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**ABSTRACT**

The papers in this collection are based on the document "Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans" and offer brief overviews of the following critical issues in education: (1) performance-based incentive plans; (2) needed organizational changes; (3) successful and unsuccessful teacher incentive plans; (4) compensation strategies and incentives; (5) teachers' salaries and benefits; (6) expecting incentive pay to improve teacher performance; (7) attracting and retaining qualified teachers; (8) lack of professional support systems; (9) the lack of opportunities for professional growth; (10) teachers sharing in decision making; (11) the stress of teaching; (12) the teaching career; (13) conceptions about the work of teaching that guide performance evaluation and staff development; (14) considerations in the development of an incentive system; (15) evaluation policies; (16) steps in planning and implementing a performance-based incentive system; and (17) recommendations for states that are considering performance-based incentive plans. (JD)

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ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE

ED273617

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## THE ISSUE: PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLANS

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

State legislatures have been considering a number of reforms directed primarily at improving the "teacher" and the quality of classroom instruction. There is a consensus that teacher quality is crucial to increasing the academic achievement of students, but states are unsure what mix of reforms will work best to achieve this goal. Few states can afford to fully fund the entire range of possible reforms and are, therefore, trying various interventions without a clear idea of which approaches will produce the best results (Kirst, 1986). The most pervasive reforms are those dealing with performance-based incentive plans.

### Performance-Based Pay Initiatives

Teacher-incentive proposals are being offered as a response to recently recognized problems in the teaching profession; problems such as the current and predicted shortages in the supply of qualified teachers and the decline in the academic ability of new entrants to teaching. The premise behind all such proposals is that these changes will attract and retain better qualified persons in teaching and will improve teaching effectiveness.

Performance-based incentive proposals differ in their basic concepts. The basic concept underlying most merit-pay proposals is that teachers can be motivated to perform more effectively if some form of monetary incentive is available for outstanding performance.

The concept behind most career-ladder proposals is that compensation and career structures should be re-designed so they provide incentives for professional development much like those of other professional occupations (Darling-Hammond, 1985). Unfortunately, the terms merit pay and career ladder are often used ambiguously.

### Definition of Terms

Because many of the terms involved have been used loosely and interchangeably, they will be defined as follows for the purpose of discussion in this paper:

**Incentive Plans:** is a generic and inclusive term that covers all such plans.

**Career-Ladder Plans:** refers to any number of plans or programs where there are levels of responsibility, status, and compensation. These are sometimes referred to as differentiated staffing or mentor/master teacher programs. In these programs, teachers are assigned to perform specified, usually non-instructional, duties in lieu of a portion of the classroom teaching assignment. Career-ladder programs establish a hierarchy of job classifications. Though advancement on the ladder often rests on evaluations of teaching excellence, higher salaries and status are given primarily for increased work and responsibility outside the classroom. It should be noted that some programs are called "career ladders" when,

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in fact, they are really only pay-for-performance or "merit" programs.

**Merit Pay:** refers to a compensation system that pays performance bonuses to teachers who, through some system of evaluation, are recognized as being outstanding. Those mentor/master teacher programs that do not include additional responsibilities or duties are merit-pay programs.

**Bonus Incentives:** refer to incentives in the form of salary differentials that are provided for teachers in areas of critical shortage (e.g., mathematics, science, foreign language, special education), or to incentives for working in specific schools or locations (e.g., inner city). These incentive-pay programs reward teachers for helping to meet certain school-district goals or to solve certain problems. They reward teachers for the conditions under which they teach, not for how they teach or the amount of responsibility they have been given.

#### Similarities and Differences

The principal differences between merit-pay and career-ladder plans (Barro, 1985) are:

First, a career-ladder plan offers professional recognition not offered by a merit-pay plan. Promotion to each successively higher rank is considered an honor and presumably is advertised as such.

Second, the special, non-teaching responsibilities associated with the higher ranks are likely to affect teachers' incentives to attain those ranks; but -- an important point -- it cannot be assumed that the effect would be positive for all teachers.

Third, the promotion and differentiated-staffing elements of a career-ladder plan may add to the acceptability, and hence the effectiveness, of performance incentives.

Fourth, based on the state plans proposed to date, it appears that significant differences in the timing and duration of rewards

may be associated with the choice between career ladders and merit pay. Rewards under career-ladder plans are likely to be permanent, but long waits may be required to become eligible for each successive promotion. The rewards under merit-pay plans may be either permanent or temporary but, in either case, are likely to be accessible with less delay. These timing differences may affect the strength of the incentives considerably.

Fifth, under pure merit-pay plans (or those programs labeled "career ladders" that have largely symbolic ranks), high-performing teachers remain in the classroom. In contrast, under "true" career ladders (those with significantly differentiated responsibilities), the best performers -- "master" or "mentor" teachers -- spend significant time in non-teaching roles. Although there is likely to be less of a short-term gain in classroom performance, the mentor/master role constitutes investment in the future -- time spent in evaluating other teachers and helping them to improve. If the plan succeeds, the long-term performance of all teachers may be enhanced.

#### Problems With Merit-Pay Programs

Most forms of merit pay have been instituted to reward superior teachers and, in some cases, to punish those who are less-than-average. In both cases, they virtually ignore the average teacher. According to those who run successful merit-pay programs in their school systems, only disaster can result from the practice of using money to punish some teachers while providing "merit" money to a handful of other teachers selected as superior (Cramer, 1983).

In addition, there is evidence that proposals to provide merit bonuses for outstanding performance may be counterproductive. The small amount of research that exists suggests the competition inherent in merit-pay plans may have undesirable side effects. For example, in-school competition for a limited number of merit-pay bonuses can

interfere with the collegiality that is necessary within an effective school. Concerns about the weaknesses of merit pay have led many states and local districts to consider, as an alternative, career-ladder plans (Kochler, 1985).

The Educational Research Service (Robinson, 1983) -- in a study of districts whose attempts to implement merit pay plans had failed -- developed a list of reasons for those failures.

The administrators of those districts attributed the failures to:

- o unsatisfactory evaluation procedures
- o administrative problems
- o staff dissension
- o restrictive quotas
- o inadequate financial incentives
- o lack of teacher consent
- o lack of definition of merit
- o inability to measure results

### Career Ladder Potential

Career ladders have the potential to provide teachers intrinsic rewards in the form of: recognition and status for excellent teachers; options for diverse work responsibilities without leaving the classroom entirely; opportunities for career advancement; career options within teaching and control over these options; opportunities to assist beginning teachers; greater collegial interaction with peers; the chance to use a wider spectrum of abilities; and opportunities for professional growth (Burden, 1985).

In addition, career ladders could provide certain extrinsic rewards: higher pay for teachers as they advance on the career ladder; improved aspects of the work environ-

ment, such as more time for peer counseling or mentoring; professional development assistance; opportunities for recognition; and more input into decision making, curriculum development, supervision, and administration at the school and district levels.

There are also distinct potential advantages to the school district (Burden, 1985). Career ladders could enable the district to use the full potential of teachers; provide exemplary models and assistance for beginning teachers; provide a method for rewarding outstanding teachers; encourage teachers to meet the higher criteria for teaching and other duties in order to move to higher levels on the career ladder; result in more resource people to deal with staff development and other professional responsibilities; provide a framework to assist individual teachers in goal-setting for professional growth; provide the profession and the school district with an avenue to improve their images and gain in prestige; and provide a framework to use teacher expertise and experience in organizational decisions.

### Conclusion

The Task Force on Merit Pay (ASCD, 1985) commissioned by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development suggests that performance-based pay plans can work if everyone involved takes a close look at their assumptions about schools and teachers. In particular, it is extremely important that career-ladder and/or merit-pay programs be considered in the broader context of human resource development. If problems that now impede teachers' growth as full professional partners remain uncorrected, any one element -- including incentive pay -- will not produce teaching excellence.

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## THE ISSUE: NEEDED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

Too many of the recent efforts to implement teacher incentive plans have overlooked a crucial factor -- management that promotes success. Schools are not currently organized in ways that promote excellence. Tye and Tye (1984) predict that currently proposed educational reforms will be no more successful than were those of an earlier time unless policy makers face the realities of what it takes to change such complex social/political institutions as schools.

### Organizational Characteristics That Discourage Excellence

Some of the organizational characteristics that discourage excellence and that are presently found in most public schools are:

- o Peer support systems that encourage excellence in other professions are absent in most public schools..
- o Teachers are expected to act like professionals but are not treated like professionals.
- o Teachers are rarely involved in meaningful discussions and decisions on matters that directly affect their classroom work.
- o Instruction time is reduced because of poor school administration, too many interruptions, too much paper work, and bureaucratic requirements.

- o Teachers have little control over staff development programs.
- o School organization discourages collaboration -- there are no processes for self-directed review and revision (ASCD, 1985).

### Organizational Changes Needed

An incentive system that rewards teachers for performance should represent a major change in the work environment of the organization. Changes in school leadership; changes in patterns of relationships among teachers, administrators, staff and students; and changes in working conditions are essential to the success of any new incentive system (Palaich & Flannelly, 1984).

People who solve problems build a sense of commitment to and concern for the organization. Participatory management patterns -- talking to, listening to, and involving people -- not only tap the resources of personnel to solve specific problems, but engage their willing cooperation and commitment (ASCD, 1985).

### Recommendations

What changes in schools are needed to attract and keep the best teachers in the classroom? The linch-pin and, indeed, the prerequisite for new teacher recruitment and the retention of talented teachers is

higher teacher salaries. Once salaries are competitive with other occupations that attract potential teachers, however, the following changes are essential:

- 1) Teachers should have the tools of their trade -- sufficient text books, materials, equipment, and classrooms -- and the time necessary to plan adequately for classroom teaching.
- 2) Teachers are entitled to safe working environments that are free from vandalism and severe disciplinary problems.
- 3) The school climate should encourage teacher autonomy in the classroom, good collegial relations among teachers and a strong sense of shared values among school staff, students, and parents.
- 4) There should be an established process for recognition by administrators, parents, and community leaders of the importance of teachers and teaching.
- 5) Career-ladder programs should be initiated that vertically restructure the occupation to create a hierarchy of positions in teaching that provide for enlarged responsibilities and for promotion within teaching as opposed to promotion to administrative ranks.
- 6) The talents of outstanding teachers should be used to create support systems for both beginning teachers and career teachers who wish to expand their skills and knowledge.

- 7) The job descriptions of teachers should be rewritten (and the necessary budget provided) to allow time for observing other teachers, for collegial exchange, and for inservice to develop new skills.
- 8) The decision-making structure of the school system should be redesigned. Teachers have knowledge and expertise that should be included in the consideration of many of the decisions made at the school and district levels.
- 9) Improvements in the training, selection, and performance of administrators, as well as in the procedures by which they manage the school and judge the performance of others, must become a top priority.

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# Issues in Perspective

Critical Issues Paper # 3

July 1986

## THE ISSUE: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

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### Successful Teacher Incentive Plans

Teacher incentive plans that have survived have used strategies that consist of varying combinations of four themes: allocating extra pay for extra work; making everyone feel special; making the program inconspicuous; and legitimizing the program by having everyone participate in its design (IEG Policy Notes, 1985). Most observers agree that merit pay works best in school systems where (1) the amount of money offered provides a real incentive to improve performance, (2) all teachers in the system are evaluated on the basis of agreed-upon criteria, and, (3) evaluation is conducted with fairness (Cramer, 1983).

**Dalton, Georgia.** The Dalton, GA, school district has had a merit pay plan in operation for more than 20 years. Over the years, teachers in Dalton have had a major voice in determining the performance criteria.

Evaluations are conducted by the teacher's principal and reviewed by the superintendent. All of the system's administrators are required to attend classes on performance evaluation and to be certified by the state as evaluators.

A unique aspect of the Dalton program is that the merit pay decisions can be appealed by teachers. These teachers meet with the superintendent and principal and work out a plan; they are then re-evaluated

in December of the next year, and if a teacher meets the agreed-upon goals-- and almost all the teachers do -- their merit-pay raise is retroactively worked into their salary schedule. The major strength of the Dalton program is that all teachers who are performing up to expectations receive merit awards -- a crucial condition that unsuccessful merit pay programs often lack (Cramer, 1983).

**Ladue, Missouri.** Merit pay has worked in the Ladue, MO, school district for more than 30 years. In Ladue, teachers are awarded points based on performance. Ladue teachers who are in the higher pay grades are expected to perform at a higher level to meet their goals. The program has provided stability in the professional staff, eliminating a major problem that most school systems have -- that the very bright teachers get stale after a few years and leave for other professions. Ladue's merit plan gives teachers a chance to shoot for higher goals and to be rewarded for their performance (Cramer, 1983).

Merit-pay programs, however, do not generally fulfill the goals for which they were originally instituted. In a study by Murnane and Cohen (IEG Policy Notes, 1985), merit pay did not appear to have strong effects on improving teachers' classroom performance. Interviews with teachers and administrators suggested that the merit pay programs provided the six districts a way:



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- o to provide opportunities for teachers with greater financial needs to augment their incomes by spending more time on school-related activities;
  - o to encourage meaningful dialogue between teachers and administrators about difficult issues such as the quality of the evaluation process; and
  - o to build community support for the public schools. Merit pay plans contribute to the perception that teachers are accountable for their successes and failures (IFG Policy Notes, 1985).
- o inservice programs were poorly planned, budgeted, and implemented.
  - o the systems proved to be more expensive than had been anticipated; funding from outside sources helped initiate a few programs but did not provide funds to sustain them;
  - o there was no systematic program evaluation on which to base modifications or revisions;
  - o there was no research on the impact of the programs on teaching effectiveness, improved learning, or the achievement of school and district goals; and,
  - o after a period of time, the systems became fixed -- there were no unfilled positions or opportunities for new (or improved) teachers to move up.

### **The Failure of Differentiated Staffing**

Differentiated staffing, a predecessor of the incentive programs being implemented today, was tried in the 1960s and died a quiet death in the 1970s. There were a variety of reasons for the failure of those earlier programs (Freiberg, 1985). While management problems constituted an major source of the failure, other reasons were:

- o the programs were initiated from the top down;
- o no organizational changes had been made to adjust the traditional structure;
- o the roles and responsibilities at each level were hard to distinguish;
- o principals and district administrators lost status in a decentralized system;

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## THE ISSUE: COMPENSATION STRATEGIES AND INCENTIVES

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Compensation Strategies

Those who favor incentive plans for public school teachers and/or administrators cite the use of such plans in the private sector. For this reason, it appears worthwhile to consider the compensation strategies used in business and industry.

Changes in employees' permanent base pay are made in industry for three primary reasons (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984):

- 1) an increase due to promotion where the job changes and the pay is adjusted for market comparability or internal equity;
- 2) a merit increase when the individual becomes more proficient at the job; and
- 3) a cost of living increase.

Murnane (1985) discusses three types of compensation strategies:

- 1) compensation based on output,
- 2) compensation based on supervisors assessment of workers' productivity, and
- 3) compensation determined by internal organizational rules.

For the first to be efficient, the worker must be provided with incentives to behave in a manner that promotes the goals of the

employer with relatively low monitoring costs. Paying a worker for the number of shirts sewn, the number of dresses ironed, or the number of bushels of fruit picked are examples of this type of contract.

There are two requirements for the second type of contract to be efficient: (a) the relationship between the worker's actions and the desired output must be clear-cut and agreed upon by supervisors and workers, and (b) the cost of monitoring must be low in relation to the productivity gains associated with using this type of contract rather than another. Under this type of contract, workers may be paid for a specified job, completed within a specified time, and meeting a specified standard.

Contracts that pay workers according to internal organizational rules generally pay the same wage for doing the same job to workers with the same experience and the same qualifications. This third type of contract is efficient in situations where (a) individuals acquire specialized experience as a result of their on-the-job experience, and (b) it is very costly for supervisors to assess accurately the performance of individual workers.

### Difficulties in Applying Strategies to Teacher Compensation

Murnane (1985) points out the difficulties that arise when deciding on incentive strategies on which to base teacher compensation. Basing teachers' salaries on their

output (student achievement or student gain scores) requires that, for each teacher, student achievement or student gains in each skill area be measured. This raises the following questions: How do you compare the output of one teacher against another? What are appropriate rates of gain? What are the values of the achievement gains of slow learners relative to those of rapid learners? What are the relative values of reading skills, math skills, social-study skills, music skills?

Additional questions that arise are: Will teachers ignore incentives based on increasing students' skill-gains and help all children, regardless of ability level, develop to the fullest extent of those abilities? Or, will they devote their time and energies to teaching those children who have the greatest chance of increasing their skills? Could the conflict between professional responsibilities and the desire to maximize their compensation produce frustration and reduce teachers' morale to the point that it becomes dysfunctional?

Basing teachers' salaries on supervisors' assessment creates incentives for the teachers to behave in ways that supervisors will view as productive. Unless the assessment criteria are clear, supervisors may base their evaluations on such things as the noise level in the classroom, if the students' desks are in straight rows, how quietly children pass through the halls or form lines on the playground, the amount of extra-classroom duty a teacher volunteers for, or how "cooperative" the teacher is, rather than on actual classroom performance.

Some teachers may spend time on those aspects of their behavior that will enhance their supervisor's assessment. For others, however, the conflict between the supervisor's and the teacher's definitions of a good learning environment or of professional behavior may reduce the incentives for teachers to strive to improve their classroom performance.

Basing teachers' salaries on internal organizational rules assumes that workers doing the same job have the same competencies, have acquired the same experience, exert the same effort, and perform at the same level of effectiveness. This is, essentially, the present model used for teacher compensation. Teachers are paid for number of years in teaching, for advanced degrees or number of inservice credits, and, occasionally, for extra duties. No distinction is made on the basis of the degree of competency exhibited, knowledge informally acquired, effort expended, or effectiveness.

### Private Sector Use of Incentives

Private-sector use of incentives is often cited as evidence that teacher-incentive systems can work. However, the analysis of current practice and research yields mixed results. Performance-based pay in private-sector organizations seems to be less prevalent than popular belief would suggest. Blue-collar workers are typically paid according to a fixed-rate schedule. And, although managers are ostensibly paid according to some form of performance-based schedule, even at the middle- and top-management levels, compensation may show low correlations with performance evaluations (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984). Most employees do not believe that their pay is based on performance; 73% of the work force states that the quality and amount of effort they put into their work has little to do with how they are paid.

Cresap, McCormick and Paget discuss a number of successful practices in private-sector organizations that have direct applicability to developing a teacher incentive plan:

- o Companies make a real effort to ensure parity with comparable positions in other organizations and across positions within the company itself. This is especially true for organizations where talent is in short supply.

- o In most effective companies, merit increases are due to achievement of specific performance-related goals. The effectiveness of the whole process hinges on the quality of the goal-setting and measurement process. No matter what form is used, the keys to success are regular management/employee dialogue, clear direction and guidance in goal setting, employee ratings, and rewards related to ratings.
- o Companies make extensive use of programs that enrich the career of the individual. Selection to such programs is perceived to be prestigious, indicating that those selected have high potential.
- o Dual-career-path or multi-ladder systems of career progression are used widely in technologically-oriented firms to attract and retain employees whose value to the organization is likely to be based on expertise. This avoids the problem of convincing strong technical people to take on management responsibilities ill-suited for them. (A clear parallel exists in the teaching profession.)
- o The multi-career-ladder approach provides significant recognition by peers that an individual is successful in his or her career. Peer recognition is a powerful motivator for scientists, engineers, and professionals with advanced degrees.

#### Variables Affecting Incentives

There are a number of variables that affect the effectiveness of the rewards associated with a performance-based incentive system. Barro (1985) suggests the following should be considered:

**Duration of Rewards.** How long rewards last is likely to be an important determinant of the effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity of an incentive system.

- 1) Permanent merit-pay increments and/or promotions are those in which a performance-based increase in pay becomes

part of the teacher's regular salary or a performance-based promotion establishes the teacher's new permanent rank.

- 2) Term pay-increases or promotions are those pay increments or promotions that are valid for a specified term of years.
- 3) Nonrecurring rewards are usually in the form of one-time performance bonuses.

**Size of Reward.** It appears that rewards must be at least on the order of 10 to 20 percent of prevailing salary levels to motivate teachers significantly.

**Number of Rewards.** The greater the number of rewards, the greater the probability of getting a reward, and the greater the expected value of a reward to the average teacher. If rewards are restricted to a small stratum of outstanding teachers, perhaps only the top 5-10 percent, large numbers of teachers would conclude, correctly, that they had little chance to qualify. Raising that percentage would convince many more teachers they had a chance and hence stimulate them to compete.

**Eligibility.** Under some of the recent state proposals, eligibility for rewards, especially promotions, is tightly tied to seniority. Until these seniority requirements are satisfied, teachers may not earn promotions or the accompanying pay increases regardless of the excellence of their teaching.

If career-ladder plans are viewed as leadership systems, there is some rationale for these seniority requirements; but if the plans are viewed as incentives, the effects are questionable. Specifically, it seems clear that any motivation that a performance-contingent reward system might otherwise provide for new or prospective teachers would be attenuated by the long delay before superior performance could earn a substantial reward. Rewards should be performance-contingent for as many

teachers as possible, as much of the time as possible.

**Costs.** As Barro points out, all the other characteristics of an incentive system must be balanced against the costs and the time and effort it takes to implement. Even an otherwise ideal incentive system would be useless if it were too costly or difficult for a state or school system to operate.

The costs that must be considered include, not only the direct expenses of the evaluation process, but also of staff time and energy, instructional time lost by the students, and interference with the instructional process or the curriculum. For instance, systems requiring extensive and repeated classroom observation will require the provision of release time for evaluators, while systems based on student outcomes may require elaborate and specialized testing programs.

### Conclusion

How to measure performance adequately but at reasonable cost is one of the more difficult problems to be faced in designing a performance-based reward system. In addition, it is difficult to determine precisely what incentives should be incorporated into a specific system or to predict how teachers or administrators will respond to those incentives.

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## THE ISSUE: TEACHERS' SALARIES AND BENEFITS

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Alternate Economic Opportunities

Talented, dedicated teachers are the essential ingredient needed to provide students with superior educational opportunities. Teachers, however, are paid less than most professionals. Low salaries for elementary and secondary school teachers have been the dominant pattern of compensation in this nation and contribute to the problems of attracting and retaining qualified teachers.

The flow of good teachers out of teaching is attributable, partly, to the greater economic rewards in other fields. In the Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers in America, 60% of the teachers reported that low pay was their main reason for leaving the profession (Teacher Education Reports, 1986). The survey results revealed that more than 35% of teachers who have left the profession now earn \$30,000 a year, while a little more than 10% of current teachers report earnings at that level.

According to a report issued by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, per-pupil spending in the public schools has risen by 22.5% in the last decade, after accounting for inflation, yet the proportion of those funds used for paying teacher salaries has dropped from 49% to 41%. Average teacher salaries were 12.2% lower in 1982-83, when adjusted for inflation, than they had been in the previous decade (AASA, 1983).

In fact, given the reasons for going to college stated by most of the current college freshmen, the outlook for attracting qualified college graduates to teaching is dismal unless salaries are brought in line with those of other professions. The 20th annual survey of entering freshman found that a record high of 69.7% of the 1985 college freshmen said "to be able to make more money" is a very important reason for attending college, while 71.8% agreed that "the chief benefit of a college education is that it increases one's earning power" (NCEI Reports, January 20, 1986).

### The Benefits "Package"

While low salaries undoubtedly keep many talented individuals from entering or remaining in teaching, pay is only one of the many things that a teacher considers before taking another job or that a prospective teacher considers before entering teaching. Each teacher, employed and prospective, is confronted with a "package" of benefits consisting of both the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and the conditions that comprise the occupation of teaching. The teaching "package" is compared with the "packages" available in alternative occupations. The decision to enter or remain in teaching hinges upon which total package best meets the needs of the individual (Barro, 1985).

The ability to recruit and/or to select teachers from among the academically able depends, in large measure, on the ability

of the schools to provide a "package" that includes working environments and career opportunities that are attractive to the academically able in the first place. Unfortunately, the nation's best teachers and principals are among the most poorly rewarded professionals in the public sector today in terms of both their work environment and job demands.

While many of the former teachers surveyed by the Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers admitted that teaching offers better fringe benefits in terms of vacations and job security than do many professions, the majority believed that salaries, professional prestige, control over one's work, equipment availability, and the chance to be stimulated intellectually are all increased in their new vocations.

### Conclusion

Supply-and-demand analyses of the labor market suggests that the raising of teachers salaries is one of the strategies needed to attract and retain talented teachers. It is unlikely that any other proposed change will be effective unless teacher salaries are competitive with those in alternative occupations.

Fortunately, raising teacher salaries has been a major priority with many of the states that have enacted educational reform legislation. Many states have coupled increases in the base salary for all teachers with some form of performance-based incentive pay plan. In fact, many governors and legislators have said that salaries for all teachers have to rise before any form of career ladder or merit pay will work (Pipho, 1986).

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## THE ISSUE: EXPECTING INCENTIVE PAY TO IMPROVE TEACHER PERFORMANCE

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Incentive Pay for Motivating Teachers

In The Logic of Teacher Incentives, a paper prepared for the National Association of State Boards of Education, Barro (1985) argues that pay incentives based on performance would strengthen teachers' motivation to perform well; that improvement is a matter of the individual teacher's choice. He suggests, "What counts is that there are steps that teachers can take that many teachers have not taken in the absence of performance-contingent rewards but that they might conceivably take when such rewards are introduced." (p. II-14)

There is very little agreement with this argument among those who are familiar with teachers or the conditions under which they work. Rosenholtz (1984) deals with the assertion -- or myth, as she calls it-- that teachers will be motivated to teach better simply because there are monetary bonuses available.

"Underlying this political platitude are several assumptions...that teachers now withhold services from students that they would supply if their salaries were better....[and] the assumption that individual teachers can improve [on their own] if only they are properly motivated." (p.6)

"The assumption that, given proper motivation, teachers can improve individually is refuted emphatically by

research showing how organizational conditions in schools can hinder individual improvement." (p. 7)

The logic of attempting to improve the quality of the teaching force and the quality of classroom instruction by simply applying the proper financial incentives applies only if you subscribe to Barro's assertion that teachers don't teach as well as they can and could teach better if they wanted to; that offering a few teachers money for outstanding classroom performance will act as an incentive for the rest to improve.

While merit pay may serve to reward excellence in teaching, there is little to suggest that merit pay, alone, will motivate very many teachers to significantly improve their classroom performance.

### Constraints on Teacher Effectiveness

In fundamental ways, the U.S. educational system is structured to guarantee the failure of teachers. A number of researchers have found that the primary motivation and source of reward for teachers lies in promoting students' growth and development. And yet, even though a teacher can experience professional success, in terms of fostering student learning, there is often a profound sense of personal failure because the process of teaching is frustrating, unrewarding, and

intolerably difficult (McLaughlin, et al., 1986).

A broad range of organizational features combine to minimize teachers' professional satisfaction and effectiveness. A study of California's schools (Commons, 1985) identified problems that have eroded the attractiveness and contribution of the teaching profession. Among them were:

Low salaries and subordinate status within the schools.

Loss of public esteem for the work and those who perform it.

Inadequate facilities, supplies, and support materials.

Isolation in the classroom, with rare opportunities or incentives for collegiality.

Increased conflict between teachers and administrators that inhibits cooperation in school improvement.

Deficiencies in professional training and support.

The lack of career choices within the profession.

### Conclusion

The problems of attracting and retaining qualified teachers in the public schools and the problem of improving classroom performance are three separate problems.

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Unfortunately, educational reforms creating various types of incentive plans appear to be based on the assumption that what will solve one problem will solve all others.

Policy makers cannot afford to forget or ignore the principles regarding human motivation. Money is a factor, but the data suggest that frustration -- over mandates, rules and regulations, administrators' behavior, legislated learning, and the like -- is the major catalyst for teachers seeking higher-paying jobs. And, given the conditions under which most teachers work, offering performance rewards to a few teachers who are outstanding is not going to have much effect on the performance of the rest.

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## THE ISSUE: ATTRACTING AND RETAINING QUALIFIED TEACHERS

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### An Historical Perspective

The growth of the public school system between 1840 and 1950 changed the occupation of teaching. What had once been the domain of well-educated white males, soon became a female-dominated occupation characterized by high turnover and low salaries. By the 1920's, 86% of the nation's teachers were female. The feminization of teaching during this period was partly the result of a steadily increasing demand for teachers, without a parallel expansion of public funding, and a ready reserve of literate, middle-class women willing to teach for low wages (IFG Policy Notes, 1985a).

A steady supply of bright, dedicated teachers was assured by the blocked career path for educated women and minorities. For decades, the only respectable and available occupations for most women were teaching and such other low-paying occupations as nursing and social work. For academically able minorities, teaching was seen as a route from working-class social status to the middle class (Sykes, 1983). With limited access to the higher paying professions open to white males, women and minorities entered the teaching field -- in effect, subsidizing public education by their willingness to work for lower salaries (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983).

Within the last two decades, a series of trends have upset the delicate balance that

provided a continuing supply of new teachers. These trends -- the decline in purchasing power of teachers' salaries, the increased career mobility for women and minorities, and the loss of occupational prestige of teaching -- have made it more likely that those bright, academically able individuals who have the option will choose more lucrative and more prestigious careers -- careers that were denied women and minorities until recently (Sykes, 1983).

### Concerns About the Teacher Workforce

As a result of these trends, several areas of concern have surfaced in public-school education. There is concern about:

- 1) the shortage of teachers, especially pronounced in the areas of mathematics, science, and foreign languages;
- 2) the failure to attract the more academically able college graduates to a career in teaching;
- 3) the failure to keep them once they are in the classroom; and
- 4) gender stratification.

Quality of entering teachers. Evidence that the more able college graduates are not entering teaching in large numbers is provided by the fact that academic scores for education majors, measured by college

entrance exams and grade-point averages, have shown a marked decline over the last decade (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983). Schlechty and Vance (1982), using data drawn from a national sample, described some characteristics of recent high-school graduates who went on to college, graduated, and entered teaching.

The sample was separated into five ranks (lowest, second-lowest, middle, second-highest and highest) according to scores on the SAT math and verbal subtests. The researchers concluded that the data supported the assertion that teaching is more attractive to those individuals with low measures of academic ability than to those persons with high measures of academic ability.

The situation appears to be continuing with the current crop of prospective teachers. The 20th annual survey of entering freshman conducted jointly by the University of California at Los Angeles and the American Council on Education (ACE) asked freshmen to indicate their "probable career occupation". The survey's findings raise some questions about the academic caliber of the young people -- predominantly female -- who identify themselves as prospective elementary and secondary teachers.

When the researchers broke down the public and private four-year colleges by levels of selectivity, they uncovered data indicating that, in almost all instances, prospective elementary and secondary teachers are most likely to be found in those institutions with low selectivity (NCEI Reports, March 10, 1986).

**Quality of remaining teachers.** The quality of those who remain in teaching is also a major concern. Schlechty and Vance (1982) found that, although education does attract and retain a proportionate share of those individuals in the middle rank, it attracts *more than a proportionate share* of those students from the lower two ranks and *less than a proportionate share* from the top two ranks. A comparison of those who indicated they were "committed teachers"

and those who were "confirmed defectors" showed that those with high ability who enter teaching are more likely to leave teaching than those with low ability. Another study found that, after six years, only 37% of teachers in the top 10% of measured verbal ability remained in the teacher work force, while more than 60% of those in the lowest 10% were still teaching (Rosenholtz, 1985).

The newly released Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers in America (Teacher Education Reports, 1986), however, found that all kinds of teachers -- from the least to the best qualified -- leave at similar rates. The survey found that those teachers who hold second jobs and secondary school teachers are more likely to leave teaching.

The survey also found that 46% of the former teachers had been in the profession less than ten years; that frequent job stress is a key indicator of a teacher who may leave; that former teachers and those most likely to leave often believe the intellectual challenge is greater in other fields; and that expressed dissatisfaction is also a predictor.

**Gender stratification.** Stratification by gender in the educational system persists. Elementary school teaching remains predominantly a woman's job. In the 20th annual survey of freshmen, women continued to express more interest in an elementary or secondary teaching career than men--9.5% of the women surveyed chose teaching as their career, compared to 2% of the men (Education Daily, January 13, 1986). In addition, the 1986 Metropolitan Survey found that male teachers are among those most likely to leave teaching. Two-thirds of the former teachers surveyed were men

#### Prospects for Attracting and Retaining Qualified Teachers

It has been estimated that 1.1 million teachers will be needed in the next eight years (Pipho, 1986). It is important for policy makers to understand that the reasons

schools have difficulty in recruiting academically able persons to teach are the same reasons the schools have difficulty retaining the services of these people once they are in the classroom. *The academic character of the education required to prepare for teaching and the intellectual nature of the task are contradicted by the isolated, non-scholarly, and non-self-renewing character of the setting in which teaching takes place* (Burden, 1985). In general, the practicing teacher functions in a context where the beliefs and expectations are those of a profession but where the realities in actual practice compare more to a trade (Goodlad, 1984).

Although the overwhelming majority of the teachers polled by the National Education Association were pleased with the flexibility they had in deciding how to teach (88%) and felt personally fulfilled in the use of their talents (83%), about half of the teachers claimed that if they had it to do over again, they would not enter teaching. This is a five-fold increase over those who responded similarly in 1966 (Mills & Stout, 1985).

When asked what it is about teaching that negatively affects job satisfaction, 41% of the teachers cited working conditions such as long hours, overcrowded classrooms, too much paperwork and too many non-teaching duties; 31% cited student-related factors such as discipline and motivational problems; and roughly a quarter of the teachers reported boredom, frustration, burnout and stress, lack of respect, and lack of administrative support as additional sources of job dissatisfaction (IFG Policy Notes, 1985b).

#### Conditions That Discourage Qualified Prospects

Those who have given serious attention to the organizational nature of schools and to the structure of the teaching occupation have identified factors that are discouraging to those whose academic qualifications and personal aspirations make them candidates

for careers both in education and in fields outside education.

Conditions existing in the public schools that are likely to be discouraging to the academically proficient include (1) the lack of a clear career ladder and career staging; (2) the tendency of school administrators to resist shared decision making and problem-centered analytical discussions among adults; and, (3) the tendency of the informal culture of schools to be dominated by a management structure that is punishment centered and bureaucratic (Schlechty & Vance, 1982).

The reasons why academically talented college graduates do not generally find a career in teaching very attractive and why many qualified teachers leave the profession can be identified by a discussion of the conditions under which teachers work. These conditions are categorized under the following headings: the stress of the work itself; the lack of support systems; the lack of opportunities for interaction with colleagues; the lack of opportunities for professional growth; the lack of prestige, status, or rewards; little input into decision making; and the lack of a professional career system. These conditions are discussed in detail in Critical Issues Papers numbers 8 through 12.

#### Conclusion

The demographic, social, and economic conditions that once provided a ready supply of qualified teachers have changed. Large numbers of teachers are retiring or leaving the profession for other jobs; there are economic and image problems that make teaching an unattractive profession. In order to solve the problems of attracting and retaining qualified teachers, policy makers must first address the economic and organizational causes that discourage the brightest students from choosing a career in teaching or, having chosen one, that discourage them from remaining in the classroom.

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## THE ISSUE: LACK OF PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

Unlike other professions, teaching does not provide for a shared culture based on the movement from knowledge to experience in the company of one's peers. Once graduated from a preparation program, most teachers find themselves alone in the classroom with a group of students with no support from peers or supervisors.

### **The Lack of Opportunities for Interaction With Colleagues**

In his study of schooling, Goodlad (1984) found that inside schools, teacher-to-teacher links for mutual assistance in teaching or collaborative school improvement were weak or nonexistent, especially in the senior high schools. There were no infrastructures designed to encourage or support teachers either in communicating among themselves to improve their teaching or in collaborating to attack school-wide problems.

Teachers rarely worked together on school-wide problems; rarely came together in their schools to discuss curricular or instructional changes. The study of schooling found little evidence that principals were exercising instructional leadership; rather, their behaviors seemed generally to reinforce the isolation and autonomy of the teachers.

Research suggests that the most effective schools -- where student learning gains are greatest -- are those where professional dialogue and collaboration are encouraged;

where teaching is seen as a collective, rather than an individual, enterprise, and where analysis, evaluation, and experimentation with one's colleagues set the conditions under which teachers improve (Rosenholtz, 1985).

### **The Lack of Support Systems**

While most experienced teachers have developed coping skills and learned to survive on their own, beginning teachers are adversely affected by the lack of support -- 15% nationwide do not last a full year (Education USA, January 20, 1986). The first year sink-or-swim syndrome is a common experience that almost all teachers believe should be corrected -- 96% of the teachers polled in a California survey believe the school administration should establish a formal system of help and support for new teachers, but only 15% claim this type of system already exists. (Koppich, et al., 1985).

Experienced teachers feel they, also, do not receive sufficient support and assistance from school administrators. Poor or inconsistent administrator support is one of the most pressing concerns teachers face. When asked what grade they would give administrators in the local public schools, 54% of the teachers responded with a grade of C or below. Local school boards fared even worse with their teachers -- with 68% of the teachers giving them a C or less (Gallup, 1984).

Teachers' poor opinions of local school boards may stem from the fact that it is the local board's responsibility to supply the funds that provide the text books, instructional materials, equipment, desks, and classrooms that make up the tools and environment of teaching. All too often, teachers are faced with shortages in text books, required to make do with limited amounts of instructional materials and equipment, and cope with over-crowded classroom.

While most professionals take clerical help for granted, it is rarely provided to assist teachers who develop their own instructional materials or who face increasing "paperwork" demands from the local district or state. Teachers spend from 10% to 50% of their time on mundane tasks that have nothing to do with instruction, and, while well-paid professionals in other fields have support staff, for teachers, even copying machines and secretaries are rare luxuries (Education Daily, April 16, 1986).

A study from Stanford University (Pfeifer, 1986) on the sources of teacher effectiveness and job satisfaction suggests that organizational conditions, more than any lack of expertise on the part of teachers, impede effective teaching, and that the effective principal provides support by "enabling" teachers to perform effectively in the classroom. In this study, principals seen as effective by teachers first attended to the everyday realities of the organizational life in schools -- by minimizing interruptions and excessive paperwork;

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insuring the availability of adequate instructional materials; enforcing clear, simple policies; providing opportunities for training; and fostering positive, supportive human relationships.

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## THE ISSUE: THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROFESSIONAL GROWTH

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Isolation Limits Opportunities to Learn.

The well-documented isolation that teachers experience day after day, affects their opportunities to learn new or more effective classroom methods. The isolation of teaching results in teachers having little contact, not only with other teachers, but also with sources of ideas beyond their own experiences. In Goodlad's study of schooling (1984), over 75% of the teachers, regardless of subject area taught or level of schooling, indicated that they were greatly influenced in what they taught by two sources -- their own background, interests, and experiences; and students' interests and experiences.

Isolation is perhaps the greatest impediment to the professional development of teachers -- to their continued learning or to the improvement of existing skills -- because most of such learning must occur by trial and error. One alarming consequence of trial-and-error learning is that teachers' professional growth depends solely on their own ability to detect problems and discern solutions. As a result, teachers have no opportunity to benefit from the advice, experience, or expertise of their colleagues; have few models of teaching excellence to emulate; have no standards against which to judge their own teaching behaviors (Rosenholtz, 1985).

### Teachers Learn From Other Teachers

A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that teachers often respond positively to alternative methods of teaching when they are given support, encouragement, and protection (Goodlad, 1984). Although teachers feel confidence in the abilities of their fellow teachers--approximately 90% feel that their colleagues are good teachers (Harris, 1984)--few teachers have the opportunity to take advantage of other teachers' experience, educational practices, and professional advice. This is supported by the findings that (Koppich et al., 1985):

- while 87% believe they would learn from observing other teachers, only 6% regularly do so;
- while 77% feel they would benefit from being observed by other teachers, only 3% have that experience;
- while 92% would like assistance from fellow teachers to solve teaching and disciplinary problems, only 33% receive it; and,
- while 93% would like to be allotted time on the job for consulting with other teachers about professional matters, only 14% have the time.



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## Peer Review for Professional Development

Peer review has been suggested as a strategy for improving classroom performance by using teachers to evaluate and provide professional development for other teachers. Peer review, broadly defined, includes the various means by which professionals determine the content and structure of their work as well as the qualifications necessary for individuals to claim membership in the profession. It includes peer control over decisions that define acceptable practice as well as peer assessment of individual practitioners.

There are several reasons for the current interest in peer review. Current evaluation practices in most school districts are inadequate for making important personnel decisions and peer involvement is seen as a way of expanding the personnel and expertise available for evaluation. In addition, peer review is seen as part of a larger agenda for professionalizing teaching; for ensuring that teachers have both the autonomy and responsibility needed to increase their voice in decision making and their effectiveness in the classroom (Darling-Hammond, 1985).

### Conclusion

Research on educational change, conducted in the 60's and 70's, found that:

- 1) schools, if they are to improve or be improved, must somehow be connected to new knowledge from the outside; and

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- 2) conditions within the schools have to be such that staff members can share this new knowledge among themselves (Tye & Tye, 1984).

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## THE ISSUE: TEACHERS SHARING IN DECISION MAKING

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### **Bureaucratic Schools Less Effective**

According to the effective schools research, schools that engage teachers in job-related discussions and have them share in decisions about instructional programs are more effective than schools in which decisions are made by rule-bound, bureaucratic procedures (Burden, 1985). Testimony before the California Commission on the Teaching Profession (Commons, 1985) indicated that "old fashioned bureaucracy is poorly suited for the management of trained professionals" (p. 33). The Commission concluded that teachers must participate in the task of managing and reforming their schools.

Lacking a voice in decisions that affect the school, teachers are often expected to practice their profession under conditions that may be administratively convenient but not conducive to effective teaching. Where learning suffers, teachers are often blamed for failure although they are not empowered to make the changes that would create a better environment for teaching and learning.

### **Teacher Dissatisfaction Traced to Lack of Input Into Decisions**

Part of the dissatisfaction teachers feel in their jobs can be traced to this lack of input -- they feel impotent to affect school-wide decisions (Tye & Tye, 1984).

According to a California survey (Koppich, et al., 1985):

- o While 90% of the California teachers polled thought they should have the right to participate in decisions about what should be taught in their schools; only 41% actually had the opportunity to do so.
- o Although 98% felt that teachers should work with administrators in setting the school's discipline policy; only 42% reported being involved.
- o Where 98% would like a voice in making teaching assignments; less than half (42%) said this was true in their districts.
- o Even though 84% believed teachers should have some say in assigning students to classes; only 28% did.
- o And while 78% thought teachers should be included in the selection of new teachers to their schools; just 15% had the opportunity to do so.

Teachers at the recent National Teachers' Forum sponsored by the Education Commission of the States (reported in Education USA, March 17, 1986) insisted that if school-level reform is to be achieved, teachers must be given the power and the time to take part in key decisions.

## Reasons For Including Teachers in Decision Making Processes

The reasons for involving teachers in "management jobs" and decision making are simple according to Darling-Hammond (1985):

First, the span of control in schools is extremely wide. Both because of limited time for supervision and limited expertise in teaching specialties, the typical principal cannot do a very good job of evaluation and staff development. The time and expertise of principals are often inadequate to the task of critiquing, assisting, and monitoring the performance of teachers in a serious, concerted fashion.

Second, the professional growth of teachers is not particularly central to the concerns of administrators. The professional growth of teachers may be central to teaching, to teacher efficacy and job satisfaction, but it is peripheral to the day-to-day tasks of administrators.

Finally, the designation of some decisions and tasks as those of management and others as those of teachers is, in part, arbitrary. To the extent that any policy or practice affects the quality of instruction delivered to students, it is a concern of teachers. If teaching is to be considered not only a job but also a profession, then teachers must be concerned about not only salaries and working conditions but also whatever affects the interests of students.

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## THE ISSUE: THE STRESS OF TEACHING

*Patricia C. Dutiweiler*

### **Demands of Teaching**

Teaching is time-intensive; requiring a great deal of time to properly prepare lessons and materials, and to assess the performance of students. Teaching is emotionally demanding; requiring constant interaction with 25 to 35 students at any given time, alertness to their responses, diagnosis of each student's needs, and instruction to help each student learn (McLaughlin et al., 1986). Unfortunately, this is expected of teachers under less-than-ideal conditions.

### **Less Stress Out of Teaching**

The Metropolitan Life Survey (Education Daily, March 17, 1986) found that the amount of stress teachers experience once they leave the profession drops dramatically. Fifty-seven percent of former teachers said they felt "great" stress in the classroom, but only 22% said they experience that kind of pressure in their current jobs. In examining what career change has meant to former teachers, the survey found that along with reduced stress, higher pay and sharply increased job satisfaction make it highly unlikely that those individuals would return to the classroom (Teacher Education Reports, 1986).

### **Sources of Teaching Stress**

In a study on the sources of teacher stress, Blase (1986) reports that there are certain aspects of the teaching environment that

direct teachers' time and energy away from instructional activities. These aspects that create stress are identified as "stressors".

Stressors in the teaching environment include student discipline problems, student absences, inappropriate scheduling, large classes, administrative interruptions, problems with equipment and the physical plant, meetings that are disorganized, unclear expectations, administrative inconsistency and indecisiveness, lack of preparation time, and lack of materials. *All of these stressors result in a reduction of time available for the teacher to spend on planning and delivering instruction and working with students.*

### **Effects of Lack of Time**

Teachers cope with these demands on their time in a variety of ways. In order to make time for planning or correcting papers, teachers often resort to "busy" seat work. Lacking the time to research and develop new materials, teachers use old materials and techniques over and over again. This affects teachers' intellectual curiosity and enthusiasm for teaching.

The positive attitudes and behaviors essential to good teaching seem to be difficult to maintain over the long run. In their place, maladaptive behaviors develop as a result of work stress. Day-to-day problems seem to affect teachers' abilities to relate to students in a personal, caring manner.

Under stress, teachers behave differently toward students. They become less tolerant, less patient, and overall, less involved.

### "More Time" -- A Reward

Blase concludes that those committed to improving schools should focus more attention on the complex nature of the organizational aspects of schools that prevent productive teaching and learning. A study conducted by the Newark, New Jersey, school system suggests that one of the organizational aspects that might be manipulated to reduce teacher stress is *time* (e.g., providing time as a reward).

The study (Azumi & Lerman, 1986), designed to identify the types of rewards and incentives valued by the teachers in the system, found that "time" can be used as a reward. The study found that the highest ranked rewards/incentives were:

- 1) having input into policy making, participating in educational decision making;
- 2) participating in curriculum development, working with other teachers, developing and presenting workshops; and
- 3) having more preparation time, more flexible scheduling, top priority for summer work.

### Conclusion

*Time* is a factor that has not received the attention it should. State legislatures and district school boards need to investigate the possibilities for decreasing the amount of time that teachers are expected to spend in active engagement with students and the possibilities for increasing the amount of time available for preparation, professional growth, and collegial exchange.

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## THE ISSUE: THE TEACHING CAREER

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Lack of Prestige, Status, or Rewards

The Metropolitan Life Survey of Former Teachers found that a factor contributing significantly to former teachers' job-change decisions was the discovery (by 64%) that their professional prestige was worse than they had expected it to be when they began teaching (Teacher Education Reports, 1986). When teachers surveyed by the Gallup poll in 1985 were asked to compare teaching to 12 other professions, more than half ranked teaching first in terms of the profession's contribution to society, but only 1% ranked teaching first in terms of "the amount of prestige people in the profession have in their communities."

When polled on the source of the rewards they get from teaching, 66% of the teachers said their professional rewards come mainly from students and helping them learn (Fiske, 1982). It is fortunate that teachers, isolated in their own classrooms, feel rewarded by their students since, unlike other professionals who look to colleagues and supervisors for such feedback, students are generally the only source of rewards for most teachers.

### The Need For a Professional Career System

The notion of "career" invariably includes moving upward in one's chosen profession. As responsibilities increase, more money, more authority, and usually greater prestige are also acquired. Teachers have little

motivation to make a career of teaching. Ironically, the career path of teachers in recent years has been closest to the pattern of blue collar workers having little formal education (Bornfriend, 1985).

An examination of the teaching career shows that, by the time a teacher has reached the highest salary level and is perhaps at the peak of professional competence, there are limited possibilities for salary advancement. Unlike business organizations where low-level managers can aspire to middle- or top-level management, the longer one teaches, the less rewarding teaching is in comparison to other careers.

There are few rewards available to the experienced teacher that are not available to those who are inexperienced. Most of the psychic rewards of teaching are as accessible to the beginning teacher as to the experienced one. Neither are experienced teachers likely to realize meaningful increases in responsibility even though research shows that these can be powerful motivators. Presently, teachers who seek higher salaries must leave the classroom and stop teaching, either to become a school administrator or to change careers.

The lack of a career pattern also limits teachers' opportunities for recognition and status. In order to have opportunities for increased status, teachers must leave the classroom for full-time administration,

supervision, or curriculum development (Burden, 1985). Classroom teachers who do not choose to become administrators or supervisors will fulfill the same job description the day before retirement as they did on their initial day of employment.

In addition to being blocked from moving up, teachers have limited opportunities for growing professionally. Teaching roles are so circumscribed that they do not customarily provide the time or opportunities for teachers to consult with other teachers and administrators, inquire systematically about teaching, create instructional materials, aid other teacher's improvement, write about teaching, administer special programs, or develop special projects. All too often, when teachers do assume additional responsibilities, there is no money in the district budget to pay an additional stipend for their time, creativity, or initiative (ASCD, 1985).

Job challenges for teachers are usually constrained by the structure of the schools. Leadership and new learning are not particularly effective ways for teachers to advance their careers and bring few external rewards within the school. In fact, a teacher's advances in these areas may not even be noticed by others in the school. When they are noticed, leadership activities may lead to conflict with school officials who may see them as a threat to their own leadership and career advancement (Chapman & Lowther, 1982).

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## THE ISSUE: CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE WORK OF TEACHING THAT GUIDE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Goals of Incentive Plans Determine Evaluation Systems

Ideally, there are three main components to any teacher incentive plan: a method of evaluating teaching performance, a method for improving performance, and a method of linking the performance ratings to promotions or rewards. The evaluation component should be designed to fit the objectives of the plan and to facilitate both the reward component and the staff-development component.

Unfortunately, even when a stated goal is to improve teacher performance, most plans do not incorporate staff-development procedures. In fact, many of the plans are based on the assumption that the reward component of the plan will provide the motive for improved performance and that, thus motivated, teachers will improve even in the absence of any structured staff development program.

For this reason, most merit-pay and career-ladder plans are primarily concerned with summative rather than formative evaluation -- that is, with determining how well teachers have been performing rather than with helping teachers improve. When the objective is to reward past performance, the assessment system (1) looks at the teacher's overall performance, and (2) compares one individual to others doing the same or similar jobs. When the objective is

to improve performance, the assessment system (1) looks at specific aspects of an individual teacher's performance, and (2) compares that teacher's performance with established competency standards (Kirkpatrick, 1986).

### Concepts About the Work of Teaching Guide Choice of Evaluation System

Much of the current literature on teacher evaluation examines instruments and techniques for evaluation without considering their theoretical bases or the organizational context in which they are to be used. Without such consideration, potential users cannot accurately determine whether or not a particular approach will help to meet their goals, is congruent with their conceptions of education, or is appropriate for the organizational characteristics of their schools. Nor can they evaluate the implementation processes necessary to successfully use a given instrument or technique (Darling-Hammond, Wise, & Pease, 1982).

### The Nature of the Work of Teaching

Evaluation involves collecting and using information in order to judge the worth of something or someone. Different conceptions of what is involved in the work of teaching will result in different ways of collecting information about teaching effectiveness and making judgments about

TABLE 1: CONCEPTS OF THE WORK OF TEACHING

	LABOR	CRAFT	PROFESSION	ART
<b>Criteria for Competency</b>	Following established procedures; student outcomes	Presence of specific competencies	Degree of skill in performance of specific competencies, problem solving, and judgment	Creative approach to teaching; ability to motivate students
<b>Role of Principal</b>	Supervisor	Manager	Administrator	Leader
<b>Methods of Evaluation</b>	To assess if teacher conforms to policy and follows procedures	To determine if teacher can demonstrate the specific competencies	To evaluate strengths and weaknesses in applying skills in order to plan for professional improvement	To assess teacher's approach to teaching
<b>Who Evaluates Teachers</b>	Principal	Principal	Peers, Principal, and Self	Self, Peer criticism
<b>Role of Staff Development</b>	Provides training to ensure teacher is proficient in the prescribed techniques and knows the rules and regulations	To train teacher in performing the specific competencies	To improve teacher's skills and knowledge and develop ability to apply appropriately	Moves teacher to developmental stage; enlarges perspective and understanding

the worth of the teacher. Every evaluation technique rests upon assumptions about the work of teaching and the relation of the teacher to the administrative structure of the school. These assumptions become manifested in both the teacher-evaluation system, which defines the teaching task and the mechanisms by which the teacher is evaluated, and in the design of professional development activities.

Teachers have been conceived of as craftspersons and professionals; as laborers and artists (Table 1, p. 2). The following discussion is based on the Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease (1982) theoretical framework for analyzing the processes of teacher evaluation.

### Teaching as Labor

Under the conception of teaching as labor, teaching activities are rationally planned, programmatically organized, and routinized in the form of standard operating procedures by administrators. The teacher is responsible for executing the plans, implementing the instructional program, and adhering to routines and procedures. The evaluation system involves direct inspection of the teacher's work: the school administrator is seen as the teacher's *supervisor*.

The worth of teachers is measured through the product or output of their work. Students' learning, as measured by their test performance, is seen as a direct function of teaching ability and is used to assess teacher performance. Teachers are also assessed on how diligently they follow established procedure, their attitude, and the careful attention they pay to administrative expectations.

This view sees the teacher as a laborer and the student as raw material. The evaluation of teaching as labor seeks to assure that tasks are completed and rules followed. The principal becomes a line supervisor who gives direct guidance to the teacher on how to implement the prescribed curriculum. In

this view, staff development is to train teachers as technicians to implement policies developed by someone else.

### Teaching as a Craft

Under the conception of teaching as a craft, teaching requires a repertoire of specialized skills. Once the teaching assignment has been made, the teacher is expected to carry it out without detailed instructions or close supervision. Evaluation is indirect and involves assuring that the teacher demonstrates the requisite skills. The school administrator is seen as a *manager* whose job requires holding the teacher to specified performance standards.

In this view of teaching, the particular skills, competencies, or behaviors of teaching are seen as directly linked to student learning and can be specified and evaluated to determine the worth of a teacher. The evaluation of teaching as a craft seeks to determine -- through observation, testing, or other means -- whether or not the teacher possesses a repertoire of teaching skills that have been identified as characteristic of a competent teacher. In evaluating teaching as a craft, the principal becomes a manager who helps the teacher to upgrade his or her skills.

Staff development is used to instruct the teacher in the proper behavior exhibited by a competent teacher. Demonstration of the skill is the major goal of the staff development.

### Teaching as a Profession

Under the conception of teaching as a profession, teaching not only requires a repertoire of specialized skills, but also requires the exercise of judgment about how and when those skills should be applied. The teacher is expected to exercise sound professional judgment. The school principal is seen as an *administrator*

who ensures that teachers have the resources necessary to carry out their work.

Evaluation is through peer review and focuses on the degree to which teachers are competent at professional problem-solving. The evaluation of teaching as a profession -- through observation, testing, or other means -- also determines that the teacher possesses a repertoire of teaching skills that have been identified as characteristic of a competent teacher. However, evaluation of teaching as a profession seeks to determine whether or not the teacher applied these skills in an appropriate way, after analyzing the problem and exercising sound judgment in determining which skills to use.

In the conception of teaching as a profession, the principal is an administrator who creates a situation in which teachers work with each other to critique each other's skills and to develop and implement plans for professional growth. In this view, teachers are given responsibility for the analysis of how students learn and for developing the appropriate techniques and curriculum.

Staff development is a cooperative effort among teachers for the purpose of increasing knowledge, understanding the learning needs of students, and developing the skills most likely to facilitate student learning.

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## Teaching as an Art

Under the conception of teaching as an art, teaching is seen as requiring the application of novel, unconventional or unexpected techniques. The teacher is expected to exercise autonomy in the performance of his or her work. Evaluation involves self-assessment and giving and taking criticism. The school administrator is seen as a *leader* who encourages the teacher's efforts.

In evaluating teaching as art, the purpose is to assess if the teacher is engaging, exciting and/or creative. The principal is a leader who inspires dedication and effort through constructive criticism. Staff development helps the teacher move to higher developmental stages in order to enlarge his or her perspectives, to develop a greater rapport with the students, and to gain greater insight into ways of motivating students to learn.

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# Issues in Perspective

Critical Issues Paper # 14

September 1986

## THE ISSUE: CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Goals of Incentive Systems

States and districts that are in the process of planning or implementing performance-based incentive systems usually preface any discussions with a statement of the goals the system is expected to accomplish. The goals identified for such systems generally fall into four discrete categories (Palaich & Flannelly, 1984):

- o improving teaching and learning;
- o improving schools as organizations in order to make schools more effective places to teach and to learn;
- o changing the composition or distribution of the teacher work force by attracting more outstanding teachers, and/or retaining talented teachers; and
- o strengthening community confidence in the schools.

### Target Groups and Assumptions

When considering incentive strategies to meet specific goals, policy makers should identify the assumptions on which those strategies are based to determine whether or not they are appropriate for accomplishing the desired goals in relation to a specific target group. To elicit better performances from existing teachers, the incentives must induce them to improve their skills. To

alter the make-up of the teaching force, the incentives must influence teacher turnover or recruitment. Strategies designed to influence one group may have little or no effect on the other (Barro, 1985). And, the strategies designed to improve schools as organizations or increase community confidence may need to be entirely different from either of the others.

There are four major strategies that have been identified as being effective for achieving one or more of the above goals. They are:

Strategy 1: *Influencing teacher turnover rates so that "good" teachers remain in the profession longer, and "poor" teachers leave teaching sooner.*

#### Assumptions:

- a. Teachers' desires to remain in or leave teaching are determined by the relative rewards available to them in teaching and in other occupations.
- b. Under the present economic conditions, significant numbers of teachers have viable options outside the teaching field.
- c. The "benefits package" and working conditions can be improved and incentives can be identified that will influence "good" teachers to remain.



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- d. Methods can be identified for inducing "poor" teachers to leave teaching sooner.

Strategy 2: *Attracting "higher-quality" entrants into teaching from the ranks of talented new college graduates and from the pool of talented persons in other jobs.*

Assumptions:

- a. Higher teacher-pay scales will help make teaching a more attractive occupation.
- b. The "benefits package" and working conditions of teachers can be made attractive to the "higher-quality" college graduates.
- c. School districts are able to discriminate between the large numbers of "mediocre" applicants and the "more-talented" applicants and will hire the "more talented" applicants.

Strategy 3: *Raising the average performance of already-employed teachers by inducing them to upgrade or utilize their capabilities more effectively by providing incentive pay.*

Assumptions:

- a. Most currently employed teachers are capable of teaching better than they teach now.
- b. Teachers have the capacity and the freedom to improve on their own.

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- c. Teachers can be induced to make these performance-enhancing changes by the offer of performance-contingent rewards.

Strategy 4: *Raising the average performance of already-employed teachers by providing both the inducement and the structured opportunities for them to upgrade their capabilities.*

Assumptions:

- a. Most currently employed teachers are capable of teaching better than they teach now.
- b. Teachers want to improve their skills and capabilities but do not have the time or the opportunities to do so.
- c. Teachers can be assisted in making performance-enhancing changes by a variety of structured staff development experiences.

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## THE ISSUE: EVALUATION POLICIES

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

### Difficulties in Developing an Evaluation System

In many respects, developing an evaluation system that *is fair and is perceived as fair* is more difficult than developing the structure of the incentive plan itself (Weeks, 1985). This is, however, essential. The success or failure of a plan depends on the existence of a reliable, functioning evaluation system that has the support of teachers and administrators.

The difficulties in developing an evaluation system are multiple and complex. Some of reasons for this include the following:

- o the results of learning cumulate over time, therefore, isolating the effects of any one teacher becomes difficult;
- o teacher effectiveness is situational and context bound and is not amenable to rigid recipes for action;
- o teacher effectiveness varies depending on the goals defined for the class or the students;
- o teachers vary greatly in the practices that work for them and the problems they confront in their particular classrooms; and
- o any given practice may be effective at first but its effectiveness may diminish

after prolonged use (IFG Policy Notes, 1985).

### Teacher Satisfaction With Evaluation Systems

Researchers (Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease, 1982) have found that teacher satisfaction with teacher evaluation systems was strongly related to (1) perceptions that all evaluators share the same criteria for evaluation; (2) more frequent samplings of teacher performance; (3) more frequent communication and feedback; and (4) teachers' ability to affect the criteria for evaluation.

Teachers are understandably wary about the criteria that will be used, the processes, and the persons who will be doing the evaluations. Teachers are well aware of the fact that the lack of rigorous, comprehensive personnel-evaluation systems in schools make performance-based incentives extremely difficult to implement. The poor training of administrators in curriculum supervision and personnel evaluation has contributed to the current problems (Podemski, 1985).

There is also justifiable concern about the lack of provisions for inservice or staff development to either improve weak performance areas or to acquire skills that are needed for advancement. Policy makers should ensure that evaluation



systems are developed that incorporate credible, specific feedback on teaching performance and that make suggestions for improvement. This will enable teachers to reflect on their teaching practices, assess their own competence, and take steps to improve (IFG Policy Notes, 1985). In addition, if teachers are to be assigned new roles they must be given appropriate training in the skills needed to perform those roles (Brandt, 1985).

### Conclusion

The measurement of performance and provisions for professional growth are critical to the success of any incentive plan. Virtually everything depends on the existence of a reliable, functioning teacher and administrator evaluation system. Assuring accuracy and fairness in the assessment of competencies is critical to any system in which individuals hold ranks according to their qualifications. The problem of measurement -- the difficulties inherent in assessing performance-- presents the greatest barrier in the development of a fair system for awarding either merit bonuses, merit salary increases, or promotions on a career ladder. Opportunities for professional growth or the lack of them -- as a component of the incentive plan -- will determine whether or not these new incentive initiatives will, in fact, result in school improvement.

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## THE ISSUE: STEPS IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING A PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE SYSTEM

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

The following suggested steps for planning and implementing a performance-based incentive system have been compiled from a number of sources and are based on the experiences of those who have studied and been involved in planning and implementing such systems.

### Step 1: Involve the Right People

- o Involve those who may participate in and benefit from the plan, those who will implement and operate the plan, and those who will financially and politically support the plan -- the school board, parents, and other community members.
- o Adoption and successful implementation of incentive plans requires the active participation of teachers, administrators, school boards, parents, and community leaders. Involvement of unions or professional teachers associations should be sought to avoid conflict over negotiated issues.

### Step 2: Conduct the Right Research

- o Investigate the various kinds of programs that have been tried.
- o Survey teachers and administrators to discover what they will support.

### Step 3: Define the Goals of the Incentive Plan

- o The underlying principle of any incentive plan should be the ultimate improvement of classroom instruction. Such a plan should be viewed as a way to reward quality teaching and not as a punitive measure to punish inferior teaching.
- o Define your purpose and goals for establishing a program -- what should it accomplish for the state or district?

#### *Goal Check List*

- \_\_\_ To provide the staff with the means of achieving instructional improvement and professional development
- \_\_\_ To provide an incentive for professional growth
- \_\_\_ To provide a means for recognizing and rewarding teacher performance
- \_\_\_ To attract to the community teachers whose knowledge, skills, and professional dedication are markedly above average
- \_\_\_ To provide an incentive for talented teachers to remain in the district



- \_\_\_To raise student achievement scores
- \_\_\_To attract teachers with instructional specialties to teach in the district
- \_\_\_To provide an incentive for teachers to teach in particular areas of the district or with special student groups
- \_\_\_To provide an incentive for teachers to perform duties in addition to their regular classroom duties
- \_\_\_To develop a cadre of professionally outstanding teachers who, while spending the majority of their time in the classroom, will be a part of the instructional leadership and decision-making structure of the school and district

#### Step 4: Design a Program to Meet Your Goals

Once the goals are determined, they serve as a guide for designing the kind of program that will most likely accomplish those goals.

#### Decide on Type and Amount of Incentives

- o The amount of the incentive should reflect the value placed on superior service and should be perceived as generous by the recipients.
- o Incentives can include such non-monetary rewards as additional time for planning, preparation, and peer interaction; opportunities for professional growth; and recognition for achievement.
- o Make sure the plan isn't designed to penalize some teachers. The idea is to *reward excellence and in all teachers who meet the criteria.*
- o A quota system restricts the numbers that will receive the incentives; teachers who do not get the awards feel resentment. However, giving incentives to almost everyone diminishes the concept of merit or reward.

- o Promotions should carry increases in authority and responsibility.

#### Establish New Role Definitions for Teachers and Administrators When Developing Career-Ladder Plans

- o Administrators' roles should be redefined when teachers have the option of assuming some supervisory and administrative duties.
- o Requirements for tenure and certification and the relationship between the stages in a career ladder should be clearly defined.

#### Restructure the Organization of the School and District in Order to Accommodate the New Role Definitions in a Career-Ladder Plan

- o Examine the nature of school management and decision making -- appropriate systems of school management and participatory decision making need to be examined.
- o Criteria for advancement should include collegial leadership. Teachers who advance to higher positions should excel both at the classroom level and at the school level with colleagues.
- o Release time or limited classroom-teaching time for teachers in the higher stages of the career ladder will need to be arranged so they can complete their professional assignments.

#### Develop and Test the Performance-Evaluation System

- o A fair and effective evaluation system requires time to develop and time to administer; requires the commitment of financial resources for development, putting the system into place, and the continuation of the system.

- o Evaluation criteria and procedures should be tested for validity and reliability and should be clearly described;
- o All personnel should be evaluated, including administrators, counselors, and supervisors.
- o Those who are to be evaluated should be involved in the development of any performance-evaluation system.
- o Standards of evaluation should be well-defined and agreed upon by those being evaluated.
- o Selection should be based solely on predetermined criteria.
- o In a merit-pay plan, selection should not be subject to a quota system. The incentive-based pay should be available to all who qualify.
- o Persons should have the right to appeal merit decisions.

**Include a Strong Staff Development and Inservice Component**

- o Continued training should be provided for teachers and administrators. The personnel, time, money, and resources needed should be considered when planning a budget.
- o Train administrators, principals, teachers, and other evaluators to measure performance effectiveness on the basis of agreed-upon criteria.

**Develop a Management System**

- o Design a program so that the effort to evaluate, train, reward, keep records, and, in the case of a career ladder, design new jobs is reasonable.
- o Sufficient funds and personnel should be available to administer the program adequately.

- o Performance-accountability procedures need to be in place to assure quality professional behavior by those at various stages of any career ladder.

**Include a Process for Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Program**

- o Develop a procedure to determine how well the proposed program achieves the state's or school district's goals.

**Include a Process for Revising the System Based on the Results of the Evaluation and Experience**

- o As development and implementation proceed, there should be enough flexibility built into the plan to meet unanticipated problems and to make appropriate changes. Can the plan be modified to suit individual school needs? Can it be changed if it is not working?

**Step 5: Establish a Budget and Identify Funding Sources**

- o Decide what is financially feasible.
- o The amount of any merit incentive should reflect the value placed on superior service and should be perceived as generous by the recipients -- 10 - 20% of teachers' base pay has been suggested as appropriate.
- o Categories for funding considerations are:
  - the developmental process
  - the evaluation process
  - the incentives themselves
  - reorganization features
  - training and staff development
  - administering the plan
  - evaluating the plan's effectiveness
- o Can states and districts pay for the developmental and administrative costs, the rewards, the additional efforts needed to implement the

system properly, and the continued operation of the program from year to year?

**Step 6: Determine the Legality of Your Program**

- o Legal issues should be resolved, especially in regard to teacher evaluation.
- o State tenure laws may need to be changed in order to implement a career ladder in which teachers are "certified" at different levels.

**Step 7: Establish a Process for Communication**

- o Frequent and direct communication with teachers, principals, and superintendents is essential. Prompt and accurate information will allay anxiety and reduce rumors and misunderstandings.
- o Put all the final decisions in writing so they can be communicated to the appropriate groups.

**Step 8: Put The Plan Into Action**

You will need:

- o A timeline that provides sufficient time for involving as many as possible

in every step of the planning and implementation, for communicating the purpose, and for training both teachers and administrators.

- o A process by which new responsibilities are assigned and old ones are realigned to fit the new organizational structure.
- o Adequate planning time for the implementation of the career ladder plans in order to minimize implementation problems.

**Step 9: Evaluate and Refine the Program**

- o Evaluate the plan so that modifications and adjustments can be made as the need becomes apparent. This should include investigations of:
  - what components of the plan were actually implemented;
  - how the processes worked;
  - the validity and reliability of the performance-assessment system;
  - whether the performance-assessment system differentiated between teachers;
  - the actual costs;
  - whether district goals were realized;
  - the un-intended outcomes; and
  - the attitudes of teachers and administrators.

These critical issues papers are based on the document, Perspectives on Performance-Based Incentive Plans. For information on purchasing that document, please contact SEDL's Publication Office.

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## THE ISSUE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATES THAT ARE CONSIDERING PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVE PLANS

*Patricia Cloud Duttweiler*

Although the mandate may come from the state level, the ideal level for implementing incentive plans is the local district level. When the state exerts control, often only passive compliance is made in most districts. A better strategy is what is called the "deregulated control model" in which the program is conceived and carried out with energy by local district administrators (Koehler, 1985).

The following are suggested procedures for states that are considering legislation for a performance-based incentive program (Frels, 1985; Koehler, 1985). By following these guidelines, a state may be able to mitigate or avoid many of the problems experienced by other states:

- o The state should identify the problems it hopes to correct, seek to determine if these are problems for all or only some of the school districts in the state, and, in the cases where some districts do not have the problem, try to determine why those districts do *not* have the problem.
- o Once the problems are identified, the state can study what type of incentive program is likely to meet its goals.
- o If career-ladder or merit-pay programs appear promising, a limited number of pilot projects should be set up to provide information on the costs, the best assessment procedures, the unintended effects, and so forth.
- o States should not take all the control away from the local districts -- district flexibility must be maintained in order to meet local needs.
- o The legislature should limit its role to making policy -- procedures should be developed by the SEA or the local districts.
- o The incentive system should be based on what experience shows is most likely to work.
- o The assessment policy should be developed in advance of implementation. There should be more than one form for the entire state -- one that can be amended by districts.
- o Statewide systems should be funded by the state -- local districts should not be expected to provide for shortfalls in state funding.
- o The state should provide staff development programs.
- o Above all, the state must get commitment from the leading actors, otherwise, the results are a paper exercise or legal actions, or both.



### *Checklist for Reformers*

The following checklist serves as a reminder of some of the more critical points that experience suggests should be considered when planning and implementing a performance-based incentive system.

- 1) Has the research and literature on such plans been reviewed?
- 2) Is the incentive plan consistent with other school goals?
- 3) Is the financial support adequate and stable enough to sustain the program?
- 4) Have all the stakeholders been involved in the development? Is there sufficient ownership of the plan?
- 5) Is there an orderly progression to change so that the participants will feel comfortable and secure?
- 6) Has the program been pilot tested?
- 7) Have the people involved received adequate training or preparation to carry out the planned change?
- 8) Is support and guidance available to assist those making the changes?
- 9) Are the incentives and rewards adequate?
- 10) Have all those who will be affected by the program been involved in developing the assessment system?
- 11) Is there a system of communication that keeps everyone informed -- teachers, administrators, school board members, parents, students, and the community?
- 12) Is professional growth and learning given a prominent place in the plan?
- 13) Has the plan been examined for its legal implications?
- 14) Has sufficient time been allowed to develop the plan, train personnel, field-test the assessment system, implement the plan on a pilot basis, revise, institutionalize, and evaluate the effects of the plan?
- 15) Is there a mechanism to document and evaluate the effects of the plan and to revise or modify as indicated?

### **References**

- Frels, K. (1985, August 7). Local education agency perspectives. In C. Clark, Proceedings: Preventive Law Institute on Career Ladder/Merit Pay. Austin, TX: Southwest Educational Development Laboratory.
- Koehler, V. (1985, August 7). National overview: Career ladder and merit pay plans. In C. Clark, Proceedings of the Preventive Law Institute on Career Ladder/ Merit Pay. Austin, TX: Southwest Educational Development Laboratory.

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