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ABSTRACT

Several times early in the twentieth century total annual immigration exceeded one million people. Current immigration figures may match those record totals. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year; newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000; and the "settled" illegal immigrant population may be growing by up to half a million a year. Many illegal immigrants entered the United States legally and then overstayed their visas, and there has also been a sharp increase in illegal border crossings from Mexico and Central America. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28% of U.S. population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030s if the currently low U.S. fertility rates continue. Public opinion strongly favors curbs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the United States, and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80 percent of legal immigrants, and Latin Americans comprised 77 percent of the illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, and may be less likely to assimilate as easily as the Asians. Recent Hispanic immigrants have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture in California. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the United States are only likely to increase. (Author/KH)

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POPULATION BULLETIN

Vol. 41, No. 4, November 1986

Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story

*by Leon F. Bouvier and
Robert W. Gardner*

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Abstract—Annual totals of new immigrants and refugees in the U.S. may now be up to the record highs of over a million immigrants counted in six years between 1905 and 1914. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year (570,009 in 1985), newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000, and the "settled" illegal immigrant population is growing by up to half a million a year, according to some estimates. Half of illegal immigrants are persons who entered the U.S. legally but then overstayed the terms of temporary visas. Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehensions of illegal aliens, projected at a record 1.8 million for fiscal year 1986, indicate a sharp increase in illegal border crossers, driven by Mexico's and Central America's mounting population and economic pressures and lured by the prospect of jobs with employers who through a loophole in U.S. immigration law can hire illegal aliens without penalty. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28 percent of U.S. population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030s if fertility stays at the current low 1.8 births per woman. Public opinion strongly favors curbs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the U.S., and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration to the U.S. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80 percent of legal immigrants and Latin Americans comprised 77 percent of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income and might be expected to assimilate in the same manner as earlier immigrant groups did. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, maintaining their own culture and the Spanish language. Research in California indicates that recent Hispanic immigrants (legal and illegal) have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the U.S. are only likely to increase.

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Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story

By Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gardner

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Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story

By Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gardner

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The number one demographic issue on Americans' minds today is immigration. The glittering July 1986 100th birthday celebration of "Liberty Enlightening the World"—the statue that came to symbolize a welcome for the world's "huddled masses" when Emma Lazarus's poem was added to its base 17 years after its dedication—reminded us that we are a "nation of immigrants." Yet the United

States is once again immersed in a debate that reflects its historically ambivalent attitudes toward immigration, as described by Population Council demographer Charles Keely:

"On the one hand, the country has historically been a refuge, a place for new beginnings, accepting and even recruiting new settlers to build the nation and its economy. On the other hand, the theme of protectionism has found recurrent expression in apprehension over the capacity of the culture and economy to absorb newcomers, in the desire to limit labor market competition . . . and even nativism and racist theories."

The number of immigrants to the U.S. in recent years may be approaching the all-time highs recorded at the turn of the 20th century. In 1907 and again in 1914, over 1.2 million immigrants came through the "Golden Door" celebrated in Lazarus's poem. In 1985 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) registered 570,009 new legal immigrants—a number greater than the number of newcomers currently accepted annually by all other nations combined. How many more entered the U.S. clandestinely is impossible to determine, but the number of immigrants settled illegally in the country could be growing by up to half a million a year, according to some estimates. Many more slip across the nation's borders temporarily. In February 1986, INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson reported that apprehensions of illegal aliens were expected to reach 1.8 million in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986—half a million more than fiscal 1985's record total of 1.3 million. Though many of these

represent repeated apprehensions of the same person, immigration officials estimate that for every undocumented entrant apprehended, two or three go undetected.²

Immigration has replaced fertility as the "relevant" demographic variable in U.S. population growth. Concern for the need to reduce fertility to attain zero population growth is but a memory as American women have averaged well under two births per woman since 1972. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration (legal plus illegal immigration minus emigration) accounted for 28 percent of the nation's population growth in 1980-85 and the proportion is growing.

Still more striking is the dramatic shift in the origins of immigrants in the past 20 years. Europeans made up 90 percent of immigrants 100 years ago when the Statue of Liberty was dedicated and more than half still in 1965 when a new influx was prompted by the law change that lowered barriers that had been based largely on race. Only 11 percent of the 570,000 legal immigrants recorded in 1985 came from Europe. Asians accounted for 46 percent of the legal total and Latin Americans—mainly Mexicans and almost all Spanish-speaking—made up 37 percent. INS officials report that close to 95 percent of illegal aliens apprehended attempt to cross the border from Mexico and those numbers are surging with Mexico's and Central America's growing economic troubles and population pressures.

Polls show that Americans strongly favor setting limitations on immigration and putting an end to illegal movements into the country. Seventy-five percent of 36,000 respondents to a late 1985 *U.S. News & World Report* reader survey said they felt immigration policy should be changed to "restrict immigration further." Of 1,618 adults polled in a nationwide *New York Times/CBS News* survey in June 1986, 49 percent said immigration should be decreased—up from 33 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll in

1965 when immigration law was last changed.³

That 1965 legislation amendment set an annual worldwide immigrant and refugee quota of 290,000 (changed in 1980 to 270,000 for immigrants plus a flexible quota for refugees, which was 67,000 in fiscal year 1986). But it left unrestricted the legal entry of immediate family members of U.S. citizens and let stand the anomaly which makes it illegal for a person to migrate into the U.S. without permission or overstay the time limits of a temporary visa but not illegal to employ such a person. Refugees were admitted in growing numbers beyond the numerical quota on an ad hoc basis during the 1960s and 1970s and under a flexible additional annual quota since the Refugee Act of 1980. As a result, immigrant arrivals and refugees adjusted admitted to legal permanent residence in the U.S. have averaged 566,000 a year since 1979, newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000 annually, and the numbers of illegal immigrants lured by the prospect of jobs—especially from the debt-ridden Latin American countries closest to the U.S.—have soared.

In 1977 the Carter administration proposed new legislation to fine persons who knowingly hire illegal aliens, add 2,000 to the INS agents patrolling the U.S.-Mexican border, and implement a legalization program for illegal aliens already in the U.S. In its final report of 1981, the Carter-appointed Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended still more sweeping measures to stem illegal immigration and put a cap on legal immigration. Many of these proposals were incorporated in the immigration reform bill first introduced to Congress in 1982 by Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyoming) and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-Kentucky). During 1982-84, versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill passed the Senate on several occasions, and one passed the House of Representatives on the eve of the 1984 elections only to die in the Con-

ference Committee. Immigration reform again appeared dead as the 99th Congress neared adjournment in October 1986. However, last-minute efforts led to passage by both the House and Senate of legislation imposing civil penalty fines on employers knowingly hiring illegal aliens, granting amnesty to aliens able to prove they lived in the U.S. since before January 1, 1982, and granting legal status for farmworkers who worked in the U.S. for 90 days a year prior to May 1, 1986.

The House's reluctant approach to immigration reform moves beyond a concern with sheer numbers to reflect the national controversy surrounding the social, cultural, and economic issues involved. Americans are asking how the nation can cope with the economic and social challenges posed by massive immigration. Is Spanish taking over as the nation's second language? How are the newest immigrants contributing to a changing U.S. culture? How is the economy affected by an increasingly foreign-born labor force? Are jobs being taken from American citizens or does the rapid influx of new residents help create jobs enough for all? Could the outlawing of the hiring of illegal aliens increase discrimination against native-born and legally resident Hispanic Americans? Does the promise of amnesty for illegal immigrants long resident in the country discriminate against immigrants who entered legally? Perhaps most important: Is the traditional assimilation of immigrants and their descendants into the cultural mainstream of the U.S. giving way to cultural pluralism or still another type of adaptation?

These are some of the difficult issues facing the nation as history repeats itself. A century ago, a stream of "new immigration" from southern and eastern Europe was just getting under way. The questions, hopes, and fears of that era were similar to those being expressed today and explored in this *Bulletin*.

We begin with describing the "phenomenon" of migration and its role in human history.

Migration as a Phenomenon

What is migration?

"Animals that wander must adapt or die. When man ceases to wander, he will cease to ascend in the scale of being." So wrote philosopher Alfred North Whitehead in 1925.⁴ If he was right, humankind need not be concerned about ascending in the scale of being because we have always been wanderers. Fossil remains of homo erectus, among the earliest ancestors of humankind, have been found as far apart as Europe and China.⁵

From time immemorial, humans have moved either to improve their lot in life or to escape intolerable situations. Thus people are both "pulled" to what appears to be a more suitable region and "pushed" from their homeland by deplorable conditions of some sort. British geographer Edward G. Ravenstein described this phenomenon in 1889 in his Seventh Law of Migration:

"Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion . . . all have produced and are still producing currents of migration ['push'], but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to 'better' themselves in material respects ['pull']."⁶

U.S. demographer Everett S. Lee restated and updated Ravenstein's Laws in a classic 1966 article, "A Theory of Migration."⁷ Lee argued that migrants' decisions are shaped by push, pull, and neutral factors in both the place of origin and the place of destination, and also by "intervening obstacles," such as the distance involved in the move. He defined migration as "a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. No restriction is placed upon the distance of the move or upon the voluntary or involuntary nature of the act, and no distinction is made between external and internal migration." Migration research generally makes this distinction, however, and in this *Bulletin* we are dealing

solely with "external" or international migration across national borders, specifically those of the U.S.

The number of people in any area can change only as a result of fertility, mortality, and/or migration. These are the basic demographic variables that generate all population alterations. But migration differs vastly from fertility and mortality.

First, births and deaths are biological processes that are distinct, uniform, and discrete events; migration is not biological and has no uniform process. There is a limit to the number of births a woman can have and we all die but once, but migration has no upper limit.

Second, migration necessarily involves leaving one place and entering another, so two areas should be considered when it is studied. Fertility and mortality relate to only one "move"—either entering or leaving an area.

Three, births and deaths are universals. To survive, societies require reproduction and some control over the inevitability of death. Migration is not universal, an inevitable event happening to everyone. It can be repeated and reversed. A territory could experience no migration at all, either in or out. On the other hand, entire societies can move and, indeed, this has occurred often throughout history.

Who moves?

The characteristics of movers are determined, at least in part, by whether push or pull factors predominate. People responding to pull factors are likely to be more innovative than those who stay behind. They are probably better educated, though perhaps less so than their new neighbors at place of destination. For example, often today these people are leaving less developed countries for relatively better jobs in industrialized nations. Sometimes this can be a "brain drain" for the country of origin; more often it simply eases employment pressures.

People responding to push factors in their homeland tend to be negatively selected. They have fewer of the positive

characteristics, such as education, of those reacting to pull factors. There are numerous exceptions to this generalization, such as intellectuals who have fled from countries like Chile and the Soviet Union, but the uneducated usually make up a substantial proportion of negatively selected migrants.

Often push and pull factors work together. For example, the Mexican illegal worker in a Los Angeles sweatshop was pushed by the lack of job opportunities at home, but he or she was also pulled by the prospect of employment north of the border. The job may not be as attractive to Americans, but it is seized by immigrants who compare the wages and conditions to what they know back home.

In today's world, refugees are perhaps the best example of persons affected purely by push factors, forced to flee their homelands for political reasons or, as in Africa periodically, because of famine. Most other migrants today appear to be better educated and more highly motivated than their nonmigrating counterparts, willing to take a chance to better their lot in life. This is as true of the poorly educated (by U.S. standards) Mexican dodging the U.S. Border Patrol as it is of the Indian engineer landing at New York's Kennedy Airport.

Why do people move?

Except for political refugees, who move for fear of their lives, most people move for economic reasons. This is what propels the Haitian risking his life in a leaking ship to get to the shores of the Virgin Islands or Florida and the trained Filipino nurse applying for a position at a West Coast hospital. To be sure, other factors are sometimes involved. Family reunification is a major reason for immigration in the U.S. today. But even here, employment is an underlying factor. Beyond the U.S., a recent example is the movement of Tamils from Sri Lanka to West Germany and finally to Newfoundland. While they left Sri Lanka reportedly as political refugees, their purpose in leaving West Germany was

primarily economic. For migrants, economic rewards mean different things in different places and different eras, but the goal has always been to improve one's lot in life, through either survival or occupational advancement.

In recent centuries, most international migration has been by single persons or families. (Some refugee movements are exceptions.) Earlier movements were more likely to be of large groups either of invaders, taking over a new territory, or of people displaced by invaders or captured in slavery. Thucydides wrote of pre-Classical Greece:

"The country now called Hellas had in ancient times no settled population. On the contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the pressure of superior numbers."⁸

This was a clear example of both invasion and displacement.

The early history of what is now the contiguous United States provides similar examples. Invaders from Europe—who could be viewed as "illegal" immigrants—replaced the original inhabitants of the region, who in turn migrated westward (displacement). Africans were forced to leave their homelands to become slaves to the colonists who followed the invaders.

Millions of people undoubtedly "migrated" through the centuries before the 1600s. How many is not known, but the history of humankind has been dramatically affected by these mass movements. For invading armies, the conquered lands promised untold riches; those displaced sought a better life elsewhere. Of course, slaves, like today's refugees, had no choice in the matter and were the exception to the rule that people move to improve themselves economically.

Where and when have people moved?

International migration has been substantial over the past four centuries. Foremost among the few predominant streams was the migration of more than

60 million Europeans to the New World between 1600 and 1940. Their destinations were principally the U.S. and Canada, South America and the Caribbean, Australia and New Zealand, and southern Africa.

Movements out of Asia were slight until the mid-20th century and consisted primarily, though not exclusively, of indentured workers. Indians went to East Africa, Fiji, and Trinidad; Japanese to Hawaii, the U.S., and Brazil; and Chinese to the U.S. International migration within Asia has been considerably greater, with Indians and Chinese settling in numerous other Asian countries. A "diaspora" of perhaps 30 million Chinese extends into such countries as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and what is now Kampuchea.

Except for slaves, few Africans left their continent before the middle of this century, but since World War II many have gone to the United Kingdom, France, the U.S., and Canada. Within Africa, long-standing tribal migrations technically became international migration when the 1880 Treaty of Berlin arbitrarily set national borders without regard to tribal boundaries. In the 20th century, there have also been large international movements of workers into the richer countries of southern Africa, to the Ivory Coast, to Ghana and Nigeria (and expulsions from both when conditions worsened), and in the 1970s and early 1980s, massive movements of refugees driven across national boundaries by war and famine, particularly from Ethiopia.

International migration among developed regions has dwindled in the late 20th century, to be replaced by soaring migration from less developed to more developed areas. Fed by cheaper and easier transportation and improved communication, the predominant streams of recent years have been from North Africa to France, from the Caribbean and Africa to the United Kingdom, from non-oil-producing Middle Eastern and Asian countries to the oil-producing Arab states, and from Latin America and

Table 1. Legal Immigration to the U.S., by Region of Last Residence 1820-1985

(Percent of total)

Intercensal decade	Total number	Europe total ^a	North and West Europe ^b	South and East Europe ^b	Asia ^c	Africa
1820-1830	151,824	70.1	67.9	2.2	—	—
1831-1840	599,125	82.7	81.7	1.0	—	—
1841-1850	1,713,251	93.2	92.9	0.3	—	—
1851-1860	2,598,214	94.4	93.6	0.8	1.6	—
1861-1870	2,314,824	89.2	88.1	1.1	2.8	—
1871-1880	2,812,191	80.8	76.2	4.5	4.4	—
1881-1890	5,246,613	90.3	78.8	11.5	1.3	—
1891-1900	3,687,564	96.4	60.6	35.8	2.0	—
1901-1910	8,795,387	91.6	46.1	45.5	3.7	0.1
1911-1920	5,735,811	75.3	25.3	49.9	4.3	0.1
1921-1930	4,107,209	60.0	32.5	27.0	2.7	0.2
1931-1940	528,431	65.8	38.6	26.7	3.0	0.3
1941-1950	1,035,039	60.0	49.9	9.8	3.1	0.7
1951-1960	2,515,479	52.7	39.7	12.7	6.1	0.6
1961-1970	3,321,677	33.8	18.3	15.4	12.9	0.9
1971-1980	4,493,314	17.8	6.7	11.0	35.3	1.8
1981-1985	2,864,406	11.4	5.4	6.0	47.8	2.6
1985	570,009	11.1	5.3	5.7	46.4	3.0
Total						
1820-1985	52,520,358	69.8	47.2	22.5	8.8	0.4

Sources: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 1984 *Statistical Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: 1986) Table IMM 1.2, and unpublished data for fiscal year 1985 (October 1, 1984-September 30, 1985).

^aIncludes all of present-day U.S.S.R., except 1931-1950, when U.S.S.R. is divided into European U.S.S.R. and Asian U.S.S.R.

^bThrough 1901-1910, North and West Europe includes Austria-Hungary. After 1901-1910, Austria included in North and West Europe, Hungary in South and East Europe. Immigrants recorded as "Other Europe" (57,182 altogether through fiscal year 1984) are omitted from these two regions as shown in this table.

^cAsia according to INS definition, includes Southwest Asia, e.g., Iraq, Israel, Syria, Turkey.

Asia (though not Japan) to the U.S. and Canada. When refugee movements are added to the already enormous amount of legal and illegal migration, it could well be that planet Earth is now witnessing the largest number of moves in history.

These migrants are reshaping the societies, economies, and demographics of both the lands they leave and their new homelands. It can now be seen that demographer Sidney Goldstein was accurate when he predicted in his 1976 presidential address to the Population Association of America that: "Migration may well become the most important branch of demography in the last quarter of the century."⁹

For U.S. demography, international migration has always been of prime importance.

Immigration to the U.S.: Before 1965

Immigration had already been occurring for centuries before the United States declared independence in 1776 and, of course, was the source of all citizens of the new country or their forebears. In fact, one justification for breaking political ties with England cited in the Declaration of Independence was King George III's "refusing to pass others [allow emigration] to encourage their migration hither." Colonial immigrants came primarily from Great Britain and northwestern Europe and settled in areas already inhabited by American Indians. These were the descendants of migrants who

Americas total ^a	Canada	Latin America ^c	Mexico
7.9	1.6	6.2	3.2
5.6	2.3	3.3	1.1
3.6	2.4	1.2	0.2
2.9	2.3	0.6	0.1
7.2	6.6	0.5	0.1
14.4	13.6	0.7	0.2
8.1	7.5	0.6	—
1.1	0.1	1.0	—
4.1	2.0	2.1	0.6
19.9	12.9	7.0	3.8
36.9	22.5	14.4	11.2
30.3	20.5	9.7	4.2
34.3	16.6	14.9	5.9
39.6	15.0	22.2	11.9
51.7	12.4	38.6	13.7
44.1	3.8	40.3	14.2
37.5	2.1	35.4	11.7
38.8	2.0	36.7	10.7
20.0	8.0	11.8	4.9

^aIncludes Canada and Latin America (see next note).

^bIncludes Mexico, Caribbean, Central America, South America.

^cNo record of immigration from Mexico, 1886-1893.

Note: A dash (—) indicates less than .05 percent.

"probably came across a land bridge between Siberia and Alaska They were Asian and although they became fantastically differentiated in language and culture, they were all biological descendants of the Mongoloid branch of humankind."¹⁰ The Asian migrants themselves had apparently displaced a still earlier group whose origins are even less clear.

Thus the land area now occupied by the 48 contiguous U.S. states has repeatedly seen the settlement of one group, followed by immigration of another. The pattern invites conflict and conflict has indeed often resulted when established groups felt threatened by newcomers. This has been evidenced in actual violence, in prejudice and discrimination, and in local, state, and fed-

eral legislation directed against immigrants.


Early immigration restrictions and numbers

The first important restrictions on immigration came only late in the 19th century, but already in the nation's first years there were measures to control who could and could not reside within its borders. For example, the Alien and Seditions Act of 1789 declared that the President could expel anyone he thought dangerous. A Naturalization Act of 1790 established that any free white person "of good moral character" who had resided in the U.S. for two years could acquire citizenship. The residence required for naturalization was extended to 14 years by the Alien Act of 1798 (which also said undesirable aliens could be deported), and then cut back to five years in 1800.

The first formal efforts to count immigrants began with an act of 1819 that "required the captain or master of a vessel arriving from abroad to deliver to the local collector of customs a list or manifest of all passengers taken on board."¹¹ Between the end of the Revolutionary War and 1819, an estimated 250,000 foreign-born persons had arrived by ship. The data collected since 1819 probably give an accurate idea of immigrant numbers, even though they are not complete because, for example, before 1904 cabin class passengers and persons arriving overland from Mexico and Canada were counted only irregularly.

The recorded numbers add up to 52.5 million for 1820 through fiscal year 1985, ending September 30, 1985 (see Table 1). The peak intercensal decade was 1901-1910, with 8.8 million recorded immigrants, while the peak decade ever was 1905-1914, with a count of more than 10.1 million. The record single year was 1907, when 1,285,349 immigrants were counted (see Figure 1, page 10). Recently recorded annual immigration has been averaging less than half that

Figure 1. Legal Immigration to the U.S.: 1820-1985



Sources: See Table 1.

number: 566,000 for the six years from fiscal year 1980 (beginning October 1, 1979) through fiscal year 1985 (ending September 30, 1985). However, adding in plausible estimates of numbers of unrecorded, or illegal immigrants that range up to 500,000 a year (see page 37) brings current immigration levels much closer to previous highs. (The 1980-85 annual average of 566,000 legal immigrants is calculated from INS data for immigrants "admitted for permanent residence." This includes persons arriving with permanent resident visas obtained at U.S. consular offices abroad, plus persons already in the U.S. on student, tourist, and other types of temporary visas and refugees and approved asylees in the country for at least one year who are adjusting to permanent resident [immigrant] status. It *excludes* newly arrived refugees and asylees who have not yet been approved. In fiscal

year 1985, for example, in addition to 570,009 legally admitted immigrants, which included 95,040 refugees and asylees adjusting to permanent resident status, 68,991 persons were admitted under the terms of the Refugee Act of 1980, including 62,477 newly arrived refugees and 6,514 persons already in the U.S. who were approved as asylees (see Figure 4, page 44).

The 53 million immigrants have come from all parts of the globe, but different countries or regions of origin have dominated the flow at different times. Immigrants from north and west Europe continued to dominate after 1820. In fact, such immigrants account for 47 percent of the 53 million and it was not until the 20th century that they made up less than half of total immigrants recorded for an intercensal decade (see Table 1 and Figure 2, page 16).

Even among Americans of similar

northern and western European ancestry, newcomers were greeted with suspicion. In the mid-19th century, "nativists" rioted against newly arrived Germans in the Midwest and formed the American Protective Association to fight the Irish. Americans of any European ancestry were wary of immigrants from outside Europe. The first such group were the Chinese, recruited to provide much-needed labor in the mines and on the transcontinental railroads in California and neighboring states, beginning in the 1850s. By the 1870s, these Asian immigrants, apparently willing to work under any conditions for low pay, were viewed by other laborers as major competitors for jobs and became victims of anti-Chinese rioting and restrictive state laws.

Restrictive legislation

In 1882 Congress passed the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, barring the immigration of laborers (but not teachers, diplomats, students, merchants, or tourists) from China for ten years. The act was renewed in 1892 and 1902 and rescinded only in 1943, when the U.S. and China were wartime allies. The precedent of this act as the first exclusion of a national group was more important than its impact on immigrant numbers; at their peak, Chinese arrivals amounted only to 39,579, in 1882, compared to more than 250,000 from Germany in the same year, which was also Germany's peak immigration year. Restrictionist aims were now embodied in federal law. A "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907-08 with Japan barred entry to laborers from Japan (and from Korea after Japan annexed Korea in 1910) and in 1917, immigration was prohibited for laborers from an "Asiatic Barred Zone" (most of China, India, Indochina, parts of Afghanistan and Arabia, Burma, Siam, the Malay States, Asiatic Russia, most Polynesian islands, and all East Indian islands).

As immigrants from southern and eastern Europe began to gain on those from the traditional source countries of northern and western Europe, they too

were seen as undesirably "alien" and threats to established "American" laborers. Numbers arriving from the two European regions were about equal in 1901-1910, but the "new immigrants" outnumbered immigrants from north and west Europe in the next ten years. A 42-volume report issued in 1911 by the Dillingham Joint Commission on Immigration, supposedly scientific and impartial, concluded that the new immigrants were racially inferior, "inclined toward violent crime," resisted assimilation, and "drove old-stock citizens out of some lines of work."¹² Eleven years later the Quota Act of 1921 established immigrant quotas for each admissible nationality based on its share of the U.S. population counted in the 1910 census; some 60 percent of the quotas went to northwestern European countries. The final definitive restrictive legislation was passed in 1924 with the National Origins Act. The quotas were similar to those of the 1921 law. As implemented in 1929, they allotted 82 percent of a maximum of 150,000 annual immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere to countries of northwestern Europe, 16 percent to southeastern Europe, and 2 percent to all others. Totally barred from entry were all "aliens ineligible for citizenship," which effectively excluded all Asians.

Although there was still no ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, the Golden Door was far from open at the beginning of the 1930s. With the added impact of the worldwide Great Depression, immigration for the decade was reduced to barely one-eighth of the total for the 1920s and scarcely exceeded the simultaneous rise in emigration. The nadir, however, came in the war year of 1943, when only 23,700 immigrants were recorded, the lowest number since 1831 (see Figure 1).

Immigration picked up after World War II. Ad hoc measures opened the door to many displaced persons and refugees. Some Asians were accorded the right of citizenship, which also meant they could immigrate, but their quotas were tiny: for



Numbers of immigrants arriving from the two European regions were about equal in 1901-1910, but "new immigrants" from south and east Europe outnumbered immigrants from north and west Europe in the next ten years.

example, 105 a year for Chinese, beginning in 1943. Small numbers of Asians gained admission through other qualifications, such as wives of U.S. servicemen allowed entry under the War Brides Act.

The nation's immigration laws were becoming more and more obviously out of date, but new legislation was difficult to enact.

Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952

Finally, in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed, over the veto of President Truman, who objected to its continuation of immigrant quotas. This act—also known as the McCarran-Walter Act after its congressional sponsors—is still in effect today, although heavily amended. It made some important

changes in immigration law, but was basically a recodification of existing legislation. Again, no ceiling was placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, while the annual quota for Eastern Hemisphere was raised slightly to 158,561. Of these, 85 percent went to northwestern European countries, reaffirming the principle of national origins. The category of aliens ineligible for citizenship was abolished, thus ending discrimination on the basis of race for naturalization and hence for immigration. But the quotas were just 100 per country for all Asia Pacific Triangle countries, and 100 apiece for such countries as Egypt, Israel, and New Zealand. Germany, by contrast, was allotted 25,814 and Ireland, 17,756.

Most important, the 1952 law established a preference order for would-be immigrants. Highly skilled immigrants

"whose services are urgently needed in the United States" (plus their spouses and children) could claim up to half the visas assigned to each country (see Table 2, page 14). First call on the remainder went, in descending order, to parents and unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens, spouses and unmarried adult children of aliens legally residing in the U.S., and siblings and married children of U.S. citizens. A person in the fifth category could obtain a visa only if his or her country's quota was undersubscribed.

The 1952 law did not mention refugees but did authorize the Attorney General to admit "parolees," and refugees were admitted in increasing numbers under this authorization (see "Refugees and Asylees," page 41). Also, after 1952 Congress enacted special legislation to permit immigration of spouses and children of U.S. citizens beyond the numerical quotas. As a result, numbers of admitted immigrants soared far over the 159,000 Eastern Hemisphere limit in the next decade and a half. Only an estimated one out of three immigrants of the 3.5 million admitted between 1952 and 1965 was actually a quota immigrant under the national origins system for the Eastern Hemisphere.¹³

The 1952 law also contained the so-called Texas Proviso. Apparently included at the urging of Texas agriculture interests, this provision specifically exempted employers from fines or imprisonment meted out to persons guilty of "harboring" illegal aliens. The direct result, according to many analysts, was the rising tide of illegal immigrants, primarily from Mexico, searching for work and finding it with employers who have nothing to fear from the law. Eliminating the Texas Proviso and imposing sanctions on employers of illegal aliens is a key provision in recent immigration reform legislation (see page 35).

The Texas Proviso left a loophole to lure illegal immigrants from Mexico even after the Immigration and Naturalization Service concluded that it had solved the

illegal immigration problem by deporting over one million Mexicans (including some who were U.S. citizens) in its "Operation Wetback" of 1954.¹⁴ These undocumented workers had streamed north during the 1940s and early 1950s as *braceros* spread the word of jobs to be found north of the border. Designed originally to bring temporary workers north to alleviate U.S. wartime labor shortages, the *bracero* program brought in 4.8 million temporary Mexican workers between 1942 and 1964. Its demise in 1964 probably stimulated a further influx of job-seeking Mexicans left without a legal means of entry.

The mid-1960s were a tumultuous time in the U.S., with civil rights activism and agitation against the Vietnam War. With regard to immigration, the time finally came when the discriminatory quota system was seen as outmoded and no longer reflective of the nation's values or its international political goals. Following hearings on immigration reform held by the Kennedy administration, a set of immigration amendments was signed into law by President Johnson in 1965, taking full effect in 1968 after a 31-month phase-in period.

1965 to Today

Immigration Act of 1965

Although on paper the Immigration Act of 1965 was simply a series of amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, it was the biggest change in immigration legislation since the 1924 law. It abolished the national origins system and discrimination against Asians. It raised the annual quota for Eastern Hemisphere immigrants to 170,000, with no more than 20,000 from any one country, and placed a ceiling of 120,000 per year on total Western Hemisphere immigration. (In 1978 this was changed to a worldwide ceiling of 290,000, with a maximum of 20,000 per country. After enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act to deal with refugees separately, the ceiling was

Table 2. Preference Systems: 1952 and 1965 Immigration Acts

Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952

Exempt from preference requirements and numerical quotas: Spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens.

1. First preference: Highly skilled immigrants whose services are urgently needed in the United States and the spouses and children of such immigrants.
50 percent.
2. Second preference: Parents of U.S. citizens over age 21 and unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens.
30 percent.
3. Third preference: Spouses and unmarried adult children of permanent resident aliens.
20 percent.
4. Fourth preference: Brothers, sisters, and married children of U.S. citizens and accompanying spouses and children.
50 percent of numbers not required for first three preferences.
5. Nonpreference: Applicants not entitled to one of the above preferences.
50 percent of numbers not required for first three preferences, plus any not required for fourth preference.

Immigration Act of 1965

Exempt from preference requirements and numerical quotas: Spouses, unmarried minor children and parents, and parents of U.S. citizens.

1. First preference: Unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens.
20 percent.
2. Second preference: Spouses and unmarried adult children of permanent resident aliens.
20 percent (26 percent after 1980).
3. Third preference: Members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability.
10 percent. Requires labor certification.
4. Fourth preference: Married children of U.S. citizens.
10 percent.
5. Fifth preference: Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens over age 21.
24 percent.
6. Sixth preference: Skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which labor is in short supply in the United States.
10 percent. Requires labor certification.
7. Seventh preference: Refugees from communist countries or communist-dominated countries or the general area of the Middle East.
6 percent. Removed when 1980 Refugee Act enacted, with 6 percent going to second preference.
8. Nonpreference: Applicants not entitled to one of the above preferences.
Any numbers not required for preference applicants. Not currently being used because preference applicants take up all available places.

Note: The spouse and unmarried minor children of a visa recipient generally receive visas in the same preference category.

lowered to 280,000, then 270,000, where it is today.) Thus the Golden Door swung wide open to Asians and remained relatively wide open for immigrants from Latin America and these two regions became the major source areas for post-1965 immigration.

Also to have important consequences was the act's change in the preference system (which was extended to Western Hemisphere immigrants in 1976). From

the skills emphasized in the 1952 law, there was a shift to family reunification as a rationing criterion. The first, second, fourth, and fifth preferences allotted up to 74 percent of country quotas to close family members of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens (see Table 2). Also, there were again no numerical restrictions on spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens, and parents were now added to this list. Another

6 percent of quotas, allocated to refugees in the seventh preference, went to spouses and unmarried adult children of permanent resident aliens (second preference) when the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed. Labor qualifications were the criteria only for the third preference (members of the professions and scientists and nonperforming artists of exceptional ability) and the sixth preference (skilled and unskilled workers "in occupations for which labor is in short supply"), with 10 percent apiece.

The emphasis on family reunification was touted as an embodiment of the nation's highest principles and efforts to change this have been met with much opposition and pious statements about the importance of the family. Some observers have suggested that this emphasis was a subtle attempt to retain the spirit of the old discriminatory system; Europeans would be far more likely than Asians to have family members already in the U.S. Also, the family reunification system effectively restricts immigration to a small segment of an origin country's population, excluding "new seed" immigrants who might bring new life, energy, and innovation to this country.

Many writers have pointed out that the scant allotment for immigrants admitted on occupational qualifications rules or consideration of current labor market needs, in contrast to Canada and Australia, whose systems allow the numbers of immigrants to be raised in times of labor shortage and restricted when unemployment is high.¹⁵ In the U.S., legal immigrant numbers have risen steadily regardless of swings in the economy since 1965, although illegal immigration appears to be shaped somewhat by the economic climate of both the U.S. and the major source country, Mexico. Just 3.9 percent of immigrants admitted in 1985 qualified under the third and sixth occupational preferences. (See Table 5, page 18). This figure does not include family members brought along by the occupational immigrant, since they do not have to qualify.)


Numbers, origins, preference categories

Although legal immigrant numbers have risen steadily since the 1965 amendments took effect in 1968, the trend can be seen as a continuation of the rise beginning after World War I (see Table 1, page 8, and Figure 1, page 10). INS figures on legally admitted immigrants are 373,000 for 1970, 531,000 for 1980, and 570,000 for 1985. (As noted, these figures omit newly arrived refugees and asylees, but include those adjusting to permanent resident status.) More dramatic has been the change in the origins of legal immigrants, also a continuation of past trends. The proportion of immigrants from the traditional sending region of Europe shrank to just 11 percent by 1981-85, while the share of Asian immigrants soared to 48 percent (see Figure 2, page 16). The size of the flow from Latin America rose, but its share of the total fell from 40 percent in 1971-80 to 35 percent in 1981-85. The sudden rise in the Asian component belies the 1965 prediction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy that only a few thousand Asian immigrants might be expected after the new law took effect.

Asians have made good use of the preference system. In the years immediately after 1968, well-educated Asians took advantage of the professional preference categories to move to the U.S. or adjust from student or business visas to permanent resident status. After five years of residence they could become citizens and then were eligible to bring in immediate relatives without numerical restrictions, as well as other close relatives under the family reunification provisions of the preference system. Eventually these relatives in turn could in the same way enlarge the family groups in the U.S. further—a process known as "chain migration."

Also unforeseen by Robert Kennedy was the flood of Southeast Asian refugees admitted to the U.S. in the wake of defeat in the Vietnam War: a total of

Figure 2. Legal Immigrants Admitted to the U.S., by Region of Last



Sources: See Table 1.

761,000 between April 1975 and the end of September 1985.¹⁶ These refugees are adding to the swelling INS count of legally admitted Asian immigrants as they adjust to permanent resident status, for which they are eligible after one year, and later as they obtain citizenship and bring in close relatives.

A major exception to the post-1965 spurt in Asian immigration are the Japanese. As a highly developed country, Japan offers its citizens as many opportunities as the U.S., if not more. Numbers of immigrants from Canada and the developed countries of Europe are dwindling as well, probably for the same reason. America is now seen as the land of opportunity mainly for people of the less developed countries of Asia, Latin America, and increasingly, Africa.

The recent increase in immigrants has reversed a 60-year decline in the proportion of foreign-born counted in the census. As seen in Table 3, this proportion of the total population fell from 14.7 percent in 1910 (and 1890) to just 4.7 percent in 1970 but by 1980 had climbed to 6.2 percent and in 1986 is undoubtedly still higher.

The composition of the foreign-born population counted in the 1980 census did not yet reflect the recent dramatic changes in immigrant flows. As seen in Table 4, immigrants from regions that dominated earlier flows were more prominent among the 1980 foreign-born

Table 3. Foreign-Born Proportion of Total Population: 1850-1980

Census year	Percent foreign-born of total population
1850	9.7
1860	13.2
1870	14.0
1880	13.3
1890	14.7
1900	13.6
1910	14.7
1920	13.2
1930	11.6
1940	8.8
1950	6.9
1960	5.5
1970	4.7
1980	6.2

Sources: 1850-1970: Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975) Tables C228-295; 1980: Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-D1-A, Detailed Population Characteristics*, March 1984, Table 253.

than they were among immigrants admitted in 1985, especially those from Europe (33.7 percent of 1980 foreign-born versus 11.1 percent of 1985 immigrants), from the U.S.S.R. (2.9 versus 0.6 percent), and Canada (6 versus 2 percent). Underrepresented by current standards were the foreign-born from South America (4.0 versus 6.8 percent), and especially Asia (18.0 versus 46.4

Residence: 1820-1985




Table 4. Regions and Countries of Origin of Foreign-Born Counted in the 1980 Census and of Immigrants Admitted in 1985

Region and country of birth	Foreign-born, 1980 census (percent)	Immigrants admitted in 1985 (percent)
Total number	14,079,906	570,009
Percent	100.0	100.0
Europe	33.7	11.0
Germany	6.0	11.1
Italy	5.9	1.2
United Kingdom	4.8	2.4
U.S.S.R.	2.9	0.6
Asia	18.0	46.4
Korea	2.1	6.2
Philippines	3.6	8.4
Vietnam	1.6	5.6
North and Central America	33.1	32.0
Canada	6.0	2.0
Mexico	15.6	10.7
Caribbean	8.9	14.6
Cuba	4.3	3.6
South America	4.0	6.8
Africa	1.4	3.0

Sources: Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-D1-A, Detailed Population Characteristics, Table 254*; INS, *1985 Statistical Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: forthcoming 1986) Table IMM 2.2.

percent). The proportion of the 1980 foreign-born from Mexico (15.6 percent) was higher than that of the Mexican-born among 1985 legal immigrants (10.7 percent), even though Mexico was the

source of more legal immigrants in 1985 than any other country, with 61,077 of the total 570,009. This probably reflects the 1.1 million undocumented immigrants born in Mexico that the Census Bureau estimates were counted in the 1980 census—55 percent of the total of 2.1 million such illegal aliens counted.¹⁷

Table 5 (page 18) shows how dramatically the family reunification bias of the 1965 amended preference system has lowered the proportion of immigrants admitted under the employment-related qualifications of the third and sixth preferences. Since 1980, that proportion has been just 3.9 percent for all immigrants and as low as 2.5 percent for Latin American-born immigrants as a whole, and 0.1 percent in 1980 and 1.5 percent in 1985 for the Mexican-born. These figures do not include spouses and minor children, which the law specifies are to be admitted in the same category as a visa recipient. Thus a scientist may bring along his or her immediate family; all would count as third preference immigrants, but only the scientist would have

Table 5. Immigrants Admitted Under Third and Sixth Occupational Preferences: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985

(Percent of total immigrants)

Region and country of birth	Year of admission			
	1970	1975	1980	1985
All immigrants	8.4 ^a	7.0 ^a	3.9	3.9
Asia	12.8	8.4	3.2	4.1
India	14.8	18.6	7.7	7.0
Korea	6.9	6.7	1.0	2.6
Philippines	20.5	11.7	0.3	2.7
Latin America	^a	^a	2.5	2.5
Mexico	^a	^a	0.1	1.5

Sources: INS, 1970 Annual Report, Tables 6 and 7a, 1975 Annual Report, Tables 6 and 7a, 1980 Statistical Yearbook, Tables 5 and 6, and 1985 Statistical Yearbook, Tables IMM 2.1 and IMM 2.2.

^aBefore 1977, immigration from the Western Hemisphere was not subject to the preference system. Thus no data are available for Latin America before that year, and data for "all immigrants" refer only to the Eastern Hemisphere.

Note: Figures are for "principals" only. They do not include the spouses and children of these principals who are permitted to enter in the same categories.

to qualify by having the necessary occupation or skill.

That family reunification determines all but a small fraction of current legal immigration does not mean that today's legal immigrants are unemployable or poorly qualified to take part in the American economy. Far from it. Many of them come from families of individuals who came under work-related preferences and hence are likely to be well-trained themselves. There is also "selection" at the origin even apart from family connections; generally only the better educated and better trained can hope to pay for and negotiate the hurdles that lie in the path of someone wishing to immigrate legally to the U.S. today.

Impact on U.S. population growth


Many of today's arguments about the importance of immigration and limiting it focus on the current "record high" levels. But just what is "record high" is not always clear. Today's annual legal immigration, as counted by the INS, is not anywhere near the annual counts of more than a million recorded six times between 1905 and 1914 (see Figure 1, page 10). However, these figures leave out illegal immigrants and newly arrived refugees. Census Bureau analysts Jef-

frey Passel and Karen Woodrow estimate current net illegal immigration—persons who live more or less permanently in the U.S.—at 100,000 to 300,000 a year.¹⁸ Others put the figure higher (see "Illegal Immigrants," page 36). In addition, recent years have seen the arrival of large numbers of refugees and asylees from Cuba, Central America, and Southeast Asia (see Figure 4, page 44, and "Refugees and Asylees," page 41). When these numbers are added in, it may be that the total number of new U.S. residents each year is now as great as in the early 1900s.

The annual rate of legal immigration per 1,000 of the population already in the U.S. is currently much lower than it was for the 100 years from 1830 to 1930 when the total population of the country was much smaller (see Figure 3). From this perspective, immigration today is not nearly so great as it has been in the past, though the rate is rising. (Note that these figures do not include illegal immigrants and newly arrived refugees, and do not allow for emigration.)

The impact of immigration on current U.S. population growth is a different story. Populations can change size only through the differences between births and deaths (natural increase or decrease) and/or between immigration and

Figure 3. Annual Rate of Legal Immigration per 1,000 Population: 1820-1984



Source: Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986* (Washington, D.C.: 1985) p. 82.

emigration (net migration). Net immigration of 500,000 a year has far less impact on population growth when annual natural increase is 3 million than when it is less than a million. With the national fertility rate down to 1.8 births per woman, natural increase in the U.S. during the first half of the 1980s has averaged slightly under 1.7 million a year, compared to 2.5 million a year during the baby boom peak decade of the 1950s, and immigration has increased. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration (including net illegal immigration, which they put at 200,000 a year) accounted for 28 percent of population growth in 1980-85, compared to 11 percent in 1955-59 (see Table 6, page 20). This is not yet up to the 40 percent which net immigration contributed to population growth during the first decade of the 20th century, but the proportion will inevitably increase if fertility stays well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, as seems likely.

Census Bureau projections show that if fertility were to remain constant at 1.9 births per woman (slightly higher than the rate recorded for the past decade), by the 2030s the U.S. would begin to experi-

ence natural *decrease* and further population growth would be entirely due to net immigration.¹⁹ In the next section we present projections showing that if net immigration were constant at 500,000 a year, the U.S. population would grow from 226.5 million in 1980 to 295 million in 2040 and decline to 277 million in 2080. With net immigration of 1 million a year (possibly not much higher than today's level), the population would be 340 million in 2080 and still growing.

The latter projections assume that by 2030, the fertility of all immigrant women will equal the low level of white non-Hispanic women in the U.S. (which is assumed to remain constant at 1.8 births per woman from 1980 onward). For Asian women this is likely. In 1980, according to the census, the average number of children ever born for all Asian immigrant women aged 35-49, 2.3 per woman, was lower than the average for all U.S. women that age, 2.6 (see Table 7, page 21). It's true that the average was much higher for women born in Vietnam (3.6), Kampuchea (3.7), and Laos (4.9), most of whom were refugees who had arrived at the vanguard of the wave of Indochinese refugees admitted

**Table 6. Net Immigration
Proportion of Total Population
Growth: 1910-1985**

Period	Net immigration component of total population growth (percent)
1901-10	39.6
1911-20	17.7
1921-30	15.0
1930-34	-0.1
1935-39	3.2
1940-44	7.4
1945-49	10.2
1950-54	10.6
1955-59	10.7
1960-64	12.5
1965-69	19.7
1970-74	16.2
1975-79	19.5
1980-85	28.4

Sources: 1901-30: Leon F. Bouvier, "The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size," *Population Trends and Public Policy*, No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1981) Table 1; 1930-69: Bureau of the Census, "Estimates of the Population of the United States and Components of Change: 1930 to 1975," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 632, July 1976, Table 1; 1970-85: Bureau of the Census, "Estimates of the Population of the United States and Components of Change: 1970 to 1985," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 990, July 1986.

Note: Data for 1980-85 include an allowance of 200,000 per year for net illegal immigration, not included in earlier data, and estimated legal emigration is assumed to be 160,000 a year, increased from 36,000 a year for earlier data.

after the Vietnam War. However, later studies of Indochinese refugees show that their fertility declines with economic and cultural adjustment in the U.S. and can be expected to approach national levels in time.²⁰

This is not so certain for most Latin American immigrants. In 1980 the average number of children ever born for Latin American immigrant women aged 35-49, 3.1 per woman, was higher than the average for immigrant women that age from any other region, and the rate for Mexican-born women that age was 4.2. (However, the average for Cuban-born women aged 35-49 was just 2.0 children.) Data for 1985 show that the fertility of all women of Hispanic descent remains much higher than that of other

U.S. women: 107 births per 1,000 women aged 18-44, compared to 76 for black women that age, and 67 for white women.²¹ Combine this with the concerns of some observers that the fertility of Hispanic illegal immigrants is very high and there is at least the potential that Hispanic immigration and subsequent fertility could add substantially to the nation's population size and growth.

Ethnic composition and distribution

Like past waves of immigration, today's immigration is changing the ethnic composition of the U.S. population. The Asian American population, strongly augmented by post-1965 immigration, increased its still small share of the total from about 0.7 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent in 1980 and 2.1 percent in 1985.²² Hispanics, increasing through both immigration and natural increase, made up 6.4 percent of the population in 1980, and this proportion is certain to grow.

The figures are much higher in local areas. In 1980 Asians (immigrants and native-born) made up 45 percent of Hawaii's population and 5.3 percent of California's. Hispanics, concentrated especially in the border states, comprised 37 percent of New Mexico's population, 21 percent of the Texas state population, 19 percent in California, 16 percent in Arizona, and also 9.5 percent of New York's state population and 8.8 percent of Florida's.²³ Some counties, towns, and cities are now predominantly Hispanic. In 1980 the Laredo, Texas, metropolitan area population was 92 percent of Spanish origin; Las Cruces, New Mexico, 52 percent; and Miami, Florida, 36 percent.

Immigrants in general and immigrants from regions besides Asia and Latin America are also concentrated in certain states. The largest immigrant concentrations are found in the two most populous states. In 1980 California, with 10.4 percent of the national population,

Table 7. Children Ever Born of Woman Immigrants: 1980

(Average number of children born per woman)

Region and country of birth	Women's age		
	15 and over	25-34	35-49 ^a
Total U.S.	—	1.5	2.6
Total Spanish origin—	—	1.9	3.2
All immigrants	2.1	1.6	2.6
Europe	2.1	1.4	2.3
U.S.S.R.	1.9	1.2	2.0
Africa	1.6	1.4	2.3
North America	2.0	1.3	2.5
Latin America	2.3	1.9	3.1
Mexico	2.9	2.4	4.2
Asia	1.9	1.3	2.3
India	1.6	1.3	2.1
Korea	1.6	1.3	2.1
Philippines	2.1	1.2	2.3
Vietnam	2.0	1.7	3.6
Kampuchea	2.0	1.9	3.7
Laos	2.7	3.0	4.9

Sources: Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-C1, General Social and Economic Characteristics*, Tables 84 and 131, and unpublished tabulations of the foreign-born by place of birth, available on microfiche.

^aAge groups differ, depending on the source. For practical purposes, using 35-44 or 35-49 makes little difference.

contained 25 percent of all foreign-born persons and 58 percent of all the Mexican-born, as well as half of the illegal aliens counted in the census. New York, with 7.8 percent of the nation's total population, was home to 17 percent of the foreign-born population, 21 percent of the European-born, and 25 percent of persons born in the Soviet Union. This distribution follows well-trodden paths. Historically, Asian immigrants have settled in the West, where the first jobs were opened to them. Mexican immigrants, legal or illegal, have always been concentrated along the southern U.S. border, where the travel is least and the climate and culture closest to those of their home country. New York was traditionally the first stop for immigrants from Europe. With today's legislative emphasis on family reunification, it is no surprise that the latest immigrants are

concentrated in the areas that have drawn immigrants from their regions in the past.

Sex and age

Traditionally, immigrants have been young adults at the stage of their lives when attachments are fewest and adaptability is greatest, and often in the past, immigrant flows have been dominated by males.

An extreme example of the latter were the first Chinese immigrants of the late 19th century. The 1890 census count of Chinese in the U.S. showed a ratio of 2,679 males per 100 females. Japanese and Filipino immigration, as well as that of other groups arriving in the U.S., was also heavily male-dominated in the early stages.

In contrast, from 1930 through at least 1979, more females than males immigrated to the U.S. in every year.²⁴ One reason for this was that many Korean and Filipino women immigrated as the brides of American servicemen. On the other hand, males have consistently outnumbered females among immigrants from South and Southwest Asia.

One might expect that with family reunification now the guiding principle for selection, legal immigrants would be much more "normal" and indeed, among the legal immigrants admitted in 1983 and 1984, there were about 102 males to 100 females. Family reunification does not determine refugee flows and illegal immigration, however. The sex ratio for refugees and asylees recorded by the INS in 1984 was 130 males to every 100 females. Passel estimated that the ratio for illegal aliens counted in the 1980 census was 113 males per 100 females.²⁵ These illegals were also heavily dominated by young adults, with 71 percent aged 15-39. Legal immigrants also seem to continue to be made up primarily of young adults.

The age and sex composition of immigrant streams has important implications for a receiving population. A balanced, "normal" immigrant population is likely to

Table 8. Educational Attainment of Total U.S. Population and Immigrants Aged 25 and Over: 1980

(Numbers in percent)

Region and country of birth	All immigrants			Immigrated 1970-74		
	No high school ^a	Completed high school	Completed college	No high school ^a	Completed high school	Completed college
Total U.S.	18.3	66.5	16.2	—	—	—
All immigrants	35.6	53.1	15.8	35.5	54.3	20.3
Europe	37.8	51.2	12.1	37.2	53.8	14.9
U.S.S.R.	37.9	50.2	17.1	17.8	70.4	30.7
Africa	11.6	81.9	38.7	7.3	88.0	45.6
North America	20.4	61.8	14.3	9.1	74.4	25.5
Latin America	47.6	41.0	8.9	51.7	36.1	6.4
Mexico	68.4	21.3	3.0	72.0	17.2	2.1
Asia	18.9	73.0	35.9	14.0	78.9	43.9
India	5.6	88.9	66.2	4.0	91.3	69.9
Korea	14.0	77.8	34.2	12.8	78.8	34.2
Philippines	18.3	74.0	41.8	11.2	82.7	53.5

Sources. Bureau of the Census, 1980 *Census of Population*, PC80-1-C1, Table 83, and unpublished tabulations of 1 foreign-born by place of birth.

develop much more quickly and easily into a settled community than an unbalanced one. The almost all-male immigrants building the transcontinental railroads in the last century invited social disorganization and conflict with other groups, who viewed them as threats.

Socioeconomic characteristics

Are immigrants likely to contribute to American society or do they represent a burden and a threat? The questions have been asked for as long as newcomers have been arriving in the U.S., and with renewed vigor today. Though the immigrant contribution to this country cannot be overemphasized, nativist and restrictionist are once again to be heard.

To judge the impact of today's immigrants we look at INS data on the occupational characteristics of immigrants admitted in 1985, which can tell us something of immigrants' potential impact as they arrive (or adjust status from being nonimmigrants), and at 1980 census data on the education, employment, occupation, and income of the foreign-born, which gives us an idea of immigrants'

situation after they have been living a while in the U.S. Education, employment, and occupation determine much of a person's place in society and are strongly correlated with income—perhaps the ultimate measure of "success" in the U.S. They are also associated with the impact immigrants have on the host society; for example, poorly trained immigrant laborers may displace unskilled native-born teenagers and less-educated blacks from some low-level jobs, and immigrant engineers compete in a tight job market with native-born engineers. Much of the current controversy about immigration, especially illegal immigration, focuses on job displacement and employment effects, real or imagined.

Education

Our data on immigrants' education—not collected by the INS—come from the census and refer to 1980, but the situation is not likely to have changed much since then.

In 1980, 67 percent of the total U.S. population aged 25 and over had at least completed high school (see Table 8, left panel). The proportions were well above

Immigrated 1975-79		
No high school ^a	Completed high school	Completed college
—	—	—
30.7	59.3	23.8
23.5	67.7	26.4
17.9	69.2	38.6
6.5	88.8	41.8
5.6	80.0	32.5
53.2	35.4	8.5
74.0	16.7	3.4
19.6	71.8	33.3
8.5	83.3	56.9
14.9	76.3	29.7
19.9	72.0	42.7

^aNo more than 8 years of education.

this for immigrants from Africa (82 percent), from Asia (73 percent), and especially for Indians (89 percent). For all immigrants from Latin America, the proportion was 41 percent, and for the Mexican-born, just 21 percent. This suggests that Asian immigrants enter one sector of U.S. society and Hispanic immigrants another.

From the data in the middle and right-hand panels of Table 8, we can see if the educational attainment of immigrants—which probably changes little after arrival for those who come as adults—has shifted in the years since the 1965 law amendments. For immigrants as a whole, educational levels appear to have improved; for example, 24 percent of immigrants who arrived in 1975-79 had completed college, compared to 20 percent of those arriving in 1970-74. Regionally, this improvement is true for immigrants from Europe and North America (mostly Canadians), but not for Asians, and especially not for Indians. The percentage of Indians with no high school education rose from 4 to 9 percent and the percentage with a college degree fell from 70 to 57 percent. This illustrates Asians' use of the preference system after the

1965 law change, as described earlier. Since there were few Indians in the U.S. in 1965, the first immigrants to be admitted came in under the occupational categories, which favored the well-educated. Later Indian immigrants could then be brought in under the family reunification procedures and were likely to be less well educated. Indians are still the best educated of all immigrants, but their average level of education is falling somewhat.

Employment and occupation

Education, of course, is no guarantee of success. Whether or not one can find a job and the status of that job are better measures of success.

In 1980, 62 percent of the total U.S. population aged 16 and over was in the labor force, either working or looking for work (see Table 9, page 24). For all immigrants of that age counted in the census the figure was a bit lower, 56 percent, but it was about the same for immigrants from Asia (63 percent), higher for Latin Americans (66 percent), and especially high for Filipinos (73 percent), and Indians (75 percent).

Of all immigrants in the labor force, 93.3 percent were employed at the time of census—virtually the same as the national figure (93.5 percent). The employment figures were higher, and the unemployment figures lower than the national average for immigrant workers from Europe, North America, and Asia. But the reverse was true for Latin American immigrants, with 10 percent of the Mexican-born workers out of work at the time of the census.

Of the 570,009 new legal immigrants recorded by the INS in 1985, only 221,873, or 39 percent, listed an occupation; most of the rest were nonworking spouses and children. The occupations of 18 percent of those with an occupation were classified as "professional specialty," and an additional 9 percent came in the "executive, administrative, and managerial" category.²⁶ These two categories, adding up to 27 percent for

Table 9. Labor Force Participation of Immigrants Aged 16 and Over: 1980

Region and country of birth	Percent in labor force	Percent of those in labor force currently employed
Total U.S.	62.0	93.5
All immigrants	55.8	93.3
Europe	47.4	94.5
U.S.S.R.	34.8	92.6
Africa	60.8	93.1
North America	50.3	95.2
Latin America	66.0	91.5
Mexico	64.2	90.2
Asia	62.6	94.6
India	74.7	94.6
Korea	63.8	94.2
Philippines	72.6	95.6

Sources: Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-C1, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 86, and unpublished tabulations of the foreign-born by place of birth.

1985 immigrants, are usually grouped together to represent the most prestigious and well-paid jobs. At the other end of the scale, 22 percent of 1985 immigrants with occupations were classified as "operators, fabricators, and laborers," a low-status category. Immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa, and especially

Canada had relatively high proportions in the top-ranked occupations and lower than average proportions in the low category, while the reverse was true for immigrants from the Caribbean and Central and South America.

Some 20 percent of the 1985 immigrants who gave occupations were classified as service workers. Showing higher than average concentrations in this category were immigrants from Africa and Latin America.

Information on the occupations of immigrants when they are admitted to the U.S. is not a sure predictor of where in the job market they will settle, since many have trouble at first finding comparable jobs, particularly professionals and those with a poor command of English. The data on 1985 immigrants' occupational status can be compared with the similar 1980 data shown in Table 10 for earlier immigrants and the total U.S. population. The proportion of 1985 immigrants in the top-ranked executive and professional categories (27 percent) was higher than that of all employed persons in the U.S. aged 16 and over in 1980 (23 percent) and also higher than the proportion for all immigrants counted in the

Table 10. Occupation of Employed Immigrants Aged 16 and Over: 1980

(Percent of total workers)

Region and country of birth	Managers, professionals, and executives	Sales and administrative, support	Services	Operators, fabricators, and laborers
Total U.S.	22.7	27.3	12.9	18.3
All immigrants	21.2	21.5	16.1	22.1
Europe	23.9	22.8	14.8	18.4
U.S.S.R.	27.8	22.8	12.2	17.0
Africa	36.1	23.5	14.2	12.9
North America	29.6	29.6	11.4	12.3
Latin America	11.2	17.9	18.0	31.2
Mexico	5.4	10.2	16.6	39.3
Asia	31.1	22.1	16.2	15.3
India	55.3	17.4	5.3	8.0
Korea	24.5	23.1	17.0	21.2
Philippines	28.1	26.0	16.2	13.2

Sources: Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-C1, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 89, and unpublished tabulations of the foreign-born by place of birth.

Table 11. Median Income of Immigrant Workers: 1979

(Workers aged 15 and over)

Region and country of birth	Males		Females	
	Median income all workers	Median income full-time workers	Median income all workers	Median income full-time workers
Total U.S.	\$12,192	\$17,363	\$5,263	\$10,380
All immigrants	10,542	—	5,094	—
Europe	12,344	—	4,850	—
U.S.S.R.	9,465	20,098	4,344	12,034
Africa	11,003	18,014	5,760	11,093
North America	13,539	21,091	5,218	12,062
Latin America	9,019	12,255	5,184	8,681
Mexico	8,192	10,809	4,442	7,408
Asia	11,412	17,557	6,328	11,384
India	18,421	22,649	7,162	13,138
Korea	12,111	17,607	6,011	10,092
Philippines	11,190	15,240	8,713	12,715

Sources: Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, PC80-1-C1, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Table 107, and unpublished tabulations of the foreign-born by place of birth.

census in 1980 (21 percent). On the other hand, the proportion in the laborer category was 22 percent for both the 1985 immigrants and those in the U.S. in 1980, and both were above the national 1980 average of 18 percent. The proportions in services were also higher for 1985 immigrants (20 percent) and 1980 immigrant workers (16 percent) than the national average in 1980 (13 percent). In between, in sales and administrative support, lower-level white-collar occupations, the proportions were only 14 percent for 1985 immigrants and 22 percent for all immigrant workers in 1980, compared to 27 percent for the nation as a whole. This pattern has been noted before among legal immigrants: a concentration in the upper and lower occupations, with relatively few in the middle-level white-collar occupations.

The 1980 occupational distribution of immigrants from different regions was similar to that of the 1985 immigrants. The percentages in the executive and professional category were especially high for immigrants from Africa (36 percent), Asia (31 percent), and particularly India (55 percent), and low for all immigrants from Latin America (11 percent) and just 5 percent for the Mexican-born. Mexican-born workers also stand out as

having the highest percentage (39) in the laborer category.

Income

Educational qualifications and even a good occupation do not necessarily add up to a good income, of course, and it is perhaps income which best summarizes a group's position in U.S. society. The 1979 median income (reported in the 1980 census) of all foreign-born male workers in the U.S. was \$10,542, somewhat below the figure of \$12,192 for the total employed male population (see Table 11). Above this level were immigrants from North America, or Canada (\$13,539), Europe (\$12,344), Asia (\$11,412), and Africa (\$11,003); trailing were immigrants from Latin America (\$9,019). For females the picture was similar, although incomes were substantially lower, as is universally true in the U.S. work force. The median for all female immigrant workers was \$5,094, compared to a total population average of \$5,263, with immigrants from Asia regionally highest (\$6,328). Female immigrant workers from Africa were also above the average (\$5,750), as were those from North America (\$5,218) and, surprisingly, Latin America (\$5,184).

In sum, today's legal immigrants generally compare well with U.S. residents socioeconomically, but some come better equipped than others. In particular, differences in education, occupation and income between Hispanics and Asians—who make up the overwhelming majority of immigrants—suggest that a two-tiered society could emerge, with Hispanics competing with poorly educated blacks for low-level service and laborers' jobs and Asians competing with middle- and upper-class blacks and whites for the well-paid, specialized jobs of America's increasingly high-tech society.

Impacts and Issues

Many issues emanate from substantial immigration. The impact of immigrants on jobs and the economy has always concerned Americans. Some have feared the social and cultural impacts. Both immigrants and established residents are concerned with how they will adapt to the changing nature of society. Much of that change is determined by demographic factors.

Changing demographic picture

With shifts in fertility, mortality, and migration, the population of what is now the United States has gone through several radical changes in its makeup. In early history, the region inhabited by Native Americans came to be populated primarily by white immigrants and their descendants, with a mingling of black slaves and their descendants and early Asian immigrants. At the turn of the 20th century, the complexion of what had been the predominantly Anglo-Saxon white population began to change, as millions of Italians, Greeks, Poles, and others from south and east Europe sailed through the Golden Door and the fertility of the U.S. resident population declined.

Today a new demographic phenomenon is occurring. Since 1972 the fertility of American women has been below the level of 2.1 births per woman needed to



Highly educated Asian immigrants come well equipped to compete in America's increasingly high-tech society.

replace the population in the long run, in the absence of migration, and the prospects are that fertility will stay low. If the current fertility rate of 1.8 births per woman were maintained indefinitely and immigration ceased immediately, within two centuries the U.S. population, which numbered 242 million in mid-1986, would dwindle to less than 100 million. However, immigration levels now approach the high levels of the early 1900s and well over 80 percent of current immigrants come from either Asia or Latin America.

Applying stable population concepts to this new phenomenon, Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur have shown that "as long as fertility is below replacement, a constant number and age distribution of immigrants (with fixed fertility and mortality schedules) leads to a stationary population."²⁷ This happens no matter what the size of annual immigration. When this zero-growth stage is reached, all of the population will be comprised of immigrants arriving after the date chosen for the beginning of the exercise and their descendants.

Bouvier and Davis have applied these

theoretical findings to the real world situation in the U.S.²⁸ Of the 226.5 million U.S. population in 1980, 79.9 percent were non-Hispanic whites, 11.7 percent were blacks, 6.4 percent Hispanic, and 2.0 percent Asians and others. If the fertility of all groups converges by 2030 at the non-Hispanic white rate of 1980 (1.8 births per woman) and if net immigration is limited to 500,000 a year (a number that obviously excludes any illegal immigration), U.S. population is projected to grow to 267 million in 2000, 295 million in 2040, and drop to 277 million in 2080. By then, 22 percent of the population would be post-1980 immigrants and their descendants. With the same fertility assumption but with annual net immigration increased to 1 million to include illegal entries, the totals would be 279 million in 2000, 334 million in 2040, and 340 million in 2080, with 37 percent of the 2080 population made up of post-1980 immigrants and their descendants.

Even though immigrants are younger on average than the general U.S. population, the U.S. population is destined to become older so long as fertility stays low; immigration will retard this aging only slightly. No matter what the annual level of immigration, if fertility continues at 1.8 births per woman, by 2030 when almost all of the giant baby boom generation born from 1947 to 1964 has reached retirement age, some 20 percent of the population will be aged 65 and over.²⁹

Immigration in combination with below-replacement fertility would have more effect on the ethnic composition of the population. With immigration of 500,000 annually, and fertility constant at 1.8 births per woman, just under 60 percent of the population of 2080 would be non-Hispanic whites, down from 80 percent in 1980. Hispanics would increase from 6.4 to 16.1 percent, Asians from 2 to 10 percent, but blacks only from 12 to 15 percent.

If illegal immigration remains high and annual immigration averages 1 million, the non-Hispanic white proportion would drop to just under 50 percent in 2080;

Asians would be up to 12 percent; Hispanics would be 23 percent, having already in 2010 surpassed blacks to become the largest ethnic minority in the nation; and blacks would be only 14.7 percent. By about 2075, non-Hispanic whites would form the largest minority in a nation without any ethnic majority population.

As we have seen, immigrants are concentrated in a few states. About two-thirds of all newly arrived immigrants settle in just five: California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois. Indeed, some 40 percent live in California and Texas. These states will be much more affected by immigration than Minnesota or Mississippi, for example. Recently prepared projections assuming low fertility and with conservative assumptions for immigration based on recent trends, point out what the next 50 years could hold for California and Texas.³⁰

California's population is projected to grow from the 24 million of 1980 to more than 43 million in 2030. In 1980 non-Hispanic whites made up about two-thirds of the state's population, but by 2010 a majority of the population will consist of Hispanics, blacks, and Asians and there will be no majority ethnic group. In 2030 Hispanic and non-Hispanic white numbers will be virtually equal, each representing 38 percent of the population. Asians will be up to nearly 16 percent, from 5.6 percent in 1980, and the black proportion will have slipped from 7.5 percent in 1980 to less than 7 percent.

The scenario for Texas is similar. The state's population is projected to grow from 16 million in 1985 to 30 million in 2035. Over that 50-year period, the non-Hispanic white proportion will decline from 63 to 43 percent, the Hispanic share will increase from 23 to 39 percent, the Asian share will go up from 2 to 6 percent, and the black proportion, as in California, will decline slightly, from 12 to 11 percent.

This nation must once again redefine itself. As Harvard sociologist Nathan

Glazer recently put it: "The United States, it seems, remains the permanently unfinished country."³¹ The challenges of such major ethnic shifts should not be minimized, but neither should they be viewed with too many misgivings. The nation is resilient and with adequate planning any problems posed by such changes can be addressed.

Immigration and the economy

Perhaps no aspect of immigration is more controversial than its effect on the nation's economy. Do immigrants, legal as well as illegal, take jobs away from citizens and permanent residents of the nation and depress wages? Do they draw more on public services than they pay back in taxes? Are immigrants needed to fill a potential U.S. labor shortage?

On the face of it, immigrants may appear to have a positive effect on the economy. Indeed, the 1986 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors states unequivocally:

"There is evidence that immigration has increased job opportunities and wage levels for other workers Immigrants come to this country seeking a better life, and their personal investments and hard work provide economic benefits to themselves and to the country as a whole."³²

Writing in 1974, demographer Kingsley Davis saw it differently:

"So dubious are the advantages of immigration that one wonders why the governments of industrial countries favor it One will find few clarifications, but official statements hint that the goals are to fill essential jobs and to stimulate population growth. One suspects that the actual causes are government inertia and pressure by employers to obtain cheap labor."³³

More recently, Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm wrote:

"I do not believe that massive immigration is the only cause of unemployment or poverty, but I know it is a significant cause of them. I do not think we can cure the ills of unemployment

by eliminating illegal immigration, but I know that allowing it to continue certainly makes unemployment worse."³⁴

Jobs and wages

Debate on immigrants' impact on jobs and wages has been heated for 150 years and more: with the coming of the Irish and later the Italians, Greeks, and Poles in New York; with the arrival of the Chinese and later the Japanese in California; and now with the latest surge of illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican border. Business and agricultural sectors who benefit from lower wage structures have generally favored immigration; workers and organized labor who perceive a threat to jobs and wages argue for restrictions.

Congress has reflected the controversy in its years of wrestling with currently proposed immigration reform bills, first introduced in 1982. For example, on June 13, 1984, Congressman Clay Shaw (D-Florida) commented: "The people left out of the [immigration] debate are the American workers who are being discriminated against, because they are losing jobs to illegal aliens who are coming to this country and working for less." A week later, Congressman Jack Kemp (R-New York) insisted that immigrants (legal or illegal) do not take jobs from Americans.³⁵

Researchers have taken up the issue. Though their findings are often contradictory and tend to rely on less than adequate data, these are serious attempts to unravel a complex problem. Two recent studies have examined the impact of Hispanic immigrants on the economy of California, where one-third of all the nation's immigrants settle.

The Urban Institute, after detailed examination of southern California's employment situation in the early 1980s, was generally optimistic about the economic impact of Hispanic immigrants, including illegal immigrants. In their final report of 1985, *The Fourth Wave*, economists Thomas Muller and Thomas Espenshade, write: "The evidence . . . points to the conclusion that the influx of Mexicans to Los

Angeles and southern California during the 1970s did not increase the aggregate level of unemployment among non-Hispanic California residents, including blacks."³⁶ Rather, they found, the native-born are replaced in lower status jobs and in turn move up the economic ladder. "While some nonimmigrants, both blacks and others, were probably displaced from low-wage jobs, others gained from the presence of a larger population."³⁷

The *Fourth Wave* does note that Hispanic immigrants reduced average wages in low-skill occupations:

"We conclude that there is evidence of wage depression attributable to immigrants. The presence of a growing immigrant work force is responsible for the slower rate of average wage increases observed in these low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing industries, and the resulting lower wage levels account for the growth of employment in these industries."³⁸

Indeed, the authors found that wages in the manufacturing sector had fallen below the national average by 1980. However, they note:

"Since most of the added jobs in highly internationally competitive sectors can be related to the presence of alien workers, the absence of these workers would not have resulted in more jobs for native-born Americans. Thus, these jobs are net additions to the economy, as the goods produced are in most instances substitutes for foreign imports. In the absence of finding workers willing to work at wages offered, at least some of these jobs would now be in the Far East or perhaps the Mexican side of the Rio Grande."³⁹

Demographers Kevin F. McCarthy and R.B. Valdez came to essentially the same conclusions in a Rand Corporation study, reported in 1985:

"Mexican immigrants appear to have stimulated total employment in the state by providing a pool of low-wage labor that has supported industrial and manufacturing growth . . . the negative labor market effects of immigrants have been minor and have consisted primarily of lower wages for native-born Latin workers Our evidence suggests that Mexican immigration has provided a boost to California's economy, especially in the Los Angeles area, by enabling many low-wage in-

dustries to continue to expand at a time when their counterparts were contracting in the face of foreign competition."⁴⁰

In sum, these studies suggest that immigration, particularly of Hispanics and including illegal immigration, has created more jobs without any severe displacement of native-born workers, at least in the long run. However, this finding results to a considerable extent from the fact that these immigrants found jobs in California's low-paying industries, as well as in agriculture. Economist Philip Martin of the University of California at Davis has elaborated on the implications of a low-paid work force for agriculture. Addressing the issue of temporary farm workers, he points out:

"If farmers have to scour the U.S. looking for workers and must offer high wages . . . and other amenities, they will find more American workers and will need fewer foreign ones. They will also have a greater incentive to mechanize. On the other hand, if farmers have few obligations in recruitment, wages and housing, they will find it easier and cheaper simply to hire aliens."⁴¹

He goes on:

"The continued dependence of the \$18 billion fruit and vegetable industry in the U.S. on alien farm workers spells disaster in the long run. The industry has two choices: it can move toward mechanization . . . or it can obtain access to a rotating pool of alien farm workers with another program of the *bracero* type."⁴²

Martin extends his observations to the industrial segment of the economy:

"Modern industrial economies can experience rising per capita incomes without population growth or immigration by providing more and better capital for each person employed and by pushing back technological frontiers The longer illegal immigration persists, the more low wages will be incorporated into the value of business assets and the longer entrepreneurs will ignore options for less labor-intensive forms of production."⁴³

Some researchers see a negative relationship between immigration and employment as well as with wages. Economist Vernon Briggs concludes: "In the

short run, it is likely that immigrants contribute to higher unemployment rates."⁴⁴ Former Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall declared to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986:

"The relative openness of the American economy to immigration (legal and illegal) increases labor supplies relative to job growth and therefore reduces wages and perpetuates marginal low-wage jobs. Of course, it is impossible to know the number of illegal immigrants, but refugees and immigrants (legal and illegal) probably accounted for at least one-quarter of the growth in the American work force during the 1970s. There is some debate over the effects of immigration on employment, but there is little doubt in my mind that it depressed wages of U.S. residents, especially in the absence of policies to maintain economic growth."⁴⁵

Ethnic enclaves and network recruitment. In establishing their place in the labor market, immigrants can take advantage of what sociologists Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach call "ethnic resilience."⁴⁶ This resilience promotes ethnic enclaves where a group's culture, identity, and internal solidarity are preserved. For such an enclave to emerge, there must be a sufficient number of immigrants of that ethnic group, sufficient sources of capital, and a sufficient supply of labor. Portes and Bach cite the Koreans of Los Angeles and Cubans of Miami as good examples. In these enclaves, newly arrived immigrants can thrive with scant knowledge of the host culture and language.

Philip Martin describes a similar process of "network recruitment" that works to the advantage of immigrants and disadvantage of native-born workers:

"Immigrant workers displace American workers indirectly by getting hired in high turnover jobs and persisting as Americans quit. Pioneer migrants get promoted to supervisory positions with responsibility to recruit workers as vacancies arise, and these immigrant supervisors hire new workers through networks of friends and relatives that operate much more efficiently in Mexican villages than in American ghettos. The language of the workplace changes, and unemployed English-speaking



Recent Hispanic immigrants, both legal and illegal, have provided a pool of low-wage labor for agriculture and industry.

workers are excluded from consideration for vacant jobs. Ethnic enclaves that exclude unemployed English-speakers have emerged in southwestern agriculture, construction, light manufacturing, and services."⁴⁷

Studies of Asian immigrants, who now outnumber Hispanics among newly arrived legal immigrants, point to a very different picture from that described in research on legal and illegal Hispanic immigrant workers. Except for most post-Vietnam War Indochinese refugees, Asian immigrants in general, as noted earlier, are much better educated than Latin American immigrants, occupy higher rungs on the occupational ladder, and earn more.⁴⁸ Thus, their contributions to the U.S. economy are more likely to be positive.

Taxes and public services

Also a prime issue in the immigration debate is whether immigrants, particularly illegals, receive more in public services—education, health, welfare, unemployment and retirement benefits—than they pay back in taxes. Again there is no agreement.

The Council of Economic Advisors is convinced that their overall contribution is positive: "Aliens may also provide a net fiscal benefit to the nation, often paying more in taxes [federal and state income taxes and social security taxes withheld in pay checks, and sales taxes] than they use in public services."⁴⁹ The existing evidence, the Council claimed in its 1986 report, suggests that immigrants are not heavy users of public services, and illegal immigrants less so than legal immigrants because they are younger and have fewer dependents, "which reduces their eligibility for programs." Illegal aliens are also deterred from applying for welfare benefits by a system now being adopted by state and local governments, aided by the INS, to screen out illegal immigrants who are ineligible for government "entitlement" programs. However, the report admits that illegal aliens make "substantial" use of public health and education services "because of their easier access."

Public hospitals rarely check patients' immigrant status before providing services. Low-income illegal aliens will be entitled to Medicaid if a July 1986 New York district court ruling granting illegal aliens access to Medicaid is allowed to stand. A 1982 Supreme Court ruling in a case brought against the state of Texas now mandates that public elementary and high schools must accept illegal immigrant children, as in fact most states were doing voluntarily before 1982.

A 1983 INS study calculated that each one million illegal aliens in the U.S. costs federal, state, and local governments \$2.25 billion a year in job displacement, police costs, education, welfare benefits, and unemployment insurance. To offset this, the taxes paid by illegal aliens were

estimated to be \$995 million per million illegal aliens, which results in a net annual government loss of \$1.26 billion per million illegal aliens.⁵⁰

These costs fall most heavily on the local and state governments where illegal aliens are most concentrated. For example, Los Angeles County's Department of Health reported in the summer of 1986 that the county had paid \$14.8 million in medical obstetrical costs alone for illegal aliens during the fiscal year ending in June 1986 and that 76 percent of babies born in county public hospitals in that year were to illegal alien mothers.⁵¹

Again, it is important to note that such findings generally refer to Hispanic immigrants. Regarding Asians, a recent study found that "Data from the 1980 census indicate that Asian Americans are very little burden on state and federal public assistance resources,"⁵² apart from post-Vietnam War Southeast Asian refugees, who have been heavily supported by government funds until they become established.

Immigrants and labor shortages

Some observers are concerned that the U.S. will be faced with a labor shortage in the coming decades if fertility remains low and argue that young foreign workers are needed to bolster the ranks of native-born newcomers to the work force that will shrink as the "baby bust" generation, born from the early 1970s onward, arrives at working ages in the 1990s.

Projections show that if fertility were to remain at 1.8 births per woman and there were no immigration, the total size of the U.S. work force would indeed decline after the year 2000. With the same low fertility but immigration of 1 million a year, the work force would continue growing and by 2080, more than 40 percent of workers would be immigrants or descendants of immigrants arriving after 1980.⁵³ To ensure a growing work force, it may well be necessary to admit a substantial number of immigrants.

Vernon Briggs argues against using

this as a reason to increase the ceiling on legal immigrants: "Let's wait to do that until that [labor] shortage happens There are all kinds of things that can happen, both on the supply and demand side. Maybe the labor force will contract, and maybe we shall need less labor in the future."⁵⁴

Just such a scenario is posited by Gail Schwartz, author of *The Work Revolution* (1983):

"In the future, the number of jobs which will be available . . . will change very radically. Technology will take away a great proportion of the relatively 'simple' jobs in manufacturing, office, and service work, in a way it has already changed warehousing. The actual, participating, active labor force will shrink."⁵⁵

To sum up the questions on immigrants' impact on the U.S. economy, there appears to be agreement, albeit tentative, that legal immigration, particularly if it is funneled into the white-collar sector (as with much immigration from Asia), serves to produce more jobs for the overall economy. There is less agreement on the impact of illegal immigrants and the legal immigrants who fill service and low-skill labor jobs. Most research indicates little negative impact on native-born workers. This is not to deny the impact on individuals. As syndicated columnist William Raspberry wrote in the spring of 1986:

"I find it difficult to believe that anybody interested in relieving unemployment among Americans, particularly American minorities, can believe that the influx of illegals suggested by 131,000 arrests in a single month does no harm to the job prospects of America's own jobless."⁵⁶

There is more agreement that immigrants, particularly illegals, depress wages in low-wage enterprises. Some see this as a positive development. The arguments of the Urban Institute and Rand Corporation studies, that low-paid immigrant labor helps U.S. companies to ward off foreign competition, are valid, but this raises broader sociological issues. Does the U.S. want to preserve

such low-wage occupations, leaving the door open to the revival of sweatshops, as is now happening in Los Angeles? Admittedly Americans benefit from low-cost agricultural, hotel, and restaurant services. But do we need a perpetual underclass to perform such services? Alternative ways can be found to preserve low-wage enterprises in more humane conditions.

The evidence is mixed on immigrants' use of public services versus the taxes they pay. For legal immigrants, the balance is probably no different from that of native-born Americans; over the years after arrival, their use of public schools and public services increases, but at the same time their incomes rise, so they pay more taxes. With illegal immigrants the balance sheet is probably negative and particularly in the local areas where they are most numerous.

Whatever the direction of employment in future years, an ever-growing proportion of the U.S. labor force will consist of recent immigrants and their children. The challenge will be, first, to assure a literate group of immigrants and then, to see how the new residents can best be trained to fit into the high-tech society of tomorrow.

Immigrants and assimilation

At the conclusion of *The Fourth Wave*, the authors observe: "Massive immigration from Mexico is contributing to an increasingly bilingual society in the Southwest It seems apparent that . . . noneconomic concerns, although rarely expressed, are uppermost in the minds of many Americans concerned about the consequences of immigration."⁵⁷

With the rising tide of immigration, perhaps half of it from nearby Spanish-speaking countries, Americans are asking if the country has a right to expect that newcomers become "Americanized," or should we encourage a new cultural pluralism where each group might maintain its ethnic identity. The questions are not new.

As early as 1751, Benjamin Franklin wrote in dismay: "This [Pennsylvania] will

in a few years become a German colony; instead of their learning our language, we must learn theirs, or live as in a foreign country."⁵⁸ By the early 19th century, writes sociologist Willi Paul Adams: "Newcomers found that their hosts harbored strong sentiments of national superiority; all were expected to leave the inferior Old World behind and, as Americans rather than as Europeans in exile, to join in building the New."⁵⁹

The publication in 1908 of Israel Zangwill's play, *The Melting Pot*, focused attention on how and whether the increasing numbers of non-Anglo-Saxon "new immigrants" would adapt to American society. Restrictionists were adamantly opposed to the melting pot idea. Anthropologist Madison Grant wrote in 1916: "If the Melting Pot is allowed to boil without control, the type of native American of colonial descent will become as extinct as the Athenian in the Age of Pericles," and President Wilson declared: "A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American."⁶⁰ Such sentiments gave birth to the "Americanization" movement which was designed to strip the immigrant of his native culture and attachments and make him over into an American along Anglo-Saxon lines.

Liberal intellectuals objected. Philosopher Horace Kallen proposed instead a cultural pluralism (a term he coined), arguing that the nation should "consciously allow and encourage its ethnic groups to develop democratically, each emphasizing its particular cultural heritage."⁶¹ Such a view was clearly not appreciated in the 1920s, which saw the passage of the restrictive quota laws.

The issue of Anglo-conformity versus cultural pluralism faded as immigration dwindled during the 1930s and 1940s. Most immigrant groups eventually became acculturated into the mainstream of American life. But it took longer for some than others and researchers again began to examine the assimilation process.

Writing in the 1960s, sociologist Milton Gordon identified three types of assimilation:

Anglo-conformity, melting pot, and cultural pluralism.⁶² He divided the process of assimilation into behavioral assimilation or acculturation—"the absorption of the cultural behavior of the host country"—and structural assimilation—"the entrance of the immigrants and their descendants into the general civic life of the receiving society." Gordon felt that acculturation had occurred for most U.S. immigrants but not structural assimilation, particularly for newer immigrants and racial minorities. Most immigrants might favor cultural pluralism but in reality it had never existed, he argued. Rather, immigrants, or at least their children, had been fully absorbed into the dominant Anglo culture.

These earlier theories of adaptation had little to say about blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, except to note their exclusion from the assimilation process. Now with the dramatic shifts in the sources of immigration since the 1960s, it is questioned how they apply to the current situation.

Writing in 1985, Portes and Bach agreed with Gordon that immigrant minorities, nonwhites and Hispanics, had not been structurally assimilated, that they had been rejected by the political and economic power structure.⁶³ But from this rejection they had developed an ethnic resilience, which binds together immigrants "who shared only the most tenuous linkages in the old country" in a culture that mingles the old-country culture with some aspects of American culture. Often this new pattern of adaptation gives rise to the ethnic enclaves noted earlier.

Will this be the adaptation pattern of today's and tomorrow's immigrants to the U.S.? The issue differs sharply from that of the turn of the century. At that time most immigrants were non-Hispanic whites and the country's population was under 100 million. Immigrants of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did speak "strange tongues" but their children and grandchildren spoke English and many climbed to starring roles in American so-

ciety: governors, senators, captains of industry, entertainers, athletes.

Today there is concern over the apparent resistance of some of the newest Hispanic immigrants to learning English. Often cited are findings from surveys by Yankelevich, Skelly and White. Comparing 1984 to 1981, they found: "There is a significant increase in the desire to perpetuate Hispanic traditions through succeeding generations. There was no sign of increased commitment to mastery of English at the possible expense of Spanish. The commitment to Spanish is stronger, if anything."⁶⁴ Yet many persons of Hispanic background succeed in American society. Denver, San Antonio, and Miami have had Hispanic mayors, all second generation. The fears expressed by some may prove to be unfounded as future generations of Hispanics assimilate into the mainstream of American society.

Asian immigrants appear to be adapting fairly smoothly. Overall they are much better educated than Latin American immigrants and this holds true for the different groups of Asian Americans. Among adult males aged 25-29 in 1980, the percentages of Asian Americans (both immigrants and native-born) who had completed high school ranged from 96 percent for Japanese down to a low of 76 percent for Vietnamese. This compares with 87 percent for white males that age in 1980, 74 percent for blacks, and 58 percent for Hispanics.⁶⁵ Clearly, Asian Americans are helping to raise the overall educational level of the nation. Similarly, Asians, particularly Japanese, Filipinos, and Indians, are likely to speak English fairly well. Even among recent Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese immigrants, well over half indicated in the 1980 census that they spoke English at least fairly well.

Citizenship, which confers the right to vote, is another indicator of assimilation and participation in American society. Over half of all foreign-born residents counted in the 1980 census were naturalized citizens, but only 29 percent of



An Hispanic schoolgirl. Some of the newest Hispanic immigrants appear committed to preserving their culture and the Spanish language, but many persons of Hispanic background have succeeded in American society.

Latin Americans and 23 percent of the Mexican-born. John Garcia notes: "Consistently few Mexicans choose to become naturalized when they satisfy the eligibility requirements The average rate of naturalization is one-tenth of that of other immigrants' naturalization rates, and this pattern has not changed significantly over the years."⁶⁶

There is another major difference between today's situation and that of immigrants arriving in the early decades of the 20th century. The quota laws of the 1920s, the depression, and World War II reduced immigration sharply until the 1960s. With few of their countrymen following them to the U.S., these immigrants and their children had time and incentive to assimilate into their new milieu. Such acculturation may take longer for today's immigrants with the continuing large additions to their num-

bers that are likely in future years, even if illegal immigration is curbed substantially.

Assimilation or Anglo-conformity versus cultural pluralism is now the issue. In recent testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Governor Lamm argued forcefully for full assimilation:

"America can accept additional immigrants, but we must be sure they become American. We can be a Joseph's coat of many nations, but we must be unified. We must have English as one of the common glues that hold us together. We should be color blind but not linguistically deaf . . . We can teach English via bilingual education, but we should take great care not to become a bilingual society."⁶⁷

Cruz Reynoso, the first Mexican-American appointee to the California Supreme Court, has voiced another opinion:

"American is a *political* union—not a cultural, linguistic, religious or racial union . . . Of course, we as individuals would urge all to learn English, for that is the language used by most Americans, as well as the language of the marketplace. But we should no more demand English-language skills for citizenship than we should demand uniformity of religion. That a person wants to become a citizen and will make a good citizen is more than enough."⁶⁸

Will Anglo-conformity prevail anew with America's newest immigrants? Or will the melting pot prove to be appropriate, refined into the newer concept of a "salad bowl"—a blending and mixing of different ethnic and racial groups? Or will ethnic resilience be the adaptation process of the future, with ethnic enclaves and cultural pluralism mingled with immigrants who choose to assimilate to form a kaleidoscope, rather than a salad bowl?

And what will happen when no ethnic majority exists, as is already the case in Hawaii and will be in California and Texas soon after the turn of the century? Will "assimilation into" become "assimilation among," and how will the long-dominant "Anglo" community react?

It is time to ask: What kind of nation do

we want in the 21st century? Yale University law professor Peter Schuck puts the question this way: "What are we? What do we wish to become? And most fundamentally, which individuals constitute the 'we' who shall decide these questions?"⁶⁹

Immigration Law Reform: 1986

Of more immediate concern than immigrants' assimilation to most Americans is the problem of illegal immigration. There is sympathy for the plight of illegal immigrants, who are simply doing what humans have done for thousands of years—moving to better their lot in life. But the issues on the negative side of the ledger are mounting. The unquestionable right of a nation to have secure borders is being transgressed by these illegal acts. The illegality of these immigrants' status in the U.S. invites exploitation: Is the existence of such a subclass healthy, not only for the immigrants themselves but also for the nation? And there is the perception that soaring numbers of apprehensions of deportable aliens by the INS signal that the problem is getting out of hand (see "Illegal Immigrants," page 36). Although opinion differs on legal immigration—if and how much the annual ceiling should be raised—there is almost universal agreement that illegal movements into the U.S. must be reduced as much and as soon as possible, by a drastic overhaul of current immigration law. Immigration reform legislation has been proposed in each of the last three sessions of Congress, beginning in March 1982.

Congressional maneuvering: 1982-1986

As the 99th session of Congress drew to a close in the fall of 1986, efforts to achieve immigration reform legislation finally succeeded. The basic features of the reforms proposed in 1986 were pre-
saged by the recommendations of the

Box 1. *Illegal Immigrants: Definitions and Numbers*

Who are they?

The very term "illegal immigrant" is subject to criticism. Sometimes the adjective used is less pejorative: "undocumented" or "clandestine." On occasion, "alien" replaces "immigrant." Some prefer the term "migrant," since many such movers remain only temporarily in the U.S. In this *Bulletin*, we generally use the commonly accepted term: illegal immigrant. The act itself is illegal, according to U.S. law, and although we do not know how many actually remain in the country, we consider crossing an international border to be immigration, not migration.

A 1985 National Research Council study conducted for the INS defines an illegal immigrant as "a noncitizen physically present in the United States who entered the country illegally and has not regularized his or her situation, or who has violated his or her terms of entry."¹ Entering the country illegally includes crossing the border "without inspection" or with fraudulent documents, such as falsified birth certificates or passports. Some 95 percent of INS apprehensions of "deportable aliens" are of persons attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexican border, because that is where the U.S. Border Patrol concentrates its forces. Illegal entries are also made across the U.S.-Canadian border and by persons arriving by air from Puerto Rico, who can escape inspection by mingling with Puerto Ricans who are U.S. citizens by virtue of Puerto Rico's commonwealth association with the U.S. About half of illegal immigrants in the U.S. are not illegal border crossers but "visa abusers": people who entered the country legally on temporary nonimmigrant visas but then overstayed the time limits of the visa or illegally took a job. Fraudulent marriages are also used to gain admission to the U.S. The INS estimated in 1986 that currently more than 30 percent of marriages between foreigners and U.S. citizens—which automatically makes the foreign spouse eligible for permanent resident status—are fraudulent.

An estimated 50 to 60 percent of illegal immigrants are Mexicans. Of the estimated 2.1 million illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census, 55 percent were born in Mexico and another 22 percent were born in

other Latin American countries.² However, illegal immigrants from 93 countries were apprehended by the INS in the early part of 1986 and the number of non-Hispanics entering through Mexico is mounting.

Census Bureau researchers distinguish illegal immigrants between "settlers," who come to the U.S. on a more or less permanent basis; "sojourners," who stay temporarily, such as seasonal farm workers; and "commuters," who cross the border daily. The impact of each group differs. Only settlers affect population growth; sojourners and commuters, as well as settlers, affect the labor market, but commuters are not likely to make use of social and health services. This *Bulletin* is mostly concerned with illegal immigrant settlers.

Traditionally, most illegal immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border have been young adult males looking for work; many returned home regularly. In early 1986 the Border Patrol reported a 43 percent increase in family groups apprehended at the border, which suggests that an increasing proportion of illegal immigrants may be intending to remain permanently in the U.S.

How many?

An honest answer to this question would be: "We simply don't know." Unfortunately, such an answer is seldom forthcoming, particularly from those who have a political, economic, or cultural interest in arguing for large (or small) numbers. Illegal immigrants are by definition undocumented. Any attempts to determine their numbers must rely on indirect, often circuitous, and even arcane methods. Efforts to estimate the "stock" of illegal immigrants—the number settled more or less permanently in the U.S. at a given time—are complicated by the fact that so many return to their homelands.

Estimates of this stock made during the early 1970s ranged from 1 million (INS estimate to House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Illegal Alien Hearings*, May 1972) to 8 million (Lesko Associates, September 1975, based on the Delphi method of asking experts what they thought the number was and averaging their replies). An INS report prepared for the House Subcommittee on Legal and Mon-

etary Affairs (September 1974) gave a range of 4 to 12 million; the then INS Commissioner, Leonard S. Chapman, in a much-publicized remark, said he personally thought the range was 6 to 8 million. A 1980 Census Bureau review of all existing studies, prepared for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, arrived at a range of 3.5 to 6 million illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. as of 1978.


More recent studies have examined findings from the 1980 census. Census Bureau researcher Jeffrey Passel estimates that "at least" 2.057 million illegal immigrants were enumerated in that census.³ From various surveys and speculations, he and other researchers arrive at a range of 2.5 to 3.5 million for the total illegal immigrant population as of 1980. The 1985 National Research Council study put the 1980 range at 1.5 to 3.5 million, and added: "... there is no empirical basis at present for the widespread belief that the illegal alien population has increased sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s."⁴ These estimates are at variance with Los Angeles County and INS officials' estimates that there were as many as 2 million illegal immigrants in that city alone in the early 1980s; with surveys that suggest that Texas may have 750,000 illegal immigrants; and with New York City Mayor Edward Koch's declaration that his city has at least 1 million.⁵

That the "stock" of illegal immigrants may have increased substantially since the 1980



INS apprehensions of illegal immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border have gone up sharply in recent years.

**Apprehensions of Illegal Immigrants:
Fiscal Years 1970-1986**



Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service

census is suggested by indirect evidence on the "flow"—the number arriving each year. INS apprehensions of illegal immigrants numbered less than half a million a year in the early 1970s, rose to over a million in the late 1970s, and dropped slightly until 1983. Since then there has been a sharp rise, with a total of 1.8 million projected for fiscal year 1986, ending September 30, 1986 (see figure). Apprehensions are not an accurate count of the actual number of illegal immigrants entering each year, because the same persons may be apprehended more than once in a year, and the rise partly reflects increased Border Patrol coverage. However, the entire 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border still had only 2,600 agents at the end of 1985 and agents reported that the numbers of persons seeking to enter the U.S. during 1986 had indeed surged—apparently driven by Mexico's mounting economic troubles and demographic pressures. INS officials estimate that for every illegal immigrant apprehended, two to three go undetected.

Passel estimates that the *net* increase in the "settled" immigrant population was 100,000 to 300,000 a year between 1980 and 1983, based on a comparison of findings from the Census Bureau's April 1983 Current Population Survey with estimates of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 cen-

sus. The 1986 INS estimate of net annual increase is 500,000—an "educated guess" based on Border Patrol experience that might go higher when the year's total experience has been reviewed.

With such an uncountable population, "educated guesses" based on observation may be worth as much as estimates based on even the most sophisticated techniques of analysis. When one witnesses the nightly confrontations between U.S. Border Patrol agents and would-be illegal immigrants at places like San Ysidro, California, across from Tijuana, Mexico, and when one sees the miles of Hispanic ghettos throughout Los Angeles county, the conclusion has to be that we simply do not know how many illegal immigrants there are in the U.S. and how many more come each year. Suffice it to say that the number is large and growing.

Where are they?

Since 77 percent of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census were born in Latin America, it is not surprising that they tended to be living in the states with the heaviest concentrations of all Hispanics and of all immigrants born in Latin America who

were enumerated in the census (see page 20). Almost half lived in California, and another 31 percent in New York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida. But more than other groups in the U.S., illegal immigrants appear to be concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, and especially Los Angeles. Los Angeles contained one-third (658,000) of all illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census, and relatively large numbers were also found in New York City (212,000) and Chicago (127,000). The census did not enumerate large numbers of illegal immigrants in the border cities of Texas. These cities apparently have large numbers of illegal workers, but they move back and forth across the border and are not settled enough to be enumerated in a U.S. census.

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2. Passel, Jeffrey S., "Immigration to the United States," text of speech delivered at Census Table, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 1986.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
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5. Lamm, Gov. Richard D. and Gary Imhoff, *The Immigration Time Bomb* (New York: Dutton, 1985) p. 15.

Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, created by Congress in 1978. Following the issuance of the Commission's recommendations in March 1981, the Reagan administration set up a task force which proposed an immigration reform package somewhat narrower than the Commission's suggestions but including two of its key provisions: penalties or "sanctions" for employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants and legalization or "amnesty" for illegal immigrants already in the U.S.

An administration bill went nowhere and was dropped when in March 1982, the first version of the so-called Simpson-Mazzoli bill (Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982) was introduced in both houses of Congress. Important provisions of this bill included amnesty, sanctions, a temporary worker program, and an annual ceiling of 425,000 on nonrefugee immigration.

Thus began the still unfinished saga of immigration reform legislation.

The Simpson-Mazzoli bill was passed by the Senate, 80-19, in August 1982, but died in the House in December, with many amendments clinging to it. The measure was reintroduced in the 98th Congress in March 1983 and again passed the Senate by an overwhelming margin, 76-18, in May. The House Judiciary Committee passed the House version in May as well, but over a year passed before it was considered by the full House.

In June 1984 the bill squeaked by the House, 216-211, but there were at least 117 conflicts between the House version and the earlier Senate version. The 98th Congress adjourned in October 1984 with the immigration bill still being argued in a conference committee. Among the snags were an amendment prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of citizenship and a proposed \$4 billion

cap on federal reimbursement to states for costs associated with amnesty.

In 1985 this phoenix legislation was again introduced in both houses of Congress: May in the Senate and November in the House. Simpson was again the Senate sponsor, but Mazzoli yielded to Congressman Peter Rodino (D-New Jersey) in sponsoring the bill on the House side. The Senate passed the bill in September 1985 and the House Judiciary Committee voted out a House version in the summer of 1986. Chances for the bill's enactment by the 99th Congress appeared dead when the House balked at a controversial guestworker provision and refused to bring the bill to the floor for debate, but last-minute efforts revived it, and both the House and Senate passed reform legislation during the final days of the session.

Immigration Reform: 1986

Reform legislation passed in 1986 contains three central provisions proposed in earlier versions: employer sanctions, legalization (amnesty), and temporary agricultural workers. Provisions were also made for state and local costs of legalization and for the investigation of claims about discrimination against aliens.

Employer sanctions. The new law makes it illegal for an employer knowingly to hire an alien not authorized to work in the U.S. Large as well as small employers (e.g. households hiring domestic workers) will be required to verify new hires by examining either a U.S. passport or a combination of a birth certificate or Social Security card with either a driver's license, a state-issued I.D. card, or an alien identification document commonly referred to as a "green card."

After a six-month education period and 12 months when warning citations would be given, employers convicted of hiring violations would face civil penalties including fines ranging from \$250 to \$10,000 and prison terms depending on the number and persistence of offenses.

The new law eliminates the Texas Pro-

viso and thus reduces what is seen as the single major "pull" factor for illegal immigrants: the probability of employment at much higher wages than obtainable in their less developed home countries. The method of ascertaining legal status falls short of establishing a national identity document. Sanctions were opposed by Hispanic groups on the grounds that the identification requirement would lead to discrimination against them by employers who would simply not hire any Hispanics rather than risk penalties. The new law establishes a special office at the Justice Department to investigate such discrimination.

Amnesty. Aliens who entered the U.S. illegally before January 1, 1982 will be granted temporary resident status. They can apply to become permanent resident aliens after 18 months and can apply for citizenship five years later. However, they will not be eligible for federally funded benefits—including welfare benefits—for five years.

The purpose of amnesty is to recognize an accomplished fact: that there are many illegal immigrants in the U.S. who have lived here a long time and become well established. To deport such a large group would be impossible and to many Americans it seems untenable to continue to countenance a large population living in this country as a subclass outside the protection of the law. Opponents of amnesty argue that it would only lure more illegal immigrants, hopeful that amnesty would be declared again in the future.

Agricultural workers. Aliens who worked at least 90 days in U.S. agriculture between May 1, 1985, and May 1986, will be given temporary resident status. After two years, those aliens would become permanent residents.

Also, aliens who can prove they worked 90 days a year in U.S. agriculture for the last three years would qualify for permanent resident status after one year.

If the program does not attract enough labor to satisfy U.S. agricultural needs, the government could approve the entry

of "replenishment" workers, who would become eligible for temporary residence if they work in agriculture for three years. Farm workers would qualify for permanent legal status after the three years.

The H2 program under which foreign agricultural workers are brought in temporarily by the Labor Department for seasonal work would be simplified. H2 workers would be allowed to receive free legal assistance for work-related matters, including employer-provided housing, working conditions and contract disputes. Opponents say the provision would still permit continued exploitation of farm labor and that American citizens and legal residents would gladly do the work if it were fairly paid. Other commentators argue that the continued existence of a large supply of cheap labor would deter some American farmers from mechanizing and would eventually make them less and less competitive on the world market.

Implications of legislation reform

What are the likely implications for American society of the reform legislation passed in 1986?

Proponents of sanctions say that illegal immigration will be curbed sharply. If net illegal immigration currently numbers up to 300,000 a year, as conservatively estimated, a large proportion of total actual immigration would be eliminated. Since Hispanics make up the majority of illegal immigrants, the Hispanic component of total (illegal plus legal) immigration would shrink. Other impacts of illegal immigration, both positive and negative, would be eliminated as well. For example, southern California's job market would change radically as its large pool of low-paid illegal workers dried up. Of course, sanctions may not be effective. Implementation could be difficult or impossible. Or discrimination might be so rampant that the sanctions would be abandoned.

Amnesty would alleviate but not eradicate a cancer in American society. There

is no guarantee that all eligible illegal aliens will register for legalization. And amnesty will be a one-shot event; recent and future illegal immigrants would be ineligible and hence a new underclass would already be formed and growing.

The guestworker provision may work more to maintain the status quo than to induce change. Agricultural employers will still have a cheap supply of labor. And many very recently arrived illegal immigrants will be rapidly set on the road to citizenship—a situation that outrages opponents of this provision.

Overall, if everything were to work as planned, illegal and hence total immigration would drop, an underclass would be eliminated, and agricultural interests would be protected.

The new law is only a partial overhaul of immigration legislation. The 1986 law says almost nothing about *legal* immigration, which many feel needs to be re-examined. In fact, the House has already begun considering such changes.

Sure to be hotly debated in the next year or two is a proposed change regarding the numbers of legal immigrants admitted. The current ceiling is 270,000 a year. But spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens, who are allowed to enter outside this limit, and refugees and approved asylees adjusting to permanent resident status, who are also not counted in the quota, have brought the total up to more than twice this number in recent years: 560,000 in fiscal year 1983, 544,000 in 1984, and 570,000 in 1985. (The INS reports that the 21,000 increase in immediate relatives admitted between 1984 and 1985, from 183,247 to 204,368, was the largest annual increase since the end of World War II and was probably related to the recent sharp upturn in permanent resident aliens becoming naturalized citizens—as they may do after five years—and thus eligible to bring in immediate relatives without restrictions. In fiscal year 1985, 95,040 refugees and approved asylees adjusted to permanent resident status.⁷⁰) Legal immigration numbers are thus in a sense

Box 2. Refugees and Asylees

Legislation and numbers

Before World War II, refugees were accorded no special place in U.S. immigration law. As a result, the only possible path to admission to this country for those fleeing oppression in Europe in the late 1930s was through normal immigration procedures under the national quotas set by the 1924 National Origins Act. This effectively barred most people seeking refuge as World War II loomed.

Refugees were not given formal status in immigration law until the 1965 amendments to the 1952 immigration act. However, beginning after World War II, numerous refugees were admitted under ad hoc measures: special legislation passed by Congress or executive actions by the President or the Attorney General. In 1945, for example, President Truman directed that 40,000 displaced persons be admitted under existing quotas. Legislation of 1948, 1950, and 1951 allowed many more displaced persons to immigrate.

The 1952 act did not mention refugees but did establish the class of parolees, whereby the Attorney General could allow individuals to enter the country "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." This approach proved to be the most flexible way to deal with refugee flows until the Refugee Act of 1980. (Parole authority still exists, but is now used to admit people for a limited time for "emergency" reasons, such as obtaining medical care.) Parole authority was used to admit the waves of refugees fleeing Hungary after the Russian-suppressed uprising of 1956, Cubans who fled after Castro's takeover in 1959, and the majority of Indochinese refugees arriving after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 (see table).

In the 1965 legislation, refugees were explicitly recognized for the first time. The seventh preference category (6 percent of numerically limited admissions) was reserved for refugees from communist countries or communist-dominated countries or the general area of the Middle East. This narrow definition of refugees remained until 1980. Refugees admitted under the 1965 provisions were given conditional entry; they had to wait two years to receive immigrant

(permanent resident) status. By 1980 some 130,000 refugees had been admitted by this route.

The Refugee Act of 1980 was an attempt to solve the problem of refugee admissions once and for all. The definition of refugee was broadened to conform with United Nations guidelines: persons suffering persecution or with a well-founded fear of persecution because of political opinion, membership in a particular social group, race, ethnicity, nativity, or religion. Refugee numbers were removed from the overall immigrant quota (which was then reduced to 280,000 in 1980 and 270,000 thereafter) and were to be determined yearly by the President in consultation with Congress. The quo-

Refugees Arriving in the U.S.: 1956-1985

Years	Source of refugees and type of admission	Number
Admitted under parole authority		
1956	East European orphans	925
1956-57	Hungarians	38,045
1960-65	East European escapees (Fair Share Refugee Law) NB	19,754
1962	Chinese from Hong Kong and Macau	14,741
1962-79	Cubans, initially by individual flight, after 1965 by regular airlift	692,219
1963	Russian Old Believers from Turkey	200
1972-73	Ugandan Asians	1,500
1973-79	Soviet Union (mostly Jews)	35,758
1975-79	Indochinese in ten separate parole programs NB	ca. 400,000
1975-77	Chileans	1,400
1976-77	Chileans, Bolivians, Uruguayans	343
1978-79	Lebanese	1,000
1979	Cuban prisoners	15,000
1980	Refugees, all sources	110,868
1968-80	Refugees admitted under seventh preference of 1965 immigration law NB	ca. 130,000
1980	Cuban-Haitian special entrants	140,000
Admitted under 1980 Refugee Act		
1981	Refugees, all sources	155,291
	Asylees approved	1,175
1982	Refugees, all sources	93,252
	Asylees approved	4,731
1983	Refugees, all sources	57,064
	Asylees approved	8,333
1984	Refugees, all sources	67,750
	Asylees approved	11,627
1985	Refugees, all sources	62,4777
	Asylees approved	6,514

Sources: Barry N. Stein, *Migration News*, No. 2, 1986; Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Branch.

tas have ranged from 168,000 in fiscal year 1981 down to 70,000 in fiscal 1985 and 67,000 in fiscal 1986. The numbers actually arriving in the U.S. since 1980 have not quite equaled the annual quotas (see table). Refugees are eligible to adjust to permanent resident status after one year in the U.S.; 87,000 did so in fiscal 1984 and 90,000 in fiscal 1985. These adjustments also come outside the annual 270,000 immigrant quota but are counted in the INS annual totals of legal immigrants admitted. (These totals do not include refugees when they first arrive.)

The 1980 Refugee Act also established for the first time an asylee category. Like refugees, asylees are defined as persons who fear persecution if forced to return to their homeland, but unlike refugees, they are already in the U.S. The limit on asylee approvals was set at 5,000 a year, but the number actually approved was more than double that in fiscal 1984 (11,600) and 6,500 in fiscal 1985 (see table). Asylees may also adjust to permanent resident status one year after they are approved; these adjustments were 5,600 in fiscal 1984 and 5,000 in fiscal 1985.

The design of the 1980 act was based on experience with the most recent large flow of refugees, those from Indochina. These refugees had been in countries of first asylum before coming to the U.S. There was no adequate provision for the sudden influx of 125,000 Cubans in the Mariel boatlift that began in April 1980, the month the act took effect. Boatloads of Cubans—and Haitians as well—arrived daily in the U.S. and there was no first country of asylum. Because the 1980 act authorized the President to admit refugees above the numerical limit and to waive the country-of-first-asylum provision, these refugees were accommodated, but not without great problems and much acrimony. The federal government ultimately decided that these arrivals were not formally refugees and created a special category for them: "Cuban-Haitian Entrant (Status Pending)." The Mariel boatlift Cubans became eligible to adjust to permanent resident status beginning July 1985 (except for the 2,500 or more discovered to be criminals, who remain in detention, and other misfits).

The appearance of the Haitians was just one example of what has become an important issue relating to asylees: economic versus political motivations for coming to the

U.S. The government feels it must make a distinction between these two and turn down requests for asylum from people it considers to be economically motivated. Otherwise, it claims, our borders would be flooded with people wanting to enter to improve their lives economically and trying to circumvent the usual preference system of immigration. The sanctuary movement, which has sprung up in reaction to government denial of asylum, claims that the rules of asylum are being applied selectively, with asylees from governments the U.S. officially supports (El Salvador, Guatemala) not being accepted, while those from governments the U.S. officially opposes (Nicaragua) are welcomed.

In the case of refugees, the U.S. government can choose whom to admit from among numbers far larger than the current quota of 67,000. (Worldwide estimates of refugees currently in countries of first asylum range upward from 8 million.) However, the patterns of potential refugee movements to the U.S. are somewhat out of the government's control, being the product of political situations in many countries around the world. There is no sure way to predict when and from where the next large flow might erupt. No law can be devised which can deal adequately with the many different problems that refugee immigration presents for the U.S.

The sudden influx of Cuban Mariel boatlift people, combined with the crest of the wave of post-Vietnam Southeast Asian refugees, pushed the refugee arrival total for 1980 well over 200,000, as seen in Figure 4 (page 44). Thus, 1980 stands out as the peak year for legal immigration in recent years, with just under 800,000 admissions. (These annual "gross" immigration numbers, illustrated in Figure 4, count refugees only in the year they arrived and asylees in the year they were approved, and omit previously arrived refugees and asylees who are adjusting to immigrant status in a given year.) Since 1980 the combined refugee and asylee totals, and hence the overall "gross" legal immigration totals, have declined. The number of newly arriving Vietnamese and Laotian refugees has gone down, although arrivals of refugees from Kampuchea have increased. There has also been some increase in refugees from Ethiopia, Iran, Poland, and Romania.



A Laotian refugee learns English.

Adjustment in the U.S.

Refugees, as noted earlier, are prime examples of people "pushed" to migrate and thus tend to be negatively selected. This was markedly true of Southeast Asian refugees arriving after 1978. Unlike the highly educated, highly skilled and urbanized other recent Asian immigrants, these refugees arrived as mostly uneducated farmers, fisherfolk, and laborers, speaking little or no English and with no family members already in the U.S. to help in their adjustment. They have faced many problems: in housing, health, education, and finding jobs. However, various studies have shown that with time and increasing mastery of English, Indochinese refugees achieve labor force participation and unemployment rates similar to the general U.S. population and the proportion living in poverty and/or dependent on welfare declines.

The first wave of Indochinese refugees to arrive, from 1975 to 1977, were relatively well educated and most had been in white-collar occupations in their home countries, so their adjustment has been easier. This was true also of Cuban refugees arriving during the 1960s and early 1970s, many of

whom have flourished in professions and business, chiefly in Florida. The Mariel boat-lift Cubans arriving in 1980, like the second wave of Indochinese refugees, had much less "human capital" to help them in their search for jobs and economic adjustment. Also, many of the 1980 Cuban refugees were criminals who still languish in jails or have caused many problems in the communities where they have settled.

Beginning with Cuban refugees in the early 1960s, the U.S. government has provided full help to refugees until they achieve self-sufficiency. (Before this, the private sector had to provide any help refugees received, and, indeed, such help had to be guaranteed before refugees were admitted.) Refugee resettlement programs include income and medical support, English lessons, help in finding jobs, and education.

Some Indochinese refugee groups have had stormy times in the communities where they have settled. Long-time residents have greeted them with resentment, suspicion, and harassment, ranging in seriousness from anti-Asian bumper stickers to violence. The refugee groups appear to be victims in part of a widespread pattern of activity against Asians in general, documented in a just-published report of the Commission on Civil Rights.¹ However, the clash between cultures has been particularly sharp with some refugee groups, such as Hmong tribespeople and Vietnamese fishermen. Southeastern Asian refugees are also handicapped by the legacy of the traumatic experiences many of them had before arriving in the U.S. But with time, studies show these refugees are accepted as established groups within the community as they find jobs, pay taxes, and start businesses.

The impact of refugees on a community has been most marked in Miami, which has been reshaped politically, economically, and culturally by the Cuban refugees of the 1960s and 1970s—and often troubled by the Marielitos of 1980.


Reference

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"uncontrolled," and there is pressure to put a cap on all immigration of whatever kind. If this were enacted into law, legal

immigration would undoubtedly go down, unless of course the ceiling were put higher than 570,000. If every country was

Figure 4. Gross Legal Immigration: Fiscal Years 1976-1985



Source: Michael Hoefler, Statistical Branch, Immigration and Naturalization Service, personal communication, September 1986.

Note: For a given year, "gross" immigration includes legal permanent residents arriving in the U.S. who were issued visas overseas, those who arrived in prior years as temporary visitors and who are adjusting their status to legal permanent resident (other than refugees), refugees on initial arrival and asylees when their status is approved.

Immigrants subject to numerical limitations: Includes Recaptured Cuban Numbers issued above the worldwide limitation in Fiscal Years 1978-1983. Excludes Cuban refugees adjusting to immigrant status in Fiscal Years 1976-1977.

Immediate relatives and others exempt from numerical limitations: Excludes refugee and asylee adjustments to permanent resident status.

Refugees paroled: Includes all parolee arrivals.

Asylees approved: Asylees when their status is approved under the 1980 Refugee Act. These asylees have usually entered the U.S. in prior years.

Cuban-Haitian Entrants: The estimated number of Cubans who entered the U.S. illegally between April 15, 1980, and October 10, 1980, and Haitians who entered the country illegally prior to January 1, 1981.

actually limited to the now theoretical per-country limit of 20,000 a year, numbers would be sharply reduced for countries currently sending numbers well above that: for example, Mexico, the Philippines, and Korea, which topped the country list of legal immigrants admitted in 1985, with 61,000, 48,000, and 35,000, respectively.

There is also a proposal to eliminate the fifth category of the current preference system, covering siblings of U.S. citizens. So many people have used this category that the 1965 law has been

dubbed the "Brothers and Sisters Act." Removing this preference would put an end to the chain migration of large extended families that it fosters. In the absence of other changes, this would remove a whole category of potential immigrants. This could reduce immigration from countries where the fifth preference allotment is now completely subscribed, though applicants under other preferences might take up the slack.

Less likely to be enacted is a proposed deemphasis on family reunification in

favor of more emphasis on occupational qualifications. Even more difficult to achieve would be agreement on a flexible quota to be changed annually to suit the needs of the labor market. Canada and Australia have such quotas, but their immigration is administered by commissions with fairly broad discretionary powers. Such a system is not likely to be acceptable in the U.S.

Putting more emphasis on labor qualifications might have the desired effect of matching the size and composition of immigration flows more closely to the needs of the labor market. It would also allow the entry of "new seed" immigrants, those now barred because they have no relatives in the U.S. and so few places are available for immigrants with occupational qualifications.

The Outlook

Even with immigration reform, outside pressures to migrate to the U.S. are only likely to increase. Labor force growth outstrips job supplies and population growth remains high in most leading countries of origin. In the Philippines, for example, fertility is still well over four births per woman and population growth is 2.5 percent a year (which doubles a population's numbers in 28 years).

Dramatic growth is projected for the population of many countries closer to the U.S. In a forthcoming report, the Center for Immigration Studies projects that between 1980 and 2010, overall population will double—from 166 to 340 million—in the countries of the Caribbean Basin (Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean island states, and the littoral nations of Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana).⁷¹ That growth will be concentrated in the age groups of young adults entering the labor force. Just to keep a lid on the already unacceptably high unemployment rates, 35 million additional jobs would have to be created between 1986 and 2000 to balance the projected increase in the labor force. "If

levels of unemployment and underemployment are to diminish, and if the trend toward higher labor force participation rates persists, then even more jobs will have to be created," the report observes. The amount of additional investment needed by 2000 to keep job supply from falling further behind labor supply in the region is estimated to be one trillion dollars, more than half of it in Mexico.⁷² The challenge for these nations is overwhelming. Inevitably, out of sheer desperation, vast numbers of their residents will make their way northward in search of work.

By legal or illegal means, immigration to the U.S. is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Whether the numbers will decline somewhat remains to be seen. The nation must be realistic, and reasonable people of different views will need to confer on how best to cope with the major changes this might imply for American life styles.

At the turn of the 20th century when the "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe were gaining on the long-dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant group, Madison Grant mourned "The Passing of the Great Race":

"The new immigration contained a large and increasing number of the weak, the broken and the mentally crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Mediterranean basin and the Balkans, together with hordes of the wretched, submerged populations of the Polish Ghettos It is evident that in large sections of the country the native American will entirely disappear. He will not intermarry with inferior races and he cannot compete in the sweat shop and in the street trench with the newcomers."⁷³

Today's new immigrants from Latin America and Asia rarely meet with such racist sentiments. It is recognized that the nation has benefited greatly from the influx of people from eastern and southern Europe, as well as the later arrivals from Asia and Latin America. The number of Americans of foreign birth who have enriched this society is imposing: from Albert Einstein to Elizabeth Taylor

to Rod Carew. The United States is far better for having remained a "nation of immigrants."

Still heard from time to time are extreme views—from restrictionists on the one hand to open-border advocates on the other. The Ku Klux Klan has found in the immigrant a new scapegoat to blame for the country's economic and social ills. Other groups have even taken up arms illegally to combat illegal immigration. At the other extreme, some Latino groups argue for the return of the territory "stolen" from Mexico in the unfortunate War of 1847, by demographic means if necessary.

But these are exceptions. On the whole, protagonists in the current debate on immigration argue their positions on the basis of American economic and social interests and humanitarian concerns for immigrants. Very few people advocate a total end to legal immigration; however, there is much disagreement on the number to be admitted. Public opinion favors restricting illegal immigration, though disagreement remains on the means to be taken.

Some people are concerned over the

apparent tendency of certain immigrant groups to maintain their own language and culture, showing little interest in becoming "Americanized," through naturalization or otherwise. Other observers see this as a passing phase and anticipate that the next generations—like the descendants of earlier immigrants—will gradually assimilate in one way or another into American society.

One thing is clear: The nation's ethnic composition is again changing dramatically. This is an opportunity and a challenge. As one writer puts it:

"America is a country that endlessly reinvents itself, working the alchemy that turns 'them' into 'us.' That is the American secret: motion, new combinations, absorption. The process is wasteful, dangerous, messy, sometimes tragic. It is also inspiring."⁷⁴

That process will be continuing as the United States enters the 21st century. *Time* Senior Editor Henry Muller recently summed it up: "No other country has the courage to let its demographic mix change so quickly, and to bet that doing so will continue to enrich it."⁷⁵ □

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