ABSTRACT
        The "Bulletin of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art
Education" is an annual publication, with each issue devoted to a
unified theme. This issue (divided into four parts) offers
thought-provoking articles on modern art, educational ideology and
curriculum, elitism versus populism, socially oriented reviews of
major art education textbooks, and relevant study resources. Part 1
features three papers designated as articles: "Art Research and
Curriculum to Accomplish Multicultural Goals" (Myrna T. Amdursky);
"Modern Fine Art: A Vehicle for Understanding Western Modernity"
(Karen A. Hamblen); and "Marginal Images: Art and Ideology in the
School" (Dan Nadaner). Part 2 presents two papers featuring points of
view: "For Cultural Democracy: A Critique of Elitism in Art
Education" (Robert Bersson) and "Elitism versus Populism: The
Continuing Debate" (Ralph A. Smith). Part 3 contains material from a
forum with three papers: "A Critique of Elliot Eisner's 'Educating
Artistic Vision'" (John Jagodzinski); "Socially Relevant Practice in
'Art, Culture, and Environment'" (Nancy R. Johnson); and "Social
Relevance in Lowenfeld's 'Creative and Mental Growth'" (Robert J.
Saunders). Part 4 is an annotated bibliography from members of the
caucus on social theory, compiled by Susan L. Dorsey. (DB)

THE BULLETIN OF THE CAUCUS ON SOCIAL THEORY AND ART EDUCATION NUMBER 3

Edited by Cathy A. Brooks

PREFACE

BULLETIN NUMBER 3 continues the lively exchange of ideas, information, and views about the relationship among art, social and cultural values, and education. The assembled authors provide us with thought-provoking articles on modern art, educational ideology, and curriculum; with vigorous arguments from differing sides of the "elitism versus populism" debate; with socially-oriented reviews of major art education texts; and with an annotated bibliography of relevant study resources.

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CONTENTS

ART RESEARCH AND CURRICULUM
TO ACCOMPLISH MULTICULTURAL GOALS

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If there were no budget constraints, art education would be nice.
Most people agree it's fun to do, and students do enjoy it. But most
people also think it's a frill and unnecessary.

As thinking art educators, we must address these issues and the
concerns of our policy makers. We must definitively respond to the
questions of why we spend all that time, effort, and money teaching art.

Historical Overview

John Adams said,

> I must study politics and war so that my sons
> have liberty--liberty to study mathematics and
> philosophy, geography, natural history, naval
> architecture, navigation, commerce and agri-
> culture; in order to give their children a right
> to study painting, poetry, music, architecture...
> (1841, p. 68)

In the late nineteenth century, the need for skilled draftsmen
and designers prompted a group of industrialists to pressure the Massa-
chusetts state legislature to make drawing a required subject in the
schools. They brought Walter Smith to this country to teach and to
create a series of drawing books which were based upon stereotypical
images.

Around the turn of the century, the virtues of hard work, piety,
and loyalty were introduced into the schools through art appreciation of
"famous" paintings depicting those themes. It was a form of culture and
and effort to properly refine the socially elite.

In the 1920's, John Dewey's philosophy of learning through experi-
ence gave birth to the concept of creative self-expression. This concept
was strongly emphasized by Viktor Lowenfeld in his landmark text, Creative
and Mental Growth, first published in 1947. For the past 35 years, this
philosophy based on the "new" field of psychology has pervaded the art
education field.

Art education is really made up of three distinct but often confused
categories: self-expression, abservation, and appreciation. (Read, p. 208)

The art education field has been heavily influenced by the concepts of Arthur W. Dow, whose book Composition (1899) placed great emphasis on observation of visual phenomena and the application of this observation to the construction of a design. Although design constructs have played an important role in the final product of art education, the primary thrust has been on the making aspect or process of art.

It is now time to reevaluate that basic question, Why are we teaching art? Is it for skill development, cultural elitism, creative self-expression, developmental growth, or communication and understanding?

Contemporary Issues

Chapman, Feldman, Grigsby, Lanier, and McFee agree that we tend to look upon the arts with the eye of an elitist group. Neither the History of Art (1962) by H. W. Janson nor Educating Artistic Vision (1972) by Eliot Eisner refer to a female artist, although art is still somehow considered a "feminine" thing to do. Nor does Eisner include a single work by a folk or craft artist, filmmaker, graphic or industrial designer.

Engel (1981) state that art is considered "Something Special" and therefore not for everyone. He does not suggest that the schools should create artists, for that is an impossibility and ridiculous, but that the schools should be charged to create competent visual perceivers. These visual perceivers should be able to respond to our total visual environment: the traditional "fine arts", the creations of mass media, and the utilization of urban spaces. Only then will we be confident that we will view art as necessary for communication both within and between groups. Only then will we create a future of choice, not chance.

The problem has many challenges. We must reach a larger portion of the school population while simultaneously convincing the policy maker of the value of understanding multicultural, visual forms. These forms are not only the means to establishing individual identity, but also the way in which we understand much of what we know about our own culture and others'. America is not a melting pot, but a tossed salad with a variety of cultures existing side by side. The political ramifications are powerful.

In his article "New Directions for Urban Research," Anthony Downs (1976) identifies education and aesthetics in the top ten priorities for social research. His ideas act as a bridge between those concerned with urban problems and those concerned with multicultural art curriculum development. Downs identifies education and aesthetics especially in terms of the effect that mass media has on social change. He recommends policy-oriented, multidiscipinary research with large scale data collection and analysis to illuminate this interaction.

Also concerned with the impact of mass media, Sherman (1980) observes that a reassessment of our conceptualization of art and emotions is essential. The pervasive influence of images from the mass media

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demands a thorough analysis.

Hans Gifforn questions the criteria upon which the revision
of curriculum ought to be based. He notes that, "we must not forget
that school instruction has also been influenced by social groups
primarily interested in increasing their personal power or economic
advantage." (1978, p. 51) Gifforn concludes that art education is
political education as well, strengthening or weakening an individual's
inclination and ability to control or change social structures.

The most popular approach to inquiry in art education is through
the theoretical framework of psychology. As Johnson notes (1980),
this approach does not consider the social context. According to her,
what is significant is how people describe life in the world. She
recommends three alternative approaches:

    1. Symbolic interactionism—the "self" changes through
life based on social interactions.

    2. Phenomenological Sociology—an inquiry into the life
of consciousness to illuminate the things that are taken for
granted. This approach depends upon the context of lived
experience.

    3. Ethnomethodology (also called "Garfinkeling" for its
author)—focuses on the methods by which people accomplish
the affairs of everyday life based on practical reasoning in
life situations.

Johnson states that any of the above approaches are more appropriate
than the traditional psychological framework.

Compounding the complexity of inquiry are the concerns of Chalmers
(1981), who states that visual symbols express and convey ideas, emotions,
qualities and feelings, but that members of different cultures do not
react in the same way to the same stimuli. He states that all art should
be considered as cultural artifact, related to the social order in a
causal-functional manner.

In his book, Ways of Seeing, Berger states that "seeing comes
before words." It is seeing which establishes our place in the world,
although we explain our world with words. The relationship has not been
settled, but clearly the social context impinges on our way of seeing.

Members of preindustrial cultures appreciate art because of their
direct and regular participation. Many of the important day-to-day things
these people do are not only functionally useful, but also useful aesthet-
ically. Their conception of value is different from ours.

Perhaps there is much that we can learn from this attitude. If,
in fact, a culture is determined by its values, beliefs and attitudes,
then every culture must surely benefit from an understanding and an

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appreciation of every other culture. McFee (1978) asks some very serious questions about our current values. Is it not time for Americans to begin to benefit from the richness of diversity within our country? Have we nearly lost the specificity of culture by stratifying our society along economic lines? Or has this divisionism brought about new "cultures" based on personal life experiences? Only exploration, research, time and an openness to new experience will lead the way to a society of meaningfulness and fulfillment for each of its citizens.

The challenge then must be to create an art education curriculum which is personally rewarding, relevant to experience, and sound intellectually. In our culture, the dominant features of which are the quest for wealth and upward social mobility, there have been precious few opportunities to express constructively <u>how</u> life feels, <u>what</u> life's special meanings are, and <u>why</u> life is different for me than for you. We need an art education curriculum that will help children to understand art in varied life styles, and thus to wisely shape their own.

According to Chapman (1978), a child's attitudes are well developed by early adolescence and, therefore, each of these purposes must be met in a substantial way during the elementary and junior high school years. We must recognize that our environment is created by human effort. Toward that end, we must emphasize how all of us are in some respects like <u>every</u> other person, like <u>some</u> other people, and like <u>no</u> other person. We must attend to those dimensions of our selfhood that can be shared with others, in order to understand our own uniqueness. We must recognize that the art which we create is influenced by cultural/social forces, and that our perception and response to visual forms is influenced by our cultural values.

In <u>Values Clarification</u> (Simon, et al., 1972), the authors explain their title as a process for selecting the best and rejecting the worst elements contained in various value systems. These choices come about through peer pressure, submission to authority, and propaganda that we encounter through traditional learning approaches, such as moralizing, modelling, or "laissez-faire". The authors identify this sequence of categories in the clarification process:

1. Prizing and cherishing
2. Affirming
3. Choosing from alternatives
4. Choosing in view of consequences
5. Choosing freely
6. Acting
7. Acting with a pattern, consistent and repretitious

They acknowledge an indirect indebtedness to Dewey's philosophy, affirming the substance and richness of his ideas.

Perhaps we should acknowledge that values clarification is a way to identify cultural differences and to assist us in determining what we truly value aesthetically and artistically in our multicultural society.

The Need for Alternative Approaches

A story is told about Picasso and a conversation he had with a German visitor to his studio. The visitor rhetorically--or perhaps aggressively--asked, "You are the painter who made the picture, Guernica?" Picasso responded, "No! It was you who created it!" This story reminds us of the connections between the individual and society, artistic act and cultural impetus, experience and symbolic transformation. (Kaufman, 1966, p. 51)

In "Why Art Education Lacks Social Relevance: A Contextual Analysis," Bersson (1981) observes that democracy represents the desired goal. "In its declared tolerance of and respect for cultural differences, in its promise of equality of opportunity and popular governance 'of, by and for (all) the people,' the principles of democracy stand as the essential potential force for the democratization of society and culture." (p. 6)

We must begin at home with the programming in our local schools. The visual arts are not a separate entity from other art forms and must, therefore, become interdisciplinary. We must address the issue of teacher resources and staff development, particularly in the study of cultures and subcultures previously ignored in the teacher's professional preparation.

We must build upon some of the efforts of particular school systems and specific individuals. The Richmond, Virgina school system has a Teacher Resource Center (Arts Library) especially equipped with motivational materials for black students. The art supervisor there has a personal slide collection of works by Afro-American artists which he uses for staff development. (Note 1)   The chairman of the Art Department at Norfolk State University has noted the need to generate a list of black artists in the community who would come to the schools to demonstrate. (Note 2)

Hobbs (1981) stated that university art departments seem to be remiss regarding art and social concerns in their professional teacher preparation programs. They have placed little emphasis on the responding process, emphasizing self-expression through studio production. Clearly, teacher preparation programs are a pertinent concern in a holistic approach to mulitcultural art education.

Learning from some existing programs which are socially responsive is a direction worth pursuing. One such program is RITA, Reading Instruction Through Art, an innovative curriculum for improving visual perception skills. This Title III, ESEA program in New York City has reported remarkable gains in basic skills competencies, particularly in the areas of human communication, reading, writing, and speaking. A second program worth pursuing, and perhaps incorporating into the school curriculum, began in California in 1967. It has involved young people in urban mural design that reflects their cultural background. It has grown nationally, and is a powerful force in community arts programming and volunteer commitment. Another exemplary program is the Urban Arts Project in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It brings students to a place where they can work

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directly with artists from many disciplines.

There is no one curriculum which could possibly meet all multicultural concerns. Socially relevant objectives are so wide-ranging, and an expanded definition of art so diverse, it would be simplistic to presume that one curriculum could possibly be a panacea. However, in the American tradition of being challenged to remedy an undesirable situation, I present the following curriculum outline, with the goal of increasing the social relevance of art instruction:

I. Objectives of Multicultural Art Education

1. To understand the visual symbols which maintain the concepts of reality for different cultures.

2. To understand the organization and roles of a given society through its visual forms.

3. To understand how visual forms contribute to our current values, especially through the mass media.

4. To create visual communication forms which respect cultural differences.

5. To increase the aesthetic knowledge of the arts audience of the future.

II. Procedure to Implement Multicultural Art Education Objectives

1. Combine art, music, theatre, and dance into an Arts Department for mutual cooperation and benefit.

2. Develop programs to utilize community resources, both individuals and arts organizations.

3. Provide opportunities for students and adults to interact in the arts, inside as well as outside the schools.

4. Require arts education for all students throughout their years of schooling, as basic to understanding effective communication in our multicultural society.

5. Develop curricula which will meet the intellectual and technical demands of each discipline. In the visual arts, we should give equal emphasis to observation, production, and response.

Conclusion

When we consider what is really basic in a society, we must pause and reflect upon the ancient peoples who drew on their walls in the caves of Altamira and Lascaux. What were they telling us of the world in which they lived? What were they telling one another?

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John Ruskin said that we learn of a society through three sources: the Book of their Words, the Book of their Deeds, and the Book of their Art. Though one does not exist without the other, the Book of their Art is the most reliable. (Janson, p. 2)

How and what do we want our descendants to know of our society?

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MODERN FINE ART:
A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING WESTERN MODERNITY

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While art curricula are not without reference to twentieth century fine art, the social significance of modern fine art has been a neglected area of study. The purpose of this paper is to survey and review the modal characteristics of modern society and modern fine art. Striking similarities are revealed in such a review which strongly suggest that a study of modern fine art in art education could serve to problematize both the social origins of modern fine art and the values of Western modernity.

Art Education Literature Review

A review of art education literature indicates that modern fine art is often neither an integral part of proposed art programs nor a specific area of study considered to be of value in understanding modern society. This may be due to a general reluctance to deal with the social functions of art. However, more specifically, neglecting the social significance of modern fine art may be due to an inability to consider modern fine art--which is often abstract and separate from overt social functions--as having meaning beyond its presentational aspects. In many of those instances in which modern fine art is specificially included in curricular planning, its social significance is essentially ignored or is limited to examples in which social content is derived from fairly obvious socio-political subject matter expresssed in a respresntational style. The work of Beckmann, Grosz, the Mexican muralists and, of course, Picasso's Guernica are invariably cited as instances of social consciousness in modern fine art (Feinstein, 1982; Feldman, 1971; Myers, 1957). The operative assumption appears to be that social meaning in art is limited to subject matter, rather than also being embedded within artistic assumptions, working procedures, audience attitudes, and the overall institutional configuration of art production and response in a given society.

A formalist approach is often accorded the study of modern fine art, wherein abstract perceptual qualities are assumed to constitute its meaning. The influential Guidelines (1970), compiled under the auspices of CEMREL, serves to indicate how the endorsement of a strictly formalistic interpretation of modern art can sever abstract form from any type of meaning beyond the perceptual experience of design element relationships. For example, a painting by Albers is discussed as a work

in which the sensuous surface has been exploited in order
to produce certain tensions and vague feelings in the
viewer. Since this is a non-objective painting, the
experience should come to a close, there being no other
kinds of meaning or significance to be found. To seek
further would be fallacious. (p. 52)

Modern fine art study appears to be primarily art historical and art
critical, with an emphasis on aesthetic qualities.

Among those art educators who are concerned that students un-
derstand art in its social and environmental context, the idea that
modern fine art might warrant specific study receives uncertain
responses. For example, while Schellin (1973) implies that modern
fine art may be indicative of social ills, he prefers that a broader
spectrum of art be studied. In a similar vein, Chalmers (1978) ob-
serves that historically, art educators, by studying primarily fine
art, have promulgated a restricted definition of art that needs to
be broadened to include the popular, environmental, folk, and commer-
cial arts. Modern fine art is often considered to have little social
import beyond the heady world of the artist and his/her moneyed
clientele. Gowans (1971), for example, dismisses modern fine art
on the basis that it is elitist and self-referent, i.e., art for
art's sake, art about itself, art about the material means of art, etc.
(Also see Collins, 1977.)

The Characteristics of Modernity

Paradoxically, it is the asocial, self-referent character of
much modern fine art that makes it very much part of a society which
gives legitimation to decontextualized experiences. From sociology
of knowledge literature, values of Western modernity have been iden-
tified that, as will be shown, often have their parallel in modern
fine art. Bell (1978), Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974), Berger and
Luckmann (1966), Bowers (1980), and Gouldner (1979) have cited the
following as dominant values of modernity: a temporal orientation
toward the future (rather than past or present), the activity modal-
ity of doing (rather than being or becoming), human relationships
that are individualistic (rather than communal or lineal), and the
human subjugation of nature (rather than coexistence or subservience).
(Also see Kluckhohn & Strodtveck, 1961.)

Bell specifically identifies change as the most pervasive value
of modernity, wherein change is often equated with progress, and human
purpose and action are the means by which perfection will be ulti-
mately attained. At the extreme, it is believed that there are no
restraints upon what can be humanly accomplished -- anything that can
be formulated can be done, and should be done. The individual, by
dint of possessing purposive rationality, gives legitimation to human
action by creating the reality in which those actions are judged.
As Foucault (1970) has noted, prior to the nineteenth century, the
individual, per se, did not exist; the shift from the external world

as a frame of reference to that of internal mental constructs places the individual stage center in a society of change, improvement, and decontextualized experiences.

Foucault traces the inception of modernity to the turn of the eighteenth century when systems of knowledge became self-referent, with each discipline folded over upon itself, seeking the source of its own episteme. In structure, operating procedures, and terminology, disciplines became increasingly self-contained, self-conscious, and self-reflective. This opened the way for artificial language systems of formalized codes, wherein signs are what they are, without connections or meanings beyond their self-evident existence. Foucault dates the all-important break with Classicism to when signs ceased to represent, to when they lost their metaphoric as if dimensions. In the twentieth century world of metaknowledge and metacriticism, language codes have become their own object. Consistent with this development, the possession of abstract, theoretical knowledge is given the highest plaudits in modern society, resulting in whatt Gouldner has termed the "culture of critical discourse." In modern society, there is a so-called knowledge industry which establishes and maintains disciplinary and intellectual integrity through theoretical justifications, specialization, and self-referenced terminology which define parameters and exclude all but the trained expert.

Modern Aesthetic Theory and Artistic Self-Reference

Significantly, the historical inception of modernity -- that is, of individualism, futurism, the separation of work from leisure, disciplinary self-reference, theoretical legitimations, and bureaucratic specialization -- coincides with the development of aesthetic theories emphasizing the noninstrumental, intrinsic value of art. From Kant's Critique of Judgment in 1790, through Schopenhauer in the nineteenth century, to Bullough, Stolnitz and Kaelin in the twentieth century, many aestheticians have proposed that art be valued for its own sake and that the value of art eschew all interests extraneous to the aesthetic response, per se (see Dickie, 1971; Osborne, 1970). This bracketing of the object is accomplished by what has been variously described as imaginative reduction, aesthetic disinterest, aesthetic interest, the aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic point of view, and psychic distancing. According to Bosanquet (1915), "In the aesthetic attitude, the object which embodies the feeling is valued solely for what it is in itself" (p. 9). One instigates the aesthetic by "putting the phenomenon . . . out of gear with our practical, actual self. . . by looking at it 'objectively'" (Bullough, 1913/1935, p. 317). Without risk of hyperbole, one may state that the intrinsic value of art constitutes the very cornerstone of modern aesthetic theory. The idea that "art is responded to on the basis of its intrinsic qualities, isolated from societal life experiences, has become thoroughly embedded and taken for granted in the operational tenets of most art theory and in much art creation and instruction" (Hamblen & Jones, 1982, p.51).

The analogy of a painting to a window with a view of a garden
is often used to explain how the viewer is to be concerned only with
what is intrinsic to art. Prior to the twentieth century, the viewer
of art might look into the window/painting, to the garden beyond,
recognizing the types of vegetation there, the configuration of the
landscape, perhaps identifying people in the garden and noting their
attire and activities. In other words, the painting offered a view
to representations with functions and associations related to one's
life experience and memories. In the twentieth century, however,
often aided by nonrepresentationalism, the aesthetician urges the
viewer to look only at the flat surface of the window pane/canvas
itself on which the lines, colors, textures, and shapes of the garden
form a' 'tract relationships (Redfield, 1971). The artist and, by
implication, the viewer of art in his/her noninstrumental responses
to art, is dealing with the synthetic language of the material means
of art, which has its own internal logic and meaning. That is, art
is self-referenced; it is about itself.

Maurice Denis, a nineteenth century artist, was one of the
first to be aware of the implications of disciplinary integrity for
artistic creation.

One should remember that a painting--before being a warhorse,
a nude woman or some anecdote--is essentially a flat surface
covered with colors arranged in a certain order. (Quoted by
Jaffé, 1965, p. 139)

To continue within the idiom of the garden/painting analogy, Denis
"established the credo of the new spirit, saying, 'We must close the
shutters.' A painting was not to be an illusion" (Bell, p. 111).
Langer (1971) echoes the beliefs of many aestheticians when she
denies to the art experience metaphoric as if dimensions, thereby
decontextualizing art from the everyday flux of experiential associations
and resemblances. "A work of art differs from a genuine symbol --
that is, a symbol in the full and usual sense -- in that it does not
point beyond itself to something else" (p. 91). Within the formalistic
aesthetic, the artist creates what Nakov (1979, p. 30) calls a self-
contained "pictorial culture," in which a metaformal dialogue is acted
out upon the flat surface of the canvas. In many cases, modern fine
art is a visual treatise on its own epistemology.

The Historical-Institutional Character of Modern Fine Art

The history of why modern fine art has come to be separated from
everyday life and why artistic creation has come to be considered as
occuring outside societal norms can only be suggested here. The creation
of art which exhibits varying degrees of abstraction, art ensconced
in the museum setting, and the changing role of the artist from anony-
mous craftsperson to that of individualistic creator have contributed
significantly to art being defined and evaluated on the basis of how
greatly it differs from common experience. As other contributing fac-
tors to artistic decontextualization one might also cite developments
such as the Renaissance separation of crafts from the so-called higher

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arts, the artists' loss of religious patronage and the replacement of handicrafts by industrially produced goods.

Individualism and Change

Commensurate with disciplinary self-reference and the societal cult of individualism, in the nineteenth century there arose a belief in the artist as the interpreter, creator, and prophet of reality. To the artist was imputed the ability to reveal subconscious truths, to be ever-critical of "what is," to be at the very cutting edge of social change. As the creative individual par excellence, the artist has ostensibly not only the right but the duty to give expression to all manner of artistic creation. "Aesthetic imagination was regarded as the sacred fount of a spirit which would transfigure the world" (Alder, 1976b, p. 420). Mondrian, for example, envisioned a world based on pure design, without recourse to the natural environment or the clutter of everyday sentiments. In her book aptly titled Progress in Art, Gablik (1977) proposes that nonobjective art epitomizes the pinnacle of cognitive operations; in such art, human purpose and ingenuity have created a world untainted by material exigencies and utilitarianism. That is, nonobjective art is a humanly created synthetic language, sufficient unto itself.

A veritable kaleidoscope of change and human invention characterizes twentieth century life, i.e., rapidly changing technologies of exponential complexity; the proliferation of information that quickly becomes outdated; and a plethoric, ever-increasing production of goods that are designed to be discarded. Needless to say, there has been a commensurate loss of cultural traditions and stablilizing belief systems. As part of the modernity mandate for progress and change, art in this century has also been marked by a bewildering number of artistic styles, movements and isms. By mid-century, the carte blanche afforded human purpose and creativity often took on a farcical, if not pathological, cast. Existential angst in the larger society found expression in the institution of fine art which readily embraced anti-art movements, anti-anti-art movements, self-disintegrating art, body mutilation art, and art which remained a thought process. While much twentieth century art is often referred to as being "revolutionary", essentially modern artists have been concerned with the radical manipulation of the material means of art, rather than direct social involvement, let alone a confrontation with established social institutions. In actuality, avant-gardism has been socially programmatic, inasmuch as change, novelty, and invention are part of, rather than counter to, modernity (see Bell; Rosenburg, 1966).

The Reliance on Expert Knowledge

While modern fine art developed, in part, out of a reaction to excessive literary meanings in Victorian art, the modern artist, ironically, has created art forms highly dependent upon the literature of art criticism and theory for understanding and appreciation. Rapid stylistic changes, abstraction, and artistic self-reference have resulted in art that often requires extensive art study and expert interpretation (see Battcock, 1973).

He who depends, as his grandfather might have done, on the
normal processes of his social environment to introduce him
to the paintings and sculptures that form part of his culture
will end with neither art nor knowledge. (Rosenberg, p. 198)

As a synthetic, self-referenced language system, modern fine art
is part of the larger information society. Much as the understanding
and use of computer languages is not a birthright or acquired through
informal learning, the understanding of modern fine art requires expert
knowledge. One might suggest that modern fine art reveals class dis-
tinctions based on knowledge acquisition, or, more correctly, based
on whether or not the individual is part of, or has access to, the
official value system created by modernity. In essence, art knowledge
is a commodity; its possession is an indication of having shares in
the "cultural knowledge bank," enabling one to participate in, to para-
phrase Gouldner, the culture of aesthetic discourse (Schwartz, p. 31).
In modern fine art, the values of modernity are writ large. If modern
fine art is alienating and confusing to much of the public, it is
perhaps the modernity values of society which are actually being re-
jected or which are inaccessible (Hamblen, 1982).

Summary and Recommendations

The study of modern fine art can provide valuable insights into
the defining character and underlying assumptions of Western modernity.
In fact, modern art should be studied for some of the very reasons it
is dismissed as being of limited social consequence. Disciplinary
specialization, the isolation of experience from context, the credence
given to discipline-specific language codes, an emphasis on innovation
and individual freedom, etc., are all part of the legitimating structure
of modern society. These and other values of modernity constitute the
underlying, taken-for-granted assumptions of modern life upon which
many institutional attitudes, ideas and act ons are based. Not surpris-
ingly, as one of the institutions of modern society, modern fine art
also exhibits characteristics of modernity specialization and self-
reference. It is modern art's autonomy, its lack of contact with
everyday life, its continual change, and the artist's search for novelty
and claim of freedom from social restraint which make modern fine art
very much about modern society. Modern fine art is an integral part
of modern society specifically because it exhibits characteristics
unique to itself.

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MARGINAL IMAGES: ART AND IDEOLOGY IN THE SCHOOL

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Art has come to connote something that is eclectic and unpredictable. Art may be concerned with the aesthetic organization of visual elements, or it may defy conventional aesthetics; it may seek to interpret visual experience, or it may interpret psychological phenomenon that have no visual manifestation; it may have significant social content, or it may not. Art defies generalizations about its form, but welcomes more readily a characterization of its spirit. Art is inquiring, open-ended, illuminating, often startling. Art is very close to the central concerns and experiential reality of the artist. While it is increasingly difficult to say what art is, it is not difficult to have a clear intuitive awareness of what art feels like in relation to other basic human activities. In the context of social mechanization and pervasive pressure to ideological conformity, the importance of this intuition about the artistic spirit may surpass the importance of particular works of art.

When we think of art as it is taught in the elementary and secondary schools, however, our intuitions about the nature of art are assaulted by uninspiring certainties. Now art can be defined by clear and familiar criteria. Art in the schools is concerned with making art objects. These art objects resemble well-known prototypes -- nineteenth century landscape painting and sculpture, expressionist painting, commercial crafts, advertising design. Art in the schools rarely is concerned with significant social content. Art in the schools is heralded as the student's opportunity for "creative self-expression", yet is presented as an infrequent diversion, occurring on the distant periphery of the student's experience during the school years. The artistic process, rather than being inquiring and open-ended, is recipe-directed; and rather than resulting in shocks and illuminations, it produces only satisfaction or disappointment in the attainment of a conventional aesthetic norm. While there exist, happily, exceptions to this characterization of art in the schools, I believe that in most cases the characterization is accurate.

Why does this gap exist between the conception of art in life and art in school? While it may seem to an artist that school teachers simply do not know enough about art to teach art, I do not believe that this is the primary reason for the gap. Teachers are not the least informed sector of society with regard to the arts, and they have long had special access to artistic discourse through art education organizations. Nor is it the case that the arts have been singled out for unfair treatment in the schools. Rather, I believe that the arts in the schools are shaped (or mis-shaped) by the same social values that shape the teaching of all subjects in the schools. These values are 1) materialism, 2) scientific reductionism, and 3) conventionalism. While the arts are not alone in being subject to these pressures, it is certainly possible to argue that they are most severely affected by them.

Materialism, scientific reductionism, and conventionalism, are of
course not unique to schools. They are larger social forces. And it is
this that makes them so influential in the school. Sociologists of educa-
tion have long noted that one of the underlying functions of the school
is to reproduce the social order (Karabel and Halsey, 1977). Public
schooling in North America has performed this function from its inception,
from the time it taught the scriptures to a society for whom religion was
law. In the 1830's, Horace Mann expanded the curriculum to include the
subjects with which we are familiar in schools today, but the dominant in-
tent remained moralistic, to ensure the moral habits of an expanding working
and middle class (Karier, 1967). Further major developments in education
have been guided by similar motivations, aimed at ensuring a preferred
social order. The high school of the 1910's would provide vocational
training; the new science curriculum of the 1960's would answer Sputnik
with a North American technocratic elite. Rarely have major innovations
in education been motivated solely by deep humanistic concern or by a
commitment to intellectual integrity. The schools were founded to convey
preferred social values, and it would be a great oversight to ignore this
function in schools today. Hidden, perhaps, among the "objective" teachings
of reading, math, science, social studies, and the arts, the larger social
values are nevertheless instrumental in shaping how these subjects are taught.

Thus, if it can be said that art adheres more to a spirit than to a
form, then the same can be said of schooling. Except that the spirit is
different. When art occurs in schools, the conflict between these spirits
is implicit and will remain highly problematic until it is explicated and
thoughtfully resolved. I will examine here the nature of the implicit
conflict between artistic and school ideologies along the three dimensions
of materialism, scientific reductionism, and conventionalism. Materialism
of course needs no explanation here as a dominant theme in North American
culture. Children are taught to value the acquisition, maintenance, and
protection of material goods over human needs in everything they see about
them: extensive devotion to house and garden; peer pressure on clothing,
records, television, sports equipment; the high professional status of
real estate, insurance, and anything technological. In its effect on school
art programs, materialism has acted as a steady erosive force, and the
course of that erosion is not difficult to chart. Contemporary art educa-
tion in North America was founded on anything but materialist values.
Art was the most romantic element of the romantic child-centered movement
in education of the 1920's and 30's. During this time, new emphasis was
placed on the child's innate capacities. With the intellectual stimulus
of Freud and Jung, psychologists and educators began to see an inner world
in children that was deep in meaning, and conducive to emotional development
if it were made manifest. One educator wrote in 1932:

> The newer education is learning the uses of the
> mysterious forces of the spirit through which one may liber-
> ally educate oneself for all the important needs of living.
> It is like the heart beat; no one has found the source of
> its power but no one doubts that the source is within us.
> The creative spirit is another heart; it will keep us alive
> if we give it a chance to beat for us (Hartman and Shumaker,
> 1932).

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Art was seized upon as the way to make this inner world manifest. Painters like Klee, Kandinsky, and the German Expressionists validated this link between psychology and art. They, like the psychoanalysts, saw a profound inner world in child art (Haftmann, 1967), and then elaborated in their work the expression of this inner world, a world filled with fantasy, fears, sweeping emotions, and simple whimsy. European art teachers like Franz Cizek and Viktor Lowenfeld absorbed these charged artistic developments, and channeled them back to education (Efland, 1979). In the literature that soon emerged on creative self-expression in child art, the artistic process was seen as emerging from the child, being filled with deep fantasy, expressing emotions, depending entirely on motivation and not at all on visual deliberation. The social upheavals of the second world war brought many European art educators to the United States, where their ideals found company with a desire to develop the emotional aspect in children's education. The creative self-expression approach to art education established itself in the educator's and the public's mind, and has remained firmly embedded there.

It might seem from this brief historical review that art has been a romantic, inner-directed, anti-materialistic force in schools. And certainly it was this in its genesis, as well as the second wave of "process not product" rhetoric in the 1960's. But it was precisely because the founding rhetoric was anti-materialistic that it is so easy to see the shaping of school art by the materialist ethic. When the discourse of school art is dominated by terms like "creativity" and "self-expression", but the practice of the school arts is directed toward making conventional art objects for exhibition, then something is amiss. Either too little thought is being put into what "creativity" and "self-expression" mean, or these terms have passed into the realm of pure slogans that are not connected to practice at all. Most likely the latter is true. Through a remarkably effective process of cultural transmission, every parent, teacher, and child seems to know that creativity and self-expression (as well as the exercise of "talent" to produce "beauty") are the purposes of art. They also expect that the fulfillment of these ideals will consist of step-by-step instructions in silk-screen printing, tie-dying, batik, watercolor, macrame, enameling, metalwork, ceramics, weaving, acrylic painting, crayon resist, collage, mobiles, puppets, papier-mache, and numerous additional "media" which are commonly described in art education literature in spite of playing little role in contemporary culture.

What seems to have happened is that the originally subtle relationship between "inner worlds" and their physical manifestation in art has degenerated into a linking of slogans to recognizable art products -- any art products. While humanistic goals still have a plane in school arts rhetoric, they are valued much less in practice than are technology, recipes, and acceptable products. Teachers seek skills in as many media as possible, with skills defined as basic technique plus a demonstration of a conventionally acceptable product. I often remind my students that many artists spend their entire lives working in one medium -- for example, oils -- and spend little time concentrating on technique even within that medium. But then, of course, these painters do not work in schools where the social ethic calls for a new and different kind of product to be created every other Friday. Teachers and students function within a set of social pressures that can never be dismissed, and that only a clear analysis and strong will can counteract.

By submitting to the materialist ethic, art is both integrated into the school curriculum and guaranteed to fail within that curriculum. Fitted to a technological mold, art can not do what it does best. Its Friday afternoon miracles -- the pattern that emerges when the rubber bands are removed from the tie-dyed cloth, the straight line under the masking tape on the acrylic painting -- can not compete with the computer war game. The pot and painting, as products, are "enhancing" and "enriching" to the model home, and so they remain only enhancing and enriching, and thus peripheral, in the school curriculum. Without the spirit, there isn't much point to art; I think that any artist would affirm this simple point.

The pressure toward scientific reductionism in schools does not do much to preserve the artistic spirit either. By scientific reductionism I mean the tendency, widespread in twentieth century thought, to believe that all physical and psychological phenomena can be broken down to a set of discrete component parts. Thus human action is understood as a set of behaviors in response to stimuli and reinforcements. In art education, the reductionist tendency may be observed in the exaggerated dogmatic emphasis on visual elements and styles. Countless textbooks review the elements of line, shape, color, form and texture. In some, such as Johannes Itten's Bauhaus course Design and Form, the explanation is genuinely illuminating, giving depth and clarity to a formalist conception of art (Itten, 1963). But in others, contemporary derivatives of the Bauhaus approach, the reductionist tendency takes over. Now the visual elements are taken literally to be a language, and exercises with these elements become equated with art as a whole. Examples of good and bad approaches are given not only for shape and color, but also for less tangible concepts such as unity, balance, and rhythm. The desire to teach art as if it possessed a definite grammar surpasses by good measure the understanding of whether art in fact has a grammar at all (a questionable proposition, perhaps best treated by Christian Metz's statement that film is not a language; nevertheless film is like a language (Metz, 1974).

Styles too become stereotyped, as if they were preexisting categories that artists followed, rather than critical generalizations developed after the fact to describe what artists have done. Students are often asked to work in impressionist, cubist, and expressionist styles, with the chronologically later styles being understood to be the more advanced styles. The isms of the sixties and seventies are reserved for advanced work.

The social pressure of the reductionist ethic, like the materialist ethic, is unavoidable. The structure of twentieth century thought, and the structure of thinking experiences in school, demands a precise breakdown of a phenomenon even though that phenomenon may cease to exist once disassembled. I do not mean by this to revive the myth that art is such an intangible and mystical experience that it cannot be systematically analyzed. Rather, I mean to make the distinction that the useful and productive analysis is more likely to occur through critical and phenomenological methods than through reductionist ones. Scientific reductionism does not destroy interest in art as much as it makes it out to be a duller, less vital occupation that it can be. Scientific reductionism ultimately creates an art in its own mold, an art of patterns and forms that are equally at home in the engineering laboratory or the computer screen as

they are in the artist's studio. This art fulfills reductionist predictions by being built upon identifiable elements; but this art represents only a limited genre of formalist art, and does little to help us understand the dominant aesthetic and social forces of contemporary art. The "visual vocabulary" art serves only to support the ethic of scientific reductionism that is so central to North American economic and social systems, and does little to support the plurality of aesthetic systems that art has the potential to bring to society.

Reductionism encourages one type of conventional product in school art, but not the most conventional type. Schools constantly look back to those styles which have been labeled and celebrated. The single criterion for emulating these styles is that they are widely known as a style. The style may be as popular as naturalistic still-life painting, but it may also be as unpopular as Rauschenberg's assemblage or as poorly understood as Cubism. But it is crucial that it is historically identifiable. Through its identifiability, the style becomes liable to simpler and simpler labeling, until the history of art becomes a succession of pointed brush-strokes, geometric shapes, and dripping paint, in that order. "Styles" are conveniently matched with techniques, such as the dripping paint style with the straw technique to blow patterns in nursery school. Or the assemblage style and the junk technique. "Don't throw away your junk," is an admonition I have heard several times among the more progressive teachers, "Bring it to the art class."

The overarching conflict between the ideologies of art and schooling, a conflict which has been implicit in the discussion of materialism and reductionism, emerges clearly in this preference for conventions. The conflict is simply this: art asks for new ways of seeing, schooling (historically) has encouraged fixed ways of seeing. Conventional patriotic figures are identified as heroes in school, when they have little heroic effect on contemporary life. North American and European military battles are singled out for intensive study, while South American, African and Asian social history receives passing notice at most. These aspects of the curriculum are evidence of a conventional view of reality, a view that fixes social reality within a particular cultural perspective and reflects specific social interests. And with this conventional, fixed view, it is very difficult to deal with a subject that represents an anti-thetical position. This is the conflict that emerges when schooling and art meet. Art demands an open and critical attitude toward the exploratory and inventive; schooling, seeking to evaluate the student's grasp of identifiable subject matter along a right and wrong scale, can not cope with this openness and uncertainty.

One might argue at this point that I have sketched my case too broadly, that the ideology of schooling can not be so sharply delineated. And clearly (indeed happily) there are many art teachers whose teaching practices do complete justice to the spirit of art, whose students learn to see more fully and develop a critical attitude toward contemporary culture. Yet no matter how many of these teachers and students are enthusiastically acting as artists in schools, the question must be raised as to why their enthusiasm has not spread more rapidly to the wider community of teachers and students. And why, conversely, has the culture of school art described here developed very rapidly, and without the sanction of the larger intellectual and artistic community? The answer to these

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questions can only be framed in the context of a larger pattern of social values that operate in schools and that work to shape the teaching of art whenever it is introduced in the school.

The alternative to this sketch of school ideology is not likely to be found in an opposing historical interpretation of schools. Rather, an alternative view is found in the realm of educational ideals, in the writings of educational philosophers such as John Dewey and Paolo Freire. For these writers, education and art have much in common. Education, like art, seeks to develop new ways of seeing and new intellectual resources for responding critically to problematic situations (Dewey, 1939; Freire, 1970). Education, like art, begins with the experience of the individual set in a social context, and seeks to develop that experience in a socially constructive manner. And education, like art, encourages the communication of different perspectives from individual to individual, and from community to community. In Dewey's and Freire's view, and in the view of many educators, this is the type of education that invites art to do what it does best, because it is art that builds upon individual and social experience to develop new ways of seeing social reality.

Thus it is ironic that this essay has had to note the opposition of schooling and art, when in theory the purposes and procedural principles of education and art are indistinguishable. In a school that fulfilled Dewey's and Freire's vision of education, the nature of school art could not be as I have described it here. School art would be changed, first, simply by being accepted. Educators would share in the intuition of what art feels like, and look for that intuition in school art activities. Materialsim would give way to mentalism, an interest in the mental experience represented by artistic form, rather than in the sheer physical form itself. The history of art would become not a chronology of technological styles but an array of interpretations of social reality. As Panofsky notes in Meaning in the Visual Arts, the world view made manifest by the work of art is nothing less than the content of the work itself (Panofsky, 1955). By examining perceptual evidence and restating it as clearly as possible, the artist does his basic work. He makes known to himself and to others the mental images that compose his experience of the world. Through the course of his work he reveals how those images combine into readings of social life and social issues -- as Vertov's films show a different Soviet Union than Eisenstein's, and as De Kooning represents a different sexual and emotional world than Bacon, or Hockney, or O'Keeffe. The artist's work makes contributions to intellectual and emotional life that far surpass the materialistic evaluation of the art object. The ee artist represents and structures his or her own knowledge of the world through the artwork, and invents symbolic means for communicating that knowledge to others.

The representational and communicative functions are basic to art, and are equally basic to education. In his literacy programs in Brazil, Freire called for educators to encourage learners to reconstruct their views of social situations that directly affected their lives (Freire, 1973). It is precisely this goal that the artistic process is designed, by its nature, to serve. Rather than dwell on the properties of the "art media," art becomes concerned with the mental structures that give artifacts their life. And once liberated from its material mold, the artistic image becomes the educationally relevant image as well.

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With a changed ideology in schools, scientific reductionism would give way to its long overdue successor, phenomenological criticism. The reductionist movement, through its negligent attitude toward such basic phenomena as consciousness, perception, and the social organization of knowledge, has left behind it an immense vacuum in formal knowledge. What is needed now, not only in the arts but in the social sciences as well, is an introduction to critical methods that provide a multi-focal approach to social reality. And here again, recent experience in the contemporary arts provides the exemplar. Film critics regularly compare semiotic, structuralist, psychoanalystic, formalist, and phenomenological critiques of the same films. The film is illuminated, its meaning enlarged and clarified, through this process of interchange and comparison. In schools, children desperately need to gain at least the feeling of what the critical process is about. They need to know, for example, that there are many ways of seeing the experience of minority groups, not the one way represented by the wire services and the television networks. They need to know that news reports are interpretations rather than incontrovertible facts; and that not only can a pen leave behind relevant features of a social event, but a camera can as well. The phenomenological attitude seems to me the most inspiring of the contemporary critical methodologies, and not a difficult one to translate into the educational practice. In biology, social studies, or English, the phenomenological attitude as modeled by art critics would simply ask children to look more carefully for relevant features, to relate interpretations more closely to the evidence, and to value the interpretations of others.

Conventionalism would face a struggle in the new school as well. The constructive and critical attitude of the artistic activity would work against the inertia and stereotyping of convention. Conventions, of course, are no less a part of the art world than the school world. But the underlying spirit of art works systematically against convention. It works for a reexamination of established reality constructions, which means a continual replacing of stereotyped images with images that more adequately represent both the data and feel of contemporary experience. The artist seeks to be non-conventional, not in the cliched Bohemian sense, but in ways that matter in contemporary society. Artists now are increasingly questioning, for example, the convention of individual self-expression as a characterization of the artistic process; they are reestablishing a social role for the artist that has not been visible under the massive rhetoric of court art, patronage art, and celebrated art. If the artist's self-critique of his individualistic past were brought into the school, it would provide the ideal model of the self-critical, socially cooperative education that Dewey and Freire delineate. Artists could help students develop their roles as social investigators and community spokespersons, roles that have become stereotyped and thus neglected in their traditional "civics" context in the curriculum.

Could schools take this kind of open questioning both of social phenomena and of the learner's response to those phenomena? From the historical evidence, one does not know if they could sustain the will for this kind of enterprise; but from a philosophical analysis, one can not doubt that they are obliged to try.

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Art would benefit from a valid association with schools as much as schools would benefit from art. While this essay has taken a critical attitude toward the history of schools and a favourable attitude towards the ideals of art, the distribution of problems and merits in each field is of course not entirely one-sided. The ideals of art also outstrip its contemporary performance, especially its most visible (museum-exhibited, book-published) contemporary manifestations. The artist's ideal of representing authentic perspectives toward social reality requires a broader base of committed artists if it is to be fully realized. Reality constructions in art must represent diverse cultural and class experience, if art is not to function only as an esoteric affirmation of dominant cultural values. The public school, obviously, is the meeting ground where the public and art could come in contact to redefine each other. From increased contact with the public school, art might lose its marginal status not only in the school, but in society as well.

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FOR CULTURAL DEMOCRACY:
A CRITIQUE OF ELITISM IN ART EDUCATION

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In the spirit of the poet and art critic, Charles Baudelaire, the essay which follows is "partial, passionate, and political." As such, it stands in direct contrast to the kind of critical writing the poet decried, "cold [and] mathematical which, on the pretext of explaining everything has neither love nore hate, and voluntarily strips itself of every shred of temperament." (1846)

To its credit, Ralph A. Smith's (1981) passionate argument for elitism in art education, "Elitism Versus Populism: A Question of Quality," elicited from me an equally partial and passionate response. This response focuses on Dr. Smith's essay and the Reagan administration's arts policy position because, taken together, they are the clearest and most unequivocal defenses of elitist art education policy that this writer knows.

It should be noted that the introductory section of this essay appeared as a "Commentary" in the November, 1981 issue of Art Education.

Introduction

After reading a good deal about the Reagan administration's proposed arts policy, I was a bit shaken to discover a strikingly Reagan-like art education policy espoused in the front pages of the July, 1981 issue of Art Education. Was it possible that the nationwide rise of political and cultural conservatism was finding its way into the ranks of our own profession? Over the years, I had come to know art educators as persons of generally liberal persuasion, but here was philosophy and rhetoric to match the best of the Reagan arts advisors. The article causing my surprise was "Elitism Versus Populism: A Question of Quality." The writer was Ralph A. Smith, Executive Secretary of the Council for Policy Studies in Art Education, a group which seeks to promulgate and assess policy for the profession.

In the past I had seen Smith take what I would call liberal positions on certain issues. For example, his opposition to competency-based education as a dehumanizing, technocratic form of training, not education. What I had not realized at the time was the conservative, elitist nature of Smith's basic philosophy of art education, especially his view as to what constitutes correct content for our discipline (Smith, 1981). The shock of full recognition did not strike home until

I had read over and over again the remarkably similar positions held by
Smith and the Reagan arts advisors, and then put both to the litmus test
of asking, "What does all this mean in terms of the real world?" The
answer was clear in both cases: the startling elimination of popular,
folk, ethnic, applied, social, and political art as cultural forms worthy
of federal support and art teaching, respectively. Based on the intel-
lectual justifications provided by the Reagan arts advisors and Smith,
the place of the popular or "people's arts" in the National Endowment
for the Arts (NEA) and in the schools, museums, and community arts centers
of this country would be severely reduced, or eliminated. Fine or "high"
art would reign supreme. In fact, it would be the primary--or possibly
the only--form of art which would be federally funded and, following
Smith's philosophy, taught in art education settings nationwide. What
such philosophy and practice represents is a conservative, elitist, and
historically reactionary response to the "expansion arts" [1] developed
under the Carter administration (Kramer, 1980), and the significant
cultural advances made in art education over the past decade.[2] The Women's
Caucus, Committee on Minority Concerns, United States Society for Education
through Art, the Social Theory Caucus, and Environmental Design and Rural
Art Educators special interest groups--all products of the last decade--
should take serious note. Hard-earned socio-cultural gains of recent
years are now under heavy philosophical and political attack from both
inside and outside the profession.

The Elitist Conception of Culture

Getting to the crux of the matter, let us see how Smith and the
Reagan advisors define "fine art" and how they justify it as the primary
or only category of art worthy of being funded and being taught. According
to Smith, fine art is "elite art," "the kind of art appreciated by
genuinely open elites, that is elites composed of persons with a higher
degree of education than that found in the general population." (1981)
The Heritage Foundation Report (Martin, 1981), which serves as justi-
fication for the Reagan arts policy, echoes the Smith definition:

> The arts that the NEA funds must support belong
> primarily to the area of high culture. Such culture is
> more than mere entertainment, and is concerned with per-
> manent values beyond current tastes and wide appeal.

As Smith notes, fine art is "the best" art, the "more difficult, aesthetic-
ally more rewarding" art, the art whose "artistic merit has been certified."

Rebuttal to Elitist Cultural Philosophy

The Big Question suddenly lights up the sky: Certified by whom?
Who certifies that certain forms of art (e.g., popular, ethnic, folk)
are "mere entertainment" whereas another form (i.e., fine art) is of
"permanent value?" Who decides that one form of art is political and
another above and beyond politics? Who defines the terms, decides upon
evaluative criteria, and determines the rules of the game? Why, the
experts, of course: persons like Smith and the Reagan arts advisors--

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partial, passionate, and political proponents of high culture. It is on this most-important-of-all question, and the circular reasoning that justifies it, that the arguments of Smith and the Reagan advisors begin to fall apart.

Easiest to rebut is Smith's contention that fine art is the type of art preferred by open elites--those persons, groups, or classes with "a higher degree of educational attainment than that found in the general population." It is only too apparent that there are many persons of higher educational attainment in our society and, more specifically, in our own field--e.g. the members of the professional special interest groups named above, and others--who value popular, ethnic, folk, applied, social, and political art as much as, or possibly even more than, works of traditional fine art. Must we dismiss all of these persons and groups as not being of a sufficiently "high degree of educational attainment," or rather, as being simply misguided or mistaken in their cultural pre-ferences? Perhaps only those persons and groups--and only highly educated ones at that--who agree with the Smith/Reaganite definition of fine art (and its preferred formalist aesthetic criteria of judgment) should qualify as "open elites" capable of defining and determining arts policy?

A second contention which is not difficult to rebut concerns the assertion that fine art is characterized by "high standards," "the pursuit of perfection," and "excellence," (Smith, 1981) whereas ethnic, folk, popular, social, and political artforms are not. All of us could, I think, agree that artists working in every conceivable form--popular, folk, ethnic, propaganda, film, video documentary, commercial photography, graphic design, etc.--can and do achieve "fine art" standards, and do create art of "permanent value." The fact that some of this art, like some fine art, has proven to have lasting value and "the integrity of great art" (Martin, 1981)--and that it is represented in the most respected art museums, books, and journals--only confirms that the finest art is a matter of, not category, but of rich, complex quality.

The Reagan art advisors, the new champions of formalist aesthetics, contend that art which is primarily concerned with social or political content should not be federally funded because it is prone to be of lesser "artistic merit" (Kramer, 1980). This contention is summarily refuted by an examination of art history. The creation of art which is supposedly separate from life (art for art's sake) and its accompanying philosophy of aesthetic formalism are recent phenomena, being no more than two hun-dred years old (Hauser, 1951, 5-25). Almost all high art prior to the Romantic period, as well as much fine and popular art of the last two centuries, has been deeply concerned with socio-cultural and/or political content. This in no way has reduced its artistic merit; witness the Parthenon, Gothic cathedrals, the Sistine Chapel ceiling, the consciously political paintings of David, Goya, Delacroix, Courbet, Picasso's Guernica, and all of the great often-anonymous folk and popular art--concerned with the everyday lives, struggles, and triumphs of common people--that have come down to us over the generations.

The related contention that the extra-aesthetic(i.e., practical,

psychological, socio-cultural, political) dimensions of art are less
worthy of study and experience than the purely aesthetic dimension
finds itself opposed by many art educators both past and present (Logan,
1955). Many contemporary art educators of "higher educational attain-
ment," have come, for example, to view the socially humanizing values
of art experience and study as being at least as important as the benefits
derived from formalist aesthetic experiences. For socially concerned art
educators, the following goals have become of the utmost importance:
multicultural understanding through art; critical understanding of the
dominant visual culture, especially its more manipulative and dehuman-
izing aspects; critical understanding of the way in which the larger social
context shapes art and art education; actual improvement of our individual
and collective lives through art study, experience, and practice.[3] For
art educators of formalist persuasion to discredit or ignore the social
dimension of the study, experience and practice of art seems exceedingly
narrow, as well as irresponsible. Supporters of a socially relevant art
education therefore are gratified that the NAEA has issued an "Art in
the Mainstream" (Feldman, 1982) policy statement wherein the social sig-
nificance of art as work, language, and values is emphasized.

Those who favor aesthetic formalism and essentialism by main-
taining that art education ought to concern itself only with art-centered
goals and thus avoid any analysis of socio-cultural and political values,
represents a severely reductionist, as well as unrealistic, point of view.
Fine art, even the most "art for art's sake" art, is socially and politic-
ally involved. The most abstract art bears a social message about the world
and the place of the artist and viewer in that world. The most consciously
asocial and apolitical works of art--as well as aesthetic experience which
many assume to be transcendentally detached from life and culture--function
in tangible socio-cultural and political ways in our society. In actual
effect, they qualify as political art and aesthetic experience; that is,
they serve to either strengthen(i.e., conserve) or change--in reactionary
or progressive ways--the socio-cultural, politico-economic order that
governs and shapes our daily lives (Hauser, 1951, pp 5-25).

Elitist Art Education and the Dominant Social Order

Where, one might then ask, do the various philosophies of art
education fit into the overall scheme of contemporary American culture
and politics? More specifically, and relative to our discussion, where
does elitist art education fit into the overall scheme of American society?
Giffhorn (1978) and Feldman (1978) have offered insightful answers to
these questions. The Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education was specif-
ically brought into existence to study the connections between art, education
and its social context (Bersson, 1980).

The connection between elitist art education and the cultural
policy of our society's power elite is most clearly seen in the strik-
ingly similar philosophies advocated by Ralph Smith and the Reagan arts
advisors. Both represent the cultural philosophy of oligarchy, as opposed
to the cultural philosophy of democracy; that is, culture created of and

by the few, as opposed to culture created of, by, and for the many. Elitist cultural policy is largely certified, shaped, financed, and proceduced by the wealthy, powerful and academically educated. It is transmitted to the larger public by primarily middle-class art specialists and educators who are of upper-class cultural persuasion. That upper-class collectors, museum trustees, gallery owners, art book and magazine publishers shape, as well as prefer, high culture is no secret. In this respect, high culture is clearly class-based culture (Bersson, 1981a). Feldman (1978), in his excellent article, "A Socialist Critique of Art History in the U.S.A.," has incisively explicated this process by which middle-class art historians, critics, and the "fine art" educators have become the often unconscious guardians, champions, and educational emmisaries of the upper-class power elite. Ardent proponents of expertism, essentialism, and aesthetic formalism in art education must become aware of how they have become cultural allies of, and educators for, the arts policy of the Reagan administration and upper-class America. If we, as art educators, are concerned with the real world implications of art and education, we must look beyond the walls of our universities, museums, and public school classrooms in order to realize the larger socio-cultural and political effects of our philosophies and actions.

For Cultural Democracy in Art/Education

What I believe art educators should be arguing for is "cultural democracy," which is succinctly defined as "culture created of, by, and for all the people." Cultural democracy equates with equality of opportunity for all persons, classes, and groups to create, study, and enjoy the arts. It is culture as a human right and not as an upper-class privilege. Cultural democracy does not mean "forced equality of results" (Smith, 1981). Cultural democracy, or "egalitarianism "--a term Smith distorts in his article--does not equate with "a flat philosophy of the equality of everything." In point of fact, it means the opposite. It means pluralism, diversity, variety, difference. It means financial and educational support for the full range of visual culture. Employing an analogy from the world of music, we support our composers and performers of classical music, but we also support our jazz and folk musicians, labor balladeers, ethnic and neighborhood artists.

Elitist Fear of Cultural Democracy

The Reagan advisors and Smith seem to be afraid of putting cultural power in the hands of the "untutored" masses. Scenes of women textile workers making documentary films about their past struggles and black youth finding out about their roots through artist-in-residence blues singers in the schools apparently send shudders up the spines of the Reagan arts advisors (Adler, Hager, and Shabad, 1981). More cultural democracy does mean more participation and power for the "untutored" common folk. Putting political, economic, and cultural power (i.e., democracy) in the hands of middle- and lower-class persons and groups has always caused fear among elites, and with good reason. Such sharing or democratization of power threatens upper-class political, economic, and cultural hegemony. In this well founded upper-class fear, and the surrounding air of superi-

ority that hides it, is a deepseated apprehension about, and resistance to, change. Thus the frequent connection between upper-class elitism and conservatism. Somehow the unschooled masses might come to share power with the upper classes, just as these classes have appropriated power from 'ne artistocratic and clerical ruling classes that came before them. This fear by the elite--often paranoiac--surfaces at times in their language, images, and references. We have Smith, for example, through the words of Barbara Tuchman, comparing the cultural sentiments of the "new egalitarians" or "populists" to those of the "Jacobins denouncing aristocrats to the guillotine." A more vivid example of elitist fear of the democratization of culture could probably not be found.

Conclusion

As art educators, we cannot be--and most of us are not--afraid of "the people." What makes us art educators is our concern for the education of the larger public. We are committed, not to art education for the privileged few, but to art study, practice, and experience for all people. An elitist art education, one based in fear of and insufficient respect for all the citizens of our multicultural, multiclass society, cannot be our way. Our road can only be toward cultural democracy, and the tolerance, respect, and equality of opportunit that it brings.

Cultural democracy, with its values of generosity and tolerance, is the only cultural and educational policy capable of embracing both elitism and populism. Reagan's arts policy which amounts to "elite art for the elite" is certainly not desirable; nor is Smith's well-intentioned but restrictive art education policy which would mean "elite art for the masses." What we do want is art and art experience of, by, and for all the people. As United State Congressman Sidney Yates has asserted, "What we want is elitism plus populism. We want quality in the arts, and we want the arts represented throughout the country "(Martin, 1981)-- in every neighborhood, and among every group and class.

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Reference Notes

1. The Expansion Arts Program is described in the National Council on the Arts' <u>Advancing the Arts in America</u> (July 1981) as "a point of entry for developing groups that are established and reflect the culture of minority, blue collar, rural, and low-income communities."

2. In addition to the development of the National Art Education Association affiliate and special interest groups subsequently cited, major art education texts with a socio-cultural focus we were published during this decade, among them: Edmund Feldman's <u>Becoming Human Through Art</u> (1970); June King McFee and Rogena M. Degge's <u>Art, Culture, and Environment: A Catalyst for Teaching</u> (1977); Eugene Grigsby's <u>Art and Ethnics</u> (1977); Laura Chapman's <u>Approaches to Art in Education</u>(1978); and Vincent Lanier's <u>The Arts We See</u> (1982).

3. See the following recent articles which are concerned with one or more of these goals. Graeme Chalmer's "Art Education as Ethnology," <u>Studies in Art Education</u>, 1981, <u>22</u>(3); Hermine Feinstein's "Art Means Values," Art Education, 1982, <u>35</u>(5); Vincent Lanier's "Six Items on the Agenda for the Eighties," <u>Art Education</u>, 1980, <u>33</u>(5); and Daniel Nadaner's "Recognizing Social Issues in the Art Curriculum," in <u>Bulletin of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education</u>, 1982, <u>2</u>.

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ELITISM VERSUS POPULISM:
THE CONTINUING DEBATE[1]

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"Elitism vs. populism" identifies dichotomous stances that are increasingly causing acrimony among those concerned with defining cultural and educational relations. Not surprisingly, the controversy is one of the sundry things touched on by the Rockefeller Commission Report <u>The Humanities in American Life</u>.[2] The report characterizes the opposing positions as follows:

> Some people think it elitist to point out that our cult.ire arose in what is generally described as the Western tradition; populist to affirm that Native and Latin American, African, and Asian cultures also form our heritage. Elitism is associated with high culture, which ofteu refers to a finite list of works, authors, and standards; populism with popular culture, which has an inexhaustible list. The rich are thought elitist because they can afford educational and cultural activities the poor cannot. Those who emphasize our common culture are sometimes called elitist, whereas those who accentuate cultural pluralism are called populist. Maintaining traditional forms of cultural expression is often viewed as elitist, whereas admiring novelty and spontaneity is apparently a populist trait. It is allegedly elitist to advocate the preservation of cultural resources, populist to urge broad access to them.

At one level, the report appears to express weariness with the entire issue, claiming that the dispute prevents us from coming to terms with genuine problems in our culture and that some of the divisions are more artificial than real--e.g., does not our heritage contain non-Western as well as Western elements, examples from popular as well as from high culture? In almost the same breath, however, the report warns that populist and elitist orientations "express tension between cultural views that are sometimes <u>irreconcilable</u> [emphasis added] and often must compete for limited resources...." But having acknowledged tensions and declared viewpoints

irreconcilable, the report cannot have it both ways sim. ly by formulating a new set of principles.3 These remarks will therefore follow another strategy, one that leaves open the possibility of narrowing the gulf separating the contending parties. To be sure, the chances for achieving this goal are slim so long as debate degenerates into ideological haggling and name-calling. Since, moreover, during such exchanges, elitism suffers by being used as a term of derogation while populism retains an aura of democratic virtue, an effort to rehabilitate elitism is in order before a reconciliation is attempted.

For present purposes, a useful outlook on elitism is provided by Stuart Hampshire,4 who writes that elitists accept four propositions. An elitist, that is, believes

> first, that there is a tradition of great, and
> of very good and interesting work, in each of the
> liberal arts, and that there is good reason to
> expect ...that these traditions are being pro-
> longed into the future. Second, that at any time
> a minority of otherwise intelligent persons, in-
> cluding artists, are deeply interested in one, or
> more, of the arts, and have devoted a considerable
> part of their lives to their involvement with them,
> and to thinking about them. The judgments of
> artistic merit by such persons, who are not dif-
> ficult to recognize, are the best guides to artistic
> merit that we have....Third, that enjoyment of one
> or more of the arts is one of the most intense and
> most consoling enjoyments open to men, and also the
> principal source of continued history and of pride
> and of sense of unity for any city, nation, or
> empire. Fourth, very often, though not always, a
> good artist does not create his own public within
> his lifetime and needs support, if he is to work
> as well as he might....

It follows from these beliefs that elitists set some store by the ideas of tradition, continuity, judgment, and competence. Nothing in Hampshire's four propositions, however, implies that elitists are necessarily cultural snobs, insensitive to minority or ethnic interests, antidemocratic, or contemptuous of popular culture. Neither do these propositions demand that access to the heritage be restricted, nor intimate that the masses are incapable of acquiring a taste for high culture. In short, much of what elitism is often criticized for is not part of Hampshire's description of it. Still, it is difficult to imagine that Hampshire's position would change the minds of avowed populists who bridle at the suggestion that judgments of artistic merit are necessary and, what is more, that they are to be made by a minority (artists, critics) specially qualified for the task; this, they would charge, constitutes an unwarranted imposition of elite tastes.

Whether one finds judgments by an aesthetic elite objectionable or

not, they are the manner in which artistic merit has usually been determined, a point to which Lord Kenneth Clark bears witness when he writes, " would deduce from history this first law...of the relationship of art and society: that visual art, whether it takes the form of image or ornament, is made by a minority [i.e., an elite] for a minority but accepted by the majority unquestionably, eagerly, and with a sense of participation."[5] One might suppose populists unpersuaded, however, for they would interpret tne historical record only as confirming their conviction that the masses have long been deluded and that it was high time they were undeceived and ready to defend their own preferences in art.

And the right of the masses to their own culture is, of course, a central tenet of what is called the new egalitarianism (a term here taken to be nearly synonymous with "populism"). Herbert Gans,[6] for example, would disagree with Hampshire's claim that only experts are "the best guides to artistic merit that we have." Since the United States is a democracy, culture should reflect the people's tastes. Knowing what they like, the people ought to be given the art they want. In other words, since there can be no disputing the value of people's preferences, considerations of quality and merit are to be abandoned in favor of a de gustibus principle. What are the likely consequences?

Some are described by Barbara Tuchman[7] in an indignant article. "The new egalitarians," she writes, "would like to make the whole question of quality vanish by adopting a flat philosophy of the equality of everything. No fact or event is of greater or less value than any other; no person or thing is superior or inferior to any other. Any reference to quality is instantly castigated as elitism, which seems to inspire in users of the word the sentiments of Jacobins denouncing aristos to the guillotine." Tuchman's objections are in part aesthetic: a "flat philosophy of the equality of everything" presents an uninspiring prospect; nothing stands out to attract attention or admiration.

But the new egalitarianism can also be faulted on pragmatic grounds. Hampshire, it will be recalled, said that even good artists may need support. In modern times, this has increasingly been understood to mean government support, which in turn has resulted in government policies for financial aid to art and artists. Yet how are such policies possible under the populist proscription of judgments of artistic merit? In the absence of standards of promoting the best, all that can be done is to distribute cultural resources equitably and to satisfy as many interests as possible. Once it is discovered, however, how wide-ranging cultural interests are and how new ones can be thought up overnight (especially when it is believed there is money available to satisfy them), a de gustibus principle becomes untenable because unmanageable.

The preceding remarks were intended to disencumber the term "elitism" of some of its undeserved negative connotations. But it should also be asked whether the new egalitarianism deserves its reputation for serving the best interests of the people. Sir Roy Shaw[8] has broached just this issue as part of his examination of the popular (and populist) view that because Western culture--the culture of Titian, Shakespeare, and Bach--is middle-class or bourgeois in its origins, it can have no relevance for

today's working classes and that those who insist it can are perpetrating
one of the major deceits of the twenthieth century. This position, Shaw
contends, is rife with hypocrisy:

> Some of those who invoke the title of democrats seem
> to believe that the most are incapable of appreciating
> the best and so you must give them something less than
> the best specially prepared for their weaker consti-
> tutions. However, they grossly misuse the word "elitist"
> by using it to smear anyone who champions traditional
> arts or high standards in them. These so-called demo-
> crats are elitists in the proper sense of the term.
> They agree with cultural snobs that the high arts should
> be preserved for the elite, a privileged few and the
> rest of the population should have something else.

He concludes that attacks on elitism are often "polictically inspired
philistinism at best, and advocacy of a form of cultural apartheid at
worst...."

The great hypocrisy of the new egalitarianism, then, consists in
this: cultural apartheid--i.e., giving the masses less than the best--
violates a sacred democratic principle, the individual's right to self-
improvement. Many who came from backgrounds that did not include an
appreciation of the fine arts but who were fortunate to have been en-
couraged to educate themselves to "one of the most intense and most
consoling enjoyments open to men" (Hampshire) should have no difficulty
in understanding the severity of Shaw's charge against populism.

If this particular indictment is seen to even the score somewhat
in favor of elitism, it still has done nothing to effect a rapprochement
between elitism and populism. Yet conciliation is not out of the question.
One needs only to remember that the present discussion has equated popu-
lism with the "new" egalitarianism, which suggests that "egalitarianism"
also has a traditional meaning. In an illuminating essay, the late Charles
Frankel[9] wrote of the old egalitarianism that its virtues consisted of
"chivalry, loyalty, generosity, at least a rough courtesy, self-reliance
and self-discipline, an eagerness to improve oneself but also a sense of
amusement at oneself, respect for an honest day's work and getting one's
hands dirty, a capacity to tell the genuine article from the fake, and a
certain earthiness and imperiousness to gentility." Such virtues, says
Frankel, "were drawn from the traditions and experiences of all classes;
and while it [traditional egalitarianism] espoused equality, it did so in
recognition of the value of other things which create differences, partisan
feelings, and stratification in society," not least of which was "the need
in every society to give public recognition to things noble and excellent
lest everything in the society's culture be regarded as disposable." Such
considerations, he says, do not subvert the principle of equality, they
merely set limits on it and keep it sane. Judgment, excellence, limitation,
sanity--these attributes certainly make the old egalitarianism compatible
with the kind of elitism described by Hampshire and defended by Shaw, an
elitist egalitarianism or egalitarian elitism that aims at the best for

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the most and pays the majority of the people the compliment of believing them capable of appreciating the best. Here, then, is a reconciliation between elitism and populism that could appeal to the best sentiments of educators.

Realistically speaking, however, what hopes are there for resolving the "elitism vs. populism" dilemma in art and aesthetic education in the direction of the old egalitarianism? One might expect that periods of consolidation such as the one we are said to be passing through at the moment would be more receptive to ideas of the kind just expressed-- ideas that would have been laughed out of most forums in the 1960's. But optimism would be premature, for the opposition remains formidable. Energetically promoted by influential sponsors, the panaceas of the populist/pluralist recent past continue to be urged upon the public.[10] And new voices are beginning to be heard which, should their chorus swell, would drown out the concerns discussed here. These voices belong to the new social critics (or critical theorists) whose writings emphasize the links between art and its social, economic, and political conditions and who tend to believe that the function of art and aesthetic education is to promote radical social change, meaning that the study and appreciation of art for its unique qualities and satisfactions get subordinated to ideo- logical interests. This is not to say that all critical theorists and their followers are hardened ideologues; some serious work is obviously being done. But there is also some adolescent dabbling and thrill-seeking, as evidenced by unexpected references to Marx and condemnations of capitalism from previously timid and conservative writers.

The path of sane compromise is thus strewn with sizable obstacles, and those bold enough to set foot on it may wish to draw inspiration from the famous words of Matthew Arnold:[11] "The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to another, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional,exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light."

Footnotes

[1]Versions of these remarks have appeared in Cultural and Educational Affairs 2 (January 1981), the newsletter of the Council for Policy Studies and Art Education, and Art Education (July 1981).

[2]Report of the Commission on the Humanities, The Humanities in American Life (Berkely: University of California Press, 1980).

[3]Several critics--among them Hilton Kramer, Samuel Lipman, and Ronald Berman--have pointed out the report's characteristic squeamishness about taking a frim stand, a failure of nerve also evident in its reluctance to define the humanities with any decisiveness.

[4]Stuart Hampshire, "Private Pleasures and the Pbulic Purse," Times Literary Supplement, 13 May 1977; a review of Janet Minihan, The Nationalization of Culture (New York: New York University Press, 1977).

[5]Lord Kenneth Clark, "Art and Society," in The Sociology of Art and Literature: A Reader, ed. M.C. Albrecht et al. (New York: Praegers, 1980).

[6]Herbert J. Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[7]Barbara Tuchman, "The Decline of Quality," New York Times Magazine, 2 November, 1980.

[8]Sir Roy Shaw, "Education and the Arts," in The Arts and Personal Growth, ed. M. Ross (New York: Pergamon, 1980); cf. "Elitism versus Populism in the Arts," City Arts Series, ed. J. Pick (Eastbourne, E. Sussex: John Oxford, n.d.).

[9]Charles Frankel, "The New Egalitarianism and the Old," Commentary 56 (3), September 1973.

[10]I am thinking primarily of The Arts, Education, Americans Panel, David Rockefeller, JR., Chairman, Coming to Our Senses (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), which, though distinctly out of joint with the times, is still systematically promoted by the interests that brought it into being.

[11]Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, quoted (which is the point here) in Lawrence A. Cremin, The Genius of American Education (New York: Random House [Vintage], 1966).

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A CRITIQUE OF ELLIOT EISNER'S EDUCATING ARTISTIC VISION

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I would like to begin with an image of a wolf pack. In a wolf pack the younger and less threatening members are allowed to take playful nips and bites at their leaders, whereas those wolves ranked just below the top do not have this privilege. Challenge for leadership is only taken seriously by a wolf of equal status. This same game is played in academic circles. It preserves the illusion that we live in an egalitarian liberal climate--all voices are given an equal primordial howl; sometimes, if one is lucky, it even results in cosmetic change--the fur is left threadbare.

Educating Artistic Vision is an "old" book written a decade ago. As such there are many aspects in it, I'm sure, Eisner would not accept today. Therefore, the critique is made by keeping his later works, particularly The Educational Imagination (1979), in mind.

To begin, Eisner claims that there are two major justifications for the teaching of art, both of which he presents in an either/or fashion. First a contextualist justification is made by claiming that art satisfies social needs. From this perspective, the practice of art must be pragmatic: art as leisure, art as creative thinking, art as self-esteem would be manifestations of this view. Shaped by this instrumentalist viewpoint, the art teacher undertakes a "needs assessment" in order to determine what the particular function of art should be (p. 3). Eisner, quite correctly, points out that the assessment of this need ultimately rests upon a particular value base which the art educator strongly believes in. Conflicts are thus possible. However,

> Somebody or some group MUST apply a set of
> values to those populations to determine
> what goals and content of the field OUGHT
> TO BE. (p. 5) [Capitals are my emphasis]

So, irrespective of the possible conflicts of values, realistically a program MUST be implemented.

The other position, which Eisner calls essentialist, gives art an exclusive and unique justification. Art can provide aesthetic experience--it vivifies life. Following Langer, art is a language of the affect. The artwork articulates our "most cherished values," he says (p. 11). These unique functions of art include a sense of vision, a means of activating one's own sensibility, to vivify the particular, to express the social character of society and possibly to bind people through ritual acts.

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Having introduced these two positions, Eisner commits himself to an essentialist position claiming that art education should be "...for the aesthetic contemplation of visual form"(p. 9), and it should redress the "historical and cultural aspects of the art curriculum which have been neglected in our programs" (p. 26). To vindicate this thesis was the task of his book. It is my opinoin that he fails to meet the promise of that commitment and inadvertently presents its antithesis.

Eisner attributes the low status of the arts in our schools primarily to the belief that American parents perceive the school to be an institution for social and economic mobility. Art, not being a very useful endeavor for employment, is perceived as a frill. Recently Bowles and Gintis in Schooling in Capitalist America (1976), Michael Apple in Ideology and the Curriculum (1976) and others like Giroux, Penna and Pinar in Curriculum and Instruction (1981) have argued quite a different thesis. They claim that the quality of education a child receives is dependent upon the social class to which he/she belongs. In short, students are streamed by a hidden curriculum to fill the slots that industry needs. Today's industry requires a glut of blue collar and white collar workers. Few middle and upper management positions are needed. Both our higher education and public schools ensure that the "needs" of capital are met. Extrapolating from Anyon's (1981) work, the discipline of art plays a different function in the education of each class. In working class schools, where the parental population consists of blue collar workers whose average incomes are $12,000, children are trained through a rigid, rule-governed and mechanized curriculum; the possibility for self-expression is non-existent. Via the ditto machine, art is reduced to the worst sort of pre-determined product. However, for schools which cater to a middle class, art takes on a popular role. In such schools, "work tasks do not usually request creativity. Serious attention is rarely given in school work on how the children develop or express their own feelings and ideas, either linguistically or in graphic form"(Anyon, p. 329). The consumption of the popular and mass arts is encouraged. This form of artistic knowledge corresponds to the tastes of white collar workers, whose children are familiarized into a slightly more active consumptive role, through the purchase of popular books and the faithful indiscriminant viewing of seasonal Hollywood features. In school, art comes across as a frill, an escape and a leisure activity. In affluent professional class schools, where the parent population is composed of upper middle class jobs (i.e., cardiologists, corporate lawyers, executives in advertising or television), art is perceived as an expressive activity. Greater autonomy and freedom is a prerequisite for those whose future successes lie in the ability to handle responsibility, show creativity, understand the nature of paradox in human existence, and yet present effective choices and programs for the resolution of such conflicts. Such a character formation is necessary for middle management positions wherein a continual crisis of identity and stress prevails. The presentment of unjust solutions to keep the system afloat (having to do the "dirty work" as the expression goes), often leads to self-doubt as to which class of people this strata wishes to identify with. Lastly, in executive elite schools, whose parents are among the top executives in major multinational corporations, the status of art is the antithesis of working class values. Art is a refinement of taste and a potential investment. Stress is placed not so much on the doing as on

acquiring reasoning and organizational skills. Such an education is well suited for tomorrow's owners of capitalist production, future directors of museum boards, members of art gallery advisory boards, or cultural offices for the government. Inadvertently and unconsciously, Eisner's book supports such a stratified society. The kind of art program he offers, I will show, maintains such inequalities. It is an ecological (biological) rather than an economical (cultural) model. It recognizes change, but not transcendence. What do I mean by this?

It is no accident that public elementary schooling was institutionalized during the mid-nineteenth century. Machines were becoming more complex and a need arose for a trained worker to handle them. Public education made this possible through the sequenced instruction of elementary school. Children of poor families were released from laboring at the age of six or seven in order to attend school. The institutionalization of public education preserved the illusion that the capitalists were indeed progressive, magnanimous and caring individuals. As capitalism changed its form from its laissez-faire beginnings to monopoly status, new skills were wanting. Again it is no accident that adolescence became a cultural phenomenon at the turn of the century (Friedenberg, 1959). Children now needed to stay longer in school because industry required more technical training. The promise of the machine age eventually generated the Bauhaus and the Vkhutemas schools along with a new crop of philanthropic robber barons. In England, Mr. Tate, a sugar magnate, immortalized his fame through the donation of the Tate Gallery, while the exploits of American culture barons such as the Rockefellers, Mellons, Guggenheims, Fords and Harrimans are well documented (Levine, 1976). Today in our own post-industrial society, we are witnessing the birth of new prolongation of childhood, that of a post-adolescence. It requires much money and many years of non-productive labor devoted to training at a technical institute or university in order to function in a bureaucratic government, cartel, or multi-national corporation.

What can be gleaned from this historical and sociological perspective is, first, that our own maturation rate is contingent upon our status in the economic production process—maturation is not a natural stage dependent on a naturally evolving organism. The amount of decision-making ability and actual effect of such decisions on lives has a tremendous bearing on our attitudes towards the constraints of our position in society. Second, our schools have always been in the service of capital despite the rhetoric of progressive, liberalist education (Feinberg, 1975). The importance of art in our school curricula is contingent upon the social stratifications of a post-industrial society. Third, alon with this vertical assessment of stratification we can add a horizontal one. The relative status of art education in our schools can also be seen in the light of the needs of industry and the state. Walter Smith's mechanical drawing programs were consistent with the needs of America's industrialization, made possible by the assembly line. Gradually, the craftsperson lost control over his/her artform as industry offered shop steward status to anyone who was willing to part with the secrets of his/her craft (Braverman, 1974). Likewise, the recognition of Lowenfeld's belief that art should be expressive of a child's psychological growth as the foundational

ideology for art education in the 1950's was consistent with America's Cold War policy. Eva Cockroft (1974) has admirably demonstrated how and why Abstract Expressionism became such a successful movement during the same period. Her suppositions and analysis apply equally well to Lowenfeld's ahistorical creative approach. Art was, after all, primarily expression.

> A work of art is not a product of nature: it
> is a product of human spirit, thinking and
> emotions, and can only be understood when the
> driving force which leads to its creation is
> understood. The driving force represents the
> need to incorporate all experience deriving
> from expression into a single work of art to
> make it a symbol of expression. (Lowenfeld, p. 156)

Sound familiar? This statement could easily characterize Abstract Expressionism. The success of Abstract Expressionism, through the attendant legitimizing by Nelson Rockefeller as the dominating force behind the Museum of Modern Art during the 1940's and 1950's, ensured the promotion of an artistic style best suited for America's Cold War rhetoric and propaganda. Such a style demonstrated the virtues of "freedom of expression" in an "open and free society" (Cockroft, p. 17). It was antithetical to both Russian Social Realism and the previous W.P.A. (Works Progress Administration) projects of the 1930's and 1940's, wherein form and content were integral components for social change. "Abstract Expressionism produced a separation of form and content in which form became dominant and predicated by the individual feelings of the artist without reference to any previous tradition." (Purdue, p. 220) Likewise, Lowenfeld's program supported a similar ideal, for he wrote in the introduction to <u>Creative and Mental Growth</u>,

> We have clearly to differentiate between
> content or subject matter and mode of ex-
> pression. As long as the child has the
> freedom to use his <u>own</u> mode of expression,
> his creativeness remains free. (p. 3)

The support of this Cold War ideology was further enhanced through the illusion that a scientific, empirical approach to art education research was neutral and value-free. "Lowenfeld was one of the first art educators to be consistently published in scientific and psychological journals." (Purdue, p. 220) The stress on creative self-expression was also consistent with a biologism that professed <u>natural</u> growth, unhampered by adult intervention, and Eisner's thesis is a logical extension of this development.

Eisner began his book by claiming sympathy for an essentialist postion, a position which claims the justification of art on the grounds of aesthetic experience, but he brilliantly(?), or mistakenly(?), changed his mind. From Chapter 4 on, Eisner accepts a contextualist view, drawing upon the ecological biologism of Dewey, and preserving the status quo wherein education is the hand maiden for capitalist needs. After a review of the history of art education, he writes,

> Although it is easy to say that, in general,
> the goals of art education should be based
> upon what it is that is unique and valuable
> about art, goals always function for people,
> and people live in contexts. Without con-
> sideration for who and where the what can
> only be couched in the most general and ab-
> stract terms. (p. 54)

From this remark Eisner then develops an art program squarely placed in
an upper middle class view. He begins by drawing on Deweyian and Piaget-
ian theories, both of which are a form of reduction (see Buck-Morss, 1975).
Both are appealing because they support a democratic-liberalist view.
So bad is Eisner's appropriation of their theory that he mixes up chrono-
logical age with mental age. For instance, he claims that

> the appropriateness for emphasizing the
> making of useful art forms for five- or
> six-year-olds will be different than for
> twelve-year-olds. Each stage of develop-
> ment, so to speak, affects what we desire
> or aim to achieve. (p. 61)

No one has raised the critical question that possibly the hidden curriculum
sequences our young to think like five-year-olds or twelve-year-olds.
No one has raised the questions, To what form of knowledge is learning
being sequenced? For what ends and in whose interests? In light of my
remarks concerning maturity, why was there no childhood for the aristocracy?
Could it be that art education curriculum unintentionally conditions the
character of artistic sensibility in each grade level to meet predeter-
mined mental ends necessary to reproduce the necessary worker spectrum?

What is most frightening about Eisner's work is the way he rational-
izes how a child's social-cultural background affects his or her particular
education environment. The question of gender, for instance, is not even
whispered despite the growing liberalism in the late 1960's and early
1970's, particularly in California (Loeffler, 1980). Eisner presents the
worst kind of determinism and predetermined slotting of classes. It is,
for all intents and purposes, the twentieth century "great chain of being"
of education. He claims that an art education program must accomodate
(a Piagetian biological term) the "cultural baggage" a child brings with
him or her to the school. This cultural overlay is to be cross-referenced
with a child's maturity which is still defined in chronological terms.
Consequently, a readiness profile is possible which can be mapped on his
Cartesian grid, which in itself is a sixteenth century concept. This grid,
which has an X-axis for maturing and a Y-axis for a continuum that runs
from low socio-economic level to high socio-economic level, becomes the
pigeon holes for all classes.

> The six year old child living in an urban
> ghetto fits in the upper left hand quadrant.
> So goals, contents, methods are selected
> which match that need.... a method quite

different from a child of the same
                    age but living in a well-to-do suburb.
                    (p. 61)

Huxley would have been proud. We have here a nicely ordered, packaged
world that places everyone in his or her place. Each strata is given a
different program. The system stays the same but accommodates everybody
"equally".

        Eisner, drawing from both Piaget and Dewey, recognizes the "live"
creature but his creature is seen in biological not human, anthropological
terms. Dewey and Piaget recognize assimilation and accommodation through
the concept of negentropy--the self is transformed gradually and slowly.
When Eisner applies this model of human development, art activities become
prepackaged consumables which bracket the student in the proper develop-
mental niche. There is no explanation as to how students may transcend,
rather than merely transform themselves, through quantum leaps rather
than qualitative jumps.

        This ecological view is essentially a pragmatism. It hides
its real task which is how to keep the little "monsters" happy and be-
lieving that they are doing their own thing--expressing themselves.
Since behavioral objectives work well for rats and most elementary children,
they are still nicely accommodated in the grand scheme of things through
what Eisner calls "sedate times". This is when the children learn about
technique through a rigid sequence of events. However, children are not
rats. There is a great deal of resistance to predetermined plans through
the children's own forms of Brinkmanship. Schools are no longer providing
the upward mobility once promised. The sharing in the growth of capitalist
expansion has stopped. In a recession, the current crisis of capitalism
requires a continued and refined ideology if the system is to maintain
itself. One result has been the wedding of expressive objectives and
behavioral ones.

        Expressive objectives now satisfy the illusion that upper and work-
ing class children have been given laissez-faire status. They are able
to "discover themselves" through art. The "New Deal" is to have the
teacher still remain as the authoritarian figure, but with a difference.
The authority is hidden from direct sight; the teacher is merely a
"facilitator," like Adam Smith's "invisible hand." However, should any
student get out of line, the "invisible hand" becomes visible, and the
system is once more stabilized. A similar illusion is found in the
market place, where small business capitalists are seen as the American
ideal, but in actuality are unable to compete with conglomerates. There
is only the illusion of free enterprise.

        In Eisner's terms this practice is called "pace." It is the same
process I have just described in economic terms. He wants the teacher to
apply behavioral objectives, then give students some "rope", by allowing
them to express themselves. The illusion that the school is an egalitarian
and free place is preserved, while all along the enterprise is being
properly managed.

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The illusion of the "liberalism" wanes as the absurdity of the biological view is pushed to the limit, with the introduction of the notion of the connoisseur. The pretense to elitism is exposed. The upper middle class is, after all, a group of entrepreneurs wishing to mimic those in control. They want their schools to reflect this. This is yet another contradiction in what is supposed to be an egalitarian art program. At the beginning of his book he claimed that knowledge is value-based and now the startling claim is made that it is precisely expert knowledge on which we need to rely.

The connoisseur fallacy lies in Eisner's inability to distinguish aesthetics as a purely sensuous, bodily awareness and art which falls into the realm of meaning. The two do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. A florist can identify a well tended orchid through its color, size and crispness, but an orchid has no social meaning--no history. If it does, it may function only as a sign of affection but not art. To get at symbolic meaning, Eisner would have to, at the very least, couch his arguments in hermeneutics. Reference to social history rather than the application of a formalist ahistorical description would help overcome the descrepancy between symbol and sign. (see Gadamer's (1975) criticism of Kant in this regard.)

I should sum up by saying that Eisner's organicism supports the status quo. Maturation is seen organically, not economically; the cultural overlay--the baggage we bring to any situation--is perceived in passive terms. Eisner eventually adopts a Deweyian problem-solving approach. Pragmatism is vindicated, and a feedback-loop model justifies artistic knowledge as a qualitative endeavor. Such an art program justi-fies art as expression aimed for an upper middle class population. Such a program preserves the ideology that art of this class must emulate the elite of society through connoisseurship. It is ironic that this upper middle class should not begin to develop an art that they can at least call their own. Finally, Eisner's program says nothing to the lower classes, nor to the elites.

If one wishes to go beyond Eisner, I would claim that a more critical, emancipatory approach is needed--one which allows the student to protect himself or herself against unconscious structuring of one's own thought. To make the unconscious conscious would be a start for a change of intent.

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SOCIALLY RELEVANT PRACTICE AND ART, CULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENT

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What is socially relevant practice? From my perspective, socially relevant practice has to do with making knowledge available to students that enables them to know about social institutions and contexts associated with the visual arts. In other words, the students are provided with experiences that lead them to an understanding of the phenomenon of art in culture and society so that they can assess and decide what their own relationship will be to concepts and objects comprising the visual arts.

Review

In Art, Culture, and Environment, June King McFee and Rogena Degge (1977) present a means for beginning to accomplish this kind of understanding. Sensitive to the power of culture and society upon the environment, their approach involves learning to "read" the meaning of objects created as forms of art. My focus is on the part of their book that deals with the cultural meaning of art. This part "analyze(s) the diverse meanings of art and explore(s) the ways these meanings function in the lives of people from different cultural groups" (p. 272).

McFee and Degge hold that the arts transmit and maintain the values of a culture. Art is thus a means of communication. The conceptual framework they use for theorizing about art is drawn from information theory and systems theory. From this perspective, the visual arts are perceived to carry messages. An example of this kind of conceptualizing can be found in McFee and Degge's analysis of clothing and dress. Clothes and body ornaments provide information about a person's role, status, and identity through symbolic meaning. To illustrate, long hair or short hair, T-shirts or suits, and earrings or watches can show others what sort of person one might be as well as what are one's interests. Wearing apparel for marriage, mourning, a football game, or other ceremonial events gives information about the importance of these events to a person and to our society. McFee and Degge also note that as cultural change occurs, the symbols and meanings associated with dress likewise change over time.

In Art, Culture, and Environment, activities are suggested for use in art classes that are designed to help children understand the nature of art in society. They involve the following concepts and sub-concepts:

1. Discovering the cultural meaning of objects
    a. comparing the meaning of objects. Example: Pots from other countries.
    b. reading the messages in objects. Example: Clocks. What does the design, material, or style say about the object? What is the message?

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c. studying the meaning of placement and arrangement.
Example: Playgrounds. What does the design tell?
Where are the open and closed areas; spaces for adults,
etc.?
d. designing meaning through organization and placement.
Example: Drawing and planning spaces for others to use

2. The art of costume and cultural roles
a. dressing up and playing roles
b. comparing apparel cross-culturally
c. studying values and roles in costume design
d. studying taste, images, and values in dress

3. Understanding cultural influences on art
a. comparing art from different cultures. Example: Masks.
Look at the design. How do you feel about it?
b. studying the values and beliefs of artists. Example:
Look at the phenomena in the art world such as galleries,
professional artists, Sunday painters, or quilt-makers.

Another aspect of understanding art in society is the difference in
cultural backgrounds of the students. One of McFee and Degge's goals
is to relate art to these differences and encourage the students to under-
stand the visual forms of other cultures.

Critique

McFee and Degge are to be commended for presenting art in society
as an important part of art education. Their perspective is in contrast
to the psychologically-based individualistic view of art that is so often
encountered in the literature of art education. There are, however,
several problems with their approach.

One of these is the lac f discussion about how objects come to
have meanings that are sociall understood. This absence may in part be
due to the inadequacies of information theory and systems theory. Neither
theory addresses the importance of human action and interaction in the
creation of social knowledge and culture. Had the authors perhaps drawn
upon symbolic interactionism as a theory (Blumer, 1969), the perspective
of Victor Turner in symbolic anthropology (1967, 1974), or the sociology
of knowledge developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), their
presentation might have been more complete. In a sense, one could say
that McFee and Degge's theoretical perspective is not entirely socially
relevant because it does not fully consider human agency in the formation
of meanings and concepts in the visual arts. An appropriate question
for the authors to address in some way is: How do cultural values come
about through visual arts?

A second problem is that McFee and Degge do not provide teachers
and children with sufficient conceptual tools for changing the visual
environment. It is certainly useful to be able to design spaces and
create art objects, but there is also a need to know that one can engage in
forming the visual environment through one's own action or a group's action
upon the thinking and planning of others. One can write letters to editors

and officials, form and join groups to speak for or against visual issues and policies, and create images such as films, posters, or art shows for the purpose of engaging in culture change. Students should know that there are ways to participate in changing and creating the visual environment and that they can indeed engage in social action if they wish to do so. Meanings about art are human products to be fashioned and refashioned as we see fit. The arts do not exist as entities, either physically or conceptually, beyond our individual and collective creation. Learning to manipulate meanings through design is an important skill, but to understand the social processes by which cultural values come to be reflected in the arts, and how they act upon the self, is a far more significant act in education.

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SOCIAL RELEVANCE IN LOWENFELD'S
CREATIVE AND MENTAL GROWTH

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For the sake of this panel presentation, I am defining "social relevance" to mean that aspect of an art education textbook which fosters a growth relationship between the student and his or her social and physical environment. Ten minutes is not much time to deal with this, either in depth or detail. This entire panel could be spent discussing the varieties of social growth in Lowenfeld's, Creative and Mental Growth. I'm sure each of the panelists could say the same about the books they are covering.

With Creative and Mental Growth, a special problem exists; that is, which edition do you use? The Old Testament or The New Testament? The first three editions by Viktor Lowenfeld, or the four posthumous editions -- the gospel according to Sts. Brittain and Macmillan. I have chosen the third edition, (hereafter cited as C&MG-3), because it was the last edition completely written by Viktor Lowenfeld, and represents a culmination of his thinking as of 1957. I shall also make a few brief comparisons with the recently published seventh edition (cited as C&MG-7).

I find three basic varieties of social relevance in Creative and Mental Growth. They are interrelated, especially as they operate on the individual child, because synthesis and integration take place in the mind of the child rather than in the subject matter itself. Lowenfeld's three varieties of social relevance are:

1. the role of art in society - which for Lowenfeld was one of creative aesthetic sensitivity to art and design in the cultural or built environment.

2. art for social growth - that is, using the art activity as a means of learning to work, cooperate and share with others.

3. art for social consciousness (or social awareness) -- that is using the art activity for children to express their feelings and attitudes about events and phenomena in society and the environment.

The first type (the role of art in society) is expressed in his opening statements about the integration of art and society.

If we want to understand a period and its characteristics, we should look at its cultural, social, and scientific achievements and its art expression. If we want to understand fully a work of art we should look at the time in which it was created, the

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circumstances which determine its style and art expression as
well as the individual forces which led the artist to his form
of expression. This interchanging effect between period and
culture, social, political and religious environment and art
expression has always been of greatest significance for the
understanding of both the period in which a culture was created
as well as the culture itself. The total integration of all
these aspects determines a culture.

If later generations would look at the interchanging effect
between our contemporary culture and its bearers, they would get
a most diverse impression. Gothic cathedrals are built between
skyscrapers and most advanced fields in science are taught in
buildings of styles or pseudo-styles long outmoded. It is quite
obvious that in this way a discrepancy is created between
teaching and action. This is true especially if educators are
not conscious of this fact. "Learning by doing" also applies
to teaching, for we cannot expect confidence from our youth if
we accept different measures for our actions. By so doing
teachers deprive themselves of the proper functioning of a
most effective educational means -- environment. In a well-
integrated culture such discrepencies do not exist. (C&MG-3,p.38)

The second variety of social relevance (art for social growth) is
described in Lowenfeld's observations about social growth, of which a
different aspect takes place at each stage of the child's artistic
development. For instance, social growth is revealed in the pre-schematic
stage (age 4-7 years) by the child's ability to identify with drawing
himself or herself in the picture, and including others and some features
of the physical environment, although their placement may be egocentric
or subjective. (C&MG-3, pp. 126-127). During the schematic stage (7-9 years),
social growth continues as the child establishes a mass consciousness,
and an awareness of her or his social environment, revealed in their art
by using a baseline and including specific features and objects in the
physical environment, such as windows, doors, furniture, trees, plants,
etc. in a sociocentric or objective placement. (C&MG-3, p. 174) During
the stage of drawing realism or the gang age (9-11 years), social growth
is the outstanding factor. The child discovers his or her social inde-
pendence, that she or he has more power in a group than as an individual.
The child's drawings may show an interaction between human figures that
was missing in earlier art work, express an emotional feeling about the
environment, such as happy or dreary, and include social differences in
clothes. They show more cooperation when working together on a mural or
other group project. (C&MG-3, pp. 209-210) During the pseudorealistic
stage or stage of reasoning (11-14 years), children develop a conscious-
ness about their social environment, and characterize their feelings and
attitudes about it through art. They show a close and cooperative re-
lationship between the human figures and specific features of the physical
environment and its conditions, juxtaposing buildings, streets, signs,
symbols and natural objects. (C&MG-3,pp.249-250) Lowenfeld identified
those items and details in examples of children's art which indicated
social growth with instructions on how to score them on evaluation
charts he provided. For each stage of growth he also discussed methods

for identifying and evaluating features in child art which indicated intellectual, emotional, perceptual, physical, aesthetic, and creative growth; their related discussions have subsequently been eliminated to form the posthumous editions.

Lowenfeld described art lessons, activities and the types of motivation or stimulation that elicit social growth (and growth in other areas) in the child's art work. They were such activities as having the child draw, paint or model in plasticine himself or herself with a pet, parent or in an event with another person. Art activities during the stages that include the baseline and a socio-centric orientation to the environment were planned to encourage additional ways of depicting spatial relationships, such as through X-ray drawings, foldovers, and overlapping. He also recommended murals as a method for developing student interaction and cooperation through group art activities. The student learned not only to cooperate and share ideas, but to give up space and territory, to move his or her contribution from a prominent to a less prominent position for the overall success of the mural, and to use overlapping and size to show importance and relationships.

The third variety of social relevance (art for social consciousness) is an extension of social growth appearing to some degree in the stage of dawning realism (gang age), but more fully during the pseudo-realistic stage, stage of reasoning and adolescence. Since this latter stage is also the one when the student's visual and haptic orientations tend to settle somewhere on that continuum, Lowenfeld recommended socially-conscious topics and stimulation which developed both orientations in its production.

Brittain also raises issues of responsibility which relates social consciousness with social conscience, as in the following passage:

> Somebody has to worry about the future of our country. With poorly designed "builder" houses, glaring neon signs, big billboards proclaiming the virtues of particular kinds of beer, and local streams being used as garbage dumps, the prospects for the future beauty of the earth look very dim... Examining our surroundings in detail, seeing beauty not only in the spectacular but also in the smallest growing things, is not limited to any one field. But art experiences can bring new realizations to this environment, evaluations based on reasons other than economic. The conservation of our resources depends in part on the sympathetic preservation of that which is beautiful, that which has intrinsic value, and that which is reusable in other forms. (C&MG-7)

Where Lowenfeld uses the imagery of cathedrals among skyscrapers to illustrate his point, Brittain uses "builder" houses, billboards, and garbage dumps. Although each reflects a different personal point of view, they also reflect the difference of twenty-five years and social change.

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In addition to these three varieties of social relevance, Lowenfeld held a very specific aesthetic philosophy about murals in the social and physical environment. He felt that murals reflected the nature or character of the society and culture in which they were painted. The purpose of murals, for Lowenfeld, is to enhance the architecture of the building, to remain sensitive to the building's architectural features and the texture of its wall surfaces without losing the building's integrity. Murals, such as those in Byzantium or the early Renaissance, reflected morally sound cultures. In contrast, murals of the late Renaissance and Baroque -- with painted-in architectural features that did not exist, beginning with Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel Ceiling, and reaching a climax in the skies, clouds, ascending angels, and people leaning over balcony railings in Rococo ceiling frescoes -- reflected a decadent and immoral society or culture.

I sometimes think of this when I see murals on the outside of big city buildings. Some are flat and decorative, depicting the history of an ethnic group or some aspect of their lives. Others deny the existence of the building by depicting streets of little shops, landscapes and beach scenes, the extension of parking lots or the street itself into a vanishing point, or the architectural features of another era. Murals we now call "street art"; they are reflections of a society trying to open-up the environment of the city through illusion.

Without making a detailed comparison between the third edition of Creative and Mental Growth, and the recently published seventh edition, one observation should be made. With the fourth edition the sections on growth areas (social, physical, intellectual, emotional, perceptual, aesthetic and creative) were dropped from the discussions on each stage of development, and collapsed into a single chapter on "The Meaning of Art in the Classroom." In the seventh edition, the sections on social growth, which Lowenfeld treated separately at each stage of development, are collapsed into four paragraphs in a chapter on "Understanding Growth and Development." In the chapters dealing with special stages of development, Brittain refers to aspects of social growth related to each stage, but in broad terms. They reflect Lowenfeld's ideas but the text has been changed.

The revision of a textbook might be compared to the remaking of a movie. Each remake takes on the styles, emphasis, design, and social milieu of the time in which it occurs. The revision, or updating, of a textbook often incorporates new research, reflects recent trends, and responds to social and cultural change. One problem arising from this is how to make the necessary revisions without losing the unique features, qualities and other aspects which gave the original its significance, importance and popularity. Consequently, Brittain may deal with similar issues but in more contemporary terms and references. For instance, the following passage under the heading, "The Meaning of Art for Society" in the seventh edition has relatively the same location and purpose as the introductory passage by Lowenfeld, quoted above from the third edition:

Art is often considered the highest form of human expression. It is certainly true that art is something that is cherished, sometimes valuable for the collector, and can even be stolen for ransom. Art is also a reflection of the society that

creates it. The art of ancient Greece or Egypt tells us a great deal about the society in which it was produced. It is a little difficult to evaluate the present forms of art within our own society; although art critics enjoy tackling this task, the artists themselves seem to be less interested in the meaning of the art they produce...It could be interesting to look at our society from the point of view of an archeologist a few thousand years from now and guess at the kind of society he might piece together from the variety of art forms found in the drug store, automobile showroom, or airport novelty shop...

Art can play a meaningful role in the development of children. Focus of teaching is the developing, changing, dynamic child who becomes increasingly aware of himself and his environment. Art education can provide the opportunity for increasing the capacity for action, experience, redefinition, and stability needed in a society filled with changes, tensions, and uncertainties. (C&MG-7,pp. 22-23)

To summarize, there is a strong element of social relevance pervading Lowenfeld's Creative and Mental Growth in both the original editions and the revisions by W. Lambert Brittain. As noted, there are three varieties of social relevance in Creative and Mental Growth: the role of art in society, art for social growth, and art for social consciousness. Lowenfeld demonstrated how to stimulate students to include aspects of social growth in their art and how to evaluate student drawings in order to identify manifestations of social growth in the relationships between human figures, the child's social and physical environment, and spatial representations. The Brittain revisions treat these aspects more generally.

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AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCUS ON SOCIAL THEORY

Susan L. Dorsey

Park School District, Boulder, Colorado

I wish to thank all of those members who helped in the compiling
of this bibliography. The idea for this project originated with the
thought of exchanging some of our interests with one another through
an exchange of our favorite, or most inspiring, books that influenced us
in one way or another.

A few books are listed by more than one individual; all comments
have been included here for the simple reason that another person's view
of the same book varies, and can make for enlightening reading.

Since many of us come together only once a year at the NAEA
Convention, this might be a way of learning more about each other,
individually and as a group. I hope this bibliography can become a
useful resource for you in teaching, as well as in your own interests.

From MYRNA T. AMDURSKY:

Juster, Norton, The dot and the line.
        "Freedom is not a license for chaos!"

Killing us softly, a film. Available through Cambridge Documentary
        Films, Massachusetts.
        "Deals with how people—especially women—are exploited visually
        through advertising."

From ROBERT BERSSON:

Chapman, Laura. Approaches to art in education. New York: Harcourt,
        Brace, Jovanovich, 1978.
        "Describes in detail for the classroom teacher (preschool through
        junior high school) and college methods students a demanding but
        practical art program and philosophy. Nonsexist, nonelitist, and
        in harmony with the yet-to-be-accomplished ideals of our democratic
        society. Chapman's approach achieves a rare balance between
        individual fulfillment and social relevance in the art program.
        For all reading levels, undergraduate through professional."

Berger, John. Ways of seeing. Penguin Books, 1977.
"A lively introduction to the way in which the dominant social classes in any given society define and shape art and visual culture to their own cultural, political, and socio-economic ends. Focuses in particular on the way in which capitalism and its ruling classes have shaped western art and culture. Provocative reading for advanced high school art classes, college art appreciation and art history courses, and professional art educators. Challenging text made clear and comprehensible by many visual aids and reproductions."

Wolfe, Tom. The painted word. Bantam Books, 1975.
"Wicked fun and insightful satire. The whole art world hated it, but the book sold like hotcakes. Wolfe explores, in pop journalistic fashion, the influence of "theory-loving" art critics and wealthy, culturally pop patrons on the development and history of modern art. Laugh and learn in two hours time. Reading for all levels, high school through professional."

Hobbs, Jack. Established ways of thinking. In Atlanta Papers, Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education Bulletin, 1981. (monograph)
"Excellent critique of the education of art educators by art departments. Art world values are taught and absorbed which prevent art education from being socially relevant. Very readable. For college level art education students through professionals."

Bersson, Robert. Why art education lacks social relevance: a contextual analysis. In the Bulletin of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education, Number 2, 1982. (monograph)
"Seeks to explain how our democratic, capitalist, technocratic society has influenced art and art education in a direction which is so individual- or discipline-centered as to be socially irrelevant. An overview. For college level art education students through professionals."

Gifforn, Hans. Ideologies of art education. Studies in Art Education, 1978, 19(2).
"Giffhorn, an important West German art educator, examines the likely socio-political implications and effects of different philosophies (i.e., ideologies) of art education, in particular, those which focus on the child, the discipline, and aesthetic education. A critique of logic and insight which makes for challenging reading. For art education professionals."

Nadaner, Dan. The politics of art teaching. In the Bulletin of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education, Number 2, 1982.
"Highly readable primer on and argument for nonsexist, multi-cultural, socially relevant art education practice. Like his other fine article, "Art and Cultural Understanding: The Role of Film in Art Education," (Art Education, July, 1981), it makes a strong case for the inclusion of popular art forms in

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the art curriculum. For college art education students through professionals."

Also recommended are both <u>Bulletins of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education,</u> (<u>Atlanta Papers</u> and <u>Number 2</u>).

From LANDON E. BEYER:

Williams, Raymond. <u>Marxism and literature</u>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
"While this book may be difficult reading for undergraduates, Williams comprehensively integrates culture, literature, and ideology. The author does a particularly nice job of arguing against the usual intepretation of Marxian analysis which reduces "superstructural" activities to economic conditions. An imporant book for all those concerned with the sociology of culture."

Berger, John. <u>Ways of seeing</u>. Penguin Books, 1977.
"A very readable, insightful analysis of how visual perception has changed historically, given changes in the larger social structure (e.g., the ability to reproduce paintings and the affect of that ability on their meanings). The book is filled with numerous examples which Berger uses to illustrate his points. One of the few attempts I know of to make concrete the connections between the visual arts and the rise of capitalism."

Beyer, Landon E., Aesthetic curriculum and cultural reproduction. In Apple, M. W. and Weis, L.(Eds.) <u>Ideology and practise in schooling</u>. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, (in press)
"This chapter analyzes the Aesthetic Education Program produced by CEMREL, Inc., and its philosophical underpinnings. Beyer argues that the curricular form and aesthetic content of this program reinforce each other in the construction of ideologically embedded tendencies."

From GRAEME CHALMERS:

Chalmers, G. Art education as ethnology. <u>Studies in Art Education</u>, 1981, <u>23</u> (3), pp 6-14.

Chalmers, G. Teaching and studying art history: some anthropological and sociological considerations. <u>Studies in Art Education</u>, 1978, <u>20</u> (1), pp 18-25.

Chalmers, G. Art in society: implications for curriculum. In <u>Curriculum Policies and the Expressive Arts</u>. Vancouver, B.C.: Center for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, 1979, pp 1-8. (monograph series)

From LAURA CHAPMAN:

Chapman, Laura H. Curriculum planning in art education. <u>Ohio Art</u>
    <u>Education Newsletter</u>, <u>8</u>(1) (Winter, 1970). Reprinted in
    <u>Texas Trends in Art Education</u>, 1978, <u>2</u>(3).
    "For teachers involved in curriculum planning. Outlines what
    a curriculum can and cannot do, shows how to plan for integra-
    tion of studio work with history-criticism and/or with work
    to enhance awareness of the social-cultural dimensions of art."

Chapman, Laura H. The future and museum education. <u>Museum News</u>,
    July/August 1982.
    "Calls for 'quality control' in muse a education at a level
    comparable to that which is exercised in other aspects of museum
    work, with particular attention to the public responsibilities of
    the museum to it's audience, the traditions of scholarship and
    practice which are insensitive to cultural diversity."

Chapman, Laura H. Research means 'searching again'. <u>Art Education</u>,
    1979, <u>32</u>(4), pp 6-10.
    "Examines the anti-intellectualism in art education and how it has
    affected research in our field, expecially the preoccupation with
    child art that seems to be 'untutored and the neglect of research
    into the social dimensions of expression and response'."

Chapman, Laura H. Coming to our senses: beyond the rhetoric. <u>Art</u>
    <u>Education</u>, <u>31</u>(1), 1978, pp 5-9.
    "A criticism of the well-publicized report, <u>Coming to Our Senses</u>
    which was assembled under the leadership of David Rockefeller, Jr.,
    and argues (in effect) that arts education should be de-schooled."

Chapman, Laura H. <u>Instant art, instant culture: th; unspoken policy for</u>
    <u>American schools</u>. New York: Teachers College Press, 1982.
    "For school administrators, parents, advocacy groups, teachers
    at all levels. Tells the 'other side' of the art education story;
    it's neglect in schools, why it's treated as a frill, what to do
    about it."

Chapman, Laura H. <u>Approaches to art in education</u>. New York: Harcourt,
    Brace, Jovanovich, 1978.
    "For elementary and junior high teachers, a number of practical
    suggestions for activities that will heighten awareness of the
    role of art in contemporary life, keyed to theory and to specific
    art forms--painting, sculpture, architecture, graphic and product
    design, etc. Deals with problem of judging "kitch" art."

From ELSBETH COURT:

Articles by Jahoda and Fortes. In Lloyd, B. and Gay, J. <u>Universals</u>
    <u>of human thought: some African evidence</u>. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1981.
"Cross-cultural child development point of view, effect of "culture"
on drawing and seeing, not specifically art."

Griaule, M. _Conversations with the Ogotemmeli_. OUP reprint, 1980.
"A poetic introduction to Dogon beliefs--how a whole society
is organized around art. Shows the highly interrelated quality
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Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1979. (1st Ed. by Addison-
Wesley, 1971).
"An introduction to non-Western Aesthetics, a little heavy, but
logical and clear."

Jopling, C.(Ed.) _Art and aesthetics in primitive societies_. Dutton, 1971.
"A classic collection of articles which includes philosophical
statements and methodological approaches."

Series of Working Papers in the Traditional Arts from the Institute for
the Study of Human Issues, P.O. Box 2367, Philadelphia, PA 19103.
"Ongoing series which includes "theoretical and methodological
discussion, research reports, bibliographies, and special issues.
University level studies of cross-cultural work in art (anthro-
pology of art)."

From MARTHA DAUGHERTY:

Davis, Beverly Jeanne. Fragments. Column, _NAEA Newsletter_.
"I find them nearly always socially relevant, and appealing to
teachers and prospective teachers."

From SUSAN L. DORSEY:

Bowers, Chet. _Cultural literacy for freedom: an existential perspective
on teaching, curriculum and school policy_. An Elan book.
"I especially recommend the chapters 2,4, and 5. The book dis-
cusses the need of reevaluation of many of the ideologies that
are taught and passed on as 'taken for granted knowledge' today.
Although not an art-based book, I think the book deals in such a
way as to expand one's view of teaching as a whole and gives
rise to some interesting questions and possibilities."

Lanier, Vincent. _Essays in art education: the development of one point
of view._ New York: MSS Information Corp., 1976.
"Although I find that I do not always agree with his point of view,
I have always found him to be interesting and controversial in
his writings. If I could pinpoint one person who I felt had

the greatest impact on my work as an art educator, it would
be Vincent. I highly recommend his writings, including his
April, 1980, speech in Atlanta (NAEA), "Six Items on the Agenda
for the Eighties." I find his writings to be for undergraduate
level as well as for the professional."

Purser, Stuart. The drawing handbook: approaches to drawing. Davis
Publications, 1976.
"The book covers such ideas as drawing concepts, aesthetic
philosophies, and student responsibilities. The emphasis is
on the interrelationship of fundamentals, creative aspects, the
materials and techniques of drawing for students at various
levels. High school and college levels."

Bell, Daniel. The cultural contradictions of capitalism.
"His analysis of the relation between modernization and what he
sees as the adversary culture of the artist is provocative. I
think it is an important book. Graduate level reading."

Friere, Paulo. The pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Seabury Press,
1970.
"His work on critical consciousness via a dialogical situation
wherein he discusses the decoding process is most enlightening.
I found his writing to be very enriching toward the conception
of education for critical consciousness. I highly recommend all
his books, especially Education for Critical Consciousness (New
York: Seabury Press, 1973)."

From ELIOT EISNER:

Illich, Ivan. Tools for conviviality. Harper and Row.
"A book that has nothing directly to do with art but which
deals with the impact of technology in society that I believe
would be relevant to members of the Caucus. The book describes
the ways in which technological devices such as the telephone,
the automobile, affect social relationships, which in turn
affect the qualities of experience that people undergo. It is
extremely relevant to anyone attempting to understand the factors
affecting contemporary society, even if one does not accept the
solutions that Illich proposes."

From EDMUND B. FELDMAN:

Feldman, E. B. Varieties of visual experience. New York: Harry N. Abrams,
Inc. and Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981. (Second edition)
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Feldman, E.B. Becoming human through art. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
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1978, 11(1), pp 23-28.   Pergamon Press
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"A social history of the artist, from shaman to gallery idol;
heavily illustrated.   Secondary and college level."

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Rudofsky, Bernard.   Architecture without architects. New York: Museum
of Modern Art, 1964.

Jacobs, Jane.   The death and life of American cities. New York: Random
House, 1961.

From KAREN A. HAMBLEN:

Chalmers, F.G. Toward a theory of art and culture as a foundation for
art education (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon,
1971).   Dissertation Abstracts International, 1971, 32, 3000A.
University Microforms No. 72-00, 912).

Efland, A. D.   Conceptions of teaching in art education. Art Education,
April 1979.

Kavolis, V.   Artistic expression--a sociological analysis.   Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1968.

"These sources are most appropriate for graduate students in art
education and especially for those with an anthropological and/or
sociological interest."

From JACK HOBBS:

Hauser, Arnold.   The social history of art (4 volumes).   New York:
Vintage Books.
"The basic text on the whole subject has to be... Difficult
reading."

Fischer, Ernst. The necessity of art. Penguin Books.
        "A Marxist perspective. Difficult reading."

Solomon, Maynard. Marxism and art. Wayne State University Press.
        "A Marxist perspective. Difficult reading."

Marcuse, Herbert. The aesthetic dimension. Becon Press.
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Berger, John. About looking. Panther.
        "Easy reading."

Dickie, George. Art the aesthetic. Cornell University Press.
        "A good book on aesthetics that proposes an institutional theory
        of art, (really a social theory). Difficult reading. "

Loeb, Judy. (Ed.) Feminist collage. Teachers College Press.
        "An anthology of very current interest. Difficult reading."

Battcock, Gregory. New ideas in art education. Dutton.
        "For provocative ideas about art education. Difficult reading."

Hobbs, Jack. Art in context. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
        "Especially chapters 1, 5-8, and pages 4-51-103."

Feldman, Edmund. Varieties of visual experience. New York: Harry N.
        Abrams, Inc. and Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.
        "Especially chapter 2 and his many other writings."

Hobbs, Jack. Is aesthetic education possible. Art Education, 30 (1).

"I also recommend Vincent Lanier's writings."

From NANCY JOHNSON:

Berger, Peter L., and Luckmann, Thomas. The social construction of
        reality. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
        "An excellent theoretical treatment of the development of social
        knowledge. The authors do not focus specifically on art; however,
        there are many implications for art education. Appropriate for
        graduate level reading."

Baxandall, Michael. Painting and experience in fifteenth century Italy.
        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
        "This book illuminates some of the social beliefs and life in
        Renaissance Italy and relates them to the style of paintings made
        at that time. A short and concise social history. Appropriate

for undergraduates and graduates."

Egbert, Donald D. <u>Social radicalism and the arts</u>. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1970.
"A cultural history of modern radicalism as reflected in theories
of art, works of art, and the social activities and beliefs of
their creators. Appropriate for college-level reading."

From ELLEDA KATAN:

Baynes, Ken. <u>Art in society</u>. The Overlook Press, 1975.
"Very expensive. That's its only fault. Beautiful, lushly
illustrated with industrial, domestic folk, popular, youth
(and fine) culture images from Western and non-Western societies.
The text is succinct and clear. The introduction provides a
rock-solid redefinition of art, away from the Capital-A Art of
the NAEA and towards what I believe must be foundational to
the redesign of our profession towards relevance.
And then--the part that blew my mind--Baynes treats the social
role of art with respect to four fundamental human functions:
Work, War, Worship, and Sex. Worship and Sex are presented as
stabilizing forces; Work as adversary; War, symbolic and
restrictive, within the modern era.
Suggests to me a whole new way of organizing both historical and
studio content."

Mumford, Louis. <u>The condition of man</u> (1944) and <u>The city in history</u> (1968)
Harcourt Brace.
"I have no idea whether these two represent the best of Mumford.
He's prolific and I've read only a small part. These are simply
the two I live with.
In the intro. to <u>Condition</u> (pp 3-15), he defines man, society,
art, work, knowledge in ways essential to reintegration of art
into everyday life. It is the cultural paradigm for which all
of his work is an illustration. <u>Condition</u> deals principally with
systems of thought, <u>City</u> with networks of power and communication
across the breadth of Western history. However true to his model
of culture, ideas and symbols are understood only in their dia-
lectical negotiation with econopolitical forces.
Not only richly informed and complexly interwoven, his style is
lusty and vigorous. <u>Very</u> entertaining. Accessibility belies
depth of implication. (If in college we could have studied Mumford
instead of Art History, we'd have had the necessary foundation for
the history needed in public school art.
The end result of reading Mumford is not simply increased under-
standing of who and how wer are today but an inspired vision of
who we could be."

Barzun, Jacques. <u>The uses and abuses of art</u>. Princeton University Press,
1974.
"In this book, Barzun moves into Mumford's league in choice of
illustrative incidents, color and energy of language, breadth

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of cultural and social reference... and the repeated insistance
upon the social function of art.
His concerns are the modern movements within the fine arts. He
traces the Romantic rejection of the elevation of reason; the
impact of sciences' high status upon art; and the distructive
impact of anti- and non-art.
His basic thesis is that art is power and power can be welded
for good or bad. To mysticize art into uninflicted goodness
is to mark both what it is doing to us at the moment and what
it can do in the future.
Lastly, he speculates that the form of art-to-come might well
be collective and anonymous."

From DIANA KORZENIK:

Munro, Thomas. Art education: its philosophy and psychology. New York:
    The Liberal Arts Press, 1956.
    "Munro looks at how society, culture controls our use of art,
    especially with adolescents. He shows how taboos about nudity
    alienate kids from art at the very age they'd be most drawn to it."

Feldman, Edmund B. The artist. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982.
    "Excellent book for teachers to offer examples to students of
    different roles society has offered artists. This book could
    be a basis for teaching art history and studio--particularly
    useful for adolescents since it is organized around identity--
    social roles, etc."

Korzenik, Diana. Back to basics and the preparation of art teachers.
    In Art education and back to basics. NAEA Publications, 1979.
    "Describes the varieties of social purposes art education has
    served as a function of the need of a particular historical
    moment. Art education is many, many types of education and
    teachers are compelled (by dint of their limited time with
    kids, etc.) to CHOOSE. Here's where the teachers beliefs,
    biases are critical."

From MARTHA T. LALKA:

Blankeslee, Thomas. The right brain. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press,
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Brandwein, P. and Ornstein, R. The duality of the mind--a symposium in
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Edwards, Betty. Drawing on the right side of the train. Los Angeles:
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Pizzat, Joseph. I'm a right brained person. Why me, God? Art Education,
      March 1979, 32, pp 10-11.

Restak, R. The brain: the last frontier. New York: Warner Books, Inc.
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Sperry, R. Lateral specialization of cerebral function in the surgically
      separated hemispheres. In The psychophysiology of thinking.
      New York: Academic Press, 1973, pp 209-229.

Vannatta, B. The brain--is half an education better than none? Art
      Education, March 1979, 32, pp 12-13.

Virshup, E. Art and the right hemisphere. Art Education, November 1976,
      29, pp 14-15.

From VINCENT LANIER:

Friere, Paulo. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder,
      1970.
      "Education as understanding of the forces of oppression and how to
      combat them. College and above."

Lanier, V. The teaching of art as social revolution. Phi Delta Kappan, 1969,
      50(6), pp 314-139.
      "Just what the title suggests. College and above."

Shahn, Ben. The shape of content.
      "How social forces are reflected in the visual arts. College and
      above."

Lanier, V. The arts we see--a simplified introduction to the visual arts.
      New York, London: Teachers College Press, 1982.

From HELEN MUTH:

Bowers, C. A. Cultural literacy for freedom. Eugene, Oregon: Elan
      Publishers, Inc., 1974.
      "This book is written from an existential perspective on teaching,
      curriculum and school policy. It was my first encounter with a
      philosophy of education, which addressed some of my own basic
      notions of the power of the learner. It is the individual's
      choices that expand or restrict his or her own consciousness. I
      believe that education is the process by which learners take
      possession of the direction and intent of their knowledge and

teaching is the medium by which the learner is asked to evaluate
his or her own view of reality as it is formed from life ex-
periences. Learning becomes an ongoing process."

Cooper, C. Designing for human behavior: architecture and the behavioral
sciences. In Long, J., Burnette, C., Moleski, W., and Vachon, D.,
(Eds.) [title not given]. Pennsylvania: Dowden, Hutchinson and
Ross, Inc. , 1974.
"The house as a symbol of the self. Cooper wrote this paper as a
think piece, based on her . interest in people's responses, to the
beginning architecture students who showed an unselfconscious use
of design elements from their own homes in their studio projects.
The idea that one's house is invested with meaning symbolic of
how one relates to the rest of society and that this meaning is
fundamental to the image one holds of the world is relevant to
social content in art education."

Muth, H. J. Children's preference for familiar large scale environments:
its implications for art education. Doctoral dissertation,
University of Cincinnati, 1981.
"Content in art education is often so narrowly limited to traditional
concepts of what is art that many children have no experience from
which to build meaning into school art acitivities. According to
this study the children involved had developed affective attachments
to familiar forms of housing by the age of eight and nine years.
The result was consistent even though there were differences in
socio-economic levels represented.
To make art classes more socially relevant to children's lives,
I believe art teachers should be aware of the impressive amount
of learning children have acquired although much of it remains
at a preconscious level. I believe that art teachers should be
aware that children's cognitive, perceptual, and aesthetic
development are closely interrelated in the formative years and
that children's early predispositions are inextricably bound to
values not yet articulated. I believe that art teachers need to
be aware that these early values are not easily superseded and
may not be alterable in any significant manner.
I believe that art teachers should construct conceptual bridges
between meaning in everyday life and meaning in art. Aesthetic
meaning is different only in degree not kind."

From ROBERT SAUNDERS:

Hall, Edward T. The hidden dimension and The silent language. Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966 and 1959 respectively.
"Both books merge for me, but they opened up a whole new dimension
in communication, and in his concept of monochronic-polychronic
personalities. Although not directed towards education and
schooling, they revolutionized my techniques in classroom communi-
cation, use of furniture and classroom dynamics."

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"The chapters on human needs and social needs, on core monuments using humanistic themes related to social values has a particular significance for developing moral, ethical, and aesthetic values through the arts. The section on the Structure of Aesthetic Education provides a context for the relation of each sensory mode to aesthetic perception, and interaction with other disciplines."

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"Thomson's tracing of tribal, agricultural, industrial cultural orientations, and our current direction into a scientific-planetary culture provided a new working basis for my own philosophy on the history of art education. It also opened me up to a context in which the future and the past became one reality. Out of it came a recognition of the need for art education to take an active role in bringing about a New Age in which the arts, aesthetics, and things of the spirit are central to human existance."

McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding media.

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From MURIEL SILBERSTEIN-STORFER:

Storfer, M. S. Doing art together. The Metropolitan Museum of Art,
        Museum Special Services Office, P.O. Box 700, Middle Village,
        N.Y. 11379.
        "A book for parents who want to develop and share the creative
        instincts of their children. This is a book about creating art.
        Based on the past eighteen years of research by the author in the
        areas of parent-child art workshops that have been enormously
        successful both at the Metropolitan and the Museum of Modern Art.
        An imaginative and practical introduction to the world of art
        for beginners of all ages."

From WALTER ST. DENIS:

Johnson, Nancy R. Social goals in the visual arts. Art Education,
        January 1982.
        "I can't think of a specific article or book which has influenced
        my belief that thus teaching art involves social theory. You
        are aware of the impact you are making in each student's social
        awareness and behavior in daily contact with each student."

From CHARLES G. WIEDER:

Read, Herbert. Education through art. New York: Pantheon, 1958.
        "Writing from a classical liberal (Libertarian) point of view,
        the author argues for the importance of art and individuality
        in education, especially as these affect life in free, open
        societies."

Rothbard, Murray. Individualism and the philosophy of the social science.
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        "This softbound volumn contains two essays on social science re-
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        incisively critical of the trends toward quantitative(empirical,
        statistical) research models where human action and motivation
        are involved. Recommended is an approach termed methodological
        individualism which is outlined in terms of basic principles
        and underlying assumptions."

Maslow, Abraham. Toward a psychology of being.(2nd ed.) New York:
        Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968.
        "This work combines humanism with ideas on self deve'opment.
        A forerunner of the humanistic psychology movement and all
        of the spinoff self-help and marriage counseling guides that
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From ANONYMOUS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND:

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