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ABSTRACT

This document features writings and curriculum projects developed by teachers who traveled to Poland and Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1992 as members of a Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar. The following items are among those included: "Curriculum Project: Women and Work: A Global Perspective" (Joan K. Burton); "The Community College and Eastern Europe: Possibilities for Academic Exchanges" (Raymond V. Coleman); "The Architects of a New Era: Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and the Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe" (William M. Mahoney); and "The Impact of Political and Economic Systems on Spatial Organization and the Landscape: Poland and Czechoslovakia in Transition from Socialism to Democracy and a Market Economy" (Stephen W. Tweedie). (DB)

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**"Poland and Czecho-Slovakia in the 1990's:
Social, Political, and Economic Transformations"
Summer 1992**

Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminars Abroad Program
Administered by the
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Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar 1992
Poland and Czecho-Slovakia in the 1990's:
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Aug 9, 1992

Czech day-care workers could help in U.S. debate



ROGER BAKER

1 The reporter's question seemed honestly naive. "Why would you want to come all the way from the U.S. to visit a kindergarten in Bardejov?"

I don't think I have ever actually been interviewed by a

reporter before. I have answered a few questions but never had what I thought was an interview. I was glad to oblige Marta Mochnack because she is doing the same thing in Bardejov, Slovakia, for Oriana as I do in Ephraim, Utah, for the Desert News.

She met me at the kindergarten I was visiting along with 15 other academics who were studying in Czechoslovakia as summer Fulbright Scholars. She wanted to talk to a few of us because she was interested in what she thought was our strange choice of places to visit in the city of Bardejov.

The kindergarten was for children ages 2 through 5 and was probably more like a U.S. preschool or day-care facility. What made this one interesting is that it was underwritten by a major industry in the city. The industry sponsoring the facility used to be a state industry but had been privatized and had maintained the kindergarten for the children of employees. This is not unusual in Eastern European countries.

It was also interesting because it extended the concept of day care to include a more comprehensive program of health care and education for the children of parents employed in the crystal-cutting and shoe-manufacturing factories.

The scrubbed children met us with a song in front of the school. We saw the tidy and inviting play area, the individual cots in the rest area, the shiny kitchen where three meals a day were prepared, and the individual rooms for the children who may become sick.

3 an obvious question. I tried to explain that day care for children was an issue in the United States. I explained that there was pressure from many to encourage more businesses to provide child care as an employee benefit. There is also a question of government subsidy for day care for low income families. I mentioned that Sen. Orrin Hatch from Utah had been very active in this discussion. There were also professors of family life in our group who were experts on child care and were involved in child-care research.

My answers, however, are not the interesting part of the exchange. Her questions reveal concerns and possible misconceptions about child care in the U.S. These questions speak volumes about what she understands about us:

"Do American women work? The impression we get from American television and other sources is that American women are restricted to household duties and child raising."

(I gave another stumbling answer and told her to put this question to the women in our group.)

"I understand what you are saying but there must be some occupations not available to women because you did not adopt an equal rights law a few years ago."

(I tried another stumbling explanation.)

"If women do work as you say, then why doesn't business or government provide the child-care right they deserve to make the opportunity to work more than lip service?"

(The stumbling explanation to this included the concept of rights in the U.S. not necessarily including economic rights. I found that discussing "rights" and "freedom" was difficult. We mean different things. We talk about freedom to act. She seemed to talk about freedom from. She talked in terms of economic freedoms and I in terms of equal opportunity.)

2 The children's art that decorated the walls looked like the spontaneous art of children everywhere. The play store could have been in any U.S. kindergarten except for the writing on the items that were bought and sold by the children.

Most impressive was that there was a well-articulated curriculum that seemed appropriate for the ages and abilities of the children. This was not a child-care facility; it was a school with learning objectives and a gentle approach to meeting the needs of individual children. It was staffed by professionals who obviously loved the children they worked with. It was everything but the regimented facility that is often the image of an Eastern European kindergarten.

I think I fumbled my answer a bit because I was unprepared for

4 "Can women rise to the same level as men in U.S. industry?"

(This answer included the term "glass ceiling" which she seemed to really like.)

If I learned anything from the exchange it was that my assumptions about others can easily be wrong. I also learned the U.S. does not have claim to all the answers and that we can learn by talking with those who we often assume know less and are always less developed and behind the U.S. At least the child-care professionals of Czechoslovakia could help us add perspective to our child-care debate.

Roger G. Baker is associate professor of English/education at Snow College. Comments or questions about "Learning Matters" may be addressed to Dr. Roger Baker, English Department, Snow College, Ephraim, UT 84627.

Aug 16, '92

Why does the best in culture seem to thrive in adversity?



ROGER BAKER

I have never really understood what we mean when we talk about culture. Particularly difficult to understand is the idea of American culture. If it is what we seem to be exporting to Poland on CDs and TVs, we may all have questions.

The televisions in hotel rooms and store windows of Warsaw seemed to be stuck on MTV. There is no doubt that rock is a particularly American art form, but it is hard for someone like me from the past generation to understand the universal appeal. It was particularly hard to understand in Poland. It seemed out of context with another cultural world that I was seeing.

My first chance to see was a walk in one of the many parks of Warsaw. I bought an ice cream cone by pointing and pantomime and by saying the only Polish word I knew, *proszę* in return the vendor chose a flavor for me and taught me my second word, *dziękuję*. Now that I had please and thank you in my vocabulary I carried my *lody* (ice cream) through the park and looked.

I saw people reading to each other. Parents sat on park benches with children and read to them. I saw a young couple and tried to

guess what he might be reading to her. An old woman was reading to an older man. Three men on a park bench were exchanging parts of a newspaper with animated discussion that probably validated the Polish aphorism that two Poles will make for three opinions and four political parties.

There was a vendor at the park entrance with a cart of books and another with newspapers. There are 14 dailies now in Warsaw. They seem to go in and out of business quickly because of their sponsorship by particular political parties, the fact that they are not market sensitive in seeking an audience and the fact that journalists think more in terms of what they want to say rather than presenting analysis to a particular audience. The number of papers available in a small market may at least be evidence that someone reads.

I observed at the opera. This year is a celebration of Mozart, and "The Magic Flute" was sung in German. I followed the English libretto but noticed that the young teen or old pre-teen sitting next to me was humming along and obviously understanding the opera.

I tried to be polite at intermission, but he could only speak Polish and German, and I was an English speaker still working on please, thank you and ice cream.

The standing room area was mostly young people. They sat on the stage stairs and stood around the perimeter of the hall. Most didn't have librettos. I wondered if they understood. I also wondered

if they watched MTV.

Ilone Morzoi-Ogorek, a publisher, tried to explain. She said that Poland is writing a new definition of culture. In the past it seems that culture was difficult to censor. Plays and books made the points with biting clarity that couldn't be censored. Books were smuggled and clandestinely exchanged. Videos of American movie classics were smuggled into the country, and Voice of America spoke to the people with information and music. Now the artistic world is free and easily accessible.

"In the past there was no thought that literature may have some commercial value. This past literature and culture was part of a fight for the souls of the people. We found, however, that culture is not an instrument of ideology; it is an instrument of freedom."

"We used to think that it was the same in America. We used to believe that artists made films in America. Now I've seen 'Shining' and also learned what it means to 'go ahead, make my day,' and I'm not certain about American culture. I'm not certain about the future of culture in a Poland that imports from America.

"We used to import the best. Now we import blindly. The choice, if we have one, is narrower than when we were censored. The first Polish 'Playboy' will be published this month. It seems that the culture of the past was about politics. Now it is about money."

It is easy to agree with her that "Playboy" is about money and not of the people like "Solidarity Weekly," which was published in the '80s and was both censored and courageous. It is also easy to agree with her that the 14 dailies published now in Warsaw may be part

of the fight for votes and minds rather than for souls.

Now there is more confusion. I started not understanding American culture. Now I don't understand Polish culture either. Is "Playboy" the price society has to pay to freely enjoy Mozart? Perhaps most important is that there is now a choice in Poland.

Culture can be what Polish people choose. Neither literature nor junk must be clandestinely exchanged. Both are in the market now as they are in the United States. We can all hope the best will win by being the best and not by force of censorship or ideology. We can also wonder along with some of the people in Poland why it is that the best of the culture seemed to thrive more in adversity than with freedom.

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LEARNING MATTERS

E. Europe's pollution woes teach a valuable lesson



ROGER BAKER

One legacy of the socialist governments of Central Europe is that they deferred maintenance. These governments also failed to file environmental impact statements with the other inhabitants of the world. Now there is something for the rest of us to learn in places like the District of Most in Czechoslovakia. This data is from the Regional Environmental Center Litvinov:

"The median life expectancy in Czechoslovakia dropped from 10th place to 27th place among European countries in the period from 1964 to 1984. In 1989 median life expectancy in the District of Most was 65.41 years for men and 73.30 years for women. In the neighboring West Germany it was 71.5 for men and 78.1 for women. In Sweden the life expectancy during the same time was 74 for men and 80 for women."

Environmental concerns may not account for all of the difference in life expectancy figures. On the other hand, seeing the area could cause one to wonder why the figures are not even more dramatic.

Eyes and throat are irritated in the first few minutes. A full day seems too long to spend there — even if you are not there during the typical winter inversions that trap the murk in the valley. Consequently, the murk settles into the lungs of the rural farmers, whose land has been pillaged for its soft coal.

One legacy of the socialist governments of Central Europe is that they deferred maintenance. These governments also failed to file environmental impact statements with the other inhabitants of the world. Now there is something for the rest of us to learn in places like the District of Most in Czechoslovakia. This data is from the Regional Environmental Center Litvinov:

the country.

It isn't necessary for the worker or fisherman who must make a living to know that surface mining in Most consumes 20 percent of the energy extracted. Transporting the coal to nearby power plants consumes 30 percent of the energy extracted. Some of the power plants are only 45 percent efficient. It all adds up to one of the most environmentally damaged areas in the world.

Perhaps there are two possible answers to the economic and environmental problems of central and Eastern Europe. These were suggested by Dr. Miroslaw Grochowski, deputy director of the European Institute for Regional and Local Development at the University of Warsaw. He said there was a normal solution and a miracle solution. The normal solution would be for angels to come from heaven. The miracle would be for the people of the world to work together.

There does seem to be some agreement on the causes of the problem. This agreement came from Polish officials and from Petr Pakosta, of the Regional Environmental Center Litvinov in the Most District of Czechoslovakia. "We have acted like we are the center of the universe."

It may be difficult for an American to imagine that any country but the United States would think itself the center of the universe or even the center of the world for that matter. It may also be difficult to accept the expert analysis and agree that this is the problem.

Certainly those who believe that everything they see is just for them will be less inclined to consider the effect of strip mining and the burning of soft coal on the global ecosystem and on real people that live miles away.

Why would someone want to live in an area where even on good winter days you still can't see across the valley because of pollution? It can't be the \$80 a year bonus that the government pays each resident. This stipend doesn't pay for the dangers of respiratory illness in children. It doesn't even pay for the inconvenience of wearing masks that may — or may not be enough to protect against the environmental mess. It certainly doesn't pay for the 15 fewer years of life for the man who must work to sustain life.

The strip mining leaves more than scars on the landscape. According to photographer Ibra Ibrahimovic, it scars the very souls of those who must make a living in the region that burns the high sulphur coal on site to generate 85 percent of the power for the country.

"Yesterday I photographed a fisherman catching a rare fish at a lake just behind the chemical plant. He told me he was catching (fish) here two years already but he was afraid to eat them. The unpleasant odor of petroleum fumes blew over us, but this can't be seen in the photograph."

This sacrifice supplies 65 percent of the total energy needs of

Pakosta wants to help educate the people of the world. He says that the world is welcome in Most and at the scheduled international center of applied studies at the Jezeri castle. Perhaps if a few see the effects of a government and industrial policy where "the plan is more important than human activity," we can all learn to become more environmentally sensitive.

Perhaps it is only for the unlucky or wealthy to visit Most and sit around a big table and abhor. Perhaps only those who have been there will recognize that the damage done there is possible in other places that believe they are the center of the world. If pictures can help educate, they are available as a video, "Top Guns and Toxic Whales." The address is Central Independent Television PLC, 46 Charlotte St. London W1P 1LX or Bond Street Birmingham, England, B1 2JP.

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LEARNING MATTERS

Poles shine real light on wit, humor



ROGER BAKER

I don't like humor that is at the expense of others. I have tried to gently stop people in the middle of ethnic jokes, and I object when my kids bring the stories home. The effect of this humor is to unfairly stereotype people. Ethnic characteristics become exaggerated character traits that are unfairly applied to a group of people despite individual differences. People who are the brunt of his humor become characters in our minds instead of people.

Why would I tell such a joke? Why, when I have self-righteously chided others for ethnic humor with an offensive funnier than thou attitude, would I think that it was funny to make a stupid joke when people asked what I planned to do as Fulbright scholar in Poland. "I plan to do the definitive light bulb study. How many does it

really take to . . ." I even repeated this in different groups as a cute response to a serious question. No one chided my answer, or I would have stopped in embarrassment.

I don't know how the jokes got started, blondes, the Irish, Poles (the term itself is pejorative), aggies, Jews. I even assumed that some of this negative humor had been corporately institutionalized when I bought a Hewlett Packard calculator a couple decades ago that boasted RPN, reverse Polish notation. When I discovered that I had to calculate mathematical expressions on the calculator in an order that seemed awkward, I assumed that the reverse Polish logic of the calculator simply meant that I had to calculate backward like some dumb calculator inventor of a certain cultural background.

The truth is that writing a mathematical expression with the operator before the operand, like $+ 3 5$, is called prefix notation. Because it was invented by the Polish logician Lukasiewicz, it is also called Polish notation. When the

operator is between the operand ($3 + 5$) it is called infix notation. Placing the operator after ($3 5 +$) is called postfix notation and is just the reverse of prefix, or Polish, notation. It is often called reverse Polish notation or RPN. It is also the way modern computers operate.

I discovered in Poland that Polish humor is often political. Rather than stereotyping unfairly it bites with a venom not possible in humorless discourse. It capitalizes on a proudly admitted Polish characteristic, animated political discourse characterized in the adage: two Poles mean three opinions and four political parties.

Perhaps an example would help, even though timing is everything in humor and next to impossible for me at my typewriter:

A Polish fisherman found a shell on the beach. Cleaning the shell liberated the spirit of the shell, which granted the fisherman three wishes. The fisherman wished for Poland to be invaded by the Chinese, and waves of Chinese rav-

aged the land. For his second wish the fisherman wished for an invasion of Poland by the Chinese. It happened as he wished. For his third wish he asked that his beloved land of Poland be invaded by the Chinese. His wish was granted.

The spirit of the shell was confused. "I have granted the three wishes as I promised, but you wished for the same thing three times. Why would you want three invasions from the Chinese?"

"To invade Poland three times they would have to march across Russia six times."

Perhaps the political nature of this humor is better understood when I try to appreciate what the Polish guide was really saying when he noted that the tallest

building in Warsaw is the Palace of Science and Culture built by the Russians. The best view of Warsaw, according to most residents, is from the top of that building because from there you can't see the building.

It may be that when we consider Polish humor, we forget Nicolaus Copernicus (the Earth is not the center of the universe), Frederic Chopin, Ignacy Jan Paderewski and Arthur Rubinstein (music for the soul), Marie Curie (recipient of two Nobel Prizes) and Casimir Funk (discoverer of vitamins). There are Nobel Prize winners for literature, Henryk Sienkiewicz (member "Quo Vadis?") and Wladyslaw Reymont ("The Peasants"). Isaac Bashevis Singer was a

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Nobel Prize winner in 1978 and poet Czeslaw Milosz in 1980. The Nobel Peace Prize of Lech Walesa is appropriately displayed in a museum by the Black Madonna, patron saint of Poland.

After being called up short for humor in poor taste, it may be that I should change the question and ask how many American Fulbright Scholars it takes to change a light bulb. It only takes one to enlighten himself, if he avoids ethnic humor and keeps an open mind while studying in Poland.

Roger G. Baker is associate professor of English, Education at English College, Springfield, or occasionally about "Learning Matters" may be addressed to Roger Baker, English Department, Snow College, P.O. Box 84627, Richfield, UT 84627.

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WOMEN AND WORK: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

A course that analyzes the working conditions and work experiences of employed women in the United States and in countries undergoing a transition from command to market economies, focusing on Poland

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Final Project Report for 1992 Fulbright-Hays Seminars Abroad
Program: "Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s: Social,
Political, and Economic Transformations"

INTRODUCTION

In my proposal to the Fulbright Commission, I stated that I would use what knowledge I gained from participating in the Summer Seminar in Poland and Czechoslovakia as the basis for developing new courses and revising existing courses in ways that would foster Goucher's goal of internationalizing its curriculum. My original plan was to begin by restructuring the social movements course and shifting its focus from the American civil rights, women's, and student movements of the sixties to the recent political protest and social changes in Eastern Europe. I have begun to develop a bibliography for the new course. However, most of my attention since returning from the seminar, has been devoted to a "complete overhaul" of my Women and Work class, which I am teaching this fall.

As the seminar progressed, I became increasingly interested in the fact that little was being said about how the transition from a command to a market economy might influence the lives of employed women and their families. When questions were asked about women's issues and, in particular, whether the "shock therapy" approach to transforming the economy would reduce the availability of services required by working women (affordable day care, etc.), the most frequently expressed attitude seemed to be "there are no women's issues; women are like anyone else." Lecturers, tour guides, guests at receptions seemed surprised at being asked such questions and some responded with scorn. For example, when asked to comment on a feminist historian's claim that women throughout the former Soviet bloc were losing resources (educational opportunities, maternity benefits) during the transition, two seminar lecturers simultaneously remarked "That's rubbish!"

On the other hand, I acquired a copy of a recent paper describing the current situation of Polish women that documented some of the difficulties faced by women employed in the paid labor force: an average salary about 30% lower than that of men with comparable education and skills; much lower representation than men in managerial and government positions at the middle-level of the hierarchy; very few, if any, women in the highest level positions in any occupation ("the glass ceiling" described in western literature on women and work). As the author noted, women in the most economically advanced nations also face these problems. Women in former Soviet bloc countries like Poland, however, are increasingly likely to experience high levels of unemployment combined with steadily decreasing occupational opportunities and a high incidence of poverty, especially in single-parent families headed by women (see Moghadam, 1992; Wesolowska, 1992; Sokolowska, 1977 and 1981; and Regulska, 1992 in the attached course syllabus, "Part II: Women and Work in Central Europe").

In part, the disadvantaged position of employed women is a legacy of the communist system, which promised much more than it provided in the way of equal rights for women. In Poland, the strength of

the Catholic church, which promotes the acceptance of traditional sex-role stereotypes emphasizing a woman's commitment to family and motherhood, further diminishes the likelihood of gender equality in the world of work. However, the early steps toward a market economy show signs of exacerbating the problems women face by emphasizing a rapid economic transition at all costs. I came away from the seminar wondering if "capitalism with a human face" is a realistic possibility, especially for the women in the former Soviet bloc countries.

I decided to organize my project in a way that allowed me to pursue the questions about women that the seminar participants did not address. Through library research, I have compiled resources on women and work in Poland which will form the basis for a four to five week segment in my course on "Women and Work: A Global Perspective." The syllabus, which describes the course and lists the readings, is attached.

Time constraints prevented me from significantly revising any other courses prior to submitting this report. However, the visits to Auschwitz, Birkenau, Theresienstadt, and the former Jewish ghettos in Warsaw and Krakow had such a powerful effect on me that I have added a section on the Holocaust to my introductory social psychology course this fall. Assignments include Elie Weisel's Night, sections of Primo Levi's Survival at Auschwitz, the film "Night and Fog," and slides of Auschwitz. After meeting with me in small groups to discuss the issues raised by these assignments, students will write a five page paper discussing how the social psychological concepts we have studied throughout the semester can help us understand the significance of the Holocaust. In the future, I hope to extend this project and develop courses on genocide and on nationalism and ethnicity. I have attached a partial bibliography on these topics--the product of my efforts to date.

In closing, I would like to thank the Fulbright Program for the opportunity to spend five weeks studying the social, economic, and political transformations occurring in Poland and Czechoslovakia. A brochure I received recently describes the benefits of participating in a Fulbright Scholar Program as follows:

- * take on a new academic challenge
- * engage in public service
- * view world events from a new vantage point
- * establish long-lasting working relationships and friendships
- * experience the satisfaction of initiating new ideas and programs that mold the future
- * enhance your teaching as you explore new methods and techniques

I began to experience these benefits during the first days of the seminar and I expect them to continue indefinitely.

GOUCHER COLLEGE
SOCIOLOGY 274
WOMEN AND WORK: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

First Semester, 1992
MWF 2:30-3:20

Joan K. Burton, Ext. 6226
VM137, Office Hrs. TuTh
1:00-2:30 or by appointment

Description of Course:

This is a course in the making. Originally, it was titled Women and the American Economy and analyzed the work and family lives of women working in the paid labor force in the United States. Given Goucher's increasing interest in internationalizing the curriculum and my opportunity to spend five weeks this summer in Poland and Czecho-slovakia, I shifted the emphasis to a global perspective on women and work.

Although the content is now international in scope, the theories and concepts used to explore women's work experiences remain basically the same. As you will see, wherever women enter the paid labor force, whether it be in countries enjoying advanced economic development, those undergoing a transformation from command to market economies, or the newly industrializing countries, they face pay inequities, occupational segregation, and a range of problems associated with combining paid work outside the home with family responsibilities. The tendency to view employed women in negative terms is also widespread and resistant to change--even in countries and among populations of people that proclaim a commitment to equality for all, regardless of gender.

We begin the course by exploring the past and present working conditions and experiences of employed women in the United States, followed by a similar analysis of working women in Poland. Because the work women do outside the home is closely linked with their participation in other areas of life, we will look at the link between women's work and their roles and statuses in other institutions, especially the family, but, where relevant, religious, educational, and political organizations as well. Our purpose is twofold: (1) to identify the specific issues relevant to women who work in the paid labor force; and (2) to become familiar with the concepts, theories, and methods used by social scientists to analyze these issues. When we explore women and work in Poland, we will study the influence of both the communist legacy and the transition to a market economy on the work and family lives of women.

In November, we will hold a mini-conference devoted to student reports on the current situation faced by working women in selected countries in the first world (economically advanced), second world (command economies currently under transition to market economies),

and third world (newly industrializing or underdeveloped economies). During this segment of the course, Dr. Hoda Ragheb Awad, the Fulbright Scholar in Residence at Goucher, will discuss women in the Middle East.

Texts and Readings:

I could not find any texts that covered the topic of women and work in the way I was developing the course. Consequently, I have xeroxed the core reading assignments and will distribute them during the first week of classes (at a cost cheaper than most texts). All assigned readings from this packet are listed below under ASSIGNED READINGS as are assigned readings on desk reserve in the library. All other articles and books listed below are either background readings (not specifically assigned to all students) or related to research for your term project. Some of these are on reserve; others are to be found in Goucher's, Loyola's, or Hopkins' libraries.

Course Requirements:

1. Essays = 40% of grade.

In lieu of a midterm and final, I am asking you to answer six essay questions, spaced every few weeks throughout the course. This allows you to respond to the readings shortly after completing them and allows me an opportunity to monitor your progress on a regular basis. Three essays (to be identified during the semester) will be one typed, single-spaced page, each worth 5% of grade; three will be two typed, single-spaced pages, each worth 10% of grade.

2. Class Participation = 20% of grade

Since much of our class activity will involve discussing questions and issues raised by the readings, you will be responsible for examining the assigned material and reflecting on it before the appropriate class. In preparation for our discussions, you should ask yourself the following questions: how does the reading relate to the topic under discussion; what seem to be the main issues at stake; what are the author's underlying assumptions, what is the nature of the evidence, how convincing or credible is the argument?

Note: Attendance is also required at all films and class discussions of films. If you must miss either, you should notify me in advance, if possible, and make arrangements to make up this assignment.

3. Term Project = 40% of grade

During the first two weeks of the semester, I will assign you to a small group (3-4), which will spend the semester doing library

research on the working conditions of women in one of the following areas of the world: Western Europe, Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, Middle East, Far East, Latin America, Africa. Groups will meet with me during the second week to decide which countries individual members will study. I will provide references to get you started and help you devise a schedule for further group meetings, which should continue on a regular basis throughout the semester, to share information and ideas relevant to women in their region.

You should view yourselves as part of a team trying to learn more about working women throughout the world. As you research your own country, if you come across anything relevant to others in the class, make note of it and pass this information on. I will be available to meet with the groups periodically throughout the semester. About mid-semester, each group will summarize for the class what they have learned to date. This should be an opportunity for seeking advice, clarifying ideas, and sharing information.

During our mini-conference on "Women and Work: A Global Perspective" each of you will present your own findings. I also expect you to have worked closely enough with the others in your group to comment on their findings as well. Your presentations should resemble a panel on your region. Other students "from" other regions should be prepared to ask intelligent questions of each panel. Your grade on the oral presentation will reflect your participation in the entire conference. If you like, we can include a closing day and invite other interested students and women's studies professors to hear what we have learned.

A draft of your final paper and a set of summary notes to be used for oral presentation is due the class meeting before your presentation. The final version of your paper (20 pages, typed and double-spaced) is due on last day of class or one week after your presentation, depending on when you give your presentation.

Participation in meetings throughout the semester to discuss progress of paper, progress reports, and participation in conference is worth 15% of grade. Paper is worth 25% of grade.

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| Summary: Essays | =40% |
| Class Participation | =20% |
| Mini-conference, etc. | =15% |
| Paper | =25% |

4. Exceptions to exam dates or to dates for oral reports and deadline for handing in written portion of term project will be made only in cases of illness, death in the immediate family, or similar catastrophes. There will be no "extra credit" assignments. If you feel a need to raise your grade, you should devote additional time to class assignments.

5. Plagiarism Policy

Writing assignments must be prepared by each student in accordance with the Goucher College Honor Code.

6. My office hours will generally be 1:00 to 2:30 on Tu/Th and by appointment.

ASSIGNED READINGS:

PART I: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Snapshots from the Past

(1) Giele, Janet Zollinger. 1978. "United States: A Prolonged Search for Equal Rights," Pp. 301-315 in Women: Roles and Statuses in Eight Countries. Edited by Janet Zollinger Giele and Audrey Smock. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

(2) Richardson, Dorothy. 1972. "The Longest Day," Pp. v-303 in Women at Work. Edited by William O'Neill. Chicago: Quadangle Books.

B. An Overview of Women's Present Working Conditions

(3) England, Paula and Lori McCreary. 1987. "Gender Inequality in Paid Employment," Pp. 286-301 in Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of Social Science Research. Edited by Beth B. Hess and Myra Marx Ferree. Newbury Park: Sage.

(4) Ferree, Myra Marx. 1983(?). "She Works Hard for a Living: Gender and Class on the Job," Pp. 322-347 in Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of Social Science Research. Edited by Beth B. Hess and Myra Marx Ferree. Newbury Park: Sage.

(5) Ries Paula and Anne J. Stone. 1992. The American Woman 1992-1993: A Status Report. New York: Norton. Read the following pgs: 28-36, 306-307, 324-25, 332-37, 340-43, 350-51, 354-57, 362-67, 384-87.

(6) Kanter, Rosabeth. 1987. "Performance Pressures: Life in the Limelight," Pp. 70-89 in Competition: A Feminist Taboo? New York: The Feminist Press.

(7) Kaplan, Elaine Bell. 1987. "'I Don't Do No Windows': Competition Between the Domestic Worker and the Housewife," Pp. 92-105 in Competition: A Feminist Taboo? New York: The Feminist Press.

(8) Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Secretaries," Pp. 69-103 in Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic.

Each student should select a chapter from one of the following to report on in class (On reserve in library or in stacks):

(9) Gluck, Shema Berger. 1987. Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, The War, and Social Change. Boston: Twayne Publishers.

(10) Schroedel, Jean R. 1985. Alone in a Crowd: Women in Trades Tell Their Story. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

(11) Lorber, Judith. 1984. Women Physicians: Careers, Status, and Power. New York: Tavistock

(12) Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs. 1983. Women in Law. New York: Anchor.

(13) McIlwee, Judith S. and J. Gregg Robinson. 1992. Women in Engineering: Gender, Power, and Workplace Culture. Ithaca: State University of New York Press.

If you wish, you may substitute your own source on women working in either blue collar or professional occupations.

PART II - WOMEN AND WORK IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- FOCUSING ON POLAND AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

(14) Anderson, Bonnie S. and Judith P. Zinsser. 1988. "Continuity and Change: Women in World War II and After," Pp. 321-329 in A History of Their Own: Women in Europe from Prehistory to the Present. New York: Harper & Row.

(15) Meyer, Alfred G. 1985. "Feminism, Socialism, and Nationalism in Eastern Europe," Pp. 14-30 in Women, State, and Party in Eastern Europe. Durham: Duke University Press.

(16) Sokolowska, Magdalena. 1977. "Poland: Women's Experience Under Socialism," Pp. 349-381 in Women: Roles and Statuses in Eight Countries, edited by Janet Zollinger Giele and Audrey Smock. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

(17) Sokolowska, Magdalena. 1981. "Women in Decision-Making Elites: The Case of Poland," Pp. 90-114 in Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites, edited by Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and Rose Laub Coser. Boston: George Allen & Unwin.

(18) Titkow, Anna. 1984. "Poland: Let's Pull Down the Bastilles Before They Are Built," Pp. 560-566 in Sisterhood is Global edited by Robin Morgan. Garden City, New York: Anchor.

(19) Regulska, Joanna (with the assistance of Agnieszka Gerwel). 1992. "Women and Power in Poland: Hopes or Reality?" Pp. 175-191 in Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

(20) du Pressy Gray, Francine. 1989. "Going Home," Pp.199-208 in Soviet Women: Walking the Tightrope. New York: Doubleday.

(21) du Pressy Gray, Francine. 1989. "Family and Work: Turning the Clock Back: Perestroika," Pp. 181-197 in Soviet Women: Walking the Tightrope. New York: Doubleday.

(22) Drakulic, Slavenka. 1992. "On Doing Laundry," Pp. 43-54 in How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed. New York: W. W. Norton.

ON RESERVE IN LIBRARY: (Assigned selections from the following readings are listed in course outline below; others are for your information as background material or related to your paper)

(23) Wolchik, Sharon L. 1981. "Eastern Europe," Pp. 252-277 in The Politics of The Second Electorate: Women and Public Participation. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

(24) Heitlinger, Alena. 1980. "Marxism, Feminism, and Sex Equality," Pp. 9-20 in Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union edited by Tova Yedlin. New York: Praeger.

(25) Adamski, Wladyslaw W. 1980. "Women in Contemporary Poland: Their Social and Occupational Position and Attitudes Toward Work," Pp. 212-25 in Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union edited by Tova Yedlin. New York: Praeger.

(26) Mazur, D. Peter. 1980. "Procreation and New Definitions in the Role of Women in a Soviet Bloc Country: The Case of Poland," Pp. 226-238 in Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union edited by Tova Yedlin. New York: Praeger.

(27) Schwartz, Janet. 1979. "Women under Socialism." Social Forces 58 (September): 67-88.

(28) Moghadam, Val. 1992. "Gender and Restructuring in the Third World and in Eastern Europe." Paper presented at the 87th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 20-24, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

(29) Weslowska, Ewa. 1992. "On Current Situation of Polish Women." Unpublished Paper.

Additional Resources on Central Europe:

(30) Bohlen, Celestine (1990, Nov. 25). "East Europe's Women." New York Times, 4:1.

(32) Kahne, Hilda and Janet Z. Giele (editors). 1992. Women's Work and Women's Lives: The Continuing Struggle Worldwide. (Chp. on

Poland). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

(33) Millard, Frances. 1992. "Social Policy in Poland," Pp. 118-143 in Bob Deacon (Editor), The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present and Future. Newbury Park: Sage.

PART III - WOMEN AND WORK AROUND THE WORLD: A MINI-CONFERENCE

(34) Smock, Audrey Chapman and Nadia Haggag Youssef. 1977. "Egypt: From Seclusion to Limited Participation," Pp. 35-79 in Women: Roles and Status Eight Countries, edited by Janet Zollinger Giele and Audrey Chapman Smock. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

(35) Zuhur, Sherifa. 1992. Revealing Reveiling: Islamist Gender Ideology in Contemporary Egypt. Ithaca, NY: State University of New York Press.

TENTATIVE COURSE OUTLINE: Includes dates of reading assignments and dates essay questions are distributed and due. Numbers in parentheses refer to the list of assigned readings above.

THE UNITED STATES:

- Sept. 2-14 Women's Work in the Trades and Factories -
Early 1900s
- 9-2: Giele (1)
 9-4: FILM: WOMEN OF SUMMER, begin Richardson
 9-7 to 11: Finish Richardson (2)
- Sept. 11 ESSAY QUESTION ON RICHARDSON DISTRIBUTED
- Sept. 14 ESSAY QUESTION DUE
FILM: ROSIE THE RIVETER
- Sept. 16-21 Analyzing Work and Gender Inequality'
Concepts, Theories and Methods
9-16: England and McCreary (3)
9-18: Ferree (4)
9-21: Ries and Stone (5) (Note: each student will
be assigned a segment of this reading to report on
in class)
- Sept. 21 ESSAY QUESTION ON THEORIES AND METHODS
DISTRIBUTED; DUE SEPT. 25
- Sept. 23-25 Women's Work at the Top and Bottom of the
Occupational Hierarchy
9-23: Kanter on Managers (6)

- 9-25: Kaplan on Domestic Work (7)
- Sept. 28-Oct.2 Clerical Work: The Woman's Domain
 9-28: FILM: GOOD MONDAY MORNING
 9-30: Kanter on Secretaries (8)
- Sept. 25 ESSAY QUESTION DUE
- Sept. 30 ESSAY QUESTION ON WOMEN'S OCCUPATIONS DISTRIBUTED
 10-2: Reports on women in blue collar work and the professions based on selected readings (see 9-13 in assigned readings above)
- Oct. 5 ESSAY QUESTION DUE
- CENTRAL EUROPE:
- Oct. 7-14 The Communist Legacy
 10-7 Anderson and Zinser (14)
 10-9 Schwartz (27) (on reserve)
 10-12 Meyer (15)
- 10-14 Discussion of progress on term projects
- 10-14 ESSAY QUESTION ON THE COMMUNIST LEGACY DISTRIBUTED
 DUE OCT. 23
- Note: Students who must miss these classes due to Yom Kippur should make arrangements to meet with me as a group to discuss these readings.
- Oct. 16-19 FALL BREAK
- Oct.21-Nov.2 The Case of Poland
 10-21 to 10-23: Sokolowska in Giele and Smock (16)
- Oct. 23 ESSAY QUESTION DUE
 10-26: Sokolowska in Epstein and Coser (17)
 10-28: Titkow (18)
 10-30 to 11-2: Regulska (19)
- Nov. 2 ESSAY QUESTION ON WOMEN AND WORK IN POLAND
 DISTRIBUTED; DUE NOV. 9
- Nov. 4-11 The Transition From Command to Market Economies:
 Its Influence on Women
 11-4 du Pressy Gray (20)
 11-6 Drakulic (21)
 11-9 du Pressy Gray (22)

- Nov. 9 ESSAY QUESTION DUE; ESSAY QUESTION ON THE
TRANSITION DISTRIBUTED; DUE NOV. 16
- 11-11 Lecture on Mogdan's (28) and Weslowska's
(29) papers (on reserve for your information but
not assigned)
- Nov. 13 FILM: SPEAKING OF NAIROBI (International Women's
Conference - 1985)
- Nov. 16-Dec.9 MINI-CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND WORK: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, EMPASIS IS ON WOMEN IN THE SECOND AND
THIRD WORLDS (see definition in course
description)

DRAFTS OF PAPERS AND ONE-PAGE SUMMARIES ARE DUE THE CLASS DAY
BEFORE YOUR PRESENTATION. YOU SHOULD MAKE ENOUGH COPIES OF ONE
PAGE SUMMARIES TO DISTRIBUTE TO THE CLASS

- Nov. 16-18: Presentation by Dr. Hoda Ragheb Awad,
Professor of Economics and Political Science at
the American University in Cairo, Fulbright
Scholar in Residence at Goucher; Read Smock and
Youssef (34) (on reserve)
- Nov. 20-23: Student Papers
- Nov. 25-27: Thanksgiving Vacation
- Nov. 30-Dec.9: Student Papers

Note: The dates for each presentation will be scheduled during the
semester. Also, Dr. Awad's presentation dates are tentative. It
may be that one or more student presentations will be scheduled
during that period and she will speak at a later date.

OTHER BOOKS AND ARTICLES OF INTEREST:

Theory

Sanday, P. R. 1973. "Towards a Theory of the Status of Women."
American Anthropologist 75: 1682-1700.

Ward, Kathryn (Editor). 1990. Women Workers and Global
Restructuring. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

International

Women: A World Report: A New Internationalist Book. 1985. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Nuss, Shirley in collaboration with Ettore Denti and David Viry.
1991. Women in the World of Work: Statistical Analysis and
Projections to the Year 2000, No. 18. Washington, D. C.:

International Labor Office.

Europe (West and East)

Lovenduski, Joni. Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy. 1986. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Heitlinger, Alena. 1977. "The Historical Development of European Socialist Feminism." Catalyst (10-11):125-51.

Heitlinger, Alena. 1979. Women and State Socialism: Sex Inequality in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. London: Macmillan and McGill-Queen's University Press.

Haavio-Mannila, E. and M. Sokolowska. 1978. "Social Position of Women," in F. Allardt and W. Wesolowski (Editors), Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland, Comparative Perspective. Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers.

Deacon, Bob. 1992. The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present, and Future. Newbury Park: Sage.

Latin America

Chaney, Elsa M. and Mary Garcia Castro (Editors). 1989. Muchachas No More: Household Workers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

REFERENCES ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF EASTERN EUROPE:
THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE; NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

Joan K. Burton
Goucher College, Fall 1992

GENERAL TEACHING INFORMATION

Butler, Johnella E. and John C. Walters (Editors). 1992. Transforming the Curriculum: Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press.

Ringelheim, Joan. 1985. "Women and the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research." Signs (10)4:741-61.

Davidson, Chandler. 1987. "Ethnic Jokes: An Introduction to Race and Nationality." Teaching Sociology 15,3 (July):296-302.

Farnham, James F. 1982. "Teaching the Holocaust: A Rationale for Dealing with the Absurd." Journal of General Education 33, 4(Winter):271-283.

Friedlander, Henry. 1979. "Toward a Methodology of Teaching About the Holocaust." Teachers College Record. 80 3(February): 519-42.

Friedman, Norman L. 1985. "Teaching About the Holocaust." Teaching Sociology. 12 4 (July): 449-61.

ETHNICITY

Nash, G. 1988. Cauldron of Ethnicity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Petersen, William. 1979. "Ethnicity in the World Today." Pp. 1-13 in William Peterson (editor), The Background to Ethnic Conflict. Leiden. Brill.

Amerisfoort, van. 1978. "Minority as a sociological concept." Ethnic and Racial Studies. 1: 218-34.

JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Hoffman, Charles. 1992. Gray Dawn: The Jews of Eastern Europe in the Post-Communist Era. (Reviewed in NY Times Book Review Section, Sept. 6, 1992, pg. 12-13.)

Shatz, Jeff. 1991. The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communities of Poland. Ewing, NJ: University of California Press.

Abraham, Ain. 1944/45. "Swislocz: Portrait of a Jewish Community in Eastern Europe, in Eastern European Jews in Two Worlds, Deborah Dash Moore (Editor).

WOMEN

Laska, Vera. 1983. Women in the Resistance and in the Holocaust: The Voices of Eyewitnesses. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Heinemann, Marlene. 1986. Gender and Destiny: Women Writers of the Holocaust. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

GYPSIES

Acton, Thomas. 1976. "Academic Success and Political Failure: A Review of Modern Social Science Writing in English on Gypsies." Ethnic and Racial Studies. 2:231-41

Kendrick, Donald and Grattan Puxon. 1972. The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies. London: Chatto-Heinemann for Sussex UP.

Ramati, Alexander. 1986. And the Violins Stopped Playing: A Study of the Gypsy Holocaust. NY: Franklin Watts.

FOLLOWING REFERENCES ARE FROM:

"The Sociology of Genocide/The Holocaust: A Curriculum Guide, edited by Jack Nusan Porter and distributed by the ASA Teaching Resources Center, 1722 N Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, (202)883-3410. This guide is filled with excellent resources--written and visual. I have focused primarily on the most recent books and articles and on what is of most interest to me at this point.)

ATTEMPTS TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THE HOLOCAUST

Hayes, Peter, ed. Lessons and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern U. Pr. 1991.

Lipton, Robert J. 1986. "The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide." Psychology Today.

Allport, Gordon. The Nature of Prejudice.

Milgram, Stanley, Obedience to Authority.

THOSE WHO TRIED TO HELP

Bartoszewski, Wladyslaw and Zifia Lewin (eds). 1969. Righteous Among Nations: How Poles Helped the Jews, 1939-1945. London: Earls court Publications. Details assistance given by Poles and Jews and includes a chronological listing of pertinent documents.

Rittner, Carol and Sondra Myers. 1986. The Courage to Care: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust. NY: NYU. Companion volume to the Academy Award-nominated documentary.

DIARIES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, MEMOIRS, NARRATIVES

Millu, Liliana. Smoke Over Birkenau. 1990.

Troller, Norbert. 1991. Theresienstadt: Hitler's Gift to the Jews. Chapel Hill: UNC, Pr.

Amery, Jean. 1986. At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities. NY: Schocken.

Zuker-Bujanowska, Liliana. 1980. Liliana's Journal: Warsaw 1939-1945. NY:

Dial.

Tec, Nechama. 1984. Dry Tears: The Story of A Lost Childhood. NY: Oxford UP.

Nomberg-Przytyk, Sarah. 1985. Auschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land. Chapel Hill: U of NC Press.

Karas, Joza. Music in Terezin. NY: Pendragon, 1985

oral testimony from Marika Frank Abrahms, in Voices from the Holocaust, p. 324-21.

Piercy, Marge. "The Dark Thread in the Weave," from Testimony: Contemporary Writers Make the Holocaust Personal, ed. David Rosenberg, p. 171-91.

Nomberg-Przytyk, Sara. Auschwitz: True Tales from a Grotesque Land.

Furth, Valerie Jakober. Cabbages and Geraniums: Memories of the Holocaust.

NOVELS (a brief selection of those published after 1985)

Ozick, Cynthia. 1989. Rosa and the Shawl. NY: Alfred Knopf.

Piercy, Marge. 1987. Gone to Soldiers. NY: Ballantine.

Fink, Ida. 1987. A Scrap of Time. NY: Pantheon.

Grossman, David. 1989. See Under: Love. NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

PHOTOGRAPHS

Vishniac, Roman. A Vanished World. (Photographs).

FILMS

See Pgs. 130-31 in Teaching Resources Guide.

SOCIOLOGY 306
SOCIAL CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Prof. Joseph Carroll
Colby-Sawyer College

Spring, 1993
Ext. 589

Course Objectives:

In 1989 the Communist governments in six East and Central European countries toppled as the populace demanded the fresh ideas and programs of democracy. Since 1989 these countries have grappled with rapid changes in all aspects of society. The purpose of this course is to explore the effect of rapid social, economic and political change in three central European countries, Poland, The Czech Republic, and Slovakia. At the present time these three countries serve as a "laboratory" in which one may view how societies change and how those changes influence the residents of those societies.

The course is divided into three major sections. The first will cover major historical background including the revolutions of 1989. The second will focus on social change in five major societal institutions: political, economic, religion, family, and education. The third will investigate some important issues which are central to East Central Europe. These are environmental issues, and a variety of questions about the role of minorities in these societies.

The final week of the course will consist of student discussions of their own final projects which will explore a particular aspect of Eastern European society. I expect students to actively prepare shorter presentations at various points during the course. Course readings will consist mainly of periodical and journal articles written since 1991. The readings will also emphasize writings by Polish, Czech, and Slovak authors when possible. We will view films and slides when appropriate.

I hope that by the conclusion of the course you will have a better understanding of social change and its impact as well as a better appreciation of this important part of Europe and therefore the rest of the world.

Required Readings:

- Davies, Norman: Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland. Oxford University Press.
- Ramet, Sabrina: Social Currents in Eastern Europe. Duke University Press.
- Havel, Vaclav: The Memorandum. Grove Press.

Whipple, Tim (ed.): After the Velvet Revolution: Vaclav Havel and The New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out. Freedom House.

A series of recent articles from books and periodicals to be copied or placed on reserve. (See attached list)

Supplemental Readings:

Echikson, William: Lighting the Night. Morrow.
Frankland, Mark: The Patriots Revolution.
Nyrop, Richard F. (ed.): Czechoslovakia: A Country Study. American University Press.
Glenny, Misha: The Rebirth of History. Penguin Books
Banac, Ivo: Eastern Europe in Revolution. Cornell University Press.
Brown, J.F.: Surge to Freedom. Duke University Press

Tentative Topics and Dates:

Week 1: Introductory Material

1. Brief Current Situation
3. Brief Intro. to Culture

Readings: Svec "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce"
Kohak "Tattered Velvet: A Country Falls Apart"
Curry "The Puzzle of Poland"
Pytko "Europe's Black Hole"
Havel: "Beyond The Shock of Freedom"

Weeks 2-4: Key Events in Recent Polish and Czecho-Slovak History

Poland

1. The Partitioning of Poland and Russian Domination (1792-1918)
2. Pilsudski and the Inter-War Period (1918-1939)
3. World War II (1939-1945)
4. The Communist Era (1948-1989)
 - a. Stalinism (1947-1956)
 - b. Gomulka (1956-1970)
 - c. Gierek (1970-1980)
 - d. Solidarity and Martial Law (1980-1989)

Readings: Davies: Chap. III (129-158)
 Chap. II (100-108)
 Chap. I (1-44; 54-62)
Ramet: Chap. 4
Firlit and Chlopecki "When Theft Is Not Theft"

Czech Republic and Slovakia

1. The Munich Agreement of 1939
2. Slovakia as a Puppet State under Tiso
3. The Communist Era (1947-1989)
 - a. "Prague Spring" (1968)
 - b. Normalization (1968-1977)
 - c. Charter 77 and subsequent repression (1977-89)

Read: Ramet: Chap. 4
Introduction to After The Velvet Revolution
Urban "The Politics and Power of Humiliation" (Whipple, 267-307)
Dubcek "1968 Revisited" (Whipple, 133-141)
Havel: The Memorandum

***** Paper #1 Due *****

Week 5 and 6: The Overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe (1989)

Ramet: Chap. 1
Reserve Materials:
Echikson: Lighting the Night
Frankland: The Patriots' Revolution
Glenny: The Rebirth of History
Banac: Eastern Europe in Revolution
Brown: Surge to Freedom

***** Paper #2 Due *****

***** Mid-Term Exam *****

Week 7: The Economy

1. Privatization
2. Foreign Investment
3. Effects on people and society

Read: Klaus: "Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia"
"Radical, Realistic Economics"
"Why I Am Optimistic" (Whipple 149-171)

Wechsler: "A Reporter At Large"

Weeks 8 and 9: Politics

1. The Constitution and Balance of Power
2. The Creation of a Multi-Party System
3. "De-communization" and "lustration" laws

Read: Benda "An Open Letter on Screening People's Pasts"

(Whipple 203-207)
Pithart: "The Political Culture of the New
Czechoslovakia" (Whipple 171-177)
Leber: "Witch Hunt in Prague"
Weigel "Their Lustration -- And Ours"
Wechsler from The New Yorker 10/19/92 (pp. 78-87)
Fuszara: "Legal Regulation of Abortion in Poland"

Week 10: Environmental Issues

1. Environment and Politics -- The Gabcikovo Dam Project
2. Pollution and Industry
3. The Public and the Environment

Read: Ridgeway: "Watch on the Danube"
Fischhoff: "Report from Poland: Science and
Politics in the Midst of Environmental Disaster"
Bingham: "Czechoslovakian Landscapes"
Light: "Pollution Most Foul"

Week 11: Family/Gender/Youth

1. Housing and Family Life
2. Youth
3. Status of Women in Eastern Europe

Read: Tarasiewicz: "Women in Poland: Choices to Be Made"
Goldberg and Kremen: "Women's Studies: The Feminization
of Poverty: Only in America?"
Sobczynca: "In Search of the Charmed Life"
Castle-Kanerova: "Interview with Alena Valterova:
Founder of the Political Party of Women and Mothers"
Szalai: "Some Aspects of the Changing Situation of
Women in Hungary"
Ramet: Chaps. 8, 9, 10

Week 12: Minority Issues

1. Slovakian Independence
2. Jews in Eastern Europe
3. The Gypsies

Read: Gal: "Slovakia's Problems and Prospects" Whipple 227-
234)
Kusy: "Nationalism, Totalitarianism, and Democracy"
(Whipple 239-255)
Brumberg: "Polish Intellectuals & Anti-Semitism"
Michnik: "Poland and the Jews"
Kalvoda: "The Gypsies of Czechoslovakia"
Ramet: Chap. 7

Week 13 and 14: Presentation of Individual Projects or
Coverage of Other Topics such as Religion, The Role of the
Press, or Education

Grading:

| | |
|---------------------|-----------|
| Mid-Term Exam | 25 |
| Final Exam | 25 |
| Paper #1 | 10 |
| Paper #2 | 10 |
| Final Project/Paper | 20 |
| Class Contribution | <u>10</u> |
| | 100 |

Attendance:

My policy is to take regular attendance only to verify the class roster. However, class attendance and participation is expected and is considered a part of your final grade. You cannot contribute to class if you are not here regularly. This class will not function well unless you finish assigned reading and come to class prepared to contribute.

Tests and Assignments:

Unless there are strong extenuating circumstances I do not give make up exams during the terms. Papers must be turned in by the Thursday of the week that they are due. Late papers are penalized.

COLLECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SOC 306

- Bingham, Sam
1991 "Czechoslovakian Landscapes." Audobon 93 (1): 92-103.
- Bollag, Burton
1992 "For Czechoslovakia's Academics, a Vexing Question: Who Told the Secret Police What About Whom?" Chronicle of Higher Education 38 (36): A39-A41.
- Brumberg, Abraham
1991 "Polish Intellectuals and anti-Semitism." Dissent 38 (1): 72-77.
- Castle-Kanerova, Mita
1991 "Interview with Alena Valterova, Founder of the Political Party of Women and Mothers (Prague, Nov. 1990). Feminist Review 39: 161-165.
- Coleman, John
1991 "Spiritual resistance in Eastern Europe." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38 (1): 113-128.
- Curry, Jane Leftwich
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**THE COMMUNITY
COLLEGE AND
EASTERN
EUROPE:
POSSIBILITIES
FOR
ACADEMIC
EXCHANGES**

BY

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FULBRIGHT-HAYS 1992 SEMINAR: EASTERN EUROPE

1992 FULBRIGHT-HAYS SEMINARS ABROAD PROGRAM

EASTERN EUROPE: TRANSITIONS
IN
POLAND & CZECHOSLOVAKIA

THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND
EASTERN EUROPE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR EXCHANGES

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THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND EASTERN EUROPE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

This report is based on research, discussions with academics who are experienced in developing international exchange programs, and talks and observations made during a visit to Poland and Czechoslovakia during the summer of 1992, sponsored by the Fulbright-Hays Seminars Abroad program. The seminar titled: "Eastern Europe: Transitions", was administered by the United States Department of Education, Fulbright Commission, the Institute of International Exchange (IIE), the Office for U.S.-Polish Educational Exchanges, and the Slovak Academic Information Agency (SAIA). The dates of the seminar were from June 22, 1992 to July 29, 1992.

The Summer Seminar program consisted of the following phases. During a three day orientation program held in New York City and hosted by the Institute for International Exchange, participants in the seminar were briefed on contemporary conditions in Eastern Europe by representatives of the Polish and Czechoslovakian delegations to the United Nations and, in addition, visited institutes relating to the culture and history of these two countries. Subsequently a group of sixteen academics from two and four year colleges and secondary schools, located in various geographical regions of the country; journeyed to these two east-central european nations under the leadership of Dr. John Micguel,

Assistant Director, Institute on East Central Europe,
Columbia University.

While in this region for a 5 1/2 week field visit, the group members had the opportunity to speak with local and national leaders, including academics from the University of Warsaw, Jagiellonian University (Cracow), Comenius University (Bratislava), and Charles IV University (Prague); concerning many aspects of society in their countries and the challenges confronting this area of Europe in efforts to convert to a market economy. In addition, the seminar participants made a number of side trips to locations of historical, ecological, and cultural interest, with overnight stays in Warsaw, Gdanska, Cracow, and Zakopane in Poland; Bardejov, Bratislava, and Prague in the Slovakian and Czech sections of the dissolving Czechoslovakian federation.

I selected as my topic of research the possibilities for two-year community colleges to establishing mutual academic exchanges involving administrators, faculty, students, and community business leaders with these countries. Internationalizing the curriculum and reaching out beyond their service area is of contemporary concern to these institutions as well as to my colleagues and myself who instruct courses and administer programs in the institutions in this segment of American education. In particular there is a great deal of discussion and activity

in the Massachusetts State College system, [a system that serves a region greatly dependent on foreign trade for its economic stability, and, consequently, has an international orientation], in developing such programs with the objective of reducing parochialism and expanding community awareness of the global village. Already several initial ventures with Eastern Europe are in place among the 29 institutions that constitute the Massachusetts system of higher education; programs that will be mentioned later.

In researching this report, individuals responsible for international programs were contacted and questioned about their programs with Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as other areas of the world.

In this report, the rationale for community colleges to expand international contacts and the benefits for both sides is presented first. Then an overview of existing programs as outlined in Report No.2, Where Walls Once Stood by Mary E. Kirk, Program Director, East Central Europe Institute of International Exchange, is briefly mentioned. The evolution through the 70's and 80's to the present of the role of two-year colleges in developing international programs is explored, followed by a brief review of progress in Massachusetts' two and four-year institutions to "internationalize" their campuses as reported by coordinators of these programs. The report goes on to discuss some of the necessary prerequisites for a successful

exchange program based on a synthesis of suggestions from various people with experience in fostering international exchange, and concludes with suggesting obstacles in the development of such exchanges, particularly with the two areas visited by the 1992 Fulbright Seminar participants.

RATIONALE FOR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

The need for mutual exchanges involving teachers, students and community leaders was underscored on a number of occasions in discussions with nationals of the countries visited. Archbishop Jan Sokol, Metropolitan of Slovakia, expressed this need at a meeting in Trnava, Slovakia: "Send us your managers; we need managers, managers, managers if Slovakia is to achieve her place in the community of nations!". In Bratislava a representative of the Slovakian Academy Information Agency, an educational service organization which encourages international educational exchanges, stated:

"the conversion to capitalism will require the training of personnel, particularly middle management and people in the technical fields. The community colleges are expertise in this area, and equipped to offer assistance. The immediate need for this level of training is far greater than professional training at the universities".

Members of the Committee on Educational of the Slovakian National Council and Polish academics were outspoken requesting both assistance in curriculum reform and in revising textbooks to accurately reflect the history

of the post-war era. "Textbooks must be written that are free of Marxian ideology", stated a member of the National Council; the legislative body that several days before our visit had declared the sovereignty of Slovakia in preparation for full independence in what the media has labeled as 'the Velvet Divorce'.

The Rector of Comenius University in Bratislava emphasized how critical is the teaching of English for the citizens of the area. If Eastern Europe is to compete economically with the European Community, a market serving 338 million people, and the economies of Japan and the United States; the knowledge of English, the language of business, is essential. We learned from our visit that many American students and teachers were already spending various lengths of time in Czechoslovakia (mostly in the Prague area) instructing English under a program sponsored by Charter 77.

Aside of assistance to the nations of Eastern Europe, exchanges would be of benefit to the future growth of the American economy. According to a report prepared by the Advisory Council for International Education, Education for Global Competence, (August, 1988), the role of the United States as a leader among nations is changing rapidly, and we are ill prepared for the changes that the trend toward internationalizing will bring to business, manufacturing, diplomacy, science, and technology. Effectiveness in such a

changing world requires a citizenry with sufficient international knowledge to cope with global interdependence. The Report claims knowledge of geographic areas, such as Eastern Europe, and cultural diversities is an essential ingredient in a liberal education.

And as evidence of our increasing day-to-day involvement with other nations, the following is cited:

-thirty-three percent of U.S. corporations profits are generated by international trade.

-the 23 largest U.S. banks derive almost half their total earnings overseas.

-four of every five new jobs in the U.S. are generated as a direct result of foreign trade.

-the economic well-being of the U.S. is inextricably linked to the world economy, with current U.S. investments abroad valued at more than \$300 billion

-Foreign individuals and corporations hold investments of \$200 to \$300 billion in American manufacturing companies.[1]

Clearly the position of this country both as a political and economic superpower will depend increasingly on the international literacy of her citizenry.

Three years ago have passed since the mind boggling, exciting days of the Polish and Czechoslovakian revolutions. Solidarity rise to power in the Polish elections under the leadership of Lech Walensa and the Velvet Revolution of the Czech and Slovak Republics came as startling events, coming at a pace unexpected even to Western intelligence. The world watched as Charter 77, People Against Violence and other groups from the latter republics demanded reform from the communist government. In Prague, over 300,000 listened to Alexander Dubchek address them in Wenceslaus Square. On Monday, November 27, 1989, over three-quarters of the workforce joined in a general strike which paved the way for Vaclav Havel ascendance as President of Czechoslovakia on December 29th.

Since then there has been a great interest on both sides for increased U.S. relations with the former satallite countries, and a number of academic and cultural exchanges have been formally established. Most of these exchanges have centered on business, political science, economics, and English as a Second Language. Some involve study abroad, consultations, research projects, and teacher workshops.

According to a report cited, Where Walls Once Stood: U.S. Responses to New Opportunities for Academic Cooperation with East Central Europe:

" U.S. universities, colleges and exchange organizations are not only expanding the scope of traditional academic

exchanges but are embarking on new initiatives and training programs for professionals and nonacademics in fields relating to current political, economic, and social transformations. Furthermore, the modes of cooperation employed by U.S. institutions and their counterparts in East Central Europe reflect the ongoing decentralization of political and academic authority in the region." [2]

This study was of 148 higher education institutions and 28 nationally -based exchange agencies or non-profit institutions. There has been a threefold increase in the number of programs since the revolutions of 1989. Program activity, including foundation grants and university funding, in Eastern Europe concentrates in the three countries of the northern tier (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). The report states that the tendency in foundation support is toward grant-making directly to institutions in this region. Most of the activities take place in East Europe at the expense of activities on U.S. home campuses.[3]

Poland has one hundred forty-three programs involving U.S.-Polish institutions. Ninety-eight are direct exchange programs with institutions which represents the largest number of participating institutions of any country in the region. This is largely due to the encouragement of contacts by the large Polish-American population during the Cold War. One-Half of the direct exchange programs are based

in Warsaw and Krakow, but with strong representation in other provincial cities.[4]

Many of these programs involve joint projects of faculty/student exchanges and management education, democratic institutional-building, and environmental protection.

Czechoslovakia has 113 programs sponsored by American universities and exchange organizations. Nearly one-half of these programs are based in the capital of Prague, and sixteen programs are affiliated with institutions in Slovakia. Unlike Poland, most of these programs have started since the Velvet Revolution in 1989. The majority of programs are in professional/technical training, particularly in management training.[5]

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS IN COMMUNITY COLLEGES

The issue this report addresses is the role of two-year schools in fostering international contacts. Although educational exchange programs in colleges and universities have existed since the end of World War I, interest in international education intensified in the decade from 1959 to 1969, with the advent of Sputnik and the Peace Corps and, as a result, large grants were made by the government to colleges and universities; grants that did not include community colleges. Much of this interest was spurred

by the Peace Corp volunteers returning to their communities with knowledge of third world conditions. These grants were directed at permitting institutions to establish area-study centers and engage in technical assistance abroad.

During the 1960s, a few contracts to community colleges and technical institutions were awarded by the Agency for International Development, but they were exceptions to the rule of working with four year institutions. During this period, the community colleges were becoming established throughout the country and had little energy left to develop an international focus. In addition, some argued that international education was not the responsibility of the community college, institutions that should concentrate on "community" as defined in a narrow, parochial manner.

The 70's saw a decline in this interest in international programs and government funding was drastically reduced. One of the first two-year colleges to "internationalize" was Rockland Community College in New York which began to provide overseas study opportunities by the mid-70's. Surveys of community colleges showed the growth of interest in exchanges experienced in the last two decades.

A 1967 study demonstrated that few foreign students were enrolled in community colleges, and those that were attended schools for the most part in the states of

California, Michigan, or Illinois. Although community colleges accepted foreign students, none had a recruit program.

A 1976-77 study of 356 community and Junior colleges reported 20,794 foreign students; i.e. holders of visas and refugees. The inclusion of two-year colleges under section 603 of Title VI (Foreign students and Foreign language Development) greatly expanded the opportunities for community colleges to participate in international education.

Three consortium furthered this development:

1. In 1976, 60 colleges formed International/Intercultural Committee of the American Association of Community/ Junior Colleges. Today more than 100 institutions belong to this organization which promotes international education at two-year schools.

2. In 1973, three colleges ,Mercer Community College (NJ), Harrisburg Community College (Pa), and Rockland Community College (NY) formed the College Consortium for International Studies (CCIS), an organization that provides for semester studies for students who might terminate their formal academic preparation after two years. In addition to foreign programs in the traditional liberal arts, this organization expanded exchanges into career areas including business, law enforcement, health services. At present, over

150 two-year scholls are affiliated with CCIS and over 1000 two-year students complete part of their degree requirements by spending a semester abroad.

3. Community Colleges for International Development (CCID) was formed in 1976. This organization sought bi-lateral agreements that provide technical assistance to other countries, including assistance in mid-level manpower training, opportunities for exchange of faculty and students, and leadership in developing international education programs in community colleges. [6]

MASSACHUSETTS STATE COLLEGES AND EXCHANGES

In an effort to coordinate efforts in international education, representatives from the 29 state supported institutions in the State of Massachusetts met in Fitchburg, Massachusetts on May 5, 1992, and agreed to form an association, MaCIE (Massachusetts Council for International Education) to promote, benefit, actively pursue, and collaborate amongst public institution in the Commonwealth in this sphere. One of the goals of this new organization is to seek recognition and release time for international activities of faculty and encourage grant seeking in international realm. In addition, Macie seeks to share and develop further in areas such as foreign student recruitment and support services (orientation and re-entry preparation), study abroad and exchange programs and curriculum

development. One of MaCIE's proposed objectives is the joint recruitment of students. Perhaps the fastest growing exchanges in the United States are in the community college sector for hotel, interior design and technical programs.

Within the state college system, a number of initiatives to establish programs have been on-going for the past several years. As examples of efforts to internationalize the campuses are the following:

* three western Massachusetts institutions, Berkshire, Holyoke and Greenfield Community Colleges have formal protocols with eight institutions in the former Soviet Union. Faculty exchanges are being initiated and seminars are being held. An English Language institute has been developed.

*the aforementioned colleges are working in the Pacific Rim to recruit international students into business and technical programs

*Middlesex Community College sponsors programs for businesses who are involved in, or want to be involved in international work. They have sponsored training sessions for Russian Bankers and have received visiting fellows. Russian Bankers are placed in local banks and offer seminars to the academic community. A scholar from Russia teaches two semesters of Russian. The College staff is developing a center to coordinate Russia and Fulbright exchanges.

* Northern Essex Community College has contacts in Czechoslovakia via faculty consulting to help with adjustments to capitalism.

*UMass/ Amherst has 1800 foreign students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate programs. The university maintains outreach in 25 countries and 55 institutions and approximately 1000 students study abroad.

* Holyoke Community College had a one month exchange program in Hotel management

* UMass medical school has a grant to develop a seminar to prepare students for international work, and have formal reciprocal relationships with medical schools in Freiberg, Germany; with Ben Gurion in Israel, and with Hondorus.

The four year state colleges have programs that are primarily student exchanges, based on one faculty member's desire to take a group of students to another country; or a limited number of students linking up with a pre-existent program at another institute.

*Bunker Hill Community College has an international Business Program, and has exchange options for students and faculty.

* Greenfield Community College has developed exchange workshops on business practices for faculty and administrators with Belorussia.[7]

FEATURES OF A SUCCESSFUL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Discussions were held with personnel involved in the international exchange of students and faculty in the Massachusetts public colleges. In order for a foreign exchange of students to be successful certain features appear to be necessary, according to these academics. Amongst these are the following:

1. Commitment from the top is a must, including governing boards, Presidents, and Deans along with the support of the college community.
2. the program should be in keeping with the special character of the institution.
3. Success should be measured by benefits to the individual student rather than standard measures, i.e. is the program suitable for individual students?
4. The Financial Aid should advertise programs that extend financial assistance to overseas study.
5. The area for exchange should be researched extensively.
6. A Strong commitment to recognize study abroad must be made by the institution and faculty.
7. Consortium arrangements involving several colleges are advisable for smaller institutions.

8. Advising is critical with a program of good orientation and screening.

9. Faculty who are supportive and interested in international issues should be enlisted as spark plugs for an exchange program.

OBSTACLES TO EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

The rationale and desirability of exchange programs with the countries of Eastern Europe has been stated, and a number of national organizations are actively involved. These organizations that may assist institutions in developing exchanges including the Institute for International Exchange, GAP, World Experience, Charter 77, People to People International, the Fulbright program, People to People International, IUC Center for International Exchange, Office for U.S.-Polish Educational Exchanges, Slovak Academic Information Agency, to name a few. However, a number of obstacles lie in the path of a community college that wishes to develop programs with this region:

(1) the historical lack of focus on Eastern European history, language, and culture in community colleges that lack a strong slavic population in their service area. Slavic language training is limited, particularly in the northeastern section of the United States.

[2] the absence of residential facilities on campuses designed to be commuting schools.

[3] fear of instability of these countries as indicated by the renewal of nationalism and ethnicity in the Balkins, the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakian Federation, and the rising consciousness of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia. This coupled with the mistrust of former communist countries beset with problems of pollution and inflation.

[4] present mood of weariness in America after the cold war and the desire to focus more on domestic issues as the economy and fiscal stability in preference to further international involvement.

[5] an attitude that questions if the former eastern bloc has anything to offer us.

[6] the lack of a central data bank on personnel, programs, resources, and materials available.

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Monday 31 August, 1992
Rotary Club of Shades Valley, Alabama

Lyman A. Drewry

Thank you very much for inviting me here today. I always enjoy being with Rotary. I was a member of the Huntington, WV club for four years and it was some of the best fun and hardest work I ever have done. When I came to B'ham, I was a member of the Ensley Rotary Club for several years - equally great fellowship and fun - but my teaching schedule almost always has me in class at meeting time, so I eventually resigned. However, I always accept an opportunity to speak to Rotary and refresh my ties. Among voluntary organizations, which Alexis de Toqueville regarded as America's unique contribution to Western civilization, Rotary is one of the most important. Among those "points of light" to which President Bush has called America's attention, Rotary is one of the great constellations. Your work with international education, your generous scholarships for American youngsters are enormously important to all colleges and universities, including BSC.

I am especially grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to talk about the future of Central Europe. I have just returned from Poland and Czechoslovakia, three weeks in each country. I was a member of the Fulbright-Hays Summer seminar conducted by the Institute of International Education in New York under the auspices of the US Departments of State and Education. We were sixteen scholars from all over the US, and our assignment was studying the social, political and economic transformations of those countries. We had lectures from academics, meetings with government officials, breakfasts with entrepreneurs, audiences with archbishops and enough visits to baroque churches, Renaissance palaces and medieval castles to last a lifetime. It was a unique and fabulous experience. I want to share a little of it with you here this afternoon.

Let me start with the invariable question I get: "are they going to make it?" The first thing Americans want to know is whether the nations of Central Europe which have for half a century been "Communist states" are going to be successful in their transition to democracy and to capitalism. Before answering, I must caution that there are terrific differences among the various countries of central and eastern Europe, and I only visited two of them - although the two I visited became three while I was there, when Slovakia split off from its federation with the Czech Republic. Not only are the differences among countries enormous, but some countries have already slipped into disaster, as we hear daily from Bosnia, Georgia and Armenia. So I would be foolish to be too sanguine.

Nonetheless, the message I bring you today is one of optimism about the transitions. Capitalism, private enterprise, free markets - whatever name you attach to the economic system by which we live - is burgeoning in Central Europe. They are going to make it economically. Capitalism will prove yet again that it

is the natural, healthy way for a society to organize its economic affairs. Free private competitive markets are the spontaneous and normal order of human economic activity, as that great Central European, the Austrian economist and philosopher, Friedrich von Hayek, was fond of reminding us before his death last spring.

I want to urge optimism on the political front as well. Democracy, freedom, liberalism, a civil society - whatever name you attach to the political system by which we live - is also burgeoning in Central Europe. Central Europe is going to make it politically, although the variations among individual countries will be great.

In terms of the countries I have just visited, I predict that the Czech Republic will certainly establish a healthy democracy and a vibrant market economy; Poland quite probably will; and while there are serious doubts about Slovakia, we can be hopeful.

I feel it necessary to emphasize optimism for two reasons. First, there have been some very disappointing and discouraging developments in Poland and Czechoslovakia in recent months - the instability of governments in Poland, the dramatic split of Czechoslovakia - but I would argue that these sad developments are less significant than they appear. Put differently, we are much more likely to hear about the bad stuff than the good stuff - which leads me to my second reason for emphasizing optimism: the American media are usually gloomy when they discuss central Europe, and I think they are often wrong.

This gloom or pessimism reflects a bias on the part of the American media in favor of collective, governmental or public sector approaches to social issues, and an expectation on their part that private market approaches will usually fail. I think we have seen these biases within the US in discussion of the recent recession. The evidence is overwhelming that this recession, while unexpectedly long-lasting, has also been shallow, and that we are now slowly pulling out of it. Yet the media, especially the television networks, continue to trumpet every plant closing, and call for government action. Given two economic statistics, one good and one bad, television will barely mention the first, but the second will get five minutes of air time, followed by a commentator exhorting government to "do something", to "take action".

The same attitudes of our American media turn up when they look at the efforts to build capitalism in Europe. When Poland went cold turkey into free prices in January 1990, every network prophesied disaster and political upheaval. Since Germany reunited, all we hear about is unemployment and working class misery in eastern Germany as the old, inefficient, wasteful and polluting Communist enterprises are shut down. The New Yorker magazine is typical; last fall, it ran one of its book-length articles on the sufferings of an east German family, a pair of

cousins, one of whom went west to look for work and wound up on welfare, while the other stayed in the East and had equally grim experience living off the disintegrating east German economy and the charity of his relatives. At the end of the article, the reader was bound to be in a state of profound depression. Apparently the reader was supposed to react by praying for the Communists to come back - but an equally valid response might have been to cancel your subscription to The New Yorker!

Of course, facts must eventually be recognized, and so stories do appear indicating that Polish living standards are actually rising, and fairly rapidly, under the market reforms. And occasionally you do see a report that East Germans are finding work (presumably to the great surprise of The New Yorker) as West Germans pour in billions of marks in investments. Just last Friday, The Wall Street Journal ran a Page-1 story entitled "After Two Hard Years, East Germans Believe Worst is Finally Over" with the subtitle: "Many are starting to adjust to capitalism, and towns are hunting for industry." This article suggests that the annual growth rate of the former East Germany is expected to be about 10% next year. If that is destitution, then we in the US might well envy it, as our politicians debate whether the US growth rate can possibly be pushed above 2.5%!

So what I want to do today is to offer you enthusiastic optimism about the future of capitalism in central Europe, in contrast to the American media. Capitalism works. Adam Smith was right. Democracy works. Thomas Jefferson was right. Of all people on the planet, we in America should understand that; and we should watch the current transitions of Poland and Czechoslovakia hopefully, joyously and with optimism.

But what about those discouraging political events which I earlier noted: the fracture of Czechoslovakia, and the revolving door for Polish prime ministers, only three years after the Revolutions of 1989. Don't these events indicate that the two countries (or three now) are on the thin edge of civil disorder? Don't they indicate some innate tendency toward political and economic collapse? No, is my reply. Appearances deceive. There are rational explanations of these events, and the remarkable thing is the strength of democratic forces, not their weakness.

There has been a paradox at the heart of the Polish revolution from its beginning in the early 1980's: a revolution against communist totalitarianism and in favor of capitalist democracy originated among, and was carried out by, Solidarity. But what was Solidarity? Solidarity was a labor union dominated by workers at the gargantuan and hopelessly inefficient state enterprises, of which the Lenin shipyards at Gdansk and the Nowa Huta steel mills at Krakow were outstanding examples. But if capitalism is to work, such goliaths must be dissolved or at least reorganized and privatized; and the main "victims" (in terms of lost jobs and the tiresome necessity of retraining)

would be precisely the authors of the revolution, the members of Solidarity. Moreover, if democracy is to work, then all citizens must be served by public policy, not just those "proletarian workers" in whose name the Communist system theoretically operated, and for whose benefit it actually operated, at least to a significant extent. Thus in politics as in the economy, the main "losers" from the democratic capitalist revolution would be precisely the authors of that revolution, the workers in the huge state factories. The more successful the revolution, the more discomfort it causes its creators! The French Revolution was said to "devour" its children, but the Polish one merely nibbles.

There is no easy resolution to this paradox, but the longer action on it is delayed, the longer will it fester into discontent. As small enterprises are privatized, as new entrepreneurs amass small or large fortunes, as the benefits of the free market begin to penetrate society, the anomalous position of the workers in big state enterprises becomes a political time bomb. They are clearly candidates for lay-off, retraining or permanent dismissal. Their wages are simultaneously too low for maintaining living standards in the new economy and too high for world market competition. Once these authors of the revolution - symbolized by the Nobel Laureate shipyard electrician president, Lech Walesa - become acutely aware of their dilemma, then their revolutionary impetus will diminish markedly. I believe that this point was understood by Balcerowicz which is why he was so urgent, so much in a rush to capitalism that he got himself fired! Now Walesa grows increasingly picky, as well as crotchety, about who he will have for a prime minister. It will be interesting to see if Mrs. Suchocka, who appears to be grasping this particular nettle by imitating Margaret Thatcher with the British coal miners in 1979, can long survive. Democracy in Poland is becoming more complicated, as it always does in newly free nations. But the important point is that no one is seriously proposing to abolish it. Solidarity and the government it sired are facing new dilemmas and conflicts; but the people of Poland still proudly wear Solidarity pins and badges, and espouse democratic and entrepreneurial values.

Variations on this theme help explain the Czech and Slovak breakup. The Velvet Revolution in that country was not led by a labor union, but by intellectuals, symbolized by the poet-playwright president, Vaclav Havel, assisted by students, journalists and other professionals. The workers in state factories and farms did, however, support the revolution. They recognized the failure of totalitarian central planning just as fully as did the Polish shipyard workers. By flukes of geography, Czechoslovak history and Soviet imperial policy, the massive inefficient state enterprises - tank and machine gun factories, and aluminum mills that pollute beyond the wildest nightmares of the Sierra Club - were concentrated in Slovakia. Clearly these monstrosities must be dismantled, workers must be retrained and must find other jobs, and the sooner the better -

but it is a painful, wrenching adjustment for the workers involved. Prague's policy has been to plow ahead as fast as possible - epitomised by Havel's proclamation a few months after the Velvet Revolution that the nation would "get out of the arms business" as soon as possible, and ratified by the election of Vaclav Klaus last spring. When the workers' inevitable reaction to the inevitable displacements associated with the restructuring of industry began, it was naturally much stronger in Slovakia. While the Czechs became the target of enormous German investment and tourism and began accelerating their shift to capitalist democracy, some unhappy Slovaks began to clamor for a slower pace. But notice that the debate is about HOW FAST to move toward democracy and free enterprise -NOT about whether to move in that direction.

Thus, it is neither surprising nor necessarily discouraging that Poland finds it harder and harder to form a government, or that prime ministers don't last any longer there than they do in Italy. After all, Italy is a healthy capitalistic democracy, which is what we want to see Poland become. As for the Czech and Slovak split, one is always saddened to see friends divorce. But this is a very sensible, thoughtful, honorable divorce in which each party is doing the other a favor by separation. Both countries intend to continue to pursue democratic capitalism, but at significantly different rates. So what's wrong with that? The paces of life in Portugal and Denmark are very different, but both are stable capitalist democracies.

Of course, my optimistic assessment may prove to be dead wrong. But it was very hard to be gloomy while walking the streets of the three capitals this summer. Bratislava, Warsaw and especially Prague, all three, already have excellent restaurants, charming bistros and sidewalk cafes, and elegant retail shops full of beautiful, high-quality goods. These touristy places in the city centers, however, may not be good indicators of local living standards. We were lucky to be able to penetrate to the side streets and the suburbs, where there aren't so many elegant shops, but there are equally encouraging signs that living standards are rising rapidly: pizza bars, neighborhood groceries and hardwares, and piece goods stores as well as the ubiquitous kiosks and vegetable stands. These places were full of good local products at prices which no Westerner would consider "high" although the removal of Communist price controls and subsidies means that many locals do feel gouged. The stores also had lots of what we would call "cheap imports", the kind of stuff we find in Dollar General stores in small towns: low-quality dishes and textiles, plastic furniture and toys. However, these items look pretty wonderful in comparison to the truly tawdry stuff that passed for consumer goods under communism! The imports, like the local products, are expensive in terms of local income and the controlled prices under the Communists. Yet the shops are crowded, the trams and buses are full, people are spending money and carrying parcels and slurping ice cream cones, and one certainly does not have the impression of economies in deep

trouble. There is not much new construction going on, probably because Poland and Czechoslovakia are still working out ownership questions; no one wants to do much with property until they are sure whose property it is. However, VW and GM are moving ahead with car plants, and other investment is trickling in. And while new construction is not common, maintenance and repair of existing buildings and facilities have clearly become high priorities, which is a dramatic change from the Communist days. Conversations with university students do not indicate much anxiety. Indeed, American students seem more apprehensive about the US recession than Polish, Czech and Slovak students seem about the transition to capitalism!

While I would love to go on talking, you must all go back to work. I will only mention that these favorable and positive impressions were uniform over all the cities, towns and villages we visited: namely, that central Europe is plowing ahead with the conversion to capitalism and that prospects are good. Prague, said to have been Mozart's favorite city in all of Europe, is becoming again Prague the Golden. It is one of the most beautiful and exciting cities in the world, crowded this summer with teenagers and university students from all over the world, joyously sipping coffee or swilling the world's best beer on Charles Bridge and Wenceslas Square. In Warsaw, we went to Europe's largest flea market, which fills up the city soccer stadium and spills over in every direction. Russians come daily on the train from Minsk bringing fabulous handicraft items to trade; perhaps the last bargains in Europe, at least for us Americans with our poor weakened dollar. Poland is full of buyers and sellers from all over the world. We kept meeting Americans trying to sell everything from masking tape to agricultural implements; and we ourselves bought Polish glass and crystal until our bags wouldn't hold any more. The East is booming.

Obviously there will be many and very severe problems in integrating central Europe into the world economy from which the Soviets wrenched it the past 45 years, but three of the most important countries - Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic - are certainly going to make it. With luck, and careful support from us and the Western Europeans, it is not unreasonable to hope that all of central and eastern Europe will eventually make it.

The Cold war is over and communism lost, but capitalism and democracy have not yet won. They will not have won until the transitions in Europe are complete. At this stage, things look good. Let us rejoice in that fact. Let us not allow caution to overwhelm our confidence in capitalism and democracy, those two great social systems of which we have for fifty years been the world's leading proponent. Adam Smith was right: capitalism works. Thomas Jefferson was right: democracy works. The central Europeans are learning those facts; let us never forget them.

Thank you.

United States Department of Education

Fulbright-Hays Seminar Abroad

Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s: Social, Political,
and Economic Transformations

Summer 1992

REPORT: "Women and Revolution in Polish, Slovak and Czech
Societies"

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"They've lost... Women in Poland
and Czechoslovakia have lost
on all fronts... abortion...
education... social services.
Except for consumer goods, women
have regressed under liberation."

Joan Hoff, "Warsaw Voice,"
July 5, 1992

I read Joan Hoff's stark, bottom-line pronouncement near the start in Warsaw of our six-week Fulbright-Hays Seminar Abroad program in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which was in the process of peacefully splitting into separate Czech and Slovak republics. Our group of 16 educators from across the United States was there to study the political, economic and social changes unleashed with the fall of communism and the transition to free market economies and democratic institutions.

The program included a wide range of university lectures, seminars, meetings and field trips to historic sites. Our schedule reflected the assumption that it was necessary to

gain an understanding of cultural tradition and distinctiveness in order to see how past relates to present, and how in the wake of the 1989 revolutions the current situation is characterized by both dizzying change and enduring tradition.

This assumption necessitated numerous visits to important churches, museums, palaces and castles, which we appreciated for their own sake and related to rich national pasts and shed light on the paradoxes facing Poland and Czechoslovakia in transition.

While Fulbright-Hays colleagues shared the full daily (and sometimes evening) schedule of events, each also had an individual project. I hoped to study how the sweeping political and economic changes were affecting the lives of ordinary people, to look more at the micro than the macro levels, with emphasis on the quality of life for women and families in the midst of economic hardship and the "velvet divorce" in Czechoslovakia. Although I knew data was limited, I was interested in discovering how women were faring in the changing employment systems.

By the second week of our program, while we were still in Warsaw, it became apparent to most of us that the busy schedule allowed little free time for research and interviews related to individual projects. In my case at least, this precluded a comprehensive analysis or systematic overview of the topic, which looked increasingly elusive, so far from the top of the local agenda women's status and women's issues seemed to be.

I decided (as did others) that my approach would be eclectic. Drawing on hard data, articles, scholarly literature

and interviews, I would gather and assess as much information as possible. I relied heavily on personal observations and often tested hypotheses with fellow Fulbrighters. The plan was to then see what sort of mosaic was formed by the various tiles.

I realized that the tentative nature of my conclusions would be heightened by the fact that Polish, Czech and Slovak societies remain in the throes of startlingly rapid economic, political and social change, with many of the old values and institutions crumbling as new societies take shape.

Women in the formerly communist states of East Central Europe have plenty of experience with work outside the home. Women in Poland and Czechoslovakia have labored on the farms and in the mines, mills and factories for generations, a circumstance historically accelerated by the horrors of war and foreign occupation, the imperatives of postwar reconstruction, and 40 years of communist rule and misrule.

While American women have struggled for the right to work as a firefighter, miner or in other traditionally-male occupations if she so chooses, a great many women in the former Soviet-controlled lands long for liberation from the "double day" or "double shift" of domestic chores and household management, coupled with a full-time job outside the home. The outside employment is underpaid (on the average, 70% of what men make) and often dreary and unsafe, but also necessary to support a family in a time of rising living costs.

I considered Joan Hoff's grim verdict and wondered whether it really applied, whether they had "lost on all fronts," and what kinds of variations and exceptions there were. A

steady stream of experts from the American Embassy, the American Studies Center and the Office for U.S.-- Polish Educational Exchanges were hardly encouraging-- they repeatedly noted the absence of reliable statistics and hard data about Polish society. These academics and officials (and even our guides) always at some point would shrug and declare, "But no one really knows what's going on."

Before surveying aspects of women's roles in Poland and Czechoslovakia, a reminder about identifiable feminist movements or women's organizations is in order. It should be remembered that part of the Soviet legacy until recently was a plethora of party-approved women's agencies and voluntary organizations. Many of these were appendages of the now-discredited Leninist parties; many have been disbanded since the overthrow of communism in 1989, and other are moribund. So it is not surprising that, in the minds of many, the notion of women's groups and the rhetoric and ideology of equality are tainted and suspect, so redolent are they of the old dictatorial regimes.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia issues specific to women tend to be difficult to address, so eclipsed are they by tribulations and occasional triumphs of rapid economic changes. In a society gripped by inflation, unemployment, declining living standards and continuing uncertainty, the struggle for survival becomes paramount. In Poland, many journalists, commentators and politicians echoed the view of Ewa Lasecka-Wesolowska, a single mother who is Secretary to the Polish Senate Commission on the Environment, who told me, "There is so much going on-- people are exhausted by economic conditions and afraid things will get worse. We have pressing issues like political paralysis facing us. We're

re-discovering our national identity after all these years. Like the other ex-communist states, we're trying to fairly deal with those who were part of the old system and decide what is justice for whom. We're trying to privatize the economy. No one has the time to think about women's issues."

All of this raised the question for me as to whether economic hardship in Slovakia and the Czech lands would also crowd concerns specific to women off the political map and off the agenda of our study/tour. In Slovakia and Poland the additional complicating dynamics involved the Slovak declaration of sovereignty, logistical details of the separation, and the emotional and complex force of the Slovak independence movement.

For the Polish economy in the summer of 1992, the good news is that the country is well along in the process of transformation from centralized command economy to a free market system. Having gone "cold turkey" in 1990, the Solidarity government successfully freed most prices, allowed the currency to float and become convertible, reduced the foreign debt, cut some state subsidies, increased exports and foreign investment and began the complex process of privatizing businesses and industries and resolving questions related to ownership of private property. An advantage has been the fact that under Soviet domination Poland remained the least state-controlled in East Central Europe. Additionally, Poland is relatively homogeneous ethnically and religiously and has a long tradition of resistance to foreign rule and struggling to preserve a distinctive national identity, heritage and traditions.

The shocks of economic adjustment have been administered

without serious social dislocations, riots or other upheavals. But the process has been long, grinding, painful and chaotic, with no apparent end in sight. Some Poles worry about the cumulative affect of economic hard times on the fabric and level of civility in society.

Although unemployment is level ing off, it is still about 12%; inflation is down from 2000% but is still a serious problem at over 50% annualized. It is generally believed that unemployment has hurt women the most, though it is difficult to document this. New positions, when available in a stagnating economy (zero economic growth for 1992 would be considered "a success"), tend to go to young men. Few new jobs are available, skilled or unskilled, for women over 35 years of age.

Women in Poland are guaranteed equality by the 1952 Constitution, an exhortatory document modelled on the so-called Stalin Constitution of 1936. The 1952 Polish Constitution is still in effect but is of little benefit to women, given non-enforcement of labor codes. Women populate typical low-paying professions, such as those in education and culture. Because of traditional forms of job discrimination and the expected paid maternity leaves, women strike a "glass ceiling" on the vocational ladder.

A major feature of Poland's budding capitalism has been the explosion of small businesses, like kiosks, fruit stands, snack bars and dry goods shops. Many of the shops are not officially registered and business tax avoidance is considered easy. The thousands of new retail outlets have provided jobs for women as low-paid retail clerks.

Given the many restrictions on women in Poland, it

was surprising to learn that 40% to 50% of the new entrepreneurs in Poland are women (according to Miroslaw Grochowski of the European Institute for Regional and Local Development of the University of Warsaw, and Urszula Grzelonska of the Warsaw School of Economics). Some of these new businesses started up by women and run by women and families reflect "mattress money," pent-up savings from the pre-1989 days when people had money but there was nothing to buy, a source of capital assumed to be drying up in mid-1992.

Sociologists and economists like Romauld Kudlinski of the University of Warsaw point out that the new small businesses underscore the centrality of the family among bedrock institutions of Polish society, because so many of the businesses are family operations. Current economic hardship and uncertainty have made family members more economically interdependent, it is argued, and the family is often the one source of stability in a society undergoing radical changes. It must also be pointed out that families are under incredible stress because life is harder for almost everyone, and many lives have been turned upside down by revolutionary developments. The new entrepreneurs in Poland come from every region of the country and come from all economic classes.

The press in the West often runs capitalism-touting, human interest stories about the Polish entrepreneur who has "made it" and is loading up on all the luxury toys. It is important to remember that these great overnight fortunes are far from typical, representing at most 1% to 2% of the population.

Doctors, many of whom are women, lawyers, professors and other members of the "professional middle class" are so

woefully underpaid that they are not middle class at all but part of the working class. For example, a full university professor makes about \$225 a month.

Ironically, poor economic conditions can create opportunities for women with careers to advance professionally. For example, the serious lack of state funds has kept salaries at universities low enough to start driving men from academia in increasing numbers. Educated Polish women in other low-paying fields, like the new entertainment and publishing industries, have similarly advanced. But the overwhelming majority of Polish women, skilled and unskilled, are just plain weary from full-time employment, shopping, domestic labor, and struggling to keep families together, psychologically and financially.

What do Polish women want? Most of all, relief from economic hard times. But the "middle class ideal" for Polish women does not include staying at home (though a great many women would prefer more part-time job opportunities and/or more flexible hours). Polish women have been 50% of the workforce (or higher) for so long that a job or career is considered essential not only for economic reasons. As Professor Grzelonska put it, "Women don't want to spend life at home, because in this society there is absolutely no social life for women as housewives. A woman needs a job or career to have a social life that is considered normal." She added that she knew of some women whose wealthy husbands forced them to stay at home where they sit around with nothing to do.

The perennial lack of state funds in Poland has resulted in a breakdown of the delivery of social services, especially health and education, which has profoundly affected the lives

of women and children.

The system of child care is breaking down. This is a major aggravation and hardship for Polish women. Due to shortages of equipment and decaying buildings and lack of caring, qualified teachers (salaries are abysmal), families are increasingly seeking alternative care for young children. The most common preferred alternative typically involves a friend, neighbor or relative ("someone you know") taking in a few children as a completely unregulated small business.

For the last three years a radical restructuring of education has been underway in Poland. Before 1989, the educational bureaucracy was highly centralized with 20% of upper management being Communist Party members.

While males tend to teach at the upper levels and dominate the administrative positions and managerial positions, the teaching profession is quite feminized, particularly at the elementary level.

Schools throughout the country seem to be in crisis. Local governments are doing a better job of balancing budgets than the national government, but education remains centralized from the Ministry level on down (in spite of a lot of rhetoric but not much action about decentralizing the national school system). Schools are plagued by overcrowding, lack of funds for equipment, and bland, uninspired teachers and teaching methods from the communist era. The curriculum has been updated, highlighted by new accurate history texts and occasional replacement of the required Marxism-Leninism class with some form of religion class, but overall conditions in the schools are so bad that there is a burgeoning private school movement in Poland.

While the crumbling public system of education is of increasing concern, it is the rapid privatization of health care services that constitute the most significant threat to Polish women and children. Receiving even minimally adequate health care at doctors, clinics and hospitals is becoming more and more difficult, as numerous horror stories attest. An American lawyer who works for the Polish Senate suffered a broken arm and had to consult five orthopedic specialists before the break was properly set. Many Poles and Americans living in Poland say you have to leave the country to be sure of getting acceptable medical care. Evidently it is the system of health care that is becoming economically class-based most rapidly.

Poor environmental conditions also threaten the health of the population. Polluted water, unsafe air and toxic sites in Poland require a multi-billion dollar cleanup (which is inevitably balanced against the demands of economic development). Shortened life spans in some regions, increased incidence of heart attacks and malignant tumors, and high infant mortality and birth defect rates are attributed largely to poor environmental conditions, according to Andrzej Kassenberg, President of the Polish Institute for Sustainable Development.

Kassenberg reports that 50% of the population is living below defined minimal environmental standards, with 3-4 million living in toxic conditions. 60% to 70% of the land of Poland is seriously damaged by pollution. The situation is worst in the industrial areas of Upper Silesia, where about one third of Poland's 40 million people live. Experts agree that millions of people from this region need to be relocated for environmental health reasons, but they have no place to go and no jobs awaiting

them. Many of these people live and work in the shadow of the large, typically unprofitable state industrial enterprises such as steel, mining and petrochemicals (the disposition of which remains perhaps the most vexing question facing the managers of Poland's economy: the end of state subsidies to money-losing enterprises would cost the jobs of at least a million additional men and women).

The future of the country of course depends on the health of Polish women. The constantly increasing numbers of premature and low birth-weight babies and those born with congenital abnormalities testify to the dangerous environmental conditions and the declining quality and growing inaccessibility of adequate health care for Polish women.

Another strain on women and families in contemporary Poland is the severe shortage and high cost of housing. According to Lasecka-Wesolowska, it is estimated that 1.5 million families share their cramped dwelling with parents and siblings. The prices of apartments and houses have reached levels beyond affordability for even those families with two well-above-average earners. She emphasizes that the housing shortage is one of the major reasons for the overall low mobility in Polish society.

The housing shortage makes divorce much more difficult. Roughly half the Polish population have been impoverished since the beginning of 1990, and therefore the situation of the single mother (95% of single parents) becomes much more difficult. The system of child support can't keep pace with inflation, and a slow and cumbersome bureaucracy rarely can coerce payment from delinquent fathers.

The economic, social and political changes still underway

in Poland have put families under considerable stress. What limited figures there are, and conventional wisdom, suggest that alcoholism, domestic violence, and teen suicide rates are up. There is evidence of greater anomic behavior among youth. Prostitution is assumed to be on the rise, and is certainly more visible. There is little doubt that property crime and organized crime ~~is~~^{are} spreading.

To what extent have women in Poland been a part of the new political freedom and run for office? Certainly there is a tradition of women notables and luminaries in Polish politics, such as Wladyslawa Macieszyna, who was known as Wladyslawa Wagner during World War II exploits, and Dorota Khuszynska, who served in parliaments from 1928-1952.

Following the election of 1990, the first free election since the 1940s, there were 44 women deputies in the Sejm or lower house and eight in the Senate, which represented about 10% of each body, a rate of participation which roughly parallels that of local government bodies like town councils (according to Professor Kudlinski).

Although the proportion of Polish women elected to positions in government and political parties is similar to that of many Western European countries, and the new Prime Minister, Hanna Suchocka, is a woman, prospects for women to percolate to the positions of leadership in government and politics are not promising. Political parties (of which there are 123) tolerate a few women on the electoral slate for appearance sake but women occupy virtually none of the top posts. Women in government tend to be prevented from occupying leadership positions such as committee heads, directors of parliamentary offices and staffs,

and managerial positions in the ministries and executive departments (with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being the worst offender with only 0.5% women in positions called "managerial").

With regard to voter participation, Polish women in 1992, like their male counterparts, have turned out for elections, but there are recent signs of seriously diminishing voter turnout. Voters are disaffected by what seems like a continuous electoral process, the complexity and chaos of the party system, the frustrating parliamentary gridlock, the same old hacks in power and demagogic appeals for support. The advent of routinized Italian-style revolving-door governments in 1993 will surely further disaffect voters.

Polish women have a long history of family planning and they favor abortion rights, in spite of Vatican dictates in an overwhelmingly Catholic country. It is true that religion is a powerful force in Poland and is crucial to Polish culture. But in Polish society there are also definite boundaries for church authority. For most Polish couples, retaining reproductive rights is more important than ever, given the economic crisis.

It is true that a few of the religious political parties are trying to turn the abortion issue into an emotional campaign issue, American-style, but most observers believe that these parties will get a lot of short-term attention but ultimately fail in their attempt to restrict Polish women's right to choose.

But of much greater import in the lives of women is that the health care crisis is making safe abortions less available. Many women are concerned that in the near future an increasingly privatized health care system, the only safe abortions may be for the rich in private clinics.

The collapse of communism in Poland has unleashed other forces, some of which have implications for the status of women. There is a national renaissance taking place in Poland as a result of emancipation from Soviet hegemony and one-party rule. The end of socialism has ushered in a resurgence of that which is traditional and conservative in Polish society, often celebrating ethnic, folk and religious traditions in the culture, and this is not always good news for women. Many women feel pushed to accept the more traditional peasant roles for women-- subservient, domestic and a less than equal partner.

Lasecka-Wesolowska, the Senate staffer and student of the changing status of Polish women, join those who claim that the popular culture increasingly depicts heroic and idealized images of Polish women from Poland's past. In these images, Polish women are put on a pedestal-- she is strong, reverent, persistent and wise-- but always on behalf of her man, with her man, or filling in for her man. It seems that some Polish women, especially in rural areas, are regressing as they are being forced into the more traditional roles which deprive them of autonomy.

But to the extent that Polish women are regressing, I argue that this is almost always due to economic malaise, rather than cultural factors, and that a great many more women are successfully taking advantage of new freedoms. Many women, from the peasant and more privileged classes, from cities and towns, are adapting to economic, political and social change, are acting on their ideas and capitalizing on new opportunities to the benefit of themselves and their families. Most of this success by Polish women has been the result of grinding and arduous

labor and some willingness to take risks.

So I think it is misleading to lump all women in Poland together and assert as Professor Hoff (who is also known in academic circles in the United States as Joan Hoff-Wilson) does that they "have lost on all fronts."

The truth is that Polish women-- both winners and losers in the new era-- are more complex and heterogeneous than that. As Monika Beyer, the cultural editor of "Spotkanie" magazine put it, "Joan Hoff is completely wrong in her conclusions because she fails to see the difference between problems of money and problems of women."

Women in Poland and Czechoslovakia continue to experience sexist discrimination and gender inequality in spite of a long tradition of constitutional and legislative protection and official egalitarian ideology. Of this there is no question. It is much more difficult to analyze and assess the phenomenon of women regressing as a result of the re-emergence of folk and religious values and traditions.

Another possible explanation for the absence of an organized women's movement in Poland and Czechoslovakia was offered by Renata Kovacova, the Foreign Affairs Manager of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists in Bratislava, and in a slightly different form in Prague by Vera Kamenickova of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Their thesis is that, since no one had freedom for so long under the communists, society is still struggling to bring the general populace up to minimal standards of rights, and that process is complex. It is a process that involves civil, legal, political and property rights. Until this lengthy

process has been completed, there will be little interest in considering the rights and status of women, due to the fundamental paternalism that pervades Polish, Czech and Slovak societies.

We crossed into Slovakia after touring the Zakopane region in the Tatras Mountains in Southern Poland. Slovakia was more of a conservative, traditional society, according to our contacts in Poland. It was suggested that the earthy peasant Slovak culture and the tumult of the independence movement would further limit women, and that Hungarian and Rom (Gypsy) women (each minority group comprising about 10% of the population of Slovakia) would fare even worse once a Slovak ethnic national state was created (assuming that day would come to pass).

The dismantling old Communist Party-dominated political and economic structures in Slovakia has proceeded more slowly in Slovakia than in either Poland or the Czech lands. In comparison to the Czech economy, the Slovak is considerably less vibrant, attracts less foreign investment and IMF financing, and has a more acute budget shortfall and currency weakness.

But perhaps the most conspicuous different involves unemployment. The official unemployment figure, for what it's worth, is 14%. Conventional wisdom in Bratislava is that the rate is really much higher, and that the 14% figure is Prague-centric. Whatever the case, many areas of Slovakia, such as Bardejov, suffer unemployment in the 20% to 30% range. Exacerbating the problem is the need to shift from an Eastward-oriented to a Westward-oriented market, even while many Polish, Czech and Slovak exports are shut out of European Economic Community markets. Some of the unemployment in Slovakia is also due to the shutdown of much of the arms industry by Vaclav Havel. Many Slovak politicians

revere Havel as moral-philosopher and resistance leader ^{but} ~~his~~
resent his sudden decision to close plants and throw more Slovaks
out of work.

Approximately 20% of Slovak Gross Domestic Product
is in the petrochemical industry, resulting in hazardous working
conditions and incidences of heavy metals in soils and groundwater.
Other major polluters which impair the health of the Slovak
people are aluminum processing facilities and pulp mills.

In Poland (where there are more than 200 environmental
organizations) and Czechoslovakia there is growing awareness
about the relationship between environmental quality and public
health. However, environmental education is still relatively
new, and public ignorance about nutritional issues, prenatal
care, and household hygiene contributes to making a bad situation
worse, especially as they affect women and children.

Our group was in Bratislava, outside the parliament
building in fact, when the Slovak National Council declared
the sovereignty of the Slovak nation in July. Headlines in the
English-language press (the "Prague Post" and "Prognosis") proclaimed,
"Slovak Leaders Rejoice as Nation Forges Future," and Vladimir
Meciar, the leader of the nationalist Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia and Slovak Premier, cried, "We have waited for this
moment for more than a thousand years."

The "velvet divorce" seems an odd separation. Polls
say majorities in both Slovakia and Czech lands oppose the impending
split. The two groups have never fought, don't seem to dislike
each other on a personal basis, and the grievances and differences
that divide them don't seem overwhelming. The Meciar-led independence

movement is a coalition of parties which came to power in part by overtly recruiting women candidates for office. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which has become a force for national liberation and redemption to some and a mindless juggernaut to others, has also been openly appealing to women voters.

Slovakian nationalism proved to be an elusive and complex phenomenon. It seems rooted in emotion and a sense of being history's victims for centuries. Indeed, while Czechs believe the reasons for the separation involve economic differences, the Slovaks see the problems in terms of equality and fundamental fairness. Slovaks resent what they see as a patronizing attitude and second-class treatment from the Czechs.

Critics of the current Slovak nationalist movement worry about the implications of independence for women and minorities in Slovakia. This movement wants to celebrate cultural uniqueness in a national ethnic state, free from outside interference and manipulation by Prague.

The potential for conflict and violence between Slovaks and Hungarians is greater than the potential for clashes between Czechs and Slovaks. In Slovakia, four of five million people are Slovaks and the Hungarian minority numbers about half a million. In the worst case scenario, Hungary intervenes to protect the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. There seems to be an inherent contradiction between the concept of an ethnic state on the one hand and the maintenance of democratic principles on the other.

According to this less benign view of the Meciar-led nationalist movement in Slovakia, women will feel themselves

under increasing pressure to conform to the Ideal of Slovak Womanhood, which features glorification of labor-intensive domestic work, especially on food preparation and preservation and textiles; child-rearing and household management; and full-time employment outside the home, preferably on the farm. Evidently, Slovak men are reportedly already resistant to helping out with domestic chores, and Slovak women cannot expect relief from either the state or men.

Traditional patriarchy restricts women in Slovakia but their greatest concern emanates from overall economic stagnation, rising living costs, and breakdowns in social services, including health care and education. Many farm families, being somewhat economically self-sufficient or tied to local markets, are hurt less by economic hard times, but in many areas child services are contracting and schools, clinics and hospitals are strapped for funds and are beginning to charge for more and more of the services they dispense.

In Czechoslovakia the teaching profession is as feminized as it is in Poland. There is an identified need and campaign to draw young males into the teaching profession, but salaries are so low that few young men even consider it. A full university professor makes about \$200 a month and is an untenured employee of the state. Teacher salaries average \$140 per month, not nearly enough to support a family. Relative to the cost of living, teacher salaries were higher in 1948, reports Jan Obdrzalek, Director of the Press and Information Department of the Czech Ministry of Education in Prague. Many of the teachers in the national system resist innovation and are capable only of the

old authoritarian teacher-centered approaches in the classroom.

Although the Meciar independence coalition recruited and appealed to women (23 of 150 elected members of parliament are women), it would be a mistake to conclude that women are widely involved in politics and government. In both Slovakia and the Czech lands, women rarely occupy important positions.

Under the heading "Women in Weakness," the publication "Svobodne Slovo" (July 8, 1992) laments this under-participation. In the presidium of the Czech National Council, there is only one woman, and there are three women out of 40 in the presidium of the Federal Assembly-- one from the Czech republic and two from the Slovak. Two women are members of the Slovak cabinet (in health and education posts, which is stereotypical down to local governments), there are none in the Czech government or in the presidium of the Slovak National Council.

As reported in the "Prague Post" (July 14-20, 1992), the article said, "Our women have never been attracted by politics although they have heard plenty of bombastic phrases about equality and about equal conditions for work. The reality was, of course, different and even now it cannot be said that they have less work and worries. But of course so few women in governments, parliaments and parties is really a rare phenomenon. Women politicians are obviously still a hard-to-get article, although in many fields they prevail not only in numbers but also in quality of work and success." Of course, these "many fields" are usually the lower paying jobs and professions, especially in Slovakia where wages and family income lags behind those of the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia.

The report concluded: "It seems that we have not yet grown to the stage when women (educated, clever, intelligent, efficient, practical, serious, with knowledge of facts), too, will have the courage and time to enter the political life. Nevertheless, the woman element on our political scene is definitely lacking."

Viera Danielova, an ethnographer and elected MP in the ruling HZDS-led coalition, claims that many women don't know if the "new rules" encourage choices and autonomy for Slovakian women.

"For many people the cultural revival means that some women are being downright counter-revolutionary if they assert themselves outside the home," she explained. Many women lack the time, opportunity, or contacts to get started in the public arena.

Among many Slovak, Czech and Polish women, the image of American women is one of radicalism and heightened militancy, the result of TV and films. As a result, many women in East Central Europe want men to be more understanding and want improved gender balance in society but say they don't want to go "as far" as American women presumably have gone.

Numerous inquiries about domestic violence in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech lands elicited little information. There are no official statistics published on the battering of women and children. Abusers of women are virtually all male, and public awareness, education and discussion about domestic violence tends to be about where it was in the United States a short time ago-- in the closet.

Even though the old communist regimes provided a range of social services, there were no counseling facilities or shelters for battered women. The churches and volunteer organizations are just starting to provide some limited services. The expectation is that NGO activity will steadily increase, including groups with roots in the West, such as the Salvation Army and 12-Step organizations.

Why aren't the post-communist governments doing more? One reason is that there is virtually no legislation at all addressing issues specific to women and children. Such legislation is not even being introduced, much less passed, so tight are public funds and so clogged are parliamentary and legislative agendas, not that these issues would generate much interest in the best of circumstances.

The daily problems which confront single mothers in the three societies are particularly acute because of the housing shortage and overall economic crisis, it is moreso because of a cumbersome child support system which can't keep pace with the rising cost of living. Part of the problem lies in the fact that each individual child support case must be heard individually before a judge. This means that women who petition for increased child support reflecting rising living costs must constantly go back to court, a time-consuming and often frustrating process. Many men are unable to make payments and others evade. In the climate of rapid political and economic change, it is easy for men to hide income or part of it. The court-ordered enforcement machinery moves slowly and cannot garnish wages.

Economic conditions in the Czech lands of Bohemia and

and Moravia were somewhat better than in Poland and Slovakia. Unemployment was down to about 3% and was said to be 0% in Prague. The Czech lands receive the bulk of loans from private and international lending agencies and most new foreign investment, 80% of which is German. 95% of prices have been freed, with only energy, rents and public transportation subsidized, with the result being an abundance of consumer goods which are increasingly expensive for the average consumer. Rents are up 100% in Prague but are still quite low.

But private housing remains very expensive for most Czechs (thanks in part to an influx of ten to fifteen thousand Americans, many of whom are able and willing to pay high rents). New building is taking place but housing construction remains more boomlet than boom because of the serious lack of capital. Millions of families live in block-like workers housing projects which are Soviet-inspired. Joint ventures to provide prefabricated housing units are in the works, anticipating an economy that will heat up in the mid-1990s.

Some of the worst environmental sites in the world threaten the health of million of Czech citizens, especially in the industrial basin around Most and Litvinov, near the German border 60 kilometers northwest of Prague. This area provides more than 80% of the coal, electrical production, and chemical processing facilities for all of Czechoslovakia. The hills surrounding the industrial basin intermittently trap airflow and create temperature inversions, which make the already toxic air worse and especially harmful to many pregnant women and young children, according to environmentalist Petr Pakosta who works in the

town council office in Most. In the 50-kilometer-wide industrial basin 50% of surface soils have been destroyed or damaged by mining operations. Soils and ground water have been polluted throughout the region. As a result, overall mortality is increasing in the Most-Litvinov area. Life expectancy is seven years less than the rest of Czechoslovakia. Residents are paid a stipend (called a "stabilization bonus") of \$80 a year for enduring the toxic living conditions.

It is important to remember that accurate data about many of the health hazards have only recently been published. Residents of polluted zones in the former communist countries have long been aware of many of the hazards, but only recently did they gain the political freedom to do something about the environment. Unfortunately, in most cases the costs of closing down major polluters remain prohibitive (and the cleanup will cost much more).

Compared to women in Poland and Slovakia, Czech women are marginally better off, tending to be better educated and enjoying slightly higher living standards. Czech men are reported to be more likely to help out with child-care, shopping, cooking, and cleaning, which is attributed to the relatively greater influence of the West.

But the reality for most Czech women is regression in living standards due to rising costs, the grind of the "double day," discriminatory practices in the employment system, and cutbacks in social services accelerated by the economic policies of the Friedmanite Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

Chances are that economic hardship will continue in the short run in the three societies, which many claim impacts

hardest on lives of women and children. Many women in Poland and Czechoslovakia feel that most men keep going to their jobs and working or pretending to work, but they, because of their second-class status, are hurt the most by political and economic changes.

Given these difficult circumstances and the persistence of traditional patriarchy, it is difficult for the handful of activists for women's causes to set a realistic agenda.

Some women pointed out it always seems to be people's private lives that are the last to change, and so it is most realistic to press for change in the public arena, fighting for legislative and legal remedies by lobbying for a specific and limited list of laws and programs to benefit women while raising public awareness.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUMMIT

A COOPERATIVE LEARNING
LESSON
FOR
WORLD GEOGRAPHY



NANCY KINDRED
MCNEIL HIGH SCHOOL
AUSTIN, TEXAS

This lesson will reveal the environmental degradation of Eastern European nations using the Danube River as an example of regional pollution. Students will use problem solving skills in a group setting to address solutions to protect the environment collectively.

Students will:

- * Trace the course of a river from its source to its mouth.
- * Locate and name countries through which the river flows.
- * Collect data.
- * Draw conclusions of relationships between population distribution and other factors.
- * Work cooperatively to solve problems.

1. This lesson is one in a series on environmental problems in East-Central Europe.
2. At the beginning of class, the teacher will lead a review discussion on the five themes of geography.
3. Students will complete handout 1 locating the route of the Danube River including the countries that it flows through or borders. The students will identify uses of the Danube River.
4. Review answers with students.
5. Divide the class into groups of 3-4 students.
6. Advise students that each will represent the president or leader of one of the eight countries that the Danube River either flows through or borders.
7. Presidents in their groups will be attending a regional conference on environmental issues and more specifically on pollution problems of the Danube River.
8. Give students a Political/Economic Data Sheet from which they will start the research process and make their decisions.
9. Advise students that using the Data sheets and understanding the necessity to alleviate pollution of the Danube, they are to cooperatively reach consensus on how to resolve the pollution problems associated with the Danube River, keeping in mind the political and economic repercussions in their own countries.
10. Students should be given approximately 120 minutes over 2 days to research in the library and develop a plan to solve the problem. They should select a spokesperson for their group to report their plan to the whole group.
11. On the next day, each spokesperson will report on how their group reached consensus and teacher will lead a classroom discussion on each groups responses.

THE DANUBE RIVER: EASTERN EUROPE'S DARK DAWN

Throughout history, rivers have served many functions. Obviously most have been sources of drinking and irrigation water for growing civilizations. They have also served as transportation routes, boundaries between countries and regions, fishing grounds, sources of energy and convenient sewers. East/Central Europe is drained by a large number of rivers, but many today are being overwhelmed with domestic and industrial pollution. The same water is used and reused many times over in the course of its journey from the headwaters to the ocean or sea. One city's industrial dump is the next city's drinking supply.

Use a colored pencil or marker, a Goodes World Atlas, and a map of Eastern Europe to complete this activity.

1. The Danube River cuts through much of East/Central Europe and is the most important inland waterway of the region. Locate and mark with an X the headwaters of the Danube River in southwestern Germany just north of Zurich, Switzerland.

2. On your East/Central European map, trace the Danube's route from its source near Zurich where you placed an X, to where it flows into the Black Sea, some 1,766 miles to the east. It helps to follow the course of the river if you remember that the Danube flows through Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade. The river enters the Black Sea at the Danube Delta.

3. List the European countries that the Danube either borders or flows through.

4. List the national capitals that are located on the Danube River.

5. Using the "Population" map describe the population density along the Danube River.

6. Name the port city near the mouth of the Danube. _____

7. Although water transportation is the cheapest means of moving products, it is also one of the slowest. Small, high-value items are typically shipped by air. Bulky, low-value items are sent by water whenever possible. Trace the water route on your maps for a cargo sent by boat from Naples, Italy, to Budapest, Hungary via the Danube River.

a. Name the seas that the cargo would pass through along the way.

b. Approximately how many miles would such a journey entail? _____

c. How far is it, by air, from Naples to Budapest? _____

d. Using the "Minerals" map, identify 2 products which might be shipped down river to the Black Sea.

8. Which countries would most likely use the Danube River as a source of power?

9. Which countries would be most likely to use the Danube as a source of water for agriculture?

10. Which countries would be most likely to use the Danube as a means of transportation?

11. Which country do you think would be most concerned about protecting the quality of the water in the Danube River? Explain.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Austria

You are the president of Austria and your country depends on manufacturing, especially steel, machinery, and chemicals. For years your country has been dumping industrial waste, sometimes toxic, into the Danube River. This has been done primarily because Germany has done the same thing with their industrial waste and by the time water runs downstream from Germany, it is already full of pollutants. You would be willing to place tighter governmental restrictions on industry if Germany would clean up their act.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Germany

You are the chancellor of Germany and your economy depends heavily on machinery production with plants located along the Danube in the southwest because transportation on the Danube facilitates exporting your huge, bulky items. With the recent reunification of Germany, plants could be relocated into the industrial areas of eastern Germany where there are other convenient sites for transportation. However, you are aware that most of the countries downstream from Germany are polluting the river even more than your country, and until they stop there is not need for Germany to take any action.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Czechoslovakia

You are president of Czechoslovakia and recognized as a leader in the area in the fields of science and technology. Your major industrial area is in Bohemia where the Elbe River is the primary river used for industrial manufacturing and transportation routes. Due to a lack of fertile land, farms are organized into collectives and land use is at a premium. Consequently, your government has used the Danube River to dump human waste into it rather than build waste treatment plants or municipal waste landfills. Besides, the Danube River is already polluted by countries upstream from Czechoslovakia.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Hungary

You are the President of Hungary. Hungary's economy depends on both industry and agriculture. Iron, steel, and bauxite ranks as the principal resources. Coal and iron ore are transported along the Danube River to steel processing plants. Without industrial sites along the river, Hungary's economy would be shattered. Although you are aware that your country is responsible for large amounts of air pollution from burning lignite coal, there has been little enforcement of anti-pollution laws in your country. Likewise, there have been reports that many of the steel processing plants along the river have been releasing pollutants into the river, but anti-pollution devices have been determined to be too costly for your recently emerging capitalist economy. Any concessions made by your country may be very costly.

NEWSFLASH!! Sovereignty has been declared by the former Slovak Republic. How will this affect your central government and the degradation of the Danube River?

Political/Economic Data Sheet Bulgaria

You are the President of Bulgaria. Your country, like Romania, shares a common border with the Danube River as the boundary line. You are self-sufficient in agricultural production, but your industries are still developing. Your country is not as responsible as others for industrial pollution, but the farther downstream the Danube River flows, the more polluted it gets. Consequently, although your country has little industrial waste, human waste has been dumped into the Danube for many years and the river is already polluted anyway. Your country borders the Black Sea and thus you have adequate industrial transportation sites. Until countries upstream from you stop polluting the Danube there is little need for your country to seek alternative ways of disposing of waste.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Romania

You are the President of Romania. Although much of Romania is mountainous, they have sizable oil and natural gas fields. However, much of the land is unsuitable for agricultural production. Most of your exports that are shipped by water, go out the Black Sea. However, your country does make substantial use of the Danube for other purposes. Due to the fact that the Danube is already substantially polluted by the time it reaches your country, you have allowed sludge from human waste processing plants to be dumped into the river. This sludge flows directly into the Black Sea. Although it may be highly unlikely, if countries upstream would stop polluting the water, then Romania would be more strict in the enforcement of its pollution law.

Political/Economic Data Sheet Yugoslavia


You are the president of Yugoslavia. Farming remains Yugoslavia's major economic activity. You do have deposits of lead, bauxite, oil, and natural gas. As much of Yugoslavia borders the Adriatic Sea, it does not have to rely too much on the Danube for transporting bulky items. On several occasions your country openly dumped mercury and cadmium deposits into the river. However, since there are no regulatory agencies to enforce pollution problems you continue to allow your industries to pollute the Danube. In addition, pollution control devices would be costly.

NEWSFLASH!! Sovereignty has been declared by three ethnic groups in your country. How does this affect your central government and the degradation of the Danube?

EXTENSIONS OF THE LESSON

1. Prepare Hypercard stacks to illustrate the course of the Danube River and the environmental problems which are associated with it.
2. Prepare a Multimedia presentation illustrating the course of the Danube River and the environmental problems which are associated with it.
3. Prepare a Video presentation illustrating the course of the Danube River and the environmental problems which are associated with it.

Eastern Europe



**The Architects of a New Era : Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, and
the Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe**

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Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990's
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1

During the past several years, the popular rebellions and dynamic forces of reform that led to the elimination of the Soviet Union and the transformation of Eastern Europe have captured broad international attention, making leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Lech Walesa, and Vaclav Havel popular symbols of the great historical tides that are bringing a new, more democratic order to the region. Some of these leaders achieved success by working within the system to eliminate the machinery of repression and initiate widespread political and economic reforms. Others have captured the popular imagination by articulating the hopes and dreams of those who, like themselves, have been kept out of the corridors of power because they were artists, writers, workers, or just common citizens.

In his autobiographical work, Disturbing the Peace, former dissident playwright and current Czech President Vaclav Havel claims that "the real test of a man is not how well he plays the role he has invented for himself, but how well he plays the role that destiny assigned him."¹ Accordingly, the new leaders who emerged in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after the mid-1980's have been instrumental in channeling the forces of reform, while at the same time realizing that long-term political and economic developments have created the context in which these same reforms became necessary, or at least desirable. Gail Sheehy, author of a biography of Mikhail Gorbachev, proposes that a good leader is one who can balance the idea that he is a "cork on the river of history" with the apparently contradictory notion that "everything he does matters." In other words, individual leaders can make significant contributions to history, but these same leaders operate within the broader context of long-term national or international developments.²

In Eastern Europe, the momentous events of 1989-1993, from the fall of the Berlin Wall through the "velvet divorce" of Czechs and Slovaks, must be viewed within the context of a post-1945 environment shaped by the repressive Communist regimes of the Soviet bloc. These regimes limited personal freedoms and economic opportunities in favor of ideological conformity and state control of the nation's population and resources. In his famous 1975 letter to Czechoslovakian Communist Party leader Dr. Gustav Husak, Vaclav Havel criticized his nation's own communist government as "a bureaucratic order of grey monotony that stifles all individuality."³ Through the extensive use of its

"hideous spider," or secret police, the communist regime stifled the creative energies of the nation and created an environment in which "despair leads to apathy, apathy to conformity, conformity to routine performance -- which is then quoted as evidence of 'mass political involvement.'"⁴ According to Havel, all that remained in his homeland under the communist regime was a system of "order without life."⁵ In order to eliminate this system of repression, however, a new type of leader had to emerge to challenge the postwar status quo in the region. Given the commanding role of the Soviet Union in the affairs of its Eastern European neighbors, this leader would almost by necessity need to arise there first.

Accordingly, it was after achieving the position of General-Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985 that Mikhail Gorbachev sought to return some measure of "life" to the bureaucratic muddle and inefficient economy of his own country, the Soviet Union. The national legacy that Gorbachev had inherited from Joseph Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev was one of economic stagnation, bureaucratic rigidity, and favoritism and corruption among the party elite. In instituting his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev was seeking a solution to the Soviet Union's economic frustrations as well as an internal renewal of the Communist Party in order to preserve the leading role of the party in Soviet life. In doing so, he would borrow ideas from previous reformers such as Nikita Khrushchev and Yuri Andropov, while at the same time seeking to build a popular base of support for controlled reforms. Gorbachev was particularly interested in courting the support of a young generation intrigued by Western ideas and frustrated by the stranglehold of the party gerontocracy on national affairs.

One of the common denominators that links many of the new leaders to emerge in Eastern Europe in the 1980's is the populist instinct that allowed Gorbachev, as well as Yeltsin, Havel and Walesa, to harness popular discontent in the name of political action and reform. In Havel's play, Largo Desolato, a worker named Sidney tries to convince dissident writer Leopold Nettles to continue risking imprisonment in the name of truth because ordinary people require a leader who can articulate their hopes and fears. Sidney tells Nettles, "You'll know what's best to do, after all you're a philosopher and I'm an ordinary bloke, a nobody."⁶ The ability to express the concerns of the "ordinary bloke" has helped Gorbachev and others to pave the way to new order in Eastern Europe, but the complex nature

of social and economic problems and the realities of the political arena can reverse the polarity of populist support against the leader who has been carried along by its momentum. In Gorbachev's case, declining public support within the Soviet Union for his slow approach to reform in turn allowed for the emergence of a new popular hero in Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation.

Unlike the playwright Havel and the labor leader Walesa, Gorbachev and Yeltsin rose to prominence as "insiders," party bureaucrats whose careers followed relatively traditional patterns until the events of the late 1980's changed their personal destinies. Havel and Walesa, meanwhile, were "outsiders" lacking the privileges and authority of party functionaries and representing "the people" as opposed to "the system." Ironically, it was Gorbachev, an eventual victim of popular discontent and political realities, who in great measure helped create the environment in which the others have gained notoriety and personal power.

In his 1978 essay, "The Power of the Powerless," Vaclav Havel wrote of the importance of "living in truth" under a communist regime that weakened the human spirit and limited individual freedoms. By "living in truth," Havel meant "any means by which a person or a group revolts against manipulation: anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers's strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration."⁷ If Lech Walesa came to represent the labor leader as political outsider-turned-insider, Havel would achieve the presidency of Czechoslovakia as an intellectual, a dissident writer, and even a fan of the rock music subculture. Havel would come to speak for those who were "living in truth" without access to political power, the "poets, painters, musicians, or simply ordinary citizens who were able to maintain their human dignity" in the face of political repression.⁸

Vaclav Havel was born into a reasonably well-off family in 1936 as the grandson of a noted architect and the son of a man who continued his father's work by building the Lucerna and Barrandov Restaurant Enterprises. As a child, Havel lived at his family's country estate and attended a village school where he stood out as the son of a gentleman, enjoying the benefits commensurate with such social status. However, Vaclav was ashamed of the advantages he received and often felt isolated from his peers and a victim of class friction, the latter becoming a severe problem when Havel's bourgeois family became the target of social prejudice under the Communist regime. In 1948, the Communists confiscated all of the Havel family's property and made life difficult for them, as well as

for all those labelled class enemies. As a result, Havel found it difficult to complete his education the way he had originally planned. He finished elementary school in 1951 and was briefly apprenticed as a carpenter before spending five years as a laboratory assistant. In furthering his education beyond that point, Havel had hoped to study film, a field in which his uncle had achieved a measure of success, but he was instead pushed into transportation economics. Eventually Havel gravitated toward the arts, first as a stagehand at the ABC Theatre in Prague and later in doing odd jobs for On the Balustrade, a theatre that would allow Havel to stage several of his plays during the mid- to late-1960's. After public performances of plays such as The Garden Party, The Memorandum, and Increased Difficulty of Concentration, Havel decided to continue his university studies on a part-time basis, eventually receiving a degree in drama from Prague University.⁹

In the years before the Soviet invasion crushed the Prague Spring reformers in 1968, Havel was still a fairly obscure playwright fighting to keep a literary magazine, Tvar, alive in a fight against government censorship.¹⁰ During the Prague Spring he joined fellow democratic reformers in lobbying the government for change. However, when Soviet tanks ended the experiment in "socialism with a human face," Havel's activities in 1968 led to a ban on the publication and performance of his plays, as well as police harassment.¹¹ Seeking a change of lifestyle and a solid paycheck in 1974, Havel began a ten-month stint as a laborer with the Trutnov Brewery near Hradecek. His experiences carrying kegs and interacting with fellow brewery workers inspired a one-act play, Audience, which Havel completed in 1975.¹²

Since the founding of the modern Czech state under the philosopher and initial president Thomas Masaryk in 1919, intellectuals in that country had played a major role in public life and contributed to a dynamic national culture. However, after the brutal suppression of the Prague Spring and the institution of repressive measures against artists and writers, the nature of intellectual discourse was transformed and many writers were forced to circulate their ideas underground in the samizdat, or "self-publishing," network. Havel ran his own "Edice Expedice" samizdat publishing venture and maintained strong connections with other artists, writers and musicians.¹³ Havel was especially close to the rock group, Plastic People of the Universe, sharing an interest in Andy Warhol and the Velvet Underground and even allowing the band to record two albums at his farm. Although

the band claimed to be less interested in political change than in the freedom to play their own idiosyncratic form of rock music, the members of Plastic People of the Universe were put on trial by the government in 1976 after performing semi-legally for five years. They were sentenced to prison terms for violating restrictions placed upon their performances and for "disturbing the peace."¹⁴

The arrest of his musician friends inspired Havel to join with other Czech intellectuals in drawing up the manifesto, "Charter 77," which called for the monitoring of human rights violations as defined by the Czech constitution. The signees of the charter represented various elements of Czech society, including workers, and soon became subject to harassment, arrest and even murder by the secret police. As a result of his work with the Charter 77 movement, Havel was arrested and released on and off during 1977 and 1978.¹⁵ In 1979, Havel, Jiri Dienstbier, and other members of the Committee to Defend the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS) were put on trial and found guilty of subversion for copying and distributing written material, mostly documents on judicial proceedings, that were deemed criminal by the government. As a result, Havel would spend almost all of the next four years in prison before being paroled due to poor health in 1983.¹⁶

Although the period after 1977 was a difficult one for Havel and his fellow chartists, the underground political network that emerged as a result of Charter 77 would prove invaluable when the opportunity arose to challenge the communist government in the Velvet Revolution of 1989.¹⁷ This was the same Charter 77 that Havel once described as "an icebreaker with a kamikaze crew."¹⁸ However, when student demonstrators met with violent government retaliation in November 1989, many of the former signees of Charter 77 emerged as founders and leaders of many different groups aimed at challenging the power of the government. From January to May, 1989, Vaclav Havel again spent time in prison for dissident activities, but in November of that year he appeared at the Cinoherni Klub in Prague to announce the birth of Civic Forum, a movement that represented "Charter 77 writ large." The Civic Forum program, "What We Want," was then drafted by a number of Havel's colleagues, including signatories of Charter 77. And when Civic Forum was allowed to send a delegation to negotiate with the government and eventually to convince the nation's leaders to write the leading role of the Communist Party out of the constitution, it was Havel who led the delegation.¹⁹

Within weeks after the outbreak of the "velvet revolution," the Communist Party had forfeited many of its major political functions to Civic Forum and its Slovak ally, Public Against Violence. When Civic Forum pressured the communists who were still in power to undertake reforms aimed at democratization and a market economy, the transition to a new Czechoslovakia had begun without even waiting for national elections. When the opportunity finally arrived in December, 1989, Vaclav Havel was chosen by the legislature to serve as Czechoslovakia's president, a position he protested that he did not wish to occupy, although he offered to serve in that capacity for a limited time if his countrymen desired it. Havel's New Year's address to the nation included the optimistic declaration to Czechs and Slovaks that "your government has been returned to you."²⁰

In early June of 1990, an electoral victory by Civic Forum and Public Against Violence in national parliamentary elections furthered the consolidation of political influence by pro-democracy forces as the allied movements won 170 of the 300 seats in the Federal Assembly and the Communists a small, but surprising, 48 seats.²¹ As a result of the strong showing by democratic political organizations, Vaclav Havel was officially elected president of Czechoslovakia for a two-year term by a 234-50 vote in the Federal Assembly early the following month.²²

In addition to supporting Havel's presidency, the new national parliament set to work implementing measures that would open the way for the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the guarantee of a minimum standard of living, and the introduction of welfare and environmental measures. As part of the plan for privatization of industry, the government also announced that private citizens would be issued vouchers that would allow them to acquire shares in state companies. In the international sphere, Havel proposed altering Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union and the neighboring nations of Eastern Europe by scrapping the Warsaw Pact and redefining Czechoslovakia's role in Europe.²³

However, if the post-communist era was promising a new civic society and progress toward a free market, the drastic changes brought about by the Velvet Revolution also revitalized Slovak nationalism and revived the decades-old debate over Slovakia's status within the Czechoslovak federal state. From an individual standpoint, Havel balanced a strong pride in his Czech heritage with a

broader sense of Czechoslovakia's place among the nations of Europe, claiming

The Czech language, the Czech way of perceiving the world, the Czech historical experience, the Czech modes of courage and cowardice, Czech humor -- all of these are inseparable from that circle of my home. My home is therefore my Czechness, my nationality, and I see no reason at all why I shouldn't embrace it.....My home, of course, is not only my Czechness, it is also my Czechoslovakness, which means my citizenship. Ultimately, my home is Europe and my Europeanness..."²⁴

As president, however, Havel emphasized his "Czechoslovakness" by expressing a desire to maintain a common country in the face of some Slovak nationalists' demands for greater autonomy or even independence, although at the same time Havel felt that in the new democratic state the Slovaks should have the right to determine their own destiny. In his 1991-1992 work, Summer Meditations, Havel would express sympathy for the Slovak aversion to being ruled from Prague, claiming that "the Slovaks have always felt that they were an overlooked and forgotten smaller and weaker brother, condemned to live in the bigger and stronger brother's shadow." Havel also suggested that "it should be no surprise, therefore, that whenever the situation in Czechoslovakia becomes the slightest bit fluid, the Slovaks always try in some way appropriate to the moment to disengage themselves from Prague."²⁵ In light of his willingness to let the people of Slovakia determine their own future, Havel proposed in December 1990 that the federal parliament pass a law authorizing a referendum on whether the Czechs and Slovaks should continue to inhabit a common country. Such a law would be passed by the Federal Assembly, but no referendum would be held by the critical June 1992 elections.²⁶

On January 1, 1991, the government ushered in the new year with plans for a radical overhaul of the national economy that would remove price controls on 85% of all goods sold, begin the sale of inefficient state-owned enterprises, privatize thousands of shops, and transform the koruna, or crown, into convertible currency.²⁷ Over the next several months, the federal government would begin implementing these policies, although progress would not come as quickly as many free-market reformers would like.

During this period of rapid change in Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel sought to maintain a presidency grounded in his own idealistic and humanitarian world-view and dedicated to the creation of a true civic society. Reacting to critics who claimed that he was too much of an idealist and too

unrealistic to function as a genuine political leader, Havel suggested that "anyone who claims that I am a dreamer who expects to transform hell into heaven is wrong. I have few illusions. But I have a responsibility to work towards the things I consider good and right."²⁸ Unwilling to alter his character or ideals to fit transitory political conditions, Havel felt it was essential for him, as an individual and a leader, to remain "decent, just, tolerant, and at the same time resist corruption and deception."²⁹ As evidence of his commitment to ideals over acceptability, Havel explained to the federal parliament in a 1992 speech, "A thousand times I've been knocked down, but never have I given up, and for me the most important thing has been whether I have held to the truth and to my principles and not whether I have been accepted or rejected."³⁰ Perhaps an overblown statement for some, but the vicissitudes of Havel's career as a dissident playwright lend some weight to the idealistic sentiment.

Havel also took pride in the fact that he had always maintained an independent stance and "never espoused any ideology, dogma, or doctrine -- left-wing, right-wing, or any other closed, ready-made system of presuppositions about the world." In fact, Havel claimed that when he was first nominated for the presidency, he found the entire notion very humorous because independence and a revulsion for ceremony and formality were so much a part of his nature.³¹ According to author and Havel acquaintance Timothy Garton Ash, "Havel is a Bohemian in both senses of the word. He is a Czech intellectual from Bohemia with a strong feeling for his native land. But he is also an artist, nowhere happier than in a tavern with a glass of beer and the company of pretty and amusing friends." Additionally, Havel "wears jeans, open shirts, perhaps a corduroy jacket, only putting on a suit and tie under extreme duress."³² However, and in spite of his bohemian tendencies, Havel was quite aware that he brought to the presidency certain skills as a mediator stemming from his ability to get along well with others and to act "as a sort of unifying agent."³³ These skills would stand him in good stead through most of his presidency, but would be sorely tested during the events leading up to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation in 1992.

In terms of applying his principles of moral behavior to the realities of Czechoslovak politics after the Velvet Revolution, Havel tirelessly promoted the transition to democracy while at the same time realizing that "as long as people are people, democracy in the full sense of the word will never be

more than an ideal. One can approach it as one would a horizon, in ways that may be better or worse, but it can never be fully attained."³⁴

However, if an ideal form of democracy was not immediately forthcoming, Czechs and Slovaks would need to apply themselves to the development of a democratic system that was based on the rule of law and the guarantee of freedom and human rights. In an essay entitled "On Home," Havel would write,

"I am in favor of a political system based on the citizen, and recognizing all his fundamental civil and human rights in their universal validity, and equally applied: that is, no member of a single race, a single nation, a single sex, or a single religion may be endowed with basic rights that are different from anyone else's. In other words, I am in favor of what is called a civic society."³⁵

In a practical sense, Havel's idealism translated into support for a market economy, for a "reasonable and just social policy," for human rights, for "decentralization and self-government," and for "the good sense of our common state."³⁶ Ultimately, however, the success of such a system would require a state that was "humane, moral, intellectual and spiritual, and cultural" and "underpinned by certain human and social values."³⁷ Although aware of the practical necessities of economic reforms and improving the standard of living, Havel nevertheless proposed that "it is no less important to do everything possible to improve the general cultural level of everyday life" and to raise "the general level of civility" in the nation.³⁸

Central to Havel's conception of civility in national life and the morality of leadership was "the idea of 'living in truth,' the idea of 'anti-political politics,' or the idea of politics subordinated to conscience." In Havel's view, the secret of a healthy political system was the appointment of individuals with a heightened sense of responsibility, willing to serve not only the present national community, but also the generations to come. This "higher responsibility" had a metaphysical foundation and represented morality expressed through constructive action for the good of the community at large. In turn, this impulse toward moral action and leadership must be present not only at the highest levels of government, but also in culture, economics, and other important spheres of public life.³⁹

As president, Havel was not as directly involved in the affairs of government as some of his allies might have liked, yet his role in Czechoslovakia's transition to democracy was less a practical political one than a moral one. Although Havel would claim that he was a writer and not a politician, his charisma and his long-term courage as a leading dissident made him a significant and popular leader. His populist appeal arose in great part because he saw himself as an ordinary person, with everyday interests and desires, who spoke for the average citizen in expressing the hopes and frustrations of a nation in transition. However, for all his down-to-earth characteristics, Havel proved to be a very intelligent, shrewd and decisive political leader with an extremely heavy work schedule that left him little time to write or to enjoy the reborn national culture that he helped inspire.⁴⁰ Because of his literary background and his writings on human freedom, Havel became a very influential figure among the younger generation, who viewed him as a symbol of the humanistic tradition inherent in modern Czech culture since Masaryk. Havel intentionally fostered the Masaryk comparison since Masaryk was an intellectual and liberal politician who brought stability to national politics by remaining above the political battleground. As in Masaryk's day, contemporary Czechoslovakia would function as a parliamentary democracy, rather than as a presidential republic.⁴¹

Ironically, however, popular sentiment in support of Havel proved to be so overwhelming that he became embarrassed by his cult-figure status and the type of journalistic glorification once reserved for the heads of the Communist Party. In fact, in commenting on Havel's widespread popularity, a long-time colleague, Pavel Bratinka, once described the playwright-president as "a cross between St. Theresa and George Washington."⁴²

Overall, though, Havel was a writer and an idealist who viewed society and the affairs of state from a moral and humanitarian perspective. Having spent decades producing essays and plays that criticized the dehumanizing aspects of the communist system or of modern society in general, as well as having spent time in prison or as the target of police harassment for his ideas, Havel had seemingly earned his status as cultural hero and symbolic moral conscience of the Czechoslovak nation. Consequently, President Havel served his nation more as a mediator and focal point for sometimes idealistic national aspirations than as a political leader caught up in the details of

legislation and everyday politics. However, it is very possible that Czechoslovakia could afford such an idealistic presidency only as long as there was some form of national consensus and the enthusiasm of the Velvet Revolution continued to shape political and economic progress in that country. As in some of the other Eastern European nations that appointed "amateurs" --poets, playwrights, philosophers, and so forth--to positions of political leadership, Czechoslovakia would discover that the end of the post-revolutionary hangover and the onset of complex socioeconomic problems and political pluralism might require less idealistic, and consequently more politically astute, leaders than the events of 1989 had brought to the fore. By the summer of 1992, Czechoslovakia's problems would eventually bring new leaders into the spotlight and eliminate Havel's presidency altogether.

As popular as Havel had become as president, there had always been critics who pointed to certain perceived mistakes or flaws in the playwright's political activities. For instance, Havel had generated ill will among many citizens and politicians early in his presidency when he chose to grant amnesty to 25,000 prisoners as a traditional gesture opening the way to a new era in national life. When this presidential action returned major felons, including sex offenders, to the streets alongside prisoners of conscience, there was a detectable upsurge in crime that tarnished Havel's attempted humanitarian gesture. Havel also received some criticism for appointing too many friends and long-time dissident colleagues to key positions in government, rather than filling those positions with experts. Additionally, Havel's well-meaning calls for tolerance towards the Communist Party and rejection of the membership's collective guilt for past policies alienated many Czechs and Slovaks who wanted to punish the party for the repressive regime it had installed and hold all party members responsible for party policies.⁴³

Additionally, Havel sometimes contributed to strained relations with the federal parliament, many of whose deputies felt that Havel remained too aloof from the everyday activities of government. Some complained that he spent too little time in his office and that he and his advisors had very little direct contact with the parliament or individual parliamentarians. Others complained that when Havel did communicate with lawmakers he would sometimes do so in irritating fashion, delivering speeches that expressed ideas in a truthful but aggravating manner. At other times, he would appear out of the blue and virtually demand that legislation he supported be passed. For

example, when negotiations between the Czech and Slovak deputies appeared to have reached a stalemate in November 1992, Havel delivered a address to the parliament calling for a referendum to decide the future status of Slovakia. In this speech, he implored citizens to appeal to their elected representatives to settle the issue in a productive manner. When a strong public reaction led to direct pressure on lawmakers, parliamentarians complained that Havel was attempting to get his way through intimidation and by circumventing the legislative process through a direct appeal to the public. The anger expressed by parliamentarians led Havel to retreat slightly during a speech from a balcony in Wenceslas Square when he told the crowd that although he appreciated the public's support he was not out to intimidate lawmakers into acquiescence.⁴⁴

Another target for critics was the series of symbolic, and sometimes expensive, modifications that Havel chose to make in Prague Castle and in the traditions surrounding the presidency. Displaying his well-honed sense of the absurd, Havel had a colleague involved in costume design for the film Amadeus create colorful and anachronistic new uniforms for the palace guard to replace the drab military outfits they had worn under the old regime. He also replaced all the old staff automobiles of the communist era with newer models, changed many of the artworks in the palace, and convinced the former dissident and rock musician Michael Kocab to compose a new anthem for the government.⁴⁵

In spite of his occasional mistakes or foibles, at the time Czechs and Slovaks cast their ballots in the critical national parliamentary elections of June 1992, Havel remained a popular and significant force in national politics. However, the emergence of political pluralism and the complexity of issues facing the electorate perhaps required a little less idealism and a little more direct leadership on the part of the president. Having served their purpose in the wake of the Velvet Revolution, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence began to wane as umbrella political organizations in the face of nascent and diverse political parties. From the Civic Democrats of Vaclav Klaus to the independence-minded Slovak National Party, the process of democratization had brought about the birth of political parties with a wide range of opinions on the pace of economic reforms and the future of the Czechoslovak federation. As a result of this changing political landscape, the president-as-mediator approach to leadership probably should have been reassessed if Havel wanted to remain an effective national

leader. Unfortunately for Havel, events would soon move beyond his control and render such a reassessment irrelevant.

On the eve of the June 5-6, 1992, national elections, Havel warned that regional differences were being exploited and exaggerated by some of the political parties that had emerged as successors to Civic Forum and Public Against Violence. Havel claimed that in seeking greater public support, some of these parties were readily adopting radical language in promoting reformist and anti-communist programs in Czech lands and an anti-reform and nationalist agenda in Slovakia.⁴⁶ Havel warned the public of the dangers of demagoguery and the exploitation of nationalist goals for narrow political gain, claiming that some major politicians were attempting to satisfy their "extravagant hunger for power" by offering "a confused electorate....a colorful range of attractive nonsense." In addition, "expressions of Fascism and anti-Semitism are condoned, and anyone who points this out is declared to have slandered Slovakia. Popular outrage is systematically directed against federal institutions as the alleged source of every kind of misery in life."⁴⁷ However, in spite of his warnings about extremism, Havel was still willing to predict that the June 1992 elections would "mark the beginning of a calmer and more stable era" for the democratic constitutional system would thrive.⁴⁸

Although honesty has always been one of Havel's more attractive qualities, his willingness to speak his mind on issues of concern proved to be a political liability as Slovaks interpreted the president's warnings about demagoguery and the political manipulation of nationalism to be less-than-veiled attacks upon Vladimir Meciar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.⁴⁹ In fact, Havel had already generated some ill will among Slovaks by ending Czechoslovakia's contributions to the international arms trade and shutting down armament enterprises in Slovakia, thus contributing to a growing unemployment rate in that republic. Some Slovaks also felt that Havel had distanced himself a little too much from the parliament and was not doing all he could for Slovakia, although criticism about Havel's reluctance to engage in everyday politics could be heard from Czechs, as well. Critics complained that when given the opportunity to address Slovak concerns, especially in his Bratislava speeches, Havel was generally either too vague and philosophical or too provocative in warning about the dangers of extreme nationalism.⁵⁰ On October 28, 1991 Havel was jeered and had

eggs thrown at him by angry Slovaks during a visit to Bratislava to commemorate Czechoslovakia's 73rd anniversary. Ironically, the same Havel who had consistently supported the right of Slovaks to determine their own future became the target of abuse by a crowd of 15,000 separatists chanting "Enough of Havel" and "Enough of Prague."⁵¹ What cannot be ignored in this context, however, is that Havel would remain one of the most popular figures in Slovakia, behind Meciar, even after Slovak leaders engineered the events leading to his resignation. Ultimately, though, Havel opponents such as Meciar would exploit occasional incidents and discontent to increase their own political support or to weaken Havel's influence in Slovakia.

However, the problem of political opportunism was not limited to either Meciar or Slovakia, because self-interest had begun to creep into Czechoslovakian politics even before the initial enthusiasm of 1989 had begun to wane. As the various organizations that had comprised the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence coalitions began to follow their individual political agendas, those coalitions, and the unity they had fostered against a common enemy, began to disintegrate to the point that Jiri Dienstbier's Civic Movement, which viewed itself as the heir to Civic Forum, would receive very little support in the 1992 elections. Earlier, Vaclav Klaus had pulled his Civic Democrats out of Civic Forum in order to promote rapid progress toward a free market economy and his own political fortunes. By personalizing the economic reform process and making it look as though only he could work the desired economic miracles, Klaus contributed a great deal not only to the break-up of Civic Forum but also to the emphasis on the personality of the party leader at the expense of a serious political platform. Klaus was able to provide his own party with a coherent reform program, but many of the other political parties that emerged lacked ideological coherence, strong leadership, or a well-defined party platform. In many cases the loyalty of party members to their organization was so slight that parliamentarians, once elected, would do whatever they wanted, regardless of party strategy or ideology.⁵²

In addition to promoting himself as an economic savior, Klaus attempted to brand all other movements and parties as further left than his own in a campaign to sway undecided voters to the Civic Democratic cause. Although Vaclav Havel claimed allegiance to no individual party, it was widely accepted that he was closer to the Civic Democrats than to any other organization, yet this did not

prevent his long-time colleague, Klaus, from exploiting the differences between the two men. Given his own ambitions as a politician, Klaus was quite content to be viewed as a practical and pragmatic individual with an impressive understanding of economics at a time when decisive leadership was needed to steer the Czechs toward democracy and a free market. Havel, in contrast, was rightfully viewed as a leader in cultural and intellectual matters and a highly moral figure. The difference was that while Havel asked the people what they wanted, Klaus told them what they needed.⁵³

In Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar contributed to the dissolution of the anti-communist coalitions by pulling his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia out of the Public Against Violence after being asked to step down as prime minister in 1991. Like Klaus, Meciar was quite willing to exploit his popularity to gain electoral support, although, unlike Klaus, Meciar promoted a highly nationalistic and otherwise very vague agenda in the 1992 election campaign. Less a political party than a movement with various factions, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia campaigned under the fairly vacuous slogan, "It's us," with a platform that appealed to Slovak nationalism and promised basically whatever a given audience wanted to hear. Although less a Slovak nationalist than a "populist-authoritarian" leader, Meciar combined rhetoric about Slovak sovereignty and national goals with the promise of jobs for workers and lower taxes for businessmen. In the end, though, the questionable nature of his promises was hardly relevant in a practical sense since his populist appeal generated widespread public support in Slovakia on the eve of the elections.⁵⁴

When the final results of the June election were tallied, it became readily apparent that Czechs and Slovaks had voted along very different lines and that the future of the federation had been cast into doubt. In the two houses of the federal parliament, the House of Nations and the House of the People, Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia had emerged as the leading Slovak party, with Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democrats gaining the upper hand among Czech parties. As a result of their electoral victories in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Meciar and Klaus were then allowed to assume the prime ministerships of their respective republics.⁵⁵

After gaining his electoral victory by capitalizing on Slovak nationalism and discontent, Meciar began pursuing a three-step strategy designed to increase Slovak autonomy. Meciar's plan called for a

commonwealth of two equal states coexisting with a common currency and a loose economic and defense framework, and to that end the Slovaks would need to pass a declaration of sovereignty, draft a new Slovak constitution, and then elect a Slovak president.⁵⁶

In making his populist appeal to Slovak nationalism in the weeks before the elections, Meciar was able to muster statistical evidence in support of his accusations that Slovakia was not being treated fairly, although those statistics did not always tell the whole story. According to the British publication, The Economist, unemployment figures from May 1992 show a 12% rate in Slovakia and only a 4% rate in the Czech lands, although the Czech Prognosis has the rates at 11.9% and 2.9%, respectively. In addition, it was reported that 96% of the \$800 million invested in Czechoslovakia from 1990-1992 had gone to the Czech lands, while Slovakia was having its armament and other inefficient industries shut down.⁵⁷ On the other hand, Czechs would argue that half the federal budget was spent on Slovakia, which contained only 1/3 of the nation's population.⁵⁸ Consequently, while Slovaks felt that they were bearing an unfair share of the nation's economic problems, a number of Czechs remained entirely unsympathetic and took the approach that Slovaks were chronic complainers who had been chafing at federal policies and Czech prosperity since the birth of the federation.

If Meciar expected strong resistance to Slovak demand for autonomy from the new government of the Czech Republic, what he found was a Vaclav Klaus who was quite willing to allow Slovakia to push the issue of autonomy all the way to the disintegration of the federation, if necessary. While Meciar sought protection for Slovakia in a slower process of economic reform, Klaus, an avid free marketer, wanted to move toward an open market system as rapidly as possible. In fact, his confidence in the Czech Republic's ability to thrive economically was so strong that he believed that if other arrangements could not be worked out, the separation of the two republics would allow the Czechs to achieve economic success much more quickly. With both prime ministers willing to go as far as dissolving the federation, steps to that end began immediately after the June elections. Ironically, the process of dissolving the Czechoslovak federation, the so-called "velvet divorce" began at a time when public opinion polls were showing that anywhere from 60-75% of Czechs and Slovaks were in favor of maintaining the common state.

In spite of Havel's long-held belief that referendums were essential in determining the federation's future, both Klaus and Meciar sought to avoid turning the matter over to the electorate because they were afraid that they would not achieve their desired results.⁵⁹ Instead, Czech and Slovak negotiators began meeting immediately after the June elections to work out plans for a weakened and short-term federal government designed to facilitate the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Czech negotiators were interested in only two options, the development of a stronger federation or a quick divorce in order to allow for rapid economic development. Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that a federation was unacceptable because it would do little for Slovak autonomy, but that rather than breaking up the common state they would settle for a loose confederation. Czechoslovakia's constitutional status was to be determined by both parliaments by September 30.⁶⁰

On July 1, Havel met with the old and new Slovak governments at Bratislava Castle after negotiations between Klaus and Meciar produced a caretaker federal government.⁶¹ However, in spite of Havel's belief that Slovaks should decide their own future, he did not support the plans that Meciar and Klaus had begun to negotiate. Very rapidly, national policy was being determined by two strong-willed and charismatic prime ministers who did not feel that Havel deserved much of a voice in the proceedings. Meciar disliked Havel for a number of reasons, not the least of which was Havel's warning about demagogues in Slovakia, while Klaus, a former Civic Forum colleague of Havel's, was determined to follow his own course of action without presidential interference. As a result, Havel felt that the people of Czechoslovakia were not being fairly represented in the negotiations and that referendums remained the only truly democratic recourse. Havel was also concerned that the collapse of Czechoslovakia would "open the doors to a wide variety of undemocratic forces in both republics," as potentially evidenced by the actions of Klaus and Meciar.⁶² And, in spite of declaring that he wished to mediate the dispute between the two republics, Havel had informed the Federal Assembly in a June 25 speech that "if a decision is made that the federation will no longer exist, I shall not be its liquidating servant."⁶³

Havel's public stance remained consistent with his previous policy toward the federation as he continued to stress "the need for a real federation with each republic having equal rights" and the freedom to determine its own future. According to Havel, the negotiations being held at that time ran

counter to public opinion and threatened to undermine what the nation had been seeking to accomplish since 1989. The debate over the dissolution of the republic might be valid, but it was essential that the process be democratic, because "the Velvet Revolution must remain Velvet."⁶⁴

If the events of June 1992 had allowed Vladimir Meciar to open serious discussion of the issue of Slovak sovereignty and to move Czechoslovakia a giant step closer to a "velvet divorce," they also inspired Meciar to place a more immediate political maneuver on his agenda: the obstruction of Vaclav Havel's re-election as president. The day after the June elections, Meciar ordered Slovak deputies in the federal parliament to vote against Havel's re-election as president in early July as a means of punishing him for denouncing nationalism and demagoguery in Slovakia.⁶⁵ Yet Havel was prepared for this possibility. Following his July 1 meetings with the old and new governments of Slovakia, Havel disingenuously told journalists at a press conference in Bratislava that he "might feel disappointment" if he was not re-elected, but that such setbacks were part of "a normal, natural process. Politicians come and go. I don't think I'm the best, most clever or brightest person for this job."⁶⁶

When the presidential elections were held in the federal parliament on July 3, Havel stood as the only candidate after Miroslav Sladek's Republican Party withdrew the candidacy of Juraj Cop that morning. In the first round of voting, Havel needed to gain the support of 3/5 of the deputies in the House of People, and both the Czech and Slovak sections of the House of Nations. With only 22 of 75 Slovak votes in the House of Nations supporting Havel's re-election and less than a required margin in the House of People, the parliament proceeded with a second round of voting in which a candidate needed only a majority of votes from each of the three groups. In this second round, Havel gained the required majority in the House of People and in the Czech section of the House of Nations, but he actually lost ground with the Slovaks and failed to gain the 38 votes he needed from their deputies in the House of Nations. As a result, Slovak representatives were successful in carrying out Meciar's plan to block the re-election of Vaclav Havel.⁶⁷

Ironically, only a few hours prior to the presidential balloting in parliament, Havel had told Le Monde that "what takes on the image of classic tragedy in Russia and the Balkans, is in our case more like an absurd theatre, a boulevard comedy, or even a farce. And that is better after all."⁶⁸ Given the

vindictive and somewhat self-defeating nature of the Slovak political maneuvering against Havel, he may have been more successful than he knew in capturing the spirit of the moment.

In spite of Havel's electoral defeat, it was assumed that he would remain in office until the official end of his term in October, although his allies in the Civic Democratic Party strongly considered legislation to create a presidency for the Czech republic that Havel would be allowed to assume. However, party leader Vaclav Klaus was concerned that a visible and influential Havel might deflect attention from Klaus's own programs and popularity as prime minister and was consequently not fully supportive of attempts to keep Havel in the spotlight. It was also reported that, privately, both Havel and his colleagues in the Czech government were relieved that he was not re-elected, because if he remained president he would find himself directed by the responsibilities of his office to defend a state that his government was in the process of dismantling. Shortly before the vote in parliament had been held, Havel commented that 'if the president becomes a figurehead, I dare say I could be far more useful to my country somewhere else, whether in the theatre, the press or some benevolent institution.'⁶⁹

In the wake of the failed re-election bid, Havel began to take a different tack in anticipation of an independent Czech republic by proposing in his weekly radio address that direct election of the president be instituted so that the president could truly serve as a mediator between the legislative and executive branches. Havel's logic was that, "If [the president's] authority were derived from the parliament, then he could not very well play the part of a balancing factor between the government and parliament."⁷⁰ However, the rapid pace of events in July would render musings about presidential power, on either the national or republican levels, moot because of Havel's rapid exit from the political stage.

Shortly after noon on July 17, and with a small crowd of Slovak nationalists gathered outside the parliament building, the Slovak National Council passed a declaration of sovereignty designed to justify Slovak demands for greater autonomy. Although some Slovaks viewed this measure as the first step toward an independent Slovakia, many would claim that the declaration was simply meant to support true equality for Slovaks within the Czechoslovak federation. Ironically, this proud moment for Slovak nationalists would be overshadowed in the world press by an event that occurred twenty

minutes afterwards, the resignation of Vaclav Havel from the presidency of Czechoslovakia. Although Havel would claim in his Sunday radio address that his resignation was not an impulsive reaction to the Slovak parliament's actions, he nevertheless made his decision official by handing in his letter of resignation to the federal parliament, to become effective at 6 p.m. on July 20.⁷¹

In a brief television interview Havel told the nation his resignation was motivated by his belief that he had "lost the confidence of a large section of the Slovak political representation," and that he viewed this loss as "an expression of distaste for me as a person [and] the values which I hold." Havel also felt that if he were to stay on as president, he might "become an obstacle to the extensive changes in our statehood, toward which we have been striving since the recent parliamentary elections." However, Havel's diplomatic reasoning also covered his obvious disappointment over the potential split in the federation and the actions of Klaus and Meciar, a sentiment underscored by his admission that he had no intention of reducing the role of president to that of "a mere clerk marking time....passively observing further events."⁷²

Havel explained to the television audience that he "decided to take this step after due deliberation, having found that I can no longer fulfill my pledges, which stem from the promise of allegiance to the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and its constitution, in a manner which would be in keeping with my nature, conviction and conscience." He added, however, that he would, "of course, continue to labor for the benefit of democracy, respect for human rights and the friendly coexistence of all citizens and nations."⁷³ In another context, he would later comment that "it would be rather hypocritical to stay in Prague Castle when a question mark looms over the existence of the state."⁷⁴

At the highest levels, reaction to Havel's resignation was mixed. In spite of his vindictive blocking of Havel's re-election, Slovak Prime Minister Meciar publically expressed his regret at the president's decision to step down before the end of his term. In part, Meciar's response was in keeping with an growing feeling among Slovaks that in helping to push Havel out of the presidency they had, in fact, eliminated the one individual who might have eased Slovakia's move toward statehood. From a Prague perspective, Czech Prime Minister Klaus commented that Havel's resignation was a logical and understandable move, although he was reportedly very happy with Havel's departure because it would

allow him much freer rein in negotiating a break-up of the federation and promoting his fast-track economic programs.⁷⁵ Given the rather large egos of the two prime ministers, the resignation of the popular Havel also meant that the two were free to develop their own individual cults of personality, thus lending credence to Havel's earlier warnings that Czechoslovak political parties were becoming far too personality-oriented at the expense of party platforms and meaningful issues.

During his last days as president, Havel seemed relieved that his life might return to some form of normalcy, claiming that he had "many times intended to withdraw--to study, to contemplate, to meditate, to write."⁷⁶ This same sense of relief was present during his last day in office on July 20 when, according to The Prague Post, Havel spent his last hours sitting in the shade on a hot summer evening "with cigarette and beer in hand, laughing with journalists, exchanging restrained presidential speech for self-deprecating humor. He seemed to welcome the return to his life as a private citizen without the pressure of political protocol and the glare of television lights."⁷⁷

Regardless of Havel's future as a national leader, his resignation from the federal presidency marked the end of a political era in Czechoslovakia. The state that Masaryk had created would cease to exist at midnight on December 31, 1992 as Czechs and Slovaks dissolved their federation and pursued their independent destinies. Ironically, Havel would return to the political spotlight by the end of January 1993 as the parliament of the Czech Republic elected him to the newly-created presidency of the independent Czech state. Since the late 1980's, however, Havel has provided the idealistic leadership that brought the nation from the heady and optimistic days of the Velvet Revolution into the political realities of economic reform, the creation of a civic society, and eventually the "velvet divorce." His critics would point to his isolation from everyday political affairs or his lack of strong leadership during the Meciar-Klaus negotiations, but as Viliam Buchert of Mlada Fronta Dnes recorded, "whatever mistakes Havel made as president, no other politician managed to do more for the good name of Czechoslovakia than he did."⁷⁸

In comparison with other leaders to emerge in the region since the democratic revolution of the late 1980's, Havel has taken one of the most difficult paths to political success. As a dissident writer, he was considered such an outsider in a repressive system that he spent years being harassed and jailed by the very same regime that he would help topple and eventually replace. For those who continued

"living in truth" for decades in a repressive society, Havel's presidency perhaps served one of their greatest rewards. And in a odd reminder of the momentous changes that have occurred in such a short span of time, remnants of the Plastic People of the Universe, Havel's friends and fellow dissidents, became one of the first Eastern European rock bands to sign a recording contract with a major Western label. Recording under the name, Pulnoc ("Midnight"), they released an album, City of Hysteria, which was recorded several years before the Velvet Revolution and which finally appeared in the United States in 1991. Ironically, the liner notes for City of Hysteria were written in the mid-1980's by a friend and admirer of the band, the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel.⁷⁹

As a result of his trips abroad, his negotiations with other former Soviet-bloc nations, and his untiring support for Czechoslovakia's democratic and economic forms, Havel became perhaps the most popular and powerful new leader to emerge in Eastern Europe after 1989, albeit on a much different stage than his Soviet counterparts who dominated the headlines. The problems faced by Czechoslovakia had been severe, but they were considerably less complicated than the social, economic and political battles being waged by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in the Soviet Union. However, where Gorbachev and Yeltsin had risen through the ranks of the Communist Party to achieve high political status, Havel had much more in common with Lech Walesa and other new Eastern European leaders who had been thrust into positions of influence after years in the intellectual or labor opposition.

Unlike Vaclav Havel's more bourgeois and dissident-intellectual route to political notoriety in Czechoslovakia, Lech Walesa's career as a leader began amidst the economic uncertainty and worker strikes in Poland during 1980. As thousands of striking workers occupied the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Walesa, a young electrician in the shipyards, would progress from negotiating worker demands to leading the independent trade union Solidarity, a movement that forever changed the relationship between the communist regime and the people of Poland, and finally to assuming the presidency of his nation.

Born in Central Poland to a peasant family, Lech Walesa had quite a different childhood from the more privileged Havel. Walesa attended vocational school, served in the Army, and in 1967 began work

as an electrician at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. In 1968, Walesa joined other workers in anti-government protests and in December 1970 served on two strike committees in the shipyards during a critical period of worker unrest in Gdynia and Gdansk. During the 1970 strikes, Walesa was elected to the presidium of the "Council for Striking Workers" to coordinate security and arrange for provisions for the strikers. Five years later, in 1976, Walesa would lose his job for participating in the June strike of that year, yet he refused to abandon his activities on behalf of his worker colleagues and joined the Free Trade Unions of the Baltic in 1978.⁸⁰

In July 1980, the anti-government sentiment that had triggered unrest in the 1970's exploded again as workers began striking in Lodz, Lublin, and Warsaw. By the middle of the next month the strikes had spread to the Baltic coast, and on August 14 workers at the Lenin Shipyard joined their colleagues across the country in demanding better wages and other concessions from the government of Edward Gierk and the communist Polish United Workers' Party. This organized and non-violent wave of strikes sweeping across the nation in July and August was motivated by economic concerns as well as by resentment of the Communist regime's privilege, incompetence, arbitrariness, and lack of accountability to the workers and the general public it was supposed to represent. When the workers of the Lenin Shipyard walked out in defiance of the government, Lech Walesa, a thirty-seven-year old unemployed electrician, climbed over the fence to join them.⁸¹

On August 15, negotiations over wage concessions and other issues began in the Lenin Shipyard as workers moved to erect a monument to those who had died at the hands of government forces during the strikes a decade earlier. With Walesa heading the strike committee, the shipyard workers were able to gain a wage increase of nearly 2000 zloties almost immediately as management sought to end the walk-out and restore order. However, when Walesa announced the wage concessions and declared the strike over, a large number of workers pressured him to continue the strike out of solidarity with other area workers who had not yet gained the raises they were demanding.⁸²

As the national labor unrest continued through August, it became readily apparent that Poland's workers were escalating the showdown far beyond wage negotiations and other limited demands. Although calls for independent trade unions were initially limited to the Baltic shipyards, workers nationwide began to combine demands for some form of democratization with nationalist and religious

symbols and rhetoric, thus linking labor solidarity with Polish nationalism and the Roman Catholic Church. Under the ironic slogan, "Workers of all enterprises -- Unite," strike committees from across Poland began coordinating their efforts in negotiations that would produce a new Independent Self-governing Trades Union, better known as Solidarity. With the support of intellectuals such as Bronislaw Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki and growing grassroots support among the general public, Solidarity rapidly gained both credibility and prestige. The support by intellectuals added an entirely new dimension to Solidarity's negotiations with the government, especially since many of these intellectuals had links to KOR, the Committee for the Defense of Workers, which had arisen in response to the government's violent repression of workers during the 1976 strikes.⁸³

As a gesture of solidarity and support during Walesa's negotiations with Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski, some one thousand delegates from six hundred enterprises across the nation gathered at the Lenin Shipyard to follow the proceedings. What Walesa was negotiating in late August was a list of twenty-one demands that the workers had convinced the strike committee to put before government negotiators when talks began. When the government consented to these demands on August 31, Walesa and other worker representatives joined in signing the Gdansk Agreement in an atmosphere of joyous optimism and enthusiasm generated by the workers' belief that the agreement would alter the entire equation of labor-government relations in Poland. Amongst the most significant concessions in the agreement were the right to organize independent trade unions free of government control; the right to strike; the promise of immediate wage increases and price rollbacks, as well as improvements in health care, social security and housing; the right to freedom of speech and access to the government-controlled media; and the right to have Sunday Catholic Mass broadcast on state radio. On September 15, the Gdansk Agreement was extended to the whole country.⁸⁴

For fifteen months, Walesa and Solidarity joined their allies among intellectuals and in the Catholic Church in pressuring the government into improving the lives of Poland's workers, while at the same time attempting to avoid government reprisals or direct Soviet intervention. The memory of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that crushed the reformist "Prague Spring" was still very fresh in the minds of the Poles, and as the Soviet Union began demanding that the Polish government re-establish control of its nation during the spring of 1981, it looked as though intervention was

becoming a distinct possibility. In March, Walesa acted to prevent a general strike which could have triggered violent repression, while KOR intellectuals such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron were being arrested for their activities.⁸⁵

Lech Walesa's leadership role in the events of 1980-1981 brought him great notoriety and respect, both home and abroad, yet in spite of his status as a hero on an international scale, the ideological nature of the Solidarity movement meant that Poland's workers saw him in a slightly different light. In light of Solidarity's belief in grassroots democracy, it would have been counterproductive to portray union leaders as heroes or to allow charismatic leaders to overshadow the movement itself. Consequently, Solidarity iconography rarely portrayed union leaders except in caricature or as much smaller in stature than Pope John Paul II, a national hero in a different context. Walesa, a man described by visiting journalist Timothy Garton Ash as a "funny little man with droopy moustache and ill-fitting trousers," lent himself to such caricature, although it was generally done with the utmost respect for his leadership skills, which in turn would often be underestimated.⁸⁶

In the midst of Soviet threats and worsening economic conditions, the late fall and early spring found Solidarity embroiled in a debate over its own structure and function. Walesa, who had been elected to the trade union's presidium in February, initially argued that Solidarity's continued existence in the face of government opposition required that the organization establish decentralized leadership so that the movement could not be outflanked by government-controlled unions. This argument ran counter to that of Jan Olszewski, who proposed that Solidarity, as its name implied, should develop a unified national structure as opposed to a network of independent unions. By February 1981, however, Solidarity's strong grassroots support in Poland led Walesa to reverse his position in favor of a strong executive. Unfortunately, the entire argument would be rendered moot in December when a government crackdown would drive Solidarity underground.⁸⁷

In September of 1981, Solidarity held the first two stages of its national congress, and in October Lech Walesa was elected president of the union with 55% of the vote. In November, frustration over the government's slow pace in instituting reforms and its failure to negotiate further concessions led the more extreme of Solidarity's leaders to call for free national elections and a referendum on

Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union. Since these were the type of demands most likely to bring Soviet intervention, the government of General Wojciech Jaruzelski kept a close eye on the activities of Walesa and his colleagues. When hidden microphones caught Walesa declaring the futility of negotiating with the Communists and others calling for democratic elections, Jaruzelski acted swiftly in declaring martial law, rounding up a great number of workers and intellectuals, and arresting many Solidarity leaders in their beds. Workers attempted to organize strikes against the government, but security forces supporting Jaruzelski's "state of war" against Solidarity crushed worker resistance before it could have a meaningful effect.⁸⁸

With many of its leaders under arrest and its membership forced underground, Solidarity would become an international symbol of resistance to the communist regime. Yet the union's significance went far beyond mere symbolism because it had set in motion ideas and alliances that would prove crucial when striking workers once again confronted the government in 1988. What Solidarity had done was to develop close links between workers and intellectuals, and between workers and the public at large. It had "transformed a 'dissident' minority into a 'dissident' majority" and subsequently triggered a "revolution of consciousness" that forced Poles to confront the historical and political truths about a regime that denied them free speech, freedom of assembly, and democratic elections. In its fifteen months of activity during 1980-1981, Solidarity had made some of these rights a reality and others a possibility, thus changing forever the relationship between the communist government and Polish society.⁸⁹

Although Jaruzelski's creation of a martial-law government left Solidarity in ruins as a legal and open organization, it did not deter the union's leadership from continuing its work in manner that would avoid further repression. In April 1982, leaders declared the existence of Underground Solidarity, a nationwide underground network designed to maintain contact between leaders and workers as the government violated the Gdansk Agreement and declared all independent unions illegal. Upon being released from internment, Walesa discovered that he was at the top of an organization that no longer had the ability to organize strikes or other labor activities in Poland. Where the organization still existed at a grassroots level, in the factory committees, it could not effectively represent worker interests if the committees were not allowed to exercise the power of a

trade union. Consequently, Solidarity was forced to turn to other means, the creation of a Solidarity counterculture, to keep its ideas and support intact.⁹⁰

Right from the beginning of the martial law repression, Solidarity turned to underground publishing and filmmaking, makeshift universities, and the promotion of more localized social activism to maintain pressure on the government. The underground press churned out dailies and weeklies on printing presses sent in from the West, while Radio Solidarity kept up a schedule of illegal broadcasts and the pirate Solidarity Television broke in over state programming to deliver Solidarity's editorial commentary on official news reporting.⁹¹

Lech Walesa contributed to the symbolic appeal of such efforts when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983, although he was forced to send his wife to accept the honor due to the government's unwillingness to let him travel outside Poland. From 1980 to 1988, Walesa and the rest of his family lived in a rather cramped apartment in Gdansk with a large room that served in the multiple roles of office, meeting room, and Solidarity headquarters. Although he was under virtually constant surveillance and successfully withstood government attempts to prosecute him for a number of "crimes" during the mid-1980's, Walesa continued to serve as the focal point of national and international attention on Solidarity and created for himself an enduring reputation as a shrewd politician and manager who emerged from a working-class environment to become a "natural politician of something close to genius."⁹²

For seven years after the martial law crackdown, Solidarity, the Catholic Church, and Western politicians would promote the idea that the only solution to Poland's economic woes was a serious dialogue between the government and representatives of Solidarity, which in turn spoke for the Polish people at large. The product of this dialogue would be a "historic compromise between the self-organized workers and a self-limiting Communist power." Unfortunately, the Jaruzelski government tried just about every tactic short of a dialogue with Solidarity over those seven years and thereby set the stage for a showdown in 1988.⁹³

During the late spring and late summer of 1988, striking workers in Poland fostered national unrest in an attempt to force the Jaruzelski government to institute economic and political reforms. Beginning with Silesian miners and steelworkers in the Nowa Huta plant, the strike rapidly spread to

the shipyards of Gdansk where strikers mobilized under the Solidarity slogan, "no freedom without Solidarity." The demands of the workers included pay raises, release of political prisoners, re-employment of all those fired for political activities, legalization of Solidarity and independent trade unions, and a promise of no reprisals. When the strikes first broke out, Walesa advised against such action because he feared reprisals, but when the scope of the unrest became apparent, Walesa appeared at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk to assume a position of leadership.⁹⁴

When Walesa appeared before a new generation of striking workers in the Lenin Shipyard in May, 1988, he declared, "I am your general--tell me where you're going and I will lead you".⁹⁵ Although technically not on the strike committee, Walesa became "the boss" to thousands of young workers wearing red-and-white armbands and massed behind a main gate "festooned with flowers, flags, and images of the pope and the Black Madonna." Outside the gate lay only the soaring memorial to fallen workers and a great number of riot police. Commenting on changes in Walesa's appearance and demeanor since 1981, Timothy Garton Ash described the former "funny little man" as "a portly figure, with neatly trimmed hair and moustache, a rather smart sports jacket (though still with the Black Madonna and Solidarity badges on the lapel), well-fitting pin-striped trousers and, somewhat incongruously, leather house slippers." Garton Ash also noted the authoritative demeanor of Walesa as he summoned advisors and delegates from other enterprises "like a king." This new Walesa was in sharp contrast to the labor leader of 1980 who stood amongst overalled workers as a peer, although given Walesa's increased stature and political abilities, it seemed a natural transition.⁹⁶

Commenting on his own role in the strikes, Solidarity leader Walesa would later claim that although he did not officially serve on any strike committees, he acted as "the trump card, the matador, who, after the toreadors have finished enraging the bull with their jabs and pokes, enters the arena carrying his sword and muleta." Or, in other words, his job "was to goad when things got stagnant."⁹⁷

By Christmas of 1989, worsening economic conditions and further outbreaks of labor unrest led Jaruzelski to take action in an attempt to preserve as much of the regime's power as possible. Faced with the options of using military force to maintain Communist control, a choice rejected by

pro-Gorbachev reformers, or negotiating with representatives of the outlawed Solidarity trade union, Jaruzelski chose the latter course of action. As a result, the government announced that it was willing to sit at the conference table with a Solidarity delegation to determine how some of the most pressing political and economic problems might be resolved.⁹⁸

On February 6, fifty-seven representatives of the Jaruzelski government and the Solidarity-led opposition convened Round Table talks in Namiestnikowski Palace, Warsaw. The government delegation, headed by Interior Minister Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, agreed to the creation of three work groups to discuss union pluralism, political reforms, and economic and social policy. Lech Walesa did not participate in the discussions after a preliminary conference in Magdalenka, preferring instead that Solidarity's experts such as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek, and Adam Michnik represent the labor union's interests. Walesa monitored the progress of the talks by making frequent visits to the Council of Ministers so that he could provide informed advice to his colleagues.⁹⁹

When the negotiations were completed on April 5, Walesa and his colleagues had been able to pressure the government into signing Round Table accords that allowed the Solidarity leaders to achieve some of their most significant objectives. These accords called for the legalization of union pluralism, and therefore the relegalization of Solidarity and Rural Solidarity, as well as the Independent Students' Association and other banned opposition organizations. In addition, the roundtable agreement called for the transition to a market economy and the restructuring of the government with a freely-elected lower house, the Sejm, a restored Senate, and a new presidency with broad executive powers and a six-year term. According to the accord, the Communists and their allies would be guaranteed 65% of the seats in the Sejm as well as the key ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs. Finally, the agreements allowed the opposition to publish its own newspapers and to gain access to government-controlled radio and television facilities.¹⁰⁰

In spite of Solidarity's great success at the bargaining table, Walesa continued to express his concerns over the seriousness of the government's intentions and even over criticism about perceived changes in his personality and leadership style. Speaking to a press conference the day after the Round Table negotiations ended, Havel reminded Poles that they had been disappointed in their optimism often enough in the past and consequently warned that "the framework of the talks

need to be translated into action, fast," in order to force the government to proceed with the promised reforms. Walesa also noted that "many people have grown to resent me or deplore me, saying that I've changed, that I used to be more spontaneous, and that my smile used to be sincere." Acknowledging that changing conditions may have forced him to become more political in his actions and demeanor, Walesa nevertheless assured Poles that essentially he had not really changed very much as a person and was therefore worthy of whatever impressions of him the public had developed in the past.¹⁰¹

Another subject of concern for Walesa in the wake of the Round Table accords was the nature and purpose of his own Solidarity organization. In spite of the organization's growing political influence, Walesa continued to promote his belief that although he would prefer that Solidarity remain a labor union, at least for the moment that union was functioning as "a reform movement whose main purpose is to break up monopolies." The organization's immediate mission was "to break the stranglehold of the existing political system, while also taking care that we don't turn ourselves into a monopoly."¹⁰² This last concern, that Solidarity itself not become a political monopoly, would lead to splits within the organization as Walesa and some of his colleagues became divided over the nature of Solidarity's role in post-communist Polish politics.

By the end of what had proven to be a successful spring, Walesa and the other Solidarity leaders began to mobilize their resources for the scheduled June elections that would create the new Sejm and Senate promised in the accords. With the Roman Catholic Church offering official support, Solidarity and its allies embarked upon twenty-five days of campaigning before the critical balloting began. When the government began promoting some of its allies as "non-Party" candidates for the 35% "free" seats in the Sejm, Solidarity was forced to mount a major effort to convince voters to cast their ballots only for trustworthy candidates. Noting the government's tactics, Walesa decided to capitalize on his own 75% approval rating by having himself photographed with Solidarity candidates and by making himself available for rallies and interviews with foreign and domestic journalists.¹⁰³

When the free parliamentary elections were finally held in June, the Communists and their allies suffered a major political humiliation as Solidarity swept to an overwhelming victory, winning 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate with the final seat going to an independent. The first round of the balloting had garnered Solidarity 91 of the 100 Senate seats and 160 of the 161 contested seats in the

Sejm. A second round of voting gave the organization another eight seats in the Senate and one in the Sejm. The Solidarity electoral victory was so extensive that even Communist candidates running unopposed in various districts were not voted into office. Communist support ranged from 5-25% across the country and only three Communist candidates won their seats outright in the Sejm.¹⁰⁴ Given the opportunity to vent their frustrations over decades of Communist rule, Polish voters had delivered a very clear message that they would no longer tolerate a government ruling in defiance of the public's wishes.

In spite of serving successfully as the charismatic leader of opposition forces, Lech Walesa chose not to run for a seat in parliament, but rather to wait for the presidential elections scheduled for 1995. Since negotiations with the Jaruzelski government called for the parliamentary election of a president for a six-year term, Walesa was content to bide his time until the top position became available. On July 14, Walesa issued a declaration that only a member of the governing coalition should be elected to the presidency and that he was ready to support whichever candidate received the National Assembly's vote of support. As a result, the parliament elected Gen. Jaruzelski president five days later, although final results showed that he had received only one vote more than the minimum needed to be elected. After the election, Walesa sent his congratulations to Jaruzelski, but could not resist adding the jab, "For your sake, sir, and for Poland's sake, I hope that the next president elected by the legislature owes his job to the voices of all Poles."¹⁰⁵

In August 1989, the Solidarity movement gained control of the government when Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual and key Solidarity advisor, was appointed prime minister by Jaruzelski. After becoming president, Jaruzelski had elevated Interior Minister Kiszczak to the premiership, but disputes with Solidarity over the nomination of government ministers brought the Kiszczak government down after only three weeks. Having lobbied for Mazowiecki's appointment as premier, Walesa was overjoyed that Jaruzelski delegated the Solidarity journalist and recently-named editor of Tygodnik Solidarnosc to form a government.¹⁰⁶ Mazowiecki had received the support of his Solidarity colleagues after Walesa turned down the opportunity to head a government of his own. Although a man of the people by virtue of his career as a shipyard worker and labor organizer, Walesa had nevertheless tried to develop the image of a man selflessly dedicated to his role as leader

and national hero. In refusing the offer to assume the premiership, Walesa said that he would prefer to return to Gdansk to concentrate on his work as a trade unionist. When it had first been suggested that he allow himself to be nominated for the presidency, Walesa claimed that he did not want to be president, but that he would assume that position for the good of the country if requested to do so.¹⁰⁷

As an astute observer of developing political conditions, Walesa realized that a prime minister could be saddled with the blame if Poland's political and economic reforms failed to proceed at the desired pace, whereas a president might remain above the fray. Also, a president could manipulate conditions by attacking a prime minister, as Walesa would later do when he criticizes Mazowiecki and other former Solidarity colleagues for being too slow in making the transition to a market economy.¹⁰⁸

Yet Walesa's refusal to assume the responsibilities of the premiership was characteristic of his behavior in other ways, as well. In his work, The Rebirth of History, Misha Glenny says of Walesa that "being prime minister would have cramped his style" because the position would have "involved spending too much time behind a desk trying to reach diplomatic solutions to very serious problems." Since Walesa was more comfortable in a less structured environment and since he preferred to follow a more actively populist course of action, the premiership would have held little fascination for him. However, since the presidency required less day-to-day involvement in the minutiae of government, it is understandable that this position would have been more attractive to Walesa.¹⁰⁹

In forming a government that would finally bring an end to one-party rule, Mazowiecki allotted eleven cabinet posts to the Geremek-led Parliamentary Civic Club that represented deputies elected by Solidarity supporters. However, in keeping with the political reality of the moment, Mazowiecki also filled four positions with members of the Polish United Workers' Party, four with PUWP allies in the United Farmers' Party, and three with representatives of the Democratic Party, a former satellite of the PUWP. In late January, the Polish United Workers' Party then voted to dissolve itself transfer its political power to a new Social Democratic Party.¹¹⁰

For Lech Walesa, the autumn of 1989 brought new notoriety on an international scale as the Solidarity leader traveled abroad during the middle weeks of November. Walesa's travels across the

Atlantic allowed him to meet with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Venezuelan President Carlos Perez, and U.S. President George Bush. Walesa also visited Polish communities abroad and addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress about the new Poland he was helping to forge. Of the latter, Walesa would note that some wits had referred to his presentation as "the best-paid speech in the world" since it moved Congress to grant Poland nearly \$250 million more in credits than it had been willing to commit to in the days before the address.¹¹¹

However, for all the optimism at home and abroad, the political environment in which Walesa and his colleagues were forced to operate was less than ideal in 1989. The compromises that had allowed Solidarity to negotiate political and economic reforms and to form a government under Mazowiecki also created a governmental structure that made carrying out those reforms much more difficult than it might have been. By guaranteeing the Communists a commanding bloc of seats in the Sejm and instituting a proportional voting system that granted seats to tiny parties, Solidarity and its allies had gained control of a semi-democratic system that frustrated coalition building and slowed the passage of legislation designed to further reform efforts.¹¹²

In December, Walesa's concern over possible legislative logjams led him to lobby for greater powers for the Mazowiecki government so that it could reorganize the economy, demonopolize the state sector, reform the tax system, and restructure government on the local and regional levels. However, Walesa was also aware that he had "poked a stick into an anthill" by proposing such increased powers and that some Poles might interpret his actions as somewhat dictatorial.¹¹³

In spite of these flaws in the system, the enthusiasm of the new post-communist government drove it to initiate legislation that would usher in a new era. To begin the new year in January 1990, Poland embarked upon an ambitious and potentially dangerous path to a free market by introducing Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's "Big Bang" or "shock therapy" reforms designed to hasten the transition. Having inherited an economy marked by hyperinflation, widespread shortages, major trade deficits and debts to the West, and only marginal foreign-exchange reserves, Balcerowicz and his supporters believed that the fast track to a market economy was the only cure for Poland's economic ills. Consequently, the "Big Bang" plan called for the elimination of price controls, the lowering of trade barriers, and the establishment of the zloty as a convertible currency.¹¹⁴

As a result of Poland's new economic agenda, the private sector would grow from 29,000 to 50,000 businesses by 1991 and one million new jobs would be created in eighteen months.¹¹⁵ Numerous stores, restaurants and other small-scale or cooperative enterprises would be established across the nation as the availability of goods improved dramatically. However, only about 10% of Poles would gain immediate prosperity from these initial steps toward a market economy and the lack of a true middle class would prevent progress from occurring at the desired, or necessary, pace. In addition, the commitment to economic "shock therapy" generated a number of problems with major political ramifications as initial optimism about the reforms, at least among economic advisors, began to subside. Slowed by legislative logjams, bureaucratic resistance, labor concerns about social welfare programs, and a host of other obstacles, the process of privatization failed to meet the expectations of many economists. Foreign and domestic investors tended to avoid large state-owned enterprises because they were inefficient, outdated, or producing products that could not compete with foreign concerns. However, and in spite of their enormous drain on government funds, few of these inefficient large enterprises could be shut down because of already dangerously high levels of unemployment across Poland. Additionally, some of these enterprises, such as the Nowa Huta steelworks outside Cracow or the mines, mills, and factories of Lower Silesia contributed greatly to environmental problems at a time when concern over environmental standards was on the rise in Poland.¹¹⁶

In addition to the economic uncertainty brought about by fast-track economic reforms, the Mazowiecki government had to confront growing criticism from Solidarity's rank-and-file, as well as from Walesa himself. Early in 1990, Walesa began to express his dissatisfaction with Mazowiecki's policies in a number of critical areas. First of all, Walesa felt that a weakened communist nomenklatura was essential to the creation of a functioning democratic government and a market economy. As long as old Party functionaries continued to hold key positions in the government and economic bureaucracy, they could work to obstruct what Walesa believed to be the most essential reforms. Since Mazowiecki had earlier warned that a witch-hunt directed toward communists would be too distracting at a very important juncture in the transition to a new society, he was not willing to undertake the weakening of the nomenklatura at a pace that would please Walesa.

Secondly, Walesa was concerned that the government was dragging its feet when it came to passing reform measures and that in order to keep pressure on legislators he was willing to become the spokesman for those who wanted their grievances to be heard in the parliament. Walesa also declared that "it was time for Solidarity to take off the gloves" and to make its objectives and complaints clear to the government.¹¹⁷

Although Walesa continued to attract the support and adulation of a great many Poles, there were a number of critics who commented on some of the less attractive characteristics that Walesa had developed over the past decade and which were now influencing his behavior. Some felt that Walesa had always possessed an undemocratic, or potentially dictatorial, streak that caused him to demand things done his way or to lose patience with governmental procedures that prevented him from reaching his objectives quickly. According to Timothy Garton Ash, author of The Magic Lantern, "Even in Solidarity's first period of legal existence, in 1980 and 1981, Walesa had a somewhat ambivalent attitude to democracy inside the movement." For example, in an interview for a Solidarity periodical, Walesa had once asked, "Can you steer a ship through a stormy sea in a wholly democratic way?"¹¹⁸

Walesa's avowed respect for the interwar leader Marshall Jozef Pilsudski as a role-model led some to draw historical comparisons between these two men who had contributed to the development of democracy in Poland, Pilsudski after the First World War and Walesa in the 1980's. What was significant about this comparison, however, was that Pilsudski lost faith in Polish democracy and toppled it, with military assistance, in favor of a dictatorship. Certainly, no one expected Walesa to follow the same path as Pilsudski, but when Walesa stated in a June 1990 interview that Poland needs "a president with an axe, decisive, tough, straightforward, who doesn't mess around and doesn't get in the way of democracy but fills in the holes immediately," critics took note.¹¹⁹

Other potentially negative traits displayed by Walesa included occasional peevishness and an unwillingness to let others gain the upper hand in a situation, even when there was no real gamesmanship involved. The new president of Czechoslovakia was the victim of Walesa's petulance when the Solidarity leader refused to travel from Gdansk to Warsaw to meet with Havel during the

latter's visit in January 1990. Walesa wanted to be treated as Havel's equal and therefore refused to travel to the capital just to meet the Czech leader. Instead of meeting with his fellow proponent of democracy, Havel had to settle for an uncomfortable visit with President Jaruzelski.¹²⁰ Walesa would later meet with Havel in March, but it was at a border site at the Karkonoski Pass in the Carpathian Mountains.¹²¹

As the split between Walesa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki began to widen, Walesa increased his stature within the Solidarity union by capturing the presidency of that organization during the Second National Solidarity Congress in April, 1990. In winning the election with 77% of the vote, Walesa felt that union members had "clearly expressed their wish that Solidarity remain a union movement" and that he was now free to pursue a policy that kept the union independent of the government and all political parties.¹²² However, instead of bringing the various Solidarity factions together in support of a consensus course of action, Walesa's election as chairman actually opened the way for a formal parting of the ways between former colleagues.

At the end of the spring, Walesa supporters in the Solidarity movement announced the formation of a Center Alliance political party to represent their interests and objectives, while in June, political friction between Walesa and the Mazowiecki government inspired a public falling out in which Walesa openly criticized Mazowiecki for hesitating on key economic reforms and failing to eliminate the old nomenklatura. In spite of the Round Table accords, Walesa did not want to share power with the communists and he was determined to find a way to push Jaruzelski out of the political picture. Another factor influencing Walesa's determination to eliminate the nomenklatura was the widespread public belief that very little had actually changed in Poland because the nomenklatura was still present and even prospering as the opening of new economic opportunities and markets greatly benefitted those who already had connections or held privileged positions under the old regime.¹²³

Walesa also felt that the Warsaw and Cracow intellectuals who represented Solidarity in the government were attempting to push him aside, so he began to grow resentful of Adam Michnik, Bronislaw Geremek, and other former colleagues. When Mazowiecki and his allies attempted to create a national Citizens' Committee independent of Walesa, Walesa's supporters defeated the plan, claiming

that it simply represented a potentially new monopoly on power. Walesa also employed a very questionable tactic when he began making oblique references to that fact that some of Mazowiecki's colleagues were Jewish.¹²⁴

Walesa took his aggressive strategy a step further in early July when he forced Solidarity's parliamentary deputies to face the trade union's rank-and-file membership in a Gdansk shipyard and to endure Walesa's accusations that they had forgotten their Solidarity roots.¹²⁵ Following these confrontations with Walesa in July, Mazowiecki and his supporters in Solidarity broke with Walesa and created a new political party, Civic Movement-Democratic Alliance (ROAD), in opposition to the pro-Walesa Center Alliance. In addition, Mazowiecki countered Walesa's charges that he was moving too cautiously and slowing down the reform process by accusing Walesa of resorting to populist tactics and desiring dictatorial powers. ROAD's position was that rapid progress toward a free market, the pace that Walesa desired, would destabilize Poland and create a whole new set of socioeconomic problems. To this end, Adam Michnik went so far as to declare that Walesa was "a danger to the nation." Center Alliance countered this challenge with the accusation that Mazowiecki's policies had left Poland trapped between communism and democracy.¹²⁶

Reflecting Walesa's political agenda at the time, the Center Alliance's primary goal was to develop plans for accelerated reforms in all areas of national life. According to Walesa, this meant open support for the Balcerowicz reform program in the economic sphere and a political offensive to engineer the "dismissal of any official who in the public's eyes represented anti-democratic, anti-Polish, or antimoral attitudes."¹²⁷ However, the Center Alliance also provided Walesa with a bloc of support as he stepped up his criticism of the Mazowiecki government in attacks that would later be echoed in his memoirs, The Struggle and the Triumph. Somewhat snidely, Walesa would write of the "glib rhetoric" of his detractors, who sat "sipping their cappuccinos" and growing "increasingly dismissive of me."¹²⁸

However, Walesa also bore a large measure of the blame for splitting Solidarity because in waging a campaign within the union to prevent the creation of a monopoly, he in fact contributed to the deterioration of the feelings of solidarity that had made the union so strong and united in the first place.¹²⁹ Occurring over time and reflecting the pluralism of post-1989 politics, the break-up of the

Solidarity movement had contributed to the development of a number of new political parties such as the Democratic Union, the Liberal Democrats, the Center Alliance, and a growing number of others. From the initial stages, the post-Solidarity parties tended to support reform, but differ on Church-State relations and in the personalities of their leaders.¹³⁰

In the midst of the growing political factionalization, Walesa achieved one of his primary political goals in September 1990 when President Jaruzelski announced his resignation after months of repeated calls for such an action by the Solidarity leader. Since Jaruzelski's departure would open the way for presidential elections to be held at the end of November, Walesa announced his own candidacy with a televised statement promising that election to the presidency would "represent an opportunity to see through to successful completion the pledge I made in August 1980." On October 3, Solidarity's National Board voted 67-10 in favor of supporting Walesa's candidacy. Joining Walesa on the list of presidential candidates were Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the prime minister; Roman Bartoszcze, president of the Polish Farmers' Party; Włodzimierz Comoszewicz, a socialist deputy in the Sejm; Stanislaw Tyminski, an emigré businessman from Canada and head of the Libertarian Party there; and Leszek Moczulski of the rightist Confederation for an Independent Poland.¹³¹

After acrimonious campaign debates and the further estrangement of Walesa and Mazowiecki, 61% of the eligible voters went to the polls on November 25. Walesa, with 40% of the votes, received less than the majority needed for a first-round victory. Mazowiecki, whom Walesa resented for conducting what he perceived as a negative campaign, received only 18% of the vote and promptly submitted his resignation as prime minister out of humiliation over the landslide defeat. Surprisingly, Tyminski received 23% of the voters' support in spite of Walesa's attempts to portray him as a cynical and manipulative outsider. In the following month's run-off election, Walesa handily defeated Tyminski by a margin of approximately 74%-26% to gain the presidency and therefore step down as chairman of Solidarity.¹³²

In the aftermath of his electoral victory, Walesa moved quickly in nominating his personal choice, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, to form a government as prime minister. Bielecki, an economist and former member of the Solidarity underground, also headed the Liberal Democrats in Poland and was expected to support Walesa's attempts to speed up reform legislation in the parliament. In March of

1991, Poland's apparent commitment to a radical economic program convinced foreign creditor nations to halve Poland's \$33 billion foreign debt. The success of the Balcerowicz plan in creating tens of thousands of new businesses impressed foreign economic experts, although rising unemployment in Lower Silesia, along the Baltic coast, and in other areas led some to wonder whether the "shock therapy" plan could manage to avoid exacting a unwanted social toll in the transition to a market economy.

Yet in spite of the welcome economic gestures by foreign nations, Walesa found himself in the midst of a new political controversy by the end of the spring. After stepping down as Solidarity leader in order to take the oath of office as president, Walesa turned the union's leadership position over to Marian Krzaklewski, who in turn began using his position to criticize Walesa and the Bielecki government. As Solidarity launched a nationwide protest against the Bielecki government's policies and the announced price rises for energy, Krzaklewski declared on May 22 that Solidarity's protective umbrella over the government was about to close.¹³³

To make matters worse for Bielecki, his government overshot its budget during the summer of 1991, thus jeopardizing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that would have the IMF write off half of Poland's \$35 billion debt if the Polish government stayed within its budget and followed the guidelines of a plan to stabilize the economy by March 1994. Contributing to the budgetary overrun were funds used to prop up inefficient enterprises and huge increases in public spending, the latter a source of continuous debate over the extent of the social welfare net.¹³⁴

By the early days of September, Bielecki faced such enormous political and economic obstacles that he resigned as prime minister and set the stage for new parliamentary election the following month.¹³⁵ However, as Walesa's political allies prepared their campaigns for parliamentary seats, Walesa's critics countered with accusations that the president was attempting to accrue more power for himself by exploiting the fragmented conditions in parliament caused by a proliferation of political parties. Critics also attempted to portray Walesa as so divorced from his old Solidarity colleagues and the people at large that he had been reduced to taking advice from a kitchen cabinet that included his former chauffeur.¹³⁶

When the elections were held in October, the elimination of guaranteed seats for the communists made them the first true parliamentary elections of the new era, although the 42.5% voter turnout did little to boost confidence in the democratic process. In addition, the large number of political parties participating in the elections created a situation in which the three most successful parties, the Democratic Union, the Democratic Left Alliance (former communists), and the Farmers' Party (former allies of the communists), received 12.2%, 12.1%, and 8.9% of the vote, respectively. Walesa's supporters in the Center Alliance came in fifth with 8.7%, while Bielecki's Liberal Democrats finished with 7.2%. The Beer Drinkers Party ended up well back of the pack with only 3.3% of the vote.¹³⁷

With the government of Bielecki and Balcerowicz officially ousted by the elections, Jan Olszewski gained the premiership and the right to appoint a cabinet in November.¹³⁸ Walesa, however, found himself at odds with several political parties over his hesitation at appointing Olszewski, a proponent of moderate reforms with strong political support. The new prime minister worried Walesa, not only because Olszewski believed in a more restrained transition to a market economy, but because he did not come from the Gdansk movement that Walesa had led. Olszewski had developed his political skills as a member of the Warsaw anti-communist opposition that evolved much earlier than Solidarity and which Walesa did not entirely trust given their intellectual background.

Given the opportunity to propose his own economic plans, Olszewski made it immediately clear that he was unwilling to continue the Balcerowicz "shock therapy" program. Instead, his more moderate proposals were designed to alleviate some of the social problems caused by the fast-track plan and its resulting unemployment, eroding welfare net, and discrepancy between wages and prices. Yet for all his claims of a more reasonable economic transition, Olszewski had great difficulties working with his own economic experts. On February 17, 1992, Finance Minister Karol Lutkowski resigned over Olszewski's economic plans because they ran counter to Balcerowicz's and seemed unproductive. Even former Prime Minister Mazowiecki attacked Olszewski's economic strategy as what signalled an extensive erosion of support.¹³⁹

On May 6, a second finance minister, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned in the midst of a crucial visit by representatives of the IMF because the Sejm voted a major increase in public spending. The Sejm accomplished this increase by cancelling two-year-old laws that ordered a reduction in state pensions

and a freeze on the salaries of employees in the public sector. Olechowski's concern was that the Sejm's actions would cause the deficit to rise above the IMF's approved limit and trigger inflation. Significantly, Olechowski had also recently been identified by Lech Walesa as a leading candidate for the premiership if the Olszewski government were to fall.¹⁴⁰

On the whole, the economic problems facing Poland were so complex and widespread that there were few quick fixes that could ease the hardships created by the nation's economic overhaul. From 1990 to 1992, industrial production had fallen by 40%, while wages had fallen approximately 27% during the first two years of the transition. Consumption had also fallen, while unemployment increased to as high as 22-25% in some regions and inflation of several hundred percent eliminated savings and severely crippled consumer purchasing power. By late spring of 1992, there would be signs that the economy had bottomed out and that industrial production would begin to rise, but few Poles saw a bright future on the horizon. According to Prof. Romauld Kudlinski of Warsaw University's Department of Economics, the changes brought about by the post-1988 economic transformation made the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia pale in comparison.¹⁴¹

As the Olszewski cabinet wobbled through the late winter and early spring, some critics began to wonder publically where the president had gone in the midst of the on-going crisis. Suggesting that a strong president could make a crucial difference in restoring governmental stability, these critics noted that Walesa had only "distinguished himself by his silence" and that his moral authority was apparently in decline. With the parliament blocking his efforts to increase executive powers and his own lack of expertise in detailed economic planning, Walesa was once again portrayed as being isolated in Belvedere Palace and remiss in his leadership duties.¹⁴²

By May it became apparent that what Walesa was waiting for was the collapse of the Olszewski government and the opportunity to establish a "technocratic government that would grant him extraordinary powers" to break the legislative logjam and pass the desired economic reforms. However, since changing the constitution by amendment to allow for increased executive powers required a two-thirds majority vote in the Sejm, it was highly unlikely that the diverse collection of political parties in that body would provide Walesa with the necessary support.¹⁴³

At the heart of Walesa's constitutional problems, though, was a political legacy from the communist era that left the emerging democracy with an inherent contradiction. Since the creation of a democratic state would require the drafting and passage of a new constitution, Walesa and other government leaders were forced to operate under the Soviet-inspired constitution of 1952 which provided for neither "rule by law" nor a democratic executive branch. Consequently, although the constitution had recently been amended to justify reforms, it did not define the powers and responsibilities of the presidency.¹⁴⁴

In addition to requesting expanded presidential powers of the parliament, Walesa suggested that he might consider forming his own political party "in order to revive Poland's stalled economic changes and resolve an escalating political crisis." Walesa also declared, "It cannot go on like this. We cannot look on indifferently as our country sinks into stagnation and disorder." What Poland needed was "a master of the house" and not "long-winded and never-ending debates."¹⁴⁵ What Walesa favored was a French-style executive branch in which the president was able to exercise direct influence on governmental policy, as opposed to allowing the prime minister too independent a course of action.¹⁴⁶

When the Olszewski government eventually fell on June 4, 1992, it appeared that the balance of power would shift to Lech Walesa, much as he had desired. However, Olszewski managed to complicate matters only hours before his government suffered a no-confidence vote in the parliament by releasing a list of national figures who allegedly served as informers under the communist regime. Although the list was not released outside the parliament, it was said to include Walesa, top Walesa advisors, leading former dissidents, and key political leaders. Those named on the list denounced it as untrustworthy and the work of professional liars, but Olszewski's act served to revitalize the campaign against suspected communists and to distract politicians who should have been focusing on reform efforts and the state of the economy.

In the midst of this potential political nightmare, Walesa exasperated the problem by choosing Waldemar Pawlak to replace Olszewski as prime minister. Pawlak was a leader of the Peasants' Party, which had formerly been allied with the communists under the old regime. As a result, Pawlak would

become the first post-1989 premier to be chosen from the communist camp. Many Poles questioned the wisdom of Walesa's choice, especially when it appeared that the appointment of Pawlak might be Walesa's way of gaining the support of old-regime politicians or of Solidarity's left wing and the farm lobby. With Walesa's relations with some of Solidarity's leaders becoming increasingly strained, it was possible that he was using Pawlak to seek secure allies in his bid for broader presidential powers. Not coincidentally, one of Pawlak's first acts as prime minister was to fire three government officials -- the defense minister, the interior minister, and the head of state-controlled television and radio -- who had been part of the political struggle between Walesa and Olszewski.¹⁴⁷ Center Alliance leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, a former Walesa ally, warned that the appointment of Pawlak marked the beginning of the recommunization of Poland.¹⁴⁸

Right from the start, parliamentary opposition to Pawlak, especially from the moderate-to-rightist parties, prevented the new premier from appointing an acceptable cabinet. Pawlak turned down an offer from the "Small Coalition" of the Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Congress and the Polish Economic Program to create a mutually acceptable government, although unconfirmed reports claimed that it was Walesa who had pressured Pawlak into rejecting the offer. Pawlak was also being cast as a willing political tool for a president frustrated at both his limited powers and the independent mindset of past prime ministers.¹⁴⁹

Pawlak himself did little to dispel the notion that he was being "manually steered" by Walesa as a means of gaining direct access to policy-making. In an interview with Wprost, Pawlak stated,

"I can see nothing wrong with this option. It is absolutely necessary to have good cooperation between the President and the Prime Minister. The actual division of work is just a matter of gentleman's agreement, provided both officials give priority to the interests of the state. This is precisely the way I view President Walesa and that's why I agreed to take up the mission to form a government."¹⁵⁰

At the same time that Walesa was receiving criticism from his choice of prime ministers, he received conflicting messages from the Solidarity rank-and-file during the union's congress in June. When delegates met for the first round of the congress in Gdansk, many of those present launched a fierce attack on Walesa and gave a major ovation to former prime minister Olszewski. Walesa, however, received the vocal support of the Siec group of works commissions, which criticized Olszewski for being unresponsive to Solidarity demands. Joining the Siec group in defending Walesa

were delegates from the Sendzimir steelworks in Lower Silesia the Baltic shipyards of Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia, and by the time the second round of the congress opened in Lodz appeals for greater unity in the ranks had toned down the open criticism of the president.¹⁵¹

For Pawlak, however, political support failed to materialize and by the beginning of July the prime minister was refusing to resign or to appoint a cabinet. Instead, Pawlak suggested that he would resign if the Sejm did not pass the programs he had requested. Walesa's comment that he might be forced to invoke emergency powers if Pawlak's parliamentary mission failed did little to dispel talk of the president's growing willingness to resort to potentially dictatorial tactics. Walesa had even suggested that he might serve in the dual role of president and premier if conditions warranted such drastic action.¹⁵²

When Walesa provided the introduction to U.S. President George Bush's speech in Warsaw's Royal Palace Square on July 5, he told the crowd that "an order is growing out of this ferment," but that the nation needed more time to sort out its political and economic difficulties. Walesa's message to his countrymen was that, "We have taken a path that no one has ever trodden before, and it is not easy."¹⁵³

For all the political problems that had beset Walesa and for all his occasional gruffness and political blunders, the president continued to garner the support of the majority of Poles, as exhibited in public opinion polls that continued to rank Walesa among the ten most popular politicians. When the Pentor Institute conducted a poll for the Wprost weekly on Walesa's future, 40% of the respondents said they "want Lech Walesa to play a greater role in Polish politics in the future." Tempering this measure of popular support, however, was the fact that a higher percentage consistently said that Walesa already had enough or too much power and should not have his executive responsibilities broadened. It was also determined that Walesa supporters were most likely to be found among the elderly, the less educated, and both unskilled and lower white-collar workers.¹⁵⁴ The events of the past couple of years had apparently cost him dearly among intellectuals and skilled workers.

When it became painfully apparent to Walesa that Pawlak had become a major political liability for him, Walesa was forced to begin negotiations with a seven-party coalition of conservatives,

nationalists, Christian Democrats, and free marketeers demanding Pawlak's removal as prime minister. Walesa had already refused to accept Pawlak's resignation and was aware that any concession to the coalition would be considered a personal defeat. However, on July 8, Walesa accepted the reality of a strong opposition bloc in the parliament and gave his consent to the creation of a seven-party coalition government under Hanna Suchocka, a 46-year-old law professor and member of the Democratic Union.¹⁵⁵

When Suchocka presented her cabinet to Walesa and the Sejm, her choices reflected the nature of her coalition, which included her own Democratic Union, as well as the Liberal Democrats, the Polish Economic Program, the Christian National Union, the Peasant Alliance, the Christian Democrats, and the Christian Peasant Alliance. With all seven of these parties behind her, added to support from Solidarity delegates, German Minority deputies, and some independents, Suchocka assumed that her cabinet would receive the majority of votes it needed to pass in the Sejm. With this kind of parliamentary support, Suchocka could be a little more direct in negotiating with Walesa, eventually allowing the president to propose a candidate for interior minister, since Walesa reportedly opposed replacing the defense and interior ministers. A presidential spokesman reported that Walesa requested written pledges from the leaders of all groups in the coalition to the effect that they would support Suchocka and her chosen cabinet, but Solidarity's Jan Rulewski, the key mediator in the coalition negotiations, claimed that the constitution did not give the president the right to make such a demand.¹⁵⁶

Ultimately, however, Hanna Suchocka was able to establish herself as a prime minister independent of Walesa and quite capable of negotiating with striking workers and farmers whose actions undermined the reported economic upturn of the summer and fall of 1992. Suchocka has also been successful in keeping a fragile coalition together and in providing Poland with a degree of governmental stability that had often been lacking under her immediate predecessors. Lech Walesa has been less than pleased with the course of events in 1992 and at year's end continues to lobby for a more powerful presidency, even as parliament seems to be backing away from the Balcerowicz fast-track approach to economic reform in favor of a slower and more cautious transition plan.

In looking back over the several years since the onset of Eastern Europe's democratic revolutions and emergence of Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa as national political leaders, it is very apparent that much of the early idealism and enthusiasm has been replaced by the immediacy of problems linked to the process of political and economic reform. When the tumultuous events of 1989 led to the ouster of the old communist regimes by those outside the political power structure, it was "outsiders" like the playwright Havel and the labor leader Walesa whose moral stature, populist appeal and experience in the opposition camp allowed them to emerge as apparent architects of a new era. However, Havel and Walesa were far from alone in leading the transition to democracy and one of the primary strengths that the two had in common, at least in the early stages, was the ability to organize sometimes disparate elements into an effective coalition for reform. Although generally "amateurs" in a political sense, Havel and Walesa were successful in channeling the optimism and energy of the democratic revolutions into programs of political and economic reform that would be conceived and carried out by a myriad of others, from economics experts to rank-and-file political novices.

One apparent problem faced by Havel and Walesa in regard to their status as political leaders is that once the democratic revolutions were over and the spirit of idealism had evolved into practical, serious politics, the political environment became much more complicated and a much less comfortable place for "amateurs." While many former opposition leaders found themselves crowded out by pragmatic politicians, Havel and Walesa managed to survive because in spite of their "outsider" origins they still possessed certain political skills that allowed them to function in a presidential capacity. Havel had gained valuable experience as an organizer and mediator during the Charter 77 years and during the initial stages of the Velvet Revolution, while Walesa had proven himself a capable leader during the 1980 and 1988 strikes, as well as during the years of the Solidarity underground. In addition, since the real everyday business of government was the responsibility of the prime ministers, it was possible for Havel and Walesa to serve in a presidential capacity without possessing the skills of more experienced politicians.

While Havel and Walesa have offered their respective nations strong populist leadership, they have also been criticized for demonstrating potentially dictatorial characteristics and for not exercising sufficient control over recent events. In Walesa's case, the charges of dictatorial behavior

certainly predate the democratic revolution in Poland and have been given additional weight through Walesa's handling of both the several prime ministers and his own once and former Solidarity colleagues. Walesa's position also remains uncertain in light of the ground lost in the continuing battle over presidential powers and the pace of reforms. In the case of Havel, charges of potentially neototalitarian behavior are less extensive and based upon more subtle reasoning, although Havel's fortunes in 1992 do little to justify such concern over political excesses and abuses of power. Havel's problem was that he became completely overshadowed by two more hardcore politicians in Klaus and Meciar who set in motion events that would not only trigger Havel's resignation but also bring about the "velvet divorce." Perhaps the message here is that both of these individuals, Havel and Walesa, have nearly completed the roles set out for them by the events of the recent past and that further progress into the new era will require governmental leaders with more pragmatic political skills. Havel's re-emergence as president of the new Czech Republic in January 1993 is a testament to his enduring popularity and his stature as a moral and cultural leader, but not necessarily a mandate on his practical political abilities.

However, regardless of how long Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa remain on the political playing fields of their respective nations or how much more they manage to accomplish in their careers, their contributions to the democratic revolutions of 1989 and the dawning of a new era in the political life of East Central Europe are immeasurable. Despite their individual political liabilities or quirks, Havel and Walesa have performed the roles that history has set out for them and they have brought the "outsiders" back into the corridors of power for the first time since the opening of the communist era. The coalitions that ended decades of communist rule may have fragmented and dissolved, but they are survived by their leaders and by the desire for a richer and more productive national life that long motivated those leaders in the first place.

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⁸³Davies, Heart of Europe, pp. 17-18; *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

⁸⁴Touraine, et. al., Solidarity, pp. 39, 106; Rothschild, Return to Diversity, p. 200.

⁸⁵Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 18; Touraine, et. al., Solidarity, pp. 197-199.

⁸⁶Laba, The Roots of Solidarity, pp. 140-142; Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity (New York: Random House, 1989), p. 225.

⁸⁷Touraine, et. al., Solidarity, pp. 197-199; Laba, The Roots of Solidarity, pp. 111-112.

⁸⁸Davies, Heart of Europe, p. 17-23; Touraine, et. al., Solidarity, pp. 197-199.

⁸⁹Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity, 106-107.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 107-108; Lech Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph (New York: Arcade Publishers, 1992), pp. 316-317.

⁹¹Menika Beyer, Cultural Editor of Spotkanie magazine, in a discussion with the Fulbright group, July 6, 1992; Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, p. 122.

⁹²Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 32, 42; Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 225.

⁹³Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity, p. 288.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁹⁵Laba, The Roots of Solidarity, p. 113.

- ⁹⁶Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity, pp. 221-225.
- ⁹⁷Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 151-153.
- ⁹⁸Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, p. 192.
- ⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 192-193; Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 174, 178.
- ¹⁰⁰Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, p. 180.
- ¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 181.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., p. 193.
- ¹⁰³Ibid., p. 205.
- ¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 205.
- ¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 214-215.
- ¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 216, 219; Glenney, The Rebirth of History, p.62.
- ¹⁰⁷Glenney, The Rebirth of History, pp. 54, 60.
- ¹⁰⁸Ibid., p.62.
- ¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 61.
- ¹¹⁰Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 221-222, 256.
- ¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 230-235.
- ¹¹²"Don't Panic," The Economist, Vol. 320, 7723 (September 7-13, 1991), p. 52.
- ¹¹³Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 246-247.
- ¹¹⁴"Business in Eastern Europe," p. 9.
- ¹¹⁵"Poland Loses Heart," The Economist, Vol. 322, 7747 (February 22-28, 1992), p. 41.
- ¹¹⁶Prof. Romauld Kudlinski, Department of Economics, Warsaw University, in a discussion with the Fulbright group on July 1, 1992.
- ¹¹⁷Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, pp. 260, 263.
- ¹¹⁸Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern, p. 34.
- ¹¹⁹Glenney, The Rebirth of History, p. 62; Ibid., p. 34.
- ¹²⁰Glenney, The Rebirth of History, p. 60.
- ¹²¹Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, p. 262.

- 122 *Ibid.*, pp. 265-267.
- 123 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, p. 263.
- 124 Mirek Luczka, of the Investigation Office of the Senate Chancellory, in a discussion with the Fulbright group, June 30, 1992; *Ibid.*, p. 263.
- 125 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, p. 264.
- 126 "Solidarity: End of the Road?" The Warsaw Voice, 27, 193 (July 5, 1992), pp. 6; *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.
- 127 Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, p. 271.
- 128 *Ibid.*, p. 278.
- 129 "Solidarity: End of the Road?", pp. 6-7.
- 130 "Spoiled for Choice," The Economist, Vol. 321, 7729 (October 19-25, 1991), p. 59.
- 131 Walesa, The Struggle and the Triumph, p. 281-283.
- 132 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, pp. 265-266; *Ibid.*, p. 284.
- 133 "Solidarity: End of the Road?", pp. 6-7.
- 134 "Poland Loses Heart," p. 41.
- 135 "Don't Panic," p. 52.
- 136 "Spoiled for Choice," p. 58.
- 137 "How Many Polish Parties Does it Take To Make a Cabinet?" The Economist, Vol. 321, 7731 (November 2-8, 1991), p. 43.
- 138 "Poland Loses Heart," p. 41.
- 139 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 140 "Coming Apart," The Economist, Vol. 323, 7758 (May 9-15, 1992), p. 58.
- 141 Remarks by Kudlinski.
- 142 "Poland Loses Heart," p. 41.
- 143 "Coming Apart," p. 60.
- 144 Mark Brzezinski, a Fulbright scholar studying the Polish Constitution, in a discussion with the Fulbright group, June 30, 1992.
- 145 International Herald Tribune, May 9, 1992, as reprinted in the May 1992 "Przegląd prasy obcej" of the Senate Chancellory Research and Analysis Office in Poland, p. 1.

146 Barton Nowotarski, Staff Assistant to Bronislaw Geremek of the Democratic Union, in a discussion with the Fulbright group, June 30, 1992.

147 "Left Turn," The Economist, Vol. 323, 7763 (June 13-19, 1992), p. 54.

148 "Solidarity: End of the Road?", pp. 6-7.

149 "Government See-Saw," The Warsaw Voice, 27, 193 (July 5, 1992), p. 3.

150 "Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak," Wprost, 25 (June 21, 1992), p.13, as reprinted in the Polish News Bulletin of the British and American Embassies, Warsaw (June 26, 1992), 120-92, pp. B1-B2.

151 "Second Round of Solidarity Congress," Gazeta Wyborcza, 150 (June 27-28, 1992), p.2, as reprinted in the Polish News Bulletin of the British and American Embassies, Warsaw (June 29, 1992), 121-92, pp. 5.

152 "Pawlak Addresses Sejm," from the Gazeta Wyborcza, 154, July 2, 1992, p.1, and Rzeczpospolita, 154, July 2, 1992, p. 2, as reprinted in the Polish News Bulletin of the British and American Embassies, Warsaw (June 26, 1992), 120-92, pp. B1-B2.

153 Text of Walesa's July 5, 1992 speech, cited in the International Herald Tribune (July 6, 1992), pp. 1,6.

154 "Walesa's Approval Ratings," The Warsaw Voice, 27, 193 (July 5, 1992), p. 3.

155 "Walesa Yields," The Economist, Vol. 324, 7767 (July 11-17, 1992), p. 52.

156 "Suchocka Cabinet Ready," from Rzeczpospolita, 159 (July 8, 1992), p.1, as reprinted in the Polish News Bulletin of the British and American Embassies, Warsaw (July 8, 1992), 127-92, pp. 2-3.

WESTERN CIVILIZATION: INFLUENCES IN WORLD HISTORY

HS 130

Spring Semester 1992

Cornish College of the Arts

Humanities and Science Program

Lecturer: Raymond S. Maxwell, III



Western Civilization: Influences in World History

HS 130
Spring Semester 1993

During the Christmas holiday of 1989 I sat in a hotel and watched the former President of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and his wife, sit through a kangaroo court trial and then be taken out and shot. Eastern Europe was an event. But the trial and summary execution of the Ceausescus was, and remains, but one of many events which have swept through Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. It was exceptional only in its ability to supersede holiday programming.

This course is an historical survey of Central and Eastern Europe. We will trace the creation of two Europes (a western and eastern part) from the period of the late Roman Empire, through the schisms of 867 and 1054, the sacking of Constantinople (1204) by western crusaders, the fall of Constantinople (1453), the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and its slow demise, and the chaos of attempting to create modern nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth century. A majority of the course will focus on the past two hundred years (1795-1992), what events, ideas, and people had the greatest impact on the region.

With fifteen weeks of class it appears we have ample time to cover the course material. Mind that this is an illusion. We will be pressed for time, and come the final few weeks of the semester you will long for the languid days of the early semester (note now that there is a vigorous reading load). Each class period will be a mixture of lecture and discussion. It is vital that you come prepared for each class meeting. The readings for this course are enjoyable, but demanding. They seek to resolve heady issues of life. Read these works, ponder the ideas within them, and you will emerge from this semester a far richer person.

"It's often safer to be in chains than to be free."

Franz Kafka, from *The Trial*

TEXTBOOKS

There are four required textbooks for the course. All may be obtained from Seattle University Book Store. There is as well the possibility that one of the finer used book stores in the area may have one, or all, of the textbooks.

The required texts are listed below.

- Gloria K. Fiero, *The Humanistic Tradition*
Tadeusz Borowski, *This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen*
Mikhail Bulgakov, *Heart of a Dog*
Mircea Eliade, *The Old Man and the Bureaucrats*
Czeslaw Milosz, *The Issa Valley*
Ludvik Vaculik, *The Guinea Pigs*

"I have seen the future, and its works."

--Lincoln Steffens (after visiting Moscow in 1919)

OF GRADES, ASSIGNMENTS, AND OTHER GOOD THINGS

No class would be complete without grades. This course is no exception. Throughout the semester you will receive points for work you do. Only at the end of the semester will you receive a letter grade. This point system need not leave you in a mystery about your standing in the class. Total your points, and compare your actual points with the potential points, and you will have an accurate reading of your current standing. All told 1000 points (something like "a thousand points of light") are possible (plus an additional 100 points should you choose to do extra credit). Assignment/points values are listed below.

| | |
|----------------------|------------|
| Examinations (three) | 500 points |
| Book Reports (five) | 500 points |

The examinations will be exhaustive in nature. You will have the whole period to write an examination. All examinations will be essay, and command of the course material is vital for you to do well on these examinations. The first examination will cover course material for the first

six weeks of the semester, the second examination material for the second six weeks, and the final examination will be comprehensive.

The book reports for this course will be short summaries of the readings. You are required to render the essence of book (*This Way...* , *Heart of a Dog* , *The Old Man...* , *The Issa Valley* , and *The Guinea Pigs*), as well as give an historical analysis. These reviews will be short and sweet (a mere one page each). In order to move us beyond the mundane world of regurgitation toward the realm of reflection, I want you to seek out the profundities of these works. Write about not just the plot of the book, but what ideas, types of personalities, etc. are employed to explore the complexities of human existence. Yes, I want you to think.

Extra credit for the course may be obtained by writing a book report on an approved title. Should you opt for this you have the potential of earning an extra 100 points.

There are those few occasions when you will not be able to make it to class. If we are having an examination that day you may not make it up, unless circumstances are so significant that it warrants otherwise. While this may seem harsh, it does free me from the task of wading through a plethora of excuses (genuine and otherwise), and acting out the role of a baby-sitter or parent.

It is your responsibility to get papers to me on time. I will not accept the excuse that your paper did not find its way to me because of failing of a friend to deliver, it was taken from my faculty box, Elvis Presley stole it from your desk and then took off in a flying saucer, etc. *You* must make sure that your paper gets to me.

All out-of-class papers must be typed (there will be five of them). They must also use standard English, and be free from spelling and grammatical errors. Papers which do not meet these minimum requirements will either be returned to the student ungraded (until the paper meets the minimum requirements), or the paper will be discounted in points.

Late papers will be accepted, but will receive no grade. It is a good idea to get your work in on time.

I do not use class attendance as part of your grade. Should you fail to attend class often your grade will undoubtedly be effected (because you will have missed lecture notes and discussion). While I rarely openly express concern to students who miss class, I do notice their absence. If you miss class you miss an opportunity to add to your knowledge.

"The great nations have always acted like gangsters, and the small nations like prostitutes."

--Stanley Kubrick

COURSE OUTLINE

January

20: Course introduction

read: *A Civilization Primer* (all)

25-27: Course introduction, the collapse of the Roman Empire

read: *A Civilization Primer*

February

1-3: A Brief History of the Byzantine Empire

read: William Pfaff, "Where the Wars Came From" and "The Absence of Empire" (on reserve)

8 10: The Eastern Europe and the Rise of the West in the Medieval Period

read: *The Issa Valley*

FIRST BOOK REVIEW DUE

15-17: The Decline of Eastern Europe and the Ascendency of the West

read: Jeri Laber, "Witch Hunt in Prague", Václav Havel, "Paradise Lost", Stephen Engelberg, "The Velvet Revolution Gets Rough" (all on reserve)

22-24: Review and Six-Week Examination

March

1-3: Eastern Europe in the Early Modern Period

read: *The Heart of a Dog*

SECOND BOOK REVIEW DUE

8-10: The Absorption of Central and Eastern Europe into Other Empires

read: Stephen Kinzer, "East Germans Face Their Accusers", Jane

Kramer, "Letter From Europe" (all on reserve)

15-19: SPRING BREAK!

22-24: Romanticism, Nationalism, and Eastern Europe

read: *This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen*

THIRD BOOK REVIEW DUE

29-31: The Creation of a New Europe in 1918

read: Fiero, *The Humanistic Tradition*, pp. 6-56; Vladimir Bukovsky,

"Tumbling Back to the Future"

April

5-7: Problems of Nation-building and Revolution, the Rise of
Totalitarianism

read: Fiero, *The Humanistic Tradition*, pp. 58-72; *The Old Man and
the Bureaucrats*

FOURTH BOOK REVIEW DUE

12-14: Review and Twelve-Week Examination

19-22: Eastern Europe in the Aftermath of the Second World War

read: Fiero, *The Humanistic Tradition*, pp. 76-100

26-28: The Opening of the Iron Curtain

read: Fiero, *The Humanistic Tradition*, pp. 102-163; *The Guinea Pigs*


FIFTH BOOK REVIEW DUE

May

3-5 Review and Final Examination

"Comrade X, it so happens, is an old Etonian. He would be ready to die on the barricades, in theory anyway, but you notice that he still leaves his bottom waistcoat button undone."

--George Orwell, from *The Road to Wigan Pier*



Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990's:
A Macrocsm of the Fulbright-Hays Group Dynamics

by

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Submitted to the Fulbright-Hays
Summer Seminar Abroad Program
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Foreign travel incites growth within the travellers at several cognitive levels. At one level travellers learn about the culture they visit. In the case of the Fulbright-Hays 1992 Summer Seminar to Poland and Czechoslovakia, the travellers learned about political, social, and economic transformations in these two cultures. At a second level, travellers learn about themselves, particularly if they are travelling and/or working with a group. Individuals may become aware of their group communication styles, the types of roles they are comfortable or uncomfortable with, their levels of tolerance, and so forth.

Indeed in my experience travelling in the Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar program, I learned about Poland and Czechoslovakia and about how I operate in groups. But interestingly, if not more importantly, upon reflection I have discovered that my personal experience as a group member was analogous to what I observed about the political, social and economic transformations in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hence, my perception of the dynamics of our Fulbright-Hays seminar group provide a framework for explaining my perceptions and insights on the rapidly changing Central Eastern Europe. In essence, at the heart of these transformations are human communication dynamics that rhetorical and small group communication theories can help us understand.

To explain my perception of Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990's, I will first describe rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke's theory of identification and division. Then, I will provide an analysis of our group's dynamics by integrating Burke's theory with

small group communication theory. Finally, I will apply these two perspectives to some of my findings from discussions, lectures, and literature obtained during the summer seminar to show how many of the dynamics of our group reflect the complicated dynamics influencing Poland and Czechoslovakia's transformation to democracy and a free market economy. This analysis ought to benefit my professional growth as well as the Fulbright Commission in at least four ways: 1) it provides the Fulbright Commission with an (admittedly biased) analysis of the strengths and limitations of the group-study tours it supports; 2) it provides a means for me to synthesize the broad range of issues investigated in the seminar; 3) it serves as a case study for research on the communication of bona fide groups that live together for a period of time since little research exists on such groups (Putnam and Stohl, 1990); 4) it provides a vehicle for me to teach components of small group communication courses and rhetorical criticism courses.

Identification and Division

Rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke defines humans as beings who use symbols (i.e. language) to overcome our condition of individual alienation. That is, we use symbols to identify our view of reality with that of those around us. As individuals, we are alone, separate from one another yet through language we become of like mind (Burke, 1962b). Concurrently, however, language contributes to further separation or division among people because

often we do not share the same meanings for certain symbols (Burke, 1966). What the word (symbol) "abortion" means to Jay may differ from what it means to Pam. Thus, humans continuously engage in symbol-use to influence one another's meanings. This is the essence of rhetorical activity.

Further, Burke writes that individuals come to identify with groups that are "more or less at odds with one another" (1962b, p.22). Members of a large group seek out smaller groups of people with whose thinking they identify and, consequently, become divided amongst themselves. Therefore, says Burke, to fully understand "identification" we must "confront the implications of *division*" (p.22). That is, identification occurs precisely because there is division; identification is compensatory to division (p.22). Stated differently, identification causes "congregation" which itself occurs through the separation of one group from another. Hence, separation (division) is compensatory to congregation (identification).

Additionally, Burke uses a religious metaphor -- the "redemption cycle" -- to describe the process whereby we use symbols to deal with conflict (1961). He explains that humankind was once pure or whole but then sinned and became "broken" because the acquisition of language enabled us to say "no" and disobey the rules. Having sinned, the believer is "broken" and must be made whole once again by redemption which is attained either through mortification (self-punishment) or through victimage (punishment of a scapegoat -- Christ). In either case, it is the suffering of a

victim that restores wholeness. So too, because of language, humans who were once whole, become divided and thus seek redemption, most often through a scapegoat. The process of alienating the scapegoat unites the people who identify with one another in blaming and hating (dividing themselves from) that victim. Again, we see that division and identification are compensatory. Hence, Hitler scapegoated the Jews to reinforce unity and identification among the Aryan nation, and white Americans alienate African-Americans to reinforce their racial identification. Bill Clinton scapegoats George Bush to build unity and identification among Democrats. The restoration of wholeness empowers the "sinners" not only to survive but to succeed.

In sum, Burke's rhetorical theory suggests that cyclically we use symbols to identify/unite and divide ourselves from one another. Part of how we unite, he suggests, is by identifying ourselves in opposition to a common scapegoat who we alienate. Inherent to unity and identification, therefore, is division and alienation.

Burke's theory is relevant to both the interactions of the Fulbright-Hays group that travelled to Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as to the current social, political and economic transformations in those two countries.

A Group in Search of a Purpose

In my attempt to make sense of the Fulbright-Hays seminar members' group dynamics, I found that small group theory was only

partially helpful because this group, unlike most of those studied by communication scholars, lacked a shared goal or task. Most literature about small group communication deals with the way in which individuals form groups, though it is assumed that these groups share some common goal. Fisher (1990) uses attractiveness, proximity, and similarities as predictors of group and sub-group composition. Jablin (1985) explains organizational assimilation by describing stages that members move through as they seek to become group members. In fact, he suggests that organizational success is, in some ways, dependent upon effective assimilation. Further, Tompkins and Chaney (1983) argue that organizational identification (perhaps around a shared task) is a critical component of organizational productivity.

These studies shed some light on the importance of the initial stages of group development, particularly in relation to organizational -- hence, task-specific -- outcomes. However, at least three important variables relevant to the Fulbright-Hays group are unaccounted for in this research. First, members previously studied did not live together. Thus, it is unknown whether groups like the Fulbright-Hays participants that live together for a period of time develop in the same manner as those that do not live together. Second, the previous literature almost exclusively examines task groups. Yet we know little about the development of groups like the Fulbright-Hays group who have no specific, shared task to complete or goal to attain. Third, the studies typically use student subjects who may react differently in

a classroom context than in a "real world" environment. As Putnam and Stohl (1990) argue, group research needs to be conducted on bona fide groups and to be exploratory and descriptive in nature. A social system fits the criteria for being a bona fide group if the boundaries of the group are stable but permeable and are interdependent with the immediate context. Clearly, the Fulbright-Hays group meets Putnam and Stohl's criteria.

In sum, small group communication theory can illuminate some of the dynamics of the Fulbright-Hays group experience. However, the limitations of small group research are illustrated by the unique qualities of the Fulbright-Hays group and, moreover, may be answered by Burke's theory of identification and division. Therefore, in this section I will describe the primary stages the Fulbright-Hays group underwent and use Burke's theory to demonstrate how those stages affected the group's interactions.

Stage One: The Search for a Common Bond

The group consisted of seventeen individuals -- six women and eleven men -- each from different universities or teaching institutions across the country. The individuals met one another for the first time during a pre-trip orientation in New York City. We were a group of traveling scholars, who had come together with only two things in common -- we all teach and we all applied and were accepted as Fulbright-Hays Summer Seminar participants. Each participant was simply an individual carrying his or her own biases, concerns, and pre-conceived notions about the upcoming six

weeks. Of course the representative from the Institute of International Education tried to facilitate group cohesion, but acknowledged the difficulty of quickly unifying seventeen strangers. In fact, he assigned each participant a roommate, with the understanding that if the arrangement was not satisfactory in New York, individuals could select different roommate for the remainder of the trip.

During the orientation individuals exchanged information related to their professional lives, personal lives and interests and anxieties about the trip. The common thread within many interactions was "the project" which was an open-ended and loosely defined report that each individual was required to produce, representing his or her interests, findings, and expertise following the trip. The ambiguity of the project guidelines created some anxiety and uncertainty among the participants. Although the "project" was to be an individual effort, this shared anxiety began to pull members together who strived to reduce the uncertainty by communicating with one another. Though uncomfortable, the anxiety served an important group function as it began to unite the individuals and form a temporary sense of group identity. In this first stage of the group experience, as participants sought points of identification amongst themselves, "the project" in a sense became the scapegoat for the group. While not hated or victimized, it was something some members could use to "blame" for their anxieties about the events that were about to unfold. Yet because the scapegoat was not hated or victimized, the

strength of identification was limited.

In retrospect I can see that the absence of clearly defined group goals or tasks limited the group's initial assimilation, though ironically the participants used the term "bonding" jokingly when referring to the orientation goals. Perhaps this collective and frequent meta-communication was a result of the absence of a common goal.

Stage Two: The Emergence of Coalitions

Within the first two weeks in Poland, some subgroups began to form around more informal means of identification such as similarities, attraction, and proximity. Interestingly, however, not all participants consistently associated with a clearly defined sub-group.

One small group of three men (two of whom were roommates) formed due to gender, similarity of interests, shared humor, and travel habits. Throughout the trip this particular group spent time drinking beer together, talking politics, and joking. There was a degree of position power within this group, especially since the designated leader for the trip was a part of this group. This individual occupied an important role as the gatekeeper of information for the trip participants.

A second subgroup was formed by an overlap of characteristics including gender, youth, occupational similarities, and proximity. These were four women (two sets of roommates), three of whom were junior high or high school teachers, the fourth of whom was a

university professor but also young and shared the others' keen interest in teaching. This group engaged in practical jokes and organized some group entertainment. Two participants (males) identified with this group on several occasions, but generally maintained high levels of independence.

A third subgroup consisted of two female (roommates) sociologists and two male (roommates) sociologists, three of whom most actively challenged the seminar by vocalizing their dissatisfaction with some of the program arrangements. They became known as "The Sociologists" and, accordingly, sought increased interaction with the everyday citizens of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Three of the four made the most "radical" move by leaving the group for three days to experience other areas of Czechoslovakia on their own.

There were six somewhat isolated male members, who might gravitate toward one subgroup or another during certain events, but never repeatedly coalesced with any particular group for an extended period of time.

While these sub-groups formed largely on the basis of age, gender, professional interest and/or proximity (i.e. roommate assignment), they became increasingly cohesive as they collectively scapegoated someone or something, particularly any frustrations they had with the program such as the number of lectures, the lack of interaction with the citizens, the lack of free time, irritation from other group members, and so forth. While the degree of scapegoating probably varied from group to group, overall, it was

not terribly divisive. On the whole the group was neither closely united nor bitterly divided. Ironically, where many groups share a metaphor like "team" or "family" to indicate their groupness, based on my recollection, the only metaphor this group used to refer to itself was "sheep." We, like sheep, often blindly, ignorant of where we were headed, followed whoever would lead us. Like sheep the group rather passively moved about, lacking a clear direction, occasionally bumping into one another to create irritation, but never fighting horribly bloody battles.

Clearly each individual had found a place within the whole group as well as sub-groups which had their particular interests and concerns. Although there continued to be some moving about from subgroup to subgroup, the general climate of the trip had been established by the time we crossed the boarder from Poland to Czechoslovakia.

Stage Three: United Against An Enemy

Again, in retrospect it is clear that the group lacked this dynamic cohesion in part because it had no shared task yet also, as Burke would argue, because it lacked a scapegoat during the first half of the trip. However, such an individual emerged during the second half. First, however, it is important to recognize that a pseudo-unifying event occurred in Bardejov as the group had a memorable cultural experience (dinner) with the city's Mayor and his deputies. The dinner was so atypical from an American perspective that it created shared memories and laughter that the

group re-lived in its conversations throughout the remainder of the trip. Yet the event was pseudo-unifying in that members had varying levels of participation and thus not all were as strongly affected.

The most unifying moment of the trip, however, came as the group members began to share their newfound and intense frustration with their Czechoslovakian guide and translator. Members were irritated by perceived problems with his insufficient translations, seemingly convoluted method of decision-making, seemingly incessant talking on the bus, and, in part his mere cultural differences. Burke's notion of identification and division was physically enacted as the official group leader held a meeting in his hotel room with the participants and without the scapegoat so that members could vent their frustrations and reach consensus on how to manage the situation. The discussion allowed members to voice their concerns and to enact change in some of the previously taken for granted policies. In a sense, this was the most task-oriented moment of the trip. For 30 minutes the group was united in order to complete a task: decide what to do about the guide. Once the group even physically divided itself from and, thus scapegoated the guide and the organization that hired him, it was united, experiencing significant identification by the end of the meeting.

While the scapegoat remained a source of irritation, enough changes were enacted to make the situation tolerable. Hence, although the group meeting served an important cathartic function, the resulting unification quickly subsided as evidenced, in part,

by the ease with which three of the sociologists left the group to travel briefly on their own.

Stage Four: It's Hard to Say Good-bye

Because the group as a whole had limited unification, it was, in a different way, hard to say good-bye. The official leader gave a brief statement expressing his appreciation of and pleasure travelling with the group. One of the unofficial leaders, who had coordinated other events for several group members, organized an champagne party the night before the group was to return to the States. Indeed, eventually a majority of the group turned up at the party. Two of the more clearly defined sub-group members attended, and several of the other participants attended, but several members did not attend which, was no doubt due, in part, to the absence of a group goal. Consequently, there was less of a need to bring shared closure to the experience.

In sum, this bona fide group experience makes an important contribution to our understanding of group communication. Not all groups have a clearly defined, shared task to complete. While it may or may not be representative of such groups, the experience of the Fulbright-Hays Poland and Czechoslovakia seminar group affirms Kenneth Burke's theory that group identification, cohesion, and productivity occurs when group members can target a common scapegoat. Moreover, it adds that a common goal, which may or may not need to be centered around a scapegoat, is also necessary to achieve identification, cohesion, and productivity. This

particular group experience indicates the need for more research on bona fide groups without shared goals and groups that live together for an extended period of time.

Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1990's: A Macrocosm of the Fulbright-Hays Group Experience

My observation of the events currently unfolding in Poland and Czechoslovakia suggests that what is true of small groups is also true of large groups. That is, Burke's rhetorical theory of identification and division provides a framework for understanding not only the Fulbright-Hays group dynamics, but also the contemporary political and social dynamics in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In Poland, Bartek Nowotarski, Staff Assistant for the Democratic Union Party who spoke with the Fulbright-Hays group, argued that the most recent presidential campaign divided the members of Solidarity which consequently has created political chaos when, in fact, unity is needed to work through the economic transition. Additionally, the Solidarity party (and Welesa) missed its opportunity to create an electoral law and a new Constitution which currently adds to the chaos and division. Poles even joke amongst themselves that where two Polish citizens are gathered together there will be three opinions or three (or four or five) parties. This joke is, itself, an indicator of the lack of identification amongst the Polish people.

Internal division in these two countries results primarily

from the absence of specific, shared goals or tasks regarding the country's future. To be sure, all people want to improve the economic conditions and to move toward a free market economy as rapidly and sensibly as possible. But there is little agreement about how those transformations are to occur. Parliamentarians haphazardly argue (rather than productively debate) electoral laws, what to do with the Constitution, methods of privatization, how to accommodate for environmental problems while privatizing, and so forth. Both countries entertain multiple (nearly 120) political parties which undermine the strength of any national unity. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Klaus and Meciar have personalized their economic reforms to win support, but their parties set forth no clear, long-term political ideology. Hence, the parties themselves lack clearly defined goals and, consequently, continue to split amongst themselves.

Additionally, Dr. K. Polak of Jagiellonian University described a breakdown in social and individual values which creates a "cumulated crisis" in the Polish nation's identity. People become alienated because the system can no longer satisfy the basic needs of its members. He claimed that people whose needs are denied, live in threat and fear, thus, failing to develop morals in their youth. Lack of morals then becomes a lack of social identity. Moreover, as the goals and norms of the State become less and less clear, a loss of a sense of identity sets in.

Kenneth Burke's notion of division and identification is an appropriate framework for understanding this confusion. Where once

they identified with one another and were united against a common scapegoat -- communism and the Communist Party -- the scapegoat now is gone, leaving the members divided amongst themselves. They now seek identification and "redemption" amongst much smaller groups (parties) who seem to share their views and provide a sense of identity. The scapegoats then become other parties against whom people who were once united are now divided.

Perhaps the issue most symbolic of the lack of identification is the "Problem of the Nomenclature." There are now lists in both Poland and Czechoslovakia of Communist Party Members before 1989. There are approximately 100,000 names on both lists. And people spend considerable time and energy debating about what is to be done with those names. It is a known fact that these are, generally, the people who now get the bigger salaries, drive the nicer cars, and own property. The question is whether these people ought to be prohibited from running for office. Should they be punished? Yet this plunges the people into the problem of motives, as Kenneth Burke would say (Grammar 1962). What if the former Party members genuinely "repented" from their communist beliefs? What if they were party members only because it was a means of keeping their jobs or because they were bribed in some other way? Who is to judge the motives of former Party members? Moreover, is it worth expending time and energy on the past? For some, it absolutely is. For example, Ewa Lasecka-Wesolowska, a Polish women's rights activist who works for the Senate Commission for the Environment, insists that these people absolutely should be out of

office. Others argue that the list should be forgotten and the new leaders should move on particularly since many of these former Party leaders who are deeply entrenched in the doctrine are older and will die out before long anyway since many of them, particularly those entrenched in the doctrine, are older.

The "Problem of the Nomenclature" is, itself, an attempt for unification by finding another scapegoat. When people cannot seem to move forward, sometimes the easiest thing to do is turn and displace blame. Just as the Fulbright-Hays travel group needed a scapegoat for unification since it had no shared sense of direction or common goal, so too, the floundering, sheep-like Poles and Czechoslovakians need a scapegoat when they lack direction. While at one level belaboring over these lists appears to be a pointless activity, it may actually serve as an important strategy for unification.

The identification/division polarization is also evident in the break-up of the Czechoslovakian nation. Only three years ago, these two republics were united against the scapegoat of communism. Now, however, in the midst of treacherous economic times, they are divided against one another, scapegoating one another to gain the strength needed to stand alone. Part of the division stems from the conflicting economic philosophies of the Czech and Slovakian leaders Vaclav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar, respectively. Klaus seeks rapid economic reform whereas Meciar seeks gradual reform that is, ultimately, more socialistic. Thus, the two groups (at least the leaders of the two groups) do not share a common goal.

Yet the Slovakian identification is heightened through division as the Slovaks scapegoat the Czechs, claiming that the Czechs have been suppressing and are patronizing. The Slovaks perceive themselves as having been put in "second place" economically because of their agricultural base, as only 12% of post-1989 foreign investment went to Slovakia when 33% was promised. The rest went to Moravia and Bohemia. Emphasis, attention and economic support, they argue, goes to Prague because it is industrialized. Consequently, many Slovaks perceive themselves as not really represented in parliament. No Slovakian paper distributed in Prague but Prague and other Czech papers distributed in Slovakia, resulting in a one-way flow of information. Moreover, as Philip Tuhy, Political Science Professor at Wilkes University, said, "There's no microphone in Slovakia" since all the information that Americans receive about Czechoslovakia comes from Prague, not Slovakia. Ultimately, the Slovaks perceive the Czechs to have treated them as subordinates rather than peers.

In contrast, the Czechs scapegoat the Slovaks, blaming them for the lack of economic progress and for being unwilling to compromise. For example, Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Antony Baudys, stated that the difference between the Czechs and Slovaks is that the former are rational and pragmatic, and the latter emotional, as well as lazy. Czechs view the problem as economic while Slovaks view it primarily as relational. The Slovaks perceive the fact that Havel stepped down after the

Slovakian vote for sovereignty as a means of discounting the significance of the Slovakian sovereignty/republic issue and promoting the Czech side. This may or may not have been the case, however, for Havel himself stated that he simply did not want to be president without having the trust of the people.

Indeed, the relationship is much like a marriage -- hence, the metaphor "the velvet divorce." The two parties cannot seem to understand one another. Part of both groups desires separation, but like divorcing couples they remain unsure about the type relationship they wish to maintain once the divorce has been settled. Should it be a federation or a confederation? As the couple asks, will we be friends? Or should we never see one another again?

The recently embellished Slovakian nationalism fits Burke's notion of how groups manage divergence. However, there are also dangers which are potentially more significant. For example, as mentioned above, people are voting for vivacious characters rather than a particular political ideology. Moreover, in the desire for nationalism, there could develop a new kind of censorship and control. A theatre professor, Sona Simkova, in Bratislava, for example, fears that she will once again face limitations on what she can and cannot perform in the theatre. She fears there will be demands that the works produced support Slovakian history, tradition, and culture rather than Czech. Furthermore, new legislation insists that Slovak language be taught in the schools, which is a problem for Hungarian schools, and that Slovakian

literature, history, and civics be placed at the core of the curriculum.

Nationalism breeds alienation of external groups, scapegoating, and often mistreatment, even war, for the sake of the "nation." This, it seems, is a universal and recurring problem. Nations need their own identity for strength and survival, and, indeed, nationalistic thinking promotes identity and unity. Yet in the case of Slovakia, identity and unity come at the expense of the Czechs, Hungarians and Gypsies. In Burkean terms, the Czechoslovakian whole is broken ("sin") because of the post-Communist disorder. Moreover, the Slovakian whole is broken from the current economic state. Redemption is being sought by Slovakia through nationalization which inherently means the alienation of the scapegoat. It is important to recognize that while this process establishes unity among the Slovakian people, many actually desire redemption through forgiveness and re-unification of the Czech and Slovak lands.

Conclusion

Cheree Carlson writes that large-scale social change

requires careful creation of identification among all actors There must be identification among the members of the out group, the members of that group with the social order, and the social order with the members. (1988, 318-319)

As Carlson argues, to affect social change, identification must

exist both among sub-group members and between sub-group members and the social order. Thus, it is clear that political parties and nationalist groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia are in need of a concrete, shared goal in order to efficiently affect the desired change. For now, these countries, like the Fulbright-Hays group, plod along as sheep, willing to follow whatever voice promises to lead them to water but lacking a clearly defined, common goal. The sub-groups scapegoat one another as well as former Communist Party members in grasp of some unity to help one another attain social, political, and economic transformation.

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Eastern Europe in the 1990's

A "Mini-unit"

by

Ms. Mary Talsky

CURRENT HISTORY - A "Mini-unit" on Eastern Europe in the 1990's
Ms Mary Talsky

Tailored to Sophomores, Juniors and Senior high school students, this 4-week unit will provide the students with basic information and a frame of reference for problem solving on Eastern European issues of the '90s. Although focused on Poland in some depth, the material will be broadened and applied to include Eastern European countries as well.

(Note: This unit is constructed for classes on the Modular Scheduling System. Therefore, the class meets 3 days a cycle and once as a small group or for individual conference.)

General Objectives: Students will recognize and evaluate the issues and problems generated by the history, culture, environment, political circumstances and economy of Poland. Skills of group communication, responsibility, research, prioritization, presentation of ideas, problem solving and evaluation will be developed.

Materials for Activities: Articles providing an overview of several issues in Poland (Bibliography listing is attached and will be updated whenever feasible.)

Handouts delineating group responsibilities.

Handouts on research methods and practice in local libraries

Clarification of grading procedure and a time table of assignment due dates.

Handout on general information on Poland.

Copies of maps of Europe before World War I, before World War II and the present. Atlases will be made available.

Handout on individual evaluation of group's work.

Preliminary Pre-test: At end of previous unit, give students a short quiz on Poland as a pre-test. No grade - questions might include:

1. What type of government does Poland have?
2. Name the leader of the country.
3. Name 3 bordering countries.
4. What do you know about Solidarity?
5. To what religion do most of the Polish people belong?

Discuss the answers and the reasons why students have so little knowledge about Poland.

Briefly introduce the unit's project, explaining that students will assume the role of being members of the Sejm and will attempt to solve some of Poland's problems.

Day 1 Procedure:

1. Distribute handout on unit grading and timetable. Explain briefly.
2. Discuss students' current knowledge of Poland.
3. Distribute blank map of present-day Europe. Using atlases, the students will work in pairs to locate and label Poland, bordering nations and the seas.
4. Provide overview of basic Polish geography and history, emphasizing the period from World War I to the present.
5. Assign packet of articles. Each student must read every article, summarize the main idea of each and comment on the author's viewpoint.

Day 2 Procedure:

1. Finish basic history overview.
2. In groups of three, the students will identify what they consider as the two key turning points in Polish history, using their notes from this class and the previous one. The purpose is to evaluate the students' understanding of the material.
3. Discuss the group's conclusions. They must explain and defend their positions.
4. Discuss whether 1992 is a turning point in its history.
5. Present a general description of Poland today, considering the economy, banking system, environment, government, foreign affairs, status of women, education, culture, etc. (Use slides if available.)
6. Remind students that article packet should be ready for next class.

Day 3 Procedure:

1. In class, discuss the major problems the students see Poland facing, based on the assigned articles. Discuss any problems with the articles themselves as to vocabulary, insufficient background understanding, etc. (Remind students to discuss these problems in the light of their role as members of the Sejm.)
2. Groups of 6-10 will be set up and assigned a committee topic on: environment, minority issues, industry and business, foreign relations, and government. (Others may be added if class number exceeds 35.) Distribute handout on group roles and responsibilities. Explain attached sheet. Students in each group volunteer, appoint or elect individuals for each role. All students have a role.
3. Provide for a research coordinator in each group to organize the list of suggested articles on their topic. Article summaries are due for class 5, at which time they will be turned in.
4. If time, give a short quiz on articles due on this day.

Small group work this week. Check on progress, clarify difficulties, the research done, etc.

Day 4 Procedure:

1. Return article summaries.
2. Distribute handout on research methods and local library locations. Review use of the Reader's Guide, computer listings, SIRS, editorial reports, etc.
3. Using examples from various sources, e.g., the World Weekly News, the Wall Street Journal, etc., evaluate the importance of valid, minimally-flawed sources.
4. Using articles (including editorials) the students have examined, discuss bias, opinion, inaccuracies, incomplete information, political positions and the effects on article information and conclusions. Compare differences between emphasis of newspaper accounts, magazine articles, editorials, first person accounts (mostly mine) and books. In small groups, students will briefly compare the advantages and disadvantages of each. (Also consider the range within each category.) If possible, provide blatantly opinionated editorials and have the students examine them critically.

Day 5 Procedure:

1. Committees meet, following assigned group roles. Research progress is evaluated, difficulties addressed, articles briefly described and potential problems with sources identified, such as bias of the author, outdated information, etc. Students determine the major problems within their area of "expertise" and prioritize them. Brainstorming of possible solutions begins. Additional necessary research is determined and assigned. For the following class, each member of the group will write a rough draft proposal addressing the top 3-5 areas of concern previously prioritized. Committees may consult each other as necessary.

Small group work this week. Check on research done and clarification of articles.

Day 6 Procedure:

1. Committees meet. Evaluation, discussion, consolidation and improvement of proposals begins. Committee goal is to write reasonable proposals "solving" 3-5 of the major problems without causing additional problems in other areas. The whole class (or Sejm) will vote on each committee's proposal. They may amend if the majority vote decrees. Part of the group's grade will depend on the passage of the group's proposal. Decision-making within the group should be by consensus. (Remind students of this process.) Other committees whose work would be affected by the proposal should be regularly consulted. (And intelligent politicking should occur, since it was learned in a previous unit on the elections.)
2. Collect the individual proposals due this day.

If necessary, an additional day of committee meetings may be added here, depending on group progress and effort.

Day 7 Procedure:

1. Group proposals are due. After committees have refined these, the group spokesperson will present each proposal. Discussion is opened up to entire Sejm. Explanations and clarifications are made. The class may propose amendments, table proposals, etc. General Parliamentary procedure will be followed. Each committee's proposals will be discussed in this manner and each will eventually be voted on.
2. Collect research articles and conclusions.

Day 8 Procedure:

1. Continuation of Day 7 activities.
2. If time remains, students may begin assignment in which each committee composes a study guide on important information on their subject. Each group member should contribute. Assignment is due for the following class.

Day 9 Procedure:

1. Collect Study Guide information.
2. Evaluate/discuss:
 - Of the proposals passed, what are probable consequences? Short term? Long term? Positive? Negative?
 - Unexpected difficulties with solving the problems.
 - Could/Should U.S./U.N. help?
 - Differences in situation if United States were the country in the spotlight instead of Poland.
 - Is Poland's future hopeful? Explain.

Day 10 Procedure:

1. Distribute study guide composite. Clarify difficult, unclear areas.
2. Discussion of difficulties encountered in solving problems in this manner, group dynamics, work load distribution, what helped groups work well together, what interfered. How could this process work better in the future? What can the students do to make this work better next time around?
3. Depending on time available, one of the following activities could be used: Review game of some sort based on new terms, people, places, etc. Present slides and stories on "My Trip to Poland." Add information on the rest of Eastern Europe.
4. Collect individual evaluation of group's work.

Day 11 Procedure:

Unit Test on Poland and Problem Solving

Day 12 Procedure:

Return tests and evaluate unit with students.

Group Responsibilities

You will be asked to accomplish a number of tasks, working as a committee representing part of the government of Poland. In order to include and involve each member of your group, the following roles need to be distributed. You may volunteer, elect and/or appoint these roles, as long as each group member is responsible for a fair share of the work.

Roles include:

- * Research Coordinator - keeps track of completed research and assigns additional research as necessary.
- * Information Collector - records information and who brings in which articles and assignments.
- * Spokesperson - represents the group and explains/defends group conclusions to the class as a whole.
- * Liaison - negotiates, updates, contacts other groups when necessary.
- Synthesizer - summarizes and clarifies group conclusions before they are recorded and ensures that all opinions and ideas of each member of the group are heard.
- Troubleshooter - anticipates and points out flaws in research, group conclusions, etc. Also helps out other group members who may be in need of help.
- Focuser - keeps group time productive and on task.

* These roles may be done by 2 people.

Other roles may be assigned if necessary.

The group as a whole is responsible for completing all research, summaries and proposals. Meeting the deadlines and the quality of work are part of the group's grade.

Grade for the unit is based primarily on your work within the group. Stay current. Be responsible. In the long run, it will make the work much easier.

Group Evaluation Form

Committee's Subject: _____

List names of each group member and the role chosen or assigned by the group.

| | |
|-------------|----------------------|
| Name: _____ | Assigned Role: _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |

Group grades will be based on 1) meeting deadlines (Mine and your group's); 2) Quality and quantity of research; 3) Participation in discussions; 4) Quality of group proposal; 5) Group evaluation of individual involvement and effort.

Unit grade includes the group grade, quiz, unit test and individual work.

| | <u>Deadline Met</u> |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. Research articles read and summarized | _____ |
| 2. Additional (group assigned) research done | _____ |
| 3. Additional individual research done | _____ |
| 4. Individual proposals completed (List names of those not completing their proposal or time) | _____ |
| 5. Group proposal completed | _____ |

Bibliography Listing - Suggested Overview Articles

General Overview of Poland:

- * "Polish Zoo". Forbes. May 25, 1992. p. 134.

Politics:

- * "The Gathering Storms." U.S. News & World Report. Oct. 28, '91. p. 59.

Environment:

- * "Report from Poland". Environment. Mar '91, p. 12.
- "Will Pollution Kill the Revolution?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
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- * "Poles Apart in New Era". Insight. Sept. 23, '91, p. 11.
- "Poland, the Pain and the Gain". Business Week. Apr 15, '91, p. 54
- "Poland's New Men of Property." Nation. Nov. 11, '91, p. 573.
- "Building a Market Economy in Poland." Scientific American. Mar '92, p. 34.
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- * My choices for initial packet

Curriculum Project
and
Presentation

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This summer's Fulbright-Hays seminar in Poland and Czechoslovakia provided me with a wealth of information to use in the development of my proposed curriculum project and public presentations about the region. Thus far, I have developed two lessons tracing Poland's History. I will use these in my classroom and present them as teaching strategies at the October 10th meeting of the Alabama Geographic Alliance for their annual "Geofest", a statewide teachers meeting. I am also scheduled to present a session titled "Eastern Europe: Lessons in Change", an information update on how Eastern Europe is changing from communism to democracy and free enterprise. This presentation will include inquiry strategies in which students will identify problems facing the region and brainstorm possible solutions to these problems. I have already completed one public presentation about the seminar to the Sylacauga City Schools Teacher Institute on August 18th. Another presentation is scheduled for a local organization on September 1st.

Included in this report are the history lessons from my curriculum project and the text from my first presentation.

Mapping Poland's Ancient History

Objective: Using the Nystrom Desk Map of Europe, the students will complete the following activities showing the development of the Kingdom of Poland until 1772 when it was partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

Purpose: Mapping historical events gives students a more concrete view of when and where events occurred. It can also help them understand the causes and effects of these events.

References: The Real Guide: Poland, by Mark Salter and Gordon McLachlan. Prentice Hall. 1991.
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World Book Encyclopedia. "Poland". Field Enterprises. 1991.

1. The Poles were a tribe of Slavic people (called Polians) that settled between the Oder and Vistula rivers in central Europe before the 700's.
 - a. Find the source of the Vistula R. in the Carpathian mtns. Trace the Vistula to its mouth in the Baltic Sea. Underline "Baltic Sea".
 - b. Trace the Oder River from its source in the Carpathian mtns. to the Baltic Sea. (It follows the border between present day Poland and Germany.)
 - c. Write "Slavs" between the two rivers on your map.
2. As Germanic tribes tried to invade this region, the Slavs united with neighboring people under the Piast dynasty in the 900's thus creating Poland. A Piast ruler, Prince Mieszko, made Christianity the religion of Poland. Famous rulers during this time include Boleslav the Brave and Boleslav the III.
 - a. Draw an arrow from southern Europe toward Poland. Write "Christianity" along the arrow to show how the religion spread from that region. Under the arrow write "966 A.D."

3. In the 1200's, Mongols (or Tartars) from East Asia began invading Poland.
 - a. East of the Ural Mountains write "Mongols". From here, draw an arrow west across Russia pointing to Poland. Write "1200's" on the arrow.
4. Because of repeated invasions by other heathen groups (the Prussians and Lithuanians), Polish leaders asked the Christian Teutonic Knights from Germany to help Poland and to protect the Christian religion.
 - a. On Germany write "Teutonic Knights" and draw an arrow pointing to Poland.
5. The Teutonic Knights not only defeated the Prussians, they killed most of them and took over the northern coast of Poland for themselves. This gave the Teutonic Knights control of the profitable amber trade along the Baltic Sea. They renamed the port city of G'dansk calling it Danzig.
 - a. Write "Prussia" along the northern coast of Poland to show land controlled by the Teutonic Knights.
 - b. Draw a dotted line from G'dansk through the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Riga to the city of Riga. Label this dotted line "amber" to show the amber trade in this region.
6. The Poles finally defeated the Teutonic Knights in 1410 at the Battle of Grunwald.
 - a. Write the dates 1225-1410 under the words Teutonic Knights.
7. The combined territories of Poland and Lithuania began with the reign of King Jadwiga of Poland and her marriage to Grand Duke Jagiello of Lithuania in in 1386. This began the Jagiellonian dynasty which remained in power until 1572.

The kingdom of Poland was at its peak by 1648.

- a. To draw the approximate boundaries of the Kingdom of Poland, begin just west (left) of Riga on the Gulf of Riga. Draw a line going east (to the right) and stop about 1/2 inch west of the Volga River.

- b. Continue this line to the south stopping at Krakow. Go southwest from Krakow to Krivoy Rog. From here, go west to the Dnestr River.
- c. Follow the river westward to its source in the Carpathian mtns. Connect this line with the line which shows the Oder R. at its source.
- d. Circle the small area around Kalingrad on the Baltic where you previously labeled "Prussia". It was not a part of Poland at that time.
- e. Label the large region you have marked "Kingdom of Poland- 1386-1772."

8 Name five countries (former republics of the U.S.S.R.) which were once a part of the Kingdom of Poland

- | | | |
|----|----|----|
| 1. | 2. | 3. |
| 4. | 5. | |

- 9. In the 1600's the Ottoman Turks (Muslims) were trying to extend their empire into western and central Europe. Poland's King Jan Sobieski defeated the Turks at Vienna in Austria. As a result, Europe remained Christian. The lands conquered by the Ottomans became Muslim.
 - a. Draw an arrow from Turkey to Vienna, Austria. Label it "Muslim Invaders".
 - b. Draw a star on Vienna to indicate the defeat of the Muslim Turks by Poland.

Modern History of Poland
(1772 - 1989)

Student Research
Project

Purpose: My purpose is to show students how the Polish nation has struggled to maintain its sovereignty and right to self-determination since the 18th century and to reinforce research skills.

Objectives: Cooperative learning groups will research questions dealing with different aspects of Poland's history since the various partitions of the late 1700's to the fall of communism in 1989. Students will present their findings to the class.

Materials needed:

1. Maps showing the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1773, and 1795, map of present day Poland
2. Five blank transparencies
3. Transparency markers
4. Reference books such as encyclopedias, historical atlases, The Real Guide-Poland, textbooks (any books with information about Poland's past or current history that are available)
5. Overhead projector

Activities: After being divided into cooperative learning groups, each group will be assigned one of the following projects to research and teach the class.

Evaluation: Each group will be graded on how well they complete their group activity and the class will be tested on information presented to the class by each group.

Student Activities

Group 1: "Poland's Boundaries: 1772 to Present"

You will prepare 5 transparencies to show how Poland's boundaries have changed since 1772. Using an historical atlas or encyclopedia, blank transparencies, and transparency markers, draw the following:

1. The Kingdom of Poland before 1772
2. Partition of Poland in 1772
3. Partition of Poland in 1793
4. Partition of Poland in 1795
5. Poland today

Use different colors to represent Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Poland

Presentation: Show these transparencies to the class and explain how Poland was divided.

Group 2: "World War I to 1939"

Using reference books, answer the following questions for the class:

1. Which side did Poland fight for in World War I? Why?
2. Who was Jozef Pilsudski? How was he important in Polish history?
3. Who was Ignace Paderewski? What did he do to help Poland in World War I and World War II?
4. What happened to Poland on Sept. 1, 1939?
5. What happened to Poland's government after World War II?

Group 3: "Devastation of Poland in World War II"

Using reference books, answer the following questions for the class.

1. What was the Holocaust?
 - a. How many Jews died as a result of the Holocaust?
 - b. What were Auschwitz and Birkenau?
 - c. Where were they located?
 - d. What was the Warsaw ghetto?
2. How many Poles died during World War II?
3. What was the Warsaw Uprising of 1944?
4. What happened to Warsaw as a result of that uprising?
5. What incident occurred at the Katyn Forest?
6. How did Poland's boundaries change as a result of World War II?

Group 4: "Poland Under Communism"

Answer the following questions and present the information to the class.

1. What is communism? Give a definition.
2. Who owns businesses and property in a communist system?
3. What is a "collective farm"?
Were the farms in Poland collective farms like they were in other communist countries?
4. What were some rights that people in communist countries didn't have that we have in our country?
(For example, did they have the right to criticize the government?)
5. What were some problems that businesses and industry had under communism?

Group 5: "The Solidarity Movement and the End of Communism"

Using information in the Real Guide, your textbook and library reference books, answer the following questions for the class.

1. What is Solidarity (Solidarnosc)?
2. When was it founded?
3. Who was its most famous leader?
4. What is "martial law" and when was Poland most recently under "martial law"?
5. What is a "strike" by workers and how were strikes important in ending communism in Poland?
6. Who is president of Poland today?

Sylacauga City Teachers'
Institute August 18, 1992

Presentation of Fulbright-Hays
Seminar: Poland and Czecho-Slovakia

(Note: This is a "transcript" of sorts from my presentation at our teachers' institute.)

Good Morning. I couldn't decide what to title this presentation today. The program calls it "How I Spent My Summer", but more descriptive choices might be "Fulbrighters Precipitate Government Turmoil in East-Central Europe", because governments ceased to function in each country we visited. Or, "Fulbrighters Eat Their Way Across East-Central Europe" because we were fed so well. Either way, my experience this summer was incredible.

Our Fulbright-Hays Seminar was titled "Poland and Czecho-Slovakia in the 1990's: Social, Political, and Economic Transformations". We spent two and a half weeks in Poland and two and a half weeks in Czecho-Slovakia. While were in Poland, the prime minister resigned leaving Parliament in turmoil. While were in Slovakia, their parliament declared sovereignty and began the process of splitting the country of Czecho-Slovakia. President Vaclav Havel resigned and their federal government ceased to exist. Talk about transformations...

It's difficult to encapsulate almost six weeks of meetings with professors, government officials, environmental experts, and economists, let alone do justice to the numerous castles, cathedrals, and places of historical and cultural importance in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, but I would like to share with you a few highlights of my trip.

You can't really talk about East-Central Europe without acknowledging the impact of World War II on the region. Poland especially still bears the scars.

Slide 1. Westerplatte-Located at G'dansk, Poland's main seaport, this is the sight of the first battle of World War II. G'dansk is a city of beginnings because this is also the city where Solidarity began the struggle for a democratic Poland during the years of communism following World War II.

Slide 2. Historical slide -Devastated city after war-Warsaw, Poland was particularly hard hit by the Germans in retaliation for the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. Hitler ordered Warsaw's buildings blown-up and burned. Warsaw's historic buildings have been restored today using paintings and photographs for reference. Polish-Americans helped contribute much of the money for this restoration.

Slide 3. Monument to the children of World War II- This statue depicts two small children carrying guns and courier pouches as a tribute to the many children who died helping fight in Poland. Plaques in the background give the names of the many concentration camps in Europe where many Poles lost their lives.

Slide 4. Wall-remains of Warsaw Ghetto- East-Central Europe was home to most of Europe's Jews before World War II. Today, few Jews remain in either Poland or Czecho-Slovakia. In many cities Jewish populations were confined to ghettos. This wall shows the remains of the Warsaw Ghetto and the plaque shows the original outline of the ghetto.

Slide 5. Jewish cemetery in Prague- Because Jews were confined to the ghetto, the cemeteries often became very crowded like this one in Prague, Czecho-Slovakia.

Slide 6. Auschwitz- The concentration camps of Europe provide a grim reminder of the genocidal practices of the Nazis during World War II. Gates to the camps boast the slogan "Arbeit Macht Frei", "Work Means Freedom"- the lie under which victims were brought to the "work camps". Our guide at Auschwitz had been part of the slave labor force at the camp. He was imprisoned at age 15 and lost many members of his family there.

Slide 7. Crematorium at Auschwitz- This slide shows the crematorium at Auschwitz. The crematoriums were built after the Nazis found that they couldn't dispose of the bodies as fast as they were exterminating people. This camp was originally built for the enslavement and extermination of the Poles, but by 1942, Hitler began to focus on the destruction of the Jews. Other groups targeted by Hitler included Gypsies, suspected homosexuals, and other non-Germanic groups.

Slide 8. Frank family luggage- This luggage belonged to the family of Ann Frank. Museum displays included entire rooms filled with luggage, eye glasses, hair brushes, and even human hair which was cut after the bodies were removed from the gas chambers and then used to weave bolts of human hair cloth.

Slide 9. Memorial to the Jews of Poland

Poland was the hardest hit during the war having more casualties per capita than any other country in Europe. We also visited Theresienstadt (Terezin) in Czecho-Slovakia. Parts of this prison camp were used as a model for Red Cross visits to show how well prisoners were treated. They were shown concerts, shining facilities, and happy children doing art work. These prisoners were shipped to their death at Auschwitz after Red Cross visits.

After World War II, East-Central Europe had to deal with Soviet dominated Communism for the next forty years. These years left these countries with a legacy of poor government planning, devastated economies, and environmental disaster.

Problems facing these countries in their transition from communism to democracy are numerous, but optimism is high. Some of the questions involved in the privatization of businesses, industries, and property involve deciding who owns what, and how do you give back property privately owned in the pre-war years yet developed by the government during the years of communism? They must learn how to function as democracies with little history of free speech, free press, and no tradition of democratic debate of issues. They must balance majority rule while protecting the rights of ethnic minorities.

Slide 10. Government subsidized housing- Housing is a major problem in this region. Except for the most rural communities, gray high-rises house most people. Young married couples must often live with parents. Divorced people frequently continue to live together because there is no other housing available.

Slide 11. Planned community of Nova Huta- This communist planned community of identical buildings and its surrounding steel mills is a town of monotonous architecture and pollution, but it is not without the spirit which seems to unite the Polish people. One building not planned in this community is the remarkable church. Built at night after the workers left the steel mills, the party officials worked each day to destroy the work done during the night. Each night for ten years the workers continued to work on this monument to their faith in God revealing their determination to carry on in spite of an authoritarian government.

Slide 12. Crucifix in church at Nova Huta

Slide 13. Steel Mills in Nova Huta- Steel mills in Nova Huta blanket everything in gray in the winter. This summer picture makes the smoke stacks appear very innocent. Pollution is taking its toll on the health of the people here and in nearby Krakow. Krakow is an old medieval city. Home of one of Europe's oldest university, many of the historic landmarks of this city are being destroyed by acid rain.

Slide 14. Coal pit at Most, Czecho-Slovakia- In search of coal to provide power for industrial eastern Europe, the largest lake in Bohemia in Czecho-Slovakia was drained. Today, only this large strip mine remains.

Slide 15. Chemical plants bordering the mine cause so much air pollution that children must wear filter masks to school on pollution alert days. Benzene is one of the chemicals produced here. This area has one of the highest infant mortality rates in Europe, as well as a high rate of cancers, lung diseases, and birth defects.

Slide 16. Medieval church at Most- As compensation for the destruction of the villages around Most, the government did save this church. They moved the church about 600 yards in order to extract the coal beneath it. They spent years researching ways to move it. You can see the view of the coal mine just a few feet in front of its new location.

Slide 17. Dam at Gabchikovo- This dam to provide supplemental electricity was at first a combined project of Austria, Hungary, and Czech-Slovakia. Because of environmental problems, Austria withdrew from the project several years ago. Hungary pulled out a few months ago. Geologists say that this dam is built over an active fault and the sight of possible earthquakes. Engineers have found problems with the materials being used in its construction. Slovakia is working to complete the dam anyway.

Slide 18. Flood plain of the Danube at Gabchikovo- Construction has already destroyed the wet lands of the flood plain at the dam.

Despite the many problems facing Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, these nations have a wealth of scenic, cultural, and historical riches to share with the world. The following slides are just a brief sampling of these.

Slide 19. Slovakian folk music.

Slide 20. Beautiful cathedrals.

Slide 21. Ruins of ancient castles.

Slide 22. Restored palaces.

Slide 23. Malbork- This castle was built by the Teutonic Knights beginning in the 1200's. The castle even had an ingenious system of central heat.

Slide 24. Scenic Polish countryside- Farms were never collectivized in Poland. Farmers plant their small farms in narrow strips, alternating crops. From a distance the variations in color make the countryside look like a giant quilt.

Slide 25. Old Town- Prague.

Slide 26. St. Wenceslas Square- Prague. We were told that Prague was the second most visited city in Europe this summer, second only to Barcelona, sight of the Olympics.

Slide 27. Storks.

Slide 28. Old Town- G'dansk- As I mentioned earlier, G'dansk was the birthplace of the Solidarity movement in the 1970's. This movement eventually grew into the movement for democracy in the late 1980's. It culminated with the end of communism in Poland in 1989 and from there, the other countries of Eastern Europe reached for democracy as well. The Velvet Revolution in Czecho-Slovakia was successful in overthrowing communism which had squelched hopes for a more human government during the Prague spring of 1968.

Slide 29. This is only one of many memorials to the martyrs of the anti-communist movement in Eastern Europe. This is the grave of Father Jerzy Popielusko, murdered by the secret police in Poland in 1984 for speaking against the government. Prague was dotted with monuments throughout the city marking the places where people who protested gave their lives to the cause of freedom in 1968. Freedom in Eastern Europe was not won easily or quickly.

Slide 30. President Bush in Warsaw- On this occasion, Poland was celebrating its freedom with a very special and solemn ceremony. President Bush came to return Paderewski's remains. The famous pianist and former leader of Poland before World War II had died in the United States, requesting that one day his remains be buried in a free Poland.

Slide 31. Old War Hero- This gentleman, a survivor of World War II and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 participated in the funeral mass for Paderewski. After President Bush and President Walesa spoke to the crowd, the gentleman turned to our small group of Americans and said in Polish, "My heart is very full for Poland today". Poland is finally free.

Slide 32. As ideas of freedom spread throughout Eastern Europe, freedom still takes its toll and doesn't come easily. The world is watching as Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia struggle to establish order. Hopefully, Czechoslovakia won't suffer violence as it goes through what it calls its "Velvet Divorce". This photo was taken from a window in the Slovakian Press Agency Building. Parliament, across the street, was in the process of reading the Slovakian Declaration Of Sovereignty to the small crowd gathered in the street.

Slide 33. Slovakian patriot and flag- The Czechs and the Slovaks know that economic hardships will have to be endured, but there is hope for a strong future. Most Czechs and Slovaks seem to be against the split. The split appears to be the work of politicians. These people have survived the whims of politicians before and are determined to make the best of this situation. Only time will tell.

The Impact of Political and Economic Systems on Spatial Organization and the Landscape: Poland and Czechoslovakia in Transition from Socialism to Democracy and a Market Economy.

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A. Background and Introduction:

In his 1985 book Dean Rugg looks at the East European landscape as a palimpsest of culture layers (Rugg, 1985). He identifies five processes each of which created its own spatial organization and distinct landscape elements: (1) German medieval colonization; (2) feudalism; (3) multinationalism; (4) nationalism; (5) socialism. These five processes, while roughly sequential, overlapped somewhat in time as well as space.

Each superimposed its landscape over previous ones, but without completely replacing or obliterating what preceded it. Once present, many of the landscape elements are retained and/or modified in subsequent eras. Thus the present cultural landscape is a mosaic containing relics of the old as well as expressions and symbols of the new process. During the 1980s, and especially after 1989, a sixth process, capitalism, began to superimpose its landscape and spatial organization on the region.

Rugg's analysis predates this period. This paper represents a preliminary attempt to identify some of the landscape changes that have already occurred during the transition from socialism to capitalism. [A list of slides used to illustrate this landscape theme is included at the end of the paper.]

B. Rural landscapes and patterns:

1. Field and settlement patterns under Socialism:

Poland was one of the few communist countries (along with Yugoslavia) that did not force farmers to consolidate landholdings into state or collective farms. Only about 25% of agricultural land was organized into these larger units, and most of that was located in the former German lands (western Poland or former East Prussia). In these areas the communist government did not have to face strong local opposition. The previous German owners had been largely replaced by Polish settlers resettled from areas east of the Curzan Line that had been taken by the Soviet Union. (Alisov, 1985, p. 57; Turnock, 1989b, pp 86-87 and 228). Consequently most of the agricultural

landscape of Poland consists of small strip plots, perhaps ten meters wide and of varying lengths, planted with a variety of grain or vegetable crops.

In contrast most of Czechoslovakia was collectivized (over 80%) and its rural landscape is characterized by very large fields of single crops, such as wheat or sunflowers. Large structures (sheds or barns) for housing agricultural equipment, storing grain or supplies, or raising confined livestock (poultry or swine) are a common feature of the rural landscape in Czechoslovakia. While usually located adjacent to a village, these farm headquarters are sometimes centrally located with respect to the large fields of a collective farm, and can be quite isolated from any settlement. Rural settlement is typically nucleated in numerous small villages. The American pattern of dispersed rural settlement on individual farms is not common in either country.

2. Observations, summer 1992:

There were few obvious changes in the rural landscape. Poland was still dominated by small strip fields and Czechoslovakia was characterized by very large fields.

While settlement "sprawl" into agricultural lands in the American sense does not exist in Europe, villages in Poland tended to have housing extended along highways more frequently than in Czechoslovakia. In addition, there appeared to be more housing construction (usually additions to existing structures) in Poland, although it was impossible to determine if these were new and "active," intermittent, or dormant projects initiated during the socialist period.

Two aspects of agriculture in developed countries make it difficult to predict future changes in the rural landscape:

(a) In the United States, the family farm has been largely replaced by enormous highly specialized agri-business operations. Full-time farmers have had to work increasingly larger units in order to compete. Smaller farmers have either given up or depend on steady income from a non-agricultural job in order to retain a rural lifestyle as a part-time farmer.

As economic units in a contemporary market system, the larger collective and state farms, if operated efficiently, should be more competitive. The inefficiencies of socialist agriculture have long been recognized (Turnock, 1989b, p 227). Nonetheless, with better management larger farms have a greater potential to become viable economic units.

(b) In developed countries, small farmers are subsidized for political reasons. Can fledgling democratic governments with limited resources afford to do this?

Even under socialism, the number of family farms in Poland declined from 3.2 million in 1970 to 2.8 million in 1985, as young people declined the opportunity to continue the family farm and opted for the lure of urban life

(Turnock, 1989b, p 237). In Poland employment in agriculture declined from 34.7% to 28.5% of the workforce over the same period, and Czechoslovakia saw a decline from 18.3% to 13.1% (Turnock, 1989b, p 226).

In Poland under a free market agricultural system one might expect farm consolidation into fewer but larger units. Assuming investment in modern agricultural equipment, the present pattern of small strip fields might gradually be replaced by larger fields which can be worked more efficiently with modern equipment. Concomitant investment in business and industry (and thus jobs) in the larger cities and towns, along with a reduced demand for farm labor, could eventually result in a further decrease in rural and small village population.

At the present time, however, immediate change seems unlikely. The trend toward agri-business is frustrated by the unstable political environment. An American businessman specifically interested in potato farming in Poland commented that not only were the "rules of the business game" unclear, but on three trips he had had to deal with three different sets of government representatives.

One attraction of small scale farming under socialism was the reduced amount of government interference in one's private life. With this benefit removed, will farmers (without subsidies) be willing to settle for a lower standard of living? For an independent farmer the time demands and economic uncertainty are major considerations. Reports to date indicate that relatively few farm workers on state or collective farms have a strong desire to become independent farmers. Relative flexibility and social and economic security (albeit minimal) appear to outweigh the demands and risks of private farming. In addition, under present conditions of political uncertainty and economic hardship, reports indicate that in many of the former socialist countries the uncertainty of the food supply in the cities, due to the collapse of pricing and distribution systems, provides a strong incentive to remain on the farm even at a subsistence level.

For these reasons it seems unlikely that the appearance of the rural landscape in either country would change immediately. Subdividing large agricultural units would certainly go against the trend in contemporary "free market" agriculture. Consolidating small landholdings into larger units requires financial resources and market opportunities that are limited at present.

Rural settlement patterns are also unlikely to change. In an area where small agricultural villages have been the tradition for centuries, it is doubtful that isolated farmsteads will become the life-style of choice. Nor are these small villages likely candidates for population increase. In Poland the percent of urban population in towns under 5000 population declined steadily from 11.7% in 1950 to 3.7% in 1980 (Turnock, 1989a, p 232).

C. Urban areas:

1. The Socialist City:

Probably the most obvious change in the urban landscape has been the visual attractiveness of city centers. Socialism largely eliminated the commercial function of downtowns, replacing private retail commercial space with large, austere administrative buildings and ceremonial public space. Retail establishments tended to be large with relatively few street level entrances. A 1974 study contrasting blocks of equal size found 42 establishments, including 9 restaurants & cafes, on Kurfurstendamm in West Berlin compared with only 17 establishments, with 2 restaurants & cafes, on Karl Marx Allee in East Berlin (Rugg, 1985, p 345). In addition, stores serving a retail function under a socialist system were renown for their drab appearance and indifference to attractive display of merchandise both in windows and inside the store.

The result was a very sterile, monotonous retail landscape in a downtown with virtually unused formal open spaces framed by intimidating, austere, symbol-laden (and often visibility deteriorating) public buildings.

2. Observations, summer 1992:

A prime example of the socialist city center was the deservedly maligned Palace of Culture in Warsaw and its surrounding area. The structure, clearly suffering from lack of maintenance, remains gray, drab, imposing and unfriendly (due to its massive scale) both inside and out. However, its surrounding grounds, sparsely used during the socialist period and often cited as an eminent example of hostile public space, now contains a fairly large, hastily constructed market (in a large "Quonset hut" structure as unattractive as its larger neighbor). Numerous kiosks and stands, which attract large numbers of shoppers, fill part of the former austere open space. The color and life of the area has clearly undergone a transformation.

The broad streets in the adjacent downtown commercial area have also undergone a transformation and now contain numerous small colorful kiosks selling fast food and snacks along with a variety of other consumer orientated products. Ironically, located across the street from the Palace of culture, this single most dominating symbol of socialism, are two of the great symbols of capitalism, McDonald'ss to the east and a new Marriott hotel to the south. And, in an almost perverse touch, a casino has been inserted in the west portion of the Palace of Culture itself.

Most stores now make an effort to have an attractive window display. According to reports from natives and repeat visitors, the number of small speciality shops has greatly increased. Travel agencies, real estate offices, clothes boutiques, and stores specializing in VCR rentals, or foreign cosmetic and beauty aids have proliferated during the last year. Western influence is

also apparent in women's fashions and Western automobiles, both of which have become increasingly evident during the past year. Of the major cities, Prague has progressed farthest in this respect, but Warsaw and Krakow also exhibit similar changes, as does Bratislava to a lesser extent. In general, the sameness of the socialist downtown has been replaced by the color and variety associated with capitalist commercial processes.

On the "down" side are reports and indications of frustration on the part of those, mostly older generations, who have spent their lives coping with a system they despise, only to see it replaced by a system in which they are unable to participate. One member of our group commented on never seeing an older person that looked happy. I watched a passerby spit on a Mercedes that was parked in front of one of the first successful (and high priced) private restaurants in Prague.

On the other hand, many "white elephants" of socialism remain. Not surprisingly, capitalist influences have yet to penetrate the downtown area of the industrial "new city" of Nowa Huta, which remains drab and uninviting. In Moravia, another fine example is the enormous multistory supermarket complex plunked in the middle of Jihlava's medieval market square. The new Palace of Culture in Stary Smokovec, Slovakia, still under active construction in July of 1992, illustrates that processes from a previous era do not terminate abruptly when their time is past.

Rugg comments on the survival of structures from a previous era but in a different role (what would be called adaptive reuse), such as churches converted into museums or a manor house and adjacent buildings on a former feudal estate serving as the main office and administrative center for a collective farm (Rugg, pp 91-92). A fine example of this is the conversion of the former Communist Party headquarters in Warsaw during the socialist era into the location of the new Polish stock exchange.

D. Regional patterns:

1. Patterns of Investment:

A recent article notes that since 1990 Western investment and trade has been heavily focused on the capital cities and the western parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Murphy, 1992). Before the socialist era these were the more economically and socially advanced portions of these countries, the parts whose political, cultural, and economic past was most closely linked to and influenced by their western neighbors, especially Germany and Austria.

The exploitation of one region by another was among the many evils of the capitalist system identified by Lenin. Ideologically, the socialist governments were committed to reducing regional inequalities, although in recent years equity was being increasingly sacrificed for efficiency (Rugg,

1985, p 263 and 266). As one Czechoslovak official put it, "Bringing the standard of living of Slovakia up to the level of the Czech lands was the only achievement of forty years of communist government (Kamenickova, 1992)."

A Polish geographer has analyzed patterns of private enterprise and foreign investment in Poland (Mync, 1991 & 1992). He divides the country into three broad regions: (1) the eastern and south-eastern region with low density of private enterprise; (2) the central region with average private enterprise participation (for the country); and (3) the western and northern region with "flourishing entrepreneurship" (Mync, 1991, p 13). [See Map 1.] The initial foreign investment preference for large cities (especially Warsaw, but also Szczecin, Gdansk, Poznan, Wroclaw, Lodz, Katowice, and Krakow) is evident by the end of 1989. [See Map 2.] The spread of foreign capital during 1990 and 1991 into both the former German territories in western Poland and the Central region is evident, as is the avoidance of the eastern third of the country (Mync, 1992). [See Maps 3 and 4.]

In Czechoslovakia the accuracy of this Western investment perception of relatively profitability, and thus preferred investment, is verified by the recent selection of investment opportunities by the citizens themselves. In June 1992, the first round of privatization allowed citizens holding vouchers to bid for shares of state held companies. Of the fifty most productive companies, as measured by productivity per worker, forty-five were located in the Czech Lands, with twenty-four in Prague itself (Prague Post, 1992). None of the forty-one companies that were oversubscribed (more bids for shares than shares available) were located in Slovakia. This suggests that even Slovak citizens see more favorable investment opportunities in the Czech Lands, and raises the question whether they will retain the right to use vouchers to invest in Czech businesses after Slovakian independence in January 1993.

A major concern is that uneven patterns of Western investment will reverse or eliminate whatever regional balance was achieved, as well as increase the economic disparities between urban and rural areas (Murphy, 1992). This, and other economic uncertainties, can lead to a reversal of progress toward more democratic political structures as well. Some observers clearly believe that the move to sovereignty for Slovakia is a step in that direction. One commentator used the analogy of the "zoo" compared with the "jungle," the zoo being a constrained but secure environment contrasted with the freedom but associated risks of life in the jungle. In his view, the Czechs had chosen the jungle; Slovaks opted for the zoo.

Personal observations in Czechoslovakia certainly reinforce the perception that investment in Slovakia is lagging. Prague appeared to be a hive of construction activity compared with Bratislava. In Prague, major renovations of entire buildings were actively in progress even on a Sunday, and numerous small individual stores were engaged in remodeling windows

and entrances to enhance the store's image, attractiveness and access to the consumer. By contrast, Bratislava seemed dominated by stalled and apparently dormant construction projects, some of which undoubtedly were initiated under the communist government before 1989. While some small scale enhancement of individual shops was evident, many of these projects also seemed to be in limbo.

This situation was attributed to unsettled questions over ownership. Investors were unwilling to make a major commitment if the title to the property was unclear. Slovak sovereignty undoubtedly further clouded the picture in Bratislava. One can only surmise that these questions of ownerships were handled more efficiently and decisively in Prague.

2. Tourism:

Tourism has been mentioned as an industry with high growth potential in both countries, but this too is biased toward the western portions of the countries. This is especially true in Czechoslovakia, where Prague was rumored to be the most visited city in Europe in 1992. Thus tourism may further exacerbate the disparity between the western and eastern portions of these countries.

Observations in Czechoslovakia certainly reinforce the point that the Czech Lands are more prepared to accommodate tourism. At our first stop in the Czech lands, Talc's numerous small shops were clearly able to handle the demands of large numbers of tourists (including many Germans). In contrast, the equally attractive Spis towns in Slovakia, such as Levoca or Bardejov, had neither the crowds nor the facilities to accommodate large influxes of visitors. While distance from the source areas of affluent tourists is certainly a major factor, and intervening opportunities in Bohemia and Moravia would draw off many tourists, the lack of tourist infrastructure and sophisticated marketing will retard tourism development in Eastern Slovakia.

Greater exposure to Western tourists and Western culture in general was evident in the Czech Lands, as evidenced by greater familiarity with the English language and the ability to cope with the often ambiguous and sometimes unreasonable demands of Western tourists. The few instances of surly behavior on the part of service workers (waiters in Krakow and Prague) seemed to be a carryover from standard socialist hospitality. One would certainly hope that they haven't passed directly to the surly behavior found in places overrun by hoards of "ugly" tourists, thus skipping the hospitable stage altogether.

The availability of Kodak film, a staple commodity of the tourist's "diet," may be a useful indicator of the degree to which a place has adjusted to the demands of Western tourists. On a Sunday in Bratislava, Kodak film was unavailable. Even the shops in the large hotels, where the most affluent Western tourists would stay, carried only Agfa color print film. At a very

picturesque major tourist destination (Devin Castle), none of the numerous kiosks sold film of any type. In a week of prowling around the downtown area of Bratislava I found only one small relatively obscure photography store that even carried Kodak film. It was closed on Sundays.

In contrast, stores carrying Kodak film, while not ubiquitous, were very evident and conveniently located in Prague, and film was available at Karlstein Castle. In addition, sidewalk vendors hawked Kodak film at several of the most popular tourist attractions, such as Prague Castle, Charles Bridge, and Old Town Square.

Of the two countries, Poland seemed to be both less familiar with and less prepared to handle Western tourists, but at the same time more accommodating and hospitable. Western influence, while omnipresent, seemed less intense. In this respect there was less of a contrast between the major Polish cities visited (Warsaw, Karkow, Gdansk) than there was between Bratislava and Prague. Zakopane, a major tourist center, was not yet inundated with Western tourists to the point that its essential character had been altered. As with Slovakia, the difficulty of access and distance from concentrations of affluent Western tourists may be the major reason for its unspoiled nature.

3. Industrial and environmental problems and legacies:

Rugg, in his chapters on landscapes of multinationalism, nationalism, and socialism, comments on past environmental impacts (Rugg, pp 184-187, 246-249, 316-318). Although the "Black Country" landscapes of Upper Silesia and Moravska Ostrava date back to the nineteenth century, the socialist governments, by dismissing environmental problems as "capitalist evils," further exacerbated the appalling conditions in those areas while contributing new environmental problems of their own. It would appear to be beyond the ability of the Czech government (and perhaps anyone) to do much about the devastated landscape around Most. The Slovak determination to operate the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube is another ongoing legacy of the socialist period, as is the continued operation of the two nuclear power plants at Dukovany (Moravia) and Jaslovske Bohunice (Slovakia).

In the early 1980s, eighty percent of Czechoslovakia's electricity came from thermal plants using brown coal. Nuclear plants contributed another five percent, hydroelectric about seven percent, and most of the remainder from thermal plants dependent on oil and natural gas imports from the Soviet Union (Alisov, 1985, pp 103-4). Given these alternatives it is little wonder that Slovakia proceeded to operate the Gabcakovo project in spite of international condemnation.

Other unproductive socialist industrial monstrosities such as the aluminum plant at Ziar nad Hronom in Slovakia or the Gdansk shipyards continue to defy easy solutions.

E. Concluding Comments:

Like the landscapes created by previous processes, socialist landscapes and spatial patterns are rapidly being replaced by capitalist structures and forms of spatial organization. Many of the socialist elements, with modifications, have the potential to be functional under the new democratic free market system. Others, on the other hand, while useless and detrimental, are simply impossible to remove because of their size and the expense involved.

The interplay of powerful forces, both internal and external, will determine who controls the new economic opportunities and will eventually determine the patterns that emerge from the collapse of socialism. Equitable privatization schemes are an important part of the process. In a climate of overall economic austerity, the problem of controlling, without discouraging foreign investment, and the fear of excessive foreign influence (especially German) is a second critical element. Finally, for reasons of political stability, the problem of subsidizing disadvantaged regions and groups to provide a minimally acceptable standard of living, is a major concern. While it is clear that new patterns will emerge, it is much too early to predict what form they will take.

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SLIDES USED TO ILLUSTRATE EASTERN EUROPE LANDSCAPES PRESENTATION:

1. Orientation: Eastern Europe map.

Landscapes of German Medieval Colonization:

2. Map: German movement to the east (*Drang nach Osten*)
3. Bardejov (Spis town)
4. Malbork (Teutonic Knights fortress)
- 5-6. strip fields in Poland
- 7-8. Collective farm in Czechoslovakia
(to contrast strip fields with a socialist rural landscape)
- 9-10. Orientation: Map of Europe, ca 1200 AD.
Map of boundary changes in Europe, 19th & 20th centuries.

Landscapes of Feudalism and Multinationalism:

11. Gdansk: wooden crane
12. Spissky Hrad, Slovakia: castle ruin.
13. Warsaw: Lazienki Palace
14. Prague Castle
15. Prague: Old Town Square
16. Krakow: Wawel Castle and Cathedral
17. Krakow: Old Town Square
18. Krakow: Cloth Hall

Landscapes of Nationalism:

19. Krakow: Kosciuszko's Mound
20. Warsaw: Chopin statue and concert in Lazienki Park
21. Warsaw: Paderewski statue
22. Warsaw: reconstructed Old Town
23. Warsaw: Hotel Bristol
24. Warsaw: Grand Opera House
25. Czestochowa: painting of Black Madonna
26. Czestochowa: "Godzilla Pope" postcard.
27. Czestochowa: Pope John Paul II at outdoor mass.
28. Czestochowa: Pope John Paul II at prayer before Black Madonna.


Landscapes of Socialism:

29. Prague: Red star in floral design. (1967).
30. Lenin portrait (1986).
31. Bratislava: former V. I. Lenin Museum
(with name discernable after lettering had been removed).
32. Prague: postcard showing Lenin's head among skulls.
- 33-34. Bratislava: Klement Gottwald statue, partly demolished, 1990;
empty pedestal at site of Gottwald statue, 1992.
35. Bratislava: street sign with name change (Sovietske to Florianske)
36. Czech-Austrian border defenses (before 1989; now removed).
37. Gdansk: Solidarity monument at former Lenin shipyards.
38. Nowa Huta: entrance to steel mill.
- 39-40. Nowa Huta: city center.



Landscapes of Capitalism:

41. Warsaw: hammer and banana poster ("creeping capitalism").
42. Bratislava: sidewalk stand with vegetable slicer and display.
43. Prague: Russian memorabilia sold from trunk of car.
44. Warsaw: Live's jeans for sale.
45. Warsaw: McDonald's (in converted bus).
46. Warsaw: MatDonald's kiosk.
- 47-48. Warsaw: McDonald's (outside & inside)
49. Warsaw: Palace of Culture (pre-1989)
50. Warsaw: Pope John Paul II holding mass at Palace of Culture.
51. Warsaw: view of MatDonald's and Palace of Culture.
52. Warsaw: view from top of Palace of Culture showing adjacent kiosks
and Marriott Hotel.
53. Warsaw: former Communist Party headquarters (now location of
Polish stock exchange).
54. Prague: billboards (Camel cigarettes, RC Cola, Sprite).
- 55-56. Prague: trolleys (Camel cigarettes, Apple Computer).
57. Warsaw: bookstore (and McDonald's litter).
58. Warsaw: real estate office window.
59. Bratislava: magazine stand (including "skin" magazines).
- 60-61. Bratislava: attractive window displays and store fronts.
62. Prague: store front under renovation.
63. Bratislava: well-dressed women shoppers.
64. Prague: new Ford stretch pickup truck; Kawasaki skidoo in back.
- 65-66. Bratislava: new parking garages in high-rise apartment area.
- 67-68. Prague: Kodak vendors; Old Town Square and Charles Bridge.
69. Krakow: Hotel Orbis/Holiday Inn.

70. Bratislava: new Hotel Danube.
71. Bratislava: sovereignty vote: crowd outside Parliament.
72. Prague: Havel picture; Bohemia teeshirt.
- 73-74. Bratislava: large building under construction, 1990 & 1992
(showing little progress).
75. Gabcikovo project: map.
76. Dunakiliti Weir (Dam) on Danube, 1990.
- 77-79. Gabcikovo Dam, lock, and reservoir.
80. Bratislava: beautiful "Red" Danube (at sunset)




Map 1: Population Distribution for Poland. [Alisov, 1985]




Approximate Border of former German lands in eastern Poland.

Map 2: Number of private enterprises per 1000 population. (Poland = 29.85) [Mync, 1992]


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Rys. 1a. Liczba spółek z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego.



Rys. 2. Liczba spółek z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego.



Rys. 1b. Liczba spółek z udziałem kapitału zagranicznego.

Maps 3-5: Number of companies with shares of foreign capital. [Mync, 1992]

A JOURNEY TO CENTRAL EUROPE, 1992

Charles J. Weeks Jr.

During the summer of 1992, I was fortunate to receive a Fulbright Seminar Abroad grant to travel to Poland and Czechoslovakia for five weeks. It was a fascinating journey during which we visited Warsaw, Gdansk, Krakow, and Zakopane in Poland and Bardejov, Bratislava, and Prague in Czechoslovakia. As a historian, I soon realized that we were witnessing societies in the midst of the difficult transition from a planned, communist economy to one of competitive capitalism. This shift is forcing the Poles and Czechs to reexamine most of the primary assumptions upon which their lives have been based since 1945. Not only are they rejecting their old economic system, foreign policy, and political leadership, but they are also, as Czech author, Milan Kundera, has observed, rebelling against the idealism of their own youths. In this sense, the collapse of communism in Central Europe represents a rebellion of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks against themselves.

Such a fundamental change is bound to be accompanied by vexing problems that will produce winners and losers. Moreover, the period of transition will take time and will be accompanied by hardships. Nevertheless, all signs indicate that the Czechs, Poles, and possibly the Slovaks will make the transition successfully. Despite the new experience of unemployment, inflation, and political instability, few Central Europeans express a desire to go back to the old system. Similarly, they have observed all too clearly the tragic results of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia and are anxious to avoid such a catastrophe.

As we travel through Poland and Czechoslovakia by way of these slides, let us observe that Central Europe has been an integral actor in Western history since the Middle Ages. During most of the major historical events of modern times, the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks have been centrally involved. Although we tend to forget it, much of World Wars I and II was fought in Central Europe, and it was here that the tidal wave that eventually destroyed the Soviet empire originated. As the world moves into the post-communist era, it is clear that there can be no effective "new world order" without the participation of Central Europe. It is in our interest to see that they succeed.

Our tour of Central Europe begins with Warsaw, capital of Poland since 1596. It is the political, cultural, and intellectual center of the nation. It is a city which bears the scars of history. Lacking any natural barriers to invaders, Warsaw was occupied by the Swedes in the seventeenth century,

the Russians in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Germans in World Wars I and II. During the Second World War, 800,000 Varsavians (including 40,000 Jews) died as a result of hostilities and 85% of the city was completely destroyed. After the war, the Russians occupied Poland and imposed a hated foreign domination that lasted until 1990 when Lech Walesa, leader of Solidarity, became president. In Warsaw history emerges from every street corner

1. Warsaw. Zygmunt Column (Old Town). Statue of Zygmunt III (1566-1632) who moved the capital of Poland to Warsaw from Krakow.
2. Warsaw. Art Exhibit (Old Town). Fledgling capitalists attempt to cash in on tourism.
3. Warsaw. Royal castle (Old Town). First built in the thirteenth century, it was the throne of Poland until her last king, Stanislaw-August II in 1795. The Nazis totally destroyed this building in 1945, but the Poles have painstakingly rebuilt it, oddly with Soviet assistance.
4. Warsaw. Novi Swiat - A main street in Warsaw leading to the Old Town. Notice the drab socialist architecture.
5. Warsaw.(south of city). Wilanow Palace. This is the residence of the most famous and revered Polish king, Jan Sobieski, who defeated the Turks at the gates of Vienna in 1683.
6. Warsaw. Wilanow Palace, gardens. Similar in style (but not scale) to Versailles.
7. Warsaw. The sejm or Polish parliament. This is the center of the new Poland where 28 different political parties have struggled to form a workable political system. The Polish political spectrum even includes a beer drinkers party.
8. Warsaw. Meat market. Notice the abundance of food (especially Polish sausage). It was comparatively expensive.
9. Warsaw. Building with bullet holes from the Second World War. Everywhere in Warsaw is the constant reminder of the horrors of war. These bullet holes are left keep the memory of the war alive.
10. Warsaw. Street memorial. Varsavians still place flowers on the street where victims of the war fell.

11. Warsaw. Warsaw.Uprising Memorial. In 1944, 18,000 Polish soldiers and 150,000 civilians died in a 63 day uprising against the Nazis. Meanwhile, the Soviet Army waited outside the gates, refusing to help. By allowing the Germans and the Poles to kill each other, they were eliminating two opponents at once.
12. Warsaw. Memorial, Warsaw Ghetto. In 1943, 40,000 Jews desperately and unsuccessfully rose against the Germans. Most of those not killed in Warsaw died in the Auschwitz concentration camp.
13. Warsaw. President George Bush addressing the Poles. The president is seeking closer relations with central Europe and is generally popular with the Poles.
14. Warsaw. Polish soldiers at President Bush's address.
15. Gdansk. View from top of the church of Our Lady. Formerly known as Danzig (pop. 463,000), Gdansk is a charming Renaissance city which is also a major industrial center of Poland. It was largely destroyed in World War II, but, unlike much of central Europe, it was restored to its original style. It is the home of Lech Walesa and Solidarity.
16. Gdansk. Astronomical clock inside the Church of Our Lady, the largest church in Poland and the largest brick church in the world.
17. Gdansk. Street scene.
18. Gdansk. Neptune Fountain. This is the seventeenth century symbol of Gdansk. Behind it is Artus Manor, fine example of Renaissance style of architecture.
19. Gdansk. Harbor crane. First built in 1444, this was one of the first large cranes to load the cargo ships on the Baltic Sea. It helped to make Gdansk a major port city.
20. Gdansk. Gothic cathedral. It contains an impressive pipe organ built in the 1700's which has 6,300 pipes and pneumatic angels and saints.
21. Gdansk. Solidarity monument. This is where the end of Soviet communism began. It commemorates the 28 Polish workers who died in the 1970 strike.

22. Gdansk. Pollution is the down side of central and eastern Europe. With virtually no restraints on industry and the lack of a free press, Poland has done environmental damage that will take years to undo.
23. Gdansk. Kantor shop. Note some of the strange nuances of the Polish language in this sign.
24. Malbork Castle. Headquarters of the Order of Teutonic Knights, a band of religious but brutal unemployed crusaders who dominated northern Poland from the 13th to the 15th centuries.
25. Malbork Castle. Courtyard as seen from a castle tower.
26. Malbork Castle. Main gate. Designed to keep enemies out.
27. Malbork Castle. Interior -- Hall leading to the meeting hall of the grand knight.
28. Malbork Castle. Ugly socialist housing as seen from Malbork Tower. Note the stark contrast between the drabness of modernity and the medieval architecture.
29. Malbork Castle. Me next to a statue of a Teutonic knight. Notice the effect of 700 years of evolution.
30. Kasmirez Dolny. This small town on the Vistula River (4,500) is built in the Renaissance style. Previous to World War II, 30,000 Jews lived here -- now there are none.
31. Kasmirez Dolny. Medieval castle from the fourteenth century overlooking the Vistula.
32. Kasmirez Dolny. A farmer's cart.
33. Radzwill Palace. The home of a famous and powerful Polish noble family.
34. Radzwill Palace. The interior.
35. Krakow. St. Mary's Cathedral. Krakow is one of the few Polish cities that was not destroyed in the Second World War. From 1038-1596, it was the capital of Poland. At St. Mary's a bugler sounds the hour but

stops in the middle of the call to commemorate the musician who warned of a surprise attack by the Tartars in the seventeenth century.

36. Krakow. Cloth Hall. A market center built in the thirteenth century where the Poles are attempting to relearn capitalism.
37. Krakow. Art for sale.
38. Krakow. Street scene, Florianska St. Note the narrow medieval streets.
39. Nova Huta. One of the world's largest steel mills, located just outside Krakow. Once a showpiece; now obsolete, unprofitable, and a major source of pollution.
40. Czestochowa. Home of the Jasna Gora Monastery and the Black Madonna, Poland's holiest icon. Thousands of pilgrims come here each year.
41. Czestochowa. The Black Madonna painting of the Virgin that Poles believe was painted by St. Luke the evangelist. It was captured by the protestant Hussites in 1430 but allegedly recovered.
42. Auschwitz. The main gate. Arbeit Macht Frei means "work makes you free." The nazis exterminated 4 million people here from 28 nations in 5 years.
43. Auschwitz. The fence. Note the impossibility of escape.
44. Auschwitz. Toilets. Note the total loss of privacy and personal dignity.
45. Auschwitz. Suit cases of the victims.
46. Auschwitz. Zyklon B. Pellets of the gas used to execute prisoners.
47. Auschwitz. Human hair of victims and the cloth made from it.
48. Auschwitz. Ovens used for cremating bodies.
49. Zakopane. In the High Tatras of the Carpathian chain between Poland and Czechoslovakia.
50. Dunajec River. Scenic river between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

51. Zakopane. Mountain architecture.
52. Zakopane. Horse with a feed bag.
53. Zakopane. High Tatra mountains.
54. Road from Zakopane to the Slovak border.
55. Slovakia, Trencin. Slovakia is the eastern one-third of former Czechoslovakia. Between 906 and 1918 most of this region was ruled by the Hungarians and there is still a Hungarian minority here. Slovakia is very beautiful and its people are quite friendly, but they resent what they consider Czech domination.
56. Trencin. An ornate altar inside a local church.
57. Spis. Here you see an enormous and largely unrestored medieval castle. The original Dracula movie, "Nosferatu" was filmed here.
58. Kezmark. A typical small town in Slovakia.
59. Poprad. A modern town in the High Tatras which is a major transportation hub. Note the ugly, uniform socialist housing.
60. Slovakia. A typical small town. Contrast this town with Poprad.
61. Bratislava. Bratislava Castle. Bratislava, population 435,000, the capital of Slovakia and second largest city in Czechoslovakia, is located on the Danube River, 35 miles from Vienna. This area was first settled in 4000 BC. Between 906 and 1918 it was part of Hungary. Between 1536 and 1784, it was the capital of Hungary. Bratislava castle, shown here, was first constructed in 907 but was destroyed by fire in 1811. This structure is a restoration done between 1953 and 1962.
62. Bratislava. Old town.
63. Bratislava. Comenius University - the major university of Slovakia.
64. Bratislava. Slovak parliament - crowd waits for the results of the vote for independence, July, 1992.
65. Bratislava. Slovaks celebrate their declaration of independence.

66. Bratislava. View of the city as seen from Horsky Park. Note the sea of ugly socialist housing.
67. Bratislava. View of the city. Contrast the Bratislava castle with the ugly socialist housing.
68. Outside Bratislava. Aluminum factory, one of the largest in the world, which is about to be shut down due to unprofitability. It is a heavy polluter.
69. Danube River. A hydrofoil and barge on the way to Budapest.
70. Vienna. St. Stephen's Cathedral. This is the center of Vienna, a rich Germanic city that was once the center of a great empire.
71. Vienna. Street scene. The rent for shop space here is among the highest in the world.
72. Vienna. Emperor Franz Joseph's castle, once the nerve center of the huge Austro-Hungarian empire.
73. Vienna. Fountain in front of city hall.
74. Slovakia, on the road to Prague. Storks nesting on a roof.
75. Slovakia, on the road to Prague. Sunflower field. This scene will always be one of my most pleasant memories
76. Telc (Czech Republic, 77 miles from Prague), Renaissance houses built in the sixteenth century. Because automobiles are banned from the square, Telc retains the flavor of the past.
77. Telc castle, Sixteenth century Gothic castle which contains an excellent collection of armor.
78. Telc castle, more armor.
79. Kutna Hora, an old silver mining town in the Czech Republic. This church, the Church of St. Barbara with buttresses was first built by the famous architect Peter Parler in 1388.

80. Kutna Hora. The Church of Skulls. When crusaders brought back earth from the holy land in the twelfth century, all local nobles competed to be buried here. When there was an overabundance of skeletons, the local bishop decided to decorate the church with them.
81. Most. On the German border. Because of strip mining, industry, and the lack of outside oversight, Most is one of the most polluted spots on earth.
82. Most. A strip mine.
83. Most. A strip mine.
84. Tabor. Fifty-five miles south of Prague, Tabor was the center of the Hussite protestant rebellion in 1420. Under Jan Zizka, the protestant peasants herd held of papal forces for 16 years.
85. Tabor. Town square.
86. Tabor. Weapons used by Zizka's armed peasants. These weapons were home made and designed to be used by infantry against calvary. Zizka was on of the truly great military tacticians of his time (15th century).
87. Karlstein Castle. Repository of the crown jewels of the Holy Roman Empire during the regn of Charles IV, c. 1348. In 1420 the jewels were moved elsewhere.
88. Karlstein Castle. View from a window inside.
89. Karlstein Castle. Interior assembly hall.
90. Terezin. Nazi concentration camp sometimes as a model facility to show the Red Cross.
91. Terezin. Cremation ovens - note the letters left in memory of those executed here.
92. Terezin. Clinic/autopsy room.
93. Terezin. Wall where executions by shooting took place.

94. Prague. Hus Square. A city of over a million inhabitants and filled with baroque churches, concert halls, and bridges, Prague is one of the most beautiful cities in Europe. Already an important trading center by the tenth century AD, Prague is the home of Good King Wenceslaus, Jan Hus, and Vaslav Havel. It is a storybook city that is only marred by armies of tourists in the summer. Here is the heart of Staré Mesto (Old Town). Jan Hus, along with John Wycliffe in England, was on of the first rebels against the Catholic Church and was burned at the stake in 1415 for his efforts.
95. Prague. Tyne Church. Founded in 1365, this church became the center of the Hussite movement. The towers are 269 feet high and the famous astronomer of the scientific revolution, Tycho Brahe is buried here.
96. Prague. Statue in the Church of St. Nicholas, one of the largest Baroque churches in Europe. Mozart once played the church organ here.
97. Prague. Astronomical clock, Town Hall. First built in the 1400s, this clock shows the movements of the sun and moon, the time of day, and the signs of the zodiac. Two minutes before each hour, Christ and the twelve apostles appear at the top followed by the grim reaper reminding us that someday we will run out of time.
98. Prague. Street scene.
99. Prague. Street scene.
100. Prague. Smetana Hall, home of the Czech philharmonic orchestra. The Czechs have a rich musical heritage. Mozart's Don Giovanni and Figaro premiered here. The most famous Czech composers are Anton Dvorzak and Gustav Mahler.
101. Prague. Royal Palace. This palace was the home of the Bohemian kings until the end of the sixteenth century.
102. Prague. Hradcanska. Hilltop castle overlooking Prague.