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**ABSTRACT**

Intended to provide background for study and discussion, this publication gives updated information on development in sub-Saharan Africa and provides a basis for understanding U.S. policy toward this vital region. The strengths, problems, politics, natural resources, and language and ethnolinguistic groups of this area of the world and the international and regional organizations active here are discussed in detail. Extensive data tables include information on the population, culture, education, labor force, imports, exports, estimated U.S. economic assistance, date of independence, type of government, and chief of state and/or head of government for each of the 46 independent countries south of the Sahara. The 55-item bibliography is divided into three sections: reference and introductory material, historical and cultural background, and contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. (AA)

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# **Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States**

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
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Information in this publication is intended to provide background for study and discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the material is specifically described as such. The publication summarizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy.



E



D



C



A



B

- A Young laborer in Zimbabwe.
- B Workmen pour molten aluminum into steel molds in Ghana.
- C Tsavo National Park, Kenya.
- D Mali village.
- E Business district, Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

# Introduction

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Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>1</sup> is the ancestral home of millions of Americans and, according to anthropological theory, the cradle of mankind—the birthplace of *Homo sapiens*. Perhaps the earliest development of settled agriculture began in Africa on the banks of the lower Nile, making possible the great advances in technology and the arts of ancient Egypt.

From at least the first millennium B.C. onward, elements of Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek, Roman, and Arab culture spread southward into Africa through conquest, trade, and the dissemination of Christianity and Islam. Trade in slaves, gold, copper, salt, spices, and many other items flourished both by sea and, following the introduction of camels in about the 3d century A.D., across the Sahara. Evidence of the extent of this trade can be found in the presence of Chinese porcelain and other oriental wares at archaeological sites in Africa.

<sup>1</sup>Although the generic term "Africa" frequently is used throughout this publication, and some data pertain to the entire continent, attention is focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the off-shore island states, which together include the majority of countries and of the continent's population. Within the Department of State, the Bureau of African Affairs is responsible for the conduct of relations with this region. Relations with North Africa are conducted through the Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Access to the cultural exchange of the Mediterranean basin was impeded by the vast expanse of desert, causing the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa to develop cultures distinctly their own. Several great empires with large cultural centers emerged but were later destroyed by war or declined following changes in global trade patterns. Although European traders had frequented the African coast since the late 15th century, knowledge of these empires remained limited until the era of African exploration and colonization in the late 18th and 19th centuries.

By the early 20th century, most of Africa had fallen under colonial domination. In sub-Saharan Africa, only Liberia and Ethiopia remained independent. In the decades after World War II, however, the peoples of Africa increasingly rejected foreign rule and demanded for themselves the fundamental freedoms for which they had fought in support of the Allied powers. By the mid-1960s, most African countries had achieved independence. Only Namibia remained in a colonial status in 1985.

There are now 46 independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the nearby islands, and negotiations on Namibia's independence are underway. Together with the countries of North Africa, these states play a significant role in the world community through the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But the process of forging cohesive national identities within boundaries drawn by European powers and among more than 1,000 ethnic groups is difficult; since independence, Africa has experienced considerable political upheaval.

It is important to understand sub-Saharan Africa's potential, strengths, and problems because they present opportunities and challenges that no world power can ignore. For the United States, Africa represents:

- The political force of the world's largest regional bloc;
- A rich source of natural resources;
- The ancestral home of 25 million Americans;
- A growing market for American exports;
- An opportunity to demonstrate, through private enterprise and government-to-government aid, that democratic institutions and individual initiative provide a better solution to the problems of the Third World than do totalitarianism and economic regimentation; and
- Possibilities for our adversaries to exploit regional tensions and foster insecurity through the indiscriminate provision of arms and support for violent solutions to local conflicts.

This Discussion Paper is designed to update information on developments in sub-Saharan Africa and to provide a basis for understanding U.S. policy toward this vital region of the world.

# Regional Profile

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## Geography

The Continent of Africa covers 11,635,000 square miles—nearly one-fifth of the world's total land surface and equal to the combined area of the United States, Western Europe, and India. The sub-Saharan portion of the continent is 9,312,375 square miles—more than three times the size of the continental United States. The African Continent stretches 5,000 miles from north to south and 4,600 miles from east to west. Its 18,900-mile coastline is washed by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

In addition to the continent itself, a number of island countries also are included in "Africa." With the exception of the Canary Islands and Reunion, all are identified with sub-Saharan Africa. These include Madagascar, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mauritius. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are part of the United Republic of Tanzania

### Topography

The African Continent consists of a series of level or slightly undulating plateaus that fall away from a central area of high formations to low-lying coastal zones averaging only 20 miles in width. Many of these plateaus lie at

altitudes anywhere from 3,000 to 9,000 feet in eastern and southern Africa, while in the north and west most of the land is between 500 and 1,000 feet above sea level.

Massive geologic changes in the plateaus have produced ridges that are among the most conspicuous features of the African landscape: the Great Rift Valley of East Africa, one of the deepest fractures in the earth's crust; Mt. Kilimanjaro (19,565 feet above sea level) and Mt. Kenya (17,058 feet) in East Africa are higher than any peak in the European Alps. These changes also produced Lake Chad in Central Africa; the lakes of East Africa, including Africa's largest, Lake Victoria; and the continent's four major rivers: the Nile (4,000 miles long); the Zaire (3,000 miles), the Niger (2,600 miles), and the Zambezi (1,650 miles).

The continent contains the world's largest desert, the Sahara; regions of heavy rainfall and lush forest vegetation; and, between desert and rain forest, broad savanna grasslands and woodlands. Nearly one-half of Africa's total area is desert, while 40% is partly forested grasslands and 10%, dense forests and thickets.

### Climate


Four-fifths of Africa lie in the tropics and have either a tropical or subtropical climate. Temperate climates are found in the north close to the Mediterranean, along the southern and southwestern areas of the Cape of Good Hope, and on

the higher parts of the inland plateaus. Air temperatures vary from hot in most parts of the continent to cold in the deserts (at night), on the plateaus, and in the mountains, where some peaks are permanently snowcapped.

Africa is divided into distinct climatic belts. The one bounded by the 5° line on either side of the Equator has a year-long hot-and-rainy climate, with some areas receiving more than 200 inches of rain annually. From 5°-15° on each side of the Equator, the climate is warm, with heavy rains during part of the year. Deserts predominate in areas 15°-30° from the Equator, and temperatures range from very hot to very cold. Accumulated rainfall in these areas is less than 10 inches annually, and sometimes no measurable rainfall occurs for years. More than 30° from the Equator, mild, rainy winters and warm, dry summers prevail.

Africa's varied climate has affected vegetation, river conditions, and the incidence of disease; it also has influenced settlement patterns. Africans sought out fertile lands, water, and areas suitable for grazing. Europeans settled near the coasts on the cool eastern and southern plateaus and in the temperate regions of northern and southern Africa. Modern cities, often former centers of colonial administration and trade, usually are located in these areas.

# Sub-Saharan Africa



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative




# History

Anthropological research and excavation in eastern Africa support the theory of the African origin of the human race. Remains of a forerunner of modern Homo sapiens, Australopithecus, and of other creatures with hominoid characteristics, such as Homo erectus and Homo habilis, have been unearthed in various parts of the continent. Some remains may be more than 2.5 million years old. Evidence of the evolution of primitive people throughout the Paleolithic Age (1 million-16,000 years B.C.) has been discovered, including remains of Neanderthal man dating to about 40,000 B.C. Some scholars believe that midway through this age groups of these African peoples migrated to other continents. Traces of humankind's continued development through the Mesolithic, Neolithic, Bronze, and Iron Ages also have been found in several African regions.

Three main physical types evolved in Africa: Negroid, Bushmanoid, and Pygmoid. Of these groups, the Negroid became dominant, learning first to hunt and forage, later to domesticate animals, and finally to plant crops. Between 1000 B.C. and 1000 A.D., a Negroid group (known by the linguistic classification of Niger-Congo and Kordofanian or Nigritic) exerted control over much of southern Africa, with a major subgroup, the Bantu, nearly eliminating the Pygmoid and Bushmanoid people in the process. Caucasoid peoples from the Mediterranean area first migrated to northeast Africa near the end of the Paleolithic period, and subsequent migrations to northeast and northern Africa occurred in the centuries preceding and following Christ. During the 7th to 10th centuries, bedouin Arabs spread Islamic influence across north Africa, while from the 10th to the 18th centuries, other Muslims continued to settle in eastern Africa from the Horn southward to Zimbabwe.

Sophisticated societies developed in early days. The Kush Kingdom (700 B.C.-200 A.D.) formed in the area of present-day Sudan. The Axum Empire, established by 350 A.D., comprised much of modern Ethiopia. For more than 1,000 years, ancient African kingdoms—such as Ghana, Kanem-Bornu, Mali, Songhai, and the Hausa



**Kingdoms and Empires  
1450 B.C. - A.D. 1800**

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states—developed primarily in the savanna lands. The kingdoms of Kongo and Lunda may have been founded as early as the 14th century, while the city-states of the Guinea Coast—Ife, Benin, Yoruba—date at least to the 15th century. These states were highly organized and engaged in long-distance trade in salt, gold, cattle, horses, and ivory.

In the early 15th century, Portuguese explorers began a gradual buildup of African trade relations with Europe and the Americas, leading eventually to Christian missionary contact with Africa. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and Arabs increased their trade with Africa. During this period, Europeans established trading posts and maritime stations on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts but rarely traveled to the interior of the continent. Slaves

became an important commodity, although trade in slaves had existed for centuries. Reliable figures concerning the extent of the slave trade are not available; estimates of the number of people sold into slavery during the 15th-19th centuries range from 10 million to 50 million.

## Colonial Era

Missionaries, traders, and adventurers penetrated the heart of the continent in the 19th century. These were the years of such explorers as Mungo Park, Savorgnan de Brazza, Rene Caille, H.M. Stanley, Sir Richard Burton, and David Livingstone. They were followed, especially after 1880, by government officials engaged in extending colonial domains.

Once the dimensions of Africa's inner geography and resources were known, colonization proceeded rapidly. Although only a small part of the African Continent was under foreign rule before 1880, all but 2 of the present 46 independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa were under European control by 1900. The two exceptions were Liberia, established by freed American slaves in the 1840s, and the ancient Empire of Ethiopia. The remainder of Africa was controlled by France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy. During the next half century, Europeans settled in various areas of the continent, traded, extracted minerals, and established governments reflecting the different policies and institutions of the colonial powers.

### Postindependence Period

Many factors helped to create a climate in which most of the European-ruled colonies in Africa eventually became independent. These included the participation of Africans in World Wars I and II; the growth of African nationalist movements; the Atlantic Charter of 1941 proclaiming the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live; and changing European economic and political concerns with respect to the efficacy and burdens of empire.

The wave of African independence began in 1957. Led by Nkrumah of the Gold Coast (Ghana), Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Sekou Toure of French Guinea (Guinea), a host of sub-Saharan countries in rapid succession broke ties with their colonial rulers. Occasionally, the changeover was accompanied by violence, as in Zaire, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Since 1957, 42 nations have joined the four previously independent countries of Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and South Africa. South Africa became an independent union with Dominion status within the British Commonwealth in 1910, and Sudan separated from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956. Namibia, under de facto South African control, remains the region's only dependent ter-



ritory; efforts are underway to move from violence to negotiation toward Namibian independence.

Africa's political evolution during the past two decades has been tumultuous, with nearly two-thirds of the countries undergoing nonconstitutional changes in government. Although more than half of the nations are led by military leaders or committees, some have now returned to constitutional civilian rule. Despite political trauma in many countries, examples exist of relative tranquility and stable leadership.

Secession attempts have threatened some nations. Eritrea has been seeking independence since 1962, when Ethiopia assumed direct control and terminated Eritrea's federated status. Shaba (formerly Katanga) unsuccessfully attempted to secede from Zaire (Belgian Congo) when it became independent in 1960, and Biafra from Nigeria in 1967.

Cultural and religious differences have led to periodic civil wars in Sudan and Chad. Warfare also has erupted between states. Somalia and Ethiopia have been fighting intermittently over possession of the Ogaden region. Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 to oust the barbaric government of Idi Amin and to retaliate for Ugandan attacks on its territory. Libya forcibly annexed a portion of northern Chad in 1980-81 and pushed further south in 1983, halting only after regional and international pressures were applied. Nigeria and Cameroon also have had tense relations over poorly defined borders.

## People

Africa's estimated population is more than 400 million, 85% of whom live south of the Sahara. If the current growth rate of about 3% continues, the continent's population may reach 800 million by the year 2000—an increasing concern of many African governments.

Because of the vastness of the continent, population density is less than half that of the United States—about 30 persons per square mile. However, people are dispersed unevenly throughout the region. Large expanses of desert and mountains are virtually uninhabited. On the other hand, good climate, fertile land, navigable rivers, safe ports, and demographic movements have created several areas with a population density as high as 500 persons per square mile. Sub-Saharan Africa's most populated areas are:


- The lands bordering the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, particularly Nigeria and the southern parts of Ghana, Benin, and Togo;
- The Nile Valley in northern Sudan;
- The East African highlands, particularly the plateaus of Ethiopia, Kenya, eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; and
- The eastern and southern coasts and interior High Veld of South Africa.

Most Africans still live in small, rural groups. However, opportunities for a better standard of living have led to increased migration to cities, which are confronted with problems of overcrowding, unemployment, and insufficient municipal services. Among cities with more than 1 million inhabitants are: Kinshasa, Zaire; Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria; Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Accra, Ghana.

Tremendous diversity exists among the people of sub-Saharan Africa. This diversity stems from a variety of causes—the infusion of elements from outside the African Continent, migration to new areas in search of better livelihood, rivalries that produced factions and subdivisions, and tendencies to organize into small, close-knit groups for protection and mutual support. Over thousands of years, this process has produced more than 1,000 ethnic divisions.



- A** Small farmer and businessman check crop grown with seeds imported from U.S.
- B** Student at the Regional Training Center for Plant Protection, Cameroon.
- C** Djerma girls in traditional headdress, Niger.
- D** Liberian training officer and secretary in U.S. AID mission.




## Languages

The complexity of African society is graphically demonstrated by the number of languages. Of more than 800 languages, fewer than 10 are spoken by more than 1 million people. Most languages are native to groups of less than 100,000.

Of the numerous linguistic authorities, the classifications of Joseph Greenberg represent a contemporary consensus (see Bibliography). His listing of categories and map on this page show the general geographic location of groups. In the brief text that follows, references in parentheses are alternate names used by George Murdock, another eminent scholar.

The largest language family is the Niger-Congo and Kordofanian (Nigratic), of which the Bantu sublanguage group is the most important. Speakers of this family of languages are descendants of the earliest people on the continent and still occupy much of sub-Saharan Africa. The Afroasiatic (Hamitic)—including Semitic, Berber, and Cushitic-speaking people—stem from the early Caucasoids and live primarily in north and northeast Africa. The Sudanic can be found in a region stretching along the lower Nile and westward through the area known as the Sahel. The Bushmen and Hottentot peoples of southern Africa speak Khoisan or "click" languages. Some languages, such as Swahili and Hausa, serve as *linguae francae* between widely divergent groups, especially in trade.

## African Language Groups



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The approximate distribution of the main native language groups of Africa is shown on the above map. Although the number of different languages is very high (perhaps more than 800), all native languages derive from four basic stocks. These stocks are represented by the shaded and unshaded portions of the map. Key letters indicate divisions of the main stocks and are placed in localities where inter-related languages are spoken. European and European colonial languages, which often serve as a common language between language groups, are not included in this presentation. The dotted line at E shows the area where ancient Egyptian was spoken, but the present language is Arabic. Certain other distributions, too minute to be shown on the map, include complex variations in the Sudanic languages; pockets of Fulani in the Atlantic subgroup of Niger-Congo (L) found as far east as Lake Chad; and Bantu (R) encroachments on the territory of the Click speakers.

© Macmillan Educational Corp. 1974



## Ethnolinguistic Groups

The diversity of ethnic groupings, which reflect original racial strains and often bear names similar to the languages they speak, is illustrated on the map. This map includes a portion of the names of well-known ethnolinguistic or tribal groups. Their inclusion does not necessarily reflect their relative importance, nor is their location on the map definitive.

Scattered throughout the continent are about 5 million people of predominantly European descent, most of them concentrated in southern Africa. There are also nearly 1 million people of Asian (principally Indian or Pakistani) origin in Africa.

## Religion

Religion traditionally has played an important role in African culture. There are many indigenous religions, but most recognize a supreme being who created all things, gave the world its order, and infused it with energy. Many African religions attribute conscious life to nature and natural objects, which has led some scholars to use the term "animist" to refer to traditional African religions. Traditional religions, however, have been slowly giving way to Christianity and Islam as life in the African interior becomes less isolated.

Christianity was spread principally by European missionaries after the 16th century. With the advent of independence, the foreign missionary effort gradually has been replaced by African clergy. Today, some 95 million Christians live in Africa.

Islam swept across North Africa in the 7th century and then expanded southward. The Sahelian countries are predominantly Muslim, as are the northwest coastal areas of sub-Saharan Africa. With 125 million adherents, Islam is Africa's largest religion.

## Ethnolinguistic Groups



This Kongo (Congo) oath-taking figure represented a power figure whose importance derived from the special qualities that the Bakongo assigned to dogs. When activated by the driving in of a nail, the dog figure was presumed to hunt malevolent spirits in the night. The large number of nails it contains is testimony to the confidence of the Bakongo in its force.






D



A



B



C

- A Yoruba mask, Benin.
- B Zulu dancers in Swaziland
- C Silt wooden drum, Central African Republic
- D Yacouba stilt dancer in the Ivory Coast.

## Culture

The cultural richness of Africa is shown in four major forms: art, music, dance, and literature. All uniquely interpret traditional African values: religious beliefs; veneration of the deceased; respect for nature; and the importance of childbearing, the family, and the community and its leaders. The arts express reverence for the past, teach social roles and responsibilities, and encourage the assimilation of traditional beliefs.

Thanks to energetic collectors, from early colonial explorers to modern curators and tourists, sculpture is the best known African art form. Most recent sculptures are of wood, but museums maintain collections from Nigeria of terra-cotta Nok statues from the second and third centuries B.C. as well as ancient Benin and Ife bronzes. Other forms of traditional graphic or plastic arts include rock paintings, decorative metalwork, basketry, and jewelry.

Traditional dances reveal much of African lore and legend, philosophy, and belief. They may celebrate past glories and triumphs, mark contemporary events and rites of passage, or make supplication for a good harvest or the security of the community. Folk dances vary markedly throughout the continent, usually involving group efforts with participants massed in circles or lines.

Drums are most often identified with African music. For thousands of years, however, Africans also have played wind, string, and other percussion instruments, obtaining subtle and complex expressions from relatively simple devices. Although much of the music has served as accompaniment for dancing, soloists and ensembles perform on many other occasions. The rhythmic patterns of African music have influenced music outside the continent, most notably American jazz.

A rich oral tradition has existed in Africa for centuries. Experts estimate that more than 250,000 myths, legends, and folk tales flourish in sub-Saharan Africa. Timbuktu had a written tradition before the 16th century. In the 18th century other literary traditions

developed in Ethiopia and later in languages reflecting Arabic influence, such as Hausa in West Africa and Swahili in the east. In the past 80 years, published works on this subject have included such landmarks as Blaise Cendrars' *Anthology Negre*, Leopold Senghor's "Necritae" poetry, H.I.E. Dhlomo's *Valley of the Thousand Hills*, Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, and Thomas Mofolo's *Chaka*.

## Political Processes

Political institutions and processes vary greatly in sub-Saharan Africa. There are federations, constitutional monarchies, military oligarchies and autocracies, republics with democratic parliaments, unicameral and bicameral houses, fully elected and partly appointed legislatures, and single and multiparty systems. Most governments are strongly authoritarian, either single party or military based.

When independence was achieved, the first order of business was to survive, and survival required the building of authority rather than its limitation as in democratic countries. Authority could not be achieved with a multiparty system. Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania and one of the original group of African independence leaders, rationalized that the single party system is more democratic, "providing it is identified with the nation as a whole," since "the people can have more opportunity to exercise a real choice than where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community." Party loyalties and discipline, he maintained, limited freedom of expression and of choice. Unfortunately, "democratic" single party systems largely failed to create the authority necessary to govern. As a result, most became, in fact, no-party, authoritarian regimes.

The various forms of government in the subcontinent also reflect the heritage of colonial administrative and political institutions as well as indigenous historical and social backgrounds. Ethiopia's former constitutional monarchy, for example, was deeply rooted in the country's centuries-old royal history. Nigeria's attempt at American-style federalism, on the other hand, represented

an effort to maintain unity in one of Africa's largest states by accommodating its ethnic, cultural, and historical differences in a decentralized system. Africa's ethnolinguistic groupings were characterized by strongly developed traditional structures, which often crossed political boundaries superimposed by colonial powers with little or no regard for linguistic or cultural similarities. Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional ethnic loyalties remain strong and have impeded the development of national consciousness. Opposition often has been based on ethnolinguistic and regional special interests.

African states probably will continue to experience change in governmental form and process as they experiment with ways to organize political power effectively and to devise a durable basis for citizen participation in the political system.

## Economy

Africa's natural wealth is vast but unevenly distributed. The continent is a major exporter of minerals—such as diamonds, cobalt, gold, and petroleum—and of agricultural commodities—such as coffee, cocoa, and tea. Some countries—Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa—have large mineral reserves. Yet other countries, such as those in the Sahel region, lack access to the coasts as well as natural resources. These contrasting circumstances have been accentuated by varied colonial and cultural heritages and postindependence theories of economic development.

Despite its natural wealth, Africa as a whole faces an unprecedented economic crisis. Falling per capita food production, severe drought, world recession, mounting debt burdens, and mistaken government policies have seriously affected development prospects. Widespread famine has accompanied the current drought; some 36 countries recently have been affected by abnormal food shortage. Untold



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thousands of Africans have perished, and an estimated 30 million urgently require food, medical care, and shelter if they are to survive. Even before the drought, more than 20% of Africa's population consumed less than the minimum number of calories needed to sustain good health. Child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa is double the rate of all developing countries.

### **Famine and the Decline in Agricultural Productivity**

Although little can be done to eliminate drought, which occurs periodically in Africa, much can be done to avoid famine. Drought has been transformed into famine by high population growth rates and the decline in farm output. Famine, in turn, has been aggravated by mistaken national policies and armed conflict.

Africa is the only region in the world in which per capita food produc-

tion has fallen during the past two decades. African dependence on outside food sources is growing at an alarming pace, and commercial imports of grain have risen at an annual rate of 9% over the past 20 years. Africa normally imports more than 10 million tons of cereals, excluding current emergency needs; if trends continue, this deficit will increase markedly. Per capita gross domestic product declined by 3%-4% per year from 1981 to 1983—attributable largely to the decline in agriculture, the primary component of most African economies.

Africa has serious agricultural constraints—insufficient rainfall, fragile soils, a variety of microclimates, high soil temperatures, extreme seasonability, and unique insect pests. Farmers have been shortening the fallow periods for their fields, which has led to decreased yields and increased soil erosion. Overuse of forests for firewood and intensive grazing also have contributed


to erosion. High population growth rates have stretched most African nations to the production limits of their traditional agricultures.

Nonetheless, Africa does have the potential to produce sufficient food for its increasing population and thereby reduce its vulnerability to future droughts. This potential depends greatly upon the ability of African governments to implement effective national policies that support small farmers and encourage the use of modern technology.

### **Debt Problems**

During the 1960s, African governments benefited from high commodity prices and generous foreign aid. Government revenue was supplemented by borrowing from private commercial banks. With the onset of world recession in the 1970s, however, the prices of African commodities plummeted while the cost of imports remained high. Drought and

Drought victims in Ethiopia.



declining agricultural productivity led to increasing commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.

As African economies declined, their governments turned increasingly to borrowing. From 1972 to 1982, medium- and long-term debt increased by an annual average rate of 22%. Debt service ratios (the relationship between debt payments due and exports of goods and services) worsened as well, with ratios of from 30% to 80% or more prevailing in some countries. Most African nations now have major debt problems. In the international forums where public and private debts are rescheduled, the majority of 1984 reschedulings were for African countries.

### Inefficient Government Policies

Africa's economic problems are closely linked to the inefficient use of its resources. Two decades after independence, African leaders are confronted with difficult choices and overwhelming economic obstacles that would try the patience and administrative capacity of more experienced governments elsewhere in the world. These leaders often discourage farm production by adopting politically expedient tax and pricing policies that have favored politically influential urban populations and have disadvantaged farmers, whose output has declined accordingly. They have created large bureaucracies, ignored the private sector, promoted state-run industries that do not produce or produce only at very high cost, maintained overvalued currencies that discourage exports and lead to balance-of-payments crises, and allowed physical infrastructure to deteriorate.

Increasingly, however, African governments are recognizing errors in past policies, and changes are occurring throughout the continent. In the last several years, attitudes have shifted dramatically on such issues as exchange rates, on measures to rehabilitate infrastructure and export industries, on reducing government regulation and bureaucracy, and on assuring that farmers are rewarded through pricing and marketing reform.

Aid donor countries and international institutions are beginning to realize that some of their practices also

have contributed unwittingly to inefficient use of resources. However well intentioned, donors have insisted on imposing their own requirements on recipients that have caused administrative problems and strained the absorptive capacity of African nations—for example, 50 donors have contributed to 188 projects in Malawi, 61 donors to 321 projects in Lesotho, and 69 donors to 614 projects in Zambia. Furthermore, aid donors sometimes have subsidized inefficient state enterprises and supported the creation of elaborate government projects that could not be maintained without continued foreign assistance. Nonetheless, foreign assistance has accomplished much in Africa. Notably, several major diseases have been eradicated, and physical infrastructure has been created to market crops and minerals. Foreign donors also helped to establish the first universities and technical training centers on the continent.



E



D



C



A



B

- A** Traditional farming in Nigeria.
- B** Grain storage in Niger
- C** Many Africans, particularly in rural areas, lack access to safe water. In Burkina AID has helped provide improved water systems to replace open wells that are easily contaminated and spread disease.
- D** AID-supported project for dry-land rice cultivation in Senegal
- E** African researcher on AID-supported project for dry-land farming in Cameroon

## Multilateral Organizations

**United Nations.** Sub-Saharan African nations play an important role in international and regional organizations. They regard the United Nations as the major forum for presenting their views and as a useful arena for advancing foreign policy objectives. Because each country, large or small, has one vote in the UN General Assembly, and because all 46 independent sub-Saharan states are UN members, Africa represents nearly one-third of the Assembly's 159 votes. When taking a common stance, African states thus can have significant, sometimes crucial, influence on many issues in the Assembly and other UN bodies. The African members have been particularly concerned about issues involving colonialism, North-South economic issues, dependent peoples, and human rights. Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have been prime movers in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions dealing with southern African problems. Occasionally, however, many have been reluctant to take controversial positions involving other African states, preferring to deal with such issues within the OAU or in other African forums.

Just as African nations participate actively in the General Assembly and Security Council, UN specialized agencies and other organizations have been deeply involved in Africa. Among these are the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Health Organization (WHO); the International Labor Organization (ILO); the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these bodies participate in the UN Development Program (UNDP), which allocates a major portion of its resources to sub-Saharan Africa.

**Organization of African Unity.** The Organization of African Unity is the most prominent and encompassing organization on the African Continent. Founded in May 1963, it includes all independent African states except the Republic of South Africa and Morocco. South Africa never belonged to the organization, and Morocco withdrew in 1985 because of the admission of the Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic (Polisario). Headquartered in Addis Ababa, the OAU has both political and economic responsibilities. The organization has no enforcement powers over its members and OAU resolutions are advisory rather than binding, although individual OAU member states historically have been reluctant in other international forums to depart from OAU positions adopted by resolution. An important OAU function is to obtain an African consensus on questions of interest at the United Nations, where the OAU maintains a permanent office.


The preamble of the OAU Charter reaffirms the principles of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also pledges to support the aspirations of the African peoples and to foster African political and economic development. Signatories

agree to coordinate and harmonize their general policies in order to promote African progress and unity, to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and to eradicate colonialism from Africa. Signatories agree to adhere to the principles of non-interference in one another's affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the condemnation of political assassination or subversive activity against neighboring states, respect for existing boundaries, the liberation of remaining dependent areas, and nonalignment with respect to non-African blocs.

The work of the OAU is carried on through four principal institutions—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Specialized and ad hoc commissions deal with a variety of activities of common interest and attempt to instill a spirit of cooperation among member states.

Annual OAU summits endeavor to deal with current crises, often involving African interstate relations. Debates sometimes avoid confrontation on the tough issues and differences that divide nations, but they can be acrimonious. The OAU has attempted to limit external intervention in African problems and to assist in such issues as the use of mercenaries in Zaire, the Biafran rebellion, disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Algeria and Morocco, the transition to independence in Angola, the status of the Western Sahara, self-determination issues in southern Africa, and human rights. In 1981 the OAU established its first joint military force to help keep peace during the civil war in Chad. Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire contributed troops to the peacekeeping force during its 6 months in Chad.

A 1982 executive decision by the OAU Secretary General to seat the Polisario—a self-styled liberation movement fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara—was strongly opposed by Morocco and many African states. However, because the organization was increasingly paralyzed due to the controversy over this one issue, the Polisario finally was allowed to take its seat at the November 1984 OAU summit. Morocco withdrew from the OAU as a result.



**Economic Commission for Africa.** The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a UN regional body in which all independent African states, except South Africa, are represented, was established in 1958 for the promotion and planning of African economic and social development through cooperative and regional action. The ECA performs extensive research and served as a catalyst in the creation of the African Development Institute and the African Development Bank. It maintains and endeavors to strengthen economic ties with other countries of the world. The headquarters of the ECA Secretariat is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

**African Development Bank and Fund.** The purpose of the African Development Bank and Fund, headquartered in Abidjan, is to contribute to its members' economic and social development. The Bank and Fund finance investment projects and development programs. After the Bank opened membership to nonregional countries, the United States joined in 1983, becoming the largest nonregional donor, with an annual commitment of \$18 million in paid-in capital and \$54 million in callable capital. It has increased its contribution to the Fund, the Bank's soft loan window, by \$50-\$75 million annually. The

United States remains the largest donor, providing 15.4% of the total Fund replenishment.

**Lome Convention.** The Lome III Convention was signed in Lome, Togo, in December 1984; it continues the special economic relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 67 nations of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. The new convention replaces Lome II, which expired in February 1985. Lome I was signed in 1975. The 5-year accord provides ACP countries with trade preferences, industrial cooperation, and \$6.3 billion in economic assistance, including the STABEX program, which helps to maintain stable export earnings for certain ACP commodities. Although similar to its predecessor conventions, Lome III adds provisions on private investment, fisheries, cultural coordination, and refugee aid.

**ACP Group.** The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States was convened originally to negotiate the Lome Convention with the EEC. Founded as a permanent organization in July 1975, the ACP Group aims to represent its members' views concerning the Lome Convention. It also tries to develop closer trade, economic, and cultural relations among ACP states and to promote effective interregional cooperation. ACP headquarters is in Brussels.

**Economic Community of West African States.** The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 16 members, including

nearly all the Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries of the West African region from Mauritania to Nigeria. Its objective is to create a common market in which internal trade barriers will be eliminated. The Community promotes free movement of people, services, and capital; harmonization of agricultural policies; joint development of economic and industrial policies; and elimination of disparities in levels of development. Community headquarters is in Lagos, Nigeria.

**Inter-African Coffee Organization.** The Inter-African Coffee Organization (ICAO) was founded in 1960 and now has 15 members. Its objective is to adopt a unified policy on coffee marketing. The organization facilitates contacts among member countries, coffee buyers, and the International Coffee Organization. It is headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

**West African Rice Development Association.** The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) has 14 members. Its purpose is to work cooperatively in the research, growing, and marketing of rice. It lobbies for increased quotas on the world market. WARDA's headquarters is located in Monrovia, Liberia.





FURNISH THE PEOPLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NOT TO BE SOLD OR  
NET 50 POUNDS

USE NO HOOKS

NO FABRIC

NO. 1

## U.S. Relations With Sub-Saharan Africa

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Although Portuguese, French, Dutch, British, Belgian, and German involvement in Africa preceded that of the United States and exceeded it in scope, U.S. relations with Africa, influenced by our status as a former colony and our absence from the ranks of colonial powers, have long been affected by humanitarian considerations and cultural links. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, following participation in the slave trade, the United States began slowly and more positively to increase its involvement through the activities of missionaries, explorers, and commercial companies. World War II changed American perceptions and shifted U.S. priorities and policies. Africa, the "sleeping giant," was beginning to awaken, bringing the realization that the United States and the rest of the world would soon have to consider its political and economic potential.

Having played a major role in drafting provisions of the UN Charter, which provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism, the United States welcomed African independence. Since then, the United States has actively

cooperated to promote economic development through bilateral and multilateral programs and in supporting enhanced regional security.

Africa is increasingly important to U.S. national interests.

- Africa is a significant factor in multilateral politics. With its bloc of 46 nations (51 with North Africa), Africa can play an important, often decisive, role in international organizations and multilateral meetings.
- The region possesses important natural resources—oil, copper, iron, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, chromium, platinum, manganese, gold, and diamonds.
- Africa offers a growing field for trade and economic cooperation with the United States. The United States needs to buy African raw materials; Africa requires capital investment, new technology, managerial skills, and markets to develop other products.
- The continent is strategically located. Many countries have deep-water ports, good airfields, and controlling positions in relation to major waterways and air corridors. The oil tanker routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Americas pass through African waters. Thus, strategic cooperation with several African states is important to the exercise of U.S. global responsibilities.
- Continuing regional conflicts make sub-Saharan Africa a potential arena for rivalry and confrontation between external powers.
- North-South issues—raised by less developed African and other Third World countries concerned with economic disadvantages—could increase hostility and resentment toward the industrialized democracies; African economic stagnation could lead to greater instability and outside manipulation.
- Africa assumes particular significance for Americans of African descent who are deeply concerned about the continent's problems.

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Facing page

U S food aid, Ethiopia.



# Elements of U.S. Policy

Elements of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa have shifted from time to time, depending on the outlook of various administrations, changing congressional attitudes, and circumstances on the continent itself. However, in the past two decades a broad outline of U.S. policy has emerged that contains the following components.

**Maintenance of Mutually Satisfactory Bilateral Political Relations.** U.S. interests are compatible with African aspirations, and the United States has made major contributions to African development and stability. A principal U.S. objective in Africa is to maintain a


climate of understanding and cooperation while encouraging restraint on the part of outside powers so that African states can devise their own solutions and maintain their independence. An important goal is to develop more constructive relations with those few African countries with which the United States has significant problems.

**Opposition to Soviet-bloc Adventurism.** The United States has tried to keep Africa from becoming an area of East-West strategic competition and conflict. The Soviets have not been similarly restrained, however. Soviet military advisers and Soviet-supported Cuban troops decisively influenced the outcome of the internal contest for power in Angola. More than 37,000 Cuban soldiers remain in Angola and Ethiopia. This situation generates ap-

prehensions in neighboring countries and contributes to a deterioration of regional stability. Libya, with great quantities of Soviet arms, has supported subversion in many African countries and now occupies part of Chad.

**Security Cooperation.** Although most African states would prefer to avoid involvement in global political and security issues, it is all but impossible for them to do so when their own security is affected. Thus it is in the interest of the United States and several African countries to cooperate in helping to ensure regional security. This cooperation may involve U.S. access to African strategic facilities, such as ports and airfields, to help maintain the free flow of oil and other vital goods through the nearby sea routes. It also may include U.S. military assistance, both materiel and training, to African forces.

## U.S.-Soviet Military Balance



Such assistance remains, nevertheless, a small fraction of our total assistance, which is chiefly economic.


**U.S. Support for Civil and Human Rights Throughout Africa.** The U.S. Government supports the establishment, maintenance, and extension of full civil and human rights and the rule of law for all peoples throughout the African Continent. The United States has taken the lead in working for a negotiated settlement for independence in Namibia and is encouraging the progressive dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa. The United States has adopted specific measures against governments responsible for violations of their own citizens' human rights, for example, Uganda, South Africa, the Central African Republic, and Equatorial Guinea. For the most part, however, the United States promotes human rights through private diplomacy, which usually achieves the most direct benefits for the people affected.



President Reagan with President Masire of Botswana.

**Resolution of African Conflicts.** Conflicts between or within Africa offer undesirable opportunities for foreign interference that may imperil regional stability and destroy the climate of confidence necessary for economic development and international cooperation. Thus it is in the interest of the United States and African nations to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

**Economic Cooperation.** U.S. policy maintains a twofold approach to the economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States provides emergency humanitarian aid to those in urgent need, whether victims of the widespread drought or of violent conflict. To promote long-term development, the U.S. Government seeks to encourage efficient African economic policies and to establish programs—for example, in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education—that provide the basis for sound economic growth. It also works to expand African and U.S. private-sector economic activities.



Vice President Bush with Kenyan President Arap Moi

## Policy Issues

The results of sub-Saharan Africa's first 20 years of independence have been mixed. Some of the former colonies have remained politically stable and have enjoyed economic growth rates above the global average. Among these are Kenya, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Botswana, and Cameroon. Others have experienced coups d'état resulting in extended periods of military rule. Most African economies, however, have stagnated or declined, with growth rates now far behind the figures for population increase. Long civil wars and insurgencies have plagued some countries (Ethiopia, Chad) and others (Angola and Mozambique) still suffer from the traumatic passage to independence. Many nations have been devastated by natural catastrophes such as the widespread drought. All African nations—even the oil producers—still face a doubtful economic future caused not only by their own misguided policies but also by global inflation and uncertain oil and primary commodity markets. Clearly, the feeling of euphoria that seized Africans upon independence is past. Chastened by experience, sub-Saharan Africa today faces the future sobered by a realization that independence is only one step toward national well-being.

Throughout this turbulent era, the United States, like the African nations themselves, has been learning the realities of the region. Since African independence, the American Government has sought to offer access to scientific, technological, and educational experience and has helped to provide the financial assistance necessary to fund development programs. Although the United States had relatively little experience in Africa before the 1960s, the record of American policy has been largely positive. Africa as a whole has not fallen prey to communism, as some once feared it might. Soviet gains on the continent generally have proved to be transitory, and Soviet opportunities have depended on local turmoil generating a demand for Soviet arms.

Development and stability normally are the first priorities of every African state. African governments are well aware that expanded trade opportunities and development capital, public or private, will come only from the West. Africa has welcomed U.S. assistance, and the majority of African governments have confidence in the good will and intentions of the United States.

Politically, African nations generally have not adopted the Western multiparty democratic model. Only a minority meet U.S. criteria for democracy, and many do not respect the human rights of their citizenry to the degree that most Americans would find desirable. Yet African countries have not followed the Soviet example, despite the Marxist rhetoric of several states. Most are humane but authoritarian or one-party regimes seeking to devise their own formulas for nation-building and development.

Because African nations acutely feel their poverty and disadvantages in the global economy, they differ from the United States on many international economic issues. They also desire greater U.S. participation in commodity support agreements, whereas the United States believes that the free market usually should determine prices and influence supply and demand.

The United States has had a wide range of policy concerns regarding Africa. The following are the principal U.S. policy issues.

### The Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is strategically located with respect to the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region. This northeastern tip, or "Horn," is comprised of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Key neighboring states are Kenya on the south and Sudan on the west. The area's importance has increased as the United States strengthens its ability to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean in the wake of instability in the Middle East. The political-military situation in the Horn is complicated by internal and regional conflicts, instabilities, and tangled external alliances. Somali irredentist claims to neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis led to an undeclared Somali-Kenyan war in the late 1960s and then to a Somali invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region in

1977-78. This invasion was repulsed after massive infusions of Soviet aid and Cuban troops to Ethiopia. In return for their help, the Soviets have acquired naval and air facilities in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government also continues to rely primarily on military force to resolve long-festering internal unrest in other regions of the country, particularly in the northern province of Eritrea.

A large Soviet-bloc presence, including Soviet advisers and some 7,000 Cuban combat troops, remains in Ethiopia. With large shipments of Soviet arms and a major expansion of its military forces, Ethiopia now has the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa. A tripartite pact concluded between Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen in August 1981 has been followed by terrorist and guerrilla attacks against Sudan and Somalia. In June 1982, Ethiopian regular troops, supporting a small number of Somali dissidents trained and armed in Ethiopia, attacked several points along the disputed Somali-Ethiopian border. Similar attacks against Somalia have occurred since then. At the end of 1985, Ethiopian forces continued to occupy two small areas of Somali territory. Ethiopia also has provided training safehavens and supplies for Sudanese rebels fighting in southern Sudan.

Over the past year the Horn has been devastated by serious drought and famine. More than 7 million people are affected by this disaster in Ethiopia alone. Many of them seek refuge in neighboring countries, particularly Sudan. The international community has responded generously to emergency needs in the region. The American public, through private contributions, has sent relief groups millions of dollars for food, medicine, and shelter. A major portion of the U.S. Government's aid to Africa is being sent to countries in the Horn, making the United States the largest single donor in the region.

The U.S. presence is not directed against any state in the region, nor do we wish to see any of these states forced to allocate additional resources to military purposes when the economic needs of their peoples are so great. However, African security is not served



Eritrean rebels.

if Soviet arms, Cuban forces, and Libyan money are combined to destabilize legitimate governments in the Horn. The United States will respond to such threats against friends and legitimate U.S. interests in the region, as illustrated by emergency arms shipments to Somalia at the time of the Ethiopian incursions. At the same time, the U.S. Government works cooperatively for political resolution of the underlying tensions that have long troubled this region and for the improvement of the economic conditions and welfare of all its people.

The United States is pursuing specific policies to advance its overall objectives in the region.

- We provide substantial assistance to the states of the region (more than \$300 million in economic assistance and more than \$100 million in security assistance in FY 1985); emergency food assistance in FY 1985 exceeded \$400 million.
- We have actively engaged with other major bilateral donor states and with the international financial institutions to promote more comprehensive programs to meet the economic problems facing Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya.
- We work diplomatically to encourage better relations among those countries in the region, such as Kenya and Somalia, with which we have close ties.
- We have made clear that we would welcome signs from Ethiopia that it, too, seeks a better structure of relationships in the region and an end to confrontational policies. We are the largest single donor to Ethiopian famine relief.
- We fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all regional states. We support the OAU position on the acceptance of postcolonial borders in Africa, as well as efforts to negotiate resolutions to specific regional conflicts.

#### Chad

A large, landlocked country in the center of Africa, Chad has often suffered from internal conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences—with factional leaders using private armies to compete for power—and, more recently, from Libyan aggression. Chad's long civil war began in 1965—just 5 years after its independence from France—with an uprising of northerners against the southern-led government. With the help of France, President Tombalbaye initially was able to repress the insurgency, but eventually the rebels gathered force. Gen. Felix Malloum, a southerner, led a successful coup d'etat in 1975; his government was broadened

to include northerners in 1978. The northern Prime Minister, Hisssein Habre, attempted a coup in February 1979 that led to fighting among 11 factions.

At this point, the civil war had become so intense that no effective government existed and external observers were obliged to intervene. A series of four international conferences, held first under Nigerian and then under OAU sponsorship, attempted to bring the 11 factions together. At the fourth conference, held in Lagos in August 1979, the Lagos accord was signed establishing a transitional government pending national elections. In November 1979, the National Union Transition Government (GUNT) was created with a mandate to govern for 18 months. Goukouni Oueddei, a northerner, was named President; Abdelkader Kamougue, a southerner, Vice President; and Hisssein Habre, Defense Minister.

This coalition proved fragile; in March 1980 renewed fighting broke out between Goukouni's and Habre's forces. The war dragged on inconclusively until Goukouni obtained the intervention of Libya, which sent more than 7,000 troops to Chad and defeated Habre's forces. These Libyan troops then became an occupation force in Chad. In October 1981, Goukouni responded to regional and international concern over Libya's announced goal of unification with Chad and requested the complete withdrawal of Libyan troops. They pulled back to the contested Aozou Strip in northern Chad, which the Libyans have occupied since 1973, and were replaced by a 3,500-man OAU peacekeeping force from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire. The United States gave strong diplomatic backing to the creation of this force and authorized \$12 million for its support.

A special summit of the OAU Chad committee in February 1982 called for a process of reconciliation among all the factions, particularly Goukouni and Habre, who had resumed military activities in eastern Chad. Although Habre agreed to participate, Goukouni refused to negotiate. Defying the OAU February 1982 cease-fire, Goukouni ordered GUNT coalition forces to attack Habre. Habre's troops seized the Chadian capital on June 7, 1982. The OAU force remained neutral during the conflict. Habre then asked the peacekeep-



ing force to stay in Chad to oversee the reconciliation process, but the force withdrew when its OAU mandate expired on June 30. Habre established a government emphasizing reconciliation and including representatives of all major Chadian ethnic and regional groups. Goukouni, former President and Vice President Kamougue, and a number of other factional leaders fled the country. In late 1982 they formed a Libyan-supported "government-in-exile" in the Aozou Strip to overthrow the Habre government.

In mid-1983, Libyan-supported rebels launched an offensive against President Habre. They were later supported by Libyan ground and air forces that forced Chadian Government troops to withdraw from Faya Largeau and other northern oases. The military situation stabilized following the introduction of French and Zairian forces. In September 1984, France and Libya announced their agreement to a mutual withdrawal of forces from Chad. All French troops were withdrawn by mid-November, but a substantial number of Libyans remained.

The United States is seriously concerned by the continued Libyan military occupation of northern Chad, which threatens destabilization not only in Chad but also in the entire region. The United States and the majority of the international community—including the United Nations, OAU, and Nonaligned Movement—recognize President Habre's government. In response to a Chadian Government request in mid-1983, President Reagan authorized emergency military assistance amounting to \$25 million.

Under Habre's leadership, Chad has achieved a significant measure of unity and purpose despite Libyan aggression. The United States enjoys close ties with the Government of Chad, and we support peaceful efforts aimed at restoring the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. U.S. policy supplements the lead role assumed by France in assisting the Government of Chad to thwart Libyan aggression and to pursue reconstruction and internal political reconciliation. In FY 1985, the U.S. Government provided substantial amounts of emergency food as well as economic and rehabilitation grant aid to Chad totaling about \$55 million.

### **Southern Africa**

The countries of southern Africa—comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique—are closely interrelated through political, socioeconomic, and cultural ties. It is a region of great mineral wealth, containing several critical resources, and occupies a strategic position along the West's oil supply route. Unfortunately, it has become one of the continent's major areas of political crisis, a region characterized by confrontation, destabilization, and armed strife.

One issue that motivated and united many sub-Saharan countries in their quest for independence still exists in southern Africa: domination by a white minority. For black Africans, colonial and racial issues are critical, while many whites in southern Africa believe their position and even their very survival are threatened. In consequence, conflicts in southern Africa have been particularly bitter—the wars to end colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique, the struggle for independence and the end of white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and continuing efforts to end South Africa's apartheid system and its control over Namibia.

An atmosphere of polarization envelops the region, providing fertile ground for exploitation by the Soviet bloc. The activity of communist countries consists principally of supplying war materiel, troops, and military support personnel, which only exacerbates the situation. Capital, technology, investment, and trade—rather than military assistance—are the paramount needs of these countries, and they must look primarily to the West for this assistance.

African attention now focuses on two principal issues: terminating South Africa's system of apartheid and achieving independence for Namibia on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 435. Efforts in Namibia by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) to achieve these goals by armed struggle, including cross-border guerrilla attacks,

have produced violent retaliatory responses from the South African Government. U.S. policy aims to end this cycle of violence, which contributes to instability throughout the region and decreases South Africa's willingness to negotiate.

**U.S. Policy.** Through frank dialogue and quiet diplomacy with all parties, the Reagan Administration has sought to develop an overall framework for regional security, to bring about the withdrawal of foreign troops from the region, to gain Namibian independence, to hasten positive change in South Africa, and to create an environment in which economic development can flourish. Our policy encourages the active involvement of the U.S. Government and private citizens or groups with all contending parties in the region. Although the U.S. Government does not regard the situation in southern Africa as satisfactory, the reality is that we can play a substantive role in encouraging peaceful evolution only if we are involved in regional diplomacy and support positive change in South Africa.

This is a role for which the United States is uniquely suited. As leader of the free world, the United States has global interests that require it to be vitally concerned about peace and stability in southern Africa. As a society that has moved with justice and humanity to resolve its own racial problems, the United States has earned the confidence of many black African countries. Thus, the United States aims to help to build bridges of comprehension and confidence between the races in southern Africa that will enable the region to avoid chaos and maintain stability while the inevitable process of evolution takes place.

**South Africa.** The United States has maintained official relations with South Africa since the establishment of a consulate in Cape Town in 1799. The many ties between the two countries include a shared language and cultural heritage, military cooperation embracing two World Wars and Korea, and important trade and investment relations. Since 1948, however, when the Government of South Africa officially adopted its policy of apartheid, which legally separated the various racial groups, relations with the United States have been troubled.



**A** Durban, South Africa, an industrial center, seaport, and resort

**B** Funeral demonstration, South Africa



Apartheid is incompatible with American values and has become increasingly intolerable as our international human rights policy has evolved. President Reagan has called apartheid repugnant, and Vice President Bush said in 1982: "Apartheid is wrong. It is legally entrenched racism—inimical to the fundamental ideals of the United States." Apartheid also is politically disastrous, since it fosters economic, military, and political instability both within South Africa and throughout the region. For both moral and practical political reasons, therefore, several U.S. administrations have sought to move the South African Government away from apartheid and toward a system of government based on participation and consent of all the governed. However, although U.S. policy objectives have remained fundamentally the same, the methods for achieving them have differed.

The Reagan Administration inherited a relationship with South Africa that was at its lowest point in recent history. It was characterized by official hostility on both sides, confrontational rhetoric often appearing in public print, and severely strained diplomatic relations. More important, a total stalemate existed on the key issues of a settle-

ment in Namibia and peaceful evolution away from apartheid in South Africa. By contrast, the current policy has worked to reestablish and maintain a relationship with South Africa that will allow effective bilateral communication and thereby enhance U.S. ability to influence South African policies and actions.

The principal issues plaguing southern Africa—apartheid, Namibia, regional security, and economic development—are closely related, and progress, or the lack of it, on one issue affects progress on the others. South Africa is the strongest power in the region, and its cooperation with other southern African nations is essential for

progress on any issue. Without such cooperation, the elements within South Africa favoring a more militant policy are strengthened; the climate in South Africa for positive change or for cooperation in economic development worsens in the face of cross-border guerrilla attacks or increased violence in Namibia. At the same time, South Africa's neighbors are less able and willing to participate in constructive regional diplomacy when that government pursues an aggressive regional policy and when hopes fade for sustained reform away from apartheid.

To achieve lasting peace and economic development, the nations of the region must evolve ground rules for cooperation and coexistence. The United States serves as an important catalyst to bring the contending parties together and to reverse the deteriorating regional security situation. Progress has been achieved. We helped to arrange the February 1984 Lusaka accord under which South Africa agreed to withdraw its forces from Angola and the two nations established a Joint South African-Angolan Monitoring Commission to oversee the withdrawal. We also helped South Africa and Mozambique to negotiate the March 1984 nonaggression pact at Nkomati—further evidence of the increased willingness of various parties to resolve their differences through negotiation and to move away from the concept of armed struggle and destabilization.

The many restrictions on trade, travel, and financial assistance and on military, scientific, and nuclear cooperation demonstrate that the United States does not have a normal diplomatic relationship with South Africa. The United States maintains an arms embargo and enforces other restrictions on the sale of equipment to South Africa's military, police, and other agencies enforcing apartheid. However, we believe that progress in obtaining South African cooperation to solve the problems in southern Africa cannot be achieved by further punitive economic actions; these tactics have proved unsuccessful and even counterproductive in the past.

We believe that South African and U.S. interests are best served by encouraging sustained movement away from apartheid. The reforms underway in South Africa in recent years represent a beginning, but the most fundamental aspects of apartheid have not been addressed. We are concentrating on positive steps to support constructive change and those who work for it. With the cooperation of Congress, we have spent more than \$10 million in FY 1985 to bring black South Africans to the United States for study; to train black trade unionists; to support the development and growth of small businesses in the black communities; and to support black education within South Africa. In addition, \$1.5 million during a 2-year

period has been allocated for specific human rights projects. These efforts supplement those of the U.S. business community, which, during the past 8 years, has spent more than \$130 million on similar programs to assist the black majority. More than 70% of all black South African employees of U.S.-affiliated private companies in the country are covered by the Sullivan code of fair employment practices.

The United States has been encouraged by some recent evidence of movement away from apartheid in South Africa, including abolition of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts; an end to the Political Interference Act, which prohibited racially integrated political parties; legalization of black labor unions; granting urban residency rights to more blacks; and increasing government spending for black education. In particular, we believe that the vote on November 2, 1983, on the new constitution—in which the white electorate indicated its support of change by a 2-1 margin—demonstrates the readiness of whites to move away from the discredited policy of apartheid. Although the new constitution is basically flawed because it grants only limited political rights to the country's colored and Asian populations and none to the black majority, we believe the vote itself indicates hope for future progress.

Unfortunately, as in the past, these encouraging signs have been accompanied by negative actions by the South African Government, such as the detention of opposition leaders on the eve of the August 1984 elections for the new tripartite Parliament and overreactions to black protests by police resulting in needless deaths, widespread detention, and actions against labor leaders.

Violence in South Africa's townships has been at a high level since the new constitution was inaugurated in 1984. Adding to black unrest have been school boycotts by students protesting inferior education; a nationwide recession, with skyrocketing black unemployment and galloping inflation; imposition of increased rents for black housing by township councils; and killings, ban-

nings, police brutality, and the detention of black leaders, some of whom were later charged with treason. In July 1985, the South African Government declared a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts to stem this violence. It subsequently announced its willingness to consider changes in laws covering influx control, the pass laws, and citizenship for blacks. If enacted, these reforms would constitute major changes away from apartheid and would continue the liberalization process. However, the government has yet to clarify its intentions or take concrete actions.

Even with these changes, major grievances would remain. There have been official hints and "trial balloons," but no significant change has occurred in the "homelands" policy under which blacks are deprived of South African citizenship and relegated to impoverished "homeland" enclaves that have little, if any, potential for independent economic or political viability. It is also unclear whether the central issue—political rights for blacks—will be resolved to the satisfaction of the government and its opponents. Although the government has indicated its willingness to negotiate this issue, many black leaders are skeptical about its sincerity.

As the pace of change increases, so do expectations for further modification, as well as resistance from substantial elements of the white minority. We believe in encouraging the reforms now underway and concentrating on positive steps that back constructive change and those working to achieve it. In doing this, one must keep in mind that the influence of outside powers on the course of events in South Africa is limited; however, it does exist and, when used judiciously, can be successful.

To indicate America's displeasure with the continued high level of violence and the slow pace of reform in South Africa, President Reagan announced in September 1985 further restrictions on U.S. ties with the South African Government. This followed nearly 5 years of consistent, forceful criticism by the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State of South Africa's human rights record and growing demands in the United States from Congress and the American public for stronger measures to bring about change in South Africa. The President carefully tailored his actions to avoid



punitive measures that would disrupt the country's economy and hurt those South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid and instead focused his actions on the apparatus that enforces apartheid.

The new measures—very similar to those in proposed congressional legislation that had been approved by the House of Representatives, except that they did not contain a ban on new investment—included expanded restrictions on nuclear and computer sales and on bank loans to the South African Government, a ban on arms imports from South Africa, a ban on importing Krugerrands, and a requirement that U.S. firms doing business in South Africa adhere to certain fair labor standards based on the Sullivan principles or forfeit marketing assistance from the U.S. Government anywhere in the world. The new measures also provided for more official U.S. assistance to black education, black entrepreneurs, black trade unions, and human rights and legal assistance programs.

**Namibia.** Following World War I, South Africa was given a League of Nations mandate to administer the former German colony of South West Africa (Namibia) until it was ready for independence. After World War II, South Africa, which had treated Namibia as an integral part of its national territory, refused to place it under a UN trusteeship and continued to administer it under South African law, including the apartheid system. In 1966 the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate, and in 1971 the International Court of Justice stated that South Africa was obligated to terminate immediately its administration of Namibia.

Confronted with a growing insurgency by the South West Africa People's Organization and worldwide disapproval of its refusal to abide by the Court's ruling, South Africa sought to establish an ethnically based structure of self-government in Namibia. In reality, South Africa retained control of the country, and African states and the international community rejected the arrangement as a basis for Namibian independence. In 1977 five Western members of the UN Security Council (the Contact Group—Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,

the United Kingdom, and the United States) began an effort to negotiate a solution to the potentially explosive polarization of the region and thereby reduce the possibility for outside exploitation. This Western Contact Group formulated a plan approved in 1978 as UN Security Council Resolution 435 that was provisionally accepted by South Africa, SWAPO, and Namibia's black African neighbors—the front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Under the UN plan, a UN Transitional Assistance Group with civilian and military components would be established in Namibia during the transitional period leading to independence. South African troops would be restricted to base and gradually withdrawn. A constituent assembly would be elected to develop a constitution. Following the election, South African

military withdrawal would be completed. After the conclusion of the constituent assembly, independence would be proclaimed.

Although South Africa initially agreed to these principles, it broke off negotiations at Geneva in January 1981. The South African Government seemed to realize the inevitability of Namibian independence but feared that the territory's white and other minorities would be given insufficient opportunity to express their political wills in a fair constitutional process and that any preindependence agreement to protect them would be abandoned afterward.

Recognizing that Namibian independence was impossible without South Africa's cooperation, the Reagan Administration sought early in its first term to revive the Contact Group initiative, this time on a basis that addressed South African concerns more directly. In September 1981, a new, phased plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 contained features designed to satisfy all parties, including the following elements:

- Agreement on "constitutional principles" to guide the constitution's drafters and to ensure that the interests of all Namibians were protected;
- Agreement on the composition, size, and operation of the UN Transitional Assistance Group; on the disposition of all troops during the transition period; and on measures relating to UN impartiality; and
- Initiation of the transition procedure in Resolution 435.

Since 1981, the United States and its contact group partners have:

- Obtained South Africa's recommitment to arrangements for bringing about Namibian independence through adherence to Resolution 435—the only internationally acceptable basis for a solution;
- Obtained the agreement of SWAPO, the United Nations, and the concerned neighboring African states to the arrangements negotiated with South Africa; and



- Rejected South Africa's temptation to seek its own "internal" settlement in Namibia, which would have guaranteed many more years of regional turmoil. We consider the South African Government's 1985 action in establishing an interim government for Namibia to be null and void and without standing. It has no significant bearing on our policy, and we have made our position quite clear to the South Africans.

The presence of about 30,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola continues to complicate negotiations over Namibia and contribute to regional instability. Although the removal of these troops is not a requirement of the Namibian independence process under Resolution 435, South Africa has made clear its readiness to proceed only in the context of a parallel commitment to resolve the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal. We believe that this issue must be dealt with as a practical necessity to obtain a durable settlement acceptable to all parties.

Acceptance by South Africa and Angola of a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal is thus the one remaining issue to be resolved in order to proceed with implementation of the resolution. U.S. diplomacy is actively involved in working out details, based on the Angolan Government's October 1984 agreement to accept Cuban troop withdrawal in the same context as the Namibian settlement. Although much hard work remains, the parties are negotiating, and the United States has been accepted as a mediator. We believe that resolving this issue will have an important impact on southern African security and make a Namibian settlement possible. If we succeed, Africa's last colony will achieve statehood. This, in turn, will help to foster a regional climate conducive to constructive change away from apartheid in South Africa.

In July 1985, the U.S. Congress repealed the Clark amendment which prohibited U.S. aid to antigovernment forces in Angola. Measures subsequently were introduced in Congress to provide humanitarian and military assistance to the antigovernment forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Dr. Jonas Savimbi. UNITA fought for Angola's independence from Portugal alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which governs

Angola today. The United States views UNITA as a legitimate nationalist organization and supports its struggle against Soviet/Cuban adventurism in Angola. Although the Administration opposes legislatively mandated aid to UNITA, it announced that it would work with the Congress to find effective ways to demonstrate support in a manner consistent with overall U.S. goals in the region.

**Mozambique.** Mozambique attained its independence on June 25, 1975, after more than 470 years of Portuguese influence and colonial rule. The transition was the culmination of at least a decade of fighting, led principally by the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). It was marked by dramatic internal change and upheaval. A one-party socialist state, with close ties to the Soviet bloc, was installed, and some 180,000 out of 200,000 Portuguese settlers, seeing their privileged position undermined, abandoned the country and fled to South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), or back to Portugal. At the same time, more than 60,000 Mozambican refugees who had fled their country returned to Mozambique.

Newly independent Mozambique soon became increasingly involved in the Zimbabwean conflict. It pledged training and transit facilities as well as logistical support to Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting the Rhodesian regime. Rhodesian forces launched retaliatory and preemptive cross-border raids and a de facto state of war existed between the two countries. As part of the war effort, the antigovernment Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), later known as MNR or RENAMO, was created with Rhodesian, South African, and ex-Portuguese settler backing.

Postindependence Mozambique's new political, economic, and social policies, coupled with the impact of the continuing Rhodesian conflict and punitive measures taken by South Africa, had a devastating effect on the economy. In 1976, the cost to Mozambique of implementing sanctions against the Rhodesian regime was \$165 million, and 10,000 people lost their jobs. Trade between Mozambique and South Africa, amounting to 6.8 million tons in 1973, dwindled to 1.1 million tons by 1981. In 1975, some 118,000 Mozambicans working in South Africa remitted most of their

earnings in gold; by 1977 the number had been reduced to fewer than 45,000, and in 1978 South Africa withdrew its fixed-price gold remittances. By 1983, Mozambique's trade deficit stood at \$500 million, and its external debt to noncommunist countries at \$1.4 billion. Perhaps most significant, when 90% of the Portuguese settlers precipitously abandoned the country after independence, Mozambique found itself bereft of private capital and both skilled and managerial services.

Following the end of the Rhodesian conflict and the establishment of the new nation of Zimbabwe in April 1980, support for RENAMO was taken over almost entirely by South Africa, which used the organization as a destabilizing force to further its own national interests. Power lines and road and rail bridges were cut, the oil pipeline running into Zimbabwe was sabotaged, and terrorist attacks were made against civilians, including foreign nationals. By 1982 RENAMO was operating in 7 out of Mozambique's 10 provinces, and by 1984 its impact was being felt on the outskirts of Maputo. Meanwhile, South African military forces launched direct, cross-border raids against African National Congress installations in Mozambique in response to actual or potential guerrilla attacks inside South Africa.

To offset the threat first from Rhodesia and later from RENAMO and South Africa, Mozambique sought and received Soviet aid. Following the signing of a Treaty of Friendship in 1977, the Soviets sent advisers and materiel to help Mozambique strengthen its position against an increasingly aggressive Rhodesia. By 1981, an estimated 550 Soviet and East European and 1,000 Cuban military advisers were attached to the Mozambican Army. East Germany virtually controlled the country's security forces, and a plethora of economic projects brought nearly 2,000 Soviet and East German technicians to Maputo and the countryside.

In the early 1980s, when South Africa took over the support of RENAMO, the Soviets increased their military involvement, providing helicopter gunships, advanced surface-to-air missiles, tanks and armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Soviet naval ships visited Maputo, a number of high-level military exchanges took place, President Machel visited Moscow, and Soviet declarations of military support were made. However, despite the rhetorical and military back-

ing, Soviet training, tactics, and armaments often were of poor quality and proved inadequate to the prosecution of the counterinsurgency war. Mozambique's disappointment with Soviet assistance was heightened by Moscow's refusal to support President Machel's request in late 1980 for association with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (the Warsaw Pact's economic community).

It is against this background of military threat from inside and outside, economic collapse, and inadequate support from their Soviet-bloc friends that Mozambique, in 1981 and 1982, began to signal an interest in improved relations with the West. It turned first to Portugal, which welcomed the approach, and in 1982 the United States received clear indications that President Machel wanted improved relations and hoped the United States could help to moderate the ever-increasing military threat from South Africa.

The United States grasped the offer to end the freeze in relations. They had reached a particularly low point in 1981 when Mozambique expelled four members of the U.S. Embassy on charges of spying, and the new Reagan Administration responded by halting the appointment of a new ambassador to Maputo and suspending food shipments. For some time the United States had been disturbed by the growing instability in southern Africa and South Africa's increasingly militant posture. It saw the approach from Mozambique as an opportunity to ameliorate the security situation in the area and to encourage Mozambique to move away from the Soviet and toward the Western camp. These developments paved the way for the March 1984 nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, known as the Nkomati accord. Although the United States has not claimed credit for Nkomati, it is no secret that it helped to bring the two sides together.

If it succeeds, the Nkomati accord, in addition to its specific security provisions and international political implications, could restore the strong pre-1975 economic links between Mozambique and South Africa and, thereby, contribute significantly to economic growth in Mozambique. Under the terms of the accord, each side agreed "not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against the other state." This meant that Mozambique would no longer allow ANC guerrillas to use its territory and that South Africa

would expel and end its support for RENAMO. Whether the accord succeeds depends on a variety of factors, not the least of which are South Africa's own internal security situation, Soviet interest in the area, South Africa's ability to exercise control over RENAMO, Mozambique's ability to rebuild its economy, and the degree of interest and involvement by neighbors and outside supporters in Mozambique and RENAMO.

Certainly, current closer relations with the West will help. By the end of 1984, Mozambique finally subscribed to the Lome Convention, which opens the door for Common Market aid, and signed a modified Berlin clause, which permits West German assistance. Mozambique has joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which are preparing to make loans and provide technical assistance to the country. American aid also has increased, particularly for emergency relief efforts in connection with the devastating drought that has embraced much of the country for the past several years. In 1985, U.S. program aid to Mozambique amounted to \$15 million; emergency food aid totaled \$45.8 million. Meanwhile, Soviet-bloc assistance, both military and other, has tended to remain level.

On the other side of the coin, post-Nkomati developments have shown that there are limits to the South African Government's influence over RENAMO. In January 1985, South Africa's President Botha admitted that "elements inside South Africa" were still helping RENAMO, and, in September 1985, documents captured by Mozambique Government forces revealed continuing South African assistance and contacts. Certainly, South Africa's willingness to improve relations with Mozambique is affected by conditions within South Africa. When relative calm prevails internally, efforts for improved relations receive more support than at present or during the recent past, when conditions are unstable. Perhaps most important, RENAMO's leadership undoubtedly has objectives that are not always in harmony with those of South Africa and may, in fact, run counter to them, depending on current political considerations.

In any event, although the United States remains concerned that fighting between Mozambican forces and RENAMO has not ceased, there is satisfaction to be gained from increased interest in Mozambique during the past 2-3 years on the part of Western

governments and businesses. Italian assistance, for example, has become sizable, and South Africans are once again exploring business opportunities in Maputo. This appears to be a direct result of Mozambique's willingness to move toward a more neutral position vis-a-vis the West, a move confirmed by the successful visit by President Machel to the United States in September 1985.

**Zimbabwe.** The United States was actively involved with the British Government in achieving a settlement of the Rhodesian war and in establishing the new nation of Zimbabwe, which became independent on April 18, 1980. Since then, Zimbabwe has sought to improve its domestic and international credibility by balancing the need for change with that of building confidence in its government. The democratic institutions established by the 1980 constitution continue to operate, and parliamentary elections, generally peaceful and fair, were held in June-July 1985.

Zimbabwe inherited a strong and diversified economy with a significant private sector. Although affected by world recession, drought, and socialist rhetoric (which has discouraged new foreign investment), the government of Prime Minister Mugabe holds a respect for market principles and international economic realities. If peace and sound economic policies are maintained, Zimbabwe has the potential to help spark development in central and southern Africa. A healthy and stable Zimbabwe also could provide a positive example for the entire region and enhance chances for stability in this troubled area.

Zimbabwe remains strongly opposed to South Africa's apartheid policy but has not allowed its territory to be used to launch guerrilla attacks against its neighbor. It has accepted responsibility for building peace in the area and approves of its neighbors' efforts to resolve their differences. Zimbabwe maintains official contacts—but not diplomatic representation—with South Africa and has worked for effective coexistence.

The United States contributes substantially to Zimbabwe's economic growth and is, in fact, its largest aid donor. U.S. economic aid since independence totals more than \$300 million.



Ethiopian refugees in Somalia

## Foreign Assistance and Economic Relations

The U.S. and African governments recognize that an inseparable relationship exists between economics and politics and that the United States and the West are uniquely qualified to respond to Africa's needs. The African nations' principal goal is development, and the United States cooperates with them in their efforts not only because their economic well-being is important to us in human terms but also because it is directly related to African security. In turn, African security and political stability are important to our foreign policy because they affect U.S. national interests. The economic crisis in Africa threatens most of our policy goals, including the search for peace in southern Africa.

In response to the economic crisis and human tragedy in Africa, the United States is providing unprecedented levels of assistance. We are attempting to alleviate the immediate needs of millions of starving people as well as to promote long-term solutions to Africa's economic problems. We are providing assistance through international organizations and bilateral programs and helping private voluntary groups in their efforts to deliver food and other necessities of life. We are now furnishing more than half of all emergency food reaching African famine victims. The United States has not allowed political differences with any government to weaken its determination to provide assistance to those in need. Indeed, we are the largest donor to Ethiopia, a country whose government has been openly hostile to us for several years.

### Emergency Famine Assistance

On July 10, 1984, President Reagan announced a major initiative to respond more quickly and effectively to the food needs of the people of Africa and others suffering from hunger and malnutrition. This five-point program includes:


- Prepositioning grain in selected Third World areas;

- Creating a special \$50 million presidential fund to allow a more flexible U.S. response to food emergencies;
- Financing or paying ocean and inland transportation costs associated with U.S. food aid in special emergency cases;
- Creating a government task force to provide better forecasts of food shortages and needs; and
- Establishing an advisory group of business leaders to share information on Third World hunger and food production.

The President also announced a comprehensive African Hunger Relief Initiative on January 3, 1985, directing the U.S. Government to provide more than 1.5 million metric tons of emergency food during FY 1985—three times the record amount from the previous year. In FY 1984, the U.S. Government provided \$200 million of emergency assistance—including more than 500,000 metric tons of emergency food aid as well as medicine and transport assistance—to 26 African countries. Total food aid to Africa amounted to more than 1.4 million metric tons in FY 1984.

In FY 1985, the U.S. Government delivered 1.8 million metric tons of emergency food assistance to Africa at a cost of \$770 million. When added to our regular PL-480 program, we provided African countries with more than 3 million metric tons of food grown in America at a delivered cost of \$1.1 billion. Another \$109 million of nonfood assistance was provided during the same period. Our entire assistance program in FY 1985—including both regular and emergency assistance—totaled a record \$1.9 billion, with almost one-half provided in response to the extraordinary famine conditions that existed on the continent.

U.S. commitment and concern were further highlighted by Vice President Bush during his visit to Sudan, Niger, and Mali in March 1985, his second trip to Africa since he took office in 1981. In order to draw attention to the widespread nature of the drought emergen-





cy, the Vice President completed his trip by representing the United States at a special UN conference on the crisis held in Geneva. His message to the international community was that, in spite of all that had been done, more help was needed—needed from all those with the means to assist and needed immediately.

### Long-term Assistance

Because the roots of the economic crisis are so deep, the solution will necessarily require resources, time, and commitment. The U.S. Government provided \$1.1 billion in regular assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in FY 1985, over five times that provided in FY 1974.

The four major "pillars" of our assistance strategy are: policy reform, strengthening the indigenous private sector, institution-building, and technology transfer.

Our economic policy reform programs seek to create incentives for growth and to enable African farmers, as well as businessmen, to play a more dynamic role. At the same time, these programs help to develop the technologies, institutions, and human capital required for sustained growth. We have placed increased emphasis on promoting private sector activity in Africa and using private rather than public sector channels to deliver our aid resources to Africa. We are supporting agricultural pricing and marketing reforms, privatization of parastatals, and increased farmer productivity through investments designed to improve technologies, access to markets, productive infrastructure, and the supply of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs.

In FY 1985, the United States launched the African Economic Policy Reform Program, which provides additional and more flexible assistance to African countries undertaking critical policy reforms. In the first year, programs totaling \$75 million were developed for Malawi, Mauritius, Mali, Rwanda, and Zambia. Although these programs are still in their initial stages, they already have served as a catalyst for action on the part of donors and the

World Bank and moved the reform process more quickly and broadly than would have been the case without our presence.

The policy reform program is a precursor of, and gave impetus to, the creation of a similar World Bank program, the Special African Facility, which, together with bilateral funds available for cofinancing, will have about \$1.2 billion to finance policy reform programs in Africa. We have been coordinating our policy reform efforts with the World Bank and, as the Bank's Facility enters an operational phase, it will provide stronger opportunities for cooperation.

"Food for Progress," another policy reform initiative, was announced by President Reagan in January 1985. This would provide food assistance on a multiyear basis to countries desiring to undertake policy reforms in the agricultural sector. The necessary legislative framework and funding for this program are being developed.

### Support for International Efforts


Although the United States has an influential role in mobilizing an effective response to Africa's economic problems, the task is not solely a U.S. responsibility and, in fact, is far too great for the United States to attempt alone. The crisis in Africa touches upon the welfare of the entire world and requires a sustained and coordinated international effort to promote long-term development.

The U.S. Government has intensified efforts to work with other donors and multilateral institutions to encourage African governments to implement policy reforms that will promote growth and development. Through international organizations and U.S. bilateral and regional programs, the United States is supporting agricultural development projects, land reclamation, and other programs to develop agricultural land and to train farmers in soil conservation techniques. The United States particularly supports the critical role of the International Monetary Fund in providing assistance for stabilizing African economies and of the World Bank in promoting economic development.

In the long run, however, primary responsibility must rest with the African nations themselves, whose actions and policies will largely determine how much progress toward long-term development is possible.

### Trade and Investment

Only a few years ago, many African regimes were either hostile or indifferent to foreign private enterprise. Today, even countries with a Marxist orientation are increasingly eager for trade and investment relations with the West. African leaders are attracted by the fact that American businesses have great expertise in fields important to economic development, such as agribusiness. They also recognize that U.S. private enterprise can provide much of the technical and managerial expertise required to promote economic growth, job creation, and improved standards of living.



However, between 1980 and 1984, sub-Saharan Africa's percentage of total U.S. private direct investment abroad remained constant at 2%—the level prevailing for the past 20 years. During 1980–84, the U.S. trade deficit with the region decreased by about one-half. Besides economic problems, other factors hinder the growth of U.S. business and trade activities in Africa. Despite growing African interest in trade and investment, the investment climate in many countries remains uncertain. Furthermore, many American businesses are indifferent to African markets or assume that opportunities are monopolized by former colonial powers.

The Departments of State and Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation seek to familiarize U.S. businesses with the problems of and opportunities for doing business in Africa, as well as with the available support services. The U.S. Government also encourages U.S. trade and investment abroad through tax and other incentives. At all U.S. Embassies, assisting U.S. businesses is a top priority. The Commerce Department's Foreign Commercial Service is represented in major African commercial centers, including Abidjan, Johannesburg, Lagos, and Nairobi. And the Agency for International Development works to enhance the role of the African private sector in development activities and to build institutions that will promote foreign and domestic business growth.



Dogon rock paintings, Mali.

**Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>1</sup>** (Numbered footnotes on p. 43)

<b>Angola</b> People's Republic of Angola (Angola)	Luanda	481,351	8.0	2.7	38	Ovimbundu (38) Kimbundu (23) Bakongo (13) Other (26)	Christian (88) Indigenous (12)	Portuguese Local	20	NA	1.9	60	40
<b>Botswana</b> Republic of Botswana (Bechuanaland)	Gaborone	220,000	1.1	3.3	50	Tswana (94) Bushmen (5) White (1)	Indigenous (85) Christian (15)	English Setswana	30	93	0.4	75	25
<b>Burundi</b> Republic of Burundi	Bujumbura	10,747	4.8	2.6	42	Hutu (85) Tutsi (14) Twa (1)	Christian (67) Indigenous (32) Muslim (1)	Kirundi French Swahili	25	29	1.9	93	7
<b>Cape Verde</b> Republic of Cape Verde (Cape Verde Islands)	Praia	1,557	0.3	2.0	61	Creole (71) African (26) European (1)	Catholic (65) Indigenous (35)	Portuguese Crioulo	37	NA	0.1	NA	NA
<b>Chad</b> Republic of Chad	N'Djamena	496,000	5.3	2.5	39	200 groups	Muslim Christian Indigenous	French Chadian- Arabic	20	37	2.0	85	15

<sup>1</sup>Industry Services  
Commerce and Government

4.2	0	550	29	27	44	1500	103	1600	1010	Oil Coffee Diamonds Iron	1.9	11/11/75	People's Republic	Pres. Jose E Dos Santos	Angola
0.7	0	750	11	1	88	740	19	640	57	Diamonds Copper Nickel Beef	11.4	9/30/66	Republic	Pres. Dr. Quett K. J. Masire	Botswana
1.2	3	255	51	15	34	198	9	79	2	Coffee Tea Cotton Hides	6.0	7/1/62	Republic	Pres (Col.) J.B. Bagaza	Burundi
0.1	0	353	NA	NA	NA	68	NA <sup>4</sup>	2	NA <sup>4</sup>	Fish Bananas Salt	2.1	7/5/75	Republic	Pres. A. Pereira	Cape Verde
0.5	0.6	110	52	14	34	122	16	65	0.1	Cotton Livestock	18.5	8/11/60	Republic	Pres. H. Habre	Chad

†Services Commerce  
Mining and Trade



Country Name (Official Name)	Capital	Total Pop. (1980)	Pop. Density (/km <sup>2</sup> )	Pop. Growth (%)	Life Exp. (years)	Major Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Life expectancy (years)	Primary Education (% of pop. group)	Total (mil)	% in Agr.	% in Other*
Congo People's Republic of the Congo (French Congo)	Brazzaville	132,000	1.8	3	47	Bakongo Sangha Bateke M'Bochi European	Indigenous (51) Christian (47) Muslim (2)	French Lingala Kikongo	50	wJ+	0.7	75	25
Cote d'Ivoire Republic of Ivory Coast (Upper Volta)	Yamoussoukro	10,000,000	100	2.5	50	Akan Mossi Dioula Other	Christian (40) Muslim (30) Indigenous (20) Other (10)	French Dioula Other	55	70	0.1	NA	NA
Equatorial Guinea Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Equatorial Guinea and Spanish Guinea)	Malabo	10,820	0.3	2.7	45	Fang (80) Bubi (15) Other (5)	Nominally Christian	Spanish Pidgin English Fang	55	70	0.1	88	14
Gambia Republic of the Gambia (Gambia)	Banjul	1,000,000	100	2.5	50	Fula Mandingo Other	Christian (40) Muslim (50) Indigenous (10)	English Fula Mandingo	55	70	0.1	NA	NA
Gabon Gabonese Republic (Gabon)	Libreville	102,317	1.0	3.1	44	Fang Eshira Bapouni Bateke	Christian (80) Indigenous (39) Muslim (1)	French Local	65	84	0.3	65	35
Ghana Republic of Ghana (Gold Coast)	Accra	92,100	13.2	3.0	49	Akan Ewe Ga	Indigenous (45) Christian (43) Muslim (12)	English Akan Mole-Dagbani Ewe Ga	55	60	3.7	55	45
Guinea Republic of Guinea (Guinea)	Conakry	5,000,000	50	2.5	50	Fula Mandingo Other	Christian (40) Muslim (50) Indigenous (10)	French Fula Mandingo	55	70	0.1	NA	NA
Guinea-Bissau Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese Guinea)	Bissau	14,000	0.9	1.9	35	Balanta Fulani Manjaca Mandinga	Indigenous (65) Muslim (30) Christian (5)	Portuguese Crioulo Local	9	NA	0.3	90	10

\*Industry Services  
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Annual (\$ bil)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita (\$)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Other†	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1994 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1994 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Former Name
1.8	3.1	1300	10	15	75	608	12	997	1001	Oil Wood Sugar Tobacco Coffee	1.0	8/15/60	People's Republic	Pres. (Col.) D. Sassou-Nguesso	Congo
0.1	NA	400	10	1	89	162	8	66	61	Hides Cattle Coffee	5	9/27/77	Republic	Pres. H.G. Apidon	Djibouti
0.1	0	417	50	2	48	37	<0.5	13	0.5	Cocoa Coffee Wood Bananas	1.0	10/12/68	Republic	Pres. (Lt. Col.) Obiang Nguema Mbasogo	Equatorial Guinea
5	3.7	142	62	14	34	206	174	406	27	Coffee Rubber Mango Milk	44.3	8/27/60	Republic	Pres. (Lt. Col.) Assioma Batista	Mozambique
3.5	0.7	2742	4	6	90	700	36	2200	680	Petroleum Wood Manganese Uranium	0	8/17/60	Republic	Pres. El Hadj Omar Bongo	Gabon
0.1	13.4	180	75	15	10	97	14	68	33	Peanuts Palm Fish	4.7	2/18/65	Republic	Pres. Sir D.K. Jawara	The Gambia
10.5	-7.2	954	NA	NA	NA	669	46	657	47	Cocoa Minerals Wood	7.6	3/6/57	Provisional Military	Chairman of PNDC Ft. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Ghana
1.8	1.3	278	40	10	50	406	98	637	119	Bauxite Alumina Peanut Cashew	6.8	10/2/68	Republic	Pres. (Col.) L. Conté	Guinea
.15	-5.1	182	NA	NA	NA	57	NA	9	NA	Peanuts Palm Products Fish	2.5	9/24/73	Republic	Pres. (Brig. General) J.B. Vieira	Guinea-Bissau

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<b>Ivory Coast</b> Republic of the Ivory Coast (Ivory Coast)	Abidjan	124,500	10.1	4.0	47	60 Groups	Indigenous (63) Muslim (25) Christian (12)	French Local	24	75	4.0	85	15
<b>Lesotho</b> Kingdom of Lesotho (Basutoland)	Maseru	11,716	1.5	2.5	52	Sotho (<100) Other (<1)	Christian (80) Indigenous (20)	English Sesotho Xhosa Zulu	55	70	0.4	36	64
<b>Madagascar</b> Democratic Republic of Madagascar (Malagasy Republic)	Antananarivo	228,000	9.9	2.8	46	Merina Betsileo Cotiers French Indian	Indigenous (52) Christian (41) Muslim (7)	Malagasy French	53	63	3.4	92	8
<b>Mali</b> Republic of Mali (French Soudan)	Bamako	464,873	7.7	2.3	45	Mandé (50) Peul (17) Voltaic (12) Other (21)	Muslim (90) Indigenous (9) Christian (1)	French Bambara	10	28	3.5	73	27
<b>Mauritius</b> Mauritius	Port Louis	720	1.6	2.0	69	Indo- Mauritian (68) Creoles (27) Sino- Mauritian (3) Franco- Mauritian (2)	Hindu (52) Christian (31) Muslim (17)	English French Creole Hindi Urdu	61	78	0.3	29	71

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7.6	1.8	671	25	25	50	1850	65	2450	469	Coffee Cocoa Wood	0	8/7/60	Republic	Pres. F. Houphouët- Boigny	Ivory Coast
0.8	-2.0	455	27	6	67	450	12	124	0.7	Wool Mohair Diamonds Labor to South Africa	16.6	10/4/68	Constitutional Monarchy	King— Moshoeshe II PM—Dr. L. Jonathan**	Lesotho
2.5	1.6	260	40	17	43	356	39	328	71	Coffee Cloves Vanilla Sugar	17.8	6/29/60	Republic	Pres. (Adm.) D. Ratsiraka	Madagascar
1.0	4.4	138	42	11	47	233	15	146	1	Meat Cotton Fish Peanuts	23.5	9/22/60	Republic	Pres. (B. Gen.) M. Traore	Mali
1.1	1.2	1053	17	16	67	393	9	363	49	Sugar Tea Textiles Tourism	5.5	3/12/68	Parl. Dem. Under Const. Monarch	Chief of State—Queen Elizabeth II Governor General— Sir S Rangoolam	Mauritius

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\*\*Maj. Gen. Justinus Lekhanya deposed  
PM Jonathan on January 20, 1986. Lekhanya  
heads the Governing Military Council.

Former Name Official Name (Earlier Name)*	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	Est. Total 1980 (est)	Est. Growth Rate 1960-80 (%)	Life Expectancy (yrs)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Lit- eracy (%)	Primary Schools (% of age group)	Total (mill)	% in Agr.	% in Other*
Namibia (Southwest Africa)	Windhoek	318,261	1.1	3.0	NA	African (86) European (7) Mixed (7)	Christian (60) Indigenous (40)	Afrikaans English German Local	39	25	0.5	60	40
Niger Republic of Niger (Niger)	Niamey	490,000	8.5	3.3	42	Hausa (20) Djama (22) Fulani (8) Touareg (3) Other (47)	Muslim (80) Indigenous and Christian (20)	French Hausa Djama	5	15	2.5	99	10
Nigeria Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria)	Lagos	357,000	91.2	3.4	49	Hausa- Fulani Ibo Yoruba	Muslim (47) Christian (34) Indigenous (19)	English Hausa Ibo Yoruba	30	42	40	60	40
Rwanda Republic of Rwanda	Kigali	10,188	8.3	3.7	46	Hutu (85) Tutsi (14) Twa (1)	Christian (74) Indigenous (25) Muslim (1)	French Kinyarwanda Kwesehat	37	70	2.7	93	7
São Tomé and Príncipe Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe	São Tomé	372	0.09	0.8	NA	Portuguese- African African Portuguese	Christian (80) Other (20)	Portuguese	50	NA	0.02	70	30
Senegal Republic of Senegal (Senegal)	Dakar	76,000	6.8	3.2	44	Wolof (28) Fulani (17) Sere (17) Other (38)	Muslim (50) Christian (5) Other (45)	French Wolof Fulani Local	10	53	1.7	70	30
Seychelles Republic of Seychelles (Seychelles Colony)	Victoria	171	0.07	0.9	66	Seychellois	Christian (98) Other (2)	English French Creole	60	95	0.03	19	81
Sierra Leone Republic of Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone)	Freetown	27,255	3.5	2.8	46	Temne Mende	Indigenous (70) Muslim (28) Christian (2)	English Krio	18	NA	1.5	75	25
Somalia Somali Democratic Republic (British Somalia and Italian Somalia)	Mogadishu	246,155	7.6	3.0	44	Somali (85) Bantu (14) Other (1)	Muslim (99) Other (1)	Somali Arabic English Italian	10	50	2.2	82	18
South Africa Republic of South Africa (Union of South Africa)	Pretoria	472,388	22.5	2.4	66	African- White Colored Asian	Christian (70) Hindu (18) Muslim (8) Indigenous (4)	English Afrikaans Zulu Xhosa Sotho Tswana	70	88	10.4	30	70

\*Industry Services  
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Year	Change 1984	Pop. (mill)	Urban Pop.	Urban Incl.	% Urban Country	Total (\$ mil)	From US 1984 (\$ mil)	Total (\$ mil)	To US 1984 (\$ mil)	Leading Exports		Date of Independ- ence	Type	Chief of State and/or Head of Government	Familiar Name
15	-7.0	1429	10	6	84	988	4	1320	3	Copper Uranium Diamonds Cattle	0	Pending	International Territory	—	Namibia
2.5	-0.8	435	44	10	46	392	2	392	0.5	Uranium Livestock Cowpeas	37.9	8/3/60	Republic	Pres. (B. Gen.) Seyni Kountché	Niger
67.0	-4.4	760	25	10	65	12,100	577	10500	2508	Petroleum Cocoa Tin Coal	0	10/1/60	Federal Republic	Pres Ibrahim Babangida	Nigeria
1.2	2.9	370	30	8	38	300	1	314	27	Coffee Cassava Tin Pyrethrum	11.4	7/1/62	Republic	Pres. (Maj. Gen.) J. Habyarimana	Rwanda
0.03	-10.0	300	40	8	52	20	NA <sup>†</sup>	9	NA <sup>†</sup>	Cocoa Copra Palm	0.3	7/12/75	Republic	Pres M Pinto Da Costa	São Tomé and Príncipe
2.8	-14.3	460	20	30	40	234	23	257	2	Peanut Cashew Peanut Palm	47.8	4/4/60	Republic	Pres. A. Diouf	Senegal
0.2	-0.2	2270	7	15	78	81	0.5	35	0.3	Tourism Copra Cinnamon	2.3	6/29/76	Republic	Pres F R Rene	Seychelles
1.6	0.6	290	42	21	46	180	15	194	18	Minerals Cashew Peanut	6.9	4/27/61	Republic	Pres. Dr. S.P. Stevens	Sierra Leone
1.9	9.6	375	55	7	38	407	76	101	0.7	Livestock Fruit Hides	70.7	7/1/60	Republic	Pres (M Gen) Said Barre	Somalia
1.8	4.8	290	10	20	30	200	100	100	100	Gold Copper Uranium Wool Sugar	10 <sup>†</sup>	6/31/10	Republic	Pres. P.W. Botha	South Africa

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<b>Sudan</b> Democratic Republic of the Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan)	Khartoum	967,500	21.8	2.7	47	Black Arab Beja Other	(52) (39) (6) (3)	Muslim (70) Indigenous (25) Christian (5)	Arabic English Local	20	50	5.7	78	22
<b>Tanzania</b> United Republic of Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar)	Dar es Salaam	365,608	21.7	3.2	52	Over 130 Groups	Indigenous (34) Christian (33) Muslim (33)	Swahili English	66	87	7.2	83	17	
<b>Uganda</b> Republic of Uganda (Uganda)	Kampala	91,076	14.7	3.2	53	Bantu Nilotic Sudanic	Christian (66) Indigenous (18) Muslim (18)	English Swahili Luganda	52	53	5.8	90	10	
<b>Zambia</b> Republic of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)	Lusaka	290,724	6.8	3.2	47	African Other	(99) (1)	Christian (51) Indigenous (48) Muslim (1)	English 70 Local	54	49	2.7	65	35

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7.3	-2.6	364	40	6	54	1800	136	790	20	Cotton Gum Arabic Peanuts	214.4	1/1/56	Republic	Chairman (Gen.) Suwar el-Dahab	Sudan
4.2	0.8	210	54	13	33	831	44	396	12	Coffee Cotton Sisal Spices	3.9	(Union) 1964	Republic	Pres. Ali Hassan Mwinyi	Tanzania
4.8	5.0	355	55	8	37	509	3	380	93	Coffee Tea Cotton	7.8	10/9/62	Republic	Chief of State (Gen.) T.O. Lutwa**	Uganda
3.4	1.7	500	14	41	45	1060	91	1030	124	Copper Cobalt Zinc Lead Tobacco	25.0	10/24/64	Republic	Pres. Dr. K.D. Kaunda	Zambia
6.8	2.0	878	15	20	25	1000	100	1000	100	Iron	100.0	10/24/64	Republic	Pres. Dr. K.D. Kaunda	Zambia

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\*\*Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance  
Army seized power on January 27 1986. Museveni  
was sworn in as President on January 29 1986.

<sup>1</sup>Statistics are drawn from the latest most reliable data available from a variety of sources particularly from the Department of State's *Background Notes* and the Central Intelligence Agency's *The World Factbook* which are periodically updated. Therefore except where indicated no specific year can be designated for each category of statistics. Furthermore current figures do not exist in many cases (indicated by NA - not available) and some data are based on U.S. Government estimates.

<sup>2</sup>The earlier name listing is included to identify for readers unfamiliar with Africa earlier names by which some of the countries have been known. In some cases these names date to preindependence and in other instances relate to previous postindependence regimes. No political significance should be attached to selections which are based largely on historical perceptions.

<sup>3</sup>Estimated and projected mid year population and growth rates are from mid year to mid year.

<sup>4</sup>Trade statistics with the United States have been combined for the Cape Verde Islands Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe. Total 1984 imports from the United States were \$29.7 million and total 1984 exports to the United States were \$0.9 million.

<sup>5</sup>Economic assistance includes development assistance Economic Support Funds and PL 480 Titles I, II, and III. Refugee and emergency famine assistance which amounted to \$879 million in FY 1985 and military assistance are excluded. Some regional funds for the African economic policy reform program also are not included.

<sup>6</sup>These funds do not go to the South African Government. AID's program in South Africa works directly with regional organizations private voluntary organizations local groups and individuals for the improvement of educational and training opportunities for South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid.



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### Facing page.

The ruins of Great Zimbabwe, the site from which the country derives its name, were the most spectacular of 150 or more *madzimbabwe* (stone enclosures; sing. *zimbabwe*). Stone construction by the Shona people began in the 11th century and continued for hundreds of years. Historians believe that at its height Great Zimbabwe's 12 clusters of stone structures housed 20,000 residents as well as the royal court, markets, warehouses, and religious shrines





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