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ABSTRACT

Drawing data from a variety of sources, a study was undertaken to place China's propaganda activities in the United States during World War II into a historical perspective. Results showed that China's propaganda efforts consisted of official and unofficial activities and activities directed toward overseas Chinese. The official activities were carried out by the Chinese News Service and its branch offices in various American cities under the direction of the Ministry of Information's International Department in Chungking. The unofficial activities were carried out by both Chinese and Americans, including missionaries, business people, and newspaper reporters, and the activities directed toward the overseas Chinese in the United States were undertaken for the purpose of collecting money and arousing patriotism. The propaganda program fell into four phases, the first beginning with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and directed at exposing Japanese atrocities. The second phase began with the withdrawal of the Chinese central government to inner China in late 1937, continued until the beginning of the European war in 1939, and concentrated on economic and political interests. The third phase ran from late 1939 to the bombing of Pearl Harbor and was directed at the American government in an effort to promote more moral, economic, and military aid for China, while the last period began when the war became global and continued until the end. The effectiveness of the propaganda program cannot be accurately measured. (FL)

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CHINA'S PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING WORLD WAR II

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ABSTRACT

This study examined China's conduct of its most important overseas propaganda activities in the United States in World War II. The findings showed that the main characters of China's propaganda in the United States in the war years included: 1) official propaganda in America was operated by the Ministry of Information's International Department in Chungking in coordination with the Chinese News Service and its branch offices in the United States; 2) unofficial propaganda involved activities sponsored by both Americans and Chinese; among them, missionaries, businessmen, and newspapermen all have tried to help the Chinese with varied reasons; 3) both the China Lobby and Red China Lobby have successfully changed American people's image about China; and 4) propaganda toward the overseas Chinese in the United States was to collect donations and to stir up patriotism.

CHINA'S PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
DURING WORLD WAR II

On September 18, 1931, Japan attacked at Mukden and soon invaded and occupied China's Three Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria). Six years later, on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops opened fire on Chinese troops at Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge), on the outskirts of Peking, making the beginning of China's War of Resistance. Ten days after this incident, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made one of his most important speeches during World War II, defining to the nation the limit of China's endurance, urging the Chinese to "take up the challenge to fight for freedom against the greatest odds," and announcing his famous warnings to Japan, "We hope for peace, but we do not seek an easy path to peace; we prepare for war, but we do not want war."¹

Long before the conflict between China and Japan became full-fledged, the American people had received a virtual avalanche of propaganda from Japan. During the first few years of war, the Japanese spent millions of dollars for propaganda activities in the United States alone. It was reported that in 1938, the Japanese Diet (Congress) appropriated \$2 million for propaganda in the United States.² A pro-China group estimated, however, that the annual budget of Japan's propaganda work in America was about \$7 million.³ Other sources showed that the figure was probably between three and five million dollars.⁴

The head man in the Japanese propaganda mill was Count Aisuka Kabayama, who ran Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the Society for International Cultural Relations, with headquarters in Tokyo and a branch office in New York, which had 10,000 feet of office space in the International Building of Rockefeller Center.⁵ This society was organized mainly because "the war in China had made Japan keenly realize the urgent necessity of propaganda;"⁶ and its officials had the status of first secretaries of embassy.

Most of the Japanese propaganda in the United States was directed from Tokyo through this society and other coordinated agencies of the government, i.e. the South Manchuria Railway. Much of it took one of the following two forms--threats or cajolery.⁷ In general, Japan's propaganda in America centered on two well-known American fears--fear of involvement in war, and fear of Communism.⁸ Their propaganda always claimed that Japan was not fighting against the Chinese people, but only the menace of Communism in China; that Japan was one of America's largest customers for many types of raw materials; and that any action taken by America only pulled Britain's chestnuts out of the fire.⁹

The Japanese rarely used the word "propaganda", but as a rule referred to their political warfare as "thought war."¹⁰ To them, this term was different from propaganda in Westerners' minds in that it was not war by thought and argument, but war on thought and argument.

In the months preceding Pearl Harbor, Tokyo Radio, the official Domei News Agency, and the Japanese press jointly conducted an efficient war of nerves, which, for all its alleged clumsiness and primitiveness, effectively deceived a good many people in the United States. It was so successful in creating a political smoke screen, by using infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that Cordell Hull, then the U.S. Secretary of State, admitted later, "I never imaged until today any government on this planet was capable of uttering them [Japanese propaganda activities]." ¹¹

CHINA'S OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES

Generally speaking, the Chinese spent little to counteract the Japanese propaganda offensives in the United States, in part, because they had little to spend, and in part, because they didn't need to spend much. On the whole, America already sympathized with the Chinese. China was the underdog in the war, and the Americans have traditionally favored the underdog. Moreover, the war was fought on Chinese soil; Chinese towns had been destroyed and Chinese noncombatants had died, and the story of their sufferings had touched Americans' hearts.

Prior to 1937, China never had any systematic policy concerning propaganda work in other countries. When the Sino-Japanese War began in July, 1937, it soon became clear that in addition to the fighting on battlefronts, a war of international publicity had to be fought. Thus, when the Military Affairs Council was reorganized to cope with wartime needs, Hollington K. Tong, a journalist trained in Missouri

and in Columbia, was appointed vice minister of its fifth board, in charge of China's international publicity work during the wartime.¹²

The fifth board existed only for two months, and its overall performance was far from satisfactory. The board's only significant contribution in the early stage of the war was the organizing of the Anti-Enemy Committee to inform foreigners in Shanghai of the Chinese viewpoints about the war. This activity provided the non-experienced Chinese publicists an opportunity to become familiar with the method of providing information and material in which foreigners might be interested. Many of committee's members, such as Dr. C. L. Hsia and Dr. Yuan-ning Wen, later devoted their energies and time to help the government develop overseas publicity programs.¹³

On Nov. 15, 1937, the fifth board was replaced by the newly established Ministry of Information, and an International Department was created and headed by H. P. Tseng.¹⁴ Tong remained as the vice minister of information and was still responsible for the international propaganda operations. Only after the creation of this department that China began to have its formal overseas propaganda organization and the department's job in foreign countries was immediately defined. The government insisted that at all times the department must tell only the facts--be they favorable or otherwise. The duty of the department was "to make the truth known to the outside world through all media by which information can be disseminated."¹⁵

The International Department was divided into several sections. The English Section was the most important one dealing with the work related to the propaganda activities in America. Headed first by James Shen, a journalism graduate of Missouri, the section was led

by Hawthorne Cheng and Wan Ho-sheng successively. The section usually consisted of six Chinese writers, most of whom had graduated from American missionary institutions in Peking and in Shanghai.

Tong's first task as vice minister of information included a series of invitations to foreign correspondents and international VIP's to Chungking since he believed that "a visit, even a very brief one, to Free China [and to Chungking], would convince the foreign correspondents [and VIP's] that the country was not, as continually claimed by the Japanese, on the verge of collapse."¹⁶ Visitors in wartime included such famous people as James R. Young, International News Service Tokyo correspondent; Roy Howard, head of the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers; Royal Arch Gunnison, North American Newspaper Alliance; and John Gunther, author of Inside Europe. The most important visitor, however, was Henry Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune, and his wife, who spent five days in China. They briefly visited the fighting front, and were impressed with the strong morale among the Chinese soldiers.¹⁷

After 1937, more and more authors, writers, and journalists who represented newspapers, magazines, radio systems, and press associations as well as freelancers all were attracted to visit interior China.¹⁸ A number of leading U.S. news media also maintained offices or correspondents in China either regularly or at frequent intervals, between 1937 and 1945. The list included the Associated Press, United Press, North American Newspaper Alliance, Religious News Service, the New York Times, the New York Post, the Baltimore Sun, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Life, Newsweek, Time, Liberty, Harper's Yank, ABC, CBS, MBS, the "News of the Day" (M.G.M. newsreel), ACME, and Reader's Digest.¹⁹

In addition, an international radio station, XGOX, was completed in 1938 and made its first broadcast in February, 1939. Photographic and film work was also initiated by the International Department. Joris Ivens, a famous documentary film cameraman and director, took thousands of feet of film to the United States and edited a film called "The Four Hundred Million." The film was re-used in a number of other films after the attack on Pearl Harbor, notably "Inside Fighting China."²⁰

MOI's Work in the United States--the Chinese News Service. The earlier work of Tong's Ministry of Information (MOI) was limited and unsystematic; most of its operations in the early stage were undertaken either by unpaid individuals or as one-shot campaigns. In 1938 and 1939, for example, Tong asked the Reverend Charles L. Meeus to serve as a volunteer to do publicity work in America for the Chinese government to encounter Japan's strong use of American Catholics.²¹ Later, young Bishop Paul Yu-pin, Vicar Apostolic of Nanking, also came to the United States in 1939 and 1940 to explain the Chinese situation to Catholic communities in America.

Begun in 1938, the International Department decided to widen its activities in the United States by sending official representatives. In an attempt to enlarge the scope of Chinese publicity work in America, Tong hired Carl Byoir and Associates, Inc. to direct Chinese propaganda in America. H. J. Timperley and Earl Leaf were appointed advisers to Chinese groups in the United States and their work involved intelligence, liaison and public relations for the Chinese government.



Both of them were on the Chinese payroll and were sent to survey American public opinion in order to set up organizations for publicity work in the United States later.

Another Chinese-paid publicist in the United States about the same time was Bruno Schwartz, who ran the semi-official organization, the Trans-Pacific News Service, in New York, for the Chinese government.²² Schwartz published a weekly newsletter and other occasional pamphlets in the "China Reference Series." The agency had two staff members and two secretaries, with a budget of \$2,000 a month, half of which came from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.²³

In September, 1941, Dr. C. L. Hsia, an experienced Chinese diplomat who had undertaken a number of important diplomatic and public relations missions for the Chinese government, was appointed the chief representative of the Ministry of Information in the United States. He also served as the new head of the Trans-Pacific News Service, he soon changed its name to the Chinese News Service.²⁴ In the same year, two branch offices, one in San Francisco and one in Chicago, were established and headed by Malcolm Rossholt and Henry Evens respectively.

During the war years, the Chinese News Service (CNS) was divided into eight sections. CNS headquarters was situated on Sixth Avenue in New York City. It moved to the 42nd floor of the RCA Building and stayed there for the remainder of World War II.²⁵ CNS's eight divisions are introduced as follows: (also see Tables 1 and 2)

Tables 1 and 2 About Here

--The Press Section was the largest unit in CNS's main office. It kept in constant touch with the newspapers and editorial offices in New York, supplying them with the latest information on China received from Chungking. This section also edited and published all CNS's news releases and publications, except CNS's^S fortnightly magazine, Contemporary China. The section's news bulletin, Voice of China, was issued six days a week, and occasionally on Sunday. The content of the bulletin was based entirely on the Chungking shortwave broadcasts; topics included items such as overseas Chinese, relations between China and the United States, war fronts in China, or war prisons. In 1944 alone, there were 954 sheets of bulletin published, which meant a total of 572,400 words.²⁶

Another important task of this section was to publish and edit the monthly magazine, China at War, CNS's oldest magazine in English which was founded in China in 1938 and transferred to the publication office in New York in 1943.²⁷ The principal reason to continue this magazine was to "disguise serious or propagandistic material by clothing it in a more attractive format."²⁸ Another reason was to establish an organic connection between material going into China at War and material used in CNS's news and feature releases.²⁹

Generally speaking, the object of this monthly was to "present a realistic and truthful picture of the many forces at work in the New China, born in war brought by Japan."³⁰ Every month, a great number of articles were prepared and assembled in Chungking, then sent to America by wireless, and finally selected and edited for publication in the CNS headquarters in New York.



--Contemporary China was a bi-weekly review aimed at offering the American public authoritative interpretations and analyses of war affairs in China. Initiated in May, 1941, the periodical was edited by Dr. Lin Mousheng. Contributors of the magazine were primarily from Chinese leaders or writers; for this reason, it was more interesting and informative than China at War, and soon became one of the most favored publications in CNS. Its circulation increased from an initial list of 2,000 to 8,700 at the end of the war.³¹

--The Visual Section handled still pictures, motion pictures and exhibition material, and it was responsible for editing films sent from Chungking which were often in a rough condition. During the war this section also performed two other functions: first, advising on distribution of photographs from Chungking, and second, advising producers in Hollywood concerning the production of better films about the Chinese people.³² In 1941, with assistances from the Ministry of Information and the China Institute in America, Inc., two offices of the Advisory Council on China Motion Pictures were established, one in New York, and the other one in Hollywood. The purposes of these offices were to "encourage American producers to make motion picture about China having cultural value, and, at the same time, correctly presenting China, the people, and the background."³³

--The Radio Section transcribed and directed broadcasts from Chungking, and produced regular and special programs for local stations in New York and networks. In 1944 alone, there were 501 radio broadcasts handled and distributed to stations in the United States.³⁴

--The Speaker's Bureau was directed by Y.C. Yang, former president of Soochow University in Shanghai. More than 400 speaking engagements were filed in 1944 alone.³⁵ The bureau's regular listeners included students in colleges and universities, people in educational associations, civic clubs, public forums, churches, and church references. Some speeches were also made on special occasions.

--The Information Division handled all inquiries that reached CNS by telephones, personal interviews, and letters. Members of this section usually were assigned to read manuscripts, articles, and books on China for those people who wished CNS to check up on facts and citations for them. Besides these inquiries from individual Americans, many public opinion formulating organizations were also served, such as those press groups including the New York Times, Time, Life, Collier's, AP, UP, CBS, MGM, and the Office of War Information (OWI).³⁶

--The CNS library was a specialized reference depository used by both CNS staff members and the general public. Many teachers, students, writers, radio commentators, librarians, and lecturers often visited the library. Other than providing a special selected booklist on China, the library also collected about 1,000 books on the Far East, and over 1,000 pamphlets published by different organizations in the United States concerning problems in the Far East.³⁷

--The Mailing and Circulation Department handled all the daily mailings in and out of the CNS offices.³⁸



--The five CNS branch offices in the Western Hemisphere were primarily responsible for distribution of the CNS publications. Each office, however, published its own daily news bulletins, Voice of China, compiled from radio broadcasts to newspapers and other press/associations in its own area.

About three to five members were hired by each of these branch offices. Yui Ming, an overseas Chinese from Hawaii, served as director of the CNS San Francisco office for two years, and in 1943, James Shen, former head of the English Section of the International Department, replaced him. Cheng Paonan, vice consular of the Chinese Consulate in New York, shifted to preside over the CNS Chicago office, and Chen Yih was the director of the Washington, D.C. branch.³⁹

Shortwave Broadcasts from Chungking. Beginning in the early part of 1940, Earl Leaf, then International Department representative in the United States, visited the West Coast from New York seeking someone to intercept broadcast from XGOX radio station in Chungking. The person Leaf approached was Dr. Charles E. Stuart, a dentist and a widely known radio amateur who had received a substantial amount of publicity in connection with his international transmitting and receiving activities.⁴⁰ In May, 1940, Stuart began to work as a "transmitter" between Chungking's shortwave broadcasts and CNS offices in the United States.

Each night, the broadcasts originated in Chungking at 9 o'clock, and were received in Ventura, California, at 6 a.m. By using two rhombic antennas on eight 90-foot-tall poles erected in

front of his house, Stuart recorded the transmissions and his wife, or his assistants, did all the transcribing.⁴¹ Each day, from 5,000 to 10,000 words were received by this facility. The material then was relayed to the CNS headquarters in New York on a teletype transmitter, and to other branch offices to issue the daily bulletin, Voice of China.⁴² Stuart later also provided a service to transfer personal "mailbag" messages from Americans in China to their friends or families in the United States without charge.⁴³

Stuart was paid a salary of \$1,200 per month by the Chinese government for the services he rendered, plus certain expenses related to the operation. Material handled for other news associations and publications was charged at the rate of one cent per word. From November, 1943 to June, 1944, Stuart received \$1,774 for this kind of services he offered to news media.⁴⁴

A lot of work had been done simply by using daily radio transmission. In addition to the monthly magazine, China at War, and the daily bulletins, Voice of China, two books--China After Five Years of War and China After Seven Years of War--were both finished by employing this word-to-word operation of the devotion by Stuart and his assistants, a work that Hsia called "the first time in history that manuscript of a complete book was transmitted in this manner."⁴⁵

CHINA'S UNOFFICIAL PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

At the early stage of the war, Tong's propaganda efforts in the United States were limited for several reasons. The most obvious one was that he had a budget of merely \$36,000 for the expenses of all his representatives as well as his office in Hong Kong, and another \$36,000 for the operation of the International Department.⁴⁶ Compared with Japan's yearly fee of \$3,500,000 to \$5,000,000 in America alone, Tong's budget was absurdly small.

But with the volunteer work of American missionaries and travelers, along with reports dispatched by American press correspondents in China, the American people were quick to sympathize with China in its misfortunes. American public opinion began to support China, especially after mid-1938 while Japan's unlimited bombings on Chinese cities were broadly reported by American journalists and other sympathizers, as well as by China's official propagandists.

Before the war, America's image of the Chinese had been conflicting. Generally speaking, the Americans respected the merits of Chinese tradition and civilization; on the other hand, they often described the Chinese as barbaric and brutal, an impression acquired from the Chinese laborers in the United States before this century.⁴⁷ Before the Sino-Japanese War broke out in North China, missionaries tried many different ways to arouse Americans' sympathy toward the "underdog" Chinese. Books published in this period had created the new image of the Chinese in Americans' mind. For example, Pearl Buck's The Good Earth alone reached as estimated 25 million Americans in

the early 1930s.⁴⁸ Lin Yutang's books, The Importance of Living and My Country and My People, plus Carl Crow's 400 Million Customers and The Chinese Are Like That all created new pictures about the hard-working Chinese.

Meanwhile, the American press generally was favorable toward the Chinese situation. "Of some five thousand editorials which have been examined," said Lin Mousheng of the Chinese Cultural Society of New York in a report about his survey of U.S. newspapers in 1937, "there is none that justifies Japanese aggression or condemns Chinese resistance."⁴⁹ A public opinion poll also showed that American people were overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Chinese in their struggle against Japan, although they still were reluctant to endorse steps that might involve the United States in the hostilities.⁵⁰

After 1937, the first group formed to speak for the Chinese interests in the United States was the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, or so-called the Price Committee.⁵¹ The major objective of this organization was to urge the American government to stop assisting the Japanese by selling them strategic material.⁵² The committee, led by Frank Price of the Theological Seminary at Nanking and his brother Harry Price, established a news service in September 1938 in Washington, D.C. They sent out a small mimeographed bulletin regularly for interested people. The stories contained in this bulletin were largely written by missionaries in China who had seen the Japanese in action.⁵³

Although Prices's information service operated for only two years, it was credited as having helped "China's publicity work during the least understood period of war."⁵⁴ Other important work executed by this committee included public awareness campaigns, collection of signatures, Congress lobbying activities, etc.⁵⁵

In addition to those pressure groups that sought to influence American's public opinion about China during World War II, a number of American medical organizations had been involved in promoting fund-raising activities to help the Chinese refugees who suffered under Japanese bombings. These relief groups also played an important role in helping China by earning the American people's sympathies. The most important relief group was the United China Relief (UCR), which was founded by eight major agencies in 1941. Its real boss was Henry Luce, who put up \$60,000 in the first era of UCR and lent it two of Time magazine's publicity men, persuaded several business leaders to join the board of the UCR and sent a personal appeal to Time subscribers that brought in \$240,000.⁵⁶

In 1943, UCR ceased to raise funds independently; ninety percent of its income was then coming from the U.S. National War Fund. In the period between 1941 and 1945, however, it was estimated that UCR had raised an impressive total of \$40 million.⁵⁷

In addition to UCR's work, the American Red Cross also launched its financial campaigns to help China. From 1938 to 1944, the total U.S. purchase value of supplies delivered to China through the American Red Cross was over \$3 million.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, YWCA and YMCA also helped the Chinese by donating money and material during the war.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek's Visit to the United States. Today, most historians would agree that the year of 1943 was the height of amity in the history of the Sino-American relations, mostly as a result of Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States early that year. Her visit brought about not only the American people's popular enthusiasm for China but also official assistance from the U.S. government.⁵⁹

In her 46 days in the United States, Madame Chiang visited six cities--Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. She began her trip on February 17, 1943, and was invited to the White House by President and Mrs. Roosevelt. She made her first speech to the Senate and the second to the House of Representatives, a distinction reserved usually for heads-of-state, and only once before for a woman (the Netherlands's Queen Wilhelmina).⁶⁰ Newsweek reported her address as "vividly but with classic Oriental courtesy."⁶¹ Time magazine described the speech in an more interesting tone: "When she finished [her address to the House], tough guys were melted. 'Goddam it,' said one grizzled Congressman, 'I never saw anything like it. Madame Chiang had me on the verge of bursting into tears.'"⁶²

From then on, Madame Chiang was constantly in the public eye for six weeks. She met the press in each of the large cities she was invited. She also spoke at tremendous mass meetings in New York, for instance, 17,000 people attended a rally in Madison Square Garden.⁶³ In Los Angeles, more than 30,000 persons crowded at the base of the Hollywood Bowl and were amazed by her speech. "All Hollywood had contributed talent toward making this event a triumph of

showmanship." Life thus reported. "But it was Madame Chiang's gracious charm, her indomitable spirit and her deeply stirring accounts of China's six-year war against Japanese aggression which made the dramatic climax of the afternoon."⁶⁴

In her tour, she met with mayors and governors, motion picture stars, labor groups, and business leaders. She visited Chinatown in each big city she toured. Her voice was heard not only by thousands of people who attended mass meetings, but also by millions who listened to the broadcasts transmitted by all the radio networks of the country. In terms of her influence, it was said that the Generalissimo had said once that his wife was worth 20 divisions of soldiers to him.⁶⁵

THE CHINA LOBBY AND RED CHINA LOBBY

In the 1950s, several news media disclosed the secrecy of the so-called "China Lobby," which was active during World War II in the United States.⁶⁶ This term was generally applied to the organizations and individuals which, in the 1940s and 1950s, attempted to influence the U.S. China policy and American public opinion in favor of supporting the Chinese Nationalists (i.e. Chiang Kai-shek) and opposing compromising with the Chinese Communists.⁶⁷ The earliest use of the term appeared in two Communist newspapers, Jewish Life and Daily Worker, in September 1949,⁶⁸ but it was not famous until 1951 when the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report issued a special article listing ten registered agents of the Nationalist Chinese government.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, some of these sources admitted that "The China Lobby was never a highly organized or as integrated as some of its critics imagined it to be."⁷⁰ Max Ascoli, publisher of the Reporter, who adversely criticized the China Lobby, stated clearly that "one of the most astonishing things about the China Lobby is that, as far as one can find out, it has no leaders, only mouth-pieces."⁷¹

The beginning of the China Lobby was broadly acknowledged to be in 1940 when T. V. Soong came to the United States to secure American financial help for the Chinese government. Soong, brother of Madame Chiang and former minister of finance, arrived in the summer of 1940 and stayed in the United States for three years. Because of his efforts, China easily gained two \$50 million loans from the United States. On February 7, 1942, Soong obtained another major \$500 million in the form of a Treasury loan, making the total amount of U.S. financial aid to China up to \$645,000,000.⁷² In 1940, Soong also set up the China Defense Supplies Inc. to control and augment the supply of arms to war-torn China, shortly after he signed the Lend Lease Act in March that year.⁷³

Henry Luce, publisher of Time and Life, was claimed to be the most influential China lobbyist in the war years in the United States. Luce, a China-born missionary's son, had from the beginning of the 1930s zealously promoted Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government as the heroes of China. He introduced ideas about China to the American public through his press empire; the Generalissimo was

adulated as the "greatest ruler Asia has seen since Emperor Kang Hsi [in Chin Dynasty] 250 years ago."⁷⁴ By 1945, the Chinese leader had been honored by six Time cover stories, one of the largest number conferred on any individual. Luce later joined the Price Committee, and in 1940 he organized the United China Relief (UCR) to provide help to the suffering Chinese.⁷⁵ His wife, Clare, was also active in the pro-Chiang organizations.

A number of institutions and individuals registered at the U.S. Department of Justice before 1945 also were claimed by critics as the part of the China Lobby. China Institute in America, Inc., for example, was an organization formed to promote the study of Chinese culture in America and acted as a general information center on things Chinese and to all Chinese students in the United States.⁷⁶ It has published a periodical, China Institute Bulletin, a book, and some other newsletters, monographs, and abstracts.⁷⁷

The Red China Lobby. Compared to the Nationalist government, the Chinese Communists never projected a very sharp image in the United States before the 1930s, nor did Americans ever pay any serious attention to them. In 1936, when they intervened in the kidnapping of Chiang at Sian, the Communists probably made one of their first headlines in American newspapers. The earliest systematic introduction of the Chinese Communists to the American people was by those writers and journalists, such as Edgar Snow and his book, Red Star Over China (1938);⁷⁸ Agnes Smedley's Chinese Destinies (1933)⁷⁹ and China's Red Army Marches (1934).⁸⁰ In these

books, the Communists were portrayed as "rural equalitarianism," and "agrarian reformer." Both Snow and Smedley made several trips to the Communist-controlled area in Northwestern China and gave laudatory accounts of the Chinese Communists, their programs, their methods, and their practices.⁸¹

Other than those two writers, one of the most successful propaganda schemes done for the Chinese Communists was through their comrades in the United States. For example, the American Communist Party had begun to contact their comrades in China as early as in the 1920s; the party even established a "Chinese bureau" in Shanghai.⁸² In May, 1933, Chi Chao-ting, a member of the party, formed one of the earliest Communist front organizations supporting their Chinese comrades' interests in America--the American Friends of the Chinese People.⁸³ Also beginning in this year, a mimeographed magazine, China Today, was published. Editors of this magazine included Chi himself, Philip Jeffe, and T. A. Bisson. This periodical was later claimed as the "birth of the [Red] China Lobby."⁸⁴ It disappeared in 1936, but most of its editors transferred to another Communist journal, Amerasia, and continued to support the Communist interests in America.

In China, the Chinese Communists decided to influence American public opinion by providing information for American correspondents in Chungking to try to find a way to change these newspapermen's images of the Communists. Many of these correspondents already had ties to the international Communists, and to propagandize the Chinese

Communists was part of their work. For example, Agnes Smedley was identified as a member of a Soviet spy ring.⁸⁵ Bissen, editor of China Today and Amerasia, was identified as a member of the Communist party.⁸⁶

Another method that Communist sympathizers used was to control the book-review market. According to John T. Flynn, who surveyed a list of 29 books on the general political situations in China published between 1943 and 1949:

Every one of the 22 pro-Communist books, where reviewed, received glowing approval in the literary reviews. I have named-- that is, in the New York Times, the Herald Tribune, Nation, the New Republic, and the Saturday Review of Literature. And every one of the anti-Communists was either roundly condemned or ignored in these same reviews.⁸⁷

Flynn also revealed that of 22 pro-Communist books, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, John Fairbank, and L. K. Rosinger wrote 12. Moreover, this group turned in 43 reviews of the books to different periodicals or newspapers in the same period. Of the seven anti-Communist books, Lattimore wrote three reviews, Annalee Jacoby two, Snow two, Smedley one, Fairbank one and Harrison Forman one.⁸⁸

Only in five years from 1945 to 1950, these people wrote a total of 162 book reviews: Richard Watts, 40; Lattimore, 26; Fairbank 20; Bisson, 18; Nathaniel Peffer, 15; Eleano Lattimore, Owen's wife, 13; Theodore White, three.⁸⁹ In a report for the McCarran Committee, it was told how this brazen promotion of book was operated:

Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia, for example, was reviewed by Edgar Snow in the New York Times, by Richard Watts, Jr., in the New Republic, and by T. A. Bisson in the Saturday Review of Literature; L. K. Rosinger's China Crisis got its send-off from Owen Lattimore in the New York Herald Tribune, Richard Watts, Jr. in the New Republic, and T. A. Bisson in the New York Times. Messrs. Watts, Peffer, and Lattimore polished up Guenther Stein's Challenge of Red China; Rosinger, Fairbank, Snow, and Watts took care of Annalee Jacoby and Theodore White's Thunder Out of China. Messrs. Rosinger, Lattimore, Watts, and Miss Jacoby assessed for the reading public the worth of their IPR colleague John K. Fairbank's The United States and China; while Owen Lattimore's book, Pivot of Asia, was in 1950 entrusted to Theodore H. White, John K. Fairbank, and T. A. Bisson.⁹⁰

In general, these authors assumed a common pattern arguing three fundamental points, according to Kubek's analysis: first, the Chinese Communists are not Communists, 'according to the Russian definition;' second, the Chinese Communists are fighting against the Japanese, and Chiang's army was not; and third, Chiang was a fascist, and his totalitarian regime was preventing the Communists from establishing democracy.⁹¹

In addition to these journalists and writers, American service officers in China also played a significant part in working for a change in American support from the Nationalists to the Communists. Among those officers, John Service, John Carter Vincent, and John P.

Davies, Jr. were the most important ones. They sent a great number of reports to the U.S. State Department indicating that the communists were democratic and that Chiang's government was corrupt. For example, in Service's report from Yen-an where he served as a member of the U.S. Army Investigation Section, dated July 28, 1944, he said, "In Yen-an, officialdom is identified with the people. There are no beggars, no signs of destitute poverty."⁹² Professor Liang Chi-tung then concluded that all the reports sent by Davies, Service and their colleagues generally followed a similar line: first, slighting of and defaming the Chinese Nationalist government; second, heaping praise on the Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang in their controversy; and finally, demanding changes in U.S. policy toward Nationalist China.⁹³

Obviously, these officers' viewpoints greatly affected the American government's China policy in the 1940s. Not only General Stiw¹ell's attitude toward the Generalissimo was swayed, even President Roosevelt's impression of Chiang's will to resist the Japanese was also changed. In 1943, it was reported that Roosevelt told Stiw¹ell after the Cairo Conference that "If Chiang collapsed, we could find another one."⁹⁴

CHINA'S PROPAGANDA TOWARD THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

IN THE UNITED STATES

The overseas Chinese in the United States have long been considered by Chinese political leaders as vital to the nation's resistance and reconstruction. Chinese propaganda toward the Chinese

in America started in the last century when the three great Chinese revolutionary leaders came to the United States to disseminate their political ideas. Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao urged the Chinese to support their Pao-Huang Hui, or Protect the Emperor Society,⁹⁵ and Sun Yat-sen told his countrymen that he wanted to establish a republican government in China.⁹⁶ All these three would agree, however, that the overseas Chinese's spiritual and material contributions to their motherland were important to the revolution in China.

Chiang's programs to ask for support from the overseas Chinese were initiated before 1937.⁹⁷ A variety of activities were executed by the government's Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Ministry of Education in coordination with Kuomintang's Board of Overseas Affairs.⁹⁸ The Chinese organizations in Chinatowns, such as the Chinese Six Companies in San Francisco and the Chinese Benevolent Association in New York, designed various programs persuading the Chinese in America to donate their money and other material to their homeland.⁹⁹ Relief groups were also organized by the Chinese. They supported the Japanese boycott, the "Bowl of Rice" activities, fund-raising work, airplane-raising campaigns, and movements for collection of medical supplies. At one time, for instance, thousands of Chinese in San Francisco were gathered to prevent a Greek ship from loading 2,500 tons of scrap iron to Japan on Dec. 16, 1938.¹⁰⁰

The greatest contribution of these Chinese abroad toward the war in their homeland was money. From the outbreak of the war in 1937 to 1945, the Chinese in America contribution more than \$56,000,000

to relief work in China.¹⁰¹ A much higher amount was remitted for investment, and for subscriptions for government's bonds, aviation, and other needs.¹⁰² To collect great amount of money, the Benevolent Association and the Six Companies devised a method of assessing the Chinese according to income and business and volume of gross sales.¹⁰³ There were montly contributions, special contributions, "offer money to the States" movements, special sales, and other means.¹⁰⁴ The fund-raising leaders then made trips to China to hand over the money to the heads of the government. Their fame spread as the Chinese papers praised their patriotism and public spirit.¹⁰⁵

Besides money, the Chinese were also urged to donate material. In the early 1940s, the Chinese government sent Air Major Général Chen Ching-yun to America on a publicity tour and he reported that \$6,500,000 was raised to buy airplanes during his trip to 70 U.S. cities. In San Francisco alone, the Chinese presented ten pursuit planes to the Chinese Air Force to form a special squadron.¹⁰⁶ Many young Chinese-Americans who had received flight training then formed a squadron of flyers and fought in China. Dr. Margret Chung, the commander-in-chief of this squadron, was hailed by the Chinese press as "Ma Chung, Mother of Chinese American flyers."¹⁰⁷

From 1941 on, the Chinese government was also interested in promoting its cultural relations with the United States, because "intensified Sino-American cultural cooperations will greatly help in stopping aggressive attempts in East and West," said Chen Li-fu,

Chinese minister of education.¹⁰⁸ University professors and graduates visited the United States, either to teach or to do advanced research, for one or two years.¹⁰⁹ The Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the U.S. A. was formed in June, 1942 by the Chinese government and headed by T. V. Soong. Awards and scholarships were also given to needy students.¹¹⁰ In the meantime, U.S. professors were invited to teach in the Chinese universities as part of the cultural exchange programs. On October 11, 1943, a graduate school of journalism was established in Chungking under the sponsorship of, and taught by four newsmen from, Columbia University School of Journalism.¹¹¹

To provide information about China to the Chinese in America, the Chinese government also used some Chinese newspapers published in the United States. On the one hand, newspapers in America gained financial support from the Nationalists and served as mouthpieces of the government. On the other hand, Chinese correspondents were also sent to the United States to cover news stories. Among them, the earliest Chinese reporters in the United States were dispatched by the Central News Agency and the Ta-Kung Pao, the biggest newspaper in wartime China.¹¹² Both of them maintained a bureau in Washington, D. C.

Additionally, for the purpose of promoting the Chinese studies in the United States, the Chinese government set up the China Institute in America, Inc., in New York in the early stage of the war. This institute sought to aid groups making a study of China through

a lecture service which gave 72 lectures a year on cultural topics, through social workshops at seven American universities for teaching subjects, and through the assignment of Chinese students in various parts of America to assist public schools in the use of study material.¹¹³ The Chinese government also offered five scholarships, of \$1,500 each, known as "Chinese Cultural Scholarships," to encourage Chinese studies in this country.¹¹⁴

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purposes of this study were to provide a historical perspective of China's international propaganda activities in the United States during the Second World War, to show the developments of its propaganda organizations, and to examine the content of these propaganda operations. The main characteristics of China's propaganda in the United States in World War II have been found to be as follows: 1) China's propaganda operations generally were executed as a threefold function: official propaganda, unofficial propaganda, and propaganda toward the overseas Chinese; 2) official propaganda in the United States was operated by the official Chinese News Service and its branch offices in different cities; 3) unofficial propaganda involved those activities done by both Americans and Chinese, among them, missionaries, newspapermen, and businessmen who all tried to help China for different reasons; 4) both China Lobby and Red China Lobby changed American people's image about China in the war years; and 5) propaganda toward the overseas

Chinese in America was for the purposes of collecting donations and stirring up patriotism.

All these operations, thus, were aimed at three kinds of publics in the United States: the American public, the decision-makers in the U.S. government, and the overseas Chinese. Additionally, American reporters in China were considered a useful medium to transmit information about China by both the Nationalists and the Communists. With the same purpose, some Chinese correspondents were sent to America to collect news about Chinese communities and Chinese life.

In terms of time and work, there were probably four kinds of propaganda programs identified during the war. Generally speaking, China's publicity work in the United States began in 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in North China. Because of the lack of preparation for the war, there were only limited overseas propaganda operations sponsored by the Chinese government, and the main task of this period was to expose the Japanese atrocities in China so principles of humanitarians could be aroused and the Japanese invasion could be stopped. The second phase of China's official propaganda programs ranged from the withdrawal of the Central Government to inner China in November, 1937 to the beginning of the European War on September, 1939. At this time, the appeal to get international sympathetic treatment was replaced by the revised policy of concentrating on economic and political interests. Organized and unorganized propaganda works were gradually developed

in the United States, while some official representatives of the Chinese propaganda organizations were sent by the government to America, in part to help Chinese diplomats in the United States to supply with reports on American public opinions and attitudes and in part to explain the Chinese situation to American friends. In addition, VIP's and correspondents of press associations were invited to visit China to get first-hand impressions of the Chinese efforts against Japanese invasion. Photographs, exhibitions, and radio broadcasts to the United States were processed.

Then, between the European War and Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, work was continued to appeal to the American government not only to give moral, economic, and military support to China, but also to stop supplying war material to Japan. The official agent of the Chinese government in the United States, the Chinese News Service, was set up at the end of this period.

The last-period effort of Chinese overseas propaganda in the United States was from the time when the separated wars in Asia (China) and the European War were combined into one global conflict. China became one of the Allies, and its propaganda activities expanded to include five branch offices in the Western Hemisphere. The International Department in Chungking was the center of all the publicity program with its staff in eight sections. Their budget was increased, and personnel were added. More importantly, the significance of the work was more understood and appreciated by the Chinese government. The coordination between the International

Department and the Chinese News Service in New York was one of the few times that China ever had to promote overseas propaganda activities.

Finally, there seemed no exact method to measure what China's propaganda achieved in the war years. However, it is evident that the Nationalists lacked effective propaganda techniques vis-a-vis the Communists, which changed irrevocably the Sino-American relations and the world view of China. Hence, it seems fair to say that during World War II the Nationalist Chinese propagandists and their sympathizers did not (or could not) develop any successful counter-act campaigns against their opponents in the United States and this fact partially contributed to the defeat of the Nationalist government in the end of the 1940s.

On the other hand, China's propaganda offensives were successful at least in the early stage of the war years. With minimal budget the Chinese propagandists built up an efficient organization to "fight" against Japan's propaganda machine. Through these people's efforts, the relationship between China and the United States reached a peak that has never been equalled. The American people's image of the Chinese was also drastically changed--from a rustic one to a more realistic impression in later years of the war.

Two more things deserve to be pointed out here. First, it was interesting to note that most Chinese propaganda campaigns during the war were executed in either the Northeast or the West Coast areas. Not many activities were operated in the South or the Midwest, nor attention paid to the people living in the country.

Second, journalists and missionaries were extensively emphasized by both Chinese and Japanese propagandists. In fact, many U.S. newspapermen and missionaries lost their objective positions and became the tool of Chinese propaganda operations in the United States. How far these reporters and evangelists have influenced the fate of China may be a topic for future research. ###

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
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TABLE 1

CHINA'S PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATIONS IN
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Chinese Ministry of Information, Representative: C. L. Hsia



Source: Hsia, C. L. and Staff, Report of the Chinese News Service Work and Activities, 1946.

TABLE 2

ORGANIZATION CHART OF CHINESE NEWS
SERVICE, HEAD OFFICE IN NEW YORK

New York Chinese News Service

<u>Business Division</u>	<u>Speakers' Bureau</u>	<u>Radio Division</u>	<u>Press Division</u>	<u>Visual Division</u>	<u>Information Division</u>	<u>Library</u>	<u>Publicatio</u>
(accounting, purchasing, office management, mailing)	Dr. Yang B.A. Liu Elsie Nyland	B.A. Liu Certrude Hung	George Kao David Leong O.K. Kohan Mrs. Jacoby Mrs. Mayer	Jean Lyon Barrie Grossman Blanche Bromberg	H.T. Chu Mae Eng	Marion Shedd	(China at War, Contemporary China, Pamphlets Books) George Kao Lin Mou-sheng Fabian Chow Hawthorne Cheng Mrs. Jacoby Mrs. O'Brien
Enid Chen Dorothy Donovan Jin Lew Patricia Hyland Patricia Walsh Miss Shnall							

Source: Hsia, C. L. and Staff, Report of the Chinese News Service Work and Activities, 1946.