DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 315 831 CS 507 078

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TITLE Academic Freedom and Scholarly Journals in Speech Communication: An Editor's Perspective.
PUB DATE Nov 89
NOTE 24p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (75th, San Francisco, CA, November 18-21, 1989).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - General (140)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Academic Freedom; Faculty College Relationship; Faculty Publishing; *Freedom of Speech; Higher Education; Personal Autonomy; *Scholarly Journals; *Speech Communication; Writing for Publication
IDENTIFIERS American Association of University Professors

ABSTRACT

Traditional conceptions of academic freedom in higher education are based on the 1940 statement of the American Association of University Professors. Sanctions were most typically administered hierarchically: administrators, perhaps pressured by forces outside the institution, punished offending faculty by denying or revoking tenure. Based on the experiences of one editor, classic assaults on academic freedom have not been a problem. In the culture of scholarly publication, the gatekeeping process results in the rejection of 80% to 90% of manuscripts submitted. The issue of merit, even with a process of blind reviewing, can and does result in decisions in which political judgments are invoked: (1) In speech communication, although a variety of politically correct sentiments may be expressed, there is a tendency to actively discourage the statement of political views. (2) In a field full of diverse and developing research and epistemological paradigms, manuscripts may be rejected for what their authors might regard as having to do with the politics of inquiry. It is not clear whether these should be regarded as potential violations of academic freedom or as matters of legitimate professional practice about which differences must continue to exist. In general, it appears that limits upon academic freedom in speech communication are either self-imposed or are administered by colleagues and peers through the process of blind reviewing, rather than by being imposed from without by administrators or the external society. (Fifteen notes and 25 references are attached.) (Author/MG)

Academic Freedom and Scholarly Journals in Speech Communication: An Editor's Perspective

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A paper presented to the

Speech Communication Association

San Francisco

November 1989

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Academic Freedom and Scholarly Journals in Speech Communication: An Editor's Perspective

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ABSTRACT

Traditional conceptions of academic freedom in higher education are based on the "1940 Statement" of the American Association of University Professors, and our most vivid memories of violations stem from the assaults of the McCarthy era, when faculty members were sanctioned for expressing (or possibly secretly holding) unpopular political views. Sanctions were typically administered hierarchically: administrators, perhaps pressured by forces outside the institution, punished offending faculty by denying or revoking tenure.

Have there been, or are there now, threats to academic freedom in the context of our scholarly journals? Based on the experience of one editor (who has edited a regional and an SCA journal), classic assaults on academic freedom have not been a problem. But in the culture of scholarly publication, the gatekeeping process results in the rejection of 80% to 90% of manuscripts submitted. The issue of merit, even with a process of blind reviewing, can and does result in decisions in which "political" judgments are invoked: (1) In speech communication, although a variety of "politically correct" sentiments may be expressed, there is a tendency to actively discourage the statement of political views. (2) In a field full of diverse and developing research and epistemological paradigms, manuscripts may be rejected for what their authors might regard as having to do with the "politics of inquiry"--that is, for working from a method that is nonstandard or is competitive with that of the referee. It is not clear whether these should be regarded as potential violations of academic freedom or as matters of

legitimate professional practice about which differences must continue to exist.

In general, it appears that limits upon academic freedom in speech communication are either self-imposed or are administered by colleagues and peers through the process of blind reviewing, rather than by being imposed from without by administrators or the external society.

Academic Freedom and Scholarly Journals in Speech Communication: An Editor's Perspective

Thomas W. Benson

As working academics, we are likely to operate under a general understanding that our work comes under the protection of something called "academic freedom," and that this freedom perhaps has something of the general sweep of the First Amendment to the American Constitution applied with special force to the places in which academics are most likely to express potentially controversial views: in the classroom, in scholarly publications, and in the public forum. This general impression is accurate enough as far as it goes, but is perhaps so seldom generally discussed or, for most of us, specifically under threat, that we may lose sight of the history and authority of the concept.

As a formal matter, the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" of the American Association of University Professors, since modified by negotiation, administrative practice, and a series of court decisions, forms the basic document defining the concept. The document formally describes tenure as a means of securing the benefits of academic freedom.

For those of us who are likely to suppose that the freedoms of academics under this policy are unlimited, it may be surprising to remind ourselves of how much the basic document hedges the concept of academic freedom.

With respect to freedom of scholarly research and publication, classroom teaching, and public action, the 1940 statement is fairly broad but in many ways severely limited:

Academic Freedom

(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.[1]

(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.

(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.[2]

I suppose I should not, therefore, proceed before saying that what follows is based on my own personal research and reflections and is not intended to represent the views of my employer, Penn State University, or of The Quarterly Journal of Speech, of which

I am the editor, or of the Speech Communication Association, which is the publisher of the journal and the host of this panel.

I have been asked, as the editor of QJS, to talk about academic freedom from the perspective of research and publication. The section of the 1940 AAUP statement that would seem to concern us is the one relating to research. Let me repeat it:

> The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results . . .

In practice, this statement should be understood as an agreement between professors in general and their employers, and as stating that professors may not be denied or stripped of tenure because a college or university is politically hostile to the professor's research findings, usually with the understanding that those findings have been published in a refereed research publication. Provable violations of the policy, defined in this way, have been relatively rare since the McCarthy era.[3] Perhaps the most frequent allegations of institutional violation of academic freedom in research have had to do with religious institutions.[4]

It is important to the health of the academic community, I think, to retain a firm definition of academic freedom as a negotiated (but, I hope, no longer negotiable away) right, which denies academic employers the power to punish college teachers for their research and professional publications (to speak only of the research clause of the 1940 statement). When we define the code of academic freedom in research thus strictly and procedurally, I must say that I know of no cases where a professor in speech communication was punished by his or her institution because of research published in an academic journal on grounds having to do with anything other than considerations of professional merit. And so, is the case closed?

I wish it were so simple.

I would like to argue today that while it is important, as a procedural matter, to retain the 1940 clause and its associated case histories as an institutional standard, it is also important to view academic freedom in a somewhat broader perspective. I will outline the reasons for this and suggest a few cases in point.

Academic freedom as defined in the 1940 statement is a narrow, procedural, and quasi-legal agreement, and as such it is precious to the academy. But does that mean that the notion of "academic freedom" does not apply except in cases where the 1940 statement has allegedly been violated? I do not think so. The 1940 statement operationalizes one aspect of a much larger and ever-changing ideal of academic freedom as an ethical system promoting and seeking the protection of free inquiry. Each of us, it seems to me, may be regarded as practicing academic freedom, and as agents in the promotion or diminishment of academic freedom in our roles as teachers, editors, journal referees, members of promotion and tenure committees, and so on. As social agents in a variety of academic roles, we have an enormous capacity to informally and invisibly affect the practice of academic freedom.

From the point of view of the intersection between researcher and professional journal, there are two major places in which violations of academic freedom might occur:

(1) The review and editorial process that precedes publication; and

(2) Tenure and merit considerations (including issues of retention, promotion, pay raises, or severing of tenure) coming after publication.

I will touch on each of these processes, with an emphasis, however, on the gatekeeping phase. Are there circumstances under which an academic journal, such as The Quarterly Journal of Speech, might be said to have violated an author's academic freedom? When I polled the present editorial board of the journal on this question, they were divided.[5] Some took the view that the journal, by definition, could not violate academic freedom, since academic freedom has to do with post-facto administrative sanctions (the domain of the 1940 statement), and since in a refereed journal there is an agreed-upon evaluation process, and that, in any case, no author has a "right to be published" in any particular journal. Those who took this view pointed out that there are a great many journals, and that refusal by one (or several) simply meant that the author had not found the right journal, or that the manuscript did not deserve publication. Academic freedom, in this view, is irrelevant to the gatekeeping process.

A competing view holds that while there is no across the board "right to publish" in a given journal, there are circumstances under which the gatekeeping and editorial process of a journal might be said to diminish academic freedom. It seems to be generally agreed that the peer review process is responsible for selecting materials for publication on the basis of their general merit and contribution to a discipline, according to the accepted standards of the discipline, and on the basis of a manuscript's relevance to the mission of the journal. Given such a standard, it could be argued that the selection or rejection of a manuscript for grounds other than disciplinary standards might violate the spirit of academic freedom. For example, those holding this view would probably consider it a violation of academic freedom if the editor of the journal rejected a manuscript because it contained political views he or she disagreed with. Suppose I rejected a manuscript because it seemed to me to take an improperly revisionist view of the Cold War, or because it praised the rhetoric of a socialist or anarchist, or because it seemed to take a conservative view of the Nuclear Freeze movement.[6] Were I to reject such a manuscript on political grounds, the author, some

would say, could justly complain that I had violated the spirit of academic freedom. But not all would agree. Some of our colleagues would argue, if I understand them, that no matter what the other merits of a work of scholarship, it may disqualify itself from publication inasofar as it professes a political view, because argument about politics is not our business--we are communication scholars. I think I am right, for example, in interpreting Forbes Hill as taking this position in his essay on Richard Nixon's Vietnam Address.[7]

According to this position, as I understand it, the editor not be construed as rejecting or forcing the revision of such a manuscript for political reasons, but rather as rejecting it for professional reasons--on the assumption that the injection of political views made a manuscript unprofessional. It seems to me that both sides have some genuine difficulties to work through, in practice, in a field like our own. Presumably one cannot conduct rhetorical criticism, say, or the study of public decision making, or of organizational communication, without some at least implicit allegiances to a variety of social views. It would be difficult to discover a mode of scholarly discourse in these fields that could be pure and value-free and at the same time of very much interest. On the other hand, we presumably do not want our journals to develop into an arena for political debates--we have other business to do.

Although straightforward issues of political censorship seem to me virtually never to have occurred during my editorial term, issues as to the permissible and desirable expression of views that are contextualized politically came up constantly. In general, my view is that an author has no First-Amendment right to publish in QJS. The journal is not obliged to permit the publication of any material simply because it is material that falls within the protection of the First Amendment. On the other hand, I believe it is in the best interests of the field to encourage vigorous investigation of the uses of rhetoric and communication, and that doing so will often invite situations in which

authors implicitly (or even explicitly) operate from identifiable ideological or political viewpoints. To prohibit such talk merely privileges what is taken for granted as value free--which too often translates into the hegemonic view of the moment.

On the whole, it would appear that a wider range of political views may now be represented in our journals than formerly, and that this has enriched our scholarly discourse. At the same time, I must admit that as an editor I sometimes found myself urging an author to avoid gratuitous political characterizations, when such characterizations appeared to distract from the business of communication scholarship as the author had defined it. At other times, I found myself defending an author's choice of point of view when it was objected to by one of our referees. I think we usually wound up making the right judgments, and typically they were on the side of authorial prerogatives. But I am still uneasy about the exercise of such editorial power, and I think I probably made some mistakes that improperly limited authorial prerogatives in the name of decorum or relevance.

There is another area of expression that I think has to do with the general notion of academic freedom, and that arises during the reviewing process. This second area has to do not so much with scholarship involving politics as with the politics of scholarship. The relevance of the politics of inquiry to academic freedom is perhaps even hazier than the matter of politics in scholarship. What I mean to refer to by politics of inquiry has to do with the ways in which we regulate what we take to be of interest and importance in our multi-disciplinary field called speech and communication. For example, during my editorial term, referees from time to time urged me to reject a given manuscript because they thought that its method was out of bounds. I was urged to reject manuscripts in rhetorical criticism because they were atheoretical; I was urged to reject a manuscript operating from a constructivist position because the position was said to be unproductive; I was urged to reject all case studies because they were inappropriately

particularistic; and so on. In every such case, I believe that the referee in question was exercising fair-minded professional judgment, though sometimes I disagreed with that judgment, as did other referees. I think that for editors it is an everyday occurence that they must decide which concepts and methods are to be regarded as contestable, and which are not. Those which are contestable are presumably best passed by the gatekeepers and subjected to open scholarly debate. Only those concepts and methods that are clearly either incontestable or beyond the interest-area of a given journal would seem to qualify as automatic reasons for rejecting a manuscript. Of course, the world does not divide itself up so neatly, partly because in a journal with a rejection rate of 85%, some manuscripts that may pass the test of "acceptable" do not pass the test of "accepted." And of course virtually every concept and method that we deal with is in some sense contestable, and so we might create for ourselves a situtation without any standards that might survive an author's objection that his or her academic freedom had been violated.

And so we find ourselves in a difficulty. Should SCA, for example, pass legislation that establishes expanded guidelines for academic freedom, such that a rejected author whose reviews hint that a piece was rejected on broadly theoretical or methodological grounds as described here could formally petition the Publications Board for the right to publish on grounds of academic freedom? For me, the answer is clearly, no. Such a solution would seem to assume that there is a "right to publish" that goes beyond the right not to be punished for what one has published, and I think it would be both unworkable and harmful in its effects on the peer review process, and for the system of academic freedom itself.

On the other hand, it does seem to me that editors and referees must work hard every day to insure that they are not violating the spirit of academic freedom in the larger sense, and must recognize that they may, in the name of what Charles Bantz calls

monomethod, or in the name of political conventionality, deny to a colleague the full range of academic freedom.[8] Of course, just as there may be some forces pushing us toward orthodoxy, there are countervailing forces urging us towards innovation and variety. Every editorial board that I have had experience with is constantly looking for well written manuscripts that are novel in content and method, even though occasional mistakes may be made in the direction of tidiness, timidity, orthodoxy, and exhausted conventions.

Probably no area of interest in our field so clearly demonstrates the problems I have been talking about than issues connected to feminism and feminist scholarship. For this reason, perhaps it will serve as a useful example of some of the problems I have discussed so far. There is now a large body of anecdotal testimony from feminist scholars that mainstream journals in speech communication have been reluctant to publish materials that are (1) devoted to feminist topics and women's studies, or that (2) employ alternative research techniques essential to but not limited to feminist scholarship that tend to be reflexive, qualitative, and particularistic. These patterns, one having to do with choice of subject matter and the other with choice of research method and presentation, are alleged by some feminist scholars to be, in the context I have argued for in this paper, an arbitrary diminishment of the spirit of academic freedom--the essentially political conventions of the patriarchal status quo masquerading as universal standards of research quality.[9] Whatever the merits of the complaint, it is widespread and deeply felt. Furthermore, it seems to me that, if it is true, it helps us to understand the link between such practices and the notion of academic freedom. Two important considerations are here advanced that would put such practices within the domain of academic freedom, conceptually if not procedurally. First, the complaint argues that hostility to the publication of feminist scholarship is not merely an issue of the politics of inquiry, but flatly an issue of politics in the usual sense--as a mode of enforcement of a system of power and the sharing of resources that

advantages some at the expense of others. Secondly, the complaint makes it possible to argue, I think, that practices which would clearly violate the procedural guidelines of the 1940 statement--that is, administrative sanctions used to enforce political conformity--are in actuality seldom needed, because other agents of the society see to it that potentially objectionable research never gets published in the first place. Under this analysis, the system of patriarchy, or, more generally, of "mainstream" values, is enforced on a case-by-case basis by editors, journal referees, university press readers, and, perhaps most devastating, by cautious authors who voluntarily restrict their own freedoms in order to make their way in the profession. The beauty of such a system, of course, is that one could hardly take oneself to court with an accusation that one had violated one's own academic freedom. Let me add that, although such an argument seems to me to have a considerable rhetorical appeal, I frankly do not know the extent to which it is true as a characterization of the academic practices of our field. But it is clear to me that several members of the present editorial board of the Quarterly Journal of Speech regard suppression of scholarship on political grounds as a serious problem, and as one that has sometimes led to rejection of their own work, or to later arguments by others that their work should not have been published. If it happens to this small group of highly visible and successful people, presumably it happens to others.[10]

There is a further obvious objection, of course, to expanding the concept of "academic freedom" to such a degree, and that is the fear that by doing so we might inadvertently weaken the protections of the 1940 statement.[11] If we broaden academic freedom beyond the protections of a legally enforceable right, have we so diluted the concept that the area of legal protection will no longer exist--will it, too, drift into the domain of "the spirit of academic freedom," and out of the domain of law?

Some feminist scholars, in addition to working to gain a voice within the professional journals, have tried to discover ways to eliminate sexism from academic debates. Instead of working for the inclusion of feminist studies, such activities seek the exclusion of scholarship regarded as sexist. For some time, journals in communication studies have worked with authors to avoid specifically sexist and racist language in research reports.[12] In October 1988, the Organization for the Study of Communication, Language, and Gender adopted its "Guidelines for Avoiding Sexism in Communication Research," and is working to have these guidelines accepted by other associations of academics in communication studies.[13] The report asserts that "sexist assumptions and values pervade the academic and scientific traditions," and urges that "scholars should be explicitly conscious of that pervasive sexism and constantly alert to its effects in the formulation of reserch questions, the definition of what serves as evidence, the methods of data collection and analysis, the perception and interpretation of information, the phrasing of research reports, and the choice of scholarship for publication."[14]

The guidelines offer a number of observations about sexism and gender bias; I will not be able to do full justice to their range and support here. I do want, however, to draw attention to the specific admonition that scholars and journals (and presumably promotion and tenure committees) should reject scholarship that violates the standards set forth in the guidelines. Among the "typical examples" of sex bias in communication research is the following:

1. Failure to be alert to gender/sex bias that inheres in traditional methodology.

Example: Aristotelian rhetoric and most rhetorical and persuasion research since that time was theoretically grounded in a male system. Speakers and audiences were predominantly male, but it was

> assumed that theories based on this population and t sted in it generalized to men and women alike.[15]

If the suggested guidelines were adopted by SCA, presumably its journal editors would be required to reject as sexist manuscripts that employed neo-Aristotelian research methods--at the very least, such manuscripts would need to contain a disclaimer that they recognized the inherently sexist limitations of Aristotelian rhetoric. It would appear, for example, that, to mention a case I have alluded to earlier, the essay by Forbes Hill on Richard Nixon's Vietnam address would be denied publication on the grounds that it was avowedly Aristotelian, therefore inherently sexist. Such a guideline seems to me fundamentally hostile to the spirit and the specific protections of academic freedom. I say this even though I agree that the attack on neo-Aristotelianism is certainly arguable, certainly within the domain of what is legitimately contestable. It is for exactly that reason that it seems to me that SCA and other organizations should not adopt restrictive guidelines, based on political considerations, pertaining to the publication of research. It would have been wrong for the editor of QJS to reject Professor Newman's essay on the grounds that it was explicitly political; it would have been wrong for the editor of QJS to reject Professor Hill's essay because its method was implicitly sexist (or otherwise politically objectionable).

If we are to have guidelines, let them be guidelines that promote academic freedom. In practice, this certainly means that we must provide occasions for variety in research outlets, that we must provide for continued discussion of the practices that govern the production, publication, and evaluation of scholarly discourse. Based on my own experience, it also seems important for editors to avoid any attempt to create narrow or overly focused definitions of the mission of a given journal during a three-year editorial term--SCA, in its wisdom, has made editorial terms short enough so that the imposition of an editor's vision is simply not feasible. It is in any case likely to lead to

artificial limits on scholarly discourse and unfairness to authors, who have necessarily been preparing a work for submission since before a given editor starts a three-year term. I hope that SCA will place an attitude of pluralism and eclectism, and a record of fairness, very high on its list of qualifications for editors. Editors themselves can help to promote an atmosphere of freedom and diversity by appointing fairminded and diverse editorial boards. This advice may sound rather bland given the importance of academic freedom, but, except in times of crisis, such as the McCarthy era, it seems to me that such practices are our best protection, at least insofar as the refereeing process at our journals is concerned.

What is academic freedom <u>for?</u> Partly, and most obviously, it is a legal protection aimed at the relationship between teachers and their employers. As such, it protects the rights of individual teachers to engage in the legitimate expression of professional and public discourse. But the concept of academic freedom, presumably, is valuable to us not only as a system for the protection of individual rights, though those rights must be the cornerstone of the system. It also exists, and is defended, partly because we believe that freedom of expression makes it most likely that an academic field will be likely to remain open to the publication of research findings that may make a difference.

And so, to confine a discussion begun in the name of academic freedom to the question of whether editorial boards violate academic freedom, which we might answer yes or no on a variety of grounds, may be to avoid the related question of whether we are doing what we need to do, as a field, to remain open to alternate views. I do not have the space here to develop this argument in detail, but it does seem to me that here we need to work hard to be not only an "equal opportunity" field, but an "affirmative action" field--that is, we need not only to provide publication outlets for high quality scholarship (which is usually likely to be mainstream scholarship) but also to provide

means for the development and dissemination of alternate perspectives--even if (as is often the case) scholarship from developing areas is not, on initial submission, of obviously publishable quality. I do not think that the editorial boards of our journals can be expected to shoulder that job by themselves, though journal referees in our field do exercise an important teaching function. We need to give continuing attention to the whole range of postdoctoral experiences that enable younger scholars, many of them with alternate perspectives and unfinished research training, to achieve their potential--both out of fairness to them, and out of our own need to have their views before us for discussion.

I do not think we can legislate ourselves out of this set of problems--they will always be with us, and we can probably do more damage than good by any attempt to redefine the 1940 statement to include a "right to publish." On the other hand, only constant vigilance and constant study and discussion of our actual review and editorial practices, and, yes, recurrent consciousness raising, can help to maintain a vigorous sphere for the practice of academic freedom as a reality.

NOTES

[1] An editor's note in the handbook indicates that the freedom to publish may be limited by other obligations, such as that of sharing authorship of collaborative work.

[2] Louis Joughin, ed., Academic Freedom and Tenure: A Handbook of the American Association of University Professors (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 36. The 1940 statement was not the AAUP's first statement on academic freedom. In 1915, the year of its founding, the AAUP issued a "Declaration of Principles" on academic freedom and tenure. See Joughin, 33.

[3] See Thomas F. Richards, "The Cold War at Rutgers University: A Case Study of the Dismissals of Professors Heimlich, Finley, and Glasser" (Ed.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1986); Lionel S. Lewis, Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Institutional Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988). The typical McCarthy-HUAC era case did not hinge primarily on research publications but on alleged subversive activities or associations, and frequently on fifth-amendment refusals to cooperate with congressional investigating committees and first-amendment resistance to institutional loyalty oaths.

[4] See, for example, James J. Annarelli, "Academic Freedom and the American Roman Catholic University" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Drew University, 1984); William W. May, "Academic Freedom in Church-related Institutions," Academe 74, no. 4 (July-August 1988): 23-28.

[5] I am grateful to the following associate editors who corresponded with me on this issue: Carolyn Anderson, Charles Bantz, Judee Burgoon, Celeste Condit, Robert Craig, Karen Foss, Dennis Gouran, Robert Ivie, Martin Medhurst, Jay Ruby, Robert Scott, Jill Taft-Kaufman, Kathleen Turner, and Barbara Warnick. They and the rest of the QJS editorial board have taught me much about the practice of academic freedom.

[6] For examples of cases in point during my editorial term at QJS, see Martin J. Medhurst, "Truman's Rhetorical Reticence, 1945-1947: An Interpretive Essay," Quarterly

Journal of Speech 74 (1988): 52-70; Martha Solomon, "Ideology as Rhetorical Constraint: The Anarchist Agitation of 'Red Emma' Goldman," Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1988): 184-[illegible]; J. Michael Hogan, "Managing Dissent in the Catholic Church: A Reinterpretation of the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace," Quarterly Journal of Speech 75 (1989): 400-415; James Darsey, "The Legend of Eugene Debs: Prophetic Ethos as Radical Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1988): 434-452.

[7] Forbes Hill, "Conventional Wisdom--Traditional Form--The President's Message of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (1972); reprinted in James Andrews, ed., The Practice of Rhetorical Criticism (New York: Macmillan: 1983), 118, note 25. Professor Hill, commenting on Robert P. Newman's "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 168-178, writes the following: "Newman . . . asks, 'Should . . . summary judgments [of contemporary political figures] be left out of an article in a scholarly journal because space prohibits extensively supporting them? Omission might contribute to a sterile academic purity, but it would improve neither cogency nor understanding.' I would certainly answer Newman's rhetorical question, yes, and I would go on to judge that view of criticism which encourages such summary judgments not to be a useful one."

[8] Charles Bantz, letter to the author, 21 June 1989. Bantz says: "What I have suspected as an author and certainly have heard vigorous complaints about is methodological orthodoxy expanding into a rigidity that makes the late A. Khomeni seem open-minded." For a discussion of changing fashions in the gatekeeping of studies in public address, see Thomas W. Benson, "History, Criticism, and Theory in the Study of American Rhetoric," in American Rhetoric: Context and Criticism, ed. Thomas W. Benson (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 1-18.

[9] For discussions of this problem, see Karen A. Foss and Sonja K. Foss, "Incorporating the Feminist Perspective in Communication Scholarship: A Research Commentary," in Doing Research on Women's Communication: Perspectives on Theory and Method, ed.

Carole Spitzack and Kathryn Carter (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988); Karen A. Foss, "Feminist Scholarship in Speech Communication: Contributions and Obstacles," paper presented to the Speech Communication Association convention, New Orleans, LA, November 1988; Diane Hope, "Communication and Human Rights: The Symbolic Structures of Racism and Sexism," in Speech Communication in the 20th Century, ed. Thomas W. Benson (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 63-89. On the competing conceptions of women's studies in communication, see Carole Spitzack and Kathryn Carter, "Women in Communication Studies: A Typology for Revision," Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 401-423.

[10] But several editorial board members said either that the issue of editorial fairness either was not, by and large, a serious problem in our field, or that, in cases where fairness was violated, it was not a matter of academic freedom.

[11] Several of my correspondents commented on this issue, among them Celeste Condit and Robert Scott.

[12] See, for example "Guidelines for Nonsexist Language in APA Journals " and "Avoiding Ethnic Bias," in Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1983), 43-49; Casey Miller and Kate Swift, Handbook of Nonsexist Writing, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

[13] I am grateful to Professor Carol Ann Valentine of Arizona State University for sending me a copy of the OSCLG guidelines.

[14] Organization for the Study of Communication, Language, and Gender, "Guidelines for Avoiding Sexism in Communication Research," October 1988, 1.

[15] OSCLG, "Guidelines," 4.

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