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ABSTRACT

Perspective realism, particularly as modified into the special case of adversarial perspectivism, and the analogy of reciprocal concave and convex world views, is an important and neglected component in accounting for the widespread discrepancies in the reporting of so-called "terrorist" events. However, the tendencies toward cooperation between and among international journalists are greater than ever before. Elements of bias and ethnocentrism and media reductionism are more widely reported than in previous decades. The overall signs of the melting of rigid world views, photocopied by the mass media, are increasingly positive. Thus a somewhat less superficial caricature of terrorism is being drawn, at least in the more thoughtful sectors of society. (Twenty notes are included.) (RS)

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Terrorism and the News Media Research Project


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PERSPECTIVIST
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COVERAGE**

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TERRORISM AND PERSPECTIVIST PHILOSOPHY: UNDERSTANDING ADVERSARIAL NEWS COVERAGE

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In the English edition of *Moscow News*, May 13, 1986, a five-paragraph-long article features the one-inch headline "CIA engineered Berlin disco explosion."¹ Quoting the ANA news agency as its source, the article claims that both the CIA and the Israeli special service Mossad sponsored the planting of a bomb in the La Belle Disco Club in West Berlin on April 5, 1986, by a U.S. soldier who was involved in an underground drug syndicate.²

Major U.S. newspapers and broadcasts reported the same bombing but attributed the bombing to Libyan or Libyan-sponsored terrorists, or quoted U.S. officials who claimed that Libya was responsible. One example of such coverage appeared on April 6, 1986, when the *New York Times* ran two adjacent stories that occupied priority positions on the front page, totaled over fifty paragraphs, as continued on later pages, and bore the headlines "2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin/Libyan Role Is Suspected" and "U.S. Sees Methods of Libya In Attack."³ Most such accounts, including the follow-up stories on all major U.S. media throughout the week of April 6–13, stated, indicated, or suggested that Libya was either responsible or assumed by U.S. (and in many reports by West German) authorities to be responsible for the Berlin bombing.

Rare exceptions to this coverage pattern did occur. For example, the *St. Petersburg Times*' lead story on April 6 noted early in the story, prior to any mention of Libya, that at least three phone calls had been received—one by a news agency in London and two in West Berlin—that claimed that the bombing was the work of a West German radical group, an Arabic group, and a West European left-wing group, respectively.⁴

The majority of U.S. reports did not mention that Libya denied any connection with the Berlin incident. The *New York Times* only briefly reported Libya's denial in the thirty-eighth (final) paragraph of their front-page story. The paragraph appeared on page eighteen.

In short, a thorough reading of primary news coverage of the April 5, 1986, West Berlin disco explosion leads to two primary views of the bomb's cause. Soviet news sources explained the incident as part of a larger series of CIA-sponsored or *allegedly* CIA-sponsored terrorist activities. U.S. news reported the explosion as related to, or *allegedly* related to, a larger fabric of Libyan-trained terrorist crimes, as masterminded or supported by Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi.⁵ Reports that a message of congratulations from Qaddafi to the terrorists had been intercepted by U.S. officials were given an average of two consecutive days of coverage, while the corresponding story of the Soviet press, that the message from Qaddafi was forged and delivered by the CIA, was a "counterpart" report wherever the Soviet press responded in depth to the U.S. version of the Berlin disco explosion.⁶

These counterpart stories, when fully researched, suggest that no major press outlet in either the United States or the Soviet Union was committed to emphasizing "both sides," or in fact, several sides (U.S., West German, Soviet, Libyan, Turkish—one of the two fatalities was a Turk) or other perspectives of the Berlin explosion. Neither gave "equal time" to foreign spokespersons nor revealed their sources. The *New York Times* reporters repeatedly mentioned "a senior American official" as their primary source about the Libyan connection, while *Moscow News* repeatedly credited only one source, the ANA news agency, for all its facts relating to the bombing.

Neither news system contextualized the incident by trying to answer the question "Why Berlin?" The various other news stories about Germany within the *New York Times*, for example, which might have been related to Berlin events during April 6–13, included a tug of war between the U.S. and the USSR over German research that the U.S. was attempting to include within the Star Wars program. This was only part of a major U.S. policy involving many U.S. attempts (Caspar Weinberger was at that time hoping to win the support of Japan where he was negotiating) to gain foreign support for Star Wars research. This story was not related by journalists to the bombing. U.S. and Soviet foreign policy struggles had been highly dramatized in the *New York Times* the day before the explosion, and missiles in Germany, as well as tensions over Berlin, had been, and continue to be, a bone of contention. Many lesser-reported incidents had shown hostility by Germans themselves, especially left-wing and pacifist groups, to Americans, particularly to nuclear-related military installations, and, to a lesser degree, to all reminders of foreign occupation.

Much Western coverage, however, did seek to contextualize the story within the more geographically scattered string of "terrorist" hostilities. The *New York Times*, among others, sought to point out possible causality by drafting a separate three column box four-fifths of a page long with the headline "Twelve Months of Terror: The Mideast Connection." A list of isolated violent actions were listed with their possible terrorist instigators so as to suggest relatedness, if not conspiracy.⁷

More conservative papers ran more outright conspiratorial columns and stories amplifying the notion, and to some extent the fear, of an invasion by Libyan terrorists. The *St. Petersburg Times*, for example, ran a daily front page series by Charles Stafford entitled "They Will Come," introduced by the ominous logo of an Inquisition-style hooded terrorist, presumably en route to invade the United States. Many of these stories also cited the Soviet Union as a major force behind Qaddafi and implied some level of Soviet support for, if not masterminding of, unified terrorist activity.

Similarly, *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Moscow News*, *Gosteleradio*, and other prime news outlets for the Soviet Union were not hesitant to link not only the Berlin bombing but also the Korean Airlines Flight 007 tragedy, attempts to photograph Chernobyl by satellite, defections, border incidents, and other controversial international actions with premeditated Western collaboration, whether spying, anti-Soviet propaganda, or Western terrorism, usually crafted by the CIA. Soviet coverage also reported news on the premise that fighting in South America, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and many other locations was sponsored or aided by the CIA and other Western forces.

In short, the tendency was to immediately blame the bombing on an adversary (the U.S. blamed Libya; the USSR blamed the U.S.), whereas recent reports from West Germany suggest that the bombing was inspired by the Syrians and probably included two Palestinians and a West German woman.⁸

From Terrorism to Perspectivism

Close research of such patterns of news coverage between rivals over several years within major news sources demonstrates a larger tendency: the official national attitudes of political adversaries are, by and large, reflected in the international news coverage of their press. Whether that press emphasizes *economic* press freedom, as in the USSR, or *political* press freedom, as in the United States, neither seems free to give "equal time" to both, or several, positions about terrorist bombings, particularly those occurring in aligned or strategic countries. These tendencies raise questions about whether terrorism coverage may ever be studied ahistorically or apolitically.

For example, the Berlin disco explosion had little journalistic life of its own. Most journalistic commentary, rather than seeking far greater detail about the German incident, sought to ferret out hidden connections of the story to a political background, and more importantly, to a *political foe* or *political threat* to the home nation of the reporter—for example, Israel suspected and blamed Syria, their most serious threat, for the bombing, while the U.S. blamed Libya. In this light, it is interesting to note that the use of the word *terrorism* in journalism usually appears in commentary about *foreign* events or domestic events with *foreign* sponsors. Imagine a U.S. or Soviet lead story beginning "today *our* best terrorists attacked innocent children in France, killing seven out of a possible twelve."

Despite the feigning of objectivity and despite many journalistic crusades against ethnocentrism and racism, mainstream journalists largely partake of a world view in which terrorism is not associated with one's self but comes from the "other," as an aspect of what Friedrich Nietzsche called "perspectivism." Perspectivism describes the world view an individual or group constructs to associate value and dominance with its own strengths. In so doing, the "other" or others are made inferior, less valuable, and relatively weak or wrong. For example, Nietzsche demonstrated that the Roman empire created established strength and power as the ultimate values, thus legitimizing their empire and conquest by brute force. Conversely, Nietzsche notes that the Christians created a counterbalancing version of self-supremacy by proclaiming meekness and piety as the ultimate values, thus creating a dominant *perspective* that made Roman values look inferior and barbarian.

Perspectivism allows an invisible shield of insulation from domestic problems. For example, when U.S. authorities speak of terrorism as foreign, they avoid acts by the Ku Klux Klan, the U.S. Nazi Party, Right to Life bombing groups, and others who participate in similar actions in the United States. By the same token, perspectivism allows Soviet journalists to associate terrorism with U.S.-inspired activities in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and many other countries, most of which are, or are said to be in the Soviet press, inspired by the CIA, while avoiding use of the word *terrorism* in association with Communist-inspired activities, or activities by aligned countries acting "defensively against Western imperialism."⁹

Adversarial Perspectivism

The phrase *adversarial perspectivism* has been chosen to indicate a specific and well-known type of reciprocal perspective-building and maintenance between adversaries. In this specific case, counterpart media are (wittingly or unwittingly) used to maintain a superior and self-righteous posture by the perspectivists (those creating and maintaining self-serving perspectives) involved. For example, both U.S. and Soviet press suspect an incident such as the Berlin bombing as probably being created by "the other."

Although Nietzsche's term *perspectivism* has been chosen, so as to imply not simply *different* perspectives (as in relativism) but rather deliberately constructed *apex* perspectives (superior to all others), the terminology is also akin to the helpful philosophical term of E. R. McGilvary—"perspective realism."¹⁰ As with Murphy's "objective realism" and Prichard's (and Chisholm's) "theory of appearing," *perspective realism* maintains that direct realism can deal with perceptual relativity by claiming that sensible qualities are related to point of view and usually to some standing conditions.¹¹

Thus in perspective realism or the theory of appearing, it becomes important to state in viewing an object "the table is round from here," or, similarly, "the table is elliptical from here." But in perspectivism the perspectivist (or creator of the perspective) usually neglects the words *from here*, whether to obtain or maintain power, or because his view is isolated or prejudiced through domestic conditioning.

Nietzsche's favorite example of this type of power maintenance, as described in *The Genealogy of Morals*, suggests that Christianity created and broadcast a particular type of morality for protection against and power over Roman amorality.¹² However, within his later work, *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche outlines the notion of perspectivism as concomitant with the human longing for power *over* or dominance, and thus as equivalent to a ruling perspective.¹³ Thus the mind is deliberately and defensively used to selectively interpret sensations from the environment with a protective, dominating, and self-elevating perspective.

Adversarial perspectivism implies not simply two rival perspectives but a structural relationship between them. For example, if both are competing for world support and attention, as is the case between the Soviet and U.S. superpowers, certain types of coverage will be given to global incidents of mutual self-interest. If terminology from optics is employed, the two types of coverage, or perspectives, might be called concave and convex, that is to say, one superpower distorts the picture of what has happened in one way, while the rival distorts the picture in the opposite direction. Concave and convex mirrors in an amusement park serve as helpful examples of distortion in opposite directions which make a person look extremely tall or fat. To each other, Americans and Soviets look exceedingly indulgent or restricted.

A transcendent view of adversarial perspectivism differs considerably from the subjective research perspective of taking sides, thus assuming that the rival country alone creates *propaganda* and that one's own national mirror of the incident remains clear and unbending. However, the notion of adversarial perspectivism does not imply some arbitrary pure truth zone at the exact midpoint between the adversaries' two points of view. Coverage of one incident may be slightly convex from side A, and slightly more concave from side B. It may be grossly distorted by both in another incident. In a case where there is little political clout at stake, or where there were numerous eyewitnesses from the international press, both press groups may overlap considerably in their accounting to appear objective and increase credibility.

Finally, adversarial perspectivism is not simply self-promoting or protective. It may also intentionally seek to deflate the image of the rival and intentionally undercut a competitive perspective. Adversarial perspectivism may target and diminish the credibility of particular policies or goals of the opponent such as the Star Wars program or occupation of Afghanistan.

A Turning Tide?

Increasingly, larger sectors of both the U.S. and Soviet public have been exposed to selected perspectives from the "adversary." The noted Spacebridges, hosted by Vladimir Pozner in the USSR and Phil Donahue, which promised "candid discussion between U.S. and Soviet ordinary citizens," permitted national audiences in the USSR and major urban markets in the U.S. to be exposed to opposing views on Afghanistan, Soviet Jews, Star Wars, unemployment, and other issues.¹⁴

Of equal interest are the tendencies in both countries to import previously censored perspectives, if only on an experimental basis. Soviet glasnost has included a loosening up of jamming U.S.-based radio signals such as the Voice of America, and U.S. news bureaus, particularly ABC, have courted Soviet spokespersons such as Vladimir Pozner, Georgiy Arbatov, and others to appear on major television and radio programs and even as counterpoint to an address by President Reagan.¹⁵

Moreover, some American audiences, particularly late-night television viewers, are occasionally exposed to alternative definitions of terrorism. Of particular relevance was the January 8, 1988, airing of *Nightline* on ABC, in which Ted Koppel interviewed Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO.¹⁶ Arafat repeatedly included the notion of state terrorism during the broadcast, particularly alluding to Israel, but also implying that the U.S. was involved in state terrorism, by which he meant terrorism carried out on behalf of an entire nation, often in warlike fashion, against threatening or adversarially aligned targets.

Although Koppel challenged Arafat repeatedly, the PLO leader was given many openings to pose an alternative view of terrorism. This is only one of many examples in which U.S. audiences are hearing, if not equal time for previously veiled or trivialized perspectives, increasingly credible foreign voices that challenge U.S. governmental and media perspectivism. Nevertheless, this exposure should be viewed as the exception, not the rule. The *Moscow News* article about CIA sponsorship of the Berlin disco bombing, like Michael Parenti's radical accounting of the downing of KAL Flight 007 in *Inventing Reality*, would still seem far-fetched to most U.S. audiences, and "total propaganda" to others.¹⁷

Moreover, glasnost, despite its tendencies toward more criticism, both of and by the press, is not a policy that welcomes equal time to all foreign viewpoints. Fyodor Burlatsky's article "Two Views On The International Journalist" makes clear three important problems for the Soviet journalist in the age of glasnost:

- 1) We have failed to promptly inform our public about the new technological revolution that has gained rapid momentum in Japan, the U.S., and the West European countries since approximately the mid-1970's.
- 2) We still lack . . . extensive information about social and cultural life abroad. Yet the fact is that 90% of the population of Western societies is made up of working people, and they are by no means utterly deceived, manipulated, and illiterate but perfectly normal people.
- 3) A third problem is to shift from the simplistic concept of an enemy to the far more complex concept of partner, rival, and competitor in portraying the Western countries' ruling circles.¹⁸

Burlatsky, like Koppel, seems nevertheless ahead of his time, by pointing toward a vision of the future in which unguarded dialogue between U.S. and Soviet "adversaries" at all levels is the rule and not the exception. Moreover, as Stevenson, Childers, West, and Marschall conclude in "Soviet Media in the Age of Glasnost," "some changes seem evident in Soviet media, particularly in television, but criticism of Soviet officials and activities is still limited, and coverage of the United States is uniformly critical."¹⁹ With noted exceptions, such as the positive coverage of the leadership summits, there are still many parallels in American media.

Toward Reciprocal Understanding

The exchange of information between adversarial journalists and similar cultural exchanges within other components of society are only a tiny beginning toward the type of understanding that is required for both to move toward a more complete picture of the other. Despite both countries being a "melting pot" of many cultural and ethnic groups, they contain a national identity different in underlying personality, not just in political beliefs, from the other. Soviet media, like Soviet society, move at a different underlying metabolic rate than the high intensity culture of the U.S. Within Soviet culture it is no more unusual for Mikhail Gorbachev to gather data and reflect upon Chernobyl before speaking than for a Native American to sit in silence at a tribal council for several days before speaking.

Likewise, the Soviet administrator, who cannot understand the U.S. penchant for seemingly nonstop press conferences and coverage, must understand American speed-up, in part created by competitive pressures and deadlines, and in part created by the adventuresome and aggressive spirit of the pioneering personality who tamed America. He must see the U.S. hunger for "tips," "scoops," photos, and seemingly trivial updates as domestically perceived as a service to customers, not as uncontrolled disturbances of the peace.

This type of deeper understanding of internal wavelengths and cultural predispositions permits a gradual shift in the perception of adversary as propagandist, a view still widely held in both countries, to colleague with a different (not better, worse, or alien) point of view. It is important to understand these various psychosociological national traits. For example, excepting Native Americans, U.S. citizens are defectors from other countries, including the descendants of captured, imported slaves, while Soviets are primarily descendants of survivors of (attempted) conquests of their native lands, which they incessantly defended for millenia. Different styles and functions of media make sense within particular historical, social, and linguistic contexts.

In similar manner, both U.S. and Soviet journalists need a deeper understanding of so-called terrorists. The sum total of people categorized as terrorists do not fit a pat, unchanging stereotype. In-depth interviews with those depicted as terrorists in many countries do not reveal a uniform pattern of deranged, hostile, illiterate, macho, and psychotic madmen. Although such people exist, much, if not all, of our monolithic image of terrorists presented to us not by people who call themselves terrorists but by mass media. We must therefore keep in mind that, in many countries, similar images of American terrorists are presented to audiences who have not known Americans first hand. Instead they have seen tourists, often at a psychological distance, and upon foreign turf, and have also viewed selected examples of U.S. media in which gratuitous crime and violence reinforce the notion that the U.S. is a country ruled by terror.

The global distribution of *The Godfather*, *Rambo*, *Dallas*, and numerous other popular exports reinforce the notion that to Americans human life and respect for others are secondary to the imposition of power and a rigid, self-serving world view. To many, these appear to be the native attitudes of the terrorist. A country that assassinates its own leaders, engages in far-reaching drug wars, creates racial struggles, catalyzes union/management battles, fosters urban combat zones, thrives on sex and violence, and deploys napalm, Agent Orange, and even the Hydrogen bomb seems absurdly naive or hypocritical when it complains of relatively miniscule forms of terrorism to smaller countries.

By the same token, when Arafat speaks of himself as a freedom fighter, and compares himself to DeGaulle against the Nazis, or Washington against the British, is he able to dispel his own association with cruel atrocities involving babies and third parties, and recreate a perspective by which he is the flawless, compassionate, and innocent patriarch of his people? It is mass media coverage, more than Arafat himself, that determines the view of Arafat which audiences find convincing.

This type of media analysis and understanding is necessary between all rival nations and their press, not just superpowers and visible liberation leaders such as Arafat and Qaddafi.

Conclusions

Both the term and concept of *terrorism* are deeply rooted in media-dominated and superpower-dominated understandings of reality. Incidents such as a bomb exploding in a German nightclub are no less likely to be colored by adversarial perspectivism than events that appear to be directly caused by global superpowers.

Even seemingly trivial (if any destruction of human life may be said to be trivial) and isolated acts of terrorism, if traced deeply, may be psychologically and sociologically related to feelings toward authority, adversaries, or harbingers of social or geographical displacement. Such displacement, authority, or adversarial conditions are frequently the effects of superpower (and aligned countries) struggles and larger political and economic outworkings.

As Robert Picard wisely distinguishes, there are several types and degrees of terrorism.²⁰ He further notes that many of these are poorly reported and misunderstood, if not totally overlooked. Several reasons exist for the low quality and relatively low quantity of coverage of specific types of terrorism that persists throughout many countries. Some of these reasons are practical and well-known: the proliferation, transience, obscurity, and relatively minute size of small political and religious groups, whether terrorist or otherwise, increase the likelihood of inaccuracy, partial ignorance, and outdated information reported by many journalists. The sheer quantity of languages, cultures, and political platforms of such groups, when taken in toto, requires total immersion of the journalist into in-depth reading about international affairs, world religions, history, and other areas to surround and at least superficially understand the web-like subject. Moreover, many terrorist groups, and indeed many national governments, are noted for deliberate misinformation on matters involving strategy, policy, and, in the case of guerrilla-style groups, geographical location.

These and related reasons account for much of the particularly entangled, vague, and often inaccurate coverage of certain types of terrorism worldwide. Nevertheless, perspective realism, particularly as modified into the special case of adversarial perspectivism, and the analogy of reciprocal concave and convex world views, is an important and neglected component in accounting for the widespread discrepancies in the reporting of so-called terrorist events.

However, the tendencies toward cooperation between and among international journalists are greater than ever before. Moreover, the awareness of perspectivism is dawning in new quarters and deepening in others. Elements of bias and ethnocentrism and media reductionism are more widely reported than in previous decades. Exchanges between and among media professionals from previously isolated countries are consistently on the upswing. Thus, overall signs toward the melting of rigid world views, photocopied by mass media, are increasingly positive. Thus a somewhat less superficial caricature of terrorism is being drawn, at least in the more thoughtful sectors of society.

Notes

¹"CIA engineered Berlin disco explosion," *Moscow News* (English edition), May 13-16, p. 5.

²The wording of the article as published in the English-speaking edition is: "ANA points out that the parties immediately involved in the attack are the American CIA and the Israeli special service Mossad. . . . The police established that the bomb, filled with US-made explosives, was delivered to the disco club by an American soldier belonging to the drug syndicate."

³Gerald M. Boyd, "U.S. Sees Methods of Libya In Attack," *New York Times*, April 6, 1986, p. 1; and John Tagliabue, "2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin," *New York Times*, April 6, 1986, p. 1.

⁴"Bomb in Berlin Club Kills 2, Hurts 155" *St. Petersburg Times*, April 6, 1986, p. 1.

⁵See, for example, Boyd, "U.S. Sees Methods of Libya in Attack;" John Tagliabue, "West Germany to Investigate Role of Other Countries in Berlin Blast," *New York Times*, April 7, 1986, p. 1; John Tagliabue, "West Germany Steps Up Watch on Libyans After Berlin Bombing," *New York Times*, April 8, 1986, p. 1; "The U.S. Sought To Link Qaddafi Loosely to Two Terrorist Attacks," *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 1986, p. 1.

⁶"CIA engineered Berlin disco explosion" contains this rebuttal version of the story: "the message allegedly intercepted by the Americans and ascribed to Libya is a forgery. It was in fact transmitted by American Army sergeant nicknamed Colonel. In order to transmit the message, he used a special car driven to the capital of the GDR for this purpose" (*Moscow News*, May 13-16, p. 5). The counterpart story by ABC News is alluded to in the *New York Times* in an April 8, 1986, story by Leslie Gelb, "U.S. Aides Think Libya Was Linked to at Least One Bombing Last Week." Gelb writes of "an ABC news report quoting United States intelligence sources as saying the United States had intercepted a message from Colonel Qaddafi to the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin after the bombing that 'in essence offered praise for a job well done.' ABC news said the message 'indicated clear knowledge of details of the terrorist attack.' "

⁷"Twelve Months of Terror: The Mideast Connection," *New York Times*, April 8, 1986, p. A7.

⁸See, for example, Serge Schemann, "German Is Seized in Disco Bombing," *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1988, p. A3.

⁹For a fuller explanation, see Edward S. Hermann, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* (Boston: South End Press, 1982); and Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Hermann, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Nottingham: Spoleen an Books, 1979).

¹⁰See, for example, E. R. McGilvary, "Perceptual and Memory Perspectives," *Journal of Philosophy* 30 (1933), pp. 310ff. and his much larger work *Toward A Perspective Realism* (La Salle, Ill.; 1956).

¹¹See, for example, Roderick Chisholm, "The Theory of Appearing," in Max Black (ed.), *Philosophical Analysis* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press 1950); H. A. Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1909); H. H. Price, "Illusions," in H. D. Lewis (ed.), *Contemporary British Philosophy* (London; 1956).

¹²Fredrich Nietzsche *The Genealogy of Morals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

¹³Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will To Power* (New York: Viking, 1967).

¹⁴The series of Spacebridges featured different audiences, some mixed, one all women, from different locations such as Seattle, Boston, Leningrad, Moscow, with live broadcasts simultaneously taped in the U.S. and the USSR for cooperative editing by Americans and Soviets and delayed broadcast in both countries wherever possible. Similar Spacebridges among children, teenagers, and other groups, albeit less issue-oriented, have also exposed mass, if not massive, audiences to less stereotypical views of the "other side."

¹⁵When Vladimir Pozner was asked to give a live counterpoint statement following a presidential address on ABC News, White House spokespersons were angered and contacted ABC. Shortly thereafter, ABC executives issued a statement that the choice of timing, if not spokespersons, was unwise. However, Pozner has been given almost countless invitations, both official and otherwise, to represent the Soviet Union on major television programs such as *Nightline* and PBS specials, since the incident.

¹⁶The one-hour broadcast aired at 11:30 p.m. EST Friday, January 8, 1988, on ABC. Koppel had interviewed Arafat earlier that day for *Nightline*. The live interview had obviously been recut for commercial interruption and book-ended by commentary later by Koppel, who introduced the interview in segments.

¹⁷Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), particularly pp. 156-160.

¹⁸Fyodor Burlatsky, "Two Views on the International Journalist," *Sovetskaya kultura*, May 21, 1987, p. 6.

¹⁹Robert L. Stevenson, Hoyt Childers, Peter West, and Susan Marschalk, "Soviet Media in the Age of Glasnost," a paper presented to the International Communication Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, San Antonio, Texas, August, 1987.

²⁰Robert Picard, "The Conundrum of News Coverage of Terrorism," *The University of Toledo Law Review* 18, (1987), pp. 141-150.

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