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ABSTRACT

American foreign policy must operate within the parameters of public opinion, and governmental and non-governmental actors must educate the characteristically alienated citizenry concerning policy issues. Since rational discourse is of limited benefit in the process, advocates instead use verbal representations or metaphor to instill within the public acceptance or rejection of policy. Metaphor (in the form of emotive symbols and narratives) sometimes evolves into a rhetorical icon that controls the legitimacy of foreign policy and subsequent governmental actions. This iconic perspective suggests the rationale for the often paradoxical state of U.S. foreign policy. The outcome of the Reykjavik (Iceland) Meeting in October 1986 between President Reagan and Soviet Chairman Gorbachev was especially problematic for the American government because of the continuation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as a viable policy. To defuse this problem, Reagan administration staff pursued the strategy of redefining the meetings by using emotive symbols to link SDI with an insurance policy or an effective shield and by using narratives that illustrated the tenacity of Reagan in dealing with the Soviets, thus emphasizing a strong presidency. This rhetorical bonding of SDI by metaphor allowed the White House to redefine the failed Iceland summit meeting as successful. If the aftermath cements SDI as an icon, SDI will be difficult to eliminate. This iconological approach of the U.S. government indicates why its commitments sometimes become impractical or dangerous international policies. (Sixty-six footnotes are appended.) (NKA)

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The Rhetorical Icon:
Toward an Iconological Theory
of U.S. Foreign Policy

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The Rhetorical Icon:
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ABSTRACT

Since American foreign policy must operate within the parameters of public opinion, governmental and non-governmental actors must educate the citizenry concerning policy issues. This essay argues that during the agenda-building process, policy advocates use metaphor to compensate for the limited expediency of rational discourse to instill within the public latitudes of acceptance or rejection of policy. Resultant is the evolution of the metaphor into a rhetorical icon which controls the legitimacy of foreign policy and subsequent governmental actions. This iconic perspective of American foreign policy suggests the rationale for the often paradoxical state of U.S. policy.

American international policy is often in a state of quandary. Militarily, the United States follows the outdated doctrine of attrition rather than maneuver warfare.¹ Representative is the 1983 invasion of Grenada by the United States. The intervention involved personnel from all four U.S. services--the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines--including six battalions of infantry and two of the elite Rangers sent in by the U.S. Army alone. According to one military strategist, the operation was tantamount to America bringing "in some elephants who went around stomping around."² In the Middle East, the necessity has arisen for a United States foreign policy, which provides for an accommodation among all nations within the Arab-Israeli Conflict.³ But even with accommodation being the recommended policy, the U.S. economically and militarily favors Israel.⁴ Discordant U.S. policy was also reflected in the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Not only was the action a blatant violation of international law, the incident represented a United States' "act of war" against Nicaragua.⁵

The incongruity of policy can be attributed to the agenda-building process which tends to limit participation of the citizenry and inhibit the decisions of governmental actors in the formulation of efficacious policy. This paper will suggest an iconological approach to the study of American foreign policy. Part one of this essay will provide a model of the rhetorical icon. In the second division, the aftermath of the Reykjavik Meeting will be discussed in terms of an emergent icon including: 1) problems originating from the meeting, and 2) the strategies employed by the Reagan White House to resolve the problems. The essay will conclude with implications of an iconological approach to policy and recommendations for future study.

I

The presumption exists within the American system of government that the will of the people must be reflected in the policies of the leaders.⁶ American foreign policy is no exception. Egressing from the Wilsonian era, official concern for satisfying public opinion has expanded as a major sphere of influence on American diplomacy.⁷

However, public opinion as an influential component in the agenda-building process of U.S. foreign policy is problematic. The American people have a propensity of indifference towards the U.S. polity. The apathetic nature of the public is attributable to the conflict within the psyche of the American individual of private versus public concerns.⁸ By opting for "privatism," a divorcement exists for the individual from political life, which leads to a motivational deficiency for gaining issue oriented information and reflecting policy preference to the government.⁹ Consequently, policy formulation is relinquished to governmental and non-governmental actors.

While the above is a disconcertion of the American political ideal of direct citizen participation in the policy process, the government, which is the final determinative of policy, can not operate autonomously from public opinion.¹⁰ The influence of public opinion is "legitimacy" or the "extent to which" governmental "actions are accepted as proper" by the citizenry.¹¹ If legitimacy is denied, elected officials are threatened with loss of office or the weakening of policy making abilities.¹²

The latitude of acceptance or rejection of foreign policy is engendered in the public through promulgations made during the agenda setting, formulating, and legitimation of "new" policy.¹³ The process begins when an international exigence--either real or perceived--is brought to the national agenda by governmental or non-governmental advocates who propose policy to solve the

problem.

For this policy to effectively resolve the exigence by moving from recognition to legitimation, the advocates are obliged to debilitate conflict confronting the proposal. The conflict arises predominantly through situational constraints and consists of problem definition and policy efficacy.¹⁴ Problem definition is fundamental due to the fact that societal events are "interpreted in different ways by different people at different times."¹⁵ The exigence must be construed within limits that identify and specify interests that generate a "high degree of agreement."¹⁶ The second constraint--efficacy--exists due to the abstract nature of policy. As Robert P. Newman has observed:

To give a good reason for adopting a certain policy involves providing evidence that the policy will have desirable consequences¹⁷

Providing evidence is formidable since "there are no facts about the future."¹⁸

Since, as stated, the characteristic of the American public is an alienation from political issues, rational discourse is of limited benefit in eviscerating the conflict.¹⁹ Therefore, advocates utilize verbal representations to substitute for the empirical experience or reality of the public.²⁰


The representations are of two types: emotive symbols and narratives. Emotive symbols merge the conflictual constraints with either concrete references or higher level abstractions. Narratives serve to defuse the constraints by endowing the perplexities with "culturally sanctioned meanings"²¹ by the "recounting and accounting"²² for human choice and action within the context of "shared-reality."²³ Thus, both representational forms operate as metaphor in that the conventions provide the abstract situational constraints of foreign policy with "context through other words."²⁴ The verbal representations do not provide description or reference but elicit images from the American encoded experience in order to determine how the public "should feel about the thing represented."²⁵

Credence to the rhetorical representations is enhanced by the perceived role and situation of the governmental and non-governmental actors. The primary governmental actor is historically and traditionally the Office of the Presidency.²⁶ Non-governmental policy advocates are generally special interest groups comprised of economic interest groups, the "military-industrial complex," and ethnic minorities.²⁷ The Administration capitalizes on the public's perception of the constitutional roles inter alia of the office as well as the situation while special interests primarily utilize the situation of the exigence.²⁸ By stressing role and situation, the advocates reinforce the rhetorical representations with a mythic credibility allowing for the personification and mandate of the policy.

As the instillment of legitimacy processes within the public psyche, the foreign policy abstraction inveterated in metaphor tends to become more significant, more powerful, and more personal than reality for the American public relying less on the pronouncements of the advocates. Ultimately, the identification between the verbal representations and the abstraction merge eventually eclipsing the constraints, advocates, and the exigence. Resultant is the evolution of the abstraction into a rhetorical icon. The process is illustrated by the following figure.

The rhetorical icon as an independent system controls the legitimacy of foreign policy and subsequent governmental actions. The symbol of the abstraction is suasy enough to determine for the American people acceptable as well as unacceptable actions of the government in the international arena. Accordingly, the icon is a part of the American "self concept." Comparable to the individual self concept, the American self concept is an "urge to become what we already are."²⁹ The rhetorical icon is instrumental in achieving that goal.

To support the contention of rhetorical icons within the agenda-building process, the Reykjavik Meeting will now be examined.



II

At the Reykjavik Meeting (October 11-12, 1986), President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev worked out a "series of accords in principle that surprised the negotiators themselves."³⁰ The tentative agreements included: 1) the banning of all medium-range missiles from Europe; 2) the initiation of a phased accord beginning with verification of existing treaties with the ultimate goal of the cessation of nuclear testing; 3) a limitation of nuclear launches, missiles and bombers, and the abolition of all ballistic missiles over ten years; and 4) "an agreed statement" concerning separated families, emigration and possible areas of cooperation.³¹ However, the series of talks, which might have produced "'historic' gains . . . foundered on" President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.³² Reagan's rejection of the Soviet stipulation to curb the initiative led to the culmination of the two day meetings with a failure to reach agreement.

The outcome of the Reykjavik Meeting was problematic for the Reagan Administration in three ways: 1) the upcoming congressional elections, 2) the legacy of the Reagan White House, and 3) the continuation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as a viable policy.

First, polls indicated defense as a major issue of concern to the electorate in the November elections.³³ The Administration was faced with the possible threat that the President could be perceived as escalating the arms race between the United States and the Soviets by his refusal to negotiate. If this occurred in October, Republican congressional candidates could pay the political price in November with the loss of critical House and Senate seats.

The second problem faced by the Administration was the fear of a negative legacy for the Reagan Presidency. Reagan initially began his term in office with a "benign neglect"³⁴ towards arms control advocating that to contain the

"Evil Empire"³⁵ a need was extant for America to rearm. This militarization posture led to the charge that Reagan was at best an adventurist cowboy and at worse a warmonger. To dispell the negative connotation, the Administration pronounced its military policy as "Peace Through Strength."³⁶ The goal of the rearmament policy was depicted as a "bargaining chip" to secure negotiations with the Soviet Union.³⁷ With the collapse of the Reykjavik Meeting, the Administration was once again faced with the resurgence of the hawkish image. If reacquired, the label in all probability would remain with the President as his administration passed into history in 1988 and would be regarded accordingly by historians.³⁸

The final problem faced by the Reagan White House in consequence to Reykjavik was the loss of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Proposed in 1983 during a national presidential address, S.D.I. was a challenge for U.S. scientists to develop an effective anti-ballistic missile defense to counter the perceived Soviet nuclear threat.³⁹ The initiative, immediately dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, received mixed commentaries. Although the Administration described S.D.I. as the solution to the Soviet problem,⁴⁰ critics charged that the policy would cost a "trillion or more dollars," would take a decade to deploy even if deployment was feasible, and ultimately would lead to the militarization of space by the superpowers.⁴¹ Failure to negotiate the reduction of existing military technology due to limitations placed on a non-existent technology could be perceived as ludicrous. If the American public were convinced of this, the President's request for future funding of the program would be jeopardized.⁴²

More important than the collapse of the S.D.I. policy was the threat of its impact on the first two problems faced by the Administration discussed above. Reagan could be viewed as a dogmatic President who refused to sacrifice a "vision" for the security of the United States.⁴³ Subsequently, a Democratic Congress could emerge as a result of the deadlock at Reykjavik, and the Executive would thereby become more ineffectual formulating both foreign and domestic policy.

With policy making hindered, the Reagan White House risked being regarded as one which sacrificed national defense and as an Administration which was impotent in foreign and domestic policy.

To defuse the problem created at Reykjavik, the Administration in what was characterized as the "most extensive public relations efforts of the Reagan Presidency" pursued the strategy of redefining the failed meetings.⁴⁴ The White House attempted the strategy by metaphorically defining S.D.I., the sine qua non of success for the Administration's plan. Verbal representations were employed to "put" S.D.I. into terms cognizable "by the people" for as Secretary of State, George Schultz stated, "I don't know who knows what S.D.I. is."⁴⁵

First, emotive symbols were used to metaphorically link the initiative with the following images:

INSURANCE POLICY: Insurance against cheating; insurance against someone getting hold of these weapons;

EFFECTIVE SHIELD: For the United States, for our allies, for the free world; and a

SHIELD THAT IS HELD IN FRONT OF FREEDOM.⁴⁶

By linking S.D.I. to other images, the Administration sought to respond to critics who would ask: "Why not give up S.D.I. for this [Gorbachev's] agreement?"⁴⁷ That response according to Reagan was:

S.D.I. is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. S.D.I. is America's security guarantee--if the Soviets should--as they have done too often in the past--fail to comply with their solemn commitments. S.D.I. is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. S.D.I. is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.⁴⁸

[Emphasis mine.]

Along with metaphoric symbols, the Administration used narratives to cause S.D.I. to share qualities with other entities accepted by the American public--particularly a strong presidency. This convention was used to demonstrate that

S.D.I. was synonymous with a determined Executive's foreign policy objectives of the "extension of freedom" and the "prevention of war."⁴⁹

Administration officials expanded S.D.I. within the broader context of a strong presidency by narrativizing the President's actions at Reykjavik to demonstrate that in the Reagan persona, the Soviets were ". . . up against someone who is capable of saying no . . ." as well as ". . . who will judge the interests of the United States and hold firm for them."⁵⁰ Director of White House Communications, Pat Buchanan exemplified the strategy in the following "fascinating story":

We [the American delegation] were waiting up in the American Room first for the President's proposal--the sweeping thing I have just described. And we were waiting, and waiting. And finally somebody said, "They're breaking."

So the American delegation moved around to the balcony. And as Gorbachev and the President came out of the lower room. . . . But one-tenth of one second later when you looked at the President's and Gorbachev's face, you said, "That's it."

And somebody beside me said, "The body-English is all wrong."

And so--then we went down the stairs. And the President stood in the foyer with Gorbachev sorta right next to him looking right at him. Closer than I am to you. And we walked by the two of them and went out the side of Hofdi House. And we stood on the side, and the cameras were in the distance.

And the President came out the front door. And when he did--I didn't hear him even though I was very close and obviously they had translators. But a friend of mine who is a photographer, who leaped into the car with me that left. He said he heard the final exchange.

And it went almost verbatim like this. According to him, that the President said something like that: "I don't know when we're going to meet again."

And Gorbachev said, "I don't know what we could have done differently." And the President said, "You could have said yes."⁵¹

[Emphasis his.]

The image attempted by this narrative as well as others was the tenaciousness of the Reagan White House in dealing with the Soviets.⁵² With the situation described as one "with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted" and "no illusion about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions,"⁵³ officials explicated S.D.I. as an extension of a President who would not "give the store away."⁵⁴ Limitations

on S.D.I. would weaken the "position of strength" endangering the "freedom and future" of the United States.⁵⁵ Consequently, S.D.I. became embroiled in the presidential foreign policy objectives resulting in greater difficulty of rejecting the Administration's attestations that: "We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States."⁵⁶

The rhetorical bonding of the Strategic Defense Initiative by emotive symbols and narratives allowed for the redefinition of the failed Iceland Summit predicated on the Administration's justification for its unwillingness to make concessions. Accordingly, White House officials redefined the meetings as successful and depicted early analyses of the summit as "superficial and mistaken."⁵⁷ Secretary Schultz, whose immediate pronouncements of the meetings were expressed as "deeply disappointed at the outcome"⁵⁸ was representative of the revision when later he stated:

The last thing that happened was a very important movement in directions that are good for the United States. And so as we have assessed it--and others have--we have said now look at these accomplishments.⁵⁹

[Emphasis his.]

III

An iconological approach to American foreign policy affords an explanation as to why the policy is often paradoxical. Viewing policy from an iconic perspective suggests that "conditioned reflexes" of the American public function as legitimacy determinants for the actions of the government. This latitude as with other attitudinal phenomena which have their bases in symbolism and not in fact "represents a comparatively unflexible, rigid form of adaptation."⁶⁰ For instance, if the aftermath of the Reykjavik Meeting instills S.D.I. as an icon, this could determine as Sam Donaldson, White House Correspondent for ABC News, posited:

. . . whether suddenly Star Wars takes off as something that goes along with the founding principles of this country as a bedrock which we won't give up⁶¹

Should this occur, the United States will be mandated to spend the estimated funds for S.D.I.'s deployment. This expenditure would come at a time when the United States must balance the budget by reducing spending to maintain national health.

Second, with the iconism of S.D.I., negotiations with the Soviet Union which are perceived as threatening the policy would be unthinkable. The current Administration as well as those of the future would not be compelled by the threat of public opinion and by history to negotiate. The neo-Cold War of the 1980's could re-emerge with ever increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This would lead to even more weaponry and even higher defense spendings. The United States would be faced with the destabilization of its budget while the world's political arena would be one of uncertainty and more doubt concerning the world's future.

The iconological approach also indicates why the United States government commits itself to "impractical or dangerous international policies."⁶² First, the icon is based on abstraction--creating "a misleading discrepancy between the . . . meaning of words and their practical significance" ⁶³ Governmental actors may come to "believe their own words" or the words of other actors within the policy process, and "as often happens, the speaker is as much misled as his audience."⁶⁴ Second, governmental actors are a product of the American socialization process. Therefore, they are not immune to the influences of extant icons within the American self concept. As with the general public, officials in the policy formulating process are preconditioned to the icon's acceptance. Finally, elected officials risk denial of legitimacy which may be "political suicide" for their career as well as future policy making abilities

if the government actor violates an icon. For example, the Reagan Administration has professed consistently that "America will never make concessions to terrorists . . . nor ask . . . any other government to do so."⁶⁵ The revelation of arms shipments to Iran and the involvement of Israel for the transfer and release of American hostages has resulted in the Reagan White House approval rating to drop dramatically and subsequent questioning of the government's ability to control foreign policy.⁶⁶ For these reasons, official policy formulators are predisposed to follow the dictates of accepted rhetorical icons even if conflictual with expedient policy.

This approach to the understanding of U.S. foreign policy is incomplete. More case studies are needed to isolate existing icons; verbal representations, which give rise to the icons; and means of the representations' employment. With future investigation and analysis, a more thorough comprehension of the rhetorical icon in the foreign policy process can be achieved. These studies would enable the scholar to determine when and under what circumstances icons emerge and deteriorate, and how actors within the process can escape their effect. Finally, future studies might lead to a more interested public in international affairs. This public--hopefully--would participate within the system influenced by rational discourse rather than by emotive symbolism.

Notes

¹"The American Way of War," PBS Frontline, 30 April 1985, p. 9.

²"The American Way of War," p. 15.

³Accommodation is an attempt to resolve the conflict in the middle east by securing peace for Israel in exchange for her return to the Arabs of those West Bank territories captured during the 1967 Middle East War. This attempt at middle east conflict resolution was first initiated by Henry Kissinger in 1973 but in all practicality has never been applied to U.S. policy.

⁴"Interview with former Illinois Congressman Paul Findly and Hyman Bookbinder, Chairman of the American Jewish Committee," CBS News Nightwatch, 12 July 1985.

⁵International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1949, p. 4; p. 244. See also: Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publ. Co., 1986), pp. 165-7.

⁶For instance, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro argue that a substantial congruence exists between public opinion and policy on highly visible issues. The authors suggest that opinion changes are important causes of policy change. See: Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science Review (March 1983), pp. 188-9.

⁷President Wilson initiated public opinion as a component of the foreign policy process with statements comparable to those he delivered at the Paris Peace Conference when he stated:

. . . [W]e are not representatives of governments, but representatives of people. . . . It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. . . . They expect their leaders to speak their thoughts and no private purpose of their own. They expect their representatives to be their servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate.

See: Woodrow Wilson, "Second Session of Paris Peace Conference," Paris, France:

25 Jan. 1919; see also: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age 4th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), pp. 231-2; and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), p. 193.

⁸Harry Holloway with John George, Public Opinion: Coalitions, Elites and Masses 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 166.

⁹Holloway, p. 167.

¹⁰Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formulation of Men's Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 124.

¹¹William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 16.

¹²As Ralph B. Levering observes, the public "probably has its greatest impact upon the policy process at the voting booth in national elections." Denial of legitimacy is evidenced in the Executive with Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek re-election due to his Vietnam Policy and the defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980 primarily attributed to his handling of the Iranian Crisis. In Congress, adverse public reaction registered over the Panama Canal Treaties in 1976 is credited in part to the defeat of half the senators who supported the treaties and who were up for re-election in 1978. See: Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy: 1918-1978 (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1978), pp. 152-3; Crabb, p. 75; and Crabb and Holt, pp 73-4.

¹³I use the word "new" because of the "non-routine" nature of policy making which occurs when policy is perceived to be different in character from other governmental policies. These policies can "upset normal decision making" and tends to attract the "attention of outsiders." Therefore initiatives of new policy are forced into the position of selling the policy to the public.

Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy 3rd ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1984), p. 11. For a detailed explanation of the policy making process see: Ripley and Franklin, pp. 1-30.

¹⁴Ripley and Franklin, p. 7.

¹⁵Ripley and Franklin, p. 4.

¹⁶Ripley and Franklin, p. 7.

¹⁷Robert P. Newman and Dale R. Newman, Evidence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), p. 33.

¹⁸Newman, p. 35.

¹⁹For instance, Newman argues that during the formulation of policy concerning communist China (1951-1960), decisions were not reached rationally, but by "fanning the flames of hostility and chauvinism." See Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China: A Study in Argument (New York: Macmillan, 1961) p. 286.

²⁰For treatments of political symbolism see: Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building 2nd ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1983), pp. 56-64; Robert E. Denton, Jr., The Symbolic Dimensions of the American Presidency: Description and Analysis (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1982), pp. 96-102; and Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, Mediated Political Realities (New York: Longman, 1983).

²¹Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical Understanding, ed. Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki (Madison: Univ. of Wisc. Press, 1978) p. 51.

²²Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs (March 1981), p. 6.

²³Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in On Narrative, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 2.

²⁴C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meanings: A Study of the

Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1923), p. 214.

²⁵White, "The Historical Text," p. 53.

²⁶As Crabb observes, the Executive calls upon a variety of advisory and administrative agencies--National Security Council, the Cabinet, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and agencies comprising the "Intelligence Community" as well as other sources--to "assist . . . in the formulation of policy" See, Crabb, p. 60. It should be noted that in recent years a goal has been pursued by legislators to "make Congress an 'equal partner' with the President in the formulation and administration of American foreign policy--thereby reversing the long period of Executive dominance in the diplomatic field " For the most part, however, congressional influence on foreign policy is limited primarily to Congress monitoring the actions of the executive through activities collectively known as legislative oversight. See: Crabb, p. 188, and Ripley and Franklin, pp. 19-21.

²⁷Crabb, pp. 239-51.

²⁸Robert E. Denton argues that the presidential roles create a source of power. For instance, the office encompasses such constitutional roles as "Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander in Chief," and "Chief Legislator." Extra constitutional roles include "Chief of Party, Protector of the Peace, Manager of Prosperity, World Leader," and "Voice of the People." These roles are cloaked in myth, magic, and reality, and when manipulated tend to "cloud issues" and "blur situations." See: Denton, pp. 42-3, and pp. 117-8. An example of special interests initiating an international exigence due to situation is the American Jewish Conference which existed from 1942-1948. During the six year existance, the lobby brought to the U.S. agenda the exigence for a Jewish Homeland (Israel). The group was effectively able to use the situation of the Jewish Holocaust to support one truism of their campaign that: "Israel is

historic justice and serves as just compensation for innumeral massacres."

See: Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Policy: 1942-1947 (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), p. vii; pp. 17-36; and p. 204.

²⁹S. I. Hayakawa, Symbol, Status and Personality (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), p. 38.

³⁰Bernard Weinraub, "In Iceland: How Grim Ending Followed Hard-Won Gains." New York Times, National ed., 14 Oct. 1986, p. 5, col. 2.

³¹"Arms Control: What Might Have Been," New York Times, National ed., 14 Oct. 1986, p. 5, cols. 4-5.

³²Leslie H. C. lb, "Sticking Points in Iceland," New York Times, National ed., 13 Oct. 1986, p. 1, cols. 3-4.

³³"Defense as a major issue of concern to the electorate" might seem conflictual with an earlier observation that the American people are indifferent concerning foreign policy. However, people reflect concern for issues that "jeopardize" everything they might hope for "in terms of standards of living, health, and the prospects for their children . . ." Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union reflect such an issue. The Soviet Union's arrest of U.S. Journalist Nicholas Daniloff in September, 1986 as well as the U.S.'s expulsion of Soviet diplomatic personnel from the U.N. during September and October, 1986 served to enhance a perception of growing conflict between the two superpowers. Consequently, defense as a "major concern" arguably would result from that perception by the American people. See: Holloway, p. 166; see also: "Interview with Senator Daniel Moynihan, D-New York, and Senator Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyoming," CBS New Nightwatch 15 Oct. 1986.

³⁴Strobe Talbott, "Buildup and Breakdown," in Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1983, ed. William P. Bundy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 588.

³⁵Ronald Reagan, "Address to Evangelical Christians," Orlando, Fla.: 8 Mar. 1983.

³⁶"Nuclear Freeze Debate," Donahue Show, 31 Mar. 1983.

³⁷"Debate,"; see also: Talbott, pp. 588-9.

³⁸"Interview with Pat Buchanan, Dir. of White House Communications,"
CBS News Nightwatch, 15 Oct. 1986.

³⁹Ronald Reagan, "Star Wars Address," Washington, D.C.: 23 Mar. 1983.

⁴⁰Reagan, "Star Wars."

⁴¹Nuclear physicist, I.A. Robbie, who worked on the Manhattan Project during WWII argues that S.D.I. is a "foolish" project "of an old man" of immense size that might take twenty years to accomplish. As Robbie states, "Think about the arrogance . . . he [Reagan] knows nothing about this" but announces the project to the world "before he consults the scientists." "Interview with I.A. Robbie," Jimmy Breslin's People, ABC, 6 Dec. 1986.

The cost estimate was stated by Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., member of the Senate Arms Committee. See: "The Reagan--Gorbachev Summit," ABC News 12 Oct. 1986.

⁴²"The Reagan--Gorbachev Summit." See also: Bernard Weinraub, "U.S. Acts to Enhance Image After Talks," New York Times, National ed., 15 Oct. 1986, p. 7, col. 3.

⁴³"Opinions Concerning the Presidential Address," ABC News 13 Oct. 1986.

⁴⁴Weinraub, "U.S. Acts," p. 7, col. 2.

⁴⁵"Interview with Secretary of State George Schultz," ABC News Nightline 15 Oct. 1986.

⁴⁶George Schultz, "Reykjavik News Conference," Reykjavik, Iceland: 12 Oct. 1986.

⁴⁷Ronald Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik Meeting," Washington, D.C.: 13 Oct. 1986.

⁴⁸Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik."

⁴⁹The "extension of freedom" objective includes the "growth of democratic institutions around the world" entailing American assistance of "freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua,

Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere." Prevention of War includes "rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and above all, beginning to work on the Strategic Defense Initiative." See: Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik."

⁵⁰"Interview with Secretary of State George Schultz."

⁵¹"Interview with Pat Buchanan."

⁵²For instance, Pat Buchanan observed that "if Franklin Roosevelt had been as tough at Yalta . . . as Ronald Reagan was at Reykjavik, we might not have had some problems that we've got today." See: "Interview with Pat Buchanan."

⁵³Reagan stated that "from the earliest days" of the Administration, he has recognized the intention of the Soviet Union. This intention was voiced by the Administration during the "Address to the Evangelical Christians" in which Reagan stated that the goal of the Soviets was world domination. See: Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik." See also: Reagan, "Address to the Evangelical Christians."

⁵⁴"Interview with Secretary of State George Schultz."

⁵⁵Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik."

⁵⁶Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning Reykjavik."

⁵⁷Weinraub, "U.S. Acts," p. 6, col. 1.

⁵⁸Schultz, "Reykjavik News Conference."

⁵⁹"Interview with Secretary of State George Schultz."

⁶⁰Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity (Lakeville, Connecticut: The International Non-Aristotelean Library Publishing Co., 1948), pp. 195-6.

⁶¹"Opinions Concerning the Presidential Address."

⁶²Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech (November 1984), 340.

⁶³Grant Hugo, Appearance and Reality in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 19.

⁶⁴Hugo, p. 18; p. 19.

⁶⁵Ronald Reagan, "Presidential Address Concerning TWA 847 Hijacking,"
Washington, D.C.: 18 June 1985.

⁶⁶Richard J. Meislin, "46% Approve Reagan's Work, Down 21 Points," New York Times, National ed., 2 Dec. 1986, p. 1, col. 5. See also: Rich Jaroslasky, "Polls Show Americans Strongly Oppose President's Shipment of Arms to Iran," Wall Street Journal, National ed., 20 Nov. 1986, p. 58, cols. 2-3.