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A study examined the effects of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) on employment patterns among those eligible for and those ineligible for TJTC. The rate at which TJTC-eligible persons penetrated the labor market and the resultant displacement of persons not eligible were examined in terms of TJTC-related variables, personal characteristics, and state employment characteristics. It was discovered that although TJTC eligibility helped eligible youth find employment during the TJTC's initial years, this advantage has since vanished. The TJTC vouchering of disadvantaged youth did not appear to result in any labor market displacement of nondisadvantaged youth. In fact, the TJTC appeared to have the effect of creating jobs. The overall job creation effects of IJTC range from 200,000 to 300,000 additional jobs. However, most of the additional employment accrued to those not eligible. The vouchering employment creation effect among noneligible persons occurred for females, whereas the employment enhancement that occurs for eligible persons due to certification was stronger for males. (MN)

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THE AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TJTC

Task 5 Final Report

by

Kevin Hollenbeck

Revised August 1986

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Columbus, Ohio 43210

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I. INTRODUCTION



I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

To introduce this study and acquaint the reader with its purpose, we provide the following heuristic. Consider the labor force in a given period as a queue of individuals rank-ordered by potential productivity. The first individual in line has the greatest potential productivity; the next has the second highest potential productivity; and so forth. Employers will fill a certain number of openings in that period and so they hire workers according to their position in the queue.

When all the openings are filled, we can imagine a line is drawn and the individuals behind that line remain unemployed. Policymakers (and labor economists) have noted that the individuals who tend to remain behind the line tend to belong to certain disadvantaged groups of the population and often require public income support. Policymakers instituted the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit ('IJTC) to attempt to influence the way employers choose workers from the queue so that more members of the disadvantaged groups would be employed. In fact, the policymakers divided the labor force queue into two queues—eligible workers and ineligible workers. We depict this transformation in figure 1.

In figure 1, the employment rate of the labor force is AB/AC and the unemployment rate is BC/AC. The employment rate of the targeted groups is A'B'/A'C' (unemployment is B'C'/A'C') and the employment rate of all workers ineligible for TJTC is A"B"/A"C". Clearly our employment policy goal should be to push the dividing line B as far leftward as possible. Without TJTC, the unemployment rate of the TJTC eligible labor force (B'C'/A'C') would



lactually, we want B to move toward the point where unemployment is a minimum without accelerating inflation. This is called the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) (see Baily and Tobin 1977). See also our Employer Analysis report (Bishop and Hollenbeck 1986).




Figure 1. TJTC division of the labor force queue

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be quite high. TJTC undoubtedly pushes B' to the left and fewer eligible workers will be unemployed.²,³ But what effect does TJTC have on B"?


A priori, the answer is unclear. If employers simply hire TJTC eligible workers instead of equally or better qualified ineligible workers, then B" will move to the right and substitution occurs. TJTC eligible workers are being substituted for ineligible workers. 4 However, because labor costs are subsidized, employers may expand employment and hire additional TJTC eligible and ineligible workers (after all, the ineligible workers who were displaced by the TJTC certified workers were more productive by assumption). Furthermore, the ineligible workers displaced by TJTC eligibles may reduce their asking wages and be hired by employers not using the program. Thus as shown in figure 2, there is a direct substitution effect of the program causing B' to move leftward and B" rightward (all other things equal) but there may also be an indirect employment effect which will presumably push B' further leftward and will exert a leftward push on B". Ultimately, both B' and B" may move to the left, i.e., TJTC may cause employment expansion for both eligible and ineligible workers.



²It is not a foregone conclusion that B' will move to the left with the advent of TJTC. First of all, employers may not alter their hiring decisions, but rather, simply receive a subsidy for hiring individuals they would have hired anyway (B' would remain the same). Second, TJTC may stigmatize workers and make it more difficult for them to find employment (B' would move rightward). Our analysis of employer behavior (Bi_hop and Hollenbeck 1985) suggests that neither of these scenarios occur, but rather some workers do become employed who would not have, absent the program.

³A rigorous analysis of the earnings and employment impact of TUTC on target group members is being undertaken in another task.

⁴It is conceivable that eligible and ineligible workers are complementary factors of production and not substitutes. For example, eligible workers may require more training and supervision, which may be provided by ineligible workers.



 B_0^* , B_0^* - Without program

 $\mathbf{B_{1}^{"}}$, $\mathbf{B_{1}^{"}}$ - Direct substitution effect

 B_2^{\dagger} , $B_2^{\dagger\prime}$ - Final program effect

Figure 2. Direct and indirect employment effect of TJTC

To our knowledge, Christensen (1984) is the only study that attempts to estimate the substitution and indirect employment impacts of TJTC. She found, that among disadvantaged youth, there is eviderae of a positive indirect employment effect and among other youth (ineligible), the indirect employment is essentially null. The data which Christensen examined were collected in March 1983 and she looked at two employment outcomes—(2) employed at the time of data collection in 1983 and (2) employed at all during the prior calendar year (1982).

The current study replicates the Christensen study using data from March 1984 but, in addition, it uses a model that is more robust. By pooling data from the earliest years of TJTC with the 1984 data, we are able to est. hate program and indirect effects that more carefully control for business cycle or aggregate demand influences. Our methodology is described in the next section of this report. The analyses undertaken hinge, importantly on variables we have called TJTC penetration rates; so in Chapter 3 we document how those rates were constructed. Chapter 4 presents the results of our analysis and the final chapter draws conclusions for policymakers.



II. METHODOLOGY



II. METHODOLOGY

The strategy used by Christensen (1984) and replicated here to estimate the substitution and indirect program effects is to regress various employment outcomes of individuals on indicators of TJTC activity in the state where the individuals reside while statistically controlling for individual characteristics, state economic/unemployment measures, and state Job Service activity. If the TJTC indicators are (conditionally) correlated with the likelihood of employment or hours worked or other employment outcomes, then we assume that TJTC was the cause and the coefficient can be translated into an estimate of substitution.

The general theoretical model used in this study may be written as follows:

(1) $Y_{jkt} = f(X_{jt}, EMP_{kt}, TJTC_{jkt})$

where,

- Yjkt = employment outcome for individual j who resides in state k in time period t (e.g., employed or not, unemployed or not, employed in private sector or not, hours worked/week, wage rate, etc.)
 - Xjt = vector of socioeconomic characteristics thought to
 influence employment of individual j in time
 period \(\text{(e.g., family income, family status, age,} \)
 race, sex, education, etc.)
- EMPkt = vector of aggregate economic variables thought to
 influence employment in state k in time period t
 (e.g., average wage rates, employment growth,
 CETA/JTPA funding, Job Service activity, etc.)
- TTJC_{jkt} = TJTC status of individual j in state k in time period t

The model may be thought of as a standard equilibration of labor demand and supply with TJTC influencing the effective wage offered in the demand model. The X_{it} variables generally



influence supply, while EMP_{kt} influences demand. TJTC is indexed by individual because of the targeted eligibility—some groups are eligible, others are not. It is indexed by state because different states administer the program differently. Some states voucher individuals sparingly, perhaps only on employer request. Others attempt to voucher a significant number of the eligible individuals who encounter the system.

We will attempt to use two strategies for estimating (1). The first strategy will be to use rooled cross-sectional data and include fixed time period and state of residence effects:

(2) $Y_{jkt} = a_0 + a_1X_{jt} + a_2EMP_{kt} + a_3 (PENl_{kt}*MEMB_{jt}) + a_4 (PENl^2_{kt} * IEMB_{jt}) + a_5 MEMB_{jt} + a_6 PENl_{kt} + a_7 (PEN2_{kt} * MEMB_{jt}) + a_8 PEN2_{kt} + a_9 DISADV_{jt} + a_{10}DSTATE_k + a_{11}t + e_{jkt}$ where.

Yjkt, Xjt, EMPkt = defined above

PENl_{kt}, PEN2_{kt} = TJTC penetration rates in state k in time period t; PEN1 measures the "target effectiveness" of vouchering (ratio of vouchers to eligibles) while PEN2 measures the penetration of TJTC certifications into the low wage labor market

DISADVjt = dummy variable set to 1 if individual j is economically disadvantaged in time t; 0 otherwise.

DSTATE_k = dummy variable unique to each state with values ranging from 0 to 50

eikt = random error term

 a_i , i=0,..., l1 = coefficient vectors.

When the dependent variable is "employed/not employed", then the coefficients represent the marginal effect of the variable on the likelihood of employment. The coefficients on the TJTC penetration rates thus represent the effect that that program has



on the likelihood of employment. The TJTC penetration rates roughly measure the intensity of use/outreach by a state and so if TJTC is effective in stimulating employment, we expect a positive correlation between employment likelihood and penetra-Specifically a3 and a4 represent the effect of vouchering. The intent of the program is to improve the job finding likelihood for target group members, but we suggest that there may be decreasing returns to vouchering (the larger the share of individuals encountering the ES that are vouchered, the less likely the probability of employment). In other words, we hypothesize that for all target groups analyzed, a3 will be positive and a4 will be negative. The coefficient a5 might be interpreted as the eligibility effect of TJTC and will be positive if TJTC has typically altered employer behavior to favor job se kers who may be eligible for TJTC, irrespective of whether they have a voucher. On the other hand, it may be negative if the existence of TJTC is stignatizing. We have no priors on a6 since it may be positive or negative desending on whether vouchering displaces noneligibles or creates employment.

The coefficient on the certification penetration rate interacted with target group membership a7, represents a certification effect for target group members, while a8 represents a displacement effect. Our hypothesis is that a7 will be positive, while a8 may be positive or negative.

From the empirical observation that disadvantaged groups tend to have employment difficulty vis-a-vis other members of the labor force, our expectation is that the ag coefficients will be negative. The theoretical reason for this expectation lies in a likely statistical association between target group membership and lower achievement in education, and less prior work experience, or perhaps in discrimination or the part of employers (all factors that are not controlled in the Xjt vector). The state level variables included in the model, EMPkt, capture local



labor market characteristics—wage rate, unemployment rate, rate of growth of employment, JTPA/CETA program activity, and employment service activity. Except for the unemployment rate, all of these variables (lagged) are theorized to have a positive effect on employment likelihood. Unemployment rates should be negatively related to employment likelihood.

We do not expect state level variables mentioned above to completely capture the influence of local characteristics on individuals' labor market outcomes. Unmeasured local labor market characteristics (e.g., effective community based organizations or affirmative action programs) should influence individual workers' labor market outcomes, and may quite well be correlated with TJTC use and employment opportunities for disadvantaged youth. In order to control for unobservable state specific effects, state dummies, DSTATEk, are introduced in the model. State specific effects are assumed to be constant over time but vary across states. 6 The advantage of introducing state and time dummies is that they can absorb possible correlations between observed explanatory variables and unobserved variables and the resulting coefficient estimates will be consistent. The data obtained from the observation periods will be pooled and the common slope coefficients a_1, \ldots, a_{11} will be obtained.

In model (2), it is assumed that the TJTC effects (a_3, a_4, a_5, a_7) and the marginal indirect employment effect $(a_6 \text{ and } a_8)$ do not change over time. This assumption, however, may not be



⁵The JTPA/CETA program activity variable will be measured by fund allocations which are, of course, dependent on the unemployment rate. This confounds the interpretation of the coefficient because part of the CETA/JTPA effect should be attributed to the unemployment rate (lagged 2 periods.)

⁶See Maddala (1981) and Mundlak (1961, 1978) for discussions of this type of model.

true and is subject to empirical testing. Our alternative estimation approach is to assume that these effects are different between 1979 and 1984. This assumption may be justified by the following fact: in 1979 the program had just started, half of all certifications were of cooperative education students, and two-thirds of the remaining certifications were retrospective.

The alternative model is written as follows:

(3). Yjkt =
$$a_{0t} + a_{1t}X_{jkt} + a_{2t}EMP_{kt} + a_{3t}(PEN1_{kt}*MEMB_{jt}) + a_{4t}(PEN1_{kt}*MEMB_{jt}) + a_{5t}MEMB_{jt} + a_{6t}PEN1_{kt} + a_{7t}(PEN2_{t}*MEMB_{jt}) + a_{8t}PEN2_{kt} + a_{9t}DISADV_{jt} + a_{10t}DSTATE_{k} + e_{jkt}$$

Note that the coefficients for the TJTC effects and the indirect employment effects now have subscripts for time periods. If these coefficient estimates are significantly different over time; we have evidence that the marginal effects of TJTC have changed.

In summary, for purposes of this paper, we can use equations (2) or (3) for three purposes. First of all, we want to test hypotheses about the coefficients on the TJTC-related variables. In particular, our hypotheses are as follows:

- . a₃ >0
- . 84 <0
- . a₅ /_<0
- ` <u>-</u>5 >`
- . a₇ >0
- . ag <0
- . aa <0

A second type of analysis is to accept the point estimates and calculate the difference in predicted outcomes for eligibles at the mean penetration rates from zero penetration and the same difference for noneligibles. These two calculations might be entitled program effects (the assumption is that the Xjt, EMPkt,



and disadvantagedness dummy appropriately control for selection). These two program effects may be represented as follows:

Eligibles
(4)
$$\hat{Y} = - \hat{Y} \\
 \hat{X}, \hat{EMP} \\
 \hat{PEN1}, \hat{PEN2} = 0$$

$$= (a_3 + a_6) \hat{PEN1} + a_4 \hat{PEN1}^2 + (a_7 + a_8) \hat{PEN2}$$
Noneligibles
(5)
$$\hat{Y} = - \hat{Y} \\
 \hat{X}, \hat{EMP} \\
 \hat{PEN1}, \hat{PEN2} = 0$$

$$= a_6 \hat{PEN1} + a_8 \hat{PEN2}$$

Finally, we can use equation (2) to <u>estimate</u> the total magnitude of jobs created and employment displacement in the population by integrating the total differential of (2) with respect to PEN1 from 0 to its mean and multiplying by the total population. That integral is as follows:

7.3

7

_ 1

(6)
$$\int_{0}^{\overline{PEN1}} dY POP = \int_{0}^{\overline{PEN1}} (a_3MEMB + 2a_4MEMB*PEN1 + a_6 +$$

$$a_7$$
kMEM.3 + a_8 k) dPEN1 * POP

 $= [(a_3 S_m + a_6 + a_7 k S_m + a_8 k) \overline{PEN1} + a_4 S_m \overline{PEN1}] * POP$ where Sm= share of total population that are target group members $k = \frac{\partial PEN2}{\partial PEN1}, \text{ a constant equal to } PEN2/PEN1, \text{ by assumption}$

In the next chapter, we examine the construction of the penetration rate variables and then chapter IV provides the estimated program effects and net employment generation.



III. PENETRATION RATES



III. PENETRATION RATES

As described in the previous chapter, key assumptions underlying the analyses are that TJTC penetration rates could be constructed accurately and could reflect the influence of the program on employment outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to document the development of the penetration rates and to present a correlational analysis which indicates how alternative penetration rate constructs relate to each other. Alternative empirical definitions of the penetration rate can be defended; but if the various alternatives are highly correlated, then the estimate of the effects of TJTC on aggregate employment outcomes will be robust. If little correlation holds, then the employment impact estimates must be subjected to sensitivity analyses.

1. CONSTRUCTION OF PENETRATION RATES

Two types of penetration rates were developed. First of all, a target effectiveness-type statistic estimating the proportion of eligible individuals actually served by the program was constructed. The numerator of this proportion could be a count of vouchers or certifications while the denominator would be a count of eligibles. The ratio of vouchers to eligibles measures TJTC client outreach of the Employment Service (ES) and other vouchering agencies and the extent to which these entities issue vouchers to their clients. The ratio of certifications to eligibles is determined by the vouchering ratio, the rate in which vouchered individuals find employment, and propensity of firms to have the vouchered individuals they hire actually certified.

Under current law, 7 employers could claim a tex credit for wages paid to new hires from any of the following nine target groups:



⁷Up until December 31, 1985.

- . Economically disadvantaged students age 16 to 19 who are in cooperative education programs;
- . Economically disadvantaged youth age 18 to 24;
- . Ex-convicts who are economically disadvantaged;
- . Vietnam-era veterans who are economically disadvantaged;
- Handicapped persons referred from vocational rehabilitation programs;
- . Recipients of general assistance payments;
- . Recipients of supplemental security income;
- Participants in the Work Incentive (WIN) program and other recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
- . Economically disadvantaged students age 16 or 17 newly hired for employment during any 90-day period between May 1 and September 15.

Note that only 5 of the target groups require the criterion of being economically disadvantaged in determining eligibility. However, three of the other four target groups use recipiency of an income-tested income maintenance benefit as a criterion. Thus, only the handicapped target group may be classified as non-income-tested.

For the economically disadvantaged groups, the definition used is that family income during the preceding six months (times 2) must be less than 70 percent of the "lower living standard" based on the lower family budget compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These standards vary by state and rural/urban residence and have not been revised since 1981.

Using an algorithm supplied to us by Christensen, we estimated the eligible population for the youth target group, the economically disadvantaged Vietnam-era veterans, and AFDC recipients by state using the March Income Supplement to the Current Population Survey for 1979, 1980, and 1984. For the latter year, data on vouchers and certifications by target group by state were



available from the U.S. Employment Service Office of Planning and Review. In Exhibits III-1 to III-3, the 1983 penetration rates for economically disadvantaged youth and Vietnam-era vets and AFDC recipients are presented using both vouchers and certifications as numerators.

Considerable variation across states in these penetration rates can be observed in the three tables. Nationally, the penetration rates for the youth target group, using vouchers, averaged about 9.7%. Examining individual states, it is observed that the lowest rates were approximately 3% in Colorado and Pennsylvania while the highest rates were around 30% in Maine, North Dakota, and Maryland. Few generalizations can be made between state characteristics and the voucher penetration rate. The variation across Census divisions was modest, the ratio ranged from .0734 to .1426. The Western divisions tended to be lower than the rest of the country. The ratio of the penetration rate using certifications to the penetration rate using vouchers is identical to the certification rate, i.e., the share of vouchers that result in a certification. As shown in Exhibit III-1, the national certification rate for youth target group is 47.5%. But across the states, that percentage ranges from about 30% in Vermont, Indiana, and Ohio to almost 90% in Mississippi and Colorado.

Exhibit III-2 arrays the penetration rate data for disadvantaged Vietnam-era veterans. As a group, this population is less than a tenth the size of the youth target group. However, the TJTC outreach to these individuals seem g eater. The average



EXHIBIT III-1(1) Employment and Training Administration

ESTIMATED ELIGIBLES, PROGRAM DATA DN VOUCHERS AND CERTIFICATIONS, AND ESTIMATED 1883 PENETRATION RATES FOR THE YOUTH TARGET GROUP

(1)	(2) 1978	(3) 1979	(4) 1983	(5) 1983	(6) 1983	1983 Penetretion Retes	
State	Eligiblesa	Eligiblese	Etigibtess	Youch erab	Certifications	(5): (4)	(8); (4)
Æ	22,196	24,974	18,118	E 202	4 000		
NH _	10,171	10,672	9,956	5,387 1,515	1,963	.2962	.1028
VT	14,283	10,295	13,783	3.026	61.4 827	.1522	.0617
MA	118,726	98,325	85,668	12,055	6.848	. 2195	.0800
RI	11,972	9,837	29,382	1,579	7 4 6	.1407	.0799
CT	35,867	17,108	54,772	2,571	1,171	.0538 .0469	.0254 .0214
NY	355,988	389,281	445,604	51,559	21,023	.1157	_0472
NJ	120,682	123,578	130,033	10,851	5,595	0819	.0430
PA	233,499	185,029	289,131	8,947	4,771	.0308	.0185
DH	138,497	174,109	279,306	18,168	6,245	.0650	.0224
in Il	103,444	75,845	135,032	22,017	6,707	.1631	0 497
MI	151,118	207,790	273,839	27,399	11,565	_1001	.0422
VI	122,946 62.340	188,979	255,841	19,629	8,241	.0767	.0322
	• -	77,183	106,899	14,103	5,389	.1319	.0504
MN Ia	64,730 52,206	77,991	78,354	9,009	5,446	.1150	.0895
HG	119,354	41,581 82,479	80,858	8,308	3,543	.1027	.0438
ID	8,973	11,519	137,497	25,153	8,659	.1829	.0630
3D	15,820	18,071	9,149 17,357	2,814	1,021	.2857	.1116
IE	22.782	25.800	40.840	3,511 2,570	1,551	.2023	.0894
CS .	43,871	38,781	46,029	3,579 8,315	1,307 2,849	.0876 .1372	.032D .0576
E	6,343	5,583	13.092	721	050		
4D	61,225	80,749	43.072	14,000	350 5,648	"n551	.0267
C	23,378	20,448	30,304	2.996	1,196	_3 <i>?</i> 50	.1311
'A	94,905	78,379	118,245	15,237	6,562	.09:19 .12:39	.0395
N.	28,548	30,509	85,881	4,115	1,442	.0P25	.0553 .0219
IC	128,063	121,981	174,892	17,818	8.407	1019	.0481
C A	74,981	74,439	95,134	8,785	4,806	.0923	.0484
Ĺ	129,513	102,588	186,409	20,843	11,017	.1107	.0591
	147,382	177,497	163,996	36,538	18,083	.2228	.1101
Y 'N	42,589	41,536	110,198	15,536	5,633	.1410	.0511
Ĺ	103,131 99,961	77,940	124,017	9,865	5,914	.0795	.0477
S	69.082	110,892	134,500	11,015	5,954	.0819	.0443
	•	47,175	91 ,843	5,904	5,082	.064 3	.0551
R A	56,831	48,042	81,401	1D,968	3,635	.1347	.0447
Ŕ	62,369 48,670	127,289	159,288	16,992	11,846	.1067	.0744
K	48,670 236,341	60,885	88,732	4,763	2,397	.0537	.0270
	200,041	347,797	333,740	28,380	15,881	.08 50	.0470
Ť	11,578	19,573	34,185	1,828	965	.0534	.0282
D Y	14,310	20,048	32,218	3,795	1,409	.1178	.0437
D	4,803 50 400	10,472	12,810	703	370	0557	0283
M	58,120 28,173	93,136 35,044	72,952	2,026	1,888	.0278	.0258
2	46,173	35,211	77,233	5,152	2,088	.0887	.0270
Ť	31,239	59,723 21,046	82,019	7,198	3,597	.1161	.0580
V	16,350	13,514	47,918	4,024	2,047	.0840	.0427
	1000	101014	20,862	1,730	981	.0829	.0470

(1)	(2) 1978	(3) 1979	(4) 1983	(5) 1983	(8) 1983	1983 Penetration Rates	
State	Eligiblesa	Eligiblese	Etigiblese	Vouchersb	Certifications	(5):(4)	(6):(4)
EA	74,047	73,949	95,652	13,904	6,915	.1454	.0723
OR CA	49,242	43,967	71,527	11,957	5,128	.1672	.0717
DA Ak	520,596 13.063	530,90 2 12,4 54	884,737 19,314	36,396	22,201	.0561	.0324
HÀ	22,910	17,495	34,507	1,934 1,373	1,196 618	.1001 .0396	.0619 .0179
TOTAL	4,119,147	4,324,202	5,817,859	564,735	268,579	.0971	.0462

aCalendar year basis. Weighted estimate from succeeding year's March Income Supplement to the Current Population Survey using algorithm supplied by the Congressional Budget Office. Does not include cooperative education students. bCalendar year basis. Interpolated from program data supplied by the U.S. Department of Labor.



EXHIBIT III-2(1)

Employment and Training Administration

ESTIMATED ELIGIBLES, PROGRAM DATA DN VOUCHERS AND CERTIFICATIONS, AND ESTIMATED PENETRATION PATES FOR THE VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS TARGET GROUP

(1)	(2) 1978	(3) 1979	(4) 1983	(5) 1983	(6) 1983		retion tee ^C
State	Eligibles*	Eligibles*	Eligibles*	Vouchareb	Certificationb	Vouchere ⁰	Certs,
ME NH	2,986	3,835	3,848	777	208	.2185	^
VT	1,219	545	1,025	196	59	.2108	.0585
MA	1,815	226	327	460	112	.581B	.0635
RI -	12,103 2,545	13,631	2,838	1,676	571	.1760	.1419 .0600
CT	4,786	811	748	173	72	.1365	.0527
	4,700	749	1,499	346	100	.1476	.0426
NY NJ	24,783	28,010	31,213	6,921	1,480	0.70	****
PA PA	7,250	5,235	1,926	1.024	375	.2472	.0521
TPA	26,808	19,412	25,842	1,508	608	.2132 .0624	.0781 .0253
OH	19,562	18,294	04 880			.0027	.0233
IN	4.788	15,866	21,699	3,626	774	,1890	.0403
IL	17,012	12,687	20,222	4,983	989	. 3657	.0726
MI	24.126	22,186	13,280 32,270	3,270	1,046	.2283	.0730
MI	2.944	4,802	11,836	3,460	1,067	.1321	.0407
A.M.I	• • • • •	4,002	11,000	3,235	720	.5033	.1120
MN IA	10,437	8,786	15,210	1.333	532	4404	0.40.4
MO	8,484	3,774	4,735	1,442	372	.1181 .2546	.0484
ND ON	7,041	7,935	5,289	3,478	1.011	.5149	.0657
50	512 3 255	1,212	529	451	105	.6005	.1497 .1398
NE	2,255	3,566	2,372	54 6	163	.1999	.0597
KS	4,816 5.455	3,401	2,235	607	132	.1742	.0379
	5 ,455	3,531	8,060	933	287	.1551	.0379
DE	2,351	0	1,)2	6 5	00	•	
MC	4,816	8,687	2,128	2.016	29	0470	.0209
C	2,162	347	1,056	149	550 31	. 3637	.0992
/A /V	3,475	12,047	7,866	1.366	443	254	.0261
IC	3,411	8,954	6,704	1,542	178	. 767	.0573
10	1,628	9,164	5,266	2,090	779	.2710 .3405	.0313
iA	7,676	4,845	4,273	751	363	.1342	.1455
Ĺ	13,787	6,122	4,835	2.275	784	.2758	.0648 .0451
•	16,387	7,439	6,038	3,436	1,330	.345?	.1336
Y	6,888	1.005	3,579	2.123		_	
'N	10,221	14,315	8,369	915	549	.5553	.1436
Ţ	5,286	11,602	7,000	1.091	44 5	.0810	.0394
S	4,247	4,427	2,726	317	505 260	.1370 .0834	.0634
R	4,582	4.530	4 400			.0034	.0684
A	4.321	4,588	4,420	1,207	3 62	.2876	.0803
K	1,290		3,937	820	784	.2149	.1784
X	18,612	1,478 27,422	7,571 1°,388	601	199	.1744	.0577
_			1,308	2,035	903	.1063	.0473
T D	1,287	3,187	2,816	257	113	4050	040-
Y	1,062	3,063	850	851	219 219	.1058 5034	.0485
,	785	639	1,385	81	46	.5031 .0472	.1285
, 1	12,413	6,955	6,348	327	257	.0381	.0491
?	5,714 4,036	3,065	4,180	586	168	.1357	.0300 .0389
•	4,036	5,45 B	8,569	920	314	.1448	.0389
,	2,629 1,845	3,258	4,574	694	188	.1990	.0568
•	1 + 040	811	1,040	340	116	.2760	.0942

	L			<u> </u>			
WA	7.386	10.385	13.6 63	3.080	961	.2939	.0917
OR .	13.637	9.782	9.423	3,351	1,032	.3063	.0943
CA	40,996	31.014	34.040	4,379	1,875	.1 239	.0530
AK	2.527	3,132	1 .815	325	151	.1223	.05 68
HA	2,001	1,286	1,590	212	5 5	.1309	.0340
TOTAL	399,985	384,959	387,951	78,757	24,735	.2014	.0633

*Co.ender year basis. Weighted satimates from succeeding year's Murch Income Supplement to the Current Population Survey. These counts are derived from small samples and should be treated as if they have very large standard arrors.

bCalendar year basis. Interpolated from program data.

CBecause of large standard arrors in astimates of aligibles, more stable estimates were derived by using the average aligible estimate.

d[5]+1/3[(2)+(3)+(4)]

0(6)+1/3[(2)+(3)+(4)]



EXHIBIT III-3(1)

¥-1

Employment and Training Administration

ESTIMATED ELIGIBLES, PROGRAM DATA ON VOUCHERS AND CERTIFICATIONS, AND ESTIMATED 1983 PENETRATION RATES FOR THE AFDC TARGET GROUP

(1)	(2) 1978	(3) 1979	(4) 1963	(5) 1983	(6) 1983		83 retion tes
State	El igibles ^a	Eligibles ^a	Eligibles*	Vouchersb	Certifications ^b	(5)+(4)	(6)+(4
HE	17,177	17,498	17,217	1,365	404	.0793	.0235
NH	5,379	4,200	5,954	472	555	.0793	.0373
VT	8,298	7,562	7,877	5,355	472	.8975	.0615
M	95,484	120,955	63,957	6,220	2,109	.0978	.0332
RI ' CT	16,326 41,734	16,822 26,583	20,813 35,816	0 3,407	0 507	.09 51	.0142
NY	343,430	369,043	377.467	30,872	4,533	.0818	.0120
N.	116,776	140,297	108,935	5.327	771	.0489	.0071
PA	214,230	198,354	154,362	7,004	1,718	.0454	.0111
OH	130,753	134,482	202,751	6,398	1,891	.0414	.0093
IN	42,430	47,755	72,860	11,122	1,464	.1531	.0201
IL	185,220	256,908	233,385	9 ,757	2,172	.0418	.0093
MI	183,845	193,996	287,040	9,834	2,900	.0343	.0101
AI	74,472	82,876	106,199	19,494	2,117	. 1 B 36	.0199
MN	40,601	39,827	50,455	1,416	729	.0281	.0144
IA	31,588	30,593	42,671	1,792	493	.0420	.0116
MC	6 5,921	68, 026	48,879	4,550	891	.0931	.0182
ND	7,155	8,176	2,571	469	111	.1824	.0432
8 D	8,529	7,121	8,478	906	276	.0951	.0328
NE	11,710	12,164	13,153	559	227	.0425	.0173
KS	26,973	27,028	25,056	3,053	553	.1218	.0221
DE	8,368	6,487	6,137	500	133	.0815	.0217
MD	50,536	30,733	32,282	7,731	1,649	.2395	.0511
DC	12,438	17,079	18,855	4,904	589	.2601	.0312
VA.	65,766	85,960 24,057	52,950	8,829	1,223	.1667 .0325	.0231 .0066
MA MA	15,846 62,390	21 ,257 61 , 223	22,845 57,918	743 7 . 023	151 1,826	.0323	.0315
SC	48,990	47,871	59,582	1,833	564	.0308	.0095
GA	64,419	52,390	86,742	7,702	1,900	.0888	.0219
FL	90,630	118,975	95,861	13,132	1,886	.1370	.0197
KY	50,804	42,409	45,238	4,701	785	.1039	.0174
TN	71,910	71,430	86,958	1,357	634	.0156	.0073
AL	75,909	54,935	48,955	16,248	7 0 9	.3319	.0145
MS	50,016	44,282	45,296	1,032	878	.0228	.0194
AR	57,501	37,901	25,733	2,587	316	.0998	.0123
LA	63,678	75,233	62,533	4,044	1,806	.0647	.0289
OK	37,022	35,911	21,241	4,123	650	.1941	.0306
TX	137,236	145,798	147,473	6,375	1,866	.0588	.01 27
MT	11,565	7,822	7,808	551	216 284	.0724	.0284
10	5,885 4,854	8,388 4 04 E	12,626	928 474	284 162	.0735 .1774	.0810
MA.	1,851	1,915 47 989	2,655 92.087	471	734	.0540	.0332
CO NM	26,891 15,692	17,288 13,087	22, 087 13,6 9 2	1,182 1,652	226	.1207	.032
AZ	15,692 12,208	13,876	34, 609	3,590	964	.1037	.0279
UT	12,944	6,678	10,158	1,179	342	.1161	.0337
W /	4,780	4,045	2,824	827	41	.3263	.0145



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(1)	[2] 1978	{3} 1979	(4) 1983	(5) 1983	(6) 1983	191 Penetro Re:	
State	Eligibles ⁸	Eligibles ^a	Eligibles	Vouchersb	Certifications	(5)+(4)	(6)+(4)
WA	75,718	59,027	49.195	4,590	1,204	.0933	.0245
OR	49,004	31,580	49,179	7,644	2,123	.1554	.0432
CA	390,806	447,828	467,344	39,721	6,487	.0851	.0139
AK	3,413	4,290	10,121	112	53	.0111	.0052
НА	21,293	13,661	10,478	404	130	.0245	.0079
TOTAL	3,263,417	3,345,123	3,500,6 69	289,040	55,485	.0826	.0158

^{*}Calendar your basis. Weighted satisate from succeeding year's March Income Supplement to the Current Population Survey.

bCelender year beeis. Interpolated from program data supplied by the U.S. Department of Labor.

voucher-defined penetration rate is approximately 1 in 5. Recognizing that there may be considerable statistical error in our eligible estimate, we note that 5 states have penetration rate estimates of over .50: Vermont, Missouri, North Dakota, Kentucky and Idaho. Low voucher penetration rates occur in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Colorado. The overall certification rate for veterans is lower than for youth--31.4% compared to 47.5%. Certification rates for veterans are lowest in West Virginia and Indiana and were highest in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Colorado.

The 1983 penetration rates for the AFDC target group are shown in Exhibit III-3. The national average voucher penetration rate is just over 8 percent, but the certification penetration rate is just over 1.5 percent. This relationship suggests that certifications are more difficult to achieve for the AFDC target group than either the youth or veterans' target groups. In examining the voucher penetration rate column, substantial variation across states can be seen—from zero in Rhode Island to almost 70 percent in Vermont. Nevada, Maryland, Alabama, and the District of Columbia voucher more than 25% of eligibles, while Minnesota, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alaska, and Hawaii in addition to Rhode Island voucher less than 3 percent.

One can get a feel for how some states administered TJTC just by examining these data. The higher the voucher penetration rates, the higher the likelihood that the state "pushes" the program. North Dakota, Vermont, and Maryland have relatively high voucher penetration rates in all 3 exhibits; Colorado and Pennsylvania have low rates. Presumably higher rates also increase the likelihood that the states are blanket vouchering, i.e., vouchering a high number of eligibles. Further evidence of blanket vouchering would be relatively low certification rates coincidental with high voucher penetration rates. Vermont and Kentucky fit this description the best. The opposite administra-

tive behavior would be manifested in low voucher rates and relatively high certification rates. Here the states are probably vouchering only in response to employer requests. Colorado, Mississippi, and Louisiana fit this description.

The second type of penetration rate in our analysis measures the degree to which certified workers entered the low-wage labor force. The difficulty in constructing this statistic comes in defining and measuring the low-wage labor force. Bishop (1984) used employment in the wholesale and retail trade and service industries as the denominator, because the largest share of certifications occur in these industries. However many occupations in these industries cannot be classified as in the low-wage labor market. Furthermore alternative sources of data on employment by industry exist. For the Current Population Survey, individuals report the industry in which they were primarily employed during the year. These data, particularly on a state level, are subject to reporting and sampling error. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also collects employment data from establish-These data are less subject to sampling error, but they double count individuals who hold multiple jobs, which may be a significant share of individuals in the TJTC target groups.

An alternative measure of the low-wage labor market is employment in certain low-wage occupations—especially semiskilled and unskilled service workers. The main source of occupational data is the Current Population Survey, so such data are also subject to the reporting and sampling errors discussed above. Yet another measure of the low-wage labor market would be labor force members from households in poverty—again measured in the Current Population Survey.

In Exhibit III-4, we display two alternative state-by-state estimates of what might be entitled the <u>youth</u> low-wage labor market and corresponding labor market penetration rates (youth

III-11



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certs divided by the youth labor market). The first estimate includes youth (18-24) who are not enrolled in school and who are employed in "low-wage industries" plus unemployed youth not enrolled in school. The second column provides youth in "low-wage occupations" plus unemployed youth. The overall youth labor market penetration rate is approximately 2.5 - 3.0 percent. Our expectation is that displacement will be more likely in states with higher penetration rates like Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana where the ratio is over 7 percent (using the low-wage industry definition). On the other hand, when the ratio is down around 1 percent as it is in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Hawaii, it is unlikely that certifications are "felt" in the youth low-wage labor market.

Under the argument that all TJTC target group members compete with each other and all other low wage workers, we have also constructed estimates of the total low-wage labor market under various conceptual definitions and correspondingly, total TJTC labor market penetration rates. These data for 1983 are displayed in Exhibit III-5. The first column presents total employment in low-wage industries as reported by employers to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (the ES 202 data). The second and third columns are estimates of the low-wage labor market using adults in the labor force (employed or unemployed) who are not enrolled in school and reside in families where the total family income is less than 100%, 125% of poverty. Columns 4-6 of the table provide the penetration rates for each of these low-wage labor market concepts using total certifications as the numerator.

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EXHIBIT III-4(1)

Employment and Training Administration THE YOUTH LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET AND TUTC YOUTH PENETRATION RATES

	[1]	76					
	Youth Employed	(2) Youth Employed	1983				
	in Low-Wage	in Low-Wage	Youth Labor Mari				
_	Industries or	Occupations or	Re	tes			
State	Unexployed	Unemployed	Youth Certs + (1)	Youth Certs - [2]			
E	38,087	55,899	.0489				
(H	30,112	43,899	.0204	.0140			
π	25,177	27,4 12	.0328	.0302			
K	1 9 0,237	295,454	.0360	.0232			
II	28,096	53,083	.0266	.0141			
.T	71,220	97,933	.0164	.0120			
Y	513,371	735,678	.0410	.0286			
ñ	247,353	316,505	.0226	.0104			
×	444,554	538,958	.0107	.0089			
H	415,264	516,911	.0150	.0121			
IN	256,950	313, 3 63	.0261	.0214			
iL et	448,111	516,399	.0258	.0224			
II.	387,077	407 ,251	.0213	.0202			
I	189,348	228,525	.0285	.0236			
IN .	196,109	237,844	.0278	.0227			
Ä	118,521	131,481	.0299	.0270			
10 10	178,202	243,732	.0486	.0355			
1D 1D	19,788	20,099	.051C	.0508			
E	26,152 45,826	27,403	.0593	.0566			
S	72,383	66,977	.0285	.0195			
3	•	94,943	.0366	.0279			
E	28,735	33,769	.0122	.0104			
D C	163,146	172,347	.0346	.0326			
Ä	37,550	40,741	.0319	.0294			
Ŷ	229,494 87,852	281,009	.0286	.0234			
Č	175,008	100,012 291,57 8	.0165	.0144			
Č	120.849	186,918	.0490	.0288			
Ă	149,339	248,843	.0381 .0738	.0246			
Ĺ	330,770	413,083	.0546	.0447 .0437			
Y	133.300	145,809	.0423	.0387			
Ň	179,854	225,595	.0329	.0262			
L	134,162	168,201	.0444	.0354			
6	69,767	109,480	.0726	.0462			
R	109,148	131,590	.0333	.0276			
A	148,695	192,248	.0797	.0616			
K	127,478	176,574	.0188	.0138			
X	572,658	747,356	.0274	.0210			
T	36,500	48,989	.0265	.0197			
0	40,198	41,907	.0351	.0338			
Y	18,411	21,446	.0201	.0173			
0	98,360	141,147	.0190	.0132			
M	49,017	50,568	.0426	.0413			
R	101,243	136,848	.0355	.0263			
T	50,016	68,249	.0409 .0250	.0300			
N	39,313	45,940		.0214			

	(1) Youth Employed in Low-Wege Industries or	(2) Youth Employed in Low-Wage Occupations or	1983 Youth Labor Market Panetration Rates				
State	Unemployed	Unamployed	Youth Certs - [1]	Youth Certs + [2]			
A	141,858	187,275	.0487	.0413			
R	88,729	133,424	.0578	.0384			
A	860,707	1,104,894	.0258	.0201			
K	24,431	26,156	.0490	.0425			
A	50,046	44,593	.0123	.0139			
OTAL	8,338,350	10,663,504	.0322	.0252			

EXHIBIT III-5(1)
Employment and Training Administration

LON-WAGE LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES AND ASSOCIATED TJTC PENETRATION RATES FOR 1983

State	(1) Employment in Low- Waga Industries	[2] Adults in the Lebor Force from Families with Income Less then 100% of Poverty	(3) Adulta in the Labor Force from Families with Income Less than 125% of Poverty	1983 Fenetration Rates		
				Certer(1)	Certs+(2)	Certe+(3)
Ĥ	123,578	26,730	44,790	.0197 .0072	.0514	.0337
ïΤ	62,717	26,793	34,424	.0072 .0225	.0335 .0527	.0200
Ä	883,127	116,956	188,220	.0225 .0108		.0410
Î	121,854	37,338	48,515	.0067	.0815	.0508
Ä	430,231	75 , 395	118,397	.0041	.0219	.0169
•	- TO PLOT	70 1000	110,03/	•0041	.0238	.0150
Y	2,210,443	905.158	850.935	.0122	.0448	.0318
U	960,730	215,435	309,381	.0070	.0312	.0218
Ā	1,374,869	453,680	591,681	.0052	.0159	.0120
Н	1,250,918	405,795	557,555	.0071	.0220	.0180
N	588,051	296,010	397,780	.0161	.0309	.0230
L	1,218,133	487,383	603,965	.0112	.0318	.0245
I	982,356	436.007	531,153	.0124	.0280	.0230
I	574,085	157,396	226,652	.0143	.0523	.0363
N	560,005	191,444	271,504	.0120	.0350	.0247
A	321,786	193,372	230,848	.0127	.0228	.0191
10	804,952	278,194	382,105	.0174	.0380	.0292
D	60, 931	44,091	54,780	.0153	.0281	*0558
iD .	77,173	46,152	93,999	.0258	.0432	.0311
E	192,682	86,062	127,157	.0096	.0194	.0131
. S	277,382	126,913	177,461	.0178	.0275	.0197
E	79,024	18,800	31,582	.0065	.0272	.0192
D	581,239	87,211	114,478	.0135	.0900	.0685
Ç	135,359	39,983	54,003	.0134	.0468	.0337
A	947,003	218,758	317,969	.0127	.0378	.0259
<u>v</u>	163,182	113,159	150,152	.0109	.0157	.0118
C	573 , 571	328,557	437,238	.0192	.0337	.0252
C	283,565	179,201	247,941	.0195	.0309	.0553
A	593,925	313,267	434,720	.0231	.0437	.0315
L	1,442,640	492,462	718,328	.0148	.0432	.0236



	(1)	(2) Adults in the	(3) Adults in the		<	
	Employment in Low-	Labor Force from Families with Income Less then	Lebor Force from Families with Income Less then			retion Rates
Ste te	Wege Industria	100% of Poverty	125% of Poverty	Certs+(1)	Carte(2)	Certe+(3)
KY	337,443				<u> </u>	L
TN	482,773	198,344	277,367	.0756		
AL	330,822	214,747	358,481	.0756 .0145	.0351	.0251
MS		257,194	352,176		.0326	.0195
	190,706	168,354	249,266	.0217	.0279	.0203
AR	005.045		- ·- V	.0325	.0368	.0249
LA	205,845	135,037	202 .144	0040		
ĎK	454,981	241,732	317,440	.0210	.0319	.0213
TX	330,632	178,264	245,192	.0319	.0600	.0457
' ^	1,837,161	759,301	1,047,540	.0098	.0182	.0132
		•	1,047,1340	.0101	.0243	.0176
MT	91,384	44,640	70 700			.0170
0	94,253	59,971	70,708	.0142	.0290	.0183
44	54,535	28,609	84,679	. 0201	.0315	
20	423,922	139,994	36,505	.0106	•0505	•0553
IM	152,537	109,893	183,781	•0062	.0204	.0158
Z	362,399	142,441	140,768	.0163	.0226	•0156
IT	157,181	70,194	189,244	.0134	.0342	•0176
N	218,189		99,479	.0164		.0258
		36,629	51 , 887	.0052	.0369	.0260
Α	485 .626	454 303		1002	.0311	.0219
R	298,590	151,767	227,384	.0187	0500	
A	3,279,495	176,800	221,510	.0277	.0598	.0399
K		1,008,682	1,382,748	.0093	.0468	.0374
Ā	54,419	21,084	27.947		.0303	.0221
•	158,439	38,544	48,401	.0257	.0664	.0501
TAL	07 000 EEE		,,	.0051	.0208	.0166
/ ' C	27,298,577	10,304,999	14,185,745	.0128		•••••
			· ·- • ·	*A158	.0338	.0246



Again, considerable variation across the states can be observed. Using the counts of adults in the labor force with family income less than 100% poverty, the national penetration of TJTC certifications is about 3.4%. The range runs from 1.56% in Pennsylvania to 9.0% in Maryland. But as with the other penetration rate measures, there appears to be no particular state characteristic that explains the variance. The regional variation (using Census divisions) for the above discussed rate is quite small, ranging from 2.8% in the Rocky Mountain states to 5.1% in New England. These are reasonably close to the national level of 3.38%.)

Notable in analyzing these data is the fact that certain states are consistently in the high or low ranges of the TJTC penetration distributions. For example, using all of the penetration rates presented in Exhibits III-1 through III-5 (a total of 11 penetration rates), Pennsylvania is among the lowest 5 states a total of 9 times, Connecticut 6 times, Hawaii and Delaware 5 times, and Colorado 4 times. On the other hand, Vermont is among the highest ranking 5 states a total of 7 times, Louisiana 6 times, Maryland 5 times, North Dakota 4 times, and Mississippi and Oregon 3 times.

Observing these types of variation in the data bolsters our confidence that we will be able to identify covariation with employment rates under the assumption that TJTC, in fact, has an influence. But because penetration rates are not unambiguously defined, we need to test whether the various concepts of the penetration rate are highly correlated with each other (in which case, we don't need to worry about which penetration rate measures to use in our analyses) or not. The next section discusses these correlational analyses.

9 ______

· 2. CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS

To test the degree of correlation among the various concepts and measures of penetration rates, we calculated the bivariate correlations among the eleven rates provided in Exhibit III-1 through III-5 plus we used other combinations of numerators and denominators, such as youth, Vietnam-era veterans, and AFDC certifications over the 4 estimates of total low wage labor market. Because of the consistency among states discussed above, and more fundamentally, because the different ratios involve identical numerators or denominators, we expected quite high correlations. Tieed the results bore out this expectation.

With only one exception, all of the bivariate correlations among the "target effectiveness"-type penetration rates in Exhibits III-1 - III-3 were statistically significant at less than .01 (recall half of these involved using vouchers in the numerator and half involved using certifications). Among the labor market-type penetration rates, the bivariate correlations were The two variables in Exhibit III-4 correlated again quite high. at .93 (p < .001) and the 3 series in Exhibit III-5 all correlated at levels that were significant at the .01 Javel. only anomalies that showed up in the correlational analysis were a zero correlation between AFDC certs as a proportion of the total low-wage market and youth cer:s as a proportion of the total low-wage labor market. Those anomalies aside, the correlations indicated that our estimates would be robust using almost any of the penetration rate concepts. As a consequence in the next section presenting the results of the analysis, we use the following definitions:

Y_PENI_{kt} = youth target group target-effectiveness penetration rate defined as youth vouchers in state k in year t divided by youth eligibles (estimated from the CPS) in state k in year t (National mean in 1923 = .0971).

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- V_PEN1kt = Vietnam-era veterans target group targeteffectiveness penetration rate defined as
 veterans vouchered in state k in year t divided
 by veteran eligibles (estimated from the CPS)
 in state k in year t (National mean in 1983 =
 •2014)
- A_PEN1kt = AFDC target group target-effectiveness penetration rate defined as AFDC vouchers in state k in year t divided by AFDC eligibles (estimated form the CPS) in state k in year t (National mean in 1983 = .0826)
- PEN2kt = low-wage labor market penetration rate of TJTC defined as total certifications divided by the total low-wage labor market defined as employment in low-wage industries (from BLS establishment data) in state k in year t (National mean in 1983 = .0128)



IV. RESULTS

IV. RESULTS

This chapter provides a discussion of the econometric estimates of the employment displacement and/or creation effects of TJTC. Recall that three CPS data sets were used in the analyses: the March 1979 CPS, the March 1980 CPS, and the March 1984 CPS. For all intents and purposes, TJTC was not in effect and could not have influenced the survey week or retrospective employment data in the March 1979 file. TJTC was new and the number of certifications was of limited size by March 1980, so the data collected in that month should reflect only a limited impact of the program. However, by March 1984, TJTC was well established and relatively sizable, so if TJTC had employment displacement or creation impacts, they should be captured in the model estimated from that data.

The presentation of results in this chapter is organized as follows: First the employment displacement estimates from the March 1984 data are given. The results are presented for the entire adult population between 19 and 35,9 for that population disaggregated by sex and race, and finally for disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged youth. Next, estimates from the March 1980 CPS are presented. Thirdly, the displacement estimates from a fixed effects specification estimated from data merged from all three CPS files are given.



⁸These particular data sets were chosen because the March 1984 CPS was the most recent March CPS available at the time and the proposed methodology required earlier CTS's to test for structural changes over time. Furthermore, Christensen (1984) used the March 1983 CPS, so we did not want to duplicate her effort.

⁹The age limit of 35 was arbitrarily set to limit sample sizes. The underlying (scrong) assumption is that any displacement or substitution that occurs does not affect individuals over the age of 35.

1. EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FROM THE 1984 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

By limiting the analysis to a single year, we are in effect, positing (3) above as our structural model in this section, i.e., allowing the TJTC impact coefficients to vary with time. We are further delimiting the analysis here to using probability of being employed as the dependent variable. A distinction is made between current year employment likelihood — the respondent indicated that she or he was working during the survey week (in March) — and retrospective employment likelihood. The latter is defined as 1 if the respondent reported working at least 1 week during the previous calendar year; 0 otherwise.

(a) Results for Total Population Aged 18-35

Exhibit IV-1 presents the coefficient estimates for the model estimated using a logit technique since the dependent variable is limited to 0 or 1. The sample is limited to all individuals between the ages of 18 and 35 inclusive and the effects of membership in the economically disadvantaged youth and the AFDC target groups could be identified. The estimated coefficients and standard errors are presented. A transformation of the coefficients to the marginal impact on the probability of employment can be performed by multiplying the coefficient by P(1-P), where P is the probability of being employed (approximated by the share of the population with the dependent variable equal to 1).

21

Among the TJTC related variables, the effect of being economically disadvantaged was strongly negatively related to a probability of employment as would be expected. Relative to the rest of the population, being economically disadvantaged in 1983 implied about a 40 percentage point (-1.99 * .69 * .31) smaller likelihood of reporting being employed during the survey week in



Employment and Training Administration

ODEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON PROBABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT (1984) (Stendard errors in perentheses)

		Dependent	Veriable
L	Verieble	Current Employment (t=1884)	Lest Year's Employment (t=1983)
F T	Economically disadventaged youth Received AFDC in 1983	-1.99+ (.098)25 (.480) -1.68+ (.229) 3.57 (6.390) -16.83 (22.010) 1.65 (2.516) -3.00 (4.566) .54** (.249) -1.46 (2.198) 18.82*** (7.230)	-4.98+ (.144)38 (.595) -1.07+ (.271) 7.74 (9.835) -37.53 (35.384)87 (2.825) 3.03 (5.417)08 (.352) 1.58 (3.837) 31.14*** (11.868)
	Personal characteristics Age Blacke Other, normhitee Female, normarried, no childrenb Female, normarried, child b Female, merried, no childrenb Hale, merried, childrenb Hale, merried, childrenb Hale, merried, childrenb Hale, merried, childrenb Log (Income) Brade Enrolled currently Central cityc NonSMSAc	.39+ (.033)34+ (.044)55+ (.067) .28+ (.045)06 (.050)18+ (.058) -1.48+ (.042)29+ (.054) .91+ (.081) .82+ (.057) .29+ (.017) .09+ (.008)85+ (.030)01 (.033)00 (.033)	.22+ (.044)83+ (.056)76+ (.084)09 (.084)11 (.069) .10 (.065) -1.34+ (.057) .12 (.072) 1.27+ (.141) 1.52+ (.108)27+ (.021) .16+ (.007)54+ (.041)25+ (.044)05 (.044)
1	State employment characteristics Per capits JTPAt-1 Per capits ESt-1 Unemployment retet Ave. afg. waga Employment growth	008° (.004) .00 (.006) 04+ (.012) 01 (.013) 3.17+ (.802)	005 (.006) .010° (.008) 08+ (.018) .04°° (.018) .40 (1.083)
1	Sample eize Emp = 1 R2	38,845d 25,304 (P≈.8905) _193	32,148e 26,119 (P=_8125) _296

No tee:

eOmitted group is whites bOmitted group is nonmarried males with no children cOmitted group is SMGA, not central city residents dRendom sample of .80 eRendom sample of .70

*eignificant et less then .10 level **eignificant et less then .05 level ***eignificant et less then .01 level +eignificant et less then .001 level



1984. As discussed in the methodology chapter, being a member of one of the target groups may affect the probability of employment over and above the effect of being economically disadvantaged. This might be thought of as an "eligibility effect". Employers may favor hiring an individual from one of the target groups on the basis that they would receive the credit. On the other hand, eligibility may stigmatize workers if employers have generally poor perceptions of them. The estimates in Exhibit IV-1 suggest that the latter is the case--eligibility because of AFDC recipiency and youth disadvantagedness is stigmatizing, although the latter is not statistically significant.

The penetration rate main effects and interactions provide estimates of the vouchering and certification impacts on employment likelihood. The eligibility-Penl interactions provide evidence of decreasing returns to vouchering as hypothesized, although the coefficients are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the vouchering penetration rate is positive and significant for the current employment outcome suggesting that vouchering does not cause displacement but rather enhances the probability of employment among the population. The certification penetration rate coefficients indicate significant increases in the likelihood of eligibles finding employment, while no statistically significant displacement or job creation for non-eligibles.

מ

If we accept the point estimates in Exhibit IV-1 and use equation (6) from chapter II to calculate total jobs created, we would derive an estimate of about 400,000 in 1984 and 200,000 in 1983. A large share of those jobs would go to noneligibles, so that we estimate that between 20-50 percent of certifications are for individuals who would not otherwise be employed.



The coefficient estimates for the personal characteristics are almost all highly statistically significant and are of the expected signs. Blacks and other minorities can be seen to have lower employment likelihoods than whites, holding other variables constant, by about 8-12 percentage points. Single females without children are about 5 percentage points more likely to be employed during the survey week than single males but there is no statistically significant differences in their employment likelihood using the retrospective employment concept. Married males (with or without children present) are about 20 percentage points more likely to be employed than single males. Married females with children have considerably lower probabilities of being employed than single males.

Age and education are positively related to employment likelihood as would be expected. Current enrollment in school is negatively related to employment likelihood. Previous year's family income (logged) is positively related to survey week employment. Previous year's family income less the individual's earnings is negatively associated with retrospective employment likelihood.

Among the statewide employment characteristics, the unemployment rate and employment growth rates have the expected signs and statistical significance. Interestingly, the previous year per capita administrative expenditure for the employment service (ES) had a positive influence on the retrospective employment likelihood. The per capita state allocation for JTPA was negatively related to employment likelihoods, although this was expected due to the allocation formulas for the Act.



(b) Results by Race and Sex

In this section of the report, we investigate whether TUTC has different impacts for males and females or different impacts by race. 10 In Exhibit IV-2, we present the results of logit estimates of the probability of survey week employment disaggregated by sex. That is, the dependent variable corresponds to the left hand column of Exhibit IV-1. As we compare the coefficients in Exhibit IV-2, it is clear that there are only a few gender differences in the structural model, which of course, buttresses our confidence in the Exhibit IV-1 estimates.

of most interest are the coefficients on the PEN1 and PEN2-eligibility interaction. For males, the PEN1 coefficient is small and statistically insignificant; however for females it is much larger and significant. On the other hand, the certification effect as represented by the target group membership-PEN2 interaction, is larger for males than females. These differences suggest that the vouchering employment creation effect among noneligibles occurs for females, while the employment enhancement that occurs for eligibles due to certification is stronger for males.

The coefficients for personal characteristics are quite similar, although the effect of being married on employment likelihood is of opposite sign as would be expected. An unanticipated difference between males and females lies in the non-SMSA coefficients. Apparently, outside of SMSAs, males have more



¹⁰A possible explanation for differential effects by gender is that employers who are knowledgeable about the program and who either stigmatize voucherees or who attempt to hire eligibles may assume low income females are eligible.

Employment end Training Administration

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TJTC ON CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD, BY SEX (Stendard errors in perentheses)

•	Sex	
Verieble	Male	Female
UTC related veriables		
Economically disedvantaged	-e.D1+ (.155)	-1. 97+ (.135)
Economically disadventaged youth	. 11 (.708)	"02 ("541)
Rec'd AFDC in 1983	-2.41 ⁰⁰ (.971)	-1.49+ (.24 7)
fouth target group member		_
* Y_Perf1984	.64 (13.20)	2.85 (7.945)
Youth terget group member Y_Pent121984	4.04 (70.00)	40.00
LFDC A Pentings	-1.64 (52.66)	-13.55 (25.798)
FDC • A Peni21984	-2.98 (18.76) 1.82 (77.93)	1.98 (2.601)
Pen1984	1.62 (//.93) .23 (.396)	-3.47 (4.653) .81** (.321)
Per 2 - 0 - 4	95 (3.432)	
Pen21984 Eligible • Pen2 ₁₉₈₄	33.96* (19.49)	-2.48 (2.867) 14.44* (7.92)
1984	40100 (10140)	(7:02)
Personal characteristics		
Age	.32+ (.053)	_46+ (_044)
9 Lacke	64+ (.066)	12* (.060)
Jther, nonwhite	- . 78+ (. 099)	38+ (.090)
donmerried, childrenb	- . 31+ (.056)	 33+ (.054)
Married, no childrenb	.90+ (.082)	45 + (_063)
Married, childrenb	<u>.83+ (.061)</u>	-1.72+ (.052)
.og (Income) ₁₉₈₃	.26+ (.025)	.31+ (.022)
Frade	.05+ (.008)	<u>.10+</u> (.006)
inrolled currently	- . 93+ (. 043)	 79+ (.041)
Centrel cityc MonSMBAc	08 (.052) 16*** (.052)	.04 (.043)
TUTORIENO	16 ^{***} (.052)	.10** (.042)
State employment characteristics		
Per cepite JTPA ₁₉₈₃	013 [*] (_006)	003 (_008)
Per cepite ES ₁₉₈₃	.00 (.008)	.00 (.007)
Jnemployment retained	05 ⁺⁺⁺ (.018)	04** (.c18)
178. BTQ. W8084004	03 (.021)	00 (.017)
amployment growth 984	3.57*** (1.265)	2.99*** (1.041)
_	40.0004	
Semple eize	17,636d	19,009d
čapi= 1 ¥2	13,671 (P=,7752)	11,633 (P=.6120)
	. 184	_16 8

Aptees

aOmitted group is whites bOmitted group is nonmerried, with no children cOmitted group is SNGA, not central city residents dRandom sample of .80

*eignificant et less then .10 level **eignificant et less then .05 level ***rignificant et less then .01 level *eignificant et less then .001 level



difficulty finding employment while females have a greater likelihood of employment relative to their within SMSA, non-Central City counterparts.

Among the state aggregate variables, the only difference between males and females comes from the JTPA per capita allocation. The overall negative relationship between this allocation and employment likelihood stems from males, while the effect is essentially zero for females.

In Exhibit IV-3, we array the results from estimating the same model as reported in Exhibit IV-2, only using retrospective employment likelihood for the dependent variable. The logit estimation procedure would not converge for males , so the exhibit only presents the results for females. We can get a sense of how different coefficients would be for males, by comparing the results in the exhibit to the right-hand column of Exhibit IV-1. If the coefficients are reasonably equal, then the male coefficient must approximate the coefficient for females. Otherwise, structural differences exist. Specifically, we were looking for further confirmation of a positive effect of PEN1 on females and Eligible*PEN2 on males and, by inference, we found these effects to be present.

In addition to disaggregating the effects by sex, we also estimated the model separately for whites and nonwhites. The results of this disaggregation are presented in Exhibits IV-4 and IV-5 for current and prior year employment, respectively. The coefficient estimates shown in these tables indicate very little



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COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT
OF TJTC ON PREVIOUS YEAR EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD, FOR FEMALES
(Standard errors in parantheses)

Verieble	Femele
TUTO-related veriables	
Economically disadvantaged	~4. 73+ (. 194)
Economically disadvantaged youth	 99 (.8 05)
Rec'd AFDC in 1983	89 ^{***} (.293)
Youth_target_group_member*	
Y_PEN11983	11.31 (12.304)
YANTA TARAKT ARANA MAMBAKT	
Y_PEMI ² 1983 AFDC * A_PEMI ₁₉₈₃ AFDC * A_PEMI ² 1983	~41.48 { 41.4 3}
AFCC *A_PENT_1983	- . 70 (2 .8 69)
AFDC * A_PEN12 ₁₉₈₃	3.01 (5.228)
FEN14092	.28 (.423)
PEN2 ₁₉₈₃	-2,43 (4,374)
PEN21983 Eligible *PEN2 ₁₉₈₃	18.30 (12,965)
Personal Characteristics	
Age	.22+ (.055)
Blacka	41+ (.074)
Nonblack, nonwhite	51+ (_107)
Normarriad, childrenb	04 (.074)
Merried, no childrenb	
Married, childrenb	-1.22+ (.069)
Log (Income)4983	29+ (_027)
Brada	.18+ (.010)
Enrolled currently	43 + (_051)
Central Cityc	15*** (.054)
NonBNSAC	01 (.052)
	10. (1002)
State employment cheracteristics	
Per cepita JTPA ₁₈₆₃	006 (.007)
Per capita ES _{top2}	.008 (.009)
Unemployment reteraco	07+ (.020)
Averege mfg. wege _{1/202}	.05** (.022)
Employment growth 1983	1.32 (1.301)
Sample eize	16.682d
Emp = "	12,289 (P=.7367)
16	12,209 (FE,/30/) -246

Notes:

aOmitted group is whitee bOmitted group is normarried, with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents dRandom sample of .70



^{*}eignificant at less than .10 level **eignificant at less than .05 level **eignificant at less than .01 level *eignificant at less than .001 level

Employment and Training Administration

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TJTC ON CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOO, BY RACE (Stendard errors in perentheses)

j		Race			
Verieble	Nonwhite	,	White		
TUTC related variables		<u> </u>			_
Economically disedventaged	-2.32+	(.216)	-1.84+	(.118)	
Economically disadvantaged youth	.63	(.758)	16	(.498)	
Received AFDC in 1983	-1.83+	(.491)	-1.88+	(.282)	
Youth target group member * Y_Pen1	2,31	(11,128)	4.16	(7.948)	
Youth target group members		(**************************************	4310	(,,,,,,,	
• Y PEM2	-13.38	(35,484)	-18,36	(28,231)	
AFDC • A Perf	3,78	(7.881)	1.31	(3.202)	
AFDC • A Peril 2	-13,34	(29,903)	-2.12	(5.344)	
Peni	.58	(.650)	.78**	(.273)	
Pen2	-1.81	(5.982)	-2.04	(2.421)	
Eligible • Pen2	13,89	(12.350)	22.04	(9.217)	
Personal characteristics					
Age	.64+	(.089)	.38+	(.038)	
Female, normerried, no childrene	.17	(.113)	.27+	(.049)	
Female, normarried, childrens	.15	(.113)	-11+	(.058)	
Female, married, no childrene	29	(.202)	- 22+	(.061)	
Female, married, childrens	68+	(.114)	-1.59+	(.045)	
Mele, normerried, childrene	22	(.132)	30+	(.059)	
Mele, merried, no childrene	71***	(.244)	.90+	(.086)	
Mele, merried, childrens	.71+	(.148)	.82+	(.062)	
Log (Income)	.39+	(.043)	.27+	(.018)	
Brada	.11+	(.016)	.07+	(3006)	
Enrolled currently	90+	(.077)	85+	(.033)	
Centrel cityb	09	(.082)	.02	(.037)	
Non SHSAb	.16	(.109)	01	(.034)	
State employment characteristics					
Per cepite JTPA ₁₉₈₃	.014	(.009)	014	(.005)	
Per cepite ES ₁₀₀₂	01	(.015)	.00	(.009)	
Unemployment rata _{roo} ,	08**	(.038)	03**	(.013)	
Ave. Bru. Wegesons	09**	(.038)	.00	(.015)	
Employment growth 984	-3.67°	(2.144)	4.59+	(.878)	
Sample eize	4,9420		31,703c		
Emp = 1	2,734	(P=.5532)	22,570	(P=.7119)	
R2`	.232	·	.180		

#Omitted group is nonmerried males, with no children bOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents cRandom sample of .80

eignificant at less than .10 level **eignificant at less than .05 level *aignificant at less than .01 level +eignificant at less than .001 level



Employment and Training Administration

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON PREVIOUS YEAR EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD, BY RACE (Stendard errore in perenthesee)

		Race		
Verieble	Norwhite		White	
TUTC related veriables				
conomically disadventaged	-5.74+	(.369)	-4.81+	(.159)
Economically disadventeged youth	-4.75	(2.912)	06	[.634]
Received AFDC in 1883	23	(.524)	-1.33+	(.332)
Youth target group member * Y_Pen1	d	(j	.58	(10.172)
fouth target group member	_	• •	.00	[10.172]
• Y Pent 2	d	()	-15.74	(36.968)
AFDC * A_Perfi	-2.12	(5.572)	-1.28	(3.605)
AFDC * A_Perfi 2	7.44	(14.018)	3.30	[8.108]
Perfl	.37	(.863)	_10	(.393)
Pen2	-2.66	(8.634)	1.33	(4.135)
Eligible * Pen2	10.86	(21.167)	37.27**	[4.135] [14.870]
	10.00	(211107)	3/.2/	[14.6/0]
Personal characteristics				
Age	.29***	(.109)	-20+	(- C49)
Female, normerried, no childrene	14	(.145)	09	(.073)
female, nonmerried, childrens	09	(.148)	08 13	(.079)
female, merried, no childrena	43	(.240)	13 -12	(.092)
emale, merried, childrene	69+	(.142)	-1.42+	
Welm, nonmerried, childrens	_05	(.151)		(.063)
tele, merried, no childrene	.84**	(.356)	.18 ⁰ 1.31+	(.0B4)
Wele, merried, childrens	1.24+	(.241)	1.31* 1.57+	(.154) (.122)
og (Income)	26+	(.049)	1.5/+ 28+	
Brada	_18+	(.021)	-,co+ ,18+	(.024)
Enrolled currently	- 90+	(.021)	.10 ⁺ 48+	(006)
Central cityb	34***	(.104)		(.045)
ion SNBAb	07	(.138)	22+	(.049)
	07	(*136)	03	(.048)
State employment characteristics				
Per capite JTPA ₁₉₈₃	-012	(.012)	~.011	(-007)
er capite ES ₁₉₈₃	.01	(.018)	011 .01	(.009)
Inemployment retained	07	(.048)	ູບາ −_09+	(.009) (.018)
va. afg. wege ₁₉₈₄	03	(.048)	*0e***	
eployment growth gg4	-2.71	(2.738)		(.020)
	-E ₀ / 1	[20/00]	1.29	(1.216)
Semple size	4.297c		27.851 c	
inp = 1	2.910	[P=.6722]	23,209	(P=.8333)
<u>ē</u> '	_381	[1-00/62]	23,208 _273	(F= .0333)

eOmitted group is nonmerried males, with no children aOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents cRandom sample of "70 dSAS set coefficient to infinity due to multicollineerity



^{*}eignificant et lese then .10 level **eignificant et lese then .05 level ***eignificant et lese then .01 level +eignificant et lese then .001 level

structural differences between the two populations. The youth eligibility effect is positive for nonwhites and negative for whites for current employment but neither are statistically significant. Otherwise, the TJTC-related variables have quite similar impacts. In particular, the PEN2 displacement impacts are virtually identical for both groups for both employment concepts.

Among the personal characteristic variables in the model, only residence outside an SMSA exhibits a markedly different effect across the two groups. Nonwhites in nonSMSA geographic areas have a 5 percentage point greater likelihood of being employed during the survey week than nonwhites in SMSAs. Whites show no statistically significant differences across SMSA categories, however.

Per capita JTPA allocations seem to favorably affect non-whites and have a deleterious effect on whites. For the latter group, a doubling of the allocation would reduce employment likelihood by about 3 percentage points.

(c) Youth Target Group Analyses

In order to compare our results directly to those reported in Christensen (1984), we estimated the employment likelihood models separately for disadvantaged and nondisadvantaged youth. Exhibits IV-6 and IV-7 present the results of these estimates. In general, the estimates for the personal and state-specific characteristics were quite comparable to those reported in Christensen (1984). The TUTC-related variables used in the estimates reported here were somewhat different, but the basic results are comparable. The CBO coefficient on a variable that is similar to PENY were as follows:

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COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL 18-28, BY DISAGVANTAGED STATUS (Stenderd errors in parentheses)

	Disadventeged Statue			
Verieble	01 sedventeged		Nond i sadventeged	
TJTC related veriebles				
Economically disadventaged youth Youth target group x Y_PENI1884	.11	(.365)	N/A	()
Y PEMIAGOA	-1.22 N/A	(1.969) ()	N/A ,12	() (•256)
PEN21984	14.31	(11.445)	50	(2.258)
Personel cheracteristics				
Age	90	(.342)	- 55+	(.062)
Bleck	.04	(.194)	54+	(046)
Other nomehite	-1.55+	(.374)	51+	(.071)
Femela, Unmerried, No children Femele, Unmerried, Children	- .31	(.224)	. 21+	()44]
Femele, Married, No children	-1 .27+ 98*	(.209) (.507)	15*** 15***	(.049)
Femele, Married, Children	-1.69+	(.353)	15 -1.48+	(.058) (.044)
Male, Unmarried, Children	56	(.351)	- 25+	(.051)
Mele, Married, No children	.30	(.458)	1.00+	(.086)
Male, Married, Children	.54*	(.315)	. 78+	[.064]
Log (Income) Grade	.31***	[.107]	.24+	(.017)
Currently enrolled	. 08+	(.033)	. 08+	(.006)
Centrel city	58+ 64+	(.162)	93+ .00	(.031)
NonSMGA	48**	(.1 96) (. 201)	02	(.035) (.034)
State-specific variables				
Per capite JTPA ₁₉₈₃	-1.22+	(.026)	004	[.004]
Per cepite Escoa	.07**	(.033)	008	(.006)
Unemployment feterops	.06	(.064)	-,05+	(.013)
Average mfg. wega:1984 Employment growth:1984	15*	(.082)	02*	(.014)
repropert Brown4984	_41	[4.711]	3.2 9+	[.834]
Semple size	1699		31,194	_
Emp = 1 R2	285 -145	(p=.1877)	21,616	(p=.6930)
 	.145		.138	

Notes:

eOmitted group is whitee bOmitted group is nonmerried meles with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents

*eignificant et Lees then "10 Level **eignificant et Lees then "05 Level ***eignificant et Lees then "01 Level +eignificant et Lees then "001 Level



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COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON PRIOR YEAR EMPLOYMENT OF INDIVIDUALS 18-29, BY DISADVANTAGED STATUS [Stenderd errors in panrentheses]

	Disadventeged Status				
Veriable	Oisadventaged		Nond1 sadventaged		
TUTC related variebles					
Economically disadventeged youth	.38	(.488)	N/A	()	
Youth target group x Y_PEM1984	-1. 08	[2 .4 77]	N/A	ìi	
Y_PEN11984	N/A	()	.03	(.323)	
PĒN2 ₁₉₈₄ .	81.18+	[17.74]	3.44	(3.675)	
Personal characteristics					
Age	85*	(.450]	.53+	(.077)	
Black	08	(.292)	85+	(.054)	
Other norwhite	- 2.21+	(.621)	88+	(.083)	
Female, Unmarried, No children	05	(.318)	07	(.080)	
Femele, Unmarried, Children	99***	(.307)	20***	(.063)	
Femele, Married, No children	.87	(.531)	.02	(.079)	
Female, Married, Children	53	[.411]	-1.48+	(.055)	
Mele, Unmerried, Children	.07	(.430)	.07	(.064)	
Male, Morriad, No children	1.13**	[.571]	1.36+	(.151)	
Male, Merried, Children	1.88+	(.379)	1.60+	(.134)	
Log (Income)	. 75+	(.138)	16+	(.020)	
Grade	.06	[.044]	.15+	(.008)	
Currently enrolled	39+	(.219)	~.58+	(.040)	
Centrel city	-1.07+	(.200)	27+	[.043]	
NonSMSA	-1.79+	(.315)	01	[.044]	
State-specific veriables					
Per cepite JTPA _{4 D D2}	192+	(.037)	.008	(.006)	
Per cepita ES ₁₀₀₃	.07*	(.041)	.01	(.008)	
Unemployment rate ₄₀₀₂	.12	(.095)	11+	(.016)	
Averege mfg. wegetage	20*	(.116)	.04**	(.018)	
Employment growth 983	-9.73	(8,251)	.18	(1.098)	
Sample eize	1899		31.194		
Enp = 1	170	(P=.1001)	21,331	(P=.8441)	
R2	.284	[1-11001]	_188	[1-0044]	

No tee:



^{*}eignificant at Less than .10 level
**eignificant at Less than .05 level
**eignificant at Less than .01 level

⁺aignificant at less than .001 level

מ	isadvantaged Youth	Nondisadvantaged Youth
Current employment (1983) Prior year employment (1982)	1.92**	.39
Litor Aggr embroameur (1985)	-1.04	50

The only significant coefficient was for the current employment likelihood of disadvantaged youth. The sign of the coefficient suggests that vouchering increases the employment likelihood of disadvantaged youth, while the magnitude of the effects suggests that virtually 100% of certifications create employment among disadvantaged youth. The fact that the coefficients for nondisadvantaged youth are not significant implies that no displacement is occurring.

In the present study, we use the coefficient on PEN2 to gauge displacement. The coefficient estimates in the two exhibits are as follows:

	Disadvuntaged Youth	Nondisadvantaged Youth
Current Employment (1984)	14.31	50
Prior Year Employment (1983)	81.18+	3.44

The scale of these estimates is larger than those in the CBO study because a certification penetration rate is used. Here, the significant coefficient pertains to prior year employment for the disadvantaged youth, although the coefficient for current employment for disadvantaged youth is nearly significant (p=.21). The magnitude of the prior year employment impact for disadvantaged youth translates to job creation on the order of 120-150 thousand jobs which is approximately equivalent to 50 percent of youth certifications. The small coefficients on nondisadvantaged

youth suggest virtually no displacement of nondisadvantaged youth.

2. <u>DISPLACEMENT ESTIMATES FROM THE 1980 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY</u>

As stated above, the basic assumption beneath use of the model given in equation (3) rather than equation (2) was that the coefficients would vary by year. A test of that assumption was performed by estimating the same equations as those reported in the preceding section only using the March 1980 CPS. Exhibit IV-8 provides estimates over the entire adult population ages 18 to 35 for survey week employment likelihood.

A comparison of the coefficients for the TJTC-related variables between Exhibits IV-1 and IV-8 shows great similarity in program effects between 1984 and 1980. The only substantial differences arise in the coefficients on youth eligibility and PEN2. The youth eligibility coefficient is positive and significant in Exhibit IV-8 while it is negative but not significant in the estimates from the 1984 CPs. The coefficient on the PEN2 variable is positive for current employment in Exhibit IV-8 and negative in Exhibit IV-1, although not significant in either case. The change in signs for the youth eligibility variable may be explainable by the fact that all cooperative education participants were eligible in 1980, but by 1984, only economically disadvantaged youth were eligible.

In order to observe whether the employment generation implied by the coefficients on PEN2 and Eligible*PEN2 for current employment was equitably distributed among race/sex groups, we disaggregated the results shown in Exhibit IV-8 by race and by sex. These results are provided in Exhibits IV-9 and IV-10. In Exhibit IV-9, it can be observed that the employment generation estimates for the current year employment concept are larger for

Employment and Training Administration

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TJTC ON PROBABILITY OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT (1980) (Standard arrors in parentheses)

Verieble	Coefficient	
TJTC related variables		
Economically disadvantaged	-2.12+ (.126)	
Economically disadvantaged youth	.60** (.239)	
Received AFDC in 1979	-1.39+ (.183)	
Youth target group member	,,,,,,	
* Y_PEN12.	13 [.200]	
AFDC A PERI.	20.88 [1.488]	
AFDC A_FEN12	-827.44** (318.78)	
PEM .	.05** [.019]	
PEI(2)	4.32 (8.636)	
Eligible + PEN2.	28.62* [17.085]	
•		
ermonal characteristics		
Age	.36+ {.031}	
Black*	81+ (.043)	
Other normhitee	35 (.086)	
Female, nonmarried, no childrenb	.05 (.045)	
Female, nonmarried, childrenb	15*** [.048]	
Female, merried, no childrenb	37+ (.053)	
Female, married, childrenb	-1.78+ (.041)	
Male, nonmerried, childrenb	28+ (.051)	
Mele, merried, no childrenb	.86+ (.074)	
Male, married, childrenb	.92+ (.056)	
Log (Income)	.28+ (.017)	
Grada	.07+ (.005)	
Enrolled currently	85+ {.02%}	
Central cityc	02 (.032)	
Nonembac	06 ⁺ (.031)	
ate employment characteristics		
Per cepite CETA ₁₉₇₉	004 [.003]	
Per cepita ES ₁₉₇₉	.01 (.013)	
Unemployment rate 1979	07+ (.011)	
Avg. mfg. wege.	.00 (.002)	
Employment growth.	.79 (.687)	
, is many an any	(1007)	
Sample size	41 ,307d	
Exp=1	28.738 [P=.6957]	
<u>R2</u> '	.188	

Notes:

#Omitted group is whitee bOmitted group is normarried males with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents dRandom sample of .80

*significant at less than .10 level **significant at less than .05 level ***significant at less than .01 level +significant at less than .001 level



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COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TJTC ON CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD (1980), BY SEX (Standard errors in parentheses)

	Sex				
Verieble	Male	Female			
TJTO-related variables			•		
Economically disedventaged	-2.35+ (.213)	-1.89+ [.154]	.		
Economically disadvantaged youth	. 87** (. 474)	.36 (.292)	Į.		
Rec'd AFDC in 1879	-1 43** (587)	-1 . 35+ (. 207)	•		
Youth target group member		(1357)			
*Y_PĚNI į	.98 (1,877)	.36 [.573]			
Youth target, group member		(10,0)			
•Y-PEN1 2	<i>-</i> 1.19 (1.414)	13 (.193)			
AFDC *A_PEMI	~48.32 (55.890)	28.53* (17.292)			
AFDC *A_PEN_2	812.25 (1045.771)	-811.96** {336.722}			
PENI	.04 (.032)	.05** (.024)			
PEN2	1.12 (6.026)	5.47 (4.572)			
Eligible * PENE _t	12,65 (48,502)	25.17 (18.326)			
Personal characteristics					
Age	_21 + (_053)	. . 8+ (.040)			
Blacks	- . 52+ (. 067)	17*** (.055)			
Other norwhites	59+ (.105)	20** (_085)			
Normerriad, with childrenb	29+ (.055)	20+ (.051)			
Married, no childrenb	. 87+ (. 075)	40+ (_057)			
Married, childrenb	.93+ (.061)	-1.78+ (.049)			
Lug (Income) in 1979	.2 3+ (. 027)	.30+ (.022)			
Grade completed t-1	.05+ (.008)	.08+ (.007)			
Currently enrolled	-1.01 + (.042)	73+ (.037)			
Central cityC	 07 (.052)	.01 (.041)			
NonSHEAC	- . 08 (.052)	05 (.038)			
State employment characteristics					
Per cepita CETA ₄₀₇₀	003 (_005)	003 (.004)	-		
Per cepite ES ₁₉₇₉	03 (.021)	.04** (.016)			
Unemployment rete ₁₉₈₀	10** (.018)	65+ (.014)			
Ave. mfg. wage _{logg}	.00 (.002)	.00* (.002)			
Employment growth 1980	2.51 (1.140)	30 (.864)			
Sample eize	19,781d	21.526d			
Emp = 1	15,847 (P≈.8062)	12,791 (P=_5942)			
R2	_178	12,781 (P=_5842) _137			

Notes:

#Omitted group is whites bOmitted group is normarried males with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents dRendom sample of #80

*eignificant at less than .10 level **aignificant at less than .05 level ***rignificant at less than .01 level +eignificant at less than .001 level







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ODEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT
OF TUTO ON CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LIKELIHOOD (1980), BY RACE
(Stendard errors in perentheses)

	Race					
Verieble	Nor	whitee	Wh	nitee		
TiTO-related variebles						
Economically disadventaged	-2,40+	(.025)	-2.02+	[.148]		
Economically disadventaged youth Rec'd AFDC in 1979	.88**	(.439)	.55*	[.294]		
Youth target group member	-1 . 38+	(.352)	-1.30 +	(.234)		
* Y_PEM11880	05	(2021	0.5	/ 700 3		
Youth terget group member	.35	(.757)	.05	[.733]		
• Y_ PENI 21980	12	(.240)	- 46	(000)		
AFDC * A_FEM11980	29.17	[29.499]	15 8.46	(.299)		
AFDC + A_FEN21980		574.225)		(20.813) (397.135)		
PEM 4 peo	*09**	(.047)	-517.01 -03	[.022]		
PEN21000	17.99*	[9.427]	3.85	[4.017]		
PENC1980 EL 1g1 ble + PENC1980	33.89	(28.080)	29.05	(23.237)		
		,,,		,,,		
Personal characteristics						
Age	.46+	(.085)	.35+	(.034)		
Female, normarried, no childrens	.00	[.114]	.05	(.049)		
remote, normerries, chitgrens	1 5	[.108]	13 ^{**}	(.054)		
Female, merried, no childrene	70+	[.184]	36+	(.056)		
Femele, merried, childrens	93+	(.111)	-1.87+	[.044]		
Male, normerried, children ^a Male, merried, no children ^a	21	(.128)	28+	(.057)		
Male, merried, childrens	.82+	[.226]	.84+	(.079)		
Log (Income)	.89+ .37~	[.147]	.91+	(.061)		
Grade	.874 .11÷	[.844]	.25+	(.019)		
Enrolled Currently	•11 ⁺ 76 +	(.015) (.072)	.06+ 87+	(.006) (.030)		
Central Cityb	/ B ·	(.082)	02	(.035)		
Non SNSAb	~.07	(.100)	05	(.032)		
	.07	(1100)	-100	[#UDE]		
State emcloyment characteristics						
Per cepite CETA ₁₉₇₉	.011	(.007)	008**	(.004)		
Per cepite ES ₁₉₇₉	~.04	(.042)	.01	(.015)		
Unemployment retained	01	(.033)	07+	(.012)		
Ave. mfg. wege ₁₉₈₀	00	(.005)	.00	(.002)		
Employment growth 1990	7.38+	(1.992)	41	(.742)		
Sample eize	- ~	70-	00 00	0-		
Engri	5,2		36,021	- -		
72 ·	3,U .2	93 (№.58 59)	20,649 .18	5 (P=.7118)		
***	• €	00	.185	J		

**Omitted group is nonmerried meles with no children. **Domitted group is SMSA, not central city residents. **CRandom sample of .70



^{*}rignificant et less than .10 level **eignificant et less than .05 level ***eignificant et less than .01 level +eignificant et less than .001 level

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females than for males. As was the case in earlier exhibits, the signs of the coefficients on PEN2 are positive, but the coefficients are not significant. Two major differences between the sexes in the results shown in Exhibit IV-9 are in the coefficients on the welfare eligibility-welfare penetration rate interactions and on youth eligibility. The results for females for the welfare eligibility-penetration rate interactions fit well the expected quadratic relationship indicating decreasing returns to additional vouchers. However for males, the signs are precisely reverse of what was expected. The positive youth eligibility effect was much stronger for males than females. Other differences in the coefficient estimates can be observed for the per capita Employment Service variable (positive for females; negative for males) and the employment growth rate (large positive for males, essentially zero for females.)

In Exhibit IV-10, we observe that the coefficient on PEN2 for nonwhites is positive and significant, while it is positive but not significant for whites. This suggests that nonwhites exhibit greater employment impacts than whites. Among the state employment characteristic variables, it can be seen that per capita CETA tended to reduce the employment likelihood of whites among the target groups, as did the state unemployment rate. On the other hand, the annual average employment growth seemed to have a bigger effect on nonwhites.

The similarity of coefficients on the TJTC-related variables between the estimates from the 1980 data and the 1984 data despite major changes in program administration suggest that the model initially discussed in Chapter 2 which calls for pooling the 3 years of data may be appropriate. We turn to the econo-

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3. DISPLACEMENT ESTIMATES USING POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA

The final set of estimates calculated to examine whether displacement occurs as a result of TJTC relies on the model specified in equation (2) in chapter II. That is, data from the 1979, 1980, and 1984 CPS files were merged and the coefficients on the TJTC-related variables were assumed to be constant over time.

Two estimation strategies were followed. The first corresponded closely to the models reported in all of the exhibits previously discussed--that is logit estimation was used. Use of the combined 3-year sample of about 150,000 adults, aged 18-35, and use of 50 state dummies could not be accomplished with our Logit software/hardware configuration, so the first strategy was to estimate the logit without the state dummies (but with time dummies) over a random 25 percent subsample. Exhibit IV-11 provides those results. The dependent variable is current year employment likelihood. As the exhibit indicates, the coefficient on PEN2 and Eligible*PEN2 are very small relative to their standard errors. The main effect for PEN1 was positive and significant, however. This suggests that vouchering has an employment creation benefit. The eligibility effects, however, corresponded to the pattern discussed previously in which being a disadvantaged youth had a positive impact on employment likelihood, while being eligible because of receiving AFDC was stigmatizing.

The second strategy was to use OLS to estimate the model of employment likelihood using a random .80 sample. In Exhibit IV-12, we provide those estimates. The left hand column in the Exhibit provides the coefficient estimates for the model without any of the state dummy variables, while the right hand column has estimated for the full model. In the former case, the coefficients on PEN2 and Eligible*PEN2 are positive, while somewhat



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COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON PROBABILITY OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT USING FOOLED DATA FROM 1879, 1880, AND 1884 (Standard errors in parentheses)

Veriable	Coefficient			
TJTC related veriables				
Economically disadvantaged	-2.05+	(.117)		
Economically disadvantaged youth	.84+	(.190)		
Received AFDC _{b-1}	-1.21+	(.106)		
Youth target group mamber		(1.00)		
*Y_PEN1	45	(.779)		
Youth target group member	•	(1000)		
* Y_PEN12.	09	(.398)		
AFDC A_FENT.	.49	(2.535)		
AFDC *A_PEM12.	.14	(5.43B)		
PEM t	.10+	(.030)		
PEN2.	1,69	(1.842)		
Eligible PEN2_t	2.33	(8.530)		
Personal characteristics				
\ge	_38+	(.034)		
Black®	- 27+	(.045)		
Other, nomehite@	- 38+	(.073)		
Female, normarried, to childrenb	-10**	(-047)		
Female, normarried, childrenb	18+	(.051)		
Female, merried, no childrenb	- 29+	(.057)		
emale, married, childrenb	-1.65+	(.044)		
Male, unmerried, childrenb	32+	(.056)		
Mele, merried, no childrenb	.86+	(.081)		
Mele, married, childrenb	.93+	(.060)		
.og (income)	.28+	(.018)		
irade	.07+	(.006)		
inrolled currently	82+	(.030)		
Centrel city¢	.03	(.033)		
IonSIBAC	.02	(.032)		
itate employment characteristics				
Per cepita JTPA.	003	(.004)		
er cepite EB _{t-1}	01*	(.007)		
nemployment rate.	- 07+	(.010)		
verege manufacturing wage.	00	(.001)		
ployment growth;	2,63+	(.804)		
emple eize	95.	1 <i>9</i> 6d		
mployment = 1		441 (P = .6948)		
e	,	188		

Notes:

eOmitted group is whitee bOmitted group is nonmarried meles with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents dRandom sample of _25

*significant et less than "10 level **significant et less than "05 level ***significant et less than "01 level +significant et less than "001 level



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OLS COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR A MODEL OF THE IMPACT OF TUTC ON PROBABILITY OF CURRENT EMPLOYMENT USING POOLED DATA (Standard errors in perentheses)

Veriable	Mode (No state	ol 1 veriables)	Model 2 (State dumnies)		
TUTC related variables					
Economically disadventeged	36+	[.010]	35	[.010]	
Economically disadventaged youth	.08	(.015)	55 -10	(.015)	
Received AFDC	20+	[.010]	21	(.101)	
Youth terget group member*	ILU.	(1010)	-,21	[.101]	
* Y_PEM	04	[.052]	05	[_052]	
Youth target group member	-,04	(.002)	05	["nos]	
* Y_PEM2	00	(.01 9)	04	(040)	
AFDC FA PENT.	- . 28	(.018) (.227)	.01	(.019)	
AFDC + A PENT2.	- <u>.</u> 28	(. 22/) (. 526)	13	(.227)	
PEM	.01+	[.003]	.30	(.528)	
PEIR	.014 .15		.01**	[.003]	
Eligible * PEN2.	.15 .18	(.179)	41*	(.220)	
crigible . PERE	,16	[.749]	03	[.748]	
Personal characteristics					
Age	.08+	(.003)	. 08+	[.003]	
Black®	05+	(.004)	06+	f.0051	
Other noswhites	07+	(.007)	07+	(-007)	
Female, normarried, no childrenb	.02+	[.004]	.02+	(.004)	
Female, normarried, childrenb	04+	(.D05)	04+	(.005)	
Female, married, no childrenb	05+	(.005)	05+	(.005)	
Femele, married, childrenb	33+	[.004]	33+	(.004)	
Mele, nonmerried, childrenb	08+	(_006)	06+	(.006)	
Mele, married, no childrenb	-09+	(.005)	.09+	[.006]	
Mole, merried, childrenb	-09+	(.0 04)	-09+	[.004]	
Log (Income)	.05+	(.002)	_05+	(.002)	
Brede	.01+	(.001)	_01+	(.002) (.001)	
Enrolled currently	15+	(.00 3)	15+	(.003)	
Central cityc	00	[.003]	15 ⁺	(.003)	
NonSMSAC	00	(.003)	00 00	(.003)	
······································	,00	(1000)	00	(.003)	
State employment veriables				_	
CETA/JTPA _t	0003	(.0003)	0004	(.0005)	
ES.	-,002+	(.001)	003+	(,001)	
Uršte _t	01+	(_ 001)	007+	(,001)	
Meget	~. 00	(. 000)	.00	(.000)	
Employment growth	.35+	(.058)	.22***	(1086)	
Semple eize	112.	522d	112.5	22d	
R ²		217		18	

Notees

eOmitted group is whitee bOmitted group is nonmerried meles with no children cOmitted group is SMSA, not central city residents dRendom sample of "80

*significant et lese then "10 level **eignificant et lese then "05 level ***significant et lese then "01 level +significant et lese then "001 level



inexplicably, the impact becomes negative and significant for the full model. The eligibility effects are again positive for youth and negative for the AFDC target group, while the vouchering effect indicated by the coefficients on the eligibility-PEN1 interaction terms are essentially zero.

In the next chapter of the report, we attempt to synthesize all the results to arrive at a conclusion about employment displacement by TJTC.



V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The estimates presented in the exhibits in the previous chapter can be used to draw conclusions about the effects of TJTC on the likelihood of employment of target group and noneligible individuals. It should be emphasized that models were estimated with alternative data sources that contain completely different calls and pertain to different years. Because the TJTC program evolved over the years after its inception in 1978, the data sources used here should capture alternative impacts in employment likelihood.

Two alternative models were estimated—one that assumed that the impacts of TJTC were basically stable over time and which controlled for time and state variation through a fixed effects methodology and one that assumed that the impacts of TJTC changed over time. The empirical results seem to support the assumption of stable impacts over time, at least for the target groups analyzed hyre—disadvantaged youth and welfary recipients.

As presented in chapter II, there were three main focuses of the analyses. First, we tested hypotheses about the signs of the coefficients in the two models. Second, by assuming that the point estimates were valid, we calculated the impact of TJTC vouchering and certification on an individual's probability of employment. We entitled this calculation the program effect. Firally, we argued that the model estimates can be used to calculate net jcb creation (or loss) in the entire population.

In Exhibit V-1, we present the results of the hypotheses tests. The first set of tests examine the effect of eligibility for TJTC and our hypothesis was of indeterminate sign because employer stigma may cause decreased likelihoods of employment, or the tax credit may cause employers to attempt to hire individuals for target groups. A consistent result is that the



V-1

EXHIBIT V-1 Employment and Training Administration SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTS

Current or previous year			Target	Hy po the se s.							
				Eligibility effect:	Vouchering effect:		Voucher employment expension or displacement	Certification effect	Certification employment expension or displacement	Reference	
empl (oyment —	Year	Population	Group	a 5 ^{>} <0	a ₃ >0,	e ₄ <0	a 6><0	e ₇ >0	a 8><0	Table
Curr	ent	1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfare	<0+	>0 >0	<0 <0	>0**	>0***	<0	IV-1
Prev	lous Year	1983	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfere	<0 <0+	>0 >0	<0 <0	<0	>0***	>₽	IV-1
Curre	ent	1984	Aged 18-35; Males	Youth Welfare	>0 <0**	>0 <0	<0 >0	>0	>0+	<0	IA-5
Curre	ent	1984	Aged 18-35; Females	Youth Welfere	>0 <0+	>0 >0	<0 <0	>0 **	>0 *	<0	IV-2
	ious Year	1983	Aged 18-35; Females	Youth Welfare	<0 <0	>0 <0	<0 >0	>0	>0	<0	IA-3
Curre	en t	1980	ad 1 8- 35ء ،	Youth Walfare	>0 ** <0+	>0 >0	<0**	>0**	>0 *	>0	IV-9
Curr	ent	1980	Aged 18-35; Males	Youth Welfere	>0** <0**	>0 <0	<0 >0	>0	>0	>0	IV-9
Curre	ent	1980	Aged 18-35; Females	Youth Welfare	> 0 <0+	>0 >0	<0 <0	>0**	>0	>0	IV-9
Curre (Logi		1979 , 1990 1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfare	>0+ <0+	<0 >0	<0 >0	>0+	>0	>0	IV-11
	ent (OLS etete iee)	1979, 1980 1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfere	>0+ <0+	<0 <0	>0 <0	>0 ⁺⁺	<0	<0+	I V -12



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^{*}eignificant at less than .10 level *eignificant at less than .05 level *e*eignificant at less than .01 level +eignificant at less than .001 level

welfare eligibility effect is negative—it is negative and statistically significant in every row of Exhibit V—1. The disadvantaged youth eligibility effect is less clear. It is positive and significant for 1380 and for the pooled data, but from the 1984 CPS, the sign is unstable and not significant. These results suggest that eligible youth were helped by eligibility during the program's initial years, but this advantage has vanished. These effects are consistent with the eligibility study is the Short—run Impacts Report.

The next two hypotheses shown in the exhibit pertain to vouchering. Our hypotheses were that the vouchering effects on eligibles would net out to be positive but would have a negative quadratic term indicating decreasing returns to vouchering. This was indeed the typical case, but the coefficients generally did not attain statistical significance. The displacement effect of vouchering, represented by a₆ in our models, was generally positive, implying employment stimulation.

The a7 coefficient represented the impact of certification on target group members and our expectation was that this would be positive since, in fact, certification implies employment. The results strongly substantiated the expected positive impact for the TJTC eligible population. The displacement effect of certification on the general population did not have a consistent sign nor significance.

The program effects and estimates of overall employment generation are shown in Exhibit V-2. It can be seen in that exhibit that among <u>eligibles</u>, TJTC had a fairly sizable positive impact on employment likelihoods. The increases were on the order of 10 percentage points. The program effect for noneligibles was positive (but small) in most cases, implying no

Employment and Training Administration
SUMMARY OF PREDICTED PROGRAM EFFECTS AND JOB CREATION

Current or previous year employment		Population	Terget Group		ed progrem ect on:	Job creation	Reference Teble
				Eligibles	Non-eligibles	or (loss)	
Current	1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfare	.12 .11	.008	340,000	IV-1
Previous year	1983	Aged 18-35	Youth Wolfere	.13 .06	•005	147,000	IV-1
Current	1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Wolfers	.12 .07	•002	44,000	IA - 5
Current	1984	Aged 18-35; Melee	Youth Welfere	.11 .1;	. D11	230,000	I V- 2
Previous year	1983	Aged 18-35; Femeles	Youth Welfere	.19 .04	001	55,000	IV-3
Current	1980	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfere	.06 .09	.011	310,000	IV-8
Current	1980	Aged 18-35; Male	Youth Welfara	.04 07	.004	50,000	1 V-9
Current	1980	Aged 18-35; Female	Youth Welfare	.09 .11	.016	300,000	
Current (Logit)	1979, 1980, 1984	Aged 18-35	Truth welfore	01 .02	.007	180,000	IV-11
Current (OLS with etate dummica)	1979, 1980, 1984	Aged 18-35	Youth Welfere	01 01	002	(62,000)	IV-12

net displacement of noneligibles by eligibles. The overall job creation estimates were typically on the order of 200,000 - 300,000 additional persons employed. Most of the additional employment accrued to noneligibles, however.

In summary, the analyses here, which could be said to reflect a full, general equilibrium impact evaluation of TJTC presents considerable evidence suggesting (1) no displacement of noneligibles by certified workers and (2) small positive levels of net job creation, although this result is tenuous and, in magnitude, represents a minority of total overall certifications.



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