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ABSTRACT

A study replicated and expanded a study by Stuart Surlin, reported in "Journalism Quarterly" in 1987, on the effects of a mass media ethics course upon students' value systems. Whereas Surlin did a simple pre- and posttest on 20 students from one class, using the Rokeach 36-item terminal and instrumental values inventory, the present study drew from a purposive sample of 206 students over two semesters. The experimental group consisted of four ethics classes; the control groups were from courses in media research, history, and public relations. Whereas Surlin found support for his hypotheses that a media ethics course would result in increased salience of the value "equality" and a decreased gap between "freedom" and "equality," and that a course in media ethics should lead to greater salience of "moral" instrumental values and "social" terminal values, the present study found different but equally justifiable patterns of response. It found highly significant differences between the posttest of the experimental and control groups, with the experimental group placing greater salience on such values as "salvation," "inner harmony," "wisdom," and being "intellectual." The pre- and posttest analyses of the experimental group showed significantly higher emphasis on values expressed by the words "inner harmony," "intellectual," and "logical," and significant decreases in those expressed as "true friendship," "mature love," "an exciting life," and "polite." Findings suggest that values inquiry remains an elusive and intriguing field of study, worth pursuing to discover the impact of instruction in students, and ultimately, the mass media profession. (Four tables of data are included and 41 references are attached.) (Author/SR)

Effects of a Media Ethics Course on Student Values: A Replication and Expansion

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Effects of a Media Ethics Course on Student Values: A Replication and Expansion

Introduction

For centuries, philosophers have grappled with questions of values. Barrett (1961) said that the concept of values can be traced back to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and others. The term "value" originates from the Latin *valere*, meaning "to be of worth." During the twentieth century, social scientists—particularly psychologists and sociologists, but also political philosophers and economists—have studied the nature and ramifications of individual and institutional values. Whereas philosophic investigations have dealt with the nature of good, right, obligation, virtue, moral and esthetic judgment, beauty, truth, and validity, more recent investigations have delved into the nature of individual belief systems and the foundations of social-political-economic structures (Frankena, 1967; Viall, 1992).

The purpose of this study is to analyze one specific subset of values and determine the extent to which such values may be subject to change when students undertake a course of study in applied ethics, specifically, mass media ethics. Based on the social psychology of Milton Rokeach (1968, 1973, 1979), these values are said to have cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (Day, 1991, pp. 10-11; Surlin, 1987, p. 564). Such values, as part of an enduring value and belief system, are thought to be important considerations in moral, ethical, or socially responsible behavior (Surlin, 1987, p. 564).

This study replicates and greatly expands a recent study by Stuart Surlin (1987), which investigated the effects of a mass media ethics course upon the values systems of a small class of 20 students. To achieve greater validity and reliability, the present authors conducted a two-semester long study of more than 200 students, with pre- and post-tests of experimental and control groups. The study takes issue with some of Surlin's conclusions about the nature of values systems, the potential of a single ethics course to affect those systems, and the ramifications of those changes vis a vis professional performance.

Review of Literature

Pojman (1990) said the term "values" is highly elastic. "Sometimes it is used narrowly as a synonym for 'good' or valuable, and sometimes it is used broadly for the whole scope of evaluative terms, ranging from the highest good through the indifferent to the worst evil" (p. 56). For instance, some philosophers approach values by discussing what is good, what has value. Therefore we can say that Kant "values" humanity per se, while Mill "values" the greatest amount of happiness or benefit to the

greatest number of people or that which harms the least. Others avoid value judgments, and merely define what it means to say something has value. They also make descriptive generalizations of what is regarded as good in a culture and theorize about those values (Frankena, 1967). Some, like Brecht (1959), describe values as metaphysical, unobservable, and unmeasurable, while many others, such as Perry (1954), maintain that ultimate values such as desire can be scientifically validated and measured.

In a review of the literature, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) found five features common to most definitions of values. They included: "(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior or events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance" (p. 551).

Although Barrett (1961) noted disagreement on the definition of values, "few, however, would dissent from the principles that values are important in behavior, they concern standards of choice and the normative, and they involve some degree of commitment" (p. 2). In Pojman's (1990) view, one does not have to enter arguments about whether values are objective or subjective, instrumental or intrinsic, in order to see them as central to the domain of morality; they are *prima facie* or overridable variables that undergird principles, judgments, decisions, and actions (pp. 64-66). Thus values serve as building blocks of attitudes, which in turn are "learned emotional, intellectual, and behavioral responses to persons, things, and events" (Day, 1991, p. 10; Harrison, 1976, p. 192). Zavalloni (1980) stated that values refer to orientations toward what is considered desirable or preferable by social actors. As such, they express some relationship between environmental pressures and human desires. And, as Christians and his colleagues pointed out in their 1991 media ethics textbook, values are "a frame of reference in which theories, decisions, and situations make sense to us" (p. 10)

In the past several years, scholars and popular writers have continued to grapple with the fundamental nature of personal and institutional values. Several perspectives remain, ranging from Alan Bloom's (1987) dismissal of values as a piece of barbarous jargon, to Frances Moore Lappé's (1989) and Hunter Lewis's (1990) enthusiastic endorsement of values as means to better understanding ourselves and instruments for resolving most if not all social, political, and religious controversies.

Sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues (1985), in their best-selling social analysis *Habits of the Heart*, warned against the careless use of the term "values," and relied instead on what they called moral ecology, or "the web of moral understandings and commitments that tie people together in community" (p. 335). In doing so, the sociologists eschewed the individualistic approach to values and valuation, at least insofar as these terms help define a national culture. Their national study of individualism and commitment in American life convinced them that values are "the incomprehensible, rationally indefensible thing that the individual chooses when he or she has thrown off the last vestige of external influence and reached pure, contentless freedom" (pp. 79-80). The authors were concerned that a self-defined American value system, typified by emphasis on success, freedom, and justice, is a highly self-centered, relativistic system (pp. 22-26). These "typically American" values can be compared to the

lists generated by Brecht (1959) and Christianson and Yang (in Dennis, 1988). Brecht's list consisted of equality; freedom, liberty and individualism; revelation of God's will plus reason; ethical naturalism; ethical evolutionist; conservative; democratic; hedonist; social idealism; nationalism; power; culture; harmony; the golden rule; justice; and truth. Christianson and Yang's list, in rank order, included moral integrity, personal freedom, patriotism, work, being practical and efficient, political democracy, helping others, achievement, national progress, material comfort, leisure, equality (racial), individualism (non-conformity), and equality (sexual) (Dennis, 1988, p. 350).

Given that Bellah *et al.* saw greater self-centeredness in American culture than did Brecht and Christianson and Yang, it is easy to see why Bellah would maintain that:

> The language of "values" as commonly used is self-contradictory precisely because it is not a language of value, or moral choice. It presumes the existence of an absolutely empty unencumbered and improvisational self. It obscures personal reality, social reality, and particularly the moral reality that links person and society. (p. 80)

Frances Lappé (1989) and Hunter Lewis (1990) had no such problem with defining and coping with the nature of values. Lappé, in a book that was also a bestseller, defined values as the foundation for a common identity—in America's case, the "common language of our commonwealth, without which we could not talk to each other and be understood" (p. 3). She suggested that Americans' fundamental enduring values include freedom, democracy, fairness, responsibility, productivity, community, family, and work itself.

> More than pride, we have gained confidence in believing that these values are profoundly useful to our society, serving both as necessary anchors and as guideposts in the inevitably chaotic and conflictive process of social change. For Americans individually, these values have been crucial as well—allowing us to perceive how our separate pursuits contribute to a purpose larger than ourselves. (p. 3)

Like Bellah *et al.*, Lappé maintained that a true sense of community and a healthy society can arise and be maintained only when we reexamine some of the loosely-defined values on their own merits, instead of automatically assuming that the institutions and "-isms" to which we pledge our allegiance are based on appropriate values and thereby actually deserve that allegiance. Her perspective was shared by Betty Sichel (1982), who maintained that "A society or nation cannot survive and progress without some common basic values and common moral principles" (p. 11).

Lewis (1990) wrote that, although the term "values" is often used loosely, it should be synonymous with personal beliefs, especially personal beliefs about the "good," the "just," and the "beautiful," personal beliefs that propel us to action, to a particular kind of behavior and life (p. 7). In this regard, he is in synch with other philosophers and social scientists such as Frankena (1967), Pojman

(1990), Klukhohn (1951), Rokeach (1968, 1973), and others. The subtitle of his book (*A question of values: Six ways we make the personal choices that shape our lives*) offers a clue to the opinion of Lewis that all values or freely chosen personal beliefs—and, indeed, all knowledge—stem from some combination of authority, deductive logic, sense experience, emotion, intuition, and science. Thus, Lewis maintained, human beings cannot separate the way they arrive at values from the values themselves (p. 14).

The foregoing suggests that there have been numerous efforts to systematically analyze and even to quantify values. By empirically measuring values, social scientists earlier this century entered what had previously been the relatively subjective realm of valuation. Parsons (1935) explained that the social scientist always "starts from the empirical facts of a certain area of experience. Philosophy is to him only an aid to the understanding of these particular empirical facts" (p. 316).

Value analyses began appearing with Clyde Kluckhohn's Value and Value Orientations in the *Theory of Action* (1951), which helped shift anthropological thinking to the position that there are certain fundamental human values common to all cultures. More recently, social science study of values has come to rest upon several methods including testimony, the study of choices, directions of interest, and observations of rewards and punishments (Albert, 1968).

The social scientist who has made the biggest impact in values research over the past several decades has been Milton Rokeach. His research led him to conclude that values are not relative, that "all men everywhere possess the same values to different degrees" (1973, p. 3). In this regard he shared the view of Kluckhohn and Murray, who in 1948 had written that "every man is in certain respects (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other man" (p. 53).

According to Rokeach (1968), values are easier to uncover and study than beliefs and attitudes because "an adult probably has tens or hundreds of thousands of beliefs, thousands of attitudes, but only dozens of values" (p. 124). He said that these values are identifiable components of a "value system," where they are measurable in relation to one another. "A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end states of existence along a continuum of relative importance," he wrote (1973, p. 5). This structure helps individuals choose between alternatives, resolve conflicts, and make decisions (p. 14).

Individuals' value systems can be determined by rank ordering Rokeach's list of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values. Within the terminal values—desirable end states of being—are some like freedom and happiness that are "personal" or self-centered and others like equality and world peace that are "social" or related to the welfare of others. Instrumental values—desirable modes of conduct—consist of "moral" or "competence" values; the former, which include being honest and forgiving, "have an interpersonal focus which, when violated, arouse pangs of conscience or feelings of guilt about wrongdoing," while the latter, such as being intellectual and logical, have a personal rather than interpersonal focus; their violation "leads to feelings of shame about personal inadequacy rather than to feelings of guilt about wrongdoing" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 8).

The hierarchy of values that results from rank ordering the two lists has been shown to be a "general plan to resolve conflicts" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 3) and a significant predictor of social attitudes and behavior (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Rokeach reported that values ranked in the middle of his values surveys change the most for individuals, suggesting that "respondents rank values at the high and low ends of the scale with considerably more confidence than those they rank in the middle" (1973, p. 39).

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that if Surlin's (1987) findings are epistemologically sound, replications of this study using larger samples and nonparametric statistical procedures should provide similar results. Surlin's hypotheses, both of which were supported, were:

> H^1: A course in media ethics should increase the salience of the value "equality" while decreasing the gap between the ranking of "freedom" and "equality."
>
> H^2: A course in media ethics should lead to greater salience of "moral" instrumental values and "social" terminal values.

Surlin argued that the personal terminal value of "freedom" is a generally salient value for most, but that the social terminal value of "equality" is less salient to persons who are politically conservative, racist, high authoritatian, and anti-civil rights (p. 564). He then hypothesized that those with the greatest gap between the values of "freedom" and "equality" would exhibit less than ethical behavior. Therefore, it was Surlin's hypothesis that a university course in mass media ethics would increase the salience of the value "equality" while decreasing the gap between "freedom" and "equality."

Surlin further hypothesized that the "social" and "ethical/moral" values would increase after participating in a media ethics class, due to students' attempts to retain and enhance their self-esteem once they were introduced to hypothetical situations in which the welfare of others is encouraged.

Method

Surlin's study used a purposive sample of twenty students in a quasi-experimental design Campbell and Stanley (1963) label the one-group pretest-posttest design. There are two possible internal validity flaws with this design. First, the students were not randomly assigned to the experimental group and therefore may not be a representative sample of all students. Second, a control group should have been studied to determine whether there were any other plausible explanations of the resulting change in values. The fact that Surlin had a small sample of 20 students also raises concerns about the reliability of the study.

The authors of this paper believed that a more carefully designed study would test the reliability of Surlin's study and yield more meaningful and valid results. The design for this study is also quasi-experimental because it was not possible to randomly assign students into a media ethics class and subsequent control classes. To compensate for the lack of random assignment, a control group was also tested to help explain other variables that might contribute to value change over the course of one semester. To increase the reliability of the design, a purposive sample of 206 students was drawn over the period of two semesters during the 1990-91 school year, at a major Southeastern university. The experimental group—made up of four senior level media ethics courses taught by two different instructors—had a total of 135 students. The control group—made up of students in senior level courses in media research, history, and public relations—had 71 students. During the first week of each semester, students in both the experimental and control groups were given the Rokeach inventory of instrumental and terminal values and were asked to rate the values in order of importance to their lives. The students were not told they were participating in an experiment in order to reduce bias in their answers. These value inventories were distributed in the same week to both the experimental groups and the control groups to reduce the possibility of diffusion or imitation of the study, which occurs when subjects discuss the study outside of their group. During the last week of the semester, the students again were asked to rate their values using the Rokeach inventory. Throughout the two semesters in question, the ethics classes (experimental groups) were not specifically taught the nature and purpose of the Rokeach inventories, although other mention of philosophic and socio-psychological values was made as part of the regular instruction.

Results

Surlin used a paired T-Test to analyze the value change between the pre-course and post-course value inventories. However, a nonparametric statistical analysis is more appropriate for both the Surlin study and this study because the students were ranking the values in the Rokeach inventory, which makes the data ordinal rather than interval (Hinkle et al, 1988, p. 14). To compare and analyze the results between the pre-course and post-course values inventories, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was used in this study. This test computes the differences between the pair of variables, ranks the absolute differences, sums the positive and negative ranks, and computes the test statistic Z from the positive and negative rank sums (SPSS-X User's Guide, 1988, p. 743).

(Insert Tables 1 and 2 here)

This analysis yielded some interesting results (see Tables 1 and 2). Within the experimental group, the terminal value "inner harmony" and the instrumental values "intellectual" and "logical" increased in salience at the .01 level of significance, while the terminal value "a world of beauty"

increased at the .05 level of significance. The terminal values "true friendship," "mature love," and "an exciting life," plus the instrumental value "polite," decreased in salience at the .05 level of significance. However, the results of this analysis fail to support the first hypothesis of Surlin because the value of "equality" did not significanlty increase in salience and the gap between "freedom" and "equality" did not diminish.

The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 also show that the study failed to support Surlin's second hypothesis. The first eleven terminal values with the highest ranking in the experimental post-test are personal values. The social value with the highest ranking is "world at peace" (12), followed by "equality" (13), "a world of beauty" (17), and "national security" (18).

The post-test results indicate that the students in the ethics class find the moral/ethical values of "honest," "responsible," "loving," and "broadminded" to be the most salient. Competence values of "ambitious," "independent," "intellectual" and "capable" were next in order of importance. However, it is interesting to note that the two variables that significantly increased in salience after the ethics course were competence values ("intellectual" and "logical"), and the one variable that decreased significantly was an ethical/moral value ("polite").

(Insert Tables 3 and 4 here)

Another nonparametric analysis, the Mann-Whitney U test, was conducted to compare the post-course values between the experimental and control groups. The results of this analysis are found in Tables 3 and 4. Both groups ranked "happiness" at the top of their terminal values, and "social recognition," "a world of beauty," and "national security "at the bottom; both valued being "honest" and "responsible" as instrumental values, and de-valued being "obedient" and "clean."

However, the terminal personal values of "salvation," "inner harmony" and "wisdom" were significantly more salient to the experimental group, while the terminal (also personal) values of "a comfortable life," "an exciting life" and "pleasure" were significantly less salient. The experimental group was also significantly more concerned about the instrumental competence value "intellectual," and significantly less concerned about being "cheerful."

Discussion

There are several ways to interpret these data. One reading is that students taking an ethics course did not necessarily demonstrate the increased awareness of social and moral values as found in Surlin's much more limited study. For instance, his students ranked equality much higher at the end of the semester than did the students in the present experimental group; on the one hand, the latter placed greater emphasis on being loving and responsible, which may make the "social empathy" question a wash.

The extent to which this study's results contrast with Surlin's findings that his ethics students tended to display more "sense of other" at the end of the course could be predicted from his self-described pedagogical emphasis on moral development. Sue Hendler (1992) has described the important fundamental differences between moral development and procedural/logical/intellectual processes for instruction and ethics decisionmaking. That difference should be considered by instructors sensitive to values instruction *vis a vis* values inculcation (Black, 1992), for, as many scholars have noted, we all teach values, whether intentionally or not (Hodges, 1990; Ramanathan, 1990; Collins, 1983; Carter, 1983).

The present results seem to suggest that values considered essential for ethical behavior are more salient to the students finishing the course in media ethics than for students completing non-ethics courses (a finding Surlin could not report because of his lack of a control group). Of course, there is the possibility that the students enrolled in the ethics course were already more concerned about these values—i.e., for them, values such as "happiness," "salvation," "honesty," and "responsibity" were highly salient prior to enrollment—and that the difference found between the experimental group and the control group cannot be attributed to the ethics course alone. Therefore, a comparison of both the pre-course/post-course changes and the differences between the control and experimental groups should yield more meaningful results. The values that changed significantly over the period of one ethics course and that were significanlty different from those held by the control group as most salient are the terminal values "inner harmony" and "an exciting life," and the instrumental value "intellectual." The values of "inner harmony" and "intellectual" significantly increased in saliency after the ethics course, while the value "an exciting life" dropped in importance.

These changes could be explained by the fact that the media ethics courses stress the importance of identifying ethical dilemmas and logically determining the most appropriate decision based on one's own well-articulated ethical philosophy and values. Although taught by two different senior-level instructors, the courses share a syllabus and common objectives; the instructors frequently team-teach. Therefore, it is not suprising to see the values of "intellectual" and "logical" increase in salience in the post-test (although it may surprise colleagues who teach research methods and history to find their students less inclined toward "logical" and "intellectual" than were students in an ethics class).

Surlin concluded, from his study of one course over one semester, that instruction in media ethics had a noticeable and an ethically positive effect upon his students' value systems. From that he says "one might assume that this shift in values will lead to moral, ethical and responsible decision-making by these soon-to-be media professionals" (1987, p. 568). The authors of the present study are somewhat less sanguine about the results of their own efforts, in part because if the variables measured are this malleable over the course of 15 weeks, there is some concern that they would be even more malleable once students step out into the pressures of daily media work. Much more extensive research is needed. Researchers would do well to track values changes as students enter their major courses, progress through

them, enter the work force, and advance within it. It would be fascinating to see whether there are fundamental values differences between or among those who select to major and subsequently work in news, entertainment, or persuasion fields. It would also be useful to gather larger samples of students, to avoid the natural biases found in the present Bible Belt study (note the high salience of "salvation," contrasted with Surlin's students' ranking it as 17th in the pre-course test and 16th in the post-course test). Demographic differences such as sex and ethnicity might be considered, as might the extent to which students have been previously exposed to the study of ethics, philosophy, moral development, etc.

Surlin's concluding paragraph bears repeating:

> Future research is needed to replicate this study by other instructors, in other geographic locations, while using differing approaches in teaching technique, class assignments, reading assignments, etc. Finally, the measurement of decision-making relative to one's value system is needed. Does a greater saliency of moral and social values actually lead to more ethical decision-making? This author believes that this would be the case. However, we must agree what constitutes ethical behavior and/or decision-making and decide how professional media behavior can be measured. (1987, p. 676)

Our replication and expansion of Surlin's study is a small demonstration of the fact that values inquiry remains an elusive and intriguing field of study, but one well worth pursuing as we attempt to discover the impact of our instruction on students and, ultimately, the mass media profession.

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Table 1
Comparison of Post-Course and Pre-course Terminal Values
in Experimental Group

Terminal Values	Post-Course Mean	Post-Course Rank	Pre-Course Mean	Pre-Course Rank	Rank Changes
Happiness	6.17	1	5.93	1	
Salvation	6.18	2	6.73	4	2
Freedom	6.41	3	6.84	5	2
Self-respect	6.59	4	6.35	2	-2
Family security	6.90	5	6.58	3	-2
Inner harmony	7.31	6	8.74	8	2 **
Wisdom	7.45	7	8.81	9	2
True friendship	8.47	8	7.56	6	-2 *
Mature love	8.81	9	8.07	7	-2 *
A sense of accomplishment	9.24	10	9.36	10	
A comfortable life	9.93	11	9.74	11	
A world at peace	10.21	12	10.64	12	
Equality	11.01	13	10.96	14	1
An exciting life	11.45	14	10.64	12	-2 *
Pleasure	12.67	15	12.44	15	
Social recognition	13.39	16	13.26	16	
A world of beauty	13.56	17	14.44	18	1 *
National security	13.95	18	13.67	17	-1

* identifies significant changes at .05 level, Wilcoxon
** identifies significant changes at .01 level, Wilcoxon

Table 2
Comparison of Post-Course and Pre-course Instrumental Values
in Experimental Group

Instrumental Values	Post-Course Mean	Post-Course Rank	Pre-Course Mean	Pre-Course Rank	Rank Changes
Honest	4.76	1	4.77	1	
Responsible	5.91	2	6.18	2	
Loving	7.58	3	7.25	3	
Broadminded	7.58	3	8.11	5	2
Ambitious	7.66	5	7.92	4	-1
Independent	7.84	6	8.67	6	
Intellectual	8.14	7	9.30	11	4 **
Capable	9.09	8	8.77	7	-1
Forgiving	9.41	9	9.04	9	
Helpful	9.65	10	9.13	10	
Courageous	9.77	11	9.02	8	-3
Logical	10.43	12	11.50	16	4 **
Imaginative	10.86	13	11.18	15	2
Self-control	10.95	14	10.44	13	-1
Cheerful	11.04	15	10.81	14	-1
Polite	11.24	16	10.41	12	-4 *
Obedient	14.32	17	14.18	17	
Clean	14.56	18	14.36	18	

* identifies significant changes at .05 level, Wilcoxon
** identifies significant changes at .01 level, Wilcoxon

Table 3
Comparison of Post-Course Terminal Values Between Experimental and Control

Terminal Values	Experimental Group Mean	Rank	Control Group Mean	Rank	Rank Difference
Happiness	6.17	1	6.13	1	
Salvation	6.18	2	8.80	9	7 **
Freedom	6.41	3	7.35	4	1
Self-respect	6.59	4	6.84	2	-2
Family security	6.90	5	7.22	3	-2
Inner harmony	7.31	6	9.45	11	5 **
Wisdom	7.45	7	10.27	12	5 **
True friendship	8.47	8	7.68	5	-3
Mature love	8.81	9	8.62	7	-2
A sense of accomplishment	9.24	10	8.63	8	-2
A comfortable life	9.93	11	8.00	6	-5 *
A world at peace	10.21	12	10.72	13	1
Equality	11.01	13	12.10	15	2
An exciting life	11.45	14	9.24	10	-4 **
Pleasure	12.67	15	11.46	14	-1 *
Social recognition	13.39	16	12.30	16	-1
A world of beauty	13.56	17	12.97	17	
National security	13.95	18	13.12	18	

* identifies significant changes at .05 level, Mann-Whitney
** identifies significant changes at .01 level, Mann-Whitney

Table 4
Comparison of Post-Course Instrumental Values Between Experimental and Control

Instrumental Values	Experimental Group Mean	Rank	Control Group Mean	Rank	Rank Difference
Honest	4.76	1	6.10	1	
Responsible	5.91	2	6.39	2	
Loving	7.58	3	7.41	4	1
Broadminded	7.58	3	8.14	6	3
Ambitious	7.66	5	7.61	5	
Independent	7.84	6	7.01	3	-3
Intellectual	8.14	7	9.68	10	3 *
Capable	9.09	8	8.28	7	-1
Forgiving	9.41	9	9.83	11	2
Helpful	9.65	10	9.24	8	-2
Courageous	9.77	11	10.99	14	3
Logical	10.43	12	10.39	12	
Imaginative	10.86	13	11.32	16	3
Self-control	10.95	14	11.22	15	1
Cheerful	11.04	15	9.49	9	-6 *
Polite	11.24	16	10.73	13	-3
Obedient	14.32	17	13.41	17	
Clean	14.56	18	13.44	18	

* identifies significant changes at .05 level, Mann-Whitney
** identifies significant changes at .01 level, Mann-Whitney