ABSTRACT
        The Japanese sentence-final particle "no" is analyzed
as a marker of evidentiality, signaling that the speaker shares a
commitment to the knowledge in question with a group of which he is
part. In contrast, bare verb forms (BVs) (i.e., the absence of "no")
indicate that the speaker, as an individual, is committed to the
knowledge in question. These two forms are contrasted with other
evidential markers such as those of reported speech and "territory of
information" that concern whether the evidence lies with the speaker
or with another. The data used in the study are drawn from 14 hours
of audiotaped family conversation. The data reveal that while BVs
frequently encode knowledge the Japanese consider inaccessible, such
as psychological states, "no" frequently encodes knowledge it
considers accessible. The proposed analysis accounts for data used to
support previous analyses of "no," and also accounts for why "no" is
used in particular conversational contexts. It concludes with a
discussion of this analysis of "no" within a theory of social
meaning. (MSE)

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Group and individual evidentials:
sentence-final *no* and bare verbs in Japanese

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Recent studies on evidentials have clarified that language encodes the speaker's knowledge system (Slobin and Aksu 1982; Lee 1985; articles in Chafe and Nichols (eds.) 1986).[1] All the evidentials so far discussed in the literature, however, are analyzed as markers of the speaker's individual state of knowledge.

What I will propose today is that Japanese has a group evidential marker as well as an individual evidential marker. The sentence-final particle *no* is a group evidential marker, that is, the speaker together with his/her group authorizes knowledge.[2] The bare verbal is analyzed as an individual evidential marker. That is, the speaker alone authorizes knowledge. I will contrast this notion of authority for knowledge with that of territory of information, and I will mention how this new way of analyzing *no* incorporates previous accounts of *no*.

The data come from 14 hours of audio-taped relaxed conversations of four different families.

Japanese sentences may end with bare verbals or with the particle *no* as in (1a) and (1b):[3]

(1)a. John ga hon o yomu.
        John SUB book OBJ read
        'John reads books.'

(1)b. John ga hon o yomu *no*.
        John SUB book OBJ read PART
        'John reads books.'

The difference between a bare verbal clause and a *no* clause other than the fact that *no* nominalizes the clause is very subtle and elusive. Thus, *no* has puzzled a number of linguists.

In this paper I will be using evidence concerning accessibility to knowledge to support my claim concerning *no* and bare verbals. The uses of *no* and bare verbals are closely related to accessibility and inaccessibility to knowledge as those terms are understood in the Japanese folk belief system.

As discussed by a number of linguists (e.g. Kuroda 1973), in Japanese certain adjectives denoting one's psychological state at the moment cannot occur in bare form without a verbal suffix *-gatte iru* 'is showing an appearance

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of' if the subject is <u>not</u> 1st person, as in examples (2) and (3).[4]

(2a)   Watashi wa keeki o tabe-<u>tai</u> desu.
       I   TOP cake OBJ eat want COP
       'I want to eat (some) cake.'

(2b)* John wa keeki o tabe-<u>tai</u> desu.
       John   TOP cake OBJ eat want COP
       'John wants to eat (some) cake.'

(3a)* Watashi wa keeki o tabe-ta-<u>gatte iru</u>.
       I   TOP cake OBJ eat want showing the appearance of
       'I want to eat (some) cake.'

(3b) John wa keeki o tabe-ta-<u>gatte iru</u>.
       John TOP cake OBJ eat want showing the appearance of
       'John wants to eat (some) cake.'

This shows that in Japanese, one's immediate psychological state is treated as something known only to oneself but not to others.[5]
   In my data, I find that utterances in bare verbals most frequently express inaccessible knowledge (e.g. one's psychological states) and that utterances marked with *no* most frequently express accessible knowledge (e.g. knowledge supposedly shared among the members of society). This is shown in Figures 1 and 2 which represent the survey of my data.

Figure 1

Marking in Psychological State Utterances

<u>*no*</u>	<u>bare verbal</u>	<u>total</u>
5.8%	94.2%	100%

Figure 2
Marking in Common Knowledge Statements

<u>*no*</u>	<u>bare verbal</u>	<u>others</u>	<u>total</u>
75%	10%	15%	100%

   Du Bois (1986) claims that no utterance is accepted without authority and that providing a source of knowledge is a special case of providing authority. He observes, "A statement is sometimes called self-evident if it is considered a basic or foundation tenet of a particular

culture..." Underlyingly in the Western culture, there is a
folk belief that truth is reached by examining accessible
evidence and reasoning logically. In the Japanese folk
belief, however, truth is reached by having consensus among
all the members of a group.[6] Thus, it is reasonable to
propose that a group can function as an authority-providing
agent in the Japanese culture. In utterances with *no*, the
authority for knowledge is given by the group but <u>not solely</u>
by any particular individual in the group, although some
individual(s) in the group may be the source of knowledge.
In contrast, when the speaker uses a bare verbal he/she
authorizes the knowledge in question as an individual. When
we speak about something, we can speak about it as a member
of a group to which we belong or we can speak about it as an
individual. In both cases, the content of what we say can be
identical, but how the content is cast is different. *No*
indicates that the speaker is speaking as a spokesman of
his/her group; a bare verbal indicates that he/she is not
speaking in such a manner. Conversation (4) illustrates this
point.

(4) [C is dancing in an old-fashioned style to the music.
     A, Y and O are watching C dance.]

--> A: Ima wakai hito soo yuu odori dekinai *no* yo.
     'Young people today can't do that kind of dancing.'

    [C is switching to a rock & roll style of dancing.]

    C: Koo yuu no?
     'This kind?'

    A: Un
     'Yeah.'

--> Y: Sore shika dekinai *no* yo.
     '(They) can only do that.'

--> O: Ako-chan dansu *dekiru*?
     'Ako, can you dance?'

Here, A, C and Y discuss young people's dancing in general.
A and Y use *no* to mark their utterances. Knowledge of how
young people dance these days is a type of knowledge that is
shared in society. In his sense, this knowledge is
accessible to the members of the society which include the
speaker and the addressees. The speaker, by asserting common
knowledge, is speaking as a spokesman of the group which
consists of the speaker, the addressee and the society. The
authority for this utterance is given by the group. The type
of knowledge asked in O's question (i.e. Can you dance?), in
contrast, only belongs to an individual until it is revealed

to others. O uses a bare verbal.(i.e. *dekiru* 'can do'). The authority for this utterance is given by the speaker alone.

In conversations (5), again we see that a bare verbal is used to mark knowledge inaccessible to others (i.e. the child's desire). Both the mother and child authorize their utterances as individuals by using bare verbals.

(5) Mother   Child

-->   Tamagoyaki mada *hoshii*?
      'Do (you) want more omelette?'

      Tamagoyaki hoshii hito,
      arimasu yo, okawari.
      'Anyone who wants omelette,
      there is more.'

                 -->C: Kamaboko ga *hoshii*.
                     '(I) want fish cake.'

However, we cannot always equate accessible knowledge with group authority because there are cases in which knowledge is authorized by the group but this knowledge is not actually accessible to the addressee.

In the case of (6), the group is composed of the speaker, the society and the addressee, although the knowledge in question is accessible only to the speaker and the society. The addressee in this case is included in the group view by virtue of being a novice in the society. Inclusion of the addressee in the group indicates that even though the knowledge in question is not directly accessible to him, it is a type of knowledge that should be accessible to him. For example, caregivers often use *no* when imparting to children knowledge that is common to the members of the society but not yet learned by the child. (6) illustrates this point.

(6) Mother   Children

                           K: ((burp))

                           H: ((laugh))

      Sore wa ogyoogi
-->   warui *no* yo.
      'That's bad manners.'

The group must consist of at least the speaker and the addressee; at times it also includes society, as illustrated in (4) and (6).[7] (7) illustrates an instance in which the

group consists of only the speaker and the addressee.
Watching the child write in his diary that he will get up at
six the next morning, the mother in (7) questions this
information using *no*.

(7)   Mother   Child

                             ((writing in his diary))

-->Rokuji ni okin *no*?
   '(You)'ll get up at six?'

        The notion of authority for knowledge which I have been
describing here can subsume the concept of territory of
information as outlined by Kamio (1979). One of the
epistemological categories encoded in a number of languages
has to do with sources of information (e.g. Chafe and
Nichols (ed.) 1936; Kamio 1979). In the case of Japanese,
Kamio (1979) claims that one important distinction
concerning epistemological categories is whether or not the
speaker can <u>assume himself</u> to be the source of information
in the speech situation. Kamio (1979) says that such
information is in the speaker's territory of information and
is linguistically expressed by either a bare verbal (Kamio's
term "zero form") or *no*. On the other hand, information
outside of the speaker's territory is indicated by the
quotative marker *-tte*, or by the hearsay markers *-soo* or *-rashii*. He gives the following examples (Kamio 1979:219.):

        (8) Ookina iwa-ga <u>mieru</u> -yo/-<u>n</u> da.
             'A big rock can be seen.'

        (9) Ookina iwa-ga mieru -<u>tte</u>/-<u>rashii</u>/-<u>soo</u> da.
             'It appears/is said that a big rock can be seen.'


According to Kamio, (8) most likely reports the speaker's
own perception whereas (9) represents a perception by
someone other than the speaker.
        The crucial difference between the two notions of
territory of information and authority for knowledge is that
while the former involves a split between inclusion and
exclusion of the speaker with respect to where the
information lies, the notion of group and individual
authorities for knowledge does not involve such a split: the
speaker is always included in the authorizing agent. In
other words, the speaker authorizes knowledge either alone
or with the group.
        If we take Du Bois' view (1986) that no utterance is
accepted without authority, we can see as shown in Figure 3,

that the notion of authority for knowledge subsumes that of territory of information.

Figure 3: Schema of authority for knowledge in Japanese

<u>Authority</u>   <u>Ling. marking</u>

                                      with group —— *no*
                              yes <
Does <u>the speaker</u>   inc'ividually — bare verbal
authorize knowledge? <
                       no
                         \
                          ⌈require marking⌉ -*tte*
                          |to indicate | -*rashii*
                          ⌊the source   ⌋ -*soo*

If the speaker or the speaker's group is not an authorizing agent, he/she is required to linguistically indicate that the source is other than the speaker or his/her group. Thus, the case of information being outside of the speaker's territory is incorporated in the schema of the authority for knowledge.[8]

The actual usage of these linguistic markings are more complex than what is shown in Figure 3. These markers co-occur in the combinations given in (10a & b).[9]

(10)   a. <u>group authority</u>   b.<u>individual authority</u>

        -*rashii no*   -*rashii*
        HEARSAY PART   HEARSAY   (bare adj. form)

        -*soo*   na *no**   -*soo*   *da*
        HEARSAY COP PART   HEARSAY COP (bare form)

        -*tte* iu *no**   -*tte iu*
        QUOT say PART   QUOT say (bare form)

   * -*soo* requires the copula *na* before *no*, and -*tte* requires the main verb *iu* 'to say' before *no*.

The phenomenon presented in (10) would be difficult to explain with only the notion of territory of information. With the notion of authority, we can account for sequences such as those in (10). When uttering what others have said (i.e. the propositional content of reported speech), the speaker may report as an individual or as a member of his/her group what he/she has heard. Using the forms given in (10a) the speaker represents as a spokesman of his/her

group the information that originates in the third party of which he/she is not a part. On the other hand, by using (10b), the speaker reports as an individual information that originates from a third party of which he/she is not a part.

Language is not only a symbolic system but also a tool to create social and psychological realities (cf. Ochs in press; Haviland 1987). A number of instances of *no* are used to create and maintain affect of harmony between speakers and addressees. This affect is a consequence of the fact that *no* can directly establish contexts in which the speaker includes the addressee in his/her view to form a group (i.e. he creates co-membership between the speaker and addressee).

It makes sense that this is a common function of *no* in Japanese verbal interactions when we take the Japanese cultural norm of face-to-face interaction into consideration. As discussed by a number of scholars of Japanese culture and society (e.g. Nakane 1970; Reischauer 1977), in the Japanese society, the group is a more important social unit than the individual and the most important goal of face-to-face interaction is generally interpersonal harmony. The particle *no* marks and creates such an affect of harmony in face-to-face conversation.

In the space that remains, I will mention how this analysis can incorporate other proposals that have been made concerning *no*.

No is often associated with women's speech (cf. McGloin 1986). This is because women are more likely to create harmony with their addressee using *no* in their speech, since women, as members of the socially less powerful sex, need more mutual support.

Similarly, since the particle *no* includes the addressee in the speaker's group, it is also used as a positive politeness strategy, and in speech acts of explanation, persuasion, etc.

Also, since *no* most frequently marks knowledge accessible to the group members, the use of *no* often coincides with shared knowledge.

No is often translated into English as "the fact that ...". If the knowledge in question is authorized by the group, it is assumed by the members of the group to be true. One characterization of "fact" is that which is considered by everyone to be true.

Thus, the present analysis can incorporate previous analyses of *no*, namely *no* as a marker of women's speech (McGloin 1986), positive politeness (McGloin 1983), explanation (Kuno 1973), presupposition (McGloin 1980; Noda 1981) and fact evidential (Aoki 1986).

In sum, in this paper I have proposed: (1) there is evidence that utterances can be authorized by a group as well as an individual, (2) *no* and bare verbals are morphological indications of this distinction, (3) such a distinction is closely related to accessibility to knowledge, and (4) group authority, by including the

addressee in the speaker's group, establishes various social and psychological realities.

Notes

1. Following Chafe (1986), I will use the term "evidential" for linguistic features which concern any attitude about knowledge.
2. In Japanese, when speakers distance themselves from the addressee as in polite style, an inflection -*masu* (*desu* as a copula form) appears on the verb stem. In such instances *no* is followed by the copula *desu* (i.e. *no desu*). Further, in male speech, often *no* is followed by the plain copula form *da* (i.e. *no da*). These distinctions are not the main focus of this paper. Therefore, I will group together these forms: *no desu*, (and its variant *n desu*), *no da* (and its variant *n da*) and *no* itself. Thus, a reference to the term "(sentence final particle) *no*" refers to any of these forms throughout this paper.
3. There are other occurrences of *no* in Japanese with which I will not be concerned in this paper. These include the uses of *no* to mark genitive phrases, to create nouns from adjectives (cf. the English *big one*), and to subordinate clauses. I will not italicize such occurrences of *no* in my examples.
4. Other adjectives of this kind include *kanashii* 'sad', *sabishii* 'lonely', *ureshii* 'happy', *atsui* 'hot', *samui* 'cold' etc.
5. I am using the term "psychological state" to refer to ability as well as desire and intention (*hoshii* and -*tai*, which both mean 'want') and other mental and physical feelings. This is because one's ability is also some quality of an individual that can not be known until it is displayed.
6. The literature on the Japanese culture points out that there are no universal principles of truth in the Japanese culture. Therefore, truth is relative to the context (e.g.Christopher 1983) and decisions are made not by some principles but by the consensus of the group (Vogel 1979).
7. The fact that the membership of a group varies depending upon given contexts parallels the fact that the *uchi* and *soto* groups (the in-group and out-group) in Japanese society vary their memberships depending upon different social situations.
8. In Cook (1987) I claimed that in Japanese both the notions of authority for knowledge and territory of information are necessary. Since then I have changed my analysis and in this paper I am claiming that the notion of territory of information can be subsumed under authority for knowledge.
9. Kamio (1979) does not consider sequences such as those given in (10).

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