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ABSTRACT

This report summarizes the role of the U.S. Congress in relation to: (1) foreign policy; (2) defense policy; and (3) the War Powers Act of 1973. An overview of the growth of Congress' involvement and the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government in policy development in these areas since the 1950s is highlighted. The report concludes that, while constitutional and theoretical debate continues about the meaning of the War Powers Act, the act probably was an ineffective Congressional attempt to control war-making powers. Scholarly research is needed concerning Congress's role in or relationship to: (1) fiscal budgeting; (2) public perceptions of Congressional responsibility; (3) constituency opinion; (4) interest group influence; and (5) structural, strategic, and crisis foreign and defense policies and programs. A 67-item bibliography is included. (JHP)

quarterly report

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY: *AN OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA**

by Randall B. Ripley

INTRODUCTION

Congress is, in virtually every aspect, at the heart of the democratic political system of the United States. This is true in terms of the meaning we have given to representative government, in terms of the opportunities and challenges posed by open elections, in terms of ethical questions that inevitably arise in any form of government, and in terms of the development of a national policy agenda, national goals, and the design of programs that seek to address agenda items and pursue goals. This paper focuses on Congress in relation to foreign and defense policy, an aspect of congressional behavior that is relatively understudied, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the Congress is peripheral in this substantive realm. In fact, the rich range of both normative and empirical questions that arise from a consideration of the role of Congress in relation to foreign and defense policy make the study exceptionally rewarding. In some ways, Congress is secondary to the executive branch in the foreign and defense policy realm. But that "second fiddle" role is vital and has become increasingly important during the last several decades, especially after both public and congressional disenchantment with the Vietnam War.

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▶ *. . . the "big questions" about the role of Congress in foreign and defense policy are really the "big questions" about the nature of foreign policy in a democracy.*

This paper concentrates on empirical questions. The normative questions are, of course, fascinating. But without solid empirical knowledge, debate about normative questions often serves little purpose. It is enough to say here that the "big questions" about the role of Congress in foreign and defense policy are really the "big questions" about the nature of foreign policy in a democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the first third of the 19th century, put the general problem most succinctly in *Democracy in America* when he observed: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. . . .A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles." (de Tocqueville, 1954: vol. I, p. 243) These same statements also characterize democratic policy-making in general, but many commentators have identified foreign and defense policy as especially likely to be damaged in a variety of ways by democratic politics, particularly when those politics are combined with a governmental structure providing separate powerful executive and legislative branches. (See, for example, a series of treatments of this theme that appeared in the decade after the end of World War II, when the United States was adjusting to its superpower status: Almond, 1950; Beloff, 1955; Cheever and Haviland, 1952; Kennan, 1951; and Lippmann, 1955).

Four sections follow. The first summarizes the role of Congress in relation to foreign policy. The second summarizes the role of Congress in relation to defense policy. The third comments briefly on the meaning of the War Powers Act. The fourth suggests some areas in which empirical research would be particularly fruitful in the next few years in helping delineate and understand the role of Congress in foreign and defense policy.

FOREIGN POLICY

Until recently, one of the most common generalizations in both scholarly and popular literature on Congress was that the executive branch, especially the President, had completely overshadowed Congress in foreign-policy matters and that the President took all major initiatives in foreign affairs without any opposition (Wildavsky, 1969: 230-43; Robinson, 1967). Like most simple generalizations, this one fails to portray a complicated relationship accurately.

The model of executive dominance may well have described a period from roughly 1955 to roughly 1965 (Moe & Teel, 1971; Manley, 1971; Carroll, 1966; and Kolodziej, 1975). Before the mid-1950s Congress was heavily involved in the post-World War II foreign policy initiatives of the United States: the United Nations, the Marshall Plan and other foreign aid, and NATO. Members of the House and Senate were involved in the early planning of these initiatives and congressional consideration of them was comprehensive. In recent years Congress has again become more assertive—particularly in reaction to Vietnam and the power of the President to wage an undeclared war—but also on other questions, such as arms sales, intervention in rebel movements against foreign governments, attempts to recover hostages, foreign aid, foreign intelligence activities, and export of nuclear materials and technology.

For approximately ten years (1955-1965) Congress did not raise major objections to the expansion of presidential influence. Congress was willing to pass resolutions that gave the President virtually a unilateral right to use American troops almost anywhere in the world if he deemed such an action to be wise and in the national interest. The last resolution of this sort was the later-repealed Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

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passed in 1964. Even in this period of congressional passivity, however, Congress had major influence in the creation of the Development Loan Fund in 1957 and the International Development Association in 1958 (Baldwin, 1966). These were new facets of the foreign-aid program stressing loans and grants to underdeveloped nations for economic purposes only.

A study of the period from 1933 through 1961 concluded that the President predominated on foreign policy, but it also reported a number of cases in which congressional influence was predominant and a few cases in which the impetus was totally congressional (six of twenty-two cases were found to have been initiated by Congress) (Robinson, 1967: 65). Another study, based on a survey of a large number of cases, noted that in many areas congressional participation was vigorous, although not dominant (Moe and Teel, 1971). This was true in regard to the role of the Senate in treaty-making (the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the United Nations Charter are cited as examples) and the role of the House Appropriations Committee in a number of foreign policy areas. In addition, Congress was found to have dominance in:

> many areas of foreign policy which in themselves appear to be peripheral. Collectively, however, they constitute a major portion of U.S. foreign policy. For example, Congress is generally credited with dominant influence over decisions on economic-aid policy, military assistance, agricultural-surplus disposal, and the locations of facilities, to name only a few. In addition, immigration and tariff policies are generally considered part of foreign policy and there is considerable evidence to indicate that Congress remains a major actor in these fields (Moe and Teel, 1971: 49).

Congress became noticeably more agressive and self-assertive on foreign policy matters during the late 1960s and especially in the 1970s (Crabb and Holt, 1988; Destler, 1985; Franck and Weisband, 1979; Pastor, 1980; Rourke, 1983; and Sundquist, 1981: chapter 10). Congressional assertiveness continued into the late 1980s and was fueled anew by the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987. This self-assertiveness reached a peak, at least in terms of widespread public visibility, during the attempts by Congress to curb and then end the war in Indochina, particularly after Richard Nixon had become President. But the self-assertiveness was not solely or even primarily a product of hostility to Mr. Nixon as a person or of a Democratic Congress to a Republican President. The same self-assertiveness continued in congressional dealings with Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan. Foreign aid, economic policy, arms sales, support for foreign rebels, and foreign intelligence activities all came under increasing congressional scrutiny. Joint development, often with considerable antagonism between the executive and legislative branches, was widely used, eagerly by Congress and begrudgingly by Presidents. Sometimes the antagonism led to stalemate. Partisanship is often a consideration in foreign policy-making (despite the myth of bipartisanship) and is particularly in evidence in the strategic area, which contains the issues that most promote continuing institutional tensions between the President and Congress. Partisanship reinforces normal disagreements based on the differing perspectives of the legislative and executive institutions (Ripley, 1985).

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In the first Reagan year, the President got permission, narrowly, to sell the AWACS plane to Saudi Arabia. He also got a foreign-aid appropriations bill—the first President in three years to do so. Prohibitions on aid to Pakistan, Chile, and Argentina were lifted by Congress at presidential request. However, Congress added new restrictions on aid to countries embroiled in controversy over human rights or nuclear proliferation. Congress placed restrictions on aid to El Salvador and refused to lift the prohibition of aid to supposedly pro-western forces in

Congress is often written off entirely in the defense field, but close analysis reveals substantial congressional impact.

Angola. A number of reporting requirements were added to the President's responsibilities even in areas in which he got a good part of what he wanted.

In subsequent Reagan years, sale of weapons to the Mideast (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran) remained a topic of considerable interest to Congress. Congress continued oversight of the agencies engaged in foreign intelligence, especially the Central Intelligence Agency, with tart-tongued reminders that the agency was responsible for keeping the intelligence committees of Congress informed of what was happening. The subject of aid to rebels in several locations was constantly on the congressional agenda, nowhere more continuously or controversially than in the case of the Contras seeking to oust the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Foreign economic policy, with its major domestic ramifications, is always on the congressional agenda, especially in an era when U.S. trade deficits were large and growing and were linked to the collapse or serious shrinkage of some key American industries. Congress took the lead in producing a major immigration bill in 1986.

A balanced conclusion about the relative positions of the President and Congress in foreign policy making must recognize that the participants have different capabilities that enable each to perform some things better than the other. The President has some natural advantages that allow him to dominate certain aspects of foreign policy. His greater ability to act rapidly and flexibly and his superior information sources are assets in diplomacy. Imagine, for instance, the likelihood of the multi-headed Congress arranging and successfully executing a re-opening of ties with China, an accomplishment that President Nixon and his advisor, Henry Kissinger, managed with apparent ease in 1972. The enormous press coverage inherent in such foreign policy coups as the China thaw lends a great deal of support to the misconception of the President's ability to dominate all foreign affairs. Or try to picture Congress—with its contending views, individuals, and factions—taking the initiative in promoting accord between Egypt and Israel, an initiative successfully taken by President Carter. Or imagine Congress negotiating an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, an executive activity that met with some success in 1987 and continues to be pursued in 1988.

But foreign policy spectaculars such as the resumption of contact with China or the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt are rare events. Much policy-making in foreign affairs is unglamorous. Routine matters may receive little or no press coverage, which results in low public visibility, but they are important to the total foreign policy picture. In these less visible areas, congressional involvement is likely to be high. Work on the details of trade policy, foreign aid, and immigration policy, though slow and tedious, is important to shaping U.S. policy toward much of the world. Congress has considerable influence in these fields.

DEFENSE POLICY

Congress is often written off entirely in the defense field, but close analysis reveals substantial congressional impact. As in the case of foreign policy, a facile generalization about the total power of the executive branch is not accurate.

On the one hand, there is good evidence that particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s individual members did not consider the broad aspects of defense policy when they were called on to make decisions about that policy. For example, the Armed Services Committees often were more concerned about the "real estate" decisions (the location of closing of military facilities) than about defense policy writ large. Members in general felt technically incompetent to challenge the judgment of military personnel

(Dexter, 1971). At the institutional level, Congress did not usually make major cuts in the overall defense budget proposed by the President. It looked "mostly at the details of defense spending but rarely at the big picture" (Fox, 1971; Art, 1985: 227).

A closer examination of defense budgets in the 1960s shows that congressional impact was substantial. The key to understanding the nature of congressional impact is to disaggregate the budget into its component parts (Kanter, 1972). Although congressional impact on the overall budget figures for the Department of Defense appeared to be limited, when the budget was split into four categories—personnel; operations and maintenance; procurement; and research, development, testing, and evaluation—a more precise view of congressional impact became evident. Congress made only small changes in the areas of personnel and operations and maintenance, and these areas accounted for over half of the budget. There was, however, considerable congressional activity in the areas of procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation.

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Data for the 1970s and 1980s show that Congress has continued to have some systematic impact on defense budgets and has continued to focus on procurement and research, development, testing, and evaluation in making its changes. In addition to the this fairly consistent congressional impact on defense budgets, Congress also makes important individual budget decisions about major defense items. In recent years one of the most publicized decisions has involved the B-1 bomber. In 1977 Congress acceded to President Carter's proposal to scuttle the project. Congress had stalled during the Ford administration (which supported the B-1) and thus gave Carter the latitude to put the new plane on ice. By 1978 the project appeared dead. In 1981, however, Congress changed its mood and supported President Reagan's proposal to revive the B-1. It is now operational, although the finished product has some serious problems. Congressional involvement in making decisions on other specific weapons has also been substantial. Beginning midway through the first Reagan term, Congress also dealt substantially with various aspects of the authorization of and funding for the complicated pieces of the defense package known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (more popularly known as "Star Wars"). Congress helped change the amount, nature, and timing of some parts of this package, which was at the top of the Reagan administration's defense agenda.

THE WAR POWERS ACT

A special instance of both foreign and defense policy was the passage of the War Powers Act over a Nixon veto in late 1973. At the time it was heralded as a major preventive against U.S. involvement in another situation like Vietnam. From the perspective of fifteen years of hindsight, it appears to be primarily a symbol of congressional insistence that Congress has the ultimate power to declare war coupled with acquiescence to the practical realities of the modern world. These suggest that a President may sometimes have to use force and commit troops without the opportunity for congressional action or even consultation with members of Congress.

There has been a great deal of constitutional and theoretical debate about the meaning of the Act. Perhaps more important, there has now been some experience with relatively small crises that show the vagueness of the statute and the power of the President to interpret the law as he sees fit. In a speech in April 1977, former President Ford voiced his opposition to the Act and also discussed his experiences as President (Ford, 1977; see also Sundquist, 1981: chapter 9; Franck and Weisband, 1979: chapter 3; and Franklin, 1987). He identified six events during his presidency

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that might have come under the provisions of the War Powers Act: the evacuation of U.S. citizens from three locations in Indo-China in the spring of 1975; the rescue of the U.S. freighter, *Mayaguez*, in May 1975; and two evacuation operations in Lebanon in June 1976. Ford asserted he did not believe the Act applied to any of these cases. Some congressional critics had thought otherwise at the time. But, in fact, because events unfold rapidly, the President clearly has the upper hand on what he does and does not do. 'Congressional criticism can be forthcoming afterward, and a President may pay a political price in terms of loss of support in Congress for differences of opinion. But there is very little Congress can do in the short run if the President acts independently first and consults later.

Ford also made it clear that even the consultation provisions in the Act (which simply urge consultation of congressional leaders by the President) were difficult to implement:

> Once the consultation process began, the inherent weakness of the War Powers Resolution from a practical standpoint was conclusively demonstrated.
>
> When the evacuation of DaNang (in South Vietnam) was forced upon us during the Congress's Easter recess, not one of the key bipartisan leaders of the Congress was in Washington.
>
> Without mentioning names, here is where we found the leaders of the Congress: two were in Mexico, three were in Greece, one was in the Middle East, one was in Europe, and two were in the People's Republic of China. The rest we found in twelve widely scattered states of the Union.
>
> This, one might say, is an unfair example, since the Congress was in recess. But it must be remembered that critical world events, especially military operations, seldom wait for the Congress to meet. In fact, most of what goes on in the world happens in the middle of the night, Washington time.
>
> On June 18, 1976, we began the first evacuation of American citizens from the civil war in Lebanon. The Congress was not in recess, but had adjourned for the day.
>
> As telephone calls were made, we discovered, among other things that one member of Congress had an unlisted number which his press secretary refused to divulge. After trying and failing to reach another member of Congress, we were told by his assistant that the congressman did not need to be reached.
>
> We tried so hard to reach a third member of Congress that our resourceful White House operators had the local police leave a note on the congressman's beach cottage door: "Please call the White House."

In April 1980, when President Carter ordered a commando raid into Iran to rescue the hostages being held at the American embassy in Teheran, he chose not to consult Congress. After the details of the raid—which was not successful—were revealed, congressional opinion was divided on whether the War Powers Act required consultation or not. No clearly dominant view emerged.

In the Reagan years, various events involving U.S. troops—the dispatch of military advisors to El Salvador in 1981, the sending of Marines to Lebanon in 1982, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the air strike against Libya in 1986, U.S. naval escorts for oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987—all raised questions about the meaning of the War Powers Act. There was some public debate by various officials after each of these events. The upshot was continued lack of clarity on the precise meaning of the Act with the continued reality that Presidents could generally act first and square things later themselves with Congress afterwards, at least in these fairly marginal and small-sized events. A major test of the Act—which would involve sending sizable numbers of American ground troops—has not yet emerged.

The most accurate conclusion about the War Powers Act—although hardly comforting—is that it remains an unclear and probably ineffective congressional attempt to control war-making powers. Needless to say, there are no automatic formulas that can be invoked to preserve

congressional power in all contingencies, given modern technology that allows mass destruction to take place in a span of minutes

PRIORITY AREAS FOR RESEARCH

A long and very ambitious research agenda dealing with Congress and foreign and defense policy would be relatively easy to create. Sadly, the topic has not sustained the kind of scholarship it deserves, given both its intrinsic interest and importance. The following five agenda items are advanced not because they are the only topics worth pursuing but because they leap out as areas in which particularly little systematic knowledge exists. Yet each of them addresses questions that, when given at least partial answers, will let us understand more clearly why Congress does what it does in making and overseeing foreign and defense policy. Developing such knowledge is, of course, a necessary prelude to sensible prescriptions by scholars for possible change or sensible attempts at changed behavior by practitioners dealing daily with foreign and defense policy. These are also topics to which the Mershon Center has a special opportunity and ability to contribute knowledge based on systematic scholarship.

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Budgeting

In the 1980s Congress and the federal government in general evolved a partially new way of thinking about budgets. The overwhelming fact of enormous deficits in the federal budget appeared, in some instances, to drive budget decisions. Programmatic concerns and concerns for good policy were less in evidence than usual. One leading weekly journal of public affairs labeled the new situation as "the deficit culture" (Haas, 1988a). Presumably this "culture" (which could less charitably be labeled deficit mania) produced new patterns of behavior and new substantive outcomes. But research thus far on the results of deficits and attitudes toward deficits in general has been slim and it has been virtually nonexistent in the case of foreign and defense policy. Spending for defense is, of course, a major part of federal spending and so the deficit culture will have had a sizeable impact both on process and on substance. Spending is a less important part of our total foreign policy effort in a direct sense (with the exception of foreign aid) but spending decisions related to defense, international trade, and international organizations are all important for the total foreign policy stance of the United States.

A recent concrete result of the deficit culture was the unique November 1987 "treaty" reached between the executive branch and Congress that set broad limits for spending in the following fiscal year. It represented agreement on total spending by broad defense and domestic categories in the budget for Fiscal Year 1989. This "treaty" also created new constraints and probably unexpected outcomes at least for the Fiscal 1989 budget (Haas, 1988b). Similar agreements may be negotiated for future years. In any event—regardless of whether this mode of proceeding is unique or turns out to be a precedent for future budget negotiations—serious research is needed on the extent to which conern for deficits actually drives budget decisions.

Public Perceptions of Congressional Responsibility

Knowledge about how the public views Congress is scant. We know that, in general, the public is not terribly pleased with Congress, because they express relatively low confidence in the job they perceive Congress to be doing. On the other hand, the voters among the same public express confidence in individual members of the House and Senate at election time by re-electing most of the high proportion who

choose to run for re-election. We have little systematic knowledge on what people expect Congress to do. People generally seem to be fairly uninformed about the range of duties of members of the House and Senate. But there are certainly subsets of people who are much more informed.

Developing systematic knowledge about public expectations about Congress as an institution and members as individuals and relating those expectations to evaluations (not limited to the electoral evaluation) of both the institution and its members cries out for more systematic attention. More specifically, systematic knowledge about how the opinion of the general public and various specialized publics on expectations about congressional behavior in the foreign and defense policy realms needs to be developed. In general, it is clear that what people believe about the institution and its members is likely to have some impact on how that institution performs its duties.

▶ Another high priority for systematic research would be to ascertain public opinion about specific foreign and defense policy issues and to relate those opinions to congressional behavior.

Constituency Opinion

The preceding research area, of course, involves public opinion. But it is opinion about what is expected of Congress in the foreign and defense policy area in a general sense. Another high priority for systematic research would be to ascertain public opinion about specific foreign and defense policy issues and to relate those opinions to congressional behavior. It may be that public opinion is very diffuse in the general foreign policy arena (Krosnick and Carnot, 1988). That in itself would be an important empirical finding. Even more important would be detailing the impact that opinion, where held, does or does not have in relation to congressional behavior. In general, it seems apparent that most members of the House and Senate have a great deal of freedom to maneuver in terms of the substantive positions they take and congressional votes they cast because most constituents are uninformed or unconcerned about most specific issues. Members try to anticipate issues that may cause them problems in their constituencies ("dangerous" issues) and they try to avoid trouble when re-election time comes by guessing the safe route to take when they vote in Congress (Fiorina, 1974). How often such potentially dangerous issues involve foreign and defense policy is not clear, but the frequency of foreign policy issues constituting potential danger for members is almost surely less than in the domestic sphere. One piece of evidence pointing in this direction is that the correspondence between roll call voting by members of Congress and constituency attitudes was quite low in the area of foreign affairs. By contrast it was significantly higher in the area of social welfare and even higher in the area of civil rights (Miller and Stokes, 1966).

Interest Group Influence

We know a reasonable amount about the impact of interest groups in American politics generally. However, we know least in the area of interest group influence on foreign policy. Even knowledge about interest group influence on defense policy tends to focus on defense contracting—an important variant of domestic politics. Interest groups come and go in the foreign policy area depending on what issues are on the current agenda. In the 1980s, for example, a number of interest groups both supporting and opposing Reagan administration policy in Nicaragua, and in Central America generally, formed and were active and visible. Other foreign policy matters stay on the agenda for a long period of time and help generate interest groups that also last longer. For example, one of the most potent lobbies of this type is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which lobbies on behalf of what it considers pro-Israel positions. In recent years, a lobby attempting to push pro-Arab positions has developed, in

part to counter the influence of AIPAC (Madison, 1985).

That individual lobbies have influence on individual issues is clear. For example, the Greek-American community lobbied for a cut-off in military aid to Turkey in the mid-1970s after Turkish military action in Cyprus. There was no countervailing Turkish-American lobby. But we do not have general, systematic knowledge about how and when and why such lobbies arise and what kind of impact they are likely to have under what conditions.

Patterns of Influence

▶ *. . .exploring differentiations among general types of foreign and defense policies. . .is a path that is not much trod. . .*

In earlier work a colleague and I have examined the possibility that there are predictable patterns of political relationships in terms of broad types of foreign and defense policy (Ripley and Franklin, 1987: pp. 22-23, 26-28, 90-91, and chapters 7 and 8). Definite patterns were found for three general types of foreign and defense policy—structural, strategic, and crisis—classifications that we developed and refined based on earlier work by Lowi (1967) and Huntington (1961).

Structural policies and programs aim primarily at procuring, deploying, and organizing military personnel and materiel, presumably within the confines and guidelines of previously determined strategic decisions. Examples of structural policies include specific defense procurement decisions for individual weapons systems; the placement, expansion, contraction, and closing of military bases and other facilities in the United States; the retention, expansion, or contraction of reserve military forces; and the creation and retention of programs that send surplus farm commodities overseas.

Strategic policies and programs are designed to assert and implement the basic military and foreign policy stance of the United States toward other nations. Examples of such policies include decisions about the basic mix of military forces (for example, the ratio of ground-based missiles to submarine-based missiles to manned bombers); foreign trade (tariffs and quotas for specific goods and nations); sales of U.S. arms to foreign nations; foreign aid; immigration; and the level and location of U.S. troops overseas (both in general and in relation to specific trouble spots).

Crisis policies are responses to immediate problems that are perceived to be serious, that have burst on the policy makers with little or no warning, and that demand immediate action. Recent examples include the Iranian seizure of U.S. hostages in late 1979; the seizure of the Mediterranean cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in 1985; and the seizure of an American commercial airplane in the Mideast in 1985.

We argue that congressional subcommittees will be particularly important in making structural decisions, that Congress as a whole has a large role to play in making strategic decisions, and that in dealing with genuine crises, at best only a few individuals in Congress can have a very limited role. The evidence that we use includes a large number of specific instances. The point of referring to this earlier work is not to report on it in detail but to suggest that exploring differentiations among general types of foreign and defense policies in terms of the relation of political process to substantive result is a path that is not much trod but is worth developing. Additional work may show that these policy categories are not satisfactory. Above all, those interested in the general notion that foreign and defense policies are not an undifferentiated category or even just two separate categories (foreign policy on the one hand; defense policy on the other hand) need to develop more systematic data with which to analyze reality.

CONCLUSION

The challenges faced by the United States in the realm of foreign and defense policy are

ceaseless. Some people bewail the role of Congress in—as they view it—messing up the responses of the United States to challenges by injecting antiquated ways of proceeding and (horrors!) politics. Others praise congressional intervention because they do not trust a particular President to behave intelligently in the international arena.

The attack on or defense of Congress in the foreign and defense policy arena tied to current policy or political preferences on the part of the observer is irrelevant. This paper has tried to make two central points that are relevant.

First, like it or not, part of the essence of the American version of democracy is to have the national legislature involved in virtually all activity of the federal government. Perforce, this means that Congress will always be important in the foreign and defense policy realm as well as in everything else the government does. This also means that whatever normal ways of proceeding Congress uses in general—antiquated, spiffily new, or a bit of both—it will also use them in dealing with foreign and defense policy. In addition, it means that the normal political preferences, styles, and concerns of members of the House and Senate will be injected into their work on foreign and defense policy. Moaning about those facts will not change them. That does not mean that what Congress does—both in general and in relation to foreign and defense policy—is incapable of being changed. Congress has, throughout its history, changed incrementally and unconsciously all of the time and occasionally in major ways through self-examination and self-prescription (prodded, in both cases, by major forces outside of Congress).

Second, items for empirical research have been proposed specifically because they are areas in which our knowledge is incomplete. Such knowledge is interesting in itself, but, more important, it is a necessary prelude to serious discussion about change or reform.

▶ . . .*the normal political preferences, styles, and concerns of members of the House and Senate will be injected into their work on foreign and defense policy.*

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Dr. Charles F. Herman, who has been Director of the Mershon Center since 1980, has been appointed Acting Vice Provost for International Affairs at The Ohio State University. **Professor Joseph J. Kruzel** will be the Acting Director of the Center during Dr. Hermann's one-year absence.

The Office of International Affairs at Ohio State, which Professor Hermann will direct, provides leadership and coordination to the University's diverse array of international activities. In addition to the Mershon Center, other units that are part of that Office include the University Center for International Studies, all area study centers, the English as a Second Language program, the Office of International Students and Scholars, study abroad, and host coordinator for the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Affairs.

Dr. Kruzel, Associate Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate of the Mershon Center, has been at The Ohio State University since 1983. He received his undergraduate degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy and his Ph.D. form Harvard University. He has written extensively on arms control and U.S. defense strategy and is currently completing a book on the neutral countries of Europe. Kruzel is the editor of the Mershon Center's highly successful American Defense Annual. He will serve as Acting Director until Charles Hermann's return in the autumn of 1989.

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Completed applications are due November 14, 1988.

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President of The Ohio State University, Dr. Edward H. Jennings, has appointed Dr. David F. Mathews to a three-year term on the Mershon Center's Board of Visitors. Mathews is the President of the Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio. He was director of HEW in the Ford administration and was president of the University of Alabama from 1969-75. Appointed for a second three-year term on the Board was Dr. Harold H. Saunders, who has been Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South African Affairs and a former senior staff member on the National Security Council. Dr. Saunders will serve as Chair of the Board for the coming year.

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