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ABSTRACT

Mexican mass media, especially television, incorporates an abundance of American programming and serves as a catalyst to motivate lower strata Mexicans to pursue life in the United States, resulting in a tremendous influx of both legal and illegal Mexicans and other Latin Americans to the United States. Although Mexico benefits because many Mexicans send money home, the resultant brain drain comes at a time when Mexico's economy must accommodate an estimated 450,000 refugees from Central America. Although Mexico has had political stability and the peso has been stable with a gradual decline during most of this century, the oil fiasco, and lack of favored nation treatment by the United States has brought Mexico to the brink of disaster. If it were not for the special interests of the United States, and several European governments and their banks, Mexico might have collapsed. Utilizing an historical-descriptive, theoretical research methodology, the paper examines immmigration-emigration patterns as cultural, economic, and political determinants that affect-effect the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the Mexicans mass media system. The Soviet Union is juxtaposed against the United States and Latin America to determine the extent of its involvement in this hemisphere. (NQA)

Mexico: The Role of the Participatory Media in Immigration/Emigration as Culture and Political Economy

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Running head: Mexico: Participatory Media

Dedication

To the Mexican community in Arcola, Illinois

Table of Contents

Dedication---------- i

Abstract---------- 1a

Methodology---------- 1b

Introduction---------- 2

Cultural Determinants---------- 3

Economic Determinants---------- 5

Political Determinants ----------10

Communicative Determinants----------20

A View from the Other Side: The United States----------24

A View from the Outside: The Soviet Union----------28

Summation----------30

Conclusion----------32

Reference Notes----------34

References----------37

Endnotes----------41

Acknowledgement----------42

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine immigration and emigration patterns as cultural, economic, and political determinants that will be shown to affect-effect the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the Mexican mass media system. Conversely, the Mexican mass media system will be shown as the participatory media that affects-effects immigration and emigration patterns as cultural and political-economic development of Mexico. That political and economic determinants affect-effect the communicative system of specific Latin American nations and vice-versa have been established (Oseguera, 1983). Moreover, this paper seeks to explore whether immigration and emigration patterns translate into cultural, economic, and political development, when potential immigrants and emigrants view the Mexican mass media system purporting a better standard of living. Further, of great import where Mexico is involved is the extent of participatory media as a viable vehicle in the propulsion of culture, economic growth, and political maturity. If these propositions are sustained in Mexico, then the consequences for political-economic development in Third World and emergent nations become meaningful.

Methodology

A historical-descriptive, theoretical research methodology, culminating as a paradigm for critical analysis, will be utilized to identify, describe, and discuss a theoretical framework that eventuates as prototype. The foregoing methodology is part of Robert Boston's classification system, specifically useful in determining performance competencies. The major emphasis is qualitative content-analysis.

Nations from two continents have been selected to satisy the paradigmatic requirements for critical analysis, and each, in turn, will be used to discuss a theoretical framework that as prototype is capable of shedding light on the host country. Continents represented are Europe and North America; primary nations selected are: the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Mexico. Mexico is identified as the host country.

Mexico: The Role of the Participatory Media in Immigration/Emigration as Culture and Political Economy

Introduction

No single work could hope to capture Mexico in epic form. Sergei M. Eisenstein, the great Russian cinematographer-theoretician, attempted more than a half-century ago to create an epic film, entitled ¡Que Viva Mexico! (Eisenstein, Note 1). This paper, therefore will concentrate primarily on the variety of reasons why Mexicans leave their homeland to resettle in the United States. The thesis of this article is that Mexican mass media, incorporating an abundance of American programming, especially television, serves as a catalyst, motivating lower strata Mexicans to pursue American life in America, based on American images in Mexican mass media.

In order to view the Mexican myth and reality, a brief discussion concerning Mexican culture is appropriate. Economic, political and communicative determinants will also be discussed. Because matters concerning mass media are the most significant for this work, they will be considered last: The United States and the Soviet Union will be juxtaposed, in order to place culture, economics, politics and communication into a world perspective. In this manner, media (as channel) converges on culture, economics, and politics (as substance) and relays substance (as meaning) to

divergent publics (as society) (Head, Note 2).

Cultural Determinants

Ethnically, Mexicans draw their heritage from three continents: Pre-Columbian North and Central America, Europe, and Africa. Except for a few African slaves brought to Vera Cruz during colonial times, most Mexicans are a hybrid of European (Spanish and French) and native meso-American Indian (Aztec, Toltec, Zapotec, Meztec, Mayan, etc.). Because Indians provided a ready-made, semi-slave work force, the Spaniards in New Spain (Mexico) had little need to introduce Africans as slaves. Until Mexico declared its independence from Spain, Mexican society mirrored Spanish society: the first printing press in the New World appeared in Mexico City; the Jesuits and other Catholic teaching orders helped to found and maintain an elite, intellectual community where Spanish nobility reigned. Mestizos participated in society, while Indians merely survived.

Mexico's most pressing problem was attempting to populate its Northern Territory, the present states of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. To circumvent this dilemma, Mexico invited French Roman Catholics from Louisiana to homestead in this territory. The major difficulty arose when non-Latin Protestant Americans, primarily of British descent, came instead. Not wishing to turn this group away after traveling so far, the Mexican government simply asked that they abide by Mexican

law. The creation of the Lone Star State, its subsequent admission into the Union (1845), the admission of California (1850), and the annexation of the remainder of Mexico's Northern Territory that would also become states, all as a result of lost Mexicans wars, devastated Mexico. Had it not been for men like Abraham Lincoln who opposed further American aggression beyond the territorial boundaries previously mentioned, Mexico might well have lost additional territory as a result of President James Polk's ambitions.

During the latter half of the 19th century, concomitant with our own Civil War (1861-65), Mexico faced the intrusion of another foreign power. France, under Napoleon III, sent Maximilian to Mexico in hopes of re-establishing French rule in North America (1864-67). Fortunately, Mexico's President-in-exile, Benito Juarez of Zapotec Indian descent, was able to successfully remove France from Mexican soil.[1] Toward the end of the century, Mexico suffered at the hands of Profirio Diaz by his creating a landless peasantry, where only a small percentage of wealthy Mexicans retained control of most agrarian land.

The oppressive Diaz Regime ushered in the Mexican Civil War during the early 20th century (1910-17). Mexico found new leadership in Francisco Madero, Emiliano Zapata, Francisco "Pancho" Villa, and Venustiano Carranza. These revolutionary heroes continued the struggle in much the same way their forefathers did one hundred

years earlier, when they sought to liberate themselves from Spanish oppression. Similarly, the serfs in Russia suffered much the same consequences as befell the peasantry in Mexico, and the Soviet Union celebrates the Bolshevik Revolution that occurred at about the same time (1917). Since the Mexican Civil War, Mexico has been, by most critical standards, the most stable nation in Latin America.

Economic Determinants

The success of the Mexican Civil War promised tenant farmers tierra. And during the early years following the revolution, agrarian reform took place at a moderate rate. In the film The Frozen Revolution, Mexico is depicted as a nation where the revolution was never fully realized; the agrarian reform promised by the revolutionary leaders was not actualized. Obviously, the revolution benefitted many Mexicans, but the question is Whom? Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Mexico made steady progress in the areas of political stability, agrarian reform, industry, education, medicine and religion. During World War II, the Mexican peso was nearly comparable to the American dollar. After the war, the Mexican peso began to slide, and as late as 1976 it was still worth 8½¢.

Mexico, like Argentina and Brazil, is blessed with abundant natural resources. Mexico's political stability, coupled with its natural resources, is responsible for Mexico's prosperity during the the first half of this century. Mexico, although not as large as

Brazil, has recently benefitted from another resource: oil. Brazil, conversely, has not found significant oil reserves in its arable land.[2] Under the presidency of José López Portillo, the Mexican people witnessed a global development plan that was to move the country forward (Street, 1983: 410). And, the López Portillo administration succeeded, initially, in out-distancing other developing nations in its quest to achieve parity with the richer nations of the world. Unfortunately, the oil crisis passed and the world began to experience an oil glut. This factor, perhaps more than any other, is responsibile for the present Mexican economic condition.

To say that López Portillo is to blame for misreading international oil market indicators, based on the previous experience of Venezuela, is unfair. According to James H. Street, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, President López Portillo repeatedly emphasized that the principal objective of the development plan was "to convert the nation's nonrenewable hydrocarbon resources, which would untimately become depleted, into a sustained, diversified growth program that would allow Mexico to produce most of its own consumer goods and create a surplus of manufactures for exportation. He warned that the process must not be accelerated too rapidly, for fear of afflicting the country with 'economic indigestion' from a flood of oil revenue that would generate inflation" (p. 412). One

of the main targets of the development program was the global education program. According to Professor Street, the (Mexican) National Council of Science and Technology estimated (in 1975) that nearly 70% of the Mexican male population over 30 years of age, the bulk of the labor force, had not completed four years of primary schooling (p. 413). As might be expected, the prosperity in the cities was not realized by a vast number of poor farmers in the rural villages (p. 412).

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado became President of Mexico in December 1982. Within the past two years, he has directed the nation in a prudent manner, necessary to avoid financial collapse, due to extensive loans incurred at the hands of his last two predecessors, especially the presidency of Luis Echeverría Alvarez (Street: 410). In his second State of the Union message (Seguindo Informe de Gobierno) to the Mexican people, President de la Madrid said "Decidimos ser nacionalistas, sin hostilidad o exclusivismos y de sujetar el poder al Derecho" ("Informe Sobrio y Sereno," 1984). De la Madrid, using phrases such as "El país es más grande que esta crisis," "Que no nos amarguen nuestros problemas," "Lo más alarmante ya fue superado, dijo," "Todavía no hemos alcanzado la victoria," "México cumplirá con sus compromisos," La reserva es de 7,278 millones de dólares," "Superávit de 6 mil millones de dólares," and "Enfrentaremos maniobras especulativas," set the tone for his administration's

continued austerity program to achieve the ultimate victory over the present economic crisis (Canton Zetina et al, 1984: 1). The present Mexican debt still exceeds $80 billion which is the world's second highest debt after Brazil's. The inflation rate, already drastically cut, remains at 80% (Migdail, 1984: 38).

President de la Madrid faces two enormous internal problems: first, peasants received few benefits when the price of oil was high; what can they expect to receive now that the price of oil has plummeted, particularly with England's latest surprise oil price slash (Rather, 1984)? second, Mexican officials under past administrations have been accused of dishonesty and corruption, especially where bribery is concerned (Migdail, 1984: 38). Many are wondering how effective de la Madrid will be at meeting the demands for goods and services, where the jobless poor are concerned, and they are also questioning the president's ability to eliminate corruption in the federal government, that has plagued past administrations (p. 38). In order to forestall this catastrophic economic crisis, his administration sought and acquired $20 billion in short-term foreign debt refinancing. "Prices were allowed to rise far above wages. Public spending was slashed and imports cut. Overgenerous food subsidies were reduced except those for the poorest segments of the population" (p. 38). The austerity program has brought some breathing room, but to most of Mexico's 75 million people, who are already below the poverty level,

the program is almost unbearable , e. g., real income fell 25% during 1983 and the living standards of the middle class dropped by 40%, while unemployment soared (p. 38).

Despite Mexico"s present crisis, the nation when juxtaposed to Brazil and Argentina seems more likely to eradicate the economic pestilence. In the article "How Much Austerity Can Latin Americans Take?" the three aforementioned nations are compared and contrasted by the editors of The Economist. They state that the Institutional Revol tionary Party (PRI) has held together. "There have been no demonstrations or food riots. The pro-government union boss, Mr. Fidel Velasquez, threatened a strike to press his demand for an across-the-board emergency wage increase of 50%, but settled for 25%. The communist-led university workers did go on strike for four weeks, but returned to work without winning any of their demands" (1983: 38).

Further proof of the nation's recovery is evidenced in an article, entitled "The So-Far So-Good Mexican Recovery." In Fortune, Kenneth Labich tells us the restructured foreign debt is about $22 billion--owed to mostly U.S. banks. The public sector debt allows for a four-year grace period on payment of principle; furthermore, creditors, holding more than half of Mexico's $20 billion private sector foreign debt, have agreed to a similar payment schedule; in addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has helped the country secure $5 billion in new loans from a consortium of foreign banks.

The latter is necessary if Mexico is to meet currently due interest payments abroad. Further evidence of Mexico's recovery is demonstrated by a $4 billion loan Mexico is now negotiating with foreign banks. Fortune believes Mexico will "get it" (1984: 98).

Part of a nation's wealth is in its people; 65% of Mexico's 75 million people are under the age of 24 (Labich, Note 3). If the country is to succeed and maintain its astounding political stability, the nation will have to realize a 4 percent annual increase, or somewhere between 700,000 and one million new jobs per year, just to keep unemployment from rising (Labich, 1984: 102). The key to the future, then, is political creativity and stability. At present the PRI is facing serious political opposition from the Conservative National Action Party; the leftist parties, as the PRI's left wing, maintain "a strong voice in party affairs;" nevertheless, if unemployment continues to swell there is a possibility that the left's influence will increase (p. 102). President de la Madrid and many of Mexico's economic critics are convinced that the worst of the nation's problems are behind them.

Political Determinants

When a nation cannot provide sufficient employment for its people, and when the standard of living begins to drop significantly, and when political repression stifles the air the citizens of that nation breathe,[3] a mass exodus ensues. The situation in Mexico

is tantamount to a patient suffering three major afflictions, any of which can result in loss of life. Mexico suffers more from the former two than from the latter. Although Mexico has had political stability during most of this century and although the peso has been stable with a gradual decline during most of the same period, the oil fiasco, no matter who is to blame, has brought Mexico to the brink of disaster. If it were not for the good will, intentions, and special interests of the United States, federal and private assistance in the way of loans, and a similar posture by several European governments and their banks, Mexico might well have collapsed. How is this possible? Mexico had the advantage of seeing Venezuela's oil mismanagement that has resulted in that nation's very slow upward mobility. Mexico is adjacent to the United States and must have been aware that if their major market could obtain oil elsewhere as a result of more favorable prices due to eventual oil consumption demands, then certain measures to insure their economic sustained growth needed to be in place, in order to forestall economic and political chaos.

The "bottom line" is that the United States is experiencing a tremendous influx of Mexican Nationals, both legal and illegal, and an influx from practically every other Latin American neighbor where governments have failed with economic and political initiatives. Scholars estimate underemployment in Mexico from 16 to 50 percent.

Marvin Alisky, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, says "My own calculations yield an underemployment rate of 20 percent. Combining it with a better documented unemployment rate, we can presume that Mexico currently suffers from a combined unemployment and underemployment rate of 46 percent." Full-time employment, then, is only 54 percent of the potential work force. The peasant culture, however, in the last few decades remains virtually unchanged. In order to survive they continue to haul stacks of firewood and catch fresh-water bass, while pregnant women work with infants secured to their backs with rebozos (1983: 429). The conditions of campesinos in the northern Mexican borderlands nearest the United States are much more favorable than that of their counterparts in the southern regions of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Campeche, and Tabasco (p. 430).

Another of Mexico's and Latin America's problems is lack of favored nation treatment. After World War II, General George C. Marshall conceived a plan whereby European allies could hastily regain an economic footing in the competitive, capitalistic West: the Marshall Plan. Likewise, post-World War II Japan, through the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, was restored over a period of time to an economic eminence that surpassed its pre-war condition. In the last of the 1984 Presidential Debates, Walter Mondate pointed out that one of the reasons for immigration from Mexico (Latin

America implied) was the lack of sufficient trade with that country (Mondale, Note 4). Increased trade with Mexico or favored nation treatment might very well result in a decrease of immigration due to an improved condition in the Mexican job market. But the fact of the matter is that, except for increased oil supply from Mexico, U.S. trade with Mexico remains essentially the same.

One thing has changed. Illegal urban Mexican workers, who are much better educated than the typical rural migrant workers, are finding jobs in U.S. industry, construction, and service areas; they are earning twice as much per hour as rural migrants and they tend to stay three times longer; and, yes, many want to become U.S. citizens (Grennes, 1980: S-6424). Mexico, thus, like many Latin American and European countries, is suffering a "brain drain" that further paralyzes the nation (Alisky, 1983: 431).

What many middle class Mexicans mow realize is that there is a major change in the Mexican party system. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) began its metamorphosis when Luis Echeverría Alvarez appointed a personal friend with little party experience, but with significant administrative experience, to be his successor. Echeverría identified him as a técnico, more interested in the bureaucratic management of the state than the tradition of populist politics preferred by the PRI hierarchy. López Portillo, in turn, appointed Miguel de la Madrid who, like

himself, is considered a técnico (Sanderson, 1983: 402). The last two years have shown the PRI to be "a vestigial organ of a populist political style that cannot weather the transition to a demobilized political system." And this state is in sharp contrast to the "legendary flexibility and imagination shown by the Mexican regime" (p. 436). What many Americans do not understand is that the Mexican president is one of the most powerful constitutional executives in the West. Besides being the standard bearer of his party, he may remove governors and delegates at will and he controls a tight federal system where states have little autonomy (p. 401).

De la Madrid, instead of seeking popular support, has threatened to dismiss strikers, refused to negotiate new concessions, and attacked the leadership of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). The president's reaction marks him as an uncompromising leader of a party with broad-based labor support. Conversely, there is an apparent wooing of the principal rival organization to the CTM, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM). This action, along with the aforementioned and other indicators, demonstrates that de la Madrid is revising the role of labor in the government radically: The CROM is attaining a more important position, while the vertical organization of labor politics within the party is being undercut (p. 403). The upshot of political radicalism in Mexico is a decline of party fortunes, accompanied

by political liberalization, fiscal austerity and a debt crisis that together change the Mexican model of one-party authoritarianism (Sanderson, Note 5). Mexicans, Americans, and the rest of the world are looking at the Mexican condition to see if the de la Madrid administration can successfully lead his nation to an economic and political haven.

In terms of foreign policy, some question Mexico's role as a regional power. In recent years Mexico has been very outspoken concerning the hemisphere, in general, and Central America, in particular. Mexico initiated the Contadora movement that includes Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama (Bagley, Note 6). Although the Contadora Group has been lauded by most western nations, the United States has ignored this initiative because it is contrary to American interests in this hemisphere. Many members of the U.S. Congress, especially Democrats, have oftentimes endorsed the Contadora perspective, but have found it difficult to force the Reagan administration to modify its policies and move ahead with important negotiations. Furthermore, the Contadora Group has enlisted the support of European leaders, such as Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Francois Mitterrand of France, and spokesmen of the Socialist International. Still, the Reagan administration has refused their counsel (Bagley, 1983: 408). The United States simply does not want to lose another nation in this hemisphere to

the Communists. De la Madrid has not been as committed to Nicaragua as was his predecessor, López Portillo (Bagley, Note 7). In addition, Mexico was very critical of the United States' position vís-a-vís the Falklands-Malvinas conflict of April-June 1982. These are but a few examples of significant Mexican foreign policy actions.

Despite the August 1982 financial collapse that followed Mexico's five-year economic boom, de la Madrid has continued to pursue an independent regional foreign policy. At first, the United States was alarmed at the economic condition in Mexico. The American administration and private sector were tempted to tie foreign loans to special Mexican concessions, e.g., the IMF austerity program. Mexico's situation, in one way, was welcomed by the U.S. because it gave the Reagan administration leverage over Mexico's competitive leadership in the hemisphere. With Mexico's indebtedness of over $80 billion, mostly to U.S. banks, Mexico would cease to criticize American policy in Central America. Nevertheless, de la Madrid and Reagan both comprehend the complexities of the economic circumstances that inextricably bind both of their nations: thus, "The Reagan administration moved quickly to backstop the Mexican economy, because failure to do so would have involved unacceptable costs to American economic interests, including several possible major bank failures and the severe disruption of the entire western financial system" (p. 407).

Besides Mexico's foreign debt, the single most pressing issue involving Mexico and the U.S. is the emigration/immigration controversy. A plethora of articles have appeared since the 210 to 210 tie vote was broken in favor of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill's passage in the U.S. House of Representatives. The legislation is now before a joint House-Senate conference for negotiation of differences between it and a Senate bill that passed 76-18 last year supported by President Reagan ("Immigration bill OK'd," 1984: A-2). Hispanics in the U.S. oppose the Simpson-Mazzoli bill because they feel its passage would result in prejudicial hiring. The bill places the employer in jeopardy because if an illegal alien is hired by him/her, then stiff penalties will be forthcoming. The employer is forced to police perspective applicants. Hispanics are concerned that employers will not hire anyone who looks Hispanic for fear of reprisals by the federal government ("Debating Immigration Reform," 1984: 449). Particularly outspoken against the bill are the House Hispanic Caucus, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (Morganthau, 1984: 23). LULAC leaders contend they will ask Congress, the Hispanic Caucus, to introduce a new bill that more adequately reflects the needs and aspirations of all Hispanics in the U.S. Not all believe a problem of immigration exists in the U.S. In an article, entitled

"Illegal Immigrants: The U.S. May Gain More than It Loses," the authors have taken the position that "the nation benefits more from the increased economic growth and lower inflation stemming from illegal immigration than it loses in jobs, lower wages, and welfare costs" (1984: 126). Conversely, in "US Immigration Policy and the National Interest," Georges Fauriol says that the U.S. can no longer accept a situation that permits the entry of thousands of illegal immigrants who "come to the United States from at least 60 different countries," but primarily from Latin America --especially Mexico. He views the present condition as destabilizing both economically and politically; furthermore, he says "The political use of illegal aliens has included attempts by certain states, particularly California, to make major efforts to register illegal aliens to vote." He also blames the Justice Department under the Carter administration, who, he says, "informally ruled that it saw no legal reason why illegal aliens could not vote in federal elections!" (Fauriol, 1984: 11). Hispanics already comprise a powerful voting group that can significantly alter the outcome of presidential elections, if a candidate is successful in winning their support. William C. Velasquez, executive director of the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project in San Antonio and similar Hispanic directors in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and Miami, are actively involved in Hispanic voter registration to promote Hispanic and

non-Hispanic concerns ("The Immigration Bill's Political Price," 1984: 99; Andrada, 1984).

Mexico also has an immigration problem on its southern border. Ironically, this problem involves the United States as much as it involves Central America. The Mexican perspective sees the Reagan administration's hard line militaristic approach as counterproductive. It prolongs the region's instability with dire consequences for Mexico. Estimates indicate 350,000 Salvadoran refugees in Mexico, with an additional 100,000 Guatemalans. With the United States' support of the war in that region through proxies, i.e., Reagan's freedom fighters--contras, Mexico can expect additional refugees from Honduras and Costa Rica (Bagley, 1983: 409).

The immigration/emigration and refugee situation in Mexico translates into an economic dilemma that is two-pronged. On the one hand, Mexico benefits for the most part with the traditional emigration because many Mexicans send money home that eventually benefits the Mexican economy. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, Mexico's economy that is undergoing austerity suffers even more when it has to make room for Central Americans. Mexico's $80-90 billion debt, as pointed out earlier, in part is the result of two principal elements: one, mismanagement of the five-year oil boom and two, lack of favored nation treatment by the United States. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has warned that the world debt crisis could

"provoke a political confrontation" between the United States and Latin America and hinder U.S., European, and Asian connections. He has said "the $350 billion debt owed by 11 Latin American nations should be dealt with as a political issue instead of an economic one." He says there is simply no chance of any principal being repaid for more than a decade. Even interest payments will become politically unbearable unless handled as a political problem instead of a technical, economic one. Once again, the refusal to accept these facts, he adds, "will provoke a political confrontation between the United States and the principal Latin American debtors" ("Kissinger says world debt represents danger to West," 1984: B-5). In the meantime Mexico's head will continue to defend the Mexican austerity program through fiscal management ("Mexico's Head Defends Austerity," 1984: 14A).

Communicative Determinants

Culture, economics, and politics formulate the message. Once the message is formed, media, as channel, delivers it to various publics. In a surprise message to the U.N., Salvadoran President José Napoleon Duarte used the U.N. as a forum to communicate his willingness to meet with the opposition guerillas in his country; similarly, Comandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the uncompromising leader of Nicaragua's pro-Marxist Sandanista regime, has brashly stated that his goal in coming to the United States is to literally

invade the U.S. media ("Comandante in mufti," 1984: 48). In both of these instances we witness individual leaders using the media to carry their messages to their intended audiences. The Mexican president uses televisa to communicate his message to the Mexican people and beyond. Most important leaders draw the attention of other media as well, such as radio and newspapers.

Mexico has 109 television stations and 6.5 million television sets, reaching more than 45 million people in Mexico; one-half of the television sets in Mexico are located in Mexico City.[4] Besides normal commercial broadcasting, the Mexican government is now making available public broadcast service and educational television. There are nearly 1000 radio stations throughout Mexico, of which 80 percent are AM and 20 percent FM. Together the AM and FM stations reach more than 20 million Mexican households, which translates into more than one radio per household (Kline, 1984). The majority of Mexican programming for television and radio is created in Mexico; however, Mexico also receives programming from around the world, particularly from the United States. This programming takes two forms: one, software that is imported from the United States to Mexico by means of video cassettes and film; and two, hardware, satellites and radio stations that are capable of beaming audio-visual and audio signals into Mexico. Examples of the latter are television satellite broadcasts via Galaxy I and the Voice of America

that is broadcast over medium- and short-waves. Recently the Federal Communication Commission (FCC), after a period of television and radio deregulation, has begun to tighten its grip on radio. The FCC has created 684 new FM stations; these stations will be realized by 684 small towns across the United States. The FCC proposes to create up to 1100 new stations of which the majority will be located in the southeast. Minorities will benefit a great deal in terms of ownership and reception ("FCC tightening its grip on radio," 1984: A-12). Thus, at a glance, Hispanics in both Mexico and the United States are exposed to a plethora of hardware and software that eventuate in Spanish and English programming. The question is: what is the nature of the programming, especially television?

Right now the world can be viewed in its entirety by three satellites situated 22,300 miles above the earth's surface, if they are spaced equally around the globe and if they follow a precise arc that is positioned above the equator. According to a recent article entitled "Will there be Room on the Arc?", Third World countries are challenging the United States on use of the orbit crucial to communications satellites (Walsh, 1984: 1043). The United States and the Soviet Union have pioneered Outer Space, but developing nations maintain that by the time they get ready to launch their own satellites, there will be literally no room in the orbit. When satellites hover over the earth, they are in a position

to be received by "down links."[5] The point is, Third World nations, like it or not, are almost obliged to utilize the satellites already in place. The U.S. claims that technical advances are expected to diminish the crowding problem. For example, improved technology, primarily in ground stations, makes it possible for the U.S. to reduce inter-satellite spacing to 2 degrees, "virtually doubling the number of satellites that may be put aloft, in the most heavily used sections of the spectrum" (p. 1044). Television satellites carry a variety of programming, e.g., commercial, educational, corporate, governmental, etc., but commercial programs, whether transmitted by satellite or ground transmitters, comprise the bulk of everyday programming for Mexicans and Americans, alike.

James S. O'Rourke IV, former drama critic and head of the BBC drama department, says the language of television is as old as civilization itself. The language is drama (O'Rourke, 1984: 428). In the "Design of Television" the authors maintain that television seeks to inform, entertain, and persuade (Oseguera et al, 1983: 70-72). In actuality, television accomplishes all of the foregoing. When Mexicans view Mexican television, no matter in which part of the republic, they receive an abundance of American television programming interspersed with their own. American programs, including Charlie's Angels, Baretta, Kojak, Hawaii Five-O, Dukes of Hazzard, Daniel Boone, Gunsmoke, Cannon, and Loveboat, are viewed regularly on Mexican

television. According to Mexicans now residing in the United States, American television programming was influential in formulating impressions about the United States, but "word-of mouth" still played a more important role in their decision to migrate. They related that American images viewed on Mexican television created an idea that America was a land of opportunity, where no poverty existed. They also pointed out that on recent visits to Mexico, they discovered that almost everyone they knew owned a television set. This was not the case approximately five to ten years ago (Nelson, Note 8).

Many studies have been undertaken to determine the influence of television. The argument seems unsolvable. Scholars have been able to determine that children and adults the world over find television a very credible media source. When people watch television, no matter the cultural differences, they regard television as a reality once removed. When Bazin arrived at the preceding conclusion, he was saying simply that moving images across a screen becomes for the viewer a second reality (Bazin, 1971). Whether or not television influences Mexicans to immigrate to the United States is not nearly as significant as the impressions Mexicans perceive of the American way of life.

A View from the Other Side: The United States

Some studies indicate that 650,000 immigrants come to the

United States each year. The U.S. Congress would like to limit this number to 450,000. The majority of illegal aliens residing in the United States are from Mexico. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill is calling for amnesty in order that illegals may obtain citizenship. By the 21st century, Hispanics will comprise the largest U.S. minority, if immigration continues at the present level ("Hispanics to Become Largest U.S. Minority.," 1983: 83). Like other minorities Hispanics realize that upward mobility requires that they learn English, the official language (Fallows, 1983: 67). There is a major controversy raging in the U.S. vís-a-vís the issue of bi-lingual education. Hispanics, themselves, appear to be divided on this important program (Morgan, Note 9). But the fact remains that there is a surge of Hispanic power in the U.S. Hispanic leaders, in cities with large Hispanic populations, are now running for public office. Several organizations with Hispanic concerns, for example LULAC, claim they speak for the entire Hispanic community. In the last Presidential Debate, Walter Mondale corrected one of the panelists when he said Hispanics are not, according to the polls, divided on the issue of Simpson-Mazzoli. One of Mondales's most ardent supporters has been San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros. At 37, he is one of the most youthful and dynamic politicians in America today (Posner, 1984: 32-33).

Hispanics, like other ethnic groups before them, will continue

to coalesce, in order to benefit their entry into the American mainstream. Hispanics do not tend to vote along party lines. Traditionally, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have registered as Democrats, whereas Cubans usually register as Republicans. Of the 10,000 Hispanics receiving citizenship in Miami this year, most will vote Republican. Hispanics tend to vote a split ticket, giving preference to the individual and the issues (Andrada, 1984).

With 22 Latin American republics south of the border, Latin America casts a giant shadow across the face of America. This shadow manifests itself in terms of the Hispanic population and their language. Contrary to a popular conception, Hispanics are not the first ethnic group to cling tenaciously to their mother tongue. Until World War II German, French, Italian, Polish, Greek, Chinese, Japanese, etc. could all be heard in practically any major American city. After the war, these languages began to dissipate, especially German. In that case there has been decided prejudice against Germans because we were at war with their native country. In his biography Lou Gehrig The Iron Horse of Baseball, he describes the prejudice others directed toward him on sandlots during World War I (Hubler, 1941). Prejudice is not new in the United States nor has it been limited to any specific group. Hispanics are beginning to take their place in the flow of American life, and they will participate and contribute as their ranks fill.

David E. Apter asks, "Are We All Latin Americans Now?" He views America and the Latin American republics as possessing a shared destiny. He gives the Kennedy administration high marks for his Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy administration attempted to establish "institutional and fiscal structures wnich would produce self-sustained growth, eliminate aristocratic and landlord classes, and so establish the basis for a growing and stable middle class." This was his answer to Marxism and the Cuban Revolution. Apter humorously states that if Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico sneeze, it is the United States that will catch the cold (Apter, 1983: 399-400).

In the communications industry we are beginning to see more entertainers of Hispanic origin. Julio Iglesias, the only recording artist ever awarded the Diamond Disc by the Guinness Book of Records because of worldwide sales, is now fast becoming a recording celebrity in the U.S. ("Julio's Star-Spangled Crusade," 1984: 95). When Americans show their appreciation by welcoming foreign entertainers to our shores or across our borders, they are showing respect to the family of man. We grow from each other's experiences. In the 1980's, America seems to be moving toward a multi-ethnicity, where the only requirement is to be American. America is more than English, more than Spanish, more than any of the previously mentioned languages; America shows its true worth by accepting the diversity that enriches us all.

A View from the Outside: The Soviet Union

In recent years we have seen some dramatic developments in Central America. Perhaps the most significant development has been the Marxist-Cuban Revolution. At present the U.S. is blaming the USSR, Cuba, and Nicaragua for destabilizing El Salvador. As a result, the U.S. has endeavored to support American interests in that area to prevent yet another Communist country from being created in this hemisphere.

The Soviet Union has long been interested in Latin America. The Cuban reality is one of their great successes. Nicaragua is only another example of growing Soviet influence in Latin America. Today, Brazil and Argentina are beginning to turn to the USSR in order to upgrade their economic and diplomatic links. Other Latin American countries are following suit: "Brazil (in 1959); Chile (1964); Ecuador (1967); Peru (1969); and Venezuela, Bolivia, and Costa Rica (1970)" (Varas, 1984: 36). For the longest time the Soviets were of the opinion that Latin America was the U.S.'s backyard and they maintained a "hands off" policy. Moreover, the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917, peasant and agrarian in nature, confirmed that Mexico and most of Latin America was simply passing "from agrarian to capitalist forms of organization before moving toward a Socialist revolution" (p. 36). Thus, the USSR helped to formulate the policy of popular fronts in South America (Varas, Note 10).

After World War II many Communist parties in Latin America went into hiding, or were simply repressed (Oseguera, 1983: 73-77).

The Brezhnev administration sought to ameliorate differences between the U.S. and Latin America. Brezhnev stated "The contest between socialism and capitalism should be decided not on the field of battle . . . but in the spheres of peaceful work" (Varas, 1984: 38). Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956), in Czechoslavakia (1968), and in Afghanistan during the Carter administration, and Soviet interests in Africa over a period of time have caused the U.S. and Latin America to reassess Brezhnev's intentions, as presently interpreted under the most recent Russian leadership.

Krushchev's embarrassment over the Cuban Missile Crisis during the early 1960's and the fall of Salvador Allende's Chile, and the fact that the USSR does not view Latin America as strategic to their defense, has caused the Soviets to maintain a cautious but increasing profile in Latin America. The Soviet government has published an editorial in Pravda, September 11, 1979, asserting the "inalienable right of the Soviet Union and Cuba to establish any military relationship they please" (Rothenberg, 1983: 3). They have not sought to support Nicaragua as a full-fledged member of the Eastern bloc defense pact. As mentioned previously, Mexico has supported Nicaragua both diplomatically and economically. However, Mexico's reason for doing so is entirely different from the Soviet involvement

in Nicaragua through its proxie, Cuba. Mexico has long taken the position of Benito Juarez's diplomatic philosophy: a mutual respect for one another is the best assurance of peace. In this sense, Mexico's involvement has been demonstrated by a philosophy of a nation's right to formulate its own destiny. Mexico is not concerned, according to de la Madrid, that Nicaragua is Marxist. Mexico views Marxism as a one-party system. The PRI in Mexico has essentially been a one-party system where both left and right political groups participate. Mexico is not threatened by the Soviet Union, because they view the east-west confrontation as irrationality due to a lack of dialogue between the two super powers. Mexico is more concerned about the possible U.S. military intervention in Central America. For that reason, it has pressed for a contadora solution in that region.

Summation

This paper has discussed cultural, economic, political, and communicative determinants. Communicative determinants were introduced last because culture, economics, and politics were viewed as the content of the message. Communicative determinants built on the previous three determinants and, as channel, sought to discuss how the quantitative and qualitative elements that comprise media can bring message(s) to divergent publics, as receivers. Mexico was seen as the primary source of cultural, economic, and

political information. The United States was introduced after the various determinants were discussed, in order to express an American view of Hispanics and an American-Hispanic view of themselves. The Soviet Union because of its super power status was introduced in juxtaposition to the United States and U.S. interest in Latin America; also, the USSR was juxtaposed to Latin America to determine the extent of its involvement in this hemisphere. Furthermore, the East-West rivalry provided an international framework from which the North-South relationships could be better understood. The central thesis has been that Mexican mass media incorporated an abundance of American programming, especially television, that serves as a catalyst, motivating lower strata Mexicans to pursue the perceived "good life" in America, based on American images they view in Mexican mass media.

Mexicans now residing in the U.S. were interviewed, to determine to what extent Mexican mass media influenced them to immigrate to the United States. Most of them concurred that although mass media presented them, generally speaking, with positive views of the United States, their main source of motivation came by "word-of-mouth" from friends and relatives.

Although mass media seemed conspicuously absent from the other various determinants mentioned, hopefully it is understood that culture, economics, and politics formulate the main ingredients

of a viable society and that communication, once again, must follow the message of these disciplines, in order to transmit and convey their essence to specific audiences. In conclusion, the hardware and software of media were shown to impact on Mexican society from two vantage points: first, Mexico's own mass media, and secondly, the mass media of the United States that permeates Mexico.

Conclusion

In the context of international systems of broadcasting, there seem to be more similarities than differences between Mexico and the United States. Mexico imports American programming in the way of satellite transmissions, videotapes, films, radio beamed across the border, and audiotapes. And, although not fully discussed, it is evident that an abundance of Hispanic media, both print and electronic, exist in the United States. Mexican mass media, according to this limited study, is not seen as having a tremendous influence in motivating Mexicans to leave their homeland in favor of the U.S. Personal circumstances, such as poverty, appear to override all other factors. What seem most significant about this study, besides the cultural, economic, and political arenas that are known to most specialists in the field, are the images Mexicans receive about the United States. Whether the images conveyed by our mass media are correct is not as important as the Mexican perceptions of these images. Mexicans view Americans as possessing

a higher standard of living, a land of opportunity, and a chance at upward mobility. In some respects Mexico's revolution has been temporarily frozen due to economic circumstances. Nevertheless, I believe that Mexico has learned some important lessons, because of the oil crisis, and that it will continue to grow and add to the rich culture it already possesses. This growth will be gradual at first, thanks to the support of the U.S. and friendly nations who have resolved to help Mexico in this trying period. Mexico is reaching out in development of every sort. Communication can be added to culture, economics, and politics, as both industry and process. I hope that both Mexico and the U.S. can peacefully agree to disagree and that our nations can continue to enjoy our differences as well as our similarities. ¡Viva Mexico!

Reference Notes

1. Eisenstein, S. M. Film form. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1949. Upton Sinclair commissioned Sergei M. Eisenstein to create a film on Mexico. Eisenstein had promised to finish the film within a year's time. After 22 months of shooting, Sinclair halted the making of the film and demanded that Eisenstein turn over all of the footage. It appears Eisenstein had become bewitched by Mexico's seemingly endless topography and culture. The film was later released, under a different editor, as a series of films. Also see Marie Seaton's Eisenstein.

2. Head, S. R. Broadcasting in America: A survey of television and radio (3rd ed.). Geneva, IL: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1976. See Sidney Head's discussion concerning the Shannon-Weaver model: Source, Transmitter, Channel, Receiver, and Destination. Also see W. Meierhenry et al. where Berlo's SMCR model is presented: Source, Message, Channel, and Receiver. I view Source as substance, transformed into Message as meaning, that is carried by Channel toward a Receiver as society or individual.

3. Labich, K. The so-far so-good Mexican recovery. Fortune, January 1984, pp.97-99 + 102. In the United States less than 40 percent of the population is under the age of 24.

4. Mondale, W. Presidential debate--CBS. October 21, 1984. Ronald Reagan replied that it was the first time he had heard the National Debt (trade) blamed for high immigration.
5. Sanderson, S. E. Political tensions in the Mexican party system. Current History, December 1983, p. 405. Although I use similar language for the sake of clarity, I have rearranged it to say something quite different. I concur with Professor Sanderson that the present regime will continue uninterrupted; nevertheless, I feel the Mexican model has been profoundly altered.
6. Bagley, B. M. Mexican foreign policy: The decline of a regional power? Current History, December 1983, p. 406. The respective foreign ministers of these nations met on the resort island of Contadora in Panama (thus, the name Grupo de Contadora) to discuss the crisis in Central America.
7. Bagley, B. M. (same reference as above), p. 406. Bagley states that Mexico exemplified growing foreign policy autonomy after 1979 with the discovery of new oil reserves. President José López Portillo gave both diplomatic and economic support to the Sandanistas for the revolution in Nicaragua.
8. Nelson, D. Personal interview conducted on October 12 and 13, 1984, Arcola, IL. Four Mexican families convened at the Nelson residence to discuss Mexican television in the Monterey, Mexico

area.

9. Morgan, T. B. The Latinization of America. Esquire, May 1983, pp. 47-56. Mexican-American writer Richard Rodriguez, in his book Hunger of Memory, says "the bi-lingualists simplistically scorn the value and necessity of assimilation . . . Dangerously middle class ethnics romanticize public separateness and trivialize the dilemma of the socially disadvantaged."

10. Varas, A. Ideology and politics in Latin America-USSR relations. Problems of Communism, January-February 1984, pp. 35-47. These popular fronts were aimed at intensifying diplomatic relations between Latin America and themselves: "Colombia (in 1935); Uruguay (1944); Chile (1944); Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela (1945); and Argentina (1946)."

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Endnotes

[1]Benito Juarez was adopted by a Mexican family of Spanish descent. He was educated and his zeal for knowledge culminated in a law degreee. He proved a very able administrator and soon rose to the governorship of Oaxaca. This Mexican state became the model of good government.

[2]Nevertheless, Brazil uses less than 15% of its arable land.

[3]During the 1968 Olympic Games held in Mexico, we received reports in the U.S. about Mexican student demonstrations and swift government reprisals in that country that left many students dead. In the United States, during the 60's, the U.S. also experienced student uprisings, e.g., Kent State, but the repression in Mexico was much more severe.

[4]Mexico City is now the largest city in the world with a population in excess of 18 million people.

[5]A down link is a television receiving dish that receives audio-visual information from a transponder situated in the satellite.

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