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ABSTRACT

Knowing that national leaders frequently make decisions based on perceptions of their country's interests, the 1984 conference focused on national interests in turning to the United Nations. Through the use of case studies, participants examined the performance of the UN system and the consequences of member nations ignoring their obligation to resolve disputes peacefully. Lessons were drawn from the study of actual conflicts: chiefly, that the United Nations can be used more effectively to prevent conflict than to rectify the damage done after hostilities have broken out (although through peacekeeping efforts, it can play a role then too). Participants also identified some procedures, which member nations should support because they are in their best interests, to strengthen the United Nations. After taking this realistic look at the United Nations, the participants reached the same conclusions as their counterparts at previous conferences: the United Nations is indispensable and offers the best chance to maintain peace and security. Yet, the benefits of using and strengthening the United Nations will be realized only to the extent that nations develop the will to do so. (Author)

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# Peace and Security The United Nations and National Interests

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Report of the Nineteenth  
United Nations  
of the  
Next Decade Conference  
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, USA, June 1984

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**Peace and Security  
The United Nations and  
National Interests**

**Report of the Nineteenth  
United Nations of the Next Decade  
Conference**

**Convened June 17-22, 1984  
in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, USA**

**Sponsored by  
The Stanley Foundation  
420 East Third Street  
Muscatine, Iowa 52761 USA  
Telephone 319-264-1500**

## About the Conference

The UN route for preserving international peace and security has often been the subject of United Nations of the Next Decade Conferences. In 1983, responding to the Secretary-General's concern about world disorder, a group of eminent statesmen and scholars met in Burgenstock, Switzerland to discuss ways to strengthen the United Nations' performance in the area of peace and security.

The major conclusion of that conference was that member nations need to use the United Nations in order to strengthen it. What then will persuade nations to use the United Nations?

Knowing that national leaders frequently make decisions based on perceptions of their country's interests, the 1984 conference focused on national interests in turning to the United Nations. Through the use of case studies, participants examined the performance of the UN system and the consequences of member nations ignoring their obligation to resolve disputes peacefully.

Lessons were drawn from the study of actual conflicts: chiefly, that the United Nations can be used more effectively to prevent conflict than to rectify the damage done after hostilities have broken out (although through peacekeeping efforts, it can play a role then too). Participants also identified some procedures, which member nations should support because they are in their best interests, to strengthen the United Nations.

After taking this realistic look at the United Nations, the participants reached the same conclusions as their counterparts at previous conferences: The United Nations is indispensable and offers the best chance to maintain peace and security. Yet, the benefits of using and strengthening the United Nations will be realized only to the extent that nations develop the will to do so.

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# Participants

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their government or organization.

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## Opening Remarks



C. Maxwell Stanley  
President, The Stanley Foundation

### **Peace and Security: The United Nations and National Interests**

For the nineteenth time since 1965, we are convening a United Nations of the Next Decade Conference, bringing together a group of able, informed, and concerned diplomats, officials, and scholars from around the world to discuss an important topic concerning the United Nations. Over the years, selected topics have ranged widely: peace and security, development, the environment, energy, outer space, and interdependence. All have concerned

existing or proposed activities of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies. Ten of these United Nations of the Next Decade Conferences have dealt with some facet of the role and the performance of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, a primary UN purpose.

Our topic this year is a continuation of our 1983 topic, "The United Nations: Peace and Security." Last year's conference was a response to Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's challenge to the 37th UN General Assembly (1982) in his candid report on the work of the organization. In it he said, "We are perilously near a new international anarchy." We believed him. The Secretary-General's challenge reflected a broadly shared and increasingly grave concern that member States are not fully utilizing the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. For as we all know, the United Nations was intended: "To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war..." Moreover, this function is the first purpose stated in Article I of the Charter:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

### **Activity**

Since the Secretary-General's 1982 report, attention has been given to enhancing the UN's capability to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council itself has discussed in informal consultations (a) the role of the Council in the prevention of conflicts, (b) the role of the Council in promoting negotiations or other peaceful settlement procedures, (c) implementation of resolutions of the Council, (d) measures concerning the Military Staff Committee, and (e) procedural changes to improve the functioning of the Council.

A number of nongovernmental organizations in the United States and elsewhere have initiated research, study, and discussions concerning the topic in its broadest context.

Although the basic responsibility rests with the Security Council, consideration is being given to the roles of the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and member states.

To date, these endeavors have not produced substantive changes or improvements. They are, however, creating a broader awareness of both the need and the opportunity to enhance UN effectiveness. The circle of concern is broadening to encompass some, but not yet enough, diplomats and governmental officials of member states, as well as thoughtful UN observers.

### **United Nations of the Next Decade Conference**

Last year our conference identified a number of ways to improve the effectiveness of the Security Council and the Secretary General when dealing with international disputes, threatened breaches of the peace, or aggression.

For now, I will emphasize four personal observations concerning last year's discussions:

1. Making greater use of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security is urgent and strengthening and improving UN procedures is important.
2. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, plus the authorities granted to the Secretary-General, provide workable, albeit slow and awkward, mechanisms for peaceful settlement and for dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.
3. The effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security depends on the will and action of member states.
4. Without a strong resurgence of national determination to use the United Nations, its efforts to maintain international peace and security will remain haphazard and will fall far short of its potential.

### **Strengthening the United Nations**

There is no dearth of ideas of how to strengthen and improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. Most ideas concern the functioning of the Security Council, others relate to the Secretary-General, and a few to the General Assembly. Ideas range from easily implemented procedural changes

to modifications of Security Council membership and other suggestions requiring Charter amendment.

Agreement on procedural modifications within the context of the UN Charter would not be difficult were member states, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, determined to act. During our deliberations, we will discuss specific measures.

However, for now, I wish to focus on the responsibilities of member states and the benefits to them of using and strengthening the peace and security capabilities of the United Nations. I do so in the belief that only as nations recognize self-interests will they use and strengthen UN capabilities and thereby honor the solemn commitments inherent in UN membership.

### **Member State Responsibility**

As we agreed at last year's conference, the United Nations falters in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, primarily because nations do not consistently perform their responsibilities as member states. There would be no armed conflict between nations were they to consistently honor the commitment of Article 2 of the Charter:

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

If nations involved in international controversy are unable to resolve their differences, they are obligated by Article 37 to "refer it to the Security Council." Were this obligation consistently followed, there would be no bypassing the United Nations on peace and security issues. Still, nations involved in controversy have too often not honored these commitments. They have allowed their differences to blind them from the benefits of resolving their differences without disturbing the peace.

Membership in the United Nations also imposes a responsibility on the nations which are not involved in a given

international controversy. Were the members of the Security Council to consistently discharge their Charter obligations and authorities, there would be UN action on every international dispute referred to the Security Council.

Moreover, Article 2 of the Charter also provides:

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

If members not involved in international controversy were to respect this requirement, Security Council actions and recommendations, including sanctions, would be more broadly supported.

In the United Nations, the sovereign nations of the world have formed an institution to maintain international peace and security. The Charter is, in effect, a mutual security contract. In the age of nuclear and other powerful and sophisticated weapons, failure to discharge the obligations of this agreement leaves the world in a state of international anarchy.

Because international conflict continues, it is evident that the failure of the United Nations to eliminate the scourge of war results from the failure of members to live up to their responsibilities. How may nations be persuaded to take their UN obligations more seriously?

### **National Interests**

Broader support for UN efforts to maintain international peace and security will only develop as members perceive it to be in their national interests. Perceptions of national interests naturally vary from country to country and within a given nation from time to time.

For our purposes, national interests and their relationships to UN peace and security activities are examined in two categories. One concerns crisis situations wherein disputing nations have been unable to peacefully resolve their controversies. The other concerns those many nations which are not involved in an international controversy but whose support is needed if UN measures are to be effectively implemented.

## Crisis Situations

Crisis situations occur when the efforts of nations involved in an international controversy fail to produce an acceptable solution. At that time, if the decision makers of those nations are not sincerely committed to the United Nations, they may be strongly tempted to follow the historic pattern of threatening and, if necessary, using armed force to resolve the controversy. The world's continuing emphasis on military power does nothing to lessen this temptation.

In such situations, referring the controversy to the Security Council would offer distinct benefits to the disputing parties. First, armed conflict with all of its devastation and loss of life could be avoided. Second, there would not be the substantial drain on the domestic economies inherent in fighting a war. These benefits would seem compelling to any reasonable national leader. Why, then, do nations on occasion disregard them and seek solution through the threat and use of armed force? Is it because they lack confidence that the Security Council can and will deal with the controversy in an acceptable manner? Do they fear that UN intervention will result in a compromise of the disputing parties' positions, whereas with armed force they may win it all? Do they consider referring the dispute to the Security Council a sign of weakness, a loss of sovereignty? Is the controversy so emotional in nature that nothing less than an all-out military effort is acceptable? Or is it just a matter of tradition; they think first of military solutions to controversies?

These, perhaps, are the most challenging questions we will deal with in our discussions. To help answer them, we have structured our agenda to include the examination of several case studies to see how the interests of nations either directly or indirectly involved have or have not been served.

In crisis situations, decision makers of those countries involved will inevitably compare the risks of relying on the UN process versus going it alone. Decisions to rely on the United Nations will be more likely if there is confidence that the United Nations can and will deal effectively with the situation and that the probable outcome will be equitable. It is most important, therefore, to improve UN procedures and strengthen its capability to deal effectively with crisis situations. It is also important to demonstrate that the United Nations can and will handle the crisis situations

and that it enjoys the broad support of its members. In short, the United Nations needs to win a few. More is required than just interjecting peacekeeping forces which remain in place indefinitely, while underlying disputes go unresolved.

### **Long-Range Benefits**

Broader use and support for UN peace and security activities will develop as all nations recognize its potential benefits. There are major long-term benefits to be derived from using and strengthening the UN capabilities to maintain international peace and security. Such a process is vital to the gradual development of a political order more compatible with the demands of an increasingly interdependent world.

Certainly, few nations would deny the ultimate objective of achieving a world without war. So destructive are modern weapons that war has become an unacceptable tragedy. The financial drain of maintaining military forces for defense has become an unbearable burden for most countries.

Wholehearted acceptance and use of the UN process for dealing with the international peace and security would not only reduce tensions among nations, but provide a means of peacefully dealing with controversies which the parties thereto are unable to resolve.

Growing confidence in UN peace and security operations would contribute to a climate in which arms and military establishments could be reduced and huge monetary and human resources released to deal with other pressing domestic and global problems.

Today, no nation, including the two major nuclear powers, feels secure. The path to genuine security requires not only substantial reduction in armed forces but also the use of effective mechanisms for peaceful settlement of international controversies. Improved mechanisms are also needed for coping with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. These are the very functions authorized by the Charter of the United Nations. The interests of every nation on the face of the earth will be enhanced by progress toward this end.

Having satisfied ourselves that not only the broad global interests, but also the more narrow national interests are served by using the United Nations to preserve peace and security, let us then examine from a fresh perspective some of the proposals to strengthen the United Nations. Which proposals are most likely to enhance pacific settlement of disputes? Which can best help the world community deal with threats to the peace and aggression? Let us measure these proposals against two standards: one, the likely effectiveness of the proposal and, the other, the probability that it will be perceived as an acceptable step by those national leaders who are open to giving the United Nations a new chance to succeed.

### Conclusion

The prominent historian, Barbara W. Tuchman, in her latest book, *The March of Folly*, defines folly as "perverse persistence in a policy demonstrably unworkable or counterproductive." Does not continued reliance on the threat and use of national military force for security and for the solution of complex controversies among nations conform to Tuchman's definition of folly? Isn't it folly to perversely concentrate on traditional behavior and neglect the urgency of responding to great technological and political change?

It is high time to return to the rationale and motivations of the founders of the United Nations. In the closing days of World War II amid the wake of its massive, unprecedented death and destruction, they fashioned a Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." May we, at this conference, find ways to encourage member states to use and strengthen UN capability to maintain international peace and security and thereby lessening the likelihood of continuing our present folly on a global scale.





Harvey



Parsons



Gauci



R.H. Stanley



Jimenez de A

# Rapporteurs' Report

The rapporteurs prepared this report following the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report, therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

## **Peace and Security: The United Nations and National Interests**

"We act as though we are living in a pre-UN world—only worse." That was one participant's comment regarding the failure of the UN system in the realm of peace and security. He, along with other participants, place the blame squarely on the shoulders of UN member nations.

By accepting the UN Charter, members have pledged to peacefully resolve their differences and to work together to prevent wars. These obligations are routinely ignored, making for a pre-UN world. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that war in the modern era is even more terrible than before the United Nations was created. Weapons are more destructive, and the distinctions between military and nonmilitary targets and combatants and noncombatants are blurred. Even the respect for neutrality has diminished.

The obstacles in the way of achieving a more effective peace and security system through the United Nations are many. However, the alternative to trying to surmount them is to permit the continued drift toward chaos. The only choice then is to use the United Nations and strengthen its ability to respond. So it was that participants met for the Stanley Foundation's 19th Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade to see if they could identify how national interests are served through the United Nations and thus make a contribution toward building a more peaceful and secure world.

### **Challenge**

In the past two years, serious new efforts have been made to evaluate UN performance in the field of peace and

security. These efforts have been prompted primarily in response to the Secretary-General's assessments of the world situation included in his report to the 37th General Assembly (1982) and the 38th General Assembly (1983). In his 1982 report, he described the present situation as near "international anarchy."

Responding to the Secretary-General's challenge, the Security Council began a series of informal consultations to consider ways to improve its performance. So far the only public document to emerge from the consultations is a September 1983 "Note by the President of the Security Council" describing the range of subjects under consideration.

Council members present at this conference said the consultations, which are continuing, have been constructive and have established a framework for further deliberations. A new "spirit of collegiality" among Council members was reported. There apparently is agreement that simple tinkering with the rules of procedure will be insufficient to make the Council more effective. While international crises have limited the time available for Council consideration, it was reported that many suggestions have been put forth which will be further studied and refined.

The Stanley Foundation's 18th United Nations of the Next Decade Conference (1983) was a nongovernmental response to the Secretary-General's challenge. The United Nations' peace and security record was examined and recommendations for strengthening performance were put forward. The basic conclusion of that conference was that efforts to improve the United Nations depend upon the willingness of member nations to act.

This 1984 conference built upon that conclusion and, knowing that nations act according to how they perceive their interests, included an examination of national interests in the United Nations. To gain insight into real world conflict situations, case studies were discussed.

### **Case Studies**

The examination of specific cases was used in an attempt to learn how conflicts develop, how they might be prevented, or, alternatively, how they can best be stopped once they break out. Six actual conflicts were discussed, and participants focused on the actions of nations directly or in-

directly involved and on the performance of the United Nations. Each case is unique but, through the discussions, common lessons emerged.

### **Lebanon**

*Background.* Periodic conflict has occurred in the geographical territory now called Lebanon practically since the beginning of recorded history. In fact, many of the currently warring factions within Lebanon have disputes that date back centuries. For purposes of this discussion, however, attention was focused on events beginning in 1978.

Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 claiming that the area was a haven for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists who were carrying out raids in Israel. The crisis was temporarily quelled when the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force, was introduced as part of an agreement which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Relative calm prevailed for the next four years.

In June 1982, Israel again invaded Lebanon. While the event which triggered the move was the alleged PLO assassination of an Israeli diplomat in London, it is generally acknowledged that Israel had been looking for a reason to once again strike at the threat they perceived from PLO terrorists. This time Israel did not stop in southern Lebanon. Hoping to drive the PLO completely out of Lebanon, they pressed the invasion to Beirut.

Attempts to put a UN force in Beirut to forestall a siege of the city failed. Instead, a multinational force (MNF) composed of US, British, French, and Italian troops was put in place without a UN mandate. Israel eventually withdrew to southern Lebanon, and the MNF, caught between warring internal factions, pulled out in early 1984 after the loss of hundreds of lives.

Participants noted that Israel attempted a unilateral military solution to its problem. So far this approach has cost 600 lives. In addition, the war effort has superheated the Israeli economy causing a real internal threat. Although Israel succeeded in driving the PLO military forces out of Lebanon, participants said that Palestinian demands for a homeland and intense bitterness still remain. In fact, Israel continues to be the target of terrorism.

Participants noted that in addition to the loss of lives, the United States and the other members of the MNF lost credibility and international standing when they were forced to withdraw ignominiously.

*UN Performance.* Fighting in Lebanon has been caused both by internal struggle and external aggression. Participants agreed that there is little the international community can do about civil war, but preventing or halting external aggression is something the United Nations must be able to do.

Participants agreed that in 1978 the United Nations went into southern Lebanon with an inadequate mandate. The agreement which dispatched UNIFIL provided for Israeli withdrawal but did not account for heavily armed, local militia which continued to roam the area. From the beginning, these troops presented problems for UNIFIL.

After the 1982 Israeli invasion began, but before Israel reached Beirut, participants believed there was a critical moment at which time the United Nations might have interjected a peacekeeping force to save the city. France made such a proposal in the Security Council. The United States, acting at the behest of Israel, vetoed it. As an alternative it was then suggested that a UN observer force be put in place; that also failed to gain sufficient support. Thus member nations forced the United Nations to sit on the sidelines and watch a tragedy unfold. Most participants agreed that a UN peacekeeping force would have had a far better chance for success than did the MNR.

### **Iran-Iraq**

*Background.* A border dispute centered on the Shatt al-Arab waterway has existed since the mid-nineteenth century when the countries involved were Turkey and Persia. Over the years the dispute, eventually involving Iraq and Iran, was the focus of League of Nations and United Nations concern. Several agreements on the waterway were reached and then abandoned. The latest was negotiated in 1975.

Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 claiming that Iran had violated principles of the 1975 agreement. Iraq apparently hoped for a quick military victory over the newly installed revolutionary government of Iran.

After Iraq's army scored some early victories, the Iranian army regrouped and counterattacked. During nearly four years of fighting, the Iranians won back the territory originally lost and then massed forces on the border posing the threat of an invasion of Iraq. As the conference met, a partial ceasefire—involving an agreement not to bombard civilian targets—had recently been agreed to as suggested by the UN Secretary-General. Iran and Iraq's armies were still engaged, and the threat of a massive Iranian offensive loomed on the horizon. Thousands of lives have been lost, billions of dollars spent on the war, the economies of both countries have suffered under the war burden, and through attacks on oil tankers the war has threatened to widen into a regional conflict.

*UN Performance.* At the time of the conference, the United Nations had been unable to bring about a full ceasefire in spite of several Security Council resolutions and the "good offices" mediation efforts of the Secretary-General. In fact, Iran refuses to acknowledge the authority of the Security Council on this matter, claiming that the Council is biased. Some participants agreed with this appraisal, noting that this matter first went before the Council in 1980 while Iran was the subject of international condemnation for holding American hostages. It was suggested by some that Iran, therefore, started off at a disadvantage which still hurts its standing with the Council today.

Participants discussed the options available to the Security Council for enforcing its call for a ceasefire. No UN military action seems possible. The collective security measures envisioned in the UN Charter have been unworkable for many years because of disagreement among the permanent members of the Council. Political and economic sanctions are possible, but, it was noted, the Council has never been very effective in implementing them. Nevertheless, some participants believed that sanctions are called for in this case and that the Council should at least look toward cutting off armaments and military supplies to both combatants.

### **Falkland/Malvinas Islands**

*Background.* Sovereignty over the Falkland or Malvinas Islands has been a thorn in the side of a generally good British/Argentina relationship since the British took control of the islands in 1833. Argentina believes it should rule the islands because of their proximity and because it held them.

when Argentina gained its independence in 1810. Britain claims sovereignty because the island inhabitants are of British ancestry and want to remain subjects of the United Kingdom. Negotiations over many years have failed to resolve the controversy.

The situation exploded in April 1982 when a minor incident between inhabitants of South Georgia Island (part of the Falklands) and Argentine scrap iron workers set off a powder keg of antagonism. Argentina invaded and took control of the islands.

Immediately after the invasion, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and then UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar attempted to mediate the dispute. Both failed and by mid-June 1982, British forces had regained control of the islands.

During the conflict, 255 British and 777 Argentine soldiers died. More than a billion dollars of military equipment was lost, and relations between two previously friendly nations were shattered.

*UN Performance.* Participants agreed that the United Nations performed as well as it could to prevent this war but narrowly failed because the disputing parties found more reasons to fight the war than to prevent it. Since 1965, the UN General Assembly has pressed the two sides to negotiate a settlement of the disputed sovereignty.

The legal issue involved is whether Argentina's claim of "territorial integrity" should prevail over Britain's claim of "self determination" for the islands' inhabitants. Participants agreed that the two concepts are not irreconcilable; "territorial integrity" can be achieved while still taking into account the interests of the inhabitants through a negotiated settlement. Why then did the negotiations lasting 17 years fail?

The British, it was said, never gave the negotiations sufficiently serious attention because of domestic political factors. Resolution of the Falklands matter was never high on the United Kingdom's foreign policy agenda, allowing a small group of hardliners in the House of Commons to regularly muster a majority to urge an uncompromising position of continued British sovereignty over the islands.

After Argentina invaded in 1982, it was agreed, the Secretary-General came very close to mediating a solution that would have prevented the British counterattack. However, differences within the military triumvirate then ruling Argentina caused a stalemate. One participant thought that Secretary of State Haig's attempt at shuttle diplomacy slowed UN intervention and got in the way of preventing the impending conflict. Additionally, public sentiment in both countries for a clear victory had risen to a point where national leaders would have found it difficult to sell a compromise to their populations.

### Suez Canal

*Background* Shortly after taking control of Egypt in 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser began to consolidate the Arab nations against Israel. When he could not make the arms deals with the West that he wanted, he moved toward the Soviet Union and stepped up his attacks on the West, particularly the continuing British presence in the Suez Canal Zone. The warming Egyptian-Soviet relationship caused the United States to withdraw its support for the Aswan Dam project, and in retaliation Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. As a result, Britain and France joined Israel's attack on Egypt in October 1956.

The United States refused to back the attack and called on the United Nations to intervene. Within days the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was authorized by the General Assembly with a mandate to separate the warring parties and to supervise withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops. The invading forces complied, and UNEF remained in Egypt until Nasser demanded they leave in May 1967 prior to the Six Day War.

*UN Performance.* This first UN peacekeeping force was considered a major accomplishment and success by conference participants. One participant called it "one of the UN's finest hours." It constituted a "ladder down which the British government could climb" and thus diffused a major international crisis. The lack of tradition and precedent in this area made it easier to improvise within the framework of the UN Charter, and the result was General Assembly rather than Security Council authorization of the force and a prominent, innovative role for the Secretary-General. In fact, the Suez crisis fostered the UN approach to peacekeeping.





Kontos



Otunnu



Krishnan



Marinescu



5 KRISHNAN

It was pointed out that even during this period of cold war hostilities the United States and the Soviet Union recognized a confluence of interests and, therefore, the Soviets acquiesced in the United Nations' actions. It was also acknowledged that the morally strong US position taken to preserve the integrity of international law, the Secretary-General's style and confidence in majority support, and the fact that the target countries of the UN action viewed the United Nations with respect were major contributing factors. Participants agreed that such a combination of circumstances is unlikely to recur, but the incident was cited as an innovative interpretation of the United Nations' Charter in halting aggression.

### **Chad**

*Background.* Chad has been torn by internal conflict since gaining its independence from France in 1960. Its brief history has been marked by several attempted coups and changing liaisons. The two current antagonists, Hissein Habré and Goukouni Oueddei, have been in conflict since early 1980 when their coalition government disintegrated. Remaining French troops were withdrawn in midyear 1980 leaving a void quickly filled by Libyan forces favoring Oueddei. Habré was driven from the country in December 1980.

Following complaints by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) regarding Oueddei's relationship with Libya, Oueddei ordered the Libyan troops to withdraw. The OAU then began to organize a peacekeeping force to supplant the Libyans, but the force was unable to prevent Habré's forces from overthrowing Oueddei in June 1982.

In mid-1983, Oueddei, with the help of Libya, mounted a counterattack. The French then supplied aid to Habré, the Libyans countered with bombing raids and troops, the French in turn committed troops to the region.

*UN Performance.* The OAU first appealed to the Security Council for financial assistance to support their peacekeeping force in July 1980. The response was delayed until March 1982 when the request was denied. Given the fact that many UN members philosophically support an active role for regional organizations, the conference participants, some of whom had been involved at the time, searched for reasons why the Security Council's response was too late and too weak.

However, no overriding reasons could be identified. Apparently, the request was received during a heavy workload period (including a contentious election of a secretary-general) and while there was a lull in the fighting within Chad, thereby diminishing the perceived seriousness of the situation.

It was noted that this case illustrates the difficulties as well as the potential of the relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations. Although many participants felt that the Security Council should have supported this peacekeeping force and should in the future support similar peacekeeping efforts, others questioned this view. They suggested that it could be more efficient for the United Nations to specialize in peacekeeping, perhaps using regional forces, while the regional organizations handle peacemaking.

### **Cyprus**

*Background.* The rivalry between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has been marked by violence for many years. The conflict was first brought to the United Nations in 1954, but the General Assembly did not pass a resolution calling for a just and peaceful settlement by negotiation until 1957.

In 1960 the island gained its independence from Britain. Three years later fighting broke out and again the conflict was taken to the United Nations, this time to the Security Council. The UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was dispatched to Cyprus along with two special representatives of the Secretary-General who tried unsuccessfully to reach a compromise between the factions.

Turkey invaded Cyprus in late 1974 and established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus which in early 1984 evolved into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. UNFICYP patrols the 100-mile buffer zone between the two communities while UN-sponsored talks continue to search for a way to end the partition of the island or to resolve permanently the Greek-Turkish conflict.

*UN Performance.* Participants viewed the United Nations' peacekeeping role in Cyprus as highly successful in spite of the 1974 setback. UNFICYP was dispatched in a timely fashion and, over the years, has prevented the loss of life which likely would have occurred without its presence.

Cyprus was also cited as a good example of simultaneous peacekeeping (separating the parties) and peacemaking (resolving the underlying problem) efforts. However, despair was expressed over the inability to reach a long-term resolution of the problem. This situation was viewed as representative of the United Nations' chronic difficulty in peacemaking.

Considerable discussion focused on the question of whether peacekeeping might be, or could become, the enemy of peacemaking by tranquilizing the situation and thereby relieving the pressure to find a solution. Although acknowledging the truth in this view, most participants concluded that peacekeeping is essential even if sometimes detrimental to peacemaking because the alternatives are so much worse. "Solutions worked out by force are not real solutions, so we are better off with the current uneasy situation" in the words of one.

One participant, noting the presence of economic as well as political problems in Cyprus, suggested that through working together on their common economic problems the parties might progress on political issues as well.

## Lessons

The discussion of the six cases yielded several general lessons, some of which provide justification for specific measures set forth later in this report. Others lend perspective to the performance of the international community. Each of these lessons was clearly supported in one or more of the case studies.

1. **The United Nations needs to strengthen its capability to prevent potential conflicts from breaking out.** It is much more difficult to stop fighting already under way than to take measures before the battles begin.

One of the problems encountered is submitting a potential threat to peace to the Security Council. Disputing parties are slow to recognize the need for third party help, and those nations not directly involved in the dispute are reluctant to bring the matter formally to the Council for fear of negative repercussions. The result is that even when events are clearly headed toward conflict, the United Nations is paralyzed.

Such was the case in Lebanon, participants observed. Several months before the June 1982 Israeli invasion "everyone" knew that tensions were building to the point where an attack was inevitable. Yet no action was taken and not a word was spoken at the Security Council until after the invasion began. Likewise, it was argued that most Security Council members were aware of impending hostilities between Iraq and Iran before they broke out but were unable to get the matter before the Council.

Sometimes, early action by the United Nations is delayed by ignorance of developments. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands incident took the whole world, including the United Nations, by surprise. While it had long been known that a dispute over sovereignty existed, few people were aware that tensions were rapidly building after the obscure incident on South Georgia Island.

To alleviate these problems and facilitate the United Nations' ability to prevent conflicts, initiatives in three areas were suggested:

- a. Methods for routinely monitoring world developments and informally calling attention to them at the United Nations need to be developed.
- b. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to take a vigorous role in seeking more information about potential trouble spots and informally calling disturbing trends to the attention of the Security Council. A method short of the formal and more politically difficult step of placing items on the Security Council agenda via Article 99 needs to be developed.
- c. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to interpret his Security Council mandate liberally and to take creative approaches in exercising his "good office" mediation/conciliation function. Participants noted several examples of positive results from such initiatives. In Cyprus, secretaries-general have aggressively pursued peacemaking alongside peace-keeping efforts. Failure to achieve a comprehensive settlement is not because of lack of effort or innovation. In the Falkland/Malvinas Islands case, the Secretary-General was very active in suggesting solutions and nearly accomplished an agreement.

In the Iran-Iraq war a liberal interpretation of his mandate enabled the Secretary-General to achieve a partial ceasefire, thereby at least limiting bombardment of purely civilian targets.

2. **Peacekeeping operations can be effective.** When hostilities break out, it is sometimes possible to effectively interject peacekeeping forces to separate disputing armies. Two of the most effective peacekeeping operations were in the Suez and Cyprus.
3. **Peacekeeping forces need a clear mandate if they are to succeed.** The pitfalls of a weak mandate were evident in Lebanon where UNIFIL was plagued from the outset by the operations of local militia which caused continuing instability in southern Lebanon. Some participants cited Chad as another example where the mandate of the OAU peacekeeping force was weak. By contrast, Cyprus was cited as an example of a peacekeeping force being deployed with a mission and area of authority understood and respected from the outset by all parties.
4. **It is necessary to distinguish between internal sources of conflict and external interference or aggression.** This, participants acknowledged, is often very difficult but should not be impossible. The United Nations has no authority to become involved in internal disputes such as the one in Lebanon. However, it needs to be able to act against complications brought about by the introduction of outside forces. The pitfalls of not doing so were evident in Chad where an internal struggle opened the country to intervention by Libya and France.
5. **Successful UN intervention requires the support and cooperation of the disputing parties.** Without this support there is little the United Nations can do. For example, in Lebanon, Israel was determined to seek a unilateral military solution to a perceived threat. UNIFIL was powerless to stop it. When the effort was made to put a new UN peacekeeping force around Beirut, Israel persuaded the United States to veto it. Further evidence exists in Cyprus where the presence of UN peacekeeping forces has acted as a deterrent. However, on several occasions tensions have risen so high that the two sides wanted to fight; peacekeeping forces cannot stop determined combatants.

A corollary to this lesson is that even when the United Nations performs as it should, it sometimes fails. The best example of this was the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. In 1965 and repeatedly thereafter, the General Assembly properly called on Argentina and Britain to negotiate a settlement. When Argentina seized the islands, the Security Council called on the parties to resolve their differences peacefully and authorized the Secretary-General to mediate. The Secretary-General pursued his mandate vigorously. All was to no avail. The United Nations operated as authorized by the Charter, but the disputants ignored their Charter obligation to resolve their differences peacefully.

6. **Some disputes cannot be resolved.** Everyone believes that peacekeeping operations are by themselves insufficient and must be accompanied by efforts to resolve underlying disputes. However, in some instances differences are so deeply ingrained that no amount of peacemaking will work. The only hope is to stand between the disputing parties.

Cyprus was mentioned as such a situation. It is an independent nation created during the post-World War II decolonization period. Neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots wanted an independent state, it was argued, and now they are hopelessly cast together although they have a deep hatred for each other. Participants agreed that only a great deal of time could yield a solution. Others cite Iran and Iraq as an example. In spite of nearly universal desire to end this war, the local differences are so strong that international pressure is ignored.

7. **Human factors have to be taken into account.** Sometimes the right thing is not done for reasons that have nothing to do with improper motives. Regarding Chad, for example, the Security Council gave inadequate attention to the OAU's request for financial assistance because it was operating with a heavy load of higher priority items, according to one participant.

In another matter, a participant expressed the belief that the Security Council handling of the Iran-Iraq war has been affected by the quality of diplomacy practiced at the United Nations. This participant said Iran was at a

serious disadvantage when, in 1980, it had a new government with inexperienced diplomats and few friends on the Council which was considering the outbreak of the war.

Another human limitation is judgment. Britain misjudged the seriousness which Argentina accorded to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands dispute. Nations almost always, it was said, misjudged the outcome of a war. Israel did not expect to suffer long-term consequences for its 1982 attack on Lebanon; Iraq thought it would score a quick military victory; Argentina did not expect Britain to send a major force to retake the Falklands.

### **National Interests**

A frank and pragmatic examination of how countries perceive their national interests and ways in which these interests are best served revealed a variety of reasons why disputes are not taken to the United Nations. The same discussion resulted in a consensus on the benefits of bringing disputes to the attention of the United Nations.

The following reasons were mentioned for not bringing disputes to the United Nations:

- Nations fear the loss of control over the resolution of the problem. National sovereignty is still an overriding value and most governments are unwilling to surrender any portion of their independent power. Bilateral diplomacy is a 2,000 year old habit which is excruciatingly difficult to break.
- Noncrisis situations do not seem to warrant UN attention. Although acknowledging that disputes are best addressed in the early stages, participants noted that small problems rarely command attention until they become crises.
- The Security Council and General Assembly are political bodies and, therefore, inevitably introduce extraneous matters into the discussion—a factor which can complicate or exacerbate, rather than resolve, a problem. This political aspect of the organization also guarantees the eventual development of a majority position which generally favors one side in the dispute over the other.



- The "tattletale" complex is very strong. No country wants to bring someone else's problems to the United Nations for fear of the situation being reversed at a later time. The need to preserve relationships with other countries also argues against bringing disputes to the United Nations, notwithstanding the potential long-term benefits.
- Some nations perceive the outcome of the UN debate to be predetermined, regardless of the merits of the case. Western countries view nonaligned bloc voting in this way.
- Some nations know they are in violation of international law or international norms and, therefore, there is no case in their favor.

Participants agreed that there are a number of compelling and pragmatic reasons for bringing disputes to the United Nations. In spite of the negative aspects acknowledged in the previous list, a variety of benefits can be realized as a result of UN involvement:

- There are overwhelming and obvious advantages in avoiding war in terms of lives saved and resources expended.
- Mediation and conciliation are realistic possibilities within the UN structure.
- The United Nations can help governments identify their long-term national interests by expanding the debate and the potential solutions beyond the short-term political objectives which invariably dominate an individual government's outlook.
- For nations which are not parties to the dispute, Security Council action can reduce the need for them to take sides in the dispute.
- Actions suggested by a third party, such as the United Nations, can often relieve a national government from having to accept blame for decisions that may be unpopular in the domestic political context.
- UN action can serve as a safety valve and a face-saving device. It is one of the few alternatives to military force; participants clearly agreed that military solutions yield diminishing returns.
- Recourse to the United Nations is a way for nations, especially small ones, to apply pressure on a larger adversary and thus help alleviate the imbalance.
- Peacekeeping and observer forces can separate the parties to the conflict and have proven effective in certain past situations.



Kirk



Berlin



Fischer



de Lacharriere



- There are benefits of having agreements on the international public record in terms of pressing compliance.

## Measures to Strengthen the United Nations

Having analyzed the development of several conflict situations through case studies and having candidly weighed the national interests involved in allowing the United Nations to handle peace-threatening situations, the participants considered measures to strengthen UN performance.

### Conflict Prevention

A major lesson learned during the case study process was that the United Nations can be most effective in preventing conflicts before they begin; improving UN performance in this area is most likely to have positive results. Some participants said there is newly expressed recognition on the part of member nations from all power blocs that a strengthened conflict prevention mechanism is necessary. The dialogue begun by the Secretary-General's reports and continued by the Security Council consultation has had much to do with this. Since the greatest promise lies in this area, participants devoted much of their time to developing rather specific proposals.

1. There was consensus that the Security Council might be able to take more preventive and timely action if the members did not feel so inhibited about raising and discussing developments that affect international peace and security. In order to facilitate this process, participants agreed that the Council should explore the possibility of holding regular, informal review sessions to share information and exchange ideas among members of the Council and the Secretary-General on any developments of general concern to the Council. It was suggested that the meetings be held at least once a month. It was agreed that details of how these meetings might be structured should be worked out by the Council and the Secretary-General.

However, most participants believed that the meetings would have a far better chance of success if they were limited to exchanges on items not formally on the Council's agenda. At least some participants thought the meetings might also be used to consider whether changes in ongoing conflicts already before the Council

had developed to a point where new initiatives might succeed.

Participants saw a number of benefits to be gained from the meetings. Besides being a device for informally calling a threat to peace to the attention of the Council, the meetings could encourage better flow of information to and from the Secretary-General. Furthermore, just the knowledge that the United Nations has discussed, even informally, the development of conditions which might produce hostilities could delay or preempt an act of aggression.

2. Participants agreed that Security Council members should meet informally with the Secretary-General, individually or jointly, on a regular basis (perhaps monthly) to share information and exchange ideas concerning current or potential threats to international peace and security. Though similar to the preceding recommendation, participants noted that individual or small group sessions with the Secretary-General might produce even more candor. Another benefit would be that preparation for such meetings would require members to look at the items on their foreign policy agendas in a UN context.
3. There was consensus that the Secretary-General needs more authoritative information on peace-threatening developments. Participants urged the Secretary-General to evaluate how senior staff might best be organized—perhaps in the form of a policy-planning council—to facilitate and coordinate reporting on developments around the world. He was also encouraged to consider wider and more frequent use of "wise men" and regional experts and to appoint aides at the scene of a dispute as *ad hoc* representatives when information is needed.

These information-gathering and analyzing measures are meant to supplement, not replace, information presented by member states. Also, participants agreed that any staff reallocation should be done with existing personnel to avoid creating another layer of bureaucracy.

4. Participants agreed that the Security Council should consider involving parties to a dispute in informal, private consultations. Once the Council has a matter on its

agenda, informal consultations have been used to discuss off-the-record ideas for handling the situation. Involving disputants in these meetings has never been done but might prove to be a logical next step.

5. Participants decried the tendency for prolonged debates in formal Security Council sessions. They urged the Council to greatly limit presentations by parties not involved in the controversy so as to avoid the Council's drift toward becoming a mini-General Assembly. Participants thought the Council should decide whether this could best be accomplished through rule-making or by increasing the authority of the Council president.
6. Consideration should be given to limiting the Secretary-General to one term of office. At the same time, extending the length of the term might be considered. This could remove some political pressure from the officeholder. It was noted that Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's announcement early in his term that he would not seek reelection freed him to be candid in his appraisal of the world situation.
7. Legal issues between disputants should be forwarded to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A suggestion was put forth that when the parties will not go to the Court, the Council might request an advisory opinion on the case on its own initiative. Some other participants, however, thought this would be a mistake.

### **Halting Aggression**

While preventing conflict is the more likely route to success for the United Nations and the obviously desired goal, conflicts will inevitably occur. When they do, the United Nations must use all practical means available to try to stop the fighting.

1. Since peacekeeping is a potentially effective method for separating combatants, participants reaffirmed the need for clear mandates on, and close Secretariat supervision of, peacekeeping operations.
2. The Security Council should be certain to word its resolutions in unambiguous terms. If the subject of a resolution is, for example, a ceasefire between two warring parties, the Council should make clear whether

- it is *recommending* a ceasefire or *ordering* one. It was argued that Council resolutions are usually not so clear and, therefore, have less force.
- 3. The Security Council needs to strengthen implementation of its resolutions. The following formula was offered: When the Council has "recommended" action in a resolution (by far the most frequent wording), the best way to encourage compliance is through bilateral pressure; when the resolution contains an "order," the Council should employ a graduated application of pressure beginning with threats to take unspecified "further steps under Chapter VII" and building toward the application of sanctions. Participants acknowledge that there are very few cases in which sanctions can be effectively applied.

#### Other

1. Member states should plan to restate publicly their commitment to the United Nations on the occasion of its 40th anniversary in 1985.
2. Reaffirming the view of previous conferences, participants agreed that the Secretary-General should be freed from some of his ceremonial duties. The idea was put forward that the post of General Assembly president be made a year-round job allowing the president to assume some of the ceremonial responsibilities.

#### 40th Anniversary

Participants called attention to the special opportunity that the 40th anniversary of the United Nations provides to further evaluate and strengthen the organization.

A number of studies, assessments, and considerable public information works are being structured around the 1985 observance of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and pointed at the 1986 UN-designated Year of Peace. This activity will take many forms around the world and will involve a wide variety of non-governmental, academic, professional, and governmental organizations and institutions. In some countries these observances will coincide with a significant national date such as Austria's tenth anniversary as a participant in UN peacekeeping forces. In other cases renewed interest in the

United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities springs not from a wish to make a particular date but from widespread concern created by several recent outbreaks of "extremely bloody and highly preventable" wars.

Discussion moved from an accounting of already planned activities to a look at what else might be done to make the United Nations' 40th anniversary more than just a commemorative event. It was acknowledged that the reexamination of the United Nations and especially its peace and security record could well result in a more negative than positive 40th anniversary. Although this group of experienced UN experts and supporters will work toward a favorable and optimistic tone, they agreed that a balanced assessment of the organization's accomplishments, shortcomings, and potential would be most constructive. This approach is viewed as the best avenue both to strengthen the United Nations and to generate public credibility, especially in the United States.

There was a great deal of interest in using the occasion of the United Nations' 40th anniversary to draw the public's attention to the organization. Recommendations around which consensus formed included:

- Creating national commissions of prominent figures such as former secretaries of state (foreign ministers) and national security advisers to raise the visibility of debate on alternatives to national military force.
- Placing public information emphasis on use of TV, radio, and newspapers rather than obscure pamphlets which no one will read.
- Ensuring that informed and constructive sources of information are readily available to all major news outlets as they begin researching background for 40th anniversary articles. Interested organizations should be prepared with ideas for future UN direction so that UN critics do not dominate the news.

Participants also agreed that in the spirit of making the 40th anniversary more than a celebration, the procedures of the General Assembly should be reviewed with an eye toward strengthening the organization and improving its effectiveness.

## Conclusion

The United Nations was founded on a note of idealism with a goal of attaining a dream—the elimination of war. The real world, however, has a habit of getting in the way of dreams, the wars of the past four decades are proof of that. Is the United Nations then an organization with an unattainable goal, doomed to irrelevancy in the real world?

In a sense, that is the question this conference addressed. Through case studies, conferees looked at difficult world situations. They candidly weighed the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations and realistically assessed national interests as they relate to the world body.

They concluded that the United Nations is more than a dream. Even in the peace and security field it makes a valuable contribution, a contribution that benefits all its member states. It *could* do much more, but its performance is hampered by a lack of support from the same members who stand to gain so much. Participants concluded that what is needed is a change of behavior. Member nations must recommit themselves to using the organization and then work toward some achievable first steps to strengthen the organization. Strengthening the United Nations is in everyone's interest.





# Chairman's Observations

These observations were prepared by the chairman, C. Maxwell Stanley, following the conference. They reflect discussion, not only at this conference, but also at prior Stanley Foundation conferences.

## Responsibility

Building on the discussions at the 1983 Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade, our 1984 participants explored why nations hesitate to make greater use of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. They documented the benefits that all nations—those at peace with their neighbors as well as those involved in controversy—would derive from using and strengthening UN capabilities.

Once again, our discussions placed the responsibility for the failure to use and strengthen UN capability squarely upon member states.

## The Question

Given the positive effects of using the United Nations to deal with controversies and conflicts threatening international peace and security, how may greater national will to use and strengthen the United Nations be stimulated?

One way is to increase confidence in the United Nations' capability. To this end, the rapporteurs' report presents several specific procedural recommendations whose implementation could lead to earlier UN involvement and an increased likelihood of success.

Greater confidence in the United Nations' capability is not enough. Nations must develop a stronger commitment to use the United Nations when incidents threatening international peace and security arise. While stronger commitment is required of every nation, even more is expected of the 15 members of the Security Council. Conventional wisdom, as well as the UN Charter, places heavy responsibility on China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the Council's perma-

ment members possessing veto power. However, the other ten nations which are selected by rotation from the five regions of the world to serve two-year terms on the Security Council, are in a unique position to press vigorously for effective Security Council action, even when one or more of the permanent members is reluctant to act. Moreover, their experience during their two-year term should enhance their own national will.

### **Persuasion vs. Enforcement**

Our discussions confirmed that persuasion is the United Nations' most effective tool to deal with peace and security matters. Repetition of collective military security action like that used in Korea in the 1950s seems very unlikely. To date, sanctions have been largely unsuccessful, mainly because of inadequate support by member states. UN intervention in pacific settlement situations before armed conflict begins is largely persuasive in nature. Even when conflicts have begun, achievement of ceasefires, deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and subsequent resolution of controversy depend largely on skillful diplomacy and persuasion by UN representatives.

Nevertheless, situations may develop where the use of sanctions is warranted. Severance of diplomatic relations, economic pressures, or embargoes may be considered. The long, drawn out Iraq/Iran war was cited by some participants as so dangerous and threatening to world security that it warrants consideration of UN-imposed sanctions.



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