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ABSTRACT

This report examines the situation of the Haitians in Miami who were formerly incarcerated at the Krome Detention Center or other Federal detention centers in the United States or Puerto Rico. The report is based upon a 1983 survey of 150 "Krome Haitians"; intensive anthropological fieldwork results are also included. The socioeconomic and cultural adjustment conditions affecting this population are described. These include background in Haiti, experiences in the United States, past and present employment status, experience with discrimination, and adaptation to American society. The report notes that neither the Krome Haitians nor earlier arriving Haitian entrants conform to the common negative stereotypes (unskilled, uneducated, and rural). Nevertheless, the Krome Haitians are found to be less skilled, less educated, and more rural than the Haitian entrants who arrived before 1981. The social isolation and employment problems that result from the changing characteristics of Haitian immigrants are discussed. Particularly emphasized is the relatively high proportion of Krome Haitians that has been forced into the "secondary sector" of the economy--with 48 percent of the Krome group earning less than the minimum wage. The report concludes with some specific policy recommendations to State and local agencies and individuals that will assist the Haitians' integration into American society. Also included are 27 statistical tables.
 (Author/KH)

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HAITIANS RELEASED FROM KROME:
THEIR PROSPECTS FOR ADAPTATION
AND INTEGRATION IN SOUTH FLORIDA

Dr. Alex Stepick

Dialogue #24

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PREFACE

Dr. Alex Stepick is assistant professor of anthropology in the Department of Sociology/Anthropology at Florida International University. Research for this publication was supported by a grant from the Office of Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Catholic Conference and Catholic Community Services of the Archdiocese of Miami. The contents of this report are solely the responsibility of Dr. Stepick.

Mark B. Rosenberg
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines the situation of the Haitians in Miami who were formerly incarcerated during 1981 and 1982 in the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Krome Detention Center or other Federal detention centers in the U.S. and Puerto Rico. For convenience, the report refers to all of them as Krome Haitians. This study is based upon a sociological survey of the Krome Haitians and intensive anthropological fieldwork conducted by Dr. Alex Stepick of the Sociology and Anthropology Department of Florida International University with support from the Catholic Services Bureau of Miami. It is the only scientific study of the Krome Haitians and the scientific procedures of the survey complemented by the anthropological fieldwork combine to produce highly reliable results. To provide context to the conditions of the Krome Haitians, the report compares the characteristics of this population to that of the Haitian Entrants who arrived in 1980 or earlier and provides an update to earlier studies by this author (Stepick 1982) and another by the Behavioral Science Research Institute (1983).

The report describes the conditions of the Krome Haitians, including their background in Haiti, experiences in the U.S., past and present employment status, experience with discrimination and social isolation, and adaptation to American society. The report concludes with some specific policy recommendations to state and local agencies and individuals that will assist the Haitians' integration into American society.

The report finds that neither the Krome Haitians nor the earlier arriving Haitian Entrants conforms to common negative stereotypes. They are not from Haiti's most isolated, rural, or impoverished regions. They are not unskilled nor uneducated. They did not come to the U.S. solely for economic reasons and are not expecting to benefit from the U.S. welfare system.

The "Krome Haitians" are as highly motivated, hardworking, and anxious to integrate into American society as previous Haitian migrants. The Krome Haitians, however, are different. They still represent a higher, more educated and skilled group than the majority of Haitians who remain in Haiti. Nevertheless, they are less skilled, less educated, and more rural than the Haitian Entrants who arrived before 1981. They are more socially isolated within the Haitian community in South Florida. They are slightly less likely to be working, and if they are working they earn less money. They are much more likely to become migrant agricultural workers. They are more likely to need and request assistance from outside agencies, particularly language and job training classes.

They do find the conditions they confront in the U.S. trying and difficult. In spite of high motivation to work, unemployment is over 60% for both Krome Haitians and Haitian Entrants. Wages are low and work is primarily part time and temporary. While the Haitian business community in South Florida is rapidly expanding, it presently cannot provide nearly enough jobs for the Haitians in Miami.

According to the study, the Haitians have experienced prejudice and discrimination from all sectors of local society — White Americans, Black Americans, and Cubans. Socially, they have reacted by isolating themselves. They rely upon neither government nor private agencies for anything they can do themselves. But they realize that economically they are dependent upon the broader community. They all want to learn English and a surprisingly high 80% want to learn Spanish, too. They shop primarily in non-Haitian stores and work primarily for non-Haitian employers. Economically, it appears as if the benefits of having Haitians in South Florida accrue as much to the South Florida region as they do to the individual Haitians themselves. In spite of the trying circumstances they confront, the Haitians express little discontent with their lives in the U.S. and very few have any intentions of permanently returning to Haiti unless dramatic changes in both political and economic conditions occur there.

Long-term adaptation and integration of recent Haitian migrants to South Florida depends upon a number of factors: The success of the local Haitian business community, provision of a permanent immigration status to the Haitians, easing of their social isolation, opportunities to learn English and Spanish, and the overall improvement of the local economy.

On the legal front, the study finds that Haitian adaptation to American life would be greatly enhanced if the U.S Congress passed legislation such as has been recently proposed by Congressman Rodino and a number of organizations such as Greater Miami United that would grant a permanent immigration status to both Krome Haitians and Haitian Entrants. Secondly, the H-2 temporary worker program should not be expanded in Florida. Such an expansion would only make an already tenuous economic situation even more difficult for Haitians, and incidentally the Black Americans who work with them as migrant farm laborers.

Special attention should be directed to the Haitian business community, as it has been to the American Black business community. Capital, training, and access to broader markets are needed. Language and job training programs for both businessmen and employees should also be continued and expanded to include Spanish language training.

Local agencies and individuals must realize that the Haitians have established a permanent presence in South Florida. Efforts to involve Haitians in all aspects of South Florida life must be renewed and continued if they are to be productive members of the South Florida community.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Krome Haitians are only the most recent arrivals of a twenty-five year diaspora of Haitians. Since Francois Duvalier ("Papa Doc") assumed power in 1958, all levels of Haitian society have abandoned their home country. The first to leave were the upper class who directly threatened his regime. Around 1964, in response to the brutality of the Duvalier regime and the lack of personal and economic security the black middle class began to leave (Ficklin 1980). In the next wave, many of the urban lower classes departed (Glick 1975; Laguerre 1978). The primary U.S. destination of these groups has been New York City, where it is estimated there are presently between 200,000 and 300,000 Haitians (Fish 1980).

In the early 1970s Haitians began arriving in South Florida. At first they came in small numbers, a boatload of twenty or thirty. In the late 1970s the boatloads grew in size and in frequency of arrival. The numbers peaked in 1980, during the Mariel Cuban crisis. Boats arrived almost daily and hundreds of others came by airplane with falsified passports and visas. South Florida began to react defensively against the new arrivals, both Haitian and Cuban. Local public sympathy for the new arrivals fleeing the oppression and poverty of their homelands transformed into calls for control.

Beginning in the Spring of 1981, the Reagan Administration initiated a policy of incarcerating Haitians who arrived in the U.S. without proper documentation. Haitians were presented with the choice of remaining indefinitely in detention or returning to their homeland where, many claimed, they would face certain persecution. Over a year later Federal District Court Judge Eugene Spellman ruled the detention policy illegal and ordered the Government to release the Haitians pending adjudication of their petitions to remain in the U.S. While the policy of incarceration was in effect the Government detained nearly 2,000 Haitians in Krome outside of Miami, in Ft. Allen in Puerto Rico, and in various other detention centers throughout the U.S.

This report describes what has happened to the Krome Haitians since their release. their successes and failures, their frustrations and satisfactions, their hopes and fears, and their prospects for the future. The report is based upon a scientific survey conducted of 150 Krome Haitians in the Spring and Summer of 1983. The survey data is complemented by intensive anthropological fieldwork. The study is the only scientific study

to have been conducted with the Krome Haitians and the sample size and complementary anthropological fieldwork make the results highly reliable. The study was directed by Dr. Alex Stepick of the Sociology and Anthropology Department of Florida International University with support from the Catholic Services Bureau of the Archdiocese of Miami. Throughout the report the results of this survey are compared to one conducted a year earlier by Dr. Stepick with about 150 Haitian Entrants in Miami. Haitian Entrants are those who arrived in the U.S. by boat or airplane before October 10, 1980. There are approximately 25,000 Haitian Entrants throughout the U.S. Most are believed to be in Miami.

II. Background

Negative reactions to newcomers is nothing new in American society. Indeed, while Americans often sympathize with migrants' motivations for fleeing their homeland, more frequently than not they have tended to erect barriers between themselves and immigrants. For the past one hundred years, over and over again the cry has arisen that immigrants take jobs from citizens, that they will become part of the criminal element in society; and more recently, that they will overwhelm schools and flood the welfare roles. These fears are usually coupled with negative stereotypes of immigrants as poor, unskilled, and unmotivated individuals who came to America only because they failed in their own society.

The actual position immigrants assume varies according to both their personal characteristics and the role they play in the receiving economy. In the beginning of migrant streams, all migrants usually come from the better off sectors of their homeland society. They have generally higher education, more skills, and more motivation than the majority of their countrymen who remained behind. At the same time, because they usually come from less developed countries they are still frequently less educated and skilled than the majority of Americans. Their adaptation depends not only on their education, skills, and motivations, but also on their particular position in the American economy.

One type of migrant flow is of professionals or skilled workers, such as the thousands of Phillipine nurses in the U.S. Society seldom defines this type of migrant as a problem, although the American workers with whom they work may resent their presence.

A second migrant flow type consists of a broad cross-section of the home country from unskilled workers to professionals and entrepreneurs. Frequently, but not always, these immigrants are refugees fleeing forces that expel some from all levels of the home society. In the new land, they establish their own society in miniature, producing, selling, consuming, and living largely within their own ethnic community. Gradually, in the second and third generations they integrate with the host society. Cubans, Asians, and Jews have all followed this path, a path that frequently encounters social and political difficulties while they remain outside the mainstream. But the economic problems for this group are relatively few and they, like the immigrants who become professionals, rather than creating burdens contribute positively to American society. With time, even the social and political problems tend to evaporate.

The third type of migrant flow consists primarily of unskilled workers. Until recently, many American employers actively recruited and even financed the journey of foreigners to the U.S. for work in some sectors of industry and agriculture. Within the past twenty years, however, migrants have needed no encouragement from U.S. employers to come to the U.S. in search of work. The penetration of North American life styles into the upper classes of the Third World have raised all Third World peoples' expectations. But the Third World economic and political systems can only provide North American lifestyles for a small minority. Many of the remainder now initiate and finance their own journeys to the U.S. in search of attaining the North American life style of material goods denied them by the poverty of their own countries.

Regardless of which type of flow they come from, the first migrants from any place are always unrepresentative. They are more highly motivated to succeed, usually better educated, more skilled, from more urban environments, and perhaps more adventurous than the average countryman back home. With time, however, as the flow continues the migrants increasingly resemble the general population of the home country. The migrants from Haiti to the U.S. are no exception. The beginnings of the contemporary Haitian flow to the U.S. were in the early 1960s when many upper and middle class families fled "Papa Doc" Duvalier's regime. Most went to New York, as well as Montreal, Paris and Boston. Florida's Haitian concentration began in the middle 1970s growing slowly until 1979 and exploding in 1980. Because so many came by small, roughly hewn sailboats, braving 750 miles of open sea, many in the U.S. presumed that the new arrivals were poor and unskilled. Our data contradict this

stereotype and confirm the generalizations of studies of other immigrant groups.

Neither the Krome Haitians nor the Haitian Entrants are uneducated, unskilled, or from uniformly rural backgrounds. They have not come to the U.S. simply for economic reasons. By Haitian standards, they are not poor. They are highly motivated and anxious to improve themselves through education and hard work. The Haitian migrants are generally all better off than the majority of Haitians back home in Haiti. Nevertheless, the more recent the migrant the more he or she is like the typical Haitian back home.

While most of the Haitians in the sample, both those from Krome and the Entrants, had migrated somewhere else before coming to the U.S., surprisingly few had gone to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has received far more Haitians than South Florida. It is currently estimated that there are at least 200,000 Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Since the Dominican Republic began producing sugar cane under the tutelage of U.S. multinational firms at the beginning of this century, Haitians have been the Dominican Republic's cane cutters, the same role Jamaicans perform in Florida's sugar industry. Tens of thousands of Haitians cross the border into the Dominican Republic every year, some legally, some illegally. Each year more and more drop out of the return migrant stream, preferring to remain illegally in the Dominican Republic after the end of the cane cutting season. They have come to assume a role similar to that of undocumented Mexican workers in the U.S.

Haitians take low wage jobs that few or no native Dominicans desire. Simultaneously Dominicans blame Haitians for the country's economic ills such as increased unemployment. In these surveys, the Haitians who have made it to the U.S. migrated both within their own country and to the U.S., but only one Krome Haitian and one Haitian Entrant had migrated to the Dominican Republic before coming to the U.S. Clearly, there are separate migrant streams from Haiti with little overlap between them. We suspect the migrant stream to the Dominican Republic is closer to the common stereotype of Haitian migrants as rural, unskilled and uneducated. Those in Florida rarely fulfill these stereotypes.

Much like the Haitian Entrants who preceded them, the majority of Krome Haitians do not come from Haiti's most impoverished Northwest region. Among the earlier arriving Haitian Entrants nearly equal numbers come from the Northwest province (34.6%) and the West province (33.7%) where the nation's capital, Port au Prince, is located (Table 1). Among the Krome

Haitians even fewer come from the Northwest (27.6%).

The Krome Haitians, however, are more likely to have rural roots than earlier arriving Haitians. While nearly half of the Haitian Entrants are from urban settings, either Port au Prince (12.4%) or smaller, medium-sized cities (35.5%), the proportion, declines among the Krome Haitians to only 7.1% from Port au Prince and 24.4% from smaller, medium sized cities (Table 2). Similarly, while 70% of the Haitian Entrants had lived in urban settings before coming to the U.S., among the Krome Haitians, just slightly more than half (53.2%) have always lived in rural settings (Table 3). The lower proportion for the Krome Haitians reflects how the migration stream broadened with time and more closely approached the characteristics of the general population in Haiti. As we shall see in the section below on Employment, the increased proportion of Krome Haitians with a rural background has influenced what jobs the Krome Haitians have in the U.S.

While the majority of the Krome Haitians may have rural backgrounds, they were not peasants in Haiti. Both the Krome Haitians and the Haitian Entrants are largely one generation removed from peasant roots. The majority of their fathers were peasants (62.2% for the Entrants and 80.3% for the Krome Haitians) (Table 4), while only a small minority of the migrants themselves were farmers in Haiti (5.4% of the Entrants and 25% of the Krome Haitians) (Table 5). Accordingly, only a minority of the migrants own land in Haiti, 31.4% of the Krome Haitians and 14% of the Entrants (Table 6). The migrants generally practiced semi-skilled trades in Haiti. The occupations ranged from professional to unemployed, but most characteristic were such trades as tailoring, carpentry, and auto mechanics. Again, these background characteristics have influenced the types of jobs the Krome Haitians have attained in the U.S.

Haitians in Florida are also considerably better educated than the average Haitian in Haiti. The Haitian Entrants had a surprising 7.6 average years of education (Table 7). In a country where 80% of the population has no formal schooling, only 6.4% of the Entrants had no schooling at all. The Krome Haitians had considerably less schooling, but still they had on the average much more education than the typical Haitian. 31.2% have had no formal schooling, but 36.2% have had some education beyond primary school and 53.9% have had some kind of commercial or vocational training, such as sewing or auto mechanic courses. This educational background provides the best hope for the Haitians' future in the U.S. While it may not be high by U.S. standards, in Haiti obtaining education requires tremendous motivation, dedication, and money. The high level of technical

and vocational educational background that the sample has reflects the Krome Haitians' ability to have attained semi-skilled jobs in Haiti. If offered the opportunity to adapt and upgrade their skills to U.S. standards through vocational education, they will undoubtedly improve their employment prospects here, too.

The religion of the migrants also reflects the trend of the migrant flow, increasingly matching the characteristics of the typical Haitian in Haiti. The vast majority of Haitians in Haiti are Catholic. Probably less than 10% are Protestants. Yet, over 42% of the Entrants were Protestants. For the Krome Haitians, only 16.6% are Protestants, far fewer than among the Entrants but probably still a higher proportion than in Haiti's total population (Table 8).

The conditions of the migrants' journey to the U.S. further reflect how the recent migrants are more like the average Haitian in Haiti. A rather high proportion of the earlier arriving Entrants came to the U.S. on commercial airliners (23.8%) (Table 9). Clearly, few desperately poor peasants can afford a trip to the U.S. on a commercial airliner. Among the Krome Haitians, however, the proportion of "airplane people," as they are called by immigration officials, dropped to 5.7%. For those who came in boats, the number of traveling companions also significantly increased. For the Haitian Entrants, relatively equal proportions came in small and medium sized boats and slightly more (34.1%) came in boats with over 50 passengers (Table 9). For the Krome Haitians the proportion coming in boats with over 50 passengers climbed to 68.7%. Numerous accounts have revealed that the transport of Haitians to the U.S. by boat had become a large and lucrative business in Haiti's Northwest during 1980 and early 1981 (see, for example, Stepick 1981). Lower level Haitian government officials condoned and financially benefited from the trade, although it was technically illegal. It only stopped after pressure from the U.S. Government forced the Haitian Government to crack down, making the planning and execution of a boat trip considerably more precarious.

The survey also attempted to assess under what conditions Haitians would return to their homeland. Because politics and economics are so inextricably mixed in Haiti it is difficult to ask and to answer questions to determine which is more important in motivating migration: politics or economics. In Haiti, more so than most other Third World countries, the political situation largely determines economic conditions. The Duvalier regime has been described as a "kleptocracy," a government by thieves. In many respects the poverty of Haiti's citizens results from the

extreme, pervasive corruption of the government and its lack of commitment to economic development at the grass roots level. Thus, if political conditions were to change, it is likely that economic development could be more widespread. Conversely, economic change is unlikely to occur without political change. Attempting to determine if an individual migrant's motivations are political or economic, therefore, is misleading and futile. Nevertheless, U.S. government officials, the media, and others continue to claim that particular migrants are economic or political.

For the migrants themselves, political and economic factors are also overlapping and intertwined. 37% of the Krome Haitians indicated that they would return if political conditions changed; 14.5% if economic conditions changed; 38.4% if both political and economic conditions changed, and 10% would not return under any conditions. The Entrants indicated a higher likelihood of returning (Table 10). 50% would return if political conditions changed; 68.2% if economic conditions changed. In the survey of Entrants, the respondents did not have the opportunity to indicate what they would do if both politics and economics changed.

Investigative trips to Haiti during the past year by Dr. Stepick have revealed that Haitians returned to Haiti by the U.S. are subject to interrogation and potential persecution by Haitian authorities. U.S. officials had interviewed a group of returnees to a small fishing village and reported that they had encountered no difficulties from the Haitian government. When Dr. Stepick interviewed the same individuals, they reported that they had been detained and interrogated by Haitian officials and advised that if they had not been met upon their return by the U.S. Ambassador they would have been jailed and tortured. It is not surprising that the Haitians themselves are reluctant to return unless dramatic economic and political changes occur.

To summarize the background of Haitians in Florida, they are not typical of the Haitians in Haiti. Neither Krome Haitians nor Entrants are fleeing solely from the impoverished Northwest. They are largely one generation removed from peasant roots. They are more educated and skilled than the typical Haitian. They are also different from the Haitians who migrate to the Dominican Republic to cut sugar cane or take other low wage, low skill jobs there. Their motivations for leaving cannot be simply categorized as either economic or political. If returned to Haiti, they are likely to be subject to persecution and it appears as if the Krome Haitians are especially intent upon staying in the U.S.

TABLE 1
Birthplace by Province

Province	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
West	29	22.8	35	33.7
Northwest	35	27.6	36	34.6
South	49	38.6	7	6.7
North	8	6.3	15	4.4
L'Artibonite	6	4.7	11	10.6

TABLE 2
Birthplace by City Size

City Size	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Port au Prince	9	7.1	15	12.4
Medium Size City	31	24.4	43	35.5
Village	87	68.5	63	52.1

TABLE 3
Urban Experience

City Size	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Port au Prince	45	31.9	48	37.7
Medium Size City	21	14.9	42	32.6
Village	75	53.2	39	30.2

TABLE 4
Father's Occupation

Occupation	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Agriculture	94	80.3	69	62.2
Semi-Skilled	17	14.5	22	19.8
Skilled	1	.8	5	4.5
Business	3	2.6	9	8.1
Unskilled, non-agricultural	2	1.7	6	5.4

TABLE 5
Migrant's Occupation

Occupation	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Agriculture	33	25.	6	5.4
Semi-skilled	37	28.	22	19.8
Skilled	4	3.	5	4.5
Business	5	3.5	9	8.1
Unskilled, non-agricultural	11	8.3	6	5.4
Student	1	.7		

TABLE 6
Land Ownership in Haiti

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Yes	43	31.4	18	14.0
No	94	68.6	111	86.0

TABLE 7
Migrant's Education

Level of Schooling	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
No Formal Schooling	44	31.2	8	6.4
1-6 years	46	32.6	44	36.4
Some Secondary	51	36.2	69	57.0
Commercial or Vocational Training	76	53.9	30	27.2

TABLE 8
Migrant's Religion

Religion	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Catholic	111	83.4	68	57.6
Protestant	22	16.6	46	42.4

TABLE 9
Transport to the U.S.

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Boat	130	94.2	96	76.2
Airplane	8	5.7	30	23.8
If by Boat, How Many Were in the Boat?				
less than 10	2	1.5	20	22.7
10 - 25	10	7.6	21	23.9
26 - 50	29	22.1	17	19.3
more than 50	90	68.7	30	34.1

TABLE 10
Conditions for Returning to Haiti

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
If Political Conditions Change	51	37.0	63	57.3
If Economic Conditions Change	20	14.5	88	68.2
If Both Political & Economic Conditions Change	53	38.4	The survey of the Entrants allowed them to respond only either political <u>or</u> economic conditions.	
Would Not Return Under Any Conditions	14	10.1		

III. Experiences in the U.S.

The primary thrust of this section is negative. Haitians have not had easy or positive experiences in the U.S. Prejudice and discrimination have confronted them repeatedly. Many have been illegally imprisoned. They have found discrimination on the job market. Three years ago there was a widespread, but unfounded fear that Haitians were spreading tuberculosis and many were fired from their jobs. More recently, they have been accused, again without scientific foundation, of spreading the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and again many have been fired and others not hired. Haitians have also been discriminated against because of their uncertain immigration status. Yet, in spite of all these difficulties, they remain positive in their attitude towards the U.S. and anxious to improve themselves.

A. Imprisonment and Immigration Status

According to the Krome Haitians themselves, the biggest problem they have had since arriving in the U.S. has been prison. The Krome Haitians were illegally incarcerated for an average of a year, before Judge Spellman ordered their release. The imprisonment of the Krome Haitians had a tremendous and well-documented psychological impact upon them. In spite of encountering and recognizing subsequent employment difficulties, inadequate housing, and ethnic and racial discrimination, over 80% of the Krome Haitians identified their imprisonment as the biggest problem they have had since coming to the U.S. (Table 11). This experience has fundamentally molded their view of the U.S. Government into one of distrust. They had come expecting something different from the arbitrary and capricious behavior of the Government of Haiti. The reality, however, proved to be more familiar than different. Subsequently they have learned that not all Americans nor all government officials are against them. Yet, they still begin with an attitude of distrust.

The earlier arriving Entrants have also suffered because of their treatment by the federal government. Haitians who arrived in 1980, like the Cubans, were granted a temporary immigration status by President Carter. The U.S. Congress was to have provided a permanent status, but has yet to do so. The Entrants remain in legal limbo. The Krome Haitians have been released pending adjudication of their claims to remain in the U.S., but they, too, are in limbo. Many employers, unaware of the

intricacies of immigration law and the promises made by former Administrations, refuse to hire Haitians.

The problem is particularly acute for Haitians because, unlike most other immigrant groups who have come to America, the Haitians came uninvited. There were no jobs awaiting them. They had not been recruited into Florida's agricultural fields as Mexicans have been into California's. In Florida, these jobs were already filled by Black Americans, undocumented Mexican workers, and in sugar cane, by legal temporary foreign workers from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands. There is little industry in Miami such as existed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries for the millions of immigrants from Europe to the Northeastern U.S. Miami's restaurant and hotel labor force was primarily American Black or Hispanic. The garment industry has been dominated by Cuban workers. The Haitians, therefore, had to search out and even create their own ways of making a living.

TABLE 11
Migrant's Biggest Problem Since Arriving in the U.S.

Problem	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Prison	98	81.7	0	0.0
Employment	15	12.5	68	66.7
No Problems	6	5.0	7	6.9
Immigration	1	.8	7	6.9
Can't Speak English			9	8.8
Financial			4	3.9
Housing			3	2.9
Can't Go to School			2	2.0
Injury			1	1.0
Robbed			1	1.0

B. Employment

After imprisonment, the most important problem faced by Haitian migrants and a current, continuing concern is employment. Over two-thirds of the Krome Haitians were not working at the time of the survey. Conditions were marginally better for the Entrants: nearly 60% were not working when we surveyed them (Table 12). The figures are shocking and far higher than for any other group in Miami, including Black American teenagers.

TABLE 12
Current Employment Status

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Working	46	33.1	47	40.9
Not Working	93	66.9	67	59.1

The Haitians, however, are not simply doing nothing. They are not on welfare and, therefore, they are finding active ways to support themselves. In spite of their claims of being unemployed, it is more accurate to describe the Haitians as primarily underemployed, supporting themselves mainly by part-time, temporary work. They are generally engaged in small scale enterprises or short term work typical of their home country, the rest of the developing world, and increasingly evident even in Miami. The recent surge by Cubans in street corner, petty commerce such as vending fruits, vegetables, and flowers in Miami is of the same nature. Haitians engage in similar activities, but are less likely to be visible to the broader community. In order to make ends meet, they obtain odd jobs using the skills brought from Haiti — carpentry, tailoring, auto mechanics, cooking, small scale commerce — providing services more cheaply and more directed to the local Haitian market. The pay or profits is unsteady and low but it provides them with a livelihood, perhaps just barely. Nevertheless, Haitians do not consider such part time work as "having a job." They would prefer permanent, steady work, which for them is the essence of "having a job." By this strict definition, far stricter than used in official unemployment statistics, over two-thirds of the Krome Haitians and nearly as many of the Entrants do not have a job.

Yet, they manage to survive without confronting starvation or becoming entirely dependent on outside assistance. How do they manage and what are their prospects for the future?

1. Adaptation and Economic Sectors

First, it must be recognized that their survival is at a level below that most Americans would consider acceptable. They live in crowded, often unsanitary conditions sharing meager resources among many. Their incomes are unsteady and barely sufficient.

Secondly, their success or failure at adapting depends not only upon their individual skills and motivations to get a job

and succeed, but also upon their mode of incorporation into South Florida's economy. Recent research on immigrants in the U.S. has revealed that individuals with similar education and skills may end up adapting differently, achieving different incomes and language capabilities according to where the economy receives them (Bonacich 1976; Hechter 1978; O'Connor 1973; Piore 1973, 1975; Edwards 1975; Beck, Horan and Tolbert 1978; Bibb and Form 1977; Tolbert, Horan and Beck 1980). For purposes of understanding immigrant adaptation to South Florida, the regional economy may be divided into four sectors: primary, secondary, informal, and enclave.

The primary sector of the economy is generally depicted as the non-competitive sector — the large scale firms of government and other "modern" industries. The main labor concern of employers in this sector is stability of the labor force. Workers are skilled, relatively well paid, and largely native-born. Immigrants working in this sector are generally legal and have a firm and stable relationship to their employer. There are probably 1,500 to 2,000 South Florida Haitians in the primary sector. They are most visible in agencies which serve Haitians such as the Haitian American Community Agency of Dade County (Hacad), and various government agencies. But they are also spread throughout the public and private sectors ranging from secretaries to doctors. These immigrants are not defined as a public problem and there is seldom even public awareness of them. There were also very few of them in either of the survey samples since they tend to be legal immigrants who have been in the U.S. a considerable while.

The characteristics of the secondary sector of the economy are largely opposite to those of the primary: firms are highly competitive and comparatively small with lower than average profit margins and relatively intensive use of labor (Castells 1975). The jobs require little or no prior training and cluster at the low end of the wage scale. Dead-end positions, low wages, and arbitrary discipline offer no incentive to remain with a particular employer (Wachtel 1972; Piore 1973). In South Florida the principal components of the secondary sector are agriculture, the garment industry, and the unskilled services associated with hotels and restaurants. While some jobs in competitive enterprises may be capital intensive or employ skilled labor and some large firms are part of the secondary labor market (Portes 1979d; Portes and Bach 1978), nevertheless, the principal labor concern of employers in this sector is the maintenance of a low wage labor supply whose demands will not erode their slim profits. Minorities and immigrants, particularly undocumented aliens, who have less recourse to labor and legal institutions,

are a logical supply for such a labor force (Rosenblum 1973; Castles and Kosack 1973). The immigrant workers newness in the U.S. and their vulnerability (if they have an uncertain or illegal immigration status) forces them to accept wages and working conditions which are unacceptable to domestic workers. Many of the jobs become identified with the ethnic background of the employees, further devaluing these jobs in the eyes of domestic workers who then resist seeking them. If natives and immigrants work side by side in such jobs antagonisms are likely and even exploited by some employers.

The informal sector is theoretically closely related to the secondary sector. It is defined primarily by what it is not: it is not controlled by the government in any way. Firms are defined as being in the informal sector if they pay no sales taxes, unemployment insurance, social security taxes, have no business license, and are unlikely to report their income to the Internal Revenue Service. This sector includes direct subsistence production (home gardens and animal raising), non-contractual wage employment (piece-work done at home for the garment industry), and independent business ventures (street corner vendors, underground manufacturers, etc.). Informal enterprises predominate in most Third World cities where stable jobs are far less numerous than the number of people seeking them. The informal sector, however, is not confined to Third World cities. It is increasingly evident in the U.S. and Western Europe (Pahl 1980; Mingione 1978; Mazur 1979; Bonacich 1980; Badillo-Veiga et al. 1979; Portes 1983; Sassen-Koob 1980). The revival of illegal sweatshops in New York is based on immigrant labor, and is credited with arresting the flight of the garment industry and even reviving this sector of the urban economy (Portes 1983). Similar operations also exist in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego, as well as Miami (Bonacich 1980; Portes 1983; Jorge and Moncarz 1980).

The enforcement or non-enforcement of labor legislation distinguishes the secondary and informal sectors. Informal enterprises consistently violate labor laws. In defense of these practices, informal entrepreneurs argue that competition is so intense and profits so small that they could not operate if forced to pay minimum wages, benefits, etc. They argue that it is better to allow them to continue unregulated because they generate employment for themselves and perhaps others while providing goods and services at bargain prices.

The final sector is the ethnic enclave, mentioned in the introduction of this section, where a broad cross-section of the home society migrates and recreates their own society in

miniature, producing, selling, consuming, and living largely within their own ethnic community. To establish an enclave economy an immigrant group must have two characteristics: (1) some of the immigrants must have access to sufficient capital to create new opportunities for economic growth; and, (2) the immigrant group as a whole must have an extensive diversity among themselves in job skills and aptitude. Usually, a well developed entrepreneurial group is among the first wave of migrants and its success at establishing businesses provides later arrivals employment opportunities virtually unavailable to immigrants in other sectors of the economy (Portes 1983). The relatively high proportion of immigrants of the same ethnic or national origin who work in firms owned by other immigrants of the same ethnic identity fundamentally distinguishes this group from other immigrant modes of incorporation into the economy. Light (1972) has demonstrated this phenomenon for Korean, Japanese and Chinese immigrants of the 19th and 20th centuries; Commons (1950) and Howe (1976) for late 19th and early 20th century Jews in the Midwest and Eastern U.S.; Haug and Portes (1980) and Wilson and Portes (1980) for Cubans in Miami.

The enclave sector may seem to overlap with the secondary and informal sectors. Just like firms in the secondary and informal sectors, enclave firms may not pay minimum wage and may require no skills; and, many self-employed entrepreneurs may avoid government regulation. But the critical difference is in the potential mobility for immigrants. Those working in an enclave sector are likely to have many more opportunities open up to them. Individuals are likely to experience social and economic mobility in their own generation. Those working in the secondary sector, on the other hand, will generally not have new opportunities become available to them and they must wait for their sons and daughters to become educated and move out of the secondary sector if they are to achieve social and economic mobility.

In summary, for immigrants the primary sector is characterized by high mobility and successful adaptation, so successful that the immigrants are likely to be pointed to as exemplary immigrants, models to other immigrants and natives alike. The enclave sector has higher visibility but still with the relatively high socioeconomic mobility of the immigrants in the primary sector. The enclave sector contains the exemplar of self-made men and women who came with nothing and became community leaders and economic successes. In contrast, the secondary sector offers dead-end jobs with almost no chance for advancement. Immigrants who enter the secondary sector of the local economy have more difficulty adapting and achieving

socioeconomic mobility and are more likely to be perceived as a public problem. Immigrants in the informal sector struggle against daily insecurity. They have a higher chance for successful upward mobility than those in the secondary sector, but not as much as either those in the primary or enclave sectors.

2. Haitians in the Secondary Sector

The Haitian community's adaptation in South Florida is highly dependent upon which sector immigrants work in. As discussed in the section on Background, a higher proportion of the Krome Haitians have rural origins. It is not surprising, therefore, that an increasing proportion of Haitians are working in agriculture, a secondary sector activity. Only 23.3% of the Entrants had worked in agriculture by the time of the survey, but more than 60% of the Krome Haitians had done agricultural work. Some had worked in Homestead, slightly more in Immokalee and even more had worked outside of Florida (Table 13). We should remember, nevertheless, that while the Krome Haitians are more likely to come from rural areas in Haiti, they were not farmers there. They were more likely to be semi-skilled workers. Thus, their penetration of the agricultural sector is not because it is their previous type of employment. Rather, the urban Miami labor market is saturated or closed, and the Krome Haitians have little choice but to try agricultural work. They are more willing to engage in agricultural work than the earlier arriving Haitians perhaps partially out of desperation and because they have at least lived in rural areas before, even if they have not worked as farmers before.

The high proportion of Krome Haitians who have worked in agriculture outside of Florida reveals that the Haitians have indeed become migrant farmworkers. Many do not just commute daily to Homestead to work. Nor do they move to Belle Glade for six months a year. Many have become a part of the nation's permanent East coast stream of migrant laborers, a position which offers little hope for advancement and eventual integration into U.S. society. Migrant laborers virtually exclusively remain migrant laborers and even their children have little chance of escaping the grind of constant travel in search of work.

Working in agriculture also has effects on the Krome Haitians social relationships in the work place. A higher proportion of Krome Haitians than Entrants work alongside other Haitians rather than in ethnically mixed workplaces. While 38.3% of the Entrants work alongside White Americans, only 4.9% of the

Krome Haitians work with White Americans (Table 14).

Examining the ethnicity of the Haitians' employers reveals that the Haitians are not working in an enclave. More Entrants have White Americans as employers (54.9%), while the Krome Haitians are most likely to have Black Americans as employers (34.2%)(Table 15). Again, this is a result of the Krome Haitians working outside of Miami in agriculture, and the earlier arriving Entrants working in Miami. The Entrants are working for urban businesses in Miami, businesses that are most likely to be run by White Americans. The Krome Haitians in agriculture are likely to be working directly under a Black American crew boss. While 40% of the Krome Haitians have never worked in agriculture since coming to the U.S., as a whole the Krome Haitians are more likely to be in South Florida's secondary sector and the Entrants in the primary sector.

The size of the firms in which Haitians work indicates they are becoming a part of the area's large businesses. Nearly 50% of the Krome Haitians work in firms that have between 100 and 500 employees (Table 16). In contrast, only 7.3% of the Entrants worked in firms this large. Moreover, only 1.9% of the Entrants worked in firms with over 1,000 employees, but 22.1% of the Krome Haitians worked in these large firms. The Entrants were far more likely to work in small and medium size firms with between 5 and 20 employees or between 20 and 100. The region's larger businesses, therefore, have begun to take advantage of the Haitians' presence, but they have done so selectively focusing on the more recent arrivals who tend to be somewhat less skilled and educated than their predecessors.

Examining earnings provides the most convincing data that the Krome Haitians are part of the secondary sector as 48% of the Krome Haitians earned less than \$3.35 an hour (Table 17). The Haitian Entrants had slightly higher wages. Only 10% earned less than the minimum wage, nearly 36% earned less than \$3.50 an hour and another 30.8% earned between \$3.50 and \$3.99 an hour. The Krome Haitians had 24% between the minimum wage of \$3.35 an hour and \$3.50 and another 16% between \$3.50 and \$3.99 an hour.

Given these characteristics of the Haitians working conditions, it comes as no surprise that they are pessimistic over their chances of advancement in their current jobs. Over one-half of the Krome Haitians believed they had almost no chance for advancement in their current job, while slightly over 40% of the Entrants believed they had no chance for advancement (Table 18).

TABLE 13
Agricultural Work in the U.S.

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Have You Done Agricultural Work in the U.S.?				
Yes	86	64.2	20	23.3
No	48	35.8	50	76.7
If So, Where?				
Homestead	46	60.5	3	13.0
Immokalee	21	14.9	5	21.7
Belle Glade	6	4.3	1	4.3
Other Places*	3	3.9	12	52.2

*For the Entrants, these were all outside of Florida.

TABLE 14
Ethnicity of Fellow Workers

Ethnicity	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
White American	4	4.9	18	38.3
Black American	6	7.4	11	23.4
Haitian	61	75.3	19	40.4
Cuban	10	12.3	21	44.7

TABLE 15
Employer's Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
White American	30	41.1	28	54.9
Black American	25	34.2	8	16.3
Haitian	13	17.8	6	12.8
Cuban	4	5.5	17	26.2
Jewish	1	1.4	4	8.3

TABLE 16
Size of Firm Where Respondent Works

Number of Employees	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Less than 5	7	9.1	5	9.6
Between 5 and 20	5	6.5	10	19.2
21 - 100	8	10.4	9	17.3
101-500	38	49.3	4	7.3
500-1000	1	1.3	0	0.0
More than 1000	17	22.1	1	1.9
Don't Know	1	1.3	22	42.3

TABLE 17
Wages

Hourly Wages	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Less than \$3.35	12	48.0	4	10.3
\$3.35 to \$3.49	6	24.0	14	35.9
\$3.50 to \$3.99	4	16.0	12	30.8
\$4.00 or More	3	12.0	9	23.1

TABLE 18
Chances for Job Advancement

How Much Chance of Advancement Do You Have in Your Current Job?	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Almost None	41	51.2	21	40.4
A Little	6	7.5	11	21.1
A Lot	4	5.0	3	5.8
Don't Know	29	36.3	17	32.7

3. Haitian Skills & Employment Prospects

These findings on Haitian employment have important implications both for the adaptation of the Haitians and for the future of Miami businesses. Interviews with employers reveal ambivalent attitudes. Those who have not directly employed Haitians apparently have little intention of doing so. They see Haitians as different from other employees only in that they speak a foreign language and, therefore, supervising them would be more difficult. Improving the Haitians' language skills would make them far more attractive to these employers. And, the Haitians themselves are aware of the importance of learning English. The Haitians are extremely anxious to learn the languages of their new environment. For most, learning a new language and finding employment are inseparable. All of the Entrants and over one-half of the Krome Haitians want to learn English. English language teachers of Haitians invariably comment positively on the Haitians' intense and sincere efforts to learn English. More surprisingly, over 80% of both groups expressed a desire to learn Spanish. They are keenly aware of the importance of the Cubans in the local economy and the benefits of knowing Spanish. Rather than being monolingual foreign speakers, the Haitians may soon become tri and even quadrilingual in Creole, French, English and Spanish. Previous studies of immigrant adaptation have repeatedly demonstrated that knowledge of the local language plays a critical role in successful adaptation. If Haitians could become fluent in English or Spanish, let alone both, they will have a much better chance of integrating into American society.

While learning English and Spanish would make Haitians more attractive as potential employees to those who have not hired Haitians, others do not need to be convinced of the Haitians' positive attributes as workers. Employers whom we interviewed who have Haitians working for them are virtually unanimous in their praise of Haitian workers. They claim Haitians work harder, longer, and complain less. They are easy to get along with and they learn their jobs quickly. Communication problems do indeed exist for those who have employed Haitians but, according to those who employ Haitians, usually overcoming them is worth the effort.

These attitudes are very reminiscent of those expressed by employers of other immigrants groups throughout the U.S. both presently and historically. Immigrants are generally more motivated, work harder, and complain less. Employers appreciate these characteristics and soon come to depend upon them. For the employers, what was an advantage becomes a perceived necessity.

Many firms in the Southwest that began using undocumented Mexicans for the same reasons that many local employers prefer Haitians now claim that only Mexicans will do the work, that there are no native Americans who will take the jobs. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's sweeps in the past few years of firms that employ undocumented workers tend to confirm the employers' statements. The undocumented workers were sent back to Mexico. The firms advertised and hired some American workers and within a few weeks the Americans quit and the undocumented replaced them.

It is indeed possible that the same process can occur in South Florida. The preference for Haitians may spread and eventually become a dependence. The Haitians will not directly be taking jobs away from Americans. Indeed they may even create jobs or keep some jobs from disappearing or moving overseas. But in some cases, they may have an indirect negative effect. Their presence, their motivation, and hardworking determination will reduce the pressure on some employers to pay wages and maintain working conditions that Americans find minimally acceptable.

The solution then is not a policy which would bar Haitians from jobs, but one which would assure that all jobs in South Florida pay minimum wage and maintain adequate working conditions. The non-enforcement of labor legislation in the Southwest has allowed the proliferation of firms that depend upon undocumented labor. The same potential exists in Miami. If labor legislation is not enforced in this region, some employers will discriminate against Americans in favor of Haitians or others of uncertain immigration status. This discrimination will not occur throughout the economy, but primarily in those businesses that rely heavily upon unskilled or semi-skilled labor, i.e. firms in the secondary sector and which are likely to try to subvert labor law and exploit their employees.

The prospect of being a preferred labor force in the secondary sector does not imply that the Haitians will all find good jobs and integrate wholly into American society. Research on Mexicans in the secondary sector of the Southwest reveals that they have little socioeconomic mobility. The same is likely for the Haitians. Krome Haitians work primarily in the secondary sector and they are unlikely to experience any socioeconomic mobility if they remain there. The Haitian Entrants are more likely to be in the primary sector where chances are somewhat better.

4. The Haitian Enclave & Informal Sectors

But what of the Haitian enclave and informal economies? This survey did not gather data on these. But other ongoing work by Dr. Stepick in conjunction with the Haitian Task Force provides a glimpse. That project has discovered a vibrant, expanding Haitian business community. It self-consciously attempts to duplicate the tremendous success of the Cuban business community. The Haitian Task Force and the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce have actively assisted and supported these businesses. They have received support from the city of Miami and outside agencies including the Ford Foundation. Nevertheless, they are encountering substantial difficulties. The Haitian business community has little capital, and they have had difficulty obtaining support from local banks. The proportion of entrepreneurs among recent Haitian arrivals is smaller than it was among the first Cuban arrivals. In fact, most of the Haitian businessmen are secondary migrants who have come to Miami from New York or perhaps Canada. Moreover, to this point, the Haitian businesses are not generating much employment except for family members. While the Haitian business community holds the most hope for the long term adaptation and integration of Haitians in Florida, for the moment it cannot fulfill the employment needs of the recent arrivals, either Entrants or Krome Haitians.

Many Haitians undoubtedly make ends meet when out of work or wages fall short of needs by resorting to the informal economy. Within the South Florida Haitian community it is easy to find tailors, carpenters, masons, electricians, auto mechanics, gypsy cabs, hair dressers, home restaurants, small scale vendors and numerous other trades. They service the Haitian community almost exclusively. Some apparently earn large profits and others barely stay in business. Currently, the informal sector is perhaps the most important economically, while it remains the least understood. Because the activities are extra-legal and even illegal, Haitians will not discuss them with untrusted outsiders. Understanding the overall dynamics of employment and business, including the informal sector, among the Haitians can only come about through intensive, long-term research.

C. Haitian Buying Habits

While the Haitians are somewhat isolated from the larger South Florida community in terms of employment, their consumption patterns closely articulate with the broader community. Indeed, it would be fundamentally misleading to say that the Haitians are

completely isolated from the larger community. Rather, the larger community benefits from the Haitian presence. Haitians buy primarily non-Haitian goods and services in primarily non-Haitian businesses. Only a small minority shop primarily in Haitian stores (29.1% for the Krome Haitians and 16.4% for the Entrants)(Table 19). 48.2% of the Entrants and 66% of the Krome Haitians shop in stores run by White Americans. Nearly half of the Krome Haitians shop in Cuban stores. At the same time, when Haitians work, they work primarily for non-Haitian businesses. In short, Haitians are economically well integrated, although in an unequal way: the larger community benefits more from the relationship than the Haitians do. Ironically, in return the Haitians receive prejudice, discrimination, and social isolation.

Table 19
Owner's Ethnic Background Where Respondent Commonly Shops

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
White American	93	66.0	53	48.2
Black American	55	39.0	11	10.0
Haitian	41	29.1	18	16.4
Cuban	55	39.0	54	49.1

D. Discrimination and Social Isolation

Haitians' problems are not confined to imprisonment and employment. They have experienced prejudice and discrimination repeatedly. They are becoming increasingly socially isolated from the region's principal ethnic groups — White Americans, Black Americans, and Cubans. Their foreign language makes communication difficult. Their black skin further deters others. The negative publicity they have received, first over tuberculosis and more recently over AIDS, has erected barriers between them and the broader society forcing them to rely upon themselves and reducing their opportunities for integration with the broader community.

The survey attempted to assess the actual degree of the Haitians' social isolation by asking how much opportunity they have had for having contact with Americans in the U.S., whether relationships between Haitians and Americans can be characterized as cold or friendly, and whether they believe Americans discriminate against Haitians. The survey results confirmed expectations. Haitians are terribly socially isolated from American society. Over three-quarters have almost no contact with Americans (Table 20). For those who have had enough contact to judge the quality of their interactions, less than 20% of the Krome Haitians have found Americans friendly (Table 21).

In some sense they are so isolated that they have formed little opinion about discrimination against Haitians by Americans. When asked if they believed that White American or Black American were prejudiced against Haitians, the majority said they didn't know. For those who did express an opinion, we found that Haitians have experienced virtually the same feelings of prejudice from Black American as White American. Thirty-nine percent felt that Black American were prejudiced towards them, while 41.4% felt that White American displayed prejudice towards them (Table 22). Many Black Americans tend to view Haitians as economic competitors. In a pattern repeated throughout the history of American immigration, the newest arrivals are blamed, rather than either those who may hire discriminatorily or the overall lack of sufficient employment for everyone who wants to work.

The Haitian response to prejudice and discrimination has been much like that of other immigrant groups. They turn inward towards their own community and rely upon informal, traditional social networks. Networks of extended family, friends, and

people from their home towns provide support and succor in times of need. Among many immigrant groups, family reunification motivates migration streams after the first wave become settled. An individual or family first migrates and after establishing itself sends back home for others. When they arrive and settle, they, too, send for still others. The new migrant, therefore, seldom arrives without already having some relative or friend to greet and help him.

The Haitians are no exception. Most Haitian migrants already have other relatives living in the U.S. (Table 23). Nearly one-third of the Krome Haitians are living in the same house with cousins, and nearly as many more live with one of their siblings. Because affordable housing is in such short supply, Haitians frequently live with relatives. For the Krome Haitians, one-third have cousins living in the same household compared to 20% for the Entrants. (It should be noted that Haitians tend to apply the term cousin to a broader group of relatives than Americans commonly do.) Housing is also crowded with an average of over 7 people per household. Only 27.0% of the Krome Haitians and 43.0% of the Entrants are either married or living with someone of the opposite sex. A large proportion have children (74.2% of the Krome Haitians), but most (95.7%) left their families and children back in Haiti -- another common characteristic of migrant groups.

There is one thing, however, which distinguishes the Haitians and their hopes for family reunification from most other immigrant groups. Neither the Krome Haitians nor the Haitian Entrants have a permanent immigration status. They are still in legal limbo and cannot sponsor relatives, including spouses and children, to come to join them in the U.S. Unless the U.S. Congress affords them permanent resident status, their families will remain split, divided by 750 miles of ocean.

The Haitians reliance upon informal organizations is revealed in the lack of participation in formal organizations. Over three-fourths of the Krome Haitians belong to no organizations of any type, including a church (Table 24). While 44.4% of the Entrants belong to a church, they belong to almost no other kinds of organizations. The reliance on informal organizations is also revealed in the search for jobs. Over 95% of the Krome Haitians and 85% of the Entrants found whatever jobs they had through family. Only 1.2% of the Krome Haitians and 10% of the Entrants used any kind of agency (Table 25). As a result, the problems of the Haitians remain largely invisible to the broader community.

Yet, the problems remain and as federal funding for language and job training diminishes, they will increase rather than decrease. Similarly, as the time increases that Haitians rely upon unsteady, part-time employment with uncertain income, the problems become increasingly difficult to solve through informal cooperation among the Haitians themselves. Of necessity, they will turn more and more to formal organizations, both government and private. The earlier arriving Haitian Entrants used such programs sparingly, but the Krome Haitians have found a much greater need. It is certainly not because they do not want to work. Few are on welfare or completely dependent upon the government for their subsistence. Very few receive any kind of cash aid. Nevertheless, they have taken advantage of programs which have been offered to them, such as the "Carter money" for the Entrants and monies administered by private voluntary agencies for the Krome Haitians. Nevertheless, the level of desire and dependence on assistance from formal agencies has increased dramatically for the later arriving Krome Haitians (Table 26). While only 18.4% of the Krome Haitians have received aid for clothing, 68.8% have received health aid, 85.8% food aid, and 91.5% housing aid. Only 30% indicated that they need more help from the church, but 95.5% would like assistance in finding employment. Among the Entrants 27.8% reported receiving food stamps, but no one claimed to be receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

TABLE 20
Chances for Contact with Americans

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Significant Contact	29	21.0	24	20.9
Little Contact	30	21.7	31	27.0
Virtually No Contact	79	57.2	60	52.2

TABLE 21
Quality of Relations between Haitians and Americans

How Are Relations Between Haitians and Americans	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Cold	32	23.2	25	23.8
Friendly	25	18.1	39	37.1
Neither	31	53.7	40	39.1

TABLE 22
Perceived Prejudice Against Haitians

Which Group Do You Think Is Prejudiced Against Haitians?	Krome Haitians	
	number	percentage
White Americans*	58	41.4
Black Americans	55	39.0

*

Numbers refer to those who thought the ethnic group was prejudiced against Haitians. We did not ask this question of the Entrants.

TABLE 23
Family Relations

Marital Status				
Single	103	73.0	73	57.0
Married or Co-habiting	38*	27.0	55	43.0

Is Your Spouse
in the U.S.
or Haiti?

U.S.	9	23.7	10	18.2
Haiti	38*	76.3	45	81.8

*

These numbers are inconsistent because some of the Haitians who were cohabiting in Haiti (plasé) said they had their spouse (madamn or mari) in Haiti, but were not married (maryé).

Where Were Your
Children Born?

Haiti	85	92.4	111	81.6
U.S.	5	5.4	25	18.4

Are Your Children
in Haiti or the U.S.?*

Haiti	88	95.7
U.S.	2	2.2

*We did not ask
this question of
the Entrants

Continuation of Table 23

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Other Family in U.S.				
Parents or In-laws				
Living in Same House	4	2.8	19	14.7
Elsewhere in the U.S.	2	1.4	4	3.1
Brothers or Sisters				
Living in Same House	38	27.0	12	9.3
Elsewhere in the U.S.	32	22.7	13	10.1
Cousins				
Living in Same House	47	33.3	22	17.1
Elsewhere in the U.S.	68	48.2	55	42.6
Aunt or Uncle				
Living in Same House	14	9.9	13	10.1
Elsewhere in the U.S.	14	9.9	9	7.0

TABLE 24
Organizations

What Organizations Do You Belong to?	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Church	18	12.8	52	44.4
Political Party	4	2.8	2	1.7
Club	1	.7	7	6.0
Professional Association	0	0.0	7	6.0
None	108	76.6	49	41.9

TABLE 25
Method for Finding a Job

How Did You Find Your Job?	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Family or Friend	79	95.2	34	85.0
Newspaper	3	3.6	2	5.0
Employment Agency or Service Agency	1	1.2	4	10.0

TABLE 26
Assistance
Krome Haitians

Type of Assistance Received*

Housing	129	91.5
Food	121	85.8
Health	97	68.8
Furniture	53	37.6
Clothing	26	18.4

*

We asked this question differently of the Entrants, so the results are not directly comparable. However, nearly 50% of the Entrants claimed to have never received any assistance, including Cuban-Haitian Emergency Impact Aid. About one-fourth had received foodstamps at sometime and none had ever received AFDC.

Type of Assistance Desired*	Krome Haitians	
	number	percentage
Help Finding Work	135	95.5
More Church Aid	42	30.0

*We did not ask this question of the Entrants.

E. Haitians' Commitment to Succeed

The Haitians have suffered discrimination and deprivation and clearly need assistance to help them become productive,

contributing members of South Florida society. Yet, in spite of their trials in the U.S., they express little resentment or dissatisfaction with life here in the U.S. Ninety percent of the Krome Haitians claimed to be completely or very satisfied with life in the U.S., while only 1.4% were not at all satisfied with their life in the U.S. The figures were scarcely lower for the Entrants. 87.1% were completely or very satisfied and only 2.6% not at all satisfied (Table 27). This high degree of stated satisfaction is remarkable given all the negative and difficult experiences they have encountered. It may also reflect the Haitians' most outstanding asset — their optimism and motivation to succeed in the face of considerable adversity.

TABLE 27
Satisfaction with Life in the U.S.

	Krome Haitians		Entrants	
	number	percentage	number	percentage
Completely Satisfied	85	61.2	46	39.3
Very Satisfied	40	28.8	56	47.9
Somewhat Satisfied	2	1.4	7	6.0
Not Very Satisfied	10	7.2	3	2.6

Almost all immigrant groups have confronted prejudice and discrimination and virtually all have eventually overcome these barriers to adaptation. The majority of immigrants have experienced rejection from the larger society, while simultaneously contributing to society. The future of the Haitians in the U.S. might, however, be unique because they are black. The first black migrants to America were, of course, forced migrants, and many of the barriers to their adaptation and integration still exist. In spite of the removal of most legal obstructions, informal impediments remain. Yet the Haitians as new arrivals have not had an entire lifetime and centuries of the legacy of racism in the U.S. The Haitians remain positive about the U.S. and highly motivated to improve themselves. If given opportunities, the Haitians undoubtedly can help themselves.

IV. Conclusions & Recommendations: Prospects for Adaptation and Integration

This study reveals that the Haitians who are in South Florida have the education, training, and skills to potentially contribute to American society. Moreover they are firmly committed to remaining in the U.S. Only the most dramatic changes in both political and economic conditions might entice them to return to Haiti. Other evidence further indicates that if they were to return to Haiti they have a high likelihood of facing persecution by Haitian officials. Because many of them left Haiti illegally, Haitian officials interrogate them closely and may imprison them upon return.

The U.S. government, however, has had a consistent, continuing policy of deterring Haitians from coming to or remaining in the U.S. (see Stepick 1981). The imprisonment of Haitians in Krome was part of this. For the Entrants, Congress has yet to act upon President Carter's promise to provide a permanent immigration status to the Cubans and Haitians who arrived in 1980. Most of the Krome Haitians are still having their applications to remain in the U.S. adjudicated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The uncertainty of their status has undeniably impeded their adaptation and integration. In many cases the impediment is direct -- employers refuse to hire them. In most cases it is less direct -- psychological and emotional stress for the individual. They cannot return to their homeland to see their wives or husbands or children left behind. Also, because they have no permanent immigration status in the U.S., the INS will not allow them to re-enter the U.S.

Provision of permanent immigration status would protect them from abuse in Haiti and greatly help the Haitians' efforts to adapt to and integrate into U.S. society. The first policy recommendation, therefore, is:

1. Permanent resident status for Krome Haitians and Haitian Entrants should be provided by the U.S. Congress. Returning Haitians to Haiti would likely subject them to persecution by Haitian officials. Moreover, permanent resident status would assist in the adaptation of Haitians by alleviating the psychological uncertainty they currently face, promoting family development and bringing many Haitians out from the underground. Moreover, if a large population exists which is afraid of the law because of their uncertain legal status, then enforcing the law,

including labor law, becomes more difficult. It would further deter others from exploiting Haitians because of their uncertain legal status. Congressman Rodino with support from Greater Miami United along with the National Emergency Coalition on Haitian Refugees, the Congressional Black Caucus and others have recently proposed legislation which would legalize the status of both the Krome and Entrant Haitians. Passage of this legislation would significantly aid the Haitians in their efforts to adapt to and integrate into U.S. society. Alternative legislation, such as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, would have excluded the Krome Haitians. They would have to continue with the time-consuming and expensive asylum hearing process which would delay decisions on their cases for up to two years. Excluding the Krome Haitians from a legalization program would only be arbitrary and inhumane.

Stated unemployment among Haitians in South Florida is very high. To survive, they rely primarily upon part-time, temporary work and small-scale self-employment. Increasing numbers are drifting into farm labor, while the Haitian business community struggles to establish itself. The type of employment the Haitians have found in the secondary sector, while currently necessary for survival, will make successful adaptation difficult. In the past, other immigrants working in these jobs have experienced the lowest socioeconomic mobility. While agricultural labor furnishes a way to make a living, it and other jobs like it in the secondary sector of the economy offer far less opportunity for advancement and socioeconomic mobility than jobs in either the primary or enclave sectors. But recent policy initiatives before the U.S. Congress may even eliminate this less desirable alternative. Some forms of last year's Simpson-Mazzoli immigration legislation proposed dramatic increases in the temporary importation of foreign workers for seasonal agricultural labor. If such legislation were to pass, Haitians would be dealt a great blow. Even this less desirable alternative to making a living would become less accessible to them. Most likely, they would return to Miami where jobs already are in short supply.

Those who support the importation of seasonal foreign agricultural workers into the U.S. argue that the program is critically important to the sojourners' home countries, especially when the countries are small and unemployment is high as in some of the Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. In the current situation where both native Americans and resident aliens such as the Haitians cannot find the type of work they prefer or are prepared for, society

confronts a difficult choice. Should it help those who are already here and reserve agricultural labor for them, perhaps trying to make it more attractive by improving the working conditions; or, should it make these jobs available to those from Caribbean islands who also desperately need work. Unfortunately, there is no alternative in this case where all can mutually benefit simultaneously. Haitians and many native Americans may not prefer agricultural labor overall, but for some it remains preferable to no work. The fourth policy recommendation, therefore, is:

2. There should be no expansion of the H-2 temporary foreign worker program in Florida agriculture. Agricultural work is increasing among Haitians. While it is not the best road to adaptation and integration, agricultural labor is better than no job at all. Proposed expansion of the H-2 program would severely hurt Haitians (and incidentally many Black Americans).

An alternative to importing temporary foreign agricultural workers is successful development in the Caribbean. Such development would decrease the pressures for migration to the U.S., both for Haitians and other Caribbean islanders. If individuals and organizations in the U.S. want to promote activities that would encourage Haitians and others to remain in their home countries, they must take into consideration the background factors the survey revealed of the Haitians who have migrated into South Florida. The Haitians we surveyed were not uneducated nor unskilled. They do not come from Haiti's poorest regions. While the Krome Haitians are more rural than the earlier arriving Haitian Entrants, most of the Haitians in South Florida have urban experiences. Their reasons for coming to the U.S. cannot be analyzed as either political or economic. The two are inseparably mixed in Haiti and in the minds of the migrants themselves. Based upon these observations, the third policy recommendation, therefore, is:

3. Development aid should focus on small-scale, labor intensive projects that actively involve individuals who have skills and education. Many organizations in Haiti and the rest of the Caribbean already implement such projects, and the Inter-American Foundation has been particularly successful. Development projects should not emphasize large-scale capital intensive projects nor the provision of goods for short term use such as food, clothing, and medicine. The same resources would be better spent on small-scale, local projects.

4. Moreover, Haitians in Haiti need to be protected from arbitrary extortion and confiscation of their property. Many

migrants came to the U.S. because they were successful in Haiti. Individuals who do manage to pull themselves up by their bootstraps commonly have their wealth extorted or confiscated by government officials. Therefore, development projects in Haiti must be accompanied by grass roots protection of human and civil rights. U.S. government aid should be contingent upon the curbing and eventual elimination of corruption and arbitrary abuse of power by local Haitian officials.

For those Haitians who are in the U.S., employment in the primary sector of South Florida's economy would be preferable to agricultural work for advancing their adaptation. Among previous immigrants, those employed in the primary sector have demonstrated the quickest and most successful adaptation to U.S. society. Many Haitians' have sufficient education and skills to become a part of the primary sector. However, they need language training and upgrading of their skills. Instructors of Haitians invariably find them to be dedicated and excellent students. Because so many of the Haitians, however, rely upon part-time, temporary work, they frequently have difficulty attending school. Schooling for them must be flexible and continuing. Recent federal cutbacks in funding of training for Haitians will significantly deter their adaptation and integration into U.S. society. The fifth recommendation is:

5. Language and job training should be expanded rather than curtailed. The federal government, in cooperation with state and local agencies should make a long-term commitment to education of the Haitians. Moreover, a substantial proportion of the Haitians recognize the importance of Spanish in the South Florida region and expressed an interest in taking Spanish classes if they were available.

The Haitian business community has self-consciously attempted to repeat the earlier successes of the Cuban immigrant entrepreneurs. If the Haitian community could imitate the success of the Cuban enclave community, Haitian adaptation would be greatly enhanced. The Haitian community has indeed begun to develop its own entrepreneurial sector and it is vibrant and rapidly growing. Nevertheless, it is still small, undercapitalized, and in need of business training. The study by Dr. Stepick and the Haitian Task Force mentioned in the text will provide a more detailed analysis of the visible Haitian business community. But many of the businesses are unlicensed operating

from the immigrant's home. The forthcoming study did not have the opportunity to examine these informal sector businesses and we know little of them because their very existence depends upon their invisibility to the broader community. Policymakers need to know more about them and need to help them come out into the open marketplace. They need not only capital and training, but tolerance and understanding from the broader community. Harsh, strict enforcement of business codes would drive many to extinction making it even more difficult for the Haitian community to adapt successfully. The policy recommendations applicable to the Haitian business community are:

6. Intensive studies should be conducted of the Haitian business community, particularly of the informal sector to determine needs and potential;

7. Technical and financial assistance, such as organized currently on a small-scale by the Haitian Task Force and the Haitian American Chamber of Commerce, should be provided on a larger scale to improve business skills and potential. This could also include development of a part of Little Haiti as envisioned in the recent design competition sponsored by the Haitian Task force and the American Institute of Architects.

8. Officials should tolerate and even encourage some kinds of informal businesses which may be in technical violation of business codes.

The Haitians' problems are not simply economic ones, but they are also social and political. Haitians have indeed encountered prejudice and discrimination. They have experienced discrimination at the hands of White American, Black Americans, and Cubans and many have reacted by withdrawing from the larger society. Some of the discrimination against them stems from the current general economic difficulties and the fears that Haitians are taking jobs away from Americans. Some arises because Haitians speak a different language and many monolingual English speakers are already frustrated at the common use of Spanish locally. Some discriminate against Haitians because they lack a permanent immigration status and are afraid to employ someone who might be an "illegal alien," although very few of the Haitians are actually here as illegal aliens.

Regardless of the roots of the discrimination against Haitians in the U.S., it is detrimental to both the Haitians and the larger community. If given opportunities, the Haitians

undoubtedly can help themselves. But if the larger community does not provide opportunities, Haitians may become a bitter and resentful minority. Both conscious and unconscious racism persists in American society and the Haitians have undoubtedly received it much as have Black Americans. Yet the Haitians as new arrivals have not had an entire lifetime and centuries of the legacy of racism in the U.S. The Haitians remain positive about the U.S. and highly motivated to improve themselves. They have not yet given up hope and with opportunity may follow the successful steps of previous immigrant groups, both black and white.

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