

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 341 080

CS 507 636

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 TITLE Back to the Definitions Themselves: The Pragmatics of Intrinsic Justification.
 PUB DATE Nov 91
 NOTE 27p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (77th, Atlanta, GA, October 31-November 3, 1991).
 PUB TYPE Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.) (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
 DESCRIPTORS *Debate; Debate Format; Higher Education; *Persuasive Discourse; *Public Speaking; *Rhetorical Criticism; *Rhetorical Invention
 IDENTIFIERS Cross Examination Debate Association; *Debate Theory; Debate Tournaments; *Intrinsic Justification

ABSTRACT

Such terms as "intrinsic justification," "intrinsicness," and "intrinsicity" are increasingly being heard in academic debate circles. Intrinsic justification consists of an argument which focuses evaluation of a resolutorial term on the term's definitional contours. Essential qualities are defining characteristics that establish that an object or concept is a member of a larger category. The theory argues that for the sake of clash, debate should center on definitive qualities. Unfortunately, some advocates have misapplied the general notion of intrinsicness. There is a misconception that intrinsic justification delimits debate, promoting constantly shifting debate. The limits actually are the restrictions on the resolutorial term's meaning. Another misconception suggests that if there are other causes to the harm or benefit claimed by one side, that harm or benefit is said to be "not intrinsic" to the asserted resolutorial link. This claim confuses intrinsicness with uniqueness. Some argue wrongly that intrinsic justification ignores context. Furthermore, critics wrongly assume that intrinsic justification presumes to create essential definitions, that it amounts to either essentialism or the concept of a world of ideal forms, or that it seeks to foist some idea of phenomenological truth on debate. Properly conceived, intrinsic justification has potential in locating common ground and encouraging clash in debate by grounding discourse in the essential definitional components of a proposition's language. (Twenty-six references are attached.) (SG)

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The Pragmatics of Intrinsic Justification**

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Paper presented at the 77th Annual Meeting of the Speech
Communication Association, Atlanta Georgia, November 1991

CS 507636

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Back to the Definitions Themselves:
The Pragmatics of Intrinsic Justification

"Intrinsic Justification," "Intrinsickness," and even "Intrinsicality" are tags which are increasingly being heard in academic debate circles. Since the argument for intrinsic justification was first outlined (Bahm, 1988), it has become a fairly common argument at C.E.D.A. tournaments. Often, however, the argument has been invoked in a way which causes anguish in opponents and judges alike. No two manifestations seem to be alike, and too often the argument does not promote clarity, but rather creates a fog of misunderstanding which seems to envelope even its proponents.

Most of these problems have stemmed from the application of intrinsic justification rather than from the theory itself. This paper will attempt to rescue the concept of intrinsic justification from this swamp by emphasizing a consistent interpretation in the practical application of the argument and by attempting to return the argument to its roots - to the concept of definitions. The first part of this paper will attempt to re-explain the nature of intrinsic justification in a simpler form. Rather than relying on the often misunderstood constructs of phenomenology, this explanation will rest of the act of defining itself. The second part of this paper will address some of the common misconceptions which seem to accompany the practical use of this theory. It is hoped that this paper will provide both a more concrete explanation of what intrinsic justification is and a more specific rebuttal of all that intrinsic justification is not.

PART ONE: A SIMPLER VIEW OF WHAT INTRINSICNESS IS:

BACK TO THE DEFINITIONS THEMSELVES

When the argument for intrinsic justification was first articulated (Bahm, 1988), the field of phenomenology was chosen as a vehicle for its expression. This was not done because the theory depended on phenomenology, but because the phenomenological purpose - a search for essential structures of meaning - closely paralleled debaters' attempts to identify and to focus debate on the resolution itself. It was by way of analogy, not substantive dependence, that phenomenology lent itself to intrinsic justification. It was reasoned that phenomenology provided both a language and tools for the reduction of concepts to necessary structures, and that debaters might use that language and tools in clarifying their argument for intrinsic justification.

In retrospect, it seems that the phenomenological presentation has led to less than perfect clarity. Much of the confusion surrounding intrinsic justification may be traced to the vagueness and uncertainty of phenomenology itself. This section of the paper will consider the possibility that intrinsic justification can be better understood in light of the concept of the definition itself. Intrinsic justification, in essence, can be seen as an argument which focuses evaluation of a resolutive term in question on the definitional contours of that term: arguments should stem from qualities of a concept which are definitional rather than from those qualities which do not define.

Essences as definitional qualities

Essential qualities, stripped of the esoteric language of phenomenology, can be basically thought of as defining characteristics. "The purpose of the real definition," Brugger and Baker (1972) note, "is to indicate the specific essence of something" (p. 88, emphasis in original). Hill and Leeman (1990) further note that essential properties are "located in the nature of an object as a member of a class of objects" (p. 134, emphasis in original). It is the presence of the essential quality which establishes that an individual object or concept is a member of a larger category of objects or concepts. Kruger (1965) notes that essences are "tremendously important in enabling us to organize knowledge, 'to get hold of the enormous variety of the world,' for they are the basis upon which we make significant classifications" (p. 114). Possession of essential qualities shows that the individual example corresponds to a larger definition. Since an essence can be seen as a limit beyond which something ceases to be itself, it is a concept which is definitional at its root. "To give the essence of X," Kruger (1965) notes, "is tantamount to defining X, to giving those characteristics without which something would not be an X" (p. 114). This seems intuitively true: if we note that the government of a particular country upholds the practice of majority rule, has short term elective offices, and extends near universal franchise and we further agree that these are all of the essential qualities of a popular democracy, then we

could conclude that the particular country meets the definition of a popular democracy. The defining role of essential qualities is also supported by the philosophical literature on the nature of definition. Abelson (1967) refers to Aristotle's familiar dictum which suggests that "a definition should give the essence or nature of the thing defined, rather than its accidental properties" (p. 322), and corroborates it stating the position of prescriptivist and linguistic philosophers of definition:

these writers usually mean that a definition should indicate the properties that define the meaning of the term in question rather than those that just happen to hold true of the objects to which the term applies. (p. 322, emphasis in original)

Abelson (1967) believes that this is true to the point of being unnecessary as a rule: saying that there is a definitional focus on essential qualities is nearly equivalent to saying "definitions must define."

Responses to Essential Definition

Hill and Leeman (1990) assert that essential qualities are not definitive. As an initial reason, they offer the fact that phenomenology does not seek to define and hence is ill suited to intrinsic justification. Independent of the applicability of phenomenology though (a subject handled below), it remains true that an essential quality can be practically thought of as a defining quality.

The other reason that Hill and Leeman offer is that intrinsic qualities are too "intuitive" to be arrived at rationally and too diffuse to be a grounding for definitions. This argument underestimates the role that essential structures play in definition and carries the misconception that intrinsic justification aims at creating definition, rather than working from accepted definitions.

To say that defining properties are too "intuitive" to be described is to say that we cannot articulate definitions: we can deal with particulars, but we cannot express that which establishes the particular as a member of a more general category. If Hill and Leeman's (1990) argument is correct it surely negates the possibility of intrinsic justification, but it also poses problems which are as severe for the logical alternative to intrinsic justification: allowing affirmatives to select a contingent (and hence parametric) example of the resolution. If there is no definition that stands apart from the affirmative's example, there is no topical standard to rely on save the affirmative's "intuition" that their case example falls within an unknown definition of the resolutorial term in question. If it is true that it is impossible to develop essential defining guidelines, then it is impossible to know whether any contingent example is truly within the resolution. The burden to prove topicality, a burden which seems essential whether we are using intrinsic justification or not, becomes impossible to meet.

The fact that essential structures do characterize definitions prevents this impossibility. Defining through reference to essential qualities may be an inexact process subject to the vagaries of discourse, but it is possible and performed countless times in both daily life as well as in the context of academic debate. We could probably agree that "foreign investment in the United States" involves the use of capital in this country by agents of another country with the intention of making a profit. This definition identifies essential qualities: if they are not present, then the act in question is not "foreign investment in the United States." Turning to expert opinion, we could argue that a "law enforcement agency" is a "federal, state, or local criminal justice agency of which the principal functions are the prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders" (Shafritz, 1985, p. 308). This definition also identifies essential qualities: if an agency has a principle function other than the ones listed (a correctional agency, for example) then it is not a "law enforcement agency."

Intrinsic justification does not create this definition, but rather makes use of it to focus the debate on essential aspects. If debaters are able to arrive at and apply definitions (the theory of topicality assumes that they are able to do so) then intrinsic justification would pick up from that point and focus the debate on the definitional aspects which have been identified.

Essential qualities characterize the "group-ness" of the thing. It is crucial to realize that, even apart from

phenomenology,¹ the location and description of essential properties is fundamental to the act of definition. This realization imparts a simplicity to the theory: any instantiation of a concept or a word has some qualities which identify it as part of the larger category (definitive qualities) and some qualities which make it unique (particular qualities). If we look at instances of "censorship of artistic censorship" some qualities of the instance would define it as such (i.e., the fact that aesthetic material is subjected to prior restraint by the government) while other qualities would not (i.e., the fact that "2 Live Crew" was the subject of the suppression). Intrinsic justification then becomes the relatively simple matter of focusing the debate on aspects of the evaluated terms which are definitive (the goodness or badness of suppression) rather than those which are not (the goodness or badness of "2 Live Crew").

This clarification of intrinsic justification makes it possible to resolve some of the theory's ambiguities. In their 1990 article, Hill and Leeman point out that locating and articulating essential qualities is not always easy or obvious. If, however, we are able to define then we should be able to locate qualities which are definitive: qualities which always indicate whether an object or concept falls inside or outside of the definition. Intrinsic justification simply argues that for the

¹ Berube (1990) may be correct in noting that intrinsic justification is far simpler than the phenomenological language in which it is couched. The theory may be productively reduced to a pragmatic focus on definitional qualities.

sake of clash, debate should center on those qualities which are definitive.

Those whose exposure to intrinsic justification has chiefly been in the form of in-round clashes on the theory may not recognize this as being the same theory. Unfortunately, the trend has been for advocates to seize upon one or two concepts within the general notion of intrinsicness and to apply them in ways which stray outside of the original meaning and rationale for the theory. The next section will address several of the major misconceptions which characterize the in-round use of "intrinsicness."

PART TWO: A MORE SPECIFIC VIEW OF WHAT INTRINSICNESS IS NOT:
SOME COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS

THE MISCONCEPTION OF UNITY

The use of the root word "intrinsic" characterizes a great diversity of arguments. A policy debater answering a disadvantage, a CEDA debater justifying the advocacy of a counterplan, a negative debater demanding absolute causality, and an affirmative debater indicting the search for absolute truth may all make use of the word "intrinsicness" but they do not all assume a consistent meaning for that term.

All arguments sharing the label "intrinsicness" do not share the theoretic foundation described above. The term existed in academic debate circles prior to my use of it, and it is not always

recognized that my argument for intrinsic justification used the term in a specialized sense. The misconception of unity assumes that there is a consistent underlying philosophy to all current uses of the term 'intrinsicness.'

Molden (1990, November) recognizes three principle uses of the term: first, to focus on that which is essential to the resolution's wording (my use); second, to explain the policy debate concept of inherency (Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983); and third, to allow circumvention of disadvantages (a frequent in-round use). Molden then proceeds to advance his indictment of intrinsicness against all three as if they are all cut from the same cloth. It is not clear that these manifestations share a common thread, and if they do, then that is an argument which needs to be advanced.

What is clear is that the argument for intrinsic justification which calls for a focus on those aspects of the evaluated resolutional terms which are definitive bears little resemblance to many, if not most, uses of the term. I see no way, for example, that the theory allows a debater who is only parametrically (i.e., contingently) supporting a resolution debater to argue "not intrinsic" to a disadvantage. I see no way that the theory described above legitimizes a negative's demand that the affirmative be the sole cause of an identified harm in order to be "inherent." I see no way that the theory described above gives support to a debater advocating an alternate way to solve affirmative's harms as a 'test' of intrinsicness which does not have to meet the traditional burden of competition.

My argument is a particular one: intrinsic justification should focus debate on aspects of the evaluated terms which are essential (definitive) rather than accidental. This argument does not subsume, or even give any particular level of support to, many contemporary uses of the term 'intrinsicness.'

THE MISCONCEPTION OF INFINITE VARIATION

One of the most common objections to intrinsicness is that it delimits the debate, permitting advocates to 'test out' of anything. This, critics say, prevents a realistic comparison and promotes a constantly shifting debate. Hill and Leeman (1990) make this argument. Intrinsicness testing, they say, provides negatives with unlimited solvency power and absolute fiat. This misconception assumes that the framework for testing, term meaning, is unlimited. This criticism is true only if we are able to discern no limit on term meaning. The argument that the advocate of, say, violence as a response to political oppression can always change their conception of this violence by "testing out" of negative disadvantages presumes that there is no practical limit to what can be meant by "violence as a response to political oppression." The lack of such a limit would indeed permit the affirmative to get out of an escalation disadvantage by saying that their "violence" would involve only passive resistance. The existence of a parameter on term meaning, such as the notion that

"violence" must involve the active use of force, would prevent such infinite testing.²

The limits on negative solvency and fiat are the limits to the meaning of the resolutorial term itself. Hill and Leeman (1990) argue that the advocate of intrinsicness could effectively reduce themselves to "disembodied eyeballs" (p. 142) devoid of anything which might create ground for an argument from the opposition. It is likely that any debater reducing the evaluative subject of their proposition to that extent would no longer be seen as addressing the proposition: a debater talking about "disembodied eyeballs" would be seen as straying outside the limits of our consensual understanding of "covert involvement..." or any other resolutorial subject.

Hill and Leeman (1990) themselves show that affirmatives have ground to argue that their arguments are based on essential features when they note that my examples on covert involvement, supporting anti-communism, harming alliances, the environment, or democracies...could, in some circumstances, only materialize and in other circumstances could more readily materialize because of the presence of the invariant

² If there is no limit on term meaning, then the problems posed to contingent justification are as severe as the problems posed to intrinsic justification. Lacking any parameter on term meaning, it would be impossible to determine whether contingent examples are within the meaning of the proposition. Topicality, in short, would be destroyed.

structures (secrecy and deception). (p. 141, emphasis in original)

Thus, assuming this argument could be substantiated, negative ground would not be unlimited: they would be forced to contend with these impacts because they link to essential (definitional) aspects of the resolution's language.

The ground for testing and for variation is only as unlimited as the meanings of the terms themselves. If a term has parameters of meaning (most topicality debates assume that they do) then those parameters define the limits of variation and specify the aspects of the proposition with which the advocates are forced to contend.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY

In debate rounds, "intrinsicness" often takes the form of an absolute causality argument: if there are other causes of a harm or benefit claimed by one side, then the occurrence of that harm or benefit is said to be "not intrinsic" to the resolutional link in question. For example, if an affirmative team claims that law enforcement power causes statism, negative teams might argue that since other things cause statism, statism is not "intrinsic" to law enforcement power. It is unclear where this argument comes from, but it does seem clear that an argument saying that debate should focus on essential (definitional) aspects of the resolution would not give support to this absolute causality argument. It is one

thing to demand that a harm stem from a definitional aspect of the resolution and quite another thing to demand that the harm stem from nothing else. Why the former would require or even suggest the latter is a mystery to this author. It is likely that the affirmative described above would survive an intrinsicness challenge (as I conceive of it) based on the fact that "law enforcement power" seems to definitionally require the power of the state.

The "intrinsicness" argument calling for absolute causality seems to be a uniqueness argument in disguise: statism is not a reason to reject law enforcement power since statism is not unique to law enforcement power. Stated in this form, the argument suggests the obvious answer that while statism may not be limited to law enforcement power, law enforcement power undeniably (and uniquely) increases the power of the state. This might be a reason why advocates attempt to lend more perceived weight to the press by labeling it "intrinsicness."

But this application is incorrect and certainly does not stem from the view of intrinsicness I defend. The equivocation of uniqueness and intrinsicness muddies the waters. Uniqueness is the claim that any benefits or harms being claimed be present in the resolution, however interpreted, and not present in the non-resolution (Flaningham, 1981) while intrinsic justification is the claim that arguments should stem from essential aspects of the resolutional terms which are being evaluated. There is a similarity, indeed, but the uniqueness claim that advocates show a

resolutionally relevant increment of harm or benefit is not synonymous with the intrinsicness claim that all arguments of resolutional harm or benefit be linked by definition or essence to the language of the proposition.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF EXTRA-RESOLUTIONAL MEANING

Molden (1990, November) and Hill and Leeman (1990) argue that intrinsic justification ignores resolutional context. By focusing on essential meaning, these authors say, intrinsic justification fails to account for geographical, temporal, and situational limits within the language of the resolution itself. It is the explicit resolutional context, and not the notion of essential meaning which should define the limits of debate, they say. This argument is based on two misperceptions. The first misperception is that there is a single identifiable resolutional context. As Hill and Leeman (1990) admit, all terms are "multistable and multidimensional" (p. 137), and resolutions, as any judge knows, can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways. A mere reading of the resolution does not fully contextualize a term: it can always be viewed in a contingent light. Thus resolutional context alone is unlikely to provide a complete and consistent understanding of the resolution.

The second misperception is that intrinsic justification exists apart from the resolution's wording. The main claim seems to be that resolutions impose situational and temporal constraints which intrinsicness would negate. This is only true if we take

intrinsicness to be some kind of "super theory" superior to resolutional justification itself. As long as intrinsicness is taken to be a method of resolutional justification (as suggested by the title 'intrinsic justification') than it exists only within the language of the resolution. This means that we do not simply look at intrinsic qualities of "covert" or "involvement" or "U.S." (Hill & Leeman, p. 141), we instead look at "some necessary aspect of U.S. covert involvement in Central America" (Bahm, 1988, p. 23). We would not look at intrinsic aspects of "foreign investment," we would have to find intrinsic qualities of "the trend toward increasing foreign investment in the United States." The focus is on finding essential definitional characteristics of the resolutional subject³ -- including all situational and temporal limitations present in the resolution's language, but excluding all situational and temporal limitations which are not in the resolution's language. The misconception is that intrinsic justification stands apart from the resolution and that it would come prior to an evaluation of the specific words of the resolution. A conception of intrinsic justification as stemming from the definitional aspects of the resolution clarifies --

³ Hill and Leeman argue that there is no mechanism for determining which terms in the resolution should be subject to intrinsic analysis, but the analysis would most obviously pertain to that which is being evaluated: the grammatical subject of the resolution ("U.S. covert involvement in Central America;" "the trend toward increasing foreign investment in the United States;" "U.S. Government censorship of artistic expression;" "violence as a response to political oppression;" etc.)

intrinsic justification begins with a reading of the definitional parameters of the evaluated resolutorial terms and as such it embraces, rather than ignores, resolutorial context.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF ESSENTIAL DEFINITION

Critics of intrinsicness often presume that the purpose of the theory is to create "essential definitions" which are taken to be near mystical properties of language which are too vague and too intuitive to be practically applied in a debate round. Hill and Leeman (1990) seem to presume that intrinsic justification is a method of arriving at definitions. For instance, they argue that variational testing is unworkable because it would require an a priori definition. This argument reveals Hill and Leeman's fundamental confusion between intrinsic justification as a topicality argument and as a justification argument. Topicality is grounded in the meaning of the topic and thus relates to selection of definitions while justification is grounded in the function of the topic and thus relates to the affirmative need to focus on and prove the proposition. While it might be possible to make use of phenomenology as a topicality standard designed to create or choose between definitions, my argument does not make such an application. Intrinsic justification is a justification standard⁴ and hence is

⁴ As a standard of justification, intrinsicness is a child of resolutorial focus. If a team were to argue and win at all levels that the best debate is promoted when affirmatives assume no burden to prove the resolution true and are given the unbridled power to

a post-topicality burden: once definitions have been chosen (either in the first affirmative speech or in emergent topicality argumentation) intrinsic justification encourages a focus on the essential qualities of those definitions. The field of academic debate has developed a large body of literature relating to standards for choosing between definitions.⁵ Definitions are selected in a debate round using standards which have not heretofore been considered too intuitive and, once selected, those definitions establish essential qualities. It is true that the process of variation presumes some prior knowledge of what a member of a category might be, but if we are able to assess topicality (a requirement of both intrinsic and contingent justification) then this should be a simple matter: several topical examples of a concept are considered, and variation determines whether the qualities of a given example are contingent or intrinsic.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF ONTOLOGY

A common answer to intrinsic justification is that things don't have essential meaning. Saul Kripke (1980) for example refutes the philosophical concept of necessity:

select their case area then the intrinsicness burden would likely be moot. There are, however, several well-argued rationales for a resolutorial focus (see especially Bile, 1987; Paulson & Rhodes, 1979; and Ulrich, 1984).

⁵ See Brownlee, 1981; Cantrill, 1988; Dudczak, 1987; Herbeck & Katsulas, 1987; Parson & Bart, 1987; Unger, 1981; Williams & Cross, 1979.

It is even suggested in the literature, that though a notion of necessity may have some sort of intuition behind it (we do think some things could have been otherwise), this notion [of a distinction between necessary and contingent properties] is just a doctrine made up by some bad philosopher who (I guess) didn't realize that there are several ways of referring to the same thing. (p. 41)

Though the terminology remains the same, this quote is more of an indictment of the ontological theory of essentialism than it is an indictment of the language based theory of intrinsicness. Intrinsicness is often confused with the philosophy of essentialism: the notion of objects and entities have identifiable and inherent properties. The assumption is that if there are not universal qualities to things, then it is nonsense to speak of essential meaning.

This argument confuses an ontologically based argument for intrinsicness with a language-based one. "Things" may not have any essential characteristics, but at an empirical level language does have such characteristics. A dog may not have any essential meaning since "meaning" is dependent on the perceiver and may take on a wide variety of forms. This notwithstanding, I believe that it is possible to say that the word "dog" has essential meaning: since all of those making non-metaphorical use of the term would be referring to an animal, to a mammal, and to a mostly domesticated pet. In a different world, we clearly might use a different word, or attach a different meaning, but in this world, and within the

constraints of our language game, there is an agreement within the language community (the agreement which makes communication possible) that a word carries a certain meaning which includes essential structures. Certainly words vary in terms of their abstractness, there being more agreement on the essential components of "table" than on the essential components of "freedom," but to say that we can communicate is to say that there are certain qualities of meaning which I can count on calling to your mind when I use a certain terms. Those qualities can be considered definitional or essential structures. Thus, intrinsic justification does not call for any philosophical purity of universal forms, but rather depends only on there being threads of meaning which we all hold in common.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF IDEAL FORMS

It is often claimed that intrinsic justification ignores the "real world" in favor of an ideal form of the resolutive concept under discussion (see Taylor, 1991, November). According to this argument, an advocate supporting "covert involvement in Central America" intrinsically, and therefore excluding accidental impacts such as support of anti-communism and torture, would be supporting only an ideal form of covert involvement, not covert involvement as it actually occurs in the world.

This argument is based on idea that it is normatively better to be focusing on current forms and practices as they actually

occur. Even assuming that this is always the case, and that a discussion of the actual practice of covert involvement is always of greater value than a discussion of covert involvement in the abstract, the argument seems to ask for more from the resolution than the resolution provides. If the current form of a practice is what should be evaluated, then the resolution's wording should emphasize that current form: i.e., "Resolved: that the current policy of U.S. covert involvement in Central America is unjustified." Assuming the current form when the resolution does not specify it, transforms the statement. If we believe that there is a difference between the statement, "Resolved: that U.S. covert involvement in Central America is unjustified," and the statement "Resolved: that the current policy of U.S. covert involvement in Central America is unjustified," it must be because the latter focuses on the practice as it now exists while the former focuses on the practice per se.

A focus on intrinsic justification would not prevent a consideration of current policy or practice, but would rather focus on current policy and practice when the resolution specifies such, but would not artificially force such a consideration when the resolution does not.

THE MISCONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PURPOSE

Wrapped in the language of phenomenology, the pragmatic purpose of intrinsic justification in promoting clash can be lost.

The purpose of intrinsic justification is not to foist some idea of phenomenological truth on debate, but rather to promote clash by eliminating a focus on resolutorial contingencies. Hill and Leeman (1990) state that intrinsic justification misapplies phenomenology.⁶ They say that phenomenology does not prefer essential to contingent properties, that contingent properties are important to meaning, and that to dismiss contingent properties confuses essence with identity. These claims are based on a misreading of my argument. The argument for intrinsic justification is not that phenomenology requires a preference for essential definition, it is that the pragmatic constraints of a debate round require a preference for essential definition, and that phenomenology can aid in getting there. Phenomenology is being used as a methodological tool to promote the pedagogical goal of enhancing clash in a debate round.

As Hill and Leeman admit, debate requires clash. Clash is not achieved if both sides in a debate are able to advance contingent interpretations of the resolution.⁷ The argument for intrinsic

⁶ Hill and Leeman are on shaky ground claiming that there is a 'correct' phenomenology. As our mutual source Ihde (1985) notes, "there are phenomenologies rather than one phenomenology" (p. vii-viii). While my initial argument is based primarily on my own readings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, it is clear that phenomenology is far from a closed philosophical system. As Thevenaz (1962) explains, "the value of the method will show itself to be strictly proportionate to the breadth of the philosophy or to the number of philosophies it has inspired and nourished" (p. 38).

⁷ This argument is fully advanced in the original article (Bahm, 1988) and is not addressed by Hill and Leeman.

justification, apart from the need to justify the proposition itself rather than some contingent manifestation (see Bile, 1988), is that in order to ensure that affirmatives and negatives are sharing a common link to the resolution, debate should center on aspects of resolutorial terms which are definitionally essential. Hill and Leeman are right in pointing out that phenomenologists would not show such a preference, but phenomenologists do not have the goal of promoting clash in an academic debate. The question, then, is whether we can use phenomenological methods for ends which are not purely phenomenological. The most pragmatic answer is yes. Surely debaters do not have the same goals as the politician, the philosopher, or the social scientist. Yet debaters can and do use political, philosophical and social scientific analysis in the construction of their arguments. If the field of phenomenology provides us with a method of identifying intrinsic features of the resolution and if the identification of intrinsic features serves the debate process by localizing clash, then the application is productive.

CONCLUSION:

In their defense of hypothesis testing theory, David Zarefsky and Bill Henderson (1983) were accused of relying on a form of theory divorced from actual in-round practice (Hollihan, 1983). I suppose that this defense of intrinsicness can be accused of the same. There is a rather large gulf between intrinsicness as

explained in the literature, and intrinsicness as it has manifest itself in rounds. The argument remains, however, that a intrinsic justification has potential as a pragmatic attempt to respond to the needs of academic debate by locating common ground and encouraging clash by grounding the discourse in the essential definitional components of the proposition's language. It remains true that a team contingently supporting a resolution and a team contingently denying a resolution may end up advancing arguments which do not clash: drug testing without due process for the purpose of firing workers is bad, and drug testing with due process for the purpose of rehabilitating workers is good. This argument avoids the clash which would occur if the advocates focused on the stable components of drug testing which do not vary from situation to situation. It is hoped, that by focusing on this rather simple thesis, and by dissociating this version of intrinsicness from the different versions advocated in rounds, and the straw-figure versions addressed by critics, this much-maligned argument might be more frequently put to practical use in debate rounds.

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The author would like to thank David Devereaux and Brian McGee for their contributions to early drafts of both this paper and the paper which will appear in Argument and Advocacy (27:4).