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ABSTRACT

Debate surrounding the 1988 Yellowstone National Park fires provides material for a case study into the relationship between a crisis and public argument. Studies like this reflect the importance of a recent trend in higher education, namely, the analysis of environmental issues from different academic perspectives. In this case, analysis of regional and national newspapers during the fire period suggests that crisis can affect argument by: (1) becoming synergistic, fueling itself and expanding at a dramatic pace; (2) shattering apparent consensus and reinvigorating submerged levels of dissent; and (3) altering accepted standards of reasoning that had been collectively agreed upon prior to the crisis. Debate over the government's handling of the fires began with documentation of a crisis situation; the second stage involved attempts to manage public perception of the crisis; and the third stage involved public discussion of the policy used to manage the crisis. Public policy makers were able to replace appeals to the archetypal metaphor of death with the metaphor of rebirth. Acceptance of the latter created a picture of reality which allowed preservation of the "let burn" policy of the United States Forest Service amid criticism of that approach to the crisis. (SG)

FUELING A CRISIS:
PUBLIC ARGUMENT AND THE 1988 YELLOWSTONE FIRE DEBATE

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During the late summer of 1988, Rocky Mountain newspaper headlines charted an impending crisis. "Epic Wildfires Alter Face of Yellowstone." "Forest Recruits Jobless to Fight Fires." "Residents Leaving West Yellowstone as Fire Nears." "Fires Near Island Park Have Residents Ready to Flee." "Record High Temps Worsen West's Fire Situation." "North Fork Fire Rapidly Closing on Island Park." "Flames Lick at Edge of Yellowstone Towns." "Giant Wildfire: Residents Flee as Fire Nears." "Firefighters Brace for High Winds." "Emergency Planners Prepare for Local Fires." "Outlook Grim for Saving Towns from Forest Fire." And finally, "Cool, Wet Weather Calms Western Fires."[1]

The August 26, 1988, Wall Street Journal carried an editorial with the ominous headline: "Yellowstone Burns as Park Managers Play Politics." Written by Donald R. Leal of the Political Economy Research Center, a conservative think-tank, the editorial chastised federal land managers for allowing "natural" fires to burn out of control in the national forests and national park areas. Leal used the Yellowstone crisis as a call to rethink the ecological worldview which guided federal public land policy. "If the Yellowstone fires continue, and if controversy over the 'natural regulation' policy is sufficiently severe to arouse public opinion," argued Leal, "'natural regulation' may be curtailed" (10). This editorial represented one of the opening salvos in the national and regional debate that emerged during the severe fire season of 1988. Politicians, farmers, journalists, and residents of various fire-stricken areas claimed that the federal government's "natural fire" policy (called by many the "let burn" policy) was dangerous, short-sighted, and wasteful. During the most intense days of the fire season,

an equally intense debate raged in the regional and national press over the fire's causes.

The Yellowstone fire debate provides an insightful case study into the relationship between a crisis and public argument. Crisis can radically alter the framework of a given public issue and in turn reconstruct standards of judgment and value. Specifically, crisis can affect argument in three different ways. First, crisis arguments may become synergistic--that is, crisis fuels itself and expands at a dramatic pace. Second, crisis may shatter apparent consensus by reinvigorating submerged levels of dissent. Third, and most important, a crisis may alter accepted standards of reasoning that were collectively agreed-upon prior to the crisis.

In this particular debate, the crisis atmosphere shifted the grounds of argument from a scientific/technical sphere of argumentation to a political/public sphere. While western forest fires burn thousands of acres of timber each year, land managers argue that the ecological benefits of fire outweigh other considerations. In the Yellowstone fire debate, however, arguments that fostered a "crisis" environment were often based upon a deeply-rooted anti-government, anti-environmentalist core of opinion. The crisis brought the competing views of public land management to the forefront of public discussion: the ecological view that public lands must be managed from a holistic view of resources and a human-centered view that resource-use should recognize the preeminence of humans in policy-making. A close examination of the debate itself reveals that two apparently diametrically opposed archetypal metaphors provided a conceptual worldview for supporters and critics of the "natural fire" policy. Michael Osborn explains that archetypal metaphors can be identified by their popularity in rhetorical discourse; their constancy through time and between cultures; their "ground[ing] in prominent features of

experience;" their "embodiment of basic human motivations;" their universal appeal to audience members; and their appearance at "critical junctures" in discourse (116-117). Critics of the natural burn policy adopted the metaphor of "death" which reaffirmed their human-centered value hierarchy; once the fires swept through an area, the blackened ruins were lost to humankind. In contrast, supporters of the policy adopted the metaphor of "rebirth" which fit within the ecological worldview that nature has primacy and that humans are only one part of a larger and more complex eco.ystem. Both death and rebirth fit within Osborn's description of archetypes. As will become clear, both metaphors appear repeatedly throughout the discourse opposing and supporting forest service policy. Both metaphors refer to life-experiences that all humans have shared throughout time, and that motivate much of our behavior. Finally, these two metaphors appeared especially in discourse which was persuasively designed and directed.

To understand better the relationship between crisis and public argument, this paper focuses on three topics. Initially, we will explore the connection between argumentation and crisis and discuss the function of metaphor in this analysis. Next we will chronicle the events that composed the 1988 fire season. Finally, we will trace public arguments during the crisis period (late August to early October 1988) as well as the crisis aftermath (November 1988 to May 1989). To facilitate this study, we examined newspapers throughout the Rocky Mountain region as well as selected national publications.

Crisis and Public Argument

Like other forms of communication, arguments are situated in a specific context. Argumentative situations, observe Ronald Lee and Karen King Lee, "are defined by audience, topics, advocates, and occasions. These elements constrain choice and shape the appropriate means of justification" (7). The

very nature of a perceived crisis may radically reshape the "appropriate" means of justification. Crises are distinguished from other events, writes Dennis Gouran, by the "unexpectedness and sense of urgency their threatening qualities create for a speedy resolution" (174). A crisis situation, he continues, has three components: threat, time restrictions, and surprise. As will become evident in this study, national and regional audiences perceived all three features in the 1988 forest fires.

The relationship between crisis and public communication has been explored by both academics and advocates. Articles with such titles as "Crisis Communications: Planning for the Unplanned" (Dilenschenider and Hyde), "What to Say When the News is Bad" (Stevens), and "Communicating During a `Crisis'" (Carr) find receptive audiences in business management periodicals. Among academics, Benoit and Lindsey have studied arguments used during the first Tylenol crisis and Benson analyzed the communication strategies used during the second Tylenol incident. Dow, Cherwitz and Zagacki, and others have examine Presidential rhetoric surrounding crises. These articles have focused more upon advocate strategies and the resulting success or failure of a given course of action. Farrell and Goodnight's 1981 study of the rhetoric surrounding Three Mile Island, however, generates some useful ideas for considering the 1988 fire debate.

Farrell and Goodnight argue that much of the perceived crisis at Three Mile Island "was generated and sustained by the failure of technical reasoning to inform adequately public deliberation." During the crisis itself, "technical and surrogate discourse were inadequate to the task of informing public judgment; that, therefore, the events of Three Mile Island mark the failure of technical reasoning and concomitant communication practices to master contemporary rhetorical demands" (273).

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggest that within argumentation, metaphor helps to "structure our present reality." If a metaphor new to us enters our "conceptual system. . . it will alter that conceptual system and the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise to" (145). If the metaphor appeals strongly enough to us, or we identify strongly enough with it, we will act on it. Presenting views of the Yellowstone fires associated with death and rebirth created powerful metaphorical associations for audiences concerned with scenic beauty. As the crisis deepened, the metaphors used by opponents and supporters of the let burn policy to describe what was happening or going to happen in Yellowstone became more fixed to the public reality of what had happened in Yellowstone. Some members of the public became convinced that Yellowstone had disappeared, while others were eager to see the changes for themselves. The metaphorical reality of death or rebirth motivated specific action from members of the public who were conscious of the situation in Yellowstone.

The 1988 Fire Season In Review

Before examining the actual events of 1988, it is helpful to understand the origins of the "natural fire" policy and how it evolved to become the standard mechanism for guiding federal land managers. The National Park Service officially recognized the importance of fire in a healthy ecosystem in 1968. By 1972, naturally-caused fires (usually started by lightning) were usually allowed to burn. According to a federal study: "The purpose for this policy change was to restore fires to a more natural ecological role. `Naturalness' is defined as those dynamic processes and components which would likely exist today, and go on functioning, if technological humankind had not altered them" (U.S. Report on Fire Management 7).

In Yellowstone Park, the natural burn area was limited to 300,000 acres until 1976. That year, the natural burn area was expanded to include nearly the entire park. Since that year, 134 natural fires have been suppressed when officials determined they posed a potential threat to public facilities or could lead to much larger fires. Under the natural burn policy, Yellowstone's worst fire season prior to 1988 was 1981, when fifty-seven fires burned 20,000 acres of land (Barker 11).

In 1988 the first fire near the park started on June 25. Several fires started and throughout July the conditions worsened as multiple fires were burning and the weather was extremely dry. The first threat to tourists came on July 22 when fire approached the Grant Village area and the first fire evacuation occurred in the park. The fire changed course and no facilities were lost at Grant Village, although the danger prompted a visit by Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel, who told Good Morning America, "Yellowstone is not in danger. . . . We're not going to let Yellowstone be damaged by this" ("Hodel Says").

Some fire experts believed the most severe fires were over. In a report to the park superintendent, a team of fire experts predicted that about 200,000 acres of the park would be burned by the end of the season. Many observers labeled August 20 as "Black Saturday," the day the fires exploded out of control. Winds of seventy to ninety miles-per-hour accelerated many fires and some officials believe over 165,000 new acres were set ablaze on this single day (Matthiessen 122). A crisis atmosphere gripped the region as the Montana communities of Silver Gate and Cooke City were threatened and residents of West Yellowstone saw fires near their community. National attention focused on the threat to the historical Old Faithful Lodge and the evacuation of that area on September 8 added to the perceptions of a situation

out of control. In addition, President Reagan ordered over 5,000 military personnel to help fight the fires, most of the park was closed to the public after August 24, and Wyoming Senators Alan Simpson and Malcom Wallop demanded that National Park Superintendent William Mott be fired. All these factors combined to create a crisis which the public believed was caused by short-sighted and faulty management.

On September 10 a cold front approached and humid air pushed into the area. On September 11 rain and snow fell and the 1988 fire season was finally under control.

The newspaper headlines reflected a lessening of crisis as Westerners began to debate the wisdom of a national "let burn" policy. "Sen. Wallop Finds Scapegoat for Tragic Yellowstone Fire." "Andrus Blasts Let-Burn Policy." "Smokey talks with Kids About Forest Fires." "Fires Still Have Place in Forest Management, Chief Argues." "Group Blasts Let-It-Burn Plan." "Fire Policy Opens Way for Political Attacks." "Learn From Yellowstone, Don't Hunt for Scapegoats." "Environmentalists Come to Defense of Federal Forest Firefighting Policies." "Hodel Says Let-Burn Policy Must Be Changed." "Wallop, Yellowstone Fire Critics Ignorant of the Facts." "Congress Will View Fire Policy."[2] The crisis had passed, but Westerners were deeply concerned about long-term policy affecting the national parks and forest systems.

Arguments in the 1988 Fire Debate

In the 1960s and 1970s a national "conservation consensus" emerged that promoted an ecological worldview in developing public land policies. The "natural burn" policy formulated by the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service emerged from the belief that public lands are a complex and diverse ecosystem with humans representing only one factor in policy-making. As a result, the public lands have been managed from

a holistic perspective, displacing the historic view of a human-centered universe.

The arguments used by supporters and critics of the "natural burn" policy evolved from the archetypal metaphors of death and rebirth. The crisis atmosphere of August-September 1988 provided a window of opportunity for critics of public land management whose calls for a human-centered standard of allocating natural resources had been muted during the Reagan years. For these individuals, the crisis of a national treasure burning to the ground symbolized "death." How could humans enjoy the wonders of Yellowstone in the midst of blackened ruins? On the other hand, supporters of a "natural burn" policy had to find an alternative view that was consistent with an ecological perspective and that refuted the "death" arguments advanced by critics. To counter their attackers, supporters of the "natural burn" policy offered the metaphor of "rebirth."

In its most fundamental terms, the chief argument over national park fire policy focused upon its proper name. The official term, "prescribed natural burn," implied a rational decision-making process that allowed some naturally-caused fires to burn while fighting others. Opponents called the policy "let burn" management, a label used extensively by the news media, probably because of its brevity and color. In terms of public perceptions, "let burn" implied a casual disregard toward fire and no concern for the economic ramifications of lost timber. Throughout the crisis phase of the fires, supporters of federal policies attempted to demonstrate that "let burn" was a misleading label in describing the current policy.

Yellowstone officials attempted to reframe the impact of the fires beginning in August. Officials acknowledged that fires of "epic proportion" would "signficantly alter the country's oldest national park, changing timber-

land into meadows." They also characterized the fire as an "ecological boon" to the park which would result in the "first major regeneration of Yellowstone in as many as 400 years" (Jones A1). Despite their best efforts to discuss fires within an ecological framework, federal officials found themselves confronted by an increasing number of attacks as the fire crisis grew.

In presenting their view of the fires, critics of the "natural burn" policy articulated a human-centered view of nature. In one newspaper editorial, the owner of a Darby, Montana, lumber company charged that the Yellowstone fires presented a paradox: "cutting a tree or a bush in Yellowstone Park or a wilderness area is bad, but burning half a million acres is good." Rem Kohrt, the author, claimed that the real problem "is not nature doing her thing via fire, but that we are busily and foolishly creating more wilderness and more national parks." With the U.S. facing a growing national debt, declining standard of living, and greater consumer demand, Kohrt proposed a s. ple solution, better wilderness management. "Management must be responsive to the needs of the resources" Kohrt argued, "the needs of the public (food, fiber, shelter, jobs, education, health care and community) and the amenity desires of the public" (6).

A retired forester from Missoula also used the fire as a vehicle to attack federal policies. Del Radtke attacked the Forest Service for being too closely aligned with environmental groups. Additionally, Radtke claimed that the problem with fire experts "is that they sometimes massage each other's egos to such an extent that they lose common sense." In a striking conclusion to his call for better land management, Radtke invoked an important symbol in previous debates: "Like Smoky Bear said to children for years, before he was killed, `Don't play with fire-you might burn a lot more than you figured!'" (5).

The metaphor of death was expressed in various dimensions. For some advocates, the death of Yellowstone was the destruction of the forest lands and the animals; for others death was presented in terms of economic hardships and social consequences. The Idaho State Journal quoted a resident of Island Park, David Hays, who watched the fires approach: "It looks like the surface of hell in Yellowstone. The sun and moon rise and set blood red. This is more like Mars than like Island Park anymore" (Rushforth 1). Residents of other communites confronted with fire expressed their outrage over fire management through the metaphor of death. A local businessman in Gardiner, Montana, argued, "I think the people here are primarily interested in another endangered species--the local businessman." The owner of a local motel in Gardiner charged, "They've killed our business" ("Park Policy Under Fire").

A group of citizens in Jackson, Wyoming, circulated a petition demanding a change in federal fire policy. The idea for the petition resulted from a comment made by visitors from New York: "They drove through Yellowstone and they said they were practically crying. . . . They asked us what we were doing about it." The petition noted that the "ill-timed Park Service policy allowing natural burns in Yellowstone Park has jeopardized, for future generations, both the use and enjoyment of our greatest national park." In attacking the existing policy, the petition noted that fires were causing pollution and contributing to economic hardship in Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana (Stump).

Dave Flitner, a rancher and president of the Wyoming Farm Bureau, compared the ability to control disease to the ability to control forest fires. Before "we invented vaccines to control historically-devastating diseases, nature destroyed humans in much the same manner as it destroyed trees. Surely environmentalists would not stretch their c'est la vie attitude toward nature

to include man's 'unnatural' healing methods. Would they?" ("Nixing Careful Harvest").

Nationally-syndicated columnist Joan Beck claimed that the "raging storms of fire" that turned Yellowstone Park to "acrid ashes" also had "scorched the National Park Service's ideological plan to let natural forest fires burn without interference." Attacking the rationale that fires promote growth and in fact support a healthy ecosystem, Beck concluded: "By the 23rd or 24th century, perhaps, those in charge of preserving our great national-park heritage will have figured out a more sensible way to protect and renew our national forests than by letting them burn down. However fascinating this untidy, blazing, spectacular climax of a forest cycle is, it is still extravagantly wasteful, dangerous and achingly sad" ("Park Service's Let-It-Burn"). In a television interview, Wyoming Senator Malcom Wallop called for the resignation of National Park Service Director Mott because Mott "continues to find some reason to celebrate this event [the fires] while all the rest of us are suffering" ("Sen. Wallop"). Even sources who acknowledged the benefits of fire questioned the impact of allowing fires to burn large areas. The Jackson Hole Guide editorialized, "The damage is not permanent, but for some it might as well be. Regrowth will occur, but the long-term effects--impossible to measure--nonetheless are disturbing in their scope" ("Congress Should Investigate").

Supporters of the natural fire policy appealed to a metaphor of regeneration and rebirth, although the support was often tempered by the recommendation that the policy should be re-thought for extreme drought years. Forestry officials consistently argued that fires "prompt rebirth in the wilderness, clearning away the old, dead and overgrown while making way for new vegetation and new wildlife habitats" ("Park Policy Under Fire"). In fact, the Jackson

Hole Guide reported on 7 September that "areas that burned a few weeks ago already have green shoots" (Kessler A1). This was before the snow fell. The Idaho Falls Post-Register suggested that because of the combination of severe drought and the pine beetle infestation which had devastated many Rocky Mountain forests from the late 1970s through the mid 1980s, "the forest was highly vulnerable to a devastating forest fire," so there was "no assurance that the fires could have been stopped, no matter what the policy." The editorial writer admitted that as a result of the fires, "the wildlife habitat in and around the park" might improve. The wisest course would be to study the policy further and, in the meantime, allow the professional forest managers to make decisions "based on available research, rather than impulsive reaction from critics or politicians" ("Natural Fire Policy" A4). The Salt Lake Tribune agreed that "fire is a natural process necessary for a healthy ecosystem in the park," and added that "natural forces sometimes conspire to create problems that, quite simply, are beyond the control of man" ("Sen. Wallop Finds"). A Wyoming columnist put it more vividly. "The Yellowstone fires are a natural phenomenon akin to a flood or earthquake," Andrew Melnykovych wrote, "staggering in their scope and fundamentally beyond human control" (A8). Some late summer park visitors were conscious of efforts to manage perceptions of the fire. "The Park Service has launched an information blitz," Tony Huegel wrote, "It is trying to assure people that the fires will help the forest renew itself" (B2). Even some of those who appeared to oppose the policy admitted that fire was part of the natural process. An editorial in the Idaho State Journal argued that "in extreme drought years, the `let it burn' policy ought to be abandoned," and then added, "even though such fires often bring regeneration and improve wildlife habitat in burned-out areas" ("What Have We Learned?").

As the snows fell, the debate cooled and focused not on abandonment of the policy, but on revision of the policy to meet special circumstances, such as those present during acutely dry summers. Dale Robertson, chief of the U.S. Forest Service, argued that "natural fires should remain a part of national forest policy," but admitted that "'we're going to have to sharpen up our criteria on when it's applied and under what conditions'" ("Fires Still Have Place"). After touring Yellowstone, Hodel promised "a new policy . . . before the beginning of the next fire year" (LaMay 1C), although major environmental groups such as the Wilderness Society and the National Parks and Conservation Association argued that the current policy was "sound, flexible and scientifically based" ("Environmentalists Come to Defense"). The Sierra Club claimed that "what is happening is going to be good for the park and the ecosystem" (Wharton). A columnist who writes about the outdoors said that because of the summer's fire conditions, "no amount of human effort was going to control this fire," and that Wallop's demand for National Park Service director William Mott's resignation was "a cheap shot by an uninformed lawmaker looking to make easy political points" (Wharton). The Salt Lake Tribune agreed that a review of the natural fire policy was appropriate, but that "it must be integrated with an assessment of why Americans have established and maintained these parks," which was "to preserve outstanding natural places untrammelled for the benefit and pleasure of everyone" ("Fire Policy Review").

As snows continued to fall, newspaper articles began appearing which charted recovery of/in Yellowstone, and compared the fires in Yellowstone to earlier fires which had led to forest rebirth--as forest managers had been claiming. Headlines such as "Large Yellowstone Animals Make It Through Fires," "Biologists Disagree on Fire Impact on Wildlife," "Animals `Prefer Burned-Out'," "Scientists Find New Life in Charred Forest," and "Analysts

Begin Search Into Wildfires' Effects; Yellowstone's Small Animals Are Hardest Hit,"[3] attest to the controversy surrounding effects of the fire but clearly juxtapose the metaphors of death and rebirth--giving the public the impression that death and rebirth might be inextricably linked. One article which appeared in a Jackson Hole paper, "The Waterfalls Fire Revisited," concerned the first fire to occur after the Forest Service natural fire policy had been adopted. The author described renewal of vegetation, new animals which had moved into the area, animals which had left and been replaced by others during the fourteen years since the fire, as well as the support for the policy which had grown after the fire had died (Thuermer). Timing the article for mid-September added support for the claim that the "let burn" policy was environmentally sound, and offered evidence that out of death could come new life.

After the fires had come under control, the Forest Service explained that "educating and selling the public on the wisdom of their current policy" would be a "top priority" (Model). After reviewing the firefighting policies during the summer of 1988, the Interior and Agriculture Departments found that they were "basically sound," although there were some "flaws" in "planning for forest fires" (Shabecoff A22). In April 1989, Yellowstone's chief ranger announced that the Department of Interior had ordered all wildfires to be "fought from the outset" while the "let burn" policy continued under evaluation (Englert B1). One editorial writer commented that this policy was as bad as the unchecked "let burn" policy. "There's no doubt that some burning is good in the long run for the health of the forest, just as there is no doubt that in times of drought it's a bad idea to let fires run unchecked" ("When We Fight Fires" 4A).

Conclusions

Our examination of the public arguments surrounding the 1988 Western fire

season, particularly the fires occurring in Yellowstone National Park, identified three stages in the crisis. The first stage involved documentation of a crisis situation; the second stage involved attempts to manage public perception of the crisis; and the third stage, which might be referred to as the "aftermath" involved a public discussion of the policy used to manage the crisis. In attempts to manage perception of the crisis, opponents of the "let burn" policy appealed to the archetypal metaphor of "death," while the supporters of the policy appealed to the archetypal metaphor of "rebirth." As the policy debate continued, it became clear that supporters were able to subsume "death" within "rebirth." This perspective of a life-cycle in which organisms are born, die, and are re-born--sometimes in different forms, appealed to members of the public who were sympathetic to an environmental perspective in which humans are part of nature, rather than to the perspective which suggests that humans are the center of nature. Acceptance of the rebirth metaphor created a picture of reality which allowed preservation of the natural fire management policy, despite the fact that the Interior Department chose to suppress all 1989 fires. Had a significant number of members of the public and policy-makers embraced the death metaphor alone, inescapable pressure would have been exerted to return to the "Smokey the Bear" policy that all fires are bad. The perspective that prevailed was that, although parts of the policy may need to be more flexible in times of severe drought, "for the forests as a whole, the fires represent part of a cycle of death and renewal that occurred for many centuries until it was interrupted by man less than 100 years ago" (Melnykovych A8).

Environmental Advocacy and Communication Education

This study reflects the importance of a recent trend in higher education, namely the analysis of environmental issues from different academic perspectives. While college courses in environmental history, environmental policies, and environmental ethics have become commonplace in the last thirty years, courses examining environmentalism and conservation from a communication perspective are relatively new. Case studies that examine enivironmental issues such as the Yellowstone Fire debate from a rhetorical lens serve several valuable pedagogical functions. First, such studies provide the foundation for course development. Since 1990, schools such as San Jose State University, Texas A&M University, and Idaho State University have created courses that study the "environmental advocacy" and "environmental communication" as unique college classes. Second, such studies help students understand more fully the relationship between public discourse and environmental policy-making. Third, such studies contribute to the larger field of scholarship and help colleagues in history and political science understand more fully the complex nature of the topic.

Although the global village metaphor has been overused and even exaggerated, there is no doubt that scholarship must address the increasing importance of environmental issues in daily life. By understanding the dynamics of the Yellowstone Fire debate, students are better prepared to evaluate future controversies in which preservation versus development is the central issue.

Endnotes

[1] These headlines appeared between 24 August 1988 and 14 September 1988 in the Salt Lake Tribune, the Riverton Ranger [WY], the Idaho State Journal [Pocatello], the Idaho Statesman [Boise], the Missoulian [MT], and the Jackson Hole Guide [WY].

[2] These headlines are typical of the many that began to appear around the middle of September. The headlines cited appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, the Deseret News [Salt Lake City], the Times-News [Twin Falls, ID], the Spectrum [Cedar City, UT], and the Idaho Statesman [Boise] from 10 September through 12 September 1988.

[3] These headlines appeared between 7 September and 18 September 1988 in the Jackson Hole Guide [WY], the Riverton Ranger [WY], the Standard-Examiner [Ogden, UT], the Salt Lake Tribune, and the Times-News [Twin Falls, ID].

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