore sites. And this would be a substantial advantage as software programming accounts for a third or more of the R&D budgets at many high tech companies."

7. **Economic gains to the host country:** A foreign tie-up means several direct benefits to the host country. Multinational firms can provide foreign exchange earnings (since some of their products may be exported), help boost the local and national economy (in the form of taxes, purchases etc.), generate jobs, check brain-drain and train technical staff in the state of the art

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technological skills. With growing international inter-organizational relationships, Bangalore has now become India's hub for communication technology development and computer software production with increasingly intimate links to leading multinational firms.

8. **Changing perceptions:** Over the past three decades multinational firms have faced stiff opposition in the late-1970s from the Indian government which encouraged local enterprises to dislodge multinationals. However, by the later 1980s the Indian government liberalized investment rules to invite foreign participation. Today, multinational firms are changing their perceptions of doing business in India and have gone ahead with several tie-ups with Indian companies. American companies now acknowledge India's seriousness to invite foreign businesses to India. It now takes only six months for a company to get approval and begin operations, thanks to the setting up of the software technology park of the Indian government.

Since the Indian government's department of electronics introduced the concept of the software technology parks a few years ago, an increasing number of multinational companies such as ANZ Bank, (Australia) and Citibank's Citicorp services have set up operations in Bangalore where computer software is developed locally and beamed directly by satellite to principals overseas.

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
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Appendix I: Location of Bangalore in India

Bangalore, a city of five million in southern India, has become India's hub for communication technology development. Located 3,200 feet above sea level, Bangalore's environment is relatively dust-free, and conducive to high-technology work.

Appendix II : List of major multinational firms in Bangalore

Motorola, USA : Communication equipment

Texas Instrument : Software

Bull SA , France : Main frame computers.

Digital U. S. A. : Computers

Hewlett Packard , U. S. A. : Testing and ,measuring instruments.

IBM, U. S. A. : Computer hardware and software.

Larsen and Toubro: Computer peripherals.

ANZ Bank, Australia : Computer software

Moog Controls, U. S. A. : Hydraulic equipment

Pieco (Philips) Key boards

Notes

[1] Richard I Kirkland Jr. , *Fortune* , March 14,1988.

[2] Quoted in cover story by Brian O' Reilly in *Fortune*, December 14,1992,

[3] The HCL- Hewlett Packard partnership was formed after Hewlett Packard invested $ 23 million in HCL (India.) which now manufactures top-of-the-line computer workstation for Indian customers. HCL also markets Hewlett Packard products in India.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE <u>WORLD ECONOMIC HERALD</u>, 1980-1989

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INTRODUCTION

In contemporary Chinese journalism history, the <u>World Economic Herald</u> is one of the best-known Chinese newspapers in the world. As an independent newspaper in a socialist country, it came into existence in the initial stage of the Chinese national reform' and was closed down by the Chinese communist government before the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. That year, however, the 72-year-old editor-in-chief *Qin Benli* (pronounced as Chin Ben-lee) was named the <u>World Press Review</u>'s International Editor of the Year.

Compared with the Chinese student pro-democratic movement and the Beijing Massacre on June 4, 1989, which were widely reported in the West, the closing of the <u>Herald</u> received less attention, and how the small newspaper rose and fell in the fluctuation of Chinese politics was known even less. Although many Western journalists and scholars expressed substantial sympathy with their Chinese colleagues, some studies done in the West on that period of Chinese history appear either untrue or misleading because of the lack of a direct communication channel.[1]

In fact, the <u>Herald</u> Incident was one of the major events that ignited the nationwide protest against government authoritarianism by Chinese journalists and students in their struggle for freedom and democracy. It also was an important contributing factor to the pro-democracy movement which culminated in the Tiananmen demonstrations. The rise and fall of the <u>Herald</u> reflects how Chinese journalists went along a tortuous road for press freedom in the 1980s.

This study traces the ten-year history of the newspaper and the personal contributions

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of the Herald staff, particularly editor-in-chief *Qin Benli*. The aim of this study is to explore how the Herald came to be one of the few independent and influential newspapers in China, and how and why it was forced to close down by the Chinese communist leaders. As an international communication research, this study also intends to dissolve, at least partially, the enigma regarding the Herald Incident in China.

METHOD

The present study is primarily based upon personal interviews between the author and some well-informed people from Shanghai, including a former Herald contributor, two journalists, and another two "insiders."[2] Both the researcher and the informants feel less restraint in retelling what occurred while studying in the United States. Since the student movement has almost ended in China and the Herald event is in the past, the present study of that historical episode is less affected by the seething emotions in the wake of the event. In many respects, calmer minds facilitate historical research for the fragments of memory are crystallized through the oral inquiry into the historicized facts, which bring to light more hidden dimensions than the hot-spot reports on the event in 1989.

In Chinese culture, interpersonal communication is an essential and credible channel to acquire authentic information. It is common sense among Chinese that most newsworthy stories may not come from official newspapers but from those who have immediate and/or hidden sources of information. The five informants, or my co-researchers, either worked for the Herald or had intimate working or personal contact with some of the staff members and related government officials. Their personal experiences provide detailed information for this study, revealing many facets of the event for the first time.

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The interviews were conducted in the Shanghai dialect since the informants and the researcher are all from the same city and the local vernacular increases the naturalness of communication as well as the research setting.

In addition to the interviews, international news magazines and monographs on Chinese studies published in the west provided supplementary data for the study. Although not many articles and books were available, they offered their international and journalistic insight into the event and furnished some factual information which the author confirmed as accurate.[3]

A DIFFICULT DEBUT

After the cultural revolution ended in 1978, a nationwide modernization drive was sweeping across China under *Deng Xiaoping*'s open-door policy. In that social milieu and in Shanghai, the cradle of Chinese journalism and the battlefield of Chinese politics,[4] the <u>World Economic Herald</u> was established with the authorization of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. This independent newspaper paid taxes, fees and salaries of the staff on its own although the government supplied foreign currencies for its correspondents abroad.[5] The editor-in-chief *Qin* remarked:

> We founded the <u>Herald</u> in 1980 at a time when China was in a period of great transition. We promoted the party policy of reforming our economic system. As early as 1978, the party had declared an "open-door" policy. If we want to carry this out, we should understand the outside world better. And we should let foreigners know China better. We started our newspaper with these goals in mind.... The <u>World Economic Herald</u> is not the organ of any municipality, government, or party. The paper belongs to the scholars and reformers who support China's economic transformation.[6]

As the press system in China has been run by the state since the Communist Party took over the country in 1949, the independence of the <u>Herald</u> resulted in problems for the

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newspaper during its pioneering days. The Herald was initially an eight-page tabloid-size bi-weekly, which did not have many advertisements. While the staff of other state-run newspapers were secured with the "big rice bowl,"[7] the Herald had to start its business with a rented office and seven mostly retired journalists. The staffers had to be both reporters and editors and frequently stood at news-stands in the street to promote sales. At times, *Qin* had to buy newsprint with his own savings before the money was obtained from the distribution channel. It was not until 1984 that the Herald had paid off its loans and began to have a stable advertising revenue for its operation.

One of the principal reasons for the success of the Herald was that the editor-in-chief is a noted figure in the Shanghai press. His extraordinary journalistic career and personal glamour gained him intimate connections with government officials, media organizations, and academicians as well as entrepreneurs of different industries. The Herald's staff referred to *Qin Benli* as *Qin Lao Ban* (Boss *Chin*). The son of a businessman from Zhejiang Province, he studied law at a university in Chongqing (Chungking) and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1938. After World War II, he began his journalism career at the Shanghai newspaper Wen Hui Daily,[8] which campaigned against hunger and the civil war and was closed by the nationalist government in 1947.

After the communist takeover in 1949, *Qin* worked for the Party's Liberation Daily in Shanghai and the People's Daily in Beijing. When Wen Hui Daily was reopened in 1956, he returned to it as executive deputy editor-in-chief and Party Secretary. During the short-lived liberalization period in 1957, *Qin* published articles critical of the Party, and shortly afterwards, he was branded a "rightist" and purged from the staff. *Qin* was persecuted again

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during the cultural revolution and returned to work after the downfall of the Gang of Four. Before he started the Herald, he was the Party Secretary of the World Economy Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

Because of *Qin*'s preponderant role, the Herald had considerable access to popular figures, including important reform officials, and other sources of information. That access facilitated its interviews and reporting, which appealed to the reader with numerous original stories on the economic reform. As a result of *Qin*'s *Guanxi* (PR endeavor), the printing of the newspaper was undertaken by the printing house of Liberation Daily, a big official paper, and those serving on the board of directors included prominent scholars of politics, economics, and sociology such as Qian Junrui,[9] Huan Xiang,[10] and Wang Daohang,[11] and Xue Muqiao.[12] Thus, it was not unexpected that the small newspaper soon became a rising star among China's metropolitan newspapers.

AN ESTABLISHED NEWSPAPER[13]

When the Herald was founded, the few staffers were mostly "borrowed" from the World Economy Institute of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. In 1981 the bi-weekly became a weekly, and a swift rise in circulation enabled the Herald to expand its coverage and recruit new reporters and editors. In 1986 it became a sixteen-page newspaper, half of which was devoted to advertising. Many big enterprises, including joint-ventures and foreign-funded factories, became routine advertising clients of the Herald. By 1989 the independent news agency had increased its staff to 100, most of whom were ambitious young people known for their courage, caliber, and political sensitivity.

While most of Chinese news agencies had their new staff members assigned by the

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state, the <u>Herald</u> recruited theirs from among a variety of people through public examination. The basic requirement was not a college degree but a commitment to the profession and capability and experience in regard to specific jobs.[14] Some empathic young people joined the staff after their personal contact and interview with the editor-in-chief. Those who passed *Qin*'s rigorous examination often turned out to be promising journalists even though some of them did not graduate from journalism schools or prestigious universities. *Lu Ye*, who got his degree from a night university, became director of the editing department because of his journalistic caliber.[15] As an additional asset which distinguished the <u>Herald</u> from other newspapers, its staffers were required to have the foreign language competence to read international publications. The first deputy editor-in-chief, *Zhu Xingqing*, was such a journalist; he knows both English and German well.

Apart from that, some of the staff were either younger generation or students and admirers of famous newspaper owners before 1949 in Shanghai, which is the cradle of China's printed, broadcast and film media. In a sense, they inherited the refined traditions of the Shanghai press, which sharpened their critical reporting in the open-door milieu.

The editorial board of the <u>Herald</u> was comprised of five members--editor-in-chief *Qin* and four executive deputy editors-in-chief. While *Qin* attended to ideological and PR affairs and occasionally wrote for the newspaper, the latter took turns taking charge of the editing for the newspaper. Every Saturday *Qin* went to the printing house and made a last inspection of the newspaper before he signed his signature for the printing. For years he had been the <u>Herald</u>'s first and last gate-keeper, who ensured that the newspaper was properly edited, printed on the last weekday, and would be available on the next Monday morning.[16]

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The <u>Herald</u> had its own independent, national and international reporting and distribution systems. Within the country, it had a news branch in Beijing, Guangzhou, and later in the Shengzhen Special Economic Zone,[17] and its reporters and special contributors were scattered around other newsworthy areas.[18] Although exact information on the international reporters of the <u>Herald</u> is not available, there was a distribution agency in Hong Kong and New York.

In the mid-1980s, the <u>Herald</u> was able to send its reporters to cover academic activities in Hong Kong and South Korea as well as Africa and Latin America. The small weekly not only became known at home and abroad as one of the most out-spoken newspapers in China, it also was widely read by general readers other than intellectuals and government officials it originally targeted at. Consequently, the readership gained a rapid increase. Before it was closed down, its circulation number was 300,000, and 40 percent of its earnings came from subscription.[19]

In 1987, *Qin* planned to add an English division to the newspaper. He told D. Shanor, a contributing editor of the <u>World Press Review</u>, that the <u>Herald</u> attempted to seek funds from international foundations to publish an English edition but its application to Ford Foundation was not successful.[20]

A FORUM FOR DISSIDENT OPINIONS

The <u>Herald</u> published economic news from many parts of the country and the world. While introducing contemporary economic theories, policies and trends, it carried numerous feature articles advocating new perspectives and viewpoints in relation to current issues of political and economic reforms in China. Since its inception, the <u>Herald</u> voiced its support

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for diverse opinions and ideologies, and its editorial policy aimed to publicize them for promoting China's economic reform. Compared with many other newspapers in the country, the Herald served as a forum for various dissidents to air their views and critique the status quo, current policies and the existing bureaucratic political system.

The most appealing feature of the newspaper was that it published articles by many well-known political dissidents such as famous astrophysicist *Fang Lizhi*,[21] radical reformist *Weng Yuankai*,[22] investigative reporter *Dai Qing*,[23] and reform theorists *Cheng Yizi* and *Su Shaozhi*.[24] As hundreds of newspapers in China lauded the achievements of the reform, the critical statements from the Herald departed from the uniform voice, broadening the readership as well as readers' horizon. Thus, the Herald established itself among numerous Chinese newspapers and magazines as a most attractive, readable publication for both average readers and Party officials.

Since different, controversial and, at times, contrasting viewpoints on China's political and economic reforms were often first reported by the Herald, those articles were frequently reprinted by many other newspapers in the country. As a result, the small weekly was soon put on the list of the government censorship.[25]

Although Chinese journalists enjoyed relatively more freedom in the open-door milieu of the 1980s, there were only three leading publications in the country which openly supported dissident or radical standpoints. Apart from Beijing-based New Observers and Economics Weekly,[26] the World Economic Herald was the only one in the densely-peopled East, and in many respects it was the most courageous.

During the short-lived campaign against bourgeois liberalization in 1986, the Herald

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was a target of attacks from the Party conservatives. However, *Qin* remained adamant in his

conviction:

> We believe that the cause of the newspaper is just, and that it is in accordance
> with the times. I think that the movement of reforms and the open-door policy
> in China are irreversible. The campaign against bourgeois liberalization will be
> a short episode in our long history.[27]

In early 1987, China's press became more and more critical of malpractice by Party

officials in the reform. Official papers such as People's Daily, Economic Daily, and even

Xinhua News Agency did aggressive reporting and commentaries on these issues. The

Herald's unofficial voice was extremely outspoken. In order to deal with the censorship by

the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, *Qin* played his *pingpong* tactic: while he hit the

ball to the very edge of the table, it was still within the permissible boundary though looking

almost out of it. Guided by that principle, the Herald expanded its reporting on many

sensitive political and economic issues.

After the summer of 1986, the Herald carried a series of courageous but risky

reports, which included an article by U. S. Ambassador Winston Lord that criticized the

Chinese for the inequity in Sino-American trade. Later, without waiting for the official

Xinhua News Agency to announce the upcoming Sino-Soviet summit, it reported the news

after a Herald journalist learned it from the Soviet ambassador.[28] In the latter half of 1986, it

also published many "avant-garde" articles such as "Open Government: the Future of World

Political Development," "A Reexamination of Socialism," and "Law and Liberty."[29]

In February 1988, the Herald tackled the heated topic of "global citizenship,"

contending that if China did not pursue courageous reforms, it would be excluded from the

global citizenry. In mid-September, the Herald reprinted signed articles on that issue from

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both Beijing's People's Daily and Taipei's Central News Daily, arousing explosive repercussions in the country.[30] Apart from those, "Democratization is the Essential Problem for Political Reform," "Aspects of Power Economics," "Social Progress Requires Free Speech," and "The Way to a Socialist Parliamentary Democracy" were also carried in the newspaper, constituting the loudest outcry for democracy in China's press. While drawing peo'??'s attention to the critical issues on China's reforms, the Herald published a series of pamp ilets, books and monographs, and sponsored a number of seminars in China, to promote the research and debate on economic and political policies for the reforms.

Not coincidentally, liberal Party Secretary General *Zhao Ziyang* and his advisors were appreciative of the Herald, acknowledging the general orientation of the newspaper and its contributions to national reform.[31] In the 1988 Annual Competition for Best News in the Shanghai Press, the Herald's news report on "global citizenship" was awarded first prize.[32]

A Ban Shi Jian (Edition A Incident)[33]

On April 15, 1989, the disgraced former Party Secretary General *Hu Yaobang* died of a heart attack during a Politburo meeting. The mourning for the reformist who had been removed from his office in 1987 soon turned into a nationwide demonstration against corruption in the leadership.[34]

On April 19, the Beijing Branch of the Herald held a forum with New Observer in Beijing in memory of *Hu*. Some liberal-minded party officials including *Hu Jiwei*, President of the Chinese Journalism Institute and the former editor-in-chief of the Party's People's Daily, attended the forum.[35] Many dissidents and reformists such as *Dai Qing*, *Ren Wanding*, *Su Shaozhi* and *Rong Jian* made strong statements against the political bureaucracy

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and authoritarianism. *Yan Jiaji*, a political scientist and advisor to then Party Secretary General *Zhao*, pointed out: "China's main problem up to this day has been the lack of democracy since a handful of people can just talk [make decisions] among themselves and put aside the interests of the Chinese people."[36] Many at the forum echoed his viewpoint, and some referred to the 1987 dismissal of *Hu* as an "illegal change of leadership."[37]

The April 24 issue of the <u>Herald</u> devoted six pages to *Hu*'s funeral, giving extensive coverage of the forum. The radical comments, particularly those naming Party hardliners such as *Bo Yibo* and *Den Liqun*, apparently astonished the censors from the Municipal Party Committee.[38] The Party chief of Shanghai, *Jiang Zeming* (now the Party Secretary General), ordered that that edition, which the <u>Herald</u>'s staff called "Edition A," not be published, and "Edition B," a revised version, was to be printed instead.[39]

On that Friday, when the staffers at the <u>Herald</u>'s main office learned that Edition A was banned by the censor of the Municipal Propaganda Department, they managed to slip out some of the printed copies before they were confiscated along with the paper mold. News soon spread by mouth and via foreign media, and copies of the banned issue were found posted on Beijing campuses.

On the next day, *Qin* went to the printing house as usual, and stayed there until the workers left. However, he did not sign his signature for the printing of Edition B. On April 24, 1989, not a single copy of the <u>Herald</u> was on the morning news-stands nor received by subscribers. The wordless resistance angered the Party leaders, who accused the <u>Herald</u> of the demise of the Communist Party and the government. While *Jiang* announced that *Qin* must step down from his post for self-criticism, he reprimanded *Qin*, as a veteran Party

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member, for pretending to comply with the order of the Party leadership but refusing to carry it out. After *Qin* was ousted, *Jiang* held a committee meeting to elicit a consensus from the participants that this was not his personal decision but one by the entire municipal party leadership.

The dismissal of *Qin* outraged the Herald's staff, who considered him as a scapegoat of the journalist campaign for press freedom. *Qin*, too, resented the decision by the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. Many colleagues from the Liberation Daily, Wenhui Daily, and Youth Journal came to the office of the Herald in Huai Hai Road to express their support to the editor-in-chief; they signed a petition to the Shanghai government for the reinstatement of *Qin*.

LAST RESISTANCE, SUPPRESSION AND AFTERMATH[40]

On May 1 and 8, 1989, the Herald published its final two editions, which carried two articles in defense of its stand. "We Need an Environment of Liberty in Which We May Speak the Truth" was written by *Shen Peijun*, a noted journalism theorist in China, and "Without Press Freedom, Stability Cannot Exist" was contributed by *Hu Jiwei*.[41] An antithesis to the Party's hardline policies, *Hu*'s argument expressed the common wish of many journalists.

In the meantime, the Herald's staff drafted and publicized a letter rebutting in detail the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee's account of the Herald event. While reporters from AP, NBC and Kyodo came to interview *Qin*, the Herald held a news conference in Jinjiang Hotel at which *Qin* gave a long speech about the incident. Since many Chinese and foreign news reporters attended the conference, the news created great repercussions at home

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and abroad. However, the order came that the Herald be suspended indefinitely.

On May 4, 1989, hundreds of journalists from the nation's leading papers, including the People's Daily, the Guangming Daily, the Worker's Daily and the Farmer's Daily, held an unprecedented demonstration in Beijing. These journalists demanded that the government give greater press freedom to Chinese media, reinstate *Qin Benli* and lift the suspension of the Herald.[42] On May 9, a petition with the signatures of 1,031 journalists was submitted to the official All-China Journalists' Association, and the Herald issue was listed as the most important concern.[43] On May 19, martial law was declared by the government to suppress the upsurging student prodemocracy movement. Most of the Herald's staff, including *Qin*, took to the street to join the demonstration against the law and for national democracy and press freedom.

After the Tiananmen Square Crackdown on June 4, three staffers of the Herald were arrested.[44] *Zhang Weiguo* of the Beijing Branch, who organized the dissident forum in Beijing, was detained for "releasing secrete information" to foreigners.[45] One reporter was jailed for shouting slogans of "Down with *Li Peng* [the Premier of China] and *Jian Zeming* [the then Party Secretary of Shanghai]." The arrest of another journalist of the newspaper was not discovered by the staff until his briefcase lay on his desk for several days.

Everyone in the press was seized with fear because nearly all of them had participated in the street demonstration and the collective petition for the reinstatement of *Qin* and the resumption of the newspaper. However, no one regretted their overall support for the student movements. One middle-aged editor left his will to his close friend and prepared for the worst.[46]

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In mid-June 1989, a rectification team headed by *Liu Jie*, chief of the <u>Shanghai Daily</u> <u>of Science and Technology</u> (now the deputy chief of the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department), was sent to the suspended weekly to lead the so-called self-criticism among the staffers. A "back-to-back" tactic--a notorious human struggle device in the cultural revolution--was employed. Each of those under political examination was told that his or her "wrong doings" had been exposed by colleagues and all he or she could do was to confess to the authorities and expose the "crimes" of others. However, those who had gone through the cultural revolution could not be trapped again by this tactic. Everybody confined the "self-criticism" to themselves, resulting in great embarrassment to the rectification team.

On August 18, 1989, the <u>People's Daily</u> carried an article by the Xinhua News Agency, "The Revised Inside Story of the <u>World Economic Herald</u> Case," which denounced the weekly for inciting opposition to the Party and its pretended obedience but actual resistance to the Party's leadership. The resumption of the newspaper became hopeless. In March 1990, the <u>Herald</u> was officially closed.

During and after the ten-month period of self-criticism, the <u>Herald</u>'s staff was in immense anguish and agony. It was not that their income was affected for the <u>Herald</u> had a substantial saving as a collective fund, which ensured the staff of receiving their regular salaries and miscellaneous monthly allowances for some time. It was that most of them could not continue their journalist careers. The reason was simple--few news agencies dared to take the political risks of hiring the staff members from the <u>Herald</u>.[47] Some of them found jobs in other occupations, but the "key elements"--the most outstanding editors and reporters-- remained unemployed. Only with the aid of close friends did some of them get opportunities

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to work at joint-ventures or foreign-funded enterprises. *Zhu Xingqing*, the former deputy editor-in-chief of the Herald and director of China's World Economy Association, was dismissed from his working post while he was at the annual meeting of the WEA in Sichuan in the fall of 1991. Although with an official title of deputy senior research fellow, *Zhu* was still jobless in June 1992. In the early 1992, the Australia-sino Association offered an invitation to him for a six-month research in Australia, and Australia embassy in Beijing asked the Chinese foreign ministry for help in the matter. However, *Zhu* was still awaiting the approval of his application in the April of 1992.[48]

ECONOMIC REFORM, POLITICS AND PRESS FREEDOM

The Herald phenomenon is an epitome of Chinese social reform in the past decade. During its ten-year publication, the rise and fall of the Herald was contextualized by the fluctuation of the political situation in China. The rapid growth of the independent newspaper occurred in the liberal atmosphere of the 1980's, which, except for 1989, supersedes any other historical period in China since 1949. To a great extent, the open-door policy diluted the politicization of press publications, and the reduced pressure from government censorship, though varying from time to time, enabled the Herald to publicize diverse opinions, including dissident viewpoints, for nearly a decade. Had it not been for the overall social change, no *pingpong* tactics or any other circumventing tactics could have been reified in journalistic practices. Historically, it was the economic reform that gave rise to the birth and growth of the independent newspaper; yet the role of *Qin* and his colleagues must be highlighted.

Despite the usual close relationship between Chinese politics and journalism, the

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government control of mass media before the Tiananmen Square Incident was not as watertight as many Western journalists believed. Press controls were informal, flexible and largely uninstitutionalized, and the manner and severity of their exercise was largely dependent on time, place, political winds and personalities.[49] Under the censorship of the country's younger, educated leaders, dissident articles in general were still allowed for publication.[50]

The Shanghai government had its own concerns in the explosive situation of the pro-democratic movement. The Party officials attempted to prevent any provocative statements directed at specific leaders in the central leadership. Usually, the officials never used harsh words in discussion with *Qin*, since he was a senior Party member and a celebrity in Shanghai press circles. However, when they learned that the April 24 edition of the Herald, particularly the report concerning the Beijing dissident forum, was leaked to the Hong Kong press before the edition was censored, their soft tone stiffened, and ideological control revealed its stern nature.

Chinese newspapers have long been regarded as the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1957, communist chief *Mao Zedong* believed that many newspapers deviated from the socialist line. His article, "Wenhui Daily's Bourgeois Orientation Should be Criticized," which was carried in the official People's Daily, started an anti-rightist campaign with journalists and writers as the first target of persecution. It was not until the nightmare of the cultural revolution was over that the tamed Chinese press system was activated, and suppression was turned into creation.

In that transitional period, while most journalists awaited the advent of more

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opportunity, *Qin* perceived that political plurality would eventually replace a univocal voice in China's press. As his perception and ambition led to the establishment of a different type of newspaper, he attained his primary goal by making the best use of his savvy media experience, the collective wisdom, and ultimately, the most optimum social economic conditions and the most opportune time of the post-cultural-revolution period. The most important reason that he was able to run an independent newspaper was that he was most likely to win political support from the reformists in the Party leadership.[51]

The closedown of the Herald demonstrated that newspapers in China are not an institution of social power. Although an independent newspaper enjoyed more freedom in the new era than previously, journalism could not go beyond the critical demarcation between media and power. *Qin* did not bow to coercion and persevered in the principles of his newspaper, holding to his beliefs to his final day. Although he agreed with the authorities to change Edition A, he did not carry it out.[52]

In view of Chinese social reform, the fall of the Herald is not unusual. The debate of economic issues is inevitably entangled with sensitive political issues. In fact, the newspaper kept challenging the ruling communist system, its aging hardliners and their conservative policies, regardless of instructions from the authorities that the economic newspaper should be confined to economic affairs.[53] In China, when journalistic independence is in conflict with authoritarian politics, those out of line are hammered down first.

Qin and his colleagues were the victims of the political struggle in China. They were not intruders into the political sphere since all Marxist practitioners understand that economics is inextricably interwoven with politics. The journalists, like the students and

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other Chinese intellectuals, were infused by the blood of the eras, and what they fought for was press freedom and democracy in China. In reality, the closing of the Herald came as a prelude to the downfall of reformist Party Secretary General *Zhao Ziyang*. The Tiananmen Square Incident was merely a bloody footnote.

In China, journalism as well as journalists is always closely tied with politics. The repercussions at home and abroad placed the closed Herald in the spotlight. When *Qin*'s illness became worse, he was sent to the East-China Hospital.[54] Although word came from the central leadership that *Qin* would be taken good care of, the dauntless fighter for press freedom died of cancer on April 15, 1991. One month before his death, *Qin* left a note to his comrade *Zhang Weiguo*:

The spirit of the Herald is immortal.[55]

CONCLUSION

The World Economic Herald is a historical product of China's socio-cultural transformation. While the independent newspaper witnessed its rapid growth in the most spectacular period of contemporary Chinese history, throughout the ten years, its rise and fall was contextualized by the ardent support from the liberal Party leaders in juxtaposition with the strong opposition from the Party hardliners. Since the newspaper played the role of an unofficial opinion leader and reform policy adviser, its radical journalistic practices sped up the long process of China's democratization, and meanwhile, constituted a tangible threat to the Party's hardliners.

History evolves around a cynical cycle. Before 1949, several Shanghai newspapers were rigorously censored or even shut down by the nationalist government because of their

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pro-democratic and anti-government tendencies.[56] History repeated itself forty years later. The Herald was forced to close down because it fired potent shots at the existing political system and some incumbent leftist leaders, and because it strove to promote press freedom and economic and political reforms.

The Herald's tragedy coincided with the setbacks of the liberal reformists in China; it reflects the shifting nature of Chinese politics and journalism. Although the newspaper was not the most tragic case in the contemporary Chinese press history, it was a newspaper, if not the only one, that experienced a dramatic rise and fall in the baffling political struggle. The Herald and Qin and his fellow colleagues will be remembered by both Chinese and international journalists for their contributions to press freedom. Above all, the Herald's spirit embodies a historical advance in Chinese journalism.

NOTES

1. For instance, Stephens (1990) stated in <u>Global Journalism</u> that it was Mihail Grobachov's visit to Beijing that enabled the Chinese students to stage the 1989 pro-democratic demonstration in Tiananmen Square. In fact, the student demonstration had continued for some days before the former Soviet leader's visit to Beijing on May 15. For details, see Li Haibo, "Sino-Soviet Summit: Normalization at Last," <u>Beijing Review</u>, May 29, 1989, 16.

2. According to the wish of all the interviewees, this paper does not reveal any of their names.

3. I only quote from those who had direct contact or interviewed with Qin and other <u>Herald</u>'s staffers, for many foreign correspondents in China dispatched their reports to their home newspapers based on second-hand information.

4. Because of its geographic position and demographic composition, all of the contemporary Chinese politicians such as Jiang Jieshi (Chang Kaishei), Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping take Shanghai as a most important forefront of their political terrain.

5. In China, the government controls all the foreign currencies. Only in recent years did the situation change a little.

6. D. R. Shanor, "China's Trumpet of Reform," <u>World Press Review</u>, October 1987, 38.

7. This is a Chinese saying which means everyone has an equal share of income regardless of individual working performance. One of the objectives of the national reform is to eliminate the "Big Rice Bowl" in the changing distribution system so as to stimulate competition among individuals.

8. <u>Wen Hui Daily</u> was founded in the Japanese occupied Shanghai by Xu Zhucheng (Hsu Chu-cheng), who was a famous and legendary newspaper baron in China. The newspaper is noted for its varieties of reports and feature articles tailored to different tastes of urban readers. Wen Hui in Chinese means collection of literary quintessence.

9. Qian is a former Vice-minister of the Ministry of Culture, and Vice-president of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

10. Huan is a well-known specialist on international affairs.

11. Wang is a former Shanghai mayor, and currently President of the Association for Mainland-Taiwan Affairs.

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12. Xue Muqiao is a renowned, senior economist on national planning and development.

13. Most information in this section comes from the interviews.

14. In Chinese culture, and particularly in the social cultural milieu after the cultural revolution, college degree cannot be overemphasized in every line of profession. Salary-rise and personal promotion are hinged upon it.

15. Many students of night or TV universities are those who, in their golden youth, missed schooling and were forced to go down to countryside during the cultural revolution. In the current Chinese education system, those in their mid-thirties or forties can only receive in-service education from those universities. However, their life experience in the farms, factories and army units rewarded them with broad vision and high level of working knowledge.

16. To this date, the Chinese have held a six-day working system. Yet many _Herald_'s staff worked on elastic working hours.

17. Shengzhen is a newly-developed export-oriented city close to Hong Kong. The special economic zone is an experimental field of Den Xiaoping's reform package where capitalist production and management principles are practiced on a large scale.

18. Strictly speaking, there is no part-time stringer or free-lance reporter in China.

19. Qin, quoted in Shanor, 38.

20. Shanor, 38.

21. Fang used to be President of Chinese Academy of Science and Technology, one of the most prestigious universities in China. As a result of his sharp criticism of the top leadership including Deng Xiaoping, he was dismissed from his post and purged from the Party. He is now in exile in the United States.

22. Professor Weng is one of the earliest advocates for China's political and economic reforms. Many of his aggressive ideas were adopted or appreciated by the reformists in the Party.

23. Dai is the adopted daughter of the late Marshall Ye Jianying. As a news reporter for _Guangming Daily_ and a well-informed "insider," she never refrained herself from criticizing the communist leadership, which embarrassed and astounded the Chinese authorities. She was arrested after the Tiananmen Square Incident, and later was released and allowed to come to the United States as a visiting scholar.

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24. Chen headed the Research Institute of the State System Reform, an advisory organization under the direction of Zhao Ziyang, the liberal Party Secretary General. Su was former head of the officially sponsored Marxism-Leninism Research Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He was dismissed from his post because of his support of the 1986 student demonstrations and his reassessment of Marxism.

25. Interviewee A. Interview by author, Athens, Ohio, May 1992.

26. Wang Juntao, a famous dissident imprisoned after the Tiananmen Square Incident, used to work for the weekly.

27. Shanor, 38.

28. It is a common, though uninstitutionalized, practice in Chinese press that official news agencies such as Xinhua are to report important news before any other newspapers.

29. Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, "Don't Force Us to Lie," Voices of China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism, ed. C. Lee, (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1990), 117.

30. Central News Daily is a leading newspaper in Taiwan, published by a news agency controlled by the Nationalist Party. As it is anti-communist, its reports or articles were never reprinted in the mainland China.

31. According to one interviewee, Zhao never had direct contact with the Herald, but his advisors such as Chen Yizi and Yan Jiaqi kept their communication channel open to the Herald and wrote some articles for it from time to time. However, during the anti-liberalization movement in 1986 Zhao had to make a few statements to criticize Qin's aggressiveness.

32. Interviewee B. Interview by author, Athens, Ohio, May 1992.

33. The contributor to the Herald (one of my interviewees) is the major source of information for this section.

34. Hu's step-down results from his soft position during the anti-liberalization movement and the student pro-democratic movement. He is widely respected because he is straightforward, liberal-minded, and more importantly, his family are free from corruption.

35. Hu was member of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress (China's Congress) then. Liberal high-ranking officials Li Chang and Li Shuo also attended the forum. For details, see Dai Qin, "Reminiscence of the Spring of 1989," China News Digest,

Supplement 12, January 8, 1993, 3-4.

36. Andrew Giarelli, "The Final Days of the 'Herald,' <u>World Press Review</u>, May 1990, 26.

37. Ibid.

38. Usually, a printed copy of a newspaper on the list of censorship must be sent in advance to the censors from the Propaganda Department of the Party Committee. The newspaper must get the approval or make some adjustments according to the censors' opinion before the final publication. The censorship is to keep the newspaper in conformity to the general policies of the Party.

39. The revision is said to include an deletion of the names of Party hardliners as well as some critical statements.

40. Most inside information in this section was provided by the <u>Herald</u> contributor.

41. Hu was a former editor-in-chief of the <u>People's Daily</u> in the 1980s. As a reformist, he initiated the proposal of establishing Chinese press law for the protection of journalists. However, his endeavor met with failure and he was deposed by the Party hardliners after the Tiananmen Square Incident.

42. On May 3 1989, a group of journalists representing approximately thirty media organizations gathered in Beijing, preparing a letter to the Central Party Committee for the reinstatement of Qin. During the demonstration of May 4, the best-known slogan is "Don't force us to lie." It was the first time in the history of the People's Republic of China that journalists from the government-controlled newspapers held an open protest against the government. Although this demonstration was not solely held for the <u>Herald</u>, it reflects the outcry of the suspended newspaper in Shanghai, which was the most sensational issue in the field of journalism. For details, see Han Minzhu, "The Seventieth Anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement," <u>Cries for Democracy</u>, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990), 188.

43. Ibid., 190.

44. Another arrest was irrelevant to the democracy issue.

45. Zhang was detained and released several times. He is now a contributor to many overseas Chinese newspapers on China's reform issues.

46. The author happened to know his friend who kept his will. The editor was not arrested, however.

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47. A former journalist of a Shanghai local newspaper provided this information for me during his visit to the United States. He was well acquainted with most staff members of the _Herald_.

48. Wang Xingjian, "A Visit to Two [dissident] Journalists and a Look at Shanghai's Openness," _Cheng Ming_ 176, June 1992, 28-30.

49. Judy Polumbaum, "Outpaced by Events: Learning, Unlearning and Relearning to be a Journalist in Post-cultural Revolution China," _Gazette_, September 1991, 140.

50. The Shanghai Party Secretary Jiang Zeming graduated from Jiaotong University in Shanghai. He used to be a senior engineer. Chen Zhili, Chief of the Department of Propaganda, is a 1964 physics graduate of Fudan University. She was in charge of the censorship and later, the "rectification" of the _Herald_.

51. Qin was a veteran communist, whose revolutionary career was longer than the Party Secretary of Shanghai Jiang. As a senior newspaper and Party chief, he had the most important card for his journalist success--his personal network. However, having experienced turns and twists of many political movements, Qin remained more of a typical Chinese intellectual--liberal-minded, idealistic, and critical. While pursuing his journalist career, he abominated corruption, political misdemeanor and power intrigues. His socialist ideology was stamped with Confucian idealism, as he wishes for an orderly, democratic society where an independent newspaper could enjoy genuine press freedom.

52. According to one interviewee, Qin went through a fierce mental struggle before he made his final decision. That is what the authorities termed Qin's "actual disobedience with pretended agreement."

53. Hsiao Ching-chang and Yang Mei-rong, "Don't Force Us to Lie," _Voices of China: the Interplay of Politics and Journalism_, ed. C. Lee, (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1990), 117.

54. This is a well-equipped and well-staffed hospital in Shanghai, which primarily serves high-ranking officials of the government and military leaders in the East of China.

55. See Note 48.

56. Many Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) officials believed that the communists manipulated the newspapers to achieve their own purposes. Hence the closedown of the well-known _Wenhui Daily_ in 1947.

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BROADCAST NEWS IN JAPAN: NHK and NTV

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Introduction

During the past twenty years, the study of the American television news has been facilitated by both the availability of inexpensive VCRs for recording and playback, and the service provided by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, which has been recording and cataloging the nightly news at the three major US networks since 1968. Both the VCR and the Vanderbilt Archive have contributed to generating the data necessary for the analysis of story content and for a better understanding of the gatekeeping and agenda setting functions of the American broadcast news industry. However, as some critics have charged, the Television News Index and Abstracts has also contributed to an imbalance in world news research (Tsang, et al., 1987, cited in Cooper Chen, 1989). The ready availability of past US newscasts has influenced what researchers have chosen to study as well as the types of questions asked and hypotheses examined.

While the majority of broadcast news studies published in English have focused on American news programs, there was a growth in the interest in foreign news and in international communication studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Much of the early interest in foreign broadcast news can be traced to the charge of an imbalance in the flow of world news leveled by advocates of the New World Information Order (NWIO), and most of the early studies attempted to either support or refute the NWIO charges.[1] Although interest in the NWIO has declined since the late 1980s, research into foreign news broadcasts has continued with studies now focusing more on gatekeeping activities and the structure, content, and concept of news in either one country or in groups of countries for comparative analyses.[2]

Despite this increase in English language studies of foreign news broadcasts, information about television news in Japan, one of the world's leading economic superpowers, remains relatively scant. Cooper Chen (1992) noted that of 14 quantitative studies in English that deal with comparative television coverage of international and foreign news, only four, Kawatake (1982), Kitatani (1981), Sreberny-Mohammadi (1984), and Straubhaar et al. (1986), included Japan. Comparative qualitative news studies which include Japan also exist, most notably, Browne's (1989) comparison of six broadcast systems and Jacobs' (1990) journalistic style analysis. However, there are few, if any, descriptive or critical studies focusing exclusively upon the content of Japanese broadcast news available in English language publications. This does not mean to imply that such studies may not exist in Japanese language journals.

Of the few English language broadcast news studies which do include Japan, most examine the evening news at the highly respected, non-commercial NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai). However, there are four major commercial networks in Japan (Tokyo Broadcasting System or TBS , Nippon Television or NTV, Asahi National Broadcasting, and Fuji Telecasting), each with their own national newscast distributed to their affiliate stations throughout the nation. Although NHK produces the most highly watched newscast in Japan, many Japanese also tune into one of the several commercial network's evening news programs. However, exact numbers of viewers for Japanese newscasts are not easily obtainable. Stronach (1989) noted that in the populous Kanto area, NHK's 7:00 pm weekday news and weather program pulled in a healthy 24.7% rating, and NTV's Sunday evening news, the only commercial news program to be found in the ratings, had a 23.1% rating. Since these numbers are based on 1980's data, they may not be representative of current viewing habits. Furthermore, Omori (Foreign Press Center/Japan, 1990) noted that the Video Research Ratings, which are the best available in Japan, have been criticized for not being representative of the total television audience.

Focus of Study

The purpose of this study is to provide a descriptive analysis and a comparison of the national evening news as reported on two Japanese networks -- NHK and NTV. Since most English language studies of broadcast news in Japan have focused primarily on NHK, this comparison of the non-commercial NHK with a commercial network news program should be of particular interest to researchers attempting to generalize about broadcast news in Japan based on data collected from NHK only.[3] NHK was selected for this study because it is the undisputed leader of Japanese broadcasting. Whereas it would have been desirable for comparative purposes to include the evening network news from all four commercial networks, the recording, translation, and subsequent analysis required was beyond the scope of and funds available for this study.

NTV was selected for comparison with NHK for several reasons. It nearly approximates NHK's 7:00 pm news in length (30 minutes), hour of broadcast (NTV- 6:00pm), and presentation style (male and female co-anchor). Other commercial newscasts were broadcast in different dayparts, were of varying lengths, and several had different presentational styles. However, most importantly for this study, NTV and NHK provide a professional simultaneous English translation of their entire newscast. The bilingual service provided by these Japanese networks, as well as the technology available to record either or both audio channels, eliminated one of the major obstacles researchers have in analyzing "foreign" news programs; that is, obtaining accurate translations of the sampled newscasts in order to conduct the analysis.

Using the methodology of content analysis, similarities and differences in news selection, story emphasis, and presentation style are noted. In general terms the study attempts to answer the question, do viewers watching one network receive a similar or a different view of national and international events than viewers watching the other network exclusively?

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In specific terms, the study addresses the following questions:

1. Is there agreement on what goes into a newscast at the two Japanese stations?

2. What are the most important categories of news stories as reported by the two networks? Is this concept of news consistent with the concept of news in other countries, and in particular, the United States?

3. Are the lead stories at the two networks similar, thereby indicating a similarity in the definition of news?

4. What is the frequency of crime reporting in a nation boasting one of the lowest crime and arrest rates in the world?

5. How much of the news hole is devoted to the reporting of international news?

6. When compared to US network news, are the two Japanese networks routinely reporting the same international stories?

Method

The early evening newscasts on two Japanese networks -- NHK (7:00 pm) and NTV (6:00 pm) -- were selected for analysis and comparison in this study. The two national newscasts are not in direct competition with one another. Both news programs originate in Tokyo and are carried throughout Japan by their network of affiliated stations. NTV's national news is followed by a half hour of local news produced by the individual affiliates, while NHK's national news is neither followed nor preceded by a local news report.

Unquestionably, NHK is the most prestigious network in Japan. Modeled after the BBC (British Broadcasting Corportion), NHK relies primarily on licensing fees imposed on all television sets for its operating revenue which amounts to well over one billion dollars annually (Dominick, 1990). The NHK news was recorded from the NHK-G (General) network station in Sendai, a major metropolitan area in Miyagi-ken in the Tohuku region north of Tokyo. NTV, also with headquarters in Tokyo where their national news is produced, is a commercial network and relies primarily on advertising for revenue much like any commercial network or station in the United States. The NTV news was recorded from their affiliate station, MMT (Miyagi Television) in Sendai.

The 30-minute evening newscasts on both stations were recorded for a period of five weeks beginning on Monday May 25 and ending on Friday, June 26, 1992. The composite, or constructed, week method chosen for coding was based on the following pattern: week #1 Monday, May 25; week #2 Tuesday, June 2; week #3 Wednesday, June 10; week #4 Thursday, June 18; and week #5 Friday, June 26. This pattern was selected rather than a random pattern so as to maximize the number of days between coded broadcast and to minimize a potential clustering effect of one story dominating the news. This one-day-plus-one-week composite week method modifies slightly the procedure employed by Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. (1985) who used a one-day-plus-two-week formula for constructing a composite week.

Although both NTV and NHK broadcast 30 minute newscasts, there were differences in the size of each network's newshole. NTV's 30 minutes included five and a half minutes of commercial messages but did not include daily sport scores nor weather reports. Both sports and weather were covered by the NTV affiliate stations in their local news reports. Noncommercial NHK had no advertisments but devoted an average of three minutes daily to sport scores and weather reports. Therefore, for comparative purposes, sport scores and weather reports were not coded in NHK's total news time. This left NHK with an average daily newshole of 25 minutes 55 seconds, and NTV with an average of 22 minutes 30 seconds. Transitions between stories and introductory news clips were also omitted from the total coded news time at both stations.

The basic unit of analysis was the news story. Not counting NHK's daily sport scores and weather reports, 157 stories (total for NHK and NTV) were coded for length, position in newscast, anchor / reporter gender, news locale, and news category. Based on the results of coding a preliminary subsample of Japanese newscasts, the following 19 news categories were established:[4]

      1) politics / government

      2) economics/business/finance

      3) international trade

      4) military / defense / war

      5) crime

          a) violence / violent crime

          b) white collar crime

      6) disaster / accident

      7) agriculture

      8) technology / science

      9) health / medical

      10) sports

      11) culture / art/ entertainmt

      12) environment / ecology

      13) education

      14) legal / law

      15) human interest

      16) labor

      17) consumer information

      18) weather

      19) other

All 157 stories were first coded by the author, and then 20% of the sample was recoded for category placement only, yielding an intracoder reliability of .969 using Hotsti's (1969) method. A trained second coder coded all 157 stories for category placement yielding a coefficient of agreement of .949 using Holsti's method. Holsti's method was used because the number of categories (19) was relatively large thereby reducing the probability of chance agreement which is the primary objection to the Holsti method. It was not necessary to recode for length since the original coding was done on a VCR capable of providing a digital readout of story length. For the section on the comparison of the US and Japanese network coverage of foreign news, the three major US network newscasts, ABC, CBS, and NBC, were examined using Vanderbilt University's Television News Index and Abstracts.

Findings

For the composite week, NHK reported a total of 92 stories (excluding daily sport scores and weather reports) for a total of 129 minutes 35 seconds of news, and NTV reported 65 stories for a total of 112 minutes 20 seconds of news. NHK reported an average of 18.4 stories/newscast compared to an average of 13 stories /newscast at NTV. Average story length at NHK was 1 minute 25 seconds; at NTV it was 1 minute 43 seconds.

Insert Table 1

Table 1 lists the number of news stories reported in each category at both NHK and NTV for the composite week. Consistent with the findings from news studies of other countries, "politics and government" heads the list with the most number of stories reported at both stations (see Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; Stempel, 1985; Canino and Huston, 1986; Straubhaar et al., 1986 cited in Cooper Chen, 1989; Surlin, Romanow, and Soderlund, 1988). The top four categories ("politics and government", "economics, business, finance", "disaster/accident", and "crime") at both networks are the same, although the rank order is different because of NTV's greater emphasis on crime reporting. NTV reported 14 crime-related stories, making it the second most reported story type and only one story less than their 15 "politics and government" stories. NHK reported only 6 crime-related stories and 27 "politics and government" stories for the composite week.

Insert Table 2

This different emphasis in story selection at the two networks becomes even more pronounced when total reporting times, rather than the numbers of stories in each category, are compared. Table 2 lists total reporting time, in minutes and seconds, for each coded category of news at the two networks. NHK reported 43 minutes 30 seconds (33.6% of total reporting time) of "politics and government" related stories while NTV reported 18 minutes 25 seconds (16.4% of total reporting time), less than half the

NHK total. With repect to "economics, business, and finance" news, NHK reported 20 stories for a total of 24 minutes (18.5% of total reporting time), compared to NTY's 8 stories totaling 9 minutes 50 seconds (8.8% of total reporting time). As with "politics and government" reporting, NTY's "economic" reporting was less than half of what NHK reported.

Looking at "crime" and "disaster/accident" reporting, the two other "most reported" categories at both stations, a reverse situation was found. NTY's 14 crime-related stories accounted for 26 minutes of reporting time, while NHK's 5 crime-related stories accounted for 10 minutes 35 seconds of reporting time, less than half the NTY reporting totals. In the "disaster/accident" category, NTY and NHK each reported 6 stories. However, NTY reported a total of 28 minutes 15 seconds of "disaster/accident" news compared to NHK's 12 minutes 40 seconds.

Unlike American network news reports (ABC, CBS, NBC), which are often indistinguishable from one another in terms of content and thereby signaling a conformity in news values (Surlin, Romanow, and Soderlund, 1988), the national news reports at the two Japanese networks, NHK and NTY, offer a distinct difference in coverage. These two Japanese networks may be providing a choice for some viewers, and complementary information for others since the two news reports are broadcast at different times.

Although other differences as well as similarities exist in the NTY and NHK newscasts, their different approach to crime reporting is particularly revealing, and explains much about each station's definition of news and gatekeeping activities. However, broadcast reporting of crime in Japan must be examined within the context of Japanese society, the organizational structure of broadcast news, and the placement of the crime story within the newscast.

Crime Reporting at NTY and NHK

Murder, armed robberies, assaults, and other acts of violence, often considered to be a staple of American broadcast news, are generally found within the domain of local news in the US. Violent crimes are rarely reported as part of the network evening newscast in the US unless the crime is excessively violent, unusual, or bizarre. This division of crime reporting in the US can be explained in part by the territorial distinctions made between local news and national news but moreso by the fact that the US is the industrial world's leader in violent crime. In comparison with the US, Japan has a relatively low crime rate.[5] Considering the average size of the news hole (20 minutes 30 seconds) in the evening news at the three major US networks, it would be impossible to cover all the crime, or even the major crimes, committed daily in the US.

Based on Japan's low crime rate, a crime story occurring anywhere in that nation might be expected to rate highly in terms of news value, and therefore be included in the evening national newscast. But, there is a wide range in the number of crime stories reported at the two stations with NTY reporting almost two-thirds more crime-related stories than NHK. And, if the American model of national/local reporting were followed, it would be expected that NTY, which is linked with a local news report, would have fewer crime-related stories than NHK. However, the opposite is true in Japan.

This raises a question about news values and whether NTV is purposely emphasizing crime stories, or NHK is purposely excluding important crime stories from their newscasts. As an indication of relative importance of crime-related stories, it is useful to look beyond the numbers and minutes of the crime reports, and note the types of stories included in the crime coverage, how crime stories rank in story sequencing, and if the crime-related stories reflect coverage of Tokyo only or of the entire country.

For the composite week, NTV devoted 23.1% of their total newscast time to reporting crime-related stories compared to NHK's 8.2% for the same period. This observable difference in crime reporting is even more striking when the type of crime reported is examined. For the purpose of this analysis "crime" was divided into two sub-categories: (1) violent crime (e.g., murder, armed robbery) and (2) white collar crime (e.g., tax evasion, loan scandals, embezzlement).

At NTV, six stories were classified as "violent crime", seven stories were identified as "white collar crime", and one story profiling yakuza (Japanese mafia) operations did not fit either subcategory. Of the six violent crimes reported at NTV, three were from the Tokyo metropolitan area, two were from other regions of Japan and one was an international story, indicating that NTV is not concentrating only on Tokyo stories.[6] Furthermore, NTV used a violent crime story to lead the newscast on two of the coded days.[7]

At NHK, all five crime-related stories were coded as "white-collar crime", indicating that NHK either purposely avoids the reporting of violent crime or does not view violent crime as fitting into their network's definition of the news. And, unlike its commercial counterpart, NHK is not followed by a half hour of locally produced news where crime stories might be covered in the community where they occurred.

Either NHK is routinely omitting the coverage of violent crime in Japan, thereby maintaining a false sense of security in the viewing audience, or perhaps NTV is overstating the importance of violent crime and taking an approach to news which includes stories chosen to titillate the audience. This inclusion of violent crime stories may be a method of increasing audience appeal, a known revenue-enhancing strategy in the US market which may be equally effective in the Japanese market. The assumption that NTV is attempting to capture audiences with stories that titillate is reinforced by an examination of the lead and second story at the two networks for each of the coded days.

Lead Stories – NTV and NHK

When comparing the three major US networks (ABC, CBS, NBC), most studies have found hard news story selection to be relatively consistent at the three networks. For the days under analysis in this study, the three major US networks selected the same lead story on three of the five days, and for the remaining two days of the composite week, two of the US networks had the same lead story (see Table 3). In the United States, a consistency in both news values and gatekeeping functions is responsible for such similarities on any given day.

Insert Tables 3 and 4

However, NTY and NHK had the same lead on only one of the five days (see Table 4). This was on June 2, 1992 when the lead story on both stations was about a rush hour commuter train crash which left one passenger dead and 164 injured. It was a story that generated considerable interest and concern in a nation which relies heavily on the railroad for domestic transportation. Both NTY and NHK provided extended story coverage (NTY: 11 minutes 30 seconds, NHK: 6 minutes 30 seconds), and both stations provided similar details of the actual crash.

For the remaining four days in the composite week, NTY led the newscasts with stories that would best be described in American terms as "sensational", and occasionally bordering on what might be referred to as "tabloid television". For example, their May 25 broadcast led with a 2 minute 25 second story about the attempted murder of well-known Japanese film director who had recently completed a feature film about the Japanese *yakuza*. The gunmen were believed to be Tokyo-based yakuza wanting revenge for the unflattering film. NTY's June 18 newscast led with a 3 minute 50 second report about a shark attack on a small fishing boat in the Inland Sea, and the June 26 report led with a 1 minute 45 second account of the murder of a Japanese businessman in the Philippines. None of these three lead stories (attempted murder, shark attack, Philippine murder) were covered by NHK.

NTY's 6 minute 30 second lead story on June 10 about a membership scam at a major golf club which bilked almost 52,000 people was also covered by NHK, although NHK's story appeared as the fourth report eight minutes into the newscast and received three minutes of coverage.

The most revealing aspect of the differences in story selection and story placement at the two networks is that the lead story at NHK for each of the study days, except the day of the major train crash, was the second story in NTY's newscast. For example NHK led the June 10 newscast with a 4 minute 30 second story about the PKO (Peace Keeping Operations controversy); NTY's second story was about the same developments (3 minutes 45 seconds). NHK's June 18 lead (3 minutes 15 second) covered a precipitous decline in the Nikkei (Japanese stock market); the same story appeared in NTY's report as the number two story (2 minutes) (see Table 4) . This difference in the selection of the lead story, and the similarity of NHK's lead and NTY's second story reinforces the assumption that NTY is attempting to capture their audience with sensational stories. After catching the audience with a sensational lead, NTY's news values begin to more closely resemble the news values at NHK.

Since NTY's national news is broadcast at 6:00 PM, they are not in direct competition with NHK's 7:00 PM national newscast. This raises the question: why does NTY emphasize crime-related stories? The answer appears to be two fold: (1) NTY is in competition with one other newscast and several entertainment programs, and (2) as explained by the executive producer at MMT, the local NTY affiliate in Sendai, the 6:00 PM audience is more heavily female, and in the opinion of the producers, Japanese women are not interested in the more complicated political and economic stories of the day (Executive Producer

MMT News, personal interview, 8/5/92).

Top Story

During the period of this news analysis (May 25, 1992 - June 26, 1992), the PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) Bill controversy dominated the national consciousness in Japan and was the one recurring story appearing almost daily in both newspapers and broadcast news. Differences in NHK's and NTY's amount of coverage of this crucial issue further explains the difference between the two networks' approach to news.

The PKO issue focused on whether or not Japanese defense forces (which function as a domestic army or a national guard) should be allowed to participate in worldwide United Nations peace keeping operations. Those in favor of the bill permitting participation generally believed Japan had a responsibility to contribute to world peace efforts beyond helping to pay the bills as they had done in the Gulf War. Those against passage of the PKO Bill favored a more pacifist Japan, and believed that permitting domestic defense forces to participate in peace keeping activities on foreign territory was unconstitutional.[8] The proposed PKO legislation precipitated heated debates in the Diet (Japanese Parliament), "ox-walking" or delaying tactics by Diet members, and mass resignations of Diet members. Daily rallies and protests for and against the bill were common in major population centers and on college campuses throughout the country. In addition, anti-Japanese/PKO demonstrations were held in several other Asian countries, most notably South Korea and the Philippines. The PKO Bill was debated in the Diet during May and early June, and passed in mid-June. By late June, PKO troops were being trained for their first overseas assignment (Cambodia).

The expectation is that the PKO story, which generated such an extraordinary amount of controversy, would dominate the news. Indeed, it was the top story in terms of recurring coverage on the two networks during the composite week. NHK reported 8 PKO-related stories for a total of 17 minutes 20 seconds of coverage, and NTY reported 5 PKO-related stories for a total of 9 minutes 35 seconds of coverage for the same period (see Table 5).

Insert Table 5

With NHK exceeding NTY in coverage of politics-related stories, it is no surprise that NHK provided 7 minutes 45 seconds more coverage of the PKO issue, reinforcing the general perception that NHK provides the most comprehensive coverage of important issues of the day.

Anchor and Reporter Gender

Anchor and reporter gender in American broadcast journalism has been an important research question since the early 1970s (see Ziegler and White, 1990). On the surface, the issue may not appear as important in Japan where almost all newscasts are co-anchored by a female and a male, both of whom strive for anonymity on the set (Christopher, 1983). However, to ascertain whether the female/male coachor format was an example of true gender equality on the Japanese broadcast news set or merely "window dressing" as had been found in some American studies, each story was coded for gender of both the newsroom anchor and, if applicable, the location reporter.

Insert Table 6

Table 6 lists the number of stories reported by the female and male anchors and location reporters at both NTV and NHK during the composite week. The NHK figures do not include the daily sport scores, which were always reported by the male co-anchor, nor the weather, which was always reported by the female co-anchor. At NHK, 39 stories (42.4% of the total) were anchored by the male, 52 stories (56.5% of the total) were anchored by the female, and only 1 story (1.1%) was co-anchored. At NTV, 38 stories (58.5% of the total) were anchored by the male, 13 stories (20.0% of the total) were anchored by the female, and 14 stories (21.5% of the total) were co-anchored.

While it appears that the female anchor dominated the reporting at NHK and the female anchor dominated the reporting at NTV, looking only at the number of individual stories reported by each anchor can be misleading. A more precise indicator of the division of male/female anchoring and reporting would be a comparison of the number of seconds each anchor was on-air during the newscast. However, this proved difficult to calculate. With the use of location reporters and multiple cuts to visuals with voice-overs during many of the stories, it was often difficult to distinguish whether the voice-over was that of the anchor or that of the location reporter. Therefore, an alternate method which counted the newsbrief segment as one story was developed for comparing reporting by gender.

Approximately three minutes of both the NHK and NTV daily newscast were devoted to the "newsbrief segment" consisting of four to seven short (20-30 seconds) stories reported by one anchor with video or graphic backup. For the composite week, the newsbrief segment at NHK was reported exclusively by the female anchor, and at NTV it was reported exclusively by the male anchor thereby inflating the actual number of stories reported by these two anchors. Combining the several newsbrief stories and counting them as one report yields a slightly different gender breakdown at the two networks.

These revised story totals for gender comparison are reported in Table 6 as "combined newsbriefs". Using these figures, the breakdown of anchor reporting by gender at NHK is male: 39 stories (57.4%); female: 28 stories (41.2%); and co-anchor: 1 story (1.5%). At NTV the totals are male: 22 stories (44.9% of the total); female: 13 stories (26.5%); and co-anchor: 14 stories (28.6%). Using the combined newsbrief figures, the male anchors at both networks dominate the newscast reporting.

However, the female anchor at NHK still reported more stories than her counterpart at NTV.

Insert Table 7

Examining the number of stories reported by the male and female anchor in each news category adds additional insight into the division of labor on the news set (see Table 7; note that each newsbrief story is included individually). At NHK, "politics/government" stories are divided almost equally between the two anchors, while the female anchor reported almost twice the number of "economic-related" stories than her male coanchor. Additionally, the female anchor outpaced her male counterpart in reporting stories in the important hard news categories of international trade, military/defense/war, and disaster/accident. At NTV, the situation was different. For the composite week, the hard news stories of "politics/government", "economics", "crime", and "military/defense/war" were almost exclusively in the domain of the male anchor. When the female anchor reported any stories in these four categories, it was generally a longer story reported in conjunction with the male anchor. The only two categories where the female anchor at NTV anchored more than one story on her own were in the "softer" news categories of environment /ecology (3) and culture /art /entertainment (2).

Unlike their American counterparts in national network newscasts, Japanese women have a daily presence on the news set. However, the generalization stops there because significant differences exist between NTV and NHK. Clearly, there is more equality and a fairer division of labor between the male and female anchor at NHK. Using the "combined newsbriefs" figures, the female anchor at NHK reported more than 40% of the stories on her own. Without combining the newsbrief segments, she reported 56.5% of the stories compared to 42.4% reported by her male counterpart. At NTV, more than half of the stories were delivered solely by the male anchor. Even with combining the newsbriefs segments at NTV, the male anchor outpaced the female anchor 44.9% to 26.5%. When examining reporter gender by story category, the female anchor at NTV reported few "hard news" stories, while the female anchor at NHK exceeded er male counterpart in reporting stories in the important hard news categories such as politics and the economy.

The presence of the female anchor in Japan may have more to do with the Japanese ideal of visual balance than with a sense of gender equality in the newsroom. In Japanese television programming, variety shows rarely have a solo host, talk shows rarely have a solo moderator, and news programs rarely have a solo anchor. Women appear in most of these televised programs as adjuncts or sidekicks to the men (see Richie, 1992: 205-208 for a discussion of the secondary role of women in TV, radio, and the traditional Japanese arts). The female anchor at NTV appears to fit into this "adjunct" pattern. She reported slightly more stories (14) in conjunction with her male co-anchor than she reported on her own (13).

With repect to field reporting, women location reporters were virtually non-existent in both network newscasts for the composite week. At NTV, 18 of the 19 location reports were filed by men, and at NHK, all 18 location reports were filed by male reporters. Despite NHK's gender equality on the news set, it appears that in Japan, the field is no place for a woman.

Kokuseika and International News

Japan has had a long history of closing and opening up to other cultures. Currently, there is a movement in Japan for *kokuseika* or "internationalization". Government officials, business leaders, and educators are vocal about the need for the Japanese to be less insular in both attitude and practice. Japan's aggressive world trade policies and practices have made the nation a primary force in the world economy, while their post World War II Constitution has encouraged their isolation in the international political arena. The PKO issue, discussed above, is an example of a political controversary associated with *kokuseika*; that is, should the government encourage the "internationalization" of Japan or should the nation remain politically isolated. Public opinion ranges from strong support to vocal rejection of the *kokuseika* movement.

To determine the news media's contribution to the "internationalization" of the Japanese television news audiences, all news stories in this study were coded as "domestic" or "international" with respect to both content and story location. Since the internationalization movement has gained momentum in recent years, it was anticipated that the number and percent of international stories at NHK would be higher than the figures found in Cooper Chen's (1989) study based on 1986 data. It also was anticipated that the number of international stories would be higher at NHK than at NTV. This second expectation was based on NHK's reputation as a relatively well-funded public corporation with the staff, capital, and equipment necessary for international reporting, as well as the belief that "NHK generally reports only weighty domestic and international "hard" news stories" (Stronach, 1989: 149).

All 157 stories coded for the composite week on both NTV and NHK were identified as either "domestic" or "international" in origin. Any story reporting events taking place within Japan was listed as "domestic", and any story reporting events taking place outside Japanese territory was listed as "international". All "international" stories were further identified as either "foreign news abroad" or "home news abroad". A story which focused on an event taking place on foreign territory and did not focus on Japanese nationals was categorized as "foreign news abroad" (FNA). Included in this category were stories such as the US presidential campaign, and the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. If a report focused on a Japanese national or a Japanese event in a foreign country, that story was identified as "home news abroad" (HNA). For example, a story about a Japanese businessman murdered in the Philippines, and a story about a Japanese Sumo team visiting Spain and Germany were identified as "home news abroad". Finally, the locale of each international story was identified to ascertain the breadth of each network's international reporting effort.

Insert Table 8

For the composite week, NHK reported 17 foreign news stories, representing 18.5% of their total story count (see Table 8). Thirteen of NHK's stories were identifed as "Foreign News Abroad" and 4 stories were identified as "Home News Abroad". For the same time period, NTV reported 13 foreign news stories representing 20.0% of their total stories for the composite week. Ten of these stories were identifed as "Foreign News Abroad" and 3 stories were identified as "Home News Abroad".

These findings for foreign news reporting at NHK are lower than previously reported findings. Cooper Chen (1989) noted in a five country sample of broadcast news that Japan's NHK had the lowest percentage of stories devoted to foreign news reporting (22.6% of total stories reported) thereby placing Japan at the very bottom of the insularity listing of the five countries.[9] Considering that NHK's 18.5% and NTV's 20.0% of foreign news stories are both lower than the earlier finding of 22.6% at NHK, the expectation that the level of international reporting would have increased over the 1986 data was inaccurate.

Cooper Chen (1989: 7) pointed out that the more economically developed and comfortable a nation (as in the case of Japan), "the more they can afford the luxury of covering events at home to the exclusion of news from overseas." While this can describe the low level of international reporting at the two Japanese networks, it is not applicable to the US networks where the number of foreign stories falls in the middle range between "very insular" and "extremely global". The case of the US networks devoting a moderately high level of attention to foreign news could be attributed, in part, to the presence of local newscasts focusing on regional stories in the US, thereby placing international and national news primarily in the domain of the networks. However, at Japan's NTV, where the national news is followed by a local newscast, the level of international reporting is equally as low as NHK's, and therefore this argument is not applicable to the Japanese experience. Clearly, other factors, such as the extent of a nation's participation in international affairs, must be identified as an important indicator for `he level of international reporting in the newscast of an economically developed nation.

In analyzing a nation's level of international reporting, it is equally useful to examine the amount of air time devoted to foreign news (see Table 8). Whereas NTV had a slightly higher percentage of their story count devoted to foreign news than NHK, they reported 4 minutes 5 seconds less of foreign news than NHK. NTV's 13 international stories accounted for 16 minutes 35 seconds (FNA: 9 minutes 15 seconds, HNA: 7 minutes 20 seconds) or 14.8% of total newstime. NHK's 17 international stories accounted for a total of 20 minutes 40 seconds or 15.9% of the total newscast time. Thirteen of NHK's stories (16 minutes 30 seconds) were categorized as "Foreign News Abroad, and four stories (4 minutes 10 seconds) were identified as "Home News Abroad". If the "Home News Abroad" time is subtracted from total foreign news reported at each station, the results indicate an even higher degree of insularity in Japan.

Two other areas for comparison of international reporting are: (1) story category and (2) story locale or region.   More than 50% of the foreign news reports at each network were categorized as "Politics/Government", following the same pattern for all reporting at each network as well as the pattern of reporting found in other countries. Comparing international stories at NHK and NTV by geographical location indicates another difference between the two networks (see Table 9). Although NTV had fewer stories with a foreign dateline, their coverage was more evenly distributed throughout major world regions (Asia- 3 stories , USA-3 stories, Western Europe-4 stories). At NHK, 7 of the foreign news stories, which accounted for 50.4% of their international reporting, originated from Asian countries. Of the two networks, NHK is following the expected pattern in foreign reporting; that is, their foreign reports most frequently originate from countries in close proximity; in this case, the Asian continent. (see Warren, 1988: 222).   NTV's wider geographical spread of international reporting may reflect their effort to be more inclusive or simply, their willingness to utilize more of the many satellite video news feeds now available to the Japanese media.

Despite the subtle differences in foreign reporting at NHK and NTV, in general, both networks report relatively few international stories.   In a nation that produces much of the world's electronic news gathering equipment and which has a reputation for an extensive network of foreign correspondents, international reporting at the networks remains low. Using the level of international reporting as one indicator of a country's insularity, the conclusion is that Japan remains relatively inward-looking rather than global in its orientiation. The content of broadcast news in Japan has not been influenced by *kokusaika* .

International News - NHK, NTV, ABC, CBS, NBC

The selection of stories for a newscast is dependent on a variety of factors generally defined as a station's gatekeeping activities. Producer's news judgement, station marketing techniques, and anticipated audience appeal are just a few of many factors contributing to the decision regarding what fills the daily news hole.

To determine the similarities and differences in international story selection at NHK and NTV, all foreign reports at one network were compared with the foreign reports at the other network for the composite week. Patterns of story inclusion and exclusion were noted. Furthermore, all the foreign news reports at these two Japanese networks were compared with the foreign news reports at the three major US networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) for the same composite period. This was done to compare the level of international reporting by the Japanese and US networks and also to compare the patterns of story inclusion and exclusion in the two countries. Vanderbilt University's <u>Television News Index and Abstracts</u> was used to identify foreign news reported by the US networks for each coded day as well as for the day

previous to the coded date. The inclusion of the previous day's stories was based on the assumption that a specific foreign news story reported on a Japanese network might have been reported in the previous day's newscast in the US due to the 13 hour time difference between Tokyo and New York (DST).

Insert Table 10

Table 10 lists the international stories that appeared on: 1) both NHK and NTY, and 2) at least one Japanese network and one US network. For the composite week NHK and NTY reported five similar international stories. These were the pro-democracy movement in Thailand (5/25), the US primaries (6/2), the Earth Summit (6/10), the proposed Thai consititution (6/10), and the Yeltsin/Bush agreement (6/18). There were six stories, pro-democracy movement in Thailand (5/25), Earth Summit in Rio (6/10), events in Libya (6/10), and three separate reports on violence in Bosnia (6/10, 6/18, 6/26), that were covered by at least one network in both countries. Another four stories, US primaries (6/2), Yeltsin/Bush agreement (6/18), astronauts at Kennedy Space Center (6/26), and a US rail strike (6/26), coded as foreign news in Japan, were carried by the US networks but coded as domestic stories. For the composite week, there were 13 foreign news stories (10 FNA, 3 HNA) carried by NHK and/or NTY that were not covered by any US network, and there were 27 foreign news stories reported by one or more of the US networks that were not covered by either Japanese network.

Although the Japanese networks are not routinely covering most of the same international stories covered by the US networks nor as many foreign stories as the US networks covered, many of the international events reported in the US do not have a direct impact on nor hold an interest for the majority of the Japanese viewing audience. For example, a Haitian refugee story (5/25 ABC, NBC), the ambush of American military in Panama (6/10 ABC, CBS, NBC), and the possibility of American POWs in Russia (6/18 CBS, NBC) are of interest to most Americans but have little impact on the average Japanese viewer and therefore would possess low news value in Japan. Similarily, Japanese network reports about Sumo wrestlers visiting Spain, or demonstrations in Korea and the Philippines against Japan's PKO activities, would have low news value for an American television news audience.

Stories datelined from the Middle East, such as on-going Lebanese/Israeli tensions (5/25 ABC, NBC; 6/26 ABC) also may be of little interest to the Japanese viewing audience. However, it can be argued that by not covering the stories, there will continue to be little interest by the Japanese in the politics of the Middle East and Japan will continue to look inward rather than beyond its borders.

Several patterns emerge when comparing NHK's and NTY's foreign news reporting. The pro-democracy movement in Thailand was the only story to receive continuing coverage by both networks (NHK 5/25, 6/10 and NTY 5/25, 6/10). This probably can be attributed to the importance of the story as grass-roots, political-change in an Asian region country. Ethnic violence in Bosnia received continuing coverage by NTY (6/10, 6/18, and 6/26) but no coverage by NHK. By most definitions of news this was an on-going story with a high news value; however, NHK chose not to report it, at least

not during the composite week. Why did NTV decide to follow the story? They may have seen the news value and/or it may have fit in with their news program's emphasis on violence. Since they had no location reporter associated with the story, they most likely had access to the visually riveting footage through a satellite feed. NTV also reported the Boipatong (South Africa) massacre, a major story carried by all three US networks, while NHK again chose not to report that story. NHK reported four stories from Korea (6/2, 6/2, 6/10, 6/26), one of Japan's nearest neighbors, while NTV had no reports during the composite week from that country.

Comparing actual international stories reported by the Japanese networks with the US networks for the same date can be tricky because of the thirteen hour time difference. Examining the time devoted to international reporting and numbers of stories reported by the Japanese networks as compared with the US networks for the same date offers a more reliable point of comparison (see Table 8). NHK and NTV devoted 16.0% and 14.8%, respectively, of their total news time for the composite week to the reporting of foreign news. For the same period, ABC devoted 26.6% of their total newscast time to international coverage, CBS devoted 30.4%, and NBC devoted 15.7%, placing NBC's international coverage in the same low range as both NHK's and NTV's.

NHK reported 17 foreign news stories (18.5% of total stories) and NTV reported 13 foreign news stories (20.0% of total stories.) For the same period, ABC reported 19 foreign news stories (32.2% of total), CBS reported 12 foreign news stories (24.0% of total, and considerably less than the Cooper Chen (1989) finding of 42.3%), and NBC reported 17 stories (28.8% of total).[10] While the time devoted to international reporting at NHK and NTV is lower than the time devoted to international reporting at ABC and CBS, the actual number of international stories reported durng the composite week remains within the range of stories (CBS's low of 12 to ABC's high of 19) reported by the US networks.

Conclusion

NHK has been referred to as the "crowning glory of Japanese television" (Christopher, 1983: 206). In many ways their evening newscast lives up to that reputation. The network presents a sober, professional news program with a "hard" news emphasis. NHK outpaces the commercial NTV evening news with more than double the amount of time devoted to the more weighty "politics" and "economics" stories.

Whereas the presentation style of the news at NTV is very similar to that at NHK, there are major differences in the content of the two news programs. NTV's emphasis on crime reporting, especially violent crime, sets the tone for their daily newscast. There is a clear intention to grab and titillate the audience with the first story. NTV does cover the hard news, that is, the major political and economic stories of the day, but their reports are generally shorter, less comprehensive, softer, and appear later in the newscast than the same stories at NHK.

Although some of NTV's "crime" reports were questionable as lead stories (e.g., shark attack, Philippine murder), they possessed news value. The surprise is that NHK shied away from violent crime stories entirely. A viewer watching NHK exclusively for their news would receive a distorted picture of

Japan as a nation with no violent crime. However, Japan is a media-saturated society. It has the highest ratio of newspaper circulation to population of any country in the world (569 copies per 1000 persons in 1985) (Nippon Steel Human Resources Development, 1988: 161), almost 100% literacy, and five national broadcast television networks including NHK and NTV. An important crime story would not go unnoticed. Therefore, it is most likely that the networks are simply carving out their niche and trying to capture a particular segment of the audience, rather than attempting to reach the entire mass audience. The fact that the two networks broadcast their evening news in different time slots reinforces the assumption that they are attempting to appeal to different audience segments.

A wide variation also exists in NHK's and NTV's use of men and women anchors. Although both networks use male and female co-anchors, the female anchor at NTV takes a backseat to the dominant male anchor who handles most of the reporting and almost all of the hard news. NHK divides the anchoring responsibilities more equitably between the co-anchors. However, when it comes to filing reports from the field, both stations rely almost exclusively on male reporters.

When compared with other countries' newscasts, international or foreign news reporting at both NHK and NTV remain at the low end of the range. Foreign news reports as a percentage of the total stories reported at NHK dropped slightly since 1986. Approximately half of NHK's foreign reports came, as expected, from Asian countries (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia), while NTVs foreign news reports were more evenly distributed throughout Asia, Europe, and North America. Both stations included several reports categorized as "Home News Abroad" (NTV-3 stories, NHK - 4 stories). These stories focused on such topics as sumo teams visiting Spain and Germany, a Japanese golfer participating in an American tournament, and a Japanese astronaut at the Kennedy Space Center. Stories involving Japanese nationals attract a high level of interest among domestic viewers, and therefore, as Japan becomes more involved in world affairs, a higher level of international reporting can be expected. As noted, the PKO story attracted the most interest and generated the most coverage during the period of the composite week. Recently, Japan has indicated an interest in greater PKO participation in UN and world peace keeping activities (Sanger, 1993). With greater Japanese participation in international affiars, undoubtably the news crews will follow.

Notes

[1] Proponents of the NWIO argued that a disporportionate amount of the world's news originated and flowed from the politically and economically powerful nations of the world, and that the coverage of less developed countries focused on negative issues such as poverty, instability, and corruption (see Kawatake, 1982, for a brief description of the the NWIO controversy).

[2] For a listing of international and foreign news studies see: Cooper Chen (1989) p. 8 notes #1 & #2; and Dupagne (1991) p.16 note #1.

[3] Kawatake's (1982) study of broadcst news in eight countries included both NHK and TBS in Japan.

[4] Both sports and weather were included in the category coding list for major sports and weather stories which were not part of the routine sport scores and daily weather forecast at NHK as well as for major sports and weather stories included in the NTV report; e.g., a major golf tournament in the USA which received 75 seconds of coverage was coded as a "sports" story.

[5] Crime rates per 100,000- Homicide: USA/ 8.7, Japan /1.1; Forcible Rape: USA/ 38.1, Japan/1.3; Robbery: USA /233, Japan/ 1.3; Larceny-Theft: USA/5078; Japan/1204; Source: Keizai Koho Center (1992).

[6] These stories were : (1) a serial burglar menacing Tokyo -area hospitals, (2) an attempted murder of a student by his classmate, (3) an attempted murder of Tokyo-based film director, (4) a suicide of a prominent businessman now being investigated as a murder , (5) an armed robbery in a small town resulting in a death, (6) the murder of Japanese businessman in the Philippines.

[7] The lead story on NTV for 5/25/92 was the attempted murder of a well-known Japanese film director, and on 6/26/92 it was the murder of a Japanese businessman visiting the Philippines.

[8] The post World War II Japanese constitution specifically prohibited Japan from maintaining a military for anything but defensive purposes.

[9] Cooper Chen's five country sample included: Jamaica, Sri Lanka, United States, Colombia, and Japan. The definition used to identify internationa: news was nearly identical to the definition used in this study. Cooper Chen identified Jamaica as having the highest proportion of international stories (52.7%) and the United States, represented by the CBS Evening News, was in the middle range with 42.3% of the stories devoted to international events. Japan's NTV was not included in this study.

[10] The three US networks reported the following average number of international stories per day for the composite week: M-5.6, T-1.3, W-3.3, Th-3.0, F-3.3. Monday 5/25 was the Memorial Day holiday in the US and the networks reported more international stories than the average. Tuesday, June 2, was a major presidential primary day in the US and the three network reported fewer international stories than the average.

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Table 1

News Stories Reported at NHK & NTV by Category (in rank order)-Composite Week

NHK[a]		NTV	
1. Politics & Government	27	1. Politics & Government	15
2. Economics/business/finance	20	2. Crime[b]	14
3. Disaster/Accident	6	3. Economics/business/finance	8
4. Crime[b]	5	4. Disaster/Accident	6
5. Culture/Art/Entertainmt	5	5. Environment/Ecology	4
6. Environment/Ecology	4	6. Military/Defense/War	4
7. Labor	4	7. Legal/Law	3
8. Military/Defense/War	4	8. Agriculture	2
9. Sports	4	9. Culture/Art/Entertainmt	2
10. Health/Medical	3	10. Human Interest	2
11. International Trade	3	11. Sports	2
12. Agriculture	2	12. Consumer Information	1
13. Education	2	13. Education	1
14. Law/Legal	2	14. Technology/Science	1
15. Technology/Science	1	15. Health/Medical	0
16. Consumer Information	0	16. International Trade	0
17. Human Interest	0	17. Labor	0
Total	**92**		**65**

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[a] excludes daily sport scores and weather reports
[b] combines all crime categories

Table 2

Time (min:sec) Devoted to Each Category of Reporting (listed in rank order)
NHK and NTV – Composite Week

NHK	time	%		NTV	time	%
1. Politics & Government	43:30	33.6%		1. Disaster/Accident	28:15	25.2%
2. Economics/business/finance	24:00	18.5%		2. Crime	26:00	23.1%
3. Disaster/Accident	12:40	9.8%		3. Politics & Government	18:25	16.4%
4. Crime	10:35	8.2%		4. Economics/business/finance	9:50	8.8%
5. Culture/Art/Entertainment	6:30	5.0%		5. Sports	6:40	5.9%
6. Sports	4:35	3.5%		6. Environment/Ecology	4:55	4.4%
7. Health/Medical	4:20	3.3%		7. Technology/Science	4:25	3.9%
8. Military/Defense/War	4:20	3.3%		8. Military/Defense/War	4:10	3.7%
9. Environment/Ecology	3:50	3.0%		9. Education	2:15	2.0%
10. Agriculture	3:35	2.8%		10. Legal/Law	2:15	2.0%
11. Labor	3:30	2.7%		11. Agriculture	1:30	1.3%
12. International Trade	3:15	2.5%		12. Human Interest	1:20	1.2%
13. Education	3:10	2.4%		13. Culture/Art/Entertainment	1:15	1.1%
14. Law/Legal	1:15	1.0%		14. Consumer Information	1:05	1.0%
15. Technology/Science	:30	0.4%		15. Health/Medical	--	--
16. Consumer Information	--	--		16. International Trade	--	--
17. Human Interest	--	--		17. Labor	--	--

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Table 3

Lead and Second Story – ABC, CBS, NBC– Composite Week

<u>ABC</u>	<u>CBS</u>	<u>NBC</u>
5/25/92		
1. Haitian Refugees	Haitian Refugees	Haitian Refugees
2. Memorial Day Observance	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia
6/2/92		
1. Campaign '92	Campaign '92	Campaign '92
2. Campaign '92 – California	US / China Trade	Airfares
6/10/92		
1. Panama	Panama	Second hand smoke
2. Earth Summit	Unemployment	"Cop Killer" Lyric Controversy
6/18/92		
1. Campaign '92	Urban Aid	Urban Aid
2. US / Russia relations	Foreign Cars & Minority Consumers	Campaign '92
6/26/92		
1. Navy– Sexual Harassment	Navy– Sexual Harassment	Navy– Sexual Harassment
2. Bosnia	Bosnia	Supreme Court & School Desegregation

Table 4

Lead and Second Story - NHK and NTV- Composite Week

NHK	**NTV**
5/25/92	
1. Loan Scandal	Attempted Murder-Film Director
2. Thailand Unrest	Loan Scandal
6/2/92	
1. JR Train Crash	JR Train Crash
2. PKO Bill	Bank Embezzlement
6/10/92	
1. PKO Bill	Golf Club Membership Fraud
2. Demonstration Against PKO in Korea and Philippines	PKO
6/18/92	
1. Stock Prices - Drop	Inland Sea Shark Attack
2. Japan and Development Assistance	Stock Prices Drop
6/25/92	
1. Annual Shareholders Meetings in Japan	Japanese Man Murdered in Philippines
2. PKO to go to Cambodia	Annual Shareholders Meetings in Japan

Table 5

PKO Controversy- Coverage by NHK and NTV - Composite Week

	NHK		NTV	
Total PKO Stories	8		5	
Percent of Total Stories		8.7%		7.7%
Total Time (min:sec)	17:20		9:35	
Percent of Total News Time		13.4%		8.5%

Table 6

Reporting by Anchor/ Reporter Gender – NHK and NTV – Composite Week

		NHK		NTV	
		all stories	combined newsbriefs[a]	all stories	combined newsbriefs[a]
Male-studio	#	39	39	38	22
	%	42.4%	57.4%	58.5%	44.9%
Female-studio	#	52	28	13	13
	%	56.5%	41.2%	20.0%	26.5%
Male & Female studio	#	1	1	14	14
	%	1.1%	1.5%	21.5%	28.6%
Male-location	#	18	--	18	--
	%	100%	--	94.7%	--
Female-location	#	--	--	1	--
	%	--	--	5.5%	--

[a] Newsbrief segments for each day counted as one story.

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Table 7

Reporting by anchor gender in each news category at NHK and NTV

	NHK			NTV		
	Male Studio	Female Studio	M & F Studio	Male Studio	Female Studio	M & F Studio
1. Politics & Government	13	14	-	12	1	2
2. Economy	7	13	-	7	-	1
3. International Trade	1	2	-	-	-	-
4. Military/Defense/War	1	3	-	3	-	1
5. Crime	-	-	-	1	-	-
a. Violent	-	-	-	2	1	3
b. White collar	4	1	-	5	1	1
6. Disaster/Accident	2	4	-	1	1	4
7. Agriculture	-	2	-	1	1	-
8. Technology/Science	-	1	-	-	1	-
9. Health/Medical	2	1	-	-	-	-
10. Sports	4	-	-	1	-	1
11. Culture/Art/Entertainment	2	3	-	-	2	-
12. Environment/Ecology	2	2	-	-	3	1
13. Education	-	1	1	1	-	-
14. Legal/Law	-	2	-	3	-	-
15. Human interest	-	-	-	1	1	-
16. Labor	1	3	-	-	-	-
17. Consumer information	-	-	-	-	1	-
18. Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	39	52	1	38	13	14

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Table 8

Foreign News Reporting at NHK, NTV, ABC, CBS, NBC – Composite Week

	NHK	NTV
All Stories	92	65
Foreign News Stories	17	13
Foreign News-percent of total	18.5%	20.0%
Foreign News Abroad (FNA)-Stories	13	10
percent FNA of Total Stories	14.1%	15.4%
Home News Abroad (HNA)- Stories	4	3
percent HNA of Total Stories	4.4%	4.6%
Total News Time (min:sec)	129:35	112:20
Foreign News Time	20:40	16:35
Foreign News- percent of total	16.0%	14.8%
Foreign News Abroad (FNA)-Time	16:30	9:15
percent FNA of Total Time	12.7%	8.2%
Home News Abroad (HNA)	4:10	7:20
percent HNA of Total Time	3.2%	6.5%

	ABC	CBS	NBC
All Stories	59	50	59
Foreign News Stories	19	12	17
Foreign News- percent of total	32.2%	24.0%	28.8%
Total News Time (min:sec)	104:10	102:00	103:00
All Foreign News	27:40	31:10	16:10
Foreign News- percent of total	26.6%	30.4%	15.7%

Table 9

Foreign News Stories Reported by Region of Origin - NHK and NTV - Composite Week

	NHK				**NTV**			
	# of Stories	Time	% of Foreign News Time	% of Total News Time	# of Stories	Time	% of Foreign News Time	% of Total News Time
Asia	7	10.25	50.4%	8.0%	3	4:30	27.1%	4.0%
N. America	4	4:00	19.4%	3.1%	3	5:25	32.7%	4.8%
Western Europe	3	3:40	17.7%	2.8%	4	4:10	25.1%	3.7%
Latin Am./Caribbean	1	1:30	7.3%	1.2%	1	1:15	7.5%	1.1%
CIS	1	:35	2.8%	0.5%	1	:45	4.5%	0.7%
International Waters	1	:30	2.4%	0.4%	-	-	-	-
Africa	-	-	-	-	1	:30	3.0%	0.5%

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Table 10

Foreign Stories Covered by Either Both Japanese Networks
or
One Japanese Network and One or More US Networks

Date	Story	Network Coverage
5/25	Thailand: pro-democracy	NHK, NTV, ABC (5/24, 5/25), CBS (5/24)
6/2	US Primary Elections[a]	NHK, NTV
6/10	Earth Summit	NHK, NTV, ABC (6/9, 6/10), NBC
	Bosnia	NTV, ABC (6/9, 6/10), NBC (6/9, 6/10)
	Thai Constitution	NHK, NTV
	Libya/Kadhafi	NTV, NBC
6/18	Bosnia	NTV, ABC, CBS (6/17), NBC (6/17)
	Yeltsin/Bush Agreement[a]	NHK, NTV
6/26	Cape Canaveral/Astronauts[a]	NTV, (covered by 3 US networks on 6/25)
	Bosnia	NTV, ABC, CBS, NBC
	US Rail Strike[a]	NHK, (covered by 3 US networks on 6/25)

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[a] covered as a domestic story by ABC, CBS, and NBC

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Colonial Broadcasting

Philosophies in British Africa 1924-1968

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For many Americans, colonialism is the second or third chapter of a grade-school history book; a distant concept far removed from personal experience. For many Africans, by contrast, colonial domination is a past reality manifest in the memories of the living. When most African nations gained independence in the 1960s [see map 1], the radio was for many a fact of life. Local radio stations were invariably the fruits of a colonial legacy. In addition, Africans were the targets of broadcast messages from as far away as Beijing and Washington. However, the colonial broadcast systems which dominated African airwaves were not the result of any monolithic force. Broadcasting to and within British Africa [see map 2] emerged out of a framework of competing interests and concerns. Educational broadcasting in Africa was thus held hostage to the needs of the empire at large and to dominant groups within its borders. This paper will outline conflicting ideologies manifest within the context of educational broadcasting to Central and Southern Africa between 1924 and 1968.

II   For the Man in the Back of Beyond: 1924-1939

Broadcasting on the African continent evolved out of a struggle among European nations for political and military supremacy. In 1915, at the height of World War I, the German government launched a cross border assault using the electronic airwaves. This external news service used radio telegraphy to project Germany's perspective into the international arena.[1] As technologies changed, and transmission of verbal communication became more feasible, the European powers began to experiment with the possibilities of radio's global reach.

By 1924, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was able to transmit a speech by King George to as many as 10 million listeners around the world.[2] The targeted audience for such programs were the European settlers, missionaries, and

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[1]Burton Paulu, British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 386.

[2]Thomas G. August, The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940 (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, ed. Robin W. Winks. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 97. King George's speech marked the inauguration of the British Empire Exhibition.

administrators throughout the colonized world.[3] Countries with relatively large, stable populations of European settlers also developed broadcast systems during this period. The first radio station on the African continent began transmissions in 1920 from Johannesburg, in what was then the Union of South Africa (S.A.).[4] The municipality of Durban, S.A., was quick to follow suit, inaugurating a station in 1924.[5] Kenya was the first of the British colonial territories to begin regular broadcasts in 1928.[6]

Ignored by broadcasters during the 1920s were those British colonies which did not have large settler communities. This disregard was indicative of a larger policy of "benign neglect," which often characterized the British colonial administration of southern Africa. The Bechuanaland Protectorate epitomized this British laxity. As early as 1887, the first assistant commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate was instructed by the colonial office in London that he should not "interfere with Native Administration; the Chiefs are understood not to be desirous to part with their rights of sovereignty, nor are [sic] her Majesty's Government by any means anxious to assume the responsibilities of it."[7] The neglect of the region was furthered by the adoption of the South Africa Act of 1910, which suggested that the three British Crown Colonies of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), and Swaziland would eventually be incorporated into South Africa. Under such an arrangement, Britain had little incentive to invest in the infrastructural development of the region.

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[3]Sydney W. Head, "British Colonial Broadcasting Policies: The Case of the Gold Coast," African Studies Review 22 (2 1979), 39-47, 39. In the case of Britain, a major market was to be found in North America, where there was both substantial interest in news 'from the motherland' and large numbers of radio listeners eager to record reception of signals from around the world.

[4]Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (Revised 1956 ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1957),245. See also Joshua Brown, Patrick Manning, Karen Shapiro, Jon Wiener, Belinda Bozzoli, and Peter Delius, eds., History from South Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices (Critical Perspectives on the Past, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 391-396. White settlers gained independence from Britain with the passage of the South Africa Act of 1910. The Union of South Africa existed until 1961 when South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth, after which it became known as the Republic of South Africa.

[5]Asa Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting (Vol. I. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 323.

[6]J.F. Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," African Affairs 71 (283 1972), 176-185, 177.

[7]Quoted in Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, 499

The British decision to begin broadcasting to Africa must be viewed within the context of a general expansion of radio broadcasting throughout Europe in the 1920s. The Netherlands was the first of the European powers to begin regular external radio broadcasts.[8] This development was followed quickly by the initiation of external services by Germany in 1929, France in 1931, and Britain in 1932 [see map 3].[9] The initial rationale for the development of an "Empire Service", given by the director general of the BBC, was that broadcasting could provide "a consolidatory [sic] element within the Empire, which in these days one cannot well ignore."[10]

The key element in this process of consolidation, as far as the British were concerned, was "the isolated man in the back of beyond to whom any contact with this country would be a very good thing."[11] Maintaining contact with British expatriates living in these remote areas necessitated the development of a system of relays and rebroadcasts [see map 4]. This, in turn, led to the realization of a second objective, that of "helping the newly established broadcasting stations overseas against circumstances which we have not had to face here."[12] By 1934, the BBC was suggesting to the government that it provide direct assistance to those colonies which were starting broadcasting stations. Broadcasting in the colonies thus developed in response to three conflicting policies: the transfer of the BBC broadcasting model; the extension of BBC services to colonial expatriates; and the development of local broadcast services.[13]

Programming in the initial phases, was generally appropriated directly from the domestic service of the BBC. It consisted of vaudeville acts, light music, commentaries

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[8]Sydney W. Head, World Broadcasting Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Wadsworth Series in Mass Communication, ed. Rebecca Hayden. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1985), 347.

[9]Ibid. The BBC began experimenting with short-wave broadcasting in 1927 but did not begin its service until December of 1932. See Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting, 322-323; also Asa Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless (Vol. II. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 370-372; British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1959 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1958), 39.

[10]See Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 379.

[11]BBC Director of Empire and Foreign Services C.G. Graves, notes of a lecture on 'Dominion and Empire Broadcasting,' December 9, 1933, quoted in Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 372.

[12]Ibid.

[13]See Elihu Katz and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 77.

and dance music.[14] In developing and maintaining contacts, culturally symbolic representations were often used to evoke memories of "the motherland". Chief among these were the chimes of Big Ben, thought by BBC personnel to be extremely popular with listeners.[15] While no accurate survey of listeners was available in 1934, there are indications that less than 100,000 radio receivers were operating in Britain's forty-seven colonies. The BBC had earlier expressed confidence in its ability to guarantee a sixty to eighty percent reception rate among these listeners.[16] From available accounts it seems that the BBC programming was reaching at least part of that intended audience. In response to the Empire Listener Research Scheme, one listener noted: "In the colonies most of our listening takes place when we have done our day's work [as we] (especially in the tropics) are sitting back and having a drink; therefore light entertainment is required, not programmes of educational value."[17] The wife of a colonial civil servant, in describing the conditions in which she was forced to live, suggested that "it is very hot and wet, and light entertainment and interesting talks are all I can be bothered with."[18]

Although the BBC aspired to be a consolatory element within the Empire, the system which evolved favored a unidirectional flow of information. Programming was developed which focused on life and events in Britain. The 1936 Report of the Plymouth Commission recognized:

> Regular daily contact with the Home Country (and at times with other parts of the Empire) and the repeated projection on the minds of listeners overseas of British culture and ideas, and all that this implies must exert a great influence. The effect of this in the long run is perhaps the more valuable, because it is neither direct nor deliberate.[19]

One of the few empire-wide broadcasts originating outside of the British Isles during radio's early years was made from the top of Table Mountain, S.A., in March 1933. The

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[14]See British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Yearbook 1934 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1934), 255-256.

[15]Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 383. Notions regarding the popularity of these icons was based on intuition rather than the results of any formal research.

[16]Great Britain. Colonial Office, Colonial Office Conference 1930: Summary of Proceedings (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), 19.

[17]Quoted in Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 410.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Finding of the Plymouth Commission. Quoted in Head, "British Colonial Broadcasting Policies: The Case of the Gold Coast," 39.

African Broadcasting Corporation arranged for a broadcast marking the arrival of the British monarch (King George V) in Cape Town.[20] The costs of this broadcast were substantial because the program was transmitted via telephone to London, recorded, and subsequently rebroadcast throughout the empire.[21]

The importance of South Africa within the Empire Service of the BBC should not be underestimated.[22] The BBC took an active role in assisting the Union government of General Barry Hertzog to structure its broadcasting system. This assistance led to a trip to South Africa by the director general of the BBC in 1934.[23] A direst result of Reith's visit was the introduction of a Schools Broadcasting program developed on the British model.[24] South Africa also was seen as important because of its perceived influence throughout the region. Circulation of South African newspapers for example, extended far beyond the Union. This, in turn, was seen as promoting a European style of journalism and -- perhaps more importantly -- the English language.

The policy of projecting Britain and British things (values, norms, goods, services, etc.) into the international arena by the BBC became more important as the political situation in Europe deteriorated in the 1930s. British policy in this regard ran counter to the wishes of the League of Nations, which encouraged its members to use radio "to

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[20]See William A. Hachten and C. Anthony Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 47. The African Broadcasting Corporation was a commercial venture started in 1927. The corporation eventually evolved into the state-run South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).

[21]For a personal account of the BBC broadcasts from the top of Table Mountain consult D.G. Bridson, Prospero and Ariel, The Rise and Fall of Radio: A Personal Recollectior (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1971), especially 133-141.

[22]The importance of South Africa to the BBC may be due, in part, to the fact that representatives of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were willing to contribute to the costs of developing the Empire Broadcast Service. Great Britain. Colonial Office, Colonial Office Conference 1930: Summary of Proceedings, 20.

[23]See Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 389. The director, Lord Reith, is said to have considered the report that he wrote for the South African government to be one of the most important documents of his carrier. For Reith's account of this trip consult J.C.W. Reith, Into the Wind (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949), especially 196-205.

[24]UNESCO, Broadcasting to Schools: Reports on the Organization of School Broadcasting Services in Various Countries (Vol. 661. Paris: UNESCO, 1949)135. This service was provided in English and Afrikaans. It was directed specifically toward 'European' and 'Coloured' schools. The UNESCO report states that "Native schools do not participate (p.138)" and indicates that a major hindrance to the effective implementation of Schools Broadcasting was the "presence of backward races especially the natives (p. 139)."

create better mutual understanding between peoples."[25] In 1936, the League went so far as to ban the broadcast of material which was detrimental to international relations.[26] Britain and other European countries, however, continued to engage in a global war of words. The escalation of hostilities into World War II played an important role in the transformation of the Empire Service.[27] While British communities overseas would remain the most important target of the BBC for years to come, the focus of attention now began to shift toward the indigenous populations of the colonies and to maintaining contacts with Allied forces.

III   The Projection of Britain: 1929-1945

The directorate of the BBC, with first-hand knowledge of the strides made by other countries, tried to interest the British government in the potential of an empire service as early as 1927. Many in the government did not see the need for external broadcasting, nor were they eager to commit vast sums of taxpayer money for the provision of these services. As a result, the government was slow to respond to the geopolitical potentials of radio.

The BBC took the initiative in developing trial broadcasts. By 1929 BBC engineers were working with the Foreign Office in developing program guidelines for a future short-wave external service. In memoranda circulated during that year it was suggested that external services were needed to combat a tide of foreign broadcasts. These memoranda further recommended that, while much of the programming could be taken directly from the home service, some programming would have to be designed for specific regions.[28] The BBC had, by July 1930, convinced members of the Colonial Office Conference that the establishment of an empire-wide service was needed. In

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[25]Gerard Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 40.

[26]The League of Nations provided no means of operationalizing the term 'detrimental to international relations' nor did the international body have any means of enforcing it's prohibition.

[27]Asa Briggs, The War of Words (Vol. III. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 491.

[28]See Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, 374. Broadcasts emanating from the United States were singled out in these memoranda as being especially troublesome.

testimony before the Colonial Conference, the director general of the BBC contended that "The Empire is presumably entitled no less than others to diffuse its ideas and its culture, and it is not impossible to conceive of a situation in which deliberate recourse to propaganda ... might become desirable."[29] This sentiment was repeated throughout the years leading up to World War II. In a 1935 memorandum from the BBC to the British Government, the broadcasting corporation outlined its belief in the power of the new medium:

> Broadcasting itself is new; it is so potent an influence that its development should not be hindered by precedents and susceptibilities, nor by considerations of financial stringencies. Already other countries have followed our lead and are securing to themselves that which their short wave services were designed to secure, the interest and gratitude of empire communities. From this more serious consequences -- commercial and political -- may follow. There is no time to be lost.[30]

The memorandum went on to suggest that Britain would have been in the lead in developing an external service except for bureaucratic delays in the early years of development. The memo also noted that "broadcasting [should] be institutionalized and treated as an organic interest in the Colonial Office and in all the colonies."[31]

The BBC-Empire Service officially went on the air in December 1932. For the next five years all external transmissions were made in English. The Germans, however, responded to the BBC's external transmissions with a campaign of English language broadcasts, using a number of powerful short-wave transmitters. Officials at the Foreign Office made increasingly urgent pleas for the government to consider the introduction of foreign language broadcasts. The extension of broadcasting to other languages was finally considered in 19__ when the Ullswater Committee convened to review BBC conduct prior to the granting of a second charter. The BBC directorate, in testimony before the committee, indicated that the Nazi government in Germany was using radio to

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[29]Lord Reith, quoted in August, The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940, 96.
[30]Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 34.
[31]Ibid., 35.

further its economic and political aims and that unless Britain did the same, the country would lose its prominence in the world.[32] The director general also stated:

> It is possible for the German station to use a more concentrated type of beam transmission than we can employ....This means that in certain areas where the danger of foreign political influence through these channels may exist (for example, in mandated territories in Africa)...the transmissions in question can be picked up with the utmost facility. News bulletins, which we have reason to believe are prepared in the German Ministry of Propaganda, are read at fixed times in English and other languages.[33]

This testimony had the desired effect. The Ullswater Committee recommended that additional funding be provided to the BBC for an appropriate use of foreign languages "in the interests of British prestige and influence in world affairs."[34]

A few in the BBC were less willing to include foreign language broadcasts in the Empire Service. As late as 1937 a BBC report noted:

> To introduce foreign languages into the Empire Service would...inevitably prejudice the integrity of the Service. The Service would be addressing part of its programmes specifically to foreign countries: it would, *pro tanto*, be indulging in propaganda: and in doing so, it would lose its present indisputable title to be called an Empire Service.[35]

Whatever misgivings the BBC may have had regarding the appropriateness of foreign language broadcasts proved to be a moot point. Fearing the effects of Italian propaganda in Palestine, the Foreign Office went ahead without the knowledge of BBC and developed an Arabic language service of its own. The inability of the Foreign Office to effectively deal with problems associated with the creation of its service led to the BBC being given control of all foreign language programming.[36]

By 1938 the BBC had been requested by the government to begin broadcasts in Arabic, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish.[37] It is significant that British

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[32]See Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting*, 42.

[33]Lord Reith, quoted in Briggs, *The Golden Age of Wireless*, 393. For Reith's perspective of events surrounding the investigations of the Ullswater Committee consult J.C.W. Reith, *Into the Wind*, 215-248.

[34]Briggs, *The Golden Age of Wireless*, 395. Upon receipt of the final report of the Ullswater Committee, Reith noted that "it gives all we want but it is a wretched document with several silly and annoying things in it." Charles Stuart, ed. *The Reith Diaries* (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1975), 169.

[35]Quoted in Philip M. Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 193-194.

[36]For a full accounting of the Foreign Office's experience with overseas broadcasting see Taylor, *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939*, especially 44-80.

[37]British Broadcasting Corporation, *BBC Handbook 1959*, 39.

broadcasts of Dutch, German, and French did not initially target continental Europe, but focused instead on the populations in colonial and former colonial territories.[38] Transmissions of Spanish and Portuguese also were directed first toward Latin America.[39] Following initial hesitancy on the part of some BBC officials, the number of foreign languages broadcast increased significantly. By the end of 1943, there were more than forty-six languages being transmitted, and twenty-five countries were involved in the re-transmission of BBC programming.[40]

Prior to the declaration of war, in 1939, the BBC maintained an informal monitoring system which kept track of general broadcasting trends. Within three weeks of the outbreak of war, a professional monitoring service was functioning. Particular attention was paid to monitoring German broadcasts to Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Greece and South Africa.[41] The BBC, in monitoring various channels and languages, discovered that the German Ministry of Propaganda was not simply re-broadcasting programs designed for local listeners but was structuring various versions suited to Germany's needs with regard to different segments of the listening audience. The BBC used this knowledge to some advantage by pointing out any German inconsistencies to listeners.[42] The guiding principle behind British propaganda during the same period was that the same truth must be told to everyone. As listeners began eavesdropping on messages intended for others, the BBC's reputation for accuracy, comprehensiveness and consistency was enhanced.[43]

In Africa, transmissions were increased to areas of potential conflict. Apart from the Arabic service to north Africa, this involved German broadcasts to South West Africa beginning in 1938, and in 1939 Afrikaans language broadcasts aimed at the Boer community in South Africa. Britain followed suit with its own Afrikaans broadcasts. The

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[38]Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 43.

[39]British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1959, 39.

[40]British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Yearbook 1944 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1944), 101; Briggs, The War of Words, 493.

[41]The British also began close monitoring of Russian and Finnish broadcasts during 1939.

[42]See Briggs, The War of Words, 429.

[43]See Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 91.

Pretoria government objected to these broadcasts on the grounds that they were imperialistic and anti-republican.[44] The British government, on the other hand, felt that it must respond to German broadcasts which were actively encouraging ultra conservative elements within South Africa's National Party to sabotage the South African war effort.[45] Despite the objections of the Union government, the BBC and South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) maintained a strong working relationship. South African assistance did not stop with the rebroadcast of BBC programming, which at its height in 1946 accounted for sixteen hours per week over five stations. Reporters from the SABC also provided extensive coverage of the war, including the Battle of Mahda Pass and Haile Selassie's return to power in May of 1941.[46]

Wartime broadcasts of the BBC also had a profound and long lasting effect on Britain's relationships with its other dependencies. The fact that so many independent countries rebroadcast BBC programming forced the adoption of the term "Commonwealth". Support for the idea of fighting for the "unity of the Commonwealth" was, after all, easier to sell than the idea of risking one's life for the "preservation of the Empire".[47] In recognition of the need to inspire unity and because of the philosophical shift brought about by the introduction of languages other than English, the Empire Service was renamed the Overseas Service in November 1939.[48]

The war brought a shift in program content and, perhaps more significantly, heralded a shift in the directional flow of information. It was no longer sufficient to maintain contact with British expatriates living abroad; instead, the war created a need for stories relevant to the large numbers of soldiers recruited from the four corners of the

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[44]Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 46.

[45]See Hachten and Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa, 47. Members of this group (Ossewa Brandwag) came to dominate South African politics in the years following the war, these included one time Prime Minister B.J. Vorster.

[46]Briggs, The War of Words, 327. These two victories, in the region of Ethiopia, were widely reported at the time. Selassie's return to power has heralded as the first restoration of a victim of Axis aggression.

[47]Ibid., 493-494.

[48]Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 195. The terms used to describe the service continued to change. The term 'External Service' quickly gained favor. By 1962 the BBC began to include the term 'World Service'. These changes signify cognitive shifts regarding the roles and functions of the service. They are also indicative of the changing geopolitical position of Britain.

Empire. In addition, events of significance were occurring in all parts of the world which had a direct impact on life in London. Further changes brought on by the war included a redirection of focus within the colonies. The families of African soldiers fighting in north Africa and around the Mediterranean needed to be informed about the progress of the war and the fate of their relatives. In Nigeria, the Gold Coast (Ghana), and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) this led to a great increase in the number of radios owned by Africans. Changes in broadcasting content, and the proliferation of radios in tern precipitated further changes within the empire. A member of the British colonial elite in Nigeria noted:

> Every time we indicted Germany or Vichy France, we indicted ourselves as well. Except for the traveled or highly educated few, Europeans had been a mass conception for so long that whatever cruelty or treachery or injustice we attributed to our enemies was seen as a possible attribute of ourselves.[49]

Thus, the seeds were sown for the rise of African nationalism and for the eventual collapse of the Empire.

IV   To Educate and Enlighten: 1935-1960

Broadcasting to Africa was, in the first instance, broadcasting to South Africa. Made necessary by the increasing hostilities in Europe, the South African airwaves became a battleground for the hearts and minds of the "Afrikaner Volk". Of secondary importance were the Rhodesias (North and South), from which large numbers of soldiers were recruited for the war effort. Third in importance during the war years were "the colonies", those British expatriates, forced by circumstance to live in the-back-of-beyond. Last but not least came the colonized peoples of Africa.[50]

In 1936, the British Government set up a committee with the mandate of "consider[ing] and recommend[ing] what steps could usefully be taken to accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in the colonies and to coordinate such services with

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[49]Sylvia Leith-Ross, quoted in Michael Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonisation in Africa," In The Cambridge History of Africa Volume 8 (ed. Michael Crowder. 8-51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 40.

[50]See Briggs, The War of Words, 512-513; also Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 194-195.

the work of the British Broadcasting Corporation."[51] The committee, under the direction of Lord Plymouth, recommended that colonial broadcast services should be used as "an instrument of advanced administration" for the purposes of "the enlightenment and education of the more backward section of the population and for their instruction in public health, agriculture, etc."[52] While recognizing that the Empire Service could not, by itself, address all of the needs of the indigenous peoples of Africa, the committee emphasized that every effort should be made to reach them. Members of the Plymouth Committee further recommended that broadcast services in the colonies be developed as government entities. The report suggested that commercial radio might prove embarrassing to the government in the long run.[53]

The recommendations of the Plymouth Committee, though roundly praised in government and the BBC, were quickly forgotten in the wake of events unfolding in Europe. Britain was, after all, a rather reluctant administrator; the main mission of colonial rule had been the transplantation of European capitalism/Christianity into Africa. By 1939, this process was largely completed. Patterns of infrastructural development on the continent became linked primarily to areas of export production (mining and agriculture)[see map 5], especially in those areas with large settler communities.[54] Thus, the first steps toward broadcast services on the African continent were in areas of direct political and economic interest to Britain. An important development, related to the recommendations of the Plymouth Committee, emerged out of the BBC director general's visit to South Africa in 1936. His report to the South African Government led to the development of the South African Broadcasting Act of 1936, which dissolved the African Broadcasting Corporation and established the South African Broadcasting Corporation as a state-run monopoly.[55]

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[51]Quoted in Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 177.

[52]Quoted in Head, "British Colonial Broadcasting Policies: The Case of the Gold Coast," 40.

[53]Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 177. See also Katz and Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance, 78; Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, 1244.

[54]See Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonisation in Africa," 9-10.

[55]Hachten and Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa, 202.

British attempts to use radio as a mechanism of education and enlightenment were limited in scope and reach. The first use of radio as a vehicle of mass education came with the introduction, in 1939, of a series of "English by Radio" courses over the BBC's new Arabic service.[56] Two other examples are perhaps more accurately described as propaganda and involved the dissemination of information in "the vernacular" of specific regions. By the end of 1939, such programs were being produced in Nigeria.[57] Weekly vernacular news programming developed under the Education Department of the Protectorate of Bechuanaland in 1942 provided a model which was reproduced throughout British Africa.[58] The integration of vernacular broadcasts into Kenyan programming was somewhat slower. However, by the 1950s Kenya was producing educational programs in both English and Swahili and was disseminating news in ten languages.[59]

A parallel development was the inauguration of the Central African Broadcasting Station (CABS). The CABS was an outgrowth of the redistribution system developed in 1932 by the BBC in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In 1941, the Director of Information for the region of Nyasaland (Malawi) and the Rhodesias proposed that the small temporary studio in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, be made responsible for broadcasting to all of the African population. In his proposal, the director presented his vision for radio in Africa:

> We believe that formal education methods, taking perhaps two or three generations to produce a comparatively civilized African people capable of working reasonably well in the development of the territory, were too slow in the face of the obvious possibilities of rapid advance in Central Africa. We believe that if broadcasting could reach the masses, it could play a great part in the enlightenment.[60]

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[56]See Paulu, British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom, 403. These courses proved to be so popular that a separate unit was established in 1943. By 1956 the unit was producing 250 lessons per week in 35 languages.

[57] Katz and Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance, 77.

[58]The rationale for these programs, as articulated by the Education Officer, was that such news would help in "keeping up the spirits of the people of Bechuanaland and counteracting dangerous rumors." Quoted in James J. Zaffiro, From Police Network to Station of the Nation: A Political History of Broadcasting in Botswana, 1927-1991 (Gaborone, Botswana: The Botswana Society, 1991), 5.

[59]Carla Heath, Broadcasting to Africans in Colonial Kenya: Roots of Contemporary Ideology (Department of Communication, Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, VA. Photocopy), 17. See also Kenya Department of Information, Annual Report 1958 (Nairobi, Kenya: Government Printer, 1989).

[60]Quoted in Peter Fraenel, Wayaleshi (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), 17.

The British Government agreed. A scheme -- which designated the Lusaka station for "African broadcasting" while maintaining the (larger) Salisbury station for "European" broadcasting -- was implemented. In the years that followed, CABS garnered praise for its role in the enlightenment program. Such praise led to expansion of the station. By 1946 CABS was transmitting in six African languages and English.[61]

The idea that radio could play a decisive role in the enlightenment of the African found favor within the Colonial Office and in government generally. Speaking in the British House of Commons in 1943, the colonial secretary remarked :

> The size of [the problem of mass education] is so great that we can only hope to solve it within any reasonable period of time if we can evolve a new technique....We shall have to make the fullest use of the cinema and broadcasting.[62]

Even the War Office appointed an educational broadcasting committee in 1944 to make recommendations for the use of radio in the reorientation of British troops. In response to this initiative, the BBC formed the "Forces Educational Unit" with a newly developed Department of Schools Broadcasting.[63]

Despite program changes in the Overseas Service, there were a number of people, both in the BBC and in the government, who believed that these changes did not sufficiently address the needs of Africa. In response, the African service, while maintaining its focus on the "White" population of South Africa, began producing a number of regular programs for specific colonies. A partnership of sorts was established between Britain and its colonies whereby "the experience of the people of Britain in tackling some of their own problems...[could] be of some use to the people of the colonies in tackling similar problems."[64] Between 1943 and the end of the war, the BBC began to produce educational programs which promoted social change in Africa. Many of these

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[61]See Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, 1246. Hailey, writing in 1956, praised the station as having been "proved very successful."

[62]Quoted in H.A. Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa (African Handbooks: 5, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), 88.

[63]John Robinson, Learning Over the Air: 60 Years of Partnership in Adult Learning (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1982), 98. The Forces Educational Unit aimed their efforts primarily at troops from the British Isles rather than toward the Empire as a whole.

[64]Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 195.

programs promoted the development of cooperatives and were directed at women. At the same time, the BBC increased its Afrikaans language broadcasts.[65]

The end of the war brought out critics of the idea of using radio in the education and enlightenment of the indigenous population of Africa. In 1946, Dr. E. Barton Worthington, writing in his development plan for Uganda, suggested:

> Broadcasting like the cinema is a relatively new invention of civilization and is apt to be extremely expensive. I suggest [that] it should not be undertaken on a large scale until far more is known than at present about its effect in African conditions. As a method of spreading propaganda it will certainly have great use if sufficient money is available. As a method of spreading culture its value is very doubtful until we know what kind of culture to spread. Except in the main centres of population broadcasting may not pass beyond the experimental stage within ten years and so I doubt whether such expenditure is justified.[66]

Such arguments limited the investment in broadcasting technologies in many regions of Africa. However, the Colonial Office in London began to show a growing interest in radio broadcasting during the latter years of the decade. In May 1948, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs circulated a memorandum reaffirming the recommendations of the 1936 Plymouth Report. The idea that radio could be an effective tool used for the advancement of indigenous populations was again put forward. The British Government began to offer colonial governments grants for the construction of broadcast facilities. Between the inception of the program in 1948 and the coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1953, more than forty broadcast systems were started in twenty-seven colonial territories.[67]

Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa was facilitated by active participation of the BBC in the development of both the technical infrastructure and the institutional support mechanisms. BBC personnel trained African broadcasters within the rubric of British Broadcasting. Many African broadcasters traveled to Britain and made their way through a BBC training program. In addition, several hundred BBC staff members worked on the

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[65]See Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 195; also Briggs, The War of Words, 513-514.

[66]Quoted in Charles Armor, "The BBC and the Development of Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956," African Affairs 83 (332 1984): 359-402, 360(n).

[67]Briggs, Sound and Vision, 470.

continent. Most of the stations developed during this period rebroadcast programming produced by the BBC for its Africa Service.[68]

The end of the war and the renewed interest in developing radio services for Africa brought with it a flood of engineers and technicians who surveyed the potentials from Tanganyika (Tanzania) to the Gold Coast. BBC personnel noted the importance of developing both community listening stations and appropriate receivers. Many staff members also were convinced of the potential vitality of radio in the African context. Ideas were generated for using indigenous folktales, riddles and plays in the education of a largely illiterate population. Broadcasting also was seen as the most effective means of interpreting government policy to the people; of speeding the spread of Christianity among the Africans; of teaching English; and of improving the life of women.[69]

One of the major constraints to the implementation of these programs was believed to be the lack of affordable and reliable receivers. The Director of Information for Northern Rhodesia felt that the development of such a receiver was essential to the effective work of the Central African Broadcasting Station in Lusaka. He eventually persuaded the EverReady Company to produce the "Saucepan Special".[70] Even with the subsequent rapid dissemination of radios within the African community, most of radios remained in the hands of "Europeans". In 1952, Lord Hailey suggested that Africans continued to be dependent on European employers for access.[71]

Throughout the 1950s, the BBC increased programming initiatives in the African region, particularly aimed at the education and enlightenment of the indigenous population. The number of languages being used in BBC broadcasts reached a peak in 1958 with forty-two, including three new language services for Africa -- Hausa, Swahili,

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[68]Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 177-179. By 1972, more than 2,000 African broadcasters had completed the BBC program

[69]See Armor, "The BBC and the Development of Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956," 365-369; also Briggs, Sound and Vision , 532-533.

[70] See Fraenel, Wayaleshi, 17-19. EverReady, in turn, saw the radio as a vehicle for increasing sales of its batteries.

[71]Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, 1245.

and Somali.[72] In 1952, the Colonial Schools Transcription Unit was given the task of "priming the pump" for school broadcasting and teacher training by radio in the colonies. In starting the Schools Transcription Unit, the Colonial Information Policy Committee cited "the struggle against Russia" as the major factor in the development of the unit.[73] As the decade progressed, "the communist threat" cast a shadow over the policy of enlightenment for Africa.

V   The March of Communism: 1945-1968

The end of armed conflict in Europe removed the impetus for a battle of the airwaves. With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the BBC began winding down from the fever-pitched propaganda efforts of the war years.[74] By 1946, however, a new threat had already been identified for which Britons felt they must prepare. In his first directive, the new director of Overseas Services expressed his view of the twin roles of the BBC:

> In the first place...Britain has to struggle against calumny and insidious propaganda poured out by upholders of a different way of thinking. Our part in counteracting this is not by refuting it, but by seizing and retaining the initiative....[and in the second instance, that the] full and impartial news bulletin....[is] the largest single factor in attracting an audience before whom the British case on current affairs can be laid and to whom the British way of life can be explained.[75]

Though the next three years were filled with budget reductions and redundancies in staffing, the BBC continued to attempt to project Britain favorably to the world.

By 1949 the BBC was again moving in the direction of increased "vernacular" programming. In explaining the need for this increase, the Secretary of State for the Colonies suggested:

> For some time we, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, have been planning measures which could be taken to combat the growth of Communist influence, not only by direct counter propaganda but also -- and perhaps chiefly by the positive projection both of the accurate appreciation of the democratic point of view and the principles upon which our civilization is based. Among these measures is the development of broadcasting in the Colonies. It is generally felt here that broadcasting

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[72]British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1960 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1960). See also British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1959, 39-54. By 1960, the number of languages other than English had dropped to twenty-two. No African languages were dropped [the Afrikaans language service had ended in 1957].

[73]Armor, "The BBC and the Development of Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956," 401.

[74]Early broadcasting reached a peak in 1944. See Paulu, British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom, 389.

[75]Sir Ian Jacob, quoted in Briggs, Sound and Vision, 155.

offers probably the best medium available to us for covering the ground; the Press, helpful though it may be, cannot be used in the same way as a government broadcasting service. It is for this reason that the Government here have decided that a substantial sum of money should be set aside for the development of broadcasting services in the Colonies.[76]

The fear of communism was heightened by the jamming of the BBC's Russian Service in 1949. The expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union and of Communist (mainland) China were seen within the independence and nationalist movements of the colonies.

Some within the Colonial Office expressed concern that references by the BBC to the British labor strikes of the late 1940s were having a negative effect on the labor situation in the colonies.[77] In Nigeria, where the press was viewed as anti-government, the BBC assisted the colonial administration in developing the Nigerian Broadcast Company (NBC). Between 1950 and 1962 almost sixty staff members helped in the development of the system. The NBC, in turn, was used with the explicit intention of trying to create a national consciousness.[78]

It was events in Egypt, rather than in Nigeria, which carried the fight most effectively against colonial Britain. With the ouster of British-supported King Farouk in 1952, President Gamal Abdal Nasser began an intensive campaign promoting the end of colonial domination around the world. By 1953 Egypt had established a powerful external broadcast capacity in the Voice of the Arabs service. In 1955, Nasser added the Voice of Africa service directed toward the southern African region. In Britain the complaint was made that:

Most of Cairo's broadcasts urged violent solutions: revolution and assassination. Often a voice beamed at one country would be contradicting a voice speaking at the same moment to another country....On all wave lengths Englishmen and Frenchmen were either imperialists, bloodsuckers, or colonialism's stooges....Nasser's secret Voice of Free Africa referred to Americans in general as 'pythons, white dogs, and pigs'.[79]

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[76]Arthur Creech-Jones, quoted in Armor, "The BBC and the Development of Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956," 362.

[77]Armor, "The BBC and the Development of Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956," 402(n).

[78]Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 180.

[79]Robert St. John, Quoted in Head, "British Colonial Broadcasting Policies: The Case of the Gold Coast," 353-354.

Between 1960 and 1965, the Voice of Africa began broadcasting in Shona, Ndebele, seSotho, and seZulu; languages not otherwise heard on the airwaves.[80] Egypt's attack thus involved not only the British and Americans, but began a direct assault upon the apartheid regime in South Africa.

In 1951, the British, perceiving that patterns of colonialism were shifting, began to prepare the African population in Northern Rhodesia for the idea of confederation with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The British response to the quickening pace of political change was to serve up news and political commentary in English and three African languages.[81] In the Gold Coast, the territorial governor likewise saw radio as an "instrument of advanced government". He suggested that while Africans were passive by nature, the educated African had a "restless mind" that was susceptible to propaganda. He further remarked that too often these educated individuals "tend to engage in discussions which, for the want of better subjects, turn all too frequently to agitation and antigovernmental, not to say communistic, activities."[82] For the governor, radio was a cheap and effective means of providing educated individuals with something better to think about. In Kenya, similar concerns led to a 500 percent increase in staffing between 1952 and 1954. The budget allocated to broadcasting also increased dramatically in the first half of the decade. At the same time, license fees were lowered in order to attract the less prosperous Africans.[83]

In 1952, a parliamentary committee was formed to review the government's information services in light of prevailing, postwar conditions. It reported that Britain's overseas propaganda would still be needed in order to "support our foreign policy...preserve and strengthen the Commonwealth and Empire... increase our trade and

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[80]See Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting: The Limits of the Limitless Medium (New York: Praeger, 1982), 283.

[81]British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1960, 90. For a personal account of this period consult Fraenel, Wayaleshi, especially 170-171.

[82]Sir Arnold Hodson, quoted in Head, "British Colonial Broadcasting Policies: The Case of the Gold Coast," 43.

[83]Heath, Broadcasting to African in Colonial Kenya: Roots of Contemporary Ideology, 16.

protect our investments overseas."[84] In response to the committee's recommendation and to the increasing threat of communism and nationalism, the BBC was actively involved in the development of radio stations throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[85] Many of the new broadcasting facilities were not only designed and built with BBC assistance, but they were also administered by BBC personnel. Those Africans involved in the production of programming often received formal training in Britain and informal "on-the-job-training" from senior BBC staff. Broadcasting thus became an essential link in the maintenance of order within the colonial system and, later, of British relations with newly independent governments.[86]

While animosities grew between East and West during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Africa remained peripheral to the conflicts of the Cold War until the mid-1950s. In 1956, Radio Peking began offering a daily news service in English. The BBC responded, in 1957, by strengthening its Africa Service, and for the first time broadcasts to the indigenous population took precedence over those to the "European" population. Radio Moscow, in turn, began to target the southern African region in the spring of 1958. The increasing significance of Africa as one of the major cold war battle fields was made more pronounced by the development of the transistor radio. These new radios greatly increased the accessibility of the African population. Transistor radios were small, lightweight, durable, battery operated, and perhaps most importantly -- inexpensive.[87]

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[84]Quoted in Paulu, British Broadcasting: Radio and Television in the United Kingdom, 398.

[85]See Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 181. Countries which receive BBC assistance (both prior to and following independence) include: Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho.

[86]See Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 182; Jeremy Tunstall, The Media are American: Anglo-American Media in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 111-113, 126.

[87]During the decade between 1955 and 1965, the number of radios owned by Africans grew by 1,200 percent. See Mansell, Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting, 239; also J. F. Maitland-Jones, Politics in Africa (Comparative Modern Governments, ed. Max Beloff. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1973), 103; Peter Lorkula Naigow, "How the Voice of America's African Division Perceives and Programs for Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Criteria Used in Determining Programming Policies" (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977), 179-181.

Britain, which had sought to preserve its Empire through war, now perceived its influence on the African continent as being diminished by an aggressive communist media campaign. The BBC noted it 1962:

> Britain...is now in fourth place. It is preceded by the USSR, Communist China, and the Voice of America....Communist China's output has continued to increase and so has broadcasting from Communist countries to Africa, Asia, and Latin America....Africa has seen the biggest and most complex developments....Over the last ten years [developments] show a change in the pattern of external broadcasting and suggest that this decade has marked a turning point in the history of propaganda -- a changeover from the dominance of the West at the beginning of the decade to the dominance of the East at its close.[88]

As the fight for the hearts and minds of indigenous Africans intensified, differing avenues of attack were used. The British understood that the primary opponents of colonial rule were the educated elites, who had benefited most form the colonial system. Rather than seeking a return to pre-colonial political systems, these bridgehead elites sought a share in the bounties of the colonial administrative structures.[39] The BBC thus targeted the most highly educated elements living in Africa.[90]

Campaigns initiated by Communist China and the Soviet Union were, in contrast, less elitist than those of either Britain or the United States, they focused on issues of "colonialism" and "neo-colonialism". With a massive increase in the number of broadcast hours, with highly selective targeting of ethnic groupings, and through the use of a wide variety of relatively obscure languages, communist broadcasters sought to appeal to both the elite African and the rural peasantry. Communist appeals pointed out the exploitative nature of the colonial/capitalist system. Issues often were related to the peasantisation and proletarianisation of the small-scale farmer caused by the introduction of capitalistic economies.[91]

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[88]British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Handbook 1962 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1962), 87-88.

[89]Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonisation in Africa," 14.

[90]Variations in the degree to which this new approach was implemented are attributable to the level of influence exerted by white settler communities and to the level of activism demonstrated by the African communities.

[91]See Briggs, Sound and Vision, 531; also Crowder, "The Second World War: Prelude to Decolonisation in Africa," 12; also Staff. "South Africa: Danger from African States." Africa Digest 9 (5 1962), 155. South Africa has seen itself as being in danger of communist inspired attack from African states since this period. In 1962, the Minister of Defense warned that it was essential for South Africa to prepare itself militarily for such an attack because help from the international community would most likely

Shifting geopolitical realities in the 1950s and 1960s made it increasingly difficult for Britain to retain its colonial possessions. Nationalist movements which swept the continent forced Britain to divest itself the last of its African holdings in 1968 [see maps 1 and 2]. As the final vestiges of direct colonial rule were removed and African states began to exercise a degree of independence, the levels of external broadcasting to the region began to level off.[92] However, Africa remained a major arena for East and West confrontation for the next two decades, and broadcasting was a vibrant expression of the struggle for cultural dominance within the region.

VII Conclusions

The primary motivation for the British in developing an external service was the maintenance of British prestige in the face of competition from its continental neighbors. The drive to maintain and project British cultural norms and values led to the development of conflicting broadcast philosophies. The capitalist economic foundations of the British empire can be seen as a driving force behind the original consolidating role that radio was to play in maintaining contact with expatriate Britons living in the far reaches of the empire during the 1930s. Juxtaposed to this policy was a competing philosophy of humanism and enlightenment, which suggested that the primary role of radio should be in the "upliftment" of the "primitive" peoples in the empire. The propaganda needs of World War II mandated that at least some of the educational needs of Africans were addressed by broadcasters. The cold war of the 1950s and 1960s in turn, radically shifted the balance between the two competing philosophies in favor of enlightenment. This shift in philosophy was a calculated attempt to maintain a degree of influence in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. As such, it is indicative of the transition from a dependence on material modes of imperialism to an emphasis on cultural domination.

---

be conditional on changes in South Africa's apartheid policies -- a step which the government could not condone.

[92]Wilkinson, "The BBC and Africa," 177. In 1972, there were thirty-four countries outside the African continent which targeted African audiences.

MAP 1

Independent Africa
1977

Tunisia 1956
Morocco 1956
Western Sahara 1976
Algeria 1962
Libya 1951
Egypt 1922
Mauritania 1960
Mali 1960
Niger 1960
Chad 1960
Sudan 1956
Republic of Djibouti 1977
Senegal 1960
Guinea-Bissau 1974
Upper Volta 1960
Nigeria 1960
Central African Republic 1960
Ethiopia
Guinea 1958
Ivory Coast 1960
Ghana 1957
Benin 1960
Togo 1960
Cameroon 1960
Somalia 1960
Gambia 1965
Liberia 1847
São Tomé and Príncipe 1975
Gabon 1960
Congo 1960
Zaire 1960
Rwanda 1962
Uganda 1962
Kenya 1963
Sierra Leone 1961
Equatorial Guinea 1968
Burundi 1962
Tanzania 1961 and 1963
Comoro Islands 1975
Angola 1975
Zambia 1964
Malawi 1964
Madagascar 1960
Rhodesia
Mozambique 1975
Namibia
Botswana 1966
Swaziland 1968
South Africa 1910
Lesotho 1966

Source: Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), xviii.

MAP 2

Colonial Africa — 1914

Ethiopia

Liberia

Belgium
Britain
France
Germany
Italy
Portugal
Spain

Source: Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Africa (Bloomington, IN:
            Indiana University Press, 1977), 134.

MAP 3

EUROPE
showing
principal long
& medium wave
Broadcasting
Stations

Source: British Broadcasting Corporation, <u>BBC Handbook 1934</u> (London: British
Broadcasting Corporation, 1934), 464-465.

MAP 4

TIME-ZONE MAP OF THE WORLD SHOWING THE COUNTRIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Source: British Broadcasting Corporation, <u>BBC Handbook 1934</u> (London: British
Broadcasting Corporation, 1934), 272-273.

MAP 5

Major Production Areas

Source: Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 31.

Colonial Broadcasting Philosophies in British Africa 1924-1968

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Broadcasting to and within the African continent evolved out of a struggle between European nations for political and military supremacy. The primary motivation for the British in developing an external service was the maintenance of British prestige in the face of competition from its mainland neighbors. The drive to maintain and project British cultural norms and values also spurred the development of broadcast systems in the colonies.

However, British colonial broadcast systems did not result from any monolithic ideological foundation. Rather, broadcasting emerged out of a framework of competing interests and concerns. The capitalist economic foundations of the British empire can be seen as a driving force behind the original consolidating role that radio was to play in maintaining contact with expatriate Britons living in the far reaches of the empire during the 1930s. Subordinate to this policy was a conflicting philosophy of humanist-enlightenment, which suggested that the primary role of radio should be in the "upliftment" of the "primitive" peoples in the empire.

The propaganda needs of World War II mandated that at least some of the educational needs of Africans were addressed by broadcasters. The cold war of the 1950s and 1960s in turn, radically shifted the balance between the two competing philosophies in favor of enlightenment. This paper traces the ideological shifts apparent within the context of educational broadcasting to and within British Africa between 1924 and 1968.

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REFLECTIONS OF CULTURAL VALUES:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CHINESE MAGAZINE ADS
FROM 1982 AND 1992

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ABSTRACT

This paper, through a content analysis of 572 Chinese magazine ads from 1982 and 1992, identifies "modernity," "technology" and "quality" as three predominant cultural values manifest in Chinese advertising over the past ten years. Results indicate that while the values less frequently used in 1992 are utilitarian in nature, the values increasing in their occurrences are more symbolic. The group of symbolic values consists of those from the Eastern as well as Western culture.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the standardization or specification of international advertising messages in different countries around the world has added great momentum to research in cultural values. The key issues are to determine whether there are important differences in cultural values among nations, and to what extent those values affect advertising effectiveness (Han *et al.*, 1992).

There is also concern over transnational advertising's influence on indigenous cultures of developing countries. In 1980, the MacBride Commission criticized advertising for its uninvited cultural intervention in Third World countries. This view was shared by Anderson (1984), Frith and Frith (1989). It was also found in empirical studies that the cultural content of advertising in countries like the Philippines and India appears to reflect the Western culture rather than their own cultures (Marquez, 1975; Srikandath, 1991).

Similarly, there is a widespread concern over advertising's creating of a materialistic fever, and inducing of a rising tide of expectations (Burstein, 1981). It is suggested that the whole fabric of traditional culture and value structure in some developing economies may be jeopardized by commercialization (Pollay, 1986b). Furthermore, some political movements like the 1989 Tiananmen incident in China were mentioned (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990) to substantiate the classical argument that in developing nations, advertising's spurring of a demand that exceeds supply of goods available leads to political impatience and even revolutionary fever (Pye, 1963; Schramm, 1964).

Although research has been done on cultural values reflected in the advertising of some developing countries (Marquez, 1975; Srikandath, 1991;

Han *et al.*, 1992; Zandpour and Qian, 1992), much remains unknown about the cultural values manifest in Chinese advertising, which has been growing fast in the last decade. The current project is intended, therefore, to bridge this gap by content analyzing Chinese magazine ads from 1982 and 1992. It is assumed that adequate knowledge of the cultural values depicted in the advertising of developing countries would facilitate researchers' evaluation of transnational advertising's influence on indigenous cultures as well as international advertising professionals' decisions on what strategies to adopt in overseas markets.

BACKGROUND

Dramatic changes have taken place in China since the mid-to-late 1970s when the post-Mao leadership came to power in the country. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of China held in December 1978 was "a major turning point in contemporary Chinese history" (Woetzel, 1989, p.60). After the congress, the country's focus was shifted from a ten-year long class struggle-oriented Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) to a grand economic development program known as the "Four Modernizations."

One of the most important strategies the Chinese government adopted to promote this program was the economic reform started in 1979. The essence of this reform was to legitimate the market mechanism in China, which has changed the country from an entirely planned economy into one supplemented by market forces (Xue, 1991).

Together with the emphasis on the role of market mechanism in economic development, advertising, which was treated as a capitalist token and totally banned during the Cultural Revolution, came back to life in China

in the early 1979 and flourished ever since (Xu, 1990). Over the past 10 years or so, advertising has become a decisive factor in Chinese lives and a window to Chinese society. Its business volume between 1979 and 1987 surpassed $185 million, rising at an annual rate of from 40 to 50 percent, far faster than the increase in the GNP of the country (*China Daily,* March 17, 1992). In 1992, China's ad expenditure reached $862 million, among the fastest growing in Asia (Karp, 1993).

After the revival of advertising in China, many societal changes have kept taking place in the country. Close at the heels of the economic reform was the open policy the Chinese leadership has been adopting since 1984. This policy is, above all else, a strategy for developing relations with the outside world so as to benefit the economic development in China (Lull, 1991). On the one hand, it allows a large number of direct imports of Western technology and managerial skills into China; on the other, it gives much priority to foreign investments (mainly through joint ventures) in the country.

The open policy exerts great influence on China's advertising industry. Currently, an estimated $75 million in billing -- eight to 10 percent of all advertising income in China -- is generated by foreign ad agencies. These comprise about a dozen transnational agencies and 30-odd Hong Kong-based companies (Keobke and Woo, 1992). It is assumed that the operation of these foreign ad agencies have, to some extent, influenced China's advertising, for good or for ill.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholarly interest in the need of relating advertising to culture was evoked as early as three decades ago by the issue of standardization or

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specification of international advertising messages. Singh and Huang (1962) found that American print-media ads cannot be effective in India, since its appeals run counter to indigenous cultural values. Lenormand (1964) came out with a similar conclusion that standardized advertising is impossible in Europe, as European countries are also hamstrung by insurmountable cultural barriers.

While Unwin (1973) found that American and international students' responses to advertising are largely influenced by their cultural backgrounds, Choudhury and Schmid (1974) noticed that blacks are more likely to recall ads with black models than otherwise. In 1975, Marquez concluded that Philippine ads reflect the Western rather than the indigenous culture. In the same year, Green, Cunningham and Cunningham discovered that though consumers in Brazil, France, India and the United States share similar needs, they vary in the way they characterized the products that could satisfy those needs. All these studies of the relationship between advertising and culture during the 1960s and 1970s was best summed up by Unwin's (1974) statement that ads are "the folklore of the twentieth century" (p.24).

Since the early 1980s, many close and analytical studies have been devoted to the cultural values manifest in advertising. Pollay (1983) developed a coding framework in his seminal research for measuring cultural values in advertising. After a modification of Pollay's framework, Srikandath (1991) identified the predominant cultural values transmitted through Indian television commercials.

Meanwhile, several cross-cultural studies have been focused on the comparison of the Eastern and Western cultures. Initially, a series of studies were conducted by Belk, Bryce and Pollay (1985), Belk and Pollay (1985), and Belk and Bryce (1986) on American and Japanese advertising. They reported

that even though evidence is clear for increasing Americanization in Japanese ads, deep-seated Japanese cultural values still remain distinct (Belk and Pollay, 1985). Focusing on the same theme, Mueller (1987) discovered that the cultural appeals used in Japanese and American magazine ads tend to differ in degree rather than in kind.

Inspired by Mueller's (1987) dichotomy of prevalent traditional/ Eastern and modern/Western cultural appeals manifest in Japanese and American ads, Han *et al.* (1992), and Zandpour and Qian (1992) compared the cultural values reflected in Taiwan and American advertising. While Zandpour and Qian's findings partly supported Mueller's results, Han *et al.*'s results largely differed from Mueller's conclusion. In 1992, Mueller updated and furthered her study of 1987, suggesting that "Japanese advertising is still far from being Westernized. In fact, there are indicators that it may be coming increasingly Japanese" (p.22). Her conclusion supported Belk and Pollay's (1985) findings.

In 1990, Tansey, Hyman and Zinkhan focused on ads for one particular product, and examined cultural themes in Brazilian and U.S. auto ads. They concluded that values differ between the business subcultures in these two countries. Instead of focusing on one particular product, Frith and Sengupta (1991) gave special attention to one cultural value important to international advertising. They discovered significant differences in the use of individualism in the magazine ads from the United States, Britain and India.

In the last few years, there is an increasing scholarly interest in countries that share a similar language and/or culture regarding the inquiry into the cultural values reflected in advertising (Katz and Lee, 1992). Tse, Belk and Zhou (1989) depicted that the different values reflected in the print ads of three Chinese-speaking societies -- Hong Kong, the PRC and Taiwan --

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are due to the societal differences in attitudes toward consumption. Frith and Wesson (1991) found that the use of individualism, egalitarianism and direct speech in American and British magazine ads differed significantly.

Also focusing on Britain and the United States, Katz and Lee (1992) extended Frith and Wesson's (1991) study by exploring differences in the television commercials of these two countries. Adopting the social-communication approach (Leiss, Kline and Jhally, 1990), they integrated information-content analysis with a comparison of cultural values. Their findings suggested that cultural differences may be important, but product categories are more determinant for the advertising format used.

KEY CONCEPT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

From the above literature review, the notion "cultural values" has emerged as the key concept particularly relevant to this study. While **culture** refers to the total pattern of human behavior in society, **values** are often defined as a set of enduring beliefs "concerning preferable modes of conduct or end states of existence" (Rokeach, 1973, p.5), which are "shared among people who are surrounded by the same cultural background" (Han *et al.*, 1992, p.2). Thus, **cultural values** are regarded as the governing ideas and guiding principles for thought and action in a given society (Srikandath, 1991), and a powerful force shaping consumers' motivations, life-styles, and product choices (Tse, Belk and Zhou, 1989).

Culture values are transmitted through institutions that traditionally include the family, religion, school and court. In the post-industrial age, mass media have become another major institution for the transmission of cultural values. Being one type of mass communication, advertising has turned out to be influential with regard to the portrayal and transmission of

cultural values. As Potter (1954) put it, advertising has "joined the charmed circle of institutions which fix the values and standards of society ... and it becomes necessary to consider with special care the extent and nature of its influence, how far it extends, and in what way it makes itself felt" (p.177).

As the core of advertising messages, cultural values are endorsed, glamorized and reinforced in advertising (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990). The way advertising achieves the "transfer" of cultural values is to establish a nexus between what is viewed as desirable in a culture and a particular product (Srikandath, 1991). Thus, as "a privileged form of discourse" in modern society, advertising makes us "accord what it says a place of special prominence in our lives" (Leiss, Kline and Jhally, 1990, p.1).

It should be noticed that, however, advertising is a "distorted mirror" regarding the reflection and transmission of cultural values (Pollay, 1986). It "reflects only certain attitudes, behaviors and values. It models and reinforces only certain life-styles and philosophies, those that serve seller's interests" (Pollay and Gallagher, 1990, p.360). Based on the above background, the following research questions were formulated for this study:

1. What are the dominant cultural values manifest in Chinese magazine ads?
2. What are the differences, if any, in the cultural values reflected in the Chinese magazine ads from 1982 and 1992?

This study did not intend to test any hypotheses, as it was hoped to sketch the contour of the cultural values conveyed through magazine ads in China.

METHOD

Sample

A total of 572 Chinese-language magazine ads were content analyzed in this study. As most Chinese magazines are published monthly and contain only one to three ads, the sample was gathered from 30 types of magazines, with 192 from 1982 and 380 from 1992. To ensure the comparability of the two groups of ads, the sample was collected from the same types of magazines published in the two years under study. Based on the editorial content as illustrated in Table 2, the 30 types of Chinese magazines were put into 10 different categories modified from Rice and Lu's (1988) eight magazine categories.

With the magazines from 1992 being the most recent, there were three considerations for choosing the year of 1982. First, it makes the time span for this content analysis exactly 10 years. Second, most Chinese magazines containing ads today had just started to do so in 1982, a little more than two years after the advertising revival in China. Third and the most important of all, the year of 1982 was representative of the transitional period after the Cultural Revolution. As the open policy had not been adopted till 1984; the "new" governmental regulations (compared with those before the Cultural Revolution) for advertising had not been released till 1987 and 1988; and no political events like the student movements in 1986 and 1989 had ever taken place then, 1982 can be regarded as a year less affected by those major social and cultural changes in China when compared with 1992.

Coding Instrument

The unit of analysis was restricted to full-page ads, but duplicate ads for the same brand were discarded from the data base of this study. The coding design was first and mainly based on Pollay's (1983) typology of the

cultural values manifest in advertising. As Pollay's framework was mainly built on the Western culture, studies on Eastern cultural values (Bond *et al.*, 1987; Frith, 1990; Mueller, 1987; Srikandath, 1992; Tse, Belk and Zhou, 1989; Xu, 1990) were also consulted.

With the duplicate values in these studies collapsed, the remained cultural values were experimentally examined in 50 randomly selected Chinese magazine ads to test the applicability of these frameworks in the Chinese context. As a result of this test, the current coding scheme was developed that contains 28 cultural values (see Table 1), with 20 borrowed or modified from Pollay's study, and eight borrowed from others. Following the same procedure, nine product categories based on the studies by Katz and Lee (1992), Keown *et al.* (1990), Rice and Lu (1988), Srikandath (1991), Zandpour and Qian (1992) were also set up so as to classify the advertised products by type. A data coding instrument, and a code book with definitions for each of the 28 cultural values (see Table 1) as well as nine product categories were prepared.

Coding Procedure

The dependent variables in this study were the cultural values manifest in the Chinese magazine ads. The independent variables were the years of 1982 and 1992 which were assumed to be able to indicate the cultural value differences in Chinese ads over the past 10 years. In addition, product origins and product categories were employed as two control variables to help examine the cultural value differences.

Two Chinese graduate students who are also fluent in English were selected and trained as coders. They were instructed to observe the cultural values manifest in a given ad rather than the qualities that flowed out of the advertised product itself (Srikandath, 1991). For instance, a color TV set

associated with electronic technology is often regarded as a modern luxury product in China. In such a case, the coders were instructed to focus on what types of cultural values were exploited to promote this product -- Is the color TV portrayed as an avenue for a happy family life, a means of individual leisure, a status symbol, or a quality product? The cultural values manifest in each ad was determined by analyzing its headline, its visual content (the layout and illustration) and its body copy (Han et al., 1992).

After the pretest, ads were content analyzed. If any of the 28 cultural values appeared in an ad, it was coded as being present. Adopting Han et al.'s (1992) coding strategy, the coders were allowed to code an ad with multiple values. This strategy, which differed from some other researchers' (Mueller, 1987; Katz and Lee, 1992) focus on dominant values manifest in ads, was found more applicable in the current study, as many cultural values turned out to be equally important in Chinese ads. While ads were coded for what product categories they fell into (see Table 4), they were also coded according to their product origins classified as "domestic," "joint venture" and "imported" (see Table 3), since products advertised in China are all from these three sources.

A series of intercoder reliability tests were administered to determine the reliability of the coding framework and the resulting data. The intercoder reliabilities (the ratio of the total coding agreements to the total coding decisions for each measure) ranged from .87 to 1.00. Among the 28 cultural values, 16 have their coefficients at or above .95. The reliability coefficients were .99 for product categories and 1.00 for product origins. These figures were understandably high, given the simplistic nature of these analyses. In all cases, coefficients exceeded the minimum interjudge reliability of .85 suggested by Kassarjian (1977).

RESULTS

The answers to the two research questions can be largely obtained from Table 5, which presents the frequencies of the 28 cultural values examined in the Chinese ad sample, and the differences between 1982 and 1992. It is evident in this table that the three most dominant values -- "modernity," "quality," and "technology" -- were shared by the ads from both 1982 and 1992. While the frequency of "modernity" increased significantly from 52.1 percent in 1982 to 76.3 in 1992 ($X^2=34.526$, $p<.001$, $df=1$), the occurrences of "quality" decreased from 50.0 percent in 1982 to 40.3 in 1992, which is also statistically significant ($X^2=4.919$, $p<.05$, $df=1$). The value "technology" was fairly stable in the ads from both years, only slightly decreasing from 47.9 percent in 1982 to 45.0 in 1992. This change is statistically insignificant ($X^2=.437$, $p<.05$, $df=1$).

Among the 28 cultural values examined, sixteen were found to have significantly changed with regard to their frequencies in the ads from 1982 and 1992 (with $p<.05$ and $df=1$). Those values of which frequencies significantly increased in 1992 included "collectivism" ($X^2=5.552$), "courtesy" ($X^2=50.597$), "health" ($X^2=6.696$), "magic" ($X^2=5.143$), "modernity" ($X^2=34.526$), "patriotism" ($X^2=6.721$), "respect for the elderly" ($X^2=5.508$), "social status" ($X^2=8.078$), "wealth" ($X^2=5.651$), "youth" ($X^2=15.276$), and "sex" ($X^2=22.903$) (all with $p<.05$ and $df=1$).

Although only "modernity" was among the three most dominant values in both 1982 and 1992 ads, some values that were absent or nearly absent in 1982 increased significantly in their frequencies in 1992. These values included "courtesy," "magic," "patriotism," "respect for the elderly," "wealth," and "sex." Meanwhile, five values were found significantly less frequently used in 1992 ads: "economy" ($X^2=19.570$), "neatness" ($X^2=10.769$),

"ornamental" ($X^2=4.030$), "practicality" ($X^2=5.900$), and "quality" ($X^2=4.919$) (with $p<.05$ and $df=1$). "Quality" was among the three most dominant values in the ads from both years.

Here, a trend is quite noticeable. That is, while the "decreasing" values are utilitarian in nature and centering around product quality, the "increasing" values are more symbolic and suggestive of human emotions. This finding still holds true when extended to those values which changed insignificantly in the ads from 1982 and 1992. For instance, the values "convenience" ($X^2=2.403$), "effectiveness" ($X^2=.406$) and "safety" ($X^2=2.300$), of which frequencies dropped insignificantly (with $p<.05$ and $df=1$), share a utilitarian nature. By contrast, values like "beauty" ($X^2=.076$), "individualism" ($X^2=1.043$), and "leisure" ($X^2=3.046$), which increased insignificantly in their frequencies, are all symbolic.

The above two major findings about the three dominant cultural values and the frequency changes in all the 28 cultural values examined in Chinese ads are more illustrative when jointly observed with the findings presented in other tables. First, all the three predominant values shown in Table 5 were used most often in ads for imported products, with "modernity" at 86.7, "technology" at 78.3, and "quality" at 53.3 percent respectively (see Table 6). Next, Table 6 indicates that ads for joint venture products are leaders for the use of several increasing symbolic values -- with "beauty" at 44.2, "leisure" at 34.6, "youth" at 44.2, and "sex" at 19.2 percent. Although ads for domestic products held the leadership for many values including "economy" (11.3%), "knowledge" (8.7%), "magic" (2.0%), "neatness" (3.3%), "patriotism" (2.6%), "respect for the elderly" (3.5%), "social status" (7.6%), "tradition" (12.6%), and "uniqueness" (4.8%), none of them was statistically significant (with $p<.05$ and $df=1$).

DISCUSSION

As stated at the outset, this study was intended to ascertain the dominant cultural values manifest in Chinese magazine ads, and to gauge the value differences in the ads from 1982 and 1992. Results indicate that Chinese magazine ads, to a great extent, tend to promote the values "modernity," "technology" and "quality." This is consonant with the social changes in China over the past 10 years. As the "Four Modernizations" program has become a dominant national theme in China, the average Chinese people who had been isolated from the outside world for decades would understandably find things that are new, up-to-date and contemporary appealing.

As sophisticated high-tech often adds charm to "modernity," it is natural that the value "technology" also appears important in Chinese ads. This "secret" is discovered by all advertisers in China. While foreign producers tend to boast the latest technology applied in their production, Chinese manufacturers also take delight in pointing out the imported technology and equipment they have adopted. Such special emphases on the value "quality" are very meaningful, because product quality is often the major concern for the average Chinese consumers whose disposable incomes are still limited. So in Chinese advertising, the values "modernity" and "technology" are jointly used to enhance the value "quality."

With regard to the cultural value differences in Chinese magazine ads, the results of this study indicate that most values decreasing in their frequencies from 1982 to 1992 share a quality-oriented utilitarian nature. By contrast, most cultural values that increased in their frequencies during the 10 years are more symbolic, suggesting human emotions.

There are two possible reasons leading to the above trend. The first one is the economic development in China. In the early 1980s, the supply of sufficient consumer goods was still a problem. It was not infrequent that many advertised products were in short supply, and consumers were upset by products of poor quality as well. So advertisers resorted to various value appeals suggesting good quality to promote their products. After 10 years of development and with the increasing competition in the market, the problem of product quality has currently become less annoying to Chinese consumers. Many household appliances like TV sets, refrigerators and stereos were no longer rarities to most urban families in China today. Advertisers need, therefore, to explore other appeals rather than merely depend upon quality-oriented values to market their products.

Another explanation for this trend has much to do with product categories. Table 7 presents that "industrial products" and "household appliances," the two most dominant product categories advertised in 1982 (see Table 4), were most frequently promoted with utilitarian values. While the values "technology" and "convenience" were most frequently used for "industrial products," the values "quality" and "economy" were most often resorted to for "household appliances" (see Table 7). The significant drop of these two product categories in 1992 ads (with $p<.05$ and $df=1$) accounted for the general decrease of quality-related values in 1992.

On the contrary, Table 7 shows that the values "beauty," "individualism," "social status," "youth" and "sex" for "cosmetics and fashion;" "tradition" for "food and drink;" "health" and "respect for the elderly" for "medicine;" and "courtesy" and "wealth" for "services" were most frequently used. As all these four product categories were significantly advertised more often in 1992 (see Table 4), the symbolic values most frequently used in these

ads naturally increased in their frequencies. This finding indicates that many cultural values expressed in Chinese advertising are indeed product-related.

It can be noticed from the results of this study that a most often-used value is always the one advertisers believe will make their product most appealing to consumers. Take "household appliances" for example. When TV sets and refrigerators entered the average Chinese households in the early 1980s as high involvement goods, advertisers viewed "quality" as the most important value to do the marketing.

Similarly, there is a close link between "cosmetics and fashion" and the cultural values used in the ads for them. Like elsewhere, as advertisers consider the motivation for Chinese consumers to buy cosmetics and fashion is to "look better" both physically and socially, they start to employ the values "beauty," "individualism," and "social status" to convey the idea that by purchasing the expensive and often imported cosmetics and fashion, consumers will achieve self-esteem and superior looks in the eyes of their peers.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this study have several implications for international advertising researchers as well as professionals. First, the significant increase of the ads for several consumer product categories (including "cosmetics and fashion," "food and drink," and "medicine") and the significant decrease of the ads for "industrial products" in 1992 (see Table 4) suggest that advertising in China is emerging more strongly in promoting consumption. This conclusion is consistent with Tse, Belk and Zhou's (1989) and Pollay, Tse and Wang's (1990) suggestions that China is becoming a more consumer-

oriented society and adopting consumption materialism.

Secondly, the emergence of this new consumer culture in China has given rise to changes in the cultural values conveyed through Chinese advertising. Results indicate that some of the most dominant values such as "modernity" and "technology" manifest in Chinese ads are from the West. Nevertheless, it is still inappropriate to jump to a conclusion now that Chinese advertising has been Westernized. The rationale for this position is that the current trend in Chinese magazine ads to shift from the more utilitarian to the more symbolic cultural values is largely a sign for the sophistication of marketing strategies in Chinese advertising. It is evident that the emotion-related values increasingly used in the Chinese ads from 1992 include some typical Eastern (like "collectivism") as well as Western (like "individualism") cultural values mentioned by Frith (1990) and Mueller (1987). As a result, Chinese advertising looks like an emerging "melting pot" for both Eastern and Western cultural values. So the question whether Chinese advertising is Westernized or not still calls for more time and closer studies to answer.

Finally, based on the finding that the three predominant cultural values manifest in the Chinese ads from 1982 and 1992 were most frequently used for imported products (see Table 6), ads of this type, despite its decrease in number, can be said to have functioned as a pacesetter for the cultural values exploited in Chinese advertising over the past 10 years. It should be noticed that although ads for imported products are the major users of Western cultural values, they have started to exploit some Eastern values more often. The most illustrative example is the significant increase of the typical Eastern value "courtesy" (Bond et al., 1987) used in the Chinese magazine ads from 1992 (see Table 5). Table 6 indicates that this value was

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most frequently used in ads for imported products. This implies that the debate over standardization or specification of international advertising messages has made international advertisers reevaluate some of their marketing strategies.

It should also be noticed that the above-mentioned "leadership" held by ads for imported products in China is being challenged by ads for joint venture products. This conclusion is formulated from the finding that in 1992 several increasingly used cultural values (such as "youth" and "sex") (see Table 5) had the highest rates in ads for joint venture products (see Table 6). So ads for joint venture products may deserve close attention in the near future.

In a practical sense, the findings of this study suggest that international advertisers should not promote advertising campaigns in China by merely using their own cultural values. Neither should they confine themselves to a set of traditional Chinese values. Instead, they need to closely monitor the trend of changing cultural values and social environments in the country and employ the most appropriate cultural values, Eastern and Western alike, to convey their advertising messages.

APPENDICES

Table 1 **Description of Cultural Values Examined in Chinese Magazine Ads**

Beauty	This value suggests that the use of a product will enhance the loveliness, attractiveness, elegance or handsomeness of an individual, and stresses the glamour, charm and fairness of a product.
Collectivism[b]	The emphasis here is on the individual in relation to others, typically the reference group. Individuals are depicted as integral parts of the group.
Convenience[a]	A product is suggested to be handy and easy to use.
Courtesy	Politeness and friendship towards the consumer are shown through the use of polished and affable language in the ad.
Economy[a]	The inexpensive, affordable and cost-saving nature of a product is emphasized in the ad.
Effectiveness[a]	A product is suggested to be powerful and capable of achieving certain ends.
Family[a]	The emphasis here is on the family life and family members. The ad stresses family scenes: getting married, companionship of siblings, kinship, being at home, and suggests that a certain product is good for the whole family.
Health[a]	This value recommends that the use of a product will enhance or improve the vitality, soundness, strength and robust of the body.
Individualism[b]	The emphasis here is on the self-sufficiency and self-reliance of an individual, or on the individual as being distinct and unlike others.
Knowledge[a]	The emphasis is on the educational and informational function of a product or service. Also it is advisable and intelligent to use the product for experts will do so. e.g., "Judge for yourself;" "Experts agree ....;" "It will enrich your knowledge."
Leisure[a]	The theme of the ad is either vacations and holidays or the relaxation and fun provided by a particular product.
Magic[a]	The emphasis here is on the miraculous effect and nature of a product. e.g., "Bewitch your man with...;" "Heals like magic."
Modernity[a]	The notion of being new, contemporary, up-to-date, and ahead of time is emphasized. The use of foreign words and foreign names in an ad also belongs to this category.
Neatness[a]	Cleanness and tidiness are stressed as a product's feature or function.

Ornamental[a]   This value emphasizes the decorative nature and function of a product.

Patriotism   The love of and the loyalty to one's own nation inherent in the nature or in the use of a product are suggested here.

Popularity[a]   The focus here is on the universal recognition and acceptance of a certain product by consumers. e.g., "Best seller;" "Well-known nationwide/worldwide."

Practicality[a]   The theme is the useful, realistic and versatile nature and function of a particular product.

Quality   The emphasis here is on the excellence and durability of a product, which is usually claimed to be a winner of medals or certificates awarded by a governmental department for its high grade.

Respect for for the Elderly[b]   The ad displays a respect for older people by using a model of old age or asking for the opinions, recommendations and advice of the elders.

Safety[a]   The reliable and secure nature of a product is emphasized.

Social Status[a]   The use of a product is claimed to be able to elevate the position or rank of the user in the eyes of others. The feeling of prestige, trend-setting and pride in the use of a product is conveyed. The promotion of a company manager's status or fame by quoting his words or showing his picture in the ad is also included.

Technology[a]   Here, the advanced and sophisticated technical skills to engineer and manufacture a particular product is emphasized.

Tradition[a]   The experience of the past, customs and conventions are respected. The qualities of being historical, time-honored and legendary are venerated. e.g., "With 80 years of manufacturing experience;" "It's adapted from ancient Chinese prescriptions."

Uniqueness[a]   The unrivaled, incomparable and unparalleled nature of a product is emphasized. e.g., "We're the only one that offers you the product."

Wealth   This value conveys the idea that being affluent, prosperous and rich should be encouraged, and suggests that a certain product or service will make the user well-off.

Youth[a]   The worship of the younger generation is shown through the depiction of younger models. The rejuvenating benefits of the product are stressed. e.g., "Feel young again!"

Sex[a]   The ad uses beautiful, handsome and glamorous models or has a background of lovers holding hands, embracing or dating to promote a product.

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[a] adapted from Pollay (1983);   [b] adapted from Mueller (1987).

Table 2   Frequencies of Magazine Categories Coded by Year

Product Categories	1982 (n=192)	1992 (n=380)
	(%)	(%)
Business and Trade	11.5	5.5
Family Life	10.9	11.3
Health and Food	8.3	14.2
Literature	3.1	3.4
Pastime and Entertainment	6.8	6.6
Politics and Law	13.5	13.4
Science and Technology	28.1	21.8
Sports	2.6	4.7
Women	5.2	7.6
Youth	9.9	11.3

Percentages may not total 100 percent because of rounding.

Table 3   Frequencies of Product Origins Coded by Year

Product Origins	1982 (n=192)	1992 (n=380)	X^2 Values (df=1)
	(%)	(%)	
Domestic	82.8	78.9	1.202
Joint Venture	1.6	13.4	20.981***
Imported	16.1	7.6	9.848**

** p<.01;   *** p<.001

Table 4   Frequencies of Product Categories Coded by Year

Product Categories	1982 (n=192)	1992 (n=380)	X^2 Values (df=1)
	(%)	(%)	
Cosmetics and Fashion	4.2	10.8	7.143**
Food and Drink	4.7	12.4	8.521**
Household Appliances	30.7	15.8	17.279***
Medicine	10.9	17.6	4.390*
Personal Care	8.3	5.0	2.467
Services	4.7	12.9	9.429**
Automobile	1.0	1.8	.528
Industrial Products	31.3	23.4	4.058*
Miscellaneous	4.2	.3	12.550***

* p<.05;   ** p<.01;   *** p<.001

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Table 5	Frequencies of Cultural Values Manifest in Chinese Magazine Ads (by Year)		

Cultural Values	1982 (N=192)	1992 (N=380)	X^2 Values (df=1)
	(%)	(%)	
Beauty	21.9	22.9	.076
Collectivism	4.7	10.5	5.552*
Convenience	12.5	8.4	2.403
Courtesy	4.7	30.8	50.597***
Economy	18.2	6.3	19.570***
Effectiveness	15.1	13.2	.406
Family	6.3	8.7	1.043
Health	8.9	16.8	6.696**
Individualism	6.3	8.7	.1.043
Knowledge	5.2	9.5	3.138
Leisure	14.1	20.0	3.046
Magic	0	2.6	5.143*
Modernity	52.1	76.3	34.526***
Neatness	6.3	1.3	10.769**
Ornamental	5.2	2.1	4.030*
Patriotism	0	3.4	6.721**
Popularity	23.4	16.8	3.597
Practicality	7.3	2.9	5.900*
Quality	50.0	40.3	4.919*
Respect for the Elderly	.5	3.9	5.508*
Safety	11.5	7.6	2.300
Social Status	2.6	8.9	8.078**
Technology	47.9	45.0	.437
Tradition	10.9	11.3	.018
Uniqueness	6.3	3.4	2.442
Wealth	1.0	5.0	5.651*
Youth	12.5	26.8	15.276***
Sex	0	11.1	22.903***

Percentages may not total 100 percent because multiple values were coded in each ad.

* p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001

Table 6   Frequencies of Cultural Values
           Manifest by Product Origins

Cultural Values	Domestic (%)	Joint Venture (%)	Imported (%)	X^2 Values[a] (df=2)
Beauty	20.9	44.2	16.7	15.927***
Collectivism	7.8	17.3	6.7	5.671
Convenience	9.1	9.6	15.0	2.072
Courtesy	20.0	25.0	35.0	7.247*
Economy	11.3	1.9	10.0	4.452
Effectiveness	15.2	15.4	1.7	8.306*
Family	7.2	9.6	11.7	1.719
Health	15.2	17.3	3.3	6.633*
Individualism	7.4	15.4	5.0	4.878
Knowledge	8.7	1.9	8.3	2.905
Leisure	14.8	34.6	28.3	17.287***
Magic	2.0	1.9	0	1.193
Modernity	65.0	75.0	86.7	12.711**
Neatness	3.3	1.9	1.7	.686
Ornamental	3.0	1.9	5.0	.948
Patriotism	2.6	1.9	0	1.658
Popularity	19.1	13.5	23.3	1.768
Practicality	4.6	0	6.7	3.175
Quality	44.6	23.1	53.3	11.396**
Respect for the Elderly	3.5	0	0	4.007
Safety	8.5	11.5	10.0	.636
Social Status	7.6	1.9	5.0	2.726
Technology	44.1	25.0	78.3	35.134***
Tradition	12.6	7.7	3.3	5.299
Uniqueness	4.8	3.8	1.7	1.271
Wealth	3.7	1.9	5.0	.750
Youth	21.3	44.2	8.3	21.616***
Sex	6.3	19.2	5.0	12.015**

[a] X^2 values indicate differences in the frequencies of each value regarding product origins.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

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Table 7   Frequencies of Cultural Values
Manifest by Product Categories

Cultural Values	CF (%)	FD (%)	HA (%)	ME (%)	PC (%)	SE (%)	AU (%)	IP (%)	MI (%)	X^2 Values[a] (df=8)
Beauty	75.5	16.1	28.6	22.7	27.8	14.0	12.5	6.6	0	110.156***
Collectivism	12.2	10.7	6.7	12.5	5.6	10.5	0	6.0	12.5	6.344
Convenience	6.1	0	11.8	9.1	13.9	0	12.5	16.6	0	23.031**
Courtesy	22.4	28.6	16.8	13.6	25.0	43.9	37.5	19.9	0	26.686***
Economy	4.1	1.8	20.2	1.1	2.8	1.8	12.5	18.5	0	45.703***
Effectiveness	14.3	1.8	5.9	43.2	30.6	5.3	0	7.9	0	95.773***
Family	2.0	8.9	22.7	4.5	11.1	1.8	0	2.0	0	51.821***
Health	12.2	30.4	12.6	28.4	27.8	7.0	0	1.3	25.0	57.613***
Individualism	28.6	3.6	5.9	12.5	16.7	3.5	12.5	1.3	0	48.835***
Knowledge	4.1	0	1.7	11.4	5.6	38.6	0	.7	87.5	166.138***
Leisure	18.4	46.4	31.1	13.6	8.3	8.8	50.0	4.0	12.5	77.008***
Magic	2.0	0	1.7	3.4	8.3	1.8	0	0	0	14.497
Modernity	71.4	53.6	77.3	64.8	61.1	59.6	100.0	72.2	37.5	21.854**
Neatness	0	1.8	2.5	0	25.0	0	0	2.6	0	67.421***
Ornamental	4.1	0	10.1	1.1	2.8	3.5	0	0	0	27.383***
Patriotism	2.0	1.8	.8	3.4	2.8	7.0	0	1.3	0	8.485
Popularity	20.4	25.0	24.4	11.4	19.4	10.5	0	21.9	0	14.121
Practicality	0	0	5.0	3.4	8.3	1.8	0	7.9	0	12.760
Quality	34.7	39.3	60.5	35.2	52.8	19.3	50.0	48.3	0	40.977***
Respect for the Elderly	0	5.4	2.5	9.1	0	3.5	0	0	0	21.561**
Safety	8.2	0	4.2	25.0	13.9	1.8	37.5	7.3	0	50.827***
Social Status	14.3	5.4	7.6	8.0	11.1	5.3	12.5	2.6	12.5	10.977
Technology	18.4	12.5	58.8	29.5	22.2	35.1	62.5	77.5	12.5	133.513***
Tradition	8.2	33.9	1.7	25.0	5.6	22.8	0	.7	12.5	84.064***
Uniqueness	8.2	5.4	4.2	5.7	2.8	7.0	0	2.0	0	6.145
Wealth	2.0	7.1	.8	1.1	0	17.5	0	2.6	0	40.018***
Youth	59.2	23.2	21.0	33.0	36.1	15.8	12.5	4.6	0	80.345***
Sex	44.9	7.1	5.0	6.8	2.8	3.5	0	.7	0	116.051***

CF = Cosmetics and Fashion;   FD = Food and Drink;   HA = Household Appliances;
ME = Medicine;   PC = Personal Care;   SE = Services;
AU = Automobile;   IP = Industrial Products;   MI = Miscellaneous.

[a] X^2 values indicate differences in the frequencies of each value regarding product categories.

* p<.05;   ** p<.01;   *** p<.001

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Emergence of a Private Press in Socialist Tanzania:

A Study of Media Worker Perceptions

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Emergence of a Private Press in Socialist Tanzania:

A Study of Media Worker Perceptions

Abstract: A survey of attitudes toward the emerging private press as perceived by 50 Tanzanian media workers from newspaper and radio, education, the government and a media women's group suggests four attitude factor types that express divergent ways of thinking about the private and official press, including two factors who support the private press and two factors who support the official press.

Abstract: A survey of attitudes toward the emerging private press as perceived by 50 Tanzanian media workers from newspaper and radio, education, the government and a media women's group suggests four attitude factor types that express divergent ways of thinking about the private and official press, including two factors who support the private press and two factors who support the official press. Tanzania, selected as a model socialist Third World country, is shifting from a one-party to a multi-party political system and expanding a government-party press system to include a private press. Factor I, the Competitive Populist, turns to the private press to carry out the development role of the media that the official press has failed to fulfill. Factor II, the Status Quo Builder, wants to build the resources of journalists, but professional changes are sought within the media status quo of a controlled official media. Factor III, the Development Promoter, supports a network of socialist development journalism roles by expanding rural media, positive news, youth issues and a populist approach within an official media system that spells out journalists' qualification. Factor IV, the Critical Reformer, presents a deep distrust of government involvement in the media and a positive assessment of the impact of the emerging private press, but underlying this is a strong belief in popular media, the democratization of news and the New World Information Order, as well as criticism of the private press.

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Emergence of a Private Press in Socialist Tanzania:
A Study of Media Worker Perceptions

1. Introduction

This paper explores the changing socialist media philosophy in Tanzania as perceived by Tanzanian media workers, including 50 newspaper and radio journalists, journalism educators and students, government information officials, and members of a media women's association.

This paper is excerpted from a larger study designed to identify the attitude structures, or factor types, among media workers revolving around a dozen issue areas identified as important by participants in preliminary interviews and questionnaires. This paper will focus on the media worker attitudes to 32 of 63 opinion statements in these areas: (1) socialism and press freedom (2) private and official media; (3) government and media; and (4) Western media models (table 5-9).

Conducted in July and August, 1992, the study began with open-ended questionnaires and interviews with about 35 journalists, journalism educators, students, and government information officials. The interviews generated about 400 opinion statements about the media in Tanzania. The researcher selected a balanced-valence sample of 63 statements and then applied an attitude research technique, Q-methodology, to the process. Fifty media workers participated in the in-depth study, interdependently ranking the 63 opinion statements on a continuum of agreement to disagreement. The 50 individual rankings, or sorts, were factor-analyzed to discover areas of commonality and difference among types of perceptions about the media. The computer analysis produced four factor types. Each factor's typal array--how the factor factor type ordered the 63 opinion statements from most agree to most disagree-- along with demographic data are interpreted in the paper.

The hypothesis in this study is that from the perspectives of Tanzania's media workers the country's emerging private press would be viewed with a mixture of socialist, traditional, revolutionary and Western philosophies that are incompatible with authoritarian or development media philosophies developed by Western media researchers and applied to Third World's media. Tanzania was selected as a model socialist Third World country for the study for several reasons. First, Tanzania has developed a socialist media policy under longtime former President Julius Nyerere designed to achieve cultural autonomy and minimize foreign cultural influences. The mainland of Tanzania has not started a television system, although the state runs Radio Tanzania and the island region of Zanzibar has a television and radio system. At the same time, however, Tanzania is undergoing an opening up of the media with the recent emergence of several indigenous private newspapers to compete with the government's Daily News and the Party of the Revolution's Uhuru, and relaxation of the monopoly distribution of Western news services formerly held by the state news agency, Shihata. Secondly, Tanzania has experienced a high degree of political stability since independence in 1961, with the media playing an important role in economic, social and political development. Within this framework of stability, however, Tanzania has begun introducing fundamental political changes with the July 1, 1992, initiation of multipartyism. As of that date, opposition political parties were allowed to seek registration as the country moves to end decades of one-party rule. By the end of July, several parties had successfully registered.

II. Background

The media philosophies in Africa usually are described by Western scholars as authoritarian or developmental. In the latter, the media are temporarily controlled by government to mobilize the people for national construction. It is assumed that once the nation is developed, the media will become free, along Western-style libertarian lines. After 30 years of independence, however, state controlled media have not yielded to free

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media. This led at least one scholar (Hachten, 1985) to accuse African governments of having "strangled the press in its cradle."

Today's press philosophy derives from Siebert's (1956) four theories: authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet-Communist. Sommerland (1966) offered a variation with three philosophies: authoritarian, libertarian and evolving, a "no-man's land" approach. Lowenstein (1971) added a social-centralist category to identify a media philosophy that helps governments harness the media for national development. Hachten (1971) and Wilcox (1975) used this philosophical system to study the African press. Wilcox concludes the authoritarian model applies while Hachten calls the press neo-Communist. Haule (1984) examined the legal controls of pre- and post-independence press in Tanzania using Lowenstein's PICA index and found both systems authoritarian.

Hachten (1985) represents one line of thought on African media from a U.S. perspective. He charges that the press has not developed in Africa because political and economic freedoms necessary to nurture the press have been denied. Government control has created a "dull, obeisant, fawning" press. The press has had no impact on economic development and political integration. The best African newspapers are British in ownership, orientation, format and content, requiring a market economy. Hachten criticized scholars for ignoring the capitalists with ties to the West in favor of socialist experiments. Opposing these researchers, who are wearing "ideological blinders," Hachten shifts blame for the failure of African media from the neo-colonists to African governments themselves. Hachten dismisses Marxist theories that African media are thwarted by multinational corporations because most African countries that rely on MNCs and are most neo-colonial are better off. Those that isolated themselves from the former colonies, such as Tanzania, are seen as economic failures where African governments "strangled the press."

Contrasting to Hachten is the view of Hamelink (1983) and others that media research theory is marred by Western ethnocentrism and measures positive change in terms of capital investment, mass production and consumer goals. Development media policies yield growth mania that organizes life around commodities and rends social systems between modernizing elites and traditional masses. Rather, according to this view, development should be measured in intrinsic communication needs. Af African may be more satisfied by community dancing than by American television sitcoms, so measuring development in TV sets per 1,000 people is inappropriate.

One of two Q-studies of attitudes toward mass-media in Africa (Wete; 1983; Hagahmed, 1985) offers operant attitude structures for examining media philosophies. Wete conducted a Q-study of attitudes of African students studying in the U.S. in which three types emerged: Type I, the Pragmatic Idealist, embodies a practical concept of the media, recognizing the need for some press freedom but considering the media's primary role as forging national identity; Type II, the Socially Responsible, allows for the developmental role of media while emphasizing the need for a free media able to criticize the government. Type III, the Split Personality, favors government control of irresponsible journalism and at the same time opposes government control. These findings reveal attitudes about the media not accounted for in the four theories of the press. All types reject unconditional press freedom and authoritarianism in the media.

Wete's thematic categories were supported by content analysis of pre- and post-independence Tanzanian newspapers (Akhahenda, 1984). Exploring four areas: development, politics, economics and crises, his study concluded that public newspapers gave more space and prominence to development news. Tanzania's "Ujamaa" program, or familyhood, was reflected in the greater use of development news. Political news received the next most coverage in the public newspaper, and the second most coverage, next to sports, in the private newspaper. Economic news was more prominent in the private newspaper but the space allotted was the same. Public newspapers gave greater

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attention to crisis news than private newspapers. On the whole, there were most similarities than differences between public and private newspapers.

III. Methodology and Research Design

Q-methodology, developed by William Stephenson (1953) is a small-sample attitude survey technique that explores subjectivity objectively. In Q-methodology, the responses of individuals are correlated and factored to identify patterns of opinion. Proponents point to the merits in studying attitudes and perceptions of individuals or groups (MacLean). Q-methodology measures the extent that each participant's response to each stimulus item correlates with every other participant's response to that item. Participants are then grouped into significant factor clusters depending on the correlation of the statement orders, yielding usually prototype factor arrays -- the statements in order for that factor type.

For this study, the population of opinion statements was developed through questionnaires and interviews with about 35 media workers in Dar es Salaam and through several Tanzanian media research works (Lederbogen; Konde; Walsh; and Tanzania Journalism Association). The researcher selected 63 statements after grouping the 400 statements into thematic areas. Respondents were asked to sort the 63 statements into 11 piles on the basis of "most agree" (+5) to "most disagree" (-5) with a required number of statements in each pile as follows:

Score:	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
No. Items:	2	3	5	7	9	11	9	7	5	3	2

Respondents also were asked to supply information regarding their job description, media organization, other media employment, education, years of media experience, age and gender.

The 50 individual sorts were analyzed using the QUANAL computer program for factor analysis. A four-factor solution was selected for interpretation after reviewing three-, four-, five- and six-factor solutions. The four-factor solution met the criteria

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of a lower percentage of confounded or non-loaded respondents (20 percent), absence of any factors with fewer than four respondents, a low correlation among factor types (only one correlation above .500), and an acceptable percentage of total variance (.40). The factor matrix is in table 10. Of the total variance, Factor I accounts for .12 percent; Factor II accounts for .09 percent; Factor III accounts for .11 percent; Factor IV accounts for .08 percent. The correlation between types shows that Factor I and Factor IV are closely related, with a correlation of .560. Factor I is also related to Factor III with a correlation of .451, but the correlation to Factor II is a low .126. Factor II also has a moderate correlation of .378 with Factor III, but a low correlation of .077 with Factor IV. Factor III and Factor IV have a moderate correlation of .369.

Of the 50 participants, 10 are either insignificantly associated with any factor, with all correlations less than .400, or are significantly associated with more than one factor, with two correlations of more than .400. For this paper, all participants are included in the factor they are most closely associated with for demographic comparisons. The computer analysis assigns all participants to a factor. In all, 14 participants are significantly associated with Factor I, with two participants added, for a total of 16; seven participants are significantly associated with Factor II, with two added for a total of nine; 11 are associated with Factor III, and four are added for a total of 15; seven are associated with Factor IV, and three are added for a total of 10.

Among the study's 50 participants are 30 men and 17 women; three subjects did not indicate gender. Each factor includes about the same percentage of men and women. The participants range in age from 22 to 51 years old, with the 30 both the mean and median age. The years of experience range from none to 30, with 7.3 the mean; the median was 5.5 years. Of the 50, 10 work as journalists for official media either government or party controlled, both print, broadcast and news agency; six work as journalists for private media; five work for the Ministry of Information as information officers; four are freelance journalists; five are members of a media women's

association; 18 are students at the Tanzania journalism school, a two-year program; two are journalism educators. Twenty-one of the participants work for other media in addition to their primary job: 12 work for public media; six work for private media; and three work for other organizations. Their education ranges from secondary level to master's degree level, with 18 indicating completion of secondary level, 16 completion of journalism certificate or two-year journalism diploma; eight completion of a bachelor's or master's degree. Eight did not indicate their education.

IV. Findings: An Overview of the Factors

The four factors that emerge from the analysis show that media workers in Tanzania combine elements of socialist and capitalist media philosophy in ways that Western researchers' theorizations fail to account for. Surprising outcomes, however, are common in Q-studies as the preconceptions of the researcher are limited and the subjectivity of the participants is magnified.

First, the four factors will be interpreted using the factor arrays' extreme agree and disagree items, which are those with an average score of more than 1.0 or less than -1.0, and demographic data. The factors will be described before seeing how they respond to ideas about the private press because an understanding of each factor is needed before seeing how each responded to individual items. A factor is a combination of people who have sorted all the items in similar ways. The people on each factor are linked by common beliefs, attitudes and opinions. Their factor array represents the hypothetical attitude, the "common" thinking of the people on the factor, weighted by each person's similarity to the factor. It is therefore useful to conceive of a factor as a hypothetical person rather than a collection of people because the factor represents a way of thinking.

Factor types usually are named in Q-studies to give a more human dimension to the interpretation and help create an image of the person the factor represents. Factor i is called the Competitive Populist because he or she has turned to the private press to carry out the development role of the media that the official press has failed to fulfill.

This expresses both a continuation of past media practices and a break with past media structures. Factor II, the Status Quo Builder, wants to build up the status of journalists and confront the problem of the media's negative portrayal and hiring of women, but these professional and social changes are sought within the structures and functions of the media status quo of an official press that is government controlled. Factor III, the Development Promoter, uncritically supports a network of socialist development journalism roles and government controlled media structures by expanding rural media, positive news, youth issues and a populist approach. This factor also seeks development in journalism training, pay and investigative reporting, and wants to establish binding journalist qualifications. Factor IV, the Critical Reformer, presents a deep distrust of government involvement in the media and a positive assessment of the impact of the emerging private press, but underlying this is a strong belief in popular media, the democratization of news and the New World Information Order, and criticism of the private press.

Factor I: Competitive Populist

The Competitive Populist (table 1) has turned to the private press to carry out the development role of the media that the official press has failed to fulfill. The Competitive Populist most strongly thinks the media should focus on processes and development issues (24) and a bottom-up approach (2). But he or she also thinks that people want to read about people, not about government leaders as in the past, a change being brought about by competition from the private media (4). This factor also thinks the media should report news critical of the government (8), which the official media have not been doing (29). To correct this problem, the government should have no control over the news or the media (61). Factor I also places a premium on the need for journalism training by professionals (7) and the need for more journalism training throughout a journalist's career (46).

The extreme negative end of the array reinforces the Competitive Populist's strong rejection of a government-imposed journalism (53, 18) and self-censorship (36). These 11 most-disagree statements also reinforce the belief in the viability of the private press by defending it against criticism of fanning ethnic conflict (63), sensationalism (10), deep societal opposition (19) and insincerity (30). The denial of any role or redeeming qualities of the official press is reiterated by the rejection of the idea that it is free enough (20). The idea that the government press should be socialistic and free to debate proposals (48) is also soundly rejected. The Competitive Populist, looking for alternatives, rejects at the same time Westernization of the press and the end of socialism (54) but also rejects the use of Third World news agencies instead of Western news agencies for international news (15).

The media workers associated with this factor reflect this combination of socialist-official and capitalist-private media values. Of the 16 media workers associated with this factor, two are public media workers and two are private media workers, but the two public media workers represent only 14 percent of the public media workers in the survey while the two private media workers represent 33 percent of that group. The factor includes three members of a media women's association with a focus on cultural issues. and nine of the 18 journalism students in the survey are members of this factor, indicative of the factor's bridging the past and future, as a generation's ways of conceiving journalism under socialism and a new generation sensitive to changes in that system. Also, one of the two journalism educators is on this factor.

Factor II: Status Quo Builder

Factor II's strongest opinions (table 2) favor building up the resources, education and pay of journalists (56, 46, 17) to do more investigative reporting (34), as well as dealing with the problem of the media's negative portrayal and hiring of women (32, 52). These professional and social changes, however, are sought within the

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structures and functions of the status quo. Factor II strongly believes that the media should adopt self-censorship to avoid conflict with government (36) and that journalists should be held accountable for the news itself and disciplined for unethical conduct (55). The development model is strongly supported (24), as is the introduction of television (43), but freedom of the press is not an issue for the Status Quo Builder because the media by their nature are not free (60).

The extreme negative statements of the Status Quo Builder indicate a strong defense of the official press and trust of the government. Factor II most strongly disagrees with the idea that the private press has no problems (59) and that the government should have no control of news (61). Defending the official press, the Status Quo Builder believes the official press will not die (58) or become sensationalized (10) in response to the private press. This factor also denies that the government has yielded to Western donor countries' demands for a free press (62) and that the news needs redefining in a national context that is not neo-colonial (5). Nyerere's socialist media policies (57) are strongly defended, as is TAJA's code of ethics (6), against charges of being forces of self-censorship. Also, the Status Quo Builder denies that media have to make leaders look good (53). Further in defense of the socialist status quo, the Builder rejects the idea that the media will become more Westernized (54).

Half the six Ministry of Information respondents are among this factor's nine subjects, but only three of the 15 public media workers overall. Also, only one of the six private media workers are on this factor. Although the factor is critical of the media's treatment of women and advocates hiring women media workers, only three, or a third, of the people on the factor are women. Overall, the Status Quo Builder has less education and is older, with six who have secondary education, the highest level attained by the factor. Only one of the 18 students is among the group. The factor also includes no one under 30, with eight of nine people reporting their ages, although it has an even distribution of years of experience from none to 30 years.

1 2

Factor III: Development Promoter

Of the dozen items Factor III most strongly agrees with (table 3), seven opinions promote development journalism roles expanding rural media, positive news, youth issues and a populist approach. Three other statements seek development in journalism training, pay and investigative reporting, and one calls for establishing journalist qualifications. In addition, Factor III, the Development Promoter, thinks television should be brought to Tanzania (43), which is a belief firmly locked into a network of socialist media goals.

After asserting foremost the need for more journalism training (46), the Development Promoter calls upon the media to influence cultural norms and educate farmers and people in rural areas (11); to focus on processes and development (24); to initiate rural papers and local radio programs (21); to present positive news in an interesting way (14); to pay attention to youth issues (12); and to focus on people themselves (4) using a bottom-up approach (2). In addition to journalist training, the Development Promoter strongly feels that the government should set journalistic qualifications before registering a newspaper (27) and raise pay above the poverty level (17), while promoting investigative reporting (34).

The extreme negative statements defend the official press, the socialist media and development journalism while criticizing the private media. The Development Promoter most strongly believes the official press will not die (58). Among related statements, the factor defends the media under Nyerere and the history of the official press(57), as well as the importance of the media's development role (44). The same statement (44) also doubts that a private press would have helped Tanzania from the beginning, supported by the rejection of the idea that the private press has no problems (59) and rejection of the privatization of radio (33). The Development Promoter does not dismiss freedom of the press, disagreeing that there is no press freedom in either a private or official press (60). The press, this factor thinks, is not forced to make leaders look good

(53), nor is the country bending to Western donors in promoting press freedom (62). TAJA's ethics code (16) is supported, which matches the type's call for journalistic qualifications. The final two statements in the extreme disagreement part of the array illustrate that this type is not critical of the official media system. The Promoter rejects statements that the media are insensitive to women (32) and that television will present negative images of women in advertising (42). Aside from higher pay and better training, the Development Promoter offers no criticism of the current system, and no alteration of its role for the media.

It is significant to the Development Promoter's strong support of the socialist roles of the media and journalistic training and pay without any media criticism that the media workers on the factor are all from the public media or the journalism school. Five of the 15 people work with public media and eight are students. There are two information officers in addition to five journalists among the 15, but no private media worker is associated with this factor. Although evenly representative of the range of education levels and ages, only two Development Promoters have more than 10 years of experience, and only one of the six 40-to 51-year-old group is on this factor.

Factor IV: Critical Reformer

A deep distrust of government involvement in the media and a positive assessment of the impact of the emerging private press characterize the strongest beliefs of the Critical Reformer (table 4), but a contradictory part of this factor's array is an underlying but strong belief in popular media, the democratization of news and the New World Information Order, and development media roles. The Reformer also is critical of the private press.

Above all else, the Critical Reformer hates censorship. He or she would end the political appointment of media editors (28) and stop all government control of news, news agencies and journalists (61). The private press now must do what the official media did not: What the government is doing (29), and the private media movement is

helping change the government news agency, Shihata, by making it competitive (38) and helping improve the prospects of journalists in terms of pay and freedom (37) as well as respect (35). But this wave of freedom and private media should be used by the media to talk about people, not leaders (4) and focus on village news and issues, including government radio programs (21). Further, popular media of song, poetry and theater need to be emphasized by the mass media (22), and journalists should promote democratization of news and the New World Information Order (45). In this array of beliefs and arguments, the Critical Reformer would completely overhaul the socialist media structures but retain the most socialistic of media functions.

The strong distrust of government tempered by the acceptance of the country's socialist press history, the qualified defense and criticism of the private press, and a call for reform of the official media are reinforced or expressed in the negative extreme of the array. The Critical Reformer most strongly denies that the media should make leaders look good to mobilize the people (53), and then strongly disagrees that the media should censor themselves to avoid conflict with government (36). Indeed, the media-government relationship has been adversarial, and people do not want media to cooperate with government (18).The Critical Reformer defends the private press today against charges that it would stir up ethnic conflict (63), but in the next breath admits the private press has problems and the official press has had its benefits (59). In contrast to the past, the Critical Reformer believes that today the official press does not have enough freedom (20), although under Nyerere, the Critical Reformer argues, the media played a positive role (57) and Tanzania has shaken the colonial definition of news (5). Finally, the Critical Reformer rejects the idea that the media should follow development news and ignore politics (24), along with rejecting the idea that the private press will lead to the death of the official press (58).

Eight journalists, one journalism educator and one student comprise this factor. Of the journalists, five work for public media and three for private media, but none of

the six Ministry of Information workers is a member of this group. The Critical Reformer also has a high level of education, with eight of 10 holding a journalism certificate or higher.

Factor Perceptions of Socialism and Press Freedom

Of the 30 statements related to issues of the emerging private press, six center on socialism and press freedom (table 5). Only Factor I, the Competitive Populist, agrees that there was nothing positive about Nyerere's socialist media policies (57), in contrast to strong disagreement by the other three factors. Factor I, along with Factor III, the Development Promoter, also denies credit to Nyerere for increasing press freedoms since the call to discuss multipartyism (50), while Factors II, the Status Quo Builder, and IV, the Critical Reformer, give him part of the credit. Factors I and II give more credit than the other two to journalists themselves for the current level of press freedom (40). Yet the direction the media are moving in is unclear. All factors disagree that the media will become Westernized (54). Socialism is being discussed and journalism will not shift to a market system. All except Factor IV think that many who support the free press movement are posturing because socialism highly values unity and suppresses diversity (30). But three factors quite strongly believe, except the neutral Factor II, that the government newspaper should not be socialistic, supporting government policies (48).

Factor Perceptions of Private Media

Of eight statements about the private media (table 6), three factors strongly agree that the private press's role is to let the voters know what the government is doing (29). Only Factor II, the Status Quo Builder, is neutral on this question, as he or she is about the idea that private media will benefit journalists (37). Factor I, the Competitive Populist, is also neutral about the impact of private media, but Factor III, the Development Promoter, and Factor IV, the Critical Reformer, agree that journalists will benefit from the private media. All factors believe to varying degrees that society itself

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does not oppose the private press (19). Looking toward the importation of the country's first private press (9), Factor IV and Factor I mildly agree it would help achieve real journalism, but Factors II and III disagree mildly. All factors also believe there are negative aspects to the private press (59), with all except Factor I strongly believing that the private press brings problems. But among those problems is not sensationalism (10). All disagree that the private press's sensationalism is even making the official press more sensational. Only Factor II, however, thinks that the private press has better-trained journalists and is poaching journalists from the official press (39). Whether the private newspapers need to organize to fight government regulation is supported by Factors I and IV but rejected by Factors II and III.

Factor Perceptions of Official Media

Of four statements about the official media (table 7), only Factor II, the Status Quo Builder, mildly thinks that the official press has enough freedom (20). The other three factors moderately or strongly believe the official press does not have enough freedom. Only Factor II again agrees that the official press has supported unity and the private press will sow the seeds of ethnic and religious conflict (63). Factor I and Factor IV strongly believe this is not the case; Factor III mildly thinks the free press will stir up conflict. Three factors agree that politicians who don't want bad news reported are a problem for the press (8), but Factor II strongly disagrees with that opinion. Three factors strongly believe that the official press survive pressure from the private press (58). Factor I mildly agrees that the official press will die.

Factor Perceptions of Government and Media

Of the nine statements about the relationship between government and media (table 6), all four factors disagree that the media and government have had a happy partnership (18), but only Factors I, the Competitive Populist, and IV, the Critical Reformer, strongly believe that the media should not adopt self-censorship to avoid conflict with the government (36). Factor II, the Status Quo Builder, strongly believes

that the media should censor themselves, and Factor III, the Development Promoter, mildly agrees. Factor III is alone in mildly agreeing that the government should appoint the heads of public media (28). The other three factors moderately or strongly believe that public media heads should not be government-appointed. Factor I joins Factor IV in strongly believing that the government should not control news, journalists or the media (61). Factor II strongly believes the government should control the media, and Factor III mildly agrees with government control. The claim that neither the government nor private press is free (60) earns a strong positive response from Factor II, a strong negative response from Factor III, and mildly negative responses from Factor I and Factor IV. Ending Shihata's monopoly on news dissemination is strongly supported by Factor IV and moderately supported by Factor II. Factor I ranks Shihata's changes with a mild agreement and Factor III regarded it neutrally. Questions about electronic media in general receive less extreme responses. Factors II and III strongly welcome the introduction of television (43), which Factors I and IV regarded indifferently. But Factors I and IV moderately agree that television's success depends on who controls it (3), which Factor II strongly disagrees with and Factor III takes neutrally. Factors I and III are neutral about whether government-owned electronic media can be critical (13), but Factor II thinks that it can be critical and Factor IV thinks it cannot be critical. Factors I and IV are in favor of privatizing radio, but Factors II and III oppose privatizing radio.

Factor Perceptions of Western Media

The cultural and social problems posed by the commercial Western electronic media (table 9) are mildly recognized by Factors II, III and IV, but Factor I mildly rejects the idea that television will create a cultural gap because of its Western character (23). Again with a Western leaning, Factor I, the Competitive Populist, strongly believes the media should not use more Third World news agencies (15). Factors II and III mildly believe the media should use Western news agencies, with only

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Factor IV, the Critical Reformer, supporting use of more Third World news agencies. Only Factor IV also thinks that the government is appeasing Western donors by shifting toward a free press (62), a suggestion Factors II and III strongly oppose. And only Factor IV mildly supports foreign investment in the media (25), a suggestion the other factors moderately reject.

Conclusions

This study shows that the four attitude factors have distinct and differing responses to questions about the emerging private media suggests neither a Western nor a communist approach to the media, but a third way that recombines ideas to fit Tanzania's form of socialism, placing the emerging private press in a Tanzanian context.

Regarding socialism and press freedom issues, most factors strongly defend Nyerere's socialist media policies of the past, yet most factors strongly feel the government newspaper today should not be socialist. Further, all agree the media would not become more Westernized.

The private media, most factors agree, should tell readers what the official press has not told them: how the government is operating. All factors agree that society does not oppose the private press and all defend the private press against charges of sensationalism. Yet all factors agree the private press has negative aspects and they are unsure of both the benefits that journalists will derive from the private press and the impact of the importation of a private printing press. The quality of the private press journalists and the idea of the private newspapers banding together to fight government regulation also drew a mixed responses.

On the official press, most factors think it is a problem that many politicians want only good news coverage and knew they could get it in the official press, and most factors think the official press does not have enough freedom. Yet most factors believe the official press is not going to die.

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Responding to the relationship between government and media, most factors agree the government-media partnership has been troublesome. Most factors also agree the government should stop appointing heads of the public media and three welcomed liberalizing changes in the government news agency. Yet there was deep disagreement between factors about how much government should control news and how much the media should practice self-censorship.

In reaction to the Western media, most factors mildly believe television will create a cultural gap because of its cost and commercial nature, and most oppose foreign investment in the media. Most also think the government's shift toward a free press is not designed for Western donor nations. Yet most factors think the media should not use more Third World news agencies.

Tanzanian media workers are involved in the process of creating a media system that reflects Tanzania's socialist history since independence with current openness and liberalization in the economic and political systems. Their attitudes may be seen as a selection of important elements from both the ideas of the past, held most strongly by the older media workers employed in public media or the government on Factors II, the Status Quo Builder, and III, the Development Promoter, to the influence of global communications trends, privatization and Westernization, as seen in Factors I, the Competitive Populist, and IV, the Critical Reformer. All are perceiving media with ideas and structures of market economics and political pluralism as they are introduced, including an emerging private press, but the underlying socialism persists to provide a framework for the forces of change.

Table 1.--Factor I extreme items

Factor I: The Competitive Populist

Most agree items   **Score**

24. The media should focus more on processes and development issues rather than big names and politics.   2.0

2. The media should use a bottom-up approach. It is the people who should make news and not the way it is done now. This would automatically give a voice to the voiceless. 1.9

8. We have a problem with politicians who want the press to report on the good side of what government is doing and not on the bad. Most officials will talk to the official media because they know they get good coverage, but they are afraid of private media.   1.8

61. The government should have no control of news; news agencies should be free; and government should not interfere in the activities of journalists.   1.8

4. I think people want to read about themselves, their problems, how their money is spent or misused. In the past, the picture painted by the media was always rosy. The media didn't talk about people, only leaders every day. Now the competition is changing this.   1.6

7. A major problem with Tanzania School of Journalism is that most of the tutors are professional teachers, not practicing journalists. They are good teachers but they know nothing about journalism.   1.5

46. A two-year journalism diploma is inadequate to train journalists. Journalism should be offered instead at the University and more on-the-job training is needed for working journalists, from seminars and short courses to support for advanced studies.   1.1

29. The private press's main role now is to make sure the taxpayer or voter knows how the government operates so they can pick good leaders. Their aim is to exactly tell the people what they were not being told before.   1.1

Most disagree items (from least to most disagree)

18. The media have been a partner of government and people are quite happy to live with that. Government has never used repressive measures because the media always played ball.   -1.0

20. The official press has enough freedom; freedom is relative. Even in a private dominated free press there are libel laws and you have to look at the interests of the owners.   -1.0

54. The media will become more Westernized. Nobody talks about socialism now. People talk about market economy. Journalism is changing from the Communist side to the Western side.   -1.1

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Table 1.--Factor I extreme items (con't)

Most disagree items   Score

19. Opposition to the private press is from society itself. You have built a tradition of protecting leaders. That is the most difficult thing to overcome.   -1.2

48. The government newspaper should be socialist, supporting government policies but free to debate any particular proposals offered by the government or others.   -1.2

30. Many who agree with the need for a free press are posturing. In Tanzania's culture and socialism, stability means unity. There is a very high premium on showing unity to the extent diversity really is suppressed.   -1.3

15. The media should use more Third World news agencies rather than Western news agencies for international news.   -1.4

36. The media should adhere voluntarily to the rules of the game by adopting self-censorship to avoid conflict with the government.   -1.9

10. The private press is watering down journalism with sensationalism, so that even the government press is more sensationalized.   -2.0

63. The official media have helped the party and government unify the country since independence, but a freer press and private press will only stir up ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that we should avoid.   -2.4

53. The media have to put a good slant on stories and make leaders look good because the people have to be mobilized.   -2.7

Table 2.--Factor II extreme items

Factor II: Status Quo Activist

Most agree items: **Score**

56. It will be impossible for journalists to be professional until the media provide better facilities, equipment and working conditions, from typewriters and computers to transportation.   2.1

46. A two-year journalism diploma is inadequate to train journalists. Journalism should be offered instead at the University and more on-the-job training is needed for working journalists, from seminars and short courses to support for advanced studies.
2.1

32. The media are insensitive to women, either ignoring women's issues or portraying women as dependents. Media should be gender-conscious toward the positive aspects and not only the negative aspects of women.   1.6

34. Reporters should be encouraged to do investigative stories instead of spiking them, as is being done currently by most editors.   1.5

24. The media should focus more on processes and development issues rather than big names and politics.   1.4

52. The media need more women journalists who are sensitized to women's issues. We have only a few women who look at issues sensitively. The other women in media don't care or take men's side, which makes women subservient to men. There should be an aspect of gender consciousness in journalism training.   1.4

55. Because news is a social good and not a commodity,the journalist shares responsibility for the news transmitted and should be accountable. Journalists should report other journalists for unprofessional or unethical conduct for disciplinary action.   1.3

36. The media should adhere voluntarily to the rules of the game by adopting self-censorship to avoid conflict with the government.   1.2

43. Television is long overdue on the mainland. It is now more expensive to install television than it was 10 years ago.   1.2

60. The media are either a government or private owner's mouthpiece. There is no freedom of the press in the country.   1.2

17. The media is one the the lowest-paying institutions. Pay for journalists should be raised above the poverty level and standardized depending on qualifications, starting at a minimum of 40,000 shillings a month for journalism graduates, for example.   1.1

Table 2.--Factor II extreme items (con't)

Factor II: Status Quo Activist

Most disagree items (from least to most disagree)   Score

5. The media need to redefine what news is in the Tanzanian context because the current definition is still colonial even 30 years after independence.   -1.0

6. TAJA's code of ethics is a model of self-censorship. Using a development media approach, it was promoted by government and passed by media.   -1.0

54. The media will become more Westernized. Nobody talks about socialism now. People talk about market economy. Journalism is changing from the Communist side to the Western side.   -1.0

53. The media have to put a good slant on stories and make leaders look good because the people have to be mobilized.   -1.0

57. There was nothing positive about the media under Nyerere. He made sure the press was tamed. He contributed a lot to self-censorship. Tanzania would have developed faster with a private press that could be critical.   -1.4

10. The private press is watering down journalism with sensationalism, so that even the government press is more sensationalized.   -1.4

62. The shift toward a freer press reflects the government's desire to appease Western donor countries on whom the government depends for survival.   -1.8

58. I think the official press is going to die. If another party comes in in 1995, can the official press support itself? If it doesn't die, it will struggle to exist. Who is going to buy the official press once the private press becomes daily?   -2.0

61. The government should have no control of news; news agencies should be free; and government should not interfere in the activities of journalists.   -2.2

59. There are no negative aspects to the private press. We should have had it since independence. The official press was a mistake.   -2.2

Table 3.--Factor III extreme items

Factor III: Development Promoter

Extreme agree items   Score

46. A two-year journalism diploma is inadequate to train journalists. Journalism
should be offered instead at the University and more on-the-job training is needed for
working journalists, from seminars and short courses to support for advanced studies.
                                                                            2.3

11. The media need to influence the cultural norms and values of people in rural areas
in order to change them to go with the times. The media also need to educate the small
farmers about developments and changes in farming.   1.9

24. The media should focus more on processes and development issues rather than big
names and politics.   1.9

27. Before a newspaper is registered, the qualifications of a journalist should be
spelled out. Now anyone can register a newspaper with the Ministry of Information.
Journalism education should be required of all full-time editors.   1.9

17. The media is one the the lowest-paying institutions. Pay for journalists should be
raised above the poverty level and standardized depending on qualifications, starting at a
minimum of 40,000 shillings a month for journalism graduates, for example.   1.8

21. Now all media coverage is on people living in towns and cities, but we could have
simple, cheap, two-page leaflets in rural areas focusing on village news. The Ministry
of Information also should have decentralized, zonal radio stations to broadcast local
programs.   1.5

14. Human nature likes negative news, but you can present positive things in an
interesting way. It could be boring to cover development issues, but not with creativity
in presentation by bringing a region to life and showing how people live.   1.4

43. Television is long overdue on the mainland. It is now more expensive to install
television than it was 10 years ago.   1.3

12. The media should pay attention to youth issues, especially because we do have a
young nation whose minds and perceptions will determine what tomorrow's country is
going to be like.   1.3

4. I think people want to read about themselves, their problems, how their money is
spent or misused. In the past, the picture painted by the media was always rosy. The
media didn't talk about people, only leaders every day. Now the competition is changing
this.   1.2

2. The media should use a bottom-up approach. It is the people who should make news
and not the way it is done now. This would automatically give a voice to the voiceless.
                                                                            1.0

34. Reporters should be encouraged to do investigative stories instead of spiking them,
as is being done currently by most editors.   1.0

Table 3.--Factor III extreme items (con't)

Most disagree items (from least to most disagree)   **Score**

33. It is a good idea to privatize radio. People who are operating radio should try to sell the government the idea of going private, perhaps starting as a parastatal.   -1.0

60. The media are either a government or private owner's mouthpiece. There is no freedom of the press in the country.   -1.0

62. The shift toward a freer press reflects the government's desire to appease Western donor countries on whom the government depends for survival.   -1.0

42. When we get television, advertising that uses women to see products will further the belief that is is all right to harass women. This kind of advertising is just now creeping into the media, but we can change it by having people to review and analyze the message before it goes out.   -1.2

53. The media have to put a good slant on stories and make leaders look good because the people have to be mobilized.   -1.3

59. There are no negative aspects to the private press. We should have had it since independence. The official press was a mistake.   -1.4

16. I don't like the TAJA code of ethics much because it pins the journalist down while the employers are not told anything. For instance, journalists are prohibited from receiving tips but it doesn't say no tips are allowed for employers.   -1.5

44. Development journalism is the job of the Information Ministry, not the role of the media. Development theory of the press has not worked. The country has gone downhill.   -1.6

57. There was nothing positive about the media under Nyerere. He made sure the press was tamed. He contributed a lot to self-censorship. Tanzania would have developed faster with a private press that could be critical.   -1.6

32. The media are insensitive to women, either ignoring women's issues or portraying women as dependents. Media should be gender-conscious toward the positive aspects and not only the negative aspects of women.   -1.7

58. I think the official press is going to die. If another party comes in in 1995, can the official press support itself? If it doesn't die, it will struggle to exist. Who is going to buy the official press once the private press becomes daily?   -1.7

Table 4.--Factor IV extreme items

Factor IV: Critical Reformer

Most agree items   **Score**

28. Government leaders should stop appointing heads of public media. The editors serve the interests of government. Some editors are politicians without any knowledge of journalism.   2.2

61. The government should have no control of news; news agencies should be free; and government should not interfere in the activities of journalists.   2.0

29. The private press's main role now is to make sure the taxpayer or voter knows how the government operates so they can pick good leaders. Their aim is to exactly tell the people what they were not being told before.   1.5

.38. I am glad to see Shihata change because the government was subsidizing these services. Now Shihata has to learn to lure customers, to show its competence, and to make sure it gives subscribers what they want.   1.5

37. With the expansion of private media, journalists will soon enjoy better prospects, such as rise in salary, wider benefits, more freedom.   1.3

4. I think people want to read about themselves, their problems, how their money is spent or misused. In the past, the picture painted by the media was always rosy. The media didn't talk about people, only leaders every day. Now the competition is changing this.   1.2

22. Popular media need to be recognized as part and parcel of the mass media and journalism education, including theater, poetry and song. Journalism education now is too narrow.   1.2

35. Since becoming competitive, journalism standards are going up slowly and the press is more accepted in society. People used to say journalists were like beggars, or they were afraid to talk to us because they thought we belonged to the security forces. More people are respecting us now.   1.2

21. Now all media coverage is on people living in towns and cities, but we could have simple, cheap, two-page leaflets in rural areas focusing on village news. The Ministry of Information also should have decentralized, zonal radio stations to broadcast local programs.   1.2

45. Journalists should promote the democratization of news and the new international information order both nationally and internationally.   1.1

Table 4.--Factor IV extreme items (con't)

Most disagree items (from least to most disagree)   **Score**

48. The government newspaper should be socialist, supporting government policies but free to debate any particular proposals offered by the government or others.   -1.0

58. I think the official press is going to die. If another party comes in in 1995, can the official press support itself? If it doesn't die, it will struggle to exist. Who is going to buy the official press once the private press becomes daily?   -1.0

24. The media should focus more on processes and development issues rather than big names and politics.   -1.1

20. The official press has enough freedom; freedom is relative. Even in a private dominated free press there are libel laws and you have to look at the interests of the owners.   -1.2

18. The media have been a partner of government and people are quite happy to live with that. Government has never used repressive measures because the media always played ball.   -1.2

5. The media need to redefine what news is in the Tanzanian context because the current definition is still colonial even 30 years after independence.   -1.3

57. There was nothing positive about the media under Nyerere. He made sure the press was tamed. He contributed a lot to self-censorship. Tanzania would have developed faster with a private press that could be critical.   -1.5

59. There are no negative aspects to the private press. We should have had it since independence. The official press was a mistake.   -1.5

63. The official media have helped the party and government unify the country since independence, but a freer press and private press will only stir up ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that we should avoid.   -1.9

36. The media should adhere voluntarily to the rules of the game by adopting self-censorship to avoid conflict with the government.   -2.4

53. The media have to put a good slant on stories and make leaders look good because the people have to be mobilized.   -2.9

Table 5.-- Socialism and press freedom statement arrays

Factors: I   II   III   IV

57. There was nothing positive about the media under Nyerere. He made sure the press was tamed. He contributed a lot to self-censorship. Tanzania would have developed faster with a private press that could be critical.   .6   -1.4   -1.6 -1.5

50. Part of the credit for increased press freedom should be given to Nyerere's call for a debate on the future of the one-party state. Private papers have become vocal critics of government economic policy and supporters of political pluralism.
                                                          -.6   .2   -.2   .6

40. The current level of press freedom can be attributed to the efforts of journalists themselves, many of whom, despite the threat of official or unofficial sanction, have pushed the limits of press freedom.   .5   .5   -.3   .2

54. The media will become more Westernized. Nobody talks about socialism now. People talk about market economy. Journalism is changing from the Communist side to the Western side.   -1.1   -1.0   -.4   -.5

48. The government newspaper should be socialist, supporting government policies but 'ree to debate any particular proposals offered by the government or others.
                                                          -1.2   .0   -.9   -1.0

30. Many who agree with the need for a free press are posturing. In Tanzania's culture and socialism, stability means unity. There is a very high premium on showing unity to the extent diversity really is suppressed.   -1.3   -.2   -.3   .3

Table 6.-- Private media statement arrays

Factors: I   II   III   IV

29. The private press's main role now is to make sure the taxpayer or voter knows how the government operates so they can pick good leaders. Their aim is to exactly tell the people what they were not being told before.   1.1   -.0   .9   1.5

37. With the expansion of private media, journalists will soon enjoy better prospects, such as rise in salary, wider benefits, more freedom.   .0   .1   .8   1.3

19. Opposition to the private press is from society itself. You have built a tradition of protecting leaders. That is the most difficult thing to overcome.
                                                          -1.2   -.1   -.8   -.6

9. After private printing presses are imported you are going to see real journalism when you get daily private newspapers. The official press will have to change.
                                                           .4   -.4   -.2   .6

59. There are no negative aspects to the private press. We should have had it since independence. The official press was a mistake.   -.5   -2.2   -1.4 -1.5

10. The private press is watering down journalism with sensationalism, so that even the government press is more sensationalized.   -2.0   -1.4   -.6   -.6

Table 6.-- Private media statement arrays (con't)

Factors:　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I　　II　　III　　IV

39. The private press has some of the best-trained journalists in the country, and has poached the best journalists from the official press. There is no longer this thinking that the private press is run by frustrated, untrained editors.　　-.4　　.5　　-.2　　-.7

49. Everybody in the private press is busy competing, but they need to form an organization of private newspapers to fight government regulation. Private newspapers cannot say no when they do not have a common front.　　.3　　-.7　　-.3　　.8

Table 7.-- Official media statement arrays

Factors:　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I　　II　　III　　IV

20. The official press has enough freedom; freedom is relative. Even in a private dominated free press there are libel laws and you have to look at the interests of the owners.　　-1.0　　.3　　-.7　　-1.2

63. The official media have helped the party and government unify the country since independence, but a freer press and private press will only stir up ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that we should avoid.　　-2.4　　.3　　-.2　　-1.9

8. We have a problem with politicians who want the press to report on the good side of what government is doing and not on the bad. Most officials will talk to the official media because they know they get good coverage, but they are afraid of private media.
　　1.8　　.9　　.9　　.5

58. I think the official press is going to die. If another party comes in in 1995, can the official press support itself? If it doesn't die, it will struggle to exist. Who is going to buy the official press once the private press becomes daily?　.2　　-2.0　　-1.7　　-1.0

Table 8.-- Government and media statement arrays

Factors:　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I　　II　　III　　IV

18. The media have been a partner of government and people are quite happy to live with that. Government has never used repressive measures because the media always played ball.　　-1.0　　-.7　　-.0　　-1.2

36. The media should adhere voluntarily to the rules of the game by adopting self-censorship to avoid conflict with the government.　　-1.9　　1.2　　.3　　-2.4

28. Government leaders should stop appointing heads of public media. The editors serve the interests of government. Some editors are politicians without any knowledge of journalism.　　.7　　.7　　-.3　　2.2

61. The government should have no control of news; news agencies should be free; and government should not interfere in the activities of journalists.
　　1.8　　-2.2　　-.5　　2.0

670

30

Table 8.-- Government and media statement arrays (con't)

Factors:	I	II	III	IV
60. The media are either a government or private owner's mouthpiece. There is no freedom of the press in the country.	-.3	.2	-1.0	-.2
38. I am glad to see Shihata change because the government was subsidizing these services. Now Shihata has to learn to lure customers, to show its competence, and to make sure it gives subscribers what they want.	.2	.7	-.0	1.5
43. Television is long overdue on the mainland. It is now more expensive to install television than it was 10 years ago.	.0	1.2	1.3	-.0
3. Television's success depends on who will control it. If government controls it, we might get a lot of propaganda. Let's wait until we see how it is set up.	.4	-.9	-.0	.6
13. Electronic media are all government, so it is difficult for the director of broadcasting to be critical. Radio will not change for a long time because that is the most effective, cheapest way of disseminating propaganda for government.	.0	-.4	.0	.8
33. It is a good idea to privatize radio. People who are operating radio should try to sell the government the idea of going private, perhaps starting as a parastatal.	.5	-.8	-1.0	.5

Table 9.-- Western media statement arrays

Factors:	I	II	III	IV
23. The Western electronic media are very powerful and serve a special class. Television is highly commercialized, and in a country like ours creates a cultural gap. Nobody can afford a TV. In rural areas it is difficult even to own a transistor radio.	-.5	.3	.6	.2
15. The media should use more Third World news agencies rather than Western news agencies for international news.	-1.4	-.4	-.6	.3
62. The shift toward a freer press reflects the government's desire to appease Western donor countries on whom the government depends for survival.	-.5	-1.8	-1.0	.3
25. I would not mind foreign investment or control of media if the investors came in for financial benefits and did not control the content of the press. It would pay journalists more so other journalists would benefit.	-.8	-.5	-.4	.3

Table 10.-- Factor Matrix

Seq.	Variable I.D.	I	II	III	IV	Com.	Pure

Factor I: Competitive Populist

Seq.	Variable I.D.	I	II	III	IV	Com.	Pure
1	40	.700	-.089	.069	-.013	.502	.974
2	8	.504	-.068	.153	.002	.282	.901
3	10	.574	.112	-.014	-.168	.371	.889
4	2	.638	-.004	.096	.204	.458	.889
5	41	.566	-.091	.055	.202	.373	.860
6	30	.625	.211	.141	.079	.461	.847
7	29	.440	.070	.205	.103	.251	.772
8	1	.491	-.049	-.139	.292	.348	.693
9	9	.495	.228	.258	.031	.364	.673
10	49	.625	-.255	-.112	.375	.609	.642
11	24	.408	.184	.218	-.179	.280	.595
12	4	.420	.124	.216	.243	.297	.593
13	38	.419	.001	.151	.367	.333	.527
14	45	.342	-.303	.107	.078	.226	.516
15	44	.434	.018	.198	.390	.380	.495
16	31	.346	.276	.333	.141	.327	.365

Factor II: Status Quo Builder

Seq.	Variable I.D.	I	II	III	IV	Com.	Pure
17	13	.109	.694	.029	-.021	.495	.973
18	14	.068	.826	.066	-.106	.702	.971
19	22	-.098	.546	.113	.063	.325	.919
20	19	-.006	.576	.092	-.211	.385	.863
21	20	.080	.730	.316	.075	.645	.827
22	18	.057	.653	.311	-.080	.533	.800
23	15	.021	.463	-.163	.262	.310	.692
24	27	.271	.465	.422	.125	.483	.447
25	42	.198	.371	.349	.137	.318	.433

Factor III: Development Promoter

Seq.	Variable I.D.	I	II	III	IV	Com.	Pure
26	39	-.128	.091	.510	.056	.288	.903
27	17	-.029	.299	.644	.052	.508	.817
28	16	.176	.273	.608	.048	.478	.774
29	46	.275	-.208	.570	.101	.454	.716
30	50	.192	.115	.373	.098	.199	.700
31	21	-.044	.298	.604	-.269	.528	.691
32	32	.369	-.014	.596	.190	.527	.673
33	43	.194	.053	.486	.296	.364	.648
34	35	.030	.374	.534	.182	.459	.622
35	28	.417	-.217	.554	.135	.547	.562
36	34	.2?5	-.119	.568	-.427	.595	.542
37	33	.164	.281	.478	.368	.469	.486

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Table 11.-- Factor Matrix (con't)

Seq.	Variable I.D.	I	II	III	IV	Com.	Pure
Factor III: Competitive Populist							
38	37	.345	-.275	.393	.064	.353	.437
39	36	.226	.206	.264	.113	.176	.396
40	26	.292	.195	.296	.199	.251	.350
Factor IV: Critical Reformer							
41	12	-.084	.067	.054	.458	.224	.936
42	11	-.064	.053	.238	.641	.474	.866
43	23	.086	.102	.174	.492	.290	.835
44	25	.172	-.042	-.180	.469	.284	.775
45	7	.355	-.148	-.076	.484	.387	.604
46	48	.293	-.318	.048	.508	.448	.577
47	5	.401	.246	.203	.503	.516	.491
48	3	.223	-.148	.269	.369	.280	.486
49	6	.508	.073	.166	.512	.553	.474
50	47	.474	-.046	.209	.475	.497	.455

		I	II	III	IV		
TOTAL VAR	- PER FACTOR	.1235	.0946	.1053	.0807	.4041	
	- CUMULATIVE	.1235	.2181	.3234	.4041		
COM. VAR.	- PER FACTOR	.3057	.2341	.2606	.1997	1.0000	
	- CUMULATIVE	.3057	.5398	.8003	1.0000		

Note: A factor loading, or correlation, of more than .400 is significant on a factor. Loadings of less than .400 are called non-loaded variables. Loadings of more than .400 on two factors are call confounded variables.

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Telecommunications Policymaking in Japan: A Case Study in Elite Power
Group Conflict and Compromise.

by

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Telecommunications Policymaking in Japan: A Case Study in Elite Power Group Conflict and Compromise.

Since the early 1970, the term "Japan Inc." has provided a familiar heuristic in the field to describe the prevailing mode of industrial policymaking in Japan. Despite its applicability to the dynamics of Japanese industrial policymaking during Japan's ascent to the status of an "advanced industrialized society," however, the Japan Inc.model's heuristic value in describing Japanese policymaking has been substantially diminished in the post-industrial era. The rapid shift of the primary economic base in the advanced industrialized countries from heavy industry to information and telecommunications as a result of the advent of new information technologies, has also led to an increasing diversification of interests among the Japanese power elites at all levels, political, bureaucratic, and business/industrial.

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to
1) present an analysis of the conflicting interests which have emerged since the advent of new technologies and
2) propose an elite conflict model as an alternative conceptualization for Japanese policymaking in the post-industrial era.

Since the early 1970, the term "Japan Inc." has provided a familiar heuristic in the field to describe the prevailing mode of industrial policymaking in Japan. Based largely on the postwar studies of Japan's rise to the status of an economic superpower, the "Japan Inc." model views Japanese industrial policymaking as a harmonious process of cooperation between two largely monolithic entities, the Japanese government (working through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the country's big business.

Despite its applicability to the dynamics of Japanese industrial policymaking during Japan's ascent to the status of an "advanced industrialized society," however, the Japan Inc. model's heuristic value in describing Japanese policymaking has been substantially diminished in the post-industrial era. The rapid shift of the primary economic base in the advanced industrialized countries from heavy industry to information and telecommunications as a result of the advent of new information technologies, has also led to an increasing diversification of interests among the Japanese power elites at all levels, political, bureaucratic, and business/industrial. Subsequently, far from reflecting the traditional traits of "harmony" and "consensus" implied by the "Japan Inc." model, the Japanese policy process in the new information age has been characterized largely by conflict, deadlock, and partial compromise among competing elite power groups.

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is
1) to present an analysis of the conflicting interests which have emerged since the advent of new technologies and

2) to propose an elite conflict model as an alternative conceptualization for Japanese policymaking in the post-industrial era.

In so doing, this paper will examine three major cases of telecommunications policymaking in Japan, the "Model City" experiments, privatization of Japan's common carrier, NTT, and the debate over NTT's divestiture.

The primary rift: MITI vs MPT

As the postwar studies of Japan's rise to economic superpower status have clearly shown, throughout the 50s and the 60s Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) acted as the leading bureaucratic body in charge of orchestrating the country's industrial policy. Relying primarily on a semi-formal (as opposed to legally ordained) mode of policy coordination known in Japanese circles as "gioseishido" or "administrative guidance," MITI orchestrated Japan's rise to the status of an advanced industrialized society in cooperation with the private industry.[1]

However, as the advent of new information technologies in the early 70s began to redefine Japan's economic base and industrial contour, it quickly became clear that MITI was to face a completely new set of interests and variables in its efforts to maintain its position as the country's leading industrial/economic policymaker in the new information age. Most important among these new variables was the fact that, unlike the informal "administrative guidance" relationship it had long cultivated with Japan's private industry, MITI had no previous contact with, or legal authority

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over, Japan's telecommunications industry. That authority, along with the responsibility to supervise the country's broadcasting industry belonged to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). Having recognized its new lease on power through its domination of Japan's monopoly common carrier, NTT, on the other hand, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications appeared determined in the early 1970s to compete with MITI for the position of Japan's primary policymaker in the post-industrial era. Throughout the 70s, 80s, and early 90s, therefore, Japan has been witness to an intense power struggle between the two ministries and their allied factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

[In an effort to try to resolve the bureaucratic conflict, in 1984 Japanese Diet gave MPT the responsibility for telecommunications "networks" while charging MITI with guiding the computer "industry." In effect, however, this distinction failed to resolve the territorial conflict, partly because of the unwillingness of both parties to withdraw from the competition and partly because of the inevitable overlap of policy issues within the two broadly defined areas of responsibility.]

The "Model City" Experiments

During the 1970s, at a time when the telecommunications market had yet to mature and vested commercial interests remained largely undefined, MITI and MPT comprised the primary actors in the elite power struggle which had begun to brew on Japan's political and economic scene. During this period, each of the two ministries tried to establish itself as the

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primary promoter of the use of new information technologies among the Japanese public.

Early in 1970, each of the two ministries inaugurated an "advisory panel" to study the ways in which the use of the new information technologies may be accelerated in Japan. MITI's advisory panel consisted primarily of elite business interests, including the electronic manufacturers,[2] while MPT's advisory panel consisted of the elite interests traditionally associated with the ministry, including NTT and the public and commercial broadcasters.[3]

Upon receiving the reports of their respective panels in 1972, MITI and MPT each went on to establish an association to plan and carry out a series of experiments in the use of new information technology. MPT's Tama Coaxial Cable Information System (CCIS) project provided a range of CATV, pay TV, facsimile, teletext and videotext services to 500 volunteer households. MITI's HI-Ovis experiment, on the other hand, offered a similar range of services, plus an interactive cable system, to 156 households and ten public buildings on a more advanced fiber optic cable network.

Because of the similarities in the nature of the projects inaugurated by the two ministries, the Ministry of Finance in reviewing the 1973 budget urged MITI and MPT to join efforts in carrying out their projected experiments. Under the weight of tradition and the cultural imperative of harmony, the two ministries obliged and subsequently formed the joint Living Visual Information System Association in June 1973.[8] The essential divergence of interests between MITI and MPT, however, proved too

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strong to allow real cooperation in the project and, despite the formal establishment of the joint association, the two ministries proceeded to carry out their experiments separately and competitively, each at its own designated site.[4]

As it soon became clear in this process of bureaucratic competition, however, MPT's ready access to the vast resources of NTT proved to be an asset which MITI was unable to replace despite the cooperation it was receiving from the nation's electronic manufacturers.

As the Tama CCIS project neared completion in 1977, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications once again drew upon NTT's cooperation to develop a new videotext service, entitled Character and Pattern Telephone Access Information Network (CAPTAIN). The new system made use of existing technology (television and telephone lines) to provide Japanese households with a relatively economical videotext service.[5] [The system began commercial operation in Tokyo in November 1984, and has shown a slow but steady progress with 105,000 sets in use as of 1990].

Soon after the inauguration of the CAPTAIN system in the late 1970s, MPT began to work with NTT on developing an Integrated Network System (INS), i.e., the Japanese version of ISDN, a digital optical fiber network capable of integrating all modes of communication. [NTT inaugurated Japan's first voice and data ISDN service in April 1988. Full-fledged broadband ISDN, capable of carrying video signals, is slated to begin early in the 21st century (before 2010).]

And in yet another bold move, in August 1983, MPT began the promotion of a nation-wide plan called "Teletopia," a name made up of the

combination of the two words "telecommunications" and "utopia".[6] A Teletopia city was envisioned as a futuristic communication model-city, the inhabitants of which make widespread use of new media technologies in almost every aspect of their daily lives. Along with CAPTAIN, the projected Integrated Network System (INS), was envisioned as the primary technological infrastructure in Teletopia model cities.

In order to encourage the participation of businesses and local governments, the ministry provided a wide range of incentives and assistance, including low interest loans, investment tax exemptions, and free consulting services.[7]

MITI, on the other hand, began in 1984 to develop its own futuristic model city plans under the name of "New Media Community" project. While, because of its head-start with CAPTAIN and access to NTT facilities and R&D, MPT was able to begin to implement the teletopia projects on a commercial basis, MITI's plan was conceived of as an experimental endeavor, consisting of a need-assessment stage, after which information systems compatible with the needs and problems of each community were to be designed and implemented.[9] Although MITI has been relatively successful in enlisting the assistance of Japan's major electronic manufacturers and prefectural governments in the project, MPT's continuing domination of NTT has provided it with a clear edge over MITI in implementing the model-city projects. As of 1990, seventy cities participated in the Teletopia plan, which since its inauguration in 1983, has been expanded to include the establishment of Telecom Plazas ("a high-level telecommunications center where individuals and businesses

can experiment with the latest telecommunications technology"), Telecom Ports (intended to promote international links through the use of "a satellite earth station and a large-scale optical fiber network"), and Telecom Research Parks ("regional facilities that will allow corporations to engage in joint research and development projects in leading-edge telecommunications and other technology").[8]

Privatization of NTT

Recognizing the need for taking NTT out of MPT's circle of influence, MITI began in the early 1980s to push for a complete privatization of NTT, an eventuality which would, in theory, eliminate MPT's supervisory authority over NTT, allowing MITI to bring NTT into the circle of private industries under its jurisdiction.

Shortly, thereafter, MITI was joined in its privatization efforts by Japan's electronic manufacturers and other large business conglomerates who were anxious for an opportunity to enter the lucrative and rapidly expanding telecommunications and data communications market. Subsequently, when the government of Prime Minister Suzuki first announced its policy of "administrative reform" aimed at trimming the fat and increasing the efficiency of Japan's public corporations, both MITI and the country's business elites, organized in the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), seized the opportunity and lobbied for NTT's privatization and divestiture as part of the government's administrative reform policy.

In March 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki established a formal advisory

committee, entitled the Second Ad Hoc Council on Administrative Reform, charged with the task of reviewing the state of Japan's public corporations and advising the government on the necessary reforms.[10] Despite its formal character as a governmental committee, however, the Second Ad Hoc Council was from the beginning under the direct influence of Keidanren. Among the most visible signs of this was the fact that the Council, appointed by the Prime Minister, was headed by the then Keidanren President, Toshio Doko, the founder of Toshiba and one of Japan's most influential "zaikai" (business elite) members. Another sign of Keidanren influence was the concurrence of the Council, both chronologically and in terms of its final recommendations, with the Keidanren Committee on Information and Telecommunications Policy. In a detailed set of recommendations submitted to the Council in February 1982, Keidanren advocated complete liberalization of the use of telecommunications and NTT privatization and divestiture.[11] A few months later, the Second Ad Hoc Council, in complete agreement with Keidanren policy recommended:[12]

* opening the telecommunications market to private competition,

* turning NTT into a 'special company' whose shares are initially held by the government and later gradually sold to the public, and

* divestiture of NTT within five years into a central company operating trunk lines, and several local companies operating local telephone services.

From the beginning the recommendations made by the Second Ad Hoc Council, particularly those urging privatization and divestiture of NTT, met with strong opposition from MPT and its supporters in the

ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[13] Based upon the traditional tendency of similar institutions in Japan to compete with one another while joining with dissimilar groups to form self-sufficient heterogeneous coalitions,[14] different ministries in Japan routinely coalesce with faction in the LDP, forming competing cluster-factions or "tribes" (zoku). Thus, after the Second Ad Hoc Council issued its report, conflict began to grow between the so-called "MPT tribe" (Yuseizoku) representing a coalition between MPT and the Tanaka faction in the LDP, and the "MITI tribe" (Tsusanzoku), representing a coalition between Keidanren, MITI, and the Miyazawa faction in the LDP.[15]

As the first step toward achieving a possible compromise, on the issue of market liberalization, MPT partially liberalized telecommunications lines in October 1982 to permit the establishment of small-scale value-added networks for business usage.[16] In the meantime conflict continued to rage on the question of NTT's privatization and divestiture, leading senior politicians outside the MITI and MPT tribes to take action later in 1983 to obtain a compromise between the two contending cluster-factions. In the course of the formal and informal negotiations that followed, the strong opposition of MPT and its allies succeeded in freezing the idea of NTT divestiture for the time being. In return, however, MPT agreed in principle to Keidanren/MITI demands for NTT's privatization.

A partial compromise was thus reached, based on the idea of privatizing NTT first and considering the desirability of its divestiture at some future date.[17] Subsequently, two laws passed the Diet in April 1984

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(becoming effective in April 1985), the NTT Co. Law privatizing NTT, and the Telecommunications Business Law, providing for market liberalization measures. Reflecting the contentious nature of the process and the precarious state of the compromise, a review clause was added to each of the two laws, requiring a formal review of the NTT Co. Law in five and the Telecommunications Business law in three years.

Although representing a partial victory for MITI and Keidanren, the NTT Co. Law contained major concessions to MPT interests. Not only did NTT remain intact as a giant company, but it was also given the go-ahead for unlimited expansion into all possible kinds of related businesses. And, despite privatization, almost all of the new company's business operations, including the appointment of top personnel and budgeting and investment remained subject to MPT supervision and approval.

The ultimate enactment of the two laws in the April of 1984 created an ironic situation in which, while new telecommunications businesses were allowed to enter the market, they could scarcely hope to compete with the formidably powerful NTT. Not only NTT's efficiency and profits, but also its stature and overall domain in the field of information and telecommunications grew rapidly after its privatization. Unrestricted by the NTT Co. Law as to the range of businesses it would be allowed to enter, NTT rapidly diversified its activities by establishing more than 120 joint ventures with major national and international businesses within a five year period. By the time of the appointed review the law, NTT stood as the largest business in Japan, with the largest number of employees (290,000), highest salary level, and one of the highest profit levels.[18] By

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contrast, NTT's three competitors, Daini Denden Kaikaku, Nihon Kosuku Tsushin, and Nihon Telecom, collectively held less than 3% of the telecommunications market, making barely enough profits to stay afloat in their fourth year of operation.[19]

Thus, as may be expected, during the two years preceding the scheduled review of the NTT Co. Law, pressure continued to build for NTT divestiture. Responding to the obvious need for action, in its interim report issued in October 89 the Telecommunications Council of MPT set forth three options for NTT's reorganization:

* keeping the present structure with necessary improvements

* breaking up NTT; or

* divesting NTT of certain forms of business.[20]

As it happened, however, NTT's continuing domination of the market and the need for its reorganization to allow greater competition, were not the only factors shaping the outcome of the 1990 review. In the months preceding the projected review, a number of other complex political and economic factors emerged on the scene, leading to a major deadlock in Japan's telecommunications policy.

To divest or not to divest: The political deadlock

Among the most important events shaping the outcome of the 1990 review was the Recruit scandal. Late in the Fall of 1988, it was revealed that NTT president, Hisashi Shinto, had accepted a substantial bribe from a major Japanese classified advertising company, Recruit, in return for giving the company illegal access to NTT's newly

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acquired American-built supercomputer for business purposes.[21] Further investigation in the matter revealed that, not only Shinto, but several LDP politicians, including Nakasone, Abe, and Takeshita, had also receiv d Recruit company shares as "gifts". The scandal led to the arrest of Shinto, and massive resignations in the Liberal Democratic Party. The "loss of face" experienced by the LDP had a major impact on the subsequent elections, during which the Socialist Party won several new seats in the Diet.

Because of the longstanding political links between the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Japan Federation of Labor Unions (Rengo) and the NTT workers union, the weakening of the LDP and the rise of the Socialist Party to a visible level of power had a major effect on the outcome of the NTT Co. Law review . Despite their openness to NTT privatization, which gave them the right to strike and ask for higher wages, the NTT workers vehemently opposed the company's proposed divestiture. Although not a traditionally strong factor in the government's policy decisions, the NTT workers' voice found an exceptionally strong expression in the Fall of 1989, when the leader of the NTT workers Union, Mr. Yamagishi, became the leader of Japan Federation of Labor Unions (Rengo) and, as a major figure in the newly powerful Japan Socialist Party, began to agitate against NTT divestiture. [22] Thus, during the few months preceding the NTT Co. Law review, the NTT workers' opposition to divestiture became a major factor shaping the outcome of the review.

Aside from strengthening the voice of the NTT workers union through the Socialist Party, the Recruit Scandal led to another unexpected

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source of opposition to NTT divestiture. During the Fall of 1989, NTT share prices began to fall rapidly due largely to NTT's involvement in the Recruit scandal,[23] leaving the Ministry of Finance, the bureaucratic body responsible for selling the NTT shares to the public, with a large number of highly unpopular NTT shares. Subsequently, fearful that a NTT divestiture may be perceived as a "weakening" of NTT and further reduce the share prices, the Ministry of Finance strongly opposed divestiture for the time being.[24]

Another major factor in the deadlock on 1990 was the opposition of NTT's top management to the proposed divestiture, a position they were effectively able to push within Keidanren itself in the Fall of 1989. Upon its privatization in 1985, NTT had become eligible to join the ranks of Keidanren as one of Japan's most profitable and powerful private companies. Soon thereafter, NTT president, Haruo Yamaguchi, began to climb the ranks of power in Keidanren, rising to the post of Keidanren vice chairman in 1989. [25] Although unable to fundamentally change the organization's position, Yamaguchi's opposition created enough conflict within Keidanren to, at least temporarily, slow down the push toward NTT divestiture. Nonetheless, the overwhelming sentiment within Keidanren remained in favor of a radical reorganization for NTT, one which would include a break-up of NTT into one long distance and several smaller local telecommunications companies.

It was under such volatile circumstances of shifting and conflicting elite interests in the early March of 1990 that the Telecommunications Council of MPT presented the results of its review and its

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recommendations for NTT reorganization to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. In its report, the Council recommended that NTT be broken up into two parts, one long distance and one local telephone company.[26]

Although representing a partial move toward divestiture, the reorganization proposed was far less radical than Keidanren had been seeking since the early 1980s (i.e., divestiture into one long distance and several regional companies).[27] Cognizant of the strong sentiment against full divestiture for the time being, and unwilling to settle for the less radical solution, on the other hand, in a surprise move Keidanren joined the ranks of those opposed to the Telecommunications Council's recommendations. Instead, Keidanren proposed a three-year waiting period, hoping that by that time the climate would be more conducive to the more radical reforms it was seeking.

Interestingly, throughout this period, MITI adopted a wait and see attitude and did not push for a radical divestiture of NTT. Although traditionally an ally of Keidanren, MITI's interests would be better served in this instance by avoiding moves which would alienate NTT, a company it was desperately trying to bring into its own circle of influence.[28]

Given the general opposition arising from a diverse set of polarized elite interests to NTT divestiture, and the pragmatic "agreement" that a waiting period was necessary, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications went on to reject the recommendations of the Telecommunications Council, proposing instead a number of minor reforms. Once again, reflecting the precarious and temporary nature of

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the compromise, a further review of the NTT Co. Law was scheduled for 1995. In the meantime, as a result of the review, NTT's mobile communications department was divested, and NTT was asked to carry out a "self-study" to insure greater efficiency and responsiveness to the public interest.[29]

Thus, under highly unusual circumstances, both NTT and MPT were given five more years in which to try to consolidate their power. In the meantime, the competing bureaucratic, political, and business elite interests continue to clash in a highly volatile policy environment, characterized by conflict, deadlock, and partial compromise.

Summary and Conclusion

It is clear from this discussion that the policymaking environment in the post-industrial Japan represents features radically different from the days of MITI-big business cooperation and dominance. The elite interests shaping the country's telecommunications policy in the new information age are shifting and diversifying and the policymaking process is characterized by conflict and compromise among competing elite interests. A conflict model, therefore, may be considered far more applicable to the current state of post-.industrial policymaking in Japan than the familiar heuristic of Japan Inc.

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Notes:

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2- Izumi Tadokoro, "New Towns and Advanced Cable TV System", Studies of Broadcasting, 1978, p. 89.

3- Ibid., p. 90.

4- Kouichi Kobayashi, "Some Critical Remarks on the New Media Research and Development in Japan," Studies of Broadcasting, 1982, p. 35.

5- Kouichi Kobayashi, p. 44.

6- Kyoshi Sato, Deputy Director, International Affairs Division, Communication Policy Bureau, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, personal interview, May 22, 1985.

7- Hiroshi Miyakawa, "Present and Future of New Media in Japan: The Concept of Teletopia", Science and Technology in Japan, July/September 1985, p. 10.

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10- "Turning NTT into Private Corporation," Oriental Economist, April 1983, p. 12.

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13- "Turning NTT into Private Corporation," op cit.

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18- Izumi Tadokoro, Personal interview, March 15, 1991.

19- Communications in Japan: 1990, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Tokyo, Japan.

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21- Izumi Tadokoro, Personal interview, February 15, 1991.

22- Norimasa Hasegawa, Director, Communications Policy Bureau, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Personal interview, February 1, 1991.

23- Takeshi Maezawa, Senior Editor, Yomiuri Shimbun, April 4, 1991.

24- Izumi Tadokoro, Personal interview, ibid.

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A CRISIS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MEDIA:

The Rise of Civil Society and Democratic Transition

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A CRISIS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MEDIA:
The Rise of Civil Society and Democratic Transition

Since the collapse of the military regime in 1987, South
Korea has seen an unprecedented transition from an authoritarian
to a democratic society. The sweeping force of change has been
affecting virtually the entire fabric of the society. This essay
analyzes problems the South Korean media have experienced in the
unfolding democratization process. Because the change in South
Korea is clearly a society-led one (Lee, 1990), the media, which
used to work mainly as an agent of legitimation for the ruling
regime under strict authoritarian control, have faced an
increasing pressure from below for an equivalent democratic
reform. This paper describes the whole situation as a crisis of
the media and discusses the contextual background of the problem
along with existing theoretical explanations. The paper then
introduces the notion of civil society as an alternative
framework which leads to a more meaningful analysis of the
problem. The main assertion of the paper is that the present
crisis of the media is a direct outcome of the emergence of
various civic organizations which have played a central role in
toppling the authoritarian regime.

The Media in Crisis

Habermas (1975: 2) defines system crises, which issue from
unresolved steering problems, as "persistent disturbances of
system integration." According to him, if a social system is

unable to create a new identity at a historical juncture, when an old identity collapses, the system is in a crisis (pp. 1-31).

The South Korean media today indicate various signs of this system crisis. Sweeping changes in the society during the past several years have led to a fundamental public re-evaluation of existing journalistic conventions and newsroom routines. The once taken-for-granted assumption of objectivity and impartiality of news reporting and the exclusive exercise of editorial rights by senior editors and management are strongly challenged not only by younger journalists but also by ordinary audience members. What makes the situation a crisis is that the struggle over new rules and norms appears not to be resolved in any immediate future. Unless a new consensus on the philosophy, roles and operations of the media is reached, the crisis is to persist.

Structural Problems

Two categories of problems constitute the core of the crisis of the South Korean media: public distrust and management-union conflicts. Public distrust refers to various forms of resentment against the media openly expressed by audience members. A representative example is a voluntary audience movement from 1986 through 1987 not to watch and not to pay the mandatory monthly viewing fee to Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), a national public television network like BBC and NHK. This was probably the first massive organized audience refusal of a television network in world broadcasting history. As a result of this drive, KBS,

which gets half of its budget from the viewing fee, lost about 30 percent of its total revenue.[1]

Newspapers have suffered from similar difficulties. For instance, the Chosun Ilbo, one of major national dailies with an estimated circulation of more than a million copies a day, was almost completely boycotted for nearly a decade in the 1980s by the people of the Cholla province, which accounts for approximately 15 percent of the country's population. Newspapers under direct government supervision have undergone more traumatic experiences. On June 20, 1987 the Kyunghyang Shinmun, a Seoul-based newspaper, saw a truckload of its papers set on fire by a group of pro-democracy activists at a public place.[2] It was a protest against the newspaper's way of reporting political matters. Beside these incidents, the threat of pro-democracy activists' occupation of newsrooms has made riot police squads constantly guard virtually all news institutions in the nation.

The union-management conflict is an internal expression of the same problem. With the success of nationwide democratic movements, virtually every news institution in Korea saw creation of labor unions in late 1987.[3] Without exception, participants of the union movement are young reporters and producers who are more progressive than senior editors and managers. These people also tend to be highly responsive to public criticisms against their work and profession. Consequently, most major news media including two national television networks have experienced unprecedented management-labor conflicts.

The central issue is the problem of editorial rights -- the
rights to plan, select, edit and publish or broadcast stories.
All unions have demanded the union participation in the process
of editorial decision-making. The union view is that editorial
rights have been consistently misused by management to unjustly
frame the news in favor of the authoritarian government. Because
most of the news is produced by reporters and producers, unions
claim, they should participate in determining what is to be
produced and how. Depending on companies, compromises reached
range from an adoption of a vote of confidence about the
performance of appointed editors to a direct election of key
editorial positions.

A question to pursue here, of course, is what has brought
about this crisis. And what do these problems imply for the
future of South Korean journalism?

Theory-Practice Contradiction

At the center of the problem is what may be called the
"working theory" of South Korean journalism, a certain cluster of
ideas or principles -- shared by publishers, editors, reporters,
government officials and the people at large -- which underlies
the daily operation of the media. The crisis of the South Korean
media stems primarily from contradictions between this theory of
journalism and daily journalistic practices.

What then constitutes the theory? And why is there
contradiction? Although there is no definitive textbook of
journalism in South Korea, the working theory can be found in

texts for journalism education, in civic books, in the charters
of journalists' associations, and above all in the constitution.
The basic ideas are: freedom of the press and the people's right
to be informed. The South Korean people have generally assumed,
even under the authoritarian rule, that the media should be free,
independent and objective. The government as well has taught the
people that it is responsible for guaranteeing the people's right
to know, and ensuring the free activities of the press. These
ideas are little different from what Siebert et al (1956)
describe as the characteristics of the libertarian theory of the
press. In fact, constitutions of all successive Republics[4] in
South Korea including the most repressive Fourth and Fifth
Republic have endorsed this cluster of ideas.[5] Having been
educated in school and by the media, most South Korean people
including journalists have regarded this theory as a practiced
principle, and accordingly have maintained a due expectation on
the media.

The present crisis of the South Korean media originates from
their repeated failure to carry out what the assumed theory
requires them to do: to inform the audience of what is occurring.
In other words, the South Korean people, given the theoretical
freedom and independence of the media, have expected them to
provide factual information on important events and issues. In
actuality, however, the media have consistently failed to meet
this expectation, particularly at critical historical junctures -

for instance, during regime changes, general elections or major government crackdowns on organizations for democratization.

Why then has this theory-practice contradiction persisted? Are the media alone to blame for not practicing the theory of a free press? The origin of this contradiction, this essay contends, lies deeper in the conditions of the South Korean society and history.

Problems of Transplanted Ideas

The institutions of the modern media in South Korea are undoubtedly a transplantation of Western ideas. While the notion of the freedom of the press and institutions of democracy have literally evolved hand in hand in the West, the South Korean media have lacked such an institutional foundation. Simply put, the idea of the free press in South Korea was nothing more than a superficial imposition of a foreign idea which completely lacks indigenous institutional support.

An important theoretical question arising from the Korean experience is what constitutes an indigenous institutional foundation for a free press? What are the conditions for a nation with an authoritarian heritage to develop a system of a free press?

Academic debates on this matter in South Korea to date have revolved around the notion of transformation of the traditional culture. Hahm's (1986) view on the South Korean legal system clearly illustrates the thesis of this argument. As far as formal organizational arrangements are concerned, Hahm presents,

the present South Korean system is modern and little different
from any continental civil law system. But the cultural
component of the legal process -- meaning the perspectives of the
people toward the law, lawyers, litigations, judges, and the
judicial process -- has rendered the system "irrelevant and
ineffective" (1986: 4). He identifies three important components
in legal systems: body of rules (postulates), organizational
arrangements (structure), and the perspectives of the
participants in the community process of interaction (culture).
According to Hahm, the South Korean problem lies in the
incompatibility of these three components.

> In the west all three components of the legal system
> developed through a process of mutual interaction. The
> legal system has remained fundamentally in consonance
> with the totality of the culture. To this the Korean
> experience constitutes a sharp contrast. The
> postulates and structures have been imposed upon the
> community. But the culture failed to welcome the
> imported components. The process of interaction
> between the imported and the indigenous has been often
> discordant and hostile. Although the postulates and
> structures with the support of the coercive power of
> the community have won consistent victory over the
> culture, the imported components remain largely alien
> and unassimilated (p. 4).

The same argument applies to the problems of democracy and
the media. For instance, Kim (1988), drawing on theories of
political culture, identifies some key barriers for democratic
change in South Korea. The principal obstacles for South Korean
democracy, he maintains, are cultural: the belief systems and
behavioral norms. Particularly, the inconsistent commitment to
democracy, the strong tendency of political conformity and the
irrational pattern of conflict resolution are three main elements

of Korean culture that have prevented democracy from properly functioning in South Korea. Kim recognizes, as Hahm does, the presence of an institutional framework: the democratic constitution, multi-party politics and the relatively independent court and the press. He argues, however, that this institutional framework has failed to work because the Korean political culture is not congruous with this framework.

In a study of political consciousness of the Korean people, Park and Kim (1987: 29) found the prevalence of Confucian influence as a main stumbling block. They argue that Confucian elements in the Korean culture - such as centralization of political power, denial of participation, rule of man instead of rule of law - are the primary values antithetical to democratic transformation.

The explanation based on cultural tradition summarized above certainly holds a validity. But in the face of rapidly unfolding empirical changes toward democratization, this explanation leads to as many questions as answers. Main questions include: Does the structural change now underway reflects the preceding cultural change? Can culture be transformed after all in any fundamental way? How does a culture change? Who initiates the process? Is democracy impossible until the cultural transformation in non-Western societies?

Given these complicated problems, the explanation based on the traditional culture holds only at most a partial validity. Therefore, it is necessary to find an alternative that accounts

for changing empirical realities of a country like South Korea
more effectively.

The State and Civil Society

The notions of the state and civil society appear to offer
an appropriate alternative for an explanation of the dilemma of
the South Korean media -- an explanation that deals not merely
with the control by the government, but with the broader socio-
historical context. Viewed from this perspective, the emptiness
of the theory of the free press in South Korea is understood as a
result of the absence of effective social forces, rather than as
an outcome of inappropriateness of the traditional culture. In
other words, it is the immaturity of the forces of civil society,
-- ones that are inherently committed to the principles of
freedom of the press -- that has resulted in the continued denial
of media freedom.

Held and Keane (1984: 37) define the state and civil society
respectively as "the apparatus of government (including its
military, economic and cultural institutions) and the realm of
social (privately owned or voluntarily run) activities." The
history of the notion of civil society traces back at least
several centuries. Keane (1988: 38) presents that the
revolutionary theme of "civil society against the state" or the
idea that "the independent 'societies' of a civil society can
legitimately defend themselves against the state" were present in
European societies, particularly in England and France, as early
as the middle of the 18th century.

The contemporary resurrection of the notion of civil society cannot be divorced from the preceding debates on the state. According to Pierson's (1984: 563) summary, theories of the state in the 1970s generally consisted of two neo-Marxist positions: the instrumental view, which regards the state as an instrument of the dominant class, (Miliband, 1969); and the structural view, which recognizes the state as constituted by multiple classes, thus acknowledging positive functions of the state (Poulantzas, 1978). Theoretical positions on the state in the 1980s, however, have dramatically diversified as various new views, including non-Marxist ones, have entered the debate. The traditional Marxist theses on the state, such as "the state as an instrument of a single class" or "the withering away of the state," Pierson maintains, have been rejected by various post-Marxist theories. Instead, the notion of the state as "an arena of struggle," and a positive recognition of the essential role of the state, have gained currency (1984: 567).

An important trend that has accompanied the change of the conception of the state is a shift of theoretical interests from the problems of the state to the potentials of civil society as an autonomous region in which divergent social movements for emancipation -- on the basis of race and gender as well as class -- can be pursued. In other words, the significance of civil society has been freshly re-discovered by many intellectuals as the guarantor of the freedom and autonomy increasingly threatened by excessive intervention of the welfare state. The expanding trend of restructuration of the Western capitalist economies

toward less government control, as Keane (1988: 7) presents, is a clear reflection of the value of this new thinking. Consequently, the challenge for theorists of civil society in the West, in Poulantzas words, is "to develop a strategy which will defend existing and cherished liberties and democratic institutions, while extending the democratic control of society and personal autonomy" (quoted in Pierson, 1984: 566).

The concept of civil society is also celebrated in Poland and other East European countries. The notion of civil society has been used in these countries to explain the process of what Pelczynski (1988) calls "de-totalization" of socialism. Civil society here refers to the increasing sphere of private activities and broadening space for political participation that Solidarity and other civic organizations have claimed back from the monolithic socialist states. It is Gramsci's notion of civil society that enjoys popularity in these countries. Civil society for Gramsci is more a political or strategic rather than a normative realm (Keane, 1988: 14-29) which, being relatively independent of the state, is not monopolized by the moral and intellectual leadership of the bourgeoisie. Gramsci's civil society, therefore, offers other groups and classes a chance to undermine the bourgeoisie's position in the realm of ideas, values, culture, education and voluntary organizations, thus prepares the way, gradually and over a long period, for a political, revolutionary struggle against the capitalist state (Pelczynski, 1988: 365). Gramsci's prescription, however, ironically is more dramatically utilized by the democratic

activists in Eastern Europe in their struggle against the totalitarian socialist state.

Civil Society and Freedom of the Press

Civil society in sum is the fundamental basis of both democracy and freedom of the press. It is reaffirmed not only in capitalist countries, but in socialist countries as well that the fate of democracy is essentially dependent upon the forces of civil society. Without a strong presence of various elements of civil society, individual liberty and democratic principles are subject to arbitrary definition by the state, and freedom of the press also hinges on the benevolence of the government. The freedom of the press in this sense should be conceived of as something that reflects the history and conditions of both the state and civil society of a country. Particularly, civil society as a sphere of individual autonomy and social liberty exerts determinant influence over what mode of public communication is practiced in a society.

The State and Civil Society in South Korea

Park and Kim (1987: 32-38) discuss the tradition of superiority of the state over society in Korea. They present three elements that have maintained the state superiority: the persistent tendency of collectivism which still needs to be replaced with the newly introduced individualism; the adoption of a transcendental or the Hegelian view of the state, instead of a social contract view; and the lack of tradition of strong autonomous society that exercises determinant influence over the

state. The third element of course directly refers to the
traditional weakness of civil society.

The state indeed has been predominant over civil society in
Korea. Three main historical factors help explain why this has
been the case: (1) the absence of civil revolution; (2) the
Japanese colonization (1910-45); (3) and the emergence of
military authoritarianism (1961-87). Transition into a modern
state without a civil revolution has meant a failure to establish
a government by the people, thus has allowed a lack of consensus
on the main social forces for historical development.
Colonization, which ushered in an extremely repressive colonial
regime, further distorted existing structural relations[6] and
almost completely destroyed even traditional civil associations.
The rise of military authoritarianism, suffering from a lack of
legitimacy, has led to an extensive domestication of overall
civilian life for suppression of any kind of civil resistance.[7]
The latter years of authoritarianism, in many respects, can even
be compared to Hitler's Nazi state. In short, it is not too far
from the truth to say that the state in South Korea has seldom
based its existence on the will or consent of the people.

Has there been no institutional realm comparable to civil
society in South Korea? The absolute predominance of the state
created a unique dichotomy of "the state and the anti-state" in
South Korea as opposed to "the state and civil society" in the
West. Whereas civil society is a concept developed from the
problems concerning how to control and limit the exercise of

political power by the state, the anti-state is a label coined by elites in the authoritarian state apparatus to publicly frame relatively small groups of democratic activists as unpatriotic and disintegrative menaces to national integration. Student activists and some intellectuals as well as a few religious leaders have constituted what is called the anti-state in South Korea. The presence of the anti-state, therefore, has been merely of symbolic significance in the flow of South Korean political events.

Under these conditions, the predominant control by the state of almost the entire social, political as well as economic and cultural institutions has gone unresisted. The mass media, in spite of theoretical independence, have never been able to successfully resist routine domination by the state.[8] The mere symbolic existence of the anti-state was not anywhere near comparable to the public sphere during the days of the European bourgeois revolution, thus was unable to provide a structural shield for free activities of the press.

Emergence of Civil Society

A major change, which is similar to the process of East European de-totalization, began to take place in South Korea from the mid-1980s. With the rapid growth of labor unions and consumer organizations as well as various political, economic and even environmental associations, the once negligible realm of the anti-state saw a dramatic expansion. A good example is the

formation of the United Minjung (people's) Movement for Democracy and Unification (UMDU) in 1984. The UMDU was a coalition of twenty-three civic organizations representing union activists, progressive intellectuals, writers, purged journalists, religious activists, Catholic farmers, and reformist teachers. Grassroots civic groups like the UMDU member organizations literally multiplied as pro-democracy movements steadily gained a nation-wide momentum in 1985 and 1986. This was partly a reflection of increasing pluralization, and partly an expression of irrepressible political dissent (Han, 1992). The subsequent massive street demonstrations in June 1987, which eventually ended the authoritarian rule by the military elites, marked a turning point in the history of South Korean civil society. The magnitude of the demonstrations has shown that the people power has grown enough to overthrow a repressive political regime. South Korean people have begun to accumulate a confidence that, if organized and united, they may bring about major structural changes. The tremendous transformations occurring today, in a sense, are the first realization of politics based on popular will in Korean history.

However, the explosive emergence of civil society is posing some problems as well. One is the problem of the "minjung," or "popular mass." Intense debates -- of academic as well as political nature -- have emerged concerning what constitutes the minjung and whether it can be the main revolutionary force for social change. For instance, Park (1985) defines the minjung from a class perspective as the "coalition of factory workers,

peasants and the urban poor," in short, the oppressed classes. Han (1987), in contrast, presents the view that the minjung should be understood in a broader sense as the "totality of ordinary citizens" who aspire for liberalization and democratization. As these views imply, there are conflicting visions for change, one toward socialism and another toward capitalist democracy. This conflict of visions clearly complicates the process of democratization. Absence of democratic culture or insufficient understanding of norms and rules of procedural democracy, as Kim (1988) maintains, have now become a pronounced obstacle. The general populace, or the minjung, has demonstrated characteristics closer to what Park (1972) calls "the crowd," which submits without criticism to the influence of a collective drive, rather than to "the public," which is guided by prudence and rational reflection.

Even though these problems still remain, it is increasingly evident that the former domination of the Korean state is slowly becoming obsolete with the growing strength of civil society. Political norms are changing, from an acceptance of an almost absolute degree of concentration of power to a recognition of the necessity to institutionally check the exercise of government power. Probably the most important is that a structural basis for the South Korean people to control or at least to resist activities of the state is consolidating, further reinforcing people's confidence about their capacity for participation.

As a corollary to this process, the media, whose institutional role used to be defined by the state, are in a

process of creating probably for the first time in the history of the country, an identity as an institution whose legitimacy is sanctioned by the people. This is a period of fundamental transformation for the Korean mass media. The crisis of the media presented in this essay is a reflection of this profound structural change which is still in the making. The enhanced capacity of civil society, whether in a restrictive form of minjung or in forms of more diversified civil organizations, will continue to press for reform in various aspects of news-making practices. The theory of a free press in this sense is only now beginning to have an indigenous structural support. New democratic institutions have not fully settled in. What is encouraging, however, is that the changes this time are produced by a rather firm structural transformation which is hard to reverse.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to explain what it defines as a crisis of the South Korean media. The media in this essay are conceived of as an institution the characteristics of which are largely determined by the relations of the state and civil society in a specific historical and social context of a country. Civil society, in particular, is essential for institutionalization of the idea of freedom of the press because, as is presented here, without a strong presence of civic forces, the media as well as other institutions of democracy are subject to almost an arbitrary domination by the state.

The crisis of the South Korean media is a good illustration. The present dilemma of the South Korean media is a result of a rapid growth of civil society. Put differently, it is the enhanced power of various civic organizations that is forcing radical changes in political, social and cultural practices in South Korea. The absence of press freedom or domestication of the press before 1987 can be explained, in this sense, by the absence of effective civil society.

NOTES

1. Kang, Jun-man's "Viewing Fee Boycott Movement" in <u>A History of Broadcasting Democratization Movement</u> (1990) published in Korean by Tae-am in Seoul provides a detailed description of this movement.

2. June 21, 1987 <u>The Hankook Ilbo</u>, a Seoul-based daily newspaper.

3. Since the first union was formed at the <u>Hankook Ilbo</u> in October 1987, seventeen unions were organized across the nation by April 1988. See the 1988 edition of <u>The Korean Press</u> published by the Korean Press Institute for more detail.

4. Each constitutional change has created a new Republic in South Korea. The current is the sixth, which came into being in 1987.

5. For instances, article 21 of the current constitution states that "all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association." It also stipulates that "licensing or censorship of speech and the press, and licensing of assembly and association shall not be recognized."

6. As in any colonialism, the Japanese regime created what amounts to a new class of collaborators on top of the existing ruling groups, thus further worsened the mechanism of domination.

7. Coercion, not persuasion, was the primary means of politics. The nearly omnipotent power of the security and surveillance agencies has been one of main characteristics of the military authoritarianism.

8. There were a number of journalists' protests for freedom of the press, but not a single attempt has resulted in any substantial improvement in media's autonomy vis-a-vis the government's control before 1987. For details on how the government controlled the media, see <u>Press Guidelines</u> published by the <u>Mal</u> magazine in 1986.

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Press and Political Liberalization in Taiwan

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Paper Presented at the AEJMC Conference, Kansas City, 1993

Two important developments since 1987 in Taiwan's political history have injected a spirit of dynamism in the island's mass media seen for the first time since the government of the Republic of China (ROC)[1] moved to Taiwan after Communists established their rule in mainland China in 1949. First, a 38-year-old ban on the introduction of new newspapers was lifted on January 1, 1988, paving the way for an increase in the number of newspapers from the prior limit of 31 dailies. Another restriction, limiting each newspaper to a maximum of 12 pages, was also lifted at the same time.[2] These restrictions ended as martial law was terminated in Taiwan in 1987, which had been in effect since 1949 and denied constitutional rights including the right to publish freely.[3] Secondly, President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC cancelled on May 1, 1991, the "Temporary Provisions" appended to the ROC constitution in 1948 to deal with Communist rebellion in mainland China. The "Temporary Provisions" had "tremendously expanded the discretionary powers of the president,"[4] including imposing limitations on freedom of speech and the press. The lifting of martial law and the "Temporary Provisions," along with moves toward constitutional reform, have created a climate for press freedom in the ROC unparalleled in the history of the island.

This article proposes the thesis that the ROC's mass media have entered a new phase in their 44-year-old history on the island as a result of the convergence of several factors: influence of the Confucian humanism movement, political and constitutional reforms, socioeconomic progress, and the impact of communication revolution. This phase is marked by an unprecedented exercise of freedom of speech and press, and the active involvement of the media in candidly covering and influencing political and constitutional reforms. This article is based on an observational study done by this writer in Taiwan in March 1992. The study primarily took three forms: a) Interviews[5] with representatives of

both the Chinese and English-language print and broadcast media, government officials and academics to determine their views on press freedom; b) Review of the English-language media to determine any strong indications of editorial independence, and review of literature on media status and performance; c) Review of literature[6] on the Confucian ideology and political developments in Taiwan to determine their influence on freedom of expression.

Because press freedom, or lack of it, closely parallels the degree of political freedom in a country,[7] a brief historical review of the political philosophy and political practices that have shaped the ROC's mass media since 1949 is given first.

Political Philosophy, Politics and Press Heritage

Political Philosophy and Politics

The ROC's political philosophy is influenced by Confucianism and its pronounced commitment to the Three Principles of its founding father, Dr. Sun Yet-sen. The Confucian political philosophy supports a benevolent form of authoritarianism. According to Confucian principles, "the people should look to wise and judicious leaders to carry the country forward, while the leaders should stay close to the people, guided in their decisions by an understanding of the wishes of the people."[8] Whereas under the ethical mandates of Confucius, the rulers were to be morally and spiritually accountable for the quality of their leadership, Dr. Sun, on the other hand, advocated accountability to people through their right to vote.[9]

Educated to be a medical doctor, Dr. Sun became interested in political philosophy and politics in the late 19th century. Alienated by China's long history of dynastic rule, he helped form an organization in Honolulu in 1894 called the Society for Regenerating China. Dr. Sun and his colleagues overthrew the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 to establish a republic.

In a series of lectures delivered in Canton in 1923, Dr. Sun enunciated his Three Principles of the People to serve as a basis for the new republic: Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood, or Socialism. The principle of Nationalism called for the

removal of the foreign imperialistic yoke and the establishment of central power based on national heritage. The principle of Democracy aims to provide civil liberties and "political power" to the people through the right to vote, but it also provides for "governing power" to the government. The principle of People's Livelihood, or Socialism, stressed the need for regulating capital and equalizing land.[10] Metzger and Myers say that the Three Principles doctrine drew on both the Chinese and Western political philosophy, synthesizing the teachings of Confucius, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Abraham Lincoln and John Stuart Mill, among others.[11] The Three Principles were incorporated into the first article of the 1946 constitution of the ROC, with Article 11 providing for "freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication."

Underlying his blueprint for a new government was Dr. Sun's concept of political tutelage. Eastman et al[12] say that Dr. Sun was committed to the goal of popular sovereignty, but he was also convinced that the Chinese people were unprepared for the responsibilities of self-rule. He therefore assigned the task of implementing a democratic system in China to the political party he founded in 1919, the Kuomintang (KMT), in three phases: the military stage, the political tutelage stage and finally the constitutional democracy stage. The military stage was considered necessary to unite China by forcing the regional warlords to abdicate to a new, central government.

The military stage was completed under the leadership of Dr. Sun and his successor, President Chiang K'ai-shek, who had become prominent in the KMT in 1923. The political tutelage stage, in which the KMT alone was responsible for governing the country at the national level and instructing the people in the elements of civics, was carried out under the leadership of Chiang K'ai-shek, first in China and later in Taiwan after the Communist victory in China in 1949. Chiang established a provisional government in Taiwan in 1949 and rejected any degree of subsequent electoral competition or the formation of political parties because, in his eyes, these limits on political dissent were needed to ensure stability and fend off Communist subversion.[13] Under an emergency

decree, he imposed martial law in Taiwan in 1949, resulting in tight controls on mass media.

The political tutelage stage continued during the approximately 10-year presidency of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, starting in March 1978. Chiang Ching-kuo, who was more democratically minded than his father, ended martial law in 1987 and did not suppress a liberal party named Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after it was formed illegally in 1986. Although the DPP was not legalized until 1989, it was already being supported by a newspaper that began publication in 1988, the Independence Morning Post.[14] Chiang Ching-kuo told his people a few months before his death in January 1988 that the time had come to move into a new era of openness and broadened democracy.

The constitutional democracy stage at the national level (competition for elections at the local level had begun as early as 1977) began in the last years of the presidency of Chiang Ching-kuo and is continuing under President Lee Teng-hui. Lee has initiated several reforms to carry out Chiang's will for a constitutional democracy. They include legalization of the DPP to allow a competitive party system and termination of the "Temporary Provisions". He said at his inauguration in 1990 that the constitution itself needed major reforms in order to make the ROC a fully democratic state. He called for the retirement of senior legislators in office since they were elected from mainland constituencies in 1947 so that fresh elections could be held, revamping of the legislature to ensure a system of checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, a review of the process of presidential election, and autonomy of local governments.[15]

Press Under Martial Law and "Temporary Provisions"

Although the 1947 ROC constitution provided for freedom of the press, this freedom was effectively denied during most of the martial law years because Chiang K'ai-shek considered the ROC at war with the Communists. In 1951, the ROC government imposed a ban on new newspaper registrations to tighten its control of the press, a move that restricted the number of newspapers on the island to 31, with a 12-page limit for each,

until 1987. The government also imposed a price control on newspapers, with the result that "many papers operated at a loss but remained in business because of the valuable publishing licenses they owned."[16] At least nine of the newspapers were published by the government and several publishers and officials of privately owned newspapers were KMT members.[17]

Governmental pressures from force to censorship and economic sanctions were used, although sparingly until the late-1950s. Privately owned newspapers were often critical of Chiang K'ai-shek's policies and programs, but the government tolerated only so much as evidenced by the fact that the Independence Evening Post was suspended for three months in October 1953 for describing a military parade in "inelegant language."[18]

The ROC Press Law was revised in 1958 to calm the increasingly critical press on the island. The revised law provided for mandatory corrections and rebuttals in newspapers and magazines by persons or organizations and suspension or seizure of a publication if convicted of committing or instigating sedition or treason.[19]

Although the Publication Law has never provided for pre-publication censorship, there were a considerable number of incidents of censorship under the martial law rule. A 1979 Freedom House survey of civil liberties in Taiwan noted that "newspapers and magazines are subject to censorship . . . and practice self-censorship. . . . [I]n late 1979, a major confrontation led to the closing of publications and the imprisonment of major leaders of the opposition."[20] Chen and Chaudhary found that censorship incidents against opposition magazines increased from 33 in 1984 to 302 in 1986. By early 1987, only three of 15 opposition magazines were still publishing.[21] Foreign publications also faced censorship, with the authorities blackening out offensive text or photographs, and even removing pages or withholding entire issues.[22] The 1986-87 Freedom House survey of civil liberties in Taiwan noted that "the dissenting journals of independent editors and publishers were unable to publish in most of 1986."

The KMT's influence on the electronic media was equally strong during the martial law years, although Article 13 of the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law stipulates that news programs shall be "objective, fair, correct, complete and shall not be in the nature of advertising."[23]

The three television stations -- China Television Company, Chinese Television System and Taiwan Television Enterprise -- are private enterprises, but they have been owned for the most part by the KMT, the Ministries of Defense and Education, and the Taiwan Provincial Government, respectively. Government maintains significant involvement in radio broadcasting as well. Of the 33 radio broadcasting companies in the Taiwan area, five are operated by the military, seven by various government agencies and 21 are private.[24] The Freedom House surveys mentioned earlier found that during the martial law years, television remained pro-government in its news and public affairs programming. Since opposition political parties were not legally allowed until 1989, both radio and television were KMT mouthpieces during the martial law years.[25]

Even though martial law was lifted in 1987, some restrictions on freedom of expression continued until the "Temporary Provisions," which gave the ROC president extra-constitutional powers, were abolished on May 1, 1991. Tien Hung-mao noted that "the entire shape of the government departs from the constitution" under the martial law and the "Temporary Provisions."[26] For example, it was a crime of sedition to openly discuss Taiwan's independence even after the martial law was lifted. The government threatened to prosecute several candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party for sedition if they advocated Taiwan's independence during the campaign for the December 1989 election for regional and parliamentary seats. The DPP has said that it is a Taiwan independence party in nature. A story in the China Post said that the ROC "government has often jailed pro-independence dissidents" because Peking has threatened to invade Taiwan if it declares itself independent.[27]

Cheng Nan-jung, publisher of the Freedom Era Weekly and a member of the DPP, was indicted in early 1989 on treason charges for publishing in his magazine a "New Draft Constitution of Taiwan" on behalf of a group calling for Taiwan's independence. After Cheng ignored two summons to appear before the authorities, a warrant was issued for his arrest. As the police came to his office to arrest him on April 7, 1989, he locked himself in his room and committed suicide by setting himself on fire.[28]

Electronic media were also under strong government control until the "Temporary Provisions" regulations were lifted. Commenting on the accessibility of the electronic media during the 1989 election campaign, the Wall Street Journal noted that the KMT made an "exclusive use of radio and TV to promote its candidates."[29] The situation for the opposition was worsened by the fact that the election law prohibited candidates from advertising on radio and television. The DPP accused the electronic media of violating broadcasting laws "which are supposed to give all parties equal access to public media."[30]

This was the media situation in the ROC until Lee abolished the "Temporary Provisions" and pushed for constitutional reforms. In June 1990, the ROC's highest judicial body, the Council of Grand Justices, handed down a ruling requiring the senior legislators to retire by the end of 1991. This move cleared the way for National Assembly elections in December 1991, the first such elections held since 1947. The new National Assembly, in which the KMT with just over 71 percent of the seats and the DPP about 24 percent are the major parties, began the task of reforming the constitution with the convening of a constitutional convention in March 1992.

Factors Contributing to Political Liberalization and Press Freedom

The underlying causes of political liberalization, resulting in press freedom, need some discussion at this point. They are linked to the evolving ideological, political and socioeconomic factors as well as the impact of communication revolution.

The traditional Confucian values were seen as providing the ideological framework for political stability, consensus and conformity, resulting in centuries of dynastic rule and

following that in the highly regimented political systems on the mainland and, until recently, in Taiwan. The rise of the twin movements of Chinese liberalism and Confucian humanism since the early part of this century, and especially since World War II, are credited for augmenting the ideological framework with some considerable success. at least in Taiwan. Metzger and Myers say that both movements have shared a clear-cut ideological emphasis on the autonomy of the individual's conscience and intellect as something not subservient to the dictates of any political party and ideology. The movements, therefore, have steadily strived to legitimize and promote political pluralism.[31] The Confucian humanists, unlike the traditionalists or the Legalists, have pictured Confucius as standing for the rights of the people as a check upon the authority of the state and its ruler.[32] They, therefore, have demanded that full democratization be carried out.

The KMT, whose official doctrine of the Three Principles supports democracy, has found it difficult to ignore the arguments of liberal intellectuals for greater freedom, especially since Confucian humanists have lent a support to pluralism also.[33] The support received by liberal intellectuals from Western countries, especially the United States, has also been instrumental in facilitating democratization in the ROC.

The rising socioeconomic status of the people of Taiwan is also influencing political openness. Studies by Lerner and Nixon have long established that a high literacy rate and economic development of a country's population are important prerequisites to political participation and press freedoms, respectively.[34] With a literacy rate of approximately 94 percent and the 1992 per capita income of $10,196, the ROC population has become increasingly politically sophisticated and is insisting on the need for further democratization. This was clearly indicated by the fact that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party won as many as 24 percent of the seats to the National Assembly in the December 1991 election. Also, results of a public opinion poll published[35] in the ROC on March 13, 1992, indicated that about 49 percent of the public wanted the country's president to be elected directly by the people. The existing system of electing the president by the National Assembly was

supported by only 18 percent and a proposal to elect the president by a proxy vote was supported by 19 percent. The remainder had no opinion on this issue. The election by proxy would require candidates for National Assembly seats to announce which presidential candidate they would support if elected. The presidential candidate who has the largest number of elected supporters would be elected.

Push for democratization is also linked with what is perceived by political analysts as Taiwan's desire to become a model both politically and economically to the mainland Chinese in its campaign to remove the Communist regime there. Castells says that having lost China, the KMT had to convert Taiwan both into a platform for the reconquest of the mainland, and a showcase of what the reformed KMT could do for China and for the Chinese. The KMT, therefore, made its adherence to the Three Principles its official ideology.[36] That commitment has been further reinforced as Taiwan strives to overturn international isolation caused by the loss of U.N. membership since 1971 and termination of diplomatic relations by the United States in 1979. The KMT knows that only genuine political reforms in Taiwan will help it establish the force of its moral superiority over mainland China, a factor critical in winning international, especially Western, support.[37]

Several academics interviewed[38] in Taipei also attribute moves toward democratization to the communication revolution, which has enhanced the flow of attitudes and aspirations, as well as facts. With 92 telephones per 100 households in 1991 and widespread use of facsimile machines, Taiwanese are in the mainstream of international information flow. Moreover, as Barnds points out, "It is impossible to isolate people from new ideas in societies that have outward-oriented economies and have sent thousands of citizens abroad each year."[39] KU-band dish antennas, legalized in 1988, have enabled hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese to have access to Japan's NHK television broadcasts and more recently, through other cable systems, to CNN and BBC Asia. With the legalization of C-band dish antennas since July 1992, access to information is now wide open in the ROC.

Mass Media Push to Consolidate Freedom

Freed of the martial law and "Temporary Provisions" restrictions, and aided by democratic influences, ROC's mass media are covering constitutional reform and other political issues with an unprecedented vigor and candidness. The range of viewpoints expressed in news columns, editorials and on broadcasting stations is so wide and the tone so uninhibited that one is reminded of the American press. Some significant characteristics of today's journalism in Taiwan are given below.

Newspapers

In an interview on March 10, 1992, Mohanan Kuppusamy, the managing editor of the English-language newspaper the China News, said that, "It is a great time to be a journalist in Taiwan." He explained that ROC had come a long way politically from the days of Chiang K'ai-shek. "The political system here was never Communist, but KMT's organization very much reflected the tight control associated with Communist governments," he said. "The political system in the ROC is being transformed completely. And, we have gone heavily into political coverage without facing any restrictions," he said.

That opinion was echoed by an expatriate American journalist, Sarah Brooks, Sunday editor of the China News. Brooks, who arrived in Taiwan in 1986 when the martial law restrictions were still in place, said the journalistic climate has improved dramatically. "When I first came here, I remember you could buy a Wall Street Journal and it might have this big black area on one page," she said, recalling how references to mainland China were once censored. "Now practically anything goes as far as journalism is concerned."[40]

A review of several issues of the China News and other newspapers indicates that since the restoration of the constitutional rule, the treatment of the once-powerful KMT has been brought down to an even level. The China News, for example, carried a story headlined "KMT reforms knocked" in its Feb. 16, 1992, issue. The story said that a KMT reform proposal for one of the branches of the government (Control Yuan) indicated that the

KMT was "buckling under the pressure of interest groups." A story, "Ballot scandal goes to court," in the March 4 issue said that two ballots for a legislative finance committee election showed faked signatures of two KMT members who were not present when the voting was done.

The DPP's proposal that Taiwan should abandon its goal of reunification with China and declare independence, a highly sensitive subject to discuss in the "Temporary Provisions" days, is now openly discussed in the press. A story in the China News on Feb. 27, 1992, "DPP has democratic priority," quoted Hsu Hsin-liang, chairman of the DPP, as saying that "DPP's political appeal was the holding of a plebiscite, not the building of the Republic of Taiwan, even though the latter is a DPP idea." Other stories cite criticisms faced by the KMT. In a story on March 6, 1992, the same newspaper attributed a statement to the former DPP chairman, Huang Hsin-chieh, which said that "the DPP may mobilize supporters for street demonstrations if the KMT refuses to revise some of the meeting rules the DPP feels are unreasonable."[41]

The China News gave an indication of its own independence by chiding a faction of the KMT Central Committee that supports presidential election by proxy. In an editorial on March 16, 1992, the newspaper noted that the faction calls the proposed system "a popular election by proxy" as if to give the appearance that the president would be chosen by people at large. "Why, then, is there opposition to the election of the president by popular vote?" the newspaper asked.

That was also the position of the other major English-language newspaper, the China Post, which in a thoughtful and well-argued editorial on March 11, 1992, pointed out the flaws in the arguments of KMT members supporting the current system of indirect presidential election. The editorial, responding to a KMT faction's argument that direct presidential election will deprive the National Assembly of its most important duty of electing the president, said,

> Refusing to revise the government structure just because the structure was
> established by the Constitution seems pointless. . . . The Constitution needs

revision because it was written on the mainland more than 40 years ago to apply to all of China. It must be revised to meet Taiwan's present-day political and social circumstances . . .

Voting to choose the president is a basic right of the people. It would be both easy and convenient for them to perform that right. No delegates are necessary to vote on their behalf.[42]

A variety of news stories in the China Post also reflect the increasing freedom of the press. A story published on March 9, 1992, said that "Over 100 people yesterday gathered in front of one of the three local television stations in Taipei to protest the government's monopoly on the electronic media." Twenty randomly selected issues of the China Post and the China News from 1991 and early 1992 reviewed by this writer indicated that both papers reflected the viewpoints of the various factions within the KMT, DPP and other political parties on constitutional reform and other political issues.

The coverage of political issues is equally vigorous in the Chinese-language newspapers, where the market is dominated by the China Times and United Daily News. In covering the 1989 election campaign, the China Times alleged several incidents of vote-buying by both the KMT and DPP candidates.[43] The relatively conservative United Daily News criticized the Taiwan independence movement, warning the DPP faction supporting independence that "advocacy of a new country is tantamount to treason."[44] Meanwhile, the party-oriented press continues to push the party line. The Central Daily News, the official organ of the KMT, staunchly supports the party in and outside political campaigns. The pro-DPP Independence Morning Post, on the other hand, has engaged in such journalistic practices as publishing a proposed draft of the "Basic Laws of the Republic of Taiwan," as well as a copy of the "Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan," both of which the government considers to be seditious works because they advocate independence of Taiwan from mainland China.[45]

The freedom of the press observed by this writer in Taiwan is consistent with the International Press Institute's analysis of the media situation there in 1991. The IPI Report said:

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In 1991, the Taiwanese press witnessed an almost entire absence of restriction on press freedom. Even opinions concerning the Taiwan independence movement, a political taboo in the past, can often be read in the Taiwan press, although organized promotion of the movement is still forbidden by the law.[46]

Since the ban on new newspapers was lifted in January 1988, many newspapers have entered the market to take advantage of new era of openness. As of April 1991, 210 newspapers were registered with the Government Information Office (GIO). Total circulation of all daily newspapers is put at approximately 5.7 million copies, with an average of 16.1 newspapers per 100 persons. The number of magazines has grown by 26 percent since the end of martial law. As of December 1990, some 4,138 magazines were registered with the GIO.[47]

Radio

Located just outside Taipei, the International Community Radio of Taipei (ICRT) captured international headlines when the New York Times reported on January 4, 1992, that three ICRT journalists were dismissed for allegedly offending the government with aggressive reporting. The three journalists, all Americans, and four other staff members were relieved of their jobs on Sept. 18, 1991, in what the station management said was a cost-cutting move. News reports in the local press, however, rumored that the three were fired for reporting "too extensively" on DPP and other opposition parties' campaigns for the December 1991 election.[48] A statement issued by the DPP charged that although ICRT is a commercial radio station, it is under the strong influence of the KMT.[49]

In an interview on March 9, 1992, Danny Chuang, the ICRT spokesman, said that one of the three fired journalists had been re-hired on a part-time basis, whereas the remaining two had filed a lawsuit against the station alleging breach of contract. This author learned from Chuang in January 1993 that one of these two had also been re-hired before any court settlement. The third journalist continued to pursue the lawsuit.

Chuang denied that the station has any ties with the government, saying that it stopped receiving government funding in 1985 when it became a fully commercial operation. ICRT, which was operated by the American Armed Forces Network Taiwan until the U.S. broke diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1978, is the only English-language station on the island with an estimated audience of more than 2 million.

Lan Roberts, an American serving as assistant general manager of ICRT, said in an interview that since 1989 "the station has been a pioneer in airing open political discussions between representatives of the KMT, DPP and other parties." Dick Graham, another American journalist at ICRT, agreed."The station has clearly evolved from being a politically closed operation to a more freewheeling one," he said, a view shared by several other foreign journalists working for the station.[50] A listening log of the station's news and public affairs programs kept by this writer over 10 days indicated that the views of the DPP were featured prominently with those of the KMT government on controversial issues.

This case study illustrates the reportorial freedom now available to broadcast journalists, yet, at the same time, it also indicates that the government may be continuing to keep a close watch on what is said on such media.

Another example that indicates that radio is moving away from pushing primarily the KMT line comes from a station owned by the KMT, the Broadcasting Corporation of China. Interestingly, the BCC is listed as a privately owned station in the ROC because political parties are regarded as private, social groups. No other political party, however, has had a license to operate a broadcasting station as of March 1992. Under a proposed revision to the broadcasting law, other political parties and interest groups would be allowed to apply for broadcasting licenses.[51] In January 1993, 20 radio broadcasting frequencies were opened up for allocation without party restriction to qualifying applicants.[52]

BCC, which broadcasts both domestically and to overseas audience, reaches domestic audience on AM and FM frequencies. Katherine Yu, the deputy managing director

in the BCC News Department, said that as the campaign for the December 1991 election was heating up, the station began a call-in program to involve listeners in debates among the representatives of various political parties.

The program, called "Summit Talk Show," is broadcast live on the all-news stations of the BCC on Tuesdays and Fridays. It typically features a debate between representatives of the KMT and the DPP, and then invites listeners to call-in with their questions or comments. "This program is so popular with the listeners that we cannot keep up with the number of calls received," Yu said. "The verbal matches between the panelists often get quite intense, but that is part of the attraction of the program," she noted. Since KMT and DPP are the strongest parties in the ROC, their representatives are now featured primarily on the program, but occasionally other party representatives are given time also.[53]

Rong-chang Yen, director of the Department of Radio and Television Affairs of the Government Information Office, said that the election law prohibits candidates from advertising on radio or television. "Even KMT is not allowed to do that on its own radio stations," he said.[54] When asked why the DPP had alleged that KMT candidates routinely receive greater access to the electronic media than the opposition candidates do, Yen said that if the KMT received more air time it was not out of any preferential treatment. "KMT simply has had far more candidates in political races than DPP and other parties do," he said.

Television

Although political campaigning is still barred from radio, the government, for the first time, agreed to allow political parties to conduct a televised campaign before the National Assembly elections in December 1991. Lawrence Chu, chief secretary of the Chinese Public Television, explained in an interview that a six-member task force was appointed by the Central Election Commission (CEC) in October 1990 to investigate and propose the possibility of allowing political campaigning on the three television networks. Three media representatives, including Chu, were included in the task force.

The group recommended in March 1991 that political campaigning should be allowed on all three networks on an experimental basis during the time slot allocated by the networks to Chinese Public Television programs. It should be noted that the ROC is in the process of building a separate public television station, which is expected to go on the air by early 1994. This will become the island's fourth network.

Chu said the proposal for televised campaigning was discussed extensively in Taiwan's media and "consistently received endorsement because of people's commitment to democracy."[55] The CEC accepted the proposal in September 1991. The formula for televised campaigning established the following rules: a) A maximum of 30 days shall be allocated for campaigning, which shall end three days before the election; b) Campaign time shall be allocated on the basis of the percentage of votes received by a party in the last election. For example, the KMT, which won 72 percent of the seats in the legislature in the 1989 election, would receive 72 percent of the total campaign time; c) Personal appearances to promote candidacy shall be restricted to a maximum of two for 30 seconds each on an unpaid basis. The CEC may allow additional appearances on a paid basis, but with strict limitations; d) Time allocated to a party shall be used to promote party image and platform; e) No party shall be allowed to do advertising.[56]

Chu said that all political parties took advantage of this opportunity for televised campaigning for the National Assembly elections held in December 1991. "Not a single complaint was received from any political party or candidate regarding the implementation of the television campaign plan," he said. The value of such campaigning has led the opposition political parties to propose relaxation of restrictions so that political parties may launch TV campaigns at times other than the stipulated period. The CEC is considering implementation of this proposal for future election campaigns. Chu noted that as guidelines for television campaigning evolve, "there will have to be a consideration for provisions similar to the American Equal Time Rule."

The CEC is also supporting the idea of televised debates in the gubernatorial and presidential elections scheduled for 1994 and 1996, respectively. The Election and Recall Law, which does not yet allow televised debates as part of a campaign, will need to be revised to allow such debates. CEC Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung expects to obtain such a revision by early 1994.[57]

There are other indications that television in Taiwan is presenting a variety of viewpoints. In a widely viewed televised debate in September 1991 between a ranking government official and a noted opposition legislator, the latter openly proposed that the island rejoin the United Nations in the name of an independent Taiwan.[58] Protest activities for a wide range of causes are routinely shown on television. One ROC network, Taiwan Television Enterprise, carries CNN news via satellite from the United States in its daily morning news program. NBC and ABC newscasts are carried on China Television Company and Chinese Television System, respectively. Viewers also have access to BBC Asia, which is competing with CNN with a considerable degree of success in Asia. Additionally, since the installation of KU-band dish antennas was made legal in late 1988, they have sprung up everywhere on rooftops in the Taipei area to allow people access to Japan's NHK television broadcasts. Hundreds of thousands of such dishes are said to be in use in Taiwan. As of 1991, there were an estimated 6.2 million television sets in use, with an average of 98.8 color television sets per 100 households.[59]

Rong-Chang Yen said that as the broadcasting law is revised, the private sector will be allowed to offer cable television service. Four additional over-the-air television frequencies will also be made available. "We expect to implement these plans by the end of 1993," he said. Meanwhile, impatient entrepreneurs are already making available cable television services in several communities illegally, even though they face government crackdowns.[60]

Conclusions

Taiwan is an interesting case study on the relevance of democracy and press freedoms in a society with Confucian traditions. Political pluralism and press freedom are not native to Confucian values, but they may not be altogether incompatible with Confucianism either. Unlike the Western liberal tradition, which predicates its social, economic and political life on individual freedoms, Confucianism relegates such freedoms to the higher priorities of a social order and economic progress accomplished under an established authority of "government by the best". Traditional Confucianism says that only such an order can provide human beings with the milieu for self-cultivation, a necessary pre-condition to the judicious use of freedoms. Confucian humanists also value the importance of self-cultivation to practice individualism responsibly, but argue that the paternalistic hand of the state is not needed in the moral development of human beings.

In any case, it is apparent that social and economic development are placed ahead of democracy in Confucian thought. That would explain why Confucian societies cannot be rushed into democracy, even when there is a broader global trend of emergence of democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, the freed satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe have put democracy ahead of economic development, presumably because of their fundamental affinity for Western values.

Confucian societies that have achieved socioeconomic progress to a substantial degree are slowly but surely moving toward democracy. That has been the case in South Korea, which in December 1992 elected a civilian as president in a multi-party election for the first time in its history, thus cementing its commitment to democracy that began in 1987. The country's Basic Press Law, enacted in 1980 to impose government controls on the press, was repealed in November 1987. In Singapore, the Confucian-style People's Action Party continues to dominate the parliament, but the opposition Singapore Democratic Party received about 49 percent of the vote in the constituencies it contested in the 1991 general election. Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong told Singapore journalists on July 27,

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1992, that media controls would be relàxed in time. As Hong Kong prepares to become a "Special Administrative Region" of China in 1997, when the British rule ends, a strong democracy movement has developed in the colony. The Hong Kong Journalists' Association is in the forefront of this movement. Commenting on the political future of China, dissident journalist Dai Qing said on January 20, 1993, that she was optimistic that economic progress would eventually lead to political reforms. Qing was speaking to the press in Taipei on her way back to China from the United States, where she was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University for a year. She spent 10 months in prison for her part in the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations.

In Taiwan itself, the restoration of the constitutional rule since the May 1991 abolition of the "Temporary Provisions" has rejuvenated the press, which has now assumed a considerable degree of "watchdog" role. It is campaigning for the establishment of a political and judicial infrastructure that would ensure a system of checks and balances. As Managing Editor Kuppusamy of the China News said, "Everybody in the media knows that an independent judiciary is absolutely important for freedom."

The press needs to become active in supporting other reforms aimed at ensuring access to information. Opposition legislators are seeking the American equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act to allow the press access to classified government documents. Another related bill calls for governmental clarification on what type of information can be classified and for how long. Other proposed legislations are aimed at enacting "Sunshine laws" at the local, provincial and national levels.[61] Some good news came for the ROC press on May 15, 1992, when the Legislature revised the dreaded sedition law, which had been used earlier to suppress, among others, opinions about the Taiwan independence movement. Under the revised law, such speech would be punishable when it is accompanied by violence or coercion. The opposition DPP has welcomed the revision, although it prefers that the law be abolished.[62]

The issue of media control also needs to be addressed. A strong controlling interest in the media by political parties, any political party, is more akin to authoritarian and totalitarian systems than democratic ones. It is a common feeling among several academics and journalists interviewed in Taipei that such a controlling interest is not conducive to a free marketplace of ideas.

The political, intellectual and socioeconomic dynamics at work in Taiwan suggest that these and related issues would be resolved in the near future. President Lee announced in January 1993 that he was planning sweeping reforms in his ruling party to meet growing demands for more democratization following the KMT setback in the Legislative Branch elections in December 1992. The KMT won only 53 percent of the popular vote in this election compared with 71 percent in the 1991 National Assembly elections.

Notes

[1]The phrase "Republic of China" is used in this article because the government in Taiwan uses this designation on the basis of its claim that it is the only legitimate political authority in all of China since it was democratically elected before Communist revolution on the mainland.

[2]Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91, "Mass Communications and Telecommunications," (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., 1990), p. 441.

[3]Raymond D. Gastil, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1986-1987 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 256-57.

[4]Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91, op. cit., p. 181.

[5]Twenty-six interviews were conducted with the following: newspaper and broadcast journalists, 16; Government Information Office (GIO) officials, 4; academics, 6. Selection of journalists was based on their rank and experience, and prominence and/or independence of a medium. Academics were chosen from the National Chengchi University and the Chinese Culture University, two institutions with well-known mass communication degree programs; GIO officials interviewed were in charge of the Department of Radio and Television Affairs.

[6]Several published works consulted on the Confucian ideology and political and media developments in Taiwan are cited in this study. See especially Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Tien Hung-mao, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1989); Chen Kuo-hsiang and Chu Ping, Forty-year Evolution of the Newspaper Industry in Taiwan (Taipei: Independence Evening News, 1987); and, Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, Understanding the Taiwan Experience: An Historical Perspective (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., 1990).

[7]Ralph L. Lowenstein, "Press Freedom as a Barometer of Political Democracy," in International and Intercultural Communication, ed. by Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill (New York: Hastings House, 1976), pp. 136-147.

[8]Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," in Confucianism in Action, ed. by David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 26-29; Jason C. Hu, "The Republic of China Today: A promise Fulfilled," The Future of China: A View from ROC on Taiwan (New York: Chinese Information and Culture Center, 1991), p. 1.

[9]Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 53-79; Schiffrin, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

[10]Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 459.

[11]Metzger and Myers, op. cit., p. 11.

[12]Lloyd E. Eastman, Jerome Chen, Suzanne Pepper and Lyman P. Van Slyke, <u>The National Era in China, 1927-1949</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 19.

[13]Metzger and Myers, op. cit., p. 7.

[14]<u>Reforms and Challenges: Dec. 2, 1989 Election</u> (Taipei: The China Post, 1990), p. 39.

[15]"The Significance and Impact of the Election for the Second National Assembly of the Republic of China" (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1992), p. 1. Typed monograph. Also see <u>Selected Addresses and Messages 1990 by Dr. Lee Teng-hui, President of the Republic of China</u> (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1991), p. 47.

[16]Interview with Ada Ong, assistant publisher of the <u>China News</u>, March 10, 1992. Also see <u>Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91</u>, p. 441.

[17]Chen and Chu, op. cit., p. 27.

[18]Ibid.

[19]<u>The Publication Law of the Republic of China</u> (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1975), pp. 6-13.

[20]Raymond D. Gastil, <u>Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1980</u> (New York: Freedom House, 1980), p. 231.

[21]Anne Cooper Chen and Anju Grover Chaudhary, "Asia and the Pacific," in <u>Global Journalism</u>, ed. by John C. Merrill (New York: Longman, 1991), p. 254.

[22]Interview with Mohanan Kuppusamy, managing editor of the <u>China News</u>, March 10, 1992. Also see <u>Republic of China Yearbook 1990-91</u>, p. 446.

[23]<u>The Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law</u> (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1983), p. 7.

[24]<u>Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92</u>, "Mass Communications and Telecommunications" (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., 1991), p. 321.

[25]Reforms and Challenges, op. cit., p. 42.

[26]Tien Hung-mao, op. cit., p. 209.

[27]Reforms and Challenges, op. cit., p. 25.

[28]Peter Wang, "Brave new world for Taiwanese press," <u>IPI Report</u>, 38: 17 (August 1989).

[29]Reforms and Challenges, op. cit., p. 33.

[30]ibid., p. 42.

[31]Metzger and Myers, op. cit., p. 11.

[32]Fairbank, op. cit., p. 204.

[33]Metzger and Myers, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[34]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 63-64; and Raymond B. Nixon, "Factors Related to Freedom in National Press Systems," in International and Intercultural Communication, ed. by H-D Fischer and John C. Merrill (New York: Hastings House, 1976), pp. 148-160.

[35]Independence News Service Poll. Results broadcast on ICRT, Taipei, March 13, 1992.

[36]Manuel Castells, "Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head," in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim ed. by Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1992), pp. 59-60.

[37]Metzger and Myers, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[38]Interviews with Academics Lo Ven-Hwei, Georgette Wang and Chung Wei-Wen, College of Communication, National Chengchi University; Paul H.C. Wang and Lee Tien-Rein, College of Journalism and Communication, the Chinese Culture University. March 16, 1992, Taipei.

[39]William Barnds, "The New Asian Challenge," The Sunday Times, Singapore, 20 September 1992, p. 7.

[40]Interviews with Mohanan Kuppusamy, managing editor of the China News, and Sarah Brooks, Sunday editor of the China News, in Taipei on March 10, 1992.

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[42]"The presidential election system," editorial in the China Post, March 11, 1992, p. 4.

[43]Reforms and Challenges, op. cit., p. 40.

[44]ibid.

[45]ibid., p. 41.

[46]"World Press Freedom review (Taiwan)," IPI Report, Vol. 40 (12), December 1991, p. 28.

[47]Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92, op. cit., p. 316.

[48]"ICRT reporters fired amid rumors," the China News, September 20, 1991, p. 3.

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[49]"Opposition charges KMT media-meddling," the China Post, Sept. 20, 1991, p. 12.

[50]Interviews with Lan Roberts, assistant general manager of ICRT; and Dick Graham, journalist at ICRT, in Taipei on March 9, 1992.

[51]Interview with Rong-chang Yen, director, Department of Radio and Television Affairs, Government Information Office, in Taipei, March 12, 1992.

[52]An Agence France Presse news story, retrieved at the Straits Times of Singapore, reported this information from Taipei on January 17, 1993.

[53]Interview with Katherine Yu, deputy managing director, News Department, Broadcasting
Corporation of China, in Taipei on March 14, 1992.

[54]Yen interview, March 12, 1992.

[55]Interview with Lawrence Chu, chief secretary, Chinese Public Television, in Taipei, March 11, 1992.

[56]Ibid.

[57]"Televised debates possible for direct elections in 1994," The Free China Journal, Vol. 9 (91), Dec. 8, 1992, p. 2.

[58]"World Press Freedom Review (Taiwan)," IPI Report, December 1991, p. 28.

[59]Republic of China Yearbook 1991-92, op. cit., p. 322; TV figures supplied by the GIO.

[60]Yen interview.

[61]"Legislators draft 'sunshine' bills," the China News, February 27, 1992, p. 3.

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THE SINKING OF LA CINQ,

FRANCE'S FIRST GENERAL COMMERCIAL NETWORK

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THE SINKING OF LA CINQ,

FRANCE'S FIRST GENERAL COMMERCIAL NETWORK

Alvi McWilliams

In 1992, just six years after entering the world amid political strife, La Cinq (Five), the first general commercial network founded in France, died in much the same circumstances, with a Socialist government facing a conservative resurgence. Two weeks after La Cinq's demise, the newly appointed secretary of state for communication announced that the government would nationalize a portion of the defunct network -- specifically, its evening broadcasting hours -- for use by a Franco-German cultural network, Arte. Conservative politicians immediately promised to undo the Socialists' new television chain whenever they won a legislative majority. On 28 March 1993, the conservative coalition trounced the Socialists in Parliamentary elections, taking 84 percent of the National Assembly's seats.[1] This means that French President François Mitterrand, who completes his second seven-year term in May 1995, will be "cohabiting" with a conservative Prime Minister and a hostile Parliament for two years. The conservatives will have ample opportunity to refashion the Socialists' newly established cultural network.

The 1992 events appeared to be a case of history repeating itself. This time, however, political distortions of the French television industry were more severe, and the outcome has further warped the French broadcasting landscape.[2] This paper will examine this most recent development, reviewing the death of La Cinq and its immediate impact on the French television industry. It will explore the potential problems posed by the government's decision to preempt La Cinq's evening hours for Arte (Association Relative à la Télévision Européene). The

hypothesis of this paper is that basic broadcast policy considerations both for the new network and for the state's two existing public television networks have once again been ignored. Audience demand, revenue, programming and production have once more received short shrift. Failure to give proper attention to audience and financial resources could cause the greatest grief to the networks most at risk. Producers face immediate consequences in all this and have begun to bear the brunt of the network's financial collapse.

A larger problem lies beneath the surface of the current situation: the French, and most significantly, French politicians, have not yet made peace with the concept of private enterprise in what was until relatively recently a state controlled industry. General commercial television finally began only in 1986 in France with the birth of La Cinq,' a network hastily conceived by Socialist politicians to frustrate conservative politicians and then born anew under victorious conservatives. Such a history profoundly complicates life in this corner of the French business world. The rules of the marketplace play a limited role because the rules of the political arena hold sway. Political retaliation appears to be the primary rule. This paper will begin by examining the historical context that created these circumstances and the problems that devolve from them.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BROADCAST MONOPOLY
AND ITS POLITIC DEMISE

France resembles many other European countries in having developed broadcasting largely under state control. Political realities growing out of World War II gave that control an interesting French twist. Although broadcasting had enjoyed a degree of private competition in the 1920s and 1930s, the Vichy government's and the German Occupation forces' use of the media

severely compromised the industry. A November 1945 decree created the supposedly

temporary Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (RTF); it remained essentially

unchanged, save for a cosmetic reform in 1974, until 1981 when François

Mitterrand became president.   With administrative appointments and budget

determined by the French cabinet and Parliament respectively, the RTF eventually

evolved into a government mouthpiece.   State television, which began regular

programming in 1948, had little importance until General Charles de Gaulle became

president in 1958.   Only 1 million of France's 12 million households had

televisions at that point, but de Gaulle quickly saw the powerful potential the

medium had. He pioneered the presidential public relations use of television,

appearing frequently on French television.[4]

De Gaulle's use, or abuse, of television deepened the governmental

predilection to censor and. control broadcasting. Presidents who followed him

were reluctant to alter such a convenient arrangement. The broadcast bureaucracy

grew, and with it, inefficiency and expense. When President Valéry Giscard

d'Estaing initiated his reform of RTF in 1974, the renamed Organisation de Radio-

Télévision Française (ORTF) emerged with more bureaucracies than before. Divided

into seven independent departments, the ORTF now had twc seperate national

networks: TF1 and Antenne 2.[5] Not surprisingly, key posts in the remodeled

departments went to Giscard supporters.

This new broadcast environment exacerbated the problems facing French

television production. Plagued by poor quality and high cost, the ORTF's

production department -- the Sociétie française de production (SFP) -- suffered

increasingly from competition because the state networks preferred cheaper

American imports or their own productions. The government responded by forcing

the stations to use the SFP for a quota of their programs.[6] The 1974 reform

left the television industry still highly centralized and technically inferior. An ominous portent for the stagnant French industry lay in the fact that the reform ultimately shifted programming toward more American style entertainment.

Giscard left another political imprint on the broadcast world, when, at the end of his term, he used the state's broadcast resources for his own political campaign while denying access to the opposition. In one heavy-handed action in 1979, the government jammed the Socialist Party's pirate radio station during broadcasts which criticized administration policies. Government forces blockaded the Radio Riposte transmission site -- Socialist party headquarters -- and served arrest papers on party leaders, including Mitterrand.

Naturally, the Socialists made breaking the state media monopoly a campaign issue. Mitterrand's "audiovisual" legislation went into effect on 29 July 1982, declaring that,"La communication audiovisuelle est libre." This official liberation of the industry immediately legalized the numerous pirate radio stations, but no new television channel loomed on the immediate horizon. The 1982 legislation also created a broadcast commission, the Haute Autorité (High Authority), whose primary duty was to guarantee the objectivity of the country's radio and television. Since political bodies would choose all the members, the commission was destined to reflect the philosophy of the party in power. Although the regional television stations became more independent and received more financial support, the 1974 structure of the television broadcasting industry remained.

The slow pace of reform allowed chronic problems to worsen. French production companies already had serious problems by late 1984. At one television production group, Technisonor, which was affiliated with TF1, Antenne 2 and FR3, production had fallen 36 percent in 1984.' Some hope for improvement

came in the form of Canal Plus, a pay-television network which began regular transmissions, via a scrambled signal, in November 1984. Authorized in the 1982 legislation, and chartered in 1983, this "private" channel was a corporation whose stock was mostly held by quasi-governmental conglomerates including the advertising agency Havas and whose president, André Rousselet, was a close friend of Mitterrand. Although Canal Plus had a very rocky first year and was nearly scrapped at one point, by mid-1986 it had one million households subscribing and could meet operating expenses.

In his fifth year in office, Mitterrand became an embattled president when his administration was tied to the sabotage of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior. Conservative politicians took full advantage of the scandal, and by autumn 1985 polls indicated that the Socialists would lose their Parliamentary majority in the March 1986 legislative elections. With time rapidly running out, the Socialists took dramatic action in November 1985. In order to frustrate the Socialists' plans to launch a private network, Jacques Chirac, the mayor of Paris and the conservative party leader, had been stalling negotiations that the Socialists had initiated for using the Eiffel Tower transmission facility. Finally the Socialists seized the tower through late-night legislative legerdemain.' This enabled the lame-duck administration to assure their nascent network access to the country's most densly populated region, the Isle de France, which had 10 million inhabitants.'

The entire manoeuvre deprived the conservatives of the television privatization issue. They immediately cried foul over the government's plans for use of the tower and the launching of new networks. Negative reaction spread to Socialist ranks when the government announced the recipie. s of a new private network.'' Mitterrand awarded the country's fifth network to a Franco-Italian

consortium led by Jérôme Seydoux -- an important Socialist party supporter -- and Italian media mogul Silvio Berlusconi. Named La Cinq, the network depended heavily on Berlusconi for its early production.

The Berlusconi selection touched off heated debate. Berlusconi, nicknamed "Sua Emittenza" (a cross between "His Eminence" and émitteur/transmitter), headed the three private networks which had devastated Italy's state networks and film industry.[11] The fact that the left had condemned him for his highly commercial television offerings, described as "Coca Cola TV" and "spaghetti TV," returned to haunt them now. Despite the storm of criticism, La Cinq debuted 20 February 1986, fulfilling the Socialists' desire to be on the air before the March elections. That same month another private television channel, now called M6, began broadcasting. The Socialist government had awarded the concession for the young adult video channel to another politically compatible group headed by the French movie firm, Gaumont. Directed by Nicholas Seydoux, Jérôme Seydoux's brother, Gaumont not only belonged in the Socialist family, but the company and its partners in the new venture also had the technical expertise to start up the channel on time.

After the conservatives won the March elections, they set about undoing the Socialists' handiwork. In May 1986, conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac announced that the state would sell two of the three French public service television stations. TF1, the oldest and most popular station, went on the block first. The newly privatized station went to a consortium led by Bouygues, the world's largest construction firm.[11] The conservatives dropped plans for selling a second state network, perhaps because the sudden proliferation of private, generalist channels had discouraged potential investors.

The conservatives' move to reassign all the Socialists' license recipients

came through new legislation -- the law of 30 September 1986 -- which replaced

the 1982 audiovisual law.[11] It created a communication commission, modeled on

the American Federal Communications Commission, to take the place of the Haute

Autorité which the conservatives had criticized as partisan. The no less

partisan Commission Nationale de Communication et de Liberté (CNCL), composed of

13 members, had broader regulatory powers than its predecessor and the

responsibility of choosing new owners for the private networks. When license

reassignment occurred in 1987, Berlusconi -- protected by a substantial

indemnification clause -- and his French partner, Seydoux, were still part of La

Cinq. Conservative publisher Robert Hersant, who had hoped to buy into TF1,

became the unlikely controlling partner of the Berlusconi-Seydoux team. The CNCL

reassigned M6 to a partnership of the Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion

and the Lyonnaise des Eaux, a utilities group headed by Jérôme Monod, a friend

of Prime Minister Chirac.

After winning a second term and a new legislative majority, Mitterrand

parried Chirac's moves on the regulatory front by replacing the CNCL with a new

body, the Conseil superieur d'audiovisuel (Higher Council of Broadcasting).

Network ownership did not substantially change until late 1990 when Hersant

reduced his stock participation in La Cinq and ceded his controlling parternship

to Hachette, France's largest media company. While Hersant's withdrawal from the

broadcast scene may have gratified Socialist leaders, it also demonstrated that

the network's spiraling debt -- due to costs exceeding income by two to one --

was disturbing enough to discourage the country's most acquisitive media lord.

By adding the two private channels of La Cinq and M6 and a private

subscription network, Canal Plus, to the industry, Mitterrand's administration

had transformed the market. After 1987, when TF1 became a private enterprise,

the competition for advertising income fostered increasingly nonpartisan programming and news reporting.[14]

Another change that emerged from the Socialists' reforms was less healthy: the proliferation of new channels created a tremendous demand for programming. Decades of state monopoly and limited programming had left French production companies, especially the state's SFP, uncompetitive. So the new networks turned to Hollywood where the price was right. According to Antoine de Clermont-Tonnerre, head of the independent production house Editions Mondiale, a French channel paid 10 times less in 1987 to buy a syndicated American program than to produce a new program.[15]

By 1989 Canal Plus was the principal buyer of American films in Europe, having gone from spending $10 million on acquiring film rights in 1985 to $100 million in 1989.[16] The buying spree ended in 1989 when the government instituted strict quotas, requiring that 50 percent of programming be French. Impending European Economic Community regulations were in the works that could require 60 percent of programming to be of European origin.[17]

The French film industry has not been shut out of this market, of course; it also produces films and programs for French television. In addition, networks have gone into co-production with film studios, and their products have become important exports to the Francophone world.[18]

All the changes in French television during the 1980s did not lead to a prosperous television industry, however. In 1989 French networks and the state production company registered a total deficit of over a billion francs ($170 million). Antenne 2, La Cinq, M6, and the SFP all recorded deficits.[19] TF1, which has the largest audience, appeared to be stable but was only marginally profitable.[20] La Cinq's deficit in 1990 reached 2.2 billion francs ($440

million) and hit an estimated 3.6 billion francs ($638 million) by the time it went bankrupt in December 1991. Mitterrand's final rush to reform led to precisely the "anarchic multiplication of channels" that his minister of communication had inveighed against in 1984 when conservatives wanted to speed up the privatization process. The state networks, plus Mitterrand's private channels, plus Chirac's privatized TF1 apparently added up to one "generalist" channel too many -- La Cinq.

THE IMPOLITIC DEMISE OF LA CINQ

On Sunday, 12 April 1992 La Cinq gave live coverage of its death. At 9 p.m., La Cinq's star anchorman Jean-Claude Bourret and co-anchor Marie Laure Augry, began the death-watch countdown with a three-hour video history of La Cinq's life. Standing in the newsroom amidst the network's assembled staff, they introduced a long series of clips from La Cinq's program and movie offerings which provided an immediate insight into one of the network's most serious problems. Fifteen of the sixteen regular programs included in the sampling were American. The same held true for seventeen of twenty of the film clips; they, too, were foreign. The absence of French productions from the history sequence was remarkable enough that Madame Augry interjected a comment noting La Cinq had broadcast French productions. She also noted that the network had participated in the production of some 500 French films, ranging from "La Lectrice" to "Indochine."

La Cinq closed on a melodramatic note at midnight, with its Straussian theme, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," filling the airwaves. A final headline message appeared on the screen: "La Cinq vous prie de l'excuser pour cette interruption definitive de l'image and du son." "Channel Five," it read, "begs your forgiveness for this definitive interruption of its image and sound." The

lingering last days of La Cinq had finally ended.

The death throes had begun in April 1991 as the network's rearranged, more family oriented, program schedule failed to attract more viewers. Advertising income remained disappointing, and the network's enormous debt continued to grow. La Cinq tried to improve its program offerings again in September and again met disappointment. Losses rose to over a billion francs for the year by December, and Hachette, the controlling partner, turned to more drastic action. On 17 December, Hachette announced it would have to institute a "survival plan" which would involve laying off 576 of the network's 900 plus employees." Darker days loomed ahead when La Cinq stockholders decided not to recapitalize the network. The next step, filing for bankruptcy, came on 31 December.

On 3 January, the Paris court of commerce appointed a judicial administrator, Hubert Lafont, and initiated a three-month observation period. Intended to provide time for considering possible ways to continue the network, the waiting period had a judicious deadline that fell just after the March regional and cantonal elections.

Meanwhile, ideas for saving La Cinq became a recurrent topic in the press. The press, in fact, began to offer its own proposals. One magazine, L'Evénement du jeudi, conceived the idea of viewer-stockholders owning the network. The search for potential solutions slid toward soap opera drama on 15 January when two potential saviors presented their ideas. Charles Pasqua, head of the conservative party, Rassemblement Pour La République (Rally for the Republic, or RPR), in the Senate, proposed creating a public-private corporation that would buy a 25 percent share of La Cinq.

A few hours later Silvio Berlusconi, La Cinq's vice president, announced that he would be willing to assume the responsibility for La Cinq. Berlusconi's

offer raised hopes at the network and within the press. TF1, Canal Plus and M6, reportedly with a secret ambition to join the Berlusconi project, proposed an all-news network à la CNN. Berlusconi quickly dismissed this option, condemning it as not viable.

For the next month and a half, attention focussed on the media mogul's efforts to get partners, financing and the approval of the Paris court of commerce by the 3 April deadline. Berlusconi's scouting also included finding out what La Cinq's projected advertising revenue was. Analysts confirmed that the network would stay in the red for at least two years. The study probably dampened Berlusroni's ardor, and by 10 March, he had not yet presented a financial plan to the court of commerce. On 24 March the Italian announced his withdrawal from the project.

This left Hachette with a dying network on its hands, and on 31 March the French media giant issued a release stating that its bill for La Cinq had reached 3.5 billion francs($638 million) between December 1991 and March 1992.[11] La Cinq's increasingly desperate state prompted equally desperate attempts to save the network. Even though Berlusconi was officially out of the running, his second-in-command tried to interest the largest French advertisers in buying up a percentage of the network's capital. The advertisers would be partners in a plan that would include Italian, Spanish and German media groups, French banks and financial firms, plus the La Cinq viewer's association.[11] The French advertisers expressed no interest in this plan, and it quickly died.

Another last ditch effort was mounted by Jean-Claude Bourret. In the final weeks of the network's life, Bourret used his position as La Cinq's star anchorman and invited viewers to join the Defend La Cinq Association he was forming. Ultimately Bourret envisaged the association as a potential partner

with other groups which would buy the network. This vaguely formulated entity was to provide the capital that would permit La Cinq to live and La Cinq's employees to keep their jobs. Bourret, as president of the association, announced late on 2 April that he would submit a plan for continuing La Cinq at the commercial court's decisive meeting set for the next day.

Judgment came on 3 April. After hearing presentations from the court-appointed administrator, representatives of the network's personnel, creditors and stockholders, as well as the quixotic Bourret, the court deemed that the network's disastrous management had dug too deep a financial hole. It ruled for liquidation and set the final broadcast date of 12 April.

With the network's end officially in sight, the next order of business was to decide what to do with the frequency that La Cinq would soon vacate. Mitterrand's outgoing minister of communication, Georges Kiejman, suggested the vacant frequency might be an opportunity for a new network, "of culture, innovation and curiosity." Such a network might also reduce criticism about how few quality programs existed on French television. The president's new cabinet, with communication housed under the more powerful position of a secretary of state, indicated the administration's increased sensitivity to broadcast issues.

Jean-Noël Jeanneney, the new secretary, continued Kiejman's cultural network concept, as did Mitterrand's new "super" secretary of education and culture, Jack Lang. Although government officials maintained that nothing had been decided, just two days after La Cinq went off the air debate over the cultural network began in earnest.   ✔

The administration plan that was emerging was to switch the government's cultural cable network, La Sept," from its current cable transmission to the La Cinq broadcast frequency. As a result of a 1991 agreement with the German

cultural cable network, Arte-Deutschland, La Sept had already been scheduled to become a Franco-German cable network, which was now to be called Arte.   The German cable system provided a potential audience of 10 million viewers, while the less developed French cable offered only 700,000 viewers.   Putting Arte on La Cinq's network would have the virtue of bringing the French audience in line with that across the border.[11]

Hervé Bourges, president of Antenne 2 and FR3, viewed this prospect as a threat to the public service networks he headed.   Bourges protested that using the frequency for such programming would endanger the identity of FR3, which has a cultural and regional coverage mission.   He suggested that the presence of the cultural network might tempt A2 to abandon its cultural programs and to follow TF1's popular and commercial programming model.   Bourges was also concerned about how the government planned to fund the new network.[16]

The prospect of "La Sept on La Cinq" prompted conservative party leader Charles Pasqua to promise that, should the conservatives win a majority in the 1993 elections, they would not be bound by the Socialists' arrangement.   Pasqua stated that the conservatives would start all over and make a new adjudication of La Cinq's broadcast frequency.   Ultimately, the conservatives hoped to "restore order in the broadcasting landscape."[17]   Among the projects on the conservative horizon were ending advertising on A2, reforming or privatising FR3, eliminating the restrictive regulations which had proved deadly to La Cinq, and, of course, replacing the CSA with a new regulatory body.

Speculation, and protest, grew over what the government planned to do with the empty frequency.   In an effort to contain the discussion, Jeanneney announced that a debate on both the print and the broadcast media would take place in Parliament on 23 April.   Including the print media meant that any hostile moves

by conservatives over Socialist broadcast measures would open up a discussion over ownership concentration of newspapers that the conservatives would prefer avoiding. Conservative publisher Robert Hersant had just bought three more French newspapers recently and stood very close to the legal limit.

During the Parliament debate, Jeanneney announced that the government would preempt the fifth network's evening hours for use by Arte. Conservative politicians criticized the plan in much the same terms as Hervé Bourges had. Even Socialist members of Parliament worried about what would happen to the state's two broadcast networks. Bernard Schreiner, a Socialist deputy who specialized in the broadcast area, said that, "The financial support that broadcasting Arte will demand can only limit the support the state gives to Antenne 2 and FR3."[11]

Financial support, the government explained, would come in part through payment from Arte's daytime broadcast partner. Jeanneney noted that the daytime partner would have to be compatible with Arte, implying an educational and cultural program character. The government also believed Arte could eventually expand its capital base through partnerships with public service networks of Belgium, Italy and Spain."

Funding was a critical problem because analysts projected Arte's program production costs would probably exceed its original annual budget by 400 million francs. The Germans, who had already financed their half of Arte through a small increase in cable television fees, would not be responsible for the sudden jump in the French budget caused by the new broadcast arrangement. France did not have the option of raising its annual viewer license fee, the redevance, because the law only permitted increases through a cost of living adjustment.

Bound by these constraints, the Socialists were tying their hopes to Arte's

daytime partner and foresaw no problem in finding interested groups. Potential partners, however, faced the challenge of financing a network with no prime time hours. The evening hours generate some 70 percent of the financial resources for a private network, and by mid-May this fundamental problem had discouraged several groups. Jérôme Clément, the president of La Sept-Arte, was not discouraged by this development. In hopes of controlling the daytime and evening network, Clément had formed a team to work on the project.[*]

Secretary of State Jeanneney eventually announced that Arte's first year would be supported through supplementary funds provided by the government; he also promised that Arte would not touch any of A2's or FR3's funding. The government also believed that the viewer license fee, which had proved insufficient to date for public broadcasting, would provide part of Arte's funding in the future.[*]

No government decision on Arte's final form was due until the end of June, but a picture of life without La Cinq had already appeared in late May. According to Médiamat's monthly survey, all the networks had benefitted from La Cinq's death. TF1 had carried off the biggest chunk of the defunct network's audience. Its audience portion jumped from 40.1 percent in the first 12 days of April to 43.7 percent in the second half of the month. Antenne 2 went from 20.8 percent of the audience before the death of La Cinq to 23.5 percent; FR3 from 11.1 percent to 13.7 percent, Canal Plus from 5.7 to 6 percent; and M6 from 8.7 to 10.7 percent.[*]

La Cinq's 1-billion-franc ($182 million) share of the advertising pie also enriched the remaining five networks. According to a Médiapolis study of how La Cinq's disappearance affected the advertising market, TF1 went from a 51 percent share of the advertising market to 55 percent between January and April 1992.

A2 and FR3 enjoyed an increase of 20 percent in the advertising income for the first quarter of 1992. Canal Plus advertising income rose 31 percent in the same period. M6, which had a 100-million-franc ($18.2 million) deficit in 1991, was out of the red for the first time in its existence.[1]

While La Cinq's absence gave the networks breathing space, it seriously threatened television producers. According to Jacques Peskine, the head of the producers union (Union syndicale des producteurs: USPA), La Cinq owed 40 million francs ($7.2 million) to producers for completed programs as of 31 December 1991, plus 50 million ($9 million) for programs in progress and another 150 million ($27.27 million) for programs near completion. Peskine predicted that La Cinq's failure to honor its debts would harm half the production companies in France. "Twenty will die," Peskine said, "and 60 will genuinely suffer."[1]

The government knew the producers' plight well, because the publicly owned Société française de production (SFP) and Télédiffusion de France (TDF) also suffered from La Cinq's death. Even before La Cinq went bankrupt, SFP President Jean-Pierre Hoss expressed alarm at losing such an important client.[1] This fact played a part in the government's decision to make use of the fifth network frequency. Without the fifth network, the SFP and the TDF would lose a potential income of about 100 and 250 million francs respectively.[1] Arte would help to fill in the void.

LIFE MINUS LA CINQ

The short-term consequences of La Cinq's death fell most heavily on television production firms, and Peskine's grim predictions will hold true for some. French producers face a difficult future in the long run, too, if current trends continue. A special study by four public agencies found that the national production of fiction programs dropped again between 1989 and 1990. Only seven

percent of French-language fiction production was new programming. Networks still found it cheaper to rebroadcast old programs or buy American ones."

The same study found that networks carried a progressively smaller load in financing program production. In 1990, that share had fallen below 40 percent. International coproduction had increased as a result, and international market concerns had pushed production toward high quality, exportable programs. Producers now faced a more demanding and complicated market; those able to produce exportable programs will fare best. The same holds true for those able to find international coproducers. Working with producers from another European country does not nescessarily provide entry to that country's market, however; international production partners often take the broadcast rights to their own country.

Producers also fear that networks may limit their purchases of expensive productions. According to Jean-Pierre Jézéquel, they may prefer to spend more on buying rights to films or sports events." With La Cinq out of the picture, French producers can anticipate a drop in orders for fiction program production. It had broadcast 225 hours of fiction in 1991, putting La Cinq in third place among the five networks.

Documentary producers will probably find Arte ordering fewer hours of their programs than La Sept did as a cable network simply due to its seven-hour broadcast schedule. In addition, Arte's German partner provides half the programming, a fact which further reduces production needs. FR3 led the networks in broadcasting French documentaries in 1991 with 149 hours of programs, and La Sept was second with 93 hours."

FR3 and La Sept had resembled each other in programming many documentaries. For this reason, among others, many feared what Arte's programming choices would

do to FR3. With an audience that had been shrinking since the 1980s, FR3 was
indeed at risk. Hervé Bourges maintained that if Arte targeted an elite public,
it could lure away a portion of FR3's audience. Bourges took action to reduce
such a menace, however. On 8 April, the president of A2 and FR3 announced a vote
approving reorganization of the networks' programming divisions. Bourges had
instigated the new arrangement to bring on board Pascal Josèphe, then director
general of La Cinq, to the new post of assistant directeur general of A2-FR3.
The two men had ties going back to when Josèphe was Bourges' student at the Ecole
supérieure de journalism of Lille, then his assistant at Radio France
Internationale, and eventually his "right hand man" when Bourges was president
of the state-owned TF1. Despite the fate of La Cinq, Josèphe is widely regarded
as one of the best specialists in France on television programming.[4]

By mid-May there were signs that the Bourges-Josèphe team was making
progress on reducing potential conflict on the programming front. In an
interview published by the professional journal Stratégies, the FR3 program
director, Raymond Vouillamoz, reported that representatives from his network and
Arte had begun meeting regularly to "harmonise" their schedules.[4] By June 1992
the harmonizing was building to a level of government orchestration. That the
state would play a principal part in the defunct network's evening and daytime
programming became steadily more apparent; Michèle Puybasset, a state
administrator assigned to study the problem of selecting Arte's daytime neighbor,
suggested that the daytime hours should be educational.[4] By September this
suggestion had become more substantial, and Jacques Boutet, an FR3 administrator,
had assigned a feasibility study for the project to Jean-Louis Missika, the
former director of the Prime Minister's Service of Information and
Documentation.[4] Dubbed "Eurêka," the proposed daytime educational network was

being promoted by Bourges, and, more important, by Jack Lang, Mitterrand's secretary of state for education and culture. In November, it received the CSA's conditional approval for the defunct La Cinq's daytime hours.

Proposed funding for Eurêka was to come in large part from the government: the network's projected annual budget of 545 million francs ($99 million) would be met by a combination of 450 million francs ($81 million) from two ministries, National Education, and Employment and Professional Development; 50 million francs ($9 million) for capital would come from the newly rebaptised A2 and FR3, renamed FR2 and FR3 (France 2 and France 3) in September, Canal Plus and M6; and Ontario TV, the (American) Discovery Channel, and Télévision Suisse romande." Bourges, who had reorganized FR2 and FR3's administration and programming in September 1992, both protected his public service networks and expanded his administrative territory, with this arrangement.

Whether the elite programming envisioned for Arte by Jack Lang and Jeanneney will find a viable audience is another question. In an earlier example of public broadcasting cooperation, La Sept programs had been regularly broadcast for several years on FR3's Saturday afternoon schedule. Ratings for some of these La Sept programs -- on what is admittedly a slow day -- were as low as two percent of the audience." Arte's first week of broadcasting in late September appeared to confirm La Sept's audience indications: Arte averaged less than two percent, some 200,000 to 300,000 viewers, and reached a high point of 2.1 percent, or 497,000 viewers, with the evening news." Clément has a goal of five to seven percent of the audience; he believes that Arte's Eurocentric focus and anti-Hollywood style of programs will attract 2.5 to 3.5 million viewers in France." According to the professional communication journal Stratégies, however, Arte's concept makes it unlikely to draw more than one percent of the

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national audience."

Arte's programming got enthusiastic response from its small audience. Its inaugural night included two documentaries, plus "Monty Python's Flying Circus," Arte's evening news show "8 et demi," and Wim Wender's "Wings of Desire."" Le Nouvel Observateur noted that fans of Jean-Claude Bourret (former anchorman of La Cinq) found Arte boring, but viewers thirsting after serious programs were delighted. "Here's the frontier between two (types of French viewers): people who like 'Supercopter' and those who purr with pleasure watching 'Dokumentar.'""

If La Cinq's demise had made room for more profound programming, it had also left behind a very deep financial hole. La Cinq's disappearance had the most dramatic effect on its controlling partner, Hachette. Less than a month after the network's departure from the airwaves, Jean-Luc Lagadère, head of Hachette announced the media giant would merge with Matra, a defense company he also heads. The merger would bring a cash infusion to Hachette, which had finally suffered a 1.93 billion francs ($350 million) loss. In addition, MMB, the holding company with controlling stakes in Hachette and Matra, had lost 448 million francs ($81.4 million) on La Cinq. Hachette's debt at the end of 1991 had hit 8.36 billion francs ($1.52 billion). In November 1992, the Paris commercial court declared Hachette's poor management responsible for La Cinq's bankruptcy and ordered the company to pay 100 million francs ($18.18 million) to the network's liquidator to settle La Cinq's remaining debts." Lagadère called La Cinq the most serious setback of his career; business analysts concurred and, more important, showed little enthusiasm about the new conglomerate." The merger makes Matra-Hachette one of the 15 largest companies in France. That such a move was necessary to restore vigor to the largest media enterprise in the

country shows how economically fragile and treacherous the broadcasting sector is. This lesson may not be apparent to the powers that be.

THE LARGER LESSON

The pattern of government intervention which runs throughout France's broadcast history has just been repeated in the recent government response to the demise of La Cinq. Intervention is such a familiar approach that failure to intervene even became an issue. In one of the more ironic twists of La Cinq's death, conservative politicians, whose privatization efforts had had a major impact on the broadcast industry, criticized the Socialist government for refusing to intervene and save the dying private network. Mitterrand responded by pointing out that the government could not stop the laws of the marketplace from taking their toll. Less than a fortnight later, the Socialist government nationalized part of the fifth channel's frequency for an enterprise which could not survive in a commercial marketplace, and which menaced cultural offerings on the public networks, A-2 and FR3. By the time the networks' opening season had arrived in September, the government appeared to be moving toward full occupation of La Cinq's network. Moreover, thanks to Hervé Bourges, France Télévision's astute director, FR2 and FR3 would have both a stake in the projected daytime network, Eurêka, and "harmonized" efforts on programming with Arte, the evening network.

The Socialist government, reeling from a disastrous showing in the March 1992 regional and cantonal elections, had chosen to act quickly on the problem posed by the defunct private television network. Their hastily erected cultural network may have a very short life after the conservatives' success in the spring 1993 legislative elections. A conservative majority in parliament enables the

conservative prime minister to remove Arte from the fifth channel frequency and to reconsider the issue of its evening and daytime use. The tone of Senator Jean Cluzel's annual report on France's broadcast media, released in December 1992, suggests the Senate has ready financial reasons for reconsidering the current cultural broadcasting arrangement. Cluzel noted that "La Sept and Arte in 1993 will cost over 1 billion francs, of which 735 million ($133.6 million) will come from transfers of public assets....Is this serious?"[11]

The record of the past decade, not to mention that of the decades since World War II, suggests that another round of remodeling is exactly what may happen after the recent legislative elections. Redesigning France's "audiovisual landscape" has become an irresistible political enterprise and promises to be so for a long time.

NOTES

1. Alan Riding, "France's Conservatives Drive Home Their Victory," The New York Times, 29 March 1993, p. A3.

2. The French call the broadcasting world "le paysage audiovisuel," which translates as the broadcasting or audiovisuel landscape. It is often simply called by its acronym, "le PAF."

3. Canal Plus, which began scrambled broadcasts on 4 November 1984, is a hybrid of private and public financing. Available only by subscription, Canal Plus is not a generalist network; it programs a large proportion of films, plus sports and documentaries.

4. According to the Journal Officiel, de Gaulle made 1,506 appearances between 1 June 1958 and 31 December 1962. Douglas J. Daniels, "Television and/in French Politics," Contemporary French Civilization, Vol. 13, No. 2, (Summer/Fall 1989), p. 191.

5. The ORTF's two national channels, TF1 and Antenne 2, and one regional channel, FR3, became separate program companies. Télédiffusion de France (TDF) became a separate broadcasting unit; other new individual companies were the Société française de production (SFP), and INA (archives).

6. Raymond Kuhn, The Politics of Broadcasting, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.), 1985, pp. 57-58.

7. Pierre Chatenier, "Programmes: la ruée vers l'argent," L'Express, 9 November 1984, p. 75.

8. Thierry Bréhier, "Les télélevisions privées à l'Assemblée Nationale: L'attaque-surprise de M. Fillioud," Le Monde, 17-18 November 1985, p. 10.

9. Jean-François Lacan, "Le gouvernement à l'assaut de la tour Eiffel," Le Monde, 17-18 November 1985, p. 10.

10. Jean-François Lacan, "La bataille des télévisions privées: L'opposition et les socialistes redoutent l'arrivée de M. Berlusconi," Yves Agnès, "Rupture d'une politique," and "Le 'mauvais tour de la Tour' peut compromettre la cohabitation, estime-t-on au RPR," Le Monde, 19 November 1985, p. 14.

11. Michèle Georges, "Télé: les chaînes du Président," L'Express, 29 November 1985, p. 15.

12. Renaud Girard, "Courting the Media Industry: Difficult Maidens, Persistent Suitors," France Magazine, Fall 1988, p. 27.

13. "M. Chirac se déclare déterminé à 'casser la concession' de la cinquième chaîne," Le Monde, 17 December 1985, p. 19; "Information: Organisation en France (radio et télévision)." Quid? 1991, p. 1172.

14. Ibid., p. 197.

15. "Buying Spree," Broadcasting, 24 August 1987, p. 46.

16. "Les nouveaux placements de Canal Plus," Journal Français d'Amérique, 27 July-23 August 1990, p. 8.

17. Lois Vines and Alvi McWilliams, "The French Media 1980-1990: A Bibliographical Article," Contemporary French Civilization, Vol. XV, No. 1, (Winter/Spring 1991: forthcoming), p. 103.

18. Browne, Comparing Broadcast Systems, pp. 120-121.

19. Philippe Pieri, "1989, sombre année pour la télévision," Journal Français d'Amérique, 12-25 January 1990, p. 5.

20. Nathalie Coste-Serdan, "Une décennie de l'audience des chaînes de télévision -- 1979-1989," Médiaspouvoirs, (July-August 1990), p. 171.

21. Luc Vachez,   "Cent jours passés à attendre un miracle," Liberation, 13 April 1992, p. 14.

22. Luc Vachez, "Jour J pour La Cinq, jour noir pour Hachette," Libération, 3 April 1992, p. 20.

23. Rete Italia, the Spanish groups Tibidao (Once), the German group Kirch (at about 51 percent of the total), the viewers' association and the French banking and financial groups (about 25 percent). Nicole Vulser, "La Cinq: verdict décisif a jourd'hui," Les Echos, 3-4 April 1992, p. 39.

24. The state company for La Sept was established in February 1986, but this public cable network did not begin transmission until 31 May 1989.

25. Laurent Bailly, "Les candidats au 'programme du jour,'" La Tribune de l'Expansion, 24 April 1992, p. 14.

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34. Cécile Thibaud, "Faillites en série," Télérama, 25 March 1992, pp. 66-67.

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36. Jean-Michel Cedro, "Canal '5'" la culture le soir avec Arte," La Tribune de l'Expansion, 24 April 1992, p. 14.

37. Odile Benyahia-Kouider, "La Cinq: les chaines respirent, pas les producteurs," Libération, 15 May 1992, p. 8. The study is by the CSA, the Centre national de cinéma, the Service juridique et technique de l'information and the Institut national audiovisuel. It is published by La Documentation française.

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39. Thibaud, Ibid., p. 67.

40. Isabelle Nataf, "Pascal Josèphe: le joker de Bourges," Le Figaro, 10 April 1992, p. xii.

41. "Allemagne/France: débats autour d'Arte," Stratégies, 11 April 1992, p. 12.

42. "L'Actualité par mois: Juin," Stratégies, Hors série, February 1993, p. 19.

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47. John Rockwell, "It's Paris and Bonn vs. Hollywood," International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1992, p. 7.

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49. "Démarrage d'ARTE sur le réseau hertzien lundi 28 septembre," Le Monde, 28 September 1992, p. 17.

50. François Reynaert, ""ARTE, c'est extra!" Le Nouvel Observateur, 29 October – 4 November 1992, pp. 46-47.

51. "Hachette condamné pour la faillite de la Cinq," Libération, 25 November 1992, p. 13.

52. Frederick Roy, et. al., "Les banques aident Hachette à effacer La Cinq," La Tribune de l'Expansion, 31 March 1992, pp. 1-3; Michel Colonna d'Istria, "Hachette veut oublier La Cinq pour se marier avec Matra," Le Monde, 3-4 May 1992, p. 15; Pascal Henisse, "Défict record pour Hachette," Stratégies, 11-17 May 1992, p. 8; Jacques Neher, "Hachette Seeks New Vigor via Matra Merger," International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1992, p. 11.

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APPENDIX

FRENCH TELEVISION INDUSTRY:
PRINCIPAL PLAYERS IN THE LA CINQ EPISODE

TF1   Télévision française 1
First state TV network. Founded, first broadcasts 1947.
Advertising permitted starting in 1968.
Privatized 1987. Controlling partner/owner François Bouygues, announced 6 April 1987 by Chirac/conservative government.
Audience share: 1990 - 41.9 percent; post-La Cinq, May 1992 - 43.7 percent

A2   Antenne 2 / FR2   France 2
Established in 1963. State TV network, national audience.
Renamed FR2, September 1993.
Audience share: 1990 - 22.2 percent; post-La Cinq, May 1992 - 23.5 percent

FR3   France-Régions 3 / FR3   France 3
Established in 1972. State TV network, regional focus.
Audience share: 1990 - 11 percent; post-La Cinq, May 1992 - 13.7 percent

Canal +   Canal Plus
Established 1984. National audience, subscription fee, scrambled broadcast. Films, sports, documentaries.
Audience share: 1990 - 4.2 percent; post-La Cinq, May 1992 - 6 percent

La 5   La Cinq
Announced 1985, first broadcast February 1986.
Established by Mitterrand/Socialist government.
Controlling owners under Socialists: Franco-Italian consortium headed by Jérome Seydoux, Silvio Bersluconi.
Controlling owners under conservatives: Robert Hersant, Silvio Berlusconi (1987). Hersant, late 1990, reduces stock participation, cedes controlling partnership to Hachette.
La Cinq enters bankruptcy, December 1991.
Last broadcast, 12 April 1992. Audience share: 1990 - 11.7 percent

M6   Métropole Télévision 6
Announced 1985, first broadcast February 1986.
Established by Mitterrand/Socialist government.
Controlling owners under Socialists: Gaumont (French movie firm, headed by Nicolas Seydoux), Publicis, NRJ radio.
Controlling owners under conservatives: CLT(Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion), Compagnie Lyonnaise des Eaux.
Audience share: 1990 - 7.2 percent; post-La Cinq, May 1992: 10.7 percent

La 7   La Sept / Arte
Company established, February 1986. First broadcast, May 1989.
State cultural cable channel, initially French audience, then Franco-German audience with European focus. La Sept programs broadcast Saturdays on FR3, Feb. 1990 - April 1992.
La Sept becomes Franco-German cultural network, Arte, debut - 30 May 1992.
Arte broadcasts on vacant La Cinq frequency, evening hours, starting 28 September 1992.

CHRONOLOGY

20 February 1986
The first broadcasts of La Cinq, France's first general commercial television
network, from the studios of Cinecitta, Rome. Partner-owners include Silvio
Berlusconi and Jêrome Seydoux, 40 percent each, and Christophe Riboud, 20
percent.

14 May 1986
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, heading the government of the newly elected
conservative majority, announces the privatization of TF1, France's first and
largest television network.

23 February 1987
Chirac changes La Cinq's partnership arrangement to include conservative
publisher Robert Hersant as a controlling partner at 25 percent. Berlusconi,
threatening to sue if removed from network partnership, continues at 25 percent.

25 February 1987
La Cinq's officially recognized regular broadcasts begin.

4 July 1989
La Cinq reports a deficit of 794.8 million francs ($145 million).

12 September 1989
La Cinq increases its capital by 300 million francs ($54 million).
La Cinq's audience stabilizes at nine to ten percent of viewing public, 1986-
1989.

28 May 1990
Hachette buys 22 percent of La Cinq's capital.

23 October 1990
Hachette becomes a controlling partner of La Cinq, with 25 percent ownership,
replacing Hersant, who reduces his stock participation. Yves Sabouret of
Hachette, replaces Hersant as president director general of La Cinq.

17 December 1991
Hachette announces a "survival plan" for La Cinq which includes laying off 576
employees. La Cinq's total deficit reaches 3 billion francs ($536 million); the
deficit for 1991 alone stands at 1.121 billion francs ($200 million).

31 December 1991
La Cinq files for bankruptcy.

3 January 1992
The commercial court of Paris opens a 3-month observation period to review
options for continuing La Cinq. Hubert Lafont becomes the court-appointed
administrator of La Cinq.

15 January 1992
Silvio Berlusconi presents himself as a possible buyer for the network.

24 March 1992
Berlusconi announces that he has withdrawn his purchase offer for La Cinq.

3 April 1992
Commerce Tribunal rules to liquidate La Cinq and sets the date for the final
transmission: 12 April.

12 April 1992
La Cinq stops broadcasting at midnight.
Higher Sunday ratings than usual on last night's broadcast: average of 26.1
percent of audience, 4,671,800 viewers - Médimétrie. Still behind TF1, at 36.2
percent, but in second place ahead of A2.

23 April 1992
Jean-Noël Jeanneney, secretary of state for communication, announces that the
evening hours, 7 p.m. to midnight,on the fifth channel's broadcast frequency will
be assigned to a European cultural channel, Arte, which will succeed the French
public cultural cable network, La Sept. Announcement made to National Assembly
during a scheduled debate on the press and broadcast media.

25 April 1992
La Sept rebroadcast of programs on FR3, 3 p.m. - midnight, occurs for last time.
(first broadcast: 3 Feb. 1990).

30 May 1992
La Sept had been scheduled to end its life as a cable network, to be replaced by
Arte transmissions on the fifth channel's frequency, beginning on this date or
no later than September 1992. Instead Arte made its formal Franco-German cable
debut on this date.

June 1992
The Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (the government's television commission)
originally proposed to review and choose from among the proposals submitted by
potential operators of the fifth channel's daytime schedule sometime in June.
Delayed until November.

28 September 1992
Arte's first broadcast on the La Cinq frequency prime-time hours.
Deadline for filing applications for the fifth channel's daytime broadcast hours.

8 October 1992
Arte's first Médiamétrie (audience measurement) results: 2 percent of viewing
audience, 200,000 to 500,000.

10-16 November 1992
CSA holds hearing on projects for ex-La Cinq's non-prime time hours. Twelve
projects are candidates for the daytime network.

26 November 1992
CSA gives conditional approval to educational network, Eurêka, to broadcast on the ex-La Cinq's daytime hours. Jean-Louis Missika, the former director of the Prime Minister's Service d'information et de documentation. The conditions include firmer financial information and arrangements, plus more information on programming. Deadline for resubmission of project: 31 December 1992.

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"Australian Journalists, Confidential Sources and the Court Room: Toward an Evidentiary Privilege for Reporters."

Paper presented to the Law Division of the AEJMC Convention, Kansas City, USA, August 12, 1993.

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Abstract

Since 1989 three Australian journalists have been jailed for refusing to reveal their sources to a court. This paper examines the difficulties reporters face when the obligations of their ethical code clash with the demands of the judicial system. It concludes that, while there will always be situations which will create such a conflict, there is scope for reform offering journalists some semblance of an evidentiary privilege. It also suggests journalists might profit from re-examining their reporting practices and questioning the rigidity of their ethical code.

Synopsis

Until 1989 no Australian journalists had been jailed for refusing to reveal their sources in a court room. Since then three Australian reporters have been jailed for that very reason.[1] Yet, the dilemma facing the judiciary when journalists lay claim to an evidentiary privilege is not a new one. Until 1989 Australian judges, lawyers, journalists and their sources had chosen to either ignore or sidestep the problem when it occasionally arose. Whether the jailings are coincidental separate incidents or are symptoms of a changing judicial - and, perhaps, broader social - attitude to the press is impossible to gauge. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the decisions have fuelled public debate on the issue and have prompted renewed calls for reform. This paper examines the legal status of the journalist-source relationship and considers the key reform proposals. It focuses upon the three cases in which journalists were jailed for refusing to reveal confidential sources and speculates as to their likely outcome if they were to recur under the reform proposals.

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[1]. *R v. Barrass*, unreported, District Court of WA, August 7, 1990; *R v. Budd*, unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, No. 36188 of 1992, Brisbane, March 20, 1992;

Introduction and purpose

For 201 years the British legal system operated in Australia without a journalist being jailed for refusing to reveal the name of a confidential source. Yet, since 1989, three Australian journalists have been jailed for obeying that section of their ethical code which forbids them breaching a confidence they have entered "in the course of their calling".[2] The purpose of this paper is to examine the laws which have facilitated the jailings and to appraise the various proposals for reform which have been mooted. The paper also endeavours to position these three incidents in a broader perspective by comparing journalists' lack of an evidentiary privilege with the status of other professionals who refuse to reveal confidential sources in court and by contrasting the Australian position with that in other Western nations, particularly Britain and the United States.

> Australian journalists have an ethical obligation to preserve the confidentiality of their sources when they have agreed to do so. The obligation is clear and unequivocal; enshrined in writing as item 3 of the Australian Journalists Association Code of Ethics.[3]

The rationale for the ethical tenet is simple: sometimes journalists must guarantee the confidentiality of a source of information in order to obtain that information. To betray that confidence may expose the source to disadvantage or danger. There is a practical rationale as well as the ethical one: if journalists made a habit of revealing the identity of confidential sources those sources would soon dry up. There is a public interest to be served in the press pursuing its role as the Fourth Estate and operating as a voice for whistle-blowers when other social institutions have broken down and offer no sanctuary. The press operated in this role to expose the wrongdoings of police and politicians during the reportage which led to the establishment of the Fitzgerald Inquiry into corruption in Queensland[4], the closest Australia has come to America's Watergate.

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[2]. Australian Journalists Association, *Code of Ethics*, Item 3.
[3]. *ibid.*
[4]. G. E. Fitzgerald, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct*, Brisbane, 1989.

The journalists' is unusual among professional ethical codes in that it offers no easy escape for the reporter pressed in court to reveal a source. Both doctors and accountants have "escape clauses" in their codes which allow confidences to be broken if required by the law. The Australian Society of Accountants' Code of Professional Conduct allows accountants to betray professional confidences "where there is a legal or professional duty to disclose".[5] The Australian Medical Association's Code of Ethics gives the bracketed proviso "(save with statutory sanction)" to allow doctors to reveal confidential information about a patient.[6]

The journalists' code, however, is like the priest's, which reads:
> The sacramental seal is inviolable. Accordingly, it is absolutely wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever, whether by word or in any other fashion.[7]

In obliging journalists to respect confidences "in all circumstances" the code allows no room for manoeuvre.

On the one hand, the law recognises the importance of confidential relationships. It offers remedies in contract, tort and equity to those who unnecessarily break certain confidential undertakings. However, it normally has placed the public interest in the fair administration of justice above the sanctity of the confidential relationship. Since the eighteenth century it has been a common law rule that witnesses should not be allowed to refuse to answer a question just because it would represent a breach of confidence. In *The Duchess of Kingston's case*[8], the Duchess's doctor was required to give evidence in breach of confidence in her trial for bigamy. Except in the case of the lawyer-client relationship, which enjoys a qualified privilege at common law[9], the courts have been reluctant to accord an evidentiary privilege to professional or pastoral relationships. Evidentiary privileges are extended further under statute in some jurisdictions to the doctor-patient and priest-penitent

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[5]. Section B7.
[6]. Principle 6.2.1.
[7]. Code of Canon Law, Canon 983.
[8]. (1776) 20 State Tr 355; [1775-1802] All ER Rep 623.
[9]. *Grant v. Downs* (1976) 135 CLR 674, and *Minet v. Morgan* (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361.

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relationships.[10] There are a small number of other exceptions to the general rule of compellability, including the right of a witness to refuse to answer incriminating questions and that of married witnesses to refuse to disclose communications made by a spouse.[11] Professional witnesses other than lawyers have usually been prevented from hiding behind the veil of a professional ethical code to protect sources of information,

> ...for litigants cannot be constrained by the private codes of strangers and, as it is no defence, neither is it an extenuating circumstance.[12]

While there is a clear public interest to be served by journalists protecting sources to aid the exposure of public wrongdoing, another pressure enters the equation which sometimes leads to the ethical obligation being tested in the court room. The obligation of confidence is pitted against a range of legal pressures - each with its own moral impact. The journalist witness - and the presiding judge - must decide which will take precedence.

> The moral issue is this: Many journalists feel that their obligation to protect sources exempts them, in certain cases, from certain other obligations. The first thing to notice is that the obligations in question are not objectionable ones. To the contrary, they have a good deal of moral force behind them. That defendants have the right to a fair trial, that they have the right to subpoena evidence in their favor, that they have the right of access to relevant information - these are rights not to be taken lightly.[13]

Law makers in various jurisdictions have juggled the competing interests and given them different weightings. Solutions range from shield laws in several US states and some European countries offering journalists substantial immunity from the forced revelation of sources through to the situation in Australia and other common law countries where journalists are offered no special evidentiary privilege when called upon to answer a "relevant" question[14]. As Mr Justice Starke put it in the leading case in the area:

> No such privilege exists according to law. Apart from statutory provisions, the press, in courts of law, has no greater and no less privilege than every subject of the King.[15]

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[10]. ALRC, *Evidence Research Paper 16*, 1983, p.3.
[11]. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, *Report on Privilege for Journalists*, Project No. 53, Law Reform Commission, Perth, 1980, para 3.11.
[12]. *Re Buchanan* (1964) 65 SR (NSW) 9 at 11.
[13]. Jeffrey Olen, *Ethics in Journalism*, Prentice-Hall, NJ, 1988, p.42.
[14]. *A-G v. Clough* [1963] 1 QB 773 at 785-786.
[15]. *McGuiness v. Attorney-General of Victoria* (1940) 63 CLR 73 at 91.

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This has been made abundantly clear on the three occasions during the past four years when Australian journalists have been jailed for refusing to reveal their sources.

Somewhere in between the US and Australian situations is the limited privilege accorded in Britain under s.10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 to any person who has published information. As this forms the basis of a reform proposal in this area, it will be discussed later.

Other nations have occasionally jailed their journalists for refusing to answer questions. Two journalists were imprisoned for three and six months in Britain in 1963 for refusing to answer questions[16]. More recently, a South African journalist was jailed for 10 days in 1991 for refusing to answer questions in the trial of Winnie Mandela[17] and American journalists were jailed for two days[18] and two weeks[19] during 1990 for refusing to reveal conversations and sources in murder trials. Others have been fined.

While Australian courts have granted no special privilege to journalists seeking to protect the identity of their sources, they have until the recent jailings demonstrated a reluctance to press the issue. One approach has been that a judge has exercised moral pressure in favour of a witness

> by intervening and asking counsel whether he wishes to press the question. Counsel may then withdraw it unless he considered that the answer would have a significant bearing on the case. In the case of a Royal Commission or other inquisitorial proceeding, the presiding officer may decide not to press a witness ... if ... the answer would appear to have little importance for the purpose of the inquiry.[20]

The closest Australian journalists have come to being accorded an evidentiary privilege has been via the so-called "newspaper rule" in defamation proceedings. Under the rule - which need not be applied in "special circumstances" - a publisher defendant will not be compelled during interlocutory proceedings to disclose the name of the writer of the article in question

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[16]. *Attorney-General v. Mulholland and Foster* [1963 1 All ER 767; [1963] 2QB 477.
[17]. *The State v. Lawrence*, Johannesburg Magistrates Court, Unreported no 8/588/91, March 4, 1991.
[18]. JC Goodale et al, *Reporter's Privilege Cases*, November 1991, p.2; cited in Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, *Discussion Paper on Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications*, Project No. 90, December 1991, p.13.
[19]. ibid., pp 1-2.
[20]. Law Reform Commission of WA, *Working Paper on Privilege for Journalists* (1977), paras 4.6, 4.8.

or the sources upon which it was based[21]. Various reasons have been given for its

existence, the most plausible being that of Dixon J in McGuiness' case, who said it was

founded on

> the special position of those publishing and conducting newspapers, who accept responsibility for and are liable in respect of the matter contained in their journals, and the desirability of protecting those who contribute to their columns from the consequences of unnecessary disclosure of their identity.[22]

The rule operates to protect publishers from plaintiffs who require answers to

interrogatories which represent little more than "fishing expeditions" - attempts to find the

source of material to show the defendant acted with malice by publishing it and to seek out

other defendants to sue[23]. The rule has been held not to apply to protect disclosure in

response to orders for discovery[24]. In Cojuangco's case[25] the newspaper ultimately decided

not to call the journalist as a witness, effectively giving up a qualified privilege defence

which was likely to have been successful. Thus, the source remained confidential and the

newspaper forsook its only real chance of a defence.

Cojuangco's case also featured High Court comments upon the ambit of privilege at

common law. In its joint judgment the court pondered the balancing interests at stake:

> No doubt the free flow of information is a vital ingredient in the investigative journalism which is such an important feature of our society. Information is more readily supplied to journalists when they undertake to preserve confidentiality in relation to their sources of information. It stands to reason that the free flow of information would be reinforced, to some extent at least, if the courts were to confer absolute protection on that confidentiality. But this would set such a high value on a free press and on freedom of information as to leave the individual without an effective remedy in respect of defamatory imputations published in the media.[26]

The court went on to say that the disclosure of a source would not be required "unless it is

necessary in the interests of justice". It extended this principle to apply at the trial as well as

the interlocutory stage, but stressed the court could compel disclosure if it was "necessary

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[21]. McGuiness v. A-G (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 at 85-86.
[22]. ibid., at 104.
[23]. Sally Walker, The Law of Journalism in Australia, Law Book Company, 1989, p.90.
[24]. British Steel Corp v. Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1169-70; Re Application of Cojuangco (1986) 4 NSWLR 513 at 522-523) and John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v. Cojuangco (1988) 82 ALR 1 at 7-8.
[25]. ibid.
[26]. John Fairfax & Sons v Cojuangco (1988) 82 ALR 1 at 3.

to do justice between the parties".[27] It said the compellability power operated as a "valuable sanction" which encouraged the media to exercise its powers responsibly, whereas "the recognition of an immunity from disclosure of sources of information would enable irresponsible persons to shelter behind anonymous, or even fictitious, sources".[28] Thus, the newspaper rule was portrayed as little more than a judicial discretion and certainly not an automatic immunity for journalists.

Even in normal circumstances, if a witness refuses to answer a question a contempt ruling is not automatic. It again becomes a matter of judicial discretion as to whether the question was relevant and necessary in the interests of justice. In *A-G v. Mulholland and Foster*[29], Lord Denning expressed a reluctance to force a journalist's disclosure of a source, saying a question did not need to be answered "unless not only is it relevant but also it is a proper, and, indeed, necessary question in the course of justice to be put and answered". In *A-G v. Lundin*,[30] Watkins LJ held that the revelation of a source would have to have served a "useful purpose" and, in the absence of other much-needed evidence, "that which was useless could not conceivably be said to be necessary". None have gone as far as some American cases which have held that a question must be answered only if it goes "to the heart of the party's case".[31]

Consequences of refusal: contempt in the face of the court.

Writers and reformers have normally chosen to distinguish between the evidentiary issue of whether a witness can rightfully refuse to answer a question in court and the procedural issue of the consequences of an unjust refusal. The Australian Law Reform

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[27]. ibid.
[28]. ibid.
[29]. [1963] 2QB at 489.
[30]. (1982) AC 1096.
[31]. *Baker v. F and F Investment* (1972) 470 F 2d 778.

Commission, for example, chose to deal with the former under its Evidence brief[32] and the latter under its Contempt brief[33]. However, it is important that this paper address both perspectives, since reform proposals might deal with either or both.

Under existing Australian law, refusal to answer a relevant question leaves a journalist open to contempt proceedings for either criminal contempt (contempt in the face of the court) or civil contempt (disobedience of a court order). The demarcation between the two branches has become vague[34] and both are similarly applied and enforced. Powers to deal with such contempts are vested in the presiding judge in superior courts under common law, while in inferior courts (district, county, magistrates, commissions and tribunals) they are conferred by statute.[35]

Contempt in the face of the court is dealt with summarily[36]. Until mid-century it was also dealt with instantly by the presiding judge. Since then decisions of superior courts have insisted on procedural safeguards to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice. These make instantaneous conviction impossible, with the charge needing to be stated clearly, the accused allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard in his own defence and an adjournment to permit preparation of the case in defence[37].

As already explained, the presiding judge has the power to condone the disobedience. If he or she decides to instigate contempt proceedings, the judge may determine liability personally or may refer the matter to another judge of the same court or to a superior court[38]. By choosing to deal with the matter personally the judge takes on the unique role of being a key witness to the crime, the prosecutor and the jury.[39]

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[32]. ALRC, *Report No 26 Evidence (Interim)*, AGPS, Canberra, 1985 and *Report No 38 Evidence*, AGPS, Canberra, 1987.
[33]. ALRC, *Report No 35 Contempt*, AGPS, Canberra, 1987.
[34]. C. J. Miller, *Contempt of Court*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 2.
[35]. ALRC, *Report 35*, paras 74-75.
[36]. ibid.. para 83.
[37]. ibid., para 83.
[38]. ibid., para 84.
[39]. ibid., para 83.

A convic `on` may be open to review by a higher court, but there is no unrestricted right of appeal for someone convicted of contempt in the face of the court, although this may be conferred by statute in some jurisdictions.[40] The presiding judge can also determine the punishment and, at common law, the judge's sentencing powers are unlimited.[41] Under civil contempt powers, judges may also jail contemnors indefinitely in an attempt to coerce an answer from them.[42] Sentencing powers of inferior courts are often limited by statute[43] such as s.77 of the West Australian Justices Act 1902 under which journalist Tony Barrass was jailed for seven days in 1989.[44]

The Australian Law Reform Commission could barely disguise its disdain for the summary procedures when it compared them with key principles of criminal law, writing:

> These powers of presiding judges, taken in combination, have a peremptory and authoritarian quality similar to those of school teachers or parents dealing with young children. It is 'summary' discipline in the fullest sense of the word.[45]

The Commission noted that any of these traditional safeguards can be absent when the presiding judge deals summarily with a contempt in the face of the court: precise definition of offences, absence of bias, presumption of innocence, confronting of witnesses, limited sentence and unrestricted right of appeal[46]. It cited one critic's indictment of the summary procedure:

> A procedure stands self-condemned when it applies methods and ideas against which the whole of Anglo-American constitutional history has been a considered and masterly protest.[47]

Further, the Commission noted several potential conflicts between the summary method of dealing with this type of contempt and article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guaranteeing minimum safeguards for a fair trial[48]. Despite this, 68.4% of

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[40]. ibid., para 86.

[41]. ibid., para 87.

[42]. ibid., para 89.

[43]. ibid., para 88.

[44]. DPP v. Luders, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989.

[45]. ALRC, Report 35, para 92.

[46]. ibid., para 93.

[47]. H.J. Laski, "Procedure for Constructive Contempt in England" (1927-8) 41 Harvard Law Review 1031, at 1043.

[48]. ALRC, Report 35, ibid., para 94.

judges and 74.6% of magistrates surveyed by the Commission considered the advantages

of the summary procedure outweighed its disadvantages (459 were surveyed in all)[49].

Justifications for the summary procedure were said to be its historical origins, the need for

such inherent powers in courts, the speed and flexibility of response it offered and judges'

ability to rely on their first-hand observations when determining the verdict and sentence[50].

The Commission concluded the continuation of the existing summary procedures for

dealing with contempt in the face of the court contravened fundamental doctrines of

criminal law and procedure - leading to the perception that justice, while perhaps being

done, was not being seen to be done.

Cases in Focus: The jailed journalists: Barrass, Budd and Nicholls.

Summary powers were invoked in the three instances which resulted in Australian

journalists being jailed for refusing to reveal their sources. Perth journalist Tony Barrass

served five days of a seven day sentence in 1989[51] and was later fined a further $10,000

for again refusing to reveal the same source[52]. Brisbane journalist Joe Budd served seven

days of a 14-day sentence in 1992 for refusing to reveal his source in a defamation trial[53].

South Australian journalist Chris Nicholls was only released at the end of June 1993 after

serving a three month sentence which had been reduced from four months on appeal.[54]

These cases illustrate the operation of the existing law.

Barrass was jailed for refusing to tell a Perth magistrate who gave him print-outs of two

tax files.[55] He had been subpoenaed to give evidence at a preliminary hearing of a charge

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[49]. ibid., para 111.

[50]. ibid., para 95.

[51]. *DPP v. Luders*, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989.

[52]. *R v. Barrass*, unreported, District Court of WA, August 7, 1990, per Kennedy DCJ.

[53]. *R v. Budd*, unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, No. 36188 of 1992, Brisbane, March 20, 1992.

[54]. *R v. Nicholls*, unreported, District Court of SA, April 19, 1993, per Taylor DCJ, No. 1699/1992; *Nicholls v. Director of Public Prosecutions for SA*, unreported, South Australian Full Court (Supreme), No. S3964.1, delivered May 21, 1993.

[55]. *DPP v. Luders*, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989, transcript 27/11/89 p.20.

against a suspended Tax Department clerk who had been accused of disclosing tax information to the *Sunday Times* about former banker Laurie Connell and his wife Elizabeth. Barrass wrote an article in the *Sunday Times* alleging that tax officers were selling confidential information for as little as $20.[56] The *Sunday Times* article pointed to the security problems in the tax office but did not publish the Connells' tax details. Barrass refused to tell the magistrate how he obtained the documents. After refusing a second time, he was jailed for the maximum period under section 77 of the West Australian Justices Act which states that a person who refuses to answer a question in court without just excuse may be jailed for no more than seven days or fined up to $175. Barrass was later fined $10,000 for again refusing to reveal the same source when the case came to trial in the District Court.[57]

The Barrass cases raise several questions which are central to reform considerations:

* Can the summary method of trying contempt charges accord with basic principles of natural justice?

* Should the nature of the litigation affect the gravity of the contempt charge?

* Should jailing for contempt be viewed as a coercive tool or a punishment? If it is meant to be coercive, does it have the desired effect? What should happen when the refusal recurs in a superior court or in related litigation?

Barrass was jailed for contempt by a magistrate, Mr P.G. Thobaven, during the preliminary hearing of the Luders charges. The transcript shows the magistrate went to considerable length to ensure the principles of natural justice were followed. He took submissions from both the prosecution and defence counsel and allowed Barrass' own counsel ample time to present a defence to the contempt charge. He adjourned briefly to allow Barrass to seek further legal advice, again over the luncheon period so the magistrate could acquaint himself with the case law in the area, again in the afternoon for Barrass to

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[56]. *Gazette of Law and Journalism*, No. 12, Dec 1989-January 1990, p.6.
[57]. *R v. Barrass*, unreported, District Court of WA, August 7, 1990, per Kennedy DCJ.

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seek the advice of senior Australian Journalists Association officials and a further two weeks to allow submissions on the contempt matter and to prepare his reasons.[58] It is difficult to assess from a transcript the mood and demeanour of a court official, but the terminology seems to indicate the magistrate displayed patience and tolerance. For example, in explaining to the defendant Luders that his case had been adjourned for two weeks over the incident, Thobavean said:

> Mr Luders, would you stand up, please. Unfortunately, these proceedings have had to be adjourned. It's not because of your fault. Basically, I suppose it's not anybody's real fault; I just say it's unfortunate. At this stage I am not in a position to make the decision which has to be made.[59]

When proceedings resumed, Barrass had confused the starting time and arrived an hour late. Again, the magistrate seemed to display a reasonable tolerance and accepted Barrass's apologies for his mistake.[60] Further, the magistrate gave the journalist five opportunities on different occasions to answer the question. He seemed to deal with the matter fairly within the constraints of a narrowly worded section of the Justices Act.[61] He even quizzed the prosecutor on the relevance of the question, the importance of the answer to the prosecution case, and whether the case would stand up without the answer.[62]

The fact that the refusal occurred during criminal rather than civil proceedings seemed to weigh heavily against Barrass at both Petty Sessions and District Court levels. In their decisions both the magistrate and the judge referred to the fact that the question was essential to establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused. In fact, both the prosecution and the defence counsel submitted that Barrass should be compelled to answer the question - with the prosecution confident it would establish Luders' guilt and the defence purportedly confident it would exonerate him.[63] Whether the parties' actions were heartfelt

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[58]. *DPP v. Luders*, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989, transcript 27/11/89 pp.10-25.
[59]. ibid., p.24.
[60]. ibid., transcript 11/12/89, p.3.
[61]. Justices Act 1902, s.77.
[62]. *DPP v. Luders*, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989, transcript 27/11/89 p.12.
[63]. ibid., p.14.

or tactical, the scenario certainly adds ammunition to those who might oppose an absolute evidentiary privilege for journalists on the grounds that such a privilege might merely provide a shield behind which the unscrupulous source can hide. District Court Judge Kennedy said as much in the second Barrass case:

> No matter how important you think your objective when you are considering overturning the law to get to the devil you should consider what protection you will then have if the devil then turns on you.[64]

Each of the Barrass cases shows a different rationale behind the prison sentence and fine handed down. The magistrate who jailed Barrass saw the prison sentence as a means of coercion rather than of punishment. He stated:

> In the instance before me, I am part way through the proceedings and, at this stage, it is imperative that the answers be given and, in order to achieve that result, the court should use its fullest endeavours. To order a fine [$175 maximum under the Act] would not achieve that and, given the serious situation, is totally inappropriate. In the end I conclude that the witness should be committed to imprisonment for 7 days. Section 77 makes provision for the recording of the matter during the time and, therefore, it must be acknowledged that, during the period of imprisonment, the witness may consent to answering the questions and so be released.[65]

By the time it reached District Court level the rationale was couched in terms of punishment rather than coercion. Prosecuting counsel O'Sullivan urged the judge to structure the sentence

> ...as a deterrent, and recognise the realities that people are going to view it in a way that says, "Well, if I am a journalist and I do this again this is the way I stand to be treated. Is it worth my doing it or is it not worth my doing it?"[66]

The $10,000 fine had no coercive value; it was clearly a punishment. The judge chose not to explain why a fine was the preferred option. It was clear that Barrass, having already served a prison sentence, was not going to be coerced into revealing his source.

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[64]. *R v. Barrass*, unreported, District Court of WA, August 7, 1990, per Kennedy DCJ, transcript 8/3/90 at p.64.

[65]. *DPP v. Luders*, unreported, Court of Petty Sessions of Western Australia, No. 27602 of 1989, transcript 11/12/89 at p.6.

[66]. *R v. Barrass*, unreported, District Court of WA, August 7, 1990, per Kennedy DCJ, transcript 8/8/90 at p. 63.

The Budd case raises similar issues in quite a different context. Whereas the Barrass case might be seen by some to offer very good reasons why the status quo should remain, the Budd case serves to fuel the argument for reform.

Budd was jailed for refusing to reveal a source during a defamation trial in the Queensland Supreme Court in which his former employer, Queensland Newspapers Ltd, was a defendant[67]. Budd refused to reveal the name of a high level contact in the office of former police minister Russell Cooper. The source had given him information about allegations of police misbehaviour at a football carnival on the condition he would not be identified. The article contained allegedly defamatory statements about barrister John Copley who was the prosecutor in a case involving assault charges against one of the police officers. The officer was found not guilty. Budd's article in the Courier-Mail contained statements about Copley's treatment of witnesses and his handling of the case.

When Budd had refused to reveal his source, Justice John Dowsett suggested he could write the name of his source on a piece of paper and hand it to the bar table only. Budd refused. The court was adjourned to allow him to telephone his source to seek his permission to use his name but he was unable to make contact. When the court was reconvened and Budd again refused to name his source Justice Dowsett charged him with contempt.[68]

Justice Dowsett said he could not begin to understand a situation in which responsible members of the community sought to put themselves above the law. He stated:

> I particularly have difficulty in understanding how journalists as a class, who perhaps more than all other professions apart from the law itself, should be able to see the need for the application of the law uniformly to all, should claim an entitlement to exempt themselves from its obligations.[69]

An exchange between Justice Dowsett and Budd illustrated the polarity of perspectives on the issue:

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[67]. *Copley v. Qld Newspapers*, Supreme Court of Qld, Unreported, No. 3107 of 1989, March 17, 1992.
[68]. Australian Associated Press, *Contempt nightlead*, 20-3-92, 7.55pm.
[69]. *R. v. Budd*, unreported, Qld Supreme Court, No 36188 of 1992, March 20, 1992.

> Justice Dowsett: I find enormous difficulty in understanding a position in which a journalist asserts the right to say whatever he says he is told about another person in an article, and then refuses to say where it came from. I just can't see the logic or fairness in that. How can it be you are entitled to say "X told me this", but then if the effect of the article is said to be defamatory of a person, that you can't justify it - you won't justify it? How is it fair to somebody who is dealt with in the article?
>
> Budd: Your Honour, journalists rely on sources every day for compilation of stories. It is an essential part of news gathering.
>
> Justice Dowsett: Unfortunately the administration of justice is an essential part of civilised society. We can only really administer the law if people answer questions when they come along.[70]

He called Budd's views "misguided", but accepted that Budd held them conscientiously and said it was impossible to comprehend why journalists should feel entitled to conceal sources. He sentenced Budd to 14 days' imprisonment, of which he served seven days after remissions under the Corrective Services Act 1988.

The mechanisms for the contempt citation in the Budd case demonstrate the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the summary method of dealing with contempt in the face of the court. Defenders of the existing system argue it allows a judge to uphold the honour of the court by dealing with contempt speedily[71]. However, in contrast to the Barrass case, the summary trial of the contempt charge in the Budd case raises questions about its fairness. The discussion of the relevance of the question Budd refused to answer was limited to a brief dialogue between Queensland Newspapers' barrister (Cedric Hampson QC), Mr Copley's barrister (Ian Callinan QC) and Justice Dowsett. Mr Hampson explained that the judicial discretion would depend on the degree of relevance of the question, to which the judge replied "it is very relevant in this case" and Mr Callinan submitted that it was "plainly relevant" because he was in cross-examination[72]. Justice Dowsett ruled:

> Although on one view of it may be said that this matter is as to credit, it does seem it is an important aspect of the case as to credit, and the credit of this witness is obviously of substantial importance in the case as a whole. Such discretion, as exists in relation to insisting upon an answer to a question for present purposes, should be exercised in such a

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[70]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at pp.258-9.

[71]. ALRC *Report 35*, para 105.

[72]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at p.256.

way as to compel the answering of a question, particularly in view of the fact that as is pointed out, the defence has sought to establish a source for each of the paragraphs in the article. I can see no good basis for not insisting upon an answer. In saying that, I have taken into account the witness's assertion that certain rules relating to his profession dictate that he not answer, and I can understand why in some circumstances such rules would be appropriate. However, in the end, if a party entitled to cross-examine insists upon an answer, then it would be to undermine the authority of the courts to back away from making a decision simply because there may be unpleasant consequences for some people. I think there are good reasons for asking the question, and good reasons for insisting upon it being answered and I think those reasons, and reasons of justice in this case, must be seen to override any professional ruling that may exist in the journalists' profession.[73]

One would expect Budd's counsel to contend the issue of the relevance of the questions for which he was being cited for contempt. Case law on the matter makes the point at least arguable - particularly in a civil case. Justice Dowsett's reasons for the citation centred on the relevance of the question, based on rulings in *Hancock v. Lynch*[74] and *A-G v. Mulholland*[75]. In the latter case it was held that disclosure should not be compelled unless it was truly necessary.[76] This was taken further in *Attorney -General v. Lundin*[77], where Watkins LJ held that the question should not only be relevant, but should also serve a useful purpose: "That which is useless cannot conceivably be said to be necessary."[78] Lundin - an investigative journalist with Private Eye - had refused to reveal who had given him a photostat copy of a document implicating a policeman in a racket disclosing information about gamblers to a company. But Lundin was held not to have committed contempt by refusing to reveal the source of the photostat because the disclosure would have been rendered useless by the absence of other essential evidence. Such a ruling shifts the focus of the contempt away from its challenge to the court's authority and towards the pragmatics of administering justice. Budd's refusal to answer the plaintiff's questions had, if anything, enhanced the plaintiff's case by casting doubt upon the authenticity of the article and helping the plaintiff establish a lack of good faith which would jeopardise the

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73. ibid., p.258.
74. [1988] VR 173.
75. [1963] 2 QB 477.
76. per Denning, p.489-90.
77. (1982) 75 Crim App Rep 90.
78. ibid., at p.99.

newspaper's qualified privilege defence. Thus, the forced disclosure of his sources would appear to serve no useful purpose. Budd's counsel raised this point only in argument as to penalty, having offered no argument on the question of guilt[79].

It is important to note here a vital difference between this and the Barrass committal hearing. Whereas in the Barrass case, the recalcitrant journalist was clearly a third party whose interests were at odds with those of the prosecution and the defence, in Budd's case the journalist's actions and interests were intricately bound up with those of the defendant. In other circumstances the journalist might well have been a co-defendant in such an action. Either way, the journalist's actions as an employee of the defendant newspaper directly resulted in the publication of the article at issue. While it might be arguable that the civil defendant's case should be allowed to sink or swim on the basis of an employee's actions, it would clearly be unjust if a criminal defendant's case should be jeopardised by the refusal of an independent journalist to answer questions.

The fact that little argument was put up in Budd's defence is hardly surprising, since counsel had only an 80 minute adjournment in which to research the matter[80]. Whereas Barrass would have been forewarned of the danger of contempt, Budd's contempt citation had obviously taken everyone by surprise. Budd and his barrister were also given the duration of that adjournment - from 12.34pm until 2.06pm - in which to attempt to make contact with the confidential source to seek a clearance to identify him. They were unable to do so - hardly surprising during a luncheon period. The expediency of the summary procedure appears to have worked against Budd in this instance, in stark contrast to the accommodating efforts of the magistrate in Barrass's case.

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[79]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at pp. 268-9.
[80]. ibid., p.261.

The most recent jailing of an Australian journalist happened in different circumstances again. Television journalist Chris Nicholls refused to reveal a source during his own District Court criminal trial for impersonation, forgery and false pretences. It had been alleged that he had obtained bank statements and documents by impersonating the de facto husband of the State Tourism Minister in an attempt to show her improper dealings during parliamentary debates on gaming machine legislation. During the trial Nicholls maintained that it had been a confidential source who had done the impersonating and forgery. When pressed to reveal the name of the source, he refused.[81] After a four week trial, the jury took eight hours to acquit Nicholls on the original charges.[82] He was then charged with contempt over his refusal to answer the questions about his source during the trial. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four months' imprisonment. In sentencing Nicholls, Judge Taylor said:

> In the subject case, the independent informer, that is, the source, had clearly committed or been party to serious offences. This puts him in a different class to most informers... I make it clear that this court will not accept an undertaking as sufficient reason in these circumstances not to disclose criminal behaviour... and so diminish the responsibility of the journalist.[83]

On appeal, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court upheld the substantive aspects of the trial judge's decision, but agreed to reduce the sentence to three months after finding that Judge Taylor had erred in believing remissions would apply. Perry J sounded a general warning to professionals claiming an evidentiary privilege for confidential communications:

> What needs to be made clear in the community is that neither journalists, nor for that matter, medical practitioners, priests, accountants, or any of the many other groups in the community who from time to time assert the perceived desirability of maintaining a cloak of secrecy over the communications which they receive from persons with whom they deal, have in law any such right, at least when it would operate against the interests of justice.[84]

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[81]. *R v. Nicholls*, unreported, District Court of SA, April 19, 1993, per Taylor DCJ, No. 1699/1992; p.1.
[82]. *The Advertiser*, April 20, 1993, p.12.
[83]. *R v. Nicholls*, unreported, District Court of SA, April 19, 1993, per Taylor DCJ, No. 1699/1992; p.5.
[84]. Nicholls v. DPP for SA, unreported, South Australian Full Court, May 21, 1993, per Perry J, No. S3964, p.20.

Nicholls was given every opportunity available under the law as it stands at both District and Supreme Court levels. At District Court Judge Taylor went through the process of determining that the question Nicholls refused to answer was relevant, proper and necessary in the course of justice.[85] We will return to these cases after considering reform proposals in the area.

Proposed law and implications, with reference to Queensland Attorney-General's proposals and ALRC reports on Contempt and Evidence.

The cases sparked public debate over the extent to which journalists should be allowed to protect confidential sources in the court room. The Barrass case prompted the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia to take a second look at the issue, with the publication in December 1991 of its Discussion Paper on Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications.[86] (The Commission had earlier recommended against any evidentiary privilege - either qualified or absolute - for journalists in a 1980 report.)[87] The release of its report is imminent. All cases sparked public debate representing a range of perspectives. Positions ranged from solicitors defending the existing law[88] through to a proposal by the Australian Press Council that Australian governments enact US-style shield laws to give a statutory immunity to journalists protecting their sources[89]. Queensland Attorney-General Dean Wells vowed to expedite the reforms currently before the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General and add a limited protection for journalists along the lines of s.10 of the British Act. The Australian reported that Mr Wells intended proceeding with a journalists'

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[85]. *R v. Nicholls*, unreported, District Court of SA, April 19, 1993, per Taylor DCJ, No. 1699/1992; p.3.
[86]. Law Reform Commission of WA, *Discussion Paper on Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications*, Project No. 90, Perth, December 1991.
[87]. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, *Report on Privilege for Journalists*, Project No 53, Perth, 1980.
[88]. Letters, *Courier-Mail*, p.2, March 27, 1992.
[89]. Australian Press Council, *Contempt - A Shield Law for Journalists*, Submission to the Qld Government, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 23 March 1992.

protection Bill in Queensland regardless of his fellow Attorneys-General attitudes to the reform[90].

Under the Queensland proposal, the onus of proof would lie upon the party requiring disclosure of the source to prove that withholding the source of information would run contrary to the conventions of natural justice", the Australian reported[91]. The Queensland proposal would involve adding a section to evidence laws as follows:

> No court may require a person to disclose the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible unless it can be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice.[92]

The Australian noted that the Federal Government could request that national security be included as a limitation on the protection. This would effectively make it a mirror of the British legislation; s.10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, providing:

> No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.

On the face of it, such a reform would appear to go little further than the existing law, which requires that the judge be satisfied that the question is relevant and necessary, and that it serves a proper purpose. However, placing the burden of proving it is necessary upon the party seeking the disclosure takes much of the responsibility away from the judge, particularly significant amid the tension of a summary trial for contempt. Academics were at first critical of the British provision, suggesting it went no further than the existing law.

Their scepticism proved relatively unfounded. A number of cases have given journalists a relatively generous interpretation of the section. In *Secretary of State for Defence v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd*[93], Lord Diplock offered a narrow definition of disclosure being necessary "in the interests of justice", noting that the expression "justice" was "not used in a general sense as the antonym of 'injustice' but in the technical sense of the administration

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[90]. *The Australian*, March 25, 1992, p.1.
[91]. ibid, p.2.
[92]. ibid.
[93]. [1984] 3 All ER 601.

of justice in the course of legal proceedings"[94]. The test was one of necessity and not simply for convenience or expedience. The test went further than enforcing disclosure simply because that might be the easiest way of identifying the source in question, although it did not necessarily mean all other avenues of inquiry had to be exhausted before the exception was applied.[95] The party seeking disclosure had to prove its necessity on the balance of probabilities and not by bare assertion (as seemed to happen in the Budd case).

The notion of necessity in the interests of justice was defined further by Lord Griffiths in *Re an Inquiry under the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985*[96]. He ruled that the word "necessary" meant something between "indispensable" and "useful" or "expedient". He suggested the paraphrase "really needed" as the closest description. This seems to take the test a step beyond the previous law, but not quite to the US test of going "to the heart of the case", as required by some US shield laws. In *Maxwell v. Pressdram Ltd*[97], the magazine *Private Eye* had refused to reveal the sources of published allegations about the activities of publisher Robert Maxwell. Kerr LJ considered whether disclosure was "necessary". He held it was not, because it was only relevant to the issue of damages.

The effectiveness of any Australian legislation on this matter will depend on the definitions of its inherent terms. The English provision defines "publication" as "any speech, writing, broadcast, cable program, or other communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public"[98]. This extends the protection well beyond journalists "to any soap-box orator who can attract a small audience to listen to his speech"[99]. However, as Miller notes, since the section applies only to "publications" it seems it does not apply where the information has not yet been published -

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[94]. ibid., at p.607.
[95]. ibid., at p.619, per Lord Scarman.
[96]. [1988] 1 All ER 203.
[97]. [1987] 1 All ER 656.
[98]. Contempt of Court Act 1981, ss19, 2 (1).
[99]. C.J. Miller, *Contempt of Court*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p.125.

which would seemingly leave journalists susceptible to forced disclosure of sources during actions seeking injunctions to prevent publication.[100]

The Queensland reform proposal defies the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission in its Evidence brief. The ALRC considered arguments in favour of evidentiary privileges for several confidential relationships, but opted only for a general provision covering all such relationships except that of the lawyer-client, for which a specific provision was drafted.

The Commission justified its decision not to grant a specific journalist-source privilege using the following rationale:

> It may well be that the information available to the media is reduced because of the absence of the privilege, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it is a bad thing. It may well be that, if immunity were guaranteed to the sources willing to give information to journalists, "leakers" of information could, for political or personal ends, "leak" information of a baseless and scurrilous character much more readily without fear of exposure. In addition, it could become more difficult to keep in check that small sector of the journalist profession willing to misreport information for pecuniary or sensationalist gain.[101]

The Commission devoted 36 pages of its Research Paper to the issue, which included extensive consideration of the law in England and the United States, including appraisal of the different states' shield laws.

The Commission rejected three alternative proposals: those favouring absolute privilege, the instigation of a privilege referee and the notion of granting a privilege in certain classes of cases[102]. The notion of the "privilege referee" would operate to verify that information was given in a confidential context; allowing a journalist to disclose an informant's identity to the referee as a condition of being excused from disclosing it in open court. The Commission rejected it because it would not allow the informant to be examined before the tribunal to ascertain the truth of the information and because the tribunal would not know enough about the litigation to determine whether the privilege should be

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[100]. ibid.
[101]. ALRC Research paper 16, p.39.
[102]. ALRC, Report 26, para 953.

allowed.[103] Further, the journalists' Code of Ethics prevents the journalist revealing confidences to any third person, including such a referee.

The Western Australian Law Reform Commission had rejected a similar proposal for similar reasons in 1980.[104] The Commission rejected the notion of allowing privilege in certain categories of cases, such as civil actions. It gave the example of Minnesota, where privilege is excluded in defamation actions where the issue of malice is raised and in proceedings where the source was likely to have information relevant to a serious violation of the law. The Commission noted:

> Such an approach rarely satisfies the newsperson claiming a privilege and frequently the categories formulated are alleged to be artificial and arbitrary.[105]

The Western Australian Law Reform Commission's 1980 report was the first major appraisal of the issue of journalistic privilege in Australia. The WA Commission had adopted a "wait-and-see" approach to the matter:

> The Commission is of the view that it would be wise not to attempt to crystallise the practice of the courts in statutory form at this stage ... The judicial discretion in this area is as yet unsettled and judicial attitudes appear to be changing rapidly.[106]

The common law prevailed in Western Australia. The West Australian Law Reform Commission's most recent project reviewing the whole area of professional privilege for confidential communications[107] seems a more sensible approach. Surely it would be a mistake to look only at the journalist-source relationship when others, including doctors and their patients, priests and communicants and accountants and their clients all have cogent arguments in favour of privileges for their own professions.

The second strand of reform provisions apply to the Commission's recommendations on dealing with witnesses who refuse to answer questions - within its Contempt brief[108].

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[103]. ibid., para 953.

[104]. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, *Report on Privilege for Journalists, Project No 53,* Perth, 1980, para 5.15.

[105]. ALRC, *Report 26,* para 953.

[106]. LRCWA, *Report 53,* p.32.

[107]. LRCWA, *Discussion Paper on Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications,* Project No 90, December 1991.

[108]. ALRC, *Report No 35 Contempt,* AGPS, Canberra, 1987.

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Assuming something short of an absolute privilege is granted to journalists in such a situation - the most likely scenario - the Contempt report considers how the courts should deal with a journalist who refuses to answer a question.

The Commission recommends a series of specific offences to replace the two existing areas of contempt which might come into play when a witness refuses to answer a question, namely contempt in the face of the court or civil contempt (the same behaviour, but in a civil case). As explained earlier, the distinction has become blurred[109]. In fact, it is difficult to see why the Commission chose to perpetuate the distinction by drafting similar provisions to cover contempt in the two circumstances.

It would be an offence of witness misconduct for a witness to refuse to appear, to be sworn or to make an affirmation or to answer a question lawfully put.[110] The procedures would differ substantially from those used at present. A requirement of guilty intent (mens rea) would apply to the offence, with two possible modes of trial available: by the presiding judge or by a single judge or three-member bench from within the same court, excluding the trial judge. If either the presiding judge or the person charged request the latter mode of trial it must be adopted. The offences would be subject to a fixed maximum penalty - either jail or fine. The charge must be in writing, specify the particulars of the alleged offence, and contain a statement about the right to have the matter tried by other members of the court.[111] The charge must not be heard until the defendant has received a copy of the charge and has had an adequate opportunity to obtain legal advice or legal representation.[112] Finally, the court trying the offence may determine that the judge or other member of the court be required to give evidence relating to the offence.[113] (A Discussion Paper on the proposals circulated by the Commonwealth Attorney-General's department takes issue with

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[109]. ibid., para 494.
[110]. ibid., Appendix A, Administration of Justice (Protection) Bill 1987, s.9.
[111]. ibid., s.12(3).
[112]. s.12(5).
[113]. s. 12(8).

the notion of judges being compelled to give evidence. Instead, it suggests the judge's associate or court officer be compellable to give evidence. It supports the other reforms.[114])

The offence is mirrored in the reform of civil contempt laws - the non-compliance offence under s45 for refusing to answer a relevant question without lawful excuse. Section 48 allows coercive sanctions to be applied in such circumstances to either secure compliance with the order or to punish the person for refusal to comply. Again, maximum sentences are stipulated[115]. An additional remedy is made available under the non-compliance offences. The court may order the respondent in a non-compliance prosecution to pay compensation to a person who has suffered by the refusal to answer the question[116]. Further, an offence of flagrant disobedience would apply in cases where a person has wilfully failed or refused to comply with an order "in such a way as to constitute a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court"[117]. The Commission notes:

In such a case, the focus of the proceedings shifts from merely upholding the rights of an aggrieved party to upholding the authority of the court.[118]

An important difference between the reform proposal and existing laws is that an appeal mechanism would be available under the reformed law. Under sections 13 and 56 appeals would lie to the court to which appeals from the court in criminal proceedings generally lie or, if there is no such court, that to which civil appeals would lie.

The contrast between the recommended procedures - choice of judges, right of appeal, etc - and those applied in the Barrass and Budd cases - summary trial by presiding judge with no appeal - are indeed stark. However, in reality it might not be so marked. Under existing law the judge has the option to refer the matter to the chief judge, or another judge, of the same court[119]. In fact, in NSW the power of judges to deal with contempt summarily

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[114]. Commonwealth Attorney-General, *The Law of Contempt - A Discussion Paper on ALRC Report No.35*, 1990, p.9.
[115]. s.51.
[116]. s.58.
[117]. s.59.
[118]. ALRC, *Report No 35 Contempt*, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, para 561.
[119]. ibid., para 84.

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is seen as a "residual entitlement"[120], so exceptional that they should only confine it to emergency cases where it is inappropriate to do otherwise[121]. The right of appeal from contempt convictions is less clear. Statutory provisions may confer a right of appeal against contempt in the face of the court, as in s.201 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW). But a right of appeal may not exist if the contempt liability is determined under a statutory provision which uses different phraseology to that used in the provision governing appeals.[122] The reforms would clarify this uniformly.

The Australian Press Council submission: towards US-style shield laws.

The Australian Press Council - in accordance with key objects in its charter to pursue press freedom - filed a submission on the Budd case to the Queensland Government in which it called for a broad privilege to be extended to a confidential journalist-source relationship[123]. The Council's proposal is that confidential communications between journalists and their sources be protected "where there is an express or implied understanding that the confidentiality of the source not be revealed, except in circumstances where there are overriding public interest reasons to justify naming the source".[124] In order to avoid a broad definition of "public interest", the Council goes so far as to list four circumstances in which the protection might be overridden. The communications would be protected unless:
    a. waived by the source;
    b. made to facilitate the perpetration of a crime;
    c. the journalist has reasonable cause to believe the source of information clearly misguided him or her for reasons of economic, political or personal gain;
    d. naming the source is absolutely necessary to establish the innocence of a person charged with a crime.[125]

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[120]. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s.48(2).
[121]. *European Asian Bank AG v. Wentworth*, unreported, Court of Appeal, NSW, 25 June 1986.
[122]. ALRC, *Report No 35 Contempt*, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, para, 86.
[123]. Australian Press Council, *Contempt - A Shield Law for Journalists*, Submission to the Qld Government, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 23 March 1992.
[124]. ibid., para 5.1.
[125]. ibid.

The Council offers a broad definition of "journalists" to avoid unnecessary limitations on the privilege.[126]

In anticipating some restrictions on the privilege, the Council directed the Queensland Government to some limitations which might be acceptable. It suggested the privilege might be lost if it was proved that the source was not in fact confidential or that the source had been previously identified in public[127]. It recommended against the court being required to conduct any "balancing test" of the right to know against the proper administration of justice. It also found difficulty with provisions limiting the privilege to certain categories of proceedings, such as criminal proceedings, suggesting instead a scenario where journalists would lose the privilege if it could be proven they had acted with malice.[128]

The Council justified its radical stance on the bases that confidential sources are essential to investigative reporting[129], sources would "dry up" if they believed journalists were being forced to identify them[130] and that confidential sources were used mainly for assessment and verification rather than as a primary research tool[131]. Interestingly, the Council addressed a common criticism of journalistic privilege: that unethical journalists would fabricate stories and then hide behind the shield. The Council suggested this had not been a problem in European and US jurisdictions where such laws existed.[132] Journalists' ethical codes prohibited the fabrication of stories and reporters had condemned colleagues who had adopted such practices[133]. Finally, the Council used the operation of the lawyers' professional privilege to counter claims that a journalists' privilege would be adverse to the administration of justice, arguing that the lawyers' privilege "assists and enhances the

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[126]. ibid, para 5.2.
[127]. ibid., para 5.3.
[128]. ibid.
[129]. ibid., para 4.2.
[130]. ibid., para 4.4.
[131]. ibid., para 4.5.
[132]. ibid.
[133]. ibid., para 4.6 and 4.8.

administration of justice", citing *Grant v. Downs*[134]. The Council noted that the legal

privilege was for the benefit of the client, who may waive it, and the "journalist's privilege

would be for the benefit of the sources but moreover for the public interest".[135]

The Press Council's submission should be seen for what it is - an ambit claim for a

broad privilege under the banner of press freedom. Even the most reform-driven Attorney-

General would not offer journalists such a generous shield in an age of high levels of

public distrust of the news media. The Press Council itself received a record 345

complaints during the 1990-91 financial year, of which 312 were related to inaccuracies,

bias or unethical reporting.[136] Nevertheless, it is important that notions of press freedom

are articulated and debated when Australia lacks any constitutional guarantees in this

regard.

The Press Council and other proponents of liberal privileges for journalists often cite

the United States as a bastion of press freedom in this regard. However, while the First

Amendment to that country's Constitution guarantees press freedom, in the case of

Branzburg v. Hayes[137] it failed to allow a journalist to use the First Amendment as a shield

against revealing a source. There, the Supreme Court stated:

> The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas
> as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the
> commission of crime...It is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every
> incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal
> statutes of general applicability. Under prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving
> substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the
> possible burden that may be imposed.[138]

It is the failure of the constitutional amendment to protect journalists from forced disclosure

of sources that has led to the enactment of shield laws in 26 US states which offer varied

degrees of protection to journalists. Some cover journalists' sources only, while others are

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[134]. (1976) 135 CLR 644 per Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ at 685.
[135]. Australian Press Council, *Contempt - A Shield Law for Journalists*, Submission to the Qld Government, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 23 March 1992, para 4.9.
[136]. Australian Press Council, *Annual Report 15*, 30 June 1991, pp.46-47.
[137]. 408 US 665.
[138]. Cited in T. Barton Carter et. al., *The First Amendment and the Fourth Estate*, Fourth Edition, Foundation Press, New York, 1988, p.431.

extended to include information.[139] Some cover both published and unpublished sources, while others are restricted to those relating to information which has been published[140]. Others frame the shield law as an immunity from contempt law rather than as a granted privilege[141]. The statutes vary as to the point at which the court may override them - in other words, in the size of their loopholes. For example, the Minnesota statute can be divested when "there is a compelling and overriding interest requiring the disclosure of the information where the disclosure is necessary to prevent injustice"[142]. The Rhode Island statute can be divested if the "disclosure of information or of the source of the information is necessary to permit a criminal prosecution or ... a felony or to prevent a threat to human life" and does not apply to "a source of any information concerning the details of any Grand Jury or other proceedings which was required to be secret under the laws of the State".[143]

Yet, no matter how tight the shield law, the fact remains that half of the United States has no such statutory protection, and is left with the common law which requires a reporter to testify when the information sought goes to the "heart" of the plaintiff's claim.[144] While this is certainly a more rigid test than the "relevant" and "necessary" terminology used under the current common law in Australia, it is far from absolute, as has been evidenced by the jailing of two journalists in recent years for refusing to reveal their sources.[145]

Cases revisited under the various proposals.

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[139]. ALRC, *Evidence Research Paper 16*, 1983, pp.493-4.
[140]. ibid., pp. 495-7.
[141]. ibid., pp.497-9.
[142]. Minn Stat Ann 595.024.
[143]. Gen Laws R A Ch 19.1 s.9-19.1-3(b)(2) and (c).
[144]. *Garland v. Torre*, 259F.2d 545; 358 US 910 (1958).
[145]. See J.C Goodale et al, *Reporter's Privilege Cases*, November 1991, p.2; cited in Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, *Discussion Paper on Professional Privilege for Confidential Communications*, Project No. 90, December 1991, p.13.

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How might the various reforms affect the cases which resulted in the jailing of journalists Barrass, Budd and Nicholls? Leaving aside for a moment the question of privilege and assuming only the ALRC recommendations on contempt reform are adopted, it would seem that in each case a number of procedural safeguards would act to preserve the operation of natural justice. In the Barrass and Nicholls cases, it would mean the offence of witness misconduct would be covered by new legislation rather than by the Justices Act and District Court Act under which the journalists were jailed. This would replace the common law under which Barrass was later fined by a District Court judge and Budd was jailed by a Supreme Court judge. All three would have had the option to have the case tried summarily by the presiding magistrate or judge or by a different judge or a three-member bench of other judges[146]. This appeared especially important in the Budd case. There, Justice Dowsett mentioned only one case in his reasons - *Lundin's case* - and did not elaborate upon its application.[147] Further, the judge made a puzzling analogy between the journalists' claim of privilege and that of the clergy:

> In recent times, there has been an attempt by the press, it seems, to in some way identify this sort of privilege with that claimed by the clergy as to confession. I cannot see that there is any comparison. The clergy, after all, claim such privilege as originating at a time immemorial, whereas the claim made by journalists is very new indeed.[148]

The analogy is peculiar because no cleric-communicant privilege officially exists in Queensland[149], although the judiciary has, by convention, been reluctant to press priests to break the seal of the confessional.[150] In giving his reasons for ruling the questions asked of Budd were "relevant", Justice Dowsett did not consider applying other, perhaps more stringent, tests on the questions which might have produced a different result. For example, were the questions, in Lord Denning's words, not only relevant but also "proper

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[146]. ALRC, *Report No 35 Contempt*, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, para 561, para 130.
[147]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at p. 272.
[148]. ibid., transcript, p.271.
[149]. ALRC, *Report No. 26*, para 903.
[150]. *X Ltd v. Morgan-Grampian* [1991] 1 AC 1, per Lord Donaldson at 19.

and, indeed necessary ... in the course of justice that it be put"?[151]. Would its answer, in the words of Lord Donovan, "serve a useful purpose in relation to the proceedings at hand"?[152] Finally, would an answer "have been rendered useless by the absence of much other related and essential evidence", as required in *A-G v. Lundin?*[153] It could be suggested that the price Budd paid for the speed of the summary procedures was that his counsel and the judge had only a very limited time in which to consider the relevant law.

A reason given for offering alternatives to the summary procedures is that the presiding judge might be biased in some subconscious way. The ALRC wrote:

> While a presiding judge would undoubtedly make every conscious effort to eliminate bias in his or her assessment of the relevant facts, there is undoubtedly a danger that the judge's role as the target of the relevant conduct (in many cases) may subconsciously influence his or her impression as to what happened.[154]

Of course, in Budd's case the judge was not the target of the refusal to answer the question. However, his impatience with the witness and lack of tolerance for his ethical stand was evident in the phraseology he used in his judgement:

> I cannot begin to understand a situation in which responsible members of the community seek to put themselves above the law. I particularly have difficulty in understanding how journalists as a class ...should claim an entitlement to exempt themselves from its obligations.[155]

He continued with phrases like "I find it impossible to understand ..." and "however misguided I think your views to be". A different judge or a panel of judges may well have come to the same conclusion. However, the summary manner of dealing with the contempt charge meant it was addressed within the atmosphere and emotion of the defamation action taking place at the time. A trial divorced from those proceedings would have better ensured justice was seen to be done in relation to the contempt charge.

Under the reforms, the journalists would have been afforded a reasonable adjournment (arguably allowed in Barrass's and Nicholls' cases) to obtain legal advice and to prepare a

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[151]. *A-G v. Mulholland and Foster* [1963] 2 QB 477 at 489-90.
[152]. ibid., at 492.
[153]. (1982) 75 Crim App Rep 90.
[154]. ALRC *Report No. 35*, para 110.
[155]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at p.271.

case in defence[156]. Maximum sentences would have applied[157]. (These would, however, be likely to be greater than the maximum seven days imprisonment and $175 fine faced by Barrass under the WA Justices Act s.77).

The time element appeared significant in the Budd case. The journalist was given only an 80 minute luncheon adjournment in which to seek legal representation and advice and attempt to contact his confidential source to obtain a clearance. Given that he failed to contact the source and at his barrister pleaded only to the sentence and not the charge, it would appear that time was insufficient.

Finally, all three would have had an unrestricted right of appeal against conviction and/or sentence[158]. In each case this would have allowed a different judge or judges to take a distanced view of the journalist's refusal to answer and the context in which it was made. Again, justice would have been seen to be done, perhaps reducing the level of media concern which surrounded the cases at the time, including front page coverage of the sentence, editorials and columns commenting on the purported injustice and, in Budd's case, simulated television enactments of the courtroom and the judge's decision[159].

We will turn now to the various reform proposals in the area of journalists' privilege and consider how the cases might have proceeded under each of them. It is doubtful whether anything short of an absolute, unqualified privilege would have protected Tony Barrass from revealing his source. This was a criminal trial and Barrass was the key witness. The charge related to a tax clerk's disclosure of tax information. Barrass was the journalist given the information. The case centred upon the identity of the person who gave him the documents. Barrass was asked a question to that effect. On present common law tests, the question was "relevant", "proper and, indeed necessary ... in the course of justice that it be put" and the answer would "serve a useful purpose in relation to the

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[156]. ALRC *Report No. 35*, para 130.
[157]. ibid., para 128.
[158]. ALRC *Report No. 35*, para 133.
[159]. ABC, *7.30 Report* (Brisbane), March 21, 1992.

proceedings at hand". An answer would not "have been rendered useless by the absence of much other related and essential evidence"; in fact, the case was tried without Barrass's evidence and Luders was convicted on other, circumstantial, evidence. Thus, for Barrass, there was no respite under the existing law. Yet neither would there have been under the reform proposals.

Nicholls would have been placed in a similar, if not more clear-cut position. His defence was premised on the fact that somebody else - his undisclosed source - committed the crimes with which he (Nicholls) had been charged. The identity of the source was the linchpin of the case.

Under the ALRC's uniform evidence legislation, the protection of the confidential communication relies on the court weighing up the desirability of admitting the evidence against the potential harm it might do to the parties to the confidential relationship, to their relationship or to similar relationships[160]. However, ss3 rules out the privilege if it would affect the rights of a person, it was made in furtherance of the commission of an offence or an abuse of power[161]. In Barrass's and Nicholls's cases the protection of the relationship - related to the leaking of tax documents - would fall victim to this subsection. Under the British Contempt of Court Act 1981 section 10 - the basis of the Queensland reform proposal - it could certainly be demonstrated "that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice"[162].

Finally, under the Press Council's suggested reform, there would need to be "overriding public interest reasons to justify naming the source" and the privilege would not apply if the communication with the journalist had been "made to facilitate the perpetration of a crime"[163]. Since the communication of the documents was indeed the very

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[160]. s.109.
[161]. s.109(3).
[162]. *The Australian*, March 25, 1992, p.2.
[163]. Australian Press Council, *Contempt - A Shield Law for Journalists*, Submission to the Qld Government, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 23 March 1992, para 5.1.

crime being tried, there would be little solace for Barrass in the proposal. Similarly, Nicholls' obligation of confidence to his source facilitated the perpetration of the impersonation offences.

Budd, however, would have more options under the reforms. We have already considered how he may well have had further options under the existing law by arguing the necessity of the questions. Another option was for his former employer, Queensland Newspapers, the defendant in the defamation action, to agree not to call Budd as a witness, effectively forsaking its qualified privilege defence by failing to show its journalist acted in good faith. This was the course suggested by Justice Hunt in the *Cojuangco* case. After his ruling had been affirmed by the High Court and the case returned for his consideration, Justice Hunt made it clear to the newspaper and the journalist where the onus lay:

> Mr Hastings (the journalist) must seek to obtain a release from his obligation of confidence (from his source). If he does not even attempt to do so, it is his own inaction which may determine his fate. Similarly - or even more strongly - if the newspaper really cares about the claim made by its journalists that their sources should be protected. it has only to undertake not to call Mr Hastings in any action brought by Mr Cojuangco, and Mr Hastings will now be freed of any obligation to disclose those sources. If the newspaper does not give that undertaking, then the attitude of the newspaper will be seen for the political manoeuvre which it now appears to be, to force the court to jail Mr Hastings and thereby to embarrass the legislature into the action which it seeks.[164]

If Justice Hunt's interpretation was applied to the Budd case, it would seem that the newspaper could have avoided the conflict by agreeing not to call Budd as a witness and the journalist (adequately briefed of the potential showdown) could have sought a clearance from his confidential source much sooner. Taken to its limit, Justice Hunt's interpretation might well portray Budd as an unwitting sacrificial lamb in his former newspaper's campaign for reform of contempt laws. Alternatively, the decision might have been a purely commercial one. Was it worthwhile for the newspaper to forsake a defence in a defamation action - perhaps costing tens of thousands of dollars in damages - to save a former employee a couple of weeks in jail? Thus, under the existing law, there may have been alternatives. According to Queensland Newspapers' editorial manager, Mr Gareth Evans,

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[164]. *Cojuangco v. John Fairfax and Sons Ltd*, Supreme Court of NSW, November 25, 1988, reported in *Australian Press Council News*, February 1989, pp.7-8.

Budd was only called as a witness because a convention had always applied in such cases that cross-examination on the matter of sources would be restricted to the imputations alleged in the action. According to Evans, the plaintiff's counsel Ian Callinan QC chose to break with convention and target his questions about sources elsewhere in the story in an attempt to establish lack of good faith. Having put Budd in the stand and examined him, it was of course too late for the defence to withdraw their witness. Evans claims newspapers will be much more cautious in future when deciding to put their journalists in the witness box.[165]

The reform proposals would present Budd with other options. Under the ALRC's uniform evidence legislation, the court would have to weigh up the harm which would ensue from the evidence not being adduced against the potential harm to Budd and his source, their relationship and journalist-source relationships in general[166]. Items raised in subsections 2, 3 and 4 might serve to qualify any privilege, however the reform would force the court to undertake a balancing procedure. In Budd's case, the scales might weigh in his favour if the court was to hold that the potential harm to journalist-source relationships outweighed the importance of the evidence to the prosecution. After all, as Budd's counsel pointed out when pleading to the sentence,

> the inference can clearly be drawn that a refusal to disclose the source is because there was no such source, so the plaintiff suffers ultimately nothing from the refusal to answer this question. In fact, if anything, the defendant suffers from the refusal of the witness to answer the question because it allows the inference to be drawn by Your Honour.[167]

Thus, the court might well allow a privilege in the circumstances.

A similar argument might apply to allow the privilege under the Queensland proposal for legislation similar to the British Contempt of Court Act s.10 provision. There, it might not be established that disclosure was "necessary in the interests of justice" because justice would be done through the defendant losing any advantage of the qualified privilege

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[165]. Interview with Mr Gareth Evans, Bond University, April 10, 1992.
[166]. s.109.
[167]. *Copley v. Queensland Newspapers*, Supreme Ct of Qld, no. 3107 of 1989, March 20, 1992, unreported, transcript at p.269.

defence through Budd's refusal to reveal the source. Justice would be done through the plaintiff being awarded damages to assuage his tarnished reputation.

The Press Council's seemingly radical reforms might encounter an unexpected sticking point in the Budd case. One example given of an "overriding public interest" which would override the privilege would be when "the journalist has reasonable cause to believe the source of information clearly misguided him or her for reasons of economic, political or personal gain"[168]. Budd had obtained his information from a senior public servant in the office of the former Police Minister Mr Cooper. The plaintiff would need to prove that Budd had reasonable cause to believe he had been misguided for economic, political or personal gain. The difficulty would be in proving he had been misguided and that he reasonably believed he had been misguided by the source. However, if this could be proven Budd would lose his privilege under the Press Council reform.

The case studies show that even if the most liberal reforms proposed were implemented, journalists would still not be absolutely privileged. Barrass and Nicholls would have still been convicted of the new offence, albeit under procedures more in keeping with principles of natural justice. Budd had unexplored options under the existing law. He would, however, have been advantaged by the reformed procedural mechanisms and the operation of a provision similar to Britain's Contempt of Court Act section 10.

Conclusion: Reporting under the proposed laws: the journalist / source relationship and role of journalism education.

How might the proposed reforms to contempt of witness laws affect journalists' reporting practices? It seems far-fetched to expect noticeable changes to reporting as a result of what might happen very occasionally in the court room. At the very least the conversion into statute of archaic summary procedures under the common law should strengthen journalists' confidence in the justice system. Statutory entrenchment of a qualified

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[168]. Australian Press Council, *Contempt - A Shield Law for Journalists*, Submission to the Qld Government, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 23 March 1992, para 5.1.

journalist-source privilege in any of the above forms would also spell out the law for journalists and, particularly if implemented uniformly throughout Australian jurisdictions, would inject some clarity into the law. Although the statutes would be subject to judicial interpretation, they at least present a starting point for journalists as lay professionals endeavouring to come to grips with the law.

However, it is not unrealistic to expect the reforms to affect the daily work of journalism. The kind of reforms to the journalist-source relationship which have been proposed strike at the heart of journalism research - the news gathering interview. While the jailing of the three journalists was regrettable, and perhaps would recur under proposed law, it has served at least one useful purpose. The jailings have demonstrated to journalists that imprisonment for this kind of contempt is something less than a remote threat - it actually happens sometimes. An appreciation of the potential risk of fine or imprisonment, even under reformed law, must cause journalists to question the terms upon which they will accept information from a source on a confidential basis. There may have been no alternative method of gathering the information. Certainly, the reporters covering Watergate - Bernstein and Woodward - and those who exposed corruption in Queensland - Chris Masters and Phil Dickie - argued that they could not have reported those stories adequately without the use of confidential sources. However, some critics argue that journalists too readily accept information on a confidential basis. Some go so far as to say that standard reporting practice should be: "It's either on the record or I don't want to know about it".

Part of the problem is that Australian journalists have no accepted system for ranking information according to its level of confidentiality, no way of defining what expressions like "off the record" or "background only" really mean. The Australian Journalists Association or the Australian Press Council should look at defining such terms as a gauge for reporters. The status quo remains that journalists and their sources too often fail to clarify the level of confidentiality of material. For example, does "off the record" mean the information cannot be used or that it cannot be attributed to this source? Does it allow the

reporter to then take the information to a third party for confirmation and attribute it to him? The matter was considered at the Parliamentary Judges Commission of Inquiry in Brisbane in 1989. The commission found conflicting meanings of "off the record" when investigating whether to remove Mr Justice Angelo Vasta from the Supreme Court[169]. Some reporters felt "off the record" meant they should stop taking notes. Some felt it meant the information could not be published under any circumstance. Others thought it meant it could be published, but not attributed, if confirmed by a second source. Other related questions might be: What is the status of "background information"? Is it ethically acceptable for a journalist to tell an independent referee the name of confidential source or does the ethical obligation strictly rule out any revelation to anyone under any circumstances?

Journalism education can play a role here, both at pre-service and in-service levels. Tertiary journalism courses serve to alert future reporters to the ethical dilemmas involved and suggest strategies for dealing with them. Employers have a commercial interest at stake here. Ultimately, it is they who must pay the damages for defamation and other actions in which journalists have unsuccessfully claimed a privilege for confidential information. In the Barrass case, the journalist suffered the punishment, although the newspaper finished up paying the $10,000 fine[170]. In defamation cases like Budd's and *Cojuangco* the refusal to reveal a source can prove costly for the newspaper groups. There will be times - even under the reformed law - when a news group will make a commercial and/or public interest decision to publish information based on unprivileged confidences. However, it will be in their best interests to keep their reporting staff fully briefed on the relevant law to avoid paying out damages or fines over unsourced stories based upon sloppy journalism research compiled by reporters ignorant of the law.

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[169]. *Gazette of Law and Journalism*, No 11, June 1989, pp9-11.
[170]. *Sunday Times*, August 9, 1990, p.3.

The commercial decision can, however, work the other way. Newsroom budgets may force journalists to opt for the anonymous source because they are not allocated the resources needed to seek out a source willing to go on the record, as David Johnston noted:

> ...the use of unnamed sources in many cases is a matter of economics, both for corporate management and individual journalists. It doesn't cost a news organisation anything to allow a government official ... to whisper anonymously into a reporter's ear. To hunt down sources who will go on the record ... or to locate, read and understand documents, takes time - and that costs money.[171]

Yet while Johnston frowned upon the use of unnamed sources as an erosion of news organisations' credibility, others favour the practice because on some occasions it is the only way an investigative journalist can expose corruption. As John Doe notes,

> To the government, a leak may be an embarrassment. But to the reporter it's useful information from an unquotable source. And to the audience it may be a valuable insight not otherwise available... a whistle blower may want to expose an abuse - but he many not be ready to risk his job.[172]

Perhaps those with an axe to grind may want to hide behind the shield of the journalist's ethical obligation. This is all the more reason for implementing a mechanism for assessing the worth of material before taking it on an "off the record" basis. Tiffen[173] chronicles a range of situations where journalists have been manipulated into taking information on a confidential basis by sources with an ulterior motive. He concludes:

> The use of confidential sources adds greatly to the information which comes to the public via the news. The importance of journalists protecting the anonymity of their sources has been shown by the persecution some have suffered when revealed. But like any other secrecy, the concealment of sources provides opportunities for abuse and deception, which can pose dilemmas when the conventions of confidentiality conceal the spreading of disinformation.[174]

Thus, a privilege for the journalist-source relationship needs to be qualified in some way to fall somewhere short of an absolute protection and somewhere beyond no protection if it is to maintain a balance between the public interests in the free flow of information and the effective administration of justice.

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[171]. David Johnston, "The anonymous-source syndrome", *Columbia Journalism Review*, Nov/Dec 87, p.58.

[172]. John Doe, "Anonymity isn't so bad", *The Quill*, January 1986, p.23.

[173]. Rod Tiffen, "Confidential sources in the news: conventions and contortions", *Australian Journalism Review*, 1988, pp.22-26.

[174]. ibid., p.26.

While journalists might welcome legislation exclusively tailored to grant them a privilege similar to the British provision, the most acceptable solution is likely to lie in a provision similar to that proposed in the ALRC Evidence brief.[175] This would formalise the process of the courts weighing up the relevant interests involved when any evidentiary privilege is claimed by a witness based on a relationship of confidence.

Yet the onus of reform should not rest solely with the legal fraternity. Professional bodies such as the Australian Journalists Association and the Australian Press Council can also help clarify the reporter's position by formulating a clear code of practice for the receipt of confidential information. Journalists could also consider bringing their Code of Ethics into line with those of other honourable professions - doctors and accountants - and consider allowing their colleagues to waive their confidentiality obligations to their sources if ordered to do so by a court which had properly weighed the competing interests.

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[175]. Australian Law Reform Commission, *Report 38, Evidence,* 1987, AGPS, Draft Evidence Bill, Clause 109.

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