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ABSTRACT

Statewide coordinating agencies are examined concerning their role in determining whether or not to establish new institutions, branch campuses, or professional schools, as well as in deciding which institutions to reallocate or eliminate and which research and public service activities to institute. The historical background and purpose of statewide coordinating agencies is also described. The question is raised as to whose viewpoint the agency really represents, the institution's or the state government's, and it is suggested that if it is not to be merely a capricious and arbitrary decision making body, it could represent the best interest of both parties. The coordinating agency, it is argued, cannot afford to be just a rubber stamp organization that merely approves every new proposal for an institution that is proposed by the state government and higher education. Rather, by considering each proposal on its own merit, the statewide coordinating agency will assure each body involved that the decision it reaches will be both fair and unbiased. Contains 7 references. (GLR)

THE ROLE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES IN PROGRAM REVIEW

by

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CONTENT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES

From the colonial period until the late nineteenth century universities in America were completely autonomous in their relationship to state government. (The Board of Regents of the State of New York was organized in 1784, but did not exercis any authority until 1961.) During the period from the late nineteenth century and continuing through the 1960s, three types of coordinating agencies were created, viz., statewide governing boards, voluntary associations, and statewide coordinating boards. (See next section for definitions of different types of boards.) Statewide governing boards started in the late 19th century, reached a peak in the first two decades of the 20th century, and underwent a slight revival during the 1960s. Voluntary associations were the most prevalent creation during the 1940s and fiscal year 1950. The creation of statewide coordinating boards started in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s.

Originally, state governments relied on the local governing board system. But, the local board members were not protecting the interest of the public as the government had expected. To put it bluntly, they were authorizing, what government officials considered, the wasteful spending of too much government money. They allowed state colleges and universities in one area of the state to duplicate the programs and services of other state supported colleges and universities in the same, or other areas of the state. In response to this lack of voluntary coordination on the part of institutional boards, between 1864 and 1945, thirteen states, with limited resources, established one single consolidated board for higher education and abolished existing local boards.

According to Berdahl (1971), a coordinating agency's "functions extend over a wide range of possible activities--planning, budget review, program approval, capital outlay review, administration of Federal programs, to name only the major ones--and board powers may be advisory in some areas and regulatory in others. There may be significant discrepancies between the "de jure" existence of powers and their "de facto" exercise. The "de facto" exercise

of powers may vary over time as the board confronts changing conditions in state government, higher education, or both" (p. 24). A coordinating may exercise all, or some of these powers, depending upon the type of agency it is, and the economic and political climate in which it has to function. Berdahl's discourse is basically favorable to statewide coordinating agencies. He views master planning and budget review by the statewide agency as basically a positive factor in the development of higher education.

The Carnegie Council, writing in 1980, expresses a different view, viz.,

> We have two great fears about state conduct. One is that some state financial planners will underestimate potential enrollments and will promise to their governors and their legislative committees more in the way of savings than can be realized if higher education is not to be greatly harmed. The other is that some educational and financial planners will see an opportunity to 'rationalize,' to seize control of systems of higher education, to make higher education an

agency of state government, to do in the name of saving money while cutting less those institutions that go along with the process. Higher education performs as a largely autonomous segment of society so much better than it would as just another government bureau. (p. 120)

The position of the Carnegie Council clearly contrasts Berdahl's perception. The Carnegie Council further cautions against "Overeager promises to save money on higher education, and plans to place systems of higher education under increased state control" (p. 120).

Perhaps the two contrasting points of view are signs of the times during which they were written. Berdahl's study was written during the growth years in higher education, 1967 to 1971. The Carnegie Council's study was written during years of declining enrollment. During Berdahl's study, colleges and universities were not being threatened with cutbacks in funding and the elimination, or consolidation of certain programs by state wide coordinating agencies, as they were during the time to the Carnegie Council's study. I am sure that this variable had some effect on the formulation

of such contrasting opinions on what should or should not be the functions of statewide coordinating agencies.

Henderson and Henderson, writing in 1974, quote Lee and Bowen (1971; in Henderson and Henderson, 1974) as saying that "the principal roles of the central administration relate to specialization, diversification, and cooperation within the system" (p. 225). Those principal roles, or purposes, as delineated by Henderson and Henderson are

> ...to survey the needs and problems of higher education with sufficient thoroughness and objectivity to make good allocations of resources..., to make recommendations for public policy..., to plan and coordinate the general implementation of programs..., to define and satisfy the needs for higher education, avoid unnecessary duplications, and prepare bases for the objective distribution of funds. (p. 230)

Glenny, writing in 1959, states that "In determining the functions and the courses of study in each

institution, central agencies of coordination work toward three goals. The first is to decrease or prevent high costs resulting from unnecessary duplication of major functions of the institutions... The second goal is to improve the quality of present specialized programs in the several institutions by centering various programs in appropriate colleges rather than allowing their growth in all... The third aim of the coordinating agency is to improve the quality of the whole curriculum of each institution not only by achieving the two goals mentioned, but also by preventing unnecessary proliferation of courses, services, and programs within each institution" (p. 88). An even more comprehensive and all encompassing delineation of the purpose of statewide coordinating agencies is given by Mortimer and McConnell (1978). They cite Glenny's 1971 work:

> ...coordinating agencies...should take leadership in promoting diversity in educational programs and types of institutions; encouraging higher education to respond to a wide spectrum of students' interests, aptitudes, and abilities;

encouraging educational innovations; stimulating the improvement of undergraduate education; making proposals to ensure ease of student transfer between institutions and programs; encouraging lifelong education; pressing for the establishment or discontinuation of graduate and professional programs in order to meet manpower and students' personal needs without oversupplying or undersupplying the market; promoting the finding of research and public service; devising methods for determining the kinds of physical facilities required for all types of students and programs; encouraging the optimal use of new instructional technology; determining procedures for terminating unproductive, obsolete, or duplicative programs; and recommending the appropriate division of financial contributions between the student and the state and the part that grants, scholarships, and loans should play in helping students meet their obligations. (Glenny, 1971; in Mortimer and McConnell, 1978, p. 88)

I think that it is apparent by the broad purposes and roles indicated above that, indeed, statewide coordinating agencies are a "power to be reckoned with."

TYPES OF STATEWIDE COORDINATION AGENCIES

The purpose of this paper, as the title indicates, is to explore the role of statewide coordinating agencies in program review. But, before we get into that, let's talk about the different types of statewide coordinating agencies. Berdahl delineates three basic types, viz., (1) voluntary associations, (2) coordinating boards, and (3) governing boards. Voluntary associations are statewide coordinating agencies created by the voluntary association of the colleges and universities in a state. They do not have any legal authority. Coordinating boards, on the other hand, are created by state statute. Coordinating boards do not supersede institutional governing boards. Coordinating boards can be either advisory or regulatory, or a combination of both. The statewide governing board is a statutory board also, but it supersedes all local or institutional boards. It usually has broad regulatory powers.

TYPES OF MEMBERSHIPS ON STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES

Three types of memberships on statewide coordinating agencies are discussed in this paper. One is called "public" membership. In this type of membership, the person is elected by the citizenry or appointed by a politician. The other type of membership is called "institutional." In this type of membership the selection process is controlled by the institution. This means that the person sits on the statewide coordinating as a representative of the institution that selected him.

PROGRAM REVIEW DEFINED

Originally many statewide coordination agencies tried to control the types of programs at various state institutions indirectly by using budgetary review. A case at point was New Mexico's Board of Educational Finance, established in 1951. It even wrote threatening letters to college presidents and used other methods of coercion to influence and control

programs on its college campuses. At the time of Berdahl's study, all coordinating agencies except the Arkansas Commission on Coordination of Higher Education Finance had been given explicit power of program review. Indirectly controlling programs by using budgetary review just had not worked. State coordinating agencies, according to Glenny, needed "full legal authority" (p. 96).

Master planning has also sometimes been used as a method of indirect program review. A master plan usually codifies the basis for establishing new colleges and universities. This codification of the criteria for establishing new colleges or universities covers only one aspect of program review. This is why master planning has been ineffective in eliminating much of the duplication that exists in many states.

According to Berdahl, program review concerns itself with, among other things, "whether or not to establish new institutions, branch campuses, or professional schools, and, if so, where; what role and scope missions, if any, to assign to new or existing institutions; which to reallocate or eliminate; which research and public service activities to institute..." (p. 139). Of course, coordinating agencies do not make

all the final decisions in all of the above areas. The degree of involvement of state coordination agencies vary from state to state. However, this is the definition (of program review) that we shall adopt in this paper.

ROLE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES IN ESTABLISHING NEW INSTITUTIONS

Statewide coordinating agencies have a big role to play in making decisions about the establishment of new institutions. Decisions of such magnitude cannot be left up to legislators and politicians. They have been noted in the past for establishing new institutions in certain areas as political favors, and in total disregard for the overall educational balance of the state. Capricious and arbitrary acts like this can have a very detrimental effect on already financially depressed colleges and universities in the state, both public and private.

Voluntary coordinating boards cannot deal with the problem of new institutions effectively because they are usually composed of representatives from different

institutions in the state and the representatives, of course, are bias against any resolution that might threaten the health or well-being of his or her institution. This is one reason why many states had to abandon their voluntary state coordinating agencies for more powerful statutory statewide coordinating agencies for more powerful statutory statewide coordinating agencies. If statutory statewide coordinating agencies are established, their powers will be not only "de facto" (as is the case with the voluntary agencies) but also "de jure." Furthermore, if their duties and responsibilities are clearly defined, decisions about new institutions will be much easier to make. It will be easier for agencies to reach a consensus. The majority of states that have statewide coordinating agencies started out with voluntary agencies, but eventually changed to the statutory kind. This fact further attests to the inadequacy of the voluntary kind of agency. According to Berdahl (1971), increasing disagreement over new institutions was one of the main factors that caused California, in 1960, to disband its voluntary agency and set up a statutory one. One big factor that lends itself to the preferred establishment of statutory agencies by most states is that they

(statutory agencies), unlike most of their voluntary counterparts, do not have to reach a unanimous decision on recommendations that they support. This in itself eliminates much of the impasse and lack of decisiveness that is characteristic of most voluntary boards. This advantage of statutory agencies clearly is a catalyst to the statewide decision making process.

One thing that statutory and voluntary agencies do have in common is the multitude of problems they face with state government and institutions. For example, California's statutory statewide coordinating agency was given the legal power of requiring that all programs for new institutions be approved by it before any action could be taken to establish them. The state legislature tried, unsuccessfully to circumvent this power by passing contrary legislation. Its effort was deterred by a governmental veto. Efforts on the part of state legislators, like this one, can clearly undermine the role that statewide coordinating boards are supposed to play in approving requests for new institutions.

As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, statewide coordinating boards face problems not only from state governments, but also from the institutions themselves.

In Illinois, for example, a group of private colleges tried to get the statewide agency's decision to establish two new public four-year colleges reversed. They were unsuccessful. In fact, in this case, the state legislature supported the position of the agency. It is interesting to note here that, in Illinois, the majority of the members of the statewide coordinating agency was publicly elected or appointed, where as in the case mentioned in the previous paragraph (California), the majority of the members of the agency consisted of representatives from various institutions. This might be a big factor in understanding why the the decisions of the two statewide coordinating agencies were received so differently. The state legislature probably favored the position of the statewide coordinating agency because it (the statewide coordinating agency) was politically controlled. Politicians on the statewide coordinating agency probably had political allies in the state legislature. The position that the agency took itself might have very well been the result of political manuevering on the part of members of the state legislature. It is conceivable that the idea of establishing two new institutions might have really originated in the state

legislature and was infiltrated through political channels into the decision making network of the statewide coordinating agency.

The state legislators probably would be very much in favor of making sure that a majority of members on the statewide coordinating agency serves as the leisure of the governor or the public. That way they can manipulate them easier. They can use their political muscle to bring pressure on agency members who vote contrary to their opinion. Many authors have talked about the politicization of the American university and its dangers. Clearly, statewide coordinating agencies will probably be recorded in history as the most politicizing developments in higher education during the twentieth century. Surely, the politicization of an entity that has such far reaching effects on the present and future direction of higher education in America has serious implications for academe.

Academicians cannot afford to just sit back and let this happen. They must become involved in the "political" process too, if they and the university are to maintain their integrity. They cannot afford to just sit back and let statewide coordinating councils and, thereby, higher education become politicized. If

they do, it could mean the demise of American higher education as we know it today.

Academicians must become involved. They must lobby in state capitals across the country. They must lobby at the statewide coordinating councils around the country.

At this point, I am reminded of Virginia Power (a electricity and natural gas utility) and the SCC (State Corporation Commission), both of Virginia. The State Corporation Commission is an organization established by the state government to regulate corporations in Virginia. It is very similar to statewide coordinating councils, established to regulate (or coordinate, if you will) higher education. Throughout its history, when Virginia Power has petitioned the State Corporation Commission for a price increase, it has very seldom, if ever, been turned down. This has been due, primarily, to a strong lobbying campaign carried on continuously by the utility, not only with members of the State Corporation Commission but with members of the state legislature also. Virginia Power realizes that in order to assure the adoption of its proposals by the State Corporation Commission, it must not only have the backing of members of the Commission, but also

members of the prospective opposition. This has been a very effective technique used by this utility. It has usually gotten Virginia Power virtually what it requested.

Perhaps America's colleges and universities should follow a similar pattern. First, of course, they should try to establish representation on the statewide coordinating agency, since this is possible in many states. Even if they themselves cannot be the majority on the agency, they should try to get persons elected or appointed that they feel will be sympathetic to the cause of higher education. Aside from this first consideration, academicians should have direct personal contact with the state governor and should establish a strong and continuous lobbying effort in the state legislature and the statewide coordinating agency. Only by doing these things can they assure the continued and substantial support for the issues that they feel are most pertinent to higher education. If the battle for higher education is to be fought in nonconventional territory, then academicians must, most assuredly, train themselves to fight in this type of terrain. If the battle is going to be fought with unconventional weapons, then, of course, academicians must become

masters of these types of weapons. Last, but not least, if the university is to survive in the WAR FOR FUNDS, it is sad but true, it must agressively attack its enemies and disarm or destroy them. If it is necessary to sign or negotiate a treaty, it must be signed or negotiated from a position of strength.

To win in the WAR FOR FUNDS, higher education must establish its primacy and necessity. It must become the top priority. It must win out against public safety, health care, unemployment, highways, recreation, crime, etc. These are just a few of the other entities that are vying for state funds.

Getting back to our discussion of program review, if higher education cannot establish that the new institutions that it is proposing should be given top priority and are necessary, it is very unlikely that the statewide higher education coordination agency will act favorably upon them. However, with the "proper" political manuevering, in manly cases, the university may be able to get favorable action on some of its most mundane requests for new institutions.

According to Berdahl, sometimes the politicians win, sometimes the institutions win, in the state coordinating game. For example, Penn State overruled

the State Board of Education's decision to usurp its two-year branches. In this case, the institution won. In another case (Ohio), the governor was able to locate a new medical school in Toledo, which just happened to be the home of the editor of a major newspaper that was one of his most staunch supporters during his campaign for governor. This time, the politician won. When politicians win, many times it is because there is a majority of public members on the statewide coordinating agency. This was certainly the case in Ohio, where all of the members of the statewide coordinating agency were public members. In a case like this, the cards are heavily stacked against the university, if it involves a decision of university concerns vs. state government concerns. With a board like this, the governor will probably be able to get it to do practically whatever he wants.

In my opinion, on any board, for it to really be effective, there must be some institutional representation. Such was the case in Pennsylvania. It had two institutional members on its statewide coordinating board. This may have been one of the reasons why the outcome in Pennsylvania was so different from the outcome in Ohio. If there had been

some institutional members on the board in Ohio, the outcome probably would have been quite different. It is clear from the Ohio and Pennsylvania examples that when universities develop proposal for new institutions, they should always be cognizant of the type of composition that the statewide coordinating agency has. Proposals for new institutions should be written in such a way that they will assure acceptance by the majority of individuals on the agency. If the agency is completely public, then, of course, the proposal should be written to appeal to the public members. If, on the other hand, there is a mixture of both public and institutional members, the proposal should be written in such a way as to appeal to both types of members. A good middle of the road position between intellectualism and utilitarianism would be good with sprinklings of both throughout the proposal. This approach is based on Berdahl's finding that public members tend to be utilitarians and institutional members tend to be intellectualists.

ROLE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES IN DETERMINING THE ROLE AND SCOPE OF INSTITUTIONS

Many state coordinating agencies are responsible for approving changes in the role and scope assignments of various institutions of higher education. According to Berdahl, "Decisions in this area involve the determination of an institution's basic type (e.g., two-year, four-year, or graduate institution) and of its curricular emphasis (e.g., liberal arts, teacher training, vocational-technical, or professional)" (p. 144-145). The role of state coordinating agencies in these decisions can clearly determine whether an institution grows, remains the same, or contracts. A community college might think that it is ready to advance and become a four-year institution, but, unless it receives the approval of the statewide coordinating agency, it will probably not get the chance to do so. Readiness is not the only factor that must be considered. The members of the statewide coordinating agency must examine a proposal for a change in institutional type by a college or university in light of the total educational program of the state. Agency

statewide coordinating agencies. But, such is not the case. There are other obstacles that private institutions must overcome when trying to change their role or scope. Not least among them are the following: the mission of the institution as stated in the original charter, the size of the endowment that the institution has, and the feeling of the local governing board about such a move. Because of these and other similar factors, many times so called "private" liberal arts institutions run into just as many problems as public ones.

According to Berdahl. "Most states have a three-tiered system: two-year colleges, four- to six-year institutions..., and the state university of universities." Without proper coordination, the push for "lesser" colleges to become greater colleges could eliminate one or more of the tiers in such systems. Of course, this is not desirable and would not tend to serve the interest of the public. These "lesser" institutions serve a valuable purpose and must be maintained. Many individuals that cannot meet the admissions requirements of a four-year college or state university can still at least get started in a two-year institution. Admissions requirements at two-year

members must ask such questions as: What effect will this change have on other, already established, institutions? Is there a need in the state for the change in institutional type? Does the state have the resources available to fund such a change? By finding the answers to these questions and similar questions, the statewide coordinating agency can improve its chance of rendering the most appropriate decision.

There has been quite a bit of discussion in the news lately about small liberal arts colleges changing their missions and roles. I am reminded of a college called Park college in Parkville, Missouri. Originally, it was a small religion oriented college. It had what is traditionally called a liberal arts curriculum. It was, basically, what we call a private liberal arts college. It was affiliated with the Presbyterians. More recently, Park College has changed ownership. Since then the curriculum has been constantly undergoing changes. It has changed being a small liberal arts college and is now well on its way to becoming a comprehensive university. It seems as though private liberal arts colleges would have an easier time changing their saga than public institutions, since many of them are not regulated by

institutions are usually lower than admissions requirements at four-year institutions and state universities. Also, two-year colleges usually offer more developmental courses. Furthermore, most two-year (or community) colleges tend to be more parochial and vocationally oriented. All of these factors emphasize the necessity of keeping these colleges around.
In many states, even decisions on institutional role changes have become politically charged. Berdahl, writing in 1971, states that "Role changes in some states depend more on political influence than on deliberate educational planning" (p. 149). This is exactly the opposite of the way it should be. Meeth (1974) indicates that lack of planning is one of the main causes of many of the problems that institutions face. Clearly, "ad hoc" planning is not sufficient enough to meet the need of the complex organization that the American university has become today.

There are two methods that statewide coordinating agencies use to assign institutional roles and scope on a statewide level, viz., the across-the-board method and the selective method. Berdahl states that the across-the-board method "involves the stipulation (in a master plan or a set of statutes or through

coordinating agency action of explicit role assignments for each institution, or for each type of institution, and the requirement that all subsequent program changes be made with the boundaries of these assigned roles" (p. 150). California is an example of this type of configuration. The role and scope of each of its different types of institutions are specifically spelled out in its 1960 MASTER PLAN. In the selective method each institution is allowed to chart its own destiny. There are no rigid limits placed on its role or scope. It (the institution) may develop along its own lines, i.e., doing what it does best. This method clearly appears to be the more flexible of the two methods. However, history has shown that institutions can change equally well under either system depending upon the type of institution it is and its association, or affiliation, with other institutions.

It is interesting to note that in 1971, Virginia's statewide coordinating board lacked the authority to directly determine the role and scope of its institutions. However, through its power to limit curricula offerings it could have a big impact on institutions' role and scope, indirectly.

A salient finding of Berdahl's study was that most

states that have community colleges want them to stay that way. They do not want them to develop into four-year institutions. These community colleges, most spokesperson will agree, serve a valuable purpose, not only to the communities in which they lie, but also to the entire state. Eliminating these institutions, or allowing the to eliminate themselves (by becoming four-year institutions) would clearly cut off the access that much of the public have to opportunities for self improvement and career advancement through higher education.

The idea of community colleges staying as they are, and continuing to serve the community in which they are located, sounds good. But it can pose some serious problems for community colleges that want to become four-year institutions. If the community college has the resources, the faculty, and the students, why shouldn't it be allowed to become a four-year institution, if that is what it wants to do? There was a "case" in California where a college dedicated to a liberal arts curriculum changed its role and mission completely (Riley and Baldridge, 1974). It changed from a liberal arts institution into what today is generally called a comprehensive urban university.

This is basically the same type of drastic change that a community college would have to go through in order to become a four-year institution. It would have to undergo a complete change in its mission. Instead of simply being dedicated to serving the community in which it is located, it would have to be dedicated to the "search for truth," or some other goal way out in the sky that is unobtainable and unquantifiable. If we were to make an analogy between higher education and Freudian psychology, clearly, the community college would represent the "id" and the "ego," and the four-year colleges and above would represent the "super ego." Another analogy that lends itself to illustrating the relationship between the different tiers of higher education is Maslow's hierarchy of needs. In this analogy, the community colleges would be associated with the lower level needs, i.e., physiological needs (job skill) and safety needs (job security), and the four-year colleges and above would be associated with higher level needs, i.e., esteem needs (the need to achieve a certain level of recognition in ones field of study) and self actualization needs (the search for truth and knowledge about ones self and his, or her, environment).

Two-year colleges that are branches of universities or senior colleges find it easier to make vertical changes in their role and scope assignments than do community colleges. The reason for this relative ease in changing their role and scope is due, in part, to the fact that they usually offer a program that is comparable to the first two years of the senior institutions. A statewide coordinating agency is more apt to look upon vertical change of any institution favorably, when it doesn't entail a change in the basic mission of the institution.

Four-Year institutions find it relatively easy to acquire the approval of state coordinating agencies for the addition of master's degree programs to their curricula. This is true in states that use either the selective or the across-the-board method for assigning institutions their role and scope.

The across-the-board method of assigning institutions their role and scope has severe shortcomings, especially when it comes to deciding whether or not an institution should be allowed to grant the doctoral degree. It is contrary to the free enterprise system. It tends to create monopolies in our higher education system. Competition helps us to

get better products and services at a more reasonable price. This principle has worked well in our system of commerce, and, if applied scrupulously to our system of higher education, it can work just as well. Statewide coordinating boards that use the across-the-board method for assigning the role and scope of four-year institutions, in the South, certainly will be viewed by members of the black community as another method of keeping black colleges "in their place."

Today, black higher education in the South (including Virginia) is in a sad state of affairs. After the Civil War, blacks, in the South, were promised a separate but equal system of education. Instead, they got a separate system that was inherently unequal. The inequality of this system can still be seen today. A very quick example will illustrate. Old Dominion University and Norfolk State University are located in the same city in Virginia. During the separate but "equal" days, Old Dominion was all white and Norfolk State was all black. Today, Old Dominion has several doctoral degree programs, whereas Norfolk State has none. Both schools are state owned and state supported. If funds had been equally allocated earlier, such inequalities would not exist today.

Doctoral programs cost money. If the state coordinating agency would recommend approval of proposals for doctoral degree programs submitted by minority institutions and also recommend the allocation of adequate funds to establish these programs, such inequities can be eliminated.

Because of the power that state coordinating agencies have, steps must be taken to assure that there is adequate minority representation on them. Issues must be discussed from a minority perspective, as well as from a majority perspective, in order to assess the impact of certain decisions on minority higher education. Black and female institutions, that is, predominantly black and predominantly female institutions, cannot remain the underdogs of higher education (neither can blacks and women). To survive as a nation, we need black leaders and women leaders, as well as their white male counterparts. We need leaders from all ethnic groups in America. Clearly, higher education must become a cooperative effort. We must work together as brothers and sisters in the search for knowledge and truth.

According to Berdahl ,

> The administrative procedure employed in program review differ widely and seem to have no particular correlation with type of agency. Quite a few agencies in our sample rely chiefly on staff analysis (Georgia, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) at least one uses a standing committee of lay board members (Oregon); several employ statewide committees composed of persons from the institutions (Indiana, Ohio, Washington); some lean heavily on outside consultants (North Carolina, Virginia); a few favor a mixed pattern, using interinstitutional committees for most judgements and outside consultants for a few others (Florida, Maryland); and one state has a standing advisory committee whose members are drawn from both inside and outside the state (Illinois). (1971, p. 163)

All of the above methods of program review have their shortcomings, of course. But the method used by Illinois appears to have run into the fewest problems. Its statewide coordinating agency, the Commission of Scholars, as it is called, is composed of nine persons

nationally known for their teaching and research. The majority of them are from outside of the state. Their duties, as outlined by Berdahl, are

> 1)Study areas of critical need for doctoral programs to determine at which institutions they should be offered and how their initiation and sound development may be expedited.
> (2) Review applications by any state university to offer a degree program requiring six or more years of education or training....
> (3) Evaluate the intrinsic merit of the particular proposal.
> (4) Determine the need for each program.
> (5) Investigate the qualification of the faculty and physical resources of the institution proposing the program.
> (6) Conduct such studies and employ, with the approval of the Board, such consultants as are necessary to inform the Commission.
> (7) Make a recommendation to the Board.
> (1971, p. 165-166)

All of their decisions up to the time of Berdahl's study had been unanimous, they had run into very few problems. The only short coming of this process is probably its high cost compared to other methods used by other states for program review. Can a state afford to spend the kind of money that Illinois spends to ascertain whether or not programs submitted by colleges and universities should, or should not, be adopted? In light of recent budgetary trends, each state must answer this question first, before it decides which program review process will meet its needs best.

ROLE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES IN REALLOCATING PROGRAMS

Reallocation of programs consists of the statewide coordinating agency, because of lack of demand in certain fields, taking certain unproductive programs from two or more colleges and universities and putting them in just one. This is usually done in order to save money. Reallocation also deals with discontinuing certain obsolete programs. Statewide governing boards have a lot of power in this area. During the 1930s Georgia's statewide governing board closed down ten of

its institutions in order to bring spending under control. Statewide coordinating boards exercise more restraint in the area of reallocation and elimination of existing programs. According to Berdahl, these such powers are not used much during growth period, but if a recession or depression develop in higher education they could be used more often.

ROLE OF STATEWIDE COORDINATING AGENCIES IN DECISIONS ABOUT NEW RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROGRAMS

The criteria used to judge new degree programs, new research programs, and new public service programs are the same, viz., institutional readiness, state needs, and state ability to finance. Problems in the research and public service areas arise when institutions expand geographically into areas that conflict with other institutions. In new research programs, the problem is coming up with a valid criteria for judging proposals for new research institutes. Statewide coordinating agencies, typically, play a key role in resolving these problems.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Whose view point does the statewide coordinating agency really represent, the institution's or the state government's? At first glance, it appears as though it represents the view point of the party that initiates the proposal. But, a closer look reveals that, if it is not just a capricious and arbitrary decision making body, it could represent the best interest of both parties. To do this, of course, it must have the financial and other resources at its disposal to do the studies that are needed to make sound judgements. Neither party might get its way all of the time. But, if the coordinating organization is functioning properly, its decisions will be generally accepted by all parties. The coordinating agency cannot afford to just be a rubber stamp organization, i.e., approving every new proposal for an institution that is proposed by the two parties (state government and higher education). It must critically examine and analyze each proposal on its own merit. By considering each proposal on its own merit, and not on the merit of the body that proposed it, the statewide coordinating agency will assure each body involved that the decision

that it reaches will be both fair and unbias.

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