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ABSTRACT

A study of non-Hispanic attitudes about bilingual education had two goals: (1) to apply symbolic politics theory to bilingual education and (2) to test the theory's assumption that the symbolic meaning of an attitude object determines which symbolic predisposition it evokes. A national sample of 1,170 non-Hispanics were surveyed via telephone interview about two versions of bilingual education: cultural maintenance and English-as-a-second-language (ESL). There were five main findings: (1) symbolic meaning influenced support for bilingual education, with cultural maintenance drawing the least support; (2) personal experience and self-interest (potential impact on one's children, personal experience with bilingualism, and living in substantially Hispanic areas) had little effect on support; (3) symbolic predispositions had substantial effects on support, particularly symbolic racism, as did attitudes about foreign language instruction and government spending in general; (4) symbolic meaning and symbolic predispositions interacted, with the cultural maintenance version of bilingual education most likely to evoke symbolic racism; and (5) living in an area with numerous Hispanics increased the tendency to evaluate the cultural maintenance plan in terms of symbolic racism. Since the last had little to do with parental variable, it is interpreted as more a case of symbolic group threat than of realistic personal threat or self-interest. (MSE)

Bilingual Education:

Symbolic Meaning and Support among Non-Hispanics

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Abstract

The goals of this study were twofold: (1) to apply symbolic politics theory to the case of bilingual education, and (2) to test an assumption of that theory, that the symbolic meaning of an attitude object determines which symbolic predispositions it evokes. The database was a national sample of non-Hispanics. Symbolic meaning was experimentally manipulated: the primary comparison being between cultural maintenance and ESL versions of bilingual education. There were five main findings: (1) Symbolic meaning influenced support for bilingual education: cultural maintenance drew the least, and ESL the most; (2) Personal experience and self-interest (defined in terms of a potential impact on one's children, personal experience with bilingualism, and living in areas with substantial numbers of Hispanics) had little effect on support; (3) Symbolic predispositions had substantial effects on support, particularly symbolic racism, as did attitudes toward foreign language instruction and government spending in general; (4) Symbolic meaning and symbolic predispositions interacted: the cultural maintenance version of bilingual education was most likely to evoke symbolic racism; (5) Living in an area with numerous Hispanics increased the tendency to evaluate the cultural maintenance plan in terms of symbolic racism; since this had little to do with parental variables, it was interpreted as more a case of symbolic group threat than of realistic personal threat or self-interest.

Symbolic Politics

The notion of symbolic politics has appeared in many guises in theory and research on mass political behavior. Much of the research on political socialization investigated children's learning of affects toward specific symbols, such as the flag, the President, the monarchy, the national anthem, their parents' political party, national enemies, racial outgroups, and so on (e.g., Easton & Dennis, 1969; Lambert & Klineberg, 1967; Sears, 1975). This preadult learning presumably left such persisting residues as party identification, nationalism, racial and ethnic prejudices, and attachment to various symbols of the nation and regime (Elder & Cobb, 1983; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980).

In adulthood, these residues could be activated by relevant symbols in the political environment, to stimulate a wide variety of political behaviors. Election campaigns make partisan symbols salient, activating party identification (Converse, 1962). The regime might manipulate national symbols to induce loyalty and patriotism (Edelman, 1971). Protestors might manipulate symbols that would evoke symbolic protests (Sears & McConahay, 1973; Sears & Citrin, 1985; Gusfield, 1963) or pro- and anti-civil libertarian forces might manipulate symbols of disliked groups such as the Communists or the KKK or those of democratic principles to forward their respective aims (Sullivan et al, 1982; Zellman & Sears, 1971).

As common as such ideas have been in the political behavior literature, no one theory of symbolic politics has been formalized or tested systematically. Some useful macropolitical overviews have been developed, synthesizing existing data (e.g., Elder & Cobb, 1983; Edelman, 1964; 1971). Some have drawn on notions of symbolic politics to inform qualitative case studies of political phenomena (e.g., Gusfield, 1963). And numerous

empirical studies have been conducted within the loose framework of symbolic politics (e.g., Sears et al, 1980; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Sullivan et al, 1982). But for the most part this work has chosen to remain close to the data and has not attempted to push forward with theory development.

Some recent work has gone in this more theoretical direction, however. Variations in attitude objects have been analyzed as determinants of the persistence of basic predispositions (Sears, 1983). A simple symbolic politics theory has been contrasted with a more cognitive variant, drawing additional assumptions from work on social cognition (Sears, Huddy, & Schaffer, 1986). The central purpose of this paper is to extend this work, explicitly focusing on variations in the symbolic meaning of a particular attitude object. The empirical study deals with bilingual education as an attitude object.

The symbolic politics approach revolves most centrally around four central points.[1] First, it assumes that attitudes primarily reflect the affects previously conditioned to the specific symbols included in the attitude object. Second, these affects toward various attitude objects may vary in strength, depending upon the strength of prior learning. The strongest have been called "symbolic predispositions" to connote their particular persistence and power. In contemporary American politics, these presumably include party identification, racial prejudice, and nationalism, as well as liberal or conservative self-designations, evaluations of various groups, and values such as individualism, egalitarianism, and post-materialism. Third, when an object includes multiple symbols, the net affect toward the total object should reflect some simple linear combination of the affects toward the constituent symbols. For example, affects toward "forced busing to integrate whites and blacks" would depend upon affects

toward such symbols as "force," "busing," "integration," and "blacks." Fourth, a symbolic politics approach assumes that such strong affective responses are more likely to control such cognitive variables as perception, expectation, reasoning, and attributions of causality (as in such processes as selective perception, wishful thinking, rationalization, or "self-serving attributional biases"), than that cognition controls these affective responses.

There are two key variables in a symbolic politics analysis, then. Presumably each individual possesses a variety of longstanding symbolic predispositions, each of which can potentially be evoked by relevant symbols. And the symbols contained within any given attitude object -- that is, the symbolic meaning in the attitude object -- will determine which symbolic predisposition is evoked. Therefore varying an attitude object's symbolic meaning should affect the relative weights of various relevant symbolic predispositions in generating attitudes toward it.[2]

Previous research on symbolic politics has shown that differences in the symbolic meaning of attitude objects evoke different symbolic predispositions. At a relatively obvious level, Sears et al (1980) showed that anti-busing attitudes were influenced most by racial prejudice while support for national health insurance was influenced more by party identification. More subtlely, Conover and Feldman (1981) showed that the affects toward the labels "liberal" and "conservative" are influenced by quite different group evaluations.

But such findings have not been pursued in depth. A more interesting question is the extent to which varying the symbolic meaning of a <u>given</u> attitude object affects which symbolic predisposition it evokes, and their relative weights. A great deal of money is spent in electoral politics

trying to sell voters on a particular symbolic meaning for a given issue or event or personality. But it may be very difficult to make substantial changes in meaning; a political rose may be a political rose by any other name. For example, Sears and Citrin (1985) found, as have many others, that presenting the attitude object "government spending" in terms of two quite different symbolic meanings led to radically different levels of public support. A strong majority prefers "smaller government" while an equally strong majority prefers the opposite -- the same or increased spending levels -- when asked about a variety of specific program areas. Despite the impact of varied symbolic meaning on the level of public support for government spending, affects toward the two versions of the same attitude object were predicted by very similar symbolic predispositions. So it is not self-evident that different symbolic meanings of a common attitude object will evoke different symbolic predispositions.

The present study therefore is intended to go beyond previous studies of symbolic politics by testing whether experimentally varying the symbolic meaning of an issue produces differences in the content, and weight, of symbolic predispositions linked to issue positions. This provides some assessment of the potential manipulability of the mass public by attempts to control the symbolic meaning of a particular issue.

A theory is of value in part to the extent that it makes predictions contrary to those of other theories. The symbolic politics theory has most often been contrasted with utilitarian, rational-actor theories. These latter make two assumptions contrary to the symbolic politics approach, that individuals' preferences are rooted in egocentric concerns, and that they process information in a rational, logical manner (Kiewiet, 1983).

Many theories assume that direct personal experiences have more impact upon the individual's thinking and behavior than do more distal experiences, and/or those mediated by other modalities of experience, such as interpersonal contacts or mass media (see McGuire, 1969; Tyler, 1981). Sometimes the relevant experiences are thought to be those in the past and they are thought to be so vivid and powerful that they receive special weight in the individual's thinking. An example is the assumption that a people that has experienced a terrible war, such as the Soviets in World War II, will therefore go to great lengths to avoid future wars. On other occasions a future-oriented self-interest assumption is made, of a rational egoistic calculus. The individual forms opinions instrumental to obtaining material goods for the self in the future.

The symbolic politics approach, in contrast, views current political attitudes as generated by the symbolic similarity of current attitude objects to longstanding predispositions. It does not necessarily assume that past experiences that were personal and proximal have greater weight in the learning process. And it would assume that calculations about current, possible momentary self interests are largely irrelevant to that process. Therefore, much research stimulated by the symbolic politics approach has contrasted the influence of symbolic predispositions with that of self-interest (e.g., Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Since self-interest is by itself a complex and multifaceted matter, these studies have focused on it and have given relatively little attention to developing the implications of a symbolic politics theory.

A related category of relevant theories concern group conflict. These theories generally spring from a larger perspective that has been described

as "realistic group conflict" theories (Levine & Campbell, 1973). They center on the idea that opposition to policies benefitting one group is based in real conflicts of interest with other groups. In some forms of group conflict theory, it is presumed that people accurately perceive these real and absolute conflicts of interest, and act on those realistic perceptions (Rothbart, 1976). In other forms, the focus is on subjectively assessed relative levels of deprivation, sometimes involving deprivation of the self, and on other occasions, perceptions that one's group is deprived (Runciman, 1966). Either way, the critical variables are perceptions of conflicts of interest within competitive intergroup relationships.

In many treatments of group conflict theory, several different elements are confounded. Sometimes the interests at stake affect the individual, but sometimes they affect the group as a whole but not the individual in question. That is, sometimes self-interest is involved, and other times group-interest is at stake. Second, the interests at stake may affect the individual's own group, or the competing group, or both. That is, the ingroup's interests or the outgroup's interests may be at stake, or both. The former two instances are most appropriately described as cases of group interest, reserving the term group conflict for the case in which there is a genuine zero-sum, competitive relationship between the outcomes of the two groups in question.[3]

"Rational actor" theories also generate predictions contrary to the symbolic politics approach. These depict the individual as responding in a calculated manner based on thoughtful perceptions, expectancies, and attributions; e.g., to perceptions of the costs and benefits of various alternatives (e.g., McLendon, 1985), to the product of value and expectancy (Feather, 1982; Edwards, 1954; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), to assessments of

outcome (Fiorina, 1981), or on the basis of attributions of causality about political and social events (Brody & Sniderman, 1976; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). The symbolic politics view is that such cognitive variables are themselves evoked by symbols; e.g., expectations that busing will expose white children to crime in minority neighborhoods are evoked by the symbols of busing and minorities. Thus the strong form of a symbolic politics theory would predict that such cognitive variables would themselves be strongly influenced by the affects evoked by such symbols, rather than having major independent influences themselves.

The same argument would hold for the cognitive biases emphasized by research and theory on social cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Lau & Sears, 1986). The symbolic politics view should be that affective predispositions are triggered by cognitive content, and would override the effects of cognitive biases.

A second purpose of the paper, then, is to extend previous comparisons of symbolic politics theory with self-interest and group conflict theories, in particular, to a new case: the case of bilingual education.

Bilingual Education

The American educational system is currently confronting a new challenge as thousands of children enter schools annually with limited or no English-speaking abilities. Changing immigration patterns are largely responsible for this change, and the trend seems likely to accelerate, if anything, over the next few decades. It has been estimated that by the year 2000 the Hispanic and Asian populations in the United States will have increased by 84 and 103 percent respectively (CCSCE, 1982). Continuing

increases in non-English speaking students will place still further pressure on schools and the education system in general.

There is widespread concern that the traditional educational approach in the United States instruction in English places non-English speaking students at a disadvantage. Bilingual education programs have been developed as a possible solution for language minority students. In its most basic form, bilingual education simply refers to the use of two languages as media of instruction. The assumption that languages other than English are valid and necessary media of instruction is something of a change in the philosophy of American education (Saville & Troike, 1971; Cardenas, 1984), receiving official legislative sanction in the 1967 Bilingual Education Act (Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act).

But bilingual education as actually implemented is not such a simple attitude object as this instruction-in-two-languages definition would suggest. There are in fact three quite different general types of programs (although actual programs are frequently some combination of these three): (a) maintenance, (b) transitional, and (c) English as a second language (ESL). These three approaches reflect quite different philosophical orientations to the teaching of limited-English and non-English speaking students. In the "maintenance" version both English and mother tongue are used to teach all or most subject matters. This stresses the development of oral and literacy skills in English, while also maintaining these skills in the native language. In the "transitional" method the native language is only used as a medium of instruction until sufficient English is learned to teach solely in the latter. ESL uses no native language and is basically intensive instruction in English. The transitional and ESL approach stress the goal of teaching the student English, with no attention to mother tongue

preservation. Not surprisingly, the maintenance version has generated the most controversy, but it has in fact been much less frequently implemented than either transitional or ESL programs (Cardoza & Purviance, 1984).

While bilingual education programs have become a legally mandated reality within schools, their level of public support is unclear. There has been much speculation that the general public is opposed to anything other than educational instruction in English. The defeat of bilingual ballots in a 1984 California statewide election, in a state with large numbers of ethnic minorities, would seem to suggest widespread public opposition to official multilingualism in the United States. If such opposition generalized to bilingual education programs, it could have major consequences for their survival. The subsequent flourishing of the "English-only" movement in the United States suggests that language issues in general, and bilingual education in particular, have become highly charged symbolic political issues (Dyste, 1987).

The handful of existing studies on the mass public's attitudes do not suggest such powerful opposition, however. For example, a 1980 Gallup poll indicated that the American public generally favored bilingual education as a teaching technique (Gallup, 1980), as did a later survey by Cole (1983). Even stronger support has been found among parents with children in bilingual programs (Adorno, 1973; Boyer, 1972; Carrillo, 1973; Gutierrez, 1972; Mosley, 1969; Sutherland, 1975; Thomas, 1976).

Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that the American public strongly supports the development and implementation of bilingual education programs. Results from existing surveys need to be interpreted cautiously, most notably because there is widespread public ignorance about bilingual education. While it is a moderately salient issue among language minority

groups, particularly Hispanics, it is not for the American public in general (Gallup, 1980; Cole, 1983). Prevalent public ignorance about bilingual education creates a problem for assessing public support. It brings into question both t .ability and the generalizatility of support estimates. While the public will voice their opinions on issues which they know little or nothing about, these are effectively non-attitudes, and are both highly unstable over time and inconsistent with other attitudes (Converse, 1975; Schuman & Presser, 1981). Thus before implications about current or future public support for bilingual education are drawn from existing public opinion studies, the prevalence of non-attitudes in the general public needs to be ascertained.

In short, a reliable estimate of current public support for bilingual education programs can be obtained only by addressing the problems of public ignorance and program diversity (and thus diversity in symbolic meaning) that plague earlier public opinion studies. But the need for educational programs for non-English speaking children will be even greater in the future than it is now. Thus it is important not only to assess current levels of program support, but to estimate future trends in public support as well.

A symbolic politics analysis would begin with the symbols in the attitude object that evoke longstanding predispositions. Thus the symbolism contained in the attitude object, bilingual education, is a key variable. Bilingual education programs in fact vary tremendously. Given the multiplicity of languages and educational techniques involved, differences between programs are considerable. Public opinion studies, to date, have not explored reactions to all the extant versions of bilingual education. Bilingual education can be portrayed in widely different symbolic terms: e.g., as simply an educational device like spelling tests or chemistry labs,

as a helping hand to immigrants eager to join the American mainstream, or as a mechanism for perpetuating and institutionalizing divisive foreign practices and the end of the "melting pot." Thus it is important to clarify what the public supports or opposes, by assessing support for the major different types of bilingual education, in terms of their inherent symbolism.

The second component of a symbolic politics theory focuses on the symbolic predispositions evoked by the attitude object. In previous research, for example, support for busing depended upon racial attitudes and political ideology (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Allen, 1984; Sears, Hensler & Speer, 1979), support for national health insurance, upon ideology and party identification (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980), and support for tax and spending reduction, upon racial attitudes, ideology, and party identification (Sears & Citrin, 1985). Bilingual education might evoke various predispositions, depending on the perceived meaning of the attitude object. Presumably among them would be (1) nationalistic responses to new immigrants; and/or (2) prejudices against domestic minorities such as Hispanics, or even blacks (Kinder & Sears, 1981); and (3) support for government spending in general or the schools in particular, based partly in political ideology and party identification (Sears & Citrin, 1985).

Specific Hypotheses

This paper, then, aims both to extend the reach of a symbolic politics theory and to apply it to the case of bilingual education. The specific hypotheses are three:

(1) Affects toward a particular political symbol depend on its symbolic meaning. In this study. meaning is varied in two ways: the respodents' spontaneous meaning -- what they think bilingual education is -- is assessed,

and symbolic meaning is experimentally varied as well. We hypothesized that the highly politicized cultural maintenance version of bilingual education would be opposed more than the benign ESL approach.

(2) Symbolic predispositions would have more influence over support for bilingual education than would self-interest, or other indicators of personal experience with the issue. In particular, we hypothesized that anti-minority attitudes would be a central determinant of opposition to bilingual education.

(3) Symbolic meaning and symbolic predispositions would interact in their effects upon support for bilingual education. Different symbolic meanings would elicit different predispositions. We expected that the cultural maintenance version would evoke anti-minority attitudes in particular, so that they would have more weight in determining support for bilingual education with that symbolic meaning.

The study focuses exclusively on the attitudes of the non-Hispanic mass public, for two reasons. First, the political fortunes of bilingual education ultimately rest in the hands of the non-Hispanic majority. Second, because Hispanics are the primary consumers of bilingual education, their attitudes toward the issue will probably have a very different basis than that of non-Hispanics; that analysis, and comparison, is beyond the scope of this project. Additionally a number of studies have already described the existing support for bilingual education within the Hispanic community (Adorno, 1973; Carrillo, 1973; Gutierrez, 1972; Mosley, 1969; Sutherland, 1975; Thomas, 1976).

Samples

The main database was a survey of a national U.S. probability sample consisting of 1,170 interviews of non-Hispanics. The screening question used

was "what do you consider your main ethnic group or nationality to be?" This national sample covered the 48-state continental U.S. It was stratified by census region, within census region by state, and within state by metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The interviews were apportioned to each subareas according to the 1980 U.S. Census count of households (proportionate-to-size -- pps -- household). The interviewing was done by Market Opinion Research by telephone during the summer of 1983.

As indicated above, one major alternative to the symbolic politics hypothesis is that opposition to bilingual education stems from feelings of threat about the encroachment of immigrants speaking foreign tongues. The majority of bilingual education programs are concerned with Hispanic children and the teaching of English and Spanish. So a sense of threat could derive either from the direct self-interest of non-Hispanic parents concerned about its impact on their own children's education, or the more diffuse sense of threat experienced by non-parents in areas of heavy and/or growing Hispanic concentration. Although Hispanics are presumably the main potential source of such threat, they are mostly concentrated in a few areas of the nation. To test such hypotheses therefore required some departure from a pure national sample. To ensure a sufficiently large group in areas of Hispanic concentration, an oversample from areas containing such concentrations was drawn. Four areas were chosen: (a) Miami, Florida SMSA -- Dade County; (b) Los Angeles and San Diego Counties, California; (c) New York City -- Counties of the Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond; (d) San Antonio, Texas SMSA -- Counties of Bexar, Guadelope, Comal. The average number of Hispanics per 100 residents in the oversampled counties was 26.3, compared to 6.4 nationally in 1980 (U.S. Census, 1980). These four pps household oversamples contained 100 interviews each. Note that these areas do not contain

Hispanics of exactly the same background, with those of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Mexican origins dominating in the four areas, respectively.

Refusal rates were around 35 percent (651 refusals) and there were 115 terminations before 1570 completed interviews were obtained. The resulting sample was stratified by sex, making it evenly divided between men (N=786) and women (N=784). As is usual with telephone surveys of political opinion, the sample was demographically skewed primarily in terms of education. Forty-four percent had either graduated or completed some college, whereas the comparable 1985 census figure for non-Hispanic adults over 25 years is 33 percent. The median household income of respondents was the same as the 1980 national median, between $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Approximately equal numbers of heads of the household were involved in professional, managerial, clerical, and craft trades, and 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as the primary wage earner. The percentage of workers involved in managerial, professional, or clerical occupations was roughly comparable with 1985 Census Figures (58 percent vs. 55 percent). Respondents' median age was between 35 to 44 years, and 15 percent of the sample was over 65, again exactly corresponding to 1980 Census figures. Sixty-two percent of respondents were currently married, while 62 percent of men and 57 percent of women were married at the time of the 1980 Census. Twenty-two percent were single (never married), and the remaining 16 percent were divorced, widowed, or separated. More than half of the respondents had no children under 18 at home, and this rate was somewhat higher than for non-Hispanic families nationally (59 percent vs. 51 percent). The sample was comparable in ethnic composition to the nation (with the exception of Hispanics) with 12 percent identifying themselves as Black, as in the 1980 Census.

Opinionation without Information

The non-Hispanic public is relatively ignorant about the issue of bilingual education. Three indicators of information level were used. The first and most important is knowledge about bilingual education. The overwhelming majority of respondents (81 percent) mentioned Spanish as being the language first thought of in connection with bilingual education. The meaning of bilingual education was determined by answers to the open-ended question, "What is your impression of what bilingual education is?" This indicated only rudimentary knowledge, as shown in Table 1. Some 29 percent were unable to describe it at all. Many others were substantially inaccurate, referring vaguely to multiple languages, such as references to bilingualism in general (18 percent) or general foreign language instruction (21 percent). The remaining third of the sample were approximately accurate, giving responses such as teaching foreign students in their own language (6 percent), teaching in two languages (16 percent), or teaching English to foreign students (9 percent). Even in these substantially accurate last three categories, responses were divided quite diffusely among the various types of bilingual education in current use. Teaching foreign students in their own language was considered an accurate description of the goal of linguistic maintenance, and drew 6 percent. "Teaching in two languages" (16 percent) could also be included as the maintenance approach, although this latter could be confused with foreign language instruction: responses included statements such as "two languages used in the classroom," or "the teacher speaks two languages." Teaching English to foreign students (9 percent) was considered closest to a transitional or ESL approach.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

In short, a diffuse variety of meanings of the attitude object "bilingual education" exist in the non-Hispanic public. The great majority

feels it has something to do with English and at least one other language, and Spanish in particular, and about half feel it has to do with language instruction. But only about one-third capture the essence of the political debate -- teaching in two langauges, primarily Spanish and English (33 percent).

The second indicator of knowledge is a self-rating of how much thought the respondent had given the issue. Respondents in the national sample demonstrated only minimal interest, with the majority claiming to have thought either "none" (31 percent) or "a little" (24 percent). The rest claimed to have thought "some" (24 percent) or "a lot" (20 percent). Third, the interviewers assessed respondents' thoughtfulness about bilingual education. These assessments were more generous than respondents' self-ratings, with most of the sample described as having "very" (38 percent) or "fairly" (40 percent) "well thought out" ideas about the issue.

Overall, then, about 30 to 40 percent of the national sample had an approximately accurate definition of bilingual education, felt they had given it at least some thought, or were described as having well thought out ideas about it. At the other extreme, about one-third were unable to describe it at all and an equal number felt they had given it no thought at all. The middle third had thought some about it, but evidently knew little more about it than could be superficially inferred from the terms "bilingual" and "education."

Despite this lack of information about bilingual education, however, degree of opinionation was very high. Attitudes toward bilingual education was measured with seven items assessing general feelings toward bilingual education, perceptions of its efficacy in achieving assimilation, educational and job equity, among others, and feelings about spending on bilingual

programs (See Table 2). Respondents gave opinions quite freely. An average of 87 percent gave a definite opinion to each item; the average respondent provided an opinion to an average of 6.3 of the 7 attitude items about bilingual education. This fits the familiar pattern of high levels of political opinionation with relatively low levels of information (Converse, 1970; Lane & Sears, 1964).

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Support for Bilingual Education

Overall Level of Support

To assess the non-Hispanic public's support for bilingual education we used the seven basic attitude questions shown in Table 2. Two assessed overall evaluation of bilingual education, and five others, perceptions of its particular effects. As can be seen, a majority of those expressing an opinion were favorable on every item. On the two general evaluative items, overwhelming majorities expressed support: 67% and 82%, respectively.

These seven items display a high degree of internal consistency (α= .82), and measure a single dimension of attitudes toward the issue that accounts for 40.3 percent of the total variance. For purposes of later analysis, a single scale of support for bilingual education was constructed from these seven items. Because some respondents did not answer all items, the final scale was constructed by standardizing and then averaging all items. However, individuals who responded to less than half (i.e., three items or less) of the items were dropped from the analysis (N=53). The final scale ranged from -10.25 to +10.25 and had a natural midpoint at zero, corresponding to a neutral response to all items. This public endorsement of bilingual education is reflected in an overall positive scale mean (M = 2.29; SD = 5.08).

Meaning and Support

The meaning of the attitude object "bilingual education" as commonly understood by ordinary Americans today is clearly quite diffuse; there is little consensus on what it is, other than that it has something to do with Spanish, with more than one language, and most think it relates to education. How do these differences in meaning influence support for bilingual education?

Spontaneous meaning. Most people associated bilingual education with Spanish. Doing so resulted in lower levels of positive support than did thinking of some other language ($t(1391) = 3.23$; $p < .01$). But beyond that, there is considerable dissension, and confusion, about what bilingual education means, as indicated above. Only a minority clearly identifies it with one of the standard versions: a maintenance, transitional, or ESL program. But the distinction between meanings matters considerably for level of support. For these analyses of the effects of meaning, the national sample and oversample were combined. A one-way analysis of variance demonstrated that support varies significantly with meaning ($F(5, 1351) = 13.58$ $p < .01$). Table 1 (column 3) shows that this was mainly due to a contrast between the enthusiastic support given by those thinking about bilingualism in the abstract as opposed to the hostility emerging from those thinking about maintenance programs in particular.

Experimentally manipulated meaning. Our other approach to analyzing support for different versions of bilingual education was to manipulate meaning experimentally and then assess attitudes toward it after spontaneous meaning and associated support had been assessed. This also had the advantage of assessing support in terms directly relevant to the policy debates, because it presented respondents with the three-way distinction

between maintenance, transitional, and ESL programs so central to program planners. Spontaneously generated meanings of bilingual education did not correspond exactly to this distinction, as we have just seen.

To accomplish this, respondents were randomly assigned to hearing a description of one of the three versions of bilingual education (maintenance, transitional, and ESL), and then presented with seven items on support for bilingual education. All three groups were read the identical introduction:

"As you may or may not know, the federal government requires that elementary and secondary schools provide special language assistance for students who are not fluent in English. Recently there has been a lot of discussion by school personnel about what kinds of special language assistance -- bilingual education, in particular -- they should provide. A number of different plans have been suggested. I am going to describe one of them, and then I am going to ask you for your reactions to this plan. This is a plan of bilingual education that could be used with any language group, but I will refer to Spanish speaking students throughout this example."

Each group was then read <u>one</u> of three versions:

(1) Maintenance:

"The Spanish and English speaking students would be together in the same classroom and would be taught in both Spanish and English. Half of the time the teacher would speak Spanish to the students, and the other half of the time English would be spoken. All their basic subjects (reading, math, and science) would be taught in both languages. In other words, the basic idea is that both English and Spanish speaking students would be taught in <u>both</u> languages."

(2) Transitional:

"Spanish speaking students would be taught their basic subjects (reading, math, and science) in Spanish and would receive special instruction

on how to speak, read, and write in English. As their English improves they would be taught less in Spanish. When they had learned enough English they would switch to a regular classroom with English speaking students in which all subjects would be taught in English. In other words, the basic idea is that Spanish will only be used until they learn enough English to get by in a regular classroom."

(3) ESL:

"Both Spanish and English speaking students in this type of class would be taught all basic subjects (reading, math, and science) in English. The teacher would speak only English. The Spanish speaking students would be taken out of this class from time to time and given special instruction in English on how to speak, read, and write English. In other words, the basic idea is that all instruction would be in English, with additional special English language training."

Immediately following this vignette they were again asked the five-item series about the plan's perceived effects. In addition, two questions were included which assessed the likelihood of the respondent enrolling his or her child in the program described, and their willingness to pay more taxes for the plan presented. These items were again standardized and summed, including only those respondents who had answered at least four items. This seven-item scale yielded quite good internal consistency (α = .84) and represented a single dimension accounting for 43.6 percent of the total variance.

Again the maintenance plan was liked significantly less than the other two (although the mean response even to it was slightly favorable). The mean support level for the maintenance plan was +1.71; for the transitional plan, +3.43; and for the ESL plan, +3.51.

Public support for bilingual education programs is clearly qualified, then. If programs entail native cultural and linguistic maintenance they are at best supported weakly. If their goal is to teach the child to use English, they are supported regardless of how much instruction in the native language is also required to do this. The usual finding that most members of the public support bilingual education programs can be explained mainly by the fact that surprisingly few ordinary citizens spontaneously perceive it in terms of cultural maintenance, unlike the many ethnic activists and non-Hispanic conservatives who primarily emphasize the maintenance version.

In the next few sections, we analyze support for bilingual education in terms of background factors and social location. Unless otherwise specified, we use the full sample (national sample plus oversample). Also, in the next few sections, our measure of support is based on the scale described in Table 2, with items administered prior to the experimental variation of meaning.

Demographic Variables

We begin with demographic variables. This is not because of any very powerful theory about their operation but more because of an initial brush-clearing expedition (Sears, 1986). In any case, the demographic variables yield little of interest. Table 3 presents the data. There is significantly greater support for bilingual education among the young, black, low income, and less educated than among their counterparts. But the total variance accounted for is not great: 5.8%. And only one effect is of sufficient magnitude to warrant further analysis: the greater support among the young. Comparison of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 indicates it is not due to the correlates of age with other demographics (of which in any case only

one exceeds .20: the correlation of age with occupation is .37). We will return to other explanations for this effect of age.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Personal Experience

In the present instance, both direct self-interest and past personal experience might influence support for bilingual education. The most direct self-interest that non-Hispanics might have in bilingual education presumably occurs for parents of those children in public schools whose education might be affected, for better or worse, by bilingual education programs. We will try to determine whether such parents' attitudes toward bilingual education in general is influenced by such self-interest in it. Second, direct past personal experience with bilingualism might influence the opinions of other respondents. Some will have grown up in bilingual families, or might have acquired bilingual capabilities later in their lives. Either experience might have persuaded the individual of the usefulness (or uselessness) of bilingualism in a fashion not available to those with no such personal experience. Finally, a third category of personal experience might mix some elements of both: those who live in areas of heavy Hispanic concentration could have had direct experiences with Hispanics, or could have a personal stake in programs that benefit Hispanics in particular, that would not be the case for those living in areas with few or no Hispanics.

Personal Experience with Bilingual Education

The most obvious form of personal experience with bilingual education is having children in school who might be affected by such programs. Thirty-eight percent of the sample (national and oversample) reported having children under 18. This subsample of parents was further asked whether or

not they had any children attending public schools (65 percent were), and whether or not they had ever studied a foreign language (65 percent had), such as Spanish (23 percent). Twelve percent of parents had children who were in, or had been in, a bilingual program. Over one-third reported either "some" (28 percent) or "most" of the other children within their school to be Hispanic. In these latter respects, respondents in the oversample of heavily Hispanic areas reported considerably more personal experience with bilingualism, the Spanish language, and Hispanic children, as shown in Table 4.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Somewhat less directly linked to formal bilingual programs, but still an important personal link to bilingualism itself, was having personal experience with a language other than English. Such experience is surprisingly common, even considering the nation's reputation as a "melting pot." The respondents' own bilingual proficiency was assessed with four items on oral and literacy skills in the second language. About a quarter of the national sample (24 percent) claimed to have some current proficiency, even if very minimal, in a language other than English. The most common languages spoken were Spanish (37 percent), French (24 percent), and German (14 percent). An additive scale was constructed (α = .83). Fourteen percent reported speaking a second language as a child, and 32 percent had parents who spoke a second language. A variable was created for familial language background, splitting those who had either spoken another language as a child or whose parents were bilingual from those who had no non-English linguistic family history. Considering both variables together, almost half the sample had had some form of personal experience with bilingualism: 16 percent both growing up with bilingualism and having some current

proficiency, 20 percent with no childhood experience but some current proficiency, 11 percent with childhood experience but no current proficiency, and 54 percent with neither.[4]

The third set of personal experience variables involves living in areas in which Hispanics also live. Table 4 shows, not surprisingly, that non-Hispanics vary greatly in the number of Hispanics in their geographical area. A large number simply have no Hispanics at all living anywhere close by. Over half of the total sample (53 percent) and almost three quarters of the national sample (71 percent) live in counties with fewer than 5 percent Hispanics. At a more subjective level, 41 percent of the national sample say there are no Hispanics at all in their neighborhoods, while another 34 percent say there are "few" Hispanics in their neighborhood. Of those in the national sample who say there are none in their neighboorhood, over half (56 percent) say they live more than 20 miles from the nearest Hispanic community. For many Americans, then, Hispanics are absent in their daily lives, a quite distant and abstract presence in their country.

At the other extreme, though less numerous, are those for whom the presence of Hispanics is a constant daily reality. Ten percent of the overall, but only two percent of the national sample live in counties that are 30 percent or more Hispanic, and 12 percent say there are "a lot" of Hispanics in their neighborhood; most of these latter (10 percent all told) feel the number is increasing (55 percent of those who felt there were any Hispanics in their neighborhood felt the number was increasing).

However, the first and most important fact to be noted about the role of Hispanic context is that it is quite imbalanced. Most non-Hispanics live in areas with few Hispanics; few non-Hispanics live in areas with many Hispanics: 35 percent of the national sample live in counties with fewer than 5 percent Hispanic <u>and</u> say there are none in their neighborhood, whereas

less than 1 percent live in counties that are 30 percent and over Hispanic and say there are a lot of Hispanics in their own neighborhood.

In our analyses below, we will take two approaches to measuring Hispanic context. In some analyses, we will use both the objective percentage Hispanic in the respondent's county and the respondent's subjective perception of the number of Hispanics in his/her neighborhood as separate variables.[5] In other analyses, we will use a more complex composite index of Hispanic context. Construction of this index involved two steps. First, subjective perceptions of the number of Hispanics in the neighborhood were combined with perceptions that this was increasing. Second, both this subjective measure, and objective estimates of the percentage of Hispanics in the respondent's county were standardized and additively combined.

Effects on Support for Bilingual Education

Two simple but opposed hypotheses about the effects of personal experience might be posed. One might be called a group threat hypothesis (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Bobo, 1983; Rothbart, 1976). It would suggest that non-Hispanics who have children in the public schools might feel that their own children's education would be jeopardized by special attention to Hispanic children, and in particular by such diversionary programs as bilingual education. Similarly, living in a heavily Hispanic area might produce feelings of threat and opposition to bilingual education. Personal experience could contribute either to support or to opposition to bilingual education.

A major alternative is a variant of the contact hypothesis. This suggests that contact with minority groups increases positive feeling for them (Allport, 1954). Hence having children who are attending Hispanic schools, taking Spanish, and taking bilingual programs should produce greater

support for bilingual education. The personal experience of being bilingual should also contribute to support for it. Living in an area that is heavily Hispanic should also create sympathy and understanding for Hispanics, and support for it.

The simple bivariate relationships, shown in Table 4, would seem at first glance to support a threat interpretation of personal experience. The least support for bilingual education is shown by parents of children in the public schools, by those with children studying Spanish, and by parents of children attending heavily Hispanic schools. Similarly, respondents who live in heavily Hispanic areas (whether assessed subjectively or objectively) are the least likely to support bilingual education.

When we look more closely at those with children in the public schools, the picture becomes still more ominous. Table 5 shows that the least support for bilingual education is given by parents of children in the public schools whose children are learning Spanish and whose schools are most heavily Hispanic.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

On the other hand, it is true that direct experience with bilingualism itself seems to have some more favorable effect. Parents of children who have been in bilingual programs are the most favorable to bilingual education, as are those who themselves are currently proficient i another language. Both of these findings are shown in Table 4. Nevertheless, Table 5 shows that parents of children who have been exposed to bilingual programs in the public schools are not the greatest boosters of bilingual programs; it is those whose children have been exposed to such programs in non-public schools (presumably mostly parochial schools) who are its most staunch supporters.

So this first pass over the data seems to suggest that people who are in a location that puts them at potential risk do respond in a self-protectively threat-reducing manner, while those with direct past experience with the supposedly threatening phenomenon are most favorable. This resembles past research on busing (see Sears & Allen, 1984): conditions of potential fu. threat, whose d ·nsions are uncertain, seem most likely to inspire self-inter.sted and self-protective political preferences.

However, before we over-estimate the impact of such self-interested motivation upon opposition to bilingual education, we should note that the magnitude of the effects is not very great. Of the various relationships in Table 4, only one of the parental-role main effects on support is significant: the 12 percent whose children have been in bilingual programs support bilingual education more than do the 88 percent whose children have not. Personal bilingual experience, whether in one's childhood family or in terms of current proficiency, has no significant effect.[6] Only Hispanic context has a systematic and significant effect, contributing to greater opposition to bilingual education.

The more refined interaction analyses shown in Table 5 generally do not yield significant differences either. However, despite the lack of significant interaction effects, some mean differences yeild significant negative reactions from parents of children in the public schools: the positive effects of bilingual programs seem to be limited to the relatively few such parents with children outside the public schools. The least positive parents are those with children in heavily Hispanic public schools.

Similarly, these effects are not of great magnitude when assessed in terms of simple linear main effects of these variables. Table 6 presents these personal experience variables in simple regression analyses. Considering all respondents (column 1), their effects are not very great. In

a regression equation, the largest effect (standardized regression coefficient) is .11, and the total variance accounted for is 2.5 percent. A comparison of Table 3 (column 2) with Table 6 (column 3) shows these personal experience variables add little to demographic variables in variance explained: only 1.3 percent. When we consider parents only (column 4), the effects of personal experience are not much greater, accounting for but 4.6 percent in variance explained. Again they add relatively little to the variance accounted for by demographic variables.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

On the other hand, the demographic variables do not explain away the effects of Hispanic context. So this remains as a finding that is worth further analysis, to determine how it should be interpreted. Table 6 (columns 1 and 2) shows that both subjective and objective indicators of Hispanic context contribute to opposition to bilingual education, giving us some confidence in the reliability of both measures and of the finding. In fact, in the overall sample, the strongest impact of personal experience is seen for Hispanic county concentration, a combined subjective measure of neighborhood concentration and Hispanics increasing in the area, current and family language background (R^2 = .026).

Context and the Parental Role

The direction of these several findings, if not their relatively weak strength, would seem at first glance to support a self-interest, group threat hypothesis. Non-Hispanics are more likely to oppose bilingual education if they live in a heavily Hispanic context, and if they have young children attending the public schools, especially heavily Hispanic schools. This might occur if the parents are assuming that bilingual education will have a negative effect upon their own children's education, and therefore are making

a decision to oppose bilingual education. Is it appropriate to interpret the effects of Hispanic context in this manner?

The demographic correlates of Hispanic context give us pause. They are not especially strong (yielding an R^2 of 5.2 percent), but, such as they are, they do not argue strongly for this self-interest interpretation. Those most likely to live in areas with greater Hispanic concentrations are older respondents (beta=.17), the better-educated (.13), and the unmarried (.11). These are not the most likely to have children in the public schools.

A closer look at the relationship between Hispanic context and our parental role variables similarly suggests that the context effects are unlikely to reflect parents' protection of their children's educational experiences. Table 7 presents the data. It makes three basic points.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

First of all, non-Hispanics who live in heavily Hispanic areas are the least likely to have children who might be in a position to be affected directly by bilingual programs, because they are the least likely to have school-age children. This we already suspected from the fact that they tend to be older than persons living in all-Anglo areas. In addition, those who do have young children are less likely to send them to the public schools than are those who live in Anglo areas. This may be due to white flight (or at least Anglo avoidance).

Secondly, those with school-age children who live in heavily Hispanic contexts turn out to have children who are already involved in bilingual and multicultural experiences. They are more likely to be taking Spanish in school, be enrolled in bilingual programs, and to be attending schools with substantial numbers of Hispanic children than are children of parents living in Anglo areas. Children who are enrolled in bilingual programs are

generally taking Spanish (72 percent of them are), though there are substantial numbers of children taking Spanish who are not also enrolled in bilingual programs (61 percent are not). Such parents do not sound like the stuff of strong anti-bilingual partisans.

Finally, those with school-age children who live in heavily Hispanic contexts are the most likely to be believe that it is actually helpful for children to learn Spanish. As can be seen in Table 7, this difference is quite substantial. Regression analyses predicting which parents have children learning Spanish (not shown here) make it clear that both Hispanic context and the belief that children profit from learning Spanish have significant effects.

Parenting in an Hispanic context, then, is linked with children's being more likely to have bilingual and multicultural experiences, and with the belief that these are useful experiences. All in all, then, these data make it unlikely that the Hispanic context effects are due to parents' fears on behalf of their children.

A direct test of this hypothesis would use regression analysis to compare parents and non-parents. If Hispanic context has a substantially bigger impact among parents, we would have reason to think that its effect is due to parental self-interest. However, the unstandardized regression coefficients for Hispanic context when it is the only variable considered is -.28 for both parents and non-parents (standard errors of .08 and .06). Its coefficients in equations also containing the various demographic variables are -.31 for parents and -.28 for non-parents (with standard errors of .08 and .06, respectively). Thus the Hispanic context effect is almost identical among parents and non-parents. And in terms of variance accounted for, it has a rather small effect in either group.

In this more fully specified account, none of the other parental variables discussed earlier have a significant effect, with one exception: direct experience with bilingual programs has a large positive effect. This can be seen in Table 6 (column 5). As might be expected, when parents have favorable attitudes about bilingual experiences, that has a positive effect on support for bilingual education more generally (column 6). Consistent with the argument being advanced here, considering those attitudes actually strengthens the negative effect of context: that is, Hispanic context has a negative effect on support for bilingual education, but the effect is irrelevant to parental role, and indeed is somewhat suppressed due to the fact that parents in Hispanic contexts actually think such multicultural experiences are helpful.

In short, the hypothesis that Hispanic context increases opposition to bilingual education because of a self-interested response by non-Hispanic parents to educational issues does not fit the data. The context effect must have some other explanation, to which we will return later.

Bilingual Experience

As we have seen, bilingual experience does not by itself have a significant positive effect upon support for bilingual education. This is an important fact of political life, because it means an absence of a potentially potent interest group on behalf of bilingualism. To explore further the possible motivating impact of bilingual experience, we looked at how they might respond as parents. It is possible that people with bilingual experience themselves would encourage and support the same for their own children. Similarly, they might value diversity, and thus be more likely to live in a context with many Hispanics.

So we looked at the association of bilingual experience variables with the other personal experience variables shown in Table 6. Neither family language background nor current bilingual proficiency related significantly (or even systematically) to those parental variables, with one exception: those with some proficiency themselves were significantly more likely to have their own children enrolled in bilingual programs: 21 percent of this small group (or about 2 percent of the full sample) did, whereas only 13 percent of the non-proficient did. Similarly, those with some proficiency were somewhat (5 percent) more likely to have their children learning Spanish, and those with some bilingual family background were significantly so (9 percent more likely $X^2=5.14$, df =1, $p<.05$).

However, none of these differences is significant. Moreover, this is a very small group. And neither the proficient nor the personally bilingually experienced were more likely than other parents to send their children to the public schools or to have them enrolled in schools with large numbers of Hispanics. Nor were the proficient or bilingually experienced themselves more likely to live in a context with many Hispanics. So it would appear that personal bilingual experience is not a strongly motivating factor.

Attitudinal Predispositions

Symbolic Predispositions

The symbolic politics approach would look first to symbolic predispositions to explain support for bilingual education. As the concept has been used in past research (see Sears, 1987; Sears et al, 1980; Sears et al, 1979; Sears et al, 1986), it refers to predispositions that plausibly can be regarded as residues of early-life socialization (whether dating from preadult or early adult life stages). One cluster of such predispositions is

generally relevant to political issues: basic values, party identification, and political ideology. Another cluster of predispositions seems likely to be especially relevant in the present context, given the fact that support for bilingual education varies with perceptions that it primarily benefits Hispanics, and with perceptions that it is intended to maintain a foreign culture among immigrants to the USA: those focusing on minorities (especially Hispanics) and immigrants.

General political predispositions. In this category, we used the standard items on party identification and political ideology (Campbell et al, 1960; Levitin & Miller, 1979). Thirty-nine percent stated they were Democrats, 26 percent Republicans, and 36 percent Independents; 38 percent liberals, and 61 percent conservatives. Two items measured egalitarian values: "if people were treated more equally in this country, we would have fewer problems," and "our society should do whatever it can to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed" (59 percent and 66 percent strongly agreed) and two measured values of hard work: "a lot of people don't get ahead because they simply don't work hard enough" and "hard work offers little guarantee of success" (17 percent agreed, and 49 percent strongly disagreed, respectively). For other work using these values, see Sears et al (1986) and Sears et al (1985). The two samples differed only microscopically on these items.

Anti-Minority Feelings. Feelings toward Mexican Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Chinese, Irish, American Indians, Vietnamese, German Americans, Blacks, and people of English descent were assessed using a 0 to 100 thermometer rating scale. A factor analysis yielded two factors that were orthogonally rotated: attitudes toward majority (English, Irish, Indians, Germans) and minority (Blacks, Chinese, Vietnamese, Mexicans,

Cubans, and Puerto Ricans) groups. An index of anti-minority affect was generated by subtracting ratings for minorities from those for majority groups. Measures of anti-Hispanic affect toward specific groups were also created from standardized ratings of Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans (in relation to the respondent's ratings of all six minority groups). Negative scores thus denote a greater dislike of particular Hispanic groups than of other minority groups, regardless of whether minority groups overall were liked or disliked.

A symbolic racism scale (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1987) was generated by additively combining the following three items concerned with support for government assistance to minority groups: "To what extent do you think the government should help improve the position of minorities?" (12 percent of the national sample said "to a great extent," and 70 percent "some"); "How much special consideration is being given to racial minorites right now?" (38 percent said "too much"); and "Special measures should be taken to insure that the same percentage of Hispanics, as other groups, are admitted to college" (31 percent strongly disagreed). Items represent a single factor that accounts for 58.3 percent of the total variance and forms a moderately internally consistent scale (α = .64).

Nationalism. Finally, nationalistic feelings were assessed by the degree of support given to the following four statements. "The United States has the best government in the world" (72 percent of the national sample strongly agreed); "I think of myself as a citizen of the world, rather than as a citizen of the U.S." (43 percent strongly disagreed); "the government's immigration policy should be more open and less selective" (46 percent strongl disagreed); and "immigrants to this country should be prepared to adopt the American way of life" (68 percent strongly agreed). When factor

analyzed, these items share one underlying dimension, although it is a weak factor, accounting for only 15 percent of the total variance. A nationalism scale was constructed by taking the mean of the four items. The scale is only moderately internally consistent, however (α = .48). The weakness of this measure should be borne in mind in interpreting its effects below.

Government Spending

A second set of potential attitudinal predictors of support for bilingual education concerns attitudes toward government spending. The public varies widely in the priority they place upon government programs and money to be spent for them, and these variations are politically highly consequential (Sears & Citrin, 1985). Second, support for spending on the schools is known to be related to support for government spending on domestic services generally (Sears & Citrin, 1985), so that too must be taken into account.

Educational spending. The first and most obvious are attitudes about spending on school programs in general, especially on foreign language instruction, and on "basics" vs "frills." The following questions assessed support for educational spending: Do you think the government is spending too much, too little, or the right amount on public schools? and is the government spending too much, too little or the right amount on the following school programs: (a) music, art, and drama, (b) math, (c) foreign language instruction, (d) science, and (e) social studies. As Table 8 shows (column 1), respondents were more likely to feel that too little, rather than too much, was being spent in each of these program areas. The greatest support was shown for Math and Science; the least for the arts and social studies.

[Insert Table 8 about here]

A factor analysis of these items revealed two orthogonal dimensions behind support for school spending, as shown in Table 8 (columns 2 and 3). The first factor reflected support for the arts, foreign language, and bilingual education (15.2 percent of variance). The second factor represented support for spending on math, science, and social studies (14.5 percent of total variance). On this basis three educational subscales were formed, standardizing and adding individual items as follows: support for spending on math and science were combined to form a scale for spending on the basics; support for the arts and social studies combined to form a spending on frills scale; and two items on foreign language instruction were combined: the item just cited on spending on foreign language education, and a second item on how strongly they favored foreign language instruction. Presumably bilingual education should receive most opposition from those who would cut school spending in general, and especially from those who most value the "basics." This is suggested by the fact that it loads heavily on the "frills" factor, as Table 8 shows.

Government spending. Since attitudes on educational spending are influenced by attitudes about government spending in general, respondents were asked whether more or less government services were needed and whether the government was spending too much, too little, or the right amount in the specific areas of health, social security, unemployment compensation, welfare, and defense. Consistent with other research (e.g., Sears & Citrin, 1985), there was strong support for more government service in concrete domestic program areas other than welfare, and, as usual, more than was felt appropriate in the abstract. However, the predominant feeling was that too much was being spent on defense as well. These data are shown in Table 8.

The non-defense items reflected a single dimension when factor analyzed along with educational spending items which account for 18 percent of the total variance (Table 8) and were additively combined to create a government services scale (α = .72).

The Structure of Predispositions

All the scales just discussed -- on non-racial symbolic predispositions, racial attitudes, and government spending -- were then subjected to a factor analysis, as shown in Table 9. In combination these factor analyses make three important points about the structure of attitudinal predispositions.

[Insert Table 9 about here]

First of all, as just noted, bilingual education, like foreign language instruction, is regarded as something of a frill in the schools (this is shown in Table 8) and therefore probably attracts some opposition for that reason.

Second, bilingual education represents a program that requires public funding if it is to be commonplace in the public schools. There is a general factor in public thinking of support vs opposition to government spending on domestic services. Attitudes toward spending on educational "frills" fall on this factor, as well, as shown in Table 9. This is likely to represent another source of opposition to it.

Third, attitudes toward minorities are at the core of Americans' political thinking. This can be seen in Table 9; symbolic racism and nationalism load on the same factor as party identification, general political ideology, and support for government services in general. And so do egalitarian values, which deal with the equality of various social groups in a more abstract manner. This intimate relationship of anti-minority attitudes to the most basic and general of Americans' political attitudes and

values -- even those with no manifest racial or ethnic content -- is a characteristic feature of American political life. This is not to say that these more general symbolic predispositions are merely disguised racism, for they clearly are more than that. But it means that many political disputes about domestic policy will sooner or later have a racial tinge. So it is likely that anti-minority attitudes are another source of opposition to bilingual education, given that it focuses centrally on immigrants and linguistic minority groups.

Attitudinal Predispositions and Support

Multiple regression analyses predicting bilingual education support from these several sets of attitudes are shown in Table 10. Each of the three categories of predictors contributes significantly to support. Of these, racial attitudes predict more of the overall variance in support than do the basic symbolic predispositions, spending or attitudes toward foreign language instruction. All these combined account for .265 of the variance in support for bilingual education.

[Insert Table 10 about here]

Symbolic racism. The strongest single factor is symbolic racism, here indexed with items dealing with special aid to minorities, as in other studies (see Sears, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1986; McConahay, 1986). It is closely related to support for bilingual education ($r = .37$, $b = .24$). This effect seems likely to be related to the fact that some perceive bilingual education as an unnecessary special favor to minority groups, especially Hispanics (see Table 1). We will return to the question of whether or not this particular symbolic meaning is the key to evoking this particular symbolic predisposition.

There are other effects of racial attitudes that are less powerful. Nationalism, and anti-Mexican and anti-Puerto Rican sentiment, along with resistance to equality as a general value, all contribute significantly to opposition to bilingual education, as shown in Table 10. In total, racial attitudes account for a sizeable amount of variance in program support in the total sample (17.1 percent, when considered alone).

Foreign language instruction. A second important factor is attitudes about spending on foreign language instruction. As we saw earlier (Table 8), the public as a whole is moderately favorable toward greater spending on foreign language instruction in general, 49 percent believing that too little is being spent, and 12 percent believing that too much is. On a second item, 85 percent of the national sample are favorable and 11 percent unfavorable to foreign language instruction in general. Table 10 shows that such attitudes are rather closely related to support for bilingual education ($r = .35$, $b = .27$). Those who feel that foreign language instruction is unnecessary or of low priority tend to feel the same about bilingual education. Again this may be linked to the particular symbolic meaning of bilingual education; many respondents perceive that it is merely foreign language instruction (see Table 1).

Foreign language instruction and bilingual education are linked in the non-Hispanic public's mind in two ways, then. Many people do not clearly perceive them as different. And attitudes toward the former have a substantial effect upon support for the latter. But attitudes toward them are different in important ways. One is that attitudes toward bilingual education are considerably more crystallized. For example, they are more constrained by fundamental political and social attitudes than are attitudes toward foreign language instruction. When support for bilingual education is

regressed upon all the variables shown in Table 10, excluding foreign language instruction, 19.8 percent of the variance is accounted for. This is shown in column 3. When foreign language instruction is treated as the criterion variable, using the identical predictors, only 9.2 percent of the variance is accounted for, as shown in column 7.

And when we look at the individual terms, further differences emerge. The response to bilingual education is heavily influenced by symbolic racism, presumably because it is regarded as an illegitimate special favor to minorities. There is a significant effect of symbolic racism upon support for foreign language instruction, but it is much weaker. Rather, foreign language instruction is responded to more in terms of how the person feels about non-"basic," more exotic, educational programs in general. People who support the teaching of the arts, music, and drama tend to support teaching foreign languages as well.

In short, there is some confusion between bilingual education and foreign language instruction, and support for the latter influences support for the former. But bilingual education is a considerably more crystallized symbolic object, more "symbolic" if you will. And part of the reason is that it is not simply seen as just another educational program; it is perceived, and responded to affectively as well, as a part of the minority agenda of marginally legitimate demands in modern America.

Spending. A third general category of sources of opposition to bilingual education is resistance to non-essential government spending, irrespective of links to minorities. General conservative political ideology has a small but independent influence on opposition to bilingual education ($r = .20$, $b = .06$). And, more specifically, so does support for government spending both in schools and on domestic services more generally ($r = .27$,

b = .08). The expected controversy over spending for school programs regarded as the "frills" has some relevance to the bilingual education issue. Support for spending on the frills is substantially correlated with support for bilingual education: the effect disappears with foreign language instruction considered, supporting our contention that both are to some extent evaluated as useless "frills." Overall, the general category of spending does make a modest contribution (R^2=9.7 percent).

A Closer Look at the Role of Anti-Minority Affect

Racial and non-racial components. Thus we are able to identify three sets of attitudinal predispositions that are significantly involved in non-Hispanics' opposition to bilingual education: resistance to special favors for minorities, as reflected in the symbolic racism scale; resistance to any foreign language instruction, which is regarded as not an educational necessity; and a more general desire for lower levels of public spending.

However, an important part of the story is that they are not wholly independent; rather, they make partially independent, but partially overlapping, contributions. Their partial independence we have already seen in Table 10; with all of them considered, each makes a significant contribution. Their interconnectedness can be seen in several ways. Symbolic racism is correlated with the other scales: with government services (r = .45), foreign language teaching (.19), and with "frills" (.27). When all are included in a factor analysis, as shown in Table 9, symbolic racism and government services have the heaviest loading on the first fact while foreign language instruction and the frills also load on it, albeit more weakly. And the substantial drop in impact of the non-racial terms when

racial attitudes are included in the equation (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 10) also provides evidence of shared variance.

How are we to interpret this pattern of partially independent and partially overlapping contributions to support for bilingual education? From a theoretical point of view, we have argued elsewhere that symbolic racism is a mix of anti-minority affect with traditional values that quite genuinely have no manifest connection with minorities (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kinder, 1986; Sears, 1987). Similarly, attitudes about government spending seem to reflect a significant component of anti-minority sentiment, along with attitudes about services and spending that have little connection to minorities (Sears & Citrin, 1985). Therefore it would not be surprising if these predictors shared contributions of both kinds -- anti-minority and simple conservative tightfistedness -- as well as making their more distinctive and separate contributions.

The latter element is easy enough to see as a common element in these predictors. Aid to minorities, government services, and frilly instruction such as foreign languages all involve spending money, and their common loading on the first factor in Table 9 could indicate nothing more than that. Indeed some (e.g., Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986) have contended that indicators of symbolic racism such as those use here may not really have an anti-minority component at all, but may instead simply reflect conservative but non-racial attitudes. Indeed, the anti-minority thermometer measures do not load on the first factor of Table 9. What evidence do we have for a distinctive anti-minority contribution made by these attitudes?

There is good presumptive evidence for it, since other studies using similar items have shown quite clearly that they blend anti-minority affects with other, non-racial forms of conservatism (see Sears, 1987). More

directly, it can be shown that the contribution made by symbolic racism is significantly reduced, though by no means explained away, by introducing these non-racial attitudes. A comparison of columns 3 and 4 in Table 10 shows that introducing non-racial symbolic predispositions and non-racial spending attitudes does reduce the contribution of symbolic racism, from .33 to .26. That latter contribution remains a powerful one, however, and we assume it has much to do with distinctively anti-minority feeling.[7]

The parental response. We earlier considered whether or not non-Hispanic parents had any distinctively self-interested response to bilingual education, and concluded that they did not in any very obvious way. But it is also possible that such minority-oriented programs may elicit special anxieties about and antagonisms toward minorities among those who are most affected. It is a commonplace of modern journalism that so-called liberals are only those who are safely distant from the real impact of minority issues; the so-called "limousine" or "swimming pool liberals." Available evidence has not supported this idea (e.g., Sears et al, 1979; Kinder & Sears, 1981), but it remains plausible.

Such a response would be reflected in stronger contributions by anti-minority variables among parents than among non-parents. Rather than go through a rather tedious demonstration of non-effects, we will just refer in a summary way to the overall findings. Table 11 shows the variance accounted for by our several categories of predictors when each category is considered in isolation. Among other things it shows that racial attitudes make, if anything, a lesser contribution among parents than non-parents.

[Insert Table 11 about here]

Inspection of the individual terms, based on a regression analysis including all predictors simultaneously, reveals that the only substantial

difference concerns government services: concern about government spending affects non-parents' support for bilingual education more than it does parents' (unstandardized coefficients of .95 and .13, with standard errors of .32 and .40, respectively). There may be an element of realistic self-interest in this.

What about the effects of the parental role variables on support for bilingual education? Do racial attitudes influence their effects? As we indicated earlier (Table 6), having children learning Spanish did not have a significant effect in any case, and the Hispanic proportion in the child's school had no distinctive effect apart from the proportion Hispanic in the parent's neighborhood and county, making it unlikely that it was a genuine parental effect. So neither bears further inspection.

Two other effects do hold up, however. Having children in bilingual programs has a positive effect upon support for bilingual education regardless of the individual's other attitudes (the b drops from .13, shown in Table 6, to .11 with all the attitudes shown in Table 10 considered). However, the role of believing that knowing Spanish is good for one's children is reduced (from .23 to .15) somewhat; as might be expected, racial attitudes influence that judgment. But a substantial effect remains. Both judgments seem primarily governed by experience rather than prejudice, then.

In short, there is no great evidence that parents' own prejudices are elicited by the threat of bilingual education more than are non-parents, or that there is any distinctive response against it from that quarter. Rather, there is some evidence that parents' reactions are on the realistic side.

Hispanic Context

Another possibility is that the effect of Hispanic context is due to symbolic predispositions. Perhaps what a heavily Hispanic context does is to

trigger anti-Hispanic prejudices. This is consistent with much early literature on white voting in the segregated South, in which the most anti-black candidates received the most white votes in heavily black areas, presumably because of the greater prejudice in those areas (Key, 1949; Pettigrew & Campbell, 1960).

This, however, also seems not to be the case. The effect of context is not reduced very much when our battery of symbolic predispositions (both racial and non-racial) are included in the equation. The standardize coefficient remains the same (-.15). Context continues to have a significant effect even with these other variables considered. Moreover, it is not reduced differentially for parents and non-parents. So it is not evident that parents in particular are vulnerable to increased anti-minority feeling in Hispanic contexts.

One might still ask whether anti-minority attitudes are stronger predictors of opposition to bilingual education in heavily Hispanic contexts.

Generational Conflict.

We mentioned initially that older people were more opposed than younger ones to bilingual education, but that the explanation was not then obvious. Let us return to it here. We saw that the simple correlation was -.20 and that the beta, with other demographics considered, was -.21 (Table 3). When all other variables are considered, the beta is -.17.

So two points can be made. One is that the generational effect holds up with everything else considered; there is a genuine generational gap on bilingual education not attributable to anti-minority attitudes, education, or other generational differences. But partly it can be attributed to other factors. The strongest correlate of age, of our various predictors, is with symbolic racism (r=.37), along with nationalism (.21). It does not correlate

strongly with the government services scale (r=-.09) With all these attitudinal predispositions included in the equation, its effect therefore drops somewhat, to .13 (using all the predictors shown in Table 10). So the generational effect is partly due, as well, to more anti-minority feeling among older non-Hispanics.

Group Conflict

How do considerations about group conflict map onto the question of bilingual education? First of all, in the present case, as we have seen, the vast majority of non-Hispanics perceive bilingual education as involving the teaching of Spanish. Presumably, then, the major intergroup conflicts relevant to bilingual education are between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. Second, an important issue is whether or not non-Hispanics perceive bilingual education as both benefitting Hispanics and providing significant costs to non-Hispanics. And third, one can ask whether these perceived costs to non-Hispanics are felt most acutely by those who would bear them most directly, and whether such perceptions are at the heart of their opposition to bilingual education.

Measures

We used two measures of perceived group conflict, both of which explicitly asked about perceptions of a competitive relationship between Hispanics and non-Hispanics, and which referred directly to the self rather than merely to the ingroup. In both cases, the tendency was to perceive a competitive relationship between Hispanics and non-Hispanics: benefits for the former would produce costs for the latter. The first item focused on economic deprivation: "compared to Hispanics, do you think the chances of getting ahead for you is much better, better . . ."; 12 percent felt their

own chances were worse or much worse, while 44 percent felt their own chances were better or much better. The second focused on the educational realm: "Suppose that Hispanic children were given more attention within schools; how would this affect the quality of education for children of people like you?" Here again the dominant perception was of a competitive relationship: 38 percent felt this would decrease the quality of education for the children of non-Hispanics, and 21 percent felt it would increase the quality of that education.

Effects on Support

The first question is whether or not perceptions of group conflict contribute to opposition to bilingual education. At a simple bivariate level, the relationship is a reasonably clear one. Among that minority of the respondents who perceived little group conflict (who felt their own prospects were much better than Hispanics', or who felt greater attention to Hispanic children would increase the quality of education for their own children a lot), bilingual education was strongly supported: means of 3.47 and 4.43 on the two items. At the other extreme, those perceiving the maximum group conflict (much worse prospects than Hispanics', or quality of education would decrease a lot), support was minimal (means of 0.67 and -0.23, respectively). The Pearson correlations for the two items with support for bilingual education were .14 and .24. The contribution to variance explained of the two items pooled was 7.2 percent. In short, the item assessing group conflict over education has, perhaps not surprisingly, a fairly strong relationship to support for bilingual education; the item concerned with economic deprivation has a significant but substantially weaker effect.

What are the dynamics of this effect? As we have suggested elsewhere (Sears & Kinder, 1985; Sears, Huddy, & Jessor, 1986), the effects of such perceptions of group conflict might in some cases be properly taken at face value, as reflecting a genuine sense of real intergroup competition. Indeed it is possible that people genuinely feel some sense of self-interest in the intergroup conflict. In other cases, however, they might simply be products of symbolic politics; the symbols of the ingroup and outgroup may simply evoke strong affects based on predispositions associated with those symbols.

These differing interpretations of the effects of perceived group conflict can be assessed in two ways. One is to assess the antecedants of preceptions of group conflict, to determine whether or not they in turn stem from realistic symbolic sources. The other is to examine the dynamics of their contribution to support, to determine whether they express symbolic or more realistically-based motives.

Symbolic group conflict. In terms of antecedants, the story differs somewhat for the two items. Without going into great detail, it turns out that the item concerned with Hispanics' education is closely related to those symbolic predispositions concerned with equality and racial attitudes. A regression equation containing the non-racial symbolic predispositions and racial attitudes explains 9.8% of the variance. The anti-minority thermometer index, symbolic racism, nationalism, and equality values all have significant effects. None of the others do.

This close linkage of perceived group conflict over education to symbolic predispositions concerning Hispanics can be seen in another way. Its effect upon support for bilingual education is substantially reduced (though not eliminated altogether) when the symbolic predispositions are included in the equation, as shown in Table 10 (column 5). This suggests

that its main role is to mediate the effects of those anti-minority predispositions.[8] In short, when we look at perceived group conflict in the educational domain, in terms of both its antecedants and its role in contributing to support of bilingual education, it seems to be playing a largely symbolic role.

The educational group conflict item, on the other hand, has little to do with realistic group conflict. The demographic and personal experience variables produce only 2.6 percent variance explained in it, and reduce its contribution to support from a raw correlation of .24 to a b of .21.

Realistic group conflict. The other item, focusing on economic outcomes, seems to be more closely linked to real personal experience, and less tied to symbolic predispositions. The R^2 for a comparable equation is 4.5 percent, and only anti-Hispanic thermometers and symbolic racism (along with hard work values and political ideology) yield significant effects.

The demographics and personal experience variables contribute 10.1 percent of variance explained in this item. Blacks, the old, the less educated, the less affluent, and those living in heavily Hispanic counties all are significantly more likely to perceive economic group conflict than are their counterparts. However, these perceptions add something unique to support for bilingual education; the contribution of economic group conflict is scarcely diminished at all by the inclusion of personal experience and demographic variables.

In conclusion, the two domains of group conflict work in somewhat different ways, but both make contributions to support for bilingual education. Conflict in the education domain is heavily symbolic, and the relevant symbols center once again on minorities and equality. It seems to be another form of anti-minority symbolic politics. Conflict in the economic

domain seems to arise more out of the real economic competition between Hispanics and some non-Hispanic groups. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the symbolic contribution in the educational domain is greater than the realistic contribution in the economic domain.

An Overall Look

It is perhaps worthwhile to give a quick overall synopsis of what we have learned about support for bilingual education. Table 11 gives the variance accounted for by the several categories we have been concerned with. The most important themes are that racial attitudes and spending attitudes dominate: opposition comes from those concerned about minorities, and about unnecessary government spending. Personal experience makes only a minor contribution, and there is little evidence that either parental role or Hispanic context interacts strongly with other factors.

The Role of Symbolic Meaning

One distinctive feature of this study is that it permits an assessment of the role of the symbolic meaning of the attitude object, bilingual education, as well as of the usual background factors. We have two ways of assessing its symbolic meaning: first, its symbolic meaning as expressed spontaneously at the beginning of the interview, in response to an open-ended question; and second, responses to our experimentally manipulated symbolic meaning.

Spontaneous Meaning

We have already seen (Table 1) that those who spontaneously interpreted bilingual education as a mechanism for maintaining a foreign culture within the United States were the most opposed to it. Not surprisingly, then, nationalism and anti-minority sentiment had the most powerful effects on

opposition to bilingual education in this group. Table 12 shows that nationalism has a considerably more powerful impact in this group than it does among those who did not interpret bilingual education in maintenance terms; indeed, it did not even have a significant effect in those other groups. Similarly, symbolic racism had a considerably stronger effect among those interpreting bilingual education in maintenance terms, though it had a significant effect in other groups as well. As a consequence, the variance explained by racial attitudes, including nationalism, is considerably higher for the maintenance group than for those with other interpretations: 30.7 percent as opposed to 19.9 percent and 13.7 percent.

[Insert Table 12 about here]

Those who did not have a maintenance interpretation generally perceived bilingual education as simply teaching in two languages, teaching English to foreign students, or foreign language instruction. As we indicated earlier, the first two of these are in some sense accurate, since they resemble the transitional and ESL versions of it, whereas the last is inaccurate.

Accuracy is inconsequential in terms of the determinants of opposition to bilingual education, however. Symbolic meaning is more important. In either case, the main distinctive determinants of opposition were attitudes about

foreign language instruction and about domestic spending more generally, as shown in Table 12. Both had significant effects among those who did not interpret bilingual education in terms of cultural maintenance, but not among those who did. Since people with these non-maintenance interpretations were not making a clear distinction between bilingual education and foreign language instruction, it is not surprising that their attitudes toward it were more dependent upon their feelings about the value of foreign language

instruction. It clearly relates, as well, to their feelings about domestic spending in general.

Racial attitudes and nationalism are even more central in the reactions of the maintenance group than this would imply. Table 12 shows that the various interpretation groups do not differ substantially in the weight of foreign language instruction when racial attitudes are not considered. However, with racial attitudes considered, foreign language instruction no longer has a significant effect for those with a maintenance perspective (compare columns 2 and 3). This suggests that attitudes about foreign language instruction carry this anti-minority message for the maintenance group, but not for the others.

The same is true for attitudes about government services in general. They actually have a somewhat stronger effect in the maintenance group than in the others, when racial attitudes are not considered (compare column 2 with columns 5 and 8). However, with racial attitudes considered, this difference is not only eliminated but it is reversed: the maintenance people give the least weight to general attitudes about government spending (compare column 3 with columns 6 and 9). Again, the most appropriate interpretation appears to be that such attitudes about spending carry the anti-minority message for the maintenance group, but not for the others.

Manipulated Meaning

In general, the same portrait emerges from the data on experimentally manipulated symbolic meaning: the maintenance interpretation evokes racial attitudes and nationalism to a greater degree than does, let us say, the ESL approach. As shown in Table 13, symbolic racism has a significant effect upon support for bilingual education, no matter which interpretation had been presented to respondents. But it is considerably stronger in the case of the

maintenance interpretation than in the case of ESL (with transitional being intermediate). Similarly, nationalism has the strongest effect with the maintenance interpretation (though not a significant one in any of the three cases). The variance explained by racial attitudes is considerably greater for the maintenance case (17.1 percent) than for ESL (6.8 percent).

[Insert Table 13 about here]

Again it would appear that attitudes toward government spending in general carry the strongest anti-minority message within the maintenance interpretation of bilingual education. When only spending questions are considered, government spending has a much stronger effect on support in the maintenance group than in the ESL group (compare columns 2 and 8). However, when racial attitudes are also considered, the difference is much reduced (compare columns 3 and 9). Again, then, the ostensibly non-racial question of government domestic spending takes on a racial component when the irdividual is responding to an attitude object with racial meaning, such as the maintenance of a foreign culture.

Having said that, it is apparent that attitudes about government domestic spending make a contribution quite independent of any racial considerations, even for those responding to the maintenance attitude object. And it is a contribution related to the fact that cultural maintenance is simply not viewed as such a high priority item for government spending as is the basic education of non-English-speaking chi'.en. This is consistent with the other research cited earlier which shows that attitudes about government domestic spending priorities have both a significant racial component and a non-racial component (Sears & Citrin, 1985). The implication is that cultural maintenance attracts opposition both on the grounds of negative feelings about foreign or minority cultures and because it is

regarded as a low priority frill that is not worth heavy government investment.

Finally, two comments on the differences among these plans. It is interesting that the transitional form of bilingual education operates in much the same way as does the maintenance form, while both are different from ESL. Apparently even a transitional period of teaching in Spanish is regarded as an illegitimate coddling of non-English speaking children.

Second, the variance accounted for is consistently higher for the maintenance than for the ESL plan, despite the fact that the latter is more extremely evaluated, on the average. This extends the earlier comment that bilingual education is a highly symbolic issue: it is, but particularly when framed in terms of cultural maintenance.

Symbolic Meaning and Hispanic Context

Earlier findings have indicated that Hispanic context evokes greater opposition to bilingual education. They have not given a clear analysis of why it does, but there is a clear possibility that it has to do with feelings of intergroup threat. If so, then such context-evoked opposition might be expected to be greatest in response to the cultural maintenance program.

To test for the possibility, support levels for each version of bilingual education are presented in Table 14 as a function of Hispanic context. As can be seen, support for the maintenance plan again remains lower than for either of the others, yielding a significant main effect ($p < .001$). Second, these data repeat the earlier finding of a significant main effect of Hispanic context upon support for bilingual education, this time using the scale of support for it that followed presentation of the three different plans ($p < .001$).

[Insert Table 14 about here]

Most important, as this hypothesis of racial threat would predict, the effect of Hispanic context is greater for the maintenance plan than for either of the others. Indeed Hispanic context has no effect at all on support for the ESL plan, and an intermediate effect upon support for the transitional plan. As a result, the context X plan interaction is significant ($F=8.94$, 2df, $p<.001$).

The realities of personal experience? This again raises the question of whether this response to an Hispanic context, and particularly to the symbolic meaning of perpetuating Hispanic culture, is a realistic and instrumental one on the part of parents concerned about their own children's fate under bilingual education, or is a more symbolic one. The data in Table 14 again make it clear that the parental role does not play a major part in this response to Hispanic context. The parental main effect is not significant ($F=0.00$), but more important the parents X Hispanic context interaction is not significant ($F=0.63$), nor is the parents X Hispanic context X plan interaction ($F=0.71$). So we do not find that parents are reacting distinctively to the Hispanic context.

The one parental effect that does emerge is a significant parent X plan interaction: parents show more polarized evaluations, on the average, than non-parents: somewhat less favorable to the maintenance plan, but more favorable to ESL. To interpret this effect requires further analysis, but it does not suggest that parents are especially threatened by Hispanics.

Symbolic Racism?. If the particular opposition generated within Hispanic contexts to the maintenance plan is a primarily symbolic one, it should be particularly strong among those who are highest in symbolic racism. This can be tested using the same data given in Table 14. We have seen in earlier analyses that the maintenance plan evokes the most opposition to

bilingual education, and that it evokes the greatest symbolic racism (see Table 13). This table replicates that finding with a significant plan X symbolic racism interaction ($F=5.41$, $p < .001$).

But these data also extend the finding to help us understand the effects of Hispanic context: its effects are particularly potent among those high in symbolic racism who are responding to the cultural maintenance plan. As can be seen in Table 14, the strongest opposition to bilingual education comes from those who are high in symbolic racism and who live in Hispanic areas, and who are responding to the cultural maintenance plan.

In short, these data close the loop for us. We find that the negative response to bilingual education among those in Hispanic areas is not an instrumental response on the part of parents concerned about their children's education. Rather, it is a response to what one particular version of bilingual education symbolizes -- maintenance of a foreign culture in the United States, and maintenance of a foreign culture that is at least modestly salient in their own area. And it is a response linked to symbolic racism rather than to realistic concerns about the possible personal impact of the policy in question.

These analyses take into account only a limited set of variables, of course, and we have seen that support for bilingual education is determined by a considerably wider panoply of variables. It is appropriate therefore to consider more fully specified models before accepting this interaction of symbolic racism with symbolic meaning.

Table 15 presents the results of regression equations carried out within each of twelve subsamples: parents and non-parents, in Hispanic and non-Hispanic contexts, and among those exposed to each of the three versions of bilingual education. The data presented there are the estimates of

variance accounted for by each of four categories of variables: parental role, racial attitudes, non-racial symbolic predispositions, and government spending. The specific variables used in each category are the same as those used in Tables 6 and 10.

[Insert Table 15 about here]

This analysis bears out the analysis of variance based on a more limited set of variables and presented in Table 14. It shows that the variance accounted for by racial attitudes is considerably higher for those given the maintenance plan and living in an Hispanic context, whether parents (35.8 percent) or non-parents (30.0 percent). Racial attitudes were much less important for those living in an Hispanic context, but given other versions of bilingual education (the R^2 varying between 4.1 percent and 19.5 percent), or for those in a non-Hispanic context but given the maintenance version (24.1 percent and 11.9 percent). This supports the earlier finding that the conjunction of Hispanic context and the cultural maintenance symbolism most evokes racial attitudes.

The same table shows that concerns about government and educational spending are also greatest when the maintenance version is presented to respondents living in Hispanic contexts, though the differences are smaller than is the case with racial attitudes. This again bears out our earlier observation that the maintenance version tends to elicit racial concerns in the guise of spending issues.

These data again indicate in several ways that the particular symbolism of cultural maintenance does not also elicit an instrumental response from parents. Parents do not exhibit more of the greater explanatory value of racial attitudes in the Hispanic context than non-parents; the R^2 for parents in Hispanic contexts is 5.8 percent greater than for non-parents, but the

parental effect is actually larger in non-Hispanic contexts (12.2 percent). Second, there is no parental effect in the increased potency of spending issues in explaining responses to the maintenance plan in Hispanic contexts. And third, there is no difference between Hispanic and non-Hispanic contexts in the potency of parental variables. In short, the special potency of racial attitudes in determining responses to the maintenance plan in Hispanic contexts is not based on the realistic, self-interested concerns of non-Hispanic parents.

The variance estimates shown in Table 15 are crude because they fail to take into account the fact that these several sources of variance are not independent of each other. This is particularly true of racial attitudes and spending, as indicated earlier. To give more precise estimates, Table 16 presents the unique variance attributable to racial and spending attitudes. The data make the same basic points: racial attitudes are the strongest predictors of response to the maintenance plan, especially in the Hispanic contexts, and the maintenance plan draws the most racial response, especially in Hispanic contexts, but neither effect is distinctive to parents.

[Insert Table 16 about here]

Finally, and not surprisingly given the findings to date, symbolic racism is the primary source of variance among the racial attitudes, and especially among those in Hispanic contexts responding to the maintenance plan. The specific regression coefficents for symbolic racism from these twelve regression equations show exactly what one might have inferred both from the simpler analysis of variance shown in Table 14, and the summary description of variance accounted for shown in Tables 15 and 16. The principal predisposition evoked by the combination of the cultural maintenance symbolism and Hispanic contexts is symbolic racism: the

government spending theme is there, but scarcely evoked in the same distinctive manner.

Discussion

It would perhaps be useful to begin by summarizing the main findings of the study. The primary intention was twofold: to apply a symbolic politics analysis to the case of bilingual education, and to test an extended version of symbolics theory, that introduced variations in symbolic meaning as well as in symbolic predispositions.

Bilingual education, like many other policy issues, exhibits a pattern of widespread opinionation with relatively little information. Among other things, many people are confused about what it really is. And this natural variation in symbolic meaning elicits significantly different levels of support for it. Non-Hispanics are not very happy about bilingual educational programs that are intended to help maintain Hispanic culture in the United States, by teaching children on a regular basis in both Spanish and English. They are considerably more positive about teaching Spanish-speaking children in English, with perhaps a little Spanish for those who have no English at all, on an interim basis.

We applied a symbolic politics analysis to support for bilingual education. Self-interest and other forms of direct personal experience proved to have relatively little effect. One important category of self-interest was having a child in the public schools whose own education might be affected by the introduction of bilingual education programs. Some experience with such programs actually increased support for them, but parents whose children were most potentially vulnerable to them were not the most opposed. Both childhood and current bilingual proficiency were assessed, but neither transferred any greater support for bilingual education

programs. Finally, proximity to Hispanics was measured in several ways; it had a significant negative effect upon support for bilingual education. Nevertheless, the total explanatory value of personal experience variables was small.

Symbolic predispositions, on the other hand, had substantial effects. The strongest by far was an index of symbolic racism, with a measure of nationalism trailing behind. Attitudes about educational and government spending also had effects: support for foreign language instruction, support for other kinds of educational "frills," and for government spending in general all had positive effects.

From a theoretical point of view, the most important aspect of the study was the test of interactions between symbolic meaning and symbolic predispositions. Previous work has generally only measured responses to a constant attitude object, or at least has not taken advantage of naturally occurring variations in the symbolic meaning of political attitude objects. In this study, both naturally occurring variations and experimentally varied symbolic meaning were employed.

There was evidence that the cultural maintenance object is the most "symbolic," in terms of eliciting the strongest and most consistent underlying predispositions.

The findings also clearly indicated that different symbolic meanings elicit different underlying symbolic predispositions. When bilingual education was defined in terms of cultural maintenance, it most strongly elicited symbolic racism. Other symbolic meanings did not do so as strongly, rather eliciting concerns about such non-racial matters as government spending, instead.

It was apparent also that this difference is one that is governed at the symbolic level. It was not stronger with parental interests, as might be expected from a rational self-interest perspective.

Nevertheless, this response to the cultural maintenance version on the basis of symbolic racism was clearly strongest among those living in an Hispanic context. Again, this did not interact with parental status, ruling out the possibility of a simple self-interest interpretation. Some evidence was presented in favor of a symbolic group threat interpretation, but that analysis needs to be pursued further.

What are the implications for bilingual education? Consistent with past surveys in this area (Gallup, 1980; Cole, 1983) the results of the present study demonstrate that the American public is favorable toward bilingual education. It also raises an important caveat: To what extent can th ; be trusted if the majority of the national public has given little thought to programs and knows very little about them?

The answer is that findings need to be treated cautiously. Public support for bilingual education is partly based on misconception. Its strongest supporters are those that know the least about it and confuse it with popular foreign language instruction or the desired ability to speak foreign languages. Among the better informed support is more equivocal. This is largely due to a minority that equate programs with the maintenance of native language and culture, something they oppose. When others are confronted with this notion of bilingual education as cultural maintenance it also meets with less support, but not outright opposition, than non-maintenance programs. Thus, in addressing the question of public support for bilingual education the answer is a qualified one. It depends on what kind of program is being discussed.

Bilingual education as cultural maintenance is not as strongly supported as non-maintenance versions. Among non-maintenance programs there appears to be no real preference for the use or non-use of the native language as an intermediary step. Opposition to cultural maintenance is linked to intolerance of minorities and Hispanics and policies benefitting them. This is also a potential source of opposition to all programs that emphasize minorities as their beneficiaries.

Thus lurking beneath the public's currently benign attitudes toward bilingual education is the potential for opposition once information levels are raised. How likely an event is this? One way to address this is to look at who is currently informed about bilingual education and why. There appear to be two major origins of information and interest. The first is via education and probably reflects a general interest in public affairs. The second is via contact with Hispanics, either in the immediate neighborhood or through children's participation in bilingual education programs at school. It seems clear that Hispanic immigration will continue, particularly in the West where interest is already the highest nationally. This will undoubtedly increase the ranks of those in contact with Hispanics and thus the size of the issue public. Independently or concomitantly media coverage of bilingual education will also raise information levels. In either case bilingual education will become more widely discussed than at present.

The consequences of this depend partly on what kind of programs are presented. If bilingual education is portrayed as linguistic and cultural maintenance, which it has frequently been within the media despite the rarity of such programs, reactions will be negative. This negative reaction would be particularly pronounced among those intolerant of special minority assistance programs, with marked anti-Hispanic sentiment, or living in

Hispanic areas. This negative racial reaction will also affect other programs that involve the use of the native Spanish language but may favor programs in which no native language is used.

All programs will garner more support from those supportive of pro school and pro government services spending. The association with foreign language instruction is a positive one for bilingual programs but difficult to maintain when more information about programs is provided.

The fate of bilingual education programs, if given over to the public, depends on their attitudes toward recipient ethnic groups and support for government assistance to such groups, neither of which are overwhelmingly positive at present. Current program support levels are high because of widespread apathy and misinformation. This situation will undoubtedly change over the next few decades and public support levels will probably decline. The extent to which this occurs depends on how programs are portrayed. Cultural maintenance programs are likely to meet with the most opposition.

FOOTNOTES

1. For previous incarnations, see especially Sears & Whitney (1973), Sears et al (1980), Sears et al (1986), and Sears (1987).
2. A related idea is that making a particular attitude object salient will evoke the particular predispositions linked to it, on which political evaluations will then be made. See the agenda-setting research by Iyengar and Kinder (1987).
3. These theoretical issues have been discussed in more detail by Bobo (1983), Sears and Kinder (1985), and Sears, Huddy, and Jessor (1985).
4. The breadth of this bilingual experience throughout the population is suggested by the fact that it has very few demographic correlates: the young are somewhat more likely to have current proficiency without family language background, and blacks to have no family background, but otherwise there are few differences except for education. Twice as many college attendees are currently proficient compared to those without any college education (32 percent vs. 16 percent).
5. These are fairly highly correlated; r=.50. Moreover, as will be seen, the two variables have parallel effects, giving us some confidence in the validity of both.
6. Those who have current proficiency but did not grow up in a bilingual household do evaluate bilingual education significantly more favorably than those with childhood family non-English experience but no current proficiency. Put another way, the "self-made" bilingual people are more favorable to bilingualism than those who have rejected their childhood

experience. A claimed skill that is internally attributed is evaluated more favorably than a rejected and externally attributed aspect of childhood. However meaningful the difference, it is not a large one.

7. A similar analysis yielded very similar results, in analyzing support for the California tax revolt. See Sears and Citrin, 1985, Chapter 8.

8. This is perhaps not too surprising, since the item explicitly raises the question of how special attention to Hispanics will affect non-Hispanic children, which is quite similar to the symbolic racism items.

Table 1

Spontaneous Meanings of and Support for Bilingual Education

	Meaning		Mean Support
	National Sample (N=1170)	Oversample (N=400)	Total Sample (N=1570)
Language			
Spanish	81%	91%	2.05[a]
Other	19	9	3.18[b]
	100%	100%	2.29
Spontaneous Meaning			
Substantially Accurate			
Maintenance			
Teaching foreign students in their own language	6%	10%	-0.74[a]
Transitional and ESL			
Teaching in two languages	16	26	2.27[b]
Teaching English to foreign students	9	15	1.75[b]
	31	41	
Substantially Inaccurate			
Bilingualism	18	17	3.89[c]
Foreign language instruction	21	21	2.23[b]
	39	38	
No description	29	10	2.79[bc]
	100%	100%	2.29

Note: Support is the mean evaluation on a scale ranging from +10.25 to -10.25, with the neutral point at zero. Entries with different superscripts are significantly different ($p < .05$).

Table 2

Support for Bilingual Education among Non-Hispanics
(National Sample Only)

	Percent with Opinions	Percent Favorable to Bilingual Education	Item-Total Correlation
Overall Evaluation			
How do you feel about bilingual education? (favor)	90%	67%	.70
Do you think there is too much, too little, or about the right amount spent on bilingual education? (too little)	78	82	.63
Special Effects			
Bilingual education is very unsuccessful in teaching non-English speaking students to speak English. (disagree)	78	60	.43
Bilingual education would give non-English speaking students a fair chance at receiving a quality education. (agree)	92	79	.62
Bilingual education will greatly increase the chances of non-English speaking students finding work once they leave school. (agree)	91	74	.58
Bilingual education is very successful in helping students fit into American way of life. (agree)	92	76	.69
Bilingual education means that there would be less resources available for the education of English speaking students. (disagree)	87	57	.34

N = 1170

Table 3

Demographic Correlates of Support for Bilingual Education

	Raw Correlation	Standardized Regression Coefficient
Age	-.20	-.21**
Sex	-.06	-.04
Race	.13	.09**
Income	-.07	-.06*
Occupation	-.01	-.01
Education	.01	-.06*
R^2		.058

Note: Entries in the first column are correlation coefficients and standard regression coefficients are in the second.

*$p < .05$
**$p < .01$

Table 4
Personal Experience

		Frequency		
		National Sample	Oversample	Mean Support for Bilingual Education
Parental Role				
Children under 18 - yes		40	39	2.56
- no		60	61	2.13
Attending public school - yes		65	58	2.31
- no		35	42	2.98
Are/have studied/ying Spanish - yes		23	42	2.32
- no		77	58	2.65
Now/have been in bilingual program - yes		12	26	3.52^{a}
- no		88	74	2.38^{b}
Other children Hispanic - most		11	24	2.29
- some		28	44	2.20
- a few		35	23	2.67
- none		26	9	3.03
Bilingual Experience				
Childhood and current		13	23	2.38_{a}
Childhood experience only		20	19	1.77^{a}
Current proficiency only		11	11	2.74^{b}
Neither		56	47	2.39
Hispanic context				
Hispanics in own neighborhood?	Number increasing?			
A lot	Increasing	10	30	1.52^{bc}
	Not increasing	2	5	2.46^{abc}
Some	Increasing	7	19	$.78^{c}$
	Not increasing	7	11	2.06^{abc}
A few	Increasing	12	14	2.13^{abc}
	Not increasing	22	14	$2.88^{al.}$
None		41	7	3.02^{a}
Distance from nearest Hispanic community:				
Less than 5 miles		16	41	2.89
5 - 10 miles		15	22	2.78
10 - 20 miles		12	26	2.84
More than 20 miles		56	11	3.08
Percent Hispanic in County (census data)				
31 - 40%		2	52	1.23^{c}
21 - 30%		6	26	1.37^{bc}
11 - 20%		9	21	1.66^{bc}
6 - 10%		11	1	2.69^{ab}
5% or less		71	0	2.88^{a}

Note: Entries with different superscripts are significantly different ($p < .05$).

Table 5

The Parental Role and Support for Bilingual Education

	Parents of Children under 18		Non-parents
	Children in Public School	Other Parents	
Children learning Spanish			
Yes	1.86(115)	3.56(43)	NA
No	2.53(250)	2.83(166)	2.13
Children in Bilingual Programs			
Yes	2.82^{a}(61)	5.12^{b}(27)	NA
No	2.22^{a}(304)	2.66^{a}(182)	2.13
Hispanic children in own school			
Most	2.01^{c}(32)	3.29^{d}(41)	NA
Some	1.84(126)	3.50(44)	NA
Few	2.85(129)	2.15(44)	NA
None	3.20(73)	2.74(45)	2.13

Note: The entry is mean support for bilingual education. Number of cases in parentheses. Entries with different superscripts are significantly different ($p < .05$).

Table 6

Effects of Personal Experience on Support for Bilingual Education

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All respondents			Parents Only		
Personal Experience						
Parental role						
Children under 18	.01	.01	-.04			
In public school				-.07	-.03	-.08
Learning Spanish				-.03	.02	-.08
Taking bilingual programs				.13**	.12**	.12**
Hispanics in school				.01	.01	-.01
Good to know Spanish						.26**
Bilingual experience						
Family bilingual	-.04	-.04	-.01	-.06	-.03	-.05
Current proficiency	.04	.04	.04	.07	.09*	.07
Hispanic context						
County concentration	-.11**		-.08**			
Neighborhood estimate	-.06*		-.06*			
Composite		-.15**		-.17**	-.19**	-.22**
Demographics						
Age			-.20*		-.15**	
Sex			-.04		-.08	
Race			.10**		-.11*	
Income			-.05		-.05	
Education			-.04		-.01	
Occupation			.01		.00	
R^2	.025	.024	.071	.046	.100	.105

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

*p < .05
**p < .01

Table 7

Hispanic Context and Parental Role: Parents Only

Percent Hispanic in County

	Under 5%	5-20%	20% or more	
Have children under 18	43	36	28	$p < .001$
Have children in public schools	66	63	58	n.s.
Children learning Spanish	19	35	46	$p < .001$
Children in bilingual programs	10	20	24	$p < .001$
Some or most other children Hispanic	32	58	74	$p < .001$
A lot helpful to know Spanish	25	38	54	$p < .001$

Subjective Estimate of Hispanics in Own Neighborhood

	None	Few	Some	A lot	
Have children under 18	47	37	39	23	$p < .001$
Have children in public schools	69	62	60	58	n.s.
Children learning Spanish	19	26	40	38	$p < .001$
Children in bilingual programs	11	11	23	26	$p < .001$
Some or most other children Hispanic	20	40	86	80	$p < .001$
A lot helpful to know Spanish	24	34	43	45	$p < .001$

Note: Entries are the percentage of parents in each type of county affected in each of the ways listed.

Table 8

Factor Analysis of Specific Items on Educational and Government Spending

	PDI	Factor Analysis 1 F1 Frills	Factor Analysis 1 F2 Basics	Factor Analyses 2 F1 Government Services	Factor Analyses 2 F2 Educational Spending
Specific Educational Programs					
Math	+66%	-.03	.56	-.06	.48
Science	+59	.10	.57	-.04	.54
Social Studies	+28	.26	.44	.16	.49
Music, Art, Drama	+18	.45	.00	.35	.22
Foreign Languages	+37	.54	.19	.15	.43
Lilingual Education	+30	.58	.08	.37	.35
Public Schools in general	+47			.42	.37
Specific Government Services					
Defense	-15			-.17	-.01
Health and Medical Services	+42			.61	.13
Social Security	+48			.55	.05
Unemployment Compensation	+ 5			.62	.01
Welfare	-32			.59	.04
Government Services in general	+17			.67	.10
Variance accounted for		29.7%		28.0%	

Note: The entry in Column 1 is the percentage difference index (PDI): the proportion who feel too little is currently being spent in the area in question less the proportion who feel too much is currently being spent. The PDI is based on the national sample only. The factor analyses used orthogonal rotations and principal component factor extraction.

Table 9

Factor Analysis of Symbolic Predisposition, Racial Attitude, and Spending Scales

	Without Bilingual Education		With Bilingual Education	
	I	II	I	II
Basic Predispositions				
Equality values	.51	-.05	.45	-.09
Hard work values	.33	-.06	.33	-.08
Ideology	.45	-.08	.45	-.09
Party identification	.43	-.03	.39	-.05
Racial Attitudes				
Symbolic racism	.70	-.13	.68	-.15
Nationalism	.44	-.1[illegible]	.41	-.19
Specific Group Evaluations				
Majority-Minority	-.31	.47	-.27	.47
Mexicans	.00	.45	.01	.45
Cubans	.05	-.49	.04	-.50
Puerto Ricans	.07	-.30	.05	-.30
Government Spending				
Educational Spending				
Basics	.05	.05	.07	.0[illegible]
Frills	.37	-.16	.41	-.08
Foreign Language	.28	-.09	.33	-.05
Government Services	.62	-.03	.61	-.05
Bilingual Education	--	--	.52	-.02
Variance Explained	15.3%	6.0%	15.3%	5.7%
	21.2%		20.9%	

Note: The factor analysis used orthogonal rotation and principal factor extraction.

Table 10

Attitudinal Predispositions and Support for Bilingual Education and Foreign Language Instruction

	Support for Bilingual Education					Support for Foreign Language Instruction	
	Correlation	Regression Coefficient				Correlation	Regression Coefficient
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Attitudinal Predispositions							
Basic Predispositions							
Party Identification	.14	.02	.00	--	.02	.13	-.07**
Ideology	.20	.06**	.08**	--	.05*	.02	.06*
Egalitarian values	.23	.05*	.06*	--	.04	.13	.04
Hard work values	.14	.00	.01	--	.00	.09	.03
Racial Attitudes							
Symbolic Racism	.37	.24**	.26**	.33*	.21**	.19	.09**
Nationalism	.21	.07**	.08**	.10**	.07**	.10	.01
Group evaluations							
Majority-minority	-.14	.03	.01	-.01	.04	-.13	-.01
Mexicans	.03	.06**	.07**	.07**	.06*	-.01	.03
Cubans	.04	.01	.00	.01	.01	.04	-.01
Puerto Ricans	.11	.05*	.07**	.09**	.05*	.08	.06*
Government Spending							
Government Services	.27	.08**	.08**	--	.09**	.12	.01
Education - Basics	.01	-.03	-.01	--	-.02	.09	.06
- Frills	.20	.03	.07**	--	.03	.23	.17**
- Foreign Language Spending	.35	.27**	--	--	.26**	NA	NA
Group Conflist							
Education	.24	--	--	--	.11**	.11	--
Economic	.14	--	--	--	.04	.19	--
Total R^2		.265	.198	.158	.278		.092

Table 11

Variance Accounted for in Support for Bilingual Education

	Entire Sample	Parents (N=593)	Non-Parents (N=975)	Hispanic Areas[a] (N=607)	Non-Hispanic Areas (N=961)	Unique Variance[b] Entire Sample
R^2 contributed by:						
Demographics	.064	.053	.072	.098	.058	.022
Personal experience	.025	.035	.022	.006	.008	.021
Basic predispositions	.099	.085	.107	.124	.091	.016
Racial attitudes	.171	.142	.194	.203	.161	.030
Government spending	.190	.191	.189	.226	.170	.044
Group conflict	.072	.061	.087	.089	.057	.012
Total	.328	.323	.331	.368	.292	

Note: The entries are the variance accounted for (R^2) in regression equations containing only the category of variables indicated.

a: Counties in which Hispanic concentration is 10% or more.

b: Unique variance is calculated by subtracting variance accounted for by everything else from the total explained variance.

Table 12

Symbolic Determinants of Bilingual Education Support by Issue Meaning

	Maintenance (N=113)			Accurate Non-Maintenance (N=452)			Inaccurate No Description (N=964)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Racial Attitudes									
Symbolic Racism	4.61(1.14)**	--	4.67(1.28)**	4.04(.52)**	--	3.01(.56)**	3.15(.30)**	--	2.24(.31)**
Nationalism	3.02(.98)**	--	2.75(1.02)**	.82(.44)	--	.52(.41)	.45(.26)	--	.32(.24)
Specific Group Evaluations									
Minority vs Majority	.04(.05)	--	.05(1.05)	.02(.02)	--	-.01(.02)	.00(.01)	--	.01(.01)
Mexicans	-.09(.07)	--	-.06(.07)	.07(.03)	--	.06(.03)	.03(.02)	--	.02(.02)
Cubans	-.04(.08)	--	-.02(.08)	.02(.04)	--	.02(.04)	.00(.02)	--	.01(.02)
Puerto Ricans	.10(.08)	--	.15(.09)	.01(.04)	--	-.01(.03)	.04(.02)	--	.03(.02)
Government Spending									
Educational Spending									
Basics	--	.91(.68)	1.72(.67)*	--	-.42(.25)	-.30(.24)	--	-.20(.15)	-.17(.15)
Frills	--	.20(.50)	-.33(.49)	--	.26(.24)	-.02(.23)	--	.46(.14)**	.31(.14)*
Foreign Language	--	.08(.03)*	.04(.03)	--	.11(.01)	.09(.01)**	--	.09(.01)**	.08(.01)**
Government Services	--	3.67(1.04)**	.40(1.17)	--	2.68(.43)	1.24(.48)**	--	1.47(.25)**	.68(.27)*
R^2	.307	.205	.365	.199	.229	.300	.137	.198	.252
R^2 uniquely contributed by:									
Spending			.058			.101			.115
Race			.160			.074			.054

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard error in parentheses. Unique variance is calculated by subtracting variance due to the other set of predictors from the total explained by both.

*p < .05
**p < .01

Table 13

Determinants of Support for Different Bilingual Education Plans

	Maintenance (N=525)			Transitional (N=523)			ESL (N=522)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Racial Attitudes									
Symbolic Racism	4.28(.52)**	--	3.10(.56)**	3.63(.47)	--	2.96(.50)**	1.49(.46)**	--	1.50(.51)**
Nationalism	.76(.42)	--	.44(.42)	.54(.39)	--	.55(.39)	.00(.39)	--	-.14(.39)
Specific Group Evaluations									
Minority vs Majority	.01(.02)	--	.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	--	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	--	.00(.02)
Mexicans	.03(.02)*	--	.03(.02)*	.00(.01)	--	.00(.01)	-.01(.01)	--	-.02(.01)
Cubans	-.03(.02)	--	-.03(.02)	.01(.02)	--	.02(.02)	.04(.02)*	--	.05(.02)**
Puerto Ricans	.02(.02)	--	.02(.02)	.01(.02)	--	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	--	-.02(.02)
Government Spending									
Educational Spending									
Basics	--	-.15(.27	-.12(.27)	--	.22(.26)	.25(.25)	--	-.19(.24)	-.20(.24)
Frills	--	.40(.26)	.24(.25)	--	-.12(.24)	-.27(.23)	--	.36(.24)	.12(.24)
Foreign Language	--	.06(.01)**	.05(.01)**	--	.07(.01)**	.05(.01)*	--	.06(.01)**	.05(.01)**
Government Services	--	2.80(.43)**	1.72(.45)**	--	2.34(.41)**	1.05(.43)**	--	.27(.41)	-.43(.45)
R^2	.171	.147	.213	.173	.112	.201	.068	.041	.086
R^2 uniquely contributed by:									
Spending			.042			.028			.018
Race			.066			.089			.045

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Unique variance is calculated by subtracting variance due to the other set of predictors from the total explained by both.

*p < .05
**p < .01

Table 14

Support for Bilingual Education as a Function of Symbolic Meaning, Hispanic Context, Parental Role, and Symbolic Racism

	Maintenance		Transitional		ESL	
	Non-Parents	Parents	Non-Parents	Parents	Non-Parents	Parents
Hispanic Area						
High Symbolic Racism	-1.71(68)	-2.59(25)	.56(76)	1.42(32)	2.64(62)	3.99(25)
Low Symbolic Racism	3.20(75)	1.65(34)	4.10(63)	4.89(31)	4.34(80)	4.98(32)
Both	0.86	-0.14	2.16	3.13	3.60	4.55
Non-Hispanic Area						
High Symbolic Racism	1.63(91)	-.52(62)	1.80(85)	2.87(56)	2.27(92)	2.01(68)
Low Symbolic Racism	3.70(92)	4.30(75)	5.89(9[illegible])	5.31(76)	4.49(86)	4.40(69)
Both	2.67	2.11	3.95	4.27	3.34	3.22

Analysis of Variance

	F	df
Plan	30.41	2**
Minority Aid	122.08	1**
Parents	0	1
Hispanic Context	10.22	1**
Plan * Symbolic Racism	5.41	2**
Plan * Hispanic Context	8.94	2**
Plan * Symbolic Racism * Parents	1.02	2
Plan * Symbolic Racism * Hispanic Context	1.18	2
Plan * Symbolic Racism * Parents * Hispanic Context	1.70	2
Plan * Parents	3.12	2*

Overall F = 10.84, df = 23

Note: Entry is mean level of support for bilingual education, with number of cases in parentheses. The symbolic racism scale is split at the mean (1.9). Hispanic areas are defined as counties at least 10 percent Hispanic.

*p < .05
p < .001

Table 15

Variance Accounted for in Support for Bilingual Education as a Function of Symbolic Predispositions, Symbolic Meaning, Hispanic Context, and Parental Role

	Maintenance	Transitional	ESL
Racial Attitudes			
Hispanic Context: More than 10%			
Parents	.358	.131	.103
Non-Parents	.300	.195	.041
Hispanic Context: Less than 10%			
Parents	.241	.185	.109
Non-Parents	.119	.254	.116
Basic Predispositions			
Hispanic Context: More than 10%			
Parents	.170	.311	.060
Non-Parents	.132	.090	.116
Hispanic Context: Less than 10%			
Parents	.195	.076	.019
Non-Parents	.134	.184	.101
Government Spending			
Hispanic Context: More than 10%			
Parents	.291	.145	.059
Non-Parents	.212	.195	.049
Hispanic Context: Less than 10%			
Parents	.139	.105	.038
Non-Parents	.138	.109	.137
Parental Variables			
Hispanic Context: More than 10%	.147	.024	.118
Hispanic Context: Less than 10%	.154	.031	.067
Total			
Hispanic Context: More than 10%			
Parents	.464	.471	.217
Non-Parents	.406	.276	.174
Hispanic Context: Less than 10%			
Parents	.308	.292	.142
Non-Parents	.255	.323	.261

Note: The entries are the variance accounted for (R^2) in regression equations in the specified subsamples including only the category of predictors indicated.

Table 16

Unique Impact of Racial and Spending Attitudes on Support for Manipulated Versions of Bilingual Education (R^2)

	Maintenance		Transitional		ESL	
	Racial	Spending	Racial	Spending	Racial	Spending
Hispanic Context: 10%+						
Parents	.112	.074	.080	.060	.089	.067
Non-Parents	.154	.067	.054	.070	.017	.033
Hispanic Context: 10%-						
Parents	.076	.021	.135	.053	.087	.023
Non-Parents	.044	.058	.107	.012	.051	.091

Note: The entry is the unique variance accounted for in support for bilingual education in the designated subsample computed as follows. For racial attitudes: the total R^2 for symbolic predispositions, spending, and racial attitudes less that accounted for by symbolic predispositions and spending attitudes together. For spending, the same total less that accounted for by symbolics and racial attitudes.

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