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ABSTRACT

Findings from a study that explored the motivations of legislators to oversee and control program implementation are presented in this paper. Implementation is viewed as a contract between the legislative and executive branches with legislators acting as monitors who use oversight to control the agencies contracted to implement policy. A total of 57 elite interviews with legislators, committee staff, and legislative agency staff were conducted in 6 states--Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania--to examine the constraints of legislative monitoring, the resources for legislative control of implementing agencies, and the extent to which legislatures use available resources to oversee implementation contracts. Principal-agent theory suggests that in all contractual relationships information is distributed unevenly among the contracting parties, skewed in favor of the agent. Data from the states illustrate how legislatures drew on their institutional and political resources to enhance their access to information and their control over contract implementation. Three tables are included. (27 references) (LMI)

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**ASSESSING LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY:
THE IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACT**

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the motivations of legislators to oversee and control program implementation. Implementation is viewed as a contract between the legislative and executive branches with legislators acting as monitors who use oversight to control the agencies contracted to implement policy.

Elite interviews in six states with legislators, committee staff, and legislative agency staff examined the constraints that impede legislative monitoring; the resources that can help legislatures control implementing agencies; and the extent to which legislatures use available resources to oversee implementation contracts. Principal-agent theory suggests that in all contractual relationships information is distributed unevenly among the contracting parties, skewed in favor of the agent. Data from the states illustrate how legislatures drew on their institutional and political resources to enhance their access to information and their control over contract implementation.

INTRODUCTION

In enacting laws that authorize the creation of programs, legislatures initiate contracts for services with implementing agencies. The implementation contract is an explicit agreement between the legislative and executive branches, under which each party promises to meet the conditions set forth in the legislation. Agencies that accept implementation monies from legislatures in effect are agreeing to the terms of the contract and confirming they are capable of fulfilling its mandates. As is true of any contract, both parties receive some value for their participation. In the relationship between the legislature and an implementing agency, the former procures services while the latter receives monies.

During program implementation the legislature, as contract principal, attempts to exert control over the agency or agent so that its actions will produce the intended results. One common aspect of all contractual relationships is that information is distributed unevenly or asymmetrically between or among the contracting parties, skewed in favor of the agent (Moe, 1984). This complicates the principal's job of monitoring the contract. Agents are likely to be selective in the information they provide to principals. Agents also can insulate themselves from principals, particularly if there are multiple (sometimes competing) principals, as when several legislative committees share responsibility for monitoring a single agency.

This paper explores the principal-agent relationship in the context of state education reform. Principal-agent theory is an

economic approach to the study of organizations that has been used by political scientists to analyze the behavior of public bureaucracies. In the language of the theory, one party, the principal, enters into a contractual relationship with another, the agent, with the expectation that the agent will pursue the principal's interests and objectives in an efficient manner, much as would the principal himself. Principals may contract with the agents because they lack specialized knowledge or because the task is large and complex. Examples of principal-agent relationships in the public sector include citizens-politicians, legislators-bureaucrats, and bureaucratic superiors-bureaucratic subordinates.

Studies by political economists have used principal-agent theory to explore the contractual relationship between Congress and the executive and to explain congressional oversight behavior (Moe, 1984; Weingast, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1987). Previous research has applied the theory to only one type of agent --- federal regulatory agencies --- and most have been single case studies. The investigation reported here is distinguished by its focus on service agencies at the state level and by comparisons across states of principals and agents involved in implementing substantively similar contracts.

The discussion that follows is based on an investigation of education reforms in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania. The research, which was conducted in spring 1987, included 57 elite interviews with legislators, committee staff, and legislative agency staff with responsibility

for overseeing education reforms enacted in the past four years. The sample was selected to highlight various approaches to education reform (e.g., comprehensive versus incremental); regional diversity; and different stages of implementation. Some of the reforms are aimed at raising academic standards for students, while others have changed how teachers are trained, recruited, and compensated in an effort to improve teacher quality.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first reviews institutional and political constraints that may impede legislative monitoring of contract implementation by agencies. The second section examines the resources available to state legislatures that can aid the effort to control and influence implementing agencies. The third section assesses the extent to which legislatures in the six sample states made effective use of available resources in overseeing implementation of legislative contracts for education reform.

There are recent indications (Aberbach, 1979; Rosenthal, 1981; Ethridge, 1984; and McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984, among others) that the incidence of legislative oversight of implementing agencies is increasing. Legislatures also have expanded their powers to control agency decisionmaking (Ethridge, 1984; Council of State Governments, 1986; McCubbins et al., 1987). The present study suggests that legislatures draw on their institutional and political resources to enhance their access to information and their control over contract implementation.

CONSTRAINTS ON CONTROL BY LEGISLATURES

The ability of legislatures to monitor and control agencies responsible for implementing programs created by law is constrained by institutional and political characteristics of the system of state government, including the part-time operation of most state legislative bodies, the short time perspective of legislators, the collective nature of legislative mandates, and the fragmentation of both program implementation and control. As a result of this combination of factors, information is not readily available to legislatures for oversight purposes, and control of the implementation process often is neither sustained nor strong.

Part-Time Legislatures

Contract principals must devote considerable time and resources to the monitoring and control of implementing agents. With state legislatures as principals, the difficulty of the task is exacerbated by part-time legislatures and part-time legislators. Legislative principals can be overwhelmed by the number and complexity of the bureaucratic actions they are charged with overseeing.

Over the past twenty years many state legislatures have moved toward increased professionalism by removing limits on sessions and salaries. A recent survey of state lawmakers conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures (Bazar, 1987) found that the number of full-time legislators has doubled since 1976.

Among the sample states, Georgia's General Assembly is most constrained by the part-time nature of the legislative job. Georgia's legislative session lasts for only 40 days a year, and in 1986 only 4 percent of the members were full-time legislators (see Table 1). A member of Georgia's Legislative Budget Office explains the impact of time constraints on oversight:

From time to time, one of the appropriations committees will indicate an interest in looking into the operations of the department of education. Well, the committee spends about an hour and then members lose interest. Unfortunately, part-time legislators don't have the time to give. They have jobs back home and can't spend the time that is needed to look into department operations.

Other states in the sample are considerably less constrained. In California the legislature met in 1985-86 for about 250 days, more than three times longer than Georgia's General Assembly, and in Pennsylvania 65 percent of legislators define their occupation as "full-time legislator" (see Table 1). In Arizona, where few legislators are full-time, lawmakers have the benefit of relatively long sessions (200 legislative days in 1985-86).

Allocation of Time

Another constraint involves the way available time is ordinarily used and the short time perspective held by most legislators (Rosenthal, 1981). For legislatures to control agents, there must be legislators interested in monitoring. During the legislative session policy development activities, which give legislators opportunities to enhance their prospects for reelection (Mayhew, 1974), take center stage and little time is available for oversight of existing programs. As one former

Table 1
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS AND FULL-TIME LEGISLATORS
IN THE SAMPLE STATES

State	Length of Biennial Session (Legislative Days) 1985-86*	"Full-Time" Legislators	
		1986	1976
Arizona	200.0	13% (12)	1% (1)
California	252.5	36% (43)	0%
Florida	120.0	13% (20)	3% (4)
Georgia	80.0	4% (9)	2% (5)
Minnesota	120.0	6% (12)	1% (3)
Pennsylvania	147.5	65% (164)	0%

*In California and Pennsylvania, legislative sessions are not limited by rule and therefore, vary from year to year. To calculate the length of the sessions in those states, the numbers of days each chamber met in 1985 and 1986 were averaged.

Sources: Data on the length of legislative sessions were provided in each state by the secretary of the senate and the clerk of the house. Data about full-time legislators are from Beth Bazar, State Legislators' Occupations: A Decade of Change, Denver, National Conference of State Legislatures, 1987.

Minnesota legislator observed:

Personal, political agendas of legislators take precedence over responsibilities for oversight. Politicians generally run like rabbits from oversight. It's boring and it's not politically sexy.

In support of this observation, education committee staff in the six states studied report policy development as the primary mission of committees, accounting for more of members' time than activities such as fiscal reviews or oversight. The lack of legislative interest in oversight appears most acute among house committees in the sample as a whole and with the senate education committees in Arizona and Georgia, where members must run for reelection every two years.

Legislators also are not motivated to ensure that bureaucrats are faithfully pursuing their implementation contracts because of the collective nature of statutory mandates. As Moe (1984) points out, "The mandate is a collective expression of programmatic purpose, and individual politicians may or may not find its pursuit relevant to their own self-interests."

Multiple Principals

Recent modernization of state legislatures has produced stronger committee systems with greater substantive expertise and more influence in shaping legislation (Pound, 1986). The delegation to committees of authority over policies within their jurisdictions has led to the delegation to committees of oversight and control of agencies as well (McCubbins et al., 1987). Any given agent thus is likely to have multiple principals, and principals may compete with each other to exert control:

In democratic politics...party competition tends to promote multiple-principal arrangements that are competitive, rather than cooperative, as none of the parties wants the others to have unfettered control over the bureaucracy (Moe, 1984, p. 768).

House committees compete with senate committees, and, within chambers, policy committees compete with fiscal and general oversight committees. The result is that legislators have a difficult time controlling agencies; they are only partial principals without complete authority to control agents. This may strengthen agencies' autonomy and enhance their ability to insulate themselves from legislative control.

The most fragmented chamber in the study sample is Florida's House of Representatives, where oversight of education falls under the jurisdiction of six committees and subcommittees: the Education Committee's Oversight Subcommittee, the Appropriations Committee's Education Subcommittee, the Intern and Oversight Committee, the Regulatory Reform Committee (which handles many sunsets and sundowns), the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee, and the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (which reviews proposed agency rules). At the other extreme is Minnesota, where the House and Senate Education Committees have responsibility for both policy and fiscal oversight of the state department of education.

Multiple Agents

Another constraint confronting principals trying to control implementation is the existence of multiple agents. In all principal-agent relationships, control requires not only that principals are able to induce executive officials to comply with

their wishes, but that bureaucratic superiors are able to induce their subordinates to comply as well (Moe, 1984). The political environment of education is further complicated by multiple political agents. In Arizona, California, Florida, and Georgia, legislatures must be concerned with the actions of elected superintendents of public instruction (directors of state education departments), and they also must track the actions of governors whose policy agendas for the executive branch may be significantly different from those of the superintendents. An extreme example is California, where a clash of policies and personalities between the governor and the superintendent resulted recently in a 10 percent cut in the department's 1987-88 budget by the governor and his appointment of a special commission to investigate "whether (state) school officials are spending the taxpayers' money wisely" (Paddock, 1987; Zeiger, 1987).

Conflict Between Parties

When there is conflict or distrust between contracting parties, agents will try to hold onto as much information as possible. Staff to Minnesota's Senate Education Committee observed that information is guarded more closely and things are done more secretively when the governor belongs to one party and the majority of the legislature to another. A staff member to the House Appropriations Committee in Pennsylvania pointed out the difficulties of monitoring when there is split partisanship:

Last year when we went over to the department of education to talk about the budget, we had an exchange based on us asking questions and them answering. Now there's a Democratic Governor and we work for the

Democratic House. Our relationship is much more flexible than a year ago when the Governor was Republican. The department is much freer about giving us information and providing details. There is more of a willingness to cooperate.

Legislatures also have difficulty obtaining information when agents perceive distrust on the part of legislators, even in the absence of split partisanship. The legislature in Minnesota had problems getting assistance from the superintendent (appointed by a Democratic governor) to reorganize the department of education after several education leaders, also Democrats, voted against her confirmation in the Senate. Distrust in Florida and Georgia, where superintendents have distant relationships with legislatures, led departments to limit legislators' access to information:

If I needed information from the department tomorrow, I'd get it next month. Each information request required three copies. The person I called needed to report to their direct supervisor with a copy; a second copy was sent to the associate superintendent; and the third went to the State School Superintendent. They were a most suspicious group.

Computers can help legislatures combat this problem, but few states use this technology to facilitate oversight (Miewald and Mueller, 1987). The most sophisticated use among the states studied is found in Florida, where adverse findings and recommended solutions from the auditor general's reports are on-line, enabling committees to track implementation by the department of education.

In the private sector, conflict between principals and agents would motivate principals to switch agents. Service providers in the public sector, however, are not subject to the

selective forces of economic efficiency (Moe, 1984). Legislatures are constrained in their choice of agents, and most principal-agent relationships in the public sector are long-term. This limits the ability of legislatures to control education reform since, at the state level, departments of education have a near-monopoly over public education services. Though departments of education in all six states survive, legislatures in Pennsylvania and Arizona have strengthened their control over some education reforms through organizational change. Pennsylvania's General Assembly enacted legislation in the early 1980s that placed four of its members (the chairs and minority chairs of house and senate education committees) on the State Board of Education, which controls departmental operations. In a highly unusual move, the Arizona legislature circumvented the department of education in the career ladder program contract, vesting implementation responsibility with a specially created joint legislative committee. Access to information and control over implementation of some reforms will be easier in these states than in others.

LEGISLATIVE RESOURCES FOR ENHANCING CONTROL

Institutional and political resources and legislative powers are available for use in enhancing the ability of legislatures to obtain needed information from implementing agencies and to exercise control over the implementation process. Institutional resources, primarily legislative staff, allow part-time legislators to oversee program implementation on an ongoing

basis. Where few staff resources are available, legislators may depend on their ties to constituents to bring implementation problems to light, or legislators who have served as "champions" of legislation creating new programs may subsequently serve as "program fixers" as well. Legislative powers also may be used to impose information collection and reporting requirements on agencies or to create special committees to oversee implementation. These and other resources and powers enable legislatures to more effectively monitor the implementation process.

Institutional Resources

Expansion and specialization of staff have been important elements in legislative modernization (Rosenthal and Fuhrman, 1981; Found, 1986). Staff resources give legislators permanent data collection and analysis capabilities independent of the executive branch, lessening legislators' reliance on agents for information about implementation. Strong staffs also allow part-time legislatures to oversee programs during interim periods when the press of policy development is less. In addition, staff can help reduce time demands on legislators by serving, for instance, as proxy monitors of implementation contracts.

California's legislature is much better staffed than the other five states in the sample (see Table 2). Eight education specialists staff that state's Assembly and Senate Education Committees, and six staff the fiscal committees. There also are seven education specialists in the Assembly and Senate Offices of Research and ten in the Legislative Analyst's Office, which has

Table 2
EDUCATION STAFF RESOURCES IN
THE SIX LEGISLATURES

Type of Legislative Unit by State	Education Staff (#)*
<u>Education Committees</u>	
Arizona - House	2
Senate	2
California - Assembly	5
Senate	3
Florida - House	6
Senate	4
Georgia - Senate	1
Minnesota - House	6
Senate	4
Pennsylvania - House	7
Senate	2
<u>Research Units</u>	
California - Assembly Office of Research	4
Senate Office of Research	3
Georgia - House Research Office**	5
Minnesota - House Research Department	2
Office of Senate Counsel and Research	4
<u>Fiscal Committees</u>	
Arizona - Joint Legislative Budget	2
California - House Ways and Means	3
Senate Appropriations	2
Senate Budget and Fiscal Review	1
Florida - House Appropriations	4
Senate Appropriations	4
Georgia - Legislative Budget Office	1
Minnesota - House Appropriations	0
Senate Appropriations	0
Pennsylvania - House Appropriations	3
Senate Appropriations	2

Oversight Units***

Arizona	Auditor General	24
California	Auditor General	60
	Legislative Analyst	10 (education)
Florida	Auditor General	90
	House Intern & Oversight Comm.	2
Georgia	State Auditor	30
Minnesota	Legislative Auditor	12
Pennsylvania	Legislative Budget and Finance Committee	35

*Includes only full-time equivalent, professional staff.
Figures have been rounded to nearest whole number.

**Staff are not assigned by policy area, however, all House
Research Office staff have expertise in education.

***Staff for oversight units are not assigned by policy area,
unless specified otherwise. Auditor general staff include
performance evaluation staff only.

primary responsibility for analyzing the governor's budget. The Office of the Auditor General has 60 program evaluation specialists in its Performance Audit Division. (Auditor General staff are not assigned to specific policy areas in any of the six states.) Legislatures in Florida, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania also have strong staff capabilities. Most notable is Florida's Auditor General, which has a staff of 90 in its Program Audit Division.

In Georgia and Arizona staff resources are considerably weaker. For example, staffing for standing committees in Georgia is centralized in each chamber, and staff work for more than one committee. This system also is used by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in Arizona, which are staffed by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee. Arizona's education committees have very small staffs (two each in the House and Senate); and the Senate's senior staffer doubles as project director for the career ladder program and staff to the joint committee responsible for overseeing implementation of the program. Arizona's Performance Audit Division is the newest of the six (created in 1978), and Georgia's, unlike the others, is under the control of the administration's Department of Audits, not the legislature.

Political Resources

Where fewer staff are available, legislatures rely more on outside sources to monitor implementation. A recent study of Congress (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) concludes that

congressmen prefer "fire-alarm"* oversight, which involves selective monitoring triggered by complaints from individual citizens and organized interest groups who bring potential contract violations to congressmen's attention.

...a fire-alarm policy enables congressmen to spend less time on oversight, leaving more time for other profitable activities, or to spend the same time on more personally profitable oversight activities --- on addressing complaints by potential supporters. Justly or unjustly, time spent putting out visible fires gains one more credit than the same time spent sniffing for smoke (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984, p. 168).

Of the six states studied, the political cultures of Arizona and Georgia foster the strongest ties between legislators and constituents due to a combination of small state size and the less professional nature of the legislatures. When staffs are small, the importance of direct public input to legislative decisionmaking tends to be great; at the same time, small state size affords easier access both to legislators for visits to their home districts and to constituents for meetings at the capitol.

In most states in the sample there are numerous interest groups concerned about education. Brudney and Hebert (1987), in their recent study of state agency environments, conclude that human resource agencies, including departments of education, are influenced more by clientele groups and professional associations than any other type of agency (e.g., economic development, natural resources, transportation). Strong alliances between

*The term "fire-alarm" oversight was coined by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) in their study of congressional oversight of regulatory agencies.

departments of education and interest groups might help the departments insulate themselves from legislative overseers. Alternatively, interest groups might be a potential resource, helping legislatures to gather the information needed to monitor program implementation by the departments (Calvert and Weingast, 1982).

Interest group support for education reforms suggests which legislatures will also have their support during implementation. Business groups played key roles in formulating Florida's merit pay plan for teachers, Georgia's Quality Basic Education Act, and Minnesota's Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act (McDonnell, 1987). Committed to contract goals, these groups will be interested in bringing potential violations to legislators' attention. On the other hand, reforms in Arizona, Florida, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania were adopted against the wishes of education associations. These groups may be more interested in fostering close alliances with departments of education in an effort to influence implementation.

Another external resource for legislatures is the positive press attention and publicity surrounding many state education reforms (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985). Legislators will be much more interested in overseeing reforms when there are opportunities for enhancing their reelection prospects. The newsworthiness of education has been especially high in Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, where successful candidates for governor recently campaigned on the issue of education reform. Georgia's Quality Basic Education Act also has a high profile

because of the massive infusion of state money it provides to the schools (\$2 billion in 1985-86). As the chair of the Senate Education Committee explains:

We put a mammoth amount of money into education and now it's on the front burner. Legislators don't have to go to the press; they come to us. The press has been on top of things from the beginning.

Legislative champions of education reforms may push for oversight, since the reforms are part of their political agendas. Legislators in the sample states championed Arizona's career ladder program and the 8th and 12th grade competency testing initiative; California's mentor teacher program; Florida's RAISE legislation, which extends the instructional day and increases requirements for high school graduation; and Minnesota's Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act. Champions may become "program fixers," following up during implementation to control agents and to repair the legislation they helped to create (Bardach, 1977). Interest in oversight may stem from the champion's strong ideological commitment to the program, since oversight can be used to improve policies and to protect against opposition. The impetus also may come from the personal benefits of oversight, as a staff member to one of the legislative champions observes: "Legislators need to protect their reputations, and not following up on something can be worse than failing to move on to the next issue."

Legislative Powers

The power of lawmakers to legislate is another important resource for controlling agents and for obtaining information about implementation. Enacting laws, however, is not equally

appealing to all legislatures. Among the six states studied, this resource probably will be used most often in California, Florida, and Georgia, where legislatures traditionally have been leaders in education policy and state control of education is accepted practice.

In formulating implementation contracts, legislatures can impose information collection and reporting requirements on agencies. The contract can specify the goals to be evaluated, who the evaluator will be, the contents of reports, and the date information is due to the legislature. This strategy shifts control over information selection from the agents to the legislative monitors. The strategy also protects legislators from information overload, a hazard several of the legislatures have encountered:

[Department of education] staff either wouldn't deliver anything or they would give us too much information. The head of the vocational education office came over here one day, and his wrists were bleeding because the box of documents he carried was so heavy.

Anytime I'd ask staff for a concise, one-page report, I could literally see the sweat gathering. Department people just don't know how to put anything on one page.

Another available strategy is the creation, by statute, of a special legislative committee to monitor implementation. For example, as part of South Carolina's education reform, the legislature created the Select Committee to Oversee the Education Improvement Act of 1984 (Pethtel, 1985; Anderson and Elliott, 1986). Since oversight is their primary mission, legislative members have a built-in incentive to fulfill the committee's mandate.

During implementation, legislatures also can apply sanctions to punish agents who stray from legislative intent. Amendments can be targeted to correct perceived violations, and appropriations committees can cut program funding or legislate policy initiatives, such as prohibitions on activities, under the cover of spending bills. Unlike legislating contract terms, these strategies are reactive, and their effectiveness is dependent upon the legislature's ability to detect violations in agency performance (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).

USE OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS IN SIX STATES

Legislatures drew on the strengths of their institutional and political resources to obtain information and to gain control over implementation of education reforms. Some legislatures, in anticipation, set a priori terms in the contracts to facilitate control over agents. Evaluation reports were mandated, and special oversight units were established with the intent that legislators would "patrol" for violations during implementation.**

Other legislatures in the sample preferred waiting for agents to act, monitoring and correcting agency performance during implementation. Under this scenario, legislators usually intervened in reaction to alarms raised by outside monitors that signaled implementation problems. However, there also was

**The term "police-patrol" oversight also was used by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) in their study of congressional oversight of regulatory agencies. The term refers to active monitoring to detect violations as opposed to reactive response to alarms from outsiders.

evidence that legislative champions, with personal interests at stake, were willing to devote considerable resources to patrolling for violations of their reforms, even when no alarm had been sounded.

Contractual Terms to Facilitate Control

A few state legislatures with a history of less than cooperative relations with the executive wrote contracts that expanded the legislature's role during implementation and imposed reporting requirements on agencies. This allowed the legislatures to survey implementation activities with the aim of discouraging violations of legislative intent and detecting and rectifying those that occurred (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).

Arizona's career ladder contract created a joint legislative committee to implement as well as monitor the program, largely because the legislature was dissatisfied with the department of education's management of earlier reforms. Legislating more detailed instructions to the department was not an option, in part because of the strong tradition of local control in the state. The legislature, at the time the Act was passed, also was uncertain how a career ladder program should be implemented statewide, and therefore opted to test the program with a few districts on a pilot basis, vesting itself with oversight responsibility. The contract gave local implementors a great deal of flexibility to pursue their own career ladder models. By funding a few districts and studying the success of their programs, the legislature could refine its policy choice over time and would be better able to make decisions about possible

statewide career ladder legislation. In the short-term, the joint committee (rather than the department) had control over and direct access to information about implementation, which enhanced the legislature's ability to patrol for violations during the pilot test. Legislative monitors, for example, discovered early that some districts, contrary to intent, continued to use traditional salary schedules for teacher compensation decisions. The joint committee called a meeting with representatives of local districts, and a revised policy statement subsequently was issued to clarify legislative intent. Remedying the violation was speedy. Provisions in the initial contract had delegated responsibility to a single unit --- the joint committee --- and the economies of specialization took over during implementation.

The Florida Legislature, which has a similar history of poor relations with the department of education, established, in its 1983 contract for education reform, the Florida Quality Instructional Incentives Council (QIIC) to "oversee the implementation of educational reforms adopted by the 1983 Legislature." With this strategy, the Florida Legislature, as did Arizona's, consolidated control over implementation into one body, thereby reducing the problem of multiple principals trying to control a single agent. The council, whose members included legislators as well as representatives of the business community appointed by the governor, helped improve executive branch cooperation and awarded a monitoring role to the interest group that had been most supportive of the reforms. Shared responsibility probably also reduced the time most legislators

had to devote to oversight. The Florida Legislature had access to the council through its members but, in contrast to Arizona's experience, it was not a drain on resources: the legislature provided the council with its own staff.

When writing contracts, legislatures also can include reporting requirements, forcing agents to provide information about implementation on a timely basis that can be used to audit and correct agency performance. Table 3 displays a summary of reporting requirements for education reforms in the six states. This strategy was utilized not only in Arizona and Florida, where reports were requested from the two oversight bodies, but in Georgia and Minnesota as well (see Table 3). Georgia used the conventional approach, requesting quarterly progress reports from the state department of education. Legislatures in the other states, however, tapped sources other than the implementing agency for information. Independent evaluations can substitute remarkably well for direct knowledge of agency performance, much as stock market evaluations of a company's profitability or the threat of takeovers may be used to assess performance in the private sector (Moe, 1984). Northern Arizona University was appointed by the legislature to evaluate the career ladder program, with a report due in 1989 when the legislation expires. The Florida Legislature initially relied on QIIC for implementation information; the first report on the reforms was submitted one year after the law was passed. Later the legislature ordered the state department to commission studies of RAISE and the master teacher program from independent evaluators.

Table 3
STATUTORY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR EDUCATION REFORMS IN THE SAMPLE STATES

Reform By State	Product	Entity Collecting Data	Dept. of Educ. Role In Product Develop.
<u>Arizona</u>			
Achievement Testing	Annual Report	Dept. of Educ.	Total Responsibility
Career Ladder Program	Annual Report	Jt. Leg. Comm. on Career Ladders	None
	Evaluation Report	Northern Arizona University	None
8th & 12th Grade Competencies	-----No Reporting Requirements-----		
<u>California</u>			
SB 813	-----No Reporting Requirements-----		
<u>Florida</u>			
Education Reform Act (RAISE)	Annual Report	FL Quality Instructional Incentives Council	None
	Evaluation Report	Research Firm	Contract Monitoring
Master Teacher Program	Report	Research Firm	Contract Monitoring
Career Achievement Program (replaced Master Teacher in 1986)	Annual Status Report	Professional Teacher Career Develop. Council	Administrative
<u>Georgia</u>			
Quality Basic Education Act	Quarterly Progress Report (changed to semi-annual in 1987)	Dept. of Education	Total Responsibility

Reform By State	Product	Entity Collecting Data	Dept. of Ed. Role In Product Develop.
<u>Minnesota</u>			
Educational Technology Act	Status Report	Dept. of Education	Total Responsibility
	Evaluation Report	Research Firm	Contract Monitor
Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act	Preliminary Report	Dept. of Education with Research Firm Designing Survey	Shared Responsibility with Contractor
	Comprehensive Report	Dept. of Education with Research Firm Designing Survey	Shared Responsibility with Contractor
<u>Pennsylvania</u>			
Chapters 5 and 6	-----No Reporting Requirements-----		
Chapter 49	-----No Reporting Requirements-----		

The Minnesota Legislature traditionally requests many reports from executive agencies, and terms in its contracts for education reform were more comprehensive than in those of the other five states. Local control is strong in Minnesota, and the legislature prefers to delegate implementation authority to the local level. Report requests are politically acceptable control mechanisms; as in Arizona, control through legislated directives usually is not. Minnesota also has the benefit of a large legislative staff that can assist by reading, analyzing, and summarizing report information for legislators. With Minnesota's education reforms, the Commissioner of Education was required to hire independent evaluators, and the type of information required in reports often was listed in the contract along with required reviews of preliminary reports by the education committees of the legislature. With the Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act, the legislature listed 15 separate issues that the evaluation report should address.

The absence of reporting requirements in California's education reform, SB 813, is curious considering the degree of conflict between the Democratic legislature and the Republican governor. Several legislators mentioned that SB 813 simply was a vehicle for giving more money (\$800 million in new state funds) to California's public schools. The legislature's primary concern was in creating programs that would be politically acceptable to Republicans as well as Democrats. How the contract would be monitored during implementation was less important to legislators, who had in the past set up a large network of

agencies (Assembly and Senate Offices of Research, Auditor General, Legislative Analyst) to oversee legislation.

In writing legislation for education reforms, legislatures also could have exerted control over agents by specifying implementation schedules, either through reauthorization or sunset clauses. The value of these mechanisms is that evaluation is automatic; legislators do not have to remember to call for a review, nor do they have to persuade colleagues that a review is warranted. Except for Arizona, which authorized the pilot test of the career ladder program for five years, none of the states in the sample used these mechanisms. Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania use sunset legislation with agencies, including state departments of education, but this mechanism was not used with the education reforms studied, even in California and Minnesota, where programs in other policy areas often include sunset clauses.

In sum, few "police-patrol" features were written into the contracts for education reform, suggesting that other means would be used to detect violations of legislative goals during implementation. With most education reforms, legislatures waited for fire alarms to sound. However, active monitoring by principals was undertaken, especially where oversight activities furthered the substantive interests or reelection prospects of legislators.

Active Monitoring by Principals

Interest in monitoring by principals appeared strongest when the education reforms were priorities on committee agendas or

when the reforms furthered the policy goals of legislators. The effect was increased efficiency as selected principals became specialists in monitoring education reforms. To enhance the appeal of monitoring, opportunities for improving reelection prospects often were integrated into the oversight process. Pennsylvania's Senate Education Committee created a temporary subcommittee whose sole mission was to investigate the effects of increased high school graduation requirements on vocational education students. Without policy development responsibility, the subcommittee devoted nearly all its time to oversight, traveling around the state conducting hearings and meetings with constituents and interest groups. Legislators on Arizona's joint career ladder committee also are monitoring specialists (80 percent of committee time is spent on oversight), and, like the subcommittee members on Pennsylvania's Education Committee, legislators have public relations opportunities: each member of the committee is responsible for visiting several local districts to monitor implementation. A commitment to good public policy initially may have motivated legislators to volunteer for these two committees (many members were also involved in developing the original reforms), but interest was sustained because members were able to do something to benefit their districts and for which they could claim credit. The special mission of these committees, in effect, gave legislators benefits for monitoring. Without this, policy development activities took center stage, as with the education committees, for instance, where members in all six states spent most of their time developing new policies.

Other active overseers were the legislative champions of the education reforms. Equipped with staff resources (all held leadership positions) and motivated by strong ideological commitments and personal curiosity, the champions actively monitored implementation to check agency compliance and to discover whether the reforms were producing the changes they had anticipated. Accomplishment of legislative intent was tied to their own self-interests.

Notably, across the states all legislative champions used informal methods to actively patrol for violations. There were frequent meetings and telephone calls with program staff in the departments of education. Occasionally also, champions or legislative staff made visits to local school districts. Such methods, argued the champions, are easier to schedule and less time-consuming than formal methods of review, such as oversight hearings. Several champions speculated that, without evidence of a problem, they probably would have had difficulty getting a committee quorum during the session when schedules are tight and new legislation is given priority, or during the interim when many members are busy in other occupations. Off-the-record meetings, according to the champions, also are "less embarrassing" for department staff, so there tends to be more honesty, more information exchanged, and more of a willingness to build consensus.

The representative from Minnesota staked out a career in the legislature changing service delivery systems, and the Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act (PSEO), which gives 11th and

12th grade students the option of attending postsecondary institutions, was her effort to change the education system. With a vested interest in the Act, she spent considerable time patrolling for violations by keeping in close communication with state department of education staff. For example, she assigned legislative staff to work with the department in developing PSEO guidelines, which ultimately were issued as "a cooperative effort on the part of...legislative staff and state agencies." In designing an evaluation of the program, the champion also took a personal role:

Early on when the department was putting together questions for the evaluation, I took an active role. I wanted to be kept informed of every step of implementation of the evaluation, so that I was sure it was as straight-forward and fair as could be. I didn't want something designed just to make PSEO look good if it wasn't good.

This representative tracked implementation by consulting with constituents. When Minnesota's Legislative Commission on Public Education held hearings around the state "to get a feel for the public's educational concerns and to float some trial balloons," she used the opportunity to advance her own agenda: "At every single meeting I asked what people were doing to implement PSEO."

Improving public policy was the main goal of this champion, and in its pursuit she was willing to make some political sacrifices:

If you were to run a balance sheet on PSEO, it cost me more than it helped me politically. I had to lay out a lot of chits to accomplish what I did. But that's okay. I happen to believe PSEO is a major change in the structure of the delivery system.

Legislative champions in the other states also were

motivated by ideological principles, although political agendas were more important. The RAISE legislation in Florida was championed by a senior senator who was education committee chair and later was elected Senate President. The senator wanted to make certain nothing happened to the reforms. According to committee staff, "They are his legacy." RAISE, which increased high school graduation requirements and extended the instructional day, had been opposed initially by many school districts and teacher organizations, so there was a possibility the reforms would be sabotaged by local implementors. Monitoring helped the senator head off attempts by the opposition to change the reforms and, in the process, helped protect his reputation.

In Arizona and California the champions of education reform were politically ambitious, and the reforms, providing nothing disastrous happened during implementation, were vehicles for building a reputation. The champion of California's mentor teacher program, a rising star who is quickly becoming the Senate's education expert, uses committee staff to monitor implementation:

Our staff job is to uncover small problems before they become big. There was a lot of opposition to mentor teacher when the program was passed and we don't want anything coming back to haunt the Senator. His name is closely tied to the program, so he'll get the blame if anything goes wrong.

Arizona's champion of competency testing for 8th and 12th graders also kept a continuous watch over the department while she was chair of the Senate Education Committee. The Arizona Legislature has no formal rule review power, but, through telephone calls and letters, the champion guided and prodded the department into

developing rules that more closely resembled her intent. Unfortunately, once the Senator was elected majority whip in 1985, good politics became more than education, her interests broadened, and monitoring of the reform stopped.

Notably absent from the list of active overseers are auditor general offices and general oversight committees. A recent study of 19 states by the National Conference of State Legislatures reached a similar conclusion: "Legislative evaluation and audit agencies have not given high priority to education programs or reforms" (Pethtel, 1985, p.4). McCubbins and Schwartz argue that general oversight committees in Congress also tend to be weak:

Subcommittee specialization...enhance[s] congressional oversight over individual agencies. Subcommittees controlling authorizations and appropriations...[are] in a better position to do oversight than so-called oversight committees (1984, 170).

Legislators apparently believe that education evaluations require education specialists. Evidence from this study also suggests that legislators do not want to assign oversight/evaluation projects to their own staff, preferring to commission studies from education specialists outside government (see Table 3). Perhaps the education reforms are considered too controversial for legislators to become closely involved in evaluations. In several of the states in the sample, the reforms may have been too new for evaluations by auditor generals or general oversight committees. California's SB 813 was the only reform evaluated by either oversight unit, and four years of implementation had passed before the auditor general's report was issued (State of California, 1987).

Responding to Alarms

Notwithstanding the willingness of legislative champions and special committees to patrol for violations, responding to alarms was the predominant form of oversight used by legislatures with respect to the education reforms. Oversight was selective, usually triggered by complaints from constituents, who served as volunteer monitors, augmenting the resources of the part-time principals. Legislatures spent less time on oversight because constituents generally assumed the time-consuming task of monitoring implementation. By waiting for alarms to sound, legislators also increased the political benefits of oversight: members received credit from constituents for intervening to investigate the cause of their complaints (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).

Complaints that triggered oversight stemmed from several sources. In contracts featuring large implementation roles for state departments of education, complaints usually were filed against departmental actions. Similarly, when the legislature gave substantial rule-making authority to the state board of education, as in Pennsylvania, complaints focused on the board's performance. There also were complaints about legislative actions stemming from the legislation authorizing the reforms. Such complaints were evident in states where the reforms were large and comprehensive or especially innovative. Finally, in California some oversight stemmed from complaints about actions by the governor, whose budget authority enabled him to override legislative goals. In every instance, the complaints were

brought to the attention of legislators by interest groups and constituents.

Contrary to expectations, legislative staff played very minor roles in triggering oversight of education reforms. Across the six states, staff spent more time confirming problems and sifting through complaints from outside monitors to help legislators avoid false alarms. The staffs in California, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania were particularly adept at sifting through complaints, in part because of the size of committee staffs (see Table 2). A second important factor was the "staff steal phenomenon" --- department of education staff leaving the executive to join legislative staff. Former bureaucrats knew who to call in the education department to verify complaints; they knew quick ways to obtain more information; and they also knew what information the department had available. Their knowledge was useful in judging the selectivity of information provided to the legislature, which helped combat the problem of information asymmetry between the legislature and the department, and also helped reduce agency insulation.

State departments of education were the main target of complaints regarding Arizona's competency testing reform and California's Cash-for-CAP program, which gave bonus money to schools with the highest improvement scores on the California assessment test. School districts and lobbyists for education groups sounded alarms by complaining they were being harmed by state policy. When the principals investigated, they discovered that agents had strayed from legislative intent and were

implementing their own policies. In Arizona, the legislature had intended that the department of education establish minimum competency levels for 8th and 12th graders in essential subjects (math, reading, and writing), allowing local districts to set their own standards within state department guidelines. Instead, the state department planned to issue skill lists for all subject areas, with statewide standards for each. When districts heard about the plan, legislators were flooded with phone calls and letters. The legislative champion (who also chaired the Senate Education Committee) reacted quickly, before the state board of education issued formal rules, and the department compromised by allowing local districts to develop their own tests and determine passing scores --- a policy more in keeping with legislative intent. Responding to this alarm produced few political benefits for the legislature, largely because local districts blamed their problems on the legislative contract and not the department's implementation. Furthermore, since oversight was conducted informally behind the scenes, most districts were not aware of legislative efforts to remedy their problems.

In California, Cash-for-CAP alarms were sounded simultaneously by education lobbyists and the Legislative Analyst's Office. This was one of few instances where legislative staff signaled a problem. The review also was unusual in that it took place during Ways and Means Committee budget hearings, which gave legislators the option of using fiscal sanctions to control implementation. According to a written report and testimony by the Analyst's Office, the

department of education was implementing the program statewide, instead of on a pilot basis in a few districts as the legislature intended, apparently because selecting pilot districts was unappealing for political reasons. Education lobbyists also charged that local implementation was contrary to the spirit of the law: some districts reclassified 12th graders as 11th graders to exclude them from the test and to improve school scores. Committee members, at the suggestion of staff, briefly considered terminating Cash-for-CAP, but ultimately opted for a milder control:

Committee members beat up the department a little during the budget hearings but that was about it. The members liked the program, because they all had high schools in their districts receiving Cash-for-CAP money.

The added control reaffirmed legislative intent, soothing members' consciences, and, equally important, it cost legislators little politically with their constituents.

The Pennsylvania Legislature allows the State Board of Education to make law. The major education reforms recently adopted by the board are increased course requirements for high school graduation (Chapter 5) and increased requirements for teacher certification, induction, and continuing professional development (Chapter 49). Legislators overseeing these reforms did not take action because the bureaucracy violated legislative goals or intent; none were stated. The problem was that board policies harmed constituents. Vocational education teachers and directors complained that increased academic requirements made graduation difficult for their students. Teacher unions were

angry their members who had Masters degrees were required to take six credits of continuing education every five years.

When constituent groups appealed to the legislature, education committees first tried to remedy the problems informally. Legislative staff met with department staff to suggest how the rules might be changed. In the case of Chapter 5, the department assented and the rule was amended by the state board. Education committee members were pleased: a public confrontation with the department had been avoided and interest groups were reassured that legislators were on their side.

With Chapter 49, the department refused to change the rule, forcing the legislature to resort to more formal methods of control. Ultimately, the State Board of Education rule was statutorily repealed. The Senate Education Committee, which led the fight, knew it would be difficult to garner legislative support for an education bill with specific program provisions, so they waited until June when the omnibus education bill was considered and added the repeal. The process was quick and there was no floor debate; the details were worked out by the conference committee. In responding to the alarm, the senators on the education committee won credit from the teacher unions, and, equally important, they avoided having to cash in the political chits that a separate bill likely would have required.

Legislation often was the target of complaints in Florida, Georgia, and Minnesota. Fire alarms identified the areas in need of repair, and through the process of oversight legislative goals were refined and elaborated. Georgia's Quality Basic Education

Act (QBE), similar to California's SB 813, is an educational milestone: it is large, comprehensive, and backed by a substantial investment of state money. The original bill, with a strong push from the governor, was rushed through the General Assembly and passed both houses unanimously. QBE was closely tracked by education interest groups whose attention was drawn by promises of increased funding. During implementation, special education groups voiced the loudest complaints. Apparently, in the rush to write the bill, the legislature, lacking the benefit of strong staff resources (as in California), miscalculated the weights in the funding formula for special education. The fire alarm led legislators to repair the contract, thereby reassuring interest groups of the legislature's intent to increase funding for education.

Also notable was the expediency of the QBE revision process, which took into account the General Assembly's short session and the time constraints of legislators. At the governor's initiative, a "revision group" was formed with staff representatives from the House, the Senate, and the executive. The group met mostly during the interim and operated consensually --- all proposed amendments were approved unanimously or deleted. Consequently, the revision bill introduced in the General Assembly had the support of all key policymakers and there was little controversy, which lessened the time legislators spent in hearings or debate.

Florida's master teacher program and Minnesota's Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act (PSEO) are innovative and

were imbued with controversy from the beginning. Teacher unions in Florida opposed awarding some teachers bonuses and also objected to the evaluation system for selecting master teachers. In Minnesota, school districts feared severe financial losses if many high school students and the money spent to educate them were transferred to postsecondary institutions. During implementation, groups opposing the reforms were on the look-out for problems in the laws that might justify their repeal.

In Minnesota alarms were sounded by school districts, charging that students made the decision to attend a postsecondary school arbitrarily and with little notice to districts; that some students dropped out of postsecondary schools after several weeks and wanted to return to high school; and that estimating the number of sections to offer and teachers to hire was difficult since student enrollments were not stable. The Minnesota Department of Education sided with the school districts and tried to influence implementation. The department, according to legislators and legislative staff, gave out erroneous interpretations of the law and "did everything they could to discourage participation." At the same time, the teacher and school board associations were lobbying hard to dismantle the program. With opposition building, the legislature focused on fending off repeal; controlling the state department was secondary.

In fall 1985, during the interim, the two legislators from the House and Senate who had sponsored the original bill a few months earlier contacted local districts informally and held

hearings around the state to solicit information about the program. PSEO's preliminary evaluation report, requested in the original bill, also helped identify provisions that needed refinement. At the start of the 1986 session, amendments were introduced to rectify PSEO's problems, as one of the sponsors explained:

It was a political strategy to ensure we had control of the changes. We also felt that if we didn't fix the administrative problems soon, amendments would pass that would repeal the program.

Some of the changes included deadlines that required students to notify districts in spring of their intent to participate, and counseling provisions to help students make more thoughtful decisions.

Oversight in this instance produced benefits both for the program and for legislators. The legislation was kept intact and improved. Legislative staff also report an increase in program support among education groups, pointing out that no alarms were sounded in 1987 when the House Education Committee held hearings to review the final PSEO evaluation report. The two champions resigned from the legislature after the 1986 session; however, other supporters of the amendments won credit from constituents for responding to local complaints and because the amendments were perceived as meeting the needs of both students and local school districts. In sum, the time invested by most legislators was small; oversight was conducted during the interim by selected principals, primarily the legislative champions and their staffs. By the time the 1986 session began, the main activity was to develop new policies for PSEO, giving members the opportunity to

reap some political rewards.

Interest group politics surrounding Florida's master teacher program were different from those in Minnesota. The teacher unions worked as monitors for the legislature, sounding fire alarms about state department performance and charging that the department's administration was "a comedy of errors." Many teacher applications were lost, tests were scheduled without notifying applicants, and there were problems with computers incorrectly recording test answers. The unions could have chosen to side with the department and to protect the agency from its legislative overseers (as the Minnesota groups tried to do). After all, most legislators had not been responsive when the unions voiced strong opposition to the original bill. The unions instead helped legislative principals combat the problem of agency insulation, and there was little evidence of agency-clientele alliances. Most other education interest groups followed suit, which simplified the principals' job of controlling departmental agents. Surprisingly, business groups, whose support led to passage of several reforms in California, Florida, and Minnesota, were not active monitors during implementation.

Complaints from the unions about the master teacher program led the Florida House in 1985 to insert proviso language in the appropriations bill requesting the state department to contract for an evaluation. Across the six states, evaluation reports rarely effected policy change, but the master teacher program evaluation, according to committee staff, was utilized much more

than others:

The momentum to evaluate was there because legislators were hearing complaints about poor implementation. Another reason the report was used was because the program turned out to be a mess. The Governor wanted to be the first state to have a master teacher program and so we rushed into it without having everything in place.

Ultimately the master teacher program was phased out for political reasons. Legislators had continued to receive phone calls and letters from teacher unions. Newspapers around the state also picked up on the issue, producing a slew of negative editorials. As one staff member remarked, "Legislators were practically stumbling over one another to be the first in line to say we needed to kill the program." The evaluation report provided documentation.

The report also was used by the Senate Education Committee in developing the Career Achievement Program, which succeeded the master teacher program. Based on report recommendations, the new program included more than two levels of teacher evaluation and greater opportunities for local district participation.

In most states, whether the superintendent for public instruction is elected or appointed by the governor, there was little conflict between superintendents and governors over the education reforms studied. The one exception was California, where the Republican governor, disagreeing with legislative goals (which had the superintendent's support), tried to control implementation of the mentor teacher program. Using his budget authority, the governor slashed support costs, covering administrative expenses such as classroom substitutes, from \$2000

to \$1000 per mentor. Education advocates representing teachers and school districts complained to the legislature, prompting an informal investigation by Ways and Means Committee staff into how school districts were using the funds. The legislature eventually sided with the local districts and retaliated by adding proviso language to the budget bill that allowed the superintendent to allocate more than the governor proposed for support costs. The legislature now authorizes a flat amount for the mentor teacher program, and the state department of education decides how to allocate the funds. Fewer mentor slots are funded, but, in keeping with legislative intent, the department allocates \$2000 in support costs for each mentor teacher.

In sum, the six states conducted oversight of the education reforms in ways that minimized time commitments and maximized political benefits for legislators. The states preferred having "education experts," legislative champions, or special purpose units act on behalf of the legislature as the principal. Oversight was selective, focusing on reports of possible violations from constituents and interest groups. Finally, legislators mixed quick, informal monitoring, such as communicating directly with department of education personnel, with formal methods (committee hearings) that had greater political pay-off.

CONCLUSION

This interpretation of legislative oversight of education reforms in six states is based on the assumption of a contractual

relationship between legislative principals and executive agents. Agents entered into and promised to fulfill the terms of the contracts for reform by accepting appropriation monies from state legislatures. Principals drew on the strengths of their institutional and political resources to maintain control over implementation of the reforms.

Monitoring was effective largely because legislatures had access to information through constituents who sounded alarms to signal potential violations. Legislative champions sometimes actively solicited input, but monitoring was equally effective, and arguably less time-consuming, when legislators waited to respond to reports from concerned constituents. While principal-agent theory argues that bureaucratic agents control information, elected principals have strong ties with the public, and as shown here, this can help reduce information asymmetries.

The reform policies studied benefited considerably from oversight. Legislators enforced compliance and agents were forced to adhere to legislative intent. Subsequently, legislators were able to judge whether the reforms were viable. There is little consensus on the single best approach to improving the education system, and many states are experimenting. Oversight helped to ensure that implementation was a true test of legislative ideas.

Oversight also gave legislators opportunities to consider whether goals should be altered in response to new knowledge or to problems encountered in implementation. Acts of legislation do not always reflect well-defined goals, in part because public

advocacy has made resolving policy issues through legislation increasingly difficult. Ineffective or unpopular legislative decisions were changed later by oversight actions, and reform policies were improved. Evidence from this study also suggests a variety of means for influencing implementation short of legislated controls. Such strategies were particularly important in states with strong local control or with political traditions of delegating broad powers to administrative agencies.

This analysis has broader implications for the role of legislatures during program implementation. Generally, the status of legislators, representative of and accountable to the public, suggests that their influence on implementation is at least as proper as that of bureaucrats with their legal-constitutional status as program administrators. Both parties represent different but limited interests. Effective implementation, therefore, requires active participation by both of these groups. This study demonstrates the ease with which legislatures, even those operating under severe constraints, can exert significant control over program implementation.

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