ABSTRACT
        The role of academic staff and faculty members in
college governance was studied at two public universities. The frame
of reference was the social contract model, which posits that
individuals give up some rights in order to have other rights
protected. Documents were analyzed and interviews were conducted with
50 staff: full professors and associate and assistant professors
comprised the faculty category, while academic staff were either
instructors or other professionals such as librarians, counselors,
admissions counselors, and nurses. Interview questions concerned the
participation of staff in governance, their satisfaction with the
system, and their interests as participants within the process. Four
conceptually distinct but empirically overlapping categories of
governance were identified: system governance, institutional
governance (university-wide committee structures such as the faculty
senate), college governance (consisting of departments for a college
with the institution), and departmental governance. It was found that
faculty participation in governance varied across professional ranks
and that job experience and personal interests of faculty affected
their participation. (SW)

Faculty and Academic Staff Participation

in Academic Governance: The Social

Contract Model

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Abstract of the Study

This study analyzed the level of involvement in college governance between academic staff (tenured or on tenure track) and faculty members. The social contract model was used as the frame of reference to guide the study.

The multiple-case study method was used to obtain data; fifty open-ended interviews were conducted: 30 with faculty members and 20 with academic staff from two research sites selected a priori. Demographic characteristics as well as other variables were analyzed to study other relationships.

Overall, the social contract model is partially applied to academic staff and some faculty members in governing institutions of higher education. When it came to decide on important issues, most faculty members were engaged in deciding those issues, while academic staff were marginally involved, and sometimes not involved at all.

It is perhaps all too fashionable to begin a discussion such as this one by subjecting part of the title to some semantic analysis to dispel any subconscious motivations which it may evoke among the readers of this paper. Nonetheless, however hackneyed it may seem, it is absolutely essential to begin this particular exchange with the rhetorical inquiry: What is Academic Governance? It is necessary to do so simply because its meaning has drifted away from its original conceptualization.

A typical misconception about governance is that it is often equated with the term government which implies the administration of public policy in a political unit. However, governance refers to the internal processes and structures through which individuals and groups participate in and influence institutional decision-making within colleges and universities (Birnbaum, 1985; Corson, 1975; Duryea, 1973). Accordingly, governance also defines and differentiates the role of other members within the university community. Mortimer et al (1978), and The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973) also have eloquently illustrated the interrelationships associated with the concept of governance.

These writers thus conceive the concept of "academic governance" to be any attempt to establish general principles about how institutions of higher education organize themselves to respond to internal and external influences or constituencies.

Reviewing the literature on academic governance, Reyes and McCarty (1985) commented that a systematic study of academic organization has yet to be made. These comments are still true.

Few students of higher education have turned their attention to academic governance and its attributes. To understand what academic governance is like -- what its characteristic structures, processes, and functional problems are -- one must rely on empirical work directed toward these questions, informed by a more general conception of academic governance. As a result, this empirical literature is fragmentary and discontinuous.

Among the most often cited works concerning academic governance is Duryea's historical account about the evolution of university organization. This work, however, describes the models used by colleges and universities and the precedents which served as springboard for organizational changes within these institutions. The emphasis that departmental identification along with the professionalism of faculty members has led faculty governance, is clearly evident in Duryea's work. Yet, this historical account did not analyze the concept of governance.

On the other hand, Baldridge et al (1977) provided a more detailed analysis of different models of governance. Based on Baldridge's (1971) study, they proposed a political model to analyze university governance. Likewise, Stroup (1966) used Weber's bureaucratic model as a descriptor of the governance structure of colleges and universities. This model was criticized on the basis that it paid no attention to the informal structure and other processes that apply to academic governance. Still another image of college governance was proposed by Millet (1962) and by Goodman (1962) describing university governance as

a process of concensus of decision making. Finally, Cohen and March (1974) described academic organization as an "organized anarchy" in which there is little central control or coordination. In sum, these models present academic governance as a structured or unstructured process; however, little systematic assessment has been conducted on these conceptual models to ascertain their hueristic power.

Another critical element in academic governance is faculty and academic staff participation in such a process. It is well documented that the participation of these groups in the governance structure of any university is essential. Concerning faculty, Clark (1971) noted that faculty has moved away from collegiality because of its professionalism and the growing size of colleges or universities. Hill and French (1967) indirectly contributed to the study of governance by analyzing the power of chairpersons as perceived by professors. They found that professors saw themselves as exercising considerable influence in their colleges. Accordingly, authority hierarchy did exist; nonetheless, professors wielded "as much control as the control to which they were subjected" (p. 455). McCarty and Reyes (1986), and Reyes and McCarty (1985) explored different models of academic governance. They concluded that professors as well as chairpersons perceived academic deans using mostly the collegial frame of reference to make decisions. Their research, however, was conducted at a large research institution. Therefore, should institutional variability be introduced, the frame of reference may very well change.

On the other hand, a group largely ignored in the professional literature is the academic staff. This group includes a highly educated non-faculty professional staff which provide academic and administrative as well as instructional services to the college or university. The literature is sparse, but when mentioned, they are described as administrative and professional employees, professional and scientific employees, exempt employees, and non-nons -- those with no classification (Hohestein and Williams, 1974; Freeman and Roney, 1978).

The label "academic staff" encompasses many personnel with diverse roles, responsibilities, and levels of participation within a college or university. Three general categories have been often used to circumvent the ambiguity of the label. The General Professional Academic Staff includes those who are involved in policy development or execution. Some members of this group also participate in directing, organizing or supervising activities. The second category is the Academic Support Professional Staff --those in charge of duties extending and supporting the research, teaching, or public service functions of the college or university. The third category includes non-faculty who have instructional responsibilities which are temporary and give no guarantee of employment beyond one academic year. This category is labeled Instructional Academic Staff.

It is generally recognized that academic staff personnel are committed to their institutions. Even though administrative or support personnel do not execute the traditional faculty

functions of teaching, research, and public service, the work
they carry out is closely associated with the academic mission of
the college or university. It is more likely that research and
instructional academic staff participate in those traditional
functions executed by faculty. Other academic staff,
nonetheless, are in constant contact with faculty and students,
and have expertise which contributes to the overall quality of
the college or university. Although academic staff participate
in the conduct of university governance, their participation is
largely unrecognized and is given little attention in the
literature.

Wright (1986) assessed the involvement of academic staff in
institutional governance. She found that academic staff
participation in institutional policy-making tends to be
determined, both in form and the degree of participation, by
faculty members. Furthermore, she indicated that academic staff
membership on faculty committees was increasing because of their
initiative to participate and faculty interest in having their
participation. Baldridge (1978) noted that the role of academic
staff in the governance process varies with institutional
affiliation. Accordingly, academic staff wield a great deal of
power in the college or university, particularly where there is
not a strong tradition of faculty governance. Leslie et al
(1982) and Glenny (1979) also have addressed academic staff but
from different perspectives. For example, they reviewed part-
time and non-tenure track faculty in some detail. In sum,
academic staff plays essential and active roles in the governance

of colleges and universities; however, few systematic studies
have been undertaken to assess their roles in college governance.

The purpose of this paper is to study the role of academic
staff and faculty members in college governance, using the social
contract model as a frame of reference.

Theoretical Framework

Most colleges and universities subscribe to one or another
form of governance, what Weick (1976) called a "loosely coupled
system," what Baldridge (1971) described as a "political system,"
or what Millet and Goodman (1962) referred to as a "community of
scholars." While the governing board of a college or university
may be responsible for setting overall institutional policy and
assuming solvency, many experts suggest that boards should share
governance decision-making with various campus constituencies
(Nason, 1975; Baldridge, 1971). The various missions of each
institution have their own constituencies and all must be heard.
This perspective argues that good leadership encourages
constituent groups in their own aspirations.

This cooperative approach to campus governance is what Keely
(1980) called a social contract model and what Chaffee (1984)
called an interpretive model. The social contract or
interpretive model denies that social collectives have personal
ends or welfares; only individuals are seen to be capable of
preferring one state of affairs over another. According to Keely
(1980) the "purpose as well as the binding element of social
organization is the satisfaction of diverse individuals

interests; and collective welfare, to the extent the term is
meaningful at all, is a direct function of individual welfares"
(p. 343). Furthermore, the social contract assumes that an
organization involves agreements among the participants to
cooperate for benefits generated by their own efforts, implying
that even everyday working relations are the products of
individual behavior.

This individualism, however, does not mean that
organizations do not have goals or that individuals do not share
goals. What seems to hold an organization together is not
necessarily agreement on results of joint action, but agreement
to the actions themselves because of what participants
individually derive from their association.

The role of the leader in an organization is communicating
and interpreting institutional policies and missions through
language, symbols, ritual, and so forth (Chaffee, 1984; Feldman
and March, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981). The social contract or
interpretive model views the organization as existing through the
medium of communication which binds autonomous, self-interested
participants. The role of the leader is not so much one of
directing as it is one of negotiating, persuading, defining
(Smircich and Morgan, 1982). This role comes close to that
described by Peck (1983) in his discussion of successful college
presidents: "Entrepreneurial administrators appear not to control
or manage but to supervise. They are brokers of change,
interpreters of policy, organizers of opinion, and supporters of
the college's mission and purpose" (p. 20). Peck said that, as

an interpreter of policy, the successful president must be aware of the stake that each participant has in the campus and in the decision-making process.

In sum, organizations are viewed as contracts -- agreements on behavior satisfying the separate interests of the participants. Individuals give up some rights in order to have other rights protected. The stability of these agreements is assured only as long as individuals within the society or organization see their interests being protected.

It was postulated earlier that the essence of the model is the agreement between an individual and the institution. Theoretically the institution signs a contract in which the individual gains some rights but also gives up others. To test the applicability of the social contract model the investigators used three theoretical constructs: level of participation, satisfaction with the governance structure, and identification with the institution.

Purpose and Methodology

The objectives of this study were to test the applicability of the social contract model in colleges and universities and to examine the participation in academic governance between academic staff and faculty members, using the social contract imagery.

The model presented above describe organizational behavior that is not easily recognized using quantitative methodology. How this behavior really functions and takes place is generally not normatively legitimate, and interpretive methods are needed

to discover and obtain these kinds of data. Methods that involve observation and open-ended interviews, eliciting descriptions of events and motives of individuals, are needed in this situation. For this reason, the multiple case study method, along with nonparticipant-observation and document analysis, were selected to conduct this study (Yin, 1985).

This study was conducted in two public universities each with aporoximately 11,000 undergraduate and graduate students. The primary mission of these institutions is teaching. Each institution has approximately 20 departments. These departments aie usually small, some consisting of three faculty members; others consist of more than a dozen members. These universities operate within a system of universities established by statute. Each is headed by a chancellor who sets policy for that particular campus under the direction of system administration.

A fact sheet compiled in 1985 revealed that the University of Wisconsin System had in its service at that time 13,838 "unclassified" employees: 6,725 faculty and 7,113 academic staff. Faculty are generally defined as individuals hired by academic departments and having tenure or tenure-track status. The system divides academic staff into two groups, teaching and non-teaching. Teaching academic staff are hired by academic departments as instructors; they generally have annual appointments with no commitment of renewal, and they are not eligible for tenure. Non-teaching academic staff may be librarians, counselors, placement specialists, admissions counselors, financial aid counselors, nurses, physicians,

computer analysts, and so forth. While many of these individuals are hired on fixed-term annual appointments, others may be granted "indefinite appointments," somewhat equivalent to faculty tenure. Each institution within the university system has its own policies on the granting of such appointments.

The two institutions surveyed for this study are similar to one another in the sizes of their faculties and the numbers of academic staff in their employ. Campus A has approximately 450 faculty members and approximately 225 academic staff members. Campus B has, according to a 1985 fact sheet, 446 faculty and 260 academic staff.

This investigation was planned with the assumption that the perceptions of academic staff and faculty members may vary depending on particular colleges within the university, the personality and governing style of each chancellor, and the predispositions of academic staff and faculty themselves. Questions probed for their overall participation in the governance structure, their satisfaction with the system, and about their interests as participants within that process.

Fifty participants, 20 academic staff and 30 faculty (tenured or on tenure track) members were selected at random from the 1986-87 Staff Directory. Eleven full professors, 11 associate professors, and 8 assistant professors comprised the sample for the faculty category, while academic staff were selected from two categories: instructional academic staff, and professional academic staff (see above for description of these categories). Ten were from professional academic staff and 10

from instructional academic staff. Each participant was interviewed in his or her office for 30 minutes to one hour. All interviews were taped and transcribed into separate protocols.

Interviews and documents yielded approximately 1,000 pages of field notes. The researchers sorted, coded, and analyzed the interview data. Each case was read at least twice and dominant themes were extracted. Responses were analyzed across and within institutions and used for generalizing to the theoretical propositions.

Further, the data were subjected to reliability checks. The investigators plus an outside social scientist selected protocols at random and coded them according to an a priori criterion. The iterrater reliability coefficient was computed; it was established that the coding system was reliable at .95. Also, the use of different sources of evidence such as observation and published documents help a triangulate the results.

The Social Contract Model Reviewed

Data were collected through interviews which were taped, transcribed, and coded by the principal investigators. Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to one hour in length. Each subject was interviewed only once. Most interviews were conducted in the offices of the subjects. Faculty and academic staff were interviewed separately. Interview questions evolved during the study; as the investigators saw the need to identify theoretical categories and to identify comparative situations, the questions became more focused.

Analysis of these interviews showed that faculty and academic staff participation in governance is much more complex than what it seems to be on the surface and that much of the faculty participation in the governance process varies with social status, years of experience, and personal interest. Faculty analyses are presented first, including a demographic profile of the subjects.

The profile of interviewed faculty members is short but instructive. Faculty had at least 12 years of service at those institutions with a median of 18.13. They have served at other institutions for an average of 1.3 years and a median of 2 years. The youngest faculty member interviewed was 33 years old and the oldest was 63. The mean age was 46.7 with a median age of 48. Eight of those interviewed were assistant professors, 11 associate professors, and 11 full professors. All had doctoral degrees from accredited institutions.

Participation: Faculty

Analysis of the data on levels of faculty governance participation revealed four conceptually distinct but empirically overlapping categories of governance. These categories include system, institutional, college, and departmental.

System governance refers to the administrative unit or body that regulates or dictates policy to all 4-year institutions which belong to that particular group of state universities. Its purpose is generally to serve as a body for communication purposes among all satellites of the system. In general, faculty members thought that the system administration or the president

of the system paid lip service to involving faculty in the decision-making process. Faculty viewed this process as essentially one-way communication coming from the regents and the president of the system.

The analysis on levels of participation in the system governance structure revealed that only full professors participated marginally in that structure. For example, speaking about a recent policy passed by the Regents of the System, this professor commented the following:

> The Regents' recent action which will force us all to accept the general education requirements of the associate degrees from center system is an infringement of the faculty's academic freedom. For the Regents to step in and do that ... I thought [it] was alarming and our faculty senate expressed its concerns about it but the Regents just ran "rough shod" over all of us on that.

Their participation was quasi-advisory, meaning that professors were consulted on issues but were given no "real" decision-making power. System administration, usually, had all decisions made before consulting with the faculty group called "super senate."

On the other hand, assistant as well as associate professors rarely participated at the system level. In fact, most assistants and associates did not have anything to say about the super senate. Associate professors were conscious, however, that system administration imposed too many rules, considering it a

violation of the faculty's right to make their own decisions. Assistant professors practically ignored any issue coming from system administration. Their preoccupations had to do with surviving the reappointment schedule and other personal issues. In general, most faculty members expressed a low level of satisfaction with the system level of governance. Participation in system governance was considered as a waste of time and energy on their part.

The second category is <u>institutional governance</u> which refers to university-wide committee structures, including the university committee and the faculty senate. Its main purpose is to legitimize institutional policy by providing the legal framework that regulates the institution and its faculty. Again in this category full professors participated the most, although there is more participation from associate professors at this level. On the other hand, there is minimal participation from assistant professors.

There was also a realization that at the institutional level the governance structure was not the most active in terms of faculty involvement. For instance, a professor expressed such a concern:

> I would imagine that probably 80% of the faculty aren't
> involved beyond the departmental level. And I think
> that most people are involved because they have to be.
> It (governance) is pretty hard to avoid it. Probably

at the university level we're talking about 15% who are generally involved.

Such participation levels created some tension among faculty members, particularly between those who actively participated and those who did not care for governance. For example, an active professor not very happy with the uneven governance load said:

> My impression is that there are a lot of people who are very happy to have 10%, or whatever it may be, out there carrying out governance functions. You hear very often faculty members say, "Don't make me sit through that stuff" and occasionally there is the rather pious comment, "Well, I teach." Or "I don't have time for that sort of thing."

Those comments infuriated those who actively participated in the governance of the institution.

Further analysis of the data indicated that the variable years-on-the-job affected how faculty members viewed governance. It was apparent that the more years faculty members had on the job the more critical they became of governance. For example, a veteran professor remarked:

> Generally speaking the faculty senate is like the House of Lords in England. They have the final check on anything, but it [whatever issue] is generally passed. Sometimes they even screw up the original intent of a particular event because they didn't understand the whole issue.

Another well seasoned faculty member saw the same problem but put it in a different context. She said:

> You're more or less at the mercy of your chancellor in terms of how much governance you have. If the chancellor believes in faculty governance and wants a fairly broad range of opinions, you can have a broad decision making process. The problem is when he "shoots down" a couple of things which he did last year. You're less enthused about sticking your neck out.

It appears then that governing bodies at the institutional level tend to be mostly reactive rather than proactive. For example, when asked about the curriculum committee, professors referred to it as a "protection agency designed to protect turf."

On the other hand, associate professors viewed institutional governance in more positive terms. They rationalized the process by providing several reasons for its existance. For instance a very active associate professor put it this way:

> The principle of governance is similar to the principle of democracy. It can lead to inefficiencies that are sometimes frustrating but in the end it's probably the best strategy to make policy that people will accept.

Another reason given to rationalize the existence of governance was that faculty are not always taking the time to educate themselves on the issues. Therefore, the governance process functions in a limited way. In the final analysis, most associate professors believe that it is essential to have faculty

input in governance and that faculty should look out for the interests of the whole institution rather than their own interests.

Finally, assistant professors do not participate in great numbers at the institutional level. The few who participate, nonetheless, have little to contribute. Most assistants participate because they have to do it; and when they do, it's mostly passive participation. That is, they are afraid to speak because of their status within the system.

College governance is a third category. The main purpose of this governance structure is to provide cohesiveness among the departments of a particular college. Most issues debated at this level had to do with the mission of the college. For example, at the time of the interview a faculty of one college were engaged in a debate concerning whether the college should emphasize more teaching or more research. Issues of that sort seemed to predominate at the college governance level.

In terms of faculty participation, the data showed that more faculty members participate at this level, including assistant professors. However, tenured senior professors seem to participate more than assistant professors.

When asked about their participation in several committees, faculty members agreed that the most powerful committee was the curriculum committee. They felt they were in control of academic matters and that it was the right of the faculty to decide those issues. Their participation in the personnel committee, however, was not as high. They all agreed that 90% of personnel decisions

were made at the departmental level. On the other hand, there was almost no faculty participation in the budget committee. It was left to the chair or the dean to prepare the budget. Faculty members usually <u>relied</u> on a knowledgeable professor for information regarding the budget. For example, a veteran professor remarked:

> Jones likes budgets, understands the process. I don't. In fact, I fear numbers. So, I listen to Jones, what he has to say about the budget. If it makes sense and seems reasonable I always vote with Jones on budget matters.

Other faculty members had different explanations for not getting involved in budget committees. An associate professor said:

> The budget is pretty well decided out of our hands. It is decided pretty much elsewhere. I don't even know where that's decided, quite frankly. So I don't have anything to say about it. I prefer not to get involved with it. It [budget] is important but I am much much more apt to be involved in curriculum. I am willing to let the chairman take care of that.

> Again, the level of faculty participation increased at the college level, especially on the curriculum and personnel committees. There is more activity from assistant professors at the college level. Nonetheless, their social status and years of experience on the job seem to affect their participation at the college level.

Departmental governance is the fourth category. Its primary objective is to deal with decision-making issues that directly affect the department's existence. It is at this level that most decisions concerning curricular and personnel matters are approved for further sanctioning at the college and institutional levels. Departmental governance is perceived to be the level where faculty governance really takes place.

The data showed that professors across ranks fully participate in the governance structure at the departmental level. Their participation, however, is motivated by different reasons. Again 20% of those who participate in department are the ones who truly believe in the concept of faculty governance. This group is comprised mostly of associate and some full professors. Fifty percent, mostly full and some associate professors, participated passively in the process. The other 30%, which was comprised mostly of assistant professors, participated in the governance structure because they had to do it--not because they believed in the concept. For example, one young assistant professor participated in the process hoping not to be penalized by his chair. He said:

> I am particularly active in governance because my chair
> sent me a letter saying that I should be more involved
> in the committee structure of the department and
> elsewhere. I am afraid that if I don't get involved in
> it, he might take a negative view of me. I don't want
> to alienate him at all.

Another insightful assistant professor viewed her level of
participation differently. She remarked:

> I often don't participate in the governance structure
>
> because I fear to offend people who are making
>
> decisions related to my job. So I cannot really be
>
> myself and still not jeopardize my future career.

In sum, assistant professors participated for reasons other than
governance itself. Their participation can be labeled as
compulsively democratic. Nonetheless, the level of participation
increased dramatically at the departmental category.

Satisfaction: Faculty

When analyses were done on interviews with assistant
professors, the findings showed that in general this group of
professors was dissatisfied with the governance structure. The
main reason cited was that they had no bargaining power within
the system. Usually the dean, the chancellor, or senior
professors were cited as the persons making the final decision on
any issue.

Associate professors, on the other hand, felt quite positive
about governance. The main reason cited was that they believed
in the concept of governance. For example, this faculty member
commented:

> I think maybe some of the younger non-tenured people
>
> may not see as much governance as I do. I've always
>
> been a strong advocate of faculty governance because I
>
> believe in it. I feel very satisfied with what we have
>
> here. Really, I think I have a little better

perspective--a little better handle on it than some of
the newer people.

Again reference was made to the individual rights of faculty
members. This professor saw faculty governance as a means to
protect anyone. He said:

Younger people are more fearful of administrators.
They do not need to be because I think there is a lot
of governance here; and it's good to talk to the
faculty and tell 'em that the structure is doing an
excellent job of protecting people's rights and seeing
that due process is followed and fairness is involved.
I really don't have any complaints and I would be quick
to voice if I had them. I am not afraid of anybody on
up. I would be glad to tell them what I feel.

Full professors also felt fairly satisfied with the
governance system. Again the main reason cited was that the
institution had maintained its agreement with them. That is,
they felt that their personal interests were well served by the
governance structure. There were, however, some professors who
were very sour against the institution. Their complaints were
mostly related to personal reasons.

Identification with the Institution: Faculty

This variable was studied to examine the professors'
identification with the institution and understand the reasons
for their identification. The purpose was to link the
identification variable to the assumption of the social contract
model which assumed that professors' loyalty to the institution

is directly related to contractual agreement made between the institution and the individual. That is, the more the institution complied with the contractual agreements the higher faculty identified with the institution.

The data indicated that most faculty members identified closely with the institution although variations were evident as analyses were done across professorial ranks. Assistant professors, for instance, did not identify with the institution as closely as did associate or full professors. Several reasons were given to justify their level of identification. For example this comment was made by an assistant professor:

> Well, I identify with it almost totally. My whole life
> is in it right now. I am going up for reappointment
> today. I better be committed otherwise I wouldn't
> last.

Another assistant professor said "I feel certain sense of loyalty to it. If I were tenured I'd feel a lot closer."

Associate and full professors, on the other hand, felt a very strong sense of identification with the institution. For example, this veteran professor with great pride said:

> The university has been very good to me, and I think
> it's a responsible institution. I am for it.

The key phrase in this quote is "the institution is responsible." That meant that the institution was complying with its part of the contract. In this case the faculty member felt free to participate in the decision-making process. Another full professor put it in a different way. She said:

> I identify with the institution very closely. The
> procedures, institutional mission and purpose are very
> consistent with my belief system. There is almost no
> conflict. I plan to stay here. I love my job. I love
> my students. I can't imagine anything happening that
> could get me to leave.

The question of identification was followed by another
question asking the respondent to identify the circumstances
under which he/she would leave the institution. The overwhelming
response was that they (most associate and full professors) would
go if their individual rights were violated by administration.
The following illustrates the point:

> I would go someplace else had we had a chancellor who
> was authoritarian and dictatorial, less than fully
> honest about things and so on. That would drive me out
> from the institution.

Following the same line of reasoning this professor commented:

> If the role of the faculty is reduced in governing the
> institution, if less emphasis on teaching is pushed, if
> the administration tries to be authoritarian, then I
> would go someplace else. Otherwise, I love this
> institution.

Some of the full professors, especially those close to retirement
said that they wouldn't go elsewhere because of their age. They
offered no other explanations.

Participation: Academic Staff

Of the 20 academic staff who were interviewed for this study, 10 were teaching staff and 10 held non-teaching appointments, although 2 of these individuals indicated that on occasion they have been asked to teach a course on an overload basis. The teaching staff interviewed represented a wide range of departments, including departments in the humanities, sciences, social sciences, and education. Similarly, the non-teaching staff interviewed represented a number of campus services, including admissions, tutorial services, financial aid, computer support services, and counseling. Half of those interviewed were women, half men. Ages of interview subjects ranged from 34 to 53, with an average of 40. Two had earned doctorates, four had bachelor's degrees, and 14 had master's degrees. In terms of prior college or university experience, the range was 0 to 12 years, with an average of 2.66. The years of service in their current positions ranged from 6 months to 14 years, with an average of 6.7 years.

Chapter 36 of the Wisconsin Statutes defines the primary responsibilities of academic staff members in institutional governance for the University of Wisconsin System. The statutes explicitly state that "academic staff shall be active participants in the governance of policy development for the institution...including personnel issues." (Wis. Stats. 36.09)

Beyond stating that academic staff "shall be active participants" in governance and "have primary responsibility" for policies which concern them, the statutes do not specify the

level of participation which academic staff should have.
Considering the vagueness of the statutes, it is not surprising
that there is great variance in the levels of participation of
academic staff at both of the campuses involved in this study.

At both campuses, the level of participation of teaching
academic staff in the governance of their departments ranged from
absolutely no participation at all to involvement nearly
equivalent to that of tenured faculty members. In the spring of
1986, Campus A conducted an internal review to examine the role
of teaching staff in governance. The findings of the review
concerning the 28 academic departments are summarized below:

	NO INVOLVEMENT	SOME	COMPLETE
BUDGET	10	8	10
CURRICULUM	9	5	14
PERSONNEL	24	2	2
PLANNING	9	7	12
AUDIT/REVIEW	11	6	11
SEARCH AND SCREEN	13	6	9
OTHER COMMITTEES	21	1	6

While Campus B had undertaken no such review, data gathered from
interviews indicated a similar range of participation on the part
of teaching academic staff in their departments at that campus.

Interviews of teaching academic staff at both campuses
indicated that personnel matters, which included such issues as
promotion, retention, tenure, and merit pay, for the most part
remained in the hands of committees made up of tenured and
tenure-track faculty. Only one teaching academic staff member

indicated that academic staff in his department are allowed
representation on the personnel committee. It was indicated that
while academic staff and probationary faculty members could
attend meetings of the department's personnel committee, they are
not permitted to vote. It was also explained that while a
department's personnel committee did not include academic staff,
individual staff members were closely reviewed by the committee
which then decided on retention and merit pay levels. Still
another academic staff instructors indicated that in their
department merit pay decisions are by tradition in the hands of
the chair, not a committee: "There is a lot less hassle that
way."

The participation of teaching academic staff in curriculum
matters again ranged from no participation at all to complete
involvement. Those interviewed indicated that the academic staff
in their departments are encouraged to make recommendations
involving new course adoptions, changes in currently offered
courses, and textbook adoptions; academic staff in these
departments are also represented on curriculum committees and are
allowed to vote with the rest of the department on curriculum
decisions. It was clearly indicated that while they have no vote
on curriculum changes, they are encouraged to contribute
suggestions for changes and new adoptions.

All of the teaching academic staff who were interviewed
claimed that their department chairs handled budgetary matters.
In each department, the chair puts together a budget after
soliciting requests and suggestions from faculty and staff. One

teaching staff member said that in her department the chair
presents the budget at a department meeting at which time all
members of the department, including academic staff, participate
in making changes and in approving the final version.

The role of non-teaching academic staff, like that of
teaching staff, showed great variance regarding participation in
departmental governance. All reported that there is no formal
participation of academic staff regarding personnel matters in
their departments or offices. There are no personnel committees
as such, as there are in academic departments. Decisions
regarding hiring, retention, merit pay, and recommendations for
indefinite appointment are made by department heads or program
directors. According to one staff member:

> Our supervisor, the program director, makes
> all personnel decisions. She also makes all
> decisions about merit pay. How she makes
> those decisions is a mystery. We don't even
> know what her evaluation criteria are.

In one non-academic department, the evaluation process does
involve staff on an informal level; individual staff members meet
with the director to establish annual goals. Even here, the
informant described the criteria for promotion and for merit pay
as "rather vague." One informant, however, said that while his
supervisor did officially make all personel decisions, the
department had evolved "a different kind of management, a
management by committee ... We reach a consensus." However,
"management by committee" appeared, at least according to the

interview data, to be a rarity. All other informants affirmed
that their supervisors made personnel decisions.

At both universities, non-teaching academic staff expressed
disappointment that they have no formal role in curriculum
decisions at all. The situations at both campuses can be summed
up in the words of one informant when asked about the role of
academic staff in curriculum development: "There is some
involvement, but not officially....Academic staff have no rights
in that area." Another staff member who was interviewed said
that curriculum "is one area where we don't work together with
faculty very well. The system just doesn't allow for it right
now."

None of the academic staff who were interviewed described
formal roles in departmental or university budget processes.
Their departments have no budget committees; instead, supervisors
and directors are responsible for budgets. They may have some
informal influences; as one informant stated, "We can discuss the
budget, but we have no final say in budget decisions."

Satisfaction: Academic Staff

When questioned directly about how satisfied they were with
their roles in departmental and university governance affairs,
the academic staff involved in this study responded at both
extremes. Satisfaction with the governance process appeared to
be linked to perceptions of the level of participation: the
greater the participation in governance, the greater the
satisfaction. Only three teaching academic staff described
themselves as "well-satisfied" or "very satisfied" with their

levels of participation in departmental governance, apparently
basing their remarks on comparisons with faculty and staff
participation in other departments. One "very satisfied"
respondent described his department as a "democratic" one which
allowed teaching academic staff to participate with faculty in
curriculum and budget discussions but not in personnel matters.

At the other extreme were several teaching academic staff
who expressed great dissatisfaction with their roles in
departmental decision-making. For example, one complained that
in her department, "staff can attend meetings, but we cannot vote
on anything, not even on where to have the department Christmas
party or whether to adjourn the meeting."

Other teaching academic staff who described themselves as
being at least "somewhat satisfied" regarded their participation
in departmental governance still complained of being treated as
"second class citizens" by their departments, describing their
plight as that of "intellectual migrant workers" who have been
"exploited by a system they've been conditioned to trust."

The responses of non-teaching academic staff concerning
their satisfaction with their departmental governance roles
paralleled the comments of teaching academic staff. Several said
that they were "very satisfied" with how their departments and
supervisors included staff in decision-making processes.
However, these individuals were conscious of the fact that their
situations could easily change with a change of supervisors.

Other respondents reported varying levels of
dissatisfaction, citing arbitrary policy decisions on the parts

of supervisors who ignore staff input, unclear evaluation criteria, lack of opportunity to help formulate evaluation criteria and personnel policies, and lack of information regarding the rationale behind departmental and university policy decisions that affect academic staff and their jobs.

When asked about their participation in governance beyond the departmental level, only two of the academic staff who were interviewed claimed to be very satisfied with the role of staff in institutional governance. One simply said that she felt the informal, advisory role played by staff was appropriate; the second suggested that he actually had little to judge by, having been hired by the university only six months previously. All of the others expressed varying degrees of dissatisfaction with their levels of participation and representation in university decision-making. While both universities have academic staff assemblies made up of a half dozen or so elected and appointed representatives, staff members were quick to point out that the assemblies have no policy-making power and act in an advisory capacity only. While the staff assemblies were credited by several respondents with helping to improve the status of academic staff by focusing attention on staff concerns, the status of the assemblies does not compare to the status of the faculty senates. Staff members were quick to point out that faculty senates have policy-making powers and were quite unlike staff assemblies which are advisory. According to one staff member,

> When the faculty senate passes something, it is
> implemented. When the academic staff assembly takes
> action on something, it isn't always implemented.
> Department heads often ignore those statements or
> resolutions. The university has no formal process for
> monitoring implementation of proposals which affect
> staff.

To another member of the academic staff, the continued "nor-
response" of the university administration to academic staff
assembly suggestions and complaints indicated that the
administration tolerated the existence of the staff assembly only
to avoid confrontation. This staff member interpreted occasional
attention administrators paid to staff issues as "token pats on
the head," and complained that staff are "still struggling for
proper recognition" of the important roles they play in the life
of the institution and the roles they should play in its
governance.

Academic staff said that the attitude institutional leaders
communicated was that faculty rights and needs had priority. One
staff member described the "arrogance" and "paternalistic
attitude" of faculty and administrators who suggest that staff do
not need to share more widely in governance because the faculty
senate and the administration "will see to the interests of
academic staff." Peck (1983) suggests academic leadership should
be aware of the stake each participant has in the campus and in
the decision-making process; however, most of the academic staff

interviewed described themselves as powerless members of their institutions whose rights are being ignored.

Identification with the Institution: Academic Staff

Despite their claims of being dissatisfied with their levels of participation in departmental and institutional decision-making, most of the academic staff insisted that they identified strongly with their institutions and had no thoughts of leaving. When asked how closely they identify with their institutions, most claimed to be "very loyal." Five of these had also been students at the institutions where they work. Said one,

> I graduated from here. So did my husband, who works
> here, too. Our lives have revolved around this campus
> since our student days. I don't want to think about
> leaving. But, I wouldn't want them to know just how
> loyal I am. If they knew, if they were sure I wouldn't
> leave for some other job, they might try to take
> greater advantage of me.

Other respondents said that they had had feelings of dissatisfaction in the past, but that they saw improvements in their own situations and in the general situation of academic staff at their universities. Leaving now would be difficult for them.

Yet when asked under what conditions they might leave their positions to go to another institution, some of those who claimed to be "very loyal" and to have "strong identification" with their departments and their institutions did admit they would be willing to leave if they were offered more money by another

employer. One admitted that he didn't enjoy the 45 minute commute to his campus and would leave if he could find a job closer to home, even though he had earlier said that he was "as loyal as can be, an eleven on a one-to-ten scale."

Most, however, claimed to have given little thought to leaving their institutions. According to one, he had made a "life decision" to stay and would leave only if he were unable to continue to do a good job. Several others insisted that other job offers would have to be overwhelmingly tempting to entice them to leave. Congenial colleagues, challenging tasks, and professional growth were other reasons cited for wanting to remain. Women academic staff said that their husbands had jobs locally, so they could not move on until their husbands decided to leave their jobs. None of the men gave the employment of their spouses as reasons for remaining.

Conclusions

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the social contract model applies in part to institutions of higher education. The institution tacitly assures the faculty member protection of his or her rights via faculty governance. The faculty member, on the other hand, agrees to work for and serve the institution without preconditions, thus a social contract is formulated.

However, the social contract model does not fully apply to certain groups of participants. In the faculty ranks, assistant professors are not treated as tenured professors are. The level

of satisfaction and identification with the institution testify
to such a claim. Most assistant professors experienced low
levels of satisfaction and identification with the institution
primarily because they felt powerless concerning decision making.
With regard to associate and full professors, they were protected
by the social contract agreement. This claim is supported as one
analyzes the level of participation of full and associate
professors across levels of governance.

The social contract model also applies in part to academic
staff. The evidence suggests that in general academic staff
don't fully participate in the governance structure of the
institution. The contract seems to be one-sided, favoring the
institution. Their varied participation at the departmental,
college, institution, and system governance testifies to this.
It is mostly negigible. These people work for and are exploited
by the institution without being granted full participation and
protection. Indeed, throughout the interviews faculty members
referred to them as "intellectual migrant workers," referring to
the treatment they were given by the institution.

Academic staff were, for the most part, vocal concerning
their dissatisfaction with their levels of participation in
governance, feeling that they deserved to be heard, especially
regarding issues which directly affect them and their jobs.
Despite their dissatisfaction, however, staff expressed strong
feelings of identification with their departments and their
institutions. This appears to contradict the social contract
theory. Consequently, the model fails to explain why individuals

with very limited action in the governance structure feel strongly about their institutions. This question was beyond the scope of this study, but it should be explored not only to understand that particular phenomena but to reconceptualize the social contract model. However, the reasons cited for remaining in their positions - congenial colleagues, professional development, challenging work in an academic environment -- may explain how the personal needs of these individuals are being fulfilled.

In sum, it is concluded that faculty participation in governance varies across professorial ranks and that job experience and personal interests of faculty affect their participation in the governance structure. It is also concluded that governance is conceptually categorized in four empirically overlapping levels in which the level of faculty participation varies according to social status. Further research should address this aspect to corraborate the claim.

It was also concluded that academic staff, whether they be non-teaching or instructional staff, do not fully participate in the governance process. However, their degree of identification with the institution is very high. Further research should address this question to understand such a phenomena.

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