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ABSTRACT

Prepared by scholars from four countries, the 63 papers in this collection address recent developments and recurrent problems in the theory, practice, criticism, and teaching of argumentation. Following the texts of two keynote addresses, the papers are presented according to eight broad categories: argumentation theory, historical and political argument, ideology and argument criticism, argumentation in special fields, meaning and argument, interpersonal argumentation, argument in groups and organizations, and debate theory and argument pedagogy. Specific topics discussed in the papers include the following: (1) recreating a rhetorical view of narrative; (2) argumentation in the field of rhetorical communication; (3) historical argument in the Lincoln-Douglas debates; (4) the education of a television debate critic; (5) Ronald Reagan's first State of the Union Address as case study in language, argument and culture; (6) argument and consciousness in labor history; (7) rhetorical grounds for determining what is fundamental science; (8) argumentation in utility rate hearings; (9) the pragmatics of meaning in argumentation; (10) a constructivist approach to meaning; (11) the role of argumentation in source credibility; (12) social confrontation in varying degrees of intimacy; (13) research on the role of argument in decision making groups; (14) argumentation and negotiation; (15) the role of propositions in forensic argument; and (16) a pedagogical justification of argumentation for the general student. (HTH)

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ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL PRACTICE:

Proceedings of the Fourth SCA/AFA

Conference on Argumentation

Edited by

J. Robert Cox
 University of North Carolina
 at Chapel Hill

Malcolm O. Sillars
 University of Utah

Gregg B. Walker
 University of Utah

Sponsored by the Speech Communication Association
 and the American Forensic Association

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ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL PRACTICE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH SCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION

Edited by

J. Robert Cox
University of North Carolina
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Sponsored by the Speech Communication Association
and the American Forensic Association

Hosted by the University of Utah
August 1-4, 1985
at Rustler Lodge, Alta, Utah

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PREFACE

One hundred and nine scholars in argumentation from four countries assembled August 1-4, 1985 at the Rustler Lodge in Alta, Utah, for the Fourth Conference on Argumentation. This biennial conference was again sponsored by the Speech Communication Association and the American Forensic Association, and was hosted by the University of Utah.

The conference shared the goal of its predecessors of bringing together leading scholars to discuss recent developments in the theory, practice, criticism, and teaching of argumentation. From the keynote addresses by Michael Calvin McGee and Charles Arthur Willard, and the presentations in seventeen panels, particular interest seemed to focus upon the relationship of argument and social practice: in political, legal, scientific, philosophical, and interpersonal realms.

Planning for the 1985 conference centered on four areas: Philosophy and Theory of Argumentation, Argument and Moral Discourse, Argument and Interpersonal Communication, and Forensics. A Workshop on Teaching the Basic Course in Argumentation and Debate was also included in this year's program. Seventy-three papers and critical replies were delivered during the conference; most are reproduced here with the permission of their authors. The individual papers remain the property of the individual authors. What we have not been able to reproduce, of course, was the lively and informal discussion of participants long after panels had "officially" ended. Such intellectual give-and-take and enthusiasm has come to characterize this biennial conference.

The scope and success of the 1985 conference could not have been possible without the assistance of many individuals. Principal among these were Malcolm O. Sillars and Gregg B. Walker who devoted long hours as local hosts, as well as co-editors of this volume. Valuable assistance in the planning of the program was provided by: James Arnt Aune, Dale Hample, Thomas Kane, Charles Kauffman, Ray E. McKerrow, Robert Trapp, Phillip C. Wander, and Charles A. Willard. The conference is fortunate to have the continued financial and professional support of both SCA and AFA. The staff of the Rustler Lodge helped to make the conference a gracious and pleasant experience. Finally, the faculty, staff, and graduate students of the Department of Communication at the University of Utah contributed much of their time and energy to the success of this year's conference. Jackie Byrd, especially, provided invaluable assistance in pre-registration and in the final preparation of this volume.

J. Robert Cox
Conference Director

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Fourth Summer Conference on Argumentation

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California State University/Fullerton
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University of Southern California
Brigham Young University
Baylor University
University of Utah
University of Utah
California State University/Hayward
University of Iowa
University of New Mexico
University of Utah
University of New Mexico
Southwest Missouri State University
University of Illinois/Urbana-Champaign
Northern Colorado University
Vanderbilt University
University of Amsterdam (Netherlands)
University of Utah
University of Utah
Frostburg State College
University of Pittsburgh
DePauw University
University of Illinois/Urbana
University of Utah
University of Louisville
Wake Forest University
California State University/Hayward
Central High School/Texas
Northwestern University

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Fourth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation

Rustler Lodge
Alta, Utah
August 1-4, 1985

Sponsors: Speech Communication Association and the
American Forensic Association

Host: University of Utah

Conference Committee:

Director: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill

Hosts: Malcolm O. Sillars and Gregg B. Walker, University of Utah

Philosophy and Theory of Argument: Ray E. McKerrow, University of Maine--
Orono and Charles A. Willard, University of Louisville

Argument and Moral Discourse: James Arnt Aune, University of Virginia and
Phillip C. Wander, San Jose State University

Argument and Interpersonal Communication: Dale Hample, Western Illinois
University and Robert Trapp, University of Northern Colorado

Forensics: Thomas Kane, University of Pittsburgh and Charles Kauffman,
Northwestern University

Workshop on Teaching the Basic Course in Argumentation and Debate:
Sharon Porter, Northern Arizona University

Local Arrangements:

Ann K. Burnett, University of Utah
Jackie Byrd, University of Utah
Jeanine DiPolo Congalton, University of Utah
William Cue, University of Utah
Karen Lundberg, University of Utah
Jan Muto, University of Utah
Alexis Olds, University of Utah
Kathy Robinson, Rustler Lodge
Mike Salvador, University of Utah
Mina Vaughn-Tate, University of Utah

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1985 SCA/AFA SUMMER CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION

SCHEDULE

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1

3:30 - 5:00 PM

GENERAL SESSION

Chair: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina-- Chapel Hill
Welcome: Robert K. Tiemens, University of Utah
Announcements: Malcolm O. Sillars and Gregg B. Walker, University of Utah
Conference Preview: J. Robert Cox

Keynote Addresses:

"The Moral Problem of Argumentum per Argumentum," Michael Calvin McGee,
University of Iowa

"Cassandra's Heirs," Charles Arthur Willard, University of Louisville

FRIDAY, AUGUST 2

9:00 - 10:30 AM

A. WHO IS AN ARGUER? A CONVERSATION WITH BROCKRIEDEL

Chair: Ray McKerrow, University of Maine-- Orono

"Who Is an Arguer? A Progress Report," Wayne Brockriede,
California State University-- Fullerton

Respondents:

Michael Calvin McGee, University of Iowa
Walter R. Fisher, University of Southern California
James F. Klump, University of Nebraska-- Lincoln

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B. DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION

Chair: Randy Hirokawa, University of Iowa

"Strategies for Threatening Face: Mitigating and Aggravating Bids and Rejections," Pamela J. Benoit, University of Missouri-- Columbia

"Toward a Developmental Perspective on Argumentative Competence," Julie M. Yingling and Robert Trapp, University of Northern Colorado

"Social Confrontation in Relationships of Varying Degrees of Intimacy," Sara E. Newell, University of Wisconsin-- Milwaukee and Kathryn L. Adams, California State University-- Fresno

"Arguing Strategies of the Elderly," Janice Schuetz, University of New Mexico

10:45 AM - 12:15 PM

A. PAPERS IN POLITICAL DEBATE

Chair: Mike Weiler, University of Pittsburgh

"On the Education of a TV Debate Critic," Donn W. Parson, University of Kansas

"In Search of the Founding Fathers: Historical Argument in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates," David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

"The Hunt-Helms Debates," Charles Conrad, University of North Carolina -- Chapel Hill and Charles Kauffman, Northwestern University

"The 1984 Democratic Debates: Does Format Make a Difference?" Robert C. Rowland, Baylor University and Rey Garcia, Southwest Texas State University

B. APPLYING DISCOVERED THEORIES IN THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE

Chair: James Klumpp, University of Nebraska-- Lincoln

"Rhetoric and Semiotic in Scientific Argument: the Function of Presumption in Charles Darwin's ORIGIN OF SPECIES Essays," Anne Holmquest, University of Iowa

"Punctuated Equilibria: A Case Study in Scientific and Para-Scientific Argument," John Lyne, University of Iowa

"Rhetorical Grounds for Determining What Is Fundamental Science: The Case of Space Exploration," Gonzalo Munevar, University of Nebraska-- Omaha

"The Science of Values and the Values of Science," Charles Arthur Willard, University of Louisville

2:00 - 3:30 PM

A. THE PLACE OF ARGUMENTATION IN SPEECH COMMUNICATION

Chair: Kenneth Anderson, University of Illinois-- Urbana-Champaign

"The Functions of Argumentation in Group Deliberation," Randy Y. Hirokawa, and Dirk R. Scheerhorn, University of Iowa

"Metaphor and Metonymy: A Relational Look at Argument and Arguing," Frank E. Millar and Gail P. Moore, Cleveland State University

"Argumentation, Interpersonal Communication, Persuasion, and the Process(es) of Compliance Gaining Message Use," Franklin J. Boster, Arizona State University

"The Role of Argumentation in Source Credibility," William L. Benoit, University of Missouri-- Columbia

B. RATIONALITY AND ITS REPRESENTATIONS

Chair: Joseph W. Wenzel, University of Illinois-- Urbana-Champaign

"The Role of Justification in Perelman's Philosophical Rhetoric," Ray E. McKerraw, University of Maine-- Orono

"Ideological Analogons: Portraits of 'Truth,'" David Cratis Williams, Wake Forest University

"Memory and Diachronic Argument: A Marcusean Note," J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina-- Chapel Hill

C. LEGAL ARGUMENTATION

Chair: David Hingstman, Baylor University

"The Path of Legal Reasoning in Sex Discrimination Cases," David S. Werling and Richard D. Rieke, University of Utah

"Storytelling in Opening Statements: Framing the Argumentation of the Trial," Kathryn Snedaker and Janice Schuetz, University of New Mexico

"Speculations on the Treason Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: Sir Edward Coke as Advocate," L. Raymond Camp, North Carolina State University

7:30 - 9:00 PM

A. NARRATIVE AND ARGUMENT: CONFRONTING MORAL DILEMMAS IN PRACTICE.

Chair: Walter R. Fisher, University of Southern California

"Storytelling and Public Moral Argument: The Case of Medicine,"
Michael J. Hyde, Northwestern University

"Recreating a Rhetorical View of Narrative: Adam Smith in Conversation
with Quintilian," Michael Calvin McGee, University of Iowa

B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEBATE THEORY

Chair: Randall A. Lake, University of Southern California

"The Role of Propositions in Forensic Argument," Thomas J. Hynes,
University of Louisville and Walter Ulrich, Vanderbilt University

"The Art of Storytelling: An Argument for a Narrative Perspective in
Academic Debate," Thomas A. Hollihan, Patricia Riley, and Kevin T.
Baaske, University of Southern California

"Topicality and Division of Ground: Framing Policy Dialectic,"
David Hingstman, Baylor University

"A Paradigmatic Theory of Topicality," Mike Allen and Nancy Burrell,
Michigan State University

SATURDAY, AUGUST 3

9:00 AM - 12:15 PM

TEACHING THE BASIC COURSE IN ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE [Workshop]

Chair: Sharon Porter, Northern Arizona University

Basic Argumentation Perspective:

"Argumentation for the General Student: Toward a Pedagogical
Justification," Patricia M. Ganer, Cypress College and Malcolm O.
Sillars, University of Utah

Combination Perspective:

Clark D. Olson, "Teaching the Argumentation Course From a
Multifaceted Perspective," Arizona State University and B. Wayne
Callaway, University of Wyoming

Competitive Perspective:

Keith Freadhoff, "Teaching Argumentation From a Competitive
Perspective," University of Southern California and Jack Rhodes,
Augustana College

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9:00 - 10:30 AM

A. MEANING AND ARGUMENT

Chair: Sally Jackson, University of Oklahoma

"A Constructivist Approach to Meaning: In Defense of Interpretation,"
Claudia L. Hale, Iowa State University

"Pragmatics of Meaning," B. Aubrey Fisher, University of Utah

"A New Look at Meaning in Systems of
Argument," Gary B. LaFleur, College of Syracuse University-- Utica

"Narrative Beliefs: Belief Spirals and the Probability Stories,"
Randall K. Stutman, University of Illinois-- Urbana-Champaign

B. HYBRID AND AD HOC FIELDS OF ARGUMENT: EXPLORING THE LIMITS

Chair: Charles A. Willard, University of Louisville

"Argumentation in Utility Rate Hearings: Public Participation in a
Hybrid Field," Michael J. Wallinger, Frostburg State College

"Exploring the Boundaries of Technical and Social Knowledge: A Case Study
in Arbitration Arguments," Randall A. Lake and Colleen M. Keough,
University of Southern California

"On the Dilemma of Ad Hoc Argument Fields: The Inadequacy of Field
Dependent Argument Standards," Craig A. Dudczak, University of
Oklahoma

CRITIC: Charles Arthur Willard, University of Louisville

10:45 AM - 12:15 PM

A. ARGUMENT AND IDEOLOGY

Chair: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina-- Chapel Hill

"Argument and Consciousness in Labor History: A Case Study of the
Gastonia Strike," James Arnt Aune, University of Virginia

"The Place of Morality in the Modern World," Phillip C. Wander, San Jose
State University

"The Rhetoric of Historiography: New Left Revisionism in the Vietnam
Era," Michael J. Hogan, University of Virginia

CRITIC: "Argument and Ideology: A Postscript," Bruce Gronbeck,
University of Iowa

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B. INDIVIDUALS AND DYADS IN ARGUMENTATION

Chair: B. Aubrey Fisher, University of Utah

"Can Ordinary Arguers Recognize a Valid Conclusion If It Walks Up and Bites Them on the Butt?" Scott Jacobs, University of Oklahoma, Mike Allen, Michigan State University, Sally Jackson, University of Oklahoma, and Dan Petrel, Michigan State University

"Unused Compliance Gaining Strategies," Dale Hample and Judith M. Dallinger, Western Illinois University

"An Investigation of Relational Interaction and Interpersonal Argument," Ann K. Burnett and G. Lloyd Drecksel, University of Utah

"What Are Conversational Arguments? Toward a Natural Language User's Perspective," Robert W. Martin and Dirk R. Scheerhorn, University of Iowa

2:00 - 3:30 PM

A. CONTRIBUTED PAPERS IN ARGUMENT

Chair: Holt V. Spicer, Southwest Missouri State University

"Propositions of Fact, Value, and Policy: A Semiotic Augmentation of Argumentation," Richard Fiordo, University of Calgary (Canada)

"In Defense of the Fallacy," Walter Ulrich, Vanderbilt University

"Argumentation in the Field of Rhetorical Communication," Norbert Gutenberg, Universitat des Saarlandes (West Germany)

"The Cosmological Exigence and Presocratic Philosophy," Peter J. Marston, University of Southern California

B. ARGUMENTATION IN GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Chair: Sara Newell, University of Wisconsin-- Milwaukee

"A Critical Summary of Research on the Role of Argument in Decision-Making Groups," Dennis S. Gouran, The Pennsylvania State University

"Argumentation and Negotiation," Gregg B. Walker, University of Utah

"The Effects of Evidence on the Perceived Outcome in Superior-Subordinate Decision-Making Situations," Kay Neal, University of Wisconsin-- Oshkosh

"Patterns of Argumentation in High and Low Consensus Discussions," Roger C. Pace, Texas A&M University

3:45 - 5:15 PM

A. JUDGMENTS, REASONS, AND POLITICAL PLURALISM

Chair: David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

"Political Judgment and Rhetorical Argument: Edmund Burke's Paradigm," Stephen H. Browne and Michael C. Leff, University of Wisconsin-- Madison

"Political Pluralism and Ideological Argument," Mike Weiler, University of Pittsburgh

"Reagan's First State of the Union Address: A Case Study in Language, Argument and Culture," Kenneth R. Chase, University of Illinois-- Urbana-Champaign

"Negative Pollspots: Mediated Arguments in the Political Arena", Robert A. Baukus, and J. Gregory Payne, Marc S. Reisler, Emerson College

B. VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST'S THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

Chair: Charles Arthur Willard, University of Louisville

Susan L. Kline, ["Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's Theory of Argumentation: A Critical Summary], University of Washington

Sally A. Jackson, "What Can Speech Acts Do for Argumentation?" University of Oklahoma

Joseph W. Wenzel, "Toward a Normative Theory of Argumentation: Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's Code of Conduct for Rational Discussions," University of Illinois-- Urbana-Champaign

Respondents: Frans H. Van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, University of Amsterdam

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CONCLUDING BRUNCH - 9:00 AM

The Moral Problem of *Argumentum per Argumentum*

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Though Mal Sillars might impishly suggest that my career has been devoted to such prose, I've never tried to write a keynote speech or a sermon. Today, however, I will try to deliver both at once. The atmosphere high above Salt Lake City nurtures this venture, for as we look down upon the holy places of the Mormon Church, we cannot help but notice that the angel Moroni is shown holding a heavenly trumpet. Of course we do not know that he sets his lips to blow a keynote, but this does not seem to be an unreasonably inference: Since Joshua fought the battle of Jericho, trumpets have set a tonic symbolizing the unity of the faithful struggling to bring heathen walls tumbling down. We are constantly hearing a clarion call to action, usually in defense of holy things against the encroachment of evil. I have nothing holy to defend, however, and the walls I would bring down are not in themselves evil, nor are they defended by heathens. I want only the form of a sermon, therefore, to suggest that the study of argumentation has strayed from the righteous path of moral reasoning. My text is the rhetorical theory of Isocrates. If I seem to wax metaphysical, and if my keynote sounds too dizzily romantic for your taste, soften your judgment with the thought that even Moroni might suffer from lack of oxygen at this altitude. Let me begin by considering argumentation as art.

Human beings can make an art out of any practice. Even a plumber might find a mode of unique self expression by installing a urinal elegantly. Some things, of course, lend themselves easily to aesthetic expression, while other things are so ordinary that only the most skilled, experienced workers could even recognize artistry in labor. Thus we would be surprised to find a plumber-artist, but probably no more surprised than we would be to find an exquisite statue of Aphrodite as the main structural support of a grain elevator. Astonishment arises from our irrational desire to see but one human motive behind what we are willing to call "art"—such ordinary labor as plumbing is thought to corrupt aesthetic motives; and if a sculptor gives evidence of "crass commercial interest," even the most exquisite statuary is somehow corrupted. Because work and art do not mix well, we often insist that art be done for its own sake; *ars gratia artis*, or, as the Greeks were prone to say, "for the good of the soul."

Plato insisted that persuasive argumentation is more like plumbing than sculpting. Because it does work, he thought, rhetoric has no substance, and hence cannot be practiced as an art. The substance of sculpting is a product, the finished statue. Argumentation, on the other hand, produces only arguments which are intermediary in obtaining the product of such real arts as medicine (health) and philosophy (wisdom). In this line of thinking, an argument is analogous to the sculptor's chisel. Rhetoric cannot be connected directly to "the good of the soul." It is instead the soul of sophistry because it promotes empty skill.

We have always known that different conceptions of sophistry create an issue between Plato and Isocrates, but we so often twist the argument toward Plato's emphasis on the *techné* of rhetoric that we skip past the point of clash. Isocrates and Plato share an antipathy toward *argumentum per argumentum*. Plato, however, positioned himself on the margins of Greek intellectual life, where sophistry is failure by degrees to approach an ideal. Isocrates, by contrast, positioned himself at the center of Greek philosophy. Sophists were extremists who oversimplified the integrated triad of thought/word/action by insisting on the primacy or exclusivity of one element. Some were involved in the practice of thinking for the sake of thinking, others talk for the sake of talk, and an impetuous few were willing to act for the sake of acting. Plato practiced the sophistic art of disputation:

Among the professors of disputation there are some who talk no less abusively of the art of speaking . . . than do the most benighted of men. . . . I could, perhaps, say much harsher things of them than they of me, but I refrain. . . . I believe that the teachers who are skilled in . . . studies of that sort do not injure but, on the contrary, benefit their pupils, not so much as they profess, but more than others give them credit for. . . . While we are occupied with [such study, we] are forced to apply our minds to difficult problems . . . [and] gain the power . . . of grasping and learning more easily those subjects which are of more importance and greater value. I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term 'philosophy' to a training which is no help to us in the present either in our speech or in our actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy.¹

Isocrates did not clearly distinguish between philosophy and rhetoric; the two practices are in fact so collapsed and integrated that he can be mistaken for what we now call a "post-modern" thinker.² In those terms, Isocratic rhetorical theory should be understood as an applied political aesthetic. The issue that separates Plato and Isocrates, in other words, has little to do with discourse strategies or the motive of those who claim to be lovers of wisdom. The point of clash is the status of argumentation as art. Those who "traduce my occupation," wrote Isocrates, "might have the effrontery to call Phedias, who wrought our statue of Athena, a dollmaker, or say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius practiced the same art as the sign-painters."³ Isocrates was one

of the most aggressive proponents of what we now call "culture study." He believed not only that argumentation is an art, but even that it deserves comparison with so-called "pure arts."

Richard Rorty, perhaps the harshest of Plato's recent critics, suggests that the "The Father of Philosophy" influenced his progeny to work from badly posed fundamental questions. He suggests that contemporary thinkers should position themselves "where the Sophists were before Plato brought his principle to bear and invented 'philosophical thinking.'"⁴ In the study of argumentation, this means re-creating Isocratic rhetoric. The most striking result, I think, will be understanding how Plato, with the aid of Aristotle, subverted the art in rhetoric by mis-construing the relationship between discourse and language. Both thinkers conceived discourse analytically, as a part/whole complex such that what we say about language will also be true of discourse. Discourse, however, is more than the sum of its parts, more than written and spoken words arranged to strategic advantage. Understood in context, it is an amalgam of thought/word/action implicating the whole life-world of both its maker and its consumer. Argumentation, therefore, produces *habits of life and living*, not formations of words. The art in rhetoric consists of *accomplishing* persuasion in the best interest of a polity, not in *discovering* "the means of persuasion," as Aristotle claimed. The important thing to say about discourse is not that it is comprised of linguistic structures, but that human thought, activity, and even Being is constituted by and in it. It would be silly to judge painters by watching them mix paints--their reputation must depend on what they make. So the art of rhetoric resides in what kind of life rhetoricians make with the words they mix.

I want to clarify and amplify my view of Isocratic rhetoric, but if you will tolerate a slight complication, I'd like to do so in the context of describing what I regard as deficiencies in the contemporary study of argumentation. The time has come for sermonizing: I want to compare what our ancestors intended the art of argumentation to make with the potential of our present conception of argumentation.

Historically, the "renaissance" of rhetoric in this century was motivated by political considerations. Argumentation was taken up, not by scholars committed to ivory-tower research into the writings of dead Greeks, but by teachers interested in responding to the most difficult problem that can arise in a democracy, the possibility that our political system in crisis will collapse into what John Dewey described as an "oligarchy" of expertise.⁵ Read in the wrong way, such early speech teachers as James Albert Winans might be thought anti-intellectual: "The old argument about the relative importance of the orator in ancient and in modern times need not detain us at all," wrote Winans, "for whatever the answer may be to that question, in these latter days of ever multiplying organizations, and in a country

governed by discussion and public opinion, it has come about that there is greater opportunity and demand for speech-making than ever before. Never before have so many ill-prepared men found themselves before audiences."⁶ Winans, of course, was not opposed to making a traditional academic practice out of argumentation, but his motive was clearly practical and political, more reminiscent of Isocrates than Plato and Aristotle. In Isocrates' language, Winans and other speech teachers meant "to obtain a polity which can properly deal with our affairs."⁷

In principle, we could have conceived an academic practice consistent with Isocrates' socially and politically conscious view of intellectual life. But, as Wander has argued, such a development was unlikely because of the location of speech teachers in Universities, and of Universities in an elitist culture. Speech teachers had to justify their practice within a traditional conception (which we get from Plato) that scholarship should soar high "above" political interest toward a cosmic, aeriferous Truth.⁸ A few courageous writers, such as Everett Leigh Hunt, risked "sophistry" by making much of the affinity between American pragmatism and Isocratic rhetoric.⁹ Most accounts of argumentation in this century, however, have been capitalized by philological neo-classicism, a view that valorizes Plato's conception of intellectual life and privileges Aristotle's arsenal of recipes.

We have a contradiction, then, between a pedagogical practice justified by a need to develop a polity competent to manage the affairs of a democracy, and a scholarly practice justified by a need to understand the mechanics and tactics of text formation. Should we test and reward students for their ability to make and promote wise practical decisions? Or should we test and reward their mastery of techniques for arranging words to strategic advantage? I would not want to pose a false dilemma for you--the rift between didactic and academic conceptions of argumentation is not logically necessary. In theory, we should be able to achieve both goals simultaneously. In practice, however, we have been driven exclusively toward academics, partly in consequence of Plato's and Aristotle's analytic distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. Scholars in Western universities, for example, are likely to separate Isocrates' political aesthetics into three "branches," each of which is treated as a self-contained "discipline": Politics is the business of the political science department, aesthetics of the philosophy department, and argumentation of a communication department. There is little coordination among "disciplines." The political scientist grades "methodological rigor" and complains about poor mastery of fundamental argument skills. The philosopher grades "creativity and thought" while complaining about widespread irrationality. The rhetorician grades the student's "accuracy and clarity of expression" while yawning at superficial thought on such trite and ineffable topics as the morality of abortion. Each student is supposed to "put it all together" on his or her own. In Isocratic terms, all three academic

practices are sophistic--political scientists teach policy for the sake of re-acting, philosophers teach thinking for the sake of argument, and rhetoricians teach argumentation for the sake of winning.

Let's look closely at sophistry in communication studies. Though I think it is too often made a scapegoat, we might look first at the history of debating. In the spirit of sermonizing, let me apply the following text from Isocrates:

I am grieved to see the sycophant's trade faring better than philosophy--the one attacking, the other on the defensive. Who of the men of old could have anticipated that things would come to this pass, in Athens, of all places, where we more than others plume ourselves on our wisdom?¹⁰

Collegiate debate was originally a laboratory exercise designed to teach the mechanics of argumentation while simultaneously giving students a semblance of experience with public life. To simulate controversy, a political problem was translated into a proposition of policy to force fledgling advocates to choose but one of two sides. To simulate publicity, debate was to take place before an audience. The audience cheered, jeered, and judged; but it was a gallery, not a polity, because participation in the debate was forbidden. Class lasted an hour, and so did debates. Now if a simulation were perfect, it wouldn't be a simulation, so we should not expect true representation of public life. One flaw, however, is especially significant because it subverts the didactic view of argument. The exercise was cast as a performance, implying that the public life being simulated is also a performance. In a sense, of course, it is--we are all familiar with the rich intellectual capital in "the world is a stage" metaphors. Such terms are not meant to imply that playing the role of advocate is the primary problem of argumentation, however. Debaters were not trained in the philosophy of action--their practice was mere rehearsal.

Viewed as a rehearsal for public life, debate teaches things that are simply not true. With rare exceptions, in crisis situations, problems in public life are not "natural," or "given," as hurricanes force themselves upon us. Social problems are shown by people who take the agenda-setting power, and the question of what should be debated in a democracy often determines the outcome of debate. I have studied social problems for twenty years, and I have yet to find one that could be reduced to a proposition--legal problems must be framed that way, but the political economy is not so orderly as a courtroom. Neither have I discovered a social problem with only two sides. Nor is the time frame of debate instructive: Argumentation in Anglo-America occurs in narrative and historical time, in time *ex nihilo* or in increments that we must measure in decades, sometimes in centuries, almost never in hours. There are genuine crises, of course; but these are rare, and I suspect that argumentation is not a characteristic or particularly

productive response to them. Finally, when a polity is silenced by procedural requirements, democracy itself is threatened. To create a "competent public," in Dewey's language, or to make a "polity that can properly deal with our affairs," in Isocrates' terms, is the best motive I can think of to study argumentation. An argumentation practice staged with an elite advocate prancing before silent masses who turn thumbs up or thumbs down in judgment--this is a Roman circus, the sign of a corrupt polity and decadent democracy.

Great changes were wrought in debate during the 1960's. Everyone understood the difficulties I've just discussed--not in my terms, of course; but the idea was there, in the common complaint that debate had little to do with "the real world." Some thought reform possible. We could abandon romantic conceptions of democracy, discover how decisions were really made, and then show our students how to grease the machinery of any organization. Others, I think the majority, gave up the notion that debate can, or should, simulate public life. For them, debate was a sport, and its connection with "the real world" was its ability to drill students on the mechanics of argumentation until the poses of parry and thrust were automatic reflexes. Notice that these two attitudes are quite compatible in their emphasis on *technique*. Professional expertise is the pedagogical goal, either because it is marketable or because it produces a championship trophy at the N. D. T.

Viewed as a sport producing marketable professional skills, debate loses all contact with Isocratic rhetoric. "Topicality" became a stock issue in debate. The resolution is treated as if it were recently brought down from Sinai--now, as never before, debate is imprisoned in mere semantic possibility. A complex political economy is better represented in new debate, but in ten-second snips that oversimplify in the act of acknowledging complexity. We still teach that there are two sides to every question, never four or seven or ten, despite the fact that society is self-consciously pluralistic as never before. Time is an important factor still, but in a curious way--the essential skill coaches look for in debate--team recruits, I am told, is the ability to speak somewhere just shy of Mach 1. Audiences have not existed for some time. Judges in otherwise empty rooms replaced them at least as early as the 1960's. The judge at first made decisions as an average member of the polity might. New debate, however, demands professionalism even of judges. To judge at the N. D. T., one must be "qualified" by the experience of having judged several rounds at a "certified" tournament. The possibility that their performance might be judged by a steel worker or a postal clerk would horrify N. D. T. debaters. Professional judges are insisted upon, of course, because no polity would make technical decisions about the sham we call argument. Morally, I think, the new debate is a realization in microcosm of John Dewey's worst fear for democracy, that it can so easily slide into an oligarchy of expertise.

Debate is too often made a scapegoat precisely because it is a microcosm. I have suggested that the problem lies in our very formulation of the questions taken to constitute the alleged "discipline" of argumentation. The history of debate lets us see how it is possible to get caught between opposing academic and didactic conceptions of argumentation. Because these ideas are compatible in principle, it is easy to blame debate coaches for allowing an unjustifiable practice. We parody Shakespeare's Caesar: "The fault, dear coaches, lies not in our theory, but in the star system of competitive debate." Let me show you that the fault lies in our theorizing, even in such important contributions as the concept of "situation."

The motif of the history of philosophy, according to Rorty, is a struggle to find an "unshakable foundation" for what we believe. Since Plato's invention of philosophical thinking, rational beliefs were thought to be true when they "mirrored Nature."¹¹ Of course no mirror is large enough to reflect all of "Nature," so we have to cut out sections, study them in isolation, and then put the pieces together as in a jigsaw puzzle.¹² This formulation gives us two reasons to take up any particular study: We might study chemistry, for example, to learn how to make wealth--such things as fertilizer or pesticides. Or we might study "the philosophy of chemistry," to understand why "Nature" is sliced so as to make chemistry a piece of the knowledge puzzle. After we have established that chemistry is what we call "a legitimate study," and after we show how it fits with other puzzle pieces, we have transformed chemistry from a mere utilitarian practice, "a knack like cooking," into a philosophically justified set of rational true beliefs.

We all know that the practice hardest hit by "Mirror of Nature" arguments is the study of rhetoric. The "philosophy of rhetoric" was defined in Plato's terms as a quest for legitimacy, a search for some way to carve up "Nature" so that rhetoricians can know how to produce the kind of truth epistemologists approve of. Bitzer suggested that persuasive argumentation is connected with nature's mirror in that common and recurring "situations," presumably natural, "strongly invite" an appropriate rhetorical response.¹³ Argumentation can thus conform to Plato's conception of "art," and many contemporary ideas of "science," by adopting a style of thought usually associated with geometry: Thought starts with the rhetorical situation as "given" or "axiomatic." Cases of argumentation in practice are judged as more and less appropriate responses to the situation. We then develop "theorems" or "principles" about what might have been better and worse responses. Finally, we connect our "theorems" with public argument in the same way that geometry applies to civil engineering--as general principles serving to justify conventional construction techniques.

So long as we are stuck with "Mirror of Nature" conceptions, Bitzer's thesis is very persuasive. But notice where the ensuing conversation leads us: Vatz pushes Scott's "rhetoric is epistemic" thesis by objecting to the claim that a rhetorical situation is "natural." Situations, he says, are manufactured from the resources of argument. They are as relative to the skill and intention of individual advocates as speech itself.¹⁴ This argument tasted sourly of solipsism, so Bitzer redirected his conception along the path of neo-classical realism: Rhetorical situations are largely beyond the individual's control; a speech may *shape* the situation to which it responds, as possible answers determine the meaning a question might have; but discourse cannot make its own situation any more than an answer can pose its own question.¹⁵ Our talk about rhetorical situation thus comes down to arguing out the subtleties of an ineffable opposition between "subjectivism" and "objectivism." And notice how little it matters: If you like Bitzer's perspective, you will stand Aristotle on his head by making "any given situation" more problematic than "discovering the means of persuasion." Instead of suggesting that the Kennedy inaugural is eloquent and politically effective when compared to similar speeches, you will prove that mediocrity is possible: Common and recurring rhetorical situations produce common, recurring, and incredibly banal "genres" of argument practice. If you find "subjectivism" persuasive, on the other hand, you will knock Burke off his feet by making the technical invention of "symbolic reality" seem more problematic than material critique of the prevailing political economy. Since only its "naturalness" is at issue, "situation" will be the foundation of what we do no matter which side earns the laurel.

From Isocrates' perspective, we are perpetuating sophistry because we are far more concerned with *having* a foundation than we are with what we *make* with it. Should we not be asking what kind of art results when we start with the concept "rhetorical situation"? Turning Aristotle upside down solves none of our fundamental problems--we merely revise and update the word *techné*. With emphasis on finding the means of persuasion, we looked for logical and psychological inducements, building up an inventory of appeals and arguments that could prove useful on any occasion. With emphasis on situation we presuppose such an inventory and look for ways to tailor inducements to the requirements of particular "fields." With Aristotle's emphasis, *techné* consists of the number of persuasive devices we accumulate and rehearse. With the second emphasis, however, *techné* consists of an ability to establish expertise in dealing with recurring situations. In academic practice, the art in rhetoric is papered over by the "field" in which argumentation is conceived to be instrumental--rhetoricians establish their "expertise" more by mastering the literature of history, philosophy, politics, and social psychology than by displaying their own wisdom. In everyday practice, the art in rhetoric is too often prostituted by "client" subordination to the profit-making, vote-getting imperatives of sheer

salesmanship--rhetoricians establish their "expertise" by showing how professionally-applied communication skills maximize profits while minimizing loss. Both in theory and in practice, in other words, we are still presenting ourselves as technicians, not as artists, and we are thereby adding our contribution to the general cultural drift which may reduce Anglo-American democracy to an oligarchy of expertise.

Enough of sins--keynotes should end on the up-beat, and sermons should offer an avenue for redemption. The problems I have touched upon are really sins of omission. I no more object to mastering the technologies of argumentation and persuasion than I would object to the sculptor's detailed knowledge of cutting tools. Mistaking the technology for the art is problematic, of course; but in modern times the far greater difficulty is lack of interest in or attention to the art of argumentation in *any* terms. I think we need to re-create the terms and meaning of Isocratic rhetoric, formulating a theory of argumentation understood as applied political aesthetics. Stating the essential commitments underlying this theory is easy: We should not equate facts and truths. Facts are nothing but raw materials, blocks of stone awaiting the sculptor's chisel. You can discover facts, but truths are *made*. The test of a truth is its promotion of human need and aspiration. Argumentation is *the art of making dreams come true*, not in fantasy to delight the imagination, but in reality to make everyday life more comfortable. The products of argumentation are not speeches and essays, but human lives. As Isocrates said, "Those who desire to follow the true precepts of this discipline may, if they will, be helped more speedily towards honesty of character than . . . facility in oratory."¹⁶ "The argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words."¹⁷

A theory drawn from these commitments would stand starkly against prevailing epistemological constructs. It would thus add a provocative alternative to Brockriede's list of perspectives on argumentation.¹⁸ Because it may also contribute to a more radical goal of redirecting intellectual life toward moral reasoning, however, I want to say more about the topics and texture of a contemporary Isocratic rhetoric.¹⁹ Let me discuss particularly the view of morality Isocrates promoted, its dependence on cultural experience, and its *techné* of historically-material comparison.

Isocrates, of course, did not claim to teach what Plato and Aristotle called ethics. He thought it wrong-headed to believe that morality can be reduced to a series of rationally justified propositions of value: "I believe," he said, that ideal morality "has never existed and does not now exist, and that people who profess that power will grow weary and cease from their vain pretensions before such an education is ever found."²⁰ Morality is learned, and it is easily recognized; but it is acquired in the practice of everyday life. It underpins the rules, codes, and laws we freeze in syntactic:

Virtue is not advanced by written laws but by the habits of every-day life; for the majority of men tend to assimilate the manners and morals amid which they have been reared. . . . It is not by legislation, but by morals that states are well directed, since men who are badly reared will venture to transgress even laws which are drawn up with minute exactness, whereas those who are well brought up will be willing to respect even a simple code. . . . Our forefathers did not seek to discover first how they should penalize men who were lawless, but how they should produce citizens who would refrain from any punishable act.²¹

Isocrates claimed to put his students in *the way* of moral knowledge. He suggested that practicing the *art* of argumentation increased the chances of developing a strong moral consciousness because advocates are constantly in situations where sensitivity to others' needs, and to their own need to keep a stainless reputation, is the *vinculum* of success.²²

This argument is easy to misconstrue if we interpret it to make the practice of individual advocates into the foundation of morality. The morality that we acquire through experience lies not in any person's life-situation, but in the texture of culture generally, both presently and historically. The rhetorical situation makes us particularly sensitive to morality, but only because we are confronting the most obvious manifestation of our political culture in the act of making persuasive arguments. The significant experience, Isocrates argued, is of *the polity*, "the soul of a state."²³ "Sycophants," speakers such as Plato's Callicles, sometimes mislead and corrupt the polity. But they are always subject to critique based on a comparison of "our present democracy with that which was handed down to us by our forefathers"²⁴:

Our forefathers had resolved that the people, as the supreme master of the state, should appoint the magistrates, call to account those who failed in their duty, and judge in cases of dispute. . . . Those citizens who . . . devote[d] themselves to the care of the commonwealth, as servants of the people, [were] entitled to receive commendation if they proved faithful to their trust. . . . If they governed badly, [they were condemned] to meet with no mercy, but to suffer the severest punishment.²⁵

Athenian political culture was ordered, in principle, to reward integrity and to punish the arrogance of power. The *techné* of praise and blame aimed at controlling "servants of the people" is easily confused with what might be called "cultural chauvinism."

Cultural chauvinism is one horn of a false dilemma often posed against those who believe that historical experience ought to influence present action. The problem is showing that dead Europeans have something important to say to live Americans. Either the past relates to the present as cause to effect, say the objectors, or as Utopia to worshipful celebrants. The

first possibility works out to be "determinism," the extreme form of which is dismal Marxist arguments about the inevitability of historical process.²⁶ The second possibility works out to be a glorification of the past to reproduce one interpretation of it in the present, the extreme form of which is Fascist nationalism.²⁷

Isocrates seems impaled on the second horn, but only if you fail to consider that his position is actually a third alternative. Those who pose the dilemma understand neither the *techné* nor the art of argumentation. The past is related to the present through analogy, as memory to action. The analogy does not *prove*--it illustrates and clarifies. History is a series of stories about people very *like* ourselves. When we know how old stories come out in the end, we are made aware of one possible outcome of *similar* stories currently in progress.²⁸ History is technically a model which functions in argument at the point where idealists typically pose hypothetical examples. The difference between Rousseau's and Isocrates' conception of "freedom," for example, is that Rousseau invented a total fiction about "noble savages" as a vehicle of comparison, while Isocrates organized the material experience of an historical polity as a vehicle of comparison. Isocrates worried about *real people* while Rousseau toyed with such terms as "rational animal" and "state of Nature" as if he were moving pieces on a chess board.

Further, history functions *artistically* in Isocratic rhetoric. We are not supposed to *reproduce* the past in the present, but to use comparison *critically*:

I reproach men in private life when they succeed in a few things and fail in many, and regard them as falling short of what they ought to be. . . . And I am of the same mind also regarding public affairs. For I think that we ought not to be proud or even satisfied should we have shown ourselves more law-regarding than men accursed by the gods and afflicted with madness, but ought much rather to feel aggrieved and resentful should we prove to be worse than our ancestors.²⁹

The point here is that the best comparisons are diachronic and not synchronic. Those who believe that we have a leg up on the good life because we are better off than folks "accursed by the gods and afflicted with madness"--Russians, in other words--are egregiously wrong in their very way of thinking. The correct analogy is historical, because our ancestors shared our political culture and the practical morality which it engenders. To make wise decisions and lead a happier life, we should keep our society under *constant* critique, taking care that we craft our lives at least as artfully as older artists who wrought similar material into an artifact we still remember as our own history.

Sermons and keynotes both require a peroration, in this case a brief summary of my hopes and aspirations for argumentation. Too long have we languished as the shade of epistemology, formulating scheme on scheme to meet the impossible requirements of "mirroring Nature." We have formed a community of technicians trapped in Plato's and Aristotle's vision of intellectual life. Argumentation was created on a different tonic, however, as an *art of moral reasoning*. My clarion call has been to create an Isocratic rhetoric, an applied political aesthetic concerned more with the health of our polity than the success of our advocates. I hope to see an argumentation practice that self-consciously aims to avoid an oligarchy of expertise which would condemn our students to the sad occupation of greasing organizational procedures. I aspire to contribute to a theory of argumentation aimed at understanding the cultural materials which we must use to carve out the best possible life-world. Above all, I hope to live in a community where reality is lived, truths are made, and facts are used. I tire of discovery. Let's *create* something.

Endnotes

¹Isocrates, *Orat.* III.258-66; In: *The Works of Isocrates*, trans. George Norlin and Larue Van Hook (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 2:329-33.

²Isocrates is "post-modern" in his insistence upon historical reason, his unyielding focus on present *praxis*, his development of a comparative "hermeneutic," his conception of the relationship between discourse and social *praxis*, and his belief that the most important motive of scholarship is moral judgment (the "praise and blame" of epideictic rhetoric). A short list of recent texts I think of as generically "post-modern" in the present context would include: Karl-Otto Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities," *Man and World*, 15 (1972), 3-37; Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities*, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983); Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (1967; Eng. trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: Verso, 1975); Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1982); Lucien Goldman, *Power and Humanism*, trans. Brian Trench and Tom Wengraf, (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1974); Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, (New York: Seabury Press, 1976); Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (1981; Eng. trans. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Ralph Manheim from the 3rd German ed. (1953; Eng. trans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969); Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (1980; Eng. trans. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Frank Lentricchia, *Criticism and Social Change*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, trans. William Kluback (1977; Eng. trans. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, *Meaning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (1955; Eng. trans. Evanston,

IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965); Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative: Volume 1*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (1983; Eng. trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason: A Theory of Practical Groups*, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith (1960; Eng. trans. London: NLB, 1976); Calvin O. Schrag, *Radical Reflection and the Origin of the Human Sciences* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1980); Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," *Review of Metaphysics*, 25 (1971), 3-51; and Paolo Valerio, *Nouantiqua: Rhetorics as Contemporary Theory* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980).

³Isocrates, *Orat.* III.2; *Works* 2:185.

⁴Rorty, *Mirror*, p. 157.

⁵John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (1927; rpt. Chicago: Swallow Press, 1964), p. 208.

⁶James A. Winans, *Speech-Making*, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: published by the author, 1934), p. 6.

⁷Isocrates, *Orat.* II.13-14; *Works* 2:111-113.

⁸See Philip Wander, "The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism," *The Central States Speech Journal*, 34 (1983), 1-18.

⁹See Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," In: *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans* (New York: The Century Company, 1925); and Everett Lee Hunt, "On the Sophists," In: Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga, eds., *The Province of Rhetoric* (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 69-84.

¹⁰Isocrates, *Orat.* IV.312; *Works*, 2:359.

¹¹Rorty, *Mirror of Nature*, pp. 131-311.

¹²Schrag, *Radical Reflection*, pp. 65-66.

¹³Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (1968), 1-14.

¹⁴Richard E. Vatz, "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 6 (1973), 154-61.

CASSANDRA'S HEIRS

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My title may seem odd. Argumentation is an intrinsically optimistic discipline. At its core is a therapeutic hypothesis--that people can make better decisions than they do, think more critically than they are wont to, reach higher than they are prone to, and abide by better rules than they are used to. Surely there are no parallels between such a sanguine enterprise and a Greek tragedy. Priam's daughter had the gift of prophecy, but was fated never to be believed. The Greeks were fatalists and we are not; our faults are not in our stars but in our decisions.

But there are other kinds of determinism. Because people often become powerful as they become famous, we sometimes forget that ideas become powerful in the opposite way. Ideas at the center of attention get severely looked after: picked at, scrutinized, and weighed. For new ideas, communities bring their full veridical arsenals into play. But ideas which recede to the background get taken for granted. They become tacit, unconscious truths--mores or folkways, as Sumner said--and hence the most dangerous hypotheses: "Because we make them without knowing it," Poincaré said, "we are unable to abandon them." Kelly called them "hostages we give to fortune"--forgone options, unseen possibilities, narrowed fields of vision--ideas whose tacitness gives them primitive authority.

We have vested interests in believing that determinism-by-tacitness is more an individual than a communal frailty. These interests have intensified with the rise of consensualism. These interests have intensified with the rise of consensualism as a dominant epistemic paradigm. First, consensualism's focus on rational consensus as a community achievement lends more importance to our disciplinary subject matter than formal epistemology did. Second, in supplanting foundationalism, consensualism has transformed our pedagogy into a celebration of the communal over the individual--of playing by the rules, following the rational recipes, and subordinating private preferences to publicly justified goals. Third, consensualism emphasizes the centrality of a subject. Argumentation is uniquely equipped to study: the argument-from-authority, exemplified by Stich and Nisbett's claim that "one of the principle effects of education is to socialize people to defer to cognitive authorities."¹ Consensualism, in sum, has put Argumentation into a permanent state of war with individual whims.

¹⁶See Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective," in Eugene E. White, ed., *Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Use of Rhetoric* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), pp. 21-38; and Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Forum: Bitzer on Vatz," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 67 (1981), 99-101.

¹⁵Isocrates, *Orat.* III.21; *Works*, 2:177.

¹⁷Isocrates, *Orat.* IV.274-75, 278; *Works*, 2:337-39.

¹⁸Wayne Brockriede, "Arguing About Human Understanding," *Communication Monographs*, 49 (1982), 137-47; and Wayne Brockriede, "Constructs, Experience and Argument," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 71 (1985), 151-63.

¹⁹See Thomas B. Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, "Accidental Rhetoric: The Root Metaphors of Three Mile Island," *Communication Monographs*, 48 (1981), 271-300; and Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Rhetorical Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," *Communication Monographs*, 51 (1984), 1-22.

²⁰Isocrates, *Orat.* IV.274-75, 278; *Works*, 2:337-39.

²¹Isocrates, *Orat.* II.40-42; *Works*, 2:129-131.

²²Isocrates, *Orat.* IV.278; *Works*, 2:339.

²³Isocrates, *Orat.* II.13-14; *Works*, 2:111-113.

²⁴Isocrates, *Orat.* II.15; *Works*, 2:113.

²⁵Isocrates, *Orat.* II.26-27; *Works*, 2:119-121.

²⁶See Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

²⁷See J. P. Stern, *Hitler: The Fuhrer and the People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Fred Weinstein, *The Dynamics of Nazism: Leadership, Ideology, and the Holocaust* (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

²⁸See Dominick LaCapra, *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 72-117.

²⁹Isocrates, *Orat.* II.72-73; *Works*, 2:151.

Aside from these disciplinary preferences, we are prone to think that consensualism is better than the epistemology it replaced. Communities do check individuals' whims and idiosyncrasies. Their tacit assumptions are more likely than an individual's to have withstood criticism. And prudent people do not rock lifeboats: since communal intellectual life is all we have, we are inclined to be good epistemic citizens. As Pascal said, one cannot be a skeptic all the time.

But piety is as pernicious as overblown skepticism--perhaps more so in a consensualist context. Communities are not beyond critique because they are less responsible than individuals for the genesis of error: their superiority stems from their openness to critique embodied in social structures which encourage innovation and debate. Consenses do change. We do find ideas which have slipped through the past's critical net. We needn't be doctrinaire skeptics to say with Hume that every piety bears watching.

Piety is most expensive for those who can least afford it. I doubt that Argumentation is more pious than other disciplines, or that any discipline is more reflective than others, though some claim to be. But Argumentation has exercised a fifty year custodianship over procedural principles and epistemic concepts--the rules, contexts, and procedures of argument and debate--matters of foundational importance in a consensualist context which might make a difference in a world seemingly bent upon bad decision-making. It would be ironic if the field were not unusually reflective about the social constitution of its knowledge. Hence the parallel with Cassandra. We have a Cassandra-like flaw in our thinking. Just as our concepts become important, the field's fatal flaw arises: we can speak only banalities.

My thesis is thus a parallel case to the field's therapeutic hypothesis: Argumentation can be a better discipline than it was born to be; it can reach higher than it is wont to; its criticism can make a difference in a world that turns on criticism; its criticism can contribute to the field's intellectual ecology. Our pedagogical heritage is an impediment to these ambitions: it constrains our hopes and shortens our reach; it narrows our vision and circumscribes our choices. The way a person orders his own freedom and determinism is arguably the most interesting thing about him. People can be--and their intellectual communities must be--as free of their histories as they choose to be.

The Argumentation Discipline

My argument must begin with proof that Argumentation is a

discipline. The conventional wisdom has been that argument studies are interdisciplinary; Argumentation is a subset of some bigger discipline, like communication or philosophy or sociology; so, Argumentation is not a discipline.

Argument studies are undeniably interdisciplinary: many fields study argument; many theories cross disciplinary/professional boundaries. But this doesn't mean that Argumentation isn't a discipline. Are Psychology or Physics any the less disciplines because their concepts are borrowed by other disciplines? I also concede that Argumentation resembles an "invisible college."² It seems more informal and flexible, less embedded in institutional concrete, than other disciplines. The field's scholars see argument more as an interdisciplinary interest area than as a discipline tout court. (In this, I may seem to be the worst offender, having argued that argumentation is a species of interpersonal communication.) But cross pollination is paradigmatic of intellectual life. Most fields acknowledge debts to other fields (consider the number of fields which have modelled important aspects of their thinking on physics, or psychology, or economics) yet, for all that, they are disciplines.

Thanks to a 20 year interregnum since the demise of the foundationalist/formalist model, Argumentation may seem too pluralistic to be a discipline. Argumentation scholars have not achieved agreement about the nature of argument, about the nature of and prospects for criticism, or even about the purposes and disciplinary boundaries of the field. We tend to equate pluralism with inadequacy because we think that internal agreement and cooperation are the marks of a mature discipline. (Witness the importance Toulmin imputes to "compactness"--the degree of agreement a field has achieved concerning its veridical standards.) The Enlightenment's view of progress is still with us in vestigial form.

But this distrust of pluralism is too easily exaggerated. First, there is nothing sacrosanct about agreement. Consensualists rarely make the French Academy their paradigm case of an epistemic community. Second, disagreement is not necessarily pathological. Disagreements require common ground, bonds of civility, tolerance, and cooperation; their presence proves that a field's tenets have not, as Toulmin says, "hardened into institutions." A field tolerant of pluralism has at least kept its cognitive options open. Argument, like fever, enjoys a better reputation than it used to. Once seen as an evil to be reduced at all costs, fever is now thought to be an essential defense mechanism.

Moreover, we display more substantive agreement than we sometimes think. Despite disagreements about the nature of argument, the field has organized its work around two pivotal propositions--more than enough to have a discipline. Their centrality to the discipline is easily proved: try to imagine what the field would look like without them. The first

proposition is:

1. Argumentation is the paradigm case of civilized procedure

This claim is a complex of at least four different but closely meshed ideas--each of which, I submit, enjoys field-defining agreement:

1.1 Huhninger's notion of argument-as-method, of the political and intellectual utility of rational dialectic, is perhaps the field's core intuition. This view has effected a consensus around certain pedagogical aims: providing instruction in critical decision-making, the analysis of controversies, tests of evidence, ethical responsibilities, social effects of advocacy, rules of rational procedure, and relationships between argumentation and communication. There are disputes about the nature of these things, not about their importance. Such disputes affect other fields as severely as they do argumentation, e.g., most fields have disputes between relativists and their opponents.

1.2 Conflict or controversy, or disagreement are at the heart of the phenomena which interest us. Theorists who agree on little else share the view that arguments involve disagreement and occur in contexts of controversy. This agreement is so striking that it might be said that "argument" is not our field's core concept or even its most important problem focus. Arguments figure prominently in controversy, but controversy is the definiens, argument the definiendum. So we are founded on a political as well as epistemological proposition that conflict, the testing of ideas, is the sine qua non of rational decision-making.

1.3 Argumentation is virtually definitive of human nature. Since this topic is too fuzzy apart from ostensive definitions, it has often been equated with rationality, which itself has usually been ostensively defined in terms of argumentation. Whether one thinks that rationality is a real, obdurate aspect of human nature or, as I do, that it is a field's way of naming reasoning it approves of, the concept has undisputed importance. The theorists who equated social life with the genesis of error restricted rationality to the individual--irrationality being a surrender to the communal. Consensualism has reversed this thinking: we trust the communal at the expense of the individual, thus tying rationality to a person's conformity to the consensual arrangements of a field. Both pictures, the former focusing on inference, the latter on public utterance, saw argument as a definitive symptom of rational behavior. Wittgenstein's views of language games and of "forms of life" are one version of this thinking; Habermas' placement of rationality in the criticizability of claims is another.

1.4 The Therapeutic Possibility. The field's pedagogical program is founded on this optimism; the idea that claims might be redeemable

through discourse is similarly optimistic, though broader in thrust; and the idea of corrections--what Arne Naess and van Eemeren and Grootendorst call "precization," what Russell called a theory of corrections, and what followers of Richards call the study of misunderstanding and its remedies--is an incorrigibly optimistic commitment. We differ on details, but the therapeutic possibility itself has never been seriously questioned.

The second proposition, around which I think argument scholars have organized much of their work, is this:

2. Argument is epistemic in communities

This proposition is a complex of two widely believed ideas:

2.1 The difference between inference and argument, the definitive characteristic of argument being its publicness. Not that argumentation is organized around an antipathy for thinking, only that inference has not been the field's paradigm case of rationality. Thus, like Habermas, we locate rationality in the publicness, intersubjectivity, (and hence criticizability) of expressions and judgments.

2.2 Intellectual evolution occurs through public discourse in communities. This claim has two attractions. First, it makes argument a pivotal epistemic concept. Arguments cease to be mere propaganda techniques for truths otherwise acquired, or pedagogical games, and become central to explanations of knowledge creation. Second, an evolutionary reading of Claim 2 meshes with the argument-as-method notion to produce a potentially powerful political theory. Spencer's slogan, "survival of the fittest," loosely captures our beliefs about argument's epistemic effects, our Jeffersonian vision of the marketplace of ideas, and dovetails perfectly with our pedagogical rhetoric. The Rortyan conversation, Rescher's pragmatics, Habermas' felicity conditions of discourse, and Lippman's view of public discourse are all dialectical theories which recognize the epistemic advantages of adversarial proceedings.

I take it that I have proved that Argumentation is a discipline, and an important one. Now I want to argue that this is a mixed blessing. Discipline is a Janus-like construct. We can scarcely object to some aspects of disciplined thought. As Foucault says, "disciplines" mean "discipline." Disciplines promote programmatic research, they embody and enforce professional, ethical, and intellectual norms, they provide forums and publications, they nurture and protect criticism, and they configure knowledge for pedagogy. But these are expensive advantages. Discipline is a peripheral blindness: it achieves acuity at the expense of breadth. Disciplinary boundaries are thus skin to a horse's blinders: they keep a not-very-bright creature from shying from the stimulus of peripheral events; they keep the attention straight ahead--just the effect I attribute

to the field's pedagogical heritage.

The field's ideas-of-origin condemn it to a fate more ironic than Cassandra's, one wired not into its telos but in its pedagogical roots. Argumentation historically arose as a particular skills pedagogy adopted by speech and debate teachers. Theory followed practice: higher order concepts evolved from the pedagogical repertoire. "Criticism" came to describe two levels of activity: pedagogy in thinking, speaking, and listening skills and their putatively more sophisticated uses by field actors doing "argument criticism." But the former has so constrained the latter as to produce a fifty year tradition of inconsequential work which has influenced neither the political nor academic spheres. American forensic programs have had unparalleled access to the nation's power elite, but this has not translated into genuine influence. Our theories find their only audience in the classroom; our criticism speaks only to us. The field seems condemned to underestimate the scope and importance of its principles and their applicability to public and intellectual problems. The horizons of argument criticism are so circumscribed that we conceptualize the problem of the public sphere in terms of elementary expository mistakes, as if we can adjudicate the abortion controversy by fixing fallacies, or the nuclear power debate by correcting inconsistencies. Just when the centrality of our discipline's concepts is widely acknowledged, it isn't clear that our history has equipped us to say anything of value.

Two Pieties of Argumentation

None of us, I think, believes that the truth of a claim inheres in the intensity of our commitment to it. We can readily point to false doctrines passionately believed by others. But a sensitivity to others' delusions should not masquerade as self-awareness. We are not immune to the pathologies we study. Perhaps more often than we would like to admit, we speak of universals, of the way of things, having our personal idiosyncracies in mind, or succumb to calling "false consciousness" in others what we call "rational commitments" in ourselves. Our pedagogy makes us doubly susceptible: in our concern to mute the individualism of children by socializing them into the authority structures of discourse communities, to replace their hedonism, narrowmindedness, shortsightedness, and near-invincible ignorance with loftier attainments and ambitions, the temptation to serve up accomplished doctrines on a platter is a powerful one.

The crippling effects of our pedagogical history can be illustrated by considering its effects on the two propositions upon which I claim the field is founded. In the pedagogical context, these propositions are rhetorical flourishes--arm-waving, really--rather than considered components of a discipline's problematic. They are so embedded in our thinking as to be logically on a par with what McGuire calls "cultural truisms." They are foundational to our conceptual ecology, but we did not come by them through the argumentation processes we prize.

It is not my point that either claim is false but that each should be treated as a claim, not a credo. Neither should be dogmatically or fideistically propounded. Both should be at the center of our attention, ever problematic, never taken-for-granted. Ideas become dogma when their implicitness exceeds their intellectual authority. And their believers are the weaker for it.

1. Argumentation is the paradigm case of civilized procedure. Critical thinking is better than intuition, emotional preferences, or chance. It is embodied in the following of rules for rational disputation which are thought to yield critical decisions.

The idea of civilized constraints is among the most persistent themes in western thought. The contrasting picture is of Primitive Man--a narcissistic, morally blind brute possessed by powerful instincts for aggression, herd followership, and, as Aristotle said, a subordination of the intellectual to the animal. The Romantics' Noble Savage was a momentary aberration. The more enduring portrait is that of a slothful lout, generally thoughtless, sometimes dangerous, always less than he might be. Hence civilization's shackles: its rules and etiquettes repress our instincts and make us toe the line. The brute is stilled, not killed; it is always there beneath the civilized veneer, but its power wanes as civilization waxes.

This is a Greco-Roman view. Plato thought that human nature fell so short of philosophy that a repressive state should compel, by force, persuasion, or false consciousness, obedience to the philosopher kings' rules. Aristotle believed that people were ruled by habits, mostly bad, and that the state's pedagogical function was to promote good cognitive/deliberative habits. The Scholastics simmered these Greek conceits in an orthodox stew of religion and politics--keeping the brute on a short (theocratic and secular) leash. One might start with sweet reason, but there was always the rack and Iron Maiden if the brute proved obdurate.

Or the analyst's couch. Freud thought that Id might outgrow civilization's constraints, like the pressure cooker allowed to build steam unchecked. And the Social Darwinists, who mixed teleology with special pleading for the British class structure, saw institutions as amalgams of rules, proscriptions, and prescriptions that kept the obedient acting in socially useful ways.

So the idea of civilized constraints is a refugee with a not entirely respectable past. The justification of a rule by appeals to teleology--historical or psychological--or by appeals to a privileged

discourse are shennanigans few of us would attempt today. Even Habermas, in arguing that the emancipatory interest is hard-wired into the nature of communication, is not exempt from pragmatically justifying particular rules. So Rule Utilitarianism, despite its poor reputation as an ethical theory, would seem to be the Argumentation theorist's lot.

Argumentation is perhaps more dependent than any other field upon the civilized constraint notion. Ehninger's notion of argument-as-procedure, which has it that dialectic lives in its rules, is foundational to the work of such similar thinkers and Wenzel, McKerrow, and Rescher and such disparate thinkers as Goodnight, Balthrop, and Brockriede.

But the justification of dialectic has not been dialectically achieved. More often than not, it is an argument from Aristotle's authority, or Plato's, or Whately's, or Habermas'. If Rule Utilitarianism is dialectic's final justification, what constitutes its proof? If the pedagogical rationale for the field is that ordinary discourse falls short of the rules of rational discourse, what constitutes evidence for justifying the rules?

Owing to its pedagogical interests, and its corollary choice of an audience for its arguments, the Argumentation field has muddled the justification of dialectic with a different argument--that critical thinking is better than impulse. Since youthful actions are notoriously more glandular than cognitively driven, no one would doubt this claim--which is just my point. Ehninger and Brockriede say that "a critical decision is based on an interpretation of relevant facts and values."⁴ Now, impulse aside, I should think that every decision, be it good, bad, silly, or evil, is based on interpretations of relevant facts and values. Surely we disagree more about others' interpretations than about whether their decisions are based on nothing. No one would doubt that rule-guided action is better than impulse--but is this an important point for a field to make? With this reasoning, Argumentation will find itself in the position of the rationality theorists who equate rationality with having reasons--any reasons being better than no reasons. But can we really point to people who act sans reasons? What we really want to do is object to their reasons, to say that their reasons are "causes," or that they are inferior to other reasons.

At this point, the argument undergoes a not-so-subtle shift: critical decisions are communal rather than individually grounded. Thus Ehninger and Brockriede contrast "facts and values" with "desires and prejudices"--the former being intersubjectively confirmable, the latter being idiosyncratic. But this doesn't help. First, as Stich and Nisbett say, we have to give the rebel his due. We do not want to say that everyone who disagrees with a well-founded consensus is uncritical or insane, though

we might believe that they are mistaken. Second, prejudices always masquerade as facts; one field's "values" are another's "dogmas." Third, impulse again aside, what would count as uncritical? A jihad? But holy wars are based upon authoritative grounds--rational interpretations of facts and values intersubjectively confirmed (as is Stich and Nisbett) by a community.⁵

So a celebration of having reasons whatever they are or of abiding by community norms whatever they are is not quite the point Argumentation wants to make. Elementary pedagogy should indeed suppress impulse, but a general theory of decision-making poses more difficult problems. Respecting adult behavior, we call "uncritical decisions" ones arrived-at by rules we object to--which brings us back to the Rule Utilitarian's problem of justifying conformity to a rule.

Ehninger and Brockriede ultimately take a pragmatic tack. But their pedagogical commitments make their argument more doctrinaire than it needs to be. Science is their paradigm case: "no scientific theory is accepted until it has been tested thoroughly." Now I do not think that this claim is true--for, say, the Copernican Revolution, the General Theory of Relativity, or--perhaps most important--the Darwinian revolution, which was adopted, as Phillip Kitcher says, because of its ability to unite the field of biology, not because of its research, or even because it was correct (there are odd genetic beliefs in Darwin's theory). None of this is to say that science cannot be one's paradigm case of critical decision-making--only that, owing to our choice of audience, we tend to argue the point in such a way as to undercut it.

A somewhat different solution is to argue in a circle, as Rescher, I think, does. Science is our most consistently successful epistemic enterprise; dialectic--read "debate"--is its basic veridical method; thus science's success proves the value of dialectic: "success is everywhere a valid--indeed the valid--criterion of methodological appropriateness. . . . [t]here can be no real question that an established method--one which has 'proven itself' over a wide variety of applications within its range of correlative objectives--has solid claims to a presumption in its favor."⁶ Whether debate has been science's method, and whether it has "proven itself," are empirical questions. But Rescher's exposition only looks like an empirical argument. It uses no case-by-case proof of the centrality of debate to science--as opposed, say, to other accounts of scientific method, or as opposed to the limited research which suggests that debate isn't quite the right model. We traditionally expect our logics-of-justification to be more formalized and housebroken than our logics-of-discovery. Nonetheless, argumentation is founded on the claim that critical decisions are better than uncritical ones--s claim that presupposes success with empirical examples.

This doesn't mean that the Rule Utilitarian cannot win his

argument, only that he needs to marshal his evidence. If one claims that dialectical rules are better than other rules, one's evidence has to be case histories.

We have, ready at hand, a laboratory of unrivaled potential for studying the effects of particular rules on decision-making. Six years ago, Zarefsky, in an unjustly ignored paper, argued that academic debate could be a laboratory for studying the hardest questions of argumentation. If forensics professionals, and their outside colleagues, would turn their attention from purely arcane and pedagogical concerns to the ambition of contributing to the discipline's stock of knowledge, they might make genuine contributions to the ongoing dialogue about the state of the public sphere. If they continue to see debate as elementary pedagogy, they will continue to brush past the nation's most promising students, touching them only lightly, and being forgotten in the crush of events.

2. Argument is epistemic in communities.

Intellectual communities are based upon adversary processes, implicit or explicit theories of criticism which promote and guide the attack and defense of claims.

This claim can be variously interpreted. Formalists might say that a field's corpus is embedded in an impersonal logic whose implicatures work themselves out aloof from the psychology, social relationships, and research activities of field actors. Symbolic interactionists might reverse that image: ideas live in the human activities; a corpus is an inanimate thing waiting for situated actors to breathe life into it. The former locates intellectual progress in the logic of the corpus, the latter in the logic of activities.

Following Toulmin, Argumentation theorists have seen both pictures as exaggerations and adopted a middle course which recognizes the importance of the logic of a corpus and the uses situated actors make of it. Thus, an idea's intellectual authority resides in its internal logic; its magisterial authority resides in the sociological niche it occupies. The difference between the disciplinary and social aspects of an ecology is analogous to the difference between geological and genealogical idioms in explanations of organic evolution. "The disciplinary aspect of intellectual history is rational, justificatory, and prospective, the professional [social] aspect causal, explanatory, and retrospective; and, in the nature of the case, these two aspects are complementary rather than equivalent."¹⁰ Experience of past accomplishments influences current decisions--a revision of Collingwood's reasons v. causes contrast. So, within Argumentation, Claim 2 is an evolutionary thesis.

This merger of dialectic with evolution has two closely related defects--neither of which needs be fatal. Their remedies will strengthen, not weaken the evolutionary thesis. The first defect is that Claim 2 is vastly underdetermined by data: given the research behind it, Claim 2 is really little more than rhetorical posturing, sloganeering. Sans evidence, it is a caricature--an exaggeration that catches the highlights but omits the details.

It is one thing to claim that argument (as a social comparison process) has epistemic effects for individuals and quite another to assert that argument is foundational to communal intellectual life. Both are empirical claims, but the former is better proved than the latter. I submit that Argumentation scholars lack the empirical basis for claiming that even their own field's development has proceeded through argument. An ordinary thought experiment will prove the point. Look at the present Argumentation (or any field's) corpus--just agreed-upon principles, not disputed cases. Now, reproduce the most efficient historical developments, from argument to argument, that would have produced this corpus. All of us, I think, would adopt shortcuts the field did not in fact take and avoid redundancy the field in fact displayed. In explaining the field's adoption of an idea, or one idea versus another, we would (more than the field did) exaggerate the effects of intellectual authority and denigrate magisterial authority. We would make these mistakes partly owing to the parsimony that comes with historical perspective and partly because we have a powerful vested interest in giving argument a position of centrality in intellectual ecologies. As Barthes said, "the retrospective is never anything but a category of bad faith."

Fields reach a point where Darwinianism is doing things the hard way. This is nowhere better exemplified than in their interfield borrowing, practices which cast doubt upon the idea that we can separate intellectual from magisterial authority at all.

The permissible interpretation of Kuhn's notion of revolutions is that they are embodied in the changes discourse communities make in their histories. Evolution is a metaphor as well as a biological fact, hence Newton's famous (if disingenuous) disclaimer, "if I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of giants." The belief that one's work occupies a rung in an ancestral ladder may well be crocodile modesty, but it is nonetheless a foundational metaphor of a successful epistemic community. But normal science is duller than revolutions, and contemporary developments do sometimes compel the abandonment of old ideas, so it sometimes happens that conceptual developments lead fields to reassess their ancestors.

Or to adopt new ones. The ancestral focus of evolutionary thinking doesn't translate intact to discussions of rational enterprises.

Recombinant DNA research aside, genetics describes fixed legacies. People cannot change their ancestors except by lying. But rational enterprises can and do alter their histories to fit present preferences. Revolution is the awl, needle, and thread for such alterations. If concept borrowing is the paradigm case and political competition the most interesting case of interfield discourse, then ancestor borrowing is surely the most muddifying case. Evolution makes us think of our history as our working stock of materials; revolutions occur when we want to change the stock. Consider, e.g., how the work of Toulmin, or Perelman, or Habermas have entered the field. In each case, prestige either preceded the evaluation of arguments or was so bound up with them as to make the distinction between intellectual and magisterial authority suspect. Their thinking entered Argumentation in the standard way fields import authorities. Prominent natives mention their work; selected aspects of their thinking are adopted; a following develops--lending additional stature to an already estimable ethos; then --after a decade, in the case of Toulmin and Perelman, less time in Habermas' cases, probably owing to the increased maturity of the discipline--the details of their theories are gradually assimilated, the particulars finally getting discussed. In the first stages of this process, the outsider's work functions primarily as an argument-from-authority.

The second defect I see in Claim 2 has already been hinted at: the distinction between intellectual and magisterial authority is too neat. It overformalizes the facts; it pays lip service to but ultimately undervalues the social component; and it turns our attention away from the ways actors behave rationally as they balance political and social pressures against their views of the intellectual merits of ideas.

The Jeffersonian legacy, and the pedagogical imperatives in which it is embodied, encourage a too-mechanical, over-rationalized view of intellectual evolution. The developmental logic which spawns an idea must be rational before we are willing to call someone's acceptance of the idea rational. Since post hoc analyses can nearly always make an historical succession of ideas appear to be a connected train of thought, the rationality of intellectual progress appears to be a plausible inference. Again, Argumentation's choice of audience leads to an exaggerated Whiggishness. Accomplished doctrines on silver platters; today's truths mustn't be historical accidents or whims. Dialectical inquiry is our version of natural selection. If there is rationality in the structure of a corpus, its corpus dialecti is rational debate. But, as was the case with the first proposition, the proof of its rationality is circular: one infers rational processes from a corpus' apparent evolutionary coherence.

Our pedagogical interests push us to an unduly circumscribed view of decision-making. It is uncontroversial that decisions occur in contexts which are more than dialectical. But we are prone to think that the social elements of decision-making are pathological disintegrations, or at least imperfections, militating against otherwise rational debate. Though we

might grant that science has social aspects, we resist seeing them as an integral part of scientific rationality. We likewise restrict our norms of political and social decision-making to those features of debate which seem to transcend or bypass individual motives, the pressures of interest groups, and vagaries of public opinion, and the other manifestations of Burke's "blunt quest of advantage."

Toulmin, who cannot be accused of succumbing to the pedagogical interest, nonetheless achieves the same effect. This result is not obvious: he takes pains to advocate the use of companion frameworks--the disciplinary and the social--for the study of intellectual ecologies: "considered as an entire human enterprise, a science is neither a compendium of ideas and arguments alone, nor a population of individual scientists alone, nor a system of institutions and proceedings alone."¹¹ All of these elements "touch, interact, and merge." A description which ignores the social bases of scientific thought will miss fundamental features of the process, for instance, cases in which ethos has outweighed logos--as in the case of the acceptance of kinetic theory in physics owing to the prestige of Clausius and Maxwell. Their arguments may have been cogent and powerful by the disciplinary standards of the times, but "the best argument in the world could 'carry professional weight' at all quickly only if its origin and presentation brought it to the attention of the influential 'reference group' at the right time, and in the right manner."¹² The professional circumstances have to be favorable before "even the best argument in the world could win the institutional authority merited by its intrinsic intellectual authority."¹³

All well and good. Toulmin would seem to be squarely behind giving social life its due. But people who use the terms "history" and "experience" interchangeably bear watching. Toulmin works with a standard Weberian sense of the social--which makes argument a component of the disciplinary, not the social side of science. By "social" Toulmin means the status and roles of particular scientists and, as well, the incidental fact of whether someone did accept an idea--a consequential matter only to historians. The relationship between the disciplinary and the social thus turns on a difference in kind. The former yields the intellectual authority of ideas, the latter their magisterial authority. The former is the locus of rationality, the latter the locus of the inertial weight of tradition. There can be no doubt which is better.

I prefer to see the magisterial authority of an idea as inhering in the logic of the activities which produced it. To my mind, the most interesting case of rationality involves a person wrestling with a problem, taking social influence, buffeted by local politics, bowing occasionally to history, sometimes as a rhetorical gesture, sometimes succumbing to determinism-by-tacitness, and, finally, framing rhetorical strategies addressed to an audience. The assessment of that person's place in the field is not merely a definition of a sociological niche, but an integral

component of our explanation of the intellectual merit of the ideas. Activities, not niches, explain the evolution of ideas. A description of the intersection of these forces would be a description of the field's rational structure. Ideas can be assessed utterly apart from such doings, but no field, even the ones that try to, does so. The neat, tidy distinction between intellectual and magisterial authority makes us use judgmental criteria that do not bear upon how ideas and bodies of knowledge in fact evolve.

Criticism, Argumentation's core enterprise, should be the programmatic study of how discourse hangs together, of the effects of assumptions on claims, of activities upon beliefs, and of beliefs upon activities. It needs not be a monolithic intellectual tradition, since every field's intellectual procedures can be studied in different ways for varying purposes. Critical traditions need only be programmatic--approximating what Laudan calls a "research program"--and thereby capable of enhancing the discipline's stock of knowledge and of advocating change in the activities studied. We once studied practices in order to commend them to students, now we must study them in order to amend them if needed.

Debate, again, is our most enduring tradition and most promising critical path. It may seem a contradiction in terms to speak of a laboratory for participant observation, but debate is just that. It forces us to enter the folkways of particular fields, to adopt their specialized modes of thinking and arguing, and, sometimes, to compare them to the methods and modes of other fields. In this respect, it is the public sphere in microcosm. No study better exposes the implications of assumptions and the cognitive consequences of practices than a sustained intense study which requires adopting the veridical practices of particular fields and which brings out the sometimes incommensurable assumptions which fuel particular claims.

So we have the means, if not the will, to create ideas that count. But what ideas? I suggest two starting points, not as a comprehensive agenda, but as especially promising--and dangerous--problems.

The argument-from-authority is arguably the 20th Century's definitive epistemic problem. It used to be a formal fallacy; and the reasons for (and even the politics behind) calling it a fallacy are still persuasive, which perhaps explains why we defer so grudgingly to experts. Yet our epistemic environment is so constituted that deference to authority, "even though it short circuits the quintessentially rational processes of personally weighing the evidence and following out a chain of logic to one's own inner satisfaction," is the rational thing to do. "Indeed, in ordinary parlance one of the best reasons we can offer for choosing a course of action is that it comports with the advice of a

recognized authority."¹⁵

The argument-from-authority is utterly central to the public sphere. The commonweal is so tied to what the Beardes called "the rule of experts" as to irretrievably submerge the intellectual authority of ideas in the magisterial authority of particular fields. By their epistemic nature, most fields do not come by tolerance easily. But the public sphere forces intolerance upon them as their authorities are cast into a competition for public attention and power. The public sphere has so structured its discourse that each field has no choice but to assert the hegemony of its special language and authority structure.

Many observers have noticed the tendency of academic debaters to be authority mongers. Unfortunately, they have taken this as a license to write the activity off--which means that they have missed the point. There is nothing wrong with the ways debaters use authority that isn't wrong with the world at large, our discipline, other disciplines, and the public sphere itself. The argument-from-authority, as the anti-Scholastic logicians knew, is use of power. It functions in academic debates just as it functions everywhere else.

I propose that we confront this problem head on. If we can solve the problems of the argument-from-authority in academic debate, we may have a result everyone else will have to listen to. This, at least, is what I mean by using debate as a laboratory.

The second starting point concerns interfield borrowing and competition. Debate might provide an unparalleled opportunity to study the autonomy of disciplines because it inevitably emphasizes the selectivity of field autonomy. Epistemic autonomy, I think, is a strategic decision as much as an epistemic mandate--at least where matters of the commonweal are concerned. Fields do borrow ideas from other fields; they do incur obligations; they do dialogue with other fields; and they do take and give influence. In good times, there sometimes seems to be so much interfield harmony and cooperation that we start to expect that different discourses truly are moving toward a final, universal unity--something like Teilhard de Chardin's point omega, or at least an argumentation theory based upon an interlocked series of consensus gentium arguments. But the controversial issues of the day bring out another side: the shields go up, the cattle herded inside. When authorities clash--as they often do--there arises much talk of incommensurability and epistemic autonomy.

We will get nowhere trying to get particular fields to surrender their autonomy, even if it is nothing but a trick. But we may get somewhere studying the possible responses to interfield relativity public decision-makers might make. Debate might contribute to these studies in powerful ways. Debaters grapple with the ways the arguments work, their fit

into judgment paradigms, and the ways their implications can be evaluated. If I am right that their efforts are the public sphere in microcosm, a programmatic study of their work might yield the bases for a philosophy of the public sphere capable of countering (not defeating) the particular claims of epistemic hegemony made by particular authorities.

CONCLUSION

"The House is increasing spending on star Wars research. . . even though few of its members understand the complex subject, one knowledgeable congressman says. . . The \$2.5 billion . . . was recommended by the House Armed Services Committee, and the panel's Chairman said it was the committee's stamp of approval that won support for the total. 'What you're dealing with is a highly technical subject that people don't feel comfortable with, that they don't understand,' Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., said. . . 'They wanted something to vote for so they picked the committee position. . . People needed something to hang their hat on and they don't know much about the technology'" (Associated Press, June 21, 1985).

"These are fine chances for an active mind" (Henry James)

The new importance of decision-making arises in a climate of pervasive doubt about the viability of democratic institutions--which seem to be withering for the want of a shared language of public discourse.¹⁶ Debate and criticism, our quintessentially democratic methods, seem impoverished in the face of a resurgent individualism, the triumph of the rule-of-experts,¹⁷ and the differences dividing discourse domains. Public issues cut across traditional field boundaries, creating conflict--competition for power--between epistemic domains which might otherwise have remained aloof, creating problems more complex than our critical resources. Without a resurgent criticism, "issues of significant public consequence, which should present live possibilities for argumentation and public choice, disappear into the government technocracy or private hands. As forms of decision-making proliferate, questions of public significance themselves become increasingly difficult to recognize, much less address, because of the intricate rules, procedures, and terminologies of the specialized forums."¹⁸ The public agenda puts individualism and consensualism on a collision course. The effect has been a degeneration of the public sphere, a reduction of public issues to simple questions of power. My point is not that the demise of foundationalism has destroyed criticism but that criticism has failed to "keep the conversation going."¹⁹

Argumentation's concepts have enjoyed a corollary resurgence in academe. Consensualism places the idea of debate at the intersection of the

many strands of thought which attempt to explain the rationality of social epistemic practices. As Habermas, speaking of the new intersection of philosophy and sociology, says, "the theory of argumentation thereby takes on a special significance; to it falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicitly rational behavior."²⁰

Public decision-makers face an intimidating agenda--nuclear war and peace, issues of global military and development policy, environmental and scarcity concerns, abortion, population policy, distributive justice, and the like--issues in which authorities (experts vested with status by particular fields) make competing claims on decision-making, based on incommensurable assumptions, and make no elementary mistakes. We should expose elementary errors when people make them, but this is too modest a goal for a discipline--on a par with restricting art, music, or literary criticism to the content of basic skills or appreciation instruction. Criticism can render stronger services than that.

The field of argumentation's silence in the face of the denigration of the public sphere is a tragedy of near-eschatological dimensions.²¹ A criticism which stands silent except for expositional mistakes is a travesty. It produces trivialities tantamount to criticizing the Versailles Treaty for its permanence. It seems as if we no longer believe, or have become cynical about, our textbook rhetoric about the place of argumentation in democratic decision-making processes. Nothing could ring more hollow than our commonplace proclamations that argument is a democracy's lifeblood, that ideas tested by rational argument, emerge the better for it, that decisions emergent from free and open debate, are the stronger for it. That's the flag, but note the army marching beneath it: Be consistent! Avoid fallacies! Use proof! Trust experts!

Nonetheless, criticism can be the field's proper subject matter and its special language for speaking to the public sphere. Argumentation can be the disciplinary custodian of processual principles capable public discourse. Its organizing hope is to empower the public sphere with its own language and epistemic--one capable of resolving disputes and with accommodating competing interests while muting the most strident voices with rational answers rather than laws.²²

Don't read Sartre's L'Homme D'Engage into my proposal. Critics needn't take to the streets to generate a literature of scope, vision, and engagement. My hope is that a criticism might be constructed out of the facts of the balkanization of knowledge--one capable of contributing "to the perfection of public forms and forums of discourse."²³ Though we seem to have lost what Tocqueville hoped would be a language of public discourse, a criticism equipped to grapple with the competing epistemic autonomy of discourse domains might yet salvage the public sphere.²⁴

The study of more complex disagreements will strengthen argumentation theory if critical practices are framed so as to contribute to the discipline's ecology. It can also strengthen the health of the public sphere by engaging in an increasingly sophisticated relationship with public decision-makers. Social studies can change the reality they confront. What critics must surrender is the pose of objectivity, of disinterested, impersonal, uninvolved judgment. Criticism that counts will inevitably join into the processes it studies. As Robert Socolow has said, "no group of analysts, however constituted, should ever imagine that their work—whether it focuses on the 'science' of a dispute or its politics—can proceed apart from the debate, for it always becomes part of the debate."²⁵

NOTES

*I thank Joseph W. Wenzel and Thomas J. Hynes for their helpful suggestions through several previous drafts.

¹Stephen P. Stich and Richard E. Nisbett, Richard E. "Expertise, Justification, and the Psychology of Inductive Reasoning," in Thomas Haskell, ed., The Authority of Experts. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 237.

²Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

³Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Tr. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

⁴Douglas Ehninger and Wayne E. Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 2.

⁵Stich and Nisbett.
⁶Nicholas Rescher, Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977).

⁷Bruno Latour and Stephen Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).

⁸David Zarefsky, "Argumentation and Forensics," Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds., Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation. (Annandale: Speech Communication Association, 1980).

⁹Toulmin, p. 314.
¹⁰Toulmin, p. 311.
¹¹Toulmin, p. 308. It is worth underscoring that Toulmin is more open-minded about the place of social processes in intellectual ecologies than most philosophers of science (e.g., compare his view with Laudén's).

¹²Toulmin, p. 272.
¹³Toulmin, p. 273.
¹⁴Larry Laudén, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

¹⁵Thomas L. Haskell, ed., The Authority of Experts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. x. See also Stich and Nisbett.

¹⁶Robert N. Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism

and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

¹⁷Haskell, p. x. See also Alvin Gouldner, The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Continuum, 1979); and Ivan Illich, Disabling Professions (London: Marion Boyars, 1977), and Toc's for Conviviality (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

¹⁸G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation." Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1982), 214-227.

¹⁹Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

²⁰Habermas, p.
²¹Goodnight.
²²John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1927); and Richard Sennett, Authority (New York: Vintage, 1980).

²³Goodnight.
²⁴See the parallel discussions in Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

²⁵Robert H. Socolow, "Failures of Discourse: Obstacles to the Integration of Environmental Values into Natural Resource Policy," in Laurence H. Tribe, Corinne S. Schelling, and John Voss, eds., When Values Conflict: Essays on Environmental Analysis, Discourse, and Decision (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976), p. 28.

WHO IS AN ARGUER? A CONVERSATION WITH BROCKRIEDE

[Editors' Note: The following is a transcript of an extemporaneous presentation by Professor Brockriede and three respondents, August 2, 1985, at the 4th Conference on Argumentation, Alta, Utah.]

Chair: Ray McKerrow
University of Maine--Orono

"Who Is an Arguer? A Progress Report"

Wayne Brockriede
California State University--Fullerton

Respondents:

Walter R. Fisher
University of Southern California

James F. Klumpp
University of Nebraska--Lincoln

Michael Calvin McGee
University of Iowa

WAYNE BROCKRIEDE: I got the idea of a progress report from the last convention of the Western Speech Communication Association at Fresno where they tried it several times and I thought it worked very well and hope that it will work well here. It gives the critics a chance to help writers save themselves from themselves before they come out with a paper or a publication. The progress report is not as far along as I would like for it to have been. I would have liked to have a paper but circumstances didn't permit it. I'll report what progress there is, report where I've been and report where I think I am and I'm sure my critics will tell me where to go.

My overall presumptive ambition is to try to put together what has been written under the heading of an epistemological focus on argument--what it can do to enhance you in understanding--with what has been written under the heading of an ontological or normative focus on argumentation--how persons function as arguers when they are acting at their very best. I hope to have some kind of integration of these ready to present as a paper at the First International Conference on Argumentation sponsored by the University of Amsterdam. I won't take time to document my sources as I try to proceed rapidly through an outline which will be giving you the bare bones of where I think I am.

I should note that probably my primary sources are Douglas Ehninger, Jurgen Habermas, Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and Chaim Perelman.

Part one, I suppose we could call the "past," and it's a perspective on argument is epistemic. I would say that my perspective has been fairly consistently person centered. In 1963, in *Decision by Debate*, I had to take a person centered view of argument with a glimmer. By the 1970s, when I tried a half-a-dozen times to outline generic characteristics of argument, I think it had become a real gleam rather than a glimmer. I intended the characteristics each to represent a perspective that one could take on argument and not as analytic categories or things that should be taken discretely that are necessary and sufficient conditions. But one can focus on arguers who make an inferential leap, who choose among competing claims, who risk confrontation, who perceive rationales, who regulate uncertainties and who share overlapping frames of reference. Lately I have become convinced that everything I do tends to end up in threes. I now reduce these characteristics to three dimensions. First of all a "knower," an arguer who makes choices and takes risks. Secondly "a relationship among arguers who share frames of reference." And finally, "a goal of regulating what is inherently problematic on the basis of inferences grounded in the best rationale."

Some of the other bits and pieces that might be considered in an epistemological perspective is a trinity that Joe Wenzel and I seem to have developed virtually simultaneously though independently: a focus on the product of a person's logic. Or one can focus on the process of interaction among the people who seek human understanding. Or one can focus on the methods and procedures arguers use to pursue their goal of human understanding.

In another essay arguing about human understanding, I suggested that argumentation is a method of understanding to be applied in three interpenetrating spheres. It can first of all assist one's understanding of the physical world of things and nature featuring an empirical dimension, or related to the validity claims Habermas calls "truth," or his translators would call truth. Secondly, to assist one's understanding of one's own intentionality or that of others. Finally, to assist one's understanding of the norms and rules that govern interpersonal relationships, which of course features the social dimension, likeness.

In my most recent essay, "Constructs, Experience and Argument," I have a model of a triangle in which argument is the base and experience is at the right and constructs is at the left. I see argument relating to experience primarily as a process of criticism. We argue about our experience and try to make sense of it, critically. Argument related to constructs I see primarily as a research process. We are trying to develop generalizations and argument is a method that will help us develop, justify and defend the generalizations our research leads us to.

Argument also plays a role in the relationship between constructs and experience which might be called interpretation, because the interpretive process is essentially, I think also, an arguing process.

Moving to the second part which one might call the "present" or the recent past. Just less than a month ago, I finished a paper with a title I have had for two years. The paper took longer than the title. The title, "Arguing: The Art of Being Human," which hopefully will appear in a book entitled *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs*, which is book in honor of Chaim Perelman edited by Jim Golden and Joe Pilotta of Ohio State. What I tried to do there is to synthesize a more normative ontological view, not so much of how argument works but how it might work. How it would work ideally if people were acting at their very best. Here again I ended up with the three dimensions similar to the three dimensions that I talked about earlier. One is the personal dimension which depicts the ideal arguer as a restrained partisan, which at first glance seems like a paradox. One must be a partisan in the sense of being committed to what one is arguing about, however tentatively. One is committed enough to risk using arguing as a method rather than procedures that are easier, depending on your size and power and charm, like coercion and deceit. So one is a partisan. But the partisan in arguing, in the ideal sense, tries to be restrained in several ways. First, by his or her critical attitude toward what he or she is doing and what the co-arguer is doing. Secondly, by a motive to let the issue be decided by arguing rather than by coercion or deceit. Third, by the nature of the activity itself which implies, I think, some of the procedural restraints that Enhinger set forth in his chapters in *Decision by Debate*, and also in his essay "Argument As Method." Finally, to try to achieve as much emancipation as is possible from the systematic distortions of communication that lurk in personal neuroses and collective ideologies.

Now I think within this personal focus there is inevitably a dialectical tension existing between restrained partisans. Too much restraint and you don't have the commitment willing to take the risks you need to take in order to use arguing profitably as a method. Too much of the other and you become a true believer, you become a fanatic. So that one needs to be a restrained partisan ideally. The ideal relationship might be called "bilaterality." This implies the possibility of influence in both directions. Both expound their own views and criticize those of the other so that the arrow goes, in both directions in an ideal relationship. You are not trying to lay a persuasive message on another person with whom you are engaging in a dialogue. Bilaterality also implies a recognition of others as peers or persons. I think it's probably clear that some people are more equal than other people and parity, I think, does not necessarily imply absolute equality in all of the dimensions that humans have, but parity implies that as persons we are peers. I think bilaterality also implies what Henry W. Johnstone calls a basic imperative that arguers should seek to perpetuate what is distinctively human among arguers by encouraging rather than suppressing efforts to reach judgments and decisions by argument. Which, I think, is a cousin to what Habermas talks about with his symmetry requirements. Bilaterality here implies a symmetrical distribution of the opportunities of all participants to engage in speech acts. I think there is a tension here, too, if co-arguers become too attached to one another it may not be as productive; if they become too detached, it may not be as productive. So I think that the relationship among co-arguers is one in which you

cope with dialectical tensions of enough attachment but not too much, enough detachment but not too much.

Third, a theological focus would depict the ideal goal of argument as what Habermas calls warranted assertibility. And this too carries a number of implications. It carries the implication that the motive on the part of the people who are in (what he calls) the "ideal speech situation" or what we might more generally call argument or discourse, is to arrive at judgments and decisions purely on the basis of the more convincing arguments. This focus implies a consensus theory of truth. The truth is what the co-arguers workout when they are in that ideal situation. But such a theory is not intended to punch in as a kind of a popularity contest so if we have five arguers, arguing together, we wait until all five people agree and then we say we have warranted assertibility. One has warranted assertibility only if there are good reasons for achieving that and this in the tradition of works like those by Karl Wallace, Wayne Booth and Walter Fisher. For at least two writers warranted assertibility means more than the endorsement by persons who were physically present in an arguing situation. For Habermas an ideal speech situation is one in which one's arguments would be convincing if one were to engage in dialogue with every conceivable co-arguer. Habermas takes an interpersonal communication model, a dialogic model, and argues that if after dialoging with a series of competent co-arguers together you achieve assertibility that is warranted. You have a better claim to that status of warrant assertibility than if you go out on the street and gather the first four people you find and engage in an argument with them when they may not have the wherewithal to present some challenges to your validity claims.

For Perelman ideally one ought to gain the adherence of the universal audience composed of competent auditors. I think the primary difference between Habermas' view and Perelman's is that Habermas envisage a biological interpersonal communication situation. Perelman envisage a public communication situation, a speaker-audience situation. Both of them are constructs in the mind of the arguer. There is not time enough to argue with every conceivable dialogue partner or to argue before every audience existing now; and of course, Habermas would have one conceive of past audiences and future audiences. So it's a construct rather than an existential reality but I think a useful concept.

Part three is the future, I will let my critics take the lead there. I had hoped to have three or four scenarios and ask them to choose among them with good reasons, of course. Actually what I have are just some hunches. One hunch is kind of an act of faith that there is or ought to be some relationship between the way people do in fact argue in an epistemological-descriptive sense of the term and an ontological-normative sense, what things would be if people were arguing by acting at their very best. Finding the precise relationships that I have in mind as my project. There are a couple of quotations that give me some hope. One of them comes from James Aune in an effort to interpret Habermas, who says that an ideal speech situation is neither something empirically observable nor a utopian construct but rather a rational reconstruction of the suppositions which are present.

Everytime, two people seriously engage in communication, and of course with those of us in this room, we have to construe arguing as a serious engagement in communication.

The second quotation is from Habermas who observes that in all speech acts the subject in their speech act performances unavoidably express their own selves at the same time they converse with one another on some propositional topic. This supposes a differentiation between a communication about objects and a metacommunication on the level of intersubjectivity. Another lead was suggested yesterday in Mike McGee's Keynote Address, something I think I should have thought of. Just as important as the methods of *techné* is the practice of reaching for the best we can be under the constraints of existential judgments to reach judgments or to arrive at decisions.

MICHAEL CALVIN MCGEE: I have two categories of responses, I think, to this general line of thinking and the way that Professor Brockriede is developing it. One is an unfair, very unfair, system of responses because it calls into question the very project itself and I want to go through that very briefly because it is unfair. I merely call attention to it because I want to raise the questions that are in a sense begged by this approach. I want to harken back to Professor Willard's keynote yesterday and look at the problem of expertise and what constitutes expert witnesses and ask why we always use philosophers' categories in order to understand our own subject matter. Epistemology and ontology constitute the main subject matter of metaphysics according to modern philosophy. Richard Rorty is correct: the very term "epistemology" or the idea that the epistemic is a body of literature is a late model development. It doesn't even exist in the ancient world; we have to go back and reinvent it. Why do we use these categories in order to understand argument which is so clearly presented to us in our own tradition and our own literature as a part of the rhetorical project? Second if we are going to use philosophical categories why do we choose marginal philosophers? Why do we choose Stephen Toulmin who doesn't make it with his own community and has to come over and make another community on his own because in our view he is so far ahead of his compatriots that they won't pay attention to him? Other marginal philosophers perhaps, such as Chaim Perelman, turned to notions of rhetoric and argumentation as a way of salvaging failed projects. In the case of Toulmin the failed project is the attempt to bring the study of morality and ethics in line with notions of truth as epistemologists think it ought to be. That's the unfair set of questions that this line of thinking poses to me.

I think the other set of responses that I have is quite fair. It has to do with the relatively recent importation of the work of Jurgen Habermas into Professor Brockriede's thinking. That, of course, has to be relatively recent; it's relatively recent for all of us. I am somewhat disturbed by the way in which Habermas is being imported into our field generally and particularly here because Habermas is being presented to us as a voice outside the context of a very intense debate which is actually occurring in and around his appropriation of some of the themes that are of interest to us. I don't, for example, hear the tension of the debate between Habermas and Gadamer. I hear that a little clearer in Professor Brockriede's most recent expositions than I

have elsewhere in the field. And the tension (most significant for my own comments today) is completely buried between Habermas and his French/Italian predecessors Derrida and Gramsci.

Now why is it necessary that we understand Habermas as a voice in a debate? A significant, powerful intellect, no doubt, but a voice in a debate whose positions are partisan and are misrepresented if they are brought to us outside the context of that debate. I think that we can see this in looking at the one--really there is only one substantive place that I find reason to disagree with Professor Brockriede, given the assumptions of ontology and epistemology--and that is the attitude of the the arguer. Remember where he tells us under the heading of ontology what attitude an arguer is suppose to have? We are suppose to have a restrained, critical attitude when we employ arguing. Why? So that we can avoid being a true believer or being a fanatic. Now I think that a restrained, critical attitude is an attitude that militates against change of almost of any sort and that prevents the formation of a serious and sincere social critic. I believe that argument is fundamentally and essentially partisan. The degree to which it tries to maintain an unrestrained and critical attitude is the degree to which it betrays its very ethos and telos. It backs away from what it wants to be, from where it draws its own source, and attempts to adopt what we all know anyway as a false pose of objective, bi-partisan judgment.

Second, we are asked to decide through argument and not through coercion. I submit to you in practice arguments are a species of coercion and that the reason we engage in argumentation is to use that form of coercion in preference to more dangerous and more inhumane forms of coercion. Argument is an instrument of social change. We are suppose to follow procedural restraints. Now when Doug Ehninger taught that to me in graduate school I didn't understand it either, except that it was a system of rules analagous to the system of rules that we put attorneys through as they go through a courtroom. I have no objection to that if we could get everybody who wants to disagree about things in the political economy to follow the same set of rules; if we want to keep it to those procedures finally.

But finally and here's the Habermas tie-in we are to try to argue to achieve emancipation. Now here I think we are really fooling ourselves. Even in Habermas' terms, achieving emancipation is a personal achievement. It is not the achievement of a group of people; it is a personal achievement. The achievement of emancipation is something that one achieves through criticism specifically through the criticism of one's own ideology and one's own participation in the ideology. I don't believe that if we do argue in order to achieve emancipation that we're going to have to translate that concept away from what Habermas, as I understand him anyway, intended that notion to be and make it into one that is very practical and political. I don't believe that it survives that kind of translation. Enough of initial response.

WALTER R. FISHER As we all know by now, one of the great things about this kind of a conference is that it comes as close to capturing the

kind of thing that would happen in graduate school on occasion. It certainly did with me at the University of Iowa when Jerry Miller and sometimes Lloyd Bitzer and sometimes Bob Tiemens and Bob Austin would meet for coffee and we would talk about ideas; and at conventions after the programs were over, we would retreat to someones bedroom and drink and talk and so on.

My remarks are about as disjointed as those of the person involved in the kinds of situations I just mentioned, but I guess I want to start by saying that I am an unrestrained partisan of Wayne Brockriede. I believe there is more than sufficient warrant for asserting this. He is the preeminent theorist and practitioner of argument in the field. And I make the assertion without fear of risking self or violating yours, which is all to prove that I am not a ideal arguer. And it is also to suggest what I think Wayne has represented, especially in the present situation and what he projects for the future.

It is not so much argument as I ordinarily know it, as it occurs in court rooms or in the legislature, but in dialogue. If you take the qualities he has talked about, the restrained partisanship, bilaterality and so on, I think you will find those to be the constituents often attributed to dialogue more than debate or argument as we ordinarily know them. One of the things that is inevitably true about the generation of ideas that would change what we understand as communication, argument, persuasion, whatever it happens to be, is that you begin with the self. That is, you try to go through your own experience and say what is this thing and try to understand it on that level. Then you move out and try to see if your experience coincides with that of others so that the only ground for the test of any theory, first and foremost and fundamentally, is your own real experience in the world, as well as that of others.

Now it seems to me theres a sense in which we have an autobiographical statement in this later part of the paper because what we have is a description of Wayne Brockriede arguing. Wayne Brockriede is a restrained partisan. He believes in bilaterality and acts it out. And furthermore he believes in the procedures of pursuing warranted assertibility. And I think that that's good. Where are we to go to move beyond that point to see if we can generalize that in terms of argument itself? It seems to me that the first step is to go back and look at argument as an instrument of knowing and ask whether or not it is possible that there are, implicit in it, values that you can say are normative. Is the pursuit of knowledge by scientists, debaters and the technicians of our society inherently a moral operation? We will have an interesting comment, I think, this evening by Michael Hyde as he talks about medical technicians and the kinds of things they have to do. I'm not sure where that works in; this is a very difficult move, from talking what is epistemologically the case, to what is ontologically the case, and by that Wayne tends to mean "axiologically" possible for the case.

One other line of question. I'm beginning to not understand "understanding." I'm not sure whether it is an act, an activity,

achievement; whether the mark of understanding is consensus in a subjective reliability, valid agreement, or a fusion of horizons, as Gadamer would represent it. I suspect that, and I suggested this to Wayne before, his friend is Gadamer rather than Habermas, because the orientation that is represented by what I see to be a dialogic orientation to argument is enhanced and supported by Gadamer's own project.

JAMES KLUMPP: One of the advantages of going last is that I looked over some of Wayne Brockriede's materials and played the old game I played as a negative debater of trying to figure out what arguments were inherent in his position so that I would hear them today and then analyze those arguments. I found myself drawing on Walt Fisher and Michael McGee and so I said they are going to make those arguments so I don't need to worry about doing it. So I have the advantage now being able to make a probe into Brockriede's position without fear of preempting some other positions.

Let me first of all talk about Brockriede's long term project because there are several things in there that I identify with. It seems to me over the last few years there are two things that Brockriede has been doing that are important to what I have been doing. The first is a movement toward helping us deal with a logic of synthesis rather a logic of analysis. A logic that attempts to put ideas together and to see what happens to ideas as they are put together rather than one that uses a reductionistic kind of procedure. He has used the title "Perspectivism" on several instances to describe this movement.

The second thrust that I identify with is the thrust toward understanding as a product of interaction rather than as the lonely story of a mind encountering an object, some kind of a social dimension. Mine is a friendly critique of what he said this morning but a critique none the less because I think he is hung-up on a old question which needs to be reformulated or it's going to put his long term project at risk. It is that sort of idea that I want to talk about a little bit and develop.

Let me begin with his statement about his perspective on argument being person-centered. And to do that, let me set up a three-part division: the first part being person-centered perspectives, the second being interaction-centered perspectives, and the third being social-centered perspectives. I think one inevitably develops an account of all of those from whichever perspective you begin with. It seems to me, however, that as I look at what Brockriede has been doing, I would not call what he has been doing person-centered. I'd call it interaction-centered. It seems to me that, in fact, a person-centered account of argument within a context of his project is untenable. Let me approach that severe statement from a couple of directions. First of all it seems to me that you cannot describe an arguer with the individual as the locus. What I mean by that is that such a description would account for the personality across situations and I think to do so is some what artificial. One instance I always recall is when Donn Parson had his first child. And when that child was three months old

and needed discipline, Parson would look at the child and begin his argument and say, "Now here Eric, we shouldn't do that because" and then go into the explanation of why we shouldn't do this and of course he was met by the most confused small face in the world. My point is that for all of us, there are times to argue and there are times to not argue. It seems to me that the basic process of human understanding begins with that kind of an understanding. Which means that our project is not to describe an arguer but is to describe the situations for argument.

The second reason the person-centered is untenable is that you very quickly begin to talk about the personal within the perspective of interaction rather than the other way around. Wayne does this with his emphasis on bilaterality. The very word "partisan" is a word that is not the locus of the individual; it presumes "interaction." I conclude that the personal is untenable.

That does not, however, get me where I want to be, which is to be arguing that the context that you really need is the context of the social. To make that argument I want to take as a text something that Wayne said earlier in his presentation. How persons function as arguers when they are acting at their very best, he said, was the essence of his project. My answer to that is sometimes they don't. When persons are acting at their very best sometimes they do not act as arguers. As an example, I will give you South Africa. It seems to me that this is a situation in which to assume the stance of an arguer, to assume the restraints of the argumentative situation established by the South African government, is not people acting at their best. Certainly the plea of the government of South Africa is no different than the plea of the government of the United States at times, that you ought to be more civilized about how you go about this; accept long term, slow change and argue with us about it. Help us determine the direction. We won't give you a voice; we won't let you vote, but argue with us about it. That seems to me to be not the prescription for the kind of praxis, the kind of projection of the individual into values that Wayne is talking about, but his prescription for the opposite.

Where does that leave us then in talking about the project that he set out for himself? It seems to me that we ought to talk a little bit about the word "should." Should statements, I would argue, must be contextually earned. Let me contrast two ways of dealing with should statements. The first is a narrative imposition route. It begins with a definition of what argument is and from that derives norms for individual behavior that would be consistent with that definition. Ultimately it takes the argument process to be most important, but it excludes the terms of the argument process from the immediate scope of argument itself and, instead, derives those from the definition of argument.

A second route to the should statement, which I call the entailment dialectic route, begins with the assumption that humans are choice makers. Choices inevitably entail values, that is they entail the should. Values involve the dialectic of the individual locus of motives with the social locus of motives. That means that values entail a

dialectic of action. The thrust of positions throws action together and creates the new out of the old. Argument, we can say, results from the human dialectic necessitated by action in a field of choice. It seems to me that that second method of getting into should is a superior method for Wayne's project than the first method, which I think is the avenue he is attempting to use. My call here, then, is for a much richer concept than a normative impositional route permits. We would be asking such questions as "when should one argue, who should argue with, with what choices of argumentative strategy will particular values be promoted?"

To summarize, it seems to me the project that Brockriede is pursuing, is to describe an ideal and that inevitably that cannot be circumscribed by argument. His dialectic in this project tends to be a Platonic dialectic. He works back and forth among unreal specifics trying to reach a real ideal which then can be applied normatively to people, to make judgments about arguers. It seems to me a more appropriate direction would be a more "social" dialectic. The energy of pairs thrown together forces the alteration of specifics. The energy of an individual locus of motives confronting the energy of the social locus of motives produces the kind of creativity that is the advancement of knowledge and of understanding human action which is characteristic of argument. The dialectic that can best provide a praxis of argument is the one based on the latter rather than the former. And it is this that Wayne would be wise to relate to his project.

RAY MCKERROW: You have now had the opportunity to engage in three different dialectical perspectives on the same work. The work has been challenged from the perspective of its relationship to unrestrained, committed advocacy for social change. That particular claim has been displaced by the argument that Wayne's project is not about public but rather about dialogue whose key term is "cooperation" rather than controversy. And that project has been redefined as interaction-centered rather than person-centered and challenged from the perspective of a Hegelian dialectic. With this very brief summary in mind, we can initiate the conversation anew with responses involving the panel members as well as members of the audience.

Recreating a Rhetorical View of Narrative:
Adam Smith in Conversation with Quintilian

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Thomas Kuhn has inspired many people to search the horizon of the present for a history-making shift in perspective that will mark out the next new age of science.¹ In part, the motivation is as old as people's realization that however little we may matter in the great scheme of history, our lives can be significant in the smaller frame of communal biography. It is a will to be important: We can contribute to the establishment of knowledge that will guide, and control those who come after us. The power appeals to some, and the duty of teaching to others; but for many these active motives come after the simpler desire to avoid ennui. To live in a time when "nothing happens" is a dull prospect; but to be alive when great change is in the air, in the Age of Revolutions, perhaps, or when a "paradigm shift" is occurring—the very idea stirs the blood and makes dull intellectual labor seem more exciting.

Belief in the cosmic significance of historical shifts in perspective clearly entails science with political tensions. In any given time, there are always some who roll along naively *dans le mouvement*, and others who act as if they have been predestined to swim against the tide. These general attitudes promote polarization and, in consequence, a political rhetoric: Thinkers who are generally comfortable in an atmosphere of change are vulnerable to chains of argument that cluster around rhetorical images of lemmings, while thinkers who seem to be resisting the inevitable are taunted by portraits of Sisyphean struggle. Truth seems to be at risk in the competition, and may really be in some cases; but a political interest is always present. One image of science has it in the paradoxical position of subverting and then becoming a "false god." When it stopped trying to coexist with religion and began to preach abstract empiricism, science destroyed one kind of reason to create another, and made up a true faith to root out an older faith.² Of course the story can be told with a different presumption of villainy, and a different sense of falseness: Anti-science, masquerading as "humanism," promoted nostalgia for archaic values and practices, inventing political tensions when the rest of the world was thought to be swept by a domineering spirit of change. And there is the third sense of falseness, the betrayed lover's neurotic fear of being out of control. The new not only produces change, but conjures such crises as Carlyle's fear of technology, or the sheer cynicism of most Marxists, to threaten comfortable old formulas. The center of political

conflict—whether the eye of the storm be masked contradiction, sweet nostalgia, or hysteria—is less important than the fact of it, for whatever its origin, conflict dictates that politics will be prominent in the act either of rolling with the flow or struggling against it. In swimming against the tide, thinkers are encouraged by the idea that a new paradigm can save them from ideology, nostalgic serendipity, or fear of what goes bump in the future. Conversely, the prospect of shifty paradigms makes an otherwise orderly, comfortable life-world feel contradicted, disrespected, perhaps even a bit senile.

Quite apart from its stated purpose of announcing one of these new paradigms, Walter Fisher's recent campaign to declare the human species *homo narrans* and not *homo sapiens* reminds us that an impressive array of human sciences have considered that the human mind may strive to mirror stories rather than nature.³ Three recent conferences on narrative, interpretation, and rhetoric have been attended by thinkers trained in all the human sciences who have in common a desire to resist the tide of our times, or perhaps to set in motion a new flood of irresistible enthusiasm.⁴ As Fredric Jameson's statement of the case illustrates, arguments about narrative are academically political in two ways, as subversion and as apology. After the assertion that "narrative is a specific mode of thinking the world, which has its own logic and which is irreducible to other types of cognition," there is the innuendo that "much of what passes for conceptual or scientific writing is itself secretly narrative in character"—as if there is a virgin blush to lose by telling stories, or an advantage to be gained from tarnishing the public image of science. The advantage, of course, is apology for literary study: "If . . . narrative is one of the basic categorical forms . . . under which synchronic and analytic thinking is itself subsumed and put in perspective," Jameson continues, "we no longer have to be defensive about the role of culture and the importance of its study and analysis."⁵

More than academic politics is involved in Fisher's statement of the case. A shifting paradigm sends shock waves through the whole political economy, even to problems of national defense. Fisher is frightened by moral and political consequences of the rhetoric of scientific expertise. He claims that science makes it impossible for a moral criticism of foreign policy, such as Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*, to be effective. People who celebrated the book, he observes, were not experts on the subjects of nuclear energy and foreign policy—they could respond to the moral impulse of the book, but they no more than Schell could speak with "authority." Opponents of Schell's tale have a monopoly on authority, according to Fisher, because they are the "purveyors of ideological, bureaucratic, or technical arguments"—writers who base their arguments in "political truth" peddle ideology, bureaucrats have an "administrative sanction" from the Reagan government, and technicians have a "subject matter expertise."⁶ Because we typically defer to them on technical matters, experts have come to expect

pliable audiences, and they therefore develop an imperious attitude toward such as Schell.⁷ Fisher wants a "narrative paradigm" of reasoning so that we can reconceptualize the role of the expert: "Experts are storytellers and the audience is not a group of observers, but are active participants in the meaning-formation of the stories."⁸ On this view, counselors of state, professional administrators, and nuclear physicists should be brought down from the high position of feudal celebrity to that of revered story-teller whose business is disseminating knowledge-as-lore.

Ordinarily, in the mind-set Jameson and Fisher oppose, it would be condemnation to suggest that current theories of narrative are politically motivated. Our purpose is to confront the political dimension of innovation, however, because it is an inescapable part of intellectual growth or social change of any sort. At issue is the competence of the politics involved. Political competence is not an issue associated with field-specific literary notions of narrative, of course; but when narrative is made to stand over and against the logic and rhetoric of science, or when it is promoted as a "paradigm" of human judgment in general, three significant issues arise: (1) As a version of orthodoxy, the theory must stand *effectively* against its opposition. Nothing good will come of an alleged paradigm shift if the only writers who feel the quake are those who already make their living peddling discourse theories. (2) As the basis of an apology for literary study and cultural criticism, the theory must stand *constructively* on its own merits. Little is accomplished if the narrative paradigm produces nothing, if it merely inundates the logic and rhetoric of science. (3) As a paradigm of practical wisdom and judgment, the theory must be *powerful* enough to generate successful policy. Morality should be an important consideration in the political economy; but it must be a kind of morality that has been groomed to expedient ends--in short, it must *work*. In a more elaborate version of this paper, my colleague John Nelson and I will consider each issue in its turn. I want here to probe into the second issue, the question of demonstrating how, and in what context, *homo narrans* contributes positively to the construction of truths.

Kenneth Burke would state the case "logologically": There are many clearly distinct usages of the word "narrative"; but, curiously, none of them have the presumption of being on the side of truth. The presumption is that narrative has more to do with hiding sins than with revealing truths. We have to ask about "the real" story, or "God's--spell" to get it over on the side of truth. "Gospel" depends on the *ethos* of the story-teller, and "real" stories are made so by rational critique of something presumed to be inherently misleading. As a matter of political competence, therefore, you need to settle the connection of truth and narrative if you want to lead those currently hobbled by the ideology of scientism toward discourse theory. They peddle their wares by claiming a monopoly on truth, and they would stand unalterably against anything that willingly acquiesced to the label "fiction"

or failed to show how story-telling can be distinguished from telling--stories when you're caught with your hand in the cookie jar.

Fisher's conception of "real fictions" is responsive to this problem because it associates narrativity with rhetoric.⁹ It doesn't take nearly so much as the suggestion of gospel to get rhetoric over on the side of truth, for rhetoric is presumed to be inherently *interested*; it misleads only when it manipulates proof to serve its interest, and it suborns proof predictably, always in the direction of its interest. Rhetoric is thus always "real," and it always calls attention to the *ethos*--the interest--of its maker. It follows that we usually have enough information to judge it "persuasive" and "convincing," thus putting it on the side of truth for reasons that originate in the rhetorical situation.

The more inventive of you may come up with five or seven, but for the moment I'll stick with the more obvious suggestion that you can combine narrative and rhetoric in two ways, depending on which "comes first" in your explanation. If narrative "comes first," you are forced to re-enact the eighteenth-century German metaphysics game: It becomes ontology to rhetoric's epistemology, and you get Jameson's position that narrative is an ideological form that sets human (class)interestedness on a particular and pretty much unalterable course.¹⁰ If rhetoric "comes first," narrative becomes a kind of procedure or step along rhetoric's path to practical action. You get what I think may be our most constructive position, that narrative is a structuring of the world so that we can bracket most of its complexities while we deal with some particular, presumably pressing, problem.

By now you're wondering about my title, for you haven't heard a word about either Adam Smith or Quintilian--unless you believe in bearded reincarnations seated at the speaker's table. I promised to put these two noble curmudgeons of the rhetorical tradition in conversation with one another, and so I shall. Curiously, the first and last points of conversation have to do with different senses of the concept "translation." Concepts of narrativity got lost in the rhetorical tradition because of a translation problem associated with the mind set of modern science and its ally in misappropriation, neo-classical philology. Constructive concepts of narrativity can be recreated by treating narrativity as the *techné* of "translation," similar to the syllogism or the scientific method. Let's deal with the first problem of translation by giving Adam Smith the first word.

In the ordered world of the eighteenth-century, when the dreams and stories of modern science were being formulated by some of the more inventive minds in the history of civilization, everything from peasants to problems had a place to stay in. When the moderns discussed rhetoric, they reflected the mindset of their milieu, seeing that the ancient art could serve truth, but not produce it--truth production, after all, was the business of

philosophers and scientists who approached problems with quite different attitudes and methods. The patron intellect of the dismal science spent several years lecturing on "rhetoric and belles lettres." The majority of lectures are on the subject of narration, and we can guess why from the following passage:

Every discourse proposes either barely to relate some fact or to prove some proposition. The first is the kind of discourse called a narrative one; the latter is the foundation of two sorts of discourses, the didactic and the rhetorical. The former proposes to put before us the arguments on both sides of the question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of influence, and has it in view to persuade no further than the arguments themselves appear convincing. The rhetorical, again, endeavours by all means to persuade us, and for this purpose it magnifies all the arguments on the one side, and diminishes or conceals those that might be brought on the side contrary to that which it is designed that we should favour."

Richard Rorty has reminded us that the motif of western philosophy which led to modern science was the prejudice that "Nature" is the ultimate arbiter of all "facts"—human understanding is a *Mirror of Nature*.¹² In Marcuse's language, it is commitment to an equation, "Reason=Truth=Reality."¹³ Notice how clearly this theme is represented in Smith's appropriation of rhetoric. Like Descartes and Pascal before him, Smith privileges the kind of discourse that relates facts in as clear and precise a way as possible. The closer we get to the fictive, what might be said to persuade at any cost, the further away we get from the sort of truths which ought to be the foundation of our beliefs and actions.

There is a lesson here which should give us caution about how we go about interpreting what we want *homo narrans* to be. In a curious irony, the first declaration of a "narrative paradigm" funded the attitude which became contemporary scientism, the very orthodoxy which the second declaration of a "narrative paradigm" means to subvert. And the spirit of appropriation was equally revolutionary. Smith could read the classical tradition to privilege narrative without misrepresenting it; but, he says, "It is rather reverence for antiquity than any great regard for the beauty or usefulness of the thing itself which makes me mention the ancient divisions of rhetoric."¹⁴ The ancients were not *authorities* on the subject of discourse, but it was good politics to make connections wherever possible, because the prevailing paradigm to be displaced approached life with Ciceronian subtlety and Christian relentlessness.

Walter Benjamin may not have been the first to make the point, but he does argue convincingly that the process of "translation" is an exercise in theft. You are the prisoner of your own intellectual climate, and your task is not just finding equivalent syntactic usages between two languages, but also to find equivalent cultural forms. Further, since cultures change

historically, "translation" must occur even in the same language, and a translation made at one moment in historical experience must be made again and again as the spirit of the times changes.¹⁵ Notice how this has worked with our understanding of Roman rhetoric: Philologists (I call them that though technically the word does not apply until the latter part of the nineteenth century) conceive themselves to be guardians of tradition. They argue incessantly amongst themselves about what Plato or Cicero *really* meant by such-and-such a statement. The problem, of course, is both bogus and ineffable, but that's not the point. The preservers of antiquity were caught in the *zeitgeist* of scientism, and so acculturated Roman rhetoric to an environment ill equipped to understand it. Quintilian's sentence "*Narratio est aut tota pro nobis aut tota pro adversario aut mixta ex utrisque*" is rendered as "The statement will be either wholly in our favour or wholly in that of our opponent or a mixture of both."¹⁶ Albeit with appropriately scholarly notation of the "liberty" taken, *narratio* is transformed into *statement* and even *statement of fact* in other places.

Let's conjure a bit with this view of narrativity. What Adam Smith and his philological allies have done is to make a pun on the word "fact" by playing with the ambiguity of the word "statement." When you go to court to "make a statement," you tell a story (*narratio*) that you purport to be true. "Truth" in such situations is dependent upon an individual's *ethos* and perspective—it is understood to be a subjective, relative affirmation. But a statement is also a proposition, a declarative sentence that affirms or denies a state or condition in allegedly objective reality. In this second sense, particularly in the climate of scientism, statements are supposed to "mirror nature." Their "truth" is dependent upon their correspondence to "what really happened" or "what really is." Quintilian discussed such things in great detail in another part of his work, presumably because the framing, defending, and attacking of propositions is a separate stage in the process of forensic argument. *Narratio* is a "statement of facts," but the facts do not exist independently of the story which structures them. Putting emphasis on "statement" rather than "story" is an adaptation to a culture that insists on *discovering* rather than *making* truths. Adam Smith's understanding of *narratio* reduces stories to the sentences that comprise them.

Those of us interested in promoting the vision of *homo narrans* are in Adam Smith's position. We have no interest in using Smith, or Quintilian, as authoritative supports for our view of the world. Antiquity matters because it can be appropriated, competently or not, to political ends. The political goal of the present line of argument is demonstrating a convincing connection between narrativity and truth. At a general level, Fisher and others already have done this by showing that moral truths are dependent upon the narratives we are pleased to pass along to our children. *Tradition* currently gets story-telling over on the side of truth. While this may be

enough for those of us conditioned to accept history as a ground of proof, people conditioned by scientism are purposefully ahistorical in their thinking. Edwin Boring tells us that "science can actually . . . lift itself by its own boot straps,"¹⁷ and Becker has characterized one of the major issues in our own field as "whether rhetoric is to be a cumulative or an evolutionary (perhaps revolutionary) discipline."¹⁸ For positive political reasons, we must be able to get narrative over on the side of truth on some more convincing argument than the historical fact that the story of liberty, for example, has been repeated many times in many circumstances.

In imitation of Adam Smith, we can re-create a conception of narrativity in Quintilian sufficient to this purpose. The striking feature of Quintilian's description of *narratio* is his emphasis on the subjective character of the truths at stake in the argument:

The [narration] of facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done. . . . [It] is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute. Most writers, more especially of the Isocratean school, hold that it should be lucid, brief, and plausible.¹⁹

The [narration] of fact will be credible, if in the first place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns . . . and if we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed.²⁰

The clear accent is on *narratio*, not on "facts." The story is supposed to be persuasive, it deals with *allegations* of fact, it aims no higher than *plausibility*. Further, tests are applied, not to the facts of the case, but to the narration of them: Credibility is the issue, not facticity, and the mirror we hold up is not to "Nature" as an objective environment, but to the correspondence between *character* and fact.

The familiar interpretation, of course, is that Quintilian is concerned with mere opinion and sheer manipulation. He is. But the problem is deciding what he is manipulating and why. With an emphasis on those who must decide, we are inclined to ask how the correspondence of character and fact contributes to a wise and prudent judgment--on these terms, *people* are manipulated. With an emphasis on the materials of decision, however, the manipulation is of the *circumstance* which requires judgment. Bryant's famous phrase makes the function of rhetoric adapting ideas to people and people to ideas.²¹ We can modify that slightly with the metaphor of "translation": Particular cases that require moral judgment must be "translated" into the cultural patterns of those charged to judge. The vehicle of translation is *narratio*, a story that structures facts according to the expectations of "native speakers" of a particular culture.²²

As Gadamer's experience with it suggests, the translation metaphor is full of traps--ultimately, he abandoned it to play with rhetoric.²³ The difficulty is how you think of what it is you "translate": If you think that narratives are forms that "mirror" equally formal commitments within a particular culture, you're in the position of privileging historical patterns of judgment that may be indefensibly oppressive--stories about the right way to deal with an old and trusted slave, for example, may be clearly precedented in the Anglo-American tradition. The moral of the story may even be quite noble, if you accept the premise of slavery as a starting point. As Habermas argued in response to Gadamer's original description of translation, the metaphor does not permit an effective critique of tradition, nor does it account for positive changes in cultural patterns over time.²⁴

In fact, I think, narratives are not "formal" in the sense we usually think of "form." We think of "narrative form" as a category of discourse, in other words, and when we realize the close connection between cultural patterns and narratives, we think of "cultural form" as if it were a "genre" of habits and customs. Actually, culture is a *set of procedures* formalized by sheer repetitions, what Ortega calls "usages."²⁵ Skill in a "native speaker" of a culture is marked by *savoir faire*, knowing what and how to "do right" in a multiplicity of common and recurring situations. It follows, I think, that if particular circumstances must be translated into cultural patterns (or *vice versa*), the vehicle of translation must have the capacity to reproduce the sense of *proceeding*. The narrative, even the simple story with nothing but an "and then . . . and then . . . and then" structure, has the power of signifying procedure.

Further, it is possible that narratives are *uniquely* able to signify procedure. Bare semiotics is capable of *communicating* procedure as a past, frozen fact, much as a photographic image "stops" a speeding race car. But no word can *signify* procedure, for words are by nature static, and procedure ceases to exist when it is interrupted even for a moment--think about the times your *savoir faire* has come a day late.²⁶ Logic and mathematics can render procedure in their own languages by assigning arbitrary values and relationships to human actions. But only the narrative re-presents, truly *signifies*, procedure, human conduct.

Quintilian's attitude toward narrative accomodates this view of a signal relationship between story and cultural practice. *Narratio* is a stage of discourse preparation. It isn't needed in all cases--sometimes, he says, you make a pure claim and leave the story-telling to an opponent who occupies a less favored position.²⁷ *Narratio* is like arithmetic, in other words: Sometimes you must translate objects into a language uniquely adapted to signify quantity. It is also like logic, for at times you need to translate things into

"language" uniquely adapted to signify inference. When the case at bar requires the resources of cultural, moral commitments, there must be a narration, for only narration can bring out and make formal the proceeding which is to be evaluated. *Narratio* is to moral reason what the equation is to mathematics, the syllogism to dialectic, and the enthymeme to Aristotelian rhetoric—it is the discourse structure that is uniquely capable of signifying what needs at the moment to be put through the mind.

We haven't thought much about morality lately—indeed, Alisdair MacIntyre believes that "we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality."¹² If I am right to understand morality as deeply embedded cultural practice, one reason we are ignorant of morality is that we redefined *narratio* to make it fit with a new idea of truth. In the process, we lost our capacity to signify morality, and since thought without signification is impossible, the subject of morality is unattended. Along this line of thinking, we can get narrative over on the side of truth in a very simple, direct way that has no contact with the idea of a privileged tradition. With a re-created *narratio*, translated into our own culture, we are able to re-present the cultural practices we revere as well as the particular circumstances which must be judged. Perhaps this twist of Quintilian will increase the political competence of *homo narrans* as he and she struggle against oppressive orthodoxies in and out of the academy.

¹²See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. enlarged. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Scholarship in the Seventies," in: *Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition*, ed. Walter R. Fisher, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1974) pp. 3-15; Paul Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society*. (London: Verso, 1978); Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. (London: Verso, 1975); Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Karl-Otto Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities," *Man and World*, 5 (1972) 3-37; Charles Sanders Peirce, "Ideas, stray or stolen, about scientific writing", *Philosophy and rhetoric*, 11 (1978) 147-55; Nancy L. Harper, *Human Communication Theory: The History of a Paradigm*. (Rochelle Park, NJ: Hayden, 1979).

¹³See Bertrand Russell, *Unpopular Essays* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), pp. 71-111.

¹⁴Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Rhetorical Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument". *Communication Monographs*, 51 (1984) 1-22.

¹⁵See W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., *On narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); and W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., *The Politics of Interpretation*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

¹⁶Fredric R. Jameson, "The Symbolic Inference; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis". In: Hayden White and Margaret Brose, eds. *Representing Kenneth Burke: Selected Papers From the English Institute* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 72.

¹⁷*ibid.*, p. 11

¹⁸*ibid.*, p. 12

¹⁹*ibid.*, p. 13

²⁰Walter R. Fisher, "Rhetorical Fiction and the Presidency," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66 (1980) 119-26.

²¹Fredric Jameson., *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); and Fredric Jameson, *Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

¹¹Adam Smith, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, ed. John M. Lothian (Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 58.

¹²Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

¹³Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 123.

¹⁴Smith, p. 59.

¹⁵Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 69-82.

¹⁶Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans H. E. Butler (London: William Heinemann, 1921), IV.ii.33-36; 2:68-69.

¹⁷Edwin G. Boring, *History, Psychology, and Science: Selected Papers* (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 79.

¹⁸Becker, p. 5.

¹⁹Quintilian, IV.ii.31; 2:66-67.

²⁰Ibid., IV.ii.52; 2:78-79.

²¹Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 39 (1953) 401-24.

²²See Renato Rosaldo, "Doing Oral History," *Social Analysis*, 4 (1980), 80-99; and Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," *Dialectica* 101 (1972), pp 1-17.

²³Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 88-138.

²⁴Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*". In: *Understanding and Social Inquiry*, ed. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 335-363.

²⁵See Jose Ortega Y Gasset, *Man and People*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: W. W. Norton, 1957), pp. 176-91

²⁶Ibid., p. 247.

²⁷Quintilian, IV.ii.4-8; 2:52-55.

²⁸Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 2.

MEMORY AND DIACHRONIC ARGUMENT:
A MARCUSEAN NOTE

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There is no past that one is allowed to long for. There is only the eternally new, growing from the enlarged elements of the past; and genuine longing always must be productive, must create something new and better.

1
Goethe, Gesprache

The mention of "memory" in a gathering such as this conference will very likely evoke images of the lost fourth canon of rhetoric or epideictic speaking. In either case, it seems to have little to do with invention or a theory of argument. Among argument theorists (with noted exceptions, 2), Tradition, Time, and Memory seem to belong to a different domain of consciousness than does the concept of Rationality.

In his essay "Knowledge in Time" (an essay that, I believe, has received insufficient attention), Farrell notes how "odd" is this removal of most models of argument from "the imposing effects of time and change." Whatever else it is, he says, history is "an invention and revision of argument."³

If so, then in what sense should we understand argument as being "diachronic?" The most straightforward sense is what Farrell himself proposes: Arguments develop their meanings within history. The relationships among claims, reasons, and issues --rather than being simultaneously "here"-- are constituted in part in "the changing developmental process of history itself."⁴

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Yet, Farrell too neglects Mnemosyne. This is surprising, given Farrell's earlier review of Critical Theory. For memory plays a crucial role in Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, and Marcuse's understanding of the crisis of modern civilization. Particularly in Marcuse, an "anticipatory memory" (vordeutende Erinnerung) preserves the possibility of the critique of rationality itself.

My own interest in this essay, then, is to begin to inquire into Marcuse's concept of memory and its relationship to diachronic argument. Because Marcuse developed this

concept in widely scattered essays, lectures, books, and unpublished manuscripts over a period of forty years, I will only try to sketch briefly the function of memory in his critical project and, second, to suggest that argument critics should seriously pursue Marcuse's idea of memory as a mode of dissociation.

"ANTICIPATORY MEMORY" AND CRITICAL THOUGHT

Marcuse's work can be understood as an attempt to identify a domain of consciousness in which a dialectical, i.e., transcendent criterion is empowered. In Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, he argues: "The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form."⁶ This dialectical pursuit of 'what is present as a tendency in the given reality' points to the need for an oppositional social force.⁷ Marcuse discovers this force in the idea of memory.

Marcuse first introduced the concept of memory in his 1937 essay "Über den affirmative Charakter der Kulture," translated as "The Affirmative Character of Culture" in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (1968). Writing at a time when the Nazis had risen to power in Germany, Marcuse was drawn to the Hegelian Marxism of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research and to the project of articulating a radical social theory. Initially, his effort to identify an external, critical standpoint focused upon individuals who were themselves estranged from the "affirmative" culture. Marcuse wrote, "Those social strata ... which are kept back in semi-medieval forms, pushed to the lowest margin of society, and thoroughly demoralized, provide, even in these circumstances, an anticipatory memory [vordeutende Erinnerung]."⁸

The emphasis upon "outcasts" reflects Marcuse's interest in those who prefigured the estranged artists of his dissertation Der Deutsche Künstlerroman (1922). Like the medieval mimes, minstrels, and itinerant scholars, the outcasts of modern society "offer 'a presage of possible truth', a 'foretaste of potentialities', 'une promesse de bonheur', in short, the 'anticipatory memory' that projects into future society the generalized satisfaction of the progressive demands and ideals of the past."⁹

Marcuse pursues this theme in an unpublished study of avant-garde writers of the French Resistance: "Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era" (1945). The radicalism of the artistic effort, Marcuse says, may promote our alienation, our total estrangement from the world. "And this alienation may provide the art-ficial

basis for the remembrance of freedom in the totality of oppression."¹⁰ Here, the anticipatory memory reappears in the dialectical character of art. The function of art, Marcuse writes, is the "awaking of memory, remembrance of things past." Art, estranged from reality, nevertheless reminds us of what we have forgotten but may yet realize in the future.¹¹

Marcuse's location of memory in art and, earlier, in the "outcasts" of society reflected his effort to identify a transcendent, critical locus or vantage point. Critical thought had to draw its concepts from outside of the affirmative culture if it was to preserve the conditions for radical analysis and transformation. In the next decade, Marcuse was to find a very different locus for the critical task of memory.

In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse subtly reformulates Freud's conception of the therapeutic role of memory. He stresses --instead of repression-- the liberation which remembrance of the identity of freedom and necessity makes possible. Marcuse argues that "the unconscious, the deepest and oldest layer of the mental personality, is the drive for integral gratification, which is absence of want and repression." As such, Marcuse says, the unconscious upholds the equation of freedom and happiness:

Its truth, although repelled by consciousness, continues to haunt the mind; it preserves the memory of past stages of individual development at which integral gratification is obtained. And the past continues to claim the future: it generates the wish that the paradise be re-created on the basis of the achievements of civilization.¹² [Emphasis added]

Thus, the therapeutic role of memory derives from its "truth value," as a decisive mode of cognition. Marcuse notes that this value lies in the specific function of memory "to preserve promises and potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual, but which had once been fulfilled in his dim past and which are never entirely forgotten."¹³

This is clearly a psychological reformulation of the concept of anticipatory memory which Marcuse had proposed in his 1937 essay. But, as one critic observes, "now a content and a context is provided: what is to be re-membered, re-collected, is the archaic infancy of the individual and the genus under the unchallenged dominion of Eros."¹⁴

Yet, this memory is not available to ordinary consciousness. With the growth of the individual and of civi-

lization, memory becomes "rationalized." Marcuse notes a two stage process: "Recalling the domain of the pleasure principle, where freedom from want was a necessity, the id carries the memory traces of this state forward into every present future: it projects the past into the future." However, the past also introduces a repressive element into this libidinal relation:

... the superego, also unconscious, rejects this instinctual claim on the future, in the name of a past no longer one of integral satisfaction but one of bitter adjustment to a punitive present. ... the memory traces of the unity between freedom and necessity become submerged in the acceptance of unfreedom; rational and rationalized, memory itself bows to the reality principle.¹⁵

Memory can no longer re-cognize its "truth," the possibility of the identity of freedom and necessity. In this condition, time becomes an ally in forgetting. "The flux of time helps men to forget what was and what can be: it makes them oblivious to the better past and the better future."¹⁶

This ability to forget is, admittedly, an indispensable feature of our mental life without which "civilized life would be unbearable." But, Marcuse argues,

it is also the mental faculty which sustains submissiveness and renunciation. To forget is also to forgive what should not be forgiven if justice and freedom are to prevail. Such forgiveness reproduces the conditions which reproduce injustice and enslavement: to forget past suffering is to forgive the forces that caused it --without defeating those forces.¹⁷

Against this surrender to time, Marcuse urges "the restoration of remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle of liberation."¹⁸ I will suggest in a moment that it is in this project that the function of memory as argument is disclosed: as a mode of dissociation of a-historical rationality.

In the view of some, however, Marcuse is not sufficiently critical of Freud; he uses "mythopoetic evidence" or, worse, lapses into "mysticism." What, then, is restored in Marcuse's *recherche du temps perdu*?

Much of the source of criticism stems from Marcuse's reference to Freud's "phylogenetic" hypothesis on the origin

of (repressive) civilization. Is Marcuse's "archaic" memory of childhood experiences pre-individual, generic? In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse writes, "This 'memory of pre-historic impulses and deeds continues to haunt civilization: the repressed material returns ...'"¹⁹ Even a sympathetic Marcusean scholar as Kellner suggests that to utilize memory and the aesthetic dimension as Marcuse intends, requires "freeing these concepts from their Freudian significations and developing them in another anthropological-psychological framework --as Ernst Bloch does in The Principle of Hope."²⁰

But Marcuse himself points to how we are to understand his appropriation of Freud. In a passage not often cited from Eros and Civilization, he explains: "We use Freud's anthropological speculation only in this sense: for its symbolic value." Though the archaic events may forever be beyond the realm of verification, "the alleged consequences of these events are historical facts, and their interpretation in the light of Freud's hypothesis lends them a neglected significance which points to their historical function."²¹

This interpretation is consistent with Marcuse's remarks on Hegel's use of Er-innerung (remembrance or recollection) as "turning into oneself," re-turn from externalization.²² In his later writings, Marcuse argues for a theory of knowledge as recollection: "as the rediscovery of the true Forms of things, distorted and denied in the established reality."²³ Recollection is "not remembrance of a Golden Past (which never existed), of childhood innocence, primitive man, et cetera. Recollection as epistemological faculty rather is synthesis, reassembling the bits and fragments which can be found in the distorted humanity and distorted nature."²⁴

The task of re-collecting these "fragments," therefore, required "the interpretation of manifestations of deep instinctual demands on the surface of modern life, and psycho-analysis confirmed [Marcuse's] earlier inclinations to allow the faculty of memory --'as a decisive mode of cognition'-- to guide the analysis."²⁵

But what of argument? If memory recalls "the true form of things," what is the relation of this truth to the rationality of ordinary consciousness?

A MODE OF DISSOCIATION

"The psychoanalytic liberation of memory," Marcuse says in Eros and Civilization, "explodes the rationality of the repressed individual. As cognition gives way to re-cognition, the forbidden images and impulses of childhood begin to tell the truth that reason denies." Memory yields its own critical standards which challenge the established reason.²⁶

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As such, Marcuse's conception differs radically from the conception of memory in rhetorical theory. In classical rhetoric, memory comes after inventio, as a retrieval of the products of consciousness. It releases its stored information for purposes determined by criteria other than memory's own. For Marcuse, however, the weight of the "discovery" of memory's content shatters the framework of the one who searches in memory. Recognition and the relation to past does not end in its "reconciliation" with the present. "Against the self-imposed restraint of the discoverer, the orientation on the past tends toward an orientation on the future. The recherche du temps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation."²⁷ (That such a conception clashes with the traditional understanding of memory in epideictic speaking --as a healing or reconciliation-- should also be obvious.)

Marcuse elaborates this function of memory in more detail in what is probably his most widely known book, One Dimensional Man (1964; 1966). It is in this context, I suggest, that memory is able potentially to function as diachronic argument: in its dissociation of the discourse and mode of reasoning of one-dimensional society.

The operational language of this society, Marcuse says, is irreconcilably anti-critical and anti-historical: "operational rationality has little room and little use for historical reason."²⁸ This "fight against history" is part of the fight against faculties of the mind that "might hinder the total coordination of the individual with the society."²⁹

Against such language and mode of thinking, memory poses a spectre: "Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights." This is so because "Remembrance is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a mode of 'mediation' which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent power of the given facts."³⁰

As diachronic argument, then, memory militates against the "closing" of the universe of discourse. It renders possible the invention of concepts which "de-stabilize and transcend the closed universe by comprehending it as historical universe." Memory-as-argument thus presents both the criteria for judgment and the basis for deliberation:

Far from necessitating an indifferent relativism, it searches in the real history of man for the criteria of truth and falsehood The mediation of the past with the present discovers the factors which made the facts ... it projects the limits and the alternatives.³¹

And, as memory dissociates the "facts," it frees the human imagination. In An Essay on Liberation (1969), Marcuse

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argues, "The imagination, unifying sensibility and reason, becomes 'productive' as it becomes practical: a guiding force in the reconstruction of reality"32

But through what agency? The notion of memory as a "productive" force raises some very troublesome questions for Marcuse concerning the relation of memory and practical discourse.

AN UNSOLVED CONTRADICTION?

Marcuse believed that established reality sanctions radical memory only in its estranged forms --in art or in the anticipatory memory of social "outcasts." For this reason, he devoted little attention in his later works to the realm of rhetorical discourse. In his last book, The Aesthetic Dimension (1978), he stressed that "only as estrangement does art fulfill a cognitive function: it communicates truths not communicable in any other language; it contradicts."33

Yet, art is inexorably invested with "guilt." Its estrangement cannot cancel the reconciliatory element in art: "The aesthetic form, however destructive it may be, stays and brings to rest. ... all content becomes the object of aesthetic gratification."34 Art cannot represent the suffering of Auschwitz or My Lai "without subjecting it to aesthetic form, and thereby to the mitigating catharsis, to enjoyment." However, Marcuse argues, this does not release art from the necessity of

recalling again and again that which can survive even Auschwitz and perhaps one day make it impossible. If even this memory were to be silenced, then the 'end of art' would indeed have come. Authentic art preserves this memory in spite of and against Auschwitz; this memory is the ground in which art has always originated --this memory and the need to create images of the possible 'other.'35

Memory redeems art, Marcuse believes, when its mimesis terminates in a recognition: "the power of aesthetic form to call fate by its name, to demystify its force, to give the word to the victims --the power of recognition which gives the individual a modicum of freedom"36 Thus, art's alienation from reality does not produce "false" consciousness but rather "a counter-consciousness: negation of the realistic-conformist mind."37 Such negation, however, is never simple negation but "its transcending preservation (Aufhebung) in which past and present cast their shadow on fulfillment. The authentic utopia is grounded in recollection."38

Still, Marcuse concedes, the effort to free the political potential of art is blocked by an unsolved contradiction: Art can express its radical potential only as art, "in its own language and image, which invalidate the ordinary language, the 'prose du monde.'" How then can art "be expressed so that it can become a guide and element in the praxis of change without ceasing to be art, without losing its internal subversive force?"39

Failing this, memory is "artistic and spurious; remembrance is no real weapon unless it is translated into historical action."40 Indeed, it is at this juncture that Marcuse's project has received its most severe criticism. Kellner complains that Marcuse fails to take account of the role of communication in human experience and to see the realm of symbolic interaction as more and other than the projections of desire and phantasy.41 And Aune notes the tendency in Marcuse and the Frankfurt School generally to reject strategic discourse or rhetoric as inherently manipulative.42

Thus, though Marcuse associates memory with the critique of rationality, he does not identify its appearances in ordinary discourse. What implications, if any, then, does Marcuse's critical project offer a theory of argument as practical discourse?

MEMORY AND PRACTICAL DISCOURSE

There is, I believe, at least one important area in which critics should pursue the idea of memory for practical argument. As a mode of dissociation, memory discloses a source of invention for what Toulmin has called "warrant-establishing arguments."43 (Curiously, the concept has received very little theoretical attention from argumentation scholars.)

As opposed to "warrant-using," warrant-establishing arguments seek to establish new premises or principles which, in turn, provide support for an arguer's claims. I am tempted at this point to cite MacIntyre's observation that the most striking feature of contemporary moral disagreement is its interminable character.44 But this would be misleading. For the issue is not the absence of "terminating" warrants --or the closure of further disagreement-- but preservation of the very possibility of argument.

As memory dissociates the "given" consciousness, it discloses a locus or starting point for critical reflection on received bases of judgment. Marcuse offers us an interesting clue in this regard. In one of his few references to a practical language, he argues "Such a new language ... cannot possibly be 'invented': it will necessarily depend on

the subverting use of traditional material" ⁴⁵ [Emphasis added]

This is, I suggest, a startlingly close description of the argumentative practices of some feminist theologians and environmentalists to establish "new" ethics. Ruether, for example, speaks of "usable traditions" as a way of making a more radical interpretation of religious paradigms to encompass women's experience. "Usable interpretative patterns are taken from Scripture and early community documents to set the original tradition against its later corruption." By allowing minority traditions to criticize dominant traditions, "one begins to discover lost critical principles."⁴⁶

And Attfield's effort to construct an environmental ethic sifts the neglected aspects of our central traditions to critique "the attitude and tradition of Despotism, an interpretation of the Biblical belief in man's dominion according to which everything is made for man"⁴⁷

Memory's dissociation thus seeks to recall sources of judgment, not always "as they were," but in their promise, as historical possibility. A diachronic sense of argument guides us, in our attempts to establish the grounds of Reason, to this anticipatory memory of what was and can still be. In our remembrance of the temps perdu, we help to ensure that the horizon of history remains open.

NOTES

¹
Vol. 3 (Leipzig: Herausgegeben von Flodoard Freiherr von Biedermann, 1910 [Nov. 4, 1823]), p. 37, quoted in Ernest G. Schachtel, "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia," in A Study of Interpersonal Relations, ed. Patrick Mullahy (New York: Hermitage Press, 1950), p. 6.

²
Cf. esp. Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs, 51 (1984), 1-22.

More typical, however, is the explicit divorce of memory from the domain of argument in Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "The Practical Celebration of Epideictic," in Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric, ed. Eugene E. White (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1980), pp. 131-155. Rosenfield urges: "there is a distinctive form of understanding [memorializing] evoked in epideictic celebration, and this mental participation differs from inferences and judgments more common to public controversy." (p. 133) And "the sense of release given by community memorialization" stands opposed to cognition which "traffics in truth and verisimilitude; it is the mental baggage of debaters, merchants, intellectuals, and others whose minds are not on such good terms with what is." (p. 149)

³
Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge in Time: Toward an Extension of Rhetorical Form," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 123.

⁴
Farrell, p. 123.

⁵
"Greek mythology celebrates Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, as the mother of all art." Schachtel, p. 3.

⁶Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), p. 145.

⁷
Barry Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography (London: Verso, 1982), p. 101. Katz notes that the idea of transcendence in Marcuse is political, not metaphysical, "for the practical function of this theoretical construct has been to provide a standard of criticism against which the prevailing reality may be judged and condemned in terms of its own potentialities." (pp. 11-12)

⁸
Herbert Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 116. [Originally published in German as "Über

den affirmative Charakter der Kulture," Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 6, 1 (Paris, 1937), 54-94.]

The influence of Schiller's "imagination" is evident in Marcuse's use of memory as a critical standard. Katz notes that Schiller assigns the free play of the imagination the "task of anticipating the reconciliation (remembrance) of the severed unity of nature and freedom, sense and intellect" and that, as in Marcuse's project, "a standard of critical judgment was to be raised" (P. 155-6)

9
Katz, 101-2. During the 1960s, Marcuse attempted to identify the "outcasts" in industrialized society "as an active social force (as distinct from an 'image'), so producing some of his most characteristic and controversial contributions to radical social theory." (Katz, p. 102n)

10
[Herbert Marcuse], "Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era," ([Washington, DC] September 1945), quoted in Katz, 125.

11
Marcuse, "Aragon," in Katz, p. 125. "Marcuse had begun work on a Proust manuscript several years earlier, but it remained unfinished and unpublished." (Katz, p. 125n)

12
Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955; 1966), p. 18. Marcuse suggests that Freud's theory of the unconscious provides testimony for his own earlier claim for the identity of freedom and happiness. Cf. "On Hedonism," in Negations, pp. 159-200. [Originally published in German as "Zur Kritik des Hedonismus," Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 7, 1-2 (Paris, 1938), 55-89.]

13
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 18-19.

14
Katz, p. 153.

15
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pp. 33-34.

16
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17
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18
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19
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20
Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 194.

21
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22
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23
Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 69-70.

24
Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, p. 70.

25
Katz, 153.

26
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Sidney Lipshires notes that "reason" here means "the rationality of the performance principle," and, as such, a rationalization of the domination of man by man." Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1974), pp. 35-36.

27
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28
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29
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30
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32
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33
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34
[Marcuse] "Some Remarks on Aragon," in Katz, p. 125.

- 35 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, pp. 55-56.
- 36 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, p. 10.
- 37 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, p. 9.
- 38 Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, p. 73.
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THE COSMOLOGICAL EXIGENCE AND PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

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... the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And to know the place for the first time.

--T. S. Eliot¹

One of the most important consequences of the Einsteinian revolution in physics is the reemergence of cosmology as a salient field of inquiry.² Cosmological concerns had been central to the scientific thought of the ancients and continued to guide scientific inquiry until the establishment of Newtonian physics as the "classical" model of science. Rather than examine the universe as a whole, Newton's method sought to *isolate* physical events which could then be studied independently. As a result, cosmology "seemed destined to disappear gradually into the mists of the unknowable."³ It was not until the rise of Einsteinian physics that the universe has once again been conceived as an integrated system--a "physical and geometric whole."⁴ As Jacques Merleau-Ponty observes: "Cosmology is again a science possessing a specific and well-defined subject: the universe."⁵

The renaissance of cosmology, however, extends beyond purely scientific discourse. Stephen Toulmin notes the beginnings of a renewed dialogue between science, philosophy, and theology which is based upon cosmological issues.⁶ He suggests that, in the development of "postmodern" science, cosmology has become a common ground for these disciplines--one which promises to increase in significance.⁷ In popular discourse, Carl Sagan has brought a new cosmological worldview to a general audience through the television series *Cosmos*, and his popular book of the same title.⁸ In her analysis of the highly successful film *E.T.*, Janice Rushing observes that contemporary science fiction and fantasy films constitute a pervasive genre of popular cosmological rhetoric.⁹

Regardless of its form, cosmological rhetoric reflects a desire to reclaim the Greek conception of *cosmos*: an understanding of the universe as an integrated system in which "all things . . . share in a common 'good order.'"¹⁰ It seeks to

demonstrate not only the character of the universe as a whole, but also humankind's role within that universe--"to grasp our place in the scheme of things and to feel at home within it."¹¹ As Toulmin suggests, the ultimate aim of such rhetoric is to establish a "more coordinated view of the world, embracing both the world of nature and the world of humanity--a view capable of integrating, not merely aggregating, our scientific understanding, and capable of doing so *with practice in view*."¹² Although cosmological rhetoric has its roots in scientific thought, its implications clearly extend into other aspects of humanity. Indeed, in its richest form, cosmological rhetoric seeks to embrace all aspects of humanity--philosophical, religious, sociological, as well as scientific-- through its understanding of the universe as an integrated system.¹³

Given the scope of contemporary cosmological rhetoric, it is clear that the cosmological exigence entails more than the mere *possibility* of such rhetoric which is implicit in Einsteinian physics. As Rushing observes, the cosmological exigence is "omnipotent" . . . both enduring and developing over time.¹⁴ It is enduring in that humankind has always been and will continue to be separated from its natural environment and the *cosmos*. Humankind, by its very use of language, can never live a truly "natural" existence: its experience is forever and irrevocably mediated.¹⁵ However, the cosmological exigence is also shaped by historical developments. As noted above, the rise of Newtonian method was largely responsible for the eclipse of cosmological rhetoric in the nineteenth century, just as the Einsteinian revolution is, to some degree, responsible for its current reemergence. The cosmological exigence is affected by changes not only in science, but in technology as well. The development of nuclear technologies, advances in medical treatments, and the continued discovery of toxic pollution in our air, water, food, and lifestyles all serve to accentuate humankind's separation from nature. These issues, among others, present difficult and pressing questions concerning the nature of humankind and its relationship with the universe--questions which demand cosmological consideration.

It is important to note that the movement to a new cosmology is, indeed, still an emerging one. "By the early 1980s," writes Toulmin, "we have done little more than reestablish the bare preconditions for the development of . . . a new cosmology."¹⁶ There is no established paradigm which we might term "the new cosmology"--either in philosophy or science.¹⁷ Nonetheless, the reemergence of cosmological rhetoric remains one of the most interesting developments in contemporary thought.

In this essay, I will examine (1) the rhetorical tasks implicit in cosmological argument and (2) the argumentative strategies employed in Presocratic cosmological argument. Although cosmological rhetoric may manifest itself in forms other than argument (such as myth), cosmological argument is more clearly aligned with the both the ultimate aims and scientific roots of cosmological thought. As Rushing observes, cosmological myth does not "deal with the nitty-gritty of rhetorical contingency," and nor does it suggest *how* humanity may find reunion with the *cosmos*.¹⁸ Such concerns, however, are commonly addressed in cosmological argument.¹⁹

Given the reemergence of cosmological rhetoric, a return to the Presocratics is justified in two ways. First, an understanding of Presocratic cosmological argument informs our understanding of the *origins* of cosmological argument. Although the poets of nonliterate cultures often provided narrative or mythic cosmologies, the Presocratics were the first to address cosmological issues in propositional language.²⁰ Second, to the degree that the cosmological exigence is enduring, a consideration of Presocratic cosmological argument will further our understanding of *possible* responses to this exigence.

The Rhetorical Tasks of Cosmological Argument

There are essentially two rhetorical tasks of cosmological argument: (1) it seeks to establish the unitary character of the universe--to articulate a conception of the universe as an integrated system; and (2) it seeks to place the realm of human action within the cosmological universe--to establish cosmological principles as *normative* principles. Although these tasks are clearly interrelated, I will, for the sake of clarity, consider each of them separately.

The need for integration is central to cosmological argument, for such argument represents the most comprehensive ambition of scientific inquiry: "to talk sense about *the Universe as a whole*."²¹ As Toulmin observes, cosmological argument advances claims about the nature of the universe "whose very generality allows them to transcend the fragmented insights of electromagnetic theory, cell biology, neurophysiology, and the rest"--while at the same time, *integrating* such insights into a more coordinated understanding of the universe.²²

Burke discusses the task of cosmological integration in terms of

"transcendence" and "reduction." Transcendence is the adoption of a perspective or language in which disjunctive categories cease to be disjunctive, and become identified as instances of a common "essence."²³ Burke illustrates the act of transcendence in cosmological discourse: "Thales presumably was attaining [a triumph of transcendence] for himself when, looking at the 'four elements,' earth, fire, water, and air, he decided that they were all 'in essence' water."²⁴ Cosmological argument, in a sense, aspires to establish the ultimate transcendence--a transcendence in which *all* the elements of the universe are conceptualized as instances of a common "nature."

Cosmological transcendence, however, also involves reduction. As Burke suggests, "a cosmology . . . is a reduction of the world to the dimensions of words; it is the world *in terms of* words."²⁵ Reduction is required in cosmological argument in that "any generalization is necessarily a reduction [since] it selects a *group* of things and gives them a property which makes it possible to consider them as a *single entity*."²⁶ It is important to note that transcendence and reduction are, to some degree, interdependent processes. Transcending terms symbolically encourages reducing terms linguistically (since formerly disjunctive categories may be replaced by a single term).²⁷

The end of such transcendence and reduction, in Burke's terminology, is consubstantiality: the identification of the common "substance" of all the elements of the universe. Burke employs the term "substance" in two major senses: as "essence" and as "context," both of which are germane to the task of cosmological integration.²⁸ One of the consequences of discussing the universe *as a whole* is that distinctions between essence and context become difficult to maintain: conclusions concerning the cosmological essence of the universe are, by their very nature, conclusions about the cosmological context as well. As Merleau-Ponty observes, cosmological argument includes "in the same description both container and content."²⁹

The second rhetorical task of cosmological argument is to place the realm of human action within the universe, conceived as an integrated system. This task, finding "a cosmic sanction for ethics, a 'natural foundation on which our human superstructure of right and wrong may safely rest,' is an enduring one" in cosmological argument.³⁰ Indeed, it is this ambition which initially united astronomy and astrotheology and transformed them into "a genuine *cosmology*": "the conviction that the entire system of the world forms a single, integrated

system united by universal principles, . . . that the universe or *ouranos* is 'well turned out.'"³¹

In Burke's terminology, this task raises the issue of scope in cosmological argument. The concept of scope is central to Burke, for in any "systematic placement, one must see things 'in terms of . . .'" And implicit in the terms chosen are 'circumferences' of varying scope."³² Whereas the first task of cosmological argument need only characterize the universe as a physical or chemical or biological system ("motion" as conceived by Burke), the second task clearly implicates human action.³³ In this sense, the second task of cosmological argument is aimed primarily at expanding the scope of the cosmological universe.

Of course, not every instance of cosmological discourse will address both tasks. The distinction presented here concerning the rhetorical tasks of cosmological argument is useful in distinguishing cosmological argument in its richest forms, and other cosmological argument which, although rightfully termed "cosmological," is somehow attenuated in its ambitions.

Presocratic Cosmological Argument

Presocratic philosophy offers one of the clearest examples of "rich" cosmological argument. It portrays the universe as an integrated, ordered system, and employs the cosmological universe as a model for a social ethic. This is most clearly apparent in the Presocratic conception of justice--one which depends upon an identification between the individual, the state, and the cosmos. The term *dike* is used in application to morals, politics, and the universe, without any clear distinction in meaning, giving rise to a "cosmic justice": "a conception of nature at large as a harmonious association, whose members observe, or are compelled to observe, the law of the measure."³⁴ In this way, the Presocratic conception of the universe preserves "the link between man, society, and nature"--a link which was lost during the rise of Newtonian method and Cartesian rationalism, and which is only beginning to be restored in contemporary thought.³⁵

In this analysis, I will focus on an examination of the cosmological argument presented in the Heraclitean fragments. Heraclitus is the most promising subject of such an examination for three reasons. First, a sufficient number of Heraclitus' fragments exist to give his argument context.³⁶ Of the 129 reliable fragments attributed to Heraclitus, 35 are directly cosmological; clearly, the largest body of

cosmological argument of any Presocratic. Second, of those Presocratics who have left a sizable body of fragments (namely, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles), Heraclitus offers the clearest example of a strictly cosmological, propositional argument. Parmenides bases his arguments in a "theory of Being" which is more metaphysical than cosmological.³⁷ Empedocles, on the other hand, is more closely aligned with the pre-philosophic poets than the Presocratics in the presentation of his cosmology. His fragments "tell stories" and are not contiguous with the general Presocratic movement toward propositional argument.³⁸ Third, although Heraclitus is particularly well-suited to the purposes of this analysis, he is also representative of the Presocratics generally. As Havelock observes, "much of the language used by Heraclitus, far from correcting or contradicting the pioneer efforts of Xenophanes, seems designed to expand and carry forward a common enterprise."³⁹

Before identifying the argumentative strategies employed in Heraclitus' cosmological argument, it is necessary to briefly summarize his cosmology. The Heraclitean conception of the universe as an integrated, ordered system is reflected in one of his most influential fragments: "This ordered universe (*cosmos*), which is the same for all, was not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it ever was and is and shall be . . ." [B 30].⁴⁰ Within this universe, the opposition of forces constitutes a natural "harmony": "That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony" [B 8]; "They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement" [B 51].

For Heraclitus, the operating principles of the universe are the principles of fire: "Fire steers the universe" [B 64]; "There is an exchange: all things for Fire and Fire for all things" [B90]. This is most clearly evident in his description of the elements as stages in a chain of vaporization ("burning"): "Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water" [B 76].

The operating principles of fire are timeless, for as Heraclitus states: "This ordered universe (*cosmos*) . . . was ever and is and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure" [B 30]. As this fragment suggests, the timeless nature of the principles of Fire are guaranteed by the law of the measure. The Heraclitean cosmos, therefore is a *total* order, "inclusive of its own past, present, and future: . . . a self-subsistent entity."⁴¹ Yet, this entity--the *cosmos*, the one order--is also a process, dynamic rather than static.

Further, Heraclitus' conception of the universe is a normative construct for human action: "One must follow (the universal Law --*logos*--namely) that which is common (to all)" [B 2]; "That which is wise is one: to understand the purpose that steers all things" [B 41]; "Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accordance with nature, paying heed (thereto)" [B 112]. However, the majority of humankind acts without an understanding of the common *logos*: "But although the Law (*logos* --the intelligible Law of the universe) is universal, the majority live as if they had understanding peculiar to themselves" [B 2]. Nonetheless, the *logos* remains a normative basis for human laws (*nomos*): "If we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all (i.e., the *logos*) . . . For all human laws are nourished by one which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough" [B 114].

Gregory Vlastos summarizes the Heraclitean cosmos and its connection to social ethics by noting Heraclitus' "doctrine of the 'common': truth is the 'common'; the world is the 'common'; and in the state, law is the 'common.'"⁴² As a result, the state is conceived as "a community, united by a common stake in a common justice."⁴³ Although this conception is consistent with the democratic political system of the time, its focus is on community rather than autonomy.⁴⁴

Argumentative Strategies in the Heraclitean Fragments

As the foregoing summary demonstrates, Heraclitus addresses both rhetorical tasks of cosmological argument. In response to the first task (establishing the unitary character of the universe), Heraclitus employs three basic argumentative strategies: symbolic extension, paradox; and figuration. In response to the second task (placing human action within the cosmological universe), he again employs figuration, this time in conjunction with an appeal to the impersonal authority of the *logos*. At this point, I will turn to the fragments for evidence of these strategies.

Heraclitus was the first of the Presocratics to employ the term *cosmos* in reference to the universe as a whole.⁴⁵ It is this act of symbolic extension which even *allows* the discussion of the universe as a single, integrated system. Heraclitus borrows the term *cosmos* from the vocabulary of the epic poets who employed it to describe the "orderly array of an army controlled by its 'orderer' (*cosmetor*)."⁴⁶ The term is "stretched" or "extended" in its application to the universe. Although Heraclitus' extension is based upon the notion of "order"

common to both his usage of the term *cosmos* and that of the epic poets, his usage is more revolutionary than metaphorical. Rather than simply drawing a connection between armies and the universe, Heraclitus is creating a "new" meaning for the term--one which is intended to stand on its own.⁴⁷

The symbolic extension of the term *cosmos* fulfills the Burkean function of reduction. It does not, in itself, transcend disjunctive categories, but rather, *reduces* what had previously been treated as "the many" or "all" to a singular entity--the *cosmos*. This reduction not only provides Heraclitus with the language necessary to discuss the universe as a whole, but also suggests the nature of the universe as a self-contained system.

Three fragments demonstrate Heraclitus' use of paradox in establishing the unitary character of the universe: "Night and day: for they are one" [B 57]; "For the fuller's screw, the way, straight and crooked, is one and the same" [B 59]; "That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony" [B 8]. Like any instance of paradox, these statements present a "symbolic problem." A paradox is a seemingly contradictory or absurd statement--one which requires some sort of symbolic rethinking to make the statement meaningful. A paradox derives its argumentative power through this requisite rethinking: new understandings of terms and their relationships become apparent as one "solves" the symbolic problem.⁴⁸

The solution to the symbolic problems presented in these fragments requires a new understanding of the disjunctive categories day/night, straight/crooked, in opposition/in concert, as instances of the natural "harmony" of opposing forces. As such, these statements are aimed at transcendence--the adoption of a point of view from which opposites "cease to be opposites."⁴⁹ Taken alone, the statements offer a rather weak form of transcendence--one Burke might characterize as mere "verbal paraphernalia."⁵⁰ The statements require a conception of opposites as "harmonious," but present no common basis for the "harmony" (that is, they offer no "reason" to accept the transcendence).

To demonstrate a basis for the natural "harmony" of the *logos*, Heraclitus turns to the operating principles of the universe. Here he develops an argument based on figuration, as demonstrated by the following fragments: "This ordered universe (*cosmos*) . . . was ever and is and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure" [B 30]; "Fire steers the universe" [B 64]; "Fire

lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water" [B 76].

To the modern reader, these statements are somewhat ambiguous: it is unclear whether Heraclitus is speaking either literally or metaphorically.⁵¹ Clearly, everything is *not* fire in our everyday, experiential sense of the term, and yet Heraclitus is surely intending something more than that everything is "like" fire. Everything *is* fire, not in terms of attributes, but rather in terms of *essence*: as elements in an enduring process of vaporization. In this sense, Heraclitus is offering fire as a *figure* (in the classical sense of *figura*) of the "universal Law."

A figure, or *figura*, draws its argumentative force by presenting a formative principle which not only accounts for "change amid the enduring essence" but also establishes a strong identification between the formative archetype and its manifestations.⁵² In the Heraclitean fragments, fire serves as the formative principle of the *cosmos*--an archetypal representation of the enduring universal Law. Compare, for example, fragment B 126 ("Cold things grow hot, hot things grow cold; the wet dries, the parched is moistened") with B 76 ("Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water"). The everyday, strictly empirical experiences described in the first statement are given figuration as stages in the chain of vaporization in the second. Fire (as figure) mediates our everyday experience and the universal Law by virtue of a common essence.

Heraclitus' figuration offers a stronger form of transcendence than his use of paradox. His figuration not only asserts the integrated nature of the universe, but further, grounds it in the articulation of a common substance--namely, the formative principle of fire.

In establishing the cosmic *logos* as a normative construct for human action, Heraclitus is fairly direct in his didactic exhortations: "One must follow (the universal *logos*, namely) that which is common to all" [B 2]; "Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accordance with nature, paying heed (thereto)" [B 112]. Heraclitus warrants these exhortations in two ways: (1) through an appeal to the impersonal authority of the *logos*; and (2) through a further figuration.

Heraclitus grounds the authority of the *logos* not in his own arguments, but rather in the nature of the *logos* itself: "When you have listened not to me, but to

the Law (*logos*), it is wise to agree that all things are one" [B 50]. In this fragment, Heraclitus not only suggests that the power of the *logos* is self-validating, but also denies that *he* is the peculiar "voice" of the *logos*. As Julius Moravcsik observes, the Heraclitean *logos* is not reliant on "sayings for which we cannot have direct evidence."⁵³ In this sense, the *logos* is very different than either prophecy or eyewitness testimony: "It is impersonal . . . we need not accept someone's hidden evidence."⁵⁴

By characterizing the authority of the *logos* as impersonal, Heraclitus asserts the incorrigibility of the universal Law. Heraclitus, as an advocate, may be subject to interrogation and correction; but the *logos*, as an impersonal authority is not. One may question his or her actions in accordance with the universal Law, but one cannot question the *logos* itself.

Heraclitus also employs figuration in relating human action to the cosmological universe. As fire is a figure of the universal Law, air is a figure of the soul: "To souls, it is death to become water; to water it is death to become earth. From earth comes water, and from water, soul" [B 36]; "A man, when he gets drunk, is led stumbling along by an immature boy, not knowing where he is going, having his soul wet" [B 117]; "A dry (desiccated) soul is the wisest and best" [B 118]. Given the Heraclitean chain of vaporization, it is clear that air, as a figure of the soul, is a *normative* construct. Air is not an element distinct from water and earth, but rather a stage in a universal process. In this way, air represents the proper or "natural" state of the soul, within the larger processes of fire.

Heraclitus' use of air as a figure of the soul broadens the scope of his cosmology to include human action. As noted above, the Heraclitean cosmology invites us to view the universe as fire (that is, *in terms of* fire). By choosing air as the archetypal representation of the soul, Heraclitus also invites us to view humanity in terms of fire (since air itself is a stage in the processes of fire). In this way, he integrates humanity into the universe, suggesting that, indeed, *all* things in the universe (including humanity) are guided and nourished by the universal *logos*.

Conclusion: Cosmological Argument and Natural Theology

The nature of the Heraclitean cosmology and the argumentative strategies employed in its presentation indicate that what Heraclitus offers is a sort of natural

theology. As such, it shares an affinity with both the traditional aims of scientific inquiry and the normative character of theological thought.⁵⁵ In developing his cosmology, Heraclitus is clearly concerned with describing and explaining natural phenomena.⁵⁶ Further, his thought demonstrates a strong empirical bias: "Those things of which there is sight, hearing, knowledge: these are what I honor most" [B 55].⁵⁷ Yet, his cosmology is also strongly normative, asserting humankind's proper role in the universe, and calling for human deference to the natural *logos*.

The religious character of Heraclitus' cosmology is also evidenced by the argumentative strategies he employs. Paradox, figuration, appeal to an impersonal authority--each of these strategies is characteristic of religious argumentation.⁵⁸ However, it would be misleading to suggest that this is entirely due to the enduring nature of cosmological argument. Heraclitus' reliance on religious argument forms is, to some degree, a result of his limited linguistic resources. As Havelock suggests, the Presocratics were working within a linguistic system which was essentially pre-conceptual, derived primarily from the vocabulary of the epic poets, and rich in its religious implications.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the Heraclitean fragments demonstrate how such argument forms may function in cosmological argument.

Although the movement to a new cosmology in contemporary discourse is still emerging, certain parallels may be drawn between the religious character of the Heraclitean cosmology and contemporary cosmological rhetoric. Thomas Lessl, in his analysis of Carl Sagan's television series *Cosmos*, concludes that Sagan's "presentation of science . . . serves for television audiences the same needs that religious discourse has traditionally satisfied for churchgoers"--namely, the "grounding [of] faith in an unimpeachable body of knowledge."⁶⁰ Further, as Lessl observes, two of Sagan's argumentative strategies are patently religious. Like Heraclitus, Sagan legitimates the normative force of his cosmology by appealing to an impersonal authority external to himself (in this case, by adopting the perspective of a detached extraterrestrial observer).⁶¹ In addition, Sagan employs a "prophetic vision" in characterizing contemporary cosmological choices: one in which humankind is either redeemed through a new understanding of its "cosmic citizenship," or destroyed in nuclear apocalypse.⁶²

In her analysis of the film *E.T.*, Rushing observes that "space fiction or fantasy [may be] the most important contemporary genre for presenting and responding to" the cosmological exigence in public discourse. She notes that *E.T.*, as a representative example of this genre, addresses this exigence through

paradoxical transcendence.⁶³ E.T., the fictional character, embodies a variety of paradoxical contradictions: he is childlike, and yet very old; he can heal plants with his touch, but cannot hold his liquor; he stumbles in our suburban tundra and yet can fly a bicycle. As Rushing suggests, the paradoxical nature of E.T. encourages the audience to transcend the conventional dichotomies of reason/emotion, mind/matter, and nature/technology.⁶⁴ Although the film *E.T.* is mythic in form, it shows some similarities to the cosmological argument presented in the Heraclitean fragments.⁶⁵ Both employ paradox as a way of transcending disjunctive categories; and whereas Heraclitus offers fire as a *figura* of the universal *logos*, *E.T.* presents its protagonist as the personification of cosmic consciousness.⁶⁶

Toulmin draws a more general connection between the new cosmological movement and natural theology. He characterizes the recent reemergence of cosmology in scientific and philosophical discourse as a reunion of natural science and natural religion.⁶⁷ Prior to the rise of Newtonian method and Cartesian rationalism, natural science and natural religion were not only compatible endeavors, they were the *same* endeavor. Toulmin argues that such an alliance is once again salient: "Science and natural religion parted company . . . for reasons that operated powerfully in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that no longer have the same power today."⁶⁸ Indeed, Toulmin maintains, "there are in fact . . . some indications that natural science and natural religion have already resumed an irregular cohabitation"--indications which are manifested in cosmological argument.⁶⁹

Cosmological argument, with its roots in scientific inquiry and its tendency to adopt characteristics of religious discourse, seems to constitute an intermediate symbolic form--one which is implicit in the rhetorical tasks of such argument. It employs a vocabulary of abstraction in which it is possible to discuss, in a systematic manner, the "nature" of the universe as a whole, and yet, retains an affinity with more poetic forms of language such as paradox and figuration, which have traditionally been associated with the normative force of religious discourse. The extent to which the emergent "new cosmology" will embody an intermediate symbolic form remains to be seen. However, the present analysis indicates that such an intermediate form may play a central role in responding to the cosmological exigence, and further, that the origins of cosmological argument constitute just such a response.

NOTES

¹T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding," in *The Collected Poems, 1909-1962* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963).

²Jacques Merleau-Ponty and Bruno Morando, *The Rebirth Of Cosmology* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982), pp. 159-61.

³Merleau-Ponty and Morando, p. xiii.

⁴Merleau-Ponty and Morando, p. 160.

⁵Merleau-Ponty and Morando, p. 160.

⁶Stephen Toulmin, *The Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982).

⁷Toulmin, p. 254.

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¹¹Toulmin, p. 1.

¹²Toulmin, pp. 255-6.

¹³Toulmin, p. 1.

¹⁴Rushing, 189.

¹⁵Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 13-15.

¹⁶Toulmin, p. 17.

¹⁷Merleau-Ponty and Morando, p. 159.

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²⁰Eric A. Havelock, "The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics," in Kevin Robb, ed., *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy* (La Salle, Illinois: The Hegeler Institute, 1983), pp. 12-5.

²¹Toulmin, p. 1.

²²Toulmin, pp. 255-6.

²³Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes Toward History*, 3rd Ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. 336.

²⁴Burke, *Attitudes*, p. 86-7.

²⁵Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 96.

²⁶Burke, Grammar, p. 96.

²⁷Burke, Grammar, pp. 77-84.

²⁸Burke, Grammar, pp. 21-3; and A Rhetoric of Motives (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 21.

²⁹Merleau-Ponty and Morando, p. 160.

³⁰Toulmin, p. 53.

³¹Toulmin, pp. 223-4.

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³³Burke, Grammar, pp. 136-7.

³⁴Gregory Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," in David J. Furley and R. E. Allen, eds., Studies in Presocratic Philosophy: Vol. I (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 56.

³⁵Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 211.

³⁶Compare, for example, the 129 Heraclitean fragments with those of: Thales (2); Anaximander (5); Anaximenes (3); or Anaxagoras (22).

³⁷Vlastos, pp. 65-6; Havelock, pp. 28-9.

³⁸Havelock, p. 18.

³⁹Havelock, p. 23.

⁴⁰The fragments in this essay are taken from Kathleen Freeman's translation of Diels, Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948).

⁴¹Havelock, p. 24.

⁴²Vlastos, p. 71.

⁴³Vlastos, p. 71.

⁴⁴Vlastos, p. 71.

⁴⁵Havelock, p. 24.

⁴⁶Havelock, p. 24.

⁴⁷Havelock, p. 24.

⁴⁸See Malcolm O. Sillars, "Religious Argument as a Field," in George Ziegelmüller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 143-151.

⁴⁹Burke, Attitudes, p. 336.

⁵⁰Burke, Attitudes, p. 337.

⁵¹To Heraclitus, certainly, a distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning would not have been meaningful; see Havelock, pp. 7-15.

⁵²Erich Auerbach, "Figura," in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 47, and pp. 11-76, *passim*.

⁵³Julius Moravcsik, "Heraclitean Concepts and Explanations," in Robb, p. 145.

⁵⁴Moravcsik, p. 145.

⁵⁵Toulmin, pp. 255-74.

⁵⁶Karl Popper, "Back to the Presocratics," in Furley and Allen, pp. 130-53.

⁵⁷See Moravcsik, pp. 142-7.

⁵⁸See Sillars; Auerbach; and Robert H. Ayers and William T. Blackstone, eds., Religious Language and Knowledge (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972).

⁵⁹Havelock, pp. 7-15.

⁶⁰Lessl, 175-6.

⁶¹Lessl, 183.

⁶²Lessl, 182.

⁶³Rushing, 200.

⁶⁴Rushing, 195, 200.

⁶⁵Rushing, 191.

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⁶⁷Toulmin, pp. 255-6.

⁶⁸Toulmin, p. 255.

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ARGUMENTATION IN THE FIELD OF RHETORICAL COMMUNICATION

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Speech communication claims 'argumentation', a phenomenon in the field of rhetoric, to be a genuine subject matter in as much as it occurs in processes of oral communication. As far as I know, elaborations on the concept of argumentation in speech communication confine themselves to considerations on argumentation training and, implicitly, refer to it as a part of 'rhetoric'. I shall therefore endeavour to outline a definition of 'argumentation' from the perspective of contemporary West German communication theory.

The following concept is based on rhetorical writings of H. Geißner. Yet, for the purpose of keeping this contribution as concise as possible, I am not giving quotations: each time reference is made to his writings (for further reading, cf. list of literature).

'Argumentation' and 'rhetoric' cannot be separated from each other. It is therefore necessary to define, first of all, 'rhetorical'. I consider also this section - at least partly - as a reformulation of present concepts of rhetoric in speech communication.


1. What is "rhetorical"?

In order to answer the question as to what is rhetorical the question as to what "rhetorical" means has to be answered. I intend to formulate in ordinary language characteristics of rhetoricity which, I think, essentially reflects Geißner's approach.

I would like to start with something that is familiar to all of us. If the starting point is everyday knowledge of every communicator we may begin by the ordinary language explication of the ordinary language expression 'to speak'. He who says 'to speak', expresses, no matter if he wants to or not, an everyday theory about 'speaking' which is inherent to the semantic implications of the word: to say 'speaking' always includes: someone speaking to or with at least one other person, about something, in one and the same language; he says something for whatever reason, with whatever intent/purpose,

somewhere, some time, by means of language, oral expression, mimics, gestures and bodily expressions. The ordinary language word 'to speak' already implies the Lasswell model.

Structuring these elements we obtain the model of a speech situation and a corresponding listening situation. The following figure summarizes what has been said so far:



These models serve to conceive the situation of speaker and listener but the question as to the distinctive features of both rhetorical and non-rhetorical communication remains open.

It might be noteworthy that I am talking about "rhetorical speaking" as well as about "rhetorical listening". In so doing, 'listening' is understood to be 'rhetorical' as soon as it becomes a 'listening to'. Making this distinction, we have reached the point of elaborating one criterion of rhetoricity.

The 'to' characterizes directiveness, it turns the listener's purely receiving behavior, which is involuntary and automatic, into an act of listening, which is voluntary and intentional. On the part of the speaker it is his becoming aware of the "what for/purpose"-category which renders his speech rhetorical. Because of this awareness, his speech behavior - then involuntary and automatic, directed by some objective situative factors of which he is unconscious - turns into voluntary, purposive speech-acting, which enables the speaker to replace or at least supplement the objective-situative factors by his own intents. Or to put it in other words: the turn-over into rhetorical speaking/listening takes

place when subjective purposes/intents add to, respectively shape, the "Why's", the motivations, inspirations, causes.

There are two other aspects which, I think, have to be clarified. First, the notion 'intentional and subjective purpose' is limited to those aspects of the speech/listening acts of which the speaker/listener is truly aware prior to the actual performance of speaking/listening. It is not extended to things/events which are being justified or reasoned subsequently to the actual acts.

Thus the following prerequisites are met if the speech/listening act is defined rhetorically: the speaker/listener has to bear his definite purpose in mind before he actually speaks/listens, and his speaking/listening has to be purely oriented to achieving this purpose.

Second, we shall bear in mind that this is the very first step in defining rhetoricity; it determines - so to speak - an everyday rhetoricity, a sort of naive rhetoric, a rhetoricity in nuce.

In spite of having a purpose, speech/listening acts may still be involuntary acts/behavior, if the what that someone intends to say is uttered completely automatically, without planning, and/or if all the elements of oral delivery or language are used entirely mechanically, without any reflection.

These linguistic and/or vocal elements have to be intentionally adjusted to the 'purpose', if the subsequent step of rhetoricity is to be reached. In other words: if the purpose-means relation is made available to voluntary disposition.

The following steps of rhetoricity result from the first:

- The means are not only oriented towards the purpose but also towards the other determinants of the speech/listening situation. In doing so an order of precedence will have to be concretized in which the reflection on the communication partner and on one's own role as speaker/listener requires the highest degree of differentiation, self-distance, self-abstraction and self-criticism.

- Not only do linguistic and vocal elements relate to determinants but also the determinants themselves inter-relate: the purpose is directed to speaker/listener, the speaker/listener is selected according to the purpose, the subject - 'About What' -, 'When', and 'Where' are adapted to purpose and speaker/listener.

The explication of 'rhetorical' we have so far sketched, refers to the distinction between 'rhetorical' and 'phatic' communication which Geißner described (Geißner, 1981):

- Phatic communication refers to conversations which "by routine and convention establish and maintain contacts; they are thematically limited to a certain horizon and the purpose-means relation is pursued unintentionally so that both the thematic and, particularly, the personal dimensions are kept within the limits of non-commitment."

"... if, however, the routinization is made the subject and if the causes for the thematic limitations are being discussed so that with the altered subject-horizon model the purpose-means relation may be grasped reflectively and intentionally, 'phatic' communication turns into rhetorical communication."

The above outline has introduced some new aspects into the discussion:

- The notion of 'rhetorical listening' determines essential features of an emancipatory discourse education and, consequently, influences the theoretical framework of speech communication.

- The location of 'rhetoric' within a dynamic and historical process ought to have essential methodological consequences:

1) With regard to the definition of rhetorical forms and to the distinction between rhetorical and non-rhetorical communication; a typological scale used as an order of precedence replaces the rigid classification which caused methodological problems in the past.

2) This scale introduces the historical dimension, and in so doing, enables us to grasp the process of gradual or abrupt rhetorization of non-rhetorical forms and vice versa. Rhetorical education is the method of rhetorization of phatic communication.

II. What is "argumentation"?

I shall try to define 'argumentation' in relation to the following dimensions:

- rhetorical discourses, talks, and/or speeches in which argumentation occurs
- the determinative and determined factors of the speaking/listening situation
- the categories 'persuading' and 'convincing' ("überzeugen" vs. "überreden").

'Argumentation' in everyday language and *** technical term designates a specific type of verbal acts (oral or written) which, in reality, do not occur as isolated actions. The common feature of 'discourse', 'debate', 'public address' etc. is precisely the occurrence of 'argumentation' besides the many other specific features distinguishing them from each other.

So 'argumentation' cannot be considered a type of verbal act occurring completely independently but it is rather embedded in a more complex type of verbal acts. The question as to whether 'argumentation' occurs in non-verbal acts, whether arguments may be built up by pictures, gestures, buildings, films, actions, shall not be investigated here.

In my dissertation (Gutenberg, 1981, p. 225) I have described the more complex types of verbal acts (discourses, speeches, correspondence, scientific communication in books, treatises etc.) as "typifications on the macro level". In contrast to these are the typifications on the micro level, that is, 'speech acts' like questions, reproaches, assertions etc.). These speech acts construct in a specific combination types of speech acts on the meso level, such as phases and segments of discourses, speeches, letters etc. Similarly to the types on the micro level they occur in more than one macro level type. So, empirical research of argumentation focuses on questions pertaining to the micro types which build up 'argumentation' and on the macro types in which 'argumentation' occurs. I shall presently follow these questions, yet only reconstructively and not empirically. Besides, since it has become clear that 'argumentation' also occurs in written communication, I wish to confine myself to oral communication. Inferences in the field of oral communication may well be transferred to written communication considering the way in which writing can be deduced from speaking historically and reconstructively: overcoming the dimensions of space and time, transferring the verbal construct out of its transitory existence into permanency, and thus making it available and multipliable also in identical wording.

Besides this relatively formal definition of 'argumentation', a more extensive determination may be obtained by asking for the function which 'argumentation' fulfills in the macro types of speech acts. If 'argumentation' - as is contended - is constituent of these macro types the meaning of the question as to its function corresponds to that referring to the function of these macro types.

The range of speech act types producing 'argumentation' reaches from public house conversations to summit meetings. Everyday knowledge as well as scientific knowledge bear witness to the fact that though in all cases, argumentation is required by rule, this rule is violated systematically. The most general expression/common language uses for these macro types is 'discussion'. The most general definition of the functions attributed to these macro types is:

- during their course, problems (or questions or topics) which may be either theoretical or practical are being dealt with, that is, analyzed;
- solutions to analyzed problems are sought and the proposed solutions are analyzed;
- decisions are made with reference to the investigated (that is discussed, analyzed) proposals to solve the problem.

(cf. Gutenberg, 1979; Geißner, 1982)

All three phases or forms have one thing in common: the participants may be of different opinions regarding the assessment of the problem, the judgement of the solution, and the proposal for decision:

- two or more analyses of the problem may be contradictory to each other - the participants have to find out which of them is the more appropriate or whether they can be substituted by a third, even more appropriate, analysis;
- two or more solutions may be in opposition to each other - the more appropriate solution to the problem has to be found;
- when solutions diverge but are considered to be equally appropriate (starting from the assessment of the problem) participants have to decide which proposal is to be put into practice.

In all three phases or forms the different opinions result in controversial positions. The process of settling this controversy may lead to different aims:

- compromise: different positions are settled by reducing them to a common denominator;
- justified dissent: the dispute remains unsettled, but the process reveals the reasons for the controversial standpoints and also why the controversy remains unsettled;
- consensus: in the sense that one of the different positions has been generally accepted;
- consensus: in the sense that by disputing on the controversy a new position develops which is generally accepted.

The process leading to these aims is called 'argumentation' in general and scientific terms. The point of friction characterized by controversial positions is defined as 'the point of dispute', that is the possibility of not only differing but, above all, contradictory opinions, which is founded in the facts and their interpretation and is subjectified in discourse (cf. Geißner, 1985).

So far 'argumentation' has been defined only partially; it has been attributed by its function to the more complex speech acts. Defining its functions, its goals are determined, too. Yet, the question as to how the process of argumentation leads to the defined goal remains open.

The category of goal leads us back to the starting point of these considerations: the structure of the speaking/listening situation or the determinants of the goal or WHAT FOR.

The complementary moment of the speaking/listening situation and the above concept of the function of 'argumentation' substantiate the conclusion that the GOAL/WHAT FOR be common to speaker and listener if the process of argumentation is to be successful. At the same time, it is only consistent to conclude that the WHAT FORs of listener and speaker be at least different, if not contradictory, to make argumentation necessary at all. This is only seemingly paradoxical: the common WHAT FOR is the GOAL to settle the 'point of dispute', that is, to elucidate the problem, to gather solutions, and to make the decision for action.

Geißner pointed out that the personal experiences of the communicators provide the background for questions and possibilities of reply (Geißner, 1985). The field of possible replies of both listener and speaker is also the field of the differing or even contradictory WHAT FOR out of which the respective communicator selects his answer to the issue and for which he seeks approval by all other participants to render it into the reply which is generally accepted.

The previous definition of 'argumentation' has been reformulated in terms of categories pertaining to the speaking/listening situation. So far, the categories WHAT FOR and WHO have been discussed. For further determination the categories WHAT and HOW are taken into consideration.

Following the model of the speaking/listening situation the category WHAT receives its final determination by all other factors, including WHO. Thus, we may characterize: the WHAT of a process aimed at settling something disputable is, first of all, the wording of the speaker's proposal of solution and, then, something which renders this proposal acceptable to the listener. Regarding the latter two possibilities are given: the acceptable-rendering WHAT can be something which conveys its factual and logical relationship to the proposal and which allows the deduction of the proposal from it. If the proposed solution is understood as 'assertion', the WHAT so conceived provides the grounds for this assertion: the whole complex, the "justified assertion" is the "argument" (cf. Geißner, 1985).

On the other hand, the acceptable-rendering WHAT may be put forth without displaying a factual and logical relationship to the proposal and still is suitable to motivate the listener to accept the proposal. Here it is a matter of simply pretending a factual and logical relationship or, without presenting such a relationship in any way whatsoever, of evoking acceptance within the listener with the intention of transferring this acceptance to the proposal. In neither case the complex is considered an argument - neither in everyday language nor in scientific terms. 'Argument' solely refers to a WHAT composed of proposal and elements rendering it acceptable whereby the two parts relate to each other on a factual and logical basis. This may be seen as a precondition to the status 'argument'.

The second condition stems from the common WHAT FOR and the speaker's reflexion on his listener's proper characteristics: It is not sufficient to combine factually and logically the proposal to its justification, but the proposal as well as the justification have to be comprehensible and acceptable to the listener, that is, adequate to his psychic, social and mental structures. Yet, this again is subject to the following presuppositions: First, a basic contradiction between the speaker's arguments and the listener's interests must not be existent (this presupposition is also valid for the point of dispute: a common answer, that is a consensus is rarely ever possible if the communicator's interests are antagonistically opposed. If this is the case, the only possible answer to an issue will be a compromise.) (cf. Gutenberg, 1979).

The second presupposition is that the 'argument' does not evoke affective, cognitive, and volitional obstacles within the listener, thus it has to be psycho-socially comprehensible and acceptable (cf. Geißner, 1969). An argument which does not fulfill these basic requirements in the process of settling a dispute cannot be considered as such.

The wording 'factual and logical' does not mean that the term 'argument' refers to the cognitive-rational parameter alone. But 'argument' is also a matter of emotions, evaluations, and volition, provided however, that these are not in contradiction to the factual matter or are even presented as its window-dressing. This leads us to questions referring to the types of argument and to the way of finding arguments. Both are subject matters of the 'topic' which shall not be treated here. Equally, it is not my concern to discuss questions of argumentative logic, i.e. the syllogistical and enthymematical aspect of argumentation. These aspects have primarily been treated by linguistics. I am concerned with the pragmatic aspect of argumentation which has not been entirely elaborated (cf. Klein).

So far, the further determination of 'argumentation' is limited to a theory of inventio, that is, it concerns the finding and mental conceptualizing of arguments in general. Quite logically, this concept has to be complemented by the aspect of factual and logical disposition which is, at the same time, oriented to the listener with respect to his cognition, emotions, volition, and evaluation. The definition as a theory of dispositio is precisely located at the threshold between WHAT and HOW. On the one side, structuring an argument belongs to the WHAT in as much as it reflects the structure of the factual and logical relationship between assertion and justification as well as the proportional structure of the socio-psychological acceptance on the part of the listener. On the other side, structure demonstrates the way an argument is presented, it is a tectonic HOW which finds its realization in the verbal, oral and mimic/gestural HOW.

This brings to light that neither the verbal elaboration - the classic 'elocutio' - nor oral expression nor facial or bodily expression participate decisively in the process of determining 'argumentation'. These parameters do not add anything essential to the connection of justification and assertion or to the orientation towards the listener. The linguistic shape and oral expression are the formulation of the mental concept 'argument', but they are not properly 'argumentative'. This does not mean that they are without any significance to argumentation. Factual, logical and psychological orientation to the listener requires the appropriate verbal and oral expression. With regard to the typological aspect, 'argumentation' assumes a specific type of verbal style and, in the actual performance, a specific oral style.

The verbal and oral styles are precisely those parameters which vest the mental concept of an argument and its mental tectonics with efficacious power (or deprives it of this power). This is how they constitute determinants of the successful process of argumentation but not of its concept. They are rhetorical devices aiming at efficacy which admittedly may impart to manipulative communication the appearance of being argumentative. Rhetorical devices which support, hinder argumentation or dissimulate the lack of it, are all other factors oriented towards the rhetorical goal and are seizable within the frame of the speaking/listening situation (e.g., selection of time, room, composition of group, organisation of the process of discourse aiming at emotions etc.).

As rhetorical-effective devices they all may decisively influence the success of argumentation, but do not constitute the concept. 'Argumentation' itself represents a rhetorical-effective device which - subject to the above described conditions - is functional and occurs canonically with the other devices.

Above we have used the notion 'manipulative' in contrast to 'argumentative'. Closely connected to this opposite pair is the opposition 'to convince' vs. 'to persuade' - 'überzeugen' vs. 'überreden'. I shall now define 'argumentation' with reference to these two categories and also the notion of 'rhetorical listening'. Several authors have argued against the differentiation between 'convince' and 'persuade' by defining it as a merely linguistic characteristic of the German language which would not correspond to the factual matter, and furthermore would not be in analogy to any other languages. Against the second argument we may hold that English as well as French distinguish between 'persuade' and 'convince' or 'persuader' and 'convaincre'. So the second argument will not be substantial at all, since the first can be refuted.

Geißner has defined 'convincing' as influencing the listener by activating "concomitantly his cognitive, affective, and volunative forces" (Geißner 1969, p. 54 f.). "Persuading is influencing the listener by producing a short circuit from his affects/emotions to his valencies (above all prejudices) and eliminating or misleading his cognitive ability."

First, arguments alone do not effectuate 'convincing', but the concurrence of all other effective devices is necessary to vest the argument with its effective power. It is true that argumentation orients itself to cognitions, but it also aims at emotions and attitudes. If argumentation aims

at generating or changing attitudes as a precondition to action, then it is the question of reaching the entire psychic complex (cf. Geißner, 1973).

Though we may define 'convincing' as something which does not come about if the cognitive-rational moment is eliminated by the prevailing moment of affect and prejudice, arguments are conveyed to the listener in a process of oral delivery. Consequently, language, oral, facial and bodily expressions etc. are considered means which effectuate the power or the argument or hinder its becoming effective. Thus, 'convincing' does not seem possible if the remaining effective devices occurring in the speech act 'argumentation' do not verbally and orally support the argument, i.e. convey it effectively to the listener. Furthermore, 'persuading' is produced but not 'convincing' if these other devices substitute argumentation or conceal its errors and lacks, respectively, pretend verbally the existence of argumentation.

This way of using effective devices is possible when the second condition is missing: the speaker himself is not convinced of the quality of his arguments, he accepts breaches in logic, inaccuracies etc. or even uses them voluntarily.

In so doing 'truthfulness' but not 'truth' becomes the criterion of 'convincing'. This implies that truthful is also who bases his arguments upon prejudices without knowing it. So 'convincing' also refers to a process of influencing truthfully with prejudiced opinions. The term 'prejudice' is understood as firmly incorporated attitudes which are no longer reflected critically and which are maintained in spite of a possible 'better knowledge'. The problematic essence of the criterion 'truthfulness' would disappear if it were not the speaker's own conviction which judges the rightfulness of his arguments, but if this conviction be exposed to reflection on its prejudiced content and, with this reservation, be brought into argumentation and be questioned and potentially revised in such a process.

This presupposes that the process of argumentation is open with regard to two aspects: First, all opponents are prepared to listen to each other's opinion and are open for being convinced. Second, opinions which harmonize with neither position but which are generated in the process of argumentation are admitted.

At the beginning, the concept of 'rhetorical listening' was introduced as 'listening action' in analogy to rhetorical speaking. Similarly, rhetorical listening reaches intentionally for at least the determinant of the WIAT FOR/GOAL.

Following the definition of argumentation so far developed, argumentative-rhetorical speaking may be situated on the previously mentioned rhetorical scale as follows:

- intentional pursuing of a common WIAT FOR; decision on the point of dispute
- intentional pursuing of an individual WIAT FOR to render one's own proposal acceptable to the listeners
- intentional shaping of the WIAT (inventio and dispositio of the argument) and the tectonic HOW with respect to the factual matter, logical and psychological conditions.

Accordingly, rhetorical listening in an argumentative process is considered a listening which is intentionally oriented towards examining auditive-cognitively whether or not the argumentative contribution follows the common WIAT FOR, whether the proposal for decision is acceptable from the factual, logical, and psychological point of view. Since we have defined the possibility of reflecting on the prejudiced content of one's argument as the criterion of conviction on the part of the speaker, the same should be applied to the listener's prejudices when he decides on the acceptability of the argument he listened to. Rhetorical listening is thus prerequisite to convincing in the process of establishing a consensus, based on the proposal generally agreed upon. At the same time, it is prerequisite to a consensus which has been established in the process of arguing, based on a solution which has been developed in such a process and which has been generally agreed upon.

Persuading, as has been defined above, excludes rhetorical listening. As a consequence, it prevents the listener, who subsequently has become the speaker, from pursuing his intentional goals and from putting forth a WIAT by means of an argument. Thus, persuasion not only eliminates the possibility of establishing a justifiable consensus but also prevents any sensible compromise or justified dissension. Though the reasons for this might originate in the individual deficiencies of communicators to perform argumentation, persuasion is mostly characterized by antagonistic interests of communicators. These antagonistic interests represent an obstacle to establishing a common WIAT FOR and an obstacle which principally does not allow accepting the WIAT FOR of other communicators. The maintenance of pseudo-argumentation offers itself as a manipulative solution. If communicators holding antagonistic positions start a discourse because this seems to be more useful than the application of authoritarian instruments, the point of dispute consists in the question as to how the compromise has to look like to be accepted by both. The

argumentative process of negotiations consists in convincing one's partner that one's own proposal of compromise accords with his interests.

Here, too, persuasion means trying to prevent rhetorical listening. Here, too, it prevents a new compromise - that is, a compromise which supersedes former proposals - from coming about. The feasible consequences of compromises which have been made manipulatively (legal settlements, trials of manipulation on the part of the manipulated, impossibility of negotiating anew with the manipulated party, etc.) display that argumentation is the appropriate procedure. With reference to communicators representing non-antagonistic interests and their decision-making processes, argumentation is the procedure which offers the best opportunity of obtaining an optimal result. In both cases, the communicative procedure 'argumentation' not only represents the more 'moral' one but first of all the more 'rational' one. The reciprocal relationship of 'argumentation', 'convincing', and 'rhetorical listening' situates this concept in proximity to categories like 'criticism' and 'mental majority'.

The concepts of factual matters as conceived by everyday consciousness can be taken for concepts "which the matters conceive of themselves", whereby their potential content of prejudices, idiosyncrasy, and ideology is assumed unquestioned. Criticism means, "to conceive what the factual matters might be" and, following its immanent theoretically constructible possibilities, "confront this with what it actually is" (Adorno, 1974). The standards of this criticism can be obtained by reflecting on possibilities which, though inherent to the matter, are not being realized, "the possibility of being different provides the norms for being so" (Aristoteles, Nik. Ethik).

As is the case with social conditions on which Adorno deliberates, arguments in a process of disputing can be such factual matters which may be subjected to critique by rhetorical listening. So far, rhetorical listening - at least latently - is always critical listening. Argumentation is critical in as much as it aims at convincing, reflects on its proper prejudiced content, and exposes itself to rhetorical listening as well as it exposes the individual proposal to be examined as to its general acceptability and its compatibility with the common WHAT FOR. In addition, it remains open to consensus and proposals which are being produced in precisely this reciprocal process of criticism. "Mentally major is who talks for himself after having thought for himself" (Adorno). Argumentation does not try to obstruct this by performing a short circuit from affect to prejudice. Only by grasping intentionally the relationship between the common WHAT FOR, individual proposal, and the backing arguments can argumentation be performed. Therefore, argumentation presupposes mental majority as well as it makes it possible.

Because of the hierarchical structure of society and due to the reflection thereof in the characteristics of individuals and patterns of action and behavior, disputable problems and matters are tackled imperatively and manipulatively rather than by arguments. Thus, argumentation becomes an instrument of critical-mental majority because it enables those who do not objectively need to employ hierarchical structures - since a basic antagonistic contradiction does not exist between them - to formulate and solve problems by consensus. At the same time, it becomes an instrument of critical-mental majority for those who are dominated by social authorities, since it enables them to level their interests against their dominators and, in search of an acceptable compromise, answer argumentatively for their interests. This, however, presupposes that both sides renounce using violence as a means of resistance to authority and as a means of executing authority - violence which is the basis of all domination. Those who execute authority are given by argumentation - as an instrument of critical-mental majority - the means of legitimating domination there where it is objectively indispensable due to the lasting permanence of the production conditions, even if no argumentation whatsoever may legitimate the permanence of these production conditions.

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PROPOSITIONS OF FACT, VALUE, AND POLICY:
A SEMIOTIC AUGMENTATION OF ARGUMENTATION

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This paper suggests the traditional and conventional notions of propositions or questions of fact, value, and policy. After examining the explanation and development these propositions usually enjoy, an analysis and amplification of them from a semiotic perspective is undertaken. The semiotic perspective employed is primarily that of Charles Morris with supporting development from the pragmatic tradition in American philosophy. For specialists in argumentation, Morris' semiotic perspective should add practical insight to their understanding of argumentative propositions. Since Morris' semiotic is behaviorally based, it should benefit argumentation specialists concerned with spoken debate in their use of evidence, counter-evidence, and analysis.

Background

In their 1930 text with the short title of A Case Book in Discussion, Frank McKinney, a lawyer and former English professor, and Mary McKinney, an English professor, explain that a proposition "should be stated in a simple, declarative sentence; should be properly limited; should not state a self-evident truth (truths and well known facts are not debatable) and should contain, as far as possible, words which are well understood and which need no definition."¹ These authors offer no classification of propositions in terms of fact, value, or policy. Rather, they explain what is meant by a proposition and suggest procedures for proving and supporting the proposition once it is stated clearly and logically.

Russel Wagner, in his 1938 text entitled Handbook of Argumentation, explains that propositions of fact are those which are "concerned only with the truth or falsity of assertions."² Propositions of value are those which "assess that something is or is not beneficial" and call for "approval or disapproval of a belief or an idea." And, propositions of policy are those which "propose a change of policy, which call for action."³ While Wagner's treatment is clear, there is little development beyond what is presented here.

Moving toward the present, Halbert Gullay's Essentials of Discussion and Debate from his 1955 account of questions and propositions of fact, value, and policy reads like a photocopy of Wagner's. He covers the three classes of propositions in one page: (1) a proposition of fact deals with the "truth or falsity of a condition or event, past or present"; (2) a proposition of value involves an "evaluation or judgment"; and (3) a proposition of policy asserts "what future action ought to be taken in the best interests of everyone concerned."⁴ With even less development, Harold Zelko's Successful Conference and Discussion Techniques only mentions the three questions and explains them by example, offering not

even a brief definition of them (Zelko, 32).⁵ It may be that Zelko assumes in his text that the reader knows these from other sources.

Covering the three forms of propositions, Hugo Hellman and Joseph Staudacher more recently explain the three in a manner almost identical to Wagner's with the exception of the proposition of fact. They expand on this proposition or "problem" by creating two subdivisions: problems of speculation and problems of degree. A proposition of speculation arises when the "question concerns whether something is or is not what it is assumed to be." A proposition of degree arises when there is a question of the "extent of something."⁶ Looking at a popular textbook by Judy Pearson and Paul Nelson, brief versions of Wagner's definitions appear once again. One possible implication being that enough has been said elsewhere on this item. Another popular text by John Baird, Jr. and Sanford Weinberg discusses the three propositions under the titles of declarative, evaluative, and actutive questions. Their discussion is brief; and, for the most part, they put old wine in new bottles. Their account of the propositions resembles earlier accounts, apart from Baird and Weinberg's adding of futurity to declarative questions: "Such questions ask whether a certain state of affairs has existed (past), does exist (present), or will exist (future)."⁷

In a contemporary text with the short title of Argumentation and Debate, Austin Frealey explains propositions of value or "judgment" and policy at some length and with reasonable development, while discussing propositions of fact indirectly. His account of propositions of judgment and policy aims specifically to improve debating skills. Frealey expounds on these propositions with reference to determining issues and supplying relevant evidence. Frealey's exposition and advice are useful indeed, yet they do not offer the more fundamental insights of Morris' semiotic.

An examination of contributions from the superb Argumentation Proceedings shows that, although argumentation studies are flourishing and progressing with amazing speed and sophistication, the particular item this paper addresses has not been covered. While Lyles¹⁰ concerns himself with semiotic consistency and inconsistency in argumentation, he does not deal specifically with the application of semiotics to argumentative propositions. Fisher¹¹, Matlon¹², Thomas and Fryar¹³, Rowland¹⁴ and Dudczak¹⁵ give extensive treatment to propositions of value. They develop their thoughts productively in a direction similar to that of Frealey, only in far greater detail. Hingatman¹⁶ views argumentation from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy and Parson¹⁷ views argumentation through a paradigm of metaphor. While both are worthwhile extensions to knowledge in the field of argumentation, neither advances knowledge in the area of argumentative propositions specifically. Selected contributions from the pragmatic tradition of philosophy shall follow.

Pragmatic Roots of Argumentative Propositions

Since Morris emerged primarily from the pragmatic tradition of Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and George Mead, some background statements will help place Morris in this historical context with reference to propositions of fact, value, and policy. Morris explains that "Peirce recognized three kinds of interpretants of symbols: the emotional, the energetic, and the logical." He then asks whether these might be "regarded as possible bases

for the "regarded as possible bases for the differences of meaning of judgments of value, of obligation, and of fact" set forth by John Dewey.¹⁸ Although the terminology varies, the import of the terminology is relatively close: propositions of fact being synonymous with logical interpretants - an interpretant being the "disposition in an interpreter to respond, because of the sign, by response-sequences of some behavior-family" - and judgments of fact, propositions of value being synonymous with emotional interpretants and judgments of value, and propositions of policy being synonymous with energetic interpretants and judgments of obligation.

Although seldom acknowledged, the history behind propositions of fact, value, and policy is rich and sophisticated, coming out of some of the finer thinkers of this century. Morris recollects that while "Dewey was greatly influenced by Mead's treatment of language," Mead "did not specifically deal with value terms." Even though "Dewey became increasingly influenced by Peirce," Peirce "had not explicitly applied the pragmatic maxim to value terms." Consequently, Dewey went about the "analysis of specifically value terms and judgments in his own manner."²⁰ Furthermore, Dewey said of Peirce that the pragmatic method which Peirce developed "applies only to a very narrow and limited universe of discourses."²¹ Since Peirce states the "nature of pragmatism in a way almost identical with Dewey's," Morris is not sure that Peirce's "pragmatic maxim cannot cover Dewey's analysis."²² Because Peirce explains that pragmatism is the "principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood."²³ Morris concludes that what Peirce did not "specifically develop in detail" in his general semiotic, Dewey made "somewhat more explicit [in] the meaning of value terms and judgments."²⁴

More specifically, Dewey sees a judgment of practice as "relating to a goal - to things to do or be done, judgments of a situation as demanding action." For example, propositions of this form Dewey would "denote practical": so and so "should do thus and so; it is better, wiser, more prudent, right, advisable, opportune, expedient, etc., to act thus and so."²⁵ In short, a judgment of practice is "made with respect to a situation in which the problem is what to do." And, while Dewey regards a "judgment of value as an instrument for a judgment of practice," he even suggests that all judgments of fact - descriptive as well as scientific statements - are "inseparable from judgments of practice."²⁶ Finally, if the "basic empirical phenomenon of value is located in relation to such behavior as prizing or enjoying," value might be defined in the "widest sense as anything insofar as it is prized or enjoyed." Moving in this direction, William James saw the essence of value as being "simply to satisfy demand."²⁷ Ralph Barton Perry found generic value in "any object of any interest."²⁸ Yet, Dewey favored applying the term value not to everything prized but "only to those cases where something is prized after envisaging the consequences of prizing it."²⁹ Morris' semiotic contribution shall be presented next.

Semiotic Development of Argumentative Propositions

Placing propositions of fact, value, and policy in the context of Morris' semiotic establishes the sign as the frame of reference for propositional adequacy, belief, and knowledge determined pragmatically and behaviorally. As the study or science of semiosis or signs³⁰, Morris' semiotic offers a grounding for argumentative propositions in his notions of semiotic adequacy, belief, and knowledge. A proposition as a sign would be "adequate to the degree to which it achieves the purpose for which it is used." Propositional signs "adequate for some purposes may be inadequate for others." To have adequacy, a proposition must reach a "goal in a particular occasion" or generally facilitate the "attainment of a certain goal." In addition, the kinds of adequacy which propositional signs have depend on an understanding of the uses to which they are put.³¹

For present purposes, these uses are the informative, the valuative, and the incitive. Informative adequacy results in convincingness: an interpreter (that is, a reader or listener) acting, as a consequence of signs, "as if a certain situation has certain characteristics."³² Valuative adequacy results in effectiveness: due to signs, an interpreter shows "preferential behavior to certain objects, needs, preferences, responses, or signs."³³ And, incitive adequacy results in persuasiveness: caused by signs, an interpreter produces "more or less specific responses." In sum, informative signs imply propositions of fact, valuative signs propositions of value, and incitive signs propositions of policy. In principle, incitive propositions aim to "direct behavior into definite channels, and not merely to give information or to determine the preferential status of something or other," as do informative and valuative propositions respectively.³⁴

The convincingness of a proposition is not "the same as its truth or reliability"; the effectiveness of a proposition may not "give a preferential status to objects which actually satisfy the needs of its interpreter"; and the persuasiveness of a proposition may "incite behavior which does not in fact efficaciously reach the goals of its interpreter." The components of truth and reliability of propositions underlie the adequacy of propositions as do the factors of belief and knowledge. While propositions may be "true or reliable without being believed to be true or reliable and without being known to be true or reliable," they may be "believed to be true or reliable without being true or reliable." Given that belief and knowledge about propositions is a "matter of degree," there may be a "low degree of knowledge and a high degree of belief." Furthermore, a "high degree of knowledge will normally, but not always, strengthen the degree of belief."³⁵

In short, "just as belief in respect to a sign is a matter of degree, so knowledge of signs, when defined in terms of degree of evidence that a sign denotes, or is reliable, or is adequate, is a matter of degree."³⁶ Important to add is that Morris' notion of denotation is referential. While all signs signify, not all signs denote. A sign or sign-complex such as a proposition denotes a denotatum - that is, anything permitting the "completion of the response-sequences to which an interpreter is disposed because of a sign."³⁷ So, likewise in dealing with propositions, all propositions signify. Not all propositions denote. Similarly, once a proposition signifies, it signifies in degrees of adequacy, reliability, belief, and knowledge as well.

Whether signs designate, appraise, or prescribe, they may be used to inform convincingly, to evaluate effectively, or to incite persuasively. This suggests that any statement of a proposition of fact, value, or policy may not be stated in purely designative or descriptive terms, appraisive or judgmental terms, or prescriptive or imperative terms. However, for propositions of fact, designative terms are the most functional kinds of terms to use; for propositions of value, appraisive terms are the most functional kinds of terms to use; and for propositions of policy, prescriptive terms are the most functional kinds of terms to use.³⁸ Given designative terms producing an informative proposition, Morris declares a designative inquiry should logically follow. Given appraisive terms producing a valuative proposition, an appraisive inquiry should logically follow. And, given prescriptive terms producing an incitive proposition, a prescriptive inquiry should logically follow.³⁹ More semantic dimensions are now added to the basic three argumentative propositions. Rather than the limited, although useful, conceptions of the propositions handed down from Wagner, the wider framework of semiotic becomes available for the practitioner of argumentation.

Morris has some especially useful comments pertinent to the three propositions. With reference to the argumentative propositions, Morris suggests that while the "relation between 'good' and 'is' is not identical with the relation between 'ought' and 'is'," there are similarities.⁴⁰ Generally, appraisive terms accompany designative terms, and prescriptive terms accompany appraisive terms. For example, "religions, in prescribing how one should act, rest their case upon appraisals as to what is good, and these in turn are made in the light of statements as to the nature of man and the world."⁴¹ This is familiar to argumentation specialists in their recommendation of propositions of policy for debate and discussion (especially public) because they logically entail propositions of value which include propositions of fact.⁴² As regards public debate, broader issues are entailed by propositions of policy than those of fact. Subsequently, more can be debated under propositions of policy than those of fact. In addition, a wider base for proof is demanded with propositions of policy than for those of fact.

When dealing with informative propositions, as in natural science, the support for such propositions is "guided by norms or standards (such as what is to count as admissible evidence)," thereby blurring simplistic distinctions between informative and valuative propositions. In other words, norms or standards may be seen as unproblematic values in both designative and appraisive inquiries. Furthermore, although Morris distinguishes between "inquiries into what is good and what ought to be done," he recognizes a "considerable independence of the two types of inquiry," since signifying something as good does not necessarily signify that something ought to be done to "bring this object into existence or maintain its existence." But, the distinction can blur due to some philosophies and religions that hold "ought" or valuative propositions as primary; that is, "the good is what we ought to bring about, and not simply what in fact is found desirable."⁴³ Although propositions of policy may presuppose propositions of value, "there is no purely theoretical reason why this should be the case." Morris would therefore regard propositions of value and policy as "theoretically independent

dimensions of signification."⁴⁴

Similarly, with informative or "is" propositions and "ought" propositions, while they may be treated as theoretically independent, there is a dynamic interaction and mutual influence between these two as well. Dealing with both "what is and what will be under certain conditions," in a style similar to Baird and Weinberg's questions of fact mentioned earlier, "is" propositions serve as merely one factor determining "what ought to be" - even though admittedly, there is no way to "determine what ought to be done solely by determining what is the case."⁴⁵

In sum, although the three types of argumentative propositions may essentially overlap, they may be treated separately by (I) defining their significations in terms of designations, appraisals, or prescriptions; (II) specifying the type of inquiry needed to support the propositions - designative, appraisive, or prescriptive; and (III) deciding what problems have to be solved in relation to the proposition - problems pertaining to "what has happened, is happening, or will happen"; problems pertaining to what to appreciate; or, problems pertaining to "what to do."⁴⁶

Morris' perspective of objective relativism augments the argumentative propositions in this way. Objective relativism is Morris' solution to the limitations of absolutist and relativist perspectives in philosophy. While absolutists would believe that some "questions could be given definitive answers" and relativists would believe that "no such definitive answers could be given" to some questions, objective relativists would believe that for some questions "objective answers could be given but only in relation to specific contexts with their own unproblematic values."⁴⁷ The determination of support for propositions and adaptation of various arguments and evidence involves an objectively relative choice that is "always made in a context."⁴⁸

To interpret propositions in an objectively relative manner would yield these rhetorical results. Assuming the following propositions are debatable, the next step will be to interpret them in an objectively relative way:

- I. The earth is five billion years old.
- II. Rock music is better than Country and Western music.
- III. Blood substitutes rather than blood should be transfused to accident victims.

Interpreting them accordingly, the following results with benefits to comprehension and proof requirements:

- IA. In relation to Carbon 14 dating techniques, the earth is five billion years old.
- IIA. Relative to residents of Toronto, rock music is better than Country and Western music.
- IIIA. Relative to Jehovah's Witnesses, blood substitutes rather than blood should be transfused to accident victims.

Consistent with the operationalism of science⁵⁰ an objectively relative perspective could play a significant role in interpreting,

explaining, understanding, defending, and attacking, propositions of fact, value, and policy. This perspective can allow arguers in debates and discussions to cut through verbal quandaries and get to the substantial issues quickly and rationally.

Summary

After tracing briefly the accounts of propositions of fact, value, and policy through various meritorious debate, discussion, and speech communication sources, the limitations of these sources were noted in light of their contributions. The next step in the paper was a concise depiction of the pragmatic roots of these propositions in such valuable sources as Peirce, Dewey, and Mead. Following this was a discussion of several of Morris' semiotic and philosophical contributions; propositions of fact, value, and policy were augmented. The discussion covered a selection of material from Morris' thought, since an entire presentation of his material relevant to these propositions would involve a book or monograph. In particular, the items discussed included Morris' notion of the sign and its uses, dimensions or modes, degrees of adequacy, degrees of truth, degrees of reliability, degrees of belief, and degrees of knowledge. The paper looked at these with reference to the argumentative propositions. It also examined the relationships between and among the propositions, the interdependence and independence of the propositions, the special relationships between "is" and "ought" propositions, and Morris' extremely useful perspective of objective relativism.

NOTES

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² Russel Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1938), p.15.

³ *Ibid.*, p.16.

⁴ Halbert Gulley, Essentials of Discussion and Debate (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p.11.

⁵ Harold Zalko, Successful Conference and Discussion Techniques (Toronto: McGraw-Hill-Hill Book Co., 1957), p.32.

⁶ Hugo Hellman and Joseph Staudacher, Fundamentals of Speech: A Group Speaking Approach (New York: Random House, 1969), p.71.

⁷ Judy Pearson and Paul Nelson, Understanding and Sharing: An Introduction to Speech Communication, 3rd ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1985), pp.175-6.

⁸ John Baird and Sanford Weinberg, Group Communication: The Essence of Synergy, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown Co., 1981), pp.101-2.

⁹ Austin Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 5th ed. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1981), pp.52-3.

¹⁰ John Lyne, "Arguing as 'Speaking a Language': Semiotic Consistency," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp.830-47.

¹¹ Walter Fisher, "Debating Value Propositions: A Game for Dialecticians," in Dimensions of Argument, pp.1014-30.

¹² Ronald Malton, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption," paper presented at the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, Alta, Utah, 1981.

¹³ David Thomas and Maridell Fryan, "Value Resolutions, Presumptions, and Stock Issues," paper presented at the Second Annual Summer Conference on Argumentation, Alta, Utah, 1981.

¹⁴ Robert Rowland, "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Value Debate," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by David Zarefsky, Malcom Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp.822-36.

¹⁵ Craig Dudczak, "Value Argumentation in a Competitive Setting: An Inhibition to Ordinary Language Use," in Argument in Transition, pp.837-44.

¹⁶ David Hingetmen, "Lessons Learned: The Philosophy of Ordinary Language and Theory of Debate," in Argument in Transition, pp.772-86.

¹⁷ Donn Parson, "Root Metaphors and Terministic Screens: Another Look at Paradigms," in Argument in Transition, pp.792-99.

¹⁸ Charles Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p.46.

¹⁹ Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), p.17.

²⁰ Morris, Pragmatic Movement, p.37.

²¹ John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1920), p.355.

²² Morris, Pragmatic Movement, p.39.

²³ Charles Hartshorn and Paul Weiss, eds., The Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-56), V, p.18.

²⁴ Morris, Pragmatic Movement, p.40.

²⁵ Dewey, p.335.

²⁶ Morris, Pragmatic Movement, pp.37-38

²⁷ William James, "The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life," International Journal of Ethics 1, 1981, p.332.

²⁸ Ralph Perry, General Theory of Value (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), p.56.

²⁹ Morris, Pragmatic Movement, p.85.

³⁰ Richard Florio, Charles Morris and the Criticism of Discourse (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), p.56.

³¹ Morris, Signs, p.93.

³² Ibid., p.97.

³³ Ibid., p.99.

³⁴ Ibid., p.102.

³⁵ Ibid., p.106.

³⁶ Ibid., p.109.

³⁷ Ibid., p.349.

³⁸ Ibid., pp.95-99.

³⁹ Charles Morris, Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relations of Signs and Values (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), p.27.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.36.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.37.

⁴² See Freeley's Argumentation and Debate; James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951); Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy: On General Argumentation, 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968); Craig R. Smith and David M. Hunaker, The Basics of Argument (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1972); and William Bennett, Pragmatic Debate (Evanston, Illinois: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1971).

⁴³ Morris, Signification, p.37.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.38.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p.27.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.41.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.43.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.27.

⁵⁰ Fiordo, p.15.

IN DEFENSE OF THE FALLACY

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The fallacy has always been a maligned type of argument. Ever since the time of Aristotle scholars have viewed fallacies as undesirable forms of argument that should be avoided by all rational arguers and condemned by the enlightened critic. Those foolish enough to present such an argument were to be chastized and quickly corrected. This view is still held today by the majority of argumentation scholars. Textbooks frequently define a fallacy as an invalid type of argument or an argument that seems to be valid without being so. Toulmin, Rieke and Janik define fallacies as "arguments that can seem persuasive despite being unsound." [1] Govier suggests "a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning, a mistake which occurs with some frequency in real arguments and which is characteristically deceptive." [2] Many textbooks in argumentation have attempted to develop a list of common fallacies in an attempt to identify the nature of inadequate argument. Unfortunately, these treatments of the fallacy have often been superficial, often merely consisting of a few examples of the fallacy being described with little explanation of what it is about the argument that makes it fallacious.

In the past few decades Hamblin [3] and others [4] have attempted to develop detailed standards to guide our evaluation of fallacious arguments. This approach to argument has had only limited success, however, since many of these scholars have disagreed, not only about what are the essential characteristics of a fallacy, but whether some traditional fallacies are, in reality, fallacies. Hamblin argues:

The truth is that nobody, these days, is particularly satisfied with this corner of logic. The traditional treatment is too unsystematic for modern tastes. Yet to dispense with it, as some writers do, is to leave a gap that no one knows how to fill. We have no theory of fallacy at all, in the sense in which we have theories of correct reasoning or inference. [5]

While recent works have attempted to develop a systemic approach to the study of the fallacy, there has not yet been a totally satisfactory treatment of fallacies. Woods and Walton observe:

At the present level of theory, an allegation of fallacy is more of a warning than a conclusive indication that an incorrect argument has been advanced, identified and cancelled. If the person accused is able to dispute the point - or if he or she has a defender - the allegation can be too easily dispatched. Merely identifying that the argument seems intuitively wrong by calling it a fallacy, or perhaps by tagging it with a Latin name, is not much use in arriving at some reasonable resolution of the dispute. Reasonable procedures for appealing to or constructing guidelines for argument are needed. In short, what we really need is a theory of the fallacies.[6]

Past approaches to the fallacy have begun with the assumption that a fallacy lacks any utility as an argument. This essay will attempt to develop an alternative view of fallacies. Rather than assuming that all (or most) fallacies are inadequate arguments, it will be suggested that many fallacies play a positive, if limited, function in argument. A fallacy should be viewed as an argument, supporting a degree of probability for a conclusion, that suffers from a generic weakness. This weakness need not be fatal for those types of argument where probability, rather than truth is the goal of the advocate. One implication of this view of fallacies is that, rather than arbitrarily rejecting all arguments that have been traditionally labeled fallacies, we need to develop standards for determining under what conditions fallacies can be useful, as well as determining how much weight should be given to these arguments. Factors such as the nature of the decision being made, the nature of conflicting arguments, and the presence of other supporting arguments would be relevant to such calculations.

It is not the position of this paper to suggest that all arguments should be given some weight by a critic of argument; there are undoubtedly numerous examples of arguments that do nothing to support the position being defended. However, many of those arguments that have traditionally been labeled as a fallacy do, in some situations, provide limited support for conclusions. In addition, viewing fallacies as partially legitimate arguments with a generic weakness may more accurately reflect the nature of this type of argument.

THE STANDARD TREATMENT

Many textbooks in logic and/or argumentation include a section on formal and informal fallacies. This section will usually include a brief discussion of several of the better known fallacies, including some examples of these

fallacies. The discussion of the fallacy in these textbooks often does little to increase our understanding of the nature of the fallacy. The "standard" treatment of the fallacy frequently consists merely of

a general definition of the concept of a fallacy, a description of various practices which are categorized as fallacies, a classification of fallacies into various groups, and an illustration of the descriptions of fallacies with examples.[7]

Few people have been entirely satisfied with this approach to the study of fallacies. A few theorists, including Lambert and Ulrich[8] and Massey[9] have gone so far as to imply that the concept of the fallacy is outdated. Even those who support the concept of the fallacy see several weaknesses in the standard treatment of the fallacy. Woods and Walton note:

... current texts too often acquiesce in the 'standard treatment,' offering little by way of explanation of the fallacies other than supposedly illustrative examples. Yet, on closer inspection, many of the examples turn out either to be arguments that are not fallacious at all, or arguments in which guidelines are so lacking that a non-arbitrary sorting of the correct from the fallacious cases seems highly problematic or impossible.[10]

The main problem with the standard treatment of fallacies is that the discussion of many fallacies in current argumentation textbooks is often extremely simplistic. Texts argue that an appeal to authority, for example, is fallacious, for example, while noting that sometimes an appeal to authority might be valid (but not explaining how one could tell when such an appeal was warranted). The ad hominem argument is included as a fallacy, yet a version of that argument is acceptable in a court of law. The definition of many specific fallacies is often so broad as to include a wide range of legitimate arguments.[11] Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of what makes an argument fallacious, as well as a discussion of the conditions that make similar arguments acceptable is rarely provided. In addition, several theorists note that the examples used to support fallacies were often inadequate. Some of the examples of fallacies are so weak that they were unlikely to be presented seriously by any advocate. Other examples do not fit neatly into traditional categories.[12]

Despite these problems, the standard view of the fallacy has remained the dominant one in our textbooks, perhaps following the line of reasoning of one author:

If only by dint of the inertia of a tradition in which there is some wisdom, it [the circumstantial ad hominem] should not be turfed

out too hastily.[13]

The appeal to tradition dies hard.

THE FALLACY FORMALIZED

In response to the growing concern with the adequacy of the "standard view" of the fallacy, scholars began re-evaluating the nature of the fallacy. The publication of Hamblin's Fallacies in 1970 and the critical reaction to that work played a major role in the re-evaluation of the theory of the fallacies. In the years following its publication, numerous theorists began to systematically study specific fallacies.

This new era in the study of fallacies is still in its infancy, with a few fallacies such as the petitio principii (begging the question) and the ad hominem receiving a great deal of attention while others have remained neglected. Johnson and Blair observe:

Of no informal fallacy can it now be claimed that we now possess a widely accepted theoretical account, and many of the important fallacies have not yet been investigated in a theoretical way at all: e.g., straw man and two wrongs. Indeed, by any standard, one of the most important fallacies is irrelevant reason ("non sequitur"), yet an adequate analysis of the concept of relevance has yet to be carried out.[14]

While the recent work by Woods and Walton has done much to clarify the nature of several individual fallacies, much remains to be done.

This approach to these types of fallacies has resulted in the development of some specific guidelines for determining when an argument is a fallacy as well as determining when no fallacy has been committed. Rarely, however, has there been a claim that the resulting guidelines were comprehensive. In addition, the study of specific fallacies has frequently resulted in fewer and fewer arguments being classified as fallacious. A few examples illustrate this trend.

The ad hominem fallacy is one of the most extensively studied fallacies. Ironically, the vast majority of these essays suggest either that the number or irrelevant ad hominem arguments is quite small, or that we should consider abandoning the concept.[15] Gerber, for example, suggests that:

Since Locke it has been taken for granted by a large consensus

of writers on the subject that at least some varieties of argumentum ad hominem are fallacious. . . . it is only by neglecting an important class of ad hominem statements that this thesis can be maintained, and the qualifications which would save the view are so serious as to render the chance of developing even a restricted version rather poor.[16]

Gerber suggests that the tu quoque, a form of the ad hominem, may sometimes be a legitimate argument.[17] Other forms of ad hominem arguments have also been defended as being legitimate arguments. This view of the ad hominem may not be surprising; there are a number of cases where we approve of attacks against the speaker. In a court of law, attacking the credibility of a witness is widely recognized as a legitimate tactic. We encourage students to evaluate the strength of evidence by examining the source's credibility. In political campaigns, some (although not all) arguments relating to the character of a candidate are held to be relevant. Character attacks can be legitimate; the distinction drawn by those supporting the utility of this type of a fallacy is to unwarranted or irrelevant attacks. This standard, however is unclear; those making the ad hominem attack may often argue that the attack is, in fact, relevant. Whether an argument is a legitimate or illegitimate argument depends on a factual judgement (of relevance) independent of the form of the argument.

Similar problems arise when examining the slippery slope argument. Govier suggests that there are at least some slippery slope arguments that are legitimate.[18] She concludes that "slippery slope arguments may contain many mistakes but need not, as such, contain any." [19] There are numerous examples where this type of argument may be very sound. There are cases where a single decision may commit an individual to subsequent action. This type of argument is heard in law courts, where an individual case may in fact create a precedent for latter decisions. Some literature in philosophy suggests that the slippery slope argument may play a role in the rule-utilitarian philosophical systems; [20] after all if individual decisions are based on general rules, an individual act can be justified only if it does not commit us to a class of similar acts. The question becomes whether the immediate decision can be distinguished from later decisions. The legitimacy of individual decisions needs to be determined using neutral principles that go beyond the immediate case; the slippery slope argument can illustrate the logical result of accepting a specific decision rule in the immediate case.[21]

Those who argue that to permit individual violation of rights may lead, one step at a time, to future violations can defend that position by pointing to historical examples where such fears were realized. Those who fight any new programs on the grounds that to permit one new spending program will make it easier to support a second program, then a third, and so on until the budget ceiling is meaningless may be arguing based upon an analysis of political

reality. An alcoholic refusing a drink because, once the first drink is taken, others will follow may be acting based upon experience. All of these arguments are examples of slippery slope arguments yet most, if not all, would seem to have some utility. Whether or not a slippery slope argument is valid depends upon at least two factual issues: whether the initial act, in fact, will lead to additional action, and whether the present action be distinguished from other actions in a manner that justifies taking this single action, but not future harmful actions.

Woods and Walton have examined the *ad verecundiam* (appeal to authority) and admit that it, too has some utility.[22] This conclusion also makes sense; everyday we resort to experts to tell us if we are sick or well, for information about the economy, scientific and technical matters, and so on. It is often impossible for individuals to know enough about a topic to make independent decisions, so authorities are frequently used to resolve disputes. Woods and Walton note:

In the case of the *ad verecundiam*, whether or not to charge that a fallacy has been committed is often obscured by the plain fact that sometimes an appeal to authority is perfectly sound.[23]

The problem with the fallacy is, in part, that individuals overstate the degree of confidence in the conclusion based on an authority.[24] In addition, Woods and Walton suggest specific guidelines for evidence,[25] but, as we will see, even these standards may not assist in evaluating when an appeal to authority is warranted.[26]

The *ad baculum*, or appeal to force, has received less attention.[27] Again, there are many instances where the appeal to force may be legitimate.[28] For example, any discussion of our nuclear weapons policy will contain an implicit appeal to force: for example, the argument that if we do not freeze development of nuclear weapons the result will be a nuclear war could technically be such a fallacy. This type of argument is obviously a useful one. It might be argued that an appeal to fear is fallacious only if the arguer is the instrument of force, but this distinction may not be helpful. Initially, it means that whether or not an argument is fallacious depends on who makes the argument, not the substance of the argument, a position that further increases the number of legitimate *ad hominem* arguments. In addition, it often unclear when the arguer becomes the instrument of force. For example, if a Soviet leader argues that the deployment of the cruise missile in Europe might cause a war because radar errors may cause a misjudgement on the part of the Soviet leadership, is that a fallacy? What about an arguer who suggests that if an action takes place, he or she might become violent, even though this violence might be unintentional (e.g., the individual knows he/she has trouble controlling her or his temper). In these cases, the use of force might be the inevitable effect of a policy,

independent of the argument.

I will discuss some other fallacies in the next section, but it is worth noting that theorists have argued that many other common fallacies may, in numerous situations, be legitimate arguments. Both Barker[29] and Sanford[30] agree that in some cases begging the question may be legitimate. Others have suggested that some versions of the fallacy of many questions are legitimate arguments.[31] Even the "two wrongs make a right"[32] and the fallacies of composition and division[33] have their supporters.

It should be clear that the broad categories employed by the traditional view of the fallacy results in numerous arguments being labeled as fallacies that are, in fact, legitimate arguments. Toulmin, Rieke and Janik concede that:

Most disturbingly to some people, arguments that are fallacious in one context may turn out to be sound in another context. Therefore, we shall not be able to identify any intrinsically fallacious forms of arguing.[34]

The question becomes, how can we best distinguish between legitimate types of "fallacies" and illegitimate arguments.

A REFORMULATION OF THE FALLACY

Traditional treatments of fallacy have begun with the assumption that a fallacy is an illegitimate type of argument. After examining the specific fallacies, in a number of cases it has become clear that arguments initially considered fallacious have turned out to be legitimate arguments. It might be useful to approach fallacies from the opposite viewpoint, assuming they are legitimate unless they share certain characteristics. From this perspective, a fallacy could be viewed as an argument, supporting a degree of probability for a claim, and with a generic weakness. This has two implications for the study of fallacies: the view of fallacies as establishing probability and the emphasis on the fallacy's generic weakness. Both of these implications will be examined in this section of this essay.[35]

Fallacies and Probability

That many arguments are based on probability has been developed by a number

of authors.[36] We often are forced to make judgements based upon inadequate information. Often we have incomplete information about a problem, or we are forced to act before additional information can be gathered. In other cases we may lack the time to gather and assimilate all available information. In short, we are forced to act based on probabilities, not certainties.

In addition, there are a number of arguments studied by students of argument (in a favorable light) that do not establish certainty. A typical textbook will contain sections on induction, even though perfect induction is rare. Argument based on causality, while an important part of argument, is, at best based on probability. The strength of even good sign reasoning is well below certainty. While many arguments seek to establish certainty, at best they can establish a certain level of probability for a conclusion.

If a fallacy is viewed as establishing certainty, it most certainly will be viewed as an inadequate argument. Once one lowers the standard for argument below the level of certainty, however, the door is opened for the utilization of a number of arguments that have traditionally been viewed as being fallacious. While these arguments may be fallacious if they are claimed to demonstrate certainty, they may be legitimate if they are viewed as demonstrating probability (or less).

To illustrate this concept, consider a type of argument, that has been neglected by many theorists. In the previous section I indicated that several theorists began with the traditional concept of the fallacy, only to discover that some of these traditional fallacies might be legitimate after all. What does it mean, however, to say that these arguments are not fallacious? For example, some appeals to authority are legitimate arguments. Does that mean they demonstrate certainty? For example, it is unlikely that Woods and Walton would suggest that even if an appeal to authority met all of their five standards it would demonstrate certainty. Similarly in many cases ad hominem arguments may be useful arguments, but they are not conclusive arguments. In short, the "lost fallacy" arguments, those arguments that initially seem to be fallacies but are not, do not demonstrate certainty; they merely establish some level of probability.

Other fallacies may function in a similar, though perhaps not as useful, manner. Many fallacious arguments add something to our knowledge, even if they might not add significant amounts to our knowledge. How much credibility should be given to a fallacious argument should be determined by weighing it against other available evidence. Where no counter-evidence or arguments exist, even weak fallacious arguments might be useful; where there is strong counter-evidence, even the 'lost fallacies' may not be sufficient to alter our beliefs.

For example, an appeal to authority may not be considered fallacious for Woods and Walton if the authority is an expert. However, if I am also an expert in the field with access to other information, such an appeal should not be strong, even if the other experts are very reputable. Presumably I should rely on my own reasoning, rather than deferring to others. If there are more objective ways to determine the truth of a position, even a strong appeal to authority would be of little use. On the other hand, if I have no information on a subject except the testimony of a sometimes unreliable source, I might have to act on that information because it is all that is available. In short, while stronger evidence increases the confidence I may have in a decision, the weight given to the evidence might depend on the availability of other evidence.

In addition, the question of whether a specific argument falls into the "clearly fallacious" category or into the "lost fallacy" category is rarely clear. The revised view of the fallacy assumes some type of a threshold; arguments above this threshold have some utility, those below this threshold can be termed fallacious. In reality, however, this threshold is, at best, unclear. At what point is an authority enough of an expert so that the ad verecundiam is not committed? How many examples must be given to avoid a hasty generalization? The dividing line is not clear; instead there is a grey area blurring the distinction between the two types of fallacies. Nor is it clear that the fallacies that do not meet this standard have no utility.

Rather than waiting for the perfect argument, we should recognize that we frequently must rely on imperfect argument. The test for a fallacy should not be whether it demonstrates truth, but whether it adds to something our understanding of the problem. From this perspective, many traditional fallacies, even weak ones, may be useful. While the strength of the argument may vary, most fallacies may add something to our understanding of the world, even if this is not enough to produce a certain conclusion. Viewed from this perspective, many traditional fallacies might be useful arguments. Rather than developing a threshold for when a fallacy is a legitimate argument in isolation, it might be wiser to draw the line between fallacious and nonfallacious types of arguments based on the nature of the decision and the availability of other evidence. Better still, it might be wise to focus on what weight should be given to these arguments.

The appeal to tradition, for example, is frequently cited as being undesirable; after all, traditions can be wrong, and changing conditions may require new actions. At the same time, virtually every debate textbook defends the concept of presumption; that we should remain with the present system until it is shown to be inadequate.[37] While there may be a question about the nature

of presumption as an argument, it is clear that, in the absence of any evidence on a topic, many theorists would sanction the use of this fallacy to guide an audience. Whether an argument is a fallacy or a legitimate use of presumption should not depend on the section of the textbook mentioning it.

The appeal to ignorance may also be useful in some arguments. Robinson[38] concedes that at least some of these appeals are legitimate, even if other appeals to ignorance may be suspect. In a court of law, for example, it would be legitimate to note that there is no information that a client is guilty to support the conclusion that the client is innocent. While the argument does not prove the conclusion, it does help support the position. This is particularly clear when there is no evidence supporting a position when there should be such evidence. If I suggest that New York City was not destroyed yesterday because there is no evidence that New York City has vanished, that would seem to be a powerful argument. In addition, combined with other fallacies, the appeal to ignorance might be useful. For example, I might argue that many people are eating at a certain diner, and since there is no reason to believe the food is bad, I might assume the food will be good. This conclusion might not be certain, but it is strong enough to warrant eating at the establishment.

The hasty generalization poses other problems. Here the question is one of a threshold: at what point do we have enough examples to act? Even with very few examples, however, we do have some information about the conclusion. If I know one member of a family I know more about that family than if I knew no family members. While I may not be able to reach a perfect conclusion about the family, I can reach some tentative, even if not totally reliable, conclusions. Even in social science theorists are working on ways of understanding reality by examining only a few cases[39]. In addition, sometimes there are only a few examples relevant to the argument, and therefore we must rely on those few examples. How many Vietnams must the United States be involved in before we decide intervention is undesirable? One is reminded of the social psychology journals that refused to publish articles about the holocaust because they were not replicable; this hardly suggests that we cannot learn something about the world by examining a few examples.

This same principle may apply even to formal fallacies. For example, affirming the consequent is commonly termed a formal fallacy. Consider the following example:

All basketball players are over six feet tall.
Fred is over six feet tall.
(so) Fred is a basketball player.

Obviously this argument is invalid; the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the first two premises. However, I do think that the first two premises do add to our knowledge concerning the conclusion. Until we know the second premise, the odds against Fred being a basketball player may be very remote. Once we learn the minor premise, while we may not know the conclusion is certain, the probability of the conclusion is much greater that it would be without knowing the two premises. [Without the second premise, the odds of Fred being a basketball player are 1/(all individuals concerned), while with the second premise the odds are 1/(those individuals over 6 feet tall); a much lower number.]

The strength of a fallacy should be viewed compared to alternative evidence and arguments on the topic. The fact that a fallacy does not demonstrate certainty is not an indictment of the argument. The question is whether or not the fallacy adds to our understanding of the issue being debated. By this lower standard, many fallacious arguments can be viewed as useful. The arguments may not be as strong as we would like, but we must act on the information available to us. Even in statistics, there are those who argue that we can learn a lot from using methods that may not be perfect.[40] The critic is forced to weigh weak arguments against each other. It should be realized, however, that whether action is warranted may require the meeting of a threshold in some cases. Various presumptions in law and public policy have been developed to set minimum standards for evidence and argument; many fallacies may not meet these standards. That does not mean, however, that these arguments are of no use for those arguments where the risks involved are low and no alternative evidence exists.

Fallacies and Generic Weaknesses

There should be a second component of a revised view of fallacies; the weakness of a fallacy should be viewed as generic. By this I mean that to call an argument a certain type of fallacy is to say that the argument tends to have a certain type of weakness. This type of weakness can suggest certain types of counterarguments that might be made against the fallacy. These weaknesses might act as topoi for the critic of argument. There is a tendency of many critics to attach the label "fallacy" to an argument when the accuracy of that label depends upon a factual assumption that is, at best, debatable. For example, a critic may dismiss an argument as being a hasty generalization when the advocate believes both that a sufficient numbers of examples have been presented and that the examples are typical. In short, the labeling of the argument may be done to prematurely dismiss arguments, rather than to promote an analysis of the strength of the argument.

For example, an argument dismissed as a false dilemma may be legitimate if the arguer can explain why the other alternatives can also be dismissed (presumably in most debates the advocates do not have time to discuss all alternatives; or they might think it "obvious" why the alternatives left out were undesirable). Fallacies relating to causality are frequently so labeled because the critic makes an assumption about the subject being argued. A critic that suggests there is a third cause that produces both the cause and the effect might make such a claim prematurely. The advocate might be able to deny the factual assumption made by the critic. Causality is a complex field of study, and many attacks on causal studies may assume too rigorous a standard; other attacks may turn out to be in error. In almost all cases the criticism involves an attack that is compelling only if one assumes the truth of other elements in the causal relationship.[41]

The fallacy of suppressed evidence makes the factual assumption that the evidence left out is relevant to the conclusion. To label an argument as a slippery slope requires assuming that the slope is not slippery, which as previously indicated is not always the case. Rowland gives the example of a false analogy that compares U.S. and British gun control laws,[42] yet a case can be made that, in the critical areas being compared, these countries might be analogous (and the strength of Rowland's attacks may depend upon the nature of the conclusions being drawn). Even if Rowland is accurate in this specific instance, it is only because his attack can withstand counterattack.[43] After all, no analogy is perfect; the adequacy of the analogy depends upon how well the analogy can be defended against attacks.

Understanding the theory of fallacies may be useful in assisting speakers to isolate weaknesses in arguments, much as preparing debaters to argue generic arguments helps them prepare for a debate. In neither case is the preparation of the attack conclusive; given the opportunity the initial advocate may be able to easily dismiss the attack. In some cases the generic weakness may be fatal; in others it will be of little consequence. This determination should be made in the open market place of ideas, not by an individual critic who does not have access to the defense of the fallacy.

Some theorists have suggested the use of a principle of charity[44] in evaluating fallacies: the critic should formulate the argument (supplying missing premises, etc.) in a manner that produces the strongest possible argument. Even these theorists, however, disagree about how this can be done. In addition, this does not solve the problem when the criticism concerns the factual truth of the missing premise, nor does it address the inability of the arguer to defend the argument against the criticism of the individual labeling

the argument as a fallacy.

By viewing the fallacy as an argument establishing probability with a generic weakness we emphasize the contribution that even fallacious arguments might make to our understanding, while noting the limitations of those arguments. How serious these limitations are will depend on the specific argument and the nature of other arguments available. Many times the criticism may be fatal for an argument. In other cases the importance of the decision might dictate a high standard for argument that the fallacy cannot meet. This does not deny that in some cases the fallacy might be an acceptable type of argument.

CONCLUSION

All argument cannot have truth as its goal. Often we must act based upon evidence that may not be conclusive. In other cases perfect evidence and/or arguments are not available. In still other situations the effort required to discover anything approximating the truth is too difficult. Frequently the decisions involved may be so trivial that absolute truth is an unnecessary goal.

The fallacy has always been a misunderstood argument. Even those theorists working in informal logic will concede that there are many examples of arguments erroneously labeled as fallacious. In fact, in those arguments where probability (or even lower levels of understanding) is the goal, we may be forced to rely on fallacious argument. In the absence of stronger arguments to the contrary, the fallacy may have a legitimate role in argument. To prematurely discount an argument as being fallacious emphasizes the argument's weaknesses while at the same time ignoring any positive contributions such an argument might have to our understanding of the world. Given that few "perfect" arguments can be found in ordinary discourse, such a strategy is unwise. At the same time, it is important to understand the nature of the weaknesses of these types of arguments, if for no other reason than to avoid placing undue weight to these arguments. The objections to fallacies may act as topoi for a critic of argument; suggesting potential arguments against an advocate; in some cases these attacks will prove successful, in others not. The fallacy may have only a limited function in argument, but that function should not be ignored.

NOTES

[1]Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, 2nd. ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc., 1984), p. 132.

[2]Trudy Govier, "Who Says There are no Fallacies?" Informal Logic Newsletter, 5 (December 1982) 2.

[3]C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1970).

[4]For a bibliography of material on this subject, see Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, "A Bibliography of Recent Work in Informal Logic," in Informal Logic: The First International Symposium, J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson, eds. (Inverness, Ca.: Edgepress, 1980), pp. 163-72; and Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, "A Bibliography of Recent Work in Informal Logic," Informal Logic Newsletter, 5 (July 1983), 3-15.

[5]Hamblin, p. 11.

[6]John Woods and Douglas Walton, Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. ix.

[7]Maurice A. Finocchiaro, "Fallacies and the Evaluation of Reasoning," American Philosophical Quarterly, 18 (January 1981), 13.

[8]Karel Lambert and William Ulrich, The Nature of Argument (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 25-28. For a critical view of this position, see Govier, pp. 2-9.

[9]Gerald J. Massey, "Are There any Good Arguments that Bad Arguments are Bad?" Philosophy in Context, 4 (1975), 61-77; and Gerald J. Massey, "The Fallacy Behind Fallacies," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Peter A. Frency, Theodore E. Vehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 489-499.

[10]Woods and Walton, p. v.

[11]See, for example, Ralph H. Johnson, "Toulmin's Bold Experiment," Informal Logic Newsletter, 3 (June 1981), 17; Ronald Roblin, "Copi's Sixth Edition," Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (July 1982), 12-13; and Douglas N. Walton, rev. of Practical Logic by Vincent E. Barry, With Good Reason by Morris S. Engel, and, The Way of Words by Ronald Munson, Teaching Philosophy, 2 (1977), 81-84.

[12]See Finocchiaro, 13-22.

[13]Douglas Walton, "What is Logic About?" Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (November 1981), 4.

[14]Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, "The Recent Development of Informal Logic," in Blair and Johnson, p. 8.

[15]See D. Gerber, "On Argumentum ad Hominem," Personalist, 55 (1975), 23-29; John Woods and Douglas Walton, "Ad Hominem, Contra Gerber," Personalist, 58 (April 1977), 141-144; Lawrence M. Hirman, "The Case for Ad Hominem Arguments," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60 (December 1982), 338-345; Trudy Govier, "Ad Hominem: Revising the Textbooks," Teaching Philosophy, 6 (January 1983), 13-24; and Alan Brinton, "A Rhetorical View of the Ad Hominem," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63 (March 1985), 50-63.

[16]Gerber, p. 23.

[17]Trudy Govier, "Worries about Tu Quoque as a Fallacy," Informal Logic Newsletter, 3 (June 1981), 2-4.

[18]Trudy Govier, "What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (June 1982), 303-316.

[19]Govier, "Slippery Slope," p. 316.

[20]See, for example, L. A. Whitt, "Acceptance and the Problem of Slippery-Slope Insensitivity in Rule-Utilitarianism," Dialogue, 23 (1984), 649-659.

[21]See Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review, 73 (November 1959), 1-35.

[22]John Woods and Douglas Walton, "Argumentum ad Verecundiam," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 7 (Summer 1974), 135-153.

[23]Woods and Walton, "Ad Verecundiam," p. 136. See also Woods and Walton, Argument, p. 86.

[24]John Woods and Douglas Walton, "What Type of Argument is an Ad Verecundiam?" Informal Logic Newsletter, 2 (November 1979), 5-6.

[25]Woods and Walton, Argument, pp. 88-91.

[26]See Charles Arthur Willard, "Some Speculations About Evidence," in Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation, Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1979), pp. 280-281. See also Walter Ulrich, "The Use and Misuse of Evidence in Debate,"

Debate Issues, 16 (January 1983), 10-16.

[27]See Dwight Van de Vate, Jr., "The Appeal to Force," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (Winter 1975), 43-60; George E. Yoos, "A Critique of Van de Vate's 'The Appeal to Force,'" Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (Summer 1975), 172-176; and Dwight Van de Vate, "Reasoning and Threatening: A Reply to Yoos," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (Summer 1975), 177-179.

[28]Charles F. Kielkopf, "Relevant Appeals to Force, Pity & Popular Pieties," Informal Logic Newsletter, 2 (April 1980), 2-5.

[29]John A. Barker, "The Fallacy of Begging the Question," Dialogue, 15 (April 1976), 241-255.

[30]David H. Sanford, "The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker," Dialogue, 16 (September 1977), 485-498.

[31]Hamblin, p. 39; Douglas Walton, "The Fallacy of Many Questions," Logique et Analyse, 24 (September/December 1981), 291-313; and Frank Fair, "The Fallacy of Many Questions: Or, How to Stop Beating Your Wife," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 4 (Spring 1973), 89-92.

[32]Leo Groarke, "When Two Wrongs Make a Right," Informal Logic Newsletter, 5 (December 1982), 10-13.

[33]James E. Broyles, "The Fallacies of Composition and Division," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (Spring 1975), 108-113.

[34]Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, p. 131.

[35]A third assumption, that a fallacy is an argument, is developed by Hamblin (p. 224).

[36]See, for example, Walter Ulrich, "The Nature of Argument and Belief: Argument as Tragedy," paper presented at the Second Wake Forest University Argumentation Conference, November 1980. See also Walter Ulrich, "An Ad Hominem Examination of Hypothesis Testing as a Paradigm for the Evaluation of Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (Summer 1984), 1-8.

[37]See Patrick O. Marsh, "Is Debate Merely a Game for Conservative Players?" Speaker and Gavel, 1 (January 1964), 46-53; and Arthur N. Kruger, "The Underlying Assumptions of Policy Questions. I. Presumption and Burden of Proof," Speaker and Gavel, 2 (November 1964), 2-17.

[38]Richard Robinson, "Arguing From Ignorance," The Philosophical Quarterly, 21 (April 1971), 105-108.

[39]Michel Hersen and David H. Barlow, Single Case Experimental Studies: Strategies for Studying Behavioral Change (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976); and P. O. Davidson and C.G. Costello, N=1: Experimental Studies of Single Cases (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969).

[40]Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Co., 1966).

[41]For a typical set of guidelines on causal reasoning, see John Woods and Douglas Walton, "Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc," Review of Metaphysics, 30 (June 1977), 583-591. For problems in determining causality, see Lester B. Lave & Eugene P. Seskin, Air Pollution and Human Health (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), pp. 235-237; Lester B. Lave and Eugene P. Seskin, "Epidemiology, Causality, and Public Policy," American Scientist, 67 (March/April 1979), 178-185; and Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," American Statistical Association Journal, 49 (September 1944), 467-479.

[42]Robert C. Rowland, "On Argument Evaluation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (Winter 1985), 132.

[43]It may be argued that the truth of the premises assumed by the critic are acceptable if they are commonly assumed to be true. This, of course, would be either an ad populum or an ad veruncundiam. In addition, it would bias the assessment of the argument against those that question current values. While it might be claimed that those who attack current values should have to support that attack, the time constraints imposed on an advocate might preclude the detailed explanation and support of all assumptions made by the advocate. In addition, the advocate might be using assumptions of the specific audience being addressed, which may not be the same as that of the critic.

[44]See Ralph H. Johnson, "Charity Begins at Home," Informal Logic Newsletter, 3 (June 1981), 4-9; Trudy Govier, "Uncharitable Thoughts About Charity," Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (November 1981), 5-6; Jonathan E. Adler, "Why be Charitable?" Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (May 1982), 15-16; Robert Fogelin, "Charitable Reconstruction and Logical Neutrality," Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (July 1983), 2-5; Trudy Govier, "On Adler on Charity," Informal Logic Newsletter, 4 (July 1983), 10-11; and Rita Manning, "A More Charitable Principle of Charity," Informal Logic Newsletter, 5 (June 1983), 20-21.

WHAT CAN SPEECH ACTS DO FOR ARGUMENTATION THEORY?

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For the past seven years, Scott Jacobs and I have given thought from time to time to the application of speech acts theory in analysis of ordinary argument. We have both been convinced that the insights into communication offered by speech acts theory could make a very fundamental contribution to the study of argument, and we have tried to point out some of the possibilities in the essays we've written on argument and persuasion in conversation. Our efforts, however, have been limited, and we have not produced any systematic, comprehensive analysis of the role of speech acts in ordinary argument. In Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion, van Eemeren and Grootendorst have attempted a systematic and comprehensive analysis.² I approached this book (and their other recent English-language publications) with genuine enthusiasm and optimism.³ I found much that is promising in this work, but I also found a number of disappointments. My purpose in this essay is to offer a summary evaluation of the work represented in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion, with focus on the use made of speech acts theory. I will begin by reviewing some central themes in the theory of speech acts, and then I will comment on what I see as the significant insights and the apparent shortcomings of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's analysis.

Two Central Themes in Speech Acts Theory

Without attempting a systematic summary of speech acts theory,⁴ I would like to highlight aspects of speech acts which have special relevance to argumentation theory and to an understanding of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's work. For brevity and focus, I will simply mention two central themes.

Force and Content

In speech acts theory, a distinction is drawn between the illocutionary force of a speech act (the kind of act it is, such as requesting, promising, or asserting) and the propositional content of the act (what is requested, promised, or asserted). Propositional content, especially of acts like asserting or stating, corresponds closely to the sort of thing one ordinarily thinks of as the substance of an argument: statements about states of affairs, about properties of objects, about attributes or actions of persons, and so on. Speech acts are not reducible to propositional content, even for the sorts of acts (like asserting and stating) most closely identified with their propositional contents. Beyond propositional content, any speech act also has some illocutionary force, and any given proposition may appear in acts of widely varying force. Thus, the proposition "Charlie will serve tongue sandwiches" may be the content of a request, a promise, an assertion, an offer, a threat, and so on. For any given force, there are categorical restrictions on the propositional

content of the act (e.g., requests take propositions about a future act by the addressee, promises propositions about a future act by the speaker), but any given proposition will not be restricted to some single force.

Without a distinction between force and content, it is not clear what need there would be for a theory of speech acts. We take an interest in the force of an utterance precisely because descriptions of utterances in terms of their propositional contents do not allow us to understand communication very well. The distinction between force and content, though familiar to most communication scholars, bears mention here because of a subtle confusion between the force and content of an assertion, to be discussed later.

Felicity Conditions

In terms of the philosophical puzzles motivating the development of speech acts theory, the idea that there are specific conditions governing the appropriate performance of speech acts is truly a central theme. Given that some statements cannot be evaluated in terms of exact criteria for the truth or falsity of their propositional contents, how can such statements be challenged, justified, or criticized? The simplified answer is that they are to be evaluated not in terms of the truth of a proposition but in terms of the rational and conventional prerequisites for the performance of a speech act. These prerequisites, which differ from act type to act type, are termed felicity conditions. The felicity conditions for a request include a desire by the speaker that the listener do the act requested, a belief by the speaker that the listener is able and willing (in principle) to do the act, and a belief by the speaker that the listener would not do the act as a matter of course. The felicity conditions for a promise include an intention by the speaker to do the act promised, a belief by the speaker that the listener wants the speaker to do the act, and a belief by the speaker that the speaker is able to do the act.

The primary appeal of speech acts theory for argumentation analysis has always seemed to me to follow from the idea of felicity conditions. Recognition of differing rational characteristics attached to different kinds of conversational acts allows for analysis of the attack and defense of such acts which does not depend on reducing them to a series of propositions. Speaking from experience in empirical analysis of conversational argument, the single most useful contribution of speech acts theory is in explaining how certain things come to be at issue in an argument. In the theory of speech acts, the performance of any act is seen as committing the speaker, in principle, to the set of beliefs and intentions embodied in the felicity conditions. Thus, the performance of a request, promise, or other act carries with it a package of commitments, expressible as propositions, and representing the beliefs associated with felicitous acts of that type. The speaker does not advance this series of subordinate propositions on their own merits, but incurs responsibility for them by virtue of performing an act for which they are rational or conventional prerequisites. Conversational argument is full of bizarre little interludes whose bearing on what might be called the issue can only be understood as depending on the preconditions of some superordinate

speech act. For later clarity, we will wish to distinguish between the propositional content of a speech act (as discussed above) and the bundle of subordinate propositions carried along when the act is performed.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst make use of the theory of speech acts in three ways: first, they provide an analysis of making an argument as a complex illocutionary act composed of elementary assertions; second, they contemplate the conventional aspects of the perlocutionary act of convincing, but come to no firm conclusions; and third, they offer a "code of conduct" for rational discussions based on a delimitation of allowable illocutionary acts and a set of more general conversational principles. The remainder of my essay will consist of discussion of the first and third of these contributions.

The Illocutionary Act of Making an Argument

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's idea that making an argument is a complex illocutionary act is an appealing one. As O'Keefe has pointed out, an argument₁ is not properly considered a speech act, but making an argument may be.⁵ The usefulness of this notion depends on the analyst's ability to formulate a set of felicity conditions for making an argument parallel to the conditions for requesting, promising, asserting, and so on. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide a candidate analysis of the felicity conditions for making an argument. According to their analysis, a speaker has properly performed the speech act of making an argument if:

- (0) the speaker has put forward an expressed opinion O and a series of assertions S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n ;
- (1) S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n are assertives in which propositions are expressed (propositional content condition);
- (2) advancing S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n counts as an attempt by S to justify O to L 's satisfaction (essential condition);
- (3) S believes that: (a) L does not (or may not) accept O ; and (b) L does (or will) accept S_1, \dots, S_n ; and (c) L will accept the set of statements as a justification of O (preparatory conditions);
- (4) S believes: (a) that O is acceptable; and (b) that S_1, \dots, S_n are acceptable; and (c) that the set of statements justify O (sincerity conditions).⁶

Two features of this analysis bear special mention. First, the conditions find equal applicability to single acts by a speaker or to multiple acts interrupted by the acts of an interlocutor. A speaker may be said to have made an argument any time actual or expectable disagreement is met with a defense, whether the defense is presented as a neat package accompanying the expressed opinion, or as a series of ad hoc reactions to demands by the interlocutor. Requesting and promising do not come about in this way, so far as has been established in the literature. Speakers set out to make a promise or to make a request, while making an argument may be imposed on the speaker by an interlocutor who calls out the

argument through a series of direct conversational demands. Making an argument may be a collaborative speech act in the blunt sense that it may come about through the subordinate speech acts of two or more speakers.⁷

A second noteworthy feature of these conditions is that they are audience-centered. This feature is typical of practically all recent analyses of speech acts in natural discourse; the consensus nowadays is to treat felicity conditions as strong or weak mutual belief conditions.⁸ But for argumentation theory, the audience-centeredness of the conditions is particularly crucial, because it underscores the cooperative nature of argument in ordinary discourse. A justification for an assertion need not be sufficient to satisfy a generalized or idealized skeptic, but only to answer the actualized skepticism of a particular interlocutor. Argument is in principle open-ended, as is suggested by van Eemeren and Grootendorst's formulations of the conditions: an interlocutor may query the initiating act, first on one ground, then on another, and so on; further, the answer to any query may itself be queried, so that arguments can expand to incorporate an unlimited number of subordinate propositions. This open-endedness might be construed, from the perspective of an idealized skeptic, to allow for infinite regress. From the dialogic perspective outlined by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the open-endedness of argument has the same sort of status as have certain grammatical principles which may be recursively applied without limit: in practice, interlocutors work out cooperatively how far an argument must be expanded to satisfy both parties or to discourage them from continuing, even though in principle they could go on forever.

Now, these two insights are appreciable, and they point to precisely what I see as the advantage of a process-based approach over a product-based approach to the study of argument. However, as a contribution to either the theory of speech acts or to argumentation theory, the conditions as formulated by van Eemeren and Grootendorst have some obvious weaknesses. There may be nothing inherently objectionable about the idea of an illocutionary act complex composed of elementary illocutionary acts, but when we get down to cases, the problems involved in analyzing such complexes look very tough. With full appreciation for the difficulty of the task van Eemeren and Grootendorst have set themselves, I wish to point out some places where they seem to me to have gone wrong.

Reduction of Argument to Propositions in the Guise of Assertions

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seemingly want to analyze arguments as constellations of propositions, but propositions are not speech acts, so instead, it is proposed that argument is composed of a series of assertions in which propositions are put forward. In trying to analyze argument this way, van Eemeren and Grootendorst at once sacrifice most of the potential utility of speech acts theory. Jacobs and I have tried to demonstrate in our own research that arguments can be offered in favor of or in opposition to any type of speech act whatsoever: requests, complaints, even compliments! Van Eemeren and Grootendorst assert instead that for argumentation to occur, the speaker must make one or more assertions in support of an expressed opinion conveyed by an initial act which also has the force of an assertive. According to their reasoning, an argument apparently originating with a speech act such as a directive is in fact concerned

not with the performance of that act, but with the performance of some indirectly conveyed act of asserting. They point out, for example, that it would be wrong to analyze "Let's take an umbrella, or do you want to get wet?" as involving an expressed opinion conveyed by a directive and argumentation conveyed by a question. Instead, they formulate the expressed opinion as "It is advisable to take an umbrella," and assert that the apparent directive actually has the force of an assertive. The rationale for these claims is not clear to me.

Between two analytic positions, van Eemeren and Grootendorst have chosen a middle ground which has the advantages of neither extreme. One might plausibly attempt analysis of ordinary argument in terms of the propositions conveyed by speech acts, and claim that argument involves rendering such propositions explicit and subjecting them to critique. Since the performance of speech acts is known to commit the speaker to belief in a package of propositions, and since argument quite often does single out one of these propositions for scrutiny, this position is not without strengths. It has problems, though, accounting for certain obvious features of ordinary argument, such as the fact that subarguments on a series of these propositions inexplicably cling together, and the fact that losing an argument is as likely to require the outright withdrawal of a speech act as the repudiation of a particular proposition. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst do not analyze arguments as constellations of propositions, but approximate this approach by analyzing arguments as constellations of assertions.

To the left of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's position is the other extreme, typified by my own work with Jacobs. Acknowledging that argument is over acts rather than over propositions, there is no obvious reason to try to reduce the myriad acts people argue for or against to what van Eemeren and Grootendorst term assertives. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst would presumably agree that the following exchange involves argumentation, and that the argumentation is directed at something conveyed by the first utterance (an act of complaining, or as they would have it, of asserting).

- 1 A: This car is the worst hunk of junk I ever owned!
- 2 B: Now what's wrong?
- 3 A: The door handle is busted. It won't open from inside.
- 4 B: That sounds easy enough to fix.
- 5 A: Each thing by itself is easy enough to fix. If you don't mind having your car in and out of the shop once or twice a week.
- 6 B: When did you ever have the car in the shop twice in one week?
- 7 A: Stop nitpicking me. You get my point all right.
- 8 B: I sure do. Your point is bitch, bitch, bitch. That's all you ever do these days.

- 9 A: Look, I only said what we've both been saying for months, that this car sucks.
- 10 B: So it sucks. Does that mean you have to make a big production out of every little thing that doesn't go your way?
- 11 A: You're the one making a big production of it. I just said what I think.
- 12 B: Repeat after me: I must not think bad thoughts.
- 13 / (laughs) I guess I shouldn't really complain about all these little problems--sorry I've been so difficult lately.

Following the suggestion van Eemeren and Grootendorst make about "Let's take an umbrella," we might try interpreting turn 1 as an assertion conveying the proposition "This car is bad." This works well, since the complaint is after all indirect rather than direct. The next five turns would then be considered as requests for supporting argumentation by B and responses by A. Treating these five turns this way doesn't give much satisfaction, but we can do it if we must. By turn 8, however, we definitely bog down, since A and B are obviously not talking about the bad car anymore, but they aren't working on a whole new argument, either. What B is doing in turn 8 is the same thing B was doing in turns 2, 4, and 6: challenging the sincerity of A's complaint by implying that A complains whether or not anything is really wrong. B has "refuted" A's complaint, not in the sense of denying the propositional content of the complaint, but in the sense of showing that A complained improperly. B challenged the act of complaining, not the act of asserting or the propositional content of either the complaint or the assertion. A, likewise, first defended the act of complaining, then withdrew the act in response to B's challenges. What advantage might come from imposing the force of an assertion on every arguable act and every supporting act is not clear, especially when we stop short of simply analyzing each utterance as one or more elementary propositions.

Inadequately Developed Conditions

A second troublesome spot in van Eemeren and Grootendorst's theory is the set of felicity conditions they have proposed. Nothing good can come of regarding argumentation as an illocutionary act if the felicity conditions for the act cannot be formulated in an empirically defensible way. Although van Eemeren and Grootendorst are to be commended for attempting the formulation, progress toward a viable speech acts analysis of argument depends upon revisions to account for counterexamples such as the following, representing apparent violations of the preparatory conditions, the sincerity conditions, and the essential condition, respectively.

1. S offers a basis for O known to be unacceptable to L, expecting that L will challenge this in turn, or perhaps hoping that L will simply decide that it isn't worth pursuing. A strategic variation of this theme might involve S offering an argument known to be unacceptable to L as a kind of gambit, to call out a conflict previously implicit or concealed.

in any visible way. S need not even accept responsibility for the quality of the supporting proposition: ordinary language provides numerous devices speakers can use to distance themselves from a premise even while using it to promote a conclusion ("By your own logic . . .," "Even your own witness agrees . . .," "If you really believe that . . .," and so on).

3. S may construct an argument not for the sake of L but for the sake of some audience, either real or imagined. S may make an argument with no expectation or intention of convincing L, contrary to what is claimed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst's essential condition. For example, Jacobs' research on witnessing and heckling concerns an argumentative exchange in which at least one party (Preacher Jéd) is alleged to be making arguments as a demonstration of Christian commitment rather than in an attempt to gain converts.⁹ Perhaps there is something defective about the arguments made with this goal (though I am not granting that). But unquestionably the arguments are recognizable as arguments. The essential condition for a speech act is not merely a correctness condition, but is, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out, a recognizability condition: a speaker who violates the essential condition should not be understood as making an argument at all. To put this point another way, there is nothing nonsensical about a speaker who claims to be making an argument, but who denies any interest in convincing L: "What you believe about X is up to you, but I happen to know that I'm right because of . . ." or "I wouldn't expect this to be convincing to you, but the argument goes like this." In part, the difficulties with the essential condition may result from the partly masked focus on propositions discussed above: only if argument is over the truth or falsity of propositions is it necessary to see the goal of argument as convincing one's interlocutor.

What damage do these counterexamples do? To say that a particular belief or intention is a felicity condition for the performance of a certain kind of speech act means, as van Eemeren and Grootendorst indicate, that the performance of an act of that type commits the speaker to holding and defending the belief or intention. For example, in making a request, speakers commit themselves to believing that their listeners are able to

no guarantee of that.

In constructing alternative sets of conditions for argumentation, it seems likely to me that a major change in the substance of the conditions will be necessary. The counter-examples I have described come about through van Eemeren and Grootendorst's over-reliance on what a listener will accept--with no clear analysis, even, of acceptability. From an argumentation theorist's point of view, the kind of conditions offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer no obvious advance in either descriptive or normative theorizing. The analysis currently offered says that S makes an argument by offering supporting propositions for an expressed opinion, and that the argument is a good one if the supporting propositions are acceptable to both S and L. What is lacking is any substantive suggestion about what it means for one act (or proposition) to support another act (or proposition). I have no candidate analysis to offer in place of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's--as I've said, the formulation of conditions for making an argument is likely to be very difficult. I can only remark that the analysis available so far is a very small return for the heavy conceptual investment in speech acts, and that the claim that argumentation may be regarded as an illocutionary act complex remains to be redeemed.

Rules for Rational Discussion

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer a set of rules, putatively speech acts-based, for the conduct of rational discussion: a kind of Roberts' Rules for conversation. The rules specify what kinds of speech acts may play a part in discussion, which participants may perform which acts, and how acts are to be distributed across the stages of a discussion. Although portions of their analysis are descriptive (having the force of assertives), the code of conduct is clearly and openly normative (having the force of a recommendation). They argue that argumentation should take place according to the rules they have formulated, not that it does take place in this way.

Developing usable recommendations from descriptive theory is a fine objective, one which the field should support. Some recent investigations of my own have convinced me that if people knew better how to make arguments, they would find themselves less frequently having arguments. A survey of conversational arguments and the frequently unpleasant relational consequences associated with them offers great opportunity for the normative theorist with an interest in ordinary argument.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's recommendations reflect the contemporary trend away from a product-based conception of rationality and toward a procedure-based conception of rationality. To argue soundly and well, according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, is not to produce arguments meeting critical standards imposed post hoc, but to participate in a procedure which guarantees a full and fair examination of ideas. Although there are some limits on the relevance of their code for ordinary argument, there are also obvious applications which might do much to improve the conduct of interpersonal argument. For example, when van Eemeren and Grootendorst's code is compared to the sorts of things people actually do in arguments, it is plain that most of us concentrate far too much on the expression of disagreement and far too little on the substantive sources of our disagreement. Whether or not people could profit from adopting the code of conduct is open to question, but I see no real reason to doubt that advantages would come from learning less disagreeable ways of disagreeing.

My enthusiasm for the code of conduct offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst is tempered by what I see as an unnecessary limitation in the scope of the rules. The code apparently applies to the conduct of only a narrow class of very special arguments--a class of arguments unlikely to occur in the interactions of ordinary people. van Eemeren and Grootendorst present their work as an analysis of ordinary argument and their code of conduct as a guide to ordinary discussion. I do not challenge their right to describe their work in this way. But there are two quite different things people mean by "ordinary" argument, and one of these meanings promises no relevance to ordinary interaction. To some theorists, like me, ordinary argument means "mundane arguments such as occur in ordinary discourse," while to other theorists, like van Eemeren and Grootendorst, ordinary argument means "logical argumentation cast in ordinary (colloquial) language." This distinction is important, because theorists whose interest is in the analysis of arguments cast in ordinary language are typically aiming for analysis of what I would consider to be extra-ordinary arguments--specifically, arguments conducted as a form of intellectual game, exercise, or contest. Extra-ordinary arguments are interesting, but they do not happen very often in the ordinary interactions of ordinary people.

Wenzel's useful partitioning of three perspectives on argument includes a contrast between argument as process (the rhetorical perspective) and argument as procedure (the dialectical perspective).¹⁰ Van Eemeren and Grootendorst explicitly align themselves with the dialectical perspective, but it is not perfectly clear that they appreciate the limitation in scope this entails. As Wenzel outlines the dialectical perspective and as van Eemeren and Grootendorst embody it, the approach has relevance to only a very specific sort of argumentation with a special sort of goal and a

special separateness from practical affairs. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's code is designed to facilitate the sort of discussion in which two people set out, self-consciously and deliberately, to cooperatively test an idea.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem at some points to wish to say something about mundane argument. Their examples are certainly mundane enough ("Let's take an umbrella"). But mundane argument is not about the testing of ideas, and there is every reason to believe that mundane argument would be impeded rather than improved by rules for efficient idea-testing. Mundane argument is, for the most part, about "getting my way." It comes about as repair of specific unanticipated problems--conflicts of actions--and it is organized to cope with this disagreement as minimally as possible so as to get on with the main business of the exchange. Mundane argument comes about as a side issue to the performance of speech acts of all stripes. The propositions expressed in such acts--their ideational content--are hardly ever of primary concern to the participants. For most of the sorts of disagreements people have to resolve, the dialectic recommended by van Eemeren and Grootendorst could only be a sort of diversion or digression.

As a single, simple example, consider the case of a parent/child dispute in which the child wants the parent to do something (e.g., go to see *Conan the Destroyer* at the movies) and the parent does not want to do it. The child's proposal having been refused, there is a disagreement to explore. The child may offer arguments for the desirability of seeing the movie or may demand from the parent reasons why seeing the movie would not be desirable. Let us suppose that the parent has no reason for refusing to go beyond just not wanting to see that particular movie. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst would have the parent and child enter into discussion of the underlying ideational content: possibly, what principled grounds there might be for evaluation of movies as good or bad, suitable or unsuitable, and so on. But having completed the discussion, nothing is really changed, for the disagreement came about through a clash of actions and not through opposite positions on a proposition. The child will surely still want to see the movie (perhaps more than before!) and the parent will still want to avoid it. The discussion might be intrinsically worthwhile, but it is an activity apart from the practical context of the mundane argument over whether or not the parent and child will go see *Conan*.

I think it likely that a code of conduct could be developed for mundane argument, similar to the code van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer for extra-ordinary argument. Such a code would explicate what it is to argue fairly in ordinary discourse. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide useful starting points in rules which guarantee all participants the right to challenge the expressed opinions of others and to express opinions of their own. Similar insights could be readily incorporated into a code which also respects the function of argument in ordinary affairs: to repair disagreement over the performance of speech acts.

NOTES

¹ Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymema," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 251-265; Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "The Collaborative Production of Proposals in Conversational Argument and Persuasion: A Study of Disagreement Regulation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1981), 77-90; Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard (Carbondale and Edwardsville: So. Ill. U. Press, 1982), pp. 205-237; and Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Strategy and Structure in Conversational Influence Attempts," Communication Monographs, 50 (1983), 285-304.

² Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications, 1984).

³ F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, and T. Kruijer, The Study of Argumentation (New York: Irvington, 1984); Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, "Unexpressed Premises: Part I," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (1982), 97-106; Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, "Unexpressed Premises: Part II," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (1983), 215-225.

⁴ In the brief summary to follow, I will not attempt to identify the sources of ideas point by point. The entire discussion draws on either or both of two works: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1975); and John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1969).

⁵ Daniel J. O'Keefe, "The Concepts of Argument and Arguing," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard (Carbondale and Edwardsville: So. Ill. U. Press, 1982), pp. 3-23.

⁶ I have taken some small liberties in summarizing the conditions: including (0), which van Eemeren and Grootendorst refer to only as their "starting point," and ignoring altogether the distinction between pro-argumentation and contra-argumentation, which though very nice is messy to argue around.

⁷ Hancher has suggested that there may be a class of speech acts which can only come about through joint action, e.g., making a bet; making an argument does not fit this class, since it may come about either as a unilateral or as a bilateral production, and since even in the

bilateral case the argument is still made by one speaker. See M. Hancher, "The Classification of Co-Operative Illocutionary Acts," Language in Society, 8 (1979), 1-14.

⁸ See, for example, William Labov and David Fanshel, Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation (New York: Academic, 1977).

⁹ Scott Jacobs, "When Worlds Collide: An Application of Field Theory to Rhetorical Conflict," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Stillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 749-755.

¹⁰ Joseph W. Wenzel, "Perspectives on Argument," in Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association/American Forensic Association, 1980).

TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION:
VAN EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST'S CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR RATIONAL DISCUSSIONS

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Argumentation, although a vigorous discipline, is one that seems to make progress in small stages: journal articles, seminars, and conference papers are the usual vehicles for our research and theory. So, the appearance of a substantial book addressing substantial theoretical issues is always an event to be noticed. Large works call our attention to large issues. This is the case with Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst.¹ Their impressive analysis invites us to consider from a fresh perspective the whole question of a normative theory of argumentation: what can such a theory hope to do? what should such a theory be like? and how should it be grounded?

I would like to use this occasion, not only to discuss selectively some of the features of this work, but also to consider how scholars in argumentation might proceed to build on the foundations established by the authors. Thus, my paper has two parts. (1) First, I want to take the authors' purpose at face value, and consider how well it is served by their analysis of speech acts in argumentative discussions and by the resulting code of conduct for rational discussants. (2) Second, I want to suggest a broader purpose as a project for the field, and consider what further developments might extend the work initiated by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst. In both sections, I will employ as organizing topoi some criteria or desiderata that seem fundamentally relevant to the assessment or the design of a normative theory of argument. The criteria I invoke are certainly not the only considerations that might be brought to bear, but they are important and useful starting points.

One final limitation by way of preliminary: like Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's book, this paper is concerned with a normative theory of argumentation in the dialectical sense. A complete normative theory of argument would presumably include a logic for analysis and criticism of particular arguments as well as, perhaps, a rhetorical account of good reasons. The focus here, however, is restricted for the most part to dialectical norms, i.e. those procedural matters that are intended to promote candid and critical decision-making.

I

American scholars in our field are accustomed to think of argumentation as a pervasive feature of social life and to concern themselves with arguments in contexts of every conceivable kind. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruijer express a similarly broad view in their general textbook,² but in the present work a narrower definition is stipulated to focus on a particular kind of argumentative discussion.³ An argumentative discussion is conceived here as a cooperative exchange of appropriate speech acts by discussants who are motivated to resolve a dispute about an expressed opinion (pp. 1-2). The discussants, furthermore, are presumed to be governed by a norm of rationality:

A language user taking part in an argumentative discussion is a rational language user if in the course of the discussion he performs only speech acts which accord with a system of rules acceptable to all discussants which furthers the creation of a dialectic which can lead to a resolution of the dispute at the centre of the discussion (p. 18).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's purpose is to provide an analysis of speech acts and other structural/procedural features of argumentative discussions of that kind, only, and on the basis of that analysis to explicate a code of conduct that will enforce the norm of rationality.

I will begin my review of their work with reference to a first criterion for theory building of this kind:

Desideratum 1. A normative theory of argumentation (a code of conduct) should be based on the best available theoretical account of the case(s) it seeks to govern.

Measured against this criterion, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's work is a notable accomplishment, for they have created an entirely original and insightful analysis of the nature and functions of speech acts in argumentative discussions. Beginning with a set of useful assumptions about the study of argument, they identify specific analytical and theoretical problems that must be resolved before establishing norms. The problems are clearly stated and the solutions are rigorously worked out. The following is a brief summary of the major lines of development as they relate to the first criterion.

The authors' assumptive framework is expressed in terms of the stress they place on the externalization, functionalization, socialization, and dialectification of argumentation. First, argumentation must concern itself with verbal means of resolving disputes rather than with mental states (pp. 5-7). The functional approach calls attention to the character of

argumentation as one form of language-in-use (a complex of speech acts), in contrast to the product-oriented conception of argument common to logical theory (pp. 7-9). Socialization refers to the communicative and interactive character of argument. The dialectical view of argument ("a Popperian critical-rationalist standpoint") is positioned against justificationism (p. 16) and prefaces the need for a normative theory: an argumentative interaction "will only be able to lead to a resolution of the dispute . . . if the discussion itself is adequately regimented. This means that in a dialectical theory of argumentation it will be necessary to propose rules for the conduct of argumentative discussions" (p. 17).

Noting the absence of any satisfactory account of arguing as an illocutionary act in speech act theory, the authors take as their first aim "to clarify what sort of speech act is being performed when argumentation is advanced and what conditions may be deemed to have been fulfilled if that speech act is performed" (p. 4). Drawing on the work of Austin and Searle, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst develop a conception of argumentation as "an illocutionary act complex . . . composed of elementary illocutions which belong to the category of the assertives and which at the sentence level maintain a one-to-one ratio with (grammatical) sentences" (p. 34). They support their interpretation cogently while reviewing alternative conceptions, and conclude with a straightforward account of the essential, correctness, preparatory and sincerity conditions for the happy performance of the illocutionary act complex of argumentation.

In a somewhat problematic section (chapter 3), Van Eemeren and Grootendorst next undertake "to clarify the relation between the performance of the speech act argumentation and the perlocutionary effect that the listener accepts or does not accept a particular expressed opinion" (p. 47). Their first line of argument concludes tentatively that

. . . the perlocution convince may be regarded as conventional in the sense that in the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary effect of the listener being convinced . . . argumentation schemata are employed which meet all three of the stated conditions for conventionality. These argumentation schemata do, after all, constitute regularities in the usage of language users trying together to resolve a dispute, the language users expect these argumentation schemata to be used and they would prefer to resolve disputes with their help. (p. 68).

The hypothesized conventionality of argumentation schema is an interesting topic, in itself, one deserving further attention, but it does not, I think, establish a necessary connection between the illocution argue and the perlocution convince. Another move is required.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst make a more persuasive case for the connection when they give an account of "a happy illocutionary perlocution of arguing/convincing" (pp. 69ff). If I have understood them correctly, the point may be brought out as follows. The perlocutionary effect associated with the illocution arguing is commonly said to be convincing, which other writers have often taken to refer to a mental state in the listener. Now, while inducing a psychological conviction may the optimum perlocutionary effect of the speech act arguing, it is not the fundamental effect. More fundamental is the speaker's objective of securing from the listener the performance of a commissive speech act indicating acceptance or rejection of the speaker's claim. Thus, there is a limited perlocutionary effect that is inherently (and conventionally) bound to the speech act complex of argumentation; it has to do with eliciting a response from a listener. So, perhaps the illocutionary perlocution should not be named arguing/convincing, but something like arguing/securing acceptance or rejection. On this view, it is not merely the argumentation schemata used that are conventional, but the perlocutionary effect itself. The pattern "argument--response" is a regularity among language users that they expect and prefer because it is useful in managing disputes. This analysis of perlocutionary effect serves Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's overall project of explaining how the propositional contents and the commitments of discussants are expressed and made available for critical examination.

The third main problem, addressed in chapters 4 and 5, is to "draw up guidelines for the analysis of argumentative discussions" which requires "an insight into the moves that have to be made for the resolution of disputes and into the nature of the speech acts that may play a part in this" (p. 75). The authors proceed to analyze argumentative discussions with regard to their simplicity/complexity, the stages through which they develop, the kinds of speech acts that are appropriate at each stage and who may perform them, and some problems of interpretation (i.e. assigning illocutionary force to statements in colloquial speech). The crucial feature of this analysis is the rigorous specification of the kinds of speech acts that may legitimately be used, which discussant (protagonist or antagonist) may use them, and in which stages of discussion they are permissible. Only those speech acts are permitted which can make a contribution to the resolution of the dispute: assertives, commissives, directives, and usage declaratives. Ruled out of the analysis are such speech acts as expressives and declaratives bound to institutional authority (p. 106).

Now the reader may be unsure about how to take what appears to be rigorous prescription for the performance of specific speech acts, by specific actors, at specific stages. Certainly, the whole rhetorical tradition suggests that any

and all uses of language are potentially valuable in an argumentative discussion. Do the authors truly mean to prescribe language behavior? They speak of the "performance" of speech acts in a way that gives that impression. Nevertheless, it is not their intention--at this stage--to limit what arguers can actually do. They note the possibility of arguers performing other kinds of speech acts (e.g. telling anecdotes or jokes) that may be beneficial in a discussion, but these "do not constitute part of the process of resolving the dispute. . . . they can be disregarded in our attempt at an analytical reconstruction" and ". . . our reconstruction is in no way intended to prohibit these or similar speech acts in argumentative discussions" (p. 198, note 39). So, we may set aside the problem of prescribing conduct, planning to return to it in connection with the code of conduct which is frankly prescriptive.

We may understand Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's accomplishment up to this point, perhaps, as akin to the "rational reconstruction" that Habermas explains as the basis of his universal pragmatics, a method of systematically reconstructing the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects.⁴ Just as Habermas reconstructs the intuitive knowledge of competent communicators oriented to achieving understanding, so Van Eemeren and Grootendorst reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent arguers striving to resolve a dispute. Their analysis provides a theoretical foundation for a code of conduct for rational discussions.

I will address the next part of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's work with reference to a second criterion for normative theory building:

Desideratum 2. A normative theory of argumentation should provide clear procedural directions for accomplishing the purpose(s) of the activity.

The purpose that Van Eemeren and Grootendorst envision as the animating principle of argumentation is the rescution of disputes. In theory, this is accomplished best in a dialectic subject to appropriate rules that promote candid and critical discussion. So, their normative principles should presumably include rules and routines for bringing into clear view the propositions at issue and the commitments of the discussants with respect to those propositions. As a corollary, the system of norms should not contain any directives that inhibit the candid expression of beliefs, attitudes and values by the discussants.

Not surprisingly, in light of the authors' objectives, the book is full of insightful observations about how to make argumentative discussions more candid. My comments, of necessity selective, will touch on three aspects of this advice. To begin with, the first five chapters, which I have

just reviewed, stand independently as an analytical reconstruction of the rational foundations of critical discussion. They may, thus, be considered implicit norms for arguers. For example, to the extent that arguers understand how it is that certain kinds of speech acts are inherently necessary for resolution of disputes, they will presumably be likely to produce those speech acts.

A second major contribution is the analysis of unexpressed premises and guidelines for explicating them (chapter 6). In a review of the literature from informal logic, where this subject has been explored most systematically, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst point to unresolved problems, including the shortcomings of the principle of charity. Their solution makes use of Grice's conversational maxims and cooperative principle to explain how unexpressed premises can be treated as conversational implicatures. Rather than committing the interlocutor to the task of figuring out the beliefs of the initial arguer relevant to the incomplete argument, this approach is more likely to identify the premise to which the initial arguer is committed and, thus, what he is in principle obliged to defend (p. 141).

This brings us to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's third, and most direct, contribution to procedural norms. They introduce their system as follows:

The rules that we formulate here have to do with the conduct of language users who wish to resolve a dispute about an expressed opinion by means of an argumentative discussion. Because they together constitute a dialectical system which enables language users to conduct themselves in a manner conducive to the resolution of disputes, they may together be regarded as a dialectical code of conduct for rational discussants (p. 152).

The code is presented in seventeen rules, some divided into sub-rules, covering the performance of speech acts and other obligations of protagonist and antagonist at each stage of the discussion. Some features of the code are highly problematic, in my opinion, because, contrary to the authors' intention, some of the rules could have the effect of inhibiting a candid exchange of views. Nothing could be more at odds with their purpose. To further "an optimal externalization of disputes" they insist that "the discussants must be able to advance every point of view and must be able to cast doubt on every point of view." This to be guaranteed by "expressly granting each language user the unconditional right to advance or cast doubt on any point of view" (p. 154). How, then, could a code conceived in this spirit possibly be inhibiting? In general, I think the authors may have taken an unduly restrictive view of the kinds of language behavior that can make a contribution to the resolution of disputes.

Now, I must acknowledge that I could be dead wrong in my interpretation of how Van Eemeren and Grootendorst want their code of conduct to be understood. But I am trying to take them literally and I think many other readers will do likewise, with similar results. In any case, if I am mistaken, they will no doubt set me (and other readers) straight, and achieving that clarification will be worth the effort. My uncertainty stems from the same kind of ambiguity noted in their analytic reconstruction of the occurrence of speech acts in the stages of argumentative discussions. There they eschewed any attempt at empirical description or behavioral prescription; the point of that section was to give an account, in the abstract, of just those speech acts that can be held to contribute directly to the resolution of disputes. In contrast, the code of conduct seems to be meant to apply to the actual behaviors of discussants. Virtually all the rules are stated as commandments governing actions that are required, permitted, or forbidden. The following passage leaves little room for doubt that they mean to prescribe what actual arguers may or may not do:

Since the behavior to which the rules relate is deliberate conduct for which the discussants bear a certain responsibility, the code relates to the acts performed by language users in discussions about expressed opinions (p. 152).

In the spirit of a friendly interlocutor, then (for I share Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's general goals), let me suggest some places where I think the rules go too far.

To begin with a major objective claimed for the code, I want to take exception to the notion that a set of dialectical rules can or should be designed for the purpose of "preventing fallacies" (p. 151). This objective is set forth early on: "In particular, the rules must ensure that no fallacies occur in the discussion" (p. 4). The importance of this objective becomes clear in the final chapter of the book which is devoted to fallacies. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer an account of fallacies based on their speech act analysis, concluding that "fallacies have to do with many more aspects of the [argumentative] discussion than one would think from the traditional definition of the fallacy as an invalid argument" (p. 188). They prefer a definition of a fallacy as "any violation of any of the rules of the code of conduct" (p. 189). From Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's discussion it is clear that many fallacies can be understood as types of language behavior that violate the code of conduct, and perhaps all fallacies could be subsumed under the rules. Nevertheless, one may still doubt if this is the most effective treatment of the several ways in which arguments and arguing can go wrong. Certainly, some fallacies, especially those involving some problem of logical form, can be identi-

fied by other criteria, and the invocation of those criteria may be the most parsimonious means of exposing errors (e.g. undistributed middle, affirming the consequent, etc). In the absence of widespread disciplinary agreement on the nature and classification of fallacies, it seems unwise to treat them all from one perspective alone.

On a more basic level, I suggest that one purpose of a system of dialectical rules should be almost the opposite of "preventing fallacies." The objective should be to facilitate the overt expression of fallacies and their subsequent exposure. This manner of stating the objective is consistent with a long tradition that regards argumentation as a method of correction.⁵ John Stuart Mill said it nicely:

The whole strength and value then of human judgement depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand.⁶

I think Van Eemeren and Grootendorst share this view in fact, for they have written, "A dispute . . . may be able to make a (more or less modest) contribution to intellectual progress" and "the resolution of disputes has no definite character but is an intermediate state (which is by definition temporary or provisional in nature) in a continuous process of intellectual growth" (pp. 1-2). Thus, the way to make progress is not by trying to prevent error, but by bringing it into the open and exposing it. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that there is any basis for deciding absolutely what is error and what is truth. And we might add to this whole discussion the observation that, in the course of intellectual striving, today's fallacy may be tomorrow's truth.

My most serious reservation about the code of conduct concerns the rigid specification of which speech acts may be performed, at which stage of the discussion, by which participant, and for what purposes. Several rules embody these restrictions; here is an example:

Rule 1.1

Assertives and illocutionary negations or repetitions of assertives may be performed exclusively

- a. by language user 1 at the confrontation stage and at the concluding stage in order to express, maintain or retract his point of view in respect of the initial expressed opinion, and at the argumentation stage in order to perform the illocutionary act complex of argumentation;
- b. by language users 1 and 2 together at the concluding stage in order to establish the result of the discussion.

Several considerations lead me to question the wisdom of this particular approach to regulating the behavior of arguers in disputes.

First, in the present state of speech act theory, it is premature to restrict the performance of speech acts on the basis of any particular classification, for no extant classification of speech acts can be accorded more than provisional status. There are useful classifications, to be sure, but no one has been so well established that we can feel confident in saying these speech acts contribute to the rational settlement of disputes, that they contribute in just these ways, and no other speech acts of whatever kind make a contribution. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst follow Searle's functional classification, with reservations, expressing confidence that "language can fulfill a finite and determinate number of functions" (pp. 22-23). But what remains uncertain is just what those finite and determinate functions are, how they can be classified and described, and how they may contribute to rational discourse. In this state of affairs, it would be wise to avoid excessive restrictions on arguers as a matter of rule. For analytic purposes, it is entirely appropriate to employ some scheme of speech acts; one must have some system for description. But it does not follow that tentatively held classifications should be used as a basis for imposing restrictions on arguers. To do so may turn out to have the unintended effect of inhibiting candid expression and critical discussion.

As a rhetorician, perhaps I can be forgiven for elaborating this point in another way. The ancient traditions of rhetoric gave wide latitude to the speaker in the invention and presentation of arguments, and modern theorists go even further in revealing how every conceivable resource of language can be used in the making and criticizing of arguments. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, for example, discuss the argumentative functions of figures of speech, contrary to the view that figures are mere embellishment.⁷ Conley, likewise, has described how the old (and somewhat discredited) rhetorical technique of copia, the piling up of abundant words and matter, can be used to argumentative purposes.⁸ The anecdote, the homily, and indeed all manner of narratives can function as argument.⁹ To conclude with an apposite example, I call attention to that masterpiece of dialectical composition, Plato's Phaedrus, where the allegorical depiction of the non-lover, the evil lover, and the noble lover convey profound arguments at several levels.¹⁰ In summary, to prohibit the performance of speech acts of any kind might deny arguers the use of important resources for--and perhaps half the fun of--invention and presentation of arguments.

For the sake of a final comment on the code of conduct, I propose another criterion:

Desideratum 3. A code of conduct for argumentation should be parsimonious.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst are to be credited with a careful, rigorous and explicit development of their system of rules for a successful dialectic, but one cannot help wondering if the system truly needs such elaboration. Generally speaking, codes of conduct are successful to the extent that they are easy to learn and remember, and that suggests brevity. Perhaps the authors of this code would agree to a principle of parsimony: assuming the attainment of desired effects, the fewer rules the better. A well built normative theory may be compared to a sailing ship, its theoretical base like a well designed hull, its rules like masts, spars and rigging--just enough to carry the optimum canvas. As my earlier review of the analytic section of their work should make clear, I think Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have designed a sleek hull with a steady keel; but they may be trying to carry more canvas on more rigging than the state of the art warrants.

As I noted earlier, the restrictions on the performance of speech acts seem excessive and premature. Moreover, there is a parsimonious rule ready to hand in a normative theory that shares many of the objectives and suppositions of the system under discussion. I mean, of course, Habermas' design of the ideal speech situation which, although not intended as an actual prescription for conduct, does establish a basis for any number of rules of conduct. With respect to the performance of speech acts, the rule derived from the ideal speech situation is: all participants must have the right to initiate speech acts of any kind at any stage of the discussion.¹¹ Substituting such a rule for the several regulations on speech acts in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's code would avoid the danger of inhibiting speakers with no sacrifice of rigor; other rules in the code would still insure opportunities for clarification, attack and defense.

Perhaps the superstructure of this vessel could be streamlined somewhat by differentiating functionally among the several parts. Some spars and rigging have to be in place at all times, others are to be used in a supplementary way only at certain times. To leave that figure for another, I have in mind the possibility of recasting the code into a system of "three R's:" rules, recommendations, and reminders. In other words, it might be possible to achieve greater parsimony by reducing the rules to a smaller number of truly essential principles, supplemented by useful recommendations and hints for better performance. Consider the following illustration in respect to performance of speech acts:

Rule: All discussants are free to perform speech acts of any kind at any stage of the discussion.

Recommendation: A speaker who does not secure uptake of the illocution intended should produce a speech act of a more explicit kind.

Reminder: Assertives are generally the most efficacious speech acts for conveying propositional content.

Now, this is all highly speculative, of course, and the approach illustrated here is but one of many ways of achieving greater parsimony. By whatever means, however, I do believe that the reduction of the number of rules in a code of conduct has much to recommend it.

So far I have tried to review the main lines of work represented in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, at least in a general way, and I have considered them in light of some general criteria for the design of a normative system. I have raised some questions about particular features of the code of conduct that I hope may lead to further consideration and clarification. Certainly, one must acknowledge Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's work as an important contribution to one historically sanctioned project of our field, namely, providing guidance for the resolution of disputes.

II

One hopes that other scholars will see this book as a challenge to join in the historic project and to continue the elaboration of normative principles. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's code, as we saw, is designed to cover one particular kind of argumentative encounter, but argumentation theory in general seeks to encompass a wider territory. As we seek to extend analytic and regulatory principles, therefore, additional criteria come into play.

Desideratum 4. A general normative theory of argumentation should be applicable to argumentative situations of all kinds.

Perhaps the danger in stipulating this criterion is that it demands so much. Arguments are everywhere, or as Brockriede says, arguments are wherever people construe them to be.¹² Certainly our critical and descriptive studies of argument cover a wide variety of situations, from interpersonal disagreements, through public debates, to institutional forums such as courts and legislatures. There is no necessary reason why our normative work cannot aspire to equally broad application.

There are many works in our literature already that deal with the ethics of rhetoric, of public advocacy, and of debate. Perhaps some of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's insights and analytic methods could be used to effect a better integration of those works. Or, we might begin with the "simple" rhetorical situation in which all arguments originate: in the face of some exigence, a speaker seeks to effect change by influencing others through speech.¹³ What would an argumentative/speech act theory have to say about the obligations of the rhetor? What might we say about the transformation of such monological situations into dialogical ones? Under what conditions is transformation of a simple rhetorical situation into a full fledged debate desirable? What are the means for bringing about such a transformation? And so on.

Another approach might be to apply some of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's apparatus to well-defined and familiar argumentative situations different from theirs. Our favorite paradigm for argumentation used to be debate, whether a match between two teams before a judge or a political contest between two speakers before a public audience. One might, for example, take Cronen's description of the functions of the debater as orator, critic and pedagogue, and inquire into the unique speech act obligations of the advocate as teacher.¹⁴ For another example, consider presidential debates. If Theodore White is right in saying that Americans choose their leaders "not out of reason, but out of instinct and trust," it may be wise to reconsider the role of expressive speech acts in this form of critical decision-making.¹⁵ There are, perhaps, limitless forms of argumentation to which a speech act analysis might be applied for normative purposes.

The contemplation of varied argumentative situations also points up the fact that there are purposes served by argumentation other than the resolution of disputes. Willard suggests that the broadest conception of the function of argument is captured by the phrase "management of disagreement."¹⁶ Sometimes this may mean no more than "keeping the conversation going." Sometimes, the function of argumentation must be viewed as Aristotle viewed the function of rhetoric, by analogy with medicine: ". . . not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow."¹⁷ In short, each unique function that may be ascribed to argumentation may call for an analysis of speech acts that are especially relevant to that function.

As one reads Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, the temptation occurs frequently to take from the shelf other works, including textbooks in argumentation and debate. There are many points at which Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's discussion parallels the "conventional wisdom" of the field, and cross comparisons may often be instructive. Moreover, the

benefits can flow both ways. This suggests a final criterion for normative theory building:

Desideratum 5. A normative theory should strive to integrate the best work from all sources.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst draw on some continental theories of argument that are for the most part, I think it fair to say, virtually unknown among American scholars. Their list of references directs attention to a wealth of material in need of study. Likewise, there are lines of work on this side of the ocean that could contribute to the resolution of some problems they explore. Two brief illustrations will make the point.

In their chapter on the explicitization of unexpressed premises, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst raise the question of how to determine the context within which to interpret an incompletely stated argument, but without a full resolution. Here is an instance where the current work in field theory, and especially the analysis of particular fields of argument, could help to flesh out their treatment of contextualizing arguments.¹⁸ In addition, Burleson suggests how Toulmin's notion of field dependence and his analytic diagram can be applied to an interpretation of the substantive context of an argument:

The substantive context . . . provides critics and theorists with important clues as to how ideas, concepts, propositions, and arguments are interpreted and utilized within a given community. . . . substantive contexts are relatively stable and enduring. Insofar as the critic or theorist is sensitive to this latter context, he avoids being forced to "arbitrarily" assign meaning to propositional elements.¹⁹

In another instance, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst posit a decision rule that runs directly counter to the prevailing theory in American circles. Their rule 12 awards victory to the protagonist if, among other things, "he has sufficiently defended all subordinate points of view; in all other cases the antagonist has sufficiently attacked the initial point of view" (p. 171). On the face of it, it does not seem reasonable to hold the protagonist to defense of every subordinate point, if one presumes that some points may stand as separable reasons supporting the initial expressed opinion. American debaters would call attention here to the idea of the "alternative justification case." And, as Freeley explains, this is a concept applicable to argument at large, not just to contest debating:

Alternative Justification Case. This variation is an ancient technique useful with broad propositions, in which the affirmative offers a multiplicity of

independent reasons for adopting the resolution. For example, the attorneys of the House Judiciary Committee initially submitted twenty-nine articles of impeachment against President Nixon.²⁰

In general, the concept of the "case" as an elaborate construction of arguments for a point of view does not appear to play a part in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's analysis. Its centrality to American pedagogy in argumentation recommends it to their attention.

In concluding, I want to remark that this review in no way does justice to the richness and subtlety of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's book. Other readers will very likely find other points of particular value. Sharing the authors' interest in a dialectical approach to argumentation, I have tried in this paper to focus on selective features of their work that may stimulate further discussion as we get on with the business of normative theory building.

NOTES

1. Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Cinnaminson, NJ: Foris Publications USA, 1984). Subsequent references will cite page numbers in parentheses.
2. F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and T. Kruijer, The Study of Argumentation (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1984), pp. 1-7.
3. Speech Acts, p. 194, note 10.
4. Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), pp. 8-20.
5. Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method," Speech Monographs, 37 (June 1970), 101-110.
6. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in Autobiography and Other Writings, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 369.
7. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: Notre Dame U P, 1969), pp. 167-171.

8. Thomas M. Conley, "The Beauty of Lists: Copia and Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, #2 (Fall 1985), in press.

9. See for example, Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs, 51 (March 1984), 1-22.

10. The classic interpretation of the dialogue is: Richard Weaver, "The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric," in The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), pp. 3-26.

11. Jurgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, ed. H. Fahrenbach (Pfullingen: Neske, 1973), pp. 211-265.

12. Wayne Brockriede, "Where is Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 11 (Spring 1975), 179-182.

13. Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (January 1968), 1-14.

14. Vernon E. Cronen, "The Functions of the Debater: Orator, Critic, Pedagogue," Central States Speech Journal, 20 (Winter 1969), 261-268.

15. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), p. 253.

16. Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983), p. 34 et passim.

17. Rhetoric, 1355b10.

18. For example, Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: Macmillan, 1979), especially Part IV, Special Fields of Reasoning.

19. Brant R. Burleson, "On the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments: Some Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 15 (Winter 1979), 146-147.

20. Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate: Rational Decision Making, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1976), pp. 190-191.

RESPONSE OF FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN

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[Editor's Note: Professor Van Eemeren's and Professor Grootendorst's remarks, which followed papers by Professors Kline, Jackson, and Wenzel, have been assembled from notes and transcription.]

Reminding ourselves of the old preacher's proverb "After twenty minutes no more souls are saved", Rob and I will try to say a few things in response to the comments on our book made by Susan Kline, Sally Jackson and Joe Wenzel, and we'll try to be brief.

It's difficult to respond "a capella" as it was called earlier. Of course we would have liked to respond in greater detail but first we'll have to think on those things being said today.

First of all, I must apologize for our English. We are taught English at school, but we don't speak it very often, so we lack practice. [To speak offhandedly is--of course--especially difficult.] That's why we scribbled down a few notes in advance and we will be adding some comments on the contributions of Susan Kline, Joseph Wenzel and Sally Jackson while talking. We can talk about a great variety of subjects, but in view of the time available a choice has to be made. We're anxious to discuss other topics at the Amsterdam Conference next year.

Rob Grootendorst and I are most pleased with the attention given to our book and we are pleasantly surprised at the degree of agreement between American scholars and ourselves. In our opinion there appears to be no substantial differences of opinion on the main issues between Kline, Jackson and Wenzel, and ourselves. Therefore, we would like to seize the opportunity to stress some points we consider of particular importance with regard to Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions and we would like to offer you some information about our research scheme and the current state of affairs in our research. As a matter of fact we finished the work on Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions in 1991 and we have done quite a great deal of research as a follow-up, mostly published in Dutch. By no means did we mean the book to be an all-embracing and everlasting complete whole. It was meant to be a starting-point for further research. And so it proved to be. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions provided the basis for several kinds of publications and continued research in the Netherlands.

I shall now tell you briefly what happened after we finished Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, leaving out the particulars. Later on, Rob Grootendorst will tell you something more about our opinion on some topics which are specially relevant in view of the remarks made earlier. Apart from sketching an overall picture of the development in our research, I may be mentioning (if time permits) some often overlooked characteristics of dialectical analysis which we consider of great importance.

In our study, argumentation theory is linked to speech communication, although we dropped the speech communication part in the English translation (because it was very much adjusted to the circumstances in The Netherlands). We try to connect problems from argumentation theory as well as formal dialectics with speech act theory and with the Gricean ideas about implicatures and with discourse analysis.

The intention behind Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions is to make a contribution to the theoretical analysis of argumentation conducted for the purpose of resolving disputes, by formulating a code of conduct for rational discussants. Such analysis is necessary if one is to be able to make sensible suggestions for the improvement of the practice of discussion, one of the objects of the study of speech communication. Answering Professor Joe Wenzel, we can assure him that the model is not meant in this form to be an exemplar model for real discussants. It is, in our opinion, of crucial importance for public life that people be critical of argumentation; so, we would like to create a frame of mind (and of reference) which furthers a critical attitude toward argumentation--political or otherwise, but political in particular. We are trying to develop instruments for letting people know in a systematic way what to look for in a discussion or a speech. We would want our system to be important for someone not primarily interested in rhetoric but in the issue which is at stake. An adequate approach to argumentative language usage that will accord with the starting points for speech communication research preferred by Rob Grootendorst and myself is only possible if the subject of investigation is functionalized, externalized, socialized and dialectified.

Functionalization means that argumentation is treated as a purposive language usage activity. Externalization means that argumentation is linked to the verbal expression of attitudes, viewpoints and opinions. Socialization means that argumentation is regarded as a component of a dialogue with a language user who reacts to the argumentation, and dialectification means that argumentation is placed in the context of a critical discussion in which both pro- and contra-argumentation can be advanced so that a regimented interaction of speech acts takes place.

A language user is rational if during the discussion he performs only speech acts which are compatible with a system of rules acceptable to all discussants which furthers the creation of a dialectic capable of leading to a resolution of the dispute at the center of the discussion. It is obvious that the rational language user postulated in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions and the model which is outlined for a rational discussion represent an ideal attuned to the resolution of disputes with a great deal of abstraction and even deviation from reality. Generally speaking, all research efforts from our part after finishing Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions have been aimed at finding ways to bridge, or at least narrow, the gap between normative theoretical insights and empirical argumentative practice. This has been tried in various ways. Here I can only touch on some salient examples.

To begin with, I return to the required functionalization of the subject of investigation. The starting point here is the standard version of Searle's speech act theory, various points of which are in Speech Acts

in Argumentative Discussions amended and augmented. A distinction is made between communicational and interactional aspects of language use. Communicative aspects relate to the illocutionary effect that the listener understands the performed speech act and interactional aspects relate to the perlocutionary effect that the listener accepts the speech act and acts accordingly. This perlocutionary effect is part of the conventional speech act itself, as distinct from any other possible consequences.

In 1983 we published a book--it's written in Dutch--in which we used these theoretical concepts to develop a normative pragmatic frame of reference for a general introduction to speech communication and argumentative analysis. Anyone familiar with the problems facing somebody who tries to apply the Searlean speech act theory to analyse real life everyday discourse, will understand that quite a few adaptations have to be provided to make it work. I do think we certainly made a lot of progress in this respect, although it is perfectly obvious that much more research is yet required. So far we have done a bit of conversational analysis, related to the work of Jacobs and Jackson, and we have carried out several pencil and paper tests and psycholinguistic experiments concerning the identification of arguments and suppressed premises, profiting from research such as Johnson-Laird's, Van Dijk and Kintsch's, etc.

Our 1983 book is a textbook of use in university classes, so we also had to pay a lot of attention to the didactics and we had to add a number of practical exercises, adequately reflecting the critical rationalistic approach we would like to advocate.

The 1983 book is the first of a series of three books. It provides the necessary equipment for analyzing expository texts and argumentative discussions. Topics discussed are, for example, argumentation structure, argument identification and the explicitization of suppressed premises.

The second book of this series, to be published this year, deals with fallacies. Just as in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions fallacies are being treated as violations of a code of conduct for rational discussants. Rob Grootendorst will tell you more about it.

The third and last book of the series, to be published next year, deals with argumentation schemata. It is comparable in a way with, for instance, Windes and Hastings. In it several types of arguments are distinguished. Each type, in our opinion, is characterized by a certain argumentation schema, implying certain critical questions.

All these books are a result of our scientific research, often carried out in co-operation with other members of our staff, and the results of these surveys have been published or will be published in the Dutch Journal of Speech Communication. Maybe we can publish some of the results in English as well. Finally, I would like to mention another project of ours. That is the study of argumentation in the context of law. We are employed in the Faculty of Arts, but in co-operation with judicial experts we are exploring the characteristics of argumentation and argument evaluation in a well-defined and restricted institutional context in which the settlement of disputes is of central importance and is guided by

written and unwritten rules which in some sense link up with our code of conduct. But don't let me dwell too long on this subject. I'd better say something in response to the members of the panel.

In response to some comments made by Sally Jackson--which are, by the way, very interesting and we hope to get the opportunity to react in a more appropriate way on paper after we have actually read her contribution.

In response to her comments on our way of analyzing non-assertive speech acts (which are part of argumentation) as if they were meant to be assertive, I would like to remark first that our way of analyzing has exactly the same advantages and is in the same way realistic as when one analyses all other kinds of direct speech acts as indirect speech acts instead of taking them at face value. Real people in real discourse (by which I don't want to suggest that we are not real) are also acting appropriately when they act this way. They won't answer the question, "do you know what time it is?" simply by saying "Yes I do" and leave it at that.

Of course we agree with Sally that argumentation, in principle, may consist of all kinds of speech acts and not just of assertives, but in our book we present it as a useful device for analyzing argumentation to proceed as if it consisted of assertives. So in the analysis you'll have to translate other kinds of speech acts (remember the umbrella example) in terms of (and as if they were) assertives. So it's a way of analyzing speech acts which aren't at face value. Assertives (which are actually not assertive) are analyzed as if they were. We still think this is a useful way to proceed in view of the commitments undertaken by people presenting speech acts as argumentative.

A dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse, in our opinion, has to make precisely explicit all these commitments of the language users involved in the dispute. This may be the occasion to assess briefly some of the differences between dialectical analysis and the so called "pure description" of argumentative discourse.

In view of the idealization involved in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions a comparison between dialectal analysis and pure description of argumentative discourse may be illuminating.

For the sake of clarity, I would like to stress from the outset that, in our opinion, for all practical purposes, it is necessary that a complete theory of verbal communication and interaction which purports to be of importance for discussants, be normative as well as descriptive. In order to comment constructively on a particular specimen of language use one has to know what purpose is served by the verbal utterances and to what extent the verbal behavior is adequate to this purpose. Characteristic of the normative conception we advocate is that, as a matter of principle, every argumentation is considered part of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a dispute, regardless of whether the dispute and the discussion are externalized or not.

In our opinion, this dialectical approach needs to be allied (among other allies) to the functionalist speech act approach, in so-called

normative pragmatics. Dialectical analysis of an argumentative discourse clearly differs from so called "pure" description. I could have illustrated this by way of an analysis of the confrontation stage of a specimen of political discourse as I have done in a paper completed earlier this year, but for the sake of brevity I shall not do this and confine myself to mentioning the most striking difference. Bearing in mind that even a "pure" description, if it is to be of any significance, has to be theoretically motivated, one must realize that the difference is not just between theory-loaded and not theory-loaded. It's rather a difference between a descriptive record and a normative reconstruction, both equally based on theoretical considerations. The normative perspective, however, as it manifests itself in the dialectical approach to argumentation, by its very nature, has its own characteristic impact. A comparison between dialectical analysis and pure description may show what this distinctive impact leads to.

The first difference between a normative reconstruction and a descriptive recording is one of selection. Depending on the criterion of relevance supplied by the theoretical framework serving as a starting point, some data are deemed worth noting while other data are left aside as immaterial. This doesn't mean that they aren't there, but they are left aside. This means that all redundancy is removed, so that the discourse can be reported in the dialectical garb or a dialogical tableau. This removal of redundancy is why the transformation which has taken place can also be called deletion.

The second noticeable difference is one of completion. This is partly a question of making arguments explicit (externalizing implicit elements which are required to fill the dialectical gaps) as when by contradicting a standpoint, somebody implicitly expresses his doubt about that standpoint. Completion is also partly a question of adding elements whose presence in a full-fledged dispute has to be assumed, as when somebody defends his position without any attacks being made. Because of this supplementary character, this transformation may also be called addition. In compliance with the dialectical theory adhered to, in certain cases the addition may even involve assigning an argumentative communicative force to a constellation of speech acts which seems to lack such force in its literal utterance.

The third difference between dialectical analysis and pure description to be mentioned here, is one of arrangement. In contrast to the procedure in a descriptive recording, the normative reconstruction of a dispute need not directly reflect the linear course of events in the sequential order of their actual occurrence. In the dialectical analysis, the arrangement is organized in order to bring out the composition of the dispute as well as possible, the reported facts corresponding to dialectically relevant factors. Because of the alterations it may bring about, this transformation may also be called permutation.

The fourth and last difference I will mention is one of notation. It is completely in line with the points just made to provide for an adequate notation of the analysis. It is best that the findings be reported in such a way that the things which are theoretically noteworthy are expressed clearly. Similar cases need to be recognizable as similar. Dialectically

relevant distinctions need to be easily identifiable, and so on. In order for a comparison to be possible, it is necessary to create a notation system and reformulate the various contributions to the dispute in its terms. In consequence of this procedure, diffuse and ambiguous wordings have to be replaced by standard formulations. For this reason, this transformation can also be called substitution. Different ways of expression, which, dialectically speaking, amount to the same thing, are given one and the same substitute, so that identical cases are treated alike. In a purely descriptive notation, differences of expression are maintained, and dialectical similarities may easily escape attention. That's what I wanted to say in a hurry, as she [Sally Jackson] mentioned. And Rob will continue with some other points, I think.

RESPONSE OF ROB GROOTENDORST

University of Amsterdam

Professor Wenzel seems to be rather satisfied with our treatment of unexpressed premises. In fact, he seems to be more satisfied than we are ourselves. Surely, we have no complaints about that. In addition we are grateful for his helpful suggestions on clarifying the role of the context in explicating unexpressed premises with the help of field theory. Besides this we feel there are a number of other problems to be solved and a number of other things to be worked out.

In talking about unexpressed premises with other people and in continued reflecting on the subject, we have learned that our treatment of unexpressed premises in Chapter Six of our book can raise the following questions:

- (1) Does there in fact exist such a thing as an "indeterminate context"?
- (2) Does the "conversational minimum" hold always in every other (specific) context than an indeterminate context?
- (3) Do the guidelines formulated in Chapter Six automatically lead to the explicitization of the unexpressed premise in a given context?
- (4) Is it justified to assume that the speaker always has the intention to use deductively valid arguments?

No doubt there are many other questions which could be asked about the explicitization of unexpressed premises. The questions mentioned, however, are essential to our theoretical approach. I will confine myself therefore to some short remarks concerning these questions, without claiming to give any definitive answers.

(1) Of course every piece of real-life argumentation occurs always in some concrete context which is never indeterminate nor neutral. We use the concept of an indeterminate context as a starting point for the explicitization of unexpressed premises, and not as an indication of an existing entity. For us it is just a heuristic device.

(2) The term "minimum" may suggest that the explicitization of an unexpressed premise by means of the conversational minimum is supposed to stand in all possible contexts. This is not our intention. In our opinion the useful role of the conversational minimum has to do with the fact that it enables us to formulate a plausible initial hypothesis with respect to the deleted premise in question. In our example the initial explicitizations also hold in most specific contexts, but one can imagine a context in which they don't. And, of course, one can think of examples other than the (quasi-)syllogistic type we used, in which the initial hypothesis has to be altered rather drastically in a more specific context.

(3) In view of the foregoing it will be clear that it would be an illusion to think that the proposed guidelines automatically could lead to the unexpressed premise in a specific case. The only thing one can expect is the formulation of a plausible possibility. Much more work is to be done to elaborate and improve the theoretical framework. But even with the help of more detailed and advanced guidelines it would be impossible to claim that one has found the only possible solution.

(4) Although we are aware of the theoretical and practical problems with the assumption that speakers want their arguments to be deductively valid, we still think that in most cases it is justified, in particular in the absence of clear and univocal indications to the contrary. Anyway, it is useful as a heuristic device. It will be clear that I don't think that we have spoken the final words on the subject of unexpressed premises in our book. Apart from the points just mentioned I see the following problems to be solved in the future:

- (1) In what way should one distinguish between the unexpressed elements in argumentative discourse which really serve as parts of the argumentation on the one hand and other tacit background knowledge?
- (2) In what way does the theoretical framework relate to the process language users go through in explicitizing unexpressed premises? In connection with this question one also has to deal with the question whether there is intersubjective agreement among language users when confronted with a specific case of argumentation in which a premise is unstated. Both questions lead to a different kind of research than the normative approach elaborated in our book. What is needed will be some sort of empirical research in which experiments are not performed--and so far to our knowledge they are not--all empirical claims are premature.

As regards Professor Wenzel's comment on the relationship between our code of conduct and the fallacies, we would like to make two short remarks. First, Professor Wenzel casts doubt on the claim that the code of conduct provides the most effective treatment of all fallacies. He points out, for example, that the so-called formal fallacies can be better analyzed by means of logical criteria of formal validity. But it was not our intention to offer an alternative for formal criteria. In fact, these formal criteria are part of what we call the intersubjective reasoning procedure which has to be called upon in the argumentation stage. So no originality is claimed here.

What we consider as one of the main advantages of our model as a tool 179

for identifying and analyzing fallacies is that it offers a possibility to account for the large group of so-called informal fallacies which always give serious trouble in what Hamblin called the "standard treatment." Because in some informal fallacies, as in for example many questions, straw man appeal to force or appeal to pity, there is in fact no question of an argument at all. And in some other cases (like, for example, begging the question, ad hominem, or appeal to authority) there is no question of an invalid argument or, when it seems, nevertheless, to be the case the argument can easily be made valid by adding the appropriate suppressed premise. We claim that these and other notorious problems can be satisfactorily analyzed by broadening the scope from the invalidity of arguments to the discussion as a whole and then finding out what way and to what extent a fallacy may hinder the solution of the dispute, as we have tried to show in our book. I must confess immediately, however, that our discussion of the fallacies in the book still is very sketchy. In another book (on identifying fallacies as already mentioned by Frans) we have elaborated on this, and have tried to give a full treatment of many other fallacies. Unfortunately the book is in Dutch, so you have to take my word for that.

Finally, very short, we agree with Professor Kenzel that the purpose of the code of conduct is not so much to prevent fallacies but rather to provide a tool for detecting them, to pin them down, so to speak, in a systematic way. We don't have the illusion that our model can actually prevent anything at all. Idealized models like ours never can. So we agree completely with Professor Kenzel on this matter and that is a nice conclusion to end with, I think.

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SPECULATIONS ON THE SIR WALTER RALEGH TREASON TRIAL:
SIR EDWARD COKE AS ADVOCATE

L. Raymond Camp
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[Coke] shewed himselfe too clownish and bitter in his carriage to Sir Walter Raleigh at his triall, where he sayes, thou traytor, at every word, and thou lyeest like a traytor.

-John Aubrey, Aubrey's Brief Lives, ca. 1680

The charge was treason and Sir Walter Raleigh¹ was the defendant.² The year was 1603 and the prosecuting attorney for the government was the indomitable Sir Edward Coke, noted throughout the kingdom for his advocacy skills. From his box Coke rose, pointed his finger at Raleigh and bombastically declared the wealthy gentleman-explorer to be a "traitor, monster, viper and spider of Hell."³ Raleigh interrupted to protest that the issue before the court was treason, not name-calling, and the judges agreed by ordering Coke to stay his tongue.

Later in the trial, Coke again directed his epithet at Raleigh. This time, however, Raleigh was ready for his adversary:

Coke: Thou art the most vile and execrable traitor that ever lived!

Raleigh: You speak indiscreetly, barbarously, and uncivilly.

Coke: I want words to express thy viperous treasons!

Raleigh: I think you want words indeed for you have spoken one thing a dozen times.

Coke: Thou art an odious fellow. Thy name is hateful in all the realm of England for thy pride!

Raleigh: It will go near to prove a measuring cast between you and me, Mr. Attorney.⁴

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Because of his vilification of Raleigh, historians have negatively judged Coke's courtroom advocacy conduct. In 1775 James Granger contended that Coke was guilty of "insolence and excessive anger," and in 1849 John Lord Campbell believed that the attorney had brought "permanent disgrace upon himself and upon the English bar" by his "brutal conduct."⁵ In 1919 Sir Harry L. Stephen concluded that Coke's vituperative rhetoric was an "unparalleled example of forensic brutality."⁶ In 1924 the distinguished legal historian, Sir William Searle Holdsworth, blamed the advocate for being "uncritical in his use of evidence to the point of misrepresentation" during the trial. In 1974 Raleigh's biographer, Robert Lacey, severely criticized Coke for his abusive language.⁷

Critics of legal argumentation frequently must assess certain dimensions of an advocate's communication ethics such as the problem of falsified evidence or appeals to intolerance as a short-term means of achieving success. In the Raleigh trial the problem is different because Coke developed his presentations with clarity, appropriate testimonial evidence and the utilization of statute materials. Because the attorney had a reasonable case against Raleigh, he could easily have chosen not to abuse the defendant's personal rights, and it is probable he would have secured a guilty verdict. Instead, he verbally abused Raleigh beyond the expectations of the royalists who witnessed the trial in loyalty to Coke and James I, whom the attorney represented. At the conclusion of the trial, some who supported His Majesty regarded Raleigh as a victim of Coke's unethical advocacy.

Thus, the critical problem in this essay is to analyze Coke's vilification of Raleigh as a violation of rhetorical ethics and to assess the impact of that violation upon the advocate who utilized it. In this case study of the Sir Walter Raleigh treason trial, my conclusion is that Coke's advocacy reputation was irreparably damaged because of his abusiveness and that his unethical behavior of the defendant contributed to the attorney's dismissal as Chief Justice of the Kings Bench by James I.

My interpretation of Coke's dialectical abuse, however, considers the highly charged rhetorical situation in which Coke's discourse can be evaluated as purposed towards arousing favorable public reaction for the monarchy during a period of violent social upheaval which threatened the stability of the government. Thus, Coke's behaviors, while unethical, might appear more appropriate than has often been judged by critics.

An alternate interpretation of Coke's dialectical behavior is needed, though before turning to it we should examine his argumentation record in politics, council and court. The purpose of this description is twofold. First, to acquaint the reader with certain major influences upon Coke, and second, to illustrate that Coke developed his public

career constructively without resorting to vilification to achieve his advocacy success.

As a speaker in court, council and parliament, Coke could be clearly heard, having learned to project his voice in grammar school and at Trinity College while practicing declamation and disputation.⁸ When he spoke with deliberation, his voice was calm; but when he was excited, Coke's vocal inflection rose with emotion. Imposing in his rich robes and gown, Sir Edward was an active speaker, moving around from counsel box to judicial bench, pointing with index finger, raising a fist to emphasize a point, and lowering his eye gaze to stare at defendants he disliked. Because of his appearance and position, neither judges nor defendants could avoid the distinguished leader's imposing presence wherever he spoke.⁹

Coke began his political career in 1593 with election to Parliament from County Norfolk, and he was simultaneously appointed Speaker of the House by Queen Elizabeth I.¹⁰ He overstepped his rhetorical liberties that same year, however, for in the presence of Queen Elizabeth and Parliament, Coke audaciously asserted that parliamentary privileges included the right of free speech. The queen rebuked him for his challenge, for she was unwilling to concede such a prerogative.¹¹ Elizabeth's rebuff of Coke was sufficiently strong that the politician delayed additional public discourse on the free speech issue, but he returned to the controversy thirty-three years later as a member of the parliamentary circle that forced the "Petition of Right" upon King Charles I. For his reward in the struggle, Charles imprisoned Coke in the Tower of London.

Neither Coke's parliamentary career nor his Privy Council deliberations were marked by vitriolic rhetoric.¹² Appointed by James I to the council, Coke took a constructive role in an advisory body that was influential because of the wide latitude of national domestic policies and problems it routinely discussed.¹³ The council also argued foreign policy controversies, such as those involving the cloth merchant trade with the Dutch, which vitally interested Coke.¹⁴ He was an ardent advocate of a strong monetary policy and supported a free trade position in the importation of cloth and cotton from the continent.¹⁵

Critics have acclaimed Coke's judicial career, for as Chief Justice of Common Pleas and Chief Justice of the King's Bench for James I, he was a model of decorum and impartiality. According to John Lord Campbell in his *Lives of the Chief Justices*, Sir Edward was so superior a presiding jurist that "the duties of the [Chief of Justice's] office have never since been performed so satisfactorily."¹⁶ As a judge, Coke was orderly and mild-mannered of speech while on the bench.

Coke was also a member of Star Chamber where he presented a number of cases; available records show no evidence that he was guilty of abusive rhetorical behavior as an advocate.¹⁷ One instructive example regarding Coke's discourse is that regarding the famous gold bullion case of 1618. James I sued 160 Dutch businessmen for illegally transporting seven million pounds sterling of gold from England.¹⁸ Sir Edward argued for the government against the defendants, many of whom resided in the London area.¹⁹ The case was extremely important to James. His adviser, Francis Bacon, had persuaded His Majesty that the evidence of guilt against the Dutch was overwhelming. A favorable judicial decision was therefore expected, and he counseled that the defendants' fines would consequently erase "half the King's debts." Unfortunately, James's hopes were dashed because his barristers had "great difficulties in finding proofs."²⁰ According to the State Papers, "the case [was] postponed for want of legal proof."²¹ Apparently, Coke was unsuccessful as an advocate because he failed to present convincing evidence of the defendants' guilt; however, the court records do not indicate that the attorney used unethical language while presenting his case.²²

Coke's immediate dialectical objective in the Raleigh trial was to secure a guilty verdict, which mandated a death sentence. Simply because of his successful advocacy record, Coke was expected to win. From 1601 to 1605 the advocate was the government's prosecuting attorney in three Oyer and Terminer trials, i.e., the 2nd Earl of Essex, Sir Walter Raleigh and Guy Fawkes. He successfully obtained a guilty verdict in all of these cases, although it is the Raleigh trial which has been recognized by critics as the most controversial.

A brief explanation of early seventeenth century treason trials would be helpful before considering Coke's unorthodox argumentation. In the Stuart period of jurisprudence, anyone indicted for treason was presumed guilty. Because the crime of treason was so infamous, witnesses and evidence of the accused's guilt were required by the court before the defendant's indictment and trial. In these circumstances, the defendant was obligated to prove his innocence, although to secure the death penalty the crown was only required to supply incriminating evidence against the accused.²³

Theoretically, then, Coke had won his case before he appeared in court, for the indictment had been served and the necessary documents and incriminating testimony had already been assembled by the prosecutor's staff. Coke had only to present his case and leave, allowing the twelve-man jury to confirm the verdict and the ten judges to determine Raleigh's fate. Coke did not choose that strategy. Instead, he argued his case as if its importance far exceeded any other state trial and as if a decision against Raleigh was absolutely necessary to the continuance of the monarchy. Raleigh was

depicted as a devious and evil plotter, capable of directing a conspiracy to overthrow the crown, as the following excerpt from a conversation between the accused and Coke reveals:

Raleigh: I do not hear yet, that you have spoken one word against me; here is no Treason of mine done. If my Lord Cobham [an alleged conspirator] be a traitor, what is that to me?

Coke: All that he did was by thy instigation, thou Viper; for I thou thee, thou traitor.

Raleigh: It becometh not a man of quality and virtue to call me so. But I take comfort it is all you can do.

Coke: Have I angered you?

Raleigh: I am in no case to be angry.²⁴

Coke arranged his testimonial evidence chronologically, and in so doing he presented a cumulative historical progression of legal opinion and precedent which supported the attorney's conclusions. To develop such a strategy, the advocate extracted appropriate testimonial evidence from a wide range of sources, such as papal bulls, chancery court proceedings, the diplomatic pouch, ecclesiastical proclamations and royal decrees.²⁵ In addition, the Privy Councilor seized the advantage of his office to obtain material stored in generally inaccessible locations, such as the Tower of London, where the royal records were kept.

In oral presentation Coke read aloud an extensive number of statute citations which were lengthy, explicit to the last detail of bibliographical reference, and literally applied to the issue or point being examined.²⁶ He frequently translated these materials from English into Latin while speaking because of his thorough knowledge of the language which also allowed him instantly to synthesize or condense citations recorded in Latin.²⁷

Like other Elizabethan-minded lawyers of the day, Coke argued from past precedents and arranged his case evidence in a past-to-present structure to emphasize his belief that the "older the source, the purer the law."²⁸ During his pleading career, Coke did not develop any other organizational pattern for testimonial evidence presentation. Reportedly, he saw little instructional benefit for the development of dispositional technique because he urged his legal assistants to avoid such study. The attorney would not endorse any particular system of message arrangement because "every man's method and observation . . . is the best . . . for himself."²⁹

Coke's presentations in the Raleigh trial contained a cumulative mass of testimonial and documentary support, which he vividly styled to create a damning impression of the defendant's guilt. The prosecutor supplied a clear chronological narrative of secret meetings involving the accused. The details of the meetings included names, dates and disclosures about the exchange of money to consummate the plot. Raleigh's allegedly traitorous conversations and deeds were exposed as evidence of his desire to promote the monarchy's fall. Coke meticulously exposed the depth of the alleged conspiracies in such colorful detail that the royalists at the trial could not have been disappointed by the evidence presentation.

The prosecutor's task of securing a guilty verdict was difficult, however, because he was reprimanded for his verbal abuse of the defendant by the court and because Raleigh himself refused to submit to Coke's denunciations. Nevertheless, Coke developed his argumentation combatively through the frequent use of *ignoratio elenchi* and *argumentum ad hominem* attacks, specifically during rejoinders.³⁰ For example, Coke so vehemently denounced Raleigh for his allegedly pro-war views against the Spanish that the defendant interrupted the advocate with an appeal to the court for verbal propriety. If his epithets were intended to goad Raleigh into an emotionally damaging admission of guilt that could be used against him, then the attorney failed, for the former Captain of the Royal Guard was undaunted by his antagonist's vitriolic language. When the presiding judge agreed with Raleigh and rebuked Coke with an admonishment to prove his case, the trial proceeded. In this instance, Coke's strategy backfired on him.

During the trial, Coke directed his *ad hominem* attacks at the defendant. The courtroom is an adversary situation where cooperativeness is not necessarily a criterion for advocacy, but Coke's charges heightened the distance between rational rhetorical choices and the investigatory purposes of the trial. Sir Edward's accusatory rhetoric was ethically divisive because he insisted, in effect, that his epithets were accurate and did not require appropriate testimonial support to prove the defendant's guilt. Thus, instead of promoting inquiry in his rejoinders, Coke demanded that the court and public accept his vilifications of the defendant as true because of the attorney's office, conferred position of trust with the government, and his reputation as an advocate.

The most facile explanation of Coke's unethical behavior is that he substituted the use of threat for evidence against the defendant, and consequently he had a weak case against Raleigh. It is true that Coke did not compare Raleigh's actions to those of other traitors in English history. For example, in 1601 the Earl of Essex was judged guilty of treason, and Coke was a government prosecutor. The attorney did not draw analogies from that trial, however, because the circumstances

were dissimilar. Essex had led an armed group of sympathizers into downtown London intent upon taking control of the government. Raleigh, along with Cobham and others, never formulated a military plan as part of their scheme.

They did, however, negatively discuss James's weak and vacillating foreign and domestic policies. James then favored peace with Spain and Raleigh did not. During the trial, Raleigh admitted he had "spent 4,000 pounds of my own [money] against the Spanish faction, for the good of my own country."³¹ In cross-examination, Raleigh also disclosed that he "had made a discourse against the Peace, and would have printed it" but he was unable to do so.³² These damaging remarks quickly prompted the prosecution to assert that "Raleigh confesseth the matter."³³ Coke exploited Raleigh's remarks by emphasizing the secret nature of the defendant's actions, and he thoroughly explained the history and applicability of Raleigh's case to treason law statutes from the reign of Richard II to Edward III. Given Coke's literal interpretations of the statutes, Raleigh's testimony, and the disclosures about the secret meetings of the conspirators, the prosecutor had a substantive case without resorting to threat or ridicule.

A second interpretation which partially explains Coke's unusual language is that Raleigh required denunciation because of his insidious and evil deeds. As the crown's representative, Coke depicted Raleigh as the leader of an organized group of dissident subjects determined to precipitate an accommodation with Spain that would place Lady Arabella Stuart on the throne and remove James I. Because of the plot's nefariousness, Coke contended that Raleigh's treason was the most heinous offense of all against the kingdom.

If the doctrine of notoriety fully explains Coke's vilification of Raleigh, critics should find it applicable to other state trials for which Coke was prosecutor. In the Essex trial, for example, Coke vividly described the Earl's criminal acts, and he thoroughly described the organization of conspirators established to seize the crown. He then presented the facts of rebellion to the court and allowed the judges and jury to confirm the traitor's guilt. In 1605, only two years after the Raleigh trial, Coke was the chief prosecutor against Guy Fawkes who had planned to blow up Parliament building with all of its members and royalty present for opening day ceremonies. In Fawkes's case the plot was especially stark, for he and some of his followers were arrested along with their explosives in a cellar directly beneath the House of Lords only hours before the convocation was to begin. Again, however, Coke chose the same strategy as in the Essex trial, for he presented the evidence of treason in a direct manner, although he characterized Fawkes as a Catholic intent upon destroying Protestantism and thus, in reality, as serving the Spanish government. Fawkes's deeds were vilified by Coke, who portrayed them as a part of the

conspiracy to remove James I from the throne. The defendant was at best pitiable, according to Coke, and at worst, he was a traitor who deserved the executioner's ax.

In all three trials there were certain essential similarities. All were described as plots directed at the monarch's removal, and all involved leaders with an organized opposition. Yet, it is Coke's use of vilification and threat against Raleigh which has harmed the advocate's reputation the most. Coke's motivation for such a strategy is contained neither in the trial transcript nor in his private letters in the British Library. It is unlikely that he ever committed these ideas to paper or, if he did, that scholars would ever find them since Coke's private letters and records were seized by Charles I as the advocate lay dying at his home in 1634. Curiously, there are no references to the Raleigh trial in either of Coke's monumental legal studies, the Institutes or the Reports.

One explanation for the attorney's behavior may be provided by focusing on the external rhetorical situation which prevailed at the time of the trial and specifically on James's difficulty in developing a public opinion climate favorable to his rule. In general, the public's awareness of Raleigh's trial was a major problem for the government. Normally, state trials are held in London, but because of the plague, it had to be moved to Winchester. In the first week of September, only shortly before the trial began, 3,335 people died of the black death in London. By November, when Raleigh stood in the dock, the weekly death rate had dropped to a new low for the year of only 2,000. Funerals were seldom held; mass burials were the usual rule.³⁴ The ferocity of the plague was also matched by repeated outbreaks of syphilis and small pox, which was spread by soldiers and sailors returning from overseas. The devastating social effects of these problems were often compounded by the resulting breakdown of city services and the disintegration of the food delivery system. Food suppliers were understandably hesitant to enter the city, and as a result, starvation was often rampant. Life was precarious and survival was the principal test of life.

James forbade public feasting and large gatherings of any kind. The court crowd and palace hangers-on left London for the comparative safety of Hampton Court, Oxford, Woodstock and Winchester. When His Majesty's advisers realized that the city was suffering and that many of his supporters had left, he was urged to show himself in public in a display of strength to the people. Perhaps because he realized the seriousness of the situation and was afraid to see the results, James pointedly refused. Reportedly, he told his counselors: "God's wounds! I will pull down my breeches and they shall also see my arse!"³⁵

James's disinterest in resolving popular problems was acute; his interest in maintaining his crown was paramount. Now, with his supporters scattered and the plague raging throughout the country, a siege mentality may well have prevailed at the palace. In addition, James never had the charisma of Elizabeth, probably because he was first James VI of Scotland before becoming James I of England. Critic Douglas Bush has explained that His Majesty was "always a stranger in England, and he was quite incapable of inspiring patriotic devotion to himself and the crown."³⁶

To make matters worse, controversies and problems seemed to multiply unabated for the monarch. Only two years before his arrival, the Earl of Essex had been executed for treason. Although that challenge had passed, now the Puritans were troublesome with their separatist tendencies. The Catholics also demanded leniency to practice their faith, and some of them reportedly preferred Lady Arabella Stuart on the throne rather than James. According to the Oyer and Terminer indictment, so did Raleigh, Lord Cobham and his brother, George Brooke, for the three had allegedly agreed that "There will never be a good world in England until the king and his cubs are taken away."³⁷ Raleigh was also accused of having written a treatise which disputed James's right to the throne. Unsurprisingly, then, Raleigh's indictment was based on an alleged "conference" to "advance Arabella Stuart to the crown and royal throne."³⁸ To add to Raleigh's woes, Lady Arabella attended the trial in Winchester along with her friends. Thus, James's detractors were boldly present for the proceedings alongside those who backed James I.

Neither Coke nor Raleigh disappointed their followers during the trial. Coke was vituperative and denigrative of Raleigh, who in turn, refused to lose his temper. In cross-examination Raleigh steadfastly maintained his innocence and replied to Coke in a calm and cool manner. Raleigh was always on the defense, Coke on the offense. The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized that Raleigh was a disloyal leader of an organized opposition, intent on seizing the monarchy. He had, asserted Coke, a large number of sympathizers who would overthrow James, wage war with Spain and promote chaos. Given such a view, the attorney had no other choice but to portray Raleigh as a clear and present danger to the public peace. In this rhetorical situation, conciliatory language might not have aroused the public's attention to the threat represented by the popular ex-military leader. Instead, sharp hyperbole was required to dramatize the defendant's treasonous activities. Coke's vivid characterizations were effective, for Raleigh complained to his adversary: "You try me by the Spanish Inquisition!"³⁹ Raleigh's protest acknowledged the severity of the prosecutor's language.

Coke's viewpoint was different, for he argued that Raleigh was guilty of plotting against James himself, and the loyalist

court faction necessarily had to recognize that fact. In addition, Coke's clear and forceful description of the plot (and Raleigh's admissions) provided James's adherents with valuable evidence which they could use to arouse dormant supporters of the crown since they desired to maintain his rule. In this trial Coke's vilification provided reinforcement evidence for those subjects who agreed with James's claim to the throne. The prosecutor's courtroom argumentation thus provided a positive rallying point for those loyalists who endorsed James's rule and had no tolerance for a traitor like Raleigh.

As chief prosecutor, Coke was the government's advocate to obtain a verdict against Raleigh and his confederates. He was successful, for the jury voted Raleigh guilty, and the judges sentenced him to death. At the conclusion of the trial when the sentence was pronounced, Raleigh spoke to the court with "learning, courage and judgment," and he told the judges that his name had been "half-hanged" by Coke but that "in the opinion of all men he had been acquitted."⁴⁰ Raleigh's judgment was astute. When two royal messengers arrived at the palace with the court decision, James asked them their opinions of the trial. The first praised Raleigh by saying that "never [had] any man spoke[n] so well in times past, nor would do so in the world to come."⁴¹ The second messenger had a more explicit opinion. Upon first seeing Raleigh, the courier said, "he was so led with the common hatred, that he would have gone a hundred miles to have seen [Raleigh] hanged, but before his departure from the trial, he would have gone a thousand to have saved his life."⁴²

Regardless of these opinions, James's counselors could still advise His Majesty that justice had been carried out for Coke had legally and persuasively secured the necessary verdict. The judges had decreed the death sentence, and it was left to James to ponder the executions. In a wise political move, James jailed Raleigh in the Tower of London. In 1618, when the crown was far more secure, Raleigh was beheaded. In reality, James's throne was safe immediately after the trial for Lady Arabella publicly renounced her claims, and she was rarely heard from the rest of her life. Raleigh's sympathizers also withdrew, some of whom eventually left for the New World as colonists.

By 1604 those who supported James I could claim a number of victories for the plague had ceased, all of the conspirators save Raleigh were dead, and competing claims for the throne were absent. For Coke, whose advocacy was successful, history has recorded other judgments. One prominent Knight of James's court who had witnessed the trial advised that Coke was "full of impertinent phrases," that he had "behaved himself violently and bitterly" and with "great provocation to [Raleigh]."⁴³ Another prominently known loyalist and trial witness could write only positive reports

of Raleigh's behavior; of Coke's argumentation, not a word was recorded. It is equally revealing that Lord Cecil, Chief Judge of the trial, never mentioned Coke or his courtroom behavior in his private letters about the case. Instead, he noted that the plot had been stopped in its "infancy" and that Raleigh had done "as much as the wit of man could devise to clear himself."⁴⁴ Thirteen years after the trial and on the night before Coke was removed from his office of Lord Chief Justice by James I, the eminent Francis Bacon delivered history's verdict of Coke's victory over Raleigh. "In your pleadings," said Bacon to Coke, "you were wont to insult over misery, and to inveigh bitterly . . . which bred you many enemies, whose poison yet swelleth, and the effects now appear."⁴⁵

Coke's dismissal--and consequent disgrace--occurred several years after he had flagrantly and distinctly violated certain treason trial rules which negatively affected the rhetorical situation. From 1601 to 1605 Coke served as advocate in three Oyer and Terminer trials, and in all of them he was guilty of using epithet, although he was the most abusive towards Raleigh of all the defendants. As a prosecutor Coke was expected to develop the crown's case with appropriate evidence and statute materials, which he did. In addition, vilification of the defendant's deeds was not unusual for the government's attorney to use since these treason trials occurred during a period of severe social upheaval when the monarchy's continuance was in jeopardy.

In contrast with these expectations, Coke arrogated to himself (perhaps with James's willingness?) the authority to employ his own discourse rules demonstrably beyond those of fair play towards the defendant. The defendant necessarily had the right to expect that treason was the issue of adjudication, not libelous slander of his name. However, Coke's forensic obligation to plead the issue was itself an issue because the defendant as well as the judges interrupted the attorney midcourse in his presentations to tell him so. Oyer and Terminer judges had the right to ask questions and seek clarifying information, but they were not presumed to be a referee for verbal fistfights between prosecutor and defendant or, most of all, to admonish the government's prosecuting attorney for his unethical behavior. Finally, although Coke was certainly required to develop lines of questioning to support his arguments, he was not expected to pursue an inquisitorial style of cross-examination. Raleigh's complaints about Coke's examination style were sustained by the court judges. Such an action was unusual enough, but doubly so since the judges were employed and paid by James I, whose rule Raleigh was allegedly guilty of threatening.

Coke's recompense for his unethical argumentation was slow in coming, perhaps too slow for those royalists whose evaluation of the attorney was decidedly negative even though

the crown's interests may have been served by violating Raleigh's rights of expression. The Chief Justice's dismissal from the bench, however, also severed his alignment with the royalist faction, and the advocate quickly renewed his ties with the parliamentarians whom he had left in 1593. Elizabeth had then rebuked Coke for asserting that Parliament members had the right of free speech. Years later, Coke returned to the House of Commons to re-assert his beliefs, and predictably, he became a spokesman for those who shared his views. James, whose relationship with Parliament was tenuous at best, eventually became so angered by Coke's advocacy that he had him thrown into the Tower of London.

It is ironic that Coke and Raleigh were both sent to the Tower by the same king. It is doubly ironic that after his notorious violations of rhetorical ethics in the courtroom Coke eventually became one of Parliament's foremost advocates of the right to free speech.

NOTES

¹Throughout this paper I have used the spelling of Sir Walter's last name which he himself most often used, Raleigh. As Robert Lacey has noted in his biography of the gentleman explorer, Raleigh consistently signed his name without the i throughout his adult life. (Robert Lacey, Sir Walter Raleigh (New York: Atheneum, 1974, xi.) I wish to acknowledge the helpful assistance of the Rev. George Tibbetts, formerly of Magdalen College, Cambridge, and Dr. Barry White, Master of Regent's Park College, Oxford, for their willingness to discuss certain points of this paper with me and Mr. Allan G. Purvis, Superintendent of the Manuscripts Room at the Cambridge University Library, for his helpfulness in locating certain valuable resource materials.

²The government's indictment of Raleigh charged him with high treason by conspiring "to deprive the King of his government; to alter religion; to bring in the Roman superstition; and to procure foreign enemies to invade the kingdom." It was alleged that Raleigh's conspiratorial partner was the Spanish Ambassador to England and that Raleigh was to receive 600,000 crowns for his role in the plot to bring down the monarch. See Sir Harry L. Stephen, "The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, 2 (1919), 172-73.

³The Rev. James Granger, A Biographical History of England (London: T. Davies, 1775), I, 383-89. Raleigh's trial began November 17, 1603.

⁴Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in David Jardine, Criminal Trials (London: Charles Knight, 1832), I, 444. The Jardine transcript was assembled from Harleian MSS 39, British Library, The State Trials report and a private copy by Sir Thomas Overbury, a witness to the trial.

⁵Granger, pp. 388-89. John Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices (London: John Murray, 1849), I, 268.

⁶Stephen, p. 185.

⁷Lacey, pp. 308-09.

⁸For a discussion of Coke's oral style see Cuthbert William Johnson, The Life of Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justices of England in the Reign of James I (London: Henry Colburn Publishers, 1837), I, 28.

⁹According to various sources, Coke was striking in appearance, with a goatee and manicured mustache, dark piercing eyes, and a swarthy complexion. His wardrobe was purchased from the latest London fashions, and the novice attorney dined in an exquisite manner with various political and judicial leaders of the day. During court terms, he kept himself physically fit by walking to and from work; when court was in recess, he sometimes rode horseback in the countryside hunt around Castleacre Priory.

¹⁰Although Coke has been criticized as an opportunist, that assertion should not obscure his moral code of behavior. Coke was a dedicated churchman, refused to accept bribes for extrajudicial influence at court, and earned rather than purchased the high government posts which were granted him by royal authority. Campbell, I, 240-47.

¹¹Campbell, I, 248-49. The Lord Keeper of Parliament, who spoke for the Queen, delivered the rebuke orally to the assembled Parliamentarians: "Liberty of speech is granted you, but you must know what privilege you have; not to speak every one what he listeth, or what cometh in his brain to utter, but your privilege is aye or no. Wherefore, Mr. Speaker, her Majesty's pleasure is, that if you perceive any idle heads which will meddle with reforming the Church and transforming the Commonwealth, and to exhibit any bills to such purpose, you receive them not until they be viewed and considered by those who it is fitter should consider of such things and can better judge of them."

¹²See David Harris Willson, The Privy Councillors in the House of Commons, 1604-1629 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 36-37 and pp. 89-90.

¹³For example, the Council investigated the sensitive topic of manorial dues to the Crown in 1620. However, unlike the Star Chamber, the Privy Council had a much wider deliberative focus since it could provide advice to the King on any topic of its choice. Thomas Rymer, Foedera ed. Robert Sanderson (London: W. Churchill, 1717), p. 224.

¹⁴The Privy Council cases involved Dutch traders. The cases concerned trading policy with the East Indies and the transportation of iron and metal from the realm by some Dutch businessmen. Rymer, pp. 170, 273.

¹⁵Rymer, p. 170. In 1619, for example, Coke argued for the implementation of a treaty with the Dutch in order to develop active commerce with the East Indies which were owned by the Netherlands.

¹⁶Campbell, I, 270.

¹⁷The court was judicial in character and contained appointees with either secular and canon law training or both. Mary Anne Everette Green, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of James I, 1611-1618 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1858), No. 4, 2 December 1618; No. 64, and No. 65, 23 January 1619; No. 76, 5 June 1619. Also, see Robert Stephens, Letters and Remains of the Lord Chancellor Bacon (London: W. Bowyer, 1734), p. 46.

¹⁸CSPD, No. 51, 29 June 1614.

¹⁹CSPD, No. 112, 26 June 1619.

²⁰CSPD, No. 87, 26 June 1619. The case was not settled until the fall of 1620.

²¹CSPD, No. 112, 26 June 1619.

²²My interpretation is based upon my reading of the State Papers; from searches of court records with the use of Thomas G. Barnes, List and Index to the Proceedings for the Reign of James I (1603-1624) in the Public Record Office, London (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1975); and from Allen French, Charles I and the Puritan Upheaval (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1955), and Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliament (London: Oxford Union Press, 1971).

It is appropriate to mention that both French and Barnes have concluded that the early Court of Star Chamber, i.e., when Coke was a member, was a generally constructive legal institution rather than one which was usually guilty of trespass upon personal rights. Eighty percent of the chamber cases involved property litigation; twenty percent involved such crimes as forgery, perjury, counterfeit coinage, and acts of violence. Thomas G. Barnes, "Star Chamber Litigants and Their Counsel, 1596-1641," in Legal Records and the Historian, ed. J. H. Baker (London: Royal Historical Society, 1972), pp. 9, 13.

²³As Robert Lacey has commented, the treason trial was "intended not to assess guilt but to proclaim it." Lacey, p. 307. The established court procedures allowed the judges to question the accused at the beginning of the trial to develop their case against the defendant. In addition, defendants were allowed neither legal assistance nor advance knowledge of the charges against them. Stephen, pp. 176-81.

²⁴Criminal Trials, I, 216.

²⁵William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., 1924), V, 457. According to Charles Gray, Coke "often reminded" his students "of the importance of going to the sources, of not trusting too much in books." Apparently, Coke's courtroom practice was the same as his instructional

advice in the classroom. Charles Gray, "Reason, Authority, and imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke," in Culture and Politics from Puritanism to the Enlightenment, ed. Perez Zagorin (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1980), p. 47, n. 3.

²⁶L. Raymond Camp, "Sir Edward Coke, Pembroke College and Roger Williams: A Critical Study of Argumentation Influence," Communication, VI, (1977), 92-93.

²⁷Holdsworth, p. 467. And, see Gray, p. 48, n. 6. Gray emphasizes that Coke had a "relish for the classics and the Bible," and a "supply of nonlegal allusions he could call on when something in his legal life suggested an association." Gray asserts that Coke had a "familiarity with general historians," although he "considered them dangerous to the uninitiated as sources for legal history."

²⁸Johnson, p. 28.

²⁹Holdsworth, p. 457.

³⁰See William Trufant Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 180-87, for an explanation of these logical fallacies.

³¹A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the year 1782. Compiled by Thomas B. Howell (London: T. C. Hansard, 1816), II, 200.

³²Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 18.

³³Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 18.

³⁴F. P. Wilson, The Plague in Shakespeare's London (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1927), p. 93, and Lawrence Stone, The Crimes of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 29-30. Jardine adds: "The plague [raged] with great violence in London and other parts of England during the autumn of 1603." (I, 400).

³⁵Kirsty McLeod, Drums and Trumpets, The House of Stuart (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977), p. 16.

³⁶Douglas Bush, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 5.

³⁷Lacey, p. 307.

³⁸A Complete Collection of State Trials, and Proceedings for State Treason, and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors, ed. Thomas B. Howell (London: T. Wright, 1776), I, 211-12.

³⁹Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 15.

⁴⁰Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 47.

⁴¹Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 47.

⁴²Collection of State Trials, (1816), II, 47-48.

⁴³Criminal Trials, I, 452.

⁴⁴Criminal Trials, I, 450.

⁴⁵Criminal Trials, I, 444.

IN SEARCH OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES

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Now that public political debates have become the American norm, scarcely a campaign passes without a reference to the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 and a wish that we could somehow recapture the art of argumentation presumably displayed there.¹ In the public mind, the Lincoln-Douglas debates are regarded as the apex of political debate and the subsequent story is one of decline. Interestingly, in the same way that modern commentators seek to "get right" with Lincoln and Douglas, those debaters also took models from an earlier past--from the founding fathers and the recently-deceased Henry Clay, who posthumously was viewed as the nineteenth century's link to the founders of the Revolutionary age.²

Although the dominant issue in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was the question of slavery in the territories, both debaters approached that issue indirectly. They discussed conspiracy theories, substantive versus procedural notions of morality, nuances of Constitutional interpretation, and the intentions of the founding fathers. This essay focuses on the last of those categories. It examines the two major historical arguments of the debates, and attempts to explain how this form transformed an impossible situation into a hermeneutic problem. The appeal of the historical argument rests partly in the character of the 1850's, but also in the dynamics of the argument form and the possibilities it affords the debaters.

I.

To trace the historical argument one must begin with Lincoln's speech of June 16 at the Republican state convention. It was in this speech that he quoted the New Testament proclamation, "A house divided against itself cannot stand," and predicted, "Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new--North as well as South."³ We tend today to find in these statements both a self-evident truth and a note of prophecy, as if Lincoln were foretelling the need for and results of the Civil War. But these remarks which time has vindicated meant something quite different to Illinoisians in 1858. They were about as valuable politically as Walter Mondale's recent pledge to raise taxes if elected, and Lincoln spent much of the campaign backpedaling from what his audiences took to be the implications of the house divided. Where Lincoln insisted that he had been only predicting a

course of events which would unfold in God's good time, he was widely taken to be expressing an intention to hasten the end of slavery. Such an object would encompass not only his stated opposition to extending slavery into new territories, but the corollary that--despite repeated denials--he really must favor moves toward abolition in the states where slavery already existed.

This view of Lincoln's intentions was damaging, particularly in the crucial battleground in the election. The contest would be decided in the central one-third of the state, populated heavily by old Whigs who were moderately antislavery but strongly anti-abolition. It drove former Lincoln supporters such as Judge T. Lyle Dickey into the Douglas camp. And it gave Douglas the opportunity for an extremely clever response. He could portray Lincoln not only as a closet abolitionist, but as an opponent of the founding fathers. When Lincoln said that the nation could not survive half slave and half free, Douglas asked, "why not?" It had been made that way by the fathers and kept that way by their descendants.

Douglas put the matter squarely at Ottawa, in the opening speech of the first debate. After quoting from the House Divided speech, he attributed to Lincoln the view that "this government cannot endure permanently in the same condition in which it was made by its framers--divided into free and slave states."⁴ This rephrasing seemed to have Lincoln directly impeaching the fathers. He then pointedly asked, "Why can it not exist divided into free and slave states? Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and the great men of that day, made this government divided into free states and slave states, and left each state perfectly free to do as it pleased on the subject of slavery. Why can it not exist on the same principles on which our fathers made it?" The wisdom of the fathers' judgment was made clear upon considering the diversity of "climate, production, and interest" in the nation, so that "the laws and regulations which would suit the granite hills of New Hampshire would be unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina."⁵ Then the Senator offered a final proof that his challenger was at odds with the judgment of the fathers. Had they really believed the "house divided" doctrine, Douglas asserted, they would have made the country all slave at the outset, since at the time of the adoption of the Constitution twelve of the thirteen states were slaveholding while only one was free. "Of course," he insisted, "the twelve slaveholding states would have overruled the one free state, and slavery would have been fastened by a constitutional provision on every inch of the American Republic, instead of being left as our fathers wisely left it, to each state to decide for itself."⁶ He was even more emphatic later in the same speech, arguing, "Our fathers intended that our institutions should differ. They knew that the North and South having different climates, productions and interests, required different institutions." Then the clincher, with an obvious note of sarcasm: "This doctrine of Mr. Lincoln's of uniformity among the institutions of the different states is a new doctrine, never dreamed of by Washington, Madison, or the framers of this government. Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party set themselves up as wiser than these men who made this government, . . ."⁷

Douglas took this same basic position in most of the debates. At Freeport he depicted Lincoln as "lay[ing] down the doctrine that this Union cannot endure divided as our Fathers made it, . . ." At Jonesboro he made a similar statement and added that "the inevitable and irresistible result of Mr. Lincoln's argument was "inviting a warfare between the North and the South, to be carried on with ruthless vengeance, until the one section or the other shall be driven to the wall and become the victim of the rapacity of the other."¹⁰ At Quincy the alleged consequence was starvation of Negroes in the South since their numbers would increase but the supply of land on which they might work would not; extinction by starvation would be Lincoln's method of abolition.¹¹ In the final debate, at Alton, the incumbent reminded the listeners that he had "rep[re]sented /the house-divided doctrine/ as a slander upon the immortal framers of our Constitution."¹² In contrast, Douglas assured his audiences, his own position was consistent with that of "Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jay, Hamilton, Franklin, and the other sages and patriots of that day," and would permit continued prosperity since "we will live up to and execute the government upon those principles upon which our fathers established it."¹³

These various statements by Douglas served to resituate Lincoln's position and redefine the issue. He effectively shifted the burden of proof, focusing attention on the house-divided doctrine and forcing Lincoln on the defensive, rather than having to defend his own record in the Senate. And he placed Lincoln symbolically in opposition to the founders and to the symbol of Union. It must be understood that the veneration of the founding fathers in the 1850's was real and carried probative force. If the "Young America" movement of the 1840's had exalted youthful energy, Americans by the fifties engaged in an almost sentimental attachment to the past. It was a sentimental age in which, as Strozier puts it, "idealization of the nation's founders" could be "an attempt to establish paternal substitutes."¹⁴ Moreover, history was still viewed, as Edmund Wilson puts it, as a power "which somehow takes possession of men and works out its intentions through them" because "the scientific study of the past had not yet disentangled itself from the doctrine of divine Providence."¹⁵ In such a context, political issues could be presented "as a mere reprise of issues already settled at an earlier day. On this view," Welter has remarked, "the object of any political campaign was to revive public virtue by invoking the precedent of the founding fathers."¹⁶ The closest modern parallels might be the wave of emotion following the deaths of Franklin Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy when identifying a policy proposal with the late President often served as a compelling argument for the proposal. Under the circumstances, Lincoln's progressive "clarifications" of the house-divided doctrine could not quiet his critics; nor could he dismiss the references to the founders as irrelevant or a red herring. Although such arguments were logically available to Lincoln (and might be welcomed by modern critics who chide the debaters for failing to "stick to the issues"), they were precluded by the rhetorical context of 1858. Lincoln's only available recourse is to defend his policy as consistent with the view of the founders. Douglas, in short, has shrewdly redefined the issue to his advantage.

He did even more than that. By suggesting that the only alternative to a nation half slave and half free was sectional warfare, Douglas placed his challenger in opposition to the symbol of Union, which--like the founders--exerted a strong pull on the loyalties of Americans during the Middle Period.¹⁷ This charge also put Lincoln on the defensive and required that he disassociate himself from the more radical implications of the house-divided doctrine. But as he did that, Douglas would be ready to charge him with tailoring his views to the wishes of his audience, saying different things in different parts of the state, and ultimately being a man devoid of principle. All told, Douglas's introduction of the historical argument was a powerful strategic move.

Lincoln, however, was not without argumentative resources. Chief among them was that the attitudes of the founders on the future course of slavery were equivocal. As Forgie put it, the record "is so complex and ambiguous that only someone with the desire to make a political case, combined with a high talent for explaining away the starkest contradictions, could torture the record into a single--let alone coherent--position for or against slavery."¹⁸ Nevertheless, the veneration accorded to the founders made divining their intentions an important enterprise, and "one of the standing debates of the ante-bellum generation was whether the Constitution had been meant by them to be a pro- or an antislavery document."¹⁹ In other words, there were topoi to which each side could appeal.

Lincoln's topoi appear to have been drawn heavily from Salmon P. Chase's anti-Douglas polemic of 1854, the "Appeal of the Independent Democrats."²⁰ Like Chase, Lincoln portrayed the founders as antislavery. Two basic arguments formed his position. First, he denied that the fathers made the nation half slave and half free; rather, they found it in that condition and, not knowing what else to do, left it that way.²¹ But, as demonstrated by the Northwest Ordinance, the abolition of the slave trade, and the absence of the word "slavery" in the Constitution, they took steps to contain slavery rather than permit its introduction into new territory. Lincoln had developed this theme as early as 1854; it figured prominently in his "Peoria speech" of that year.²² The difficulty with this position is that it was overstated. As Allan Nevins points out, "The fathers had not forbidden the expansion of slavery into areas to which it was manifestly suited; the Southwest Territory had been opened to it while the Northwest was closed. Their expectations regarding its termination had been more equivocal than their hopes."²³

Lincoln's other argumentative position referred to the phrase, "all men are created equal," in the Declaration of Independence. Surely that document was meant to encompass Negroes, he maintained; indeed, until the introduction of the Nebraska Bill in 1854 no one could be found who had asserted the contrary. "I think I may defy Judge Douglas," Lincoln boasted at Galesburg, "to show that he ever said so, that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation."²⁴ From this standpoint it was easy for Lincoln to conclude, as he did at Jonesboro, that Douglas "has himself been chiefly instrumental in changing the policy of the fathers" by retreating from the ideals embodied in the Declaration.²⁵ Although

the Declaration of Independence had no legal status, Lincoln insisted that it was more fundamental than the Constitution as an expression of American values. In particular, he regarded the ideal of equal opportunity as the most basic foundation of Union. In a speech in August of 1858, he went so far as to identify the Declaration with the doctrine of Genesis that man is created in the Divine image.²⁶ Both of Lincoln's arguments tried to reach beyond the fact that the nation was part slave and part free at its inception, and to discuss the intent or motive of the founders through the use of arguments from sign.

Douglas attempted to discredit these claims with a sign argument of his own. Many of the founders, including Jefferson, were themselves slave owners. How could they have written the statement, "all men are created equal," intending it to apply to slaves, and continue to own slaves themselves? Either Lincoln was incorrect or the founders stood exposed of the basest hypocrisy. The latter possibility was easily dismissed in an age which so venerated the founders, so their ownership of slaves became sign evidence that Lincoln's view of their intentions was in error. At Galesburg Douglas was most specific. Noting that all the signers of the Declaration represented slaveholding constituencies, and reminding his audience that "no one of them emancipated his slaves, much less put them on an equality with himself, after he signed the Declaration," the incumbent asked whether "every man who signed the Declaration of Independence declared the negro his equal, and then was hypocrite enough to continue to hold him, as a slave, in violation of what he believed to be the divine law?"²⁷

How then did Douglas account for the "created equal" phrase in the Declaration? Clearly, the signers "had no reference to the negro whatever when they declared all men to be created equal. They desired to express by that phrase, white men, men of European birth and European descent, and had no reference either to the negro, the savage Indians, the Feejee, the Malay, or any other inferior and degraded race. . . ."²⁸ The purpose of the phrase, Douglas insisted, was to establish the equality of men born in America and in Britain. Although colonial dependence on the mother country was described in the metaphor of "slavery," still there is no evidence that the founders collectively passed judgment on the nation's peculiar institution. In this respect Douglas's historical claim was closer to the mark than was Lincoln's. The challenger, not the incumbent, was again placed in the role of deviant from the viewpoint of the founders.

Douglas sought to destroy Lincoln's other claim by arguing that it was not any legislation which had kept slavery out of the Northwest Territory, it was factors of economics and climate. As proof, he pointed out that, notwithstanding the Northwest Ordinance, slavery persisted for many years in the Northwest Territory, including Illinois. It was finally abandoned when it was clearly unprofitable. The Ordinance had been ineffective in ridding the Northwest Territory of slavery; it was the market which did it. So, if neither the Declaration of Independence nor the actions of the early Congress supported Lincoln's view of the will of the founders, then Douglas was back to the position which he had taken

at the outset: he was the true heir of the founding fathers whereas Lincoln, the closet abolitionist, was challenging the wisdom of the past and threatening disunion.

To avert such a judgment, Lincoln would need to elaborate and defend his own theory of history. He did so by the device which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have labeled dissociation--breaking a previously unitary concept into parts for the purpose of rejecting one while accepting the other.³⁰ First, he took the term "equality" and examined its various aspects. At Ottawa and again at Quincy, Lincoln explained that his reading of the Declaration of Independence did not entail social equality for the Negro. Remarking that there was a physical difference between the races and that he agreed with Douglas that his own race should have the superior position, he then added "that notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." He then proceeded to make the dissociation explicit: "I agree with Judge Douglas [that the negro] is not my equal in many respects--certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."³¹ Social equality was one thing, but equality in basic rights was another.

This dissociation enabled Lincoln to reduce the apparent radicalism of his position. The equality which Lincoln defended was, after all, a flimsy reed. He was saying only that the founders opposed slavery, without implying that either they or he would favor any other change to improve the status of the Negro. Still, this first dissociation did not enable Lincoln to answer Douglas's charge that he must be accusing the founders of gross hypocrisy since so many of them were slaveowners. For this purpose Lincoln drew a second distinction; between the Declaration as fact and as norm, between empirical description and ideal principle. This distinction had been made a year earlier in his Springfield speech of June 26, 1857, but it did not surface in the debates until the last encounter, at Alton, where Lincoln read from his earlier speech. The founders, he noted, "did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. . . . They meant simply to declare the right so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit."³² He reached this conclusion, he explained in the earlier Springfield speech, because the phrase, "all men are created equal," could be "of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration not for that, but for future use."³³

What Lincoln was suggesting was that the Declaration ought to be viewed not as a fact but as a proposition--in precisely the sense that the Gettysburg Address later described the nation as dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. It was a statement to be proved, and the proof would come in the life of the country. Therefore, as Basler put it, "American democracy, as an active, living thing, meant

to Lincoln the verification or proving of the proposition to which its very existence was in the beginning dedicated.³⁴ The important thing was that, to prove the proposition, history should be a path of steady progress toward the realization of the objective; Americans needed especially to be on guard against retrogressive moves. As Lincoln quoted himself at Alton, the framers of the Declaration "meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence..."³⁵

This formulation made it much easier for Lincoln to characterize Douglas as the transgressor against the founding fathers. If the founders had endorsed not so much an end state as a tendency, then one could reconcile their belief with their own ownership of slaves. They regarded slavery as an evil which must end sometime, even though they recognized that the world was not yet ready for abolition. So long as people believed that slavery was an evil which must someday end, its actual presence in American society was of less concern to Lincoln. That was what he meant in asserting in almost every debate that the founders had placed slavery where the public mind would rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.³⁶ What Lincoln championed was therefore a return to the vision of the founding fathers. This argumentative stance was consistent with a prominent nineteenth-century theme, that reform was conservative, "an effort to restore an America which had somehow been lost or subverted."³⁷ In this case it was clear that the subverter was Douglas himself, first because he needlessly encouraged agitation over the slavery question by introducing the Nebraska Bill and then because he proclaimed that he "don't care" whether slavery was voted up or down. His stance was required by the logic of popular sovereignty but was at odds with the moral judgment which Lincoln imputed to the fathers. So Douglas was the deviant, and the way to restore the spirit of the Revolution was by supporting his Republican challenger.

With this response, Lincoln revealed a significant difference in the ways he and Douglas argued from history. Douglas took the past on its own terms, finding in it factual confirmation for his claims about the origin of the present situation. For him, history was a source of documentary evidence. Lincoln, in contrast, viewed history as dynamic, and he projected into the future from the motives he attributed to the past. In this way, history has a narrative continuity; it is a source of stories rather than documents. The appeal of Lincoln's historical argument is largely in the story it tells of the declension from the vision of the fathers, a calamity for which Douglas is identified as the chief villain. Consistent with the theory of Alasdair MacIntyre, the moral argument on which Lincoln ultimately triumphs is both embedded in and bolstered by the historical narrative, and the narrative form enhances the credibility of Lincoln's position.

For all that, however, Lincoln's claim still begged the question. It began with an argument from residues--since the "created equal" phrase was not put in the Declaration for immediate needs (itself a disputed point), it must have been intended as a maxim for the future. This

assumption then "proved" what the founders wished to be slavery's ultimate fate, and that in turn "proved" that Douglas was the apostate. Douglas's position likewise depended upon an assumption, that the Constitution rather than the Declaration was the origin of American government and that the framers of the Constitution, in the name of the popular sovereignty principle, deliberately made the new nation part slave and part free.

The Lincoln-Douglas debates exposed the potency of the historical argument, convincing each "that his position would be unassailable if he could trace it back to the Founding Fathers."³⁹ But each probably was unsatisfied with his defense of his historical claims since, as noted above, they rested at key points on assumption or inference rather than evidence. During 1859, each sought to remedy that defect by studying early American history. Douglas "withdrew from the Library of Congress such standard works as *The Federalist*, *Jonathan Elliot's Debates*, and the first six volumes of *George Bancroft's History of the United States*, . . ."⁴⁰ The result of his inquiry was an article published in *Harper's* that fall, which extensively reviewed the acts and statements of the fathers in an attempt therein to ground the principle of popular sovereignty.⁴¹ For Lincoln, "long hours were spent poring over materials in the Illinois State Library and in digesting *Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution*,"⁴² a research program whose fruits were evident in February, 1860, when Lincoln spoke at Cooper Union and examined seriatim the views of the founders about the peculiar institution, in order to support the claim advanced in the debates that they had wished to place it in the course of ultimate extinction.

II.

Although the primary historical argument concerned the views of the founding fathers, there was an important secondary argument which both helps to explain the election results and suggests an important caution for political debaters about employing this argument form. Just as both Lincoln and Douglas sought to "get right" with the founding fathers, so each saw himself as the true descendant of Henry Clay. The sage of Ashland had been in the grave for only six years, but already his place in the pantheon of heroes was secure, particularly as the growing national discord over slavery brought the values of his compromising spirit into sharp relief. But there was a more specific political reason for Lincoln and Douglas to try to claim the legacy of Clay: he was the patron saint of the Old Line Whigs of central Illinois on whose votes the outcome of the election would be determined. They were characterized both by a "traditional hostility to Locofoco Democracy" and "a deep aversion for the excesses of abolitionism."⁴³

In seeking the Clay mantle, Lincoln emphasized his own Whig heritage and proclaimed Clay his "beau ideal" of a statesman--although, as Douglas noted, Lincoln had deserted Clay for Taylor in 1848 when it was clear that the Great Compromiser had no chance to win. More to the point, Lincoln insisted that Clay's views on slavery were similar to his own. He favored not abolition but gradual emancipation, and he particularly opposed the introduction of slavery into new territory. Clay had said,

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Douglas, however, was not without arguments to claim the mantle of Clay. Mainly, he suggested that Clay embodied the spirit of compromise which Lincoln's radicalism disrupted. His complaint against Lincoln on this score was based on the premise that Lincoln was part of an effort to disband the Whig party and move it toward abolitionism. At Freeport, for instance, Douglas charged, "Lincoln went to work to dissolve the Old Line Whig party. Clay was dead, and although the sod was not yet green on his grave, this man undertook to bring into disrepute those great compromise measures of 1850, with which Clay and Webster were identified."⁴⁷ The argument was developed at greater length at Charleston, in the heart of the Whig country, and was succinctly summarized, albeit exaggerated, in the final debate at Alton. As Douglas there recalled history, in 1850, "we Democrats, with Cass at our head, welcomed Henry Clay, whom the whole nation regarded as having been preserved by God for the times. He became our leader in that great fight, and we rallied around him the same as the Whigs rallied around Old Hickory in 1832, to put down nullification."⁴⁸ The incumbent here was engaging in hyperbole, since the Democrats had not rallied around Clay's version of the compromise measures but his own separation of the omnibus bill, and since the Whig party had not even been formed in 1832. But it was an effective appeal to Clay's memory, all the same.

Not surprisingly, Lincoln was upset at Douglas's pretensions to the legacy of Clay. In a speech shortly before the Charleston debate, he said that "as to Douglas being of any kin to him, everybody knows they never had a single feeling in unison, and that Douglas was one of his most virulent abusers while living."⁴⁹ (One thinks immediately of Edward Kennedy's 1980 protest that Ronald Reagan had no right to quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt.) Some historians have supported the Clay-Douglas analogy, though; for example, Cain explains that when Clay voiced opposition to the spread of slavery, he "was speaking of slavery in new societies and governments, not of the western territories, where the Great Compromise was content to depend on Mexican law or the dictates of the Supreme court."⁵⁰ Lincoln's protest may have been indirect evidence of the effectiveness of the Little Grant's argument to the old Whigs. What is more, it was aided by a powerful inartistic proof.

This episode suggests an important limitation on the historical argument. For maximum effectiveness, it must be grounded in a past sufficiently out of reach for there to be no authoritative eyewitnesses. The appeal to the founding fathers met this requirement ideally. The positive symbolic value of the fathers was nearly universal, but the "text" was sufficiently ambiguous to generate a range of rival interpretations. Their effectiveness depended upon the abilities of competing arguers to weave together a realistic narrative. The availability of eyewitness testimony or designated heirs weakens this ambiguity, and turns the historical argument from a hermeneutic pursuit into an inartistic proof. When that happens, the historical argument is skewed in the direction of the eyewitness. It is no longer a balanced approach available to both sides of a dispute over essentially contested ideas. The Lincoln-Douglas debates illustrate both the artistic and the inartistic variations of the historical argument, and they reveal also the relative effectiveness of documents and stories as forms of support. In this way they contribute to our understanding of the more general phenomenon which Reid has labeled "the rhetoric of history."⁵²

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NOTES

¹For recent examples of this phenomenon, see Mitchell Locin and Daniel Egler, "Mondale Calls Again for Debates," Chicago Tribune, August 25, 1984, p. 2; Henry Fairlie, "The Decline of Oratory," New Republic, May 28, 1984, pp. 15-19.

²Fehrenbacher argues that, because of Clay's attitude toward slavery, he was Lincoln's tie to the founders. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, "Only His Stepchildren: Lincoln and the Negro," A Nation Divided: Problems and Issues of the Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. George M. Fredrickson (Minneapolis: Burgess, 1975), p. 47. Study of the discourse of the 1858 campaign suggests that Clay fulfilled this role more generally.

³The text of the "house divided" speech may be found in Paul M. Angle, ed., Created Equal? The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 1-9. For an excellent analysis of the speech, see Michael C. Leff, "Rhetorical Timing in Lincoln's 'House Divided' Speech, The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1983).

⁴Dickey's letter endorsing Douglas was published in the Chicago Daily Times, August 7, 1858, p. 1. It was a serious disappointment for Lincoln.

⁵Angle, pp. 109-110.

⁶Angle, p. 110.

⁷Angle, p. 110.

⁸Angle, p. 113.

⁹Angle, p. 167.

¹⁰Angle, p. 199.

¹¹Angle, p. 343.

¹²Angle, p. 364.

¹³Angle, p. 267.

¹⁴Charles B. Strozier, Lincoln's Quest for Union: Public and Private Meanings (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 55.

¹⁵Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 102.

¹⁶Rush Welter, The Mind of America, 1820-1860 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975), p. 26.

¹⁷This theme is developed at length in Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776-1861 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964).

¹⁸George B. Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided: A Psychological Interpretation of Lincoln and His Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), p. 126.

¹⁹Martin Duberman, "The Northern Response to Slavery," The Anti-slavery Vanguard: New Essays on the Abolitionists, ed. Martin Duberman (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 399.

²⁰On the comparison between Lincoln and Chase, see, for example, Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 112.

²¹Angle, p. 353.

²²See Roy P. Basler, ed., Marion Dolores Pratt and Lloyd A. Dunlap, asst. eds., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), II, pp. 249, 274.

²³Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln: Douglas, Buchanan, and Party Chaos, 1857-1859 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), I, p. 392.

²⁴Angle, p. 298.

²⁵Angle, p. 206.

²⁶For a discussion of this comparison, see William J. Wolf, The Almost Chosen People: A Study of the Religion of Abraham Lincoln (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 96.

²⁷Angle, p. 294. See also p. 201.

²⁸Angle, p. 201. In some formulations of this argument, Douglas had limited the Declaration's applicability to Englishmen, enabling Lincoln to bid for the immigrant vote by pointing out that Douglas read out of the American covenant not just blacks but also whites of European descent. An early example of this rejoinder is found in Lincoln's June 26, 1857 Springfield speech. See Basler et al., II, p. 407.

²⁹In his speech at Springfield in July, 1858, Douglas discussed the existence of slavery in the early days of Illinois. See Angle, pp. 59-60.

³⁰See Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 411-459.

³¹Angle, pp. 117, 327.

³²Angle, p. 379.

³³Basler, et al., II, p. 406.

³⁴Roy P. Basler, "Abraham Lincoln: An Immortal Sign," The Enduring Lincoln, ed. Norman A. Graebner (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 14.

³⁵Angle, p. 379.

³⁶See Angle, pp. 119, 205, 353, 384.

³⁷Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p. 86.

³⁸See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

³⁹Robert W. Johannsen, "Stephen A. Douglas, 'Harper's Magazine,' and Popular Sovereignty," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 45 (March, 1959), 613.

⁴⁰Johannsen, p. 613.

⁴¹Stephen A. Douglas, "The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local Authority: Popular Sovereignty in the Territories," Harper's, 19 (September, 1859), 519-537.

⁴²Wolf, p. 111.

⁴³Don E. Fehrenbacher, "The Origins and Purpose of Lincoln's 'House Divided' Speech," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 46 (March, 1960), 619.

⁴⁴Quoted in Clement Eaton, Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), p. 122.

⁴⁵Angle, p. 382.

⁴⁶Angle, p. 311. Cf. Basler et al., II, p. 131.

⁴⁷Angle, p. 161.

⁴⁸Angle, pp. 371-372.

⁴⁹Basler, et al., III, p. 244. The speech was delivered at Monmouth, Illinois.

⁵⁰Marvin R. Cain, "Lincoln's Views on Slavery and the Negro: A Suggestion," Historian, 26 (August, 1964), 508. See also Gerald M. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas: Defender of the Union (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), p. 72.

⁵¹Christopher N. Breiseth, "Lincoln, Douglas, and Springfield in the 1858 Campaign," The Public and the Private Lincoln: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Cullom Davis, Charles B. Strozier, Rebecca Monroe Veach, and Geoffrey C. Ward (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1979).

⁵²Ronald F. Reid, The American Revolution and the Rhetoric of History (Falls Church, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1978), pp. 12-14. Reid refers to the question, "how do popular perceptions of history function rhetorically in persuasive discourses?"

POLITICAL JUDGMENT AND RHETORICAL ARGUMENT: EDMUND BURKE'S PARADIGM

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Cox and Willard's introductory essay in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research represents the first systematic attempt to understand the history of argumentation research within our field.¹ The essay serves its function well, delineating the major trends and placing them in a general relationship with one another. Nevertheless, owing to the breadth of the subject and the brevity of the essay, the authors can do no more than survey the literature, and often subtle points of interconnection remain unexamined. In particular, Cox and Willard present evidence of an unrecognized continuity between the older tradition and the more recent scholarly efforts within the field. Amidst the manifold changes that occur, a fundamental problem seems to persist, and that is an awkwardness in matching theory with concrete practices. The scholarly focus alternatively centers on discrete and isolated events or on theory per se, and the footing in the middle ground between the two remains unsteady and hazardous. The result is a consistent failure to engage the objects of our study in a theoretically interesting fashion. Moreover, we believe that once this problem is appreciated, the history of the field itself suggests a corrective, and thus our purpose is to combine certain recent theoretical insights with the interests of the older tradition in an effort to discover a middle ground for the study of argument.

Cox and Willard demonstrate that our scholarship proceeds from a stable but moribund pattern of "applied formalism" to a more vigorous but rather unstable effort to conceive new foundations for the discipline. Within the original pattern, the subjects of study did not seem problematic. Pedagogically the field centered on forensic contests, and critically it dealt with the documents from the history of public address. But neither side of this project yielded much theoretical insight into the character of argument. Directed as it was toward a self-regulated contest, forensic pedagogy stressed rules-of-thumb rather than matters of deeper intellectual interest. And the historical-critical scholarship proved unable to grasp the argumentative action within the texts it surveyed. Cox and Willard clearly indicate the major impediment to this goal: the dominant theory of applied formalism involved a gross form of reductionism. In their words, the approach sought "to 'uncover' the essential (logical) structure of an argument -- to reduce the manifest rhetorical appearance to its underlying (real) form. Such reductionism often was accomplished through the use of a formal language such as symbolic logic or various descriptions of inductive and deductive modes of reasoning."² In other words, the substantive and circumstantial aspects

of any particular argument were divorced from force of argument qua argument. The latter was entirely a matter of abstract rules of inference.

This stance involved a paradox. The existing rationale for rhetorical scholarship depended upon a dichotomy between rhetoric and poetic that stressed the radical particularity of rhetorical discourse. On this view, poetic addressed abiding and universal concerns, while rhetoric was bound to the circumstances of a unique situation. Yet, when scholars attended to the argumentation in rhetorical texts, their method alienated them entirely from the case at hand. The logical containers of applied formalism condensed the data into abstractions that strained against the presumed requirements of the critical enterprise. Consequently, the scholarship stuttered between the solidity of particular argumentative performances and the disembodied canons used to evaluate the strength of arguments. Without access to a space between these poles, there existed no conceptual mechanism for negotiating a rhetorical rather than purely logical basis for argument theory.

This inconsistency in the research program proved especially debilitating because it went unrecognized. It was not just that the scholarship was theoretically barren; more important, without a precise location of the problem, there seemed no resource for effecting an internal corrective. That is, the theoretical problem appeared as purely theoretical rather than as the subtle and more profound difficulty of attuning the theory and the subject to one another. In fact, the prolonged alienation of theory from the particular objects of study discouraged formulation of the issue in these terms. Moreover, contemporary scholars exploring new avenues of inquiry still fail to appreciate the basic dilemma of the earlier scholarship and thus, in our judgment, do not recognize the way its effects contaminate their thinking. There exists a tendency toward over-correction that allows the errors of the past to work their mischief even in the work of those who strive to eliminate them. This irony displays itself most clearly in the way that the notions of "paradigm" and "paradigm change" appear in our literature.

Since the mid-1960s, attacks against applied formalism have gained increasing force, and it is now evident that this approach has become passé. Current trends in the field, however, sprawl in many different directions, and they seem unified only in the negative, in their common rejection of older ways of thinking. Cox and Willard characterize this situation as a pre-disciplinary phase marked by "paradigmatic disputes."³ Their assessment is consistent with the commonly accepted view of current conditions, but we believe that the reference to the term "paradigm" and the implied association with Kuhn's theory of disciplinary change are somewhat misleading. Our reservations arise both from the basic meaning of the term itself and from our understanding of Kuhn's use of it.

The Greek word paradeigma literally means a showing beside or along side of. Its primary meaning of "pattern", "model", or "example" follows

from the way in which we learn about or explain one thing by reference to another thing belonging to the same class. In this sense, Greek ethics through the sophistic period is "paradigmatic" rather than abstractly "theoretical," since morally proper behavior was learned not by knowledge of the abstract qualities defining a virtue, but by emulating the character of a specific person who exemplified that virtue.⁴ One could learn to be courageous, for example, by referring to the character of Achilles as it is revealed through the *Iliad's* narration of his actions.

The classical rhetorical tradition recognizes the movement of paradigmatic thought as a special kind of inference. When Aristotle divides rhetorical proof into syllogism and induction, he designates the example (paradeigma) as the rhetorical form of inductive argument. And he distinguishes between example and dialectical induction in that the latter draws a generalization from a number of particulars, whereas the former deals with the relation of particular to particular. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle refers specifically to circumstances where the better known of two cases belonging to the same class is used as the basis for inference about the less well known case. But the emphasis on the relation of particular to particular still holds even when paradigm is used in the more expansive sense of "model" or "pattern" (as in the case of ethical paradigms). Although the paradigm may serve to organize an entire domain of activity, it still does not lose its status as a particular instance falling within that domain.

Kuhn's conception of paradigm is broadly similar to, although somewhat more complex than, the Greek conception. For him, the paradigm is still an exemplary case, a particular study or experiment that serves as a model for inquiry within a science. In modern scientific disciplines, not one but many paradigm cases direct the course of thought, and these cases are linked by family resemblance into an interlocking relationship. Abstract theory consists in the effort to reduce these various paradigms to their essential features. But such "theories" are second order phenomena; the more concrete paradigms actually account for the coherence of a discipline, and the configuration of a discipline changes primarily in response to the choice of exemplary models.⁵ Unlike abstract precepts, paradigms are intimately connected with the data contained in a discipline, and hence, for Kuhn, no categorical distinction exists between observed facts and theory, since paradigms adjust both simultaneously. Theory then does not arise from the accumulation of brute data, but the data accumulated within a science does play a decisive role in the creation and revision of dominant paradigms. The motive for paradigm change, in fact, occurs precisely when scholars detect a tension between observed data and paradigmatic expectations. This circumstance yields the perception of an anomaly -- an awareness that the theoretical principles implicit in the paradigmatic matrix cannot account for some aspects of the subject under investigation. In turn, this awareness prompts "a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected."⁶ In extreme instances, such adjustment turns into revolutionary change as the anomalies of the old

system become paradigms for a new one. In all instances, however, paradigm change remains closely linked to efforts to explain the phenomena studied in the discipline.

Following this account of "paradigm" and "paradigm change", we would expect that the critique of applied formalism, at least in some considerable measure, would stress the failure to account for much of what happens in public argument. And indeed, it is simple enough to show that this "paradigm" cannot account for salient features of its classic objects of study; to reduce the argumentation of such oratorical masters as Cicero, Burke, Webster, or Lincoln solely to a priori logical forms involves omission or distortion of such that is crucial. Yet, the critique of applied formalism makes little reference to problems of this order. Complaints about the tension between the theory and the phenomena found in the texts are usually general. For the most part, the critique centers on the inadequacy of applied formalism as a general theory considered from an abstract perspective.

Cox and Willard provide subtle but important evidence to support the claim we have just made. In analyzing the causes leading to the demise of applied formalism, they stress its character as a perspective "grounded in a priori assumptions about Being and Knowledge."⁷ In other words, the animus for change refers to the superstructure; the key issues are ontological and epistemological, and they ground themselves in general philosophic conceptions rather than anomalies located within in the subject studied. Thus, it is not surprising to discover that the original momentum for change arises from sources external to the discipline, from "scholars who were outside the field of argumentation proper."⁸

These scholars, notably Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman, set out to reform the epistemological foundations of logic and inquiry. Consistent with that mission, they struck at basic assumptions informing the then dominant formalist approach. In the process, much in the spirit of Kuhn's work, they shifted the weight of philosophic interest from atactic, a priori categories to grounded argumentative practice.

Within our corner of the academic world, the appeal of this approach was obvious and almost irresistible. Unfortunately, however, the success of philosophers in developing grounded logics knocked the ground out from underneath the field of argumentation. In the first place, the subject matter of argumentation experienced an immediate and seemingly unlimited expansion. Rhetorical argumentation was no longer just for political use; it extended into every form of symbolic activity, including the deliberations of scientific communities. Argumentation, in a sense, had become a theoretical engine, and its scope seemed co-terminous with the study of inquiry. Secondly, the shift in the direction of the philosophical wind immediately pushed down the conceptual props upon which our tradition rested. If formalism was inadequate even in "theoretical" domains, then its applications were obviously flawed beyond redemption. The old paradigm tumbled down at a single blow; it did not remain visible

long enough to offer a point of resistance around which anomalous data could be collected and against which emerging paradigms could be tested. Instead, there was a stampede toward grounded theory *per se* in any and all of its manifold forms. The field experienced not paradigmatic dispute but a war of competing meta-theories imported from external sources, and each of these meta-theories brought in its train a new conception of the subject of study. We engaged in speculation about grounded theory without clear reference to a domain of action where observable practice constrained the range of theory. Grounded theory, in short, had itself become an abstract concept.

Viewed in this way, the history of the field reveals the appearance of symmetrically opposed core problems. The older scholarship, burdened with inflexible and inappropriate theoretical presumptions, could not engage its subject matter in a way that yielded theoretically interesting paradigms. The recent scholarship, freed of this burden, appears to have lost the content of the discipline in rejecting the containers of applied formalism, and thus it is unable to locate a sufficiently stable subject matter for the formation of paradigm cases. To state the problem in these terms, of course, is to suggest a remedy. The strength of each approach complements the weakness of the other. The old core subject of the discipline -- political rhetoric -- still awaits concerted and systematic analysis from a grounded perspective that allows interplay between the theory of argument and the practices that characterize the actual conduct of argument.

At this point, we need to clarify the scope of our proposal. We are not issuing a manifesto for the field, but only suggesting a line of inquiry that we ourselves intend to pursue. We do not believe that political rhetoric exhausts the field of argumentation. Nor are we committed to any claim about its priority over argumentation appearing in other domains. What we can safely claim is that, wherever else it may occur, practical argument manifests itself in a particularly clear and obvious way in deliberation about issues of public concern. Moreover, while this subject is vast and complex, we already have a canon of literature that marks reasonable and manageable limits for its study. And finally, recent thought in political theory suggests that deliberative rhetoric offers an arena in which the interconnection between theory and practice becomes a central and defining feature of the subject studied.

We refer to the concept of political judgment first suggested by Hannah Arendt⁹ and later elaborated by Ronald Beiner.¹⁰ We are duly aware of the danger of simply forcing this notion from political theory into the field of argumentation. Consequently, we intend only to outline its main features and then attempt to establish a paradigm of its operation by analyzing a classic text from the rhetorical tradition.

The concept of political judgment emerges from the effort to explain rationality in politics in terms that avoid strict laws of entailment. On this view, the essence of politics consists in deliberative discourse, and

deliberation, since it looks forward to action in diverse and changing circumstances, cannot suffer reduction to static principles. Instead the deliberative process engages judgment, "a form of mental activity that is not bound to rules, is not subject to explicit specification of its mode of operation (unlike methodical rationality), and comes into play beyond the confines of rule-governed intelligence. At the same time, judgment is not without rule or reason, but must strive for general validity."¹¹ This "general validity" establishes a standard for a modified rationality, and the act of judging embodies such rationality for at least two reasons. First, judgment demands public justification. It requires support from good reasons which, if they do not compel necessary assent, must at least gain intersubjective approval. Second, although the act of judgment always refers to some particular course of action, the faculty of good judgment requires the ability to align a case at hand with principles of action. These principles, of course, do not exist in a tidy hierarchical order, and their application to a specific situation is never formulaic. But rather they are a repertoire of semi-coherent, partially realized patterns gleaned from experience and capable of achieving completion as they touch the substance of an actual situation. Political judgment, then, is the meeting ground between the flux of political circumstance and the reflexive principles that guide our sense of continuity in the public world. It is the catalyst that gives order to the reality of our particular experiences as it gives the substance of the particular to our conceptions of order.

The special, synthetic character of judgment perhaps emerges most clearly by reference to its ambiguous placement in relation to space and time. It is equally possible to locate judgment within or in opposition to the local and temporal circumstances which frame the act of judging. On the one hand, following Gadamer's interpretation of *phronesis*, we can stress the immediate presence of this frame and conceive judgment as a product of the requirements of practical action. Judgment then appears to emerge in and through a particular set of circumstances; it is teleological, adaptive, and heteronomous (i.e. adjusted to the opinions of others who participate in the community of judging subjects). On the other hand, following Kant, we can stress the need for the judging subject to stand outside the flow of time and events in order to establish critical distance from the object of judgment. Judgment then becomes a product of an "enlarged mentality;" it is contemplative and autonomous, completely liberated from the pressure of teleological concerns and the vagaries of competing opinions.¹²

Beiner demonstrates that an adequate theory of political judgment must balance these two conceptions. Sound political deliberation must acknowledge the difference between the two even as it incorporates both. That is, political judgment demands not only the distance necessary to assume "responsibility for mediating between universal and particular," but also responsiveness to "the contingent circumstances that impinge upon and therefore condition the mediation."¹³ Political judgment, therefore, stands in both a direct and mediated relationship to the particular. It involves principles that rise above but do not subsume the particular, and

thus it moves in and beyond the time and place of deliberation without resting at either level. In short, political judgment yields principles that simultaneously arise from, adhere to, and extend beyond the contingencies of a particular situation.

Beiner insists, logically enough, that this whole process can appear only in discursive form. Consequently, a slight extension of his terminology yields the conclusion that the manifestation of political judgment is political rhetoric. Or, to approach the point from a different angle, we can say that the subject of political argumentation is the discursive manifestation of judgment. This formulation, we believe, involves more than just tinkering with the language of a political scientist. Beiner himself recognizes the close connection between his theory of judgment and Aristotle's conception of the function of rhetoric.¹⁴ And perhaps more important is the unrecognized but striking correlation between Beiner's two dimensions of judgment -- that which is located directly in and that which stands outside the time and space of action -- and the traditional *topoi* of deliberative argument, the expedient and the honorable.

In any event, to pursue this connection between judgment and argument is almost automatically to reconfigure the status of argumentation theory. Since judgment does not submit to but rather embodies theory, some of our traditional assumptions about constructing and testing theory lose their force. Such concerns as the statistical representativeness of the data surveyed and the logical coherence of theoretical precepts become, at best, second order issues. Instead, theory is forced to the ground, since theorists themselves must exercise the same kind of situated judgment that argumentative performance exhibits. Just as the arguer must generate principles within and through the fabric of the particular case, so must the student of argument comprehend the principles that inform and are informed by the discursive action within particular texts. Theorists become critics who center their attention on concrete events, but who assess each text simultaneously at different levels. They judge both the substantive and artistic features of argument while recognizing that these features exist only in their situated relationship to one another, and they must deal with forms of argumentative action as they appear in concrete arguments. This is not to say, however, that the principles operating in each text are entirely unique. It is possible to generate a body of principles, to place them in some sort of relationship to one another, and to transfer principles from paradigm cases to other cases. In fact, without such conceptual mechanisms, the theorist could hardly locate the space needed to judge arguments from a perspective beyond the particular. Nevertheless, these theoretical principles do not form a self-contained, disembodied unity. They constantly change in nature, number, and relationship as their manifestations in argument are recognized. And they resist simple, direct application to any particular case, since they actually function in argument only as they are instantiated and adapted to the particular. Theoretical precepts, in sum, play a role in argumentation scholarship, but as an ancilla to rather than as the subject of study. Theory ends not in comprehension of abstract

coherence, but in the development of the faculty of judging how particular arguments do their work.

To this point, we have only sketched the rudiments of a theory of argumentation based on the concept of political judgment. An adequate understanding and assessment of this approach requires a much more detailed and careful account of its nature. Nevertheless, mindful of our own warnings against ungrounded speculation about grounded theory, we are reluctant to pursue this matter in general terms. Further elaboration seems pointless unless we refer to concrete practice, to argumentative texts that demand explanation of principles in the context of their use.

Fortunately, the literature of political rhetoric offers a notable case where the problem of judgment emerges as a central issue both in principle and in practical application. Edmund Burke's "Speech to the Electors of Bristol," an acknowledged but largely neglected masterpiece of oratory, directly engages the issues we have just set out in abstract terms. In that speech, Burke defines the proper stance in time and space for legislative judgment, then attempts to show that his specific actions conform with this definition, and throughout he subtly blends his actions and his concepts so that they mutually reinforce one another. The whole of this effort establishes a paradigm of judgment designed to vindicate the orator and win the consent of the audience that is to judge his merit as their representative. In the following pages, we present a critical reading of that speech with a view toward understanding its concrete rhetorical texture even as we explore its significance as a paradigm case.

Delivered at a moment of domestic and international crisis, the Bristol address commands the added interest of historical drama. Wars abroad, religious strife at home, and wildly shifting commercial arrangements had loosened the Whig's somewhat complacent hold on political affairs. Burke, too, felt the shifting winds: Bristol electors, grown impatient with his absenteeism, now pressured Burke to attend with greater fidelity to their interests. And, in fact, Burke seldom visited the city, preferring instead to maintain London quarters. Wittingly or not, Burke's conduct suggested a certain aristocratic tincture, a coloring not easily blended with the industrial complexion of the city. While its representative pursued the lofty ideals of Rockingham Whiggery, Bristol found its hold on protected markets increasingly tenuous. The war with America, uncertain and often bitter relations with Ireland, and fervent anti-Catholic sentiment preoccupied Burke's attention. And when, in the eyes of the Bristol electors, not enough was directed toward them, a general election promised relief. Burke's speech thus comes at a poignant moment, a turning point in his career located amidst crises of state, and more than that, it comes just as British political history wavers between the reform pressure of the bourgeoisie and the traditional prerogatives of the aristocracy. Nowhere is this tension more palpable than in the argument about the role of the representative. At least since the Wilkes controversy of 1769, the idea that a representative might rightfully exercise his judgment independent of the expressed wishes of the community

had become a matter of heated controversy. The representative, many argued, ought to receive and act upon the instructions of his constituency; to do otherwise was to abrogate a basic political trust.

Burke, then, faces a challenge as an individual, as representative for Bristol, and as a symbol, as representative of an established but increasingly unpopular paradigm of legislative judgment. Even the most cursory reading of the speech indicates that Burke grapples with both problems. On its surface, the speech clearly partitions itself into five sections, each treating an ostensibly different theme. The brief introduction expressly addresses the main principle, as the orator explains the benefits of independent judgment in politics. The next four sections, following in the sequence of a well-ordered brief, respond to the specific charges -- that Burke had neglected his constituents, had acted against their interests in the matter of Irish trade policy, had ignored their clearly voiced sentiment in supporting Beauchamp's bill to reform penalties against debtors, and had offended public opinion in supporting Saville's measure for relief of Roman Catholics.

Under more careful scrutiny, however, the local movement among discrete arguments gives way to a different and more global pattern of development. The four sections constituting the body of the speech appear less as self-contained arguments than as narratives that repeatedly instantiate principles announced in the introduction. These four "stories" provide a series of disclosures, each meant to vindicate Burke's principle by revealing their successful operation in action, each meant to illuminate Burke's actions by reference to a single set of principles incarnated in different circumstances. Taken separately, the narratives unfold along conventional lines, framing situations and events within historical boundaries. Taken together, they move in a slow inexorable circle, as they loop back to their genesis in principle and thereby clarify moments of exemplary judgment. The movement of the text is accordingly complex, its course determined by the braided threads of principle and action, by the interlocking structures of political time and space.

Burke's introductory remarks quickly and efficiently establish the parameters of the situation. Faced with the demands of the election and uncertain of its outcome, Burke is politician enough to realize he must reclaim popular support. He desires, therefore, to "take the authentic sense of my friends upon a business of so much delicacy."¹⁵ In fact, public opinion will determine whether Burke continues the canvass at all; he will, at all events, respect the wishes of the electors. This nod toward his audience, however, is immediately succeeded by a resolute claim to retain autonomy in judging deliberative issues. Even as Burke identifies his relationship to the city as that of "an honest servant in the equity of a candid and discerning master," he insists that his role is not one of obsequious dependence. As a representative called to account for his actions, he disdains the opportunity for apology or excuse and moves instead into the objective light of public space, a realm where all

can judge for themselves what character discloses. "I have lived too long to be served by apologies," he says, "or to stand in need of them. The part I have acted has been in open day; and to hold out to a conduct which stands in that clear and steady light for all its good and all its evil, to hold out to that conduct the paltry winking tapers of excuses -- I will never do it" (368-9).

Burke thus indicates the tensions conditioning political judgment. Prompted by circumstance to solicit popular support, the representative appeals to a principle of autonomy by nature resistant to such endorsement. This recourse to principle in the face of political flux defines the opening stage of the text's development. The tone here is dignified and distant, and if Burke acknowledges the interests of his constituents, he just as strongly insists upon the limits of their claim. Amidst the push of events and the pull of strident opinions, an unchecked desire to satisfy popular appetite reveals weakness, not strength of character. The representative, rather, must "look to the nature of things," and not to the "humors of men" (269). Only then is he in a position to act in accord with the natural rhythms of time, liberated from the short-lived demands of popular whim. This stance, in turn, requires stability of character and conduct, and as Burke has acted, so shall he account for his actions. But, as he prepares to undertake this disclosure, Burke effects an important redefinition of the role of public judgment: denied the right to restrain the autonomy of the representative directly, his audience assumes the role of spectators; they are to render a judgment only at the end of the performance. "Applaud us when we run," Burke directs his hearers, "console us when we fall, cheer us when we recover; but let us pass on, -- for God's sake let us pass on" (369). Understanding this relation to the representative, the electors, like their representatives, judge from a distance. And so, the audience should view Burke's conduct in its entirety, "like sound judges, and not like cavilling pettifoggers and quibbling pleaders" (370).

In such the same sense, Burke argues that the preservation of the public space itself requires a perspective located at a proper degree of distance. It, too, is sensitive to the pressure of heteronomous opinion and threatens to collapse when popular demands overwhelm its borders. An arena of free action, this space is needed for the work of the representative; and those who most value this work "will not bear to have it soiled and impaired by those for whose sake they make a thousand sacrifices to preserve it immutable and whole" (370). If the popular will intrudes too far into this space, if the representative becomes servile, then the space must contract, and the best men either will leave the public stage or seek refuge with the court. Again, Burke asks his audience to judge as he would judge and to maintain the necessary distance between the representative and the represented. "If we do not permit our members," he concludes, "to act upon a very enlarged view of things, we shall at length infallibly degrade our national representation into a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency" (371). The first section of the speech thus ends where it started, anchored in principle to the autonomy of political judgment. And the multi-faceted symmetry of the

argument calls upon the auditors to adopt and act on the principle in question. In shifting their perspective from a restrictive view of heteronomous interest to an enlarged conception of political time and space, Burke sets up the possibility of his own vindication. Yet, since he asks the audience to act in emulation of his own judgment, that he may be judged properly, he must disclose not only the principles which regulate his character, but his character as manifested in action.

The direction of the text shifts at this point. Burke now engages the specific charges outstanding against him, framing his responses within a series of four narratives. The first of these concerns the most personal charge -- that he neglected his Bristol constituents. Although brief, this section incorporates the spatial and temporal themes common to all the narratives.

Burke allows that "there is a decorum and propriety in a member of Parliament's paying a respectful court to his constituents" (372). If he did not pay court often enough, however, it was not through lack of good will. Indeed, it was by virtue of the distance between Bristol and Westminster that Burke could attend to more important matters. Unlike his opponents, whose business appeared limited to shaking hands and making promises, Burke had exploited his opportunities in Parliament to advance the real interests of his constituents. "I canvassed you through your affairs," he explains, "not through your persons" (373). The space between the representative and the represented therefore is not to be lamented, but to be protected against the seductions of the crowd and the pressures of campaign politics. Within this space, Burke's character is revealed in its fullness: though retaining the right to autonomous judgment, he remains alert to the legitimate interests of his constituents. "I was not only your representative as a body, I was the agent, the solicitor of individuals; I ran about wherever your affairs could call me; and in acting for you, I often appeared as a ship-broker than as a member of Parliament. There was nothing too laborious or too low for me to undertake" (373).

Spatial distance, then, allows the representative freedom to use his time in the conduct of substantive business. More important, such distance opens a perspective on time necessary to the proper understanding of political realities. Burke admits that in fact he could have visited Bristol more often but chose not to do so. When the city was infused with the contagion of war against the colonies, and "all wounds and banks of our constancy were borne down at once, and the frenzy of the American war broke upon us like a deluge" (375), Burke absented himself from Bristol. Why? From his more distant and more steady vantage, Burke could accurately gauge the situation; uncontaminated by this local frenzy, he understood the international repercussions of the war and found in every victory another goad to folly. Conversely, when his predictions proved correct and the war turned against England, Burke again chose to stay away, fearing to insult by his presence. Yet, if his absence sometimes appeared indecorous, it proved exemplary in the end. Time has vindicated

the representative's distance from the local and immediate, for it "at length has made us all of one opinion" (376). Viewed from the perspective of time present, the events of the past themselves, not apologies and excuses, justify Burke's stance. And as the audience participates in this narrative, it comes to share in its lesson -- judgment must remain fixed in the nature of things: "This a true, unvarnished, undisguised state of the affair. You will judge of it" (376).

The second narrative elaborates the lessons of the first. Burke's role in the Irish Trade Acts had seemed to many unduly sympathetic to the Irish, this at a time when Bristol's livelihood depended on its commercial relations. Burke, of course, was especially vulnerable on this matter; as a native of Ireland he inevitably risked offending the special interests of his adopted city. Nevertheless, Burke had sought to fix Anglo-Irish trade policy in a period of considerable unrest. The American war had opened up new markets and had forced a realignment of commercial relations. Confronted by a series of rapidly changing circumstances, Parliament wavered. Unable to chart a consistent or stable policy, it reacted blindly to each point of pressure. In prose that mimics the state of its subject, Burke recalled how Parliament was "frightened into a limited concession by the menaces of Ireland, frightened out of it by the menaces of England, was now frightened back again, and made a universal surrender of all that had been thought the peculiar, reserved, uncommunicable rights of England" (378-9). In the end, came disaster: "A sudden light broke in upon us. It broke in, not through well-contrived and well-disposed windows, but through flaws and breaches -- through the yawning chasms of our ruin. We were taught wisdom by humiliation" (379). The power of the metaphor at the end of this passage contrasts significantly with the rapidly shifting syntax of its beginning. The style incorporates the point: the passage of time illuminates with unmistakable clarity the folly of mere temporizing.

Burke understood this principle before the event, and so he had stood firm amidst the tumult. Not coincidentally, he remained distant from Bristol. Foregoing the "little, silly, canvass prattle of obeying instructions, and having no opinion but yours," Burke commanded a perspective denied to those seated within the pressures of the moment. His distance offered a perspective for judgment that opened access to a higher order of reason. This enlarged view found warrant for action in "the instruction of truth and nature," and it secured its ends not by seducing public opinion, but by looking forward to the greater interests of the community. As Burke employed this enlarged view in the Irish Trade Acts debate, he once again provided an exemplar of sound political judgment. And he drove home the point through a striking thematic and metaphoric summary: "A representative worthy of you ought to be a person of stability. I am to look, indeed, to your opinions, -- but to such opinions as you and I must have five years hence. I was not to look to the flash of the day. I knew that you chose me, in my place, along with others, to be a pillar of the state, and not a weathercock on top of the edifice, exalted for my levity and veratility, and of no use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashionable gale" (382).

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The third charge against Burke concerned Lord Beauchamp's bill, a measure designed to reduce the severity of penalties against debtors. As if to underscore the dangers of public seduction, this narrative reveals Burke to have acted in compliance with the short-sighted interests of the Bristol community. The city naturally had a stake in the strength of credit laws. It feared that Beauchamp's bill threatened the delicate balance between credit and capital, and so presented to Burke a petition announcing its opposition. A rumor of sorts suggested that Burke handled the petition with contempt. Not so, declared Burke. In fact, he had delivered the petition, "though it militated with my oldest and my most recent public opinions," with a "strong and more than usual recommendation to the consideration of the House, on account of the character and consequence of those who signed it" (382). Ironically, then, Burke was chastised for something he had not done, and far from ignoring the wishes of his constituents, he had complied against his better judgment. In the end, Burke could only regret he had not left himself open to criticism on the lesser matter. He had allowed easier consensus to intrude on the integrity of his judgment, and for this, he vowed compensation: "I owe what, if ever it be in my power, I shall most certainly pay, -- ample atonement and unvarious amends to liberty and humanity for my unhappy lapse" (383).

Burke's failure to act on an enlarged view of the matter before him constituted a genuine failure of the public trust. Viewed dispassionately, Burke explained, the bill was just, designed only to remedy "a gross and cruel fault in our laws." And the very injustice of existing laws perpetuated foolish and inexpedient policies. Most notable among these were "acts of grace," whereby imprisoned debtors were released periodically solely because of overcrowding. The laws thus made a mockery of themselves -- imprisoning people who were not criminals only to cast them out of prison, not because of humane sentiment, but because of the failure of the law to achieve its intended purpose. The ineffective cruelty of such legislation cried out for correction, and Beauchamp's proposal was a step in the right direction. "If we continue to oppose this bill," Burke warns, "we shall be found in a struggle against the nature of things" (386).

The fullness of time, Burke maintains, will make clear the justice of this bill. Meanwhile, Burke can only lament the consequences of its defeat. Succumbing to the demands of his constituents, Burke had violated his own judgment, and so had relinquished any claim to leadership on the matter. As he concludes this third narration, Burke presents a short digression on the character of a certain Mr. Howard. Howard, it seems, had pursued the problem of debt legislation with constancy and foresight. For the moment, then, it is Mr. Howard and not Mr. Burke, whom the audience must emulate.

The fourth and final narration, however, once again places the orator at the center of the paradigm. Burke's role in the reform of Catholic penal laws reveals a character fully worthy of emulation. His actions, as

in the first two sections, instantiates the principles established at the outset of the speech. But in this case, the issue is drawn more sharply and in more detail. The final narrative is far longer than any of the others, and it reduces itself to a story of the individual will confronting and overcoming the rage of popular unrest. At the same time, and consistent with the increased momentum of the text, the conflation of character and action, which indirectly permeates the whole work, now finds explicit statement. The Catholic problem, Burke asserts, "is a business closely related with the rest. My little scheme of conduct, such as it is, is all arranged. I could do nothing but what I have done on this subject, without confounding the train of my ideas and disturbing the whole tenor of my life" (388). Having announced this principle of unity, Burke turns to the specific issue in a way that typifies his whole train of thought. He undertakes his account of events by disengaging them from their immediate context, seeking, instead, to relocate the crisis within its larger historical and ethical context. From such a perspective, the proper standard of judgment makes its appearance amidst the clutter of detail, and the audience is invited to judge the orator in terms of his fidelity to that standard.

Precedents to sectarian strife date back to the Reformation, Burke begins, but until the spirit of persecution is banished, the work of the Reformation remains incomplete. Protestants, seeking to dismantle "the vast structure of superstition and tyranny" of papal authority, often succeeded only in reversing the terms of hatred. Their notorious penal codes thereby became symbols of hypocrisy, and where, Burke says, "those laws were not bloody...they were worse; as they were slow, cruel outrages on our nature, and kept men alive only to insult in their persons every one of the rights and feelings of humanity" (391). As Burke proceeds to examine the origin and progress of such codes, it becomes clear that their intolerance was rooted in a lack of perspective, an incapacity to prudently chart a course between extremes. Catholic action led to equally severe Protestant reaction, and the injuries of the moment destroyed all balance. It was to rectify this historically driven chain of injustices that Sir George Saville introduced his bill. Saville's role, on Burke's account, was particularly noteworthy, since it originated from a desire to preserve the true Protestant spirit and to protect Protestantism against its own excesses. In this sense, Saville displayed "his rooted hatred to all kinds of oppression, under any color, or upon any pretense whatsoever" (398). Saville, in other words, understood that the difference between principle and extremism consisted in the capacity to judge events from an enlarged perspective.

Unhappily, popular opinion too often failed to achieve the same perspective. Although the bill repealed but one of the prejudicial statutes, it encountered a storm of public outrage. "No-Popery" riots spread throughout London, and sectarian violence marked every stage as the anti-Catholic codes were dismantled. The public demanded that Commons uphold the codes. Burke, for his part, applied his energy against such pressure, freely acknowledging his resistance to its presence. In fact, he recounted, "I called forth every faculty that I possessed, and I

directed it in every way in which I could possibly employ it. ... If, therefore, the resolution of the House of Commons, refusing to commit this act of unmatched turpitude, be a crime, I am guilty among the foremost" (412-13). But if Burke stood convicted in the verdict of transient opinion, he was vindicated by reflexive judgment. He steadfastly held his ground in principle and refused to desert the course of honor even against the powerful blasts of intolerance. And once again, time itself redeemed his stance, proving that true expediency arises from principle. Later events were to place England in grave peril from abroad, and she was saved the catastrophe of internal subversion added to foreign threat only because Saville's act had secured the loyalty of the Catholic population. Such toleration as Burke could effect served both honor and expediency. The resolution of the crisis at hand had demanded principles discerned from a more remote perspective. That perspective, in this case as in all others, defined the ground of political judgment. In exercising such judgment the representative gathered the particular and the general into a unity of conception. The course of the whole speech, in fact, had been a journey toward this realization: "The diversified, but connected fabric of universal justice is well cramped and bolted together in all its parts; and depend upon it, I have never employed, and I never shall employ, any engine of power which may come into my hands to wrench it asunder. All shall stand, if I can help it, and all shall stand connected" (418-19).

All told, Burke's "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" establishes and enacts a paradigm for political judgment. Almost all of its arguments bear upon the key problem in dealing with judgment -- the coordination of spatial and temporal conceptions relevant to making political decisions. The essence of Burke's position is that the fluctuating and ambiguous subjects of political deliberation demand judgment disciplined by critical distance. The legislator must operate in a free space where reflective principles can mediate and shape the response to particular situations. In assuming this ground, the judging subject is not alienated from the particular, since distance in space creates a perspective from which an enlarged view of things can emerge. Indeed, lacking this perspective, political deliberation is not simply unprincipled, but ineffective; judgment can engage particulars successfully only when it comprehends them in terms of the general sweep of history. Consequently, Burke collapses the expedient into the honorable and defends the autonomy of judgment as a necessary control over the uncertain conditions of political action.

This "theory" of judgment appears in an oration, itself a medium for political deliberation intimately connected with practical action. Thus, the abstracted theoretical content of the discourse cannot stand as its end. The theory must do work in a specific context and interact with the particulars that inform it. That is, parallel to the demands of the subject, the situation in which the discourse is delivered requires something more than mere theorizing about the nature of action. Responding to this constraint, Burke argues by paradigm. The action of the text proceeds through a series of particular cases, and as Burke presents a narrative account of these cases, they disclose his actions in concrete circumstances. These narratives function as paradigms, since,

while they begin with locally different issues, they all embody the same set of principles. Beneath the linear movement within and between particulars, then, the auditor discovers a repetitive form that converges on the same point. Taken as a whole, this rhetorical structure, such like the pattern Eliot sees painted on a Chinese jar, "moves perpetually in its stillness."¹⁶ In other words, the rhetorical texture of the speech instantiates the unity of time and space, of action and principle, which is itself the subject of the speech. And the auditor who accepts the rhetorical paradigm Burke performs is induced to accept the political perspective he advocates.

In concluding, we ourselves must exercise the discipline of critical distance. However noteworthy Burke's rhetorical artistry, the fact remains that the speech failed to move the immediate audience. Three days after its delivery, Burke was forced to withdraw from the election. And as time has passed, his theory of representation has receded against the tide of more democratic thought. Moreover, Burke's conception of political judgment implies a rhetoric of consent hardly consistent with the contemporary stress on the rhetoric of participation. For many, Burke's key premises seem narrowly aristocratic or hopelessly unrealistic. These reservations, however, do not detract from the status of the "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" as an important paradigm for the study of political argumentation. To understand the way that the speech grounds and embodies its principles places us on the road to understanding how the theory of argument unfolds within the texture of argumentative practice. Burke ably demonstrates the possibilities before us if we choose to locate our theory within the subject we study.

ENDNOTES

¹J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, "Introduction: The Field of Argument," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. xiii-xlvii.

²p. xxi.

³p. xiv.

⁴See Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), I, 42-43 and 428, n. 18.

⁵Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 43-51. Kuhn further clarifies his views on this matter in the "Postscript" to his second edition. See esp. pp. 187-191.

⁶Kuhn, p. 53.

⁷p. xxii.

⁸p. xxii.

⁹"Truth and Politics," in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1977), pp. 227-264.

¹⁰Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

¹¹Beiner, p. 2.

¹²For Kant, see the Critique of Judgment, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); for Gadamer, see Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); for an analysis of both relevant to this context, see Beiner, pp. 11-25, at passim. The discussion above follows Beiner.

¹³pp. 112-113.

¹⁴pp. 83-101.

¹⁵"Speech at Bristol prior to the Election," in The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Little Brown, 1884), II, 367. All references to the speech come from this edition and hereafter are indicated parenthetically within the text.

¹⁶T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1941), p. 19.

ON THE EDUCATION OF A TV DEBATE CRITIC

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On October 11, 1985, like many Americans, I was sitting in front of the television set taking notes as Geraldine Ferraro and George Bush traded barbs, and, occasionally, ideas. At the close of the debate a strange thing happened in my home: the room was flooded with light (it was not a divine revelation of the winner), the cameras whirred, and within thirty seconds of the last statement of the debate, a voice bellowed, "So tell us, professor, who won the debate and why?" It was clear that as a TV debate critic, I had arrived.

My situation is probably not unique. Across America every four years or so -- at least in those elections where there are debates -- colleagues in communication studies and especially debate coaches are given special public attention as they bring their critical expertise to bear on public election debates. For those debate coaches laboring in public (and sometimes even university) obscurity, it is their moment in the sun. Various debate coaches find themselves and their opinions in newspapers, magazines, on radio, on regional and even national television (it is an unconfirmed rumor that Bill Kurtis' demise at CBS was related to the inclusion of debate coaches on CBS Morning News). It is pleasant to have colleagues in other disciplines ask your opinion on the debates; it both recognizes and confirms your expertise.

Over the past three elections I have analyzed the Presidential debates for the Associated Press, the Hearst Newspapers, USA Today, local and regional newspapers, local and regional radio and television and even engaged in a radio debate with Sam Becker on who won the debates. A good deal of my education as a TV debate critic came from these experiences, and much of that education was painful. I would like to begin with several observations drawn from these experiences before generalizing to some of the problems incumbent in evaluating the Presidential debates.

1. Media Criticism is on Media Terms. What should have been obvious to me from the outset took a good while to learn: you adapt to the needs of the media rather than the reverse. While your evaluation may involve detailed explanation of judgment, the likelihood of such explanation appearing is slim to none. If your analysis is submitted to a newspaper,

space constraints will limit what is used. The consequence is that one statement may be lifted from a paragraph of context and render your judgment confused, confusing or simplistic. If you are interviewed the chances of distortion are enhanced, but the safety of preparing a written criticism is at the mercy of newspaper space needs.

In television news, a major war or famine may take as long as four minutes to detail, but usually less. A debate evaluation is not quite at that level of importance. Over a period of time I "improved" sufficiently to move from one minute of comments to almost three minutes -- a major victory. However, it may not be inaccurate to say that a two minute commentary simplifies and distorts the message and generally frustrates the critic as well as the audience. The alternative of an old debater -- just speeded up -- simply renders the criticism incomprehensible. All this assumes, of course, that the various media want any kind of cogent explanation accompanying the decision.

2. The media want an immediate decision and preferably a score. The instant focus after each debate is to answer the question "Who won?" This is consistent with the metaphor of the campaign: a race or a game with a winner and loser and numbers to demonstrate such victory with accuracy. In fact the language has become so commonplace that we don't tend to think of it as a metaphor at all. The complete media focus on "Who won?" actually began to worry the candidates and their trainers. Patrick Caddell's memo posed the dangers for Carter in 1980:

The more crucial and dangerous game is that with the press. They have an inordinate role in convincing the public not only who won on 'points' but more critically, on the nature of the debate itself Thus we cannot let the press go into the debate with the single notion of looking just for a winner and loser.... We must make an all out effort to educate the press to the question of (1) Will Reagan be specific? (2) Will he flip-flop? (3) Will he know what he is talking about? ... We have to emphasize that such is the criteria we are looking to for 'winning' and hurrying Reagan. It must seep into their psyche as well.

Cadell and friends were not able to educate the media in time. Following the 1980 debates, stations encouraged phone in calls (for 50¢ you could register a vote for Reagan or Carter as the debate winner). While not a replication of the Literary Digest poll of 1936 which predicted Landon over FDK, as a basis for generalization it presented some methodological difficulties. By phone tally, Reagan outdistanced Carter by almost two to one.² How many of the unemployed chose this method of registering their preferences is not clear.

After one of the 1984 debates I was called by USA Today for my decision. "Who won?" they asked. "Mondale," I responded. After a pause I asked if they would like some reasons for my decision. "No, that's all right," they countered, "just the decision is all we need." I hung up in disbelief. The Associated Press has used the standard 30-point debate ballot for Presidential debates since 1976, and key to their reporting is a rundown of the numbers. Could you score it a tie? Perhaps, but it confuses the media. (Perhaps the incumbent serves as the negative and any tie goes to the incumbent). But central to media reporting is the win and loss and the margin of victory, preferably quantitative.

3. The media debate decision alters the artifact. This is another way of saying that the media debate decision takes on a life of its own, and becomes persuasive in itself. It is as if the goal of the media was to provide "consensus" and that picking a winner was like answering a question as "right" or "wrong." Sears and Chaffee spotted this tendency in two studies done on the 1976 debates:

A good bit of this consensus appears not to have been based on 'reality,' however; that is, it was not based on the viewers' direct perceptions of the debates. Rather, the news media quickly established a consensual answer to the question of which candidate had won a debate, partly through immediate reporting of poll results. This in turn guided public responses to that question, as if it were the 'correct' answer, and eventually it became so.³

It may be that each debate invites a "consensual winner." However the very act of finding such a winner involves the featuring of certain factors and ignoring others. Vancil and Pendell observe

Thus, it may be more accurate to say that the 'consensual winner' evolves from the interactions of public polls, critical commentary from analysts, and the frenzied efforts of the press to discover the winner.

Moreover, as the consensus is developed and articulated, it has an apparent power to persuade the viewing public if its 'correctness.'⁴

It is commonplace now to believe that Kennedy clobbered Nixon in the very first 1960 debate when the immediate reaction suggested it was a close debate. The impetus over time has been to increase the margin of victory -- often by a multiple of the initial judgment. For example, the 1980 Cleveland debate between Carter and Reagan was quite a close one, in the opinion of the critics and in initial audience reaction. However, both pointed in the direction of Reagan. When the Lew Harris survey was conducted one night after the debate, the vote had grown for Reagan, 46 to 26.⁵ Using the 30-point APA ballot, I found a two point advantage to Mondale in the first 1984 debate. By the time of their second encounter, I was asked if the second debate was an "lopsided" as I had thought the first one. The effect of time is to improve consensus.

One reason for these changes is that media analyses of debates feature certain issues and ignore others. There is no doubt that Ford was premature in declaring the Eastern European bloc countries liberated in 1976. On many of the other issues he did quite well, but the question was what relative weight this gaffe would carry. It became a major media focus and by one day later Carter had become the overwhelming winner.⁶ Jimmy Carter's reliance on Amy to substantiate the horrors of nuclear war became a way to explain his lack of effectiveness. The gaffes assume a life of their own when treated by the media. Nelson Polsby observes that a gaffe can be exploited by the press; a candidate may say something "that sends the press baying like a pack of beagles into the next week or ten days seeking after clarifications, revisions, apologies, or concessions."⁷ Such errors can be capsulized quickly and neatly by the media, which uses them to gain a consensus view of the debate.

Such "beagle baying" need not be tied to issues in the debate. After his showing in the first 1984 debate, commentators searched to account for Reagan's ineffectiveness. When one commentator chose "age" as the explanation it spread for several days as "the" reason Reagan was less effective. In fact, this set of comments provided much of the rhetorical exigence for the second meeting. When Reagan managed to dispatch the issue with his single and best line of the evening, the issue had actually helped Reagan in the second debate; for those who thought Reagan had won the debate, many cited his handling of this "issue" -- one created as the first debate and its evaluations began to take on a life of their own.

In the media rush to determine "who won?" there is scant attention paid to what it means to win or the criteria used to decide victory and defeat. Vancil and Pendell found at least six different meanings when viewers declare a winner. These include (1) the viewer's pre-debate preference; (2) the candidate whose positions are most consistent with those of the viewer; (3) the candidate with superior skills of advocacy; (4) the candidate with a superior Presidential personality; (5) the candidate who benefits from an opponent's blunder; and (6) the candidate who is declared a winner by the media.⁸ That viewers have different criteria for declaring a winner should not be surprising, nor that they may use these criteria in combination. In the first five criteria, the artifact of the debate itself provides the materials for judgment. In the last criterion, the materials for judgment come from the media assessment.

If viewer's decisions will differ depending on the criteria they employ, so too will the critic's decisions. The criteria I had used in 1976, 1980 and 1984 in judging for the Associated Press were borrowed from intercollegiate debate. They included the familiar categories of analysis, reasoning, evidence, organization, refutation and communication or delivery. The assumption has been that there are sufficient similarities between intercollegiate and Presidential debate to employ these criteria without concern. But how similar are the Presidential debates to intercollegiate debates? The answer is -- not very.

Presidential debates differ from intercollegiate debates in a number of ways. There is no single proposition, but rather each question asked could be turned into a proposition. Hence a Presidential debate could wind up having between ten and twenty separate propositions, some of great import and some of less import, such as questions on improving Harry Truman's salty language. The audience being addressed is fundamentally different and the assumption in intercollegiate debate is that the winner will have better command of issues, evidence, that reputation will be irrelevant. Commenting on the differences, Myles Martel, who was both a college debate coach and a debate adviser to Reagan, concluded, "I learned quickly that there was a vast difference between political and academic debate; any attempt to force the academic model on a campaign was, at best, naive and, at worst, politically dangerous."⁹

However the criteria used to evaluate academic debate had been borrowed to handle the Presidential debates. These criteria assumed that the Presidential debates were primarily an exercise in argumentation. As I had done in evaluating

intercollegiate debates, I was awarding issues and then returning to the ballot to find the categories to help me differentiate the candidates. I suspect it was not unusual to find judges for the Associated Press deciding first who won and then filling the "boxes" provided as the categories of judgment on a ballot. The awarding of issues makes the debate primarily an exercise in argumentation and that view really produces criticism more dialectical than rhetorical.

In applying these criteria to the second 1984 debate, I concluded that Ferraro's answers in the area of foreign policy were slightly worse than Bush's handling of domestic issues, producing a slight advantage for Bush (in scorecard terms, Bush 27, Ferraro 26). A distinguished critic in our department evaluated the debate and found an edge for Ferraro. Such splits are hardly surprising to old debate coaches who remember being on the short end of 4-1 decisions. In this case it was the use of different criteria that produced a different decision.

If the debate is viewed as a candidate enacting the possibilities of Presidential leadership, then depending on what constitutes Presidential leadership, such a view, more rhetorical than dialectical, would produce a different decision. If the debate is viewed as a candidate overcoming campaign exigencies, such as the 1980 view of Reagan as "trigger happy," such a view may conclude that Reagan was the superior debater. Differing rhetorical views may well conclude that different candidates "won" the debate. While this position is antithetical to the media notion of increasing "consensus," it may be the necessary antidote to provide an understanding of the debate -- to move beyond the simple matter of "who won" and "by how much" -- the cornerstone concerns of media criticism.

Criticism by its very nature may be a process of elongation -- of amplification, explanation, illumination. The assets of a critic are time and space. Media messages are the product of condensation -- of reduction, simplification, capsulization. The major limitations of media criticism are time and space. It may be that criticism -- especially TV criticism -- is by its nature at odds with media constraints. If so, media criticism will always be an act of at least partial frustration for the critic.

Susanne Langer died last week while I was preparing this paper (the connection I think was not causal). I paused to reread and reflect on that brilliant 89-year-old monument to anger in this century. We are known, she said, by the questions we ask and the way we ask them.¹⁰ Our views are shaped by our questions.

Perhaps our angle of vision, to paraphrase Burke, resides in the shape of our questions.

"Who won?" It seems a simple enough question, one that should elicit a straightforward answer. I have been trying to answer the question for some years. Who won? Affirmative or negative? In political years, Kennedy or Nixon, Reagan or Carter, Mondale or Reagan? In each case you are asked to make an either/or decision. Answers such as "both" or "neither" are inappropriate -- they show that you are confused, or refusing to play the game. In either case, you are certainly going to be disqualified as a TV debate critic.

The disjunction seems sensible enough. After the election one candidate will retire to write his memoirs, make furniture, raise past experiences to the level of crises, and/or play golf. The other candidate will postpone his memoirs, raise experiences to the level of crises and ride horses. One wins; another loses. That is the nature of the game.

It is certainly possible that a critic can provide coherent reasons for a judgment that one candidate "won" the debate. But I would like to suggest that one function of criticism may be to rewrite the question. Perhaps if we could answer the question "What did the debate mean?" we might be less preoccupied with "who won?" All of this is inconsistent, of course, with the focus, space and time restraint of current media criticism. For the media, it should be brief, capsulized and quantitative. "Who won the debate, professor?" "Neither." The education of some media debate critics is slow and painful.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Patrick Caddell quoted in Myles Martel, Political Campaign Debates (New York: Longman, 1983), p. 27.

² Martel, pp. 27-28.

³ David Sears and Steven Chaffee, "Uses and Effects of the 1976 Debates: An Overview of Empirical Studies," in The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976, ed. Sidney Krause (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 239.

⁴ David Vancil and Sue D. Pendell, "Winning Presidential Debates: An Analysis of Criteria Influencing Audience Response," The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 48 (Winter 1984), p. 70.

⁵ Quoted by Vancil and Pendell, p. 71.

⁶ Sears and Chaffee, p. 240.

⁷ Nelson Polsby, "Debatable Thoughts on Presidential Debates," in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), p. 178.

⁸ Vancil and Pendell, pp. 62-74.

⁹ Martel, p. xi.

¹⁰ Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), pp. 15-32.

THE 1984 DEMOCRATIC DEBATES: DOES FORMAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

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There is widespread agreement on the social functions served by campaign debating. While the purpose of debates for the candidates is to gain votes, their purpose for society is to provide the people with useful information to facilitate rational voting. Kraus and Davis make this point clear:

We have concluded that television debate can increase what voters know about candidates and issues. Therefore, debates can enable our society to take another step toward the realization of the democratic ideal that all citizens are capable of voting responsibly based on knowledge, not on prejudice. ¹

This rational purpose of the debates can be broken down into three closely related functions. First, debates are designed to provide the public with useful information about the issue positions of the candidates. This view assumes that one cannot vote rationally without being aware of the "differences between the policy views of the candidates" ² and is the most commonly cited function of political debating. For example, the theme of the 1976 presidential debates, hosted by the League of Women Voters, was "Issues not Images." ³ In a review of empirical studies on presidential debating Chaffee and Dennis refer to informing the people about the issue positions of the candidates as "one of their [the debates'] major social tasks. . ." ⁴

Although informing the people about the issue positions of the candidates is clearly one of the (and in the view of most commentators perhaps the most important) social functions of campaign debating it is not the only function. The debates are also designed to provide the people with useful information about the candidates themselves. For example, Edmund Muskie has argued that it is at least as important that the people judge the personal quality of presidential candidates as that they judge the issue positions. ⁵ Here, the idea is that by placing the candidates in an uncontrolled setting the people can learn about their personal characteristics. The problem with most

campaign communication is that it is tightly controlled by the campaign machine of the candidate involved. Consequently, in a campaign speech or advertisement the people are unlikely to learn much about the candidate's personality. However, it is argued that in the give and take of a debate the people may learn something about the true personal strengths and weaknesses of the various candidates involved. This view is expressed by Raines: "These events [campaign debates] place a premium on character and personality, insofar as these qualities are revealed by appearance, demeanor, and the ability to perform under pressure." ⁶ There is also data indicating that campaign debates may facilitate the personnel interview function by giving the people a chance to see the two candidates together. The side by side presentation may reduce selective perception. ⁷

Finally, campaign debates serve a ritualistic function; they reaffirm our faith in the democratic process itself. By participating in the debate, the public and the candidate express support for democracy. J. Jeffrey Auer explains that: "debate has historically been regarded as an essential tool of a democratic society where the majority rules in a milieu of free speech." ⁸ A similar point is made by Chaffee and Dennis: "debates make substantial contributions to the process of democracy and perhaps even to the longer-term viability of the system." ⁹ Support for this function of the debates can be found in opinion data indicating that public faith in the candidates often increases following a debate. For example, the 1960 presidential debates evidently reassured the partisans of both parties about the ability of the two candidates. ¹⁰ This function of the debates would be undercut were significant personal conflict to occur in the debates. If campaign debates were to degenerate into name-calling or mere theatrics then they might not reassure the public about the integrity of the candidates involved.

Not only is there agreement about the social functions served by campaign debating, but there is general agreement that up to a point the debates have successfully fulfilled those functions. For example Swanson and Swanson note that the 1976 Carter-Ford debate "provided important information for the voters. . . ." ¹¹ Lemert, et al, conclude that "watching a televised debate early in the [1980 Republican] presidential primary season can increase respondents' interest in and knowledge about, the campaign." ¹² Chaffee and Dennis make the same point: "the debates clearly performed one of their major social tasks, that of providing information about the candidates and their positions that was new to many voters." ¹³

While there is little question that past campaign debates have aided the voters, at least to some extent, in making rational voting decisions, it is also quite clear

that there is room for substantial improvement. For example, Bitzer and Reuter as well as Auer have attacked the quality of the issue analysis found in many campaign debates. In addition, campaign debates have been criticized as exercises in mere image-making. For example, Kirpatrick has argued that debates often place too great an emphasis on "stage presence rather than political performance."¹⁵ In addition, some have argued that campaign debates have not adequately served their function because they have been dull. Critics have called for "more showmanship and more passion," and decried the "stiff quality of past debates."¹⁶

The most obvious means of improving the quality of campaign debating is to alter the format. The problem is that the political incentives facing the candidates do not mesh very well with the social functions served by the debates. The candidates have little incentive to take specific positions on the issues and justify those positions with tight reasoning and hard evidence. Specific positions are politically dangerous. It is very difficult to attack a candidate who advocates "reform" of the defense system (who is against reform?), but very easy to attack a candidate who identifies the specifics of a plan to cut defense. It is only reasonable to expect candidates to follow debate strategies that they believe will maximize votes and it is the conventional wisdom that detailed analysis of specific issues is not a valuable vote-getting strategy. In addition, candidates have every incentive to try and maintain whatever image they have been attempting to create outside of the debate situation. Consequently, they have strong reasons to avoid situations in which the public could judge their true personality. It is far safer to stick to prepared material and the packaged image.

Stanley Kelley realized even before the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates that the only means of encouraging candidates to discuss the issues was the format of campaign events. In his book Political Campaigning Kelley advocated campaign debates as a means of encouraging more analysis of the issues of the campaign.¹⁸ Currently, some commentators make a similar point by arguing that the best means of improving the quality of rhetoric in campaign debates is an alteration in format.

A study of campaign debates during the 1984 Democratic primaries has the potential to illuminate the degree to which alterations in format can improve (or harm) the quality of political debating. Since the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates, most campaign debates have used some variant of a press conference format in which a journalist asks each candidate involved in the debate a question and then the candidates answer in turn. Partially in response to the criticisms of past campaign debates, the Democrats

experimented with a variety of debate formats during the 1984 primary season. For example, in the January 15, 1984 debate at Dartmouth college eight candidates participated in a free-form exchange about the issues and the campaign. In the first half of the three hour debate, Ted Koppel of ABC asked questions about the issues of the campaign. However, there was no set time limit for answers and not all candidates spoke on each question. In effect, the candidates had to fight to get the floor. In the second half of the Dartmouth debate, talk show host Phil Donahue asked questions about the issues, but also took questions from the audience and "roamed the aisles of the audience like a circus barker, pointing, gesturing, breaking into one subject to suggest another, breaking the chain of discourse."¹⁹ The format of the Dartmouth debate sharply contrasts with the traditional press conference style of debate. Some believe that it was a major success: "I think the star of the whole thing was the format. . . ."²⁰ However, it also could be argued that the format facilitated theatrical displays not reasoned analysis of the issues. The less structured, more interactive format of the Dartmouth debate was imitated in other debates throughout the campaign. By analyzing the 1984 Democratic primary debates it should be possible to judge whether an interactive format is more conducive to fulfilling the social functions of campaign debates than the traditional press conference format.

To test the effect of alterations in format on the 1984 Democratic debates we have focused on three debates: the Dartmouth debate, the debate held prior to the New York and Pennsylvania primaries, and the first Reagan-Mondale debate (on domestic policy) from the general election campaign.²¹ The reasons for choosing the Dartmouth debate are obvious. We already have described the interactive format of the debate. Because it occurred very early in the campaign, a large number of candidates participated (Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson, Walter Mondale, George McGovern, Rubin Askew, Ernest Hollings, Alan Cranston, and John Glenn). The number of candidates in the Dartmouth debate is important because it contrasts sharply with the much smaller field present in the New York debate. The New York debate was held on March 28, 1984 six days prior to the New York primary and two weeks before the Pennsylvania primary. By this point in the campaign, only Mondale, Hart, and Jackson were still in the race. The New York debate used an interactive format in which all three candidates sat around a table with the moderator, Dan Rather, at the center of a circular auditorium at Columbia University. Rather asked the three candidates the same question, but no formal time limits were used and at times he interceded in the debate to clarify positions and referee disagreements between the candidates.

The interactive formats found in the Dartmouth and New York debates contrast sharply with the typical press conference format of the first Mondale-Reagan debate. In that debate, Mondale and Reagan were each asked a series of main and follow-up questions by a group of journalists. In addition, the candidates were given a rebuttal on each question. We hope that a comparison of the arguments found in the two primary debates, as contrasted with the first Mondale-Reagan debate will illuminate the effect which alterations in format can have on campaign debating. Obviously, there are difficulties involved in any comparison of primary and general election campaign debates. It is certainly possible that candidates debate differently against opponents from their own party than they do against opponents from the other party. However, here our concern is not with what issue positions the candidates took, but with the way in which the candidates explained and defended those positions. It seems likely that the type and quantity of evidence and explanation used in debates does not vary significantly from primary to general election debates.

In order to consider the quality of the argumentation in the three debates, we did a close textual analysis of the debates, applying three tests to them. First, we catalogued all the issues discussed in the debates. For the debates to fulfill their educational function, they must focus on the important issues of the campaign. In the discussion of the three debates we will build a case for our interpretation of which issues were un-important to the campaign.

Second, we tested the degree to which the candidates supported their claims with evidence or reasoning. If the public is to rationally choose among the candidates, it is necessary for the candidates to support their views with evidence of some kind. It is not enough for a candidate to say that arms control could work; he or she should have some support for that claim, whether in the form of evidence (statements from authorities, examples and so on) or reasoning explaining why an arms control program could succeed. In applying this test, we recognized that much argument is enthymematic, drawing upon shared social knowledge. We tried to take into account the enthymematic nature of argument by applying a very low standard for support materials. For example, in the New Hampshire debate Reubin Askew opposed the nuclear freeze by noting, "It's having an effective deterrent and lessening of tensions ultimately I believe, however, that rather than trying to freeze everything and you lose the ability to be able to modernize and make them less stabilizing" (p. 88). Askew implied but did not clearly state that modernization of our current nuclear forces is necessary to preserve deterrence and would be prohibited by a nuclear freeze. The application of this test produces a total count of the number of claims made in each debate that were supported by

evidence and/or reasoning as well as a count of the total number of individual pieces of evidence or reasons cited as support. Perhaps more importantly, it also reveals the number of instances in which candidates asserted points without any proof. By comparing the degree to which claims were supported by evidence or reasoning and the amount of evidence or reasoning used in the three debates it should be possible to draw some conclusions about the effect of format on use of support materials in campaign debates.

Finally, we applied a dialectical test to the debates by counting both the number of instances in which a candidate criticized the position of another candidate as well as the number of instances in which the candidate who was attacked responded to the accusation. If the people are to understand the issues it is clearly important that the candidates search out the weaknesses in each the positions of their opponents. It is a commonplace assumption of both democratic and argumentation theorists that rigorous criticism in the free marketplace of ideas is the best test of truth. Thus, in a superior political debate the candidates will criticize the positions of the other candidates involved as well as respond to attacks on their positions. By counting the number of instances of such criticism and response in the three debates it should be possible to judge the degree to which the interactive format is superior to the traditional press conference format in encouraging dialectical exchange.

Application of the three tests we have outlined should give us an idea of how well the two Democratic primary debates and the first Mondale-Reagan debate served the educational function of campaign debates. The three tests all measure important dimensions of the issue analysis function served by campaign debating. Moreover, the three tests also can aid us in evaluating the degree to which the debates fulfilled the personnel interview function. The important point is that the people learn most about the personal characteristics of the candidates when they see them debate the issues. In the give and take of discussion about the issues, the personal qualities of the candidates may be revealed. The public will learn little about the personal qualities of the candidates as long as they are mouthing platitudes. However, in the heat of argument the personal qualities of a candidate may become clear. In this regard the dialectical test is particularly important.

We did not apply a separate test to determine whether the debates fulfilled the ritualistic function served by campaign debates. The important point is that all debates will serve that function, as long as they do not degenerate into name calling or mere theatrics. Unfortunately, there were a few instances in the 1984 Democratic primary debates

in which the candidates got so caught up in the theatrics of the television debate that the issues almost got lost.

The method we have described obviously is imperfect. The categories we have applied to the three debates are by their very nature ambiguous. However, we think that this ambiguity is unavoidable. The problem is that only uninteresting categories can be applied with total objectivity to a debate. The critic could count the number of sentences of a particular type in the debate, but such an analysis would tell us little of interest. We believe that the looser categories that we have applied to the debate can tell us more about the debate than the application of any quantitative content analysis system. While the categories described here have an element of ambiguity, in each case, we independently analyzed the debate and then went over the analysis and agreed upon the proper application of the categories. The result of the analysis should be a useful if not perfectly objective description of the three debates in question.

Issues

In general, all three debates focused on important issues. In New Hampshire the candidates discussed: a woman Vice-President, the nuclear freeze, the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, conventional arms, the military budget, the state of the economy, the budget deficit, trade deficits and protectionism, Grenada, Lebanon, Central America, UNESCO, South Africa, Reaganomics, Mondale's policy proposals, troop reductions in Europe, abortion, and Mondale's tie to unions. Nearly all of these topics were of major concern to the American people. Of all the issues considered only UNESCO was not really a major concern to the people. However, the inevitable result of dealing with so many issues was that the debate barely scratched the surface of many of the issues that were discussed. For example, at one point Donahue asked the candidates if they wanted to stop covert operations in Honduras (p. B9). After eliciting agreement from all the candidates, Donahue simply moved on to another question. There was no discussion of what was wrong with U.S. policy in Honduras or what might be done to improve it. The discussion of abortion was equally cursory (p. B9). Several of the candidates simply said that they were for free choice, but did not explain that position at all. While a number of important issues were considered in New Hampshire, the candidates did little more than state positions on those issues; they did not have time to develop those positions in any depth.

The story is somewhat different in New York. The debate focused on twelve issues: a balanced budget, personality changes in the candidates, weaknesses of the candidates, education, government support of Chrysler,

windfall profits tax, arms control, use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, use of force in Central America and the Middle East, a Palestinian homeland, and gun control. All of the policy issues considered in the debate were obviously important. And the discussion of those issues was in far greater depth than in New Hampshire. For example, the discussion of the Chrysler bailout was quite specific, down to a consideration of the economic effects of the bailout on minority workers (p. B 9).

What is striking, however, is the lack of value of the two political questions which Rather asked. For example, Rather's first question asked the candidates to identify their greatest weakness (p. B9). In response, Hart said that he wished that he could have traveled more, but also noted that he had gone to some twenty foreign countries including the Soviet Union. Clearly, he was trying to make the point that he was experienced in foreign policy. Jackson admitted that his campaign for "social justice" had not gotten the attention of the American people, but used his answer to reemphasize the importance of his campaign. Mondale cited his great experience in government and the consequent "acura" he had received as his greatest weakness. He was trying to contrast his great experience with the more limited experience of Hart and Jackson. None of the three candidates identified a true weakness in their character or experience. The obvious point is that candidates are not going to admit major weaknesses on television. Political questions such as the one just discussed, the later question about candidate personality changes, and the question about a woman Vice-President in the Dartmouth debate are unlikely to reveal much about the candidates. Instead, they elicit statements that are designed to reinforce a pre-planned image. We are more likely to learn about the true weaknesses of the candidates by watching them debate back and forth on the substance of policy issues rather than by asking political questions.

The first Reagan-Mondale debate in Louisville focused exclusively on domestic issues, almost all of which were important. Reagan and Mondale debated about: the balanced budget amendment and the federal deficit, Social Security and Medicare, leadership ability of the candidates, Lebanon, religion (including prayer in the school), crime, education, drugs, the environment, farm policy, the size of government, abortion, taxes, and candidate weaknesses and mis-statements. Again, the policy issues were important, but the political questions were not. For example, in the final question of the debate, (p. A28) Diane Sawyer asked Mondale and Reagan to identify the "most outrageous" thing that the other had said in the debate. The question practically invited name calling and the answers easily could have degenerated into something quite petty. Instead, Mondale essentially avoided the question and after complimenting

Reagan, called for the establishment of new programs to solve social problems. Reagan accepted Mondale's compliment and talked about social security. Neither candidate wanted to risk a personal dispute; and consequently they both evaded the question. Because candidates want to win, they have enormous incentives to evade political as opposed to substantive questions. Only on specific questions about policy can a candidate be pinned down or forced to answer a charge.

Evidence and Reasoning

There is a striking contrast between the evidence usage in the New Hampshire debate on the one hand and the New York and Reagan-Mondale debates on the other hand. In New Hampshire the candidates made 160 total claims of which 28 were supported by reasoning, 33 by evidence and 4 by both reasoning and evidence. In 95 instances the candidates simply stated claims without citing any evidence or reasoning. The abortion and covert intervention in Honduras examples cited earlier are typical illustrations of this point. The candidates took a position on these issues, but did not back it up.

By contrast, in New York and Louisville, the candidates did a good job of supporting their claims. In New York, 99 of the 140 claims were backed up by evidence and or reasoning. In the Reagan-Mondale debate, 90 of 111 claims were supported. The vastly superior use of support materials in the New York and Louisville debates, as opposed to the New Hampshire debate can best be understood in tabular form.

Support For Claims

	Total Claims	Total Supported Claims
New Hampshire	160	65 (40.6%)
New York	140	99 (70.7%)
Louisville	111	90 (81.1%)

Reasoning and Evidence Usage

	Total of Evidence	Total Reasons	Total Support
New Hampshire	33	62	95
New York	43	97	140
Louisville	43	91	141

Note, the candidates occasionally cited more than one reason or piece of evidence for a claim.

The data illustrated in the two tables has several interesting implications. First, it suggests that the New York and Louisville debates produced quite similar argumentative practices. In effect, by asking all three candidates the same question and attempting to allocate equal time to each candidate, Rather gave the interactive format many of the characteristics of the press-conference format. The most important difference between the two debates is the considerably higher degree of support for claims found in the Reagan-Mondale debate than the New York debate. Reagan and Mondale provided some form of support for over 80% of their claims as opposed to only 70% in the New York debate. The most likely explanation for this difference is the greater time available for explaining positions in the Reagan-Mondale debate.

Second, the development of issues in the New Hampshire debate was quite cursory. The very limited time available for answers forced the candidates to take positions without supporting them. They wanted to get their position down on the record, but did not have the time to do more than simply state it. There would appear to be a direct tradeoff between the depth in which issues are discussed and the breadth of the issues covered in the debate.

Dialectic

The final category to be considered is dialectic or refutation. One of the main goals of campaign debating is to place the candidates in direct conflict on the issues in order to test their positions and also their personal mettle. And one of the goals of the interactive format was to increase such interchange. However, there was surprisingly little refutation in the three debates and the level was much lower in New Hampshire than in the other two debates. The quantity of dialectical exchange is indicated in tabular form.

Dialectical Exchange

	Critical Statements	Answers to Criticism
New Hampshire	23	12
New York	24	21
Louisville	29	22

The most striking implication of this data is that the interactive format used in New Hampshire did not produce much dialectical exchange. There were more critical statements and far more answers to criticism in the New York and Reagan-Mondale debates than in New Hampshire. Again, the shortage of time for developing positions in New

Hampshire is probably the explanation. The candidates in New Hampshire barely had time to stake out a position on the issues. They could not get into complicated discussions of the weaknesses of their opponent's positions or detailed defenses of their own position.

The obvious exception to this point is the dispute between Glenn and Mondale over problems facing the party. Glenn blamed Mondale for the sins of the Carter administration while Mondale attacked Glenn for voting for Reaganomics. This dispute had value, but at one point it degenerated into bickering:

Mr. Mondale: Hold it, hold it.
Mr. Glenn: I'll tell you why it is. It's because you . . .
Mr. Mondale: It's because you voted for Reaganomics
Mr. Glenn: Twenty-one percent interest rates. . .
Mr. Mondale: Who has the floor here?
Mr. Glenn: Seventeen percent inflation rate, and that's why we lost the White House and it's why . . .
Mr. Mondale: Who has the floor here? Wait a minute now.
Mr. Glenn: You said it was free floor. (p. B)

This exchange did not illuminate the issues.

In sum, an interactive format would not seem to be needed to encourage refutation. The longer time limits of the Reagan-Mondale debate and the provision of rebuttals in that debate in fact produced far more dialectical exchange than in New Hampshire. Rather's careful allocation of speaking time produced a similar result in New York. The interactive format does, however facilitate bickering between the candidates. In New Hampshire, Glenn and Mondale could fight for the floor. However, in a press conference style debate, the candidate would have to wait until the next speech in order to respond.

Conclusion

This study of the 1984 Democratic primary debates clearly indicates that Stanley Kelley was correct when he argued that candidates would adapt to the situation facing them in a political debate. The interactive format used in the Democratic primary debates clearly influenced the argumentative and rhetorical strategies of the candidates. Consequently, there are significant differences in the kind and amount of arguments and evidence found in the New Hampshire primary debate and the first Reagan-Mondale debate. This study suggests that Rather's application of the interactive format in the New York debate made it quite

similar to a press-conference debate. The result was a set of argumentative practices that were quite similar to those found in the Reagan-Mondale debate. Some of this result may be purely accidental and the difference between a primary and a general election debate also may explain part of the contrast. However, it seems clear that the interactive format used in the New Hampshire and other Democratic primary debates encouraged argumentative and rhetorical practices that were significantly different from the practices encouraged by the more traditional press conference format.

The effect of the format alterations on the capacity of the debate to fulfill its social function is mixed. Clearly, the interactive format encourages the candidates to fight for the floor (you can only score political points if you are talking). The result may be a more interesting debate that will better keep the interest of the viewers. In addition, it could be argued that the greater passion produced by the interactive format may reveal more of substance about the personalities of the candidates involved than would be revealed with the more controlled press conference format. Additionally, the flexible time allocation procedure of the interactive format result in a consideration of more total issues. If an important goal of campaign debating is to tell the people where the candidates stand on as many of the important issues as possible, then the interactive format would seem to be well designed to facilitate that end. Finally, the interactive format is far more flexible than the press conference format for dealing with large numbers of candidates. The Dartmouth debate nicely illustrates this point. If all eight candidates in that debate had been given three minutes to state their position on an issue, it would have taken almost half an hour to get through a single question, even without rebuttals or follow-up questions. Not only would such a format be extremely cumbersome, but it also would be very boring.

While the interactive format has some advantages there are also significant problems. First, the greater conflict produced by the format may distract the voters from the important issues under consideration. The exchange between Mondale and Glenn in the Dartmouth debate, in which they blamed each other for past failures of the Democratic party, illustrates the point. This exchange did not illuminate the issues. It showed Mondale blaming Glenn for Reaganomics and Glenn attacking Mondale for a variety of sins of the Carter Administration. There were important issues involved in this dispute, but they were not touched in the exchange. Rather, the two candidates tried to make theatrical gestures that would receive play on the television news shows. And in fact that was precisely what happened. In addition, there is always the danger that such an exchange could

become a bitter fight that would undercut the ritualistic democratic reaffirmation function of campaign debating. Moreover, there is reason to doubt whether this kind of exchange produces much useful personal information about the candidates. It is widely believed that both Mondale and Glenn had planned out the statements which they used in their exchange. Consequently, the people did not learn much about Mondale or Glenn, but only what their campaign staffs thought would be good political theater.

There are other problems with the interactive format used in the Democratic primary debates. Although the moderators of the debates that we have analyzed attempted to be fair in asking questions and allocating time, there is always the danger that a moderator might attempt to bias the debate process for one candidate. The moderator plays a far more important role in the interactive format than either the moderator or questioners do in the press conference format.

Finally, while the interactive format allows for more issues to be considered, it also means that those issues are not covered in any depth. Although it is important that the people know where the candidates stand on the issues, this knowledge is of relatively little value unless they know some details of those policy positions and the rationale behind them. Under the interactive format, the analysis of the issues is short circuited. The discussion of abortion in the Dartmouth debate illustrates this point. At one point, Donahue elicited one or two word statements of position on abortion from all of the candidates. Such discussions do not illuminate the issues. The problem is still greater when use of support materials is considered. The interactive format forces the candidates to state their position in a very few seconds. Along with the details of those positions, the reasoning and evidence that back them up of necessity get out of the statement. The result is a campaign debate in which the candidates take positions on the issues, but only rarely explain them or back them up with evidence. This criticism is less applicable to the New York debate, precisely because Rather allocated more time to the candidates on each question than was available in New Hampshire.

The point to be drawn from this analysis is not that the interactive format should be scrapped in favor of the traditional press conference style campaign debate. Some form of the interactive format is clearly needed when there are six or seven candidates. Even in such large primary debates, however, it might make sense to give each candidate an opportunity to state his or her views at greater length, without fear of interruption. Each candidate could be given an opening statement or alternatively, the statements could be spread throughout the debate. These statements would

allow a candidate to sum up the reasons for supporting his or her candidacy over that of the opposition.

In debates where only three or four candidates are involved, it should be possible to develop a format which would avoid the problems associated with both the interactive and the press conference format. First, longer time limits are needed. If the candidates were given five minutes to develop a position on a broad issue like social security, they would have the opportunity to both outline their views and support them. Even the two or two and a half minutes available to answer questions in the press conference format really is not long enough to say much that is sensible. In addition to giving the candidates more time it might make sense to get the press out of the debate altogether. The issues to be considered in the debate could be agreed upon in advance. The press has a natural incentive to try and ask very specific almost "trick" questions to pin down the candidates. The result is that the candidates spend days memorizing details about public policy to guarantee that they will not look stupid. However, the ability to memorize endless details is not an important qualification to be president, only to succeed in the press conference format of campaign debates. Alternatively, the press may ask questions that they believe are news worthy but which do little to illuminate the policies or personality of the candidates. Surely, Dan Rather's question in the New York debate about the greatest weakness of the candidates fits into this category. No rational candidate will admit in public that he or she has important weaknesses. Thus, Rather's question could not produce useful information. The people might learn more about the issues, if three or four broad issue related themes (like social security, strategic defense, the environment) were considered in every debate. Rather than responding to specific questions, the candidates could each state their position on the general themes and the public could judge the candidates based on the aspects of the theme which the candidate emphasized.

The final element in this format would be provision of time for rebuttals. If the candidates were given two short rebuttals on each question that would both provide an opportunity for and also encourage refutation of the opposition's position. Neither the press conference format nor the interactive format either encourages or even really allows much opportunity for refutation. However, if there were two rebuttals on each question, then the candidates would be encouraged to attack the positions of their opponents (in order to force them into specific and therefore politically risky positions) and also defend their own positions. The second rebuttal is the key, because in it the candidate can use to his or her rhetorical advantage any failure of the opposition to deny a previous charge.

The resulting refutation also might provide information that would allow the people to better judge the intellectual quality of the candidates involved. If the public is to learn anything about the candidates as people, that learning will occur when the candidates are not simply replaying canned statements but are adapting to the arguments of the opposition. It is in the refutative component of debates that the people can learn most about the personal qualities of the candidates.

In sum, we believe that wherever possible the interactive format used in the 1984 Democratic primary debates should be avoided. Instead, a debate format that removes the press, provides the candidates with more time to explain their positions, and encourages refutation through the provision of multiple rebuttals should be utilized. These conclusions echo the point that Jeffery Auer made after the Kennedy-Nixon debates; campaign debates have been "counterfeit," not real debates. By making the format of campaign debates more like real debates, the political incentives facing the debaters could be altered in order to better fulfill the social functions of the debates.

Notes

- 1 Sidney Kraus and Dennis Davis, "Political Debates," in Handbook of Political Communication, ed. Dan Nimmo and Keith Sanders (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), p. 291.
- 2 Robert Erikson, Norman Luttbeg, and Kent Tedin, American Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1980), p. 205.
- 3 See Norman Cousins, "TV and the Presidency," Saturday Review 13 November 1976, p. 4.
- 4 Steven Chaffee and Jack Dennis, "Presidential Debates: An Assessment," in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 89. Also see Kraus and Davis, "Political Debates," p. 289.
- 5 Muskie is cited in James Cresser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 246.
- 6 Howell Raines, "TV Debate, the Great Campaign Equalizer," New York Times 27 January 1984, p. A14.
- 7 See Chaffee and Dennis, p. 79.
- 8 J. Jeffrey Auer, "The Counterfeit Debates," in The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960 A Reissue, ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 142.
- 9 Chaffee and Dennis, p. 98.
- 10 See Samuel Lubell, "Personalities vs. Issues," in The Great Debates, p. 151.
- 11 Linda Swanson and David Swanson, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the First Ford-Carter Debate," Communication Monographs 45 (1978), p. 349.
- 12 James Lamert et al, "The Effects of Viewing a Presidential Primary Debate," Communication Research 10 (1983), p. 167.
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- 15 Evron Kirkpatrick, "Presidential Debates: What Can We Learn From 1960," in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, p. 50.

16 Norman Lear, "Additional Comments," in With the Nation Watching (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1979), p. 15; Susan Hellweg and Steven Phillips, "Form and Substance: A Comparative Analysis of Five Formats Used in the 1980 Presidential Debates," Speaker and Gavel 18 (1981), p. 75.

17 See Melvyn H. Bloom, Public Relations and Presidential Campaigns (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), p. 31; Jeff Greenfield, Playing to Win (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), p. 209.

18 Stanley Kelsy, Political Campaigning: Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate (Washington, D.C.: Brookings: 1960), pp. 4-5, 17, 68-70.

19 Dudley Clendinen, "Format Showed Politics Can Be Good Television," New York Times 16 January 1984, p. B7.

20 Robert Goodman is cited in Clendinen, p. B7.

21 For the texts of the debates see "Excerpts From Transcript of Democratic Candidates' Debates," New York Times, 16 January 1984, pp. B8-B9; "Transcript of Democratic Candidates' Debate in New York," New York Times, 29 March 1984, pp. B9-B10; "Transcript of Louisville Debate Between Resgan and Mondale," New York Times, 9 October 1984, pp. A26-A29. Further references to these debates will be made in the texts in parens.

NEGATIVE POLISPOTS: MEDIATED ARGUMENTS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

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The contemporary political campaign in America is inextricably married to the vast television network which permeates society. The medium of television has become the primary source of information for the voter in an election.(1)

The reasons for television's high profile in the modern campaign are relatively obvious. First, television has such a dominant role as a purveyor of public information in most every social context.(2) Second, television is the most functional tool, in economic terms, for the candidate. With the medium, the candidate can reach the greatest number of voters at the least expense.(3) Finally, the major political parties have, over time, witnessed a marked attrition, in terms of strength and influence, of their once powerful social structure.(4)

The decline in party structure has caused or coincided with a decline in party loyalty.(5) The contemporary popularity of ticket-splitting and voter independence has meant that more and more voters make a voting decision extremely late in the campaign. The increasing number of undecided voters has created a greater demand for information about the candidates.(6)

This leaves the candidate for office with two options. The candidate can tell the voters more about him or herself, or the candidate can tell the voters more about the opponent. The work presented here focuses on political advertising as an extension of the latter premise.

For the purposes of this paper, negative advertising is defined as a spot that tells the voter less about why the candidate is fit to serve in office and more about why the opponent is unfit to serve. Ads that, in theme or structure, are intended for such a purpose are considered negative polisspots.(7)

This work proceeds from the Payne/Baukus trend summary of GOP senatorial spots from the 1984 national campaign.(8) Of the 81 GOP senatorial ads viewed in the study, the largest single group of spots - 28 - used attack strategies directed against

their opponent. For this reason, more in-depth examination of some of the negative advertising is pursued in this paper. The campaigns to be studied are in the states of Iowa, Illinois and North Carolina, chosen due to their high profile in the national press and the competitive nature of each race.

Purpose

The objective of this work is to examine the phenomenon of negative political advertising from a number of differing perspectives. A brief history of the negative campaign is followed by an investigation into questions of style and strategy and their broad implications as interpreted by the researchers. A more subjective perspective is provided by some of the actual maestros of the mediated debate within the negative polispot - the political consultants. Finally, a discussion ensues on some of the considerations that have been offered for effective management of the growing trend in usage of attack campaigns. Offered here is an examination into the strategic as well as ethical factors that surround the issue of negative political advertising as seen by the authors as well as other interested parties.

History of the Negative Polislot

Though the rise of negative advertising to the prominence it now enjoys is a contemporary phenomenon, we can find negative appeals in some of the earliest television polislots. Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates, in The Spot, credit the Democratic party with the first use of negative political advertising.(9) In the 1956 presidential campaign, Estes Kefauver was the spokesman in a number of spots that called Dwight Eisenhower to task for some of his statements made in the 1952 campaign.

Adlai Stevenson's reluctance to mix it up with Ike meant that Kefauver would be the team spokesman in the negative spots. Stevenson appeared only in the spots with a more positive spirit. There are a number of elements in these original negative spots which have survived in the present-day strategies for producing attack oriented advertising. The use of film of the opponent is often employed, in modern spots, in order to attack the opponent. Also, the use of a surrogate spokesman is more popular in negative spots, whereas, the candidate often speaks in more positive ads. In these early negative spots, Kefauver was clearly used as a surrogate for Stevenson.

Perhaps the most notorious use of attack techniques in the 1960's was Lyndon Johnson's "Daisy" spot which juxtaposed images of a small girl plucking daisies with those of a nuclear mushroom cloud. This advertisement so raised the ire of not only the Goldwater camp but the general public that 1,300 calls of protest were received at GOP headquarters the night of its first and only

airing. Spots like this one helped to successfully portray Barry Goldwater as dangerously comfortable with the idea of nuclear warfare. During the 1960's and early into the 1970's, direct personal attacks on television were especially popular. However, by the mid 1970's, the tone of the attacks softened markedly. Yet, if the ferocious tone of the attack spots subsided, the incidence of attack spots grew rapidly.(10) One important reason for such growth was the entry into the media arena of well financed political action groups. The *raison d'etre* for such groups was to attack particular candidates who did not advance their organization's political agenda.

The 1980 and 1984 election resulted in some of the most senior members of the senate - including George McGovern and Charles Percy - going down to defeat in the face of strong negative advertising campaigns. Many experts expect the negative trend in political advertising to continue. Lance Tarrance, in Negative Campaigns and Negative Votes, discusses the prevalence of negative advertising and suggests a possible scenario in which negative advertising may dominate media strategies in future campaigns:

Utilized only in the smallest of scales previous to 1980, it is likely that future elections at the congressional and U.S. Senate levels will witness a greater usage of negative theme campaigns as a result of a strong increase in the numbers of and abilities of single interest groups and their access to campaign-related technology. The emergence of this form of campaigning on a large scale represents a new chapter in the political campaigns in the United States, and will necessarily warrant additional close observation in order to understand how best to either utilize it or combat it effectively.(11)

The Negative Polislot - Winning the Mediated Debate in Iowa, Illinois, North Carolina

The three senate races explored in this work are considered to have been among the fiercest, in their negative tone, of the election. They exemplify a spiral effect in which one negative spot is answered with a second negative spot. Lance Tarrance cites five (5) ways of retaliating against a negative strike: 1) admit it (2) explain it (3) apologize for it (4) ignore it (5) attack the source. However, Bob Dow, media consultant to Iowa senator Tom Harkin, corroborates Tarrance's viewpoint that none of the five strategies are effective:

1) Admit it. In 1980, Iowa Senator John Culver used this strategy. In essence, Culver said. . . "yes, I'm a liberal. I admit it. And I'm proud of it." Culver lost. The problem is that a campaign only

has so much time and money to tell its story. If a campaign spends all its time and money telling the other side's story. . .it loses. It's like shooting at the other team's basket.

2) Explain it. Explaining takes more time and money than admitting. If you try to explain, you're not only shooting at the other team's basket. . . you're shooting their free throws, too.

3) Apologize for it. This is like scoring a basket for the other team, then running to the public address system and announcing, "Boy, was that stupid of me!"

4) Ignore it. Politics operates on a simple premise: GUILTY. People expect the worst. Thank you Richard Nixon.

5) Attack the source. Closer. . .but still no banana. In Tarrance politics, attacks come from a third party. . . NCPAC. Church tried to attack NCPAC. So, when the Idaho voters went to the polls, they despised NCPAC and its dirty politics. NCPAC wasn't on the ballot. Church was. The voters may have despised NCPAC, but they bought NCPAC's story and voted Church out of office. Attacking the source is like slugging the cheerleader.(12)

Instead, Dow offers a sixth strategy: to fight back with a negative spot attacking the opponent on one of his or her own weaknesses.(13)

Dow's reference highlights the primary strategy within the mediated debate, control of the agenda. With a negative attack, the perpetrator attempts to bring the agenda for argument on to his or her own home park. The topic of the negative is chosen because the perpetrating candidate perceives an advantage for debate. All five (5) of Tarrance's suggestions for retaliation call for the victim of the attack to wrestle with the opponent on the opponent's terms. By fighting back with a negative spot directed at one of the opponent's weaknesses, the candidate can attempt to change the debate agenda to conform to his or her own terms. The media debate, then, becomes a spiral in which each candidate, through negative spots, attempts to retake control of the agenda.

The Harkin-Jepsen race in Iowa illustrates one way to fight back:

Jepsen Spot

Video

Red Background... still photos of old fireman...older woman appear on the screen at appropriate times.

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
CONGRESSMAN TOM HARKIN...HE WANTS TO BE A SENATOR.

BUT HE HAS THE WORST ATTENDANCE RECORD OF ANY IOWA CONGRESSMAN.

HE CLAIMS TO CARE ABOUT OLDER IOWANS. BUT HE DIDN'T EVEN BOTHER TO VOTE ON FINAL PASSAGE OF THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT BILL.

AND WORSE YET, FAILED TO VOTE ON FINAL PASSAGE OF THE TWO BILLS TO SAVE SOCIAL SECURITY.

Type reads...IT BOTHERS US. IT SHOULD

THE THINGS WE'RE BEGINNING TO AND FIND OUT ABOUT TOM HARKIN REALLY BOTHERS US.

AND THEY SHOULD.

Harkin Spot

Video

Black background.

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
ROGER JEPSEN SAYS ATTENDANCE RECORDS SHOULD BE AN ISSUE IN THE IOWA SENATE RACE.

LETS LOOK AT THE FACTS.

Jepsen starts to wipe his brow.

THE DAY THE SENATE VOTED ON THE CHILD PROTECTION ACT...TO TOUGHEN UP CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS... ROGER JEPSEN MISSED EVERY ROLE CALL VOTE.

Super NO VOTE over sweating Roger.

95% under freeze of Harkin.

ACCORDING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY...TOM HARKIN HAS BEEN PRESENT THIS YEAR FOR 95% OF THE VOTES.

87% under freeze of Jepsen.

ROGER JEPSEN'S ATTENDANCE RECORD IS 87%...LOWER THAN ANY IOWA

MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

Black background...red "target letters"...ROGER JEPSEN...WRONG AGAIN. ROGER JEPSEN...(BUZZER SOUND) WRONG AGAIN.

Though Harkin does not change the issue for discussion, he changes the topic of debate from one of his own record to that of Jepsen's voting record. Harkin's spot reflects a sense of confidence that the candidate has the advantage on the issue of voting records. There is no reason, therefore, to change topics. Harkin's spot only takes the focus off himself and places it on Jepsen.

A Percy spot demonstrates an attempt to bring a new issue to the debate agenda hoping that it will evoke a sense of shock on the part of the voters and embarrassment on the part of the opponent, Paul Simon.

Percy Spot

Video

Freeze of Ayatollah Khomeini

Iranians running in street

Shot of American hostages

Iranians chanting in street...
American flag burning

American flag with yellow ribbon

Copy of Simon letter, keyed
window of Khomeini on left and
Simon on right

Shot of hostage

Keyed windows... Khomeini, left;
hostage, middle; Simon, right

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ORDERS THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN
EMBASSY IN TEHRAN.

SIXTY-THREE AMERICANS ARE HELD
HOSTAGE...

AS IRANIAN MOBS EXPLODE IN
HATRED FOR THE UNITED STATES.

AMERICA UNITES AGAINST IRAN.

BUT PAUL SIMON WRITES AN
OFFICIAL LETTER TO AYATOLLAH
KHOMEINI PRAISING HIM AS A
JUST AND HOLY MAN.

SIMON LABELS THE SEIZURE OF
SIXTY THREE AMERICAN HOSTAGES
AS MERELY A MISUNDERSTANDING.

IS THIS THE KIND OF FOREIGN
POLICY WE WANT FROM AN ILLINOIS
SENATOR?

This particular spot marked a change of course from the preceding media debates on the budget issue. The ad reflects an attempt on the part of the Percy campaign to alter the mediated debate agenda.

Simon attempted also to gain control of the mediated agenda with the use of an attack spot directed at Percy's perceived weakness on the grain embargo issue.

Simon Spot

Video

Reagan and Percy at outdoor
rally.

Spotlight on Percy.

Freeze of Simon

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
PRESIDENT REAGAN INDICATED LAST
MONTH THAT HE SHARPLY
CRITICIZED THE GRAIN EMBARGO
FOR HURTING THE ILLINOIS
ECONOMY.

BUT WAIT A MINUTE... ISN'T
THAT SENATOR CHARLES PERCY
NEXT TO HIM TAKING IN THE
APPLAUSE. WHAT'S HE DOING
THERE? CHARLES PERCY CAST THE
DECIDING VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE
GRAIN EMBARGO.

HOW SHORT DOES HE THINK OUR
MEMORIES ARE?

PAUL SIMON OPPOSED THE GRAIN
EMBARGO. AND HE'LL BE A
SENATOR WE CAN COUNT ON.

This volley of media spots illustrates the perpetual spiral effect in which one negative spot leads to another attack spot, as each candidate attempts to avoid sparring with the other on an issue in which he or she perceives to be at a disadvantage in the debate process.

The spots in the three races of North Carolina, Iowa and Illinois all contain elements of style that are often found in the classic negative spots.

All of the candidates refrain from appearing personally in any attacks on the other candidate. Like Eisenhower, contemporary politicians use surrogate announcers to speak for them fearing the possibility that the voters will perceive the attacking candidate negatively. None of the negative spots from the races examined contained attacks in which the candidate personally delivered the message on camera. In order to satisfy the legal requirement that the candidate appear in his/her polispots, the negative ads all concluded with a tiny picture and signature of the candidate.

The most popular stylistic technique employed footage of the

opponent against himself or herself. This technique was used by Jesse Helms in a unique ten second format.

Helms Spot

Video

Small keyed window graphic of Jim Hunt with his hand raised apparently voting. Also, newspaper headline reading "Hunt Votes Plan to Raise Taxes".

Cut to two keyed windows of Hunt; one speaking and one still.

Keyed windows of Hunt featured with graphics of the announcers message.

Using a similar stylistic strategy, Tom Harkin attempted to portray Roger Jepsen as incompetent.

Harkin Spot

Video

Freeze of Jepsen on left

Hog appears center top

Harkin freeze in upper right super INTRODUCED A BILL

Super LUNCH under Jepsen

Tractor approaches in upper center

Super ...AND A NAP under Jepsen

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
WHO VOTED TO RAISE OUR TAXES?
THE SAME JIM HUNT WHO SAYS...

JIM HUNT:
"I DO NOT PROPOSE THAT WE RAISE
TAXES".

ANNOUNCER:
YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS,
JIM!

Audio

ANNOUNCER:
SEEMS LIKE ROGER JEPSEN WOULD
SAY JUST ABOUT ANYTHING TO GET
THE VOTES OF IOWA'S FARMERS.

BUT LET'S LOOK AT THE FACTS.
(Hog snorts in Jepsen's ear)

LAST SPRING WHEN CANADIAN HOGS
WERE FLOODING OUR MARKETS ...
TOM HARKIN INTRODUCED A BILL TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

ROGER JEPSEN...HAD LUNCH WITH
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.
(Clatter of dishes...waitress
asks, "more tea?")

AND WHEN TWO IOWA FARMERS DROVE
A TRACTOR ALL THE WAY TO
WASHINGTON TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT
FARM DEBT...ROGER JEPSEN FELL

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freeze (w/ eyes closed)

Red target letters...
WRONG AGAIN

The technique used here is important for its value in enhancing the credibility of the attack ad. If a voter is exposed to actual footage of the candidate saying one thing and doing another, the likelihood is greater that it will be perceived as credible than if he is simply told of the candidate's inconsistency by a paid announcer.

The Campaign as Argument

The attack spots that appear in the three campaigns analyzed here express a perception of the political campaign as an argumentative conflict manifested through the mediated debate. In this dimension, the political campaign becomes simply a series of arguments to be won.

More important, from this perspective, than the salience of a particular issue to a voting decision, is the perception on the part of the voter that the candidate has won the argument. The subject of the attack spot is important only in as much as it contributes to a media confrontation that is winnable. In other words, the issue around which the argument is centered is less important than the public perception that the candidate has won the debate.

In choosing the topic for the attack spot, the candidate attempts to select an issue on which he or she can defeat the opponent. In the consideration process, the candidate attempts to assess the opponent's potential to counter an attack on a given issue. The candidate chooses the issue that is estimated to afford the least opportunity for the opponent to counter. The aim for the candidate is to ensnare the opponent into an argument which he cannot win.

Both Percy and Helms reflect this perspective in their spots concerning, respectively, Simon's stance on the Iran crisis and Hunt's support from New York. Jesse Helms employed what Tarrance labels a cross-pressure strategy, hoping to accentuate the age old North-South cleavage, by emphasizing the Yankee constituency of the "New York Committee to Elect Jim Hunt." (14) Charles Percy's mediated association of the Ayatollah Khomeini with his opponent, Paul Simon, was an awkward attempt to take advantage of the perceived inconsistency in values that would

ASLEEP. (Sound of snoring)

ROGER JEPSEN SEEMS TO THINK THAT
HE CAN FOOL IOWA'S FARMERS...

(Buzzer sound.)

WRONG AGAIN!

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move supporters away from the southern Illinois congressman. The Percy spot backfired.

It is possible that neither of these issues would have surfaced were they not raised by the two candidates. The question of their saliency to a voting decision is, of course, highly subjective. It is likely, however, that in North Carolina and Illinois, as in most of the nation, they ranked considerably lower on the voter agenda than economic issues. Yet, despite their likely low profile on the voting agenda of most North Carolinians and Illini, the perceived value of these two issues as winnable arguments may have been considerable.

The basic premise behind this perspective is that the public perception of an argument won has a value beyond the actual subject of that particular argument. Effectively, it provides an additional criterion to be considered in the voting decision. Even though a candidate may appear weak on a number of high-profile issues, the candidate can gain support as well as the appearance of momentum by picking an argument and winning it.

In line with this interpretation of the political campaign, the strategy for the candidate is to make the winning of the media debate as important a voting criterion as possible. The increasingly popular suggestion that the political campaign turns on questions of character suggests that such an objective may in fact be realistic.

Though Tarrance suggests in his article that contemporary attack campaigns are based less upon character assassination than past attacks, the root of any attack of the opponent is the suggestion that he or she is in some way, either because of incompetence, inconsistency or insincerity, unfit to represent the people. The central issue of any political campaign is the character of the candidates. Des Moines Register staff writer David Yepsen elaborates with respect to Iowa:

Iowans can't know all the positions the man they elect would take on the roughly 2,000 votes he will cast from 1985 to 1991. . . Many voters are looking for a candidate they can trust - a candidate of good character - to represent their needs and views. (15)

In a contest of character, the perception of being a winner can be attractive and, indeed, invaluable. The possibility exists, then, for the voter to be attracted to the candidate based on his or her appearance as a success in winning the mediated debate. The issue on which the attack spot is based then becomes important to the voter because it is on this point that the candidate is associated as the conqueror.

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A final consideration in the argument that transpires during prime time television respites is the possibility that the candidate has chosen an issue which the public rejects as either completely uninspiring, or, as in the case of Percy's Ayatollah spot, completely unfair. In Percy's circumstance, a relatively informed and understanding electorate sympathized with Simon's explanation of the unique events surrounding his correspondence with Khomeini. The issue did little, therefore, to arouse the public or attract media attention. In choosing the Iran issue, Percy attracted more public resentment toward himself, for what was considered a low blow, than he did toward the Simon campaign.

The races in North Carolina, Illinois, and Iowa reflect attempts on the part of the candidates to pick media fights with their opponents, and win them. In turn, candidates attempt to avoid entering into fights in which, they believe, they are disadvantaged. In this fashion, such elements of agenda control and the spiral effect become integral to a strategy for functioning effectively in the environment of the negative campaign.

The Attack Ad: The Consultant's Perspective

What are the predominant opinions on the negative polispot among consultants? Is it accepted as a legitimate tool of the campaign process? Are there agreed upon boundaries on subject matter and personal attacks? Who is responsible for ensuring the validity and propriety of content within the spots? Should further action be taken to curb use of this controversial political commercial? These and other pertinent questions are presented to some of the country's leading political consultants in the effort to better appreciate the philosophical underpinnings of today's negative polispot. Those interviewed include: Michael Goldman, Boston; Dan Payne, Boston; Harvey Englander, Newport Beach, CA; Bill Roberts, Los Angeles; Gerald Vento, Boston; and media critic Edwin Diamond, New York.

"The negative spot is essentially voter education with a sharp knife." (16)

Michael Goldman

Boston based Michael Goldman maintains that every campaign has within it "elements that demand a potential response." If during the course of the campaign the opposition's message is perceived to be effective in reaching voters, the astute candidate will develop "response spots specifically designed to check this persuasive appeal." Goldman points out that such response spots are usually classified as negatives, and play a vital legitimate role in the campaign process. Thus, there is nothing inherently unethical about the negative genre. There are, of course, the tainted relatives of response spots - innuendo, fabrication, and distortion. All are publicly shunned

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and readily dismissed as unethical and inappropriate in the campaign process.

Goldman concurs with Tarrance's thesis that negative ads are legitimate forms of campaign communication. Fellow Bostonian Dan Payne agrees: "Any serious candidate running for office must consider the use of negatives." (17)

Identifying the specific function of this strategy, Goldman states, "negative ads inform the public of issues and beliefs that sharply separate the potential candidate from the voter. Harvey Englander further enumerates on the value of such spots: "They identify inconsistencies in which the opponent has failed to represent the district's interests." (18) The best negative spots "do not themselves create an imperfection within the opposition," argues Payne. Instead they merely "play on pre-existing issues." For example, Senator Helms' ten-second negative polispot, highlighting the inconsistency of what his opponent, Jim Hunt "says" as compared with what he "does" on the highly salient issues of school prayer and taxes, serves to illustrate this strategy. The Helms' spot closes with an off-camera announcer chiding the Democrat's flip-flop: "You can't have it both ways, Jim!"

Providing the viewer mediated dramatizations of contested issues, the negative spot does, indeed, stimulate and intensify voter interest. But Payne cites side effects: "The campaign with the predominance of negative spots often becomes very personal." There is an increase in emotive interest within the public on a given issue. Goldman explains that often the entire campaign is skewed and interest on other pertinent issues neglected in the heavily dominated negative campaign.

Englander suggests that a prerequisite for the use of any negative spot against an opponent is the initial establishment of the candidate's own credibility. Goldman concurs: "The successful campaign must be integrated, there must be some positive spots - identification and argument ads." Lacking a carefully integrated strategy that employs both positive and negative spots, the candidate plays a high risk game. The public might perceive from the void of any positive programs that the only tack is one of tearing down the opponent. A backlash of support for the victim of this overly aggressive strategy can often result. Payne explains that voters sometimes view such ill-planned negative ads as "acts of desperation."

Goldman favors traditional wisdom on candidate usage of the attack spot. He finds challengers more apt to use the negative ad in the effort to "justify or reinforce a negative response to the incumbent." No incumbent believes he "is doing anything other than a sterling job," according to Goldman. Thus, the negative polispot provides the challenger the means to "cherry pick specific points and issues" judged fruitful enough to create

dissonance within the voter on the incumbent's record. In contrast, Payne maintains it is the issue rather than the candidate's status that invites use of negative spots. In open elections or close contests such as those studied in North Carolina, Illinois, and Iowa in 1984, Payne argues "the negative polispot is often predominant in the campaigns of both candidates in the on-going effort to erode the support of their opposition."

"I think I ought to have the right to lie to you if I think it will help me win." (19)

Bill Roberts

Critics view the negative ad as rife with questions of truth and ethics. (20) Others are outraged that Bill Roberts and other consultants publicly argue for no restrictions or rules in the political campaign. To many, political consulting is a meritocracy. One's reputation rises within the political arena accordingly with a winning record. There is intense philosophical debate on this ethical issue. Regarding truth of content in ads, Goldman believes that "fairness is in the eye of the beholder, as is the interpretation of facts." Payne asserts there to be at least "a smudge of truth" in most attack ads. Both disagree with Bill Roberts on no parameters or limits on the campaign's message; the consultant should never blatantly lie to the public. Advancing this philosophy, Englander places verification of facts and a well-researched message as the primary steps in building an attack spot's credibility and establishing its propriety. Yet, not all players in the political arena operate from this ethical base.

"Negative political campaigning is shaking our democracy off its foundation and its time we acted." (21)

Senator John Danforth

Responding to the possibility of legislation to curb use of negative spots, all consultants interviewed are adamantly opposed. They point out that one of the most extraordinary qualities of political advertising is its exclusion from the requirements of the truth and advertising laws. In addition, first amendment rights are cited as major stumbling blocks for passage of any legislation. According to Goldman: "Outrageous rhetoric is a fundamental right of every candidate, and any legislation would infringe upon this right of every American citizen."

These consultants maintain that the best jury to judge the propriety of attack ads is composed of those agents for whom the message has been so designed - the public. All express faith in

the growing sophistication of today's public in detecting untruths and innuendos in the negative polispot. Bill Roberts, who engineered Ronald Reagan and George Deukmejian's successful gubernatorial elections in California states: "You can't give the public b.s. today, because they are experts in picking out sincerity and the lack of it." Roberts admits that "winning is still numero uno," in any electoral effort. Furthermore, he argues that it matters not "whether I am moral or whether the candidate is moral." Instead, the final judgement rests with society's most important jury: "If the public says if you lie to me I am going to vote against you, if you do things that are immoral I will vote against you, this has an effect." The twenty-five year veteran of politics identifies the reciprocal influence of television and the mass media on the consulting community as the most feared and effective weapon in the effort to "clean up" the campaign process.

"If a campaign is based on lies and innuendos the public will find it out through the press and media."

Harvey Englander

All consultants interviewed favor a more activist press to expose parties guilty of exceeding truth or common decency in negative advertising. Ascribing to this viewpoint, Jerry Vento states, "If the fifth estate would exert more pressure and point out the questionable negative spot, or the fact that a message is inconsistent with the actual record, the whole process would be improved." (22) Media critic Edwin Diamond concurs, "The instances where the press has been the cop on the beat and identified questionable practices have witnessed the candidates, more often than not, pulling the spot in question." (23)

Yet, while the press can, and on occasions, has influenced a candidate's choice of polisspots, it has not done so to the satisfaction of some critics. In an attempt to meet this exigence, Senators John Danforth and Ernest Hollings introduced legislation in the U.S. Congress during the summer of 1985 to curb the use of the negative polisspot, Bill S-1310, The Clean Campaign Act. (24)

The Clean Campaign Act

Senator John C. Danforth, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, believes that advertising is "eroding our democratic process and creating apathy and cynicism among the public". (25) The main provisions of "The Clean Campaign Act" require a candidate personally to make any references to opponents in radio and television ads. If any reference to the opponent is not made personally by the candidate, that opponent will be awarded free time to respond to the spot. In the event that an independent political action committee or third party runs an ad opposing or

endorsing a candidate, the opponent will be awarded free response time.

Conclusion: Negative Advertising and the Advertising Cycle

The primary task of any advertising campaign is to attract attention. If attention is not aroused there is reduced probability that any carefully designed stimulus will be converted into an assimilated perception within the public. Until this process occurs, there is little likelihood that a person will be influenced by an advertisement. The ability of an ad to act as an attention directing device is greatly influenced by the nature and extent of the current advertising environment. In essence, the persuasive process is similar to a ground-figure relationship, i.e., the figure must be sufficiently different from the background in order to attract attention and ultimately, produce an effect. In advertising, this ground-figure relationship is often conceptualized as "background clutter". That is, a proliferation of other spots that tend to reduce the uniqueness of an ad and, therefore, reduce audience attention and impact. In theory and practice, any advertising technique is only maximally effective if it stands out from the rest of the advertising clutter. This concept suggests that the very proliferation of negative political advertising will reduce its attention attracting potential. In response, the evolutionary cycle will offer new techniques to once again entice the voter, suffering from overexposure to the negative polisspot or just plain turned off by the attack technique.

Negative political spots like other advertising techniques should cycle in and out of favor as a preferred tactic. Recent research by Garramone indicates that voters disapprove of negative political ads; they do not consider them truthful. (26) This, coupled with the increased prevalence of the technique, should check the negative spot's popularity.

While the Danforth-Hollings "Clean Campaign Act" does have merit, the process and effect of advertising in a highly competitive environment should, in itself, reduce the necessity of such controversial legislation.

Further investigation into the relative merit of positive versus negative campaign thematics in general can provide useful insight on the ability of polisspots to actually influence the outcome of an election. While it is important to note current trends and to discuss modes and practices of today's negative advertising, further study should also attempt to assess the overall effectiveness of this questionable technique.

Footnotes

1. See Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, American National Election Studies Sourcebook, (Cambridge, MA: 1980), Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.15, 5.16.

2. Otto Kleppner, Thomas Russell, and Glenn Verrill, Advertising Procedure, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 126.

3. Edmund W.J. Faison, Advertising: A Behavioral Approach for Managers, (New York: John Wesley, 1980), p. 580.

4. Robert Agranoff, The New Style in Election Campaigns, (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972), p. 8.

5. See Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and Joseph Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976)

6. V. Lance Tarrance, Negative Campaigns and Negative Votes: The 1980 Elections, (Washington: Free Congress Research and Educational Foundation, 1982), p. 17.

7. For other definitions of polispots, see Stuart H. Surlin and Thomas F. Gordon, "How Values Affect Attitudes Toward Direct Reference Political Advertising," Journalism Quarterly, 54 (1977), pp. 89-98. Also see, Tarrance, Negative Campaigns, p. 5.

8. J. Gregory Payne and Robert A. Baukus, "Trend Analysis of the 1984 GOP Senatorial Spot," paper presented at the McElroy Symposia, "Current Trends in Broadcast Advertising," University of Northern Iowa, April, 1985.

9. See Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates, The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1984).

10. Ibid.

11. Tarrance, Negative Advertising, p. 15.

12. Robert Dow, "The Jepsen-Harkin Senatorial Campaign - 1984", speech delivered at the McElroy Symposia, "Current Trends in Broadcast Advertising," University of Northern Iowa, April, 1985.

13. Ibid.

14. Tarrance, Negative Advertising, pp. 5, 35.

15. David Yepsen, Des Moines Register, September 17, 1984, p. 3a.

16. Information contained in a personal interview with Michael Goldman, July 25, 1985, with research assistant Peter Lodge. All subsequent comments from Goldman are from this interview.

17. Information contained in a personal interview with Dan Payne, July 25, 1985, with research assistant Peter Lodge. All subsequent comments from Payne, who is not related to any of the authors, are from this interview.

18. Information contained in a personal telephone interview with Harvey Englander, October 23, 1983. All subsequent comments from Englander are from this interview.

19. Information contained in a personal telephone interview with Bill Roberts, October 26, 1983. All subsequent comments from Roberts are from this interview.

20. USA Today, June 25, 1985, p. 10a.

21. Senator John Danforth, USA Today, June 25, 1985, p. 10a.

22. Information contained in a personal interview with Jerry Vento, October 19, 1983.

23. Information contained in a personal interview with Edwin Diamond, July 25, 1985.

24. USA Today, June 25, 1985, p. 10a.

25. Senator Danforth, USA Today, June 25, 1985, p. 10a.

26. Gina M. Garramone, "Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads," Journalism Quarterly, 16 (1984), p. 258

IDEOLOGICAL ANALOGONS: PORTRAITS OF 'TRUTH'

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In his 1976 *Esquire* article, "What I Saw at the Abortion," Richard Selzer, himself a surgeon, provides a narrative description of witnessing the saline abortion of a twenty-four week fetus. Selzer prefaces his narrative by declaring himself to be both an objective observer and a man of compassion. The epigram following his title reads, "The doctor observed, the man saw." This combination of dispassionate observation and 'true vision' allows Selzer to avoid the pitfalls of sophistic argument, of linguistic distortions. He sees--and reports on--things as they are: "I see. . . blood, disease, phlegm, and so on. I touch them to destroy them. But I do not make symbols of them. What I am saying is that I have seen and I am used to seeing." Emphasizing visual images, Selzer proceeds to set the stage for the abortion (four 'abortionists,' the woman, and himself) and to describe the insertion of the needle; then,

I see something!

It is unexpected, utterly unexpected, like a disturbance in the earth, a tumultuous jarring. I see something other than what I expected here. I see a movement--a small one. But I have seen it.

And then I see it again. And now I see that it is the hub of the needle in the woman's belly that has jerked. First to one side. Then to the other side. Once more it wobbles, is lugged, like a fishing line nibbled by a sunfish.

Again. And I know.

It is the fetus that worries the line thus. It is the fetus struggling against the needle. Struggling? How can that be? I think: that cannot be. I think: the fetus feels no pain, cannot feel fear, has no motivation. It is merely reflex.

I point to the needle.

It is a reflex, says the doctor. . . .
A reflex, the doctor says.

I hear him. But I saw something. I saw something in that mass of cells that understands that it must bob and butt. And I see it again! . . .

We are not six, I think. I think we are seven.

Selzer's 'witnessing' of pain, his 'seeing' the agonizing death throes of the fetus, verifies for him the essential humanity, the personhood, of the fetus: it must be counted as fully present as the mother, the doctors, the nurses, and Selzer. For Selzer, this 'sight' is incontrovertible 'proof,' virtually immune to the insidious seductions of 'argument':

Does this sound like argument? I hope not. I am not trying to argue. I am only saying what I've seen. The flick [of the needle in the womb, perceived as a harbinger of doom]. Whatever else may be said in abortion's defense, the vision of that other defense will not vanish from my eyes. What I saw I saw as that: a defense, a motion from, a effort away. And it has happened that you cannot reason with me now. For what can language do against the truth of what I saw?

Selzer's vivid account of the saline abortion dramatically reveals the persuasive power of the visual. His 'seeing' pain verifies for him the 'humanity' of the fetus, and his imagistic narrative gains persuasive power from its use of what Perry Miller has called "the rhetoric of sensation." In addition, Selzer's essay reveals the argumentative resource whereby a discursive proposition ("the fetus is a person") may be metonymically condensed ("pain is emblematic of personhood") and then re-presented in visual form (his 'seeing' of pain), which in turn 'steps out of' the argumentative fray created by the metaphorical and deconstructive currents of language: "For what can language do against the truth of what I saw?" Selzer's narrative does not itself 'step out of' the linguistic, since it recounts in imagistic language what he saw, and as narrative it remains completely within the swirling ambivalences of linguistic determination. Its structure, however, as a 'conversion experience,' occasioned by the 'sight' of the 'truth' of the 'pain,' and hence the 'humanity,' of the fetus, is suggestive of the significance of the relation between the propositional and the visual in argument and rhetoric.

The visual representation, and especially in our mass media society the photographic and film representation, of abstract argumentation is a legitimate, and perhaps even pressing, area of interest for those concerned with argumentation theory. This form of argument, this visual 'iconizing' of linguistic propositions, seems to be particularly powerful if considered in relation to the resources of ideological argument, as the Selzer piece dramatizes. This essay explores the relationship between ideologically infused arguments and their visual representation. The essay consists of two sections, one an

explication of theoretical principles and the other a case study guided by those principles. The first section will advance a conceptualization of 'ideology' as a cohesive and integrated argumentative structure which is 'inspired' by a core principle, an ideational 'hub' which 'controls' the argumentative stances of the ideology. This core proposition may, in turn, be 'condensed' or 'reduced' metonymically to a sensation which may be rendered visually present. The visual image is 'analogous' to, even while a reduction of, the ideational hub. The more 'analogous,' the more proportional, and the less symbolically mediated the visual image in relation to the ideational, then the more 'purely present,' the more completely removed from the realm of the linguistic, from the reaches of 'argument' as traditionally conceived, is the ideology. These visual reductions of ideological core principles will be called 'ideological analogons.' The second part of the essay will employ the structural conceptualization of 'ideology' developed in part one in an explication of the ideological analogons of the pro-life movement. Of particular concern are the photographic and film representations of the fetus in the womb which purport to 'show' 'pain' and hence, through a variety of metonymic 'reductions,' to prove the 'humanity,' the 'personhood,' of the fetus. The film "The Silent Scream," and the controversy surrounding it, will be used as representative of that mode of argument.

I.

To advance a conceptualization of 'ideology' as a recurrent and recognizable argumentative form is to focus the discussion on the characteristic structural features of various 'ideologies' as they present themselves in public discourse. It is, in other words, to treat 'ideology' as a special case of language-use and argument. Ideology does not exist outside of the realm of the linguistic but rather is created by, and propagated through, language. 'Ideology,' then, is a linguistic, argumentative structure, and as such it should be studied through modes of analysis derived from a consideration of language in general. This paper will approach 'ideology' in that manner; that is, rather than grounding 'ideology' in social action, including history, I will treat 'ideology' as a special case of language use which attempts, through recurrent and recognizable argumentative and rhetorical strategies, to insulate itself from the deconstructive undercurrents of the reflexive nature of language, to privilege itself above the *in quoque*. Specifically, this section of the essay will advance three theoretical propositions: 1) 'Ideology' may profitably be conceived of as an identifiable argumentative structure, typified by four related, but theoretically distinct, argumentative 'strategies.' 2) Visual representations of the ideational 'genius' of an ideology begin to remove the ideology from the realm of linguistic

disputation and to insulate it from argumentative assault. 3) Ideological analogons may be recognized which function as a visual representation, or condensation, of the ideology. These ideological analogons provide a methodological perspective by which, through a kind of 'tacking back and forth,' the critic can discover the ideational hub and structural coherence of the ideology.

In considering ideology as a special instance of language use which is characterized by recurrent and predictable argumentative strategies, I will appropriate Burke's perspective that the 'perfection,' or 'end-of-the-line,' of a linguistic category may contain, dramatically speaking, the 'essence' of that category. Following that tradition, the delineation of the four characteristic strategies of ideological argument considers those strategies in their 'perfected' form, and as such it would be problematic to point to historical individuations which achieved these forms 'perfectly.' Recognition of the 'perfected' structure of ideological argument, however, allows subsequent recognition of arguments which participate in the ideological, or even those which are suggestive of 'incipient' ideologies which have yet to emerge full-blown on the social landscape. With this in mind, the four characteristic strategies may be described in the following manner:

- 1) Ideology contains an ideational unitary principle which, although logically prior to the ideological argument, may in fact not be 'discovered' until such argument approaches its own 'perfection.'
- 2) Ideology is characterized by a terminological penchant to encompass, and thus to sublimate and/or dismiss, competing systems of explanation.
- 3) Ideological systems are self-contained and self-authenticating; that is, ideological terminology is self-referential, turning all questions of legitimacy inward toward the unitary principle.
- 4) The ideational hub, or the unitary principle, as it approaches a 'perfected' state, tends to become 'self-present' through its instantiation in sensory and imagistic emblems, which though infused with the ideational principle of the ideology are nonetheless in themselves non-linguistic and thus insulated to some degree from argument and direct challenge. This 'self-presence' of what was heretofore an abstract linguistic proposition may be either 'mythologized,' in the sense that the image may achieve a deistic presence, or

'de-mythologized,' in the sense that the visual presence is, or may metonymically substitute for, the ideational. The 'perfection' of this imagistic representation would be in photographic and documentary film analogons of the ideational hub.

Before proceeding with a more detailed discussion of the fourth strategy, especially the theoretical relation between the linguistic and the visual, it seems appropriate to offer a brief elaboration of the four strategies which are viewed as constitutive of a formalistic conceptualization of ideology.

The first argumentative resource, or strategy, characteristic of ideology, that of evolving an ideational unitary principle, contains three implications pertaining to the form of ideology. The first is that ideology exists in the realm of ideas and in the realm of symbolic action, not in the realm of social action. This harkens back to de Tracy's original formulation of ideology, and, as will be suggested below, just as de Tracy's "science of ideas" was soon translated into social theory this conception of ideology as symbolic structure must eventually lead toward an understanding of social action and culture, it is nevertheless theoretically appropriate to start with the abstract, idealized perfection of the ideology in itself. The distinction is that although ideological argument might have social impact, the 'essence' of the ideology is not in the effect ~~per se~~ but rather in the argument proper, and this leads back toward symbolic form. The second implication is that ideology revolves around a unitary principle, or an ideational hub. Burke makes this argument in his explication of the types of association which are constitutive of identification; the third type of association, "the 'ideological,'" is predicated upon the recognition that there are

distinct, specialized expressions, all derived from the same generating principle, hence all embodying it, without the need of direct 'interactive' borrowing. . . . For, given sufficient discernment and expressiveness on the part of the critic, such a unitary principle should lead itself to statement in terms of an idea. And it would be 'prior' to the economic in the sense that it would be more general, so that the economic behavior, like all other modes of expression, would in its peculiar way manifest the same character.

The ideational hub, or the logically prior unitary idea, functions within the ideology as the "ultimate term." Although the unitary idea is logically prior to its implication in social action, that is although ideology is logically prior to the cultural embodiment of and action in

accordance with it, the recognition of the unitary idea may come temporally after social action 'motivated' by it. This leads to the third implication: ideology often, although not necessarily is 'discovered' in defense of social or cultural actions. Ideology often functions as an ideational rationalization of, justification or 'apology' for, what has occurred, is occurring, or seems imminent. From one perspective, this makes ideology appear as a tool of the elite, as a means of social control and as an exercise in and of power. From a 'dramatic' perspective, however, focusing on the linguistic structure of motives rather than presumed a priori social or class motives, such 'apologia' serve to illuminate the argumentative resources of the ideology. They may function as definitional 'aria,' or as the 'hitting upon' a definition which, as Burke writes of Aristotle's definition of 'tragedy,'

so sums things up that all the properties attributed to the thing defined can be as though 'derived' from the definition. In actual development, the definition may be the last thing a writer hits upon. Or it may be formulated somewhere along the line. But logically it is prior to the observations which it summarizes. Thus, insofar as all the attributes of the thing defined fit the definition, the definition should be viewed as 'prior' in this purely nontemporal sense of priority.¹³

This perspective, besides forming a basis for a structural or formal understanding of ideology, also 'stands on its head' arguments for the directive force of history, for historical forces are the products of definitional recreation which may be evident, or existent, only retrospectively. In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke suggests that 'ideology' is evident in "that 'invasion' whereby material history is derived from 'spirit.'" And, in his response to Jameson, Burke further argues, "The distinction between ideas as causes and ideas as caused doesn't look quite so clear if, along logological lines, one views both a title like 'Providence' and a title like 'dialectical materialism' as 'god-terms.'" The appropriate response, Burke concludes, is the recognition that 'ideas' and 'terms' "are not merely 'derived' from material conditions; they are positively 'creative' of material conditions. In this sense, a theory of 'consciousness' as historically conditioned would not be accurate enough. Rather, we must study the 'human condition' from a theory of terminology in general."¹⁵ Or, in respect to ideology, from a view of what constitutes ideology in itself; that is, as a special case of terminology, ideology must be studied to determine what is unique in the structure and functioning of its linguistic and argumentative configurations.

The second characteristic strategy of ideology is that it 'encompasses' competing systems of explanation. Another way of phrasing this is that for its own evaluation, ideology avoids semantic 'true/false' standards which judge on the basis of non-ideological perceptions of reality; rather, the terminological structure of an ideology is such that it engulfs counter-arguments, re-casts them in its own perspective, and, through this, either dismisses them as irrelevant or claims them as additional evidence of the truthfulness of the ideology. In this encompassment, ideology is metaphorical and, to that extent, poetic in its formulation. Ideology is a perspective through which to view and interpret the world, and the better able the perspective is to account for all observations, the more 'pure' the ideology. Such engulfing metaphorical constructions defy evaluation by any sort of objective 'truth criterion,' as Burke observes in "Semantic and Poetic Meanings":

'Poetic' meanings, then, cannot be disposed of on the true-or-false basis. Rather, they are related to one another like a set of concentric circles of wider and wider scope. Those of wider diameter do not categorically eliminate those of narrower diameter. There is, rather, a progressive encompassment.

The more encompassing the ideology, the greater its explanatory power and, simultaneously, the more impervious it becomes to falsification. The most encompassing, the largest of the concentric circles, and thus the most perfect metaphorical construction, tends to become hypostatized; the perfect metaphor, the perfect ideology, has the appearance of undeniable truth, for it encompasses and accounts for all competing explanations. This, of course, reverses the classic Marxist interpretation of 'ideology' as some sort of "false consciousness." From 'inside' an ideology, that ideology must appear as truth, or as 'non-ideological' in a traditional sense.

The third strategy, by integrating the formal characteristics of the previous two, provides a further basis for the claim that to an adherent ideology must appear as truth. Specifically, in a perfected ideology, the unitary principle, from which the encompassing terminology is derived, infuses every element in the ideological structure such that, strictly speaking, the entirety of it becomes self-referential and, hence, tautological. All questions of the legitimacy of, for example, the encompassment of a particular counter-argument thus become referenced inward, toward the unitary principle; from this perspective, at its 'outer edge' of argumentative defenses, the ideology's strategic resource is to recycle its own arguments and the counter-arguments through its ideational

core, and the unitary principle thus re-infuses all elements of the argument and in that sense validates the ideology's claim. The process is somewhat analogous to Burke's description of a materialization/spiritualization cycle in language in general: in "On Words and The Word," Burke argues that we begin with words derived from the empirical realm of our everyday experiences. These soon become analogized to the spiritual realm, but even in subsequent 'de-analogizing' they are nonetheless 'inspired.' This materialization/spiritualization cycle is compared with Plato's Upward and Downward Ways:

... first, there is the 'Upward Way' from 'lower terms' to a unitary transcendent term conceived 'mythically' (analogically); and then there is a reversal of direction, a 'Downward Way,' back to the 'lower' terms with which the dialectician began his climb; but now the 'lower' terms are viewed as having become modified by the unitary principle encountered en route. The secular, empirical terms are 'infused by the spirit' of the 'transcendent' term.

If the analogy is applied to the argumentative structure of an ideology, then it should become evident the sort of cycling-through which I have in mind. The outer-circles of the encompassing ideology are continually referenced to, and thereby re-infused with, the ideational god-terms, which, even as 'transcendent' terminologies, function as ideological hubs or centers.

The final strategy of the perfected ideology concerns the transformation, or the condensation, of the ideational into the imagistic and mythic; through this transformational process, ideology gains social force. Once mythologized in this specific sense, ideology provides the 'tyrannizing image' which solidifies the beliefs of a culture and produces cultural homogeneity.¹⁸ It is at this point that, in Burke's description, ideology descends like a god to earth and takes up "its abode in a body," making that "body hop around in certain ways" although "that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology happened to inhabit it."¹⁹ Ideology, at this point, is far advanced from the abstract "science of ideas," for now those ideas are emblemized, stamped into the culture, and repeatedly enacted in the ongoing social drama. In a sense, these images represent true ideographs²⁰ in that they provide summational 'pictures' of the ideational hub of the ideology. These images 'step out of' the ideology proper; they become engraved in the culture, again relatively impervious to argumentative assault. They are the icons of the culture, the "reductions of the 'pure idea' to terms of image and fable" and myth.²¹ These graphic embodiments of the unitary principle contain the ideological

'germ,' and a participant in the culture can 'work backwards' from the image to the ideological principle (indeed, this may represent one avenue by which ideology becomes articulated only after the incipient culture, here borrowing Weaver's use of that term, has 'backed into it'). Burke writes,

For a way of living and thinking is reducible to terms of an 'idea'--and that 'idea' will be 'creative' in the sense that anyone who grasps it will embody it or represent it in any mode of action he may choose. The idea, or underlying principle, must be approached by him through the sensory images of his cultural scene. But until he intuitively grasps the principle of such an imaginal clutter, he cannot be profoundly creative, so far as the genius of that 'idea' is concerned. For to be profoundly representative of a culture, he will imitate not its mere insignia, but the principle behind the ordering of those insignia.²²

That principle constitutes the ideational core of the ideological structure, and the intuitive 'discovery' of the ideational in the emblematic might well constitute the 'mythic' dimension of the imagistic. Through ideology's instantiation in image it acquires greater social force and, by virtue of its non-linguistic 'concretization,' greater immunity to counter argument. In this relationship, it acquires a motivational force separate from, on a different order than, the motivational force of ideology proper.²³

To appreciate more fully the 'supplemental' motivational and persuasive force of the visual, it is necessary to examine the nature of linguistic predication. Language operates through signifying structures which reference things which they are not; or, as Burke writes, "Language, referring to the realm of the non-verbal, is necessarily talk about things in terms of what they are not--and in this sense we start out beset by a paradox."²⁴ Given this quandry, language, "to be used properly, must be 'discounted.'" We²⁵ must remind ourselves that. . . the word is not the thing."²⁵ For Burke, this essential paradox is explicable as the principle of negativity:

The paradox of the negative, then, is simply this: Quite as the word 'tree' is verbal and the thing tree is non-verbal, so all words for the non-verbs must by the nature of the case, discuss the realm of the non-verbs in terms of what it is not. Hence, to use words properly, we must spontaneously have a feeling for the principle of the negative.²⁶

Infused with, and generated by, this principle of negativity, human language can never be fully present; that

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is, linguistic meaning, the signified, is never fully congruent with linguistic form, the signifier.

In the Derridean critique of language, this same paradox is pursued in different terms. Derrida interprets language as an unstable intertextual interpenetration of signifiers which produces only the shimmerings of traces, of signification. Meaning is necessarily indeterminate: no sign dominates, or 'theologically' commands, the possibilities of meaning. There is only intertextual play, which charts the deconstructive undercurrents of language, always retracting the tide of linguistic assertion in the undertow of negation. The signification of a term is always something other than itself; the meaning is absent, is other. This 'otherness' in language, this duplicity, reminiscent of Burke's principle of negativity, always places the linguistic in the realm of argument. Linguistic assertions can always be deconstructed; they are, in fact, always already deconstructed. There is no privileged concept or position outside of the play of signifiers, and it is in this sense that deconstruction, as a critical system, is open to the *in quoque*, is itself already deconstructed. As Derrida puts it, "the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. This is what the person who has begun the same work in another area of the same habitation does not fail to point out with zeal."²⁷ This doubleness of linguistic assertion posits propositions and simultaneously erodes the univocality, the very assertiveness, of the propositions. Within the realm of the linguistic, the play of signifiers, the doubleness, the negativity, of language itself, guarantees the possibility of disputations of claims and reasoning, of, in a word, argument. The projection, the infusion, of the propositional into the imagistic, however, radically alters the prospects for argument.

The sort of reduction of the propositional to the visual which I have in mind is an analogical reduction; that is, as much as possible, the 'meaning' or 'interpretation' of the visual should be congruent with the image; it should require little, if any, supplemental code for its interpretation. There is no 'negative' to this type of visualization; there is no doubleness, no deconstructive undercurrent: the visual image simply is. Dyer, following Barthes, writes of these as 'iconic signs,' and her example is the portrait: "Photographic images look like the thing, place, or person being represented. . . , and the signifier-signified relationship is one of resemblance or likeness. A portrait of a person is an obvious example of an iconic sign, because the picture resembles that person."²⁸ As Barthes has observed, such iconic signs suggest a "relationship between thing signified and image signifying" which is analogical, or "quasi-tautological," but not 'arbitrary' and digital, as is the case with linguistic signifiers.²⁹ In its purest form, the iconic image is a 'denoted image,' which "can

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appear as a kind of Edenic state of the image; cleared utopically of its connotations, the image would have become radically objective, or, in the last analysis, innocent.³⁰ That is, the Edenic image is 'perceived,' not 'interpreted.' It does not, at any rate, require a sophisticated code for its interpretation. For Barthes, the photograph is the purest, most Edenic, of iconic signs:

In the photograph--at least at the level of the literal message--the relationship of signified to signifiers is not one of 'transformation' but of 'recording,' and the absence of a code clearly reinforces the myth of photographic 'naturalness': the scene is there, captured mechanically, not humanly (the mechanical is here a guarantee of objectivity).³¹

The iconic sign, the Edenic image, is objective; it is recognizable, meaningful, in itself, requiring no sophisticated supplemental code for its interpretation. The photographic image is 'present' in itself, although as Barthes' writings suggest it is a presence in a peculiar sense: it is "not a consciousness of the being-there of the thing (which any copy could provoke) but an awareness of its having-been-there;" that is, "there is the always stupefying evidence of this is how it was, giving us, by a precious miracle, a reality from which we are sheltered." "What we have," concludes Barthes, "is a new space-time category: spatial immediacy and temporal anteriority, the photograph being an illogical conjunction between the here-now and the there-then."³² Curiously, a film, which lacks the Edenic qualities of a photograph by virtue of its necessary implication in a sequencing of events, in a narrative structure, and yet for that same reason, attains a greater sense of historical currency, or temporal presence. Film "can no longer be seen as animated photographs: the having-been-there gives way before a being-there of the thing." Barthes speculates that as a result of precisely this difference, viewers are better able to identify with, to project themselves into, film.³³

In our helter-skelter, mass media culture, of course, no image is really innocent; no photograph is truly Edenic, and it is here that the relationship between the linguistic and the visual becomes increasingly complex and nebulous. Our culture 'captions' the iconic for us; our perceptions, even the most rudimentary ones, are infused with, framed by, the configurations of our cultural milieu. We are still, and more than ever, a civilization of writing.³⁴ In this sense, culture, and ideology, tend to 'caption' photographs for us, and this 'captioning' moves toward narration as the still-photos of photography move into the sequences of film.³⁵ The relation between iconic image and 'caption,' however, is a reciprocal one: even as the most innocent,

Edenic, and pure iconic image (the "message without a code") necessarily, and paradoxically, supplements itself, or captions itself in a connotative sense (that is, provides a level of meaning "in addition to the analogical content itself," as in the example of photographic style and the cultural connotations attendant to various styles)³⁶ so too do overt 'captions' or narrations frame, and control, the possibilities of meaning for the image. That is, the 'meaning' of the image, even the Edenic image, moves into the linguistic, cultural, and ideological, and the 'meaning' of the linguistic, cultural, and ideological moves into the image. Each conditions the other. In an appropriation of Barthes' terminology, each has the potential function of 'anchoring' the other. In consideration of the function of the linguistic message in relation to the iconic, Barthes finds that the linguistic limits, or controls, the polysemous possibilities of meanings in images; that is, the linguistic anchors the range of meaningful interpretations of the image. The ideological, for example, "remote-controls" a believer "towards a meaning chosen in advance."³⁷ The converse seems equally true: the image, especially an Edenic image or a film representation, may implicate the observer in an interpretive web of ideological configurations. That is, the more Edenic a photograph, or the greater the presence attained in a film, the more that photograph or film controls the range of linguistic possibilities attributable to it, the more it anchors the interpretive process. When an iconic image attains a vividness, a sense of its own self-presence which drastically curtails the range of meanings, and when that 'self-present' meaning is tied-in to an ideological structure, then the observer risks being seduced by the entirety of the ideological edifice. Thus, the image may be, in analogous form, the ideational hub of an ideology. This cross-current produces a margin of overlap, or a grey area, between the digital and the analogical, between the linguistic and the visual, and it is in this area of overlap that we find 'ideological analogons.'

An ideological analogon is a visual representation, most purely a photographic or film image; it is 'structured' in such a manner, either in its own composition or through relatively direct labeling and interpretation ('captioning'), that it is proportional with and analogous to ideological core principles. The visual 'contains' through the reductive powers of metonymy the ideational genius of the ideology. The success of the ideological analogon seems to depend both upon how clear and self-present the images are and upon how proportional, or analogous, the images are with the ideological. That is, just as a portrait may be photographic or impressionistic, so the image of an analogon may be more or less self-present or Edenic. Similarly, an analogon may vary in its proportionality to the ideological. The rhetorical

effectiveness of the ideological analogon would seem to vary along those two dimensions.

For the believer of the ideology, the images appear as 'incontestable,' 'incontrovertible,' 'indisputable,' 'naked' 'truth.' The visual is not only a portrait of truth; for the ideologue, it is the truth. The ideologue is now essentially beyond the linguistic, above the play of language and the fray of argument. For the non-ideologue, the image is seductive: once you 'see' it, that is 'see' even the barest analogy between what is visually present and a 'caption' or interpretive frame which participates in the configuration of ideological principles, then some small portion of the ideology has been 'proven,' has been seen. This harkens back to Selzer's epigram: the doctor, the detached, de-humanized technician, observes, but "the man," a compassionate participant in our culture, 'sees.' He 'sees' an analogy between what is visually present during the abortion and how the pro-life ideology 'captions' that vision; that is, he 'sees' the 'humanity' of the fetus. In the case of this epigram, of course, to 'see' is to be a 'man,' linguistically re-affirming the virility of the pro-life stance and, incidentally, Selzer's own humanity, since at least some will grant 'man' the status of a variant of 'person.' In "The Silent Scream," as we will see, to see movement as visually present is to have a 'pure' observation (assuming for the moment that movement is indeed clearly visible), but as soon as movement is 'linked-upward' with 'pain' or 'purpose,' then the 'humanity' of the fetus is also seen. There is a 'metonymy-in-reverse' or a working backward from the image to the ideology. In this sense the non-ideologue who 'sees' may be an incipient ideologue.

II.

In his introduction of "The Silent Scream" before its national broadcast on WTBS-Atlanta on February 17, 1985, the Rev. Jerry Falwell exhorted his viewers:

Imagine. What you're about to see, the nation has never seen before. We've always maintained that if the nation could see--not hear about--see the destruction of human life in the womb the same way that we were shown the Holocaust of the Jews by Hitler, or the starving little children in Ethiopia, the heart of America would open up and say, "Do something!"³⁶

As Falwell indicated, the uniqueness of "The Silent Scream" is that it purports to be the often spoken-of "window to the womb."³⁹ It allows viewers to 'see' the actual abortion of a 12-week fetus, to see, in the words of Ronald Reagan, who "endorsed" the film, the "unmasking" of abortion's "brutal nature."⁴¹ Reagan declared, "It's been said that if every

member of Congress could see that film, they would move quickly to end the tragedy of abortion, and I pray that they will."⁴² The act of seeing is presumed to be tantamount to the act of believing: for pro-life advocates, the visual proof contained in "The Silent Scream" has, in the words of the film's narrator Dr. Bernard Nathanson, "convinced us that beyond question the unborn child is simply another human being, another member of the human community, indistinguishable in every way from any of us."⁴³ And this seems to be the central claim of the film: the fetus is a human being, a person.⁴⁴

The persuasive strategy which is important for our present venture is the attempt in "The Silent Scream" to visualize the concept of 'human life.' My examination will proceed by: first, briefly suggesting that the proposition that "the fetus is a human being" is the ideational core of the pro-life ideology; second, positing that the concept of 'human life' may be metonymically reduced to sensations of 'pain' and the physical resemblances and proportionalities; third, suggesting that "The Silent Scream" attempts to instantiate resemblances and, especially, 'pain' in the ultrasound images of the fetus during the abortion; and, fourth, offering some evaluations of "The Silent Scream" generated from the preceding theoretical development of ideological analogons.

The proposition that the fetus is a living human being is the ideational hub of the pro-life ideology; from the 'genius' of that core assertion the remainder of the right to life ideology radiates out like the spokes on a wheel. The "actual gut of the case," as Dr. Nathanson put it, is "whether" abortion is the destruction of a living human being or not.⁴⁵ Once the fetus is granted equal status as a living, human person, "indistinguishable in every way from any of us," then the associated claims of the right to life ideology--e.g., abortion is murder, abortion is like euthanasia, abortion is the American Holocaust, etc.--all follow automatically. If a person becomes fully convinced that the fetus, even as early as, say, 12-weeks, is fully and equally human, then abortion-on-demand becomes a moral impossibility. The rhetorical challenge of the right to life advocates is, at its most fundamental level, to convince its audience that the fetus is a human being, a person.

That which constitutes a human being, that is his or her humanness, remains a matter of question. Answers to "What is it to be human?" have certainly varied, but, it seems, for the most part, attempts to define 'human' have approached it through consideration of topics such as body, mind, and soul. That is, if a 'human' consists of both a distinct form (a recognizable body) and a distinct substance (the amorphous amalgam of mind and soul), then that which

possesses those same attributes must also be 'human.' While this is tautological, it is so by reduction: it leads toward the metonymic substitution of observable traits for abstract conceptions, such as 'humanness.' In the right to life movement, 'humanness' seems to have been reduced to the lesser abstractions of physical resemblance and 'pain,' which can, in turn, be reduced to, and visually represented as, physical proportionality and movement.

The reduction of 'humanness' to resemblance and 'pain' requires some explication. The reduction stems out of the mind/body dualism (or even the trinity of body/mind/soul, with 'pain' emblematic of both mind and soul). The reduction of the 'body' to 'physical resemblances of the body' and, in turn, to 'images proportional to the body' seem fairly self-evident: that which looks human is human.⁴⁷ The movement from mind/soul to 'pain,' however, requires some development, both historically and argumentatively. The national attention given to the issue of 'pain' escalated dramatically following Ronald Reagan's first speech as an officially declared candidate for re-election. In that headline-making speech, Reagan declared, "Medical science doctors confirm that when the lives of the unborn are snuffed out, they often feel pain--pain that is long and agonizing."⁴⁸ The pro-choice response was swift, vigorous, and, for the most part, based upon a definition of 'pain' which distinguished between reflex responses and reactions which are, in the words of Dr. Ervin Nichols of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, "in any way interpreted by the fetus as pain."⁴⁹ Reagan responded to the criticism by referring to a 1981 essay in the Human Life Review,⁵⁰ and the issue of pain began to gain prominence as a major issue in the abortion controversy.

In the article to which Reagan alluded, law professor John T. Noonan, Jr. argues that we normally know "whether someone is in pain" by the person telling us "that he or she is suffering."⁵¹ Since the 'unborn' do not possess language, how then can we tell whether or not they feel pain? Noonan suggests that we look to sense receptors, which will provide signals:

By what point do such receptors exist? To answer this question, the observation of physical development must be combined with the observation of physical behavior. As early as the 56th day of gestation,⁵² the child has been observed to move in the womb.

Based on this reduction of pain to movement, Noonan declares, "It would seem clear that the reaction of the unborn to stimuli like light and pressure are the motivational responses we associate with pain." As a result, "there is as much reason to believe that the unborn

are capable of pain as that they are capable of sensation."⁵³ Noonan ends his argument for equating pain with sensation and movement by suggesting an empathetic relationship between the observation of reactions in another and what those reactions would mean in us.⁵⁴ Noonan's equation of 'reaction' and 'pain,' and his invitation for the observer to project himself or herself into the place of the fetus, has remained representative of the right to life argument on the pain issue.⁵⁵

The pro-life ideology reduces 'pain' to movement away from noxious stimuli, but why is pain itself such an important issue, one important enough for Ellen Goodman to declare as "at the center of the abortion dilemma"?⁵⁶ One obvious reason is that it invites the sort of empathetic projection and identification which Noonan encouraged. Another is that, in the eyes of some pro-lifers, it reverses the issue of compassion and makes the pro-choice advocates seem unfeeling.⁵⁷ Perhaps more fundamentally, however, reaction to noxious stimuli imply a purposefulness in the fetus, a sense, even, of impending doom, of death. Nathanson, in his narration of the abortion, describes the reactions of the fetus to the suction tip, even before the tip makes direct physical contact with the fetus:

You will note, that as the suction tip . . . moves toward the child, the child will rear away from it and undergo much more violent, much more agitated movements. The child is now moving in a much more purposeful manner. Its orientation changes from time to time; it is rearing again here.⁵⁸

Death approaches, and the fetus recoils. There is an omniscience in its 'recognition' of impending doom, and what could be more emblematic of 'humanness' than the anguish generated by the recognition of mortality and death? By the equation of movement with pain with purposeful behavior in response to the anticipation of death, the right to life ideology has founded a metonymic chain linking observables, such as resemblances and movement, with humanness.

"The Silent Scream" attempts to instantiate the linkage of observables with humanity in visual images which are undeniable, which, in the words of Michael Linzey in his introduction to The Silent Scream, leave "absolutely no doubt about what has been portrayed in the film. A healthy, twelve-week-old fetus has been ripped limb from limb, right before the eyes of the viewer." The visual evidence is, for Linzey,⁵⁹ self-evident: "No one can deny this, and no one does." The primary ideological analogon in "The Silent Scream" is in the real-time ultrasound imaging of the actual abortion; it is in the ultrasound image that we 'see' the child rear in pain, that we 'see' purposive behavior. Nathanson provides a narrative description of the events

which we 'see' in the ultrasound imaging. The following excerpt accompanies the visual images of the abortion:

Now the suction tip has not actually touched the child, even though the child is extremely agitated, and moving in a violent manner. . . . It is only after the fluid has been broken, the sac disrupted, that the tip will actually come against the child. . . . Once again, we see the child's mouth wide open in a silent scream. . . . This is the silent scream of a child threatened imminently with extinction. Now the heart rate has speeded up dramatically, and the child's movements are violent at this point. It does sense aggression in its sanctuary. It is moving away; one can see it moving to the left side of the uterus in an attempt, a pathetic attempt, to escape the inexorable instruments which the abortionist is using to extinguish its life.⁸⁰

The description is clearly one of a sentient being trapped in a helpless condition and doomed to destruction. The passage clearly reveals the relationship between movement, pain, and humanity. The critical question, however, is, "How self-present, how Edenic, are the images?" Although the Rev. Jerry Falwell maintains that "you will not need a voice-over to tell you what is happening as that precious little human being is destroyed and literally annihilated, and is racing away, in that restricted environment, from the tools of death that are reaching for that infant,"⁸¹ this critic finds that the primary persuasive quality of "The Silent Scream" derives from its narrative 'captioning' of the film and not from the images *per se*. In what follows, it will be suggested that "The Silent Scream" fails to instantiate successfully the images of resemblance and pain and that it is for this reason that the film has failed to live up to the prediction that it would be the Uncle Tom's Cabin of the right to life movement.⁸² My evaluation is framed in terms of the ideological analogon.

As suggested in the theoretical explication of the ideological analogon, the success of the analogon could be expected to vary both with the vividness or self-presence of the image and with the proportionality of the analogon to the ideological principles. "The Silent Scream" encounters difficulties in relation to both tests; ultimately, however, its failure of the first test renders consideration of the second problematic. That is, if it is unclear what we have seen, then it is impossible to compare the proportionality of that to the ideological configuration. This evaluation, then, will focus upon the failure of "The Silent Scream" to achieve that which it most desired: a vision of the death of a human being.

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In sonographic 'photography,' although the sound images may at times appear as normal visual images (much in the way that an X-ray image 'looks like' a person), any understanding of the iconic message beyond the barest recognition of proportionality (e.g., recognition of a head or a hand) is dependent upon a sophisticated interpretive code. What we see in "The Silent Scream" is not an Edenic image, not a representation which renders present in its fullest manner that which it is, but rather an image which takes a "trained eye" to decipher.⁸³ Just as most of us would need the assistance of a radiologist to 'see' the presence or absence of certain organs in an X-ray, so too must a sonographer 'translate' the image to the observer. Thus the paradox of "The Silent Scream" is that while it purports to show, in a virtually Edenic, pure manner the humanity of the fetus, there are at least two levels of transformation and translation required before the proof can in fact be 'seen.' First, the swirls of black, grey, and white which constitute the image on the pie-shaped screen must be seen as coalescing into a resemblance of the human body. While occasional images resembling the head or hands may be distinguished, this untrained observer found highly imaginative Nathanson's description of the visual images:

Looking a little more closely at the child, we can discern the eye, or the orbit of the eye here, the nose of the child here, the mouth of the child here, and we can even look at the ventricle of the brain here. This is a fluid filled space in the brain. We see the body of the child here with the ribs in silhouette and the spine of the child at the back.⁸⁴

The images of these attributes of resemblance and proportionality to the fully developed human body are not self-evident; they require interpretation and translation by experts trained in the area of ultrasound.

The second area in which translation is required is in the 'seeing' of movement and, especially, its equivalent of pain. In the visual sequencing of the film, we move from a freeze frame on the 'silent scream' itself (which I never did 'see,' even after repeated viewing) to the "violent" movements of the fetus away from the suction tip; what happens, of course, is that just as we are told that movement will occur, the film switches from the slow motion and freeze frame sequence which depicted the 'scream' back to its regular speed. This alteration of the film speed creates an obvious illusion of motion, but it is difficult for the untrained eye to distinguish the movement of the fetus from the movement effects created by the change in film speed. This is not to say that "The Silent Scream" engages in photographic slight-of-hand; rather, it is to indicate that, again, the untrained eye cannot 'see' in

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compelling fashion what is said to be occurring.

Sonographic images are not photographs or film images in the normal sense of those terms; they are, rather, themselves resemblances of film images. The interpretation of the ultrasound images requires mediation: they are not clearly visually analogous to that which they represent. They are not Edenic. In this sense, they are failed analogons because ultimately they must rely upon the narrative 'captioning' provided by Mathanson. The linguistic frames the imagistic, but, in this instance, the imagistic cannot stand alone, and the images, because of their need to be mediated, to be interpreted, do not seduce the non-ideologue into the ideological configurations. In the case of "The Silent Scream," the ideology must come first, and it may then "remote control" the ideologue into 'seeing' the 'incontrovertible' visual proof of the child's humanity. But the failure of the film to instantiate clear ideological analogons will probably limit its success to the audience which already participates in the right to life ideology.

ENDNOTES

¹ Richard Selzer, "What I Saw at the Abortion," *Esquire*, 85, no. 1 (1976), 66-67. Emphasis in original. In addition, Selzer suggests that very much the same events would have been seen in the abortion of a sixteen week fetus.

² Selzer, 67. Emphasis in original.

³ Perry Miller, "The Rhetoric of Sensation," *Perspectives of Criticism*, ed. Harry Levin (Cambridge, 1950); rpt. in Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (1956), 167-183. Miller argues that Jonathan Edwards, working from Locke's premise that ideas can "be given a name only by those who have first had the sensation," went beyond Locke and connected ideas to emotions and passions through the connector of language, especially sensory imagery.

⁴ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950; rpt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 14.

⁵ The second section of this essay, of course, attempts to show how the pro-life ideology approaches a complete instantiation of these forms. For another application of these four strategies toward the explication of an ideology, in that instance the pro-slavery movement, see David Williams, "'Ideology' and Rhetorical Form: The Tyrannical Re(i)gn of Sambo," paper presented in the Seminar on Ideology and Rhetorical Form, Speech Communication Association National Convention, Chicago, November 1984.

⁶ It should be noted that these four strategies, as delineated, are heavily derivative from the writings of Kenneth Burke. In the subsequent elaboration of these strategies, I point toward the pertinent portions of Burke's writings which influenced this particular formulation of ideological strategies.

⁷ See Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, trans. Suzanne Langer (1946; rpt. New York: Dover Publications, 1953), 57, 97-98.

⁸ It should be noted that this formulation does not deny the possibility that a given analogon might not be both 'mythologized' in the sense indicated and 'de-mythologized' in the sense of approaching visual purity.

⁹ Destutt de Tracy originally defined 'ideology' as "the science of ideas," or "the philosophy of mind." See Raymond Williams, "Ideology," in *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford, 1976), 126.

10 The three types of association are the mechanical, the analogical, and the ideological. See Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 132-137. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of these modes of association to the issues of identification and identity, see Christine Oravec, "Kenneth Burke's Concept of Association and the Complexity of Identity," unpublished manuscript.

11 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 135. Emphasis in original.

12 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 183-189.

13 Kenneth Burke, *Language As Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 3.

14 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 110.

15 Kenneth Burke, "Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment," *Critical Inquiry*, 5 (Winter, 1978), 406, 414. Emphasis in original. See also, Fredric Jameson, "Ideology and Symbolic Action," *Critical Inquiry*, 5 (Winter, 1978), and Fredric Jameson, "The Symbolic Inference; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis," *Critical Inquiry*, 5 (Spring, 1978).

16 Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 144. Emphasis in original.

17 Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970), 5, 37.

18 Richard M. Weaver, *Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Time* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1964), 11, 12.

19 Burke, *Language As Symbolic Action*, 6.

20 This is in distinction to McGee's use of 'ideograph,' which often involves only elliptical phrases, e.g., "rule of law," in place of elaborated ideological statements. McGee, curiously, does not seem to require that ideographs be graphic. See Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66 (Feb. 1980), 1-16.

21 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 200. It should be noted that my use of 'myth' as a mystical, deistic experience, a merging of signifier and signified into a god-head, does not correspond directly to Burke's formulation of going through sensory images to ideas to myths. See *A Rhetoric*, 202.

22 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 133.

23 Burke, *A Rhetoric*, 202.

24 Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 5.

25 Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion*, 18. Emphasis in original.

26 Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion*, 18. Emphasis in original.

27 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976), 24.

28 Gillian Dyer, *Advertising as Communication* (New York: Methuen, 1982), 124.

29 Roland Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," *Image-Music-Text*, trans., Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 35-36.

30 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 42.

31 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 44. Emphasis in original.

32 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 44. Emphasis in original. Although I submit that the "this is how it was" dimension of a photograph contains a 'peculiar sense' of presence, Barthes declines to consider that as a sense of 'presence.'

33 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 44-45.

34 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 38.

35 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 41.

36 Barthes, "The Photographic Message," *Image-Music-Text*, 17.

37 Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the Image," 38-40.

38 Jerry Falwell, "Jerry Falwell Live," WTBS-Atlanta, Feb. 17, 1985. All punctuation and emphases are mine.

39 See, for instance, Bernard N. Nathanson, "If Wombs Had Windows," in Nathanson, *Aborting America* (New York: Doubleday, 1979), 206-217.

40 Reagan's endorsement is included in advertising for "The Silent Scream." See the advertising pages in *The Silent Scream*, ed. Dan Turner (Anaheim: American Portrait Films Books, 1985).

41 Reagan, letter to Donald S. Smith, Feb. 22, 1985, in The Silent Scream, 123.

42 Reagan, as quoted in "The Silent Scream: Seeking an Audience," Newsweek, 105 (Feb. 1985), 37.

43 "Text of 'Silent Scream,' in The Silent Scream, 14.

44 Although many critics do not make an equation between 'human being' and 'person,' the pro-life spokespersons invariably do. For an elaboration of the pro-life equation between 'human being' and 'person,' see Robert Brungs, "Human Life vs. Human Personhood," Human Life Review, 8 (Summer 1982), 70-80. "The Silent Scream" seems to use the concepts equivalently.

45 Nathanson, in an interview with Jerry Falwell, "Jerry Falwell Live," WTBS-Atlanta, Feb. 17, 1985.

46 Burke, A Rhetoric, 183-189.

47 For example, Dan Donehey, of the National Right to Life Committee, is quoted as saying, "The abortion rights people are no longer able to use the slogans of the last thirteen years-- blob of tissue,' 'product of conception.' The film shows something with arms and legs. Now they see the baby before their very eyes. 'Silent Scream' has demonstrated the humanity of the unborn child." The Silent Scream, 39.

48 Reagan, as quoted in "Reagan Tells Broadcasters Aborted Fetuses Suffer Pain," New York Times, Jan. 31, 1984, A16.

49 Dr. Nichols, as quoted in "Reagan Tells Broadcasters," A 16.

50 "Reagan Tells Broadcasters," A16.

51 John T. Noonan, "The Experience of Pain by the Unborn," Human Life Review, 7 (Feb. 1981), 9.

52 Noonan, 12.

53 Noonan, 14.

54 Noonan, 18.

55 For instance, in the wake of "The Silent Scream," the pro-life position was that "the fetus reacts to pain" and that while the cortex might allow someone "to make an intelligent decision about pain," pain itself is a reaction against noxious stimuli. The Silent Scream, 47.

56 Ellen Goodman, "Abortion, Pain and Survival," Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1984, A 17.

57 See Joseph Sobran, "The Averted Gaze: Liberalism and Fetal Pain," Human Life Review, 10 (Spring 1984), 5-15.

58 "Text of 'Silent Scream,'" in The Silent Scream, 22.

59 Linzey, in The Silent Scream, vi.

60 "Text of 'Silent Scream,'" in The Silent Scream, 23-24.

61 Falwell, as quoted in The Silent Scream, 40.

62 Gordon Humphrey, as quoted in The Silent Scream, 35-36.

63 E. Michael Linzey, in The Silent Scream, 115.

64 "Text of 'Silent Scream,'" in The Silent Scream, 22.

POLITICAL PLURALISM AND IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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One of the most persistent issues to gain the attention of observers of politics from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Rousseau is the problem of faction. All theories of government have had to deal in one way or another with the threat to political and social order embodied in the existence of minorities acting in support of their own interests over and against the general interest. "In order for the general will to be well expressed," said Rousseau, "it is therefore important that there be no partial society in the State."¹ Recognizing the inevitable, however, he added, "if there are partial societies, their number must be multiplied and their inequality prevented." This latter suggestion was Rousseau's way of rendering an unfortunate phenomenon harmless.

In more recent political theories, that is, in several since the seventeenth century, "partial societies" of individuals have played a more positive role. For liberal theory, they have become the source of a vital check on the power of the central government, and their ubiquity has become a cause for celebration rather than regret. Such groups and their functions are recommended today by many political scholars under the label "pluralism."

The concept of pluralism has been analyzed in at least three different functional contexts. Political association is the first. Here, pluralism is a matter of political parties and factions which represent the views and aspirations of various constituencies. These parties and factions seek to influence public policy primarily by means of political representation; that is, voting rights in decision-making bodies. They are organized around and for this purpose. Multiple parties are crucial to liberal politics in that they provide a check on the power of the group in control of the central government. For this reason, "the most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them." "The right of association therefore appears to me," continued de Toqueville, "almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty."²

As with all rights, however, the danger of abuse looms. The right of association "may be perverted or carried to excess by others, and from an element of life may be changed into a cause of destruction."³ The factionalization of politics may prevent a government from staying in power long enough, or if it stays, from mastering the majority support necessary, to maintain political order. In European countries, this problem is addressed in the tendency of minority parties of form coalition governments, and by procedural barriers to

frequent changes of government. In the United States, factionalization is not a problem at the political party level since viable third parties are and have been for at least most of the twentieth century, virtually non-existent. However, governmental paralysis is still a major issue because factionalization can cut across formal political party boundaries.

This is the second context in which pluralism may be discussed; that of non-political party organizations which influence political decision-making directly. These are the so-called special interest groups which use lobbying, financial contributions, letter-writing, etc. to influence legislative activity. These groups usually are organized not only for political purposes, although some come so close that they might be viewed as political factions merely. But others, such as labor unions, represent their members' interests on non-legislative fronts as well, and are organized primarily for these purposes.

Finally, pluralism is sometimes studied in relation to organizations which function entirely or almost entirely outside the political sphere. Religious groups are obvious examples, although the overtly political activities of many of these raise questions as to whether any relatively large voluntary association of individuals can be totally apolitical in its functions. Thus, the distinctions I have made among the three contexts of pluralism are most easily supported in terms of the functions of organizations rather than their types. This, in itself, is a significant fact. It suggests that a given organization, though capable of different functions, nevertheless is likely to combine them at least to some extent. Except for political parties and some lobby groups, most organizations will be political and non-political concurrently. This means that arguments for pluralism which rest on defining organizations as one or the other will be presenting at best an incomplete picture of what pluralism implies, and perhaps a highly misleading one. I will be discussing this "part/whole" fallacy at some length below.

I propose to analyze the arguments for pluralism presented in the works of three authors operating from three distinct points of view. My authors are Michael Walzer, Robert Dahl and Ralf Dahrendorf, and they represent respectively the approaches of political philosophy, political science, and sociology.⁴

What do I mean by argument analysis? Obviously, an answer to this question requires first, some notion of what an argument is, and second, a notion of what an argument does. Just as obviously, I have insufficient space to justify my answers to these questions. All I can do is state them. For my purposes an argument is a formal claim occurring in a particular discourse. In this case, I am discussing formal claims which support a concept defined as pluralism. The discourses in which these claims occur are scholarly studies, that is, books produced by people employed in academic institutions, and aimed primarily at an audience of others similarly situated, or with similar interests.

The nature of the discourse I have selected raises some difficult

issues as to the question of what an argument does. The most obvious difficulty is whether academic arguments do anything at all of such importance. I am talking here of rhetorical effects which extend beyond the walls of academic institutions. Here again, an extended discussion is not possible, but I offer the following observations.

I take the position that academic arguments for pluralism are worthy of analysis insofar as they contribute significantly to the reinforcement of liberal capitalist ideology; that is, to the impact this ideology has on the maintenance of existing power relations in capitalist societies. I choose to take as given the importance of the ideology/power relationship.⁵ My project is to specify the ways in which particular academic arguments provide ideological resources for liberal capitalism. In other words, I will attempt in a tentative and abbreviated way to submit academic arguments for pluralism to an ideological critique.

It is one thing, of course, to reveal the ideological elements in a particular discourse. It is another to determine the extent to which a discourse reinforces ideology generally. Not surprisingly, most critics of argument and indeed, most critics of rhetorical forms of whatever kind, are forced, by the vastness of this latter task, to confine themselves to the former. The question of rhetorical effects is either ignored or begged. Raymond Williams' comment on how critics of culture usually deal with effects seems relevant here. "Certain sociological facts and considerations are rather hastily admitted, usually in a received and well-worn form, and some minor place is reserved for them. But then, we understand, the real work can begin; we go to 'the works of art themselves.'"⁶

A well-rounded critique of academic pluralist ideology should include analysis of the significance of academic institutions generally in the transmission of ideological messages to that audience(s) whose acceptance of ideology is important to the maintenance of existing power relations. Again, this is a subject so large that I can do little more than mention some theoretical and empirical contributions which might provide the basis for an institutional explanation of the impact of particular ideological arguments.

Althusser's analysis of "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" is a possible point of departure.⁷ He identifies the educational system as the primary means by which capitalist ideology is transmitted. The various other state apparatuses he lists are less significant for two reasons. First, they do not involve the degree and intensity of influence which an educational system can exert. No other state agency has access to its subjects for several hours a day from childhood through adolescence. Second, all other state apparatuses have historical equivalents in pre-ideological (that is, pre-capitalist) periods. Only compulsory, universal, universal education is unique to capitalist societies.⁸

Althusser is viewing the education system as a whole. The arguments I wish to critique are found in a part of that system, higher education, which covers only a portion of the population, and that portion in an unsystematic way. Yet its impact is likely to be much greater than these

quantitative factors suggest. Those who teach in the educational system at any level are themselves products of higher education. The ideological messages communicated in Political Science 101 are bound to show up in Social Studies I, especially in its textbooks.

We can make the case even stronger for the impact of higher education by combining "elite" theory with Althusser's emphasis on the educational system. Following Pareto, Mosca and Michels, and more recently C. Wright Mills,⁹ we can hypothesize that the maintenance of existing power relations in liberal capitalist society is dependent not so much on an ideological consensus among the general public, as among a much smaller group variously called opinion-leaders, the ruling class, or the power elite. These are the very people who are most likely to have been exposed to academic ideological arguments.

A number of empirical studies in the last several decades have indicated that the strongest commitment to what are usually defined as democratic liberal values is found among the most extensively educated groups as measured by years of schooling.¹⁰ To the extent that the sort of authors I am studying are among the chief purveyors of these values, their discourse seems worthy of careful analysis.

I do not pretend that this brief discussion of the sociological significance of academic institutions as they relate to the transmission of ideology settles the controversial questions I have raised. I offer it only as a tentative justification for the focus of this paper; as a small portion of the evidence which might be available to prove that academics' ideas do indeed have consequences. Now I turn to the specific arguments I wish to analyze, arguments in favor of pluralism.

There is a reason for supposing that among the myriad arguments academics advance, pluralist arguments hold a place of special significance. This is the fact that the very organization of academic institutions themselves is an example of pluralist philosophy. The term "university" suggests a conglomeration of disparate disciplines, each ruled by its own particular methods and traditions, each relatively autonomous, all united only by the desire to discover and transmit real knowledge. Within each discipline it is expected that "all major" points of view will be represented, or at least not suppressed. Thus, in the act of presenting any argument, academics erect an argument for pluralism. This is just as true for the champion of fascism as it is for the advocate of liberal democracy. The university seems the perfect embodiment of Mill's "market-place of ideas" where all claims compete on equal ground for the adherence of audiences.¹¹ The pluralism exemplified in the structure of academic institutions may make more potent the effect of explicit arguments in its favor.

The arguments I will discuss come from authors who should not be considered friends of liberal capitalism. Michael Walzer and Robert Dahl have argued for decentralized socialism in preference to existing political and economic arrangements.¹² Ralf Dahrendorf's discussion of pluralism incorporates a theory of class conflict within industrial capitalism.¹³ Nevertheless, all three consider pluralism compatible with the political systems they espouse, and, indeed, necessary to them.

I claim that in arguing for pluralism, these academics unintentionally use ideological argument strategies consistent with the maintenance of liberal capitalist hegemony.

This is not to say that these works constitute ideologies as such. I would prefer, with Anthony Giddens, to avoid the question of what is an ideology by hypothesizing that all discourse is ideological to greater or lesser degree.¹⁴ The point is not to specify some arbitrary point at which a discourse becomes an ideology instead of merely ideological. Rather, I wish to uncover what I believe are significant ideological elements with these particular discourses.

I will rely chiefly on a Marxist critique of ideology in specifying the characteristics of ideological argument. Giddens has summarized these as follows: 1. The representation of sectional interests as universal ones; 2. The denial or transmutation of contradictions; and 3. The naturalization of the present.¹⁵

Pluralism as a political philosophy is uniquely situated to claim that it represents universal interests as opposed to sectional ones because by definition, it claims to represent all interests. The only question remaining is an empirical one; what political arrangements are necessary to guarantee that all interests receive their "day in court?" Or, in other words, if some interests are inadequately represented, this does not indicate a conceptual flaw in pluralism, but rather a failure to arrive at the appropriate means of implementing it. Pluralism can present itself as inherently non-ideological — ideology being understood as the false claims of partial interests to represent the whole.

This is not quite as clear as it seems, however. Even if all interests are represented, this does not translate to the representation of universal interests. The latter implies a single interest or set of interests which every individual in society shares, while the former is merely a conglomeration of interests each one of which serves only a part of society's membership. The parts do not add up to the whole.

Or do they? The problem for pluralist theory is to discover some universal interest which underlies the political system while retaining the essential feature of the relative autonomy and freedom of partial interests. Michael Walzer's solution is fairly typical. "Every particular measure," he says, "is pushed through by some coalition of particular interests. But the ultimate appeal in these conflicts is not to the particular interest, not even to a public interest conceived as their sum, but to collective values, shared understandings of membership, health, food and shelter, work and leisure. The conflicts themselves are often focused, at least overtly, on questions of fact; the understandings are assumed."¹⁶

This statement is striking in that it describes a process quite similar to one which might appear in any Marxist critique of ideology. Here we have the admission that actions motivated by partial interests are justified in terms of universal "values." We need only take the additional step of exposing these values as sham universals; that is, as ideological tools which serve the perpetuation of ruling class domination

while masquerading as servants of the general welfare. Clearly, defenders of pluralism would want to avoid this extension of their analysis. On what grounds do they do so?

The most obvious answer is the argument that the values which underlie pluralism really are universal. They really do serve everyone's interest in a given society. The pluralist must advance this argument cautiously, however. If we begin to look for universal values it will not be long before our society will start to look more and more homogeneous in its interests; in other words, less and less pluralistic. And the more clearly we define our value consensus, the closer we will come to something which looks suspiciously like an "ideology," the very result pluralist theory is supposed to avoid.

Walzer reflects these concerns. He acknowledges that "the first impulse of the philosopher is to resist the displays of history, the world of appearances, and to search for some underlying unity: A short list of basic goods, quickly abstracted to a single good; a single distributive criterion."¹⁷

Having posed the problem, Walzer finds his solution in a theory of justice. His book Spheres of Justice is an attempt to construct a theory which allows for different distributive criteria in different social spheres. For instance, criteria by which justice is determined in the religious sphere will be different from those in the political or economic sphere. This is an ingenious approach, but not really satisfactory for two reasons. The first is that as a practical matter, spheres cannot be kept separate. Taxing policy regarding non-profit institutions is bound to affect religious organizations, for example. In which of these two spheres, the economic or the religious, do we place this issue? Which set of distributive criteria do we apply? Or, if we attempt to combine the two sets, on the basis of what principles do we do so?

Second, Walzer, in fact, does propound a single general principle which cuts across spherical boundaries. This is the principle of pluralism itself. In his words, "when meanings are distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate."¹⁸ In other words, spheres, to the extent they really are separate, ought to operate autonomously. Obviously, this begs the question of whether spheres can be separate, or how separation is to be determined. Moreover, Walzer ends up arguing that all human beings within a society share an intuitive sense of justice, which though its manifestations change from social context to social context (and rightly so since this is part of the principle of justice itself), still retains some consistent substance. The nature of this substance is hinted at in his subtitle, "A Defense of Pluralism and Equality." Yet no formal principle of equality is defended because this would violate the principle of autonomy of spheres.

Walzer's arguments are unsatisfactory as political philosophy, but I am interested in them mainly for their ideological character. From an

ideological perspective, his theory amounts to the presentation of pluralism as a kind of universal interest which does not have to justify itself as such. Pluralism can deny that it represents a partial interest only because by definition, it represents the sum of partial interests. Yet pluralism need not defend itself as representative of any universal interest; that is, it need not demonstrate that a given interest is universal, because at the point such proofs are demanded, it can claim to represent no interests at all. This is the ideological significance of Walzer's attempts to deal with the part/whole problem. It is a strategic advance over arguments which claim that a partial interest is universal. Such arguments at least involve a burden of proof. Pluralism, in effect, theorizes away the universal-interest half of the pair. It then need show only that no minority partial interest is allowed to predominate, a task accomplished definitionally.

My position is that pluralism does in fact represent a particular partial interest made to appear universal, however effectively this fact is disguised. That interest is the maintenance of existing power relations in liberal capitalism. The second category of ideological argument I am using moves us toward an explication of this relationship. In their denial and transmutation of contradictions, advocates of pluralism justify the status quo.

Ralf Dahrendorf's Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society is an analysis of what he calls post-Capitalist Societies. These are distinguished from capitalist societies in that in the latter "not only authority and social status, but also industrial and political conflict are superimposed one on the other."¹⁹ In post-capitalist societies by contrast; that is, in contemporary Western industrial countries, "the subdivision of authority positions stimulated by an ideology of rationalization in both enterprise and the state is an autonomous process."²⁰ In short, "in post-capitalist society, industry and society have, by contrast to capitalist society, been disassociated."²¹

Anthony Giddens argues that capitalism's primary contradiction is the coexistence of private appropriation and socialized production,²² a state of affairs that forces the interpenetration of social, political, and economic concerns. By way of brief example, it is clear that large industrial corporations have enormous public significance for whole communities. No one from Pittsburgh could doubt this in light of the current situation of steelworkers. Yet the control of corporate policy and the disposition of corporate profits are claimed to be private matters properly outside the scope of public accountability.

Arguments which either deny this contradiction or transmute it to a different argumentative context tend to obscure the extent to which liberal capitalism ignores the interests of industrial wage workers, and, for that matter, all employees. Dahrendorf's book exhibits both strategies. He, with many others, notes that industrial wage workers comprise a steadily shrinking percentage of the working population. The labor force has shifted to service and high technology employment, both more likely to involve "white-collar" work. This sort of work he claims has significant consequences for the material and psychological well-being of

workers. On the one hand it is well-paid enough to obviate the need to be obsessed with material concerns. On the other, it incorporates a set of social status rewards not directly related to income. The general result is a diversification of the work force in socio-economic terms, which reduces the bases for the recognition of common, economic class interests.

Dahrendorf wrote in 1959, and it is hard to deny the general accuracy of his description. Indeed, the workforce has become increasingly diversified (although more in the direction of low-paid service employment than he foresaw), and with the decline of the organized labor movement, it is hard to find much evidence of working class coherence. But these developments do not deny the inherent contradiction of capitalism Giddens emphasizes. They may simply make that contradiction easier to obscure through ideological argument. The issue is whether the social existence of employees are significantly less affected by the economic realities of capitalism than formerly, or, put another way, whether the degree of economic, political, and social interpenetration is insignificant enough to justify the pluralist description of contemporary Western societies.

The "post-capitalist" thesis, whether we call its referent the "post-industrial society" or the "new industrial state,"²³ is a theory of social harmony based on pluralist assumptions. Dahrendorf argues that only when economic, political, and social conflicts are superimposed on one another; that is, when the same people line up on the same side of more than one type of conflict, is the social fabric threatened. He takes as inevitable the existence of conflict within any given "sphere", in Walzer's terms. Within each there will always be two classes, one dominant and one suppressed. But so long as a large group of people does not find itself suppressed all or most of the time in all or most spheres, stability will reign. Pluralism is the term which describes this state of affairs, a state which Dahrendorf believes exists in post-capitalist societies.²⁴

Notice how effective this line of argument is in preempting its critics. Instead of denying the existence of conflict in society, this theory embraces it. Dahrendorf acknowledges the existence also of domination; in fact, he considers it inherent. But he is still able, thanks to pluralism, to arrive at an end point of social equilibrium. So long as conflict remains autonomous within spheres, this is possible. This means that the spheres themselves must be distinct. What makes them so is the changing roles of each individual across spheres. In one he will be dominant; in another suppressed. There will be at least something for everyone.

Even given this distribution of roles, however, the ubiquity of conflict in pluralistic societies is a problem. Within a sphere, conflict could well become intense and violent. A suppressed group may forget, within the context of a given conflict, the comforts of their dominant position within another. Dahrendorf, therefore, adds a concept which reduces the dangers of conflict, and at the same time, transmutes the conflict/harmony contradiction he has created. This is his theory of conflict regulation.

Dahrendorf lists several elements of pluralist societies which act to keep conflict within acceptable bounds. "First,.... both parties to the conflict have to recognize the necessity and reality of the conflict situation, and, in this sense, the fundamental justice of the cause of the opponent."²⁵ This amounts to being able to say "If I were in his shoes, I would take the same position." Second, conflicting interest groups must be organized.²⁶ Organization, in Dahrendorf's sense, implies the acceptance of certain behavioral norms that exclude "guerrilla warfare." He means organization for the purpose of participating in regulated conflict, or at least organization which allows such participation. Such an act of organization tends to preclude intense or violent options. Third, "the opposing parties in social conflicts have to agree on certain rules of the game that provide the framework of their relations."²⁷ He adds that "rules of the game can serve their function only if and as long as they put both parties on an equal footing and do not imply any substantive stipulations disabling one or the other conflict group."²⁸

It is important to realize that Dahrendorf's theory of conflict regulation virtually eliminates the significance of conflict from his general theory of society. This is true because once his conditions of conflict regulation are present, it is difficult to see how conflict can ever substantially alter the status quo. In the first place, a recognition of the necessity of conflict and of the justice of one's opponents' position does not imply impassioned advocacy, but rather, self-conscious role - playing in much the same way as does participation in a debating contest. Second, the effect of formal organization for the purpose of participation in controlled conflict precludes the sort of intense and/or violent action which appears to be a prerequisite of change. Perhaps most important, acceptance of rules of the game which place both sides on an equal footing merely reinforces preexisting advantages of dominant groups over suppressed ones.

What Dahrendorf has done is admit, on the one hand, that societal groups within a given context have inherently contradictory interests both sets of which cannot be served simultaneously, while on the other, has constructed a model of conflict regulation based on assumptions of deliberative decision-making via persuasion. If conflict is real, and if conflicting groups recognize this, then persuasion will hardly do. If, however, conflicts can be regulated by these means, then it must mean suppressed groups do not take them all that seriously to begin with, or, more to the point, can be persuaded not to do so in contradiction with their real interests.

Pluralism comes to the rescue in both these latter cases. If groups can be dominant in some areas, they don't mind so much being suppressed in others. Of particular importance to an ideological critique, however, is the option of persuasion. What is it that might persuade suppressed groups that their interests have been dealt with adequately even if they go unserved? I claim it is the procedures of conflict regulation themselves which accomplish this rhetorical miracle. The attention of suppressed groups is diverted from their interests in a particular conflict to the rules of the game by which that conflict is conducted and controlled. Procedure becomes a substitute for substance.

This form of ideological argument is so common in liberal capitalist societies that it might well qualify as a separate category. I include it here because it seems to be a clear case of the transmutation of a contradiction. When attention can be focused on the rules of a game, there is a tendency to forget the function served by the game itself. In the case of conflicts of interest within capitalist societies, attention is directed to ostensibly fair procedures within the game of public debate. This tends to obscure the extent to which participation in debate precludes more violent options for change, and obscures as well the ways in which public debate legitimizes existing political structures.

When anti-war protest groups in the 1960's organized teach-ins they had already opted for a form of protest well within the ability of existing institutions to contain. Teach-ins required open, formal organization and those active in these organizations were seldom involved in more violent activities. Moreover, teach-ins implied acceptance of deliberative, persuasive models of social change. This concession forced others. Teach-in leaders preferred to include only anti-war speakers. Many universities, however, demanded that "all viewpoints" be represented. My undocumented suspicion is that where universities had their way, the effect of teach-ins was to increase faith in the existing system of government even as it may have decreased support for the Vietnam War. Insofar as one of the major rhetorical objectives of some anti-war groups was to stimulate a systemic critique of American society, the teach-ins may have been counterproductive.²⁹

Ciddens' third category of ideological argument is the naturalization of the present. This defines arguments which imply the inevitability or inherent desirability of existing power relations based on allegedly unchangeable circumstances. These arguments are subject to two possible criticisms. First, the circumstances may indeed be changeable; that is, they may be the result of a particular stage of historical development, rather than "the way things are." Second, the implications of these circumstances may be invalidly drawn.

Robert A. Dahl's Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy opens with the following argument:

"....the most powerful ideologies of our age all suffer from having acquired their shape and substance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or very much earlier, before the world in which we live had come fully into view.... liberalism, conservatism, capitalism, socialism, Marxism, corporatism, anarchism, even democratic ideas, all face a world that in its form and thrust confounds the crucial assumptions, requirements, descriptions, predictions, hopes, or prescriptions they express."³⁰

Students of religious rhetoric will recognize in this passage an argument similar to those advanced by founders of new religions: "A new faith is needed because all of the old faiths are wrong." Of course, in religious arguments old faiths seldom are indicted on grounds of failing to take account of historical change. Usually, the converse is true. But the appeal of new religions is often based at least implicitly, on the fit between religious principles and the lives people lead in the world as it is.

For Dahl, the most important fact about the political world of today is its scale. We live in nations of millions of citizens. This means that traditional democratic rights, even if universally extended, "would only mean that every citizen, not merely some citizens would exercise an infinitesimally small amount of influence over the government."³¹ This means that for democracy in large systems to be meaningful, it must operate not on a mass basis for this is only sham democracy, but on a small-scale model. How can this be done in a large system? Pluralism is the answer. Democracy must find its true realization in small-group activity in the workplace, in the church, and in the neighborhood. Decentralization of control in all these areas is therefore desirable.

The unalterable facts which Dahl assumes are the existence of the large nation-state, and the political arrangements appropriate to it. One could argue, of course that nation-states are a feature only of a particular historical period, but even if this is conceded, the argument of scale is persuasive since historical trends appear to move in the direction of larger and larger systems. The problem is that this is no less true in non-political arenas, particularly the economic, than in political ones. Why is it that the brute fact of scale makes democracy impossible on a national political basis, and yet decentralization of power is a viable solution in other realms? Either the scale of political units is not an inherent problem, or more likely, the scale of economic units is. Dahl's argument along with those of other advocates of industrial democracy tends to obscure this "fact."

Rousseau's argument for rendering partial societies harmless, you will recall, was to multiply their number and safeguard their equality. This sounds very like what Dahl claims has happened to the individual citizen. This raises the question of whether decentralized and fragmented groups are consistent with the real decentralization of power which is the theoretical result of pluralism. This seems particularly relevant in the economic sphere in which the international organization of capitalism raises issues of scale which go vastly beyond the boundaries even of large nation-states.

My purpose in this essay has been to identify ideological elements in academic arguments for political pluralism. Obviously, I have not presented a comprehensive discussion of this political theory or even of the authors' works I have discussed. I mean this essay as a preliminary investigation into ways in which pluralist arguments may operate ideologically to legitimate existing power relations in liberal capitalist societies. I believe that subsequent efforts in this direction would be a worthwhile occupation for argumentation scholars, as they have been in the recent past.

NOTES

1 Jean Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, ed., Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martins Press, 1978), book 2, Chapter 3 (1762).

2 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, trans., Francis Bowen (New York: Random House, 1945), Vol. I, chapter 12, p.203.

3 Ibid.

4 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959).

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14 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, p.178 and pp.184-188.

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16 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p.82.

17 Spheres of Justice, p.4.

18 Spheres of Justice, p.10.

19 Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, p.243.

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26 Dahrendorf, p.226.

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28 Dahrendorf, p. 227.

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REAGAN'S FIRST STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS:
A CASE STUDY IN LANGUAGE, ARGUMENT AND CULTURE

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The popular press viewed the 1984 Presidential campaign with an eye toward the phenomenon of Ronald Reagan's popularity. Until the Democratic convention, Reagan's stronghold on the political terrain seemed impenetrable. Only after the convention did the popularity gap between Reagan and Walter Mondale close somewhat; yet Reagan quickly regained his massive lead in the polls.[1]

Explanations for Reagan's apparent mastery of the political field are not hard to come by. Speech communication scholars focus primarily on the heroic dimensions of the Reagan presidency, using the theoretical foundations of myth and archetype.[2] The popular press provides similar accounts of a mythic Presidency.[3] Yet, overall, the press has been satisfied with marvelling at the Reagan phenomenon and offering only a limited analysis of Reagan's political supremacy.[4] *Newsweek's* August 1984 cover story offered a typical portrayal of Reagan: "His mastery of the form [presidential politics] has a power of its own--and there is simply no question that Reagan has radically altered the nation's political dialogue." [5] This assertion seems to be a result of a common observation during the '84 campaign: the Democratic candidates were hard-pressed to find a weakness in Reagan's political armor. Reagan forced the Democrats to fight on his own turf using weapons of his own choosing.

I intend to provide another explanation for Reagan's unique position in the political arena. Specifically, I offer a partial account of how Reagan's political discourse has constrained the political opposition, and how it is that Reagan has "radically altered" political discourse in this country. Whereas other accounts of Reagan's rhetoric usually cover a cross-section of his public argument,[6] I provide a comprehensive textual reading of a single Reagan speech; Reagan's first State of the Union address in 1982 is both a significant and representative sample of Reagan rhetoric. The organization of the address, the nature of its appeals, the thematic development, and the overall tone mark this text as a typical Reagan production. Therefore, it can be analyzed for its clues to the Reagan rhetorical mastery even though the media construction of the Reagan phenomenon did not blossom until the spring of 1984.

Moreover, the State of the Union is always a significant address for a President. The 1982 address became his first opportunity to consolidate the policy victories of 1981 and set the agenda for the future. Rhetorically, Reagan is in full stride in this speech, laying out the positions which would allow him to take credit for the economic recovery of 1983 and propel him to victory in 1984. Reagan's 1982 State of the Union address is a particularly impressive instance of the argument techniques that remain constant throughout the adjustments, successes, and failures in domestic and foreign policies during Reagan's first term.

My analysis is also theoretically distinct from previous examinations of Reagan rhetoric in that it is based upon particular assumptions about the relationship between a text and culture. I understand a particular text, whether oral or written, to be embedded in culture; thus, it can be interpreted within the encompassing social realm. This assumption is not unique to the study of Reagan, nor is it unique in the field of political criticism.[7] However, two differences distinguish the particular kind of text-culture relationship suggested in this essay from other essays on Reagan.

First, a text is a production of signs dependent upon a pre-given system of codes. The study of a text will therefore entail an examination of both signification (the codes) and communication (the production of signs). Umberto Eco's work develops the theoretical description of signification and communication.[8] The first section of this essay will be devoted to the signification in Reagan's State of the Union address, using Eco's semiotic meta-language to explicate the cultural codes responsible for the production of meaning in Reagan's message. The second section of the study will be an attempt to analyze the organization of meaning in Reagan's address, developing the way the meaning is applied in Reagan's text. This second section emphasizes the rhetorical function of Reagan's signifying practice, relying upon Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca's formulation of argument.

Second, systems of signification are linked to cultural struggles for dominance and authority.[10] Specifically, the struggle for political and social dominance involves the struggle over cultural codes. For instance, in the 1984 Democratic convention keynote address, Mario Cuomo associated the sign-vehicle /family/ with a diversity of social collectivities, such as the population of New York, social service recipients, and Democratic party members. Cuomo's associations are an attempt to alter the usual association of /family/ with the cultural content <<nuclear family unit>>. According to Stuart Hall's conception of political discourse in culture, the objective of Cuomo's code-changing is not

merely to provide an attractive image or vision of government and society but to intervene into Reagan's dominant discourse with the ultimate hope of providing an alternative way for Americans to live their relation to economic and state institutions, that is, as a nurturing and caring family unit which is based on mutual dependency.[11] Therefore, Cuomo's speech is a part of a struggle, albeit a losing one, for the cultural authority to describe and define how individuals experience and live their position in society.

Reagan's 1982 State of the Union address is a suitable example of his own struggle for cultural authority. Therefore, the use of a semiotic meta-language to describe Reagan's discourse indicates not only the cultural context in which the speech can be interpreted, but also, and more specifically, the realm of an ideological struggle for dominance. These assumptions provide a framework for exploring Reagan's visible but little understood alteration of the "nation's political dialogue." [12]

Codes

I have divided Reagan's text into five major divisions: (1) Introductory remarks and review of the accomplishment of his first year in office; (2) preview of the 1983 Federal budget; (3) articulation of the New Federalism (the most controversial section of the speech); [13] (4) survey of foreign policy; (5) peroration filled with heroism and patriotism. [14] Owing to the unlimited terrain of the cultural semantic field, [15], I will limit my "field" of study by tracing three major clusters of oppositions which pervade and animate the text: <<superficial/foundational>>, <<past government/present government>>, and <<undeserving/deserving>>. These oppositions were discovered by tracing nouns and adjectives throughout the address and linking these sign-vehicles with their coded connotations in the cultural semantic field. Since the cultural units are meaningful by virtue of their opposition to other units, the tracing of connotations identifies intersecting semantic axes. For example, the sign-vehicle /artificial/ is coded to the content unit <<artificial>>, which is in opposition to <<natural>>. This semantic axis, <<artificial/natural>>, can be connected with or intersected by other cultural units depending on the speaker's adjustment of sign-vehicles. For the purpose of clarity, I will analyze each of the major oppositions separately.

<<Superficial/Foundational>>

The first clear hint of the <<superficial/foundational>> opposition is found early in the speech. After the initial

greetings and introductory preview, Reagan briefly reviews the failures of past government programs and the actions of the present government. Between this opposition of past and present government, which will be discussed later in this essay, are oppositions which can be grouped under the <<superficial/foundational>> opposition. Reagan states, "We have an economic program in place completely different from the artificial quick fixes of the past." Reagan identifies how the audience is to interpret "program" by opposing it with "artificial quick fix." The negative connotations that result from the combination of an <<artificial/natural>> semantic axis with a <<quick fix/stable improvement>> semantic axis are subsequently reinforced by Reagan's metaphor for "program." In the introductory preview, he speaks of the program as a "foundation we've carefully laid for our economic recovery." The use of "foundation" and "laid" places "program" in the semantic field of <<construction>>. As opposed to "artificial quick fix," "foundation" in <<construction>> is interpreted as the necessary first step for producing a building that is stable and will meet desired expectations.

A foundation is a beginning, and Reagan further enhances the interpretation of "program" by proclaiming, "Together we have made a new beginning, but we have only begun." Characteristic of beginnings as foundations, as opposed to beginnings as quick-fixes, the text continues: "No one pretends that the way ahead will be easy . . . The economy will face difficult moments in the months ahead. But, the program . . . will . . . put us on the road to prosperity and stable growth." Reagan valorizes a program of stable growth as opposed to a quick-fix (a superficial solution); a program that is a beginning, a foundation, a road to prosperity.

Reagan proceeds in the second major section of the speech to invoke other semantic fields for the purpose of strengthening the <<superficial/foundational>> semantic opposition. He claims the economic problems "will not respond to quick political fixes." Instead, he states, "we must stick to our carefully integrated plan for recovery." The sign-vehicle /political/ can connote the cultural units <<partisan>> and <<election-minded>>. When combined with the previously mentioned connotations of "quick fix," the sign-vehicle /political/ portrays the Democratic plan as a carelessly developed program to gain political advantage. The opposite of this scheme is Reagan's own integrated plan. "Integrated" is used to place the plan on the axis of <<simple/complex>>, an opposition Reagan connotes in a prior sentence by metaphorically describing the economic problems as "deeply rooted."

Reagan describes the basis of this integration as "common sense" whereas a "quick political fix" is described in the next paragraphs as "the only alternative" and as

"turning back the clock." The text therefore relies on cultural codes which associate /economic program/ with <<integrated common sense plan>> and /the only alternative/ with <<politically motivated regression>>. This opposition is also reaffirmed in the concluding paragraphs of the message. Reagan affirms economic problems and denies any "quick fix . . . to instantly end the tragic pain of unemployment," but suggests "the process has already begun and we'll see its effect as the year goes on." Reagan's description of his solution as a "process" and the implication that its effects are inevitable ("as the year goes on") further connotes <<progress>>. The development of the <<regress/progress>> opposition is therefore combined with the <<superficial/foundational>> opposition, a combination which is articulated in the two remaining sections of the address.

In the third major section Reagan promotes the "essentials of that [economic] program" with the New Federalism. He continues the opposition of <<regress/progress>> to emphasize the desirability of the suggested "change." Moreover, he adds to the meaning of "program" by placing it in two different semantic axes: <<timid/bold>> and <<conventional/innovative>>. As Reagan claims, "Our next major undertaking must be a program--just as bold, just as innovative." This intersection of <<boldness>> and <<innovation>> connotes a program of <<strength and courage>>. This connotation is particularly desirable in light of the fourth section dealing with foreign affairs.

Twice Reagan refers to the "progress" of American foreign policy: once in the introduction to the address in the context of /foundation/ and /spirited initiative/, and a second time in the opening section of the fourth section of the speech. Reagan clearly uses the positively coded connotations of /progress/ to characterize his proposals. In the next few paragraphs Reagan speaks of the "program" as a "sound strategy" to deal with foreign "instability." Building on the <<regress/progress>> and <<superficial/foundational>> oppositions, Reagan classifies American response as making the difference between "peaceful change" and "disorder and violence."

Thus, Reagan's State of the Union address has been produced by a reliance upon the historical-cultural coding practices familiar to many Americans: the expressions of /progress/, /program/, /strategy/, /innovative/, /bold/, and /realism/ have been associated in contrast to the expressions /quick fix/, /turn back the clock/, /naivete/, and /self-delusion/.

<<Past Government/Present Government>>

A second opposition appearing throughout the text is <<past government/present government>>. Every section of the address is implicitly marked by this distinction. In an introductory paragraph, Reagan outlines the opposition to be developed within the text: "When I visited this chamber last year as a newcomer to Washington, critical of past policies which I believed had failed, I proposed a new spirit of partnership between this Congress and this Administration and between Washington and our state and local governments." At this early point in the speech, Reagan draws the line between "past policies which . . . had failed" and "a new spirit of partnership." Reagan refers again to the <<past/present>> opposition a few paragraphs later. He explains: "To understand the State of the Union, we must look not only at where we are and where we're going but where we've been. The situation at this time last year was truly ominous." He adds to the already proposed <<past failings/new partnership>> opposition the expression /truly ominous/.

Reagan continues to identify the <<past>> by associating it with the economic evils of society: "inflation, taxes, and interest rates would all be higher" if the present proposals had not been adopted. The suggestion is also made within the text that domestic affairs were "uncontrollable" prior to the present Administrative actions.

The association of /past policies/ with /failure/, /truly ominous/, /inflation, taxes, interest rates/, and /uncontrollable/ is strongly contrasted with the concluding paragraphs of the first section. Reagan metonymically replaces references to "Administration and Congress" with "Together, we"; references to <<past government>> are expressed by "Government." In seven brief paragraphs, "Together, we" introduces differences between <<present>> and <<past>>. [16] For instance, "tax reductions" are a product of "Together, we," whereas "built-in profit" and "hidden incentives" are a characteristic of "Government." "Saving the taxpayers \$2 billion" is a product of "Together, we," whereas "waste and fraud" are a characteristic of "Government."

This distinction is continued in the next two sections of the speech. Reagan once again places all responsibility for economic programs on "the inheritance of decades of tax and tax and spend and spend." <<Tax and spend>> is repeatedly affirmed as the nature of <<past policies>>. The repetition of "tax" and "spend" clearly connotes <<irresponsible government>>, a connotation subsequently emphasized by Reagan's description of government entitlement programs as characterized by "spiraling costs" and "uncontrollable expenditures." The taxpayers are being "defrauded," announces Reagan, but present efforts by Congress and the Administration will serve to "control" such "corruption."

Within the foreign affairs section <<present government>> is described by "strength" and "negotiations." Conversely, <<past policies>> are described by "restraint" and "accommodation," which led to an "unrelenting buildup of [Soviet] military forces." <<Present government>> is therefore associated to <<strength>> and <<Soviet weakness>>, whereas <<past government>> is linked with <<accommodation>> and <<Soviet strength>>.

Similar to the <<superficial/foundational>> opposition, then, the development of <<past government/present government>> is a hierarchical combination of different semantic axes. The adjustment of sign-vehicles in the text results in the coded message that Reagan's Administration will produce a controlled, responsible, strong government. This government is in marked contrast to the previous administration which, while in the process of strengthening the Soviets, managed to present themselves as irresponsible, uncontrolled, weak, and accommodating.

<<Undeserving/Deserving>>

Like the other two oppositions, <<superficial/foundational>> and <<past government/present government>>, the final opposition is difficult to untangle from the context. This opposition is also particularly difficult to express, but there is a clear distinction drawn within the text between Americans who are able and willing to contribute to their country and those who detract from the ideals of the country.

A sample of the numerous references connoting these oppositions is found in the introductory section. Reagan invokes the familiar political sentiment to make government the "servant of the people." But Reagan extends these usual rhetorical tokens by prolonging his emphasis on the American people. He devotes a paragraph to listing various workers--auto workers, lumberjacks, steelworkers, farmers, etc.--to whom the American government should "make all the difference." He concludes the paragraph with a reference to "everyday Americans who harbor the simple wish of a safe and financially secure future for their children." In this description of "Americans" as "everyday" with a "simple wish," the connotation is that these people are not asking for much. And since the motivation of this "wish" is for their "children," the content focus is not on <<self>>, but <<others>>. Everyday Americans are <<unselfish>>.

The <<deserving Americans>> are also very <<responsible>>. Reagan announces his implicit faith in citizens toward the end of the introduction: "Together, after

fifty years of taking power away from the hands of the people in their states and local communities we have started returning power and resources to them." He later stresses the need to "mobilize the private sector" so that Americans can be brought "into a volunteer effort to help solve many of America's social problems." This relationship between <<power>> and <<solvency>>, usually coded by politicians as connotations of /government/, is reversed by Reagan. This is one of the unique marks of Reagan's rhetoric. Whereas most politicians refer to the dependency of government on the people, few have stated the ideal as actively as Reagan.

The opposition is drawn most directly with the discussion of entitlement programs in section two. Here Reagan argues that "waste and fraud" are present in such programs. The argument is developed, however, in terms of the American people. Reagan describes those people involved in the fraud as "cheating the system," and also as those who were "very confident that nothing was going to happen to them." Then Reagan boldly proclaims: "Well, something is going to happen. Not only the tax-payers are defrauded--the people with real dependency on these programs are deprived. . . ." This passage clearly connotes the <<undeserving/deserving>> opposition which began in Reagan's introduction. Reagan even strengthens the opposition by contrasting the "needy" with the "greedy."

The third section of the address continues the affirmation of Americans' <<unselfishness>>. As Reagan states, "We also believe in the integrity, decency and sound good sense of grass roots Americans." "Grass roots" is a metaphor for "everyday," once again connoting a <<lack of selfish ambition>>. /Grass roots/ is also a culturally coded expression used in political discourse to emphasize the interests of the people rather than the bureaucrats. Thus the cultural unit <<non-political>> would be part of the semantic field, which would also invoke the axis of <<partisan/non-partisan>>, again connoting the <<selfish/unselfish>> axis. Reagan's next paragraphs further serve to link the various desirable qualities of humanity to American people. He speaks of community service groups "that help community needs. Such groups," Reagan claims, "are almost invariably far more efficient than government in running social programs."

The final section of the address most strongly affirms Reagan's support of unselfish, deserving Americans. Characteristic of this rhetoric, Reagan uses a specific incident combined with a formal name to emphasize the accuracy of his observation. He supports his belief in "the integrity, decency and sound good sense" of Americans through reference to Jeremiah Denton and Lenny Skutnik; two individuals characterized as "heroes." He also refers to "parents who sacrifice long and hard," "volunteers" who help

the "needy," and the millions of "unsung heroes who may not have realized their own dreams."

The unselfishness that characterizes all these Americans is contrasted to those who slight the American spirit. Reagan warns: "Don't let anyone tell you that America's best days are behind her . . . We've seen it triumph too often in our lives to stop believing in it now." In opposition to the heroes and the volunteers are those who refuse to believe, the pessimists. Thus, the <<peessimist/optimist>> axis is linked with the other axes to portray two very different types of Americans.

SIGN PRODUCTION

The small portion of Reagan's textual semantic field displayed in the previous section is sufficient to show how the cultural code permits an explication of the meaning in Reagan's text. I have synchronically divided the text into three major oppositions, yet the key to the Reagan message is the hierarchical combination of these oppositions; the development of each opposition is blended into one overarching structure of meaning. All of the links from <<deserving>>, e.g., unselfish, volunteer, heroic, and common sense, are connected with the semantic associations of <<foundation>>, e.g., progress, bold, realism, and prosperity. These correlations are brought to bear on, and articulated with, the development of <<present government>>, which is linked with partnership, tax reductions, strength, Soviet weakness, etc.

In contrast to these positive connections is the development of <<past government>>. The negatively valued semantic units associated with <<superficial>> and <<undeserving>> are in turn associated with the past policies of "Government." Therefore, the opponents of Reagan's proposals are pessimists, politically motivated, naive supporters of taxes and uncontrolled spending, selfish, willing to turn back the clock, supporters of waste and fraud, and responsible for high interest rates.

Provided with this semiotic understanding of the text's signification, what can we say about Reagan's mastery of the nation's political discourse? First, we must understand the strategy of the text and then consider that strategy in light of a theory of culture. Eco describes the labor of constructing and interpreting a text as "sign production." Rhetorical labor involves adjusting the code through manipulating sign vehicles. Eco suggests that rhetoric "represents one of the more complex manifestations of sign production.[17] Eco does not develop the possible avenues for manipulating expressions, but he does say that Perelman's rhetoric can be assimilated into semiotics. Thus, we can

understand Perelman's description of argument techniques as a description of textual operations, taking it as a guide to describe the coding adjustments in Reagan's text.

The most obvious observation about Reagan's sign production is his use of dissociation. An audience's conflicting conceptions of reality is the key to the argument technique of dissociation.[18] Reagan spoke in the face of such conflict. His constituency applauded his successful first year, yet much of his audience held to a conception of socio-economic policy shaped by the New Deal and the Great Society. Similarly, Reagan's "talk-tough" foreign policy clashed sharply with Carter's emphasis on human rights. Reagan works his dissociations against these views of Federal reality by skillfully splitting each of the concepts of government, economy, and foreign policy. The result is an appearance and a reality: Reagan's "new partnership" is deeply rooted in the historical ideal of American democracy, undeterred by an ultimately unrealistic alternative. "In forging this new partnership for America," Reagan announces, "we could achieve the oldest hopes for our republic; prosperity for our nation, peace for the world, and the blessings of individual liberty for our children and, someday, for all of humanity." Reagan's implicit description of his statecraft as the true, fundamental, and essential form of American Government is made explicit in his conclusion to the fourth section of the address: "Our foreign policy must be rooted in realism, not naive or self-delusion."

This central dissociation of past government from Reagan's "new partnership" is developed through the contrasts of artificial and natural, weak and strong, violent and peaceful, etc. Thus, the semantic axes discovered through an analysis of codes are recognized strategically as the fleshing-out of the appearance/reality pair. Perelman argues that oppositional pairs are connected with the philosophical pair so that the privileged term of the philosophical pair (Reagan's "new partnership") is linked with positive qualities, and the negative qualities are linked with the discredited terms (the political philosophy of Reagan's opponents).[19] Reagan's text is strategically developed by dividing the conflicting picture of reality into negative and positive portraits.

Furthermore, the process of dissociation as an argument technique requires a consideration of its starting points. Perelman explains that philosophical pairs frequently correspond to "two human fundamental tendencies: the classical and the romantic spirit." [20] To promote audience adherence to a particular view of reality, a speaker relies on values and loci (common places) to enhance the acceptability of the dissociation. These classical and romantic tendencies illuminate Reagan's sign production,

leading into an account of the Reagan phenomenon.

In Reagan's text, sign-vehicles are syntactically connected in order to associate Reagan's domestic and foreign policies with both classical and romantic cultural values: the past government/present government opposition relies mainly upon classical connotations for its development, e.g. partnership, control, and responsibility. However, the other major oppositions rely upon a combination of classical and romantic values: the development of the superficial/foundational opposition relies upon the romantic values of naturalness, boldness, and courage, as well as the classical values of integration, foundation, and stability; the undeserving/deserving semantic axis is connected to the classical values of non-partisanship and common sense and the romantic values of optimism, charity (unselfishness), and the concern for others. Therefore, Reagan's dissociation of his programs from alternative proposals incorporates values from a wide spectrum of the cultural semantic field.[21]

This survey of Reagan's values is not intended to exhaust the starting points of argument in Reagan's text. Perelman's description of tendencies is a reduction of a complex network of loci, beliefs, truths, etc. These descriptions are handy characterizations which can be used to emphasize Reagan's ability to bring the contradictory dimensions of American experience together in support of his proposals. Yet this essay suggests the values are used not only as starting points in support of Reagan's administration, but are applied via dissociation as the antitheses of Reagan's political opposition.[22] Thus, opponents of his speech face not only the task of using American values as skillfully as Reagan, but must do so while denying the characterization of their own position as naive, selfish, pessimistic, responsible for Russian strength, etc.

The dilemma faced by Reagan's political opponents tends to bear out the political aphorism that "the person who can set the terms of the debate has the power to win it." [23] This bit of political wisdom even comes close to the Newsweek quote testifying to Reagan's political mastery. Yet we are still far from accounting for the ability of Reagan to alter the nation's political discourse. The analysis of his argumentation in the State of the Union address is only one piece of a complex puzzle; nevertheless, it is an important piece. The relationship of this argumentation to the Reagan phenomenon can be approached through a consideration of Reagan's text as part of a political struggle for hegemony.

As indicated earlier, I follow Hall in describing culture as composed of social struggles and contradictions. Any text, therefore, will be determined by and determining of several of these social fissures. This view of the text builds upon a semiotic conception of meaning: the power to

adjust the cultural code is a power to influence the verbal resources people use to define, describe, and live their position in the social sphere. Reagan's text is not excluded from this practice. The State of the Union address is one text among many that combine to create an ideological authority of Reagan's political discourse. The struggle in which Reagan is engaged is a struggle over the "common sense" thinking and living of the American voting public.[24] Reagan's production of signs is designed to bring the contradictory and historically-based values of American culture together into a new relationship. The public would no longer think primarily of the Federal Government as the guarantor of public services, but as the protector of a progressive, equitable and inspirational free market. Individuals would live in relation to market structures as if they were living out the very potential of the American dream. For an individual to deny Reagan's overall sense of American life is to deny their own experience as an unselfish, courageous, heroic, optimistic, and responsible citizen.

Hall's research into British politics of the later 1970's and early 1980's is instructive here. He describes the authority and domination of the Thatcher government as hegemony.[25] "Hegemony," Hall writes, "is always the (temporary) mastery of a particular theatre of struggle. It marks a shift in the dispositions of contending forces of struggle and the articulation of that field into a tendency. Such tendencies . . . create the conditions whereby society and the state may be conformed in a larger sense to certain formative national-historical tasks." [26] The Reagan phenomenon is similar to Thatcher's hegemony in this respect: both leaders are able to orient the society and the state toward their own particular domestic and foreign tasks. Reagan's discourse is one means of developing the cultural tendencies leading to this hegemonic formation. When Newsweek describes Reagan's alteration of political discourse it is noticing the Reagan hegemony and the function of Reagan's discourse in constructing and containing the argumentative appeals made throughout culture.

Reagan's first State of the Union displays an early effort to secure hegemony. His associations and dissociations play equally upon the values of political friends and enemies. A political opponent attempting to gain the adherence of an audience to a contrary proposal will probably rely on the classical and romantic values associated with Reaganism. In this sense, Reagan has altered the political dialogue of the nation, creating a new articulation of common sense with which oppositional rhetoric must struggle. Criticisms of Reagan's policy seem to be criticisms of fundamental, common-sensical American values. Alternative policies necessarily rely on values already instantiated in the Reagan policies. In short, Reagan

controls the semantic bases. His unique ability to subsume the privileged positions in the cultural field to his own political policies apparently leaves critics and opponents scrambling to find a place to stand in the political arena.

CONCLUSION

I have outlined one determining moment in Reagan's struggle for hegemony; and this has involved a theoretical articulation of language, argument and culture. I now offer an overview of the theoretical practice in this essay as well as the implications for rhetorical practice. Eco argues: "all theoretical research must . . . have the courage to specify its own contradictions, and should make them obvious where they are not apparent." [27] Since my analysis of Reagan's State of the Union address involves theoretical claims, the presence of two theoretical contradictions in the analysis can be briefly noted.

First, Eco's semiotic meta-language is designed to provide a formal and theoretical constraint on the analysis of culture. Indeed, the reliance on slashes, guillemets, and oppositions in this essay might present an appearance of a systematic and objective method. However, the experience of culling useful material from Eco and the subsequent (or even prior) application of that material to Reagan's text is as much the result of a critic's unique placement within the cultural semantic field as it is the result of systematically considering the cultural units invoked by Reagan's text. The critic's observations are, on the one hand, constrained by the connotational range of American political discourse and, on the other hand, always and necessarily escaping the theoretical framework of semiotics. Nevertheless, the reading of Reagan's text I offer should be recognizable and defensible as a reliable description of the cultural code.

Second, and perhaps not as obvious as the first, is the contradiction created by combining the theoretical stances of Eco, Perelman and Hall. I am convinced that Perelman is useful and necessary as a link between Eco and Hall: Perelman's insights into the strategic value of argument are a significant aspect of semiotics, an aspect in which Eco makes few contributions. Perelman's insights also allow for the specific analysis of a text, and thus provide the strategic detail missing from Hall's cultural analysis. Yet, some potentially interesting theoretical conflicts are created by using Perelman to bring Eco and Hall together. Foremost among these is Perelman's reliance on a traditional humanistic conception of the human subject as rationally and reflectively present-to-self, one who is the locus of decision making and persuasive experience. [28] Conversely, Eco's reliance on the boundaries of semiotics leads him to avoid any claims about the nature of the human subject; and

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Hall's strategic reliance on Althusser's structural-marxism is designed precisely to rethink human experience as an ideological construction. [29]

I have detailed these particular contradictions because the relationship between them displays some fundamental issues in the analysis of argument and culture. The experience of the critic in working through a particular text is similar to the experience of the advocate intervening into culture. Both activities seem to require a reflective and conscious attempt to discriminate among competing discourses; the critic must select a framework suitable for the task and reconstruct the text accordingly while the advocate must select the fundamental aspects suitable for the task and reconstruct the cultural code accordingly. [30]

This common experience pervades our cultural existence. The assumption that humans selectively produce and respond to discourse is powerful, intuitive, and "common-sensical." However, Hall's cultural theory contains a substantive reworking of the notion of "common sense." Hall's motivation for redescribing human experience stems from his attempt to explain and influence social organization. Therefore, one task for the argument theorist-critic who seeks to think through the relationship of argument and culture is to critically consider the humanistic presuppositions pervading most contemporary research on argument.

The critique of human experience in the name of cultural theory also raises another fundamental issue for the argument critic. The conceptualization of the human subject in terms of culturally determined meanings casts doubt upon the assumed value of the critic's self-appointed task: the description and, perhaps, prescription of rationality. Specifically, the question is raised concerning the role of rationality in social change. The following formula for a better society is often assumed by argument criticism: public issues + rationality = public knowledge (wise decisions). Culture theory provides a critique of this formula through the demonstration that public issues and public knowledge are saturated with history, complexity, and struggle. [31] Where is the place for rationality? In this essay, the already tenuous connection between Perelman's argumentation techniques and his defense of rationality is sacrificed in order to appropriate the techniques for the analysis of political struggle. Indeed, Hall ignores the place of rationality in any formula for social change. Certainly, one task for the critic, suggested by this essay, is to secure a theoretical place for rationality in the description of social change.

Along with raising some theoretical issues concerning argument and culture, the research offered here can also enhance rhetorical practice, i.e., the actual practice of

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intervention into the struggle for hegemony. The analysis of the State of the Union address is an example of how an advocate might survey the cultural terrain in order to find the strategic place of attack (or defense).

Due to the complexity of hegemonic formation, potential places for intervention are numerous. However, a tentative site of struggle can be located based on the research presented here. Generally, one wishing to break into the Reagan hegemony must attempt to disarticulate, or dissociate, Reagan's association of classical and romantic places. One need not forsake American values. Instead, one can use the values in the same oppositional manner as Reagan yet reverse their application. For instance, Reagan's use of the romantic opposition "artificial/natural" can be turned against him by appealing to an equally strong classical opposition, "chaos/order." [32] Thus, one can argue: "We cannot allow the Reagan administration, or any administration, to let its citizens be subject to the inconsistencies and injustices of marketplace barons who are free to benefit some and, tragically, betray others. The shifting winds of high finance should not prevail against the reasonable order provided by our democratically selected governing body." This bit of political prose, although admittedly overdone, is saturated with classical values centering around the "chaos/order" pair. The oppositional structure is typically Reagan, yet the classical values are used to dissociate Reagan's view of government from the advocate's view of government.

Based on the analysis of Reagan's first State of the Union address, the advocate could prepare an overall message in which the central opposition would be "Reagan Administration/Proposed Administration," and this opposition should be essentially articulated with romantic values. The support of the opposition, however, should not be limited to romantic values but rely heavily on classical values as well. Notice that this message strategy is the exact opposite of Reagan's argumentative structure in the State of the Union address. His basic opposition between past government and present government is essentially a classical opposition (an emphasis on partnership, control, etc.), yet this opposition is combined with the romantic values supporting the other major oppositions. By selecting romantic values to characterize the central opposition, the advocate's intervention provides both an alternative to Reagan's vision of government and an opportunity to dissociate Reagan's vision from several American values. [33] Further analyses of Reagan's language and argument might serve to modify or extend this strategy of advocacy. The particular synthesis of semiotics, argument, and cultural analysis presented here can be a useful guide in such endeavors.

NOTES

1. See Walter Shapiro, et al., "Warming Up for the Kickoff," Newsweek, 30 Jan. 1984, pp. 14-15; George J. Church, "Riding a Wave of Good Feeling," Time, 27 Aug. 1984, pp. 18-19; Walter Shapiro, et al., "Can Mondale Come Back?" Newsweek, 3 Sep. 1984, pp. 20-21.
2. Barry Alan Morris, "The Ponderosa Presidency: Reagan's Western Melodramatic Form," Speaker and Gavel, 19 (1982-83), 31-37; Dirk C. Gibson, "Ronald Reagan's 1980 Campaign Communication: A Case Study in Political Mythography," Speaker and Gavel, 19 (1982), 70-74; Walter R. Fisher, "Romantic Democracy, Ronald Reagan, and Presidential Heroes," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 46 (1982), 299-310; Janice Hocker Rushing, "The Rhetoric of the American Western Myth," Communication Monographs, 50 (1983), 14-32; Sarah Russel Hankins, "Archetypal Alloy: Reagan's Rhetorical Image," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), 33-43; Gary C. Woodward, "Reagan as Roosevelt: The Elasticity of Pseudo-Populist Appeal," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), 44-58.
3. See, for example, Bruce Bawer, "Ronald Reagan as Indiana Jones," Newsweek, 27 Aug. 1984, p. 14.
4. See Steven R. Weisman, "Can the Magic Prevail?" New York Times Magazine, 29 Apr. 1984, pp. 38-42; Hugh Sidney, "Why the Criticisms Don't Stick," Time, 21 May 1984, p. 53.
5. Tom Morganthau, et al., "How Good a President?" Newsweek, 27 Aug. 1984, p. 30.
6. See the essays listed in note 2. Also see: Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., "Presidential Rhetoric and Presidential Power: The Reagan Initiatives," Speaker and Gavel, 19 (1982), 39-46; Idem, "Ronald Reagan's Rhetoric: An Update," Speaker and Gavel, 19 (1982), 47-54; Martha Anna Martin, "Ideologues, Ideographs, and 'The Best Man': From Carter to Reagan," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 49 (1983), 12-25; Bert E. Bradley, "Jefferson and Reagan: The Rhetoric of Two Inaugurals," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 48 (1983), 119-36; David Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer, and Frank E. Tutzauer, "Reagan's Safety Net for the Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of Definition," Central States Speech Journal, 35 (1984), 113-19; Robert L. Ivie, "Speaking 'Common Sense' about the Soviet Threat," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 48 (1984), 39-50; and Henry Z. Scheele, "Ronald Reagan's 1980 Acceptance Address," Western Journal of Speech

7. The essays by Rushing, Hankins, and Fisher are examples of how a relationship between text and culture can be considered in criticism. Philip Wander's essay on rhetorical criticism and ideology has perhaps engendered the most response to the text-culture connection. See: Philip K. Wander, "The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), 1-18; "Special Reports: Responses to Wander," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), 114-127 and Central States Speech Journal, 35 (1984), 43-56.

8. Eco states the act of producing a linguistic message is dependent upon a system of codes shared between members of a culture. The code is the cultural convention which connects the verbal expressions with culturally shared content, or meanings. Each verbal expression, or sign vehicle, is recognizable via its placement in relation to, or in opposition to, other sign vehicles. For example, /rat/ is phonemically different from /cat/. Similarly, the shared content, or cultural unit, is meaningful due to its placement in opposition to other cultural units; e.g., we understand <<rat>> because of its opposition to <<cat>>, or <<dog>>, or <<mouse>>. The code provides the correlational rule which connects the sign-vehicle /cat/ and the cultural unit <<cat>>. To analyze a message in terms of the cultural units denotated and connoted through the use of sign-vehicles is to analyze the signification of the message. I follow Eco in using slashes to identify a sign-vehicle and guillemets to indicate a cultural unit. I will use quotation marks to emphasize the attribution of an expression to a source. Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

10. Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems," in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall, et al. (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 15-47, develops this view of culture in more detail. I rely upon his conclusions in this essay. Also see: Stuart Hall, "The Problem of Ideology--Marxism Without Guarantees," in Marx 100 Years On, ed. Betty Matthews (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp. 57-85. Hall frequently relies on the definition of ideology offered by Louis Althusser in "Marxism and Humanism," in Althusser's For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979): "ideology is a matter of the lived relation between men [sic] and their world" (p. 233). This view of ideology underlies the analysis in my essay as well.

11. The term "intervene" is used here to indicate the active quality of Cuomo's alternative picture of government and society. Thus, his speech is not merely providing an alternative picture, rather it is an attempt to break into Reagan's political discourse. I borrow the term from Hall's work, yet it is also used by Eco (p. 29).

12. A note of caution is necessary here in order to underscore the claim of this essay. I do not intend this exploration to uncover the sole cause or reason for the Reagan phenomenon. Neither should this essay be read as necessarily offering an account of Reagan which is incompatible with other explanations offered by speech communication scholars. Rather, the analysis herein is an interpretation of one moment in American culture in which Reagan's popularity is currently paramount. Following Louis Althusser's conception of "overdeterminism," I understand the innumerable moments of culture to be interrelated, mutually determining, and necessarily effective: Louis Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in his For Marx, pp. 89-116; Also see Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies," pp. 32-34. Thus, any one act of Reagan is interpreted as an effect of other cultural acts as well as a locus for the production of further effects. A particular cultural act is always in a complex relationship with other cultural phenomena. Therefore, the various explanations of the Reagan phenomenon are not merely different interpretations of the same phenomenon, but are accounts which vary by virtue of their selection of different determinations within culture. The differing explanatory accounts of Reagan's political mastery should be seen as pointing to different stands of determination in the cultural fabric. In this essay I attempt to pull out only one strand--Reagan's argumentation in his first State of the Union address--and suggest how it contributes to an understanding of Reagan's political mastery.

13. Newspaper editorials focused primarily on this section of the speech. See Editorials on File, 13 (16-31 Jan. 1982), 64-75.

14. I used the transcript from Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 (15 Feb. 1982), 258-62. Examination of the text in relation to an audio-cassette recording of the speech reveals some minor differences (disfluencies, applause interruptions) and a major organizational error in the printing of the text. My divisions of the speech are based on the corrected text. All quotations from the speech are taken from this transcript; the minor errors do not affect any of the quotations in this analysis.

15. Eco, pp. 121-29.
16. The second paragraph in this series of seven does not begin with "Together, we." Instead, "Together" and "we" are emphasized by their separation. The mediating words describe a characteristic of <<past government>>.
17. Eco, p. 278.
18. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 412.
19. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 422.
20. Chaim Perelman, "Classicism and Romanticism in Argumentation," in The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications, trans. William Kluback (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979), p. 159.
21. The nature of this argumentative technique can be further illustrated with the help of Rieke and Sillar's discussion of American values in Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, 2nd ed. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1984), pp. 118-24. They identify six broad categories or systems of values which may help students of argument to classify and thereby better understand the use of value appeals in American discourse. The remarkable quality of Reagan rhetoric is its string of associations extending into all six categories. For example, Reagan's State of the Union falls primarily into three systems: the "progressive," the "collectivist," and the "personal success" systems. Yet Reagan's connotational field also taps into the other three systems: the undeserving/deserving opposition extends into the "puritan-pioneer-peasant" value system as well as the "transcendental" value system, and the past government/present government opposition connotes the "enlightenment" system. Reagan's combination of conflicting values is also pointed out by Gary Woodward in an examination of Reagan's use of populist political appeals. Woodward's claim seems similar to mine in this respect: Reagan's messenger collects and associates competing political values into a unique political message. The first three characteristics of populist rhetoric, as described by Woodward (pp. 47-49), are consistent with the romantic values and loci as described by Perelman.
22. Henry Z. Scheele also identifies Reagan's ability to connect the negative values with the political opponents; yet Scheele does not include an analysis of argument technique, nor does he consider the cultural significance of Reagan's reliance on values.
23. I am quoting Zarefsky, Miller-Tutzauer and Tutzauer (p. 119), who include this aphorism to illustrate the effectiveness of Reagan's dissociation of "safety net."
24. For further discussion of "common sense" and culture, see Errol Lawrence, "Just Plain Common Sense: The 'Roots' of Racism," in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1983), pp. 47-94. Ivie also relies on "common sense" as a phrase to indicate the acceptableness of Reagan's discourse, yet Ivie does not place "common sense" in the context of cultural struggle.
25. Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in The Politics of Thatcherism, ed. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp. 19-39.
26. Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies," p. 36.
27. Eco, p. 7.
28. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, pp. 14-17.
29. Eco, pp. 314-17; Hall, "Cultural Studies," pp. 31-35.
30. The relation between argument and criticism is effectively stated by Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60 (174), 165-74.
31. Michael Calvin McGee has been a frequent opponent of rationality as a necessary consideration in the analysis of public argument. However, he opposes it from a similar but significantly different theoretical viewpoint than what I have argued in this essay. First, McGee relies on a conception of ideology as "false consciousness," a position which is the repudiated precursor to the conception of ideology informing this essay (See: McGee, "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 61 (1975), pp. 243-47). Second, McGee's position on ideology seems to lead him to a point of inaction: The scholar, he claims, should not venture into the political arena without risking damage to his or her academic calling (McGee, "Social Movements as Meaning,"

Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), p. 76). Hall, on the other hand, understands academic discourse as the means to identify possible avenues for political intervention. This essay is produced in agreement with Hall's interest in the value of theoretical discourse. However, I do not share Hall's political investment in socialism. The insights offered through semiotics and cultural theory can be useful in the development of a representative democracy.

32. See Perelman, "Classicism and Romanticism," pp. 164-165, for a helpful listing of romantic and classical pairs. Also see The New Rhetoric, pp. 426-28, for the description of how to overturn a dissociation.
33. This proposed strategy is very similar to Cuomo's strategy at the Democratic convention. Cuomo presented a view of government that is fundamentally romantic--government involved with the unique needs and concerns of individuals--yet he developed this view by using classical values: the "family" metaphor, to which I referred earlier, relies on the classical values of social organization. Although the strategy of Cuomo's keynote address was not sustained throughout the Democratic campaign, his approach seems to be the best possible option against Reagan's ideological authority.

ARGUMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN LABOR HISTORY:
A CASE STUDY OF THE GASTONIA STRIKE

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Theodor W. Adorno remarks at the beginning of Negative Dialectics that philosophy lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.¹ Despite the immense prestige which Marxists recently have attained in such diverse academic fields as history, economics, anthropology, and cultural studies, the rhetorical situation of contemporary Marxism is much like that of the early Church fathers. There must be some explanation why the eschaton never arrived.

American Marxist historians have turned to the study of the American Communist Party as a way of answering Werner Sombart's famous question, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?"² In fact, a rather significant battle is shaping up between so-called "institutional" historians of Communism such as Harvey Klehr and Theodore Draper and so-called "social" historians of Communism such as Maurice Isserman and Vivian Gornick. The "institutional" historians emphasize the control of the Soviet Union over American Communism, while the "social" historians emphasize the relative autonomy of the Party during key periods, especially the Popular Front.³ In a sense, the history of the American Communist party has become a site of cultural struggle between neo-conservatives and neo-Marxists. The rhetorical and argumentative dimensions of American Communism, not to mention the labor movement in general, have received relatively little attention.⁴

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the argumentative strategies of writers who have tried to represent one of the strangest episodes in the history of American radicalism: the Gastonia, North Carolina, textile strike of 1929. The strike was the first American Communist-led labor dispute to receive national and worldwide attention. It was in many respects a dismal failure, resulting in the conviction of the strike leaders for conspiracy to commit murder, and in a long-lasting hostility to labor organizing in the South. The events leading up to the strike and the trial of the strike leaders, however, exercised a powerful hold on the imaginations of many writers. The Yale theologian Lynton Pope used the events to write a classic work in the sociology of religion, Millhands and Preachers.⁵ At least six 1930's novels drew directly on the Gastonia events, three of which were translated into Russian for the edification of the Soviet working class. Fielding Burke's (Olive Tilford Dargan) Call Home the Heart, the only novel of the six to attain genuine literary stature, has recently been reissued in the Feminist Press series on "forgotten" American women writers.⁶ W.J. Cash's The Mind of the South has a major section on the strike.⁷ A whole set of sociological studies of the Southern textile industry, most of them originating at the University of North Carolina, also were inspired by the strike.⁸

The story of the strike itself is rather bizarre. Whether one reads it as an example of the perfidy of international Communism, the tragic spirit of Southern culture, the beginnings of "socialist feminism," or an unfortunate episode on the way to more civilized labor-management relations under capitalism, the story is worth telling, both on its own terms and as the site of a continuing interpretive struggle over the "meaning" of American radicalism. Although this paper is largely descriptive, I view it as a contribution to the larger problem of the textuality of Marxism.

The Gastonia Strike

Before 1929, Gastonia, North Carolina, was one of the major textile centers of the South. Labor was cheap and productive, and the industry had been relatively free of conflict which had marked it in the Northeast. The Southern ruling class had done their best to attract Northern capital, and, as Irving Bernstein writes, "felt it their sacred duty to protect the industry against outside encroachments in such matters as foreign competition, the child labor amendment, and federal investigation of working conditions."⁹ Even in the South, however, the industry was increasingly plagued by overproduction, speculation in the price of raw cotton, and competition by other fibers such as silk and rayon.¹⁰ The response to these market factors at the Loray Mill, the largest mill in Gastonia, owned by the Northern Manville-Jenckes corporation, was the "stretch-out," a "modern management" technique used to increase productivity and to discipline the labor force--a technique more recently described in the film Norma Rae. Although the Loray Mill was perhaps the most profitable unit in the corporation, F.L. Jenckes, the owner, had foreseen a further drop in demand for cotton fabric resulting from the shift from cord to balloon tires, and in 1927 ordered the superintendent of the Loray Mill, G.A. Johnstone, to reduce costs of production at least half-a-million dollars a year. Johnstone arbitrarily increased work loads, at times doubling them. Within fifteen months the superintendent reduced the number of workers from about 3500 to 2200, while keeping production at previous levels.¹¹ Most writers consider the stretchout to have been the immediate cause of the strike. W.J. Cash, in his inimitable style, finds a larger lesson about Southern ideology about work in the response to the stretch-out:

To be wrenched out of the old, easy-going way so long native to the country, to be required to exhibit more energy than the climate allowed for--that was in itself bad enough. But to be deprived of one's dignity as an individual and made into a sort of automaton; to be stood over by a taskmaster with a stop-watch in his hand (a taskmaster who himself would have an "efficiency expert," usually a Yankee, at his elbow), and checked on at each visit to the water-cooler or toilet; to be everlastingly urged onto greater exertion by curt commands and sneers, and to have to stand periodically and take a dressing down with a white face, just as though one were a nigger, under the ever present threat of being summarily dismissed--for this people so immensely proud in its curious way, bred to the ancient Southern notion that each was a white man like any other,

that each in some fundamental fashion was as good as any white man who walked the earth and entitled to be treated with respect and consideration; bred, too, to the heritage of knowing the masters of the mills on the old casually intimate terms--for such a people, that was well-nigh or wholly intolerable. 12

Cash's comment, as is characteristic of most "readers" of the strike, probably says more about his own ideology than it does about the workers. A number of other factors contributed to social unrest in the mill. Wages, for instance, were incredibly low. In 1926, a southern textile worker earned an average of \$15.81 for a 55-hour week compared to \$21.49 for a 48 hour week earned by her or his New England counterpart.¹³ This average, however, masks the fact that at the Loray Mill the work week often was extended as long as 72 hours.¹⁴ Night work for women and children also was common. It is important to remember that the unit of employment in the mills was the family rather than the individual. As Bernstein writes, "From the employer's standpoint, the family was more efficient. Many jobs required nimbleness of finger and keenness of eyesight; hence the employer's interest was in the young rather than the old. Children, not the mill, assumed the obligation to support those no longer employable."¹⁵

The control of the millowners over the work force was enhanced immediately by the fact that they provided houses, stores, schools, and even churches for the workers in the "mill villages," and in a larger sense by the chronic oversupply of labor caused by the depletion of agricultural land. The stretch-out, however, seems to have broken this control. On March 5, 1928, weave-room workers at the Loray Mill staged a brief walkout to protest the stretch-out and wage cuts. The actual cause of the strike itself, however, seems to have been the rhetorical efforts of Fred Beal. Fred Beal, who recounts his life in his book Proletarian Journey, was a veteran of the great Lawrence strike of 1912, and more recently had been a leader of the New Bedford strike, which had moved him rapidly from an I.W.W. syndicalist to a member of the Communist Party.¹⁶ Beal, for all his revolutionary rhetoric, was at heart a pragmatic trade unionist. He had come to Gastonia in mid-March 1929, under orders of the National Textile Workers Union (NTWU), one of the so-called "dual unions" created by the Communist Party. He had immediately formed a secret union, comprised of a handful of workers at the Loray Mill. Company spies found out about the union, and in late March several union members were dismissed. Beal then called a public meeting of all Loray workers for March 30. Several hundred workers joined the union after the meeting, and Beal was authorized to call a strike, despite his objections to the timing. On April 1 virtually the whole work force on both shifts walked out. The demands presented to management on the third day of the strike seem, in retrospect, rather modest:

1. Elimination of all piece work, hank or cloth systems, and substitution of a standard wage scale.
2. A minimum standard weekly wage of \$20.
3. Forty-hour, five-day week.
4. Abolition of all speeding and doubling up of work.
5. Equal pay for equal work for women and youth.

6. Decent and sanitary working and housing conditions:
 - (a) Immediate installation of baths without extra charge to workers.
 - (b) Screening of all homes without extra charge to workers.
 - (c) Repair of toilets in the mill.
7. Reduction by 50 per cent of rent and light charges.
8. Recognition of the union.

The response to the walkout was swift and shrill. On April 4, Governor O. Max Gardner ordered the National Guard to Lorys Village. The conservative AFL denounced the strike. The rhetorical tone of the aftermath of the strike was set by circulars distributed by the millowners:

Our Religion, Our Morals, Our Common Decency, Our Government, and the very foundations of Modern Civilization, all that we are now and all that we plan for our children IS IN DANGER. Communism will destroy the efforts of Christians of 2,000 years. Do we want it? Will we have it? NO!! It MUST Go from the Southland. 18

A cartoon in the Gastonia Gazette depicted a snake wrapped around the base of a flagpole bearing the American flag, with the caption, "Communism in the South. Kill It!" Advertisements in the paper, paid for, as it said, by "Citizens of Gaston County," read: "RED RUSSIANISM LIFTS ITS GORY HANDS RIGHT HERE IN GASTONIA." They described the Communist Party as a "party that seeks the overthrow of capital, business, and all of the established social order. World Order is its ultimate goal. It has no religion, it has no color line, it believes in free love--it advocates [the destruction of--lines unfortunately left out in the actual advertisement] all those things which the people of the South and of the United States hold sacred." 19

The Party rushed representatives of Worker's International Relief, the International Labor Defense, the Young Communist League, the Young Pioneers, and the Daily Worker to Gastonia. Control of the Strike shifted from Beal to the leaders of these organizations who, among other things, arranged for delegations of emancipated workers to visit New York and other Northern cities to raise money. Albert Weisbord of the NTWU ordered Beal to make racial equality a central issue in the strike, despite the fact that the Lorys Mill had only two black employees. Beal's more pragmatic strategy yielded to orthodoxy. 20

Reporters from the Nation, the New Republic, and many other periodicals also descended on Gastonia. Protests were staged by Communists in England, Germany, Denmark, and elsewhere. As Theodore Draper writes, "For a few months, Gastonia was lifted out of mill-town obscurity and made into a symbol of all that was wrong with the capitalist system." 21

The strike itself, however, was nearly broken by April 15, when strike breakers had brought the mills back to normal production. On April 18, a band of masked men, singing "Praise God from Whom All Blessings Flow," wrecked the union headquarters and destroyed their store of food by dousing it with kerosene and setting it afire. On April 20, Governor Gardner ordered

the withdrawal of the National Guard. On May 6, the mill ordered the eviction of 62 families, including a child suffering from smallpox, from company houses. The NTWU constructed a tent colony on a vacant lot to house these families. An extraordinary young woman named Ella Mae Wiggins, a 29-year-old mother of nine children, four of whom had died in childbirth, sang original songs, which she called "ballads," to raise the morale of the strikers. Many of these songs were later collected by the Party into a small pamphlet entitled Songs of the Class Struggle. One of the most memorable is called "The Mill Mother's Song";

We leave our home in the morning,
We kiss our children goodbye,
While we slave for the bosses,
Our children scream and cry.

And when we draw our money,
Our grocery bills to pay,
Not a cent to spend for clothing,
Not a cent to lay away.

And on that very evening,
Our little son will say,
"I need some shoes, dear Mother,
And so does sister May."

How it grieves the heart of the mother,
You every one must know,
But we can't buy for our children,
Our wages are too low." 22

Fearful of trouble, the strikers created an armed guard. On June 7, Police Chief A. O. Aderholt and several deputies--at least two of whom had been drinking heavily--entered the union grounds without a warrant. Shot were exchanged and four officers were wounded, including Aderholt, who died shortly afterwards. There is no evidence that Beal himself was armed. 23

A mob descended on the tent colony and destroyed it. Beal fled to Spartanburg, South Carolina, but was later arrested and charged, along with sixteen others, including three women, with conspiracy to commit murder.

The trial, which was widely covered in the national and international press, began, after a change of venue, on August 26, 1929, in Charlotte. Attorneys for the defense included Leon Josephson from the ILD, John Randolph Neal from the ACLU, who had previously been on the defense team for the Scopes trial, and Arthur Garfield Hayes, also from the ACLU. Attorneys for the prosecution included John G. Carpenter, Clyde R. Hoey--the brother-in-law of Governor Gardner and later governor of North Carolina himself, and A.L. Bulwinckle, the local attorney for Hanville-Jenckes, later member of

Congress, who allegedly had led the vigilantes in their destruction of the tent colony. The governor chose Judge M.V. Barnhill to conduct the trial. 24

A rather bizarre move by Carpenter resulted in a mistrial. Carpenter ended his case for conspiracy by introducing a device he had seen in a popular film of the day, The Trial of Mary Dugan. Carpenter had constructed a black-shrouded, life-sized dummy of Aderholt, bullet-holes, bloodstains, and all. When he unveiled it, the murdered man's widow and daughter wept. Just after the judge ordered the dummy removed, one juror, Joseph C. Campbell, became terror-stricken and went mad. This led Barnhill to call a mistrial on September 9. Several jurors told reporters that on the basis of the case thus far presented they would have voted for acquittal. 25

A reign of terror followed in Gastonia. Hundreds of men roamed through Gaston and adjoining counties, destroying NTWU and ILD property. Morris Wells, a British Communist, was beaten by a mob. He was later able to identify five of his assailants, who were tried but not convicted because Wells' testimony was ruled inadmissible on the grounds that he did not believe in God. 26 On Saturday, September 14, Ella Mae Wiggins was murdered by five Loxey Mill employees. They also were acquitted, despite the fact that the murder had been committed in broad daylight in the presence of more than fifty people. 27

The strike had been called off completely when the second trial opened on September 30. The ILD, in a tactical blunder, dismissed Hays and Neal of the ACLU from the defense, chiefly because they refused to follow the orthodox Communist line that the case was a frameup. Carpenter shrewdly dropped charges against nine defendants, including the three women, and reduced the charges against the other seven from first to second-degree murder. Carpenter also managed to get a jury more sympathetic to the prosecutor. Although Beal and his codefendants confined their testimony to the facts of the case, their attorneys permitted Edith Miller of the Young Communist League to proclaim revolution and denounce religion from the witness stand. The result was, as Liston Pope writes, that the trial of the Gastonia defendants turned into a heresy trial. John G. Carpenter focused heavily on religious themes in his final summation, a speech whose spaciousness Richard Weaver no doubt would have admired.

Carpenter knelt before the jury, as if at Aderholt's death bed. He handed the bullet-riddled coat of Aderholt to his weeping widow, telling her to take it home. He told of scenes of immorality at the union headquarters. He even gave an encomium to the yarn made in Gastonia:

Why, you could wrap it around the sun sixteen times, around the moon thirteen times, around Mercury, Venus, and Saturn, stretch it from San Francisco to southernmost Africa and right back to Gastonia. 28

He concluded:

Do you believe in the flag of your country, floating in the breeze,

kissing the sunlight, singing the song of freedom? Do you believe in North Carolina? Do you believe in good roads, the good roads of North Carolina on which the heaven-bannered hosts could walk as far as San Francisco? . . . Gastonia--into which the union organizers came, fiends incarnate, stripped of their hoofs and horns, bearing guns instead of pitchforks. . . . They came into peaceful, contented Gastonia, with its flowers, birds, and churches . . . sweeping like a cyclone and tornado to sink damnable fangs into the heart and lifeblood of my community They stood it until the great God looked down from the very battlements of heaven and broke the chains and traces of their patience and caused them to call the officers to the lot and stop the infernal scenes that came sweeping down from the wild plains of Soviet Russia into the peaceful community of Gastonia, bringing bloodshed and death, creeping like the hellish serpent into the Garden of Eden. 29

Judge Barnhill denied all but one objection by the defense to this summation. Court was recessed for the weekend as soon as the summation was finished. The jury was sent out on Monday, October 21, and returned in less than an hour with a verdict of guilty. The judge sentenced Beal and the four other Northern defendants to seventeen and twenty years in the state prison, imposed sentences of twelve to fifteen years on two others, and a sentence of five to seven years on the remaining one.

Counsel for the defense had taken a total of 159 exceptions to the trial, and filed an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The Court handed down its decision in August 1930, finding no error. Responding to objections against the admission of religious issues in the trial, the Court concluded, "Ours is a religious people. This is historically true. American life everywhere, as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs, its society, gives abundant recognition and proof of the fact." 30

The subsequent story of what happened to Fred Beal and the other six defendants is perhaps even stranger than the trial itself. They all jumped bail and fled to the Soviet Union, where Beal and some of the others rapidly became disillusioned. Beal saw that Soviet workers, under pressure from Stalin's demand for rapid industrialization, themselves were subjected to the stretch-out. He also saw firsthand the famines that were caused by Stalin's agricultural policies. Beal secretly returned to the United States, where he wrote Proletarian Journey, which was serialized in the Hearst papers. Proletarian Journey is an eloquent and bitter book which attacks Stalinism, the American Communist Party, and liberal fellow-travelers who refused to listen to his revelations about the truth of the Soviet system, a system which had even jailed his fellow defendant, Louis McLaughlin, for stealing a loaf of bread in Moscow because he was hungry. Beal was arrested in 1930 and returned to North Carolina to serve his sentence. He was pardoned in 1942, after much agitation by liberals and labor groups, including the AFL, and he spent the rest of his life in poverty and isolation, returning to public view only to testify briefly as a friendly witness before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947. 31

"Reading" the Strike

The narrative of Gastonia can be told in many ways. I ended the previous section of this paper with the death of Fred Beal mainly, I suspect, because for me Beal is a tragically heroic figure. Soon after the end of the strike, many other writers sought to impose a narrative line on the events. Of all the readers of the Gastonia text, only Fred Beal and the workers themselves failed to find what they expected.

The Gastonia events, in a sense, mark the beginning of what Rene Girard calls a "sacrificial crisis," or Kenneth Burke calls a "ritual drama," culminating in a search for a surrogate victim or scapegoat.³² The pages upon pages of commentary on Gastonia, even in their most self-effacing scholarly moments, all take sides in one way or another, praising heroes and blaming villains. The commentaries often tell us more about the writers themselves than they do about the lives of the illiterate mountain folk, the "linheads," who for one brief moment acted heroically in the face of brutal oppression.

The Communist Party, for example, immediately reacted against its own failures in Gastonia by expelling the other major leaders of the strike from the NTWU in 1929.³³ In an Orwellian way, William Z. Foster rewrote the history of the strike in his 1937 book From Bryan to Stalin by giving credit for leadership of the strike to William Dunne and by calling Beal a "defendant who later turned traitor."³⁴ Carl Reeve, who represented the Party's International Labor Defense at the trial, redresses some of the official CPUSA injustice to Beal in two posthumously published essays published in the Party's theoretical journal Political Affairs in 1984. Reeve restores Beal's place in the history of the strike but accuses Beal and others of being "weak and fainthearted" for not staying the course that would lead to the triumph of socialism. Reeve compares the Gastonia strike to the J.P. Stevens organizing campaign of the 1970's and the campaign to free the Wilmington Ten, concluding:

Those who do not turn away have the knowledge and satisfaction that they are going forward with history and that a better and fuller life for all is ahead, without exploitation, without racism, in a peaceful world, where socialism is a fact of life.³⁵

Another set of readers have used the strike to extract lessons about the evils of Communism. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, for example, take this stance in their history of the Communist Party. They conclude,

The stress must be placed upon the profound irresponsibility with which the Communists seized upon the desperation of the Gastonia mill hands in order to make political capital; the cynicism that lay hidden like a canker in their idealistic readiness to suffer so long as it was "their" strike; the indifference to the dignity and needs of the human beings whom they involved and then manipulated in the interests of ideology. In the Gastonia strike, as in so many other situations, the Communists committed the greatest of all sins in their treatment of the workers: they used them.³⁶

Howe and Coser's argument is characteristic of the so-called "institutional" view of American Communism, which assumes that Communist policy was always

directed from the top down. The argument makes sense in terms of the conduct of the trial, but not in terms of the strike itself, when one considers that it was the workers, not Beal, who wanted the strike in the first place. One wonders, too, about the "cynicism" of the many Communists who risked their lives during the strike. W.J. Cash is perhaps more accurate in his conclusion that the Southern reserve army of surplus labor and a constricting Southern ideology were responsible for the strike's failure.³⁷ The failure of the AFL-led textile strike in Danville, Virginia, in 1930, and virtually all other Southern textile strikes until the 1970's are further evidence for Cash's position.³⁸

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the representation of the strike is its fictional depiction. Five of the novels written about Gastonia were by Party members or fellow-travelers: Mary Neaton Vorse's Strikel, Grace Lumpkin's To Make My Bread—which was later made into a popular Broadway play, Let Freedom Ring!, William Rollins' The Shadow Before, Myra Page's The Gathering Storm, and Fielding Burke's Call Home the Heart. The penchant of proletarian novelists for writing about failed strikes is a rather strange one. In Burke's case, the only novel to rise above the turgid conventions of proletarian literature, her deep interest in women's consciousness reveals profound tensions in Communist ideology. Her heroine, Iahma (a sort of Southern Emma Bovary) is really interesting to the reader, even today, but only when she is dealing with more personal concerns, such as birth control, than with the strike itself. Burke locates the failure of Communist ideology to persuade her heroine in Iahma's physical encounter with a black woman, after Iahma has saved the life of the woman's husband. The black woman's embrace so nauseates Iahma that she runs away into the mountains, back to the husband she had deserted to seek her fortune in the world outside. There have been few serious readers of these novels since the 1930's, and all of them read the novels with differing ideological purposes. Sylvia Jenkins Cook, for example, in her magisterial study, From Tobacco Road to Route 66, retells the story as an episode in the recurring American cultural struggle to define the character of the Southern poor white.³⁹ Alice Kessler-Harris and Paul Lauter, however, call for a retelling of the story, and the story of the women writers who first told it, in order to reconstruct the history of American "socialist feminism," to reexamine questions about the role of art in a revolutionary movement, and to "provide another piece of the puzzle that illustrates how women have come to consciousness over the years."⁴⁰

In contrast, Draper takes a mandarin stance of worldweariness at revolutionary hubris in his 1971 essay, "Gastonia Revisited":

In the American annals of the Third Period and the revolutionary upsurge, Gastonia came first. It took place before the Wall Street crash and in as unlikely a place as one could have imagined. Little or no attention has been paid to it in the recent books on the depression. Yet it may hold a special interest for the present revolutionary generation—not because it suggests how similar a previous revolutionary generation was but rather how different it was. For one generation, revolution may mean a change in "consciousness"; for another, it meant going to Gastonia or its equivalents. The story is worth telling both for its own sake and for what it tells about the difference between yesterday and today.⁴¹

The liberal sociologists of the 1930's including Liston Pope, Jennings J. Rhyne, and others tended to view Gastonia as a "prize laboratory" to test sociological theories, theories which themselves no doubt could take a heroic role in reforming rather than revolutionizing society.⁴² The characteristic liberal theme of reform is best captured by Irving Bernstein's conclusion to the Gastonia story in his history of American labor, The Lean Years:

A careful search of the wreckage reveals that not quite all was lost. There was some improvement in working conditions. The mills in Gaston County, for example, reduced the work week from sixty to fifty-five hours with the same take-home; at Marion hours were shortened by six per week, wages rose five per cent, and welfare was liberalized. At its 1930's convention the Cotton Textile Institute voted to abolish night work for women and minors under eighteen. More important than economic change, however, was a stirring in men's minds. The decent people of the south were profoundly disturbed by the rot exposed when the stone was rolled over by the Piedmont revolt. Religious bodies began seriously to study and debate what might be done to better the lot of the millhand. The universities, notably North Carolina, undertook systematic investigation of the textile industry and the mill-village system. Finally, the strikers left nuclei of workmen, though bitter in defeat, determined to do battle again for their unions when the time was ripe.⁴³

Bernstein's optimism is hardly borne out by subsequent Southern labor history. The success of the J.P. Stevens organizing effort in the 1970's is largely attributable to the influx of black workers into the textile industry who lacked the traditional mill village psychology of the poor whites.⁴⁴ Further, even the Stevens contract seems a largely hollow victory in light of capital flight from the South to the Third World. The Southern textile industry lost some 28,000 jobs in 1984 alone.⁴⁵

The textile mills in Gastonia today remain largely unorganized. Fred Ratchford, executive secretary of the Gastonia Chamber of Commerce in the 1970's, and himself a longtime employee of Burlington Industries, the world's largest textile company, said of the 1929 strike in Loray:

One good thing about it is that there have been several efforts to organize here in the plants and not one has been successful. Some of the old folks in the plants remember that earlier time.⁴⁶

A larger study of the strike and its representation might focus on what Hayden White calls modes of emplotment used by historians of the strike.⁴⁷ One could say that the Communists wrote the history of the strike as a romance, leading to an ultimate triumph of light over darkness. Liberals such as Pope or Bernstein wrote the history in a comic mode, stressing the limited victories of reform. The anti-Communists such as Howe and Coser or Draper vacillate between tragedy and satire.

It would be all too easy to conclude a study of the various arguments-

tive strategies involved in representing the strike by making some fashionably post-structuralist pronouncement that history is ultimately an unfollowable text. If no one's "consciousness" in the strike was exactly correct, it does not follow that everyone's was false. The Gastonia strike and the subsequent history of Southern textile workers largely supports Marxist hypotheses about the importance of class struggle in history, the role of ideology (particularly religion) in repressing workers, the doomed character of revolutionary efforts that do not or cannot seize the state apparatus, and the continuing problem of capital flight. The problem then, as always in Marxism, is the once and future role of the Party's rhetoric as the joker in the dialectical pack.⁴⁸

Notes

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, tr. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 3.

² Werner Sombart, "Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?" International Socialist Review 7 (1907), 420-425.

³ See Theodore Draper, "American Communism Revisited," New York Review of Books, May 9, 1985, 32-37 and "The Popular Front Revisited," New York Review of Books, May 30, 1985, 44-50. Also Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second World War (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1982); Vivian Gornick, The Romance of American Communism (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

⁴ See Richard J. Ilkka, "Rhetorical Dramatization in the Development of American Communism," QJS 63 (December 1977), 413-427; Carl Burgchardt, "Two Faces of American Communism: Pamphlet Rhetoric of the Third Period and the Popular Front," QJS 66 (December 1980), 375-391.

⁵ Liston Pope, Millhands and Preachers: A Study of Gastonia, North Carolina (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942).

⁶ Fielding Burke (Olive Tilford Dargan), Call Home the Heart (Old Westbury, New York: Feminist Press, 1983); originally published in 1932. The other novels are Sherwood Anderson, Beyond Desire (New York: Liveright, 1932); Grace Lumpkin, To Make My Bread (New York: Macaulay, 1932); Myra Page, Gathering Storm (New York: International Publishers, 1932); William Rollins, The Shadow Before (New York: McBride, 1934); Mary Heaton Vorse, Strikes! (New York: Liveright, 1930).

⁷ W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Vintage, 1941).

8 See George S. Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1931) and Jennings J. Rhyne, Some Cotton Mill Workers and Their Villages (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930).

9 Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years, A History of the American Worker 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 2-3.

10 Bernstein, p. 3.

11 Pope, p. 230.

12 Cash, p. 353.

13 Theodore Draper, "Gastonia Revisited," Social Research, Spring 1971, p. 5.

14 Bernstein, p. 9.

15 Bernstein, p. 5.

16 Fred Beal, Proletarian Journey (New York: Hillman-Curl, 1937).

17 Pope, pp. 241-242.

18 Pope, p. 253.

19 Pope, p. 254.

20 Bernstein, p. 23.

21 Draper, p. 16.

22 Cited in Dan McCurry and Carolyn Ashbaugh, "Gastonia, 1929: Strike at the Loray Mill," Southern Exposure 1 (Winter 1973), p. 190.

23 Bernstein, p. 24.

24 Pope, p. 287.

25 Bernstein, p. 26.

26 Bernstein, p. 26.

27 Pope, p. 234.

28 New York Times, October 21, 1929, p. 24.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

30 See "The Gastonia Strikers' Case," Harvard Law Review, 44 (May 1931), 1124.

31 See Draper, p. 27; Carl Reeve, "Gastonia: The Strike, The Frameup, The

Heritage." Political Affairs, April 1984, p. 24.

32 See Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

33 Draper, p. 27.

34 Cited in Draper p. 27, n. 35.

35 Reeve, p. 31.

36 Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 262.

37 Cash, pp. 364-365.

38 See Dennis R. Nolan and Donald E. Jones, "Textile Unionism in the Piedmont, 1901-1932," in Gary M. Fink and Herl E. Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 48-79.

39 Sylvia Jenkins Cook, From Tobacco Road to Route 66: The Southern Poor White in Fiction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976).

40 "Introduction," Call Home the Heart, p. xv.

41 Draper, pp. 3-4.

42 See Pope, p. 3.

43 Bernstein, p. 42.

44 See Bruce Raynor, "Unionism in the Southern Textile Industry: An Overview," in Fink and Reed, pp. 80-99.

45 In These Times, April 17-23, 1985, p. 12.

46 Cited in Ashbaugh and Curry, p. 195.

47 See Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

48 I have borrowed the figure of the joker in the dislectical pack from Terry Eagleton's discussion of Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire in Walter Benjamin Or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London: Verso, 1981), p. 162.

THE PLACE OF MORALITY IN THE MODERN WORLD

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An ethics . . . , based largely on opposition to clericalism and dogmatic religion, is confronted with the problem of an attitude to the compelling moral values that religion sometimes embodies. Naturalists have been inclined to feel secure in their methodological warfare with revelation, miracle, and rationalistic proofs of deity, but a little uncomfortable before the injunctions of humility and love. . . . One wishes that Russell, immune to the emotional aura of Christianity and extraordinarily perceptive of the nuances of conduct, could have translated systematically the empirical import and application of the old concepts and demonstrated their greater felicity in a better philosophic environment.

Justus Buchler¹

One measure of the power of religion at the turn of the century, and the change which has taken place, lies in the ferocity of the attacks leveled against it by those who spoke in favor of a modern world. For those who called for a society guided by the precepts of science and shaped by the miracles of technology, the modern world did not exist. It was a kind of dream, the future they were working to create. For those of us now living in advanced, industrialized societies, the "modern world" is the one in which we live. All that remained, until recently, of the great struggle between science and religion was an allusion to Bishop Usher's date of creation and the testimony of William Jennings Bryan in "Inherit the Wind."

However secure the modern world may seem, however progressive, sophisticated, and free thinking one has become, there remains one area, staked out by the religionists in the great debate, that remains troubling, and this, as Buchler's note indicates, concerns the place of ethics and morality in the modern world. Religious faith, whether Eastern or Western, Protestant or Catholic, fixes on the realm of ends, visions called upon to orient judgment and guide action. Where, in our world, with its faith in science, evolution, mathematical physics, and technology, do we address the questions of how people ought to think and act?

The development of academic philosophy in the 20th century may be interpreted as an effort to answer this question. The specialization taking this as its object of study is called "ethics." The ways in which professional philosophers have attempted to come to grips with ethics in the last seventy years, both through what they have and have not said, is, I think, illuminating. The study of ethics in England and the United States, over this period, focused on the meaning of "good," "ought," and "is"; rejected the worth of propositions associated with theology and metaphysics; and tried to transform the study of morality into a descriptive science. In the early 20th century, for example, G. E. Moore, an influential Cambridge philosopher and editor of *Mind* in the 1920s, in his book, *Principia Ethica*,² attended to the "non-natural" properties of moral and ethical terms, meditated on examples drawn from the perception of colors and physical presence, all in an effort to "clarify" ordinary language. A. J. Ayre, in the early 1930s, introduced logical positivism to the English speaking world. In his book, *Language, Truth, and Logic*,³ Ayre divided intellectual activity into the study of empirical propositions (the domain of science) and analytic propositions (the domain of logic and mathematics). Propositions associated with ethics, aesthetics, and theology he dismissed as nonsense. Metaphysics he equated with meaningless-ness, a way of talking filled with "emotive" terms.

The study of ethics in England and the United States became, on the one hand, expositions on how people who actually debated moral issues used language, and, on the other, following Charles L. Stevenson's *Ethics and Language*,⁴ in the 1940s, an inquiry into the emotions associated with the use of moral terms. But whether the turn was toward linguistics or psychology, what is most striking about such work concerns the examples. The crises and confusions encountered by real people--cheating in business, capital punishment, bombing defenseless cities--were not taken seriously, were not, in fact, the sort of examples provided. By 1960, Mary Warnock, in her survey, *Ethics Since 1900*, denounced the trivialization of the subject, including the refusal of moral philosophers (she confined herself to England) to commit themselves to moral opinions, a problem arising out of the positivist distinction between moral philosophers who analyze the logic of moral discourse, and moralists who practice it. She looked forward to discussions containing long, complicated, more realistic examples. "I think," she concluded, "that the days of shouting to revive the fainting man, and the days of grading apples, are over."⁵

It is not as though philosophers were caught unawares. Of Moore and the ordinary language philosophers, R. G. Collingwood, an Oxford philosopher and archeologist, wrote in his *Autobiography*, in 1939, they have "destroyed everything in the way of positive doctrine they had ever possessed. Once more, I am concerned only with the effect on their pupils. It was . . . to convince them that philosophy was a silly and trifling game, and to give them a life-long contempt for the subject."⁶ A decade

after Mary Warnock's hopeful prediction, Ernest Gellner, an English philosopher and anthropologist, commented on the state of professional philosophy in the United States. He noted the avoidance of real issues and a preoccupation with method as an end in itself:

A heavily professionalized, routinized profession is tackling an issue which, precisely, is about the relation of the technical-professional to the personal, individual, and ultimate; and in as far as it tries to satisfy some non-professional style of life, it tends to be alien models which alone have glamour for it. The result--an unconvincing, tedious, largely irrelevant technicality, and a sad dependency on foreign modes, an absence of local roots.⁷

Alasdair MacIntyre's recent book, After Virtue,⁸ with its excoriation of modern academic philosophy, is part of an ongoing indictment.

The attack, and it is occurring in a number of fields of study, focuses primarily on the impact of logical positivism, but it expands to include any philosophy (realism, naturalism, behaviorism, pragmatism, etc.) which share the following assumptions: (1) A distrust in or repudiation of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual potential of ordinary people; (2) A belief in the privileged insights of a technically trained scientific elite; (3) A rejection of idealism, metaphysics, and the subordination of moral and ethical questions to science; (4) An uncritical faith in the progressive nature of Science, Technology, or the Scientific Method. Pursued in a variety of ways, the critique questions the equation of Science with Reason, to be precise the assumption that anything not sanctioned by science, scientific method, or scientists is either non-rational or irrational. "Whatever knowledge is attainable," Russell once stated, "must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know."⁹ It is this attitude, the assertion of the epistemological primacy of science and the scientific method, which is now being disputed.

Taken in isolation this attitude and the assumptions it makes are striking in their familiarity. It is odd to think that they were once radical propositions. To understand the historical origins of these themes, the problems to which they formed strategic answers, the attractions they had for real audiences is to understand a world in which science and technology held some hope for the future, but were being held back by a different faith and obscured by a different sort of common sense. In an effort to get at these origins, it might prove useful to examine one text which various schools in academic philosophy recognize as seminal, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.¹⁰ Logical positivists and analytic or common language philosophers alike point to the Tractatus as a founding document.

Acknowledged as a source of inspiration, its arguments engaged, redefined, corrected, and refuted, the Tractatus has, nevertheless, remained isolated in the hypothetical space of propositional logic. That is to say the historical context in which it was written, its appeal to and interpretation by different audiences has, until recently, played little part in the professional dialogue over it. Burdened by formal analysis and systems of logical notation the text itself helped to encourage, both substantively and stylistically, the human voice, speaking through the Tractatus, was stilled.¹¹ One of the many virtues of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin's book, Wittgenstein's Vienna,¹² is the recovery of the rhetorical dimension in the explication of philosophical texts, the Tractatus in particular. This work along with masterful treatment of politics and culture in Carl Schorske's Fin-De-Siecle Vienna¹³ not only burst through the remarkably persuasive limitations placed on the meaningful by modern philosophy, but manage to explore the reasons for and attractions of modernism itself.

The Tractatus, as the product of an actual author, constructed in a particular time and place, was culled by Wittgenstein from notebooks he had been keeping while a member of an artillery regiment in the Austrian army during the Great War. In an Italian prisoner of war camp, in 1918 he brought together several propositions about language and logic on which he had been working, established an order for them, producing a manuscript which was smuggled out of the camp by a friend of John Maynard Keynes and delivered to Wittgenstein's teacher and friend at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell. Translated by C. K. Ogden from the German, it appeared in English in 1922 with an introduction by Russell. Some eighty pages long, containing a series of numbered propositions, ranging from common sense definitions, to technically drawn deductions, to the most sibylline comments on death, ethics, and silence, the Tractatus remains a remarkable and varied document.

Because of the hermetic nature of the text, it is virtually impossible to infer the historical context surrounding the production of the Tractatus and its early reception. There is no mention of the Habsburg Empire or the Vienna where Wittgenstein grew up. There is only one reference to an Austrian, Fritz Mauthner, and that a repudiation. References to Russell and Gotfried Frege exist, passing mention made of Whitehead and Moore. These references are brief, often technical allusions not involving quotations.

It is, therefore, necessary to go beyond the text to fathom the historical context in which it was produced and interpreted. The Vienna in which Wittgenstein grew up was a cultural center. It was the Vienna of Ernst Mach, Karl Kraus, Gustav Klimpt, Oscar Kokoska, Gustav Malher, and Arnold Schoenberg among others. Brahms was a visitor in the Wittgenstein home as was the young Bruno Walter. This was the Vienna of the Austro-Hungarian empire, an aggregate of warring nationalities held together by a central

government dominated by a monarchy. For the state to survive, for government to function, no one group of subjects could be favored at the expense of another. As a consequence, the ruling elite encouraged in the arts, architecture, literary, and intellectual life an avant garde whose work was not merely abstract, but also, and this was its political import, non-particularist, a style detached from national, local, ethnic, racial, religious, in brief historical associations. Such a style reduced the likelihood of conflict and, at the same time, favored, ironically enough, the rise of cosmopolitanism. Thus, during the final stages of a reactionary state, conditions were such that it encouraged, among others, artists, free-thinking intellectuals, and Jews.

Stylistically, the Tractatus is of a piece with other forms of cultural expression in pre-war Vienna in its disengagement from history and from forms of expression associated with ordinary existence (i.e. conversation, poetry, plays, speeches, etc.). When examples do appear, and they rarely do, they are taken from music, mathematics, and logic. Mathematical notation predominates. The sense of coherence that comes from integrating the comments of others, drawing from many different groups or schools, fashioning transitions relating, through words, cultural variety and historical complexity is absent in the Tractatus. In its place exists a much tighter and, in our world, a more persuasive organizational strategy, the consecutive numbering of sentences or propositions. Quite apart from the logical entailments actually displayed and recommended, the appearance of order in the Tractatus gained from the use of numerical sequencing imposes itself at a glance. The withdrawal from everyday life, or at least everyday life as Wittgenstein might have recollected it during the war, was a conscious one, and it related to the overwhelming complexity examples from that sphere were bound to introduce. Colloquial language, he writes, is part of the human organism and no less complicated than it, but "it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logic of language from it . . . the silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated" (4.002). Stylistically, in relation to everyday life, history, and ethical and moral issues, Wittgenstein's treatise is to the essays of Kraus and Freud, the latter with its clearly drawn characters with their animality contained in classical Greek drama, as the art nouveau paintings of Gustav Klimpt are to the Cubism of Picasso and Braque.

Just as the Tractatus, philosophically, repudiated the historical, anecdotal, sensuous, and the emotional, restricting its subject matter to still life, so does Cubism in art. Rejecting impressionism, they verge on quasi-geometric forms. True, the Tractatus is influenced by, takes up the major themes in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, but the break stylistically between the Principia and the work of F. H. Bradley, for example, is enough to indicate a generic difference and to reflect on the nature of its appeal and audience.

Not only are the examples, style, and logic in the Tractatus divorced from the everyday world, but so also, and quite explicitly, is the persona it commends--the "philosophical I":

The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit--not part of the world (5.641).

The boundless translucence which is the "philosophical I," is not an actor but a species of Ideal Observer. Action, the rational deliberation of policy, has nothing to do with logic in the Tractatus:

The world is independent of my will (6.373). Even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favour of fate, for there is no logical connexion between will and world, which would guarantee this . . . (6.374).

In the absence of an existential I, one who can act in the here and now with the aim of changing the world, there is no need, nor can there be any justification for talk about morality and ethics.

Of the will as the subject of the ethical we cannot speak (6.423).

There is no way to talk meaningfully about such things, because in this world,

All propositions are of equal value (6.4).

There can be no ethical propositions because propositions cannot express anything higher (6.42).

This is not to say that, for Wittgenstein, whose learning and sensibilities moved through every cultural sphere in old Vienna, moral, ethical, and aesthetic concerns were meaningless. They were not pertinent to the logic worked out in the Tractatus:

It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and Aesthetics are one). (6.421).

After the war, Wittgenstein's brother who had been a concert pianist and lost an arm in the war, commissioned a piano concerto for the left hand, by a French composer, Maurice Ravel. Ludwig himself was a fine amateur musician. I mark this, as do Janik and Toulmin, to indicate something of the class, the Wittgensteins were quite wealthy, and the culture, especially the richness of the culture, within which his comments about music and aesthetics, and by implication ethics, may be interpreted.

While the Tractatus, through its author, may be situated in the context of pre-war Vienna, its reception by the members of the Vienna Circle, founded by Moritz Schlick in 1924, occurs in a radically altered historical context. I do not wish to deny the intellectual continuities which occur, a continuing interest in the works of Mach and Frege for example, or a commitment to using science and mathematics as a model for knowledge, but to emphasize a change which had occurred in the socio-political and cultural context. The Empire was destroyed. Austria had a population of some seven millions after the war, compared with seventy-millions under the Monarchy. A state of civil war now existed between "Red" Vienna and the outlying areas. Even nationhood stood in doubt, as the middle-classes were bent of joining Austria with Germany, and the themes of racial purity and anti-Semitism were becoming viable politically. For the academics, Schlick, Carnap, Goedel, Waismann, Bergmann, and the others who met after the war, the old culture was dead. Religion, government, politics, simple forms of civility had failed. The old order could not be revived. Amidst the collapse, they looked about them for something promising a more coherent future. They placed their faith in science and mathematics, in the methods used in these areas which had proved so powerful and exciting, methods which work even when all else passes into irrationality and despair. However quaint Wittgenstein may have appeared to them in Spring, 1927, at their first meeting, as he read aloud the poems of the Indian mystic, Rabindrath Tagore, they had found in the Tractatus an approach to language confining it to what to them made sense. They could retrieve language from the madness of politics and place it at the service of science and mathematics. The logic which came to be associated with the Vienna Circle divided the world into propositions of fact and propositions of definition. All other propositions become meaningless not because of their transcendental status, but meaningless because they could not be transformed into questions of fact or elemental definitions.

Science and mathematics are progressive; the applications of science have enormous potential in helping mankind; therefore, the logic of science should be applied to language itself in a world where irrationality and illogic pass for reason. Wittgenstein dissociated himself from the positivist program in the early 1930s. Other philosophers unconvinced by the "logic" attributed to mathematical physics, the paradigmatic science in the positivist critique (the effort to show one logic underlying all the sciences was ongoing), argued for a different approach to logic. The issue was framed by Collingwood. He objected to "propositional logic":

According to propositional logic . . . truth or falsehood . . . belongs to propositions as such. . . . It seemed to me that this doctrine was a mistake due to the early partnership between logic and grammar. The logician's propositions seemed to me a kind of ghostly double of the grammarian's sentence.

There is, he argues, a different way of understanding logic in relation to propositions:

This attempt to correlate the logical proposition with the grammatical indicative sentence has never been altogether satisfactory. There have always been people who saw that the true 'unit of thought' was not the proposition but something more complex in which the proposition serves as answer to a question.¹⁴

A logic of question and answer breaks out of the bounds of psychology and method and comes to grips with actual people in real situations. Collingwood's most famous work is The Idea of History,¹⁵ it is a logic enabling us to fathom the action making up an historical event that he has in mind. This is a logic which can cope with a range of allusions and concerns encompassing what an observer might call history or culture, a logic which does justice to the ongoing flow, the reality of history and culture found in the eternal present of dialogue and purposeful activity.

This is the logic underlying Janik and Toulmin's treatment of Wittgenstein. Through a logic of question and answer, the Tractatus becomes, more than a text or a philosophical position, a response to issues, part of an ongoing dialogue. Responses to the Tractatus, its reception by different audiences at different times, become not only ideas about or rejoinders to the Tractatus, but interpretations of the text in the context of different sorts of questions.

A question posed in and through the Tractatus was how is it possible to make sense through language during a period of economic, political, and social disintegration. This was, in the postwar period, roughly the question asked by members of the Vienna Circle. Whether or not they actually articulated the question, it is a question which makes sense of their project, gives it purpose. The persona embedded in the answer, the "philosophical I," the commitment to the natural sciences, to a world of colorless, isolated, anticeptic "facts," to the hypothetical space of mathematics, to symbolic forms detached from politics and culture, from history itself, the resort to method or technique as a way of stipulating what is and what is not meaningful, all this can be understood not only as a brilliant and complex idea, but also as a strategic response to the problems facing the Empire as well as the needs of rebuilding after the war.

The psychology implied in an Ideal Observer, the doing away with subjectivity, making one perfectly responsive to the findings of science, the work of technically trained people in positions of power and influence (i.e. scientists, applied scientists, and expertise) fits the needs of a central government in a society where hope for stability lies in effacing all signs of localism, that is ways of understanding, seeing, and acting one grows up

with, learns from the family, at church, or from one's immediate friends.

As industrialized nations after the Great War consolidated the powers granted the state to prosecute a world war, as the huge corporations emerged and the agrarian areas emptied into the worker's enclaves we call metropolitan areas, the prestige of science and technology grew. It is in this new world that the logic embedded in the Tractatus and amended by logical positivism ceased being a revolutionary challenge and became more a matter of common sense.

An uncritical celebration of the ideals of science, a belief in mathematics and science as a guarantee of progress, these themes merge in positivism, so that, in the way Comte envisioned it, positivism expanded in the public space to become a secular religion or what we now call "Scientism." The point here, however, is the degree to which positivism, as a world view, accords with the needs of government bureaucracies and a corporate state for unattached and "objective" expertise. Scientism, operating through structures evolved during two world wars, encourages a persona which uproots the subject, severs, in the name of professionalism, all links to the subject's life world, reduces ethics and morality (in contrast to "professional standards and commitment") to nonsense, and calls for the removal of important decisions from the public space and places them in the hands of expertise. Having constructed an Ideal Observer, Scientism further subordinates the subject, this time the subjects to be described, experimented on, or otherwise acted on, through its procedures for knowing. Through the "scientific method" people become objects (i.e. objects of study) and masses (i.e. aggregates to be studied and described rather than individuals or groups to be consulted with or understood on their own terms). Through the logic attributed to mathematical physics are methods secured arbitrarily repudiating, as unscientific, ways of knowing based on egalitarian relationships between the knower and the known. It is faith in instruments--which are simply assumed to be neutral and wielded by ideal observers--and the "findings" made possible by their application which disengage the practice of science from questions about meaning and purpose. Questions about purpose, the moral implications of objectification, the ethical basis of the structure employing people to use such instruments are, in Scientism, not merely evaded but transformed into evidence of irrationality or anti-intellectualism.

At the heart of Scientism is an uncritical acceptance of the goal of prediction and control, to the harnessing of nature (i.e. the goal of natural science) and, when the objects to be studied, classified, or experimented on are people, to the imposition of order on even unwilling subjects. The fact that people have to be required, either by government, the corporation, or the university, to become "subjects," because of the nature of the methods employed (often statistical requirements), is not a problem but rather a given in Scientism.

While Scientism may usefully be understood as the religion of technocracy, its historic reluctance to allow personal experience or the life-world to determine what is logical, rational, or moral has provided points of resistance in the struggle between progressive centralists and proto-fascistic localists. Such a conflict took place toward the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in post-war Austria, and during the collapse of the Weimar Republic in Germany. In the United States elements of positivism, pragmatism, and realism ("realistic" policies becoming the byword for reasonable) informed the Progressive movement and Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s and 40s. Throughout this period technically trained expertise grew in prominence in the national government and worked closely with other progressive forces against local bastions of racism, authoritarianism, and greed.

Scientism, wedded to liberal, progressive politics can, and did in the 1950s and early 60s, lay claim to a vision and methods for realizing it superior to other groups in the political sphere. In the struggle to make progress, people who are not objective, who are biased, unscientific, outmoded become obstacles. Religious groups had been accused of being superstitious, metaphysical, and anti-intellectual in the 19th and early 20th century; political groups were characterized as inefficient, unprogressive, and ideological in the period following the Second World War in the United States. The incarnation of Scientism I refer to here was called the "end of ideology movement" associated with social scientists such as Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Seymour Martin Lipset, Irving Kristol, and Richard Hofstadter.¹⁶ They did not call for an end to ideological disputes. Ideological struggle was over. Political debate, class conflict, protest movements were no longer necessary, had become obstacles to efficient government. Experts in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 1960s announced that they were poised not only to win the war on poverty, ignorance, and disease at home (completely eliminate them), but also to begin the task of nation-building abroad.¹⁷

Scientism, joined with central governments trying to stave off civil war, fight fascism, promote racial equality, and eliminate poverty, etc., can ignore the theoretical problems concerning the place of ethics and morality in its world view. Richard Hofstadter, in his apologia for liberal Scientism, noted its rise during the Progressive era and its precipitous fall after the war. One reason for this fall, he wrote in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, was that the "intellectuals" may have, in the words of Walter Lippman, "supplied the Battalion of Death with too much ammunition."¹⁸ But with the re-emergence of intellectuals--technically trained "experts"--during the New Deal and then, what to Hofstadter in the early 1960s, looked like their ultimate vindication in the Kennedy administration, liberal Scientism, in its triumph over fundamentalism's revolt against modernity, became equated with "political intelligence":

Characteristically, the political intelligence, if it is to operate at all as a kind of civic force rather than

as a mere set of maneuvers to advance this or that special interest, must have its own way of handling the facts of life and of forming strategies. It accepts conflict as a central and enduring reality and understands human society as a form of equipoise based upon the continuing process of compromise. It shuns ultimate showdowns and looks upon the idea of total partisan victory as unattainable, as merely another variety of threat to the kind of balance with which it is familiar. It is sensitive to nuances and sees things in degrees. It is essentially relativist and skeptical, but at the same time circumspect and humane (pp. 134-35).

What carries the weight in Hofstadter's celebration of political intelligence, from the standpoint of ethics and morality, is the term "humane." While it is possible to impute to expertise or technocracy humane beliefs as an act of faith, there is also the matter of the policies actually promoted.

Put simply, when conflict is not between progressive centralists and fascistic or racist localists, but between imperial and pro-nuclear centralists and anti-imperial and anti-nuclear localists, a commitment to silencing or effacing local commitments may be called into doubt. In his rejoinder to the end of ideology movement, Michael Novak, in 1968, noted that the war in Vietnam was a liberal, a pragmatists' war. Opposition to it encounters a "vast consensus, a tradition that has been appropriated with growing extension and solidity since at least the first days of the New Deal. That tradition is anti-meta-physical; it values compromise and adjustment; it prides itself upon its diagnosis of 'real' interests and its estimate of immediate 'realizable' possibilities; it thinks itself, in a word, unusually 'realistic.'"¹⁹ In his view, the anti-ideologues were simply blind to their own ideology. They too had interests. Their own "subjectivity," their value judgments, predilected standards (like "quantification"), and political preferences, all evidence choice and, therefore, responsibility. This they conceal in the white light of their suppressed ideals. The partiality of these ideals, along with the consequences of acting on them, becomes mystified. The American intellectual community, Novak declares, mystifies such issues in its uncritical preference for "how to questions" and its mindless commitment to "prediction and control":

Such questions demand as much quantification as the material will bear ('and then some'). Effectively, this preference removes the intellectual community from facing value questions and questions of ends--these are 'soft' questions and those who deal with them are considered unprofessional. Rewards go to hard-nosed analysts who provide the power of prediction and control (p. 391).

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Government experts, during the war in Vietnam, employed the rhetoric of science, as well as the methods, in support of American policy. Actions were measured through tonnage dropped, acres defoliated, and body counts, progress assured through infra-red detection on the ground and precision bombing from the air. Through the rhetoric of science, the language of Scientism used to legitimize government actions, the victims of the war were imprisoned in the hypothetical space of mathematical symbols, their cries muffled by the massive walls of descriptive statistics, their ordeal intensified by the miracles of military science and technology.

This may be too complex an argument for an approach to language built on examples such as "here now is a brown patch" and "a bachelor is an unmarried man," but I do not want irony to cloud the issue. The official use of statistics (i.e. body counts) referring to physical objects (i.e. bodies) legitimized the war in Vietnam by offering an "objective" index of progress and by neutralizing victimage. This use of language conforms to the strictures laid down by various forms of Scientism. Methods can be and were, in fact, established to verify body counts. The claims were, in a word, falsifiable. New techniques were employed to test hypotheses about more efficient ways to establish more favorable ratios. The "data" were, of course, embedded in larger issues having to do with official policies and the value of American and Vietnamese lives. Insofar as the sciences are content to describe, to accept the world as given without inquiring into who gave it, why it is given, and what occurs when it is "found" through scientific methods, they contain nothing enabling one to evaluate the "facts" or to determine the most "humane" to treat them (whether, in the case of Vietnam, it was better to call the stuff of body-counts "murders," "unnecessary or meaningless deaths," "slaughter," "patriotic sacrifice," "corpses," or to render them numerically).

Science stands mute before the stuff observed. It has no obligation to examine the consequences following on the use of scientific procedures. The degree to which stuff is legitimized in the act of being observed and recorded in prescribed ways, the degree to which the symbolic transformation of unnecessary suffering into brute fact contributes to the policies continuing the suffering lies beyond the realm Science, unless contracted to look into such matters. In the absence of support, however, such questions are concealed not only in the "givens," but also in the "findings," terms relieving those who accept what is in the attitude of an explorer in an alien country of all responsibility save for following the proper steps and keeping accurate records.

In the broader political context in American society, the language of science is associated with technocracy; the language of morality with religious groups; and the language of ideology with leftist political parties. However crude, these associations do clarify socio-political struggle. The technocratic party's effort at totalization, at de-legitimizing its rivals through the

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end-of-ideology movement in the early 1980s floundered not on the influence of the opposition, but on the alliance between Scientism and government policy in Vietnam. With the appropriation of the rhetoric of science by representatives of the military-industrial-educational complex to legitimize the construction of multi-billion dollar weapons systems, there is no reason to believe that a new end-of-ideology movement will appear, at least not one armed with a sincere belief that science and scientifically trained expertise should be the makers of our destiny.

Even if progressive centralists begin to see the light, Scientism offers little hope. The assumption that the good, the true, and the humane will once again be embraced by a unified, self-correcting scientific "community" and, through its representatives (experts, consultants, advisors), impress itself on decision makers, in the way that Fabian socialism was supposed to work in England, seems hopelessly naive, the sort of naivete which can, however, protect itself through a firm resolve to remove science from history and, in the case of Vietnam and the war industries, from living memory.

In the absence of a constituency able to influence decision making, the scientist who would oppose government or corporate policy can no longer lay claim to being an agent for progress. Calling someone an "expert" or a "scientist" does not tell us anything about his or her politics or morality, nothing at all. This is because neither Science nor a technical education can be pointed to as a unambiguous instrument for human progress. A scientist in opposition is simply one more individual in a society so confused about democracy that it equates the opinions of publics with the findings of public opinion polls. What happens when scientists disagree? Debates take place over the nature of research, research methods, the interpretation of findings. Inquiries are made into the shape given scientific knowledge through the system paying for it. When experts disagree, the issues fall back into common language, a medium wherein "facts" can be debated, "methods" cross-examined, and "findings" scrutinized over their moral, ethical, and political implications.

What then is the place of morality in the modern world? I do not believe the question is equivalent to asking what is the place of religion in the modern world, though there is considerable overlap. Frederick Copleston, an historian of philosophy, puzzled over the meteoric rise of logical positivism. One of the urgent problems of our times lies in reconciling technical industrialized civilization with religious faith, artistic sensibility, and the perception of moral values. But while there is no real conflict between scientific theory and revealed dogma, the empirical sciences, he notes, have fostered an outlook unfavorable to metaphysics and religion. The cause is not, however, to be found in academic philosophy, but rather in the "type of mind" produced by an industrialized, technical civilization, governed predominantly by economic values. The materialism of commerce and worship of efficiency in the here and now of digital clock time produce a

consciousness "naturally" closed to the Transcendent, to metaphysics, and to theology. In my opinion, writes Copleston, "it is the existence of this type of mind, or of this mentality, which is largely responsible for the influence of positivist philosophy in such countries as England, Sweden, and the United States."²⁰ We are, in the modern world, persuaded to reject not only the past, most especially the "pre-scientific era," but also everything hostile to the ideology of corporate capitalism, in other parts of the world, state socialism.

How does this relate to the question of morality? Morality concerns individual conduct ("how ought I act") and the standards for the evaluation of conduct in actual communities ("what is the good by which I should guide my actions"). When the individual is taken in isolation, crisis requiring him or her to examine conduct and evaluate courses of action make themselves felt. This is the "felt need" pragmatists talk about when pushed to define a problem, and the powerful sense of ethical issues positivists concede when they identify an emotive dimension in moral and ethical definitions. But the place of morality, the origins of the idiom, images, rules, stories, arguments, and feelings called upon in the here and now to clarify what one is doing or about to do lies in the space provided by traditional groups (family, church, professions) and voluntary associations (friendships, action groups, unions, movements) to which individuals refer when taking stock of who they are or ought to be.

The question linking political, religious, and professional groups in the modern world concerns their continued existence in the great metropolises dominated by the corporate state communicating day after day, year after year, an ideology of consumerism, promoting the subtle terrors of not possessing consumer products in and through a "popular" culture filled with stories about the threat of physical violence and the joys and perils of recreational sex. The continuation of mass based political movements and the emergence of both the Catholic church and Protestant fundamentalists into the political sphere are symptoms of a growing disenchantment with the modern world. The issues raised, ranging from abortion to nuclear weapons, signals an unwillingness on the part of many to contain moral and ethical issues in the silence of individual choice, the vagaries of professional codes, or the results of scientific research.

CONCLUSION:

Religious communities in the United States, most recently the Catholic church, political groups, communities of artists, writers, and intellectuals, people who get together and talk over real issues are approaching a common vision on the dangers of the war industry and its impact on the political process. Within the scientific community are those, one can read their work in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, who also stand in opposition. Increasingly scientists, in various fields, have assumed

leadership in this opposition. Less than a quarter of a century ago, while American social scientists were proclaiming the end of ideology, Bertrand Russell called for a radical change in the scientists' conception of duty. Scientists the world over, he said, should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. Such action would entail personal dangers. "But after all," he argued, "it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible."²¹

FOOTNOTES

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- ³A. J. Ayre, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover), 1946. 1st ed. published, 1936.
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- ⁵Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 147. (first published, 1960).
- ⁶R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 49-50.
- ⁷Ernest Gellner, The Devil in Modern Philosophy, ed. I. C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 44.
- ⁸Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press), 1981.
- ⁹Quoted in William Barrett, "Introduction," Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, ed. William Barrett and Henry David Aiken, III (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 3.
- ¹⁰Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD), 1922.
- ¹¹Stanley Cavell comments on logical analysis in philosophy that it "has depended upon the suppression of the human voice." For him, ordinary language philosophy is about the "recovery of this voice (as from an illness) . . ." ("Politics as Opposed to What?", The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 197.
- ¹²Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon Schuster), 1973.
- ¹³Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Vintage Books), 1981.
- ¹⁴Autobiography, pp. 34-5. Ernest Gellner calls attention to Collingwood's position in this matter in his chapter, "Thought and time, or the reluctant relativist," pp. 151-165.
- ¹⁵R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1946. See also his, Faith & Reason, ed. Lionel Rubinoff (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), especially the essay, "Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself," pp. 108-121.
- ¹⁶See The End of Ideology Debate, ed. Chaim I. Waxman (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1969.
- ¹⁷See Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70 (November 1984), 339-361.
- ¹⁸Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 213.
- ¹⁹Michael Novak, "An End of Ideology," The End of Ideology Debate, p. 391.
- ²⁰Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy (London: Search Press, 1979), pp. 31-32.

²¹ The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Dennonn (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), pp. 723.

The Rhetoric of Historiography: New Left Revisionism in the Vietnam Era

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Argument from history is common in deliberative debate; political advocates routinely look to the "lessons of history"—legal precedents, parallel scenarios, or traditional wisdom—to guide decision-making and to justify policies. Perhaps, as Ernest May suggests, looking to the past is human nature—a habit of thinking. But whatever the cause, looking to history for answers gives historiography on-going political relevance. Historiography, when evoked in debate over contemporary issues, functions rhetorically to constrain interpretations of current events and to limit consideration of policy options.

Historians often write with an eye toward influencing political decision-making. And not surprisingly, they disagree on the proper point of view and on the "lessons" of history. Few still insist that historiography must be "complete" and "objective" if it is to provide lessons for policymakers. Historians generally recognize that political and social processes are complex, multi-faceted phenomena which cannot possibly be described exhaustively. They know they must inevitably report only a small slice of past reality, and that their data may be selectively preserved or otherwise sketchy. Moreover, historians recognize that their own beliefs and values inevitably color their interpretations of historical evidence. Thus, modern historians strive, not so much for objectivity, but for persuasiveness. All historiography is partial and subjective. Some accounts are just more believable than others.

This essay examines two competing frameworks for describing and interpreting American foreign policy in the historiography of the Vietnam era. The first, which may be called the "traditional" perspective, includes both "official" interpretations developed in the accounts of those involved in policymaking in the Cold War era, and a "liberal-realist" critique by professional historians. The second perspective, New Left Revisionism, gained popularity in the mid-1960's through the early 1970's. It reflected the beliefs and values undergirding radical protest against the war in Vietnam.

These differing perspectives on history are contrasted most strikingly in two areas of disagreement. The two schools clashed most vigorously over the question of responsibility for the Cold War. Traditional writers placed

blame for world tensions squarely on the Soviets, while New Left revisionists placed varying degrees of blame on American policymakers. Second, traditional and revisionist historians differed theoretically on the nature of domestic influences on American foreign policy. More conventional writers attributed significant powers to public opinion; they treated it as a dominant influence. In dissent, the revisionists highlighted the interests of a ruling economic elite. They attributed much decision-making to the desire to protect corporate America's interests overseas, while they described a disinterested general public stupefied by a rhetoric of illusion and myth.

Both historical perspectives contributed to our understanding of post-war American foreign policy. While New Left revisionists employed questionable methods and doubtful theoretical premises, and while their writings were irritatingly polemical, they did force more traditional historians to rethink their own overly simplistic interpretations of American foreign policy. In the end, the result may be a synthesis superior to both traditional and revisionist historiography. Through a synthesis of the two perspectives, a more complete view of post-war diplomatic history emerges, along with a more sophisticated theoretical understanding of the forces shaping American foreign policy.

The Origins of the Cold War

The history of the Cold War, especially the question of its origins, has been perhaps the most controversial topic in all of American diplomatic history. The debate became particularly heated in the mid-1960's, as young New Left historians challenged the "official" interpretation found in the memoirs, diaries, and travelogues of American politicians and diplomats, along with the "liberal-realist" critiques of professional historians. The more radical of the New Leftists, or the so-called "Wisconsin School," provoked the most vigorous controversies over American foreign policy since World War II. But questions about their scholarly practices and their theoretical assumptions detracted from the persuasiveness of their case.

The primary target of the revisionists was the "official" history of the Cold War, identified most frequently with the memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Published in 1955, Truman's memoirs held the Soviets entirely responsible for the rapid deterioration of relations following World War II. In witnessing the Russians at Potsdam, Truman learned that the Soviets were not "earnest about peace" and that they hoped to exploit post-war chaos to spread communist ideology. This led him to conclude that this "new menace" was "every bit as grave as Nazi Germany and her allies." The Russians, according to Truman, "were coldly determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to further Communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the

world."²

The "official" interpretation contrasted this aggressive, expansionist portrait of the Soviets with a portrayal of America as unselfish and idealistic. "For the first time in the history of the world," Truman wrote, "a victor was willing to restore the vanquished as well as to help its allies." According to Truman, containment was defensive, altruistic, and dictated by America's historic ideals: "The ideals and traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened."

One did not need to probe deeply to find the "lessons of history" in Truman's memoirs. Recalling America's past mistakes, the former president urged Americans to avoid again retreating into isolationism. Times had changed, and the nation could no longer turn its back on its international duties. In summarizing the "lesson" of the Cold War, Truman wrote:

Throughout my years in the Senate I listened each year as one of the senators would read Washington's Farewell Address. It served little purpose to point out to the isolationists that Washington had advised a method suitable under the conditions of his day . . . and that although conditions and our international position has changed, the objectives of our policy—peace and security—were still the same. For the isolationists this address was like a biblical text. . . .

I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where they were already significant threats. Inaction, withdrawal, "Fortress America" notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

Truman claimed that the case for resisting world-wide communist aggression persuaded even those who "had, not so long ago, been outspoken isolationists." When he announced the policy to Congress, "the congressmen rose as one man and applauded." He boasted that "all over the world voices of approval made themselves heard," while Communists and their fellow travelers struck out at me savagely." And in the beginning, the historical establishment joined Truman in proclaiming that Russia had shattered "America's wartime vision of a peaceful and progressive postwar world by aiming "to foment revolution and conquest on behalf of communism's cause." Like Truman, most historians contrasted an aggressive and expansionist Russia with a "virtuous, restrained, and almost passive" America. While Russia's post-war internationalism was deemed an attempt to enslave the world,

American internationalism "represented her assumption of leadership among the 'peace-loving' peoples of the world in defense of self-determination and other 'democratic' values."⁸

But uncritical acceptance of the "official" view was short-lived within the historical establishment. Indeed, as Robert Tucker has noted, the view that eventually became the "dominant post-war interpretation of American diplomacy"—a "liberal-realist" perspective—was pervasively critical. "In this historiography," Tucker wrote, "the American diplomatic record is marked by confusion and uncertainty over the ends and means of foreign policy, indeed, over the very nature and meaning of foreign policy." But the "liberal-realists" stopped short of morally condemning American policymakers. As Tucker explained, the liberal-realist critique was critical of strategy, but not of basic aims in American Cold War policy:

But if American policy has been misguided, this is not to say that it has been malevolent. A conventional historiography may find our perceptions faulty, but it does not identify our perceptions with our intentions. It may find our judgment wanting, but our motives cannot be gainsaid; if we have misused our power, it is not through the desire to exploit others. The failure of American foreign policy is a failure compounded of sentimentality and intellectual error. . . . Although a policy of misplaced altruism may lead to disaster, particularly when recipients are determined to resist American benevolence, it is still somehow redeemable precisely because of its essentially disinterested character.¹⁰

The liberal-realist critique became a target along with the "official" interpretation when William Appleman Williams led a wave of New Left revisionism in the 1960's. Inspired by Williams' writings and seminars at the University of Wisconsin, the revisionists completely overturned the official interpretation, laying blame for the Cold War squarely on U.S. officials bent on promoting the interests of an economic elite. The Wisconsin revisionists wrote an advocacy history, defending it as a remedial measure to balance government propaganda and the writings of the gullible liberal-realists. The revisionists sparked an uproar within the historical profession. But much to the chagrin of their critics, the controversy only served to spotlight their challenge.

Williams achieved notoriety with his "Open Door" thesis: the argument that American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century has aggressively and belligerently promoted American business penetration into new foreign markets. He dismissed as unpersuasive the argument that American Cold War policy was defensive, for "a nation with the great relative supremacy enjoyed by the United States between 1944 and 1962 cannot with any real warrant or meaning claim that it has been forced to follow a certain approach or policy."¹¹ Nonetheless, Williams was relatively charitable to American policymakers. Denying that American policy was the product of "purposeful malice, callous indifference, or ruthless and predatory exploitation," he granted that American leaders "believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed"; they had "internalized, and had come to believe the

theory, the necessity, and the morality of open door expansionism." He refused to say that America "started or caused the cold war" or that American policymakers were "evil men."¹² As the title of his most famous book suggested, he considered the Cold War a "tragedy of American diplomacy," not a crime.

As passions rose in the Vietnam era, younger revisionists increasingly viewed Williams as overly conservative. Indeed, the Founding Father of the "Wisconsin School" eventually became "a constant embarrassment to the younger radical scholars."¹³ Intent on strongly indicting American policymakers for the war in Southeast Asia, the younger radicals were chagrined by Williams' empathy for the motives of American policymakers and by the "old-fashioned philosophical idealism" of some of his writings.¹⁴ Thus, writers such as Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz, and Lloyd C. Gardner adopted Williams' "Open Door thesis," but they infused it with a moral indictment of American policymakers and strong sympathy for Soviet motives. Like Williams, Gabriel Kolko blamed the Cold War on America's "militant intervention into the affairs of literally every area of the world." While Russia followed a "conservative policy" in the post-war world, the U.S. blamed "all the world's social and economic ills" on "a Russian plot" and made Russia the scapegoat for "the collapse of capitalism."¹⁵ The younger revisionists thus went well beyond saying America caused the Cold War to saying they did it for selfish economic reasons. And then, in effect, they lied to the American people about those motives.

Unlike Williams, the younger revisionists displayed a relentless economic determinism. While Williams described a moralistic as well as economic *Weltanschauung* behind American foreign policy, Gabriel Kolko led the radicals in portraying American international interventionism as strictly a business proposition. In *The Roots of American Foreign Policy*, Kolko wrote:

The dominant interest of the United States is in world economic stability, and anything that undermines that condition presents a danger to its present hegemony. . . . In today's context, we should regard United States political and strategic intervention as a rational overhead charge for its present and future freedom to act and expand. One must also point out that however high that cost may appear today, in the history of United States diplomacy specific American economic interests . . . have often defined the national interest on the assumption that the nation can identify its welfare with the profits of some of its citizens. . . . The costs to the state as a whole are less consequential than the desires and profits of specific class strata and their need to operate everywhere in a manner that, collectively, brings vast prosperity to the United States and its rulers.¹⁶

The young revisionists were also harsher and more strident than Williams in their moral critique of American policymakers. Rather than grant American policymakers the sincerity of their principled rhetoric, the younger radicals deemed them cynical and hypocritical. They argued that moralistic rhetoric only masked the true forces behind American foreign policy—acquisitiveness and greed—and duped the American people into blind quiescence. Gabriel

Kolko warned readers not "to confuse the American rhetoric and descriptions of intentions with the realities and purposes of operational power." The "reality" for "many decades" was that American foreign policy pursued "the domestic and international objectives of private American business interests,"¹⁷ and that American policymakers often did not "truly" believe "their moralistic contentions."¹⁸ Similarly, David Horowitz called "the rhetoric of opposition to [communist] aggression" a "mere cover for containing internal change" in foreign nations.¹⁹ Perhaps Lloyd Gardner put the revisionist thesis best, labeling American policymakers "architects of illusion." According to Gardner, American officials masked their true motives with a "series of rationales, expedients, and explanations which grew into the myths and illusions of the Cold War."²⁰

In its harshest form, the revisionist critique even dismissed America's rationale for dropping the atomic bomb as myth or illusion. Arguing that the U.S. really sought to intimidate Russia with the bomb, Gar Alperovitz issued a profound moral indictment: "The common belief is that the question is closed, and that President Truman's explanation is correct: 'The dropping of the [atomic] bombs stopped the war, saved millions of lives.' My own view is that presently available evidence shows the atomic bomb was not needed to end the war or to save lives—and that this was understood by American leaders at the time."²¹ Revisionism thus saddled American officials with the moral responsibility for using the bomb on Japan as a symbolic act. And this they did, presumably, for narrowly selfish motives.

Alperovitz's thesis proved too much for more traditional historians. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. declared it "time to blow the whistle" on New Left revisionism in a letter to the *The New York Review of Books*.²² Later, in *Foreign Affairs*, Schlesinger conceded that one should not necessarily "deplore the rise of Cold War revisionism." But he warned that "all of these books, in spite of their ostentatious display of scholarly apparatus, must be used with caution."²³ Others, like John Gaddis, argued that the revisionists committed the same sin as the "official" histories criticized by William Appleman Williams: regarding history "as a stockpile of facts to be requisitioned on the basis of what is needed to prove a conclusion decided upon in advance."²⁴

By far the most serious challenge to New Left revisionism came in 1973, when Robert Maddox published the first detailed and systematic evaluation of revisionist scholarship. In his analysis of seven major revisionist books, Maddox concluded that all were "without exception based upon pervasive misuses of the source materials." According to Maddox, "the most striking characteristic of revisionist historiography" was "the extent to which New Left authors have revised the evidence itself."²⁵ Critics of the New Left, such as George Kennan, hailed Maddox's book for exposing "the liberties taken with historical evidence in much recent literature about the origins of the Cold War." Calling the abuses "quite shocking," Kennan claimed that Maddox "performed a needed service" in bringing revisionist sins "to public attention." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. agreed, commenting that "Professor Maddox's meticulous examination of the Cold War controversy raises the most serious questions about revisionist scholarship."²⁶ Schlesinger even expanded

the dispute by raising questions about the revisionists' political loyalties: "The fact that in some aspects the revisionist thesis parallels the official Soviet argument must not, of course, prevent consideration of the case on its merits, nor raise questions about the motives of the writers, all of whom, so far as I know, are independent-minded scholars."²⁷

David Horowitz responded for the revisionists, attacking Princeton University Press for publishing the "spurious and defamatory" book. According to Horowitz, the publisher was influenced most "by the favorable recommendations of the late Professor Feis, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., George Kennan and Eugene Rostow, who are either principals in the historical debate over the cold war, or have been associated with the making of the foreign policy under review." This fact, in Horowitz's opinion, raised "the most serious questions about the standards of publication, review, and scholarly discourse in the historical profession."²⁸

The revisionists had long been arguing that there was some sort of conspiracy against their work within the historical establishment. In the revised edition of *The Free World Colossus*, published in 1971, David Horowitz wrote of this alleged suppression of radical thought and of the connection between his work and the anti-war movement:

The Free World Colossus was written in the winter of 1962-3, but first appeared only in 1965, having languished for more than a year on the desks of various editors. At that time the cold war was still regarded as America's holy crusade to save the world from Communist totalitarianism, and it was not easy to find a publisher in the United States ready to print such a book. The intellectual atmosphere was frigid, both on and off campus, and remained so until the birth of a mass anti-war movement created a new climate in which dissenting theory and analysis could begin to develop with some self-confidence. To the extent that *The Free World Colossus* . . . assisted the growth of this movement by advancing a new understanding of cold war history, I am satisfied that the effort put into research and writing was not wholly in vain.²⁹

Horowitz may have been right that "the historical establishment . . . for two decades promulgated and inculcated a propagandistic view of the history of the post-war years under the guise of academic scholarship."³⁰ But as Horowitz's own words reveal, the revisionists were even more explicit in their political advocacy. And their conspiracy logic notwithstanding, they were blessed with more than ample opportunity to participate in the scholarly dialogue. Books by Williams and his students flooded the market for nearly a decade. Revisionist books were repeatedly reprinted and revised, and they bore the stamp of such "establishment" publishing houses as Simon and Schuster, Random House, and Hill and Wang. New Left revisionists enjoyed all the attention, prestige, and creature comforts of academic "stars." For portraying Truman as perhaps the greatest war criminal in all of history, Gar Alperovitz was rewarded with fellowships at both the John F. Kennedy Institute at Harvard and the Brookings Institution. In 1965 NDC even hired Alperovitz as a "Special Consultant" for the White Paper, "The Decision to

Drop the Atomic Bomb." Such was the "repression" of "all critical thought." Such were the "tremendous obstacles" placed before the revisionists by "the guardians of the intellectual status quo."³¹

Claims that revisionism was suppressed were also belied by the fact that "radical criticism came to exert . . . an unexpected influence, particularly among the younger generation." That the revisionists significantly "influenced the thought of a generation of students," as Tucker has observed, "cannot be doubted."³² Even grown-ups who should have known better, such as rhetorical critics, embraced the revisionist perspective wholesale and without reservation. Karlyn Campbell, for instance, fell victim to the illusion that revisionism was beyond argument in her critique of Richard Nixon's "Vietnamization" address of November 3, 1969. Upholding an unsubstantiated revisionist interpretation of America's early involvement in Vietnam as a standard of "truth," Campbell proclaimed Nixon's traditional interpretation a "misrepresentation."³³ Of course, theorists of argument might demand that the revisionist shoulder a burden of proof in debate with a traditionalist. And the ordinary citizen might demand at least some proof that the President a liar. But Karlyn Campbell would have none of that; revisionism presumably was "the truth" and required no evidence.³⁴

Such was the impact of the New Left revisionists; they received extraordinary attention and exercised considerable influence. Yet in the final analysis, they contributed little to our understanding of American foreign policy. Even if their evidence had been sound and their partisanship restrained, the revisionists failed to offer a useful way of looking at the forces that shape decision-making in American foreign policy. They offered an overly simplistic, single cause interpretation of human behavior. "None of them . . . analyzed [the] internal determinants of policy in terms of their full diversity and relative significance," as John Gaddis argued, and their wholesale acceptance of the Open Door thesis constituted "an old methodological fallacy: the single-cause interpretation of history."³⁵ The revisionists ignored the multiplicity of motives evident in the rhetoric of policymaking officials. In effect, as Gaddis argued, they dismissed all rhetoric not expressing economic motives and took very seriously all rhetoric that did:

Public and private statements made by policymakers at the time . . . indicate that they did not accord the Open Door the importance revisionist historians have given it. . . . Washington officials articulated with at least equal emphasis such other goals as unconditional surrender, the disarmament of defeated enemies, self-determination, and the establishment of a new collective security organization.

The revisionists are no doubt aware of these other war aims, which figure so prominently in the statements of American policymakers at the time, but they pay little attention to them. They seem to assume that government officials exposed their true motives only when they discussed economics—all the rest was rhetoric. It is unclear what grounds the revisionists have for making this assumption.³⁶

New Left revisionism did not come labeled "advocacy history." Just as an earlier generation of students and casual readers may have unquestioningly accepted "official" historiography, some people undoubtedly swallowed New Left revisionism under the illusion that historiography is factual narrative rather than political rhetoric. How many casual readers recognized that the revisionists, like the traditionalists criticized by Horowitz, presented their own "propaganda" under "the guise of academic scholarship"? How many readers were aware of the questionable uses of evidence in revisionist scholarship? How many questioned the assumption of economic determinism undergirding revisionist scholarship? If trained scholars like Karlyn Campbell seemed oblivious to these questions, one hardly could have expected the casual reader to raise them.

Trust the People?

For many years, diplomatic historians simply assumed that public opinion basically determined American foreign policy. For instance, Thomas Bailey, in *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, concluded that "the American people, exercising their democratic privilege and enjoying freedom of speech and press, have shaped their own foreign policies."³⁷ Even critics of foreign policies shaped by public opinion, such as Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, always assumed that American foreign policy did reflect "the will of the people." What they said, as Ernest May has noted, was that "this should not be so—that policy should come to a larger extent from calculation by experts."³⁸

Traditional historians always had problems explaining the many exceptions to their rule that the public dictates American foreign policy. Robert Browder once wrote, for instance, that FDR "was remarkably sensitive to public opinion and throughout his tenure as Chief Executive seldom moved politically or diplomatically until he was sure that the majority of his countrymen would follow either from previous conviction or, on occasion, because they were fascinated by the boldness of his actions."³⁹ In other words, FDR always followed or moved with public opinion except, of course, on those occasions when he did not.

Traditionalists also failed to elucidate how policymakers came to "know" public opinion. For the most part, traditional historians assessed "objective" public opinion with such imperfect measures as polls or electoral behavior, and then assumed that policymakers perceived public opinion in precisely the same fashion. They failed to consider in any practical sense the mechanisms or processes by which policymakers themselves measured the public will. They seemed to assume, in Bernard Cohen's words, that accurate portraits of objective public opinion were "absorbed, by osmosis, into the

political bloodstream."⁴⁰

Above all, the traditional assumption that "the people" fulfilled the role prescribed by democratic theory seemed devastated by the first generation of empirical survey research. Indeed, survey research in the 1950's, as summarized in the classic study, *The American Voter*, suggested that the American people were simply incapable of fulfilling such a role:

We have, then, the portrait of an electorate almost wholly without detailed information about decision making in government. A substantial portion of the public is able to respond in a discrete manner to issues that might be the subject of legislative or administrative action. Yet it knows little about what government has done on these issues or what the parties propose to do. It is almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government actions; knowing little of particular policies and what has led to them, the mass electorate is not able to appraise either its goals or the appropriateness of the means chosen to serve these goals.⁴¹

At first glance, the New Left revisionists seemed more in touch with empirical reality. Rejecting the traditional assumption that "the people" shaped American foreign policy, they argued that "the close and serious student of modern American foreign relations" could "rarely, if ever, find an instance of an important decision made with any reference to the alleged general public desires or opinions."⁴² "The fact that a ruling class makes its policies operate, even when the mass of society ceases to endorse them," Gabriel Kolko argued, was "a central reality most analysts perpetually exclude from a descriptive explanation of American society."⁴³ And, of course, the war in Vietnam presumably proved such contentions. According to Kolko, Vietnam proved beyond all doubt that the ruling elite will continue a policy that serves its interests even while "mass agreement withers away and even disappears."⁴⁴

One can only speculate about how the revisionists came to their conclusion that support for governmental policy in Vietnam had "disappeared" by the late 1960's. Some of the explanation may lie in the mutual reinforcement of like-minded thinkers—in the parochialism of America's elite college campuses. Or perhaps the radicals were deluded by a mass media that declared quiet support for the government less newsworthy than noisy dissent. But whatever the cause, the result was an illusion. Indeed, the case of Vietnam demonstrated, if anything, the responsiveness of policymakers to public opinion and the public's fundamental distaste for the radical critique.

Contrary to radical rhetoric, very few Americans supported withdrawal from Vietnam before the government itself was pursuing such a policy. From late 1964 until late 1968, public support for withdrawal never exceeded 20 percent; those who were dissatisfied with the status quo were far more likely to support escalation than withdrawal.⁴⁵ As late as 1967, those favoring escalation outnumbered those favoring withdrawal by the striking margin of 58% to 6%.⁴⁶ And while it was true that support for withdrawal increased

rapidly after the 1968 elections, it is also true that withdrawal (albeit gradual) had become the government's policy. Ironically, as Lurch and Sperlich have commented, the radical critique actually may have reduced support for the government's program of gradual withdrawal by generating resistance from those "who considered themselves loyal and patriotic": "Antiwar demonstrations had not convinced most citizens that the United States was morally wrong in being in Vietnam and may have even slowed the movement of withdrawal sentiment by acting as a negative reference point. . . . By 1969 or 1970, such views certainly found more support and encouragement from more traditionally acceptable opinion leaders than in earlier years, and so identification with the disliked 'protestors' did not pose such a problem for the average citizen."⁴⁷

To add insult to injury, the radicals even failed to win substantial support from American young people. One of the recurring images of the war in Vietnam, of course, was "that of youthful protestors picketing in massive numbers, singing, chanting, and venting their anger at continuing American involvement there."⁴⁸ We heard in radical rhetoric of a new generation of students, rejecting "the whole thrust and direction of American foreign policy."⁴⁹ But survey research suggests the opposite. Throughout the Vietnam era, younger people were far less supportive of withdrawal and far more supportive of escalation than were older respondents. As Lurch and Sperlich summarize the findings: "The striking fact is that the younger a person was during the Vietnam era, the more likely he or she was to support the war."⁵⁰

The New Left revisionists tried to have it both ways. Pointing to elite college campuses and media images, they argued that support for America's Vietnam policy had withered away or even disappeared. When confronted with polls showing continued public support for the government, however, they evoked a theory of "false consciousness"; they wrote of an indifferent public duped into quiescence by appeals to "a broader social welfare and erstwhile consensus."⁵¹

The argument of "false consciousness" may have been warranted by survey research in the 1950's. As Ernest May has written, the first generation of survey research was indeed "fertile with new suggestions for possible manipulation of public opinion."⁵² But survey research in the 1960's and 1970's painted a different portrait of the American people. The public apparently had become more aware, concerned, and politically active than they had been in previous years.⁵³ At the very time surveys showed widespread support for America's presence in Vietnam, they also showed it was a more informed support than might have been found in the 1950's. Moreover, the dissent that was found in data on Vietnam reflected, not so much the revisionist critique, as the critique of America's "no win" policy by conservative ideologues. Most Americans did not agree with the radicals. But neither did they all unquestioningly tow the governmental line.

"False consciousness" was just another myth of revisionist theory that detracted from the persuasiveness of their case. Indeed, neither their claims that "the people" were duped, nor their claims that "the people" supported their viewpoint, rested on anything more than impassioned

assertion. As in their writings on the Cold War, the revisionists simply ignored contrary evidence. Again, the revisionists were not about to let the facts interfere with their holy crusade.

Nonetheless, many casual readers again embraced the radical perspective without significant demurrals. And again, rhetorical scholars were among the worst offenders. Hauser and Blair swallowed revisionism wholesale, for instance, calling "the liberal democratic conception of the public . . . only an ideal, a fiction at best." In a major theoretical essay on public opinion, they argued that we have a "government of, by, and for special interests," while "the people" are but a "depoliticized estate" that renders "mass loyalty to a government which does not include them in its decision-making process."⁵⁴ Like Campbell's revisionist history of Vietnam, Hauser and Blair's characterization of "the people" as "fiction" went unargued, as if proponents of revisionism bear no burden of proof in challenging traditional democratic theory. Again, intelligent people fell victim to the illusion that revisionism was self-evidently true and that traditional notions could simply be dismissed.

Toward a Synthesis

As the passions of the Vietnam era subsided, a more mature perspective began to emerge in American diplomatic historiography. More recent writings on the origins of the Cold War have synthesized traditional and revisionist perspectives, producing a more complete view of history. And while historians have yet to complete a similar synthesis of perspectives on public opinion, the rationale for such a synthesis has become increasingly apparent. In closing, this essay articulates that rationale by describing a situational theory of public opinion.

The synthesis of traditional and revisionist historiography on the Cold War first began to appear in the writings of the original combatants. Without abandoning his view that revisionist historiography should "be used with caution," Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. admitted that he had spoken "somewhat intemperately" in earlier critiques and conceded that "revisionism is an essential part of the process by which history . . . enlarges its perspectives and enriches its insights."⁵⁵ But more important, the substance of traditional and revisionist interpretations began to merge, producing a more sophisticated, dispassionate historiography on both sides. The editors of a book including new writings by representatives of both schools made this point in introducing the essays:

Each of the essays is rooted in one of the "schools" of interpretation . . . , yet they are characterized by the refinement and sophistication which those interpretations have acquired with the passage of time. .

. . . Significant differences still exist, for example, between Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., often considered a spokesman for the Liberal Establishment, and Lloyd C. Gardner, a member of the "Wisconsin School," yet their differences are not argued in the simplistic terms that most likely would have obtained in an earlier time. Some may conclude that the general movement seems to be away from extreme polarization of attitudes and toward some middle point."⁵⁶

The label "post-revisionism" has since emerged to describe a new generation of historians who embrace the synthesis. As Martin McCauley writes, post-revisionists seek "to avoid the polarities of blame-it-all-on-the-Soviets or blame-it-all-on-the-Americans." Instead, they recognize that the situation was "so infinitely complex that no generalizations about who was to blame will suffice." The post-revisionists acknowledge the weaknesses of both traditional and revisionist accounts: "the former pays little attention to the legitimate security needs of the USSR, while the latter ignores Soviet behaviour which gave rise to shifts in American policy." And above all, they try "to stand back from the battle, avoid blatant partisanship and at the remove of a generation or more to pass a cold, critical eye over the 'sins' of all participants."⁵⁷

John Gaddis' *The Origins of the Cold War* was among the best of the early post-revisionist studies. First published in 1972 and winner of the Bancroft Prize, the book praised the revisionists for emphasizing domestic influences upon American foreign policy, yet it reflected the traditional assumption that policymakers could be taken at their word when they articulated non-economic motives. By "focusing so heavily on economics," Gaddis argued, the revisionists failed to fully explain most major U.S. policy initiatives, all of which could be explained "far more plausibly by citing the Administration's need to maintain popular support for its policies than by dwelling upon requirements of the economic order."⁵⁸ Recognizing economic interests as among the interests given expression in the demands of "the public and its representatives on Capitol Hill," Gaddis acknowledged the importance of economic motives on at least some occasions. But unlike the revisionists, he also recognized that other concerns—even moral concerns—imposed "definite limitations on how far policy-makers could go" by defining their "range of acceptable options" in particular political climates.

Historians have not been so adept at synthesizing theoretical perspectives on public opinion, despite the fact that traditional and revisionist perspectives are not as different as they may seem. In describing the public generally as either conforming or not conforming with the role of the public in democratic theory, both treated public opinion as a "stable entity that changes little in composition or state of consciousness from one situation to another."⁶⁰ And both treated the responsiveness of policymakers to public opinion as a stable relationship. Hence, it made sense from either perspective to ask such questions as: Is the public informed? Does the public influence political leaders? And given the assumption of both that the relationship between public opinion and policymaking was fixed and unchanging, one was forced to conclude that the

traditionalists or the revisionists could not both be right.

The changing portraits of public opinion in survey research challenge the assumption that public opinion exists in a fixed state of consciousness. The data reveal that citizens are not always uninformed, apathetic, and manipulated or always informed, interested, and influential. Instead, survey research suggests that the level of public knowledge and interest in political affairs is linked to the political environment: to the issues at hand and to the nature and appeals of political leadership. In other words, the nature and role of the public varies by historical context and is shaped by changing political stimuli. As Gerald Pomper explains, "the particular conclusion of low ideological awareness . . . during the Eisenhower period may have resulted from the generally low level of ideological stimulation during this period."⁶¹ By contrast, the portrait of the aware, interested citizen arose out of the more stimulating political climate of the 1960's.

The responsiveness of policymakers to public opinion also varies situationally. Theories of the public-as-fiction correctly maintain that public opinion can have no impact on policymaking independent of how it is perceived by political leaders. As Michael C. McGee has argued, politically relevant public opinion is discovered, not through survey research, but through analysis of rhetorical documents containing history as "mediated or filtered" by political leaders.⁶² Such analysis, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere,⁶³ reveals that policymakers in America are indeed sensitive to public opinion. But they often do not obey it, consciously or unconsciously, for ideological and empirical reasons. Our political philosophy is ambivalent, allowing policymakers to justify the "national interest" taking precedence over public opinion in certain situations. And the empirical problems of "knowing" public opinion may bedevil even those policymakers intent on obeying its dictates. American policymakers routinely assume that "the will of the people" may be discerned through "scientific" polling, yet the conceptual and technical limitations of polls call this assumption into question. Polls typically do not distinguish between strong and weak opinions, between rational and irrational opinions, or among shades of opinion on particular issues. Even slight differences in sampling, data collection or question-wording can make enormous differences in findings. And once statistics are gathered they still may be interpreted in very different ways, especially by politicians with partisan concerns.⁶⁴

A situational theory of public opinion recognizes that the relationship between the public and policymakers sometimes resembles the traditional model and sometimes the revisionist model. In some situations, political rhetoric may afford audiences the opportunity to arrive at reasoned opinions and may inspire political expression and activity. In other situations, the citizen's best efforts to participate may be thwarted by a lack of information or perceived motivations for political activity. In some situations, policymakers may uphold "the people's" sovereignty and intelligence and defer to an accurate perception of public opinion. In other situations, policymakers may deem the public too uninformed or emotional to dictate foreign policy, or they may defer to an inaccurate perception of "the people's" will.

A realistic theory of public opinion recognizes that the interaction between "the people" and policymakers is a complicated and ever-changing relationship. Rhetorical scholars can contribute significantly to our understanding of that relationship by elucidating how ideological and empirical arguments shape policymakers' perceptions. Beyond that, empirical survey research affords the opportunity to evaluate the arguments and perceptions of key policymakers. Although no single poll reveals the "reality" of public opinion in all its complexity, one at least may surmise how well a particular conception conforms to the thrust of all available empirical data.

For a number of years, political scientists have told us that the influence of public opinion on policymaking can be described only in particular historical contexts or with reference to the changing national agenda and political dialogue. Yet many scholars persist in overgeneralizing about the public's impact on foreign policies and in deriving political "lessons" from their mistake. The time has come to bury ideological hatchets and to acknowledge the lessons of empirical research. The relationship between the public and policymaking is a complex and ever-changing process that defies the simplistic explanations of ideological crusaders.

Conclusion

Traditional historiography in the Vietnam era admittedly left a lot to be desired. As a description of the Cold War's origins, it resembled the plot line of an old-time Western: the Americans wore white hats and the Russians wore black. As a description of the forces shaping American foreign policy, traditionalism was even more naive. As Thomas McCormick has argued, too many traditionalists assumed that foreign policies were "the end product of elite decision-makers, operating in a relative social vacuum, interacting with other nations' elite decision-makers."⁶⁵ And when they did attend to domestic influences, they engaged in an ideological celebration of public opinion; they simply assumed that "the people" fulfilled the duties prescribed by democratic theory.

The fact that the traditionalists may have been wrong, however, does not mean that the revisionists were right. The revisionists painted an equally black-and-white picture of the Cold War's origins, and they too overgeneralized about the impact of public opinion. Like the traditionalists, the revisionists had political goals. By portraying the Cold War as American aggression and by downplaying the impact of public opinion, they hoped to strip the policymaking elite of its political legitimacy. In passionate times, one hardly could have expected dispassionate historiography. But excuses only highlight the need for more

mature understandings.

Rhetorical scholars should be particularly sympathetic to synthesizing the polarized histories of the 1960's. They should recognize political posturing when they see it, and they should be sensitive to the logic of competing points of view. Like debate in many contexts, historiographical debate is a clash of partial realities; each side may present a different, but equally true "slice" of a "reality" in dispute. In effect, debate between traditional and revisionist historians constituted the defense and the prosecution of American foreign policy. It remains for the "jury" of all interested scholars to finish synthesizing the truth.

Notes

- ¹Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), esp. pp. ix-xii.
- ²Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955-56), II, 101, 110-12.
- ³Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 101, 110.
- ⁴Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 101-02.
- ⁵Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 103, 106.
- ⁶Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War*, eds. J. Joseph Huthmacher and Warren I. Suanan (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Co., 1970), p. vi.
- ⁷Henry Pachter, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War," *Dissent*, 15 (1969), 505.
- ⁸Gardner, Schlesinger, and Morgenthau, *Origins of the Cold War*, p. vi.
- ⁹Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 21.
- ¹⁰Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, p. 28.
- ¹¹William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (New York: Dell Books, 1962), p. 208.
- ¹²Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, pp. 2, 206.
- ¹³Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," *American Historical Review*, 72 (1967), 1245.
- ¹⁴Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History," p. 1246.
- ¹⁵Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 622.
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- 27 Gardner, Schlesinger, and Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. 44, nt. 3.
- 28 Horowitz, "An Open Letter."
- 29 Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus*, pp. 3, 7.
- 30 Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus*, p. 7.
- 31 Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus*, pp. 5-6.
- 32 Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, p. 19.
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- 34 Forbes Hill made much the same point in "The Forum" of *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*: "What is at work in [Campbell's] analysis compelling the conclusion that the United States is responsible for what has happened in Viet Nam is the revisionist theory of the cold war, so popular now in New

Left circles. . . . It informs the whole of Professor Campbell's critique. Naturally Richard Nixon does not analyze the situation this way, and, of course, that must mean he is guilty of gross misrepresentation." See Forbes I. Hill, "Reply to Professor Campbell," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (December 1972), 457.

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⁵³See Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

⁵⁴Gerald Hauser and Carole Blair, "Antecedents to the Public," *Pre Text*, 3 (1982), 140-41.

⁵⁵Gardner, Schlesinger, and Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. 43.

⁵⁶Gardner, Schlesinger, and Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. ix.

⁵⁷Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Longman Inc., 1983), p. 14.

⁵⁸John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 357-58.

⁵⁹Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, pp. 357-8.

⁶⁰W. Lance Bennett, *Public Opinion in American Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1980), p. 13.

⁶¹Gerald Pomper, *Voters' Choices: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 11-22.

⁶²Michael C. McGee, "In Search of 'the People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (1975), 249.

⁶³J. Michael Hogan, "Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy: The Case of Illusory Support for the Panama Canal Treaties," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 71 (August 1985), forthcoming.

⁶⁴For a discussion of problems of methodology and interpretation in polling see Charles W. Roll and Albert H. Cantril, *Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics* (Cabin John, Maryland: Seven Locks Press, 1980), pp. 65-135.

⁶⁵Thomas McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," in *The State of American History*, ed. Herbert J. Bass (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 122-23.

ARGUMENT AND IDEOLOGY: A POSTSCRIPT

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[Editors' Note: This commentary is a response to the papers by J. Michael Hogan, James Arnt Aune, and Phillip C. Wander]

As the person charged with replying to the panel on "Argument and Ideology," I face some duties I know I don't have time to complete. To do an adequate job of critique, I would have to make more explicit than any of these gentlemen have done connections between argument and ideology. And, I might add, were I in fact to seek those connections in these three papers, I think I would find myself forced to change the title of the panel to "Argument, Narrative, and Ideology."

As I read these papers, I became struck by the fact that all three are both analyzing and telling stories. Professor Hogan's paper very directly retells the story of three historiographical perspectives on Vietnam. That is, he arranges the works of traditionalists, the Wisconsin School revisionists, and some later synthesizers into a story of his own. Professor Hogan's story is a melodrama, wherein historians are depicted as almost victimized by the Demon Ideology, either haplessly, as in the case of the traditionalists, or self-consciously, as in the case of the revisionists. I say "almost victimized," because of course Professor Hogan's story has a happy ending; in the final tableau, we see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., admitting his intemperateness, shaking hands with Lloyd C. Gardner, while Professor Hogan looks over their shoulders, praising their moves toward synthesis, drawing out as the moral of his story "The time has come to bury ideological hatchets and to acknowledge the lessons of empirical research" and admonishing "rhetorical scholars" to join in on the work of synthesis because, "Like debate in many contexts, historiographical debate is a clash of partial realities." That tableau floats slowly into the sunset, with Professor Hogan telling us that "It remains for the 'jury' of all interested scholars to finish synthesizing the truth."

Professor Aune's approach to narrative likewise exists on two, or perhaps three, levels. Level One is the story of Gastonia he himself constructs, as his notes indicate, and he'll tell you if you ask him, out of the histories of others, some original research he did in the *New York Times*, and some other original research done by a person named Robin Hood for an M.A. thesis. At Level Two is the story of how others interpreted the Gastonia strike within the webs of their own ideological agenda and aesthetic impulses. Then, if I were to posit a Level Three in this paper--and I think I can even if it is not developed fully by Professor Aune--it would include his synthesis of Level One and Level Two stories into another: the story of both the failures of radicalism in the United States and the failure of scholars to penetrate the popular consciousness with historical and socially sensitive stories about labor and working conditions in this country.

If Professor Hogan offers us melodrama, and Professor Aune, tragedy, then Professor Wander tells stories, as he is wont to do, in an ironic mode. Professor Wander's world is one filled with dialectical contradictions ströling through the history of the life-world; those contradictions have a tendency in Wander's world to periodically replace each other, as that which was positive for a while soon becomes negative, as each new credo of salvation becomes perverted when it is lived to an extreme, and, as always for Professor Wander, as his world is threatened with nuclear destruction. Yet, interestingly, Wander's world has never blown up, so his stories are not tragedies; rather, I think, as I said, they're studies in the ironies of social existence. In his paper, those ironies are seen in Wittgenstein's Vienna, in Wittgenstein's own logical abilities in times of personal stress, in Wittgenstein's redirection of his own thinking, as Wander discusses it late in his paper, away "from positivism and the empiricist epistemology of Moore and Russell" and toward what Wittgenstein himself later referred to "the true problems of philosophy, which we are to feel 'on our own pulses' and in our own experience."

In Professor Wander's story, thus, intellectual polarities constantly reverse themselves in often immoral ways, while life goes on--and on, one hopes, even in an age threatened by the holocaust.

Now, I asked to have the papers on this panel rearranged a bit because I think they are now in order so far as their narrative approaches to matters of argument and ideology are concerned. Professor Hogan retells the story of Vietnam historiography so as to eliminate ideological contamination from the process of history writing. In the sentences I quoted, he certainly is suggesting something akin to the objectivistic philosophical goals for historians that were so heavily discussed in positivist debates of the 1950s and early 1960s by the likes of Nadel, Passmore, Popper, Bergmand, Mandelbaum, Dray, and the others offering philosophical analyses of history writing as an intellectual endeavor. He even goes on as to suggest that there is a "logic of competing points of view" so far as historical writing is concerned.

I asked to have Professor Aune's paper second because he explicitly moves beyond his colleague's positivist impulses. Though he suggests that "The purpose of this paper is to analyze the argumentative strategies of writers," he in fact does not discuss arguments as arguments whatsoever. Rather, he catches us up in the stories others are telling; he strives to make sense in an implicit way of the ideological mindset--yea and indeed, even the "consciousness"--of various kinds of storytellers. There is no search for "the truth" in much of this paper (unless we consider Professor Aune's own version of the story as such an attempt at Truth). Rather, there is a deliberate and provocative effort to counterpoise the historical and artistic narratives, not to destroy ideology but merely to correct false consciousness. As Professor Aune suggests, while historians make no appeals or approaches to Truth, and while they certainly do work within the blinders of personal and professional perspectivism, historians can be expected to detail (argumentatively, perhaps?) the relationships between ideological consciousness and "the facts" of the persons, objects, and events being discussed. To Aune, the struggle over meaning referred to early on his paper is one of somehow fitting ideological presuppositions

accurately to those facts. The relationship between ideology and the life-world ultimately is an attributive one.

Professor Wander's paper is properly considered third on this panel because, as usual, he brings up the Left in conceptual discussions of ideology and argument. Those of you who have followed the exchange over Wander's views on ideology and criticism being printed in the Central States Speech Journal know rather clearly that he would accuse Professor Hogan of naivete. To Wander, we cannot escape our ideologies; we only can substitute one for another. To Wander, no facts exist outside of our ideological postures toward them; facts indeed are not facts, but, rather, materializations useful to a testing of an ideology's moral code. Even as Wander, thus, writes history, he bends it to his own ideological purpose--and, I should add for those who have not read his work, he does that bending consciously. As he is arguing in the Central States Speech Journal series, a rhetorical critic without moral and ideological goals--and for Wander those terms are almost equivalent--is a critic ignoring his or her obligation to both society and the profession.

Had I time and some resources, I now would be ready to offer a critique of these three papers within the frameworks I have just reconstructed. In a critique of Professor Hogan's conceptualizations, I would chide him a bit for confusing matters of historiographical interest with questions concerning the craft of history writing. I would suggest that it is impossible for history writing to avoid the evils of perspective-taking, that is, ideological assumption; the human being by nature sees the world from somewhere, from some vantage, from a vantage determined by our own purposes, by our socialization into a web of ways for seeing, and by the limitations of language as a medium of communication. This is not to say that Professor Hogan's concern for the "facts" surrounding some person, object, or event is not a proper and even a primary concern for historians. It is, but at the level of craft or *techné*. Before writing history, historians of necessity must find ways to (with some accuracy) reconstruct the past. That reconstruction, though, to my view precedes the writing of history, just as it does for Hayden White's historian. To White, as he wrote in the Autumn 1980 issue of *Critical Inquiry*, the historian is a different kind of storyteller than either the annalist or the chronicler. The annalist arranges facts, the chronicler sees that they are coherent, but the historian interprets them perspectively. I would ask, had I time, that Professor Hogan rethink his ideas on synthesis, truth-finding, and even argument in light of contemporary narrative theory.

With more time, I would suggest that Professor Aune do a couple of things in the project of which this paper is a part. For one thing, he needs to engage in self-critique. Even as he exposes the ideological limits of the stories of others, he ignores his own. He certainly suggests his own ideological posture in sentences such as the following: "The commentaries [of others] often tell us more about the writers themselves than they do about the lives of the illiterate mountain folks, the 'linheads,' who for one brief moment acted heroically in the face of brutal oppression." What we get in this analysis, were I to categorize Aune's views generally, is a near-classic Romantic vision of antiheroism. At least I am convinced he is writing social history within a web of romantic notions--notions of the little people with their folkish wisdom

of the virtues which reside in lower-class citizens, of heroism born unconsciously of sweat and self-protection rather than ideologies, and of, as I said earlier, perspectives as human mechanisms for attributing meaningfulness to facts. Until Aune engages in a self-critique of these notions, he will only be toying with his hearer and reader, pretending to be investigating the ideologically determined shortcomings of others from the vantage of a "neutral" narrative he himself has constructed, when in fact that narrative he himself has constructed, when in fact that narrative is governed by an ideological posture every bit as interested or prejudicial as those of others.

Finally, I suppose I would critique Professor Wander, though I undoubtedly would do it unfairly. In the paper offered to this conference he has overstated in significant ways the lack of moral discourse in this country during the twentieth century. Many of those discourses--coming from intuitive, rationalist, empirical, and situational theories of ethics--I reviewed seventeen years ago in an essay on the "is-ought" gap," so I certainly won't rehash them. I think, too, especially, he underestimates scientists' abilities to deal with the moral dimensions of science. Russell was not the only analytical philosopher to be a pacifist: The international peace organizations formed after World War II were heavily populated by scientists and other positivists; Robert Oppenheimer's arguments with Edward Teller made front-page news; Shockley's research on race and I.Q. did not go unexamined morally; recent work by the Association of Concerned Scientists is constantly before the public eye. Scientism in Wander is depicted as the debilitating collective mindset of anonymous white-coated scientists plotting the destruction of the world. When we actually materialize scientism, however, it becomes more variegated morally. Professor Wander, I think, must rather more fully engage in factual materialization than he is in this paper if he is to retain the title of "scholar." And he, too, ought to in a more self-reflexive fashion consider his own use of storytelling as a scholarly format. As a storyteller, he becomes more a persuader than an arguer.

But, as I said, I don't have time to do these critiques. So, I won't. Besides, I promised a "postscript," not a "critique," in my title. My postscript is a simple one: Like everything else recently, or so it feels, the relationship between "argument" and "ideology" is becoming complicated by narrative forms with this moral-political purposes. We must continue our work on that three-way rather than a two-way interaction. To that end, starting a year from now, I will be devoting a large portion of my own scholarly work to a collaborative project on "The Rhetoric of Historical Narrative" with Professor Allan Megill of Iowa's Department of History. I suggest others take up similar projects.

STORYTELLING AND PUBLIC MORAL ARGUMENT: THE CASE OF MEDICINE*

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To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one's birth to one's death is ... to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life. It is, that is, to be open to being asked to give a certain kind of account of what one did or what happened to one or what one witnessed at any earlier point in one's life the time at which the question is posed.

Alastair MacIntyre¹

Walter Fisher recently asked his fellow critics to tell "stories" that may inform his conception of "the narrative paradigm."² In the following essay I will respond to this request by telling a story about a professional community whose very existence has always depended on the ability of its members to recognize and appreciate the importance of storytelling as a life-promoting activity. The community I have in mind is that of medicine. Today, this community is being confronted by moral dilemmas that are threatening its reputation. As will be detailed below, these dilemmas are due to the scientific and technological capabilities of medicine, capabilities that have enabled the members of the medical community to increase their technical expertise when telling each other stories about the diseases that plague their patients' lives. These stories are constructed primarily for the purposes of making a medical diagnosis and prescribing treatments; their narrativity must therefore subscribe to the dictates of what Fisher terms "the rational world paradigm." Due to the dilemmas now confronting it, however, the medical community is being challenged by its critics to engage in public moral argument and thus to expand its appreciation of the scope and function of storytelling.

By offering an account of how the medical community is responding to this challenge, I will attempt not only to show the heuristic value of Fisher's thinking on narration, but also to suggest how his narrative paradigm can be expanded such that its relevance as a rhetorical/critical tool is further enhanced. My account begins with an examination of both the moral dilemmas that are confronting the medical community and the situation that has come to take form because of this confrontation. Here I comment on the way physicians typically use stories in the performance of their duties. I next provide an analysis of a story that was told by a physician and that exemplifies what Fisher describes as "narrative rationality." A concluding discussion is then offered to suggest some of the implications that follow from my account.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DILEMMAS

Throughout the twentieth century, and in response to the public's increased appetite for a prolonged life, medical science has developed technologies that have greatly expanded the concept of health care. Respirators, bypass surgery, dialysis machines, CT scanners, pacemakers, chemotherapy, organ transplants, and artificial hearts are some of the better known technological advances that have enabled medicine to intensify its legendary "war" against life-threatening disease. The war, we are told, is being won; and the expectations of both the medical community and those whom it serves continue to grow. But this success and its attending expectations have created dilemmas regarding life and death that the medical community is hard-pressed to resolve. A story can help illustrate this point:

In May, 1980, Mr. Howard F. Hubbs suffered complete kidney failure. For the rest of his life he would have to live with the help of a dialysis machine. His life was sustained but its quality was tragic: He lost his job, he lost his capacity to function sexually, he abandoned his religious faith, he developed severe neurotic behaviors.... Staring at his blood moving through a machine, he continued to ask: "What is going on here?" "What is happening to my life?" Alone in his house he wrote in a diary that he kept to document personal responses to his deteriorating condition: "I can't die because I must stay to keep up with the 'Jones.' I can't die because I have traditions to carry on. I can't die because I am afraid too." In the next entry he wrote: "Everyone calls, the phone rings and rings with questions and professional advice. But it's too too bad that they can't help--because they don't know my pain--Nor Do I." On 20 February, 1984, due to complications associated with his illness, Mr. Hubbs died.

A success of medical science had enabled Mr. Hubbs to live, but it was a living hell, evidencing how sophisticated medical care can increase levels of pain and suffering (i.e., morbidity). Thousands of patients whose lives are sustained by the technological capabilities of medicine are experiencing this fate everyday. The irony here is discomfiting. And the discomfort grows when one realizes that the success of medical science in developing its technologies is also related to skyrocketing health care expenditures, accusations of impersonal medical care, and ethical questions concerning the proper and timely use of life-support systems. Dr. Willard Gaylin summarizes the irony of the situation quite well when he notes that "it is not the deficiencies of medicine that present the medical community with dilemmas, but the successes."⁵

More than ever before in its recent history, medicine is being required to resolve this ironic situation. Its chief benefactor (and persistent critic) is demanding an immediate reply. And who is this benefactor? Dr. Lawrence Altman supplies his colleagues with the answer to this question:

Let me remind you that in this post-World War II era, the taxpayer, the public, has become the chief benefactor of medicine. Medicine is now a public institution because it is the taxpayer who is paying for the bulk of the costs of patient care, medical research, and medical education.

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Members of the medical profession have become public servants. And they are accountable to the public in the same way that other public servants are.⁶

Such accountability creates a difficult problem for the medical community. As I will now attempt to show, this problem has much to do with the way in which the members of this community have been conditioned to use stories in the performance of their duties.

Public Moral Argument: Telling Stories about Life and Death

In being accountable to the public about the dilemmas fostered by its technological successes, the medical community is forced to engage in what Fisher describes as "public moral argument." Such argument, according to Fisher,

is to be distinguished from reasoned discourse in interpersonal interactions and arguments occurring in specialized communities, such as theological disputes, academic debates, and arguments before the Supreme Court. The features differentiating public moral argument from such encounters are: (1) It is publicized, made available for consumption and persuasion of the polity at large; and (2) it is aimed at what Aristotle called "untrained thinkers," or, to be effective, it should be.... Most important public moral argument is a form of controversy that inherently crosses fields. It is not contained in the way that legal, scientific, or theological arguments are by subject matter, particular conceptions of argumentative competence, and well recognized rules of advocacy.⁷

One reason why the medical community has a difficult time engaging in such argument can be illustrated by the following story.

I recently had the opportunity to discuss with twelve, fourth-year medical students my current research on how the intensification of medical technology is affecting doctor-patient relationships. Seeking to determine how these students felt about the dilemmas under consideration here, I began the discussion by telling them the story of Mr. Hubbs. Neither the story nor the rationale for telling it were well received. Objections centered on the "subjective" and "unscientific" nature of the story. Why this defensive response to a story that most certainly was true?

One must understand that medical students are not adverse to being told stories about cases that are relevant to their professional livelihood. As Dr. Eric Cassell points out, "the recitation of cases--telling stories--has been a way to teach medicine that has survived through the ages because nothing else does the job as well."⁸ Oftentimes the cases that are recited by physicians are explications of "illness stories" that were told to a physician by a patient during a history-taking session. Such stories, according to Cassell, "are different from other stories because they almost always have at least two characters to whom things happen. They always have at least a person and that person's body." Patients are under no

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professional obligation to make this distinction when telling the story of their illness, when trying to remember all that has been happening to them because of some bodily disorder that they believe is indicative of some disease. Physicians, on the other hand, do have a professional obligation to make the distinction; for only then can they properly diagnose and perhaps cure the diseases afflicting their patients. Thus, of the two characters that motivate the patient's illness story, it is the body, the place where a disease unfolds, that must assume priority as a matter of interest for the physician.

In explicating a patient's story to their students and colleagues, physicians are expected to offer a narrative that reflects an understanding of this priority and that does so with as much precision and accuracy as possible. The scientific and technological capabilities of medicine prove invaluable to the physician who must perform this task. By greatly enhancing the physician's ability to discover, diagnose, and then decide what to do about a patient's illness, these capabilities enable a physician to construct a story that, in Fisher's terms, abides by the precepts of "the rational world paradigm" and thereby enables the physician's peers to determine whether or not the story reflects an argument that is empirically verifiable and thus scientifically competent. In short, when physicians recite cases for the purposes of instructing their associates about the practice of medicine, they do so within a community whose members require from their teachers an ability to tell a certain kind of story--one whose narrative probability and narrative fidelity reflect an expert appreciation of how science and technology can disclose the workings of the body.

One perhaps can now understand why the medical students reacted defensively when asked to comment on the story of Mr. Hubbs. As told, the story was about a person, not about his body; it emphasized how the scientific and technological abilities of medicine adversely affected this person, not how they helped to sustain his bodily functions; it intimated that medical technology may prolong death, not life; it revealed moral dilemmas, not medical solutions. The story, in other words, did not coincide with the expectations and requirements that have long guided medicine in its telling of illness stories. Rather, it challenged the medical students with a difficult task: it asked them to step outside the boundaries of their training, their expertise, their traditional rationality, and to understand and accept as true a narrative that questioned the capabilities that make possible the students' professional existence. Who, one might ask, would not become somewhat defensive if their livelihood was so questioned?

Importantly, what is being suggested here should not be interpreted as but an attempt to justify the medical students' behavior. Their story was told because it helps to illustrate why the issue of accountability poses a problem for the medical community when it is forced to engage in public moral argument over cases like those of Mr. Hubbs (cases that remind the medical community not only about the successes of its scientific and technological capabilities but also about certain moral dilemmas that, as indicated earlier, are likewise made possible by these capabilities). It should now be clear that the existence of this problem has something to do with the way the medical community typically uses stories in the performance of its duties. This use of stories is motivated by the need to be

interested in "the disease in the body in the bed."¹⁰ With respect to the requirements of public moral argument noted earlier, however, this interest proves deficient; for the stories it motivates are not directed toward the public of "untrained thinkers." It would seem, then, that if it is to be accountable to this audience about the dilemmas arising from its technological successes, the medical community must expand its appreciation of the scope and function of storytelling. Turning once again to the narrative perspective offered by Fisher will be helpful in determining what the medical community must do to perform this task.

MEDICINE'S MOVE TO NARRATIVE RATIONALITY

According to Fisher,

the proper role of the expert in public moral argument is that of a counselor, which is, as [Walter] Benjamin ... notes, the true function of the storyteller. His contribution to public dialogue is to impart knowledge, like a teacher, or wisdom, like a sage. It is not to pronounce a story that ends all storytelling. The expert assumes the role of public counselor whenever she or he crosses the boundary of technical knowledge into the territory of life as it ought to be lived. Once this invasion is made, the public, which then includes the expert, has its own criteria for determining whose story is most coherent and reliable as a guide to belief and action. The expert, in other words, then becomes subject to the demands of narrative rationality.

As used here, the term "narrative rationality" points to that which is at work in all forms of storytelling. As Fisher puts it, this ontological sense of "rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings--their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives"¹² Narrative rationality thus makes room for those stories that may not meet all the requirements of argumentative competence dictated by the rational world paradigm but that still warrant serious attention because of the values they express--values that oftentimes offer people moral guidance when they are forced to confront the ultimate questions "of life and death, of how persons should be defined and treated, of preferred patterns of living."¹³

We have already seen that within the medical community the demands of narrative rationality require a physician to tell a story wherein the "body," and not the "person," assumes priority as a matter of interest. For the public, I would argue, the priority is different. Because of its lack of technical expertise and because of the way it has been influenced by the media to understand and appreciate the workings of medicine, the public expects physicians to tell it stories that are person-oriented.¹⁴ Instructed by this orientation, the public can more readily determine whether or not the stories it is hearing from the medical community contain values and attitudes that the public deem important for its health care.

Is all of this to say that if physicians are to assume "the proper role of the expert in public moral argument" about the dilemmas fostered by medicine's technological successes, they must expand the narrative rationality of their illness stories such that priority is given to the "person" (or persons)? From the standpoint of what Fisher has told his fellow critics so far about the teachings of the narrative paradigm, an affirmative answer to this question would have to be maintained. In theory, the answer is sound. But how are physicians supposed to apply this theoretical answer to their world of practice? Should physicians tell stories about people who, like Mr. Hubbs, have suffered from medicine's scientific and technological successes? Must they make sure that when telling such stories they at the same time promote those values (e.g., truth, harmony, equality, a oneness with the Cosmos) that Fisher has constantly emphasized as being "relevant to the good life"?¹⁵ Which of these values, for example, would help solve the problem about whether or not physicians are obligated to confer "technological immortality on dehumanized patients?"¹⁶

As best as I can determine, the only suggestion that Fisher has offered for answering such practical questions is this: "... good stories function in two ways: to justify (or mystify) decisions or actions already made or performed, and to determine future decisions or actions." This suggestion still falls short of providing specific answers to the questions just raised. I do believe, however, that the suggestion does offer an important directive for the critic who is interested in determining how physicians are attempting to expand the narrative rationality of their illness stories such that they can engage in public moral argument about the dilemmas under consideration here. As a way of demonstrating this belief, I now will offer a brief analysis of a story that recently appeared in Harper's magazine. Written by Dr. David Hilfiker, the story is entitled "Making Medical Mistakes: How Doctors Harm Patients--and Themselves."¹⁸

Narrative Rationality: Is it Enough?

As its title suggests, Dr. Hilfiker's story is an exposé, a public revelation of something discreditable happening within the medical community. Seven different cases punctuate the narrative, each detailing how the author has contributed to the occurrence of iatrogenic disease (i.e., doctor-inflicted injuries). All the cases are person-oriented; there is no attempt to mystify the moral dilemmas raised by the cases by disguising them in esoteric medical jargon. The matter of interest here is not the disease in the body in the bed.

In the first recited case, for example, the reader is told about a woman who comes to see Dr. Hilfiker for a prenatal examination:

At her appointment that afternoon, Barb seems to be in good health, with all the signs and symptoms of pregnancy: slight nausea, some soreness in her breasts, a little weight gain. But when the nurse tests Barb's urine to determine if she is pregnant, the result is negative. The test measures the level of a hormone that is produced by a woman and shows up in her urine when she is pregnant. But occasionally it fails to detect the low levels of the

hormone during early pregnancy. I reassure Barb that she is fine and schedule another test for the following week.²⁰

Once again the test proves negative.

I am troubled. Perhaps she isn't pregnant. Her missed menstrual period and her other symptoms could be a result of a minor hormonal imbalance. Maybe the embryo has died within the uterus and a miscarriage is soon to take place. I could find out by ordering an ultrasound examination. This procedure would give me a "picture" of the uterus and of the embryo. But Barb would have to go to Duluth, 110 miles from our village in northern Minnesota, for the examination. The procedure is also expensive. I know the Dailys well enough to know they have a modest income. Besides, by waiting a few weeks, I should be able to find out for sure without the ultrasound: Either the urine test will be positive or Barb will have a miscarriage. I call her and tell her about the negative test result, about the possibility of a miscarriage, and about the necessity of seeing me again if she misses her next menstrual period.²¹

An examination one month later shows no changes: No menstrual period, no miscarriage, and still another urine test proves negative. A "miscarried abortion" is offered as a reason for the patient's complications. The reader hears how Dr. Hilfiker explains to the patient what this term means and how such an ailment can result in a woman becoming sterile if a miscarriage does not occur or if the dead embryo is not removed by "a dilation and curettage procedure to clean out the uterus." This procedure is explained to the patient. Another examination two weeks later again shows no changes. A fourth urine test is negative. The emotional impact that all of this has on both the patient and the physician is shared with the reader. An operation must be performed:

Things do not go easily this morning. There is considerably more blood than usual, and it is only with great difficulty that I am able to extract anything. What should take ten or fifteen minutes stretches out into a half-hour. The body parts I remove are much larger than I expected, considering when the embryo died. They are not bits of decomposing tissue. These are parts of a body that was recently alive!... Despite reassurances from a pathologist that it is "impossible" for a pregnant woman to have four consecutive negative pregnancy tests, the realization is growing that I have aborted Barb's living child.²²

In an age where consumers are becoming more aware of their social and political rights, such an admission of culpability on the part of a physician is eagerly welcomed by patients who feel that their expectations concerning the treatment of their illness are not being properly fulfilled. "Improper medical care" is the accusation; malpractice litigation is often the result. In an unsolicited letter sent to this researcher, one patient who was hospitalized in Chicago for cancer treatments states her case as

follows: "Amazingly enough I am beginning to hear about others who have sued, not just for the money or even for the mistakes done to them, but because of the frustration and anger created by thoughtless words or no words at all. It's amazing how much patients can forgive in deeds, but cannot forgive in words or lack of them."²³

All of the cases recited by Dr. Hilfiker provide a response to this patient's frustration and anger. The response is that of public moral argument. Thoughtful words are offered as Hilfiker transcends his community's boundary of technical knowledge, assumes the role of public counselor, and talks about medical mistakes that he knows are associated with occurrences of morbidity, burdening health care costs, accusations of impersonal medical care, and ethical questions concerning the proper and timely use of life-support systems. But why has Hilfiker chosen the sensitive and embarrassing topic of mistakes to address such dilemmas?

The topic of mistakes enables Hilfiker to place both the medical community and its critics on common moral grounds:

Mistakes are an inevitable part of everyone's life. They happen; they hurt--ourselves and others. They demonstrate our fallibility. Shown our mistakes and forgiven them, we can grow, perhaps in some small way become better people. Mistakes, understood this way, are a process,²⁴ a way we connect with one another and our deepest selves.

Hilfiker does not use this understanding of mistakes as an excuse for medical malfeasance. He does, however, allow it to play an important role in his argument. He notes, for example, that

because of its technological wonders and near-miraculous drugs, modern medicine has created for the physician an expectation of perfection. The technology seems so exact that error becomes almost unthinkable. We are not prepared for our mistakes, and we don't know how to cope with them when they occur.²⁵

And the situation becomes even more intolerable, he argues, when one realizes how the public also expects physicians to be perfect because of their scientific and technological capabilities.

This perfection is a grand illusion, of course, a game of mirrors that everyone plays. Doctors hide their mistakes from patients, from other doctors, even from themselves. Open discussion of mistakes is banished from the consultation room, from the operating room, from physicians' meetings. Mistakes become gossip, and are spoken of openly only in court.

Unable to admit our mistakes, we physicians are cut off from healing. We cannot ask forgiveness, and we get none. We are thwarted, stunted; we do not grow.²⁶

This last point is especially important to Hilfiker's understanding of mistakes. For what is thwarted when physicians are unable to admit mistakes is their capacity to deal with their emotions in a healthy manner. "Guilt," "anger," and "anxiety" receive the most attention as Hilfiker shares with his reader what he did not share with the persons whose illness stories are being told. One hears how these suppressed emotions inspire feelings of incompetence and self-doubt and how such feelings are oftentimes disguised by an arrogant and all-knowing demeanor. "Little wonder," Hilfiker remarks, "that physicians are accused of playing God. Little wonder that we are defensive about our judgements, that we blame the patient or the previous physician when things go wrong, that we yell at nurses for their mistakes, that we have such high rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, and suicide."²⁷ Determined to put an end to these debilitating problems that adversely affect the doctor-patient relationship, Hilfiker concludes his story with the following prescription:

At some point we must all bring medical mistakes out of the closet. This will be difficult as long as both the profession and society continue to project their desires for perfection onto the doctor. Physicians need permission to admit errors. They need permission to share them with their patients. The practice of medicine is difficult enough without having to bear the yoke of perfection.²⁸

Has Hilfiker told what Fisher would call a "good" story? I believe so. The story definitely seeks to justify decisions and actions already made and performed, and to determine future decisions and actions. Furthermore, in telling the story, the physician did not use his expertise "to pronounce a story that ends all storytelling" about the dilemmas arising from medicine's scientific and technological successes. Rather, he engaged in public moral argument by telling an illness story that allowed "persons" to be the primary matter of interest. Guided by this interest, the story offered an authentic response to the "demands of narrative rationality": it asked its readers (the public and members of the medical community) to acknowledge that they are fallible, that they thus will make mistakes, and that they must be willing to admit such errors if they expect to maintain some semblance of well-being in their personal and professional lives. The value of this acknowledgement, it seems to me, is undeniable. But is this value strong enough to bring together the medical community and its critics such that the practice of medicine will no longer be plagued by its own successes?

CONCLUSION

The case of medicine presented in this essay, and the way this case was conceptualized by turning to Fisher's narrative paradigm, requires one to ask this question. The idealism of Fisher's perspective--its emphasis on how stories that speak to the highest human values can lead people to the "good life"--would suggest that Dr. Hilfiker's story should warrant serious consideration from its audience. I hope this suggestion is correct, for then one could be somewhat confident that a forthcoming answer to the question would be: "yes." At the present time, however, I am afraid that such confidence may be misleading. I say this for the following reason:

The dilemmas confronting the medical community today are part of a dense social and technological fabric; to separate the dilemmas from this fabric is to obscure their real meaning: The scientific-technical expertise of the medical community must be juxtaposed to the psychological orientation of the patient (public); moral and legal questions raised by death cannot be separated from historical, social, and economic issues; and in a democratic society none of these concerns can be separated from the political reality in which they occur. In this reality many stories are being told about the dilemmas; they are all competing to be heard. Fisher tells us that such competition is necessary if the "truth" is to prevail.²⁹ But in the case of medicine discussed here there are many truths at work: those of doctors, patients, lawyers, theologians, politicians, and so on. Not all of these truths coincide, despite the fact that they are heard in "good" stories. How is the public to decide about which of these stories deserves the most attention? Is the public competent enough to make such a decision? Fisher expresses hope that such competence exists. Public opinion polls suggest that this is not the case.³⁰

This discrepancy points to a problem in Fisher's position: it is too idealistic, too trustful of a public mentality that I fear would only perceive in Hilfiker's story an affirmation of its own bias against the medical community. Hilfiker's story deserves more credit than this; the narrative paradigm says so. The good life ought to prevail; I agree. Still, I worry about how such idealism can play a role in the lives of people who are caught up in the practical world of high tech medicine and who are all struggling to have their individual expectations fulfilled as they deal with matters of life and death. Professor Fisher's ideas suggest that these people can find comfort in the power of the word. Let me say once again: I hope he is correct.

NOTES

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¹ Alastair McIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 202.

² Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs, 51(1984), 1-22.

³ See, for example, Stanley Joel Reiser, Medicine and the Reign of Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books); Charles Mangel and Allen B. Weiss, Medicine: The State of the Art (New York: The Dial Press, 1984); Samuel Vaistrub, Medicine's Metaphors: Messages and Menaces (Oradell, N.J.: Medical Economics Company, 1977).

⁴ The patient's name in this story has been changed to provide anonymity to his family.

⁵ Willard Gaylin, "Modern Medicine and the Price of Success," Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons, 68(1983), 4.

⁶ Lawrence K. Altman, "After Barney Clark: Reflections of a Reporter on Unresolved Issues," in After Barney Clark: Reflections on the Utah Artificial Heart Program, ed. Margery W. Shaw (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), p. 119.

⁷ Fisher, 12.

⁸ Eric J. Cassell, Talking with Patients, Vol. 1: The Theory of Doctor-Patient Communication (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), p. 8.

⁹ Eric J. Cassell, Talking with Patients, Vol. 2: Clinical Technique (Cambridge: The MIT Press), p. 15.

¹⁰ Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p. xix.

¹¹ Fisher, 13.

¹² Fisher, 8.

¹³ Fisher, 12.

¹⁴ Cf. Altman; Maryann Haggerty and Charles D. Bankhead, "Medicine and the Media," Medical World News-Psychiatry Edition, (June 1984), 28-38.

¹⁵ Walter R. Fisher, "The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration," Communication Monographs, in press.

16 Norman G. Levinsky, "The Doctor's Master," New England Journal of Medicine, 311(1984), 1573-1575.

17 Fisher, "The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration."

18 David Hilfiker, "Making Medical Mistakes: How Doctors Harm Patients--and Themselves," Harper's, 268(May 1984), 59-65. Hilfiker published an earlier and very similar version of this article (entitled "Facing Our Mistakes") in the January edition of the New England Journal of Medicine, 310(1984), 116-122.

19 For a critique of the medical profession based on the phenomenon of iatrogenic disease, see Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (New York: Random House, 1976).

20 Hilfiker, 59.

21 Hilfiker, 59.

22 Hilfiker, 60.

23 The letter was sent in response to a news release published by The School of Speech, Northwestern University, announcing my grant from The W.K. Kellogg Foundation.

24 Hilfiker, 60.

25 Hilfiker, 62.

26 Hilfiker, 62.

27 Hilfiker, 65.

28 Hilfiker, 65.

29 Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," 2, 14.

30 See Robert J. Bledson and Drew E. Altman, "Public Attitudes about Health-Care Costs: A Lesson in National Schizophrenia," New England Journal of Medicine, 311(1984), 613-616.

RHETORIC AND SEMIOTIC IN SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT: THE FUNCTION OF PRESUMPTION IN CHARLES DARWIN'S ORIGIN OF SPECIES ESSAYS

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Everyone, these days, would agree on the importance of the enthymeme; but not everyone would agree on just what an enthymeme is.¹ Likewise, within the study of argument, the problem of presumption is deceptively simple: to what, specifically, does "presumption" refer? Some have said "presumption" is: "such a pre-occupation of the ground, as implies that it must stand good until some sufficient reason is adduced against it." Or, some have said, "presumption" is: "a posture toward change that embodies a person's or a field's attitude toward a procedure of proof." Or again, that: "presumption is that tension between the premature denial of new knowledge, falsely retaining old knowledge, on the one hand (the 'conservative presumption'), and the premature acceptance of new knowledge, falsely denying old knowledge on the other (the 'liberal presumption')." But all three of these definitions differ from one which says "presumption" is: one of the twelve "modal qualifiers" ("certainly," "presumably," "for all that we can tell," etc.) any argument may have, indicating the kind of rational strength to be attributed to a "claim" on the basis of its relationship to "grounds," "warrant," and "backing."² What is presumption?

Others, by-passing the labor of definition altogether, have simply situated presumption in a "location," such as: in a probability, in a tension with "burden of proof," within a belief, attached to a belief, in an object of agreement almost identical to fact, in "the normal or the likely," in a belief which is its own evidence, or in the property of the accused by the cliché "he/she who asserts must prove." There are still others, moreover, for whom the essential character of presumption is situated in a logical construct, an audience-conferred advantage, a conclusion drawn until the contrary is proven, or, in three places at once--in an "objective" pre-occupation of the ground, in a circumstantial inference, and in the "realistic" interpretation of an audience.³ Where is presumption?

Such multiplicity of meanings in all the presumption-talk is probably its most intriguing feature. For it is even common for "some" people to have multiple senses of presumption within a single work. In Willard's work there is presumption₁ (the psychological sense), and presumption₂ (the sociological sense), while by presumption (sans subscripts) he says he shall mean both. Goodnight borrows Whately's first formulation of presumption to use as his "conservative presumption," then posits the "liberal presumption" as its mirror opposite (both senses

being sociological). Finally, as Gronbeck has pointed out long ago, even Whately had three versions of presumption--one as a logical constant, one as a psychological construct, and the third a matter of inference.⁴ Unfortunately, there are "others" as well, I have in mind Stephen Toulmin and Richard Crable, who have multiple senses of presumption, apparently without recognizing it themselves.⁵ So things are at least conceptually diverse in a number of ways, and maybe even mysterious. Yet, not to despair, a word that is very easy to define is a word we can well get along without.

Actually, we can make sense out of the situation by knowing that what "presumption" is for anybody depends on where they are studying arguments. No single stasis exists among the conversationalists to the presumption-talk, so that it cannot be argued once and for all: "Resolved, presumption is _____." "No, it is not _____." Positions taken on presumption ought to be advanced as pertinent to a context for argument--ethics, philosophy, the law, science, the public, or everyday discourse--and understood as such. That they are not always so advanced goes without saying.

Arguably, the sense of presumptive ground will vary according to the particular issues in various contexts, and if we but recognize it, the situation will make possible future studies in comparative, applied presumption. I can explain the first half of the previous sentence by saying that what is true of rhetoric in general is a fortiori true of a rhetorical concept--presumption, and rhetoric "appears as an overreaching, or architectonic method whose specific form depends upon the context in which it is used and on the subject matter to which it is applied."⁶ But then comes "the other shoe" to the meaning in the second half of the sentence. Here, what is true of signs in general may be true of the signs "rhetoric" and "presumption" in particular. That is to say, "Every sign arising out of a particular occasion will lose that particular reference in proportion as we find it can be used on other occasions, and so all words will at last in their individual capacity become general."⁷ At any rate, presently, there are various species of presumption, suited to their own ecological niches. So all things considered, there seems a virtue in not pretending to have a "science" of presumption yet, that does not pretend to be the last word on the term. Rather, the virtue is in tolerating the ambiguity so that the word can stretch across great regions of study, or contexts of knowledge. For what is true of the inherent ambiguity of language itself may be a fortiori true of a word: "Meanings are stable--just stable enough to make inference possible, not so stable as to make it unnecessary. Given nature's size, language otherwise could not reach around it."⁸

Why consider one meaning of presumption over another? Or why consider one theoretical way over another way? What I wish to be inferred from the discussion so far is, that any way into

presumption must lead us in a hapless direction which theorizes in this matter without inquiring: a) what actual phenomenon are to be explained, and b) to what arena of argumentation the phenomenon is pertinent. And if there be a fitting way into presumption, it must be one that takes the inquiring direction indicated and furthermore, is fundamentally based upon a viable theory of language. I have labored in this different direction. And in what I desire to lay before the reader is the hope that I may have a beginning which eventually will end in establishing the rhetoric of science on a soundly useful basis.⁹

The word "presumption" has not hitherto been recognized as a technical term of rhetoric and semiotic at once (this pair of roots has been neglected), and in proposing it as such I do so with a new conception to express (that of the presumptive inference as an abduction), so as to fit it for the rhetoric of science. Since no previous theories of presumption were ever designed to apply to the rhetoric of science; and since no previous rhetorician of science has ever sought or developed a theory of presumption; therefore, for these and other reasons I arrived at the decision to use the word "presumption" to denote the "abduction" of a scientific argument. Adapting Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of language and argument, I define "presumption" in the sense of "abductive inference" as follows: Presumption, in rhetorical argument, the hypothesis that some very curious circumstance is a case of a certain general rule; amounting to all but proof, or, it may be all but baseless.¹⁰ Applying this definition to Darwin's actual arguments in the essays he wrote preceding the first publication of his "revolutionary" Origin of Species, we learn several things. First, we see the significance of presumption specifically and rhetorical argument generally to Darwin's discovery of the path-breaking theory in science. So, a fortiori, I am suggesting that rhetoric makes an essential contribution to the acquisition of knowledge in a science (though, by no means is rhetoric the "whole story" any more than it is something "merely pejorative"). Secondly, applying this definition to the origin of species discovery can result in students of argument learning more about presumption as abduction from the very insightful way in which Darwin used it.

To conclude the prolegomenon to the present essay, it is good to keep in mind our purpose. Let us say that presumption is such an important concept to study because conceptual attention and procedural assumptions about argument affect the possibility of change, resistance to change, and the possibility of understanding different positions between speakers and audiences. So, our purpose is to study presumptions because presumptions affect how arguers interpret and investigate the rhetorical conditions for the possibility of thinking "otherwise" than an audience already believes. To accomplish our declared purpose, Peirce is peerless. To start with his adumbrations on abduction is to give a "significance" to presumption that no other system can share.

In this essay, my primary goal is to defend the possibility of examining scientific argument using presumption as abduction as the key concept for analysis and criticism. The documents to be examined are the extant essays of Charles Darwin in which he made known, to himself, the arguments in biological thought that soon would be made known to others, beginning in 1959 with the first publication of the Origin of Species. In analyzing Darwin's discovery, however, I will not be simply a contemporary voice for the Peirce fragments on abduction. But in a second sense I will also be speaking for Peirce, filling out the skeletal references to Darwin's logic which were begun by Peirce, were never found, and perhaps were never finished.

Peirce and Darwin were both scholars of the same century, read many of the same philosophical books, and Peirce's first reaction to Darwin's famous text is even recorded. His initial response was to say that "Mill's doctrine was nothing but a metaphysical point of view to which Darwin's, which was nourished by positive observation, must be deadly."¹¹ A scant few other reactions to Darwin's work occur in Peirce's writings, such as one in which Peirce compares the role of abduction in logic to the role which reproduction plays in Darwin's original theory (to produce variations).¹² Then there is the passage in which the American praises the Englishman for his hypothesis which is, "argued with a wealth of knowledge, a strength of logic, a charm of rhetoric, and above all with a certain magnetic genuineness that was almost irresistible."¹³

But the most mysterious passage of all is set up in this way. In a fascinating chapter on "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce makes the bold claim that "every work of science great enough to be well remembered for a few generations affords some exemplification of the defective state of the art of reasoning of the time when it was written; and each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic."¹⁴ What follows this introduction is a unique paragraph on Darwin, describing the Darwinian controversy as a lesson in logic. After the second sentence of the paragraph, Peirce closes the subject with a footnote about Darwin's work: "What he did, a most instructive illustration of the logic of science, will be described in another chapter [where?]; and we now know what was authoritatively denied when I first suggested it, that he took a hint from Malthus' book on Population."¹⁵ The fragment of "what Darwin did", which I have proposed to study under the rubric of presumption as abduction, is apparently lost to this world. So it remains for someone to act as Peirce's voice--to give a concrete, practical application of the use of abduction, and an application to a text which Peirce himself said he found genuine, charming, strong in logic, and wealthy in knowledge.

A commonplace in homiletics is to cite the text under scrutiny, so as to delimit the passages considered and review their

content, before beginning an exegesis. I intend to follow a similar procedure here by delimiting the works of Darwin on which the analysis will be focused and reviewing the contents of the scientist's hypothesis for its central claim and premisses. Then I will develop the concept of presumption as abduction with its several implications, show how an understanding of abduction can illuminate certain problems in the "Darwin Industry" of scholarship, and apply the method of abduction to "The First Pencil Sketch of 1842" and the "Essay of 1844" in which Darwin developed the theory of the origin of species.

Almost every story narrates the creation of The Origin of Species as the culmination of a process of enlargement and improvement that began approximately in 1837 after Darwin's return from a five-year, worldwide voyage aboard the H.M.S. Beagle.¹⁶ Invited aboard perhaps primarily for his gentlemanly spirit (for his status as naturalist was not yet confirmed),¹⁷ Darwin spent most of his free time collecting geological, zoological, and botanical specimens in South America. After returning to England, in 1837 Darwin began what might be considered the first of his four pocket notebooks on "the species problem" which he would compile from 1837-1839 based on what he had collected and observed in South America. Speaking of the opening of the first notebook in his autobiography, Darwin wrote: "In July [1837] I opened my first notebook for facts in relation to the Origin of Species, about which I had long reflected, and never ceased working on for the next twenty years."¹⁸

Though perhaps the natural selection hypothesis was conceived in some sense of "form" by 1839 or so, Darwin's worldwide correspondence with a network of scientists in the 1830's, 1840's, and 1850's reveals the frame of mind of an arguer searching to understand what he ought to believe about the origin of species.¹⁹ In 1842, the theorist penciled a thirty-five page sketch of an essay from the notes he had written in a hurried, fragmented style and kept in personal notebooks on "the species problem." Struck down by illness, probably from a tropical disease acquired during the Beagle voyage and certainly a disease that debilitated him for the rest of his life, the author did not improve his first pencil sketch of the species theory until the writing of his 230-page "Essay of 1844."²⁰ Of these two preliminary essays to the 1859 Origin, the late Sir Gavin de Beer, one of the foremost Darwin scholars, once said, "They provide invaluable information on the way in which Darwin was led to his conclusions."²¹

Although the exact date of Darwin's process of discovery is unknown, but arguably falls somewhere between 1837 and 1845, the fixing of an exact date is of less importance than that the two essays were a part of his developing thought on "the species problem." Since the problem of examining the complete develop-

ment of Darwin's theory of species would include a period from 1837-1859, a partial study focusing on the role of the essays of 1842 and 1844 during the crucial period in the development of his thought has the advantage of testing out the method of approach I advocate before it is applied to such controversial aspects of his discovery as the extant fragments. I consider Darwin's unpublished essays on the origin of species hypothesis to be rough drafts which were "struggling for existence," and which can help investigators appreciate how a famous scientific arguer discovered a now generally accepted hypothesis.

Now that the "text" under scrutiny has been delimited to the essays, a second promise to review the contents of the origin of species theory needs to be fulfilled. This is an important matter since, as Morse Peckham observes, "Darwin complained often enough that few really understood the theory of Natural Selection, and were he to examine various cultural histories and even certain respected histories of science published since his death, he would still complain. . . ."22 Every worthwhile hypothesis is in response to some crucial problem. For Charles Darwin this problem was "the species problem" and might be stated as follows: How, and in what way, do species and varieties differ from each other? Although his solution, the species hypothesis, was constructed over time from a complex nexus of experimentation, observation, and reasoning, it may be summarized by emphasizing three key notions. First, it became evident through observing surprising facts, that variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature could only be explained on the supposition that species gradually become modified. Second, once one supposes that the fact of variation of species has occurred, then some cause must be discovered which explains how species are slowly modified. Darwin perceived that selection was the keystone of human success in making useful varieties of animals and plants, thought that selection might also be the key to modifications in a state of nature, but was not sure how this applied. Thirdly, after reading "Malthus on Population", the thought occurred to Darwin that, under the circumstances of the struggle for existence, favorable variations would tend to be preserved and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. If the struggle for life which checks the number of progeny that live were supposed, the formation of new species would be the result.

Stephen Toulmin wrote in The Uses of Argument that, "to make a new or better argument in any field is to make an advance in the substance of the field itself."23 There can be no question that Charles Darwin's argument for the modification of species changed the substance of not just one field, but several--natural history, geology, zoology, botany, and maybe even philosophy.24 He did so by arguing for a hypothesis which went through all the degrees of confidence from "baseless"--according to himself as well as others--to "generally admitted" in the 1870's despite the fact that the genetic processes his causal

argument presumed were not even proven to exist until 1930 and after.25 Anyone who studies the works of Darwin will find every evidence of an arguer attempting to argue, to himself and others, what the most reasonable hypothesis might be to believe. My hypothesis to explain how he argues is that he did so primarily by using presumption in the sense of abduction--and in such an insightful way that even Peirce could not have foreseen.

What the significance of Darwin's argument was, where it originated, and what structure of inference became the outstanding feature of its architecture, are questions which have not been satisfactorily answered either by the Darwin Industry of scholarship or by the misconceptions implicit in the prevailing theories regarding the logic of discovery. Ever since the late nineteenth century, it has been generally believed that, of his predecessors, Darwin alone understood the "significance" of evolution. Yet what problems do scholars pursue, what questions do they ask, to arrive at an appreciation of such "significance?" Scholars studying Darwin ask, for example: Why did he delay publication of The Origin? Why did he study barnacles so long? When did the reading of Malthus' doctrine affect his theory? Why was it Charles Darwin, rather than Alfred Wallace, who is credited with "the discovery?"26

Even if these questions were answered adequately, and many of them often are, it would still be necessary to explain what method of argument figured in the development of his conclusions. With but one exception, which I will discuss, the study of argument does not occupy a central place in the Darwin Industry, and whether the following is a reason for that, or just part of the disappointment of it, also clear is the fact that "rhetoric" has been given no place of any substance within the Darwin Industry.27 As long as "rhetoric" is thought of in only the narrowest meanings--as mere persuasion, as pretty language, as figures of speech, as something "extra-scientific," as seduction (which is the case in the Industry), then "rhetorical argument" will suffer a similar fate. And by implication, "rhetorical argument" will have no place in a study of the "significance" of Darwin's discovery. Reflecting years later upon his own discovery, Darwin wrote: ". . . my success as a man of science, whatever this may amount to, has been determined as far as I can judge, by complex and diversified mental qualities and conditions. Of these, the most important have been-- the love of science--unbounded patience in long reflecting over any subject--industry in observing and collecting facts--and a fair share of invention as well as of common sense."28 Just what can be said of his "fair share of invention" can be derived in part by a study of the role of presumption as abduction in his logic of discovery and by the existing evidence of its use. I suggest that concentrating on Darwin's discovery of his species theory as a vivid instance of the use of presumption as abduction leads to several conclusions quite different from those now generally held regarding Darwin and his hypothesis.

Where the study of argument might conceivably be said to have gained some attention among those in the Industry, it has done so in what might be referred to as "the hypothetico-deductive model" controversy. Here, the question has been: Did Darwin's arguments regarding natural selection fit the logical empiricist hypothetico-deductive model?²⁹ Since the hypothetico-deductive model is directly derived from the logic of deduction, and whereas many of the disputants to the controversy who answer "no" to the question supply induction as the chosen model, the controversy might more appropriately be said to revolve about the question: What structure of inference best captures the method of argument by which Darwin was led to his discovery? The available answers we have to choose from would then include deduction, induction, abduction, and, of course, seduction.

One reason which might account for the ability of the hypothetico-deductive model to compel attention in the Darwin industry as the "approved" model of the argument is due to the larger influence historians and philosophers of science have had with the hypothetico-deductive method in the logic of scientific argument. Here, Popper, Reichenbach, and Braithwaite have long been imposing figures. Because of their influence, Norwood Hanson reports, the "approved" answer to the question, "Is there a logic of scientific discovery?" is "No." Hanson writes:

Thus Popper argues: "The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it." Again, "There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of the process." Reichenbach writes that philosophy of science "cannot be concerned with [reasons for suggesting hypotheses], but only with [reasons for accepting hypotheses]." Braithwaite elaborates: "The solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here."³⁰

On this view, the discovery of the hypothesis can only be explained by individual psychology, unusual sociological circumstances, or by a disciplinary explanation from psychology or sociology. Nonetheless, despite Popper's, Reichenbach's and Braithwaite's intention that the hypothetico-deductive model be used for analyzing the arguments supporting already invented hypotheses, in the hands of the hypothetico-deductive theorists in the history and philosophy of science, the model is put to use as an analysis of the structure of inference in discovery.

If such propositions as Popper et al. advance and as are used by hypothetico-deductive theorists in the Darwin industry are to be accepted, then my theory must be abandoned. However,

if the hypothetico-deductive theorists were to use the model of Popper et al. for the purpose it is appropriate--for the analysis of arguments supporting already invented hypotheses--then there would be no quarrel. My objection is that using the hypothetico-deductive method to explain the logic of discovery in Darwin's arguments is an ad hoc way of bringing deduction to bear on a question that deduction cannot answer. Popper et al. are right: the hypothetico-deductive structure of inference is a model which illuminates the testing of an argument, not the reasons which led an arguer to produce the hypothesis in the first place. But Popper et al. are incorrect to further claim as a result that there can be no logic of discovery. Advised by Peirce, what Holmquest advocates is that deduction and induction both are useful for examining how Darwin tested his hypothesis, but that the logic of presumption as abduction (which presupposes rhetoric and semiotic) is most useful for analyzing and criticizing how Darwin arrived at his hypothesis in a reasonable way. The evidence from his essays and notebooks suggests that he used abduction to reason toward the possibility of the hypothesis, while he used deduction and induction to test its probability.³¹

On the view of "rhetoric" implied by the controversies in the Darwin industry, one might expect a study of how Charles Darwin seduced the creationists by persuasion, of how charming was the domestic breeder analogy he used, how the points in *The Origin* were arranged, or how the scientist decided to communicate his theory once he had its substance.³² Yet, only an appreciation for the artistic sense of "rhetoric" can give it a place greater than something "extra-scientific" in this literature. So, departing from the definition of "rhetoric" as "persuasion" or "figures of speech," we arrive at the following definition. Of all the available definitions of "rhetoric," this one stands out as most appropriate in a study of the logic of discovery in the the context of scientific argument.

According to Michael Hyde and Craig Smith, "rhetoric" is: "not primarily a theory of forms, speeches, and persuasion; rather, it is the 'practical mastery' that people have for making known to others that which is understood."³³ In other words, they mean, "Rhetoric is the process of making-known meaning both to oneself and others through the interpretive understanding of reality."³⁴ To the extent that the latter is an accurate restatement of their definition, I endorse it with an amendment. For I hope to improve upon its presuppositions by pointing out other presuppositions which the definition should presuppose. With the substitution I have in mind, the resulting definition would read: Rhetoric is the process of making-known something as something for somebody through the interpretive understanding of reality. Why has such a move been suggested? Because Hyde and Smith's definition lacks a

recognition of the role of signs as mediators when something is made known as something for somebody. Despite the ineluctance, I make this suggestion in order to define a special province for rhetoric and semiotic to explain how change occurs in the linguistic possibilities of a scientific practice.

Together with the suggested definition, I would also assert that the function of rhetoric is to provide advice in the formation of ideas in a context.³⁵ In addition, rhetoric as a process with a primary function has two ends: (the interpretive understanding of reality) for oneself is the first end, invention; and (the interpretive understanding of reality) for others is the second end, judgment. Now that a perspective on "rhetoric" has been established for the arena to be studied, it is time to connect that perspective to an analysis of presumption in scientific argument.

It is impossible within the limits of a study to develop the complete philosophy of the structure of inference I wish to emphasize--presumption as abduction. Instead, a series of already carefully investigated postulates, which at least can be checked against the evidence, is advanced. According to this manuscript, "presumption" in scientific argument shall mean: In rhetorical argument, the hypothesis that some very curious circumstance is a case of a certain general rule; amounting to all but proof, or, it may be all but baseless. To summarize, consider the concept in Peirce's own words:

Presumption, or, more precisely, abduction (which the present writer believes to have been what Aristotle's twenty fifth chapter of the second Prior Analytics imperfectly described under the name (Greek) ἀναγωγή, until Apellicon substituted a single wrong word and thus disturbed the sense of the whole), furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies. Upon finding himself confronted with a phenomenon unlike what he would have expected under the circumstances, he looks over its features and notices some remarkable character or relation among them, which he at once recognizes as being characteristic of some conception with which his mind is already stored, so that a theory is suggested which would explain (that is, render necessary) that which is surprising in the phenomena.³⁶

In addition to this summation, two other comments from Peirce are particularly telling. First, he says, "Presumption is the only kind of reasoning which supplies new ideas, the only kind which is, in this sense, synthetic."³⁷ Next, and more boldly, he writes, "All the ideas of science come to it by way of Abduction. Abduction consists in studying facts and

devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that if we argue ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way."³⁸

Take the purpose of presumption as abduction to be to start inquiry: to start with facts, and proceed to initiate an account for the facts, which will lead to the end of the surprise, and the beginning of an expectation by which one will not be disappointed for a time.³⁹ As Peirce said, the purpose of the process of explanation is to show that the hypothesis might have been expected, had the facts been fully known.⁴⁰ Then given the purpose of the inference, abduction takes a special form.

To understand abduction as a form of non-necessary reasoning, one must become familiar with "the case" as the unknown which is inferred, and "the hypothesis" which brings this about. Consulting Peirce, we learn:

Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.

Thus A cannot be abductively inferred, or if you prefer the expression, cannot be abductively conjectured until its entire content is already present in the premiss, "If A were true, C would be a matter of course."⁴¹

The form of an abductive inference consists of three premisses. A surprising fact(s), C, is observed, and begs for explanation. Next, a hypothesis, A, is proposed that would account for the surprising fact(s), if it were true. Finally, an arguer supposes that there is reason to suspect that the hypothesis proposed is true. Peirce believed that we commonly say the hypothesis is adopted "for the sake of explanation."⁴² Yet a frequent misconception that occurs is to take Peirce to mean that the hypothesis explains only the surprising fact, when actually it explains more. When we understand what Peirce meant when he said, "every abductive inference is thought, at the time of drawing it, as one of a possible class of inferences," then we understand the hypothesis A in abduction is inferred as a single conclusion, yes, but yet as "a case."⁴³

One of the indispensable elements of the form of abduction to grasp is "the case" as a particular which allows general-

ities to be inferred. According to our understanding, once one argues, "Presumably, hypothesis A," that arguer means hypothesis A explains the surprising circumstance, C; but he/she also speaks as if A were a fortiori true of a phenomenon of which C is potentially only a part. The inference of "the case" must be construed in this broad way because Peirce was of the opinion that scientific reasoning is always about a phenomenon not an isolated fact. For time and again, in various ways, he says: "An isolated fact is precisely what a demand for an explanation never refers to; it always applies to some fact connected to other facts which seem to render it improbable."⁴⁴ Abduction starts with an event, a circumstance, a result, a fact. But it uses the present result to make an argument about an absent, but future phenomenon. For a pragmatist, a phenomenon refers to facts at our fingertips and facts that are conceivable and possible in the future. Since a phenomenon does not refer to any single event in the past, abduction can hardly be an inference about a single, particular instance.

Notice, too, how Peirce's definition of a hypothesis is compatible with the action of "the case" I have described. Here Peirce affirms how the entertaining of a hypothesis creates the movement of thought that alone leads to genuinely new knowledge:

Any proposition added to observed facts, tending to make them applicable in any way to other circumstances than those under which they were observed, may be called a hypothesis. . . . The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it, whether as a simple interrogation or with any degree of confidence, is an inferential step which I propose to call abduction.⁴⁵

With this last definition, therefore, we have now explicated the associations of all the key terms in the definition of presumption. Presumption: in rhetorical argument, the hypothesis that some very curious circumstance is a case of a certain general rule, amounting to all but proof, or it may be all but baseless.

Abduction also must be distinguished from deduction and induction to be understood, but that does not mean that abduction is incompatible with these logical inferences. Abduction having provided a thinker with a suggested theory, or at least a reasonable guess, he/she proceeds to the Second and Third Stages of Inquiry.⁴⁶ As a second stage in the reasoning, one may use deduction by deducing from the discovered theory a "promiscuous" variety of consequences to the effect that if we perform a certain act we shall find

ourselves confronted with certain experiences. Continuing with the reasoning process, induction occurs in the third stage of inquiry. Induction is an operation of experimentally testing a hypothesis which consists in remarking that if the hypothesis is rational, observations made under particular conditions ought to have particular results. Peirce was of the view that when a hypothesis has sustained a testing--by deduction, induction, or both--as severe as the present state of knowledge in the particular discipline under investigation will allow, the hypothesis will be admitted provisionally into the record of achievements, subject to reconsideration along with all the other achievements when the discipline is in a position to insist upon another grade of security.⁴⁷ Thus, inference of the presumptive, abductive kind includes those arguments in which (1) the facts asserted in the premisses do not compel the truth of the fact concluded but instead suggest its possibility, and (2) where the "significant" observations are actually additions to directly observed facts. Since the purpose is to start inquiry, and the probative strength is judged by application using other logics, any one abductive argument can register degrees of confidence ranging from a naive expression in the interrogative mood, to a fair guess, to a question meriting attention by others, up through the appraisal of plausibility, even to an uncontrollable inclination to believe.⁴⁸

Given the preceding analysis of abduction, I would extend four conclusions as postulates: (1) Since an abduction amounts to an addition to observed facts, characters cannot be counted as things but must be estimated according to their significance; (2) "Significance" specifically means substituting a general expression for particular characters (and generally means something is taken as a sign for something else); (3) Presumption as abduction replaces a "tangle of predicates" about facts with a general expression, thereby inviting a crucial role for language in discovery; (4) Language is not secondary to logic nor is language secondary to empirical observation--the language of rhetorical argument respects both logic and observation but does not admit either to be primary when accompanying it.⁴⁹

Arguably, the "highest powers" of reasoning are needed to conclude the "significance" of an event when an interpretation actually may not exist yet but rather may be in the future, as what would be "the case."⁵⁰ To evoke the non-existent which, for all we know may be, implies vision or insight. Concerning the form of abduction specifically, the conclusion of the argument which is inferred through the formation of an interpretation is something previously unknown--the minor premiss, or "the case." Reasoning by abduction, an arguer realizes the significance of something he/she did not so realize before, and sets forth a new way of paying attention that previously did not exist. Hence, the arguer communicates something as something for somebody--communi-

ates an interpretation to oneself and others. This is discovery, understood through rhetoric and semiotic.

The task of rhetoric, Peirce believed, is to offer advice for administering the conditions by which, even in a scientific intelligence, one sign creates another sign and especially one thought is created on the basis of another thought.⁵¹ Unfortunately, though, he did not deal with abduction insofar as it bears a particular relevancy to a specific endeavor. Obviously, then, the whole point of studying Charles Darwin as a "revolutionary" scientific thinker is to investigate whether signs and thoughts create other signs and thoughts in such a way that a doctrine of rhetoric and semiotic--focused on presumption as abduction--can be said to explain the scientist's argumentation as a process of rhetorical change. My argument is that nothing but abduction would so much contribute to an understanding of "rhetoric" as it functions in the production of knowledge by "the logic of discovery," and provide an explanation of the "significance" of Darwin's arguments.

If Darwin started reasoning with a hypothesis not a fact, as the hypothetico-deductive theorists are wont to believe, it was a very old hypothesis not a new one for when he went to South America Darwin was a creationist. In 1834 at Valparaiso he wrote: "I have already found beds of recent shells yet retaining their colour at an elevation of 1300 feet, and beneath, the level country is strewn with them. It seems not a very improbable conjecture that the want of animals may be owing to none having been created since this country was raised from the sea."⁵² And yet, slowly Darwin began to collect too many facts which were unexpected on the creationist view. A useful summary of the facts which surprised him to think otherwise are contained in his autobiography, but appeared before that in the "Essay of 1844":

During the voyage of the Beagle I had been deeply impressed by discovering in the Pampean formation great fossil animals covered with armour like that on the existing armadillos; secondly by the manner in which closely allied animals replace one another in proceeding southwards over the Continent; and thirdly, by the South American character of most of the productions of the Galapagos archipelago, and more especially by the manner in which they differ slightly on each island of the group; none of the islands appearing to be very ancient in a geological sense.⁵³

These are the facts he was struck with, but what form did he use to hypothesize about them? He continues:

It was evident that such facts as these, as well as many others, could only be explained on the supposition that species gradually become modified; and the subject haunted me. But it was equally evident that neither the action of the surrounding conditions, nor the will of the organisms (especially in the case of plants), could account for the innumerable cases in which organisms of every kind are beautifully adapted to their habits of life. . . .⁵⁴

If Darwin went aboard the Beagle as a creationist, even a budding Cambridge clergyman, how did he arrive at the directly opposite conclusion?

Evidence indicates that he did so by proposing a new hypothesis upon being confronted with the observation of surprising facts (and armed with an available hypothesis that did not explain the surprise). Consider this:

To be brief, I assume that species arise like our domestic varieties with much extinction; and then test this hypothesis by comparison with as many general and pretty well-established propositions as I can find made out,--in geographical distribution, geological history, affinities, etc. And it seems to me that, supposing that such hypothesis were to explain such general propositions, we ought, in accordance with the common way of following all sciences, to admit it till some better hypothesis be found out. . . . I do not much underrate the many huge difficulties on this view, but yet it seems to me to explain too much, otherwise inexplicable, to be false.⁵⁵

Through the surprise of facts followed by the positioning of a new hypothesis to explain the surprise, thereby belief was disturbed, doubt was created, and Darwin was led to consider a new belief in regard to species: "These facts [species of a larger genera in each country would often present more varieties than the species of a smaller genera] are of plain signification on the view that species are only strongly-marked and permanent varieties."⁵⁶ Consider also that the same abductive pattern seems to appear whether his aim is to explain a small set of surprising facts or to explain a whole class of facts as "the case." First notice the former from the essay of 1842: "Now this wonderful fact of hand, hoof, wing, paddle and claw being the same, is at once explicable on the principle of some parent-forms. . . becoming through infinite number of small selections adapted to various conditions."⁵⁷ While in the "Essay of 1844" he expects the hypothesis to ex-

plain an entire class of facts:

It is evident that when in each species of a group its organs consist of some other part metamorphosed, that there must also be a "unity of type" in such a group. And in the cases as that above given in which the foot, hand, wing, and paddle are said to be constructed on a uniform type, if we could perceive in such parts or organs traces of an apparent change from some other use or function, we should strictly include such parts or organs in the department of morphology. . . .⁵⁸

Numerous diverse examples could be adduced to show that Darwin reasoned to his hypothesis by the method of abduction: "All of what you kindly say about my species work," he wrote to Joseph Hooker, "does not alter one iota my long self-acknowledged presumption in accumulating facts and speculating on the subject of variation, without having worked out my due share of species."⁵⁹

Without having demonstrated for the audience my due share of examples of abduction, the probability of my hypothesis cannot be said to be established. Throughout this essay, however, my concern has been to establish a possibility--the possibility of having a theoretical reason for entering a scientific controversy, for entering one particular Darwinian controversy, and the possibility of applying presumption as abduction to scientific arguments. So I will conclude this essay by offering what can be gained by such a study as I advocate if my theory be true. To borrow Darwin's line, "it seems to explain too much, otherwise inexplicable, to be false."⁶⁰

What we gain if presumption as abduction be applied as a tool of criticism to the essays of 1842 and 1844 is an appreciation for the insightful way in which Darwin reasoned that the creationist explanation must be superseded. The basic pattern of abductive inference he used many times: a surprising fact, C, occurs; if A were true, C would be a matter of course; suppose A is true. By 1842 and 1844 though, Darwin had complicated this pattern in two important ways as he sought to discover the most reasonable position to take on "the species problem."

In the first place, he expressed an essential disagreement between he and the creationists about what represented "a surprising fact" in nature (an anomaly). Facts which received no explanation, or else a miraculous one, were surprising to Darwin and became expected on his view of species. Likewise, facts which were seen as surprising to the creationists were considered common happenings in nature on the

interpretation of Darwin's theory. And he explicitly pointed out this tension between the views about what counts as a surprising fact. In a sense, then, Charles Darwin provided the stimulus of interpreting something as a surprise for somebody who did not "see" that, implied that since there was a surprise then a causal explanation was needed, and finally solved a problem others were content to forever relegate to the unknown.

Consider the following passages where Darwin starts by arguing that what appears wonderful--the fact of extinction--is to be expected:

The extinction of the larger quadrupeds. . . has been thought little less wonderful than the appearance of new species; and has, I think, chiefly led to the belief of universal catastrophes. . . . If the rule is that organisms become extinct by becoming rarer and rarer, we ought not to view their extinction, even in the case of the larger quadrupeds, as anything wonderful and out of the common course of events. For no naturalist thinks it wonderful that one species of a genus should be rare and another abundant, notwithstanding he be quite incapable of explaining the causes of the comparative rareness. . . . No doubt there are in each case good causes: but they are unknown and unperceived by us. May we not then safely infer that as certain causes are acting unperceived around us, and are making one species to be common and another exceedingly rare, that they might equally well cause the final extinction of some species without being perceived by us?⁶¹

Contrast the above with Darwin's view about what ought to be considered "wonderful" instead: "In a future part of this work [Essay of 1844] we shall show that, as a general rule, groups of allied species gradually appear and disappear, one after the other, on the fact of the earth, like the individuals of the same species: and we shall then endeavor to show the probable cause of this remarkable fact."⁶² Time after time, Darwin argued that what creationists marvelled at were common events in nature; for unlike them, he invented causes in nature to explain anything he marvelled at, implying any scientist should do the same.

In the process of trying to conclude for himself the possibility of the introduction of fresh species being a natural in opposition to a miraculous or perhaps unknown event, Darwin also suggested that the causal argument for transmutation of species used observation and reasoning to actually explain nature whereas the creationist account amounted to sometimes restating a fact, sometimes begging the question, and even sometimes invoking an "empty metaphor"

where "plain signification" was needed.⁶³ For instance, he says;

Now these several facts, though connected together, must by the creationist (though the geologist may explain some of the anomalies) be considered as so many ultimate facts. But it is absolutely opposed to every analogy, drawn from the laws imposed by the Creator on inorganic matter, that facts, when connected, should be considered as ultimate and not the direct consequences of more general laws.⁶⁴

Also, he says, "I repeat, these wondrous facts, of parts created for no use in past and present time, all can by my theory receive simple explanation; or they receive none and we must be content with some empty metaphor, as that of de Candolle, who compares creation to a well-covered table, and says abortive organs may be compared to the dishes (some should be empty) placed symmetrically."⁶⁵ So Darwin was an arguer who supplied both the interpretation for what represented a surprising fact, and the interpretation for what causal hypothesis represented the explanation. Thus, if any opponent objected to the first premiss of abduction (a surprising fact, C, is observed and begs for explanation), he had already made the acceptance of it part of his discovery.

As part of the argument for the natural selection of species, he focused on the representation of surprises in nature in order to argue that the cause he foresaw was at least possible. So, in the first place, Darwin's leap of abductive inference was so bold because arguing for the possibility implied that he preferred to reason on the basis of unknown causes than either to rest in the belief of the creationists of "creation" as "a process he [the zoologist] knows not what,"⁶⁶ or to say with Whewell that "the beginnings of all things surpass the comprehension of man."⁶⁷

In the second place, I think Darwin used abduction insightfully because he showed that something is unknown more than it is known (implying present belief should be disturbed, not left at rest). Considering the second premiss of abduction (if hypothesis A were the case, surprising fact C would be explained), he proposed a causal hypothesis as a suggestion but at the same time proposed that a path to greater knowledge was unobtainable without this bold hypothesis. His intention was to enliven people to the possibility that organisms vary; the possibility that variation is unlimited; and hence, possibly, species modify and are not independently created.

The way he accomplished such a feat was in large part through an a fortiori argument from the known practice of

domestic breeding to produce variation in agriculture and horticulture. The distinguishing feature of the domestic breeder argument is the a fortiori nature, not the superficial analogical character of it, and a focus on presumption as abduction leads us to this appreciation. Arguably, where Darwin distinguished himself from all previous theorists of evolution rests in the power of the a fortiori argument of domestic breeding.

In a nutshell, here is the argument from domestic breeding:

It is wonderful what the principle of Selection by Man, that is the picking out of individuals with any desired quality, and breeding from them, and again picking out, can do. Even breeders have been astonished at their own results. They can act on differences inappreciable to an uneducated eye. Selection has been methodically followed in Europe for only the last half century. But it has been occasionally, and even in some degree methodically, been followed in the most ancient times. There must have been also a kind of unconscious selection from the most ancient times, namely, in the preservation of the individual animals. . . most useful to each race of man in his particular circumstances. . . . I am convinced that intentional and occasional selection has been the main agent in making our domestic races. Now suppose there was a being, who did not judge by mere external appearance, but could study the whole internal organisation--who never was capricious--who should go on selecting for one end during millions of generations, who will say what he might not effect.⁶⁸

What Darwin did was to set up an a fortiori argument through the known practice of domestic breeding to show the possibility of variation. If visible, external variations are created by "intentional selection," he argued, all the more might "unconscious selection" produce slight variations, unperceived by us, in the state of nature. He writes: "This kind of insensible selection. . . we may feel nearly sure, from what we see has been done by the more direct method of separate selection within the last fifty years in England, would in the course of some 1,000 years produce a marked effect."⁶⁹ Furthermore, "If man were during 10,000 years to be able to select, far more diverse animals from horse or cow, I should expect there would be far less differences in the very young and foetal state."⁷⁰

On the basis of the essays of 1842 and 1844, one could conclude that the domestic breeder argument was used because:

(1)time was such an unknown variable to selection (we cannot perceive the intermediate steps between forms even in intentional selections); (2)if domestic effects can be selected in a short time, possibly natural effects have taken place during the long duration of life on earth; (3)if favorable conditions for variation under domestication have made efficient changes, then less favorable conditions in nature might produce slight variations and (4)knowledge of domestic breeding is greater than naturalists' knowledge of the definition and classification of natural species and varieties.

Due to these advantages, Darwin invoked the practice of domestic breeding as a "constant" for scientific research and the basis for an *fortiori* argument. By himself, invalid or not, he could not study experimentally everything he needed to know. So he hypothesized about nature from what he could show happened domestically. In effect, he was claiming more than he knew in order to know something new. What made his abduction unbelievable also allowed for foresight. When pressed by objections the only other reasons he could bring forth to show that the unknown is greater than the known and that unlimited variation is possible were: (1)variations are so slowly accumulated as to be unperceived, (2)"Nature doesn't make leaps," and (3)the imperfection of the geological record. And yet, with only a few exceptions says Ernst Mayr and others, modern biology has proven his foresight true.⁷¹ In a slightly different way, I think Peirce would have found Darwin's epistemological stance, especially about the unknown, to be proven true also. Peirce writes: "Notwithstanding all that has been discovered since Newton's time, his saying that we are little children picking up pretty pebbles on the beach while the ocean lies before us unexplored remains substantially as true as ever, and will do so though we shovel up the pebbles by steam shovels and carry them off in carloads."⁷² "presumably" means "for all we know; for all we know," "presumably."

The skillful use of knowledge of domestic breeding as an *fortiori* argument, the insightful handling of the representation of surprising facts, the act of beginning to reason with a surprise then making a leap into the unknown--these features cannot be explained on a hypothetico-deductive account of argument. Rather, they appear as "ultimate facts." But on the view of presumption as abduction these features of argument are connected to one another as well as to other facts, and are explicable. A complete demonstration of their possibility and probability may well provide the basis for a new interpretation of Darwin, presumption, and rhetoric in the future.

¹ Thomas Conley, "Some Significant Contributions to the History of Rhetoric: 1970-1982," *Rhetorica* (Spring 1983), p. 93.

² See Richard Whately, *The Elements of Rhetoric*, ed. Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963). Charles A. Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1983). G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Liberal and Conservative Presumptions: On Political Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument," in *Proceedings of the First Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Jack Rhodes and S. Newell (Annandale: Speech Communication Association, 1980). Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1958); and Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, *An Introduction to Reasoning* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979).

³ See Patrick Day, "Presumptions," *Proceedings of the International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. (Verlag Herder Wien, University Wien, 1970), pp. 137-143. Richard Whately, *The Elements of Rhetoric*, ed. Douglas Ehninger. Richard Crable, "Knowledge-as-Status: On Argument and Epistemology," *Communication Monographs* (December 1982), pp. 249-262. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1969), p. 73. Nicholas Rescher, *Methodological Pragmatism* (New York: New York University Press, 1977). Gary Cronkhite, "The Locus of Presumption," *Central States Speech Journal* (November 1966), pp. 270-276. Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision By Debate* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1963), pp. 83-83. J. Michael Sproule, "The Psychological Burden of Proof: On the Evolutionary Development of Richard Whately's Theory of Presumption," *Communication Monographs* (June 1976), pp. 115-129. Thomas Hynes, "Liberal and Conservative Presumptions in Public Argument: A Critique," in *Proceedings of the First Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Jack Rhodes and S. Newell (Annandale: Speech Communication Association, 1980). Bruce Gronbeck, *Archbishop Whately's Doctrine of Presumption and Burden of Proof: An Historical-Critical Analysis*, MA Thesis, University of Iowa, 1966.

⁴ Charles A. Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge*; G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Liberal and Conservative Presumptions: On Political Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument"; Bruce Gronbeck, MA Thesis, University of Iowa, 1966.

5 Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning; Richard Crable, "Knowledge-as-Status: On Argumentation and Epistemology."

6 Walter Carlton, "Theory Transformation in Communication: The Case of Henry Johnstone," Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975), p. 87.

7 Benjamin Smart, Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics (London: 1839), p. 187.

8 Dwight Bolinger, Aspects of Language, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), p. 205.

9 I have borrowed the syntax for this sentence from the conclusion of Benjamin Smart, Beginnings of a New School of Metaphysics.

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11 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 44.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 478.

13 Charles S. Peirce, "Evolutionary Love," The Monist, January, 1983, p. 279.

14 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmatism, p. 225.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 226, note 1.

16 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition, with an Introduction by Ernst Mayr (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). Edward Manier, The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle (Dordrecht Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1978). Dov Ospovat, The Development of Darwin's Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Gertrude Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967). Michael Ghiselin, The Triumph of the Darwinian Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). Charles Dar-

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17 Jacob W. Gruber, "Who Was the Beagle's Naturalist?" British Journal for the History of Science 4 (1969), pp. 266-282. See Harold Bursfyn, "If Darwin Wasn't the Beagle's Naturalist, Why Was He on Board?" British Journal for the History of Science 8 (1975), pp. 62-69, for the argument that Darwin was chosen as a gentlemanly companion.

18 Francis Darwin, ed. The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin Vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1887), p. 56.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 250-557.

20 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile, with an introduction by Ernst Mayr, p. ix. See S. Adler, "Darwin's Illness," Nature 184 (1959), pp. 1102-1103. Also, Michael Kelly, "Darwin Really Was Sick," Journal of Chronic Diseases 20 (1967), pp. 341-347.

21 Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, Evolution by Natural Selection, with a foreword by Sir Gavin de Beer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 2.

22 Morse Peckham, A Variorum Text, p. 9.

23 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 257.

24 See the introduction by Ernst Mayr in Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile. Michael Ghiselin, The Triumph of the Darwinian Method. Ghiselin makes the strong claim about philosophy in particular.

25 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans. by A. Wainhouse (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1971).

26 See Barry Gale, Evolution Without Evidence. Gale considers various proponents of the view that Darwin de-

layed publication of The Origin; then argues that rather than being delayed, the book was rushed into publication. For the view that the long study of barnacles did matter, see Morse Peckham, A Variorum Text. On the question of Malthus, consider for example, Sandra Herbert, "Darwin, Malthus, and Selection," Journal of the History of Biology 4 (1971), pp. 209-217. Controversy emerges about the credit for discovery in Barbara G. Beddall, "Wallace, Darwin, and the Theory of Natural Selection," Journal of the History of Biology 1 (1968), pp. 261-324. H. Lewis McKinney, Wallace and Natural Selection (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 131-146.

27 Manier speaks as if "rhetoric" is not substance but style only. He uses the words "language," "figures of speech," "effects," "flourish," and "trickery" interchangeably for the word "rhetoric." Edward Manier, The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle. Barry Gale, in Evolution Without Evidence, speaks of Darwin's Origin as being "more rhetorical than evidential" in nature. Neal Gillespie also clearly separates the process of rhetoric from the substance of Darwin's argument in Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). The secondary literature about Darwin abounds in extremely narrow definitions of rhetoric. As a consequence, any implications for rhetoric and knowing are bypassed for disciplinary explanations from sociology, philosophy, psychology, history, and the history and philosophy of science.

28 Francis Darwin, ed. Life and Letters, pp. 85-86.

29 The basic structure of the hypothetico-deductive account of inference includes these features in this order: 1. a highlevel, general hypothesis is stated; 2. other, less general hypotheses are deduced from the first as predictions; 3. observation-statements derived from (2) are tested to check the truth of the initial hypothesis.

30 Norwood Russell Hanson, "Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?" in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Baruch Brody (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).

31 Ernst Mayr, Edward Manier, and Gertrude Himmelfarb are three scholars in the Darwin Industry who seem to appreciate this distinction in Darwin's argument between the possibility and the probability of the hypothesis. Yet, they do no even hint at what the importance of the distinction might mean to the logic of discovery. Furthermore, they talk a great deal about the components of Darwin's ar-

guments, but have no particular concept or kind of inference to explain them. Unfortunately, Manier even follows up the distinction between possibility and probability with a sharp distinction between "the language" and "the logic" of Darwin's theory. Edward Manier, The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle.

32 In Evolution Without Evidence, Barry Gale spends much of his time defending the thesis that Darwin was a successful communicator. But what he means is that Darwin was a persuasive gentleman who was able to encourage a network of scientists to collect facts for him. Gale separates the substance of Darwin's theory from the communication of it.

33 Michael Hyde and Craig Smith, "Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen But Unobserved Relationship," Quarterly Journal of Speech 65 (December 1979), p. 351.

34 Ibid., p. 348.

35 Michael McGuire, "The Structure of Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 15 (Summer 1982), pp. 149-169.

36 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 2: Elements of Logic, pp. 496-497.

37 Ibid., p. 497.

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39 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, p. 123.

40 Arthur Burks, ed. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. 7: Science and Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 119.

41 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, p. 117.

42 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 2: Elements of Logic, p. 450.

43 Ibid., p. 268.

44 Arthur Burks, ed. Vol. 7: Science and Philosophy, p. 120.

45 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 6: Scientific Metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 357-358.

46 Ibid., pp. 319-323.

47 Arthur Burks, ed. Vol. 7: Science and Philosophy, p. 148.

48 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 6: Scientific Metaphysics, p. 320.

49 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 2: Elements of Logic, p. 387; Vol. 6: Scientific Metaphysics, p. 357.

50 Arthur Burks, ed. Vol. 8: Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 137.

51 Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, ed. Vol. 2: Elements of Logic, pp. 135-136.

52 Francis Darwin, ed. Life and Letters, p. 363.

53 Ibid., p. 67.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., p. 384.

56 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile, pp. 69-70.

57 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1842," in Evolution By Natural Selection ed. Sir Gavin de Beer, p. 74.

58 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1844," in de Beer, pp. 220-222.

59 Francis Darwin, ed. Life and Letters, p. 391.

60 Ibid., p. 384.

61 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1844," p. 166.

62 Ibid., p. 168.

63 Ibid., pp. 203-4; 219.

64 Ibid., p. 194.

65 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1842," p. 83.

66 Neal Gillespie, Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, p. 28.

67 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1842," p. 60.

68 Francis Darwin, ed. Life and Letters, p. 479.

69 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1844," p. 100.

70 Charles Darwin, "Essay of 1842," p. 79.

71 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile, p. ix.

72 Charles S. Peirce, Essays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Vincent Tomas (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 227.

PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA: A CASE STUDY IN SCIENTIFIC
AND PARA-SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT

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Readers of popular magazines, having recently seen articles with titles such as "Darwin's Mistake," "Darwin On The Run Again," and "Science Contra Darwin," might suspect that some major upheaval is in progress within the scientific community concerning the status of evolutionary theory. The indications come from mainstream sources, such as the "Science" section of *Newsweek*, which even if not an impeccable scientific source in its own right, is a reasonably good barometer of what is publicly sayable about science. The specter of evolution under attack is in itself nothing new, of course, as Darwin-baiting has long been a favored cultural pastime of our more flamboyant preachers, textbook critics, and other guardians of public morals. But such exercises, at least since the time of Darwin's triumph, were generally attacks from the outside--rear guard actions from those who did not know or did not accept the authority of science in questions considered a part of the moral domain. The difference in this case is that the purported attacks come from within the scientific establishment and thus turn the received authority of science against itself.

One might speculate on how this news would resonate for the typical reader--the reader who has little background in biology beyond that one high school course (with the textbook that ventured a few cautious paragraphs about the theory of evolution). Might it for instance confirm a secret suspicion that, after all, humankind arose from more dignified origins than the primordial slime? Might it strike a ready nerve, calling up a reflexive assurance that there are indeed chinks in the armor of science? Might it help to revive the sense of mystery about the universe that science seems forever conspiring to quash? Such questions probe some of the psychological consequences of the way scientific authority is constructed and reconstructed, and at some point I hope to return to them. For present purposes, however, my point of entry is a more structural question. I want to understand how, in a case such as this, a movement among different audiences can transform an argument. For a scientific specialist to move to broader audiences is a high-risk game, but one for which the potential payoff can be great. It can on the one hand enhance the practical potency of a theory by concealing

its vulnerabilities, but it can also expose the theorist to new threats. The game itself, however, is in the end not one of the theorist's own making. It is, rather, a game of intersecting and overlapping communities, each of which might either stimulate or provide a check on the others.

The word "game" can mislead, however. More is at stake here than strategies of subterfuge and contrivances for winning. The regulative ideals of the scientific community need to be recognized, even when they are not fully controlling. But a rational account of a many-sided controversy also requires a conception of rationality liberal enough to admit the different knowledge frames in which the controversialists participate. In order to do justice to the rational content of the arguments one must not fall prey to that caricature of rationality which presumes that to join in argument all participants must share the same assumptive frames, standards of evidence, and rules of inference. Arguments that matter do not occur in such a "flat" world. If they did, they would press out conclusions mechanically--a task for which the computer might be better suited than people. Because what is interesting, argumentatively, is not mechanical, a rational account of arguing must tell of those shifting, vital formations that keep issues alive and unsettled, or simply, arguable. A genuinely rational account of an argument should not leave its pragmatic value a mystery.

This biological debate is not the product of arguers who share the same assumptive frames, standards of evidence, and rules of inference. In fact not all who participate in it even have scientific purposes. At best, within the narrowest scope of the technical debate, the standards and purposes heavily overlap. At worst, within the broadest scope of the public controversy, as when the creationists appropriate Stephen Jay Gould's words to make their case against Darwin, they are irremediably different. Even within the strictly scientific literature, however, this is not a controversy in which the participants share a common disciplinary matrix, but one in which the gaps between different knowledge bases make an essential contribution to the dynamics of the argument. Different people get into this fray for different reasons, and they do so with different predispositions and resources. The same may be said of the multiple audiences for this debate, some of whom are active participants and some of whom participate only from the armchair. The controversy functions in different ways for different people, but it is possible to trace a general trajectory of its evolution.

THE FIRST AUDIENCE ENGAGED

The story I am telling begins with a 1972 essay entitled "Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism."² Paleontologists Niles Eldredge, of the American Museum of Natural History, and Stephen Jay Gould, of Harvard, collaborated there in an effort to explain what paleontologists since before Darwin had

considered a problem: the gaps in the fossil record. Darwin himself had offered various reasons why we should not expect to find a complete record of the transition among life forms. These included the tendency of nature to cover its own tracks ("Nature may almost be said to have guarded against the frequent discovery of her transitional or linking forms."), and science's still very spotty knowledge of the fossils. His metaphor is worth extended quotation:

... I look at the natural geological record, as a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly-changing language, in which the history is supposed to be written, being more or less different in the interrupted succession of chapters, may represent the apparently abruptly changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive, but widely separated, formations.

In speaking here of the "apparently abruptly changed forms of life," Darwin seemed to think the abruptness only apparent, for it was an essential tenet of his theory that nature does not make jumps ("Natura non facit saltum"). Indeed, so central to his theory was this premise, or so he believed, that he reckoned any documented jump in organic evolution would count as what we in the post-Popperian era would call the falsifying conditions of his theory: "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down." And this was because the very notion of natural selection, or so he believed, depended on gradualism. "Why should not Nature have taken a leap from structure to structure?" he asks the readers of *On The Origin of Species*. "On the theory of natural selection," he answers, "we can clearly understand why she should not; for natural selection can act only by taking advantage of slight successive variations; she can never take a leap, but must advance by the shortest and slowest steps." All the while, Darwin noted the great difficulty in finding complete transitional evidence within the existing record, a difficulty, he wrote, that "pressed so hardly" on his theory.

The difficulty of filling the gaps in the fossil record has remained a challenge to paleontologists and it has continued to pose theoretical questions. To the anti-evolutionist preachers, these gaps are a rhetorical playground, on which has been created a veritable genre of discourses on the "holes" in evolutionary theory. To much of the general public, continued news of these

gaps helps to keep evolution in a status of being "only a theory" (where "theory" is taken as roughly equivalent to "hypothesis"). To scientists, the gaps take on variable theoretical significance, depending in part on their disciplinary specialties. For paleontologists, Eldredge and Gould offered a fresh perspective on the fossil record, which had certain methodological implications, e.g. for how an evolutionary curve is plotted out over time. But what of the theoretical purport? Here the story was to become more tangled and complicated, as the theoretical implications of the "punctuated equilibria" notion have been pushed rather boldly by Gould beyond the more cautious position taken by Eldredge and Gould in 1972.

THE GRADUALIST PICTURE FRAMED

The original piece by Eldredge and Gould was as much a meta-theoretical as a theoretical statement, concerned with the relationship between theories and data. Their general point was that one's theoretical models will shape the process of data collection and will even determine what counts as data. They took this as relatively well established in the philosophy of science but insufficiently appreciated among practicing scientists. "Inductivist notions continue to control the methodology and ethic of practicing scientists raised in the tradition of British empiricism," they observed, and this produced a kind of naivete about the way information is accumulated. Most paleontologists, they found, were held captive to a "picture" of evolution as a steady, gradual process. According to this picture, the fossil record would ideally consist of a long sequence of continuous, finely graded intermediate forms linking ancestors to descendants. Any break in that sequence would be taken as an imperfection in the record--it could not be seen as a possible jump in the evolutionary sequence itself. The expectation of a faulty record generated a kind of institutionalized response to discontinuities in the fossils. Eldredge and Gould found "a nearly-ritualized invocation of the inadequacy of the fossil record," whenever a graded continuum could not be documented (p. 97). They wished to awaken their fellow paleontologists to the presence of these theoretical blinders.

The bias toward gradualism had discernible historical roots. In Darwin's time, the anti-evolutionists aligned with the "catastrophist" doctrine, which held that geological change had always been abrupt, and that the creation of species too had been abrupt. Although organic evolution could be conceived as either a continuous or a discontinuous process, the opponents of evolution of course held that species were created in a divine instant. Perhaps this led Darwin to see the fate of his theory as bound up inseparably with the gradualist position. In the modern "synthesis," the evident power of a reductive method further

helped to institutionalize gradualism. When the various sciences of genetics, natural history, paleontology, morphology, and botany were brought together under an inclusive set of Darwinian principles in the 1930's and 40's, this "synthesis" had a unifying power that, according to Gould, became increasingly rigid.¹⁰ What began as "expansive, generous, and pluralistic," he contends, hardened into an insistence upon genetic micromutation and gradual selection under natural selection. In their 1977 paper,¹¹ Gould and Eldredge would also observe the suspicious compatibility of gradualism with a Western ideological commitment to gradual, "progressive" change. Thus, it was not in scientific theory alone that the roots of the gradualist bias would be found.

By the same token, it may not be in scientific theory alone that the roots of punctuated equilibria can be found. As one "picture" offered in replacement of another, Eldredge and Gould held in the 1972 essay, punctuated equilibria will not be proved or disproved "in the rocks" (pace Dr. Johnson); rather, it will provide a better way of interpreting fossil data. At stake, they seemed to be saying, is a kind of imagery. On the side of phyletic gradualism is the image of a "stately unfolding" in the history of evolution--a branching tree. On the side of punctuated equilibria is a more artificial looking, constructed graph, modelling long periods of stability, occasionally and abruptly interrupted by short bursts of speciation. But each picture prescribes a methodological preference, so the issue is not simply an aesthetic one. For phyletic gradualism, the picture prescribes treating discontinuities as mere absences in the record. For punctuated equilibria, such gaps become presences. As Gould and Eldredge would put it in 1977, their model authorizes "treating stasis as data."

What had suggested this revised picture to Eldredge and Gould was a theory of speciation found in biology and authoritatively formulated by Ernst Mayr in 1963.¹² This theory of how new species arise, the theory of allopatric speciation, had become the theory of speciation among biologists, according to Eldredge and Gould; and yet it did not seem to be fully appreciated by paleontologists. They thus presented themselves as interpreters of the theory to paleontology. "Since paleontology has always taken its conceptual lead from biology (with practical guidance from geology)," they wrote, "it was inevitable that paleontologists should try to discover the meaning of the biospecies for their own science" (p. 92). The theory seemed to hold significant implications not only for understanding the origins of species, but for where and how one should expect to find fossil evidence of speciation. One section from the 1973 essay provides an especially good summary of these implications:

The central concept of allopatric speciation is that new species can arise only when a small local population becomes isolated at the margin of the geographic range of its parent species.

Such local populations are termed peripheral isolates. A peripheral isolate develops into a new species if isolating mechanisms evolve that will prevent the re-initiation of gene flow if the new form re-encounters its ancestors at some future time. As a consequence of the allopatric theory, new fossil species do not originate in the place where their ancestors lived. It is extremely improbable that we shall be able to trace the gradual splitting of a lineage merely by following a certain species up through a local rock column.

Moreover:

...Most morphological divergence of a descendant species occurs very early in its differentiation, when the population is small and still adjusting more precisely to local conditions. After it is fully established, a descendant species is as unlikely to show gradual, progressive change as is the parental species. Thus, in the fossil record, we should not expect to find gradual divergence between two species in an ancestral-descendant relationship. Most evolutionary changes in morphology occur in a short period of time, relative to the total duration of species.¹³

Taken together, these points argued for treating the fossil record within a regional rather than a single-location framework, and for expecting no pattern of constant change at a given location.

DIALECTIC SEPARATION

As responses to Eldredge and Gould began to appear, it was suggested by some that the originality of the proposed model was overstated; that its boldness resulted largely from its posing against each other only the extreme alternatives in what might be seen as a continuum of possible positions. The terms "phyletic gradualism" and "punctuated equilibria" had after all both been created by the same authors in order to pose a contrast. Writing in *Science*,¹⁴ for instance, Charles Harper congratulated Eldredge and Gould for introducing the theory of rapid isolation in small peripheral isolates to the great majority of English-speaking paleontologists and for calling attention to its implications. But he found them posing the alternatives too starkly: few paleontologists would rule out the possibility of rapid speciation in small peripheral isolates, on the one hand, while few biologists would rule out occasional phyletic evolution

within established species. He took to task a prominent ally of Eldredge and Gould, paleontologist Steven Stanley, who had proposed some tests for evaluating the two rival hypotheses, on grounds that Stanley had forced a choice between extremes: "His argument is analogous to a defense of laissez-faire capitalism by saying 'but surely you don't prefer Maoist communism'" (p. 48). Ruling out the "extreme" versions of the two viewpoints, Harper concluded, the issue would be the relative frequency of species origination by gradual changes; and this, he admonished, would be for the determination of population geneticists.¹⁵

When Gould and Eldredge wrote again in 1977, they seemed wary of empirical tests of their "picture," emphasizing the character of gradualism as a bias. Many of the examples brought forward to refute their model, they said, had been mere reflections of the gradualist bias. They wanted the new model to remain in unblurred contrast to the old. And yet they also seemed to be throwing water on the notion that this was something revolutionary: "For all the hubbub it engendered, the model of punctuated equilibria is scarcely a revolutionary proposal. As Simpson (1976, p. 5), with his unflinching insight, recognized in three lines (where others have misunderstood in entire papers), our model tries to 'clarify and emphasize ideas nascent in previous studies.' We merely urged our colleagues to consider seriously the implications for the fossil record a theory of speciation upheld by nearly all of us..."¹⁶

Stephen Toulmin has observed that theoretical controversies in science often move from the positing of false dichotomies to the progressive reconciling of the apparent extremes. In the great nineteenth century controversy between geological "catastrophists" and "gradualists," for instance, further investigation revealed less catastrophic catastrophes and less gradual graduations, to the point where the two camps were eventually divided more by their different rhetorics than by different factual accounts. This makes an instructive example, as it is the very tension between the catastrophists and the gradualists which not only sets the stage for Darwin's thinking, but which echoes mightily through the current debate over punctuated equilibria. The rhetoric of theoretical dichotomies and their possible reconciliation is a part of this echo, and though it would be a prejudgment to speak here of "false" dichotomies, one finds already such indications as one might expect if this episode were true to the pattern described by Toulmin. Consider the 1982 testimony of George Gaylord Simpson (he of "unflinching insight"): "The authors [of punctuated equilibria] ... have created a dichotomy which, like most dichotomies, is merely the dialectic separation of the two extremes of a continuum. Slow evolutionary change or no change at all in a span of geological time has certainly occurred and so has exceptionally rapid change in a usually shorter span, but so have all the intermediates between those extremes and all the combinations of the two."¹⁸

UPPING THE ANTE

The controversy might have long since run its course toward some reconciliation between the extremes had Gould not caught his second wind and written in 1980 what appeared to be a manifesto for a new general theory of evolution. While working as co-authors, Eldredge and Gould had spoken of incorporating data about evolutionary tempo into the record; and from the distribution of tempos, they were led to "strong inferences" about the modes of evolution. On his own, Gould would push more ambitiously into theorizing about the general modes of evolution. In an 1980 article entitled "Is a new and general theory of evolution emerging?"¹⁹ he boldly announced that the modern neo-Darwinist synthesis had broken down on its fundamental claims. These claims were those of extrapolationism (deriving macroevolutionary explanation by extrapolating from microevolutionary changes), and exclusive reliance on natural selection leading to adaptation. Evolution, he postulated, was hierarchically organized, with different modes operating at each level, thus making it impossible to extrapolate from one level to another. Furthermore, macroevolution was governed by higher-order selection, operation on groups of species, and not subject to individual adaptation. "A new and general evolutionary theory," he wrote, "will embody this notion of hierarchy and stress a variety of themes either ignored or explicitly rejected by the modern synthesis: punctuational change at all levels, important non-adaptive change at all levels, control of evolution not only by selection, but equally by constraints of history, development and architecture--thus restoring to evolutionary theory a concept of organism."²⁰

Read as a manifesto, Gould's 1980 essay is a rhetorical feast. He positions himself against the "orthodoxy," "dogma," and unwarranted "faith" in the old order, whose death he pronounces. He couches the account in terms of a historical narrative, reconstructing the inherently corrupt foundations on which the old synthesis rested, and revealing the strategies by which its proprietors maintained their power ("...A synthesist could always deny a charge of rigidity by invoking ...official exceptions, even though their circumscription, both in frequency and effect, actually guaranteed the hegemony of the two cardinal principles"). The exclusive dependence on adaptation had "infected our language" and become "virtually impossible to dislodge because the failure of one story leads to invention of another rather than abandonment of the enterprise." He gives personal testimony on how in his days as a graduate student the synthetic theory had "beguiled" him with its power. Then he had watched as its intellectual justification slowly unraveled, leaving it to be carried on by an orthodoxy. He reveals that the orthodoxy is saturated with Lamarckian error and Western themes of "ranking by intrinsic merit." He tells of the excitements of the new punctuational approach, and offers appealing new imagery of:

organic, non-deterministic processes. "Organisms are not billiard balls, struck in deterministic fashion by the cue of natural selection, and rolling to optimal positions on life's table," he concludes. "They influence their own destiny in interesting, complex, and comprehensible ways. We must put this concept of organism back into evolutionary biology." Even for the layman, this is stirring prose.

THE SECOND AUDIENCE PROVOKED

But now Gould was no longer speaking just to paleontologists and to the followers of his brilliant and popular essays in Natural History. No longer just an interpreter of biology, extracting its methodological implications, he now seemed to be calling for a new genetics. He was pushing onto the turf of the geneticists and population biologists, and for this he would make himself newly vulnerable and a target for attack. Most important of these attacks, perhaps, was that of distinguished geneticists G.L. Stebbins and F.J. Ayala in a 1981 article in Science.²¹ Stebbins and Ayala accused Gould of erecting a straw man in his version of the fundamental claims of the modern synthesis. And more damaging, perhaps, they found that he had misunderstandings about genetics--here is where Gould would pay for the sin of crossing disciplinary bounds. Rather than resting exclusively on natural selection, as Gould had suggested, geneticists describe gene change through four processes: mutation, gene flow, random drift, and natural selection. It is simply incorrect, they charged, to say as Gould did that in the synthetic theory all genetic change is adaptive; for there has from the beginning been major controversy concerning the relative importance of random drift and natural selection.

Other misunderstandings, they found, arose from applying the paleontologist's perspective to microbiological processes. The first of these was a result of the fact that, unlike the geneticists, paleontologists recognize species on the basis of observable, morphological differences. Hence the paleontologist will see speciation as involving substantial morphological change, "because only when such change has occurred is the paleontologist able to recognize the presence of a new species" (p. 968). This would presumably guarantee "gaps" in the fossil record, whether or not speciation had occurred suddenly. A second misunderstanding concerned time scale. When the punctuationalists speak of an "instant," they are thinking in geological time. A thousand years is a mere instant on that scale, but it is a long time from the microevolutionary perspective of the population biologist. The question of "How gradual is gradual?" might arguably be akin to "Is the glass half full or half empty?" The problem posed here for Gould, however, is that whatever scale one wants to use, a thousand years or so might be plenty of time for species change to occur according to the modes of evolution postulated by the modern theory. So while there is again something to be said for the role of different

pictures, there is more to it in this case than the choice of how to represent time. For according to Stebbins and Ayala, Gould had been enticed by his picture of instantaneous change to suppose that something more than tempo had to be at issue--that there must be a different mode of change to explain such abruptness.

All was not bad news for Gould in this landmark response, however. Stebbins and Ayala went on to argue that the principles of microevolution cannot be deduced from those of macroevolution, and this would seem to be consistent with a hierarchically arranged theory. In exploring the senses in which the micro and macro levels of evolution might be "decoupled," they argued that prevailing principles of microevolution are compatible with both gradualist and punctuationalist models of macroevolution; and so long as this remains the case, it is not the place of microevolution to adjudicate between the rival hypotheses of macroevolution. Thus there was hope for the punctuational account, even if it had been based on misunderstandings, and even if what was promising about it was not revolutionary, but quite consistent with previous theory. After this, Gould's work continued to clarify his hierarchical theory, but it lost much of its power as an unsettling challenge within the scientific literature. Ironically, however, it is in this period that the public impact of his work became most visible. Having weathered battles within the scientific literature, he would now find his expertise functioning in new and different ways.

ORIGIN OF THE SPECIOUS

I have argued elsewhere that expertise can function according to three general frames, depending largely upon the audience's relationship to the original context of investigation.²² Held nearest to the original context of investigation, expertise plays a role that can be called epistemological; for here is where it is intended as a contribution to a rational enterprise. Here too is where it is most subject to qualified peer evaluation. A paleontologist, speaking to colleagues in the context of what Kuhn would call normal science, is bound in by the norms of inquiry for that discipline. Once the expert gains the attention of other disciplinary groups, the epistemic impact of his or her expertise is largely a function of how well the assumptions and procedures of the interacting disciplines can be made known to each other. There is thus a task of interpretive understanding, or if you will, a hermeneutical task, at the heart of this process. Such is the case when paleontologist Gould becomes involved in a controversy with population geneticists over time scales, for instance. If the interdisciplinary or hermeneutical frame permits what from the epistemological perspective would appear as distortion, there is at least in that case an interaction of disciplinary standards which set the parameters of the discussion.

Now when Gould reaches out to a lay public, or when his work is appropriated by those trying to influence the public, the discourse has reached a third frame, where the original disciplinary assumptions are lost, leaving it more or less wide open as to what interpretive conventions will be used to make meaning of his texts. The argument, one might say, becomes "para-scientific." The investigative goals of paleontology might be distorted or lost altogether in this frame. In those cases where scientific talk catches the ear of the laity, the impact of expertise becomes a matter of rhetoric, in a very traditional sense of that term. In this frame, the words of the expert will often resound in ways that will astound their author. Stephen Gould has no doubt been dismayed to see some of the contexts in which his words have been put to use. Who would foresee that the words of a leading evolutionary scientist would become ammunition for those seeking to discredit the very notion of evolution? And yet this is just what has come to pass, as the advocates of a position called "scientific creationism" have appropriated the expertise of Gould to further their own ends.

In a widely distributed book by creation science's leading spokesman, Duane Gish, Evolution? The Fossils Say No!, Gould is made to play the creationists' game by criticizing the received theory of evolution. By a logic of "if they're wrong, we must be right," the creationists are able to put the critique of phyletic gradualism to good use. Consider the following examples of Gish's quotations from Gould, followed by his interpretation:

Gould: All paleontologists know that the fossil record contains precious little in the way of intermediate forms; transitions between major groups are characteristically abrupt.

Gish: Gould is thus arguing that the fossil record, . . . does not produce evidence of the gradual change of one plant or animal form into another and that, again, . . . each kind appeared abruptly (p. 172).

Or again:

Gould: Even though we have no direct evidence for smooth transitions, can we invent a reasonable sequence of intermediate forms, that is, viable, functioning organisms, between ancestors and descendants? Of what possible use are the imperfect incipient stages of useful structures? What good is half a jaw or half a wing?

Gish: The argument here, that gradual evolutionary change of one form into another is

impossible because the transitional forms, being incomplete, could not function, is an argument that has long been suggested by creationists (pp. 172-73).

And again:

Gould: There has been no steady progress in the higher development of organic design. We have had, instead, vast stretches of little or no change and one evolutionary burst that created the whole system.

Gish: Eliminate the words "evolutionary burst" and substitute the words "burst of creation" and one would think he was reading an article by a creationist (p. 177).

Indeed, played in this context, Gould's words sound as if they might have come from the sermons of Herbert W Armstrong. The fact that he has written a series of essays disputing the basis of creationist claims seems no impediment whatsoever to the creationists' purposes. His credibility for their targeted audience derives less from his overall position within the scientific firmament than from his saying what serves the rhetorical purpose at hand--that being to weaken the authority of the scientific consensus by showing evidence of dissent from within. There is a paradox at work here, of course, in that Gould's credibility as an evolutionary scientist is invoked in order to weaken the credibility of evolutionary science; but this is really nothing more remarkable than the time-honored rhetorical device of turning the tables. As evidence of the very arguability of prevailing scientific views, punctuated equilibria is fair game for the creationist rhetoric.

THE GAME OF DARWIN

Positioned by the popular press as a would-be falsifier of Darwin, Gould has responded by portraying himself as "essentially" a good Darwinian despite the differences that he wishes to make so much of. He finds himself in something of a rhetorical bind insofar as his celebrity as a theoretical innovator rests on his dissent from the "Darwinian synthesis," and yet his scientific self-respect (as contra the creationists) derives from his being a part of that very tradition. One rallies around "Darwin" in declaring against the anti-scientific forces of ignorance. It is thus a curiously fine line that his different purposes have forced him to walk: For one purpose he must reject the basic tenets of the Darwinian synthesis, but for another, he must remain a theorist working in the spirit of The Founder. However much distance Gould may need to put between himself and Darwin in order to clear a space for himself in history, he cannot afford to lose access to the considerable cultural capital

invested in Darwin. Theories may come and go, but Darwin is the sign under which business in the evolutionary sciences is conducted, the eponym for an age. We are all "Darwinians" now.

So how does Gould maintain his tenuous position? He does so partly by way of a "loose constructionist" strategy, whereby the strict tenets of Darwinism (the letter) are transcended in order to remain true to the basic program (the spirit). Oddly enough, the "vision" is upheld despite a challenge to what he calls "the essence of Darwinism": the claim that natural selection is a creative force, and the reductionist assertion that selection is upon individual organisms is the locus of evolutionary change.²⁶ Gould calls for a theory that departs from the received synthesis, but one, he says, which "would embody, in abstract form, the essence of Darwin's argument expanded to work at each level (p. 386)." This hierarchically restructured theory of evolution might thus be seen as a "higher Darwinism."²⁷

The aspiration to be, in effect, a better Darwinian than Darwin, makes most sense if one thinks of Darwinism more as a philosophy of inquiry than a theory of specific mechanisms in evolution. Gould argues that a "larger theme" than the two rejected tenets can be found in Darwin's work: an attempt to establish principles of reasoning for the historical sciences. "Thus," he writes, "we should not claim that all Darwin's books are about evolution. Rather, they are all about the methodology of historical science" (p. 386). This, rather than gradualism, is the key to the vision. Darwin may have placed great emphasis on gradualism, but even this could from the right perspective be seen simply as an uncharacteristic mistake. Gould quotes T.H. Huxley, who wrote to Darwin on the day before the publication of Origin of Species: "You load yourself with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting Natura non facit saltum so unreservedly."²⁸ The hierarchical theory would take that onus off evolutionary science.

To whatever degree Gould may be seen as a good Darwinian, he does take Darwin as a venerated figure--perhaps even as a role model. Like Darwin, he immerses himself in the gathering of data from nature and crafts his theories with that in mind. Like Darwin, he addresses a broad audience in addition to a circle of scientific experts, always with eloquence and force. And like Darwin, he cuts across disciplinary barriers to attempt a new synthesis. He is forced, like Darwin, to respond to a variety of criticisms. But unlike Darwin, he lives in a time when it is impossible to have mastery of all the sciences of nature; when even the most brilliant of scientists must press against the weight of a vast establishment of compartmentalized research specialties and defer to their respective experts; when the machinery of proof is ponderous and bureaucratic. In the news weeklies there may be the appearance of upheaval, and the rhetorical influence on the public may be considerable. Even within the sciences, there may be adjustments in understanding;

but revolutions in knowledge waged by single thinkers seem almost a part of the romantic past. Science, for better and for worse, seems much too institutional for that now. Perhaps there could not be a Darwin now. Scientia non facit saltum.

NOTES

- 1 Tom Bethell, "Darwin's Mistake, *Harper's*, Feb. 1976, pp. 70-75; "Darwin is on the Run Again, *People*, 8 Dec. 1980, p. 151-2 ff. Sharon Begley, "Science Contra Darwin," *Newsweek*, 8 April 1985, pp. 80-81.
- 2 Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, "Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism," in *Models in Paleobiology*, ed. T.J.M. Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co., 1972), pp. 83-115.
- 3 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 292.
- 4 Darwin, pp. 310-311.
- 5 Darwin, p. 189.
- 6 Darwin, p. 194.
- 7 Darwin, p. 302.
- 8 Eldredge and Gould, p. 85.
- 9 Michael Ruse, Darwin's Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976).
- 10 Stephen Jay Gould, "Is a New and General Theory of Evolution Emerging?" *Paleobiology*, 6, No. 1 (1980), 119-130.
- 11 Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, "Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered," *Paleobiology*, 3, No. 2 (1977), 115-151.
- 12 Ernst Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1963).
- 13 Eldredge and Gould, pp. 94-95.
- 14 Charles W. Harper, Jr., "Origin of Species in Geologic Time: Alternatives to the Eldredge-Gould Model," *Science*, 3 Oct. 1975, pp. 47-48. On this phase of the controversy, and at other points in this essay, I am much indebted to Henry Howe of the University of Iowa Zoology Department.
- 15 Responding to Harper's characterization of his position, Stanley pointed out that he agreed that intermediate positions were possible and reiterated his view the phyletic gradualism should be defined as the view that phyletic change is "the clearly dominant mode of evolution." The punctuated equilibrium model, by contrast, should represent the view that "much more

than 50 percent of evolution occurs through sudden events in which polymorphs and species are proliferated." Thus what had begun as contrasting "pictures," was on its way to more prosaic comparisons of percentages. See Steven M. Stanley, "Stability of Species in Geologic Time," *Science*, 16 April 1976, p. 268.

- 16 Gould and Eldredge, p. 117.
- 17 Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 119 ff.
- 18 George Gaylord Simpson, The Book of Darwin (N.Y.: Washington Square Press, 1982).
- 19 Gould, 1980, pp. 119-130.
- 20 Gould, 1980, abstract.
- 21 B. Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco J. Ayala, "Is a New Evolutionary Synthesis Necessary?" *Science*, 28 Aug. 1981, pp. 967-971.
- 22 John Lyne, "Ways of Going Public: The Projection of Expertise in the Sociobiology Controversy," Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. D. Zarefsky, M. Sillars, and J. Rhodes (Annandale, VA.: SCA-APA, 1983), 400-15.
- 23 Duane, T. Gish, Evolution: The Fossils Say No! (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers, 1979).
- 24 There are other ways that creationists turn the tables on the evolutionists as well. A favored tactic is to set up strict criteria for what would constitute a legitimate theory, e.g. that a scientific theory must be falsifiable. See Gish, p. 13. The claim that evolution is not a falsifiable theory is an interesting one; for it does appear that the evolutionary scientists are irrevocably committed to the reality of evolution (as a condition of their practice, one might say). One cannot readily imagine such scientists under any circumstance rejecting the very concept of evolution, even if various tenets of evolutionary theory remain up for grabs. To the creationists, this smacks of dogma; but this is because they fail to understand that the weight of rational support for evolution, in the broadest sense, is distributed across many specific theories. The whole edifice does not come crashing down because of weaknesses in a particular area. Nor is theoretical clash excluded. Gould's case in fact shows just how far one might go in attacking the received view yet still remain not only an evolutionist, but even "true to Darwin." See, e.g., James Gleick, "Stephen Gould: Breaking Tradition with Darwin," *New York Times Magazine*, 20 Nov. 1983, p. 48 ff. "Darwin is on the Run Again," *People*, 8 Dec. 1980, pp. 151-2 ff. See, then, Stephen

Jay Gould, "Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory,"
Science, 23 April 1982, pp. 381-387.

²⁶Gould, 1982, p. 381.

²⁷Gould, 1982, p. 386.

²⁸Gould, 1982, p. 386, n. 29.

RHETORICAL GROUNDS FOR DETERMINING WHAT IS
FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCE: THE CASE OF SPACE EXPLORATION

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In a recent report entitled "Faith in Science," published by the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, we are told that "America is in love with scientists," and that "The Apollo program remains, for many, the crowning American achievement, the standard of success against which other aspects of American life are judged--and found wanting."¹ I mention this report not because I am going to discuss its substance, but because I find curious its identification of the Apollo program with science. I myself would tend to make that identification, even though--and this is the reason why I find the whole thing curious--the scientific establishment fought the Apollo program on the grounds that it was political showbiz and not science.

I do not wish to rehash old fights in great detail, but I would like to pursue, in this paper, the general issue of the justification of space exploration. I am not going to settle the issue here, for that requires a much longer work, but I will provide a sketch of how it can be settled.² My purpose in providing this sketch is to show how rhetorical considerations can be crucial to disputes about what constitutes fundamental science.

Space exploration is a particularly good subject for this purpose, since it has been attacked as an unwarranted extension of science at the expense of more pressing human needs, and also as lacking enough scientific merit to deserve all the talent and money that goes into it. Thus to defend space exploration one needs to give a general case for why science ought to be supported, and then argue that space exploration is scientific enough to be included.

The case for space exploration must be made within a rhetorical context created by the critics' objections to the enterprise as a whole. There are two main kinds of critics. The social critics often object on humanitarian grounds. They worry that while enormous amounts of money are spent in space, people go hungry and without shelter here on Earth. We are besieged by illness and poverty, ignorance and hopelessness. Should we not try to put our own house in order before sticking our noses in other corners of the universe? These critics may even agree that space exploration is a good thing. But just as well they may also agree that opera is a good thing. In both cases they would balk at expenditures in the billions of dollars a year while pressing human problems go unsolved.

The second main kind of critics--which one may call ideological--do not think that space exploration is a good thing. They view space research as a continuation or extension of big science, and science as a basically unwise activity, for science leads us to interfere with nature instead of trying to live in harmony with it. As they see it, this massive interference has brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. Only a change

of ideology, or perhaps of moral outlook, can give us hope. The promise of space, as described in the standard case for it, is than a siren song that diverts our attention at a crucial moment in our history.³

Now, proponents of space exploration often present an argument based on the many benefits that we derive from the space program: weather satellites save lives and crops, communication satellites bring about an economic expansion, land satellites help us manage our resources and protect and monitor the environment, and space technology in general spins off valuable products into our lives.

But the social critics are not likely to be persuaded by this standard argument. For it is not obvious how a probe of Jupiter, a mission to a comet, let alone the planning for an interstellar flight have such tangible benefits. What the standard argument leaves out is precisely the heart of space exploration: those very things that bring to it an air of excitement and adventure, those elements of discovery and satisfaction of curiosity that fuel the imagination and the enthusiasm of its advocates. The ideological critics, for their own part, may look upon the environmental benefits of space exploration as a case of using science and technology to touch up the mess caused by science and technology.

I suggest a different approach. To begin with, if we reflect on the matter we will realize that the dispute about space exploration involves assumptions about the nature of science. For example, the social critic would find the value of scientific knowledge--as obtained through space sciences--not large enough to justify the money that it presumably takes away from attending to other human needs. But to estimate the value of scientific knowledge in any fruitful way one should have some idea of what science is like and of what it has to offer. The ideological critics for their part hold that science is unwise. But what insights about science have led them to such conclusion? Sometimes disputes of this sort are presented as conflicts of values. And conflicts of values are presumed to be unsolvable. But as we can see, in this case at least, assumptions about the nature of science enter into the estimates of value. And thus an intelligent discussion of the subject should require an examination of those assumptions. In this manner what begins as a dispute about social policy becomes in part a problem about the nature of science. And since the nature of science is the main concern of the philosophy of science, our problem falls within the province of philosophy of science.

Since there are many possible objections to space exploration, trying to identify all the corresponding assumptions about the nature of science would soon become an unwieldy task. It seems more fruitful to present what I think is an appropriate way of looking at scientific knowledge, see how well this view fits space science, and then make a proper estimate of the value of space science. The idea is that if we understand the nature of space science, we will readily see its significance; and if we see its significance the objections will be untenable. By proceeding in this manner some specific assumptions will be unmasked and refuted, while others will fall by the wayside, anonymous victims in the defeat of the views to which they gave rise.

What is the appropriate way of looking at scientific knowledge in general and space science in particular? Let me sketch it by drawing a contrast

to a rather typical way of looking at science.

Scientific knowledge is supposed to be objective. This is often taken to mean that scientific knowledge is factual, that even laws and theories can be trusted only because they are summaries of facts or are derived from the facts in some fashion. Scientific knowledge is thus ultimately a body, a collection of facts, and science is an agency for collecting facts about the universe. With this view of science, justification is an uphill battle for a proponent of space exploration. For example, why is it urgent to place X-ray telescopes in orbit to observe radiation that has been coming for millions of years and will be coming for millions of years more? Why couldn't we wait one or two centuries, or at least until some of our problems down here are more tractable?

Nevertheless there is reason to suspect that the emphasis on facts is very misleading. Strong currents in contemporary philosophy of science suggest that it is more fruitful to think of science as spectacles through which we look at the universe. Indeed, without the scientific views that we have and the ways in which they permit us to interact with the universe, there are many aspects of nature to which we would simply be blind. When we put on our scientific spectacles we can see those aspects of nature. But we do more than that. Because based on our views of the world we make estimates of what problems we face and of what opportunities we can take advantage. And as I will argue, the solutions to many problems, the awareness of other problems of which we are ignorant, as well as the bringing about of new opportunities require the refinement, the modification, and sometimes the replacement of our scientific spectacles. In the long view of things, there are practical as well as scientific reasons for preserving the dynamic character of science.

This philosophical position is buttressed by the history of science. Indeed, many examples from the history of science illustrate how our scientific views influence which experiences (observations) we are to count as "facts."⁴ The distinction between theory and fact is then in question. And thus we may suspect that there is more to the satisfaction of scientific curiosity than the collection of facts. As a result, our problem of the justification of space exploration takes on an entirely new light.

Once we place emphasis on the essential transformations of science and their consequences we gain a new point of attack. A scientific view is, then, very much a way of viewing the world. But scientific views are still our creations and thus imperfect. They are always in need of refinement, modification, or replacement altogether. The pressure for such changes come from the double exposure to unusual circumstances (which force us to stretch our views) and to competing ideas (which are often developed to account for a few of those unusual circumstances, and then claim the right to extend to the entire field of the discipline). From these considerations follow two important consequences for the problem of the justification of the exploration of space.

The first is that what is at issue for science itself is not merely the addition of a few, or even many, interesting facts but the transformation, perhaps radical, of our views of the world. As we will see below, space exploration provides a most extraordinary opportunity (and as I will argue,

an essential one as well) to effect the kinds of changes always needed by those spectacles through which we view the universe. To reject or to slow down that opportunity is to reject or to slow down the refinement and possible replacement of those spectacles.

This brings us to the second important consequence: since our world views tell us what the world is like, they also determine ultimately what opportunities we can take advantage of and what dangers we can be warned about. Thus with changes of world view comes the realization of many new opportunities and dangers. Moreover, many problems cannot be solved unless a different point of view comes into play. Therefore to reject or slow down the process by which science grows, by which we refine and replace our communal spectacles, amounts to a decision to deprive ourselves of much that is good and to continue to expose ourselves unnecessarily to who knows what dangers.

These rather abstract considerations can be illustrated by concrete examples. Einstein began his career by asking "useless" theoretical questions such as "What would the universe look like if I were traveling on a light ray?" In trying to satisfy his curiosity about this and other equally practical issues he was led eventually to develop his theory of relativity and to take a most decisive role in pushing physics down the slope of the quantum. He changed several of our views of the world in profound ways. From some of his more specific accomplishments several theoretical opportunities about light became possible. And some of those in turn led to the theory of lasers. Lasers in turn opened up many technological opportunities. It was not long before some researcher decided to apply them in medicine. Today lasers are used in extremely delicate surgical procedures that would not be possible with any other technology known to medical practitioners. And it all began with a change of world view in a field far removed from medicine at the time.

In contrast imagine a crash program in Einstein's early days to have surgeons develop a surgical instrument that could do the sorts of things that a laser can do today. Is it reasonable to suppose that the point would have come when the well-supported surgeons would have realized that their aim required the overthrow of the physics of their day? And would they have then laid out the steps necessary to replace that physics with a view that would lead them to lasers, and so on? I think not. But without the new physics, could the surgeons have developed the equivalent of lasers, or of much other Western medical technology for that matter? Again I think not.

The deep connection I have outlined between theory and practice in the long run can be more clearly seen if we approach science as a social product of our biological brains. A biological context can be most illuminating because the human brain is a product of evolution, intelligence depends on the brain, and science is a social means by which intelligence interacts with the universe at large. Although there is much resistance in philosophical circles to this move, I think that much can be gained from investigating the nature of science in this manner. One of those gains is the realization that science allows us to manage in a diversity of environments, as well as to deal with a changing environment. And another gain is the understanding of intellectual curiosity as rooted in our biological nature, and thus connected with our sense of adventure and our inclination toward play.

These two gains will provide the basis for bringing together the motivation of science with its justification. In particular they permit us to take care of objections to the effect that scientists do not tabulate the practical benefits of a view before they accept it; that they often do not have any inkling of the consequences of their views; and that they accept the views that best satisfy their intellectual curiosity. If we see science as a natural social ability, we can remind ourselves that the intellectual curiosity that motivates science has its roots in an enhanced ability to survive. My biological account of science (developed at length in my Radical Knowledge) thus explains why science is in a deep sense practical even though individual scientists may not be.⁵

Nevertheless we should not assume that the general case I have sketched applies fully to space science, let alone to the whole of space exploration. First we need to overcome several objections about whether space science fits the pattern of the general case, and about whether space science is fundamental science. To qualify as space science, a field normally has to be connected in a crucial sense with doing investigations from above the Earth's atmosphere. So understood, space science has roughly three main fields: planetary science, physics and astrophysics, and space biology. All three present obstacles to my sketch.

Of planetary astronomy (also called comparative planetology, which overlaps to a great extent with the exploration of the solar system) we must determine the following. Granted that by going into Earth orbit and looking down we can learn much about our own planet, but what can we learn about the Earth from looking at another planet? It would seem, as an early Greek might say, that if the other planet is different we are not learning about the Earth, and if it is like the Earth we should not waste effort going there when we might as well look at the Earth itself.

As for space physics and astrophysics, including space astronomy, how can that knowledge change our lives down here? It may be fascinating to find out what makes quasars burn, but fascination aside, will that feed hungry children or at least make automobiles run more efficiently? To be sure, I have given examples of how a change in scientific point of view brought about the realization of opportunities which may have otherwise been unthinkable. The use of lasers in surgery may even be a good illustration of why serendipity is a natural consequence of science. And elsewhere I have used the case of general relativity to show how space exploration may transform a very theoretical point of view, how it may force it to change our reckoning with the universe.⁶ But are these examples truly relevant?

We might think that lasers are built on fundamental principles of matter, on principles, furthermore, that apply right here on Earth. So there is no mystery why a revolution that gave us those principles had terrestrial applications. General relativity, on the other hand, seems very esoteric. Spacetime near the earth is almost flat, and so the (General Relativity) gravitational effects near the Earth are bound to be very small and probably of limited application. The rest of space physics and astronomy is not in any better position. By going out there, by placing telescopes in orbit and all that, we might challenge our points of view and force them to change. But they are points of view about what is up there, not about what is down here.

Space biology fares even worse, since many space scientists themselves see little value in it, beyond the need to keep astronauts healthy. And since many of those scientists would prefer unmanned exploration, even this conditional value of space biology is in question. Space biology can be roughly divided into two main areas. The first investigates the possibility of extraterrestrial life; it goes by the name of exobiology. The second investigates the behavior of terrestrial life in outer space; it corresponds to the idea most laymen have of space biology. These two areas are distinct and, not surprisingly, they present different problems of justification.

At first glance, the peculiar thing about exobiology as a science is that it may have no subject matter. That is, terrestrial life may be the only life in the universe. Or what is practically the same, even if there is life somewhere else we may never find it. Or if we find it we may not recognize it for what it is. Part of the problem for the other branch of space biology is one of image. For instance, NASA has placed great emphasis on vestibular research, for the function of the inner ear is deeply connected with motor and perceptual systems. Since motion sickness is probably the result of vestibular disorientation, research in this area has shown great concern for the welfare and effectiveness of the astronauts. And thus people who want to turn down support for space biology often say that it is just more research on why the astronauts throw up.

A proper defence of space science cannot be attempted in a conference paper. I will outline, however, some of the main elements of that defence for most of the branches of space science; and I will discuss in some detail the reasons for investigating the behavior of terrestrial life in outer space. The motivation for this last choice is that I have already discussed the other branches of space science at other conferences, and that I cannot help feeling a sweet, though perverse, satisfaction in trying to overturn the most unflattering verdict given by expert wisdom.

For several decades, until the advent of the space age, the prestige of the planetary sciences was very low. With the progress of space exploration there has come a recognition that there are many interesting scientific questions to pursue in trying to understand not only the solar system but the processes leading to the formation and evolution of planetary systems generally. As it turns out, these questions hold more than abstract scientific interest.

There is urgency in searching for answers to them, if nothing else because of the situation that the world faces for the remainder of this century and much of the next. Even if the often-predicted great catastrophe caused by overpopulation and the extraordinary rate of exploitation of resources is avoidable, the fact of the matter is that we face some very serious problems. Moreover, these problems cannot be tackled wisely unless we have a better understanding of the global relationships between the basic systems of the earth's environment. We need to know more about how the atmosphere is affected by the oceans--which provide most of the water vapor, absorb CO₂, and make a convenient sink for heat. We need to know how oceans and atmosphere interact with the geophysics of the planet. And we also need to know what part life has played in transforming all of these systems. That part, incidentally, may have been quite considerable. For

example, life helped break down the CO₂ in the atmosphere, thus possibly preventing a runaway green-house effect that would have made the Earth almost as hot as Venus. We used to think that Venus had no life because it was too hot, but some now quip that Venus is too hot because it never had any life.

This last thought illustrated very vividly how our knowledge of the history of life may profoundly affect our understanding of the atmosphere of a planet. It also suggests that some of the vital questions cannot be asked fruitfully unless we go into space. And not merely because from the high ground we can gain a global perspective, or because the Earth's environment extends to the ozone layer and the magnetosphere. By comparing our planet with others we test our ideas about weather, tectonics, and the origin of life. The study of the cosmos also yields an understanding of the evolution of planets and planetary systems that will help us determine what factors affect the long-term behavior of a planet (e.g., ice ages and extinction cycles) and of the solar system of which it is a part. And from this determination we may judge far more precisely what we can do to our Earth, what we are doing to it, and what changes are required to meet our needs without sealing the fate of our descendants. This must be done in the decades to come. Since it cannot be done without a point of comparison, without being able to consider alternative scenarios, and since only comparative planetology can provide what is needed, the pursuit of this branch of space science will remain urgent in the decades to come. As for the long run, the issue may well be extinction.

The justification of exobiology proceeds along similar lines. The lack of extraterrestrial specimens is an objection to the pursuit of exobiology only if we accept a very narrow definition of the field. For exobiology goes beyond the search for extraterrestrial life: it is largely the application of space science and technology to understand how life originated on this planet. Exobiology tries to determine, for example, what the Earth was like 3.5 - 4.5 billion years ago--what was the ultra-violet flux? What was the volcanic and other tectonic activity? How much molecular oxygen was in the atmosphere? And how much ozone? How much carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen were "recycled" through the Earth's crust and how much were brought to the Earth by asteroids and comets? To decide these issues we must go away from the Earth to study the older surfaces of the Moon and Mars, the presumably still primordial atmosphere of Titan, and the largely untouched chemistry of comets. Exobiology is thus inseparable from comparative planetology.

Moreover, the very role of the imagination in trying to determine the range within which life can be born and the possible forms life may take provides a fruitful context in which to discuss questions of origin and evolution. For by the consideration of likely scenarios for life, and by the comparative examination of the planets in our solar system and of other planetary systems, we will be better able to understand not only how life came about but why it took the paths that it did when it apparently had others available.

In its own ways, exobiology thus illustrates how space science preserves the dynamic character of science in general. The vigorous pursuit of exobiology would inevitably lead to the profound transformation of our views of the living world. And since those views are linked to our understanding of the global environment, the resulting theoretical adjustment would be of

great magnitude--and so eventually would be the change in the way we interact with the universe.

Space physics and astronomy also show that space science is particularly well suited to keep science under challenge, to make it grow, to bring about the transformation of our panorama of problems and opportunities. Close attention to the aims of particle physics (which for many amounts to fundamental physics) indicates that models of the very small have to be checked against our observations of the cosmos, particularly where instances of extremely high gravitation is involved (the origin of the universe provides the favorite "testing" ground). That is, the ultimate progress of fundamental physics requires a program of cosmological observation that cannot be carried out except by doing astronomy from space. The reason is simply that most of the relevant information is contained in X-rays and other frequencies of radiation that are absorbed by the Earth's atmosphere. Indeed, we are on the verge of an explosion in our cosmological knowledge.⁸ It is clear, then, that the philosophical position that defends fundamental physics applies equally well to space physics and astronomy.

And now I turn to the investigation of terrestrial life in space. To those who are acquainted with it, the remarks made earlier are neither accurate nor fair. For in space we can ask questions about life that are not possible otherwise. In particular we can study the role of gravity in the structure and the development of organisms. In a space station, for example, we may choose at will the amount of gravity to which plants and animals will be exposed. This can be done merely by the use of a centrifuge. When the centrifuge is off, the gravity is close to zero. And when it is on it makes the container go in circles, subjecting the object under study to whatever acceleration we wish. To a plant or an animal such acceleration is the equivalent of a gravitational force acting on it. Our main interest lies in the range between 0 and 1 g, since there we may study not only the perception of gravity but perhaps even the role that gravity has played in evolution. For by experimenting in that range we may be able to determine gravitational thresholds of biological importance; that is, we may determine the minimum level at which gravity can be detected and at which it becomes a significant factor in physiological or developmental functions.

But are these important questions? Are there any reasons to suspect that gravity will in fact turn out to be a significant biological factor? Many biologists believe that the biological research done in space is not of very high quality. And this low evaluation is reinforced by two further notions. The first is that all the abnormal effects of gravity take place at the systems level, not at the level of cells. Thus, for example, since we do not need the big bones for support we lose calcium; this loss may in turn have unusual effects on several physiological functions, and so on. But with appropriate exercise and diet we may preserve our need for those bones; therefore the system imbalance will be largely corrected and the unusual circumstances will be kept to a minimum. As a consequence, the biological significance of space will also be kept to a minimum.

The correctness of this notion is presumably buttressed by experimental and theoretical considerations. Most space biologists themselves have interpreted the results of many cellular experiments as indications that

cells are largely unaffected by gravity.⁹ And this conclusion comes as no surprise, since it accords with what theory has led them to expect: cells are small enough that the force of gravity is of little strength when compared to the electromagnetic forces so crucial to the chemical bonds of life.

At the molecular level gravity should be even less significant. And this brings us to the second notion at play. Many biologists are inclined to believe that what really matters in biology takes place at the molecular level or close to it; therefore, as far as they can tell, controlling gravity as a factor is not going to bring us great breakthroughs.

It is true that in space biology, unlike space astronomy today, but like space astronomy not long ago, we cannot specify the great scientific rewards that await us. We know, however, that the gravity of the Earth has been a constant throughout the evolution of life. We also know that the more pervasive a constant the more difficult for us to determine its role, if any. That is exactly what happens with gravity. How are we to proceed, then? First of all, we cannot resolve the matter by further standard biological analysis. For in analysis we use the tools of prevailing theory to investigate some phenomena. To discover that role by analysis is therefore practically impossible, since nothing in our previous biology makes gravity a crucial element of the theory. What we need is either an alternative theory in which gravity is assigned a specific role, or else the manipulation of gravity to make present theory fail. We can do both.

These new theoretical and experimental directions are suggested in part by some of the early results of space biology, and in part by emphasizing some relevant aspects of standard theoretical biology. They will permit us to show the mistakes in the two notions that buttressed the general low estimate of the value of space biology. The first notion, we may recall, was that microgravity affects organisms only at the systems level. Investigations then have the main purpose of determining just what systemic effects take place and how they can be corrected. This clinical work has made its practitioners confident that with appropriate compensation (diet, drugs, and exercise) men and women can survive in space for long periods of time, perhaps indefinitely.

But even if this is true it takes away nothing from the promise of space biology. If we wish to determine the role of gravity as an all-pervasive factor in individual development and in patterns of evolution, the systems level is actually not a bad place to begin. The human body, for instance, appears fine-tuned for the Earth's gravity. We might have expected to extrapolate our centrifuge studies here on Earth (with gravities above 1g) to the microgravity of space. Thus if we lose body mass under an acceleration of several g's, have it normal at 1 g, then presumably we would gain mass at less than 1 g. But it turns out that we lose mass at less than 1 g. The body mass in question here is intracellular mass (that is, it goes beyond the loss of fluids throughout the body and of calcium in the bones). Similar reactions take place in microgravity with temperature control and other physiological functions. The explanation of some of these reactions seems to be that the shift in body fluids that comes from changes in gravity affects the communication between cells.

This fine-tuning of physiology to the Earth's gravity--which is seldom

emphasized if realized at all--should provide a fruitful theoretical perspective to study the relationships between a variety of internal systems and cycles in the human body. Why are physiological functions maximized at 1 g? This leads to questions about why the body works as it does, questions that would not occur that easily otherwise. A preliminary answer is that gravity is used to harmonize a variety of physiological systems. One way to think about this is that gravity is like the glue that holds such systems together. Once the glue is gone, they do not quite work together. And from their failures we learn what makes them work correctly under terrestrial conditions. Another way to think about it is that those systems change their responses in order to adapt to the new conditions. That may also give us significant clues about their normal modes of interaction with other systems or mechanisms.

This fine-tuning to 1 g may become acute in issues of development. In microgravity a human male excretes from 1.5 to 2 liters of body fluids, with pronounced reductions in the levels of sodium and potassium. By contrast a pregnant human female is expected, in 1 g, to show an increase of 1.5 to 4 liters over her pregnancy, with a marked retention of sodium. Since the development of the organism follows a strict sequence in which each event must take place within a critical period, and since the availability and composition of the body fluids is essential to the proper environment in the placenta, we can readily see that disruptions at the system level affect physiological processes at lower levels. At the present time it would be morally impermissible to have pregnant women in space.

The human body is resourceful; it may be able to compensate the effects of microgravity in a systematic fashion even during a pregnancy. But to determine whether it can, we must resort to experiments on animals.¹⁰ By removing gravity, then, we can observe how the development comes unglued; by "dialing" several degrees of gravity we can refine our examination. The mere fact that many systems function optimally at 1 g provides warrant for designing experiments to determine how the timing and feedback controls of development operate. This, it seems to me, is not a matter of small importance.

"Mere" systemic effects can have profound repercussions. A clever probing of them can reveal much not only about development but also about the operation of many physiological functions, including their coordination. This possible gain in knowledge may extend to the cellular level, in spite of the experiments on cells mentioned earlier. The cells of complex organisms are parts of cellular systems; for example, of specialized tissue. The role cells play in those systems affects in large part how the structural elements of cells operate. Those structural elements (called cytoskeletal) are responsible for communication among cells, transportation of plasmas, and maintenance of the cells' compartments. Changes in the environment of the cell lead to cellular changes in shape, in ability to move, and in internal metabolism (i.e., polarity, secretion, hormone regulation, membrane flow, and energy balance).¹¹ Changes that take place at the systems level in the organism, such as body fluid shifts, are bound to affect several cellular systems, are going to change the cellular environment, and thus are going to affect cells themselves.

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The experiments that put our minds at ease with respect to the action of gravity on cells took place in cell cultures; they did not examine cells that formed part of the complex wholes which are the cells' normal environments. It is not surprising that such experiments could not expose the indirect action of gravity that starts at the systems level of the organism and works its way down into the realm of the small.

Since genes contain the languages of life, and since organisms are the books written in that language, we tend to think that significance in biology goes from the small to the big. But we have just seen that much of the small depends on the big, since the function of the small depends on the larger whole to which it belongs (and that whole often depends on an even larger one of which it is a part, and so on). It is true, however, that genes are in some sense supposed to be independent of the organism's environment: theory demands that genetic variation not be coupled to the mechanism of selection (i.e., that the environment cannot have a hand in inducing the variations that are compatible with it, otherwise it would be possible to inherit acquired characteristics). Nonetheless, even if this demand is strictly interpreted,¹² many molecular processes may still be open to the influence from above I have just discussed.

It is also true that, in many areas of biology, real and fundamental progress is achieved when a strong connection can finally be made to the genotype of the organism in question; that is, when we can finally explain how the genes give rise to the mechanism or function in question. Be that as it may, it is misleading to think of genes as the embodiment of some sort of archetype that the organism will grow into, barring acts of God and other misfortunes. Given a certain genotype--and the right circumstances at many different stages of development--a certain individual organism will result. But at many critical junctures within those stages of development things could go slightly differently. The consequence would be a different organism.

The important point for our issue is that at those critical junctures, genes and the various structures to which they give rise take advantage of many environmental constants in order to keep their appointed rounds. Nature does not create everything anew and at once. It takes advantage of what is already there, it builds on the structures it finds in place, it develops not by reaching for an ideal but by a process best described as gerrymandering.

My suggestion is, of course, that the fine-tuning of several physiological functions for 1 g indicates that gravity is one of those constants that provide the context in which the language of life comes to make sense. Without it the human genotype would be expressed very differently, if it could be expressed at all. If my suggestion is correct, the manipulation of gravity can be used to much theoretical profit in connection with the study of genetics.

The reason comes from emphasizing some of the points already made. It is not easy to discover genes and then ask what they do. Often the question goes from the top down: given a certain function or structure, how do genes contribute to bring it about? This indicates that we need knowledge of all the other levels in order to guide genetics. Moreover, it is not necessary that all the alignments and states of equilibrium that many

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physiological systems reach be encoded in any one set of genes. Some genes may have been selected because they lead to the construction of an organ or function that finds accommodation with earlier organs or functions. And the genes that lead to those earlier organs or functions are now preserved because the new arrangements are advantageous to the organism as a whole.

The point is this: even if we knew what genes brought about the newer organ or function, and even if we knew all the steps in the construction, we still would not understand that aspect of physiology. For those genes and those steps make biological sense only against the background of the existence of those other organs or functions. And all these together make sense only in the context of whatever constants a form of life has come to take for granted. Thus, for example, the pattern of a net of nerves may not be encoded in the genes. The only "instruction" may be for the nerves to keep growing, but since the tissue in which they grow does not permit easy penetration, the nerves have to work their way around. The result is a very specific kind of net, although nowhere in the genotype could we find the "blueprint" for such a net.

The moral of this story is that knowledge of one level--even if it is "fundamental"--is very limited without knowledge of the other levels. But this more complete knowledge can be gathered only to the extent that we grasp the context in which genes find ultimate expression. And that requires the manipulation of constants in order to determine their role.

I have already suggested some reasons why gravity is one of those relevant constants. It may turn out, of course, that the actual threshold for the proper functioning of physiological and developmental is less than 1 g, that as soon as a gravity vector (direction and intensity of cavity) is detected things will work normally or almost normally. Determining that threshold is one of the important initial tasks of biology in space (that subdivision of the field is called "gravitational biology"), a task that finds no counterpart in doing centrifuge studies on the Earth.

It may also turn out that we can discover how to compensate for most of the systemic disturbances of the organism caused by microgravity over long periods of time. That would be ideal. Not only could we benefit from investigating the effects of microgravity on a variety of organisms, but we could do so without risking serious damage to the biologists carrying out those investigations in space.

The experimental and theoretical promise of space biology is thus far greater than we may imagine from glancing at a few reports of the rather pedestrian biological experiments that have been done so far. Two further considerations should give solid anchor to this conclusion. The first is conceptual; the second is historical. In a recent paper, H. A. Lowenstam and Lynn Margulis have argued convincingly that the ability of eucaryote cells to modulate their internal concentrations of calcium made possible the appearance of calcareous skeletons.¹³ The appearance of such skeletons in turn made possible, over 500 million years ago, the Cambrian Explosion, during which all the major divisions of life became established. The importance of this argument, for our purposes, is that calcium metabolism is one of the first things affected by microgravity.

Calcium ions in solution are essential for many physiological functions, including cell adhesion, muscle contraction, amoeboid cell movement, and--as it is now acknowledged--they are also used to transmit information between cells. Not only is the intracellular regulation of calcium essential to the function of eucaryote cells, it is also important in the genesis of tissues and embryos. The regulation of calcium seems to be one of those physiological functions on which nature has built a whole array of other functions. This key evolutionary role apparently began, according to Lowenstam and Margulis, when "prey, forced to escape from more effective predators, developed highly integrated sensory and motor systems that must have involved increased coordination and speed of the muscle system."¹⁴ These two skills depend on muscle contraction. And muscle contraction "responds directly to calcium release."¹⁵

Since the regulation of calcium may have been very instrumental in the evolution of complex organisms, and since life develops in a gerrymandering fashion, the biological importance of calcium may go far beyond what standard theory assigns to it. Determining that importance is precisely one of the areas where experimentation in space can be of advantage. This consideration thus provides one more reason for thinking that in space biology, too, exposure to new circumstances may lead to the profound transformation of our ideas.

The examination of the role of gravity in living things has paid off from the beginning. It was Darwin himself who first noticed that the tips of growing roots and shoots were used to detect gravity. "We now know," he said, "that it is the tip alone which is acted on, and that this part transmits some influence to adjoining parts, causing the latter to bend."¹⁶ The study of this influence, in a long series of experiments beginning with the publication of Darwin's work in 1880, yielded the separation (1920's) and chemical identification (1930's) of the first hormone known to make plants grow.¹⁷ Space biology seeks the opportunity to continue this history.

This completes the sketch of the heart of my argument for space exploration. Although the argument itself must tie many loose ends that I have not even mentioned, I must return now to my original purpose in discussing the matter.¹⁸ We often think of science as a pristine discipline in which disputes are decided by more or less clear rules interpreted by experts. This ideal suggests itself when we look at scientific laws and theories in their mathematical expressions. We know, of course, that the actual practice of science is messier than that. And if we think carefully about it, we may also conclude that the actual practice of science has to involve rhetoric. This may be a derogatory thing to say about the practice of science, but we may tell ourselves that as science approximates its ideal it gets away from the rhetorical influences.

I trust, however, that my discussion of space exploration shows that those rhetorical influences are not the shortcomings of human nature but essential parts of science, seen now as an activity and not as a frozen picture of its end product. In the first place, questions of justification arise in a rhetorical context. This means that what counts as a reason for what research to undertake depends on that context. Among the contextual elements we may include political and philosophical objections, economic circumstances, and the state of technology. The manner in which our

reasons satisfy the requirements of the context, or in which they change the context, determines to a large extent which science can be justified and which not. In the second place, as some of the examples make clear, often the testimony of experts about what is good, or even fundamental science, can be overturned, at least in principle, by enlarging the discussion to include elements from the rhetorical context which the expert is likely to ignore (cf. the cases of space astronomy and space biology). All this goes not to show that science is worth less but to make it appear more human. As it ought to be.

Notes

1. "Faith and Science," Report from the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1985, p. 1.
2. I have attempted a much longer treatment of the subject in my book in progress, The Dimming of Starlight: The Philosophy and Justification of Space Exploration.
3. I do not mean to suggest that these two categories of critics exhaust all the positions that can be taken against space exploration. But I do think they are the most important objections. An extreme version of the ideological objection would hold that space technology makes nuclear war inevitable. For a full response to this and other objections I can only refer the reader to my upcoming book, for unfortunately I cannot deal with them here.
4. See for example Paul Feyerabend's long discussion of Galileo's response to the Tower Argument, in his Against Method, NLB, 1975.
5. Radical Knowledge: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Limits of Science, Hackett, 1981.
6. See my "Pecking Orders and Rhetoric in Science," upcoming in Explorations in Knowledge, Spring 1986.
7. Scientists who oppose manned exploration on the grounds that it detracts from real space science often concentrate their fire on space biology. Writing in Nature, R. Jastrow said that the Space Station would be a tragedy, "...another two decades of original research on why astronauts vomit." (Quoted in Science Digest, May 1984, p. 142).
8. See "Pecking Orders..." op. cit.
9. For this general conclusion about the space environment, see G. R. Taylor, "Cell Biology Experiments Conducted in Space," BioScience, Vol. 27, p. 102. For an influential experiment on cultures of embryonic lung cells, see P. O'B. Montgomery Jr., et al, "The Response of Single Human Cells to Zero-Gravity," in R. S. Johnston and L. F. Dietlin, eds., Biomedical Results from Skylab, NASA SP-377, 1977, p. 221.

10. Of particular interest would be animals who exhibit a highly differentiated ability to distribute fluids (e.g., Gerbilline rodents). "Final Report of the Developmental Biology Working Group," unpublished (made available to me by courtesy of Dr. Emily Holton), p. 6.

11. Ibid. p. 5.

12. Every system of the organism tries to maintain homeostasis (a relatively stable state of equilibrium) against the next higher level, and the organism as a whole against the environment. Thus the genes benefit from many levels of homeostasis serving as a buffer zone against the environment. Nonetheless it is clear that the general environment sometimes will affect the intracellular environment and thus may conceivably act as an agent of selection against some pieces of DNA and in favor of others (at the molecular level, that is). This is not to say that acquired characteristics can be passed on, since the features of the environment that will favor some traits at the level of the organism are not of a kind with those that would act on pieces of DNA within the cell. That is what happens, for example, when a change in the cellular environment may permit a mutation to survive which will later be considered a defect of the organism vis. a vis. the general environment.

13. H. A. Lowenstam and Lynn Margulis, "Evolutionary Prerequisites for Early Phanerozoic Calcareous Skeletons," BioSystems, 12, 1980, p. 27.

14. Ibid. p. 36.

15. Ibid. See also, S. J. Roux, ed., The Regulatory Functions of Calcium and the Potential Role of Calcium in Mediating Gravitational Responses in Cells and Tissues, NASA CP-2286, 1983.

16. C. Darwin, assisted by F. Darwin, The Power of Movement in Plants, John Murray, 1880, p. 592.

17. Adapted from the Dedication to Charles Darwin in the Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the IUPS Commission on Gravitational Biology, Supplement to the Physiologist, vol. 27, 1984.

18. Among them, the connection between space science and exploration in general, the replies to different moves available to the ideological critics, and the evaluation of my philosophical conclusions as guides to political decision.

THE SCIENCE OF VALUES AND THE VALUES OF SCIENCE

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Forty years ago this week, the Enola Gay flew. She left in her wake the Nuclear Age, the Age of Anxiety, and the Age of Decision-Making. Government, to recoin Frost, became "play for mortal stakes," with a new vocabulary studded with talk of "irreversibility," slippery slopes, and "the rights of the future." Thanks to memoirs and countless articles, we know that the makers of the bomb developed by happenstance a discourse that made each step appear to be the logical outcome of previous steps, a discourse that internalized value judgments, making them case-specific to the matter at hand. There was an air of inevitability: someone would eventually build and use a nuclear device, so it was a race; thousands of Americans would die in an invasion of Japan, so the flight of the Enola Gay was a forgone conclusion. She apparently carried no regrets on her manifest.

One lesson to be learned from the decisions that led to the flight of the Enola Gay is that methods and structures of discourse do not only use values, they create them. This is not a new lesson. Aristotle made the point that means create unintended as well as intended effects; he thus bound ethics, politics, and rhetoric together so that they might present a united front to problems. This ethical binding of rhetoric has been the received wisdom among academics--witness our current fascination with the social-psychological side effects of mass persuasion. Nonetheless, our observance of this grim anniversary is a fitting occasion to call attention to just how little effect Aristotle's lesson has had outside academe, to how commonplace the decisions which launched the Enola Gay were.

We do not debate about ends, Aristotle said, but about means. He meant by that roughly what Hume meant by saying that reason always serves the passions. Instrumental reasoning can be guided by values, but not vice versa, because there is a difference in kind between reason and passion. Many otherwise different explanations of values share this view. Theologians hold value to be God's attitude toward objects, dimly sensed by man. Intuitionists say that values inhere in objects independent of our thinking. Analytic philosophers, e.g., Russell and Stevenson, see values as expressions of attitudes and as rhetorical instruments for tapping the attitudes of others. Hedonists equate value with feelings, e.g., pleasure. As these views would have it, values cannot be justified by reason because they are not acquired by reason. The ordinary language philosophers view the matter differently. Values are criticisms--prescriptions,

recommendations, or appraisals--justified by a field's conventions. As sociological facts, values may well be the preunderstandings of discourse, the dimly sensed, taken for granted assumptions which guide a field's talk. But they are not beyond reason--and thus not beyond analysis and critique.

Argumentation theorists have appreciated this insight and put it to work. In a way Durkheim would have approved of, a synergism has developed between thinking drawn from the sociology of knowledge, ordinary language philosophy, and Argumentation's traditional analytical and critical aims. Nowadays, it is standard practice to study values in terms of their organizing influence upon fields of discourse, their effects upon beliefs and their functions as premises in arguments.

But one implication of this thinking has not been fully appreciated, viz., that Argumentation is obliged by its own analytic assumptions to turn its value analysis on itself. If values infuse the discourse of fields in general, we shouldn't suppose that Argumentation is exempt from this effect. If we believe that a field builds its values when its structures its discourses, we should be attentive to the value-constitutive effects of our own discourse. We should pose such questions as a matter of reflective routine in a discipline. I want to pose them, however, with regard to the contributions Argumentation might make to a philosophy of the public sphere. Argumentation's most profound contribution to such a philosophy may well consist of its organized knowledge about the structure of deliberative discourse and its effects upon outcomes. But our thinking about debate as a way of structuring discourse has not kept pace with our thinking about values in general. The ordinary language shift has not been translated into our thinking about debate, which is still firmly rooted in the 18th century.

The sins of fathers are oft visited on sons. Argumentation, evolving as it did from 18th Century rhetorical and epistemological theories, bears a strong family resemblance to the sharp value--reason distinctions of Mill, Hume, and Bentham and their more recent ancestors Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross. And debate bears the stamp of this ancestry. Weber would have called it the paradigm case of instrumental reason, a vision we still carry as intellectual baggage into the contemporary dialogue concerning the place of argument in a public philosophy. Because we depend upon wholesale assessments of the public sphere's problems, we tend to think that public discourse is withering for the want of an argumentation theory. I believe that just the opposite is true, or at least arguably so: the public sphere has an argumentation theory; that theory's content closely resembles conventional thinking within the Argumentation discipline; and at least some of the most serious problems of the public sphere stem from its assumptions about deliberative discourses. If the Argumentation discipline became more influential, its effect would be analogous to injecting the patient with cancer in order to cure a cancer.

Argumentation scholars will, I believe, better serve their discipline and the commonweal by building upon two closely related themes. The first concerns the evils of treating discourse as instrumental rationality, a theme established by Weber, elaborated upon by Horkheimer and Adorno, and approached in a different way than I shall use here by Habermas. An argumentation theory based upon an instrumental view of decision-making is the problem of the public sphere. Discourse premised upon the instrumental view has perpetuated the rigid disjunction of fact and value that is our Enlightenment heritage. It creates a mechanistic, technocratically biased mode of discourse that, as Robert Socolow says, cannot express the things we care most about. The second theme grows from two different sources construed against the backdrop of Kelly's personal construct theory: J.L. Mackie's belief that values are constructs we invent and Robert Socolow and Laurence Tribe's arguments that the public sphere's failures of discourse stem from a failure to realize that we do--and more important, can--construct values. Discourse doesn't only use values, it creates them. As Tribe says, we cannot measure only the outcomes of decision-making, since the nature of the processes by which we reach decisions shapes our experience and expectations, thus designing our future value preferences.

Argumentation's View of Science and Technology

First I want to argue that the way we ordinarily describe the problem of the public sphere is incomplete. This will allow me to work up to the claim which follows in the next section, that some features of Argumentation itself are part of the public sphere's problem. This first step will establish a context for the second. The trickiness of context is a well understood phenomenon in Argumentation. We all know that debates have, as physicists say, extreme sensitivity to starting conditions. Their outcomes can be changed by even very subtle shifts in their contexts. But the shift I want to make isn't subtle. I believe that an argumentation theory grounded in a facile contrast between orders of knowledge will contribute nothing new to the structure of public discourse. If we persist in believing that science cannot research values, that it does not embody and create values, or that argumentation does not create values, we will set into concrete some already well entrenched prejudices.

While the philosophy of science has become increasingly social, the social world, it seems, has become increasingly scientific. Since Dewey's time, the public sphere has been studied and analyzed. This examination has yielded two very different diagnoses. To state them bluntly makes them caricatures of scientific versus humanistic prejudices, but since that's all I think they amount to, I will risk the consequences of putting them in blunt form: (1) the public sphere isn't scientific enough; and (2) the public sphere is too scientific.

Proposition (1) had its genesis in the debates among scientists and their non-scientific advocates in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries concerning whether scientists should have--and should actively seek--more influence upon public policy than they had hitherto been given. One conclusion of this debate was that scientists were obliged to ensure that their hard-won knowledge was not ignored and thus had a duty to seek influence in the political sphere. A picture gradually evolved which emphasized the ways scientific evidence gets distorted in the thrust and parry of daily decision-making--the public sphere being a mudhole filled with unrecognizable facts. Scientific evidence can speak for itself, all things being equal, until contaminated by the cupidity, credulity, obstinacy, venality, stupidity, and sheer cussedness of political life. No one, least of all Dewey, has fully believed so extreme a contrast. Nonetheless, the problem of the public sphere has largely been thought to lie here in the ways public decision-making falls short of science. This diagnosis has resulted in a remarkable unity among the remedies proposed: within its limitations, the public sphere should strive to emulate scientific inquiry.

Proposition (2) tends to be framed in eschatological terms, and it is profoundly anti-technological, if not antiscientific. We possess the technology to crush individual autonomy, to debase traditional values, and to make irreversible decisions with incalculable consequences in matters of environment, energy, population policy, and global politics and war. Technological achievements have created unparalleled wealth and comfort for a handful of the world's billions--perhaps at the expense of the Third and Fourth Worlds; yet our political institutions, all designed in the 18th Century, cannot keep pace with our problems. Low tech solutions in a high tech age. The most poignant case in point has been made by Goodnight--that the language of the public sphere has disappeared into the discourses of the specialized fields. Thus, "issues of significant public consequence, what should present live possibilities for argumentation and public choice, disappear into the government technocracy or private hands. As forms of decisionmaking proliferate, questions of public significance themselves become increasingly difficult to recognize, much less address, because of the intricate rules, procedures, and terminologies of the specialized forums."

Notice that the values of scientific knowledge and method are not at issue. Technology isn't equivalent to science, and it is the former that is at issue, especially with the most famous case in point, cost-benefit analysis. Its proponents and opponents often call it "science" rather than a "technique." This is sometimes a rhetorical strategy, since wrapping oneself in the mantle of a legitimizing label is a powerful way of ingratiating oneself to decision-makers and of defending and commending one's results to the public. The opponents of cost-benefit analysis do the same thing in reverse, hoping to capitalize upon anti-scientific sentiment. But when we boil their arguments down, the values of scientific knowledge and method are not, and really never have been, at issue.

Aside from such labelling problems, most of us, I think, would acknowledge an ambivalence toward these two claims. The problem of the public sphere seems more complex than either claim implies, so neither claim can be swallowed whole. Respecting proposition (1), for instance, we should acknowledge the possibility that Max Weber's famous claim that scientific inquiry cannot settle political disputes is mistaken. Scientific inquiry does solve political disputes. Argumentation theorists have achieved considerable agreement around the proposition that the public sphere uses two major methods of problem-solving--the law and science. Since the law uses scientific testimony in the same way political decision-makers do, we would be mistaken to assume that science cannot solve political disputes. Science is the public sphere's evidentiary standard. The public sphere is utterly dependent upon the argument-from-authority, and science is its paradigm case. Moreover, we can scarcely doubt that scientific inquiry is appropriate to at least some political issues. The testimony and leadership of scientists changed public opinion about nutrition, population control, health care, and the environment. Scientists, in fact, have played a worthier role in environmental disputes than we sometimes give them credit for. And the facts do count: we do not import panels of humanists to test bridges or assess nuclear engineering problems. The fact that political issues are sometimes more complex than scientific ones, strictly speaking, or that science cannot definitively answer certain questions, doesn't remotely impugn science or its place in political discourse. It merely makes it a piece of a bigger picture.

We likewise must acknowledge the truth we see in (2). Our decision-making institutions do seem to plod along, panting in the wake of events. Our horse-and-buggy public discourse, though occasionally charming, seems a quaint throwback--in the very worst sense of that term. We are so thoroughly enmeshed in the individualism inherited from the 18th Century that, as Habermas has read Weber to say, our understanding of rationality seems inextricably tied to instrumental reason. The language of instrumental reason has proven too light to carry the weight of current dilemmas. What passes for public discourse in America is embodied in what Burke calls "a blunt quest of advantage."

Their exaggerations aside, the defect of both claims inheres in our way of looking at them. We think like individualists when we define them. We thus lack a language adequate for defining them in any other way. Science is or isn't an ogre depending upon its achievement of our wants. Proposition (1) says that science is the best instrument for satisfying our wants; proposition (2) predicts that science will ride rough shod over our most basic wants. In either case, the satisfaction of human wants--or nonhuman wants in the case of the environmental movement--is our organizing paradigm. Since questions frame the horizons of their answers, questions posed under the aegis of individualism so bias our thinking that a full

blown, distinctively public discourse seems impossible.

Many scholars conceptualize the conflict between propositions (1) and (2) as one of facts versus values. Proponents of (2) thus claim that the public sphere reduces fragile values to quantities, distorting their essential natures or crushing them under the weight of numbers. Proponents of (1), oddly, use the same reasoning to reach the opposite conclusion: decision-making guided by values is vague and intuitive; values are imprecise, idiosyncratic, and proportionately beyond critique. Both sides, then, see values in terms of individual wants; both see values as a priori givens lying outside a debate, informing it, to be sure, but nonetheless apart from it. A higher synthesis of (1) and (2), if it isn't foreclosed by the heat of the rhetoric surrounding the two claims, starts with a recognition that the fact-value distinction in the policy realm is spurious.

Making Values

Values, I claim, are just like any other beliefs, except that people seem more willing to kill or die for them. This special quality doesn't mean that values are God's A's, or that they are soldered into the essences of things by a craftsman-like Nature and dimly perceived by intuition. It only means that values are sometimes sociological pathologies. It is all too easy for us to think that, while our values are rational contrivances, those of ordinary folk are pathological, like genetic disorders. Since values do seem to get transmitted by processes that, if we distort them enough, look like genetics, even in this enlightened age, we still treat values as mystical givens, on a par with demons and angels.

But it seems obvious that we make values, just as we construct any beliefs. Consider Habermas' development of a conception of freedom and its relations to discourse, or Kant's categorical imperative, or Rawls' exposition of justice as fairness, or the evolution of the containment doctrine. And it seems equally obvious that our methods of deliberating about beliefs affect our values. Habermas, Kant, and Rawls make strategic decisions in making their cases that frame our thinking about their results. Consider Tribe's argument:

The fluid character of means-ends relationships has long been postulated, and I have elsewhere argued that it ordinarily describes the actual situation not only during the process of choice but in its implementation as well. Indeed, I would hypothesize that most of the crucial environmental choices confronting industrialized nations in the last third of the twentieth century will be choices that significantly shape and do not merely implement those nations' values with respect to nature and wilderness. Such choices will do more than generate a distribution of payoffs and penalties to the

persons affected in terms of their preexisting yardsticks of cost and benefit. Choices of this type will also greatly alter the experiences available to those affected, the concomitant development of their preferences, attitudes, and cost-benefit conceptions over time, and hence their character as a society of persons interacting with one another and with the natural order.

For instance, if we frame the environmental debate exclusively on a quantitative, want-centered calculus, this will gradually change our most basic way of valuing nature. Certainly nature can be discussed in cost-benefit terms, but as Tribe says, environmentalists feel disingenuous in doing so; they are not saying quite what they mean; they are merely adapting to what they take to be the formal requirements of public debate. The danger is that pretty soon, they won't remember what they meant. As their thinking collapses more and more to debating in the mode of human wants, they lose their ability to express the idea that nature has importance in itself. They need not ignore human wants, but, as Tribe says, they must not ignore what they care most deeply about.

Why, we sometimes ask, are debaters--in and out of academic life--such authority-mongers? The answer is that debate is a way of structuring discourse which favors authoritarian appeals. Values emanate from practice and become sanctified with time. The more they recede into the background, the more taken for granted they become. Argumentation theories are, in a sense, nothing but amalgams of values. Consider, e.g., Robert Socolow's argument that "public debate is cloaked in a formality that excludes a large part of what people most care about." Current cost-benefit analysis practices, Socolow argues, are based upon golden rules, "prescriptions and routines that the analyst perceives to be a means of simplifying the tangle of options (and of staying out of trouble), but that prevent the analyst from taking full advantage of the capabilities the tools provide." Socolow cites as cases in point the perfunctory rejection of a proposal because it is not a multi purpose project and the ways numbers become immutable constants--indeed, they are sometimes written into law--once we forgot how they are derived. His conclusion: "to allow any minimum flow is to skew the discourse. Whenever a groundrule of discussion is that some standard or guideline is to be accepted as an on-off number, above which there is 'safety' and below which there is 'peril,' two vital kinds of discourse become illegitimate: discussions of acceptable damage, and discussions of damage limitations." Let us consider Socolow's development of the first point in full:

But people prefer appearance to reality. There is rarely any clamor to make trade-offs explicitly; it is enough for many that the compromises reached reflect professional judgment. Public discourse is thus dominated by solutions offered as risk-free . . . [examples are aviation safety, for which the acceptable fatalities per year are never discussed publicly, and military discourse, in which acceptable losses are kept hidden]. But neither the Mayor whose town abuts the airport nor the President preparing the battle plan can use such

language with his constituency. The larger the issue of public accountability (as opposed to professional accountability alone) looms in an official's mind, the less willing he becomes even to formulate a problem in terms of acceptable risk.

And obviously, it is impossible to discuss damage limitations unless one has first discussed acceptable risks. The very structure of the debate, therefore, skews the discourse in favor of ruling the deeper arguments out.

Values and Science

The false contrast of values with facts, of science with humane concerns, has spawned the assumption that present analytic techniques cannot accommodate values. Both Socolow and Tribe, via different arguments, are concerned with claiming that such an assumption vastly undervalues our analytic techniques. While abstractions are harder to express than quantities, "one must concede that there is nothing in the structure of the techniques themselves, or in the logical premises on which they rest, that inherently precludes their intelligent use by a public decisionmaker in the service of these intangible, or otherwise 'fuzzy' concerns." For instance, Argumentation theorists, who think like utilitarians when they make judgments of the outcomes of deliberative practices, nonetheless have easily and readily embraced Habermas' idea that argumentation be redeemable through discourse. A value of considerable abstraction has thus assumed center stage in a thoroughly utilitarian calculus. Another example, Tribe's, concerns the transference of distinctively human terms, the language of rights, to nonhuman entities such as animals. This linguistic strategy paves the way for a strengthened empathy for animals because it creates new possibilities for analogies between human and animal experience. Such a development, Tribe thinks, might further pave the way for a more sophisticated transference of rights to the environment itself--a view which doesn't depend upon seeing the environment solely in terms of its capacity to satisfy human wants. "What is crucial to recognize is that the human capacity for empathy and identification is not static: the very process of recognizing rights in those higher vertebrates with whom we can already empathize could well pave the way for still further extensions as we move upward along the spiral of moral evolution."

The Kohlbergian tone to Tribe's argument is doubtless intentional. Analogies between cognitive development and the evolution of intellectual traditions as in Toulmin's ecological model are common. But it is worth remembering occasionally that the structure of discourse is not fixed and that we should tinker with it as a matter of principle. If the structure of debate ordinarily disprefers compromise, and pushes us toward black-white, right-wrong decisions, this needn't be taken as proof that there is something sleazy, or at least too fuzzy, about compromises. The fault may lie instead in a debate format invented for simpler issues than are our lot today. If questions structurally prefer answers shaped to match the assumptive world of the questions, thereby guaranteeing that questions dictate their answers, can we not redesign the contexts of

cross-examination to accommodate to competing points of view? If we discover that the structure of deliberation leads us to conceptualize time as a scarce commodity, thus making us bend to the pressure of events, the compelling demands of time, far more than we really must, can we redesign discourse to incorporate the realization that most things are not as temporally urgent as we may think? If we find that the very structure of discussion and debate lead us unwaveringly to fasten upon the short run, thus muting the future's demands on our thinking, cannot our vocabulary be expanded, perhaps along the lines suggested by Tribe, to give the future a voice in present deliberations? The future, as Wenk has said, is not what it used to be. Our vision of decision-making was created in an era for which the future existed as a vast expanse of possibilities; we now see the future in terms of constraints.¹²

CONCLUSION

Most fields, I suppose, occasionally feel that the public sphere's failings stem from the want of their subject matter or from a failure to listen to their experts. But delusions of grandeur shouldn't masquerade as diagnoses. Most fields, arguably, could improve their collective mental health by occasionally acknowledging that it might be a disaster if the public followed their advice. Argument scholars should begin every project by considering that possibility. The field cannot complain that the theories of debate which comprise an important part of its subject matter have found no audiences outside the discipline's boundaries. Post-Jefferson, our public sphere is founded upon the 18th Century's model of debate. Important aspects of what we have taken to calling "the problem of the public sphere" may thus reside inside our discipline as well as outside; and perhaps steeping the public sphere even more in our doctrines would only intensify its problems. If we discover, as I think we shall, that we structure our deliberative discourse in such a way as to keep us permanently in the strategic, tactical, conflictive mode--and never in the contemplative mode--why shouldn't we consider the appropriateness of changing our way of talking about at least some questions?

At the very least, we have a glimmering of what it will take to diagnose the problem of the public sphere. While it is right to say that public discourse has disappeared into the discourses of specialized fields and that interfield relativity has held the public hostage to epistemic standards which are beyond public critique, these are partial diagnoses. Field relativity is an obstacle (in particular contexts) to achieving consensus; but describing the obstacle doesn't fully explain why we cannot surmount it. Perhaps we need to adjust our thinking about what it would mean to "surmount" it. Relativity, e.g., needn't be pathological in a political system based upon compromise and whose discourse practices do not insist upon naming epistemic winners and losers. Societies can, and often have, accommodated to and survived chasmic internal differences. The relativist's diagnosis, while right, doesn't completely describe what is wrong with our public discourse. There is at least nothing wrong with

considering the possibility that our theories are what's wrong with public discourse.

NOTES

¹See the review in Malcolm O. Sillars and Patricia Ganer, "Values and Beliefs: A Systematic Basis for Argumentation," in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds., Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983); Joseph W. Wenzel, "Toward a Rationale for Value-Centered Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (1977), 150-158; and Walter R. Fisher, "Toward a Logic of Goods Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (1978), 376-384.

²J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977); Laurence H. Tribe, "Ways not to Think About Plastic Trees," in Laurence H. Tribe, Corinne S. Schelling, and John Voss, eds., When Values Conflict: Essays on Environmental Analysis, Discourse, and Decision (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976); and Robert H. Socolow, "Failures of Discourse: Obstacles to the Integration of Environmental Values into Natural Resource Policy," in Tribe, Schelling, and Voss.

³Hence the label "policy sciences." See Harold D. Lasswell, "The Policy Orientation," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951); William Dunn, Public Policy Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981); and an example that is virtually a caricature of the point: David R. Anderson, Dennis J. Sweeny, and Thomas A. Williams, Essentials of Management Science: Applications to Decision-Making (St. Paul: West, 1978).

⁴G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1982), 214-227.

⁵Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

⁶Tribe, p. 68.

⁷Socolow, p. 2.

⁸Socolow, p. 6.

⁹Socolow, p. 9.

¹⁰Tribe, p. 64.

¹¹Tribe, p. 87.

¹²Edward Wenk, Jr., Margins for Survival: Overcoming Political Limits in Steering Technology (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979).

THE PATH OF LEGAL REASONING
IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES

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Appellate courts working day-by-day to make justice sensible or at least reckonable present a rich body of discourse susceptible to analysis by communication scholars. Perelman notes that justice is a prime example of a "confused notion" which like other philosophical concepts, "cannot be reduced to clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric."¹ Study of appellate decision making from the perspective of argumentation theory is now well established.²

But just as justice is a confused notion that resists clear definition, so is the reasoning that is used to justify concepts of justice. As argumentation research has sought to set out the reasoning used in appellate decision making, the need to consider the dynamics of the process has become clear.³ It is not enough to present an analysis of the reasoning in one case or even a combination of cases on a single issue. Analysis must now be directed at the process of judicial decision making over time on related issues.

The purpose of this study is to suggest a theoretical rationale for the processual analysis of judicial reasoning and provide a preliminary application of the method in the area of Supreme Court decision making in sex discrimination cases. The structure of our argument will begin with the support for the claim that the dynamics of appellate decision making require a processual analysis. We will then argue that the rationale of a processual analysis can be found by treating the appellate court as a task oriented group and looking to group communication theory for guidance. Finally, we will present an extended analysis of decisions on sex discrimination to illustrate the application of the method.

A few reservations must be stated even though they will quickly become obvious. First, no single work can fully characterize legal reasoning. There is too much scope and rapid change. Second, we are tentatively suggesting a rationale for a processual analysis and obviously it is applied in only a superficial way. If this first step seems to make sense, we will go on to do analysis in greater depth. Finally, we do not

pretend to have exhausted case law on sex discrimination. We have selected a few cases over time to try out our analysis rather than perform a detailed legal study of the issue.⁴

DYNAMICS OF APPELLATE DECISION MAKING

A logical positivist view of legal reasoning restricts the dynamics of appellate decision making to the study of case-by-case differences. That is, as long as legal philosophers held to the notion that the work of the courts could be circumscribed within the limits of formal deductive logic or science, then study of the courts' opinions was centered on how universal premises of law were seen by courts to apply to the endless flow of fact situations. The dynamic was in "law" rather than logic, which was changeless, and change in the law came not from courts' creations but from their "findings" as Constitutional, statutory, or common law major premises were related to fact situation minor premises.⁵

A generation of legal realists came within a hair's breadth of making the dynamics of appellate decision making a function of the variation from justice to justice. They saw both law and logic as idiosyncratic to individual decision makers or momentary coalitions.⁶

The application of argumentation theory to judicial decision making⁷ restored some order by suggesting that while the logic was not universal neither was it idiosyncratic. Using primarily the theories of Toulmin⁸ and Perelman⁹, scholars have charted some of the typical lines of reasoning and warrants used in appellate opinions.¹⁰

But such studies have, to date, tended to focus upon single cases or a few related cases and have sought to describe the collection of warrants or lines of reasoning used by the courts. They have, therefore, overlooked the process dynamic of appellate decision making: the path of legal reasoning. Brkic' says:

the formalized legal process. . . is dynamic. . . it has a contemporary dimension since it occurs in space and time; it also has a historical dimension for it evolves through space and time. It can be thought of as a happening sometimes manifesting sharp features and at other times a shading off of contours. . . . The dynamics of the legal process is such that, as it is directed by rules and principles, it also creates and modifies the existing ones.¹¹

The functional adequacy of legal reasoning depends on consequences, not essences.¹² "Thus the nature of legal reasoning may change correspondingly with changes in social needs."¹³

Judges act within a process that involves principles of reasoning, established substantive and procedural law, human and social facts, and the ethical ideals and moral practices of society.¹⁴ And, "each of

these fields is to an appreciable degree open, fluid, and ambiguous, offering the judge room to maneuver.¹⁵ The legal system is not insulated and rule-oriented, there are social reasons for formulating fresh law, and the need for ease and flexibility of change, in a rapidly changing society, is facilitated by severing justification of the decision from justification of the guiding rule of law.¹⁶

To summarize, the application of argumentation theory to the study of legal decision making resolved many of the difficulties found in the positivist and realist perspectives. Specifically, the argumentation perspective rejected the static image of the positivist and the chaotic image of the realist. However, the argumentation perspective has generated its own difficulty in the implication that judicial reasoning can be characterized as a rather stable field of argumentation through the itemization of a body of warrants or lines of reasoning. The difficulty is this: decisions are in actuality merely frozen moments in an ongoing process of judicial decisioning. To complete our theory of the field of appellate legal reasoning, we must develop some method to account for the reasoning transactions over time. We must find some way to chart the path of legal reasoning.

APPELLATE COURTS AS SMALL GROUPS

When appellate decision making is described as "rational," the flow or evolution of the law is charted on the basis of legal doctrine. Rational in this sense means conformity to the rules of logic, and in the clearly defined and routine decisions, courts remain quite able to state and follow doctrine. Rational behavior, says Perelman, is that which is in:

conformity to principles, to the spirit of system, behavior which chooses ends through knowledge of cause, makes use of the most efficacious means, and makes action conform to the results of one's reflections and designs, not allowing oneself to be held or led astray by the emotions of passions.¹⁷

The rational represents "anchors" or points of general agreement which can be relied upon as relatively solid warrants on which to base an argument.¹⁸

By contrast, Perelman describes the "reasonable" as a function of common sense. The reasonable person

is guided by the search. . . for what is acceptable in his milieu and even beyond it, for what should be accepted by all. Putting himself in the place of others he does not consider himself an exception but seeks to conform to principles of action which are acceptable to everyone.¹⁹

The reasonable represents "reach-tests" or conjectures beyond what is clearly established and agreed upon. Where the anchor rests upon established principles and agreement, reach-tests rely on conjecture, that which one believes ought to be established.²⁰

Perelman suggests that the rational was, for centuries, associated with the idea of natural law: "the rational in law corresponds to adherence to an immutable divine standard, or the spirit of the system; to logic and coherence, to conformity with precedents, to purposefulness."²¹ In contrast, "the reasonable . . . characterizes the decision itself, the fact that it is acceptable or not by public opinion, that its consequences are socially useful or harmful, that it is felt to be equitable or biased."²² When decisions are both rational and reasonable, the system functions smoothly and with high predictability. When there is a dialectic between the rational and the reasonable, there is a basis for movement of thought.

A judicial decision could be rational and yet, in the view of some (or many) unreasonable. The rational principles on which a decision is based may be (1) unjust or iniquitous as in those supporting the decision to remove Americans of Japanese ancestry from their homes at the start of World War II: national security was a solid rational principle, but morally the action was challenged as unreasonable; (2) or they can be given improper weight as in waste disposal decisions solely based on the principle of private property: free use of private property has been a dominant rational principle, but today it is argued that reason demands that it be balanced against the safety of the environment; (3) or they can be inadequate to the extent that the empirical facts on which they rest are misunderstood as in the question of whether separate can be equal: In 1985, the research data are not so one-sided.²³

Perelman summarizes his essay on the rational and the reasonable in a way that clearly provides the basis for our suggestion that group decision theory can lead the way to an analytic scheme for judicial decision processes:

Thus, the idea of the reasonable in law corresponds to an equitable solution, in the absence of all precise rules of adjudication. But it can be that recourse to the reasonable only gives a provisional solution, waiting for the elaboration of new legal construction which would be more satisfying. The reasonable guides this endeavor toward systematization, toward the rational systematic solution.²⁴

As we have already suggested, a concept of the rational and the reasonable can be compared to the small group concept of anchor points and reach-tests suggested by Scheidel and Crowell.²⁵

They describe idea development in small group discussions in terms of a spiral: the group establishes anchor points representing agreement and more or less circles those points with reaffirming discussion. Similarly, appellate courts set doctrine or legal principles (the rational) as anchor points and then circle them by case after case decided on the same basis.

In the spiral model, the group from time-to-time will advance a

reach-test representing the conjecture of an idea not previously agreed upon or within the scope of existing knowledge. Sometimes, the group refuses to affirm the reach-test, and discussion returns to the anchor points. Or, the group may provide support for the reach-test with affirming discussion, and the level of agreement within the group will expand slightly. Then the former reach-test becomes a new anchor point and the circle has spiraled. As the anchoring and reach-testing proceeds, the spiral enlarges.

In courts, from time-to-time a decision is conjectured on bases other than established doctrine and strict precedent, sometimes in a dissent representing a reach-test not accepted by the court, and sometimes in a majority opinion, there will be a time of reaffirming decisions following it in an effort to solidify the new anchor and move the reasonable into the rational. We would characterize the judicial process just as Fisher describes the spiral decision making process: "The spiral process is cumulative and progressive, reflecting continuous modification of ideas and backtracking to agree-upon ideas as members reconfirm positions."²⁶ As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor put the process:

Changes in the courts' agenda are generally a delayed response to changes in the nation's agenda. . . . Justice moves slowly and the courts arrive on the scene late. But once there we must usually linger for a while, and it often takes a series of decisions to flesh out a new statute.²⁷

We would add only that the courts stay to flesh out a newly established anchor point whether it came from a new statute or a reach-test within their own group. Makau discusses the development of reasonableness standards by the Supreme Court of the United States and argues that such standards must adapt to the "pragmatic demands of a changeable yet critical particular audience" and so must effect a "marriage of the pragmatic with the ideal."²⁸

Let us be clear about the position being taken. We are arguing that argumentative analysis of appellate decision making must include attention to the ongoing, process nature of groups of justices deciding various kinds of cases. To accomplish that task, we are suggesting that small group decision theory be applied. Specifically, we will claim that the Scheidel and Crowell spiral theory of idea development can be used to guide an analysis of the reasoning appearing in appellate opinions in selected groups of related decisions appearing over time.

Since strict rules forbid scholars from making even casual notes of judicial conferences, and since our focus is not actually on the unplanned interaction among groups of justices but rather on the carefully planned representations of the interaction that appears in written opinions, the application of group communication theory cannot be straightforward. Most often, opinions reflect the careful compromise of conflicting positions and thus do not reveal the original differences, with the exception of

dissents. For that reason, our claim that opinions reflect group interaction must not be taken literally. Instead, we propose using a small group metaphor to justify a modification of that theory to the legal context.

The metaphor is not, however, totally strained. Remember, appellate courts typically work in banks of three to nine people who must generate at least a majority consensus to reach a decision. Remember further that written opinions include the majority, concurring, and dissenting points of view, and in one sense we can directly observe justices "interacting" with one another. Most important, remember that our claims will not relate to the body of group communication data based on unplanned interactions directly observed. Rather we propose to generate a completely new body of group communication data: planned appellate reasoned interaction. And, we propose to analyze it with modifications of group theory.

On the foundation just laid, we can now rest the modified and simplified analytical framework we propose to use. First, reflecting Scheidel and Crowell's spiral theory, we suggest that appellate opinions on cases involving the same generic issues will

- (1a) reveal clear anchor points in the form of doctrine or principles that will justify most decisions;
- (1b) reveal reach-tests on a "reasonable" basis when a challenge to anchor points emerges;
- (1c) reveal circling to reinforce majority accepted reach-tests so as to erect new anchor points and establish a new concept of what is rational;
- (1d) reveal a spiral pattern of decision that may move in more than one direction.

Since precise definitions of these propositions in relation to judicial decisions cannot be made without greater testing, we propose to take their general sense from group theory into an inductive examination of decisions related to sex discrimination. As we compare the general concepts to the specific reasoning found in the opinions, we will suggest tentative definitions. In final discussion, we will comment on the extent to which the general concepts proved useful in making sense of the process or path of decisioning.

SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Sex discrimination law has achieved prominence as a constitutional issue relatively recently. Prior to 1970, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue only occasionally and, when a case was heard, the discriminatory statute was usually upheld.²⁹ In early judgments, the Court upheld such laws as Michigan statute which prohibited women from being bartenders,³⁰ and an Illinois statute which barred women from practicing law.³¹ In 1971, however, the Court decided the case of Reed v. Reed.³² In holding as unconstitutional an Idaho law which gives automatic preference to males as administrators of decedent's estate, the court struck down a gender-

based classification for the first time in its history.

In the years since Reed, a large number of cases involving gender-based discrimination have found their way onto the docket of the Court. Where the Warren Court decided many significant and pivotal cases dealing with racial discrimination between 1954 and 1970,³³ the Burger Court has, from 1971 to the present, been the adjudicator of many disputes concerning challenges of sex discrimination. Unlike the Court's fairly well-defined stand on how to review cases dealing with race, a consistent standard of review and judgment for cases with sex-based discrimination claims has yet to be formulated. As Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court in the 1981 case of Michael M. v. Sonoma, noted: "As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had some difficulty agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications."³⁴

The lack of consensus on what the proper course of analysis should be remains a thorny problem for the Court. Though it has established a variety of constitutional principles and procedural criteria which must be addressed, the Court has yet to iron out a settlement on how these are to be applied. Perhaps more importantly, however, the members of the Court are not in entire agreement on the assumptions which underlie even these principles and criteria. Most prominent among the disputes surrounding the proper course of analysis is the issue over what standard of review should be taken when dealing with a sex-based discrimination claim. Despite intense efforts by equal rights organizations and women's legal groups, a majority of the Court has refused to grant gender-based classifications the same level of scrutiny afforded racially-based classifications. Since the Court has determined that discrimination charges on the basis of race are immediately a "suspect" class of litigation, these kinds of cases are subject to a heightened level of judicial analysis called "strict scrutiny."³⁵

The effort by the Court to develop a standard of review to be applied to sex-based discrimination cases is marked by a history of tentative consensus and strong disagreement. Members of the Court have forwarded a number of approaches; some have been accepted, others rejected, and still others have been put on hold. The common thread that runs throughout all of the standards is that none have been embraced entirely by the whole Court. Yet, at each stage in the debate, a point of agreement, an anchor point, has been established. And, since the standard of review determines what kinds of conditions need to be satisfied in order for an existing law or statute to be upheld, the anchor points established and used by the Court control and confine the entire judgment.

The evolution of the standard of review question in sex discrimination litigation will be analyzed within the framework of the spiral decision making model. The emphasis here will be on pivotal cases which heralded an actual change in the standard as well as lines of arguments which attempted to effect a change but were unsuccessful in garnering sufficient

support to establish a new anchor point. Attention is paid to how the Court attempts to overcome the rational (the system that was and is) by recourse to the reasonable (the ideas that are and the system to be). By examining the lines of reason advanced to compel a new anchor point, the effort to resolve the dialectic between the rational and the reasonable is made visible.

THE RATIONALITY STANDARD

The first anchor position adopted by the court is found, as mentioned earlier, in the landmark case of Reed v. Reed.³⁶ In Reed, a reach test was used which argued that the criterion established in an earlier case not specifically designed for sex discrimination reasonably could be applied to a gender-based classification. Citing the 1920 case of Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,³⁷ Chief Justice Burger writing for an unanimous Court determined that a classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."³⁸ Based upon this standard of review, claims of unconstitutional gender-based classification were to be investigated with an eye for "fair relationships" which were connected to some legislative objective. The justification in the opinion was straightforward in its explanation. The question of law was decided by precedent alone; in using the "rational approach" derived from an earlier case, the Court established an anchor point from which subsequent litigation should operate.³⁹

While the direct appeal to the Royster precedent may appear to be a simple case of an application of the rational, the decision of the Court to recognize probable jurisdiction was another matter. Reed was not the only contemporary case to be appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds of sex discrimination, and it was not, most probably, singular in its characteristics. Why then was this case chosen and why was this decision the first one to overturn a law on the basis of an unconstitutional classification? Given the social atmosphere of the times which saw a rising interest in equal rights and a growing feminist movement, the answer suggests itself. The Court as a decision making body does not exist in a vacuum. Though it is insulated from political pressures by lifetime tenure, as Justice O'Connor noted, the Court recognizes and responds to changes in the social climate. As such, the Court's decision to review the case comprised an active choice and cannot be separated from the social context of the day. Though no claim is being made here that a direct link can be established between Reed, the influence of the women's rights movement, and the Court's noting of probable jurisdiction, there is a reason to believe that the Court recognized a need to address issues of this nature. To ignore these types of cases and refuse entry into a new era of judicial concern on sex-based discrimination would deny the reasonable. The rational system of traditional judgment needed to be brought up to speed with the public environment.

The Reed decision established the new anchor position from which subsequent claims of sex discrimination were to be examined. In choosing

a standard borrowed from a different genre of cases, Reed engineered the device through which gender-based classifications could be constitutionally evaluated. And, through the citing of Reed in later cases, the Court spiraled around this anchor and made it ever more authoritative and rational.⁴⁰

REJECTION OF THE SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION

The next important effort to define the proper approach to be taken on sex-based discrimination cases was the 1973 decision of *Frontiero v. Richardson*.⁴¹ In *Frontiero*, the Court struck down a federal statute that required women, but not men, in the Air Force to demonstrate that their spouses were dependent on them for more than one-half of their support in order to receive additional benefits. In writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan attempted to establish a new anchor point for the adjudication of sex-based discrimination cases. The effort was made to establish that sex, like race, was a suspect classification and was thus subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Brennan's attempt to reach test to a new anchor point, however, failed for it only garnered the support of four justices (including Brennan). As it takes a majority of the Court to establish an opinion as precedent and a number of justices rejected the strict scrutiny reasoning in their concurrences, the suspect classification and strict scrutiny aspects of the opinion did not become the new paradigm for deciding sex-based discrimination cases.

In the effort to make suspect status the new anchor point for sex discrimination litigation, Brennan based his arguments on three types of appeals to the reasonable. Paramount among Brennan's reasons for the Court adopting this posture is that women have been historically deprived of their equal status within society, often with the support of the law. Bolstering his analysis with citations of such works as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, Montague's *Man's Most Dangerous Myth*, journal articles from *Women in American Politics*, and studies like "The President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities, a Matter of Simple Justice (1970)," and "The President's Commission on the Status of Women (1963),"⁴² Brennan concluded that: "There can be no doubt that our nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism which, in practical effects, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.'⁴³ Brennan extended his analysis to argue that discrimination was not just a thing of the past but that "women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena."⁴⁴ In this line of argument, then, Brennan utilized historical evidence to advance the cause of the reasonable.

A second justification for the suspect status classification advanced by Brennan was based upon a historically derived analogy which emphasized the similarity between the treatment of blacks and the treatment of women. Brennan wrote that:

Throughout much of the 19th century the position of

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women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal guardianship of their own children. . . . And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right--which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and political rights"--until the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.⁴⁵

Once it was established that women, like blacks, had suffered discrimination at the hands of society and often under the auspices of the legal system, Brennan advanced the primary argument that sex is like race and thus should be accorded the same status with regard to protection from discrimination:

Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. *Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.*, 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). . . . As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. [citations omitted]⁴⁶

The justification Brennan generated was, then, based upon a framework of history and tradition. By comparing the treatment of women in America (which seems to be unfair) with the treatment of blacks in America (which we know to be unfair and unconstitutional), a strong analogy was made. Since it is well established both socially and legally that discrimination on the basis of race is wrong, by using race as a parallel situation, discrimination on the basis of sex should also be wrong for it rests upon the same assumptions about constitutional equality. The analogy that is made between race and sex is an appeal made on the basis of the reasonable. Though one half of the analogy rests upon the rational (discrimination on the basis of race is outlawed in legal precedent), the argument for granting sex suspect status rests upon the power of the reasonable (that sex is like race).

The third justificatory approach used to argue the suspect class status was to show that the legislative branch of the government was developing a recognition for equity in the areas of gender classification. By arguing that the people's elected representatives were attempting to formulate new principles of equality for the sexes, Brennan suggested that the Court should take note of these efforts and respond accordingly.⁴⁷ In a review of congressional action which cited the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Rights Amendment, Brennan concluded that: "Congress

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itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration.⁴⁸ In this line of reasoning, then, Brennan presented an argument that was responsive to action within another branch of the government. Thus, once again, this line of reasoning achieved its momentum through an appeal to the reasonable. If the people's representatives recognize the justice of absolute equality, it is only reasonable that the Court should acknowledge these efforts and respond accordingly.

The arguments rejecting the need to adopt a new level of scrutiny were based upon two straightforward lines of analysis. The first argument appealed directly to the rational. Four of the justices, though they concurred with the judgment that overturned the discriminatory statute, felt that the usual standard of review--the rational basis test--was sufficient in its scope to decide the case at hand. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued that:

It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding. Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which abundantly supports our decision today, did not add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect. In my view, we can and should decide this case on the authority of Reed and reserve for the future any expansion of its rationale.⁴⁹

Thus, in his denial of the need for the suspect classification, Burger retreated to the previous precedent and emphasized the sufficiency of the Reed anchor point. There was no judicial impetus for an appeal to the reasonable, the rational was entirely capable of rendering the appropriate decision. Since no dialectic existed between the rational and the reasonable in this case (the rational standards yielded a reasonable judgment; recourse to new standards established by the reasonable would not alter the decision), the creation of a new standard was judged unnecessary.

The second argument forwarded to deny the need for the Court to raise sex to the status of a suspect classification employed a similar to warrant the one Brennan used to support his third argument. Burger also argued that the Court should be sensitive to the current happenings within the Halls of Congress. More than sensitivity though, Burger suggested that the Court should exercise a high degree of judicial restraint and indeed defer any significant change in their classification perspective until Congress decided upon the proper course. Burger argued that:

By acting prematurely and unnecessarily [before the Equal Rights Amendment is approved], as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment.

It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action . . . does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.⁵⁰

Thus, Burger also reached outside of the rational to support his position. But rather than using the reasonable to advance something beyond the scope of the existing system, he used it to reinforce the need to adhere to the rational.

Frontiero illustrated the inherent difficulties under which the reasonable operates when it attempts to overcome the rational. Brennan's historical and analogic reasoning was a risky enterprise.⁵¹ The analogy in this case suffered because accepting the new standard did not depend upon a direct link to previous precedents. If the argument for the similarity between race and sex was denied, the argument for suspect status was non-binding and unpersuasive. Though it is true that all reasoning from precedent is, to a certain extent, analogic (for no two cases are exactly similar), an analogy built from historical rather than legal precedents is less legitimate in the eyes of the law. Therefore, the reasonable is forced to assume the burden of proving its legitimacy while the rational is granted its status automatically. Thus, the reasonable must employ arguments that are considerably clear and compelling in order to overcome the inherent advantages of the rational. In Frontiero, it would seem that the reasonable did not meet that burden.

The ease of retaining a perspective in law (i.e. the supremacy of the rational) discourages reach tests which attempt to establish a new anchor point purely on the momentum of the reasonable. In this case, Brennan's attempt to employ a new standard for deciding sex discrimination cases was met with resistance based upon a firmly embedded anchor. It was easier to stand on the solid platform of the rational than to leap to a new point of reference aided only by the power of what seems reasonable. The presumption rests with the existing precedent that appears to "do its job just fine," and it runs against the adoption of new principles that, at least in this case, would not have altered the outcome of the decision. In Frontiero, the majority of the justices did not feel impelled to abandon the security and sufficiency of the rational in favor of the more encompassing and, to a certain extent, restrictive perspective of the reasonable.

THE MID-LEVEL STANDARD

Though Frontiero was the last time that the suspect classification campaign was waged in the formal opinions of the Court, the debate over the proper scrutinizing perspective to be used was by no means over. In 1976, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in a case challenging the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute allowing females over eighteen to purchase 3/2 beer while prohibiting males under twenty-one from purchasing the same product. In Craig v. Boren,⁵² the reasoning the justices used in making their decision against the state established a new standard of review. This standard, however, unlike the one advanced in Frontiero, had the support of enough of the Court to become precedent to be used in

future litigation. In the opinion of the Court, Brennan wrote that in order to "withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classification by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. [emphasis added]"⁵³

The most striking aspect of this new standard was the lack of argument supporting the position. Contrary to the usual procedure of framing the proper legal questions to be addressed in terms of a listing of precedents which affirm it as the correct approach, Brennan's statement of the criteria for judgment was not followed by references to the precedents which established this perspective as the proper one to use. What did follow the "important" objective standard was a brief summary of what objectives the Court had found in the past to be insufficient to justify such a classification. The Court noted that Reed provided the direction that would justify invalidating statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy in light of more germane classificatory schemes. Thus, the argument was that:

Reed v. Reed has also provided the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification. Hence, "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, Schlesinger v. Ballard, concerning the financial position of servicewomen, Frontiero v. Richardson, and working women, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, could not justify the use of a gender line in determining eligibility for certain governmental entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the "marketplace and world of ideas" were rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes that were premised upon their accuracy.⁵⁴

The justification for the standard of review designed for sex discrimination cases was not developed from precedent. What was done, however, was to discuss the times the Court had used the theory in practice. Thus, the evolving case law of denied statutes was used to build this new standard. By a circuitous route, the Court "justified" this new position. But what were the arguments underlying this new position? Based upon the cases chosen to be included in his brief summary, it appears that Brennan wanted to demonstrate that traditional views of women can no longer be tolerated. Referring to certain orientations as "archaic and overbroad" and the view of women as homemakers, not thinkers, it seems as though Brennan was appealing to modern sensibilities. In this sense, Brennan relied upon the force of the reasonable, what we know as true--that which is commonsense--to defend the new standard against charges which attacked its lack of precedent, to withstand its departure from the system of the rational. Who would argue, asks Brennan rhetorically, that women should be limited to the home? Who would support the notion that women should not achieve parity in governmental entitlements? Who would fight to keep women out of the "marketplace and world of ideas?" By pointing to the types of injustices that the new standard would remedy, the argument achieved a sympathetic

posture. Through the creation of implied rhetorical questions or situations to which few would like to address publicly and attach themselves, the new standard achieved a momentum apart from any substantive legal issue. Brennan executed a successful reach test which established a new anchor point by virtue of an appeal to and dependence on the reasonable.

While some might not have preferred to address the questions raised in Brennan's opinion, Justice Rehnquist was undaunted. In a direct confrontation with the new standard, Rehnquist pointed out his disagreements with the Court's decision. He noted that the Court's disposition of the case was objectionable for a number of reasons, and primary among them was:

... the Court's enunciation of this standard, without citation to any source, as being that "classification by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." ([his] emphasis added). The only redeeming feature of the Court's opinion, to my mind, is that it apparently signals a retreat by those who joined the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson from their view that sex is a "suspect" classification for purposes of equal protection analysis. I think the Oklahoma statute challenged here need pass only the "rational basis" equal protection analysis expounded in cases such as McGowan v. Maryland and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. [citations omitted].⁵⁵

Rehnquist's analysis and indictment of the new standard never relinquished its grip on the point that the criteria were not founded on established legal precedent. He discussed the potential difficulties that would result from this new approach as well as the absence of a link to the Constitution. Arguing that the new doctrine "apparently comes out of thin air," Rehnquist suggested that given the difficulties the Court experiences with the two standards of review already existing, there should be considerable presumption against the insertion of another standard between the rational and the suspect standards.⁵⁶

Holding to his argument, Rehnquist also forwarded a sub-argument reminiscent of Burger's concurring opinion in Frontiero. In the course of his analysis, Rehnquist wondered why the rationality standard was dropped in favor of a vague substitute.⁵⁷ The rational standard would have conducted the analysis of Craig with the same level of integrity as the new mid-level approach did, and would have established a stronger link with the law in the process.

In analyzing these arguments it is surprising that given their rejection of Frontiero's arguments calling for strict scrutiny, the Court accepted a new perspective that was even less grounded in the traditional rational system. The use of notions that seem common and reasonable linked to previously decided cases enabled the justices to prepare for an

inferential leap made without the safety net of the rational.

Having created a new anchor point which lacked strong links to the "law," the new standard needed to be employed in order to maintain its saliency. The Court's handling of subsequent cases and its appeal to the mid-level analysis quickly established the case law that grants rhetorical legitimacy to a legal standard.⁵⁸ The standard of "an important governmental objective" was granted a credible judicial status through use. Though no precedent will be adopted by the Court before its time, once a new principle is introduced and accepted it will either flourish through use or wither from disuse. The origins of a law are not as salient as its case history. Once adopted into the system, it is the viability of the reach test which dictates its future, not necessarily its original link to the system. Thus, by rapidly developing a strong case law to bolster the new standard, the Court transformed the reasonable into the rational. Once codified through use, what was only reasonable is granted the systematic authority of the rational.

CONCLUSIONS

The model of process reasoning suggested in this essay offers a number of advantages for the study of appellate decision making. From an argumentation point of view, the focus on the entire opinion including the concurrences and dissents allows the researcher to more fully appreciate the "dialogue" which creates, reinforces and changes the law. By considering all of the voices manifested in a judicial opinion we can better understand future points of reference and gain insight into how legal doctrine evolves. Through examining the lines of argument advanced in favor of new positions, we can see efforts to make that which is common sense, that which is reasonable, into that which is rational. As the reasonable is often derived from popular knowledge in the social environment, we also gain an understanding of the culture in which the courts operate.

Similarly, the use of the metaphor of anchor points and reach testing yields a useful alternative to the static view of the logical positivist and the chaotic view of the realists. In emphasizing the path of legal reasoning as seen through a series of reach tests and anchor point circling, we can better understand the process of legal decision making. By realizing that present positions are, in part, the result of previous failed attempts at change and that future turns and anchors are determined, in part, by current reach testing, we can be better prepared to predict and account for future turns and anchor points in law. Thus, in viewing appellate court reasoning as patterned discussion, our attention is focused on the process law. The rationale for a processual analysis of legal reasoning articulated here allows for an investigation of argumentation over a period of time and attempts to emphasize the importance of appeals to the reasonable in order for "law" to overcome entrenched positions (the rational) and establish new principles.

As we noted at the beginning of the paper, we realize that this study

is by no means comprehensive of either legal reasoning or the case law of sex discrimination. This study is only a first step. The observations we make are tentative and provisional; further research is needed to confirm these conclusions and refine the model presented here. We are confident, however, that the basic system presented here is sound. Law, as a function and product of society, must be responsive to that society. The reasonable must be advanced when the rational scheme upon which the law is based is incapable or unwilling to render a reasonable decision. The tension which exists between the codified principles of the rational and socially based perceptions of the reasonable is what allows the system of law to move and create a new path.

NOTES

- ¹Chaim Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), p. vii.
- ²See: William L. Benoit, "An Empirical Investigation of Argumentative Strategies Employed in Supreme Court Opinions," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 179-195; Nancy Dunbar and Martha Cooper, "A Situational Perspective for the Study of Legal Argument," in Dimensions, pp. 213-241; and Stephen B. Jones, "Justification in Judicial Opinions: A Case Study," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 12 (1976), pp. 121-129.
- ³Sarah E. Newell and Richard D. Rieke, "A Practical Approach to Legal Doctrine," Journal of the American Forensic Association, (in press).
- ⁴The focus of analysis in this essay is on Supreme Court cases litigated on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Emphasis was given to those cases which were pivotal in challenging or changing existing decision making criteria.
- ⁵Martin P. Golding, Legal Reasoning (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1980).
- ⁶Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).
- ⁷See: Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyer's Reasoning (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Hubert Hubien ed., Legal Reasoning (Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1971); and Perelman, Justice.
- ⁸Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).
- ⁹Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1969).
- ¹⁰See: Jones, "Justification in Judicial Opinions;" Benoit, "An Empirical Investigation;" and Dunbar and Cooper, "A Situational Perspective."
- ¹¹Jovan Brkic', Legal Reasoning (New York: Peter Lang, 1958), p. 2.
- ¹²E.E. Dais, "Legal Reasoning and Value Ambivalence," in Hubien, Legal Reasoning, pp. 21-29.
- ¹³Dais, "Legal Reasoning," p. 21.
- ¹⁴I. Jenkins, "The Framework of Legal Decision Making," in Hubien, Legal Reasoning, pp. 289-294.
- ¹⁵Jenkins, "The Framework of Legal Decision Making," p. 293.
- ¹⁶H. Levy, "On Justification of Judicial Decisions: Some American Contributions," in Hubien, Legal Reasoning, p. 310.
- ¹⁷Chaim Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," in Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 118.
- ¹⁸See: B. Aubrey Fisher, Small Group Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1980), p. 142.
- ¹⁹Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," p. 118.
- ²⁰See: Fisher, p. 142.
- ²¹Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," p. 121.
- ²²Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," p. 121.
- ²³W.T. Blackstone, "Criteria of Adequacy for Judicial Reasoning," in Hubien, Legal Reasoning, pp. 233-242.
- ²⁴Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," p. 123.
- ²⁵Thomas M. Scheidel and Laura Crowell, "Idea Development in Small Discussion Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 50 (1964), pp. 140-145.
- ²⁶Fisher, p. 143.
- ²⁷Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Speech given at the Annual University of Utah Law School Alumni Banquet, 8 February 1985, reprinted in Res Gestae, 7, no. 2 (1985), p. 5.
- ²⁸Josina M. Makau, "The Supreme Court and Reasonableness," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70 (1984), p. 380.
- ²⁹See: Stephanie M. Wildman, "The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence," Oregon Law Review, 63 (1984), 272-276.
- ³⁰Goessart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
- ³¹Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
- ³²Reed v. Reed, Administrator, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
- ³³The most notable of the Warren Court decisions which propelled the racial equal rights litigation into its modern stature was, of course, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Discussions focusing on the impact of Brown in terms of its role as the herald of a new era in racial discrimination cases can be found, most recently, in: Michael Coniss, "The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker: A Historical-Legal Analysis of School Desegregation," Southwestern University Law Review, 8 (1982), 197-229; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, "The Supreme Court, The Equal

Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality," Virginia Law Review, 61 (1975), esp. pp. 947-950, and 957-961.

³⁴Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981).

³⁵For a legal history of this approach see: Gerald Gunther, "The Supreme Court 1971 Term; Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection," Harvard Law Review, 86, (1972), pp. 24-48; Judith A. Baer Equality Under the Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), chapter 5; Margret A. Berger, Litigation on Behalf of Women (New York: Ford Foundation, 1980), chapters 5-8; and "Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality," Harvard Law Review, 95 (1981), pp. 487-508.

³⁶Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

³⁷Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).

³⁸Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76.

³⁹We recognize that any use of precedent can be considered a reach test. The use of precedent relies upon similarity not on exactness. There is, however, a question of degree and it is on this principle that we use the metaphor of "reach testing." We are concerned about those reach tests which borrow a standard or criterion from an entirely different genre of cases. When a decision uses a precedent from a set of case law which is not similar in the basic charges brought in the case at hand, we consider this more of a reach test than the normal use of precedent. Thus, on a continuum, we are using the concept of reach testing to denote those uses of precedent and other forms of argument which go beyond the normal boundaries of reasoning from legal fact similarity.

⁴⁰In terms of Supreme Court opinions alone, Reed has been cited seventy-two times since the original decision was handed down. Thirty of those cites occurred in the first five years following Reed. See, for example: Frontiero v. Richardson, Secretary of Defense, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1974); Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Wiesenfeld 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Michael M. v. Sonoma, 450 U.S. 464; Rokster, Director of Selective Service v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); and Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).

⁴¹Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 677.

⁴²Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 684-686.

⁴³Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 684.

⁴⁴Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686.

⁴⁵Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 685.

⁴⁶Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 686-687.

⁴⁷Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 685-687.

⁴⁸Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 687-688.

⁴⁹Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 691-692.

⁵⁰Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 692.

⁵¹For a discussion of the reasoning deficiencies peculiar to the analogy, see: Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), pp. 165-167.

⁵²Craig v. Boren, Governor of Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

⁵³Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.

⁵⁴Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-199.

⁵⁵Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 217-218.

⁵⁶Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 220-221.

⁵⁷Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 217-218.

⁵⁸In terms of Supreme Court Opinions alone, Craig has been cited forty-eight times since the opinion was written in 1976. See, for example: Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256; Wengler v. Druggists Mutual, 446 U.S. 142; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455; Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57; and M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. H. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984).

STORYTELLING IN OPENING STATEMENTS:
FRAMING THE ARGUMENTATION OF THE TRIAL

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Opening statements in judicial proceedings are somewhat unique as speech situations. As a type of argumentation the opening statement presents a very special case. Opening statements cannot, according to trial procedure, be argumentative. The United States Supreme Court has limited opening statement to the purpose of informing "the jurors concerning the nature of the action and the issues involved" and giving them "an outline of the case so that they can better understand the testimony."¹ However while the opening statement is nonargumentative, it is the anticipation and promise of what is to come; thus, it is also the quintessence of argument, for this segment of the trial must persuade without appearing to do so.² For this reason, opening statements provide a crucial but unusual form of argumentation in criminal trials.

Authorities on trial advocacy suggest that the opening statement is one of the most important phases of the argumentative process and, therefore, also the most significant aspect of any criminal trial. Effectual advocates suggest that there is no single tool which has more potential for securing a favorable verdict than the opening statement which frames the perception of jurors so they will anticipate and interpret the discourse of the trial according to a particular theory of the case. For example, James W. Jeans concludes that if advocates convince juries of their theory of the case during opening statement they have a "four out of five" chance of winning their case.³ Similarly, Craig Spangenberg emphasizes that the opening statement is crucial to the trial proceeding. He stresses that if faced with the necessity of choosing just one time to speak in the trial, he would select the opening statement. Taking an even more specific point of view, Allan E. Morrill recommends that advocates in opening statements should "paint a picture in the mind's eye" through the use of words.⁴ Moreover these words focus the attention of jurors on the lines of reasoning they should adopt for the entire trial proceeding.

This essay conceives of opening statements in criminal trials as a genre of legal argument. In doing so, we (1) examine the theoretical assumptions of genre analysis and narrative argument, (2) provide a model for classifying and evaluating opening statements in criminal trials, and (3) apply this theory to a contemporary and an historical trial.

This study is significant in several ways. First, it continues research emphasizing implications of theories of argumentation for the study of law. Second, the study analyzes historical trials to verify current research results about contemporary proceedings. Third, our essay integrates research from the legal profession with that of theorists in argumentation. Finally, the essay explains how opening statements function as part of the larger chain of reasoning in trial proceedings.

In their analysis W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman conclude that effective advocates achieve favorable verdicts by telling believable stories to jurors. By binding together large volumes of complicated and disjunctive argumentation, the advocates can provide a persuasive connective thread for the entire proceeding. Stories told in trials fit with Walter R. Fisher's conception of narrative argument. He believes narrative works as a justification for beliefs and values by applying description which "offers an account, an understanding, of any instance of human choice and action."⁵ Thus stories influence verdicts in criminal trials, when jurors use the stories of their lives "as a basis for judging the stories" told in opening statements.

Whereas storytelling is the form underlying the narrative argument of the opening discourse, the genre of opening statement itself is more complex. An analysis of genre must demonstrate the similarity between historical and contemporary examples of opening statement, specify this type of argumentation as a distinctive kind of discourse in the trial proceeding, examine the internal workings of the discourse, and specify the contexts, motives, and effects of this segment of the trial.

Jackson Harrell and Will A. Linkugel explain genre theory as a method for classifying discourse according to its type or kind.⁶ This method of categorizing discourse identifies the norms and central tendencies of a representative sample, catalogs "linguistic and organizational" features of the discourse, and maps the course to be followed by future speakers who may wish to develop this kind of discourse. Delineating genre is possible, because one group of discourse "shares some

important characteristics" which distinguish it from other discourse.⁷

Since there are "a limited number of ways" to respond rhetorically to any "given situation type," and since situations recur historically, they spawn similar responses to speakers in common situations.⁸ Thus, opening statements constitute genres of discourse because there are a limited number of ways for attorneys to achieve a rhetorical purpose when legal contexts and restraints are similar. In sum then, one genre distinguishes itself from another by its unique form, content, and style; is generalizable to similar discourse from different historical periods, and offers a norm or standard by which similar types can be compared.⁹

The opening statement is a narrative argument or story which enables a cast of courtroom characters to follow the development of a case and reason about the issues in it. Although Bennett and Feldman view all processes of the trial as contributing to a common story, it is the opening statement that outlines the plot, describes the characters, depicts the setting, attributes the motives, and portrays the action of the story.¹⁰

In opening statement, the advocates develop the crucial parts of their theory of the case by presenting a kernel of a story. Seymour Chatman explains that these kernels are "nodes or hinges" in the narratives; that is, they are major claims that underlie the advocate's theory of the case. The nodes in an opening statement supply the incidents that explain why a crime does or does not fit the allegations of the criminal indictment. Even though the story of opening statement must be brief, it weaves a core narrative that becomes the central interpretive framework for the entire trial. Whereas the kernel is the skeletal story, satellite narratives fill out, elaborate, and extend the narrative through the information gathered during the examination of witnesses.¹²

The effectiveness of the argument in a criminal trial depends on the ability of attorneys to persuade the jury by reflecting "the social understanding common in society" and incorporating "changes in these understandings over time."¹³ The story works as a "frame" for interpretation; that is, it imposes structure on diverse information, forces images to coalesce within the story, and establishes consistency among characters, setting, motive, and action.¹⁴ Moreover, this type of narrative argument permits jurors, who are often unsophisticated and from diverse backgrounds, to find common interpretations, to compare competing stories from the prosecution and defense, and to make sense out of large quantities of isolated and

diverse bits of information presented during the course of the trial.

Stories, then, are vehicles for assisting jurors to interpret courtroom argument and to understand an advocate's theory of a case. The opening statement is important to trial outcome because it previews, outlines, and directs the more developed chain of reasoning that emerges in the trial. As a genre, opening statements reveal common form, content, and style.

Form

Form is the connective structure of discourse. Kenneth Burke views form as "an equational structure" that gives a pattern and shape to the discourse.¹⁵ Bennett and Vivian Dicks show that stories in criminal trials are linked together by definition, connecting evidence, and credibility.¹⁶ More specifically, definition locates the central action of the story, focuses on the key elements of the narrative, and graphically depicts the accused and the witnesses. Then, by way of inference or linking, advocates relate evidence in such a way that certain persons are directly connected to specific key events and actions. In doing so, advocates lay the foundation for refutation of opposing witnesses and develop strategies of vilification that will degrade the opponents and their witnesses. In this way, the story of the opening statement is the key for connecting all participants and actions depicted in the trial and for establishing a perceptual framework into which all subsequent discourse should fit.

Content

Whereas form supplies links between ideas, content presents the ideas themselves. Content includes the justifications offered to the jurors to persuade them to vote for acquittal or conviction. The content of opening statement seeks to meet several purposes of this phase of the trial process: to promote the theory of the case, to introduce what evidence will reveal, to educate the jury with regard to legal standards with which they may be unfamiliar, and to appeal to the jury in an effort to gain a favorable decision.¹⁷ The content of the story reflects traditional factors studied by social scientists such as issues, strategy of presentation, and tactics to induce resistance to persuasion.

Qualities of the content deserve further explanation. Issues include major claims of the case and their accompanying legal evidence. For example, the issues in a criminal trial stem from the criminal indictment and concern such actions as whether persons committed murder in the first, second, or third degree; persons conspired to

overthrow the government, or persons committed rape or criminal assault against another person. The issues are bound closely to the pleadings and the indictments. Advocates choose a strategy of presentation when they decide whether to present a one or two-sided argument. Most opening statements are one-sided arguments that attempt to identify the interests, needs, and values of the jury with the theory of the case of the prosecutor or the defense. To be persuasive advocates must develop narrative arguments that show their theory of the case is more probable than the theory presented by the opposition. To do this attorneys might describe their clients or the victims as family persons who are active members of the community and who hold positive reputations and, in doing so, develop the elements of character and motive in the stories of the opening statement. Thus, content is the personal and legal substance of the case presented in the narrative of opening statement.

Style

Whereas the form is the connecting structure of the discourse and the content consists of the issues, the style is the linguistic embellishment of the discourse. Just as in any act of storytelling, the story must be told in ways that engage the audience through the use of repetition, powerful verbs, carefully chosen adjectives, the use of the active voice, and imagery and metaphor.¹⁸ The dramatic story of an opening statement should heighten jurors' awareness about the chain of reasons to be developed in subsequent parts of the trial.

The style of the advocate who presents the opening statement should parallel the style of an effective storyteller. Thus, advocates should repeat key claims which reflect the point of the story; that is, reasons why the accused is either legally guilty or innocent. For example, advocates might develop the chronology of the story of the characters and actions which result in the indictment of an accused, and the corresponding dramatization of the narrative must appeal to the attitudes and feelings of the jurors. Advocates should use imagery and metaphors to develop narrative appeal, language, which in turn, enhances the story and involves the listeners. For example, prosecutors might picture the accused as a vicious animal stalking victims in the night and defense attorneys might picture that same person as a victimized and mentally ill veteran of Vietnam who has no control over his actions. Or advocates might choose metaphors that add vividness to the story, by denoting one kind of idea or object in place of another or by suggesting an analogy or likeness between ideas, objects, or people.¹⁹ Advocates often use metaphors as they compare the accused to demons

and traitors and their acts to destructive accidents, storms, or devastation. In this way, advocates use language to draw jurors into the reality of the stories they present in their opening statements.

Evaluative Standards

In addition to parallels between the form, style, and content, genres of opening statements should show similarity between contemporary and historical types. One testament to their similarity is that the advice to trial advocates about the content and style of opening statements in the time of Cicero is quite similar to that found in current textbooks on advocacy. For example, Cicero recommends that an advocate develop the exordium, the opening part of a trial, by inflaming the court by way of pathetic proof, using language designed to arouse emotions, appeal to sympathy and pity, and stir the audience.²⁰ Additionally, Cicero recommends that advocates should state the case, define the dispute, and then establish the allegations.²¹ Adopting similar advice, Thomas Mauet, a contemporary theorist of trial advocacy, advises that opening statements should be delivered forcefully, state facts of the case and be "organized in a manner that communicates clearly to the jury."²² Although neither specifies directly that the advocate tell a story, both recommend narratives that appeal to attitudes and use elevated and embellished language.

The stories told by advocates in criminal trials can be assessed in two ways: by what effects the discourse has on the participants in the courtroom and by how the story of the opening statement frames the chain of reasons that evolve in the remainder of the trial. The effects depend upon the purpose, context, and audience of the trial. To achieve their purpose, advocates must tell a story that performs the following functions: clearly simplifies and emphasizes the issues, introduces and characterizes witnesses, establishes logical connections between acts and persons, and describes in detail the scene and motive of the alleged crime.²³

The context is the historical setting in which a crime and the subsequent trial proceeding occurs. This context embodies the prevailing public values and needs as well as commonly held prejudices and stereotypes. Contextual factors such as the religious fervor of the fundamentalists of the rural South affected the outcome of the Scopes Trial, and the communist hysteria of the 1950's entered into the decisions about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

Whereas context determines the public mood, the audience of jurors are the decision-makers who judge the

trial. The audiences for opening statement consist of a primary audience (the judge and/or jury),²⁴ a secondary audience (the press and courtroom spectators),²⁵ and a universal audience (all reasonable people).²⁶ These audiences hear, interpret and judge the merit of the story. Moreover, advocates should adjust the form, content, and style to the jurors they seek to convince.

Determining how the story works provides another mode of evaluation. Fisher suggests that narrative argument succeeds with an audience when it is consistent, accommodating, corroborated, and convergent with audiences.²⁷ Thus in a criminal trial, the story should provide persons and actions that are consistent with the facts of the case; establish the motives consistent with the credibility of those who testify; accommodate the story to the images and metaphors likely to represent the experiences of jurors; confirm the interests, values, and attitudes of jurors, and fit the story so that it converges with the prevailing public mores and perceptions of justice. Thus jurors decide verdicts by reflecting upon the competing stories of the defense and prosecution and choosing the narrative that they believe gives the most reasonable account of the action. For them, reasonable means the narrative of the case presents a probable explanation that fits with the jurors' knowledge and experience of human behavior.

Analysis of Trials: Chicago Anarchist and Chicago Eight

This essay illustrates the genre through a case study of the opening statements of the prosecution and defense in the Chicago Anarchists trial of 1886 and the Chicago Eight trial of 1969 by giving a brief synopsis of the competing stories of the trial, analyzing their qualities as genre, and evaluating their effects.

Synopsis of Trials

On May 4, 1886, a meeting of workmen was called in the Haymarket district of downtown Chicago for the purpose of discussing the worsening conditions of labor in the city. As the meeting approached a close, several policemen entered the crowd and ordered the meeting to disperse. At the same moment, a dynamite bomb was thrown into a crowd of policemen. Seven police officers were killed and 60 more were seriously wounded. The defendants in this case were charged with conspiring to murder and being accessories before the fact in the death of a policeman killed in the bombing.

The prosecutor's interpretation of the events that

transpired included portraying the defendants as conspiring maliciously to destroy property and person and endeavoring to make anarchy rule. The prosecution stated further that while none of the defendants may have personally thrown the bomb, they each abetted, encouraged, and advised the throwing of it and, therefore, were guilty of conspiring to commit the "most fearful massacre ever witnessed or heard of in this country."²⁸

The lawyers for the defense, on the other hand, promoted a story that the defendants were not at or near the Haymarket when the crime was committed, that the meeting had been orderly, that none of the defendants had resisted the police, and that the defendants had assembled peaceably to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Over eighty years after the Haymarket conspirators were convicted and sentenced, another equally controversial case involving a charge of conspiracy took place in Chicago. In 1969, the federal government charged eight defendants with "conspiracy to incite riot." All defendants were representatives of anti-war groups who had gathered to demonstrate at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.

The case of the prosecution resembled the Haymarket trial in that it also sought convictions for conspiracy by claiming that the eight Chicago protestors solicited others to protest, violated city ordinances, made unreasonable demands on the police, and overtly incited others to riot. The prosecution argued that these men planned and organized the riots during the political convention.

Adopting a very similar approach to the case of the Haymarket defendants, the advocates for the Chicago Eight emphasized the First Amendment rights of the defendants claiming they indeed had a constitutional right to exercise free speech and to assemble. Additionally though, the defense claimed the Chicago eight assembled independently and they had no previous associations with each other. Finally, the defense accused the state of using force and illegal means against the defendants who were "merely exercising their legal rights."

Form

In the historical trial, the opening statement of the prosecution defines the central action of the story as one of anarchists conspiring to maliciously destroy life; describes in detail the acts of the conspiracy, telling the jurors what subsequent testimony will reveal; graphically depicts the elements that are necessary for a conspiracy charge; and connects the evidence by stressing that the defendants have upon many past occasions openly and publicly commented on the need to adjust the wrongs

against man "by bloodshed, by dynamite, by pistol, by Winchester rifle."²⁹ Thus the advocate infers that this current attack on humanity is in keeping with the past behavior of the defendants. Furthermore, the prosecution vilifies and degrades the defendants as persons.

In contrast, the defense presents a story emphasizing the individual rights of the accused; focuses the jury by urging them to "weigh the evidence as it bears upon that charge"³⁰ of murder and upon that charge alone; and describes the central characteristics of the law. Then the advocate connects the evidence by linking the fact that our system of government allows men to believe and express their thoughts "whether they be inimical to present institutions or whether they favor them,"³¹ and by explaining that the defendants only tried to better the workingman's conditions; that is, "they inaugurated every movement that tended to alleviate the conditions of the workingman and allow him a greater time to his family, for mutual benefit."³² Additionally, the defense refutes the prosecution's theory that the defendants conspired maliciously to destroy property and person. They also vilify their opponents, accusing the police of devilish behavior and accuse a prosecution witness of being a "professional and constitutional liar."³³

The form of the opening statement of the Chicago Eight is similar to that of the Haymarket case in that the prosecution makes connections between the law of conspiracy and the actions of the defendants. The state also posits that the eight defendants all belonged to the National Mobilization Committee to end the war in Vietnam and in this group planned and organized the riots at the convention. Specifically, the prosecutor describes the acts of defendants as recruiting, organizing, and inciting people to riot.³⁴ Initially, the prosecutor infers that the defendants belonged to the committee, then claims that the committee's purpose was to incite riots, and finally concludes that they engaged in acts such as building explosives, using guerilla fighter techniques, making chemical weapons and training persons how to resist arrest. Through this chain of reasoning, the prosecutor tries to show that the eight defendants planned and incited the riot. To vilify the defendants, the government attributes both evil language, vicious motives, and excessive behavior to the defendants.³⁵

The defense of the Chicago Eight resembles the narrative argument of the Haymarket defendants. The defense begins the story by focusing on the defendants peacefully protesting in the "finest American tradition of the National Convention of the party in power,"³⁶ and

clarifies the concept of protest--stressing that the Constitution gives the defendants the conscious right to demonstrate and protest in an organized manner. The defense links the assertion "that the police in this city embarked on organized conspiracy of berserk brutal action against these demonstrators,"³⁷ showing that not only is the premise of the prosecution's case inadequate, but through the use of vilification it is implied that the state is deliberately evil. Finally, the defense uses the strategy of refutation, stating that "the real conspiracy in this case is the conspiracy to curtail and prevent the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and related issues,"³⁸ and further, questions the credibility of the system of government thereby rendering the government's case vulnerable to the test of reasonable doubt.

Content

The content of the opening statement of the prosecution of the 1886 conspirators emphasizes that the defendants conspired to throw the bomb and destroy life. The state supports its case with the following proofs: the past actions of the defendants are in keeping with this aggressive behavior; the defendants are all active anarchists seeking to impede law and order; the defendants used the labor movement as a vehicle for expressing their views and attacking institutions; and the defendants had knowledge of bomb manufacturing. Using a one-sided story of the issues, the prosecution promotes the state's charges.

Whereas the prosecutor frames his story into a logical series of claims about the defendants, the defense tells two stories; each with different issues and a different logic. In the opening statement of the defense, the advocate answers charges about the motives and character of the defendants.³⁹ Their issues are not an independent and probable story but instead a refutation of the issues and evidence of the prosecution. In effect the defense narrative re-presents the narrative of the prosecution for interpreting the issues. At the same time, the defense adds a scenario of its own by claiming that the defendants did not throw the bombs nor were they in the vicinity of the crime. The defense tries to anchor this story to juror values by appealing to the basic rights of persons as guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the right to believe and express thoughts whether or not these thoughts support present institutions, to assemble peacefully, and to work to improve the conditions of the laboring persons. Thus, the narrative is a story about hard-working men exercising their First Amendment rights.

Even though the Haymarket case charges the defendants with murder and the Chicago Eight indicts its defendants for inciting riot, both prosecutors and defense develop

common issues and evidence for their cases. Just as in the 1886 trial, the prosecutors of the 1969 case build their opening statement story around issues and evidence of conspiracy and attack the credibility of the defendants. The prosecutor of the contemporary trial stresses the legal definition of conspiracy and then gives a one-sided narrative specifying factors of the character of the defendants which show them to be probable conspirators. Their credibility is the main issue of the story since the state claims that the defendants demonstrated before, leaked plans to disrupt peaceful protest, knew skills for making chemical weapons, and practiced guerilla tactics. The prosecutor anchors the issues to values of jurors such as the need for law and order, public control, and personal decency in ways similar to the prosecution of the Haymarket case.

The content of the defense for the Haymarket resembles that of the Chicago eight in its anchoring of issues to jurors' values. However, the defense of this contemporary case presents an independent narrative giving a one-sided story of their case and refrains from a refutative scenario such as the one presented in the Haymarket case. Instead the defense offers an alternative explanation of the events. Specifically, the Chicago Eight defense argues that the defendants have a right to protest peacefully the policies of the Democratic party on the war in Vietnam. The defense asserts the following proofs: the demonstrators wanted to influence the adoption of a new party platform; the city officials were determined to prevent the planned protest; the defendants wanted to demonstrate meaningfully against the war, and they exhausted every avenue in an effort to gain the permission of the city to do so.

The defense anchors the issue of protesting and demonstrating by associating these acts with behaving in the "finest American tradition."⁴⁰ Then the defense links the attack on the defendants to all American citizens, stating that everyone's right to protest in a meaningful fashion as guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution is being questioned.

Style

Given the tumultuous times and the violent circumstances in which both trials occurred, it is not surprising that the language of the opening statements of both trials is overstated and highly dramatic. In the 1886 case, the prosecution and defense stories engage the audience in their narratives with repetition, imagery, and metaphor.

The prosecution constantly repeats the words "conspiracy" and "anarchy" and uses other emotionally

laden words to assault the character of the defendants. For example, he uses phrases to cast the defendants in roles of evil, cowardly men who are plotting to "ruin our laws and our country."⁴¹

On the other hand, the defense in the Haymarket case stresses that the defendants were just exercising their rights. The defense uses imagery of suffering servants to show the defendants as men who "endeavored to better the condition of the laboring man. . . . it was to raise them above constant labor and constant toil and constant worry and constant fret, and to have their fellow-men act and be as human beings and not as animals."⁴² The defense uses the metaphor of false testimony to describe the witness Gilmer as a "constitutional liar" whose testimony is so false that it "would fall of its own weight," and thereby interrelates the perceptions of falsity with probability.⁴³

The prosecutor characterizes the Chicago eight by reiterating phrases such as "planned," "infiltrated," and "plotted" to stress the act of conspiracy. He also repeats the evidence to be presented and alludes to the past acts of each of the defendants. This prosecutor chooses words such as "guerilla fighter," "chemical warfare," and "molotov cocktail" to describe the defendant's actions. The terms elicit powerful imagery since they are all associated with the enemy actions of the Viet Cong, a group who are waging the same war the defendants purport to protest. Several quotations from the defendants are used to dramatize the conspiratorial issue and to impugn the credibility of the defendants. For example, one segment of the opening statement uses these words of defendant Bohdy Seal in its story to demonstrate the character and motive of the defendants: "He told the crowd that every black man should get a .357 Magnum revolver, should get a .44 automatic pistol and an M-1 rifle, and then start running in large groups and take direct action . . . and encircle the police whom he called pigs. He said. . . if they get in your way, we should kill some of these pigs and put them on a morgue table."⁴⁴

The defense repeats that the defendants came to protest peacefully, even though the state officials were determined to prevent their protest. The dominant image is built of peaceful protesters demonstrating in the finest American tradition, organizing because it was their right to do so. The defense uses metaphor to refer to the opening statement as the "table of contents to the book."⁴⁵ They seek to demonstrate the true premise of the defendants' case and the inadequacy of the state's case through contrasting metaphors. Despite this presentation of verbal decorum, the nonverbal message that derives from the

appearance and manner of the clients and the liberal reputations of the defense attorneys seemed to defy the orthodoxy of the arguments because both defendants and counsel looked and acted the part of dissidents with values of the counterculture.

The opening statements of the prosecution and defense reveal some contrasts in form, content, and style. Both acts of prosecutors in the historical and contemporary cases present a persuasive narrative that is a one-sided statement about the evil motives, acts, and consequences for the crime which previews subsequent testimony and makes connections between the malicious acts and the evil behaviors of the accused. In contrast, the defense for the Haymarket case summarizes legal issues but adopts a conventional rather than a narrative form, and refutes the case of the prosecution rather than narrating a probable story for the defense. The Chicago Eight defense presents a narrative in much the same way as the prosecutor but the narrative may have been unpersuasive to jurors because the verbal scenario contradicts the manner and appearance of both the defendants and their attorneys who sought a persuasive effect from their opening statements.

Evaluation

The purpose of the prosecution of both cases is accomplished by relating stories that reduce the issues of the case to one major claim that the defendants are anarchists who conspired to commit murder in the 1886 trial and the defendants are conspirators who incited riot in the 1969 trial. Other narrative factors that develop this argument are the advocates' detailed characterization of the proofs, their graphic depiction of the crime, and their presentation of a story that demonstrates that the accused had the motive and opportunity to commit that crime.

In the 1886 case, the defense achieves their purpose by labelling the issues and by challenging the opposition to prove the defendants were accessories to the crime of murder through story elements such as depicting the defendants as humanitarians, framing the story as murder, and appealing to the constitutional rights of all Americans. In the 1969 trial, the only orthodox segment of the trial was the opening statement which fit standards for this genre by adopting a narrative form with logical connections, featuring content linking legal issues with the actions and credibility of the accused, and using a compelling and dramatic style of presentation.

However, after both opening statements are presented the trial proceeds in an unorthodox manner that subverts the logical narrative of the opening statement and adopts a competing frame of interpretation for the trial. The

competing frame is that of a disordered, illogical, and unfair trial. This frame surfaces because the subsequent trial is characterized by cursing and profanity in the testimony, loud conversations between the defendants, emotional outbursts by both the defendants and the judge, and verbal battles between the judge and the attorneys.

Additionally, the context and the jurors in the cases are significant to the outcome of the trials. The context of the 1886 trial features a polarized conflict between the capitalists and labor; deep resentment against political ideologies; fear of communism, socialism, and anarchism; and promotion of strong feelings about nationalism. All of these factors make it difficult for jurors to believe the opening statement of the defense.

More specifically, the jurors themselves were predisposed toward the case of the prosecution.⁴⁵ In this trial, the jurors consisted of 12 men ranging in ages from 23-53. They represented a conservative, church-going, employed, and patriotic group. Among the jurors were no liberals, no union members, no immigrants. The occupations of the jurors ranged from stenographer to construction worker, farmer, and shipping clerk. Prior to this trial and during the voir dire process ten of the jurors admitted that they had heard and read negative publicity and that they had formed strong opinions of the case. Nevertheless, the judge allowed them to serve on the jury, because they said they would try not to let their opinions enter into their verdicts. Prior to his selection, one juror, George Adams, said, "the police ought to have shot them [the defendants] down" and "if I was on the jury I would shoot the damned burglars."⁴⁶ Additionally, all but one juror admitted that he held strong negative attitudes toward socialists, anarchists, and communists; yet all were allowed to serve on a jury for this case. In the Haymarket case, the immediate audience of the jurors was predisposed to accept the story of the prosecution and to reject that of the defense enhancing the probability that the trial verdict would be "guilty as charged."

The context of the 1969 trial was the Vietnam war and the protest and violence that occurred as demonstrators encountered the police when they failed to obey the rules of civil disobedience. At the time of the convention in 1968 and also at the time of a trial a year later the country was polarized on the issue of the Vietnam War as well about issues concerning the rights and limits of protestors to block traffic, sit in public areas, and use profane language.⁴⁷ The memories of those Chicagoans who sat on the jury must certainly have entered into their knowledge and attitudes about the defendants. Since the

judge was clearly biased against the defendants and since the defendants and their counsel reinforced the stereotypes of leftist demonstrators inside the courtroom, it is probable that jurors were predisposed against the defendants.

In the Chicago Eight trial, the jurors consisted of suburban, employed, middle-class, and pro law and order men and women who resided in the Chicago area during the 1968 demonstration. The voir dire process was conducted by the judge and the venireman. The defense attorney objected to all the jurors on the grounds that they were not asked relevant questions. They challenged three potential jurors for cause on the grounds that they were related to Chicago police and that they were pro-government because of their job experience. These challenges were denied by the judge and the jurors were allowed to serve.⁴⁸ Curiously, none of the jurors were asked questions related to their knowledge of the 1968 demonstration, their memory about negative publicity, or their attitudes toward the war, passivists, and demonstrations. Hence, the immediate audience of the jury was predisposed to the prosecution. After hearing testimony, jurors reported they became disillusioned with the case of the government because of the unorthodox proceeding that followed the opening statements. The fact that the trial verdict was overturned on the grounds that the trial proceeding was not according to the law suggests that this particular opening statement became ineffectual because of the subsequent disruptions in the trial.

This study suggests strong parallels between the opening statements of the two trials--one from 1886 and the other from 1969. The opening statements of both the prosecution and the defense provide examples of the narrative form of argument which share content based on similar indictments and similar constitutional issues presented in a dramatic manner. Additionally, the opening statements of both the prosecution and the defense share similar purpose, context, and audiences. The study reveals a genre of argumentative discourse. Even though a greater sample of opening statements needs to be studied, our work provides a starting point for classifying genres of argument in trial process. We encourage others to analyze other genres and other trials so that the relationship between argumentation theory and law can be more clearly conceptualized.

NOTES

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EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:
A CASE STUDY IN ARBITRATION ARGUMENTS

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Introduction

People long have contended the epistemological grounding of argument. Ever since the Sophists first aroused Plato's ire, combatants have quarreled over whether the office of rhetoric is only to make the Truth effective or whether, on the contrary, rhetoric has some role in constituting the Truth. The Sophistic legacy in this ancient dispute is manifest in the modern "rhetoric-as-epistemic" literature, initiated by Robert L. Scott in 1967 and elaborated, refined, and extended to this day.¹ It seems safe to say that the view that argument in some sense creates knowledge today dominates the field; in the era of symbolic interactionism and intersubjectivity, precious few take up the Platonist cross.

Platonic method nonetheless obliquely guides our course. For, when faced with the question, "what is the relationship between rhetoric and knowledge?", Plato would insist that any answer be grounded in proper definitions of terms. And so a subsequent question arises: what is "knowledge"? Indeed, one of the approaches of modern scholars wishing to formulate an epistemic function for argument has been to reconstitute the meaning of "knowledge", rejecting positivist conceptions which restrict it to deducible certainties verifiable by observation in favor of conceptions which include probabilities consensually assented to.²

Important differences among these modern visions of the meaning of "knowledge" exist, even though they are all sympathetic to and extensions of the rhetoric-as-epistemic project. Some, in insisting that all knowledge is rhetorical, treat knowledge as a "whole cloth." That is, they emphasize the consensual grounding of all knowledge, including the empirical observations of science, and thereby stress the essential similarity of "knowledge" in all fields.³ Others, however, argue either that there are differences in kind (genus) between some knowledge types (i.e., some forms of knowledge are not consensually determined) or that, even if there are no differences in kind, there remain other useful differences, of degree, context, etc. (species distinctions) between knowledge forms which, they argue, tend to be overlooked or underplayed.⁴ In short, in their zeal to rescue rhetoric from its status as the "harlot of the arts," some understandably have stressed the consensual status of, not just some, but all knowledge, thereby implying a monistic character. Others, perhaps bolstered by the pluralistic implications of field theory, believe that this obscures distinctions which would lead one to a more multivalent conception of knowledge.

The most common distinction which the pluralists wish to preserve is that between "social" and "technical" knowledge. This distinction is central to Tom Farrell's 1976 essay and to his 1978 response to Walter Carleton, and he and his associate Tom Goodnight have examined the implications of the distinction for understanding the "rhetorical crisis" which occurred at Three Mile Island, the way in which America understands "poverty" and its obligations to the poor, and other issues.⁵ Generally speaking, "technical" knowledge is said to be the knowledge of observation, law-like in its regularity, while "social" knowledge is that which depends upon relationships among groups of actors, rule-like in its degree of certitude. Sometimes a third kind of knowledge, the "personal", is also distinguished.⁶

Of course, such pluralist distinctions raise yet another question, that is, what is the relationship between these varieties of knowledge? The answers to this question are what most interest us in this essay. Farrell acknowledges that the boundaries between social and technical knowledge are often indistinct and, further, that instances of social knowledge can become technical, and vice versa.⁷ Similarly, Goodnight suggests that any argumentative artifact can be understood as an instance of social, technical, or personal knowledge, and that what is really important, rhetorically, is the way advocates attempt to transform one kind into another for strategic purposes.⁸ And Lyne emphasizes the way in which disputes are "framed" as issues involving various kinds of knowledge, at the expense of and in antidote to the tendency to reify discrete categories of knowledge as separate "things."⁹ Pluralist theorists, in other words, tend to view argument processually, and to view social and technical knowledge not as independent entities but as ways of symbolically encompassing situations. In such a view, the "boundaries" between social and technical knowledge are fluid and contextually determined, not immutably fixed by definition or essence.

Despite such theoretical indeterminacy, one particular characterization of the relationship between social and technical knowledge seems to dominate the literature. Virtually everyone writing in this area devotes considerable space to discussing what they believe is an alarming condition: the tendency in modern society to privilege technical over social knowledge, at the expense of the public good. Farrell refers to the "tenuous adversary relationship of technical and social knowledge," and laments that "many former matters of statecraft or practical wisdom seem now to be the prerogative of bureaucratized and specialized imaginations. This 'technical' knowledge is grounded upon a consensus removed from public scrutiny."¹⁰ Goodnight expresses his belief "that the public sphere is being steadily eroded by the elevation of the personal and technical groundings of argument."¹¹ And together, Farrell and Goodnight find deference to the technical sphere unwarranted and dangerous, arguing that, as in the case of Three Mile Island, such deference precludes real public deliberation and action.¹²

The clearest exemplar of this viewpoint is Walter Fisher's work on the "narrative paradigm." His is the most radical intent; he characterizes the notion of social knowledge and the entire effort to reconstitute the meaning of "knowledge" as one attempt to salvage the "rational world paradigm," an attempt which does not go far enough.¹³ Befitting this intent, his comments on the privileging of technical discourse are the most explicit, and most

condemnatory. He divides critical responses to Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth* into two camps: those "celebratory" reviews which are "in sympathy with the book's moral thrust", and, on the other hand, those "purveyors of ideological, bureaucratic, or technical arguments."¹⁴ And Fisher himself celebrates the former and bemoans the fact that "it is submerged by ideological and bureaucratic arguments that insist on rival moralities and technical argument which denudes it of morality altogether, making the dispute one for 'experts' alone to consider."¹⁵

The narrative paradigm thus is Fisher's effort to provide a basis upon which to reconsider, if not solve, this state of affairs. In his own words, it is "concerned with the concept of technical reason and the way it render[s] the public unreasonable; with the idea of rationality being a matter of argumentative competence in specialized fields, leaving the public and its discourse irrational; with the apparent impossibility of bridging the gaps between experts and the public and between segments of the public; and with the necessity to learn what was supposed to be the essence of persons--rationality--so that one class of citizens can always be superior to another."¹⁶

The privileging of technical over public argument appears, in these authors' eyes, to reverse the proper relationship. When Farrell argues that technical knowledge is not to be equated with "the practical competence to determine whether such knowledge should be employed," he appears to suggest that social knowledge is more fundamental and important in the sense that it is required to guide technical competence.¹⁷ Similarly, Goodnight argues that the public sphere "transcends" the personal and technical spheres because it alone acknowledges that "the consequences of dispute extend beyond the personal and technical spheres."¹⁸

There is both an epistemological and a political agenda here. The epistemological agenda is to ground "Truth" in the discourse of ordinary humans, to make the knowledge claims of ordinary people with no special training in modes of reasoning count. The political agenda is democratic/egalitarian: to level the distinctions between expert and citizen, superior and inferior, to hold experts accountable to the "will of the people," and thereby to promote the art of public deliberation in communities of equals or, at minimum, authorized hierarchies.¹⁹ Again, the clearest expression is Fisher's. Because narrative rationality is a capacity all humans share equally, he argues, it is "inimical to elitist politics," and the paradigm of which it is part "provides a radical democratic ground for social-political critique."²⁰

We come not to bury this program, but to praise it. We believe that there is much truth in diagnoses of the emasculation of the public (although we might quarrel with some characterizations of the basis and nature of the problem); similarly, we find much merit in attempts to harness technical knowledge for social aims (at least in some circumstances). At the same time, the point we wish to emphasize is that this issue in the relationship between social and technical knowledge is not the whole story. Other relationships, less adversarial, less denigrative of the technical and less celebrative of the social, typify argument in other contexts, and are in need of study.

The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to consider other relationships between the public and technical spheres, relationships acknowledged but neglected by the current literature. To explore these relationships, we employ a case study in labor-management arbitration.

Knowledge in Arbitration: Blurring the Boundaries

The case study employed here consists in the arbitration of a grievance filed in 1979 by the unionized Teaching Assistant's Association of the University of Wisconsin-Madison against the Department of Nutritional Sciences and the University. The Department required that each Ph.D. candidate have one semester of teaching experience; however, it did not designate these students as "teaching assistants", nor did it compensate them for their services. The TAA filed a grievance, arguing that this practice violated the "scope and duration" clause of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the TAA and the University in 1978. This clause read, in part: "A graduate student enrolled at UW-Madison who is employed to carry out teaching responsibilities in an instructional department under the supervision of a faculty member shall be designated as a Teaching Assistant." The TAA's grievance on behalf of graduate students in the Department sought back-pay and benefits.

The dispute ultimately hinged on two issues. The first was procedural. The University argued that the union knew, or should have known, of the Department's practice as early as 1976, but waited 2 to 3 years to file a grievance. Hence, it contended, the grievance was no longer "timely" and should not be arbitrated. In response, the union argued that it could not be expected to know everything that goes on on campus at all times, that it became aware of the Department's practice in September, 1978, and filed its grievance promptly after that date, and that the issue of timeliness was moot because the Department's practice constituted a "continuing violation" of the collective bargaining agreement.

The second issue was substantive, concerned with the meaning of the term, "employed". The University construed this term narrowly, as meaning "paid for services rendered," and argued that the graduate students were not employed for their teaching services; rather, the students taught simply to fulfill graduation requirements legitimately set by the faculty in accordance with University governance procedures. The TAA construed the term more broadly, as meaning "used" or "assigned," and argued that the graduate students, because they performed all the duties of Teaching Assistants, thus were so "employed" by the University, and deserved both title and compensation. The TAA observed that other departments had similar teaching requirements, but paid students as Teaching Assistants while they fulfilled the requirement. Such designation, therefore, the TAA alleged, was a contractual obligation established by the collective bargaining agreement. The University contended that, because the faculty have the right to establish degree requirements and to specify the manner in which they may be fulfilled, the fact that other departments designated students as TAs when fulfilling this requirement did not obligate the Department of Nutritional Sciences to do so; rather than a contractual obligation, they suggested, such designation was a managerial prerogative.

The data for this study consists of six documents: the initial briefs

which each side filed with the arbitrator, each side's rebuttal brief, the hearing transcript, and the arbitrator's award and opinion.²¹ An examination of these documents, we argue, reveals that the relationships between the social and technical in arbitration differ in three important ways from the relationships portrayed in the current examples of nuclear war and energy.

(1) First, current examples depict intuitively clear and discrete spheres. The issues involved are great social issues of life-and-death import. John Dewey argued that the relevant public for any action is constituted by the scope of the consequences of that action.²² The public sphere defined by the issue of nuclear energy, then, consists, at minimum, in all those who lived near or downwind from Three Mile Island, or who live in proximity to any nuclear plant, i.e., a very large number of ordinary people from all walks of life. And the public sphere defined by The Fate of the Earth is so expansive as to include, in all likelihood, all humankind. The technical sphere, on the other hand, is restricted in these examples to a comparatively small number of bureaucrats (be they power company officials or mouthpieces of the Pentagon) who are concerned only with "kill ratios" and "damage control." In arbitration, however, the distinctions between spheres are not so clear-cut.

(2) Second, current examples dramatize morality plays wherein public and technical forces compete for dominance. In arbitration, however, the opposition between spheres is not so clear-cut.

(3) Third, current examples value the public sphere and devalue the technical sphere, and thus lament the privileging of the latter at the expense of the former. In these examples, technical argument "wins", and this outcome is viewed as unfortunate, if not catastrophic. In arbitration, however, this normative preference is not so clear-cut.

To liberally borrow an anthropological term, arbitration, we suggest, is a "liminal" field, an in-between or transitional forum, suspended between the public and technical spheres, and the arbitrator a liminal persona, possessing both technical expertise and public conscience.²³ As such, it is fertile ground in which to explore subtleties beyond the gross opposition of the public and technical domains in argumentation.

To begin with (1), the distinctions between the technical and social spheres in arbitration are problematic. The knowledge relevant to arbitration is basically social in character, being grounded not in observation of law-like regularities in nature, but in the negotiated rule-guided relationships between groups of people. This is best typified by the collective bargaining agreement ratified by both union and University, which established the context for the grievance at issue in this case. Indeed, Farrell describes social knowledge as grounded in a consensus which need not actually exist but which is attributed as the basis for further argument.²⁴ In this sense, the hearing process may be a paradigm case of social knowledge. The union's brief is replete with appeals to the "clear," "unambiguous" and "precise" definition of the bargaining unit "agreed upon by the parties" in the collective bargaining agreement; it deduces from this agreement the "contractual obligations" that allegedly bind the University, and finds that "no basis exists for a reasoned argument" to the contrary;

the University's position, the union contends, is "specious" and "frivolous"; its claim that the matter is not procedurally arbitrable, the union contends, is "merely a ploy designed to block consideration of the merits" of the dispute, and "makes a mockery of the dispute resolution mechanisms established by the contract and threatens the integrity of our collective bargaining agreement." For its part, the University's brief engages in essence in revisionist history, challenging the union's understanding of the prior consensus, and describing its own understanding of what was and was not agreed-to.

Yet, while the arbitration hearing engages primarily social rather than technical knowledge, this is the social knowledge of a circumscribed public. At issue are not the very lives of scores of ordinary human beings, but only the economic well-being and social status of a small group of atypical individuals within an academy, which is itself simply a somewhat larger group of atypical individuals. The consequences for the general public are remote, and it does not participate in the hearing process. At most, the social knowledge involved is that negotiated between one group of employees and one university in one state in the midwest. And not even this public is entirely involved; rather, each side's interests are represented by proxies, elected officials of the TAA and the University's legal department. In other words, this is the social knowledge of a body of elites and not, as in other examples, of the public as a whole; to this extent, it is comparatively a more "technical" sphere.

The arbitration process itself demands more specialized knowledge as well. Arbitration possesses guidelines for argument and quasi-legal rules of evidence and procedure, and employs professional arbitrators to resolve disputes according to those guidelines. In this case, both the union and the University tailored their arguments to these specialized standards in an effort to obtain a favorable decision. The union's arguments, particularly, conformed to the standards of specialized reasoning set forth in accepted arbitration texts, and the union invoked these standards as "decision rules" for the arbitrator to follow in areas of disagreement. For example, to establish the procedural arbitrability of the dispute, and to counter the University's "timeliness" argument (itself an argument that conforms to these specialized standards), the union argues that the grievance concerns a "continuing violation" which is therefore not subject to the "timely filing" standard, and it cites a respected arbitration text to define a "continuing violation." Similarly, in disputing the meaning of the term "employed," both sides adhere to the arbitration standard that the intent of the parties at the time language is bargained ought determine the meaning of that language, and, accordingly, spend a great deal of time reconstructing what they "meant" when they agreed to the 1978 language. And because the union and the University could not agree on even their intents in negotiating the term "employed," the union then invokes popular dictionary definitions of the term, together with the procedural arbitration rule that such definitions carry in such circumstances. Clearly, both sides engage in the specialized modes of reasoning sanctioned by arbitration as a technical field. This is not public deliberation.

And yet, to further muddy the waters, the hearing process is less specialized than some other forums, e.g., the law. Its rules are considerably less rigid than legal rules; arbitrators play more flexible

roles than judges, and represent concerns broader than those of the immediate parties involved. Further, the hearing process itself bears a much stronger resemblance to the rough-and-tumble of public forums than to the solemn decorum of tightly-regulated technical forums, such as courts of law. These characteristics are well-summarized by Louis Jaffey: "Arbitration . . . is a school, an arena, a theatre. Everyone both participates and observes. The whole company of actors--arbitrator, union and employer officials, the griever, and the witnesses . . . --sits at one table. Argument, assertion, testimony, charge and countercharge, even angry abuse--sometimes spontaneous, sometimes 'for the record'--flow freely in quick, continuous intercourse. The arbitrator may let the discussion take its head for a moment, then rein it in . . . Because the process is relatively free, it may assume many forms, some quiet and orderly, some volatile and discordant."²⁵

In short, arbitration is a hybrid. While it engages social knowledge, it is not the social knowledge of the public sphere but that negotiated by elites and articulated in moderately technical discourse. Other examples, by focusing on great social issues with ramifications for the entire mass public, tend to conflate social knowledge and the public sphere. Arbitration suggests that this need not be the case.

(2) In arbitration, the alleged adversarial relationship between the social and technical spheres is also problematic. We have noted already that arbitration is a hybrid, a fuzzy blend of the specialized and the public. Far from causing the process to self-destruct due to internal oppositions, this blend legitimates the process, and is responsible in large measure for its ability to work.

Although the hearing process is specialized, demanding that participants possess technical competence, the very existence of the process acknowledges substantial "public interests" in productive and calm labor-management relations. The rationale for arbitration lies in the recognition that work stoppages, strikes, and labor violence can seriously injure and even cripple whole communities of ordinary publics. Its reason for being, therefore, is to represent the public's interests and to minimize the occurrence of and damage from labor strife.²⁶ Often such public representation is written into the law. Where public employees are involved, for instance, state statutes often require that fact-finding boards and arbitrators give strong consideration to the "interest and welfare of the public" in their decisions.²⁷ As suggested above, the arbitrator is, then, a liminal persona, a technical expert with a public conscience, who speaks on behalf of those not able to speak for themselves in a specialized setting. Of course, the degree to which such a system truly functions representatively is another matter; cooptation is an ever-present danger, and competing public interests may be involved. Nonetheless, our point is that arbitration is not only a specialized sphere, but a specialized sphere institutionally informed and legitimated by the public sphere.

The public is not much in evidence in the present case if, by "public," one means the public-at-large. Neither the union's or the university's briefs, nor the arbitrator's opinion, appeals explicitly to the welfare of this public in justifying itself. For all parties involved, as noted above, the relevant "public" appears limited to their academic institution and those affiliated with it. Given this somewhat circumscribed meaning of the

"public," however, the public sphere as grounding is very much in evidence. For underlying the social knowledge relevant to the grievance issues are competing visions of this public's welfare.²⁸

The union's vision emphasizes economic welfare, particularly the fair and equitable distribution of material resources. The graduate students in question are primarily wage-earners, or "employees," and the academic institution in which they work is, for these purposes, principally an "employer." Thus, the union argues, because the Departmental students perform the same teaching duties as other graduate students whom the University does designate as "Teaching Assistants," the former share a "community of interests" with the latter. And these interests are fair and equitable treatment, in pay, title, and collective bargaining benefits. Consistent with this tendency to view its situation in labor-management terms, the union attacks the University's position as a "proclamation of raw managerial prerogative" which represents "the epitome of unfair and inequitable treatment" and which "contradicts sound labor relations policy which encourages the resolution of disputes at the earliest possible stage of the grievance procedure." Clearly, in their eyes, the public welfare is best served by fair treatment of workers, including adherence to procedures (i.e., arbitration) which protect worker welfare by equalizing the balance of power between workers and managers.

The University's vision, on the other hand, emphasizes intellectual welfare, particularly as this depends on academic freedom and faculty governance. "Teaching assistants are first and foremost graduate students," and their teaching roles are "secondary," the University maintained. Moreover, the academic institution of which these students are a part is primarily a teaching facility whose responsibility it is to properly educate students. Because the establishment of degree requirements is essential to the fulfillment of this purpose, the University argues, the Department's teaching requirement is not primarily an economic issue but an intellectual one. Moreover, they contend, establishment of an employment relationship was judged by the Department to be inimical to the accomplishment of this academic task, and thus the Department is exercising proper judgment in denying such a relationship. Graduate students in the Department who fulfilled the teaching requirement, they argue, did so not on an employment basis but "as part of their student life." Clearly, in the University's eyes, the public welfare is best served by the orderly fulfillment of the intellectual and educational missions of the academy. A labor-management relationship can only disrupt these missions; it is revealing that, a year later, the University Chancellor, Irving Shain, in an address to the faculty senate, attacked a teaching assistants' strike--a legitimate phenomenon from the labor-management perspective-- as the "latest episode in a 10-year history of harrassment of the University by the TAA."²⁹

In sum, underlying the union's and the University's arguments regarding the grievance in question, presented within a specialized sphere which both sides share, are divergent publics. This is not a case of technical versus social knowledge, but more a case of competing understandings of the public meaning of a body of social knowledge, articulated within a technical forum.

From this characterization of arbitration, it is rather easy to see how (3) the normative preference for social knowledge exhibited in the

literature is somewhat problematic. In the cases of *THI*, *The Fate of the Earth*, and others, technical knowledge "wins" its duel with social knowledge, a victory that is to be lamented. But this judgment is at least partially a function of the political rather than the epistemological agenda discussed above. One factor at work here is the liberal democratic preference for popular rule. We are suspicious of ruling elites, and the smaller the elite and the larger the public, the more suspicious we become. Relatedly, the higher the stakes, the more suspicious we become. Thus, when a very small technical elite holds the power of life and death over vast populations (as in questions of nuclear strategy), we passionately protest. However, if the public weren't so badly outnumbered, and the stakes weren't so high, the privileging of the technical might seem more benign and, possibly even desirable. In other contexts, such as arbitration, therefore, other normative preferences are equally understandable.

First, because in arbitration there is no simple duel, there is no simple winner. We are confronted with a circumscribed social knowledge contested in a technical forum. Both relatively specialized forms of argument and relatively global visions of public welfare are essential to the cases of both sides. In this case, the arbitrator ruled for the union and against the University and, in a sense, one might argue that this represents the triumph of technical reason. After all, the union's specialized arguments were more adept at employing standard arbitration rules to guide the arbitrator's decision, and the public vision in which these arguments were grounded--labor-management relations--was more familiar to the arbitrator-in-his-role-as-arbitrator. Perhaps the union was indeed somewhat better at "playing the arbitration game." But the University was no slouch either, no "untrained" public at the mercy of technical knowledge which it itself could not master. Indeed, had the arbitrator chosen to resolve the procedural arbitrability issue on strictly technical grounds, he would have ruled for University, not the union, since the grievance was filed after the "statute of limitations" specified in the collective bargaining agreement had expired. But instead he accepted the union's "continuing violation" claim, which had no basis in the specialized bargaining agreement per se, but rather was a concept imported by the union from the broader labor-management sphere. In this small way, therefore, the arbitrator's decision represents a defeat for the technical sphere.

We think it more accurate to say that, reflective of the hybrid nature of the arbitration situation, the arbitrator's decision in this case also was a hybrid. He had to evaluate the competing claims of rather specialized arguments, but did not do so on the basis of "technicalities." Rather, his opinion continually invokes his own concept of what it is "reasonable" to believe. In ruling for the union on the matter of procedural arbitrability, for instance, he writes that he "accepts as reasonable the proposition advanced by the Union to the effect that they cannot reasonably be held to be fully knowledgeable and aware of all practices that exist in every corner of the University. The record and evidence reasonably supports the finding that the grievance that was filed in September, 1978 was promptly filed following the first time at which the Union obtained reasonable knowledge of the practice." It is difficult to avoid the language of the narrative paradigm here. It seems to us that the arbitrator's judgment here is not based on technical superiority, but more loosely on whether the union's "story", taken as a whole, makes more or less "sense" (Fisher would say,

possesses greater or lesser narrative rationality and fidelity) compared to the University's story. If this is so, then the public sphere (in the circumscribed sense we described above) appears to be alive and well, even in this comparatively technical forum.

One might still argue, however, that arbitration privileges the technical sphere at the expense of the public-at-large. Indeed, ordinary people are excluded from the hearing process and thereby prevented from critically deliberating and expressing, say, their preferred view on whether universities are appropriate settings for labor-management bargaining. But, we would ask, is this such a bad state of affairs? Would the community truly be better off, more humane, or liveable under such populism? Or might this interfere with the ability of the arbitration process to work smoothly and, thereby, to safeguard the "public interest"? We do not attempt to answer these questions, and do not need to. We simply want to emphasize that, in this situation, the privileging of the technical over the public is not so self-evidently undesirable. In the crass jargon of political science, we suggest, neither the masses nor the elites are completely trustworthy, and so the normative preference for the public sphere over the technical sphere may not be appropriate to the same degree in all circumstances.

Conclusion

One important and useful extension of the rhetoric-as-epistemic literature has been the consideration of the monistic or pluralistic nature of "knowledge." Majority opinion holds that there are many kinds of knowledge, and considerable attention has focused on two: the "technical" and the "social."

This essay has examined the relationships between technical and social knowledge in a case study of labor-management arbitration. We argued that arbitration exhibits the social knowledge of a comparatively small "public," and articulates it in a comparatively specialized domain of technical discourse; that both sides in the grievance case studied engage in this technical discourse, but do so from divergent underlying conceptions of the public welfare; and that the arbitrator's decision in this case is not an unqualified victory for either the technical or public sphere.

This characterization, we admit, is neither simple nor precise. To the degree that the fault does not lie with our exposition, it may illustrate our central point: that the boundaries between the technical and public spheres are frequently indistinct, and more complicated than current examples in political rhetoric might suggest. We hope to have illustrated the following points: (1) social knowledge need not oppose technical knowledge, but in fact may inform it; (2) technical knowledge need not oppose social knowledge, but in fact may articulate it within the constraints of particular fields; (3) neither the technical nor social spheres are "whole cloths", but instead often are manifested in combinations or patterns.

We believe that a great variety of such patterns exist. Several questions require further exploration. For example, is social knowledge necessarily the (only) knowledge of the public sphere? Must technical knowledge be elitist? Is social knowledge necessarily democratic? Are

Arguments which draw upon technical and social knowledge in concert more "powerful" than those that draw upon only one? If so, in what way? Ought technical knowledge always be subordinated to the norms of social knowledge? We do not disagree with extant analyses of the technical and public spheres in energy, the nuclear arms race, and other social issues. And we endorse the processual orientation of other authors; indeed, viewing the different spheres of knowledge as processes of interaction rather than as things better explains how these patterns can arise and change. Our modest aim has been simply to illuminate a different pattern, in the firm pluralist conviction that such analyses can enrich our understanding of and appreciation for the diverse possibilities embodied in "rhetoric as a way of knowing."

NOTES

¹Major essays in this literature include: Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal*, 18 (1967), 9-17; Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later," *Central States Speech Journal*, 28 (1976), 258-66; Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62 (1976), 1-14; Walter M. Carleton, "What is Rhetorical Knowledge? A Response to Farrell--And More," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (1978), 313-28; Thomas B. Farrell, "Social Knowledge II," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (1978), 329-34; Thomas B. Farrell and Thomas S. Frentz, "Communication and Meaning: A Language-Action Synthesis," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 12 (1979), 215-255; Walter R. Fisher, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (1978), 376-84; Walter R. Fisher, "Rationality and the Logic of Good Reasons," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 13 (1980), 121-30; Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," *Communication Monographs*, 51 (1984), 1-22; Barry Brummett, "Some Implications of 'Process' or 'Intersubjectivity': Post-modern Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 9 (1976), 21-51; Richard Cherwitz, "Rhetoric as 'A Way of Knowing': An Attenuation of the Epistemological Claims of the 'New Rhetoric'," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 42 (1977), 207-19; Earl Croasmun and Richard Cherwitz, "Beyond Rhetorical Relativism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 68 (1982), 1-16; Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hinks, "Rhetorical Perspectivism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 69 (1983), 249-66; Richard Cherwitz and James Hinks, *Communication and Knowledge* (Columbia, SC: Univ. South Carolina Press, forthcoming); Celeste Condit Railsback, "Beyond Rhetorical Relativism: A Structural-Material Model of Truth and Objective Reality," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 69 (1983), 351-63; and Richard B. Gregg, *Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in the Foundations of Rhetoric* (Columbia, SC: Univ. South Carolina Press, 1984).

²While the precise form and strength of such claims vary, cautioning one against "pigeon-holing" scholars, nonetheless see especially the works of Scott, Brummett, Farrell, and Fisher.

³The most notable advocate of this perspective is Carleton.

⁴See especially Farrell, "Social Knowledge II," and Scott, "Ten Years Later," pp. 259-60.

⁵See Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory"; Farrell, "Social Knowledge II"; Thomas B. Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, "Accidental Rhetoric: The Root Metaphors of Three Mile Island," *Communication Monographs*, 48 (1981), 271-300; and G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (1982), 214-27.

⁶Goodnight, esp. pp. 218-20.

⁷Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," pp. 7-8.

⁸Goodnight, pp. 220-22.

⁹John Lyne, "Ways of Going Public: The Projection of Expertise in the Sociobiology Controversy," in David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes, eds., *Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation* (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 400-422.

¹⁰Farrell, "Social Knowledge II," pp. 333, 330.

¹¹Goodnight, p. 223.

¹²Farrell and Goodnight, esp. pp. 295-96. While their conception of knowledge is explicitly pluralist, and they complain that "it has become fashionable to collapse the distinction between social and technical discourse" (p. 299), they see the different domains of knowledge in an antagonistic relationship given form by an "historical dialectic" (p. 300). Goodnight explores another example of this relationship in "On Questions of Evacuation and Survival in Nuclear Conflict: A Case Study in Public Argument and Rhetorical Criticism," in Zarefsky, Sillars, and Rhodes, eds., *Argument in Transition*, pp. 319-39.

¹³Fisher, "Narration," pp. 4, 15.

¹⁴Fisher, "Narration," esp. pp. 11-12.

¹⁵Fisher, "Narration," p. 12.

¹⁶Fisher, "Narration," p. 15.

¹⁷Farrell, "Social Knowledge II," pp. 331-32.

¹⁸Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres," p. 220.

¹⁹In addition to works already cited, Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin's attack ("Public Knowledge and Ideological Argumentation," *Communication Monographs*, 50 [1983], 47-65) on Lloyd Bitzer's concept of the "public" ("Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," in Don Burks, ed., *Rhetoric, Philosophy and Literature* [West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Univ. Press, 1978], pp. 67-93) exemplifies this agenda. McGee and Martin object to Bitzer's characterization of the public sphere on the grounds that it amounts to neoplatonic authoritarianism which "undercuts the people's will to power by creating the fiction that people ought to have academically 'good reason' for what they do" (p. 55). McGee's own formulation of the public sphere is "In Search of 'the People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (1975), 235-49. Other comments on "equality" appear in Michael Calvin McGee, "An Essay on the Flip Side of Privacy," in Zarefsky, Sillars and Rhodes, eds., *Argument in Transition*, pp. 105-114. The normative notion of "communities" appears to be a favorite new god-term for scholars in this area: see Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," p. 11; Bitzer, p. 79; and Fisher, "Narration," p. 5.

²⁰Fisher, "Narration," p. 9.

²¹Teaching Assistants' Association, "In the Matter of the Arbitration Between the Teaching Assistants' Association, Local 3220, American

Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison: Union's Brief," September 14, 1979 (mimeo.); "In the Matter of the Arbitration Between University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Nutritional Sciences and the Teaching Assistants Association: Post-Hearing Brief of the University of Wisconsin-Madison," September 14, 1979 (mimeo.); Teaching Assistants' Association, "In the Matter of the Arbitration Between The Teaching Assistants' Association Local 3220, American Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison: Union's Rebuttal Brief," October 2, 1979 (mimeo.); letter from Charles E. Carlson to Robert J. Mueller "RE: Arbitration of Dispute Between the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Nutritional Sciences and the Teaching Assistants Association," October 2, 1979; "In the Matter of Arbitration Between University of Wisconsin-Madison and Teaching Assistants Association, Local 3220, AFL-CIO: Transcript of Proceedings" (Madison, WI: Professional Reporting Service, Ltd., n.d.); and Robert J. Mueller, "In the Matter of the Arbitration of a Dispute Between University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Nutritional Sciences and the Teaching Assistants' Association, Local 3220, American Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO): Award and Opinion," October 23, 1979 (mimeo.).

²²Cited and evaluated in Bitzer, pp. 77-81.

²³See Victor W. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969).

²⁴Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," p. 6.

²⁵Louis Jaffey, quoted in Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, *How Arbitration Works*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1976), p. 14.

²⁶Elkouri and Elkouri, pp. 790-93; Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," in Sam Zagoria, ed., *Public Workers and Public Unions* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 101-21, esp. 118-19.

²⁷Elkouri and Elkouri, pp. 790-91.

²⁸On this general point, see Colleen M. Keough, "Bargaining Communication and Arbitration Arguments: An Analysis of the Collective Bargaining Between the Teaching Assistants' Association and the University of Wisconsin-Madison" (Thesis, Purdue Univ., 1983), pp. 60-64.

²⁹Keough, p. 62.

ARGUMENTATION IN UTILITY RATE HEARINGS:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN A HYBRID FIELD

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The rapid and sustained escalation of energy costs in the 1970's had a major impact on the social, political, and economic life of the world. As the impact spread throughout the economy of the United States, consumers had few opportunities to participate in the decision making about the price of energy. They might complain to gasoline station owners, to each other, or even to their legislative representatives, but beyond the limited action of conservation, there was little they could do to directly participate in arguments and decisions affecting the costs of energy.

On the surface, there is a beguiling appearance of a major exception to the foreclosure of public participation in energy-cost decisions: public utility rate hearings. Nearly every state has a regulatory agency that exercises some control over the prices charged to consumers for natural gas and electricity. Typically the regulatory agency holds several hearings to gather evidence and hear arguments from the public as well as the utility company before reaching a decision on an appropriate rate.

In his speculative essay lamenting the decline of public participation in deliberative rhetoric, Goodnight has noted

Many forms of social persuasion are festooned with the trappings of deliberation, even while they are designed to succeed by means inimical to knowledgeable choice and active participation.¹

If Goodnight is correct (and I believe he is) in his claim that the technical sphere of argument is expanding at the expense of the public sphere, then utility rate hearings would seem to be a classic case in point. That is, utility regulation appears to be a forum of argument that partially preempts the public domain, even though legally required to solicit public participation in the deliberations.

This paper examines the nature and effectiveness of public argumentation in selected rate-setting hearings held by the Public Service Commission of Maryland.² That analysis leads to three tentative theses:

1. The public is ill-equipped by training, access to forceful data, and practice in using field-specific arguments to meaningfully participate in the decision making process of rate setting.

2. The mixture of characteristics of public-policy and legal fields of argument contributes to public disenchantment, confusion and anger.

3. The public hearings function more as a forum for a rhetoric of legitimation than as an opportunity for gathering decision-making arguments.

Method

In the years since Toulmin championed the notion of field-dependent arguments,³ considerable controversy has arisen about appropriate criteria for defining the existence of a field, and about the theoretical utility of such a concept.⁴ Willard has been, perhaps, the most prolific and persistent contributor to that debate as he has set out to advance a field theory of argumentation based on a constructionist/interactionist view, complete with a critical methodology.⁵ Rieke has been one of the foremost advocates of legal argument as a distinct field, but even he concluded that "We may find that the central focus is not law, or science, or any other professional identification. It may be form or function, or process."⁶ In summarizing the definitional dispute, Zarefsky categorized the perspectives as determination of a field by form of argument, or subject matter, or situational features, or shared purpose of arguers, or audiences.⁷

For the critic to take any one definitional perspective is to necessarily limit what can be said about the artifacts criticized. Thus, there is a strong temptation to simply replace all of Reike's and Zarefsky's "or's" with "and's" in order to suggest that discipline and subject matter and form and audience and situation and purpose are all different dimensions of the determination of a field.

Wenzel has advanced what, to me, seems to be a sensible alternative to either impulsive editorial manipulation or declaration of unqualified allegiance to a single perspective of the nature of a particular field of argument. He suggests that "fields of argument should be construed as the propositional content of a disciplined, rational enterprise with an epistemic purpose."⁸ More importantly, he offers the critic three levels of analysis: His "logical" level includes the "conceptual and propositional contents of knowledge structures, including their characteristic formal properties." This is where he locates a "field" of arguments, in a very restricted use of the term. The "dialectical" level considers the forums, or the "particular disciplinary, professional, and institutional practices characteristic of a rational enterprise." The "rhetorical" level includes the general environment which offers "an innumerable number of contexts for arguing."

The intent here is not to enter into the ongoing debate on the preferred definition of a field, but to use one of the perspectives of field theory to explicate the role of the public arguments in one arena of decision making. Wenzel's analytic framework seems more appropriate for this task. The incidental result is a partial answer to Willard's call for the critical work "needed to flesh out examples."⁹ As applied to the argumentation of utility rate decisions, this three-level analysis reveals a hybrid field which combines features of the legal and public policy fields of argument.

Dialectical Level

At the level of institutional practices, most stages of Maryland Public Service Commission proceedings seem to resemble the legal forum more closely than those of policy making.¹⁰ Typically, a utility company submits a formal application to the PSC for authority to charge their customers more for their services and provides pre-filed testimony of expert witnesses. These first documents include citations of the appropriate statutes, previous PSC decisions, statements of past and projected income and expenses, and comparisons of that data to what they have previously been authorized to earn, or should be allowed to earn. Upon receipt of the application, the PSC staff examines and analyzes the request and pre-filed testimony and data are set for evidentiary hearings. In addition to the PSC, the Office of People's Counsel receives a copy of the company documents and pre-files opposing arguments in which the company's evidence and claims are systematically examined and either admitted, minimized or disclaimed. At the evidentiary hearings the company presents oral testimony by their experts, and the PSC staff, People's Counsel, and any approved intervenors are afforded the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. After cross-examination of company witnesses, the PSC staff and People's Counsel present their own documents and expert testimony, which are also subject to cross-examination. It is worth noting here that the PSC Rules of Procedure require that

all parties, except individuals appearing in their own behalf, shall be represented by attorneys-at-law who are duly admitted and enrolled to practice before the Court of Appeals of this State where the Commission is performing a quasi-judicial function as distinguished from a legislative, executive, or a ministerial function.¹¹

Up to this point the procedures are very closely modeled after the judicial forum: attorneys, acting as adversary representatives, present opposing arguments on a very specific proposition to a third party who is authorized by law to make a decision.

However, when gathering input directly from the public, the procedural model more closely resembles committee hearings in the legislative forum. The scene shifts from the PSC hearing room in Baltimore to public buildings in several cities and

towns throughout the company's service area. The events are labeled "public hearings" or, sometimes, simply "evening sessions." Seldom do all five commissioners attend any one session. In fact, the hearing may be conducted by a hearing examiner from the PSC staff, with no commissioners present. The degree of formality of these proceedings is considerably lower than in the evidentiary hearings. There are no briefs, no prior notification of substance of evidence or intent to testify, and no cross-examination. In fact, the only stipulation prior to testimony seems to be a sign-up sheet listing names and addresses of those wishing to comment on the utility company's proposal, and sometimes even that is not enforced. In short, the procedural image of public participation in the decision making process is one of an informal discussion that is far more akin to the political arena than to the judicial forum.

After all the evidence and arguments are gathered, the PSC typically operates procedurally in the judicial mode. It issues an "opinion" which systematically reviews the arguments in the case and, issue-by-issue, accepts, modifies, or rejects the claims of the adversaries. The opinion is accompanied by an "order" which specifies the amount of rate increase and method of implementation authorized for the utility company.

Logical Level

As in the procedural level, the logical level of analysis of the substance, forms, and product of argument in PSC proceedings reveals a mixture of legal and public-policy characteristics. Gronbeck has noted that

American lawyers . . . draw their data from particular observation and hypothetical reconstructions, employ statute-based regulations and profession-based "laws of evidence" as sources of inferential statements, and phrase their claims in terms of evaluative statements.¹²

That characterization very closely matches the rate regulation arguments.

The criterion for PSC decisions is based in statutory law, which empowers the Commission to determine "just and reasonable rates of public service companies." "Just and reasonable" is further specified as rates

which will result in an operating income to the public service company . . . yielding, after reasonable deduction for depreciation and other necessary and proper expenses and reserves, a reasonable return upon the fair value of the company's property used and useful in rendering service to the public.¹³

By setting the criterion for decisions, the statute also functions as the prime determinant of acceptable types of evidence, relevance of evidence, and qualifications of those

testifying. If the criterion is a "fair return on investment," then the relevant data must focus on accounting procedures, market trends, debt limits, ability to attract capital, rates of depreciation, and the multiple other kinds of information that seem to have become the special province of accountants and economists. The dominant mode of warrants in the quasi-judicial forum is likely to be analogical, comparing the present returns with previously authorized levels of some proposed new level which is advanced as being more fair. In the evidentiary hearings and in the opinions justifying the decisions, that is precisely what occurs. One summary taken (almost at random) from a PSC opinion may illustrate this point.

Matityaku Marcus, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, testified in this proceeding on behalf of People's Counsel with respect to the fair and reasonable rate of return which [Baltimore Gas and Electric] should be permitted to earn on its investment. Dr. Marcus noted that the testimony of Dr. Morton, the Company's rate of return witness, relies on the comparable earnings approach. In the application of this method, Dr. Morton places, he said, particular weight on the earnings of unregulated manufacturing industries, as reflected in the earnings of Moody's 125 Industrials and S & P's Industrials for 1965 to 1975, and for 1970 to 1975, range from 12.5 percent to 13.1 percent. This should be contrasted with the 14.0 to 14.5 percent return on equity recommended by Dr. Morton in this proceeding.¹⁴

While that evidence and reasoning, and those sources may be characteristic of the evidentiary hearings and opinions, they are certainly not representative of the argument's presented by the public. In the latter situation the witnesses are more likely to identify themselves as distraught consumers, retired persons, ministers, representatives of consumer groups, or local elected officials. The evidence is more likely to be anecdotal, successive utility bills showing increases, or generalized assertions about the economic hardships of some groups of customers. The claims usually advanced are that the proposed increase should be denied because people cannot afford to pay the bill, the company is mismanaged, the fuel-rate adjustment already constitutes an exorbitant increase, or the PSC is bowing to the demands of the companies at the expense of the public whom it was supposedly created to protect.

For example, at one comparatively sedate hearing held in Annapolis, a delegate to the state legislature called a proposed hike "reprehensible and very insensitive at this time with high inflation and people living on fixed incomes." As support he offered the following:

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I would suggest that we take a hypothetical [case]; I have a lot of constituents who are living on fixed incomes of \$250 to \$300 a month. Their rents are averaging \$150 to \$175 a month. That leaves them very little money for food.

Now, if their utility rates go up, they could do two things, as their rent stays the same or goes up, they can either cut back on their food--which is a tragedy--or they can cut back on their heat.¹⁵

An elderly woman argued against the increase in this way:

I have been doing everything possible to decrease my light bills. I have no more front porch light on to light the sidewalk and the area around my house, I cook vegetables for two days so that I just use the steamer on the second day so I don't have to use more electricity. We only have one room lighted in the evenings and our heat is always down to 65 degrees.

In spite of her conservation efforts, she pointed out, "there has been a 25 percent increase in my electric bill even though I have gotten meager and more meager."¹⁶ Another witness, identified as a representative of the Pasadena Improvement Association, proclaimed widespread lack of confidence in the PSC because the people "feel it is useless to even show up and talk against something like this because it is certain to go through."¹⁷

The dominant common characteristic of such data and claims is irrelevancy for the statutory criterion of a reasonable return on the company's investment. The PSC decisions persistently cite the highly technical testimony of the expert witnesses, but rarely cite testimony gathered from the general public. To do otherwise would be to violate the statutory authority and invite legal reversal of the decision. As one commissioner told a public audience:

The thing you have to consider, this is like a lawsuit. If the Commission were to make their decision based on emotion, then certainly the company could come down to Annapolis to the Court of Appeals and have it reversed. The evidence that they need to determine and make their decision is based on those expert witnesses.¹⁸

Thus, the bulk of the public testimony being gathered outside the legal forum was denied relevance for the decision. But the kinds of data and claims which fit the legal criteria are not normally available to the "average" consumer. Even if available, few have the economic training and linguistic repertoire necessary to digest the data and formulate opposing arguments. The pool of potentially "qualified" witnesses is reduced even further when one considers the considerable amount of time required for the undertaking.

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Finally, even if these hurdles are overcome, the public testimony is suspect because it is not given under oath. As one Commissioner said: "these people are not under oath as an expert is. So they have an awful lot of latitude in what they say, without having to be responsible for what they say."¹⁹ In short, the public is precluded from meaningful direct participation in the decision.

There is one possible exception to the hegemony of the company's financial conditions. In a 1965 Potomac Edison case, the hearing examiner included the following statement in the opinion:

Being cognizant of the present economic situation as it exists in the Company's service area, the Examiner has recommended a rate of return which, while above the return recommended by Mr. Bernstein, is near the lower end of the zone of reasonable return. The ability of the Company's customers to pay increased electric is, to this extent, a valid consideration in arriving at a fair and reasonable rate of return.²⁰

Upon appeal, the court specifically sanctioned that criterion when it proclaimed:

Clearly, it was not inappropriate for the commission to consider local economic conditions in arriving at a reasonable rate of return. Inherent in the rate making process is a "balancing of the investor and the consumer interests."²¹

In spite of the court approval of an ability-to-pay criterion, I have been unable to find the rationale cited in subsequent PSC decisions. When I asked the Chief Hearing Examiner for guidance, he indicated that I was unlikely to find such language. He suggested the evidence that the Commission included the customer comments about ability to pay was to be found in the extent to which the decision came closer to the People's Counsel recommendation than to the company's request.²² At best, that is tenuous and ambiguous support for the claim that the public plays a meaningful role in the rate setting process.

The Commissioner interviewed as part of this study explicitly rejected "affordability" as a criterion within the purview of the PSC. The proffered rationale was twofold. First, U.S. Supreme Court rulings and Maryland statutes require "cost-of-service" standards for rate setting, and prohibit the Commission from designing discriminatory rates. Second, an affordability criterion would constitute a social program which the PSC is unqualified and unequipped to handle because they have no way to make the determination of who can afford it. To the extent that such a standard is legislatively implemented it would have to be administered by a social service agency, not the PSC.²³

One of the more precise distinctions between the legal and political fields of argument is to be found in the method of resolution of the dialectical conflict. In the legal field the decision is typically a dichotomous choice of the claims of one side or the other, while policy field arguments are typically resolved by consensus or compromise.²⁴ McKerrow has noted that the degree of a decision's "reasonableness" is a function of discourse that adheres to the "standards of rationality adopted by a communication community."²⁵ Zarefsky contended that it is the "dialectical tension between the liberal and conservative presumptions which sustains political institutions," and that claims which veer unabashedly toward either pole, without acknowledging and legitimizing the alternative presumption are likely to be dismissed as unreasonable.²⁶

While the preponderance of characteristics of PSC proceedings, at both the forum and field levels of analysis, are cast in the legal model, the decisions are unequivocally in public policy mode. It is rare to find decisions which either accept all of the increases requested, or deny any increase at all. In fact, it is almost as rare to find People's Counsel arguing for complete denial of a request. In the one case I have found where that was a People's Counsel claim, they also presented a considerable number of contingency arguments of a need minimization.²⁷

If the companies and the Office of People's Counsel have learned to live with this inconsistency, and accept the resulting parameters of reasonableness, much of the public has not. For example, one irate customer asserted:

We've had it with you as a Public Service Commission. You are supposed to protect the interests of us, the public. It's obvious you don't. Every year we come in with great numbers to plead that we can't take another rate increase. Not one year, not one year have you totally rejected a BG&E request. So we are here tonight to let you know, once and for all, we are just not going to stand for you representing BG&E any longer.²⁸

Another witness proclaimed:

We understand how the trip back for more money works. They come down and always ask for a rate they don't expect to get and you give them so much of it. So when they are asking for 17 percent, they are only asking for 10 percent. We know that. We know who wines and dines.²⁹

While these examples may be more volatile than the norm, they are representative of a persistent public perception that compromise decisions are unreasonable.

Rhetorical Level

Within the parameters of the intent of this particular study, Wenzel's rhetorical level of analysis is more difficult to apply. Since, as he suggests, there are innumerable contexts for arguing, the rhetorical perspective seems particularly pertinent for case studies, and less useful for descriptive/critical examination of a field, or for examining the public's participatory role in the field. Nevertheless, with that reservation in mind, the following speculations are offered for consideration.

Bitzer has noted that rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a fitting response to a situation.³⁰ It may be that major situational exigencies occasioned by events like the 1976 oil embargo, or the most recent break-up of AT&T are responsible not only for major increases in attendance at the public hearings, but also invite significantly different forms of public utterance such as threat, mass demonstration and hanging in effigy. Yet, as the previous analysis shows, these forms of argument are specifically denied impact on decisions made within the rate-setting field.

As Gronbeck has noted, "Individuals argue with each other from within role definitions (unless, of course, they are involved in some form of legitimation crisis, in which case they may well argue about the role definitions themselves...)"³¹ Having been denied access to power within the rules of the established forum, the public may seek to change the role definitions. This would account for testimony which accuses the commissioners of being "wined and dined" and of representing the utilities instead of regulating them. The rules perspective of the rhetorical environment may also account for the periodic recurrence of calls for an elected Public Service Commission and for political pressure on the Governor to appoint commissioners who are more receptive to the consumer's view. Rather than change their responses to conform to the field, the public may attempt to change the rules of the field to fit the response.

If, like Lucaites, we view legitimation as a "social rhetorical process through which public advocates seek to produce a state of mass political consciousness which might be described best as 'public trust,'"³² then there is evidence that some in the PSC see the public hearings as an arena for a rhetoric of legitimation. In separate interviews, two years apart, the Chief Hearing Examiner and one of the commissioners offered very similar views which can be summarized as a three-fold function of the public sessions: (1) to gather comments for the record; (2) to allow cathartic public expression; and (3) to educate the public about the powers and the procedures of the Commission.

As shown in the preceeding analysis, gathering comments and allowing cathartic expression are not synonymous with using

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those arguments in the decision-making process. Of course, another response is that it is the function of the Office of People's Counsel to represent the public in the balancing of consumer and investor interests. That may be true, but it begs the question of the public's role in the decision-making process.

It is in the "educational" function that the legitimation purpose emerges most clearly. Commissioner Hamilton was more explicit when he stated:

"Some of them [the public] feel it's a waste of their time. It really isn't Quite often it puts them where they understand the process. It helps by them being a participant, regardless of the effect on what the decision may be If nothing else, they see the commissioners as real people."³³

Thus, the public role is transformed from a source-participant to receiver-participant. The irony is that this occurs in a forum that is statutorily mandated to serve data gathering.

In short, it would seem that situational exigencies give impulse to arguments which are available to the public, but outside the field. These arguments, in turn, engender PSC responses which seek to legitimize the forthcoming decision and the commissioners' authority and obligation to reject most of the arguments advanced by the public.

SUMMARY

It has been my contention that the public frustration and anger is at least partially a function of the hybrid-field characteristics of the regulatory argumentation. The preponderance of legal characteristics at both the forum and field levels sets an expectation of a dichotomous choice--increase or do not increase the rates. When the compromise decision is issued, it contradicts that expectation and, even though it might be closer to the public's position than that of the utility, it violates the public's standard of reasonableness. The violation may be further compounded by the absence of specific acknowledgment of the arguments presented by the public and by the rhetoric of legitimation advanced in a setting ostensibly intended for gathering arguments. The end result is public disillusion and bitterness, and charges of collusion and violation of the public trust.

In light of the weight placed on the data from financial experts, and the arguments advanced by lawyers representing the staff, company and People's Counsel, it is questionable whether the public hearings serve a meaningful role in the balancing of

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consumer and investor interests. In other words, it seems warranted to concur with Goodnight that the field has grown at the expense of the public domain. It remains for other research to determine whether the Maryland Public Service Commission is an anomaly, or whether the same hybrid-field characteristics and problems extend to the broader arena of regulatory agencies in general.

NOTES

¹G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry Into the Art of Public Deliberation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Spring, 1982), p. 215.

²Rate-setting decisions are distinguished from rate-structure decisions in that the former involves setting an allowable charge for the service or product, while the latter involves differences in rates for such variables as different types of user or amount of usage.

³Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 14-15.

⁴A range of the theoretical and critical views can be found in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. George Ziegelmüller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981). Cited hereafter as Dimensions.

⁵See, for example, Charles A. Willard, "Argument Fields," Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research. eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 24-77.

⁶Richard D. Rieke, "Investigating Legal Argument as a Field," Dimensions, p. 158.

⁷David Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions in the Theory of Argument Fields," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Spring, 1982), pp. 194-200.

⁸Joseph W. Wenzel, "On Fields of Argument as Propositional Systems," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Spring, 1982), p. 204.

⁹Willard, p. 77.

¹⁰The following description of procedures is based on an interview with Kirk J. Emgee, Chief Hearing Examiner, Public Service Commission of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, June 28, 1983; examination of several utility rate-setting case files; interview with Wayne Hamilton, Maryland Public Service Commission, July 3, 1985; observation of public hearings; and Public Service Commission Law of Maryland (Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1978), pp. 172-191.

- ¹¹Public Service Commission Law of Maryland, p. 175.
- ¹²Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Sociocultural Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer," Dimensions, p. 13.
- ¹³Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 78, Sections 68 & 69.
- ¹⁴Public Service Commission of Maryland, Case No. 6985, "Opinion in the Matter of the Application of Baltimore Gas and Electric Company for Revision of Its Electric, Gas and Steam Rates," December 9, 1976, p. 13. Cited hereafter as PSC Case 6985.
- ¹⁵PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Annapolis, Md., October 28, 1976, p. 6.
- ¹⁶PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Annapolis, p. 28.
- ¹⁷PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Annapolis, p. 28.
- ¹⁸PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Annapolis, p. 56.
- ¹⁹Hamilton interview.
- ²⁰Public Service Commission of Maryland, Case No. 6786, "Report of the Examiner in the Matter of the Application of the Potomac Edison Company for Revision of Its Electric Rates," March 24, 1975, p. 35.
- ²¹The Potomac Edison Company v Public Service Commission of Maryland. 279 Md. 573, 369, A. 2d, 1035 (1977).
- ²²Emgee Interview.
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- ²⁴Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1979) pp. 197-202.
- ²⁵Ray E. McKerrow, "Rationality and Reasonableness in a Theory of Argument," Advance in Argumentation Theory and Research, p. 121.

- ²⁶David Zarefsky, "'Reasonableness' in Public Argument: Fields as Institutions," Dimensions, p. 91.
- ²⁷PSC Case 6985, "Brief of People's Counsel."
- ²⁸PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Baltimore, Md. October 26, 1976, p. 13.
- ²⁹PSC Case 6985, "Public Hearing," Baltimore, Md. F. 68.
- ³⁰Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (1968), pp. 1-14.
- ³¹Gronbeck, Dimensions, p. 12.
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PRAGMATICS OF MEANING

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"[M]eanings are based on perceptions. They are internal information. They are part of the products of perception."¹

"Words don't mean, people mean. Meanings are in people. They are the internal reactions of the human organism to its environment."²

"'[M]eaning': the attachment of importance or significance to something."³

Information theory succeeds in "eliminating the subject of meaning from the study of communication."⁴

The concept of meaning may be the most pervasive concept in all of communication study. Virtually every textbook in virtually every area of communication includes some discussion of meaning. Each of the above comments, for example, comes from a current textbook in communication, and each is based on the currently popular psychological notions which characterize much of today's thinking about human communication. This paper employs a different perspective to inform our thinking about the nature of meaning and, indirectly, of human communication. The present perspective, "pragmatics," is admittedly less well known but is probably more valuable when attempting to understand and explain the complexities inherent in the study of communication and of argument.

The discussion in this paper will proceed through the traditional tripartite arrangement of developing argument: definition, application, and implications. First, the paper will include definitions important in the application of pragmatics to the study of human communication. Second, I will apply pragmatics to the concept of meaning, particularly meaning in argument or argumentation. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications (particularly the increased complexity of meanings) that ensue from applying a pragmatic perspective to the study of meaning in argument.

PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS

A pragmatic perspective of human communication has been developed from a combination of system theory (specifically, a theory of "open systems")⁵ and the philosophy of pragmatism⁶. Although many references applying a pragmatic perspective to human communication are available, the seminal work of Gregory Bateson's "Palo Alto group"⁷ remains perhaps the best source for understanding the conceptual and theoretical basis of such a perspective. A pragmatic perspective advocates no particular method of inquiry. In fact, a variety of quantitative and qualitative methodologies are used by contemporary researchers in their observations of communicative phenomena.

The following discussion is intended not as a definitive depiction of a pragmatic perspective of human communication, but as an admittedly generalized description. Further, the principles of pragmatism and open system theory are applicable to communication in a variety of different ways. Hence, the discussion that follows is intended as a description of "a" pragmatic perspective rather than "the" pragmatic perspective. I intend to keep this discussion at a rather high level of abstraction so that it incorporates a broad variety of theoretical conceptualizations and methodological applications.

Thought and Action

Perhaps the most central proposition of pragmatism is the specific relationship between human thoughts (cognition, rationality) and actions (behaviors). Significant to understanding the relation between thoughts and actions is the principle of summum bonum -- "reference to the final end of action," not to be confused with reference to merely "practical effects which are actually encountered in experience."⁸ This principle stipulates that the only way humans have to cope with their world is through the interplay of belief and doubt in an ultimately rational process of human thought. But belief can have existence only in the presence of doubt. Since experience has no opposite, no counterpart to the reality of experience, then experience is basically unknowable as a long lasting belief. In other words, a generalization based merely on experiences does not lead to "belief" but to "habit," at best.

Thought (or belief) is significant only when one is willing to act upon it under conditions that involve some risk -- that is, doubt. As Peirce phrases it, "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason."⁹ Pragmatics thus marries form and function, time and space. They are inseparable and reflexive. Perceptual judgment no more leads to action than action leads to perception. Perception is meaningless and unknowable without the presence of "purposive action." And purposive action is action that possesses some "final end," some meaning. The principle of summum bonum can thus be interpreted as "purposive action," "meaningful action," or "interpreted action." And action, defined through this principle, thus becomes the focal point of human rationality.

Pragmatics takes into consideration perception, cognition, belief, and other psychological concepts as relevant to the process of human communication. But the one constant that absolutely must be included in any and every conceptualization of communication is action, purposive action. The first pragmatic principle of human communication, then, can be phrased: Behaviors (actions) are the phenomena of study necessary for understanding human communication.

Holism

A first principle of system theory is that of holism, that a system is a "whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence

of its parts.¹⁰ Holism denies the physicalistic assumption that the system can be adequately understood by reductionism or decomposition -- that is, by analyzing the parts or factors that make up the system. In fact, holism stipulates that a system can be adequately understood only through discovering the nature of the triple interdependence among the system, its component subsystems, and its environing suprasystems. The components of the system provide the existence of the system, but only their interrelationships or connections among each other can define the system. The importance or significance of the system, though, can be understood only by seeing it in the environment of its association with a suprasystem or suprasystems.

When human communication is the system of interest, such as two people engaged in conversation, the individual human beings are the component subsystems, of course. They are related or connected with each other through their behaviors or actions. The only way one human being can relate to or with another human being is by behaving, acting toward or in concert with the other. No particular action is important, of course, until it meets the summum bonum principle of placing that action in reference with some connected and interpretable pattern that leads to some final end or purpose. Purposiveness is thus knowable only in the pattern or sequence of behaviors -- that is, the interaction.¹¹ Furthermore, that pattern is significant only when placed in a broader sequence of actions and time frame (the suprasystem). The result is that a system is always nested within a larger system and contains many subsystems nested within it.

The second pragmatic principle of human communication, then, can be made explicit: The interpretation/definition of communicative actions is to be found in the patterns of how those behaviors connect with one another. To discover the meaning/significance of those communicative patterns is to place them in context; the same communicative pattern may be significant in one context and insignificant in another.

Reality and Evolution

Pragmatism rejects both nominalism (existence of an object in and of itself) and idealism (characteristics of object not available to our experience) as adequate explanations of reality. Nor do humans have a capacity to "acquire" reality, which assumes that an object possesses an objective reality "out there somewhere" waiting to be discovered. What is pragmatically "real" is the result of an act of human creation and is susceptible to human understanding through one of three modes of logical thought: deduction, induction, and abduction. Of these three, the most important for human communication is abduction.

Karl Weick refers to the abductive creation of reality as a process of "enacting" reality.¹² Human life is fundamentally a process of being in an environment, social and cultural as well as physical. We attempt to make sense out of our environment, understand our existence in terms of our understanding, and adapt to changes that are constantly occurring in our environment. Enactment is thus an "effort after meaning." But the meaning of the environment is an act of "invention," not discovery.

We begin this effort after meaning in a state of confusion or maximum uncertainty. As we act and continue to act over time, we soon develop a history of actions which we then punctuate or organize into "meaningful" patterns which is our interpretation or definition of reality. In its ultimate form, this principle of enacted reality through retrospective sensemaking has been stated as "How do I know what I think until I hear what I have to say?"

Reality is thus a process that occurs over time. It begins with actions, proceeds through a sequence of actions, and ends with the human creation of an understanding of reality through retrospectively making sense of those actions. Reality construction is a process of reducing uncertainty from a large list of possible interpretations to some level of meaning -- that is, a manageable level of uncertainty. At this most fundamental level, pragmatic meaning is similar to the conceptualization of meaning in information theory¹³ -- a process of reducing alternative interpretations to some workable interpretation or definition. In fact, the concept of meaning (reconceptualized as uncertainty reduction) is absolutely central to information theory. And that is why the assertion that information theory eliminates the subject of meaning from the study of communication seems so absurd. Its major contribution to the study of communication is the reconceptualization of meaning.

The third pragmatic principle of human communication, then, can be phrased to understand communication is to "make sense" of the patterns of interactive behaviors retrospectively. In fact, now that discussion has led to these three pragmatic principles of human communication, we can add two additional principles by inference. Both of these final pragmatic principles are less descriptive than comparative. That is, the principles define pragmatics by indicating how this perspective differs from other perspectives used to understand the process of human communication: A pragmatic view of communication involves asking "How behavior means?"¹⁴ rather than (syntactics) "What does behavior mean?" or (semantics) "What do people mean by their behavior?" And, finally, Others look for causes; pragmatists look at events and patterns of those events. Others ask "why?"; pragmatists ask "So what?"

PRAGMATICS OF MEANING IN ARGUMENT

Since the publication of *Principia Mathematica* shortly after the turn of the century, philosophers have sought to develop a system of formalizing arguments used in daily social life. Toulmin's triadic formulation¹⁵ at one time seemed to provide the answer to the problem of formalizing arguments-in-use but has since proved quite unsatisfactory. Pragmatics also does not provide for a formal structure of what probably is unformalizable. In fact, its emphasis on the inseparability of form and function would prohibit a general logic of marketplace arguments. However, pragmatics does focus study on the interpretation of meaning in such a way as to provide some general assistance for interpreting the usefulness, if not the validity, of argument-in-use. This discussion attempts to apply pragmatics to the concept of meaning and illustrate that application in terms of the meaning of argument.

Context -- Meaning in use

Often asking "where" something is more informative to meaning than asking "what" something is. For example, psychology defines meaning as a process of perception and locates meaning in the mind of an individual human being. Philosophy (logic) defines meaning as a form or structure and locates meaning within some language (typically mathematics). The physical sciences define meaning as decomposition of structural elements and locate meaning in objective materiality. Communication, viewed from a pragmatic perspective defines meaning in a pattern of interaction and locates meaning in events. The locus of meaning also defines the nature of the context which is essential to the concept of meaning. Locating meaning in the human mind automatically defines context as more human minds, such as social or cultural norms and values. Locating meaning in the pattern of events automatically defines context as events, such that society and culture become definable in terms of time-bound principles.

Context thus comprises events. Larger contexts by definition mean larger (that is, longer) events. Since the context determines how much significance or importance can be attributed to the event, the choice of what context in which to place the event is crucial to the assessment of meaning. The concept of "fields," popular in current research into the meaning of argument, is essentially a system of contexts available for judging the significance of argument. However, if "fields" possess any value in pragmatics, they must reflect events of when the arguments have occurred. Pragmatically, then, meaning always "occurs." Meaning cannot exist in isolation from its being "used" at some time by some one. Any judgment of validity or worth of an argument, isolated from its actual existence as an event (that is, meaning-in-use), is meaningless from a pragmatic perspective of human communication. Hence, meaning "belongs to" its context of events, not to the person who uses it or a person who responds to it. Meaning is part and product of its use in time.

Pattern -- Reduction of Uncertainty

Perhaps the best way to understand meaning as reducing uncertainty is to understand the absence of meaning. Before information theory, we tended to think of the absence of meaning as a state of nothingness; no meaning implied absence of anything. The presence of meaning, then, required that to have meaning is to bring something to the situation of interpretation. Hence, the cliché -- "Words don't mean; people mean." Nothing existed in the situation until and unless the human interpreter provided it from somewhere inside the human mind -- typically the system of percepts gained through past experience and carried around inside the human mind. A pragmatic perspective continues to conceptualize meaning as a cognitive experience, but of a vastly different kind.

Pragmatically meaning is a process of elimination, rather than one of discovery. Meaninglessness is not an absence of meaning so much as it is the presence of too many meanings. Acquiring meaning, then, is a process of gaining information for the purpose of eliminating the vast number of potential meanings. Without information, the human has little to assist the cognitions. Too many interpretations or meanings remain

as potential alternatives. The information-processing human has no idea whether meaning₁, meaning₂, meaning₃. . . or meaning_n is appropriate or accurate. Uncertainty, the state of insufficient information to choose among alternatives, characterizes the absence of meaning. Information is necessary to eliminate some meanings as inappropriate or inaccurate. The human goes through the process of acquiring information in order to reduce alternative meanings to some level of reasonable uncertainty. A state of "certainty," in the sense of eliminating all alternatives but one, is probably an ideal state never achieved in "real life." And even if such a state did indeed occur, it would be temporary. The process of uncertainty reduction never ends and often includes periods of increased uncertainty. Pragmatic doubt is inherently omnipresent throughout the process of uncertainty reduction.

Humans process information over time as events occur. The process of reducing uncertainty is a process of making connections between and among events. It follows that the minimum number of events necessary for uncertainty reduction to occur is three: the event, the event that precedes it, and the event that follows it. Realistically, of course, events are constantly occurring, and many more than three events are considered. But some context of events is minimally essential in the process; therefore, three events are absolutely necessary whenever any human being engages in meaning. The pattern of events, the connections between events, provide information to reduce equivocality.

Sensemaking -- Inference through Abduction

A pragmatic perspective inherently endows the human actor and the process of human communication with rationality. Traditionally, we have come to understand rationality as form or structure present in argument: two or more premises and a conclusion. A traditional understanding of the forms of argument includes but two: induction and deduction. The application of pragmatics to forms of argument results in the addition of a third form: abduction. We are relatively familiar with induction and deduction but somewhat less so with abduction. Essentially, the process of abduction is a process of drawing inferences from available information contained in premises, similar to induction and deduction, but differing from deduction in that the inference is not necessitated by the premises. But abduction also differs from induction in that the inferred conclusion is not a generalization or inclusive statement about phenomenal properties. Abduction leads inferentially to a conclusion which may be called an hypothesis. Specifically, abduction leads to an explanation rather than a generalization. Induction generalizes, and abduction explains.

An example might best illustrate the formal difference between the rational processes of induction and abduction. I see an apple fall from a tree. I also observe rocks fall down a mountainside. After numerous instances of observing falling objects, I may use induction in order to infer some conclusion about falling objects. I look at the similarities of the objects that I have observed exhibiting falling behavior. I thus conclude that all objects with mass and volume fall when not supported. On the other hand, I might employ the process of abduction to draw some

inference from the same events or premises. I might infer that there is some principle, called "gravitation," that serves to explain the events of falling rocks. I then continue the process of observing additional events and in order to define and refine the explanatory inference that created the construct of gravitation. Newton, we can say, engaged in a process of abduction as he developed his inference concerning the force of gravitation.

Pragmatic rationality is always a process of organizing available information in order to draw inferences. It is a process of drawing inferences on the basis of making sense of available information. It is fundamentally a process of organizing events so that a conclusion may be drawn. But pragmatic rationality also implies that one essential to any human action is the principle of doubt. Without the presence of doubt, a human belief is unlikely to play a significant role in human actions. An inference drawn formally from deduction contains little doubt and is thus relatively insignificant. An induced inference is similar to habit or generalization from experiences and is thus not particularly of value in understanding human actions. Inferences which result from a process of abduction, however, continue to possess doubt and are likely to be present in continued future behavior as humans "test" the validity of their inferences.

The focus on events occurring in context automatically presumes the axiom that rational understanding or sensemaking occurs retrospectively in time. We cannot interpret the meaning of an event until after it has occurred. We cannot interpret the meaning of an event until we are able to see it in the context of other events after they have also occurred. Rationality, particularly abduction, is not unlike puzzle solving. It involves a process of organizing events into some pattern that endows the events with meaning. This process of organizing, typically called "punctuation," is a rational process of retrospective sensemaking and should not be confused (as some communication scholars have done) with the process of human perception. Perception is neither retrospective nor sensemaking. It is a process of applying semipermanent meanings (percepts) on a phenomenal event in order to attribute meaning to that phenomenal event. Perception structures the event prospectively, rather than retrospectively, and "forcefits" phenomenal events into preexisting percepts, thereby virtually eliminating pragmatic doubt. Abduction is explanatory, an act of invention, necessarily inferential, and always characterized by pragmatic doubt.

IMPLICATIONS

Any discussion of a concept as abstract as meaning must eventually come to the point of addressing the "so what" issue. So pragmatics has a way of reconceptualizing the process of human communication and, along with it, the concept of meaning. So what? People still mean, and words still don't. Where does that lead? What difference does it make? The answers to questions such as these need to provide a fresh insight into a more complete or more satisfactory explanation, or the presence of a pragmatic perspective will hold little interest or significance for any student of human communication or argument. Fortunately, a pragmatic

view of communication does indeed lead to fresh ideas and understanding of communication. The following discussion will treat two implications that grow directly out of a pragmatic perspective. The second of these implications is, by far, the more important implication and will receive the most attention.

Values

Pragmatic meaning, you will recall, wedded into an inseparable unity the form and function, time and space, of events and human actions. An event has no form or structure in and of itself but, rather, takes on formal characteristics when placed in the context of events and seen as a fundamental part of a pattern. Events may be structured in any number of ways, for example, cause-effect, antecedent-subsequent, simultaneity, redundancy, timing, among others. The structural component of meaning is absolutely inseparable from its functional component. The meaning of even a material object, a "thing," comes from human action -- functional events in regard to it. Hence, the extrinsic meaning of any "thing" may change considerably as the functional events evolve over time. Further, an inherent part of the meaning of any thing is "value," the functional property of meaning.

Gold, for instance, is a materialistic object, a metal, a physical element. The meaning we have of gold takes into account its physical properties (atomic weight, yellow color, malleability, etc.) but also recognizes its "value" as a medium of exchange. Typically, we tend to see values as a product of human attributions. Humans, we say, place high value on gold. We ask ourselves, "Why do the people value gold so highly?" Because it's scarce, perhaps. Because it costs so much money, perhaps. Because it can be exchanged for so many goods and services, perhaps. But this view of "values," though rational, is certainly not consistent with pragmatic functions. The apocalyptic novel of American life after a nuclear holocaust, *Alas Babylon*, relates the incident of one man who was found dead of radioactive poisoning contained in gold he had stolen and accumulated. Now gold had no functional value in this post-war world. Uncontaminated food and gasoline were extraordinarily valuable, but gold was of little use, even as a medium of exchange.

Attribution as a purely psychological process separate from the impact of functional events is not an adequate explanation of value. Pragmatically, the character who hoarded gold made an error in his interpretation of gold. His error was based on using a context (the world prior to nuclear war) that no longer existed. He attributed value to the gold, not on the basis of pragmatic function, but on the basis of his percepts that he continued to carry around with him in his mind. He attributed value to the gold by failing to take into account the events in the context and how human actions functioned toward the metal. The psychological view of values would ask, "Why do people kill for gold?" The psychological answer would be, "Because people attribute value to it." The pragmatic view of value would retrospectively make sense of events and infer that gold has significant value because people kill for it. The crucial pragmatic characteristic of value in meaning, then, is not that humans attribute value to an object (such as gold) or concept

(such as freedom), but that every object of concept has some level of value that is determined by events relevant to it. Most important of those events are the human actions toward it.

The example of gold is obviously contrived. It discusses "error" as though only pragmatics could uncover the fact that the poor soul who hoarded gold had made an error in judgment (value). Every perspective or definition of meaning would render this same judgment. But the point to be gleaned from that example is not the mere presence of an error in one's meaning. In fact, "error" in meaning or interpretations is simply not significant. More important is the function of pragmatic doubt and its role in assessing value in meaning. For the human actor, reality construction (that is, meaning) is a struggle that culminates in action. But human action does not eradicate doubt; that action occurs in its own context and is subject to further interpretation in a constant state of changing events and pattern of events -- a constant state of "becoming." But the meanings will continue to change as events change, only as and if the actor continues to hold doubt and continues to "mean."

Values are thus interpretations of meaning contained in the pattern of past human actions. They involve the "final end" of action that goes beyond the immediate practical effect of human action and extends a lone existential action into "purposive action" or "meaningful action" or, in our words, "pragmatic action." Pragmatically, humans cannot doubt the fact of their action, but they can doubt the value of their action. In other words, belief and abstraction of value are products of sensemaking which occurs after action. A value is the result of a rational process of retrospectively making sense from a pattern of events. A value, too, is an abstract concept not directly expressible in action. Therefore, a value results from the rational process of abduction, organizing events to form an inference that creates and contains the abstract value. The concept of "values," viewed pragmatically, is consistent with a rational process and central to the concept of meaning as enacted.

Paradox

Perhaps the most intriguing insight into the concept of meaning, at least the most intriguing in many decades, is the notion of paradox. It is a direct result of applying a pragmatic perspective to the study of human communication.¹⁶ A paradox results from a pragmatically rational process of constructing reality, but the meaning produced by sensemaking contains elements that are both true (in their own frames of reference) and incongruent (logical impossibility for both to be true). The simple illustration of a paradox is the statement, "I am lying." This sentence can be neither true nor false, but it must be one or the other. Yet, if true, the person is saying his statement is false. If the statement is false, then the person is saying that he is telling the truth. A common paradox and a current object of study among the therapists associated with the Mental Research Institute at Palo Alto is the admonition to "Be spontaneous." If you respond to the command by changing your behavior, you aren't being spontaneous. But if you ignore the command, you don't change your behavior and you continue not being spontaneous. The result is a clear paradox as a result of making sense of the action.

Some communication scholars have become intrigued with the concept of paradox but have failed to take advantage of the pragmatic imperative present in a paradox. They tend to see paradox as a mere contradiction of conflicting information. For example, authors of several currently popular textbooks in interpersonal communication have illustrated their definition of paradox with the example of conflicting meanings emanating from multichannel presentations: verbal communication says "I'm poised" and nonverbal behaviors say "I'm nervous." A pragmatic paradox contains a single meaning, two elements of which are both true and inconsistent with each other. The multichannel contradiction of verbal and nonverbal behavior contains two meanings that are certainly inconsistent with each other, but both meanings are not true. One is true; one is false. The problem is not a paradox, but a decision as to which of two meanings to accept. Perhaps "irony" is a better descriptor of this situation.

Paradoxes of meaning have typically been associated with pathology, particularly schizophrenia. However, the same therapists who associated double binds with mental illness have insisted that paradoxes also have important implications for all of communication and human behavior.¹⁷ For one thing, paradoxical meanings are much more common than we might at first think. Second, we tend to equate paradoxes to quickly with a problem that must be overcome, rather than understanding how paradoxes function in our "normal" communicative behavior. Third, the paradox is often a valuable insight into developing communicative skill and, at the same time, maintains the rational human process of understanding a world that is often nonrational.

Finding ourselves in a situation that we have defined as containing a paradoxical meaning is often a learning process affecting how we act in the future. For example, paradox leads to confusion, and confusion has benefits of which we are typically unaware.¹⁸ Among other benefits, Watzlawick points out that our confusion resulting from paradox leads us to "fresh and creative ways of conceptualizing reality"¹⁹ along with the fact that it "sharpens our senses and our attention to detail."²⁰ It is certainly true that we know little about how paradox functions in the process of argument and communication. We have spent so much time and effort on forms of meaning that we have tended to ignore the functions of meaning, particularly pragmatic functions. Coping with paradoxical meanings may be the key to understanding communicative competence, too.

CONCLUSION

A few years ago Larry Grossberg asserted that various alternatives of "communication theory" could be phrased by filling in the appropriate blanks of the following sentence: "Communication is the _____ of meaning between individuals through _____."²¹ Several inferences are possible from this generic sentence. One, Grossberg limits the term "communication theory" to interpersonal settings. Two, Grossberg places the concept of meaning at the very center of the communicative process. More importantly, though, Grossberg goes on to assert:

[O]ne can adequately summarize the diversity of responses that have been given to the question of

communication with three phrases: (1) correspondence through exchange, (2) sharing through emergence, and (3) constitution through interpretation.²²

Grossberg's analysis of communication theory suggests that all the alternative perspectives on human communication are reducible to three: a psychomechanistic theory ("correspondence through exchange"), a psychosocial theory ("sharing through emergence"), and a psychotranscendental theory ("constitution through interpretation"). The discerning reader will undoubtedly discover a common thread of psychologism that permeates all of communication theory, according to Grossberg's analysis. Missing from any of Grossberg's three phrases is anything that could be grossly interpreted as representing a pragmatic perspective.

No one (least of all, I) should experience surprise by a persistent tendency of our society to emphasize a psychological view of humans. We are comfortable and familiar with the psychological notions, even when we don't always understand them in all their Freudian implications. We like the mystery of not knowing all the secrets of the human mind, even when we are often afraid that this lack of knowledge will lead us to be defenseless against dangers from, say, television advertising. Yes, we live in a psychological society, and pragmatists often find difficulty in getting their message across to an obstinate audience. Perhaps one place to begin is with Grossberg's generic statement of communication theory and fill in the blanks with a pragmatic interpretation. That statement would then read, "Communication is the creation of meaning between individuals through cooperatively enacting their reality."

ENDNOTES

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⁹Hartshorne and Weiss, Vol. 5, p. 212.

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¹⁴See Albert E. Schefflen, How Behavior Means (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974).

¹⁵Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

¹⁶See Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson; and also Paul Watzlawick, How Real Is Real? (New York: Vintage, 1982).

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¹⁹Watzlawick, p. 28.

²⁰Watzlawick, p. 29

²¹Lawrence Grossberg, "Does Communication Theory Need Intersubjectivity? Toward an Immanent Philosophy of Interpersonal Relations," in Communication Yearbook 6, ed. Michael Burgoon, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), p. 172.

²²Grossberg, p. 172.

A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO MEANING:
IN DEFENSE OF INTERPRETATION

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One particular issue which has intrigued a variety of theorists involved in the different social sciences is the system by which individuals derive or achieve meaning with respect to the world around them. Numerous attempts have been made to clarify the concept of meaning and the processes involved in an individual's efforts to make his/her world meaningful; however, those efforts have failed to produce a commonly accepted understanding of either the concept or the nature of the processes involved. What does seem clear is that theory development within the communication discipline is greatly impacted by theorists' implicit and explicit assumptions concerning meaning. The concepts of argument and arguing provide excellent examples of research and theory development concerns which are responsive to a priori notions of the relationship between communication and meaning. If a particular theorist defines meaning as a cultural creation or "given" aspect of any interactional context, then arguments and the process of arguing are most profitably examined as products of the culture (micro and/or macro), not of the individuals involved. If, however, meaning is seen as residing within the individual, perhaps responsive to but certainly not determined by any particular cultural milieu, then arguments and arguing are best examined from the viewpoints of the individuals involved in the focal interactions.

The intent of this paper is to present but a single view as to the nature of the communication-meaning relationship. The perspective presented has its roots in the paradigm of constructivism. The constructivist approach to communication has involved an articulation of the relationship between social cognition and communication development/competence. Constructivism recognizes the intrinsic character of the communication-meaning relationship by the very nature of the definition offered for the word "communication": "the process by which shared meaning is created".¹ Thus, the constructivist begins from a stance which places meaning as central to the communicative act. Beyond that definitional specification, a fundamental assertion of constructivism has been that individuals approach their worlds through ongoing processes of interpretation. An individual's actions (communications) are hypothesized as reflecting, though not necessarily mirroring, those personal interpretations, i.e., those private meaning-making processes.

In order to accomplish the goal assumed by this paper, two related issues must be broached: (1) the role of interpretation in the process of creating meaning and in the communication process, and (2) the role of the communication theorist/researcher in defining that communication-meaning relationship. The general position advocated by constructivism and reviews of research done within the constructivist framework are described elsewhere.² Thus, the present discussion will be limited to those aspects of the constructivist perspective specifically relevant to the interaction between meaning and communication.

INTERPRETATION, MEANING, AND COMMUNICATION

A variety of perspectives exist concerning the nature of meaning in the context of communication. The pragmatic position, for example, emphasizes "aspects of understanding that are 'common' to the communicators". Within the pragmatic perspective, meaning is thought to be evident in patterns of behavior (particularly in redundant patterns of behavior). Coordinated management of meaning, on the other hand, looks to rules and meta-rules as vehicles through which coordination of behavior is enabled, relationships are established and maintained, and, thus, interaction is made meaningful.³

The constructivist perspective views meaning, as it is related to communication, as an individual sense-making process. The data for that sense-making are the verbal and nonverbal cues perceived by the individual, but the sense-making itself is interpretation. Within this approach to human functioning, knowledge is seen as rooted in the individual and the individual's socially constituted symbolic structures.⁴ While "events" exist apart from the individual, an individual can come to know those events only through his/her own perceptual and interpretive processes. These perceptual and interpretive processes are responsive to, but not predetermined by, the individual's cultural milieu.

Four fundamental assumptions of constructivism are relevant to the present discussion. Taken individually, the four are relatively simple, straightforward assertions. As a collective whole, they constitute the presuppositions of constructivist theory and research. In order to establish the proposed relationship between meaning and interpretation, each of these assumptions needs to be briefly explored.

The first assumption is that humans are active perceivers and interpreters of their environments. Essentially, the constructivist position demands that individuals be viewed as integrally involved in the process of creating meaning. In contrast to mechanistic conceptualizations of human beings as passive recipients of external stimuli, constructivism emphasizes a definition of humans as active organisms. Individuals

are seen as being the sources of acts, and meaning is the product of individual cognitive processes.

The cognitive processes or "interpretive schemes"⁶ which guide individual sense-making are, themselves, subject to growth and change. Development of an individual's socio-cognitive system is seen as a product of the interaction of the individual and his/her milieu. The nature of the development which occurs is defined as involving change (growth) in both the quantity and the quality of the constructs or schemes available to and employed by the individual. In this respect, constructivism draws upon the theoretic position advanced by Heinz Werner in his assertion that cognitive development is a process involving movement from a condition of relative globality and non-differentiation of cognitive structures to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic organization. With development and change in the individual's interpretive schemes come development and change in the product of those schemes, i.e., meaning.

As an example of that change, recent theory development and research within the constructivist framework has pointed to qualitative differences in the message strategies of children as they approach a persuasive task. On the most basic levels are those messages presenting only simple or elaborated requests; on the other end of the scale are those messages which reflect an appreciation for counterarguments and/or attempt to present the request in a way which emphasizes advantages to the persuadee. Barbara O'Keefe and Jesse Delia suggest that these qualitative shifts in message strategy evince developmental differences in the recognition of and accommodation to the multiple purposes or functions which a persuasive message serves. As an individual's interpersonal construct system becomes more complex (i.e., more differentiated and abstract), that change in interpretive scheme should lead to a more sophisticated understanding of (meaning for) the interpersonal objectives which exist within a given context.

Two very different but associated points should be emphasized at this time. First, while it might be possible to chart general socio-cognitive development (à la Piaget, for example), development is a dynamic process which does not proceed at the same pace for all individuals, nor do all individuals achieve equal levels of sophistication in their interpretive schemes. It is, in point of fact, those differences in sophistication of socio-cognitive systems that have proved of particular interest to theorists operating within the perspective of constructivism. Second, although the emphasis thus far has been on the individual, constructivism recognizes meaning as both an individually and a socially constituted entity with two different senses of the notion "socially constituted". One sense of "socially constituted" is present in the recognition that individuals are born into a human community, i.e., into a

world which is defined, interpreted, organized and meaningful.¹⁰ Part of assuming a position as an accepted member of any culture involves accommodating to the social world which already exists. The other sense of "socially constituted" resides in the recognition that communication, itself, is a social process and that individuals engaged in the process of communication are simultaneously engaged in the business of creating a shared sense of reality. Thus, the very nature of the social encounter provides a context for altering individually constituted understandings.

The second fundamental assumption of constructivism is that, through perception and interpretation, individuals create their own concepts of reality. This assumption is closely aligned with the first assumption. While the first called for a view of humans as active in the interpretation of their environment, the second is the recognition that what constitutes reality for one individual might not constitute reality for another individual. That is, the product of the activity of interpretation will not, necessarily, be identical for any two individuals. The significance of any event (or interaction) does not reside in the event, itself; rather, significance is an individually and socially negotiated out-growth of the event.

One might argue that an apparent contradiction exists between the current assertion that reality is individually constituted and the previous assertion that individuals are responsive to and accommodate a pre-existent human community. However, no such contradiction exists. While each individual is born into an already established, defined and organized world, the task of making that extant environment personally meaningful is still an individual process, calling upon the individual's own interpretive schemes. The nature of the individual's interpretive schemes is certainly responsive to that individual's cultural milieu, but a recognition of responsiveness should not be confused with the assertion of a cause-effect relationship. Thus, it is culture as perceived and interpreted by the individual which is the operative construct. Even in the more narrowly defined context of a specific interpersonal encounter, acknowledgement of a socially negotiated reality should not be confused with the assertion that the interactants thus share identical realities. At the risk of a negative example, any victim of bypassing will confirm that coordination of behaviors is fully possible in the absence of mutually shared realities. On a more positive note, interpretation and meaning are, themselves, dynamic in their natures and responsive to the substance and tone of any encounter. Just as communication is a dynamic, on-going process, so is interpretation. Any significance assigned to event X at time A is open to modification as a result of communication and additional sense-making efforts. While the typical result of such modification might be that the communicators obtain more closely

aligned senses of reality, such an end-result is by no means guaranteed.

Following from the first two assumptions, the third assumption of constructivism is that, through communication, individuals attempt to create a shared concept of reality. Through interpretation, individuals make their worlds personally meaningful; through communication, individuals attempt to make their worlds socially meaningful, that is, they attempt to create a shared sense of meaning.

Any constraints which exist to guide an individual's meaning-making processes are derived, in part, from that individual's desire to achieve effective (or competent) communication. As such, culture and the social constitution of reality again become considerations. But in addition to any notion of significance preceding an interaction (as, for example, cultural notions of the significance of a marriage ceremony, presidential debate, or employment interview), there is a recognition that the "meaning" which results from any encounter is a reciprocal and emergent creation. Individuals engaged in interaction cooperate to some extent in determining the nature of the "reality" in which they are engaged. Each interactant brings to bear his/her own dual processes of perception and interpretation in determining the cultural and relational roles/rules applicable in the given context. The joint (or coordinated) notion of what is appropriate in the context of the encounter is then implicitly (on occasion, explicitly) negotiated with the other interactants.

The final assumption to be reviewed is that competent communication is dependent on understanding how others define their realities. Clearly, the argument thus far has been that meaning is the product of individual perceptual and interpretive systems. The significance which an individual ascribes to any context or encounter, guides the individual in the selection of an appropriate interactional strategy. As any encounter might involve multiple goals, multiple strategies might be required. Whatever the case, competence is dependent upon the ability of any particular actor in an encounter to understand the realities of the other actors involved in that encounter, select an appropriate strategy for that encounter, and capably enact that strategy.

Rebecca Rubin and Sally Hensl recently offered a perspective concerning communication competence which is particularly attractive within the framework being advocated in this paper. The approach they suggest is one based on the impressions of those involved in the interaction. Within this view, competence is defined as "an impression formed about a communicator by other people".¹² In deciding, for example, whether or not someone involved in an argument is competent, the impression-based perspective would look to the views of those

others involved in that argument, not to some external criteria or standard of judgment. Such an approach is intuitively attractive as it calls for attention to the dimensions of judgment applied by those persons involved in situ.

Within this view, competence as a communicator is aided by (if not clearly dependent on) the ability of that communicator to decipher the standards of judgment being employed by those others involved within the interaction. The central issue is still one of the interpretation-meaning relationship. In this case, the question becomes one of metaperspectives, i.e., how fellow communicators interpret the encounter and the meaning (or significance) that they, therefore, ascribe to the interaction. Assuming that a particular interactant capably perceives and interprets the perspective of his/her fellow communicators, then it should be possible for that interactant to select a line of action (or strategy) which is appropriately adapted to the needs of the situation and the other interlocutors.

In general, then, the paradigm of constructivism calls for a view of humans as active in the perception and interpretation of their environments. Further, there is a recognition that the "products" of that activity are individually relevant concepts of reality which interactants attempt to share through communication. Finally, there is the assertion that competence as a communicator is dependent, in part, on one's ability to perceive and interpret the realities of others involved in any interaction. The concept of "meaning" within this framework is coterminous with "reality" or "significance". The meaning of any event is the significance which the individual ascribes to that event. Given the dialectic nature of communication and interpretation, meaning serves both as a guide to and a product of communication.

ROLE OF THE COMMUNICATION THEORIST/RESEARCHER

A theme which has long been a part of constructivist philosophy and research is embodied in the assertion that one's conception of science should be consistent with one's view of persons (and vice versa).¹³ Thus, there is an insistence on an alignment between any perspective's presuppositions concerning what it means to be human and the dictates of that theory concerning the nature of the scientific enterprise. Given that constructivism is based in an interpretive orientation which recognizes the creation of meaning as an individual achievement grounded in the dual processes of perception and interpretation, then research conducted within the aegis of constructivism should reflect that particular philosophic anthropology. Thus, attention must be given to significance (meaning) as an individual creation, not a creation of an a priori set of circumstances or research conditions.

Within some other perspectives (Fisher's pragmatic perspective, for example), the intrapersonal level of functioning is viewed as having, at most, a minimal impact on the interpersonal system. This is not to say that internalized phenomena (i.e., individual perception and interpretation) are defined as nonexistent or as having no impact on individual functioning, but that any impact of such phenomena on interpersonal functioning is viewed, at best, as only being indirect in nature. Obviously, the constructivist perspective asserts a different point of view. Rather than defining the impact of internalized processes as indirect, constructivism subscribes to a view of internalized processes as serving to guide interpersonal functioning. The imposition of a line of distinction between individual processes and interpersonal processes is considered arbitrary and as serving no useful function.

By way of example, most theorists would agree that the sincerity and/or intentionality of a particular behavior can have an impact on the social system involved. While those operating within the constructivist framework would certainly agree with that basic position, they would modify the assertion slightly to point out that it is the perception and interpretation of a particular behavior as sincere or intentional which is critical. Behaviors, in and of themselves, are neither sincere nor insincere; they are, however, perceived and interpreted as such by fellow interactants and observers of the interaction. Any particular behavior might be perceived and interpreted as sincere by one interactant while being perceived and interpreted as insincere by another interactant and not perceived at all by yet a third interactant.

A number of related issues emerge from the recognition of an interpretation (meaning)-communication relationship. One of those issues is the question of whether communication behavior, within any perspective claiming a central role for individual processes or attributes, becomes a simple additive product of those processes. As Fisher views it: "if the phenomenon of human communication is derivable from the properties or attributes of individuals, then communication is a summative 'heap' that can be totally analyzed by observing the individual communicators in isolation".¹⁴ This argument would be of greater concern if all individuals employed the product of their perceptions in the same way (drawing the same conclusions concerning the goals of the encounter and communication strategies which should constitute a response, and possessing equal capability with respect to the enactment of those strategies), and if perception and interpretation were not ongoing processes, as dynamic as communication itself. With that recognition of the dynamic interrelationship between interpretation and communication, it becomes impossible to limit the investigation of communication to any additive model of intrapersonal processes and be satisfied. (Just as, from the constructivist

perspective, it is equally unsatisfactory to limit the examination of communication to behavior without some attention to individual interpretive processes.)

Still, one might wonder whether a tautology is being established by coupling the claim that interpretation guides communication behavior with the insistence that communication research should examine both interpretation and behavior. If an essential relationship between interpretation and behavior does, in fact, exist, then isn't it sufficient to limit one's examination to communication behavior, deriving from that behavior the probable content of an individual's intrapersonal evaluation? Such an approach might be a viable option were it not for the principle of equifinality. As has been argued up to this point (and as is reflected within the notion of equifinality), even if two individuals perceived a situation in similar fashions and drew similar interpretations, that would not insure that they would then also select the same communication strategy as a response or that they would both capably enact that strategy. By the same token, very similar communication behaviors could reflect very different interpretations. Thus, it is only through the examination of both interpretation and communication that one obtains an understanding of and an appreciation for the social system which emerges through interaction.

One final issue should be broached. Certainly, a measure of any perspective is the extent to which that perspective permits, even encourages, the examination of questions not endorsed by other perspectives. The interpretive orientation assumed by constructivism clearly legitimizes the examination of the relationship between intrapersonal processes and interpersonal functioning. While not all internalized phenomena necessarily impact communication, the issues of which phenomena do affect communication and the nature of that impact are appropriate concerns for those involved in the discipline of communication. Just as the social system is important in understanding the dynamics of the communication process, so is the individual interpretive system.

The study of argument (in O'Keefe's sense of argument--argument-as-process¹⁵) can serve as an example of issues related to the meaning-communication relationship which are specifically legitimized by the perspective of constructivism. One such issue is the very question of what constitutes an argument. Admittedly, a level of utility can be achieved by having the researcher decide, on the basis of prevailing theory, what serves as an argument, that is, what elements must exist in any particular interaction to determine that "argument" is an appropriate label for that interaction. However, the researcher's theoretical distinctions concerning the nature of arguments might not be shared by those individuals actually involved in the interaction. An interesting question arises in

the issue of how natural language users label their interactions and what, from the perspectives of natural language users, constitutes an argument (as opposed, for example, to a discussion or a conflict or a fight). That issue can be legitimately broached only from an approach which recognizes meaning as a product of individual perception and interpretation. Only within such a perspective is the possibility of individual differences in definition recognized and authorized as a concern for both research and theory development.

A second area legitimized by constructivism's approach to the meaning-communication relationship is that of the rationales which underlie the process of arguing. That is, the question of what accounts for a particular individual's selection and execution of any argument, tactic, or strategy can be meaningfully addressed only from a perspective which encourages the examination of individual interpretive processes. Again, the principle of equifinality subsumes the particular problem encountered here. Any argument, tactic, or strategy can reflect a number of different rationales, just as any rationale might be actualized through a number of different arguments, tactics, and strategies. The equifinality which exists in the situation should not be viewed as providing license to, therefore, ignore the issue of individual perspectives as a fruitless chase of an ephemeral phenomena. Patterns of relationships can be discerned and examined in terms of their contribution to theory development. The point is that such an examination can and will take place only from a stance which recognizes meaning as an individual product and, thus, provides for an interpretive orientation.

CONCLUSION

Each of the different philosophic approaches to the discipline of communication offers its own view concerning the nature of the relationship which exists between communication and meaning. Within the perspective of constructivism, the communication-meaning relationship which is advocated is seated in a recognition of meaning as reflective of individual perceptual and interpretive processes. This individually-based interpretive orientation results in a recognition of and an appreciation for multiple perspectives as extant within any social context or encounter.

The position of multiple-perspectivity offers a number of implications for communication theorists. The acknowledgment of meaning as an individual construction or sense-making process brings with it the responsibility for eliciting, as opposed to assuming, the interpretations of interactants. At minimum, the interpretive orientation detailed here imposes a recognition that individuals vary in the level of sophistication of their sense-making processes and awareness. Differences in socio-cognitive development offer implications for individual

functioning in all contexts, but particularly in social encounters.

While communication behavior is recognized as typically reflective of individual sense-making (setting aside situations of deliberate deception), the correspondence between interpretation and communication cannot be considered pure, simple, or immediately apparent. Rather, the very nature of the complex relationship which exists between interpretation (meaning) and communication invites critical examination. In particular, theory building efforts focusing on the process of arguing benefit from an interpretive approach as it shifts attention away from arbitrary criteria and standards of judgment imposed by the researcher and concentrates, instead, on standards of judgment applied by those involved in the interaction. Such a shift in focus is both appropriate and profitable for theory development in the discipline of communication.

NOTES

¹David L. Swanson and Jesse G. Delia, The Nature of Human Communication (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1976).

²See, for example, Jesse G. Delia, "Constructivism and the Study of Human Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 63 (1977), 66-89; Jesse G. Delia, Barbara J. O'Keefe, and Daniel J. O'Keefe, "The Constructivist Approach to Communication," in Human Communication Theory, ed. Frank E.X. Dance (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 147-191; Daniel J. O'Keefe and Howard E. Sypher, "Cognitive Complexity Measures and the Relationship of Cognitive Complexity to Communication," Human Communication Research, 8 (1981), 72-92; Swanson and Delia.

³B. Aubrey Fisher, Perspectives on Human Communication (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1968), p. 252.

⁴Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce, and Linda M. Harris, "The Coordinated Management of Meaning," in Human Communication Theory, ed. Frank E.X. Dance (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 61-89.

⁵Delia, "Constructivism".

⁶Delia, O'Keefe, and O'Keefe.

⁷Heinz Werner, "The Concept of Development from a Comparative and Organismic View," in The Concept of Development, ed. Dale B. Harris (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 125-148.

⁸Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, "The Development of Functional Persuasive Skills in Childhood and Early Adolescence," Child Development, 47 (1976), 1008-1014; Jesse G. Delia, Susan L. Kline, and Brant R. Burleson, "The Development of Persuasive Communication Strategies in Kindergartners Through Twelfth-Graders," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 241-256.

⁹Barbara J. O'Keefe and Jesse G. Delia, "Impression Formation and Message Production," in Social Cognition and Communication, ed. Michael E. Roloff and Charles R. Berger (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 33-72.

¹⁰Delia, O'Keefe and O'Keefe.

¹¹Rebecca B. Rubin and Sally A. Henzl, "Cognitive Complexity, Communication Competence, and Verbal Ability," Communication Quarterly, 32 (1984), 263-270.

¹²Rubin and Henzl, p. 264.

¹³Delia, O'Keefe and O'Keefe, p. 148.

¹⁴Fisher, p. 213.

¹⁵Daniel J. O'Keefe, "Two Concepts of Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (1977), 121-128.

A NEW LOOK AT MEANING IN SYSTEMS OF ARGUMENT

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Rhetoricians have long understood the importance of the situation to the design and interpretation of messages. For centuries, teachers of the communication arts have told their students to adapt their ideas to the audience and the occasion.¹ Other theorists, of the present age of electronic technology, while overstating their claim, have broadened this ancient advice to include the medium of exchange.² Some have been adamant about the need for good rhetoric to fit its situation's invitations regarding "purpose, theme, matter and style."³ And yet others have gone so far as to characterize Rhetoric as an art of adjusting ideas to situations and situations to ideas.⁴ In the history of this discipline, Rhetoric, it has never been controversial or new to claim that messages must be adapted to their contexts, and it would hardly be novel to insist that meanings are influenced by matters of context. It is, however, somewhat of a new twist on things to stress that context will be influenced by matters of text; and even more novelty might be ascribed a position which explicitly emphasizes that messages, or "texts," frequently "reconstruct" the context.⁵ This latter position, recently simplified for publication by Robert J. Branham and W. Barnett Pearce, is at the heart of a theory of communication which is summarized in this present paper. Ultimately, the "new look at meanings," spoken to in the title of this paper, sits squarely in the traditional rhetorical concern for matters of context, yet emphasizes the reflexive relationship between texts and contexts and casts the situation as a hierarchy of ways of looking at that situation.

The theory presented in this paper builds upon previous theorizing by Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce, and their students.⁶ It is known as the Special Theory of Reflexivity (henceforth, STR) and is an important part of the General Theory of Communication which is more popularly known by its "ancestral terms": The Coordinated Management of Meaning. A summary of the STR, as revised and extended by the present author, this paper will explain the utility of a model which facilitates articulation of ways in which verbs may carry the potential for multiple levels of meaning and which thus allows for the analysis of intrapersonal confusion typical of dyadic argument in interpersonal relationships. In addition, structured by verifiably idiosyncratic and variably complex rules for interpretation and action, meanings are cast as processual forces in reflexive relationships and as marked by variations in attributed or felt certainty. Organized into layers of verifiably abstract and variably durative senses of context, by the model mentioned above, meanings are also cast as informing the generation of transpersonal logics of argument characterized by varying levels of transpersonal forces which derive from the nature of the logics themselves, as well as from the intrapersonal rules which conjoin to create the conversation.

The Special Theory has been explained in considerable detail, in its earlier formulations, in several previous papers.⁷ The purpose of this present paper is only to outline the hypotheses and models of the STR in order to explain its utility for the analysis of intrapersonal confusion typical of dyadic argument in interpersonal relationships. Fundamental to this explanation, and to this theory, is a way of looking at contexts. The cornerstone of the STR is a model which suggests a view of contexts as varying in degree of abstraction and as hierarchically organized; in effect, it allows for a more careful articulation of the ways in which messages may have multiple levels of meaning, some of which may seem self-contradictory to a subject.

A Model of Contexts

As Vernon E. Cronen and his colleagues have noted, "Bateson's essential insight was that communication can be treated as a hierarchical system and that social meanings, like other hierarchical systems, may exhibit reflexive relationships."⁸ The view of context presented here capitalizes on that insight. It offers a view of several levels of context and suggests that meanings relevant to any level of this model will inform and be informed by meanings apparently relevant to both lower and upper levels of this hierarchical organization. As such, the model allows for a view of contexts as contextualizing and being contextualized; words-spoken and gestures-acted are cast as caught in a concentric web of grander and grander frames of reference.

Figure 1
The Hierarchy of Contexts

CULTURAL PATTERNS
LIFE-SCRIPTS
RELATIONSHIPS SCRIPT
RELATIONSHIP CONTRACT
RELATIONSHIP
EPISODE
INTERACTS
SPEECH ACTS
NONVERBALS
VERBALS

Understanding the model is facilitated by viewing each level as contextualized by meanings relevant to the next upper level and as informing the interpretation of meanings at the next lowest level. Lower level

meanings come to "count as" elements of upper level constructions; upper level meanings serve to frame lower level meanings as grander schemes of context, as apparently more abstract or more enduring and stable tableaux. Yet, it should be understood that "upper" and "lower" refer only to the relative positions of whatever levels of the hierarchy are made salient. As Branham and Pearce have recently written, "Rather than an orderly hierarchy of successively abstract contexts, such as envisioned in Bertrand Russell's 'Theory of Types,' the relations between texts and multiple layers of contexts may be said to form what Bateson termed 'a dance of interacting parts'; and a zig-zag ladder of dialectic between form and process."⁹ And John W. Lannamann's view is to see each of these levels as "a transparent vantage point around which a person orients his or her meaning structure."¹⁰

The model suggests that verbal communication is contextualized by nonverbal messages and that, reflexively, nonverbals are informed by the verbal for possible interpretation. It suggests that verbal and nonverbal elements combine to allow for the interpretation of what speech acts--insults, compliments, questions--have been performed and that, reflexively, notions regarding the speech act serve to contextualize verbal and nonverbal meanings. It suggests that speech acts in combination are taken as recognizable brief exchanges or "interacts"¹¹ and that, reflexively, one's sense of how interacts should proceed serves to contextualize one's view of what speech acts have transpired, and so on. Interacts come to "count as" ongoing sequences with recognizable beginnings and endings, "episodes," and these, in turn, become the context for understanding what interacts are likely given some episodic context. Episodes suggest, upwardly, what the "relationship" is now like and, conversely, one's meanings for the present nature of the relationship serve to contextualize the episodes which may transpire. Views of the relationship come to inform meanings regarding the "contract" or, rather, variably implicit agreements that we share regarding "how we will be for each other." And, this contract suggests, in turn, what relationship "scripts" are possible or being acted out. The "scripts" is a level of meanings which suggests, as context, what "contracts" are variably acceptable/possible. Finally, these relationship scripts suggest, upwardly, notions relevant to self-conceptions which are contextualized by acceptable/possible scripts for "the kind of person I am" and the culture serves as a grand contextual backdrop for all of these considerations.¹²

The relationships between levels of the model outlined above are by no means the only ones suggested by the model. Any two layers are hypothesized to be in this text-context relationship; the organization of the model is only meant to suggest what reflexive relationships are useful to consider and what frames of context are likely to be considered as grander when considering any two levels of meaning.¹³

The Utility of the Model

Because the STR conceives of meanings as usefully organized into a hierarchy of layers of context, and because the relationships between these layers are modeled as mutually informative or "reflexive," the model itself introduces the possibility of exploring the tangles or problematic relations which might exist for persons when meanings understood at one level of context do not jibe with interpretations which seem appropriate to some other level. Intrapersonal and interpersonal entrapment in the confusion and behavioral paralysis which may result from such problematic relationships within the hierarchy of contexts has been the focus of study in Family Therapy for a number of years.¹⁴ Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, borrowing from computer scientists and subatomic physics, have referred to these problematic relations as "strange loops."¹⁵ And, expanding on the theme, Branham and Pearce have now differentiated between loops that are "strange" and loops that are "subversive," and have recast strategies of loop resolution previously suggested by the present author.¹⁶ The utility of the model is, then, its ability to guide us in the clarification of the location of loops, their understanding as problematic, and their resolution when problematic. More broadly, the STR allows for better understanding of dyadically generated interpersonal arguments and their distinctive, perhaps idiosyncratic, transpersonal logics generally.

A Summary of the Special Theory of Reflexivity

Many theorists have now contributed to the STR. The theory as it is summarized here is based primarily on the work of Vernon E. Cronen and his colleagues, but includes several modifications and additions made by the present author, independent of their work. Some of what follows is taken verbatim from previous summaries of the theory, however much of what is reported here constitutes expansion of the original theory.

A fundamental postulate of the special theory suggests that "systems of meaning and action are persons' cognitive constructions of their social realities and are not best assessed as reflections of external realities." Both the General Theory (GT) and the STR take the ontological position that communication is the process by which persons create social realities.

As noted above, the theory suggests that meanings are best modeled as existing in hierarchical relationships of contextualization. It also suggests that some degree of reflexivity is common to all hierarchical relationships and that reflexive loops are formed whenever persons deal with the implications of lower level meanings for some upper level of context and then consider contextual influences on lower level constructs. Upward movement, in this path of considering, is thought to manifest forces known as "implicative" forces. Downward movement is theorized to manifest the forces of "contextualization."¹⁷ These are also cast merely as "upward" and "downward" forces in the system.

LaFleur's modifications here suggest the nature of these forces. He has argued that it is sensible to conceive of upward forces as characterized by varying levels of constitutive certainty and has defined same as "the level of certainty that a person feels regarding the interpretation of a unit of meaning to a higher level of context." For example, he writes,

"a given unit of content may be thought to constitute a particular speech-act, e.g. an insult, with some degree of certainty." 18 The idea here is to suggest that persons' interpretations-upward vary from extremely doubt-producing to incredibly certain. Downward force, the notion that upper level contexts influence lower level constructions, is cast, on the other hand, as some function of level-confidence, the degree of confidence or certainty that an individual feels regarding his or her conceptualization of a layer of context. Level-confidence speaks to the question: how certain am I (for instance) that this episode (or relationship etc.) is as I think it is? LaFleur's "Downward Impact Corollary" suggests that downward force also affects level-confidence at salient lower levels of the hierarchy and the levels of "felt obligation" or "deontic force" which will characterize appropriate rules for action. 19 The "Upward Impact Corollary" suggests that upward forces have impact upon the salient upper levels of the hierarchy and may alter the level-confidence of upper layers of context.

STR also posits that: there is a temporal dimension to the experience of reflexive relationships. 20 LaFleur has extended this notion and has suggested that rules for interpretation, as well as so-called "upward" and "downward" movements within the hierarchy must be conceived of as marked by temporal adjectives, e.g. "now" "then" and "soon." Terming these "temporal operators," LaFleur has repeatedly argued that the "primitive" models, as they are called, of the General Theory (GM) ought to be modified to include such temporal operators, even if it does complicate things considerably. Looping, in fact, must be understood as a temporal process. "A person first examines implications upward and then considers the contextualization downward, or vice versa. Perhaps, as the present author has previously noted, these loops ought to be depicted as spirals in time. The STR posits temporality as a dimension. 21

The "Whole-Part" Corollary claims that "hierarchical relationships are not always isomorphic with part-whole relationships." 22 This thesis is meant to stress that although the hierarchy model might be seen as consisting of smaller parts which are ordered so as to suggest whole-part relations--several "relationships" might be thought of as contributing to a "life-script"-- the STR recognizes that, for instance, an individual might perceive his or her self through the context of various episodes or speech acts. 23

The theory does not assume that reflexive relationships are all problematic. Contrarily, the theory posits that reflexive loops are essential and intrinsic to all social interaction. "The emergent quality of contexts entails the tendency to form reflexive relationships." 24 Learning may be modeled as the resolution of problematic loops.

The third proposition of the theory is the assumption that the analysis of reflexive relationships requires knowledge of contexts which are not always explicit in the texts. And, even though the STR includes the notion that not every level of the hierarchy is relevant to every interpretation, Cronen and his colleagues have insisted that three or more levels of meaning are required to analyze reflexive loops.

Having claimed that not all reflexive relationships are problematic the STR clarifies the nature of "strangeness" or "intransitivity" between levels of meaning. The theory posits that whenever two levels of meaning are in reflexive relationship their "fit" or tendency to jibe may be termed "transitive" or "intransitive". These terms are the rough equivalents of "oharmed" and "strange" 25 or simply, unproblematic and problematic. Two levels of meaning are said to have a transitive relationship when lower level meanings seem to fit or jibe with salient-relevant upper levels of context and when those same upper levels of context seem to suggest the acceptability or propriety of meanings at the salient-relevant lower levels of the hierarchy. 26 Another way to conceive of transitivity, given the postulation of constitutive certainty and level-confidence, is offered by LaFleur: Two levels of meaning are transitive when the implicative or upward force does not significantly alter the level-confidences of the relevant upper levels of context, and when contextual or downward forces do not suggest the need for changes in constitutive certainty or level-confidence at lower levels of the hierarchy. 27

Intransitivity, or "strangeness" exists when "lower level meanings do not seem appropriate or fitting, given a person's conceptualization of the salient-relevant upper level of context... and when upper level formulations do not suggest that lower level meanings are appropriate," 28 meanings at two levels do not jibe. LaFleur has also characterized intransitivity as observable when upward forces significantly alter the level-confidences of salient-relevant upper levels of context or when upper levels of context suggest dramatic shifts in constitutive certainty at salient-relevant lower levels of the hierarchy. He has also argued that prolonged or seemingly unresolvable "strangeness" may result from an inability or unwillingness to understand what aspects of a message are salient-relevant to what levels of context; unresolvable strangeness which seems productive of ineffability is what Branham and Pearce seem to mean by "subversive" loops. 29

It is really the analysis of "strangeness" or "intransitivity" which stands out as among the principle contributions of this theory. How does everyday interaction carry with it the potential for incredibly confusing relationships among the multiple levels of meaning? That is the question that STR seems to speak to in all of these above notions. But what else does the theory facilitate understanding?

The theory suggests that the transitivity of meanings is determined by persons' experiences and/or cultural patterns and that metarules inform and stipulate the kinds of relationships that can occur among meanings. The theory further posits that intrapersonal confusion will tend to persist when persons lack strategies for resolving problematic loops, producing confusion at the level of action. Although significant others are seen as capable of blocking intrapersonal resolution of intransitivity, a major contribution of this theory has been the articulation of modes of resolution available and utilized by persons when dealing with "strange" and difficult problems of fit. Both LaFleur 30 and Branham and Pearce 31 have attempted the description of a taxonomy of resolution strategies.

Strategies of Resolution

Propositions 7 through 10 of the Special Theory warn of and describe the problems which may result from difficult intransitivity. The seventh proposition, as noted above, warns that it may produce confusion which will persist in systems lacking modes of acceptable resolution. The eighth proposition suggests, optimistically, that "persons often act creatively upon their own systems of meaning by separating levels of meaning and by converting intransitive to transitive loops,"³² but the ninth proposition warns that unresolved looping may result in damage to the life-script and the tenth warns of exaggerated importance being attributed to behavior which is linked through looping to the highest levels of the hierarchy. In fact, Cronen and his colleagues have gone so far in their "Positive Effects Limitation Corollary 10.1" to suggest that unresolved loops may result in the generation of schizophrenia.³³ Clearly, the STR suggests that strategies of resolution should be studied.

Intrigued by these problems of intransitivity, the present author has conducted several case studies of intrapersonal confusion in interpersonal relationships.³⁴ Several means of dealing with "strangeness" have become apparent: bolstering, exploding simultaneity, attributions of madness and badness, refusal to interpret, redefinition of context (or, as Branham and Pearce have termed it, "contextual reconstruction"), reinterpretation of meaning (or, as Branham and Pearce have termed it, "conformity"), adjustment of valence or value, and appealing to a fourth level of context.

1. Bolstering: As a strategy of resolution this method involves any attempt to bolster confidence or certainty in any salient-relevant level of the hierarchy. Theoretically, increasing level-confidence allows for resolution of the loop/the weaker conceptualization is forced out of the system.
2. Exploding: This strategy relies on the subject's ability to reconcile problems of fit by exploding the necessity of simultaneously present interpretations. Meanings at one level or the other are written off, typically, as, for instance, "not true now, maybe later." It is, theoretically, the adjustment of temporal operators.
3. Attributing: Attributing madness or badness to self or other seems to be a well-used method for resolution. Systems that are insane or malicious may be expected to produce intransitivity; the assumption implicit in this strategy.
4. Refusal: Subjects have frequently reported that they simply refuse to consider or make sense of intransitive ideas. Akin to what Branham and Pearce call non-participation, this strategy constitutes mere withdrawal from the idea.
5. Redefinition: Termed contextual reconstruction by others, this method involves allowing text to redefine context. It is, theoretically, a kind of surrender to the power of the upward or implicative forces in the system. It may involve altering "the expectations" within which text is understood and evaluated.

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6. Conformity: Another simple way of resolving apparent intransitivity seems to involve a kind of easy reinterpretation of lower level meanings, text, to suit upper level constructions, context. Theoretically, level-confidence may be so high as to force the constitutive rules into a state of complexity. Conformity may result from bolstering.
7. Revaluation: This strategy seems to involve the discounting of the importance of the problem. It may or may not result in a refusal (see above) strategy. Some subjects, for instance, reported that they were still very confused by the loop but that it was simply "not important" anymore. (It should be noted that neither attributing nor revaluation actually involve resolution of the loop; they are, perhaps, better characterized as coping strategies.)
8. Appealing: This strategy involves cognitive searching for a third salient-relevant level of context which, if characterized by satisfactory level-confidence, may help to resolve the intransitivity. Two levels do not jibe; a third may clarify the system. Subjects have also reported appealing to a fourth and fifth level of context in what I have cast as a search for level-confidence.
9. Wobble: In a previous paper the present author insisted that the STR must include a corollary informed by the usual communication theory notions of process. Simply stated, the wobble corollary suggests that intransitivity exists in a processual state, i.e. that because meanings change as often as they do, any experience of intransitivity might also be characterized by change. Strangeness of fit may even cognitively disappear and then reappear for subjects, producing a kind of wobble of fit. As a strategy of resolution, "wobble" seems to involve a kind of determination to allow meanings to shift over time: a kind of passive waiting for transitivity.

This concludes the present summary of the STR as developed by Vernon Cronen and as extended and modified by his students and the present author. The reader is respectfully reminded that this is only an outline of that theory; more comprehensive in detail, example, and illustration are the several papers, articles and books cited in this text.

Conclusion

Rhetoricians have, indeed, long understood the importance of matters context to the design and interpretation of messages. The paper at hand has, however, stressed a new twist on the relationship between messages, interpretations, and their contexts. Summarizing the Special Theory of Reflexivity, this paper and those it reports on have emphasized a reflex of influence between texts and contexts, messages and situations, interpretations and notions of self. It has summarized the recasting of the

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infamous "rhetorical situation" as a hierarchy of ways of understanding multiple levels of context and has reviewed the modes of resolution apparent in the reports of subjects that have dealt with problematic and difficult reflexive relationships within their systems of meanings.

The implications of this theory for the study of argument are numerous. These implications derive from both this new view of context and from the assumptions made here about the nature of intrapersonal processes.

Hierarchically organized levels of context allow for a new view of meaning: one which supposes that the multiple meanings of a statement may be modeled as a set of upward and downward forces which are variably responsible for reflexive changes in level-confidence and constitutive certainty within the system. In addition, the postulation of intransitive and transitive relations suggests that argument may be profitably conceived of as the process whereby persons work out problematic relationships among their levels of meaning.

Given this new view of argument, reason-giving and claim-making may be viewed as the observable vehicles or means for attempting these resolutions of fit. Argumentative competence--so clearly a function of knowledge, skill and motivation--may also be some function of the abilities of persons to coordinate the working out of intransitive reflexivity transpersonally; and, developmental progression through any hypothesized levels of such competence might now be studied as the maturing of abilities involved in the interpretation of the multiple levels of meaning, such as the ability to make decisions regarding what aspects of a message suggest what meanings at what levels of context. In short, traditional views of argument and current views of argumentative competence need not be abandoned but, rather, understood as the superstructure of these intrapersonal processes.

Perspective-taking, the ability to understand how other constructs his or her reality, can now be studied as some function of one's ability to accurately project another's assignment and creation of meanings and confidence to various contextually specific levels of construct-bound meanings; and, the development of cognitive complexity, as well as the more flexible and complex strategies of sophisticated communicators, might now be studied as the result of these intrapersonal processes. Moreover, complex and flexible strategies might now be studied in order to better understand the contribution of such sophisticated strategies to the resolution of reflexive and problematic relationships and as intrinsic to the development of transpersonally competent logics of interaction, given the modeling of transpersonal logics within the more General Theory (GTM). In fact, argumentative strategy might even be very profitably viewed as a kind of poking around or testing of the limits and constraints of any particular logic.

In short, this theory allows for a more detailed understanding of the ways in which intrapersonal negotiations with the multiple meanings of sentences/claims may guide the patterning and structure of observable turns in interpersonal argument, if not argument generally. It does so by recasting context as a complex of tableaux for meaningful orientation,

by suggesting possibilities for inter-level relationships, and by formulating a processual model which suggests the nature of resolution strategies necessary for the intrapersonal invention of good sense and "good reasons." Thus, in some sense, this theory, as revised and extended by the present author, suggests the skeletal format for a substantial intrapersonal rhetoric, one which may profitably inform the study of observable argument.

¹Aristotle, for instance, tells us that "Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches." The listener, he tells us, "determines the speech's end and object." See Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, I, 3 (Franklin Center, Pennsylvania: Franklin Library Press, 1981) p. 16.

²McLuhan's claim that the medium "is" the message called attention to the ways in which technologies, as extensions of man, are in reflexive relationship with the "content" of the old technologies, but his argument is also that the media alter "our relations to one another and to ourselves" by shaping and forming the "scales and forms of human association and action." The implications for Rhetoric constitute a new emphasis on the interaction between text and medium. See Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) pp. 8-9.

³Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1(1968), 1-14.

⁴Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 39 (1953), 413

⁵Robert J. Branham and W. Barnett Pearce, "Between Text and Context: Toward a Rhetoric of Contextual Reconstruction," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 71 (1985) 19-36.

⁶Vernon E. Cronen, Kenneth Johnson, and John W. Lannamann, "Paradoxes, Double-binds, and Reflexive Loops: An Alternative Theoretical Perspective," *Family Process*, 21 (1982), 91-112. See also: Kenneth M. Johnson, "A Theory of Reflexive Loops in Conversation," Diss., University of Massachusetts, 1980; and John W. Lannamann, *Hierarchical Levels of Context and Reflexive Loops: An Investigation of Meaning Structures in Human Communication*, Diss., University of Massachusetts, 1983; also, Gary B. LaFleur, "Problematic Reflexivity and Its Resolution: Toward An Explanation of the Mechanism of Change in Systems of Human Communication," unpublished paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, 1982; also, Gary B. LaFleur, "Temporal Perspectives and Logical Forces in Systems of Human Communication," Diss., University of Massachusetts, 1982. The best summary of the General Theory is probably, W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, *Communication, Action and Meaning* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

⁷Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann. Also, Gary B. LaFleur, "When Things Don't Fit: A Discussion of the Nature of Intrapersonal Confusion in Interpersonal Relationships," convention paper, New York State Speech Communication Association, Niagara Falls, N.Y., 1984; and LaFleur, "Problematic Reflexivity..."

⁸Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, p. 95

⁹Branham and Pearce, p. 21

¹⁰Lannamann, p. 95

¹¹The present author has inserted this level of context into the hierarchy in order to suggest a level of contextualization which allows for the interpretation of speech acts and is not really episodic. "Intersot" is used here to denote what Timothy Leary and the Kaiser Foundation Group referred to as an "interpersonal behavior reflex" of "reflex arc." See: T. Leary, "The Theory and Measurement Methodology of Interpersonal Communication," *Psychiatry*, 18 (1955): 147-161.

¹²It should be pointed out that this model differs from the usual model of hierarchy presented previously by Cronen et al.; it includes a new differentiation which allows for the more careful articulation of how meanings come to have significance regarding the nature of the relationship. "Relationship" is the level of context that has to do with present conceptions of how the relationship is going. "Contract" is a level of context which speaks to implicit and explicit agreements between the parties regarding the nature of the relationship. And, "relationship scripts" is a level which pertains to the notions that a person might have regarding what kind of relationships are possible for him or her.

¹³The present author disagrees with earlier formulations which suggest that it is sensible to invert these levels for matters of analysis and to, thereby, suggest that, for instance, the level of episode might serve to contextualize one of the relationship levels. In my view, to contextualize is to serve as a grander frame of reference. Lower levels, in my view, do not contextualize upper levels; rather, they inform them, invoke them, and reconstruct them, etc. See Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann for the alternate view.

¹⁴Bateson has been the father of this school of thought. See: Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine, 1972) and *Mind and Nature* (New York: Bantam); also see: Paul Watzlawick, Janet M. Beavin and Donald D. Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (New York: W.N. Norton, 1967) and Gregory Bateson, Donald Jackson and J.H. Weakland, "Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia," *Behavioral Science*, (1956), 1, 251-264.

¹⁵See Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, p. 98

¹⁶See LaFleur, "Problematic Reflexivity..." and "When Things Don't Fit."

¹⁷See Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann; also see LaFleur, "Problematic..."

¹⁸See LaFleur, "When Things Don't Fit..." p. 6

¹⁹See Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, p. 100; and LaFleur, "Problematic..."

²⁰See LaFleur, "Temporal Perspectives..." p. 78

²¹See LaFleur, "Temporal Perspective..."

²²See Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, p. 99

²³See Vernon E. Cronen, Kenneth M. Johnson and John W. Lannamann, "Paradoxes, Double-binds, and the Reflexive Loops: A Comparison of Two Theoretical Perspectives and a Suggested Methodology," conference paper, Theory and Methodology Workshop, National Council on Family Relations Annual Meeting, Portland, Oregon, 1980. p. 11

²⁴Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, "Paradoxes..." 1980, p. 12.

²⁵Branham and Pearce, pp 23-25

²⁶Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, "Paradoxes..." 1980, p. 22

²⁷LaFleur, "When Things Don't Fit..." p. 9.

²⁸Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, "Paradoxes..." 1980, p. 22

²⁹LaFleur, "When Things Don't Fit..." p. 10

³⁰LaFleur, "Problematic Reflexivity..." and "When Things Don't Fit..."

and Branham and Pearce, pp 28-30

³¹Branham and Pearce, pp. 28-30

³²Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, 1980, p. 25

³³Cronen, Johnson and Lannamann, 1980, p. 27

³⁴LaFleur, "When Things Don't Fit..." and "Problematic Reflexivity..."

NARRATIVE BELIEFS: BELIEF SPIRALS AND THE
PROBABILITY OF STORIES

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The work of critical scholars toward the development of a narrative theory of discourse constitutes some of the most exciting scholarship in argumentation. Walter Fisher's essay on the "narrative paradigm" for communication as well as earlier work by W. Lance Bennett on storytelling as a judgmental framework in the courtroom has channeled an interest in how stories give order to human experience.¹ In many, if not all, communication contexts stories provide us with both the ability to make sense of the world and the framework from which we judge new knowledge and information presented us.

According to Scholes, narrative is a place where sequence and language intersect to form a discursive code.² He writes:

A word in any language carries with it a semantic field of potential meanings which is partly governed by social code and partly individualized by the unique features of whoever utters or interprets the word. When a word is incorporated in an utterance, the semantic field is narrowed by its situation in a syntactic structure, in a discursive pattern, in a social situation, and in a referential context. Thus each interpreter generates a distinct interpretation for each textual sign, and, to the extent that communication is achieved, the interpretations of all interpreters of the same utterance will correspond with one another and with that of the person who employed the sign in the original act of communication (p. 207).

Scholes argues that narrative is not just a sequencing but a sequencing of something for somebody. Only an event can be narrated. A narrated event is the symbolic presentation of a sequence of events connected by subject-matter and related by time.³ Without temporal relation, or subject continuity Scholes argues, we have only a list. Any set of events that can be sequenced and related can also be narrated. Scholes claims that a formal feature of narrative texts is the presentation of events having already happened. Narrative is always past.

A story, according to Scholes, is a narrative with a specific syntactic shape (beginning-middle-end) and with a subject matter which allows for or encourages the "projection of human values upon this material." The producer of a historical text affirms that the events entextualized did indeed occur prior to the entextualization. Thus the interpreters are required to bring extra-textual information to evaluate such a historical narrative. This interpretation involves the construction of qualities that resemble aspects of the events, called a diegesis, by which events are ordered and all

relationships are as clear as possible. The extra-textual information used by an individual in order to evaluate a narrative is always grounded in a belief system based on experience, authority and inference - invariably other narratives. How a narrative is formally addressed in this belief system is an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper. What is of primary concern is a foundation to that question is the reasoning process by which individuals order beliefs so as to choose between stories. Given two competing stories, as in the courtroom or family disputes, what makes one story more believable and acceptable than another? Fisher argues that formal and substantive features work to distinguish story acceptability.⁴ Formal features, which constitute what he terms narrative probability, are attributes of the consistency of characters and actions. The question this consistency answers is whether the narrative satisfies the coherence of what we know to be true. Fisher and Bennett both argue that stories must meet a demand of coherency to be considered true. Thus stories which are most consistent and coherent within their own story elements are considered more probable than those less so. Substantive features, which constitute the narrative fidelity for Fisher, concern how people come to adhere to a particular story. While Fisher argues for the logic of good reasons as a means of distinguishing the fidelity of stories, no such criteria exists for assessing narrative probability. The judgment process of how individuals assess the consistency and coherency of story elements has not been addressed. I propose that one viable approach toward understanding this judgment process is the assessment of beliefs as they are used by individuals to assert the reality of an event or reconstruction of an event. The purpose of this paper is to offer a reconceptualization of the belief construct which enhances our understanding of narrative judgment.

THE CONSTRUCT OF BELIEF

Aristotle was probably the first scholar to carefully consider the construct of belief and articulate his claims. According to Corbett, Aristotle used the Greek word *pisteis* to stand for rhetorical proofs.⁵ The root of *pisteis* is *πιστις*, or belief. Aristotle perceived belief as "the highest degree of certainty to which we can attain in dealing with the everyday affairs of men" (p. 599). To Aristotle, belief was clearly a statement of reality, a degree of certainty that a claim of reality was true. Two thousand years later, William James came to the same conclusion.⁶ To James, beliefs were tied directly to an individual's perception of reality. In fact, beliefs constitute reality. James wrote: "Everyone knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by the mind, but is held to have reality" (James, p. 283). James held that belief was a "sense of reality".

Approaching the definition of belief in a somewhat backward, yet revealing manner, James first addressed the opposite of belief. He stated that the true opposites of belief were doubt and inquiry, not disbelief. He wrote: "We never disbelieve anything except for the reason we believe something else which contradicts the first thing" (James, p. 284). If the opposite of belief, as James maintained, was doubt, then belief was certainty, a certainty of reality - but in degrees. According to James, a belief is every degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty and conviction. The point James attempted to make in first approaching the opposite

of belief is that belief and disbelief are two aspects of one state of mind. That state of mind refers directly to what constitutes reality - what degree of certainty is believed - for the individual.

Philosopher Irwin Edman makes this point clear in an anecdote from the Philosopher's Holiday:

One instance of Dewey's frankness comes to mind. There was among the group a young lady who had come from England where she had studied philosophy with Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. She listened patiently for weeks to Dewey's varied insistence that the truth of an idea was tested by its use. One day she burst out toward the close of the seminar in the sharp, clipped speech of the educated Englishwoman: "But, professor, I have been taught to believe that true means true; that false means false, that good means good and bad means bad; I don't understand all this talk about more or less true, more or less good. Could you explain more exactly?"

Professor Dewey looked at her mildly for a moment and said: "Let me tell you a parable. Once upon a time in Philadelphia there was a paranoiac. He thought he was dead. Nobody could convince him he was alive. Finally, one of the doctors thought of an ingenious idea. He pricked the patient's finger. 'Now', he said, 'are you dead?' 'Sure', said the paranoiac, 'that proves that dead men bleed....' Now I'll say true or false if you want me to, but I'll mean better or worse."

Beliefs, like stories, are not true or false but are rather claims of probability. The importance of James' conceptualization of doubt should not be missed. When an individual claims that a story or event is false it is not a disbelief in the story as much as it is a belief that something is awry or another story is more acceptable.

James' unique contribution to the belief literature was his view that belief was a degree of certainty and that belief constituted reality. In a similar realm, several researchers have claimed that belief is a judgment of reality, not in degrees of certainty but as a conviction of consciousness.

McDougall maintained that belief is, in essence, a claim on reality.⁸ He held the view that belief is always preceded by doubt and that it is the mental process judgment which converts doubt into belief.

Stout and Lundholm shared the same view with slightly different orientations. Stout viewed belief and judgment as synonymous, while Lundholm viewed belief as a perception of reality.⁹ According to Lundholm, the object perceived is an object believed.¹⁰ To believe, wrote Lundholm, is to think something and coincidentally to assert its reality. Stout viewed judgment as more central to the assertion of reality. He wrote: "Judgment is the Yes-No consciousness; under it I include every mode acknowledgement explicit or implicit of objective existence" (p. 97-98).

The similarities between James' notion of reality and degrees of certainty and the views held by McDougall et al. are more than coincidence. Clearly, James influenced these researchers; but their focus and extension of James' ideas did not proliferate the idea of degrees. Instead, they centered on a notion of process, where judgment and belief became synonymous as the process of asserting reality.

Seventy years after James asserted that beliefs are degrees of certainty, McGuire and others extended this idea and quantified beliefs. McGuire, Wyer and Goldberg, and Fishbein and Ajzen defined belief as the subjective probability that an object has a specific attribute or trait.¹¹ According to Fishbein and Ajzen, a belief represents the information a person has about an object or behavior. Specifically, a belief links an object to some attribute. The terms "object" and "attribute" are used generically by the researchers, referring to any discriminable aspect of the individual's world. The object of a belief may be a person, a group, an institution, a behavior, a policy, an event, etc.; the associated attribute may be any object, trait, property, quality, characteristic, outcome or event.¹²

According to Fishbein and Raven, beliefs have both a weight - termed expectancy - and a positive or negative evaluation, called a value.¹³ The expectancy is the probability that the belief is true, while the evaluation indicates its relationship with a specific attitude or behavior in question.

For example, the belief statement "Ronald Reagan is highly intelligent" will be believed differently by different people; while one individual may believe the statement to be 100% accurate, another might agree with the statement only 60%. The belief might be evaluated positively or negatively, depending on the individual and/or the behavior in question. So belief is not a matter of acceptable versus unacceptable statements but rather a matter of probability or degree of believability.

In an attempt to promote a detailed understanding of the narrative judgment process, a new perspective of belief is offered. This perspective contains three parts which will be discussed individually: (1) belief as a degree of certainty on a subjective continuum; (2) belief as always dependent on other beliefs; and (3) beliefs as a series of dependent premises.

BELIEF AS A DEGREE OF CERTAINTY ON A SUBJECTIVE CONTINUUM

In the first of three components of our perspective of belief, we borrow from several of the earlier investigators. From James, we borrow the view that belief is a degree of certainty; that is to say that any belief is a bipolar construct with complete doubt and complete certainty that some relationship or object exists at the extreme poles. In order to enable a researcher to measure this bipolar concept, we place this degree on a continuum, much like the definition of belief as a subjective probability. The difference here is a matter of interpretation. Whereas in the subjective probability view a belief represents the percentage of probability that an object has a specific attribute or trait, here we refer simply to the continuum of doubt to certainty that an object or a relationship exists. The difference is quite small, until one then interprets what a belief represents. In this view, the polar extremes can become substitutes for common language used by individuals: At the complete-doubt-pole, we say that the individual "knows" that an object or relationship exists. In this approach, the definition of belief determines the response. Remember that belief is on a continuum of complete doubt to complete certainty, not on a continuum of true or false. To state that a belief statement is true or false is to force a position of desired reality - of disbelief. For example, to respond to the statement that Ronald Reagan is pro-ERA as false (0% probability) is to assert a position of disbelief rather than to place a claim on knowing. James

maintained that the opposite of belief is doubt not disbelief. We cannot disbelieve something without believing something else. To state that a statement is false is to claim a disbelief. But what is the other belief that leads us to that position? An individual either knows something to be certain, does not know, or falls in between. In the subjective probability view, an individual must take a position of truth or falsehood despite his/her lack of knowing, in some cases.

BELIEF AS ALWAYS DEPENDENT ON OTHER BELIEFS

James maintained that we do not believe something without first believing something else. Such a statement does not a good syllogism make: If X, then first Y. If Y, then first Z. The circle goes on forever. But it must have started somewhere. There is little doubt that we, as humans, are enmeshed in a circle of beliefs. There is simply no exit from this circle. When we make observations we do not typically form one inference about what we see or hear, or taste. We form several, each building upon the other. Somewhere, one came first - we think - but it is impossible to tell which, and more impossible as time and experience continue. The tautology seems apparent: No matter how humans observe or justify their observations, we must always appeal to some belief (some degree of certainty). Even one's beliefs depend on one's beliefs. Lehre makes this point quite nicely:

Sense experience, whether commonly casual or carefully controlled, always leaves open the question of what we are to believe. The prick of sense often elicits ready consent, but what we believe in the face of sensory stimulation depends on our antecedent convictions. For example, imagine we believe we see something red before us, and this belief arises so naturally and quickly that no other belief seems to be involved. But we are enmeshed in our beliefs. We believe our circumstances are those in which we may trust our senses and, consequently, that there is little chance of error. If we believed instead that the chance of error was great, we would resist responding with such perceptual belief.¹⁴

In short, each belief we hold is dependent on other beliefs; that is an inescapable circle of beliefs. The usefulness of this view will be made clear in the discussion of the third component of our perspective.

BELIEFS AS SPIRALS OF DEPENDENT PREMISES

Researchers have proposed several metaphors to capture the interrelated dependency of beliefs: Rokesch describes beliefs in "systems", where beliefs form nests of open or closed systems.¹⁵ Quine and Ullian view beliefs as a web, where all beliefs form the interrelatedness of reasoning and evidence.¹⁶ In the previous section, we use the metaphor of a circle of beliefs to capture the dependencies of the constructs. But these metaphors are inadequate given that beliefs are degrees of certainty on a continuum and that all beliefs depend on other beliefs. The metaphor proposed here - to capture the complexity of this dependency is a "spiral of belief". The metaphors of circle, system and web, don't allow for the researcher to reach a hand in and grab a belief, hence knowing his/her position in the web or system or circle. The

metaphors simply do not allow for an adequate explanation of how to focus on a starting point or what to do after one is found. But the notion of spirals of belief allows us to - in fact, demands us to.

The metaphor of spirals of belief indicates that one belief serves as an anchor for the spiral (any belief in question). The belief then extends itself upon other beliefs and detracts itself to earlier beliefs (or premises) that enable us to believe it in the first place. As the belief spirals - as new beliefs come into play - it changes. One belief leads to another and to another, but there is no hierarchical ordering, only a cumulative and progressing spiral where beliefs extend and retract, each belief dependent on the premise before it and responsible - at least in part - for the belief that now exists after it.

Beliefs, as many researchers have maintained, are interrelated so as to form attitudes or predispositions to action. But the key is not to focus on the product their interrelatedness and dependency form, but on the relationship of the beliefs themselves. To understand narrative beliefs one must first understand this interrelatedness. The spiral metaphor does this.

McGuire, among others, approaches the "system" of beliefs as interconnected syllogisms containing both a vertical and horizontal structure. In this approach, two premises lead logically to a conclusion, where the premises may serve as the conclusions of other syllogisms in the system. The conclusion of one syllogism may also serve as the conclusion of other syllogisms. While this approach captures, in part, the dependencies of beliefs, it demands that beliefs work logically in their connectedness. Any belief not acting as a premise to some conclusion in syllogistic fashion is not included in this system. It is here that this view fails to capture the complexity of narrative beliefs. Certainly, we hold conclusions and claims (beliefs) not derived syllogistically. These beliefs are still inescapable components of a belief spiral, and they must be accounted for in the judgment process.

In short, the spiral metaphor shows us that, although we must start from one belief, to understand narrative beliefs we must identify the progressive spiral of interrelated beliefs. The construct of belief is far more complicated than simply being able to isolate one belief and observing its formation, change, etc. To identify any one belief, according to the three component definitions of belief, the researcher must also identify the possible spiral of beliefs that enable it to exist.

In order to illustrate a belief spiral, the following example is offered. Let us start with a belief spiral of an object, such as a telephone. An individual X holds many beliefs about and toward this object. These beliefs might include:

- a. Telephones are made of plastic
- b. Telephones have twelve buttons or ten holes
- c. Telephones come in a variety of shapes
- d. Telephone rings can be adjusted for loudness

Person X also holds beliefs about actions involving the telephone

- e. Telephones rely on computers to arrange circuits to connect calls.
- f. In emergencies, it takes too long to reach an operator or local police.
- g. Businesses could not conduct business without the use of the telephone.

The belief list has the potential to be enormous. Of course, only a certain set of these beliefs would be salient given a direction or focus from which to view the telephone. For the purpose of this example, let us say that beliefs A to G represent the salient beliefs in question concerning the telephone. From this list, perhaps only A & C have any logical connection: X might believe that phones come in varying shapes because they are made of plastic. If this is the belief held by X, then we can say that beliefs A & C share a common connectedness and hence C is dependent on A. At this point we are not sure what beliefs surround these two in the spiral, but for this example we will create two related beliefs: A2 The plastic comes in assorted colors and C2 The most economical shape is the trimline. Person X could not hold belief C2 without first holding belief C, thus making these two beliefs directly connected. Belief A2 although related to belief A is not a dependent belief and will exist as a periphery belief in this cluster. This same system of dependency exists for the other beliefs held by X. In this example, belief G will be surrounded by beliefs about business, about conducting business over the telephone, and about telephone use. These beliefs will combine with G to form a cluster which will be located to similar clusters within the spiral. The belief spiral of any individual interpreting a narrative will exist of salient beliefs concerning story elements and actions which the individual brings to the narrative. This extra-textual information, as Scholes terms it, will be incomplete. As the narrative unfolds, the missing beliefs will be generated along with the creation of new clusters. How the belief spiral works to represent the narrative judgment process is even more precise.

For example, a narrative might begin with the statement: "A young man with a checked sports coat walked out of the telephone booth." Any individual listening or reading this reconstruction will immediately form beliefs concerning the substantive elements of the story. These beliefs will fall into three categories. Substantive beliefs are those beliefs concerning the characters and action of the story. Any object or behavior described will generate these substantive beliefs. Definitional beliefs are those which define the precise meaning to words or phrases used in the narrative. These meanings are individualized and are usually stated in ranges or degrees. Descriptive beliefs about the cultural and personal significance of the elements are often inferred beliefs. Individuals infer from past narratives or experiences or draw from ideological prejudices in order to make sense of the narrated experience and to compare it with their own. These three belief types comprise the individual's narrative beliefs. For the statement above, the beliefs generated by a specific individual might include:

Substantive beliefs:

1. Beliefs about objects, such as the sports coat and telephone booth. (The man was wearing the sports coat. The telephone booth had an entrance way.)

2. Beliefs about the action (The man had a reason for being in the telephone booth).

Definitional beliefs:

1. Beliefs about the meaning of "young". (Young men are between the ages of 15-29 years-old.)
2. Beliefs about walking. (Walking means the man made a speed of between 1 and 3 miles per hour. Walking means leisurely and not excited.)
3. Beliefs about sports coats. (Sports coats are jacket-like and have buttons.)

Descriptive beliefs:

1. Beliefs about young men. (Young men are often concerned only with their own personal gain.)
2. Beliefs about checked sports coats. (Sport coats are fashionable. Checks are usually dark in color. People who wear sports coats are informal.)
3. Beliefs about telephone booths. (Telephone booths are quickly disappearing. Telephone booths are usually near stores or gas stations. Telephone booths often have their directories missing or damaged.)

These beliefs are far from exhaustive. Everyone of the hypothetical beliefs listed is dependent on an unlisted premise. For example, the belief that sports coats are fashionable is dependent on beliefs about fashion. These beliefs are, in turn, dependent on other premises.

As the narrative continues, the individual continues to generate more beliefs. These additional beliefs enter the spiral at the point of nearest relation. For example, if the narrative states that the telephone booth is red generates substantive beliefs about red booths, definitional beliefs about the color red, and descriptive beliefs about the typicality of red telephone booths. These beliefs will cluster with previously generated beliefs concerning the story element of the telephone booth. In turn, the cluster will be located in the spiral nearest to beliefs on an element most closely related to the telephone. As the narrative progresses and new information is evaluated, the spiral changes form as clusters change both in shape, detail and location in the spiral.

NARRATIVE PROBABILITY

The narrative probability of two competing stories can be viewed as the consistency of agreement between beliefs in the spiral. As new beliefs are generated from new narrative information they serve one of three functions in

the spiral: (1) the belief becomes a supportive premise for an existing belief; (2) the belief begins an entirely new cluster which will adhere to the spiral at the nearest relational point; or (3) the belief will conflict with an existing belief, possibly causing a chain-reaction of inconsistency with the premises supporting and surrounding that existing belief.

In the example of the young man, the narrative might continue and state that the man put the sports coat on after leaving the phone booth. This new substantive belief conflicts with the earlier belief that the man was already wearing the coat. The interpreter will probably solve this conflict by changing the initial belief into: the man was holding the sports coat while in the phone booth. Most often, new narrative information will require no more than a rearranging of existing beliefs in order to solve any inconsistency. This changing process by first entering doubt into the existing belief structure is not without consequence. Given two stories, both of which seem probable or reasonable but which disagree, the interpreter must decide which narrative is more acceptable as reality. The probability of the narrative, I will argue, is rarely a case of blatant inconsistency of elements where details and action are in contradiction. Rather both stories will seem feasible. In these cases individuals select the most acceptable story based on the amount of beliefs they were forced to correct or alter in order to maintain consistency. The more beliefs changed, the more doubt has entered the system. The consequence of this doubt is to cast a shadow over a reasonable story. When compared with another reasonable story, this shadow works to make this story less probable and less acceptable in the mind of the interpreter.

NOTES

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METAPHOR AND METONYMY: A RELATIONAL
LOOK AT ARGUMENT AND ARGUING

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At the last summer conference on argumentation, Brockriede emphasized that the study of argument is "rich enough to accommodate" expansion into other specialties and urged a communal rejoicing as "perspectives on its study increase."¹ He readily admitted that no one scholar can focus on its multiple possibilities for investigation and application and "still engage in the kind of rigorous scholarship that truly advances" one's chosen perspective.² However, in the community of scholars within which studies of argument are embedded, "specialties can coexist harmoniously, especially if some of us try to build bridges between them so an understanding of one approach enriches an understanding of another."³

The intent of this paper is an outreach for mutual understandings in the belief that such bridges can be built. We say an outreach because we claim no deep understanding of the study of argument that emerges from its rigorous investigation and, therefore, we are unsure about where the bridges' foundations might be constructed on separate shores. We do claim such an understanding of a relational approach to interpersonal communication. The hope is that clarifications and understandings of our differences and similarities with those who do specialize in the study of argument will emerge. We expect to learn much more than provide learnings. A word of caution, however. If we are correct in asserting that the relational view is part of the larger cybernetic revolution presently occurring in Western science and philosophy,⁴ then clarifications of differences between specialties will not result, in the short-run, in harmonious coexistence, but such clarifications will result, in the long-run, in more useful theories about the communicative and rhetorical aspects of building, maintaining and changing the patterns of social order.

This essay begins with a sketch of the traditional views on metaphor and metonymy, reviews Wilden's⁵ attempt to re-define them as communication processes, and then discusses our underlying epistemology utilizing the relevance of these terms to relational communication.

METAPHOR AND METONYMY

The original definition of metaphor advanced by Aristotle serves as the basis from which linguistic and rhetorical dis-

cussions generally proceed. "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy."⁶ From Aristotle's definition emerged the classification of metaphor into four types: (1) genus to species (metonymy), (2) species to genus (synecdoche), (3) species to species (metaphor), and (4) analogy.⁷ Thus, Aristotle "...defined metaphor for the entire subsequent history of Western thought."⁸ The definition takes the word or the name as the unit of analysis.

The notion of transference is a distinguishing characteristic of Aristotle's comparison theory. By transference, meaning is carried from one word to another resulting in a comparison. Having conceptualized the process, it was operationally connected to the noun: "...metaphor is something that happens to the noun."⁹

The original comparison theory evolved into a literalist or substitution approach to metaphor through an emphasis on borrowing from another domain to create a metaphor.¹⁰ A metaphor as a single-word unit is substituted or used in place of an equivalent literal meaning. Given that literal meaning can be substituted for metaphorical meaning, then advocates of the literalist tradition regard metaphor as a type of fallacious reasoning or an abuse of language. Meaning therefore is restricted to the level of the isolated word and language is viewed as limited to one discourse. Within the literalist view, when a metaphor can be reduced to a physical universe of discourse (e.g., literal discourse), then it is considered meaningful. If the metaphor cannot be replaced or substituted with an equivalent literal meaning within the physical universe of discourse, then the single word expression is considered meaningless and an abuse of language. Metaphor does not create new similarities but formulates similar, antecedently existing within the single domain of literal knowledge. Considering metaphor a stylistic device, the literalists asserted that a metaphor does not precede but follows the thought conveyed by the metaphor itself.¹¹

In opposition to the literalist approach, the supervenient approach to metaphor acknowledged two universes of discourse.¹² This approach separates the metaphorical from the literal meaning and does not attempt to reduce the former to the latter. Within the supervenient approach, there is no substitute for metaphor; a literal substitution would necessarily result in a loss of meaning through translation from one domain (literal) to the other (metaphorical). Substitution is assumed to require a step-by-step cognitive analysis and, therefore, any attempt to reduce the metaphor to its literal term would negate the intuitive process necessary for grasping the meaning of the metaphorical expression. The notion of meaningfulness, therefore, is not limited to a single literal universe (e.g., all comparisons between two terms need not be enumerated)

as it is within the substitution view. Both literal and metaphorical meanings can coexist. The supervenient approach does not treat metaphor primarily as a stylistic device, but extends the function of metaphor beyond ornamentation and into the realm of knowledge acquisition via intuitive processes rather than through discrete, analytical processes; thought and language are united.

In contrast to the previous approaches to metaphor, the interaction view¹³ asserts that both thought and language are fundamentally metaphorical. Metaphor is not viewed as an abuse of language, a riddle or an ornament but is itself the constitutive form of language.¹⁴ This perspective emphasizes the creative aspects of metaphor and the influence it has on the nature of language. Metaphors do not transfer perceptions into words; rather, perceptions are a reflection of metaphor. "The processes of metaphor in language...are superimposed upon a perceived world which is itself a product of earlier or unwitting metaphor."¹⁵ The issue is no longer the structure of metaphor as a word-focused figure of speech, but now text and context are said to interact; "the word as an act of mind... so depends on other acts of the mind that it can be distinguished from them only as convenience of discourse."¹⁶ Meaning is contextualized. Rather than a substitution or a comparison, metaphor is now conceived of as a complex interaction through which new similarities are created but not antecedently determined. This generative power of metaphor is in its ability to re-describe reality;¹⁷ the power is not in the metaphor but in the nature of language fundamentally constituted by metaphor. Debates over literal and metaphorical meaningfulness have given way to the recognition that any linguistically defined context is fundamentally metaphorical.

Several insights into the structure of language and the unity of language and thought are mentioned in the literalist, supervenient and interactionist approaches and this brief sketch has not done justice to their contributions. However, even a more thorough review would still result in several limitations from a communication point of view. In general, these traditions were more concerned with taxonomic classifications rather than social interactive processes; they frequently focused only on the isolated word as the unit of analysis and just infrequently concerned themselves with the sentence or larger units of analysis; the relationships between metaphor and metonymy are typically avoided even though metonymy is explicitly utilized for comparison purposes and implicitly presumed for understanding of their comments; they typically, though inadvertently, propagated a "conduit metaphor"¹⁸ approach to communication by reducing it to the study of linguistic, syntactic categories and processes; and these writers rarely concerned themselves with the larger socio-communicative context within which linguistic texts are produced and thus avoided the requirement that different levels of reality require different levels of explanation. In sum, these three approaches have treated metaphor and metonymy as unique tools

of language rather than treating language per se as a tool of measurement, as a tool for creating distinctions.

Jakobson,¹⁹ while staying within a linguistic framework, moves beyond the limitations of the traditional views. Metaphor and metonymy are posited as the fundamental "two modes of arrangement," the two basic "operations,"²⁰ or simply the two "poles" of language processes.²¹ In this now classic piece on aphasia, Jakobson frames the concepts of metaphor and metonymy as abstract linguistic relationships that are manifested in communication processes. Conceptually, these two abstractions are no longer limited to the domain of traditional rhetoric. Much of his discussion of these processes extends beyond pure linguistics; for example, verse patterns based on parallelisms between adjacent lines are highlighted; in Russian lyrical songs metaphorical processes are said to predominate; in poetry metaphorical constructions are acknowledged; in prose contiguous relationships are said to be created through metonymical digressions from the plot to characters to setting; in motion pictures the use of camera angles and differing lenses are used to create metonymic set-ups; and the metaphorical and metonymical relationships among symbols in the structure of dreams in Freudian psychoanalysis are also examined. Throughout his treatment of the metaphor and metonymy poles is the underlying theme that these processes are not only reflexively related to themselves as codifications but also to the larger socio-cultural setting in which they are created and perpetuated. Both poles are viewed as systems of relationships. Metaphorical processes are created by acts of combination and proceed through the specification of similarities; metonymical processes operate through specifications of contiguities and are created through combination. Neither pole is an independent entity existing without the other; rather metaphorical and metonymical relations are themselves interrelated and cannot be understood separately. "In normal verbal behavior both processes are continually operative, but careful observation will reveal that...preference is given to one of the two processes over the other."²² Furthermore, "a competition between" the metaphoric and metonymic relations is "manifest in any symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social."²³

Wilden argues extensively throughout his book System and Structure that metaphor and metonymy are basically communication and not just linguistic processes; Jakobson's two poles of language are "actually the two poles of communication in the semiotic sense."²⁴ While acknowledging an indebtedness to Jakobson, he is chastised (along with most information theorists and most structural and generative linguists) for being too preoccupied with syntactics and insufficiently concerned with semantics and pragmatics.²⁵ Like other linguists, Jakobson is said to deal "in general only with signification (digital communication) and not with meaning (analog communication), nor with the problems of translation from one to the other."²⁶ Wilden's attempts to define metaphor and metonymy as the two poles of communication in the semiotic sense are summarily

TABLE 1: Wilden's Descriptions of Metaphor and Metonymy*

METAPHOR	METONYMY
Relation of similarity	Relation of contiguity ²⁷
Jakobson's methods of arrangement of selection and substitution	Jakobson's methods of arrangement of combination and contexture ²⁸
Locke's association of ideas by similarity or simultaneity	Locke's association of ideas by contiguity or causality ²⁹
Saussure's "axis of simultaneities"	Saussure's "axis of successions" ³⁰
Synchronic: symptom and condensation in a Freudian sense, substitution, paradigm, code, similarity	Diachronic: desire and displacement in a Freudian sense, combination, syntagm, message, contiguity ³¹
Primarily involves a change in selection from the code	Primarily involves combinations in the messages constructed ³²
Paradigmatic, selective, substitutive, concurrent, similarity	Syntagmatic, combinatory, contextual, concatenated, contiguity ³³
Axis of selection	Axis of combination ³⁴

*These descriptive sets are to be read in terms of each other and are not to be thought of as simple aggregates of synonyms.

listed above in Table 1 and the general relationships posited between them are listed in Table 2.

In human communication, metaphor and metonymy are considered digital aspects,³⁵ but the analog relations of similarity and contiguity can be observed in animal communication systems. For example, the playful 'nip' of animal behavior is originally formed by a contiguous relation with the 'bite' of fighting and is, therefore, defined as a metonymic sign. But the integration of the 'nip' into another level of communication makes it also into a metaphor (a substitution) in the new code of communication saying "This is play".³⁶ In sum, this brief history of metaphor and metonymy attempted to evidence the claim that they can be fruitfully viewed as communication processes without reducing the study of communication to the study of linguistics. The next section summarizes the epistemological framework of relational communication that utilizes these terms for analyses of human interaction patterns.

TABLE 2: Wilden's General Relationships between Metaphor and Metonymy in Bounded Communication Systems.

- (1) Metaphor and metonymy are not entities or object categories. They are terms for digital distinctions that describe abstract relations which are nowhere. Thus, the polarization of these terms has signification only in context and, therefore, may or may not be analogically meaningful.³⁷
- (2) Metaphor (paradigmatic) and metonymy (syntagmatic) describe the relationship between synchronic and diachronic aspects of discourses of communication.³⁸
- (3) The synchronic processes of goalseeking systems are viewed as a combination of messages within codes according to metonymic principles (that is, governed by deviation-counteracting processes). The diachronic emergence of the metaphoric event is brought about by the intensification of the contradictions in metonymic principles (that is, governed by deviation-amplifying processes).³⁹
- (4) These two are not primarily linguistic processes but communication processes. Selection from the code (metaphor) and combination in the message (metonymy) must and do occur in any communication system whatsoever.⁴⁰
- (5) The two processes of metaphor and metonymy cannot be separated in the natural history of a communication system, though they can be analytically distinguished.⁴¹
- (6) What distinguishes metaphor and metonymy as communication processes is the relative semiotic freedom of their use. (Semiotic freedom refers to the degrees of freedom within a matrix of constraints.) The relative scope of the code (metaphorical processes) and the relative logical possibilities of combination in message construction regulate the information of the system and, therefore, its present organized structure and evolving organizing patterns.⁴²

RELATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

A relational approach to interpersonal communication⁴³ is a part of the interactional view⁴⁴ which is part of the "new order of communication" called "metacommunication"⁴⁵ which is part of the "cybernetic revolution"⁴⁶ presently occurring in Western science and philosophy. These metaphors (relational, interactional, metacommunication and cybernetic revolution) are themselves metonymically related. Each is contextualized by

the other in a hierarchical, reflexive manner (a metonymic relation) and each is similar (a metaphorical relation) in their epistemological assumptions. Principle among these epistemological similarities is an emphasis on "thinking in social contexts" in contrast to "thinking in categories."⁴⁷ Learning to think in contexts is rooted in the switch to information from matter-energy as primary descriptors of the "messages-in-circuit" that constitute social interaction.⁴⁸

The switch to information--which, as a difference, is itself a relationship--results in treating interactive behaviors as messages which, in turn, presumes that "mind is a necessary explanatory principle"⁴⁹ in relational communication. The concept of mind, however, is not to be thought of as a property of an individual, but as an intangible processor of information that is "immanent...in pathways and messages outside the body",⁵⁰ it "operates within hierarchies and networks of difference to create gestalten"⁵¹ or meaningful interpretations from the subject's point of view.

Messages are thought of as intrinsically multi-levelled and are constructed within codifications that focus on the differences between perceptions. A message might be defined as a "synchronic transformation or codification of difference", it is "conceived of as a difference between perceptions, where perception is the active specification of an external event and not the passive reception of one."⁵²

In communicational systems, codifications are assumed to be of two general types--analog and digital. These two are fundamentally different in form. A digital code "lies 'outside' the sender and receiver and depends upon an 'objective' repertoire of discrete elements (distinctions) for the selective and combinatory choices"⁵³ made in message construction. An analog code, on the other hand, is "neither 'outside' nor composed of discrete elements. The analog code is nothing more or less than the very relationship between the sender and receiver",⁵⁴ the analog code, therefore, is the shape of the messages-in-circuitry that are social relationships. Neither term is conceived of as an entity or a category of things; they are descriptions of relationships in context.⁵⁵

The primary functional difference between these two in human communication processes is that "translation from the analog to the digital often involves a gain in information (organization) but a loss in meaning",⁵⁶e.g., a teacher defining the concepts of symmetry and complementarity. Conversely, "translation from the digital to the analog...usually involves a loss of information and a gain in meaning",⁵⁷e.g., the teacher providing examples of symmetrical and complementary interactions.

Humans appear to be the only animals faced with the problems of translation between these two because we appear to be the only animals capable of using one type "in place of

another."⁵⁸ The ability to use one in place of the other stems directly from the invention of the negative,⁵⁹ from the invention of 'not'--a second-order digitalization or a "rule about relations."⁶⁰ Code systems that include the negative are usually called symbolic languages --the negative is the "ultimate test of symbolicity."⁶¹ The negative, in turn, gives rise to the principle of perfection well discussed by Burke.⁶²

With the invention of the negative, the 'word' fell out of the 'sentence'.⁶³ Although the biblical phrase "In the beginning was the word" may be a "very important thing to say about human beings, it is quite untrue about the evolution of messages in general. In the beginning was the sentence."⁶⁴ When the word fell out of the sentence, digital distinctions (report, denotation, information, negation, concepts, information about concepts) became separable from the analog instructions (command, connotation, evocation, refusal, relationships, evocation of images).⁶⁵ Humans became "moralized by the negative"⁶⁶ by "being able to see ourselves as if we were objects in the outside world."⁶⁷

The ability to see ourselves as if we were objects results in the "problematical twistiness"⁶⁸ of self-referential statements. A general label for systems (e.g., a sentence, a language, an argument, a society) that "twists back on itself and closes a loop...is reflexivity."⁶⁹ As Mead emphasized, reflexivity is a necessary component of becoming socialized, of becoming a member of a group.⁷⁰ An individual is "in" society when the moralizing negatives giving rise to the principles of perfection as conceptualized by that society are "in" the individual. The means or how for becoming a member is the internalization and reconstitution of society's symbolic language.⁷¹

Self-referential statements are also assumed to result in the subjective experience of consciousness,⁷² of the recognition by the individual that s/he is separate from the messages-in-circuitry constituting the social interaction within which s/he is connected. Self-referential statements also result in the paradoxes of science and mathematics. The paradoxes of self-reference enter into the language of science because scientists not only want to write sentences they want to say about them that they are true or not. And as soon as we make true or false statements about sentences in science "we are back in the universe in which we are using a language in which we refer to ourselves."⁷³

The logical antinomies of self-referential statements have resulted in the "loss of certainty" in logic and mathematics,⁷⁴ as well as the recognition that social membership is inherently double binding.⁷⁵ Put another way, humans mis-use symbolic languages by asserting that an objective, certain, absolute truth is both discoverable (It is "out-there," independent of any language system and language users) and transmittible (It is knowable "in-here," by an individual or social group so that It can be taught and shared, or guarded and hoarded.) This

mis-use of language results in our becoming "rotten with perfection"⁷⁶ and stems directly from an Aristotelian logic that forbids the assertion of sentences at more than one level.⁷⁷

The prohibition of self-referential statements, of simultaneously multi-leveled sentences that twist back on themselves, was the stop gap technique used in the theory of logical types to preserve analytical truth. We now realize, of course, that the theory of logical types was an unsuccessful attempt to deal with the problems of self-reference because it was: (1) based on a picture theory of language--one that also viewed metaphor and metonymy as mere figures of speech; (2) assumed that "external reality exhibits discrete levels of organization free from loops" (or twistiness)--the territory was not assumed to be recursively organizing but categorically organized; and (3) asserted that symbolic expressions that confuse these discrete hierarchical levels of organization "out-there" are destructive of clear representations "in-here."⁷⁸ Thus, in our current attempts to develop a scientific language for describing the messages-in-circuitry characterizing human communication processes, both the antinomies of formal language systems and the double binds of informal socio-cultural language systems are to be "embraced rather than exorcised."⁷⁹

A metacommunicational framework attempts to embrace these paradoxes by focusing descriptive efforts directly on the "weaving of contexts and of messages which propose contexts--but which, like all messages whatsoever, have 'meaning' only by virtue of context."⁸⁰ A metacommunicational framework attempts to theoretically explain and methodologically describe "all exchanged cues and propositions about (a) codification and (b) relationship between"⁸¹ interactants as immanent in message performances. Like metaphor and metonymy, the notion of metacommunication attempts to cover two inseparable processes: synchronic explanations based on descriptions of a system's levels of organization as a commentary on the text of another level, and diachronic explanations based on descriptions of both the developmental pathways and the evolving passages from one level of organized complexity to another.⁸²

"A phenomenological approach to communication implicitly or explicitly assumes that all behavior is communication."⁸³ This assumption is necessary to avoid a reductionist, positivistic epistemology that reduces the study of meaning to the study of syntax, a "conduit metaphor"⁸⁴ approach to the study of communication processes. Conversely, to say that all behavior is communication necessarily dethrones "the 'objective' values of scientism"⁸⁵ or the "myth of objectivism"⁸⁶ that legitimize the Perfect by declaring that the "behavior of any system...is a function of the way the observer-participant punctuates it."⁸⁷ "Rather than being errors in syntax...all epistemological errors in science and philosophy are errors in punctuation."⁸⁸ The notion of error in the previous sentence refers not to the empirical accuracy or inaccuracy of facts, but to the ideological, epistemological, theoretical punctuations

required for facts to become facts. Facts (as text) are a function of the theory (context), within which they are metonymically derived and verified; but the contextualizing theory as text is itself contextualized by the ideology of the larger socio-cultural system, within which the theory is developed; which, in turn, is contextualized by the larger ecological environment which is the context for the ideology as text. The two processes of metaphor and metonymy cannot be separated from one another.

Since the part (text) cannot include the whole (context), any knowledge claim is necessarily incomplete and, therefore, not true in an absolute sense; Reddy's "toolmaker paradigm"⁸⁹ seems a more useful metaphor for studying human communication processes. Recognition of this inherent incompleteness is a metaphorical event that blurs the boundaries of the metonymically created context-text relations. That is to say, texts and contexts are reflexively related not only to themselves as codifications, but also to the larger socio-ecological systems within which they are generated. (These larger systems have been arbitrarily, though not accidentally, punctuated so that 'objective' statements could be made about them, albeit from a 'subjective' point of view which, of course, is authoritatively denied so that we can become double bound and pursue our wending quest for perfection.)

OUTREACH

This brief, tortuous journey (are you still there reader?) of a relational epistemology can now conclude. We began by saying this essay was an outreach and we will end as we began. Aristotle used the metaphors of change (meta) and movement (pherein) to explain the concept of metaphor; loosely translated, a metaphor is "...an act of outreaching and combining."⁹⁰ In that sense, the following thoughts are offered.

Consciousness and aesthetics are the great untouched questions.

Bateson⁹¹

(1) Both relational communication and argumentation scholars are concerned with ethical and aesthetic judgments. Aesthetic judgments appear to be primarily metaphorical, an analogic pleasingness of form--though necessarily contextualized in some ill-defined, contiguous relationship. Conversely, ethical judgments are primarily metonymical, a digital prescription of form. The fact that Burke emphasized Order⁹² or the "hierarchical principle"⁹³ as the fundamental motive manifested in social interaction is not arbitrary, accidental, nor trivial. A social system is primarily regulated by deviation-counteracting processes (metonymic relations) so that it can reproduce itself, maintain its present organized form and perpetuate the proper socialization of its members so that its death, and thus theirs, can be denied.⁹⁴

Metaphor is related to prophecy,⁹⁵ to "new visions,"⁹⁶ to innovative restructuring of the old: Metonymy, on the other hand, is related to the priesthood⁹⁷--of which college professors are an intimate part--who repeatedly chant the application of outdated concepts stemming from the mechanistic, Cartesian-Newtonian world view that cannot explain, nor even acknowledge, the reflexive, recursive loops within which our current socio-ecological crisis has evolved.⁹⁸ If the "whole planet" is indeed at a "turning point,"⁹⁹ then we, as teachers and scholars, by actively avoiding aesthetics, are decreasing the likelihood that more useful metaphors will emerge. Do we, as teachers, scholars, citizens, want to be an active part of our own demise? (The part that destroys the whole, destroys itself.) Even if the "whole planet" is not at a "turning point," are we, as teachers, as members of the priesthood, as preachers of the Word, as chanters of the "ethics of symmetry"¹⁰⁰ that legitimizes our metonymical chain of ethical ideals, actively increasing our students' "pursuit of unhappiness"¹⁰¹ by decreasing their ability to think metaphorically? Is laughter worth the price of competitively defined success? Laughter may indeed be the only social medicine for in laughing, we laugh at ourselves and, thereby, remind ourselves that we are necessarily part of our own troubles. As parts, we are therefore responsible for the conditions of the whole; we are not separable from our social relationships, nor would we want to be.

Comedy unites us; tragedy separates us from our gods. But the gods of truth, certainty and perfection are our own "grand illusion."¹⁰² The basic modern secular philosophy is abstraction, a digitalization that creates its own context, the etymology of which signifies a "drawing away from."¹⁰³ If the cybernetic epistemology reviewed here is accurate, then our whole way of thinking about what it means to be human "has got to be restructured."¹⁰⁴ A new set of metaphors, a new aesthetics, that focuses on the relational dynamics of socio-ecological systems is required.

(2) Relational control researchers have momentarily disregarded analyses of subjective meanings in order to develop useful methods for describing the recursive loops of interpersonal relationships. A relational approach, however, is necessarily concerned with an individual's phenomenologically constructed realities. Attempts to describe subjective meanings will necessarily focus on propositions about codifications, on how humans use and abuse themselves with language categories by confusing levels of distinctions. As a starting point for studying phenomenological realities, we find it useful to assume that: (1) consciousness is structured like a language (digitalized significations); (2) unconsciousness is structured like a communication system (analog meaning); and (3) the translation or crossing the unconscious-conscious boundary is "structured by language."¹⁰⁵

Whether these assumptions are accurate, of course, awaits the outcome of future investigations. In the meantime, we find

these assumptions useful for several reasons. Methodologically, they direct researchers to examine the text of what people say, to focus on the metaphorical and metonymical descriptions people provide about their own interpersonal relationships. These texts are then used to make inferences about the personally constructed realities created and sustained in conversation with others. If phenomenological realities are created in conversations with others, then the way to change states of consciousness is to change how we talk and what we talk about; we can learn to talk differently, just as we learned to talk the way we do now, and, therefore, learn to act, feel and experience ourselves differently. The therapeutic worth of these assumptions about consciousness, then, are their "freeing and healing" metaphorical potential, as one of our students said--a Catholic priest by the way.

The pedagogical implication of these assumptions is that by focusing our students' attentions on their own words, we can increase their consciousness of themselves, their interpersonal relationships, their socio-cultural contexts, and the ecological contexts within which we all are embedded. Aristotle was right, of course, when he claimed that people cannot be taught to see resemblances, to see metaphorical relations. As teachers, however, we can place students in classroom contexts that increase the odds that such resemblances can be experienced, we can provide contexts for practicing metaphorical "eurekas"; (e.g., the nine-dot problem, various optical illusions, Escher prints, discussions about self-referential sentences and "Be spontaneous" paradoxes, as well as, the study of formal paradoxes, are all classroom activities that provide practice at thinking metaphorically, creatively). By helping our students learn to "play with words", we can help them break the bonds of their own subjectively maintained limitations by altering the content of their inner dialogues and, thereby, help them cross the bar between consciousness and unconsciousness.

The epistemological utility of these assumptions is the questioning of our conceptual habits that are part of the socio-ecological crisis within which we are presently immersed. Part of that crisis is the continued application of an extinctive world view ("the mechanistic world view of Cartesian-Newtonian science"¹⁰⁶) to the problems of organized complexity, to the problems of living in recursive loops, of living in a self-referential universe. What we need is a new metaphor, "a new 'paradigm'--a new vision of reality; a fundamental change in our thoughts, perceptions and values"¹⁰⁷ is required. A new metaphor that depicts reflexive loops, that evokes consciousness of the fact that we are all parts of the whole which is characterized by hierarchical "orders of recursiveness."¹⁰⁸ The ethical implications of our assumptions about consciousness, then, concern the dethroning of the "ethics of symmetry"¹⁰⁹ that have helped create our current, global crisis. An ecological imperative emphasizing the symbiotic structuring of life is required; the cybernetic epistemology outlined will assist the emergence of such a metaphorical paradigm.

If "presence" is "the displaying of certain elements on which the speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of the hearer's consciousness,"¹⁰ then our presence here has been to display the importance of thinking relationally. Our purpose has been to center attention on the figure-ground relationship per se, on learning to think in contexts, on learning to think in loops, on learning to think in metaphorical-metonymic circles. Our presumption has been that the study of argumentation "must take into account the study of human language and the matter of interpretation."¹¹ Matters of interpretation are matters of punctuation which, in turn, are logically prior to the acceptance of facts as facts, of truths as truths. All three of Perelman's "starting points"¹² are intrinsically matters of preference (values, metaphors, ideologies). Perelman's demonstrative conclusions and argumentative conclusions¹³ are both probable, neither is certain; impersonal demonstrations are necessarily embedded in personal communication relationships and not impersonal logical ones. Ideas, as information, are by definition not physical objects to be discussed in matter-energy terms and framed in objective metaphors; as information, ideas are differences, and differences are relationships which are nowhere other than in the matrix of selections utilized to punctuate those differences.

Although our social and personal maps (digitalizations of the analog) are the territory of interest (digitalizations of those digitalizations) for both argumentation and relational communication scholars, we cannot therefore say that the map is the territory. The maps are necessarily metaphorical indicators of the metonymic relationships of the territory within which the map-makers are swallowed. Humans cannot escape the reflexive nature of our maps, nor can we escape the recursive loops of the territory. We can attempt to live responsibly within them.

NOTES

¹Wayne Brockriede, "The Contemporary Renaissance in the Study of Argument," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annadale, VA: SCA, 1983), p. 24.

²Brockriede, p. 24.

³Brockriede, p. 24.

⁴Magoroh Maruyama, "The Post-Industrial Logic," in The Next 25 Years: Crisis & Community, ed. A.A. Spekke (Washington D.C.: World Future Society, 1975), pp. 43-50.

⁵Anthony Wilden, System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange, 2nd ed. (London: Tavistock, 1980).

⁶Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry with a Supplement on Music (1457b), trans. S.H. Butcher (The Library of Liberal Arts, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.), p. 28.

⁷Donald F. Miller, "Metaphor, Thinking and Thought," Et cetera, Summer (1982), p. 137.

⁸Paul Ricoeur, La métaphore vive (Editions du Seuil, 1975), trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costell SJ under the title of The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 3.

⁹Ricoeur, p. 16.

¹⁰The three approaches to metaphor which we discuss (literalist, supervenient and interactive) are intended to represent the evolving epistemological framework, within which the concept has been developed from a linguistic perspective. For a thorough discussion of these orientations, see Warren A. Shibles, An Analysis of Metaphor in the Light of W.M. Urban's Theories (Paris: Mouton, 1971), pp. 63-74. See also Andrew Ortony, Ralph E. Reynolds and Judith A. Arter, "Metaphor: Theoretical and Empirical Research," Psychological Bulletin, 85 (1978), pp. 919-943; Peter Schofer and Donald Rice, "Metaphor, Metonymy and Synecdoche Revisited," Semiotica, 21 (1977), pp. 121-147; Roger Tourangeau and Robert J. Sternberg, "Understanding and Appreciating Metaphors," Cognition, 11 (1982), pp. 203-244.

¹¹Shibles, p. 74.

¹²Advocates of the supervenient approach to metaphor give emphasis to the intuitive, unexpected nature of metaphor. For example, see Andrew Ortony's discussion of his inexpressibility thesis in, "Why Metaphors are Necessary," Educational Theory, 25 (1975), pp. 45-53. Also see, Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor & Reality, (IN: Indiana University Press, 1967).

¹³The basis of the interactive approach was introduced by I.A. Richards. See I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 89-112. Though our discussion concludes with this perspective, it by no means represents our epistemological assumptions. For instance see, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago, ILL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); Donald F. Miller, "Metaphor, Thinking and Thought: Part II," Et cetera, Fall (1982), pp. 242-255; James Fernandez, "The Mission of Metaphor in Expressive Culture," Current Anthropology, 15 (1974), pp. 119-143.

¹⁴Richards, p. 90. We agree with Richards' view that metaphor does not add power to language. However, whereas he gives attention to the internal structure of metaphor, we are concerned with the relationship of metaphor as well as metonymy to natural conversation.

¹⁵Cited in "I.A. Richards on Metaphor", in Warren A. Shibles, Analysis of Metaphor in the Light of W.M. Urban's Theories, (Mouton, Paris, 1971), Appendix C, p. 135, from I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 108-109.

¹⁶Shibles, p. 131.

¹⁷Ricoeur, p. 6.

¹⁸Michael J. Reddy, "The Conduit Metaphor - A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language," in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 284-324. The conduit metaphor is the label given to a logic framing discussions about language (a metalanguage about language, a commentary on language as text). The four core expressions of the "major framework" of the conduit metaphor are: "(1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another; (2) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts once again from the words" (p. 290). The conduit metaphor approach to language readily implies the "bizarre assertion that words have 'insides' and 'outsides'. After all, if thoughts can be 'inserted' there must be a space 'inside' wherein the meaning can reside" (p. 288). Viewed from a conduit metaphor frame, what requires explanation in human interaction "is the failure to communicate" (p. 295); such failures are typically blamed on the speaker or writer because the extraction of 'meaning' from words is a relatively passive activity of the listener or reader compared to the actions of speaking and writing. The power of this logic lies in its ability to consistently explain such failures. Further, many common English words and phrases encourage conduit thinking about language; for example, words like "transmit," "transfer," "convey," "encode," "decode," and phrases like "get your ideas across," "put your thoughts into words," "don't give away your ideas," "give me an idea," all imply the bizarre notion that words are "filled" with meaning. A moment's reflection, however, witnesses that such thinking about language is patent nonsense--though such thinking is useful in upholding the legitimacy of the existing social order. Signs and signals "do something". They cannot contain anything" (p. 306). In sum, the conduit metaphor approach to language and communication "objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion" (p. 308, emphasis added).

¹⁹Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances," in Fundamentals of Language, Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, 2nd ed. (Paris: Mouton, 1971), pp. 67-96.

²⁰Jakobson, p. 74.

²¹Jakobson, p. 90.

²²Jakobson, p. 90.

²³Jakobson, pp. 94-95.

²⁴Wilden, p. 57.

²⁵Wilden, p. 352.

²⁶Wilden, p. 26. For an excellent discussion of the terms analog and digital see the chapter entitled "Analog and Digital Communication: On Negation, Signification, and Meaning." This chapter ends with a set of descriptors of the terms analog and digital as applied in different contexts. A summarizing overview of this discussion results in the following "general relationships in particular systems" between analog and digital communication: "(1) The analog is of a higher logical type than the digital. (2) The digital is of a higher order of organization than the analog. (3) In nature, the digital is the instrument of the analog. (4) In (western) culture, the analog is the instrument of the digital. (5) Both analog and digital communication occur in all open systems. (6) All digitalization generates paradox or oscillation at some level in the system. (7) All control processes require digital communication to set limits on positive feedback. (8) The terms 'analog' and 'digital' describe relationships in context, and not entities or 'objective' categories" (p. 194).

²⁷Wilden, p. 47.

²⁸Wilden, p. 47.

²⁹Wilden, p. 49.

³⁰Wilden, p. 50.

³¹Wilden, p. 55.

³²Wilden, p. 58.

³³Wilden, p. 351.

³⁴Wilden, p. 352.

³⁵Wilden, p. 193.

³⁶Wilden, pp. 59, 173 and 401.

³⁷Wilden, p. 58.

³⁸Wilden, p. 50.

³⁹Wilden, p. 141.

⁴⁰Wilden, p. 352.

⁴¹Wilden, p. 48.

⁴²Wilden, p. 352.

⁴³Frank E. Millar and L. Edna Rogers, "A Relational Approach to Interpersonal Communication," in Explorations in Interpersonal Communication, ed. Gerald R. Miller (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 87-103; Frank E. Millar and L. Edna Rogers, "Relational Dimensions of Interpersonal Dynamics," in Explorations

in Interpersonal Communication, 2nd ed., eds. Michael E. Roloff and Gerald R. Miller (Beverly Hills: Sage, in press). These works attempt to explicate three basic dimensions of interpersonal relationships--control, trust and intimacy. Each dimension is conceived of as a distance (which itself is a relationship) that is regulated by and through participation in communicative dynamics. Thus, the theoretical focus of this approach is a delineation of the relationships between patterns of relationships as manifested in message performances. To date, the control dimension has been the primary focus of empirical investigations.

⁴⁴Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin and Donald D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York: Norton, 1967); Paul Watzlawick, How Real is Real? (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); Paul Watzlawick and John H. Weakland, eds., The Interactional View: Studies at the Mental Research Institute, Palo Alto, 1965-1974 (New York: Norton, 1977); Carol Wilder, "The Palo Alto Group: Difficulties and Directions of the Interactional View for Human Communication Research," Human Communication Research, 5 (1979), pp. 171-186; Carol Wilder-Mott and John H. Weakland, eds., Rigor and Imagination: Essays from the Legacy of Gregory Bateson (New York: Praeger, 1982).

⁴⁵Gregory Bateson, "Information and Codification: A Philosophical Approach," in Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry, Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 209.

⁴⁶Maruyama, p. 43.

⁴⁷Maruyama, p. 43.

⁴⁸Wilden, p. 218. See also, Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine, 1972); Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (New York: Dutton, 1979).

⁴⁹Gregory Bateson, "Afterword," in About Bateson, John Brockman, ed. (New York: Dutton, 1977), p. 239.

⁵⁰Bateson, 1972, p. 461.

⁵¹Bateson, 1977, p. 243.

⁵²Frank E. Millar and Janet B. Bavelas, "The Pragmatic/Interactional Perspective on Communication," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Honolulu, 1985, p. 7.

⁵³Wilden, p. 456.

⁵⁴Wilden, p. 456.

⁵⁵Wilden, p. 194.

⁵⁶Wilden, p. 168.

⁵⁷Wilden, p. 168.

⁵⁸Wilden, p. 164.

⁵⁹Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

⁶⁰Wilden, p. 185. Wilden asserts that "the introduction of 'not' into an analog continuum is a necessary (but perhaps not a sufficient) condition for natural language" (p. 189); he also states that "syntactic negation does not necessarily involve more than distinction, and includes levels of relation" (p. 188). Thus, since signification is restricted to the "denotative and concept-transferral operations of digital system," it may or may not be concerned with actual ecological relations (e.g., analog meaning) and "can create its own context" (p. 184), he seems unnecessarily cautious by not claiming that the negative is a sufficient condition for the emergence of a symbolic language.

⁶¹Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric (Prospect Heights, ILL: Waveland, 1985), p. 173.

⁶²For an extensive set of references about Burke's discussion of the negative see Foss, Foss, and Trapp, p. 173.

⁶³Jacob Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 38.

⁶⁴Bronowski, p. 37. The sentences of animal communication (and of human infants?) are related to the messages-in-circuitry within which they are performed by metonymy. When the word fell out of the sentence, words became combinatorial units of the code related to themselves by metaphor (substitution). As Wilden states: "The original dictionary is a dictionary of messages; it is replaced by a dictionary of the code" (p. 174).

⁶⁵Wilden, p. 193.

⁶⁶Burke, 1966, p. 16.

⁶⁷Bronowski, p. 38.

⁶⁸Douglas R. Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 6.

⁶⁹Hofstadter, p. 6. For further discussion of reflexivity, see Douglas R. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

⁷⁰George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 134.

⁷¹Bronowski, pp. 34-39.

⁷²Julian Jaynes, The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 66. See also: Bronowski, 1978; Mead, 1934; Ken Wilber, The Spectrum of Consciousness (Wheaton, ILL: Quest, 1977);

Frank E. Millar, "Communication and Consciousness: Measuring the Maps of Maya," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Speech Communication Association, Fresno, 1985.

- 73 Bronowski, p. 84.
- 74 Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). The reasoning of mathematics, of course, is deductive which "by its very nature, guarantees the truth of what is deduced" (p. 4) if the self-evident axioms on which such metonymic chains of reasoning are based are true. Godel's incompleteness theorem, however, proved that the fundamental axioms or logical principles upon which mathematics is based "could not prove the consistency of mathematics"; the notion that there is a method of reasoning which guarantees infallible truths "is a grand illusion" (p. 6). Mathematics is a digital system of codification that can create its own context and, therefore, is concerned with signification which may or may not be related to analog meaning. Any translation from the digital to the analog is necessarily limited and metaphorical; the criteria for judging the merits of such translations are utility and aesthetics, not truth.
- 75 Wilden, p. 121; Wilber, p. 234.
- 76 Burko, 1966, p. 16.
- 77 Robert Fischer, "The Making of Reality," Journal of the Altered States of Consciousness, 3 (1977), pp. 371-389. See also Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, 4th ed. (Lakeville, CT.: The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., 1958).
- 78 Vernon E. Cronen, Kenneth M. Johnson, and John W. Lannaman, "Paradoxes, Double Binds, and Reflexive Loops: An Alternative Theoretical Perspective," Family Process, 20 (1982), p. 94.
- 79 Carol Wilder-Mott, "Rigor and Imagination," in Wilder-Mott and Weakland, p. 40.
- 80 Bateson, 1972, pp. 275-276.
- 81 Bateson, 1968, p. 209.
- 82 Wilden, p. 356.
- 83 Wilden, p. 110.
- 84 Reddy, p. 288.
- 85 Wilden, p. 111.
- 86 Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 210-222. These authors state that the objectivism myth "is unable to give a satisfactory account of human understanding" and, therefore, is similarly inadequate for analyzing the following "issues which require such an account" (p. 222): the human conceptual system and the nature of human rationality; human language and communication; the

social sciences; ethical and aesthetic values; scientific understandings; and the ways in which the foundations of mathematics might serve as a basis for human understanding. The issues itemized, of course, are exactly the ones making up the focus of our discipline.

- 87 Wilden, p. 111. See also Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, pp. 54-59.
- 88 Wilden, p. 111.
- 89 Reddy, pp. 292-297. In contrast to the conduit metaphor, the toolmaker's paradigm expects that misunderstanding, partial understanding, and deviant readings of the same text are inherent in the communication system. The focus of explanation in human interaction, then, is understanding, not misunderstanding, and that requires effort. The toolmaker's paradigm "makes it plain that...there is no culture at all unless it is reconstructed carefully and painstakingly in the living brains of each new generation" (p. 309).
- 90 Wheelwright, p. 72.
- 91 Bateson, 1979, p. 211.
- 92 Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in William H. Rueckert, ed., Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 460.
- 93 Foss, Foss and Trapp, p. 174.
- 94 Ernest Beck, The Denial of Death (New York: Free Press, 1983).
- 95 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: New Republic, 1935), p. 228.
- 96 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
- 97 Burke, 1935, p. 228.
- 98 Capra, pp. 15-16.
- 99 Capra, p. 16.
- 100 Wilden, p. 213.
- 101 Paul Watzlawick, The Situation is Hopeless, But Not Serious: The Pursuit of Unhappiness (New York: Norton, 1983).
- 102 Kline, p. 6.
- 103 Burke, 1935, p. 229.
- 104 Bateson, 1972, p. 462.
- 105 Wilden, p. 456.
- 106 Capra, p. 15.
- 107 Capra, p. 16.

- 108 Bateson, 1979, p. 209.
109 Wilden, p. 213.
110 Foss, Foss and Trapp, p. 115.
111 Foss, Foss and Trapp, p. 117.
112 Foss, Foss and Trapp, p. 111.
113 Foss, Foss and Trapp, p. 106.

ARGUMENTATION, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PERSUASION, AND THE PROCESS(ES)
OF COMPLIANCE GAINING MESSAGE USE

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Courses in argumentation, interpersonal communication, and persuasion have little overlapping content. However one might define the field of argumentation, there would be considerable agreement on one point. Argumentation has as one of its concerns the study of reason-giving behavior. There would also be substantial agreement that interpersonal communication is, among other things, the study of intimate, as contrasted with non-intimate, relationships. A primary focus of the study of persuasion is the effect of messages designed to change attitudes, behavior, and the like. Given these characterizations it is not difficult to understand why there is little common content in courses representing these three areas of communication study.

Nevertheless, communication problems are not always so polite as to respect our intradisciplinary boundaries. Rather, some problems intersect what we commonly consider discrete areas of inquiry. The successful solution of such problems requires that the corpus of knowledge from all pertinent bodies of theory and research be examined.

Understanding persons' compliance gaining message use behavior is such a communication problem. Specifically, compliance gaining message use experiments demand that either experimenters or participants generate lists of compliance gaining messages. Such behavior is reason-giving behavior, and therefore, must be a concern of argumentation scholars. Moreover, the use of compliance gaining messages is expected to have an impact on the health of the persuader-persuadee relationship, and therefore, must be a concern of interpersonal communication scholars. In fact, such a concern stimulated early compliance gaining message use studies. For example, Miller, Boater, Roloff, and Seibold write,

... one might expect that some strategies used in noninterpersonal transactions would be chosen, at most, infrequently in interpersonal relationships. For instance, strategies grounded in punishment are a fairly common persuasive commodity in brief noninterpersonal confrontations. By contrast, choice of such strategies in ongoing interpersonal transactions could result in emotional scars which would threaten the stability and health of the relationship.¹

Furthermore, a compliance gaining message may be construed as an appeal. While the impact of appeals on the persuasion process has long been studied, the lists generated, both by participants and experimenters, contain appeals the effects of which have not yet been ascertained. They must, therefore, be of concern to persuasion scholars.

While the insights of argumentation scholars, interpersonal communication scholars, and persuasion scholars have already produced some theoretical and empirical fruit, there remains much to understand concerning compliance gaining message use. And, the cooperative and coordinated effort of scholars of argumentation, interpersonal communication, and persuasion are necessary to increase that understanding. In this paper the state of knowledge concerning compliance gaining message use will be explored. In so doing gaps in knowledge will become apparent. These gaps are not considered deficiencies, but rather as opportunities; areas of study in which students of argumentation, interpersonal communication, and persuasion have the potential to contribute knowledge-generating insights.

Dimensionality of Compliance Gaining Message Selection

Although several methods of studying compliance gaining message use behavior have been developed, the most prevalent procedure is one developed by Marwell and Schmitt.² Based upon a thorough review of compliance literature, they compiled a list of 16 compliance gaining message strategies.³ Subsequently, they constructed a number of hypothetical compliance gaining situations, and used the 16 compliance gaining message strategies to generate 16 compliance gaining messages specific to each compliance gaining situation. Participants received both the hypothetical compliance gaining situation and the list of 16 compliance gaining messages. Their task was to rate how likely they would be to use each of the compliance gaining messages in each of the particular compliance gaining situations.

The central concern of this experiment was to find the dimensions of participants' responses to these compliance gaining messages. This issue is basic to any further study of the compliance gaining message use process, since the variable(s) that underlies (underlie) persons' responses to these compliance gaining messages must be identified before the antecedents and/or consequents of these responses can be ascertained.

Thus, Marwell and Schmitt factor analyzed their data, and found a five factor solution. Subsequent studies also produced multidimensional solutions,⁴ but interestingly there was little consistency in these results. The number of factors obtained varied across studies, and the content of the factors varied substantially as well.

These inconsistencies led Hunter and Boster⁵ to perform reanalyses of the Marwell and Schmitt data, the Miller et al. data, and the Kaminski et al. data. They found these data to be unidimensional. They showed that nonlinear item characteristic curves produced nonlinear relations among responses to each pair of compliance gaining strategies, and that this nonlinearity produced the spurious multidimensional factors found by other investigators.

The implications of these reanalyses are, at minimum, two fold. First, when investigating the antecedents and consequents of compliance gaining message use, the best indicator of the latent trait which underlies these responses is the sum of participants' responses to all compliance gaining messages. Second, the need to determine the substantive nature of this latent trait is emphasized. Some have argued that this trait is empathy.⁶

Others have speculated that the dimension is verbal aggression.⁷ Recent work by Infante, Trebing, Shepherd, and Seeds⁸ suggests the possibility that the variable is argumentativeness. Regardless, all of these suggestions are speculative, and it remains for validation studies to identify this dimension.

The Content of Compliance Gaining Messages

Marwell and Schmitt generated their list of compliance gaining message strategies by reviewing the compliance literature. This technique has been termed a "deductive" approach. Other researchers have generated lists of compliance gaining message strategies inductively.⁹ Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin characterize this approach in the following manner,

... the strategies constructed by subjects for particular persuasive situations are examined, patterns or generalizations among the data are discovered, and these patterns form the bases for the category scheme.¹⁰

For example, Falbo generated a list of compliance gaining strategies by having undergraduates write an essay entitled, "How I Get My Way". Raters coded these responses into 16 categories; the categories being constructed a posteriori.¹¹

Some have claimed that inductively-derived lists are more reliable and valid than deductively-derived lists.¹² Despite some minor differences, however, the content of the various lists is remarkably homogeneous.¹³ Moreover, in a recent paper Boater, Stiff, and Reynolds¹⁴ show that persons' responses to both the Marwell and Schmitt list and the Schenck-Hamlin et al. list have the same unidimensional factor structure. They also show that the correlation between responses to the two lists is approximately 1.00 when corrected for attenuation due to error of measurement. These data suggest strongly that both lists measure a common underlying trait. Given the similarities in content, it is not unlikely that other lists would produce the same results.

While the various lists have not differed substantially, the variable(s) measured by the different procedures may differ. The deductive method requires that persons select among a number of alternative messages which are provided by the experimenter(s). Some inductive procedures, such as Clark's,¹⁵ require that persons generate compliance gaining messages, and then perhaps select from their self-generated list. These two processes, generation and selection, may measure different characteristics of persons. But, only carefully designed validation studies can clarify this issue.

Despite the homogeneity of the existing lists of compliance gaining message strategies, it does not follow that the generation of additional lists is to be avoided. To the contrary, it is evident that there are a number of compliance gaining message strategies that have gone untapped by those who have produced such lists. For example, no existing list contains sequential strategies, such as the foot-in-the-door or the door-in-the-face strategies.

A benefit of incorporating additional strategies in compliance gaining experiments is that the factor structure of these data may be altered, and

the additional dimensions would provide more information potentially useful in predicting compliance gaining behavior. In order to compile a list of additional strategies, however, it may be necessary to update Marwell and Schmitt's literature review. Another potentially fruitful method of generating additional strategies involves interviewing compliance professionals in order to discern the strategies that they use in their work.

Typically, compliance gaining message use experiments have employed and/or analyzed lists of compliance gaining messages. Such experiments have, in the main, been role-playing experiments. A few studies have, however, employed related, but different types of, measures.

For example, Boster and Stiff¹⁶ noted whether participants requested more points, less points, or made no request of a confederate on an anagram task in which points were applied to course credit. Both Boster¹⁷ and Boster and Lofthouse¹⁸ measured speaking time, number of reasons given, and the number of prods to which the participants responded during attempts to persuade a confederate to participate in an experiment and an instructor to give a particular grade.

The former measure produced results similar to those produced by responses to the Marwell and Schmitt procedure.¹⁹ The latter three measures are highly correlated with one another, and are consistent with the hypothesis that they are indicators of a common underlying trait. This trait appears to be a different one than that tapped by responses to the Marwell and Schmitt list, since Boster found responses to the Marwell and Schmitt list to be uncorrelated with an index formed from the three behavioral indicators ($r = .02$).²⁰

Situational Determinants

Communication scholars have attended carefully to features of the compliance gaining situation in order to predict respondents' compliance gaining message use. The effects of five situational characteristics have received scrutiny, although the attention paid to one of these variables has been sparse.

Several experiments have examined the impact of the intimacy of the persuader-listener relationship on compliance gaining message use.²¹ Additionally, several experiments have studied the effect of the duration of relational consequences on compliance gaining message behavior.²² All of these experiments employed a Marwell and Schmitt procedure. While statistically significant relationships between these situational characteristics and compliance gaining message selection have been reported, generally the strength of these effects is negligible.²³ Moreover, even the weak correlations which are typically reported may be attributable to confounding situational effects with specific message content.²⁴

Clark found that self interest was a powerful predictor of compliance gaining message generation, but not compliance gaining message selection.²⁵ The latter result was replicated by both Hunter and Boster and Williams and Boster.²⁶ While Boster and Stiff found a strong self interest effect on

their behavioral measure,²⁷ neither Boster²⁸ nor Boster and Lofthouse²⁹ obtained a self interest effect on their behavioral index. In sum, the self interest data are mixed, and a plausible explanation for the variance across experiments is that different dependent measures produce different effects. Self interest appears to have no impact on compliance gaining message selection and no impact on measures of speaking frequency, number of reasons, and responses to prods. On the other hand, there is some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that self interest has an effect on compliance gaining message generation.

Hunter and Boster³⁰ report that the variable, benefit to the listener, is a strong predictor of compliance gaining message selection. But differently, respondents go to greater lengths to persuade another for what is perceived to be that other's "own good". This result has been replicated by Williams and Boater.³¹ Moreover, Boster and Stiff found that benefit to the listener had a strong impact on their behavioral measure.³² On the other hand, neither Boster³³ nor Boster and Lofthouse³⁴ found that benefit to the listener affected their three item behavioral index. Hence, these data are mixed, and the variance in the results may be attributed to the difference in dependent measures. Data are consistent with the hypothesis that benefit to the listener has an impact on compliance gaining message selection. It has no effect, however, on speaking frequency, number of reasons, and responses to prods.

Clark³⁵ varied whether respondents liked or disliked the target of the compliance gaining attempt. She found that liking had an impact on message generation, but that it had no impact on message selection. Since it is premature to draw firm conclusions from a single study, these results must be held in abeyance pending replication, or lack thereof.

It is interesting to note that, although there has been ample interest in situational determinants of compliance gaining message use, the effects of only five situational variables have been assessed. Clearly, there is a need for further research in this area. Pertinent to this issue, Cody and McLaughlin³⁶ asked participants to rate compliance gaining situations for similarity/dissimilarity, and subjected these data to a multidimensional scaling algorithm. They found that their participants distinguished six dimensions. The impact of some of these dimensions on compliance gaining message use has been assessed; the impact of other dimensions has not. While the fact that respondents distinguished certain dimensions does not imply that these dimensions will have an effect on compliance gaining message use, and while the fact that respondents did not distinguish certain dimensions does not imply that such dimensions do not have an impact on compliance gaining message use, the Cody and McLaughlin dimensions would provide an excellent starting point for future research.

Individual Difference Determinants

Communication scholars have also assessed the impact of certain individual difference variables on compliance gaining message use. Several such variables have received considerable attention.

In a number of compliance gaining message selection experiments neither

empathy³⁷ nor communication apprehension³⁸ have correlated substantially with the criterion variable(s). Furthermore, communication apprehension had no impact either on Stiff's³⁹ behavioral measure or Boster's⁴⁰ behavioral measure. It did correlate positively and substantially, however, with Boster and Lofthouse's⁴¹ behavioral measure. An aspect of the experimental designs may account for these paradoxical results. In both the Stiff experiment and the Boster experiment communication between the persuader and the listener was mediated; via intercom in the former experiment, and via telephone in the latter experiment. Conversely, in the Boster and Lofthouse experiment the persuader and the listener engaged in a face-to-face encounter. Consequently, a plausible hypothesis to explain these data is that a face-to-face encounter is necessary to raise the anxiety of high communication apprehensives sufficiently to distinguish their behavior from low communication apprehensives.

Both dogmatism⁴² and negativism,⁴³ a dimension of Christie and Geis's⁴⁴ Mach IV scale, have been found to correlate positively and substantially with compliance gaining message selection. Dogmatism also correlated highly with one of Boster and Stiff's two criterion measures.⁴⁵ Yet, it was a trivial predictor of both Boster's⁴⁶ and Boster and Lofthouse's⁴⁷ behavioral index. Therefore, the bulk of the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that dogmatism is not a strong predictor of the behavioral measures. These data suggest the possibility that the responses to the compliance gaining message selection instrument measure a different underlying trait than the behavioral measure(s), a result consistent with Boster's data.⁴⁸

The negativism results are more complex. Negativism was found to be a strong predictor of both of Boster and Stiff's dependent measures,⁴⁹ and a strong predictor of Boster's behavioral index.⁵⁰ But, negativism did not correlate substantially with the Boster and Lofthouse behavioral index.⁵¹ The Boster and Stiff experiment and the Boster experiment differ from the Boster and Lofthouse experiment in at least one important way. The latter involves a status difference between the persuader and the listener, the listener being an instructor and the persuader being a student; whereas, the former two experiments involve relations between peers. Thus, the usual tendency of the highly negative participant to be more persistent is blunted when dealing with a higher status target. Perhaps the more strategic highly negative subject intentionally behaves in a more subdued manner so as not to alienate the target, thus making the highly negative subject's behavior similar to the low negativism subject.

Finally, in compliance gaining message generation experiments cognitive complexity has been shown to be an important predictor of compliance gaining message outcomes.⁵² Interestingly, however, there has been little "cross-over" research. As with situational determinants, those students of compliance gaining message selection have ignored the variables examined by students of compliance gaining message generation, and those students of compliance gaining message generation have ignored the variables examined by students of compliance gaining message selection. It is for future research to fill this lacunae, as well as to examine the impact of other important individual difference variables, such as argumentativeness, on both compliance gaining message selection and compliance gaining message generation.

The Dynamics of Compliance Gaining Message Behavior

The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide an integrated view of the preceding research fragments. A summary to guide this discussion is presented in Figure 1.

The left side of this diagram posits that the situational variables and the individual difference variables are causally antecedent to certain traits characteristic of respondents. Put differently, persons' responses to the Marwell and Schmitt list (as well as other lists), their reactions to the Clark interviewing procedure, and their behavioral outcomes all indicate something about them. For example, verbal aggression may cause subjects to select or reject various Marwell and Schmitt messages, and it may be argumentativeness which causes persons to talk more or less frequently, give more or less reasons, and respond to more or less prods in the Boster and Lofthouse experiment.

Situational exigencies and individual differences may make persons more or less verbally aggressive, thereby affecting their responses to the Marwell and Schmitt items. Similarly, situational exigencies and individual differences may affect how argumentative one is likely to be, thereby affecting how long one speaks, how many reasons one gives, and so on. It is conceivable, and even probable given the data, that certain situational/individual difference variables affect one trait, but not others. For example, benefit to the listener may largely determine how verbally aggressive one is likely to be, but it may be irrelevant to predicting argumentativeness. In addition, communication apprehension may affect how argumentative one will be under certain conditions, but it may not affect verbal aggression. But, of course, these suggestions are speculative, and it is clear that a good deal of research must be performed in order to clarify the nature of these causal links.

Next, the diagram asserts that the traits, indicated by responses to the various compliance gaining procedures, exert a causal impact on compliance gaining message behavior. Consider, for example, how verbal aggression and argumentativeness could be combined to yield information concerning compliance gaining message behavior. For heuristic purposes suppose that these two variables are dichotomies. One might then predict that a subject low in both traits would make a simple request when in a compliance gaining situation; whereas, a subject high in both traits would advance a number of arguments which vary substantially in affective impact. A subject high in verbal aggression and low in argumentativeness would send one message, a threat; whereas, a subject low in verbal aggression and high in argumentativeness would advance a number of arguments, but they would be primarily positive in affective impact. Knowledge of additional pertinent traits would make predictions more specific. For example, a subject low in verbal aggression, high in argumentativeness, and highly dogmatic would advance a spate of positive arguments, but there might be more repetition than would be exhibited by a low dogmatic subject with corresponding levels of verbal aggression and argumentativeness.

Conceivably, knowing a sufficient number of traits would allow one to predict exactly what persons would say in a given compliance gaining

situation. In the last analysis such a hope may be overly sanguine. Predicting exactly what another will say in a compliance gaining situation may be akin to the fabled physical scientist trying to predict the exact path that a leaf will traverse on its way to the ground in the autumn. Nevertheless, one should be able to predict the general type of thing that persons would say with knowledge of a sufficient number of pertinent traits. Again, it must be emphasized that a considerable amount of data is necessary to find these relevant traits, and to specify the relationship between them and compliance gaining message behavior.

Finally, on the right side of the diagram compliance gaining message behavior is said to be causally antecedent to both relational development and persuasion. As mentioned in the introduction both interpersonal communication scholars and persuasion scholars have taken the position that the kind of compliance gaining message one employs has an impact both on the success of relationships and on success in getting another to do what one wants that other to do.

While these issues are a bit beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that while there has been considerable research concerning the effect of certain appeals on attitude change, the effects of many of the appeals found in the various compliance gaining message use experiments have not been tested. Moreover, with few exceptions there has been little study of how the type of compliance gaining message used has impacted upon specified relationships. Therefore, there is also much research to be done before these links are clarified.

Implications for Future Research

Numerous avenues for future research have been mentioned, and hypotheses have been alluded to, in the preceding paragraphs. In this section these issues will not be restated. Rather, selected research programs tailored to the skills of argumentation scholars, interpersonal communication scholars, and persuasion scholars will be discussed in turn.

The concerns of argumentation scholars are most likely to be found in the middle of Figure 1. Armed with an arsenal of knowledge of reason-giving behavior argumentation scholars are equipped to attack problems of the lack of both exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness in lists of compliance gaining strategies. Furthermore, trait validation problems, such as what responses to the Marwell and Schmitt list indicate, and studying the links between traits and compliance gaining behavior fall well within the purview of argumentation researchers. While this list does not by any means exhaust the contributions that could be made by argumentation scholars, e.g., they undoubtedly would be adroit at adding to the list of compliance gaining situations, it best represents the core of expertise and interest among those experts in argument.

Both interpersonal communication scholars and persuasion scholars have special interest and expertise in the right side of Figure 1. The former are able to make important contributions in analyzing the relationships between the particular compliance gaining messages which are uttered, and the subsequent effects on relational development. The latter are able to assess the

impact of several untested appeals on attitude change, behavioral intentions, behavior change, etc.

Additionally, persons from all areas have special abilities which would contribute to clarifying the left side of the diagram. All areas have identified situational characteristics and individual difference variables pertinent to their research interests. This information is likely to be of importance in predicting the traits indicated by responses to lists of compliance gaining messages, responses to interviews, and behavioral responses.

In conclusion, given the view of the problems arising from the study of compliance gaining message use, it is clear that solutions to these problems require considerable intradisciplinary effort. It will indeed be necessary to replace intradisciplinary rivalry with intradisciplinary rapprochement in order to make progress in this area of communication inquiry.

NOTES

¹Gerald R. Miller, Franklin J. Boster, Michael E. Roloff, and David R. Seibold, "Compliance-Gaining Message Strategies: A Typology and Some Findings Concerning Effects of Situational Differences," Communication Monographs, 44 (1977), 38.

²Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: An Empirical Analysis," Sociometry, 30 (1967), 350-364.

³See Marwell and Schmitt, pp. 357-358.

⁴For example, see Edmund Kaminski, Steven T. McDermott, and Franklin J. Boster, "The Use of Compliance-Gaining Strategies as a Function of Machiavellianism and Situation," Central States Speech Association Convention, Southfield, Michigan, April 1977; Miller et al.; Michael E. Roloff and Edwin F. Barnicott Jr., "The Situational Use of Pro- and Anti-Social Compliance Gaining Strategies by High and Low Machiavellians," in Communication Yearbook II, ed. by Brent D. Ruben (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 193-205; and Michael E. Roloff and Edwin F. Barnicott Jr., "The Influence of Dogmatism on the Situational Use of Pro- and Anti-Social Compliance-Gaining Strategies," The Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45 (1979), 37-54.

⁵John E. Hunter and Franklin J. Boster, "An Empathy Model of Compliance-Gaining Strategy Selection," Speech Communication Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, November 1978.

⁶Hunter and Boster.

⁷James P. Dillard and Michael Burgoon, "Situational Influences on the Selection of Compliance-Gaining Messages: Two Years of the Predictive Utility of the Cody-McLaughlin Typology," Communication Monographs, in press.

⁸Dominic A. Infante, J. David Trebing, Patricia E. Shepherd, and Dale E. Seeds, "The Relationship of Argumentativeness to Verbal Aggression," The Southern Speech Communication Journal, 50 (1984), 67-77.

⁹Toni Falbo, "Multidimensional Scaling of Power Strategies," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35 (1977), 537-547; Ruth Anne Clark, "The Impact of Self Interest and Desire for Liking on the Selection of Communicative Strategies," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 257-273; Michael J. Cody, Margaret L. McLaughlin, and William Jordan, "A multidimensional Scaling of Three Sets of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," Communication Quarterly, 28 (1980), 34-46; and William J. Schenck-Hamlin, Richard L. Wiseman, and G.N. Georgarakos, "A Model of Properties of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," Communication Quarterly, 30 (1982), 92-100.

¹⁰Richard L. Wiseman and William Schenck-Hamlin, "A Multidimensional Scaling Validation of an Inductively-Derived Set of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," Communication Monographs, 48 (1981), 252.

¹¹Several of Falbo's compliance gaining strategies do not involve the use of verbal messages. Some other inductively-derived lists share this feature.

¹²Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin, pp. 253-255.

¹³While the verbal labels given to strategies by different authors do differ, the nature of the appeals is similar. Such a result is not overly surprising. It is unlikely that undergraduate students would generate a spate of strategies that had been overlooked by social scientists who have made a career of studying compliance. On the other hand, certain compliance professionals, such as salespersons, are likely to generate strategies unknown to both undergraduate students and social scientists. See, for example, Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: How and Why People Agree to Things, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984). Unfortunately, such persons have not been employed as subjects in compliance gaining message use experiments.

¹⁴Franklin J. Boster, James B. Stiff, and Rodney A. Reynolds, "Do Persons Respond Differently to Inductively-Derived and Deductively-Derived Lists of Compliance Gaining Message Strategies," International Communication Association Convention, Dallas, Texas, May 1983.

¹⁵Clark,

¹⁶Franklin J. Boster and James B. Stiff, "Compliance-Gaining Message Selection Behavior," Human Communication Research, 10 (1984), 539-556.

¹⁷Franklin J. Boster, "The Impact of Self Interest, Other Interest, and Relevant Personality Traits on Indicators of Argumentativeness," Unpublished Manuscript, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, January 1985.

¹⁸Franklin J. Boster and Lynn J. Lofthouse, "Not Just Another Investigation Into Compliance Gaining," Unpublished Manuscript, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, May 1985.

¹⁹Put differently, with some minor exceptions situational difference variables and individual difference variables correlated similarly with both measures.

²⁰Boster.

²¹Kaminski et al.; Miller et al.; Roloff and Barnicott, 1978; Roloff and Barnicott, 1979; Alan L. Sillars, "The Stranger and the Spouse as Target Persons for Compliance-Gaining Strategies: A Subjective Expected Utility Model," Human Communication Research, 6 (1980), 265-279.

²²Kaminski et al.; Miller et al.; Roloff and Barnicott, 1978; Roloff and Barnicott, 1979; Myron W. Lustig and Steven W. King, "The Effect of Communication Apprehension and Situation on Communication Strategy Choice," Human Communication Research, 7 (1980), 74-82.

²³John E. Hunter and Franklin J. Boster, "Situational Differences in the Selection of Compliance-Gaining Messages," Speech Communication Association Convention, San Antonio, Texas, November 1979.

²⁴Sally Jackson and Dencil Backus, "Are Compliance-Gaining Strategies Dependent on Situational Variables?" The Central States Speech Journal, 33 (1982), 469-479.

²⁵Clark.

²⁶Hunter and Boster, 1979; DeLann L. Williams and Franklin J. Boster, "The Effects of Beneficial Situational Characteristics, Negativism, and Dogmatism on Compliance-Gaining Message Selection," International Communication Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 1981.

²⁷Boster and Stiff.

²⁸Boster.

²⁹Boster and Lofthouse.

³⁰Hunter and Boster, 1979.

³¹Williams and Boster.

³²Boster and Stiff.

³³Boster.

³⁴Boster and Lofthouse.

³⁵Clark.

³⁶Michael J. Cody and Margaret L. McLaughlin, "Perceptions of Compliance-Gaining Situations: A Dimensional Analysis," Communication Monographs, 47 (1980), 132-148.

³⁷DeLann L. Williams, The Effects of Beneficial Situational Characteristics, Negativism, and Dogmatism on Compliance-Gaining Message Selection, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, December 1980; James B. Stiff, A Behavioral Study of Compliance-Gaining Message Use, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, December 1981; James P. Dillard, John E. Hunter, Michael Burgoon, Franklin J. Boster, and James B. Stiff, "An Empirical Test of the Empathy Model of Compliance Gaining Message Selection," International Communication Association Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 1985.

³⁸Lustig and King; Williams; Stiff.

³⁹Stiff.

⁴⁰Boster.

⁴¹Boster and Lofthouse.

⁴²Roloff and Barnicott, 1979; Williams and Boater; Boster and Stiff.

⁴³Kaminski et al.; Roloff and Barnicott, 1978; Williams and Boster; Boster and Stiff.

⁴⁴Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism, (New York: Academic Press, 1970).

⁴⁵Boster and Stiff.

⁴⁶Boster.

⁴⁷Boster and Lofthouse.

⁴⁸Boster.

⁴⁹Boster and Stiff.


⁵⁰Boster.

⁵¹Boster and Lofthouse.

⁵²Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, "The Development of Functional Persuasive Skills in Childhood and Early Adolescence," Child Development, 47 (1976), 1008-1014; Jesse G. Delia, Susan L. Kline, and Brant R. Bureson, "The Development of Persuasive Communication Strategies in Kindergarteners Through Twelfth-Graders," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 241-256; Barbara J. O'Keefe and Jesse G. Delia, "Construct Comprehensiveness and Cognitive Complexity as Predictors of the Number and Strategic Adaptation of Arguments and Appeals in a Persuasive Message," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 231-240.

FIGURE 1.

AN OUTLINE OF THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE GAINING MESSAGE BEHAVIOR



THE ROLE OF ARGUMENTATION IN SOURCE CREDIBILITY

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Introduction

Ever since Aristotle advanced his justly-famous tripartite division of rhetoric into ethos, pathos, and pragma (or logos),¹ source credibility has been assumed to be distinct from argumentation. Herbert C. Kelman reinforced this assumption through his theory of the three processes of persuasion: compliance, identification, and internalization.² When considered simply from the standpoint of message variables, there are indeed clear distinctions between source credibility and argumentation, as research by Kelman and others documents.³ However, when we adopt the increasingly popular view that the receiver or audience is an important aspect of the rhetorical or persuasive process, we discover that argumentation plays a central role in social influence through communication.

One of the earliest theorists to recognize the importance of audience argumentation (although he did not advance his views in quite this fashion) is William J. McGuire.⁴ Inoculation theory, which employs a medical metaphor to conceptualize the process of creating resistance to persuasion from one's opponents, argues that for an audience to be maximally resistant to persuasion, they must be motivated (by threat or forewarning of the impending attack) and trained (either by example or practice) to refute the arguments of opponents. One particularly interesting result is the so-called "paper-tiger" effect: the defense which produces the greatest amount of immediate attitude change produces the least resistance to counter-persuasion. Hence, it appears that the determinant of resistance to persuasive attacks is not necessarily the strength of the receivers' attitude prior to the attack but their motivation and ability to generate arguments against opponents' messages.

The cognitive response model⁵ provides a systematic approach to this conception of the role of audience argumentation in persuasion, and will provide the theoretic framework for the subsequent analysis. This essay argues that, just as active receiver involvement in the form of counter-argument production determines resistance to persuasive attacks, so too does audience argumentation determine the effectiveness of source credibility appeals, traditionally assumed to be outside the realm of argumentation (or ancillary at best). Accordingly, the following section will discuss the cognitive response model, which will then be employed to elucidate the nature of the relationship between source credibility and argumentation.

The Cognitive Response Model

The basic tenet of this perspective on persuasion is that receivers actively participate in influence attempts, producing cognitions (thoughts) in response to the stimulus provided by the persuasive communication. These thoughts are arguments which either support or refute the speaker's position (audience thoughts can also be irrelevant to the message). Just as the notion of "attitude" is a mediating variable between persuasive communication and behavior, so too "cognitive response" is a mediating variable between persuasive communication and attitude change.

Greenwald indicates that research has failed to establish high correlations between learning (retention) of message content and persuasion.⁶ Love and Greenwald confirm this conclusion and report that both immediate and delayed attitude change correlate with the audience's cognitive responses.⁷ Other evidence also demonstrates that an individual's cognitive responses to persuasive communication are a significant determinant of persuasion.⁸ Cacioppo, Harkins, and Petty point out that additional support for the cognitive response approach includes studies which report that

manipulations that affect cognitive responses also affect persuasion (Calder, et al., 1974; Petty et al., 1976; Roberts & Maccoby, 1971) and... implementation of statistical procedures to assess causal orderings of cognitive responses and persuasion has indicated that cognitive response may have mediated yielding to persuasion (e.g., Greenwald, 1968b; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970) but that the reverse causal ordering was not operating (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979a, 1979b; Petty & Cacioppo, 1977).⁹

Therefore, audience-generated supportive and refutative arguments (cognitive responses to persuasive communication) play a key role in mediating the persuasion process.

This is not to claim that message content or arguments are unimportant to persuasion. The claim advanced here is that attitude change is mediated by the audiences' thoughts. If an idea is not cognitively available to the receiver, it can not be expected to have persuasive impact. The persuasive message provides a) the stimulus for development of the receivers' supportive and counter arguments, b) information useful in developing those arguments as well as c) illustrative examples of supportive and/or refutative arguments. Petty and Cacioppo report that under high involvement conditions, strong message arguments create more supportive and less refutative thoughts (audience arguments) than weak message arguments, one indication that content is an important factor influencing cognitive responses.¹⁰ Furthermore, while some studies report that audience arguments which cannot be directly traced to the message are the cognitive

responses which most influence attitude change,¹¹ others indicate that audience thoughts which can be traced to the message are most effective.¹² Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty offer the reasonable suggestion that on topics upon which the audience is knowledgeable, the former might be expected to be more effective, while on topics that the audience knows little there is no alternative but to rely on the ideas and information in the message.¹³

The cognitive response model has several important points in its favor. First, for theorists who reject the "hypodermic needle" model of persuasion (i.e., the advocate "injects" the audience with a persuasive message which forces them to change their attitudes), it posits an important and active role for the receiver. Second, it provides explanations for results which are difficult to account for otherwise (for example the curious finding that distraction may increase the persuasiveness of a message, discussed below). Third, because it introduces a new mediating variable (rather than simply positing new relationships or orientations toward existing concepts), it is compatible with existing approaches to persuasion. Petty, Ostrom, and Brock explain that it is congenial to the four major approaches to persuasion:

Each of the four traditional approaches can be discussed in cognitive response terms, although the focus of each is different. For example, a learning theorist would propose that a persuasive communication is effective to the extent that the recipients adopt the message's argument as their own cognitive responses. Perceptual theorists would be interested in how a person's pre-existing repertoire of cognitions influences the meaning given to a message. Functional theorists would expect people to have different cognitive responses to the same communication depending on how the communication relates to underlying needs. Consistency theorists would focus on the consistency or inconsistency between the responses elicited by the message and already existing cognitions.¹⁴

The major drawback to the cognitive response model is that it complicates the process of persuasion by introducing another mediating variable. However, this loss is offset by the gain in explanatory power.

For example, as just suggested, under certain conditions, distracting the audience can enhance attitude change. Petty and Brock report that 20 of 22 studies on distraction find that, at least under certain conditions, distraction enhances persuasion.¹⁵ This finding is somewhat difficult to reconcile with an approach which assumes that message content is learned by the receiver--obviously, distraction, if it influences reception, should impede it rather than facil-

itate it. However, cast into cognitive response terms, this result is perfectly understandable. In each of the seven studies of Petty and Brock's review which assessed the audience's counterargument production, distraction decreased audience counterargumentation. Thus, distraction interferes with the ability of the recipient to develop counterarguments to the speaker's position, not with reception of the message, and the lack of critical thought permits greater attitude change.

Thus, a cognitive response is a receiver-generated argument which can either support or refute the arguments of the message. Message arguments provide the stimulus for production of these audience arguments, as well as making available information and sample arguments. These receiver-generated arguments mediate attitude change, which is correlated with cognitive responses but not with recall of message content. With this conception of the cognitive response model in hand, we can turn to a discussion of source credibility.

A Cognitive Response Analysis of Source Credibility

Only one essay has presented a discussion of credibility from the cognitive response perspective.¹⁶ Unfortunately, this treatment fails to consider some of the issues addressed here. Given the claim that it is the recipient's thoughts (supportive and counter arguments) on the topic which mediate attitude change--and not simply message content as measured by recall--then for credibility to influence attitude change it must affect the cognitive processing of that message. According to this view, a source of high credibility mediates attitude change by suppressing counterargumentation. In other words, the audience is more likely to question a non-credible source than a highly credible one. Thus, high credibility functions analogously to distraction: the latter interferes with the receiver's ability to generate counterarguments, while the former reduces the receiver's motivation to generate refutative cognitive responses.

In line with this notion, Gillig and Greenwald report that more counterarguments are produced in response to message attributed to a low than a high credibility source.¹⁷ It is also consistent with Cook's finding that persuasive communications given by high credibility sources produce less counter arguments than messages with no source identified, and that such no-source messages stimulate less counterarguments than messages from sources of low credibility.¹⁸ Thus, it appears that source credibility mediates persuasion by making the audience more (or less, in the case of disreputable sources) likely to carefully scrutinize the message (i. e., generate counterarguments).

This is not to suggest that credibility is the only, or

even the most important factor in the persuasion process; only an important one. Audience involvement in the topic is an important variable in the credibility process. Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman report that on highly involving topics, message arguments produced significant attitude change, while source credibility did not.¹⁹ On uninvolved topics, both source credibility and message arguments create attitude change; but the former is more effective than the latter. It is not surprising that receivers carefully scrutinize a message on a highly salient topic even when the message is attributed to a highly credible source (deferring less to the opinions of an expert source) and that they would expend less effort examining a message on a non-salient topic (choosing instead to defer to the judgment of a source they respect). If the topic is non-salient, deference to a highly credible source permits receivers to avoid the cognitive effort entailed in developing counterarguments, while still exercising some control over yielding (i.e.; judgment of the source's expertise instead of judgment over cogency of message content).

This analysis of source credibility effects from the standpoint of the cognitive response model and audience-produced argumentation can be employed to explain several patterns of results in the work on this concept. For example, it can readily account for the finding that more attitude change occurs when the source is identified before the message than after. Ward and McGinnies found no difference in attitude change between high and low credible sources when identified after the speech (i.e.; it was too late for the knowledge that the speaker is highly credible to suppress counter-arguing in the high credibility condition).²⁰ They also report that early mention of non-credible sources was less persuasive than late mention of non-credible sources; which is consistent with the suggestion made earlier that receivers are likely to listen more critically to a source they know is suspect. The latter finding is reported by Greenberg and Miller and Husek.²¹ Similarly, Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt as well as Greenberg and Tannenbaum report that credibility has no effect on persuasion when the source is identified after the message.²² Mills and Harvey also found that expert (but not attractive) sources produce more attitude change when identified before than after the message.²³ The fact that attractive sources are just as persuasive when identified prior to than after the speech can be explained by suggesting that attractive sources are persuasive because of who they are; whereas credibility influences persuasion by affecting how critical we are likely to be of what they say.²⁴ Note that a conception of source credibility as distinct from cognitive responses (e.g., as additively or multiplicatively related to message content) cannot readily account for these results.

A cognitive response analysis of credibility can also shed light on the suggestion that extrinsic credibility

studies are more consistent than those employing the intrinsic credibility paradigm. The first, and more common approach, which Andersen and Clevenger label "extrinsic" credibility, attributes a single message to several sources with different levels of credibility. Since the actual message and its presentation remain constant, any differences in attitude change must be a function of variations in the sources' credibility. The second paradigm, Andersen and Clevenger's "intrinsic" credibility, prepares different messages and/or presentations of a message, assuming that those differences will generate differential credibility, which in turn will mediate attitude change.²⁵ Support for the former approach is generally positive.²⁶ There are exceptions to be sure (e.g., in forced compliance studies²⁷), but the literature is generally quite consistent in finding that messages attributed to high credible sources are more persuasive than those attributed to non-credible sources.²⁸

However, support for the latter, less common approach, is mixed. Use of metaphor,²⁹ and evidence,³⁰ fluency and organization,³¹ rate,³² and language diversity,³³ have all been found to enhance both credibility and attitude change. However, Thompson found that a speech might increase a speaker's credibility without increasing attitude change.³⁴ Studies on delivery,³⁵ and perceived organization,³⁶ report that these variables enhance credibility but not persuasion. Ostermeier reports that increased use of self-reference is associated with greater perceived competence, trustworthiness, and attitude change, while increased use of prestige reference increased trustworthiness but not perceived competence or attitude change.³⁷

This pattern of results is amenable to explanation by the cognitive response analysis of source credibility advocated here, which suggests that source credibility mediates attitude change by influencing audience argumentation. Hence, credibility induction must take place early enough in the message to influence processing of the message. That is to say, if perceived credibility increases early in the message, the audience will begin to be less critical of that source's ideas (that is, receivers will generate fewer counterarguments and consequently experience greater attitude change). On the other hand, if credibility is enhanced too late, the audience will already have produced sufficient counter-arguments to inhibit persuasion. Thus, the results which support the intrinsic credibility approach may well come from studies in which the source's credibility was increased early enough to inhibit much of the audience's counter-arguments, while data which do not support it could very well come from studies in which credibility was eventually increased, but not early enough to stop substantial counterarguing.

Although it is convenient to suggest that there is a "point" at which the source's credibility is enhanced, in

most cases this is probably a gradual process (e.g., with each use of evidence the audience's opinion of the source rises a bit), although no research has examined this process. Furthermore, although the claim that credibility induction must occur "early enough" is vague, it is unlikely that more specificity is possible. If there is nothing controversial in the first half of the speech, there is likely to be little counterarguing; and no need for enhanced credibility at that point in the speech. On the other hand, when the beginning is very controversial, even if credibility is increased early on in the speech it may be too late to stop the audience from developing their most effective counterarguments.

Another result which is amenable to explanation by this analysis of audience-produced argumentation is that sources of moderate credibility are, in some circumstances, more persuasive than ones of high credibility.³⁸ These results all occurred when the speaker advocated a position close to the audience's own attitude (i.e., one of low discrepancy). Sources of high credibility have been found to decrease argument production, as discussed earlier. However, one would expect that supportive arguments would be the predominant type of cognitive response to a pro-attitudinal message (small discrepancy). Hence, low credibility sources permit the supportive argumentation necessary for attitude change on pro-attitudinal topics. In line with this analysis, Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt report that more supportive arguments are produced in the moderate credibility condition than in the high credibility condition.³⁹

Summary

The cognitive response model suggests that, in response to the stimulus of argumentative messages, audiences produce supportive or refutative arguments (cognitive responses). These arguments mediate attitude change, and in fact correlate more highly with persuasion than recall of message content. Receivers are more likely to suspect sources of low credibility, and consequently produce more counterarguments in response to messages attributed to them. On the other hand, receivers are less likely to be critical of sources they respect, and generate less refutative arguments in response to their messages. This perspective can be employed to satisfactorily explain several curious patterns of results: to argue generally for the importance of receivers in argumentation and of the cognitive response model generally, and for a greater scope for argumentation than typically assumed in social influence through communication.

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39Sterthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt.

STRATEGIES FOR THREATENING FACE: MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING BIDS AND REJECTIONS

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Activities in the everyday world frequently require the cooperation and collaboration of multiple interactants.¹ Theorists have postulated that the impetus for the development of communication is found in the dependence on social rather than solitary activity to achieve goals:

Man is not just a rational animal. He is a "symbol-using animal," because his use of symbols is what makes him specifically different from other animals. Also, it is the use of symbols that he relates himself with others so that, in his organizing system of interdependencies he may satisfy his needs.²

Social interaction displays the negotiation of individual lines of action, the unfolding alignment of actions to what the other is doing or intends to do.³ In particular, social interaction is the tool for communicating relationships and shaping and directing the course of practical activities.

Children learn early that satisfaction or fulfillment of their wants are frequently dependent on another and that communication improves their ability to articulate and achieve those wants. Their earliest experiences are with caregivers who are directive and helpful in the development of activities. Learning to collaborate in the development of a social activity with other children is a fundamentally different task. Several studies of children ranging from 10 months to 2 years report that in play groups with their peers, children are more likely to engage in solitary activities or social activities with adults instead of other children.⁴ Piaget describes 40% of the discourse of 4 year olds as egocentric, "noncommunicative repetitions, soliloquies, or collective monologuing, where everyone talked and no one listened."⁵ More recently, a number of scholars have criticized Piaget (and others) and have argued that preschoolers do exhibit communicative competencies. Unlike the toddlers, "preschool children center their attention on each other as primary obstacles and primary means to achieving want satisfaction."⁶

One focus in the literature is the description of the role of discourse, strategy, and structure in children's arguments.⁷ This is justifiable given that arguments are a common feature in children's conversations. Bronson indicates that approximately 45% of the brief encounters of

preverbal children are disagreements ranging from mild distress to struggles.⁸ My own work with preschool children also provides evidence of the abundance of instances of opposition in children's conversations.⁹ As an extension of this earlier work, this paper is focused on opposition as it emerges within the context of episodes where interactants attempt to collaborate on an activity, so that individual lines of action coalesce to a common focus at the same time. In other words, it is limited to instances in which children attempt to get other children to do what they want when they want it and it meets opposition.

Opposition is conceived as a relationship between interactants. Although it takes many forms, the nature of the relationship communicated by disagreement is shared. Opposition introduces psychological distance and is inherently face threatening. It stands in contrast with the typical accord in conversation for "ordinarily the definitions of the situation projected by the several different participants (are) adhered to one another so that open contradiction will not occur" and interactants collaborate in the maintenance of each other's face.¹⁰ Brown and Levinson argue that face consists of wants that can only be satisfied through the actions of others. Negative face claims the right to freedom and against impositions from others; positive face is the desire to be appreciated and approved by others. Since being able to uphold face is dependent on another, an interactant is generally willing to satisfy the face wants of another to insure the attainment of their own face wants.¹¹ The effect on discourse is a pattern detailed by Pomerantz, as the preference for agreement.¹² Jackson and Jacobs indicate that interactants make use of the felicity conditions of speech acts to mitigate disagreement.¹³ And Brown and Levinson describe strategies for redressing a face threatening act.¹⁴ This emphasis in the literature may lead to the conclusion that opposition is avoided because it causes social breakdowns; and, in the unlikely event that it does occur, it is quickly repaired through mitigating utterances. Yet, in children's discourse, opposition occurs frequently, is sustained over several turns, and exhibits aggravating as well as mitigating forms. It will be argued here that the normal course of preserving face and mitigating disagreement is altered when one of two conditions obtains: 1) the interactant decides to overtly attack the other's face to gain a relational advantage (e.g. to exert control in the relationship), or 2) the interactant reacts to what is perceived as an intolerable attack by a conversational partner. As the discourse unfolds, opposition may escalate or deescalate through a variety of mechanisms. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to describe the emergence of opposition within children's social activities with special attention to strategies that mitigate and aggravate the face threatening character of opposition.

Children's conversations were obtained from twenty four

children enrolled in the Wayne State University Child Development Center. Children (2-5 years) were assigned to dyads and encouraged to play together for approximately fifteen minutes. Their interactions were transcribed from tape recordings and observer notes. Transactions which initiated a social activity and a partner rejected that bid were isolated for analysis. An utterance was considered a bid to engage in a joint activity if the form and context of the utterance suggested a continuing relationship between the interactants. This excluded announcements of an individual's activity unless such utterances paralinguistically enticed the partner to join in the activity. Opposition to the bid was apparent through a display of the disagreement or through the failure to provide uptake for the bid by producing a coherent contribution. The latter become apparent as a form of opposition only within the context of responding to a bid to engage in a joint activity and have been underrepresented in previous analyses.¹⁵ These procedures isolated twenty six instances which were analyzed for patterns. This analysis describes the structure of episodes of collaborative activity and the emergence of opposition within that structure, details the forms of bids and rejections and the qualities which mitigate or aggravate these utterances, and provides evidence that children's utterances are responsive to the relational level of partner's messages concerning face.

First, the master structure of an episode organizing activity is a bid-response pair. This pair does the procedural work for organizing the activity and is recycled when negotiation is necessary. Although other adjacency pairs intervene, they are generally embedded or side sequences to this main structure. The activity is initiated by a bid to engage in a particular task. The form of that bid is mitigated if it can be interpreted as a suggestion or proposal for action and aggravated if it is understood as a command or order. So that in addition to the negotiation of the task, the talk proffers relational messages that can be accepted or rejected. The messages impinge directly on face concerns. The response can be either an acceptance or a rejection. Acceptance of a bid is apparent by the compliant coherence of the next turn at talk. When an aggravated bid is accepted "a view of the parties as having asymmetrical rights and duties with respect to each other is thus collaboratively displayed."¹⁶ (see examples 1-3)

1. D: You didn't give me my pig. Give me my pig.
C: Here's your pig. Here.
2. Da: Alright. Come on. It's somebody else's turn.
De: Me.
C: Me.
Da: It's not your turn. ((to De))
H: How bout my turn?

Da: No. You had your turn.

3. K: Wait. You gotta take them all off.
((blocks))

R: ((R takes all of her blocks off))

A mitigated bid can be accepted while simultaneously maintaining the face of both parties. Mitigation enhances (but does not guarantee) agreement and diminished conflict. (see examples 4-5)

4. Da: How take will you please take these round greens? Cuz these they don't they might fight. We should take take those.

De: Alright.

5. T: We gotta take all these out. Know what we got then?

D: What?

T: We-we got (put) this back.

D: So do I.

These examples briefly illustrate the "uneventful" elaboration of activities over a series of turns, when a bid is accepted.

Of more interest to the present investigation is the occurrence of opposition to a bid, requiring negotiation of the shape of the task and the relationship among the interactants. Rejection of bids may also be mitigated or aggravated. If talk continues beyond this initial exchange (i.e. bid-rejection), it eventually recycles to another bid which can also be accepted or rejected.¹⁷ With each recycling, a rejection continues the overt opposition and indefinitely extends the length of the argument.¹⁸ As each turn at talk is built out of the preceding talk, a definition of the situation emerges, making it clear that "an individual can more easily make a choice as to what line of treatment to demand from and extend to others present at the beginning of an encounter than he can alter the line of treatment that is being pursued once the interaction is underway."¹⁹ This suggests that each exchange is important in organizing the talk which follows. And, that forms for bids and rejections are not simply stylistic choices made by an individual speaker but provide crucial evidence of the evolution of arguments within the context of joint activities.

The second purpose of this analysis is to characterize the form of bids. Maynard's recent analysis of children's arguments surveys the literature and concludes that "how arguments arise out of children's ongoing practical activities has been neglected" and directs attention to an analysis of arguables, the antecedent to the display of opposition.²⁰ In a study of 8 to 13 year old children, Goodwin demonstrates the importance of this first move in the con-

text of task activities, suggesting that a mitigated directive is generally met with a mitigated form of opposition while an aggravated imperative receives an aggravated response.²¹ This justifies a careful examination of the bids to engage in joint activities. This examination illustrates how bids become recognizable as attempts to characterize both interactants as agents in a shared activity and articulates strategies which mitigate or aggravate the arguable.

Bids take three primary forms: procedural metatalk that serves an organizing function by explicitly directing the activity, locational directives that orient the hearer to a common activity, and recognizable first moves in a "game." The most obvious examples are provided by procedural forms because the negotiation of the activity is placed on the surface of the talk. The bid names the activity being suggested and establishes that both speaker and hearer are to act as agents in the production of the activity. The plural forms (let's, we, us, our, everyone) communicate this relationship most directly. (examples 7-8)

6. D: We should read a book.

A: We don't have no books. So we can't read a book.

7. D: Now everyone do this. ((the other puzzles))

T: Now I put the bigger blocks. ((there are building blocks in the room.

This form is hearable as a request for a mutual undertaking, softening the imposition of a request on a hearer's face by sharing responsibility for the accomplishment of the activity.

Although the singular form does not display the joint relationship as explicitly in the talk itself, it is apparent from a shared understanding of the context of the utterance.

8. D: You should play with me ok? Oh apple and ball. You don't mess with me. And a house. And and

C: Yeah. Where this go? Oh these mine.

In this instance, the hearer (you) and the speaker (me) are placed in a relationship for an activity (play) that is generally understood to involve multiple parties. Requiring more of an inference from the context is K's aggravated bid in the next example:

9. J: A house. A rooster. A duck. ((naming the parts of the puzzle as K takes them out))

K: No a duck. A poisoned duck. Awwh.

J: A clock. A dog. A car.

K: Firetruck.
 J: Firetruck.
 K: I mean a truck. Apple tree.
 J: A stove. I mean a pot. ((looks to her))
 K: Go.
 J: A chicken?
 K: A bird. That's a bird. ((K laughs))
 J: Shut up.
 K: Just do this again.
 J: You just don't tell me what to do.
 (Mosquito breath.)

Over a series of turns it is apparent that an activity has been jointly agreed upon that positions J in the role as the namer of puzzle parts and K as the commentator on his naming. When K exceeds her role by criticizing his abilities, opposition emerges and disrupts the sequence. It is within this context that K's directive in the next to last line is heard as a bid to reinstate the activity that both have come to understand as a joint product. A bid is necessary because J must produce another naming before K can fulfill her role. The singular form directs the partner's behavior into compliance with the activity in contrast to the plural form that directs the dyad's behavior.

Like requests that specify an individual action, bids for joint action can make reference to preconditions.²² These data indicate that procedural bids (plural and singular) reference willingness to engage in a social activity and obligation to participate in the collaboration, expanding the number of possible constructions, such as:

	Willingness	Obligation
Plural	Let's do X ok? We could do X.	We should do X. We gotta do X.
Singular	Do you want to do X? Will you do X?	You should do X. I just want you to do X.

References to these preconditions have implications for the relational messages being conveyed concerning face. All of the references to willingness are inquiries that explicitly attend to negative face concerns, reducing the imposition that occurs when individuals direct others' behaviors. On the other hand, references to obligations are statements that reiterate the assumption that the hearer has a duty to comply with the bid. This makes the disregard for face explicit and conveys implicitly that their relationship is such that the speaker has the right to expect acquiescence. Labov and Fanshel also portray preconditions as a source for displaying relationships in the discourse. They illustrate that for requests "references to needs and abilities are generally mitigating while references to rights and obliga-

tions are aggravating."²³

The second form for bids is a locational directive that orients the attention of a listener to a desired activity. A prerequisite for any joint activity is sustained attention by both parties. An indirect way of introducing a possible activity is to entice the partner to be interested in objects that are in a given location that are necessary for enactment of the activity. This may be enough to initiate the activity without making a direct request to do so. Thus, the speaker wants less of the hearer explicitly and impinges less on the face of the speaker.

10. JJ: Look at this. ((a puzzle piece))
 Ju: No.
 JJ: Look at this.
 Ju: No. No.
 JJ: I gonna eat it.
11. D: Oooh. A girl book.
 G: Oooh. Ain't nothing in here.

The first uses a locational verb; look, here and there are particularly prevalent in the examples of bids. The second entices attention to the book through paralinguistic markers that draw out the appreciative "oooh" and then identify the object deserving of such attention. It is interesting to note that in example 11, the speaker also ends up resorting to more of an enticement to attention by threatening to eat a puzzle piece.

The third form for bids in children's discourse occurs when a game that is recognizable as a jointly constructed activity is initiated. Some games are ritualized to the extent that the sequence of actions for both parties is specified. The game of hide and seek can not be played alone, it requires one party to do the finding and another to do the hiding, so that when JJ announces what role he will take, it is clear that it is a bid for Ju to take up the other role:

12. JJ: I'll find you. I'll find you. I'll find you Julius.
 Ju: I not playin.
 JJ: Play. ((increases volume))
 Ju: I'm not playin.

Other games like "pretending" are more loosely structured and the bid is to contribute to the fantasy. These kinds of games are marked by laughter and exaggeration to convey a suspension of real time and space for the game.

13. K: Y'all want me to catch the bus home give me the money. ((R laughs))
 R: You need a bus ticket boy. Oh. ((shows

exasperation))

14. D: Oh you're a monster!
S: That smell like like some lotion. ((opens it and puts some on her face))
D: I'm goin put it on my face.

Example 14 indicates that R is willing to join K in pretending. He marks his statement with exaggeration and an increase in volume and she acknowledges by treating it as a laughable utterance. Her willingness to play out the game is evident by the coherence of her statement even though there is disagreement concerning the relational message. In contrast, the next example illustrates a bid to pretend being monsters that does not receive uptake by the partner. The partner's turn indicates a preoccupation with another activity that entices D to abandon the pretending activity altogether.

Brown and Levinson categorize acts that threaten the hearer's negative face and the first among their list is "those acts that predicate some future act A of H, and in so doing put some pressure on H to do the act A."²⁴ When a speaker makes a bid to engage in a joint activity, the hearer is being pressed to do a future act called for by the nature of the activity. This face threatening act can be mitigated or aggravated. In the previous discussion of the forms of bids, a number of strategies for establishing a particular relational tone emerged. First, plural forms moderate while singular forms do not redress the face threat to the hearer. Plural forms predicate future acts for both hearer and speaker while singular forms explicitly address only the hearer's responsibilities in the activity. Second, forms which address the preconditions of willingness mitigate while reference to obligations aggravate. A query concerning willingness softens the pressure to act for the hearer while calling out an obligation heightens the expectation and conveys an unequal status in the relationship. Third, a bid produced off record subdues through indirectness while an on record bid is direct and must be acknowledged as having a recognizable intent. On record strategies clearly communicate the intentions of the speaker while off record strategies permit more than one unambiguously attributable intention.²⁵ Thus, off record strategies are perceived as less coercive, permitting the hearer with an opportunity to treat the utterance as something which it is not. Bids were off record for locational directives that could be perceived only as requests for this single action (e.g. Look) rather than a request for a joint activity with multiple actions. First moves in games particularly when loosely structured, could also be interpreted as solitary play instead of a bid for a joint activity. In contrast, a procedural form has a direct and recognizable intent and must be responded to accordingly.

The next section of this analysis considers the form for rejections of bids, detailing the means by which opposition emerges. Children reject bids by indicating an unwillingness to engage in the activity, an inability to proceed with the activity, or a rejection/negotiation of the relationship that has been implied by the bid. These rejections are based in claims (although not always explicit) that the bid is deficient for failing to meet the necessary preconditions for a bid to engage in a for a joint activity. In any event, the rejection threatens the positive face of the interactant making the bid, conveying that their wants are not acceptable or desirable. This threat to positive face can be mitigated through redressive strategies or aggravated by openly displaying disregard for the other's face.

The first form expresses an unwillingness to engage in the activity, making it painfully clear that the speaker's assumption that the partner was willing is inaccurate. It is characterized by the absence of any account that might explain why the bid was deficient. The most "direct, clear, unambiguous, and concise" way of doing this is a bald refusal.²⁶ (see examples 15, 16; also the prior examples 2, 10).

15. D: Do you want to take those animals off?
((there are animals on the back ledge))
S: No. No.
D: Yeah.
S: No.
D: Yeah.
S: They might get us. (Don't get em.)
16. A: I'm the daddy.
M: Unhuh.
A: I'm the mommy.
M: I'm the daddy.
A: I'm the daddy too.
M: No you didn't. ((increases in volume))

Although Pomerantz finds that "yes" is a simple granting of a request, "no" is not a simple refusal for when it occurs without any additions, it has other meanings like abruptness, annoyance, or rudeness.²⁷ Relationally, it conveys an abusive disrespect for the partner's face. Unwillingness is also expressed off record by preschool children, as in examples 17, 18 and the prior example 7.

17. D: Look at this. ((the puzzle))
T: Look at this picture now. ((at the blackboard))
18. D: I makin a necklace. You going put all of em on here? (5 sec.) You makin a ball? ((D drops a green block and it rolls, after this he refers to it as a ball)) I makin a ball. Ooh a ball. ((rolls another block on the floor))

S: Ha hip hip. ((dancing around))
D: Sit down, I make a (ball too). ((S sits down))

Example 17 illustrates a rejection of D's bid to play with the puzzle by offering an alternative bid through a locational marker to direct attention to playing with the blackboard. This form fails to acknowledge the first bid and neglects face but whether the original bid has been rejected or postponed or not heard is ambiguous. In the next example, the interactant rejecting the speaker's activity does not seek to replace it with a joint alternative but is content to engage in her own activity. Because the utterance is not coherent with the bid and can not be perceived as agreement. To hear it as a rejection requires more of an interpretation than with the bald refusal.

The second form references an inability to do the activity. This failure to comply refers to external features of the task, "task relevant conditions related to the context of the direction."²⁸ This transfers the blame for failure to comply away from the interactant and on to the uncontrollable aspects of the situation. The rejection is thus not an indication that the speaker's wants are not desirable, only that those wants are not possible. Inability arises when the necessary objects for the joint activity are not available or when others intervene (or are perceived as likely to intervene) to prevent the enactment of the activity. To return to an earlier example, D offers a joint bid to read books. A's first objection is that the necessary objects are unavailable and thus the activity must be rejected. When this claim is refuted, A follows with another reference to inability, this time arguing that the adult present will not allow the activity.

19. D: We should read a book.
A: We don't have no books. So we can't read a book.
D: Here's here's some books right here.
A: I know but I don't want cause Pam won't let us.

The face threat inherent in the rejection is mitigated because it is due to inability and not an indication of the worth of the bid or the individual offering that bid. If such an account explaining the rejection is accepted, equilibrium can be restored in the relationship because the face threat is redressed.²⁹

While bids can be rejected for task related reasons, they are also rejected or negotiated when there is objection to the relationship being expressed. This form of rejection makes it quite clear that children respond to the relationship level of partner's messages. In example 9, K's aggravated bid is hearable as an order. Since orders are given to subordinates, it isn't surprising that J explicitly re-

jects the relationship indicating that K is in no position to tell him what to do and further amplifies his own claim to status by issuing an insult. Or, a softened response negotiates a more acceptable line of treatment rather than an outright rejection.

20. Ds: I take the big ones. You take the little ones. Alright? ((blocks))
Ds: Let me take the big ones too.
Ds: (I guess.)

Ds makes a move to control desirable resources which could result in unequal status. Even though she mitigates this bid to direct the activity, her partner is unwilling to accept it and asserts an alternative definition of their relationship which is accepted.

Interactants mitigate rejections to minimize conflict and protect the face of their partner. That their utterances should attend to the partner's face concerns indicates their desire to cooperate and establish equilibrium in the relationship. An aggravated rejection can be a response to an aggravated bid; for a face attack will engender self protection and an attack on the face of the other. It may also emerge as an attempt to gain a relational advantage and can occur without any provocation. For, aggravation "constitutes part of the currency through which status and leadership are negotiated."³⁰ This analysis indicates that four strategies are in use by preschool children to mitigate or aggravate rejections to bids. First, forms which provide an account for the rejection are mitigating while those that are bald and without reasons aggravate the force of the rejection. The latter connote that the hearer is not worth the effort required to offer an explanation. Second, those forms that reference the precondition of ability are mitigating while those that reference the relationship are aggravating. Inability originates in an external task related reason for rejection while disagreement concerning the relationship is an internal person centered explanation and consequently more face threatening. Third, rejections which are produced off record are more deniable while on record rejections can not be interpreted as expressing any other intention. Finally, rejections are marked for intensity through many kinds of devices. Mitigating may be accomplished through paralinguistic features like laughter that can be heard as transforming the disagreement to play, tag questions, and hedges. Aggravation is conveyed by paralinguistic features indicating derogation (see examples 9, 14), increases in volume (see examples 12, 16), and intensifiers (e.g. No way, Never).

The final part of this analysis examines the relationship between the bid and the rejection. Goodwin claims that "the format of the first pair part is characteristically implicative of the format of the second pair part."³¹ So,

mitigated bids should call forth mitigated rejections while aggravated bids should be followed by aggravated responses. If mitigation is occurring, interactants are trying to minimize the face threat and that effort would be reciprocated to create a sense of equilibrium in the relationship despite the disagreement. If an utterance is aggravated, it establishes that the reciprocal maintenance of face has deteriorated and the obligation to attend to the partner's face is no longer operating.

In the 26 episodes negotiating a joint activity, there were frequently multiple bid-rejection pairs. The average per episode was 3.05. To determine the relationship between bids and rejections, each pair part was categorized as mitigating or aggravating based on the strategies developed earlier in this paper.³² 78% of the pairs were reciprocal, matching the format of the prior utterance. 19% of the pairs involved a mitigated bid that received a mitigated response; 59% of the pairs matched an aggravated bid with an aggravated response. This also documents the prevalence of aggravated forms in children's conversations with their peers. While the literature focuses heavily on mitigation, it is apparent that for the description of children's discourse, more attention needs to be given to aggravated forms.³³ Of the mismatched pairs, 17% were a mitigated bid-aggravated response pair and 5% were an aggravated bid-mitigated response pair. The character of an utterance influences the evolution of the episode. It is not just the activity that evolves but it is also the definition of the relationship between the interactants that develops through the discourse.

The instances analyzed in this paper exhibit the social organization of preschool children's attempts to enact joint activities. A focus on opposition as it emerged within this context led to an examination of the forms of bids and rejections. This analysis concentrated on face as a critical dimension for understanding how social relationships emerge in interactions through the strategic use of language. Strategies for mitigating and aggravating were outlined. It is claimed that the format of an utterance has implications for succeeding discourse. The emergence of an episode, the escalation and deescalation of an argument in progress, can be more fruitfully examined from within the perspective provided here.³⁴

NOTES

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13 Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 251-265; Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "The Collaborative Production of Proposals in Conversational Argument and Persuasion: A Study in Disagreement Regulation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1981), 77-90.

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16 Marjorie Harness Goodwin, "Directive-Response Speech Sequences in Girls' and Boys' Task Activities," in Women and Language in Literature and Society, eds. Sally McConnell-Ginet, Ruth Borker, and Nelly Furman (New York: Praeger, 1980), 157-173.

17 Side sequences and embedded sequences can intervene between bids and responses and between recycled pairs, but continued talk that negotiates the activity eventually returns to the bid-response pair.

18 As long as both interactants are willing to express their opposition, the argument continues.

19 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, p. 11.

20 Maynard, p. 1.

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27 Pomerantz; Michael Stubbs, Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 118.

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30 Goodwin, "Directive-Response Speech Sequences in Girls' and Boys' Task Activities," p. 160.

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32 It must be noted that there are degrees of mitigation and aggravation and that this analysis did not make this distinction. If an utterance contained any of the forms of mitigation, it was classified as a mitigating utterance.

33 Jackson and Jacobs; Labov and Fanshel; and Brown and Levinson focus on mitigation.

34 This framework provides a more systematic treatment of the ideas concerning the evolution of an argument with its escalating and deescalating moves first articulated in Benoit, "Extended Argument Sequences in Children's Discourse."

TOWARD A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON ARGUMENTATIVE COMPETENCE

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When argumentation was synonymous with formal logic, the notion of argumentative competence was unproblematic. A competent arguer could formulate an argument that conformed to the rules of logic, while an incompetent arguer could not. In 1958, publications by Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca¹ and by Stephen Toulmin² started a movement away from a model of argument based on formal logic toward one based on more person-centered logics. If the quality of an argument and the competence of the arguer no longer can be tested against the standards of formal logic, some theory of argumentative competence is needed in order to be able to assess the relative competence of arguers.

While the discipline of speech communication has shown a great deal of interest in the idea of communication competence, scholars of argumentation have shown very little interest in theorizing about the notion of argumentative competence³. The development of the concept of argumentative competence is important both theoretically and pedagogically. The argumentation theorist as well as the classroom teacher ought to have standards to distinguish a competent arguer from an incompetent one.

In this essay, we will report the beginnings of our attempt to theorize about the notion of argumentative competence. We will begin by briefly describing the notion of communication competence along with some of the issues surrounding it, then we will offer what we believe are the minimal standards for an adequate conceptualization of competence, and finally we will provide an outline for the development of a model of argumentative competence. In this essay, we will confine our claims about argumentative competence to interactional contexts.

The Notion of Communication Competence

Communication competence has been the object of wide discussion and varied theoretical treatments. The theoretical construct has been acknowledged in its complexity, yet research measures have remained overly simple and vulnerable to criticism. The positions of the various competence camps have been stated and restated⁴ but still boil down to one issue: whether or not to make a distinction between capacity to perform (knowledge) or the performance itself (skill). If we choose knowledge, we may deny ourselves the means to measure the construct adequately⁵. If we choose performance, we risk simplification of a complex, often intentional, activity⁶. To acknowledge both requires a complex model of the competent communicator that has yet to be articulated and tested.

One of the problems with the conceptualization and measurement of competence that has contributed to much of the confusion is the tendency to view competence as a global construct attributed to an individual by self or others⁷. Self-report measures may demonstrate the subjects' own evaluation of their effectiveness in communication, but would depend greatly on other factors including the state of the individual's self-esteem and recent communication success. Another approach has been to rely on an "expert" to report an individual's competence--for example, a teacher who has had many opportunities to observe a student's communication behavior. The problem here is twofold; the "expert" has an agenda for competence--teachers may prefer polite students, and the "expert" only views the subject in one context, in the classroom. In light of the advantages and disadvantages of each measurement type, we might best glean information about the students' perception of their personal effectiveness (inevitably confounded with self-esteem) from self-reports and about social appropriateness (confounded by relational and contextual variables) from other reports. Given both, a picture of competence in a context might emerge, though couched in terms of impressions rather than actual performance or underlying knowledge.

Although most scholars acknowledge that communication competence is comprised of elements such as those suggested by Cupach and Spitzberg (skill, knowledge, and motivation), few have adequately addressed all of them in operation. Skills may be either directly observed or the impression of skill recalled. Knowledge and motivation are much trickier. If an individual demonstrates skill, we may infer the necessary knowledge to use the skill; for example, if Jack smiles and offers his hand when introduced, we may assume that Jack possesses a knowledge set (what we will call a script) for first meetings of this kind. However, we cannot infer a lack of knowledge from an absence of skilled performance. The same may be said of motivation; that is, it may be implied in performance but not denied without performance. Motivation raises the issue of intent. Competent performance often may be automatized behavior once the script has been learned and continues to work⁸. Only in unique situations may we find highly intentional behavior accompanied by arousal of motivation.

Finally, the literature concerning competence has failed, for the most part, to address the influence of development and change in the individual. Although we all recognize that individuals do change and might even agree that the infant is not just an incompetent adult, few scholars of communication competence acknowledge the rudimentary assumption of development in humans. The few notable exceptions claim quite varied orientations to developmental competence⁹. Mainstream research in communication competence has yet to make explicit the incomparability of a competent nine-year-old and a competent forty-year-old on any of the dimensions mentioned above.

Characteristics of an Adequate View of Communication Competence

In our view, an adequate theory of communication competence should address at least three issues. It should account for (1) the role of context in communication; (2) the proper combination of knowledge, skill,

and motivation; and (3) the development level of communication knowledge and skill within the individual. In the paragraphs that follow, we will address the necessity of these three issues and briefly outline a few of the elements of each and their relationship to argument.

The Role of Context

We will make the case that communication contexts are internalized as features of psychological processes in the form of scripts¹⁰. Because of the interrelatedness of context with cognitive processes for understanding communication events, specific environmental circumstances will predispose individuals toward competence in some areas and not in others, even though we can assume that individual biological maturation will mandate that social actors achieve some basic levels of communication skills in a particular order (for example, egocentric speech before socialized speech). For instance, some individuals might be highly competent in a context that requires argument skills and incompetent in a context that requires comforting skills. Even those individuals who are competent in arguing in certain contexts (debate for instance) may not be competent in arguing in other contexts (say an interpersonal relationship).

Thus, an adequate theory of communication competence somehow must attend to the issue of communication context. One way to attend to this issue is to measure a person's competence over a wide variety of contexts. Using this method, one would get some kind of an aggregate account of the person's competence. While this method is certainly acceptable, our approach is to limit the claims we make about a person's communication competence to contexts requiring argument and even further to interactional contexts.

Knowledge, Skill, and Motivation

Cognition, behavior and affect are inextricably entwined in the communicator, but must be addressed individually in a coherent view of the development of competence. We will use the more specific terms preferred by Spitzberg and Cupach for discussing interpersonal communication competence-- knowledge, skill, and motivation--although we will be defining the terms for our own purposes.

Our position is that a complete model of communication competence should account for all three components. All three are necessary conditions for the performance of competent communication. The absence of any one element may prevent a person from being perceived as a competent communicator. At the same time, we hasten to point out that the absence of one component (motivation) should not be considered a sign of the absence of some other(s) (skill or knowledge). Thus, a person who fails to exhibit any one of these three components may not be perceived as a competent arguer by others. At the same time, we must not assume that the person whose performance is not perceived as competent is unskilled or lacks basic knowledge about how to argue. That person simply may not be motivated to argue in an effective and/or appropriate manner.

Knowledge. Although the cognitive component of competence may be approached from a variety of perspectives, we have found the notion of "script" (along with "plan" and other higher level structures) to be useful in explaining the development of interpersonal competence¹¹. Schank and Abelson used artificial intelligence to model psychological processes. They explained human understanding of social behavior by referring to psychological structures called scripts. People know how to act appropriately because they have knowledge about the world in the form of scripts, or standardized general episodes¹². However, if people were limited to scripts, their repertoires would be small indeed, so another structure called a plan was suggested for storing more general information about how actors achieve goals¹³.

Schank followed the original theory with a 1982 book more pointedly focused on memory. Although many scholars have suggested a close relationship between memory and human communication, Schank specifies language as the "medium by which thoughts in a memory are transmitted to another memory"; words are then used to move, change, and alter scripts and other cognitive sets¹⁴. He also explains the distinction between scripts and plans in terms of the interconnections to be made; the less you know about a situation, the more work is needed for processing. Plans require more work, while scripts require less. A script is based on direct experience and so may be used efficiently in another situation that matches it; however, it is not flexible enough to be used in widely differing contexts. We abstract and generalize from multiple experiences to form more abstract structures (e.g., plans) with multiple retrieval methods; that is, we can use information garnered from one situation to help us in quite another one when we develop plans. Not only are specific scenes in memory scripts, but organizers of those scenes allow us to place the scenes in context. These multiple types of entities in memory allow humans to learn, intentionally as well as adaptively.

Skill. The search for a generic set of skills that describes general communication competence is slowing because of a frustrating lack of consistent results. Empathy, for example, has been touted as a requirement for communication competence, but the research ranges from quite supportive of a correlation between empathy and competence¹⁵ to contradictory¹⁶. As Redmond suggests, the problem may lie in measurement or theoretical confusion, but nevertheless competence and its assumed correlates are most often assessed by impressions of effectivness and appropriateness rather than by observation of behavioral skills¹⁷.

We will divide our discussion of argumentation skills into cognitive and behavioral skills. Although we are considering the cognitive and behavioral skills separately, we want to emphasize their interrelatedness.

The capacity to recognize contrast is an important cognitive ability relevant to the skills needed to argue effectively. The perception of contrast occurs very early in the human infant as the infant comes to recognize the difference between self and other. Later, the ability to contrast is extended to other notions such as right from wrong, etc. Without the ability to perceive contrast, we would be unable to argue

because we would not be able to recognize that one position might be "better" (or even different) from another position.

Without the initial perception of contrast, humans would be unable to take the perspective of other because they would not even recognize the perspective of other as different from the perspective of self. Taking the perspective of other, a cognitive ability directly linked to the perception of contrast, is very important as a part of the cognitive skill component of argument. Without the cognitive ability to take the perspective of another, one could not adapt reason-giving strategies to the perspective of the listener.

If contrast and perspective-taking are among the important cognitive skills associated with argument, what, then, are the behavioral skills involved in arguing in an interactional context? We believe that these skills generally can be classified into two categories: disagreeing and reason-giving. We also believe that these behavioral skills are reflective of the cognitive skills discussed above. In an earlier study, one of us¹⁸ maintained that these are two of the generic characteristics of interactional argument. Beyond that study, we find the literature relevant to argument in interaction supportive of our view that disagreeing and reason-giving are two fundamental features of argument. From his constructivist/interactionist perspective, Willard defines argument as "a specific genre of interaction (occurring within certain kinds of rhetorical situations) in which the participants perceive mutual incompatibilities in their respective positions and attempt to 'hash out' the differences or to persuade the other individuals to adopt more consistent beliefs or positions on the issues"¹⁹. Disagreeing and reason-giving are clearly involved in the process of hashing out differences with respect to mutual incompatibilities. Jackson and Jacobs' "prototypical argument"²⁰ is a combination of argument₁ (reason-giving) and argument₂ (disagreeing). While some scholars focus on disagreement²¹ and others focus on reason-giving²², both are central to the study of interactional argument.

Disagreeing skills are relevant to the cognitive skill of contrast. An argumentative person, according to Rancer, Baukus, and Infante, is one who is able to "recognize controversial issues in communication situations, to advocate positions on the issues, and to attempt refutation of the positions which other people take on those issues"²³. Reason-giving skills are evidence of the ability to take the perspective of other. Scholars assume that reasons that are adapted to the perspective of the listener are more effective than reasons that are related only to the perspective of self²⁴. Persons whom we might call "pathological arguers" resort to violence to settle their disagreements with others. Others resort to communication strategies such as demands or requests that do not account for the perspective of the listener. The more competent arguer is skilled in assessing the perspective of the listener and adapting reasons to that perspective. While a wholly incompetent arguer may resort to physical aggression or violence, a more competent one will invoke reasons to attempt to persuade the other party.

Santer and Ely²⁵ have developed a typology of conflict behaviors that are relevant to argumentation skills. Their typology consists of nine

levels of conflict behaviors ranging from direct physical aggression to integrative solutions. At level one, the speaker responds with direct physical aggression. At level two, the speaker threatens physical aggression, or issues a verbal assault such as name calling. While level three involves direct non-physical aggression such as calling on the intervention of an authority figure, level four threatens non-physical aggression. A speaker responding at level five will invoke rules or norms, and a speaker at level six will respond with a simple request. At level seven, a speaker responds with a polite request, while at level eight a speaker adds reasons to the request. Finally, at level nine, the speaker responds with an integrative solution; one that seems to respond both to the needs of the speaker and the listener. These are a few of the behaviors that we see as relevant to the skills of argumentation. We believe these nine ways of dealing with conflict are related disagreeing and reason giving. As one moves from level one toward level nine, one begins to deal with disagreement by utilizing a process of reason-giving instead of violence.

Motivation. The question of intent looms when we ask what motivates individuals to behave as they do. The question is much easier to answer when it concerns young infants; we assume they perform to top capacity, that is, they do what they can do. However, when symbol use emerges, so does the ability to plan a behavior or to intend an effect. Although we may talk a good theoretical game concerning motivation, we still must rely upon behaviors for assessment. We may assume that, given a highly effective and appropriate performance, an individual has sufficient motivation to actuate knowledge and skill; thus, all three are adequately functioning. The problem arises with the individual who performs at a low level—who does not create the impression of competence; we only can assume first that motivation is inadequate before we leap to the conclusion that knowledge or skill is lacking.

Our approach to the dimension of motivation is twofold: First, we assume that humans have a general need to interact effectively with their environment²⁶. Expectations for behavior are learned, however, and the developing individual learns much about the costs and rewards of behaviors in context. Undoubtedly, individuals are motivated to varying degrees dependent upon expectations within an interactional context. If we assess competence across several contexts and with different partners, we may see the results of motivational changes as they vary within an individual. Secondly, we believe that one important element in the development of tasks to measure argumentative competence is to ensure that the tasks are consequential to the subjects in the study. Studies of persons involved in inconsequential tasks do not show them operating as they would in tasks where they are more highly motivated because the outcome of the task is of some consequence to them.

The Role of Development

A developmental view of communication competence is essential since otherwise we might label persons as "incompetent" merely because they have not reached the appropriate level of development relevant to the competencies found lacking. A second reason that a developmental view of

communication is essential parallels the notion that description should precede prescription. The notion of competence must, by its nature, address normative or prescriptive questions such as, "What characteristics separate a good arguer from a poor one?" and "What knowledge and/or skill does a poor arguer need to develop into a good one?" We are probably safe in assuming that more effective and appropriate skills generally are developed with age and less effective and appropriate ones are extinguished. Thus, by describing skills developmentally, we should be better able to prescribe "effective" and "appropriate" skills.

Although we assume that communication skills are learned, only a few scholars in the field of communication competence have discussed the issue of development, generally borrowing from prior research to make their points²⁸; or in one case, developing an other-rated scale of competence in children²⁹. With respect to the field of argumentation, Burleson³⁰ has summarized how some elements of argumentation change systematically as a function of natural development of the individual. Because we agree with Johnson that human communication development extends throughout a lifetime and is "influenced by biological and social elements"³¹, we would like to be able to specify some of those elements as they come to bear on interpersonal argument. To do so, we first will set out some of the theoretical constructs that should be addressed in a developmental perspective of competence.

We often assume, when studying adult communication, that normally functioning humans have developed adequate communication systems. When we begin to explore development itself, we are forced to consider the human capacities that allow us to build the communication systems we later take for granted. We will mention a few of the most obvious individual requirements for competent human interaction focusing on those that we suspect are most relevant to competent argumentation.

Development of the Knowledge and Motivation Components. Scripts are based on the assumption that because something has happened in the same way many times, we can expect it to happen in the same way the next time. When this expectation fails, the script failure is indexed, and we must try to explain the failure and produce alternatives to the script. Here is where developmental issues can be illuminated by this theme. The structures--scripts, plans or organizers--may not be innate, but the ability to form and manipulate them may be³². Infants, as "pattern-seekers"³³ are predisposed to process and use speech patterns as well as other types of serial information. Infants begin to form simple adaptive scripts almost immediately. Consider Schank's example of a six-month-old's script. The child may perceive several things about the environment that are important (form a pattern). In order to store them as a unit or scene, the child must choose one of the items as primary; that is, a "first discrimination" (contrast) must be made in order to set up an indexing method. In any set of ordered (serial) steps, one thing must come first, the next indexed in terms of the first and so forth³⁴. The child who is played with after diaper changing may first discriminate Diaper Change and Index Play; thus, the child will expect play to occur with diaper change, which can cause problems for parents and infants alike.

When we build scripts, we must be capable of making guesses and correcting them when they fail.

When interaction input fails to correspond with the expectations set in our scripts, we can 1) modify the specific expectation that failed (i.e., learn the variables of the script); 2) alter the original script (i.e. create a set of invariate elements that are dependable across situations); or 3) index the event as an expectation failure (i.e., keep the information specific to the original script, but form more general information to help explain the failure). When we choose the final strategy³⁵, we must begin to use memory organizers to abstract information from specific events so it can be used in a variety of quite different situations. The infant who fails to experience play with diaper change eventually must separate the two events in memory, while retaining an organizing structure that records the relationship between the two event structures. In order to do so, the child must be able to contrast the two events, see them as separate, though related, and abstract their relatedness for further reference.

The ultimate result of generalizing memory entities may be Schank's notion of universal scenes or organizers, which contain no information about context but are defined in the roles they play in organizing memory³⁶. They may organize the temporal sequence of behavioral expectations (e.g., "disagree" and "give reasons" scenes into a universal "argument" organizer) or organize the scenes that make up a universal set (e.g., "make contracts" and "make arrangements" in an "agreement" script). We may indeed create universal memory organization packets for "argument" that change, develop, and generalize as older, simpler memory structures fail; the universal version would be highly abstract and capable of guiding our understanding of an argument-like event successfully across situations.

As individuals develop the ability to contrast more abstract features and as they develop their abilities to take the perspective of others, the nature of their scripts change. Some arguers are limited to scripts based on contrast of concrete issues and on the perspective of self while the more competent arguer will have built scripts based on contrast of more abstract issues and the perspective of other.

Knowledge structures used to inform behaviors are based on experience with others and the environment, and transformed by the organizing we perform cognitively. That is, a rich store of experience undoubtedly will provide the basis for more scenes in memory storage (scripts), but the way those scenes can be used will vary from individual to individual depending on the flexibility of the user's organizing system. We suspect that challenges, or failures, in the operation of knowledge structures foster the development of flexibility in organization--failures stimulate learning and thus more generalizable structures.

Development obviously relies on practice in situations that count--salient events that arouse motivation. Although failures appear to stimulate learning, successes are necessary for sufficient motivation to be communicatively appropriate. Herein lies the paradox found in most theories of human development--knowledge demands failure and motivation

demands success. The trick is finding the optimum balance between rewarding and costly communication, as any parent can testify. Failures bring growth in knowledge structures; successes bring growth in motivation.

Development of the Skill Component. Cognitive skills such as contrast and perspective-taking are important to a developmental view of argumentative competence. Contrast, as many scholars have observed, is important to our cognitive development³⁷ as well as to our system of spoken language³⁸. When infants are able to distinguish between self and other-than-self, between their own powers to control the environment and others' powers, then the capacity may begin to serve more complex processes. One of the first indicators of symbolic function is the ability to use the negative (experienced parents will recall the "terrible twos"), or to contrast what is with what is not or never can be. The capacity for contrast is preliminary to the perception of similarity and thus necessary for categorization.

Perspective-taking, and related concepts such as role-taking or cognitive empathy, undergirds many communication behaviors. Not as primary as a capacity to contrast, perspective-taking apparently relies upon the use of a comparatively highly developed symbol system. Piaget³⁹ described the growth from egocentric to socialized thought in the first seven years as an increasing ability to take another's perspective. Vygotsky⁴⁰ explained that same line of development as a process of internalizing speech that had been used egocentrically such that problem solving could become a silent thought sequence to serve social interaction--that is, become socialized speech. When inner speech can serve social speech, perspective-taking becomes possible. The ability to step away from the center of self and imagine another's perspective emerges after the contrast may be made between one's own sense-making and another's. The human symbol user normally will acquire these capacities upon which communicative competence is predicated.

Our developmental view of argument skills includes not only those cognitive skills that we just mentioned, but it includes the development of behavioral skills also. As we have indicated, some of these skills have been arranged by Samter and Ely according to the degree that the strategies are person centered. In other words, level-nine strategies involving integrative solutions are much more prosocial than level one strategies involving physical aggression. Samter and Ely found the choice of higher level strategies to be positively associated with both age and cognitive development. We might extrapolate their results to claim that as people progress both in age and cognitive development, the scripts available to them for participating in communication events that require arguing become more prosocial--they move away from violence and toward solutions that account for the perspective of self as well as the perspective of other.

If we begin to compare observable skills, such as the ability to refute a claim or to express a reason from the perspective of the listener, to impressions of competence we may begin to piece together the skills that are perceived as competent at various levels of development. We expect skill achievement to correlate with impressions of competence at varying developmental levels.

One way of testing the importance of specific behaviors to the impression of competence is to assess the impact of behaviors on evaluations at different developmental levels as well as in varying situations. Backlund⁴¹ suggests two benchmark levels in skill development. Benchmark one concerns appropriateness and would assess performance of cultural norms and role-taking behavior, benchmark two addresses effectiveness in terms of the use of rhetoric, persuasion and communication strategies.

A Model of Competence in Interactional Argument

Having acknowledged the complexity of the task, we now will outline a model of communication competence in interactional argument. Although we do not presume to articulate all of the requirements of such a model, we do hope to provide a theoretical framework adequate for testing.

Given the acquisition of certain human capacities, knowledge, skill, and motivation interact to produce communication competence in various contexts. In the case of interactional argument--given the acquisition of the capacities of contrast and perspective-taking--abstract and flexible knowledge structures (scripts and plans), skilled communication behaviors informed by those structures and motivation for effective and appropriate behavior will interact to produce increasing levels of argumentative competence.

Optimum levels of argumentative competence may be expected in human development under the following conditions: (1) physiological and psychological development adequate for the acquisition of human communicative capacities for contrast and perspective-taking, (2) a rich communicative environment with a variety of partners and contexts, (3) opportunities for failed expectations to generate more generalizable knowledge and (4) opportunities for success in getting needs met and in understanding others' perspectives.

So what are the guidelines for the assessment of argumentative competence? Since we believe any model must account for developmental changes in the individual, our answer must assume normal development of the individual and must vary according to the age of the individual. But in general we maintain that as the individual progresses from childhood to adulthood, the following characteristics describe the development of argumentative competence. (1) Argumentative competence develops as the arguers knowledge structures progress from rigid to flexible knowledge structures about argument. As arguers develop, they begin to develop scripts that allow them to contrast abstract as well concrete ideas. They develop scripts that allow them to act in accordance with the perspective of others as well as in accordance with the perspective of self. (2) Argumentative competence develops as arguers develop both the cognitive and behavioral skills needed to manage disagreement in prosocial ways. Argument becomes, to borrow from the title of a well-known argumentation text, "an alternative to violence"⁴². (3) Argumentative competence develops as arguers are motivated to argue in ways that are both effective and appropriate. Arguers realize that they must be willing to risk

confrontation in order to settle important differences. As they develop, they come to recognize that inappropriate confrontation can increase rather than decrease levels of disagreement and thus be counter productive. In summary, as arguers develop their competence, they become more knowledgeable, more skilled, and more motivated.

A research program should describe the various developmental levels of argumentative competence by testing: (1) populations of various ages with a "normal" developmental history; that is, excluding participants suffering decrements in physiological or psychological abilities related to communication. (2) the same sets of skills across a context by relatively "objective" standards (for example, behavioral argument skills coded by several judges), (3) the scope and flexibility of knowledge (for example, the response to a unique task, giving a twist to a familiar situation--that is, challenging an established script), and (4) the intentional as well as mindless behaviors.

Of course, the above description is not specific enough to satisfy the demands of measurement either for the researcher or for the teacher interested in assessing the progress of some student. While we agree that measurement of theoretical constructs is fraught with obstacles, we believe that measurement of a concept like argumentative competence is essential if the concept is to have theoretical or pedagogical utility. In this essay, we have tried to put our theoretical house in order. This, we believe, is a necessary prerequisite for adequate measurement of any concept.

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SOCIAL CONFRONTATION IN RELATIONSHIPS OF VARYING DEGREES OF INTIMACY

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Roles and norms provide guidelines for appropriate behavior in all relationships with others from stranger to intimate. When someone's behavior does not meet our expectations then we may confront the person. Social confrontation is a particular kind of communication episode where one person says to another, in essence, "I'm not happy with your behavior." This type of claim is warranted or legitimized by the shared expectations of the relationship. Through social confrontation the "rules" of a relationship may be challenged, clarified, legislated, or remediated. The central issues of social confrontation are: (1) Is the rule or expectation legitimate? (2) Did the "alleged" behavior actually occur? (3) Does the behavior in fact constitute a rule violation? (4) Does a superseding rule outweigh the expectation? Social confrontation may serve to regulate behavior (compliance-gaining), increase understanding (information-processing) or negotiated and maintain a relationship.

Our expectations for behavior may stem from general social and cultural understandings or from negotiated, unique understandings. Miller and Steinberg dichotomize relationships into noninterpersonal and interpersonal according to the type of information one has about the other.² In noninterpersonal relationships one must rely upon social and cultural knowledge to predict the actions of the other. In interpersonal relationships one has personal and psychological information about the other. Altman and Taylor's theory of social penetration describes the process of moving from stranger to intimate through breadth and depth of self-disclosure over time.³ As relationships become more intimate, the rules or expectations for behavior become more personalized. Wood describes this process as the development of a relational culture, "a privately transacted system of understandings that coordinate attitudes, actions, and identities of participants in a relationship."⁴

We propose that social confrontation will vary in purpose, strategy, and form given the level of intimacy of the relationship. Our separate lines of research have led both of us to a number of observations about how relationships are negotiated. In an extensive study, Adams collected naturally occurring conversations from nine dyads (three acquaintances, three friends, and three marital couples).⁵ She analyzed the conversations utilizing a metaphor of negotiation of relationships. Newell, in a series of studies utilizing role-playing and self-report data, has been exploring how dyads negotiate their relationships specifically through social confrontation.⁶ Our work converges in the description of episodes where behavior is reproached - social confrontation. Our work suggests that social confrontation will vary given the intimacy level of the relationship.

For example, Newell and Stutman identified seven factors which influence the decision to confront: (1) nature of the relationship, (2) perceived urgency, (3) perceived responsibility to confront, (4) perceptions of the other, (5) resources, (6) appropriateness of time and place and (7) perceived outcomes.⁷ Certainly these perceptions will vary given the level of intimacy of the relationship. In addition, Newell has described different patterns of how social confrontation may be done including information-processing and guilt-induction.⁸ One might expect different patterns to be more likely given the level of intimacy of the relationship. Adams reported differences in how marital couples reproached behavior compared to acquaintances and friends.⁹ She observed that marital couples were more likely to continually challenge each other, reproach each other's desires, future plans and status reports.

Our purpose here is to present in proposition form our speculations concerning how social confrontation appears to vary with the level of intimacy of a relationship. These propositions should be read as ideas worthy of further exploration rather than statements of empirical "truth". We will provide examples to illustrate our propositions; they are not to be taken as documentation of the validity of the propositions.

The examples come primarily from self-report data. After a brief explanation of social confrontation, a college class was asked to think of three recent instances where they confronted someone: (1) a stranger, (2) someone you know moderately well, and (3) an intimate. For each situation they were asked to describe the relationship, explain why they confronted the person, and write out the conversation. In addition, we will use examples from Adams' data of naturally occurring conversations between marital partners to illustrate propositions concerning intimate relationships.

Continuum of Intimacy

Intimacy is most simply understood as a measure of the amount and quality of knowledge of one another. But two other critical attributes appear to develop along with personal knowledge. Simmel has described intimate relationships as those most central to one's life.¹⁰ The development of an intimate relationship involves not just self-disclosure but an expanding sharing of the diverse activities of one's life. Intimacy carries with it a feeling of interconnectedness and an expectation for future interconnectedness in the doing of one's life. As the other becomes more central to one's life, attachment to the other may grow. McCall and Simmona suggest that attachment to another grows as our self-identity becomes connected to our view of our self in relation to the other.¹¹ Wood also stresses the relationship between the relational culture of the intimate relationship and the identity of the participants.¹² Thus, intimacy consists of three attributes: (1) breadth and depth of knowledge of one another, (2) expectations for future interaction and interdependence, and (3) attachment - the degree to which self-identity is tied to the other.

Intimacy may be viewed as a continuum upon which relationships may be located. For discussion and analysis purposes we are rather arbitrarily dividing the intimacy continuum into four levels:

Level 1 - Stranger. The interactants have no personal knowledge of one another but rely totally upon social and cultural

knowledge of the situation and their respective roles. Strangers do not expect to interact again. And strangers have no influence upon one another's self-identity.

Level 2 - Acquaintances. The interactants have some working knowledge of one another. Personal information is probably limited to aspects relevant to the situation which brings them together. Acquaintances may include roommates, co-workers, teachers and students, neighbors, potential friends, etc. Acquaintances expect to see one another again but in limited circumstances. Influence on self-identity is probably minimal.

Level 3 - Friend. The interactants have a high degree of personal knowledge of one another. The category of "friend" may include friends, siblings, parents, romantic partners. Friends expect to interact with one another in a wide variety of contexts, often far into the foreseeable future. They often have a strong impact on self-identity.

Level 4 - Intimate. The interactants may report that they know one another as well as they know themselves, maybe even better. Intimates are central to one another's lives, interconnected in a wide variety of activities in the past, present and projected future. The relationship is so central to one another's self-identity that they may lose a sense of boundary between self and other.

Propositions

We propose that social confrontation will be somewhat different at each level of intimacy. Specifically, degree of intimacy will affect: (1) the purpose for confrontation, (2) the nature of expectations leading to confrontation, (3) the time orientation of the confrontation, (4) the importance of context to the confrontation, and (5) the projection of self on other in the confrontation. Table 1 summarizes these variants.

Table 1

Level of Intimacy and Characteristics of Social Confrontation

Characteristics	1. Stranger	2. Acquaintance	3. Friend	4. Intimate
Purpose	Regulation of Behavior	Coordination of Behavior	Negotiate Relational Culture	Negotiate Relational Culture
Nature of Rule	Social Norm	Specialized Social Norm	Relational Rule	Relational Rule
Time Orientation	Present	Present, Immediate Past & Future	Past, Present & Future	Past, Present, & Future
Context	Situation Bound	Situation Bound	Situation Fluid	Situation Fluid
Projection of Self on Other	None	Low	Moderate	High

Level 1 - Stranger

Confronting another person is justified by a norm of rule of the relationship. Following Toulmin's model of argument,¹³ the behavior of the other serves as grounds for the claim, "your behavior is undesirable." The norm or rule of the relationship serves as the warrant linking the grounds to the claim. In social confrontation of a stranger one relies upon shared social and cultural understanding of norms of a situation. The confrontation is bound to the context - time, place, and social function of the situation.

1. Confrontation of a stranger requires being in a situation where the social norms are generally understood by all participants.

- a. Since the social norms are clear cut, confrontation may be done totally nonverbally. A look of displeasure may be enough to make the other aware of the rule infringement.

Example: In a lecture a man and woman behind me kept talking in a low whisper. I turned around and gave them a dirty look. They returned a shocked look and quit whispering.

- b. Strangers may feel no obligation to respond to another stranger's expression of displeasure. Then social confrontation may proceed with an explicit reminder of the nature of the situation and its implied rules. Explicit statements are harder to ignore and require either defiance ("I know the rules, but I don't care") or compliance.

Example: Just this morning in the library I was trying to study and these two people came by and stopped to talk to the guy on the other side of the table from me. They were talking right out loud. After a few minutes of this and after they had ignored my disgusted looks several times, I said, "Do you mind? Some of us are here to study." They quickly left.

- c. A stranger may comply due to the strong demand characteristics of the situation but express hostility towards the person calling them on the rule violation.

Example: I was in a long line of people waiting to go on a ride at Disneyland. After waiting for 20 minutes, three girls butted into the line ahead of me and a friend. I immediately became angry and told them to go to the back of the line. One of the girls called me a few choice words and then they left.

- d. Or a stranger may, in essence, get caught doing something "they know they shouldn't" and meekly comply.

Example: A man was checking oil in a car next to mine at my apartment. I was walking across the parking lot and noticed him drop an oily paper towel in the back of my truck. I picked it up and took it over to him and said, "Excuse me, but that was my truck you threw this in. Would you like me to show you where the trash cans are?" He said, "No", and disposed of it properly.

2. One is less likely to initiate or persist in a confrontation with a stranger as one often has the option of just leaving the situation and never having to interact with the person again.

Example: At a movie theatre some older ladies were behind us giving play-by-plays. First, I turned and gave them a dirty look and when they didn't stop then we got up and moved.

3. Confrontation with a stranger is more likely to end without smoothing hostile feelings or saving face.

Example: Walking down the street I ran directly into a stranger, or rather, she ran into me. And because I wasn't in a very good mood anyway, I was rude when I probably should not have been. She said, "Oh excuse me, I wasn't watching where I was going." I responded, "Obviously", and walked on.

4. In some situations the role of either the confronter or the confrontee requires compliance upon request.

Example: At a restaurant I told the waitress, "The food I ordered isn't cooked right." She said, "I'm sorry, I will take it back and get it cooked right." I told her, "Thank you."

5. A "Sir Gallahad reflex" may prompt confrontation of a stranger in order to protect someone.

Example: A boy was cruelly ridiculing a younger boy who looked like he came from a poor family. "Excuse me, but I don't appreciate you talking like that around me. If you want to cut somebody's self-esteem could you please go elsewhere? Preferably, look in a mirror and find your own faults." He left, mimicking me.

6. Confrontation of a stranger may stem purely from a desire to preserve certain social norms, to counteract deviance or inconsiderate behavior.

Example: A couple were going to get in their car. The girl recklessly opened the car door, it hit the car next to it so hard that it shook. After dinging the door, she laughed and started getting in the car. I walked over to the guy and told him I would think twice about dating a girl who treated other people's property so carelessly. I walked away before he could say anything.

Confrontation with a stranger may be simply to regulate behavior - particularly behavior which interferes with the confronter's accomplishment of the purpose for being in that particular situation. The confrontation depends upon clear understanding and acceptance of the social norms of the situation and is context-bound. Since self-identity is not tied to the relationship with the stranger we may be more willing to be hostile and rude.

Level 2 - Acquaintance

We may generally avoid confronting acquaintances because we lack knowledge of how the other will respond. The relationship is not at a level to have developed an expectation or responsibility for honesty. Two respondents report: "Usually I don't do anything when it's someone I know moderately well. I'm usually afraid that someday I might have to ask this person for a favor, or because they really might get offended." "I don't think I ever confronted someone I knew moderately. I usually think it's their problem and ignore it or leave."

1. With acquaintances, the reason for confrontation may not be so much the violation of a clearly understood rule but rather confusion over what the expectations of the situation or the relationship are.

Example: A few weeks ago my husband and I went out of town for the weekend. Upon arriving home we found mud tracked all the way through the house and mud all around my recently cleaned bathroom sink and floor. The only people who have a key besides us are our neighbors whose parents own the apartments. We immediately called them:

"Hi, do you know anyone who was in our apartment this weekend."

"Well no, why?"

We then explained why and described the mess.

"Oh, I guess I did give the key to the construction workers who were remodeling the apartment below you, in case they needed to use the bathroom or anything."

"That's nice to find out some construction workers were here while we weren't. I thought that's what we paid rent for. Can't we expect any right to privacy?"

He then apologized and offered to come reclean the apartment. We did not accept the offer, but did accept the apology with the promise that it would not happen again.

2. Confrontation with an acquaintance tends to be done very gingerly.

a. Confrontation may be presented as information processing.

Example: I approached a teacher because I wanted to know why my research paper was graded so low (class of about 75).

"Hi. I was wondering what was wrong with my paper so I can improve on the next one."

The teacher reads the paper. "When did you turn it in?"

"Two weeks early."

"That explains it. I graded those that came in early a lot harder because I had the time and I had to hurry with the late ones. I'll raise it one letter grade."

b. Confrontation may be performed through teasing or humor to preserve a light atmosphere.

Example: I said to my roommate in a teasing manner, "Greg, you sloppy sucker, why can't you ever clean the house?" He responded in a similar manner. And then I said, "No, seriously, we need to keep the house cleaner."

c. Confrontation may lead to an offer to help.

Example: At music and group practice, a member of the group was not attending the rehearsals like he should. It was slowing down my progress because he was my partner.

"Hey Tom, we've missed ya, where have ya been?"

"I wish everybody would leave me alone. I haven't missed that much. I just won't do the dance."

"What about your dance partner? Is that fair for her? She's put a lot of time into it and now you say forget it."

"Well, I just can't learn it because they keep on changing it."

"Tell ya what, I'll help you. You can do it!"

3. Confrontation with an acquaintance may be done implicitly rather than explicitly. (Perhaps the motivation is to get even rather than to negotiate expectations.)

Example: My roommate came home drunk last night. Now I don't mind drinking, but in excess I can't stand it. She was "trying" to do things that would make us sympathize or laugh with her. Disgusted with her, I just ignored her. Getting ready for bed that night I wasn't overly quiet. If she had a hangover, it was her fault and anything that happens to her. . . well.

4. Negotiation of rules at the acquaintance level is crucial to the survival and evolution of the relationship to friendship.

a. Failure to adequately negotiate rules may lead to termination.

Example: When my roommates were upset with me I could tell. First, I received a dirty note taped to my door. And second, I received the silent treatment. No one would tell me what was bugging them or what I had done wrong until I came right out and asked them what the problem was. Then in a round-about-way (avoiding directly talking about it) they told me. Later, even though the issue had been discussed and supposedly resolved, body language from my roommates told me I could no longer live in that apartment.

- b. Failure to follow through on negotiated rules may lead to stagnation and arrest the development of a relationship.

Example: I confronted a fairly new (not close) friend because she was giving me double messages and it was driving me crazy. One minute she'd be super nice, the next time "cold". She was constantly offering me rides and then forgetting, etc. I knew she did it to other people too, and that sometimes they didn't like her for it. It was a long conversation. First, I asked her if she had known that I had been angry with her for quite awhile. (She hadn't, and I wasn't surprised.) Then I said that that was half of the problem - that she didn't care enough to notice that I was unhappy with her. I told her the only reason she was able to upset me was because I liked her so much. I told her that I was upset because she was sending double messages and confusing me, but I did want to be friends still. (In other words, I wanted her to change so we could be.) She was really nice about it, and said that she hadn't realized what she was doing. She said she could see what she needed to do differently with other people, and thanked me for pointing things out to her. I told her to please tell me when she wasn't happy with me, but she said she couldn't think of anything that bothered her. (In my opinion, she didn't care again.) Anyway, she was really nice. But she still does the same things, but worse. Sometimes she's nice; but usually cold.

Between acquaintances, social confrontation appears to negotiate a set of working rules for how to get along within the situation which brings them together. The confrontation is bound to that situation, context-specific, and tends to be primarily about present behavior with reference to immediate past and limited projected future behavior. The relationship has little impact on self-identity so confrontation may be avoided or used only as necessary to coordinate behavior.

Level 3 - Friend

With the development of friendship, we acquire a sense of responsibility to maintain the relationship. Confrontation may be more frequent than with acquaintances. The issues of confrontation become more complex due to the increased interconnectedness of the participants' lives. The importance of the relationship to one's self-identity introduced problems of negotiating boundaries between self and other.

1. In confronting a friend we may express a willingness to understand the friend's account for the problematic behavior, perhaps even helping in building the account.

Example: A friend had written me a check for some cosmetics and it bounced.

"Carol, that check you wrote me came back."

"Oh, I'm sorry. I'll bet Moose cleared the account before it cleared the bank."

"I'm sure things are pretty outashepe, especially going through a divorce."

"Yes. Listen, I'll get the cash to you Thursday after payday."

"Okay. I'll really appreciate it."

2. On the other hand, friends count a lot on the taken-for-granted understandings between them. When these are violated, hostility may erupt.

Example: On a bike ride my friend wanted to go one way and I wanted to go the other way. The only thing we did was scream each other's names and then took off the way each of us wanted to go. We eventually thought we would see each other around the block. But I couldn't find her and went home, while she waited for 15 minutes on the corner she expected to see me at. When we finally confronted each other I jumped in yelling at her, not giving her a chance. She did the same. We were both too stubborn to listen to each other.

3. The number of issues which become interconnected between friends may make social confrontation very complex with a number of issues being implied at one time.

Example: "Why do we always have to spend money; can't we do anything that's free?"

"It's not your money anyway. You won't have to pay a dime. I'll pay."

"Still, can't we do anything that's simple and cheap? If your mom knew what you spent it on she'd stop sending it."

"Just because my parents aren't like yours! They don't make me do it all on my own. You sure try to make it clear to them how I spend it when you're around them and they still give it to me."

"Oh you think it's just 'cause of my parents! And you make it sound like I say all those things just to get you in trouble and since it didn't, why do you care anyway. . ." etc., etc.

4. Confrontation between friends may frequently involve the negotiation of boundaries.

- a. Friends negotiate the extent of involvement in one another's lives. They must find the balance between relational identity and preservation of individual identity.

Example: My roommate is my best friend, plus we had all of our classes together. She seemed to be slightly upset with me so I asked, "Have I done something to make you mad at me?"

"Not really, it's just I'm tired of always being together and competing against you."

"Well, maybe we shouldn't take every class together, so we can meet more people, and not always be around each other."

"That would probably help. It's hard being around the same person 24 hours daily."

- b. Friends must negotiate expectations for openness and needs for privacy.

Example: One of my really close friends wanted me to tell him something, and usually I would. But I said, "No, I can't." He said, "I thought we could talk to each other." I said, "Well some things we can and some things we can't. It bothers me when you think I have to tell you everything."

- c. Friends indirectly negotiate limits on control or influence within the relationship.

Example: We both wanted to see a movie but disagreed on which one so we ended up going mini-golfing instead.

"Let's go see xxx."

"I'd rather go see ooo."

"We always go see what you want to see."

"Fine, let's go see xxx."

"No, I don't even want to see a show anymore."

"Okay, let's go somewhere else, like mini-golf."

"Fine."

5. The confrontation between friends frequently relies upon knowing how to "read" one another, and a commitment to one another. This dependability may lead to manipulative gamesmanship.

- a. Friends can use exaggerated threats without risk of being misunderstood.

Example: My friend was chewing gum loudly with her mouth open. I said, "Quit chewing your gum so loud or I'll beat you to a frazel." She said, "Ya, I'd like to see ya try." But she didn't make so much noise.

- b. Friends may avoid direct confrontation by acting "strange", requiring the other to coax you. This action may be a way of evading responsibility for the confrontation.

Example: When my boyfriend does something which offends me, I clam up. I get very sad, not mad. I don't talk very much and when he asks me what the matter is I say, "nothing." He has to coax it out of me before I'll tell what it is that has upset me.

- c. A friend may use the other's feelings of attachment and responsibility to gain compliance or contrition.

Example: I was supposed to meet my boyfriend at a certain time so that we could go to an activity together. He wasn't there so I left without him. The next day I saw him and jokingly told him I wasn't speaking to him. He had forgotten and he felt worse than I could have made him feel by yelling at him. I rubbed it in by telling him how much fun I had.

6. Confrontation between friends begins to show a willingness to speak for one another - to project one's self upon the other, telling them how they should feel or think.

Example: I visited my best friend for a week and she was being rather pessimistic. She had a negative attitude. She said something negative that we both knew was not true. I denied the statement, "No, it's not, and you know it." She paused and realized the significance of what was said. I continued, "Sharon, you've been doing that a lot lately, saying things you know aren't true." She agreed and we talked it through a little more. She decided she needed to think rightly.

Friends confrontation appears to center on specific expectations for one another and their relationship. Confrontation may take place about behaviors far removed in time and space. An integral part of negotiating the emerging relational culture is the negotiation of boundaries between self and other. Self-identity becomes tied to the friendship yet participants may strive to maintain a separate identity as well.

Level 4 - Intimate

With intimates the degree of attachment may be so high that the participants confuse self and other. They feel comfortable telling one another how to think and feel even beyond the boundaries of their relationship. Ironically, because of the degree of interconnectedness in their lives, mundane affairs may intrude upon intimates leading to numerous tiffs over minor behaviors. The high expectations for the participants to know and understand one another may lead to many frustrations. In addition, intimates may become too relaxed with one another. In intimate relationships we expect the other to accept everything about us (Mark Knapp's, "Love me, love my rhinoceros"). We may become unwilling to monitor our own behavior feeling that we are now "backstage" and do not need to perform.

1. Mundane activities may infringe upon the intimate relationship.

- a. Intimates may have tiffs over failure to meet expectations in minor day to day activities. Intimates are "supposed to know" the varying conditions regulating rule application.

Example: I was angry with my husband for not waking me up in time to go to church.

"Why didn't you wake me up?"

"You always get mad at me when I wake you up."

"I do not get mad at you for waking me up at 8:00, only when you come in at 6:00 and every 15 minutes after that."

Jerry just walked away and went to church.

- b. Intimates find themselves in the paradoxical situation of being willing to make time for one another yet are supposed to understand the other's needs to get work done.

Example: My wife and I are both students. We had a confrontation over whose work was more important. "You are always too wrapped up in your work to even listen to what I have to say. I have enough of my own work to worry about."

2. Intimates face the continuing problem of negotiating the boundaries between integration and separation. The confusion of other with self may lead to problems.

- a. Being one's "true" self with the accompanying unwillingness to monitor behavior with intimate may become a source of confrontation.

Example: When my husband gets upset, he swears. Yet, I never heard him swear before we were married. This was not a first confrontation. I have let him know before that swearing is very offensive to me. But have tried not to say too much. One day it was particularly bad so I confronted him with, "Why don't you ever swear in front of your mother?" He replied, "Because she would be really disappointed in me if she heard me swear." I countered, "Don't you think I'm disappointed, or don't you care?"

- b. The tendency to speak for one another may lead to a perceived infringement on self-hood.

Example: Yesterday my husband and I were talking and I made a statement about how I felt about something. His return was, "Oh, you don't really." I then let him know that I did not appreciate him telling me how I felt just after stating how I felt.

3. Intimates are held accountable for their behavior even outside of the boundaries of the relationship.

Example: After being gone for two hours Terry quizzed her husband as to what he had done in that time period, "So what else have you done, just carry chrome for two hours?" Carl proceeded to account for his time, "No the metal I carried in. . . I watched TV for half an hour while I was eating dinner."

4. Intimates are much more concerned about projected future behavior.

Example: Lynn offers a conjecture about possible behavior both could consider in the future: Leaving their children with grandparents while going on a vacation. David reproaches the hypothetical behavior by questioning the appropriateness of such behavior,

"two weeks though that's asking a lot." Lynn then accounts for her offense denying David's reproach by offering an example contrary to his reproach, "my mom's use to that." David again reproaches with, "not as infants." Lynn then accounts again dispelling David's reproach and thus aligns the proposed vacation with the appropriate age for leaving children with in-laws. David accepts the possibility.

Intimates must simultaneously negotiate the mundane activities of every day life along with their definitions of self. Confrontation may be time and context free. They tend to confront over projected future behavior. Intimates expect one another to understand the nuances of their expectations given the numerous taken-for-granted accumulated over time and shared experience. Attachment is so high that the boundaries between self and other may become confused.

Conclusion

We have claimed that social confrontation is a particular kind of episode through which relationships are negotiated. But the type of relationship, characterized by its degree of intimacy, also affects the form and substance of the confrontation episode. Thus, our understanding of relational development may be enhanced by studying social confrontation. But our understanding of the social confrontation episode will also be enhanced by studying the nature of the relationship in which it occurs.

Notea

¹Sara E. Newell and Randall K. Stutman, "Interpersonal Disagreement: The Study of Social Confrontation," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. D. Zarefsky, M. O. Sillars, and J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 725-739.

²G. R. Miller and M. Steinberg, Between People: A New Analysis of Interpersonal Communication (Palo Alto, California: Science Research Associates, 1975).

³Irving A. Altman and Dalmas A. Taylor, Social Penetration: The Development of Interpersonal Relationships (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

⁴Julia T. Wood, "Communication and Relational Culture: Bases for the Study of Human Relationships," Communication Quarterly, 30 (1982), 75-83.

⁵Kathryn L. Adams, "Communication as Negotiation: A Study of Strategic Interaction in Social Relationships," Diss. University of Utah 1985.

⁶Sara E. Newell and Randall K. Stutman, "A Qualitative Approach to Social Confrontation: Identifying Constraints and Facilitators," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November 1982; Newell and Stutman, "Interpersonal Disagreement," Sara E. Newell, "Patterns of Social Confrontation," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, November 1984.

⁷Newell and Szutman, "Qualitative Approach".

⁸Newell, "Patterns".

⁹Adams.

¹⁰George Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. Kurt Wolff (New York: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 118-135.

¹¹George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, Identities and Interactions (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 172-174.

¹²Wood.

¹³Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 111.

ARGUING STRATEGIES OF THE ELDERLY

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If reasoning is one of the qualities that make persons human, then it is especially appropriate to investigate what common and diverse strategies of argumentation persons adopt during different stages of the life cycle. Although gerontologists have not studied the arguing strategies of the elderly specifically, they have examined the way elders solve problems, make decisions, and communicate with peers and family. This body of research offers several hypotheses that can help establish a framework for investigating how the elderly argue. The sociological hypothesis suggests that elders argue similarly to all other segments of the population and that problems or peculiarities of arguing derive not from the chronological age of a person but rather from elders' level of education, work experiences, and personal and professional learnings.¹ A second hypothesis is philosophical; it concludes that elders are experiencing their final stage of life and therefore they focus their communication upon human values, learnings from life experiences, and accumulated wisdom.² A third hypothesis infers that physical and social deprivations reduce the ability of elders to reason as they grow older. This point view claims that elders once had reasoning skills but that these skills have declined because the physical health of the elder has degenerated and their social contacts have decreased.³ The final hypothesis is perceptual-cultural; this position claims that the elderly share common strategies and abilities to communicate but that these are perceived differently in different cultures. For example, in some cultures, persons believe that elders are wise and knowledgeable and others in the population look to them for advice on solving problems. In other cultures, the elders are perceived to be old, outdated, and irrelevant to the rest of society so their arguments are interpreted as erroneous and useless.⁴ Each hypothesis demonstrates the variety of assumptions that underlie research about the communication of elders. This essay adopts assumptions similar to the philosophical hypothesis and examines how elders use the narrative mode of arguing as a way of justifying actions and values.

Most of our knowledge about the arguing strategies of the elderly comes not from research in gerontology but from our own personal experiences with the elders in our families and communities and from observations of elders portrayed in the mass media. For example, those of us who

viewed the film "On Golden Pond" saw Henry Fonda, a retired college professor, portray a forgetful, fearful, and irreverent elder who often tried to debate with his wife, daughter, son-in-law, and grandson. But when he engaged in propositional argument and case building, he failed to persuade members of his family. However when the elderly man began to tell stories to family members, he succeeded in getting them to accept and understand his actions and values.

The fact that others can beat understand elders through the narratives they share is an instructive theme. It suggests that narrative is the appropriate focus for scholars to take when they study the arguing strategies of elders. The purpose of this essay is to develop a framework for understanding narrative argument and to propose that this mode of arguing is characteristic of elderly persons. To accomplish this goal, the essay (1) develops a narrative framework for the study of the argumentation of elderly, (2) applies this framework to the analysis of oral histories, and (3) evaluates the narrative approach as a method for looking at modes of arguing throughout the life cycle.

Narrative Framework

Developing a narrative framework for the study of argumentative discourse involves defining this mode of discourse, explaining the argumentative characteristics of story, and analyzing how a specific genre of narrative works as argument.

In its broadest sense, narrative includes "the words and/or deeds--that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create, and interpret them."⁵ Narrative has three defining traits. The first trait is the content of the narrative--the chain of events, actions, and happenings of the story. Specifically, the story attributes meaning to the stories of human experience.⁶ Often the meanings of the stories of elderly result from their interpretations of solving problems, surviving hardships, or enduring oppression. The issues of stories stress the values gained from experience. The second trait consists of existents which are the character and setting of the narrative. The existents are both the characters who create and experience the action and the setting or the context in which the action takes place.⁷ In some stories, the storyteller is the main character whose point of view structures and forms the story. In other narrative, the storyteller is the observer who tells others stories for them. Context consists of both the times and places in which the narratives are situated. The final trait is the discourse

itself, the linguistic means by which the content and the existents are presented by the storyteller.⁸ Discourse includes the reasoned connections of the narrative such as the generalizations or claims, inferences, and justifications. The discourse may also establish the motive and meaning of the story through the language of description, imagery, metaphor, and analogy. Summers concludes that narrative is "a way of looking at life" that allows auditors to "discover the values the author chooses to prove."⁹ In this essay, narrative argumentation refers to the process in which storytellers seek the adherence of auditors to the value claims they present in their stories. Claim means the linguistic statements about persons, places and ideas which elders use to interpret the meaning of their stories.¹⁰

Narrative does not take traditional argumentative forms because it often lacks "clearly identifiable modes of inference" and "rational standards taken from formal and informal logic." Instead narrative consists of "stories constituted by good reasons." These stories become "rational when they satisfy the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity."¹¹ Narrative probability means that the stories provide coherent accountings between storytellers and auditors whereas narrative fidelity means that the stories fit with the experiences auditors have had in their own lives.¹² Unlike traditional rationality, narrative is not normative instead it describes "human choice and action" and uses these descriptions as the basis for identification with the values and experiences of auditors.¹³

Narrative can work effectively as reason-giving discourse in several ways. First, storytellers establish a specific point of view and/or stance and therefore interpret their own behavior and the behavior of others from a designated perspective.¹⁴ In this way, the narrator-arguers take positions toward experiences and actions and use various elements of the narrative to support those positions. Second, a story organizes large amounts of information in a condensed and involving sequence.¹⁵ Whereas the claims of traditional argumentation contain a limited amount of information presented in a linear sequence, stories present large amounts of information and multiple claims in configural accounts of the narrated action in which characters act within a setting for a purpose. Third, depending on the plot of the narrative, the story provides predictable causal connections between persons, contexts, ideas, and objects.¹⁶ For example, the life stories of the elderly link them to important customs and traditions; to past and present members of their community; to other persons who have shared significant contexts with them during their

lives; to ideas about how to succeed, work, raise children, take care of the land, or live through hard times; to certain symbolic objects such as clothes, vehicles, books, money, or technical advances. Fourth, narrative argument seeks the participation of the auditors in the action of the story because the story cannot be understood unless auditors bring their knowledge of history, their personal experiences, and their values to the interpretive framework of the story. 17 Just as auditors fill in premises or conclusions to a linear argument, the auditors of narratives fill in the gaps of the configuration of the story with their own experiences and understandings.

Narrative includes a variety of genre including: autobiography, saga, legend, adventure, oral history, fantasy, and melodrama. 18 Each of these types of narrative embodies properties of argument. However, this essay will focus on one genre, oral history, as narrated by elderly storytellers. When I use the term elders or elderly, I am referring to persons over eighty years of age. Oral history refers to first-person accounts of life experiences that result from an interviewer asking selected questions that are responded to by an interviewee. 19 Oral history is "a process of collecting . . . reminiscences, accounts, and interpretations of events from the recent past which are of historical significance. 20 Oral histories are a discursive method of representing and promoting human values. By responding to selected questions, narrators create meanings from life experiences, connect this meaning to specific values, and endow this experience with universality and purpose. For this reason, oral histories act as arguments because the stories persons tell make sense out of their experience through their interpretations of the interplay of content, existents, and discourse of their stories.

Several reasons justify the study of oral histories as the data for analyzing the arguing of the old-old, that is, the segment of persons who have exceeded the chronological age of eighty. Narrative is the typical discourse used by this group who rely more on the knowledge gained from personal experience than the that gained from external sources. Additionally, oral histories use an open-ended process so that elders can address issues without responding to a questionnaire or answering prescribed questions. Because the elderly sometimes fear unfamiliar settings and persons, the oral histories are conducted in the interviewee's home by someone who knows them. Finally, elders often have sight and hearing impairments that might limit their ability to respond to other research processes but these impairments have little or no effect on the ability of elders to provide an oral history. 21

Content. The content of the oral history is grounded

in the experience of the narrator. In ways similar to traditional argumentation, the purpose of the storyteller affects how the narrative will be structured. The purpose or end helps to establish the issues, the characters, and the settings that are chosen from the relevant life experience. 22 In general the purpose of the oral history is to deliberate about personal experience with the assistance of the questions of the interviewer. This deliberation leads to themes which, in turn, connect experience to particular values. Oral histories are a kind of "reasoning in retrospect," that is, the narrator reflects upon experiences and then evaluates that experience according to some present value. 23 The broad questions selected by questioners permit respondents to give detailed narrative responses that describe, interpret, and connect lived experiences. Values, according to Milton Rokeach, are "abstract ideals, positive or negative . . . representing a person's belief about an ideal mode of conduct." 24 Values are suggested by questions of the interviewer that seek information about occupations, ethnic background, religious preferences, work experiences, traditions, and economic situation. Thus the argumentative content of an oral history consists of value claims in the form of themes such as "the meaning of my life is that I learn from my mistakes and never repeat a mistake twice," value propositions such as "everyone should experience poverty and then they would know why it is important to save money," or social maxims such as "God will take care of those who take care of themselves."

Existents. In a narrative the experience and issues of value are developed through characters and contexts that are carefully described by the arguer-narrator. In oral histories, the value claims presented by elders are made from a subjective point of view. The central character is always the storyteller and "you cannot take the I out of the I remember of oral histories. . . the viewpoint of the individual resides in the very form of the oral history." The other important characters are the persons who influenced the choice and actions of narrators in positive or negative ways. 25 The setting or context is important to the oral history narrative. Often common contexts appear and reappear in the oral histories of the elderly such as the depression, World Wars I and II, and moving from another country. Occupational contexts also enter into oral histories with emphasis upon farming locations, mining activities, factory work, working for the railroad, or medical, teaching, or religious professions. Still another context features personal settings that include a family home, a place of sickness, moving from one region of the country to another, and a place associated with special experience of pain or of happiness. The

narrator is free to move from one context to another or to superimpose several contexts as a backdrop for his or her choices and actions.

The descriptions of both characters and context must be sufficiently detailed by the narrator so that the action and the choices appear true and probable. Narrator-arguers seek identification of the auditors with the characters and contexts of their narratives so the auditors will both believe and understand the stories.

Discourse. The discourse must accommodate both the content and the existents of the narrative. Adept narrator-arguers develop arguments by accepting common premises, making clear inferences, justifying claims, and using stylistic device to certify the importance of claims.

Sharing common premises is necessary for oral histories and these premises are clarified when questioners select respondents because they perceive the respondents to have first-hand knowledge and experience about a subject of historical inquiry. Before the question-response sequence begins, narrators and questioners accept the idea that narrators will give honest and accurate statements about their memories and their interpretations of events. Both recognize that questioners will ask probing questions about issues, characters, and setting in ways that will encourage the respondents to present detailed accounts. Thus, sharing premises in oral history means that participants understand their unique roles, recognize the purpose of the oral exchange, and agree to have their discourse recorded, transcribed, and disseminated for public scrutiny.²⁶

Agreement about the premises precedes the interview and helps to shape the content that evolves in the claims made through the narrative. Claims are ideas that narrators want their auditors to accept. Claims take the form of personal affirmations, judgments, or generalizations.²⁷ For example, in oral histories, narrators tell stories that have a point and that acts as an argumentative claim. In these historical narratives, elders make two typical types of claims. One is "a memory claim", that is, one person's claim as to what has happened in the past. These claims are difficult to analyze because they are often devoid of directly expressed evidence and the justification depends upon the memory of the narrator. The second type are value claims, that is, judgments "about a person, place, thing or idea."²⁸ Value claims can be either judgments about abstract values such as fairness, justice, truth or concrete values that judge specific persons, groups, or objects.²⁹ Often in historical narratives, the storyteller reveals a hierarchy of values through the configuration of the story.

The value claims are the product of inferences, that is, mental leaps from the data supplied in the narrative to a conclusion.³⁰ In oral histories, elders leap from their detailed accounts of their own experience, the characters who influenced them, and the places pertinent to the story's conclusions about the worth of someone or something. For example, elders might describe a landowner and his dealings with their community and then leap from that data to the conclusion that he was a dishonest scoundrel. Thus narrative provides the evidential data that is the grounds for the value claims they make.

Third, narrative offers justifications for the value claims it makes. These justifications are really warrants within the narrative that provide a rationale for the conclusions by implying or stating reasons why the claim is worthy of belief.³¹ However, because narrative is not linear and sequential, the justifications are of several types such as those implied by the plot and characters of the narrative, by other values expressed earlier or later in the narrative, by the common experiences of narrators and auditors, and by maxims or personally derived wisdom. The methods of justifying value claims differ widely from one oral history to another, but the methods within a single oral history are often quite consistent with one another.

Finally, the certitude of narratives is affected by the stylistic choices of the storyteller. To do this, the narrator embellishes the story with repetition and restatement, analogy, and emotionally-laden adjectives and adverbs.

Analysis of Narratives

This essay analyzes oral and transcribed oral histories from the Pioneer Foundation Collection containing ninety histories that were recorded between 1952-1965. The purpose of this project was to get a historical record of the pioneer life of ranchers and miners in Southern New Mexico. All of the subjects for the project lived in the last century and they ranged in age from eighty to one-hundred years old. The histories were recorded by Lou Blachley who had knowledge of the area and its people and who was a trained oral historian. The interviews resulted in over 600 audio tapes and thousands of transcribed pages. The individual histories range in length from twenty to one hundred pages. My analysis first investigates some commonalities among the narrative reasoning of the pioneers and then investigates examples of argument in the individual narratives by focusing on the content, existents, and discourse of the oral histories.

The common stories presented in these ninety histories stressed crime and weather crises. The crime stories ranged from tales about stealing property, defrauding persons out of property, to killing people. And the bad weather narratives recalled drought, floods, snow storms, and an earthquake. These narratives expressed value claims about the importance of honesty, the necessity of preparing for bad times, and the importance of acting like a lady or gentleman. Characters were central to the crime stories and featured legendary outlaws such as Billy the Kid and the heroic sheriff, Pat Garrett, who killed him; the violent wars of the Apaches and of their leader Geronimo; the deaths of innocent women and children as well as the justified murders of scoundrels and crooks. The characters of the weather stories most often consisted of the narrator, his or her family, and community members who shared the victimage and heroism of the weather crises. Whereas the context produced the struggle and subsequent action of the stories, the characters dominate the struggles and action of the crime stories. The value claims in all of the stories consisted of the following: the worth of persons, the quality and quantity of land, the quality of community residents, the importance of vehicles and work animals, and the character of many persons.

The oral histories vary in their narrative probability and fidelity. The improbable and unbelievable narratives resulted from the inability of some storytellers to provide sufficient detail about the persons, places, and actions of their recollection of history to show auditors that they were eye-witnesses to the circumstances they talked about. On the other hand, the probable and believable narrative arguments showed remarkable detail in the characterization of persons, the description of places, and the perception of things. One of the most involving of these stories recounted how a grizzly bear had mangled a man in the community and how the resulting physical disfiguration ruined his life. In this narrative, the storyteller described the trees and brush; the time of day and even the position of the sun; the dress, facial expression, weight, and attitude of the victim of the grizzly attack. This discursive detail created strong images of character, provided suspense, and encouraged the belief of auditors that the narrator was an eyewitness to the event and that his value claim--"nature punishes men for their foolishness"--is likely to be true.³²

Even though the quality of oral histories differs from storyteller to storyteller and from episode to episode within a single narrative, these oral histories share the trait that they present narrative arguments about issues of value and their purpose is to gain adherence of these value

claims from auditors. Whereas some narrators tell auditors directly what the meanings of their narratives are, others give much detail and allow auditors to draw their own conclusions about the meaning of the oral history.

Each storyteller chronicles different stories and each person adds unique versions to the stories because of their backgrounds and personalities. The following section of the essay analyzes three narrative segments of three different oral histories by focusing on the narrative argument found in each sample.

The first narrative centers upon the experiences of Lewis Jones, who as a child, recalled and evaluated the winter of 1888 in Reserve, New Mexico.³³ The purpose of his story is to relate the history of his experience of survival during a very bad winter. In the narrative, the storyteller, his family, and members of the community combine their resources to overcome the obstacles of the environment. Just as in other oral histories, the narrator and questioner enter into the discourse by acknowledging that the narrator has first-hand experience, will provide accurate and truthful accounts, and agrees that the material will be recorded and disseminated to the public.

Unlike most narratives, Jones begins with a value claim: "The winter of '88, by george, everybody almost starved to death in Reserve." Next, the story develops grounds or evidence for the inference by explaining: "There wasn't a pound of flour or coffee, bacon, lard. Oh, there might have been a little bacon if somebody had a hog or something like that. But there was nothing. They had nothing." The narrator repeats his point that the food supply was completely gone. The he digresses from his claim to explain the role of a character who helped keep food in the community as long as possible because he would let people grind corn in his old mill. This character is described as "an old fella moved in there from Missouri with a counter coffee mill." This fellow was kind enough to let everyone use this mill to make corn meal from dried corn. The narrator recalls that "everybody would go there every morning and mother used to send me there every morning with a ten pound lard bucket full of corn to grind . . . And, I used to done that every mornin" and stand in line . . . Maybe there'd be eight or ten grind there at a time." After the grinding mill broke down, Jones recalls, someone had to do something to prevent the starvation of the entire community. So his father and two friends decided to rig "sleds and sleigh runners" onto a team of horses and, with Jones himself accompanying the expedition, the men headed North to find food. Their journey to Magdalena, New Mexico, was slow and traumatic because "the

horses would . . . walk on top of the ice and snow and occasionally would break through. Your horses would bog down and your wagon would bog down." After twenty days of travel, Jones, his father, and his father's friends returned to Reserve "with seven or eight hundred pounds of food, flour and . . . a little sugar and coffee and things like that." The narrator concludes: "I was about fourteen, you see, then, just a kid . . . that was some, some trip! And cold, my godalmighty. I don't see how we ever got through."

In this narrative, two actions or events, that of grinding corn meal and traveling to Magdalena are the grounds for inference enabling the narrator to argue that everyone nearly starved because the grinding mill broke and the trip north to get food was so precarious that the people barely got back alive. The justification for the story are both in the narrative and in the minds of auditors who respond to the narrative. Specifically, the story makes clear that the food supply is gone. And auditors can participate in the argument to the degree that they believe the narrator, identify with his struggles against the weather, see that the narrative fits with their knowledge of history, relate their experience with severe winter conditions, perceive the credibility of the storyteller, and have familiarity with other narratives making similar claims. Any one of these factors may limit the probability and fidelity of the narrative and thereby limit auditors from giving their assent to the value claim/s of the story. This narrative presents a strong argument with an explicit grounds for inference, a justification for the claims, and linguistic embellishment in the form of detailed description and vivid imagery.

A quite different type of narrative argument appears in the oral history of Ben Perry who recalls that stealing cattle was prevalent and being a cattle rancher was difficult.³⁴ Using the same premises as other oral histories, the narrator develops a social maxim for his story that emphasizes "honesty is the best policy." Although Perry does not give much detail about the context, the setting in the 1880's is relevant to auditors' understanding of the story. At this time, cattle ranchers moved in by the dozens to take advantage of the rich grazing land in the area. Since New Mexico was not yet a state, the laws for grazing were not clear and so each cattleman settled the land and claimed it for himself. In this narrative, the characters are more important than the context for this storyteller who develops character by using comparisons and contrasts. First, he compares his own character with that of Dan Gatly, an honest rancher for whom he worked and then he compares his honest acts with

other cowhands who would not hesitate to steal a cow if they got a chance.

The story begins by a reference from the questioner to Dan Gatly. Perry recalls, "Dan Gatly . . . as I told you has 27 descendants, that is with the wives of the children . . . He did all right . . . and they was a good family too. And I'll tell you something that Dan Gatly was one of the best men in the world . . . He was just as honest as the day is long . . . I know 'cause I worked with him and I was workin' for him." Perry explains that as a young man, he had a bad reputation and when he came to work for Gatly, Gatly told him that "I'd damn sure have to quit stealin'" because he was honest and he intended to make the community honest. But Perry explains, "I got up there and it wasn't as honest as he thought it was" so I told him "you just overlook a whole lot of stuff that you don't want to see." Gatly told me "Ben, I'd rather lose a cow anytime than steal one." But he stresses, "In those days, if you didn't steal cattle you couldn't stay in the cattle business." Then he digresses from his account of honesty to give some explanations of how they would steal cattle. They "would kill the beef and eat it" or they would sell it so there would be no evidence of any crime. After detailing some stories of things he had seen, Perry concludes "everybody, everybody would have been better off if they'd of gone and just taken care of their own outfit and been honest."

The major claim stresses honesty and appears at the end of the story. Perry infers this from a series of concrete value claims such as Gatly was the best man in the world, he had a good family, I didn't have a good reputation. The narrative lacks specific detail about actions, conflicts, and characters and so the premises of the narrative configuration are left out and auditors are expected to fill in the missing detail from their knowledge of the storyteller, their perceptions of the purpose and context of the story, or their own assumptions about honest and dishonest actions. If auditors do not fill in the gaps, the narrative likely will remain incomplete and the story will lack both narrative probability and fidelity. The story also lacks the linguistic embellishment of descriptive detail, memorable images, and analogies. The argument does seem to support a common maxim about honesty, but it does not give enough new evidence to show either why that value was not accepted by ranchers or why it should have been believed thus the narrative is a weak argument.

The third illustration comes from the oral history of Ida Burgeas who recounts her memories of the raids of Geronimo and Victorio, Apache warriors, in 1886.³⁵ Her

purpose is to compare her childhood perceptions with those conclusions she has affirmed seventy-five years later. Her value conclusion is that children do not recognize the danger that adults do. Unlike the Perry narrative, Burgess provides some detail about the context of the story explaining the landscape and the physical terrain of the area which helps provide a rationale for the actions of the story. However, she could have filled in some detail about the historical context explaining that ranchera were settling areas that the Apaches believed were their rightful land and because they were powerless under the law, they tried to scare the ranchers away by raids and killing. She ignores the motive of the actions of the villains but concentrates instead on the effects on herself and members in her community. Burgess, at age ten, is the major character of the narrative and other characters are her neighbors who are victims of the raids and the Indian warriors who are the villains of the story. The most interesting feature of the discourse is its emphasis on the source (the Indians) of the evil actions. She stresses: "they killed the colt so the colt wouldn't give them away"; "they killed a lot of people"; They "caused her horse to throw her"; and they killed "the whole infantry." Her point of view toward the action is quite clear and the repetitive discourse enforces the strength of the claim she makes.

In addition to her focus on the cause of the deaths and hardships, the narrative shows irony by comparing her childhood evaluation of the story with her adult conclusions. An example of how she recounts this irony is found in this segment. Burgess recalls that although many people were killed in the raids, she remembers most her personal loss. During the raids, a neighbor was returning with some fabric to make a dress for her. The dress would be very special since she had only one dress. However, she never got the dress because the neighbor's horse was "spooked by an Indian standing behind a tree that caused her horse to throw her" and "the Indian stole the dress and I never got to see it, that was worse than the Indians to me. . . I didn't realize the danger."

This story shows how oral history permits "reasoning in retrospect," that is, the narrator can re-evaluate the historical experience in light of contemporary knowledge and understanding. This kind of arguing juxtaposes the earlier claim with the later ones and shows auditors the justification for reinterpretation. In Burgess's narrative, the justification appears in a second segment of the story in which she tells how the neighbors "gathered every night at the Shackelford ranch" because they were afraid the Indians would attack them. She recalls

"everyone slept with a gun under their pillow." While they were asleep one night, a posse from Fort Bayard "went up to waylay the Indians . . . and they were waylaid themselves and everybody was killed." She concludes "it was a lark to me because I didn't realize the danger. But to grown people, it must have been terrible."

Although many narrators decide upon their claims long after the event, they present the claims as if they were held at the time of the event as both Jones and Perry do. Burgess explains the difference and also gives a justification for that difference in a segment of the narrative. For several reasons, her narrative seems believable since auditors are likely to acknowledge the selfish interests of a ten year old and the account fits with general knowledge about the Indian history of the area. She adds probability to the narrative by adding specific names, dates, and places and uses vivid detail that is characteristic of an eye-witness observer. Thus, the narrative provides a strong argument stressing that children are blind to danger because of their selfish interests.

Oral History as Research Method

This essay promotes the study of narrative argument through the analysis of oral histories as a method for investigating how the oldest segment of the population gives reasons. In doing so, I conclude that narrative is a legitimate form of argument; it is the most common mode used by the oldest segment of the population; and narratives vary according to the content, existents, and discourse. Some of these type of arguments are weak and others are strong according to their ability to create narrative probability and fidelity for their auditors.

Even though this essay stresses how elders seek adherence of auditors through the stories they tell, oral history may also provide another means of reasoning for elders in that this process may encourage elders to reflect on their experience and thereby create new knowledge and meanings. Gerontologist Robert Butler suggests that this kind of communication is helpful to elders because they establish patterns and connections in their life that they may not have seen before.³⁶

The use of oral history need not be reserved for the study of how the elderly argue but this method might provide useful discourse for the study of how each segment of the population recounts stories of similar experience. This type of data should show narrative reasoning and value claims in all segments of the population. A panel studying

argumentation throughout the life cycle could provide a more systematic study of arguing if we used data from the same method.

I recommend oral histories as a source of discourse for several reasons. They provide extensive and detailed texts of discourse in both oral and transcribed form. Unlike pencil and paper tests and research interviews, oral history does not depend exclusively upon the questions of someone else for the content. Another advantage of this method is that persons are recorded in their home and with artifacts that give a depth and authenticity to the discourse that is not always present in the data secured from other methods. Finally, the narrator responds to only two or three issues and is encouraged to provide detailed responses to the questions on these issues. The limited role of the questioner forces the respondent to take a leading role in the oral history.

Using oral history, of course, has limitations as well. By definition, oral history requires a select rather than a random sample of a population and because of the premises of the interview, some persons will opt not to participate. Second, untrained interviewers may taint the oral history by asking too many questions or the wrong type of questions. Even though a certain degree of reliability can be achieved when one questioner conducts many oral histories, comparing the results of histories conducted by many different persons may lack reliability. Finally, the result might be affected by the use of the tape recorder or by the fact that every word is going to be disseminated for public scrutiny. Nonetheless, I believe oral history provides an excellent source of textual data that can be used for investigation of value claims and narrative argument. Moreover, oral history is a useful method for studying the argumentation of the oldest segment of the population.

NOTES

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2. The philosophical position is found in the following: Harry R. Moody, "Education and the Life Cycle" A Philosophy of Aging," in Introduction to Educational Gerontology, ed. Ronald H. Sherron and D. Barry Lumsden (Washington, DC: Hemisphere Publishing, 1978); Robert N. Butler, "Successful Aging and the Role of the Life Review," Journal of The American Geriatric Society, 5 (1974), 529-535; A. Monk, "Life Fulfillment for Older Persons Symposium," The Humanist, 37 (1977), 4-33; William Bier, Aging: Its Challenge to the Individual and Society (New York: Fordham University, 1974); and Henri Nouwen and Walter J. Gafney, Aging: The Fulfillment of Life (New York: Doubleday, 1976).

3. The deprivation hypothesis is suggested in: L.R. Goulet and P. B. Baltes, eds. Life Span Developmental Psychology: Research and Theory (New York: Academic Press, 1970); James E. Birren, ed. Handbook of Aging and the Individual: Psychological and Biological Aspects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); and Elliott Dunlap Smith, Handbook of Aging (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972).

4. The cultural position is stressed by the following: M. Clark and B. Anderson, Culture and Aging (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1967); D. Cogell and L. Holmes, eds. Aging and Modernization (New York: Appleton, Century and Crofts, 1972); and Edmond Palmore, The Honorable Elders: A Cross Cultural Study of Aging in Japan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975).

5. Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs, 51 (1984), 2.

6. Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 9-19.

7. Chatman, pp. 9-19.

8. Chatman, pp. 9-19.

9. Hollis Summers. Discussion of the Short Story (Boston: Heath & Company, 1963) p. vii and Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 82-159.

10. Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, 2nd ed. (Glenview IL: Scott Foresman, 1984), p. 49

11. Fisher, 2.

12. Fisher, 8-9.

13. Fisher, 9 and Scholes and Kellogg, pp. 82-159.

14. Scholes and Kellogg, pp. 240-282.

15. W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1981), pp. 6-10.

16. Scholes and Kellogg, pp. 207-214.

17. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 140-41. Hauerwas claims that stories build community through the sharing of values in narrative discourse.

18. Scholes and Kellogg, pp. 17-57.

19. Willa K. Baum, Oral History for the State and Local Historical Society (Nashville, TN: American Assoc. for State and Local History, 1974), p. 7.

20. Alice Hoffman, "Reliability and Validity in Oral History," in David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, eds. Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology (Nashville, TN: American Association for State and Local History, 1984), p. 68. The focus of oral history on values is explained in James Bennett, "Human Values in Oral History," Oral History Review, 11 (1983), 1-15.

21. Atchley, ch. 6 and Janice Schuetz, "Gerogogy: Instructional Programs for Elders," Communication Education, 31 (1981), 341.

22. Frank Kermode, "Secrets and Narrative Sequence," Critical Inquiry, 7 (1983), 1-15.

23. Methods for doing oral history are explained in: Baum, pp. 23-32; Charles Morrissey, "On Oral History Interviewing," in Lewis A. Porter, ed. Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, IL: Northwestern

University Press, 1970); pp. 109-19; and Thad Sutton, George L. Mahaffey and O. L. Davis, Oral History (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), pp. 1-23.

24. Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1968), p. 113.

25. Bennett, 6.

26. These assumptions are outlined in Baum, pp. 23-25.

27. Definitions of claims parallel those explanations in Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision By Debate, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 40-41.

28. Hoffman in Dunaway and Baum, p. 7.

29. Rieke and Sillars, p. 49.

30. Ehninger and Brockriede, p. 23.

31. Ehninger and Brockriede, p. 24.

32. Amos Walter interviewed by Lou Blachley, Pioneer Foundation Oral Histories, Tape #17, p. 24.

33. Lewis Jones interviewed by Lou Blachley, Pioneer Foundation Oral Histories, Tape #176, p. 13.

34. Ben Perry interviewed by Lou Blachley, Pioneer Foundation Oral Histories, Tape #33, p. 21.

35. Ida Burgess interviewed by Lou Blachley, Pioneer Foundation Oral Histories, Tape #111, p. 8.

36. Butler, 529-535.

CAN ORDINARY ARGUERS RECOGNIZE A VALID CONCLUSION
IF IT WALKS UP AND BITES THEM ON THE BUTT?

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Do the principles of logic play a role in the native reasoning processes of naive social actors? Or is logic simply an artificial system of principles codified by philosophers and imposed on ordinary people by formally trained critics? Most critics and researchers would probably acknowledge the value of logic as a system for prescribing how people should argue and reason. It is also obvious that naive social actors can be trained (at least to some extent) to employ principles of logic in the invention and evaluation of arguments. But there are large segments of our field who would refrain from claiming that logical patterns of inference are indigenous to either ordinary language use or to human psychology.

Of course, the strongest argument in defense of logic as a system basic to human thought would seem to be the intuitively obvious quality of its principles for those who are formally trained in the principles. The fact that the principles of formal logic describe patterns of inference whose validity requires no further justification would seem to suggest their status as basic laws of thought. Once learned, the principles appear self-evident, as though they were given naturally.

The trouble with this position, however, is that people who are not formally trained in logic all too often show little native appreciation for those principles in their arguments and reasoning. People will commit and accept all sorts of fallacies. They regularly and spontaneously make and understand arguments that are quite inadequate when judged according to formal standards. Argumentation critics have consistently found great difficulty in applying logical formalisms to the interpretation of ordinary discourse.¹ In fact, much of the current descriptive work in interpersonal argument seems to have abandoned this concern altogether--as though logic were somehow irrelevant to how ordinary argument is conducted.²

More important for the purposes of this study is the poor performance of naive subjects in controlled studies of their reasoning abilities. When given formal reasoning tasks in experimental settings, people do show some tendency to draw logically valid conclusions, but they also regularly make

a host of systematic errors.³ When placed in a cross-cultural context, the performance of non-literate people on such tasks is even more discouraging.⁴ Many experimental researchers have tried to explain these errors in terms of information-processing distortions of a basic underlying logical competence, but little positive evidence for such a competence has been forthcoming.⁵

The defense of a logical model of reasoning has struck many as ad hoc, gaining its plausibility not so much from independent evidence as from an unshakable faith in the logical nature of the way people think and behave. The current body of evidence has led many communication researchers to dismiss the idea that human reasoning is structured according to logical principles, calling it "the logic fallacy."⁶ For these sceptics, it would seem far more parsimonious to simply assume that human "belief processing" follows the laws of a "psycho-logic" that sometimes makes the same inferences as a logical system would, and sometimes doesn't. Rather than trying to explain illogical inferences by looking for factors that might interfere with the smooth operation of logical processes, these researchers find it simpler to explain logical inferences by specifying the conditions under which basically alogical processes might result in a logically valid inference.⁷

One way to begin to resolve this controversy might be to recast the relation between logic and human reasoning. Rather than seeing logic as laws of thought which, if they exist, cannot be broken, logic might be seen as a normative system of discursive rules. These rules would be tacitly known by naive social actors, though the application and formulation of the rules would be problematic. We can assume that those rules are more or less adequately represented by a variety of formal systems, though that is an empirical issue.

The point of a normative conceptualization of logic is that while people might not always argue or reason logically, they try to--especially when making any claim upon the belief of another. Cooperative speakers will try to see to it that their patterns of argument and inference conform to standards of logical validity. On this view, the naive social actor's grasp of the principles of logic is akin to linguists' notion of a native linguistic competence.⁸ Here, the key to establishing the relevance of logic to human reasoning would not necessarily be to show that people always or even usually produce logically valid arguments and inferences, or even that they will always or even usually detect invalid forms. People can be assumed to have a variety of difficulties in trying to match language (natural or formal) to a logical representation. And they can be expected to employ a variety of strategies and information-processing heuristics that will be more or less successful in achieving that goal. The key to establishing the pertinence of a normative system would be to show that ordinary people can be made to recognize valid and invalid forms of argument and inference and that they will prefer valid over invalid forms when they do recognize them.

A parallel to language processing might be instructive here. One would not want to say that because people make careless grammatical errors (e.g., mistakes in subject-verb agreement) or because they misunderstand a

sentence that they lack the linguistic competence described more or less adequately by current linguistic formalisms.⁹ Consider, for example, the following sentence (from Johnson-Laird):¹⁰

This book fills a much needed gap in the literature.

Many readers, on first glance, will take this sentence to be complimenting the book as being much needed. While the fact that people will misread the sentence in this way tells us something about the processing heuristics that people use, it is the fact that people can also recognize the error that tells us that the heuristics are used in the service of the rules of grammar.

Along similar lines, this study was designed to test the idea that subjects untrained in formal logic would be able to recognize errors they made in drawing conclusions from abstract categorical syllogisms. Specifically, it was hypothesized that when pairs of subjects were asked to resolve differences in the conclusions they drew, subjects would be more likely to change incorrect conclusions in favor of correct conclusions than they would be to change correct conclusions in favor of incorrect ones.

Experiment 1

Method

Subjects were 18 volunteers from an introductory communication class; extra credit was offered in return for participation in the study. None of the subjects had any previous background or training in the principles of formal logic or debate.

Subjects came by appointment for their participation in the study. Upon their arrival they were given a set of ten premise pairs to abstract categorical syllogisms. On the basis of past experiments, two types of syllogisms were included. Five premise pairs were chosen that subjects would almost always solve correctly. Five premise pairs were chosen that subjects would almost always solve incorrectly. Each item consisted of two premise pairs with abstract content (e.g., All A are B, No C are B, Some C are not B). Premise pairs with both determinate and indeterminate conclusions were included.

Subjects were asked to draw valid conclusions for each premise pair. The meaning of a logically valid conclusion was explained as were the meanings of the terms (e.g., "some" means "at least some, and possibly all"). Subjects were instructed to assume that all sets were non-empty. They were also told that it was possible that there was no valid conclusion to be drawn from a given premise pair and that in such cases they should write down "no conclusion." Any conclusion drawn by subjects involving a valid entailment was counted as correct.

Upon completion of the syllogisms, subjects were paired with a confederate and brought to another room. There they were told to compare their answers and to try to resolve any disagreements. The pairs were instructed to spend only a couple of minutes on any disagreement and were

told to leave disputes unresolved if they could find no way to come to a mutually acceptable conclusion. No subject reported feeling that they did not have enough time to work through their disagreements. Unknown to the subjects, the discussions were recorded by audiotape. After all procedures were completed, subjects were told the purpose of the study and informed of the tape-recording.

The confederate was an undergraduate volunteer who was given the correct solutions to the syllogisms. For seven of the syllogisms, the confederate was instructed to give an incorrect answer and to argue for that solution if the subject drew a different conclusion. For the other three syllogisms, the confederate was trained to argue for the correct conclusion. The latter three syllogisms were spaced at irregular intervals on the test form.

The argument strategies supplied to the confederate involved the use of Venn diagrams to present configurations of the sets named in the premises. In the case of arguments for correct conclusions, the confederate was instructed in the use of diagrams that depicted counter-examples to incorrect conclusions that subjects might be expected to make (i.e., diagrams that showed the subject's conclusion was not true for a configuration consistent with the premises). In the case of arguments for incorrect conclusions, the confederate was instructed in the use of diagrams that depicted configurations that were possible (but not required by the premises). Both the confederate's answers to the syllogisms and his arguments were standardized for each of the ten items.

Analysis and Results

Both the subjects' initial conclusions and their resultant conclusions following discussion with the confederate were coded as either correct or incorrect. Both conclusions were also coded as either in agreement or disagreement with the conclusions of the confederate. Resultant conclusions were coded also for being changed or unchanged from the initial conclusion. Results are presented in Table 1. As expected, subjects working individually made many errors on this task, drawing invalid conclusions 63% of the time. Subjects also showed a pronounced tendency to reach some sort of resolution when paired with the confederate, coming to a resolution in 76% of the cases in which subject and confederate initially disagreed.

This tendency toward resolution appears to be more than mere agreeableness or persuasibility. The probability of the subject changing when both the subject and the confederate started out with different, incorrect conclusions can be considered a sort of base-line value (to serve as an expected probability in testing hypotheses about other conditions); empirically, this probability turned out to be .50. When both subject and confederate started out incorrect, the subjects shifted to the confederate's conclusion half the time and persisted with their own conclusion half the time. When the subjects started out with a correct conclusion (and the confederate an incorrect conclusion) they were less likely to change (43% did so), but not significantly so ($z = -1.069$). However, when the confederate started out with a correct conclusion (and

Table 1

	Subjects' Solutions After Discussion with Confederate		Persistence in Own Conclusion	Total
	Initial Agreement	Acceptance of Confederate's Conclusion		
Confederate Correct/ Subject Correct	10	---	---	10
Confederate Correct/ Subject Incorrect	---	31	13 (2)	44
Confederate Incorrect/ Subject Correct	---	24	32 (18)	56
Confederate Incorrect/ Subject Incorrect	38	14	14 (8)	70*

*In 4 cases the resultant conclusion could not be determined.

Cases in parentheses indicate the number of times the confederate resolved the difference by shifting to agreement with the subject.

the subject an incorrect conclusion) the subject was significantly more likely to change (70% did so, $z = 2.71$, $p < .005$). In short, subjects were significantly more likely to abandon an incorrect conclusion in favor of a correct alternative than to abandon a correct conclusion in favor of an incorrect alternative ($\chi^2 = 7.58$, d.f. = 1, $p < .01$).

Experiment 2

The results of the first experiment provide some limited support for the idea that naive social actors prefer valid conclusions to invalid conclusions when these are pointed out and argued for. While subjects did not show any strong tendency to persist with correct conclusions they drew themselves, they did accept correct conclusions argued for by the confederate. However, this tendency might somehow be an artifact resulting from a spurious persuasiveness on the part of the confederate. There may have been a bias in the way in which the confederate argued for his conclusion when that conclusion was correct as opposed to when that conclusion was incorrect. On several occasions, the confederate did overstep the bounds of his instructions, acquiescing with the conclusion of the subject--most notably in those cases where he was instructed to argue for an incorrect conclusion. While the confederate claimed this was the result of interactional pressures to appear reasonable, this source of contamination cannot be dismissed. To rule out this potential flaw, a second experiment was conducted along the lines of the first, this time using pairs of naive subjects rather than subject-confederate pairs.

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Method

Subjects were 56 volunteers from introductory communication classes; extra credit was offered in return for participation in the study. None of the subjects had any previous background or training in the principles of formal logic or debate.

As in experiment 1, subjects came by appointment and were given a set of abstract categorical syllogisms to solve. Instructions were the same as in the previous experiment. The test items consisted of 16 premise pairs, different from those used in experiment 1. These premise pairs were chosen for their variability in conclusions drawn; previous experiments had shown that subjects draw a wide range of correct and incorrect conclusions for those items. Both the quantity and the content of the syllogisms were changed from experiment 1 to ensure a large number of disagreements and a balance in the distribution of correct and incorrect conclusions drawn by the subjects in any given pair.

After completing the syllogisms, the subjects were paired with another subject they did not know and were brought to another room. As in the first experiment, they were told to compare their conclusions and to try to resolve any differences. In this study the discussions were openly tape-recorded and subjects were informed of the taping prior to the discussions. After comparing answers the subjects were debriefed. None said that the recorder inhibited their arguments.

Analysis and Results

Both the initial conclusions and resultant conclusions following discussion were coded as either correct or incorrect, and as either in agreement or disagreement with the conclusion of the other subject. Resultant conclusions were also coded as being either changed or unchanged from the initial conclusion. Results are presented in Table 2. As in experiment 1, subjects working individually made many errors in reasoning, drawing invalid conclusions 59% of the time. And again, subjects showed a pronounced tendency to reach some sort of resolution, doing so in 91% of the cases where the subjects initially disagreed. The most pertinent information is the probability of shifting to a correct conclusion or an incorrect conclusion, given that one partner initially drew a correct conclusion while the other drew an incorrect conclusion. In these cases, resolutions were significantly more likely to favor the correct conclusion (67%) than to favor an initial incorrect conclusion (33%; $z = 4.178$, $p < .001$).

Discussion

The purpose of these experiments was to test the idea that naive social actors possess a native appreciation for the normative force of the principles of logic. Such a position would suggest that while ordinary people may make a variety of logical errors in their reasoning, the concept of logical validity is something they intuitively grasp and respect. Logic should not be equated with laws of thought, but with a second-order system of principles that regulates the operation of the information-processing

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Table 2
Subjects' Solutions
After Discussion in Pairs

	Agree on Correct Conclusion	Agree on Initial Incorrect Conclusion	Agree on New Incorrect Conclusion	Persist in Separate Conclusions	Total Pairs
Initial Agreement/ Both Incorrect	---	143*	---	---	143
Initial Disagreement/ Both Incorrect	6	28	2	6	42
Initial Disagreement/ One Correct	100	48	1	12	161
Initial Agreement/ Both Correct	102*	---	---	---	102

*Does not represent any change from initial conclusions.

heuristics and strategies that people employ when reasoning with discourse. If the conclusions that subjects in this study drew initially were simply the product of alogical laws of belief processing, then there would be no reason to expect subjects to show any appreciation for logical errors or to prefer valid conclusions over invalid ones when trying to resolve differences in their conclusions. This does not appear to be the case. In both experiments, naive subjects displayed a clear preference for valid conclusions over invalid ones when they were pointed out and argued for. As such, these findings confirm Wason and Johnson-Laird's assertion that people not only get deductive problems wrong, they usually come to realize their mistakes.¹¹

Subjects did surprise us, however, in their willingness in experiment 1 to abandon their correct conclusions in the face of the confederate's arguments for an incorrect conclusion. While we are not prepared to make any strong interpretation of this finding, we suspect that this may be due to subjects giving in to the confederate's intransigence in the face of the pressure to come to some sort of a resolution. No such intransigence was a factor in experiment 2 where subjects not only almost always came to some sort of resolution, but also did so in a way that was consistent with a preference for logically valid conclusions. Likewise, where a valid conclusion was defended by the confederate, the pressure for resolution and the requirement to arrive at a valid conclusion cooperated to produce the

expected tendency. The confederate's own self-report of a felt need to compensate for his intransigence by accepting the subjects' conclusions on occasion is also consistent with this interpretation. But further evidence is needed to resolve this matter.

NOTES

¹ Cf. David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western Speech, 30 (1966), 241-247; Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortenson, "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 143-151; Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54 (1968), 260-267; Hugh G. Petrie, "Does Logic Have Any Relevance to Argumentation?" Journal of the American Forensic Association, 6 (1969), 55-60; David W. Shepard, "The Role of Logic?" The Forum, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (1969), 310-312; Charles Arthur Willard, "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 308-319; Charles W. Kneupper, "On Argument and Diagrams," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14 (1978), 181-186; Brant R. Burtleson, "On the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments: Some Theoretical and Methodological Considerations," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 15 (1979), 137-147; Charles Arthur Willard, "Propositional Argument is to Argument What Talking About Passion is to Passion," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 (1979), 21-28.

² Cf. Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 251-265; Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 205-237; Barbara J. O'Keefe and Pamela J. Benoit, "Children's Arguments," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, pp. 154-183; Pamela J. Benoit, "The Use of Argument by Preschool Children: The Emergent Production of Rules for Winning Arguments," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. George Ziegelmüller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), 624-642; Robert Trapp, "Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 516-530. But also see David R. Seibold, Robert D. McPhee, Marshall Scott Poole, Nancy E. Tanita, and Daniel J. Canary, "Argument, Group Influence and Decision Outcomes," in Dimensions of Argument, pp. 663-692.

³ Gerald R. Miller, "Some Factors Influencing Judgments of the Logical Validity of Arguments: A Research Review," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (1969), 276-286; P. C. Wason and P. N. Johnson-Laird, Psychology of Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972); Dale Hample, "A Review of Empirical Literature on Logical Processes," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, November, 1979.

⁴ Cf. Sylvia Scribner, "Modes of Thinking and Ways of Speaking: Culture and Logic Reconsidered," in New Directions in Discourse Processing, ed. Roy O. Freedle (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1979), pp. 223-244.

⁵ Cf. Wason and Johnson-Laird; Hample; Scribner; Mary Henle, "On the Relation Between Logic and Thinking," Psychological Review, 69 (1962), 366-78.

⁶ Jesse G. Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), 140-48; Rodney A. Reynolds and Michael Burgeon, "Belief Processing, Reasoning, and Evidence," in Communication Yearbook 7, ed. Robert N. Bostrom (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983), pp. 83-104.

⁷ Cf. Sally Jackson, In Print, Journal of the American Forensic Association, 17 (1980), 66-72.

⁸ Cf. Scott Jacobs, "Language," in Handbook of Interpersonal Communication, ed. Mark L. Knapp and G. R. Miller (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985).

⁹ Cf. Wason and Johnson-Laird, p. 132.

¹⁰ Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983).

¹¹ Wason and Johnson-Laird, p. 2.

UNUSED COMPLIANCE GAINING STRATEGIES

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This is the second paper in a projected series of studies designed to explore why people choose not to make certain arguments. Nearly all of our scholarship or argumentation is concerned with public arguments: those which survive the mental processes of judgment and selection. Examination of these survivors is profitable, but by its nature does not allow much insight into the reasons why certain arguments are made in preference to others. Such information is obviously important to a full theory of human invention.

Our research project is aimed at description of the non-surviving arguments, and, more importantly, the apparent causes of people's reluctance to use them. The first canon of rhetoric is sometimes divided into creation and judgment; our concern is with the latter topic. Our ultimate objective is a more complete theory of invention than is possible without examination of unacceptable arguments. People use private editorial standards to discipline their public utterances, and we propose to identify those cognitive judgment criteria.

Methodological Issues

Our ambitions are immediately confronted with certain methodological difficulties, however, and we cannot claim to have overcome them completely.

Perhaps the main problem is getting access to unused lines of argument. A fleeting thought immediately rejected may not be available to the rhetor, much less to someone interrogating him/her; ordinary self-reports ("please list the ideas you thought of, but decided not to use") seem pointless.¹ Nor does straightforward introspection recommend itself, partly for the same reasons of recall unreliability, but also because anyone doing such introspection (e.g., the authors) is likely to have training and experience which might make the results non-generalizable.² Even talk-aloud protocols will not give access to ephemeral thoughts.³ And the reality of evaluation apprehension makes it unlikely that people would candidly admit to having thought of arguments they judged to be terrible or offensive.⁴

Due to these considerations, we do not ask respondents to report the rejected arguments. Instead, we supply them with lists of plausible lines of persuasion, and ask for endorsements or rejections. Then we request justifications for each rejection. In this way, we obtain data

on which kinds of arguments are not made, and the reasons for their non-use.

This procedure places on us the burden of inventing the arguments. If our inventions are significantly unlike those of naive actors, our work is somewhat open to the criticism of ecological invalidity. Such a criticism would be extremely telling if our goal were to describe the creative part of invention, and compliance gaining strategy researchers have been immersed in precisely this controversy for several years.⁵ In our case, however, the chief interest is in the reasons for rejecting arguments. Even if we happen to provide people with some arguments which are unlikely to have occurred spontaneously, respondents may still use their normal standards of judgment in deciding to endorse or reject our suggestions. The generality of the reasons we found in the first study encourages us in the belief that people have a reasonably limited set of standards which they apply to a wide variety of arguments.⁶ So long as unlikely arguments (or authentic arguments which we do not anticipate in our stimulus lists) are not rejected for unique reasons, our work is unimpaired by the validity debate concerning lists of compliance gaining strategies.

By using the most common set of strategies, we provide our respondents with a fairly large number of plausible choices.⁷ We recognize some possibility that our results would differ in degree if different strategies were used as stimuli, but we believe that the general outline of our results would still appear.⁸

The last main obstacle to this line of research is our use of self-reports to obtain rejection rationales. Though we concede that we do not get perfect representations of our respondents' reasons for not using various arguments, we believe that our data are reasonably useful for several reasons.⁹ Our respondents have made conscious decisions about each argument moments before writing each rationale. These features of consciousness and recency afford confidence in the validity of the reports.¹⁰ The information we seek ought to be available for recall, and respondents of good will can probably be relied upon to provide it accurately.¹¹

Our general procedure is certainly imperfect and our results ought to be (and soon will be) triangulated by other methods. Nonetheless, we are satisfied that our research strategy provides a reliable route to the preliminary information we seek in these first studies.

Rationale

Our chief purposes here are to confirm the usefulness of the coding system developed earlier, and to offer tentative generalizations about the criteria people use to edit arguments.

This report expands on the first one in several respects. The main purpose of the initial study was to determine if our methodology--

described in general terms in the preceding section—is viable. In that experiment, all respondents were given the same list of compliance gaining strategies, taken directly from Marwell and Schmitt's paper. A coding scheme was developed to account for the rejection rationales respondents provided. The coding system had eleven substantive categories, and more than 95% of all responses fell into them. Intercoder reliability was 69%, which is low but tolerable. These results encouraged us to continue use of the system.

The use of a single stimulus situation in that first study makes generalization of its substantive results difficult. Here, we use four different situations, all created for the purposes of this study. This is only a modest improvement insofar as generalizability is concerned, since each strategy/situation combination is still only represented with a single message, rather than the multiple messages demanded for real rigor.¹² We made the decision to use single message exemplars in order to balance the tedium of completing and coding the questionnaires against our desire to increase the situational variety in our data base. Although the present investigation uses as much stimulus variety as most compliance gaining research, we still consider that our design allows only tentative conclusions in most respects.

However, the design should give us a good estimate of the coding system's reliability with a variety of stimuli. We should also be able to obtain credible information on the general nature of people's editing criteria for public arguments.

Method

Subjects. Sixty four communication majors served as respondents. 45% were male, and 55% female. About three-quarters were juniors or seniors, and their mean age was 20.8 years.

Materials. Each student received a booklet containing two of the four situations used in the study. Each one-page situation consisted of a brief description of the persuasive task, followed by sixteen possible "things you could say."

In contrast to the earlier study's stimulus, which required subjects to take the role of a parent encouraging a high school student to study, all four of these situations were intended to be immediately relevant to our subjects. Here are the vignettes which preceded the lists of strategies:

(1) You have been dating the same person now for about two years and you are thinking about getting engaged. Christmas vacation is coming up soon and you want your boyfriend/girlfriend to come home with you. S/he initially disagrees but you are still trying to convince him/her.

(2) You have been living with your roommate in an apartment

for several months. You generally take turns cleaning the place up and now it is his/her turn, but the apartment is in a real mess and s/he hasn't done any cleaning for several days. You want him/her to clean up.

(3) You have been living in an apartment with two friends for the school year and now, since school is over for the year, you are getting ready to move out. The landlord has come over to inspect the place, and you are trying to convince him to return your deposit money. Your roommates had to work so they aren't there with you.

(4) You are taking a history class and today in class you got back a term paper you turned in three weeks ago. You thought you worked really hard on it and did a good job, and you have received a C+. You have come in to ask the professor to change the grade from the C+ to a B-.

Situations were collated into all possible combinations in equal numbers, and booklets were distributed randomly in the four classes used. Thirty subjects responded to situation 1, thirty one to situation 2, thirty two to situation 3, and thirty three to situation 4. (In two cases, we discarded data from one of a respondent's situations because of incompleteness.)

The sixteen possible persuasive arguments for each situation were written so as to represent Marwell and Schmitt's sixteen compliance gaining strategies. The strategies were presented in a different random order for each situation. Subjects checked "use" or "not use" for each strategy. On the back of each situation's page, respondents were asked to "put the numbers of the suggestions that you did NOT use, and write a sentence or two for each, saying why you didn't want to use it."

The introductory page of the booklets contained some demographic items. Students required about twenty minutes to complete the task.

Coding. The coding system presented in the earlier report, slightly modified, was used here as well. Two codes were not used at all, and so were dropped from the system. These were the original categories 3 ("Don't prepay. Get the compliance first, then give the reward.") and 4 ("Don't make morality an issue."). Several of the remaining codes received minor elaborations. The system used here is presented in Figure 1.

The two authors, working independently, coded respondents' justifications for not using arguments. Intercoder reliability for all four situations together was 78.0%. Specific reliabilities were: situation 1, 78.2%; situation 2, 76.1%; situation 3, 80.0%; and situation 4, 77.6%. These percentages are based only on coding of rejection rationales; code 99, on which there were no disagreements, was omitted from these calculations. All these figures are about 10% higher than the reliability for the first study; this probably reflects

the authors' greater familiarity with the system. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.

One measure of the coding system's adequacy is the proportion of responses which had to be coded as "other" (category 11). Using only the data for rejected arguments, 9.6% of responses were coded 11. This is perhaps a little higher than might be preferred, but does indicate that the coding system is capturing most of what respondents have to say. In fact, many of the responses which fell into this residual category did so because they had little content (e.g., "wouldn't use it," or "this is stupid"); responses of this sort have limited value for this line of research anyway. The only substantive comments coded as 11 tended to be refutations of the suggested argument, rather than explicit statements as to why the argument would not be used.

Results

We report three categories of results. First, we will detail the data of primary interest, those which describe our respondent's editing standards for arguments. Second, for the benefit of readers interested in standard compliance gaining research, we will briefly report the frequency with which each strategy was endorsed. And finally, we will explore an issue of some methodological importance: the influence that the situational variable has on our results.

Editing Standards. Table 1 contains our raw data, and shows the frequencies with which each code was used, summed across all four situations. 42.5% of the stimulus arguments were judged acceptable overall. Although some were obviously more attractive than others, this figure is high enough to suggest that our inventions were plausible.

Table 1 makes clear that some of the reasons for rejection are more important than others, both in frequency of use and in range of application. The most often-used codes were 9 (relevance: 15.9% of the total) and 8 (truth: 9.2%). Positive altercasting (strategy 12) was especially vulnerable to charges of irrelevance, but the issue of pertinence seems broadly applicable to all strategies, as is the veracity criterion. Code 4 (treat yourself positively: 7.8%) is also generally applied, but is especially prominent for strategy 7, aversive stimulation, a very negative tactic, and for strategies 5 and 6, liking and pre-giving, which may have seemed too demeaning. Next most common was code 5 (don't harm the other: 6.3%). This is especially relevant to negative altercasting, negative self-feeling, and negative esteem. Code 3 (don't threaten, bribe, or punish: 5.6%) indexes rationales for not using promises, pre-giving, and several more obviously negative tactics. The remaining substantive codes have less importance, and tend to be used primarily to reject a single strategy.

Table 2 condenses the codes into four larger categories, which are arranged in a general pattern of increasing editorial sophistication.

These combinations were done on an a priori basis, and reflect those of the first paper.

The crudest category, effectiveness, involves simple judgments that the argument would not have worked, or would have backfired, with no further explanation. This category was least important, accounting for only 10% of the data. (Note that the coding system has an upward bias: if a respondent's rationale seemed to involve two reasons, the higher, more sophisticated code was used.)

The second combined category is called objectionable strategy. It contained three codes in the first study, but two of those were not used here, leaving only the present code 3. This class of responses represents principled objections to negative tactics, without further elaboration. For instance, some respondents frequently reported that they simply did not like to use threats. The 121 responses coded here are 11% of the total.

The third category, which contains 32% of all data in Table 2, represents person-centered objections. Some of these were self-oriented, and generally communicate the idea that self-respect would prevent the respondent from using a particular tactic. About an equal number of the comments coded here (see Table 1) represent concern for the other: either an unwillingness to harm the other, or a recognition of the other's self-worth. The remaining data come from concerns about harming the personal relationship between the arguer and the target person. The numerical frequency of this whole group of responses shows that our subjects are sensitive to the importance of interpersonal relationships, and base some of their intentional decisions on such issues.

The last composite category is discourse competence. The justifications coded here reject arguments because they are untrue, irrelevant, or familiar. The refusal to make arguments with such flaws generally parallels the requirements for competent discourse, as we will explore in the Discussion section. This category accounted for 46% of all responses, and was dominated by considerations of relevance.

The condensed codes also appear in Table 3, along with some condensations of the compliance gaining strategies.¹³ These various combinations make generalizations more manageable. A test of contingency reveals that strategy and code are in fact dependent on one another to a modest degree ($\chi^2=95.73$, $df=6$, $p<.001$, $V=.21$, $C=.29$), as was also true in the initial investigation.

Notice particularly in Table 3 that the usual prominence of discourse competence concerns nearly disappears for punishment strategies, and is replaced with increasing attention to person-centered issues, as well as more unelaborated rejections. The relative drop in discourse competence reasons also appeared in the first study.

A second result of some interest is that person-centered objections

were not prominent for pro-social strategies. This is understandable, of course, since pro-social strategies are least likely to offend, by definition. Still, about a quarter of all rejections of pro-social strategies were on grounds of interpersonal harm of some kind. The earlier report showed an even more pronounced tendency to reject supposedly pro-social strategies on interpersonal grounds.

The data reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 suggests these conclusions: that discourse competence and person-centered concerns are the dominant reasons for rejecting arguments; that the primary discourse issues are truth and relevance; that the chief interpersonal orientations are to self and other, but not to relationship; and that naive actors are able to give theoretically informative reasons for rejections of arguments.

Compliance Gaining. Tables 1, 2, and 3 report the frequency with which various compliance gaining tactics were endorsed and rejected. Pro-social tactics are most acceptable in general, but this may be in part because half the sixteen strategies are classified as pro-social. Certain strategies--11 (negative self-feeling), 12 (positive altercasting), and 15 (positive esteem)--are not endorsed with much frequency, though they are pro-social (see Table 1). Psychological force tactics are next most numerous, though several strategies in this category are only rarely acceptable: strategy 13 (negative altercasting) and strategy 16 (negative esteem) are the least approved in the whole list. Punishment approaches are normally rejected, but this is due largely to the seventh tactic, aversive stimulation. Threats (strategy 2) were accepted with respectable frequency. Taking into account the number of strategies in each of the condensed categories, the pro-social tactics averaged 55.9 endorsements, psychological force averaged 54.0, and the mean for punishment tactics was 43.0.

Situation. Although situation was not manipulated in any systematic way in this study, we made an effort to vary intimacy of relationship (dating partner, roommate, professor, and landlord were targets) and task orientation (have dating partner come home for Christmas, get apartment cleaned up, obtain a higher grade, and recover a deposit). We did not intend to generalize about intimacy of situation or task orientation (or any other variables inadvertently manipulated), but merely to introduce some situational variability into our stimuli. We want to know whether cognitive editing strategies are contingent on situation.

Table 4 reports condensed strategies and condensed codes for each of the four situations. The general contingency between strategy and code reported above for the cumulated data also appears for each situation's results: situation 1, chi-squared=44.56, df=6, p<.001, V=.30, C=.38; situation 2, chi-squared=39.26, df=6, p<.001, V=.31, C=.40; situation 3, chi-squared=40.38, df=6, p<.001, V=.28, C=.37; and situation 4, chi-squared=17.67, df=6, p<.01, V=.16, C=.22. The dependency of code on strategy is weakest for the fourth situation, but present at moderate levels in all four.

We also conducted analyses to determine if code is dependent on situation, for each of the sixteen strategies individually. Of these sixteen chi-squareds, thirteen were statistically significant. The only exceptions were strategies 2, 7, and 12 (threat, aversive stimulation, and positive altercasting). The pattern of judgment (i.e., the codes) was significantly altered by situation for the other thirteen strategies.

A different picture emerges by condensing the codes, and omitting those for "accepted argument" and "other." Of the sixteen strategies, only seven show a significant contingency between code and situation. Though situation still has an important effect for about half the tactics, these results suggest that situation has a weaker effect on general results than on the more specific (not condensed) ones.

Separate analyses were conducted to see if situation affected the frequency with which codes 99 ("accepted argument") and 11 ("other") are applied to the strategies. Endorsement of arguments is dependent on situation (chi-squared=98.34, df=45, p<.001, V=.20, C=.32). This is evidence that preference for different persuasive tactics is influenced by the persuasive situation. Use of "other" reasons for rejecting an argument also depends on the situation (chi-squared=62.75, df=45, p<.05, V=.43, C=.60). The significance of this test is largely explained by a single cell--strategy 9 for situation 1--in which an unusually large number of responses was coded as 11. On the assumption that use of the "other" code is inversely related to the quality of the coding system, the overall significance of the test has the important methodological implication that the coding system's quality may differ from situation to situation, though the effect is not a striking one.

Discussion

This report supplies evidence that naive actors can provide reasonably sophisticated explanations for their rejection of arguments. Only about 10% of all such rationales consisted merely of an estimate that the argument would not work. Considering the effort involved in giving more elaborate answers, this 10% figure may overestimate the real proportion of simple effects judgments in editing.

Another 11% of the rejections had to do only with the nature of the argument: threats and bribes were often reported as unacceptable kinds of appeals to make, regardless of other factors. The data we report here do not permit any indication of why the negative tactics are rejected, but based on our readings of respondents' justifications, we suspect that many of these rejections are really interpersonally-based. People may have learned over the years that threats hurt others, that bribes are demeaning, and so forth, and thus these appeals ought to be avoided. In responding to our instrument, however, people may have simply reported the conclusion of their experience ("you should never threaten someone") without necessarily relating the basis of their judgment. Other comments that fell into this general category involved

effectiveness (for instance, "bribes never work") and were classified here because of the upward sophistication bias we intentionally built into our coding system.

Nearly a third of all rejections were person-centered. Our respondents showed a frequent concern for self-image, and refused to make arguments which they felt were sycophantic, too aggressive, or which did not match the student's self-image in some other way. Concern for the other was about equally important. People reported avoiding tactics which were harmful, which might elicit anger, or which were disrespectful. Explicit appeal to preservation of the relationship between the arguer and receiver was rare, but may have been implicit in some of the comments about not harming the other.

This category of rationales would seem to have special importance for argumentation researchers. Several scholars who focus on interpersonal arguments have made disagreement regulation or avoidance a central concept in their theories.¹⁴ The prominence of the person-centered rationales in our study may help to document naive actors' reasons for avoiding disagreements, their guidelines in regulating it, and their awareness that disagreement regulation is an important function of interpersonal argument.

The last and largest category of editing criteria is discourse competence. These standards, particularly truth and relevance, account for almost half the rejections in this study. These findings, too, link nicely with some current issues in argumentation. Both Grice and Habermas specify principles for competent discourse; these include truth and relevance.¹⁵ Our data show some naive awareness of these issues, which have been chiefly argued philosophically in our literature to this date.

Our study's other values are methodological. The coding system has enough scope to capture nearly all of people's reasons for not using arguments. This fact will permit us to use our categories of rationales in other work. In particular, we now feel that we can construct closed-ended items for people to use in explaining why they object to certain arguments. Future data collection will be more efficient and less tedious, both for the respondents and the investigators. Our findings regarding the influence of situation, while not surprising, confirm that future work must attend to differences in situations if generalization is to be justified.

Conclusion

This study's aim was to describe the cognitive editing standards people use in deciding what arguments to make, and which to reject. Their standards fall into four main categories. In order of importance, these are discourse competence, person-centered rationales, rejections of certain kinds of argument, and simple effectiveness judgments.

Figure 1

Coding System

Directions: If you are uncertain about which of two codes to apply, use the higher number (except for 11). Some ambiguous comments can be clarified by referring back to the list of compliance-gaining strategies, to see what the subject is talking about.

CODES EXPLANATIONS

- | | |
|----|---|
| 01 | Only use arguments which will WORK. The subject gives no further codable rationale as to why the argument will fail. If the subject does give a codable rationale (e.g., "threats never work") code the answer under the rationale ("don't threaten"). |
| 02 | Don't say things which could BOOMERANG TACTICALLY or make the other DEFENSIVE. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of relational worsening, use 07. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of personal boomerang for the other, use 05. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of personal boomerang for the arguer, use 04. |
| 03 | Don't THREATEN, BRIBE or PUNISH, or use any other negative or high-pressure tactics. If there is a rationale given, however, code it there (e.g., "you wouldn't want to live with him/her after you threaten him" would be 07). |
| 04 | Treat YOURSELF POSITIVELY. Don't do anything you'd regret or which would harm your image of yourself. Don't make yourself vulnerable to the other; don't put yourself in his/her debt. Don't BROWNOSE or whine. Don't be PUSHY. Don't STOOP to his level. Don't BEG. Not my STYLE. |
| 05 | Don't HARM the other. Don't hurt the other's feelings, or make the other feel GUILTY or MAD. Don't do anything that will harm the other's present or future happiness or personality. But for questions of the other's right to choose, use 06. |
| 06 | Treat the other POSITIVELY, as an independent, mature person. Let the other make his/her own choices. Don't PROJECT your own desires or feelings. Don't be SELFISH. He/she may have a GOOD REASON. Don't TRICK the other. |
| 07 | Preserve your RELATIONSHIP with the other. Don't say things that could cause future problems in the relationship. The subject should mention (or clearly have in mind) the relationship. For comments which point only to injury to the other's self-image, use 05 or 06; for comments which point only to injury to the arguer's self-image, use 04. |

- 08 Use only TRUE arguments or assumptions. Don't rely on false premises about debts or moral issues. Be HONEST. Don't B.S. Be REALISTIC. Don't say things the other thinks are FALSE. Don't make IMPOSSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS.
- 09 Only use RELEVANT arguments. Don't use any which you or the other or anyone else would perceive as irrelevant to the issue. Be DIRECT. Don't say UNNECESSARY things.
- 10 Be NOVEL and informative. Don't say obvious things, or things the other already knows.
- 11 OTHER. This category especially includes suggestions as to what the subject would prefer to be arguing (e.g., "I wouldn't use this one because the last one is better"). Also, this is STUPID or IGNORANT. Use this if the subject offers a rebuttal to the argument, rather than an explanation of why s/he wouldn't choose to use it.
- 99 Subject chose to use the strategy.

Table 1
Raw Data - All Situations

CODE	STRATEGY ¹																Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
99	61	62	78	55	79	54	24	85	85	58	26	29	19	94	26	22	857
01	2	1	1	3	5	4	11	2	0	4	5	3	5	2	1	4	53
02	0	3	2	3	2	1	22	1	0	1	2	5	5	1	1	3	52
03	21	9	5	10	3	17	5	3	3	2	6	3	10	3	3	10	113
04	9	9	4	5	18	16	30	4	6	8	10	6	11	4	7	10	157
05	1	7	2	5	2	2	11	3	4	3	20	8	37	1	5	15	126
06	1	4	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	4	5	1	4	0	3	2	31
07	4	2	0	1	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	20
08	5	13	18	28	0	5	3	0	5	21	31	4	8	3	23	18	185
09	13	4	8	9	10	19	3	21	13	15	12	61	20	12	47	34	301
10	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	10
11	9	12	4	7	5	7	6	7	8	10	7	5	4	5	8	7	111

Note. N for each column is 126. The sum for the whole table is 2016.

¹Here are the strategy codes: 1=promise, 2=threat, 3=expertise (positive), 4=expertise (negative), 5=liking, 6=pre-giving, 7=aversive stimulation, 8=debt, 9=moral appeal, 10=self-feeling (positive), 11=self-feeling (negative), 12=altercasting (positive), 13=altercasting (negative), 14=altruism, 15=esteem (positive), and 16=esteem (negative).

Table 2
Data with Condensed Codes - All Situations

	STRATEGY ²																Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
CONDENSED CODES¹																	
Effectiveness (1&2)	2	4	3	6	7	5	33	3	3	5	7	8	10	3	2	7	108
Objectionable Strategy (3)	21	9	5	10	3	17	5	3	11	2	6	3	10	3	3	10	121
Person-Centered (4,5,6&7)	15	22	8	11	22	19	52	7	19	15	35	16	54	5	15	27	342
Discourse Competence (8,9&10)	18	17	28	37	10	24	6	21	8	36	45	65	29	16	72	53	485

Note. The sum for the whole table is 1056. Remember that codes 99 and 11 from Table 1 are omitted here.

¹See Figure 1 for an explanation of the original codes which are condensed here.

²See note 1 to Table 1 for an explanation of the strategies.

Table 3
Condensed Strategies and Condensed Codes - All Situations

	CONDENSED STRATEGIES, ² f (%)			
	Pro-Social (1,3,5,6,11, 12,14,15)	Psychological Force (4,8,9,10,13,16)	Punishment (2,7)	Total
CONDENSED CODES¹				
Effectiveness (1&2)	37 (07)	34 (09)	37 (25)	108 (10)
Objectionable Strategy (3)	61 (12)	46 (12)	14 (09)	121 (11)
Person-Centered (4,5,6&7)	135 (26)	133 (34)	74 (50)	342 (32)
Discourse Competence (8,9&10)	278 (54)	184 (46)	23 (16)	485 (46)
Total	511	397	148	1056

¹See Figure 1 for an explanation of the original codes which are condensed here.

²See note 1 to Table 1 for an explanation of the original strategies which are condensed here.

Table 4

Condensed Strategies and Condensed Codes - Individual Situations

	CONDENSED STRATEGIES ²															
	Pro-Social (1,3,5,6,11, 12,14,15)				Psychological Force (4,8,9,10,13,16)				Punishment (2,7)				Total			
Situation: ³	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
CONDENSED CODES ¹																
Effectiveness (1&2)																
f	5	8	13	11	3	6	13	9	10	9	12	6	18	23	38	26
%	4	9	11	7	3	9	12	7	25	23	34	18	7	11	15	8
Objectionable Strategy (3)																
f	21	17	7	16	9	1	17	11	2	4	2	6	32	22	26	33
%	17	18	6	10	10	1	16	9	5	10	6	18	13	11	10	10
Person- Centered (4,5,6&7)																
f	24	16	28	67	32	19	36	38	20	20	18	16	76	55	82	121
%	20	17	24	41	35	28	34	30	50	51	50	47	30	27	32	37
Discourse Competence (8,9&10)																
f	71	53	68	70	47	42	39	67	8	6	3	6	126	101	110	143
%	59	56	59	43	52	62	37	54	20	15	8	18	50	50	43	44
Total	121	94	116	164	91	68	105	125	40	39	35	34	252	201	256	323

¹See Figure 1 for an explanation of the original codes which are condensed here.

²See note 1 to Table 1 for an explanation of the original strategies which are condensed here.

³Situation 1 is the Christmas trip; 2 is cleaning the apartment; 3 is the apartment deposit; and 4 is the grade appeal.

Notes

¹See, for example, Dale Hample, "On the Use of Self-Reports," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 20 (1984), 140-153.

²See Edwin G. Boring, "A History of Introspection," *Psychological Bulletin*, 50 (1953), 169-189.

³Some limitations to such protocols are discussed in Linda Flower and John R. Hayes, "The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical Problem," *College Composition and Communication*, 31 (1980), 21-32.

⁴Milton J. Rosenberg, "The Conditions and Consequences of Evaluation Apprehension," in *Artifact in Behavioral Research*, ed. Robert Rosenthal and Ralph L. Rosnow (New York: Academic Press, 1969), pp. 279-349.

⁵A particularly thorough literature review on this topic is Lawrence R. Wheeler, Robert Barraclough, and Robert Stewart, "Compliance-Gaining and Power in Persuasion," in *Communication Yearbook 2*, ed. Robert N. Bostrom (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), pp. 105-145.

⁶Dale Hample, "Roads Not Taken, Arguments Not Made," paper presented to Central States Speech Association, Chicago, 1984.

⁷Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt, "Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: An Empirical Analysis," *Sociometry*, 30 (1967), 350-364.

⁸We propose to collect data concerning this issue in our next study in this project.

⁹See Hample, "Self-Reports;" Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes," *Psychological Review*, 84 (1977), 231-259; K. Anders Ericsson and Herbert A. Simon, "Verbal Reports as Data," *Psychological Review*, 87 (1980), 215-251.

¹⁰Ericsson and Simon.

¹¹We may reasonably expect most subjects to be cooperative. See John G. Adair, *The Human Subject: The Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), ch. 2.

¹²Sally Jackson and Dencil Backus, "Are Compliance-Gaining Strategies Situational Variables?" *Central States Speech Journal*, 33 (1982), 469-479.

¹³We combined the strategies based on factor analyses reported in Michael E. Roloff and Edwin F. Barnicott, Jr., "The Situational Use of Pro- and Antisocial Compliance-Gaining Strategies by High and Low Machiavellians," in *Communication Yearbook 2*, ed. Brent D. Ruben (New

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1978), pp. 193-205.

¹⁴Papers illustrating this orientation include Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 205-237, and Robert Trapp, "Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 516-530.

¹⁵H. Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 41-58; Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), ch. 1. Also see Joseph W. Wenzel, "Jurgen Habermas and the Dialectical Perspective on Argumentation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 (1979), 83-94, and Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1985), ch. 9.

AN INVESTIGATION OF RELATIONAL INTERACTION & INTERPERSONAL ARGUMENT

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Within the past decade argumentation scholars have demonstrated an increasing interest in developing theories of interpersonal argument.¹ Robert Trapp's² contribution to this development focuses on providing characterizations of interpersonal argument derived from judgments of ordinary social actors. His study identifies three categories of interpersonal conversation. Ordinary social actors tend to label samples of conversation reflecting actualized and unresolved disagreement as argument. These conversations comprise the category of Paradigm Cases of Argument. On the other hand, these subjects tend to label samples of conversation involving elements such as resolved disagreement, misunderstanding, shared outcome preference, refusal to engage in disagreement or other avoidance responses as not argument. These samples comprise Conversation Other Than Argument. Finally, a third category, Peripheral Cases of Argument, comprises samples of conversation not clearly judged to be argument or not argument. According to Trapp, then, interpersonal argument occurs when, "two parties intentionally engage in disagreement over some preferred outcome and are unable to resolve these differences."³

Trapp urges researchers to continue to search to understand the breadth and depth of interpersonal argument and suggests that useful insights may result from looking at the same data from differing perspectives. An examination of this data from the perspective of relational communication appears to be a useful direction in which to pursue this search.

Communication scholars in general suggest all communication comprises both a content and a relationship dimension.⁴ Trapp's study tends to focus on the content dimension. On the other hand, research focusing on the relationship dimension examines the metacommunication or instructions about how the communication is to be interpreted. Characterization of relational control mode interaction associated with interpersonal argument appears to have particular relevance to Trapp's definition of interpersonal argument because analysis of this interaction reveals communicators' agreement and disagreement concerning the definition of the relationship.

Three relational states are possible in control mode interaction:

(1) a "one-up" state (+); a "one-down" state (-); and a state of equivalence (=). A one-up state indicates an attempt to control the definition of a relationship. A one-down state indicates an attempt to relinquish control of this definition. A state of equivalence indicates a definition of relational equality. Each state reflects the individual's definition of the relationship, indicating attempts to control the other's behavioral options, willingness to have one's behavioral options controlled by the other or shared control. According to several scholars,⁵ the minimal unit of relational control mode interaction analysis is the interact or two contiguous statements.

Analysis of relational control mode interaction results in several forms of complementary or symmetrical relationships. For example, complementarity describes a relationship in which the participants exhibit the same definition of who is in the controlling position. This indicates agreement concerning the definition of the relationship. Complementarity comprises some form of one-up state followed or preceded by some form of one-down state. For example, A's one-up state followed by B's one-down state indicates A and B agree A is in the controlling position and B relinquishes control to A.

Symmetry describes a relationship in which participants exhibit different definitions of the relationship or disagreement concerning the relational definition. For example, competitive symmetry is characterized by A's one-up behavior (indicating an attempt to define A in the controlling position) followed by B's one-up behavior indicating a different definition of the relationship (an attempt to define B in the controlling position). Concatenous equivalence statements describe a relationship in which participants exhibit relational equality. The remaining possible definitions involve patterns which cycle from or to shared control.

The present study proposes to pursue the search to understand interpersonal argument through exploration of the association between Trapp's categories of interpersonal conversation and relational control mode interaction. The descriptive research question asks, what are the relational control mode interaction characteristics of Paradigm Cases of Argument, Peripheral Cases of Argument and Conversation Other Than Argument?

Method

The data of the study comprised the 60 sample cases of conversation used in Trapp's study. Each case was coded into the categories of RELCOM by a trained coder. Several studies have demonstrated the utility of empirically examining relational control mode communication using this interaction analysis system.⁶ Reliability among three pairs of raters for RELCOM using Guetzkow's formula⁷ ranges from .8649 to .8243.

RELCOM reflects states of relationship definition observable in the

manner in which behavioral options are either taken from (+;+), shared with (-), or relinquished to others (-;-). This analysis system contains five mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories:

1. Dominance (+)
2. Structuring (+)
3. Equivalence (=)
4. Deference (-)
5. Submissiveness (-)

A copy of the coding manual which operationalizes each category is available from the authors upon request.

Several constraints are inherent in RELCOM analysis. First, the minimal unit of interaction analysis is the interact.⁸ Second, RELCOM analysis requires coders to categorize each statement in relationship to the preceding statement. Consequently, the first statement in each conversational sample receives no code. As a result of these constraints, 15 sample cases provided insufficient data for analysis and were eliminated from the study.⁹

The authors determined the distribution of coded interaction patterns for each sample of conversation and converted this distribution to percentages. The authors then organized the data of the study according to Trapp's three categories of interpersonal conversation. We examined each category separately to discover interaction patterns similar across cases comprising the category.

Results

The results of the data analysis suggest an association between Trapp's three categories of interpersonal conversation and relational control mode interaction characteristics. To some degree, these categories are distinguishable on the basis of their characteristic interaction patterns.

The interaction occurring in five of the six example Paradigm Cases of Argument examined in this study is characterized by competitive symmetry only (see Table 1). No other interaction patterns occurred in these conversations. Competitive symmetry indicates participants disagree concerning the definition of the relationship, each defining self in the controlling position. The following conversation illustrates this interaction pattern.

Example 27 (Paradigm Case of Argument)
Goodwin¹⁰

Three inner-city black children planning a sling shot battle.

01 R: I'm on Michael side.

- 02 M: No you not.
- 03 R: Yes I is.
- 04 C: No you aint.
- 05 M: Yeah? You gonna get shot too you come here.

The interaction occurring in 10 of the 13 examples of Peripheral Cases of Argument examined in this study is characterized by symmetry in conjunction with varying combinations of complementarity and patterns involving equivalence (see Table 2). For example, four cases¹¹ are characterized by competitive symmetry and complementarity. One case¹² is characterized by competitive symmetry and patterns involving equivalence. Finally, five examples¹³ are characterized by competitive symmetry and complementarity as well as patterns involving equivalence. The following conversation illustrates these interaction patterns.

Example 08 (Peripheral Case of Argument
Jackson and Jacobs, QJS, 1980)¹⁴

- 01 J: Let's get that one.
- 02 A: No. I don't like that one. Let's go somewhere else.
- 03 J: Shower curtains are all the same.
- 04 A: Well yeah. I know. But you might as well get one that looks nice.
- 05 J: And probably get one that costs more too.

The interaction occurring in 15 of the 26 examples of Conversation Other Than Argument examined in this study is characterized by complementarity and/or patterns involving equivalence (see Table 3a). For example, three cases¹⁵ are characterized by complementarity only; three cases¹⁶ are characterized only by patterns involving equivalence; and, 9 cases¹⁷ are characterized by both complementarity and equivalence. The following conversation illustrates these interaction patterns.

Example 57 (Conversation Other Than Argument)
Jackson and Jacobs, QJS, 1980)¹⁸

- 01 D: We have eight ounces left. That should last us for a couple of days. At least.
- 02 B: Heh yeah, I guess so.
- 03 D: Twenty-four days I would estimate.
- 04 B: Eight ounces?!
- 05 D: Sure we did smoke a lid in two or three days.
-
- 16 B: That's like--that's like drinking eight or nine kegs every week.
- 17 C: Or smoking two packs of cigarettes every day.
- 18 A: EHH - heh - heh - heh - heh.
- 19 B: Yeah. (.) Only I don' smoke two packs // of cigarettes every ---
- 20 C: Three? Four?
- 21 B: No. Not nearly that many.

The interaction occurring in nine of the 11 remaining examples of

Conversation Other Than Argument (see Table 3b) is characterized by patterns similar to those characterizing Peripheral Cases of Argument: competitive symmetry as well as complementarity and/or equivalence.

Discussion

The purpose of the present study is to contribute to the understanding of interpersonal argument. Toward this goal the study describes the relational interaction which distinguishes interpersonal argument from some other categories of interpersonal conversation. Further, the following discussion attempts to integrate the results of the study with the findings of Trapp's study.

The present study identifies four categories of interpersonal conversation. These categories are characterized by particular patterns of relational control mode interaction as well as some particular aspects of the content dimension of communication.

The first category, Paradigm Cases of Argument (see Table 1), is characterized by relational interaction reflecting disagreement concerning the definition of the relationship. This interaction reflects sequential attempts to restrict the behavioral options of other participants and competition to control the relationship. The interaction describing this category tends to be characterized by this single relational definition.

A second category, Conversation Other Than Argument (see Table 3a), is characterized by relational interaction reflecting agreement concerning the definition of the relationship and by equality. One crucial observation is the total absence of disagreement or competition concerning control. In other words, the interaction is characterized by relational agreement and equality rather than disagreement.

A third category, Peripheral Cases of Argument (see Table 2), is characterized by relational interaction reflecting disagreement concerning the definition of the relationship as well as agreement and equality. Recall, this category comprises samples of conversation which were not clearly judged to be argument or not argument. Some subjects in Trapp's study judged these cases to be argument whereas other subjects judged these cases to be not argument. There was no statistically significant agreement concerning these cases. This lack of agreement can be explained by the variety of relational interaction patterns characterizing this category. That is, the relational interaction exhibited in Peripheral Cases of Argument is similar to Paradigm Cases of Argument in the sense that both are characterized by disagreement concerning the definition of the relationship. However, the disagreement exhibited in Peripheral Cases of Argument is tempered, mitigated or balanced by the inclusion of congruent definitions of the relationship and by interaction involving equivalence (no attempt to control behavioral options).

The fourth category (see Table 3b) is characterized by relational

interaction similar to that exhibited in Peripheral Cases of Argument: disagreement tempered by agreement and equality concerning the definition of the relationship. However, the subjects of Trapp's study labeled cases comprising category four as Conversation Other Than Argument. Trapp's maxim suggests a distinction between Peripheral Cases of Argument and the cases of this fourth category. The maxim states, "a presumption exists against labeling an event as an argument when a more palatable label is available."¹⁹ Further, Trapp's definition of interpersonal argument infers subjects tend to perceive resolved disagreement as not argument. The cases comprising category four tend to terminate in some form of mutual resolution (e.g., direct or indirect acquiescence or clarification of a misunderstanding), thereby enabling subjects to interpret these cases as other than argument. The following example illustrates this category.

Example 31 (Paradigm Case of Conversation Other Than Argument)
Jacobs and Jackson, in Cox and Willard²⁰

A is in the kitchen. B is in the basement.
The television is in the living room.

- 01 A: Turn on the last ten minutes of *As The World Turns* and we'll see if anything exciting is happening.
02 B: Go ahead.
03 A: You. I'm making lunch.
04 B: No.
05 A: Well you're right in there!
06 B: No I'm not [shouted loudly]
07 A: Oh.

On the other hand, conversations comprising Peripheral Cases of Argument tend to terminate in unresolved disagreement or unilateral resolution without acquiescence (not unlike Paradigm Cases of Argument), as the following conversation illustrates.

Example 04 (Peripheral Case of Argument)
Trapp example²¹

Jan and her ten year old daughter Erin are talking on a Wednesday evening.

- 01 J: You need to take a bath.
02 E: Why?
03 J: You haven't all week.
04 E: Yes I have.
05 J: When?
06 E: Sunday.
07 J: Take a bath!!

The implication is, in the absence of mutual resolution or acquiescence, subjects could not agree to categorize such cases as Conversation Other Than Argument. Further, in the presence of relational interaction reflecting tempered disagreement, subjects could not agree to categorize such cases as argument. However, the combination of relational interaction patterns and lack of resolution identify this group of

conversations as a separate category.

In conclusion, apparently analysis which combines elements of the relationship and content dimensions of communication provides greater breadth and depth of explanation than does the analysis of either dimension in isolation. The analyses appear to be complementary. Each contributes insights to enhance the other. The present study builds on Trapp's study and describes four categories of interpersonal conversation. The first category, Paradigm Cases of Argument, is characterized by disagreement concerning the definition of the relationship and unresolved disagreement in the content dimension. The second category, Conversation Other Than Argument is characterized by relational equality and agreement concerning the definition of the relationship.

The third category, Peripheral Cases of Argument (or Tempered Argument: Unresolved), is characterized by relational disagreement tempered by equality and agreement concerning the definition of the relationship. Further, this category is characterized by unresolved disagreement or unilateral resolution without acquiescence in the content dimension.

The fourth category (Tempered Argument: Resolved) is characterized by disagreement tempered by equality and agreement concerning the relational definition (similar to Peripheral Cases of Argument). However, this category is characterized by mutually resolved disagreement in the content dimension.²²

Although our study provides new insights, it is only one of the initial steps toward developing theories of interpersonal argument. Much remains to be discovered. Continued exploration is needed to further advance the understanding of this phenomenon. Several possible directions for future research emerged from the present study. For example, we examined only the control mode element of the relationship dimension of communication. Future research might focus on other elements of the relationship dimension such as self-disclosure and trust. Further, other elements of the content dimension such as source of information and equivocality reduction might be explored. The results of our study also suggest further exploration into the difference between mutual resolution of disagreement and unilateral resolution without acquiescence may be useful to the development of a typology of interpersonal argument.

Additional insight into interpersonal argument might be gained through gathering additional transcripts comprising longer conversations and examining interpersonal argument in the context of ongoing relationships. Another possibility would be to have subjects listen to audiotapes of conversations to determine which cases were argument and not argument. This method would provide paralinguistic cues. Investigation might also include asking subjects to provide reasons for their judgments. Subjects might also be asked to categorize the nature of the perceived relationship

between individuals involved in the conversations.

There are, of course, limitations to the present study. For example, further analysis is required to explain cases within each category which were exceptions. Perhaps the suggestions listed above might shed light on these exceptions. Although we acknowledge much remains to be discovered, we hope the present study in some measure contributes to the understanding of interpersonal argument and encourages future research.

TABLE 1: RELATIONAL CONTROL MODE INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF PARADIGM CASES OF ARGUMENT

Example	Relational Control Mode Patterns				
	Competitive Symmetry			Complementarity	
	f+ f-	f- f+	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-
20			100%		
27			100%		
54	12.5%	25%	62.5%		
56			100%		
58			100%		
06		33.3%		33.3%	33.3%

TABLE 2: RELATIONAL CONTROL MODE INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF PERIPHERAL CASES OF ARGUMENT

Example	Relational Control Mode Patterns									
	Symmetry			Complementarity		Equivalence	Patterns Cycling to & from Equivalence			
	f+ f-	f- f+	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-	f- f-
14	25%	50%		25%						
30		33.3%		33.3%	33.3%					
04	20%	20%		20%	60%					
59		11%		44.4%	44.4%					
12		17.6%		17.6%	23.5%	5.8%	11.7%	5.8%		17.6%
03		16.6%		33.3%	16.6%			16.6%		16.6%
15	8.3%	8.3%	33.3%	8.3%	8.3%			16.6%		16.6%
42		16.6%	33.3%		16.6%			16.6%		
33		14.2%	14.2%		14.2%	14.2%	14.2%		14.2%	14.2%
08		33.3%						33.3%		33.3%
28						25%		25%		25%
07			100%							
45			100%							

TABLE 3a: RELATIONAL CONTROL MODE INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVERSATION OTHER THAN ARGUMENT

Relational Control Mode Patterns						
Example	Complementarity			Equivalence Patterns Cycling to & from Equivalence		
	T- &-	&- T+	&- T-	->->	->T-	T->&-
11	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%			
40	50%		50%			
43	50%		50%			
02				33.3%		33.3%
49				50%	50%	
51				50%		50%
24			50%			50%
26	11.1%		22.2%	33.3%	11.1%	22.2%
48	8.3%		16.6%	25%	16.6%	8.3%
57	22.2%		22.2%	22.2%	22.2%	11.1%
53	25%		25%	25%		25%
41			33.3%		33.3%	33.3%
09			33.3%		33.3%	33.3%
05			50%			50%
55	25%		25%	25%		25%

TABLE 3b: RELATIONAL CONTROL MODE INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVERSATION OTHER THAN ARGUMENT

Relational Control Mode Patterns							
Example	Symmetry		Complementarity		Equivalence Patterns Cycling to & from Equivalence		
	T- T-	T- &-	T- &-	&- T-	->->	->T-	T->&-
13	28.5%			14.2%		28.5%	28.5%
39	14.2%			14.2%	14.2%	28.5%	14.2%
01	35.7%	7.1%	14.2%	14.2%		14.2%	14.2%
19	50%			50%			
60	66.6%			16.6%			
47	83.3%			16.6%			
25	25%				25%	25%	25%
31	75%						25%
46	50%				25%		25%
38			33.3%		33.3%		33.3%
10	100%						

TABLE 4: CATEGORIES OF INTERPERSONAL CONVERSATION

Category 1: Paradigm Cases of Argument (Burnett & Dracksei; Trapp)	Category 2: Conversation Other Than Argument (Burnett & Dracksei; Trapp)
Relationship Dimension: disagreement concerning the relational definition	Relationship Dimension: relational equality and agreement concerning the relational definition
Content Dimension: unresolved disagreement	Content Dimension: no disagreement (disagreement is not actualized)
Category 3: Tempered Argument/Unresolved (Burnett & Dracksei); Peripheral Cases of Argument (Trapp)	Category 4: Tempered Argument/Resolved (Burnett & Dracksei); Conversation Other Than Argument (Trapp)
Relationship Dimension: relational disagreement and equality as well as agreement concerning the relational definition	Relationship Dimension: relational disagreement and equality as well as agreement concerning the relational definition
Content Dimension: unresolved disagreement or unilateral resolution without acquiescence	Content Dimension: resolved disagreement (mutual resolution)

NOTES

¹For example, see Dale Hample, "The Cognitive View of Argument," Journal of the American Forensics Association 16 (1980): 151-59; Sally Jackson & Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (Oct. 1980): 251-65; Scott Jacobs & Sally Jackson, "Argument as a Natural Category: The Routine Grounds for Arguing in Conversation," Western Journal of Speech Communication 45 (Spring 1981): 118-33; Scott Jacobs & Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," Advances in Argumentation and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Press, 1982), 205-37; Robert Trapp, "Special Report on Argumentation; Introduction," Western Journal of Speech Communication 45 (Spring 1981): 111-17; and Robert Trapp, "The Role of Disagreement in Interactional Argument," unpublished, 1985, 1-44.

²Trapp, 1985.

³Trapp, p. 2.

⁴p. Watzawick, J. Beavin and D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).

⁵For example, see Don Ellis, "Relational Control in Two-Group Systems," Communication Monographs 46 (1979): 153-65, and B.A. Fisher and G.L. Drecksell, "A Cyclical Model of Developing Relationships: A Study of Relational Control Interaction," Communication Monographs 50 (1983): 66-78.

⁶For example, see G.L. Drecksell and B.A. Fisher, "Relational Interaction Characteristics of Women's Consciousness--Raising Groups," paper presented at the Western Speech Communication Association, Phoenix, AZ; Fisher & Drecksell, 1981, and B.A. Fisher & W. Werbel, "T-group and therapy group communication: An interaction analysis of the group process," Small Group Behavior 10 (1979): 475-500.

⁷H. Guetzkow, "Unitizing and Categorizing Problems in Coding Qualitative Data," Journal of Clinical Psychology 6 (1950): 47-50.

⁸B.A. Fisher and Leonard Hawes, "An Interact System Model: Generating Grounded Theory of Small Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Speech 57 (1971): 444-53 and Karl Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing (Reading, Mass.: Addison & Wesley, 1969).

⁹Cases providing insufficient data included cases with three or fewer statements, and cases with more than one uninterpretable statement. Thus, two of the eight (25%) Paradigm Cases of Argument, seventeen (24%) Peripheral Cases of Argument, and cases between argument and peripheral argument, as well as six of the thirty-two (19%) cases of Conversation Other Than Argument were eliminated from the analysis by these criteria.

¹⁰Marjorie Harness Goodwin, "Processes of Dispute Management Among

Urban Black Children," American Ethnologist 9 (1982): 76-96.

¹¹Cases 14, 30, 04, and 59.

¹²Example 08.

¹³Cases 12, 03, 15, 42 and 33.

¹⁴Jackson & Jacobs, 1980.

¹⁵Cases 11, 40 & 43.

¹⁶Cases 02, 49 & 51.

¹⁷Cases 24, 26, 48, 57, 53, 41, 09, 05 & 55.

¹⁸Jackson & Jacobs, 1980.

¹⁹Trapp, 1985, p. 16.

²⁰Jacobs & Jackson, 1982.

²¹Trapp, 1985.

²²Table 4 summarizes these distinctions in matrix form.

WHAT ARE CONVERSATIONAL ARGUMENTS? TOWARD A
NATURAL LANGUAGE USER'S PERSPECTIVE

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Increasingly, argumentation theorists are giving attention to the study of argument in face-to-face interaction and this has been accompanied by an interest in how naive natural language users conceive of conversational arguments. Most exemplary of this work are studies by Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, though others have entered these discussions as well. While progress has been made in characterizing conversational arguments in this manner, several important issues remain fuzzy and unresolved. Consequently, this study addresses two of these issues: (1) the definitions of "disagreement" and "argument" utilized by Jacobs and Jackson and (2) their resulting conception of the relationship between conversational disagreement and conversational argument.

The paper is organized into four sections. First, we review the past work of Jacobs and Jackson regarding the definitions of conversational disagreement and argument and in so doing derive a general rationale for our study. Second, we present the methodology of our own investigation of these issues. Third, the results of our study are discussed, and finally, conclusions and implications are considered.

Rationale

Jacobs and Jackson arrive at their description of conversational arguments through a method labeled "analytic induction." They write:

The first step in the process (of analytic induction) is the location or collection of some number of relevant examples of the phenomenon being studied. In our own efforts to produce a second order description of the natural category of argument, we began by collecting a

set of naturally occurring arguments, relying on our native speaker/hearer intuitions to identify relevant cases.

Again, in concluding their paper, they write:

Through the methods of analytic induction, we have been able to build a second-order concept of argument which formally represents the naive theories of argument shared by ordinary speakers and hearers.

As an approach to the study of conversational phenomena, analytic induction has many advantages. And, for the study of conversational arguments in particular, Jacobs and Jackson have demonstrated that the method is capable of deriving substantial claims about the phenomenon. However, a potentially valuable next step in the study of conversational argument and disagreement would be ascertaining what natural language users themselves define as "disagreements" or "arguments," as a check against those definitions derived by Jacobs and Jackson. A similar approach to problem has been taken by Trapp. This procedure allows a safer generalization of "naive" theories of argument to natural language users. If examples used as a basis for generation of those "naive" theories of argument do not represent "relevant examples of the phenomenon" as ordinary language users would classify them, then in principle this undermines the generalizability of any "naive theories" of argument derived from those examples.

For this reason, this study will attempt to verify as relevant cases of disagreement or argument those examples offered by Jacobs and Jackson.

Conversational Disagreements. Jacobs and Jackson also posit that conversational arguments revolve around or follow out of "disagreement-relevant speech acts." They suggest that the basis for disagreement is not simply the truth or falsity of stated propositions but also contradictions between preconditions for one speech act and another. For Jacobs and Jackson, those preconditions are the "felicity conditions" posited by Searle. Thus, according to Jacobs and Jackson, every speech act, since each involves felicity conditions (or preconditions), can be "disagreed with" and hence, may form the bases for a disagreement or argument.

For example, suppose speaker S makes a request of hearer H. According to Searle, one of the felicity conditions for making a request is that the speaker believe the hearer is capable of fulfilling the request. Imagine this sequence:

S: Can I borrow your car?

H: No, it's in the shop.

Following Jacobs and Jackson's definition, this is a disagreement, since the request was responded to with a "dispreferred second pair part"(refusal of the request).

We view this as problematic since it results in calling events like those above "disagreements" when our own native speaker/hearer intuitions tell us they are not. This should not be seen as quibbling about the definition of disagreement. If naive theories of disagreement and argument are to be derived from relevant cases of these classes of phenomena, then we feel that some consideration needs to be given to the "naive theorists" or natural language users understandings of these phenomena.

Conversational Arguments. A second motivation for this study concerns the nature of conversational arguments and how conversational arguments are conceived and/or defined by natural language users. Jacobs and Jackson posit a two pronged approach. First, conversational arguments have a functional component; namely, the projection, avoidance, production or resolution of disagreement. Second, arguments have a structural component; a variety of structural expansions of adjacency pairs.

O'Keefe and Benoit have elsewhere argued the inadequacy of a structural approach.

Approaches that emphasize discourse structure to the exclusion of other properties of argument draw boundaries around instances of interaction in such a way as to include some borderline cases and arbitrarily exclude others.

In rejecting a "structural account" of argument, O'Keefe and Benoit instead adopt a "generic characteristic" approach. This approach tries to identify the "set of features that commonly (but not necessarily) appear in arguments so that an event which displays a number of these features is probably appropriately described as an argument". Using this generic characteristic approach, O'Keefe and Benoit further identify one generic property of all arguments; "a relationship of opposition between participants". Thus, according to O'Keefe and Benoit, "arguments begin (and continue) as overt opposition is made manifest, and arguments end when opposition is no longer manifest".

Both the structural account of Jacobs and Jackson and the generic-characteristic approach of O'Keefe and Benoit have shed light on the nature of conversational arguments. Yet, neither approach utilizes everyday language users to help construct theories about the "structure" and/or the "characteristics" of conversational arguments. This study represents an attempt to determine just what everyday language users identify as cases of argument and as importantly, on what basis they make those decisions. Through this method we intend to add to or refine both the "structural" and "generic characteristic" approaches.

Thus, our two central concerns in this study were: (1) to ascertain what everyday language users would be willing to label conversational disagreements and arguments, and (2) to begin to elaborate the features of these two phenomena and their relation to one another.

Method

Subjects

The subjects in this study were forty-six undergraduate students enrolled in two courses in the Department of Communication at a large midwestern university. Participation was voluntary.

Materials

Twenty-one segments of conversation, originally presented by Jacobs and Jackson, were printed on separate sheets of paper, one segment per sheet (See examples 1-22, excluding #16, in Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 225-234). At the top of the sheets were the following instructions:

Read carefully the following segment of interaction taken from an actual conversation. Imagine you overheard this segment.

After the segment of interaction was presented, subjects were then asked to respond to a multiple-choice type question asking the following:

Would you say that this interaction is an example of?

- A: An argument
- R: A disagreement
- C: Neither an argument or a disagreement
- D: Both an argument and a disagreement

- F. Impossible to tell
- F. If none of the above, what is it?

The multiple choice question was followed by a brief free response question which asked the following:

Briefly explain why you responded the way you did:

Procedures

After volunteering to participate in the study, each subject was given a packet of materials containing the twenty-one examples, and response solicitations as outlined above. For each subject the examples were presented in a random order. On the outside of the packet were the following instructions:

This study is interested in how people describe segments of interaction taken from actual conversations

In your envelope you will find 21 segments from conversations.

We would like you to read each example carefully and then make some decisions about what to call the segment. We would also like you to briefly explain each choice.

Make your decisions one at a time. That is, read one example, make your decision regarding that example, and then proceed on to the next example.

No time limit was placed on the subjects for completion of the task, although most took between thirty and forty minutes.

Results

As indicated earlier, subjects were asked to categorize each example as either "an argument," "a disagreement," "both an argument and a disagreement," "neither an argument or a disagreement," or "can't tell." Table 1 reports the percentages of subjects who placed the examples into these categories.

Table 1: Percentages- Designated Classification X Example

# of Example	Argument	Disagreement	Neither	Both	Can't tell
1	9	57	6	24	4
2	56	11	16	13	4
3	2	7	80	2	11
4	9	13	35	9	35
5	57	4	13	24	0
6	15	26	32	13	13
7	51	13	16	9	11
8	7	22	38	4	29
9	0	0	91	0	9
10	0	0	83	0	17
11	20	22	45	0	13
12	2	17	55	2	29
13	15	38	26	32	2
14	2	17	69	4	2
15	28	11	46	11	4
17	2	4	85	0	7
18	2	2	89	0	7
19	13	51	8	18	4
20	15	15	48	0	24
21	2	48	25	2	23
22	15	30	26	7	24

* Percentages reported in this category are a compilation of "neither" and "None of the above" responses.



Generally, subjects in this study seemed to have a somewhat different conception of disagreements and arguments than Jacobs and Jackson. While subjects seemed to concur with Jacobs and Jackson regarding what was neither an instance of disagreement nor an instance of argument, subjects seemed to be substantially at odds with Jacobs and Jackson when it came to classifying interactions as disagreements, arguments or both. Also, when subjects did label segments as disagreements or arguments, they almost always offered reasons for making such classifications which were substantially different than those which are given as a basis for Jacobs and Jackson's definitions of argument and disagreement.

In one example(#2) subjects seemed to be in total agreement with Jacobs and Jackson.

#2: S and C are getting ready to pack up for departure from a visit with relatives.

(1) S: Do you know where my bag is?

(2) C: Yeah, it's packed away.

(3) S: Whadya mean it's packed away?!

(4) C: Just what I said!

(5) S: Why in the world would you do something like that?!

(6) C: Uhhhhhh [C stalks off in a huff]

Subjects very clearly felt this interaction should be classified as an argument(56%), as did Jacobs and Jackson. In fact, another 13% of the subjects indicated that they felt the interaction represented both a disagreement and an argument. However, the subjects seemed to have somewhat different reasons for these classifications than might be suggested by a "structural" orientation to conversational argument. According to our subjects, example #2 is an argument because: "there are opposing viewpoints," "they are fighting," "it is irrational or stupid," "it is an argument for the sake of argument," "it is heated," "one is mad at the other(four subjects), "they are yelling, "S blows up"(two subjects), "there is excitement in the voices," "heavy emotions are involved," "one personally attacked the other," the interaction sounded "accusatory,"

"both appear to be under a lot of strain," and it was a "high pressure, volatile situation." Even those subjects who chose to categorize this interaction only as a disagreement more often than not suggested that the interaction was a "disagreement" because of the presence of hostility, raised tempers, anger or opposition. Finally, those subjects who chose to classify the interaction as neither a disagreement or an argument indicated that they did so because there were "no conflicting opinions" and were also more likely to label the interaction as a "tiff," a "squabble" or temporary "anger," "frustration," "disgust," or "irritability," but "not angry or enraged as in an argument."

In many other examples, subjects not only differed from Jacobs and Jackson in terms of the reasons given for their classifications of these segments of interaction, but generally disagreed with the classification selected. For example, in examples #1, #13, #19 and #21, Jacobs and Jackson suggest that these represent cases of both disagreement and argument. Our subjects, however, chose to label these as instances of disagreement only(57%, 35%, 51% and 48%, respectively). Reasons given for classifying example #1 as a case of disagreement but not a case of argument included: differing opinions(five subjects), "not intense," "no distraction from topic," "one doesn't know enough to argue," "they're not trying to say one religion is better," "they're not really pulling at facts," the interaction "appears friendly," "no name calling or personal attacks"(four subjects), and "no yelling or anger"(eight subjects). Reasons given in response to example #13 were quite similar. Subjects noted "a conflict of beliefs"(ten subjects), but felt the interaction was not an argument because: "there are no fighting words, although they are going back'n'forth," "the lady really doesn't know what she believes in," "A isn't strongly convicted enough in her views for it to be an argument," "it is discussed rationally," and "they disagree on a few concepts, but not major ones." Similar reasons were given by the fairly large number of subjects(22%) who classified Example #13 as both a disagreement and an argument: "contrasting opinions," "some hostility and defensiveness," and "exasperation," "yelling," and "rudeness." In response to Example #19, subjects offered reasons such as differing viewpoints(fifteen subjects), "no name calling," "some tension," "defending of sides," and noted that the interaction seemed to be "leading up to an argument," but that the interactants were "not yet arguing."

Finally, in responding to Example #21, subjects noted "differing opinions"(twelve subjects), and "indignance" on the part of interactant B as reasons for their particular choice of classification. Also of interest here is the somewhat large percentage of subjects(23%) who indicated that they could not decide how to classify the interaction. Over three quarters of

these subjects indicated that they needed more information, specifically "more interaction" and "tones of voices," in order to make a classification. With regard to examples #5 and #7, Jacobs and Jackson suggest that these interactions also represent cases of both disagreement and argument. Consider example #5:

#5:

- (1) A: Come help me.
- (2) B: I'm busy.
- (3) A: I need you to hold this.
- (4) B: I need to finish this.
- (5) A: I always help you when you ask me.
- (6) B: I never ask you when you're busy.
- (7) A: Come on, you lazy creep.
- (8) B: Bug off, you shrew!

Our subjects generally chose not to label this interaction as a disagreement or both, but instead chose to classify the interaction as an argument only. Reasons given included; "it's silly, it's stupid--a disagreement is over something," "opposing goals"(six subjects), "how they are talking to one another," "name calling"(three subjects), "hostility, anger and bitterness"(three subjects), "resentment," "violent tendencies in responses," "lack of cooperation or compromise," "personal attacks"(three subjects), "it goes back'n'forth," "not listening enough to disagree," and "apparent undercurrents--like they're arguing over more than just one helping the other." Similar reasons were given to explain the classification of example #7. Subjects noted "illogicality," "defensiveness," "name calling," "stubbornness," "heated" exchanges, "hasty words," "hardcore emotion," "tone of voice," "personal" attacks and that A was "upset," "pissed off," and "exploding."

Our data also indicate that perhaps natural language

users have more stringent criteria for calling an interaction a disagreement than do Jacobs and Jackson. While Jacobs and Jackson suggest that examples #14, #15 and #18 represent cases of disagreement, our subjects seemed to feel that the interactions were neither disagreements nor arguments (46%, 69% and 89% respectively). In response to example #15, for instance, subjects chose overwhelmingly to label the interaction as a "misunderstanding"(twelve subjects), "confusion," "a simple conversation," "a request and reply," or a "squabble."

#15. A is in the kitchen. B is in the basement. The television is in the living room.

- (1) A: Turn on the last ten minutes of As The World Turns and we'll see if anything exciting is happening.
- (2) B: Go ahead.
- (3) A: You. I'm making lunch.
- (4) B: No.
- (5) A: Well, you're right in there.
- (6) B: No I'm not [shouted loudly]
- (7) A: Oh.

Subjects noted in particular that the interaction "ceased when A found out that B wasn't in the living room." On examples #14 and #18, subjects felt that the interactions represented a case of "discussion"(seven a subjects for example #14), "an agreement"(eight subjects for example #18), and noted the absence of "conflict"(five subjects for each example), "no defending of sides," "no frustration," "no explicit differences" for example #14, "no forcing of the issue," "no tension or hostility," "no fighting," "no dispute," and the presence of "compromise" for example #18.

Examples #3, #9, #10, #12 and #17, are classified by Jacobs and Jackson as neither disagreements or arguments. Our subjects were largely in agreement with this view. Subjects

classifying these segments as neither arguments or disagreements were 80%, 91%, 83%, 55% and 85% respectively. In response to example #3, twenty of the subjects labeled this as an "agreement," thirteen subjects labeled it a "simple discussion," and a few other subjects suggested that it might become a disagreement or an argument in the future. Reasons given for classifying it as neither an argument or a disagreement included the following; "no supporting reasons given for each other (five subjects)," "no conflict," and "not enough expression." Responses to example #9, below, are most exemplary.

#9: E is C's grandparent. Both are visiting C's parents while C is home during Christmas vacation. E lives in another town. It is Sunday and E is getting ready to leave.

- (1) F: How long do you have here?
- (2) C: Oh, we're planning to go back Thursday or Friday.
- (3) E: Oh, well. Maybe you can come up for a day and visit us.
- (4) C: Yeah, maybe so. We'll have to see.

Nineteen subjects chose to label this as a "regular conversation," or a "simple discussion," five subjects as "a request-with a putoff as a reply," and several others as a suggestion with an uncertain response, a small talk for the purpose of gaining information, or the telling of a "white lie" by Speaker C. Reasons given for classifying the segment in the Neither category included; "no defending of sides," "no frustration or tension," "no real negative or positive feelings," "no explicit conflict," and that the interaction was "not over anything major". In response to example #10, subjects classifying this as neither a disagreement or an argument chose instead to label this segment as; a simple "question and answer" (three subjects), a "simple conversation" (ten subjects), an "agreement" (five subjects), and simply an "arranging of an appointment" (ten subjects). As a basis for classification into the Neither category, subjects noted that; "no disagreement was implied" (two subjects), there was "no conflict" (six subjects), and "no negativity," "no tension, stress or confrontation," "no harsh interaction," and "no hostility." In response to example #12, subjects calling this neither a disagreement or an argument, chose instead to

label the segment of interaction as "a suggestion," a "discussion of a suggestion," or a "suggestion which gets stifled" (twelve subjects). Other subjects labeled the interaction as "a misunderstanding," "confusion," "I just trying to please S" (three subjects), "a circular interaction," or "just dinner conversation which fades away." Reasons given for a Neither classification included; "no tenseness," "no yelling or screaming," "no real disagreement," "no one really listening," and "no contrary opinions stated." In response to example #17, the results were similar. Fifteen subjects chose to label this as a simple "discussion" or "conversation", eight subjects labeled the segment as an "agreement," and six subjects as a simple "question and answer". Subjects also noted the absence of "conflict" (five), "blatant disagreement" (three), "harsh words," "hostility," "anger," "opposing viewpoints," or "fighting" as the basis for making their classification decision.

In responding to four of the examples (#4, #8, #20, and #22), subjects either labeled the interactions as neither a disagreement or an argument (35%, 37%, 48% and 26% respectively) or expressed great difficulty in being able to discern the appropriate category by marking the "Can't Tell" option on the questionnaire (35%, 29%, 24% and 24% respectively). In fact, these four examples drew more "Can't Tell" responses than any of the other examples. For example:

#20: S enters the house carrying a suitcase.

- (1) C: Hey, you didn't bring this back.
- (2) S: Bring what back?
- (3) C: The suitcase.
- (4) S: Of course not. Robeson's was closed.

In each case between 50 and 70% of the subjects chose not to label the interaction as a either a disagreement, an argument, or both. For Jacobs and Jackson, their preferred categorization is unclear but they seem to suggest that these are neither disagreements or arguments, but have the potential to become either. Our subjects seem to agree. Perhaps those who had difficulty choosing a category were responding to what

they saw as a potential direction the interaction might take. Cicourel's notion of the "prospective sense of occurrence" would seem to suggest this possibility, as would comments from subjects such as "could turn into an argument," "need additional interaction," and "need more dialogue"¹⁶.

Finally, in response to two examples (#6 and #11), subjects demonstrated no consistent patterns of classification.

Conclusions and Implications

The implications of our results are threefold. First, O'Keefe has cogently suggested that there are two senses of "argument" found in everyday talk¹⁷. The first sense, or argument₁, refers to "a kind of utterance or a sort of communicative act"¹⁸. The second sense, or argument₂, is a "particular kind of interaction"¹⁹. Admittedly, our study was not aimed at elucidating this distinction. Our instructions clearly called for subjects to attend to that second sense of argument, argument as interaction. But our study does lead to a further distinction in the meaning of argument₂.

There is a long and rich history in the field of rhetoric of concern with argument as "reasoned discourse." This "reasoned discourse" approach to argument has been utilized in studying both monologic argument(argument₁) as well as dialectical or disputational argument(argument₂). Recently, the importance of dialectical argument as a type of "reasoned discourse" is being recognized by small group researchers interested in idea development processes within groups. For example, in a recent study conducted by Siebold, McPhee, Poole, Tanita, & Canary, three approaches to argument were compared²⁰. These three approaches or models were: (1) the Toulmin model²¹; (2) the Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca model²²; and (3) the Jacobs and Jackson model²³.

We believe it noteworthy that the Jacobs and Jackson model was included with these other two models. In fact, we posit the correctness of this grouping since all three models of argument concern "reasoned discourse." In explaining conversational argument through the use of felicity conditions Jacobs and Jackson have entailed a "reasoned discourse" perspective. Other scholars have noted that speech acts or felicity conditions speak only to the "reasoned" aspects of ordinary discourse at the exclusion of the affective²⁴, and have additionally noted the limitations of this approach²⁴.

We also suspect that argument₁ plays a critical role in argument₂, only when argument₂ is seen as "reasoned discourse." This makes sense given that Jacobs and Jackson have previously argued that O'Keefe's two senses of argument are

"unified by a common generative principle"²⁵.

In contrast, however, we argue that none of the approaches to reasoned discourse match the understanding of argument by everyday language users. Our results suggest that for ordinary actors, argument is a hostility-laden event where sharply contrasting expressions of opinion, loud voices, intense emotion, anger, frustration, and namecalling characterize the interaction. Of course, in real life, as in many of the examples used by Jacobs and Jackson, both "reasoned discourse" and hostility laden discourse overlap. However, what seems most critical in the naive theories of everyday actors is not reasoned discourse, but hostility laden discourse.

At the very least, it will be important for theorists and researchers interested in everyday occurrence of argument to specify clearly which type of discourse they are investigating in their research. Theories or explanations derived from investigations of one type of argument₂ may not generalize to the other. We are not suggesting that either form (reasoned discourse or hostility laden discourse) should take precedence over the other in research. On the contrary, we feel that both phenomena occur in ordinary discourse and hence are equally deserving of further investigation. For whatever reasons, however, argument theorists have avoided hostility-laden discourse as a topic of study.

A second implication of our work concerns the nature of the relationship between conversational disagreement and argument. We are not able, on the basis of subject's responses in our study, to sort out a single relationship between conversational disagreements and conversational arguments. If there is a single naive theory which connects these phenomena, it is not all that clear from our data. Instead, there seems to be at least three possible relationships between conversational disagreements and conversational arguments from the perspective of natural language users. These are:

(1) Conversational arguments and disagreements are the same phenomenon. That is to say, some natural language users in our study seemed to use the terms interchangeably.

(2) Conversational arguments are a possible result of conversational disagreements. This is the type of relationship which has been discussed by past work²⁶.

(3) Conversational disagreements are a "milder" form of conversational arguments. This possible relationship was clearly indicated in our data by the very large number of subjects who would say "it's a disagreement, but it's not yet an argument because there is no hostility or name calling."

We believe the inconsistency between subjects regarding the relationship between disagreements and arguments leads to one of three conclusions, none of which we are prepared to support definitively at this time. It may simply be that there exists a variety of naive theories regarding this relationship. That is, while there does not exist a single naively perceived relationship across subjects, each subject does have some theory connecting the two events. Or it may be that there does not exist a consistent sense of the disagreement/-argument relationship for any of the subjects. Perhaps the concepts are simply too murky for everyday interactors. A third possible conclusion is that there exists a single relationship but that our method was unable to access the everyday language users' naive perspective on that relationship.

At this point, we must note that Burleson has been sharply critical of approaches which attempt to capture ordinary language user's understandings of arguments.¹ He suggests that interest should lie in the nature or characteristics of the empirical object of argument itself and not in use of or understanding of the word. He also argues that theories of argument should be formulated with the goals of argumentation theorists and researchers in mind rather than the interests of natural language users. We are largely in agreement with Burleson on both of these points. However, we believe that one important aspect of understanding an empirical phenomenon is to understand what features characterize that phenomenon. We are simply using everyday actors as one method to arrive at those features. This, in combination with direct observation, yields more complete understandings of the phenomenon.

Finally, we believe that a profitable direction for research is in understanding contextual differences between the types of discourse we have specified. Are certain situations more compelling for the production of reasoned discourse than hostility laden discourse? If so (as we suspect), what are the features of the situation which prompt one type of argument over another? For example, is familiarity between the interactants necessary for hostility laden arguments? If asked to "argue" about a relevant issue, would some relational dyads automatically engage in hostility laden discourse and others reasoned discourse? And under what circumstances might reasoned discourse give way to hostility laden discourse or vice versa? At this point, our evidence seems to suggest that rational or reasoned discourse for natural language users is synonymous with "having a discussion" or "discussing something calmly," and not with "having an argument." However, much more evidence would be needed before such a viewpoint could be confirmed. Future work might also focus on the nature of the relationship between disagreement and either of the two forms of argument. Investigation of these and other similar questions could aid argumentation theorists and communication theorists and researchers in general.

¹ Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Basis for the Enthymeme," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66(1980), pp. 251-265; Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Argument as a Natural Category: The Routine Grounds for Arguing in Conversation," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 45(Spring 1981), pp. 118-132; Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Strategy and Structure in Conversational Influence Attempts," Communication Monographs, 50, (1983), pp. 285-304; Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard (Carbondale & Edwardsville, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 205-237.

² A. W. Harrington, D. R. Scheerhorn, & R. Martin. "A Pragmatic Analysis of Conversational Disagreements: Rules and Implications," (paper presented to annual conference of the Speech Communication Association, New York, New York, 1980); R. Trapp, "Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars and Jack Rhodes, (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 516-530.

³ Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 219.

⁴ Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, pp. 236-237.

⁵ See Norman K. Denzin, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 195.

⁶ Trapp, 1983.

⁷ Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, pp. 226-227.

⁸ John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

⁹ Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 227.

¹⁰ Searle, 1969, p. 66.

¹¹Barbara J. O'Keefe and Pamela J. Benoit, "Children's Arguments," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard (Carbondale & Edwardsville, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 160.

¹²O'Keefe & Benoit, pp. 161-162.

¹³O'Keefe & Benoit, p. 161.

¹⁴O'Keefe & Benoit, p. 162.

¹⁵O'Keefe & Benoit, p. 163.

¹⁶A. V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Interaction (New York: The Free Press: MacMillan, 1974), p. 87.

¹⁷D. O'Keefe, "Two Concepts of Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (1977), pp. 121-128; D. O'Keefe, "The Concepts of Argument and Arguing," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. R. Cox and C. Willard (Carbondale & Edwardsville, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 3-23.

¹⁸O'Keefe, 1977, p. 121.

¹⁹O'Keefe, 1977, p. 121.

²⁰D. R. Seibold, R. D. McPhee, M. S. Poole, N. E. Tanita, & D. J. Canary, "Argument, Group influences and Decision Outcomes," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference On Argumentation, eds. G. Ziegelmüller & J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 663-692.

²¹S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958).

²²C. Perelman & J. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

²³Jacobs & Jackson, 1982.

²⁴M. L. Pratt, "The Ideology of Speech Act Theory," Centrum, New Series, 1:1 (Spring 1981), 5-18.

²⁵Jackson & Jacobs, 1981, p. 225.

²⁶Harrington, Scheerhorn & Martin, 1980.

²⁷R. R. Burleson, "The Senses of Argument Revisited: Prolegomena To Future Characterizations of Argument," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. G. Ziegelmüller & J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 955-979.

A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF ARGUMENT IN DECISION-MAKING GROUPS

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Although argument as a concept has long been acknowledged for its relevance to interaction in small groups, attention to its general functions and role has been rather limited in research.¹ In fact, only recently has argument begun to attract more than scattered attention. One can speculate as to the reasons for this discrepancy between the acknowledged importance of argument and the paucity of inquiry into its role. Whatever the factors responsible for the inconsistency, it is clear that the period of neglect is coming to an end.² An examination of what we presently know, therefore, may be useful in charting possible alternative futures. The purpose of this essay is to engage in such stock-taking and to identify some directions in which continued study of argument in decision-making groups may profitably move.

Reviewing past research on the role of argument in groups is to discover a variety of perspectives on a theme. As the following select summaries will reveal, argument has been viewed both as an instrument and as a process. It has been examined as a source of influence and as an obstacle to progress. It has been conceived as symptomatic of the personal qualities of individual group members--as a characteristic of one's communicative style. And it has been studied as inferences that groups draw upon in reaching decisions. Such differences in perspective complicate our ability to synthesize research findings. On the other hand, the diversity in point of view contributes to one's appreciation for argument's conceptual richness.

For purposes of this essay, I have grouped prior research into four categories: argument as disagreement, argument as a behavioral predisposition, argument as a developmental process, and argument as collectively shared inferences. As is true of any classificational scheme, the content entered does not always conform perfectly to the characteristics of the categories employed, and depending on one's focus, some of the studies reviewed could easily fit more than one category. I have, therefore, used the criterion of reasonable similarity as opposed to mutual exclusivity as the organizing principle. Following the review of research, the essay offers a critical assessment and presents some prospects for subsequent research suggested by the assessment.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Argument as Disagreement

In the early 1950s, Asch reported a series of studies in which individuals in groups were subjected to pressure by coached majorities

who reported perceptual experiences at odds with those of naive group members.³ This pioneering work led to numerous other investigations of normative and informational social influence.⁴ One landmark study emerging from this line of inquiry was conducted by Schacter.⁵ In his research, Schacter investigated the effects of disagreement with a majority discussing a human relations problem and discovered that persistence in a deviant position, no matter how defensible, often resulted in rejection of the antagonistically related group member.

Other scholars with the same general interest produced data different from Schacter's. Harnack, for instance, found that an organized minority (organized in respect to the arguments and evidence backing them) can lead a majority to an initially unacceptable position.⁶ A similar conclusion is implicit in research by Valentine and Fisher and Bradley et al.⁷ The findings in both cases indicate that the manner in which arguments are developed and presented, as well as their content, influences the position a group will ultimately endorse. Additionally, it appears as if the relationships among group members of differing persuasions are contingent on how their conflicts are resolved. When Deutsch and Krauss studied individuals in a conflict situation, solution-centered arguments facilitated the management and resolution of conflict.⁸ When argument involved the exercise of power, however, it functioned as an obstacle to effective problem-solving.

Janis's work with the concept of groupthink underscores the vitally important role that argument as disagreement can play in decision-making discussions.⁹ It was, according to Janis, the absence of counter-argument and challenge in discussions of several foreign policy decisions he reviews that laid the foundation for inappropriate actions. Other incidents of comparable misdiagnosis and subsequent misadventure include our response to the Mayaguez seizure, the controversial swine flu vaccination program, and the Watergate coverup.¹⁰ In each case, disagreement with positions endorsed by the majority could have led to a different outcome.

Argument as a Behavioral Predisposition

One's propensity for argument, apart from the instrument itself, has also been a focus of interest in some research on decision-making groups. As a behavioral inclination, one typically finds the term argumentativeness as the object of interest. The investigation of this quality has shown a relationship to several different outcomes. Of these, the ones most frequently examined are opinion formation and change and leadership emergence. The term carries with it many negative connotations; however, there is nothing about the quality of being argumentative that necessarily implies negativity.

In early research on one's propensity for argument, reflective thinking ability was linked to influence on group decisions and their quality.¹¹ One of my own studies revealed that argumentativeness when manifest in factually based claims and procedurally oriented suggestions promoted consensus in initially divided groups discussing questions of policy.¹² Similar findings were uncovered in controlled investigations by Hill, Knutson, and Knutson and Kowitz.¹³

Some of the most recent scholarship concerned with opinion formation and change has concentrated on argumentative tendencies characteristic of the members of decision-making groups that experience polarization. Alderton detected a strong connection between the types of arguments produced by group members varied in respect to locus of control and the direction in which they polarize. Whereas externalizers produce arguments reflecting impersonal attributions of the causes for socially proscribed behavior and, hence, shift toward leniency in their recommendations of appropriate penalties, internalizing group members appear to advance more arguments assigning personal causes as responsible for such behavior and, thereby, shift accordingly in the direction of severe sanctions.¹⁴ These data were consistent with those acquired in an earlier study by Alderton and in subsequent research by Alderton and Frey.¹⁵ In both cases, group members' loci of control were correlated with the types of arguments produced and the direction of shift in discussions of deviant behavior.

In addition to its influence on opinion formation and change, the propensity of the individual for argument has proved to be related to leadership emergence in decision-making groups. An oft cited case study by Geier revealed a negative relationship between argumentativeness and ascendance to positions of authority in initially leaderless group discussions.¹⁶ Supportive of this relationship were later investigations by Russell and Lumsden, both of whom discovered that individuals expressing high levels of disagreement had a substantially reduced probability of being acknowledged as leaders by other group members.¹⁷

What appeared to be developing as a consistently negative relationship between argumentativeness and one's chances for selection as a group leader was thrown into question when Sharf examined rhetorical processes related to leadership emergence and noted that its likelihood depends on the type of argumentative behavior a discussion participant exhibits.¹⁸ Those who contribute most to the fashioning of a group's rhetorical vision are more likely to be acknowledged leaders. Schultz has also examined the argumentativeness/leadership emergence relationship in a series of studies and has produced evidence of a positive relationship.¹⁹ In line with the implications of Scharf's research, Schultz ascertained that the manner in which argumentativeness is displayed and the functions it serves are important determinants of its relationship to one's being acknowledged for his or her leadership. In those studies showing a negative relationship, the types of arguments being advanced were seldom of a constructive variety.

Argument as a Developmental Process

A third approach to the study of argument has been to view it as a developmental process, that is, as a continuously evolving claim or set of claims. This perspective seems to have been inspired in part by more general interest in the sequential analysis of social interaction. The impetus is understandable in light of the recurrent tendencies of groups to pass through various phases of conflict and conflict resolution.²⁰ Scheidel and Crowell were apparently the first researchers in Speech Communication to adopt a developmental view of argument.²¹ Although they did not use the term *argument* as such, the characteristics of what they refer to as "thought units" suggest the

sort of assertion that advances a claim. The pattern of ideational development identified by these investigators has argument as claim evolving in terms of initiation, clarification, acceptance, further clarification, substantiation, acceptance, and further substantiation.

Following the lead of Scheidel and Crowell, other researchers began finding a regular stage in decision-making discussions characterized by argument.²² Unfortunately, as this body of inquiry continued to unfold, investigators became less and less focused on particular types of utterances and instead turned their attention to determining the relative predictability of all manner of communicative behavior in groups. In the past few years, however, a handful of studies have returned to a more limited view of the development of arguments.

Drawing on the work of Anthony Giddens, Seibold et al. examined argument in groups from a structural perspective.²³ Working with conceptual schemes taken from discussions of argument by Toulmin, Perelman, and Jacobs and Jackson, this team of researchers was able to map the processes by which arguments develop and either gain acceptance or lose force in shaping a group's consensus. Specifically, "[W]inning" arguments subsumed others' reservations and evolved fairly substantive claim, data, warrant linkages, whereas 'losing' arguments evidenced subtle but significant claim changes in the face of refutational and social pressure, little indication of data for claims, and too many divisions from the line of reasoning attempted."²⁴

Hirokawa and Pace took a somewhat different tack and examined arguments in relation to the effectiveness of decision-making groups.²⁵ Their analysis revealed a much more rigorous assessment of arguments by members of effective groups, whereas ineffective groups tended to accept arguments uncritically as well as to advance them with little or no supporting information. These findings parallel those of Seibold et al. in respect to what constitutes a winning vs losing argument and those in a study by Pace showing that opinion shifts are a function of how well related arguments are developed.²⁶

As a reaction to research by Bishop and Meyers suggesting that the mere number of arguments advanced in a discussion accounts for decisional shifts, Alderton and Frey tested a developmental explanation.²⁷ Their position was that it is the reaction to argument that accounts for decisional shifts. The emergence of a strong negative correlation between favorable reactions to minority arguments and the degree of polarization evidenced in decision-making groups and the presence of a marginally significant positive correlation between unfavorable reactions to minority arguments and polarization were partially supportive of Alderton and Frey's expectations.

Argument as Collectively Shared Inferences

The final group of studies to be reviewed are closely linked to those in the preceding section of this essay. In the present case, however, argument has been specifically defined as inference, that is, as a claim that goes beyond the data on which it is based. With the possible exception of the study by Seibold et al., this distinction has not been explicit in the previously cited research. Instead, the concept appears to subsume any claim that can be advanced in support

of a position on an issue.

The current line of research, it seems safe to say, is in its infancy and was largely stimulated by the appearance of Nisbett and Ross's 1980 publication of Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.²⁸ Prior to the release of this volume, however, two studies had been done which suggested that group decisions are based on inferences that are collectively shared and affected by certain informational qualities as well as the predispositions of the members. Thompson et al. manipulated the vividness of evidence in a mock trial involving defendants of "good" and "bad" character.²⁹ In the case of the defendant of good character, more inferences of guilt were made when the prosecution evidence was vivid. When defense evidence was the more vivid, information favored inferences of probable innocence. In another investigation, Davis et al. produced evidence establishing that a general belief in the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of rape leads to judgments in a specific case that are congruent with jurors' pre-deliberative biases.³⁰

Recent inquiry has begun to probe the communicative characteristics associated with the functions of inferences in decision-making groups. In one instance, several of my former students and I examined the interaction of groups differing in the severity of penalties recommended for high and low status actors who had committed either an act of manslaughter or assault and battery. In the discussions of both cases, group members inferred that the behavior of low status actors was due to personal factors to a much greater extent than they did when considering an individual of high status.³¹ In addition, in the discussions involving the case of manslaughter, groups more frequently made inferences about the probable circumstantial influences responsible for the high status actor's behavior than they did when accounting for the behavior of the low status actor. This relationship was further supported in a study with Andrews showing a correlation of nearly .70 between the attribution of personal responsibility and the severity of the penalty deemed appropriate for instances of student misconduct.³²

The work summarized by Nisbett and Ross, along with Wyer and Carlston's model of person memory, provides a basis for suspecting that the impact of inferences on social judgments is developmental and that when a group acts inappropriately, such behavior can be traced to the interaction of the members and their reactions to choice-related inferences.³³ This suspicion received some support in an analysis of six laboratory groups discussing cases of student violations of university regulations.³⁴ Of 80 case-related inferences made in those discussions, only one was challenged. In the remaining instances, the inference was either reinforced, extended, or followed by another inference. In a further examination of the Watergate transcripts, I discovered a similar pattern.³⁵ In nearly every case involving inferences bearing on the wisdom of the cover strategy, there was reinforcement of the judgment expressed, furtherance of the inference, or a conspicuous absence of challenge.

The patterns identified in these last two investigations were examined more systematically in two controlled studies involving differences in the communicative behavior of effective and ineffective decision-making groups. Mason found that effective groups make fewer

inferences than ineffective groups and that when they occur, the members of effective groups are less likely to reinforce them.³⁶ In a similar investigation, Martz reported not only less reinforcement of inferences by members of effective groups, but the presence of corrective influences as well.³⁷

ASSESSMENT

Despite the diversity of interests represented in the body of research reviewed in this essay, it should be clear that argument does play a significant role, both in contributing to the outcomes that decision-making groups achieve and in influencing relationships that develop among their members. It should also be clear that the effects of argument cannot be described in any uniform, easily generalizable way. The contingencies determining how argument functions are too numerous to permit such description. On the other hand, it does seem appropriate to conclude from the review of previous scholarship that the manner in which arguments are advanced, the foundation on which they rest, and the responses to them all have measurable consequences for the performance of decision-making groups. This observation applies whether one is viewing argument as the expression of disagreement, as a behavioral inclination, as the development of positions on issues, or as a communicative process in which inferences become collectively shared.

Even though the several distinctive approaches to the study of argument in past research on decision-making in groups lead one more or less to the same general conclusions, this volume of scholarship is not without its problems. At the most fundamental level, conceptual looseness prevents one from making unequivocal statements about the functions of argument in decision-making groups. Additionally, it is not always clear how argument differs from other concepts, such as opinion, assertion, value judgment, and persuasive appeal. Many of those investigating argument fail to provide an operational definition of the concept, let alone a theoretical description.³⁸ The problem of conceptual overlap is not inherently undesirable. Rather, it is the failure to conceive of argument consistently as choice-related that obfuscates conclusions about the role it plays. In the absence of some consistent focus on the consequences argument is expected to have in contributing to the choices that decision-making groups ultimately endorse, the reason for its study loses significance.

Of all the criticisms that could be made of research on argument in decision-making groups, possibly the most crucial has to do with the failure of researchers to provide adequate descriptions of the conditions under which argument, in principle, will function in particular ways. This is not to suggest that all past research has been theory-free. In most instances, those investigators testing hypotheses have identified some premise or set of premises suggesting what will be found.³⁹ My concern lies more with the absence of any appreciable effort to embed specific hypotheses in a larger discussion of how argument may be linked to other aspects of decisional processes, for example, a group's authority structure, the perceived importance of the question to be resolved, and the potential consequences of choosing inappropriately.

The history of research on argument in decision-making groups is one of fragmentation. Some investigators have been interested in how arguments develop. Others have been concerned with the responses they elicit. Still others have concentrated on the relationship of argument to outcomes, such as the quality of decisions reached, patterns of influence, and affective responses to the experience of decision-making. Argument has even been conceived as an outcome itself. While each of these interests has been instructive, it would appear that more insights could be gleaned and better understandings developed if we could somehow merge the separate strands of inquiry into a more encompassing view.

An approach along the lines suggested might begin with a particular and restricted view of argument, for example, a claim representing support for a position on an issue that provides a basis for choice.⁴⁰ If accepted, the claim favors a given choice. If rejected, it provides a basis for an alternative choice. Such claims could either be of a factual nature (that is, referring to what is true or probable) or entail the advancement of value judgments (focusing on matters of propriety and morality). Within this frame of reference, an argument may be viewed as either a point of departure or a destination. Whatever the case, interest would lie in determining what characteristics of argument and the communicative environment in which it arises contribute to acceptance or rejection of the essential claim(s) it embodies. Acceptance and rejection tendencies could then be more systematically related to the choices groups make, the members' reactions to them, patterns of influence, and any affective states that develop as a consequence of them.

The approach I am describing presumes an overall process of choice that will characterize most groups. This is not to suggest, however, that the uniformity characteristic of the general process is also likely to be manifest at more microscopic levels of analysis. On the contrary, this view clearly implies specific manifestations of almost infinite variety. The purpose of research would be to account for this variety. If we think of decisions as a product of the acceptance and rejection of arguments supporting positions on issues, what we need to know is how communication serves to create differences in the relative acceptability of arguments and how the chances for acceptance and rejection are affected by other elements in a decision-making group's environment.

Not many of the studies cited in this essay have examined argument in relation to particular choices groups make.⁴¹ Among those that have, moreover, only the one by Seibold et al. has revealed an effort to describe the relationship in terms of the larger logical structure and social environment in which arguments serve as a basis for choice.⁴² These investigators established that how an argument develops communicatively determines its acceptability and that the level of acceptability relates directly to the choices decision-making groups come to support. Their analysis is very much in line with suggestions by Leff and Hewes and, more recently, by Enos for rhetorically based approaches to the analysis of argument in group decision-making discussions.⁴³ Although the data were drawn from a very limited sample, the research nonetheless provides an excellent model for others to follow.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INQUIRY

Subscription to the view of argument as claims providing bases for choice opens a large number of possibilities for future research. For instance, if we begin with the assumption that group decisions reflect those positions on issues, the arguments in support of which group members find most acceptable, then it is possible to ask how arguments become acceptable. More specifically, what informational requirements do group members demand that an argument must satisfy, and how do these requirements vary as a function of the group's composition and structure? Does the presence of counterargument affect the acceptability of arguments, and if so, does the manner in which counterarguments are presented bear on the degree of acceptability? Does the mere expression of reservations influence acceptance or redefine the informational requirements a group imposes on arguments?

Another line of inquiry that may be profitably explored has to do with the relative weight different arguments have in shaping decisions. For any set of arguments that group members find acceptable, how many actually enter into the final choice? Do arguments vary in weight, and are there discrepancies between apparent weight and actual impact on group decisions? Are some arguments decisive, sufficient alone to determine a group's choice? If so, what sorts of task characteristics and psychological attributes of the group members invest these arguments with such compelling force? Is the structure of a series of arguments concatenated, or are choices constrained by the relative primacy and recency of the arguments related to them? Do arguments have sleeper effects? That is, do some arguments that are initially rejected later find their way into decisions reached, and do initially acceptable arguments lose their force as bases for choice?

Research on the weight of argument suggests furthering our investigations of effective and ineffective decision-making groups. As I mentioned previously, several studies have already been done and have produced promising results.⁴⁴ Much more could be done, however. In my investigation of the Watergate transcripts, simple agreement with inferences appeared to have the same impact on their acceptability as one would expect from factually based support.⁴⁵ Do ineffective decision-making groups typically treat shared opinions as if they were factual evidence? Do they tend to discount or even ignore such evidence when it is presented? How is disagreement managed in ineffective groups as opposed to effective ones? Do authority figures encourage agreement with their inferences by the manner in which they call for discussion, and does the encouragement increase the likelihood of a group's choosing unwisely or inappropriately? Is the function of argument in ineffective decision-making groups simply to make authority figures' wishes known? Do effective decision-making groups do a better job of keeping arguments issue-oriented than their ineffective counterparts?

We know far too little about the affective states to which arguments in decision-making groups contribute. It is clear that disagreement can be threatening and conflict-producing, but are logically well structured arguments in any sense threatening to some group members, and if so, under what circumstances? When there is a strongly preferred position?

When they give credibility to intuitively objectionable positions? When they appear to be at odds with acknowledged values of the group members? Are arguments, even if not intended, construed as personal attacks? Does argument stimulate competitiveness to the point that it induces a desire to "win" a discussion that supplants the need for rational choice? Is argument viewed as inconsistent with the objectives of decision-making discussions, and if so, does such a perception of inconsistency lead to emotional reactions that can destroy a group's cohesiveness and sense of purpose and, hence, its ability to choose?

The preceding suggestions are by no means exhaustive. I trust, however, that they are sufficiently illustrative of the range of possibilities that exist for expanding our knowledge of the role of argument in group decision-making. More important than any specific suggestion, in my judgment, is the frame of reference. By clarifying the concept of argument and by viewing it as an instrument of choice in decision-making groups rather than as something that merely occurs, we are much more apt to develop meaningful and integrated descriptions of the interplay between the cognitive and affective factors that influence and shape the decisions that groups make. So conceived, the concept of argument can play a vital role in generating interesting questions, the answers to which will take us far beyond what we presently know about decision-making in general.

NOTES

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¹A. Craig Baird, for example, as far back as 1927, recognized that argument was crucial to making informed choices in public discussion. See Public Discussion and Debate (Boston: Ginn, 1927).

²It may be that the pedagogical practice in which discussion was treated as a form of exploration of solutions to problems, as opposed to the advocacy of preferred alternatives contributed to inattention. It may also be the case that since group researchers in Speech Communication followed the model of Social Psychology, a concern with personal factors resulted in neglect of communicative activities. As more scholarship began focusing on the content of interaction in the 1960s and 1970s, however, the observation that argument (especially conceived as the expression of disagreement) can substantially affect problem-solving processes and the relationships among those whom engage in them. In the past ten years, there appears to be substantially more interest in argument as an aspect of group decision-making than ever before.

³See Solomon E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in Groups, Leadership, and Men, ed. Harold Guetzkow (Pittsburg: Carnegie Press, 1951), pp. 177-90.

⁴One of the classic studies in this area was Morton Deutsch and Harold B. Gerard's "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences upon Individual Judgment," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51 (1955), 629-36.

⁵Stanley S. Schacter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46 (1951), 190-207.

⁶R. Victor Harnack, "A Study of the Effects of an Organized Minority upon a Group Discussion," Journal of Communication, 13 (1963), 12-24.

⁷Kristin Valentine and B. Aubrey Fisher, "An Interaction Analysis of Innovative Deviance in Small Groups," Speech Monographs, 41 (1974), 413-20; Patricia Hayes Bradley et al., "Dissent in Small Groups," Journal of Communication, 26 (Autumn, 1976), 155-59.

⁸Morton Deutsch and Robert Krauss, "Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1962), 52-76.

⁹Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

¹⁰See Theodore J. Lowie, "Presidential Power: Restoring the Balance," Political Science Quarterly, 100 (1985), 192; Chris Argyris, "Making the Undiscussable and Its Undiscussability Discussable," Public Admini-

stration Review, 40 (1980), 205-13; Dennis S. Gouran, "The Watergate Cover-up: Its Dynamics and Its Implications," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 176-86. See also Courtright's laboratory investigation of groupthink. Ineffective discussions in this study were also characterized by an absence of disagreement. John A. Courtright, "A Laboratory Investigation of Groupthink," Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), 229-46.

¹¹See H. Charles Pyron and Harry Sharp, Jr., "A Quantitative Study of Reflective Thinking and Performance in Problem-Solving Discussion," Journal of Communication, 13 (1963), 46-53; H. Charles Pyron, "An Experimental Study of the Role of Reflective Thinking in Business and Professional Conferences and Discussions," Speech Monographs, 31 (1964), 157-61; Harry Sharp, Jr. and Joyce Milliken, "The Reflective Thinking Ability and the Product of Problem-Solving Discussion," Speech Monographs, 31 (1964), 124-27.

¹²Dennis S. Gouran, "Variables Related to Consensus in Group Discussions of Questions of Policy," Speech Monographs, 36 (1969), 387-91.

¹³See Timothy A. Hill, "An Experimental Study of the Relationship Between Opinionated Leadership and Small Group Consensus," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 246-57; Thomas J. Knutson, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Orientation Behavior on Small Group Consensus," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 159-65; Thomas J. Knutson and Albert C. Kowitz, "Effects of Information Types and Level of Orientation on Consensus-Achievement in Substantive and Affective Small-Group Conflict," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (1977), 54-63.

¹⁴Steven Alderton, "Locus of Control-Based Argumentation as a Predictor of Group Polarization," Communication Quarterly, 30 (1982), 381-87.

¹⁵Steven Alderton, "Attributions of Responsibility for Socially Deviant Behavior in Decision-Making Discussions as a Function of Situation and Locus of Control of Contributor," Central States Speech Journal, 31 (1980), 117-27; Steven M. Alderton and Lawrence R. Frey, "Effects of Reactions to Arguments on Group Outcome: The Case of Group Polarization," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (1983), 88-95.

¹⁶John G. Geier, "A Trait Approach to the Study of Leadership," Journal of Communication, 17 (1967), 316-23.

¹⁷Hugh C. Russell, "An Investigation of Leadership Maintenance Behavior," Diss. Indiana University 1970; Gay Lumsden, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Verbal Agreement on Leadership Maintenance in Problem-Solving Discussion," Central States Speech Journal, 25 (1974), 270-76.

¹⁸Barbara F. Sharf, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Leadership Emergence in Small Groups," Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), 156-72.

¹⁹See Beatrice Schultz, "Characteristics of Emergent Leaders of Continuing Problem-Solving Groups," Journal of Psychology, 88 (1974), 167-73; "Communicative Correlates of Perceived Leaders," Small Group Behavior, 11 (1980), 175-91; "Argumentativeness: Its Effect in Group Decision-Making and Its Role in Leadership Perception," Communication Quarterly, 30 (1982), 368-75.

²⁰See, for example, Robert F. Bales and Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46 (1951), 485-95; Warren G. Bennis and Herbert A. Shepherd, "A Theory of Group Development," Human Relations, 9 (1956), 415-37.

²¹Thomas M. Scheidel and Laura Crowell, "Idea Development in Small Discussion Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 50 (1964), 140-45.

²²See B. Aubrey Fisher, "Decision Emergence: Phases in Group Decision-Making," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 53-66; James W. Chesbro et al., "The Small Group Technique of the Radical Revolutionary: A Synthetic Study of Consciousness Raising," Speech Monographs, 41 (1974), 136-46; Donald G. Ellis and B. Aubrey Fisher, "Phases of Conflict in Small Group Development: A Markov Analysis," Human Communication Research, 1 (1975), 195-212.

²³David R. Seibold et al., "Argument, Group Influence, and Decision Outcome," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. George Ziegelmüller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia, 1981), pp. 663-92.

²⁴Ibid., p. 684.

²⁵Randy Y. Hirokawa and Roger Pace, "A Descriptive Investigation of the Possible Communication-Based Reasons for Effective and Ineffective Group Decision Making," Communication Monographs, 50 (1983), 363-75.

²⁶Roger C. Pace, "Group Discussion as a Rhetorical Process: The Influence of the Small Group Setting on the Process of Accedance," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Washington, D.C., 1983

²⁷George D. Bishop and David G. Myers, "Informational Influence in Group Discussion," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 12 (1974), 92-104; Alderton and Frey, op cit.

²⁸See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

²⁹Cited by Nisbett and Ross, p. 52.

30. James H. Davis et al., "Bias in Social Decisions by Individuals and Groups," in Dynamics of Group Decisions, ed. James H. Davis et al. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1978), pp. 32-52.

31. Dennis S. Gouran et al., "Social Deviance and Occupational Status: Group Assessment of Penalties," Small Group Behavior, 15 (1984), 63-86.

32. Dennis S. Gouran and Patricia Hayes Andrews, "Determinants of Punitive Responses to Socially Proscribed Behavior," Small Group Behavior 15 (1984), 525-44.

33. Nisbett and Ross, op cit.; Robert S. Myer, Jr. and Donal E. Carlston, Social Cognition, Inference, and Attribution (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1979).

34. Dennis S. Gouran, "Communicative Influences on Inferential Judgments in Decision-Making Groups: A Descriptive Analysis," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association), pp. 667-84.

35. Dennis S. Gouran, "Communicative Influences on Decisions to Continue the Watergate Coverup: The Failure of Collective Judgment," Central States Speech Journal, in press.

36. Gail E. Mason, "An Empirical Investigation of Inferential and Related Communicative Processes Distinguishing Effective and Ineffective Decision-Making Groups," Diss. Indiana University, 1984.

37. Amy E. Martz, "An Investigation of the Relationship Between Verbalized Inferential Errors and Group Decision-Making Effectiveness," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago, 1984.

38. In fairness, I should point out that several of the investigators whose work has been cited have made no overt claim to be studying argument. When one reviews the types of communicative behaviors on which they have focused, however, they generally appear to fit within the family of concepts for which argument is an appropriate label.

39. Still most of the studies reviewed in this essay have been exploratory.

40. This definition allows for the inclusion of other concepts that some would find distinctive. The unifying characteristic, however, is the stipulation that the types of claims in question provide bases for choice. Different types of utterances can all serve this function.

41. Exceptions are the studies by Alderton (1982), Alderton and Frey, Gouran et al., and Seibold et al.

42. Seibold et al.

43. Michael C. Leff and Dean E. Hewes, "Topical Invention and Group Communication: Towards a Sociology of Inference," in Ziegelmüller and Rhodes, op cit., pp. 770-89; Richard L. Enos, "Classical Rhetoric and Group Decision Making: A Relationship Warranting Further Inquiry," Small Group Behavior, 16 (1985), 235-244.

44. See Hirokawa and Pace; Martz; Mason.

45. Gouran, in press.

THE FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENTATION IN GROUP DELIBERATION

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The last several years have witnessed a growing interest in the study of argumentation in small group contexts. For the most part, this research has focused primarily on the nature and structure of arguments and argumentation processes in small group interaction.¹ Recently, however, an increasing number of group communication scholars have begun to call for the systematic study of argumentation's role and functions in group deliberation.² As Hirokawa puts it, if we are concerned with understanding how group interaction affects various group outcomes, then we ought to be concerned with understanding what happens in groups as a result of the production of arguments since they are an integral facet of group interaction.³

Although a number of scholars have called for the systematic examination of the functions of argumentation in group deliberation, surprisingly few researchers have answered the call. This point is explicitly made by Vinokur, Trope and Burnstein when they conclude that "we still do not have a good picture of the argumentative process, and very little is known about the content, impact, and availability of different arguments."⁴ In short, as Seibold and Meyers note in a recent review of the literature, with the possible exception of work done by group polarization researchers, very little empirical research has focused on the functions or consequences of arguments in the group discussion process.⁵

In recent essays, several authors have suggested that the failure of researchers to examine the functions of argumentation in group interaction is due, in part, to the absence of an adequate conceptual understanding of the functional nature of group argumentation.⁶ The purpose of the present essay is to present such a conception. Specifically, we intend to offer a conceptual framework which outlines the various outcomes or consequences that can be brought about in a group through the production of reasoned discourse.⁷ In doing so, we seek to achieve two objectives: (1) to provide a more precise understanding of the specific ways argumentative process can function in the small group setting; and (2) to provide a suitable starting point for systematically examining the complex, multi-functional nature of group argumentation.

The remainder of the essay is organized into three sections: First, we discuss current views of the function of argumentation in group deliberation. Next, we build upon existing views and suggest a broader conceptual framework for understanding the functions of group argumentation. And finally, we outline some

specific research implications of this broader conceptual framework.

Current Views of the Functions of Group Argumentation

For the most part, current views of the functions of argumentation in group deliberation tend to parallel those of traditional argumentation theorists.⁸ Specifically, group communication scholars have tended to discuss the functions of group argumentation in terms of either rhetorical advocacy or discovery.

Advocacy. Several group communication scholars have suggested that the primary function of argumentation in groups is to bring about opinion change. Hirokawa, for example, suggests that arguments are one type of communicative strategy utilized by group members to influence the opinions and beliefs of their colleagues.⁹ As he puts it, "For the most part, group members' efforts to influence or alter the opinions of others tend to involve the presentation of data (or the suggestion of the existence of such data) which lead logically to a stated or implied claim or conclusion."¹⁰ Similarly, Seibold et al. view arguments as "systems or interrelated patterns of interaction" wherein group members advance "arguables" for the purpose of eliminating disagreements or bringing about convergence on the issues in question.¹¹ In short, scholars suggest that the primary function of argumentation in group deliberation is to bring about persuasion--to convince group members to accept or reject particular claims, ideas, and positions relevant to the choice-making situation.

Discovery. A second, though somewhat less common view of the function of argumentation in group deliberation is that arguments are a means of creating intersubjective reality within the group. Proponents of this perspective essentially contend that group argumentation aids the construction of a set of beliefs and assumptions which are ostensibly shared by members of the group. Enos, for example, suggests that arguments allow for, or function to bring about a synthesis of various argumentative positions.¹² In his words, arguments "have the potential of forming one collective mind directed toward a synthesis of rationality."¹³ Likewise, Alderton and Frey contend that arguments are designed and articulated to produce specific meaning in the minds of other group members for the purpose of achieving a shared view of the problem and choices facing the group.¹⁴ In short, these scholars claim that argumentation functions to create or discover a shared social reality within the group.

In practice, group argumentation serves both of these functions. Arguments function to bring about opinion change within a group, just as they undoubtedly function to create a social reality within that group. In fact, it is quite possible that "advocacy" and "discovery" are inseparable functions of group argumentation; in functioning to bring about

opinion change within a group, arguments also serve to create an intersubjective reality for the group members.

While we agree with these views of the function of argumentation in group deliberation, we suggest they may be overly restrictive in their focus. Simply stated, we believe group argumentation can serve a variety of different functions in addition to rhetorical advocacy or discovery. We thus maintain that a thorough understanding of the functional nature of group argumentation requires that we adopt a broader conceptual view of the functions of argumentation in group deliberation. In the next section of this essay, we present such a conception.

Additional Functions of Group Argumentation

We contend that there are at least five functions of argumentation in the group deliberation process, in addition to "advocacy" and "discovery." They are (1) clarification, (2) unification, (3) relationship management, (4) norming, and (5) impression management. Before discussing each of these additional functions, however, an important prefatory remark is needed. We contend that the functions of arguments are multi-dimensional--that is, they typically will not function in only one specific way. Rather, arguments tend to simultaneously serve several functions, often in various degrees, during the deliberation process.

Clarification

The production of arguments during group deliberation often serves the important function of clarifying various aspects of the issues and choices facing the group. For instance, arguments presented in support of, or against competing positions or choices can function to clarify the positive and negative aspects of those alternatives, thereby facilitating the group's recognition and understanding of the reason(s) why various alternatives should or should not be selected. In short, argumentation during group deliberation can function to highlight the "pros" and "cons" of competing choices facing the group.

Arguments presented by group members can also function to clarify the reason(s) underlying their decisional preferences. Since arguments presented in support of, or against particular claims or alternatives often reflect the reason(s) the arguer decided to accept or reject those claims or choices, such arguments can provide others with clear insights regarding the bases for individual preferences. For instance, the argument(s) presented by a group member can reveal the "logic" or reasoning employed by that individual in arriving at a particular choice, or the personal values or attitudes underlying the decisional preferences of that individual. In short, since arguments represent public "displays" of private beliefs, values, and reasoning, their presentation to the group can function to help

its members better comprehend why particular colleagues have decided to accept or reject a given claim or alternative.

Unification

The production of arguments during group deliberation can also function to unify the group during the deliberation process. More precisely, arguments can serve to facilitate and solidify group consensus and/or commitment on various decisions made the group.

The unification function of argumentation has been well-documented by previous group communication scholars. Scheidel and Crowell, for example, discovered that group members often rely on reasoned discourse to "anchor" decisions made during the deliberation process.¹⁵ As they put it, arguments are often advanced by group members during the decision-making process in order to insure that the group is in agreement on prior decisions made.¹⁶ Similarly, Fisher notes that in later stages of the decision-making process, arguments produced by group members tend to take on a "justificatory" role.¹⁷ That is, arguments appear to be produced in order to eliminate any reservations or lingering doubts that group members may have regarding the appropriateness or correctness of choice(s) made by the group.

In short, arguments produced during group deliberation can function to unify a group around its decision(s). Simply put, by arguing in favor of a choice already made by the group, or by arguing against choice(s) already rejected by the group, members are no longer persuading each other. Instead they are making the group more cohesive by demonstrating or reiterating that which they already agree upon.

Relationship Management

Yet another important function of argumentation during group deliberation is the management of interpersonal relationships within the group. Specifically, the production of arguments can serve to establish or maintain either positive or negative interpersonal relationships within the group. That is to say, they can function to bring two or more group members affectively closer together, or drive them farther apart.

This relational function of argumentation is perhaps best understood in terms of social exchange theory. In their oft-cited book, The Social Psychology of Groups, Thibaut and Kelley argue that group members tend to evaluate the communicative behaviors of others in terms of "rewards" and "punishments."¹⁸ A "rewarding" behavior, they suggest, is one that brings about favorable feelings or emotions for that individual; while a "punishing" behavior is one that results in unfavorable feelings or emotions for that individual. According to Thibaut and Kelley, group members tend to be attracted to colleagues who produce "rewarding" behaviors; and tend to avoid those who produce behaviors that are punishing to them.¹⁹

From a social exchange perspective, it is not difficult to see how arguments can function to bring about or maintain positive or negative interpersonal relationships within the group. Specifically, arguments produced during group deliberation can be viewed by group members as sources of rewards and punishments. For example, the production of an argument in support of a suggestion made by another member can be rewarding to that individual; conversely, the production of an argument against a suggestion made by another member can be a source of punishment to that individual. The production of arguments which others find rewarding tends to foster the development or maintenance of positive relationships between ourselves and those individuals; while the production of arguments which others find punishing tends to have the opposite effect--establishing or maintaining negative interpersonal relationships between ourselves and those individuals. In Thibaut and Kelley's words, group members are likely to be positively-oriented to colleagues who produce supportive arguments, but negatively-oriented to colleagues who produce refutational arguments.²⁰

Another facet of the relationship management function of group argumentation concerns its use for maintaining relational homeostasis within the group. Simply stated, arguments are occasionally produced by group members for the purpose of maintaining an equilibrium (or "balance") between our actions and feelings toward other group members. For instance, sometimes a group member will produce an argument in support of another member's idea principally because s/he likes that group member. Similarly, a group member will produce an argument against the idea of another principally because s/he dislikes that member. In short, arguments can function to communicate attitudes toward members of the group and, thus, to further those interpersonal relationships.

Norming

The production of arguments during group deliberation can also function to establish the decision-making norms and procedures of the group. In Davis' words, group argumentation can serve to establish a particular social decision scheme within a group.²¹

According to Davis, groups often arrive at a decision by following a set of agreed-upon rules and procedures. In some cases, these rules and procedures are discussed prior to their utilization (as when a group considers a discussion format prior to engaging in the discussion), while in other cases, the components of the social decision scheme are never formally articulated or discussed by the members of the group. Regardless of whether the rules and operating procedures of the group are formally discussed, however, the production of arguments during the group's deliberation can function to influence its norms and procedures.

First, the production of arguments during group deliberation can establish a particular decision-making protocol. Simply put, the production of arguments during early stages of the deliberation process can serve as a "model" for future actions in the group. For example, if a group member sees others arguing for or against particular claims and ideas in the initial stages of the discussion, s/he is more likely to engage in such practice later in the discussion. On the other hand, if that member does not observe such actions, then s/he is less likely to engage in such practice. In short, the production of arguments during group deliberation can serve as a guide to what is appropriate conduct during the decision-making process.

Closely related to this notion of protocol is the fact that the arguments can serve as a guide to what is appropriate arguing in the group. Specifically, if a member sees others advancing particular kinds of arguments, or arguing in a particular way during the discussion, that member is likely to pattern his/her arguments after those that s/he observes. Similarly, if that individual notices that certain types of arguments tend to be more (or less) effective or well-received in the group, then the individual is likely to utilize that knowledge in the construction of his/her own arguments. For that group member, then, arguments produced by fellow members function as "models" for his/her own argumentation.

Impression Management

The final function of group argumentation which we wish to outline in this essay is one of impression management. Specifically, we contend that the production of arguments during group deliberation can serve to influence how we see ourselves, as well as how others see us. Stated another way, arguments are "public performances of personal reasoning," and how well one "performs" arguments has direct implications for that person's self-perception, as well as the perceptic that others have of that individual.

For example, Seibold et al. point out that "weak" or "flawed" arguments are often met with scorn and derision within the group.²² In these cases, the production (or "performance") of these weak arguments, first of all, can cause other group members to form negative impressions of the arguer (e.g., "S/he is not a very smart person). Moreover, we suspect that the production of ineffective arguments also can cause the arguer to reassess his/her own self-perceptions (e.g., one's reaction might be, "Other people must see me as a dummy").

Similarly, group argumentation can function to positively affect self and others' perceptions. If a member happens to produce a "strong" argument which proves to be very effective in the deliberation, it is likely that such a "performance" will cause other group members to form a positive impression of the arguer. At the same time, it is also possible that the production

of an effective argument will enhance the arguer's perception of himself/herself.

In short, it seems clear that, under certain circumstances, group argumentation can function to either positively or negatively affect a group member's self-perception, as well as the perceptions that others in the group have of him/her.

Summary

To summarize, we suggest that there are at least seven general functions of argumentation in group deliberation. In addition to the two traditionally-mentioned functions of advocacy and discovery, we contend that group argumentation also functions as a source of:

- Clarification
- Unification
- Relationship management
- Norming
- Impression Management

These seven functions, of course, do not represent the complete domain of group argumentation functions. To be sure, there are likely to be a number of other functions that can be served by the production of arguments during group deliberation. For instance, it is quite possible that within each of the seven aforementioned functions, there can exist a number of different sub-functions that can be performed by group argumentation.²³ Nonetheless, it is our contention that the seven functions identified in this essay represent some of the more prevalent functions of argumentation in group deliberation.

Finally, it is critically important for the reader to remember that the functions of argumentation in group deliberation tend to be multi-dimensional in nature. That is to say, arguments typically do not function in only one way during the group deliberation process. On the contrary, it is more likely that a specific argument will simultaneously function in several different ways in any given situation. For example, an argument may simultaneously function to (1) bring about opinion change, (2) create a part of the group's shared reality, (3) establish a discussion protocol, and (4) manage impressions within the group. Likewise, an argument can simultaneously function to (1) unify the group around an idea, as well as (2) facilitate the development of a positive relationship between two or more members in the group. In short, group argumentation not only functions in a variety of ways across situations, but also function in a variety of different ways within situations. This is precisely what makes the study of group argumentation functioning a complex undertaking.

Research Implications

Despite the obvious complexity of studying the functions of argumentation in group deliberation, several specific lines of research emerge from the conceptual framework outlined in this paper.

First, researchers need to focus on the task of empirically validating the functional nature of group argumentation. In the present essay, we suggest there are at least seven general functions of argumentation in group deliberation. For the most part, however, there exists little empirical data which conclusively demonstrate that group argumentation in fact functions in the ways we have outlined. It thus seems clear that these general functions of group argumentation need to be empirically verified by future researchers. Moreover, since it is possible for argumentation to function in ways other than those discussed in this essay (i.e., there may be a number of sub-functions of arguments within any general function), there is little doubt that future researchers need to begin empirically identifying the specific functions of arguments in group deliberation.

Second, researchers need to focus on the relationship between the form and functions of group argumentation. We need to understand how the structure of arguments influence or are influenced by their function(s) in the group deliberation process. Researchers need to examine how different types of arguments function in different situations. Similarly, researchers need to discover what types and forms of arguments are used by group members to achieve different ends or functions in the deliberation process.

Third, researchers need to focus on the relationship between functions and outcomes of group argumentation. For example, we need to examine the relationship between the functions of group argumentation and such group outcomes as decision-making effectiveness and consensus. To be sure, researchers have made some notable headway in understanding the relationship between argumentation and group polarization. However, little corresponding progress has been made in regards to other important group outcomes. We thus maintain it is imperative that future researchers begin to examine how the functions of argumentation in group deliberation are related to all of the important group outcomes. Such research is critical in helping us to understand better the role argumentation plays in various group outcomes.

NOTES

1 See for example: Steven M. Alderton, "A Processual Analysis of Argumentation in Polarizing Groups," in Dimensions of Argument, eds. G. Ziegelmüller and J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 693-703; Richard L. Enos, "Heuristic and Eristic Rhetoric in Small Group Interaction: An Examination of Quasi-logical Argument," in Dimensions of Argument, eds. G. Ziegelmüller and J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 719-727; Randy Y. Hirokawa, "Group Discussion as a Rhetorical Process: The Structure and Function of Argument in Group Decision-Making," Paper presented at the Conference on Research in Small Group Communication, Pennsylvania State University, 1981; David R. Seibold, David J. Canary, and Nancy E. Tanita-Ratlidge, "Argument and Group Decision-making: Interim Report on a Structural Research Program," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., 1983; David R. Seibold, Robert D. McPhee, Marshall Scott Poole, Nancy E. Tanita, and David J. Canary, "Argument, Group Influence, and Decision Outcome," in Dimensions of Argument, eds. G. Ziegelmüller and J. Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 663-692.

2 See for example: Hirokawa, 1981; Seibold, et al., 1981; Steven M. Alderton and Lawrence R. Frey, "Argumentation in Small Group Decision-Making," in Decision-Making and Communication, eds. R. Hirokawa and M.S. Poole (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, in press); David R. Seibold and Renee A. Meyers, "Communication and Influence in Group Decision-Making," in Decision-Making and Communication, eds. R. Hirokawa and M.S. Poole (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, in press).

3 Hirokawa, 1981, p. 1.

4 Amiram Vinokur, Y. Trope, and Eugene Burnstein, "A Decision-Making Analysis of Persuasive Argumentation and the Choice-Shift Effect," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11 (1975), pp. 127-128.

5 Seibold and Meyers, in press.

6 See for example: Seibold, et al., 1981; Alderton and Frey, in press.

7 Throughout this essay, the term "argument" will be defined as "reasoned discourse in support of an implied or explicitly-stated claim. The term "argumentation" will thus be defined as the "process of advancing, supporting, modifying or refuting claims through the use of reasoned discourse."

8 See for example: Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson

and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1969).

9 Hirokawa, 1981.

10 Ibid., p. 8.

11 Seibold, et al., 1983, p. 17.

12 Richard L. Enos, "Classical Rhetoric and Group Decision-Making: Dimensions of Facilitation," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., 1983.

13 Ibid., p. 6.

14 Alderton and Frey, in press.

15 Thomas M. Scheidel and Laura Crowell, "Idea Development in Small Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 50 (1964), pp. 140-145.

16 Ibid., p. 144.

17 B. Aubrey Fisher, "Decision Emergence: Phases in Group Decision-Making," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), pp. 53-66.

18 John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959).

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 James H. Davis, "Group Decision and Social Interaction: A Theory of Social Decision Schemes," Psychological Review, 80 (1973), pp. 97-125.

22 Seibold, et al., 1981.

23 Dale Hample raises a similar point in his article: "Functions of Argumentation" in Argument in Transition, eds. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1983), pp. 560-572.

ARGUMENTATION AND NEGOTIATION

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A married couple negotiates a division of labor regarding household tasks. A customer and salesperson bargain over the purchase of a new car. A university department chair negotiates with a college dean over budgetary items. Professional baseball player and team owner representatives negotiate America's national pastime. American and Soviet negotiation teams bargain in their search for a solution to the nuclear arms race. In each of these situations, the negotiators state preferences, present information, and react to the other party's views in an effort to resolve their particular conflict. The bargainers communicate, they argue: providing reasons for their interests and offering support for their positions. Argument inheres in the process of negotiation.

Negotiation occurs in a wide variety of circumstances. And regardless of the situation, amount of issues, degree of formality, or number of parties, bargaining embraces decisions arrived at through argument. Negotiation is defined as a joint decision-making process in which bargaining parties use arguments to overcome conflicts of interest and achieve an acceptable outcome. This definitional perspective reflects a number of assumptions about negotiation and negotiators. First, negotiators address conflicts of interest. Zartman notes that "negotiation is a process of two (or more) parties combining their conflicting points of view into a single decision."¹ Second, negotiation is a voluntary, interdependent endeavor. Negotiators choose to bargain because they perceive agreement as superior to individual decisions, no settlement, or the status quo. They realize that each party's outcome depends upon the action of the other bargainer(s).² Third, negotiators behave as decision-makers. They attempt to influence and are influenced--their perceptions and judgments guide their decisions. Consequently, negotiators may make choices which deviate from a rational course of action, thereby explaining Raiffa's observation that bargainers do not always reach a joint decision when a zone of agreement exists.³ Negotiated choices, whether rational or nonrational, reflect argument. Bargainers use argumentation--the advancing, supporting, interpreting, critiquing, and answering of claims--to influence their opposite numbers. "Negotiation is a method of social decision-making," Druckman remarks colloquially, consisting of "choices against another person and is accomplished by persuasion and haggling."⁴

Ironically, while observations like "negotiators argue" or "negotiation involves argumentation" seem obvious, communication scholars' acknowledgement of the importance of argument in negotiation

has been infrequent. Rieke and Sillars author the only argumentation text that characterizes negotiation as a decision system which uses argumentation. They observe that "argumentation plays a significant role in negotiation."⁵ Reiche and Harral define negotiation as a form of argumentation.⁶ Schuetz contends that "negotiators manage conflicts by giving reasons (arguing) to facilitate exchanges among disputants in the conflict."⁷ Donohue, Diez, and Stahle posit that "a cursory analysis of any transcript of negotiation reveals that much of what the participants are doing is arguing about their respective positions."⁸ Putnam and Geist assert that "reasoning, or the giving of reasons, is an important part of negotiation interaction."⁹

Much of this attention on the role of argumentation in negotiation has been recent. While these efforts are useful, negotiation scholars from such fields as psychology, management, and political science have led the discussion of the place of argument in bargaining and negotiation. Twenty-five years ago, Rapoport contrasted "debates" with fights and games as a mode of thought about conflict. While Rapoport distinguishes between argument and debate (and certainly does not equate debate with bargaining or negotiation), his work introduces conceptions of argument ("marshalling facts" or "calling attention to chains of logical consequences") and debate (an attempt to "modify the image of the other;" "the objective is to convince your opponent") to the study of conflict.¹⁰

While Rapoport differentiates argument from debate, his discussion of debate provides the basis for other scholars' work in argument and negotiation. Hopmann, King, and Walcott have revised their content analytic framework, Bargaining Process Analysis (BPA), to include the category of "persuasive behavior." The authors note "the primary intention of this category is to incorporate variables which are most relevant to the role of debate in negotiation as defined by Rapoport [*Fights, Games, and Debates*]."¹¹ And the Bargaining Process Analysis system, as revised into BPA II, has been employed to study arguments and other verbal messages in bargaining interaction.¹²

Other negotiation scholars allude to the importance of argument in negotiation. Sawyer and Guetzkow observe that the central process of negotiation is "reciprocal argument and counterargument, proposal and counterproposal, in an attempt to agree upon actions and outcomes mutually perceived as beneficial."¹³ Zartman claims that "political persuasion" is "the aspect of power that is most relevant to negotiations."¹⁴ Axelrod sees argumentation as a vital part of negotiation. "Most of what happens in negotiation," Axelrod notes, "is the assertion of arguments by one side, and the response with other arguments by the other side."¹⁵ Walcott, Hopmann, and King venture that "most negotiations are, to some extent, exercises in persuasive debate."¹⁶ Bacharach and Lawler relate argumentation in negotiation to bargaining power. "Arguments," they contend, "are the justifications, explanations, rationalizations, or legitimizations that parties give for the positions they take in bargaining." Bacharach and Lawler stress that "modes of argumentation reflect the bargainers' image of the power relationship."¹⁷ Pruitt casts "persuasive argument" as a

concession-inducing tactic associated with competitive negotiation behavior (distributive bargaining).¹⁸

While a number of scholars, particularly from outside the field of communication, have speculated on the relationship between argumentation and negotiation, little integration exists. This essay provides that integration and contemplates needed areas of inquiry. Specifically, the essay reviews the relevant literature regarding (1) factors affecting argumentation in negotiation, (2) the kinds of arguments in negotiation, and (3) the functions of argument in negotiation. The commentary also considers issues not yet addressed by the literature on argumentation and negotiation as well as contributions argumentation scholars can make to the study of bargaining and negotiations.

FACTORS AFFECTING ARGUMENTATION IN NEGOTIATION

Donohue, Diez, and Stahle observed recently that "a review of work in negotiation research reveals that not much attention has been given to specifying the various ways in which context can affect bargaining as well. Little attention has been given to factors that might affect argument in bargaining. Certainly negotiation behavior reflects structural and contextual pressures or influences. Yet negotiation theorists rarely consider how structure and context relate to negotiator's arguments. Rubin and Brown, for example, provide the most comprehensive treatment of "structural components of bargaining situations." They discuss the nature of such "social, physical, and issue characteristics" as the presence of audiences, the number of bargaining parties, the negotiation setting, the availability of communication, time limits, reward structure, and the number of issues, and the effects of these characteristics on bargaining behavior.²⁰ But Rubin and Brown do not relate these structural or contextual bargaining components to persuasive or argumentative interaction.

Only two essays explicitly address factors that influence argumentation in bargaining. Donohue, Diez, and Stahle consider contextual elements and Reiches and Harral explicate "dimensions" that affect argumentative interaction in negotiation.²¹ Despite some shortcoming, each essay identifies features of negotiation germane to the study of argumentation and bargaining.

Donohue, Diez, and Stahle base their discussion of contextual elements on recent scholarship in communication and linguistics, compliance in negotiation interaction is influenced by three factors: potential outcome, rules, and relationship form.

"Potential outcome" encompasses the extent to which the bargainers know the issues in conflict, are aware of the desired outcomes of each party, and are inclined to negotiate, given their power to control the solution. It also embraces the diversity of outcomes and the degree to which outcomes are determinant or fixed. Drawing upon the work of Putnam and Jones, Donohue et. al. surmise: "when parameters such as these are known, the interaction begins in a less argumentative tone as the

individuals simply exchange positions on the issues. At later phases of interaction, the discussion becomes more heated [argumentative?]."²² But Donohue, Diez, and Stahle do not indicate how these "outcome" factors affect communication and argument in terms of types or functions of messages. Undoubtedly, a negotiator's knowledge of the issues in dispute, the other party's desired outcomes, the number of alternatives, solution rigidity, and relative power influence her or his argumentative choices, but how is not clear. And Donohue et. al. comments imply that more precise definitions of negotiation situations correlate with less argumentative interactions. Possibly, as negotiators know more about outcome factors, they narrow their focus, maintain less decision latitude, and become more single-minded. In game theoretic research, communication seems less important when outcome matrices are fixed and the parties in conflict know the outcome options. If negotiators' choices are highly structured, perhaps argumentation plays a less critical role in the bargaining process.

Secondly, Donohue, Diez, and Stahle identify "rules" as a contextual parameter. Rule parameters include specification of a meeting's structure; advance knowledge of time limits; the presence of people, other than the principal bargainers, in the meeting; the agenda (issue order), and physical features of the meeting (table size, seating arrangement). Numerous rules and rule specificity typify formal negotiation. Donohue et. al.'s analysis suggests that rules constrain argumentative choices. They assert, for example, that "other people in the room may affect the extent to which the negotiators become argumentative."²³ Time limits undoubtedly affect the number of arguments a negotiator can advance on an issue. Donohue, Diez, and Stahle do not address specifically how rules affect argument choices or kinds of arguments employed. But their discussion does imply that argumentation differs according to the formality of negotiation. Most of the literature on argumentation in bargaining and negotiation fails to recognize this distinction.

Donohue, Diez, and Stahle cast "relationship form" as a third factor influencing negotiation interaction. They delineate four relational parameters: the nature of the negotiators' relationship with each other, the negotiators' previous experiences bargaining with each other, the extent to which the negotiators represent others, and the degree to which negotiators are on the same side. Donohue and his colleagues do not discuss how these relationship factors influence communicative choices, except to surmise that parties who have bargained with each other frequently will employ different argumentative tactics than strangers.²⁴ Obviously, bargaining communication is swayed by the negotiation relationship. Other relationship-related factors, such as trust and power, affect argumentative decisions. Perhaps individuals with less bargaining power, for example, marshal certain types of support for their claims, use particular types of arguments, or target their messages at precise (and perhaps limited) goals. Bacharach and Lawler, drawing upon Komorita and Chertkoff's bargaining theory of coalitions, postulate that high-power negotiators (negotiators with more power in the bargaining relationship) use equity appeals while negotiators with less power make appeals of equality and

responsibility.²⁵ Certainly relationship factors bear upon argumentative interactions in negotiation, but to what extent and with what effect remains undetermined.

While Donohue and his colleagues do not incorporate power as a relational factor influencing negotiation, Reiches and Harral do include power as a "dimension of argument." In addition to power, Reiches and Harral contend that risk, compromise, prediction, and situation each affect the "argumentative dialectic" of negotiation. "The claims that each bargainer can advance are determined by . . . dimensions of argument," Reiches and Harral explain, "dimensions that aid critical evaluation of any argumentative transaction, but that are especially pertinent to the examination of negotiation."²⁶ Reiches and Harral propose that the five "dimensions" interact, rather than operate unilaterally, to produce argument in negotiation. Ironically, their discussion emphasizes how the dimensions are distinct while not clarifying how they interact. And the exploratory studies they report do not explain prediction or situation (the examined dimensions) in terms of argumentation in negotiation. Still, their dimensions of argument deserve attention as factors influencing negotiation interaction.

Reiches and Harral treat power and risk together. They assert that "perceptions of power, determined by the relative rewards and costs in a situation . . . help to decide the amount of risk that a negotiator may take at a given time."²⁷ Reiches and Harral claim "the power that each negotiator attributes to his opponent, as well as the amount of risk an individual is willing to take, can significantly influence the statements spoken across the bargaining table."²⁸ Regrettably, Reiches and Harral do not explain how perceptions of power influence argumentation, the extent to which parties use argument to change perceptions of power, or address the issue that arguments themselves constitute risk-taking in negotiation.

Compromise represents the third dimension of argument. How this affects argument is unclear. Reiches and Harral observe that a willingness to consider alternative proposals distinguishes the process of compromise, implying that one's disposition to compromise or reach agreement actuates argument.²⁹ Obviously, negotiators who prefer a joint decision to terminating negotiation, or who want to approach rather than avoid conflict, will continue to argue. Negotiators unwilling to collaborate, cooperate, or compromise may prefer no agreement to a settlement they perceive unfavorably. Reiches and Harral's treatment of compromise does not enhance knowledge regarding how highly competitive (distributive) bargainers and collaborative (integrative) bargainers use argument.

Reiches and Harral claim "prediction" is a determinant of argument in negotiation. "The argumentative process culminating in agreement," they submit, "is significantly dependent upon behavioral predictions based on the expectations of the participants," suggesting that a bargainer's predictions and expectations regarding outcomes and behaviors dictate certain argumentative choices.³⁰ What those choices are remains ambiguous. Reiches and Harral also observe that a

negotiator uses argument "to increase the accuracy of his predictions concerning his opponent's position."³¹ Apparently, predictions direct arguments and arguments change predictions, which, in turn, generate arguments. Arguments do reveal information about a bargainer's position along with aiding the determination of the other bargaining party's utilities. Prediction may be much more a function of argument rather than a determinant of argument in negotiation.

Lastly, Reiches and Harral posit that "situational variables" affect negotiators' arguments. They note that "the actual verbal exchange cannot adequately be analyzed without consideration of the context in which it occurs."³² In fact, Reiches and Harral assert that "situation" may be the paramount determinant of argument, influencing perceptions of power and risk and a bargainer's orientation toward compromise. They argue, for example, that the urgency of the issue impacts on bargaining power, while never explaining how this affects argument. Donohue, Diez, and Stahle provide a more substantive analysis of contextual influences, but neither they or Reiches and Harral offer a concise discussion of how argumentative choices and communication in negotiation vary according to situational factors.

Still, these efforts to identify and explain factors which influence argumentation in negotiation, while limited, furnish grounds for investigation and discussion. Effective negotiators do prepare to bargain, and this preparation includes the generation of argumentative strategies and tactics appropriate to desired outcomes and reflective of the negotiator's perception of the bargaining situation and negotiation relationship. Argumentative choices change during the process of negotiation as bargainers understand better the influence of rules, the pertinent relationships, and the expectations of the other bargainers.

TYPES OF ARGUMENTS IN NEGOTIATION

While very little literature exists regarding factors which influence argumentation in negotiation, a number of scholars theorize about the kinds of types of arguments found in bargaining. The types of arguments posited can be organized roughly into the following groups: preference arguments, cause-effect arguments, power arguments, normative arguments, self-presentation arguments, and bluff arguments. These are not distinct categories--much overlap exists in the literature. The categories do not encompass every element of "argument type" offered in the literature (they are imperfect pigeon holes). Some kinds of arguments offered in the literature come from content analytic coding schemes, others from abstract discussions of negotiation, and even some from traditional argumentation theory. A number of the argument types reflect a "macro view" of negotiation while others stem from a "micro view." Putnam explains the distinction.

At the micro-level, interaction sequences determine the nature of conflict cycles, manage information exchanges, recast goals and purposes, and structure bargaining relationships. At the macro-level,

interaction sequences comprise phases and cycles that move bargaining sessions toward an eventual resolution.³³

Finally, some of the argument forms reflect no theoretical grounding while others quite clearly do. In other words, not all argument types are created equally. These qualifying remarks are not intended to diminish the value of the literature proposing kinds of arguments, but rather to place the following discussion in proper perspective.

Preference Arguments. Preference arguments are statements of value. They constitute reasons for what negotiators do or do not prefer. A bargainer may use a preference argument to justify her or his own desired outcome (utility) or to change what the other bargainer wants (the opponent's utility). Preference arguments appear in the literature as value assertions, value arguments, intrinsic interest appeals, and tactical arguments. Axelrod states that "value assertions are those assertions whose effect variable is the utility of a participant."³⁴ A labor union representative who tells management that salary concessions would decrease worker incentive and productivity is advancing a preference argument, implying that salary concessions are bad for management. Zeichmeister and Druckman's concept of value argument refers to "preferential statements which purport to reflect whether the speaker is for or against the issue or idea expressed."³⁵ Consequently, when U.S. arms control negotiators tell Soviet representatives that they latest Soviet proposal for missile reductions in Europe favors in Eastern bloc to the disadvantage of NATO, they are offering preference arguments.

An appeal of intrinsic interest, as articulated by Sawyer and Guetzkow, is a preference argument. They explain this appeal and provide an example.

Intrinsic interest: You should want to do this, for its direct benefit, which possibly you do not fully perceive. "Lower tariffs will permit your people to buy imported goods more cheaply."³⁶

Consistent with Axelrod's value assertion, the appeal of intrinsic interest attempts to change a negotiator's utility. So too, does Walton and McKersie's "tactical argument." Tactical arguments identify consequences an opposite negotiator will encounter if her or his current position remains unchanged.³⁷ Tactical arguments attempt to modify an opposing negotiator's perceptions of his or her own utilities, consequently functioning as a kind of preference argument.

Cause-Effect Arguments. Obviously, Walton and McKersie's tactical argument hypothesizes about effects. Many preference arguments express values by way of cause and effect, and cause-effect arguments convey preferences. Cause-effect arguments may imply preferences or provide support for preference arguments. When one bargainer tells another, "This agreement is good for you because . . ." causal reasoning supports the claim of preference.

A number of writers emphasize cause-effect argument in negotiation. Axelrod contrasts value assertions with causal assertions, explaining that the latter includes three components: cause, connector, and effect. The "connector" indicates whether the argument expresses a positive or negative cause-effect relationship.³⁸ Hopmann, King, and Walcott's "persuasive behaviors" (in Bargaining Process Analysis II) include two cause-effect arguments: negative predictions or warnings, and positive predictions. These statements of prediction posit effects over which the bargainer has incomplete control.³⁹ Similarly, Angelmar and Stern discuss warnings and recommendations. Recommendations and warnings, they state, predict "pleasant versus aversive consequences . . . (whereby) the source does not control the occurrence of the predicted event."⁴⁰ And as part of their Conference Process Analysis system for coding negotiation interaction, Morley and Stephenson specify "positive consequences of proposed outcomes" and "negative consequences of proposed outcomes." The former identify statements referring to the advantages of accepting some outcome while the latter denote statements referring to the disadvantages of accepting a particular outcome.⁴¹ Putnam and Jones modify the BPA II's persuasive behavior category to include causal arguments of self-support and Putnam and Geist incorporate Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik's conception of causal reasoning into a "schema for analyzing reasoning in the negotiations."⁴² Promises and threats may be viewed as cause-effect arguments (as well as power arguments). Sawyer and Guetzkow, for example, articulate an appeal of second party effects.

Second party effects (for example, threat of force): If you don't do it, I may do something you won't like. 'If you do not lower your tariffs, we may have to raise ours.'⁴³

Cause-effect arguments constitute a significant part of argumentation in negotiation. Putnam and Jones study of bargaining reciprocity indicates that causal arguments occur with greater frequency than any other argument type.⁴⁴ And Axelrod reports that, in foreign policy settings, causal assertions appear more often than value assertions but are disagreed over less.⁴⁵

Power Arguments. Power arguments, particularly when negotiators employ threats and promises, overlap with arguments of cause-effect. But power arguments go beyond cause-effect statements. Power arguments attempt to influence through defining (or redefining) power in the negotiation relationship. Bacharach and Lawler feature the concept of power argument. "On the broadest level, bargainers can ground power arguments in resources, dependence, or sanctions," Bacharach and Lawler contend, and emphasize that "power arguments attempt to manipulate the other's perception of the power relationship."⁴⁶ Power arguments affect how dependent one bargainer feels on another for a satisfactory outcome. Bacharach and Lawler explain:

The four dimensions of the dependence relationship imply four general modes of argumentation: arguments that manipulate the other's

commitment, arguments that manipulate the opponent's perception of its alternatives, arguments that manipulate the opponent's perception of one's own commitment, and arguments that manipulate the opponent's perception of one's own alternatives.⁴⁷

As Bacharach and Lawler's modes of argumentation indicate, power arguments seek to change opposing bargainers' perceptions. Bacharach and Lawler offer four examples of power arguments: coalition arguments, which attempt to modify the dependence relationship by forming a coalition with parties outside the immediate relationship; threat-to-leave arguments, which assert a party's possibility of leaving the negotiation situation or bargaining relationship; self-enhancement arguments, whereby a party claims to contribute much to the bargaining relationship; and priority arguments, through which a bargainer tries to manipulate the opponent's perceptions of his or her priorities in order to communicate commitments on issues.⁴⁸

Bacharach and Lawler's examples, while interesting, only identify overt approaches to changing the bargaining power relationship. Arguments also function subtly to affect perceptions of dependence. A bargainer's control and dissemination of information through argument can change perceptions and expectations. Arguments directed at the bargaining relationship itself or arguments for a particular bargaining approach (e.g., formula-detail, integrative, distributive) may alter negotiator interdependence. And Bacharach and Lawler rely exclusively on labor-management negotiation for examples. Power arguments may vary, in terms of form and function, in international affairs or legal negotiation.

No other work in negotiation comes close to Bacharach and Lawler's efforts to discuss substantively the issues of power and argumentation. While power has become a popular negotiation issue of late, particularly in the trainers' literature (e.g., seminar texts), only Bacharach and Lawler relate it to argument.⁴⁹ Walton and McKersie's tactical arguments can function definitionally as power arguments as can Sawyer and Guetzkow's second party effects appeals (threat of force). But neither is discussed in terms of bargaining power. Finally, to the extent that threats and promises function as arguments, they certainly impact on perceptions of dependence. Threats and promises are rarely cast as arguments, but the potential to do so exists, given the extensive literature.

Normative Arguments. Appeals to societal or community standards or principles, such as fairness or responsibility, comprise part of the bargaining influence process. Such arguments, Bacharach and Lawler contend, "involve the application of general rules . . . normative rules refer to external, nonutilitarian standards that ostensibly should be upheld by both parties."⁵⁰ Sawyer and Guetzkow explain that "third party effects" appeals draw upon norms. Negotiator tells another, "others want you to do so, and will give their approval," asserting the negotiator that a particular action is the right or appropriate thing to do.⁵¹ And "positive and negative normative appeals" comprise part of Angelmar and Stern's content analysis system for bargaining in

marketing. Drawing upon Tedeschi, Schenkler, and Bonoma's Conflict, Power, and Games, Angelmar and Stern explain that "normative appeals are messages in which the party indicates that the other party's behavior has been, or will be in accordance with or in violation of social norms."⁵²

Bacharach and Lawler identify three normative arguments relevant to bargaining: equality appeals, equity appeals, and responsibility appeals. Equality appeals argue for equal payoffs, a "50-50 split." In contrast, an argument of equity favors a distribution of payoffs reflective of each party's contribution to the negotiation. An argument of responsibility advocates need as the basis for evaluating bargaining proposals and determining outcomes. Bacharach and Lawler point out that bargainers employ those normative arguments that best serve their interests and support their power position in the negotiation relationship. High-power bargainers, for example, may appeal for equity while extremely disadvantaged bargainers advocate responsibility arguments.⁵³

Similarly, Zartman and Berman propose five types of justice which could appear as normative appeals. Substantive justice refers to criteria of self-support. The substance of discussion suggests the appropriate settlement, and parties generally view the substantive issues differently, according to their own interests. Procedural justice, like Bacharach and Lawler's norm of equality, supports splitting the outcome or sharing the payoff equally. Akin to equity appeals, equitable justice refers to the apportionment of payoffs according to each party's characteristics, such as power or resources. Compensatory justice resembles an appeal of responsibility. It recommends that the weak deserve the most, that outcomes should reflect need. Finally, subtractive justice rationalizes the removal of possessions from parties in conflict. Zartman and Berman explain that since bargainers may want to deny something of worth to another party rather than possessing it themselves, subtractive justice can be employed as a compromise.⁵⁴ Like Bacharach and Lawler's normative appeals, the use of these five types of justice as arguments will reflect a negotiator's self interest.

Self-Presentation Arguments. A self-presentation argument is any argument in support of one's own position. Consequently, preference, cause-effect, power, and normative arguments can also exist as arguments of self-presentation. Arguments are labeled as statements of self-support in the Bargaining Process Analysis II system. Hopmann, King, and Walcott define "supporting argument-self" (as opposed to "supporting argument-other") as: "Actor justifies or provides a general argument in favor of actor's own substantive position or presents evidence to support position."⁵⁵ The category does not really discriminate kinds of arguments. Recognizing this, Putnam and Jones modify "Self-supporting argument" by specifying four types of support: statistical, example, analogy, and cause.⁵⁶ Putnam and Jones' study of argumentation in teacher negotiations, while not employing Bargaining Process Analysis, further delineates arguments of self-presentation. They assert that "argumentation in negotiation consists of written

proposals for changes in the current contract and the subsequent counterproposals offered by both sides.⁵⁷ This very limited view of argument in negotiation implies a self-support focus, as does Putnam and Geist's use of categories of claims and reasoning to analyze arguments in bargaining.

Self-presentation is not a particularly insightful way of characterizing argument in negotiation. It provides little information about the forms or functions of arguments in bargaining. Portraying arguments in terms of preferences, power, or norms encourages more precise analysis and discussion about the nature and role of argumentation in bargaining, providing direction for contemplating what arguments do.

Bluff Arguments. Like self-presentation arguments, practically any argument in bargaining can be used to bluff or deceive. Bacharach and Lawler explain that "a bluff argument is an attempt to persuade the opponent to act in terms of an illusory conception of the power relationship."⁵⁸ Lewicki denotes four forms of deception which could serve as bluff arguments: misrepresentation of one's position to an opponent, bluffing (falsely stating intentions to act, like false threats or promises), falsification of information, and deception ("a collection of arguments are made that lead the opponent to draw an incorrect conclusion or deduction").⁵⁹

No doubt bargainers bluff and deceive. But how can we recognize arguments of misrepresentation, falsification, or bluff? Only when bargainers admit their intention to deceive or when arguments are verifiable, can we know that bluff arguments occur. Given the definitions and descriptions, we can identify preference, cause-effect, normative, and power arguments in negotiation interaction. Bargaining transcripts reveal negotiators appealing to norms of equity, stating preferences, arguing negative implications of alternative outcomes, and making threats. Yet any of these arguments could be bluffs, something transcript or interaction analysis does not discern.

By organizing the bargaining and negotiation literature's treatment of argument types into arguments of preference, cause-effect, power, norms, self-presentation, and bluff, we can better understand various forms arguments in negotiation may take. While this rough categorization is open to both refinement and debate, it integrates the literature as well as suggesting what arguments do. Ultimately, this latter concern may represent the area of greatest interest to scholars of argumentation and negotiation.

THE FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENT IN NEGOTIATION

In their noteworthy essay on communication and bargaining, Putnam and Jones note four functions of communication: the coordination of outcomes, the exchange of information, the expression of strategic action, and the identification of patterns or regularities of behavior.⁶⁰ In a similar and more detailed vein, Schelling contends that "the essence of bargaining is the communication of intent, the

perception of intent, the manipulation of expectations about what one will accept or refuse, the issuance of threats, offers, and assurances, the display of resolve and evidence of capabilities, the communication of constraints on what one can do, the search for compromise and jointly desirable exchanges, the creation of sanctions to enforce understandings and agreements, genuine efforts to persuade and inform, and the creation of hostility, friendliness, mutual respect, or rules of etiquette."⁶¹ Where communication exists in bargaining and negotiation, so, too, does argument. In the bargaining and negotiation literature, various authors contemplate the functions of argumentation in negotiation. Either directly or indirectly, the thoughts of negotiation scholars seem consistent with Putnam and Jones' functions of communication and Schelling's substantive conceptualization of bargaining. The negotiation literature suggests a number of ways in which arguments operate in bargaining, including the modification of preferences, payoffs, perceptions, and expectations, the exchange of information, the structuring or shaping of outcomes and issues, and the identification of firmness of position.

Modification of Preferences, Payoffs, and Perceptions. Negotiators use arguments to influence other bargaining parties. Bargainers prefer their agendas, their issue definitions, and their settlement alternatives. Consequently, a negotiator tries to change the other bargainer's preferences and perceptions of his or her own bargaining position. Consensus exists on these points. Sawyer and Guetzkow claim that "the aim of much communication in negotiation is to persuade the other party that his self-interest is not what he thought, by providing information, interpretation, or implications that cause him to reassess the utility of various outcomes."⁶² Snyder and Diesing echo these ideas. Persuasion, they observe, attempts "to change the adversary's estimate of the empirical consequence of possible outcomes, or the value he places on these consequences."⁶³

If a negotiator's preferences change, so, too, do her or his utilities, or the values placed on various outcomes. Arguments to modify preference attempt to alter solution utility. Zartman surmises that "the means of persuasion raise or lower the value of various alternatives and related reference points [offering point, acceptance point, and security point], and render other alternatives relatively more or less attractive."⁶⁴ Negotiators, as decision makers, use arguments to change the bargaining parties' evaluation of their values.⁶⁵ And Beisecker notes that persuasive strategies promote the reassessment of preferences, or evaluation of outcome utilities.⁶⁶

As preferences and utilities change, payoffs shift. Arguments are used to transform the distribution of payoffs. Snyder and Diesing assert that persuasive tactics, such as arguments, attempt to change one's own payoffs or the opponent's estimates of them for possible outcomes and attempt to change the opponent's payoffs.⁶⁷ Payoffs change if a negotiator can change another party's assessment of his own utilities. "Persuasion," Snyder and Diesing argue, "also includes trying to change the adversary's estimates of how oneself predicts the nature of outcomes and values them."⁶⁸

Viewed broadly, arguments to change preferences, utilities, and payoffs intend to change perceptions. Reighes and Harral note that arguments affect perceptions of outcomes.⁶⁹ Zartman discusses how persuasion manipulates negotiators' perceptions.⁷⁰ Given the centrality of power in their theory of bargaining, Bacharach and Lawler allege that arguments establish or change "the opponent's perception of the power relationship."⁷¹ Ikle relates arguments to expectations and evaluation. He maintains that persuasive communication changes the opponent's expectations regarding probable outcomes, alters the manner in which alternatives are evaluated, and reveals new outcomes.⁷² Rieke and Sillars also recognize this principle function of argumentation in negotiation. "Arguments are advanced," they write, "to modify the opponent's concept of acceptable settlement."⁷³ Perception and preference change seems the paramount goal of argumentation in negotiation.

Information Exchange. Arguments in negotiation provide information and gain information. Putnam claims that "in addition to questions and answers, information exchange is managed through the use of arguments."⁷⁴ Zartman and Berman's analysis of the "detail phase" of negotiation suggests that arguments can convey information about values and commitments and send signals through wording.⁷⁵ Bargainers learn about their counterparts and the negotiation situation, to varying degrees, through argument. Negotiators "realize that they have only an imperfect understanding of one another's preferences," Axelrod observes, "so they pay attention to the other's arguments for several reasons, including a desire to find pairs of items on which concessions may be profitably exchanged."⁷⁶ Gulliver articulates a processual model of negotiation in which argumentation and persuasion promote information exchange and learning. Yet he notes that arguments (and arguers) may create confusion in early phases of negotiation while clarifying positions in later stages. And Gulliver notes that providing information is a double-edged sword, for as a bargainer gives information through argument she or he may also become more susceptible to argument.⁷⁷

Shaping of Issues and Outcomes. In conjunction with providing information and attempting to influence perceptions, arguments also affect the organization and definition of issues, and the nature of outcomes. Prior to negotiating the issues themselves, bargainers may provide arguments regarding the order of issues to be addressed. Or arguments may center on other procedural matters, topics often addressed during a prenegotiation period. Beisecker believes that persuasive communication may relate to the application of negotiation procedures to specific situations. "Communication focusing on this attribute," Beisecker explains, "includes that pertaining to the establishment of an agenda, the designation of speaker orders and speaker responsibilities . . . and so forth."⁷⁸ Arguments influence the rules of negotiation, which, in turn, influence arguments regarding issues.

Arguments also define the issues of negotiation. Bacharach and Lawler contend that argumentation is "a means of negotiation the definition of issues." They discern that bargaining issues can be

defined specifically or broadly, separately or as part of a group, and integratively or in a distributive fashion. Arguments address the definitional options and the subsequent choices influence the nature of argument in the negotiation.⁷⁹

Finally, arguments shape outcomes via the obvious: they provide support for positions, offers, and counteroffers. Rieke and Sillars write that "argument in bargaining is characterized by frequent statement of offers for settlement accompanied by arguments in support of the offer."⁸⁰ Bacharach and Lawler point out that "argumentation is a means of justifying offers and counteroffers."⁸¹ Putnam and Geist join the chorus. "Arguments form the basis for modifying the [bargaining] proposal," they proffer, explaining that "proposals are reshaped throughout the process of argumentation and the presentation of new proposals; these steps are circular and feed into one another."⁸²

Underscoring Firmness and Commitment. Bargainers use arguments to communicate positions of firmness and degrees of commitment. While negotiators need to listen actively and give serious consideration to the arguments, interests, and position of their counterparts, they will be more flexible on some issues than others. Contrary to a popularized myth, not everything is negotiable. Although rigidity of prenegotiation positions often inhibits the bargaining process, negotiators will identify, during the bargaining process, items or issues upon which their position becomes firm. Given a bargainer's interests, some points cannot be conceded or accommodated. As Fisher remarks, "an openness to reason combined with a principled refusal to yield to blackmail can change the game."⁸³ Arguments identify points of firmness, while hopefully maintaining an orientation of "firm flexibility."⁸⁴ Jervis posits that in international affairs, an adversary's perception of a bargainer's commitment of firmness increases the likelihood of a peaceful solution.⁸⁵ Snyder and Diesing assert that persuasive messages can increase the credibility of a negotiator's firmness without changing the payoffs.⁸⁶ And commitments, even conveyed through contentious behavior such as pervasive arguments (like threats) can promote bargaining within an integrative perspective. "One element of explicit problem solving," Pruitt contends, "is to signal a firm commitment to one's basic interests."⁸⁷

Argumentation and Competitive Bargaining. In terms of the relevant literature, arguments serve to alter perceptions and preferences, exchange information, shape issues and solutions, and emphasize areas of commitment. Some scholars suggest a few other functions as well, most notably that arguments foster distributive negotiation. Pruitt claims that persuasive arguments reinforce a distributive--competitive, zero-sum, or fixed pie-orientation to bargaining.⁸⁸ Rieke and Sillars agree. Drawing upon Donohue's negotiation rules, Rieke and Sillars conclude that "cooperation does not seem to be a mark of argumentation in negotiation" and "successful negotiation does not reveal a cooperative spirit."⁸⁹ Pruitt, Rieke, and Sillars are wrong. Arguments in negotiation are not inherently competitive or distributive. Arguments can promote integrative problem-solving, collaboration and cooperation. Within an integrative frame, arguments

support joint preferences and mutually beneficial outcomes. Certainly negotiators may argue competitively, but such behavior reflects their interests and a distributive bias rather than the arguments themselves.

ISSUES TO CONSIDER

While some work has been done addressing factors which influence argumentation in negotiation, kinds of arguments in bargaining, and what purposes arguments serve in negotiation, many issues await consideration as theory and research advance. These issues can be framed as questions.

Does Argumentation Differ Depending Upon Bargaining Orientation? The negotiation literature distinguishes frequently between distributive and integrative approaches to bargaining. Distributive bargaining implies a "win-lose" orientation, a clearly adversarial bargaining relationship, self-interest, competitive behaviors, and a zero-sum or fixed pie conflict. Distributive tactics include extreme initial positions, guarded disclosure of information (perhaps deception), and a small concession rate. Integrative bargaining displays a problem-solving or "win-win" orientation, a collaborative bargaining relationship, mutual interest, cooperative behaviors, and an expandable resource or payoff pie. Tactics include the identification of goals and interests, a sharing of information, and analysis of alternatives in terms of joint benefit.

The analysis of argumentation in negotiation needs to consider the differences between distributive and integrative bargaining. Arguments vary according to the orientation. Bluff arguments are inconsistent with integrative bargaining while power appeals such as coalition and threat-to-leave arguments reflect distributive negotiation. None of the current literature compares and contrasts argumentation across orientations. Even Pruitt, one of the leading theorists on integrative bargaining, sees persuasive argument as a distributive behavior.

How Does Argumentation Vary According to the Negotiation Arena? Contrary to recent claims of Putnam and Geist and Womack and Lawson, negotiation is not AN argument field.⁹⁰ Rather, negotiation occurs in a number of different fields or arenas, such as international affairs, labor-management, law, sales, and interpersonal relationships. Scholars must recognize the differences between these arenas when discussing argumentation in negotiation. Argumentation in labor-management bargaining, for example, seems much more overt or explicit than argumentation in international negotiation. International negotiation appears to rely much more on public argument than collective bargaining or legal negotiations. Deceptive or bluff arguments may occur more often in sales than law. And the same types of arguments may operate quite differently from arena to arena.

The nature of argumentation in bargaining depends on the negotiation arena. Cultural influences and degree of formality vary from one arena to the next. Winthrop Brown, for example contends that overlapping interest "is the only real basis of solid agreement [in international diplomatic negotiation], not argument, or persuasion, but concurrent

interests."⁹¹ Snyder and Diesing contend that bargaining in international crises is coercive rather than persuasive.⁹² The various bargaining arenas provide fruitful opportunities for the comparative and critical analysis of argumentation.

Does Argumentation Change from one Method of Dispute Resolution to Another? Negotiation is only one communication method of dispute resolution. Conflicts can also be resolved through mediation and arbitration. Mediations and arbitrations bring third parties into a conflict situation, and negotiation may not even occur when arbitrators make the decisions. Argumentation serves dissimilar functions and assumes different forms when third parties intervene. Scholars have not recognized this. Schuetz and Womack, for example, both speculate about the relationship of argumentation and negotiation while conducting studies of mediation behavior. Womack does address how mediators use arguments but does not relate her conclusions to negotiation.⁹³ Certainly, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration are related, but in no sense are they synonymous. Scholars should not assume that what is true of argumentation in one mode of dispute resolution is true in another.

Are Threats and Promises Arguments? Some scholars say they are while others place threats and promises outside of argumentation and persuasion. Threats are employed to influence and gain adherence, but they, along with promises, are arguably coercive. Coercion implies the limiting of choice, and perhaps a corresponding limitation on argument. Scholars of argumentation and negotiation might address this issue, one particularly relevant to the study of bargaining in international affairs.

What Relationship Exists Between Questions and Arguments? Some negotiation theorists and practitioners contend that questions play an important part in gaining information and influencing the process and outcome of negotiation. Donohue, Diez, and Stahle's discussion of the relevance of discourse analysis to the study of argumentation in negotiation suggests that questions and arguments may interact in negotiation (and in ways different from conversation).⁹⁴ Perhaps questions cue arguments or serve argumentation purposes.

Are Theories of Argumentation Relevant to the Study of Negotiation? To date, no substantive attempt has been made to wed argumentation theory, whether classical, contemporary, or revisionist, to negotiation. Such efforts could contribute much to the theory and practice of negotiation. More than just contemplating data, warrants, and claims, argumentation scholars might examine the role of public argument (e.g., public pronouncements or positioning through the media) in negotiation, compare and contrast private and public argument in bargaining, analyze the influence of various audiences (opposite bargainer, constituencies, media) on argumentation in negotiation, research the construction of arguments in bargaining, decipher argument interaction sequences, contemplate the relationship of argument to some other variable, such as power, bargainer attributes, or face-saving, or scrutinize argumentation in negotiation in various bargaining phases. And Gale suggests that

jurisprudential theories of argument are relevant to conflict resolution theory. "A reasonable direction is the reformulation of the theory of conflict resolution in terms of the theory of argumentation as it has been developed in jurisprudential contexts [e.g., Toulmin and Perelman]," Gale writes, noting that "this point is implicit . . . in the development of international law" and diplomacy.⁹⁵

This list is far from exhaustive. The questions asked about argumentation in negotiation, and every influencing factor, argument type, and argument function found in the negotiation literature suggest a myriad of areas of inquiry.

A FINAL THOUGHT

In their popular book Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury proclaim that "without communication there is no negotiation."⁹⁶ Correspondingly, there is no negotiation without argumentation. In this essay, I have reviewed and organized the literature relevant to the study of argumentation and negotiation, asked some important questions, and offered some tentative answers. But, as this commentary illustrates, much analysis, examination, and discussion still needs to be done. Erudition relating to argumentation and negotiation comes from and goes in many different directions. The communication and argumentation fields have contributed little to the current body of knowledge. Situational and contextual influences on argumentation in negotiation, the types of arguments in bargaining and the related issues of power, values, and cause, and what arguments in bargaining do seem natural areas of investigation for argumentation scholars. With conflict so prevalent in society, it is imperative that we study its most common method of resolution, the decision making process of negotiation and the influence processes that occur within it.

Notes

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³Margaret A. Neal and Max H. Bazerman, "Perspectives for Understanding Negotiation: Viewing Negotiation as a Judgmental Process," Journal of Conflict Resolution 29 (March 1985), 34; Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

⁴Daniel Druckman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of Negotiation," in Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives, ed. Daniel Druckman (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 41. This definition of argumentation is drawn from Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984), p. 5.

⁵Rieke and Sillars, p. 43.

⁶Nancy A. Reiches and Harriet B. Harral, "Argument in Negotiation: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach," Speech Monographs 41 (March 1974), 37.

⁷Jan Schuetz, "Argumentative Competence and the Negotiation of Henry Kissinger," Journal of the American Forensic Association 15 (Summer 1978), 2.

⁸William A. Donohue, Mary E. Diez, and Renee B. Stahle, "New Directions in Negotiation Research," Communication Yearbook 7, ed. Robert N. Bostrom (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 254.

⁹Linda L. Putnam and Patricia Geist, "Argument in Bargaining: An Analysis of the Reasoning Process," Southern Speech Communication Journal 50 (Spring 1985), 229.

¹⁰Anatol Kapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 273; 11.

¹¹P. Terrence Hopmann, Timothy King, and Charles Walcott, "Bargaining Process Analysis II," unpublished manuscript, The Harold Scott Quigley Center of International Studies, The University of Minnesota, 1977, p. 3.

¹²See for example: P. Terrence Hopmann and Timothy D. King, "From Cold War to Detente: The Role of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," in Change in the International System, eds. Ole R. Hostli, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 163-188; Linda L. Putnam and Tricia S. Jones, "Reciprocity in Negotiations: An Analysis of Bargaining Interaction," Communication Monographs 49 (September 1982), 171-191; David A. Bednar and Michael Glauser, "Interaction Analysis of Collective Bargaining: The Barrington Oil Company Case," Academy of Management Proceedings '81, ed. Kae H. Chung (Academy of Management Association, 1981), pp. 188-192; and David A. Bedner and William P. Currington, "Interaction Analysis: A Tool for Understanding Negotiations," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (April 1983), 389-401.

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¹⁴I. William Zartman, "The Analysis of Negotiation," in The 50% Solution, ed. I. William Zartman (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976), p. 33.

¹⁵Robert Axelrod, "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Settings: Britain in 1918, Munich in 1938, and Japan in 1970," in The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications, ed. I. William Zartman (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 177.

¹⁶Charles Walcott, P. Terrence Hopmann, and Timothy D. King, "The Role of Debate in Negotiation," in Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives, ed. Daniel Druckman (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 193.

¹⁷Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics, and Outcomes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984), p. 157.

¹⁸Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981), p. 77.

¹⁹Donohue, Diez, and Stahle, p. 251.

²⁰Rubin and Brown, pp. 41-156.

²¹Donohue, Diez, and Stahle; pp. 251-254; Reiches and Harral, pp. 36-48.

²²Donohue, Diez, and Stahle, p. 253.

²³Donohue, Diez, and Stahle, p. 253.

²⁴Donohue, Diez, and Stahle, p. 254.

²⁵Bacharach and Lawler, p. 176. See also S.S. Komorita and Jerome Chertkoff, "A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation," Psychological Review 80 (1973), 149-162.

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²⁷Reiches and Harral, p. 38.

²⁸Reiches and Harral, p. 38.

²⁹Reiches and Harral, p. 38-39.

³⁰Reiches and Harral, p. 39.

³¹Reiches and Harral, p. 39.

³²Reiches and Harral, p. 40.

³³Putnam, "Bargaining as Task and Process," p. 3.

³⁴Axelrod, p. 181.

³⁵Kathleen Zechmeister and Daniel Druckman, "Determinants of Resolving a Conflict of Interest: A Simulation of Political Decision-Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (March 1973), 81.

³⁶Sawyer and Guetzkow, p. 480.

³⁷Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1965), p. 72.

³⁸Axelrod, p. 181.

³⁹Hopmann, King, and Walcott, pp. 3, 9.

⁴⁰Reinhard Angelmar and Louis W. Stern, "Development of a Content Analytic System for Analysis of Bargaining Communication in Marketing," Journal of Marketing Research 15 (February 1978), 95.

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⁴³Sawyer and Guetzkow, p. 480.

⁴⁴Putnam and Jones, p. 182.

⁴⁵Axelrod, p. 189.

⁴⁶Bacharach and Lawler, p. 168.

⁴⁷Bacharach and Lawler, p. 168.

- 48 Bacharach and Lawler, p. 169.
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- 51 Sawyer and Guetzkow, p. 480.
- 52 Angelmar and Stern, p. 95. See also James T. Tedeschi, Barry R. Schlenker, and Thomas V. Bonoma, Conflict, Power, and Games (Chicago, Aldine Publishing, 1973), pp. 143-144.
- 53 Bacharach and Lawler, pp. 176-177.
- 54 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 102-105.
- 55 Hopmann, King, and Walcott, p. 9.
- 56 Putnam and Jones, p. 180.
- 57 Putnam and Geist, p. 230.
- 58 Bacharach and Lawler, p. 171.
- 59 Roy J. Lewicki, "Lying and Deception: A Behavioral Model," in Negotiating in Organizations, eds. Max H. Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 70-71.
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- 62 Sawyer and Guetzkow, p. 480.
- 63 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 198.
- 64 Zartman, "The Analysis of Negotiation," p. 36.
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- 72 Fred Charles Ikle, "Bargaining and Communication," in Handbook of Communication, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 841-842.
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- 76 Axelrod, p. 177.
- 77 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 114-117.
- 78 Beisecker, p. 155.
- 79 Bacharach and Lawler, pp. 158-167.
- 80 Rieke and Sillars, p. 43.
- 81 Bacharach and Lawler, p. 158.
- 82 Putnam and Geist, p. 230.
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⁸⁸See Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior, p. 77; and Pruitt, "Strategic Choice in Negotiation," p. 170.

⁸⁹Rieke and Sillars, pp. 42-43. See William A. Donohue, "Development of a Model of Rule Use in Negotiation Interaction," Communication Monographs 48 (June 1981), 106-120.

⁹⁰See Putnam and Geist, p. 229; and Deanna F. Womack and Harold L. Lawson, "A Comparison of Negotiation, Judicial Debate, and Academic Debate as Argumentation Fields," Unpublished manuscript, Emerson College, Boston, Massachusetts, 1985.

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⁹²Snyder and Diesing, p. 197.

⁹³Schuetz; and Deanna F. Womack, "The Role of Argument in Mediation Styles," Journal of the American Forensic Association 21 (Spring 1985), 215-225.

⁹⁴Donohue, Diez, and Stahle, pp. 254-261.

⁹⁵Stephen Gale, "On the Design of a Semiotic Theory of Conflict Resolution," The Papers of the Peace Science Society (International) 25 (1975), 82. See also Stephen Gale, "Language and Conflict: Toward a Semiotic Theory of Harmonia Mundi," Journal of Peace Science 2 (Spring 1977), 218.

⁹⁶Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 33.

PATTERNS OF ARGUMENTATION IN HIGH AND LOW CONSENSUS DISCUSSIONS

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The goal of the present research was to identify and describe patterns of argumentation which differentiated between high and low consensus group discussions. A descriptive analysis of ten group discussions revealed three different patterns of argumentation which distinguished groups reaching unanimous or near unanimous agreement from groups which did not. This paper will explain the rationale behind the investigation, detail the methodology, and report the results and implications of the analysis.

Rationale

In recent years several small group and rhetorical scholars have examined the role of argumentation in the process of group discussion.¹ Although past studies have varied in goal and method, each has validated two basic assumptions concerning small group communication. First, previous studies have indicated that group discussions are inherently rhetorical. As members of a group discuss ideas or problems, disagreement inevitably occurs. Since agreement, at least in a minimal amount, is necessary for a group to progress towards a final decision, disagreement creates a need or exigence for resolution.² Groups can resolve the disagreement in a variety of nonrhetorical ways. For example, groups can coerce dissident members into submission, compromise, or simply avoid the disagreement.³ Many disagreements, however, can be, and often are, resolved through rhetorical strategies. Gouran writes: "Frequently the only way of achieving acceptable closure on the question a decision-making group confronts is through one or more participants persuasive skills."⁴

Second, previous studies have demonstrated that argumentation is an important rhetorical strategy often employed by decision-making groups. Enos writes, "Many groups come into existence expressly for the purpose of argument, since resolution via argument will enable a collective sense of rationality to be articulated."⁵

Previous data-based research efforts have identified a variety of forms or characteristics of group argument. Black, for instance, observed groups using both enthymemes and examples as forms of argument.⁶ He qualitatively linked

Focus of Analysis. Although the analysis was a grounded attempt to discover similarities and differences in group argument, some theoretical direction was necessary to provide parameters to the investigation. Two general areas of focus, relating to O'Keefe's distinction between "making an argument" and "having an argument" were employed.¹⁵ For each of the areas of focus, a series of critical questions--used as guidelines for the grounded observation--were formulated. One area of focus centered on mutual advocacy. Mutual advocacy was defined as two or more members jointly constructing an argument in support of a particular claim.¹⁶ Critical questions included: Which members participated in constructing the argument? Which members supplied which parts of the argument? How did the configuration of the mutual advocacy differ from previous claims? What issue or issues were in dispute? Was the mutually constructed argument a counter-argument? Which members were left out of the mutual advocacy? The other area of focus centered on "interactive argument." Interactive argument, or "having an argument" in O'Keefe's terms, was defined as two or more members of the group exchanging claims and counter-claims over a single disputed issue. The critical questions included: What types of issues generated argument? Which members of the group offered refutation and counter-argument? Did the original advocate respond to the counter-claim? Did other group members support either the original claim or the counter-claim?

Grounded Observation. The procedures for consistent and thorough observation were adapted from descriptive techniques outlined by Schefflen and Hirokawa and Pace.¹⁷ First, one transcript was randomly selected and the analysis commenced with the first episode. The transcript was read and reread several times before any written observations were made. Once the researcher was familiar with the transcript, observation of argumentation patterns commenced with mutual advocacy and each of the critical questions was asked and answered for the first episode. Once all of the questions for mutual advocacy were answered, the analysis proceeded with the second focus, interactive argument. When all of the questions for each of the focuses were answered for the first episode, the procedure was repeated for the second episode. When all of the episodes in one transcript were analyzed, the next transcript was selected randomly and the procedures repeated. The analysis continued until all 197 episodes contained in the ten transcripts were analyzed for both mutual advocacy and interactive argument.

Next, the recorded observation from groups within the two cells, HC and LC, were compared to discover consistent similarities. The comparison was performed by contrasting the recorded observation of one group against the recorded observations of all other groups in the cell. Observed argument patterns which occurred in all of the groups within the cell were recorded on a composite list of similarities. This

list then became the basis for the second level of analysis---comparison between cells. Each item on the HC list was compared against all of the items on the LC list. Any item on the HC list which appeared to be similar to an item on the LC list was removed. When the analysis of the items on the HC list was finished, the procedure was reversed for each item on the LC list. Again, similar items were removed. All remaining items on the lists constituted the observed differences between the two cells.

Results

Three patterns of argumentation were observed which appeared to differentiate between HC and LC discussions. 1) Low consensus groups formed fixed patterns of mutual advocacy which extended across unrelated issues or topics. High consensus groups engaged in mutual advocacy, but the members involved changed from issue to issue. 2) High consensus groups engaged in mutual advocacy when no disagreement was present. Low consensus groups did not. 3) Members of high consensus groups frequently reversed their position on an issue within a single episode. Members of low consensus groups rarely changed an argumentative stance which they had advocated within a single episode.

Fixed Pattern

Each of the low consensus groups developed informal coalitions which engaged in mutual advocacy or mutual counter-advocacy over a series of different issues. For example, one member would state a claim and a second member would support the claim with an example. Still another member would rephrase the claim and add another example in support of the position. In this manner, two or more members of the group jointly constructed the argument or counter-argument. Members C&D of group LC1, for instance, joined in mutual counter-advocacy over the issue of increased security guards to deter fans.

- A: I think if you just throw a couple of guys down there with billy clubs, policemen, they would do the job just fine.
 C: You'd need a lot.
 A: You wouldn't need a lot.
 D: Yeah, you would.
 A: Just twenty would do it.
 C: They had twenty down there and that didn't stop them in other games.
 A: Did they do anything? No!
 C: There are so many people that go down there it's kind of tough, to just start whacking . . .
 D: What happens, is that you have the leaders, then you have this little pack behind them and most

people are usually hidden, behind other people, and they don't really care, you know. I mean, they're messed up and they don't think. They are like, you know, I don't think that more security would help.

This pattern of C-D advocacy extended across such unrelated issues as the price of current football tickets, the use of dogs as a deterrent, heavy fines for violators, and the use of electricity to prevent students from touching the goalposts.

- A: Another suggestion is to put an electric current through the posts.
C: (laughs).
D: How high?
A: I don't know.
C: A couple of thousand watts?
A: I think two to four hundred would be enough.
D: Would that be expensive?
A: Are you kidding. No, you plug in anything and its like that much volts. A dryer uses that many volts. You can have it rigged out easily, that no current is strong until the person makes ground contact, you know, then, during only that instant, electricity would be drawn. Like it won't be a capable circuit and the human body will provide that.
D: I think it's a little violent, though.
C: Well, if you put a warning up there, and they touch it, it's their fault.
A: Yeah, like test it, "OH," then they go away. There's nothing they can do about it, you know.
C: That will probably cause a lot of controversy, though.
D: Yeah, that would be very controversial.
C: They'll start destroying something else.
D: You'd find people with, like, huge blankets wrapped around the pole, you know, to protect themselves. Then they would rip it down.

High consensus groups, however, rarely repeated argumentation patterns across different issues. Members engaged in mutual advocacy and counter-advocacy, but coalitions were confined to specific issues. HC2, for example, showed a very consistent pattern of advocacy when dealing with the issue of increased police personnel to deter students. Member C advocated the use of additional police officers three different times during the discussion. Each time, members A & B engaged in mutual counter-advocacy.

- C: It's got to be some kind of force, I think. Just to scare them away. At least at first.
A: To increase security?

- C: Yeah.
B: To have them with billy clubs, and shields and masks, the SWAT team?
C: Until they get used to them, until the students get used to the idea that they are not supposed to be there, you know what I mean?
D: Yeah.
C: Just for the first few games . . .
A: That will take away from the football experience, don't you think?
C: But something has to be done.
B: It's dangerous.

The pattern, however, did not hold for other topics. Member A engaged in mutual advocacy with C many times throughout the discussion. For example, A and C attempted to persuade B that more publicity concerning the problem was necessary.

- C: I think if a lot of the players came out and said something, maybe that would stop it, more. See, I didn't even hear any of that.
A: Maybe they did and we didn't hear about it, so they should start more, ah, advertising.
C: Yeah.
A: More publicity about it.
C: Yeah.
A: That would be a good thing. Tell them, you know, give people the facts. People don't know that people are getting hurt. They leave, they only hear about it the next day.

Argument Without Disagreement

Members in HC discussions frequently engaged in mutual advocacy even when no counter-arguments were presented. One member would introduce a claim and a second or third member would supply an example or additional claim in support of the original argument. For example, group HC2, argued that the problem was temporary and that no action ought to be taken.

- A: I don't think it's a problem.
B: Maybe our solution is just to leave it alone.
B: Yeah.
A: Let it go as it is.
C: I doubt they'll rip them down every game, anyway.
B: Alabama, West Virginia, Notre Dame. That was good, the Alabama game. How many games, did we tear them down? Three games?
C: Yeah.
B: That's it . . .
C: Well, we should just leave it alone.

Change of Position

Members of HC discussions often changed their position, or argumentative stance, within a single episode. Frequently, these members argued against claims which they, themselves, had originally initiated. For example, Member C of group HC5 advocated the use of heavy fines to deter students from entering the football field. Later in the episode, however, he reversed his position and argued against the idea.

- C: Fine them. Someone, you know, will learn from that, probably.
A: No.
B: Cause money really isn't anything.
A: Daddy will pay for it.
C: Yeah?
B: You gotta show to everybody what you're doing to them, how you are punishing the people who are doing it. Because you might punish one person or two or three, but then the next time out of 34,000 students here, you know, who was fined? We don't care!
A: Yeah.
B: We'll go out for revenge. They fine them now and he'll go out and do it again because they fined him. They always find any excuse to do it.
A: I know, I think . . .
B: Like a vicious circle.
C: Even fines wouldn't solve it, cause all the people still speed and you get fined for that. They never stop anyone.
A: That's true.
C: A lot of people can afford it and don't care. Like he said, paying that much to get into the game, what's another . . .
A: Yeah.
C: Especially the people that drove in, motor homes.

Members of low consensus groups, by contrast, rarely changed position within an episode. Most frequently, advocates in low consensus groups repeated their stance when other members of the group disagreed. Often this occurred several times in one episode. For example, Member B of LC2 repeated the claim, that guard dogs would solve the problem, three different times in a single episode.

- B: I thought of a good solution that they use at other colleges, is that they get, like Doberman pinschers . . .
A: I don't . . .
C: Oh, wow.
B: and put them around. The reason it works is that

nobody is necessarily going to jump down to a dog, whereas when you see all those officers down there, they are not going to do anything to you.

- A: A lot of those people are a little inebriated at those games, and uh . . .
B: I still don't think that if there's vicious dogs, I mean, I don't know anyone who isn't afraid of a Doberman pinscher.
A: Well, that's true. It would get a little violent, couldn't it?
B: Yeah, I just don't, I just think that if they try, don't think people are going to . . .
C: I think it will stop them before they do anything.
B: I mean, I just think it would stop people from even considering it.
A: From even considering it in the first place?
B: Because, for all you know, these dogs are trained to rip you apart.

Discussion

The observed results suggested some interesting differences between HC and LC discussions. Not only did the analysis reveal different patterns of argument, but the results also suggested that argument functioned differently for high and low consensus groups. Argument in LC discussions appeared to function as indicators for emerging coalitions. Groups used in the study were zero-history groups and members had little, if any, opportunity to form factions or allegiances before the discussion. The results suggested that the factions which did develop during the interaction, communicated their affiliations through the use of mutual advocacy. Over several issues, two or more members began to sense that they shared common views on the problem or interpretation of facts and opinions. This developing bond began to manifest itself in and be communicated through a pattern of support and countersupport. Argument functioned not as a rhetorical strategy, but as a marker for disagreement, defining emerging coalitions and identifying who was on what side of an issue.

Argument in HC discussions, by contrast, functioned to reinforce developing consensus. Members signaled support for and acceptance of an idea by engaging in mutual advocacy even when disagreement was not present. Group members were able to articulate a collective rationale for the decision and at the same time signal each other that consensus was beginning to develop.

In addition, arguments in HC discussions were used to persuade group members to a point of view. Members in HC discussions who originally disagreed with a particular

suggestion were able to freely rejoin the rest of the group and argue for the solution. In this manner, IIC groups made use of the traditional function of argument, persuasion, to facilitate consensus development.

In summary, the present study sought to identify patterns of argument which differentiated high and low consensus discussions. Three such patterns were described. The present study was, admittedly, only a beginning. However, the results were an initial step in establishing a link between the way in which group members formulate, advocate, and refute arguments, and the outcome of the discussion. Establishing such a relationship would not only add insights into the uses of argument in a non-public setting, but also greatly explicate the process of consensus formation.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Daniel J. Canary, Nancy T. Ratledge, and David R. Seibold, "Argument and Group Decision-Making: Development of a Coding Scheme," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Speech Communication Association, Louisville, Kentucky, 1982; Alice Donaldson, "The Role of Advocacy in Small Group Discussion," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: SCA, 1981), pp. 790-798; Richard Enos, "Classical Rhetoric and Group Decision-Making: Dimensions of Facilitation," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., 1983; Dennis S. Gouran, "The Suasory Functions of Communication in the Process of Group Decision-Making: Necessity and Paradox," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., 1983; Randy Y. Hirokawa, "Group Discussion as a Rhetorical Process: The Structure and Function of Argument in Group Decision-Making," a paper presented at the Conference on Research in Small Group Communication, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa., 1981; Roger C. Pace, "The Influence of the Small Group Setting on the Process of Accedence," a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., 1983.

² Hirokawa, p. 3.

³ Dennis S. Gouran, Making Decisions in Groups: Choices and Consequences (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982), pp. 119-201.

⁴ Gouran, "Suasory Functions," p. 1.

⁵ Enos, p. 2.

⁶ Edwin B. Black, "A Consideration of the Rhetorical Causes of Breakdown in Discussion," Communication Monographs 22 (1955), 15-19.

⁷ Hirokawa, pp. 10-12.

⁸ Pace, p. 13.

⁹ Canary, p. 10.

¹⁰ For an example of reviews of consensus research, see John A. Kline, "Orientation and Group Consensus," Central States Speech Journal, 23 (1972) 44-47; Thomas S. Knutson and Albert S. Kowitz, "Effects of Information Type and Level

of Orientation on Consensus-Achievement in Substantive and Affective Small Group Conflict," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (1977), 54-63; Thomas S. Saine and Douglas G. Bock, "A Comparison of the Distributional and Sequential Structure of Interaction in High and Low Consensus Groups," Central States Speech Journal, 24 (1973), 125-130.

11 See, for example, Enos, p. 2; Gouran, "Suasory Functions," p. 1.

12 For an analysis of systematic observation of group interaction see Albert Schefflen, "Human Communication: Behavioral Programs and Their Interaction," Behavioral Science, 13 (1968), 44-55; For an analysis of "grounded" observation see Barney G. Glasser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967).

13 See, for example, the research on orientation and consensus, Dennis S. Gouran, "Special Report: Variables Related to Consensus in Group Discussions of Questions of Policy," Communication Monographs, 36 (1969), 387-391; Kline, pp. 44-47; Thomas J. Knutson, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Orientation Behavior on Small Group Consensus," Communication Monographs, 39 (1972), 159-165.

14 For discussions of episodes, see Joseph P. Forgas, Social Episodes: The Study of Interaction Routines (New York: Academic Press, 1979); Thomas S. Frenzt and Thomas B. Farrell, "Language-Action: A Paradigm for Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62 (1976), 333-349; Dorothy L. Krueger, "Martial Decision Making: A Language Action Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68 (1982), 273-287.

15 Daniel O'Keefe, "Two Concepts of Argument," The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (1977), 121-127.

16 Pace, p. 13.

17 Schefflen, pp. 44-47; Randy Y. Hirokawa and Roger C. Pace, "A Descriptive Investigation of the Possible Communication-Based Reasons for Effective and Ineffective Group Decision Making," Communication Monographs, 50 (1983), 363-379.

THE EFFECTS OF EVIDENCE ON THE PERCEIVED OUTCOME IN SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE DECISION-MAKING SITUATIONS

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Contemporary communication theorists generally accept the thesis that well documented evidential support enhances the persuasiveness of messages. Quantitative studies, however, lead some researchers to question whether evidence has any value in enhancing a message's persuasive effect. After reviewing the available quantitative research in 1964, Richard Gregg concluded, "The audience reaction to an argument may have little or nothing to do with whether the argument includes fully documented or completely undocumented evidence, relevant or irrelevant evidence, or any evidence at all."¹ The five major studies examined by Gregg, however, were based upon the short public speech on a "current events" topic. This type of conceptualization of persuasive endeavors has characterized much of the quantitative work in persuasion, as well as much thinking in the field of speech communication.

Research on the stability of decisions offers an alternative conceptualization that is, in many ways, more typical of persuasive interpersonal situations encountered in one's everyday activities. Basically, this paradigm focuses upon the factors involved in destabilizing an already announced decision. If one's employer, for instance, announces a policy designed to increase efficiency in one's work schedule, what factors are likely to be effective in enabling one to change that decision? The traditional paradigm would treat this situation as an occasion for a persuasive attempt, either oral or written. The alternative paradigm would focus on what appears to be more basic considerations. What is the status relationships between the persuader and the persuadee? What effect does the sex of one have vis a vis the sex of the other? Is the decision made by an individual or by a committee?

One well established principle in social psychology advanced by Asch² suggests another factor that might be prominent in affecting the stability of interpersonal decisions. Asch has suggested that individuals will use all available information in making a decision. Bradac, Sandell, and Wenner further emphasize that a rational model of behavior assumes that persons will seek facts and opinions from competent sources and that such data will compel a choice.³ One might infer, then, that the addition of information to decision-making situations in an organization may well affect the perceived stability of that situation. Drawing upon the traditional thesis of speech communication mentioned at the

outset, one might theorize that a business situation, in which the persuader wishes the decision overturned, ought to be perceived as less stable if sound evidence is available than the same situation in which evidence is not available. If evidence affects the perceptions of decision stability, it would appear inappropriate to measure the net persuasive effects of various quantities and qualities of evidential support added to messages. It would suggest, instead, that one needs to utilize the framework of an interpersonal decision-making situation to measure the extent to which persuadees perceive the stability of a decision based upon the quantity of information. This may be a more accurate means of assessing the evidential effect. Hample provides further support for this idea when he writes,

The challenge is to test evidence in the way it is usually viewed, instead of treating the debater's quotation as the prototype. It is not enough to merely know how much evidence appears. The researcher also needs to estimate the probative power of the evidence in order to test the traditional view of evidence's importance to persuasion.

The primary purpose of this study is to discover if evidence affects the perceived stability of decisions as measured by the instrument called "Decisions." Secondly, the study attempts to discover whether there are differential effects on the stability of decisions depending upon the sex of the persuader and persuadee in superior-subordinate decision-making situations.

Background and Statement of the Problem

As stated previously, the contention that both quantity and quality of evidential support will enhance the perceived persuasiveness of messages is widely accepted by theorists of argumentation and persuasion. Several empirical studies designed to test that thesis provide only minimal support, however, while other studies conclude that evidence has no perceived influence in persuasive messages. Because of such conflicting results, there have been a number of hypotheses advanced to explain the lack of support discovered for the thesis, but comparatively little research has been conducted to support any of these hypotheses. Therefore, before offering explanations for the negative results, it is necessary to conduct research designed to discover the conditions under which evidence does or does not operate to produce differential receiver effects.

The instrument called "Decisions" suggests one way of testing a potential evidential effect; namely, whether evidence affects the perceived stability of interpersonal decisions. The "Decisions" instrument was validated as an effective

measure for determining changes in perceived stability of decisions in prior research. The instrument also appears to deal with situations which, when compared to situations involving short, formal speeches on current events topics, are relatively more typical of everyday kinds of decisions which which many people are confronted. If Asch's theory is true, a person will use all available information in making a decision, than a decision-making situation between two individuals within an organization may well be the most appropriate framework for testing the impact of evidence. Rogers and Rogers provide the rationale.

Information represents a reduction in uncertainty. An organization is constantly trying to gain information from its environment about the likelihood that some event might happen and thus reduce its uncertainty. For example, a business firm has a market research department to measure changes in its customers' likely buying behavior. An army unit has an intelligence section in order to learn as much as possible about the likely actions of the enemy. These boundary-spanning mechanisms allow the organization to gain information about certain alternatives, and thus, reduce its uncertainty.

The evidence studies examined in this paper's review of pertinent literature confine themselves to investigating the effects of evidence as it relates to a persuasive public speaking situation. In the previous research, the evidence was merely plugged in throughout the oral presentation to lend support to assertions. Therefore, all of the previous conclusions were linked to the public speaking forum and may not be applicable to other given situations. As William Dresser suggests, people may view public speeches as a performance rather than a source of information to use in rational decision-making. Thus, a study on the perceived stability of decisions attributed to the addition of evidence in an everyday decision-making situation within an organization may reveal significantly different results.

With this concept in mind, the following research questions were formulated.

1. Is there a difference in the perceived stability of a decision in superior-subordinate decision-making situations in which no formal evidence appeared and those same situations to which fact evidence has been added and to which opinion evidence has been added?
2. Will the perceived stability of the decision during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation vary significantly with the sex of the persuader?

3. Will the perceived stability of the decision during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate vary significantly with the sex of the persuadee?
4. Will there be a significant interaction between the addition of evidence and the sex of the persuader during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation?
5. Will there be a significant interaction between the addition of evidence and the sex of the persuadee during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation?
6. Will there be a significant interaction between the sex of the persuader and the sex of the persuadee during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation?
7. Will there be a significant interaction between the addition of evidence, the sex of the persuader, and the sex of the persuadee during a persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation?

Before proceeding any further, there are a number of terms crucial to the study that need to be defined.

Evidence--"Factual statements originating from a source other than the speaker and/or opinions of persons, other than the speaker that are offered in support of the speaker's claims."¹⁴

Factual Evidence--"Independently verifiable information about a phenomenon, e.g., an occurrence, existence, classification, or characteristic of something."¹⁵

Opinion Evidence--"A conclusion formed by an expert or lay witness concerning that phenomenon which is arrived at through a process of reasoning."¹⁶

Superior-Subordinate Decision-Making Situations--Operationally defined by 10 descriptive examples which were utilized in this study. The 10 examples used in this study are presented in Appendix A.

Review of Pertinent Literature

Two kinds of literature seem most relevant to the purpose of this study: (1) experimental studies concerning the effect of evidence upon audience attitudes, (2) experimental studies concerning the effect of additional information in decision-making situations. Although the studies reviewed are not an

exhaustive list, the list seems fairly representative of the type of work done in this field.

Cathcart¹⁰ and Bettinghaus¹¹ conducted the only studies to produce statistically significant results favoring the inclusion of evidence in a speech designed to achieve attitude change. Studies reported by Gilkinson, Paulson and Sikkink¹² also demonstrated trends favoring the inclusion of evidence, but did not meet normal criterion levels for statistical significance.

Although these studies tend to support the belief that audiences do distinguish between evidence and no evidence they have two basic limitations from the perspective of the current study. First, all the research dealt with the effect of evidence upon attitude change in a short speech rather than with the effect of evidence upon the perceived stability of decisions. Second, the authors failed to control for the confounding effects of source credibility. Later research by McCroskey and others suggest that the presence of a high-credibility teacher-experimenter would artificially increase the credibility of an unknown, tape-recorded speaker.¹³ McCroskey concluded that sources with high credibility probably would evoke attitude change without the use of evidence because such sources would already have the character of an authority.

Wagner¹⁵ reported the results of an experiment in which the amount of evidence was systematically varied. The results of the experiment indicated that all the speeches changed attitudes including the control group. Thus, evidence did not appear to increase the persuasiveness of the speech.

Anderson¹⁶ tested if the extent of the evidence's citation made a significant difference in attitude change. The experimenter found no difference between no citations and very complete citations in attitude change of audience members. However, subjects listening to complete citations did make significantly higher scores on an information-retention test than did the other subjects. Anderson suggested that perhaps this is because "a listener perceives the citation of a source and the indication of an author's qualifications as meaningful: 'Now, this is going to be important; listen carefully.'"¹⁷

Numerous researchers have attempted to test the effect of varying quality of evidence upon attitude change. Dresser¹⁸ discovered that audiences recognized evidence deficiencies in a speech which utilized evidence from an unreliable source, but did not recognize evidence deficiencies in speeches which utilized irrelevant or inconsistent evidence from reputable sources. Arnold and McCroskey¹⁹ conducted a study which directly investigated the perceived credibility of authority-based assertions. They compared reactions to biased, unbiased,

and reluctant opinion statements and found that the unbiased evidence was perceived as most credible; the reluctant testimony received the second highest ratings and as hypothesized, the biased evidence was found least credible. The surprising discovery in this particular study was that unbiased evidence conditions received more favorable ratings than the reluctant evidence conditions. However, it was attributed that this finding may express differences in initial source credibility and not the nature of the evidence statements. The results of a similar study conducted by Anderson²⁰ indicated that regardless of the type of evidence attributed to the source, the higher the credibility of the source the greater the credibility of the assertion. The study also supported the theory that reluctant evidence, regardless of the credibility of the source, was perceived as more influential than biased evidence.

The previous research reviewed dealt with the perceived credibility of the evidence itself. Ostermeier²¹ tested the effect of evidence on perceived speaker credibility and concluded that any form of evidence significantly increased the speaker's credibility among the audience. Luchok and McCroskey²² did a similar study, but examined the effect of defective evidence, evidence from questionable sources, and evidence not relevant to the issue discussed, on the speaker's credibility. Results indicated that inclusion of defective evidence retarded positive attitude change, particularly for a communicator with moderate initial credibility, and that inclusion of defective evidence led to significantly less positive perceptions of the communicator.

Many of the discrepant results of previous studies might be explained by the experimenter's failure to control for critical factors such as the topic of the speeches. With this in mind, Harte²³ conducted a study which investigated the receivers' attitudes toward evidence in relation to the topic of the message and initial credibility. The results of this study indicated that when receiver attitudes were initially strong, evidence produced significantly greater long-term attitude change regardless of the initial credibility of the source. However, when subjects held neutral attitudes initially, the inclusion of evidence in the message produced no significant persuasive advantage either immediately afterwards or three weeks following exposure to the message. Thus, the results of Harte's investigation may suggest that the topic of the message is significantly related to evidence effectiveness and the degree of attitude change obtained.

Harte²⁴ did some additional research to discover how successful an audience is at discriminating between evidence which meets the generally accepted "tests" of evidence and evidence which does not meet those tests. The results of the study indicated that there was no significant difference between the subjects' ability to detect unreliable sources and

their ability to detect irrelevant evidence. Therefore, the study suggested that audiences do not apply the tests of evidence in the same manner as textbook writers assume they do.

Along this same idea, Kline²⁵ studied the manner in which subjects select evidence for their speeches. The results indicated that one type of individual chose evidence primarily on source credibility, another on manifest source, another on statement complexity and another on the basis of scientific proof. If this study can be generalized, it may explain the contradictory results of past studies. It may be that previous studies have been influenced by the types of people selected for the experiment.

One approach to clarifying the relationship between evidence and attitude change in communication situations was to examine the differential effects of evidence attributable to the receiver's personality. Bostrom and Tucker²⁶ were unable to support the hypothesis of an interaction between evidence and the personality type of the receivers. However, Kline²⁷ discovered that factual specific evidence makes more of a difference for receivers of high intelligence as compared to those of low intelligence.

Based primarily on his doctoral dissertation, McCroskey²⁸ attempted to provide data upon which to base meaningful generalizations about the effects of evidence in persuasive messages. He conducted the most comprehensive experimental research completed to date on the role of evidence in messages. Tentatively, he drew these generalizations: (1) Including good evidence has little impact on immediate attitude change or source credibility if the source of the message is initially perceived to be high-credible, (2) Evidence has no impact on attitude change or source credibility if the message is delivered poorly, (3) Evidence has little impact on attitude change if the audience is familiar with the evidence prior to hearing the message.

McCroskey also reported a series of variables which may affect the relationship between evidence, attitude change and credibility. First, there is no reason to believe that the type of media used to study evidence will affect the results. Second, prior knowledge of the audience will cause no significant difference in either attitude change or source credibility. Third, the use of evidence increases the amount of attitude change produced over a period of time. Thus, these factors must be controlled in order to provide a clear understanding of the relationship evidence has with the audience.

In terms of the present study, all of the previous experimental research dealt only with the effects of evidence upon attitude change and credibility in a short public speech on a current events topic and not with the effects of evidence upon perceived stability of decisions.

Bradac, Sandell, And Wenner²⁹ have conducted the only study to date utilizing evidence in a decision-making framework. They performed a Q-analysis on data received from three hypothetical decision-making situations and revealed that several types of persons respond differently to the utility of evidence in a situation. Basically, they discovered three categories of people: types which found directive information most useful, types which preferred unknown but competent sources, and types which depended upon sources who were known and trusted regardless of the kind of information the source offered.

The present study differs from the Bradac, et al. research in several aspects. First, the present investigation utilized 10 varied decision-making situations compared to only three situations. Second, the decision-making situations were not superior-subordinate interactions. Third, the objective of the Bradac study was to discover what type of individual preferred what type of evidential information, not to determine if evidence will be influential in changing a decision in a situation as the present study does.

An overall analysis of the research in the area of evidence thus far reviewed, leads to two conclusions.

1. No author has yet conducted a study on the effects of evidence upon the perceived stability of decisions in an everyday superior-subordinate situation similar to those situations people encounter daily.
2. No consistent generalization can be drawn concerning the impact of evidence upon attitude change since no predictable or repeatable data has been forthcoming.

The second type of literature to be examined is the research completed utilizing information as a variable in decision-making situations. Five experimental studies will be examined in this area. This is by no means the total work that has been done in the field, but these studies are the most pertinent to the research objectives of the present investigation.

The amount-of-information variable was subjected to an experimental study by Kernan and Mojena.³⁰ Their results confirm the common belief that people fail to utilize most of the information to which they have access, and suggested that certain kinds of people as measured by their personality profiles, are exceptionally efficient in the use of available information. Again, as in the evidence studies, the personalities of the subjects being tested may well have had a significant effect on the results of the investigation.

Lashbrook, Snavely, and Sullivan³¹ discovered that it takes at least twice as much information to produce attitude change in people who are apathetic if the source was perceived

as having low credibility, the subjects did not perceive an information overload even though an overload condition was perceived for the same amount of information when the source had high credibility.

Pruitt³² investigated the informational requirements for changing a decision once it has been made. The results of the study suggested that people will require more information before changing a decision than before making one because of an impatience in the latter case to begin working toward goals. In a similar study, Cangelosi, Robinson, and Schkade³³ attempted to discover whether or not information influences behavior in choice decisions initially, and the extent to which information increases the rationality of choice. They concluded that generally subjects who received information behaved more rationally in their choice decisions than those that did not. However, the quantity of information received made little difference in the subjects' choices.

In conclusion, the findings of the informational studies have broad implications for the study of an individual's perception in the area of evidence. However, none of the research focuses on evidence as a source of information in a decision-making situation.

While considerable information has been accumulated about the place of evidence in persuasive communication, the surface of this problem area has barely been scratched. Such questions as "What type of evidence (opinion, factual) has the most favorable impact on an individual?" and "Does evidence function the same way in a public speaking situation as it does in a superior-subordinate decision-making situation?" need to be answered. Thus, an inherent need exists for more imaginative research in this area. Further justification for focusing upon evidence as a factor in decision-making is provided by social psychologist, Barry Collins: "When an individual is playing the problem-solving game, he is concerned about getting truthful factually correct information relevant to the problems he wants to solve. Within this framework, evidence may assume the role ascribed to it by traditional theory, i.e., the chief material of proof."³⁴

Methods and Procedures

The procedures used in the study are described below. The procedural steps are not presented in chronological sequence, but are organized by subjects, materials, criterion measure, selection of evidence, control of variables, administration of the instrument, and experimental design and statistical treatment of data.

Subjects - Two hundred and forty students enrolled in freshman speech courses at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh participated in the experiment. All the subjects used in the experiment were undergraduate college students ranging from ages 17 to 28.

Materials- An edited version of a 10-item instrument titled "Decisions" was prepared. Previous research has demonstrated this instrument to be sensitive to changes in variables manipulated in the situations.

The instrument describes a situation in which an individual with the power to make a decision has done so. The superior (persuadee) is then approached by his subordinate (persuader) who attempts to convince the employer to revoke or change the decision. The situations described in the instrument appear to be representative of the kinds of superior-subordinate persuasion situations one is likely to confront in the everyday world. The instrument is appended (see Appendix A).

Criterion Measure- For each of the items, the subjects answered on a response continuum taking one of the following two forms.

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

The two forms of the criterion measure were distributed equally among the situations. The purpose for inverting the continuum throughout the test was to avoid any "order" effects which might occur in the answers given by a subject. The order in which the two forms appeared was randomized.

The subjects were asked to give an answer in terms of a probability estimate that the decision would be changed. One hundred percent meant that the individual was sure it will happen; 0% meant he did not think that there was any chance it will happen. The subject marked his estimate by placing a circle around the number he felt best reflected the probability of the persuader changing the persuadee's decision.

Selection of Evidence- Six individuals who have previously taught argumentation and debate courses or had extensive knowledge in the area of argumentation and debate were asked to construct 10 pieces of evidence to correspond with each situation. Three of the individuals made up factual evidence while the other three prepared opinion evidence. The criterion utilized for composing the evidence was to present the information which would best support the contention of the persuader in each of the 10 situations. A panel composed of three individuals well versed in the area of evidence was used to determine which particular example of opinion evidence and which example of factual evidence in each situation would be used. Each member of the panel ranked the three sample pieces of factual and the three sample pieces of opinion evidence for each situation. The criterion utilized for ranking the two pools of evidence was whether it was the best example of opinion evidence which supports the contention of the persuader and then the best example of factual evidence which supports the contention of the persuader. The examples of factual and the

examples of opinion evidence which received the lowest sum of the rankings for each situation were selected for the instrument. Every piece of evidence selected for the experiment received first rankings from at least two of the three judges. Each of the 10 situations were represented by one piece of factual evidence and one piece of opinion evidence. The selections utilized in the experiment are appended (see Appendix B).

Control of Variables- Each of the 10 items on the decision instrument was reproduced in the following manner.

1. The prior editing of the instrument resulted in 10 situations in the following versions:
a. male persuader, male persuadee;
b. male persuader, female persuadee;
c. female persuader, male persuadee;
d. female persuader, female persuadee;
This resulted in 40 different versions of the 10 situations.

2. Each of the 40 situations generated in "1" was then reproduced so that the persuader was in each instance:
a. supported by no evidence,
b. supported by opinion evidence,
c. supported by factual evidence.
This created 12 different versions of each of the 10 situations, resulting in 120 items in total (12 versions x 10 situations).

3. The 120 original items and their copies were compiled into 240 10-item 'tests.' Each test was composed of 10 of the 12 possible versions of the superior-subordinate situations. For example, a test would be composed of the first situation (No Evidence, Female Persuader, Female Persuadee), one copy of the second situation (Opinion Evidence, Female Persuader, Female Persuadee) and so on until all of the versions of the 10 situations had been distributed into 240 tests. The order of each situation was randomized in the test.

Administration of the Test- The test was administered to 240 subjects with the following instructions: "In the following situations, a variety of different decisions have to be made. You are to draw upon your familiarity with similar real-life situations that you have encountered to judge which way a decision will go. Each of the answers is to be given in terms of a probability estimate. One hundred percent means you are sure it will happen; 0% means you do not think that there is any change it will happen. Mark your estimate by placing a circle around it. Try to put yourself in the shoes of all parties in the stories when you make your estimates."

Design and Statistical Treatment of Data

The design utilized for this research project was a 3 x 2 x 2³⁶ factorial. The independent variables were three levels

of evidence--opinion, factual and no evidence; two levels of sex of the persuader; and two levels of sex of the persuadee. The dependent variable was the subjects' responses to the 10 hypothetical situations.

In order to determine if the cells of the matrix were homogeneous, a F_{max} was computed between the two extreme cells. The result of the F_{max} test revealed a significant difference existed between the two cells. However, Lindquist says on the basis of Norton's data, that unless variances are so heterogeneous as to be readily apparent, that is, relatively large differences exist, the effect of the F test will probably be negligible. Boneau confirms this. He says that in a large number of research situations, the probability statements resulting from the use of t and F tests, even when these two assumptions are violated, will be highly accurate.

The raw scores within each cell of the matrix were squared and summed. A factorial analysis was then computed to discover any significant effects due to evidence, any significant effects due to sex, and any significant effects that might have occurred between variables. If any significant F ratios were found, a Scheffe post hoc test was used to discover the source of the difference.

Results and Conclusions

This section presents the results of the statistical tests performed on the experimental data. Interpretation and discussion of these results will be presented in the second part of this section. The .05 level of significance was used for all statistical tests.

Results

The results of the analysis of variance on the evidence factor are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

Analysis of Variance Values for the Evidence Factor				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	943.50	2	471.75	60.64*
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

The F value of 60.64 is significant at the .05 level. This finding supports the concept that the evidence factor during a

persuasive attempt in a superior-subordinate decision situation decreases the perceived stability of the decision.

Factor 2--Sex of the Persuader

The results of the analysis of variance on the sex of the persuader factor are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2

Analysis of Variance Values for the Persuader Factor				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	12.04	1	12.04	1.55
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

The F value of 1.55 is not significant at the .05 level. This finding fails to support the concept that the perceived stability of the decision will vary significantly depending upon the sex of the persuader.

Factor 3--Sex of the Persuadee

The results of the ANOVA on the sex of the persuadee factor are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3

Analysis of Variance Values for the Persuadee Factor				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	10.93	1	10.93	1.41
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

Interaction of Factor 1 and Factor 2

The results of the ANOVA between the interaction of the evidence factor and the sex of the persuader factor are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4

Analysis of Variance Values for the Interaction of Factor 1 and Factor 2				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	.68	2	.34	.044
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

The F value of .044 is not significant at the .05 level. This finding fails to support the concept that the stability of a decision in a persuasive situation will vary significantly depending upon the inclusion of evidence and the sex of the persuader.

Interaction of Factor 1 and Factor 3

The results of the ANOVA are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5

Analysis of Variance Values for the Interaction of Factor 1 and Factor 3				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	1.55	2	.78	.100
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

The F value of .100 is not significant at the .05 level. Therefore, this finding fails to support the hypothesis that the stability of a decision in a persuasive attempt will vary significantly depending upon the inclusion of evidence and the persuadee.

Interaction of Factor 2 and Factor 3

The results of the analysis of variance are summarized in Table 6.

The F value of .91 is not significant at the .05 level. Thus, this finding fails to support the hypothesis that the stability of a decision in a persuasive situation will vary significantly depending upon the sex of the persuader and the sex of the persuadee.

Table 6

Analysis of Variance Values for the Interaction of Factor 2 and Factor 3				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	7.03	1	7.03	.90
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

Interaction Between Factor 1, Factor 2 and Factor 3

The results of the ANOVA are summarized in Table 7

Table 7

Analysis of Variance Values for the Interaction of Factor 1, Factor 2, and Factor 3				
Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between Groups	36.25	2	18.13	2.33
Within Groups	18,570.34	2388	7.78	

The F value of 2.33 is not significant at the .05 level. This finding, therefore, fails to support the hypothesis that the stability of a decision in a persuasive situation will vary significantly depending upon the inclusion of evidence, the sex of the persuader, and the sex of the persuadee.

Scheffe' Test for Multiple Comparisons

Since a significant difference was discovered between the F values of the evidence factor, a Scheffe' post hoc test was utilized to isolate the source of the difference. The results of the Scheffe test are summarized in Table 8.

Table 8

Scheffe' Test for Comparisons of the Three Levels of Evidence			
	D	D ²	I ⁴
N.E. vs. O.E.	(825) ²	680,625	54.96
N.E. vs. F.E.	(1201) ²	1,442,401	116.47
O.E. vs. F.E.	(376) ²	141,376	11.42

F Prime--9.24 at .05 level of significance.

Since the F prime was 9.24 and the comparisons of no evidence (N.E.) to opinion evidence (O.E.) ($a_1=54.96$), no evidence to factual evidence (F.E.) ($a_1=116.47$), and opinion evidence to factual evidence ($a_1=11.42$) were significantly above this figure--the following conclusions were drawn:

(1) The results from the Scheffe' test indicate the opinion evidence was perceived as more influential in changing a decision in a persuasive situation than no evidence.

(2) Factual evidence was perceived as more influential in changing a decision in a persuasive situation than no evidence.

(3) Factual evidence was also perceived as superior to opinion evidence for influencing a decision change during a persuasive superior-subordinate situation.

Conclusions

This section presents the conclusions of the results reported previously. Several potential explanations concerning those results are plausible.

However, the conclusions of this research must be limited by several factors. First, the use of college students as subjects in this study restrict the results of the research. The college population differs from the general population in many ways, but one of the most important is that the average intelligence of college students is well above that of the general population.⁴² Subjects of varying intelligence levels may react differently to the evidence. Therefore the experimental population utilized in this study is not representative of the general population.

Second, the investigation did not take place within the framework of a live decision-making situation. The experiment utilized only a written exercise to explore the effects of evidence within the decision-making process. Use of evidence within a live persuasive decision-making situation may render different results.

Within these limitations of this research, the results support the following conclusions:

1. The addition of opinion evidence during a persuasive attempt between a superior and a subordinate decreases the perceived stability of the decision significantly as compared to no evidence.

2. The addition of factual evidence during a persuasive attempt in an everyday situation decreases the perceived stability of the decision significantly as compared to no evidence.

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3. The addition of factual evidence during a persuasive attempt in an everyday situation decreases the perceived stability of the decision significantly as compared to opinion evidence.

4. The perceived stability of the decision with the addition of evidence did not vary significantly depending upon the sex of the persuader or the persuadee.

5. There were no significant relationships between any of the three factors--evidence, sex of the persuader, and sex of the persuadee.

These conclusions are contrary to the majority of previous research studies completed in the area of evidence. However, the conclusions of this study do support the theory that the listener's perception of the importance of the decision to be made can affect the impact of the evidence.⁴³ Hayakawa also has expressed that people are more likely to act rationally when making important decisions than they are when making trivial decisions.⁴⁴ Therefore, if the listener views the decision to be made as unimportant, evidence will probably make little difference.

These conclusions also give credence to the theory advanced by Asch--individuals will use all available information in making a decision. Thus, treating evidence as a source of additional information for a decision-making situation appears to be a more accurate means of assessing the evidential effect as compared to evidential support added to a public speech.

Finally, these conclusions support the concept that the quality of information obtained will make a difference in the perceived stability of a decision. Contrary to previous studies that measured the net persuasive effects of opinion and factual evidence, the results from this investigation indicate factual evidence superior when compared to opinion evidence in decreasing the perceived stability of a decision in an everyday situation.

There may not be one explanation of why evidence does or does not enhance a persuasive attempt. Several explanations appear plausible depending upon the circumstances involved in a given situation. Thus, a need exists to further examine the variables related to persuasive attempts in everyday employer/employee situations and evidence should continue to be one of the major variables under investigation.

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Appendix A

The 10 Item Instrument

1. The art films instructor, Dr. Gerald P, of a small college would like to bring in a certain X-rated film which contains a number of erotic scenes. The instructor knows that his chairman, Dr. John C. has a personal policy of strict censorship toward any form of adult entertainment. The art films instructor feels this film is socially relevant and hopes to persuade his chairman.
2. Ms. Jane A., a publishing editor, has just finished rewriting Chapter 4 of a children's reader for the Macmillan Publishing Company. She has asked Ms. Mary M., her secretary, to read the chapter and make comments before she sends it in for the final review. Ms. M. feels that she has written the chapter in language far too advanced for the age group intended to use it and that it will be rejected.
3. Mr. Steve L., a newly hired book buyer for a large downtown bookstore, has decided to buy a new line of books, most of which have parts considered to be pornographic by many people. Miss Sally O., his boss and manager of the bookstore, is afraid that these books will drive away quite a few of the regular customers.
4. Mrs. Elaine T., the manager of an old established restaurant, has decided to buy new furnishings for the restaurant. She wants to buy large wooden furniture because she thinks it will make the restaurant look more elegant. Miss Susan K., a waitress at the restaurant, feels that light modern furniture would be better because it is less bulky and will give the restaurant more seating space.
5. Mr. Carl B., the business manager of a small free medical clinic, feels that although the clinic has been in operation at the same location for three years, it should be moved to another location a mile away because there is a larger building available. Mrs. Dorothy P., a nurse, feels that such a move would be bad because the current patients would not be able to go so far away.
6. Mr. Doug B., a director of a large mental hospital, has stopped all visitors for a particular patient. Mr. George K., a psychiatrist at the hospital, feels this order is upsetting the patient and would like to convince the director to change the order. He knows that the director has previously been receptive to suggestions and therefore plans to approach him directly.
7. Ms. Helen D., a teacher in a large city system, failed to gain tenure at the time she became eligible because of a complaint from the principal Mrs. Grace S. The basis for the complaint was the seemingly unstructured and lax method of teaching which was not in line with what the principal felt best for the students. Ms. D. feels she has been unfairly judged and wishes to convince the principal to change her judgment.

8. Mr. Ray K has recently been informed that he will be "let go" as bookkeeper because of a rather costly recent error. Mr. K feels this action is highly unfair because of his past history of competence and because of the extenuating circumstances surrounding this particular error. He has requested an appointment with Ms. Jane D., his boss, to try to convince her.
9. Mr. Dennis E wants to suggest a topic for a panel discussion for an employees' training day at work. He has been informed that his boss has already selected the topic for the panel. Mr. E has, however, become very interested in a certain current topic which he wishes to have discussed by the panel, and has decided to try to convince his boss, Mrs. Pamela C, to change the topic.
10. The owner of a large corporation, Mr. Craig J, is going to consider a proposal to make mandatory retirement at age 60. Mrs. Harriet G, the personnel director of the corporation, is strongly opposed to this proposal because she feels that people should not be "sent out to pasture" just because they have reached a particular age. Mrs. G has made an appointment to try to dissuade the corporation owner from consideration of such a proposal.

Appendix B

Evidence Included in the 20 Item Instrument

Item 1

Factual Evidence

Dr. Gerald P. points out that the movie has received five awards for being an outstanding film by the National Educational Association and is recommended highly by the association.

Opinion Evidence

Dr. Gerald P. tells his colleague that: Dr. Norman Rivkin, Professor of Art at Yale University and former member of the Catholic Film Censorship Board stated, "Although this film incorporates certain scenes which some may find objectionable, the filming of them was so tastefully done that they became a natural part of the sequence of events. More importantly, the scenes are absolutely essential to the point of the film--a point to which all thinking persons should be exposed."

Item 2

Factual Evidence

Ms. Mary M. shows Jane A. a list of vocabulary words compiled by the National Elementary Education Association that second graders and a list that fourth graders are supposed to know and points out that the majority of the words in the chapter are not on the second grade list, but instead found on the list for the fourth graders.

Opinion Evidence

In order to persuade Ms. Jane A. that the chapter is too advanced, Ms. Mary M. has secured comments from two other teachers who teach the age group in question and they also feel the chapter is too advanced.

Item 3

Factual Evidence

Miss Sally O. shows Mr. Steve L. a list of hard-to-sell books compiled by the bookstore owners across the nation. The majority of books that he wishes to purchase appear on this list.

Opinion Evidence

Miss Sally O. points out that the New York Times Literary Magazine has predicted a trend away from this type of literature in the future because of an antagonistic reaction to it by the older readers, who comprise the majority of subscribers to the magazine.

Item 4

Factual Evidence

Miss Susan K. points out that there are often long lines outside the restaurant and many potential customers leave. Thus, more seating space would alleviate this problem.

Opinion Evidence

Miss Susan K. knows that their mutual friend, an interior decorator, also favors the modern furniture and hopes that telling the assistant manager about the decorator's opinion will be persuasive.

Item 5

Factual Evidence

Mrs. Dorothy P. shows Carl B. the personal records of their patients which showed that nearly 80% of them did not own cars and 60% of them had no access to a transportation vehicle.

Opinion Evidence

Mrs. Dorothy P. points out that at the time the clinic was originally located three years ago, local surveys showed that most of the indigent patients favored the present location because of its accessibility.

Item 6

Factual Evidence

Mr. George K. has checked the patient's records which show that in a past instance when the patient was denied visitation, the patient's symptoms became much more severe.

Opinion Evidence

Mr. George K. states, "Another psychiatric aide who has worked with the patient has told me that the patient has told him of being depressed since Monday. Since the only change in her routine was the suspension of visitation rights, the aide thought that her lack of contact with the outside world might be the cause of her depression."

Item 7

Factual Evidence

Ms. Helen D. points out to the principal that according to the National Education Achievement test that her students took a month earlier, her class scored in the top 30% across the nation.

Opinion Evidence

Ms. Helen D. has examined a number of education textbooks and has compiled a list of educational authorities who recommend methods similar to her own.

Item 8

Factual Evidence

Ray K. has compiled a record of the savings his bookkeeping has brought about in recent years that shows that he has saved the company much more money than the error cost.

Opinion Evidence

Mr. Ray K. tells Jane D. that, "The last two persons who held your job always regarded me as an excellent worker and you can call them to confirm that. Even your boss told me that I shouldn't worry about the mistake, since it was such an unusual situation he might have made a similar error himself."

Item 9

Factual Evidence

Mr. Dennis E. has collected a number of documents which show facts and figures that indicate the topic is one of vital interest to the group.

Opinion Evidence

Mr. Dennis E. states, "Two other members of the group were absent when the topic was chosen and they have each told me that they think it is unfair to choose a topic without giving everyone a chance for input."

Item 10

Factual Evidence

Mrs. Harriet G. intends to present statistics from a federal agency showing that employees over 60 are frequently the most dependable and productive workers in a firm.

Opinion Evidence

Mrs. Harriet G. points out that the American Journal of Commercial Psychology states that according to several business managers' opinions, an individual's long experience with a firm more than compensates for loss of mental sharpness due to age.

The Art of Storytelling:
An Argument for a Narrative Perspective
in Academic Debate

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During the past two decades scores of essays criticizing the substance and style of academic debate have been published in our journals and presented at our conferences. Perhaps no other activity has engaged in such intense introspection and self-directed criticism. The arguments generated in these essays have become very familiar: academic debate fails to teach effective public speaking¹; the tournament format over emphasizes learning the strategic dimensions of argument to the detriment of teaching reasoning skills²; debaters too often become "anti-social" and "predatory"³; debate has become an "elitist" and "strange community" in which participants artificially narrow and distort the meanings of topics⁴; and, debate has become a "closed system" alienated from "real world" argumentation.⁵

These critiques have sparked lengthy and impassioned discussions at two National Developmental Conferences on Forensics,⁶ during the meetings of the National Debate Tournament Committee, and in almost any gathering of current or former forensics educators. Indeed, the problems in American forensics have become so visible to those most actively involved in debate that it was especially rewarding to find a recent investigation into the world of intercollegiate debate by someone from outside of the activity resulted in an article that was so thoroughly positive about the merits of debate training. While this praise for academic debate was encouraging, the criticisms from within should not be overlooked, for they remain a pressing issue in the minds

of many debate coaches and they can negatively affect the perceptions that our colleagues and administrators have regarding the worth of debate programs. What has been most unsettling about many of these critiques, however, is that they illustrate a fundamental lack of agreement within the debate community regarding the primary goals of academic debate. It is unlikely that the debate community can resolve its differences unless agreement emerges regarding the goals to be pursued.

This essay: 1) examines the two primary models competing for acceptance in academic debate; 2) argues for the importance of identifying transcendent exemplar models for debaters to follow; 3) suggests the appropriateness of a "storytelling" perspective of academic debate; and 4) indicates how such a perspective can resolve many of the tensions and disagreements in the debate community.

Citizen Advocacy vs. Elite Policy-Making

The two competing models operating in intercollegiate debate could be conceptualized in several different ways. One way would be simply to consider CEDA and NDT debate as two uniquely separate communities, one whose primary focus is teaching students effective oral communication skills, and the other which concentrates on developing sophisticated analytical and refutational techniques in students. Such a conception of a CEDA-NDT dichotomy would be misleading, however, since NDT coaches and judges are concerned with oral argumentation skills, and CEDA coaches and judges are committed to teaching effective analysis and refutational skills.⁸ Both activities, in fact, claim to represent the "ideal" goals of academic debate.

G. Thomas Goodnight accounted for the different philosophies operating in the forensics community in another way, arguing that competing theories of decision-making have had a profound effect on the debate community. He wrote that the two models of debate had competed for acceptance in the modern era:

The first model has been variously labeled the 'reasonable citizen,' 'public advocacy,' or merely the tradition [sic] method of debate. . . . [thus] debate is formulated as an expectation that advocates present proofs within discrete categories so that appropriate burdens are fulfilled in arriving at a

reasonable decision. . . . this model of debate as method is rather simply formulated in that if any reasonable advocate or citizen could but adhere to its principles, problems could be discovered, causes assessed, solutions evaluated, and the consequences weighed.⁹

Goodnight contrasted this "traditional" model with one that emerged in the early 1970s--the policy making model:

Whereas the old model had the democratic goal of emphasizing citizen participation, the systems analysis or policy-making model is oriented toward improving the decisions of an educated elite who must govern in a complex world. Consequently, debate as method is refocused from a common activity to an elite responsibility, from a broad attempt to define consensus to a specialized requirement for social actors operating within constraints from the discourse more appropriate to a public forum to specialized languages insulated within technical forms of decision-making.¹⁰

The development of the new model for debate argumentation was inspired by many dramatic changes, not just in debate but in the way in which political scientists began to conceptualize the public's role in the decision-making process.¹¹ These attitudes were also reflected in the actions of government policy makers, for the 1960s and 1970s came to be known as the era of the "bureaucratization of change," a time when government social planners took a more active role in policy making, and when many of the conventional assumptions about the role of government in people's day-to-day lives were altered. In this model, policy change was always occurring, and the question was how best to control change and to guide it.¹²

The implications of the systems analysis perspective on academic debate were quickly felt and the nature of the activity changed quite significantly in response to this new approach. Brock et al. proposed a move away from a "stock issues" conception of cause and away from a status quo conception of deliberating policy alternatives. In its place came the notion that complex issues of policy deliberation were omni-present and that policy makers were to stay abreast of proposed changes in order to secure the best mix of state and federal policy actions.¹³

This is not to say that the systems theory model of debate caused all of the subsequent changes in academic debate--this would certainly be an unreasonable claim since many changes, most notably the increasing rate of speed, clearly preceded this model. This approach, however, did shift the focus of debate from a public advocacy emphasis to stress the systematic deliberation of the policy issues themselves.¹⁴ The policy-making perspective was widely accepted by debate judges,¹⁵ and, once their critics embraced this approach, students adjusted their strategies accordingly.

Dramatic and controversial changes in academic debate began to appear in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, as debaters and their coaches were eager to embrace a new style of debate, one which would facilitate more in-depth attention to issues and more sophisticated techniques for analysis and refutation. The nature of the debate format, however, made such changes difficult to invoke.¹⁶ Debates were somewhat lengthened when cross-examination periods were added (the time for speeches remained unchanged), but, nonetheless, it was difficult for debaters to accomplish all they wished to accomplish within the confines of the tournament format. In response, debaters began to speak more quickly, affirmative cases were narrowed and the focus shifted from the resolutions to the specific policies advanced by the affirmative and the negative.

Debaters seek to win, and the strategic innovations which they employed became "moves" in an increasingly sophisticated game--moves that were legitimized by the operationalization of the new decision-making models. That these moves were sanctioned by the new models added to their appeal. Such moves did, after all, seem to make the game more exciting.

The new style of debate required debaters to carry more evidence to be prepared to cope with the many interpretations of the topic which they might confront. Debaters needed evidence if they were to win debates, for the policy-making perspective did not place much emphasis on "reasoning;" it was a model of debate which was driven by a need for data to support the best potential policy actions.¹⁷ As Spiker, et al. wrote: "It can be easily assumed that the unspoken maxim in intercollegiate debate in recent years has been, 'A blurb is better than nothing; but a study is better than a blurb; two studies are better than one; and three or more studies are a trend.'¹⁸

We believe that this conflict between the two models--for citizenship or leadership-- has been counter-productive, and that in fact, there is much to commend a debate program philosophy which encourages participation in activities likely to advance both public advocacy skills and the consideration of complex policy issues.¹⁹ We are not against the notion of plural models in academic debate, rather, the position that we defend genuinely embraces pluralistic assumptions.

We believe, however, that policy debate has gone too far in the direction of embracing an elitist conception of argument, one that makes debate a technocratic process which can be understood only by highly trained dispassionate "experts" who are isolated from the passions of the broader public. The conviction shared by many policy-making theorists that careful and deliberate action must be undertaken by highly trained experts who must "lead" the public is dangerous, as was shown by the experience of the Vietnam War. One need only remember that the "best and the brightest" academicians and foreign policy experts of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations devised the shrewd policy by which the United States would "manage" the conflict in Vietnam, and these experts were very reticent to involve the mass public in their policy deliberations, choosing to dismiss public protests against the war on the assumption that the public did not understand the complexities of foreign policy.²⁰ Even many policy-making theorists now recognize that when experts are insulated from the public they often make poor decisions.²¹

That debate has become an elitist activity is often heard in the grumblings of disenchanted coaches. This complaint is frequently misunderstood--debate is not elitist in the traditional sense of "big reputation schools" vs. "little schools" but the very model of argument we have adopted is elitist. As the debate season progresses, debaters become more and more immersed in their topics and make more and more technical and sophisticated arguments. These arguments gain meaning in the highly rarefied air of the debate community--they are understood by other debate game players--but often have no real meaning outside of that community. We believe that for debaters to gain the kind of in-depth knowledge they seek, we need to connect their understanding of these complex topics to practical knowledge. From this perspective, the key to effective debating lies in adapting expert knowledge to common understanding,²² and not merely the generation of more expert knowledge.

We would like to see academic debate move in the direction of a "communication style" which manages to preserve many of the best elements of the policy-making systems theory perspective--the emphasis on careful and deliberate considerations of policy alternatives--while also teaching debaters to make arguments that appeal to and have meaning for broader audiences. In this way academic debate can make a greater contribution to the quality of the public dialogue, and the research and expertise of our debaters can be more meaningfully shared with an educated and enlightened citizenry.

An Exemplar Model for Debate

As debaters learn the "art" of debating, they learn not just appropriate techniques for developing and refuting claims, but also the means by which such claims should be researched, created, composed, and evaluated. Debaters learn about debating by actually engaging in forensic disputations, thus through praxis, the actual involvement of actors with the practical realization of their interests.²³ As in almost all human activities, debaters gain not just from their own experiences, however, but also by observing and imitating others. In this sense, participants in the debate community are engaged in significant discourse, for which they understand the rules, customs, and conventions. The participants in academic debate thus belong to the same rhetorical community and they share a communication style. The key aspects of style are the associated standards of excellence, models of exemplary events (analogous to exemplars), and concepts to help new adherents learn the style.²⁴

Actual debates become the exemplars that embody the form and content that the participants in the "rhetorical community" find acceptable. As Ernest Bormann argued:

Exemplars include the way the participants invent, construct, and exchange verbal and non verbal messages in the varied contexts which the vision emphasizes for communication. Among the main components of exemplars are the programs for transactions which the participants share and which children or newcomers must learn before they can participate in communication according to rules of the style. These programs include the contextual requirements and the norms which monitor transcontextual behavior. The accepted

exemplars also include the rules and norms that regulate the communication games of the activity.²⁵

By participating in the academic debate learning laboratory, debaters thus learn not only argumentation skills, but also the rules and norms of the debate community and the contextual requirements of debate argumentation--strategy and gamesmanship.

The most noteworthy aspect of the exemplar model concept is that debaters have a profound influence over the nature of the activity in which they participate. Since debaters emulate the most successful debaters, debate educators often have very little influence over the nature of the activity, except the extent to which they help determine who is "successful." We can lecture, cajole, and caution our students when they mirror the behaviors of exemplars of whom we do not approve, but if these exemplars are successful, our students will not be persuaded.

The primary way debate educators can have much influence on student behavior is when they act in the role as judge. But experience over the years has clearly illustrated that judges are very unwilling to make known their own prejudices. Judges are also under pressure to live in accordance with the exemplar models for the activity, and, for the most part, the "best" judges have been those who would not interject themselves into the debates. As Michael Weiler wrote:

In debates, an increasing number of judges allow theory to be determined by the arguments presented. Judges who do not do so risk being viewed as maverick and kooks, or worse as anachronisms. Thus, the debate judge finds himself an actor cast in a paradoxical role. He is expected to have opinions about theory and to justify them at least once yearly in the National Debate Tournament Judges Booklet. But he also must have the good grace to forget about such biases for the duration of a given debate.²⁶

Judges are in fact socialized to judge every debate as a totally unique and individual contest. They are not to allow their biases to influence their decisions, they are not to interfere in the debate process, and they are not to bring into the room with them any of the knowledge or the experiences they may have gained from judging past

debates or from their own expertise on the topic. As Dale Drum wrote: "the judge is supposed to have no emotions, no biases, no feelings on the matter, and, in fact no memory."²⁷

Despite the increased recognition in recent literature that the debate judge should primarily be an educator concerned with teaching argumentation skills, most debate judges continue to behave more like neutral referees than like the expert educators they purport to be.²⁸ Given that debate educators have not reached wide agreement as to the goals that should be pursued, however, perhaps this is just as well. In fact, we seem to have resolved the problem of lack of goal consensus artificially by allowing students to "create" a system where the lack of consensus is not an issue in deciding who wins or loses debates. If we did suddenly find that more judges were inclined to intervene in the judging process, we might have very confused and alarmed debaters. Some judges would bring into the room with them their preference for a "citizen advocacy" perspective of debate and others their preference for a more technocratic conception of debate, and debaters would not know what to expect or what standards they should seek to appeal to in their arguments.²⁹

The most reasonable solution to this problem is for the debate community to clarify and develop some consensus regarding the exemplar models that we wish our students to follow. Judges must subsequently be willing to act in the role of critics of argument in order to reinforce these appropriate communication activities. The next section of the essay offers an argument concerning what we believe to be a preferred communication style for academic debate.

A Storytelling Perspective of Debate

In his discussion of the need for a reunion between argumentation theory and debate theory, Goodnight argued that "a significant gap seems to be developing between theories of argument and theories of debate. Many contemporary theorists do not extend their insights into the realm of debate."³⁰ We propose that the notion of the "narrative paradigm" as recently articulated by Walter R. Fisher, can bridge part of this gap.³¹

Fisher contrasted his notion of the "narrative paradigm" with the "rational world paradigm." There can

be little doubt but that academic debate is based upon the assumptions of the rational world paradigm. This paradigm presupposes that humans are essentially rational beings; that the dominant mode of human decision-making is argument; that the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations; that rationality is determined by knowledge of the subject matter, argumentative ability, and skill in advocacy; and that the world is made up of a set of logical puzzles which can be resolved through appropriate analysis and reasoning.³² In the narrative paradigm, on the other hand, humans are viewed essentially as storytellers; the paradigmatic mode of decision-making is the construction of "good reasons" which vary from situation to situation; the production and practice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and character; rationality is determined by the abilities people have to test narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and narrative fidelity, whether the stories ring true with other stories they know from experience to be true; and, the world consists of a set of stories which people choose from among in order to "live the good life."³³

Fisher goes on to argue that most people reason via the narrative paradigm, and that it is through this paradigm that untrained audiences can evaluate relatively complex arguments. While the rational world paradigm creates a special place in the social hierarchy for field experts, the narrative paradigm recognizes the intrinsic ability that human actors have to test the quality of the stories which they experience and tell. Fisher does not posit that one paradigm is superior to another, or that narrative audiences cannot make mistakes,³⁴ but he argues that "experts" also make mistakes.³⁴ Furthermore, he argues that if the experts are accorded undue respect from the untrained audiences, and if those audiences do not attempt to question the experts because they grant them their expertise, then there is the potential for a society to develop where some people are trained to lead and other persons are trained only to follow.³⁵ Experts do continue to have a role in the narrative perspective--the role of counselor. The expert contributes to the public dialogue by imparting knowledge, telling stories, and sharing his/her wisdom.³⁶

The contrast between the narrative paradigm and the rational world paradigm does not suggest that narrative arguers are somehow irrational, and it is not our desire

for academic debate to become a less rational enterprise. Rather, we would like to see academic debaters become the expert advocates who engage in the research, careful analysis, and deliberation about complex policy issues, and who can then create compelling and consistent stories that can be understood by audiences who do not share their expertise. Essentially this would require debaters to create "real world" arguments that will have meaning as audiences construct them and incorporate them within their own narrative frameworks. Were our debaters to become storytellers, they would recognize the potential to reach audiences beyond the boundaries of the debate community. In addition, the tremendous storehouse of information and knowledge that debaters acquire might be more useful to society. In fact, academic debaters could even become a check on the government elites who make policy in Washington and in the state capitols. If the tremendous expertise generated by debaters could be translated to common social understanding, debaters could begin to partake in actual social dialogues.

We believe that encouraging debaters to become storytellers would also enrich forensics education by providing a more well-rounded training in rhetoric. As Richard Weaver argued:

For the most obvious truth about rhetoric is that its object is the whole man. It presents its arguments first to the rational part of man, because rhetorical discourses, if they are honestly conceived, always have a basis in reasoning. Logical argument is the plot, as it were of any speech or composition that is designed to persuade. Yet it is the very characterizing feature of rhetoric that it goes beyond this and appeals to other parts of man's constitution, especially to his nature as a pathetic being, that is, a being feeling and suffering.³⁷

As Fisher concluded: "a whole rhetoric should deal with the whole man [sic], not just man as a logical machine attempting to solve the world's problems as though they were logical puzzles."³⁸

Debaters as Storytellers

If debaters, judges, and coaches came to realize the importance of creating compelling stories, there might be significant changes in the nature of contemporary debate, changes which would help to bridge

the schism which exists within the debate community and between the debate community and the public. In order to achieve this goal, the communication style of academic debate would have to become more like that generated in conversation and less like the highly technocratic rational argument that exists now--an argument form that so values objective rationality that it is often irrational in its conclusions.³⁹ The creation of an alternative communication style requires debaters to learn about the principles of storytelling and to recognize that their arguments have a place in the public dialogue. Debaters will need to understand that audiences make judgments on the basis of the stories which are constructed and on the ability of these stories to meet the requirements of the "reality testing" to which they are subjected. Stories also have a context and a history--social and political events do not exist in isolation, and people's sense of dramatic reality, their "social knowledge," transcends individual events and is a part of their very understanding of themselves and of their place in society.⁴⁰

Teaching debaters to engage in storytelling should not be difficult, for, as Fisher observed, all people are essentially storytellers, and the testing of stories is an essential part of the human symbolic experience. People are trained as storytellers and as evaluators of stories by the very process of becoming acculturated.⁴¹ Although debaters might benefit by learning the terminology of the narrative paradigm--the notions of narrative fidelity and narrative probability--debaters already have the rudimentary skills to evaluate stories. What this perspective of academic debate must teach debaters, however, is the art of creating the best possible stories, those stories which will energize audiences by giving such a meaningful depiction of reality that it seems to correspond to listeners' beliefs and values.

Debaters must analyze their propositions and come to understand them as real, historical, cultural and political problems. They should investigate the various "solutions" that have been proposed for the problems they discover and then identify the solution that they wish to advocate, keeping in mind that their position must also be historically, culturally, politically, and environmentally sound. Such an approach will encourage debaters to attend to the value dimensions of the different policy alternatives. The debaters' primary

objective is to create stories that can compete favorably with those that their opponents will tell, stories that offer alternative accounts for the values, beliefs, and experiences central to their propositions.

This new perspective of debate also requires a different understanding of the concept of presumption. The notion of presumption has already undergone many changes. In fact, the traditional conception of presumption and of prima facie burdens seems to have almost disappeared from contemporary debates, as most critics will accept any argument supported by evidence as worthy of warranting a belief. Critics seeking to develop a narrative understanding will proceed differently, however, for they will be determining whether arguments hang together as stories and evaluating them in terms of their own cultural beliefs, values, and experiences. Narrative critics might well be more cynical of all stories and probably will not presume any argument to have merit until it is woven into the fabric of a story which is sufficient to convince them.

While there might well be many implications of such a view of academic debate in practice, at least a few should be discussed. First, as previously mentioned, debaters would create "real world" arguments--stories which confirmed people's values and social understanding. For example, advocating world government as the negative story, in response to an affirmative story which increases exploration and/or development of space by forbidding the military use of the shuttle, might well prove more difficult in a narrative conception of argument because most narrative arguers would be reluctant to accept as true stories that required them to put aside their nationalistic tendencies. Pride in their nation is too closely related to most people's (especially most American's) very conceptions of themselves and of their society. Such pride would likely discourage them from accepting any story which maintained as a central principle the notion that they should rebuke their nation. Likewise, an argument calling for a socialist revolution in the United States would have difficulty winning adherents. Still other arguments claiming positions such as "rights malthus," "nuclear proliferation is good," etc., might also have trouble meeting the requirements of good stories. We are not suggesting that such stories could not be developed by debaters, or that they are not arguments that audiences should hear. Debaters could, and perhaps even should,

continue to argue such positions. The difference, however, would be that narrative critics would not be inclined to suspend their beliefs in order to give such arguments a hearing. Consequently, these arguments would face very rigid tests of narrative fidelity and probability, much as they would if they were made before non-debate audiences. Hopefully the result would be that such arguments would be made only when they represented genuinely appropriate stories.

Second, the principle of judge non-involvement in the debate process would most certainly dissipate as judges would be called upon to have a very different conception of their role. No longer serving as simple arbiters in a conflict, judges would evaluate the stories that the two teams constructed and attempt to ascertain which story was superior. Critics, would of course bring their beliefs and knowledge from past experience, their values and their passions with them into this argumentative encounter. This new principle of judge involvement should not be taken as a license for unlimited judge intervention into the debate, however, but rather, judges should seek to serve in an intersubjective role engaged in a dialogue with the texts of the stories.⁴² This intersubjective role presumes that each judge, as a member of the professional community of academic debate, sees his/her task as teaching the communication style of academic debate. Thus the judge would use his/her ballots, including the actual decisions reached, to perpetuate a continuing dialogue regarding the merits of the stories told, and teaching the art of creating and testing effective stories.⁴³

Third, debaters would be required to create consistent and compelling stories. While some current approaches to academic debate affirm the legitimacy of conditional arguments, even arguments which contradict each other, this would not be appropriate in a narrative perspective of debate. Narrative arguers do not intentionally create stories which are internally inconsistent or which have parts that cannot compatibly coexist. In fact, stories are evaluated primarily based upon their consistency and coherence.

Finally, the style of the activity would likely change. Acceptance of a narrative perspective of debate might make it possible for debaters to put more emphasis on communicating with their hearers, to use more analysis, create examples and analogies to aid them in

their persuasion, and put more emphasis on their skills as communicators and less emphasis on their skills as information processors. In a rational world paradigm, such as the one existing now in contemporary debate, advocates are rewarded for the number of arguments which they can create in support of their positions. In the narrative paradigm advocates are instead rewarded for the intrinsic qualities of the stories which they create and for the ability of those stories to account for experienced events better than competing stories can account for those events.

The most obvious concern regarding the acceptance of a narrative perspective of debate centers on what would be lost by our no longer concentrating on debate as a rational activity. We do not believe this concern to be legitimate. Because the process of testing stories which would go on in a debate round would be very rigorous and would require that the stories be developed based upon evidence and analysis, debate would continue to be a rational enterprise. Debaters and debate critics would continue to possess a very shrewd and well-defined sense of argument. They would still be involved with research, and through this research they would learn how the "experts" in the field evaluated stories. Thus rather than sacrificing rationality, debaters would be enriching their education by supplementing their rational arguments with a narrative capability. In fact, the quality of evidence required to support a claim will have to improve as skeptical listeners make even greater demands upon the testimony and the studies offered to warrant a belief. Careful attention to argumentative detail will still be required as debaters search for ways to expose the weaknesses in their opponent's stories. The primary difference in debate from this perspective is that human values, human emotions, and human experience will play a much larger role in the argumentative process.

Two final arguments in support of a storytelling perspective of debate should be offered. First, such a perspective would make our activity seem infinitely more understandable to our colleagues, administrators, and to the general community, people who are themselves storytellers. As a result, it would likely make it much easier to "sell" the merits of debate and engender a climate of greater support for academic debate.

Second, teaching debaters to engage in storytelling might be of immense help in preparing them for arguing in

"real world" contexts. Fisher has reported that most political argument follows this mode of reasoning.⁴⁴ Of even greater benefit to most debaters, however, were the results of a study undertaken by W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, who found that the dominant mode of argument in the courtroom was storytelling.⁴⁵ Since a significant percentage of our debaters enter the legal profession this would provide them with a learning laboratory to develop their skills in narrative argument.

Conclusion

We believe that many of the problems in intercollegiate debate can be traced to the lack of an agreed upon exemplar model for the activity. We propose that such a model be the storytelling communication style, and that judges be encouraged to evaluate the arguments presented to them on the basis of their narrative fidelity and narrative probability, using their ballots to instruct debaters in the art of creating effective stories. We believe that such an approach would produce genuine and significant benefits to the debate learning laboratory and to the debate community.

Notes

¹Paul A. Barefield, "Contemporary Forensics: An Appraisal," Speaker and Gavel 8 (1971), p. 35. See also: James P. Swinney, "The Relative Comprehension of Contemporary Debate Speeches," Journal of the American Forensic Association 5 (1968), p. 20.

²Henry McGuckin, "Better Forensics: An Impossible Dream," Journal of the American Forensic Association 8 (1972), p. 183.

³Lester McCrery, "Tournament Debating Should Be Abolished," Gavel 37 (1965), p. 14.

⁴William R. DeMougeot, "Intercollegiate Debate: Intrapersonal But Still Unrealistic," Speech Teacher 21 (1972), p. 135.

⁵Thomas E. Harris and Robert M. Smith, "A Systems Analysis of the Current Debate Controversy," Journal of the American Forensic Association 9 (1973), p. 356.

⁶The papers and resolutions from these conferences have been published, see: James H. McBath (Ed.), Forensics as Communication (Skokie, IL: National Textbook, 1975); and Donn W. Parson (Ed.) American Forensics in Perspective (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1985).

⁷Zoe Ingalls, "Resolved: that Competition in College Debate is as Fierce as in a Basketball Playoff," The Chronicle of Higher Education, 8 May 1985, p. 13.

⁸Thomas A. Hollihan, Patricia Riley, and Curtis C. Austin, "A Content Analysis of Selected CEDA and NDT Judges Ballots," in David Zarefsky, Malcolm D. Sillars, Jack Rhodes (Eds.) Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983): 871-82.

⁹G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Re-Union of Argumentation and Debate Theory," George Ziegelmüller and Jack Rhodes (Eds.) in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), p. 417.

¹⁰Goodnight, pp. 417-418.

¹¹For an illustration see: Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), especially pp. 43-61. Lindblom concludes that most "ordinary" citizens are little interested in questions of policy outside of a very few critical issues; that most have little knowledge of policy issues; and that those who do form opinions on policy issues often do so on the basis of very little factual information.

¹²For a more complete discussion of the development of systems theory in government decision making and its application to academic debate see: Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

¹³Brock, et al.

¹⁴Goodnight's discussion of the effects of the developing systems theory model on presumption is most informative. See: Goodnight, pp. 418-19.

¹⁵It is worth noting, for example, that a survey of judges at the 1974 National Debate Tournament found that 42.9% of the respondents viewed themselves as "chooser[s] of policy systems," the most frequently selected role. This is especially interesting because the introduction of the policy making perspective to academic debate by Brock, et al., had come in 1973. For further information on the judge's survey see: J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association 11 (1974), p. 62.

¹⁶It is worth noting that one of the leading advocates of the "policy making" perspective did advocate changes in the debate format to better facilitate policy comparisons. The inertia of tradition more than anything else seems to have been an obstacle to such change. See: Bernard L. Brock and Steven D. Fieldman, "The Case Comparison Format: An Experimental Format for Intercollegiate Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association 9 (1973): 450-57.

¹⁷For a discussion of the way evidence came to supplant reasoning in debate see: Jeffrey K. Lukehart, "The Role of Evidence and Analysis in Contemporary Intercollegiate Debate: Assessments and Implications," paper presented at Iowa State University, Ames, IA, December, 1976.

¹⁸Barry K. Spiker, Tom D. Daniels and Lawrence M. Bernabo, "The Qualitative Quandry in Forensics," Journal of the American Forensic Association 19 (1982), p. 88.

¹⁹For a compelling argument on the value of teaching CEDA and NDT skills in the same program see: Allan Louden and Curtis C. Austin, "CEDA vs. NDT: A Dysfunctional Myth," in Don Brownlee, ed., The CEDA Yearbook, 1983, pp. 6-12.

²⁰David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1969).

²¹See: Robert M. O'Brien, Michael Clarke, and Sheldon Kamieniecki, "Open and Closed Systems of Decision-Making: The Case of Toxic Waste Management," Public Administration Review 44 (1984): 334-40. Also, Technology on Trial: Public Participation in Decision-Making Related to Science and Technology (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1979).

²²This is in keeping with Donald C. Bryant's belief that the rhetorical function is the "function of adjusting ideas to people and of people to ideas." See: Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: It's Functions and Its Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech 39 (1953), p. 413.

²³Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (London: Hutchinsons, 1976).

²⁴For a more complete discussion of the notion of "communication styles" see: Ernest G. Bormann, Communication Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980): 60-67.

²⁵Bormann, p. 67.

²⁶Michael Weiler, "Debate Theory: Delusion and Snare?" paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, CA, November, 1981, p. 4.

²⁷Dale D. Drum, "The Debate Judge as a Machine," Today's Speech, 4 (1956), p. 30.

²⁸Robert C. Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge: A Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debates," Journal of the American Forensic Association 20 (1984), p. 192.

²⁹This is precisely the problem that Friedman discussed in his essay. See: Robert P. Friedman, "Reflections on an Incompetent Judge," Journal of the American Forensic Association 8 (1972): 123-26.

³⁰Goodnight, p. 415.

³¹For a more complete discussion of Fisher's perspective see: Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 1-22. We do not suggest that Fisher's notion of the "narrative paradigm" be applied to academic debate in the same sense in which the term "paradigm" is frequently used in current debate literature. In fact, we believe that the use of "paradigms" in academic debate has produced confusing and somewhat muddled contests. See: Patricia Riley and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Paradigms as Eristic," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, KY, November, 1982.

³²Fisher, "Narration . . .," p. 4.

³³Fisher, "Narration . . .," pp. 7-8.

³⁴Fisher, "Narration . . .," p. 9

³⁵Fisher, "Narration . . ."

³⁶Fisher, "Narration . . .," p. 13.

³⁷Richard Weaver, cited by Walter R. Fisher, "Advisory Rhetoric: Implications for Forensic Debate," Western Speech 29 (1965), p. 116.

³⁸Fisher, "Advisory Rhetoric," p. 116.

³⁹For example, one of us recalls a debater who argued that we should not attempt to reduce injuries resulting from traffic accidents because this would lead to unused hospital beds which would in turn lead to unnecessary surgery. Every step in the causal chain was carefully documented, including the student's conclusion that the number of deaths resulting from the excess surgeries would claim more lives than would the traffic accidents. Despite the soundness of the evidence and analysis, however, this still does not seem to be a very rational argument.

⁴⁰See: Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976): 1-14. And, Walter R. Fisher, "Rationality and the Logic of Good Reasons," Philosophy and Rhetoric 13 (1980): 121-30.

⁴¹Fisher, "Narration. . .," p. 9.

⁴²The notion of an "intersubjective critic" engaged in a dialogue with the text of the debate was created by V. William Balthrop, "The Debate Judge as 'Critic of Argument': Toward a Transcendent Perspective," Journal of the American Forensic Association 20 (1983), p. 5. Our conception of the intersubjective critic would, however, almost certainly call for more active judge participation than would Balthrop's notion of this critical function.

⁴³A similar notion was espoused by James F. Klumpp, "What Changes in Judge Behavior Would Improve the Educational Quality of Forensics?" Paper presented at Iowa State University, Ames, IA, December, 1975, p. 4.

⁴⁴Fisher, "Narration. . . ."

⁴⁵W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981).

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THE ROLE OF PROPOSITIONS IN FORENSIC ARGUMENT

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That the proposition, or some means to manifest that proposition through a specific instance, should prove the center of dispute should not be surprising. The public argument among Rhodes and his critics [Ganer[1], Herbeck and Katsulas [2], Ulrich and Keeshan[3], Paulsen and Rhodes[4], Rhodes[5], Rhodes and Pfau[6]] pivots on Rhodes' contention that we should focus debate on the proposition. Moreover, Rhodes contends that such a focus justifies requiring an affirmative to defend the implications of all "typical examples" of that proposition. His critics have concluded that such a requirement would make a mockery of the debate community's efforts to teach arguments about public policy.

Similarly, one focus of Zarefsky's[7] view of the debate process is the view of proposition as analogue to a research hypothesis. This is contrasted with the more widely accepted view of debate as a means of comparing competing policy systems, where debate should focus on particular policy manifestations of that proposition, rather than policies which are implicit yet undefended in the proposition and its opposite.[8]. Again, at the base of this clash are competing views of the role of the proposition in academic debate.

When the negative advocate suggests that a counterproposal competes with an affirmative proposal, is it sufficient to show that the proposal provides a reason to reject the proposition, even if it fails to provide explicit reasons for rejecting the specific proposal which was derived from the affirmative proposition? In the case of a policy proposition where the action advocated is directional and measurable--e.g., increase, strengthen, reduce, weaken, and the like--this is not an idle question. A counterproposal may in fact adopt dimensions of the affirmative proposal as long as the initial action is offset with an action equal in magnitude and opposite in direction, assuming that the proposition and not the specific proposal are the focus of argument.[9]

Leaving the realm of competitive academic debate for a moment, the question of focus of argument is no idle issue. Dworkin[10] reports, for example, that there are great disputes between those who would focus on

specific legislative language, rather than contextual/inferential interpretation of statutes. If we are correct, propositions or claims are the focus of arguments everywhere, and the nature of this dispute has more than reference to competitive forensics.

Earlier, Ulrich[11] indicated that one difficulty with some arguments about value propositions was the assumption that all value resolutions should be treated alike. He made the not very radical suggestion that the wording of the resolution or proposition, rather than general theoretical discussions of value resolutions or propositions, should determine the validity of certain negative strategies. That the distinction between proposition and specific manifestations of that proposition has not created quite the furor in CEDA debate and value propositions as has been the case in policy debate may well be accidental. We would argue that the complexity of propositions, the uncertainty of the nature of qualifiers for those propositions, rather than any inherent difference in advocates, has been the reason for the greater furor over the focus of argument in a policy debate. Moreover, we would argue that the extant furor in policy debate reflects the failure of disputants to recognize the earlier Ulrich admonishment.

We make two general claims in this essay. 1) The focus of debate should rightly be the proposition which gives rise to debate. 2) The acceptance of the focus of debate on the proposition brings only those implications as are required [either by consensus or by superior argument] for the advocates of that proposition. We set about the proof of these claims through several steps:

- 1) tracing the history of intercollegiate debate propositions to determine the cause of the present disputes;
- 2) examining in detail the dispute among Rhodes and his critics to examine its relation to the present claims;
- 3) examining the nature of policy propositions and their contraries to establish some general patterns of refutation of such propositions;
- 4) providing reasons for our claim that the proposition which serves as the initiator of a dispute also serves as its ultimate focus.

We should outline a few assumptions which are made in this essay. First, the the distinction between resolution and proposition may create more problems than solution. Rhodes[12] is correct when he asserts that the debate literature frequently uses these terms interchangeably. Mills[13] is probably also correct when he asserts that the use of terms from other disciplines causes confusion when such terms take on varied meaning in academic debate. That a resolution has certain implications to a congressman is probably the consequence of peculiarities of dealing with legislative resolutions, and is not particularly informative about some normative description of how propositions/resolutions ought to be treated.[14] Zarefsky and Patterson[15] assert that proposition, topic and resolution have been used as synonyms in the context of academic

debate, and even a cursory scan of argumentation and debate works quickly verifies that assertion. The use of proposition here is only to provide a convenient means of providing a symbol system for the analysis of specific propositions in section 3 of the essay.

The Development of the Debate Proposition

To debate, there should be some agreement on the subject of the debate. In the earlier years of debate, this problem was usually solved by drafting a contract between two schools involved in debate.[16] This approach proved unworkable as teams traveled to numerous other campuses and as debate tournaments became popular. Reacting to these changes, the forensics community developed a process for adopting a single national topic.[17] Given that coaches and/or debaters in the first part of this century had to construct their own topics, however, many of the earlier textbooks would include guidelines for good debate topics. These guidelines suggested that resolutions should be current, controversial, balanced, and so on.

These earlier texts did not draw a distinction between the resolution and the plan. Indeed, the assumption of some of these texts was that debate should emphasize the major principles behind the resolution. Windes and Hastings, for example, complained about advocates not addressing the vital issues behind the proposition and instead emphasizing tangential issues. [18] Such a focus may be the consequence of the view that a good proposition is a limited one.

According to this perspective, it was not enough that a proposition be limited. It should also be composed of terms which were not ambiguous. Foster, for example, suggests that "the proposition should not hinge on ambiguous terms, that is, words with more than one meaning,"[19] and "The proposition should be sufficiently limited in scope to admit satisfactory treatment in time or space available." [20] The reasoning behind his requirement seems to be that the burden placed on an advocate would be unclear if the resolution is broad and ambiguous. The assumption is that the entire resolution would be debated, not a subset of that resolution.[21] Better debates are derived from narrow and clear topics, these theorists would conclude. Many of the examples of resolutions given in the earlier textbooks were also value topics which could not be narrowed by presenting a plan. To indict a resolution as ambiguous would not be a serious concern if the debate could focus on a specific policy implied by the resolution.

Over a period of time, plans started becoming more and more sophisticated. While the plan was closely linked to the resolution, the plan did not always encompass the entire resolution; for example, Dartmouth College interpreted the topic "Resolved: that Congress should be given the power to reverse decisions of the Supreme Court," by defending a plan which was limited to the reversal of non-unanimous decisions. [22]

Rhodes[23] may be correct when he suggested that, in the past, individuals debated the entire resolution because the resolutions were narrow. From the 1951-1952 year until the 1965-1966 year, college topics were extremely narrow, and the gap between the affirmative plan and the resolution was inconsequential.[24]

Since 1967 or so, the view of the ideal debate resolution has changed. This is the case, both in theory and practice. Recent theorists have suggested that good debate topics were broad debate topics. Lichtman, Rohrer and Corsi, for example, write: "The wording of debate resolutions is usually broad. This allows to choose [sic] from several different courses of action as fair interpretations of the resolution." [25]

Zarefsky and Patterson argue "a resolution is often worded fairly broadly." 26 This view that broad topics are desirable has been reflected in the types of topics that have been debated in the past two decades. Starting with the 1965-66 topic, "Resolved: that law enforcement agencies should be given greater freedom in the investigation and prosecution of crime," we have had numerous broad topics. As a result, teams have often emphasized a subset of the topic. More to the point, resolutions became worded so that there were multiple instances of actions which singly would affirm the proposition. Kovalcheck explains:

The judges quickly perceived that it was unreasonable to expect an affirmative team to deal with the totality of the topic, and few doubted that such changes as the recognizing of Red China, ending the Vietnamese War, pulling troops out of Europe, or even altering the world's monetary system, were not significant. Negative teams, then, had to be prepared to debate four or five topics, each requiring separate analysis, separate evidence, and separate plan attacks, and this multiple topic approach was the harbinger of the 1970s. [27]

Even if the focus of the debate prior to 1966 was on the resolution, there was little consensus on what this meant. Teams would present plans that illustrated the nature of the resolution, and in most debates the emphasis was on these plans. Since the distinction between the plan and the resolution was small, the question of emphasis was usually trivial. Broader topics made the question of emphasis real. Rather than direct attention to broad changes in theoretical emphasis, the gradual shift attracted little notice.

The question has attracted attention within the last few years from the work of Rhodes and his critics, who have focused considerable attention on the plan/proposition distinction. While there has been some

Initial attention to the issue nearly ten years ago concerning questions of alternative justification, the question remained largely dormant for nearly ten years. As we will later note, much of the attention of this debate [as well as the earlier one concerning alternative justification] was directed at the immediate strategic considerations associated with one position or another--rather than the logical consequences of maintaining a proposition as the focus of academic debate.

We can summarize this section as follows: the distinction between propositions and policy examples derived from them had been small until recent years. In part this shift reflected a shift in belief about whether broad or narrow problem areas made for better debates. This shift in emphasis gave rise to a larger theoretical debate resulting from the implications of advocating a proposition based on specific instances of it. The next section considers one of those debates.

Many of the arguments that debate should focus on plans generated by a policy proposition, rather than on the proposition itself, are rooted in assumptions about the appropriate educational role of academic debate, rather than the logical implications of selecting a proposition as the starting point and focus of that intellectual enterprise. Herbeck and Katsulas[28], for example make four arguments in defense of the statement that plans should be the focus of argument in a policy debate. The first, that of tradition, rests on the authority of Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson[29], among others--without noting the reasoning associated with that tradition. In fact, what is most curious about this particular appeal to tradition is the absence of any reason giving effort in the original Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson essay. The footnote which has been used by proponents and opponents of the resolution/proposition as focus dispute merits repeat, as well as discussion.

In context, Goodnight et.al were refuting the Lichtman et.al. essay which defended the prospect of multiple and independent cases or defending the debate resolution in a single debate. Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson responded:

Our view of debate is essentially different. A debate team is arguing for only one goal, ultimately, the adoption of the resolution. As such, its responsibility is to interpret and thus define the parameters of the resolution for a particular round. Although we realize this does not ontologically encompass the resolution for all times, it does allow for the establishment of common grounds for debate which entails a complete responsibility for initial arguments for the affirmative and negative team.[30]

Several things are clear from this passage. First, Rhodes and Paulsen, as well as Ulrich and Keeshan are correct in finding this passage as support for their positions. It is clear from the context of the

footnote, however, that Ulrich and Keeshan are probably closer to the mark, given Goodnight, Balthrop and Parson's emphasis on advocacy and non-conditional arguments, as well as their claim that debate best meeting the activity's educational goals is debate which compares two policy systems. But in neither instance is there much if any reasoning for the contrary positions. In fact, the cited quotation is preceded by the claim "Our view of debate is essentially different," without in any way indicating the basis of the disagreement.

Second, the Goodnight, Balthrop, and Parson position is laden with additional unproven assumptions. Debate should be a comparison of policy systems, they assert. Arguments about policies, rather than arguments about procedures, are the best arguments for training students about arguments. While each of these assumptions have merit, they do not add much to an internally consistent defense for the view that either the plan or the proposition which gave rise to the plan should be given prior consideration. To use reasoning from authority in this instance reminds one of Booth's[31] lament that social consensus could be reasonably used to defend Charles Manson's actions to his followers once immediate social approval is accepted as the touchstone of reasoning.

The second and third arguments made by Katsulas and Herbeck, time constraints of debate and the size of propositions, as well as decreasing the educational value of debate, are both rooted in extraneous assumptions. To say that debate has time constraints and that argument must be limited for educational purposes are important considerations. But the probative value of such considerations ought to be determined without any direct effect on the argument that the plan rather than the proposition which gave rise to it should be the focus of argument. Similarly, it should be possible to disagree about the educational values of debate--or even that there are educational values--and still agree that the plan should be the focus of debate arguments. These are largely unrelated issues, or at least items which only marginally follow from one another. Even in the face of such defenses, the claim that the plan should serve as the focus of argument ought to stand on its own merits rather than the merits of either the present format of debate or the educational benefits from the use of such formats. We assume that most conventions are the result of actions which had clear reasons at the time they were instituted. We would expect, for example, that 8-3-4 and 10-5 time limits were instituted because they produced a debate with 1 hour of speaking time. The 10-3-5 format presently used at the National Debate Tournament reflects a compromise of the National Debate Tournament Committee between those who wanted the longer speech time, and those who desired cross examination. The wish that a proposition be binding on advocates, had reasons which we hope are still relevant.

Herbeck and Katsulas' fourth argument on multi-directionality is rooted in some unstated assumptions about characteristics of propositions,

which are covered in greater detail later. The problem here is not the use of external standards so much as the general problem we isolate with previous debates about propositional focus--namely, the assumption that arguments of propositions of different form require identical refutational requirements. Consider two simple policy propositions: X should do all y; and X should do some y. Let us also assume that y consists of actions $c(1...n)$, where $c(n-1)$ is the negative of $c(n-2)$, the condition Herbeck and Katzulas describe when they lament that resolutions are often multi-directional. The first proposition in this instance would be an absurdity, since it would require advocates to support the impossible claim that a thing and its opposite are simultaneously desirable. This is the objection raised by Herbeck and Katzulas.

The second proposition [X should do some y] is the more likely form of policy propositions--namely that X can be verified by either $c(n-1)$ or $c(n-2)$, but need not be verified by both. And since the advocacy of the entire proposition may be accomplished by the acceptance of only some y, the claim that the entire resolution must be defended is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that opposites cannot be defended. Our claim here is that policy propositions may well be multi-directional, but only in those instances where the proposition does not require advocates to simultaneously advocate both such directions.

We can summarize this section simply--previous disputants in the plan-proposition-resolution controversy have often defended their case on evidence external to the reasons for giving either plans or propositions primacy. In other instances, they have assumed that all propositions/resolutions are alike--a thesis which we would argue is undefended. This issue will also serve as the focus of the next section of this essay.

Need to Examine Proposition Specifics

The centrality of plan or resolution has been hotly disputed in the counter-warrant debate. We would argue that independent of wisdom of counterwarrants, that debate does not cast much light on the present conflict.

In many cases, there is an argument about whether the resolution is or is not key without examining the different forms which a resolution may take. To admit that the resolution is key is not as important as indicating what are the reasonable requirements associated with the refutation of a particular resolution.

In a simple example, the statement "All governments should be socialist" could serve as the basis for argument. It might be written in

the form "all x should be y." The negation of this proposition would be "some x should not be y." An advocate for the first proposition might choose to support the claim by arguing that a specific x [say the U.S.] should be socialist. This instance conforms fairly well to those situations in which advocates of the counterwarrant concept may be justified in arguing that the affirmative advocate has made a hasty generalization--whether the wisdom of socialism in the U.S. can be appropriately extrapolated to other nation states is an arguable proposition.

In this same proposition, the affirmative might choose to affirm the universal claim--all nations should be socialist--by reading general support that socialism is a generally nifty thing. Similarly, the negative could refute this general proposition with the proof of the proposition "some x should not be y." For the universal proposition, one negative instance would be sufficient to refute the statement of proposition. So the proof that "France should not be socialist," or any other negative instance, for that matter, would serve to counter the general statement. In this instance, the use of a counterwarrant--or another example of a socialist government, albeit one ignored by the affirmative, would be sufficient to deny the affirmative proposition.

To continue the illustration, if the debate proposition were "some x should be y," or "some nations should be socialist," then proof of the statement "The U.S. should be socialist," would affirm this proposition. In this instance, proof of the proposition "France should not be socialist" would not on its face be relevant to the question of U.S. socialism, unless the advocates provided additional proof that French governance were related to US governance. At minimum, the failure of the initial advocate to mention French governmental form would not be relevant to their expected proof requirements.

Notice that the two examples alternately provide support for the positions found on both sides of the plan/proposition debate. The first illustration provides an instance where a counterwarrant makes sense--but only because the proposition required advocates to affirm all instances to prove an event. The second illustration provides support for the claim that the focus of dispute ought to be a specific instance of the proposition. This is true, however, because the form of the proposition was such that specific instances are sufficient to support a general claim.

We have outlined a several examples of the forms which policy propositions could take, as well as the variety of strategies which would be available to negate that initial proposition. As Prior[32] observes, owing to works of Aristotle and Russell, propositions ought to be considered in pairs--the initial statement and its contradiction(s). While we are willing to admit that the effectiveness of contradiction is subject to

argument for some of the following pairs, they should serve as examples to establish our general thesis that the precise nature of a proposition must be examined to find meaning in the statement that the proposition is the focus of debate.

Refutation of whole proposition comes in various forms

<u>proposition</u>	<u>refutational possibilities</u>
x should be done	x should not be done. not x should be done
some x should be done	no x should be done. x used to isolate truth of x should be done.
all x should be done	some x should not be done
x should do y	not x should do y not x should do not y x should do not y
x should do y for all z	not x should do y for all z x should not do y for some z x should do not y for some z not x should do y for some z

It should be clear that some of these may not serve to refute the initial proposition. For example, the proposition "not x should do y for some z" may not negate the initial proposition if the actions of x and not x are not exclusive of one another--for instance, national (x) and international (not x) actions could work on the same y problem at the same time. Our argument here is that propositional forms combine with substantive issues in determining the conditions in which that initial proposition is refuted.

We should note at this point that we wish to stay outside of the theoretical/practical proposition test controversy, characterized by disputants such as Wallace,[33] A.J. Kenny,[34] and J.Jarvis.[35] This controversy is based upon competing claims about whether there are different standards for evaluating the validity of arguments based in either practical [inquiry undertaken to determine what shall or should be done] or theoretical [inquiry undertaken to determine what has happened or what will happen] statements. In general, work on propositions and their negations in logic has been restricted to discussions of theoretic propositions. We would be willing to concede that some of the contrary policy propositions offered may not serve as contraries for the initial

proposition, or at least may arguably fail to do so. This, however, will not undermine the strength of our argument--namely that changing in the form of the proposition should change what is required to refute that proposition.

While not an exhaustive list of possible symbolic representations for policy propositions, they are illustrative of several concepts:

- 1) Specific examples can justify some propositional forms.
- 2) Specific examples can provide reasons to reject some propositional forms.
- 3) The truth of a single example may be generally inadequate to provide proof for some propositional forms.
- 4) The falsehood of a single, or even many examples may be generally inadequate to reject some propositional forms.
- 5) The more detailed the propositional form, the greater the need to focus upon particular elements of that proposition to determine reasons for its affirmation or its negation.

Notice that in all instances, the truth of the proposition is always the focus of argument. That the proposition may be denied by a single counter-example, or may be largely unscathed by a great number of counter-examples, depends on the form of the original proposition, rather than some convention which we may have for argument focus. Our argument here is that certain disputes may most appropriately be directed toward plan specifics. Other disputes may be most appropriately directed toward the provision of counter-examples to the plan representing the proposition, rather than directed toward the original example used. But that decision of appropriate strategy depends largely on the original propositional form used--including qualifiers for proposition subject, object, and objectives.

We believe that after one clears away the emotional barrage attached to positions on both sides of the controversy, the position that the proposition should serve as the focus of debate makes considerable sense. First, there is sign evidence that such should be the case. To give some reason to the convention of continuing to have a national debate proposition, debate should be so focused. This is not to say that a problem question, a problem area, or a general topic may not better serve the interest of directing attention to specific instances of public policy. (Most of those who would dispute the notion that the proposition should be given priority do so because they object to the chance that attention will be diverted from public policy questions. The alternatives would certainly suit that requirement better). It is to say that the existence of a proposition means that we must deal with it even if we choose not to do so.

Second, accepting the primary role of the proposition in defense of an affirmative position allows for a series of conceptual consistencies which may not otherwise be possible. It certainly saves us from the fate of having to argue that the establishment of the relationship between the proposition and the plan is no more than a game rule or social convention, rather than part of the same process of gaining adherence to a policy statement.

Notice that our previous discussion has indicated that there is little to fear about the requirement to prove "the entire resolution" unless we are careless in the way in which we frame resolutions and the qualifiers which they include. Unless the proposition states that "X should do all Y," there is no requirement that all Y be defended to provide a defense for the proposition. When the qualifiers are absolute, then the proof requirements for an affirmative are absolute. Take, for instance, the proposition: That all US military interventions into the internal affairs of any nation or nations in the Western Hemisphere should be prohibited--or, for all x, y. Once we accept the notion that "any nation or nations" means all nations in the Western Hemisphere, then we have required the affirmative to defend "the entire resolution," or rather, all possible instances of intervention in all nations of the Western Hemisphere. In essence we make our task clear as we make certain qualifiers which we use in our propositions.

Ulrich's previous example for non-policy propositions analysis provides an interesting instance of problems which may be created by uncertainty of qualifiers. His example, "that higher education has sacrificed quality for institutional survival" creates difficulty for questions of truth requirements only because we do not know whether "higher education" should be interpreted as a collective or an individual noun phrase--a meaning question which would be certainly arguable for grammarians. This illustrates that to accept the proposition as the focus of argument only requires that care be taken in the phrasing of qualifiers--an issue which should be of concern under any circumstances since advocates already need knowledge of word meanings even with a proposition relegated to ground division.

We have argued that the acceptance of the proposition as the focus of argument in an academic debate seems the logical outcome of our decisions to continue to use a proposition as debate's starting point. The acceptance of this position allows advocates to consistently defend a variety of concepts--the need to require topicality to be binding--rather than assert such as a convention equated with time limits. We argue that the acceptance of this position need not cause for advocates--since the requirement to defend "the entire proposition" does not demand the defense of all instances of a particular policy direction, but only that number of directions which would prove the resolution true. If we are only supposed to do something, we certainly don't have to do everything.

NOTES

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- 2 Dale Herbeck and John Katsulas, "The Affirmative Topicality Burden: Any Reasonable Example of the Resolution," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (1985), 133-145; "A Response to Rhodes and Pfau," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (1985), 146-149.
- 3 Marjorie Keeshan and Walter Ulrich, "A Critique of the Counterwarrant as a Negative Strategy," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 (1980), 199-203.
- 4 James W. Paulsen and Jack Rhodes, "The Counterwarrant as a Negative Strategy: A Modest Proposal," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 15 (1980), 205-210.
- 5 Jack Rhodes, "A Defense of the Counterwarrant as a Negative Strategy," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (eds.) Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 485-493.
- 6 Jack Rhodes and Michael W. Pfau, "Resolution or Example: A Reply to Herbeck and Katsulas," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (1985) 146-149.
- 7 David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," in David Thomas (ed.) Advanced Debate (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook, 1983) pp. 427-435.
- 8 See Allan J. Lichtman, Daniel M. Rohrer, and Jerome Corsi, "Policy Systems Analysis in Debate," in Thomas, pp. 375-390. The centrality of the plan to this perspective is not altogether clear, as can be seen in Allan J. Lichtman, Charles Garvin, and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 9 (1973), 63.
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- 10 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, (Cambridge, Ms: Harvard University Press, 1985), see pp. 9-103.
- 11 Walter Ulrich, "The Nature of the Top'c in Value Debate," in CEDA

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14 This is one of the difficulties with the treatment of resolutions/propositions found in Kingsley's work. See Eilene Kingsley, "Rhetorical Definitions of the Debate Resolution: A Call for the Question," a paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, November, 1978.

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31 In Zarefsky, p. 429.

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33 James D. Wallace, "Practical Inquiry," Philosophical Review, 78 (1969), 435-450.

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TOPICALITY AND THE DIVISION OF GROUND: FRAMING POLICY DIALECTIC

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Many of us are now confronting a problem of communication unique to our times. We want to be more fluent in our discourse with microcomputers. They will not work for us without it. So we initiate some pleasantries in simple commands, and, in gratitude, the computer processes some words. But on occasion the conversation becomes strained as the computer makes more demands on our lexicon. We are told that we must direct our comments to the program disk.

When we make contact with the program disk, we discover to our chagrin that someone else has already had a chat with the computer. In fact, this discussion made such an impression the the computer can sing it from memory. But listening to this recital does little for our understanding. What words we can make out are punctuated by choruses of #..C\$pp. After recovering from the shock of unfamiliar sounds, we begin to wonder why the programmer doesn't speak English. We become angry that our conversation with the computer has been interrupted by some dimly-perceived flaw in the gibberish of programming statements. But we are chastened by the thought that the programmer's choice of language is her own business. If the use of program language is as arbitrary as it seems, arguing with the programmer would be mere quibbling.

Enough frustration with our inability to make full use of the system's capability may lead us to enroll in a programming class. As our studies progress, our perspective on the nature of the conversation between programmer and computer changes. We discover that certain unusual symbols must be employed to avoid confusion with alphanumeric symbols processed in typing. Other symbols are in the language to facilitate optical character readers. We develop the ability to converse in the same language with computers (and in a corresponding verbal shorthand with other programmers).

After awhile, we even may be able to return to the programmer of our original disk and critique his use of language. Discussion of these issues is no longer quibbling, and the choice of programming language no longer arbitrary. When program talk diverges from standard English, we know why. Yet the program talk and our ordinary language do share common roots. We might even contemplate the possibility of a machine language that mirrors standard English, but for our present purposes and capabilities, such a language doesn't merit the tremendous expenditure of human effort to realize it.

Our collective experience with the issue of topicality in academic debate shares qualities with our uninitiated reaction to computer talk. Many past conversations among debaters, judges and coaches have produced a tradition in our community that the requirement of fidelity to the meaning of the resolution should regulate "word processing" of specific arguments by advocates. But we find it difficult to explain what the language of fidelity means when applied to specific situations of advocacy, and, in particular, arguments about definitions and context.

Novice (and some no-so-novice) debaters view topicality as a special language of argument that is grounded in the arbitrariness of resolution drafters and judge perceptions. They learn to recite the command statements of topicality standards (a prior issue, debateability, field context, grammatical accuracy, fairness, etc.) while remaining unable to translate these standards into concrete implications for evaluation of argument about the resolution. They are in the position of the ordinary microcomputer user, trying to clear the program disk of unneeded data by typing in anything that comes to mind.

Despairing of the argumentative chaos that the uncertainty creates some participants turn to rules of thumb for evaluating the impact of specific definitional arguments. This process is similar to telephoning a customer service agent to get the proper command for the program disk. You still might not find out why you typed in that particular set of symbols. One method is to define "being topical" in a manner similar to the way that the British ethicist G. E. Moore defined "goodness": as a simple, undefinable property that is intuited. Evaluation of arguments about specific definitions can be gained by the critic's intuition that a plan just "is" or "is not" faithful to the thrust of the resolution. I will have more to say later about the perceptions of the role of topicality in debate that engender this rule. But the effect of the rule is to convert a problem of justification between participants into a psychological issue (each judge's application of the rule of thumb).

Another way out is to elevate an analytical tool for evaluating specific definitional claims to the level of a metatheory about what the critic should do in assessing the impact of topicality as a whole. When some talk of "reasonableness" as a criterion, they refer not to the presumed qualities of specific definitions but rather to a presumption of indeterminate strength that the affirmative plan or parts thereof are faithful representations of the resolution. Others talk of "best definition" not as a call for comparing specific definitions according to some criteria of meaning but rather as a requirement that the affirmative be faithful to the best possible interpretation of the resolution. This view amounts in practice to a presumption in favor of the negative.

The use of the second strategy is not limited to those who don't feel they understand the program language of topicality. The major proponents of "reasonableness" and "best definition" in the published literature both take advantage of the ambiguity between analytical tool and metatheory and accuse their opponents of subscribing to the "unfair" opposing metatheoretical position.

Choosing among the metatheories is not the end of the advocate's or critic's task. We must know how and why to apply these presumption rules to specific circumstances. At this juncture, we return to the vagaries of the topicality program language. We hear about right-to-define, division of ground, contextual accuracy, and "delimitation." But the relationship of these standards to specific duties of the advocates remain unclear. In consequence, the metatheoretical versions of "best definition" and "reasonableness" encourage the judge to do what she probably would do anyway - to rely on a general sense of persuasive strength. This works well enough in most instances. But what happens when able advocates of specific definitional arguments center clash on the issue of topicality? Which presumption rule should apply? It doesn't require extensive recollection of the heyday of arguments that "topicality is not a voting issue" to know what normally happens - judges don't vote negative on topicality. We shut down the computer rather than take the risk that someone else will discover that we don't understand the program language.

Rules of thumb in interpreting unfamiliar languages cannot be eliminated nor should they, for they respond to the unavoidable circularities of reasoning and reference that plague our efforts at comprehending and articulating what is true, good, and fair in our shared activity. But rules of thumb need not be applied in every situation. When we understand more about why we use certain languages, we push back the veil of uncertainty that occasions the judgment to invoke the rule. More debates become resolvable on the basis of superior analysis and explanation of the reasons why particular interpretations of the resolution are important to the quality and coherence of advocacy. If our goal as participants in the activity is to help ourselves and others to recognize and evaluate justifications for claims, this search for understanding should bring us closer to its realization.

What this essay offers is a short course in the programming language of topicality - how topicality controls the dialogue between advocates on particular resolutions. Like the study of machine language, this course seeks to explain patterns of resolitional interpretation according to the pragmatics of their use by debaters. Our syllabus will reflect the view that confusion about the connection between the theory and practice of topicality argument often arises from a neglect of pragmatics in the implicit theory of resolitional meaning. Topicality is not simply a matter of semantics (the referential relationship between words in the topic as signs and plan provisions as actions signified in the words) or of syntax (the internal coherence of the resolitional statement when definitions given to individual words and phrases in isolation are combined). Semantic and syntactical evaluation, rather, are tools to assist advocates in describing how particular definitions affect the regulatory functions of fidelity to the resolution. These regulatory purposes of topicality, in turn, are fulfilled in the pragmatics of resolitional interpretation by the advocates.

As is appropriate to short courses, the syllabus limits itself to one function - the division of argumentative ground between affirmative

and negative. But mining this often-invoked but seldom-developed concept yields a surprising rich view of practical ore. In particular, we learn the decisive role that the paradigms of debate have conferred upon topicality argument in realizing in practice the decision rules that each paradigm's model of truth-testing generates. We may no longer conceive of topicality argument as merely a preliminary check upon the range of cases from which an affirmative may draw and we can sort out our semantic and syntactical tools according to their relative sharpness in support of functional claims for interpretation.

Before we enter the first part of the course, we might spend a few moments expanding the notion of "division of ground." What do we mean when we invoke this standard? I see at least two senses or purposes that are linked to the model of debate as dialectic. One pushes the two sides apart and moves them toward horizontal poles which each side defends as a discrete intellectual and active alternative. Label these poles "Policies" or "Resolution/Nonresolitional cores" as you will; the separation preserves an initial distance between the two sides within the same set of social problems. We endorse this distance when we extol the values of argumentative clash and of the development of genuine alternatives on propositions of policy. It is untidy and dissatisfying, to say the least, when a debate concludes with both sides dimly recognizing that they have advocated the same set of actions.

Yet there is another sense of "ground division" that ignites warning flares when advocates begin their inevitable effort to reposition their poles toward the center of the horizontal dialectic. We don't need to be experts in the politics of presidential campaigns to appreciate the strategic value of or the inevitability of such maneuvers. The territory lying between the two sides is persuasive ground because it has political opinions and justifications for actions (advantages and disadvantages, if you will) buried in it. Capturing parts of what seems at first to be "no-man's land" converts, the matter of their hidden resources into persuasive force.

Arguments about division of ground create a path of justification for claims which challenge the legitimacy of these maneuvers. It is a vertical path in the sense that advocates move from claim-ground assertions of legitimacy to warrants and to regressions back from those warrants. Dialectic moves upward in a transcendental search for the preconditions of advocacy relevant to a judgment of legitimacy or downward in an empirical critique of the adverse practical consequences of illegitimate maneuvers in previous (or projected) situations of advocacy. The clash of advocates on these vertical justifications determines the final positions of the horizontal poles relative to each other and relative to the political concerns that provide context to our resolution of policy.

Does the implicit sanctioning of this practice cut against the previous ideal of strict separation between the two sides that facilitates clash? Yes. But it also recognizes that our resolutions have vigor and relevance to advocates and audiences only when they reflect what people in society are saying and doing about the policy context of the resolutions. When it functions well, the vertical

dialectic and horizontal trench warfare between advocates in academic debate mirrors the ways in which we believe real-world advocates do or ought to connect facts and values in support of actions.³ We expect our debaters to enter such ways of life upon graduation, and their training in advocacy to improve their critical judgment about the rules, institutions, and substantive concerns for social policy. By assuming a stance that makes fidelity to resolutorial purposes irrelevant to policy argument evaluation we unwittingly may lock the gates leading out to the vertical paths of justification. Forced to play within the small yard of "direct clash" during intellectual childhood, debaters may find the security of the yard irresistible in later years as well, and fashion their own padlocks. Such practices fit in well with the programs of political actions who cloak assertions of power and domination in the mantle of "respectable dissent" and empirical social science. Policy dialectic holds out the hope that we need not forfeit the power of judgment and critique to live the good life.

The Licensing Function of Topicality and Division of Ground

The most widely-held perception of the place for topicality argument in debate is in disputes over the fit between the affirmative case area and the resolution. Grounds for the belief lie in the notion that the drafters of national debate resolutions design topics to provide a solid year's worth of fresh but thoughtful argumentative opportunities for both sides. The design criteria are two-fold: Make the wording of the topic restrictive enough to permit adequate negative preparation of case-specific refutation but broad enough to give the affirmative an adequate range of problems and values from which to develop cases. A good topic is neither too broad nor too narrow for the purpose of debate.

The application of this idea to practical advocacy relies on appeals to legitimacy and a sense of good will on the part of debaters. The syntactical and semantic properties for various interpretations of the words in the resolution imply different degrees of affirmative freedom to choose among case approaches. The defense of a particular case as faithful to the resolution may require the affirmative to advance an interpretation with highly unusual properties. If they do, so the claim goes, they have abused their privilege to define terms in such a way as to license their case. We should presume that the affirmative intends to bend the bars of our topical prison to escape by surprise from clash with their opponents. The judge's adverse decision on topicality is both punishment and deterrent to others who would commit the same offense. It is the only way to avoid the ultimate nightmare of affirmative teams who discuss any area of public policy that strikes their fancy under any resolution.

This view's popularity should not be confused with its pedigree. Topicality as licensing for case choices is a relatively recent conception. Older debate texts devoted considerable space to the problems of drafting suitable national resolutions. The conclusions of these texts on the specificity of language often confirmed that of Alan Nichols, who told us that "the proposition should state, with all possible certainty, the specific solution advocated." If we examine

closely the intercollegiate debate propositions of the time, we see that some did achieve a high degree of specificity. One called for the enactment of the McNary-Haugen Bill, another for compulsory arbitration by the NLRB, yet another for the cancellation of interallied war debts.

Why the concern with specificity? Wasn't this the golden age of affirmative responsibility for the whole resolution? Nichols implies otherwise. The 1933-34 topic, for example, called for a substantial increase in the powers of the president as a settled policy. "Teams could discuss virtually any subject and still bring it within the plausible meaning of the proposition. Debaters all over the country were quick to sense this opportunity."⁵ And apparently took advantage of it, as Nichols proceeds to list ten very different subject areas employed successfully by affirmative teams.

What this bit of history reminds us is the extraordinary degree to which our notion of licensing is parasitic upon unarticulated assumptions about what constitutes good "substantive" styles of argument for or against particular policies. When Nichols and others called for specificity, they envisioned debates as products of intensive investigation into the specific merits of well-defined solutions.⁶ Debaters would be prepared to argue in depth about the grounds and warrants for those solutions. By contrast, the licensing notion proceeds more by extension than intension. Debaters are ready to clash when they possess a number of "case-specific" arguments, including harm denials, alternative methods for solving problems, and especially, disadvantages. But what makes this style of argument superior to Nichols'? We could beg the question by saying it works better, but our congenital guilt about employing fallacies inhibits us. Perhaps advocates should be directing more attention to answering that question.

Then again, perhaps not. They might be discouraged by the peculiar consequences for argument evaluation that come from the application of licensing as a rule of thumb. We might remember, for example, that some cases become more topical as the year progresses, by principles of fair notice and expectations of untiring negative research. Moreover, advocates are compelled to defend what might be considered fallacious reasoning. We may not know whether the strongest negative position against a particular case lies until that case has been argued for some time. But the fairness standard for licensing requires us to assume that it is possible to argue against a case on its specific merits, and to do so well.

Although not completely unreasonable, the assumption can be dangerous if it diverts the critic's attention from the effect of each side's interpretation on the ability of the negative to formulate the best defense of its position against the plan. The affirmative, on the one hand, in answering topicality, is forced to cast doubt on its own ability to defend inherency, solvency, and significance by arguing where case-specific attacks could be found. Oddly enough, judges often seem more likely to vote on topicality against "fringe of the topic" cases in the middle of the debate season if their debaters have had difficulty finding case-specific negative evidence. On the other hand, if negative teams continue to counterplan against the same

"fringe" cases through the latter parts of the season, many judges will refuse to entertain topicality strategies. The topicality argument suffers from guilt by association with the counterplan. From the point of view of success with topicality, it is almost better for the negative to make poor case-specific attacks and concede their weakness than to attempt the best negative response to the affirmative position.

Related to this is a second weakness of the simple licensing standard. Its emphasis on abuse or potential for abuse as the benchmark of reasonableness mistakes enterprise for evil intention. Recall that licensing assumes that affirmatives seek new licenses in order to reap the advantages of surprise. There is little room for the possibility that the affirmative chose the interpretation because they found it to be the best example of the resolution on its merits. Thus unusual cases, and especially "new" cases, are immediately suspect on grounds of non-topicality.

According to this view, the resolution transforms itself into an analogue to the "problem area," a type of boundary that recently has been attached to high school national debate topics. But in our case, the boundary is extremely porous, because it consists of various persons' pre-tournament season ruminations about what the topic "means," expanded by the run of cases from certain respected programs.

Again the difficulty lies in what the standard neglects--the strength of the interpretation itself and the justifications for it. A particular affirmative team may have very poor definitions and defenses of its overall interpretation. But if the case itself falls within the problem area analogue's boundaries, few judges will vote on topicality, even if the negative challenge is vigorous on the interpretative issues. Conversely, an affirmative team might have developed analysis with strong intuitive appeal, only to have that analysis rejected because the case is too "squirrely." Indeed, the more able the defense, the more likely some judges are to believe that the affirmative implicitly concedes the non-topicality of the case because it has "overprepared" against possible attacks. This belief also encourages the negative to include a large number of quibbling ("junk") topicality arguments in the hope that the affirmative will undercut their own credibility or at least waste a good deal of time responding to them. All of this maneuvering goes on in abstraction from the interpretative accuracy or cogency of each side's definitions and justifications. At least in the case of the high school problem area, we are given some other words to define and to add social context to resolutorial interpretation.

To sum up, we can see the strengths and shortcomings of the simple licensing notion of topicality in its attitude toward the relationship between resolutorial wording and argumentative clash. Licensing advocates believe that by establishing a workable range of cases (variable over time), the topic ensures that the two sides will examine the important issues implicit in the resolutorial area of policy concern. This desire for clash coincides in part with the purposes of division of ground discussed earlier, and is commendable in its intentions.

But the tendency of licensing to endow a single, unstated model of argumentative clash as the ideal renders it unstable for and irrelevant to interpretative analysis of the topic. Because negative teams have not had the opportunity or desire to develop case-specific attacks against a wide range of "fringe" cases, their arguments about what the affirmative interpretation does not allow them to do are purely hypothetical and speculative. This vagueness is matched on the critic's side by the arbitrary nature of the presumption against the new or unusual that the problem area analogue introduces. The affirmative's ingenuity is limited not by the interpretative quality of its syntactical and semantic analysis but the creativity and geniality of the critic. In short, licensing does little to establish the division of ground because it often bears little relationship to the reasons for which advocates make strategic decisions on argumentative positions.

If we are to give the licensing notion a stronger place in grounding topicality analysis, we must flesh out the bare bones of the narrowness/breadth of topic dichotomy. Advocates should make specific connections between various forms of resolutorial interpretation and the range of cases that result, to the point of telling the critic what those ranges might be. Even more important, however, is the articulation of the consequences of the interpretation and case range for argumentative choice. Does the interpretation make all counterplans topical? Is there any room for non-topical alternatives of any kind? Does the resulting interpretation encompass within affirmative territory solutions to all possible disadvantages? Notice that the questions point to the practical maneuvers of horizontal and vertical dialectic that make up the concept of division of ground.

These objections can be developed in a concrete manner even if the affirmative case area is unfamiliar to the negative. They can provide cogent reasons to reject exorbitant claims of effects topicality when those claims endanger clash. Licensing moves beyond rule-of-thumb when it becomes reflective about why topicality ensures quality argumentation. Rather than assuming the worst motives on the part of affirmative and negative teams, critics should consider and apply a view of licensing which recognizes and supports the search for alternative policies or resolutorial tests.

Horizontal Dialectic: The Counterplan Example

For me, the clearest expression of the practical application of the hypothesis-testing view of debate is contained in David Zarefsky's well-known article on causal argument. He calls upon to ". . . divide the universe of relevant options other than those embodied in the proposition (for convenience, this universe may be designated 'Negative-land') into characteristics which are essential to its non-propositional nature and those which merely are incidental features--a division, that is, into core and periphery." How does the advocate go about discovering the "core" of negative land? Presumably she must discover the context of the policy areas for which the resolution serves as a call for action. The advocate must adopt a persuasive way of accenting certain words in the resolutorial sentence to decide what

constellations of attitudes and institutions inhere in the situations envisioned in the resolution and its absence.

Most of us have encountered this issue of ontological commitments from topic statements outside of the hypothesis-testing framework. Advocates of change-of-government counterplans, ban-the-subject counterplans, offset counterplans, and the like argue that the affirmative must support the continued existence of the institutions or actions that are eliminated by the negative counterplan. Whatever the merits of such claims in particular debates, these counterplans must be grounded in some kind of definitional analysis. The analysis denies the right of the affirmative to call for action on the contingency that the changes recommended by the negative fail to materialize. This path is the only way to replace arbitrariness with at least a gloss of reasons. Otherwise, for every claim of "reasonableness" by the negative, there will be an equal and opposite claim of fiat abuse by the affirmative.

I have pursued this diversion to illustrate a broader point. Counterplan competitiveness notions accepted by the majority of debate critics ground themselves in claims about topicality. Consider mutual exclusivity. Lichtman and Rohrer suggest that two policies are mutually exclusive when both cannot exist simultaneously. The conditions for impossibility and simultaneity, however, are embedded in the resolitional context. The simultaneity requirement, for example, is an interpretative gloss on and a commitment to an implied time frame for policy consideration. Reasonable disagreement upon this standard is possible. It may be good to strengthen our European troops for awhile and then eliminate them. Why must we assume that the "and then" phrase is excluded by definition from the resolitional wording?

Net benefits competitiveness, as modified by the recent theoretical discourse about permutations, also depends for its justification upon resolitional interpretation.⁹ Net benefits without permutations encourages a Maginot-line construction of counterplan advantages to outweigh affirmative claims. But permutations must not alter the topical nature of the affirmative plan. The question of how that nature is changed by selective incorporation of counterplan provisions must be settled by claims and proofs about resolitional context.

Counterplans are just one practical illustration of the horizontal poles of advocacy that frame the dialectic of policy in debate. Topicality analysis enables debaters to defend their deeds to the argumentative ground surrounding the poles. But if debaters neglect the interrelationships among competitiveness and topicality claims, they soon will discover that their poles are sinking into the ground. Interpretations of the resolution that draw from field context are especially useful in establishing what social advocates conceive as "live" alternatives or options within the policy area. These conceptions, in turn, can give rise to new and richer grounds for claims of policy competition.

Vertical Dialectic: The Disadvantage Example

The end of our short course, as in the case of our real-world experience, suffers from the effects of a shortage of teaching time and space. Let us use our remaining time together to evoke possible meanings for further inquiry.

Negative disadvantages are premised upon a prediction of the effects that a particular course of action will produce. Just as it is possible to achieve the effects of affirmative advantages through non-resolitional alternatives, the affirmative may discover ways in which the disadvantage effects may be mitigated without reducing the topical translation of the resolitional statement into plan action.

Hypothesis-testing, as we know, has a very generous standard of mitigation. The action may lie outside of the resolitional statement as long as it does not contradict the essence of the resolution. Policy-making, by contrast, applies a stricter standard of correspondence between plan and resolitional language. Although some critics require more, James Unger's statement that all plan provisions must bear a rational relationship to a topical scheme of action to receive consideration reflects the majority position.¹⁰

It is impossible to evaluate the relationship between a plan provision and the essence of the resolution (topical scheme of action) without seeking justifications based upon interpretations of the resolution's meaning. Why should we believe, for example, that policy-makers would conceive of guaranteed funding and enforcement as part of a call for action? Only if an advocate can show that the words of the resolution assume such things as preconditions do we feel justified in entertaining that belief. Semantic analysis accompanied by evidence of field understandings will supply reasons to believe that certain actions are included or excluded from the purview of the resolution.

The framework of this dispute over what we sometimes call "extratopicality," then, is an illustration of the role of topicality in the raising and evaluating of questions in the vertical dialectic of debate. When a negative team encroaches upon the no-man's-land between the advocates by presenting a disadvantage that links affirmative land with certain related actions and beliefs in an prediction of bad consequences, a challenge for justification of the linkage is made. The direction for further warrants lies upward in some notion of the preconditions set upon the scope of argument by the resolitional policy context. Without discussion of these preconditions and their grounds, debates constantly threaten to dissolve into a stalemate of competing claims and impacts. The values of argumentative clash and comparison call upon the vertical dialectic in part for their realization in practice.

Conclusion

If we have completed our assignments faithfully, we may come out of our short course understanding and speaking a different language, the language of resolitional dispute. To be sure, it is an artificial language. We do not expect to use it in discussions around the dinner table. But "artificial" need not be a pejorative term. We construct languages out of our general linguistic resources for specific purposes. As long as we continue to comprehend and employ these languages within their purposes, we cannot be ostracized justly. The computer is not condemned to the trash can when humans discover that it requires a machine language. If we disagree on the importance of language use in debate, our dispute will pass quickly to the goals of the activity of interpersonal, political argument in itself.

What we have learned is that clash over the definition of terms in a resolution of policy is not an end in itself. Little educational value can be gained by threatening to punish advocates for what in retrospect may have been minor lapses in the achievement of maximum grammatical accuracy and sensitivity to the shared understandings of policy experts. Critics are hardly in a position to stand in such judgments on these issues anyway, when we ponder what information and literary skills we would bring.

Considerations of grammar and field context, however, are important to the critical evaluations for which topicality arguments are appropriate. The advocates dispute resolitional interpretations because fidelity to resolitional contexts allows the judge to determine whether each side has made a persuasive claim to the argumentative ground it occupies.

Part of that division of ground lies in the relationship between the cores of the resolution and the non-resolution--the horizontal dispersion of argument. Whether we particularize that concern as the permissible range of affirmative cases or as the range of negative options for counterplan, the basis for disagreement is the same. Definitional interpretations which find support in rules of grammatical construction or field understandings establish boundary lines.

The other part of ground division involves critical supervision over attempts to capture the middle ground of beliefs and actions that on its surface seems to belong to neither side. Linkages between poles and middle, however, are an inevitable consequence of rhetorical sensitivity to the character of modern political discourse. Public actors, whether seen as technocratic elites or as faithful representatives of public will, are reflective about the intertemporal relationships among political decisions. Advocates in policy debate assume similar stances in an effort to ground their positions and their opponents' positions in the larger context of social choice. When these claims are disputed, controversy takes on a vertical profile of warranting. Both sides search for an adequate explanation and defense of the preconditions for policy success. These justifications transcend the particularity of the discourse about the specific resolution or plan. Field contextual notions of what we reasonably can expect of

political system performance after specific policy change are transmuted into definitional interpretations when advocates utilize them in disputes over resolitional ground.

Our task as forensics educators becomes clearer as well in the light of our new literacy. Argument about topicality deteriorates into objectionable quibbling when advocates lose sight of the reasons why the argument began. Instruction in techniques of resolitional interpretation should focus on the purposes that topicality serves in debate and the ways in which analysis of grammatical construction and field-specific understandings should be applied in practice to achieve those purposes.

NOTES

¹ See Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 14

² Compare James J. Unger, "Why Not The Best?" Rostrum 56 (Oct. 1981), 4-9, with Dale A. Herbeck and John P. Katsulas, "The Affirmative Topicality Burden: Any Reasonable Example of the Resolution," Journal of the American Forensic Association 21 (1985), 133-145. (Hereinafter cited as "JAFAs").

³ For a discussion of various judging models, see Bill Balthrop, "Citizen, Legislator, and Bureaucrat as Evaluators of Competing Policy Systems," in David A. Thomas, ed., Advanced Debate (Skokie: National Textbook, 2d. ed., 1979), pp. 402-418.

⁴ See Alan Nichols, Discussion and Debate (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), p. 257.

⁵ Nichols, p. 254.

⁶ See Nichols, pp. 256-257.

⁷ David Zarefsky, "The Role of Causal Argument in Policy Controversies," JAFAs 13 (1977), 184.

⁸ Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General Theory of the Counterplan," JAFAs 12 (1975), 74.

⁹ See, e.g. Dale A. Herbeck, "A Permutation Standard of Competitiveness," unpublished paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Washington, D.C., November 13, 1983.

¹⁰ See James J. Unger, "Analysis," in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Future (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Debate Handbook, 1979), p. 2.

A PARADIGMATIC THEORY OF TOPICALITY

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Space according to the American Armchair Dictionary is the "expanse in which the solar system, stars, and galaxies exist; the universe." Therefore, the plan forbidding the use of spy planes is topical because they fly in the universe;

so sayeth the Affirmative.

"Space law deals with the area above the ionosphere." This is from Fuzzy Alderbaan, ex-wookie and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Space. Spy planes fly in the earth's ionosphere as admitted in cross examination, so the plan to ban spy planes is not topical.

so sayeth the Negative.

At the back of the room sits a judge that is required by the tournament director to decide between these two definitions of "space". While the judge may prefer to define space as the empty vacuum existing between the ears of these two speakers, the ballot will force another choice. Both definitions are "reasonable" and to decide on the "best" definition is dependent on the standard that is used to define the words of the topic.

Admittedly, the previous example is absurd. There is a need, however, for precise standards so topicality disputes can be argued and resolved easily. Current means of resolving such disputes leaves judges without a clear and consistent manner of adjudication. Trying to develop a universal form of argumentation to be used to decide this issue in a debate round causes great difficulty. Argumentation should begin with the paradigm being used and the methods of argument should spring from the burdens the paradigm establishes. Methods of resolving the controversy will lose much of the universal application but will gain clarity because of their paradigmatic specificity.

This paper will analyze the reasons why a paradigmatic theory of topicality is necessary. Then a topicality theory for the hypothesis testing paradigm will be proposed.

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Theory and Paradigm

The problem with topicality, as with several other issues in debate, is the separation of theory from paradigm. At times a theoretical outline is developed and then applied to the paradigms. Paradigms could be seen as argument fields that frame the context of argumentation. DeStephen argues that, "building a theory of topicality on the basis of field constructs opens a host of possible avenues for debate." Since different paradigms may require different burdens to be met, this appears "reasonable" or "best".

Paradigms should tell an advocate what issues are important and how they will be judged. General positions like "best" or "reasonable" should be viewed from the paradigm that is being used to decide the issues in the round. A rhetorical critic judging a debate on the basis of topicality might well decide that the best definition is one used by a universal audience. On the other hand, judges who view themselves as a Supreme Court Justice ought to use the best legal definition as established by precedent.

This technique can be applied to other issues like inherency, significance, or solvency, in addition to topicality. Unfortunately, there is no universal or consensual agreement on the way to resolve the issues that transcend paradigms. Issues sometimes may be eliminated or treated differently by paradigms. One example was the transformation of the issue of inherency by the comparative advantage format. Some theorists argued that inherency was not an issue because the format only required that the affirmative case be comparatively better at the time of adoption.

To resolve topicality arguments, the forensic community has begun adopting the "best" definition standard proposed by Unger. This standard was developed by Unger to resolve the problems of using "reasonableness" to resolve topicality arguments. A reasonable definition can be any definition that provides a reason for the interpretation of the words in a particular manner. The "best" definition standard is one that decides very often between contexts. The best context provides the best definition. A topic can be viewed, however, as religious, political, economic, educational, scientific, or cultural in nature, to suggest a few of the possible contexts that could be used.

The process goes through two steps, first determining the proper context, then deciding on the best definition within that particular context. Contextual arguments over "more reasonable" or "bestness" would suffer from the same affliction as arguments over the definition of the individual words. While the focus would be on the social interpretation of the subject matter rather than the definitions of the particular words, there is nothing to suggest that such interpretations are more easily debated and adjudicated than arguments over words. Determining context holds many problems independent of determining which definition is "best" within the particular context.

Suppose the topic is increasing U.S. foreign military commitments. The affirmative proposes to allow C.I.A. actions in Afghanistan and Angola. C.I.A. involvement would mean that arms and advisers would be "secretly" sent to help the rebels. If a negative argues from a legal standpoint, C.I.A. actions are not classified as a "military" policy in terms of the law or in court decisions. If the affirmative argues from a functional standpoint, those organizations that undertake military actions are part of the military regardless of the official governmental title or legal definition. The dispute is not about the affirmative fulfilling a certain definition or which definition is "best". The dispute is really over the role of the judge as a decisionmaker. The argument involves a choice between a set of rules to decide the dispute. Does the judge use a legal definition like a judge would use in a court case or does the judge take a more normative stance on the use of the word.

Rowland defines argument fields by suggesting that a field is established by the argumentative purpose. The social context may be appropriate for establishing some fields but will not resolve topicality arguments. The purpose of debate itself is subject to disagreement by persons within the debate community. Without an agreed purpose the social context will depend on the topic and/or judge. Our society's fields are so intertwined that distinguishing a purpose may be impossible, especially when deciding between competing advocates that can show a "reasonable" defense for their interpretation of the context. Whether advocates argue as lawyers, lobbyists, or can establish their own rules will make a difference in the effectiveness of certain arguments.

For example, all policies have legal and religious implications. That does not mean a policy must use legal and/or a religious definition, but certainly a choice must be made between definitions. Abortion is defined by laws, religions, and courts. This does not mean that all laws agree, that all religions agree, or that all courts agree. It does mean that these "fields" usually use different standards to judge arguments about the "best" definitions. Debaters must make a decision a priori about their choice to argue as lawyers, priests, or lobbyists. Once the role has been decided upon, then the proofs can be judged.

There may be a reason to use the best definition available, but the question of what constitutes the best definition is left unresolved. One can check to see if the resolution as defined leaves no term redundant, is contextual, limits discussion, or any number of criteria for a "good" definition. The process, however, offers no techniques of resolving conflicts over what is the "best" definition, since the "best" definition for a word depends on the function of the argument. All the standard provides is a different basis for evaluation that favors the affirmative. The burden is put on the negative to provide a superior definition, and failure mandates affirmative acceptance. Rather than helping to establish a process of limitation, it provides an enormous burden upon the negative to prove superiority over the affirmative interpretation of the topic.

The starting place for arguments should be the paradigm. Paradigms, within their framework, should establish what constitutes the best type of definition for that paradigm. Argumentation should come from that position, rather than ignoring this necessary first step. This paper will focus on one paradigm and propose a paradigmatic theory of topicality for hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis testing as proposed by Zarefsky did not give a method of resolving topicality disputes specific to that paradigm.¹¹ The approach simply asks that the topic be justified by the affirmative team. This paper will take the hypothesis testing paradigm and suggest a way of analyzing the issue of topicality. In hypothesis testing, the resolution is the concept under study and the affirmative plan is the specific operationalization of the hypothesis to be tested. In science a test either meets or does not meet certain criteria and on that basis is rejected or accepted as a test for the concept under study.

Scientists examine the operationalization to see if it is valid beyond the experiment conducted to all other instances falling within the concept under study. Kerlinger defines external validity as the question, "when an experiment has been completed and a relation found, to what populations can it be generalized."¹² Debaters and judges are seeking to find if the specific case (operationalization) generalizes to the population at large (resolution).

The affirmative team must provide a satisfactory argument that the concept under study has been adequately operationalized by their case. The plan and case ought to justify the conclusion the resolution asks to be drawn. This does not mean that the experiment must establish conclusive evidence, but satisfactory evidence according to the standards for a valid experiment.

No experiment usually provides conclusive evidence about the empirical world but that does not stop science. Galileo's dropping a ten pound and a one pound weight off a high tower did not conclusively prove that objects of unequal weight fall at the same speed. The experiment did provide satisfactory evidence to draw a conclusion that one would expect other objects of unequal weight but similar shape to fall at the same speed.

In addition, the negative need not offer a counter-theory or other means of measurement. All the negative has to prove is that the affirmative proposal does not generalize to the resolution. The negative may find it desirable to argue for other interpretations of what the affirmative case does measure, but this is not a necessary burden.

Validity as Topicality

The literature reviewed showed five possible methods for establishing the external validity of an instrument: content or face,¹³ construct,¹⁴ concurrent,¹⁵ predictive,¹⁶ and categorical.¹⁷

Face validity is simply a first look criteria. Content validity is similar in that they both look at the measurement device and see if it is what one expects to be used. Can one look at the case and plan given the topic and accept it as an example of the resolution. Indications of validity might be the qualifications of experts: are they from the academic professional fields one would expect to be involved in the problem area? A judge could examine the particular congressional committees that held hearings and determine if they are ones likely to deal with the subject matter. Finally, a judge could listen to the vocabulary that authorities use to describe the issues and subject matter to see if they are terms one would expect to hear when discussing the problem area. If these indicators match the expectations about the topic, then face or content validity could be said to exist. For example, the topic on space exploration would lead a judge to expect sources of evidence to be from places like NASA, Aviation Weekly, or Carl Sagan by the affirmative.

Construct validity asks if the theoretical concepts discussed fall under the problem area. If the source of the problem and its solution do not discuss the topic's problem area, then the affirmative fails to demonstrate a relevant construct. Possible questions of rendering a decision on construct validity could be asked about the case. If the case were Ethiopian food aid run under a military topic, the affirmative could be asked to demonstrate that the theoretical tenets advanced within the case fall within the problem area of the military. In addition, the affirmative might address whether the issues involved in food aid are considered in terms of military theories and jargon. Is food referred to as a weapon when used in Ethiopia? Are treaties like SALT or other historical agreements concerned with food as a potential weapon?

Concurrent validity seeks to find out if the instrument is similar to other instruments measuring the concept under study. Is the affirmative case similar to other affirmative case ideas being used to assess the topic. If the example is so different from other cases being used, then the topicality of the approach is suspect. The affirmative would have to show the clarity of the approach, why the difference is justified and still is acceptable. Under the hazardous wastes topic, several teams suggested that nuclear waste was included in the topic area. With a large number of teams using this case to support the topic, the presumption of topicality goes strongly to the affirmative since other experimenters agree this a good measure. This does not guarantee that the measure is a good one, only that it meets this particular standard.

Predictive validity should tell a judge about the ability to predict the nature of future cases. Other cases ought to reach similar conclusions about the same issues as in the particular

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debate. If the issues of the particular test (case) are so idiosyncratic, then no prediction beyond the example may be possible. If under the labor union topic, a team suggested that the unique problems of one particular union could be solved by eliminating that union, would the logic apply to other unions that faced similar problems. The specific instance may be correct and true but have no implication for the general principles involving the role (if any) union power should play in society. Since the judge ultimately must affirm the resolution on the basis of the example presented, the test must be a good example of the resolution. The particular threshold and standards for examples are and should be argued in the particular round.

Categorical validity refers to the ability of a category system to classify items quickly and efficiently. The definitions offered by the affirmative should establish a categorical system that cases fall within. In social science, gender is probably the quickest and most efficient categorical variable. The variable has a great deal of validity since it is considered to cover all cases and is easily applied. The high school topic involving "arms" sales presented problems since many dictionaries define "arms" as a "weapon". In the broadest sense, a team could argue for a restriction of the importation of Japanese cars. Cars are used to run down people and as a means of suicide. Obviously, the definition fails this criteria because it is inexact in its ability to classify items. A car is not normally considered a weapon but can be used as one. If the definition does not make it possible to readily and sensibly categorize ideas/objects as either resolutional or non-resolutional, then the definition is not valid and the test has suspect validity. A vague definition may make cases that do not fit the other criteria of validity clearly topical. An acceptable definition must be one that when used provides a degree of precision.

Conclusion

The paradigm puts the burden of topicality on the affirmative. Before accepting an instrument, the scientist (affirmative) must prove that the instrument is externally valid. The negative's only burden is to show that the affirmative's approach has unacceptably low external validity. This will require that both teams argue for the establishment of clear criteria to decide the issue. Failure to argue topicality by the negative, however, concedes the issue to the affirmative. One can assume that if the affirmative and the negative both concede the issue that the test meets minimal criteria unless some reason is given to doubt that assumption.

Another implication is that the affirmative meet all criteria in this analysis. A truly valid instrument should meet all of the criteria if it represented the concept under study. By meeting all the standards established, the affirmative has then advanced a topical case.

When deciding between definitions to be used to meet the external validity criteria, a judge could use "best" or "reasonable" standards. Whether one should use the most valid or a valid definition is arguable. The previous criteria are only a means to evaluate definitions; they can be used as minimal standards or as comparative standards.

The issue of topicality should be decided on the basis of the features of the paradigm used for the debate. As an example, the hypothesis testing model should have a paradigmatic theory for topicality argued as external validity. This is not to make a case for the use of the paradigm. The example is offered because it shows the radical departure from most traditional treatments of topicality. This treatment may be a reason to prefer or reject the paradigm but paradigms should be judged on how they define and treat the relevant issues.

The use of words to define other words will inevitably be inexact. The argumentative purpose that the definitions serve should provide some basis to decide the issues. The paradigm should outline how the issue is to be argued, a legal paradigm will have debaters argue about standing to try an issue, a scientific paradigm should use external validity. Since courts of law and scientists have specific standards for definitions and arguments, the arguments debaters use should focus on how definitions meet or do not meet those standards. The arguments would gain clarity and improve in quality as standards are developed.

Thus, debaters will be forced either to argue for the paradigm during the debate or in some manner be made aware of the particular judge's preference. Development of standards for topicality and other issues would also aid the judge in deciding whether to use that particular paradigm or not. Rowland has set out methods to assess the utility of a paradigm for academic debate.¹⁸ Obviously, the next step is to explicate how each paradigm addresses the central issues and makes an overall assessment of the paradigm to determine what the issues are and how they ought to be treated.

NOTES

¹An example of an application of this approach is found in Clark Olson's, "Counterwarrants and Clash: Never the Twain Shall Meet," Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981.

²Dan DeStephen, "The Development of Standards for Arguing Topicality," Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981, p. 6.

³Robert Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1982), 133-140.

⁴For a general dialectical approach and its criticism, See The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 21 (1984), 76-97.

⁵A summary of the dispute is made by Charles LaGrave's, "Inherency: An Historical View," in Advanced Debate. Edited by David Thomas. (Skokie IL: National Textbook Co., 1979).

⁶James Unger, "Topicality: Why Not the Best?" Rostrum, 56 (1981), 5-9.

⁷Donn Parson, "On 'Being Reasonable': The Last Refuge of Scoundrels," in Dimensions of Argument, Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, Alta, Utah, July-August, 1981, p. 532-43.

⁸Robert Rowland, "Argument Fields," in Dimensions of Argument, p. 56-79.

⁹David Zarefsky, "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1982), 141-144.

¹⁰Unger, p. 9.

¹¹David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis-Testing," Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, San Francisco, California, December, 1976.

¹²Fred Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967) p. 301-302.

¹³Gerald S. Ferman and Jack Levin, Social Science Research: A Handbook, (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1975), p.14; Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 2nd ed., (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1979) p. 132.

¹⁴Ferman and Levin, p14; Herbert M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock, Methodology in Social Research, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 67.

¹⁵Ferman and Levin, p14; Edward Suchman, "The Principles of Research Design and Administration," in An Introduction to Social Research. Edited by John T. Poby. (New York: Meredith Pub. Co., 1967), p. 32; Babbie, p. 132.

¹⁶Blalock and Blalock, p13; Edwin Ghiselli, John Campbell, and Sheldon Zedeck, Measurement Theory for the Behavioral Sciences, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1981), p. 280.

¹⁷Blalock and Blalock, p. 267.

¹⁸Robert Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (1982), 133-140.

ARGUMENTATION FOR THE GENERAL STUDENT: TOWARD A PEDAGOGICAL JUSTIFICATION

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Over two decades ago, Ogden Nash penned another of his famous short poems:

Oh, jump with joy,
Be blithe and gay,
Or weep, my friends with sorrow.
As California is today,
The rest will be tomorrow.

While Nash was writing of the increases in smog, freeways, population, etc., it may be that some educational trends also reflect California's activities. If so, of great interest to those in argumentation is the three-year-old California State University and College system graduation requirement for a semester-long course in Critical Thinking. Such a requirement now faces the 300,000 students in the 19 campus CSUC system and that portion of the over one million community college students on 108 campuses who seek their college's general education certification to the CSUC system.

The CSUC requirement is stated as follows: "Instruction in critical thinking is to be designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which should lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge and skills in elementary inductive and deductive process, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought." (1)

For those of us who have considered argumentation to be one of our major interest areas, the importance of such a course is self-evident but it is heartening to know that others share our views. (The close correlation between the above statement of the requirement and many course descriptions of argumentation is not totally coincidental; instrumental to both the wording and the passage of the requirement was the presence on the committee of the statewide

President of the CSUC Academic Senate, Robert Kully, Professor of Speech Communication at CSU Los Angeles.) In California, the two courses which most often have been certified as meeting the new critical thinking requirement are the Logic courses taught by Philosophy Departments and the Argumentation courses taught by the Speech Communication Departments. Clearly, the system has perceived that the efforts entailed in teaching and learning argumentation closely parallel the desires for the development of such analytical skills on the part of college graduates.

Yet, the key question must be asked whether we, in our teaching of our argumentation courses, are meeting the needs as assessed by the CSUC Board of Governors or not. The issue here is not pragmatic, i.e., whether a particular course satisfies the criteria demanded by a particular governing board; if it were, the concern would apply only to teachers of argumentation in the state of California. Rather, the issue is of a broader philosophical concern, i.e., what is the goal of a course in argumentation and for whom is such a course intended? If one accepts the principle underlying the CSUC requirement, that all students both need and would benefit from exposure to courses designed to improve general analytical skills, attention must be paid to concerns about how best to approach such courses. Today, California's teachers are mandated to address such concerns; tomorrow, others may be.

This panel is intended to address three general perspectives on the teaching of the college argumentation course. Perhaps for want of better terms, they have been divided into those of the basic argumentation perspective, the combination perspective, and the competitive perspective. Our presentation will attempt to address some of the directions those of us teaching the course from the basic or general argumentation perspective feel should be followed. In so doing, we intend to discuss the rationale for such a course, the specific skills to be developed, possible textbooks, potential organization and structure of such a course, and available exercises for such a course. I will focus on the first three aspects while Malcolm Sillars will address the latter two.

One caveat may be in order. The distinctions between teaching argumentation from a general perspective and from a competitive debate perspective are probably fairly clear and the presentations by Professors Rhodes and Freadhoff should help draw those distinctions. However, we suspect that the distinction between the general perspective and the combination approach may be more artificial. Teaching argumentation from a general perspective does not preclude the utilization of the debate model as a means of conveying the basic principles of argumentation; we would never suggest that formalized debate has no proper place in the teaching of

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generalized argumentation. Our suspicion is that there will be a certain degree of similarity between our positions and those of Professors Olson and Callaway. The differences are probably more those of degree than of kind, i.e., we would perceive formalized debate more as a tool rather than the tool and the rules of formalized debate are less significant to us than are the principles. As noted earlier, such distinctions may be more artificial than real in nature.

Rationale

With any course, two critical issues that must be addressed are which students would benefit from such a course and what specific skills should they have developed at the conclusion of the course? This section of the presentation will concern itself with the first issue.

It is readily apparent that the competitive intercollegiate debate activity does not serve all members of a college population--nor should it. Few students have the desire, the competitive drive, the intelligence, the financial backing, the time, the teaching, etc., to enable them to be even moderately successful at even the lower levels of competitive debate. Moreover, even if it were possible to involve 100% of a school's population in the activity, the loss to those individuals who desire excellence and who are capable of achieving it would be substantial as the overall quality would inevitably be lower than it is today.

However, saying the above does not mean that only a select few can benefit from the development of skills in critical thinking and reasoning. It is our position, like that of the CSUC system, that such skills are not only important for all students, not simply the intercollegiate debaters, but that they may be even more important for the general student than they are for the debater. (There is a fair amount of evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, that those students who attempt intercollegiate debate have already developed a certain level of skill even before they become involved. Such does not mean those skills are not significantly improved; it simply indicates that the base level is already frequently higher than it is for the general student.) The development of critical reasoning skills is needed by all students, not only a few select debaters, and it becomes essential that courses be offered that go beyond efforts to develop skills for a limited number of college debaters.

However, that is not to suggest that debate has no place in the basic argumentation course. Certainly, an exposure to some of the precepts of competitive debate can serve to illustrate certain of the critical thinking skills being sought. However, we would contend that it is better to expose

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large numbers of students to a few basic principles than it is to expose small numbers to in-depth concepts. If the goal is to be an educated society, then concern must be placed on the development of the masses and not simply the elites.

Moreover, it should be noted that such an approach does not necessarily ignore those students who are capable of achieving even greater skills and may, in fact, encourage their existence. If a student, upon exposure to less technically sophisticated concepts in a basic argumentation course, feels the need or desire for a greater development, that student may be motivated, either personally or with the instructor's encouragement, to participate in intercollegiate forensics. Nothing about teaching the course from the basic perspective would preclude that. However, teaching the course from a competitive orientation may well preclude the development of skills in students who do not perceive themselves, for whatever reason, as desirous of achieving such a skill level.

We would thus conclude that the major rationale for teaching a course from the basic perspective is that it is the best means of developing critical reasoning skills for the average student. Free societies are dependent upon having large numbers of liberally-educated citizens and the skills attendant upon the mastery of argumentation lie at the core of any liberal arts education.

Specific Skills

While the foregoing has been more of a philosophical justification for the teaching of argumentation, concern must be given to the specific skills that such a course should be designed to improve. Such skills can be divided into attitudinal and technical ones.

On the attitudinal level, we would suggest that one significant change that ought to take place is for students to develop a different perspective on the role of argument in society. If one were to ask students on the first day of class for synonyms for the word "argument," one would invariably hear many words with negative or pejorative overtones. The problem with that is not that it conveys a poor understanding of our discipline (although it does that also) but rather that it reflects a built-in bias against critical examination of issues. It is not only the word that students shy away from but the very act itself. It is essential that students be given a better understanding of what argument truly is so that they may develop a more positive attitude toward the activity.

It is here that theoretical principles can begin to offer insights that can lead to changing student perceptions. For

example, an instructor may discuss the underlying principles in Wayne Brockriede's seminal "Where is Argument?" (2) In the process of doing so, it becomes possible to outline those characteristics that make for true argumentation as opposed to those that contribute simply to fighting or quarrelling. Once students understand that disagreements may lead to fighting--but they may also lead to arguments--part of the attitudinal battle is already won. The mind-set is no longer that the consequences of disagreements are necessarily bad. A respect for the role of argument in society is fundamental to the development of any type of critical reasoning skills.

Second, students must be made aware of the importance of being open to other ideas. Too often, individuals presume that all right is on their side and only wrong can be found on the other side. It is critical that such a rigid thinking pattern be dispelled. While Ehninger and Brockriede in Decision by Debate(3) make the point that debate is a cooperative rather than competitive activity, excess reliance on the competitive debate format can squelch that orientation. However, by stressing certain principles, such can be made more clear to students. For example, if one were to include in the process of discussing the briefing of issues the importance of ascertaining agreed-upon or shared facts, values, and credibilities, one can begin to show students that differences between advocates are not necessarily black and white. Reagan and Mondale may disagree on how to pursue nuclear arms reduction but if students are forced to acknowledge that Reagan is not intent on beginning a nuclear holocaust nor is Mondale determined to turn the United States over to the Soviet Union, they begin to have a better understanding of both the difficulties in resolving disputes, and the fundamental integrity of the participants in such disputes. Eliminating the "holier-than-thou" thinking that typifies so much of current discourse is essential to the process of developing open examination of issues and thus is a fundamental skill that must be addressed.

Third, students must be made aware of the importance of taking stances on different issues. It is no accident that the CSUC requirement includes the phrase "advocate" in its description. While there are numerous societal and educational pressures leading students to take the safe position of not taking positions, it is incumbent upon an argumentation course to inculcate an awareness of the significance of doing so and, if necessary, force students to do such. Obviously, part of that can be accomplished by having a formal debate in the course where a student must both attack and defend ideas. However, that is not the only option and a basic argumentation perspective allows for other opportunities as well. Whether one chooses to exercise those options in the oral arena, in activities such as persuasive speeches, negotiation, parliamentary assemblies, etc., or in the written mode via analyses and evaluations of arguments,

academic journals, etc., students must be exposed to the process of taking firm stances--tempered by an understanding of the myriad of possible positions--on matters they have been exposed to. If we agree with Edmund Burke when he said "all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing," it is essential that students be shown not only the acceptability but, in fact the necessity, of being willing to take positions and argue for them.

Beyond the above general attitudinal skills, though, a course in argumentation must offer students specific skills to enable them to carry out the philosophical concerns more fully. We should indicate that our concern is much more focused on analytical skills than it is upon performance skills. The latter is certainly a useful adjunct but we do not see it as the *raison d'etre* for argumentation courses. The following is a brief overview of the skills we feel to be critical and which a basic argumentation perspective can help develop.

First, we believe students should be made aware of the essential elements in the argumentative process. Our bias, reflecting the works of Toulmin and Perelman, is for students to recognize the audience-centered nature of argumentation. (Such, in fact, may be one of the unique aspects that argumentation brings to critical thinking that is less pronounced in most formal logic courses offered in philosophy departments.) We perceive that the "objective of such argumentation is to help others reach a decision." (4) By continually relating the concepts of argumentation to the audience-centered perspective, students have an opportunity to realize that argumentation is not something that occurs in a vacuum but is rather of critical importance to all processes involving decision-making. Moreover, by exposing students to such theoretical constructs as Perelman's "universal audience," it is possible to explain to them different criteria utilized by different audiences to reach decisions and to offer suggestions regarding higher levels of critical awareness.

Such elements, though, also include more specific concepts that can be explained from a basic argumentation perspective. At the core, students can be taught that "argumentation is a communicative activity in which you advance claims, support them, and strengthen and refine them so that they will resist the refutation of others." (5) By offering students an explanation of what each of these key elements is and how they relate to one another in the argumentative process, the framework is set for a more full development of the specific factors to be assessed within each of those areas.

One of the means of addressing such elements is to introduce the student to the Toulmin model. While generally a

bit difficult for the beginning student to grasp immediately, examining the layout of an argument can help the student to begin to understand the complexity of an argument--but also the relative simplicity of assessing the argument when one has a tool for doing so. Considering the theoretical construct in terms of everyday arguments can allow a student to understand the interrelationships of significant elements of the argumentative process.

Second, students must be made aware of the different settings within which argumentation can and does occur. In a broad sense, they can be taught that "arguments are applied to the entire spectrum of communication situations--from casual interpersonal or small group interactions to more formal situations of conference, debate or negotiation." (6) Beyond that, specific examples within each of those areas can be developed by the instructor. An approach to the course which relies solely or even very extensively upon the competitive debate model can cause a student to have a too-limited view of the places in which argumentation takes place. At the bottom line, students must learn to recognize that "arguments occur in the vicinity of people" (7) if they are to develop an appreciation for the importance of developing their critical skills. By achieving the objective of instilling such recognition, the groundwork for further skills development has been set.

Third, students must understand the nature of claims in argumentation, both as to the types of such claims and their roles in different argumentative situations. All too often, it is apparent that individuals are not even aware of the exact position for which their adherence is being sought. By focusing on the nature of claims, one can better explain how different criteria can be employed to evaluate and analyze such claims. For example, a student who can distinguish between propositions of fact, value, and policy can more readily be taught the bases for judging such claims than can the student who only sees an amorphous blob in the argument.

Fourth, students must be exposed to the role of evidence in the argumentative process. While one might contend that the competitive debate model can force an awareness of the centrality of evidence better than any other approach, such ignores the reality of the majority of human argumentation. Seldom, if ever, in real-life does one find evidence evaluated strictly on the basis of the largest numbers of pieces of evidence one can cite in the shortest period of time. In fact, one might contend that the debate model is potentially counter-productive as few lay individuals are overly impressed by the type of evidence utilization common in academic debate and it is entirely possible that a backlash can arise which denigrates the role of evidence in argument. We would suggest that students can be made aware of the importance of evidence without resorting to the competitive model. Within this area,

then, it is essential that students be exposed to two concepts, i.e., the various types of materials which can serve as evidence and, most critically, different means of evaluating such evidence. It is not enough to instill in students the idea that mere assertions are insufficient and that there must be data behind the claims; it is central to the critical reasoning process that the students be given criteria upon which to evaluate such evidence.

Fifth, language as an argumentative construct must be discussed. Given the fact that most students enter an argumentation course with the wrong idea of what argumentation is, they are no less likely to enter with a misunderstanding of the role language plays in argumentation. Too often they assume that the more intense the language is, the better the argument is. Instructors must explain that such is not the case and that the opposite may, in fact, be true. Moreover, students can be made aware of the fact that many potential disagreements could be solved more easily if more care and precision were taken with the language.

Sixth, students need to be instructed about the role that source credibility plays in the argumentative process. Obviously, that will have been discussed to some extent in the process of covering other concepts such as testimonial evidence. However, it is entirely proper to devote a separate section to the credibility of the students themselves. Such a section may touch upon, but is not confined to, performance skills. Analytical skills will also have an impact upon how one's credibility is assessed by others and that situation ought to be brought to the students' attention.

Finally, an argumentation course ought to seek to develop a student's refutation and rebuttal skills. Granted, the process of taking a stance is a step in the right direction but students must be made aware that it is the height of sophistry for them to advance a claim and then be unable or unwilling to defend it against the attacks of others. Moreover, they must be made aware of the fact that letting other positions go unchallenged is not the route to coming to the best decisions. By teaching students specific techniques of refutation and rebuttal, a more dialectical argumentative process ensues and, in the end, a better decision-making process.

The above is not meant as an exhaustive list of the specific skills an argumentation course can and should teach. It is simply to highlight what we perceive as some of the more critical factors. We do not suggest that these cannot be taught using the competitive debate orientation; we simply suggest that, for the greater number of students, there are other ways of instilling such skills. The theoretical explanations must remain at the core of the course; the specific means of applying those explanations can be based

upon a myriad of approaches

Textbooks

Obviously, the approach we are suggesting is different than the way the argumentation course used to be taught. Even two decades ago, it would have been virtually impossible to find a textbook that would suit this type of course as argumentation texts tended to rely solely on the competitive debate model as a means of explaining the concepts. Today, that is no longer the case. Without concerning ourselves with the causes of such a change, suffice it to say that there are now textbooks available for the argumentation instructor who wishes to approach the course from the more basic perspective. The following paragraphs will cite some of the more useful textbook choices available to the instructor.

While it may be embarrassing to one of us, first mention must go to Argumentation and the Decision-Making Process (8) by Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars. It ought not to come as any earth-shaking surprise that we find this text to be one which gives sufficient consideration to the rationale, attitudinal and technical skills which we discussed above. In fact, the Rieke and Sillars text was really the first in the field to abandon an overt emphasis on academic debate. As such, it was the pioneering work from which others have taken their cues. Primary attention is paid in the work to the "audience-centered concept of argument;" it is the construct that undergirds the entire text. In the book, little consideration is given to formal academic debate but extensive discussions are offered of the application of argumentative constructs to a variety of situations and settings. Thus, one could teach the course from this text without any discussion of formalized debates or, if one wished to include them, supplementary lectures or reading would be necessary.

Operating from a somewhat similar perspective is An Introduction to Reasoning (9) by Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke and Allan Janik. In this text, the unifying construct of the work is an explanation of the various facets of the Toulmin model. In addition, the authors focus extensively on what be termed "everyday argumentation." There is no specific reference to academic debate and, like the Rieke and Sillars text, this one devotes an independent section to special fields of reasoning.

Argumentation: Reasoning in Communication (10) by J. Vernon Jensen is quite similar in orientation to the Rieke and Sillars volume. The echoes of their work can clearly be heard in his. There are some differences, however. He frequently alludes to academic debate in his discussions but does not really focus his attention upon it. One thus gets a taste for the activity but in no way can it be a full meal. Depending

on the orientation of the instructor, certain of Jensen's chapters, such as the one on the oral presentation of argumentation, may or may not be useful as one attempts to focus on the basic precepts of argumentation.

J. Michael Sproule's Argument: Language and Its Influence (11) follows a similar orientation. While he does include two chapters about formal debate, an interesting chapter on ethics, and some useful exercises, his focus is upon the theoretical constructs of argumentation. Unlike the Rieke and Sillars text, which has the notion of the audience-centered perspective as a guiding principle, there does not seem to be a unifying position for Sproule's work. Such may be either an advantage or a disadvantage, depending upon the general desires of the instructor.

The final text which we feel most closely serves the needs of a general course is Richard E. Crable's Argumentation as Communication: Reasoning with Receivers. (12) Crable acknowledges his indebtedness to the works of Toulmin and notes that he approaches argumentation as a special sort of communication process rather than a kind of quasi-logical act. Its unifying construct is an emphasis upon how a receiver responds to arguments but he does not totally ignore the qualitative and ethical demands placed upon the arguer.

Clearly, there are a number of other argumentation texts available for adoption. It is our judgment, though, that the six cited above are the texts which most closely approach the course from the basic argumentation perspective which we are committed to. Other texts focus much more significantly on the competitive perspective and, thus, seem more appropriate for those courses which choose to approach the argumentation course differently than we do.

Conclusion

It is our position, then, that a rationale exists for teaching the argumentation course from a general perspective in order to foster certain specific skills and that texts are readily available for those desiring to teach a course from that perspective. We would contend that doing so provides a service to the students, the colleges and the society. Of course, any such approach entails certain inherent risks. There is always the danger that one may be successful in teaching students to reason critically.

On the final examination for my argumentation course, I presented students with the following scenario: "Assume that the Board of Trustees of the California State University and College system is discussing the following proposition: 'Resolved, that the general education requirement for a course in Critical Reasoning should be abolished.' You are addressing the Board. Take a position on either side of the

proposition and present and defend your arguments." A freshman student offered the following answer: "Yes, courses in critical reasoning should get abolished immediately. We as educators are doing our job to prepare students for life as our government and society's values have evolved to this point. College students who have had a critical reasoning course are beginning to disrupt things. Several have been reported cross-examining teachers on their course information, many are asking teachers for credentials, some even ask teachers to supply good arguments as to why the course is necessary. It hasn't stopped there. Why one student today asked top administrators why it was necessary for them to be away from campus for so many seminars and that student already knew how much had been spent and who had spent it. If students like this are able to gain adherence of others we could be in trouble again just like the sixties. Our government has been doing a good job of suggesting where we as educators should milk-down information students receive in classes about government workings and society. Isn't it up to us to take the initiative and abolish a course that only starts the fires of anger and resentment in officials public statements. Let's do our part to protect the status quo." Surely if a freshman student can see the possible consequences of teaching the course from a general perspective, professionals should be able to do so as well. The moral is clear: if we do not want to take the risks attendant upon teaching citizens the precepts of general argumentation, we ought not to choose this approach. However, if the idea of teaching students to critically examine the workings of argumentation in society have any appeal, the general argumentation perspective can be most useful.

Notes

*The author would like to express her appreciation to Dr. Malcolm O. Sillars for his contributions to the conceptualization and development of this paper.

¹David A. Thomas, "Summary of the Workshop in Pedagogy and Curriculum Development," in Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1983): 252.

²Wayne Brockriede, "Where is Argument?" Journal of the American Forensic Association, 11 (Spring, 1975), 179-182.

³Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

⁴Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company, 1984), p. xvi.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Brockriede, p. 179.

⁸Rieke and Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process.

⁹Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1984).

¹⁰J. Vernon Jensen, Argumentation: Reasoning in Communication (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1981).

¹¹J. Michael Sproule, Argument: Language and Its Influence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

¹²Richard E. Crable, Argumentation as Communication: Reasoning with Receivers (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1976).

TEACHING THE ARGUMENTATION COURSE FROM A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE

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The basic argumentation course can be a forum for discussion with many applications.¹ To allow students to gain the broadest perspective of the discipline, the merits of teaching a multifaceted approach combining both theoretical concepts and competitive skills are explored. This paper outlines reasons why both theoretical and competitive approaches can be combined successfully without sacrificing one orientation over the other.

A Case for the Multifaceted Perspective

Considering the variety of applications that argumentation has, students should be exposed to the widest range of opportunities. If merely a theoretical approach is used, students are often left with a mind full of concepts but with a lack of practical skills based on those concepts. What good does it do one if s/he can place any argument into a Toulmin diagram and label the parts if they are not a more discerning consumer of argument in their everyday life? Volumes of theory, all of which may be useful to some degree, have been written about argument, yet it is the practical application of this theory which makes it truly useful to the beginning student of argumentation. Limiting a course to mere theory can be too esoteric for students to fully appreciate.

Another application that is popular among several instructors, particularly debate coaches, is a competitive debate oriented approach. Some directors of forensics might find the beginning argumentation course a useful place to teach the competitive skills which can be practiced on the debate circuit week-end after week-end. However, to limit students to solely one application also does them a disservice. For example, a competitive approach is limited in its discussion of ethos and rarely reaches beyond the dab of persuasion that occurs in today's debate round. The discussion of language rarely centers on the substantive usage of language in all arguments, but instead concentrates on the use of jargon and word economy. The nonverbal aspects of argumentation are virtually ignored and the theory students study most likely focuses on standards of counterplan competitiveness or respective debate paradigms. Too often, then, students get a stilted perspective of argumentation with but a single application. As Gregg Walker noted at the National Development Conference on Forensics, "We may believe that argumentation is central to debate, yet many debate students have a poor understanding of classical or contemporary theories of argument. Our persuasive speakers and 'analyzers' of communication, driven more by a quest for plastic trophies, may search for the most tournament-successful speech method rather than making strategic choices as a knowledgeable rhetor."² When instructors teach solely competitive skills in the classroom with little application

beyond the debate round, students are cheated out of a variety of opportunities which could benefit them in society. Unfortunately, the reverse is also true. Students trained only in a theoretical perspective do not benefit from the intense experience of debating. As Brenda Logue noted, "Few other communication courses have the built in pressure element that is present in debate."³

The advantage to a multifaceted perspective is that one can strike a balance in the introductory course, using it to serve both needs. It can provide the fundamental theory of the discipline AND provide a use for that theory through the application of competitive debate. Yet the application does not need to end there. Many types of competitive and noncompetitive activities can be used as tools to further the understanding of the theoretical knowledge students gain. In addition, teaching about competitive debate can give the activity broader exposure, as many a fine debater has been recruited from a basic argumentation course.

Problems with Teaching a Multifaceted Approach

One of the most basic problems in trying to strike a balance between theory and competition is to find a text suitable for this purpose. No less than a dozen argumentation texts are currently peddled for our use, and it is often difficult to decide which one suits this purpose best.

Several texts come down on the side of teaching a theoretical perspective. Rieke and Sillars⁴ have recently published a new edition of their text which provides a good, updated version of argumentation theory with a new application of theory in their fields section. Yet, this text is hardly useful in teaching contemporary competitive debate, as was noted by Charles Kneupper in a review of the text, "It is more suited to classes which approach argument cognitively and emphasize theoretical concerns, than to classes oriented to the practice of intercollegiate debating."⁵ This omission seems a bit odd in light of the authors' acknowledgment in the introduction to their section on fields that students, "will learn about the problems and techniques of argumentation where specialized knowledge is necessary."⁶ Certainly competitive debate fits such a description and could have been included.

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik⁷ begin their text from a philosophical standpoint using the Toulmin model as the basis for their discussion. Consequently, after reading this text, a student undoubtedly should be able to diagram nearly any argument and perhaps even apply arguments in the special fields of law, science, arts, and management. However, students will not have a clue as to how to apply these skills in a competitive debate as was noted by Daniel O'Keefe, ". . . [I]t is not an academic debate text (and hence there is no mention of counterplans or inherency or cross examination techniques). . ."⁸

Richard Crable approaches his text from a receiver viewpoint claiming to "view argumentation as the sort of rational process described in the theorizing of Professor Stephen Toulmin."⁹ In his attempt to transcend

the strict logical interpretation of argumentation, he, too, has failed to focus on competitive debate.

J. Michael Sproule¹⁰ also takes a unique perspective in his approach to argumentation. He combines the substance of argumentation with other theories of communication, such as perception, language, and persuasion. Janice Schuetz comments on its usefulness from a debate standpoint, "Sproule's text offers an alternative approach which de-emphasizes competitive debate and stresses the applications of argumentation to contemporary contexts."¹¹

J. Vernon Jensen claims to be all things to all people. He writes, "This book is intended for courses in Argumentation or Argumentation and Debate, whether at the lower or upper division level. It should also fulfill the needs of courses in Applied Logic and Argumentation in departments of Philosophy, English, and Journalism. The book is appropriate as well for the debater and for students in adult education courses."¹² While perhaps the most readable and well explained text in the areas of evidence and reasoning, it falls short of its goal to assist competitive debaters. When Jensen tries to include a debate perspective on various issues such as case and debate formats, he treats current formats lightly and includes many additional formats one would hardly conceive as being useful on the competitive circuit. His information regarding debate is highly descriptive and the mechanics for practicing the various forms of debate are missing from the text.

On the other hand, several texts emphasize only the competitive debate area as an application for argument. Perhaps the most well-known text, Argumentation and Debate, by Austin J. Freeley,¹³ has been useful in providing the fundamentals of debate for over two decades. In each edition, Freeley makes an effort to update information on current practices in competitive debate. While his text is undoubtedly useful and probably occupies a prime spot on the shelf of each forensic educator, it provides only a cursory treatment of such theoretical issues as ethos, values, language, syllogisms, and fields.

Patterson and Zarefsky¹⁴ begin their text with a unit on basic argumentation which is sound but paves the way for their contemporary hypothesis testing approach to competitive debate. This book has a distinct debate flavor throughout and omits such standards as a discussion of the Toulmin diagram.

Gerald Sanders solely deals with competitive debate. In fact, to the extent that Sanders discusses theory, he "indicate(s) how it can be used in a practical sense in academic debate."¹⁵

With such a myriad of texts available it is difficult to choose which one best represents a multifaceted approach. However, I found the following three to come the closest to integrating theory with the practice of competitive debate.

Ehninger and Brockriede,¹⁶ while concentrating on a debate perspective, provide a sound theoretical base for its application. They address current concepts in argumentation theory in their chapter "Perspectives on Argument" and delegated the information regarding contemporary competitive debate practices to then-active coaches.

Ziegelmueller and Dause¹⁷ also strike a good balance of theoretical information and competitive practice. Yet their material is somewhat dated since their book was published a decade ago. Both argumentation theory and debate practice have changed greatly.

Finally, Eisenberg and Ilardo¹⁸ provide a thumbnail sketch of competitive debate, doing a reasonable job of outlining speaker responsibilities, formats, etc. However, their approach is rather simplistic and is not integrated as a method of application of argumentation throughout the book--the chapter stands alone. Several chapters later the authors even include a chapter on "Applied Argumentation" that doesn't even mention academic debate as an application.

Such attempts are disappointing. Most texts fail because they attempt to be all things to all people. By trying to tailor themselves to both camps many texts do not do a thorough job with either, leaving the student frustrated and confused. Most books have their merits and their faults. As a result, I find myself using chapters of various books to combine these two approaches, so my syllabus winds up looking like a "Who's Who" of argumentation authors.

A second problem in teaching a multifaceted perspective is the limited time in any academic calendar. Obviously all instructors must make choices as to what material to present and what to omit, yet when combining two approaches, the difficulty of this task is magnified. It is rare to find a college or university that teaches both an argumentation and a debate course as two separate classes. So most frequently, instructors are forced to squeeze both segments of the course into a single semester or quarter. Trying to do too much can be dangerous, as students can easily become confused. If enough time is not allotted, especially for the competitive aspect, students can come to dread debating and the quality of the learning experience becomes little more than an exercise in futility.

Solutions to Teaching a Multifaceted Perspective

Nevertheless, I believe there are a variety of ways that a multifaceted course can be taught successfully. One approach which emphasizes a broader application is to structure the course around Aristotle's three forms of discourse: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. To demonstrate the importance of argumentation in deliberative rhetoric a legislative forum could be held in the classroom. The instructor acts as chair and the students, as members of various committees, present bills which can be debated, voted upon, or referred to committee for later consideration.

This assignment normally takes at least two weeks so students have adequate time to structure, support, and rewrite their bills. This provides a positive method for students to understand the importance of argumentation in public policy-making situations and can also prepare them for competitive policy debate. Another assignment which stresses the deliberative aspect of argumentation is for students to trace a bill through the state legislature. Many colleges and universities are located in close proximity to state capitals and this assignment allows students to see the many and varied times that practical argumentation skills are necessary to enact legislation.

Forensic rhetoric can be taught by having students involved in moot court proceedings. A variety of cases, both real and fictional, can be obtained from such sources as the Point of Law game. Students assume various roles such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, jury members, etc., so that each student experiences the importance of argumentation in a legal context. This assignment can also be expanded to include lessons on brief writing to offer students practical experience in sound argument construction. If one does not have time for entire court proceedings, another option is to have attorney-judged debates. This combines the skills of debate with a legal perspective. Most communities have a pool of former debaters who are now members of the legal profession who might conceed to assist with this assignment. Finally, if class time is truly at a premium, students can visit a trial in the community and identify the types of arguments used. This perhaps provides the most valid experience of legal argumentation. Obviously it is rare when an entire class can arrange to see a trial, so a group of students may attend and report back to the class. This experience normally provides good insight into the workings of the court system and the argumentation necessary for its success.

Since epideictic speaking is usually ceremonial in nature it is often important to analyze the ethos of the speaker. Students can be assigned to select a speaker and then focus on the elements the speaker uses to establish his/her credibility both verbally and nonverbally. The assignment can be extended to ask students to identify aspects the speaker used which may enhance their personal credibility. This is useful for debaters so they can understand what elements contribute to making a presentation credible or incredible. Another assignment which teaches about credibility is to have students analyze the article "Who's Really Running America?" an annual feature published in U.S. News & World Report. Students can identify which leaders have ethos and how that ethos was attained. It is also interesting to see how this list changes from year to year. Students may want to speculate on what attributes cause people to appear on the list at one time and not another.

When teaching the specific application of argumentation to competitive debate several options are available. Considering the complexity of the activity it is usually a good idea to provide a model for the students to follow. A demonstration debate by members of the intercollegiate debate team can provide such a model and generate respect and enthusiasm for the activity. However, if careful modifications are not made and caveats

given, students can become perplexed and bewildered with the complexity of the activity. However, if properly introduced, even the vast volumes of evidence competitive debaters are likely to drag in can serve a useful learning purpose. According to Logue, "[This] 'negative aspect' of competition is also indicative of the massive amounts of information which one experiences daily in society. Certainly a student in argumentation and debate does not at the end of a course amass volumes of research, but a student can come away with a sense of the volumes of information available in presenting and defending a position."¹⁹ If a live performance cannot be arranged, a video of a debate can serve a similar purpose. Critiquing the debate using official ballots can provide unique insight into the criteria judges will later use to evaluate student performances. This is also an appropriate time to teach the skill of flowsheeting so students can accurately keep track of the debate.

The debate assignment should concentrate on the application of several argumentative skills. Argument construction and organization can be stressed through the assignment of a brief for the debate. Students can emphasize the importance of research by writing a library log which details their efforts in gathering evidence for their debate, identifying the types of material found, blind alleys, and research successes. If the classroom experience proves to be stimulating, tournament experience can be used to supplement classroom training. Throughout the country there are local debate leagues, such as the Twin Cities Forensic League, Mid-America Forensic League, Valley Forensic League, and the Pacific Southwest Collegiate Forensic Association, which sponsor a series of short tournaments. Students can get practical application in competitive debate by entering such a tournament or by accompanying the intercollegiate debate team to participate in the novice division of a regular season tournament. Not only does this provide a valuable experience for the students, but it also broadens the scope of the institution's forensic program, usually at a minimal cost. Such an assignment can be used as a supplemental class requirement or as extra-credit.

Obviously debate formats can be altered to suit specific class time available. Several other formats have proven successful. One such option is the attack and defense speeches. The class is divided into several groups according to interest on a particular topic. Each student presents a short (three-minute) speech advocating change from the present system. S/he will then be refuted by another student for the same amount of time and then the first student gives a short speech to defend his/her original position. This rotation continues until every student has had both the opportunity to attack and defend a position resulting in three short speeches. Another opportunity for students to construct and refute arguments is to have students work in dyads and present point/counterpoint speeches, similar to the ones formerly done by television news commentators. This assignment gives students a good initial opportunity to create a case and engage in preliminary refutation skills, without requiring the thorough analysis necessary to extend arguments. Finally, alternative debate formats can be used, such as a parliamentary debate. This exercise can involve

the entire class at once. In addition to teaching debating skills, this exercise also requires a knowledge of parliamentary procedure, and important skill, yet one found infrequently in the college curriculum.

Several general assignments can also highlight various components of argumentation theory and provide useful application of argument skills. Many of these ideas come from the course "Analysis of Oral Argument," a basic distribution requirement taught at the University of Minnesota. Claims made via the media often make excellent ideas for classroom speeches or discussions. Having students analyze the claims, evidence, types of reasoning, and fallacies in television commercials, billboards, and printed advertisements provides a good opportunity for students to evaluate the argumentation they daily consume. Examples of arguments from the public radio feature "All Things Considered" also make for lively classroom discussion and excellent essay test questions. Students can become involved citizens by drafting letters to the editor of a local newspaper. Rough drafts can be presented in class and tested to determine the effectiveness of the ideas. Revisions can be submitted for possible publication. Examples of arguments can also be found in the cinema. Class discussions or assignments can be constructed around a controversial movie, perhaps on some public problem such as nuclear war, i.e. Testament, Special Bulletin, etc., or a classic movie such as Twelve Angry Men. Even the lyrics of a popular song can arouse a lively discussion as students analyze the various arguments made. Finally, students can be made aware of the importance of argument fields by writing a paper based on an interview they've conducted with an expert in a chosen field. Students should attempt to discover the kinds of arguments which are preferred by persons in that specific field. Such an assignment can also be expanded to include evidence types and values found to be successful in a given field. This assignment allows students the opportunity to begin characterizing a specific field of argumentation.

Conclusion

Teaching the basic argumentation course from a multifaceted perspective offers students the widest understanding of the practical application of argumentation theory. By combining both the theoretical and competitive aspects of argumentation, students can gain a fuller understanding of argumentation. By learning how audience analysis is critical for the debate judge, a student can understand that adapting to the receiver is a critical element of successful argumentation. Participation in the debate activity can underscore the rigor, quick analysis, and skillful practice that is essential in competitive debate but is also useful in a legal and legislative contest as well. Such positive exposures of argumentation can only serve to strengthen forensic programs and provide a multitude of experiences for the student so that the introductory argumentation course becomes a rewarding blend of theory with a practice.

NOTES

¹Such applications include Phyllis Bosley, "The College Argumentation and Debate Course: Applications to Mass Communication and Public Relations," and Brenda Logue, "Argumentation and Debate: Applications for Organizational Communication and Business Majors," papers presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1978.

²Gregg Walker, American Forensics in Perspective, ed. Donn Parson (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1984) 47.

³Logue 7.

⁴Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1984).

⁵Charles W. Kneupper, rev. of Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, by Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Journal of the American Forensic Association 21 (1984): 105.

⁶Rieke and Sillars 214.

⁷Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: Macmillan, 1979).

⁸Daniel J. O'Keefe, rev. of An Introduction to Reasoning, by Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, Journal of the American Forensic Association 17 (1980): 65.

⁹Richard E. Crable, Argumentation as Communication: Reasoning with Receivers (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1976) v.

¹⁰J. Michael Sproule, Argument: Language and Its Influence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

¹¹Janice Schuetz, rev. of Argument: Language and Its Influence by J. Michael Sproule, Journal of the American Forensic Association 17 (1980): 63.

¹²J. Vernon Jensen, Argumentation, Reasoning in Communication (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1981) vii.

¹³Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, Reasoned Decision Making, 5th ed. (Belmont, MA: Wadsworth, 1981).

¹⁴J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).

¹⁵Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, 2nd ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1983) ix.

¹⁶Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockrieke, Decision by Debate, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row).

¹⁷George W. Zieglmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation, Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

¹⁸Abné M. Eisenberg and Joseph A. Ilardo, Argument, A Guide to Formal and Informal Debate, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).

¹⁹Logue 5.

Teaching Argumentation from a Competitive Perspective

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When choosing a format to teach argumentation, the instructor has a multitude of options. This paper will present the pedagogical advantages and implications of teaching argumentation from a competitive perspective. In so doing, I will first discuss the nature of the competitive approach, then present the advantages this perspective offers, and finally, suggest a means for applying this perspective.

Nature of the Competitive Perspective

Most instructors associate the competitive perspective with teaching the skills of advocacy through the use of the debate laboratory. Unfortunately, some educators believe that debate in the classroom is synonymous with intercollegiate debate--an activity that has become estranged from the discipline of communication in a number of departments. The competitive perspective I am advocating is similar to the intercollegiate debate model in that students are trained argumentation skills through an extensive process of advancing and defending claims. It differs, however, in that students apply argumentation and debate theories in a manner designed to gain the adherence of peers or a lay audience, as opposed to the "trained" forensic judge. When taught in this fashion, the competitive perspective is "audience-centered." Students learn the fundamentals of debate, while maintaining a public speaking style of delivery and a concern for arguments that are created for lay audiences.

Advantages of the Competitive Perspective

Based on my own experience and discussions with colleagues, I have found that the use of extended classroom debating can enhance student involvement and responsibility. Students are motivated by the competition that debating offers and know that ultimately they are responsible for their classroom performance. This involvement, with other classmates inspires students to work toward their potential and take greater care in making sure that their work is properly completed.

Implicit in training students to be effective advocates and critics of argument is the notion that students should be able to effectively articulate and defend their claims. Participating in educational debate is an effective way for students to develop these skills. Unlike the "basic" or "multifaceted" approaches to teaching argument--which offer limited debate experience--the competitive perspective utilizes the debate laboratory as the primary method for teaching argumentation. As a result, students taught via this perspective have a greater opportunity to become proficient in creating, articulating, and evaluating arguments. Finally,

through the process of debating a proposition students learn first hand that multiple interpretations exist for any given issue. The student discovers that competing views should not be rejected or accepted without analysis. Debate requires students to critically evaluate the positions of others and to develop arguments in response to their opponents positions. This process of critically analyzing, evaluating, advancing and defending claims fosters an appreciation for pluralism and uniquely enhances a student's understanding of how ideas should compete in a free society.

Teaching the Competitive Perspective

When teaching argumentation from a competitive perspective, a text that facilitates this view is Austin J. Freeley's book, Argumentation and Debate: Reasoned Decision Making, fifth edition. The following three sections discuss the general course parameters, how to prepare students to debate, and the nature of the debate experience.

General course parameters: Students should debate a single proposition for the duration of the course. The competitive nature of debate, combined with the use of a single proposition for the entirety of the course, encourages students to continually rethink and investigate related arguments, thus, producing the advantages from critical analysis, etc. discussed earlier. Propositions should be narrow in scope; I suggest using the current novice National Debate Tournament (N.D.T.) proposition, or a restricted version of the N.D.T. topic. A common procedure among my colleagues is to make plans "self-evident." (e.g. Handguns should be banned). I recommend the use of policy propositions, rather than value propositions, simply because my past experience indicates that students can better conceptualize, and thus gain greater benefits, from policy propositions. The proposition should be introduced early in the course, and should be used to explicate argumentation and debate theory.

Preparation for debating: In preparing the students to debate, I recommend the use of "Master Learning Assignments." These assignments are not graded per se, but must be completed satisfactorily in order to pass the course. These assignments can include evidence assignments, affirmative and negative briefs, refutation briefs and an annotated bibliography. In addition, class time should be devoted to discussing the nature of argument, analyzing the proposition, cross examination and flowsheeting.

Debates: To gain the benefits of an extended debate laboratory, I recommend that a minimum of five weeks of the semester be spent debating. Scheduling can be a problem, so students should be informed early that some debates will take place at times other than the regular class period. Time should be appropriated so students can receive immediate feedback from the instructor, or critic. This means the instructor should not hesitate to adjust the debate format (i.e., speaking times), or when necessary, form three person teams instead of the traditional two person teams. Students should be responsible for final versions of their affirmative and negative briefs. Students should also attend other debate rounds involving

their classmates and be required to provide written critiques. If possible, students should be given the opportunity to participate in actual debate tournaments. Most areas of the country have regional organizations that offer novice divisions (or preferably Beginners Divisions, where students have no prior debate experience in high school or college) where students will find competition comparable to what they have experienced in the classroom.

Conclusion:

Training students to argue effectively is one of the most important skills for life in a democracy. The competitive perspective, unlike others, teaches the skills of analysis, research, proof, reasoning, organization, and communication. The debate laboratory offers students the opportunities to discover and develop skills that can be used both in and beyond academia. I believe that these considerations combine to give the competitive perspective unique pedagogical advantages over other approaches, and that it merits serious attention by argumentation instructors.

ON THE DILEMMA OF AD HOC ARGUMENT FIELDS: THE INADEQUACY OF FIELD-DEPENDENT ARGUMENT STANDARDS

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Having reviewed the literature on Argument Fields I was reminded of Justice Potter Stewart's pragmatic pronouncement on hard-core pornography. He could not define obscenity, he had written, but "I know it when I see it."¹ Actually, Justice Stewart may yet prove to have been further advanced in his understanding of obscenity "absent" a cogent definition than I am in my understanding of argument fields armed with an abundance of perspectives to choose from.² Leaving aside the intrinsic interest which may be imparted by each of us to our respective subject of inquiry, I think I can safely parrot the commentary that "argument fields" have been used in a variety of ways since first proposed by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument. While the diversity of views has resulted in a robust exchange, we may be at a juncture where pedagogical aims of teaching argument fields are obscured by their imprecision.

While I don't mean to claim pedagogy as my unique preserve, I am concerned that after all is said and done we may not be able to produce any consistent description of argument fields which can inform students of argument where to look for, how to recognize, and how to evaluate arguments should they find them. Since a fields-based approach to argument presumes there should be differences in arguments, one would expect that those differences to be identifiable. Of course, this is predicated upon the fields being discernable. Except for a few texts which have described a limited number of "fields" and their attendant elements,³ most authors have proposed a set of principles and routines for determining fields, rather than offering a typology of fields with supporting standards and criteria.⁴ At best we may be offered an anecdotal example or two.

Which brings me to this essay. How do we use argument fields to instruct persons to "advance, support, modify, or criticize claims so that appropriate decision makers may grant or deny adherence?"⁵ Actually, you'll be disappointed to discover that I don't directly answer my own question. I have not structured the "super-matrix" of fields which accounts for the various blends of argument forms, subject matter, situational factors, audience purpose, or academic disciplines which have been described as determinants of fields.⁶ Such an instrument may well be impossible to construct, but in any event, it is not my interest here.

Rather, I propose that we re-examine the notion of fields as a justificatory tool. Developmentally mature social actors have been socialized to include argumentation within their repertoires. As these actors are confronted by the contingencies of their existence, they search their repertoires for an appropriate response. This is to say that people learn social rules and apply them when they think the rules are appropriate. Argumentation is viewed as a set of social skills which a person employs. Beyond a very limited range, the average person does not differentiate "fields of argument" until experience

dictates the need for an adaptive response. The average person (social actor) does not normally employ field distinctions in making claims. If field-dependence becomes an issue, it is an artifact of justifying the claim. That is, a claim becomes an argument in search of a field which can justify it. But while field distinctions may be employed by argument theorists and critics, they are seldom used as intentional strategies by argument users.

There are really two arguments imbedded in this position. First is the argument that the several perspectives offered in explanation of argument fields, when treated separately, are at best post hoc descriptions which do not readily avail themselves to use by persons engaged in argument. In my pedagogical frame of reference, they don't inform the average persons well in choosing how they should approach a situation. Of course, the second position is that when taken together, these perspectives are confusing. Even if informed in advance, the average person would find the conflicting descriptions unuseable.

So I will briefly review the perspectives which have been advanced for argument fields and discuss their pedagogical limitations. Then I will advance the position that most argumentative claims are ad hoc attempts at justification--Arguments which are in search of the field which may justify them.

Perspectives on Fields of Argument

There are at least two reasonably good reviews on approaches to the nature of argument fields. These are by Zarefsky⁷ and Rowland.⁸ While they differ on some particulars, I have largely used their categorizations with some revision to reflect subsequent contributions to the literature. Since my purpose is different from theirs, I will emphasize some elements they do not.

1. Argument Fields are Determined by Formal Characteristics (Logical Types).

On its face, this approach to evaluating fields would appear to be most promising for the argument practitioner looking for an argument field. If fields are delineated by the same logical type,⁹ then all one would need is the catalogue of type-field characteristics. Logical types would serve as a template identifying fields. Consonant with this approach is McKerrow who criticizes those who would remove argument fields from "its logical type context and applying it more broadly to disciplines or definable subject matters"¹⁰

While conceptually appealing, this approach has failed to provide instruction on the location of fields. After positing the type-field delineation in The Uses of Argument, Toulmin has been silent in expanding this notion to a taxonomy of fields. There is reason to believe such will not be forthcoming. Rowland has noted that "a single type of argument or evidence may be used in many contexts." He further contends that for many disciplines there is no single accepted form of argument.¹¹ So as a student of argument seeking to inform myself of what field I was in, I could not use the formal characteristics of argument as a guide because (a) no catalogue of field-type characteristics exists, and (b) if it did exist (in whole or part) there would not be an invariable connection between field and argument type.

Willard's indicative of logical types as indicia of fields argues the two would be redundant. Additionally, other elements which are characteristic of fields would be forsaken by this approach.¹² Since Willard's approach deserves

separate treatment as a theory of fields, I will delay addressing him here. It should suffice to say that if one accepts Willard's position on fields, the pedagogical reservations on formal characteristics become irrelevant--it would no longer be acceptable as a perspective on fields.

2. Argument Fields are Determined by Subject Matter.

As with formal characteristics, treating argument fields as determined by their subject matter (or content) has a surface appeal. In essence this approach would categorize all arguments about a subject together as a field. A student of argument seeking the field of argument on the subject of abortion would have a cross-referenced index of the topic regardless of origin or perspective. Some have argued that debate topics constitute subject matter fields¹³ while two argumentation textbooks distinguish "Special Fields of Reasoning/Argument" which appear to have their focus upon subject matter.¹⁴

The problems of using a subject matter to understand fields of argument are considerable, however. First, there is a question of what information is pertinent to a "subject" field. This concern was first visited upon me as a young graduate student searching Psych. Abstracts for references on "Order Effects." While I thought I was looking for listings pertaining to primacy and recency, and climax and anti-climax sequences of organization, the listings under order effects kept liberating me of these issues in preference of "serial predicate order" and the like. Ambiguity in categorization may occur even with the specification of criteria for inclusion (or exclusion). Rieke and Sillars may illustrate this problem in describing their approach to specialized fields:

Our approach is that specialized argumentation does take place, and a field is defined by the claims the professionals in that field argue, the kinds of argument forms they choose and the way they support such claims. However, we recognize that the characteristics we have found do not always hold. We have defined fields by their usual principles of argumentation.¹⁵ (emphasis added)

Second, a common subject label does not imply agreement among the sources who contributed material to the subject. The point is patently obvious in subjects like abortion as Willard has already described.¹⁶ The constitutional lawyer explaining the legal basis for Roe v. Wade may find little in common with the cleric advancing the moral reasons for opposing abortion. If these adversarial positions are categorized as belonging to the same subject matter, the student of argument may understandably be confused as to why a field contains seemingly incompatible parts. The other alternative for dealing with incompatible elements within a subject matter field is to adopt a "Solomon solution"--declare separate subject matter fields.

The "Solomon-solution" to resolving subject field incompatibilities leads to its own set of problems. The most obvious of these to our student of argument fields is that the subject matter field takes on a very ephemeral quality. What is a subject field if it can be dismissed and reconstituted to suit the expedience of the moment? Can our student have any confidence in the use of such an entity as a warrant for a claim? More importantly, I believe, the bifurcation of subject fields creates a specious "intra-field" consistency without informing us how to resolve the newly created "inter-field" conflict.

This intellectual "sleight of hand" contributes to ambiguity of what constitutes a field as well as promotes a sense of the "amorality" of fields. I believe the following passage from An Introduction to Reasoning conveys the point:

We shall not present arguments in any one field of practical reasoning as being better or more rational than others. The only judgments that we shall pass will, as a result, be "intrafield" judgments, having to do with features that make some scientific arguments weightier than other scientific arguments, some legal considerations more forceful than other legal considerations, and so on. We shall not be concerned with "interfield" comparisons. It is not our aim to argue, for example, that all scientific arguments are--simply because they are "scientific"--weightier than any legal or ethical argument.¹⁷

So once again as the student seeking to determine which argument field I was in, the subject matter distinction creates difficulties because (a) the subject field may be ambiguous, (b) it may create inconsistency by its inclusion of incompatible parts, or (c) to obtain internal consistency it reformulates itself. While Kafka may have had literary license, when an argument field can undergo metamorphosis for expedience, it makes the poor student of argument suspicious of the residue.

3. Argument Fields are Determined by Academic Disciplines

Zarefsky treats this as a special version of the "subject matter" field approach¹⁸ while Rowland calls them "sociological entities containing all the scholars in a discipline."¹⁹ In either case the approach roughly equates an argument field with an academic discipline. Not all disciplines are created equal, however, as Toulmin distinguishes among compact, diffuse, would-be, and undisciplined disciplines in addition to the undisciplinables in Human Understanding. The student of argument fields would be informed of his/her location among fields by knowing the requirements expected within the appropriate discipline.

I believe Zarefsky's criticisms of this approach are most salient to a pedagogical focus, so I'll rely primarily on his analysis. He first notes that disciplinary boundaries are becoming obscured. He further offers that different disciplines may have a common interest (implying that the correspondence between academic discipline and argument field is not exclusive). Finally, he observes that the breadth of some disciplines may make differences among members in the same discipline greater than between scholars in different disciplines.²⁰ All of these point to difficulties the student of argument would encounter in using academic disciplines as the criterion of fields. As disciplinary boundaries become obscured their correspondence with an argument field becomes blurred. Common interest upon a problem area by separate disciplines argument field boundaries. And the range of focus in some disciplines may make the very label "academic discipline" more of an historical artifact than an integrating element of common discourse.

A more serious problem Zarefsky identifies is that academic disciplines represent "an inappropriate paradigm for general argumentation." This occurs because most argument does not occur "within the confines of an academic discipline."²¹ If the common person generates arguments uninformed by the field (discipline) at hand, then the field hardly instructs our talent argument.

This last criticism identified by Zarefsky is central to my position that fields (however construed) are at best post hoc descriptions which do not readily avail themselves to use by persons engaged in argument. If uninformed in the standards of each academic discipline (of which a complete catalogue is once again absent), then the typical person is not given much help in discerning an approach based on disciplinary fields. Of course, the task is not made easier when Toulmin orders disciplines from compact to undisciplinable.

4. Argument Fields are Determined by Shared Purpose

Rowland has proposed that persons who share a common purpose are occupants of the same field. The shared purpose of arguers "energizes" the field notion of argument to integrate differing conceptions of situation, method, subject matter and discipline.²² To our student of argument a field should be identifiable if its member explicitly tell us their shared purpose or if we are capable of inferring it. Find the purpose and you'll have located the field.

The problems with this approach center on the determination of shared purpose. For instance, Rowland himself acknowledges that in the ordinary language field of abortion there are apparent conflicting purposes held by the disputants.²³ Zarefsky notes that discussions may occur among persons who have multiple purposes.²⁴ Additionally, in ordinary language arguers may not know their own purpose.

Farrell develops a set of criticisms of this approach which can be summarized in the following: Rowland's approach distorts Toulmin's purpose in ignoring a presumed ordinary language tradition, restricts field evaluation to a relatively limited number of fields, and uses fields for evaluation rather than for description.²⁵ Rowland responds that it is not apparent that Toulmin meant to define fields as ordinary language, the utility of field theory as a critical tool would be useful regardless of the definition of argument, and that evaluation is not rejected by Toulmin.²⁶

From the pedagogical perspective of the use of fields, I think the limited applicability of shared purpose to ordinary language has the most relevance to my concerns. Combining Zarefsky's earlier reservation with Farrell's, it would appear that shared purpose may be begging the question. Rowland has an interesting response to the claim that faith healers and physicians have a shared purpose of ridding humans of disease. He claims that they obviously don't have the same purpose.²⁸ While this may be obvious to Rowland, it is not universally so. They may have multiple purposes, among which is included healing the sick. But the categorical claim that these purposes are different seems to illustrate Zarefsky's challenge that arguers may have multiple purposes. How does the student of argument become informed of the "true" purpose?

I think it can also be said that even in the narrowly defined academic fields that purpose may not be apparent. The field of international relations is replete with instances of multiple agendas operating even as the parties profess common interest of making the world safe from nuclear war.²⁹ Even in the field of law, where there appears to be a general consensus that it be treated as a field, the criticism has been raised that the apparent shared purpose of law does not really operate in a fashion consistent with shared purpose.³¹ Rowland may be correct that shared purpose provides a critical perspective which energizes a field. It may not, however, inform the ordinary language user of what this is.

5. Argument Fields are Determined by their Audiences.

This is the heading I finally decided to employ to place Willard. Perhaps it would have been more accurate to say "Argument Fields are determined by Willard." In a broad series of articles, Willard has maintained that it is through the psychological and sociological processes of interchange that determine the field. Fields exist "in the action of their members."³² People define situations as arguments, but these situational definitions are not purely idiosyncratic because social actors exchange their perspectives. "Any particular encounter or relationship is what it is because of the intersubjectivity derived agreements of the actors."³³

While this brief gloss hardly does justice to Willard, the student of argument fields can derive the following elements from Willard's approach: First, a field cannot be determined in advance of its "creation" by its users. Second, the composition of membership (and their attendant construct systems) combined with situational elements are more important than any externally presupposed (a priori) strictures. For instance, Willard had earlier indicted "Formalism" (logical types) because such an approach would "require ruling intentionality and context-embeddedness of utterance out of the picture."³⁴ Logical (linguistic) types would destroy the sociological entities of social actors. If I may recite an axiom of some repute, "words don't mean, people mean." It is not a great distance removed for Willard to claim that fields get their meaning from people.

How can our student of argument fields take exception to this? Well, it would be a difficult task to instruct our student of fields as to the appropriateness of argument claims prior to encountering (and engaging in a type of intersubjective communality) with the members of the field. All fields become "ad hoc" congregations. While this may be a valid construction of field theory, it requires a fairly sophisticated analysis by the ordinary language user to find "recurring" elements which transcend these constructions, at best. At worst, the pedagogically confused seeker of lost fields must re-invent a field with each social encounter.

5A. Argument Fields are Determined by Schools of Thought

This approach also is credited to Willard and constitutes a "middle"³⁵ level between Toulmin's "compact fields" and ordinary language fields. Zarefaky has suggested that this notion of a "world view" suggested by Toulmin implies that argumentative choices may be affected in significant ways.³⁶ To the student of argument fields, this approach suggests that schools of thought serve as an organizing point of view which allows ideas and events to be meaningfully integrated.

In criticizing this approach, Rowland links it to Kuhn's notion of paradigm. He notes that argumentative disputes may be resolved without the presence of a dominant paradigm (which by extension is suggesting they may not need a superordinate school of thought.) More importantly, this "other" sense in which Willard uses "fields" is not compatible with the ordinary language use which seems to underlie the rest of his program.³⁷ There is an ambiguity created for our student of fields when their usage shifts. Each construction of field may be treated as valid, but not at the same time. Perhaps our student would invoke O'Keefe's solution of subscribing.

6. Argument Fields are Determined by Community Standards.

This approach receives its primary direction from McKerrow who advances the thesis that we participate in different communities of interest which have different expectations and norms for evaluating arguments.³⁸ He does not claim this as a field approach, but it helps us distinguish differing interests we possess which operate in directing choice. In a somewhat different approach, Klumpp uses a dramatic perspective to "understand the argumentative dimension of communication as social definition of community and use that understanding to study the ways of arguing that characterize the conflicts in social interaction within and between communities."³⁹

The primary difference between these two approaches and Willard's might be stated as a greater emphasis on the presumed endurance of the social unit as the focus for analysis. This may be a greater-than, less-than distinction, but the difference in emphasis appears to be present. As such, the student of argument fields may ask how communities assist in understanding fields. Presumably, the normative function of groups generates and propagates the standards, which can be transmitted. The outstanding question is whether McKerrow's three contexts (social, philosophical, and personal) can account for the range of argument situations which might arise.⁴⁰ Further, while defining arguments as community of interests (or purpose) may synthesize a certain unity, it remains problematic whether the "community" actually partakes in the collective representation. A common audience may not exist, and if it did, it may be incidental anyway.⁴¹ Klumpp's dramatic approach was intended to generate research into fields rather than develop a theory of fields. As such, we should hope that community characteristics may be generated.

Conceptually, community differences make sense. Our student of argument fields might make some use of McKerrow's distinctions and hope for further refinement. But at best these are not sufficiently developed to be complete, and in any event probably constitute part of what Wenzel has defined as a context, which represents only a partial dimension of field.⁴²

6A. Argument Fields are determined by Socio-Pragmatics.

The latest entry to the field of field construction has been advanced by Newell. The Socio-pragmatic perspective shares many of the assumptions of the preceding category, although Newell more directly compares and contrasts it with Willard's "constructivist/interactionist" approach:

The pragmatic perspective focuses on the social system rather than the individual. The social system is described by describing patterns of behaviors. Describing a field of argument involves describing patterns of arguments within a social system. . . .

Constructivism and socio-pragmatism may be viewed as going in opposite directions to describe argument fields. Constructivism searches within members of a community's individual, psychological processes of sense-making to deconstruct an argument field. Socio-pragmatism observes behavior between members of a community to describe how they socially construct a field of argument. Pragmatism doesn't deny psychological processes, they just aren't the focus of study.⁴³

Newell uses the socio-pragmatic approach in a case study of the Utah State Legislature to confirm that recurring patterns appear in what she labels "the web of justification." Her results are interesting even if one were to question the demographic characteristics of the Utah State Legislature which might make it more homophilous than other institutions. She does, however, add two interesting qualifiers in applying the perspective to other settings: "(1) the body of talk should have an identifiable purpose" (which should make Rowland happy), "and (2) argument, the making and supporting of claims, should relate directly to the purpose for interaction."⁴⁴

These qualifiers seriously call into question the range of application for the socio-pragmatic perspective. Certainly, the qualifiers stated earlier pertaining to "shared purpose" apply here. Additionally, the qualifier that arguments should relate directly to the purpose of interaction may be an impossible one outside of a relatively narrow range of situations--legislatures, legal proceedings, problem-solving groups, etc. The constraints may well create the greatest limitation. One might even ask how one treats statements (arguments, inquiries, filibusters, etc.) within these settings which are not directly related to the purpose of interaction? So our student of argument fields may find some instances in which the patterns of arguments appear to create fields of discourse which show consistency across actors over time. But as with the "communities," the range of situations can be so described is in question.

To this point in the narrative, the review of various perspectives on argument fields have not aided the theorist or the critic in defining the characteristics of argument in a specific area.⁴⁵ If this is true for the specialist in argumentation, what instruction can the ordinary language user take from the notion of fields in informing his/her own argument use? Each of the preceding perspectives was evaluated for its pedagogical limitations. Hence, it is my contention that field distinctions are not normally employed by the ordinary language user in argumentation. In its place ordinary language users employ "ad hoc" justifications. Let us turn to these now.

Ad Hoc Justification

It may seem trite, but the parallel is too conspicuous to pass up--As "Rhetoric is the Counterpart of Dialectic," so I would maintain that "Ad Hoc justification (ordinary language use) is the counterpart of Argument Fields." I have already noted that argument fields have a special appeal and interest for the theorist and critic of argument, but their utility for the average person has been diminished by their complexity, incompleteness, and ambiguity. Why should we presume that the ordinary language user employs the "field" metaphor or standards propagated by "scholars" of argument? One may take Toulmin's distinction among rational enterprises articulated in Human Understanding as an indication that we should not expect to find recurring patterns which can be "disciplined" as we descend the framework.⁴⁶

If I can state this position succinctly, it would go something like the following: Long ago Toulmin suggested that there were invariant elements to argument which he described as their force, and dependent elements, which represented the grounds or criteria necessary to entail belief.⁴⁷ The question of what was the minimum criteria necessary to secure belief (adherence) varied by field. But "field" is a construct which assumed greater normative force

as the criteria became specifiable. Hence, what Toulmin later described as compact disciplines were characterized by an adherence among practitioners to a set of criteria which had greater compliance because of their specification. But the "undisciplined" arenas of human discourse had evolved no self-constructed standards would could require a normative adherence. So what becomes a field is ultimately dependent upon the shared construction of criteria. Some arenas of have evolved criteria which involve their practitioners with shared expectations. These expectations may be routines, standards, procedures, and the like. Those who stand outside the arena, either through an inability to comprehend (and hence, share in the criteria) or because they prefer an alternate construction of criteria, may be said to be outside of the field.

Should we expect all persons to construct the same criteria? Probably not. In his earliest writings Toulmin alludea to the differentiation of criteria which may be employed. In Reason in Ethics he cautions:

We must expect that every mode of reasoning, every type of sentence, and (if one is particular) every single sentence will have its own logical criteria, to be discovered by examining its individual, peculiar uses.⁴⁸

So even if we could determine fields of argument by criteria constructed by their users, there would still remain those outside of the "field" who would not be constrained by the normative force of the criteria. These persons, who I have banded about as ordinary language users and our poor student of fields, is outside the field because he/she can't comprehend it, or having comprehended its requirements, has opted for other criteria. Zarefsky uses an example which closely approximates what I have in mind:

Most instances of argument do not occur within the confines of any academic discipline. Even when arguers concern themselves with, say, the budget and national finance, they often generate arguments uninformed in any meaningful way by the discipline of economics.⁴⁹

Since these persons outside of the field nevertheless generate arguments, there must be some way to evaluate/judge them other than through a reliance on argument fields. And so there is. But it is not through the normative criteria which would be associated with a "field". But the requirement for these are individually employed. I label these as "ad hoc" because they appear to be without the rigor and consistency one would presume to exist with "field" criteria. But actually, the individual's criteria may be every bit as rigorous and consistent in its application as socially constructed field criteria. They simply lack the sanction of social consensus.

So to the ordinary language user, the process of evaluation of argument criteria is similar, if not identical, to that employed under the aegis of a field. This conception of "ad hoc justification" differs from Wenzel's "arguments-at-large" notion. He uses the term to refer to "those ephemeral arguments that are made in unique contexts to serve ad hoc purposes, then pass away never to be recalled or employed again."⁵⁰ For my conceptualization, ad hoc justifications are the employment of criteria for argument evaluation which occurs outside of a "field" construction. They may be individual constructions, but they are not necessarily unique or ephemeral.

Willard, who likes to call fields sociological entities, has argued that in his constructivist/interactionist approach, fields move beyond idiosyncratic construals because social actors engage in things like reciprocal perspective taking and intersubjectively derived agreements. This position should be in accord with what I have just argued, and also with the following.

I have asserted that claims are arguments in search of fields. This statement probably makes some tacit assumptions about the necessity of human needs for discourse with other. I think Schutz's Interpersonal needs have something to do with this.⁵¹ Since the assertion of an argument claim has ego-risking potential, there would appear to be a ego-defensive tendency to either utter claims which have a fair potential of acceptance (correspondence, shared construal, etc.) in preference to those which weren't. This may explain why Newell obtained such regular patterns of accord in her analysis of the Utah State legislature. It may also assist us in understanding the broader sociological phenomena of "argument evolution." Railsback's analysis of the evolution of argument on the abortion issue points in the direction of Ad Hoc Justification seeking the legitimacy of a field.⁵²

Conclusion

The several approaches to argument fields don't inform the ordinary language user/student of argument how to use fields. They probably can't. Rather than teaching our students what argument requirements exist for fields, they would be as well served in developing sense of what is appropriate criteria for the situations they have or are likely to encounter. Field development may yet prove to be fruitful for argumentation theorists and critics, but for the average person, they have limited utility.

NOTES

¹ Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p. 11.

² See David Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions in the Theory of Argument Fields," Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (Spring 1982), pp. 191-203; Robert Rowland, "Argument Fields" in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. George Ziegelmueller & Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 56-60. This anthology will hereafter be cited as Dimensions.

³ See Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, & Allan Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: MacMillan, 1979); Richard D. Rieke & Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1984).

⁴ For example see Rowland, Dimensions, pp. 68-75. He offers Legal Argumentation and Newspaper criticism.

⁵ Rieke & Sillars, p. 5.

⁶ Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 194-198.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Rowland, Dimensions, 56-60.

⁹ Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 14.

¹⁰ Ray E. McKerrow, "On Fields and Rational Enterprises: A Reply to Willard," in Proceedings of the (First) Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. Jack Rhodes & Sara Newell (Falls Church, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1980), p. 403. Hereafter cited as Proceedings.

¹¹ Rowland, Dimensions, 57.

¹² Charles Arthur Willard, "Argument Fields and Theories of Logical Type," Journal of the American Forensic Association 17 (Winter 1981), 144-145.

¹³ Douglas Ehninger & Wayne Brockreide, Decision By Debate, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 92.

¹⁴ See Introduction to Reasoning, 193-343; and Rieke & Sillars, 214-347.

¹⁵ Rieke & Sillars, 214-215.

¹⁶ Charles Arthur Willard, "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument Fields," in Proceedings, p. 379.

¹⁷ Introduction to Reasoning, 200.

18. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 195.
19. Rowland, Dimensions, 57-58.
20. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 195.
21. Ibid., 196.
22. See Robert C. Rowland, "The Influence of Purpose on Fields of Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (Spring 1982), 228-245; and Rowland, Dimensions, 56-79.
23. Rowland, Dimensions, 75A.
24. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 197-198.
25. Kathleen M. Farrell, "Shared Purpose is Not the Answer: A Response to Rowland," Journal of the American Forensic Association 20 (Winter 1984), 173-178.
26. Robert C. Rowland, "Rowland Replies," Journal of the American Forensic Association 20 (Winter 1984), 178-180.
27. Farrell, 177.
28. "Rowland Replies," 180.
29. For instance see Daily Oklahoman, "Shultz, Russians Trade Charges at Helsinki," p. 1.
30. See Introduction to Reasoning, 203-228; Rieke & Sillars, 216-242; Richard D. Rieke, "Investigating Legal Argument as a Field," in Dimensions, 152-158; and David A. Ling, "Policy Advocacy in the Legal Setting," in Dimensions, 196-206.
31. M. Jack Parker, "The Unique Role of Language in the Judicial Process: After-the-Fact Classification of Human Behavior," in Dimensions, 207-212.
32. Charles Arthur Willard, "Argument Fields," in Advances in Argumentation Theory & Research, J. Robert Cox & Charles A. Willard, eds. (Carbondale, IL: STU Press, 1982), 75. See also "Some Questions About Toulmin," 348-400; "Theories of Logical Type," 128-145; Charles Arthur Willard, "Field Theory: A Cartesian Meditation," in Dimensions, 21-43.
33. Willard, "Cartesian Meditations," 41.
34. Willard, "Theory of Logical Types," 145.
35. Willard, "Some Questions About Toulmin," 378.
36. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 196-197.
37. Rowland, Dimensions, 59.
38. Ray E. McKerrow, "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions," in Proceedings, 214-227.
39. James F. Klumpp, "A Dramatistic Approach to Fields," in Dimensions, 44.
40. Rowland, Dimensions, 60.
41. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 198.
42. Joseph W. Wenzel, "On Fields of Argument as Propositional Systems," Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (Spring 1982), 211-213.
43. Sara E. Newell, "A Socio-Pragmatic Perspective of Argument Fields," Western Journal of Speech Communication 48 (Summer 1984), 249.
44. Ibid., 259.
45. Rowland, "Influence of Purpose," 233.
46. Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 133-199.
47. Uses of Argument, 15; 36-38.
48. Stephen Toulmin, Reason In Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 83.
49. Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions," 196.
50. Wenzel, "Propositional Systems," 208.
51. William C. Schutz, The Interpersonal Underworld (Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1966), 18-25.
52. Celeste Condit Railsback, "The Contemporary American Abortion Controversy: Stages in the Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984), 410-424.