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ABSTRACT

Three papers from a symposium on "Reflections on Deviance in 1984" are presented with particular emphasis on educational programs for behavior disordered students. An initial paper by James A. and Robert H. Zabel entitled "Reflections on Deviance in Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Conversation with 'George Orwell'," presents a simulated conversation with George Orwell who discusses life experiences leading to his views on deviance, predictions in his novel, "Nineteen Eighty-Four," and differences between psychoanalytic and behavioral views of deviance. In the second paper, "Behavior Disorders and the Family in 1984," Roger Kroth discusses the changing structures of American families, reviews recent work on families of exceptional children, and urges professionals to rethink their positions on working with parents. A final paper, "Saving Children in the Age of Big Brother: Moral and Ethical Issues in the Identification of Deviance," by James M. Kauffman, raises concern over adhering to legal mandates as the highest ethical standards, illustrates moral and ethical issues in a hypothetical case study, and emphasizes the importance of viewing the total picture. (CL)

National Needs Analysis in

BEHAVIOR DISORDERS

Reflections on Deviance in 1984: Selected Papers from the 1984 Midwest Symposium in Behavior Disorders



NATIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS/LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROJECT

REFLECTIONS ON DEVIANCE IN 1984: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1984 MIDWEST SYMPOSIUM IN BEHAVIOR DISORDERS

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May, 1984
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Columbia, Missouri, 1984

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PREFACE

In late February of this year, the second annual "Midwest Symposium for Leadership in Behavior Disorders" was held at the Adam's Mark Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri. Approximately 500 persons involved in the education of behaviorally disordered children from Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska participated in the Symposium, together with others from outside of these four states.

The theme for the Symposium was "Reflections on Deviance in 1984" with emphasis upon examining the current status of educational programs for behaviorally disordered students in light of George Orwell's observations about deviance in his classic book, Nineteen Eighty-Four. The program was extensive and varied, offering a formal debate, a conv· sation with "George Orwell", several additional keynote addresses, and more than 30 breakout sessions that either focused on themes and issues of the keynote presentations or provided opportunities for participants to share ideas and concerns.

In the initial keynote session, Robert Zabel (Kansas State University) interviewed "George Orwell" on a variety of topics related to the Symposium theme. Orwell, played by James Zabel, a professor of European history at the School of the Ozarks, described some of his own life experiences that led to his views on deviance, responded to questions about some of his predictions in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and reflected on differences between psychoanalytic and behavioral views of deviance. Many issues were left unresolved for conference participants to pursue further in their discussion groups.

Addressing the second keynote session that afternoon, Roger Kroth, from the University of New Mexico, spoke on the topic of families of behaviorally disordered children in 1984. Kroth pointed out the changing structures of American families, shared some recently collected research on families of exceptional children, and urged educators to work as partners with parents.

Following the Kroth presentation, a number of follow-up sessions provided opportunities for additional exploration of his topic.

On the following morning, James Kauffman of the University of Virginia challenged our conventional thinking in the identification of behaviorally disordered children by raising a number of concerns over the adherence to legal mandates as the highest ethical standards. Kauffman urged special educators to not simply defer to the law but to engage in rigorous analysis of what is best for all parties concerned. Again, several related topics were addressed in a dozen different follow-up sessions.

These three presentations comprise this document and, as such, represent a sample of the overall symposium offerings. We feel they reflect the diversity, spirit and challenge which permeated the entire symposium. The National Needs Analysis in Behavior Disorders Project at the University of Missouri-Columbia feels honored to be providing one vehicle in the publication and dissemination of these papers. The Symposium Planning Committee will distribute additional copies to participants of this year's conference and some of the papers may appear in professional journals. It is hoped that these papers will serve as a resource to educators and that the provocative nature of these papers will stimulate thinking regarding the nature and treatment of behavior disorders in 1984 and beyond.

The Editors

Judith Grosenick
Sharon Huntze
Reece Peterson
Robert Zabel

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CHAPTER 1

REFLECTIONS ON DEVIANCE IN NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR
A CONVERSATION WITH "GEORGE ORWELL"

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Introduction

At the 1984 "Midwest Symposium for Leadership in Behavioral Disorders" held in Kansas City this February, George Orwell's views of deviance in his classic novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, and other works were examined for their relevance to our views and treatment of deviance in 1984. In this paper "George Orwell" is interviewed by a professional special educator about his life experiences that have shaped his views of deviance. Orwell's childhood and schooling, his experiences in the British Imperial Police, as a down and out writer in Paris, as an investigative reporter of social conditions in the British working class, and as an anarchist in the Spanish Civil War provide the basis for discussion. As much as possible, Orwell's own words in Nineteen Eighty-Four and other writings are used and references are provided, although in some instances quotations have been slightly altered to fit the conversational format.

Commentator: We welcome you to this special event, marking the year that George Orwell chose as the title of his famous book. We are interested today, in asking Mr. Orwell whether or not the predictions he made have come about, and in particular we are interested in his views of deviance -- a major theme of the book. Mr. Orwell, welcome to our conference.

Orwell: Thank you, Mr. Zabel. A conference on "behavior disorders" sounds ominous to Winston Smith and me, but I am interested in your opinions on that

subject also.

Commentator: Does it bother you to be among leaders who work with behavioral disorders?

Orwell: Well, in my day we would not have been so eager to have called ourselves "leaders." We had enough of "leaders" in "Der Fuhrer" and "il Duce." I hope this is not a training ground for the Ministry of Love. Or would you call it the "Department of Human Care Services?" Perhaps those of you in the university settings would be better suited for the Ministry of Truth in Nineteen Eighty-Four?

Commentator: Do you really believe that some of us might fall into those categories?

Orwell: Of course, most of us do much of the time. Didn't you find anything in my book that reminded you of the ways you define and treat deviance?

Commentator: A disturbing question. Let's get back to that later. Mr. Orwell, most of us are familiar with your better known works, Nineteen Eighty-Four and Animal Farm, but probably know little about your life and your other writings. What can you tell us about your background and the major events which have shaped your views?

Orwell: You would like a biographical sketch?

Commentator: Yes, please.

Orwell: I was born in 1903 in India where my father was an official in the Opium Department of the Indian Civil Service.

Commentator: Excuse me. Your real name is Eric Blair, isn't it?

Orwell: I am not sure what you mean by "real." I was born "Eric Blair."

Commentator: Why do you write under a different name?

Orwell: There is no great mystery. As a writer I use "George Orwell." It sounds a bit more English, don't you think?

Commentator: As a psychologist something like a name change makes me wonder about the reason. One wonders if you were breaking with your past -- creating a new persona perhaps. I am sorry for the interruption. Please continue.

Orwell: Yes, well . . . When I was very young, my mother took my sister and me back to England where we lived while my father completed his career (Crick, 1980, pp. 5-7). When I was eight I was sent to a detestable little boarding school -- let's call it Crossgates -- where I spent several miserable years. I won a scholarship to Eton where . . .

Commentator: Excuse me, again. Why do you say a detestable little boarding school?

Orwell: Probably the greatest cruelty one can inflict on a child is to send it to school among children richer than itself. By their law I was damned, I had no money, I was weak, I was ugly, I was unpopular, I had a chronic cough, I was cowardly, I smelt. The Headmaster let me know in various ways that I was on reduced fees -- a scholarship boy -- there on suffrage. I was caned several times for things over which I had little control -- and then made to acknowledge my sinfulness (Crick, 1980, pp. 21-23).

Commentator: Aren't you laying it on a bit thick? I mean, others who attended the same school believe you were exaggerating. Were these feelings perhaps misperceptions of reality and your selective view years later of what was really a rather good prep school (Crick, 1980, pp. 16-17)?

Orwell: Well, what is reality in this case? Maybe it is the perception that matters. Still, I think my memory is pretty accurate. My friend Cyril Connolly, who also went to Crossgates, once said, "(The private school) is one of the few tortures confined to the ruling classes and from which the workers are still free" (Stansky and Abrahams, 1972, p. 35). People from my class, the "lower upper-middle class", the ones on the edge of the ruling class (the "Outer Party", if you will), were being taught our proper roles.

Commentator: So you think that what is expected of one is set very early in life?

Orwell: One's place in the world -- in the system -- does not depend on one's own efforts but on "what you are" (Stansky and Abrahams, 1972, p. xviii).

Commentator: Again, sorry for the interruption. Go ahead.

Orwell: I won a scholarship to Eton. There were many other middle class scholarship boys there. We even had a certain prestige that the aristocrats didn't have. I was fairly happy during those three years, but I did not go on to university as I suppose my tutors hoped. Instead, in 1922 I enlisted in the Indian Imperial Police and was sent to Burma.

Commentator: Was this a logical decision? I mean it seems like a waste of your elite education at Eton which is supposed to be the training ground for British leadership, isn't it?

Orwell: It was a perfectly "logical" decision, given who I was. My training was in fact to be of service to the British system, and when you consider the family tradition in the colonial service, well . . .

Commentator: You mean, again you were trained for the "Outer Party" but not the "Inner Party" like Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four?

Orwell: Yes.

Commentator: How long were you in Burma?

Orwell: Five years. One tour of duty. I returned in ill health in 1927 and took the opportunity to resign from the Service.

Commentator: Did you write anything during those five years?

Orwell: No. The demands of the policeman's role left me neither time nor initiative to do anything else.

Commentator: But seven years later you wrote a novel, Burmese Days, and two rather famous short stories set in South Asia. Were these autobiographical?

Orwell: Not exactly, but I think they give accurate impressions of what

Burma was like.

Commentator: Were you a critic, at the time, of British rule in the East?

Orwell: British imperialism was a great evil. I knew it then, but I was part of the system. That is the point of "Shooting an Elephant", one of the stories to which you have alluded. I really did shoot a magnificent animal that had killed an Indian coolie but which probably threatened no further danger. I shot him because the Indian crowd expected it of me. At that moment, as I stood there with the rifle in my hands, I first grasped the hollowness, the futility of the white man's dominion in the East. Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed native crowd -- seemingly the leading actor of the piece, but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow faces behind. And my whole life, every white man's life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at (Orwell and Angus, 1968, Vol. I, p. 239).

Commentator: So you left the Imperial Service and broke with your expected role?

Orwell: Yes, and I started writing, which I had wanted to do since age six or seven ("Why I Write," in Orwell, 1956, p. 390). My family, of course, was not happy about the decision to leave the service, but after my recovery, I went to Paris to live the Bohemian life and write. Paris was a cheap place to live until my meager funds were spent. Then I was reduced to fleabag hotels, and work as a "plongeur" washing pots and pans in the bowels of a luxury hotel (Orwell, 1972). My health finally gave out again and I spent some time in a charity hospital in Paris, where the poor go to die or are killed by doctors still playing with medieval methods of medicine ("How the Poor Die" in Orwell, 1956, p. 87). Somehow, I survived that, went back to England to recuperate, and got a job in a bookstore in London which did not provide much money but did give me the leisure to do some serious writing.

Commentator: You published Down and Out in Paris and London in 1933, based on your experiences with the poor in both France and England, and then Burmese Days came out in 1934. These were both books of social and political criticism, and most of your writing (at least that which is well known) could be seen in this light. Would you describe yourself as a political writer?

Orwell: When these books were written my political views were only beginning to take shape. I was more interested in writing than in politics. I would not, for example, have described myself as a Socialist then. But looking back, it seems to me nonsense, in an era like our own, to think that one can avoid writing of politics. Everyone writes of it in one guise or another ("Why I Write" in Orwell, 1956, p. 394).

Commentator: But you are a Socialist now?

Orwell: Yes, since 1936. A friend of mine, Richard Rees, tried to convert me to socialism for three years before that. But I remained unconvinced, uninterested. Then I went North. When I came back in the Spring of 1936 I had been converted (Stansky and Abrahams, 1980, p. 145).

Commentator: You went North?

Orwell: Yes, to the coal mining districts of Northwestern England. To the region around Wigan. The Left Book Club commissioned me to write a journalist's account of conditions in the mines and in coal mining towns. This was a popular sort of expose journalism at the time. The weeks in the North changed my life. I was tremendously impressed with the sheer physical abilities of the miners, and their absolutely essential role in the civilization we had in England. And, I saw the desolate life of the working people, the inescapability of their conditions, the roles they were forced to play. They are kept by society in a subservient role, because our "civilization" is based on their suffering. They are the proles without which our lives, our soft "superior"

lives, would not continue (Orwell, 1958, pp. 33-35).

Commentator: Was there a sense of the injustice of this inequality and demand for change?

Orwell: Let me illustrate with an incident I observed. In Wigan I stayed for a while with a miner who was suffering from an eye disease. He could see across the room but not much farther. Watching this man go to the colliery to draw his meager compensation, I was struck by the profound differences that are still made by status. Here was a man who had been half blinded in one of the most useful of all jobs and was drawing a pension to which he had a perfect right, if anybody has a right to anything. Yet he could not, so to speak, demand this pension -- he could not, for instance, draw it when and how he wanted it. He had to go to the colliery once a week at a time named by the company, and when he got there was kept waiting about for hours in the cold wind. For all I know he was also expected to touch his cap and show gratitude to whomever paid him; at any rate he had to waste an afternoon and spent sixpence in bus fares. It is very different for a member of the bourgeoisie, even such a down-at-heel member as I am. Even when I am on the verge of starvation I have certain rights attaching to my bourgeois status. This business of petty inconvenience and indignity, of being kept waiting about, of having to do everything at other people's convenience, is inherent in working-class life. A thousand influences constantly press a working man down into a passive role. He does not act, he is acted upon. He feels himself the slave of mysterious authority and has a firm conviction that "they" will never allow him to do this, that and the other. A person of bourgeois origin goes through life with some expectation of getting what he wants, within reasonable limits. Hence the fact that in times of stress "educated" people tend to come to the front. They are no more gifted than the others and their "education" is generally

quite useless in itself, but they are accustomed to a certain amount of deference and consequently have the cheek necessary to a commander (Orwell, 1958, pp. 48-49).

Commentator: Are you saying that social status distinctions are not only a reflection of wealth, but also of the willingness to respect authority?

Orwell: Yes.

Commentator: So you became a Socialist. What sort of Socialist -- a Marxist, a Communist?

Orwell: No. I dislike all those smelly little orthodoxies that imprison people. I am a Socialist, but my socialism is pretty simple. The "professional Socialists" are their own worst enemies.

Commentator: How so?

Orwell: Socialism in its "developed form" is a theory confined entirely to the leisured class. One sometimes gets the impression that the mere words "Socialism" and "Communism" draw towards them with magnetic force every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-weaver, sex-maniac, Quaker, "Nature Cure" quack, pacifist and feminist in England. If a real working man, a miner dirty from the pit, for instance, had suddenly walked in their midst, they would have been embarrassed, angry, and disgusted; some, I should think, would have fled holding their noses. Socialism for the working man simply means better wages and shorter hours and nobody bossing you about. So far as my experience goes, no genuine working man grasps the "deeper implications" of socialism. Often, in my opinion, he is a truer Socialist than the orthodox Marxist, because he does remember, what the other so often forgets, that socialism means justice and common decency (Orwell, 1958, pp. 173-176).

Commentator: You learned this when you went "North". What did you learn when you went "South" -- to Spain later in 1936?

Orwell: I learned that freedom and justice and common decency can exist . . . but that they can be betrayed.

Commentator: You fought on the Loyalist, the Republican, side against the Fascists. What was the Spanish Civil War like? Your book Homage to Catalonia has often been praised as the most insightful document of the period.

Orwell: The war was, in many respects, a comic opera. Military instruction on our side was almost non-existent and the weapons we were expected to use seldom matched. I must say that all the time I was in Spain I saw very little fighting. No aeroplane ever dropped a bomb anywhere near me, I do not think a shell ever exploded within fifty yards of me, and I was only in hand-to-hand fighting once (once is once too often, I might say). Of course I was often under heavy machine-gun fire, but usually at longish ranges. Often I used to gaze round the wintry landscape and marvel at the futility of it all (Orwell, 1952, pp. 22-23).

Commentator: So you think the Spanish Civil War meant very little?

Orwell: I certainly did not say that. When I first arrived in Barcelona in December, 1936, I found something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle. Every shop and cafe had an inscription saying that it had been collectivized, and even the bootblacks had been collectivized and their boxes painted red and black. Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the face and greeted you as an equal. In outward appearance it was a town in which the wealthy classes had practically ceased to exist. All of this was very moving. There was much in it that I did not understand, in some ways I did not even like it, but I recognized it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for (Orwell, 1952, p. 405).

Commentator: Against fascism?

Orwell: No. That's too simple. The thing that happened in Spain was, in

fact, not merely a civil war, but the beginning of a social revolution. It is this fact that the anti-Fascist press, particularly the Communists inside and outside Spain, made it its special business to obscure. The issue was narrowed down to "fascism versus democracy" and the revolutionary aspect was concealed as much as possible.

Commentator: Even the Communists opposed a socialist revolution?

Orwell: It was conformity and power that the Soviets wanted, not the egalitarian revolution. Thus, their press indulged in lies implying that scores of thousands of working-class people, including eight or ten thousand soldiers who were freezing in the front-line trenches and hundreds of foreigners who had come to Spain to fight against fascism, often sacrificing their livelihood and their nationality by doing so, were simply traitors in the pay of the enemy. And this falsified story was spread all over Spain by means of posters and repeated over and over in the Communist and pro-Communist press of the whole world. One of the dreariest effects of this Spanish Civil War has been to teach me that the Left-wing press is every bit as spurious and dishonest as that of the Right (Orwell, 1952, pp. 50, 64-65).

Commentator: It strikes me that several themes that show up later in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four have their origins here. For example, the apparent attraction you have for the working classes and for the militiamen too, reminds me of the hope Winston Smith has for the proles.

Orwell: In Spain, one was always making contacts that bridged the gulf of language and tradition and class.

Commentator: And the rewriting of history -- the falsification of the facts of the Civil War -- that is the background to the obliteration of history that we find in Nineteen Eighty-Four?

Orwell: Yes, that was the betrayal.

Commentator: You were wounded and back in Barcelona where it became apparent that the revolution was turning against your side. So, you left Spain surreptitiously and returned to England. You know, the last paragraph in Homage to Catalonia makes it sound as if you left one world for another when you returned. You speak of: "England . . . still the England I had known in my childhood: the railway-cuttings smothered in wild flowers, the slow-moving streams bordered by willows, the larkspurs in the cottage gardens; and then the huge peaceful wilderness of outer London, the barges on the miry river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket matches and Royal weddings, the men in bowler hats, the pigeons in Trafalgar Square, the red buses, the blue policeman . . . " (pp. 231-232). Is this England the "Golden Country" that Winston Smith dreams of as a haven of civilization?

Orwell: But you left out the last part of that paragraph after my bucolic setting where I conclude: " . . . all sleeping the deep, deep sleep of England, from which I sometimes fear that we shall never wake till we are jerked out of it by the roar of bombs." (p. 232)

Commentator: World War II?

Orwell: And its aftermath, in Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Commentator: What did you do in the war?

Orwell: I intended to enlist for active military service but was rejected on medical grounds. Rather stupid, don't you agree, considering my service in Spain? Still, B.B.C. could use my talents for a couple of years.

Commentator: Doing what?

Orwell: Interpreting our cause to East Indian listeners.

Commentator: Propaganda work?

Orwell: If you like. It was important to keep Indians and Burmese loyal to the Empire.

Commentator: But as an opponent of the British Empire, didn't you think your position hypocritical? I mean isn't this close to what the Communist Party did in Spain -- manipulate the truth, rewrite history?

Orwell: It seemed the lesser of two evils. And at least I was able to find the model at B.B.C. for the Ministry of Truth.

Commentator: Did you take pride in your work?

Orwell: I am not sure how effective I was. Winston Smith, of course, was very good at what he did. He had pride in his craft. His work absorbed him. I eventually had to leave.

Commentator: The five years after the war resulted in the two books most associated with your fame -- Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. Was Animal Farm a thinly disguised parable about the history of Soviet Communism?

Orwell: When I started writing the book in 1943, most Englishmen were allowing their admiration for the military heroism of the Russians to blind them to the faults of the Communist regime. I wanted my countrymen to start thinking clearly again.

Commentator: So Napoleon the pig is Stalin and Snowball is Trotsky?

Orwell: If you choose to see them that way.

Commentator: This is a question that I have often wondered about. In Animal Farm but also in Nineteen Eighty-Four, do some of the characters actually represent real people? I mean, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, is Big Brother really Stalin, and Immanuel Goldstein actually Lev Bronstein, otherwise known as Trotsky?

Orwell: Those were obviously powerful images when the book was written and help to make the point. But if you don't go beyond that you . . .

Commentator: No, I don't mean to imply that Nineteen Eighty-Four is just a satire on Soviet Russia. But these people were in your mind when you created

the characters?

Orwell: They are composite characters.

Commentator: Mr. Orwell, it is time now to explore Nineteen Eighty-Four more precisely. But may I summarize what I perceive as the "meaning of your life" as you have described it. Tell me if I am wrong in my conclusions. It seems to me that there are two strong threads woven into all your experiences. First, you have always been aware (often painfully aware) of the strength of social class designations -- whether it is your own "upper lower middle class" background or the limits that race, class origins, or nationality impose on social interaction. Second, and this may have been formed in your mind later on, you see the world traveling toward greater conformity and efficiency at the expense of individual freedom and human dignity and equality. Is this a fair summary?

Orwell: No, but it will have to do, I suppose.

Commentator: Let's turn now to Nineteen Eighty-Four. How much of what you wrote in Nineteen Eighty-Four has actually come to pass?

Orwell: What? You've missed the point. Everyone knows that there was some thought at first about naming the book Nineteen Forty-Eight or something else. This was not a futuristic book. It was already here.

Commentator: Already here? Again, it seems to me you are laying it on a bit thick.

Orwell: In the years after the war there were plenty of people who could remember totalitarian societies. Russia and Nazi Germany weren't liberal democracies after all. In the 1930's millions of people were ruled through a combination of terror and love. Big Brother was alive and well.

Commentator: Alright. Let's agree that you meant Nineteen Eighty-Four to be a parable rather than a literal prediction. But then, even if there is a

timeless character to the book, do you see any of the behavior described in Nineteen Eighty-Four coming about today? That is, after all, how most of us are viewing Nineteen Eighty-Four in this namesake year.

Orwell: Well, you tell me. As you read Nineteen Eighty-Four today, are there portions of the book that strike you as uncomfortably close to your world?

Commentator: Yes, in certain respects. The book describes a world divided up among three rival super-powers, and one could draw the parallel to the United States and its NATO alliance, the Soviet bloc, and China. Let me quote from Nineteen Eighty-Four on this point, because it does seem remarkably prescient. You say, "The splitting-up of the world into three great superstates was an event which could be and indeed was foreseen before the middle of the twentieth century. With the absorption of Europe by Russia and of the British Empire by the United States, two of the three existing powers, Eurasia and Oceania, were already effectively in being. The third, Eastasia, only emerged as a distinct unit after another decade of confused fighting" (Orwell, 1983, p. 123). I find this amazingly close to our world today.

Orwell: But you note that this could have been foreseen shortly after World War II. There are, of course, ways in which the world's history as described in Nineteen Eighty-Four can be found to have been misinterpreted. I certainly did not think we could reach 1984, almost 40 years since Hiroshima, without a nuclear war of enormous proportions, in the mid-1950's at the latest.

Commentator: Winston Smith, in reading Goldstein's secret book, reads that after the holocaust of the 1950's (and I quote): "No formal agreement was ever made or hinted at, no more bombs were dropped. All three powers merely continue to produce atomic bombs and store them up against the decisive opportunity which they all believe will come sooner or later" (Orwell, 1983, p. 130). This

sounds to me like the nuclear arms race.

Orwell: Yes, there does seem today to be an incredible degree of Doublethink. We know (at one rational level) that even a small portion of the nuclear bombs in the arsenals of the Russians and the Americans can make the planet unfit for most life, and yet can suspend judgment as Winston Smith does and argue for even more thousands of these weapons, then we are engaging in Doublethink.

Commentator: Still, in your book you describe a world that in many respects does not seem to have come into being. For example, you describe an underdeveloped world -- Africa and so forth, which "no longer, in a material sense, contains anything to fight about" (Orwell, 1983, p. 124). What about oil and other valuable resources? And it seems to me your image of a world that has abandoned the development of technology seems to have been belied by history.

Orwell: If I were now to re-write Nineteen Eighty-Four in a futuristic manner, some sort of science fiction, there would be some changes. But I told you, it is not supposed to be taken as a prediction.

Commentator: Do you think your explanation of the primary aim of warfare, that is, to use up the products of the machine without raising the general standard of living -- to use up the surplus of consumer goods in order to maintain a hierarchical society -- would this also have to be modified in light of developments, say in America and Western Europe? After all, we are in the midst of a consumer-oriented age, aren't we, in which the satisfaction, the gratification of our material desires is highly successful? Almost all Americans and Europeans have the goods of the earth that previous generations could only dream of. And I don't see any diminution of this trend in the future.

Orwell: Together, America and Western Europe comprise about only 500 million

people out of a world population of four and one-half billion in the world. If you are going to use my book as some sort of template for the present world, then you had better consider that maybe three billion of the world's population play the role of the proles, whose sweat and poverty make your world possible. And then you can see modern military activity in that light. Don't tell me that war, or the preparation for it, does not take place at the expense of the progress of the world. Goods must be produced by our industries (and developed by our scientists) but they must not be distributed. Even when weapons of war are not actually destroyed, their manufacture is still a convenient way of expending labor power without producing anything that can be consumed. One of your nuclear submarines, for example, equals the education budgets of two dozen of the poorer developing nations of the world.

Commentator: This sounds strikingly similar to a recent analysis of the lack of mental health, educational, and other services to children by Marian Wright Edelman. She states, "An escalating arms race and nuclear proliferation hold hostage not only the future we adults hold in trust for our children, but also the present that is, for many millions of our young throughout the world and America, one of relentless poverty and deprivation" (Edelman, 1983, p. 594). She goes on to say that the world's public expenditures per soldier average $19,300 compared to only $380 per school age child. She claims, "If you had spent two million dollars a day every day since Christ was born you would have spent less than President Reagan wants the American people to believe the Pentagon can spend efficiently over five years" (p. 595).

Let's get away from this for the moment. Another problem I had with the book, if one were to interpret it as in some degree futuristic, is the low level of technology available even to members of the Party -- outer or inner. For example, even the telescreen seems to be a primitive instrument. Do you

think this was poor prophecy?

Orwell: I have never been impressed as some other so-called "utopian" writers have been about the potential of technology. But as long as you brought it up, I think that my telescreen is primitive and dwarfed by the totalitarian potential of television today.

Commentator: Television is "totalitarian"? That's a very limited view. Television can be abused, I suppose, but also provides opportunities for education -- for maximizing knowledge and giving us information about the rest of the world -- knowledge that is more instantaneous, more up-to-date.

Orwell: Come now. You psychologists know better than that. Television is a way of modifying behavior. It captures your will and limits your choices.

Commentator: But the trend in television is in the opposite direction. What about public television, with its open-endedness, its invitation to quality in the arts, or its invitation to diversity of opinion in its news programs?

Orwell: Listen, 90% of the population who watch television watch it to escape from those sorts of activities -- to escape from reality. They want packaged gratifications without expending the effort to find out whether or not these entertainments are worth anything. They want soap operas or "sit-coms" (How do you like that for Newspeak?) -- shows with canned laughter and even applause when a character utters some pseudo-philosophical insight. You spent hours every day allowing the television to wash over you. Your children grow up with the television as a friend.

Commentator: There is a sort of escapism. I imagine there were similar fears when the printing press was invented. New technology -- television, computers -- is always resisted by some groups.

Orwell: It's not at all the same. There is a different sort of mental activity involved in television. The technology is not so terribly sophisticated, '

television has ushered in a post-literate stage of human history. When you read a book, you must do the work. This is very different than receiving, as a passive vessel, the "truths" that television, directly and subliminally, imposes on you most of the time. When Western man became literate in the 16th century and beyond, he created the great political freedom movements that have so characterized our modern history -- the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and so forth. But now we are giving up our freedom and escaping into easier and more comfortable, more passive roles. We are beyond literacy, and moving beyond freedom and dignity as well.

Commentator: Interesting -- you have used the same words that B.F. Skinner uses as a title for one of his books. We'll get back to that later. As long as you bring up the issue of literacy, let's talk for a bit about language. To be "Orwellian" in language has become commonplace in modern times. Do you think that imprecision in language is a serious problem today? I mean, is our language more "Orwellian" than it used to be?

Orwell: There are several problems when one looks at the evolution of language. Do you remember Syme, Winston's colleague in The Ministry of Truth? He took real pleasure in destroying words, cutting language to the bone. There is a trend today to simplify language, particularly by making different parts of speech interchangeable and also by purging ambiguities and shades of meaning from vocabulary. Our new words are simply staccato sounds expressing what is meant to be a clearly understood concept. It is becoming more difficult to use our commonly-understood vocabulary for literary purposes or for political or philosophical discussion (Orwell, 1983, p. 199). On the other hand . . .

Commentator: Excuse me. Could you give an example or two of what you mean?

Orwell: Yes, well . . . nouns, for example, become verbs quite easily. You

in this room are fond of discussing whether or not "exceptional" children should be "mainstreamed" in education. You make a noun into a verb, which incidentally also implies a sort of engineering that is rather totalitarian. After all, Winston Smith was "mainstreamed" wasn't he? As to the actual simplification of language, well, computer language has done a lot of damage. I cringe every time I hear terms like "input", "output", and "interface."

Commentator: You said that there were several problems related to language misuse. What else strikes you about modern language trends?

Orwell: Language is political. I mean, the vocabulary and style we use indicates our political and social power -- our status.

Commentator: Is it your impression that psychologists and special educators fall into this area of language use?

Orwell: Social scientists in general use obscure language. What is the ordinary person to think of the following example?

> Central to (his) theory of moral development and to other cognitive-developmental theories is the concept of the invariant sequence of stages. Stage development is held to be irreversibly progressive (but may stop at any stage), with no regression in competence and no skipping of stages. Following from that is the notion that disequilibrium elicited by exposure to reasoning at the next higher state represents the optimal means for inducing structural development. Despite the centrality of the sequentiality claim in his theory, its empirical status remains large y equivocal . . .

Commentator: It seems perfectly clear to me, but you consider this bad writing?

Orwell: It is more than bad writing. This piece imposes a barrier of class, of status, between the writer and the masses of the population. It can only be understood by the elect. It is part of what reassures the writer of his inclusion in the Inner or Outer Party. It distinguishes him from the "Proles" (or what you might call the "care recipients"). It's the advantage the "care giver" gets through his privileged education. The substance of what

he is saying is no mystery, but his language is. True communication, of course, is of little importance here.

Commentator: Let me get this right. You believe in language that is direct but not colorless?

Orwell: Yes, one can at the same time be honest and direct, and also retain the nuances, the shades of meaning, found in the English language.

Commentator: You said earlier that viewing Nineteen Eighty-Four as a work of prediction misses the point of the book. What is the point of Nineteen Eighty-Four?

Orwell: Your conference topic, deviance, comes pretty close. Incidentally, I am wondering how you define "deviance"?

Commentator: Well, let's see. A difference from group norms for behavior or thinking . . . or feeling. Special Education deals with remediating this sort of deviance.

Orwell: Who establishes what these norms are?

Commentator: The group . . . society does.

Orwell: Do you ever feel that you might be the victim yourself? I mean, it has been my experience that society's roles victimize both sides. Those who impose society's rules on the recalcitrants end up being just as much the victims as the deviants themselves. My experience in boarding school, in Burma, in observing the social and political conformism in England and Spain -- all these experiences have shown me that the suppression of what is labeled as deviance is actually a way of imposing the political will, or ideology, of one class upon another. It has little to do with adding to the material or spiritual well-being of the recipient.

Commentator: Would you explain what you just said?

Orwell: Most of the time we act out our roles without reference to

reasonableness. What we are really doing, I suspect, is running in fear from the possibility that we might discover that below the thin veneer of respectability, of civilization, of apparent normality, we are really bundles of deviance.

Commentator: This is very interesting. William Rhodes who was keynote speaker at last year's symposium has written extensively on the concept of deviance. He once wrote, "Normality is a general neurosis taught to civilized man to protect him from devastating realizations about himself. Normality is a modern totem through which we claim kinship with the mythically unblemished and invincible ones, and cover from ourselves our own vulnerability in a world which is not ours and which will go on without us after we are gone . . . In sum, normality is a mass cultural neurosis . . ." (Rhodes, 1977, p. 122). Was O'Brien's brainwashing of Winston Smith a result of the Inner Party's need to conceal from themselves truths about themselves?

Orwell: The totalitarian system described in Nineteen Eighty-Four is an extreme case. O'Brien and the other Inner Party members know very well what they are doing. They understand that the ultimate truth of human nature is to subject someone else to your will. O'Brien is quite clear about that. But still Winston Smith is a scapegoat. He could, of course, have simply been vaporized, have disappeared, have been killed. But O'Brien spent a great deal of effort first in "special education" to convince Winston Smith that his behavior was abnormal. Only when Smith could really believe that 2 + 2 = 5 and learn to love his tormentor, Big Brother, could O'Brien rest secure in his own normality. You see the victim is as much O'Brien as it is Smith. Remember that Doublethink was strongest in the Inner Party. O'Brien had to reassure himself that he was not crazy.

Commentator: Not crazy? Then, was Winston Smith crazy?

Orwell: Well, why not? Deviant, certainly. Isn't neurosis a form of deviance? According to your definition of deviance, Winston Smith was neurotic, was crazy. "Sanity is a statistical matter" (Howe, 1983, p. 184). He had to be set straight, not for his own sake, but for the mental health of the Inner Party. Sanity requires submission to what is normal (Howe, 1983, p. 165).

Commentator: I guess you have a good point about Winston Smith. The official definition of serious emotional disturbance includes the following criteria: an inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships, inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances, a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression, and a tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears (Federal Register, Vol. 42, 1977, p. 42478). Certainly, these all are characteristics displayed by your Winston Smith. Is Nineteen Eighty-Four overly dramatized? When we read the book we are, after all, shocked that this sort of behavior could be tolerated.

Orwell: In America, perhaps it comes out in a less virulent form than elsewhere. I understand that in the Soviet Union, social dissidents are regularly confined to psychiatric institutions.

Commentator: But international psychiatric groups have recognized this travesty and have ejected Soviet psychiatrists from membership.

Orwell: But you do get the point don't you? If neurosis is defined as deviant behavior and deviance is determined by society's norms, then the social dissidents are indeed crazy. There is little choice but to lock them up.

Commentator: We don't lock up our social and political dissidents in this country.

Orwell: Oh, don't you? But you do sometimes label and segregate those whose

behavior violates your expectations of what is normal. You do have special classrooms, institutions, and prisons which you hope will correct aberrant behavior. I realize that in most cases these systems are much less repressive than those described in Nineteen Eighty-Four, and that they are often based on compassion. Nineteen Eighty-Four is a society in which deviance has all but been wiped out. It may crop up here and there, perhaps it even serves the function of scape-goating, but sooner or later all deviant acts, and even thoughts, will be found out. We are not, thank goodness, quite on the threshold of Nineteen Eighty-Four, at least in Europe and America. But we should be alert to its temptations.

Commentator: And what things should those of us in psychology, or special education, be alerted to?

Orwell: First of all, I should think that you would want to confront your fallibility. As I understand it, there is a debate over something as fundamental as the source of the deviance that makes special education necessary. You use two different terms: emotional disturbance and behavioral disorder.

Commentator: You're right, there is a psychoanalytic approach and a behaviorist approach.

Orwell: And, of course, this reflects a deep disagreement between those who would interpret deviance as something wrong, a problem, within the individual, and those who blame the environment.

Commentator: And with which side would you agree?

Orwell: I should not like to be categorized either way, but by and large, in my experience, our society imposes upon us such iron-clad restrictions about behavior tnat it is impossible to escape. I would have to agree, I suppose, to that extent, with the behavioral view.

Commentator: But you don't feel comfortable in that camp?

Orwell: No.

Commentator: Why not?

Orwell: Because what is called "social engineering", or "behavior modification", too easily passes on to totalitarianism -- conformity to rigid norms.

Commentator: Are you implying that we may, in a sense, create our own kinds of totalitarian regimes in our special education programs, which force our students to conform to rigid norms for behavior?

Orwell: It may be that some of your programs systematically demand conformity of behavior, thought, and feelings, and that some of the technologies you employ are painfully aversive to your students who must conform or suffer the consequences.

Commentator: But how can you contradict yourself so much? Throughout your life you have come up against experiences which cry out for correction -- British subjugation of colonial peoples, the inequality of the British school system, grinding poverty in the British working classes. How are these to be overcome if not through a commitment to changing the behavior of people through new environments? Have you read B.F. Skinner?

Orwell: Yes, in preparation for this event.

Commentator: Skinner wrote Walden Two (1947) about the same time you wrote Nineteen Eighty-Four. How are the two books different?

Orwell: How are they alike?

Commentator: Both are "futuristic" in the sense of proposing a utopia (or, in your case an anti-utopia). Both seem to be to describe behavioral conditioning, although, of course, Skinner is optimistic about the end result, whereas your world is a dismal place.

Orwell: You've answered your own question about how the two books are different.

Commentator: Why can't behavioral conditioning be beneficial? There's nothing threatening about Skinner's Walden. Those who live in that environment are more creative, more productive, less aggressive.

Orwell: But less human . . . And I think the belief that the inhabitants of Walden Two would be more creative is perhaps wrong. This has been tried before. Skinner is not so different from the utilitarians of the early 19th century. We should remember that the most famous product of the utilitarian movement, John Stuart Mill, was almost a casualty of this behavioral conditioning. He had a nervous breakdown, which he overcame only by embracing the heretofore "forbidden" side of his personality -- the affirmation of love, of freedom, of the individual spirit -- all those things that Skinner doesn't really believe exist.

Commentator: You believe that there is something real to love, to freedom, a spirit in individuals? That there are these forces internal to all of us?

Orwell: Yes, and they are the most direct and strongest in those who have been least "conditioned" by class and by education.

Commentator: So you are not really a behaviorist. You cautioned us to clarify our thinking about the nature vs. nurture debate. Yet, you show that contradiction yourself.

Orwell: I suppose you are right.

Commentator: And what else should we in special education be alerted to? I'm not sure you have clarified our thinking in your previous point.

Orwell: People in special education should be aware of their own motivations. Self-criticism is a painful but valuable corrective. You function as members of the Party. You are all members of the Outer Party at least. Perhaps, some of you are leaders even in the Inner Party. In my experience, people can devise ideologies (consciously or not) which cover their economic and political motives.

Commentator: You mean that special education programs may have as much to do with protecting the career and status of the teacher, administrator, psychologist, or researcher as providing care for the disturbed?

Orwell: Anytime an educational system grows in complexity, and "care-giving" becomes bureaucratized, becomes big business, the line between helping and harassing becomes blurred. I am sure that O'Brien was convinced that he was only trying to help Winston Smith.

Commentator: Mr. Orwell, besides deviance, another major theme of this conference has to do with the family and behavior disorders. Do you have any thoughts on the family in 1984?

Orwell: I have no professional training in that field either.

Commentator: Yes, but is the family an important concept in your book?

Orwell: The family image is central to the book. You have, for example, Smith's neighbors, the Parsons, who have abdicated as parents. The rearing of their children is essentially out of their hands. The father is so slavishly and fearfully a believer in the Party that he has forgotten the importance of living discipline at home. The behavior of the children has been formed by the Party, not by the family. As a result, the Parsons' children are little monsters -- although normal by the Party's standards.

Commentator: Is there any lesson here for us today?

Orwell: You have to draw your own conclusions. Perhaps "care-giving" should focus on rebuilding the family more than on curing the behaviorally disturbed after the damage has been done.

Commentator: The recurring dream that Winston Smith has about his own mother -- does that serve as a contrast to the Parsons family?

Orwell: Not precisely, but Smith's dream, which gradually becomes clearer in the book, is quite important. I should like to think that this was one

memory which O'Brien was not able to erase. Winston's mother loved him even at the expense of her own health. She forgave his beastly behavior and sacrificed herself.

Commentator: There is another haunting image of the family. In the war film that Smith writes about in his clandestine journal, he remembers a Jewess in in a lifeboat sheltering her little boy from machine gun fire -- all to no avail of course. Her arms don't stop bullets and bombs.

Orwell: And do you remember that one of the proles in the audience had to be ejected from the theater because she kicked up a fuss about the scene? That made an impression on Smith too. It is a hopeful thing in this tragic image.

Commentator: Along this same line concerning the family, you obviously meant to draw a contrast between Smith's unfortunate marriage to Katharine, the cold paragon of Party commitedness, and his affair with Julia -- the "rebel from the waist down."

Orwell: It was the Party's intention to remove all competing enjoyments -- whether sexual or familiar, from society. Energy was to be focused on the Party alone.

Commentator: Any final comments on the family in 1984?

Orwell: I am no expert on family life, and I suppose no one would say my own family experiences have been "normal" -- whatever that may be. I had little to do with my father, and as a husband and father my experiences were short-lived. But what I did have has convinced me of the importance of that part of life. The deepest satisfactions and the most profound tragedies too have always been bound up with the family. Privacy, love, friendship, and when the members of a family stood by one another without needing to know the reason -- these things go back to ancient days. I should hate to see this dignity of emotion, these deep and complex feelings, disappear as the family

weakens in modern times (Howe, 1983, p. 22). Yes, I should think that the health of the family would properly occupy many of you who care about the reasons for behavior disorders.

Commentator: Mr. Orwell, I hope "Nineteen Eighty-Four" is not here yet, nor in the future.

Orwell: I don't really believe it is in any literal sense. It is a warning.

Commentator: Mr. Orwell, my feeling is that you are an anarchist (or what we might call a counter-theorist).

Orwell: Better an anarchist than a Party functionary.

Commentator: I could try to summarize what your significance is for the twentieth century, but I am afraid that categorizing an anarchist is a lost cause. I am not sure that you have helped us to sort out our lives, but you have posed some disturbing questions. May I read, in summation, a poem of yours, not well known, actually, but perhaps reflecting the dilemmas and contradictions you sense in your world?

A happy vicar I might have been
Two hundred years ago.
To preach upon eternal doom
And watch my walnuts grow.

But born, alas, in an evil time,
I missed that pleasant haven,
For the hair has grown on my upper lip
And the clergy are all clean-shaven . . .

I dreamed I dwelt in marble halls,
And woke to find it true,
I wasn't born for an age like this,
Was Smith? Was Jones? Were You?
(Why I Write, in Orwell, 1956, p. 393-394)

Thank you very much Mr. Orwell.

Orwell: You are welcome.

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CHAPTER 2

BEHAVIOR DISORDERS AND THE FAMILY IN 1984

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Parents of exceptional children have presented a challenge to professionals. There is a general feeling that they should be involved in the education of their children and that they have a number of needs that are different than parents of "normal" children. Parents of behaviorally disordered children seem to be even more needy -- or their children seem to need more from their parents. Almost to a person, professionals are critical of the fact that parents do not get involved. When meetings are held and these targeted parents do not show up, there is a group sigh and the remark, "the parents who should be here, are not here tonight."

Part of the problem is that professionals know that when parents and professionals work together, parents can act as change agents for their children (Becker, 1971; Berkowitz & Graziano, 1972; O'Dell, 1974; Patterson, 1976). Almost any teacher can supply anecdotal examples of successful cooperative efforts. A number of studies have reported that family relations can be improved and parents can receive social support (Coleman, Dougher & Tanner, 1976; Neman, McCann, Ross, Menolascino & Neal, 1977; Tavormina, Hampson & Luscomb, 1976). This knowledge only adds to the frustration of the professionals.

Some Assumptions

When one begins to consider the family as an integral part of the educational scheme, there are certain assumptions that seem helpful. These have guided in the development of the Parent Involvement Center in Albuquerque,

which serves both teachers and parents of exceptional children.

Assumptions

1. Money. There will never be enough money to do the things that both parents and professionals know would help. The lack of funding will govern the types of interaction that are feasible in any program.

2. Time. There will never be enough time to do the things that both parents and professionals know would help. For parents, caring for other family members and holding a job will become priorities. For professionals, other families will experience crisis situations and require help.

3. Personnel. Few colleges and universities provide training for teachers or other educators in working with families (Kroth, Otteni, & Parks, 1982). This may be one of the reasons professionals have turned to parents as therapeutic agents (Guerney, 1968).

4. Heterogeneity of Parents. Unfortunately, professionals who individualize for children forget that parents are not a homogeneous group. Materials that they cannot read, activities that they cannot carry out, expectations that they cannot fulfill are continually being presented to families, with little consideration to the size, composition, income level, educational level, language or values of the family.

5. Needs/Strengths of Parents. Closely tied to the recognition of the heterogeneity of parents is the assumption that parents have different needs at different times, and that they have different abilities for coping with their situation. Some parents even have the strength and energy to teach other parents, while some parents have little reserve.

These assumptions about the populations under discussion will affect the types of service provided to parents and the parents' ability to carry out treatment. Professionals will recognize that the best of programs inappropriately applied may cause more harm than they will do good (Doernberg, 1978; Foster, Berger & McLean, 1981).

Changes in Family Structure

There have been many changes in family structure and style over the past fifty years. These changes have and will affect child-rearing practices. Without placing a value judgment on the old versus the new, look at some of

the differences and speculate on the ways that parent/professional interaction has or might change (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

FAMILIES (STYLE AND STRUCTURE)

	THEN (50 years)	NOW
FAMILY COMPOSITION:	Many members Extended Intact	Few members Nuclear Reconstituted Alternative styles*
FAMILY INTERACTION:	Work, play games Talk together (2-3 hrs. a day) Intergenerational	Little family work, Parallel TV viewing (ave. 7 hrs. a day) 15-20 min. interaction a day
FAMILY WORK:	Mainly fathers Family businesses	Both parents (70% of the time)
NEIGHBORHOODS:	Much interaction Ethnic Rural/small town	Anonymity Integrated Urban
EDUCATION:	Less than 1/2 finished HS Few went past HS	Most finished HS Many go to post HS
ORPHANAGES:	Some	Very rare
CHILD ABUSE:	????????	Currently a problem
DIVORCE:	Rare	Common (over 1/2 of children will live in single parent family by age 15)

*Percent of births to unmarried mothers has more than quadrupled.

In the past, families tended to be larger, and often located close to relatives. They were usually intact, and the father went off to work in the morning, while the mother stayed home. The children usually had a good idea of what their fathers did for a living and visited them at work. The children might be expected to follow in their fathers' footsteps, either by working in the plants, on the farm, or the family business. Most families worked, played,

and talked together. They often supplied their own entertainment.

There was a fai. amount of intergenerational interaction. The family visited grandmothers for vacations, and problems were solved across generations. Neighborhoods were small and interactive. People kept track of each others' children, and it was difficult for children to "get away" with anything without their parents knowing about it. Often the neighborhoods were of the same cultural value system, and people lived in rural areas or small towns. Less than half of the children finished high school and few went on for further training.

In the past, some children ended up in orphanages. Just how prevalent child abuse, incest and some of the current family problems were is difficult to determine -- it was "kept in the family." Divorce was rare and generally frowned upon. Being an unmarried mother was not acceptable.

At present, family size is dropping, even in families of behaviorally disordered children. The reconstituted family is common and some have estimated that 50% of all children will live in a single parent family by the age of fifteen. Most children will have to learn to adjust to a number of "parents." Because people move more frequently it is unusual to have relatives around with which to leave the children if something occurs. Since most of the families are urban, there is little "family work" that needs to be done -- taking out the garbage only goes so far as a meaningful activity. The latest figures indicate that daily television watching averages seven hours and two minutes per household (Albuquerque Tribune, January 25, 1984). Thus, family activity may be involved in parallel TV viewing and values are affected by what is watched on the "tube". Considering the number of available hours in the day, family interaction time is reduced to only 15-20 minutes a day.

Most school-age children have both parents working (70%) if they live in a two parent family. Therefore, the time before and after school is not

available for interaction. This also reduces the hours that parents are available for conferences with the school or to work directly with the child on some home/school project.

It is difficult to rely on neighborhood families to oversee children or to provide some perspective of norms for children's behavior. Meeting with a group of first grade mothers, the author was interested in the wide range of bedtimes for those children. In the old days, if a child said that everyone was doing "it" the parents could quickly check with one another to see whether "it" was true or not. Now, children are frequently able to set their own norms for behavior because of lack of parent-to-parent interaction.

Although very few orphanages exist today, foster home placement still occurs. Child abuse is a well-recognized problem and most large communities have Parents Anonymous support groups available. Many unmarried mothers are keeping their babies and this group has increased in size over the past few years, increasing the number of single parent families dramatically.

Considerations for Behaviorally Disordered Children

One might imagine that the families of behaviorally disordered children might be even more disorganized, and this is true. However, it is important to keep in mind the heterogeneity of families of handicapped children. There are some intact families of behaviorally disordered children which provide tremendous amounts of support to themselves and other families.

Consider the following:

1. In a normal classroom one might expect that one out of five (20%) of the children would be living in a one parent family. Surveying 149 children in classes for severely behaviorally disordered, it was found that 45% lived in single parent families or some other arrangement. There was a significantly greater proportion than in normal, learning disabled and gifted populations.

2. Casey (1983) found that 22% of the children admitted to a residential treatment center for emotionally disturbed children were living with both natural parents and 71% were living in single parent families.

3. A study that is currently underway reveals that 32% of a random sample of behaviorally disordered children were living with both natural parents, 16% were living with a parent and a stepparent and the remaining 52% were in some other living arrangement.

There is an overwhelming feeling by professionals that parents of behaviorally disordered children need to be involved in some type of program to learn management techniques for their own mental health. The reality of their world would raise the question of when and how!!! Some of the following are realities for these parents:

1. They frequently cannot get a sitter for the child, especially if the child is severely handicapped.

2. For many families, there is only one parent and no other relatives with whom to leave the child so they can attend meetings or workshops.

3. Parents have typically worked all day and are too tired to go back out at night.

4. The other children need some of the parents' time.

5. If the child is bussed to school, which is not unusual, the meeting place may be far away.

6. There are clothes to wash, meals to fix, repairs to be made, and these activities may overwhelm the single parent.

It is easy to want to fix blame on the family unit. It is not uncommon to hear people say that unstable parents lead to unstable children. If one takes Bell's bi-directional model seriously, then the disturbed child may be causing the parent to be disturbed (Bell, 1968; Bell & Harper, 1977). Consider for a moment <u>living</u> with some of the children in programs for behaviorally disordered for 24 hours a day. Unfortunately, it does not seem permissible for parents to have "burnout".

Big Brother-1984

One might wonder how "Big Brother has intruded into the lives of families by 1984. The federal government has passed a law (P.L. 94-142) which requires services for every child. Through child find, children were tracked down and forced to go to some type of program and in the least restrictive environment. Some parents do not want their children to go to public schools. In fact, they would prefer to keep them in segregated facilities. Only one state (New Mexico) has not accepted funds from P.L. 94-142 and the citizens must still comply with the regulations.

The verdict is still out on how intrusive the government is or can be on issues like the "Baby Doe" case or abortion. Warehoused away are extensive census records on each family, and children in special education have massive "confidential" record folders.

Roger McIntyre proposed on a Psychology Today interview cassette that parents should have to be licensed to have children. He makes the point that almost everything else requires a license -- driving a car, selling beer -- but the most important of human endeavors, child bearing and raising is left to chance. He suggests that prospective parents should at least know the basic food groups. He points out that we now have the technology to "lock" the reproductive process until such time as the adult can pass a test. Even though his arguments make sense, play his tape to a group of adults, ask for comments, and watch the room heat up. Maybe the federal "Big Brother" is not here yet.

In some ways, there may be an insidious "Big Brother" operating under the guise of professionals operating for "your own good." Meeting with a group of teachers of behaviorally disordered children one day, one of them suggested that the parents should be involved in treatment or the teachers

should not have to work with the children. Almost all heads nodded. Parents have reported many times that physicians have told them that they should institutionalize their children.

Doernberg (1978) and Foster, Berger and McClean (1981) make a strong case for having professionals rethink their positions on working with parents. Seldom is a functional analysis of the family structure or family system undertaken before intervention procedures are proposed. In most cases, one professional does not know what another one is suggesting or even if there are any others. Meeting with a group of parents of young visually handicapped children it was found that some of the parents were being seen by as many as 20 professionals. In some cases, it seemed that the recommendations of the professionals were in opposition to one another. Tremendous pressure is often put on parents to carry out certain interventions. The whole family structure may crumble because of the concern for the handicapped child. Unless parents have learned to be assertive they may try to implement all that is asked from them, or take the criticism that will be levied at them. Parents are continually besieged with suggestions to check with their lawyer, check with their doctor, check with their therapist, etc. One might ask, "Who is 'Big Brother'?" It could be as Pogo said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

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CHAPTER 3

SAVING CHILDREN IN THE AGE OF BIG BROTHER: MORAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEVIANCE

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Introduction

The theme of this conference, as I understand it, is the spectre of behavior control that is destructive of the human spirit. As it relates specifically to George Orwell and 1984, the theme is the totalitarian state and how totalitarianism could be related to the problems and needs of emotionally disturbed children, their families, and their teachers. A basic assumption underlying all the keynote presentations and discussions, apparently, is that a totalitarian state manipulates the behavior of its citizens in an immoral or unethical way. All states control the behavior of their citizens, of course, but totalitarian states control people through coercion and the denial of rights and freedoms that we consider inviolable. As agents of the state, teachers and other school personnel obviously are in the business of controlling children's behavior. The issue for us as special educators is the extent to which our control techniques are morally and ethically defensible. We would like to control children's behavior in the interest of their individual happiness and self-realization in a humane society, not only in the interest of the state.

The Problem

A special educator's first step in controlling a child's behavior is identification of the child as a deviant individual who needs special education. Therefore, the specific problems with which I am to deal this morning are these: Under what conditions are we ethically and morally justified in

identifying a child as deviant? More specifically, under what circumstances do we do a deviant child more harm than good by identifying him as in need of special education because he is "seriously emotionally disturbed" or "behavior disordered" according to the state's legislation? And to what extent do we participate in over-monitoring and over-controlling behavior? More specifically, do we use technology to invade children's right to privacy and to coerce them into conformity to the state's wishes in the way Orwell suggested we might in 1984?

General Issues

Before taking up the specifics of moral and ethical issues in identification, we would do well to consider some of the more general issues involved in the morality and ethics of behavior control. London (1971) suggests, in the final chapter of his book, Behavior Control, that the contemporary ethic of individual liberty is derived from two ancient principles; the first is that people are entitled to behave as they please, the second is that they may not hurt other people. A workable ideology based on these principles must promote individuality but at the same time protect people from the individuals around them. But operationalizing this ideology is no simple matter. First of all, what "hurting someone" means is not always clear, and we do not always know that someone needs the protection we believe we can offer. Defining "hurts" and devising "protections" are the stuff of the moral and ethical dilemmas of behavior control.

Freedom, as many writers have pointed out, is never absolute for anyone in a free society. Some freedoms must be given up in the interest of maintaining a free society. The central moral and ethical issues in a free society are where power -- control over other people's behavior -- is to be vested and the limits that should be placed on the uses of power.

One reality we must confront is the fact that the definition of ethical conduct cannot be static. The definition of ethical behavior must change to keep pace with social circumstances, especially circumstances related to the development of technology. As man develops more sophisticated tools for dealing with his environment, including more sophisticated behavior control technology, ethical considerations must change, else they lose their meaning. London (1971) observes:

> It does not take very elegant analyses to see that some of the ethical abstractions in common use can retain their ideological sanctity only if people do not think much about subtleties which make their meanings doubtful. Everyone presumes to know what freedom is or what will means, for instance, as long as they refer to common things in everyone's experience which can be understood in simple terms and acted on accordingly. The subtleties of analysis tend to subvert traditional ethical ideas by showing that their traditional meanings are too simple to be accurate. Technology contributes to the subversive process by inventions which complicate or simplify life in ways that make old ethical doctrines appear irrelevant -- like medical techniques which keep a man's vegetative functions alive long after his animal passions and intellectual processes have died, so that euthanasia laws start to lose their meaning, or welfare laws which seem to make a gratuitous virtue of personal charity to widows, orphans, and the aged. Either way, technological invention can suck the breath of life from common referents, render their former meanings meaningless, and undo the ethical doctrines that had once served the status quo. The ideological cornerstones of modern man are constantly ground down by the innocent creations of his engineers (pp. 256-257).

In considering the ethics of identifying emotionally disturbed children, one cannot examine merely the behavior control technology we call behavior modification or applied behavior analysis. One must examine also the behavior control devices that we have constructed as a society, i.e., the laws that govern our society.

Laws are devices for channeling power, for limiting behavior control as well as for controlling behavior. The intent of law is the control of behavior in the interest of freedom -- to minimize the hurtful control of one person by another. We are constantly making new laws and amending old ones because of

what London calls the "ravages of power," the unintended indecencies that become clear to us only as we live with laws and experience their confines. We must consider two points here. First, we are destined to continue constructing new legal devices and reconstructing old ones. We must always be inventing new ways to control the hurtful application of technology and to ameliorate the harm done to individuals by the control devices we have already constructed. Second, we are never justified in viewing the law as the highest moral and ethical standard to which we can appeal. We must live with imperfect laws and the realization that the law is imperfectable. We must live also with the realization that the law, which represents our attempt to operationalize moral and ethical principles, follows slowly upon a trail of human suffering.

In our society, laws most often are passed with good intentions. They are designed to protect individuals and to foster justice. Nonetheless, we often observe after they are passed that they harm as well as protect, that injustice still exists. Therefore, to focus ethical and moral judgments only on the law as it currently exists is to close our eyes to man's inhumanity to man, to embrace the law as an absolute ethic that shuts out the contexts of behavior control which must be considered if justice is truly to be served.

I suggest, then, that in thinking about the moral and ethical issues involved in identifying social deviants we must consider the contexts in which we make decisions about handicapped children. Specifically, we must consider at least the political context, the legal context, the research context, the technological context, and the professional context in which our judgments are shaped.

Before considering these contexts and their influences on our ethical judgments, I should perhaps tie the discussion to something more concrete.

I want you to think about the case of a child I am about to describe. I realize that there is considerable danger in presenting a single case for consideration, since one case cannot draw out all the issues or illustrate all the facets of the problem. Nevertheless, I think we may be better able to deal with some of the complexities of the problem of identification if we have at least one common point of reference.

A Hypothetical Case

Imagine, if you will, the hypothetical child I am about to describe. This child is purely hypothetical, but he is very much like many of the children with whom educators must deal every day.

T.J. is an 11 year old boy in fifth grade. His IQ is 115. He has no significant physical anomalies and no history of developmental delay in motor or language development. He had no particular difficulties academically until the fourth grade. His academic performance was about average until last year, when his grades suddenly began to deteriorate. This year he is earning mostly Ds and Fs.

T.J. was not known as a problem child in school until last year. But every teacher who has dealt with him in the past 18 months has commented on his frequent misbehavior. He is difficult to manage because of his high rates of out-of-seat behavior, talking out, teasing, and temper outbursts. He is typically defiant of teachers and argumentative with his peers. These problems are, in the opinion of his current teachers, increasing. His belligerence recently resulted in several fights in and around school, including one in which another child was injured and required medical attention. Two weeks ago he was caught shoplifting a bag of candy from the local drugstore. Ratings by his teachers on a problem checklist indicate that his behavior is a problem more often than 90% of his schoolmates.

T.J. has no close friends, although he is sometimes tolerated briefly in social situations by other boys who exhibit similar behavior patterns. He and his two older brothers live with his mother and stepfather, who provide little supervision or control for him or his siblings. His parents have never shown any interest in his progress or lack of it in school, and they have refused to recognize that any of his behavior, including the fights and shoplifting, is a problem.

T.J.'s current teachers are quite concerned about him for several reasons. He does not complete most of his academic work and is failing in most subjects. He disrupts the class frequently by hitting or taunting other students or mumbling complaints about the teacher and assignments. He spends a lot of his time in class drawing "tattoos" on his arms with felt-tip pens. None of the three experienced teachers who manage 63 fifth graders as a team has been able to establish a close relationship with T.J. or produce significant improvement in his behavior.

Is this child emotionally disturbed for special education purposes? Of course, one can plead the case that more information is necessary to make a decision. Nevertheless, one obtains a general impression of the child and his problems from the information I've given. And we should not miss a crucial point here -- that regardless of how much additional information I might have provided, more would always be desirable. Furthermore, disagreement among professionals, regardless of the information provided, always would be highly likely.

Some of us would argue that T.J. is a problem, but that he is not emotionally disturbed. He may need help, we might say, but not special education. He may be somewhat socially maladjusted, but not seriously emotionally disturbed. Probably it is his teachers and parents who are responsible for his

apparent problems; they are the primary owners of the problems, not T.J. His problems can best be addressed by consultation with his regular class teachers in how to manage his classroom behavior and by social workers or other community social agents. He and everyone else involved has more to gain than to lose by his remaining in his regular class, unidentified as an exceptional child.

Others of us would argue that T.J. shows all the classic signs of a child in trouble, and that he is certainly headed for increasing social and academic trouble unless something is done -- probably something like the interventions we call special education and related services. Special educators are the most appropriate professionals to deal with the situation, and the benefits of identifying him for special education would clearly outweigh the damage that might be done to him in the process. When all the likely outcomes are weighed -- the outcomes for T.J. and his classmates, teachers, and parents as well -- the greatest freedom and least hurt are going to be caused by placing him in special education.

The point I wish to make here is that many of the children with whom we are concerned -- probably <u>most</u> of them, in fact -- are arguably emotionally disturbed. Their designation as emotionally disturbed or not disturbed is a matter of subjective judgment of the costs and benefits involved. And that judgment carries with it a considerable burden of responsibility, since the consequences of designation or nondesignation may be extreme. Identification is no trival matter. The fact that some children have been seriously harmed by careless identification practices led to a law designed, among other reasons, to protect against the harm done by inappropriate identification. P.L. 94-142 is based in part on the premise that designating a child as exceptional is a very dangerous act, one that could do great harm -- harm that would far outweigh any possible good outcome.

In recent years the law has had at least one good effect on our profession -- it has made us realize as never before that we do not do only good. Historically, we have thought of ourselves as the good guys, the teachers and administrators who really care, the ones who offer help to those who suffer at the hands of regular education, the ones who save the children. But we can no longer assume that everyone else will see us as we have historically preferred to view ourselves. Today, many would cry woe to the child who finds himself in our clutches! We have become, at least sometimes, if not always, the boogey-men and wicked witches of the schools in the eyes of the law. We cannot ignore the fact that the law came into being partly because our moral and ethical judgments have not always been sound. The fact is that we have, as a profession, hurt some children in our attempts to help them. The fact is that we have sometimes abused our power. The fact is that children often do need protection from our efforts to help them.

But let us consider in more detail the political, legal, research, technological, and professional contexts in which our judgments are made. Only by considering these contexts can we hope to understand the way we are perceived -- and perhaps are -- the savers or destroyers of children.

The Contexts of Decision

The Political Context

Special education's great surge, beginning in the 1960s and culminating in P.L. 94-142 and other legislation and litigation of the 1970s, occurred in the context of liberal politics. Most of us have grown up professionally under the influence of a political climate that emphasized individuality and the civil rights of minorities. Our profession flourished in an era that included the call to celebrate deviance and that guarded individual rights with little regard for social responsibilities. The moral and ethical standards

of the era of our fastest growth had no clear reference points in our social structure.

Today we are in the midst of a flaming hot conservative revival. In the interest of social stability and traditional values, the pendulum of political climate has swung to the side of moral absolutes and constriction of individual expression. The Reagan administration is the darling and willing tool of fundamentalist Christian religion, which touts ethical and moral absolutes as answers to all the world's woes. The absolute ethics of the conservative revivalists suggest that we face no ethical dilemmas, only moral failures that must be rectified by the application of the rigid formulas of fundamentalist dogma.

The recent call of the Reagan administration for "good old fashioned discipline" in American schools may in some respects be overdue, for few if any of us would be willing to argue that discipline in its best sense has not been seriously lacking. Nevertheless, the Reagan initiative involving the Departments of Justice and Education appears to have overtones of the unbending and simple-minded application of rules, the kind of authoritarian approach that pleases constituents who see the world as a high-contrast black and white photographic print in which good and evil are always crisply defined.

The influence of the current conservative political climate on our judgment about our hypothetical child, T.J., and similar children may be considerable. We should not be surprised to find that our judgment is influenced by political leaders' expressions of the opinion that schools must become more orderly places, that disruptive elements must be removed therefrom, and that special education has grown beyond reasonable bounds. Neither should we be surprised to find that the federal Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) is reflecting the conservative political revival. The government will, after all, try to protect its image and construe the facts in its favor.

A case in point is a recent statement by an official of the OSEP concerning identification of handicapped children. The official was quoted as saying, "Just about all handicapped school-age children who need special education have been identified . . . Our original estimates of the number of handicapped children in this country might have been clearly overestimates . . . As you look at this (child count data), you also accept that there are not hundreds of thousands of children out there in need of services" (Report on Education Research, 1983, p. 5). Some of us would beg to differ with this statement. We would be so bold as to suggest that in the case of at least one special education category (the seriously emotionally disturbed), a rational look at the available data indicates that there are hundreds of thousands of children out there who need services but have not been identified.

Let us be more specific. Let us also be extremely conservative in our arithmetic, so that we err always on the side of underestimating the number of disturbed children who could be identified. In the United States today there are about 40 million children and youth of school age. But let us be conservative and use only 30 million as the basis for computation. Suppose that the major prevalence studies are correct and that at least 6% of the school-age population could be considered disturbed by a reasonable criterion (cf. Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1981; Cullinan, Epstein, & Kauffman, 1984; Graham, 1979; Kauffman, in press). Let us be so conservative that we take only one-third of that estimate (i.e., 2%) as the basis for our computation. Based on a prevalence of 2% and a population of 30 million, we arrive at an estimate of 600,000 disturbed children in the U.S. who need special education. Now we must subtract the number of children currently receiving services. According to the most recent government figures, about 350,000 children are being served under the seriously emotionally disturbed category (Report on Education

Research, 1983). But let us be conservative once again and estimate that the number is actually 400,000. Still, using these extremely conservative figures, we must conclude that 200,000 children who are disturbed and could profit from special education have not been identified.

The figures I have just presented lead me to believe that someone in the government is playing politics with the identification of handicapped children. But the problem is not only political. Part of the reason for the discrepancy between the government's view and what we may see as reality as professionals is the fuzziness that exists in the law under which identification occurs.

The Legal Context

P.L. 94-142 and its rules and regulations provide, presumably, an appropriate beginning point for ethical judgments about the education of handicapped children. Without belaboring the point here -- for I have commented on it in detail elsewhere (Kauffman, 1980; 1982; in press) -- I wish to point out that the current federal definition of disturbed children provides guideposts only to one's own insanity. It must be ranked among the most incomprehensible statements produced by the federal government. After modification by the federal bureaucracy and in the form in which it was promulgated by the government, it is incomprehensible even to Eli Bower, who authored it originally (Bower, 1982).

We must not lose sight of the fact that P.L. 94-142 was passed with only good intentions. We needed the law because of the harm that was being done by the unrestricted use of power: some children were being misidentified as handicapped; many handicapped children were not being served; many special education practices were professionally and ethically shabby. The law did not solve all these problems, but it did bring progress. Like all laws, it also created new problems. Now, if we are to be truly ethical in our conduct,

we must point out the faults and limitations of the law and work for its amendment. Not to recognize and criticize its flaws is to make the law our Holy Scripture and our profession our religion.

Current special education law fails to recognize some of the realities of school life and social deviance. The demand that all handicapped children be identified and served, regardless of economic or other practical constraints, such as the unavailability of trained teachers, is simply inconsistent with the way the world is. We have unreliable means for drawing the distinction between the disturbed and normal and limited means for serving the students we believe are disturbed. We have, as Achenbach and Edelbrock (1981) have put it, no "litmus test" for children's psychopathology. Moreover, the law does not recognize that children can be sort of handicapped and need sort of special education. The law inadvertently hardens the line we draw arbitrarily -- necessarily, perhaps, but arbitrarily, nonetheless -- between those who are handicapped and those who are not. The law presumes the need for special protections for those who cross that imaginary line, indeed even for those children whose location in relation to the line we want to question formally. But it offers no protections at all for children who are judged to be non-handicapped, who do not quite cross the line. This kind of all-or-nothing offer of protections is not consistent with the kind of judgments we must make about children's behavior. We should not be surprised to find increasing evidence that the law results in frequent miscarriages of justice, since some of its basic premises are inconsistent with the nature of social deviance.

In the case of our hypothetical T.J. and similar children the law is little help. Certainly the law requires that if T.J. is identified as disturbed, then certain procedural protections must be afforded him and his parents. But if T.J. is not identified he is left almost defenseless insofar as education

law is concerned. Regular education law affords little or nothing that would help T.J. through his problems. This is why I believe that one of the most serious errors of judgment we have made as a profession has been to construe the problem of special education primarily as a problem of a minority's civil rights. We cannot effectively guarantee the rights of a minority -- indeed, we cannot make sense of minority rights at all -- when the very identity of that minority is both arbitrary and subjective. The law attempts to treat handicapped children as a clearly identifiable class, but the class has boundaries that now defy and always will defy clear demarcation.

The nature of social deviance, especially social deviance in the context of schooling, is such that under the law there is great pressure not to identify children for special education. The assumption implicit in the law is that school children are not in need of extraordinary protection unless they are identified as handicapped. Only after we, the ostensible child helpers and child savers, are called in is the child considered legally at risk. The child's behavior does not put him at risk according to the law; our recognition of his behavior as deviant is what puts him at risk. This is not a new insight, of course, only a restatement of the well known theory that we make our society's deviants by our perceptions and pronouncements.

The law necessarily highlights our current ethical dilemma -- should we risk planting the kiss of psychological death on the child's ruddy cheek in order to offer what we hope but do not know for certain will be of help? We must recognize that the law, for all its good points, was not based on research, and that the courts do not necessarily make judgments based on research. Neveretheless, research may help us deal with the issues the law will not let us avoid.

The Research Context

Research data should help us understand the political, social, and legal factors that influence our judgments about which children are disturbed and which are not. Empirical data should help us deal more rationally and caringly with the moral and ethical problems we face in identification. It should help us weigh potential harm and potential benefits.

Many of us have guessed for years that most emotionally disturbed children go undetected and unserved in our public schools. We have felt that negative attitudes toward disturbed children, the high cost of services, and the unavailability of programs and trained professionals are the primary factors behind the generally low percentage of the school population identified as disturbed under P.L. 94-142 and related state laws. Recent research reports have tended to confirm our guesses (Cullinan, et al., 1984; Graham, 1979; Knitzer, 1982; Long, 1983). If nothing else, recent research regarding identification should make us aware of the fact that judgments are skewed in favor of nonidentification of seriously troubled children.

Epidemiological research consistently indicates that the federal estimate of the prevalence of serious emotional disturbance is extravagantly conservative. One cannot read the research on children's behavior problems without coming to the conclusion that the criteria school officials are using for identification are outrageously stringent or, on the other hand, that hundreds of thousands of children's problems are being misinterpreted as insignificant (see Cullinan, et al., 1984; Kauffman, in press; Knitzer, 1982; Long, 1983). Moreover, follow-up research indicates clearly that the prognosis for children who are aggressive and disruptive in school is very poor (Loeber, 1982; Robins, 1966). The long-term risk for such children would not appear to be increased by their identification for special education.

One obvious question one could ask of research is, "Does the evidence suggest that we have been too quick to identify children as deviant? That is, have we labeled too many or too few children as disturbed?" As I mentioned previously in discussing the political context of our decisions, the evidence suggests clearly that we have been too hesitant to identify disturbed children, that we have allowed many to suffer too much social and academic failure before intervening.

In spite of the obvious underidentification of emotionally disturbed children and the poor prognosis for children who are aggressive, we do not have good research data to support the efficacy of special education in reducing long-term risk. This presents one of the greatest difficulties we face in the ethics of identification, in my opinion -- we simply do not know enough about the effects of intervention to be extremely confident in balancing the potential harm of identification against the possible benefits of special education. As a result, we tend to overstate our case on occasion, to place too much trust in the hopes and myths of our profession, to assume that we are the ultimate help-givers and child-savers. Ironically, in the main we have ignored the needs of many children who are having a difficult time socially and academically while touting our ability to help all handicapped children, regardless of the nature or severity of their disabilities.

The Technological Context

The technology of behavioral assessment and behavior control has advanced dramatically since 1948, the year in which George Orwell published 1984 and B.F. Skinner published Walden II. Fortunately, the technology of behavioral monitoring envisioned by Orwell has not been put to use in schools to spy on children, to invade their privacy in the name of Big Brother or anyone else. Neither has the technology of behavior management ushered in the utopian

society envisioned by Skinner.

The measurement technology available today should mean that we have more adequate data for making judgments about deviance. We are seriously remiss in our responsibilities as professionals if we do not include direct observational data in our assessment procedures and employ social validation techniques as part of our judgments of social deviance (cf. Kazdin, 1980).

Unfortunately, the availability of measurement technology does not ensure that it is being used appropriately and widely. We should not be led to think that technological advances will remove completely the need for sensitive and ethical judgment about the meaning of the data we obtain by direct measurement of behavior or any other means. We should hope, however, that in the future our profession will make better use of the available technology. Today our identification procedures appear to be tied too much to economic and political pressures and too little to reliable data, a circumstance that may be an open invitation to unethical control.

The Professional Context

One of our fond hopes as special educators -- perhaps our fondest -- is that we will save handicapped children from psychological pain, social misfortune, physical deterioration, and economic disadvantage and lead them to a bright tomorrow. We have zealously pursued the realization of that hope. In some cases, I believe, we have pursued it with such messianic zeal and with such an absolute, simple-minded ethic that we may have become our own worst enemy. Our messianic hopes have led us to become willing participants in messy antics that reveal an unquestioning, narrow-minded attitude toward the moral and ethical dilemmas we face. The antics of some members of our profession have included personal hostility toward those who dare to question the law or the limits of our ability to help the handicapped (cf. Bailey, 1981;

Ellis, 1981). Our antics have included a child-like appeal to other professionals to solve our ethical problems, an attempt to escape responsibility for difficult decisions by appealing to bureaucratic authority.

My opinion is that the special education profession today has more of the markings of religion than of science, that its advocates are guided more by creed than by data, and that its activists proceed more on the basis of emotion than of rational analysis. Perhaps a Falwellian society -- one in which the dictates of religion restrict personal choice -- is a greater danger to our freedom today than is an Orwellian state. As a professional group, we are too serious about ourselves, too convinced of our ultimate rightness, too frequently guided by absolutes that quickly and inevitably become obsolete, too deeply anti-intellectual.

The hyperbole we have generated regarding P.L. 94-142 is nothing short of tragi-comic. We have been willing partners in telling the Congress and the public that we can do things we simply cannot do. We have focused on the letter of the law, on the literal interpretation of its every word, and on procedural compliance with its mandates in a manner that would shame the staunchest fundamentalist's regard for Scripture. Like the Moral Majority, we have become so adept at our own moral flim-flam that we no longer recognize it as such.

A case in point is the unwillingness of some of our colleagues to yield on the matter of the educability of every living child, no matter how profoundly handicapped. The letters of the law -- all and every -- are used to buttress the absolute ethic that education can never be discontinued, even temporarily, for any child -- ever. Accordingly, no child, no matter how minimally responsive to heroic efforts to provide a meaningful education, may be considered beyond educational improvement by special educators. This is the absolute ethic

of the law as it now stands. Like all absolute ethics, it has, as London (1971) might put it, had the breath of life sucked out of it by technological and social change.

We live, as many observers have noted, in a litigious society. We tend today to look for a legal solution, sometimes through legislation but more often through the courts, to every problem with which we are confronted. Somehow we appear to have become convinced that legal or quasi-legal proceedings will not only crystalize the moral and ethical issues of contemporary life, including education, but yield decisions that are ethically superior to those that could have been reached outside the courtroom or hearing. However, many of the moral and ethical issues involved in our business as special educators can probably be addressed more adequately by educators and social scientists than by lawyers and judges. The notion that the courtroom is the place where the most appropriate and relevant ethical issues will be addressed is not consistent with the performance of the judicial system (Baumeister, 1981; Townsend & Mattson, 1981).

Turning over questions of ethical judgment in special education to attorneys is an antic we can ill afford to continue. Persons trained in the law may have expert knowledge of the legal system and the ways in which the law can be turned to the advantage of their clients. They are not necessarily made of superior moral fiber or possessed of finely-tuned ethical judgment. And they are rarely as knowledgeable as special educators about the needs of children or the possible benefits and dangers of identifying social deviance.

We should be cognizant of the frequent failure of ethical and moral judgment among the professional groups to which we are tempted to turn for resolution of our moral and ethical quandaries. We should not forget that the child-savers of the early part of this century invented the juvenile court

system with good intentions and high hopes. Today we are painfully aware of the limitations and failures of the juvenile justice system on which child-savers based their hopes. This system gives judges considerable latitude in using their moral and ethical judgment, and now we know that they have often used it poorly (Arnold & Brungardt, 1983; Silberman, 1978).

Recent public criticism by Chief Justice Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court, by Derek Bok of Yale University, and by the most recent appointee to Virginia's Supreme Court, among others, of the glut of lawyers being trained by our nation's law schools and of the questionable ethical conduct of many lawyers should, in addition to frequent news stories about the miscarriage of justice in today's courts, shatter any remaining illusions we might harbour about the superior moral and ethical standards of the legal profession. Children may indeed sometimes need protection from the ostensible help offered by special educators; everyone may sometime need protection from the ostensible help of legal advocates. Our tendency as special educators to turn to lawyers for help reflects not only the litigiousness of our society but a self-concept battered by many years of public criticism of education and our own self-recrimination.

Conclusion: Guidelines for Ethical Decisions

In conclusion, we all recognize the fact that we are living in the age of Big Brother, the time in which Orwell predicted that the state would pervasively monitor and coerce the behavior of its citizens. My feeling is that Orwell's predictions have not, fortunately, become reality in most respects for the citizens of our country. In the matter of identification of social deviance in children, I believe that the ethical and moral issues today have more to do with social, economic, and political pressures not to identify serious emotional disturbance than with over-monitoring and over-

control. I do not believe that the technology we have available to us today is often used to invade children's privacy or coerce them into mindless conformity.

The ethical and moral features of our identification of social deviance are shaped by the contexts of our decisions. In the present political context, we are likely to be pressured not to identify children who do need special education. Ethical action on our part will, I feel, require that we use the best data available to argue against the government's contention that nearly all children who need special education are now receiving it. The current legal context of our decisions demands that we make all-or-nothing judgments about children's behavior that are often inappropriate or impossible, given the nature of social deviance. In my opinion, our conduct will be ethical only if we persist in pointing out the flaws in the law and the inequities it perpetuates and continue to work for its amendment. The research context of our decisions indicates clearly that we have been too conservative in identification of disturbed children but leaves us, in some cases, without adequate information for weighing the potential harm of identification against the potential benefits. An ethical response on our part must include vigorous efforts to obtain reliable research data on the immediate and long-term effects of special education. In the context of present-day technology, ethical professional conduct demands that we use and encourage our colleagues to use the most valid and reliable behavior measurement techniques available. Finally, the current professional context of our decisions is rife with messianic zeal, anti-intellectualism, moralistic condemnation of those who do not embrace the absolute ethic of the law in its present form, and a tendency to defer unnecessarily to the legal profession when moral and ethical dilemmas are perceived. We must acquire a more realistic attitude toward our child-

saving efforts, adopt a more open and tolerant attitude toward our colleagues who disagree with us on highly emotional issues, insist on a more intellectually rigorous analysis of our problems, and learn to address our own moral and ethical dilemmas.

The moral and ethical dilemmas we face in identifying disturbed children are real and persistent. They will not go away simply because we have a law and courts to which to appeal or because we cling desperately to our professional Scripture. We will always be "on the hotseat," having to use our best personal and professional judgment to estimate the costs and benefits for the parties involved. Life in the real world offers us no easy outs, no simple solutions.

Our best protections against ourselves, and the best protections for children, are our self-awareness and introspection. We cannot avoid making decisions about identification. But, unfortunately, we can and often do avoid questioning our own motives and the potential harm of our decisions as well as their potential benefits for children.

I suggest that in the process of identifying disturbed children we must keep in mind the fact that someone is experiencing significant psychological and/or physical discomfort. We cannot deal ethically and effectively with this discomfort unless we consider the interests of all concerned parties. Some people's interests have, in my opinion, tended to get lost in the identification process. Perhaps we need to be more careful not to let either the rhetoric of conservative politicians or that of radical advocates for handicapped children blind us to the rights and needs of any individual. I believe that ethical professional conduct requires that we be aware of at least the following three aspects of the problem.

First, we must try to assess as accurately and sensitively as we can who is suffering and how much they are suffering because of the child's behavior.

The child's own suffering is an important beginning point. Too often, however, we lose sight of the suffering of the child's peers and teachers. We have a responsibility not to harm the child by careless identification. We also have a responsibility not to allow the child to harm the academic and social progress of other children. And we have a responsibility to consider the mental health of the teacher, a duty to prevent the teacher from facing day after day a situation that is intolerable. We are not being morally and ethically responsible if we let our advocacy for handicapped children completely overshadow the needs of the nonhandicapped adults and children involved. We cannot make morally and ethically sound decisions unless we are concerned about reducing discomfort for <u>everyone</u> who is suffering significant pain.

Second, we must assess as best we can the probable outcomes for the child and others. Given that the child is not identified as disturbed and no intervention is provided, what is likely to be experienced by the child and those who must live with him and deal with his behavior in the school and community? On the other hand, given that the child is identified, what is the probable effect of the intervention that is most likely to be offered? An important point here is that one must weigh the probable effects of <u>available</u> services, not the most desirable or ideal services. Ethically and morally defensible decisions must be based on what exists, not on what we wish were so or on what we fantasize.

Third, we must weigh costs and benefits -- try to balance the likely outcomes of available intervention against the risk of harm we may do by identification. And here's the rub -- we cannot be honest and have unbounded faith in our judgment. Neither we nor anyone else -- not psychiatrists, not researchers, not parents, not the children themselves, not attorneys, not judges, not psychics -- can be <u>absolutely</u> certain in the majority of cases that

the best decision has been made. The problem of identifying social deviance is, for special educators or anyone else, risky business.

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