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ABSTRACT
        This paper uses the occasion of reviewing three books
on university issues and higher education to discuss the ability of
university faculty to enter into dialogue and discussion about higher
education. The paper reviews the following books: "The Idea of a
Modern University" (edited by Sidney Hook and others) a book which
presents the views of professors assembled in 1972 at Rockefeller
University (New York); "Qualitative Inquiry in Education: The
Continuing Debate" (edited by Elliot W. Eisner and Alan Peshkin) a
volume published following a conference in 1988 at Stanford
University (California); and "Leadership for the Twenty-First
Century" (Joseph C. Rost). The review argues that these books
illustrate that university faculty members do not know how to discuss
educational issues openly and constructively. Higher education must
strive to discuss its mission and goals more constructively in light
of empirical knowledge, analytical thought, and logical reasoning;
that universities must give more attention to institutional
leadership and the training and preparation of their own leaders; and
that the divisiveness of campus politics precludes informed,
deliberative, and constructive consideration of the universities'
problems and issues. (Includes 13 footnotes.) (JB)

THE MODERN UNIVERSITY,
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH,
AND LEADERSHIP

Cameron Fincher

The University of Georgia
Institute of Higher Education
Athens, Georgia

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THE MODERN UNIVERSITY,
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, AND LEADERSHIP

The reasons for discussing three disparate topics in the same paper are coincidental. Three books came to my attention within a matter of days, and I was struck by the similarity of their flaws and defects. As my reading continued, I was increasingly convinced that university faculty members do not know how to discuss educational issues openly and constructively. Taken one at a time, they are the most intelligent people I know; gathered in assembly to discuss educational research, the purposes of the university, or the nature of institutional leadership, they are seldom intelligible.

In discussing the books here, a chronological order makes the most sense. "The Idea of a Modern University" presents the views of professors assembled in 1972 at Rockefeller University in New York. "Qualitative Inquiry in Education" has been published, following a small conference in 1988 at Stanford University. "Leadership for the Twenty-First Century" is the work of a single author, but displays the same misdemeanor in academic thought and discussion.[1] The eighteen-year gap between the first and second "faculty symposiums" is particularly relevant to changes in debating styles, but it is also a discouraging example of how faculty stereotypes are perpetuated despite changes in the larger, more significant issues in higher education.[2] If accepted too literally as a contrast in two generations of academic scholars, the concurrent reading of both volumes would dampen all expectations for the 21st century, as discussed in the third volume.

The Modern University

The volume edited by Sidney Hook, Paul Kurtz, and Miro Todorovich is indebted to Cardinal Newman for its title only. Instead of a learned discussion of the university's purpose in the midst of great change, the book is an effort (supposedly) to mobilize resistance to the (then) recent politicization of university and college campuses. As such, the book displays faculty

reactions to student protests, disruption, and violence. The intent of the conference was "to facilitate the adoption of procedures by which all genuine education issues could be peacefully and rationally solved." Readers familiar with the many volumes published by Sidney Hook will appreciate the choice of words. On the other hand, readers who do not recognize the names of Sidney Hook and Paul Kurtz are "victims of a generation gap."

The names of conference participants were highly visible in 1972, and the appearance of such a distinguished group is usually the best guarantee of a successful conference. The institutions represented at the conference are well known nationally, but there is a noticeable absence of representation from the midwestern and southern regions of the nation. In such respects, the conference was similar to many other called or externally funded symposiums convened during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Three keynotes were apparently sounded at the conference. Fritz Machlup (economics), in his opening paper, questions the widespread use of the term "universal higher education." To Machlup, universal higher education was neither a promise nor an illusion, but a contradiction in terms. Only a small proportion of students have the intelligence, creativity, interest, ambition, diligence, and persistence to benefit from higher education.

Patrick Suppes (philosophy, statistics) responds *ad hominem* and with pretensions to argue semantics. In other words, he attacks Machlup's reasoning and his use of words. Suppes obviously prefers a common sense meaning of "universal education," and he offers his own "facts" to prove that Machlup is wrong. He includes in his paper "the moral and social argument" for opening the doors of colleges and universities to those who are clamoring to enter.

Hook concurs that attitudes toward universal higher education "depends primarily" on how we interpret the "key terms in the expression." He, too, finds "Professor Machlup's treatment rather unsatisfactory," and he rules that since diligence and perseverance are so closely related, Machlup is left with only five of the six qualities he identified. The "five traits or qualities" are, of course, a matter of degree, but "interest is psychologically the dynamic factor" — and the task of the teacher is to motivate

student interest. The solution to Machlup's problem is to develop teachers for broader or liberal education. Then, we can expect a larger proportion of the students to profit from "universal access."

Despite an able assist from Daniel Patrick Moynihan (sociology), who supports Machlup well by setting the record straight, and a cogent defense by Ernest Nagel (philosophy), who accuses Suppes of shadow-boxing, Machlup has been out-debated. Despite his reputation as an economist and the reception of his widely read book, "The Production and Distribution of Knowledge,"[3] Machlup made a tactical error in talking about universal higher education instead of the university's difficulties in meeting the increased demand for its services. From that point on, the symposium is a recitation of woes for the contemporary university and no longer a rational discussion of rational alternatives to student radicalism.

Arthur Bestor (history) tries gallantly to get the conference back on track. He defends the university's intellectual integrity against "disruption, vandalism, and destruction," pointing out that some universities have been reduced almost to a state of siege. The greatest danger is "loss of nerve," thereby succumbing to the belief that attacks on the university represented an "irresistible wave of the future." It was no secret, Bestor contended, that "politicization" was what militants wanted. But to commit the university to any "particular political, economic, or social program . . . would operate to circumscribe, immediately and sharply, the intellectual and political freedom of the university."

To Bestor, the responsibilities of the university and its scholars were obvious:

> Objectivity, scientific rigor, and scholarly integrity are important . . . are indispensable safeguards in every situation where the welfare of society or of individual human beings depends in any way upon the accuracy and validity of the findings on which policy will finally be based. (p. 72)

To the activist, Bestor continued, "the meticulous testing of conclusions is so much academic mumbo-jumbo" that interferes with the application of new, but untested, insights and ways of doing things. As a historian, he believed the university should

keep knowledge of the past alive and usable by subjecting all scholarly findings to intense critical examination.

In response, Robert Nisbet (sociology) agreed but quickly turned his comments to the hubris of "distinguished scholars" who made the university "easy prey" for violence and vandalism. Nisbet was followed by other "distinguished scholars" who also agreed with Bestor and then subverted his defense of the university. Oscar Handlin (history) moved quickly that the scholar's standards must be defined and defended. He then passed on to the "provincial, local, and particularistic pressures" put on the university. Irving Kristol (urban values) worried that faculty critiques of student radicalism would be a defense of the status quo. He assured Bestor that the correct term is "professional integrity" — not intellectual integrity. He then placed the blame on the university's many faults (e.g., trivialization, homogenization, and lack of a philosophy of education), while agreeing, from the beginning, that student radicalism was not due to the university's faults. Samuel Lubell, better known as a political analyst, believed the essential problem to be the feudal state of universities and academic departments, and the ensuing fragmentation of knowledge. He, too, saw far more problems than solutions.

After Kristol bemoans the trivialization of graduate education and Lubell wrings the university's hands "mea culpa," the other participants can offer only grievances, worrisome concerns, and coinciding issues, of which they were aware before they attended the conference. Steven Cahn (philosophy) addressed the role of liberal education and worried about the preservation of its content. Robert Hoffman (philosophy) was concerned about the irrelevance of relevance, stating that dispassionate inquiry was not the equivalent of indifference to societal problems. Gary L. Dorsey (jurisprudence) argued that the future of the university was dependent upon rationality, an indispensable but not sufficient condition for the university's survival.

The "crucial problems" of the modern university were identified in ways suggesting that participants were compelled to say something, and as if they could relieve that compulsion by adding one more problem to the list. John Searle (philosophy) discusses the inconsistent role of the faculty, the lack of a coherent

theory (of the university), and again, the lack of a philosophy of education. John Bunzel (president of California State at San Jose) addresses collective bargaining, the faculty as employees, the erosion of public trust, and adversarial relations that prevent consensus. Paul Seabury (government) raises the question of faculty involvement in affirmative action programs. Richard Gambino (educational philosophy) comments on the ethnic revolution, the role of groups and individuals in public policy, the myth of mobility based on individual merit, and the mythical ethic of fairness. In other words, the issues of equality and quality, excellence and irrelevance, faculty morale, tenure, finance, scholarship, general education, and the humanistic tradition are added to the university's agenda.

All issues and concerns are based more on observations or experience as university faculty members than astute insights or perspectives that follow from their respective disciplines. The published statements of some participants read like transcriptions of recordings from floor mikes. Only a few contributors make adequate use of references, and the best that many participants can offer are after-thoughts ("The long-term issue is . . ." or "The real problem, I think, is . . ."). In many ways, the published papers and comments reflect the ineptness of faculty in discussing issues, and they are indicative of the university's diminishing capabilities to debate critical societal issues and public policy.

The conference at Rockefeller University and the publication of its proceedings came at a time when the purposes and functions of all universities and colleges were subject to changes that knew nothing of rational analysis, deliberation, dispassionate discussion, or open-mindedness. The professors assembled to discuss rational alternatives to student radicalism were seasoned scholars and highly intelligent faculty members. Their names and reputations gave luster to the table of contents and ensured a widespread readership for the published papers. It is unfortunate that they did not discuss the idea of a modern university, its appropriate response to student dissent, or the many challenges with which the university was confronted. It is tragic that they chose instead to discuss the weaknesses of their colleagues' reasoning and the lack of a philosophy of education to guide higher education in its "time of troubles."

Qualitative Inquiry

The contributors to Eisner and Peshkin's volume of qualitative research are, in many respects, similar to the participants in the conference on the modern university. To no small extent, each group represents a generation of faculty members invited to discuss important issues and to seek consensus where such was possible. The university professors assembled in New York were wiser, more mature, and better established than those who met at Stanford, but that is not a cause for celebration. To their embarrassment, both groups demonstrate the fractionness of faculty forums and underscore the traditional penchant faculty members have for "thinking otherwise." Both groups contain pedants who would rather prove someone else wrong than to propose a constructive solution to a pressing problem. But more important than any of the above, the faults of the participants and contributors can be attributed to the rules of academic gamesmanship — and to the failing capacity of the university for intellectual discussion of common problems and significant issues.

The 1988 conference on qualitative research was held at Stanford University. The senior editor, Elliott W. Eisner, is professor of education and art at Stanford; Alan Peshkin, the junior editor, is professor of education at the University of Illinois in Urbana. A co-sponsor of the conference was Teachers College Press, the publisher of the book. The program consisted of invited papers from "outstanding scholars" (n=15). Attending the conference were fifteen other participants and the two editors.

Papers were presented by two participants each on five selected topics: subjectivity, validity, generalizability, ethics, and uses. The two papers for each topic were critiqued by other participants who were invited for that purpose. Many questions could be raised about the editors' choice in participants, but more serious questions should be raised about their choice of topics. The editors state that they wanted participants who could draw upon their personal experience (of, not in) qualitative research. They undermine their participants with a caveat that most are qualitative researchers "by taste rather than by socialization" and thus, "have not learned to view the conduct of . . . inquiry within the philosophical context of methodological issues."

Objectivity

D.C. Phillips (philosophy), the first participant, apparently was asked to make a case for some semblance of objectivity in research, and he is promptly taken to task by Egon Guba (education) for not defining objectivity. Many readers will think, no doubt, that Phillips defined the term in a reasonable and acceptable manner by "a critical spirit," an appeal to evidence, that is crucial for objectivity in any inquiry. Indeed, he granted listeners (and readers) their own subjectivity — even the belief that objectivity is *not* dead. After reading Guba's criticism, many readers may agree that Phillips's paper makes an even better case for objectivity. Also, they may wonder why Phillips was invited and why he accepted. His views on objectivity do not prepare readers for the remaining chapters in the book.

Phillips is followed by two authors who "celebrate subjectivity" (Guba's phrase). Michael Apple (curriculum and instruction), the junior author of record, was apparently asked to prepare a paper on subjectivity, and he apparently brought in a colleague who became the senior author by writing the paper. Leslie Roman (curriculum and instruction), who refers to herself several times as "I(Roman)," evidently bases her contribution on a study of "middle- and working-class Punk young women in the context of their interactions with Punk young men." Skeptical readers will ask why Apple felt a need for a co-author, and they might wonder why relevance was not one of the topics chosen for consideration.

Despite the distractions of Roman and Apple's paper, the repartee between Phillips and Guba is the best exchange of opinion in the book. Guba refutes Phillips a bit too abrasively on the issue of objectivity and needlessly declares his preference for subjectivity. But Phillips holds his own when he writes that Guba is entitled to his "constructions" but when Guba expresses his constructions publicly, they become open to "criticism and check." In brief, Phillips again demonstrates what he means by objectivity, and it is most regrettable that participants could not "generalize" Phillips' retort to the entire field of quantitative research.[4]

Validity

The editors' choice of validity, as a topic for discussion, and their choice of authors are particularly unfortunate for readers who would like to know more about the topic. The editors lead into the discussion with an implied definition of validity as the correspondence of qualitative research findings with truth, but neither Madeleine Grumet (education) nor Harry F. Wolcott (anthropology) are disposed to accept such a naive definition. The critique of their papers by Phillip W. Jackson (education and behavioral science) merely adds to the confusion. As a result, the treatment of validity, as a related concept, is quite shabby.[5]

Madeleine Grumet writes as a teacher who is interested only in improving the art of teaching. She provides three "narratives of educational experience" written by one of her students, and moves from them to a discussion of the "tensions between the mimetic and the transformative." She concludes that teaching, as she has "tried to show, is both art and science." Phillip Jackson considerately provides the full quote from which Madeleine Grumet has taken her title, "On Daffodils That Come Before the Swallow Dares." He then confesses that she moves too fast for him. Noting that she repeats the line twice, Jackson is mystified by Grumet's knowledge of the personal meaning (of the phrase) to the author Virginia Woolf. She, in reply, says that Jackson, in asking her to slow down, is revealing the lock-step system he would impose on others.

Harry Wolcott first rejects "the problem of validity" as irrelevant, talks a bit about its relevance to testing, and quotes ethnographic researchers who regard validity as related to the accuracy of observations and findings. Before digressing to a lengthy episode in his personal life, Wolcott provides several aphorisms that suggest a long-standing concern with accuracy, candor, and the reduction of errors in his work. His last words on the subject suggest that he has made a case for "cutting the concept down to size." Jackson notes that Wolcott gave his assigned topic "short shrift," but admits that Wolcott caught his attention with the personal episode he depicted. For reasons unknown to those of us seeking objectivity, Jackson then dismisses Wolcott's efforts

"to be as credible, balanced, fair, complete, sensitive, rigorously subjective, coherent, internally consistent, appropriate, plausible, and helpful as possible" (in his work) *as* sounding like "the litany of virtues we used to rattle off as boy scouts." Evidently, the "rule of the game," as played at Stanford, did not permit agreement with previous speakers.

Among several questions that are not asked and not answered clearly is one that is crucial: validity for what? Validity is an abstract concept that makes sense only when we are talking about the validation of methods, procedures, instruments, or such. There are no tangible indices, measures, or criteria of validity that will correspond to "truth" or "reality," as those terms are used in educational research. Useful methods are available, and quite helpful, if researchers want to demonstrate the accuracy or precision with which data, factual information, or knowledge have been gathered and presented. The internal consistency (reliability) of methods is not something the researcher can assume, and the relationship of methods to something other than their internal components (validity) is not a matter to be rejected, as Grumet and Wolcott have done. To an appreciable extent, this section of the book is the one most open to ridicule. Why did the editors not ask the authors to address questions of verification or validation? If verification, the authors could have obtained good assistance from historians; if validation, Wolcott could have made better use of Cronbach's work.

Generalizability

The question of generalizability may be too "sophisticated" for inclusion in this volume. Readers may wonder: why not the problems or issues that are involved in generalizing research findings to other groups of subjects or respondents? Public opinion polling is the form of research most often associated with sampling as a means of generalizing to a larger, defined population of voters, consumers, employees, students, and so forth. Robert Donmoyer (curriculum theory) and Janet Ward Schofield (psychology) handled the question without the agonizing evidenced by previous authors.

Donmoyer begins with a mistaken notion that the social scientist's views of generalizability have been distorted by Edward L. Thorndike's (1910) expectations of "a complete science of psychology." Thorndike was enthusiastic about the predictability of human behavior at the time, but most academic disciplines and scientific fields were enthusiastic in the progressive era. Thorndike was but one among many issuing promissory notes that would never be redeemed. Donmoyer recovers his momentum but not before needless obfuscation of "the complexity challenge" and "the paradigm challenge." What he meant by the two challenges is neither clear nor relevant to what comes later.

When readers learn that Donmoyer is writing about experiential knowledge and generalization from experience, they will appreciate his contribution. His "alternative conceptualization" of generalizability is based on personal knowledge (as clarified by Michael Polanyi) and six years of experience as a classroom teacher. He describes his conceptualization in terms of Lincoln and Guba's "language of transferability." Since Donmoyer underestimates the reasoning capabilities of human minds, it is well that generalization is a tacit process. After his consideration of "working hypotheses" and transferability, Donmoyer turns to Piaget's stage theory: assimilation, accommodation, intergration, differentiation. From this perspective, he concludes that case studies have at least three advantages. They can make accessible places where we have not been before; they permit us to see (through the researcher's eyes) what we might have missed; and they are less likely to produce defensiveness among students, less resistance to learning. Critical readers can point out that these are not new advantages restricted to case studies; textbooks and other instructional materials (filmstrips, slides, movies, videotapes) should have the same advantages.

Janet Ward Schofield discusses the low priority given generalizability (when it is not rejected entirely). Precise replicability is not a criterion for generalizability in qualitative research, but a growing emphasis on the concept is perceptible. She asks the question: To what do we generalize? And she replies that three domains (what is, what may be, and what could be) will suffice. In the first there is generalization to the typical,

the common, or the ordinary. In the second, we generalize to what may be in the way of change, in life cycles of phenomena. And in the third, we generalize to the ideal or exceptional. She also discusses the possibility of generalizability through aggregating or comparing independent studies. In brief, Schofield does not overemphasize the specific problems of generalizability in qualitative research.

Howard Becker (sociology), in responding to Donmoyer and Schofield's papers, does not rebuff or rebut his two colleagues. He contributes to the discussion by his reflections on generalization "as something social scientists do together, as a routine part of their work activity." He states that educational researchers must make generalizations for multiple audiences. Earlier he had expressed the opinion that qualitative research was not respected because education was still dominated by lay persons with little training in research. Teachers and administrators, in particular, often lacked the training and experience to transfer research findings to schools and classrooms. Becker is to be commended for recognizing that schools are "what we are generalizing about." No other participant in the conference displayed this kind of awareness.

Ethical Issues

Jonas F. Soltis (philosophy) and Louis M. Smith (educational psychology), with a constructive synthesis by Yvonna Lincoln, give the book its finest moments. Readers, not fully imbued with qualitative research, would be well advised to read this section first and then backtrack, as their interests suggest. Indeed, qualitative research has many ethical issues to resolve, just as all of education has many moral, ethical, legal, and administrative problems that must be solved before scholars or scientists can study, investigate, or research the nation's schools in a climate and environment that is conducive to credible and fair inquiry, analysis, and interpretation. Public schools have been tied in legal knots since the 1950s, and the lesson to be learned is that schools run by the courts are no more effective than those run by neighborly school boards who want the best for "our boys and girls."

Many readers will hope that Soltis was right when he wrote that education is a moral enterprise, and many will agree when he identifies the purpose of qualitative research as informing "our deep understanding of educational institutions and processes through interpretation and narrative description." OR, as he also writes, "...to adopt, create, and use a variety of nonquantitative research methods to describe the rich, interpersonal, social, and cultural contexts of education more fully than can quantitative research." Had Soltis controlled his prejudices toward quantitative methods, he could have given us the best definition in the book by not inserting the words "nonquantitative" and "more fully than quantitative research." With its problems, public education needs all the help it can get from any source that has the best interests of education at heart. The crucial factor is what others can contribute, not whether their methods are qualitative or quantitative.

Louis Smith, who has made contributions to education before-and-after qualitative-quantitative distinctions become obligatory, identifies several ethical issues that arose in the course of his work as an onsite consultant. At least one issue involved the possibility of being called as an expert witness for the school at which he was conducting confidential research. Had he been called, he may have found that ethical issues are secondary to legal issues in courtrooms. More than one researcher has found that research is "discoverable under the law"; that communication with litigants is, by no means, privileged; and that professional opinion may not be respected. Credibility as a witness is determined by the court. Thus, Smith's list of ethical issues contains other items that should be resolved as ethical issues before they become legal issues.

Yvonna Lincoln contributes more substantially to the conference papers than any other participant. She defines qualitative research as "not simply ... a set of findings that reflect nonnumerical ... data but ... a set of social processes characterized by fragile and temporary bonds between persons who are attempting to share their lives and create from that sharing a larger and wider understanding of the world." And she summarizes the "state of affairs" in qualitative research when she later writes:

> That is where we are now: struggling with a set of
> professional standards and values that belong to a prede-
> cessor paradigm, a separate ontological, epistemological,
> methodological, and exiological system that is rapidly
> being replaced by naturalistic inquiry. *(p. 290)*

Readers need not agree with her choice of words to understand
what she means.

A prominent contribution is the matrix of Soltis's purposes
of qualitative research (description, evaluation, intervention, and
social critique) and perspectives (personal, professional, and pub-
lic) she pulls together to "map potential ethical issues." It's true
that Soltis rejects her generous effort, saying that her "extrapola-
tion" of his attempt "to cast a coarse heuristic net into the ocean
of qualitative research ethics misconceives and misdirects (his)
project." But readers, who are inclined to visualization, will ap-
preciate Lincoln's diagram, one of the few in a wordy volume.

Lincoln contributes further by extracting from Smith's "first-
hand vignettes" a list of ethical issues (n=16) which she states
quite well. She believes the issues to be subtle and to occur as
"interaction effects of persons, contexts, times, and professional
principles."[6] More than a few readers will welcome Lincoln's
closing paragraphs about Kant's "categorical imperative" and
"practical imperative." In fact and principle, she has given good
advice to participant-observers in subcultures where "intellec-
tual curiosity" is not a dominant value. And at least one reader is
better informed as the result of Lincoln's footnote concerning
the difference between research subjects and respondents.

The Uses of Qualitative Research

The conference papers on uses are anti-climactic to the pa-
pers on ethics. Thomas Barone's (secondary education) uses of
qualitative inquiry are directed to literary texts and the literary
experiences of author and reader. Barone ponders the meaning
of use before deciding how he will "use the occasion" to discuss
"the narrative mode." His goal, apparently, is "to reorder the
totem pole of the qualitative research genre." In doing so, he
presumably would teach narratives as a "conspiracy" to create
new worlds that are both desirable and possible.

Christopher Clark's (educational psychology) participant-observer report on a classroom activity in which the children made applesauce is a case study, more or less, of what he and the students learned from the experience. Clark is definitely the most enthusiastic of all conference participants. He tells his readers what all teachers should know (but may not): students can and do learn from organized activities, and what they learn is relevant to the world in which they live. Clark's major emphasis, however, is on the product of his learning experience instead of the process. The report he wrote was distributed to colleagues, and he anticipates the report's widespread use and influence. Any writer of a textbook would warn Clark that his high expectations may not be realized.

Together the papers are representative of neither the best nor the worst in uses of qualitative inquiry, and critical readers should hope that the papers are not representative of "the typical, the common, and the ordinary" that is discussed in other papers. But whatever the papers might be representative of, that domain, area, or level of qualitative research is in the midst of a credibility crisis.

The implications of Barone's paper for educational research and the education of educators will not be clear to readers who are not members of some unspecified in-group. Clark's ingeniousness, as displayed in his paper, is difficult to reconcile with his years of experience in education. In either event, both writers are quite capable of writing "tongue-in-cheek" and getting away with it. Barone, in particular, is almost Faulknerian in his approach: if given the occasion to tell a story, it might as well be a whopper. Do the editors bite "hook, line, and sinker" when they suggest that novels may someday be accepted as PhD dissertations? A cynic might say, "it's been done for years — but not intentionally."

Miles and Huberman are eager respondents to the papers on uses. As critics, Miles and Huberman are squarely on target in their reactions to Barone's "unquestioned assumptions," but off base in their choice of jokes. They accuse him of monolithism and straw-manning; his attacks on "paradigmatic ways of knowing" should read logical positivist or realist ways of knowing, and his advocacy of a "narrative" epistemology (as the one true

way) should read idealist/phenomenological epistemology. Thus, they imply that Barone is careless in labeling the work of his adversaries, as well as his own work. Barone, in return, accuses Miles and Huberman of "unpacking his message" and, among other things, monolithism and straw-manning.

Miles and Huberman are more humane in criticizing Clark's paper, but nonetheless effective in their demolition of his "up-beat piece." But whatever Barone and Clark are writing about, they are not writing about the uses of educational research. However much Barone and Clark may trivialize their invited topics, and however Miles and Huberman may disparage or demolish the two "case studies" presented, the authors of pages 305-363 are not talking to, or writing for, or communicating with each other. It is possible, perhaps, that one or two are talking about educational research but the probability that all four are talking about educational research is painfully low. The most interest-ing aspect of Miles and Huberman's critique is the comfort they will give those threatened by qualitative research. There is no unity in the enemy's camp; qualitative researchers do not like each other any more than they like colleagues who are engaged in experimental design, statistical analysis, mathematical model-ing, or survey research.[7]

The Editors

In their introductions to the five parts of the book, and in their closing comments, Eisner and Peshkin, as editors are much too reassuring that the contributed papers serve the purposes intended. Given the subtitle of their edited volume, "The Con-tinuing Debate," critical readers may regard the papers on sub-jectivity and validity as a dismal failure and the papers on uses as a parody on muddled thinking. Glimpses of an enlightened debate might be found in the sections on ethics and generali-zability, but readers are entitled to more than the editors have given them.

A critical review of the conference or the book would raise many questions about the choice of participants. The editors do not tell us how their authors were chosen, and they give no indication that at least four or five unfortunate choices were

made. And yet, the editors are too quick to praise and they have
often praised authors when they could have graciously ignored
them. On occasion, the editors are careless in their choice of
terms such as, "in the best tradition of scholarship." If anything
is "conspicuous by its absence," it is the best traditions of schol-
arship. No historian is present in the book, and the best tradi-
tions of scholarship are not served exceedingly well by those
identified as philosophers.

Regrettably, the editors themselves are not above the fray.
Who is denigrating *whom* when they write about, "denigrators
who remain uncomfortable with a nonquantitative approach to
research?" And *who* is assuring *whom* when they ask rhetori-
cally, "In short, just how much idiosyncrasy is there in conven-
tional research? How much of it is replicable?"

In summary of Eisner and Peshkin's edited volume, it is not
unfair to ask if their contributors clarify the murky issues of
qualitative inquiry or if they throw more mud into the water? It
is charitable to ask if they have raised more questions than they
have answered? And it is necessary to ask how teachable are the
methods of qualitative inquiry, as discussed by Roman and
Apple, Grumet, Walcott, Donmoyer, Barone, and Clark? What
do the articles edited by Eisner and Peshkin contribute to our
collegial understanding of learning and teaching in schools and
colleges? More important than all of the preceding, what is be-
ing advocated by the authors and editors of this particular book?
What are the changes in educational policies and practices that
would follow from the papers by Phillips and everyone who
follows him?

Leadership

The relevance of "Leadership for the Twenty-First Century"
for the modern university and qualitative research is evident in
the many changes that have taken place in scholarly research
over the past twenty years. The faults of Rost's book on leader-
ship, foreshadowed in "The Idea of a Modern University," are a
singular expression of the confused thinking that overshadows
"Qualitative Inquiry in Education." The quality of reasoning
and the authoritarian tone in all three volumes gives no hint of

the "healthy" skepticism becoming scholars and their willing-
ness to suspend judgment until more can be learned about the
issue at hand. Rost states, in the preface, that his book "has
taken a long time to write" because of what has happened in his
mind and life, "the heart and soul of what is in the book." He
follows with a brief biographical sketch, in which he mentions
his schooling, his teaching experience, his (undergraduate) the-
sis on Japan and WWII, his master's thesis on Franklin D.
Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court, and his doctoral
dissertation on the merger of Wisconsin's two university sys-
tems. In 1976 he went to the University of San Diego where he
helped inaugurate a doctoral program in leadership and a master's
program in educational administration. He regards the inaugu-
ration of the doctoral program in leadership as "the most ex-
traordinary" experience in his life. He tells us all this to estab-
lish, no doubt, his credentials for writing his book.

The book itself is "a critique of the efforts of leadership
scholars and practitioners in the twentieth century to understand
leadership based on the values and cultural norms of the indus-
trial paradigm." The book is also "an effort to move our under-
standing of leadership forward, toward a postindustrial para-
digm that will take hold in the twenty-first century." Does he
mean that his book encompasses scholarship and practice in
leadership, thereby enabling our movement from an industrial
paradigm to a postindustrial paradigm?

Rost does indeed promise his readers much! He claims that
he has reviewed almost 600 books or articles published on lead-
ership since 1900, and he finds fault with all of them. No author,
in all those years, has defined leadership, to Rost's satisfaction,
and his conviction that definition is essential to inquiry is the
burr under his saddle. Rost and some of the contributors to
"Qualitative Inquiry" are amazingly similar in their eagerness to
find "the one best way" to truth, reality, or paradise. So much
that Rost would have been at home at the Stanford conference —
until he spoke, and then he would have been slaughtered by the
other participants. He would have been called a postpositivist,
causal realist, at best, and a dozen other unprintable names, at
worst.

As an ideologist looking for an adversary, Rost finds one in "mainstream behavioral scientists" who have adopted "the logical positivist framework of research," which requires, of course, "quantification for validity and replicability." Such adversaries give "a definition of whatever they are researching that allows the subject to be quantified even though they have no guarantee that the quantifiable definition actually describes the reality the researchers say they are studying." To avoid further diatribes of that kind, we should not ask to see Rost's guarantee that his nonquantifiable definition of leadership actually describes the reality he claims to study.

The irresponsible aspect of Rost's style of thinking and writing is a lack of concern about whom he insults. No less than "95 percent of the scholars ignore [their acknowledged lack of a clear understanding of what leadership is] . . . and write their book, chapter, or article as if they know what leadership is." Two paragraphs later, he lashes out at psychologists who do not have a clear definition of "the psyche, or the psychic." Does Rost know that no respectable psychologist would use such terms in 1993?

Rost deconstructs his own credibility before he can even begin to tell his readers what he believes leadership to be. He labels as myths and rituals: (1) any statement by a reputable scholar or practitioner that progress is being made in research, (2) the use of any tests, of any kind, for any purpose, (3) diagrams of two-dimensional models, (4) drawing systems-oriented figures with squares, rectangles, triangles, circles connected by arrows, (5) decision trees ritualizing how leaders should behave in certain circumstances, (6) producing movies, audio- and video-cassettes, workbooks, slides, transparencies, and computerized software to train people, (7) doing collaborative research (i.e., joint authorships), and (8) any focus on leadership styles as a way of making leadership meaningful. In short, there is no end, perhaps, to the methods and techniques that Rost scorns. In addition, he assures us that the reality (of leadership) is quite different and more complex.

Rost's assertions are made with great confidence. On page eleven, he writes, "Only a few of the authors who wrote the 312 books, chapters, and articles reviewed in this study made a significant contribution to our understanding of leadership, because

the large majority of them did not concentrate on the nature of leadership." What is the nature of leadership, we ask. In Chapter 5, "The Nature of Leadership," we should find our answer. There Rost gives us a postindustrial definition by asking, with the help of doctoral candidates in leadership studies, "What is (James MacGregor) Burns's *real* definition of leadership?" NOT his definition of transformational leadership, as so many think, but "Burns's *real* definition." After reading, rereading, discussing, and rediscussing (with his doctoral students) Burns's book, Rost defines leadership in terms of four essential elements:

> Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes. *(p. 102)*

In an extended definition which follows, Rost tells his readers that the influence relationship is multidirectional and the influence behaviors are noncoercive. He identifies leaders and followers as "the people in this relationship"; followers, of which there must be more than one, are active, and typically, he says, there is more than one leader in the relationship. By the intention of real change, Rost means that leaders and followers "purposefully desire certain changes"; real changes are those that are substantive and transforming. But change is apparently not necessary for "leadership to occur." The intention is "in the present" and changes "take place in the future." During the process, if process is what Rost is describing, leaders and followers develop mutual purposes that are "forged in the noncoercive influence relationship." The word "reflect" does not mean to "realize," and (in time?) mutual purposes become common purposes.

Since Rost's definition of leadership is the "heart and soul" of his book, his definition should be examined closely. In brief, it would appear that leadership "occurs" when "an influence relationship" includes "leaders and followers" who "intend real changes" and "develop mutual purposes." Leaders and followers thus are the entities (or actors), but leadership is a relationship which involves noncoercive influence, intention of substantive(?) change, and mutual purposes. Readers may wonder, therefore, if Rost has defined leadership or embedded it in the abstractions of a relationship which is not adequately defined.

After searching so diligently for his definition, defining leadership as an "influence relationship" with four essential elements, and discussing the "consistent, coherent, workable, and accurate model of leadership" he has "put together," what does Rost do with it? Does it meet his standard of a definition as usable by practitioners as well as by scholars? He tells us that if the definition is unusable in "the real world by people who live and work in that world, it is useless in any research that scholars might want to conduct to understand that world." Is the definition "usable in the here and now, giving the user the power to do an analysis of a particular phenomenon immediately after gathering data"? In other words, a critic might ask, can the readers take Rost's definition and do good qualitative research the next time leadership occurs?

Instead of answering such questions, Rost returns to the confusions of leadership and management, devoting a full chapter to contentions he has already dismissed. He is under some compulsion to define management as "an authority relationship," implying in the process that all managers and their subordinates produce and sell goods and/or services. The solution, as readers should know by the time they reach page 151, is to define "leader" and "manager" differently, as well as "follower" and "subordinate." After redefining management, a term corporate business might prefer to define, Rost defines(?) leadership and ethics in the 1990s. Here he succumbs to one of the rituals that he despises in other scholars and practitioners: he presents two continuums neatly intersecting equi-distantly from their extremes. One continuum is ethical process and the extremes are "ethical process" and "unethical process"; the other continuum is ethical content and the extremes are "ethical content" and "unethical content." Eventually, he turns to the future where a postindustrial paradigm and a postindustrial school of leadership will require postindustrial definitions, no doubt. Rost's editor is to blame, perhaps, for the waste of paper in the ethical process and content diagram, but he alone must accept responsibility for the lack of information in his categories of "ethical" and "nonethical."

To appreciate the usefulness of Rost's definition of leadership, it is well to summarize the steps he has taken in arriving at

his particular choice of words: (1) he has read what others have written on leadership, and he has taken notes; (2) he judges as unworthy the work of James MacGregor Burns and everyone else who has written on leadership — and summarily dismisses them all; (3) Rost convinces himself that inadequate definitions of leadership are responsible for the misguided efforts of theorists, researchers, and teachers over the past sixty years; (4) he then convinces himself that until a comprehensive definition of leadership is provided, the foolish mistakes of the past will continue, and (5) he convinces himself that he can provide such a definition. He reveals his definition of leadership on page 102 and discusses the "essential elements of leadership," as identified in his definition.

In reaching his definition of leadership, Rost cites no research of his own and he does not indicate how the research of others has been used in developing his thoughts and attitudes concerning leadership. He acknowledges the influence of James MacGregor Burns in his dedication but Burns' influence will not be obvious to readers. Indeed, Burns is castigated in the book as a uni-dimensional writer who misses altogether the holistic view of leadership that Rost promises his readers. In other words, he offers his vision of leadership as a promissory note that has no warranty, a note that cannot be redeemed in the immediate or distant future. Nowhere in his definition is there mention of the personal qualities of leaders (or followers), the situational demands and the conditions under which leaders interact with followers, or the influence of time and place (chance, luck, fortune). The influence of these variables have been studied and confirmed by numerous researchers. They need not be universal or constant components to be crucial determinants of the effectiveness of leadership. Each is indicative of the *realities* with which behavioral and social scientists must deal.

James MacGregor Burns, in his foreword, tells us that Rost is not polemical. The great majority of readers will disagree; Rost is polemical and the tone of his pronouncements is dogmatic from beginning to end. At no time is the soft voice of reasoning between colleagues heard in his writing. He speaks in harsh and strident words that would serve much better if delivered from a

political stump, a pulpit, or a judge's bench. He does not persuade or convince his readers; he berates them with his beliefs and opinions (in the name of scholarship). If his beliefs are firmly founded in scholarly studies, he should have let such studies speak more often.

His "premature" completion of the book permits him to refer several times to "the events of 1989-1990" but not the Persian Gulf War. In a postwar revision, would Rost say again that President George Bush's leadership was "playing the same role, as Ronald Reagan?" Would Rost dismiss Norman Schwarzkopf as "coercive" and praise Saddam Hussein for his "saviorlike essence in a world that constantly needs saving."? And if he had read the third edition of "Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership" (1990), would he continue to dismiss forty years of research by behavioral and social scientists who have provided much more than definitions?[8]

Rost closes his book with expressions of confidence in a new "school of leadership." In his reading, he had detected "in the background assumptions and in the meanings behind the words used in the definitions and models" the misconceptualization that leadership is good management. "I will call it the industrial paradigm of leadership," he writes, "and will discuss it in depth in upcoming chapters." Much later Rost castigates the language and methodology of the industrial paradigm as: rational, technocratic, linear, quantitative, and scientific. Can we infer that the language and methodology of Rost's "school of leadership" are: irrational, communitarian, circular, qualitative, and preliterate?

The Perils of Rhetorical Reasoning

The three volumes discussed in this paper display many faults that are common to discussions of the modern university, qualitative research, and leadership. The most common fault is an excessive reliance on rhetorical reasoning in addressing issues of major importance to education. To some extent, the interplay of logical and rhetorical reasoning can be seen in faculty discussions of "the modern university", but capitulation to rhetorical reasoning is much too evident in the other two volumes. In each volume, there is a misapprehension of research and

scholarship that reflects the "new canons of scholastic dialogue?", the self-serving assertions that take the place of deliberate inquiry, inductive reasoning, and the disciplined pursuit of understanding. The risks in this capitulation are quite evident in the volume by Rost, but qualitative research, as advocated in Eisner and Peshkin, puts the value and utility of scholarly research (and the university) in greater peril. Although there are appreciable differences in style and content between the faculty symposia of 1972 and 1988, their common faults are cause for alarm. Each is a discouraging display of faculty rhetoric, under the guise of addressing crucial issues in academe.

In brief, it is difficult to read the three volumes without concluding that: (1) the quality of scholarly thought and discussion is declining rapidly in American colleges and universities; (2) the idea of academic collegiality is shamefully dim; (3) and the image of the university is embarrassingly tarnished. The reasons are many but not impossible to identify: academic administrators, teaching faculties, and professional staffs have not bothered to learn what the purposes of higher education are, and they have not studied the history of their own institutions, academic disciplines, or professional specialties. Each group of well intentioned individuals have been too busy with their academic careers, and yet they are easily distracted by the clamor of the university's diverse constituencies who would use the university for the gratification of narrowly defined interests.

Other reasons quickly follow. One distinguished scholar,[9] who served as president of three different institutions, has written that the modern university's goals are excellence, prestige, and influence; in pursuit of these goals the university takes in all the money it can — and then spends all the money it gets. Another distinguished scholar,[10] "a quantitative researcher" with a dozen or more outstanding books to his credit, emphasizes that the university is overly concerned with its resources and its reputation. Resources are sought in order to enhance its reputation, and the enhancement of its reputation enables the university to take in more resources. A third scholar[11] who has studied the modern university, depicts in unflattering terms the university's immaturity in pursuing conflicting goals. He describes

many universities accurately as "hungry, captive, politicized, and deconstructed."

In such institutions faculty members are caught in an inverted vortex. When the university can raise sufficient funds, there will be special (or chaired) professorships, perhaps with an illustrious name attached. But to be eligible for the honors that only the university can bestow, faculty members must publish in journals that take pride in their limited readership and their high rejection rates. This means that the modern university has relinquished much of its right to establish scholarly standards to the editors and reviewers of refereed journals. If assistant professors can run the gauntlet of unknown reviewers and publish in journals on other campuses, their scholarly productivity will be properly documented. In such matters there is great irony, just as there was irony in what passed for "the best traditions of scholarship" in the conference on qualitative inquiry. Assistant professors, who could pick up promotion-and-tenure points by publishing (in a volume from Teachers College Press, for example) are seldom invited to conferences where publication of their papers are assured. In such ways they are caught up further in the pressures to publish — even gibberish, if it is in a journal that can be passed off as prestigious. The gist of "publish or perish" policies is a frantic effort by mediocre writers to publish where they can — and to hope that the frequency of publication will be tacitly equated with "qualitative writing."

In its continuing search for funds, the university is much too reluctant to say "No!" Contractual agreements between universities — and business corporations, or government agencies, or foundations — are increasingly necessary to meet the university's need for resources. If the irony of the university's search for resources (even to the extent of selling the names of its separate colleges) and the faculty members' search for publishing outlets (for the purpose of job security and advancement) can be appreciated, the decline in scholarly thought and discussion becomes more understandable. If universities and faculties would reduce some of their self-inflicted miseries, there would be less worry and concern about qualitative inquiry, scholarly publishing, research funding, and faculty productivity. And given more sensible

promotion and tenure policies, there would be much less inter-
est in the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative re-
search. Many faculty members would continue to publish (for
the rewards of scholarship and not for the benefits of job secu-
rity); more faculty members would show an interest in the im-
provement of undergraduate education and the quality of their
own instruction (if such were appropriately recognized); and the
worries of uptight universities would be lessened dramatically.
In all such matters, leadership is always essential.

The Perils of Educational Research

The ground swell of interest in qualitative research is not in
doubt. Many newcomers to faculty ranks need alternatives and
other options in gaining promotions, tenure, and salary increases.
Thus, there are many faculty members who need a more bal-
anced interpretation of qualitative research, as its methods and
procedures are applicable to their own fields of special*zation.
They need to know how they can use new and different meth-
ods of inquiry, analysis, interpretation, *and* explanation in meet-
ing their research interests and needs. They do not need the
acrimonious debates of pedants who cannot discuss objectively
the methods they use in their research and the means by which
they verify observations, findings, conclusions, and inferences.
The intellectual, cultural, and technological changes that com-
pound the difficulties of qualitative research are also important
in educational, institutional, and higher education research. Edu-
cational research, in general and in particular, has been sub-
jected to intense criticism for many years. It is perhaps fitting
that Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley's[12] "experimental and
quasi-experimental designs" have run their course. It is also
encouraging that survey research and field studies are no longer
the one recourse for educational researchers lacking funds and
analytic capabilities for experimental research. Further encour-
agement can be taken from: (1) recognition that analysis of vari-
ance and multiple regression models are part of a general (linear)
model, (2) the simmering down of evaluation research as a pro-
fessional specialty, and (3) the passage of grand theorists and
abstracted empiricists (C. Wright Mills' terms) at annual meetings

attended by educational researchers. It is nonetheless true that educational research, whatever its nature, is still dominated by methodological issues and does not come to grips with substantive issues, problems, and concerns (as mature researchers should). Too many educational studies are displays of methodological fireworks without yielding concepts, principles, or practices that are applicable in college and university classrooms. Despite years of methodological innovations, we are unable to specify *what* school children learn; even more important, we do not know *why* so many fail to learn.

For such reasons, it is especially unfortunate that ethnography, naturalistic inquiry, and/or qualitative research are mistaken for historiographic, developmental, comparative methods of inquiry and analysis that have served us well for years. It is inexcusable that qualitative research is regarded as antithetical to statistical, experimental, empirical methods of investigation and discovery. And it is pathetic when qualitative researchers anathematize statistical analysis and experimental design. There is no dialectic at work in educational research, no identifiable thesis and antithesis that will eventuate in a usable synthesis. There is an urgent need to reconcile many opposing points of view, but no hope can be expected from dialectical reasoning.

In all areas of academic research, scholarship, inquiry, analysis, interpretation, or explanation, there is needless self-justification in dealing with methodological issues. Within the diverse ranks of research, too many faculty members sound like frustrated assistant professors who are trying to convince a senior colleague that their methods of inquiry are sophisticated enough to warrant recognition and praise. Much to our regret, most research is viewed through the lenses of excessively narrow subspecialties and hyphenated disciplines. Give bright and energetic specialists an opportunity to study the institutional functions of universities, add current promotion and tenure policies, and each specialist will return with some small slice of the institution or its sociocultural context that will fit under his or her disciplinary microscope. Give them a sabbatical to become a generalist, remind them that they are on a tenure track, and they will return a methodologist. Assemble a diverse group of individuals interested in qualitative inquiry, as Eisner and Peshkin did, ask them

to address methodological issues such as subjectivity, validity, generalizability, ethics, and uses — and then do your best to make sense out of their idiosyncratic responses. To gain any informed appreciation of qualitative research, it is necessary to read separate bits and pieces that never quite fit together as any kind of a meaningful pattern.

To make substantive and significant contributions to the solution of educational problems, and to the resolution of complex policy issues, research findings, conclusions, and implications must be publicly verified in schools and colleges. All published research is a written reconstruction of inquiry, interpretation, analysis, and explanation — forms of objective and systematic reasoning that may begin in the privacy of individual minds but which must be communicated to others who can verify, understand, and use for teaching and learning purposes. Colleagues of comparable education and experience must be able to follow the researcher's trail and to attain comparable insights, perspectives, outcomes, results, and/or experiential evidence. In other words, educational research — qualitative or quantitative, nomothetic or idiosyncratic, general or specialized, advanced or technical — must be objective (in facilitating inter-observer agreement), systematic (in making its procedures explicit), valid and reliable (in the sense of being trustworthy and dependable), credible (in its published findings), and fair (as being relatively free of bias and prejudice).

Qualitative researchers, to make a substantial and significant contribution to the improvement of education, must help eliminate the most dubious of all dichotomies (qualitative versus quantitative) in research.[13] Whatever the relationship between the two forms or styles of research, the differences should be de-emphasized and their complementary features should be articulated in ways that permit better communication between the opposing factions. Both parties would be amazed at the great majority of researchers who occupy the middle ground. Surveys, polls, field studies, and various other studies involving observation, interviews, questionnaires, and letters of direct inquiry are seldom exclusive in their uses of quantitative or qualitative methods. Institutional research, policy studies, and many other studies proceed without concern for justifying their methods of

inquiry and analysis because their findings, conclusions, and implications are based on credible methods of inquiry and analysis. Policy recommendations, in particular, follow from the logical procedures employed and *not* from the dictates of a particular ideology. Thus, there remains an urgent need for: (1) research that is theory-based, and (2) research that is policy-related. And in all areas and levels of education, there is room for competent research whatever its preferred methods of credible inquiry and analysis. Credibility is based on much more than classification as basic or applied research and involving categorical (qualitative) or continuous (quantitative) data.

All forms of educational research, in their concern with change, should give more emphasis to continuity. Research findings and conclusions that do not build on the past are unlikely to be useful in the future. Researchers are not given *carte blanche* in creating their own world of students and schools to satisfy the whims of their intellectual curiosity. Schools and colleges have been a part of the educational researcher's "totality" for many, many years and they exist for reasons other than to serve as objects (or subjects) of research. Students are individuals with personal qualities, rights, and responsibilities (and "never as a means only", as Lincoln has reminded us); they will be students long after they were research subjects or respondents. Schools, colleges, and universities have traditions, customs, habits, and personalities of their own; these, too, must often be regarded as "ends unto themselves."

Without continuity in educational research, change will be too radical for public acceptance, societal approval, and enduring improvements. Without change in schools and colleges, continuity becomes unadaptive, inflexible, unaccommodating, and deadening. Under the canopies of social progress, cultural development, institutional improvement, academic freedom, or intellectual freedom, researchers should be encouraged to explore, investigate, measure, assess, or evaluate as their intellectual competencies and ethical maturity permit. They should do so, however, with full awareness that neither colleagues, state, nor society are obligated to accept, approve, and sustain idiosyncratic or ideological research that is incompetent, irresponsible, or counterproductive to education.

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Methodological Sophistication

The social sciences, in general, have long been criticized for their sophisticated discussions of concept and methods — and their lack of explanation. As a result, the findings of social and behavioral science, if credible, have often been dismissed with the reaction, "Of course, everyone knows that!" The same is true of educational research.

To many experienced educational researchers, advocates of new methods frequently are perceived as captives of "technique", as lacking in purpose and substantive outcomes, as undecided about uses and applications, and yet, very argumentative about the adoption of new "methodologies." All forms of educational research lack credibility when they are ideological in tone, excessively subjective, and inexcusably boring. To talk pedantically about paradigmatic shifts, to employ epistemological arguments in defense of methods, and to prattle needlessly about conceptual or theoretical frameworks, be they paradigms or models, is the surest way to lose educational audiences. In doing so, virtually all researchers will ignore the legal, social, economic, and political issues that have turned the public schools into ideological battlefields. When single-interest groups continuously make power plays in educational affairs, without regard for consequences (or in any way being accountable), it is inane to talk about qualitative or quantitative research as "a change agent." Indeed, all forms of objective and systematic inquiry are difficult under such conditions, and one of the realities of public school education is the bitter fact that a science of education is now impossible.

To join the community of academicians with research and scholarly interests in education, qualitative researchers must concede that many reservations about their methods, assumptions, and inferences are in order. Basic differences in thinking, working, writing styles do indeed interfere with the communication of advocates and adversaries in the 1990s. Qualitative research does have its naive advocates; much of the research is superficial, and too much of it is pretentious in the claims of new or innovative methods of inquiry. Some claims are hardly more than another way of talking about research (not conducting research).

As in other verbal habits, closed discussion with like-minded colleagues reinforces an ingroup feeling that leads to further closed discussions and eventually to closed minds.

The two most important questions about qualitative research are immediate and direct: (1) where is the evidence of its value, usefulness, and/or relevance? and (2) how teachable, how learnable are the "new canons" of scholarly inquiry that are so actively advocated without adequate demonstration? Qualitative researchers would be well advised to seek a higher level of methodological sophistication, one that is *not* too high off the ground, and one that is closer to the perceived realities of students, teachers, parents, school officials, and taxpayers. Should educational researchers, of any allegiance, fail to build on the research findings of those who have preceded them, they will succeed only in "re-inventing the wheel" or "discovering the obvious." And all educational researchers should ask periodically if their methods of inquiry and analysis disclose empirical facts and substantive findings that a competent journalist or investigative reporter would not find just as quickly?

In Conclusion

If the inferences in this paper are in order, they have many implications for the future of the modern university, educational research, and academic leadership. The purposes and functions of the university must be discussed in faculty forums, scholarly journals, and the news media with more intelligence than most of us have seen over the past thirty years. No "paradigmatic shift" is required for faculty to discuss more wisely and well the purposes of their institutions and programs, but empirical knowledge, analytical thought, and logical reasoning are mandatory. No new "school of leadership" is needed to ensure institutional effectiveness, but universities should give more attention to institutional leadership and they should accept more responsibility for the training and preparation of their own leaders.

The purposes and functions of universities, colleges, and schools are increasingly diverse. In serving their many constituencies, universities must cope with divisive forces that do *not* attest to the worn adage of "strength through diversity." Indeed,

the university's greatest need is not further diversity but more consensus in its various missions, goals, and objectives. To a perilous extent, the common purposes of educational institutions (at all levels) are obscured by their social, political, economic, and legal problems. In 1993 universities, in particular, are more politicized than they were in 1973. The divisiveness of campus politics precludes informed, deliberative, and constructive consideration of the university's many problems and issues. The number and size of the university's many constituencies preclude any satisfactory notion of faculty forums or councils that could address the issues.

Once again, there is irony in the university's remarkable research and technological capabilities — its problem-solving capabilities — and the means at its disposal for conflict resolution and consensus building. A challenge to the modern university, therefore, is to bring its commendable problem-solving capabilities to bear on the effective resolution of its numerous conflicts. In similar manner, research on the university's internal operations, procedures, and processes should be encouraged in every feasible way. If given suitable incentives and rewards, many faculty members would turn their research interests to the problems of the university. In doing so, they could produce far more substantive results, with added benefits to the university's effectiveness. Where there is reluctance to encourage research on "sensitive problems," there should be cooperative arrangements for faculty members in peer institutions to conduct such studies. In brief, given the pressures upon faculty to publish scholarly studies, why not encourage them to turn their scholarly methods of inquiry and analysis to some of the university's innumerable problems, issues, and concerns?

In educational research, all universities and faculties would benefit from less heated discussions about "methodologies." There is an obsession with methodology that does not serve the university's need for factual information and substantive knowledge that can be applied to the solution of problems. The "methodological skirmishes" seen in Eisner and Peshkin, and the rhetorical reasoning displayed in Rost and "The Modern University," contribute nothing to the solution of methodological problems.

Since the first clash between devotees of analysis of variance designs and multiple regression analysis, methodological issues have dominated educational research to the detriment of usable results and outcomes. And since the melee following the "Equal Opportunity Study" in 1966, many research findings, concerning schools, have been methodologically de-constructed. Given any opportunity to set aside their methodological antipathies and to conduct substantive studies on educational problems and issues, educational researchers (of all stripes) would be well advised to do so. Education is far more important than paradigms, models, and conceptual frameworks.

With respect to academic leadership, all institutions seeking presidents, vice presidents, and deans should be interested in the cost/effectiveness of their recruitment, selection, appointment, and reassignment procedures. The most important challenge, however, is to provide more effective inservice programs for academic administrators and to develop programs of continuing professional education that will be mutually beneficial to administrators and institutions. In brief, the education and development of administrative leaders is a responsibility that universities, in particular, and other educational institutions, in general, must accept in the 1990s. Administrative leadership is essential in all phases of the university's efforts to study its programs, services, and activities and to re-define its purposes and functions in a changing world.

Footnotes

[1]*The Idea of a Modern University*, edited by Sidney Hook, Paul Kurtz, and Miro Todorovich. (Prometheus Books, 1974); *Qualitative Inquiry in Education: The Continuing Debate*, edited by Elliot W. Eisner and Alan Peshkin. (Teachers College Press, 1990); *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century*, by Joseph C. Rost. (Praeger Publishers, 1991).

[2]Another reason for discussing these books collectively may be the recency with which I have written on each of these topics. See "Administrative Leadership in Higher Education" in *Higher*

Education: Handbook of Theory and Research, Vol. III, (Agathon Press, 1987, pp. 155-198); "The Possibilities and Actualities of Discipline Inquiry," (*Research in Higher Education*, 1991, 625-650); "The Idea of the University in the 21st Century," (*British Journal of Educational Studies*, 1993, 41(1), 26-45).

[3]Machlup, Fritz. *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*. (Princeton University Press, 1962).

[4]The editors would have been wise not to raise the question of objectivity versus subjectivity. All academic disciplines, sciences, and professional specialities have settled the matter, one way or the other, and neither objectivity or subjectivity is worthy of sworn allegiance. To most of us, the difference between the two is as obvious as the difference between itching and scratching. No hunter has ever seen his blue-tic hound itch, but he knows full well why blue-tic hounds scratch.

[5]Too many qualitative researchers speak glibly of continuums or dimensions and then deal with absolute categories which they reject. Would a qualitative researcher actually be interested in "degrees of differences?" For a more favorable reaction to Louis Smith's and Matthew B. Miles' work, see "Some Straight and Positive Thinking about Schools." *Contemporary Psychology*, 1972, 17(12), 658-660.

[6]Lincoln need not have apologized to qualitative researchers for using an adversary's terminology (i.e., interaction effects); but quantitative researchers will notice that she has referred to the sixteen ethical issues as "a dozen ethical issues."

[7]As a professional colleague who has learned much from Don Campbell and Lee Cronbach, I would never call them "major neopositivist methodologists." I would call them "brilliant."

[8]All readers, before accepting Rost's opinions, should at least skim several pages of the third edition of *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook*.

[9]Howard R. Bowen, *The Costs of Higher Education.* (Jossey-Bass, 1980).

[10]Alexander W. Astin, *The Unrealized Potential of American Higher Education,* Third Annual Louise McBee Lecture. (Institute of Higher Education, The University of Georgia, 1992).

[11]Paul K. Conkin, *The Mature but Anxious University: Hungry, Captive, Politicized, and Deconstructed,* Fourth Annual Louise McBee Lecture. (Institute of Higher Education, The University of Georgia, 1993).

[12]Campbell, Donald T. and Stanley, Julian C. *Experimental and Quasiexperimental Design for Research.* (Rand McNally, 1966).

[13]Judith Preissle Goetz and Margaret Diane LeCompte, *Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educational Research* (Academic Press, 1984) has been used frequently while reading Eisner and Peshkin's volume on "Qualitative Inquiry."

Purpose and Functions

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