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ABSTRACT

The eight articles in this collection focus on the Fulbe culture in West Africa, its intragroup relationships as well as its relations with other ethnic groups. Each article relates the concept of ethnicity to social and political differentiation among tribes. Following an introduction by Emily Schultz, John Lewis presents the findings of three field visits to evaluate transhumant cattle management in the Sahel. Paul Riesman examines the relationship between the Fulani people of West Africa and their environment, paying particular attention to the people's cultural and environmental ties to their cattle. Gregory Finnegan and Christopher Delgado discuss the relationship between the Mossi farmers and the Fulbe herders in Upper Volta. The changing significance ethnicity has in the various power relationships of the aristocracy of the Sokota is presented by Joyce Hendrixson. James Vaughan examines intersocietal relations of two groups, the Margi and the Fulani, from a historical perspective, focusing on the reasons for cultural barriers against the Fulani. Chantal Collard discusses the various neighbors of the Fulbe, and Emily Schultz is concerned with perceptions of ethnicity in Guider Town, Cameroon. A final article, by Eric Ayisi, analyzes the main points of the preceding articles. Notes on contributing authors conclude the journal. (LP)

Image and Reality in African Interethnic Relations: The Fulbe and Their Neighbors



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INTRODUCTION

IMAGE AND REALITY IN AFRICAN INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: The Fulbe and Their Neighbors

EMILY A. SCHULTZ
St. John's University

Earlier versions of all but one of the papers in this collection originally were presented as part of a session organized by Emily Schultz and Paul Riesman at the 77th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in 1978; the session was entitled "Image and Reality in African Interethnic Relations: The Fulbe and their Neighbors." Motivation behind this session was twofold: first, a desire to stimulate contact and discussion among anthropologists who had done research among Fulbe groups in different areas of West Africa; and second, a desire to investigate what it meant to be "Fulbe" in such varied cultural, historical, and ecological contexts. From this came the second part of the symposium title: "the Fulbe and their Neighbors." Schultz had found, in her own research, that the pattern of relations between Fulbe and non-Fulbe in Northern Cameroon was vastly different from the ethnographic descriptions of relations between Fulbe and non-Fulbe elsewhere in West Africa. It seemed that steps might be taken to sort out the reasons for such differences if scholars, familiar either with a Fulbe group, or with another ethnic group having a history of contact with Fulbe, could be brought together to compare notes and to confront the issues directly. To this end, a panel was assembled of seven scholars presenting six papers. Four of the panelists had worked with Fulbe (Delgado, Riesman, Hendrixson, Schultz), and three others had field experience among groups which have a long history of contact with the Fulbe: the Mossi of Upper Volta (Finnegan), the Margi of Northeastern Nigeria (Vaughan), and the Guidar of Northern Cameroon (Collard). The paper by John Lewis, who worked among Fulbe in Mali, was added to the collection after the symposium met. Discussants for the symposium were C. E. Hopen and Michael M. Horowitz.

RESEARCH SITES OF THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SYMPOSIUM



The central aim of the symposium was comparison. For a people as well-known and as widely dispersed throughout West Africa as the Fulbe, comparative work of some kind would seem essential. To be sure, studies of Fulbe pastoralists have appeared in general works on comparative pastoralism (e.g. Monod 1975). By and large, however, comparative work on Fulbe society and culture has been lacking. One outstanding exception to this rule has been the work of Marguerite Dupire, who was one of the first post-war anthropologists (along with C. E. Hopen and Derrick Stenning) to undertake serious social scientific studies of contemporary Fulbe society. After working among the Wodaabe Fulbe of Niger, she went on to gather her own comparative data on other Fulbe societies in Cameroon, Senegal, and Niger. Her massive volume L'organisation social des peul (1970) presents the results of this comparison in the domain of kinship and marriage. In recent years the number of ethnographic studies of different Fulbe groups by other anthropologists has increased. It seemed to be time to synthesize some of these recent findings. Indeed, 1978 -- the year of the symposium -- saw the appearance of Victor Azarya's historical sociological comparison of Fulbe elites in Guinea, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The continuation of such efforts promises a deeper understanding of what it means to be Fulbe in West Africa and may allow us to devise better explanations of the extraordinary resilience of the Fulbe culture heritage.

Scholars acquainted with West African ethnography or history have probably heard of the light-skinned pastoral Fulbe cattle herders or, alternatively, of the Muslim Fulbe clerics and militants. Yet the question of Fulbe identity loses its straightforward character once one undertakes to formulate an answer based on careful analysis of the data. Perhaps the first thing one discovers is the long list of different names by which groups classified today as "Fulbe" have been known in the past. As Stenning has summarized (1960:140): "They are known as Fula in Gambia and Sierra Leone: Fellah by the Arabs of the Western Sudan, Fellaata by the Kanuri and other peoples of the Chad Basin; Peuls by the French; and Fulbe in the German literature. Their own term for themselves is Fulbe (sing. Pullo) and their language is Fulfulde. The British in Nigeria use the Hausa term Fulani ...." It is interesting to note, given the orientation of the symposium, that most of these names, given to the Fulbe by their neighbors, are rejected by the groups so named, who prefer to be known as "Fulbe" (e.g. Issa and Labatut 1974). One might therefore begin comparison by selecting groups whose members identify themselves as "Fulbe." The range could then be broadened by going on to consider those groups who are classified as Fulbe by outsiders -- by their neighbors. Such a procedure would seem to be justifiable, since the boundaries of any group in society tend to be negotiated by insiders and outsiders, whose criteria of membership need not coincide.

The question "Who are the Fulbe?" (and, by implication, who are not) focuses on the phenomenon of ethnicity. As Cohen states in his recent review of the ethnicity concept in anthropology (1978:380,386):

> Ethnicity. . .represents a shift toward new theoretical and empirical concerns in anthropology. . . . Ethnicity, as presently used in anthropology, expresses a shift to multicultural, multiethnic interactive contexts in which attention is focused on an entity -- the ethnic group -- which is marked by some degree of cultural and social commonality. Membership criteria by members and nonmembers may or may not be the same, and the creation and maintenance of the ethnic boundary within which members play according to similar and continuing rules is a major aspect of the phenomenon.

All of the authors in this collection have taken this theoretical shift and have attempted to apply the concept of ethnicity to their own ethnographic data. A number of authors refer to the groundbreaking work of Fredrik Barth (1969), accepting or rejecting his definition of ethnicity, but nonetheless finding it a useful way to begin to approach the phenomenon. Some writers have found Ronald Cohen's recent definition of ethnicity (1978) most useful in their work. Three writers also mention the work of Edward Spicer (1971), and indicate the ways in which his description of the "oppositional process" in the formation of "persistent identity systems", such as ethnic groups, helps to clarify the process of the formation of Fulbe or non-Fulbe identities in the regions of West Africa where they worked.

Most of the authors concentrate primarily on contemporary ethnic relations between Fulbe and non-Fulbe. Three authors, however (Riesman, Hendrixson, and Collard) emphasize the fact that the contemporary situation cannot be presumed to have existed in the past, and they have chosen to take an explicitly historical approach to the question of Fulbe/non-Fulbe relations. In their papers, as Hendrixson puts it, "historical facts are treated anthropologically," and it is clear that a full understanding of who the Fulbe are (and who their neighbors are) requires historical depth as well as geographic breadth. Historical depth allows us to assess the nature of "Fulbe culture" in its widest sense: the origins (if ascertainable) of the cultural common denominators (if any) which all "Fulbe" carry with them through time (and across space), and which lead them (and others) to perceive affinities among even widely separated groups. Geographical breadth, of course, attests to the historical movements of Fulbe and highlights differences among Fulbe groups which have been conditioned by different cultural, social, ecological and situational circumstances. Both dimensions inevitably lead to a consideration of the relationships between Fulbe and their neighbors which have shaped these similarities and differences, from past to present.

Approaching the nature of Fulbe identity by means of the ethnicity concept, the authors are able to state the ways in which Fulbe differ from other neighboring groups (and, indirectly, from other Fulbe groups). Schultz, for example, found that Fulbe settled in town in northern Cameroon distinguish themselves from their non-Fulbe (Pagan) neighbors

along three dimensions: religion (Islam), language (Fulfulde), and cultural style (urban). Vaughan found that a similar constellation of attributes were used by the Margi of Northeastern Nigeria to set themselves apart from the Fulbe, but he emphasizes another factor, difference in power, as being paramount. This difference was initially manifest in two different and highly elaborate political systems, Fulbe theocracy and Margi divine kingship. Elsewhere, a single criterion alone suffices to distinguish certain Fulbe groups from their non-Fulbe neighbors. For the ruling Sokoto elite, Fulbehood reposes in adherence to Islam; for the dominated rural pastoralists of Tenkodogo, Jelgoji, and Macina (and their Mossi and Bambara neighbors) it reposes in the pastoral way of life; and for the Pagan Guidar of northern Cameroon, the cleavage finds expression in a kinship idiom, conflict between two brothers (whose identities, it should be added, are reinforced by differences perceived to exist in religion and phenotype).

Sense can be made out of these varied data once each group is considered in its cultural and historical context -- its ethnic context. Barth (1969:15) argues that those traits which become diagnostic of ethnic identity achieve this status because, in a particular context of ethnic interaction, they become socially relevant. As contexts differ in cultural terms, so too will the status of particular cultural attributes of a groups which are deemed relevant for interaction with other groups. These traits are isolated and identified by means of Spicer's "oppositional process", a process that has not a little in common with Evans-Pritchard's notion of segmentary oppostion (Cohen 1978:381).

Once viewed as socioculturally relevant attributes of ethnic identity which have become institutionalized over time, particular traits may be used as clues to the contexts under which groups such as the Fulbe and their neighbors meet and interact. These contexts have varied over time, as several of the papers amply demonstrate. From the Fulbe perspective, an important situational feature has been their political status in the encounter. In certain areas (e.g. Tenkodogo), Fulbe have always operated from a position of weakness: the Mossi go so far as to claim certain Fulbe as "their" Fulbe. Fulbe in such a context correspondingly have little power to negotiate their own identity and find that identity being shaped to the needs of the dominant group: in Tenkodogo, pastoral Fulbe are assigned, and apparently accept, the role of "bankers" for Mossi who entrust cattle to them, and thus their pastoral role dwarfs all others in salience for them. The pastoral way of life is also of supreme importance to the Fulbe Jelgobe of Upper Volta who interpret the history of their relations with the Mossi, however, in somewhat different terms. While Mossi may have preferred to think of the Jelgobe as a subject people, the Jelgobe themselves saw their "submission" to the Mossi in the precolonial period as a clever political strategy which afforded them protection from their enemies while allowing them to preserve their traditional way of life. In this regard, Lewis makes valuable contribution when he emphasizes the important economic and ecological consequences of pastoral Fulbe submission to different West African states. As he notes,

state control of grazing lands in many cases preceded the arrival of Fulbe pastoralists, and indeed, such control was often a precondition of pastoral penetration.

Elsewhere, however, the nature of Fulbe/non-Fulbe contact has been shaped by Fulbe groups who dominate their neighbors. This came about in northern Nigeria as a reversal of previous power relations, as Hendrixson documents; subsequently, this pattern of Fulbe/non-Fulbe contact spread, among other directions, into Northeastern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon. In these cases, the Fulbe who dominated were militant Muslim clerics whose ambitions to rule and to transform society took priority over pastoral attachments.

It appears, therefore, that we must deal with at least two variants of Fulbe culture, related but distinct. Several of the papers mention different kinds of Fulbe, and similar references are not uncommon in the literature, although ethnographers may be more familiar with the pastoralist image and historians with the sedentary Muslim image. The contrast is problematic, however. What can be the connection between scattered bands of nomadic or seminomadic herders who are few in number, lacking in power, and widely believed to be "pagan"; and urbane, sedentary Muslims -- clerics, traders, rulers -- who may own cattle, but who do not herd? Close attention to the historical facts do not permit acceptance without reservation of the facile explanation that contemporary settled Muslim Fulbe are, in all cases, the descendants of pastoral pagan Fulbe who were sedentarized and Islamized relatively recently by their neighbors (for a critique, see, for example, Hendrixson in this collection; Schultz 1979). All Fulbe yet encountered, even those adjudged "pagan" by others, ordinarily claim to be Muslim, and learned clerics are not unknown even among the remotest pastoralists.

It would seem, in fact, that Fulbe culture history shows both Islam and pastoralism to be venerable Fulbe values. Both sets of values seem always to be present, and either set may become relevant as the primary expression of Fulbe identity, depending on the wider arena of Fulbe/non-Fulbe interaction. In some cases, both sets of values may be prominent. This seems to have been the case, for example, among Fulbe in Northern Cameroon under the Adamawa Empire in the nineteenth century. Heads of households were often free to undertake religious studies while their pastoral commitments were attended to by younger brothers or sons, and their subsistence needs were guaranteed by slave labor. Such household heads, however, were linked to settled communities; indeed, progressive sedentarization of nomads, or transhumants, was an important aspect of social policy for Fulbe rulers such as Muhammad Bello of Sokoto and Ahmadu Lobbo of Macina (see Lewis, in this collection; Schultz 1979; Last 1965; Norris 1975). To this extent, pastoral commitments were already subordinated to political commitments justified in terms of Islamic orthodoxy, and this subordination has only increased over time. When this situation is contrasted, for example, with that of the Fulbe of Upper Volta, it becomes clear that the circumstances of intergroup contact

greatly condition the emergence of either Islam or pastoralism as the value primary for Fulbe identity, and the other value is forced, for better or worse, to accommodate.

The sociocultural effects of the tension between Islamic values and pastoral values under certain conditions (i.e. following the achievement of political power by some Fulbe groups in the name of Islam) can be seen in a widely documented split within the category of those who call themselves Fulbe. This split vividly illustrates the way in which group identities are negotiated. It is exemplified by the contemporary split which can be observed in Northern Cameroon between the settled Muslim Fulbe and the pastoral Mbororo'en, the latter of whom reject the label attributed to them and claim instead that they alone are the true Fulbe, that settled "Fulbe" have forfeited all rights to the ethnic label (Collard notes that this split is recognized by the Guidar of Northern Cameroon as well). Elsewhere in West Africa a similar internal cleavage among Fulbe can be observed. In their paper in this collection, Finnegan and Delgado report that "Tenkodogo state contained, and contains, two kinds of Fulbe. . . .the long distance cattle traders. . . .as likely as not regarded as foreigners, 'Malians'" and "the Fulbe settled among the Mossi. . . . serving as herders of Mossi cattle as well as their own. . . .and who provide the main context for Mossi-Fulbe relations at the village level." The literature concerning the Fulbe offers many such examples. Rivière (1974) for instance, reports that in Futa Jallon the distinction was quite clear between the Fulbe elite (sedentary, Muslim) and the Fulbe herders, who formed part of a lower social stratum which included non-Fulbe farmers subject to the state, and which provided the ruling groups with the food and labor it required.

The status, and particularly, the power differential between these two kinds of Fulbe is striking: whenever both groups form part of the same interaction field, the Muslim groups are dominant and the pastoralists are subject to them. In such cases, moreover, the pastoralists are invariably considered "pagan" by the settled Muslim Fulbe. Rivière, in the article cited above, continually refers to the pastoralists as pagan, although offering no evidence for this allegation. Hendrixson, presenting the point of view of the Fulbe elite of Sokoto, reports that they included "non-Muslim Fulani" within the category ahl al-dhimma (protected, tribute-paying non-Muslim peoples subject to the Muslim state). It is clear historically, however, that for Muslim Fulbe elites, the term "pagan" could be used to refer to any group, Fulbe or not, which refused to submit politically to the current regime (e.g. Ba and Daget 1955). Although it is true that in Islam, politics and religion are often inseparable, such a political use of the term says nothing about the nature of the actual, day-to-day religious faith of members of the defiant groups.

It would seem, therefore, that the attribution of paganism to nonconforming Fulbe groups by Muslim Fulbe rulers demonstrates more about the dynamics of ethnogenesis than it does about religious commitment. Muslim Fulbe ruling elites which emerged in West Africa

during the nineteenth century needed to establish their legitimacy in symbolic as well as practical terms. Symbolic supremacy could be demonstrated by adherence to Islamic orthodoxy on their part; practical supremacy, however, required acceptance of and submission to their rule on the part of others. The struggles which ensued upon their attempts to achieve the latter goal cut them off from certain of their coethnics who were then set apart and labeled pagan. Hendrixson remarks on the ambivalence experienced by the nineteenth century Muslim Fulbe elite of Sokoto when they tried to define the nature of their relationship to the Fulbe pastoralists. Their evident desire to distinguish themselves from the pastoralists is revealed in the written documents they left behind; these and other such documents written by Fulbe and non-Fulbe Muslims, recently translated, have been the source of much new information about Muslim clerical and ruling groups in nineteenth century West Africa (see, e.g., Willis 1979). These documents, however, written by members of a particular social stratum, reveal at best the opinions and desires of members of that stratum concerning their own identity. Muslim Fulbe may well have striven mightily to disassociate themselves from the pastoralists and to identify themselves with a wider, more cosmopolitan Islamic community. But their own assertions in these matters are not sufficient to determine their success or failure in achieving this goal, particularly in the early years of their rule. Ethnic identity is a negotiated phenomenon, and much current writing in the history of West African clericalism presents, unfortunately, the case of only one party to the negotiation.

It seems necessary, therefore, to recognize openly the varieties of Fulbe culture which have existed and continue to exist throughout West Africa, and to attempt to uncover the nature of the relationships among these groups, if we are to come to an adequate understanding of the internal dynamics of Fulbe culture and Fulbe history. At the same time we cannot neglect the interactions between Fulbe and non-Fulbe which have had their own role to play in shaping Fulbe identity. Clearly, an understanding of Fulbe identity, past and present, cannot be achieved by treating Fulbe subgroups as isolated entities. Traditional historical or ethnographic analyses which do so, though valuable, are ultimately of limited explanatory usefulness, and they need to be supplemented with comparative, interactive analysis if broader issues are to be treated. The papers in this collection do not pretend to be definitive statements of such analysis. They do, however, offer an initial attempt to address comparative, interactive issues in Fulbe studies and to remedy the partial views of Fulbe culture that individual studies are ordinarily obliged to present. Perhaps their greatest value will lie in the discussion they stimulate among scholars who are also interested in these wider issues, and who may be moved to fill in further pieces of the puzzle through research of their own.

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RANGE USE AND FULBE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: THE VIEW FROM MACINA

JOHN VAN D. LEWIS
Howard University

Introduction

This paper[1] is offered as a contribution to an intensifying, post-drought evaluation of transhumant cattle management in the Sahel. It is based on three field visits, each of approximately two months duration, made over the course of a single season (1977-1978) to the transhumant herds of the Fulbe community of Jafaraabe (Mopti Region, Mali).[2] I studied herd management and pasture appropriation as the Jafaraabe cattle were moved along the three trajectories of their seasonal displacements:

1. Out of the interior delta of the middle Niger River valley at the beginning of the rains (June, July) north to the Sahelian pastures of southern Mauritania;

2. Down from the Mauritanian Sahel after the rains (October, November) along a carefully predefined stocking route (burtol) to the Niger itself, just upriver from its interior delta; and

3. Across the Jaka effluent of the Niger (December), running the western length of its interior delta, and northeast into the lower-lying portions of that Delta as the dry season progressed (January-May).

This is the renowned, transhumant system of Macina, best known from the work of the geographer Jean Gallais (1967) (Imperato 1974). In



THE ECOLOGY OF ANNUAL MIGRATIONS OF CATTLE IN THE SAHEL

Map from: H. Breman, A. Diallo, G. Traoré, and M. M. Djitexe 1978
Production Primaire Sahelien, Wageningen - Halland

this system the stocking routes back to the interior delta as well as the dry season pasture in that floodplain are precisely allocated to different Fulbe user groups. Not only are those groups expected to use their own trek routes and pastures before anyone else does, they can exact rent from stranger herds and flocks following after them.

This system of pasture regulation is considered to be unusual for Fulbe or any other pastoralists' practices in the Sahel (Swift 1977:464). First of all, in the dry season, delta pastures furnish an unusually large expanse of unusually green grass unusually late in the dry season. Yet many other Fulbe territories (the Senegal River valley, Lake Chad basin, etc.) are not without smaller examples of similar phenomena. Furthermore, many Fulbe are found in plateau and hilly areas (Futa Jallon, Beledugu, Jos, Adamawa, etc.) that have catchments of water and moisture that offer fresh dry season grasses and water points. Secondly, the order that is seen in this Macina system is considered to be the outcome of the unique, empire-building holy war, called the Dina, of Sheku Ahmadu and his followers ca. 1819. Yet other Fulbe holy wars (Futa Jallon, Sokoto, Adamawa. etc.) have also provided protection for pastoralists and pastoral interests (Azarya 1978). Furthermore, Fulbe, whatever their livestock or pasture management practices, are rarely found far from areas of state, or regional chiefdom, control. The Wodaabe "nomads" studied by Stenning (1959) and Dupire (1962), and on whom much of the popular image of the unattached Fulbe pastoralist rests, are in fact recent arrivals in areas that had to be first "pacified" by Kanuri or French regimes respectively. In the former case, British "pacification" made possible further migratory drift for the wanderers (Stenning 1960). Before state control preceded such pastoralists, they could not organize to procure those areas of Northern Nigeria and Niger for themselves. Tuareg pastoralists, on the other hand, were able to control many of these areas before the advent of colonial rule (Baier 1976). In Mali, the arrival of accelerated numbers of Fulbe pastoralists from the area of the Tekrur state, then controlling the middle Senegal valley, coincides with the pacification of the middle Niger valley by the medieval Mali empire (Gallais 1967).

The Macina state of Sheku Ahmadu in the first half of the nineteenth century apparently pursued a policy of sedentarising "nomads" (Vincent 1963, Johnson 1976). This policy appears to have had the beneficial consequence that herds going out from the interior delta (at the start of the rains) received state protection (Gallais 1967) as an inducement to more family members to remain in the more pious surroundings of the home community. However, on many other counts the herding Wodaabe of Macina resisted the interference of the Dina state with their movements. For example, Sheku Ahmadu proscribed many of the decorations and festivities that made the arduous transhumance more interesting to those who undertook it. The effecting distribution of the pasture rights between the delta communities seems to have predated the Dina (Ba and Daget 1962). In fact those with the most extensive and secure claims, such as the Jallube of the Lac Debbo area, appear to have

had the most ornery relations with Sheku Ahmadu's state (Gallais 1967).

In this paper my efforts will be directed to showing how the day-by-day observation of the seasonal unfolding of this celebrated Macina transhumance system further compromises its reputation as an unusual case for the Sahel. The allocation of pasture rights in this sytem was found to be an outgrowth of institutional relationships that also prevail among more "acephalous" Fulbe elsewhere in West Africa. My field results then can explain how the Macina system of pasture appropriation could have predated the Dina state-formation period. Furthermore, the findings suggest that range use in neighboring Fulbe transhumant systems, where local-level institutional relationships are analogous, may not be as chaotic as popular reputation would have them.

Clan and Community

The allocation of pasture and water rights in Macina, as among other Fulbe in West Africa, is done on a community (wuro) rather than on a patrilineage (suudu-baaba) or clan (leynol) basis. This is a key characteristic of social organization that distinguishes many Fulbe from the Moor and Tuareg nomads to their north. As we have seen, Fulbe pastoralism, however dispersed and unsystematic it may appear, is rarely practiced far from areas under state control. The Moor and the Tuareg, on the other hand, have always avoided effective state frontiers and sought to restrict their expansion. These nomads use patrilineal relations to form their warring groups. However, among the Fulbe, even where the lineage is used as a metaphor of territorial or "sociogeographic" (Reisman 1977) affiliation, it is the residential group (wuro), "strangers" included, that acts on any claims. In Macina where a territory is named for a certain clan (e.g. Jallube) many individuals born outside the clan, but living within the community named for it, can, discretely, acquire that name as their mothers move from husband to husband and it becomes ambiguous as to which one is to be recognized as father.

The relationship of lineage to community in Macina is central to the operation of their pasture tenure system. This relationship resembles lineage/community politics described for Fulbe communities elsewhere in West Africa.[3] I will argue that while in Macina this relationship has developed to the point that pasture tenure regulations have become extremely firm, this same relationship in other Fulbe populations provides the organizational potential for a similar intensification of pasture appropriation practices.

I will begin to make this case by recounting some of my direct field observations of the transhumance in and out of the interior delta. But before I begin, let me reemphasize that characteristic of Fulbe social organization that distinguishes it almost everywhere from the nomad organization of non-Fulbe pastoralists in West Africa: the umbrella of state control. The social organization that is adapted to, though not necessarily totally acquiescent to, this state control has the makings of a

better land management unit than one that operates in defiance of most aspects of territorial hegemony. It can be assumed that the distinguishing features of Fulbe social organization developed a millenia age under the shield of the Tekrur (Tukolor) state in the Senegal River valley and then expanded or was adopted, as pasture areas (particularly alluvial ones resembling the Senegal floodplain) to the east came under state control. In less than a century since the imposition of the colonial "peace" the Fulbe have expanded (or Fulbe ethnic identities with the associated social organization have been adopted) across the savanna from the Cameroun as far east as Ethiopia.[4]

Jafaraabe

Jafaraabe is located on the triangular promontory formed by the separation of the Jaka effluent from the north bank of the Niger River midway between Sansanding and Mopti. At the time of its flood (August-December) a certain portion of the Niger River bypasses its main channel, that flows east towards Mopti, and floods northeast up the Jaka effluent towards Lac Debbo. At the height of this flood, water spreads out into effluents of the Jaka itself and disperses, in most years, over all but the highest ground of the interior delta floodplain. As these flood waters recede, important perennial grasses (Echinocloa, Oryza, Veteveria, etc. -- depending on the soil and ground level) are left behind.

The grazing potential of this floodplain varies from year to year depending on the extent and timing of the flooding. As Jafaraabe is located at the entrance rather than the exit of the delta, the pastures around it get such flooding as there is to be first and lose it, to the lower delta, first. Lying at the upper edge of the delta, Jafaraabe territory is insufficiently flooded in dry years. Nevertheless, if it has been a wet year, communities controlling lower ground further into the delta can only lead their livestock onto their own pasture very late into the dry season.[5]

Hence the quality of pastures around Jafaraabe can vary seasonally just like the resources used by less fortunate Fulbe pastoralists involved in a transhumant adaptation keyed on the use of non-alluvial dry season pastures. In both cases, this variability calls for resource-sharing ties with communities in different micro-ecological and micro-climatic zones. In both cases these inter-regional ties are worked out on a herd-to-herd, herd-to-community, or community-to-community basis. Rarely are pasture and water resource-sharing arrangements made by or on behalf of one's lineage.

The point here is that in Macina these resource--sharing arrangements are more conspicuous than they are among Fulbe elsewhere because they are more often made on a community-to-community rather than a herd-to-herd basis. But the principle of separating the organization of resource access from that of patrilineal livestock inheritance is common to other Fulbe instances. This principle appears to be an extremely important component of Fulbe social organization in most areas

where dry season resources, however variable, are relatively reliable; it also serves as the basis of more informal Fulbe range management arrangements elsewhere. Before generalizing further, let me review how this process operates in the case of Macina.

Jafaraabe owns the pasture (leydi) in its hegemony (laamu); the boundaries between it and neighboring hegemonies in Macina are divided by highly visible markers: an effluent channel (mayo), a cattle path (burtol), a minor detail of topographic relief marked by a change in the species of grass cover.[6] The owned pasture of a hegemony such as Jafaraabe is divided between that (burgu) open to any animal legitimately in the territory and that (harrima) restricted to the dry season milk herd (bendi).

Although there are other villages in the Jafaraabe hegemony, the jooro of that polity is in Jafaraabe itself so that the whole hegemony takes on the name of that village. The other villages are called ngendi, if like Jafaraabe the Fulbe dominate within them, or saare if captive (Machube) or sedentary, agricultural populations may be dominant. Each village has a chief, jom ngendi or jom saare as the case may be, but the hegemony as a whole only has one. The jooro has no authority concerning the internal politics of the village; his jurisdiction carries only to the pasture (leydi) of his hegemony and the transhumant herding unit (eggrigol -- 30,000 head of cattle in the case of Jafaraabe) that has priority access to them.

It is common for rival jooros to set themselves up within a single hegemony, even trying to set up separate hegemonies within the original one. This is most common where the original jooro has been ineffective in enforcing the pastoral community's claims to its own pastures relative to claims made by outsiders. This split becomes effective when herds leave the original eggrigol herding unit to form another with the new jooro. This fissioning process has increased recently where Fulbe complaints against farmers who have begun to cultivate rice in prize Echinocloa pastures have been ignored by the government. Being on the higher periphery of the delta, Jafaraabe is less suitable for rice, hence there have been fewer such fissionings. There remains one jooro there.

Sheku Ahmadu halted such processes of fissioning in his own day by naming his own jooro where there were disagreements or where the existing jooro was found wanting in allegiance or in Islamic piety. Furthermore, he insisted that succession to this office proceed from father to son. This rule forestalled the proliferation of rival claimants where fraternal succession to office is observed. Macina Fulbe accepted Sheku Ahmadu's authority in this matter because he guaranteed their pasture claims against those or rival pastoralists, free farmers, and neighboring plantation systems.[7]

However, then as now, a decentralization of the jooro's pasture authority would ensue where the pasture claims of his hegemony were

being brought into question. Hence, a lack of unity in Fulbe pastoral groups should be seen as a reflection of their inability to bring a range under their effective control. It should not be seen as a lack of an organizational intention to do so.

The jooro of Jafaraabe represented that herding community of nearly 30,000 head of cattle[8] in a variety of ways having to do with the access of these cattle to pasture. I will describe some of these functions in the next section when I review the flow of transhumance as I observed it. Here I must anticipate that description by noting that the provision of all these services gave the jooro or his family few rights in the other Jafaraabe herds that he represented. His own herd was conspicuously small, but there was no question of anyone from Jafaraabe helping him out. For his own part the jooro was too proud to seek cattle loans from within the Jafaraabe community or even, for that matter, from Fulbe anywhere else either. He sought to rebuild his herd through managing the cattle of non-Fulbe, Maraka traders.

The jooro represented the territorial claims of the Jafaraabe herding community. The "corporate functions" (Smith 1975) of this community, pasture tenure, were kept remarkably distinct from the organizational forms of cattle ownership, prestation, loaning and inheritance.[9] I will explore the significance of this organizational boundary as we proceed.

The End of the Dry Season

The end of the dry season finds the transhumant herd (garti) and the young male herders[10] far into the interior of the Delta on the more recently flooded grasslands of a Macina Fulbe hegemony established therein. Various forms of rent are expected by the jooro presiding over that area. When there are rival jooros, such rents can be more effectively evaded. But even where there is one undisputed jooro, other local potentates may expect presents from visiting herds. Presents to government officials, of course, do not fluctuate with the internal politics of the Fulbe system. But presentations to other Fulbe can vary according to an illuminating range of factors.

The political variables have already been alluded to. Where a single jooro is incontestably in office in an unfragmented hegemony, he should be visited, although he may refuse, and be expected to refuse, any presentations.[11] Such refusals are invariably due to the fact that the herds of the jooro's own group will be required to sojourn in the hegemony of the guest herds at another time of the year. Even when such refusal is a foregone conclusion, the ceremonial visit to the host jooro should still be made. If it has not been, other Fulbe from the host community may simply remove an animal or two from the visting herd--informing the jooro of what they have done, but not passing the animal on to him. Hence, the jooro is there to protect as well as to tax the visiting herds. He is particularly concerned to protect herds from territories where the

herds from his own communities are expected to be guests later. The individual Fulbe may look to gain an animal for his own herd from a visiting herd, hoping nevertheless for better luck for himself when the tables are turned. But the jooro looks out for the combined grazing interests of his group as a whole. This requires a different orientation than the project of maximizing the increase of one's own herd.

The guest herder that loses an unoffered animal to the host group rarely complains to the administration. Such a complaint will rarely benefit him, but it is sure to earn him the bitter enmity of the prosecuted Fulbe. Rather, to cope with these unexpected rents, these guests will keep extra elder steers,[12] or unproductive females in their herd, lest the predatory host be obliged to remove a more productive animal from the herd.

The politics of guest-host relations adjusts not only to seasonal climatic changes, but also to climatic variations between the years. As soon as it became clear that 1977-1978 was going to be a dry year (the Macina Fulbe are more attentive to the river level than to rainfall in making this determination), the jooro of Jafaraabe began cultivating relations with FulBe from hegemonies deep into the Delta: Uro-Ngia, Yallalbe, Jallube. The Jafaraabe herds would be spending a long stretch of the dry season as guests of these lowland groups. Key herds from these hegemonies were permitted to move forward with Jafaraabe herds when the latter moved first over its own stocking route (burtol) and pastures.

However, in 1976-77, a wet year, the opposite was the case. The hegemonies of Uro-Ngia, Yallalbe and Jallube were still inundated well into the dry season. Herds from these groups were guests of Jafaraabe and other hegemonies on the southwestern exterior of the Delta for an extended period. However, these exterior hegemonies did not exploit their advantage. Jafaraabe moved onto some of their own grasslands well before access to them was dry, in order to accommmodate the Macina herds coming down the burtol behind them with some Delta grazing. It was hoped that this deference would lead to lighter rents when the Jafaraabe herds were thrown back on the interior lands later in the dry season, and for extended periods in drier years. It was the Jafaraabe jooro who initiated the move--in campfire meetings with elder herdsman--to be deferential in this manner. It was the jooros of the interior groups, not the individual Fulbe in them, who were expected to remember such deference. Thus, as the higher boundaries of the Delta got drier and became grazed-out, and hence as Jafaraabe herds followed (see below) the herds of the interior groups onto the lower floodplains, they would verify memories of this deference with the jooros there. Whether or not they were partially excused from rent payments as a consequence, at least a call on the jooro would absolve them from having to furnish an animal to a host Fulbe less likely than his jooro to have remembered, or even benefitted, from the earlier deference.

Of course, the rent-paying situation of non-Macina groups (Segu

Fulbe, Seno Fulbe, Warabe (sing. Bororo), Moor, and Bella) using the Delta at this time, is more stringent. Nevertheless, enormous numbers of them come, doubling the number of head depending on this alluvial resource for their dry season grazing.

The Tuareg are more reluctant to conform to these rent-paying arrangements, particularly in the northern Delta, where they feel they have been grazing from before the time any Fulbe made claims to the area. We have already seen how it is not within the organizational compass of the nomadic Tuareg to claim finite territories directly. Rather, they are better organized to control range use directly through warfare, raiding and the defense of privately-owned wells. This system does not work as well in riverine areas where permanent water is available.

Every year there are quarrels, often leading to deaths, between Tuareg and Fulbe in the northern Delta. However, equally as often, a face-saving rent-paying mechanism is found. Whenever the Tuareg offer scarce desert salt on good terms of trade, tensions between them and the Delta Fulbe are mollified.

Transhumance Out of the Delta

With the coming of the rains, pasture tenure regulations relax, and each herd (seore) in its transhumant grouping jan'e of 3-4 herds is left to each herd manager's luck and skill. Too early a departure could leave the herd stranded without any water on the route to the north. Too late a departure could find the herd bogged down in mud, while the ticks, flies, and mosquitoes brought in by rains and floods attack the animals.

Before leaving the Delta, the transhumant herd (garti) has to pass near the home community or at least be joined by the dry season milk herd (bendi) that had stayed closer to the milk-selling women at home. Another smaller milk herd (dunti)[13] is left off to supply the family (all but the active[14] males transhuming to the Sahel) with milk[15] during the rains. These animals are considered forfeitary since they are rarely found in good health after exposure to the diseases brought with the rains and the flood.

The herds mount through the farming latitudes to the Sahel as quickly as possible. The mud and flies of those latitudes are as disagreeable to the herder as are the anxieties of the Bambara farmer for his sprouting millet. As far as the grazing in these farming latitudes is concerned, transhumance out of the zone during the rains is as good for the grasses as it is for the health of the herds. The absence of ruminants at this growing time enables the grasses to develop their root structure and go to seed[16] without interference, Furthermore, the soil structure is not disturbed by herd stampeding the moist ground. Unfortunately, in this respect, not all the herds are managed by Fulbe. The growing herds of the farmers are left to stampede the soil, overgraze, and, too many of them,

to die in these southern latitudes.

In precolonial times, soldiers would be posted at the ponds along Macina's stocking routes (burti) to the north to protect the herds against poachers. The water in these ponds had to remain intact to slake the thirst of the herds returning after three months of grazing in the north. These ponds lay along the stocking routes belonging to hegemonies on the western fringe of the Delta, such as Jafaraabe. Hence it was the jooro who sought the authorization and the support of the Macina state for placing soldiers at these ponds. These soldiers are also said to have reduced the threat of the Macina herds from being pillaged by the warlike Moor and Tuareg.

Pasturing in the Sahel has become more of an individual matter now that the predatory threat has been reduced. There is an abundance of milk as far as the herders' consumption needs are concerned. And it is true that there are few markets at which this milk can be sold. But this does not mean, as has often been asserted, that milk is wasted. The "surplus" milk is left for the calves who strengthen immeasurably during this period. They need the strength for the arduous descent to the south.

Pasturing in the Sahel is an open matter. Access to prize pastures, of which there are many, depends on the availability of surface water. The wells of the Moor and Tuareg are as unavailable to the Fulbe at this time as they are during the dry season. The distribution of some of this surface water varies from year to year; so a rotational range-use scheme does appear to operate. In any case, the Fulbe herds can hardly be said to make a dent in the vistas of grass in the Sahel at this time (Breman et al. 1978). The cattle are said to be at their fullest and healthiest at this point in the year.

The Return

The herds leave the Sahel even before the surface water dries up because they fear for the availability of water on the route to the south. In the days of the Macina state, as we have seen, ponds along this route were protected for later use so that the transhumant herds could enjoy the benefits of Sahel grazing for a longer period.

Now these ponds have become the focus of a short transhumance by herds out of the farming villages along the stocking route. These farmers' herds have been increasing in size as more cash flows through their hands at a time when few alternative investment outlets present themselves. This same cash flow has reduced the confidence these farmers might feel for the Fulbe herders who used to manage their animals on full transhumance: nowadays such Fulbe are expected to sell off some of the farmers' animals in a clandestine fashion to a marketing opportunity far to the northern end of their transhumant trajectory.

The colonial and post-colonial governments have not supported the

Macina Fulbe's claims to control the ponds on their stocking routes; they have not permitted the Macina Fulbe to police them themselves. Thus the farmers' herds (particularly the growing herds of the colon rice farmers, of the Niono Office du Niger perimeter just to the west of the Jafaraabe stocking route) sully up and drink up the ponds during and immediately after the rains.

The jooro's inability to control this situation has undermined his role somewhat. Nevertheless, once the Jafaraabe herds begin to assemble at the canal drain around Sokolo, preparing for the descent to the Niger River, the jooro's organizational guidance is sought.

No other herd is expected to move down the Jafaraabe stocking route (if not across it--as with the farmers' animals), until the herds in the Jafaraabe eggrigol has done so. So the timing of the entrance into the Delta of these following herds (Djenne, Uro-Modi, and then some non-Macina groups) is under the control of Jafaraabe. In timing their moves, the Jafaraabe group (i.e., the jooro) has to take a complex set of considerations into account.

These considerations are governed by the understanding that no herd moves ahead of the Jafaraabe's on its stocking route, or enters Delta pastures (Jafaraabe's and those beyond) from that route before [17] Jafaraabe's own animals have passed. Therefore it is in the interest of renewing its own pastures for the Jafaraabe group to delay. First of all, the perennial grasses of the floodplain can sustain heavy grazing later in the dry season if they have been left alone to develop their ramifying root structure for a sufficient period after the flood. Secondly, while the floodplain remains moist, it is in the further interest of those perennials gaining a strong root structure that the ground remain free of stampeding hooves until it is hard.

Unfortunately for the ecology, the Jafaraabe herds cannot delay as long as they would like.[18] As we have seen, the ponds along the stocking route to the south have been nearly used up by the recently proliferating farmers' herds. In addition to drinking and muddying up the water, these alien herds have destroyed the grazing around the pond. Therefore it is not only Jafaraabe, but also its allies who come behind it, who have to move quickly to the south. Once the watering possibilities of the Niger Valley have been reached, Jafaraabe has to move quickly along the chain of campsites (winde)[19] in its own Delta territory in order for its allies to accommodate themselves behind them. Later in the season, as we have seen, many of these same allies find Jafaraabe herds in need of their hospitality. The treatment they received during this bottleneck period of descent from the north is not forgotten. In this way Jafaraabe lets them onto the alluvial grasses by moving along almost as soon as they arrive. However, they then delay moving any further than is absolutely necessary for fear of what the cattle might do to the more recently flooded ground ahead of them, and for fear of what the lingering dampness might do to the health of their cattle. Thus the whole system waits for over a month,

over-grazing [21] what in French is called the zone d'attente, before the festive crossing of the Jaka effluent into the rest of the Delta.

Much of the western boundary of the Delta increasingly finds itself in a similar predicament at the time of the return. New quasi-sedentary herds have everywhere used up the stocking route ponds (and the surrounding pasture) during and immediately after the rain. Herds are coming south sooner and more quickly, spending the additional time in the zone d'attente, waiting for the crossing of the Jaka effluent (lumpal) into the grazing hegemony of the next community.

Luckily, this festive crossing is surrounded with such ceremonial significance that is invariably delayed beyond the time when the individual herd owner might wish: festive preparations have to be made, dignitaries invited, dates announced, women beautified, jewelry polished, prize steers painted, etc. The grasses to the east of the effluent are the beneficiaries of this delay, for until the leading group (Jafaraabe in this case) crosses the effluent, no other transhumant herds can graze this ground until the day after the leading groups have crossed. The following group (Djenne in this case) passes in front onto its own territory, where it is given twenty days of unmolested grazing before Jafaraabe's eggrigol can follow.

All these timings, delays, and crossings are coordinated by meetings of the senior herders (having left their towns to meet the youths with the returning herds), with their jooros, and then of the jooros of the cooperating communities meeting among themselves.

Herd Groupings

In retracing these seasonal movements, I have been careful to distinguish when decisions are made by the individual herd manager, and when they are made by the jooro's herding group.

At an intermediate level, between the seore herd and the jooro's laamu group, there is the transhuming unit (jan'e) in which three or four seore herds move as a coordinate unit. While the seore herd will be composed of the cattle of full brothers (if their combined holdings do not exceed the efficient operating size, 200-300 head, of a garti herd or, in rare cases, agnatic cousins (again, if individual holdings are small)) the jan'e transhuming unit will hardly ever be composed of the seore herds of agnates, brothers or cousins. When agnates split their holdings into separated seore herds, they invariably join up with separate jan'e transhuming units at the same time. These latter are more often composed of the seore herds of herd managers united by matrilateral ties first and patrilateral ties last.

Thus, at even a more basic level than the appropriation of laamu pasture hegemonies the solidarity of the patrilineal grouping is superseded. I would isolate two explanations for the emphasis on non-agnatic, matrilateral ties in the formation of jan'e transhuming units:

(a) Non-agnatic ties need reinforcement in binding together the pasture-owning communities as they are not automatically emphasized by cattle prestation, loaning and inheritance codes.

(b) Transhumance management, whether that of herds or of patures, is seen as qualitatively different from the personal accumulation of cattle wealth. An individual giving too much attention to the latter will not be an attentive cooperative herder. He will not be herding for the joy of it, but for the return of it. Such an outlook leads to risky divisiveness on the cattle trek. This herder will visibly be giving special attention to his own animals or the ones he expects[21] to inherit. He will consequently be neglecting the animals of others entrusted to his charge as well as animals in neighboring herds. One sign of a good herder is taken to be his ability to give equal care to all animals under his charge, regardless of who owns any one of them. Were agnates to move their herds side by side in a jan'e transhuming unit, these differences of ownership might be harder to ignore. Agnatic jealousies might incite one herder to let some animals of a collateral agnate get lost. Herding cooperation on the transhumance is essential for its success.

Conclusion

My purpose here has been to show how the range control system still largely in force in Macina is built up out of fundamental aspects of Fulbe social organization that are found among many non-Macina Fulbe pastoralists:

(a) The immersion of patrilineal, cattle-inheriting ties into the formation of a community in which members' rights have little to do with their lineage membership.

(b) The emphasis on a Fulbe cultural style with this open community as the arena for displaying that style; successful displays, and therefore reinforced community membership, transcend one's position in the lineal system of wealth allocation: the style requires that one act and dress in a certain way and that one own livestock (cattle in the cast of Jafaraabe), but it does not require that one be descended from a certain ancestor.[22]

These aspects of Fulbe social organization highlight its fundamental contradiction: the cooperative spirit necessary for transhumant and grazing success leads almost inevitably to wealth differences that threaten that spirit. However, this contradiction is recognized and more or less overcome by linking the herding spirit and pasture appropriation to ties that circumvent lineage--related wealth differences: culture and community.

NOTES

1. This paper was first presented at the 1978 meetings of the American Anthropological Association in Los Angeles on a panel chaired by Brian Spooner entitled "Current Issues in Pastoralism."

2. These field visits were undertaken as part of my employment by the Human Science division of the International Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA). I am grateful to Gunnar Haaland, head of that division, for including these treks in its program. I am also grateful to the livestock economist George Sacker for useful conversations between field visits, and to the animal scientist Trevor Wilson for joining me on the last of them. My legitimacy in the eyes of the Fulbe increased on this final visit when it was seen that I was accompanied by someone as knowledgeable about livestock, though in different ways, as they.

   I owe my introduction to these herds and the opportunity to follow them to Henk Breman, Abdramane Diallo and Gaoshu Traore of the Dutch-financed Production Primaire Sahelien pasture research project. These ecologists had been following the Jafaraabe herds, doing grazing studies, steadily since the previous season (1976). We all owed our rapport with the herders to Hamadi Dicko, of l'Institut d'Economie Rurale, who comes from one of Jafaraabe's leading families, and who introduced us all to the community. Of course, none of this would have been possible without the enthusiasm of Jafaraabe's own jooro, Hamdi Jagnya Bari, for this research on its pastoral economy.

3. These range from the highly stratified farming villages at Futa Jallon (Derman 1972) in Guinea to the egalitarian Wodaabe of Niger (Horowitz 1972). See Dupire 1970 for an interpretation of the earlier literature on the Fulbe. Azarya (1978) discusses this same phenomenon in analyzing the use of lineage politics by Fulbe aristocrats in areas of high social stratification (Northern Cameroun, Northern Nigeria, and the Futa Jallon area of Guinea).

4. Discussions of Fulbe "migrations" have yet to be adequately tempered with considerations of ethnic mobility into the Fulbe category. This process of ethnic change is receiving increasing documentation in the literature (Grayzel 1977).

5. The flooding of the Delta is affected by rainfall in the Upper Niger watershed as a whole particularly the headwaters in Guinea. Rainfall rarely exceeds 20 inches in the latitudes of the Delta itself.

6. Such topographic markers can be a mound, togguere, a steep bank, dengwel on an effluent, mayo, or the species change marking the boundary between higher, runde, pasture, on middle level, feya, or lower level, debare, grazing (Gallais 1967).

7. At that time most farmers were captives of the Fulbe, though not necessarily of pastoral Fulbe. The Dina increased the number of slaves brought into the Macina farming economy (Johnson 1976).

8. The Fulbe pastoralists at Jafaraabe, unlike many other groups of Macina Fulbe, do not transhume with small ruminants. They claim that they are obliged to enter the Delta earlier in the dry season than is appropriate for smaller ungulates. It is clear that sheep and goats would have difficulty crossing the Jaka effluent when the Jafaraabe cattle do (usually December)--it is still too high then.

9. Most of the ethnographic work on the Fulbe goes into great detail about these shared responsibilities in animals (Dupire 1963, 1970, Hopen 1958, Horowitz 1974, Reisman 1977).

10. Only women from groups with villages deep into the delta will sortie to accompany the transhumant herd (garti) at this time. Garti herds from further away will only have their young male herders as is the case with all Macina herds at other times of the year. Elders will only leave the village to meet with these herds when political or key management decisions were called for. I may have seen more of these herd visits than was customary as many of these elders would materialize in Jafaraabe village just when my ILCA Land Rover was heading back from the village to the garti herds.

    The life of the women who spend much if not all of the year in the home village is linked to that of the absent herding male in its distinctiveness relative to the surrounding agricultural and fishing population. Divided by physical space from each other, the Fulbe herder and woman keep the same social distance from the non-Fulbe whom they find themselves among (see Reisman 1971, Lewis n.d.).

11. Such a refusal is subtly made before the presentation is offered. Once it has been offered, however, a refusal would be an insult.

12. This is one "rational" explanation for the fabled Fulbe tendency to retain unproductive animals in their herds. While it should be emphatically pointed out that much of the Fulbe reluctance to sell animals is a myth reiterated by those anxious to discredit Fulbe management of the nation's pastoral wealth, it can be added that aged females and steers are occasionally retained in the transhumant herd for the perfectly rational purpose of calming the younger, more sexually alert animals. This calming influence can be of considerable labor-saving importance to the transhumant herder (Lewis n.d.).

13. If more of the family went with the garti on transhumance, the dunti could remain smaller than it already is. But, as we have seen, Sheku Ahmadu encouraged more citizens to remain sedentarized throughout the year. Furthermore, the dunti collectively were intended to

supply the rainy season milk needs of the empire as a whole. Undoubtedly, however, these dunti remained smaller than the Dina state may have liked. They are certainly of token size today. It whould be added, that through the politico-economic changes linked to the Dina many Fulbe acquired captives who could help them build the straw huts in which dunti cattle are kept at night to shield them from the flies and ticks of the wet season.

14. The ages of such "active" males varies as a function of the availability of herding labor and the herding labor needs of each herd unit (seore).

15. The Fulbe women at Jafaraabe sell nearly as much milk as they consume at all times of the year, even when they are left with a minimal number of cows (dunti) during the wet season.

16. Ecologists often cite the inability of annuals to go to seed, whether from continued drought or overgrazing as a cause for their disappearance from a zone (Pierre Hiernaux and Henk Breman personal communications).

17. In other parts of Macina, other groups must wait 10-12 days until the owning group has transhumed onto its own pastures.

18. Even so, the pastures used by the Macina Fulbe do not show the same overgrazing over a twenty-two span between aerial photographic coverage: 1953 (Institut de Géographie Nationale) - 1975 (International Livestock Center for Africa) (Personal communication Mark Heywood).

19. These sleeping points are as precisely defined as prime grazing space. The cattle will only accept to pause at night on ground that they find comfortable. In addition to refusing to camp with mosquitoes or thorns, the cattle will be restless if the ground itself is not sufficiently sandy.

20. It should be emphasized how this zone d'attente overgrazing was minimal when the Macina Fulbe had military control of the ponds along their own stocking routes.

21. Animals may be passed along one by one to an heir before the death of the former owner so that these heirs will not violate Fulbe norms by giving special preference to the lineage, as opposed to non-lineage, animals confided to them. Such preferences will already be spent on the smaller number of animals already in their possession on account of these early inheritance practices.

22. That the Fulbe identity is not fixed by lineage membership is put in an interesting way by Reisman:

The notion of lineage ... permits the Fulani to conceptualize their society, to classify themselves in relation to each other, but this classification is used in quite varied ways according to circumstances. The genealogical hierarchy of the lineages has no real effect on the political and social life of the country but establishes within this society of strong anarchic tendencies the notion of an order in which each individual has his place. Everything happens, then, as if being born into a lineage in Jelgoji society is like receiving a numbered ticket to a theater whose seats are not numbered and where, when you cross the threshold, you find no definite arena for the action to take place in. (1977:51).

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ARISTOCRATS AS SUBJECTS IN A MULTI-ETHNIC STATE

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The saying "Man cannot live by bread alone" undoubtedly has parallels in the wisdom of every human culture, including even that of the anthropologists. The common Western interpretation of the saying is that people need spiritual as well as physical sustenance; they need God's support as well as the fruits of their own labor. As atheist anthropologists we could interpret the saying to mean that man needs not only bread -- that is, food -- in order to live, but also the word "bread" -- that is, symbols and culture -- in order that the sensible world makes sense. Perhaps because we do not live any longer on bread, but on petroleum, flavored air, and money, the fundamental unity experienced by most peoples between the source of their livelihood and that of their spiritual values is not so obvious to us.

What do the pastoral Fulani of West Africa live on? The attempt to answer this question makes us realize that livelihood and food are not necessarily the same thing. For what the Fulani eat more of than anything else is nyiiri, millet in a form halfway between bread and porridge. Yet they do not normally view millet as being either their staff of life of their source of spiritual values. Rather, it is cattle that they perceive this way, despite the fact that milk is less important than millet in their diet and meat is rarely eaten. Although cattle are not the actual, direct source of food for Fulani pastoralists, either nomadic or semi-sedentary, the ownership and sale of cattle and their products play important roles in the satisfaction of material needs and in the perpetuation of Fulani social forms and values. This is most obvious

among the nomadic Fulani, who obtain their millet either by direct trade of milk and butter or with money from the sale of these products.

Among the semi-sedentary Fulani, such as the Jelgobe of Upper Volta with whom I have lived, the connection between having cattle and getting food is still less direct. In fact, whether there exists a solid link is a kind of puzzle which it will be one of the purposes of this paper to clarify. In Jelgobe society today there is no commercialization of milk and almost no selling of butter. Cattle are sold occasionally to get money for taxes, clothes, and consumer goods, but not to buy grain unless there has been crop failure. During the rainy season, when the cows have the most milk to give, herds are often split up for transhumance and people staying at home do not necessarily have milk in abundance; during the dry season the cows give little or no milk, so for at least half the year most people get from no milk to a few sips of milk per day. From an ecological point of view, it can be argued that despite this low degree of reliance on cattle for subsistence, having cattle confers on these Fulani certain advantages that pure agriculturalists don't have. The main ones are two: first, better health because of having more protein in the diet and because of the seasonal movement of the villages which would lead to more sanitary conditions in the settlements; second, the ability to survive on milk during a crop-growing season, since the mobility of a herd allows a person to cultivate a field in an area he has never been in before and thus take advantage of, rather than suffer from, the great micro-regional fluctuations in rainfall that characterize the Sahel ecological zone.

While these ecological advantages may be real, however, they do not at all enter into Jelgobe thinking on why they keep cattle, nor do they appear to be causal factors in the maintenance of the pastoral way of life. The most important fact about cattle, both from the Jelgobe point of view and in the force of its influence on Jelgobe culture, is that they are wealth. The Fula word for wealth is jawdi, which very probably derives form the verb "to go," yahude. Emile Benveniste has shown that Indo-European words for wealth often derive from roots meaning "to go," and it is significant that both in Fula and in Indo-European languages these words for wealth always apply to forms of wealth that can go of their own accord, namely animals and slaves. In the Jelgobe view, wealth has nothing to do with mere survival or even with having a better standard of living; rather, wealth allows one to act with "a touch of class", with munificence and pizzazz. At the same time, however, this wealth "that goes" seems to impose certain conditions on those who possess it or covet it. One is that a person must in some sense be "worthy" of wealth that he has, and another is that this worthiness is largely measured by the person's willingness and ability to seek and defend that wealth by fighting for it. This requirement does not imply that a person will be actually fighting most of the time. Rather, it means that he must continually symbolize his willingness to fight by acting so as to preserve his honor; in other words, by suppressing or overriding any manifestations of personal failing or weakness.

It is precisely because cattle are not merely the basis of subsistance -- and actually make a small and apparently inessential contribution to the food supply for many families -- that love of cattle can be dissociated, in Fulani thought, from concern with the satisfaction of basic survival needs. In fact, it is an essential part of the Fulani code of honor (pulaaku) that a person appear to be above such mundane concerns as the need to eat, drink, defecate or sleep. We think of milk as an excellent food to satisfy hunger and thirst, while for the Fulani it is akin to divine ambrosia; they experience the very availability of milk not as a matter of having enough to eat but as a symbol of having cattle and thus of belonging to a superior class of people. This idea is vividly expressed in a speech by a nineteenth century Macina Fulani mother to her son when he managed to return home alive after having been robbed by the Bambara of the cattle he was guarding during transhumance. The young man had been presumed killed while defending the herd and his family was in mourning for him when, a week later, he sneaked into the village at night.

"Who are you?" asked his mother, surprised.

"I'm your son, Allay Ceeno."

"Where are your cows and your comrades?"

"Captured and led off to Segou."

"And you are still among the living!" And worse yet, you take advantage of the shameful complicity of darkness to slither in like a snake and appear before your wife and me, who shed proud tears for you as a hero and who were wearing mourning for you as if you had fallen a martyr to your duty? A Fulani who loses his herd is a prince who loses his crown. Shame on us! Listen, unnatural herdsman: Ilo, the pastoral poet and brother to Canaba, the python who is king of cattle, has said, "Oh young herdsman with braided tresses, when a herd and a kingdom are there for the taking, give your life to conquer them, and when they are threatened, give your life again to defend them." Allay Ceeno slunk off, crying, and was never heard from again (Ba and Daget, 1962:91).

For the pastoral Fulani, then, having herds is not only essential to their identity as Fulani, but is also the basis for and legitimation of the sense of superiority they have in relation to other ethnic groups. But this sense of ethnic identity expresses itself in somewhat different ways in different political contexts. This fact emerges in a striking manner when we examine the changes in the way the Jelgobe have responded to and made use of the Mossi, their most important neighbors, during the past two or three hundred years.

When the first Jelgobe families arrived in the Djibo area perhaps as early as 1570, the Mossi kingdom of Yatenga was still quite small and was not yet centered as far north as Ouahigouya. The Kurumba were the dominant population numerically and probably politically, though there

was a strong Sonrai presence in the village of Tigné, which was governed by a branch of the same families that ruled Hombori and Gao. The Jelgobe immigrants were married into the Jallo clan in Boni, Mali, and had wandered into the Djibo region herding Jallube cattle which had been entrusted to them. For reasons not clear from the oral traditions, the Jelgobe decided not to return to Boni. Perhaps they felt that they could gain their independence from the Jallube by submitting themselves to the chief of Tigné; for that is what they actually did. When the Jallube came to try to get their cattle back, the chief of Tigné prevented them from doing it. According oral traditions, the Jelgobe remained with the chiefs of Tigné for forty-eight years and had no chiefdom of their own. If the genealogies I have are correct, however, the actual length of time was two to three generations, for it wasn't until sometime between 1750 and 1790 that the Jelgobe fought and defeated the Sonrai and the Kurumba and became masters of the region known as Jelgoji.

Many oral traditions mention the important Mossi chief Naba Kango, who played a major role in the expansion and consolidation of the Mossi state of Yatenga. But these traditions associate this chief with events that could not have happened during his reign because they occurred after his death. It is possible that Naba Kango's fame was so great that for outsiders any important deeds were considered to be his because his was the best known name. Another possibility, however, is that Naba Kango had a role of some kind in the war between the Jelgobe and the Sonrai and Kurumba (even though oral traditions don't associate his name with this particular event) since, according to Michel Izard, Naba Kango not only ruled Yatenga at this time (1757-1787) but also did engage in some military expenditions in the region. Izard cites Frobenius as saying that the Jelgobe called Naba Kango to help them shake off the dominance of the chief of Hombori. I suspect that this was not the Jallo chief who had ruled the Jelgobe in Boni (as Izard thinks), but rather the Sonrai chief who was a relative and ally of the chief of Tigné (see Izami, 1970, vol. 2:328). It was Naba Kango who founded Ouahigouya as the capital of Yatenga, and though the Jelgobe never became his subjects or vassals, they did appeal to the Mossi for help on two other crucial occasions in their history, as we shall see.

Let's stop a moment and look at what seems to be going on. Mythic as the events just recounted may be -- they occurred as long ago as the founding of our own country -- they appear to initiate a pattern which recurs both in more solidly established historical data and in the data of my own observation among the Jelgobe. Succinctly stated, the pattern is that mastery -- or at least independence -- is attained not by achieving unity and a strong sense of purpose in the group, but by calling on powerful external forces and playing them off against one another. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Jelgobe had gotten free of the Jallube by appealing to the Sonrai and Kurumba, and they had gotten free of the latter rulers perhaps with the help of the Mossi. It might almost be said that rather than filling a political vacuum, the Jelgobe were creating one for themselves in which their tendencies to anarchy and group fission

could have free play. Now, these tendencies are, I believe, a direct consequence of the commitment to cattle-raising under sahelian conditions, since mobility, dispersal, and independent decision-making are not only advantageous for the mutual well-being of cattle and people, but also sometimes necessary for their survival.

During much of the nineteenth century, the Jelgobe found themselves surrounded by expansionist political systems: the Fulani empires of Sokoto and Macina to the east, north, and north-west, and the Mossi kingdom of Yatenga to the west and southwest. The Jelgobe did not join in the holy wars that founded the Fulani states, I think, because, unlike the Fulani of Sokoto, Liptako, and Macina, they were not at this time an oppressed minority in a region dominated by another ethnic group. Ba and Daget say that Jelgoji was a part of the Macina empire of Sheeku Aamado, but I never heard anything to that effect during my stay in Jelgoji. Rather than unite for defense against these expansionist forces, the Jelgobe, who had already long been divided into the two chiefdoms of Baraboullé and Djibo, fought against each other, rustled one another's cattle, and went on countless raids for booty and glory against other peoples as well, both Fulani and non-Fulani. It is my contention that it was in part the strength and stability of the Mossi kingdom of Yatenga that guaranteed the survival of the more factional, anarchic polity of the Jelgobe. This was possible because, on the one hand, the Mossi had a powerful and fearsome army that was capable of fighting a long distance from home, while on the other hand the state was in no way capable of imposing a different way of life on the Jelgobe (and other Fulani). Until the colonial conquest, it seems that the banner of Islam alone had the capability, if only temporarily, of integrating many pastoral Fulani groups into a single political organization where deference to a non-kinsman did not mean defeat and dishonor.

In about the middle of the nineteenth century, though the sources are somewhat contradictory on the date, an army from Macina invaded Jelgoji. Both oral tradition and Ba and Daget say that this invasion was a response to a request by one faction within a chiefdom, though other aspects of the situation they describe are quite different. The sources agree, however, that what actually happened was a disaster for everybody. On the pretext of holding a peace negotiation with the young men of the leading families, the Macina general invited them into a walled enclosure that had been specially built for the occasion. Forty (or forty-four) unarmed men went inside; there they were overpowered by armed soldiers who slit all their throats. Word was immediately sent to the Mossi king at Ouahigouya. This was probably Naba Yemde, as Michel Izard's chronology and the genealogical record I have both place this event under his reign. Within a few days a large Mossi army came from Ouahigouya and took the Macina army by surprise. The latter were routed and many of the men were killed or captured. What is not clear is what happened to the Mossi army afterward. Some accounts are silent, with the implication that the Mossi simply returned home. Others, such as Ba and Daget (1962:172), suggest that the Mossi tried to take over Jelgoji, but that the inhabitants

shortly rose up against them and massacred them as badly as the Mossi had massacred the army from Macina. This version is supported by the fact that a well-known song exists concerning a great battle between the Jelgobe and the Mossi around the pond of Djibo. The refrain goes:

> People flocked to the waters of the great pond of power.
> God watched over it until the dawn,
> Broad blades guarded it all day long,
> Who comes in peace, let him drink and wash;
> Who comes for evil, let him drink blood.

Doubtless both the Macina leaders and the Mossi kings had good reasons of their own for bothering with Jelgoji. Izard's interpretation for the Mossi is that the latter were afraid of any nearby expansion of the pan-Islamic, Fulani empire. From the Jelgobe point of view, however, the Mossi interventions were always seen as a response to a local call for help, and the eventual retreat or withdrawl of the Mossi was proof of Fulani superiority in cunning, courage, and even righteousness. This interpretation is supported by analysis of a further Mossi intervention in Jelgoji that must have occurred around 1883, during the reign of Yatenga Naba Woboga (1877-1884). Here again, in the Jelgobe view, this was not an unprovoked invasion, but a response to a call for help -- in this case from a person who wanted to assume the chiefship in Baraboulle. He took advantage of a time when the leading warriors and chiefs of the region had gone off the Téra, in what is now Niger, to help the chief of Dori sack that city. The Mossi army came and attacked Baraboullé; though many of Baraboullé's finest warriors were killed that day, the Jelgobe were ultimately able, by somewhat miraculous means, to reverse the tide of battle and kill or drive the Mossi all the way back to their own territory.

During the first hundred years of their relations with the Mossi, then, from the late eighteenth century until the late nineteenth century, the Jelgobe could maintain their sense of superiority to the Mossi without losing the benefits of being within their sphere of influence. The fact that the Mossi had a superior political organization and could field a larger army did not in the least undermine the Jelgobe attitude towards them. For the Fulani, it was other Fulani and Tuareg who were the most worthy opponents; useful as the Mossi army might be when called in to help one group of Jelgobe sieze power from another, the Mossi ethnic group was seen essentially as a race of potential slaves. But while these attitudes and tactics preserved Jelgobe independence in the nineteenth century, they contributed to a bloodless takeover by the French at the turn of the century. When the Jelgobe tried to make use of French might in their factional struggles, they discovered to their dismay that the French were staying and had no intention of going back where they came from.

Under the colonial regime which began, for the Jelgobe, in 1898, and in the post-independence period, which began in 1960, Jelgobe attitudes towards the Mossi have undergone an interesting shift. On one level, the attitudes have remained just what they were before. A dramatic example

of this point was given me by one of the best oral historians I worked with, a descedent of slaves of Djibo. When I asked him to tell me about the fight between the Jelgobe and the Mossi he said, regretfully,

> I don't dare, Paul, I just don't dare. I'm not a betrayer. I don't dare do that... You don't know what we are like. The Jelgobe don't like that. Besides, I'm just a commoner since I'm not required to get mad at another person. No, I don't dare, Paul my friend, and I wouldn't lie to you. Anything you want that doesn't involve Jelgobe scandal is fine with me, because they have power over me and won't leave me alone. I know their power over me, for I'm just a commoner, Paul. I don't dare talk about them and Yatenga -- though I might if we were somewhere else -- but as for them, no sirree. I myself saw the evil of this quarrel almost come to pass. I was present recently when the Yatenga Naba, on visit here, alluded to those events and the thing just barely didn't explode. You know it was prince Haruna (of Baraboulle) and the Mossi chief who came close to killing each other over this just a few houses away from here. They were ready to kill each other. Tell that story? The Jelgobe wouldn't tolerate it.

The lively memories and powerful feelings connected with these past events, however, are colored and subdued by the fact that the Mossi, who are the dominant population in the Upper Voltan state, have slipped into the role of colonizer vis-a-vis the Jelgobe today. In the town of Djibo, which is largely made up Riimaaybe descendents of slaves of the Fulani, it is now "in" to speak More even though everyone's native language is Fulfulde. But the Jelgobe herdsmen of the surrounding hamlets do not learn More. What would have been disdain for the language fifty or one-hundred years ago, however, now expresses itself as puzzled and almost hurt ignorance. The proud and defiant anarchism, which founded Jelgobe independence and at the same time made possible the success of their pastoralism, appears as backwardness and rigid traditionalism in the context of modernization and economic development.

In the 1940's, for example, when the colonial government began to require people to send their children to school, the Jelgobe either bribed the schoolmaster with a gift of a cow to be able to keep their children, or sent the children of slaves in the place of their own. Today, these slave children have often become petits fonctionnaires in the local government, and some of them have risen to higher positions in the Voltan administrative system. I have the distinct impression that they enjoy the many opportunities they have to harrass their former masters with administrative details like renewal of out-of-date identity cards. It is thus not merely governmental dragging of feet that is keeping the Jelgobe from getting more and better schools. While most Mossi villages today have schools, most Fulani villages do not. A Jelgobe village chief said to me in 1975 that he was unhappy with the government's decision to build a school in his village. Though he, and other Jelgobe, are aware that the

Mossi have in a sense replaced the European in the state administrative system, few Jelgobe believe that joining that system is a meaningful option for them. On the psychological level, the feeling still persists that it is demeaning to enter into competition with people whom one perceives as social inferiors. An even more important reason for not entering that competition, however, may be that the rewards of the new economic and political order are seen as antithetical to the cattle-herding ethos.

The Jelgobe today often refer to themselves as backward, as "bush" people, and they even describe some of their characteristics, such as their inability to cooperate, as "bad." These attitudes, I believe, are simply the logical transformations, due to a changed context, of the pride and distinctiveness they used to feel when they were their own masters. It may seem a little crazy -- or at least self-defeating -- for them to stay on the sideline while other ethnic groups forge ahead in the competition for education, foreign aid grants, and political dominance. A closer look at the Jelgobe's ecological situation suggests, however, that their behavior is not crazy -- though it is too early to say whether it is self-defeating. We noted above that a key aspect of the Fulani ethos was to view cattle not as a mere source of food, but rather as the source for the distinctiveness and superiority of their way of life. We saw that in an earlier era, a Fulani who had no cattle was not considered a worthy Fulani. Then, as now, taking care of cattle required a willingness to endure much physical hardship and the ability to resist the temptation to cash in on the market value of the animals in return for comfort and luxury. Today, though there is no longer any need to defend the cattle against thieves and warriors, or even wild animals, the temptations to buy comfort and luxury have increased immeasurably. The Jelgobe are under many pressures, both obvious and subtle, to take a more businesslike, commercial attitude towards cattle-herding. But to adopt such an attitude would, in the short run, probably lead to massive selling of cattle and exodus to the cities. Possibly, then, we are in the presence of a total system's defence of the pastoral way of life in a drastically changed economic and political context.

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CACHEZ LA VACHE: MOSSI CATTLE, FULBE KEEPERS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ETHNICITY

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This paper dicusses relations between Mossi peasants and Fulbe herders in the canton of Oueguedo in the Sous-Préfecture of Tenkodogo in the Centre-Est Préfecture of Upper Volta. The Tenkodogo Sous-Préfecture corresponds in area to the pre-1974 Cercle of the same name; both are roughly equivalent to the pre-colonial Mossi state of Tenkodogo. Two separate research projects form the basis of this report. In 1971-72 Finnegan, a social anthropologist, studied the impact of labor migration and population movement on the social structure of the Mossi village of Kougsabla (Kugsabla on Map 2.)[1] Kougsabla lies at the eastern edge of the canton, some 5 km. from the village of Oueguedo (Wedhgo on Map 2.). The village was chosen for study because its population is not of royal or chiefly descent; indeed, it is inhabited by the descendants of clients or slaves. Delgado, an agricultural economist, studied Mossi peasants in Oueguedo village, site of the canton chief, in 1976, and Fulbe herders living under his jurisdiction, in 1977.[2] His research specifically concerned Mossi farming and its relationship to Fulbe herding. In this paper Finnegan contributed the theoretical material on ethnicity and Mossi states, and ethnographic material. Delgado supplied the conclusions concerning the economic relationships between Mossi and Fulbe. (For further details, see Delgado 1977, 1978, 1979, and Finnegan 1976, 1978, and 1980.)


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TENKODOGO IN AFRICA
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Upper Volta
DORI
OUAHIGOUYA
OUAGADOUGOU
DIAPAGA
BOBO DIOULASSO
TENKODOGO
scale: 1/8 000 000
0 40 200 km

MAP 1



Map 2. Tenkodogo Region: Mossi-Bisa Division. *(Jean Bernard 1966: Map 4)*



Map 3. Mossi States at French Conquest 1896. *(M Izard 1970, facing p.388)*

Discussions of Image and Reality in relations between Tenkodogo Mossi and Fulbe mean revising the picture in the literature previously established and noting how it is currently undergoing change. Finnegan shows how Mossi-Fulbe relations were affected by their common membership in the Tenkodogo state, and suggests the importance of this case for theories of ethnicity. Delgado addresses the image of Fulbe, and of Fulbe-Mossi relations, held by certain development officials and expatriate authorities. He argues that certain assumptions (and policies) about the desirability of Mossi agricultural change in the direction of cattle-raising are incorrect. He supports on economic grounds the existing division of labor on ethnic lines between stockraising and cropping, and underlines the essential role of Fulbe herdsmen in the Mossi farming system.

The Tenkodogo Mossi and Fulbe lived in a multi-ethnic kingdom, which, besides them, included large numbers of Bisa (sometimes described by the Mossi term for them, Boussance), Yarsé traders, blacksmiths, and various fringe-Mossi groups. Interethnic relations in Mossi states remain poorly analyzed in the literature. This is so for two reasons: Mossi states have too often been described as more unitary and centralized than they really were, so that ethnic variation within them is not dwelt upon. Also, the historic circumstances of much theoretical concern with "ethnicity" in Africa--urbanization and social change--obscures the role of long-standing, stable multi-ethnic systems.

The Mossi have been described in general works on Africa as though there was only one Mossi kingdom (cf. Thompson and Adloff 1958:30; Webster and Boahen 1970:87, 233; Martin and O'Meara 1977:88, 135); the Moro Naba of Ouagadougou, the largest state, is sometimes referred to as "Emperor of the Mossi." Most writings that display awareness that Mossi political organization was more complicated are limited to mentioning the three formally independent states of Tenkodogo and its junior (but bigger and historically more powerful) offshoots Ouagadougou and Yatenga (with Fada-N'Gourma sometimes added as a fourth.) Only M. Izard, whose work is the most detailed of all Mossi studies, labels the 15 dependencies and buffer states with the same term as the three main ones: he calls all kingdoms (royaumes.) (Izard 1970 and Map 3 of this paper.)

There are several reasons for this usual oversimplification, that go beyond avoiding confusing details. To Mossi, the three states are conceptually different; it is only at the level of political process that reality diverges from ideal. Almost all the published research on the Mossi, and all but the most recent, reports fieldwork done in royal or district capitals; all historic and ethnographic writing by Mossi is by members of royal lineages or those of court functionaries. The bulk of the literature on the Mossi, then, may overemphasize the perspective of those at the centers of traditional power. (Cf. Finnegan 1976: 60 for citations.) Such a perspective is the more important, given that all writing save the earliest explorers was done after the French conquest in 1897, when the kingdoms no longer functioned as they had. A result of all this is that less

attention has been paid to ordinary folk--of whatever ethnicity--in the kingdoms and non-Mossi groups encapsulated within them.

There is material on the "Mossification" of froniter groups. (Cf. Finnegan 1976: 35-38, 144-7 for a review.) A good amount has been written on the Yarsé, the Moré (Mossi)-speaking traders of Mande origin who lost all non-Mossi traits and language save their propensity for long-distance trade and its corollary Islam. (Izard 1971 is a good source.) But Mossification is seen as a process (ending in the creation of ordinary Mossi) and the Yarsé are simultaneously the best-known example of, and the exception to, assimilation-by-Mossification and the general Mossi resistance to Islam. (Finnegan 1978)

Relatively little is written on the states as political structures encompassing a range of ethnic groups. The case of the least-known kingdom, Tenkodogo, is notable in this regard. Other than the work of the present authors, little has been published on this state: Anon, 1944, Balima 1970, and Kawada 1968 and 1979. It turns out that the lack of information has prevented recognition that Tenkodogo as a Mossi state differs in several cultural respects from the better-known cases of Ouagadougou and Yatenga--a difference not least in the area of ethnic diversity.

Tenkodogo is traditionally the original Mossi state, founded by cavalry from the Dagomba state to the south. Dating the foundation of the Mossi states has been the subject of much controversy, depending as it does on reconciling king lists, putative length of reign, and occasional mentions in Arabic histories. In a major survey of th · field, Izard was unable to date the founding of the Tenkodogo dynasty ea ıier than c. 1650 AD (vs. 1495 and 1540 for Ouagadougou and Yatenga; Izard 1970: 100, 225.) For our purposes, whether one talks of the 1300s or the 1600s, there has been a Mossi state centered on Tenkodogo for some hundreds of years--long enough to have evolved a stable political system and certainly long enough to have "Mossified" the inhabitants.

In fact, accepting modern administrative units as roughly equivalent in area to the precolonial kingdom, 63% of the Tenkodogo population is Bisa, a people of Mande origin surrounded by Voltaic peoples. (Cf. Maps 2 & 3) The Moré-speaking Bisa within Tenkodogo state differ linguistically from their fellow ethnics in the independent Bisa zone to the west, along the White Volta river; to this degree they are Mossified. However, from the point of view of Tenkodogo Mossi the Bisa are Bisa, not Mossi. Objectively, compared with their Mossi fellow-citizens, Tenkodogo Bisa have different burial and widow-remarriage customs, as well as distinctive surnames and (as shown below) a greater openness about admitting cattle ownership. The Bisa are well integrated into the kingdom; there are Bisa chiefs ruling territories rather than merely their co-ethnics (in contrast to the Fulbe chiefs mentioned below). Bisa and Mossi intermarry freely; Finnegan's data from Kougsabla, a mostly Mossi village (with one Bisa household) showed 33% of 309 in-married wives and 12% of 149 husbands

of village women to be Bisa, in a several-generation sample. (Finnegan 1976: 148-152).

Besides these historical considerations, a second major reason for raising the issue of ethnicity in relation to Tenkodogo is the situational nature of such identity. In one of the most widely-cited theoretical essays on ethnicity, F. Barth has written:

> ...regarded as a status, ethnic identity is superordinate to most other statuses, and defines the permissible constellations of statuses, or social personalities, which an individual with that identity may assume. In this respect ethnic identity is similar to sex and rank, in that it constrains the incumbent in all his activities, not only in some defined social situations. (Barth 1969: 17)

The Voltaic literature seems a clear exception (if not a challenge) to this generalization.

It was with reference in part to Mossi and other Voltaic peoples that Jean Rouch coined the term "supertribalism" to describe transformations and consolidations of ethnic identities among migrants in southern Ghana. (Rouch 1956: 163-64)

In recent Upper Volta politics there have been two instances when national leaders (respectively political and religious) were accused by Mossi opponents of not being Mossi (both were) because each came from a frontier-Mossi area. (Finnegan 1976: 144-45; cf. Skinner 1970b; 115, 1974: 340-41, and 1970a: 192) Finnegan found several instances of individuals or whole lineages changing clan identity; in at least one major case the change included ethnicity as well, from "Gourounsi" (the Mossi catch-all term for the stateless Voltaic peoples to their south, whom they raided for slaves.)[3] (Finnegan 1976: 125-6)

The Tenkodogo state was founded in ethnic diversity, which remains. The pre-Mossi inhabitants, the Bisa, have not lost their identity in hundreds of years of Mossi rule. They are not the autochthonous peoples like the Talse or Ninisi elsewhere in the Mossi states, who are contrasted as Mossi commoners descended from the original, pre-state inhabitants, and distinguished from the chiefs (who are descended from immigrant horsemen). The formal opposition between earth-priest/owner and secular ruler, for which the Voltaic cultures are so well known(Cf. Goody 1971: 64-66) did not exist in Tenkodogo. The Bisa were not assimilated to the degree of taking this structural role, despite the other ways they were incorporated.

The Bisa have been exposed to Mossi rule in Tenkodogo for centuries. So too have the Fulbe discussed in this paper. Delgado cites research dating the arrival of the Oueguedo Fulbe in the canton in the 18th century, coming from Macina in what is now Mali. (Delgado 1978a:

35) Their descendants, then, are not only incorporated into the Tenkodogo state, they are and have been tied to one district chieftaincy for at least 200 years.

These Oueguedo Fulbe do some farming. Their houses are less permanent than the mud-brick Mossi ones,[4] but are shifted within a spatially and legally limited area. Only to the extent that they move cattle from one pasture to another are these Fulbe "nomadic."

Elsewhere in the Mossi states, such "settled" Fulbe are called by the hyphenated term Silmi-Mossi, combining the Moré words for Fulbe (silmissi) and Mossi. (Skinner 1964: 12; Hammond 1966: 16; Schildkraut 1978: 31; all these authorities define the Silmi-Mossi as descendants of Mossi fathers and Fulbe mothers, but such unions being rare--Hammond says "now regarded...as prohibited"---what seems noteworthy to the Mossi is settled and incorporated Fulbe practicing some agriculture.) In Tenkodogo, however, the term Silmi-Mossi was unknown; Fulbe of two hundred years' standing in the community were referred to by the same term --Silmissi--as the "independent" Fulbe north of the Mossi described in Riesman's paper in this collection.

What, then, does all this mean? In noting that African studies of ethnicity are too often bound up with studies of migration, Abner Cohen describes long-standing, stable migration patterns and says "in many situations migrancy is not a developmental phase but a structural status." (1969-xiv) We would adopt and adapt his phrase and assert that, at least in Tenkodogo, ethnicity is not a developmental phase (under "Mossification") but a structural status.[5] Cohen goes on to argue that "in the idiom of research, ethnicity is a variable" (contrary to Barth, as quoted above) and "one way to make a start is to analyze ethnicity in terms of interconnections with economic and political relationships." (1969:xv)

Such a perspective seems especially apt for Tenkodogo and the other Mossi states: a cultural definition of ethnicity is inappropriate to a situation in which some people in some places are Mossified and in others are not. Typing ethnicity to political considerations is necessary in a culture area noted for having both state and stateless societies. Local social structure and subsistence farming are broadly the same throughout the Voltaic area; it is political structure which differentiates, say, the Mossi from the Tallensi.

Finally, in the case of the Tenkodogo Fulbe, just as the trading role of the Yarsé kept their ethnicity intact despite minimal cultural distinction from other Mossi, it is economic specialization (caring for Mossi cattle) which accounts for their sharp ethnic separation from surrounding Mossi society. Their religion--Islam--is shared with the Yarsé (and, nowadays, with many ordinary Mossi). The third diagnostic characteristic of Fulbe in many parts of West Africa (and even in northern Upper Volta; cf. Riesman's paper), claims to ruling or aristocratic status, is clearly not present in a system where Mossi rule Fulbe and each chief

(see below) has "his" Fulbe. If their political status is subordinate, their religion not unique, and their culture at least as potentially susceptible to assimilation over time as that of the Yarsé, the Fulbe in Tenkodogo have a notable sharp identity which must be grounded in their economic function. We shall show in this paper that it is useful for Mossi to have a major kind of wealth--cattle--in the hands of specialists who are not Mossi, who are not any kind of kinsman and whose ties to government (whether traditional or modern) are more tenuous and less trusting. We now turn in detail to our own research.

At the moment of French conquest in 1897, Tenkodogo was involved in war with the neighboring state of Koupela, to the north. Koupela was a dependency of another state, itself nominally subject to the Ouagadougou kingdom. To be matched evenly in a war with a second-degree dependency shows the gap between the place of Tenkodogo in Mossi tradition and its realpolitik weakness.

This weakness affected Mossi-Fulbe relations. Tenkodogo Mossi raided the stateless "Gourounsi" to their south and southwest, but were themselves raided by Koupela. Sometimes captives could be ransomed back with a "sister" given in marriage, but often they were sold to the Fulbe areas north of the Mossi states, around Djibo and Dori. (Cf. Riesman 1977: 262-3) A returned ex-slave from the north was credited with introducing Islam to the village studied by Finnegan, in the 1930s. Another ex-slave, who remained in the north, provided a refuge for several kinsmen during the 1940s when French indirect rule in Kougsabla was especially harsh.

The geographic location of Tenkodogo also affected Mossi-Fulbe relations. An important trade route passes through Tenkodogo (and Kougsabla) to the most important Mossi marketplace, Pouytenga in Koupela. Because of this route, the area has a heavy concentration of Yarsé. Studies of Yatenga Yarsé disagree as to whether they are endogamous, but those in Tenkodogo certainly marry other Mossi. In fact, Kougsabla exhibited a statistically significant (albeit unexplained) preference for marrying Yarsé women. (Finnegan 1976: 165-66, Appendix III) For Kougsabla, at least, contact with Yarsé brought Mossi into contact with Islam and with long-distance trade, and thereby into contact with Fulbe. The Kougsabla/Tenkodogo cattle trader, mentioned below as having had one of the few Fulbe wives married to a Mossi, is a villager who exploited matrilateral Yarsé kin to become a long-distance trader himself.

The Tenkodogo state contained, and contains, two kinds of Fulbe. There were, and are, the long-distance cattle traders, for whom Tenkodogo town was the site of a political power controlling trade routes and remains the center for customs and veterinary services which regulate the modern trade. These traders are as likely as not regarded as foreigners, "Malians," who come into contact generally only with Mossi officials or those in the cattle business. There are also the Fulbe settled

among the Mossi, whom we have already introduced, serving as herders of Mossi cattle as well as their own. It is these that Delgado studies, and who provide the main context for Mossi-Fulbe relations at the village level. These Fulbe are localized to the extent of having allocated land on which they farm as well as pasture.

Politically, both Mossi and Fulbe were subject to a hierarchical system. Tenkodogo was divided into sectors, for which different ministers in the king's court were responsible. These sectors in turn were divided into districts, roughly equivalent to modern cantons, whose chiefs ruled a number of villages (20, in the case of Oueguedo), each with its own chief. Oueguedo has a population of about 6000 people. "Official" villages for census and fiscal purposes may aggregate socially or historically discrete villages, and Fulbe are counted separately from non-Fulbe in a given community. Statistical precision is further compromised because not all villages in a given cantor are "of" it: some villages report (and pay taxes) directly to the royal court, bypassing the district/canton chief. This situation was present in the traditional state as well as the modern republic. Because Oueguedo lies on the frontier with Koupela, it contains several such villages, directly commanded by the king because of their former military importance. The residents of these "strategic hamlets" interact freely with Oueguedo neighbors and kin, but are counted in the figures for the much larger Tenkodogo canton. Finally, population figures are imprecise because people as well as livestock are taxed: it is less easy to conceal a child than a cow, but it occurs, especially with female children less likely to be enrolled in school (for which a birth certificate is required).

In 1976 the government estimated Oueguedo's population at 5685, of whom 167 were Fulbe. Additional Fulbe (and Mossi) lived in the directly ruled villages of Pouswaka (studied by Delgado) and Pedogo (studied by Finnegan). In the overall region, Fulbe make up some 4% of the population, with 37% Mossi and 59% Bisa. (1976 estimates; Delgado 1978: 18)

Fulbe camps are scattered in brush areas between Mossi villages. The canton chief appoints a Fulbe chief over all Fulbe in his jurisdiction. This was true precolonially, and remains so today. Canton chiefs each have "their" Fulbe, a qualifier still in use today. (Delgado notes that being referred to in this way galls the Fulbe more than any other term. 1978a: 36) The canton chief through the Fulbe chief, allocates land for Fulbe and their herds. Delgado reports no case from Oueguedo of Fulbe having been displaced to make way for Mossi farms, although he observed this 30 km. to the south. However, he does note increasing Mossi-Fulbe conflict over cattle disturbing "bush" fields (as opposed to the fields in and around villages), as population pressure forces Mossi to open up additional land for cultivation. (Delgado 1977: 10, 56)

While Mossi and Fulbe are part of the same political system(s), and are linked economically, there is little other social interaction. Delgado

notes that Fulbe received help from Muslim Mossi neighbors in cooperative work tasks like threshing or wall-building, and gave such help in return. The Fulbe he interviewed, however, were unanimous in stating that they did not give such help to the owners of cattle they tended, except in one case where the owner was also a neighbor. (1977: 45) In Finnegan's data, only 3 of 34 social gatherings (threshings and other cooperative work groups, weddings, and funerals) numbered Fulbe among the guests. The guests at the well-attended funeral of a Moslem marabout in Kougsabla included a Fulbe schoolteacher, and two threshings for Muslim villagers brought Fulbe from Pedogo, 2 km. NE. The Fulbe numbered 3 out of 33, and one of 29 guests, respectively.

Intermarriage is equally rare. Delgado states it to be between Fulbe and Muslim Mossi, if it occurs at all. He also notes that two Fulbe household heads in a sample of twenty had second wives who were Mossi, while he never heard of a Mossi marrying a Fulbe woman. He says that it is difficult to imagine a Mossi peasant whose wife is reluctant to work in the fields. (1977: 23)

Finnegan recorded 6 Fulbe women marrying into Kougsabla, out of 309 in-marrying wives, and no Fulbe among the 149 husbands (past or present) of Kougsabla women. This low incidence is the more notable given the otherwise wide range of spouse ethnicity. We have mentioned above the high proportion of Yarsé and Bisa wives in Kougsabla. Only 44.3% of the 309 recorded wives were Mossi, and only 51% of the husbands of Kougsabla women, when Yarsé are counted separately from Mossi. When Koupéla Mossi are distinguished (as they are by Kougsabla people), the villagers married spouses from 10 different ethnic groups or subgroups. (Finnegan 1976: table IV-3)

Only two of the six Mossi-Fulbe marriages were "normal," arranged marriages with family consent. One was between a successful cattle trader and the daughter of a wealthy (El Hadji) Fulbe cattle dealer. The other involved a villager who has become a cattle raiser in "Dori," north of Mossi country. The other four cases involved elopements, and one of those was between urban, elite migrants rather than rural villagers. Three of the six marriages have ended in divorce. A Kougsabla Mossi, stating why Mossi do not marry Fulbe, said that "Fulbe women prefer cows, and won't marry someone without cows. Even today they won't cultivate--they just milk and go." (29 x: 5)

The major relationship between village Mossi and semi-sedentary Fulbe is that of cattle-keeping. Mossi own various kinds of livestock. Most families have sheep and goats, some, principally Christians, have a few pigs. Traders traditionally had donkeys for export and as transport; today donkeys are in limited use for plow and cart traction. The political elite had horses, the traditional basis of military power and a definite status symbol. Kougsabla in 1971-72 had only one horse, a gift from the Tenkodogo king to a renowned shaman (tiimsoba). Chiefs even today, including the Oueguedo Naba, are mounted on certain ritual occasions.

The economic elite owned cattle. But the treatment of cattle differed (and differs today) from other livestock. Sheep, goats, pigs, and donkeys are kept in or near one's compound, visible to all. Likewise, horses are kept by those lucky or powerful enough to own them, and to command the labor to bring fodder to them: horses are not grazed.

Mossi cattle, however, are not raised by their owners. They are instead kept by Fulbe. There are several reasons for this practice: It puts the animals in the hands of specialists, and specialists able to move the cattle as grazing demands, without regard to demands of village farming. It puts the herds away from settled areas, minimizing crop damage and in former times making it easier to hide herds from raiders. The practice of dividing a large herd between several Fulbe maximizes security from loss by disease or theft. Most importantly, however, the practice keeps Mossi cattle ownership secret, both from one's own family and from government tax collectors.

This is important: Mossi do not openly talk of their wealth, but barring modern elites with significant cash holdings, only cattle may be concealed from public view. Small stock may be counted as children bring them out to graze. Radios, tin roofs, motorbikes (not to mention mills, cars, and tractors) or opening a market stall all testify to their proprietor's economic position. Ownership of cattle does not.

Delgado compared cattle ownership in two communities of peasants in the Tenkodogo state: Bisa in the canton of Loanga, and Oueguedo Mossi. He notes that his Bisa and Mossi data are in theory comparable, but in fact Mossi estimates are far too small. His enumerators in the Mossi village made little effort to obtain figures relating to cattle holdings, since sample members were not enthusiastic about providing such information. (Delgado 1978:179) Not only did no-one admit to Finnegan that he owned cattle, only the informants with whom rapport was closest would state that someone else owned cattle, and even then would only hazard a guess. Mossi are no more desirous-- possibly less-- that their kinsmen and/or fellow villagers know their wealth than they want it known by tax collectors, anthropologists, or economists.

Finnegan only recorded one sure case of cattle ownership, and that came to his attention as accidentally as it came to the attention of (some) villagers. The eldest son of the late village chief, resident in the capital of Ouagadougou, owned six cattle with a friend, another chief's son and fellow Protestant clergyman. The latter died, passing effective control of the cattle to his brother, who sold three or four without permission from the co-owner. Others died, leaving one cow. This one only came to semi-public notice when the brother refused to cooperate in helping the surviving owner obtain the animal from its Fulbe caretaker, who refused to give it up without the brother's consent. The owner, then, was obliged to take his younger brothers into his confidence in order to enlist their aid in locating the recalcitrant heir and persuading him to cooperate. This difficulty would not have arisen had the arrangements with the Fulbe not

been made by the dead partner, and had the surviving owner not been pursuing a career 185 km. away. In this case the circumstances were unusual, and the problem was only incidentally one of Mossi-Fulbe relations: it was Mossi-Mossi relations which drew attention to wealth which would otherwise have remained hidden.

This incident points up the secrecy attached to Mossi cattle holdings. Other incidents could illustrate it as well. One lineage head denied to Finnegan owning any cattle, despite relatively great implicit wealth. A farmer himself, he had four sons in urban jobs, two of them managerial, a fifth son who is a cocoa planter in Ivory Coast, and a daughter married to a Presidential orderly. He explained a missed appointment by having been at a Fulbe village some 10 km. NW. In Finnegan's notes and on government tax rolls this man owned no cattle, but one doubts that a man in his 60s would bicycle such a distance over rough trails merely to pass the time of day. Indeed, various Kougsabla tax rolls from the 1950s and 1960s never listed more than one head of cattle in the village, while Finnegan's quite incomplete and indirect figures suggest at least nine head belonging to only three individuals, and these three by no means the wealthiest.

The incident of the non-returned cow also suggests the price Mossi pay for secret and skilled "professional" cattle keeping. Because ownership is often secret even from one's close kin, a Mossi cannot easily mobilize lineage support if a Fulbe herder disputes his version of a cattle-keeping agreement, to say nothing of the possibilities for inheritance problems if an owner dies unexpectedly. Delgado applies a comment about the Bisa to Mossi as well:

> Generally, only the head of household knows the size of his herd, along with the Fulbe who looks after them. He will tell the secret to his heir (his eldest son) before his death. (Pegard 1966: 129)

In return for keeping Mossi cattle, Fulbe get occasional small cash payment (say 100 to 500 francs CFA) and kola nuts, sometimes millet, and, mainly, use of the milk. Calves remain the property of the Mossi owner. An additonal benefit is manure, useful for fertilizer, fuel, and as an ingredient of adobe plaster for walls and floors. Peasants vie to have Fulbe graze their herds on harvested fields, for the manure which will enrich them, while Fulbe on their side get the use (and sale) of manure from the cattle corrals, regardless of the ownership of the cattle.

Delgado's research, some five years after Finnegan's, shows rights to manure becoming increasingly a matter of contention between Mossi owners and Fulbe keepers. Increased ease of transport has altered Mossi agriculture. (The highway from Ouagadougou to Togo, which bisects Kougsabla, was paved between 1971 and 1974.) Cash crops, both vegetable and fruit, are being grown for urban, West African, and even European markets. (The Kougsabla absentee cow-owner cited above has

planted an orchard of 80 mango trees, with an eye to cash income. Buyers from Niger purchased mangoes annually for export by truck to Niamey.) Such increased cash-cropping, combined with a general decline in soil fertility due to population pressure, has increased the value of manure. Owners are demanding the manure from their cattle at the moment when its value to the herders has increased, causing friction between owners and herders.

The non-public nature of the cattle contract makes it all the more necessary that it be based on trust. There are Mossi-Fulbe contacts even though social interaction is not great: most Mossi speak some Fulfulde, and Mossi know and greet neighboring Fulbe. Mossi are free to pick herders for their cattle from surrounding Fulbe, and the rare owner of many head will disperse them among several Fulbe. However, 30% of Delgado's sample of Fulbe kept cattle for Mossi whose fathers' cattle had been herded by their fathers: the relationship was hereditary and stable. The remaining owner Fulbe relationships grew out of existing friendships between the Mossi and a friend or relative of the Fulbe, or vice-versa. (Delgado 1977:37)

Delgado found the beginnings of erosion of this interethnic trust stemming from culture change among Fulbe youth. Youths have access to influences (radio, bars) unavailable to their elders during their youth, influences which run counter to traditional Fulbe culture, and they have the opportunity to migrate widely and easily in Francophone West Africa. Since youths do most of the actual herding of the cattle, a dishonest or disaffected youth has the chance to sell Mossi cattle without permission, or even to sell an individual animal several times over, pocketing the money, and departing for Ivory Coast leaving his father holding the bag. (Delgado 1977:80-81) While such change is not yet a major disruption of the traditionally Mossi-Fulbe interdependence, further developments in this line would seriously undermine the basis for that relationship.[6]

Delgado's farm management studies lead him to several conclusions about the economics of the Mossi-Fulbe relationship and its implications for development policy. Despite appearances to the contrary, Tenkodogo Fulbe are highly integrated into the cash economy. Policy actions designed to "bring the Fulbe into the marketplace" are therefore misplaced. This heavy involvement in the market results from the inability of Fulbe herders to grow enough millet to eat, requiring sale of dairy products and even livestock to buy grain. Second, even though Fulbe have a much higher cash income than Mossi farmers, the overall value of production (including subsistence) per worker is the same for the two ethnic groups. (Delgado 1979: 99-100) Apart from the individual's job preferences, there is currently no economic incentive for the Fulbe to become Mossi-like crop farmers, or vice-versa. Third, the current Fulbe practices in Tenkodogo of cultivating relatively large areas of very low-yielding millet and of keeping low-return entrusted cattle are part of a de facto profit maximizing strategy, given the relevant resource constraints. The fourth conclusion is that simultaneous production of millet and cattle

leads to a severe labor bottleneck in late July and mid-November. These seasonal labor shortages effectively contrain expansion of output. Fifth, under current conditions, sale of manure is economically feasible and can benefit Fulbe sellers and Mossi purchasers. Sixth, a rise in the returns for entrusted cattle has the effect, assuming current prices and availability of grain for purchase by Fulbe, of making specialization in livestock the economically optimal production strategy, to the detriment of extensive millet cultivation. This is all the more so if Fulbe can sell manure as well as milk and animals. Finally, Delgado concludes that under these conditions Fulbe specialization in livestock maximizes economic welfare in Tenkodogo. (1979: 6-7)

Despite the many problems facing the continued existence of this interethnic system, such as population pressure and low return on entrusted cattle, we feel that a sense of the economics of the matter (Delgado) and the long-standing social and political relationships (Finnegan) argue that Mossi and Fulbe should continue to meet each others' needs. The relationship between ethnic groups in the modern nation-state is a direct continuation of pre-colonial patterns, in which even ethnicity (at least for Mossi) was politically determined (and, we argue, Fulbe ethnicity was economically defined.) Tenkodogo Fulbe have not faced the political role-reversal in the 1960s and 1970s reported for their northern Upper Volta fellow-ethnics in Riesman's paper in this collection.

In a larger sense, however, we must consider why economic specialization which makes sense need be defined ethnically. There are other economically specialized groups in Tenkodogo Mossi society: blacksmiths, potters, and drummers. All are limited to specific, named descent groups, living in separate villages with distinctive names. It is clearly sensible to have complicated techniques like iron-working or cattle-raising handed down within families in a society where traditionally a child learned essential skills from observation and participation. And the connection of blacksmiths with the earth and their forging weapons as well as tools has given them a mystical power and separate social status throughout West Africa.

At the same time, all these groups are "Mossi" in a way the Fulbe are not. Blacksmiths marry other Mossi. Moslem Yarsé speak Moré as their first language, not their second. What then accounts for the past separation (despite incorporation) of the Fulbe?

We think that the answer lies in the need for Mossi to have as unambiguous a relationship as possible with their "bankers." The need to keep cattle away from fields placed the Fulbe farther away physically, a separation culturally reinforced by the need to keep contracts secret from other Mossi, down to and including one's closest kin. Kougsabla and Oueguedo Mossi have ties of neighborhood and affinity with their Yarsé, blacksmith, and drummer neighbors, besides whatever economic ties link them. This is not the case with most, if not almost all, Mossi-Fulbe

relations, which do not have these sorts of cross-cutting ties to cloud the economic nature of the contract and to compromise secrecy.

The relative ease with which the Mossi states have assimilated people of other ethnic groups suggests that views like those of Barth, which see ethnicity as somehow fundamental and not easily subject to change, cannot explain all facets of ethnicity in Africa. On the other hand, the relative non-assimilation of the Fulbe (and note the degree of assimilation of the Tenkodogo Fulbe compared to those described by Riesman) and the great need of Mossi to safely "cacher la vache" support Cohen's contention that ethnicity is a variable related to economic and political factors.

NOTES

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2. Delgado's research in 1976-78 was funded by the Entente Livestock Project of the Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, where he was an Assistant Research Scientist, and by U.S.A.I.D. Contracts/AID/afr-c-1169.

   The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of their past or present employers or funding agencies.

3. A similar phenomenon is suggested by data on the occurrence of segments of the same clan among different ethnic groups. Goody notes that elders of a Sisala clan section admitted to being Dagaba, "despite the fact that they are in all outward appearances thoroughly assimilated into the SISALA (sic)." Their use of the Dagaba name was "an indication of origin, not of present cultural affiliations." (Goody 1954: 23) Elsewhere Goody notes of the Sisala that their society contains clans of Fulbe, Gonja, Mamprussi and Mossi origin, all of whom had become 'Sisala.' (1969: 149)

   Ronald Cohen, studying the "evolution of multi-ethnicity on the Biu Plateau" in Nigeria, on the southern fringe of the Bornu state, traced one patrilineal clan through at least three ethnic groups, as sons and brothers 'hiving off' to new land had continued a southwesterly movement over time. (1974: 15-16)

4. Although Mossi-style mud-walled huts are becoming increasingly frequent, reflecting the long-term character of Fulbe settlement in

these villages.

5. Continuing footnote 3 in the context of relating ethnicity to economic factors, Izard in his analysis of Yatenga Yarse had to distinguish between clan of "Mande" origin and those of "Mossi" origin:

> Lineages of varied origin took Yarsé clan names...and adopted the Yarsé economic and social way of life. Among these groups which became Yarsé we note those with the clan-name Sore, who are of Mossi origin. (Izard 1971: 214 n. 1; translated.) (cf. Skinner 1978: 192-3)

In passing, Sore as a Yarsé name occurs frequently in Kougsabla genealogies; there are Sores living in the village.

6. It would be interesting if it is the independence of the Fulbe on the Yatenga borders, so well described in this collection by Riesman, which lies behind the more strained Mossi-Fulbe cattle-contract relationship described by Hammond:

> The relationship of the Mossi to the Fulani (sic) herdsmen of Yatenga manifests particularly well the ambivalence characteristic of many of their reciprocal economic arrangements. Each group-- Mossi and Fulani--profits from the exchange and values its perpetuation, yet each fears that the other may be taking advantage secretly, abusing his rights to the detriment of the other. The Mossi farmers regard their Fulani partners with great distrust. They contend that the herdsmen who take their cattle north out of Yatenga during the growing season never lose their own beasts, but that it is only the animals belonging to the Mossi that go astray, are stolen, fall sick, or prove to be barren.

(1966: 100-101) What Hammond found in the 1950s sounds like what Delgado found developing in Tenkodogo in the 1970s.

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*Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the International Food Policy Research Institute.

THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF ETHNICITY AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS, SOKOTO, NIGERIA[1]

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This paper deals with the changing significance ethnicity has in the various power relationships of the aristocracy of Sokoto. In Sokoto, the aristocracy are regarded as a separate stratum which contains within itself elements of ethnicity, estate, class and party. Changes in the social and political relationships of the aristocracy have been extensive during this century; however, they have not been sufficiently radical to transform the socio-political structure completely. Without an analysis of the political basis of social and cultural identity, one cannot understand why categories and groups emerge, change or persist. Factors in this process are 1) the direction and processes of structural change and changes in the interpersonal relations within the aristocracy; 2) the ways in which the meaning and content of structural relations change while formally remaining the same; 3) the social, political and economic forces present but not brought to bear on the structure or manipulated so as to maintain it; and 4) the different levels of social and political consciousness the people have of the situation. In this paper, historical facts are treated anthropologically.

In reflecting on social and political relationships in Sokoto, the present author came to see Ronald Cohen's definition of ethnicity as the most illuminating. He defines ethnicity

> ". . .as a <u>series</u> of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The assigning of persons to groups is both subjective and objective, carried out by self and others, and depends on what diacritics are used to define memberships" (Cohen 1978:387).

Ethnicity thus defined is not unlike Turner's (1977:63) definition of culture ". . .as an endless series of negotiations among actors about assignment of meaning to the acts in which they jointly participate." What makes ethnicity different from other forms of social and cultural identities is that individuals and groups have a consciousness of themselves as being "a people" by virtue of common ancestry or descent defined socially, culturally and/or experientially. The assigning of persons to groups or categories based on ethnicity expands and contracts in inverse relation to the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of membership at varying distances from the individual.

Contrary to Barth (1969), then, ethnic boundaries are not always stable. Not only is Sokoto ethnically diverse and pluralistic,[2] but an individual may be a member of multiple identity systems whose boundaries shift, expand and change giving ethnicity in most instances a distinctly segmentary character. Political and economic relations between individuals and groups are largely structured by their membership in a political community defined territorially, but whose boundaries may shift from the household, residential quarter, the district, the emirate, division, province, state, region to the nation and, in some instances, the world of international affairs.

Relationships between people of different ethnicities may be equal and complementary as Fortes (1945, 1949) has shown in his analysis of political and ritual interdependence of the Namoos and Talis among the Tallensi. Or, it may be as it is in Sokoto, that unequal power relations between people of different ethnicities occur when identity reinforces stratification by class, whether class is defined in terms of the differential relations of authority or in terms of the social relations of production. Ethnicity is one form of non-class cleavage (Dahrendorf 1959). However, in Sokoto, ethnicity is only one principle of definition of membership in the ruling stratum which contains within itself elements of class, control over the resources of production and authority (religious and political) and estate, defined as hereditary royalty.

Historically derived sets of diacritics, to use Cohen's (1978) term provide potential frames for identifying individuals and groups both by themselves and others. The tension between the resilience of determinate institutional structures and the ability both to adapt creatively to changing environments and to create new environments makes for a certain amount of indeterminancy in social and political relationships.[3] The identity of members and categorizations by others is more or less fluid and more or less multiple. Identity may be either claimed or accorded.[4] Whether or not identity is maintained or changed or different aspects of it manipulated in relationships is in part determined by a) the historical situation in which people find themselves and in part create and b) the different levels of consciousness people have of the social, political and economic forces involved.[5]

The use of the terms "Hausa" and "Fulani" as categories by which

people identify themselves and are identified by others is an accepted fact of the historical situation. They do not, however, refer to immutable, permanent isolates. Their traditions of origin are traditions of the origins of particular families and lineages, not entire peoples. They are categories referring to languages and cultures (Adamu 1976; Skinner 1968; Usman 1975; Willis 1978); and as such, they are created, learned and used by individuals and groups. In Sokoto, a member of the aristocracy in certain circumstances thinks of himself and is thought by others as being Hausa. In other circumstances, he is Fulani, Toronkawa Fulani, and more importantly, he is zuriyan Shehu,[6] descendant of the nineteenth century revolutionary leader. In all circumstances it is the definition of oneself as Muslim that is constant. Vaughan (1978:16) has stated that "...cultures.../ are / stages through which individuals pass." Rather than restrict the meaning of stage to that of irreversible passage, it is perhaps more appropriate, for Sokoto at least, to think of it in the sense of drama and performance that occur within certain historical and institutional contexts.

Although Hill (1976, 1977) claims that Hausa and Fulani form two distinct societies in Northern Nigeria, this model or generalization is not adequate in understanding social and political relationships in Sokoto.[7] Sarakuna (office-holders) are not heads of ethnic communities; rather, they rule over territories with peole of diverse origin, identity and interests. For any one individual, he/she is a member of a single social order characterized by multi-ethnic relationships, class stratification, occupational specialization, clientage relationships and quasi-theocratic hierarchical political relationships. Without an understanding of the relationships of religious, political and economic power, one cannot understand how and why categories and groups emerge, persist and change in Sokoto.

There are a number of criteria used singly or in combination by the people of Sokoto to define themselves and others, some of which are: 1) kasa (country), the place where one lives, usually defined as a political territory, for example, Kasar Sokoto, Kasar Kebbi, Kasar Kano; 2) asali (place of origin or ancestral home, especially if one has moved); 3) addini (religion), the most important distinction being between Muslim and non-Muslim. The category non-Muslim includes a) ahl al-kitab, people of the book, Christians and Jews, and b) Arnawa, Garewa and/or Maguzawa whose religions are based on fertility and spirit reverence of the iskoki system of belief and ritual. 4) jama'a (community), which in Sokoto usually refers to a community based on religious identity, belief and ritual; 5) jamiyya (society, guild), for example, Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa, a political party; 6) kabila (lineage, clan); 7) sana'a (occupation); 8) kungiya (group); 9) gida (household); 10) iyali (Family); 11) zuriya (descendant, dynasty), defined patrilineally; 11) nisba (descent/kinship based on genealogy overriding ethnicity and patrilineality); nasab (pl. of nisba) is one's pedigree; 13) silsila[8] (spiritual line or genealogy and chain of authority of any learned man overriding kinship, ethnicity and class); 14) tariqa (path, Sufi brotherhood); 15) unguwa or shiyya (residential quarter);

16) birni (town); 17) daraja (honor, respect, noble qualities); 18) girma (prestige, status); 19) barantaka (relationships of clientage between persons who stand in an asymmetrical relationship of dependence between patron and client regardless of class and ethnic identities); 20) masu-sarauta/talakawa (political relationships defined between those who control the resources for ruling and those who do not).

There is a range of possible combination, manipulation and interpretation of the above criteria. The ambiguities, discontinuities and contradictions of the criteria and related symbols, values, institutions and relationships provide a very dynamic and fluid quality in social and political relationships.

In 1809, five years after the beginning of the jihad, the city of Sokoto was founded by Mohammad Bello dan Fodio as a ribat; that is a Sufi center of learning and a frontier fort from which dar al-Islam (the land of Islamic government and law) might spread into dar al-harb (the land of war or the land of polytheism), based on the ideals of the Abbasid Caliphate. Sokoto became the principal center of administration along with its twin capital at Wurno. It has also been a center of Islamic learning, pilgrimage and commerce, although the latter is less well documented than the first. The Sokoto hinterland has been for centuries an arena of flourishing international trade, migration and city-states of various strengths and duration: Kebbi, Zamfara, Gobir and Sokoto.

The aristocracy of Sokoto came into dominance forming a ruling elite as a result of their leadership in the early nineteenth century Islamic revolutionary movement and the consequent establishment of the Caliphate under the leadership of Shaykh 'Uthman ibn Fudi (in Hausa, Shehu Usman dan Fodio), a Torodbe or Toronkawa scholar and cleric. Fodio is a Fulfulde name meaning in Hausa mallam and in Arabic 'alim, the learned. Shaykh Abdullahi, Shaykh 'Uthman's brother, defined Fudi as "one learned in the law" (Hiskett 1957:560).

The aristocracy of Sokoto are variously referred to as 1) mujahidun--participants in the jihad; 2) masu-sarauta--those who control the resources for ruling. In the context of the political history of Sokoto, masu-sarauta referred only to the royalty, i.e., the Caliph, the Waziri, and 'ulama (sing. 'alim) who were of the family of Shaykh dan Fodio. It also referred to the close companions who were with him at the time of the jihad, in other words, the "founding fathers". Today masu-sarauta includes non-royal councillors who have been appointed and turbanned by the Sultan; 3) Toronkawa--referring to the scholarly lineage from which the principal leaders of the jihad and rulers of the Caliphate in Sokoto and Gwandu were drawn.[9] However, it should be noted first of all that not all Toronkawa were ever associated with ruling. Many of them still pursue the tradition of scholarship which has historically been their principal métier while others are craftsmen, traders and/or farmers. Secondly, not all of the nobility are Toronkawa. Some are Alibawa (the family of the Magajin Gari), Alkamawa (the family of the Magajin Rafi), Sullebawa

(three of the principal kingmakers), and Katsinawa (the family of the Galadima), for example. Non-Fulani have at various times held important posts as councillors and been granted leadership over particular territories although their numbers have been smaller than those recognized as Fulani.

The aristocracy share with the people of the town the identity of Kadirawa which is used by the Bakin Sarki (the town crier) to address the inhabitants of the town whenever he is calling out a message from the Sultan. Although loosely translated to mean "the Faithful", Kadirawa stems from the intricate association of the Qadiri tariqa with Shaykh dan Fodio and his descendants and hence the rulers of Sokoto and their followers.[10] Marafan Sokoto, a councillor and descendant of one of the companions of Shaykh dan Fodio, stated that "Qadiriyya means Shaykh 'Uthman dan Fodio's empire" (interviews. Sokoto, 1975).

Today, the aristocracy and the people of the city of Sokoto speak Sakkwatanci, a dialect of Hausa which has a tremendous admixture of Arabic and Fulfulde. They are called by themselves and others Sokotawa, the people of Sokoto. At one time, members of the aristocracy spoke and wrote Fulfulde.[11] Today, however, only the Wazirin Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu, speaks and writes in Fulfulde. He learned Fulfulde after he became an adult [12] in order to be able to read the literature of the jihad. Arabic was the principal language of the jihad and later of the court; however, some of the literature was either written in Hausa and Fulfulde or translated from the Arabic in order to reach a wider public.

Although the aristocracy of Sokoto speak Hausa and have assimilated much of what is thought of as Hausa culture, they have continued to maintain a separate identity, and this identity is based on religion, descent and their role in governing. The history of the Sokoto aristocracy exemplifies in many ways what Spicer (1971) has called a persistent identity system which he defines as one with the capacity to exist in different and contrasting social and cultural environments. People develop well-defined symbols of identity differentiating themselves from other peoples. The "...meanings of the symbols consist of beliefs about historical events in the experience of the people through generations" (Spicer 1971:797). Spicer adds that:

> "Each persistent people, like all other peoples, maintains a conception of a moral world: but there is a part of the general moral world that becomes specialized for guiding them in the realities of opposition. The meanings of symbols include ideal behaviors relative to opposing peoples and stereotypes regarding the behavior of those peoples. The moral world as a whole may be much influenced and differentiated by class and other factors within the persistent society, but that part of the moral world involving interethnic relations remains quite separate from such influences."

The political history of the aristocracy of Sokoto can be divided into

four periods, the major themes of which help to define who they are, their own sense of themselves and their place in the world. The first is the pre-jihad period up to 1804. Although it existed at the time, the category "Fulani" was not politically important.[13] Their principal identity was as Muslim clerics and scholars. The second period is from about 1804-1903, the beginning of the jihad, the establishment of the Caliphate to the time of colonial occupation and rule by the British. This marks a period of time when "the aristocracy" changed from being only scholars, mystics and preachers and became rulers. With their increasing dependence of the Fulani pastoral clan leaders for support and their subsequent rise to power, a higher status accrued to being Fulani.

The third period is 1903-1960, the colonial era, during which time they were both subjects and rulers with their power being greatly restricted. Tradition defined in terms of religion became the focus of collective identity. The fourth period is from 1960, when Nigeria became politically independent from British rule, to the present, marked by a) National and Regional Government and b) from 1966, Military and State government. Under the Regional Government, the aristocracy were able to maintain a significant hold on the religious, political and economic institutions of the new centers of political and economic power. While under the Military State government, their power has been more greatly reduced than at any time in the past.

Prior to the beginning of the jihad in 1804, the category Fulani was not politically important for the Toronkawa.[14] Their literature reveals the ambivalence they had in defining Torodbe-Fulani relationships. They adopted the language of the Fulbe and much of the Fulbe ethos while maintaining a separate identity. The relationship between Fulani and Toronkawa was discussed by Shaykh Abdullahi dan Fodio, Shaykh 'Uthman's brother, in one of the principal documents of the jihad. He writes:

> "Tribes of Islam--and Turubbi is our clan
> Our Fulani and our Hausa all united,
> and among us other than these certain tribes joined together
> For the help of God's religion--made up the union.
> Brother to the Arabs, and from Rum b. Is they are sprung.
> And 'Uqba is the ancestor of the Fulani on the Arab side,
> And from Turubbi their mother was Bajjumanghu..."
> (Abdullahi 1963:110-111).

In another account of the history of the family of Fodio, Shaykh Abdullahi says that they were the first to live in the country of Konni, before the Hausas and the Tuaregs, and preceeded "...the Fulani in Hausaland by seven years" (Hiskett 1957:560).

If we look at Shaykh Abdullahi's account as a hypothesis to explain relationships between different people, we can note a) Fulani and Toronkawa (Turubbi/Torodbe) are related but different; b) Toronkawa are part Fulani, part Arab. 'Uqba b. Nafi was an Arab Muslim of the Umayyad

branch of the Quraysh, and hence, a member of the family of the Prophet Mohammad. Allegedly, 'Uqba travelled along the North African coast during the seventh century and settled in or near Futa Toro.[15] The Toronkawa, and specifically, the family of Fodio, identified themselves as descendants of one of the most illustrious Arab lineages, that of the Prophet Mohammad.[16] The persistent tension between the universalism of Islam and the local expression of ethnic identity is clearly manifested in Shaykh Abdullahi's account. Secondly, the family of Fodio defined themselves as first settlers in the area which later became the field of battle for establishing an Islamic state.

The historical origins of the Toronkawa are obscure. Willis (1978) gives evidence of their somewhat humble and eclectic origins in Futa Toro and Futa Jallon from whence they migrated, teaching and preaching Islam as they moved eastward, and often intermarrying with and settling among the local populations through whose territories they passed. They spoke Fulfulde, but they sometimes abandoned it for the language of their "host" societies--earlier among the Songhay and later in Hausaland or as they called it bilad al-sudan. According to Willis (1978:211), Torodbe historically suggests a métier, a scholarly estate, not an ethnic category. Following Ibn Khaldun (1959:313), Willis (1979:13-14) states that pursuit of the religious sciences of Islam, scholarship and teaching, fell under the category of crafts or estates. Torodbe, then, "practiced the 'craft' of Islam" (Willis 1978:198). In this regard, the family of Fodio were not unlike other scholarly lineages of the southern Sahara; for example, the Ineslemen of Tuareg society and the Kunta of the Azawad area near Timbuktu with whom they maintained close contact.[17] Shaykh dan Fodio's family also studied with and intermarried with the scholarly families at Yandoto in Zamfara, an international community of scholars south of Sokoto including Kanuri and Hausa-speaking scholars (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975; Usman 1974).[18]

It should be added that if before the jihad the Toronkawa practiced the craft of Islam, after the jihad and the establishment of the Caliphate with its capital at Sokoto, the Toronkawa practiced the craft of ruling. And ruling in all of Hausaland is the most prestigious occupation bringing with it great command over the resources of power, wealth and prestige (girma and daraja).

According to Alhaji Junaidu, Wazirin[19] Sokoto (1970), the Toronkawa and the ancestors of Shaykh dan Fodio arrived in Hausaland, after travelling through Mali, under the leadership of Musa Jokollo, and settled in the area of Birnin Konni about 500A.H./1106 A.D. However, Last (1967:lxiii), by counting eleven generations from Shaykh 'Uthman to Musa Jokollo, has arrived at a date in the fifteenth century, a date which Usman (1975) and Zahradeen (1976) accept, as the date of their arrival in the land later to be dominated by the state of Gobir.

The Toronkawa settled in towns or near them and moved as their calling of preaching and scholarship required. In Sokoto today they are

known as Fulanin zaure[20] marking the significance of the zaure (entrance hall) in the student-teacher relationship as a place of study.[21] As their literature from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrates, the aristocracy of Sokoto have a long history of acquaintance with the "high culture" of classical Islam. They maintained contact with the international community of Islam through travels and literature: Shaykh 'Uthman's uncle made the pilgrimage to Mecca and so did his teacher Shaykh Jibril of Adar.[22] Students travelled great distances to study with a particular scholar and/or to receive baraka (blessing) from him. This tradition is still alive today.

As a minority in an area where Islam was already generally known and accepted and where the head of state was a Muslim, even though his authority was based on the religion of spirit and ancestral reverence and fertility of the land, the Toronkawa formed a learned and respected elite of scholars symbolized by the wearing of long robes and turbans. Their self image was that of a spiritual aristocracy.[24] Their claims to social honor and power were derived from knowledge and piety through orthodoxy and strict observance of the precepts of Islam. Islam increased the feeling of cultural and religious superiority of believers against unbelievers and orthodox against unorthodox Muslims by advocating hijra (migration) and jihad (holy war or struggle) when other attempts of implementing the ideals of Islam failed.

The Toronkawa dissociated themselves from occupations of inferior status and aversion (wanda ake kyama)[25] and specialized in the Islamic sciences ('ulum; sing. ilm). In Sokoto, the two principal sciences of Islam in which they specialized were and are tasawwuf and fiqh (mysticism and law). The Shari'a defined the ideal in terms of man's relationship to man and mysticism defined the ideal in terms of man's relationship to Allah (interviews Alkali Yahaya,[26] Sokoto, 1976).

The Toronkawa of Sokoto are Sunni Orthodox Muslims and members of the Qadiri tariqa. Tasawwuf as a science is not synonymous with the tariqa as an institution. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, they were practically the same (Stewart 1976). The mujahid's study of tasawwuf served to legitimize and sacralize his authority through mystical powers, and mystical authority helped in the administration of the Shari'a and hence Islamic government. Study of political activity and governing, siyasa, is inherent in the intellectual tradition of Islam. By the nineteenth century, the Qadiri tariqa was largely the preserve of scholars and jurists--a tradition continued in present day Sokoto, unlike in the Middle East where the tariqa is, in most places, the popular "church" of Islam and made up the disenfranchised masses (Keddie 1972).

By the time of the beginning of the jihad, in 1804, the Toronkawa had resided in Hausaland for more than 400 years contradicting Lugard's assumption of their alien status (Lugard 1965/1922; 1970/1906). By the eighteenth century, the family of Shaykh dan Fodio was sufficiently integrated into the political community of Gobir to be advisors to the

Sultan of Gobir and teachers of Gobir princes.[27] In recounting the events leading to the jihad, Shaykh Abdullahi writes that while he and Shaykh 'Uthman were travelling in Zamfara, the Sultan of Gobir called "all the 'ulama of his country" and "we gathered together before him" (Usman 1975:11-12) indicating that they regarded the state of Gobir to be their home.

Not only did they see themselves as members of the political community of Gobir, they also saw themselves as members of an international community of Islamic scholars. Muhammad Bello dan Fodio wrote that a certain Mallam Hasan, "one of the greatest among the mallams of Abu Abdullahi... who in his book...wrote that whenever he met a person he asked him whence he came. When the man told him, he would reply, 'I am your fellow countryman, for I am learned and a mallam'" (Hiskett 1957:571). It is this identity as members of a scholarly class and tariqa networks which permitted independence of an existing state structure and continues to cross-cut boundaries defined by class, ethnicity and state.

In his twenty years of preaching and writing before the final call to jihad came, Shaykh dan Fodio appealed to the scholars, pastoralists, Fulani and Hausa peasants on the basis of the universal principles of orthodox Islamic law and belief. Although the head of state of Gobir was Muslim, the Shari'a was not justly enforced especially in the matter of taxes and inheritance. Craftsmen, farmers and pastoralists alike were often subjected to discriminant and oppressive taxes and Hausa and Fulani, freeborn Muslim and non-Muslim were indiscriminately enslaved. The irrelevance of ethnic distinctions in the ideal Islamic state is clearly outlined in Shaykh dan Fodio's Bayan Wujub (El Masri 1968). Leadership in the ideal state was to be an open elite of scholars whose learning and piety alone provided the basis of their authority. The Shaykh offered a government based on Islamic social justice (adalci). All of the groups involved in the jihad,[28] scholars, farmers, pastoralists and traders, depended on the goodwill of others more powerful than they themselves (Waldman 1965:344).

Not all Muslims, however, joined the jihad. Some fought on the side of Gobir. In fact, Gobir's supporters were made up of a cross-section of Muslim and non-Muslim, Fulani, Hausa and Tuareg. Included among Gobir's supporters were Muslim scholars from Yandoto[29] (Usman 1974) and two brothers of Shaykh dan Fodio who, according to Shaykh Abdullahi (1963:111), did not join the jihad "for fear of loss of wealth and from hope of security from the corrupt". There was, however, sufficient discontent with Gobir rule that their forces were beaten and Caliphal government was established extending its boundaries across what is now Northern Nigeria. The jihad was a revolt by a group whose members were motivated by diverse ideas and incentives but who shared a common goal of realizing their ideals of a better social order.[30]

The jihad, which began in 1804, had the effect of establishing the

Toronkawa in power, and in Sokoto, not just the Toronkawa, but the zuriyan Shehu, the descendants of Shaykh dan Fodio. Their movement changed from one of religious ideals and reform to become a political movement of protest and change, not unlike that of the Sanusi discussed by Evans-Pritchard (1949). As they passed from a movement based on religious reform to one of ruling and administration, ethnicity became more and more important in defining political relationships. The scholars who led the jihad became increasingly dependent on the Fulani clan leaders for security and support especially the Sullebawa, Kebbawa, Alibawa and Konni Fulani. After the jihad began, a large number of the original community of scholars died as a result of religious zealousness without adequate military training and as a result of famine (Alkali Yahaya, Sokoto, 1975; Last 1965, 1967).

In order to establish an administration and to maintain security and support, fiefs, offices and titles were given to Fulani clan leaders, family and close associates who were principally Alkamawa, Toronkawa, Alibawa, Sullebawa and Konni Fulani and constituted what can be thought of as "the founding fathers".[31] Greater power and higher status accrued to the Fulani clan leaders. The rulers consolidated their control through intermarriage and clientship. Office holding became associated with religious knowledge, ethnicity, ties to the jihad, kinship, clientage and loyalty.

With the increasing rise to power of the clan leaders to the exclusion of the talakawa or commoner class from positions of ruling, and with the disaffection of the peasantry because of the exaction of tribute and the raids on their fields for food in times of war, there were numerous revolts[32] in Zamfara and Kebbi against the new government. The pastoralists were disenchanted because their leaders and advisors were becoming rulers. In traditional Fulani pastoral society, the Ardo was a leader, one who advises, asks for consensus: he was the first among equals.[33] Under Caliphal government, he became a ruler with powers restricted only by the Caliph. As Paden (1973:221) has pointed out, the leaders of the jihad were less concerned with inequality than with injustice. This is clearly demonstrated in Shaykh dan Fodio's discussion of justice and charity in Bayan Wujub(El Masri 1968).

Emirate authority was quasi-theocratic and hierarchical. In the new Islamic government, land distribution and revenues were in the control of the new leaders.[34] Fiefholders known in Sokoto as ubankasa, or father of the land, had control of farming land, military postions and slaves, that is, control over labor and production. As such, they also had control over the principal items of export and commerce[35](Baier 1977; Lovejoy 1977). The establishment of an Islamic state brought about a shift in religious, political, economic and social policy. The revolution was not, however, completely successful in bringing about the ideals articulated by the jihad leaders due in large part to the continuing significance of pre-jihad institutions and structures of relationships.

Although the clan leaders continued to be electors, by the middle of the nineteenth century power was shifting from the clan leaders to the princes and gentry (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975, 1976; District Notebooks, Sokoto Divisional Office). By the end of the century, the princes and fiefholders were sufficiently independent and wealthy enough to command private armies and raid the territories of other princes. Maiturare, Marafan Gwadabawa, a descendant of Caliph Atiku, for example, commanded an army of Tuareg mercenaries and raided the territory of the descendants of the Commander of the Army under Shaykh dan Fodio (Harris 1939; Interviews, Sokoto, 1975).

Positions of economic and political power were increasingly closed. The category "Fulani" became exclusive referring to pastoralists and rulers defined in terms of occupation and political relationships.[36] Non-Muslims who submitted to Caliphal government, but retained their own identity and customs, were recognized as protected people, ahl al-dhimma, and paid a tax called jizya. The category ahl al-dhimma was ethnically pluralistic including in some instances, non-Muslim Fulani.[37] New converts to Islam were assimilated to a generalized Hausa culture and language,[38] not to Fulani. The rulers themselves abandoned Fulfulde for the Hausa language and gradually assimilated many of the customs of Hausa culture. The numbers of settled commoner Fulani increased as a result of Caliph Bello's policies of sedentarization (Last 1965). While they continued to maintain an ethos of "Fulani-ness", they were not structurally distinct from the talakawa or commoner class.

The city of Sokoto was characterized by tremendous ethnic diversity. This was in part due to its function as an administrative center as well as a center of commerce and religious study. According to Marafan Sokoto (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975), Sokoto was also a place of refuge for those Muslims who felt persecuted in other areas.

As capital of Caliphal government, 1809 to 1903, Sokoto was the recipient of slaves sent there as tribute from the subordinate emirates. Sokoto was once described to this author as a city of masters and slaves (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975). Some slaves were sold to North African merchants, others were settled on privately owned farms as well as the lands that belonged to the state and were, consequently, associated with particular offices. While in theory any man could own slaves, slaves could own slaves as long as it was recognized that their property was ultimately that of their masters;[39] ownership of significant numbers of slaves became restricted to the ruling stratum. This was in part due to the cost of ownership and maintenance of large households and settlements. Ownership of slaves was translated into a symbol of political authority. Each royal household had a retinue of messengers, servants and artisans.[40] The status of holding of slaves cut across hierarchical political relationships. Slaves were primarily non-Fulani although not universally so. The category non-Fulani was ethnically diverse and pluralistic. Those slaves who became trusted servants of the ruler wielded more power than free commoners regardless of ethnic identity.

Slaves who converted to Islam were often freed by their master in accordance with the hadith: "He who sets free a Muslim slave shall be free from Fire."[41] Emancipated slaves frequently became clients to their former masters. In Sokoto, emancipation did not change the status of the slave in the eyes of the former master. As client (bara), the person remained dependent and hence subordinate to the one who formerly freed him.[42] Loyal clients of both free and slave origins were attached to or adopted by the family of their patrons.

One means of giving recognition to a loyal and trusted client, regardless of his origins, was and continues to be the gift of a daughter, niece or classificatory relative, in marriage. Children of such unions cannot make claims to political office which is based on the patrilineal principle of inheritance and succession.[43] However, they are given certain privileges and positions and are permitted to inherit property in accordance with the principles of Maliki law. Children of an aristocratic father and a concubine or slave mother (umm walad) are able to rise in the political hierarchy by succession to royal office. Several Caliphs of Sokoto have been the children of such unions.[44] Concubines are neither kinsmen nor often of the same ethnic identity.

Maliki law states that persons who marry should be equal (kafa'a).[45] In Sokoto, equality in marriage is defined in terms of religious piety (addini) and good health (lafiya) necessary for the completion of one's responsibilities in marriage and establishing a new family.[46] Marriage should be between people equal in honor (daraja) but not necessarily of the same qualities; for example, her generosity and his scholarship. It is not necessary that the two people be of the same estate or occupation (sana'a). The aristocracy may give a daughter to any Muslim not of the despised groups (wanda ake kyama). Ethnicity is not a criterion in defining equality in marriage.[47]

There is tension between kafa'a so openly defined and the principle of preferential marriage within the aristocracy which says it is ideal to marry within one's own family.[48] The preferential and ideal form of marriage, which is most significant for first marriages, is one between father's brother's son and father's brother's daughter. In cases in which first marriages are with father's brother's daughter and, hence, a kinsman and a "Fulani" and the second is with a non-Fulani, difference is sometimes made in the kinds of bride-wealth given. In one instance, it was explained that one gives cattle when marrying a Fulani and money when marrying a Hausa. Hausa in this context is a pluralistic category including a number of ethnic identities. However, children of unions between a Fulani aristocratic father and a non-Fulani mother are treated equally in matters regarding succession and inheritance. Among the aristocracy patrilineality takes precedence over the principle of ethnicity and, in effect, becomes one of the principal criteria defining identity.

Although the authority of Caliphal government derived from orthodox Islam, and the office of Caliph was in theory an elected office

open to all free and learned men, succession to office has in practice been based on dynastic claims and leadership in the jihad. The descendants of Shaykh dan Fodio, zuriyan Shehu, have controlled the positions of political and religious authority. The office of Caliph or Sultan has been restricted to the descendants of two of Shaykh dan Fodio's sons: Bello and Atiku. Since about 1932, the office has been held by members of the Bellawa lineage. The office of Wazir has been retained in the line of descendants of Shaykh dan Fodio's daughter, Nana,[49] and her husband Gidado dan Laima, Caliph Bello's first Wazir.

In Sokoto, lineage ties are important only for the aristocracy, that is people whose ancestors were the leaders of the jihad and founding fathers of the Caliphate, and for the arnawa, non-Muslims. The majority, the commoners (talakawa), trace their descent bilaterally. The institutionalization of the principle of patrilineality in defining succession to office among the aristocracy is intricately associated with the principles of Maliki law of inheritance[50] and with the Sufi principles of baraka (a spiritual blessing bestowed by Allah; grace, charisma) and wilaya (nearness to Allah or sainthood). Wilaya and baraka can be attained by right of birth or by the process of religious devotion and asceticism. Proof of piety is manifested by following the examples of the Prophet Mohammad and by observing the principles of the Shari'a. Their spiritual line of authority (silsila) as well as their history of origins (Abdullahi 1963; Bello 1962; Junaidu 1970) link the family of Fodio to the family of the Prophet Mohammad.[51] The tombs of Shaykh dan Fodio and his son Bello, the second Caliph of Sokoto, have become noted places of veneration and pilgrimages.

There has been inconsistency in the genealogical claims made by the aristocracy. Shaykh Abdullahi (1963; also Hiskett 1957) refers to their descent from the family of the Prophet Mohammad through 'Uqba b. Nafi who, according to Batran (1979:114), is a descendant of the Umayyads of the Quraysh, the clan of the Prophet Mohammad. Writing at about the same time, Caliph Bello,[52] in his Infaq al-Maisur, claims descent from the Prophet Mohammad through his grandmother, Hawwa, Shaykh 'Uthman's mother, who, it is asserted, was descended from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad.[53] However, Shaykh dan Fodio, in his Tahdhir al-Ikhwan, refuted that he could be a Mahdi on the grounds that he was not a descendant of the Prophet (Last 1967:4). It is Shaykh 'Uthman's view that is accepted by Alkali Yahaya, a very pious, learned scholar and jurist of the family of the Wazir. Alhaji Junaidu, Wazirin Sokoto (1970), however, replicated the historical claims of Shaykh Abdullahi while Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Sardaunan Sokoto (1962) replicated Caliph Bello's genealogy in his autobiography written after independence from the British.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which other Caliphs did or did not encourage this reckoning of genealogical descent from the Prophet. It is quite common in the scholarly lineages throughout the Sahara (Batran 1979; Norris 1975). It was a popular issue in Sokoto in 1976 when, on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, a minor disturbance was created as a

result of some people in the mosque giving recitations on the saintliness of the family of Fodio by virtue of their spiritual genealogy.

The coming of the British and the beginning of the colonial era for the people of Sokoto was March 15, 1903. The aristocracy became subjects as well as rulers. Based on classical Islamic doctrine and the examples of the Prophet Mohammad, as discussed by Shaykh dan Fodio in his Masa'il Muhimma on the question of muwala or the relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim in a situation where Islam is not strong, the 'ulama of Sokoto were able to articulate a philosophy of working with the British in the affairs of the world while remaining loyal to Islam. They accepted that in dealing with the colonizers, it is permissible "...to befriend with the tongue but not with the heart" (al-Bukhari 1968/-1902:307).[54] The doctrine is called taqiyya which, in effect, says that it is sometimes necessary to show mental reservation for purposes of self-preservation. Tradition defined in terms of religion became the focus of collective identity.[55]

Taqiyya is what Turner (1977:74) has called a root paradigm; that is, "...consciously recognized (though only on occasions of raised consciousness) cultural models of an allusive, metaphorical kind, cognitively delimited, emotionally loaded, and ethically impelled, so as to give form to action in publicly critical circumstances."[56] It played an important role both in defining the interaction of the jama'a (community of believers) with the Gobir state prior to the jihad in the nineteenth century and in maintaining autonomy and oppositon to their new overlords, the British. The aristocracy were able to reformulate and reassert an identity based on religion in order to maintain independence of colonial society while working with it.

The colonial government had the dual effect of 1) weakening the political and hence religious authority of the aristocracy of Sokoto by their own postion as the new overlords, and 2) strengthening the position of the aristocracy by policies of Indirect Rule which more firmly established their position and even expanded their authority into areas where they had not been previously successful.

The British took over the powers of appointment and dismissal of Emirs who had been under Sokoto's suzerainty. In 1931, they deposed Sultan Muhammad Tambari, demonstrating that even a Sultan was vulnerable to their power if he proved unfavorable to colonial rule. This had the effect of weakening both the religious and political authority of Sokoto and, hence, the Qadiri tariqa. In 1907, the Emir of Katsina could tell the British Resident that he did not consider the Sultan of Sokoto a superior in religious affairs because he was not of the same sect (tariqa?) as the Sultan. He looked on him, he said, as a brother much in the same way that he thought of the Emir of Kano (NAK/SNP 7/2827).[57] By the second decade of the century, the Emirs of Zaria and Kano had both affiliated with the Tijani tariqa--one means of dissenting from the religious authority of Sokoto and the Qadiri tariqa. It was also a means of

defining legitimacy for their own positions which they now owed to the British colonizers.[58] The association of the Qadiri tariqa with the Caliphate has already been noted.

Membership in a tariqa as a means of dissent continued through the 1950s and 1960s to the present day in Sokoto culminating in the opening of a Tijani mosque in 1975. The building of the mosque was spearheaded by people from Zamfara, Yelwa and Argungu[59]--all areas which have historically resented the political and religious domination of the Sokoto aristocracy. The Imam of the mosque is Mallam Bello Gusau,[60] from Zamfara. Mallam Bello is also Muqaddam (initiator) of the Tijani tariqa.

The mosque is sometimes referred to as "Kaolack's mosque" giving recognition to Shaykh Ibrahim Niass of Kaolack, Senegal.[61] Shaykh Niass was the recognized head of the Tijani tariqa for West Africa. He was a Wolof speaker of non-aristocratic origin (Behrman 1970; Froelich 1962). The people in Sokoto who led the movement to have the mosque built are non-aristocratic teachers, permanent secretaries and commissioners in the state government.

The Tijani tariqa was often associated with the opposition party (NEPU) during the 1950s and 1960s especially in Zamfara. Although the head of the NEPU party was a Fulani, NEPU leadership was critical of the "Fulani" and aristocratic domination of emirate and regional government. However, the Tijani tariqa in Sokoto[62] is not associated with any one stratum or ethnic group. It cross-cuts ethnic and class cleavages. In the 1950s the Emir of Gwandu, a descendant of Shaykh Abdullahi dan Fodio, a Toronkawa Fulani aristocrat, and member of the dominant political party (NPC), announced his affiliation with Tijaniyya. He wanted to become Sultan of Sokoto and was resentful of the reemergence of Sokoto's hegemony during the 1950s (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976). Since the jihad when Bello, Shaykh 'Uthman's son, and not Shaykh Abdullahi, his brother, was appointed Caliph to succeed Shaykh 'Uthman, the ruling house of Gwandu has maintained some resentment of Sokoto. While Gwandu has historically maintained favorable sentiments to the Tijani tariqa, the Caliphate remained a single polity.[63] Gwandu and Sokoto have been held together, in part, by bonds of kinship and marriage alliances.

Tariqa membership is in theory egalitarian and based on open recruitment. It provides an alternative to the hierarchical closed nature of the social and political system in which political and religious leadership is based on hereditary membership in one of the royal dynasties. In Sokoto, however, the Qadiri tariqa has been intimately associated with aristocratic leadership and, consequently, closed hereditary succession to religious and political office.

It is difficult to generalize about the relationship between tariqa membership and ethnic or class identity. Tariqa membership may in certain circumstances enable a group to reinforce or establish its identity just as the Qadiriyya did in the case of the Fodio family in Sokoto and the

Kunta in Timbuktu.[64] However, membership in the Qadiriyya has, under different circumstances, cross-cut cleavages based on ethnicity both among the Kunta family in Timbuktu and the Fodio family in Sokoto. The same can be said for the Sanusiyya (Baier 1974; Evans-Pritchard 1949). While the Tijani tariqa is not associated with any one stratum or particular ethnic group in Sokoto or in Kano,[65] in Ibadan, membership in Tilaniyya serves to reinforce Hausa ethnic identity (Cohen 1969) just as membership in the Ahmadiyya reinforces Yoruba identity in Sokoto.[66]

Members of a single ethnic identity may be members of different turuq (sing. tariqa). Behrman (1970) points out that Wolof are members of Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya and Muridiyya. Toronkawa have historically been leaders of both Tijani and Qadiri turuq (Martin 1976; Willis 1979). The same tariqa has at different times been the vehicle to protest established authority as in the jihads of the nineteenth century and at other times become established authority as did the Qadiri tariqa in Sokoto and the Sanusiyya in Cyrenaica. The historical relationship between ethnicity, class and political activism of tariqa organizations indicates what Gutkind (1974:57) has called "...a locally-based reactive political consciousness..."

In the face of dissent defined in the form of allegiance to a different tariqa, the aristocracy of Sokoto in 1961, under the direction of Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Sardauman Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region, led a movement to establish a religious organization that cross-cuts all turuq, the Jama'atu Nasril Islam, Society for the Victory of Islam. All Muslims are members: they may choose whether or not to activate their membership. Following political independence from the British in 1960, and in the context of Regional and Federal government, it was felt that there was a need to forge a new unity among Northerners. It has also been suggested (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976) that Sardauna[67] never gave up his dream to be Sultan of Sokoto and that his leadership both in the Regional government and in the Jama'atu Nasril Islam provided the base from which the ideals of Shaykh dan Fodio's Caliphate could be perpetuated. When this author once asked one of the outstanding 'ulama in Sokoto the name of the founder of the JNI, the reply was Shaykh 'Uthman dan Fodio.

The principal concerns of the JNI are the propagation of the principles of Islam and with Muslim unity within Nigeria in particular and throughout the world. Many of its efforts go toward education and training preachers: it has one school, the Ma'ahadu Amirul Huminia Muhammed Bello, located next to the Sultan's palace in Sokoto. The headquarters of the JNI are, however, located in Kaduna, the old capital of Regional government. Today, the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Abubakar, is President of both the Jama'atu Nasril Islam and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, thereby reasserting some of the power and prestige as leader of Islamic affairs lost under the colonial government.

During the colonial era, the power and authority of the aristocracy of Sokoto were restricted and the administration more narrowly defined.

Local government officials, or as they were then called, the Native Authority, became salaried employees. A treasury was established and taxes collected from which the affairs of the local government were to be run. This was an attempt to do away with the system of tribute and Islamic taxation and to separate the public from private finances of the local government officials. It changed the aristocracy from rulers to public or civil servants.

The Sultan no longer had the power of dismissal. Instead, he had to refer the matter to the British Resident. Fiefholders were ordered by the British to live in their home territories and not at court as the pattern had been established in the nineteenth century in order that the Caliph might in part have a closer control over them. Many people in Sokoto interpret the moving of the fiefholders to their home territories as a means of weakening the position of the Sultan. He was, they say, deprived of some of his principal advisors at a time of considerable stress.

Territories which previously had the status of emirate, being established by flagbearers of Shaykh dan Fodio, were reduced to the status of a district, and the fiefholder or emir became a district head, for example, Bungudu in Zamfara. However, the British never seemed to have questioned the right of the fiefholders and title holders to maintain control over large parcels of land inherited from fathers who were part of the Caliphal government.

Slavery was abolished by the British. Lugard's policies were, however, directed only to the legal status of slavery" and not to the people who could more accurately be thought of as being in a condition of inherited tenancy. In nineteenth century Sokoto, slaves were sometimes freed by their owners in accordance with Islamic tradition; however, many of these freed slaves continued a relationship of dependency with their former masters either as household or domestic servants, farm tenants or as clients. Some of the freed slaves established themselves as free farmers, craftsmen and traders. With the skills acquired from formal western education,[68] some descendants of former slaves have risen in the hierarchy of the state's civil service. The feeling among the aristocracy that somehow the social order is being inverted is manifested by the frequent exclamation that "our slaves are becoming our masters."

Throughout the colonial era and early independence, the aristocracy of Sokoto were regarded as the elite of Northern emirate government. Sokoto always had the highest prestige and position over all other aristocratic groups. As early as 1910, a school modeled along lines of western education was established in Sokoto for the sons of the aristocracy (Arnett 1920; Bello 1962). The establishment in 1931 of the Northern Provinces Advisory Council was the first step toward domination of "modern" politics by emirate authority and, hence, the Sokoto aristocracy.

Indirect rule changed government without changing the elite,

aristocratic composition of those who govern (Whitaker 1965). Tax collection was left in the hands of the aristocracy. They had the appearance of sponsoring the development of local services, hospitals, markets and education; but they could do so only within the limits set by British policy.

The early British annual reports (NAK/Sok Prof 567/1909, 625/1906, 581/1914), political diaries and district notebooks demonstrate the concern the colonial government had in strengthening the position of the Sultan vis a vis his subjects. They incorporated formerly independent, non-Muslim, areas into the sultanate, for example, Kotorkoshi and Chafe. District heads thoughout the province were encouraged to pay annual visits to the Sultan to reaffirm their allegiance and loyalty. Whenever a rebellion against the Sultan was led by one of the district headmen, for example, Sabon Birni in 1931, the authority of the Sultan was upheld (District Notebooks, Sokoto Divisional Office). The British believed they needed the aristocracy to legitimize their own power and to act as intermediaries with the talakawa or commoners, especially the peasantry. This has largely been the attitude of all succeeding governments in Nigeria at least up to 1976.

Loss of political supremacy by the aristocracy seemed eminent in 1954 with the creation of the Ministry of Local Government and the gradual transfer of political power from the emirate or Native Authority to the central Regional political institution in Kaduna, capital of the Northern Region. In 1954, the Sultan's position as Sole Native Authority was abolished. Local government became Chief in Council. Until now, the council had been only advisory. Under the new regulations, the Sultan could veto a recommendation or vote from the council; however, if he did so, he had to submit a report to the Regional Government justifying his action.

The new Ministry of Local Government was presided over by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Sardaunan Sokoto, who was sympathetic to the style and substance of emirate politics. This particular restriction on the powers of his cousin was seen by many people in Sokoto as Sardauna's attempt to usurp the power and prestige of the office of the Sultan for himself: it was an office he valued more than the premiership itself.

Under Sardauna's leadership of the Northern Regional Government and as President General of the dominant political party of the North, the NPC (Northern Peoples Congress), the aristocracy of Sokoto were able to reassert their influence on politics and government. At the national level, they were able to maintain 50% of the representative votes in the Federal Government while making up only one of the three regions of the Federation.

The aristocracy were able to secure domination of the new centers of economic power. Through their influence in Regional Government, they were able to have their members appointed to the Marketing Board,

monopolizing the buying of local cash crops at fixed prices. Through their continued control over large parcels of land, they were able to exert even more control over the new cash crops: peanuts, cotton, tobacco. They were also able to influence the development of businesses through their membership on the Northern Region Development Corporation which provided loans to businesses, and by being appointed chairmen and members of the boards of corporations which have international ties.

During the colonial era, the aristocracy maintained their hold on the judiciary and the police to the extent they were permitted by British policy. As a result of the Nigerian legal reforms of 1959, family law, which was thought of as essentially a religious matter, was left to the Shari'a courts while criminal and civil law were left to the secular, state courts. It has been only under state military government that the Emir's court has been abolished and the police placed under state as opposed to emirate government. The Islamic judicial system is maintained and quite prestigous. However, it is under the auspices of state government and not traditional, aristocratic, or what is now called local government.

The opposition party in the North was NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union), led by Alhaji Aminu Kano, a Fulani and a member of one of the respected families of jurists and scholars in Kano. Alhaji Kano was critical of the Regional Government which he saw as having been defined largely by the needs and policies of the Colonial Government and greatly changed from the ideals of government enunciated by Shaykh dan Fodio based on scholarship and responsiveness to the people (Paden 1973; Whitaker 1965). His dissent and call for reform were phrased in terms of religious symbolism and values, values which also served, in part, to legitimize the social order he criticized. He attempted to create a viable alternative to the aristocratic dominated NPC by building a party based on class and ethnicity: he appealed largely to commoner (talakawa) and "Hausa" interests. His party had little impact in Sokoto principaliy because of its revolutionary goals.

There are circumstances in which ethnicity may be invoked, for example, in defining succession to positions of power and authority and control over positions of status and prestige. The office of Caliph/Sultan, Wazir, Imam (of the principal mosque in Sokoto) and certain councillors and district headships are all offices and titles associated with the founding fathers of the Caliphate.[69] Ethnicity is, however, but one component defining the ruling stratum. The ruling stratum embodies within itself certain elements of class and estate.[70]

In other circumstances, the local expression of ethnicity may be negated or withheld, as for example, when appeals are made to the principles of Islamic universalism by the Jama'atu Nasril Islam, or appeals are made to shared history and culture for purposes of political mobilization. In the face of mounting fear of "Southern" domination during the 1960s, the members of NEPU and NPC, along with the UMBC, the party of the Middle Belt, closed ranks. There was no longer a

significant difference between Hausa, Fulani, Tiv, Kanuri, Nupe, Muslim (Tijani or Qadiri), Christian, Kanawa, Sokotawa: they were one, mutanen arewa, People of the North.

After the creation of states in 1968 by the new military government, Sokoto became the capital of the North West State formed by the merging of Sokoto and Niger Provinces. In 1969, the state government formed a committee to make recommendations for changes thought to be needed in local government. Their stated aim was to make government more representative and to increase the participation of the talakawa in local government affairs. The committee, known as the Dasuki Committee was dominated by royalists and royalty (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976). Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, Baraden Sokoto, a direct descendant of Shaykh dan Fodio, was appointed chairman. Committee membership also consisted of a son and a nephew of the Sultan. The recommendations of the committee had the effect of maintaining the Sokoto aristocracy in a dominant position and Sokoto as the dominant division within the state. In spite of Zamfara nationalism,[71] it remained as part of Sokoto Division although the division was made up of three-fourths of the population of the province. There were times when the state government questioned whether significant changes were needed in Sokoto. They argued that there was not organized public outcry from the talakawa.

However, the Sokoto Local Authority Council was enlarged to make it more representative. Traditional and elected councillors were retained. The Sultan became Chief and Council with the state government retaining the right of dismissal. Population size in each district was the criterion for determining representation. The final selection of councillors was left to the Divisional Secretary, the state government representative. The council membership increased from 12, 10 of which were aristocrats, to 72. However, 50% of the portfolios went to senior, traditional councillors (North West State Government 1970:4). Dissent within the council meetings was almost non-existent principally out of respect for, or in deference to, the Sultan, Wazir and other traditional and aristocratic councillors who dominated the meetings (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976).

The power and authority of the Sultan and council were, however, reduced as a result of the Local Government Reforms of 1970. The Divisional Secretary became the state representative on the Local Authority Council and acted as an overseer of the running of the council. Prior to the 1976 Federal Guidelines for Local Government Reform which abolished Divisional Adminsitration, there were two successive Divisional secretaries in Sokoto. Both men were Muslim and both were from the former Niger Province, an area that was traditionally called "Bauchi", a land from whence slaves came.

As a result of the 1970 reforms, the council was enlarged and did bring non-aristocratic representation to local government, but it did so largely in the form of merchants, businessmen and successful farmers who were wealthy but non-aristocratic. They converted their wealth into

social honor symbolized by having large polygynous families and numerous clients, and by demonstrating generosity, piety and support of Islamic educational institutions and organizations, such as Jama'atu Nasril Islam and the Islamic Educational Trust.

The ethnic composition of the wealthy farmers, merchants and businessmen in Sokoto is pluralistic. Unlike Kano where wealthy merchants are non-Fulani (Paden 1973), the occupations of trade and farming are not associated with any one ethnic identity in Sokoto. Writing in 1925, Meek (1969:222) stated that: "The Fulani in Sokoto have much more diversified occupations than is the average for the whole country, engaging in trade to a greater extent." This is certainly the situation today. And it is the case both with aristocratic and non-aristocratic Fulani. It is said that Caliph Bello engaged in commerce as one means of maintaining his household independent of the public treasury (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976; Sa'id 1975),[72] and that Caliph Atiku had large farms and often resided in his fief placing his treasurer in charge in his absence (Arnett 1920:7). Wealthy merchants and farmers in Sokoto today are Fulani and non-Fulani, aristocratic and non-aristocratic. This is quite contrary to Smith's (1965:231) claim that "Aristocratic Fulani have... maintained that aloofness from trade and farming which forms part of their pastoral heritage."

The self-image of the aristocracy of Sokoto has not been of themselves as pastoralists but as scholars and rulers. It has already been noted that they distinguished themselves from "Fulani" defined as pastoralists. In defining themselves as a spiritual aristocracy and rulers of Islamic government they looked to the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad who had been a successful businessman.[73] In the nineteenth century, one of their closest allies was the scholarly Kunta family of Timbuktu, fellow Qadiris, who actively engaged in commerce.[74] This tradition of openness to the occupations of trade and farming continues in Sokoto today.

Intermarriage between the aristocracy and wealthy merchants, regardless of ethnic origins, is quite common. One man, who was at one time a blacksmith and, therefore, of humble origins, has become a very wealthy merchant and middleman serving as one of the Local Buying Agents for the Marketing Board. He is very well respected having demonstrated many noble qualities.[75] He has served on the newly expanded council. In 1976, the Sultan gave to him a daughter in marriage. This particular case is not unique. However, moving up in the hierarchy by means of clientage, and achieving success in business and marriage ties with the aristocracy do not mean that one necessarily either claims to be or is accorded the identity of Fulani.[76]

With the creation of the North West State in 1968, people from Niger Province took over the dominant positions in the state government whose capital was Sokoto. In 1968, Niger Province had 25% of the state's population but held 70% of the administrative positions in the state's civil

service. In 1974, the people of Niger Province held 50% of the senior administrative positions in the state government.[77]

Under Regional Government, the Nupawa and others from Niger Province had been prominent members of the NPC and allies of the Sokoto aristocracy. However, within the context of state government, they confronted each other as competitors for influence with the military government and the state's civil service. These new elites from Niger Province as well as those of non-aristocratic families from Sokoto have better formal western education but are perceived as being less prestigous by the aristocracy. They have assumed many of the characteristics of a ruling class and are consequently resented by the aristocracy.

Within the Local Government itself, the Divisional Secretary had a wide range of powers sometimes overriding those of the Sultan. He was directly appointed by the state Governor and, hence, accountable only to the Governor. In 1975, five out of the ten Divisional Secretaries in the state were Nupawa. Most of them served in areas of the former province of Sokoto.

Inter-elite and inter-ethnic rivalry were expressed in the language of religion. A new organization, the Islamic Educational Trust, was founded by Shaykh Lemu, a Nupawa and a Civil Servant in the Ministry of Education. He is a man quite learned in Islamic history, having studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and he is also a Muslim preacher and teacher. Although the leadership of IET is Nupawa, the membership of the advisory board cross-cuts identity based on ethnicity and territory. Some of its members are also active in the JNI. And some of the members of the advisory committee are also associated with the Tijani tariqa either through direct participation or through family ties. The Jama'atu Nasril Islam is viewed by some of the members of IET as "elitist" and "a private organization made up of the Sultan and his family"..."for the express purpose of perpetuation of the jihad and Fulani control" (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976).[78]

The leadership of IET is itself elitist. However, their elite status is based on formal western education and employment in the state's civil service and institutions of higher learning. Many of the members spoke with pride about their skills and training and their "progressive" values exemplified by, among other things, religious education for women: they have built a mosque on the outskirts of the city and frequently hold special services for women. They also encourage secular education for women. It should be noted that many of their ideals are the ideals that were also expressed by Shaykh dan Fodio.

While JNI is perceived as pan-national and elitist, IET concentrates it. efforts on local state Islamic education. One of their principal goals is to translate the Quran and other religious literature from Arabic into Hausa in order to make them more accessible to a wider range of people. They have sometimes sought the assistance of the aristocratic 'ulama of

Sokoto in pursuing this goal. One prominent scholar had rebuffed them, but another, and a member of the same family, very willingly assisted them (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976). Both JNI and IET compete with each other for the same sources of funding locally and internationally. And members of each organization accuse the other of being dominated by ethnic and class interests.

There was tremendous pressure for the division of the North West State into two states. The Sokotawa felt that they had been "re-colonized" and the people of Niger felt that the resources of the state government were too concentrated in Sokoto. Sokoto, on the basis of numerical strength and the continuing influence of the Sokoto aristocracy, especially the Sultan, was able to obtain more services than the southern part of the state which supplied the largest percent of manpower to the ministries and state government. The state was finally divided in 1976 as part of a national plan of decentralization of powers and responsibilities of Federal and State governments.

Since coming to power in 1804, the aristocracy of Sokoto have maintained their position of dominance and influence in religious, political and economic affairs. Yet, with the shift in the centers of political and economic power, and the shift in the boundaries of self and others, the position of the Sokoto aristocracy as rulers has weakened. They have been able to continue as members of a stratum which contains within itself elements of class, status-group (ethnicity and estate) and party[79] each with a changing role in the definition of the aristocracy depending on the historical circumstances in which they act. The aristocracy no longer control authority positions nor are they the ones who define the goals or make the final decisions of policy. However, they are able to have their voices heard and to influence decisions. They have recently been represented on the Constitutional Drafting Committee arguing for a need for constitutional guarantees for the Shari'a and the need for greater power to be retained by local government.

The Sokoto aristocracy are also represented in the world of international finance and business, either as Chairmen of the Board (for example, Costain, Nigerian Electric Power Authority, Nigerian Railway Corporation) or as Directors of banks and companies. They are represented on the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, Council of the Universities in Nigeria, faculty and heads of university departments, in the state government as ministers, and on commissions for local government reform (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975, 1976).

While changes have been extensive, they have not been sufficient or radical enough to transform the social and political structure completely. The changes brought about by economic development and local government reforms have not significantly changed the position of the aristocracy vis a vis the talakawa, especially the peasantry. Both the British colonial government and the succeeding Nigerian governments

believed they needed the aristocracy to legitimize their own regimes and both used the aristocracy as intermediaries in their efforts to have their programs accepted by the peasantry and the talakawa in general while at the same time introducing changes which significantly altered the power and authority of the aristocracy. The Nigerian Military government did provide greater alternatives to the commoner classes through state courts, development boards which were independent of the local government, an expanded local government council, and employment in the greatly understaffed civil service for those with skills obtained through formal western education.

A number of changes have taken place for the talakawa: economic development with an increase in migration to the urban centers,[80] wage labor, education and increases in services such as health care, electrification and water wells. However, with only 10% of the state with as much as primary education,[81] the majority still lack the skills and the security to manipulate the alternatives present and to move away from established patterns of social and political relationships.

For the majority of the talakawa, patron/client relationships continue to be more important than class relationships. Patron/client relationships are given political expression in the attendance of the clients in the zaure or entrance hall of their patron and political superior, ritual greetings and salute, and by the removal of one's shoes before entering the zaure of the patron. Patron/client relationships are also given expression in the continued social and economic indebtedness of the client to the patron. There is always the feeling in patron/client relationships that no one individual can operate on one's own and, therefore, needs the patron to act on one's behalf.

A class[82] of landed and ruling aristocrats, gentry and wealthy merchants and businessmen is in the process of forming on the basis of their traditional alliances as well as alliances in the new centers of political and economic affairs. A consciousness of themselves as a class is more greatly developed among the aristocracy and their allies and clients which include wealthy merchants and 'ulama than it is among the talakawa. Their alliance is symbolized by intermarriage: the Sultan has daughters married to the wealthiest merchants and businessmen in Sokoto (both Fulani and non-Fulani); to the Emirs of Kano and Zaria (both Fulani but members of the Tijani tariqa), and more recently to the Emir of Argungu (a Kebbawa Hausa);[83] and to the gentry and 'ulama in Sokoto. It was often said in Sokoto that to know the lines of marriage ties between people is to know the lines of indebtedness between them (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976).

Islam, understood at different levels of meaning by the people, continues as the basis of the legitimacy of the social order. And, hence the sacredness of tradition remains the focus of collective identity.[84] The majority of the people of Sokoto state identity themselves as Muslim (North West State Government Statistics 1975). They share a common

value orientation at different levels of consciousness and interaction whether Hausa, Fulani, Kebbawa, Zamfarawa, Dakkakari or Nupawa. Hausa language and culture are other elements of shared value orientation. Religion continues to be the principal vehicle of protest. Opposition and dissent are phrased in the language of religious values and symbols, i.e., membership in the Qadiri or Tijani turuq, membership in the Jama'atu Nasril Islam or the Islamic Educational Trust. However, the majority of the talakawa participate in political activity primarily as clients of political and religious elites whether aristocratic or non-aristocratic, Fulani or non-Fulani. The most articulate critics of the established social order are those that are most learned in Islam, for example: Alkali Yahaya in his lecture "Social Justice" (adalci) read to a gathering of state and local government officials and businessmen on the day of the Prophet's birthday (Sokoto, 1976) and the writings of Alhaji Junaidu (Balarabe 1975) and those of Shaykh Lemu. As such, proposed changes are phrased in terms of reform not revolution, although the same themes in different historical circumstances were part of the paradigm for revolutionary change. It remains to be seen what effect a return to civilian rule and party politics in 1979 will have on local social and political relationships.

Islam is increasingly important and conversions continue at a rather rapid rate. This is perhaps due to Muslim identity being associated with both the "traditional" and "modern" administrative elites as well as the proselytizing efforts of the different Islamic organizations. However, unlike some areas in Northeastern Nigeria (for example, Vaughan 1978), Islamic identity is not synonymous with Fulani identity. First of all, the histories of the Katsinawa, Gobirawa, Zamfarawa and Kebbawa Hausa are the histories of peoples with centralized state governments with Muslim leaders (however imperfectly Islam may have been practiced) and with flourishing centers of trade and Islamic scholarship. Among non-Hausa who become Muslim, such as the Dakkakari, Gwari, Gungawa, and many Fulani, there is a tendency to maintain their identity in certain contexts while in others to define themselves as Hausa.[85] Secondly, although people who define themselves as Fulani are found throughout the hierarchy of social and political relationships, the occupations of ruling and pastoralism are restricted to those who are defined as Fulani. The Sokoto aristocracy have become Hausaized both in language and culture while maintaining their own separate identity which is intricately associated with Islamic scholarship, their leadership in the nineteenth century jihad and their role in governing adding further support to Hymes' (1968:29) contention that "a language community...is purely a linguistic category--comprising people who in no sense constitute a corporate or organized entity."

In sum, changes in the social and political relationships of the aristocracy have been cumulative. While the sociopolitical structure has retained many of its formal characteristics, it has taken on new content and meaning. In spite of the shift in the political and economic centers of power, the aristocracy of Sokoto have been able to maintain a significant

hold on the new resources and to convert them to their benefit. However, they no longer monopolize production and commerce; nor are they in charge of the judiciary and decision making. The aristocracy now find themselves in competition with commoners for access to the centers of power. However, those able to compete, that is, the wealthy merchants and the new administrative elites, reaffirm the traditional culture by converting their wealth to social honor defined in terms of the ideals of the tradition and by forming marriage alliances with the aristocracy. People continue to be divided along lines of patron/client relationships, class and ethnicity. Ethnicity is but one element in defining self-other interactions. Its role in social and political relationships varies with the particular historical and structural conditions in which people in part find themselves and in part create.

There is a consciousness among the aristocracy of themselves as being Fulani and Arab, Fulani and Hausa, Sokotawa, Northerner and Nigerian. As the boundaries of social and political relationships shift, so do the definitions of self and others. What remains constant in the definition of themselves, and hence, the basis of their persistent identity system, has been the definition of themselves as Muslim scholars and leaders. Islam as a paradigm has both moral and existential characteristics. For the aristocracy, Islam has been and continues to be the principal statement of the way the world ought to be and provides by the examples of its leaders and a rich body of literature a guide for the definition of self and others in publicly critical circumstances.

NOTES

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1. Field work was made possible by a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Fellowship and a NDEA Title VI Grant.

2. It is possible to count at least one hundred "ethnic" identities within Sokoto by the time one delimits the core identities and then proceeds from there to all the permutations.

3. Turner (1977) speaks only about adapting creatively to changing environments.

4. See Berreman (1973) for a discussion of ethnic identity change and the constraints on change.

5. For a discussion of the historical circumstances in which people act and the continuity of tradition see Marx (1968/1858).

6. Shehu is the Hausa equivalent for the Arabic title of Shaykh.

7. This distinction of "Hausa" society and "Fulani" society is not limited only to the writings of Polly Hill. It pervades most of the social science literature on Northern Nigeria.

8. Silsila and isnad (pl. asanid) are sometimes used interchangeably. When a student has sufficiently completed his studies in one of the branches of the Islamic sciences with a scholar, he is given an ijaza, a certificate. Silsila and isnad refer to the spiritual and intellectual genealogies or chains of authority of knowing.

9. Although there was tension between Gwandu and Sokoto, they were held together by bonds of kinship and intermarriage. The Caliphate remained a single polity in spite of the varying degrees of autonomy of its members.

10. There are people dwelling within the city who are not Muslims and there are Muslims who are members of the Tijaniyya and Ahmadiyya.

11. "It was the custom for many years that members of the aristocracy would place their children in the custody of the pastoral Fulani in the rural areas of Sokoto or employ Fulani matron in their houses to serve as attendants to their children in order that they would learn and continue the language and customs of the Fulani. This, however, did not prove to be successful and Fulfulde has gradually been replaced by the dominant language Hausa." (Mallam Abbas. Sokoto, 1976).

    The loss of Fulfulde is attributed by some members of the aristocracy to the large numbers of concubines maintained by the royal households. Concubines were neither kinswomen nor often Fulani.

12. Mallam Abbas Yahaya (Interviews, Sokoto, 1976). Mallam Abbas is a nephew of Wazirin Juanidu.

13. It is difficult to know just how and to what extent Fulani identity was important in other contexts. Abdullahi (1963), Last (1967) and Usman (1974, 1975) state that Shaykh dan Fodio's community of students and followers prior to and during the jihad was ethnically diverse. In Sokoto, many of the characteristics of Fulaniness, reservedness, modesty, fortitude, are the very values also taught in

young children's Quranic education. They are also the values of mutumin kirkii, the good man, throughout Muslim Hausaland (see Kirk-Greene 1974).

14. See Waldman (1965) for further discussion on this point.

15. For a discussion of 'Uqba b. Nafi, see Batran (1979).

16. There is disagreement among the Sokoto aristocracy about their genealogical ties to the Prophet Mohammad. This is referred to later in the paper.

17. Batran (1979), Norris (1975), Sanneh (1976), and Stewart (1976).

18. This contradicts Smith's (1964) claim that Yandoto Mallams were all Hausa or that the conflict which later developed with Yandoto was based on ethnicity. For data supporting a position contrary to Smith's see Usman (1974, 1975).

19. Waziri is the title for prime minister.

20. In many areas of Northern Nigeria, sedentary Fulani are called Fulanin gida (in Hausa) or Fulbe sare (in Fulfulde). However, in Sokoto, the aristocracy are known as Fulanin zaure. Gida means house or compound: zaure is the entrance hall of a house.

21. In Sokoto, the mosque was not a place of study as it was in North Africa and in the Middle East. Once a student was ready for advance study, he sought a Shaykh or mallam who, while having general knowledge of the Islamic sciences, was also specialized in one branch or another, such as grammar, law, mysticism, theology, traditions, commentary on the Quran. There are several which have been established by different Islamic organizations, some primary and some secondary, modeled on the state-run school system, but with emphasis on the teaching of religious subjects. However, the institution of the zaure school still continues to be important.

22. There is inconsistency in the literature on the ethnic identity of Shaykh Jibril. Last (1967), Hamani (1975), Norris (1975), Hiskett (1957) variously refer to him as Tuareg, Berber, Hausa.

23. When Shaykh dan Fodio's community was perceived as a political threat, the Sarkin Gobir forbade the wearing of turbans, the veiling of women and the conversion of Islam to those who were not already Muslim (Last 1967). Today, any pious, learned Muslim can wear the turban (for men) and the veil (for women).

24. For a discussion of the Toronkawa as a spiritual aristocracy in other areas, see Behrman (1970), Willis (1978, 1979).

25. In Sokoto, the occupations of greatest aversion are butchering, tanning and dyeing. These are filled primarily by Gobirawa and Zamfarawa Hausa whose ancestors were, in most instances, resettled in Sokoto by Caliph Bello after the conquests of Gobir and Zamfara during the jihad.

The occupations with which Fulani are most identified in Sokoto are ruling and administration, Muslim scholarship, clerical activity, weaving, embroidery, sewing, farming, commerce and pastoralism. Ruling and pastoralism are, however, the only occupations historically exclusive to the category Fulani. The category Fulani is, however, quite pluralistic. Only Toronkawa Fulani have control over the highest offices and positions of political power and authority. One Fulani group, the Zoromawa, are merchants, blacksmiths and leatherworkers, a situation contrary to what Dupire (1965) reports for Niger where Fulani do not engage in crafts traditionally associated with being Hausa, and hence, non-Fulani. In Sokoto, the Zoromawa are said to be descendants of a servant of Uqba b. Nafi and a Fulani (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975; Last 1967).

There are certain occupations which are associated with non-Fulani peoples: other than butchering, tanning, dyeing, already mentioned, there are building, drumming, praise-singing, palace guards and messengers (other than diplomatic couriers between emirs). The category non-Fulani is quite pluralistic, and the occupations other than ruling and pastoralism are open to non-Fulani people. With the increasing movement southwards by the Tuaregs as a result of the Sahelian drought, Fulani are no longer the only pastoralists around Sokoto.

26. According to Alkali Yahaya. Alkali Yahaya is a member of the family of the Waziri and descendant of Shaykh dan Fodio.

27. Shaykh dan Fodio was an advisor and teacher to Yunfa who became Sarkin Gobir in 1802, two years before the jihad was declared against the state of Gobir.

28. Hamani (1975) refers to mercenaries who made up part of the Shaykh's following as well as the following of the ruler of Gobir.

29. Yandoto had an international community of scholars. The Shaykh had studied there and his family had marriage ties with scholars of the Yandoto community. Usman (1974) gives an assessment of the failure of the community as a whole to join the Shaykh's forces. If his analysis is correct, ethnicity would not have played a significant role.

30. There are numerous interpretations of the motivations of the jihad Brass (1920) saw it strictly as a movement of the Fulani to replace the Hausa rulers for materialistic gains. Last (1967), Smith (1960,

1964), Hiskett (1957), Johnson (1967), and Martin (1976) have variously seen it as a religious movement and as a confrontation between two ethnic groups. The term "Fulani jihad" recurs throughout most of the literature. H. F. C. Smith (1961:2) sees the jihad as "...an important intellectual movement involving in the minds of its leaders, a conception of the ideal society and a philosophy of revolution." No doubt it was that. And based on the details given in Last's (1967), Zahradeen's (1976), Hamani's (1975) and Usman's (1974, 1975), writings concerning the composition of the early jihad, it no doubt was community made up to people of different ethnic identities and motivated by diverse ideas and incentives although led by Toronkawa Fulani.

31. Some offices were reserved for royal slaves who were primarily non-Fulani but not universally so. I have focused on offices held by freemen.

32. The best documented revolt was that by Abd al-Salam, an Arewa Hausa scholar, who had played an important role in the jihad. He later felt that he was not receiving sufficient reward for the part he was playing and resented some course the jihad was taking (Last 1967).

33. For a discussion of the Ardo, see Stenning (1959, 1966) and Abubakar (1972).

34. Waqf, or land held in common for the community, was under the direct control of the leaders of the Islamic state and these were the zuriyan Shehu and their allies and clients. Each fief had its own territorial definition and the benefits of office were sometimes accrued not so much from direct ownership, although that did occur, as from the possession of slaves who worked the farms for the benefit of the officeholder. It was in effect the economic base of titled offices. Wealthy merchants and titled officeholders had their farms which were called slave settlements (rinji). See Balandier (1970) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (1975) for a discussion of the significance of control of property and production systems. For an overview of property and production systems, see Goddard (1972), Helleiner (1966), Hill (1977) and Oluwasanmi (1966).

35. The principal items traded northward were grains, slaves, dates and leatherwork in exchange for horses, natron, salt and luxury items.

36. Fulani craftsmen and farmers are settled in and around the city of Sokoto.

37. Based on a letter from 'Ali b. Bello to Khalilu b. Abdullahi in 'Abd al-Qadir b. Gidado, Majmu (Last 1967:106).

38. See Skinner (1968) for a critique of the use of "Hausa" to refer to an

ethnic group. It is a Songhay term used to refer to the diverse peoples east of them over whom they ruled during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

39. Alkali Yahaya (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975, 1976).

40. Household servants and artisans were given to a man at the time he married and established his own household. Servants were also inherited and offices had attached to them particular sets of servants. There tended to be perpetuated in particular family lines (Interviews, Sokoto, 1975, 1976).

41. See also Sura XXIV:33 in the Quran.

42. This was true of individuals and groups. An entire rinji, slave settlement, was sometimes freed; however, the people frequently remained in a position of inherited tenancy. One such example in Sokoto is rinjin Sambo. Sambo was a close companion of Shaykh dan Fodio.

The English terms "slave" and "client' do not adequately convey the freedom a slave might have and the restrictions a client may experience.

43. Clientage is both a relationship of dependence and a mechanism for mobility cross-cutting ethnic and class cleavages.

44. The significance of the status of the mother varies. On the one hand, a man of a slave mother is not prevented from succession to the office of Caliph, as Ali b. Bello exemplifies. On the other hand, Caliph Bello reckoned his genealogical ties to the Prophet Mohammad through his paternal grandmother and the Prophet's daughter Fatima. The descendants of Nana, Shaykh dan Fodio's daughter, have at different times wielded more power than the Caliph. Recognition of this fact is given in the following statement which had specific reference to Alhaji Junaidu, the present Wazirin Sokoto, and direct descendant of Nana: "Waziri ka fi mai abu karfi."

45. The definitions of equality in marriage varies with each of the Sunni legal schools.

46. However, the origins of the parents (dankatakar nasab) should be known (Alkali Yahaya, Interviews, Sokoto, 1976).

47. A Muslim woman should not marry a non-Muslim man although a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman--the assumption being that a) the woman will convert and b) the status of the children will be that of the father. "Non-Muslim" and "Muslim" cross-cut identities based on ethnicity.

48. Family includes any persons related through the father and the mother although for purposes of succession, the principle of patrilineality is the most important.

49. Nana was a poet, scholar, and mystic. The office of Wazir has been retained in the line of Nana and Gidado except for a brief time during the 1920's.

50. "By inheritance, I refer to the transmission of property rights, by succession, to the transmission of statuses. Inheritance and succession are closely related and commonly proceed together..." (Smith 1965:233). Descent is the reckoning of kinship.

51. The role of the Qadiri tariqa in the jihad has been discussed by Hiskett (1973), Martin (1976), Paden (1973) and Zahradeen (1976).

52. However, according to Sa'id (n.d.), Bello attempted to dissuade his family and followers from acting as though they were a saintly family by virtue of birth. al-Hajj Sa'id was a Tijani and follower of al-Hajj Umar. He visited Sokoto during Bello's reign and developed a close friendship with him.

53. Batran (1979) points out that marriage affinities and kinship through the maternal line is quite common among many of the Muslim scholarly families of the Saharan area. Also see Norris (1975).

54. Based on Waziri Bukhari's reading of Shaykh dan Fodio's summation of the different kinds of relationships between Believers and Unbelievers, he stated that: "The third category of friendship is that which is permissible.... It is having (a) relation (ship) with unbelievers and befriending them (out of fear of them), with the tongue but not with the heart.... It is permissible in a land where it (i.e., Islam) is not strong" (al-Bukhari 1968/1903:307).

    The community was indeed in a situation of fear. The Sultan had left Sokoto intending to reach Mecca. The British had demonstrated their superior military strength on the battlefield just outside the city. The alternatives were either to emigrate (hijra) or to remain and articulate a doctrine based on the past experiences of other Muslim leaders and jurists. al-Bukhari's Risala includes a letter from Ahmad b. Sa'd, Alkalin Gwandu and a Tijani, according to Last (1967:219-220). Sa'd argued that if all people emigrated, there would no longer be dar al-Islam.

55. For a discussion of religion as the basis of collective identity see Geertz (1965, 1973), Smith (1970) and Weber (1958, 1964).

56. I wish to thank Charles Adams for referring me to Turner's paper.

57. NAK refers to the National Archives in Kaduna. After British

occupation, and the dissolution of the Caliphate, the Amir al-Muminin is more accurately thought of as Sultan rather than Caliph.

58. Unfortunately in a paper of this scope it is impossible to treat all facets. The Ahmadi tariqa also has a mosque in the city.

59. The three principal men who headed the move to build the new Tijani mosque were Alhaji Bello Gusau, Principal, College of Arts and Arabic Studies, Sokoto; Alhaji Ibrahim Argungu, former Commissioner, Sokoto; Turakin Yelwa, former Commissioner, Sokoto--from Zamfara, Argungu and Yelwa, respectively.

60. Mallam Bello Gusau was at one time Principal of the College of Arts and Arabic Studies in Sokoto. He is now in the Ministry of Education.

61. Shaykh Ibrahim's nephew visited Sokoto in 1975 while this author was there. According to B. G. Martin (personal communication), Shaykh Ibrahim died in 1978.

62. Within any one tariqa, there are several branches and lines of segmentation.

63. Gwandu has historically been quite favorable to the Tijani tariqa.

64. See Batran (1979) on the Kunta family.

65. See Paden (1973) on Kano.

66. In addition to the Ahmadiyya, there are two Islamic societies associated with the Yoruba in Sokoto: the Ansar-ud-Deen and the Nawair ud-Deen.

67. As a descendant of Shaykh dan Fodio and member of the Bellawa family, Sardauna was eligible for succession.

68. It often happened, especially during the early days of colonialism, that sons of former slaves would be sent to the "western" schools in the place of the sons of the nobility. The nobility had a great aversion to the "western" schools. Education and religion were so closely associated in their own minds that, for a long time, they feared that their children would become "Christianized" if they sent them to the "western" schools.

69. The control of the zuriyan Shehu over the positions of power and prestige is symbolized by ritual greetings and salute from a person of inferior status to one of superior status; a separate royal cemetery, the tombs of its most notable ancestors being places of pilgrimage and veneration; the division of meat based on status distinctions (the forelegs of a ram going to the nobility: the neck

and back going to the people of burden); the maintenance of large households of family and clients; generosity to the poor; leaders in Islamic organizations and education.

The ritual greetings and salute are replicated throughout the hierarchy from a person in inferior status to one in superior status. However, there were situations in which greetings were markedly different, and these were in the contexts of interaction between Muslim aristocrat and non-Muslim. In one situation this writer observed in Gwadabawa District just north of Sokoto city, the District Headman, a Muslim aristocrat, was greeted both by the village headman, a Muslim and by the head of the arnawa, the Matsafi, the man in charge of the rains and fertility of the crops. The village headman saluted the District Headman while the Matsafi prostrated himself by kneeling on the ground and tossing sand on his head. It symbolized the fact that the greatest difference is between Muslim and non-Muslim although the category Muslim is quite pluralistic ethnically and cross-cuts the hierarchy of social and political relationships.

70. See Wallerstein (1972) for a discussion of the relationship of class, party and status groups in one stratum. Also, Van den Berghe (1975) and Robbins (1975) for a discussion of the relationship between class and ethnicity.

71. Zamfara has some of the most fertile lands in the state. It is the state's principal agricultural area.

72. Sa'id is not specific on exactly how Bello maintained his household independent of the public treasury However, there are traditions in Sokoto of Bello's involvement with commerce.

73. See Watt (1961) on the life of the Prophet Mohammad.

74. On the Kunta and their interaction with the family of Fodio, see Batran (1979), Last (1967); on their possible role in the commerce of Sokoto, see Baier and Lovejoy (1975). The importance of trade and commerce in Sokoto is evidenced by Clapperton's (1966:187, 202) discussion of the Ghadamesi merchants who fought in the armies of the jihad and the presence of the men from Timbuktu.

75. Noble qualities here refer to the ideals of large polygynous households, numerous clients, giving to the poor, piety, respect, support for Islamic organizations.

76. While distinctions within a family seems to be maintained, especially which reference to succession, there are situations in which one may chose the ethnic identity of either the mother or the father. After close association with a particular family, one is said to become like that family.

77. Statistics from the Ministry of Local Government, Sokoto.

78. These views are a composite of interviews with numerous people and are not, therefore, any one person's comments.

79. See Wallerstein (1972:209) for a discussion of a stratum which embodies within itself elements of class, ethnicity and party.

80. The Local Government Reforms of 1976 not only had the express purpose of decentralizing government, but they were also meant to provide guidelines for curbing the flow of migrants to the urban areas by providing better services and jobs in each "Local Government Area".

81. Statistics from the Ministry of Education, Sokoto.

82. For a discussion of class, see Gutkind (1974) and Worsley (1969).

83. The Kebbawa dynasty of Argungu historically have been enemies of Sokoto. They successfully maintained their independence from Sokoto until the British Occupation.

84. Symbols and institutions may be both religious and political, traditional and modern and they may have sacred and secular significance at the same time. It is only when structural and historical approaches are combined that the spuriousness of these dichotomies is best demonstrated.

85. In Yauri emirate/division, Salamone (1975) reports that Gungawa become Hausa upon conversion to Islam while Kamberi do not although they do speak Hausa. Barkow (1976) refers to an example of Fulani becoming Hausa. Ethnic consciousness among a people is to some extent still symbolized by striation markings. Those people known as Hausa Banza, the Zamfarawa, Gobirawa, Kebbawa, Katsinawa, Burmawa, and Nupawa have historically had striations. Striation is gradually ceasing. The aristocracy of Sokoto criticize its use. Whether the gradual loss of striation can be attributed to the levelling influences of the universalism of Islam, the increasing appeal of Hausaization and Northernization, Nigerianization or western influences, or all of these, is difficult to determine.

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MARGI RESISTANCE TO FULANI INCORPORATION: A CURIOUS RESOLUTION

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This paper discusses intersocietal relationships as revealed in the histories of the Margi and Fulani situated around Madagali in the plains and western slopes of the Mandara Mountains in what is today Nigeria. Additionally, it treats recent events during which the beginnings of a resolution of past antagonisms can be seen.

The indigenous societies in the region--Margi, Matakam, Higi, to mention only the largest--reveal considerable internal heterogeneity. However, the distinction between any and all of them and the intrusive Fulani is clear and immediate. The most relevant criteria of differentiation are religion--Muslim versus pagan or more rarely Christian, history--immigrant versus autochthon, and, of course, language--Fulfulde versus Margi. Other differences of custom including subsistence patterns, marital rules, traditional clothing, and the like are less often mentioned, though they are nevertheless a part of the process of discrimination. But all differences blend into THE difference--power. It is not that one has power and the other does not, nor even that one has political dominance over the other, though both of these are common observations. The essential difference is that, until recently, they each have had separate domains of power.

Throughout the periods of Fulani hegemony and colonial rule the pagan societies of the Mandaras retained a surprising amount of local autonomy, doubtlessly because of their geographic isolation and relative inaccessibility. This did not mean that they escaped the Fulani, as

subsequent documentation will reveal, but it does mean that they were never overwhelmed or truly dominated by the Fulani, who through their dependency upon cattle and horses were restricted to settlements in the plains and valleys adjoining the mountains. In the case of relations between Margi and the Fulani there was an additional divisive element, for the Margi, unlike other Mandara societies, had small divine kingships which gave them an added dimension of identity and an added organizational basis through which they could resist the Fulani. Margi identity is revealed in a prayer offered annually by the king of Gulagu: "Give me the wisdom to be just even to Matakam and Plasar." The former symbolize the other indigenous societies and the latter is the Margi term for Fulani.

Since the Fulani live amongst the Margi, the situation calls to mind the literature on ethnic identity. However, it is important to recognize in this paper that the identity of the Margi or the Fulani is more than cultural awareness: it is a political distinctiveness. Although today there is a culturally plural society based upon administrative and economic convenience which suffuses the area, until 1964 at the earliest Margi and Fulani were socially distinct. The boundary maintenance, which is largely a metaphor to writers on ethnicity, was literal to Margi and Fulani.

In the nineteenth century a Fulani chieftancy developed around the Margi settlement of Madagali nestled in the Mandara Mountains in what is today northeastern Nigeria. The settlers, as opposed to Fulani nomads who had passed through the area, were members of the Ba clan of the Wollarbe Fulani led by Ardo Dadi (though one account makes no mention of him). At the turn of the century when Ardo Njida succeeded as their head, their presence in the area was far from commanding, as they were vastly outnumbered by the surrounding Margi. The Kingdom of Mandara to the northeast was even more intimidating, for it subjected the area to annual raids.

The Adamawa Emirate, just to the south, was emerging under Modibbo Adama at this time, and when Njida heard of Adama's jihad, he seized the opportunity to become his northernmost ally. Initially, however, the ties with Adamawa were insubstantial and Madagali continued to be raided by Mandara, the town being sacked in 1815. Finally, in 1823 Adama succeeded in defeating the Mandara, and though he left one of his sons to rule Madagali, in two years the son left, and the chieftancy reverted to Njida. These events illustrate a very important pattern which has continued to characterize the relations between Madagali and Yola, the subsequent capital of Adamawa and a name synonymous with the emirate; that is, begrudging interdependence with the Fulani of Madagali seeking to maintain their autonomy and Yola attempting to assert its dominance.

This reached a climax when an outcast son of Njida attempted to capitalize upon a rebellion of the Margi of Gulagu against Yola to assert his independence. It is unlikely, however, that the Margi cared about the

difference between the Yola and Madagali Fulani, and their rebellion was unrelated to the internecine struggles of the Fulani. The critical event in the rebellion was a nearly successful Margi attempt to kidnap the Waziri of Yola. This act brought the full force of Adamawa against the Margi in what is known as the Gulag Campaign of 1872 (East 1935 [1967]: 90-91 presents the Yola version), and although the Fulani rebel was killed, it was the pagans who suffered most. This was not to be the last time that pagans would suffer as a consequence of the quarrels between Madagali and its adversaries.

The end of the nineteenth century saw the partition of the area so that Madagali came under German administration as a part of Kamerun, while Yola came under the British as an eastern outpost of Nigeria. Adamawa resisted the British, and when Yola fell in 1901, the Lamido fled to the Germans, only to be rebuffed. In 1902 he attempted to get the support of the aged Ardo Bakari of Madagali against the Europeans. Although Bakari did not support him, the Germans were suspicious and attempted to depose him. After a campaign in which once again the pagans suffered more than the Fulani, the Germans succeeded in murdering Bakari and installing his son, Hamman Yaji, as the Ardo of Madagali.

Some versions of this event allege that it was Hamman Yaji who lured his father into the German trap, and though at least one version disputes this, it is undeniable that on the day following his father's murder he was installed by the murderers. Hamman Yaji reigned for twenty-five years, under German, French, and British administrations. He was deposed by the British in 1927 and exiled to Sokoto where he died two years later. His reign in Madagali is significant for the universal abhorrence with which it was viewed by pagans, the journal which he left behind, British reaction to his administration, and the impact which it has had on events long after his death.

Even today, the name of Hamman Yaji is synonymous with oppression and cruelty. I have known many informants who could speak with first-hand knowledge of the events and hardships of his reign. At the turn of this century the valley of Wano was a sizable collection of Margi hamlets which was on the verge of becoming an independent kingdom, but Hamman Yaji's slave-raids so decimated it that today it is but a scattering of compounds. The remnants of a stone wall across Makwan valley reveals an attempt to keep Hamman Yaji's soldiers away, but an old woman who lived at the far end of the valley attested to its failure and the atrocities committed by the soldiers. The dynastic succession of the Margi kingdom of Gulagu was on three occasions interrupted as Hamman Yaji attempted to install leaders whom he believed would cooperate with him.

But the most striking tales of the period were collected by Kirk-Greene from informants at Sukur, the region's most important pagan kingdom. Sukur received Hamman Yaji's special attention and its very existence was kept a secret from the British.

> On one raid Hamman Yaji's soldiers cut off the heads of the dead pagans in front of the Lidi's (King's) house, threw them into a hole in the ground, set them alight and cooked their food over the flames. Another time they forced the wives of the dead Sukur men to come forward and collect their husbands' heads in a calabash; on yet another occasion, to take all the heads down to Madajali for the Fulani to see. . .When Hamman Yaji learned of the great significance attached to the Sukur burial rites, he ordered his troops to cut up the bodies of the dead so that they could not be given a decent burial. (1960:75)

Hamman Yaji had many rest houses scattered throughout his domain in which he would stay when on tour. During his reign they were reminders of his power and his rule. Today their ruins are regarded with a mixture of awe and loathing, but more importantly, they do not permit the memory of Hamman Yaji to die.

It must be admitted that accounts such as those told to Kirk-Greene and me are of questionable accuracy, given the subjectivity of our informants, though the fact that these tales are told and believed has an importance all its own. But the journal which Hamman Yaji kept from 1912 to 1927 tends to confirm the stories in less dramatic terms. The journal is composed of over 1100 entries, varying from a few each month in the early years to twenty or more in the months toward the end of his reign. The original manuscript was in Arabic; the copy to which I have access is an edited translation by William Reed, an Assistant District Officer who, I have deduced, had had dealings with Hamman Yaji in Madagali District.

The journal contains countless references to raids upon pagan villages, though virtually none after 1920. The references to slaves are even more numerous. Consider the following continuous passage which was literally chosen at random. (This period was during French suzerainty.)

> July 12, 1919 I received news that the pagans of Mugudi had robbed a caravan of Zira Bugel and had killed one man and captured his people and two horses.
>
> July 15 I raided Sinagali capturing 40 cattle and 40 sheep and goats. Fadhl al Nar's rifle got broken.
>
> July 18 Yerima Abba returned from the Captain's celebration. [Bastille Day?] He brought two horses belonging to the pagans of Mugudi, which he had captured from them.
>
> July 24 I sent Fadhl al Nar to raid Kamale and he captured 34 slaves, 26 cows and 130 goats.

July 27 I caused the name of my land to be changed and gave away two slave-girls on the occasion of changing the name, and I fixed a fine of 5s for anyone who made a mistake in this name.

Aug. 12 I bought two female slaves for 160 shillings. On the same day Babal arrived with 70 cartridges.

Aug. 21 I sentenced Wurduru to 12 months imprisonment for killing a man of the Sina pagans.

Aug. 26 I sent off Jauro Bazza with 150 shillings for my own requirements with 30 shillings as a present for a clerk in Bornu.

Aug. 29 I paid Sabel Surmatali a slave for 60 cartridges. In the future I shall buy them for cash.

Sept. 13 I left Wuro Alhamdu in order to meet the Captain at Duhu.

Sept. 14 I left Guram and the Captain left Duhu and we went to Madagali. I gave him 3 well-bred horses and the same day he went off to the Wandi hill and spent the night at Tongo.

Sept. 16 I raided the pagans of Kara, who are between me and the Mandara people named Dhunfa, and we captured 4 slaves, of whom I returned 2 and kept 2. We got a cow and killed 4 men.

Oct. 1 The soldiers returned from raiding Bau and brought 25 slaves and 27 cattle. They killed 4 men. Sheep and goats came to 124.

These entries amply document the events which pagans have reported in more vivid terms.

But the journal reveals more. When one reads it over and over again--and perhaps becomes inured to the atrocities reported so routinely --a picture of Hamman Yaji the man slowly emerges. There was little personal data put into the entries and there is less after Reed's editing, but some points emerge. He was a devout Muslim who viewed pagans ethnocentrically, as beyond understanding. Yet he was a man of personal honor who took his obligations seriously. Note above the punishment of Wurduru for killing a pagan, and on the last page of the journal he reports paying a debt to a pagan. He worried about his health, and seemed to have had chronic stomach problems. He was puzzled when others did not agree with him, be they slave or colonial official. He wrote poetry: he could be impatient with argument, yet the mundane did not escape his

attention. The last entry, presumably just before he was captured is fascinating for its mixture of impervious cruelty and absurd routine:

> August 25, 1927 I sent Tataraktu a slave-girl from my house, who belonged to the Wobongo pagans. His wife gave me 32s as her ransom. On the same day Sarakin Lifida ruined the onions.

However often I read the journal, even knowing what was to happen to Hamman Yaji, I can find no substantial evidence that he ever believed that he was anything other than a just administrator or that he was aware of the seriousness of the growing British dissatisfaction with him. In fact, the evidence is that he believed that the allegations were trivial and unworthy of consideration:

> February 5, 1927 A Christian arrived at Madagali, named Mr. Wilkerson. Derebe made a complaint and recovered his daughter, and Umaru Abba made 7 complaints, which were not proved. This was all a waste of time.

Nothing suggests that he thought he was in danger of being deposed.

It must be remembered that he knew very little interference in his administration before the arrival of the British. The main effect of the German administration seems to have been that they armed him, ostensibly to fight the British during World War I. However, there is no evidence that he ever fought them and considerable that he used the technology to rule the area more fiercely. The British initially looked upon him with favor as the Colonial Report of 1928 explained: "The District Head had been allowed much scope, and his undoubted gifts and strength of character had fostered the hope that he would eventually realize that it was to his interest to conform, and to become a real pillar of the Administration." But, the Report continues: "Adverse reports concerning him had been received for some years and he had received many warnings and reprimands, but in spite of all and in spite of many professions of repentance and promises to reform, he persisted in malpractices until he could be tolerated no longer. He was deposed, and as it was obvious that while a man of his influence and power was present amongst his own people peace and justice could never be established, he was deported to Sokoto."

I suspect that the situation was somewhat more complex than this passage would indicate. Although it is apparent from the journal that with the passage of time contacts with the administration increased appreciably, thereby submitting his rule to closer scrutiny by colonial administrators: it is difficult to imagine that they needed more damning evidence than that provided by the very first British District Officer to meet Hamman Yaji in 1921, one year before British administration officially began. He wrote, "Among the hillmen, Madagali's name is an

object of such dread and loathing as I have never seen in this country before, as was illustrated by the pagans in a manner fantastic but for its intensity" (Kirk-Greene 1954a).

I believe that the critical factor in his rejection by the British was their allegiance with and dependence upon the Adamawa regime at Yola which was continuing its attempts to reign-in the Madagali Fulani. The journal documents increasing contacts with the Lamido of Adamawa, but it is of importance that these contacts were often in conjunction with British administrators who without exception supported Yola's demands. Entries concerning payment of taxes to Yola and trips there could only reflect his subordinate position. Nor is it insignificant that when Hamman Yaji was replaced it was by a cousin of the Lamido of Adamawa. This is not to deny that ultimately the British were repulsed by his rule. Kirk-Greene has characterized Hamman Yaji's regin as,

> a quarter century of unbelievable tyranny and cruelty, of slave-raiding and oppression, that continued untrammelled throughout the tenuous German control and the shadowy French administration of the Great War, right down (to) and after the arrival of the British in 1922. . . .So fascinating is it in its ugliness: suffice it to say that Hamman Yaji, with his private army armed with rifles and unchecked slave raids, cause such misery and murder in Madagali District that even to-day his name is one of the blackest spots in the turbulent history of the Northern Touring Area. (1954b)

However, I must add that such judgments are post facto and that evidence from the period shows ambivalence and expediency on the part of the British administrators.

Nor can it be said that the pagans were entirely acquiescent in their dealings with the Fulani; they often provoked his responses. It must be remembered that whereas the pagans were hill people, the Fulani, dependent as they were upon cavalry, were largely restricted to the plains; therefore, Fulani suppression of the pagans never amounted to control. It was not unusual for pagans, from their mountain refuges, to attack small groups of Fulani in a kind of continuing guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, their moderate successes seem only to have fueled their sense of resistence and nonsubjugation. (Note the Gulagu rebellion above.) Finally, we might mention how the pagans must have appeared to Hamman Yaji. Imagine, for example, what it must have been like when, in 1915, Hamman Yaji accidentally encountered two young pagan leaders and a band of their kinsmen who were bent on attacking and killing their king, a man who was their father's brother. He instructed them only to oust the incumbent, but it is not hard to imagine that he thought them a bunch of savages, despite the questionable origins of his own chieftancy.

In 1959 as I began my research, the Fulani still held the official administrative positions in Madagali District, though it was a Fulani of the

Yola line rather than one from Madagali. The difference was largely insignificant to the pagans, and there is evidence to show they distrusted the Fulani of Yola even more than those of Madagali. The shadow of Hamman Yaji was still a potent political force in the area as revealed in the 1959 United Nations Plebiscite to decide the future of the Trust Territory (Vaughan 1964). Ostensibly, the choice was between joining an independent Nigeria, a position favored by Fulani, and staying under the United Nations; but locally this was interpreted as a choice between Fulani rule, unchecked by British influence, and continued British administration without ties to the Nigerian Fulani. The vote was to remain under the United Nations by a margin of approximately seven to three. During this campaign, Fulani rule was the prime issue among commoner pagans and memories of Hamman Yaji's rule were repeated daily.

Following the vote, drastic changes were made in both local and regional governments. Soon after the Plebiscite we awoke one morning to discover that the Fulani District Head and his retinue had fled to Yola during the night. In June of 1960 a local Christian was elected District Head by the newly elected District Council which was dominated by pagans. A second Plebiscite was scheduled for 1961, and Nigeria promised the area separate provincial status and local rule should it vote to join Nigeria instead of the Republic of Cameroun which were the two alternatives. Nor was the spector of Hamman Yaji gone, for a kinsman ruled Mokolo in Cameroun, and it was widely believed that Madagali District would come under his control should the vote favor union with Cameroun. The second vote reversed the first by almost the same margin; Madagali joined Nigeria though no longer under Fulani district rule.

The reorganization was real, it was effective, and pagans perceived the change. Although Fulani continued to live in Madagali District where they constituted a sizable minority (18-20%) in the population, they no longer dominated the politics of the area. Since 1961 the memory of Hamman Yaji has lost its political relevance if not its historical interest. This radical change, the near elimination of Fulani as a force to be reckoned with in local affairs, has had very far reaching and unforeseen consequences for the pagans of Madagali.

To these people the only Muslims they had ever known were Fulani; rejection of and hostility to the latter were inseparable from the former. But after the Plebiscite the situation changed. As local non-Fulani entered the wider political arena, they discovered the practical consequences of the fact that the control of Northern Nigeria was in the hands of Muslims, and for all practical purposes Islam--rather than any political or ethnic platform--was the region's largest single unifying force. To be a political leader, but not be a Muslim, was to be out of step with all higher authority. In consequence, there were good reasons for political leaders of the area to become Muslims. Thus, when Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region, toured the area in 1964, he was remarkably successful in converting to Islam pagan leaders

and others with political ambitions. These included very traditional, anti-Fulani individuals in the former pagan communities; for each Margi king and his governmental staff were converted. I should hasten to add, however, that I have found their conversions sincere and I doubt if any were motivated exclusively by the political advantages of their acts. The Sardauna was a famous and charismatic man and when he entered those remote hamlets and approached even the most conservative Margi kings, the latter were impressed, moved, and, finally converted.

I do not wish to overstate the case; the converts constituted a very small percentage of the population though they were a very conservative and influential segment. It would go too far to say that the changes which so small a segment have undergone are changes in Margi "culture," but some of their changes have had implications for the whole--a consequence of the fact that the king is a corporation sole--and all change which they have experienced is instructive.

Because many of the converts constituted a relatively homogeneous group and lived together in royal villages, it has been possible to observe the change as a group phenomenon. In this sense, although the numbers are small, the observed changes are much more like cultural change than simple individual conversions. The former rigid prohibitions against certain forms of caste interaction dissolved even though members of the opposite caste had not converted, and I found a few cases of caste intermarriage. All of the public rituals associated with the king--which rituals were the heart of the communities' religion--had been dropped. "Slavery" which had flourished into the 1960's was no longer honored. Finally, at least two individuals--one of whom was the king, the most traditional Margi man I had ever known--had married parallel cousins, women who were their "sisters" in Margi kinship terminology. Other changes were less startling; limiting wives to four and alcoholic abstinence, though each of these caused some backsliding.

Space will not permit a full analysis of this change, but two points can be made which relate to both the remarkable ease of the change and its extraordinary breadth. Although Margi have justly been characterized as provincial, this does not mean that they are ignorant of the existence of other lifestyles. Within a few hours walk of Gulagu, the kingdom in which I lived, no less than eight other distinct cultures may be encountered and both Fulani and Matakam hamlets are encapsulated within Gulagu itself. In brief, Margi and even the remotest pagans have long known of the existence of other customs such as non-caste organization, secular leadership, slave prohibition, and parallel cousin marriage. I suggest that this knowledge has provided them with alternative life-styles to which they have turned and which they believe appropriate to their new statuses. In this fashion, neighboring societies became templates of change for them.

Insight into why their change seemed so much broader than required of a change in religion came when I suddenly realized that the word being

used to mean Muslim, plasar, was the same word used to mean Fulani. Thus the historical unity of Fulani and Islam was also a linguistic identity. Nor was the problem merely one of language, for there was a considerable confusion in the minds of my informants as to the substantive differences between the two categories. The difficulty may have been exacerbated by the fact that although Margi can articulate the notion of ritual (zibsu), the broader notion we capture as religion is more difficult for them. Perhaps most important is the tendency for Margi to define themselves in terms of the performance of certain rituals, as the statement, "a Margi is someone who performs mba" (Vaughan 1962:50); thus when converts gave up their Margi rituals, they were perceived as giving up their Marginess. No one seemed able to say where the boundary lay between being plasar (Muslim) and plasar (Fulani), and most--including converts--saw no difference.

Perhaps stimulated by my presence and the fact that I had known him before his conversion, the king went to some pains to explain to me that he was still a Margi. That this occurred many weeks after my return and that he announced it in the manner of a discovery suggest to me that this was an emerging awareness for him. Some others found his distinction a happy one. But most converts did not recognize, or had failed to discover, the differentiation. A few of the latter moved into the Fulani settlement, used Fulfulde in their homes, and encultured their children into what they perceived as the Fulani life-style. These individuals associated more with their Fulani neighbors than their pagan kinsmen, and I noted that at least some of their children listed their "tribe" as "Fulani" (in English) in a school survey.

Margi and the other pagans have had considerable experience at maintaining their independence. They have, however, virtually no experience at any significant form of cultural contact except rejection; their boundary maintenance has been literal. Now, as they experiment with new forms of openness, they seem not to know how to restrict change. In fact, I was once visited by a group of school teachers who were able to express their concerns over their friends' and neighbors' seeming inability to maintain their identity as Margi. As noted above, it would seem that the heterogeneity of the area has given individuals from one society the option of "joining" another. Matakam become Margi, and Margi become Fulani. To the extent that these societies represent different levels of integration with regard to the national culture, they represent stages through which individuals pass, a curious variation upon evolutionary theory.

At the outset of this paper I noted that the social autonomy of the Margi was not entirely consistent with the literature on ethnicity although the heterogeneity of the area was suggestive of the concept. In Ronald Cohen's exhaustive survey of ethnicity, he observes that it "has no existence apart from interethnic relations" (1978:389). However, he emphasizes the situational character of this in that it is often a case of one against another when, in a different context, the two might be allied

against some other reference group. It is to this dimension of ethnicity that these data have relevance, for I am suggesting that to characterize interactions between autonomous societies as ethnic interaction would render the concept vacuous when contrasted to those situations in which the boundaries are metaphoric and shifting. The contact between Fulani and Margi in the Hamman Yaji era was intense and it was frequent, but it was interaction between competing autonomous societies. Margi lived in what they perceived as an independent society; they had to interact with Fulani, Matakam, Higi, and others in markets, administrative centers, in occasional encounters elsewhere, but these contacts were extra-social in the context of ordinary life. To an extent that many ethnographers of less remote societies might find difficult to believe, this situation still prevails, especially in mountain hamlets.

I feel that discussions of ethnicity should be reserved for those situations wherein two or more populations with mutually recognized cultural differences interact within the same social milieu. That is not how I would characterize the Madagali societies until recently. However, the conversions of Margi political leaders to Islam, as described above, represents a new situation, one which justifiably evokes a discussion of ethnicity. Nor should it be concluded that the situation will be only appropriate for converts to Islam, for other changes following the governmental reforms of the 1960's portend a possible similar development for the rest of the population. Participation in district and regional affairs and improved transportation has linked these formerly provincial mountaineers with much of the rest of Nigeria. (To mention but one example, the pottery produced in Gulagu has become very popular and is being shipped to Maiduguri from which it is distributed over a wide area.) The insular quality of Margi society is ending.

The question remains as to the form that the new society of Madaga'i will take. It seems unlikely that Margi society will be able to adjust and adapt to the new situation yet retain its distinct identity, its cultural isolation. On the other hand, present data do not yet suggest the emergence of a multi-ethnic society in which Margi have found cultural identity at the expense of their social autonomy. There is the suggestion that past Margi exclusivity and inflexibility could lead to their eventual absorption into a cosmopolitan Fulani culture. The resistance of one generation would, then, have sown the seeds of a resolution undreamed of by Hamman Yaji and his gallant protagonists.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GUIDAR OF NORTHERN CAMEROON AND THE FULBE (1800-1977)[1]

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INTRODUCTION

In the collection, one ambiguous point must be clarified immediately concerning the Fulbe and their neighbors. Let us consider the question of the Fulbe first, since nothing has yet been said about who their neighbors are.

A distinction is commonly made between nomadic Fulbe or "Cow Fulbe", who lead a pastoral, nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life; and urbanized Fulbe ("Settled Fulbe"), who are the political rulers of Northern Cameroon (the president, Ahmadu Ahidjo, is himself a Fulbe) and who have control over an important part of the market (together with the Hausa) and over a certain (Koranic) education. Both types of Fulbe will be examined in this study.

On the other hand, the Fulbe of Northern Cameroon are a product of specific developments. Though they are related to other Fulbe of Senegal, Upper-Volta, etc., they were deeply affected by intermarriages and other multiple contacts with their neighbors of Nigeria and Cameroon. This historical background makes them both the same and different with respect to the other Fulbe -- a point which should not be neglected when making comparisons.

The neighbors referred to in this study are the Guidar, a population of over 50,000 persons, classified among the Kirdi group or Plains

Map 1 :

Ethnic groups of Northern Cameroon (Source Poulewski)



Fulbe		
1. Wandala or Moundara		
2. Koloko	Islamized	
3. Arabes		
4. Mafo or Matakam		
5. Moufau		
6.		
7. Kapsiki	Mountain Kirdi	
8. Hina		
9. Daba		
10. Goude		
11. Fali		
12. Guider		
13. Moudang		
14. Toupouri	Plains Kirdi	
15. Massa		
16. Mousgoum		
16. Guiziga		
a. Pagans of the Marc Mossive		
b Bana		
c. Djimi		
d. Njen		
e. Mambay		
f. Bata		
g. Bornounon		

Animists, as opposed to the Islamized plains groups, who include the Fulbe, and the Mountain Animists who settled in the Mandara Mountains further north of the Guidar territory or to the east (cf. map no. 1).

The Guidar are farmers; they mainly grow millet (the red variety, but also the white and the yellow), cotton for cash, and groundnuts. They also do some minor stock-farming: poultry, sheep, goat and, more and more, cattle, though herding of the latter is left most of the time to the Fulbe.

When looking at the territory of these Guidar "neighbors" (cf. map no. 2), one notices that it is crossed by the Fulbe in its western part and that the city of Guider, where E. Schultz worked, is its central point. This is already evident to a great extent from the enclosed geographical map (map no. 3) which outlines the ecological niches (it will be seen later that some historical facts also help to understand this distribution).

In fact, from a geographical point of view the region of Guider is most varied: On the one hand, there are the valleys of the main rivers with their sandy beds, such as mayo Louti and mayo Guider, where the villages are strung out along the banks, and which have always been a favorite haunt of the Fulbe herdsmen. On the other hand, there are the empty lands between the rivers, interrupted by inselbergs which often look like chaotically piled-up rocks; the soil surrounding these rocky hills is often fertile and has weakly but steadily flowing water-pockets. The mounts can be and were used as temporary hide-outs, particularly during the war against the Fulbe, but they cannot be strictly considered the site of a mountain-type dwelling. In fact, the Guidar did settle at the foot of these rock-islands or rock-hills, but never on mountain slopes. These zones are used as pastures during the dry season by the nomadic Fulbe, whose herds cross them regularly every year. This is not indicated on the enclosed ethnic map, on which the eastern part of the territory (around Lam) appears "untouched" by the Fulbe.

We are thus dealing in this case with "interior neighbors", with regard to whom the Guidar preferentially defined themselves; but not exclusively so. The Guidar are also in contact with 5 other ethnic groups who, although they are farmers, have in some cases ways of life different from their own: the Mambay are fishermen; the Fali and the Daba live on the mountains, instead of at the foot of the mountains or in the plains like the Guidar. In the constitution of the Guidar ethnic groups, Spicer's "oppositional process" (1971:795) has also taken place with regard to these ethnies. In his famous work, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969: 13-14), F. Barth gives an empirical and behaviorist definition of ethnicity: "A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription when it classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background. To the extend that actors use ethnic identities to categorize themselves and others for purpose of interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense".

Map 2:
Ethnic Map of the eastern part of the arrondissement of Guider



According to J. Lestringant (data from the ethnic census of 1958).

--- Habitat of the Fulbe ethnos
—— Principality or Canton border

inhabitants	100	500
Chede	^	
Guidor	•	o
Dabo	x	X
Fali	o	o
Malboy	△	
Moundang	^	
Fulbe	P	Ⓟ

Guider, city where E. Schultz worked

In the same book, the author requests that, in ethnic studies, consideration be shifted from the inner constitution and the history of separate groups, and given to the origin of ethnic boundaries and their maintenance; he means social boundaries, of course, and not just physical ones. We would like to show here how the social boundaries between Fulbe and Guidar -- as well as those existing among the Guidar and among the Fulbe -- developed, changed or subsisted over time.

This study is, therefore, a diachronic study including several notable stages: Before the Fulbe Jihad, from 1830 to 1918 from 1918 to 1960 and since 1960. The inter-ethnic relations between the Fulbe and their neighbors, the Guidar, were greatly affected by these political turning-points: the Fulbe invasion of Guidar territory; the colonial conquest and the German, followed by French, colonial administrations; and the accession to independence of Cameroon under President Ahidjo. A considerable change in meaning and content of Fulbe or Guidar ethnic (or national?) identities took place during these periods -- a fact that will be underlined in this study.

Image, reality... Among the myths or historical accounts of the Fulbe/Guidar relationship, we were struck by the way certain ones used the language of kinship (filiation, alliance, consanguinity) and of sexuality to report "ethnic" differences. The history of kinship among the Fulbe, for example, is well known: They descended from an inter-ethnic marriage between a male Arab and a female Sarakole (Soninke) who gave birth to 3 females and one male. No matter where in Africa they lived, the Fulbe have always been in contact with foreign farmer groups, which accounts for the inter-marriage just mentioned. The language of kinship and of sexuality is a language which greatly facilitates the internalizing of the differences by pushing them so-to-speak "under the skin", which connects them with concepts like race, caste or ethnicity. This study will point out how the image of the Fulbe/Guidar relations is reflected in the myths by means of kinship.

1. Guidar/Fulbe relations before the Fulbe invasion of Guider (1830) -- for the Fulbe: Kitaaku (ancient times) or Jaahilaaku (pre-Islamic times); for the Guidar: The times before the Fulbe, or the times of the Guider principality.

   a) The principality of Guider

      At the beginning of the Guidar stem, two ethnic branches can be located:

      -- The first came from Bornu (Badagaza) and crossed the Mandara kingdom (the Wandala). They were Moukdara, "real" Guidar. The word Guidar was used for the first time by the German explorer H. Barth in 1857. "Mou" means people, "Kadara" means from Kadara, i.e. from Guider. They supposedly emigrated because of fighting in Bornu, after

Orography of the Guidar Country

Map 3



succession disputes within the Wandala dynasty; or because they refused to pay tribute, or else because of the Islamization of the Wandala dynasty under Boukar Adji (1731-53). The Guidar call themselves "brothers" of the Wandala and, according to linguists (Schubert, Hagege, Newman and Ma), the Guidar language is very closely related to the Mandara language. Ethnographical indications also confirm that, if they are not closely related, at least they have long been neighbors with the Mandara (Wandala, as they are called by the Guidar). Before 1830, a Moukdara dynasty was settled in Guider and, according to the genealogies collected, at least 5 kingdoms succeeded each other before the Fulbe invasion of 1830.

It is an interesting fact that the Fulbe's migratory path from bornu is so similar to that which the Guidar took (Eldridge, 1976: 11-12).

-- The second ethnic branch came from the Mandara mountains (Goudour). They fled from the overpopulation of animist refugees in the Mandara hills haunted by the slave raiders of the Wandala kingdom; or from the ravaging locust invasion of the region during the 17th century; or else from the fighting of the great kingdoms in the north. These "Guidar" had a long experience of resistance in the mountains to the neighboring kingdoms.

In this first state, we encounter a process of historical transformation, and a process of clanification and classification of the different groups entering the Guidar space; nothing much can be added to this. Each group has a clan name derived from the name of a village in the political space of the Guidar where it was given a socio-political function -- that of a chief of the earth or chief of the village. It is noteworthy that no "ethnic" difference is converted into racial superiority and that there is no asserted ideology of exclusion or "kinship" among the different migrant groups. It will be shown that the nomadic Fulbe were integrated in the same manner: "People from....", the place not being specified. The Moukdara chief of Guider commanded the distant villages -- such as Libe, Djougui, Lam, Bidzar -- through his brothers or his sons. Every second generation, these local commands were relieved (cf. the neighboring chiefdoms of the Guiziga or the Moundang). This thus represented a centralized political system. The Guidar principality was located just south of the Wandala kingdom boundaries. It was not, as postulated by K. Strumpell, dependent upon the Wandala kingdom. My data coverge with those of M. Eldridge (1974: 192) on this subject.

b) The Fulbe in the principality of Guider

The arrival of the Fulbe in Dilara, a plain located in the northwestern part of the Bornu country, dates back to the very early days. The stage of the Fulbe in the kingdom of Bornu or, for some, in the Hausa country seems to have been essential for the later evolution of the Fulbe of Northern Cameroon. It was only in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries that the Fulbe began their migrations towards the Wandala and the Benoue. They arrived in the Guidar country by small groups of migrants and melted into the crowd. They preferably settled in the valleys along the mayos (rivers) and crossed the eastern region only for pasture during the dry season, after the harvest of millet and cotton.

This was for the Fulbe a phase of dispersal, of scattering and of loosing the ties of blood among themselves:

> In the old days, there was not much knowledge in these countries and, when they first arrived, the Fulbe were given by the natives the name of the place they came from; the natives said: 'These are the Fulbe of this or that region, but those are the Fulbe of this or that other group'. So the Fulbe continued naming each other in the same manner and gave their groups the names of countries they had crossed. (Eldridge, 1976: 63)

The case of the Fulbe thus shows the same process as described above for the Guidar. M. Eldridge had to do much patient research in order to reconstruct the relationships. In the plain of Diamare, in the northern part of the Guidar country, there were mainly the Feroobe (descended from So), as well as in the eastern Guidar zone (the Mbororos); in Guider there were the Wolarbe, i.e. the Bamle (descended from Ba); and in Bindir, further east of the Guidar territory, there were the Illaga (descended from Deto). After the Fulbe invasion of 1830, more Illaga came to settle on Guidar territory in Mayo-Loue, Guider and Golombe. The relationship between the Guidar and these Fulbe turned out quite differently as will be seen later.

The Fulbe who crossed the Guidar territory or stayed there belonged to various groups. They paid grazing rights to the chief (from time to time an ox, a calf or a heifer, but also a tribute in milk). Symbiosis was strong between Guidar and Fulbe; the Guidar knew about cattle, but left the raising to the Fulbe, requesting from time to time an animal for food. The Fulbe were entrusted with Guidar orphans (infants) in exchange for millet or cotton; those orphans often remained

with the Fulbe group. Women were exchanged between the two groups by inter-marriage. The myths account for the Fulbe/Guidar symbiosis in the following way: "God had 2 sons; He gave the hoe to one of them and the whip to the other" (there is no reference as to whowas the first born or the favorite...). The relations between the Fulbe and the Guidar or the animist populations in general deteriorated with their successive arrivals and numerical increase. The Fulbe herdsmen allegedly were stopped at the bank of mayo Louti, near Mayo-Loue, by the Guidar's hostile attitudes (according to Lestringant, 1964:110). Their sedentarization in particular seems to have caused a problem. However, we have no confirmation of this deteration of the relationship with the Guidar before 1830, as with the Guiziga neighbors: Stealing and slaughtering of cattle, excessive levy of their flocks, their harvest, and even, according to the Fulbe, rape of the girls and jus primae noctis (Eldridge, 1976:81). They were far less numerous in Guidar territory and there were inter-marraiges between the Guidar and the Wollarbe (Lestringant, 1964:303). That the raltions between the two groups were not all that bad, even if occasionally hostile, is obvious from the attitude shown by these groups toward the Guidar after the invasion of the principality in 1830. This invasion, as we shall see, would not alter Fulbe/Guidar relations.

2. Islamic times for the Fulbe: Zamanu Diina, for the eastern Guidar: the time of war with the Fulbe.

"After having ensured by armed force -- the Jihaadi, the holy war -- the political supremacy of the Muslims, the Fulbe continued their systematic territorial conquest, organized the construction of the new States and of their political powers; simultaneously, a definite sedentarization of the vast majority of the nomadic herdsmen took place and a new Fulbe society was born, that of large cities. It must be said here that the state of Bornu had been decisive in this transformation (or the sojourn in the Hausa country, depending on the groups). Since the very beginning of this period from among the educated Marabout, the Moodibe, a ruling class had emerged whose principal task would consist in leading the Jihaadi and in assuming the political powers of a new kind, the continuity of which they ensured by setting up the present dynasties. Once launched, the Fulbe of Adamawa within half a century (1800-1850) conquered vast territories extending from the Mandara States in the north (the Wandala) to the edge of the equatorial forest". (Eldridge, 1976: 13).

The conquest of the north by the Fulbe confirmed the division of the society into free men and servants, the conquerors assigning the defeated to a type of serfdom that freed the former of such humble tasks as farming and stock raising and ensured them the ease and freedom required for their martial and political activities.

In 1830, Modibo Adama headed the offensive against the principality of Guider. A new type of Fulbe, almost completely unknown by the Guidar, appears. This is what K. Strumpell says about the event (transl.):

> To avenge for this defeat, Adama was sent from Gourin. Advancing along the valley of Mayo Tiel, he reached the crest of the Mandara hills, crossed the pass of Pogolossum and launched his army against the pagan principality of Guider. Prince Mouli Madi fell under the sword of the Fulbe near Sugi (Doubi); his son Mouli fled toward the mountains west of Guider around Libe. The same fate was awaiting the pagans related to the Guidar of Mousgoy whose capital city Loumass was burnt down. With Guider an important junction of communication had fallen into the hands of the Fulbe.

From then on, the history of the Guidar tribe split in two. One part of the Guidar, those settled along the valleys of the great rivers and in the zones of the low-plateau, were subjugated by the Fulbe. The other part, who had taken refuge in the eastern, more mountainous zone -- where our research took place-(from Bidzar to Lam and Matafal) defended dearly their liberty and answered all attempts at assimilation with stubborn and desperate resistance or massive emigration, flowing back when the conditions became more tolerable. The Guidar around the mountains of Libe eventually were given an intermediate position, since the Moukdara chief of Libe was under the direct control of the Emir of Yola.

This divergent development, however, was not immediately obvious, for -- and this is an almost unique event in the records of the Adamawa -- the Fulbe intervention was not immediately followed by a dynastic rupture in Guider: No Fulbe Bamle applied for the commandership. The Fulbe at first designated an Islamized son of the former prince Mouli Madi, Kankalesso (called Salissou), in 1830; then, given his obvious lack of aggressivity towards the pagan Guidar, they designated a Fulbe friend of Mouli Madi who was married to one of Mouli Madi's daughters and thus was also his son-in-law; this latter made Salissou -- "alliance oblige"! -- the enthroner of the sovereigns, i.e. the chief of the land. This perhaps explains the fact that there was no insurrection of the defeated Guidar, no immediate fightings against the groups of Libe, Lam and Bidzar where -- in the villages at the foot of the mountains or not far from them -- the brothers of the reigning prince Kankalesso had retreated along with numerous Guidar, a fact that confirms what we said earlier about Fulbe/Guidar relations and their relative equilibrium. Guidar resistance was never really organized, but when fourteen years after the fall of Guider -- with the reign of Mbella, an Islamized Fali -- hostilities broke out, the Guidar of Lam and of Bidzar had anchored themselves so steadfastly at the foot of their

rocks and their mountains that nothing would move them away. Faced with this situation, the Emir of Yola tried to post the more bellicose foreign dynasties of Illaga in Guider and in Mayo-Loue.

About 1870, for strategical reasons, the Iamidate of Mayo-Loue was founded: with the mission of keeping the eastern Guidar in check and of progressively subduing their villages. But this attempt failed. In fact, the Guidar managed to raise a barrier between the Fulbe States along the border of the Benoue. This is never mentioned in the texts when speaking of the Sokoto empire; and yet, as indicated by Major Dominik and stressed in the travel reports analyzed by J. Lestringant:

> All travel reports expressly agree on this subject; they describe the Guidar as savage hordes and their villages as fortresses opposing a victorious resistance, when not spreading terror among the travelers. The furious rage and aggressivity of their warrlors is said to be 'comparable to that of the dog faced baboon' (1964-134).

When attacked, the Guidar had a simple but effective technique: the children and the women climbed into the mountain with their millet and groundnuts, while the men stayed at a lower level and greeted the Fulbe with arrows, spears and heavy rocks. When the Fulbe threatened to climb up the mountain, the Guidar started rolling down big stones. This is how Lam resisted a month-long siege by the Illaga emir, Zubeiru, of Bindir (1901).

On the other hand, those of the Guidar villages that were not effectively protected by solid natural terrain against which the Fulbe horses were useless, had a much weaker defense position; this is probably how the villages of Djougui and Biou were temporarily enslaved. Furthermore this region, particularly during the rainy season, occasionally suffered from unavoidable raiding expeditions by the Fulbe looking for food and, especially, for slaves; men and children were thus snatched from the fields by surprise in order to be sold.

Thus situation was, however, quite different from that of the Guidar who lived on the low-plateau and were subdued by the Fulbe. They had to render services and pay tribute in kind.

In the eastern section, facing the common enemy, the integration process of the different original groups -- along with those who continued to arrive sporadically, like the Mambay, Daba, Guizlga, Moundang, all subjected to the same pressures from the Fulbe -- was considerably accelerated. One ethnic awareness came to light, in opposition to the Fulbe, during this period: that of the Baynawa, the "friends", and distinguished itself from that of the subdued low-plateau Guidar and, among them, the Moukdara with whom the

eastern Guidar nevertheless still acknowledged kinship.

The most interesting phenomenon to occur at that point in this zone is the transformation of the political system: the passing from a centralized system -- that of the principality of Guider -- to small, politico-ritual federations, not very far-reaching, and organized on a basis of "halfs", which allowed for integrating the differences by means of political and ritual complementarity (chief of the earth, blacksmith, chief of the village) with alternating functions according to the seasons and agricultural rhythms. The eastern Guidar also set up a system of secondary marriages by reciprocal wife-capture among remote villages, which enabled strangers to become integrated in a network of alliances and created a solidarity among the different remote villages during armed conflicts with the Fulbe. Moundang and Guiziga villages practiced this type of matrimonial exchange with the eastern Guidar. Thus a rapprochement among foreign groups took place in this manner, their alliance being secured by the initial stealing of wives.

It is an interesting fact that -- although the struggle with the Fulbe was long and hard -- on the ideological level the confrontation and symbiosis between the two cultures are expressed, on the Guidar side, by the metaphor of a struggle between two brothers: one, the dominant, is big and "red" (the Fulbe), the other is thin and "black" (the Guidar or the Kirdi in general). Fulbe supremacy is ascribed not to a more advanced technology or to greater numbers, but to a more powerful religion to which the Guidar did not want to submit due to the "fault" of a woman whom God had asked to bring Him her children: for fear of circumcision, she allegedly presented only three, hiding the three others (her favorites) -- hence the difference between the God-blessed and the others.... The Guidar thus have a clear feeling of inferiority as compared to the Fulbe, which they express in terms of lesser virility (less imposing figure, uncircumcised penis).

Consequently, on the Guidar side there has been interiorization of an ideology that inferiorizes them from a racial and religious point of view.

A second myth stresses the importance of writing and knowledge: "God asks His wife to bring Him her two sons: she hides one and shows the other (the Fulbe). He then asks her to bring Him the other one too and, meanwhile, says to the child present to try and watch what He is going to do. He orders the two children to hide their faces, then proceeds to write. The Fulbe peeps through his fingers, while the Guidar dutifully closes his eyes, rolling pebbles in his hand. This is why the Guidar only have divination, whereas the Fulbe have writing and the Koran". The image is that of the double-dealing Fulbe. The Guidar speak differently of the Illiga of Bindir or of Mayo-Loue whom they describe as ferocious but more

straightforward, a distinction the Fulbe themselves make between the Illaga and the Feroobe -- the former using violence, the latter using ruse. (Eldridge, 1976: 33).

Another distinction was made by the Guidar between the Islamized and sedentarized Fulbe whom they call the Fulbe, and the Mbororos, the nomadic Fulbe. According to the Fulbe traditions, which in this case are identical with those of the Guidar,

> Another group of Fulbe refused to abandon their ancient culture and old customs and continued their pastoral way of life without becoming stable, refusing to settle in a given place, refusing to take part in the holy war of the Sehou of Sokkoto, paying no attention at all to the application of religious rules and devoting themselves exclusively to their herds. (Eldridge, 1976: 41).

The symbiotic relationship with these Mbororos continued during the war against the others; ironically they are also part of the Kirdi group, the pagans.

The Mbororos, as a matter of fact, distinguish themselves from the sedentary Fulbe urbanized whom they call Houyas.

Consequently, this stage corresponds both to Fulbe ethnic revitalization and a regrouping of the different Fulbe factions on the basis of kinship (the 4 children), and to a split of the Fulbe group into Houya/Mbororos. Fulbe nationalism and the practice of the Islamic religion were thus used to assure and to justify the creation of a slave State.

Opposite these dominating Fulbe, the Kirdi group -- subdued or resistant pagans -- came into being. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the myths we collected are recounted -- with minor variations (ethnic difference depending on the same scheme?) -- by all the Kirdi groups of Northern Cameroon (cf., for example, A. Adler, 1972: 40-41).

3. The period of the White men.

a. The Germans

At the conference of Berlin (November 1884 - February 1885) where Africa was divided, Cameroon was assigned to Germany on the condition that the allotted territories be occupied, hence the expeditlon of Major Dominik who arrived in Northern Cameroon at the beginning of the century.

After having divided the Guidar territory among the different lamidates, the Germans left the commands of the country

entirely to the traditional chiefs. The Guidar of the low-plateau consequently had to continue to pay tribute to the Fulbe, but the latter now had the possibility of calling on the German armed forces. The Fulbe position was thus reinforced. The Baynawa-Guidar, on the contrary, developed xenophobic feelings and retreated into the anarchic individualism of the village communities.

The German domination put an end to large-scale slave trading, which nevertheless continued secretly for a time. During the years of famine, Guidar children or, through Guidar middlemen, other Kirdi children were apparently even sold to the Fulbe, whereas formerly orphans used to be given to the nomads. But in principle slave trading was no longer practiced. The subdued Guidar, however, still had to pay a tribute in oxen, goats and poultry.

b) The French

In World War I, Cameroon passed from German to French domination, which did not make much difference right away. At the beginning the French applied essentially the same policy as the Germans and opted for an indirect administrative system through the intermediary of the Fulbe.

While the Guidar of Libe and of Guider had long been organized into canton and lamidate, the administrative situation of the eastern Guidar still remained confusing and fluctuating. The Guider plateau was still the object of various covetous desires on the part of the neighboring Fulbe lamidates which laid conflicting claims to it. But the eastern Guidar purely and simply refused any kind of integration and did not hesitate to do away with their village chiefs, if they found them too cooperative with the French or the Fulbe.

In 1927, the region of Lam was agitated by a beginning Messianic movement which soon spread into the neighboring Guiziga and Moundang sectors. A Guidar from Lam, Toumba na Domdoko, who called himself Mangelva ("Celestial One" or God), preached that sacrifices must be made on the altar of the ancestors, that it was not useful to farm, that the harvest would take care of itself, that the Whites would go away, that their bullets would change into water, etc... Within a few months, he had acquired considerable authority not only over the Guidar, but also over their Kirdi neighbors, the Guiziga and the Moundang. This movement is extremely interesting, for it is a transposition, on the religious level, of a desperate protest against colonial and Fulbe intrusion, shared by other Kirdi, and which for a quarter century had never ceased to find expression in multiple acts of rebellion.

In 1933, the Fulbe lamido of Mayo-Loue, by means of clever manipulation and generous gifts, obtained the villages of Biou and of Bidzar. In 1935, using the same method, he was attributed the villages of Djougui, Lam, Nioua, Houmbal, Douva, Guidi, Karba, Kong-Kong, Doussoum, Dahal, Balia and Boudva. And extortions started again: pillaging of the villages, systematic raises in taxes, abusive tribute requests of goods and services to the lamido's profit, fines, marriage frauds... The motives for dissatisfaction were as varied as they were intolerable. This baleful situation had as a consequence the extension of the Guidar geographic sphere, or rather their migration, for they moved by the hundreds, as usual, preferring exile, at least temporarily, and freedom to the conditions imposed on them. The emigrants often chose the east and Chad where they were protected by the border and where they had relatives; there was also a change in density inside the Guider territory.

On February 3, 1938, an incident occured in connection with the lamido of Mayo-Loue who had come to Lam to collect the tax moneys: fourteen people were killed. The Guidar took hold of the total sum and later turned it in to the special agency at Guider, indicating, by doing so, that they preferred to deal directly with the Whites -- a very clever move that would soon change their condition. The colonial authorities promptly decided to remove the Fulbe from any kind of power over the eastern Guidar. Therefore, in 1940, the Guidar villages went under the direct control of the head of the subdivision. Though the initial stage in colonization had brought about massive migration of the Baynawa-Guidar, an exacerbation of relations between the Fulbe and the eastern Guidar, and a Messianic movement -- as soon as they were no longer under Fulbe tutelage, the eastern Guidar established a far better collaboration with the French colonial administration. This alliance -- unequal as it was -- between the Whites and the Guidar, over the heads of the Fulbe, is reflected in the administrative reports. Every now and then, the Guidar are still referred to as savages, but less and less so; the Fulbe, however, are often called rascals. In 1960, J. Lestringant stated that the Guidar were the most encouraging element in the Guider district and that they showed a vitality that made it easy to predict the leading role they were later to play (1964: 392). In the forties and thereafter, Christian missions and schools were relatively well accepted by the Guidar: more conversions to Catholicism than to Islam can be noted and, proportionally, more schooling among the Guidar as opposed to the Fulbe (who had Koranic schools). The Baynaw-Guidar accepted regrouping within a canton in 1957. This movement towards political and administrative unification, however, did not have the expected effect of

ethnic revitalization, since 3 years later Cameroon, within a different context, became independent.

4. The Fulbe-Guidar relationship within the United Republic of Cameroon.

In 1960 Cameroon became independent under president Ahidjo -- born from a Fulbe father and a reportedly, according, to Guidar slander?) Toupouri (Kirdi) mother. This produced a closure of the national space, Cameroon, and a process of state-controlled centralization which inferiorized regional cultures, relegating them to the realm of folklore. This centralization had, of course, its economic repercussions, too. From the very beginning, the government insisted on unifying Northern Cameroon by means of Islamic customs. It must be underlined here that, when one speaks ofFulbeization, or "Islamization", what is meant is that the transformation of the Kirdi took place under Fulbe influence and imitation of a Fulbe model. But we must be fully aware of the fact that these Fulbe themselves had borrowed a great deal from the customs of Bornu, of the Wandala (Mandara) and of the Hausa country, as well as from the European model. Before 1960, only the house servants or slaves of the Fulbe or a few animists had converted (the other elements, women and orphans, had been integrated in a different manner). Until then, also, the Islam had tolerated the surrounding animism. According to R. Santerre, however, in the 1960s already more than a tenth of the 300,000 Fulbe of Northern Cameroon were in fact descendants of animist ethnic groups completely assimilated to the Fulbe by means of the processes described above (1973: 20).

From 1960 to 1970, pressure to convert was exerted mainly in cities (cf. study by E. Schultz) and on a special category: young men. There was not a single Islamized Guidar in the village of Lam (2,000 people). Stress was laid on the "Fulanization" of urban elites: mainly administrative personnel and often Guidar who had been educated and baptized by the missions -- so that they had to convert a second time.

From 1970 on, pressure was extended over the rural areas, starting with the political elites, there too. In the eastern Guidar sector, the first affected was the chief of the canton of Lam. The Islamization of this canton-chief in 1970 raised outcries of protest among the village elders. The chief defended himself by outlining the advantages to be gained from this for the canton; as a matter of fact, the Lam-Guider road was resurfaced that year for the first time in ten years. While this kind of local pressure was being exerted in the rural zones, Polish missionaries were partially relieving the French missions, around which the identity and ethnic resistance of the Guidar to the Fulbe had crystallized. In 1973, an Islamized Guidar deputy was installed in the village; a few among

the local elites, those closest to the chief, converted to Islam. In 1977, it was rumoured in the village of Lam that a list of the converts was to be submitted to Saudi Arabia in order to pay for the Guider-Tchontchi road. The connections with Moslem Africa and a pan-Moselm nationalism with the oil-producing countries were emphasized.

Fulbeization is undoubtedly a social promotion, a selective process applied from above, which explains its popularity. It is seen by the bush-Guidar as a disgrace, a betrayal which in most cases, within a short time, breaks off all pre-existing ties of kinship. Those who converted are ridiculed for "acting like a Fulbe"; they are covered with shame by saying that they have "sold" themselves, that they have converted in order to obtain social and material advantages (for which they are envied, of course), and that they will never be free, will always be dependent on a superior, that they have lost their liberty. What they actually have lost, at least to a great extent, is the support of kinship ties, which means that they are more readily assimilated to the Fulbe group.

The converting Guidar are Fulbeized by very quickly changing from the Guidar language or from French to Fulfulde -- the Fulbe language -- and from European or traditional costumes to the loose-fitting clothes worn by Islamized populations of the north. They change names, but without giving up completely their former identity. Guidar names are names given according to birthrank. The second name of an indivldual is the birthrank of his father. When convertlng to Islam, the Guidar take Fulbe names which correspond to their birthrank and to that of their father, thus unintentionally making their affiliation with the Fulbe group look as though it dated back to the previous generation. So their identity is partially preserved. Equally noticeable is the change in their habits and food: They give up red millet for white; in most cases, though, they continue drinking alcohol. They pray in public and observe officially the Ramadan fast, but they are never circumcised, which is paradoxal since it is known that for the Guidar, Kirdi means pagan, certainly, but it also means "uncircumcised".

Their wives very seldom convert; in any case, they do not remain indoors all the time, unlike the Fulbe women who go out very seldom and then only at night and accompanied. Islamization of women is almost non-existent in the country-side. Conversion in their case clearly means a regression in status, unless they have hopes for a hypergamic marriage with a Fulbe.

What has been said above goes to a great extend beyond the single case of the Guidar and applies with slight variations to all the Kirdi. This is both a process of Fulbeization and Islamization and a folklorization of the regional cultures, particularly that of the Guidar. The dancers of Lam are the best dancers of Northern

Cameroon. They are present at all the major cultural events of the north; their photograph can be seen in all tourist centers.

Strangely enough, the Guidar's relations with the Mbororos have changed too. With powdered milk being available on the market, in dispensaries or missions, orphans are no longer given to them. On the other hand, with the development of cotton cultivation (which entails that of private ownership) and the utilization of plough and ox, the Guidar have from now on better income which they also invest in live-stock (mainly cattle and goats, but more and more cattle), hence their troubles with the Mbororos concerning the dry-season pastures; even though the Guidar ate up the first draught-oxen -- which were introduced within the context of development --, it did not take them long thereafter to understand the use of oxen. The Mbororos no longer pay grazing rights to the chief and, even worse, as the Guidar say, they now have the benefit of Muslim judges' complicity and support in the legal proceedings which are regularly brought against them every year for devastation of cultivated land. In 1977, the villagers set fire to certain places used by the Mbororos, in order to protest against this situation. Meanwhile, some Guidar have become stock-farmers, but never raising cattle exclusively. In 1977, we had a surprising encounter with Guidar herdsmen leading Mbororo herds, as hired hands of the latter! The transition to a market economy and a mixed economy has, in the end, most seriously changed the relations between Fulbe herdsmen and Guidar farmers -- relations that for a long time had remained without much modification.

Notes

1. This study is based upon:

Field Trips -- one year in 1970-71, 2 weeks in 1973, and 2 months in 1977. I made my investigations among the Guidar (in the mountainous eastern part of the Guidar country) and, moreover, from a rural standpoint (my study was not concerned with cities, as opposed to that of E. Schultz who worked in an urban environment);

German (Barth, Strümpell, Dominik) and French (Beaudelaire and Lestringant) written contributions:

oral traditions for pre-colonial data and -- concerning the history of the Fulbe and what they say about their relationships with the other ethnic groups -- the writings of M. Eldridge (who gathered his information from Arabic writings and from the oral traditions of the

Fulbe).

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PERCEPTIONS OF ETHNICITY IN GUIDER TOWN

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The Sub-Prefecture of Guider ties together the important northern and southern regions of the Northern Province of the United Republic of Cameroon, and lies between the neighboring states of Nigeria on the west and Chad on the east. The Sub-Prefecture emerges as the point where different geographical regions come together, and it is uniquely located in human terms as well: midway between the two important centers of Muslim Fulbe (sing. Pullo) concentration in the Northern Province, Maroua to the north and Garoua to the south. Guider also embraces the two important non-Fulbe human groupings of northern Cameroon, the so-called Mountain Pagans to the west and the Plains Pagans to the east. For these reasons, Guider has been viewed as a microcosm of the lands and peoples of northern Cameroon (Georges and Leynaud 1968:4). Guider Town, where research for this study was undertaken, is the capital both of the Sub-Prefecture and of the traditional Fulbe lamidate of Guider, which makes up one of the fifteen administrative subdivisions existing within the Sub-Prefecture itself.

The village which would grow into Guider Town had its beginnings as a settlement in the territory of the Guiçar, one of the indigenous Plains Pagan groups of the region. In 1830, the village of Guider was brought into the expanding Muslim Fulbe empire of Modibbo Adama of Yola. From that date, it developed into a Fulbe-ruled principality isolated in the middle of a vast area inhabited by many different indigenous non-Fulbe peoples who were under only the most tenuous Fulbe control. Guider Town, however, developed as a Fulbe stronghold, as an economic,

political, and religious center. With the coming of colonial rule in the twentieth century, its importance as an urban center was reinforced, as first the Germans and later the French made the town a colonial outpost (see Lestringant 1964). This centrality continued after independence, with the Sub-Prefecture of Guider now scheduled to become a full Prefecture in the near future, with Guider Town as its capital.

The growing importance of Guider Town as an urban center may be measured by its growing population: from a village of barely 6000 in 1958, it had grown by 1976 into a bustling town of over 15,000.[2] Perhaps more remarkable even than this rapid growth, however, is the growth in ethnic diversity of the urban population. Early census materials indicate that only in 1944 was the unique Fulbe character of the town modified by the presence of some 130 Guidar. By 1958, however, although the Fulbe were still the most numerous ethnic group present in town, the Guidar population was nearly as large, and substantial numbers of individuals from nearby ethnic groups, such as the Daba, Fali, Moundang, Hausa, Kanuri, and Ndjegn, had also established themselves in town. All of these groups had increased their numbers by 1967, and the Guiziga, hitherto unrepresented in the census figures, were an important new addition, along with modest numbers of yet other newcomers from throughout the Northern Province of Cameroon such as the Goude, Toupouri, Mambay, Dourou, and Gambai. By 1976, these groups were even more solidly represented in town, and Fulbe constituted, as most, only a fourth of the urban population. Nevertheless, the Fulbe language continued to be the lingua franca of the town, not only in public but increasingly in the private sphere as well, particularly in families where the spouses had different ethnic backgrounds.

Ethnicity is a fruitful concept when used to analyze the ethnographic complexity of Guider Town. Drawing upon the work of Gordon (1964), Barth (1969) and Spicer (1971), I have found it useful to view the ethnic group as a special kind of social group which, within a larger sociocultural context, claims for itself, or is accorded by others, the status of "a people", in terms of a complex of socially relevant attributes which its members are believed to exhibit. Socially relevant attributes emerge through social contacts which allow participants to identify points of cultural similarity and difference between them. This corresponds, in part, to what Spicer calls the "oppositional process" (1971:795). The features identified will then be available for use, to be minimized or emphasized as circumstances are believed to dictate. Thus, historical and situational factors shaping the circumstances of intergroup contact play an important role in determining which cultural attributes (if any) will become socially relevant markers of ethnic group boundaries. Moreover, comparison of a number of different cases of interethnic contact will reveal that socially relevant attributes are diverse and may or may not include such traits as language, religion, race, ancestry, geographic origin, or other features. The crucial element, however, seems to be the existence of <u>overlap</u> between a population and a <u>series</u> of attributes, usually cultural in nature. The greater the number of cultural traits which

the same group of people share, the stronger is their sense of separate identity as a people, in contrast to other groups of people who do not share these traits.

When the people of Guider categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction, they do so on the basis of ethnic identity: that is, in general, people are labeled in accordance with their possession of an exclusive set of cultural traits, all of which together are associated with a specific, named human population. In order to elicit these labels from informants, two Fulfulde words may be used: lenyol and asngol.[3] Thus, in response to the questions "Noy asngol ma?" and "Noy asngol maako?" ("What is your asngol?" "What is his/her asngol?"), or to the questions "Noy lenyol ma?" or "Noy lenyol maako?" ("What is your lenyol?" "What is his/her lenyol?"), people frequently replied with ethnic labels (Fulbe, Guidar, Daba, etc.). These were group names which were mentioned in the ethnographic literature and which were therefore expected. The questions which elicited them, however, also provided responses which initially were unexpected: village or town labels corresponding to the informant's place of birth, for example. It quickly became apparent that the terms asngol and lenyol could be used to identify groups defined not only in traditional ethnic, or tribal, terms, but also according to primarily regional or religious criteria. Paden (1970:268) has noted a similar phenomenon in Kano, Nigeria, where the "concept of 'ethnicity' in Kano history has included at least eight categories: religion, place of birth, family origins, family or clan, land, language, urban location and race," and he provides examples of ethnic groups whose identity is based on each of these categories (1970:262). Hendrixson, in this collection, describes much the same situation for Sokoto Nigeria.

This overlap in referents in Guider, as in Kano or Sokoto, appears to be closely reflective of the fluid state of affairs which residents of all of these towns must confront when attempting to determine both their own group affiliation and that of other people. This uncertain state of affairs seems, for Guider Town, to be a direct result of the important demographic shifts which the Sub-Prefecture of Guider -- and indeed northern Cameroon as a whole -- has undergone in recent years. Census figures which I collected in 1976 demonstrated that 82.9% of all current residents of Guider Town were not born there. The town's population is thus overwhelmingly composed of migrants, newcomers, who have arrived in the past two or three decades, moving largely from rural areas of the Sub-Prefecture. As a result, urban Guider is a phenomenon which these Pagan migrants have newly created, thanks to their great numbers. Thanks to their great diversity, moreover, they must deal with a new town whose variety must often appear to verge on the chaotic. Old social and cultural categories are no longer adequate, unless modified in some way to cope with the new social and cultural groupings which the urban environment presents. Attempts are made to order this diversity in a satisfactory way, but no single set of categories with a single corresponding set of agreed-upon meanings has yet been institutionalized. In Fulfulde, at least two sets of meanings for the words asngol and lenyol,

based on different principles, and produced by people in different social structural positions, currently compete with one another for acceptance. The existence of a set of options probably lends a certain stability to social relationships which must be carried out in the face of such diversity, allowing people with differing beliefs the freedom to accommodate one another with a minimum of conflict (cf. Leis 1970). These same options, however, afford individuals an opportunity to manipulate coexisting group classifications for their own ends. The choices these individuals make, moreover, permit the social scientist to observe directly the ways in which new social groupings define themselves in a changing environment and come to assume new collective identities.

It will be the task of this paper to discuss both the individual manipulation and the progressive institutionalization of emerging ethnic identities in Guider Town. The examination of these processes will focus, first of all, on the activity of self-ascription, which involves the evaluation of one's own performance as a group member; and secondly, on the activity of other-ascription, which is concerned with an individual's evaluation of the performances of other people who either do or do not claim the same identity which the evaluator claims.

Responses to the question "Noy asngol ma?" provided much of the data which will be used in this paper to examine patterns of ethnic self - ascription. Most of this information was gathered during the census which I carried out in the early months of fieldwork. I discovered that most people who claimed to be Muslims gave me the name of a Pagan ethnic group without hesitation, when I asked them to name their asngol. Because such responses appear to contradict my hypothesis concerning the ethnic identity change supposedly undergone by Fulbeizing Pagans, they must be explained. First, however, it will be instructive to treat those instances where my census question brought forth questionable responses which led to my suspicion (frequently confirmed later) that deliberate ethnic label manipulation was taking place. Indeed, those times when I suspected manipulation and enquired further, I uncovered a common strategy which many Fulbeizing Pagans appear to use to varying degrees, and which is demonstrated in the following example:

> One morning, when censusing a quarter on the northwestern edge of town, I approached a large compound. Outside the compound wall, I noticed a lone hut, in front of which sat a young man of about 20 years of age (as I later learned). I greeted him, explained my task, and he agreed to answer my questions. When I asked him "Noy asngol ma?", however, I noticed that he hesitated before answering and then replied "Fulbe." I noted this, but as he seemed somewhat timid and wary, I decided not to press the matter, thanked him for his help, and proceeded to the large compound immediately alongside his hut. I was well received by the compound head, a Koranic scholar with two wives and several children. He cheerfully answered by questions and told me, among other

things, that his asngol was Ndjegn.

Among the list of household members which he had provided, I noticed that he had mentioned a younger brother and yet I did not see anyone in the compound matching his description. When I inquired as to the younger brother's whereabouts, the older brother replied that his sibling lived in a small hut outside the compound walls -- indeed, I had probably passed him on my way into the older brother's compound. In fact, the Koranic scholar's younger brother was the same young man who had just identified himself to me as "Fulbe."

I expressed my confusion to the older brother, asking him how it could be that he, a Ndjegn, had a brother who was Pullo. The scholar laughed and told me that his brother was also Ndjegn. But, I asked, why did he say he was Pullo? Well, the scholar replied, did the young man not speak Fulfulde? I agreed that he did. Did the young man not pray? Again, I agreed that he said he did. Well then! The informant smiled, indicating to me that his point had been made.

This encounter with the Ndjegn Koranic scholar and his younger brother was the first of its kind for me, and the scholar's tactics had their (undoubtedly) desired effect. I left his compound feeling chastened and slightly foolish for having asked a question whose answer was so obvious. When I analyzed this interaction later, however, and added to my analysis my experience in other interactions of a similar nature, I began to understand the general strategy involved. The Ndjegn scholar, and others in Guider as well, had devised a way of affirming Fulbehood without, at the same time, denying an obvious non-Fulbe ethnic tie. My Ndjegn informant never once stated outright that his younger brother was a Pullo. Instead, by emphasizing the language which his brother spoke and the religion which he practiced, he attempted to lead me indirectly to the conclusion that his younger brother had to be a member of the ethnic group which is most strongly identified with Fulfulde and Islam. By de-emphasizing the ethnic label itself (Fulbe) and stressing the cultural traits associated with that label, he seemed to be trying to persuade or convince me that if the language and religion of his brother were the language and religion of the Fulbe, then his brother was a Pullo. Rather than make this rationale explicit, however, he masked it by using an aggressive, interrogative speech style ("Does he not pray?" "Does he not speak Fulfulde?"). By his manner, the older brother expressed great shock that I should question anything as evident as his brother's ethnic identity, and he nearly succeeded in shaming me publicly when I was forced to admit in front of the numerous residents of his compound that the young man did indeed speak Fulfulde, and did indeed pray to Allah five times a day.

This kind of label manipulation was straightforward, and I had expected to find it. I had not, however, expected to receive place names as replies to questions about asngol membership. Sometimes, the term

used to identify the informant's asngol was identical with the term he gave as his place of birth; thus, many people born in Lam responded that their asngol also was "Lam". This seemed to point to a clear connection between regional identity and ethnicity. It seemed to hint at one origin for the names of groups of people which, in northern Cameroon, have traditionally been identified as ethnic groups or tribes. In cases such as that of Lam, moreover, informants readily agreed upon further questioning, that they were also Guidar (or Bainawa). Thus, there did not appear to be any deliberate attempt in these cases to avoid claiming one ethnic label by substituting a place name for it.

In other cases, however, the situation was less clearcut. Two town labels in particular were notable in this respect: Garoua and Maroua. Informants in Guider Town frequently asserted that if a person said that he was from Garoua ("Garouajo") in response to the question "Noy asngol ma?", this meant that he was really a Fali who was ashamed to admit the fact. Similarly, informants believed that a person claiming to be "Marouajo" was really a Guiziga. The Fali in Garoua and the Guiziga in Maroua happen to be the indigenous non-Fulbe groups whose traditional homelands included the sites of these two cities prior to the Fulbe conquest (Lebeuf 1961:15; Pontié 1973:13). Although they continue to live in these cities today, neither the Fali nor the Guiziga retain power, which is securely in the hands of descendants of the Fulbe conquerors. The strategy, therefore, of a person claiming "Garouajo" or "Marouajo" as his ansgol, once again is to attempt to claim Fulbe ethnic affiliation by indirect means; and many people in Guider recognize the ploy for what it is. In this case, place of origin is emphasized as well as language spoken and religion practiced. Thus, an informant identifying himself as Garouajo or Marouajo will ask, "Do I not pray? Do I not speak Fulfulde? Was I not born in Garoua (or Maroua) (i.e. in a town where the Fulbe are numerous and dominant)?" Surely all this cultural and geographical evidence must convince the questioner that his informant could only be a Pullo.

In this way, regional identity is pressed into service as an index of ethnic identity, and, as a result, distinctions between the two kinds of identity are blurred. Religious identity as well may be emphasized and made to stand for ethnic identity, as in the following example:

> The informant, a man of about 40, identified his asngol as "Fulbe Funangue", or Eastern Fulbe. When asked if he knew of any divisions within the Fulbe group itself, he replied that he did: for example, his lenyol was Fulbe Ngara; and there were also the Fulbe Illaga of Mindif, the Fulbe Bamle who lived near the Fali -- and the Mandara, and the Kole'en (Kanuri)! When queried about his inclusion of the latter two groups as Fulbe subgroups, he repeated that they all were Fulbe, "for do they not all pray? Only their languages are different."

This informant is perhaps more generous than other genealogically authentic Fulbe might be, extending in this way the boundaries of his

ethnic group to include all those who have accepted the Fulbe religion, Islam. As we shall see, many Fulbe have a much narrower conception of legitimate membership in their group. Nevertheless, form of religious practice is a highly visible cultural criterion which can be used to divide people into distinct and reliable social groupings. It is a form of categorization which colonial administrators consistently employed, which many ethnographers have adopted, and which has produced the common division of the peoples of northern Cameroon into the Muslims and the Pagans. But although the Pullo informant cited above certainly used the same ordering principle as these European outside observers, he retains the ethnic label Fulbe, rather than using the Fulfulde term Juulbe, which means "those who pray", and is usually translated "Muslims." He would seem, then, to perceive a connection between religious affiliation and ethnic identity which the religious label alone cannot convey. Thus, there appears to be a kind of fluidity regarding the phenomena -- village, region, religion, language -- which may be chosen to stand for the group of people with whom an individual feels solidarity, and whom he considers to constitute his asngol.

This situation is altered somewhat when an informant is asked the question "Noy asngol maako?", referring to a third party. The criteria which informants employ to answer this question differ, furthermore, depending on whether or not the third party claims the same identity as the informant claims. It may be that the informant does not know beforehand what identity the other person claims for himself. But whether he is categorizing a neighbor or a stranger, he is normally able to assemble some information about the person, in order to assign him to one or another stereotyped category.

The most clearcut stereotypes are those used by Fulbe to characterize the Haabe (sing, Kaado), or Pagans, and those used by non-Fulbe from various ethnic groups to characterize the Fulbe. Three prominent features which occur in these stereotypes are language spoken, religious affiliation, and cultural style. Thus Fulbe have no trouble identifying as Haabe those individuals who speak little or no Fulfulde, or who perform Muslim religious ritual either not at all or with little skill or regularity. The style component is more complex, involving the identification of any one of a number of behavioral or cultural traits which a given individual may possess. Fulbe view Haabe as poor, dirty, bush-dwelling farmers who come to town only on market days, when they demonstrate their lack of sophistication by evincing astonishment at the technological wonders they see, and their lack of refinement by getting drunk and starting fights. Most urban Fulbe, or course, are also farmers and not all are wealthy by any means. Nevertheless, even the poorest among them considers himself to possess an obvious intellectual and moral superiority over the ignorant Kaado. Unlike those timid people from the bush, for example, the Pullo is familiar with street lights, running water, and motor vehicles, and has long since ceased to be awed by them. Unlike the Haabe, who never wash and who go naked[4] or dress in leaves or in skimpy cast-off European clothing, the Pullo washes regularly and dressed modestly: men in long

pants and long-sleeved shirts, with robes falling at least to their knees, caps on their heads; and women with generous headties and a second wrapper to cover bare breasts or to serve as a veil.

The Pullo, furthermore, exhibits moderation and restraint in every activity he performs. He walks, for example, at a measured, leisurely pace; whereas the Kaado walks rapidly, looking neither to left nor right, overcome by his evident desire to reach his destination in a hurry, with no time to greet those he passes. The Pullo abstains from alcohol and prides himself on his ability to control his passions in public, to present always an unruffled, untroubled front, and to be willing at all times to socialize with those whom he encounters. The Kaado, on the other hand, allows his emotions free rein in public, feeds them with alcohol, and regularly allows them to lead him into violence.

The opinion of the Fulbe held by members of various non-Fulbe groups living in the rural areas of northern Cameroon has often been reported in the ethnographic literature. From these accounts emerges the collective stereotype of the Fulbe as ruthless conquerors and religious fanatics who "strike their foreheads on the ground" (Martin 1970:207). In former days, they tried to murder or enslave those who did not belong to their society. Today, they preserve their sovereignty in the wider world, and they lie in wait, ready to expfoit or -- and perhaps this is worse -- to co-opt and absorb, those unfortunates who venture outside the protective boundaries of their traditional ethnic homelands. This stark and terrifying portrait, however, takes on a somewhat softer contour and greater detail for Pagans who have moved to town. Those Pagans who resist Fulbeization seem to maintain what is perhaps the simplest and least subtle conception, among urban dwellers, of who the Fulbe are. Pagan Guidar living in a peripheral urban cluster which was studied intensively, for example, identify the Fulbe by the language they speak, by their religious behavior, and by their cultural style. Fulbe style, for these Guidar, was by definition urban; in fact, they seemed to regard all seasoned town dwellers as Fulbe, remaining unaware of the ethnic and regional variety which the urbanites themselves recognize as existing among themselves. Fulbe style was also defined to a great degree in terms of power and wealth. Thus, "Fulbe" were the leaders, I was told, the "big men in town" (mawbe wuro); "Fulbe" were the rich men in town; "Fulbe" were the merchants. Wealth permits people to display further traits which the Pagan Guidar identify as belonging to the Fulbe: the wearing of expensive and elegant clothing, the possession of fine homes built out of concrete instead of mud. The Fulbe are also known to Pagans as learned men, and normally it is Islamic learning which is meant. For a non-Muslim, this erudition is important chiefly because it is a source of magical knowledge. When in need of medicinal therapy, a Pagan man will consult Koranic scholars as readily as he will consult his own traditional curers, for the power of the written word is considered by many to be stronger than that of the barks and powders used by the traditional curer, and is believed to produce superior results. Indeed, informants who were Koranic scholars sometimes mentioned the trips they regularly made into

the rural areas of Guider country to sell medicines to the Haabe.

Of all the traits which combine to form either Fulbe or Haabe stereotypes in Guider, it is noteworthy that real or imputed shared ancestry does not figure among them. When the people of Guider sort their neighbors into ethnic categories, they do so first of all on the basis of the cultural traits which these neighbors display. Questions about ancestry and place of origin are posed only if ambiguity is perceived, if a person displays a mixture of traits belonging ideally to different categories, or if the person claims an identity different from the one which the informant -- on cultural grounds -- has attributed to him. This is perhaps most obvious among genealogically authentic Fulbe who have doubts about the claim which a third person makes to Fulbe ethnic identity. Fulbe will, under these circumstances, pay strictest attention to the individual's pedigree, and often so-called "Fulbe" cultural characteristics which the individual possesses will be discounted. Such behavior is not surprising, since the Fulbe traditionally have enjoyed a high social status which many remain eager to protect. Nevertheless, despite this strain toward ethnic exclusivity, many genealogically authentic Fulbe in Guider were willing to grant that the phenomenon of Fulbeization could and did occur. Although on some occasions they were loathe to admit that Fulbehood could be achieved, several genealogically authentic Fulbe informants reluctantly agreed that cultural conformity with Fulbe ways did count for something. A Pagan who accepted Islam, spoke Fulfulde regularly, and took up an urban occupation in addition to farming, could not, they believed, be classed together, strictly speaking, with a brother of his who had accomplished none of these things.

It is true, moreover, that the acceptability of Fulbeized Pagans definitely increases with the passage of time. For many Fulbe informants, the longer the period since some or all of the members of a non-Fulbe ethnic group had Islamized, the more seriously their claims to Fulbe status were taken. Such a position emphasized once again the equivalence in the minds of Fulbe between being Muslim and being Pullo. Thus, the Pullo Ngara had no trouble accepting Mandara or Kanuri as Fulbe since these two groups had been thoroughly Islamized for generations. Another articulate Pullo informant, furthermore, was willing to accept as genuine Fulbe many of those who called themselved by what might be considered "hyphenated" ethnic labels (i.e. Fulbe-Guidar, Fulbe-Fali, Fulbe-Daba). Since the ancestors of these people had been Islamized in the previous century, he explained, their Fulbeization was deeply rooted and demonstrably genuine, as it had endured with the passage of time. In this way, hyphenated Fulbe were different from recent Pagan converts whose adherence to Fulbe ways, including Islam, had not yet faced the test of time, and was believed to be superficial. Individuals who convert and then revert to Pagan ways are often cited to illustrated this superficiality.

Thus, genealogically authentic Fulbe and people who Fulbeized long ago become confounded into a single category. In this light, it is probably significant that no one seems able to explain the meaning of the

hyphenated Fulbe ethnic labels in a thoroughly consistent manner: these labels are sometimes said to refer to people whose Pagan ancestors Fulbeized and intermarried with the Fulbe long ago (e.g. Kirk-Greene 1958:127; Lestringant 1964:292ff, 395; Lacroix 1965:428); and at other times they are said to refer to Fulbe who have lived among a given Pagan population for many generations, with no intermarriage or assimilation implied (e.g., Lacroix 1965:301, 309).

All of the ethnic categories so far discussed, of course, constitute ideal types. As they are used daily, however, in real interactions, they rarely produce classifications of concrete individuals which are analytically accurate both in cultural and in genealogical terms. Since the criterion of ancestry, for example, is only invoked in ambiguous situations, Fulbeized Pagans who have successfully mastered Fulbe urban culture might easily be classed as Fulbe by Fulbe observers who are strangers to them and who must rely on appearances alone. If nothing in their behavior causes other people -- Fulbe or non-Fulbe -- to question their claimed ethnic identity in the first place, further inquiry into ancestry will never be contemplated. Fulbeizing Pagans might be expected for this reason to prefer to live in areas somewhat distant from their Pagan homelands, in order to avoid being associated with their ethnic groups of origin. Such mobility became possible following colonial pacification, and it seems to have been employed, for example, by people who chose the Marouajo or Garouajo label, but who sought to make their careers in Guider, a town at some distance from those two large urban centers.

Pagan identification of members of other Pagan groups is, in some ways, more complex than Pagan identification of Fulbe. To begin with, Pagan migrants are usually very familiar only with the appearance and customs of members of those few ethnic groups whose traditional territories were close to their own group's territory. Thus, when informants were asked, for example, to describe the traits they associated with each of the ethnic groups living in Guider Town, many answered that they were only able to do so for a few such groups; and these were invariably Pagan groups which the informants had come to know as neighbors while still living in the bush. Before moving to Guider Town, these informants were often unaware of the existence of some of the non-Fulbe groups which live there. A Moundang, for example, would in all likelihood have never heard of the Ndjegn, and his first inclination would probably be to classify Fulbeized Ndjegn -- the only kind living in Guider Town--together with the Fulbe, having no reason to doubt that they were Fulbe. Similarly, he would probably identify as Fulbe other wealthy, influential citizens, such as the Hausa and Kanuri merchants, who are few in number and whose language, religion and cultural style are identical to that of the dominant Fulbe. When Fulbeizing Pagan migrants were asked to name the ethnic membership of certain prominent individuals in town, there was sometimes confusion: a young Kanuri civil servant, who had in fact been born and raised in Maroua, was, for example, identified as being Pullo. In all such cases, language, religion, and cultural style are the perceived factors which promote such categorization.

In other cases, however, the Pagan migrant will be able to conclude that certain persons are not Fulbe -- for example, because of the language they speak -- but he will be unable to provide the proper non-Fulbe ethnic label, since he has had no contact with the group in question, and cannot recognize the language spoken. A factor which is sometimes seized upon at such times as a means of identifying non-Fulbe groups is that of facial scarification patterns, since the Fulbe do not scarify. Informants, describing the physical appearance of the members of a given ethnic group, sometimes mention the distinctive pattern of scars which the members of that group are supposed to possess (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Because such classification of others regularly involves superficial and perfunctory contact, ethnicity does function as a categorical relationship in Mitchell's sense (1966:52-53), when Pagans must sort out other Pagans in this way.

Yet the criterion of facial scars is not fool-proof, since subgroups of the same language or ethnic group (e.g., the Guidar) may have different scarification patterns; or several different linguistic or ethnic groups may have virtually identical scarification patterns (e.g. Sara, Guiziga, Moundang). Thus, when an individual must identify another person's ethnic membership on the basis of facial scars, as opposed merely to describing such scars, inaccuracy (from an analytic point of view) is highly likely. This may have important consequences if, for example, a Moundang is taken for a Guiziga and treated accordingly, with disdain, distrust, or contempt for his alleged thieving ways. It was said in Guider --perhaps unfortunately for the Moundang -- that nowadays many Guiziga migrants regularly identify themselves as Moundang in order to escape the stigma attached to their ethnic origin. It was also said that many Guiziga have stopped practicing scarification and teeth-filing (another traditional form of bodily mutilation) since these physical characteristics give their origins away. In general, however, it appears that extensive bodily or facial scarification is taken as an indication of Pagan origins, whether or not the informant is able to identify the Pagan ethnic group responsible for it.

It would seem, therefore, that the situation of the Pagan migrant in northern Cameroon who leaves his home territory is similar in at least one respect to the situation of the Guatemalan Indian who leaves his (Colby and van den Berghe 1969:179-180):

> Generally, the Indians tend to have a more fragmented view of their country (than do the ladinos). Although they readily perceive linguistic similarities between their own group and other Maya groups, they have relatively little feeling of solidarity qua Indians. Rather they tend to regard their own local municipio group, or perhaps their linguistic group, as one community among many. The ladinos are simply one such group, albeit an important one.

In another respect, however, the situation of the Pagan migrant is quite different: the migration of Pagans has long involved more than gradual

drifting from one region to another, although that pattern has also occurred. Rather, migration in northern Cameroon, at least since the rise of the Empire of Kanem, has been intensified. Warfare, slave raiding, and territorial expansion have again and again brought about the fission of ethnic groups, followed by subsequent fusion to the remaining ethnic core of individuals or groups of different origins. Students of Pagan ethnic groups again and again emphasize the tremendous heterogeneity of the societies which they study, a heterogeneity which often renders hopeless the construction of more than partial histories of component groups, clans or lineages.[5] While incorporation of outsiders normally occurs in all societies, it can be argued that such incorporation has been stepped up in northern Cameroon, largely because of the extreme and continuous political and religious turmoil to which this part of West Africa has been subject up to the present day (cf. Lestringant 1964:80).

Thus, in a very real sense, the crossing of ethnic boundaries is "traditional" among Pagans. Furthermore, it is traditional for the current members of a Pagan ethnic group to acknowledge their origins in a different Pagan group, while simultaneously affirming their identities as members of the group with which they are presently affiliated, whose language they speak, and whose territory they inhabit. An excellent example of this phenomenon is displayed by the Guidar of Lam who, while all claiming to be Guidar, nevertheless recall clearly their various ancestral ties to the Daba, Mambay, Guiziga, Moundang, and even Mandara (Collard 1977, 1971). So too do the Daba of Mousgoy recognize their past Guiziga origins at the same time that they and others affirm their contemporary Daba identity.

These Pagan traditions of ethnic group migration, fission, and reconstitution by incorporation of outsiders have a direct bearing on the meaning of Fulbeization for Pagan migrants in town, as well as for their unconverted kin in the bush. For generations, Pagans in northern Cameroon have crossed ethnic boundaries and changed their ethnic identity by changing certain crucial aspects of their cultural repertoire. Speaking a new language; creating or transferring loyalties to a new set of earth spirits and ancestral spirits as a result of settlement and intermarriage; adopting techniques, beliefs, and numerous items of material culture peculiar to the group recently joined -- all of these activities have played a normal part in the ethnic histories of the indigenous non-Fulbe peoples of northern Cameroon. When the Fulbe established themselves in the area, their dominant relationship with Pagans was different from the largely egalitarian relationships which had characterized interaction among the Pagan groups themselves. But as an ethnic group, the Fulbe were perceived by Pagans essentially in the way other ethnic groups were perceived. For this reason, Fulbeization, when it began, was not a new kind of phenomenon in northern Cameroon. As a sociocultural process, it had been predated by "Moudangization", "Dabaization", "Guidarization", and countless other ethnic assimilation processes. Thus, it was only natural that Pagans who adopted Fulfulde, Islam, and urban Fulbe culture be perceived as having "become Fulbe" by

their unassimilated coethnics. In the same manner Guiziga had "become" Moundang, or Daba, or Guidar. What was ne. about Fulbeization, however, was the dominant political and economic position occupied by the Fulbe in relation to the different Pagan groups; the fact that Fulbeization betokened upward mobility in a way that Pagan ethnic group change did not; and the fact that Fulbeized Pagans were perceived by their non-Fulbeized coethnics as having identified with their oppressors, as having turned against their kin, in a way that Moundangized Guiziga, for example, could not be said to have done.

It is thus possible, from this perspective, to understand readily why Fulbeization is accepted as real by unassimilated Pagans. It is also possible to understand why Fulbeizing (or fully Fulbeized) Pagan migrants to Guider are able honestly and sincerely to claim that they are Fulbe without denying their non-Fulbe ancestry. In traditional Pagan terms, they have indeed "become' something different by adopting a different language, religion, and set of customs. Since such cultural traits -- particularly language -- were the hallmark of Pagan ethnic identities, ancestry being of only secondary importance, so too are these traits emphasized as the hallmark of Fulbe ethnic identity. And these traits all can be learned and incorporated into one's active cultural repertoire within the space of a person's lifetime. Thus do Fulbeized Pagans like the Ndjegn scholar feel perfectly justified in basing their claims to Fulbehood on their possession of acquired Fulbe cultural characteristics, while ignoring or downplaying the importance of genealogy. In traditional non-Fulbe terms, such culture-based claims to ethnicity are perfectly valid and indisputably self-evident.

In traditional Fulbe terms, however, they are not. For the Fulbe, ancestry matters. This is clear in the much described Fulbe preoccupation with their racial distinctiveness and superiority (see Hopen 1958:passim). Genealogically authentic Fulbe in Guider would, in all likelihood, prefer to draw the boundaries of their ethnic group in a manner which excludes all those unable to trace descent from unambiguously Fulbe ancestors. It seems clear, for example, that the Fulbe of Maroua or of Garoua -- two urban centers possessing large concentrations of ethnically self-conscious, genealogically authentic Fulbe -- have largely succeeded in their exclusivist policies. This contention is perhaps supported by the fact that certain Fulbeizing Haabe from these two cities have stopped short of appropriating the Fulbe ethnic label, and have chosen instead the town labels "Marouajo" and "Garouajo", despite their mastery of Fulbe cultural forms. The Fulbe of Maroua and Garoua seem to have the numbers and the influence to preserve their ethnic exclusivit. The Fulbe of Guider, it would appear, do not.

On the contrary, the Fulbe of Guider are handicapped by their low numbers and their consequent need to recruit support from fello citizens with non-Fulbe origins. Their drive for ethnic exclusivity is checked by their practical need for committed defenders of the Fulbe way of life. Thus they are forced to consider cultural commitment before they

consider ancestry. In Guider, then, ethnic antagonism of a specifically racial or ancestry-based nature is virtually absent. Traditional Fulbe "racism" is structurally dysfunctional in Guider Town, owing to the need which the Fulbe have for non-Fulbe support. In town, the Fulbe have had, in fact, to accept a non-Fulbe definition of the situation, including a non-Fulbe definition of Fulbe ethnicity which ignores ancestry and emphasizes culture. Fulbe racism has not disappeared entirely, however. Rather, the scorn and hostility formerly reserved for all people lacking a Fulbe pedigree has now been redirected toward all those who lack urban Fulbe culture: the unassimilated rural Haabe and the Mbororo'en (pastoral Fulbe nomads). And Fulbeized Pagans have adopted this scorn and hostility for the Haabe and the Mbororo'en as they have adopted the rest of Fulbe culture.

Most Fulbeizing Pagans in Guider therefore consider themselves to be Fulbe by virtue of their cultural practices. For them, this is the most important source of an individual's ethnic identity. At the same time, the absence in Guider of sustained discrimination on the basis of ancestry -- a state of affairs for which they are largely responsible -- appears also to promote a widespread willingness on the part of Fulbeized Haabe to acknowledge their ethnic groups of origin, even to outsiders. It seems clear, for example, that most Fulbeizing Pagans in Guider interpreted my initial census questions about asngol and lenyol membership in their narrow references to kinship or descent group. Further conversation almost always revealed that the Pagan ethnic label was only used in reference to ancestry: Fulbeized Haabe referred to themselves as Fulbe in most other contexts, and distinguished themselves sharply from the Haabe, invariably on cultural terms. One woman, for example, who said her asngol was "Guidar", did not know the Guidar language and had spent her entire life in urban areas of northern Cameroon and Chad. She was the first informant encountered who used the term "Haabere" to refer to indigenous, non-Fulbe (i.e. "Haabe") languages in general. And she went into great detail in describing the ways in which "Haabe" customs were different from those which "we Fulbe" observe.

Similarly, when I first sought field assistants, I was eager to find individuals fluent in Fulfulde and French. Both the young men I eventually hired first presented themselves to me as "100% Fulbe." Both were indeed fluent in Fulfulde. They were sons of ruling families from different outlying areas of the Sub-Prefecture of Guider, and both were practicing Muslims with a thorough mastery of urban Fulbe culture. In addition, both had attended secondary school. Yet both, I later learned, were from Fulbeized Haabe families -- one Ndjegn, the other Fali. Furthermore, neither was disturbed when I enquired about the fact. Indeed, when providing census data on their own families, each spontaneously listed his asngol as Ndjegn and Fali, respectively. It was this data, offered openly and unselfconsciously which first illustrated the split between ancestral identity and cultural identity which prevails in Guider. After all, when I had asked them about their knowledge of Fulfulde, I was asking them about culture, not ancestry. and culturally, they were indeed "100%" Fulbe."

Thus, in Guider, Fulbeized Pagans tend to compartmentalize ascribed phenomena (i.e. ancestry) and achieved phenomena (i.e. the cultural repertoire to which one is currently committed), and to associate each with a different ethnic label. This kind of dual identity persists in Guider, it would seem, because culturally Fulbeized Pagans are accepted on a footing roughly equal to that of genealogically authentic Fulbe, for the reasons delineated above. Confidence in being accepted as Fulbe on the basis of one's cultural accomplishments, furthermore, appears to permit Fulbeized Haabe in Guider to acknowledge freely their non-Fulbe ancestry. Significantly, it is recent rural migrants (such as the younger brother of the Ndjegn scholar) or migrants from other urban areas where non-Fulbe origins carry a definite stigma (such as those calling themselves "Marouajo" or "Garouajo"), who showed themselves most unwilling to admit to a non-Fulbe asngol. It is of further interest to note, moreover, that those Fulbeized Haabe whose ancestors Fulbeized several generations ago appear to demonstrate their security in their dual identity by using a hyphenated ethnic label -- Fulbe-Guidar, Fulbe-Fali, and so forth.

This dual identity acknowledged by Fulbeized Pagans is directly related to the current ambiguity surrounding the referents for the Fulfulde terms asngol and lenyol. And this ambiguity, which can involve many more than two kinds of identity, seems to have grown out of not-always-conscious efforts to make these Fulbe words reflect Pagan concepts. As discussed earlier, the original meaning of these terms had primarily to do with kinship and descent. In Pagan societies, however, kinship identity was a variable phenomenon. Kin group consciousness traditionally did not often extend beyond the local family group. At most a hamlet or group of hamlets might recognize a common identity, but even this did not always imply a firm alliance. Thus, one's ethnic consciousness stretched no farther than one's family or lineage consciousness, even as kin organization, political organization, and religious organization were isomorphic with one another. One's family group had a name, which might also be the name of the locality where lineage lands were found; one's religious and political loyalties were likewise confined to the same named group; and one's style of bodily ornamentation, social comportment, and general material culture might also bear the unique stamp of the particular area where one's named kinship group traditionally resided. Yet localities were never totally isolated. They regularly absorbed individuals or groups of individuals of different ethnic origins, or they were absorbed by others, following migration. Eventually, a variety of origins for members of a single named locality became commonplace and non-distinctive.

Fulbeizing Pagans who adopt Fulfulde have adapted Fulfulde terminology in an attempt to translate these Pagan folk concepts of ethnicity. They have done so, however, in a somewhat paradoxical way. Although, on the one hand, they recognize the traditional Fulbe reference which asngol and lenyol make to one's descent group, they deny at the same time that ancestry is relevant as a determinant of Fulbe ethnic identity. By accepting the general definition of these terms, but by

rejecting that definition as being either a necessary or sufficient indicator or Fulbe ethnicity, they are in fact forcing the terms themselves to refer to a more general notion of group membership which is capable of accommodating this central contradiction. Traditional Pagan concepts of group membership varied, as we have seen, and might be based on a number of criteria including, but not restricted to, kinship. As a result, asngol and lenyol are becoming classificatory terms of increasing imprecision and flexibility, which may legitimately be used to refer to groups defined on the basis of any and all of those criteria. Fulbeizing Haabe, or course, are able to capitalize upon the growing openness of these terms in their efforts to claim Fulbe ethnic identity: by choosing to define the asngol Fulbe in terms of language, religion, urban customs, or even place of origin (such as Maroua or Garoua), they are able to shift attention away from their undeniably non-Fulbe ancestry, and to focus it instead upon their equally undeniable mastery of Fulbe cultural forms.

So far we have examined the interplay of self- and other-ascription of ethnic labels in the formation of the identities "Fulbe" and "Haabe" in Guider Town. I should like to end this discussion by considering the fate of Fulbe pastoralists who, although they are found in the Sub-Prefecture of Guider, would at first seem to have no place in the foregoing scheme. Their status is important for comparative studies of the Fulbe, and it is perhaps best illustrated by an examination of the concept of pulaaku, or "Fulbehood" (cf. Taylor 1932:59) as it is understood by the Fulbe of Guider.

Riesman, who explored the meaning of pulaaku for the pastoral Fulbe Jelgôbé of Upper Volta, defines it as "the qualities appropriate to the Fulbe" (1974:127). These qualities are inferred from Fulbe statements about certain human attributes which are definitely non-Fulbe in character: "these characteristics are, from the fact that they manifest themselves in other social groups, non-Fulbe and worthy of scorn; together, they constitute the negative of the ideal Pullo" (1974:118). This negative image is displayed most clearly by the Haabe (who are identified as "non-Fulbe blacks") and by the maccube (who are non-Fulbe serfs of the Fulbe). Such people are stereotyped as being black, fat, crude, naive, irresponsible, uncultivated, shameless people who lack self-control and have no understanding of or love for cattle. As a result, the ideal Pullo is one who is light-skinned, slim, refined, sophisticated, responsible, cultivated, modest, and self -controlled, with an instinctive affinity for cattle and a detailed knowledge about their ways (Riesman 1974:119-120). Pulaaku is believed by the Jelgôbé to be innate in all Fulbe, but to be expressed only in public, before other Fulbe. Ideally, the individual who would adhere perfectly to the demands of pulaaku would be a light-skinned, cattle-loving individual "without needs, a man capable of living without eating, drinking, or defecating . . . a being entirely cultural and independent of nature . . . a being whose gestures are never involuntary" (Riesman 1974:128). The achievement of this ideal, of course, cannot be sustained indefinitely, but the Jelgôbé do not require perfection in this regard. "On the level of social reality, thus, there is no question of not having needs; the person who most closely approaches the ideal is the one

who does not permit himself to be dominated by his needs or by his emotions, but who always remains in control of himself in the eyes of others" (Riesman 1974:129). Significantly, although the Fulbe Jelgôbé consider themselves Muslims, and indeed "the fact of being Muslim is inseparable from the fact of being Pullo" (Riesman 1974:101), Islam plays no discernable role in their definition of pulaaku.

For the Bibbe Bii Siroma, pastoral nomads of northern Cameroon, pulaaku is translated by Labatut as "wisdom" and refers to the traditional beliefs and values encoded in Fulbe proverbs and made manifest in pastoral nomadic life. Pulaaku constitutes a "code of Fulbe morals, inherited from the ancestors, for which the elders are the depositories and maintainers" (Issa and Labatut 1974:33). The "cardinal virtues" of pulaaku, as defined by these Fulbe nomads, include courage, modesty, self-control, patience, and intelligence (Issa and Labatut 1974:55). Although Labatut's informants practiced what he called a superficial Islam, Islamic orthodoxy was not considered a virtue of pulaaku, and lack of orthodoxy did not cause one to "lose" pulaaku. Rather, the Bibbe Bii Siroma, like the Jelgôbé, emphasized their language (Fulfulde), their racial distinctiveness, and their pastoral way of life as being necessary to maintain pulaaku (Issa and Labatut 1974:59).

Many of the virtues which pulaaku signifies for the Jelgôbé and the Bibbe Bii Siroma are also recognized in Guider as being Fulbe virtues (see Figure 4). However, although the term "pulaaku" is known in Guider, it is not commonly used in conversation in reference to one's supposed Fulbehood. Indeed, its range of meaning in Guider seems to be generalized self-control and forbearance. When asked about pulaaku, informants ordinarily gave examples of any one of several kinds of behavior which, in their view, demonstrated pulaaku: not eating all the food one's host offers one, not talking too much in the presence of others, doing good deeds for others, not betraying another's trust. One articulate informant, an educated, Islamized Daba, explained pulaaku in the following terms:

> We say that someone has pulaaku when he never returns evil for evil; and also someone who suffers without revealing his secret to anyone has pulaaku. Also someone who receives a blow without taking revenge has pulaaku. In a word, pulaaku means savoir-vivre, mastery of oneself, good conduct, self-consciousness.

This same informant explicitly rejected any connection between pulaaku and Fulbe ancestry or Islamization:

> People of different ethnic groups may or may not understand this idea of pulaaku for it is not a line of conduct which all Muslims must follow. It is a (kind of) behavior of each individual toward himself and what he does. Thus pulaaku can exist in any individual.

The opinion of this Fulbeized man of Pagan origins may be compared

with the point of view of an equally articulate, genealogically authentic Pullo. For him, pulaaku meant personal dignity, and an individual with pulaaku is one who is able to maintain his personal dignity in public. Dignity is preserved by correct observance of various taboos regarding the use of terms of address or of commensality; of traditional rules of etiquette (such as removing one's shoes before going into someone else's house); of self-control (controlling physical needs, walking slowly, talking softly, being patient and slow to anger, especially with those who break your trust, and not seeking revenge). Failure to comply with these strictures causes one to feel semteende, "shame", for such failure is itself believed to constitute shameful activity (cf. Riesman 1974:133ff). In addition, however, pulaaku involves neddaaku, "respect" -- "self-respect" or "manhood"[8] according to Taylor (1932:148) --; that is, positive gestures which demonstrate one's good breeding. Many actions which demonstrate neddaaku are Muslim religious prescriptions (such as showing respect for one's mother, running errands or doing good deeds for others, keeping one's religious obligations of prayer, etc.). Failure to adhere to the demands of Islam shows an absence of neddaaku and, a fortiori, a failure to maintain one's pulaaku.

This informant believed that the strictures of pulaaku are applicable, in the first place, to all genealogically authentic Fulbe ("Naturally."). In addition, however, they are also applicable to longtime converts to Islam, such as the Hausa, Kanuri, Mandara, Shoua Arabs, Fulbe-Guidar, Fulbe-Fali, and Ndjegn (he believed that hyphenated Fulbe were not genealogically authentic Fulbe, but rather Pagans who had Fulbeized in past generations). After a long period of time, he said, pulaaku "enters the blood." Recent converts to Islam, however, such as "Pagans who have just come down off the mountain and say they want to be Muslims" cannot properly be said to have, or to lack, pulaaku; the rules do not apply to them.

In this view of pulaaku, its connection with the Fulbe is explicitly recognized, but not exclusively claimed. Even for this Pullo, who carefully distinguished genealogically authentic Fulbe like himself from Fulbeized Pagans, the "qualities appropriate to the Fulbe" are also seen to be traditionally appropriate to all other genuine Muslims, regardless of ethnic group. Thus, once again, Fulbehood is confounded with Islam, such that a genuine conversion to Islam (as demonstrated by time-tested resistance to Pagan backsliding) is seen to confer upon the convert the privilege of having his behavior evaluated in terms of pulaaku. This informant was willing to extend that privilege to Fulbe-Guidar and Fulbe-Fali; the Fulbeized Daba informant, however, was prepared to extend it to all individuals, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation.

Thus, even as claims to Fulbe ethnic identity are being made in Guider without reference to one's ethnic group of origin, so too pulaaku seems in the process of becoming detached from its ethnic group specificity, and assuming a generalized meaning of right conduct for all members of (Fulfulde-speaking) urban Sudanic Muslim society, whatever

their roots. This transformation of pulaaku is further highlighted by contrasting its range of meaning in Guider with its range of meaning among the Jelgôbé and the Bibbe Bii Siroma. This comparison, summarized in Figure 4, shows that several components of pulaaku according to the pastoralists are not present in the conception of Fulbehood current in Guider. Conspicuous by their absence are references to skin color and to body shape and size, and especially to innate Fulbe affinity for and understanding of the ways of cattle. These qualities, appropriate to pastoral Fulbe, central to their identity because they set them apart from all their non-Fulbe neighbors, are excluded from the Fulbe ideal in Guider. Cattle, in particular, "the highest value of Fulbe society" for the Jelgôbé (Riesman 1974:155), are never mentioned.

On the contrary, single-minded adherence to transhumant pastoralism, to "la vraie vie peule" (Riesman 1974:155), is scorned by urban Fulbe, who identify such a way of life not with themselves, but with the Mbororo'en. Thus, a split in the features of pulaaku accompanies the split between Fulbe and Mbororo'en which has developed in northern Cameroon. Furthermore, certain notions of respect, neddaaku, absent from the Jelgôbé and the Bibbe Bii Siroma concepts of pulaaku, have replaced cattle-oriented values of the latter two groups. Significantly, neddaaku is closely connected with the correct observance of Muslim religious prescriptions, which the Mbororo'en are said to know virtually nothing about. Thus, for the urban Fulbe in Guider, orthodox Islam supersedes pastoralism as the key symbol of the Fulbe way of life.

As might be expected, those pastoralists who are called "Mbororo'en" by urban Fulbe in northern Cameroon have their own position on these matters. According to Labatut, the Bibbe Bii Siroma resent the "Mbororo'en" label and insist that it is not they, but rather the settled Muslim Fulbe who have forfeited their right to be called Fulbe: "doovi'el (doovi'en?) ngalaa pulaaku", "the sedentaries have no pulaaku" (Issa and Labatut 1974:61). Yet the opinion of these numerically weak and scattered pastoralists carries no authority in urban Muslim Fulbe circles, where the Mbororo'en appear to represent all those features of Fulbe culture which are incompatible with settled, orthodox Muslim life. For example, racial and ancestral "purity" are no longer socially relevant attributes in Guider, since the Fulbe there have for generations allied themselves in marriage with their black, non-Fulbe subjects. Nor is an overriding commitment to cattle husbandry socially relevant. Only those pastoralists (e.g. the Fulbe Bamle) whose herding activities are not believed to interfere with regular participation in the urban Muslim community are recognized as "Fulbe" in Guider. Wide-ranging pastoral nomadism, which avoids urban contacts and eludes settled Muslim authority, is rejected as a valid expression of the Fulbe way of life.

Thus, racial distinctiveness and pastoral nomadism characteristic of the Mbororo'en, have been added to the list of non-Fulbe traits believed to characterize the Haabe. In fact, many of the traits said to be typically Haabe are also attributed to the Mbororo'en. Mbororo'en, of course, are

believed to be no better than Pagans in religious terms, because of their alleged faulty knowledge of Islam; and Haabe and Mbororo'en alike are considered crude, unsophisticated, immodest and violent. In the eyes of Urban Fulbe, therefore, the Mbororo'en have come to participate in that "negative of the ideal Pullo" which is otherwise the province of the Haabe. Indeed, Mbororo'en appear to be perceived as a kind of rural Pagan counterpart to urban Muslim Fulbe, in the same way that, e.g. rural Pagan Guidar are counterparts to Fulbe-Guidar. As a result, the "incipient ethnic split" noted by Barkow (1976) between Muslim and Pagan Hausa in northern Nigeria is well advanced among Muslim and "Pagan" Fulbe in northern Cameroon.

In these ways, the urban Fulbe of Guider have had to modify the criteria of Fulbehood. While acceding to pressures from the Pagan farmers indigenous to the region who vastly outnumber them and have begun adopting their way of life, they have at the same time been powerful enough, particularly in concert with their Fulbeized Pagan allies, both to appropriate successfully for themselves the "Fulbe" ethnic label and to enforce an urban Muslim definition of Fulbehood, in the face of pastoralist challenge.

NOTES

1. Fieldwork was made possible by a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Fellowship. I am grateful to Paul Riesman and Robert Lavenda for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this paper.

2. For a detailed breakdown of Guider census materials over time, see Schultz (1971:59).

3. For a review of the terms lenyol, ansgol, asli, and their variants in other dialects of Fulfulde, see Schultz (1979:241,275).

4. Lestringant (1964:121) notes the report by Passarge (1895:221-430) that the captives of a Pullo were not allowed to wear clothing as clothing was the sign of a free man.

5. Discussions of the diverse origins of subgroups constituting certain present-day Pagan groups in northern Cameroon may be found in Collard (1977, 1971) for the Guidar; Lebeuf (1961) for the Fali; Lestringant (1964) for the Daba, Ndjegn, and Goude; Podlewski (1966) for Ndjegn and Goude; Adler (1973) for the Moundang; and Pontié (1973) for the Guiziga. These findings are summarized in the Appendix in Schultz (1979).

6. Paul Riesman (personal communication) notes that "the word neddo (from which neddaaku derives) is the normal (Fulfulde) word for human being (as opposed to animal or spirit) and is thus very appropriate for a broader based way of speaking of 'humanity'."

7. A few informants, when asked to describe the appearance of the Fulbe occasionally mentioned light skin and thin body as being characteristic of the Fulbe. However, these traits were never stressed by anyone who was attempting to demonstrate his Fulbehood. Fulbeized Pagans stressed culture, and genealogically authentic Fulbe stressed pedigree.

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FIGURE 1

COMPARISON OF INFORMANT OPINIONS CONCERNING SCARIFICATION PATTERNS OF SARA, MOUNDANG, AND GUIZIGA

SARA:

a) 5 informants (2 Fali, 1 Daba, 1 Ndjegn, 1 Toupouri) described Sara scars in this way

b) 1 Moundang informant described them in this way, adding that they were "like the Guiziga"1

c) 1 Guiziga described them as having "no pattern", but covering the entire face.

MOUNDANG:

a) 6 informants (2 Fali, 1 Guiziga, 1 Guidar, 1 Pullo, 1 Ndjegn) described Moundang scars in a way identical to a) above.

b) 1 Fali informant described them in this way, adding that they also had scars on the stomach and arms:

c) 1 Toupouri informant described Moundang scars in this way:

GUIZIGA:

a) 9 informants (6 Guidar, 1 Guiziga, 1 Daba, 1 Pullo) indicated that Guiziga had scars (all over their bodies." 3 of these (1 Guiziga, 1 Guidar, 1 Daba) went on to describe facial scars.

b) 5 informants (3 Guiziga, 1 Moundang, 1 Fali,) described facial scars in this way:

c) 6 informants (1 Guidar, 1 Pullo, 1 Daba, 1 Namchi, 1 Fali, 1 Sara) described facial scars in this way:

d) 1 Pullo described facial scars in this way:

FIGURE 2

COMPARISON OF INFORMANT OPINIONS CONCERNING SCARIFICATION PATTERNS OF HAUSA AND NDJEGN

HAUSA:

a) 3 informants (1 Moundang, 1 Ndjegn, 1 Pullo) described Hausa scars in this way:

b) 2 Fali informants described them in similar terms, adding another scar below the right eye:

c) 2 informants, (1 Ndjegn, 1 Daba) described Hausa scars in this way:

d) 1 Guiziga informant distinguished between scars for Hausa men and Hausa women in this way:



men women

e) 1 Toupouri informant described Hausa scars in this way:

NDJEGN:

a) 3 informants (1 Fali, 2 Daba) described Ndjegn scars in this way:

b) 4 informants (1 Moundang, 1 Toupouri 1 Guidar, 1 Guiziga) described them in this way:



c) 1 Ndjegn informant described them in this way:

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FIGURE 3

COMPARISON OF INFORMANT OPINIONS CONCERNING SCARIFICATION PATTERNS OF THE GUIDAR

a) 11 informants (3 Guiziga, 7 Guidar, 1 Daba) described Guidar scars in this way:

b) 1 Guidar informant specified that a) was only for men; that Guidar women scarified in the following way:

c) 7 informants (4 Fali, 1 Ndjegn, 1 Guidar, 1 Sara) described Guidar scars as essentially being like a), except that there were 3 marks on either cheek, instead of 2.

a) 2 informants (1 Hausa, 1 Daba) described Guidar scars as follows:

d) 1 Fali described Guidar scars in this way:



e) 1 Daba described Guidar scars in this way:

e) 1 Guidar described Guidar scars in this way:



FIGURE 4

COMPARISON OF IDEAL FULBE TRAITS ACCORDING TO THE FULBE OF GUIDER, THE FULBE JELGOBE, AND THE FULBE DAGEEJA BIBBE BII SIROMA

GUIDER	JELGOBE	BIBBE BII SIROMA
----	light-skinned	light-skinned
----	slim	slim
refined	refined	
sophisticated	sophisticated	intelligence (?)
cultivated	cultivated	
responsible	responsible	courage (?)
modest	modest	modest
self-controlled	self-controlled	patient (?)
----	instinctive affinity for cattle and knowledge of their ways	instinctive affinity for cattle and knowledge of their ways
good Muslims (neddaaku)	----	----

DISCUSSION

ERIC O. AYISI
Commentator

The current issue of the Third World Studies brings together articles which are thematically interrelated. The authors present various perspectives of a common theme from their own field-work experiences under the general rubric Images and Reality in African Interethnic Relations: Fulbe and their Neighbours. In each of the articles the author attempts to show how the concept of ethnicity serves as mnemonics for social and political differentiation and is simultaneously manipulated in complementary opposition when social hierarchy or prestige seems to present blurred boundaries between ethnic groups. The Fulbe who are studied by the various contributors are a congeries of ethnic groups territorially dispersed throughout west Africa. They are found in northern Cameroon, northern Nigeria, Mali and Upper Volta, but their ethnic distinctiveness is indubitably articulated either by religious persuasions, political and social pretensions, linguistic patterns or life style. One thing that all Fulbe have in common, no matter where they are located, is their sense of assymetrical status consciousness in relation to their neighbours who are non-Fulbe. In this sense, social images are inherently disjunctive with social reality. The Fulbe may be sedentary Muslims or pastoral nomads; they may be aristocrats or cattle herders, but they claim and believe implicitly in a common aristocratic (blueblood) consanguinity.

The ethnographic data thus become so vast, a labyrinth that the authors presenting such cross-cultural data help to throw into sharp relief the intrinsic v es which shape the perception of the Fulbe as distinct groups.

Emily Schultz who provides explanatory comments to the series addresses the question of ethnicity among a congeries of ethnic groups in an area located in the northern Cameroon. The Guider Sub-Prefecture lies between southern and northern regions of the United Republic of Cameroon. The Guider principality forms the focus of her studies and the Fulbe ethnic groups constitute the population of her research project under the title "Perception of Ethnicity in Guider Town." Schultz's diachronic accounts are so illuminating that on the pain of redundancy, I will just discuss the main points of the paper.

The history of Guider starts in 1830 when it was brought into some type of confederacy with the Muslim empire of Modibo Adama of Yola. Afterwards, Guider became a thriving urban center ruled by the Fulbe or people of Fulbe extraction. The political and social pre-eminence of the Fulbe are linked with what anthropologists sometimes call "historical charters" and they are articulated in certain attributes which are "socially relevant" and are necessary for the mutual understanding and sympathy in the business of arranging harmonious social contacts between the various ethnic groups, while at the same time, allowing people to "identify points of cultural similarity and differences between them." These attributes which Schultz alludes to are expressed in the common idiom and dogma of the people of the principality of Guider.

But Schultz uses a structuralist approach for she analyzes certain native idioms to get behind the symbolisms of the social usages among the Fulbe. The two statements which occur in Schultz' discourse are lenyol and asngol, and these put in sentence forms read as follows: Noy asngol mafta?, Noy lenyol ma? (What is his or her asngol?, or What is your lenyol?). The words, according to Schultz, refer to one's place of birth and also mean one's religion or language. Ethnicity refers to certain characteristics or cultural attributes among the Fulbe. The term "Fulbe" in this context refers to certain attainable qualities and non-Fulbe may become Fulbeized once these cultural attributes are acquired. In this regard, according to Schultz, those person claiming Garouajo or Marouajo as birth places (asngol) will describe himself ethnically as Fulbe and therefore, people who are genealogically of Fulbe extraction and those Fulbeized "become confounded into a single social category."

What is of great curiosity for me is the use of the Fulbe ethnic label by pagan converts in a hyphenated form, thus making it difficult to distinguish between the social implications and historical circumstances associated with the label (Kirk-Greene 1958:127). Schultz disposes of this problem by introducing other equations into the social pre-requisites for Fulbeization. Miscegenation and acculturation also seem to play a great part in the process of assimilation into the Fulbe ethnic groups. For example, pagans who have mastered the Fulbe culture either through marriage or proselytization or otherwise might be perceived as Fulbe by other Fulbe. But sometimes the social repertoire for acceptance may include certain physical characteristics such as facial scarification or deportment and language. The Fulbe enunciate well and they are

compulsively clean. They also dress moderately and abstain from alcohol. They stand in sharp contrast with other ethnic groups like the Haabe who are said to be "dirty, bush dwelling farmers and who lack savoir faire." The peasant Fulbe who are farmers and are not as affluent as other Fulbe complement their economic inadequacies with their obvious intellectual and moral superiority over other non-Fulbe like the Haabe

Through the interplay of what Schultz describes as "self-ascription" and "other-ascription," that is, how one perceives himself and others perceive him, we are able to understand the formation of Fulbe ethnic identities in Guider town. Both the Fulbe and the non-Fulbe transcribe the notion of sophistication into their language patterns to reinforce the social awareness of the various ethnic groups. For example, the Bibbe Bii Siroma, pastoral nomads of northern Cameroon pulaaku is translated as "wisdom" and refers to the traditional beliefs and values encoded in the Fulbe proverbs and made manifest in nomadic life (Issa and Labatut 1974). It is quite clear that certain cultural traits may be used to indicate o .'s ethnic identity as long as these attributes are not mutually disjunctive or do not affect the classificatory designation of the group in terms of the attributes. There are, therefore, definitive criteria to be observed in such matters and this is clear in the idiom in which they communicate their ideas. For example, pulaaku is defined rather broadly. It means courage, modesty, self-control, patience and intelligence-all of which are virtues found among the Fulbe.

My own field experiences in this matter underscore Schultz' conclusions. The Akwapim tribe in eastern Ghana have identical ethnic structures. The district was a small village until 1733 when the Akans from the northern part, an overspill of the Ashanti kingdom, came at the instance of the leaders of the Guans, the aboriginal ethnic groups, to help repel an oppressive emperor. The defeat accomplished, these Akans remained in the Akwapim district and reorganized the political system of the area. The Akans, who were originally Akyems, matrilineal groups, assumed the political oversight of the area and ruled the area until the independence of Ghana in 1957. The Akans introduced into the Akwapim social structure certain socially relevant attributes which are woven intricately into the body-politic so that social contact and harmonious social relations between the various ethnic groups are impossible without the enactment of these attributes. There has, therefore, been a deliberate process of "Akanization" in the area.

Schultz has a firm control of her subject matter and she has provided fresh insight and new dimensions to the Fulbe society. For myself, I can only cite the (Wasp) White Angle-Saxon Protestant as a case in point and emphasize the fact that cultural attributes, if they are universally accepted among groups of distinct social backgrounds do bind together separate and discrete groups and usually the people who propagate these attributes predominate over all others. In Guider town, religion and language of the Fulbe became status symbols to which non-Fulbe were attracted because Fulbeization was viewed as upward mobility

and learned in Islamic religion and savoir vivre.

The discussion moves to the social implications of ethnicity as a function of economic and political relationships and the tables are turned this time, for the Fulbe who lay claim to aristocratic status are placed in assymetrical status vis-a-vis the Mossi. The main-thrust of the paper deals with the relations between Mossi peasants and the Fulbe herders in the Canton of Oueguedo, in the Sub-Prefecture of Tenkodogo, in the Center East Prefecture of Upper Volta. The paper is a joint-venture of Gregory A. Finnegan, a social anthropologist, and Christopher L. Delgado, an agricultural economist. They write under the heading "Mossi Cattle Fulbe Herders and Maintenance of Ethnicity". Delgado provides most of the data on Finnegan's the article is based while Finnegan analyses the data. The site of Delgado research was Kougsabla and he informs the reader that the rationale for his choice was to deal with a society which does not have chiefly or royal descendants; in other words, an acephalous system in order to better understand the role of ethnicity in the society. Kougsabla seemed to be suitable because the inhabitants are descendants of ex-slaves and clients. The paper attempts a demographic analysis of Tenkodogo where Mossi and Fulbe lived in a multi-ethnic kingdom. Besides the Mossi and Fulbe, there are also other ethnic groups-Bisa, Yarse Traders, blacksmiths and various fringe Mossi groups.

Tenkodogo therefore presents a mosaic of multi-ethnic groups with the Mossi claiming political and social preeminence. Other writers have described the Mossi as a centralized, unitary society and sometimes the Moro Naba of Oueguedo, the largest state, is referred to as the "emperor of the Mossi." From all accounts, the Mossi had political and social pre-eminence over the non-Mossi and, according to the authors, there was a process of "Mossification" of frontier groups. (Izard 1971)

The Tenkondogo state in which the various ethnic groups are located, including the Mossi and the Fulbe, was founded with the Mossi immigrant. The pre-Mossi inhabitants, the Bisa, are not the "autochthonous peoples" like the Talse or Ninisi elsewhere in the Mossi State. The Talse and the Ninisi claim right of first occupation by their forefathers, horsemen, who displaced the earth-priest/owner and secular ruler. The Voltaic cultures are full of ritual functionaries who combine ritual expertise with social and political functions (Goody 1971). The Oueguedo Fulbe according to Delgado (1978:35) arrived in Tenkodogo in the 18th century from Macina in what is now called Mali. The circumstances of their migration are not clear, except that their descendants were incorporated into the Tenkodogo state and have been tied to one district chieftaincy for about 200 years.

The Oueguedo Fulbe do some farming and their houses are modest in architectural formation. They are nucleated and because of their occupation, they lead a semi-nomadic life. They are ubiquitous in the Tenkodogo state and elsewhere in the Mossi states and they are called by the hyphenated term Silmi-Mossi combining the More words for Fulbe

(silmissi) and Mossi.

There are two kinds of Fulbe in Tenkodogo state. There are the long-distant traders who deal in cattle, for whom Tenkodogo town was the site of political power controlling trade routes and provide veterinary services which is the microcosm of modern trade. There are aiso the Fulbe who settled among the Mossi and served as herders for the Mossi cattle as well as their own. These Fulbe form a locality with their own allocated land for pasture and farming. In political terms, the Mossi and the Fulbe belonged to the same chiefdom. Tenkodogo was divided into sections, each sector assigned to a minister of the King's court. These sectors were further divided into districts equivalent to Cantons whose chiefs ruled a number of villages. There have been a number of demographic shifts and structural changes since the state was founded. It now contains a congeries of multi-ethnic groups.

Fulbe camps are scattered in brush areas between Mossi villages. Chiefs are selected from the Fulbe to be responsible for Fulbe affairs. The Canton chief, through the Fulbe chief, allocates land for Fulbe and their herds. The fact that the Mossi chief retains the altimus haires of the land reinforces his political importance over the Fulbe.

Although the Mossi and Fulbe belong to the same political system and are linked economically, there is little interaction. This gives the relationship between the Mossi and the Fulbe an assymetrical posture bordering on a caste system without any of the ritual encumbrances and prohibitions. However, inter-marriage between the two ethnic groups are rare. Mossi women may marry a Fulbe, but a Fulbe woman will not marry a Mossi man. There is no legal prohibition but, according to Finnegan, the Fulbe women do not want to marry Mossi men because they do not have cows. The relationship between the Mossi and the sedentary Fulbe is that of economic ties. The Mossi do not herd their cows themselves; they prefer to put the herding in the hands of specialists, the Fulbe. The Mossi may keep goats, sheep and the more affluent keep donkeys and horses, but the cattle which are the source of the wealth and political power are raised by the Fulbe. The Fulbe know how to move the cattle between pastures and also understand the grazing habits of cattle. The practice takes the cattle away from the immediate lands for cultivation and the Fulbe being accustomed to nomadic existence can move about with the herds.

In return for the services rendered by the Fulbe herders the owners gave them occasional small payments and kola nuts, sometimes millet and the use of milk. Calves remain the property of the owner, but the manure which is used as fertilizer, fuel and as an ingredient of adobe plaster for walls and floors go to the herders. Sometimes peasants invite herders to allow their cattle to graze on their harvested farms for the manure which enriched the fields. The Fulbe sometimes sell the manure from the cattle corrals and pocket the proceeds.

According to Delgado, the rights to manure became a bone of contention between the Fulbe and Mossi because the demand for manure increased with the demographic changes. Increased transportation facilities altered Mossi agriculture and cash crops, both vegetables and fruits, were cultivated for the growing urban west African and European markets. These changes in agriculture set forth other changes in the relationship of the Mossi/Fulbe. The implicit trust which held the two ethnic groups together eroded because by now the children of the Fulbe herders had been exposed to town life and their loyalties were no longer to be counted on by the Mossi. There were cases of theft and sales without the permission of the cattle owners and absconding to other areas. The Fulbe children who were the backbone of herding took to urban life and could no longer be depended upon.

Delgado ties the various points in his study together in his conclusions showing how the Fulbe are intergrated into the Tenkodogo economy. Be that as it may, my interest reached its zenith reading about the mechanism of ethnic alignment through economic obligations and how the Mossi interacted with the Fulbe only in economic matters. None-theless, the ethnic distinctions only disappear ideally, but form the basis of social integration and interaction. This paper is different from Schultz' in many ways, for the paradigms for ethnic identification and distinction are not expressed in social terms but occupational differentiations and economic factors.

Hendrixson attempts to show how political modernization changed the significance and power relationships of ethnicity in Sokoto in Nigeria. Sokoto is a special case study from the previous societies because it had an aristocracy which began by the 19th century. Aristocracy in this context refers to an ethnic group, members of which enjoy undisputable political pre-eminence over the ethnic groups in the kingdom.

Hendrixson distinguishes and describes four periods of the development of the aristocracy. The first was what she describes as "pre-jihad". At this time ethnicity was expressed not in social categories but in ecclesiastical and academic designations and the term "Fulani" was not as significant as simply being "Muslim cleric and scholar".

The second period which Hendrixson dates from 1804-1903 is characterized by the emergence of the post-jihad era and the establishment of the Caliphate, a harbinger of the colonial rule. The colonial policy of using existing social and political structures as infrastructure for colonial administration changed the character of the aristocracy but it added new dimensions to the nature of it. In addition to being clerics and scholars, they became rulers. The fact that the British used the leaders of this aristocratic ethnic group enhanced their status and power and being Fulani, gave them a "particularistic status symbol".

The third period was during the colonial period (1903-1960) when they were both clerics and rulers but with attentuated political functions

and religious criteria became the main rationale for ethnic solidarity and hierarchial arrangement.

The fourth period was when Nigeria became independent and regional and national government were established. During the regional government the aristocracy was able to control the political, economic and religious centers of power because most of the leaders of the newly formed political parties were either formed by the aristocracy or by clientage relationships.

Like all ascriptive status, Sokoto aristocracy was validated by "historical charters" which traced descent to Shaykh 'Uthman dan Fodio. It was believed that he was first to live in the country of Konni before the Hausas and the Tuaregs. There are many versions of this charter but it all boils down to the fact that Fodio was believed to be descended from 'uqba b. Nafi, the direct descendant of prophet Mohammad who traveled along the North African Coast and settled in Futa. This historical postulate however far-fetched and truncated has been the main grounds of political authority and pre-eminence of the Sokoto aristocracy. It is quite interesting that religious paradigm seems to help the Sokoto aristocracy to maintain their superior position in spite of the changes of history which have characterized the power centers of most African countries. According to Hendrixson, the history of the Sokoto aristocracy exemplifies in many ways what Spicer (1971) has called a persistent identity system which he defines as "one with the capacity to exist in different and contrasting social and cultural environments.".

The Muslim religion has now come to be the main articulation of the aristocratic pretension because of their putative ancestry which is traced to Prophet Mohammad. Although Muslim religion tends towards oeconominicalism, the priesthood and its governance are vested in the Sokoto aristocracy who manipulate these interests for both economic, political and social purposes. And Hendrixson was right when she said that the Sokoto aristocracy was represented in the world of international business and finance, either as chairmen of Boards or General Managers of Banks and other important posts in Nigeria.

James Vaughan deals with the Margi resistance to Fulani incorporation and he finds similar "constellations" of paradigms among the Margi of Northern Nigeria. Margi are one of a cluster of heterogeneous ethnic groups who inhabit a topographical area in the plains and western slopes of Mandara mountains in Nigeria. They live among the Matakam, Higi and other neighbouring ethnic groups. Although they all occupy a common spatial area, they are culturally different. The Margi are pagan while their closest neighbours, the Fulani, are Muslims. There are also Christians in the area. The Margi are different from the Fulani not only culturally but also in their linguistic patterns, type of economy (subsistence economy), and also the fact that the Margi are autochthonous ethnic groups while the Fulani are immigrants. The Margi incidentally speak Margi and the Fulani Fulfulde.

The various pagan societies including the Margi, according to Vaughan, enjoyed a comfortable degree of autonomy during the Fulani hegemony and colonial rule. The pagans were able to hold off Fulani dominance because of the natural environment which rendered communication between the Fulani and the other ethnic groups difficult and provided some type of ramparts and fortress against invasion from the outside. But more significantly for the Margi was the fact that they believed in divine kingship and any idea of incorporation into the Fulani political system was inconceivable. The Margi and Fulani were for sometime politically and socially distinct but since 1964 administrative and economic factors have brought these different groups together to form a common political community.

Fulani political pre-eminence started in the 19th century when a Fulani chieftancy was established around a Margi settlement of Madagali in the Mandara Mountains in northern Nigeria. The Margi did not feel kindly disposed to the presence of the Fulani in the area but tolerated them with muted contempt.

The Fulani tried to establish control over the Margi but the Margi resisted and after a series of rebellions described by Vaughan, the Madagali area came under German administration as part of Kamerun and Yola under the British as part of Nigeria. When Hamman Yaji succeeded to the chieftainship, he waged holy wars against the pagan societies in the area and the accounts of his atrocities are described in a diary that he kept. Hamman Yaji's excesses outraged the sense of justice and propriety of the British but they tolerated him because the Germans were trying to use him against them during the first World War. But Yaji's blatant cruelty forced the British to depose him and deport him to Sokoto. Hamman Yaji's rule left painful and resentful memories among the pagan societies which lingered on. Hamman Yaji epitomized Fulani hegemony and oppression and the Margi refused to have any political alliance with them. But as independence approached and some of the non-Fulani entered the political arena, the Margi realized that common sense and enlightened self-interest demanded a new policy of accommodation and compromise because the Fulani held most of the important official posts in the government. Later, Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto, and the Premier of the Northern Region toured the Mandara area and recruited young men for his party which essentially meant conversion to the Islamic faith. Fulani now was divested of its Hamman Yaji connotations and it became the means of upward mobility. Vaughan did not state this matter clearly but we may subsume from his analysis that enlightened self-interest may sometimes cut across cultural boundaries -- boundaries replete with conflicts and tensions for economic and political gains. The reader is taken back to the point I made earlier about the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). The American dream is based on a work ethic -- the Protestant ethic. In order to be in the main-stream of the American life one has to subscribe the work ethic.

The other papers do not raise any significant issues; they reinforce

the major themes. However, the paper on Fulbe social organization which deals with certain aspects of the economic and social life of Fulbe and also that of Collard which reflects the Levi-Straussian approach are thought provoking. As I indicated, Schultz' introduction to the series is so succinct that I have only concerned myself in my discussion strictly to certain major issues. The papers together make very interesting reading and provide materials for further research into the Fulbe who are scattered over the whole of West Africa.

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