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AUTHOR   Berkowitz, Marvin W.
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ABSTRACT
                 This argument for process analysis in moral education
focuses primarily on social developmental processes and educational
processes that influence the development of moral reasoning
structures. The descriptive-developmental approach, the
developmental-ethical approach, and the developmental-process
approach to moral discourse are briefly described. Based on a
ten-year investigation of the nature of moral discussion-based
interventions, the author reports that "transactive" forms of
discussion lead to higher levels of moral understanding by expanding
upon, critiquing, or integrating the reasoning of a co-discussant,
thus increasing the likelihood of developing more adequate forms of
reasoning. Because only about 15 percent of such discourse takes the
form of the most developmentally productive type of transactive
discussion, the author proposes that moral and social education in
the future look to monitoring and training in social interaction
skills in order to maximize the developmental benefits of such
programs. Four other future concerns for moral education are
presented: (1) theoretical and empirical knowledge of the
relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior must be
integrated into moral education practice, (2) the role of affect in
moral functioning must be addressed, (3) moral education must be
defined more broadly than classroom-based phenomena, and (4)
value-based moral education must be integrated with structural
"value-free" approaches. (LH)

PROCESS ANALYSIS AND THE FUTURE OF MORAL EDUCATION

Marvin W. Berkowitz

Department of Psychology
Marquette University

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Marvin W. Berkowitz
Marquette University

Moral education, as is true as well for many educational
models, has tended to focus on outcomes. Developmental education,
of which moral education is one example, has been explicitly de-
fined as an outcome-oriented discipline by Kohlberg and Mayer
(1972). Indeed the title of their often cited paper is
"Development as the aim of education". Restated for moral
education that would read "_Moral_ development as the aim of
moral education". Certainly one would be hard-pressed to
argue convincingly against the merits of such an outcome as the
goal of moral education. Why indeed engage in moral education if
not to produce individuals who, by some measure, can be described
as having become more moral as a product of the educational
curriculum? The goal of my argument today is not to refute
such a claim. Rather, I hope to supplement it. I will argue
that there is another focus, a complimentary focus, in moral
education that has been sorely neglected, i.e., the _process_
of developmental moral education. Furthermore, I will argue
that this historical neglect is currently being corrected and
will continue to be so.

Before I present my argument for process analysis in moral
education, I think it would be useful to expand upon what I
mean by process and identify that particular aspect of process
that I intend to focus on in this paper. Process in education

and development can be examined on two levels. At the more
molar level, we can simply define it as the means of growth and
learning, i.e., the "how" of education in contrast to the ends
or "what" of education. This is an overly general definition
however. At the more molecular level, we can distinguish between
various specific processes in moral education. We can point to
the didactic process of the classroom teacher. We can highlight
the bureaucratic process of the organizational structure of the
school system. And we can address the social process that more
directly produces psychological development. Teaching processes
have been amply described in the education literature (e.g.,
Hersh, Paolitto & Reimer, 1979). Clark Power has just addressed
the organizational process of moral education. Therefore,
acknowledging the general notion of process as the means of
moral education, I will focus on the third type of specific
moral educational process, namely social developmental process.

All four of the speakers presenting papers in this
symposium approach moral education from the perspective of
cognitive-structural psychology. While some of us differ in
the degree to which we accept orthodox versions of the Piagetian
and Kohlbergian approaches to moral education, we nonetheless
tend to view moral education as focused on the structures of
understanding of moral and/or conventional value systems and
conflicts. Not surprisingly then, my focus on social developmental
processes in moral education will stem from this perspective.
Perspectives derived from other approaches to moral education

might not share my conclusions about developmental process. For
example, a character indoctrinative approach such as is used in
Soviet education would emphasize socialization and learning
variables more than cogntive-developmental variables. Or more
laissez-faire approaches to moral education such as some of the
"free" schools would look to issues of liberty and minimized
conflict rather than optimal levels of social and cognitive
conflict.

My orientation instead is toward the educational processes
that impact upon the development of moral reasoning structures
in students. I specifically am interested in those educational
processes that promote the development of Kohlberg's (1981)
stages of moral reasoning. I do not, however, believe that
what I have to say here is limited to Kohlberg's theory. Indeed
it is not limited even to moral stages, nor social-conventional
stages, about which our next two speakers will amplify. Rather,
these processes are implicated in all social cognitive structures
of reasoning and perhaps non-social cognitive structures as well.
We have recently investigated the relationship of some of these
processes to stages of Piagetian logical thinking (Gibbs, Schnell,
Berkowitz & Goldstein, 1983) and are currently looking for
parallels between the processes in the development of moral and
religious understanding. Nevertheless, in all of these cases,
the underlying theoretical assumptions are those derived from the
cognitive-structural theory of Jean Piaget (1970), especially
his notion of the equilibration process. We do not have time
today unfortunately to expand upon these premises here.

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Let us turn instead to an example of how process analysis
has been neglected in stage-based moral education. At the heart
of all such moral education is some form of peer moral discussion.
I should mention at this juncture that there are currently three
different developmental approaches to the study of moral
discourse (Berkowitz, 1984). First, there is the descriptive-
developmental approach which is concerned with the development
of moral discourse per se, and which attempts to describe the
various stages of the development of such discourse (e.g.,
Miller, 1981). The second approach is the developmental
ethical approach which focuses on the inherent moral aspects of
human verbal interaction (Habermas, 1975; McCarthy, 1978). This
approach tends to focus on the ideal form of moral discourse
and to justify it from the standpoint of normative ethics. The
third approach is the one I will elaborate upon today. This
developmental process approach (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983)
represents an attempt to discover how moral discourse leads to
individual moral reasoning development.

Such moral discourse is almost always an ingredient in
successful moral education programs. It may take the more
obvious form of classroom moral dilemma discussion (Blatt &
Kohlberg, 1975; Colby, Kohlberg, Fenton, Speicher-Dubin &
Lieberman, 1977), or the leass obvious forms of peer
counseling (Dowell, 1971; Sprinthall, 1976; Sullivan, 1980),
community meetings (Power, 1981), school judicial boards (Power,
in press) or role-playing (Arbuthnot, 1975). The content of
such discussions varies from standard hypothetical dilemmas

to course content-related ethical problems to current events
and even to real personal moral issues, but in all cases the
process is at least in part based in peer discussion of
ethical issues.

Based upon this analysis, it is rather startling that
we have seen so little consideration of the nature of such
discussion in the literature. Very little direct empirical
attention has been paid to answering how such discussion pro-
duces development, even given that an impressive body of
literature suggests that it consistently and effectively does
so. Recently such investigations have begun to appear
in the literature. Let me now briefly describe some of
these approaches to understanding the moral discourse process
of moral education, as well as similar studies of parallel
developmental phenomena.

As I have argued elsewhere (Berkowitz, 1981; Berkowitz,
in press), the moral education literature has emphasized
the practice of peer discussion in producing moral develop-
mental gains in students, but has misunderstood the nature of
the process. Both teacher facillitation behaviors and student
stage levels have been the predominant foci in such curricula
and teacher training models. Interpreting some educational
and psychological research inappropriately and integrating
it with certain untested theoretical assumptions, moral
educators have felt confident in their often inaccurate

understanding of _how_ moral education programs lead to moral
development. Actually they have been able to account for
very little of the variance in the success or failure of such
programs.

For the past ten years, along with my collaborator John
Gibbs, I have been investigating the nature of moral discussion
as it relates to the effectiveness of moral discussion-based
interventions. We have discovered that the form that
discussion takes is a significant predictor of whether the
discussants will successfully develop higher levels of moral
understanding. We have borrowed John Dewey's (Dewey & Bentley,
1949) term "_transactive_" to describe this type of discussion,
defined as _actively thinking about the reasoning of one's co-
discussants and representing that in one's discourse behavior_.
Hence when one student expands upon, critiques or integrates
the reasoning of a co-discussant s/he is engaging in
behavior that should increase the likelihood of   de-
veloping more adequate forms of reasoning, theoretically by
maximizing the opportunity for Piagetian disequilibrium. On
the other hand, students that engage in such non-transactive
discourse behaviors as simple "parroting", non-sequitors,
or alternating monologues would be unlikely to benefit
developmentally from the discussion. We have identified 18
types of transactive discussion and have successfully related
them to developmental gains in a peer dialgoue intervention
with undergraduates. Furthermore, transactive discussion
seems to account for more moral development than moral stage

or other more traditional variables. Bill Damon (Damon &
Killen, 1982) has partially replicated this research with young
children and is currently attempting to refine his categoriz-
ation of elementary school developmental discourse. While
John Gibbs and I, as already noted, have found that our
transactive discussion behaviors are largely built upon the
development of logical thinking in adolescence, Damon and
others (e.g., Powers, 1982) have managed to successfully
adapt some of those behaviors in studying younger subjects.
Furthermore, in Europe Fritz Oser (in press) has been taking
a similar appraoch to the study of earlier adolescent moral
discourse. We therefore feel that we have uncovered a signifi-
cant developmental process, but one that needs to and can be
adapted and expanded for other age groups.

Not only is our work not limited to one age group but
as I had mentioned a moment ago, I do not feel that this
work is specific to the study of discussions of only moral
content either. Indeed work paralleling ours has been done in
more traditionally cognitive reasoning domains. Let me
briefly list some of these studies.

While much research has been done in the past decade
or so in an attempt to demonstrate the developmentally facili-
tative effects of peer conflictual discussions of logical
Piagetian problems (e.g., Silverman & Geiringer, 1973),
only a few of these studies have directly investigated the
underlying discourse process. Miller and Brownell (1975)
examined some of the interactive behaviors in peer conserver/

non-conserver conflict resolution dialogues. Ellice

Forman (Forman, Parrish & Hom, 1980) has analyzed early

adolescent attempts to jointly solve Piagetian formal

operational tasks. More recently, Max Miller and Bill

Damon have independently begun programs of research with young

children that should shed more light on the social conflict

process underlying logical development.

I realize that this cursory overview of ongoing research

into the social interactive processes of moral (and other)

reasoning development must be somewhat vague and therefore

frustrating to those of you not previously familiar with this

work. However, given the time constraints in this presentation

format and the fact that most of the information alluded to

thus far is available in print elsewhere, I have opted to

minimize the details in my presentation of the existing

literature in order to allow time to more directly address

the integrative theme of this symposium, namely "Moral and

social education for 1984 and beyond". By now it should be

obvious that I would argue that developmental process should

not and will not be ignored in considerations of moral and

social education in the future. While I have focused upon the

research side of this issue, I am not insensitive to its

applied side. It has become all too clear to me that there

is a fundamental and inappropriate assumption in the moral

education literature concerning verbal competency (an

assumption that is probably present in other educational

domains as well). While we generally recognize that individual

language skills, such as the "3 R's", need educational
nurturance, it is nevertheless assumed that students come to
class with the social verbal skills necessary to optimally
interact verbally with their peers. Particularly in the prac-
tice of moral education, interest and effort in monitoring and
training such interactive skills is non-existent. It has
always seemed somewhat unreasonable to me to assume that such
training is unnecessary. In our research, we have found that
only 20-25% of undergraduate moral discourse represents what
we call developmental or transactive discourse behavior, and
that only about 15% of such discourse takes the form of the
most developmentally productive type of transactive discussion.
I would assume, although we have not yet collected data to
document this, that training would increase those numbers.
We are presently testing this assumption. If we are right,
it seems fair to also assume that this increase would
consequently increase the developmental benefits of moral
education programs. Therefore I would propose that moral and
social education in 1984 and beyond look to monitoring and
training social interaction skills in order to maximize the
developmental benefits of such programs. In order to do
that, we need more data about the nature of developmentally-
facilitative discussion processes. And, built upon these
data and in collaboration with educational practitioners,
we need to develop curricula for training developmental
discourse in students (cf. Berkowitz, 1982, for such a
proposal).

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I have essentially highlighted a single theme in moral education thus far in this presentation; a theme that represents current and future directions in the field. I would like to take advantage of having the floor at the moment to briefly suggest four other "future directions" that I consider to be very important for the future of moral education. The first three can also be considered "process" issues in moral education. All four are currently beginning to be explored by numerous researchers.

First, theoretical and empirical knowledge of the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior must be integrated into moral educational practice. While a substantial literature on laboratory and field studies of such "judgment/action" phenomena has been developed (cf. Blasi, 1980), the education literature is still only beginning to seriously consider this relationship (e.g., Oser & Schläfli, in press; Power & Reimer, 1978), despite the centrally practical issues involved in school behavior and student development.

Second, the role of affect in moral functioning is beginning to be addressed, despite the traditional Piagetian de-emphasis of emotional and personality phenomena (Villenave-Cremer & Eckensberger, in press). As a sidelight on these issues, abnormal personality issues are also beginning to be addressed in a new movement becoming known as "clinical-developmental psychology" (Hewer, in press; Kegan, 1982; Noam, in press).

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A third future direction for moral education has already been touched upon by Clark Power today. His study of large school governance processes is an example of a diverse set of studies concerned with out of classroom, and even out of school, moral education; that is, moral education defined more broadly than classroom-based phenomena. Other examples of this concern the workplace (e.g., Higgins & Gordon, in press), professional education (e.g., Oser & Schläfli, in press) and the family (Lickona, 1983; Powers, 1982). It is abundantly clear from the early Head Start efforts as well as from other similar programs that the life of a student is best touched in many areas rather than merely the classroom if meaningful change is to be effected.

Finally, a fourth new direction concerns the integration of value-based moral education with structural "value free" approaches, such as has been described by Kohlberg and his colleagues. One side of this issue (although certainly not the only side) relates to religious approaches to moral education. In the attempt to faithfully adhere to the theoretical model of universal structural development, Kohlberg and others have exorcised values from their implementations of moral education. They have had justifiable reasons for doing so, which I will not elaborate here. It has become clear to me in the past five years, however, that we can no longer ignore value-based approaches to moral education. I have been faced too often by the religious educator who sincerely is attracted to adopting part or all of the Kohlberg approach but who is

frustrated and confused by the implication that s/he must
abandon values in the religious curriculum is s/he is to
do effective and valid moral education. Unfortunately,
I have no ready answers to this problem. Our next two
speakers, Larry Nucci and Judy Smetana, will speak to
a related issue, the relationship of social conventions
to morality, and perhaps will therefore indirectly shed
some light on this issue. I therefore will now relinquish
the podium to them.

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