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ABSTRACT

Incentives to encourage teacher excellence for the purposes of teacher attraction, retention, improvement, and enhancement are examined in this report. Motivators involving monetary plans, career status, awards and recognition, professional responsibility, and workplace conditions are described, as well as the issues of cost, planning, and evaluation. Other topics covered are teacher evaluation--its purposes, plans implemented by other states, and its organizational impact--and developing a decision-making framework. Seven recommendations are made, some of which include matching the type of motivator with the intent of the incentive plan, consideration of a wide range of motivators built along a continuum, and encouragement of teacher feedback. One figure and an extensive bibliography are included. (LMI)

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U.S. Department of Education

**INCENTIVES THAT ENHANCE
THE TEACHING PROFESSION:
BACKGROUND PAPER**

Carol A. Bartell

The University of Iowa

**One in a Series of Reports on
Attracting Excellence: The Call for Teacher Incentives**

1987

NCREL 
**NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL
EDUCATIONAL LABORATORY**

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Incentives That Enhance The Teaching Profession:

Background Paper

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Preface to Series

How can the best and brightest among college students be encouraged to enter teacher preparation programs? What does it take to recognize, reward, and retain outstanding educators in elementary and secondary schools? Why do some educators invest more of themselves in developing their professional skills? The questions are myriad.

And as frequently as someone poses a question, another recommends an answer: introduce career ladders and mentoring systems; raise standards and salaries for entry into teaching; strengthen graduate and undergraduate programs of professional development; identify the most superior professionals with better tests and performance evaluation systems.

Debated and considered by policy makers, educators, scholars, and taxpayers, such questions and answers have been at the heart of educational reform initiatives nationwide for the past several years. And, in the same period, many innovative programs to provide incentives to educators have been introduced. Numerous states and local districts, including many in the region served by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL), have considered or taken action to implement incentive policies and programs.

In response to considerable interest in the theme of incentives among constituents in the region, NCREL initiated activities to develop information resources and encourage related research early in 1986. The first activity involved reviewing relevant literature and developing a framework to guide future conceptual work and strategies. The framework first was employed to describe significant themes and issues apparent in policies and programs of state governments. Several papers regarding policy issues on incentive programs were presented and discussed at a seminar held in 1986.

In 1987, the focus of Laboratory activities began to shift from initiatives taken by states to programs in local school districts. A survey of districts in all seven states of the region and case studies to create profiles of a small number of district-level programs comprised the next phase of activity.

Many, many people have contributed to NCREL's work on the theme of incentives for teachers and other educators. Participants in the 1986 seminar, and authors and reviewers of various products have provided, sifted, considered, and translated what has become a significant pool of information.

Although all who have joined this effort have made important contributions, special credit is due to Dr. Carol Bartell of the University of Iowa's College of Education. Her interest in identifying difficult issues and promising programs was equalled only by her dedication to sharing what she was learning with educators, policy makers, and other scholars.

Art Dorman, Graduate Research Assistant at the University of Iowa, and Nancy Fulford, Program Associate at the Laboratory, also deserve special credit for contributing to the development of this product series.

NCREL is proud to publish this series of products.

Jane H. Arends
Executive Director

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Deputy Executive Director

Judson Hixson
Director, R&D Resource Development

Incentives and the Teaching Profession

Managements have always looked at man as an animal to be manipulated with a carrot and a stick. They found that when man hurts, he will move to avoid pain -- and they say, "We're motivating the employees!" Hell, you're not motivating them, you're moving them.

-- Frederick Herzberg

It is time for incentives! Wherever we turn today, there is talk of how to offer incentives that would lure more, better qualified people into teaching, keep the best teachers on the job, and stimulate all teachers to work up to their potential. New policies are being adopted in state legislatures and boards of education, large sums of money are being allocated, and such terms as merit pay, career ladders, and mentor teachers are becoming household words. Suddenly, it seems, public concern for the quality, well-being, and commitment of teachers has turned incentives for teachers into a priority in schools throughout the nation.

A variety of incentive plans have been introduced in many states and localities; changes have just begun or are being deliberated in other places. Few states or local education agencies are immune from this movement. This is a time of great hope and excitement, but it is also a time of uncertainty and ambiguity. Beneath the flurry of activity at the national, state, and local levels, there are many unresolved questions about incentives for teachers. This report raises some of these questions and investigates the various answers that have been suggested by both research and practice.

Defining Incentives

An incentive is that which induces, motivates and encourages participation or performance. It implies an external influence that offers something desired in order to produce a certain behavior.

Incentives as inducements to behavior are highly subjective and value-related. What serves as an incentive for one person or group of persons does not always motivate another; if you do not value something, the possible receipt of it can hardly be a motivator. Incentives can be strongly or weakly valued or fall somewhere along a

continuum. Incentives may complement or compete with one another. If you have many reasons for acting a certain way and few reasons to exhibit opposing behavior, you are most likely to behave in a manner which satisfies the dominant motivational factors.

Incentives vs. Disincentives

Incentives are distinguished from disincentives in much of the literature. A disincentive is that which discourages participation or performance. You may have an incentive to perform a certain task, join a group, or become a member of a certain profession, but the disincentives may be more powerful.

Herzberg (1959) refers to work satisfiers and dissatisfiers. Work satisfiers relate to sense of accomplishment, recognition, and intrinsic pleasure derived from the work itself. Dissatisfiers stem from conditions surrounding the job, or extrinsic factors, and may relate to the physical environment, type of supervision, status, administrative practices and compensation. The removal of dissatisfiers does not automatically cause satisfaction, nor does the enhancement of satisfiers erase the effects of dissatisfiers.

Sergiovanni and Carver replicated Herzberg's work among teachers and found that achievement and recognition were very important motivators, along with the work itself, responsibility, and the possibility of growth. Among the dissatisfiers reported were: routine housekeeping, taking attendance, paperwork, lunch duty, insensitive or inappropriate supervision, irritating administrative policies, and poor relationships with colleagues and/or parents. The point is made that advancement, frequently found to be an important motivator in private-sector studies, was missing in the study of teachers. The authors state: "Advancement was simply not mentioned by teachers because teaching as an occupation offers so little opportunity for advancement. If one wishes to advance in teaching, he must leave teaching for a related education profession such as administration, supervision, and counseling" (Sergiovanni & Carver, 1973, p. 77).

Incentives for teachers may be identified in terms of those factors which increase the level of satisfaction and provide increased effort toward higher achievement. Conversely, disincentives diminish the level of satisfaction and may lead teachers to

reduce their efforts or even to abandon their work altogether. Satisfiers are associated with intrinsic rewards and can be viewed as motivators, while dissatisfiers are associated with extrinsic rewards (or lack of them), and can be viewed as maintenance factors (Herzberg, 1959).

Herzberg's theory suggests that it is not possible to motivate people at work through maintenance factors. Reducing class size, improving fringe benefits, or monetarily rewarding outstanding performance may well do two things: (1) reduce or eliminate the dissatisfaction of teachers, and (2) create conditions wherein they may be motivated (Owens, 1981).

Organizational participants are motivated to remain within a setting and contribute productively only so long as the inducements offered are as great or greater than the contributions they are asked to make (March & Simon, 1958). Rosenholtz observes that "the rewards of teaching must outweigh the frustrations" (1985, p. 355).

Dan Lortie (1975) looked at the rewards that teachers reported receiving from their work and classified them into three types: extrinsic rewards, ancillary rewards, and psychic or intrinsic rewards (p. 101). Extrinsic rewards refer to those rewards such as earnings, prestige, and power over others. These rewards exist independent of the person who occupies the role. Ancillary rewards are those that may be thought of as rewards by some, such as the length of the work day or job security. These also flow from the nature of the work and are experienced by all, but are not perceived as rewards by all. Psychic rewards are entirely subjective valuations made in the course of work engagement. They include such things as satisfactions derived from seeing children learn and opportunities to express creativity. In a study of teachers in Dade County, Florida, Lortie found that 76 percent of the teachers consider psychic rewards to be their major source of work satisfaction (p. 104).

Other studies support Lortie's findings. Using Lortie's categories, Bartell (1986) found that psychic rewards were most often mentioned (53 percent) by teachers in her study. John Goodlad reports (1984) that a majority of teachers in his study had entered teaching because of the kind of the work it offered. He also addressed the nature of disincentives. From interviews with teachers who had left the profession, he found that they were "frustrated in what they wanted to do or disappointed in their own

performance," and that although "money was not a major reason teachers gave for entering teaching, it ranked second as a reason for leaving" (p. 172). Persons who do choose to stay say that they value intrinsic rewards, collegiality, mastery of subject matter and working with young people (Rosenholtz and Smylie, 1983).

Disincentives or dissatisfiers that have been identified by teachers often focus on the lack of perceived conditions that are felt to be necessary satisfiers. Teachers indicate that the public attitude towards schools and teachers is not as supportive as they might like (District of Columbia Public Schools, 1984; Brandt and Dronka, 1985; Harris, 1985; Smith et al, 1983). While working with students is often cited as a prominent satisfaction derived from teaching, a poor student attitude toward learning (A Study of Teacher Incentives for the District of Columbia Public Schools, Summary Report, 1984) and disciplinary problems with students (Smith et al, 1983) become major sources of dissatisfaction. Collegial relationships with other teachers and administrators are an important satisfier (District of Columbia Public Schools, 1984; Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1983); therefore, poor collegial relationships, lack of support from peers and administrators, and lack of opportunities to develop such relationships emerge as disincentives (Brandt and Dronka, 1985; Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1983).

Other dissatisfiers indicated by teachers are low pay (Fiske, 1982; Harris, 1985; Smith et al, 1983) and the necessity of performing many non-instructional duties (Brandt and Dronka, 1985). In keeping with their perceptions about their roles as professionals, teachers feel that they should have more input into decision-making in schools (NEA, 1983; Koppich, et al, 1985; Perrone, 1983). In short, teachers are expected to act like professionals and are disappointed when they are not treated as such. Duke (1984) emphasizes this point when he writes:

...Contemporary professionals are the bearers of a variety of unrealistic expectations, the possession of which produces disillusionment, job dissatisfaction, and the yearning to try other fields of endeavor (p. 4).

Duke believes that teachers suffer from this disillusionment when they find out that they are not to have the benefits of professional status; this is a principle cause for

eroding teacher morale. The Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy (1986) addresses this point as well:

One of the most attractive aspects of professional work is the way professionals are treated in the workplace. Professionals are presumed to know what they are doing, and are paid to exercise their judgment. Schools on the other hand operate as if consultants, school district experts, textbook authors, trainers, and distant officials possess more relevant expertise than the teachers in the schools (p. 57).

In assessing the relationship between salary and dissatisfiers on the job, Hawley (1985) states: "It is important to note that pay does not compensate workers for the unsatisfactory aspects of their jobs" (p. 57).

In a survey conducted for the National Education Association, teachers responded to questions about working conditions based on the principles of effective private-sector organizations. The majority of those polled reported that supportive conditions -- which included clear organizational goals and priorities, adequate resources to do the job, communication and cooperation among staff, and involvement of all employees in decision-making -- were not present in the teachers' work environment ("Teachers' work environment...", 1986). The absence of such supportive conditions in the school could be considered potent job disincentives.

Somewhat in contrast to the findings of the NEA survey, The National Center for Education conducted a survey and found a higher level of teacher satisfaction. As reported in The Executive Educator:

Our survey found teachers are satisfied with almost all aspects of their teaching careers, with the exception of salary and status in the community. In fact, we found teachers are more satisfied with every aspect of their lives than are college graduates in general (Feistritzer, 1986).

Much of the literature emphasizes that intrinsic rewards are more powerful than extrinsic rewards, such as salary and benefits. This would support the theory that the removal of dissatisfiers, which tend to be associated with extrinsic rewards, does not in itself cause the emergence of satisfiers, which are linked to intrinsic rewards. Both actions -- the removal of sources of dissatisfaction while developing opportunities for increased satisfaction -- play a part in the design of effective incentives for teachers.

Clay (1984) found the reasons most often cited in research for teachers leaving the profession were low pay, low status, high level of stress, and lack of potential for professional advancement. In contrast, Dan Lortie (1975) examined the attractions to teaching in his comprehensive look at the teaching profession and identified five major themes that describe the motivations expressed by those who have selected teaching as a profession: (1) the interpersonal theme, describing those who like to work with people, particularly young people; (2) the service theme, describing those who feel that they have a special mission and get satisfaction from service to others; (3) the continuation theme, describing those who see schools as socialization agencies and see their roles as transmitters of the culture; (4) the material benefits theme, describing those for whom teaching represents employment security or social mobility; and (5) the time compatibility theme, describing those who appreciate the typical length of the work day and the work year (pp. 27-32).

A comparison of the incentives for becoming a teacher with the disincentives which have driven people away reveals that the success or lack of success in meeting the expectations represented by the incentives to enter teaching were not the factors which ended up driving people away. This illustrates the different roles played by incentives and disincentives, and the need to be attuned to both. When designing plans which may serve as incentives to teachers it is important to determine what incentives are strongly valued by teachers, incorporate as many potential motivators as possible into the plan, and to minimize whatever serves as disincentives.

The Intent of Incentives

In this life, you have to be mighty careful where you aim because you're likely to get there.

-- Chet Atkins

Incentive plans are designed to promote movement along a selected path. When designing such plans, it is important to decide what behavior you want to promote or the outcome you wish the incentive to produce. Whose behavior is being influenced and what is the intent of the plan? Who receives the incentive to action and what action or behavior is to be fostered?

The receivers of incentives in the educational setting are easily identified. Incentives can be aimed at administrators, counselors, and other professional staff, as well as classified employees, but the focus here is on the teacher as the receiver.

The behaviors which incentives intend to foster are varied. Current teacher incentive plans focus on four major areas of concern: (1) the attraction of competent and talented individuals to the teaching profession; (2) the retention of superior teachers; (3) the improvement of teacher performance; and (4) the enhancement of teaching as a profession.

Incentives for Attraction

It has become apparent that new incentives are needed to attract competent individuals to the teaching profession. Since 1973, both the number of college students majoring in education and the academic competencies of these students have declined. Nearly 50 percent fewer students were enrolled in colleges of education in 1983 than in 1973. While Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of college-bound students who identify teaching as their prospective profession have consistently been lower than those of students entering other professions or graduate training programs, within the past decade new teacher candidates' scores have dipped even lower (Darling-Hammond, 1984).

Another problem associated with the impending teacher shortage is the unprecedented number of teachers who are nearing retirement age. The average age of American

teachers is now about 42 and it is predicted that in the next five years, up to 40 percent of the current teaching force will retire or leave the profession (Hanes & Mitchell, 1985; NEA, 1983).

The old incentives are increasingly ineffective, especially for women and minorities who now have many more career options than they have had in the past (Schlecty & Vance, 1983). In addition, only 70 percent of those who are trained to be teachers actually do teach (Cresap, McCormick and Paget, 1984).

Feistritzer (1986) challenges the extent of this projected teacher shortage. She notes that there was an ample supply of teachers to meet the need in 1984-85 and writes:

...in my view, the teacher shortage we've been warned of has been blown all out of proportion. The Center for Statistics' projections are made on the basis of declining enrollment in colleges of education during the past 15 years -- a period when, because of declining enrollment in public schools, there was little demand for extra teachers. But as last year's experience shows, the pool of teachers is there to draw on when we need to. I predict we'll have little trouble staffing the schools in the near future. As soon as the need is known, people will step forward to fill the gap.

However, there may be limits on the "pool" of teachers Feistritzer refers to as the demand continues to grow. While some of those who were edged out of teaching due to reduction in force actions during the enrollment decline are no doubt prepared to return, many will not return, according to a survey of former teachers (Harris & Associates, 1985). The Report of the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession reports:

...former teachers appear satisfied with their health and retirement benefits. They report less job stress, greater control over their own work, and increased job satisfaction. Eighty-three percent of former teachers said they were unlikely to return to the classroom, suggesting that new policies to hold on to our most able teachers may be more effective than trying to entice former teachers back to the classroom (1986, p. 98).

Specific content areas will be especially hard hit by shortages. National Science Foundation data indicate that 50 percent of secondary math and science teachers are not qualified to teach their current course assignments. By 1995, a projected 40 percent of current math and science teachers will retire, while increased emphasis on science in the curriculum will lead to increased enrollments in science classes (Cresap, McCormick & Paget, 1984).

While increasing the size of the pool of teachers is one viable goal for incentives (Miller & Sidebottom, 1985), other incentives focus on the quality of new entrants to the field. Bell (1983) reports that most education students earn scores at the bottom 25 percent of SAT and ACT college entrance exams. At the same time, their grade point averages tend to be higher than students in other disciplines, leading Bell to suspect that their training programs are lacking in rigor.

A noticeable decline in the quality of new teachers was cited as one of the main factors leading the Charlotte-Mecklenberg School District in North Carolina to develop a career development program (Hanes & Mitchell, 1985). This program has received nationwide attention. In California, most students entering teacher education had SAT scores lower than the norm. Concerns about these findings helped to motivate the establishment of a statewide teacher incentive program (Smith, 1983). Schlecty and Vance (1983) point out that students entering teacher education have, as a whole, been less academically talented than other majors as far back as the 1920s. This "legacy", they feel, is a stigma surrounding teacher education programs which has become self-perpetuating.

The discussion of incentives for attraction has to this point been limited to drawing teachers into the profession at the preservice level. A good share of control over these circumstances is in the hands of the teacher-training institutions; however, state governments have recently become active in this effort. Such incentives include special loans for students, loan forgiveness programs, programs which include cooperative experiences in private industry, raising admission standards to elevate both the prestige of the programs and the caliber of students enrolled, and restructuring the teacher education programs to make them more vibrant and stimulating.

Incentives designed for those already in the work force can attract prospective teachers as well, by making teaching a more attractive option for talented young persons to consider.

Incentives for Retention

Another incentive path for teachers is to keep them where they are, to retain our present teaching force. As cited above, the need for teachers is growing, and retention of the most capable teachers has become a priority for leaders in education. For a variety of reasons, teachers have been leaving the profession in ever greater numbers. Schrag (1983) has suggested that at age 40, a superior teacher has three viable options: to become an administrator, to become bitter, or to leave education. Excellent teachers are not necessarily inclined to be administrators, nor does their talent as teachers guarantee that they will excel as administrators. At any rate, if all superior teachers wished to take this route, there would never be enough administrative positions to go around. For many then, in the absence of other incentives to keep them in the classroom, the only way to avoid becoming bitter is to leave the field. Schrag calls for the development of incentives to prevent such an exodus from the classroom.

Cline and Henschke (1981) found in a study of career mobility in education that teachers actually have very limited opportunity to advance within the school organization. According to Otto (1980), career lines for each individual develop along two dimensions. The first is related personal life history, and the other is within the context of social history, such as economic conditions, periods of war or peace, cultural movements, and the like. Both dimensions should be considered when designing incentives to retain teachers.

Recent research has indicated some alarming trends. It is the most academically talented teachers who leave the profession (Lyson & Falk, 1984; Pavalko, 1970; Tierney & Bond, 1985), often within the first five years of their careers (Pederson, 1970; Schlechty & Vance, 1983). The report of the Task Force on Teaching as a Profession states:

Teachers find themselves in their mid-thirties faced with the prospect of no salary growth in real terms when their peers are beginning to enter their prime earning years. It is small wonder then that half of all teachers leave the work force within seven years and that the caliber of new teachers entering the field does not compare favorably with college graduates entering other fields. The salary structure impels the most able teachers, those most likely to raise the performance levels of the schools, to leave the profession just as they acquire the experience to assume effective leadership (1986, p. 98).

Incentives for Improvement

If enhancing the teaching profession is the ultimate goal, attraction and retention of teachers is not enough. Raising the performance level of teachers is another important incentive effort to promote. Incentives for ongoing growth and development must be offered. Such incentives move beyond looking at the teaching force quantitatively in order to embrace qualitative aspirations, with the ultimate aim of improving the learning of young people in our schools.

A strong human resources plan is called for; according to Castetter (1986), this plan should be directed toward:

- . Improving the performance in their present positions of all incumbent position-holders;
- . Developing key skills of selected personnel so as to fill anticipated vacancies;
- . Promoting the self-development of all personnel in order to enhance their influence as individuals and to facilitate need satisfaction (p. 29.).

Incentives for improvement should be directed not only toward improving the skills of marginal teachers, but also toward the enhancing the skills of competent teachers, so that they too experience growth and renewal. At times, incentives will be offered to encourage retraining of teachers for a new skill or content area for the benefit of both the individual teacher and the school system.

One way to think about incentives that promote such growth is to return to a consideration of what it is that motivates teacher performance. Mitchell (1983) reports that intrinsic rewards are more important for improving effectiveness, though extrinsic ones can help with recruitment and retention. Intrinsic rewards, as stated earlier, are related to the nature of positive conditions in the workplace and engagement with task at hand. Smith (1983) concurs with this viewpoint and writes "Teachers need to feel competent and in control of their classroom and their professional lives" (p. 31). Recommended incentives for increased teacher effectiveness, according to Smith, are improved job security, public relations to foster a positive image of teachers in the community, treating teachers with respect, creating a more supportive environment (including removal of obstacles to teacher efficacy), fostering cooperative teacher projects, and providing meaningful staff development.

Staff development activities and opportunities are closely related to incentives for improvement. Lawrence (1982) found that the most effective staff development activities: involved teachers in the planning; were designed as a collective faculty effort; were designed at the local level but permitted hiring of outside consultants; were scheduled at times which did not compete with the workday; had diverse program patterns; involved participants in both receptive and active roles; included feedback; had professional development leaders; had opportunities for participants to view demonstrations of exemplary practice; did not rely on lecture as the main activity; and were conducted at the school site.

Wade (1984) found that inservice activities are especially effective incentives when people are selected to attend, as opposed to those which are required for the entire staff. The feeling of being lifted out of the crowd for some special attention can be a powerful incentive.

Raising recertification standards would act as an incentive for increased effectiveness in that teachers would be required to engage in more professional activities to be eligible for certification renewal (Smith, 1983). It is possible, however, that in the absence of other incentives, making the requisites for continuing a teaching career more stringent might act as a disincentive for some teachers.

Incentives can motivate individuals to assume certain roles or responsibilities that serve their own needs as well as serving school and community needs. Whaley and Wolfe (1984) report that the strongest incentive for teachers to supervise student teachers in their classrooms are the status and recognition which often accompany that role. McGee (1986) has studied incentives that encourage teachers to adopt an innovation; in this case it is the use of computers in schools. He finds that economic incentives, such as offering salary increases or paying for coursework, are not as important as "political" incentives in encouraging the desired behavior. The specific political incentives he cited were:

- (1) Providing public recognition for individual staff members;
- (2) Formally recognizing computer use in a memo to the central office of school board;

- (3) Arranging for media coverage;
- (4) Tying computer use to job security;
- (5) Tying computer use to potential promotion;
- (6) Offering an enhanced job title for successful computer use (p. 6).

In addition to incentives which address the individual teacher, incentives can be offered to an entire staff for the purpose of promoting increased effectiveness. Examples of this include fostering an atmosphere of collegiality, school-wide recognition, and improved instructional leadership by school principals (Cornett and Weeks, 1985). At the school level, the principal plays a vital role in offering incentives for improvement. Teachers want three things most of all from their principal: control over the learning environment; help in motivating students; and strokes for good work (Southeastern Educational Development Laboratory, 1983). Principals who can provide this have created strong incentives for improved effectiveness for the staff as a whole.

Incentives for Enhancement

To understand the need for enhancement incentives, it may be helpful to think of incentives as hierarchically arranged. Attraction is the first step, after which the focus turns to retention of the best candidates. Efforts then need to focus on continued improvement with the final step being enhancement of the individual's role and contribution to the profession. Different incentives hold appeal at different stages. Enhancement of teaching as a profession is the ultimate goal of all incentive plans. If more highly-talented persons are attracted to teaching, if those persons remain committed to the profession and are given opportunities to grow and expand within their roles as teachers, then indeed, the profession will be enhanced.

There is no consensus on what elements are needed to improve schools and teaching. Choices and tradeoffs have to be made. An Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development task force (1985) states that the evidence from studies of effective schools and other organizations argue for:

- . The necessity of establishing an organization identity and sense of commitment;
- . The importance of building a personnel evaluation system that emphasizes accomplishment, establishes high but reasonable expectations, and positively reinforces productive people;
- . The generative power of a staff development program that allows professional staff to learn, grow, and achieve;
- . The positive impact a liberating work environment has when job roles are flexible enough to allow people to experience diversity in their professional lives;
- . The vigor organizations achieve when they encourage and support "champions" (Peters and Waterman, 1984);
- . The ultimate wisdom of involving people at all levels of the organization in decision-making, planning, and evaluation (pp. 17-18).

The Focus of Current Incentive Plans: Trends and issues

A reform movement that restores our schools to the standards of 1950 is not good enough. We must design them for the economic and social conditions America will face in the 21st Century.

-- Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy

Current incentive plans are based upon a variety of conceptions of what motivates persons to enter and remain in the teaching force and continue to grow and improve as professional educators. The intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy is one way to examine such sources of motivation. We can also distinguish between monetary and non-monetary incentive plans. An examination of currently operating incentive plans yielded the following categories of possible motivators, which serve as a framework for this discussion:

- . monetary compensation;
- . career status;
- . awards and recognition;
- . professional responsibilities;
- . conditions of the workplace.

Monetary Compensation

Nearly half of the public thinks that teacher salaries are too low, as indicated in the latest Phi Delta Kappan Gallup poll (1986). In this recent survey, 49 percent of respondents thought teachers deserve a higher salary and 10 percent felt teachers were paid what they deserve. The remaining 27 percent were uncertain.

A variety of incentive plans focus on monetary concerns. Many localities are attempting to raise all teachers' salaries, with particular emphasis on starting salary in the hopes of attracting more, and better qualified new teachers. Others have focused on improving the range and choice of collateral benefits.

Incentives have traditionally been built into the single salary schedule itself, by designing schedules that reward additional training and experience. Additional incentives are provided in some formulas that drive these salary schedules, by advancing teachers more than one step at a time, or by giving full credit for experience outside of the school district on a local salary schedule.

Some consideration has been given to the use of market sensitive pay for positions where there is a critical shortage (mathematics, chemistry, science, computer science). Bonuses are given on a one-time basis to attract teachers to a particular teaching area or geographic location. Bonuses have also been used to reward outstanding teacher performance. Grants, sabbaticals, and pay for additional training could also be considered a monetary incentive, although other incentives are involved here.

Another modification in the traditional pay scale is the design of differing salaries based on job factors, similar to a "comparable worth" scheme.

The most well-known and highly publicized of the attempts to tamper with the traditional compensation practices has been the plan to introduce performance-based salaries, or, as it is more popularly known, "merit pay."

Merit pay plans have been introduced into the educational arena at several points in the last century. Simply put, people judged to be performing better are paid more. Johnson (1984) points out that educators have adopted merit pay plans when there has been widespread concern about the country's international standing. In the 1920s, such concerns stemmed from participation in World War I and in the 1960s the influence of the launching of Sputnik fueled major reform efforts in education. Inman (1984) offers three reasons why merit or performance pay has not worked in the past: low funding, unsatisfactory methods of evaluating meritorious work, and staff dissension.

In the wake of the National Commission on Excellence report (1983) and many other reports calling for strong educational reform measures, the notion of paying teachers on the basis of their performance has once again gained broad public appeal in our society (Educational Research Service, 1983; Gallup, 1984; Johnson, 1984). Although merit pay has become an extremely controversial topic among educators themselves, there is some support for the concept of paying teachers according to how effectively they perform in their jobs.

The National Schools Boards Association surveyed 1,261 teachers to assess their attitudes toward differential pay for teachers. Almost two-thirds of the respondents (63 per cent) supported the idea of paying teachers according to how well they perform in the classroom (Rist, 1983).

In a survey of 1,756 principals and teachers in Texas public schools, over half (923) of the respondents agreed with the philosophy of merit pay as a means of rewarding those educators determined to be most effective (Brooks, 1979).

While many teachers and administrators support the concept of merit pay, they worry about the implementation and administration of such plans (Educational Research Service, 1983; Johnson, 1984; Rist, 1983). School districts which have discontinued their merit pay plans express the following reasons for having done so: unsatisfactory evaluation procedures, heavy administrative burdens, staff dissension, restrictive artificial cutoffs, inadequate financial incentives, lack of consent of teachers, lack of definition of superior results, and inability to measure program results (Educational Research Service, 1983).

There are many ways to pay according to merit. Newcombe (1983) delineates at least eleven categories of merit pay: general school board policy, percentage increase for merit, merit longevity pay, horizontal advancement based on merit, ranges on the salary schedule based on merit, double increment on salary schedule based on meritorius service, supplemental contract for meritorious service, multiple track salary plan, merit pay for conducting a curriculum project, merit increase determined by a point system, and merit honuses based on performance criteria.

Merit pay is not the only new form of compensation that has been considered. Other incentives that rely on modifications to the traditional salary and benefits packages can be noted in the literature.

Levin (1985) addresses the need to offer specific monetary incentives to attract teachers of math, computer science, chemistry, and physics. He notes the high salaries offered to graduates in those fields by private industry, particularly in those industries related to defense production and development. He suggests that because the federal government has played a part in establishing much of this competition for science and

math majors, it would be proper to establish federal subsidies for special incentives to recruit math and science teachers. Woo (1985) proposes that public schools help find summer employment for math and science teachers as one way to bring their salary levels closer to what they might earn in private industry.

Rush (1983) agrees with the concept of using differential pay for teachers to attract people to shortage areas, but is concerned about the appearances of inequity among school faculty. He suggests involving staff to design a system for establishing comparable worth between teachers trained in various disciplines and their counterparts in private industry.

Collateral benefits have become a substantive element in the total compensation package. Among innovations in this area is the cafeteria-style benefit compensation plan. Lawler describes this approach:

One way to improve employee satisfaction with fringe benefits, at virtually no cost to the organization, is to introduce a cafeteria-style fringe benefit compensation plan. Under this plan, employees receive the amount of money the organization allocates for their total pay package and spend it as they wish. The choice brings home to employees rather clearly just how much the organization is spending to compensate them and ensure that the money will be spent only on the fringe benefits they want. Thus it can increase employee perceptions of the value of their pay package and also increase their pay satisfaction, improving organizational effectiveness by decreasing absenteeism and turnover and generally allowing the organization to attract a more competent workforce (1976, pp. 12-13).

Several states have adopted plans to monetarily reward entire schools based on improved student achievement. Florida's meritorious schools, Tennessee's School Improvement Incentives Project (SIIP), and California's Education Improvement Incentive Program (EIIP) are examples of this approach.

The single salary schedule prevalent today originated as a way to assure equity and to prevent racial, sex, or other biases from affecting teacher salaries. When designing plans that would modify this approach to compensation, it is important to avoid a return to practices which encourage such biases.

Career Status

Incentive plans designed to enhance career status through providing options for teachers within the field of teaching are based upon the premise that teachers need to have opportunities for career advancement. Career ladders, or career development plans, are designed to offer this opportunity.

The concept of career ladders, like merit pay, is based on rewarding the most competent leaders. In exchange for that reward, however, teachers' roles change as they assume different or additional responsibilities. While plans vary from state to state and within states, the basic purposes of career ladders are:

- . to encourage good teachers to stay in the profession by providing advancement possibilities within teaching;
- . to counteract stagnation by varying teachers' responsibilities and activities at each level; and
- . to reward and motivate superior teachers through enhanced prestige, responsibility, and increased remuneration (Cresap, McCormick, and Paget, p. 22).

Additional responsibilities of teachers moving up on the ladder may include working with student teachers or beginning teachers, conducting staff inservice activities, developing curriculum, acting as a peer evaluator, becoming a grade level or content area supervisor, or any number of other tasks. Different sets of responsibilities are identified with each rung of the career ladder so that teachers at the same levels would work on the same range of activities and receive the same range of rewards.

Parker (1985) compares merit pay, personnel distribution plans, and career ladders. Merit pay is simply more money for better work. Personnel distribution plans pay more for teachers in areas of shortages of difficult assignments. Career ladders offer more pay for both better and more work. Parker also reports that teachers prefer career ladders over merit pay plans, as confirmed by the findings of a Metropolitan Life survey. In this survey, 87 percent of the teachers favored career ladders that provide teachers with greater opportunities to take on more responsibility and pay (Harris, 1984).

Hawley (1985) makes the following recommendations for developers of career ladder plans:

- (1) Economic reward for high performance should be significant.
- (2) Teachers should be required to continuously demonstrate high performance in order to retain high pay and status.
- (3) Awards should not be competitive.
- (4) Predetermined quotas should not constrain the possibility of receiving merit pay.
- (5) The criteria against which performance is measured and the goals they manifest should be clear.
- (6) Assessment measures should be seen as fair and predictable.
- (7) Evaluation, monitoring, and feedback should be frequent.
- (8) Formative and summative evaluation should embody the same criteria and standards, but be administered separately.
- (9) Inservice/staff development should be related to the career ladder system and should focus on improving teachers' chances of earning higher pay and status.
- (10) Differences in rewards should lead to differences in roles and responsibilities.
- (11) Teachers should help design and assess the plan. (pp.57-61)

Shedd & Malanowski (1986) are also concerned about career enhancement for teachers. They argue that the career ladder concept restricts the growth of some teachers and encourages competition rather than cooperation, as there are usually a limited number of positions available on each step of the ladder. Instead, they propose a career development plan be in place for all teachers to encourage continuous growth within the profession.

Others propose that career options be considered, such as more part-time positions, job sharing opportunities, lengthening the contract for summer employment, early retirement options, and other practices that offer a wider or different range of career opportunities for teachers (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984).

Awards and Recognition

Awards and recognition provide evidence of a job well done. While the award itself is an extrinsic reward, it tells teachers that they have performed at an outstanding level and increases their sense of well-being and confidence. Porter & Lawler (1968) suggest that awards and recognition, as extrinsic rewards, serve as motivators and lead to increased satisfaction if (1) the individual perceives that effort will actually yield the desired result, and (2) the individual values the reward.

Awards can be monetary or non-monetary in nature. A one-time bonus for outstanding performance, recruitment bonuses, scholarships or funds offered for increased training, and grants given to develop special projects are examples of monetary awards that are awarded on a competitive basis. Non-monetary awards include teacher-of-the-year awards, teacher-appreciation dinners, and publicity about teachers' accomplishments.

Awards are most effective, according to Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, when "used in combination with other types of incentives" (1984, p. 27). These authors warn against offering either too few or too many awards. In the former case, teachers may come to view them cynically and, in the latter case, such rewards may lose their prestige and power.

Frase, et al. (1982) examined a plan to distribute recognition awards based on teacher performance. The rewards varied in type, and included such things as attendance at professional conferences, cash, and instructional materials. Conference attendance and the purchase of long-sought-after classroom equipment were the most highly valued awards by teachers.

Recognition usually accompanies awards and makes them highly valued, but recognition need not be limited to tangible rewards. Recognition from administrators, supervisors, parents, and colleagues is highly valued by teachers (Bartell, 1986; Rosenholtz, 1985; Schlecty, 1983) and can be communicated verbally, in writing, or in indirect ways. Recognition offers teachers a validation of their work and an appreciation of their accomplishments.

Professional Responsibilities

Challenging and rewarding professional responsibilities can serve as teacher-motivators. These are opportunities for teachers to assume new roles or expand their current roles within the teaching profession. Such opportunities do not necessarily change career status or even necessarily carry increased remuneration. The focus is instead on the opportunity to develop new professional responsibilities.

Mentor teacher or master teacher plans offer this opportunity to teachers. An examination of several operating plans give some insights into the roles these teachers play.

California developed a mentor teacher program as directed by the state legislature. The primary function of these mentors is to work with new teachers. They may also provide staff development and work on curriculum, but are specifically restricted from evaluating other teachers. As school districts drew up local interpretations of the state guidelines, the five most frequently cited activities for mentor teachers were: staff development for individuals upon request; conducting school-wide staff development activities; assisting in locating and organizing instructional materials; curriculum development in high priority areas; and, assisting new teachers (Wagner, 1985).

A district need not be large nor have extensive financial resources to have a successful mentor program. Wheatland, California, is a small elementary district with an enrollment of 1,600 students, and has only 83 certified staff members and three mentor teachers. However, the superintendent views this program as an opportunity to rejuvenate staff and provide opportunities for teachers seeking leadership roles. Mentors in this district have been involved in training other teachers in the use of computers for instructional purposes and in implementing a summer school program. These activities represent an opportunities to tap local talent rather than calling in outside consultants (Wagner, 1985).

There are other ways of expanding professional responsibilities for teachers. Special projects developed by teachers can be funded by districts, or teachers can be hired for the summer months to develop or evaluate new curriculum materials or perform other

professional duties. Sometimes teachers are paid additional stipends during the school year if they assume additional responsibilities, particularly if they work in co-curricular areas.

Two cautionary notes have been raised regarding the expansion of teachers' responsibilities. It is important to determine that the added duties are not superfluous make-work activities and that the additional duties and responsibilities do not end up taking the best teachers out of the classroom.

Conditions of the Workplace

The conditions under which teachers work can support or detract from their performance.

Cresap, McCormick and Paget (1984) give the following examples of possible improvements that can be made in the teachers environment into order to make working conditions more desirable:

- . Providing alternative arrangements for chronic discipline problems;
- . Establishing a more supportive school climate;
- . Increasing teachers' involvement in planning and decision-making;
- . Reducing interruptions of classroom time by announcements, special pull-out programs, and co-curricular activities administrative matters, thereby maximizing the time teachers can devote to instructional matters;
- . Focusing more financial and other resources on support for classroom teaching;
- . Reducing the curriculum fragmentation and crowding that results from continuously adding new topics without dropping others;
- . Improving the balance in class sizes and teaching loads across schools, grade levels, and classrooms;
- . Providing discretionary funds to schools, departments, and/or teachers for supplies, materials, and other instructional expenditures;
- . Providing offices or improved work areas for teachers to use during planning and other noninstructional time;
- . Enhancing school building comfort and appearance (p. 27).

Rosenholtz (1986) has identified organizational determinants that contribute to teacher commitment. In a report of her survey of teachers in Tennessee, she related workplace commitment to teacher perceptions of the organizational properties of schools. Seventy-three percent of the variance in teacher commitment could be attributed to the following variables: (1) task autonomy, or the degree to which teachers felt they had a role in decision-making; (2) learning opportunities available to teachers in the workplace; (3) teacher rewards, either through the intrinsic task feedback they receive from students or through external recognition from valued others; and (4) teacher certainty about student capabilities, believing that learning gains are possible.

Other incentive plans, such as career ladders, also have the potential of addressing conditions of the workplace. In her examination of the impacts of career ladders on teachers and schools, Hart (1986) found that:

Career ladder teacher's tasks, the assessment of their impact on the schools, and the interaction of that assessment with the emotional tone surrounding the initial work of these teachers had great importance for the successful early stages of job redesign implementation for teachers. Unable to isolate their assessment of career ladders from their assessment of the reform's impact on school-wide improvement of student experiences, instructional methods, curriculum, and problem-solving, teachers responded in both schools with strong positive and negative feelings (p. 77).

The work of Rosenholtz, Hart, and others (Cedoline, 1982; Ellis, 1984; Kaltsounis, 1985; Smith, 1983) indicates that the nature of teachers' engagement with the work and the conditions under which teachers perform their tasks play an important role in determining job satisfaction. An incentive for the teacher, then, is the establishment of favorable conditions in the workplace.

Planning Issues

A variety of incentive plans are being proposed and adopted. How are such plans designed and implemented? Who assumes responsibility for oversight and direction? What fiscal issues are involved? How are these plans evaluated? These are some of the policy issues that have been raised regarding teacher incentive plans.

Some plans have developed slowly, using pilot projects to aid in final deliberations over the shape the plan is to take. This was done in South Carolina, where three programs were piloted in nine districts for the 1985-86 school year. One plan was then adopted for statewide use. Several criteria were used to select the pilot program. The incentive

plan had to use student learning to evaluate teacher performance, use evaluation teams composed of teachers and the building principal to assess teacher performance, utilize evidence of self-improvement through additional training, have meaningful participation of teachers in developing the plan, and include work with student teachers (Thomas & Welch, 1984).

Virginia is another state that has funded pilot programs. Five districts tested pay-for-performance models and three master teacher plans were funded. Outside evaluations were conducted and the results distributed to all districts in the state for further consideration and deliberation (Cornett, 1985).

Other states have implemented their programs immediately, and done so on a statewide basis, such as in Tennessee, Texas, and Florida. Tennessee has revised the plan in accordance with feedback from the schools and teachers' union. One recent change that has been made is to publicize the evaluation criteria. Tennessee has also dropped a requirement that teachers develop a portfolio to represent their accomplishments (Cornett, 1986). In the case of Florida, hasty implementation led to resistance, forcing a considerable revamping of the program ("Florida scraps...", 1986).

Some plans are designed and administered primarily at the state level. Others are state initiated, but offer more options for local design and control. Still others are being designed and implemented completely at the local level. Tennessee offers an example of a plan that is heavily controlled at the state level. Utah, Florida, and California offer varying degrees of local options. The Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina, plan is an example of a locally designed and implemented plan.

Utah authorized \$15 million for career ladders. A strong feature of this plan is the decentralization of the design and administration of career ladder plans. Some district's plans focused on merit as a means of obtaining advancement while other plans emphasized role enlargement for participants. There was considerable diversity in terms of number of steps on the ladder, types and amount of rewards, and the type of evaluation system used to determine placement on the ladder (Hart, et al., 1986).

Florida has replaced its master teacher program with a three-step career ladder called a Career Achievement Plan. Some criticisms leveled at the master teacher plan were: lack of teacher involvement in the development stage; the small number of teachers to qualify under the quota system; and reliance on too few measures to evaluate teachers. The new legislation was supported by the state's teachers unions, education associations, business leaders, and the governor. In the Career Achievement Plan, a teacher's license may be suspended or revoked if that teacher does not pass performance evaluations. Local districts are to devise plans in cooperation with their teacher unions. These plans must fall within guidelines specified by lawmakers and are subject to approval by the state board of education. To deal with the problem of limited funding, which would require teachers to compete for a small amount, the program will be repealed if lawmakers do not allocate at least \$90 billion by July 1, 1988 ("Florida Scraps...", 1986).

The state of California mandated the development of a mentor teacher program in each school district, providing only very broad guidelines. The districts had to establish selection criteria, plan their implementation procedures, and develop the role of the mentor teacher (Wagner, 1985).

Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina, adopted one of the first of the new career ladder plans. Designed at the local level, under guidance from University personnel, it was operating in 1980 after a four-year planning process.

Another aspect of planning is determining of the context in which the plan is to operate. An awareness of community perceptions and preferences enables program planners to tailor plans accordingly. Gress (1985) conducted a survey in Toledo, Ohio, to find out how much community support existed for various incentives. Gress found that the public was most willing to support rewarding excellence in teaching, but was least eager to support additional pay for length of service, which is the way most salary schedules are organized.

The legal basis for salary differentiation is another factor to consider in planning incentives. O'Reilly (1983) investigated this issue and found that the courts have upheld the practice of performance-based pay, as long as the school district is prepared to refute charges of abridged civil rights. Another legal issue that bears consideration

is the scope of bargainable issues that are defined in each state. Should the teachers' organization have a role in negotiating matters that relate to incentives, such as determining how teachers should be evaluated? If so, any incentive design is subject to this consideration.

Costs

Cost consideration cannot be avoided. Attention must be given to a large array of funding concerns, from such obvious costs as increased teacher salaries, to somewhat less obvious ones, such as the cost of travel for teacher-evaluators, or the expense of substitute pay for replacement of teachers who are attending special incentive activities. Peterson (1984) estimated these indirect costs to be \$700 for each teacher being evaluated in Utah.

If sufficient funds are not available for incentives (be they monetary incentives or non-monetary that often have administrative costs), the plan is not likely to be successful (Cornett, 1985). Policy makers must decide, if funds are limited, between dividing up what there is among everyone or limiting access to rewards so that fewer will earn them, making the rewards more substantial for those who do. Very few locales have ample resources to offer full rewards to all who qualify. When California initiated its mentor teacher plan, the guidelines stipulated that 5 percent of the teachers from each district could be chosen, but money was available to reward only 3.5 percent that first year (Wagner, 1985).

Some type of revenue collection program may be needed to fund the incentive program. Pate-Bain (1983) criticizes the funding of teacher incentives by increasing the sales tax, claiming that it is an overly regressive tax. Still, in many states that is the easiest kind of tax increase to implement.

Economies of scale enable larger districts to more easily redirect money into teacher salaries and other incentives (Turner, et al., 1986). Therefore, smaller districts are at a financial disadvantage to implement career incentives (Burden, 1984).

When incentive programs are funded by states, it is possible to compensate for inequities among districts. Utah provided funds for its career ladder plans to all districts, allowing the districts to elect to spend up to 50 percent of the incentive funds on extended school year contracts (Murphy, 1984). Georgia provides state funding for on-the-job assessment of new teachers, and also funds staff development programs linked to teacher assessment (Leach & Solomon, 1984).

Maryland has established a program to encourage cooperation between local school districts and institutes of higher education. State funding supports this program, with 70 percent of the program budget being distributed to the public schools, 15 percent to the state department of education, and 15 percent to the State Board of Higher Education for distribution to participating institutions (Maryland State Board for Higher Education, 1985).

Schools want to be assured that funding will be sustained. In some cases, states have provided funding for pilot programs or start-up costs only. For a successful incentive plan, schools must have a reliable source of funding beyond the initial implementation period. The state of Illinois, for example, authorized grants of \$1000 to each of 500 teachers who had been selected as master teachers in 1984. However, the funding was not renewed and so the program was left in limbo (Southern Regional Education Board, 1984).

Actual costs of incentive plans are difficult to predict or to measure, particularly plans which have not established quotas to limit expenditures. In addition, the uncertainty of funding from one year to the next can make budgets quite variable. In 1985, when Alabama was considering a career ladder plan, cost estimates ranged from \$720 million to \$1.5 billion over five years ("Performance pay...", 1986).

Another obstacle to arriving at a cost estimate is the incremental effect of increasingly more teachers climbing the ladder or becoming eligible for incentive bonuses. In Utah, the career ladder program cost \$17.7 million the first year and \$35.6 million the second year. Revenue shortfalls caused the governor to cut the promised increase the third year ("Performance pay...", 1986).

Funding such programs is a major issue to be considered in policy formulation. Sufficient funds need to be allocated to make plans effective.

Program Evaluation

How are such plans evaluated? Whether they be incentive pay plans, career ladder plans, or any other form of incentive plan, the ultimate measure of effectiveness is the ability of the plan to attract, retain, and motivate competent teachers. This is a difficult thing to measure or assess, as are many other educational reform measures. It is simply too soon to tell.

Peterson (1985) points out that too often policy makers and politicians expect immediate results. He suggests waiting at least a year before attempting to evaluate a newly initiated incentive plan.

South Carolina had to allow more time for evaluation than had been anticipated. After running pilot incentive programs in 11 districts for one year, the legislature had planned to select one for statewide implementation. However, they extended the pilot phase for another year in order to conduct the evaluation more thoroughly. In the meantime, South Carolina expanded the number of pilot projects to about half of the state's districts ("State ladder plans...", 1986).

Teacher satisfaction is one measure of a program's success. Rosenholtz (1986) suggests examining the factors which determine organizational commitment, as measured by teacher satisfaction, attendance, and retention. As a component of her evaluation activities, Hart (1985, 1986) has chosen to focus on the plan's impact upon the roles of teachers and other members of the school organization.

Hatry and Greiner (1985) suggest periodic evaluation of incentive plans to determine whether the plan is achieving its objectives and is cost effective. This allows for adjustments to be made as necessary.

Assessment of any educational reform effort is important. The attempt to make substantial changes and thus enhance teaching as a profession requires careful and thorough evaluative consideration.

The Evaluation of Teachers for Incentives

Teachers, for their part, must offer the public a commitment to the highest standards of professional competence. They must acknowledge their basic responsibility for performance. They must work for results, as I think most want to do, not work to the rule.

-- Governor Thomas H. Kean

Incentives require that teachers be held accountable. In order for teachers to have something for which to strive, and to be recognized and rewarded in some way for outstanding teaching, performance standards must be established. Teacher performance, then, should be measured against those standards.

Teacher evaluation, as defined in this discussion, includes "any formalized appraisal of teacher performance or capabilities with intended consequences for individual teachers, such as improving their teaching or determining their position within the organization in which they work" (Knapp, 1982, p. 1).

If performance-based incentive plans are to be implemented, the question of how to assess individual teacher performance becomes important. School districts in a study undertaken by the Educational Research Service (1979, 1983) report that the development of a comprehensive evaluation process is a key element in successful implementation of the program. For a truly effective incentive plan Hatry and Greiner (1985) conclude that such assessment must:

- (1) be reliable and valid -- that is, it should evaluate well those elements that are supposed to be assessed;
- (2) be reasonably comprehensive -- it should cover major aspects of a teacher's performance, even if not all aspects can be measured; and
- (3) be perceived by the various participants -- teachers, administrators, the school board, and the community -- as fair and reasonable (p. 29).

Teacher evaluation has traditionally served a wide variety of purposes and has been accomplished through various methods. Both the purposes and the methods need to be carefully considered when designing and implementing teacher evaluation plans to address the issue of teacher incentive programs.

Purposes of Evaluation

Educators are concerned about teacher evaluation for many different reasons. Millman (1981) distinguishes between formative and summative evaluation. The goal of formative evaluation is to identify teachers' strengths and weaknesses and plan appropriate professional development activities. Summative evaluation provides a base for administrative decisions surrounding hiring and firing, promotion and tenure, assignments and salary. Both serve important purposes, although in practice this distinction is not often clearly recognized. As Stiggins and Bridgeford (1985) state:

Summative evaluations are designed to ensure that highly qualified educators enter the profession and continue teaching. Formative evaluations help those already teaching to develop and refine vital skills. Most teacher evaluation conducted today attempts to do both simultaneously. In practice, however, most evaluation practices address summative goals (p. 85).

Wise et al. point out that different processes and methods suit various purposes:

For purposes of accountability, teacher evaluation processes must be capable of yielding fairly objective, standardized, and externally defensible information about teacher performance. For improvement objectives, evaluation processes must yield rich, descriptive information that illuminates sources of difficulty as well as viable courses for change. To inform organizational decisions, teacher evaluation methods must be hierarchically administered and controlled to ensure credibility and uniformity. To assist decision-making about individuals, evaluation methods must consider the context in which individual performance occurs to insure appropriateness and sufficiency of data (p. 12).

The literature has contained several recent reviews of current methods used to evaluate teachers (Ellett, Capie & Johnson, 1980; Haefele, 1980; Levin, 1979; Lewis, 1982; Medley, et al., 1984; Millman, 1981; Peterson & Kauchak, 1982; Popham, 1975). The predominant methods used have been described by Knapp (1982, pp. 2-3) as follows:

Observation of in-class teacher behavior, variously defined, by school principals or designated supervisors. Instrumentation varies, but usually includes some form of structured observation, or rating (see Medley, 1978). Less common variants include peer observational systems (e.g., the "collegial evaluation system," as reported in Roper et al., 1976) with or without teacher self-assessment, a student rating component, and occasionally parent input as well.

Assessment of the outcomes of regular classroom teaching, as indicated by tests of student achievement, in some cases combined with student satisfaction measures. Approaches vary, depending on the criteria against which satisfactory performance is measured, ranging from established norms to criterion-referenced gains of several kinds (see Haefele, 1980; Millman, 1974).

Performance tests of teaching abilities, as indicated by the teacher's success in a defined teaching exercise with a small group of pupils over a brief period of time. Success can be judged either in terms of pupil learning gains (see Popham, 1975) or selected teacher behaviors (Medley, 1978). A variation on the theme assesses teacher competence in simulations of classroom interaction, peer-teaching, or role-playing situations (e.g., Peck and Joyce, 1972).

Assessment of teaching "know how" by written tests such as the National Teacher Exam or by other means such as the Teacher Perceiver Interview (Selection Research, Inc., 1977; Muller, 1978). The results of these techniques are presented to discriminate good from poor teachers, at least at the level of adequate minimal competence.

Castetter (1986) has proposed a model for the assessment of teacher performance that incorporates both formative and summative purposes. It is a goal-setting model, emphasizing performance targets, self-evaluation, continuing feedback on performance outcomes, and close appraisee-appraiser relationships. Castetter emphasizes that there is no best strategy for judging and improving performance and that performance appraisal strategies at this point in time must place greater reliance on judgment than on precise measurement.

Tracy and MacNaughton (1985) point out that traditional methods of evaluation tend to rate teacher abilities in terms of minimum competence and therefore afford administrative control over the enforcement of bottom-line performance standards. However, for effort beyond the minimal requirements, especially efforts which are teacher initiated, traditional evaluation methods are inadequate. If outstanding performance is to be identified and rewarded, new methods of evaluation must be developed.

New Means and Measures

The trend in establishing evaluation procedures for the new teacher incentive plans is toward the utilization of multiple measures, the incorporation of measures that have been drawn from the research on effective teaching, the involvement of a wide range of personnel in the development of assessment criteria, and training for the persons who evaluate the performance of teachers.

The Tennessee Career Ladder plan has perhaps drawn more attention than any of the other of the new breed of incentive plans. Two years were spent developing a system of evaluation for determining teachers' status on the ladder. Teachers, administrators and state education personnel helped formulate the evaluation instrument. Teachers are evaluated by a team, and most of the evaluators are teachers who have been trained for the task, so that there is some semblance of "peer evaluation". Six categories have been established as the criteria for evaluation:

- (1) prepares for instruction effectively;
- (2) uses teaching strategies and procedures;
- (3) uses evaluation to improve instruction;
- (4) manages classroom activities effectively;
- (5) establishes and maintains an effective leadership role; and
- (6) communicates effectively (Clapp, 1985).

Furtwengler (1985) describes Tennessee's evaluation process in more detail. Seven data sources are compiled to address the six areas of competency delineated above. The data sources include classroom observation, a portfolio created by the teacher, an interview with the teacher, a peer questionnaire, a student questionnaire, a principal questionnaire, and a written test.

In addition to the statewide evaluation plan which is required for moving to the top two levels of the career ladder, each district develops a local plan to use for evaluating teachers at lower levels. These local plans are submitted to the state for approval. Most districts have adapted the state plan for local use (Furtwengler, 1985).

Pate-Bain (1983) points out one of the difficulties in implementing a statewide evaluation plan. In Tennessee, it was logistically impossible for the initial group of 75 evaluators to evaluate all of the teachers who applied for career advancement the first year.

Seiling, Oklahoma, has been using a merit pay plan which emphasizes students' standardized test scores to predict expected growth in learning on both a class-wide and school-wide basis. Teachers are awarded additional pay if their students surpass the

expectations. Sealing officials think that selecting the right tests for measuring student growth is critical for the success of their incentive program (Daughtery & Dronberger, 1983).

A unique system of evaluation in Round Valley, California, combines rating for individually initiated projects, for principal observations, and for group efforts. A formula then determines the amount of the award to be earned. This interactive merit incentive acts as a control against teachers becoming overly competitive. Another aspect of this plan is that the results of each evaluation are held strictly confidential. This small school system felt that its recipe for merit pay was successful.

The Round Valley plan was already in effect when California adopted a statewide program of performance-based incentives in 1983. The mentors were to be nominated by teacher-dominated committees within each school district; up to five percent of the teachers in each district were eligible for mentor status. Evaluation criteria were to be locally determined. Wagner (1985) reports that the complexity of each district's mentor selection process varied according to the importance the administration and teachers in that district attributed to the program and to the perceived status of mentors.

Utah also gave its school districts a mandate to develop a career ladder program with local options included within the specific design of the plan. Peterson (1985) describes the Park City School District plan. Park City allowed each teacher to select four "lines of evidence" upon which that teacher's evaluation would be based. The lines of evidence from which teachers could choose included: student reports, peer review, pupil growth, parent surveys, systematic observation, special service, content-based teacher tests, professionalism, administrative reports, and others. On the positive side, this system has the effect of using the evaluation process as an incentive, with teachers being motivated by the opportunity to document their successful experiences. It was criticized, though, for allowing negative aspects of a teacher's work to go unnoticed or unremediated. There was also some concern about the vulnerability of the plan to the manipulations of those who are adept at marketing themselves.

An analysis of plans for implementing career ladders among school districts in Utah revealed that 85 percent of the districts developed new evaluation systems to use for this purpose, while 15 percent retained their former evaluation practices. Also, 67 percent used their new evaluation procedures for all teachers, while 18 percent only required career ladder applicants to use the new procedures.

Among forms of evidence being used in the school districts in Utah (and the percentages of districts intending to use each type) are: administrative ratings (84 percent), student achievement (53 percent), peer review (33 percent), self evaluation (29 percent), student evaluation (27 percent), ratings for professionalism (20 percent), parent surveys (18 percent), and interviews by an evaluator (11 percent).

Nottingham (1985) reports on teacher appraisal guidelines which were drawn up in Idaho for use in career ladder decisions. The evaluation focused on teaching, and not on teachers, with attention paid to classroom instruction and effectiveness. The need for training of evaluators was explored, with development of shared expectations, definitions of terms, sharpening of data collection skills, and familiarity with known models for evaluation. The Idaho report also suggested that objective student surveys and artifact collection be incorporated into evaluation procedures. The involvement of teachers in the collaborative development of local plans was urged.

The evaluation procedures under development for a career ladder plan in Georgia call for each supervisor and professional to establish job responsibilities and objectives for each academic year. Two formal evaluations will be conducted by the supervisor, with written assessments of strengths and weaknesses. The first observation is preceded by a conference. Peer observation is included in the identification of strengths and weaknesses (Cornett, 1986).

In 1985, the Florida legislature called for an outside evaluation of their master teacher program. The outside evaluators centered their criticisms on the evaluation system and called for expansion of the present instrument to include planning and other skills not directly observable in the classroom. These evaluators also recommended a combination score be derived, based on the written test and the classroom observation and suggested that outside evaluators be used to assess teacher performance (Cornett, 1986).

Some states and districts prefer to pilot test evaluation procedures before implementing incentive plans. This is the course pursued by Alabama when twelve districts were selected to field test new evaluation procedures. Under this plan, professional teachers are observed by two evaluators (the principal and either an assistant principal or instructional supervisor) twice during the year, for a total of four visits. Probationary teachers are observed six times. An evaluator questionnaire, to provide teacher information that cannot be observed in the classroom, is also used (Cornett, 1986). Fairfax County Schools, in Virginia, pilot tested an evaluation plan in 1984-85, redesigned the plan in 1985-86, pilot tested the new plan in 1986-87, and is prepared to fully implement the new plan in the 1987-88 school year (Bartell, 1986; "Fairfax study finds...", 1987.)

Organizational Impacts

Both teachers and administrators have concerns about the implementation of teacher incentive plans and the evaluation procedures that are a crucial part of such plans. These concerns have direct implications for the school as an organization and the roles that members play within that organization. As Knapp states:

...research needs to investigate more fully the interaction of various "constituencies" in the design, installation, and implementation of teacher evaluation systems. Important differences in the points of view and relative power of these constituencies are probably the most powerful determinant of teacher evaluation systems (p. 2).

Involving teachers in the design of instruments and procedures by which they are to be evaluated is crucial. "Performance evaluation done in conjunction with teachers connotes a positive and growth related, rather than judgmental experience" (Pembroke and Goedert, 1982, p. 30).

In a survey of teachers and administrators in the state of Illinois, teachers voiced their preference for multiple evaluators, including peers, administrators, and parents, as a way to increase objectivity. However, 67 percent of those teachers were against merit pay, and 70 percent believed that if merit pay plans were adopted, evaluation would not be objective. They expressed a preference for basing extra pay on increased or different responsibilities, rather than on student achievement or National Teacher Examination scores (Ogletree, 1985).

A Rand study (Wise, et al., 1984) found some areas of concern even among those school districts considered to have well-developed teacher evaluation plans in operation. The most common concern expressed was that principals lacked sufficient resolve and competence to evaluate accurately. Role-conflict was cited as the reason. The next most common problem was teacher resistance or apathy. Lack of uniformity and consistency within a school system and inadequate training for evaluators were also reported as concerns. A final concern expressed by a majority of the respondents was the inability of the system to recognize differences in elementary, secondary, and specialist teacher performance (pp. 22-23).

Johnson (1980) conducted interviews with persons involved in competency-based evaluations in four suburban school districts. Her findings indicated that principals expressed different concerns than central office personnel. System-wide administrators talked about "uniformity, control, and compliance" while principals spoke of "flexibility, autonomy, and diversity". In many instances, these evaluators seemed to have opposing objectives. Johnson states: "It suggests that there is something in the nature of teaching and evaluation, in the roles of principal and teacher, and in the traditional organization of the school district that accounts for the reluctance, ambivalence, and resistance of building principals to embrace the task of competitively assessing teachers' work -- a responsibility that is thought to be routinely accepted by supervisors in business" (p. 224).

Hart, Kauchak, & Stevens (1986) examined the effects of career ladder implementation efforts on the work of the school principal. Principals expressed generally positive attitudes about the effect of the first year of career ladders in their districts. A majority of the principals thought that career ladders rewarded excellent teachers, had positive effects on interaction between principals and teachers, and conformed to the legislative intent in Utah.

Principals in Utah did experience a change in their roles as a result of the career ladder plans. The administration of career ladders took a great deal of time. They were more positive about the career ladder effort when efforts were made to adjust their support system, streamline their work, and keep them clearly informed about all aspects of the implementation process.

It is important to design and implement teacher evaluation processes for incentive plans that enhance rather than impinge upon teachers' and administrators' roles.

Darling-Hammond et al. (1983) in their review of the literature relating to the organizational implications of teacher evaluations give particular attention to the interests of the stakeholders in an organization. They offer four minimal conditions a successful evaluation system:

- . All actors in the system have a shared understanding of the criteria and processes for teacher evaluation.
- . All actors understand how these criteria and processes relate to the dominant symbols of the organization, that is, there is a shared sense that they capture the most important aspects of teaching, that the evaluation system is consonant with educational goals and conceptions of teaching work.
- . Teachers perceive that the evaluation enables and motivates them to improve their performance; and principals perceive that the procedure enables them to provide instructional leadership.
- . All actors in the system perceive that the evaluation procedures allow them to strike a balance...between control and autonomy of the various actors in the system (p. 320).

A wide variety of teacher incentive plans are being conceived and introduced into schools. Such plans differ in the underlying conceptions of the nature of teaching, what rewards appeal to teachers, and how teachers work together in their organizations.

Incentive plans require that teachers be evaluated. Many plans attempt to achieve both formative and summative purposes, evaluating teachers for improvement and accountability. Some direct evaluation to both the individual and organizational levels. Methods of evaluation can be devised that best suit each intended purpose. Instrument validity and reliability ought to also be considered when designing evaluation methods. It is not clear that one evaluation system can be effective, valid and reliable in addressing all purposes stated above.

Once the methods are designed to suit the purpose, the full range of implications ought to be carefully examined. What implications does the evaluation system have for teachers and others who work in the organization?

A Framework for Decision-Makers

Policy makers will determine the future of teaching by the decisions they make today.

-- Arthur Wise

A Framework for Planning

A variety of teacher incentive plans have been introduced across the nation. Such plans are based on differing conceptions of what motivates teachers and teacher performance. The following motivators were presented as a framework for classification of such differing conceptions:

- . monetary compensation;
- . career status;
- . professional responsibilities;
- . awards and recognition; and
- . conditions of the workplace.

When designing such plans, it is important to decide what behavior we want to promote or the outcome we wish to produce in response to the offering of the incentive. What is the intent of the plan? Possible intents that have been presented in this report are:

- . the attraction of competent and talented individuals to the teaching profession;
- . the retention of superior teachers;
- . the improvement of teacher performance; and
- . the enhancement of teaching as a profession.

Incentives, then, should be designed to match the motivator with the intent of the plan. If it is believed that monetary compensation is a strong motivator for those entering the teaching profession, and the intent was to recruit outstanding candidates, teachers would be offered the highest beginning salary that was possible, be provided a bonus amount for signing an early contract, or be reimbursed for the first month apartment rent. If schools believe that professional responsibilities are the strongest motivator the focus would be on the nature of the job itself and the opportunities available for professional advancement.

The framework presented here does not mean to suggest that any given incentive plan will address only one cell of the matrix. Usually more than one motivator is considered in the building of incentive plans. In fact, it is more realistic to consider that a wide range of motivations will predict and influence teacher behavior. The framework should not be used to fit a specific plan into an individual cell. It can be used to examine instead how each cell is addressed in a proposed incentive plan. The most comprehensive plan will address as many cells as possible, including various factors that are felt to motivate teachers and serving a wide range of purposes or intentions.

An examination of intents and motivators relating to incentives should be considered along a continuum rather than within individual cells. For example, in building an incentive plan that would address rewards and recognition as a motivator, it would be necessary to establish rewards and recognition opportunities that would attract teachers to the job, retain teachers once they are on the job, and offer them opportunities and incentives to continue to improve their performance in the classroom. Such incentives are not one-time, single opportunities for recognition, but built upon a widely conceived range of strategies designed to establish an organizational climate in which numerous and appropriate opportunities for rewards and recognition do exist. As teachers progress through stages in their careers, the incentives continue to encourage growth and development within the profession, thus enhancing the teaching profession itself. Piecemeal approaches to incentives will only provide temporary solutions and will not, in the long run, enhance the profession.

		INTENT			
MOTIVATOR		attraction	retention	improvement	enhancement
monetary compensation					
career status					
awards and recognition					
professional responsibilities					
conditions of the workplace					

Figure 1. A Conceptual Framework for the Examination of Teacher Incentive Plans

A review of research and practice suggests the following broad recommendations for states and localities in their consideration of teacher incentives:

- (1) Determine the intent of the incentive plan under consideration. Will it be designed to attract potential teachers, retain the most competent, motivate improvement of all teachers, or enhance the profession of teaching throughout the region. Does it tend to focus on one or a combination of the above?
- (2) Determine the locus of responsibility for design, oversight and evaluation of such plans and establish a means of communicating and coordinating efforts at all levels.
- (3) Involve people throughout the organization in the planning for incentives, particularly at the teacher level, where the impact of such plans will be most directly felt.
- (4) Consider the contributions to teacher satisfaction and the motivation of teacher performance in the design of such plans.
- (5) Give careful attention to the design of teacher evaluation procedures, including both formative and summative components.
- (6) Consider cost factors. Do the potential benefits justify the expenditures? Are the expenditures sufficient to meet the intended goals?
- (7) Include ongoing evaluation of the program, and modify it as seems appropriate.

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