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ABSTRACT

The term "underclass," which refers to the concentration of economic and behavioral problems among racial minorities (mainly Black and Hispanic) in large, older cities, accurately describes a real and new condition in the United States social structure. In a sense, the rise of the underclass is an effect of the success of American social policy: the civil rights revolution caused a bifurcation of the racial minority groups. As upwardly mobile and educated members of racial minority groups have moved out of the ghetto, the people left behind have become more isolated and their problems have increased. Underclass conditions are economic, behavioral and attitudinal, and geographically focused. The concentration of poor Blacks and Hispanics in urban poverty areas is well documented, and little descriptive research is still required. For makers of urban and social policy, therefore, the time has come to shift focus from diagnosis to prescription, and to address the needs and problems of the underclass. The philosophy of the Great Society has given way to a newly emerging social philosophy, adopted by conservatives and liberals, which synthesizes three approaches to welfare reform: guaranteed income, job provision, and block grants. One new trend, workfare, has shown promising effectiveness in reducing welfare dependency, and its emphasis on jobs appeals to the new reform mentality. Appended are tables presenting detailed data on the characteristics of poor people in 14 of the 100 largest cities in the United States. (KH)

THE UNDERCLASS -- Will It Always Be With Us?

Richard P. Nathan

3-9-87

THE UNDERCLASS -- Will It Always Be With Us?

Prepared for a Symposium at the

New School for Social Research

November 14, 1986

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Ken Auletta added a word to the popular vocabulary with his series of New Yorker articles and book on the underclass. At first, people interested in social policy balked at the term, concerned that it would have an adverse labelling effect, stigmatizing the people in what the Economist in a recent article termed America's "huge and intractable, largely black underclass." (1) I have written this paper as an essay on the word (what does it mean?); the condition (is it new; why has it developed?); and the response (how should we deal with this condition?). This is not a research paper; it is more of a personal statement with emphasis on the policy response to underclass conditions. Others, particularly Robert R. Reischauer and William Julius Wilson, both commentators at this symposium, are conducting in-depth studies on the concept and nature of the underclass.

I. The Use of the Word "Underclass"

It is not a happy conclusion, and in my case it did not come easily, but I conclude that the word "underclass" is an accurate and functional term and that we should use it in diagnosing and prescribing for American social problems in the current period. One reason for this conclusion is purely practical. The word has caught on. Nothing social scientists could do would change matters very much. But there is a second and more important reason for this conclusion that the word "underclass" is functional.

Regrettably, I conclude that the word reflects a real and new condition in the society with which we must come to terms. It is a condition properly described by the term "class." Sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf defines class as a group emerging from societal conditions which affects structural changes. (2)

The essential argument of this paper is that there has been a distinctive structural change in social conditions in the United States over the past two decades that is expressed by the term "underclass," and that there is now a quite broad consensus among politicians and experts that this has occurred. The word "underclass" is increasingly used in the media as a shorthand expression for the concentration of economic and behavioral problems among racial minorities (mainly black and Hispanic) in large, older cities. For those of us interested in urban and social policy, I believe the time has come for us to shift our focus from diagnosis to prescription. There are still important research issues on our agenda relating to the causes and

characterisitics of the underclass, but there is no longer as much to be achieved by debate on underclass conditions compared to attention devoted to how we deal with these conditions. In particular, I believe research by William Julius Wilson provides a convincing analysis of the "problems that disproportionately plague the urban underclass." Says Wilson,

> Included in this population are persons who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or have dropped out of the labor force altogether; who are long-term public assistance recipients; and who are engaged in street criminal activity and other forms of aberrant behavior. (3)

My essential argument is that researchers, government officials, and organizations and foundations interested in social and urban policy should place more emphasis on the strategies that can be adopted, and can be expected to work, in dealing with this problem. This paper, presents a description, which I think reflects a widely shared view, on the nature of the underclass. But the emphasis is on the response to this critical new reality in American society.

II. The Emerging Consensus on Underclass Conditions

The existence of a distinctive underclass in an ironic way is a result of the success, not the failure, of American social policy. The successes of the civil rights revolution (surely not complete, but extraordinary nonetheless) has caused a bifurcation of the racial minority groups, which were the focus of the civil rights laws of the fifties and sixties and the big-spending social programs from the mid-sixties into the seventies.

If I may use a personal recollection, I remember my first visit to a southern state in the mid-fifties. Driving through a rural area, I saw signs that said "Colored" on run-down cabins and motels. My reaction was to think how remarkable it was that such accommodations could already have what were then brand-new colored television sets. It did not take long for me to realize that these were segregated facilities.

Such outward manifestations of discrimination are gone now from our official language and the behavior of our leading and large institutions. This is not to deny that discrimination exists in more subtle forms; it is meant to call attention to the fact that the opportunity structure of our society has changed. Members of racial minority groups who are educated, talented, and motivated can assimilate in ways that a generation ago would have been thought inconceivable.

But there are unanticipated results of social change. As avenues of opportunity have opened for upwardly mobile and educated members of racial minority groups to move to suburbs and better-off urban neighborhoods, the people left behind in the ghetto -- the hidden city -- are more isolated. The role models of an earlier day (a teacher, postman, civil servant) have left. There is no reason they shouldn't. However, the result is that the dangerous inner-city areas that fester in our land have become an increasingly more serious social and economic problem.

It is useful to put this point as a hypothesis: Underclass conditions are multi-faceted. They are economic, behavioral and geographically focused. (4) This is not to say that we can easily put our social science calipers to the task of measuring the underclass. The underclass involves more than things we can measure with conventional economic and demographic indicators -- such as low income, long-term unemployment, limited education, and the incidence of welfare dependency. The underclass condition is also attitudinal and behavioral. It involves alienation, and for the long-term welfare sub-group what Thomas Pettigrew calls a feeling of "learned helplessness." (5) It is often manifest in crime and vandalism, which serve to further isolate underclass groups.

Although a great deal of research has been done on poverty and underclass conditions, there are bound to be differences in interpretation. The main point that needs to be made here is like the cautionary label on cigarette packs: "Be careful when you read the work of social policy experts." We need social policy experts, and there are important areas yet to be studied under the heading of the underclass. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw different conclusions from the same data. At the very least, thoughtful observers of this subject should look at the work of a range of experts rather than unquestionably accepting a single interpretation of the nature and reasons for underclass conditions -- mine included.

Having given this warning, I feel more comfortable in summarizing my own conclusions. My view of the situation, based on what we know at present, is that the underclass is a distinctively urban condition

involving a hardened residual group that is difficult to reach and relate to. I believe this condition represents a change in kind, not degree, although it must always be added that we are talking about a relatively small sub-group among the poor. Census Bureau data are available for 1980 on the population by race in urban poverty areas in the nation's 100 largest cities They show disturbingly high concentrations of black and Hispanic urban poverty. These data indicate that the black and Hispanic population of urban poverty areas accounts for between 6-15 percent of all persons in poverty in the United States, depending on the definition used for poverty areas. If we define urban poverty areas as census tracts with 20 percent or more poverty population, there were 4.1 million black and Hispanic poor persons in poverty areas of the 100 largest cities in 1980. This is 15.1 percent of all persons classified as being in poverty. If we use a more highly concentrated definition of poverty areas -- 40 percent or more of the population in poverty -- 6.0 percent of all persons in poverty reside in these areas. The concentration of poor black and Hispanic persons in poverty areas in selected cities is shown in the table and charts which follow. Moreover, over the past decade, census data indicate that the concentration of poor blacks and Hispanics in poverty areas rose by some 40 percent in the most severe urban poverty areas, although the 1970 and 1980 data are not precisely comparable.

The politics involved in dealing with urban underclass conditions are difficult because, on an overall basis, the numbers of people affected are small and also because the people involved tend not to vote, do not have powerful interest groups that support them, and because the areas in which these problem conditions are concentrated are places that can be dangerous and threatening to outsiders.

TABLE

Central City	1980 Population (1)	Population Below Poverty in 1979 (2)	Population Below Poverty and Living in Poverty Areas (3)	Black & Hispanic Below Poverty in 1979 (4)
Newark, N.J.	326,105	106,895	94,988	94,925
Atlanta, Ga.	409,424	112,622	93,192	95,628
Birmingham, Ala.	288,004	61,658	45,222	49,461
St. Louis, Mo.	444,308	96,849	76,456	69,018
Montgomery, Ala.	173,334	33,556	27,788	26,231
Detroit, Mich.	1,182,733	258,575	189,002	285,114
Chicago, Ill.	2,965,648	681,410	429,940	472,653
Cleveland, Oh.	564,407	124,860	93,784	83,334
Philadelphia, Pa.	1,653,164	348,517	248,735	229,140
New York, N.Y.	6,963,692	1,391,981	985,770	988,933
Oakland, Calif.	333,263	61,689	37,489	45,286
Los Angeles, Calif.	2,987,573	477,976	298,786	322,288
Kansas City, Mo.	448,001	57,965	34,441	31,655
Houston, Tx.	1,578,359	199,763	98,181	146,299
100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES	47,567,225	8,135,283	5,191,114	5,169,529

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980: Subject Reports: Poverty Areas in Large Cities (PC 80-2-8D). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1985. See Table 1. "Poverty Status in 1979 and Other Selected Characteristics of Persons, Families, and Occupied Housing Units in Census Tracts Classified by Alternate Poverty Rates: 1980."

Central City	Black & Hispanic Below Poverty and Living in Poverty Areas (5)	Percent Black & Hispanic Poor Living in Poverty Areas (5)/(4)	Percent City Population That is Poor, Black or Hispanic, and Lives in Poverty Areas (5)/(1)
Newark, N.J.	87,952	92.7%	27.8%
Atlanta, Ga.	85,843	88.9%	28.8%
Birmingham, Ala.	48,318	81.5%	14.4%
St. Louis, Mo.	53,731	92.3%	14.3%
Montgomery, Ala.	24,638	93.9%	14.2%
Detroit, Mich.	168,736	78.4%	13.6%
Chicago, Ill.	398,228	82.6%	13.2%
Cleveland, Oh.	73,563	88.3%	13.8%
Philadelphia, Pa.	284,948	89.4%	12.4%
New York, N.Y.	848,671	85.8%	12.2%
Oakland, Calif.	31,685	69.9%	9.5%
Los Angeles, Calif.	248,199	74.5%	8.3%
Kansas City, Mo.	25,646	81.8%	5.8%
Houston, Tx.	84,272	57.6%	5.3%
100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES	4,139,976	80.1%	8.7%

Central City	Percent White Poor Living in Poverty Areas (10)/(9)	White Below Poverty Level in 1979 (9)	Poor Whites in Poverty Areas (10)
Newark, N.J.	57.8%	10,959	6,337
Atlanta, Ga.	47.3%	16,858	7,680
Birmingham, Ala.	39.4%	11,858	4,676
St. Louis, Mo.	45.8%	27,085	12,191
Montgomery, Ala.	43.1%	7,240	3,122
Detroit, Mich.	52.3%	50,646	26,472
Chicago, Ill.	28.9%	117,218	33,851
Cleveland, Oh.	48.1%	40,401	19,416
Philadelphia, Pa.	37.1%	104,992	39,001
New York, N.Y.	31.8%	360,469	114,502
Oakland, Calif.	26.8%	11,439	2,971
Los Angeles, Calif.	24.3%	119,998	29,140
Kansas City, Mo.	32.2%	25,154	8,000
Houston, Tx.	8.5%	46,867	3,996
100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES	33.9%	2,658,750	902,270


Concentration of Poverty
100 Largest Central Cities
Number Below 1979 Pov. Level (Millions)
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Black & Hispanic
White
Race
Living in Pov. Area
Not in Pov. Area


Black and Hispanic Poverty
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles
Number Below 1979 Pov Level (Millions)
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Central City
Living in Pov. Area
Not in Pov. Area


White Poverty
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles
Number Below 1979 Pov Level (Millions)
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Central City
Living in Pov. Area
Not in Pov. Area

This situation has important implications for government policy. I believe the fact that underclass conditions are so intractable and that they involve alienation and criminal behavior is one of the reasons underlying the current conservative retrenchment mood of the nation on social policy. There has been a shift over the past decade not just on social spending and not limited to our belief about what we can achieve under social programs. This shift involves a perceptable and disturbing change in public opinion on race and civil rights issues. The way we came to believe we are supposed to behave toward the members of minority groups in the sixties and seventies has changed in the eighties. It is my opinion that this often unspoken (though sometimes privately conceded) shift in opinion was partially caused by the increased severity of urban underclass conditions and that this situation in turn is manifest in heightened racial intolerance. In the long-run, these developments, unless we respond to them wisely, could threaten the social and civil rights policy gains of the earlier and more hopeful period beginning in the mid-sixties that lasted throughout most of the seventies.

III. The Response -- A Matter of Values

The third topic considered in this paper is the response to underclass conditions. My purpose is not to discuss specific programs, but rather to present ideas on the strategy for dealing with underclass conditions.

Here, I have better news to report. As I see it, new thinking is emerging in the current period about government social policies that represents a fortuitous development. It reflects a synthesis of conservative and liberal ideas on a basis that includes the best features of both. It is useful to view this development in historical perspective.

To a considerable degree, the motivating spirit of social policy in the United States in the Great Society period was a feeling of guilt about the conditions of a society which blocked, rather than facilitated, the movement of racial minorities into the social and economic mainstream. Associated with this spirit was a sense of discovery that the culture and ideas distinctive to racial minorities should be recognized and more widely appreciated. Soul food, Gospel music and the dress, language, and humor of blacks, in Tom Wolfe's wonderful satire, all came to be part of a new, socially-motivated form of "radical chic." White liberals especially reached out in well meaning ways to understand and identify with the black community.

This attitude carried over to government programs. Among the central ideas of Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty were compassion and power to the people. Again, Tom Wolfe captured the feeling of this concept in the popular literature. In his short story, "Mau-mauing the Flak Catchers," he wrote about going downtown to mau-mau the bureaucrats. "The poverty program encouraged you to go in for mau-mauing." Otherwise, the bureaucrats at City Hall and in the Office of Economic Opportunity, said Wolfe, wouldn't know what to do. "They didn't know who to ask." The answer in San Francisco, the locale of Wolfe's story, depended on "the confrontation ritual."

> Well ... they used the Ethnic Catering Service ... right ... They sat back and waited for you to come rolling in with your certified angry militants, your guaranteed frustrated ghetto youth, looking like a bunch of wild men. Then you had your test confrontation. If you were outrageous enough, if you could shake up the bureaucrats so bad that their eyes froze into iceballs and their mouth twisted up into smiles of sheer physical panic, into shit-eating grins, so to speak -- then you knew you were the real goods. They knew you were the right studs to give the poverty grants and community organizing jobs to. Otherwise they wouldn't know. (6)

As I read the tea leaves of social policy, this deferential attitude carried over into the Nixon-Ford period in the mid-seventies. It determined what was permissible in both the rhetoric and substance of social policy. The now-widespread frustration with Great Society programs did not become a part of the popular mindset on social issues until the latter part of the seventies.

George Will makes an observation that is helpful in understanding the new philosophy of social action that began to emerge in the late nineteen seventies. He notes that politicians, although they may not concede that this is so, are often involved in shaping and changing moral values.

> ...statecraft is soulcraft. Just as all education is moral education because learning conditions conduct, much legislation is moral legislation because it conditions the action and the thought of the nation in broad and important spheres in life. (7)

This idea is the key to the hopeful point in this paper that we appear to be moving towards a new formula for dealing with underclass conditions that corrects for the miscalculations and excesses (however well intended) of the Great Society. Social policy is now evolving in a way that reflects an increased belief on the part of both liberals and conservatives that there should be a behavioral quid pro quo. I

have already mentioned the reluctance on the part of people in the field of social policy in the period from the mid-sixties through the mid-seventies to intrude on the culture and value system of the groups that in Lyndon Johnson's presidency were discovered as a new focus for social policy. Allowing people to do their own thing was felt to be (and there is a good argument for this) the right approach to helping the poor. The guaranteed-income or negative income tax idea reflects this view. The problem of the poor is that they don't have enough money: Providing resources (preferably in the most flexible form, hard currency) was seen as enabling them to make their own choices.

Imperceptably at first, a movement developed in the late seventies on the part of social-policy intellectuals questioning these assumptions. There is a concept in economics that is helpful for the analysis here -- signalling. We may not be doing people a favor if we transmit signals about welfare "rights" and "entitlements" in a society that has a deep and strong Calvinist tradition that practically deifies the work ethic. The change that has occurred in our ideas about signalling under social programs is best seen by looking at the welfare field, and particularly at the most controversial welfare program for able bodied, working age poor people with children -- the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.

There have been three main theories of welfare reform for AFDC over the past twenty years, all of which have been publicly prominent. One theory, mentioned earlier, is the guaranteed-income approach. Another is the employment approach (jobs are the answer). The third approach, for which Ronald Reagan was the principal spokesman in the seventies,

is the devolutionary or block-grant approach to welfare reform. Its aim is to "turn back" responsibility for the welfare population to the states on the premise that states (and also local governments) are in the best position to provide services and make the fine-grained determinations necessary to enable (or better yet, push and require) working age, able bodied poor persons to move into the labor force.

The synthesis I see emerging in the current period contains elements of all three approaches, though the dominant themes are work (the employment approach) and devolution (relying more heavily on the states). A single word captures the shift that is occurring "workfare."

In the seventies the word "workfare" was used in a narrow way to refer to the idea that people should "work-off" their welfare grants, i.e., that welfare recipients should be required to work (even in "make-work" jobs) in exchange for receiving their benefits. Liberals on social policy issues, and this included most welfare administrators, heaped abuse on this idea, calling it "slavefare" and rejecting it out of hand. Efforts to tie welfare to work in a binding way were often undermined by the welfare establishment. This occurred, for example, in Massachusetts, where such an effort was made by Governor Edward King and in California under Governor Ronald Reagan. Reagan's 1971 California welfare reform plan, which included an AFDC work requirement and a work-experience component, never got off the ground. At its peak, only three percent of the eligible population participated in work-experience programs.

But something happened on the way to the forum -- in this case the U.S. Congress. Ronald Reagan as President won grudging acceptance from the Congress to include authority under the AFDC PROGRAM in the 1981 budget act to allow states to test new employment approaches to welfare reform, including the workfare approach. What emerged out of the efforts to implement this legislation is what I call "new-style workfare." The history of the nomenclature is interesting.

The 1981 budget act included a provision permitting the states to experiment with what was termed in Washington alphabetize -- CWEP, standing for "community work experience programs." The same acronym (CWEP) had been used in California in the nineteen seventies, only the "C" was for "California," and not "community" under this California program.

The big difference in the 1980s -- and this is a critical point -- is that liberals and the welfare establishment began to shift their ground politically and at the same time to shift their terms of reference. The term "workfare" is increasingly being used in a new way. It takes the form of obligational state programs that involve an array of employment and training services and activities -- job search, job training, education programs, and also community work experience. Over two-thirds of the states are now developing new-style workfare programs along these lines. Research by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in eight states, with 35,000 people assigned to program and control groups, shows promising -- though not large and dramatic -- results from these programs in terms of increased earnings and reduced welfare dependency. Whether this shift to "new-style

workfare" is intellectual or tactical is hard to say. For what it's worth, my reading of new-style workfare is that the initial response of the welfare establishment and liberals among social policy experts was expedient and tactical, but that as events transpired conviction followed suit.

One reason for the increasingly positive response, particularly on the part of state government officials, to the new authority in the 1981 budget act reflects the opinion held by many observers of urban conditions that the critical need in distressed urban areas is jobs. In effect, new-style workfare creates jobs (short-term entry-level positions very much like the CETA public service jobs we thought we had abolished in 1981). At the same time, new-style workfare provides a political rationale and support for increased funding for education and training programs; it also discriminates under these employment and job preparation programs in favor of the most disadvantaged people. The latter effect (discrimination in favor of the most disadvantaged) corrects for the problem of "creaming" under employment and training programs, a practice which has been the subject of strong and justifable criticism on the part of experts in the field of employment and training.

The California story for new-style workfare is particularly interesting. Under a conservative governor, George Deukmejian, a deal was struck between the governor and liberals in the Legislature (notably Arthur Agnos) on legislation that involves a fundamental restructuring of the welfare system to shift its orientation from a payment and social-service system to a new system strongly oriented

towards training, education, job placement, and work -- including in some cases the assignment of welfare family heads to obligatory work experience positions.

At first, the language was oblique. Work experience was called "PREP" in California, the letters standing for "pre-employment preparation." But increasingly the press and participants in the debate on this legislation came to call the whole program and process by one word, "workfare." This newspeak of welfare reform in California -- and also in many other states -- now uses the term "workfare" to refer to the array of job-focused programs and child care and other services to reduce welfare dependency. New-style workfare is a blend of conservative and liberal themes. Moreover, in finding this nice balance, I believe there is reason to hope that politicians have "detoxified" the welfare issue. This shift is healthy and encouraging for social policy in the United States. The basic strategy involves state initiatives, institutional-change at the state level, and the idea of obligation.

This is not to say that the obligational concept in social policy can be expected to take hold everywhere and expand rapidly. My point is that successful policy change must have a foundation in values. It is in these terms -- in terms of building a new foundation of values as a basis for policy change -- that I see some grounds for a modest sense of hopefulness in the current period.

We make our greatest progress on social reform in the United States when liberals and conservatives find common ground. New-style workfare embodies both the caring commitment of liberals and the themes

identified with conservative writers like Charles Murray, George Gilder, and Lawrence Mead. It involves a strong commitment to reducing welfare dependency on the premise that dependency is bad for people, that it undermines their motivation to self-support and isolates and stigmatizes welfare recipients in a way that over a long period feeds into and accentuates the underclass mindset and condition.

The new message is a familiar one: "You have to go along to get along." You have to go along, that is, with a set of values about work, job skills, behavior in the workplace, and attitudes towards success in the economy. It is the society behaving, if you will, like a supportive parent. Rather than telling people there is something wrong with you, you need help, we do better by telling them, "You are as good as the next person, you should make it on your own." Confidence rather than deference is the essence of this new approach to social policy.

In the long run, the test of the society's will to move in this direction requires two things -- money and a willingness on the part of governments at all levels to focus training, educational and employment services on those who need them the most. This includes both female welfare family heads and unemployed young males in distressed urban areas. Fortunately, research shows that such a targeting policy -- discriminating in favor of the most disadvantaged people -- has positive results. Yet, even if we respond to this challenge, underclass conditions will not be alleviated quickly or easily. The task requires time, patience and a willingness to experiment and adapt in social policy. To the question in the title of this paper, "The

Underclass -- Will it Always be With Us?" the answer is that, even with the best of efforts, it will be with us for a long time. Nevertheless, I believe there is reason now for a more hopeful mood about our ability to make a dent in America's most challenging social problem which tests the very mettle of our democracy.

FOOTNOTES

1. "America's Underclass, Doomed to Fail in the Land of Opportunity," The Economist, March 15, 1986, pp. 21-26.

2. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. ix.

3. William Julius Wilson, "The Urban Underclass in Advanced Industrial Society," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., The New Urban Reality, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 133.

4. In a report on urban policy issued by the National Academy of Science in 1982, Kenneth B. Clark and I criticized social scientists for "a tendency to shy away for a direct and clear characterization" of the urban underclass. We defined the urban underclass as multi-dimensional, involving "attitudinal differences, behavioral patterns, and separateness." See chapter 3, "The Urban Underclass," Critical Issues for National Urban Policy: A Reconnaissance and Agenda for Further Study, First Annual Report of the Committee on National Urban Policy, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 1982, p. 33.

5. Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Social Psychology's Potential Contributions to an Understanding of Poverty," in Vincent T. Covello, ed., Poverty and Public Poverty: An Evaluation of Social Science Research, (Boston, Mass.: G.K. Hall), p. 219.

6. Tom Wolfe, Radical Chic and Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers, (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 118.

7. George F. Will, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government Does, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 19.

APPENDICES

Tables for Presentation

Richard P. Nathan

The New School for Social Research

November 14, 1986

The Concentration of Poor People in Poverty Areas in the Nation's 100 Largest Central Cities

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The attached tables supplement the data on pages 6-12 of the paper, "The Underclass--Will it Always be with Us?," prepared for presentation at the New School for Social Research.

It should be noted that the figures presented here are not comparable to those in the paper. In presenting these detailed data on the characteristics of poor people and families in individual cities, it is not possible (as is done in the analysis for the paper) to combine the black and Hispanic population and compare this group to the white population. The comparisons here show the black and white population of the 100 largest cities. An additional column is shown for Hispanics; it includes persons who are also counted in the black or white population. Highlights of these data are presented on the next page.

Highlights

The cities selected for analysis are:

Atlanta, Ga.	Birmingham, Ala.
Chicago, Ill.	Cleveland, Oh.
Detroit, Mich.	Houston, Tx.
Kansas City, Mo.	Los Angeles, Calif.
Montgomery, Ala.	New York, N.Y.
Newark, N.J	Oakland, Calif.
Philadelphia, Pa.	St. Louis, Mo.

Among the points that stand out from this analysis of the 100 largest cities:

- 8.1 million people are classified as poor; this is 17 percent of the population of the 100 largest central cities.
- 11 percent of the white population in the central cities (3.4 million people) had income below poverty; 30 percent of the cities' black population, (3.7 million people) had income below poverty.
- 64 percent of the poor in the nation's 100 largest central cities live in poverty areas, census tracts where at least 20 percent of the population is below poverty.
- The concentration of poverty in poor neighborhoods is twice as great for blacks as for whites; 83 percent of poor blacks live in poverty areas as compared to 41 percent for whites.
- Poor blacks and Hispanics in urban poverty areas stand out for having a much higher proportion of female-headed families--74 percent for poor black families in urban poverty areas as compared to 55 percent of Hispanics and 49 percent of whites.
- The unemployment rate for poor people in poverty areas (24.8) is more than three times the rate for all income groups citywide (7.4).
- The unemployment rate for poor blacks in poverty areas (30.3 percent) is almost twice the rate for poor whites (17.5 percent).

Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980: Subject Reports: Poverty Areas in Large Cities (PC 80-2-8D). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1985.

Table 1. "Poverty Status in 1979 and Other Selected Characteristics of Persons, Families, and Occupied Housing Units in Census Tracts Classified by Alternate Poverty Rates: 1980."

Table 2. "Household Relationships of Persons, Families, and Unrelated Individuals by Poverty Status in 1979, Poverty Area Residence, and Spanish Origin: 1980"

Table 3. "Age, School Enrollment, and Educational Attainment of Persons by Poverty Status in 1979, Poverty Area Residence, Race, and Spanish Origin: 1980."

Table 4. "Labor Force Status and Labor Force Status in 1979 of Persons and Families by Poverty Status in 1979, Poverty Area Residence, Race, and Spanish Origin: 1980."

Table 6. "Income Type in 1979 of Families and Unrelated Individuals by Poverty Status in 1979, Poverty Area Residence, Race, and Spanish Origin: 1980."

100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	47,507,225	30,799,343	12,355,315	5,947,380
Living in poverty areas	15,485,176	5,313,044	8,137,168	3,158,620
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	8,125,233	3,380,695	3,656,622	1,584,102
Poor persons in poverty areas	5,191,114	1,398,179	3,030,847	1,160,567
Percent concentration in poverty areas	63.9%	41.4%	82.9%	73.8%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, 100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES

1. Families	1,064,526	249,532	650,933	254,477
2. Female-headed families	687,465	121,325	479,720	139,005
Percentage of families headed by females	64.6%	48.6%	73.7%	54.6%
3. Families with public assistance	548,928	105,248	364,379	121,316
Percentage of families with public assistance	51.6%	42.2%	56.0%	47.7%
4. Persons 25 years & older	2,165,763	665,912	1,211,809	438,699
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	1,416,518	417,917	784,477	342,162
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	65.4%	62.8%	64.7%	79.4%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	24.8%	17.5%	30.3%	28.3%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	34.0%	35.6%	32.6%	36.4%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	7.4%	5.5%	12.8%	9.2%
9. Civilian labor force participation rate, all income, citywide	62.1%	62.8%	59.3%	62.3%

ATLANTA, GA.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	489,424	131,488	274,623	5,430
Living in poverty areas	244,513	31,619	211,871	2,989
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	112,622	16,684	94,955	1,843
Poor persons in poverty areas	93,192	7,766	84,786	1,360
Percent concentration in poverty areas	82.7%	46.8%	89.3%	73.8%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, ATLANTA, GA.

1. Families	19,929	1,210	18,625	298
2. Female-headed families	14,178	548	13,577	198
Percentage of families headed by females	71.1%	44.6%	72.9%	68.3%
3. Families with public assistance	9,184	448	8,633	129
Percentage of families with public assistance	45.7%	37.8%	46.4%	44.5%
4. Persons 25 years & older	48,132	4,519	35,258	518
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	27,869	2,997	24,751	362
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	69.4%	66.3%	70.2%	69.9%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	21.8%	11.5%	22.9%	36.7%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	34.8%	38.6%	34.4%	37.7%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	8.8%	4.8%	10.5%	10.7%
9. Civilian labor force participation	68.2%	61.7%	59.4%	61.1%

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	288,804	121,738	156,832	2,812
Living in poverty areas	126,688	22,399	103,611	948
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	61,658	11,953	49,331	622
Poor persons in poverty areas	45,222	4,683	40,288	497
Percent concentration in poverty areas	73.3%	39.2%	81.7%	79.9%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

1. Families	9,639	824	8,768	122
2. Female-headed families	5,916	338	5,578	64
Percentage of families headed by females	61.4%	41.0%	63.6%	52.5%
3. Families with public assistance	3,618	265	3,329	47
Percentage of families with public assistance	37.5%	32.2%	38.0%	38.5%
4. Persons 25 years & older	20,486	2,881	17,382	192
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	12,749	1,832	10,838	184
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	62.5%	63.6%	62.3%	54.2%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	27.1%	21.3%	28.0%	18.1%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	34.7%	29.8%	35.5%	33.5%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	8.7%	4.8%	12.6%	10.3%
9. Civilian labor force participation	58.1%	60.9%	55.6%	53.3%

CHICAGO, ILL.	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	2,965,648	1,490,847	1,182,549	420,880
Living in poverty areas	1,170,721	236,893	785,397	222,957
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	681,410	158,495	374,927	101,530
Poor persons in poverty areas	429,940	60,863	321,626	71,716
Percent concentration in poverty areas	71.5%	37.9%	85.8%	70.6%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, CHICAGO, ILL.

1. Families	86,729	10,949	65,972	14,920
2. Female-headed families	60,664	5,666	50,915	7,144
Percentage of families headed by females	69.9%	51.7%	77.2%	47.9%
3. Families with public assistance	53,843	5,075	44,637	6,760
Percentage of families with public assistance	62.1%	46.4%	67.7%	45.4%
4. Persons 25 years & older	167,167	31,099	119,042	23,726
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	112,700	21,331	77,563	20,241
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	67.4%	68.6%	65.2%	85.3%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	35.1%	24.4%	40.4%	27.9%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	29.3%	33.1%	26.3%	43.0%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	9.8%	6.1%	15.9%	12.1%
Civilian labor force participation rate, all income, citywide	61.2%	63.0%	56.8%	67.2%

CLEVELAND, OH.	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	564,407	303,819	248,213	17,713
Living in poverty areas	272,565	88,885	184,270	11,246
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	124,868	42,304	78,552	5,453
Poor persons in poverty areas	93,784	28,985	69,769	4,346
Percent concentration in poverty areas	75.1%	49.6%	88.8%	79.7%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, CLEVELAND, OH.

1. Families	20,478	4,847	15,731	1,839
2. Female-headed families	14,432	2,268	11,749	663
Percentage of families headed by females	70.5%	56.8%	74.7%	63.8%
3. Families with public assistance	11,799	1,898	9,485	636
Percentage of families with public assistance	57.6%	46.9%	60.3%	61.2%
4. Persons 25 years & older	41,372	10,236	29,996	1,489
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	26,547	6,608	19,170	1,123
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	64.2%	64.6%	63.9%	75.4%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	31.8%	28.5%	35.7%	23.9%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	29.2%	31.9%	28.2%	31.4%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	11.8%	8.3%	14.6%	13.8%
9. Civilian labor force participation	56.1%	56.7%	54.9%	57.6%

DETROIT, MICH.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	1,182,733	410,170	748,451	28,211
Living in poverty areas	572,383	116,925	440,808	18,158
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	258,575	52,763	199,859	6,822
Poor persons in poverty areas	189,692	28,831	156,521	5,578
Percent concentration in poverty areas	73.1%	53.1%	78.3%	81.8%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, DETROIT, MICH.

1. Families	40,209	5,126	34,136	1,212
2. Female-headed families	30,015	2,816	26,681	735
Percentage of families headed by females	74.6%	54.9%	78.2%	60.6%
3. Families with public assistance	25,447	2,986	22,149	723
Percentage of families with public assistance	63.3%	56.7%	64.9%	59.7%
4. Persons 25 years & older	79,654	15,940	61,962	1,960
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	50,807	10,668	39,878	1,294
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	63.8%	66.9%	63.1%	66.0%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	46.3%	31.7%	49.7%	40.4%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	27.6%	25.1%	28.8%	32.5%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	18.5%	12.3%	22.5%	20.7%
9. Civilian labor force participation	55.9%	54.5%	56.6%	57.2%

HOUSTON, TX.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	1,578,359	970,714	435,832	278,919
Living in poverty areas	394,354	56,242	288,012	79,866
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	199,763	69,770	97,859	58,170
Poor persons in poverty areas	90,181	12,923	63,159	21,695
Percent concentration in poverty areas	45.1%	18.5%	65.1%	43.2%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, HOUSTON, TX.

1. Families	18,397	2,174	13,599	3,961
2. Female-headed families	9,791	591	8,437	1,147
Percentage of families headed by females	53.2%	27.2%	62.0%	29.0%
3. Families with public assistance	5,259	378	4,289	748
Percentage of families with public assistance	28.6%	17.4%	31.8%	19.9%
4. Persons 25 years & older	39,233	6,371	27,809	7,985
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	28,064	5,014	18,821	6,994
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	71.5%	78.7%	67.7%	87.6%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	13.7%	11.8%	14.6%	10.7%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	42.5%	45.1%	41.6%	48.6%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	3.6%	2.6%	5.9%	4.8%
9. Civilian labor force participation	72.1%	73.4%	69.6%	70.0%

KANSAS CITY, MO.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	448,801	387,837	128,335	14,528
Living in poverty areas	123,195	37,183	81,129	5,928
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	57,965	26,318	29,384	2,562
Poor persons in poverty areas	34,441	8,736	24,113	1,813
Percent concentration in poverty areas	59.4%	33.2%	82.1%	70.8%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, KANSAS CITY, MO.

1. Families	6,412	1,293	4,849	320
2. Female-headed families	3,850	584	3,276	142
Percentage of families headed by females				
3. Families with public assistance	2,679	439	2,153	75
Percentage of families with public assistance	41.8%	33.3%	44.4%	23.4%
4. Persons 25 years & older	15,532	5,099	9,724	645
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	9,423	2,993	5,965	457
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	60.7%	58.7%	61.3%	70.9%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	23.6%	16.9%	26.7%	12.3%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	38.3%	34.9%	40.5%	39.6%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	6.5%	5.0%	10.9%	9.8%
9. Civilian labor force participation	66.2%	66.0%	66.6%	69.5%

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	2,987,573	1,882,456	494,357	805,463
Living in poverty areas	964,146	327,445	319,898	431,137
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	477,976	207,458	129,492	195,317
Poor persons in poverty areas	298,786	87,944	105,244	136,913
Percent concentration in poverty areas	60.8%	42.4%	81.3%	70.1%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

1. Families	56,115	15,117	22,932	25,953
2. Female-headed families	27,493	5,562	16,137	9,189
Percentage of families headed by females	49.0%	36.8%	70.4%	35.4%
3. Families with public assistance	21,602	4,828	13,263	5,897
Percentage of families with public assistance	38.5%	26.6%	57.8%	22.7%
4. Persons 25 years & older	123,835	38,996	44,234	50,531
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	75,978	24,837	22,282	41,899
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	61.7%	63.7%	50.2%	82.9%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	18.5%	15.3%	27.7%	15.6%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	43.3%	47.5%	33.0%	54.4%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	65.5%	66.5%	58.3%	68.5%
9. Civilian labor force participation rate, all income, citywide	6.8%	5.6%	11.3%	8.5%

MONTGOMERY, ALA.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	173,334	104,575	67,689	1,626
Living in poverty areas	79,900	22,030	57,767	763
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	33,556	7,308	26,150	300
Poor persons in poverty areas	27,780	3,140	24,605	244
Percent concentration in poverty areas	82.8%	43.0%	94.1%	81.3%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, MONTGOMERY, ALA.

1. Families	5,557	643	4,910	41
2. Female-headed families	3,463	263	3,196	39
Percentage of families headed by females	62.3%	40.9%	65.1%	95.1%
3. Families with public assistance	2,086	121	1,961	19
Percentage of families with public assistance	37.5%	18.8%	39.9%	46.3%
4. Persons 25 years & older	11,027	1,675	9,338	103
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	7,955	1,103	6,838	93
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	72.1%	65.9%	73.2%	90.3%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	23.0%	16.7%	23.9%	32.5%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	36.5%	32.6%	44.1%	26.0%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	6.5%	3.6%	12.2%	10.6%
9. Civilian labor force participation	60.7%	62.9%	56.9%	53.8%

NEW YORK, N.Y.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	6,963,692	4,276,332	1,761,868	1,393,932
Living in poverty areas	2,741,660	896,189	1,226,561	955,148
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	1,391,981	550,352	520,364	498,811
Poor persons in poverty areas	985,770	261,466	452,838	421,810
Percent concentration in poverty areas	70.8%	47.5%	86.9%	84.7%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, NEW YORK, N.Y.

1. Families	221,696	54,354	100,164	102,421
2. Female-headed families	150,553	30,066	74,701	71,170
Percentage of families headed by females	67.9%	55.3%	74.7%	69.5%
3. Families with public assistance	129,879	28,122	59,906	65,358
Percentage of families with public assistance	58.6%	51.7%	59.8%	63.8%
4. Persons 25 years & older	416,497	123,626	189,853	156,651
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	274,321	80,136	114,321	109,390
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	65.9%	64.8%	60.2%	69.8%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	25.7%	19.4%	30.3%	25.3%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	28.3%	28.0%	29.1%	25.7%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	7.7%	6.1%	11.3%	10.9%
9. Civilian labor force participation rate, all income, citywide	57.9%	58.3%	57.8%	54.3%

NEWARK, N.J.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	326,105	106,492	190,820	60,990
Living in poverty areas	242,389	50,610	168,097	46,278
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	106,895	21,508	71,638	25,108
Poor persons in poverty areas	94,988	15,275	67,506	22,185
Percent concentration in poverty areas	88.9%	70.8%	94.2%	88.4%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, NEWARK, N.J.

1. Families	20,987	3,379	14,800	5,258
2. Female-headed families	15,922	2,136	11,778	3,706
Percentage of families headed by females	75.9%	63.2%	79.6%	70.5%
3. Families with public assistance	13,868	1,933	9,315	3,498
Percentage of families with public assistance	62.2%	57.2%	62.9%	66.5%
4. Persons 25 years & older	35,988	7,197	25,091	6,864
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	23,966	5,245	15,808	5,350
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	66.6%	72.9%	63.0%	77.9%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	29.8%	16.3%	32.9%	23.5%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	27.4%	23.8%	28.6%	25.6%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	13.3%	9.6%	15.8%	13.7%
9. Civilian labor force participation rate, all income, citywide	55.4%	57.3%	54.3%	55.9%

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	1,653,164	964,213	629,153	63,244
Living in poverty areas	712,335	183,851	484,266	49,929
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	340,517	112,352	202,364	29,813
Poor persons in poverty areas	248,735	44,924	188,352	26,682
Percent concentration in poverty areas	73.0%	40.0%	89.1%	91.7%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

1. Families	58,862	7,825	38,198	5,686
2. Female-headed families	34,588	3,659	28,322	3,212
Percentage of families headed by females	68.8%	46.8%	74.1%	56.5%
3. Families with public assistance	38,827	3,574	24,169	3,680
Percentage of families with public assistance	68.6%	45.7%	63.3%	64.7%
4. Persons 25 years & older	108,917	23,773	76,984	8,854
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	71,554	15,119	50,616	6,792
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	65.7%	63.6%	65.7%	76.7%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	37.2%	24.3%	41.6%	37.6%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	27.9%	29.7%	28.8%	24.1%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	11.5%	8.3%	17.1%	16.8%
9. Civilian labor force participation	54.6%	55.7%	53.1%	47.5%

ST. LOUIS, MO.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	444,388	236,992	203,587	5,226
Living in poverty areas	232,761	55,178	176,051	2,884
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	96,849	27,538	68,446	1,287
Poor persons in poverty areas	76,456	12,531	63,335	1,028
Percent concentration in poverty areas	78.9%	45.5%	92.5%	79.9%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, ST. LOUIS, MO.

1. Families	14,428	2,154	12,179	182
2. Female-headed families	9,973	1,136	8,784	91
Percentage of families headed by females	69.1%	52.7%	72.1%	50.0%
3. Families with public assistance	7,668	914	6,699	84
Percentage of families with public assistance	53.1%	42.4%	55.0%	46.2%
4. Persons 25 years & older	31,738	6,889	24,545	375
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	21,867	4,701	16,988	245
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	68.9%	68.2%	69.2%	65.3%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	31.8%	19.1%	34.8%	33.3%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	36.2%	32.9%	37.8%	43.6%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	11.2%	6.5%	17.7%	10.8%
9. Civilian labor force participation	56.6%	56.5%	56.5%	63.5%

OAKLAND, CALIF.

	Total	White	Black	Spanish Origin
ALL INCOME LEVELS IN 1979				
Population	333,263	127,490	157,470	31,888
Living in poverty areas	126,673	20,836	86,452	15,188
INCOME IN 1979 BELOW POVERTY				
Population	61,609	13,291	39,135	6,450
Poor persons in poverty areas	37,498	4,891	27,836	4,867
Percent concentration in poverty areas	60.9%	36.8%	71.1%	63.1%

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN POVERTY AREAS, OAKLAND, CALIF.

1. Families	8,223	643	6,433	821
2. Female-headed families	5,543	311	4,858	355
Percentage of families headed by females	67.4%	48.4%	75.5%	43.2%
3. Families with public assistance	4,793	271	4,859	388
Percentage of families with public assistance	58.3%	42.1%	63.1%	36.5%
4. Persons 25 years & older	15,953	2,631	11,868	1,453
5. Person 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	7,449	1,839	4,872	1,853
Percentage of persons 25 years & older who completed less than four years of high school	46.7%	39.5%	44.1%	72.5%
6. Unemployment rate among poor in poverty areas	32.2%	16.4%	37.6%	23.8%
7. Civilian labor force participation rate of poor in poverty areas	34.4%	37.6%	32.9%	45.4%
8. Unemployment rate, all income groups, citywide	9.4%	5.6%	13.5%	11.7%
9. Civilian labor force participation	59.7%	59.3%	58.8%	61.9%

Summary on Large Cities

Poverty Concentration

1970-80

For the 1970 Census, the Census Bureau published a report on population characteristics of the nation's 50 largest cities. For 1980, the Bureau issued a similar report on the 100 largest cities. We use the same 50 cities that are included in the 1970 report to compare poverty conditions in 1970 and 1980.

Altogether, these 50 cities lost population (-5.1%) from 1970 to 1980. But their poverty population grew by 11.7%. And the concentrated poverty population grew by 30.5%. This term refers to poor people in Census tracts with more than 20% poverty.

The white poverty population of these cities declined and the black poverty population rose, i.e., -18.3% vs. +18%.

The black poverty population in poverty areas rose more than the over-all black poverty population; it rose by 22.6%. Moreover, in extreme poverty areas (our term for Census tracts with more than 40% poverty), the total poverty population grew by 65.9%; the black poverty population in extreme poverty areas grew by 58.6%.

Table enclosed

POVERTY DATA FOR 50 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES, 1970, 1980

	1970	1980	Percent change 1970-80
Population	39,827,807	37,815,907	-5.1%
Population below poverty	6,005,673	6,708,464	11.7%
Percent population below poverty	15.1%	17.7%	
Poor in poverty areas (20 % or)	3,371,309	4,398,621	30.5%
Percent population that is poor and in poverty areas	8.5%	11.6%	
Percent of poor in poverty areas	56.1%	65.6%	
White poor (Hisp incl)	3,217,228	2,629,498	-18.3%
White poor as percentage of population	8.1%	7.0%	
White poor as percentage of poverty population	53.6%	39.2%	
White poor in poverty areas	1,175,755	1,106,166	-5.9%
Concentration of white poor in poverty areas	36.5%	42.1%	
Black poor (Hisp incl)	2,662,077	3,140,292	18.0%
Black poor as percentage of population	6.7%	8.3%	
Black poor as percentage of poverty population	44.3%	46.8%	
Black poor in poverty areas	2,138,470	2,621,058	22.6%
Concentration of black poor in poverty areas	80.3%	83.5%	
Total poor in extreme poverty areas--40% or)	974,489	1,613,875	65.6%
White poor in extreme poverty areas	256,805	260,884	1.6%
Black poor in extreme poverty areas	708,853	1,124,344	58.6%

Fifty Largest Cities - Percentage Poverty, Change 1970-1980

City	Percent Pop Below Pov 1970	Percent Pop Below Pov 1980	Increasent % Point Change 1970-80
Newark, N.J.	22.3%	32.8%	10.5%
Atlanta, Ga.	20.5%	27.5%	7.0%
Detroit, Mich.	14.9%	21.9%	7.0%
Chicago, Ill.	14.5%	20.3%	5.8%
Buffalo, N.Y.	15.4%	20.7%	5.3%
Philadelphia, Pa.	15.4%	20.6%	5.2%
New York, N.Y.	14.8%	20.0%	5.1%
Rochester, N.Y.	12.5%	17.5%	5.0%
Cleveland, Oh.	17.4%	22.1%	4.7%
Baltimore, Md.	18.4%	22.9%	4.5%
Miami, Fla.	20.3%	24.5%	4.2%
Boston, Mass.	16.2%	20.2%	4.0%
Los Angeles, Calif.	13.3%	16.4%	3.2%
Toledo, Oh.	10.9%	13.6%	2.7%
TOTAL 50 CITIES	15.1%	17.7%	2.7%
Columbus, Oh.	14.0%	16.5%	2.4%
Milwaukee, Wis.	11.5%	13.8%	2.3%
Long Beach, Calif.	11.9%	14.2%	2.3%
Louisville, Ky.	17.1%	19.3%	2.2%
Cincinnati, Oh.	17.6%	19.7%	2.1%
Oakland, Calif.	16.5%	18.5%	2.0%
Indianapolis, Ind.	9.7%	11.5%	1.9%
Washington, D.C.	16.9%	18.6%	1.7%
St. Louis, Mo.	20.2%	21.8%	1.6%
Minneapolis, Minn.	12.2%	13.5%	1.3%
St. Paul, Minn.	9.6%	10.9%	1.2%
Memphis, Tenn.	20.8%	21.8%	1.1%
Honolulu, Haw.	9.0%	10.0%	1.0%
Omaha, Neb.	10.4%	11.4%	1.0%
Pittsburg, Pa.	15.6%	16.5%	0.9%
Seattle, Wash.	10.4%	11.2%	0.7%
Norfolk, Va.	20.0%	20.7%	0.7%
El Paso, Tex.	20.6%	21.2%	0.6%
Dallas, Tx.	13.6%	14.2%	0.5%
San Diego, Calif.	12.3%	12.4%	0.2%
Kansas City, Mo.	13.0%	13.2%	0.2%
Fort Worth, Tex.	13.8%	13.9%	0.1%
Portland, Ore.	13.0%	13.0%	0.0%
Denver, Colo.	13.7%	13.7%	-0.0%
Tampa, Fla.	18.8%	18.7%	-0.1%
San Francisco, Calif.	14.1%	13.7%	-0.3%
Phoenix, Ariz.	11.6%	11.1%	-0.5%
New Orleans, La.	27.0%	26.4%	-0.6%
San Jose, Calif.	8.8%	8.2%	-0.6%
San Antonio, Tex.	21.7%	20.9%	-0.8%
Birmingham, Ala.	23.0%	22.0%	-1.0%
Nashville-Davidson, Tenn.	13.7%	12.6%	-1.1%
Jacksonville, Fla.	17.5%	16.0%	-1.5%
Houston, Tex.	14.2%	12.7%	-1.5%
Tulsa, Okla.	12.2%	10.4%	-1.8%
Oklahoma City, Okla.	14.3%	12.0%	-2.3%