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ABSTRACT
              A philosophical analysis of play and games is
undertaken in this paper. Playful gaming, which is shown to be a
synthesis of play and games, is utilized as a category for
undertaking the examination of play and games. The significance of
playful gaming to education is demonstrated through analyses of
Plato's, Dewey's, Sartre's, and Marcuse's theories of play. An
analysis of the learning of norms and values in political and
educational socialization games also is made. (DB)

PLAYFUL GAMING

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I. Introduction

Playful gaming may be seen as a category for the
analysis of play and games. Though not a treatise on the
definition of play or game, the paper may be seen as a
modest contribution in that direction. The existential
possibility of playful gaming is demonstrated logically,
through a synthesis of play and games, and functionally
through the examination of instances where it makes sense
to speak of games that are more or less playful. The
significance of playful gaming to education is demonstrated
in the analyses made of Plato's, Dewey's, Sartre's and
Marcuse's theories of play, the synthesis of an instruction-
al game-category for the translation of an educational ideal
into practice, and the analysis of the learning of norms
and values in political and educational socialization games.

II. Playful gaming

Playful gaming may be seen as an activity that occurs
in all games that are played. Since games are not always
played, as in games where players do not want to play, it
seems logical to point out that not all gaming in a game is
also playful. Games that are playful, or playful games,
vary according to the degree to which playing in a game is
more or less emphasized, depending on the purpose or theory
for which each playful game is used. But since all playful
games are, by definition, playful, we conclude that common
to all playful games that are gamed is _playful gaming_.

Abstracting from this observation, we also conclude that
playful gaming may be seen as an idea or metaphysical cate-
gory in which playing and gaming are each a necessary, but
not sufficient condition. As a result of the tendency of
the human mind to conceptualize and abstract, playful gam-
ing may be raised to the status of a concept or an idea
or a category that becomes more or less firmly entrenced
in the ideal but _subjective_ cosmos of our imagination. Un-
less we can successfully argue against the possibility of its
existence in ideal form, in our imagination, playful gaming
may thence be used deductively in the study of games and
games-like activities. Transcending all particulars or
particular instances of playful games, playful gaming is not
an idea of the Platonic type, but rather a synthetic a
priori of the type found in Kantian metaphysics.[1]

The following objection may raised against the possi-
bility of having a logically valid concept of playful gaming.
It may be argued that there is no difference between "play"
and "game", and thus make no sense to talk about "playful
gaming" as a term with a meaning different from "gaming"

(or "playing"). Indeed, in the literature on play and games, several authors use the term "play" and "game" interchange-ably, as if they are logically coextensive.² If "play" and "game" have the same exact meaning, there is no sense in qualifying "game" with a term that has an identical meaning: nothing more is said about game other than that it is gamed.

A careful review of the literature on the nature of play and games leaves us with some commonly held or "residue" ideas. Play is seen as an activity that is voluntary and desired for its own sake, as an end in-itself. Games, on the other hand, are formally what they are because of their dependence on rules.³ Thus rules make the game irrespective of the attitude of the players in the game. We conclude that since play and game are terms with different meanings, we may give playful gaming a new lease on life. Games may be gamed playfully, or not played at all.

A second objection against playful gaming may take the following form. It may be argued that as soon as play is saddled with rules, it becomes non-play; that its autotelic quality is lost by the imposition of, and dependence on, rules. Thus, it may be argued that as soon as play is encapsulated inside a set of game rules, it loses its play quality and becomes game. In other words, it may be said that rules in a game drown the play quality in play by making rules, rather than the activity itself, the defining factor.⁴ Since games were earlier defined as necessarily controlled by rules, then if by "playful" in playful gaming one means play controlled by rules, playful gaming may be a con-tradiction in terms.

The basic flaw in this objection is its failure to dis-tinguish between rules that are externally imposed, and rules that are intrinsic or self-imposed. The latter may occur in play, since they emanate from the player himself; the former may be found only in non-play activities, in-cluding in games that are not played, that is, in games where the activity is externally imposed. Thus there seems to be nothing essential about game rules that characterize them as playful or not, other than the attitude of the players toward game rules as being their rules. Any game may become playful once its players decide voluntarily to accept its rules. In this "borrowing" of rules from a game, the players may be less creatively playing under borrowed, rather than self-developed rules, but since their rules are self-imposed, they are nevertheless playing. Or, put more abstractly, they are playfully gaming.

One should also consider the fact that play may have

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rules apart from any borrowing from, or relation to a game.
It has been argued that all play that involves the faculty
of imagination is necessarily representational, and, there-
fore, also ruled. [5] This view has been defended on the
ground that in play, one is not unreflectively living him-
self out, but imaginatively projecting the play situation
that, as a rule, must be consciously represented and dif-
ferentiated in order for it to continue to be play. Accord-
ing to Vygotsky, this is the reason why players are more [6]
conscious of rules in their play, than in their non-play.
He offered an illustration of two sisters who decided to
play sisters: the sisters now played sisters according to
the rules of sisterhood, whereas before, they were living
their role as sisters without consciously generalizing and
representing themselves as sisters.

Though the objection may be raised that not all play is
representational, [7] the significant point for our purposes
here is that if it can be shown that play has rules, they
are always self-imposed. Stated another way, rules that
are played but played outside the context of a game, are
more spontaneously grounded in the player than rules that
are borrowed and played in a game; in both circumstances,
however, rules are self-imposed, and, therefore, played.

It follows logically from our analysis that if a game
could be forced on the players, it would cease to be play.
The two terms, play and game, should be carefully used in
order to account for the fact that rules in play are always
self-imposed, as compared to game rules, which may or may
not be. Thus one of the necessary, though by no means
sufficient, criteria in the analysis of play and games is
the voluntariness of rules. We conclude that playful
gaming may be seen as a metaphysical category that allows
someone to rate the rules in a particular game according
their degree of playfulness, that is, according to the de-
gree to which players feel that game rules are self, rather
than externally imposed.

III. Play and Political Education

It has been maintained that in play, players represent. [8]
Since representation occurs through the faculty of imagina-
tion, this means that in play, players also imagine. That
play is imaginative, especially after three years of age,
is widely held in the literature. [9] As imagination, play
is "unreal" in so far as it harbors only possibilities. In
imagining the possible and projecting it into the future,
play never leaves non-play, but is played out in the midst
of non-play. Consequently, the unreality of play is not a
characteristic of play, but of the fact that the surrounding

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<u>reality is not playful</u>.[10]

In order to understand this comparison (of play to
reality) better, let us compare play, which is v o l u n -
t a r y a n d i m a g i n a t i v e, w i t h
S a r t r e' s phenomenological ontology. The for-itself
secrets a nothingness in the in-itself, and imaginatively
projects a possibility in the in-itself. Thus the in-itself
is necessary for the for-itself to arise <u>as</u> a for-itself.
Similarly with the "realness" of play; play may be seen as
unreal only if the reality surrounding play is non-play.
Once the reality around play becomes play, then play be-
comes "real" (and reality playful) while what was before
real, now is pushed aside into either the unreal or the
marginally real.

The underlying assumption in the above argument is
that as imagination, play acts like a Hegelian negation
in the midst of non-play.[12] The political and social signi-
ficance of this element of play has been realized only by
a few, and then mostly by philosophers such as, Plato,
Schiller, Ruskin, Sartre and Marcuse.[13] Thus play may be
seen as offering refuge to the repressed, since it allows
the free play of imagination. Psychoanalysts have seen
play as abreaction or compensation of painful experiences
in non-play: players act out in play what they could not
or would not do in non-play.[14]

It may be argued that to a political conservative,
play represents a threat and he may try to control it.
One way of controlling play is to abreact its voluntary
basis by ossifying its rules into a game, and then force
the game on the players who thus either cease to play, or,
as we have seen in our analysis of play and game, above,
adopt or internalize game rules voluntarily. If rules
are internalized as one's own, in the sense that they are
seen as self-imposed, then playing in the game may con-
tinue as play, but play that "borrows" its freedom to
create rules, from the rules of the game. Games fence
play inside a manageable area that can be much more easily
supervised than pure play. A conservative may design
games that allow very little <u>spontaneous</u>, as contrasted to
<u>borrowed</u>, creativity in play.

An example of a conservative who realized the political
significance of play and games is Plato.[15] Misunderstanding
his political philosophy, some writers saw in his blueprint
for education a benevolent desire to allow youth to play
freely and be educated and develop through "games".[16] But
Plato repeatedly and explicitly emphasized his dislike for
free and unbridled play, and carefully discriminated bet-

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ween games that will be used freely in order to select the elite, and games that will be carefully designed, prescribed and supervised in order to educate the masses, including the masses of children. In none of his games are the rules to be questioned or avoided by the players without suffering punishment by the state authorities.[17] Obviously, Plato's "games" should rate very low in spontaneous creativity, though their degree of playfulness would depend on the players' attitude toward the corresponding game rules.

In the other camp of political thinking, radical philosopher Herbert Marcuse saw the "play impulse" as the vehicle to liberation from the oppressive order of things.[18] Inspired by Schiller's critique of alienation as the result of dehumanizing work, Marcuse defended and described his utopian, though by no means necessarily unrealizable, society where work would become play and competition display.[19]   In contrast to Plato's emphasis on the imposition of games, Marcuse grounded liberation in the ability of man to govern himself in play.[20]

In his encomium of play, Marcuse failed to appreciate fully either the internal dynamism of playful games, or the conservative role that games may be designed to play. Thus it is conceivable that in "abreacting" play, games undermine spontaneous creativity by changing it into creativity that is well fenced and borrowed from, or based on the limits prescribed by the rules in the game. He failed to realize that the "play impulse" may be thus incorporated into the prevailing reality and sublimated in the form of a more or less playful game. Thus emptied of a large part of its spontaneity and total freedom, the play impulse becomes politically less threatening to the status quo. Moreover, the players in a game may become so engrossed in playing the game that they cannot see the hand of the game designer that lies behind the scenes. Consequently, due to the self-propelling effect of playful game rules on the players, the game may be played and have certain socialization outcomes without necessitating the presence of its designer to enforce it on the players.

A disciple of Marcuse's philosophy may be alarmed by this functional autonomy in playful games: games may be designed that, if played by the masses, may lead to the re-intergration of revolutionary play impulses that the masses may have developed in their free play of ideas and imagination, into the repressive order; and since t ere is no need to enforce the rules of a game that is carried forward by the players themselves, there is no need to enforce the game.

It may be argued that in modern society, where the communications media (T.V., radio, film, etc.) is by definition a network of representative signs, thus lending itself easier to play, games may be designed that can be played through the mass media.[21] These games have rules (rules of conduct, social expectations, what products count as desirable, etc.) that are widely disseminated through the media and known to the majority of people. The element of playfulness in these media games may cause the audience, as a result of the joy and entertainment that may accompany play, to not only participate frequently, but also to project, identify with, and internalize the model values and behavior displayed in the media. Sugar-coated with play, media games may thus act as an agent of social-ization, or "media socialization," into the mainstream, which may or may not be personally alienating. Without altering radically the ludic or play element in society, these media games may socialize its audience to not only accept non-play around them, but also to continue to de-pend on media games for some play in their lives.

Consequently, it may be argued that in places where the media is centrally controlled by a repressive status quo, the playful socialization games played in the media may act as an agent of repressive, albeit playful, social-ization. Playful games may become a formidable weapon in the hands of a repressive status quo, whose control of the media enables it to underwrite, become a patron of, or design games whose playfulness and wide dissemination may stifle revolutionary impulse, prevent social conflict, or result in the re-integration of the oppressed in the social order that oppresses them. With little effort and not a drop of blood, the state of domination is thus inter-nalized, valued, and preserved by the oppressed themselves.[22]

Ironically, the same line of thought may lead one to argue that playful games may be used by the oppressed, and specifically by their leaders, to penetrate the repressive social order. Revolutionaries may design media socializa-tion games, displayed in the underground press and other communications media controlled by anti-establishment forces, that may engage the attention of those who play in them to the repressive   nature of the repressive order. This may be done using the same means as that which is used in the playful media socialization of the oppressed back into the repressive order, namely, through the medium of playful games. Although their ends are different, their means are the same: both the oppressor and the oppressed may use play-ful games in order to educate, influence, and redirect the masses. Thus, it is not a matter of which social ideal do

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all playful games, or, more abstractly, <u>playful gaming</u>, pro-
mote(s), because that depends on what playful game is used,
and also how it is used. Since playful games may be more
or less playful, and gamed in different ways, they may be
made to serve different ideologies, beliefs, or purposes.
The question that comes to mind, then, is how can playful
games be made to serve those ideals that are said to be
desirable.

In the following sections, this question will be dealt
with in different ways, starting with what <u>has</u> been done,
and ending in what <u>might</u> be done.

IV. <u>Unanswered Questions</u>

At the present time, probably the best that can be done
in order to investigate the extent to which games are linked
to social behavior, is to extrapolate from studies in the
psychology of play, to what the effects of playful games in
the social arena <u>might be</u>. [23]   There is obviously a need for
clear conceptualization, leading ideas, and empirical re-
search in this area. For example, are there playful games
that lead <u>necessarily</u> or with a high degree of probability
to specific socialization outcomes, and if there are, should
we re-design our educational games to conform to our social
values? If there are not, or if we deceide to see games as
<u>ends</u> rather than as <u>means</u>, then should we <u>always</u> use play-
ful games <u>only</u> as a means for the achievement of game-extrinsic
goals, or should we <u>rethink</u> and <u>reconstruct radically</u> our
lives so that playful games are no longer "unreal", or a
mere means to something else, but the <u>essence</u> and <u>reality</u>
of our lives? [24]   The latter consideration seems especially
pertinent today in light of the possibility, in the not too
distant future, of a society that becomes technologically
automated and work-free. By "work-free" here is meant a
society in which machines do all the monotonous, boring, and
alienating labour, leaving humans free to work-play at things
they really like. In that society, where all work is play,
alienating labor may no longer be necessary as a means to
happiness, though undoubtedly some will continue to see
alienating labor as a desirable end in-itself. At any rate,
the author makes no effort, in this paper, to analyze fully,
let alone offer any answers, to all these problems, issues,
and concerns. If anything, he has attempted to remove only
some of the shrubs and wild bushes that proliferate in the
wilderness of numerous, but sometimes uncritical studies of
play and games.

V. <u>Dewey's Theory of Play</u>

In testing the existential validity of playful gaming,

I have selected to review analytically Dewey's theory of play, and synthetically the theory of "freedom education".

In his overall theory of the nature of interest and its role in pedagogy, Dewey included games and play in his proposed curriculum.[25] Dewey thought that education should be built on the interests and native needs of the students, and, therefore, students should be allowed to play, especially in early childhood; in playing freely, students not only quench their interests, but also manifest them visibly in action, thus offering the opportunity to their teacher to observe them at play and learn their interests.[26]

Thus Dewey did not think that education should be based on free play for its own sake, but only as a means for teachers to learn about the native needs and interests of their students. This is also evidenced in his belief that sooner or later teachers should intervene in children's play, and guide their play intelligently toward educationally and socially desirable goals. If that does not happen, then "play results in amusement and not in educative growth."[27] Or as he put it elsewhere, "play...changes into fooling and if habitually indulged in is demoralizing."[28]

It may be argued that in Dewey's theory of play in education we can discern a frail reflection of his belief, stated most clearly in Experience and Education, that impulse alone should not guide student behavior in school, but should allow intelligence, judgment, and observation to intervene.[29] This intervention of intelligence may be compared to the intervention of the teacher in children's play: as a model whose authority is sanctioned by the social order generally, the teacher may represent intelligence and rationality to the child. At any rate, it follows logically from our analysis of playful gaming that in so far as Dewey advocated intervention from outside and certain limits be placed in child's play, to that extent he also believed that children's games should not be totally free and spontaneously engaged in, but controlled and supervised. It may even be argued that Dewey's problem-centered pedagogy resembles playful games that transcend free play by incorporating it into a set of game-rules designed benevolently by the teacher.

We may also note that if play is representational, then Dewey's fears concerning the cognitive role of play in education may be unfounded. Play may be inherently educative, not only as a means to educative growth, but as an educative experience in-itself. As representation, play engages the mind in symbolic activity, in the isolation, projection, representation and manipulation of meanings and ideas. It may be argued that if Dewey had realized the cognitive imperative of play, he may have considered it not only a means to educative

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growth, a mere sideshow that allows teachers to observe their students' native interests, but an activity with intrinsic educational value.

Finally, it should be noted that in _free_ play, children may engage in democratic problem solving, an idea that has been tested and empirically verified in experience. [30] If empirical testing continues to show this to be true, then free play (or games that are very playful) may not only be intelligent, but also democratic and problem-oriented--three aspects of play that are also important prerequisites in Dewey's theory of method in education.

If Dewey advocated games that are not free-play or "very" playful, as our anslysis, above, has shown, they are not totally devoid of play, either. The author has not concerned himself, in this paper, with the detailed construction of a rating scale that measures _exactly_ game playfulness. It suffices here to point out the fact that, using Dewey's theory of play as an example, we have illustrated the existential utility of playful gaming in the metaphysics of play and games.

VI.   Freedɔm Education

The ideal of "freedom education" was contrived by the author a few years ago on the basis of Dewey's and Sartre's philosophies of freedom. [31]   When he wrote this ideal, the author felt a pressing need to find an appropriate method for translating it into practice. It is submitted that playful games may be designed that meet the logical criteria for an appropriate method for this ideal. By "criteria" here is meant the basic premises in freedom education. Thus, nothing is said here about the _effectiveness_ of these games in experience, other than that they may be designed; since little is known about the effectiveness of games, generally, it would be presumptuous and logically suicidal to claim that these games, if they can be designed, they will also _necessarily_ bring about in experience the educational outcomes that are described as being _desirable_ in freedom education. Their effectiveness can only become a hypothesis for empirical testing in experience. These playful games may be seen, if logically congruent with freedom education, as working hypotheses for empirically testing the effectiveness of freedom education _via playful games_. Of course, if after testing in experience the effectiveness of these playful games, we find that they are ineffective, that still does not show that freedom education may not be translated in practice, e.g. through means other than playful games, and certainly does not reflect on the coherence of freedom education as an internally consistent system.

Since these playful games share certain criteria in
common, they form a game-category or group that, if des-
cribed in the abstract, may be seen as a game metaphysic.
Given that freedom education is neither Dewey's nor
Sartre's theory of freedom and education, but a synthesis
of the two into a new whole, this game-category may share
some of the elements in the theories of play in Dewey
and Sartre, but ultimately transcends both.

Dewey's theory of play has already been dealt with,
in a previous section of the paper. According to Sartre,
play releases subjectivity. [32] Because so completely self-
ruled and self-regulated, pure play does not participate
in the project of the for-itself to unite with the in-itself
and become God; its rules are its own, and they are their
own foundation. Thus in play man does not aspire to appro-
priate the in-itself or subjugate the world. [33] It may be
argued that in Sartrean ontology, when man is playing, he
is free even from the demands of Sartrean freedom.

Let us now proceed to lay down the foundations of the
aforementioned game-metaphysic, which we will call FREEDOM.
In FREEDOM, students participate in the invention of both
rules and rules about rules, or meta-rules. There is only one
meta-meta-rule that is given or built into the game, namely
that no rule may be made without first thinking of a meta-
rule on which the rule is based. Rules and meta-rules
parallel the structure of imaginative consciousness in
Sartrean ontology: conscious that it is conscious, and also
free to make itself be. [34] In allowing this open-ended
choice at the top, students come face to face with their
responsibility to make rules, rather than borrow them and
thus fall completely into "bad faith". [35]

Since it is stipulated in freedom education that students
should learn how to translate their self-awareness as choosers
into intelligent action, [36] there are certain methodological
imperatives that FREEDOM meets, not by imposing them on the
students as game-rules or laws, but structurally through
the process of making the game playful. Thus students
borrow no rules from the teacher or designer of FREEDOM, but
begin with a problem, the lack of rules. Subsequently, they
solve this problem interactively with the teacher, who acts
as a resource, and any later problems that come up, they
solve on the basis of the rules they have made. As a result,
they not only feel responsible for the choices they make
(something which Sartre saw as desirable), but also focus
their education on problem solving (desirable in Dewey).

Assuming that playfulness in a game motivates the player
to continue playing, then since FREEDOM is very playful, it

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may be argued that, in playing FREEDOM, students look for-
ward to return to wherever the game is played (the school,
the classroom, or elsewhere) in order to continue playing.
Anticipating their moves and play in the game, students
look forward to return to the classroom to continue playing
in FREEDOM, but prepare themselves and utilize all the re-
sources available in social life while outside the class-
room. This meets one of Dewey's most important criteria
for education, namely, the desire for continuous and un-
interrupted growth.

Since students or players in FREEDOM are allowed to
participate in the invention of rules, FREEDOM registers
the interest of the player in the game. By drawing to its
orbit the interest of the player, FREEDOM motivates him
to go on playing on the basis of his interest. The class-
room is not seen in isolation from all the things that may
be interesting outside its sphere of influence, such as,
libraries, art institutes, industry or museums. It is the
place where knowledge, ideas, learning, and problem solv-
ing are primarily played, whereas the world outside the
classroom is the place where this classroom play motivates
students to continue learning and solving problems for, and
in anticipation of, this play. Education that is built on
the interest of the student is another important prerequisite
in Dewey's theory of method in education.

Assuming that play is, to a certain extent, an exercise
in the manipulation of meanings and ideas, then it may be
argued that FREEDOM engages the player in thinking reflec-
tively or intelligently in his play, which meets an important
criterion in both Deweyan epistemology and Sartrean philosophy
of freedom, and also in freedom education.

Finally, the role of the teacher in FREEDOM is trans-
formed from one authority type to another: from institutional
and antagonistic, to playful and cooperative. Since his
authority over the meta-meta-rule is reflexive, he is also
bound by the rules the meta-meta-rule may generate. His
authority is not the authority of a dictator, but of a judge
who must interpret the game according to the meta-meta-
rule. Consequently, FREEDOM players do not feel their
teacher's weight in the classroom as undesirable, but as
a resource for the solution of problems. Again, this meets
Dewey's pedagogical theories of teaching, Sartre's theory
of self-government in play, and is strongly implied in
freedom education.

As mentioned earlier, FREEDOM is not a particular
game, but a lower order metaphysic of one type of playful
games. It is adaptable to the teaching of different sub-
jects, as diverse as philosophy, law, medicine, and
sociology. [37]   In conclusion, it is submitted that enough
has been said to allow this adaptation to occur on the basis
of the educational synthesis described in the ideal of
"freedom education".

Footnotes

[1] Plato, Euthyrpo, Charmides, Phaedo, Laches, Republic, Meno, Laws, in The Dialogues of Plato, 4th edition, 4 vols., ed. B. Jowett (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1953). Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, tr. with introd. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950).

[2] There are almost countless examples of this usage of "play" and "game". The works cited, below, were selected without paying meticulous attention to including all the articles that fall under this category: see C.S. Byrum, "Philosophy as Play," Man and World: An International Philosophical Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug. 1975), pp.311-26; R.F. Dearden, "The Concept of Play," The Concept of Education, ed. R.S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 73-9; J.L. Esposito, "Play and Possibility," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 137-47; Karl Groos, The Play of Man (New York: D. Appleton, 1901); J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949); K. Riezler, "Play and Seriousness," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 19 (September 11, 1941), pp. 505-15; G.P. Stone, "The Play of Little Children," Child's Play, ed. R.E. Huron and B. Sutton-Smith (New York: John Wiley, 1971); L.M. Hinman, "Nietzsche's Philosophy of Play," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 106-24. There is a second group of writers on play who may not confuse the two terms in their writings, but show little awareness of, or interests in, the epistemology of play and games; a third group of writers shows more interest in the relationship between play and games, and some of the writers in this group are included in note no. 3, below.

[3] B. Suits, "What is a Game?" Philosophy of Science, Vol. 34 (1967), pp. 148-56; Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978); E. Radar, "A Genealogy: Play, Folklore and Art," Diogenes, No. 103 (Fall 1978), pp. 78-99; R. Burke, " 'Work' and 'Play'," Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Oct. 1971), pp.33-47; C. Cherry, "Games and Language," Mind, Vol. 84, pp. 528-47; J. von Neumann & O. Morganstern, Theory of Games and Economic Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944); P. Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969). There are also many works in the psychology of play, some of which are included in note no. 23, below.

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[4]P. Weiss wrote that the difference between play and games is a matter of emphasis on rules. As he put it, "It is a rare game in which there is not a considerable expression of spontaneity, but the spontaneity is normally kept within the confines of the rules. If freshly forged, the game is still kept in consonance with accepted rules. Because there is spontaneity in a game we are justified in saying that a game is 'played'. Play, though, puts its emphasis on the spontaneity, and not on the rules." Sport: Inquiry, p. 146. This "mild" view of the difference between play and games by Weiss may be contrasted to the "hard" view held by a group of writers who see play and games as polar opposites. For example, Alvin W. Ross maintained that games are, on account of several of their characteristics, including rules, "point-for-point antitheses of what we here suggest to be the characteristics of 'play'." Ross, "Toward Understanding the Concept and Function of Play," Educational Theory, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan. 1956), p. 23n.

[5]L.S. Vygotsky, "Play and Its Role in the Mental Development of the Child," Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution, ed. J.S. Bruner, A. Jolly and K. Sylva (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 537-54.

[6]According to Vygotsky, "there is no such thing as play without rules...." Play, p. 541.

[7]For example, someone may argue that some of the play-instances in Jean Piaget's observations of infants-at-play are not representational. See J. Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962), pp. 6-146.

[8]Vygotsky, Play; S.K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Mentor, 1942), pp. 126-28; E. Fink, "The Ontology of Play," Philosophy Today (Summer 1974), pp. 147-61; Fink, "The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play," Games, Play, Literature, ed. J. Ehrmann (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

[9]In addition to the works by Fink and Langer, cited in note no. 8, above, there are several works in philosophy and psychology that analyze the imaginative aspect of play. In philosophy, see John Dewey's account in "Imagination and Play," The School and Society, reprinted in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, Vol. 1: 1899-1901, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 85-6; Dewey, "The Second Stage or Play Period," Middle Works, Vol. 1, pp. 194-210; Dewey, "Play, Work, and Allied Forms of Activity," How We Think, reprinted in Middle Works, Vol. 6, pp. 307-11. H.G. Gadamer, "Play

as a Clue to Ontological Explanation," Truth and Method
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 91-106.
J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1953), pp. 710-17. H. Marcuse, Eros and
Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 177-96.
In psychology, see Piaget's work, cited in note no. 7,
and J.N. Lieberman, Playfulness: Its Relationship to
Imagination and Creativity (New York: Academic Press, 1977)
for a resourceful guide and analysis. G.H. Mead's analysis
of the "generalized other" in game-like behavior may be
seen as a sociological explanation of the learning of norms
involving the play of the imagination. G.H. Mead, Mind, Self
and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

[10]Most writers who compare play to reality do so as a way
of showing the permanent "unreality" of play. The unreality
of play is discussed in Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature.
Only a few have seen a different reality in play. Of the
latter, see Schiller's, Plato's, Ruskin's, Sartre's and
Marcuse's works where they discuss play, in note no. 13,
below.

[11]Sartre, Being and Nothingness.

[12]G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J.B. Baillie
(London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1964).

[13]Plato, Laws, Bk. VII, 797-98; also Laws, Bk. I, 643b;
Republic, Bk, Iv, 425a. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic
Education of Man, tr. Reginald Snell (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1954). Schiller's political argument on the re-
lationship between play, education and liberation cannot be
seen, understood fully, or appreciated if only some of his
letters in Education are read; the logical coherence and force
of his argument are carefully built from letter to letter,
and all the letters must be read to appreciate fully his
ideas on play (e.g.. in letters 14 & 15). John Ruskin, The
Works of John Ruskin, ed. E.T. Cook & A. Wedderburn (New York:
Longmans, Green, 1903-1912). Marcuse, Eros and Civilization.

[14]E. H. Erikson, Play and Development (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1972); Erikson, "Toys and Reasons," Childhood and
Society (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950). S. Freud, "Beyond
the Pleasure Principle," The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 18, ed. J. Strachey
(London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis,
1955), pp. 7-64. See, also, the pertinent reviews of the re-
lationship between psychoanalysis and play in R.E. Herron
& B.S. Smith, Child's Play, pp. 107-84; and S. Millar, The
Psychology of Play (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968).

[15]Esp. in the Laws and the Republic. See note no 13, above, for the exact references to Plato's works.

[16]See,for example, G. Ardley, "The Role of.Play in the Philosophy of Plato," Philosophy, No. 42 (July 1967), pp. 226-44.

[17]As Plato put it, "The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way: People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men, will be different from +he last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws: and no one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states....Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song? nor must anyone be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures." Laws, Bk. VII, 798b/e. Priests and priestesses, "acting in concert with guardians of the law," will be able to punish severely anyone who does not obey or conform; Laws, Bk. VII, 799b/d (Jowett's translation). Plato's thought on play in the Republic is paternalistic and less punitive, but still interventionist and propaedeutic; Republic, Bk. IV, 422e, 425a; Bk. VII, 537a.

[18]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization.

[19]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 188, 190. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, letters 14, 15.

[20]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 195, 222-23.

[21]For a play theory of mass communication, see W. Stephenson, The Play Theory of Mass Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[22]An incisive, philosophic-characterological analysis of the internalization and preservation by the oppressed of the state of domination may be found in Albert Memmi's well known book Dominated Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

[23]S. Millar, The Psychology of Play, R. E. Herron and
B. Sutton-Smith, Child's Play. J.S. Bruner, A. Jolly, and
K. Sylva, Play: Its Role in Development and Evolution.
J.N. Lieberman, Playfulness: Its Relationship to Imagination
and Creativity. In addition to the above works, which have
been cited in earlier notes, see, also, J.L. Singer's pioneer
work on imaginative play, The Child's World of Make-Believe:
Experimental Studies of Imaginative Play (New York: Academic
Press, 1973).

[24]In his game-like treatise on games and utopia, Bernard
Suits concluded his (the grasshopper's) dialogue by asking,
stoically, the same question of his readers (other characters
in dialogue); B. Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia.

[25]J. Dewey, "Play and Work in the Curriculm," Democracy and
Education (New York: The Free Press, 1944), pp. 194-206;
Interest and Effort in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1913); esp. his discussion of Froebel, and his analysis of
play in pp. 66-89; "Imagination and Play," School and Society;
"The Second Stage or Play Period," Middle Works; "Play, Work,
and Allied Forms of Activity," How We Think.

[26]Dewey, Interest and Effort, pp. 76-80, 86.

[27]Dewey, School and Society, Middle Works, p. 88.

[28]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.

[29]Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Collier, 1963).

[30]S.K. Polgar, "The Social Context of Games," Sociology of
Education, Vol. 49 (October 1976), pp. 265-71.

[31]A. Makedon, "Freedom Education: Toward an Educational
Synthesis of Dewey's and Sartre's Philosophies of Freedom,"
Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy
of Education Society 1977, ed. R. Craig and F.C. Neff (Detroit:
MWPES, 1978), pp. 34-43.

[32]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 711.

[33]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 710-12. Several authors
wrote on Sartre's philosophy of play; though Sartre himself
did not write extensively on the subject of play, his philosophy
of freedom is such that it may be seen as an extension of his
theory of play. J.P. Fell, "The Ethics of Play and Freedom:
Conversion," Heidegger and Sartre (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1979), pp. 129-51. W.L. McBride, "Play," in "Jean Paul

Sartre," <u>Existential Philosophers: Kierkergaard to Merleau-Ponty</u>, ed. G.A. Schrader, Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 283-88. R. Netzky, "Playful Freedom: Sartre's Ontology Re-appraised," <u>Philosophy Today</u> (Summer 1974), pp. 125-36.

[34]Rules and meta-rules in this game-metaphysic may be compared to H.L.A. Hart's view of law as a combination of primary and secondary rules. H.L.A. Hart, <u>The Concept of Law</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). Thus, a meta-rule may be compared to a secondary rule or a law in the U.S. Constitution that may not guide action directly in particular circumstances, but is itself the basis for more situation-specific rules or laws.

[35]"Bad faith" is Sartre's term of living without acknowledging that one is free. See his chapter on "bad faith" in <u>Being and Nothingness</u>.

[36]Makedon, <u>Freedom Education</u>, pp. 40-41.

[37]The author designed an instructional role-play game for teaching <u>philosophy of education</u> that allows students to participate as <u>choosers</u> and <u>learners</u> in the course. A. Makedon, "Challenge: An Instructional Game Designed for the Teaching of Philosophy of Education," unpublished monograph.