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ABSTRACT
                Findings and implications of a study of the
institutional development of a sample of colleges and universities
that were federally funded are summarized. The information is
designed to assist personnel at the institutional level and at the
developmental activity level. The study sample of 51 institutions had
substantial funding through Title III of the Higher Education Act
during the 1981-1982 academic year and for 4 or 5 previous years. As
background, institutional development is discussed as a process of
change as well as a set of interacting forces. Information on the
study is also provided, including the selection of institutions, the
selection of developmental activities for case study, and conduct of
the field work. Findings at the institutional level are discussed
regarding: rating institutional development as positive, stable, or
vulnerable; factors associated with differences in developmental
status; and other factors appearing to distinguish strong
institutions. Findings at the activity level are examined concerning:
criteria for determining success of individual development
activities, factors related to success of developmental activities,
and factors related to success of specific kinds of activities.
Finally, the components of development that may be controlled by the
institution (e.g., long-range planning) are discussed. (SW)

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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RTI Report Number 2102/06-01F   October 1983

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INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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Institutional Development: Implications For
Institutions of Higher Education

CONTENTS

This document is addressed to presidents and a variety of other adminis-
trators and faculty at 2- and 4-year higher education institutions which are
now engaged in broad developmental efforts or are contemplating making major
changes in status, program, or condition. The material contained herein is
presented as a summary of the findings and implications of a two-year inquiry
focused on the current and prospective future viability of a sample of insti-
tutions which had substantial HEA Title III funding in 1981-82 and the prior
four or five academic years. This study was preceded by a one-year review of
the Title III program as an operational entity, along with a preliminary
examination of the processes by which institutions applied for and utilized
awards for specific developmental activities.

A similar summary document has been prepared as a companion to this one,
drawing on the same institutional inquiry referred to above. It is addressed
to operations and development managers and staff in the Title III Program
office and, although it reports the same essential findings, it applies them
somewhat differently for that audience.

The two-year study on which both documents are based took place in the
period 1981-83. As a study of the dynamics of institutional development and
change, it utilized case study methods directed to institutions as a whole and
to selected developmental activities funded in whole or part by external
resources. The general purpose, as stated in the full report of the study,[1]/
was as follows:

> The inquiry attempts to discover what specially supported develop-
> mental activity may contribute to the improvement and self-suffi-
> ciency (independence from continuing Federal support) of higher
> education institutions with limited current resources; how it con-
> tributes; and what institutional practices in general are associated
> with improvement of condition in terms of quality of program and
> prospects for survival.

This broad purpose was amplified into more specific objectives, including
those indicated on the following page.

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[1]/ "An Anatomy of Institutional Development for Higher Education Institutions
Serving Students from Low Income Backgrounds," report of work done by Research
Triangle Institute under Contract Number 300-80-0830 with the U.S. Department
of Education. Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute,
October 1983. (A chapter-by-chapter synopsis of the full report is provided
as an appendix to the present document.)

(1) To determine the general factors associated with the direction of overall development (growth; stability; and decline or stagnation) for institutions receiving substantial support from Title III.

(2) To identify developmental activities that seemed to be serving their functions well, in terms both of Federal intent and institutional needs and purpose, and to determine the salient factors associated with such specific successful investment.

(3) To extrapolate and postulate the general nature of institutional development, as the success experiences observed might suggest.

(4) To ascertain the types of impacts and consequences that developmental activities might have on institutional condition.

In pursuing these objectives, the essential strategy was to explore excellence and meaningfulness at the institutional and activity levels, mainly as perceived and reported by institution personnel themselves. The purpose was to learn as much as possible about success by recognizing it where it existed, and by attempting to understand it in terms of an array of associated factors. A corollary strategy, therefore, was to explore contrasts in practice that would illuminate development purposes, processes, and outcomes. Such contrasts were possible because a significant range in the quality of developmental activity procedures and outcomes was found across the sample of 51 colleges and universities.

The study did not employ a design or a set of strategies that would permit any overall evaluation of the Title III program or its management by program staff or its direct utilization by institutions. That was not the purpose of the research. Similarly, the study did not permit generalizations, regarding the development process or effective use of external funds, to institutions broadly or to institutions undertaking the same sorts of developmental activities. Instead, the work proceeded under the assumptions that (1) the Congress, in the 1980 enactment of the Higher Education Act, indicated continuing and substantive interest in developmental support of certain institutions of higher education; (2) there have been exemplary uses made of Title III and other external or temporary funds by institutions eligible for Title III support; (3) a review of events at a sample of institutions would suffice for arriving at useful insights into the development process and the generation of hypotheses; and (4) attention to factors associated with successful application of Title III funds would be instructive for Program and institutional managers.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The purpose of this document is to abstract from the full study report a
set of findings and observations that may be useful to personnel at the insti-
tution level and at the developmental activity level. In a very real sense,
this means sharing with interested parties the perceptions and experiences of
colleagues at a set of institutions which, by definition as "eligible Title
III institutions," serve minority and low-income students and have faced
challenges to their viability and likelihood of survival in the recent past.
This report also incorporates the observations and conclusions of the research
team, as drawn from the entire field experience, with special attention to
institutions as operating and developing entities that utilize discrete develop-
mental activities. Thus, there is necessarily an emphasis on the entire
institutional condition and climate which both require and foster effective,
but typically "separate," developmental efforts.

The report is presented in five parts. The first defines institutional
development in broad terms, and the second outlines the field study itself,
both as backdrops for the subsequent sections. The third and fourth parts
summarize the findings of the study at the institutional and then the discrete
activity levels. The fifth part draws the findings together into a "blueprint"
or suggested guide for institutional development.

8

In addition to the authors, RTI staff involved in planning and site visits were John Pyecha and Lucia Ward. Graham Burkheimer, Suzie Bolotin, Roger Cohen, and Tulasi Chittor assisted in abstracting data from HEGIS and other ED files, and in sampling and statistical analyses.

Many others have been of substantial, indeed crucial, assistance. We owe particular debt to the presidents, chancellors, and other administrative officers of the institutions that agreed to participate in the research, to select appropriate developmental activities, and to arrange productive visit schedules. We are equally indebted to the many key staff members, faculty, and students who shared their experiences and speculated with us on the issues involved in equal opportunity, program quality, and institutional development.

Many staff then or now in the Division of Institutional Development (the Title III Program office) of the U.S. Department of Education, provided needed assistance in gathering and interpreting relevant materials and gave highly useful advice; we wish to thank, in particular, John Rison Jones, Jowava Leggett, Roger Norden, and James Ormiston.

Finally, we are especially grateful for the thoughtful and creative review of this document provided by the presidents of three Title III-eligible institutions: Dr. Luns Richardson of Morris College, Sister Donna Jurick of Trinity College (Washington, D.C.), and Dr. Robert Albright of Johnson C. Smith University. They offered honest and constructive criticism from their vantage points and we trust that we have been responsive to their substantive concerns.

Institutional Development: Implications for
Institutions of Higher Education

I. THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Development as a Process of Change

Institutional development may be defined as the ongoing process of progres-
sive, positive change, as institutions respond to changing conditions of all
sorts in their environments and thus change their own condition. An institu-
tion may continue to develop as long as it is in existence; or it may remain
in a status quo, or it may decline--and the same holds true for any component
part of an institution, although at any point in time the institution is the
sum of its constituent parts.

In the long term, institutions of higher education have undergone major
structural and program changes from the point of founding to the present time.
This broad sort of evolution accounts for the fact that many present-day
colleges and universities have far outstripped their initial or intermediate
status, since they began their careers many years ago as junior colleges,
secondary academies, normal or technical institutes, elementary schools, or
highly specialized training centers for teachers or ministers. Similarly,
some present-day community or technical colleges began as secondary institutes
or as single-purpose schools. Such changes typically represent a series of
forward, upward steps toward a larger or more important place in American
higher education, although the idea or expectation of dramatic stepwise revi-
sions in structure and program have seldom been a part of the founding purpose.
Moreover, such changes typically require a good span of time in which to
germinate and emerge, and as often involve controversy among various internal
and external forces as result from a "natural" or logical flow of events. But
these evolutions have occurred. They are a part of the history of many of our
institutions and in themselves describe development in the broadest sense.

Within the context of such long-term change (or, equally, accounting for
those institutions that continue to be the 2-year or 4-year colleges they set
out to be), current short-term change takes place. Here we have reference to

significant additions to or deletions from the program of offerings; reorganization of the administrative structure; creation of fiscal or information systems; and various forms of "outreach" by which the institution extends its services to new locations or new populations. These changes are perceived to be quite different qualitatively from the major evolutions referred to above--at least in retrospect--since those are defined as very broad in scope and represent major revisions in structure, possibly size, and certainly institutional mission.

The more short-term aspects of development, which are the subject of this special report, differ in the sense that they are easier to "see" and control, and generally represent the results of some level of conscious planning. It is here that we define development in terms of "response to changing conditions of all sorts," although clearly the resulting changes decided on by a college or university can as often be reactive as proactive.

The significance of all this is that many institutions have experienced special pressures or circumstances over the past 10 to 20 years that have threatened their survival. Declines in the student-age population, various legal requirements, a societal change in the valuing of liberal education, lower apparent levels of readiness for college study, the emergence of new specialized careers and professions, increase in the numbers who prefer to commute, new opportunities for minorities--all these and more have affected enrollment, retention, fiscal condition, faculty quality and morale, and even the colleges' place in the sun (that is, their special reason for being). Some institutions have closed as a result of not being prepared or able to meet such challenges; others have merged with or been absorbed by larger or more "successful" institutions.

Yet many institutions have struggled valiantly and to some degree effectively with these modern-day pressures. And some have accomplished notable reversals in their attractiveness to students, their enrollments, their program of offerings, their fiscal viability, their attractiveness to alumni and other donors and thus their endowments. How? They have made changes. In responding to the general situation in the nation as well as to their own unique circumstances, they have engaged in "development" as defined here and they have done so both reactively and proactively. Put another way, they have taken a measure of control over their situations and intervened in their own long-term evolutionary development by altering a number of current, short-term aspects of their total institutional operation.

11

B. Development as a Set of Interacting Forces

Clearly, institutional development cannot be a single event or the result of a single decision. Many forces and factors are involved in "ordinary" current operations; it seems reasonable to assume that the same would be true in making progressive changes in any or all aspects of current operations. In order to get a handle on such interacting forces and set the stage for discussing various ways of attacking development needs, a simple model is proposed here: institutional development has to do with the progressive structure, functioning, and consequent condition of the institution, as it may evolve over time.

Applied to an institution in existence, structure includes physical facilities and human resources, educational program, administrative and management structure--in short, what the institution has to work with (or to use in generating support revenue). Functioning has to do with how the structure is applied to the particular educational mission of the institution (or to other missions it may serve), and includes such processes as resource allocation, exercise of policy and traditions, service delivery, decision processes, and the like. Condition, which at any point in time is a cross-section view of the stage of development, involves the degree to which structure and functioning interact in ways that sustain and enhance the institution, and may be reflected through such constructs as quality of program or impact on students and community or nation, or through such indices as those for fiscal assets or current risk position. Finally, development, expressed as successive changes in condition, may be understood through examining how structure and functioning have contributed to those changes. Change is an instrumental criterion toward enhanced viability as the ultimate criterion.

For current purposes of understanding how particular developmental efforts impact on an institution and its condition at any point, it would be useful to distinguish three kinds of activity, each of which can be postulated to have a unique and necessary kind of role to play in an effectively developing institution, although not necessarily occurring at the same time or directed to the same institutional purposes. These are (1) educational and student support service program development activities, or those concerned directly with improving the educational program, its quality, and its impact on students; (2) administrative and management activities, or those concerned with improving the functioning of the institution as a whole through improved general manage-

ment practices; and (3) fiscal development activities, concerned directly with improving revenue, the allocation of fiscal resources, and control of the mix of factors that interact to determine overall fiscal condition and prospect.

Further, these three components or domains interact in various important ways, regardless of the particular "stage" each happens to be at at a particular time, and in sum they define institutional functioning in the most basic sense. Thus they are also necessarily involved and synergetic in institutional development (which implies improvement or enhancement). Developmental activitie in the program area involve the creation of new educational or student support programs and/or the creation of (improved) capability to deliver these programs and services. Developmental activities in the management area involve the improvement of the process by which decision among program development prioriti and investment of funds and resources are made, their operation monitored and facilitated, their impact and consequences evaluated, and the process by which all or part of their outcomes are incorporated into the institutional structure Developmental activities in the fiscal area involve, at least, improvement in the continuing assessment and elaboration of the institutional condition, or the search for new sources and amounts of fiscal support (e.g., a program designed to attract new funds).

II. PROCEDURE EMPLOYED IN THE FIELD STUDY

Case studies were conducted in 51 two- and four-year institutions that had received Title III awards over a period of five or six years. While advance study of the historical record of grants and other facets of institutional development was undertaken, the principal mode of data collection was two-day site visits to each campus. Visits were made between July 1982 and April 1983 by teams of three specialists drawn from a pool of twenty professional staff and consultants, using semi-formal interview guides and structured reporting forms.

A. Selection of Institutions

Sample size was arbitrarily set at 50 at the outset--large enough to represent a variety of institution types and a range of funded developmental Activities, and small enough to permit a case study approach through site visits. (A later addition, because one school that had declined to partici-

pate then agreed to, brought the actual total to 51). The issue of public versus private control, and the implications for institutional purposes and use of development funds, further helped define the sample into two subgroups that would be large enough to permit contrasts: 20 public and 31 private institutions.

It was reasoned that continuation in the program over time and something more than minimal investment would be required for impacts of Title III funding to be discernable. Accordingly, the sampling pool was restricted to institutions with active grants in 1981-82 that also (1) had received funding for institutional activity (as opposed to consortia activity) for at least 4 of the 5 years preceding the 1981-82 academic year; and (2) had received an average annual award of $200,000 or more over the 5- or 6-year period. For practical reasons, the sample was further restricted to the contiguous United States. Applying these criteria to the 537 institutions with prime grants in 1981-82 yielded 77 public and 81 private institutions (a total of 158).

From the resulting public group two samples, each of 20 institutions and designated prime and backup samples, were drawn by purely random means; prime and backup samples of 30 privately controlled institutions were similarly selected. Letters (signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary then responsible for the Title III Program) explaining the study and inviting participation were mailed to chief administrative officers in the prime samples, with follow-up telephone calls by senior project staff. Of the prime public sample, the presidents of 15 ultimately agreed to participate and did so; the corresponding number of acceptances was 24 from the prime sample of 30 private institutions (supplemented by one additional college, as noted above).

Replacements for those declining to participate were drawn from the backup samples, attempting to match replacements with prime institutions in terms of control (public, private), program (two- and four-year), and predominant ethnicity of student body.

The ultimate resulting sample is characterized as follows. Of the 51 institutions, 20 (39%) were public and 31 (61%) were private, located in 23 different states. The public group included 9 two-year and 11 four-year institutions; the private group, 1 two-year and 30 four-year institutions. Twenty-seven of the institutions (53%) were traditionally black. Headcount for public institutions ranged from 900 to 9,200, with a median of 3,150;

14

5

private institutions had a headcount range from about 200 to 3,200 students, with a median of approximately 1,000. Thirty percent received their first awards in the Advanced Institutional Development Program (AIDP); of the remaining 70 percent starting under the Basic Institutional Development Program, one-fourth had moved into AIDP prior to the start of the new SDIP program in 1979. Average annual Title III awards over the five- or six-year period ranged from $200,000 to $780,000 with median values of $281,000 for public two-year institutions, $483,000 for public four-year institutions, and $408,000 for private four-year institutions.

B.   Selection of Developmental Activities for Case Study

While institutions were selected randomly within the constraints outlined above, developmental activities were chosen by purposive means. In line with the research objectives, every effort was made to identify specific activities that institution personnel "believed had [already] contributed significantly to the development and fiscal viability of the institution." A developmental activity was defined as a unit of activity supported in whole or part by external funds, conducted within the previous six years, designed to improve the fiscal viability and self-sufficiency of the institution directly or through improvement of quality of program or functioning, and which was (1) described by a formal plan outlining purpose, strategies, expected outcomes, and time lines; (2) assigned a discrete budget; (3) managed by a person (or committee) designated as responsible; and (4) formally monitored with records of milestone or outcomes attainment. Developmental activities were deliberately not restricted to those funded by Title III in whole or in part, thus encouraging institutions to consider similar efforts supported by other kinds of external agents such as foundations, businesses, or non-Title III Federal offices.

Presidents were asked to nominate up to four activities in each domain (fiscal, management, or program) meeting the definition employed, and believed to have accomplished something meaningful for institutional development. The intent was to select one activity in each domain for review on each campus, and over the entire sample to derive a wide variety of activity types for later analysis. Selection was made jointly by institutional representatives and professional staff at RTI. There was a conceivable universe of over 1,200 funded Title III Activities undertaken and/or completed in the period 1976-82 by the 51 institutions. Because institutions were asked to select among these

15

in terms of significance rather than by random means, the activities selected are clearly not representative of all funded activity at the sampled institutions.

Of a planned 153 activities (one per domain per institution x 51 institutions), 150 were ultimately selected for onsite review. The large majority had been assisted by Title III, but some had been supported by foundations, businesses, various non-Title III government grants, and other temporary sources. As noted below there was an imbalance in favor of program Activities since not all institutions nominated fiscal or management Activities. Activities were ultimately classified as follows:

Fiscal Domain: (N=39)	Fiscal Accounting Systems	(22 Activities)
	Resource Enhancement	(11 Activities)
	Planning and Improvement of Fiscal Management	(6 Activities)
Management Domain: (N=48)	MIS Development	(10 Activities)
	PME or PME/MIS Development	(11 Activities)
	Institutional Research	(11 Activities)
	Long Range Planning	(5 Activities)
	Administrator or Trustee Training	(2 Activities)
	Development Office Development	(1 Activity)
	Institutional Self-Study	(1 Activity)
	Program Evaluation	(1 Activity)
	Creating New Organizational Unit	(3 Activities)
	Student Recruitment	(1 Activity)
	General Administrative Support	(2 Activities)
Program Domain: (N=63)	New Programs or Majors	(10 Activities)
	Strengthening, Refining, or Upgrading Existing Programs	(12 Activities)
	Enhancements to Instruction (Methodology; Academic Services)	(16 Activities)
	Student Support Services	(25 Activities)

C. Conduct of the Field Work

After extensive formal and informal communication with chief administrative officers and other personnel, review of appropriate materials in the Title III Program office, and study of an array of documents such as catalogs and long-range plans, two-day visits were undertaken on each campus. A team of three specialists (one in higher education administration, one in fiscal affairs, and one in academic/support program assessment), with one designated leader, carried out a number of tasks related to the overall functioning of the institution in the assigned domain, and also to the operation of the pre-selected developmental Activities.

These assignments were structured around prepared instrumentation that served as a guide to overall interviewing, observation, and study of materials and records onsite. The same instrumentation, when completed, then served as the formal documentation for each specialist's reports which were submitted, along with relevant ancillary materials.

The fiscal specialist was charged with determining fiscal condition in terms of current values (and trends over the preceding five years) in revenue, resources, expenditures, and overall risk position. The charge also included speculating on internal and external factors that appeared to affect fiscal condition, characterizing fiscal management practices and the role assigned to external funding, and postulating changes in fiscal practice that would advance institutional development in the particular case.

The management specialist was charged with examining the institution's condition in such areas as faculty resources, applicants and enrollment, quality of educational and student support programs, organizational structure, and fit between mission and market--in terms of current status as well as five-year trends. This person was also asked to abstract the institution's planning process and context factors affecting development--along with exploring the history of Title III and similar external support in terms of present and future needs and assessing the critical management challenges it faced.

The program specialist was asked to examine program development history over time in terms of origins, purposes, interrelationships, fit with and/or impact on mission, internal facilitating forces and barriers, and the impact and consequences of specific program development efforts. This charge also included noting the role played by Title III in program development, assessing the perceptions of key faculty and staff in how this role might be enhanced, and tying such data to the institution's philosophy of development. Attention was given to academic and technical programs as appropriate, and also to a variety of student services.

For discrete developmental activities, each specialist was asked to explore the origins of and need for the activity; the objectives and chief strategies employed for their attainment; the resources of all sorts invested; the plausibility of accomplishing the objectives via the various inputs; climate and context factors affecting activity progress; and the impacts and consequences of the activity particularly in relation to the institution as a whole. Activity staff and institution-level respondents were contacted.

8

17

Group and individual interviews were scheduled with the president and other administrative officers; the Title III coordinator; the developmental activity directors and staffs; and selected faculty, other administrative staff, and students. The number of respondents ranged from 15 to 35, depending on the size and complexity of the campus and the Activities selected. Extensive recourse was also made to a variety of materials, some assembled in advance or examined on site. This included revenue and expenditure line items for fiscal years ending 1976 through 1981, enrollment, and faculty counts, as assembled for the annual HEGIS Surveys; student aid dollars received over that period; formal audit reports; catalogs; self-studies and accrediting commission reports; presidents' annual reports; Title III awards, 1976-1982, and selected portions of the institutions' Title III proposals and/or operating statements; and internal and external evaluations on developmental programs and activity.

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AT THE INSTITUTION LEVEL

A. <u>Rating Institution Development as Positive, Stable, or Vulnerable</u>

The chief analytic strategy was to evaluate the overall developmental status of all 51 institutions on a scale that would yield at least three categories of current status and trends. Utilizing all data assembled on the institutions, a fiscal, a management, and a program analyst (all of whom had served frequently on the site visit teams) independently rated developmental status in the appropriate domain. The principal focus was on qualities that express the current intent of Title III (fiscal health and viability), together with quality of program for the students served. Care was taken to identify <u>conditions</u> or <u>qualities</u>, leaving for the next step the identification of <u>contributing</u> forces and processes that would emerge from contrasts of institutional groupings by developmental status.

For classification in terms of fiscal development, emphasis was placed on such indicators as trends in and sources of revenue; the distribution of expenditures; the unrestricted current fund balance; and enrollment. In the program domain, attention was focused on proportions and absolute amounts expended on instruction; student-faculty ratio; quality and morale of faculty; quality of academic/technical program offerings; student support services and range of academic resources; and clarity and distinctiveness of institutional

mission. In the administrative/management domain, the evaluation considered
absence of friction within the governing board or between the board and the
chief administrative officer (hereafter referred to simply as president);
appropriateness of board size and composition; attitude of board, faculty, and
staff toward the president; the president's knowledgeability of the institution;
the president's tenure and active involvement in institutional affairs; coverage
of other administrative functions by appropriate staff; reasonable continuity
of key administrators, and absence of conflict among them; the absence of
significant institutional crises; and adequacy of physical facilities.

Of the 51 institutions, 9 were placed in the "positively developing" or
strong category, with overall positive ratings in each domain; 20 were unani-
mously placed in the "stable" category; and 8 unanimously rated as "vulnerable"
or at risk. The remaining 14 institutions received "mixed" ratings among the
three domains--6 with positive fiscal ratings, 7 with positive management
ratings, and 6 with positive program ratings, but each rated as stable or
vulnerable in one or both of the other two domains.

All but one of the 9 positively developing institutions were privately
controlled as were all 8 vulnerable institutions. The public institutions
represented half of the mixed group and over half of the stable group. Tradi-
tionally black institutions were quite evenly distributed among the four
groups, with four in the positive group, seven in the stable group, six in the
at-risk group, and ten in the mixed group.

B.   Factors Associated With Differences in Developmental Status
Institutions rated positively were contrasted with the other groups, to
determine what factors or forces might be associated with differential ratings
in developmental status, or that might constitute plausible explanations of
these differences.

1.   Centrality of the Chief Administrative Officer
The most significant associated factor, from the perspectives of the
fiscal, management, and program observers and analysts, was the leadership and
management capability of the institution's president. There was a substantial
consistency in the values, foci, and styles of operation of the presidents of
the positively developing group which contrasted sharply with those of the
presidents of the vulnerable group and to some extent with the stable group.

In addition, chief administrative officers of the 9 strong institutions had all been in office at least five years, again in sharp contrast to the weak or vulnerable group, several of whose presidents were new in the past two years.

A first distinguishing characteristic of the presidents of strong institutions was that they were rather clearly prime decisionmakers, firmly in control of the institution's destiny and realistic in their assessment of its problems. Yet, the emphasis was seldom "this is what we are," but rather "this is what we are going to be, and this is how far we've come to this point." They held a sense of positive optimism about the institution's future, and were action, not reaction, oriented. While these presidents generally were good listeners and aware of serious and creative voices, they were in control; as one president put it, "The faculty's job is to teach; mine is to manage the institution."

A second distinguishing presidential characteristic in strong institutions was that they were planful. They expressed developmental priorities in line with their keen sense of mission and market and the match with what the institution had to offer. They also tended to operate with particular sensitivity to the longer term consequences of prospective change (for example, a new emphasis on remediation was seen as important for its direct impact on students, but more so for its clear signal to faculty that individual attention to students was valued). Presidential vision was directed to future institutional status and the means for maintaining new levels of program and condition.

These presidents also possessed pervasive fiscal awareness. Major decisions were made in a cost context; or, the decision procedures were so established that costs would be the controlling factor. There was an equal concern with revenue potential, articulated with fiscal priorities. They not only were aware of the various factors contributing to revenue generation, but were actively involved in this arena, seeking ways to increase enrollment or personally pursuing new revenue sources. Day to day expenditure control was generally delegated, but typically in a context of clear rules and constant monitoring (the president stepping in quickly if controls were threatened). In contrast to the vulnerable institutions, these presidents were seldom surprised by a "sudden" fiscal emergency: initial investments were made with an eye to contingencies, a plan for monitoring, and one or more avenues for new support

or graceful retrenchment or revision. The presidents of the more successful institutions were, as one analyst expressed it, "conservative entrepreneurs" who did not delegate the responsibilities--only associated tasks--of revenue generation; they were equally mindful of the necessity of expenditure control.

Presidents at strong institutions also exhibited obvious leadership in developing the educational program. Virtually all had taken firm hold of the program, program change process, and program direction at some point prior to 1978; most worked with or delegated to other top-level administrators in regard to program and mission development, including those assigned the role of Title III coordinators in the majority of cases; and there was evidence that getting the program in order and up to date was a chief early priority of nearly all these presidents and that this priority was acted upon quite comprehensively.

In these institutions, presidential involvement in and oversight of the Title III program awards was also notable. The presidents considered this source of support to be ephemeral, and had planned from the beginning to structure Activities so that they could make their own place in the fabric of the institution. For some, this meant emphasis on what added assets and resources the institution would have at the termination of current funding; for all, this meant a preconceived strategy for assuming support by revenue or savings generated, and for using initial success or substance in attracting continuation funds from other sources. These presidents were acutely aware of the consequences of cessation of special support, and planned accordingly. The choice of developmental Activity represented deliberate priorities of the president, and typically was not a simple attempt to capitalize on available funds. These presidents produced their shopping lists first, and generally were not distracted by an available item not consistent with their priorities. In addition, most presidents had been actively involved in the preparation of applications and in many instances had had personal and direct contact with Title III staff.

Presidents at strong institutions appeared knowledgeable about success experiences on similar campuses and actively sought advice and counsel from their peers at such institutions. They were good listeners outside as well as inside. Many had had personal contact with Title III Program staff, and all were scrupulous in assuring that their institutions followed regulations and guidelines to the letter (in contrast with situations where violation of regulations

or specialized interpretations typically were associated with serious developmental difficulties). Both the strong and vulnerable groups had presidents active in the political side of Title III, such as contacting Congressional officials or attending hearings, but such activity was more frequent in the vulnerable category.

Many of the presidents of the successful group had also addressed the improvement of their board's functioning in revenue generation and in resolving substantive issues driving major decisions. It was not unusual that a turn-around came with some crisis prompting the board to take on a new president; the new presidents then went to work on the board as well as on the institution's problems. They promoted eclectic board membership, more faithful attendance, participation in key committee work, concern with revenue generation, and involvement in policy relevant to the institution's developmental needs.

2.   Characteristics of Senior Administrative Personnel

The senior administrative staffs of the positively developing institutions were also perceived by site visitors as vital factors in development. There were few incumbents from prior administrations, and these staffs were relatively lean. They tended to be aware that as a team they were interdependent; this in turn appeared to be a function of delegation of responsibilities and delineation of limits by the president.

Two key positions with regard to effective development appeared to be those of the chief academic officer and the chief fiscal officer, the former to manage the faculty and academic/technical program, and the latter to provide adequate accounting procedures, timely reports, and control of expenditures.

The chief academic officers at strong institutions presided relatively impartially over the teaching faculty and the academic/technical programs; they were the guardians of quality and standards as the institution may define them. However, as a group, their roles constituted more than that of the traditional academic officer. They promoted the concept and availability of various forms of faculty development, and--particularly germane to this group of institutions--had creative roles in reviewing and expanding the academic/ technical offerings. Their allegiance was directed more to institutional development than to traditional faculty values or expectations, and thus they raised faculty consciousness to new values, new (sometimes controversial career-oriented) program offerings, and new student populations.

22

The chief fiscal officers typically were acutely concerned with good funds management and accounting procedures, and the integration of these functions with other institutional functions. Despite serving essentially staff roles, they could hold their own in meetings of the board and the faculty, and served on the president's council often as leaders rather than merely as members. They enjoyed the confidence of their presidents, who prized them for particular qualities: timely and accurate operating reports, attention to audit requirements, application of controls, and, in some instances, knowledge of the investment market. Though most institutions were relatively small, fiscal support staffs were well-developed, with relatively little turnover; they knew their assigned functions and were oriented toward accuracy and timely production. While the priority at these institutions was the availability of good accounting information to decision makers and the avoidance of audit exceptions, there was also a pervasive concern by the chief fiscal officers with identifying and rectifying problems such as student accounts receivable, or escalating damage from deferred maintenance. (The chief fiscal officers of the at-risk institutions presented a mirror image of these characteristics, including rapid turnover and fiscal management difficulties sometimes bordering on the illegal or unethical.)

Other administrative officers played more variable roles, and seemed, as a group, to exercise less control in establishing developmental options. At a few institutions the president had delegated some functions to a strong senior vice president or provost, permitting more personal time to be given to fund raising. Student affairs directors and other administrative staff focused on maintaining standard operations with no special responsibilities related to development. Even the "development office" functions were generally restricted in scope at these institutions with regard to enhancing change. Although no institution vested sole responsibility for fundraising in the development office, those that relied primarily on formal funds development activity did not fare particularly well. In many instances the "development" function is still new and the particular challenges great; in no instance was this kind of activity in and of itself turning an institution around. The more significant efforts resulted from active involvement of the president and/or members of the board.

23

Over the _total_ group of institutions, the Title III coordinator incumbents represented a considerable variety of backgrounds, current roles, and future prospects with the institutions. Some were principally a minority representative on a majority campus; some were administrative assistants or aides; others were individuals of substantial credentials or corollary responsibilities. The strong institutions, while having such variation, had Title III coordinators who not only reported to the president or chief academic officer, but also did so frequently and personally. All coordinators in the strong institutions saw their futures bound to how well they performed for the institution, not with how well they performed with Title III program management; as a group, they were distinctly different from their counterparts at vulnerable institutions. And they were as much concerned with broader institutional development as they were with the operation of Title III activities _per se_, and thus saw the necessary interrelationships. Where they performed essentially as administrative assistants, there was, in the stronger institutions, some line office devoting a fair amount of time to oversight of the Title III program and to overall planning for development, delegating more routine functions to the coordinator.

3. Other Factors Appearing to Distinguish Strong Institutions

Many of the practices that appear to explain institutional differences in developmental status have been expressed in the foregoing subsections. Some additional aspects of the institutional milieu, as discussed below, deserve special note.

For most of the institutions reviewed, _formal long-range planning_ activity or emphasis was absent or only recently implemented; yet this did not hold for the majority of the institutions rated as strong (or several of those rated stable). A number had engaged in such planning over a five- to ten-year period, frequently initiating the action after an accrediting review, a self-study, or a widely held concern that the future required deliberate consideration of options. Faculty and administrators were variously involved; the structure for the planning activity tended to change from time to time; planning moved from periods of activity to periods of quiescence; and it was apparent that rules for decisions, or priority areas for examination, or a structure for proceeding were a matter for presidential guidance. In some cases the president (and/or the board) made urgent decisions that constituted the framework for subsequent participatory and collegial planning. The fact that groups broadly

15

24

representative of institutional goals and functions worked together in the strong institutions, provided a positive forum for debate of desirable directions which most members of the institutional community were aware of and supported.

The strong institutions clearly valued institutional <u>accreditation</u> and renewal, and accreditation of particular programs by appropriate national agencies or professional groups. Accreditation was not just something fervently hoped for, but something planned for and deliberately sought.

The strong institutions combined a firm sense of <u>mission</u> with an orientation to their <u>current</u> <u>and</u> <u>prospective</u> <u>markets</u>. They seemed to share a sense of why students were attracted, and, at the same time, to make physical and programmatic adjustments that would continue to attract them. Admissions and recruiting functions were given high priority, with increasing aggressiveness and targeting of prospective students, including new populations such as nontraditional students seeking degrees, foreign students, (new) minority groups, and adults attracted to enhanced continuing education offerings. Overall, these institutions have worked to revise or clarify their missions into something the institution community is comfortable with, and to develop a distinctiveness that attracts students, faculty, and outside support.

Prospective new or enhanced <u>programs</u> <u>tended</u> <u>to</u> <u>build</u> <u>on</u> <u>existing</u> <u>strengths</u>, and there were few instances of proliferation or efforts to move in several diverse directions at once. The trend in these institutions was toward more pragmatic or career-specific programs such as health services and business, with some decline in more traditional liberal arts areas. The transition appeared effective at the strong institutions, with a new sense of pride and quality; the vulnerable institutions seemed less sure as to what they were about, and less responsive to (or aware of the need for) programmatic change. Some at-risk campuses were torn by an old guard holding to "traditional" programs and emphases, with administrators tending to move slowly toward program redefinition.

The strong institutions frequently <u>combined</u> <u>Title</u> <u>III</u> <u>funds</u> <u>with</u> <u>other</u> <u>external</u> <u>resources</u> to facilitate development or to cover special costs unallowable under Title III. These efforts were seldom a simple result of raw grantsmanship, but represented a planful and deliberate search to cover predetermined priorities, with versatility in selling assets or potentials. And, whatever soft monies the strong institutions had acquired, there was good evidence that

their earlier infusion supported activities now integrated within the regular organizational structure of the institution, and did not constitute special and separate pockets of activity operating outside the traditional channels.

The strong institutions had also clearly made better use of consultants and assisting agencies. This seemed to be a function of exploration before commitment, use of established agencies or professional groups, identifying truly useful sources quickly, and utilizing outsiders to help develop capability rather than to provide it as a continuing service. Institution personnel at various levels also knew success experiences elsewhere and stayed in touch with helpful colleagues on other campuses.

These were also the locales where the developmental efforts supported by Title III became the elite efforts, not those stigmatized by associations with less desirable students or salvage operations. The data also clearly suggest, however, that when Title III funds exceed some proportion of total revenue (at about 8 or 10 percent), the institution (a) is more likely to be in the vulnerable category, and (b) is less likely to be able to see the developmental effort attain operational fruition after Title III support ceases. In such instances at the weaker institutions, it seemed that dependence on Title III was encouraged, or that the "loan" was beyond the prospects for payoff, or that Title III was carrying in some way a vital portion of the ongoing operating costs.

At the strong institutions the role and attitude of the faculty have an important place in development. These institutions have a faculty core with a set of generally favorable and flexible attitudes about their roles and that of the institution, and a vested professional interest as opposed to only a personal one. Positive attitudes include: acceptance of some responsibility in attracting and retaining students for the sake of institutional survival and/or growth; participation in program change and acceptance of new directions in program, in mission, in populations; involvement in professional development (updating, retooling) in a speciality area and openness to new instructional methodologies and media; and acceptance of and some participation in a variety of support services, both academic and personal. By and large these faculties enjoy the confidence and respect of the "institution" in a quid pro quo situation, in that they are represented in formal ways in the program planning process, exercise their own individual or group enterpreneurship in working toward new programs, and are offered a range of professional development opportunities. Though there was a considerable range in faculty salaries, high morale and low turnover seemed to be a function of the institution's providing

17

them with opportunities for personal growth and participation in the growth and development of the institution.

Finally, institutions varied substantially in their stage of readiness for development. Some institutions entered the current decade with adequate and cost-efficient buildings and equipment, while others were now suffering because of long-deferred maintenance costs; some, though with faculty salary schedules low in comparison to other institutions in the sample, had found ways such as those noted above to attract and maintain a high quality faculty that afforded some guarantee that program development funds would be used well; and, some institutions were impacted heavily by such external context factors as competition from nearby lower cost public institutions or problems in the local economy. Those institutions with their houses reasonably in order several years ago were more likely to make good use of Title III and other external investment; those overwhelmed by problems prompting a constant crisis situation or a continuing hand-to-mouth condition were less likely to be able to look very clearly beyond the current year. The dilemma posed is that Title III is intended to impact on developmental condition, yet appears (and plausibly so) to improve condition to a much greater degree at the institutions with substantial developmental momentum under way. The issue is further complicated by the general finding that whatever the developmental status of the institution, it is those activities that institutional sources are truly convinced they need, and have laid a groundwork for prior to Title III funding, that are used to developmental advantage; and that those activities imposed on the institution from outside, however reasonable, are less likely to be taken seriously or used to developmental advantage--as if tolerated as a condition of the grant, and cast aside when no longer required for that purpose or when they no longer come free. In all these aspects of "readiness," the effectively developing institutions had a distinct edge on the vulnerable, from philosophical approach to implementation.

IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AT THE ACTIVITY LEVEL

A. Criteria for Determining Success of Individual Developmental Activities

Under the current interpretations of Title III intent, any developmental activity should bring the institution closer to the ability to maintain itself

without further Federal HEA Title III support for that or other purposes.
Some Activities are essentially one-time-only efforts--e.g., the acquisition
of equipment, faculty development, or management reorganization--that leave
important specific residues or broad capabilities. Others lead to new ongoing
operations that must be supported in some way if they are to continue, and in
the majority of cases such continuation was assumed to be important. Most
Title III activity falls in this latter category.

Such Activities designed to initiate <u>continuing operational functions</u> may
be successfully institutionalized (i.e., their potential validated) only under
one or another of the following:

1) funds for the new activity costs can be generated by the activity
operation either through new revenue or cost savings achieved through
the activity itself, where institutional policy allows such increase
or cost savings to be invested in continuance or supplanted funds to
be used

2) funds for the activity can be and are displaced from less desirable
activities

3) the case for new costs can be and is successfully sold to the regular
fiscal authority (if publicly supported) or to a new support source
(public or private institutions)

4) the case for the urgency or desirability of increasing revenue in
general to cover the activity is made sufficiently by the experience
that revenue generation activities in general are deliberately and
effectively enhanced

5) new or operational costs are insignificant--e.g., although substantial
startup costs may have been involved (for equipment, faculty retraining,
etc.), a modified but no more costly operation or program is in
place.

This reasoning suggests that one should be able to characterize a develop-
mental Activity as successful or effective if the conditions it was intended
to improve are improved, or if the ongoing activity it intended to set in
motion proceeds after the developmental period, without deleterious impact on
(or, decline in) such indicators as overall enrollment or current fund balances.
In short: whether a developmental Activity is actually institutionalized in
an ongoing operational form becomes an important criterion of success.

The experience in the field, however, often suggested that an institution
is the sum of all the forces it experiences and all of its component parts and
that it can benefit "developmentally" in ways other than institutionalization

19

of developmental Activities. This raises a simple question: Is it reasonable to try to detect change at the institutional level that may be associated with any single Activity? It was noted, too, that some desirable activities were not intended to "make money" or "save money" but to add dimensions of depth and quality to either the education program or the administrative function. And as verified many times over in the case studies, exemplary or valuable Activities, as a function of attaining reasonable and valued objectives, could be found in instances where the overall trend was one of decline at the institutional level. In addition, the field experience revealed that developmental activities are themselves developmental; they often need time and refinement and applications (not just fiscal support) to come to fruition as "activities" and in terms of meaningful outcomes for the institution.

Yet, Title III funds--and other forms of external support for developmental purposes--are not awarded on a general, block grant basis, but for specific propositions (i.e., developmental Activities) that can be construed as reasonable units for investment, and that can be monitored as to progress made in carrying them out and impacts or consequences resulting from such effort.

In other words, the collection of 150 Activities was not a set of absolutely definable efforts capable of being neatly classified into one or two Yes-No outcome categories. It was necessary to establish and implement judgmental criteria that took into account the realities of the ways institutions operate, their definitions of Activity and of effectiveness, unique situations that qualified success one way or the other, and the actual timetables for Activity implementation--as well as explicit or implicit differences among Activities in the three domains and their possible interactions.

Success at the Activity level was thus generally defined as follows. A successful developmental Activity--in any of the three domains--has some or all of these characteristics:

1) The Activity has (or promises to have) recognized and recognizable value in relation to its objectives and place in the institution or in relation to its consequences for the institution;

2) There are detectable positive outcomes and consequences that outweigh detectable negative outcomes and consequences;

3) The Activity contributes in demonstrable ways to institutional condition--e.g., it attracts new revenue, it provides a necessary

20

29

function at a lower cost, it increases or stablizes enrollment, it improves the quality of instruction or instructional resources, it places the institution in a better competitive position for students or new revenue, it leads to a greater capacity for change in positive directions;

4) Along with other effects, it has such valued (but unintended) outcomes as improved morale, provision (or coordination) of standard services not available before, models for development and change in other units, clarification of mission, enhancement of program distinctiveness.

5) It is accepted or valued and utilized on a continuing basis, by the relevant constituent members of the institution (administrators, faculty, students) in terms of its original or revised purpose.

Employing the criteria, analysts rated all 150 Activities on a three-point scale with particular attention to Activity outcomes (as impacts or consequences). Equal attention was given to absolute findings in terms of Title III intent (e.g., enrollment changes, fiscal changes, new services to minorities) that could reasonably be attributed to given Activities, and to the overall quality of outcomes including their potential for future changes in structure, function, or condition. There was a tendency for Activity ratings to fall in line with the overall ratings of institutional status and development, but there were many exceptions to this pattern. Activities were classified as follows:

| | Activity Rating | | | |
Domain	Strong	Neutral	Floundering	Totals
Fiscal	22	11	6	39
Administrative	22	12	14	48
Program	25	28	10	63
Totals	69	51	30	150

B. Factors Related to Success of Developmental Activities

This section discusses the major institutional factors found to be associated with effective Activities in general, and then the more immediate factors appearing to relate to the specific kinds of Activities reviewed.

1. Institutional Factors Related to General Activity Success

Regardless of the domain, some factors appeared to distinguish the successful from the less successful or the clearly ineffective Activities in plausible ways. These are institutional factors of climate and context that encourage (or by their absence inhibit) effective Activity generation. The

data suggest that what is valuable about these circumstances is not only that they exist and affect individual Activities favorably but also that they reflect a larger concern with quality of performance and the need for follow through.

The first major factor--the origin and genesis of the Activity--encompasses several components that are predictive of future implementation and success. Central to this is a perception (and acceptance) of the Activity as a necessary and valued aspect of planned change proposed for the benefit of the institution.

Successful Activities generally were not those suggested by institutional guesses of what would be funded and what not, nor the result or quick creativity at application writing time. Instead, most had had thought, attention, some ground work, and in many cases some advance investment of time and money, for one or two years (or more) prior to first presentation in a Title III application. The need and priority for what they might contribute was recognized at an institutional level in such major needs as accreditation, solvency, planned giving, information systems, and retention. (A distressing contrast noted with regard to floundering Activities or those abandoned upon cessation of support, was that they appeared to have their origins in real or perceived pressure from the Title III program staff without real acceptance at the institutional level; from sellers prompted by, or susceptible to, profit motives--e.g., computer hardware salesmen--or from a consultant with a "plan" that would require continuing service.)

Successful Activities tend to be related to institutional mission in some essential way: they correct an inadequacy in carrying out that mission or they help bring it to fuller expression. They also tend to be new-venture efforts that have the active support of the president as well as other administrative officers concerned, and frequently can be found as priorities in the president's prior reports to the board or in planning documents that predate the Title III application. They generally are related, in terms of some level of planning, to available or potential resources. Thus, a vital characteristic of such Activities is that they are themselves outcomes of the total milieu, reflecting a prioritized sense of needs and attainable goals. Indeed, their goals were clearly realistic, sometimes to the point of modesty. For example, the student services program that aimed at reducing attrition by 50 percent, for example, was much less likely to be impressive on any count than the program that projected a 10 percent reduction.

A striking difference for effective Activities was that some appropriate authority--usually the president--moved only after considering how associated costs outside the grant could be obtained and how increasing support over time by the institution could be derived or achieved. Real development time and costs were often known, and strategies for the assumption of support for the Activity (or for the developers, in some instances) had been examined and judged reasonable. In short, though development was seen as a risk, the risk-taking was relatively conservative. Also characteristically anticipated in the success experiences were not just the formal outcomes desired, but the administration's prediction of positive and negative consequences for the institution as a whole--with action taken at that level to encourage the positive consequences and to neutralize or vitiate the negative. Many instances emerged--e.g., the president who made notable effort to raise some development money elsewhere for traditional program areas, while seeking Title III assistance for new (and more pragmatic) program areas; or the institution deliberately pushing the faculty toward computer literacy by making hands-on experience easy, palatable, and challenging.

Another characteristic of the successful developmental Activity was that it was not housed in some special place until it had proved itself worthy, but from the beginning was placed in the responsibility of the regular producers and consumers, as prescribed by the organization chart and regular lines of authority. This tended to hold in many cases even when some key person in the organizational hierarchy was skeptical at first, as long as the priority at the top was clear. Perhaps even more importantly, the successful Activities were those that were built on existing strengths--that utilized staff ready to move into larger responsibilities, that capitalized on available resources, that accentuated a growing market, etc.--rather than those that attempted to generate everything needed de novo.

A second major institutional factor related to strong Activities was the thoroughness with which they were initiated, given leadership, and implemented. Considerable care was taken to place development in capable hands--to someone believed from prior experience to be a person who could carry it off or to a new person brought in whose potential utility to the institution would go beyond that developmental responsibility per se. If particular technical competence was required, as with MIS development, evidences of competency that administrative officers could understand were required, such as prior products

or successful performance as a consultant or the recommendations of trusted professionals. On the program side, institution staffs frequently engaged in dialog with professional groups (or consultants) to be sure they were on the right track. Such steps aided--at the outset--in establishing workable goals, anticipating problems or hurdles, and allowing a reasonable period for meaningful development.

These Activities were monitored by at least the activity director's supervisor and often by those higher in the organization line. The successful Activities also were those with built-in criteria of a cost accounting sort. Probable costs were anticipated; if met and not exceeded, the work progressed. Few of the institutions had significant surplus funds; but, those that attempted to bail out Activities generating significant unanticipated costs generally seemed to suffer in the long run or entertain real risk as a consequence. Some situations were noted--for example, need to upgrade computational equip- ment--where the new costs were deliberately considered and the necessary funds sought before purchasing or leasing the replacement equipment, with some slowdown in the interim more tolerable than the act of robbing (or borrowing from) Peter to pay Paul.

In addition to the above, in all three domains special efforts were consciously made to win the support of (other) faculty and staff, to get them involved and participating, and to encourage their utilization of the processes and products. By and large, the well-planned Activities that grew out of broader needs and sense of mission earned such support, usually at least nominally and often enthusiastically.

In sum, the institutional base provided any Activity has a large role in its success. Institutions in year-to-year decline seldom seemed either to turn around on the basis of one or more good and exciting Activities, or to be able to maintain many developmental Activities to any fruition. Activities were much more likely to be successful at institutions moving purposefully and planfully, rather than attempting to hold to lost dreams or operating on a crisis management basis or trying one thing one year and something else the next. These were, of course, the institutions also strong enough to sustain the Activity if successful, and not to suffer unduly if it had to be abandoned.

2. Factors Related to Success of Specific Kinds of Activities

a. MIS and Fiscal Accounting Systems Activity

Some of these were primarily involved with fiscal data (general accounting, payrolls, etc.) while others were primarily directed toward student

based operational data (transcripts, admissions, student aid, registration, space usage, etc.). Most of these Activities had been in place three or more years at the time of the site visits; there was a wide range of rate of progress in terms of what systems were up and operating routinely.

When the emphasis was on fiscal data, the successful Activities tended to be rooted in a recognized need for more timely month-to-month accounting and projections. There was a recognition of the hazards of delayed reports, and of the increasing complexity of accounting needs. The successful MIS Activities serving student-based record systems more often grew out of a need for "information for decision-making." Some presidents with successful Activities made less than optimal use in their own day-to-day planning and work, though an equal number attributed the emphasis on planning and timely information to the demands imposed on them by Title III. But in all successful instances, the systems were developed for a variety of consumers, and designed to ease day-to-day operations and reporting. The greatest benefit, however, came to institutions that were sensitive to the value of well-designed systems for projections, following trends, and planning.

The successful systems in either the fiscal or student data emphasis were without exception capably directed by individuals with two distinct kinds of capability: (1) technical competencies in developing and working with automated data systems, and (2) a service orientation to the potential uses and users, and a strong interest in working for or with them in achieving a useful product. Nevertheless, most had had outside help from consultants and/or assisting agencies at the beginning, and consequently had grown in the job. The mirror image generally spelled disaster or very limited progress, which seemed predictable in weak Activities where the director had limited technical ability, had an indifferent faculty and/or administration, and demonstrated little effort in looking for ways to be useful.

Successful MIS Activities appeared to follow a sequence something like this: (1) recognition and assignment of priority to need for more efficient systems; (2) careful advance planning as to what the system should progressively accomplish; (3) exploring software options for specific priorities of kinds of data and outputs; (4) committing to software so determined, with an eye to needed and practical modifications; (5) selecting hardware based on needs and software options selected; (6) giving special attention to convincing adversaries that the systems would be useful (not infrequently in general training or

workshop settings, or by teaching them something useful they could accomplish; and by taking care to have back-up manual systems so failure during development would not be total disaster); and (7) giving constant attention to user interests and needs, and manifesting versatility in creating add-on modifications.

In general, consortia approaches seemed to work well when a computer or MIS center served each institution in its own terms, but did not seem to work well when the institutions tried first to agree on data and format needs, then turn the matter over to the programmers. Similarly, a clear signal on weak MIS Activities was initial commitment to hardware, and/or dependence on the hardware manufacturer or salesman for advice, software, and technical assistance.

b. PME-MIS Activity

Developmental Activities concerned with Planning, Management, and Evaluation (PME) systems, and sometimes described as PME-MIS with the MIS function clearly emphasized, were distinctly different from the MIS Activities referred to above in that their goal was primarily good planning, with any MIS development functioning in an ancillary way.

What PME consisted of turned out to be quite variously interpreted. For some, it was essentially the generation of operational manuals; others focused on cost analyses and budget projections. Some focused on evaluation; others were involved in attempts to explicate mission or to create objectives for a management-by-objectives system. Most involved the creation of a planning document, generally a report of what had been accomplished in any formal planning activity. Those PME Activities judged to have developmental value focused more generally on planning, and were concerned with overall planning as a process of cyclically evaluating program performance, making projections, and determining priorities for development in some systematic way. They were the umbrella for some formalization and systematizing of a more general planning process involving individuals in debate with one another, committees making particular inquiries, etc., but resulted in some criteria and projections or recommendations.

The successful PME Activities traced their origins 5 or 10 years back, and clearly predated Title III support. Some useful start had been achieved in which the president was interested. The successful PME Activities also made costs and productivity indices central in the planning mechanisms created, involved some formal training components for planning participants, and served as a prime basis for determining budgetary priorities. However, in no instance

was a truly model PME system found, nor were associated ongoing and systematic data systems yet very well integrated.

c. Institutional Research Activity

These developmental Activities tended to be generally unimpressive; not infrequently they appeared to be the poor man's substitute for an MIS. The incumbent directors represented a variety of disciplines and levels. Most Activities focused on descriptive compilations of relatively routine data of greater interest to the institutional researcher than others. The two clear exceptions were (1) an Activity created by a president with a good idea of the kind of data he needed for decisions, board meetings, speeches outside the college, etc., and where a thriving MIS was already in place; and (2) an instance where a remarkable young lady could always suggest useful analyses to address any issue of interest, drawing on a parallel excellently functioning MIS Activity and its director. Too frequently, the site visitors found exciting data produced but few relevant people on campus who could say anything about it, much less generalize from it. The institutional research Activity was one of the more likely to disappear when developmental funding ceased.

d. Long-Range Planning Activity

Activities labeled as Long-Range Planning tended to reflect planning in the most traditional, yet solid, sense; the focus was using a process involving individuals and committees of different perspectives, establishing special task forces, and placing some synthesis of opinion or findings in the service of the institution. Though the fiscal aspects of planning were not featured, they clearly were not ignored.

The successful Activities seemed to be the administrative Activities most consistently associated with overall positive institutional development status; and four of the five LRP activities examined were rated as successful. Communalities among these four included: origin in the early 1970's; a period of approximately 10 years in which progressive planning activities were engaged in; original impetus in an authoritative outside (e.g., accrediting commision) or inside (e.g., faculty self-study committee) concern; and substantial assistance from the outside in training faculty and administrators. All were formally concerned with such elements as examination of mission; market and enrollment trends; current resources; projection of effects of present and ideal programs; establishing cost and other criteria for allocation of resources; recommending allocations and noting alternatives; and monitoring, evaluation, and replanning.

e.   Other Administrative and Fiscal Development Activities

In the fiscal area, the most exciting other kind of effort was what has been termed "resource enhancement," or improvement of fund raising procedures; useful training has been provided, and some gains have been made, yet the institutions concerned have alumni of limited affluence, and are more likely to attract assistance as a matter of need and philanthropy than as a matter or promise and investment. Some of the more impressive work (e.g., the creation of a new administraitve unit or a new program) was covered by regular operating funds; indeed, development is an important part of the administrator's job. The more urgent need seemed to be well encapsulated in such developmental Activities as trustee training in one instance (involving the president and the Association of Governing Boards) and as general administrator training in another (involving a continuing series of workshops, variously supported, for administrator development).

f.   New Education Program Development Activity (Programs and Majors)

The new program development Activities rated as successful presented some strong lessons in successful development, to some degree from the physical evidences of faculty, resources, and students in place, but also from the plausibility of associated features. These programs were initiated by key administrators with a clear intent of attracting more students; there was a conscious effort to build on and utilize existing strengths (e.g., to modify other relevant regular courses to permit them to serve double duty), at the same time responding to a detected new opportunity, usually in a field without significant competition. The projected programs were part of, and not at variance with, the institution's long-range plan; their fit with mission, or their role in accentuating it, was clear. The opportunities responded to were not those that would proliferate a mission, but clarify and tighten it. The fulfillment of other values--e.g., the attraction of more able students, or the improvement of employability of graduates--was also a frequent consideration.

The successful new program efforts were also marked by careful planning. Presidents were usually involved as determiners of priorities. Most institutions contributed some hard dollars to the planning venture from the beginning, and typically, two or more years of intensive planning and data collection had been sustained prior to Title III support. There were deliberate efforts to cultivate honest positive attitudes and enthusiasm among the planning members, their colleagues, and the potential program operators.

The _initial_ operational steps did not seem to be related to later success. This may be explained by noting that a minimum of 2 or 3 years of experience and fine tuning seemed to be required for determining whether or not the new program would indeed be viable in its own right. Early signs frequently proved unreliable and major revisions sometimes had to be made.

New program development efforts that floundered were generally at variance with the characteristics cited for the successful efforts. Also, some failures were associated with change in the lead person for the development effort, with gross misjudgment of the attractiveness of the program to students (in some cases because of being outdated by the time the program was ready to go), or with failure to anticipate early operational expenses that the program might require while gaining momentum.

g. <u>Strengthening, Refining, and Upgrading Existing Programs</u>

These Activities were generally <u>not</u> directed toward increasing enrollment, but were conscious efforts to improve and augment the legitimacy of current offerings. As upgrading efforts, they were concerned with improving quality; they were not particularly susceptible to any argument for improving revenue in any short-term period in the future, but they were quite likely to involve new activity not routinely affordable in the past.

The successful Activities also tended to emphasize the deeper academic values and concepts of quality. Accreditation goals were frequently powerful guides and motivators. Adjunct improvements--e.g., a concomitant library development--were powerful convincers that the changes had their own rightful reputability and wider value. The aura of increased professionalism and disciplinary integrity was never far away, and there was conscious effort in the successful cases to displace threat that weaker faculty might feel by their moral support and specific upgrading effort as a part of the process.

h. <u>Activities Involving Enhancements to the Instructional Enterprise</u>

Included here were such Activities as an institution-wide move to a competency-based paradigm; review of curriculum and requirements; developing instructional technologies; developing media and instructional materials; adding an internship experience; and creation of some instructional support such as a learning resource center or computer-assisted adjuncts.

Again, these changes represent attempts to improve quality, although increased efficiency may also be involved. Success was judged mostly in terms of the campus response through student and faculty attitudes, the logic of the

basic propositions, or some notion of what constitutes quality in a particular area. Almost always a vital aspect of instructional enhancement was improvement of faculty quality, attitudes, and practices as the "deliverers" of good instruction.

i.   Student Support Services Activity

The kinds of developmental Activity presented thus far frequently had financial support outside of Title III; this was not the case for the student support services examined, which not only generally had Title III as the sole source of outside support, but also were the most frequently nominated kind of program development activity. The programs judged successful in this area tended to be institution-wide, in the sense of serving all students or all students classified as needing special assistance. Deliberate efforts had been made to remove any stigma from use of services, with attention to legitimacy of what was done in the eyes of the faculty: this was achieved by such mechanisms as standard setting, the involvement of faculty with relevant disciplines, department controls, or otherwise placing oversight responsibility in the academic chain of command as opposed to the student personnel arena. This in turn frequently led to other academic support facets or spinoffs: a revised freshman orientation program, required basic skills programs, testing programs, new approaches to academic advising, and so on.

Improved retention of students was almost always the stated prime objective for the support services Activities. The programs were so diffuse, however, and student involvement sufficiently varied, that attribution of any improvement in retention to a specific service could not be made with confidence. The successful programs were characterized by greater attention to tracking students, and to maintaining special records on services received and hurdles passed.

Strategies varied considerably, but appeared to be tuned, in the successful programs, to sensitive interpretations of all particular handicaps or barriers the student faced. Thus, one campus notarized two counselors so they could handle financial aid transactions; on another campus, a minor in Native American Studies was as much an adjunct to improve attitudes toward Native Americans by other students as to provide a study program of interest to Native Americans. Where students were found confronted with personal problems, clinical components were added. Yet, the same array of strategies was found in the student services Activities judged as weak; the strong Activities differed as a function of the energy directed, the commitment of the staff and the nourishment of that commitment by the rest of the campus, and efficient coordination of services.

V. A FUNCTIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR ENHANCING
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the chief outcomes of the study of developing institutions, as described in this report, was the postulation of a systematic process through which institutions could make the most of their situations by establishing priorities and undertaking articulated developmental activities. The resulting guide or "blueprint" is applicable to institutions pursuing progressive change whether or not they are currently eligible for Title III support, or seek assistance for developmental activities through Title III or other resources.

The blueprint suggested here carries no guarantees, of course. Since the research constituted a series of studies of selected activities in a variety of institutional contexts, it speaks more to certain kinds of challenges and actions than to the entire scope of institutional operation. However, we feel that this "guide to action" addresses the key features of the best standard operating procedure when a college or university recognizes its situation for what it is and determines to make studied changes in structure and function-- and thus in condition. Our research also suggests that such a renewal process works best when the recognition of status and need, as well as the ensuing pursuit of comprehensive changes, is in the hands of a strong and vital leader- ship--usually the president--that sees the connections among structure, function, and condition and also among the educational program, institutional administra- tion, and fiscal management. Under such informed leadership progressive change is bound to occur, other things being equal.

The end result of positive "development" is usually some form of structural or functional change (or some major effect on condition) that is visible and pervasive. The means by which such development is mounted is often less visible and perhaps somewhat isolated from total campus awareness. Thus in the present context there needs to be a connection between any blueprint for effective development and the sorts of discrete developmental activities that were reviewed in the field. We think that such a connection exists. Once an institution formally reviews its circumstances and needs, sets out to affirm or alter its mission and clarify its purposes, and begins prioritizing subsequent action steps through formal planning, it utilizes whatever resources are available in accomplishing its newly framed goals. Those resources typically include (a) existing features of structure, such as committed faculty, promised

but conditional challenge grants, or special facilities, (b) existing features
of function such as earlier (but possibly shelved) attempts to alter program
or management, or plans contained in a formal self-study, (c) grants from
foundations, businesses, individuals, or other private sources, either restricted
or unrestricted, (d) cooperative ventures with other institutions or consortia,
so as to save resources or multiply benefits, and (e) grants from the HEA
Title III program which have historically supported development efforts in the
three domains specified here as program, administration, and fiscal management.

The effective institution merges its own existing strengths and resources
with those from the outside that can most successfully aid in accomplishing
intended and meaningful change. The external support (characterized here as
"activities" assisted financially by grants from the Title III Program and
foundations/businesses) fills in and helps with the needs the institution
itself has identified, so that gains can be made faster, more comprehensively,
and at a lesser direct risk to institutional condition. Thus "donors" and
"benefactors" all have a stake in progress and change and focus attention on
the units of new effort--called activities--that are pursued in the interests
of development.

To be sure, some institutions have accomplished desired development
without federal funds, while others have made developmental inroads with
relatively small amounts of external support or possibly by unexpectedly large
gifts or lucky opportunities for significant increases in enrollment. Our
chief interest here, however, is the larger group of more typical institutions--
mainly those serving sizable proportions of low-income students and thus
highly susceptible to current fiscal pressures and also eligible for Title III
awards--and how some of them have made wise use of sizable Title III or other
external grants through the mechanism of specific goal-oriented developmental
activities. The blueprint, in other words, describes a merger of targeted
external assistance with the total internal situation.

A.   The Central Role of Planning
The institutions visited, though varied, had some aspects in common. All
had high proportions of low-income or minority students; all had, in comparison
with other institutions of their type, more limited fiscal resources to invest
in the educational program. All had received substantial assistance over the
prior 5 or 6 years from Title III, for the purpose of improving management and

program quality and acquiring a greater capacity for achieving or maintaining fiscal viability. The institutions differed markedly, however, in current risk position and in the direction and rapidity of developmental movement, differences that argue strongly for the need for careful, comprehensive planning.

Many--particularly the public institutions--appeared stable, with no real threat to survival, but with little evidence of having experienced marked change in quality or capability. While their officers and faculties were not necessarily comfortable with current condition, their focus appeared to be largely on maintenance of the particular niche and assets the institution provided. A president or a business manager might be threatened; the institutions were not.

Some other institutions were in a more vulnerable position, suffering from crises that threatened to overwhelm them; this status may have been a result of mistakes or complacency in the past, of natural disasters, or of particularly troublesome contextual factors such as: declines in regular sources of support, competition from more advantageously situated institutions, or erosion of traditional constituencies.

Yet some institutions clearly had positive momentum: they were finding ways to increase revenue or to operate more efficiently, to allocate resources to better advantage, to improve quality and relevance of educational treatment of students, to provide better for faculty and staff--usually while expanding or holding steady their enrollment, but sometimes as a deliberate adjustment to an enrollment decline. This latter group were in sound fiscal condition, with trends projecting substantial security for the future.

What the differences among these institutions would have been without the special developmental investment is largely undeterminable. It appeared, however, that institutions making good use of Title III or other external support (in terms of the excellence of activity execution) generally <u>tended to be those with the most positive prospects as institutions with or without special developmental assistance.</u> Developmental investment was found not to provide in and of itself any guarantee of positive results. While the kind of special developmental investment examined was generally encapsulated in a package of several discrete activities calculated to improve some aspect of developmental functioning, and though these activities could be assessed with some confidence in terms of their specific and plausible objectives and outcomes, their larger contribution to the total institutional condition or free-standing

capacity for positive change is less clear, as a simple function of the varied
and complex forces that interactively affect the total institutional condition.
In other words, it was not always clear how a given "package" of developmental
efforts could help the situation or that such a group of activities should do
so. There was no magic in either a dollar amount of assistance or a particular
set of developmental efforts in and of themselves.

Why? What can explain the general health of the stronger institutions,
in light of the statements just above? It appears that some sorts of pervasive
and possibly inherent institutional forces may account for this.

The stark contrasts in developmental condition seemed to expose rather
clearly some particular forces in the institutional structure and characteris-
tic mode of functioning that appeared to control what was done with all the
problems, assets, and opportunities, and which seemed to provide satisfactory
explanations of current status as well as satisfactory bases for projecting
future status. There was some evidence, also, that how Title III or other
developmental activities were managed and utilized was very much like any
other asset or opportunity was utilized; and that it was easier to identify
the functions associated with using investment money well than to determine
what particular investments would improve those functions and functioning.

However, the more difficult proposition of using investment to improve
the institution's management capability cannot be ignored. Title III is
directed toward improving educational opportunity, with probably too many of
the institutions serving this function experiencing some degree of risk; it is
also directed toward the improvement of institutional capability for managing
its affairs, both fiscal and programatic.

We place strong confidence in the finding that those institutions that
had devoted a substantial period to a long-range planning process appeared
to have the best current condition and the most promising prospect for the
future--not just because the particular planning activities examined in the
field were strongly associated with evaluation of institutional status, but
also because their elements tended to appear wherever developmental excel-
lence was believed to exist. At the same time, we recognize that some excel-
lent and productive planning takes place in the short-range and may not be
comprehensive of the total situation, especially for institutions in a per-
ceived risk position where time is of the essence for both planning and deci-
sions.

43

Thus we should look more closely at the overall process of planning as it is illustrated in those institutions that are clearly making developmental progress, in terms of postulating the essential elements of such a process that either come before or are integral parts of such long range planning. We believe that the elements of effective long-range planning include: (1) the specification and further explication of institutional mission; (2) formulation of criteria for evaluating various aspects of institutional functioning, in terms of mission and other considerations, and the assessment of current status; (3) planning activity itself, or the determination of short- and long-term developmental priorities and the strategies for their attainment; (4) implementation and operationalization of these priorities, and their monitoring; and (5) assessment of outcomes and consequences, both of developmental changes and the total functioning of the institution as it may be progressively modified by internal developmental activity as well as by (new) external forces.

B.   Overview of Suggested Developmental Process

Institutions are different, as are their historic evolutions, their central missions, and their current situations. Thus what is outlined here cannot be construed as a model fitting all instances. But as an outline, it includes the more general processes that must obtain if continuity and vitality are to be assured for the developing institutions as defined by Title III eligibility and intent.

Whatever the situation or set of needs (at an institution newly facing crisis or the need for a turnaround, or one which has moved beyond that status but continues to enhance ts condition), planning seems to be the central element in accomplishing useful change. It has a vital role in all stages of development, representing a goad to change in some cases or an advanced level of response to change and thus a continuing mode of operation. Since planning is (or should be) ever present, it cannot be isolated as a single element in a sequence of steps--and thus the first and major topic in the outline is the central role of planning.

The subsequent sections deal with a variety of other steps that may in some circumstances be viewed and acted on sequentially, but which more typically will have to be addressed concurrently. No absolute sequence is suggested, but there is some logical utility in the order in which they are discussed

here: coming to grips with institutional role and mission; assessing current status and needs in light of mission and fiscal viability; fiscal controls; engaging in a planning process; market assessment; program change in line with the market assessment; recruitment and enrollment; revenue, resources, and budgeting (which are necessary aspects of planning); management and organization; review and assessment of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

That is a long list. It implies that many steps and substeps are involved and that many different persons within and outside the institution must participate (or be taken into account) in some way. A central finding of the current study is that a generic difficulty among the slow-developing institutions was that they tended to be overwhelmed by the prospect of addressing so many processes when they were already faced with limited resources and sometimes a low level of morale. And some of them were painfully slow to move. Yet, and this is equally important, several of the strong institutions themselves had been in the same situation years prior, had taken on a new chief administrative officer, and had indeed accomplished major and very real turnarounds that made them different places from what they had been six or eight years earlier. And several of the institutions rated overall as stable or neutral were in the midst of a serious "developmental process" that held real promise for their improved condition and vitality after another two to five years of effort. It is from these institutions, public and private, two-year and four-year, that useful lessons have been learned.

C.   Recognizing and Specifying Institutional Mission
Institutions are at different points with regard to mission. There are those that have a strong, clear mission and identity but which still may need to take steps to make the mission operational and comprehensive. Others may need to clarify or revise the strategies which are currently being applied to the operationalization of mission. Still others may, for a variety of reasons, need to develop or dramatically alter the actual wording and content of the mission statement. For institutions in any of these categories, this section is intended to discuss a range of possible ways by which the mission (both the statement and its actualization) can be strengthened through careful review and delineation.

The institutional mission is the totality of its distinctive and purposeful reasons for being, in terms of (1) the particular subpopulations it intends to serve; (2) what it strives to provide for them through its educational and other programs; (3) its particular values; (4) the roles it serves for its controlling authority; and (5) the particular services it aspires to render to its broader publics.

For any institution the mission--regardless of its content in these terms--is modified by changes in the external world that affect its potential as well as its particular success and failure experiences. In addition, institutions differ in the extent to which the mission is explicit, in an adequate statement, or implicit, as may be inferred from what it appears to be accomplishing. What is important here is how the institution's concept of mission may be utilized to affect positive development, maintenance, and viability. For this purpose, we are concerned about differences in the ways institutions determine and apply the concept of mission, not differences in mission itself.

Institutions also differ markedly in the clarity and specificity with which their missions are or can be expressed in objective terms. The mission statement of some institutions is little more than a carefully worded expression of extant biases, of generalities that cannot be contested and which are unamenable to any real proof of accomplishment. If there is no extant and accepted statement of mission, the mission that can be inferred sometimes suffers from the same problems of ambiguity and generality. In other instances, the mission is clearly stated, or can be readily extrapolated, in terms of its particular targets, objectives, and values.

The particular subpopulation the institution intends to serve should be identified in terms of all characteristics relevant to student market, program content, instructional strategies, and particular institutional values. An excellent example was provided by one institution clearly exemplary (now) in overall developmental progress which several years ago was at a turning point and needed to specify mission as it examined its overall status and condition.

> This institution first examined its current student population in
> terms of their geographic origin, ability, prior academic perfor-
> mance levels, family occupational and income characteristics, and
> activity following graduation. Learning that the majority of its
> students came from a discrete geographical area, it then examined
> the competing institutions also drawing heavily from that area, in

terms of their admissions standards, costs, and programs. The
findings not only identified a prime target area and particular
secondary schools within that area for recruiting, but also sug-
gested a current involvement with and market for students from
families with incomes in the $14,000 to $22,000 range, with SAT
scores in the low average to average range, who tended to be first
generation college students or children of alumni, and who aspired
to education that would assure them productive employment in their
home areas and its (rather distinctive) prevailing employment market.
Some of the later results attributed to this clarification effort
included more efficient recruiting; increased enrollment; the estab-
lishment of a remedial service; the decision to hold the line on
tuition increase but expand other sources of support through funding
drives; to invest in further development of several programs relevant
to career opportunities in the area served, and to let other programs
make a transition to a general education service function; and to
fill faculty positions with individuals interested in such students
as those identified and specially recruited. The institution appeared
to be remarkably successful in all these endeavors; it had a renewed
and special sense of mission. It also presented itself as a happy,
effective, and growing operation with a year-end surplus of revenue
over expenditures.

What the institution provides to students through its educational and
support programs is a matter of characterizing the kinds and qualities of
educational offerings. We were impressed with the institutions that took
self-study and accreditation in particular program areas seriously, and/or
which attempted to validate perceived strengths by follow up of majors after
graduation, or who took student evaluations maturely and seriously. We noted
also the trend at most institutions to put more emphasis on student concerns
for marketable skills. We noted as well some serious effort to determine the
real value of some of the traditional liberal arts and sciences courses, and
to examine their functional interrelationships with the new developing programs.

With regard to particular educational, religious, humanitarian, or scien-
tific values, the intent, of course, is more difficult to express. But the
strong institutions tended to express a unanimity on these matters, and the
successful activities were seldom in disharmony with such unanimity where it
existed. Some of the most troubled campuses were those where faculty, or
faculty vs. administration, were torn between liberal education and "vocation-
alism," between remediation as an integral part of the program and as an
adjunct salvage operation, between service to community or national interests,
or between a religious or secular emphasis in course content or student life
activities.

47

The interests and needs of the controlling authority appeared to be critical and more recognizable for the public institutions, where boards represented political and economic interests as well, and where particular functions might efficiently be allocated among different institutions in a public system. Most 2-year college boards, though frequently subject to large coordinating boards of greater or lesser authority, consisted of a crosssection of community leaders and representatives of particularly critical trades or technologies in the community. The private institutions appeared less susceptible to particular operational mandates from their boards; church influence, though still strong in some because of a need to preserve financial support from that source, seldom resulted in the specification of mission mandates except in terms difficult to operationalize or in terms affecting one segment of the total institutional enterprise.

Service to the broader publics, except for the 2-year community colleges, is a somewhat esoteric matter in most instances, representing a simple expression of values, a peripheral activity for public relations functions. Yet some of the more successful institutions had identified particular contributions or types of "outreach" the college could undertake in regard to the cultural, social, or economic life of the community or for the sponsoring religious group, some special interest group, or the state or nation. Some found opportunities for direct service within the usual functions of the institution--as in the establishment of an associate degree program within a medium security prison or specialized programs or courses for adults or retirees. Conversely, benign non-recognition of special service roles that the institution could play seemed to be an attitude related to decline or risk, as in cases where large contingents of foreign students were ignored or where the institution chose not to consider adult or continuing education in spite of community interest and the obvious potential for enhanced viability.

The recognition, elaboration, and specification of mission is, in theory, a starting point; in some planning activities, it is a discrete and initial step leading to specification of goals and suggestions for priorities for study or tryout. For most, however, mission specification is ever-present as particular operational points are reached or problems recognized. It is strongly recommended, in any case, that all aspects of mission be considered in concert so that the interactions can be capitalized on--and that every effort be made to arrive at staff and faculty consensus on institutional role and mission.

D. Assessing Current Overall Status and Needs, and Related Budgeting

The assessment of current status can logically proceed from an examination and/or restatement of mission, toward determining the degree to which current programs, services, and functions do or can fulfill the elements of mission as agreed on. Where the concern has been some level of mission clarification or addition, the assessment process may already be somewhat routine and usually related to annual budgeting processes. But where the concern is with dramatic change in mission, assessment is and leads to a major decision point: If we have now markedly altered our mission, or put it into specific action terms, what do we do next? And on what kinds of information do we base our next steps?

Similarly, assessment of current status and needs may either precede or grow out of the long-range planning process. In some cases a serious examination of current condition, trends, and enrollment may lead to a new planning effort of greater dimensions, while in other instances status assessment may be a built-in aspect of a structured planning process. For convenience here, and in order to highlight the importance of status assessment, this topic is treated separately, although such assessment should always be perceived as an integral and regular part of effective planning cycles.

Several general observations about productive status assessment grow out of the study. These are: (1) criteria for assessment are formally specified before assessment and uniformly applied; (2) the positively developing institutions more frequently consider cost vs. contribution as a critical element in the assessment of status of any program, function, or activity; (3) the budgeting priorities are documented in terms of the institutional mission and income potential or usage, as opposed to the aspirations of department or program heads or representatives involved, and are qualified or supported by trends data; and (4) the channels for review, recommendations, decision and modification, and action are formalized, generally understood, and accepted as reasonable by all segments of the college community.

Assessment should consider a wide range of associated factors in each of the three postulated domains, including current fiscal condition, organizational structure, prospective resources, nature of faculty, quality of library, facilities, new program opportunities, and a variety of enrollment patterns.

The criteria for assessment of status sometimes come from a strong and involved president, from an administrator serving that role (as in a PME or IR

function), or from outside contractor or consultant assistance. However, in the most visibly successful cases a hard working committee of key faculty and administrators, aided (but not directed) by outside specialists, has been involved. In one institution, where program content and appropriateness were assessed, the following complex but effective review pattern was developed.

> The formal criteria involved rating 18 specific factors in the evaluation of academic programs: (1) faculty-program congruence; (2) demand by majors; (3) service to non-majors; (4) centrality to college mission; (5) library holdings (against ALA norms); (6) library acquisitions; (7) facilities and equipment; (8) demand for graduates; (9) locational advantage; (10) comparative advantage (against programs in four competing institutions in the area served); (11) public visibility (count of significant faculty/public contacts; (12) ratio of credit hours of instruction to number of FTE faculty involved; (13) credit hour production trend over the past 5 years; (14) FTE staffing trend over the last 10 semesters; (15) achievement of prior year enrollment target; (16) proportion (over three years) in the ratio of direct costs and number of credit hours offered; (17) average cost per credit hour; and (18) percent of refunded to actual credit hours. For all categories, the specific procedures or rating criteria were, of course, specified and standard. In spite of the detail and specificity of the process, the burden on the department heads and reviewers did not seem excessive. The insertion of the cost and production elements was a president-directed strategy for assuring that department heads became sensitive to these real-life consider- ations in their own planning and requests.

This was the structure one institution employed for academic program assessment. Other operations or functions are frequently similarly involved. For example, some of the institutions used the NACUBO self-study workbook indices and criteria to assess periodically the functioning of the fiscal units of the institution; and student service functions were frequently eval- uated against usage criteria or staff/service ratios. Many institutions develop formal individual performance evaluation criteria and most have regular procedures for this purpose; these can include contribution to program effec- tiveness, if the latter is specified and identified. And, in most instances in the study, the specification of assessment criteria and their application had not been (if functioning smoothly and integratively) the product of a system developed and installed in a brief period or by some assessment special- ist with a package. Rather, well-functioning systems were usually the result of a deliberate and continuing effort of many key individuals dedicated as much to the institution as to their disciplines or roles. The NACUBO workbook

41   50

exercise was sometimes an exception; in many instances, however, the principal enthusiast, if any, was the person putting the NACUBO data together. Sharing in the formulation of the concepts and criteria seemed to be a powerful mechanism for taking the activity seriously, and for assuring utilization of the results.

The inclusion of cost factors (and in some instances, generated or potential revenue) is well demonstrated in the example cited above; and, though most of the academic communities examined never totally dominated, the values were relatively modest, costs and revenue considerations considered and assigned. Institutional vitality and viability seemed to be negatively associated with no formal assessment, or with excessve focus on subjective and inconsistently based judgments of quality.

The direct association of the assessment activity with the budgeting process is, of course, a natural and direct outcome of assessment; procedures varied as to the final individual or forums for budgetary decisions and allocations, though in almost all instances this was a process involving initial guidelines from the president and/or chief fiscal officer; assessment and formulation of priorities and dollars needed at the program or function level; the transmission of these recommendations to a management council or the budget officer; their or his recommendations to the president, who made decisions for recommendation to the board. The board, in turn, ratified the recommendations or, in some few instances, imposed its decisions as final judgment. The president, in the last analysis, was the prime determinant of ultimate action.

The successful institutions generally developed two budgets, one based solely on assured revenue, the other on assured revenue plus solid prospects for particular external assistance. The best approach to budgeting as an aspect of assessment, one that can be utilized where a computerized MIS is operational, involves simulations. With a number of interrelated givens, including several different prospective resource and enrollment figures, many possible outcomes can be tested for a future period of one year to five years and formulas derived for promulgating "safe" budget parameters under varying income and expenditure assumptions. Such an approach is a valuable tool for examining current status (in terms of a one-year period, for example) as well as for projecting into future years.

51

The final distinguishing feature of effective budgeting processes is the clarity of the channels and processes involved in preparing the final budget recommendations. If the channels are clearly understood and the evaluation criteria and process fully known, the process is seldom controversial (though individual elements may be protested or contested). It is secretiveness within the process or the exclusion of key individuals from a reasonable role therein that may lead to disruptiveness or apathy in some instances, or in others simply to bad decisions as attested by subsequent institutional experience.

E.   Establishing and Implementing the Long-Term Planning Process

For the sample of institutions as a whole, there was considerable variation in the emphasis given to planning, the time frame into which planning effort was directed, and the mechanisms and individuals involved. Most--but not all--made some assumptions toward anticipating a subsequent year's budget, and had some procedure beyond simple presidential or board mandate or decision for allocating the anticipated revenue.

In using the term long-range planning, we are not referring to a process of setting objectives for the coming year for the purpose of exercising control, but rather to a serious effort to look some reasonable distance--i.e., two to four years--beyond the next budget year, and to encompass a concern for interacting aspects of revenue generation as well as expenditures.

The latter was an activity that characterized the strong institutions essentially without exception. It was also noted that most strong institutions had engaged in some formal long-range planning activity or activities over a period of ten years or more. From the study, it is possible to extract some commonalities regarding this long-term experience. First, there was some precipitating circumstance--a persuasive consultant, an accrediting commission report, a president's recognition of the need to anticipate prospective futures. Second, recourse to outside assistance had generally been made at the beginning, apparently both to reinforce larger recognition of the need to plan by using a prophet from another land, and to help the institution establish some structure for the planning effort. Third, although the president had been continuously and actively involved, so had a variety of other actors--key individuals and committees; and, the composition of planning groups as task forces, their mandates, and their procedures had varied from time to time, with periods of

relative inactivity between formal efforts. Fourth, the current long-range plan was not the president's secret blueprint, nor an exercise by some individual or ad hoc committee directed to producing a document, but a set of objectives, goals, and criteria widely known by faculty and staff.

We believe that the institution that has not engaged seriously in the long-range planning process must start with a firm commitment on the part of its board and/or president to anticipating the future and preparing for it. The apparent need for sustained effort over time noted for the strong institutions, and the variable mechanisms they used from one point in time to another, suggest that the establishment of a structure for planning, though possibly a pilot effort at first, and one that evolved as a function of the interaction between the president's style and contextual features of the campus, became a vital part of the process.

1.   Determination of a Structural Approach to Planning

The initiation of long-range planning conceptually and practically involves several elements. First, there needs to be either a varied and progressive experience evolving into a structural approach to planning that all can live with, or a deliberate determination or selection of that structural approach. By approach, we refer to what elements are prescribed as fixed or given, and what elements constitute variables for decision. For example, planning can start with the given that a particular academic program will be created; the planning function then involves selection of means for carrying it out. Or, a broader objective--e.g., to increase enrollment and tuition revenue by ten percent--can be the given, with planning then to involve both a number of sub-objectives and identification of means for attaining each. The development options can be broader still, to include the values or ideals that will be used to guide the projected specific objectives, broader objectives, and acceptable means; and, the values or ideals can constitute a given or be the subject of some deliberate decision process. Professional planners generally distinguish among these approaches, and take some stance as to which is most desirable. Logic and the research experience suggest, however, that the long-term objective is to achieve some degree of unanimity on values, goals, and means, and that institutions and presidents vary in terms of capability and readiness to operate effectively at one or another of these levels.

2. Specification of the Planning Process and the Participants

Another aspect of the initiation of the planning process is the delineation of the process and the specification of the participants and their roles. One consideration is what particular skills, insights, technologies, and capabilities exist and can be harnessed. Some of the institutions examined had little tradition of collegiality, or indeed would have been pressed to find many faculty capable of taking on certain planning tasks. Yet, any campus consists of some individuals who want to maintain the status quo, some who want to find means to return to the past, some who want to build particular empires or change for the sake of change--when the idealized outcome probably needs to be a bit more profound, to concern what the institution can do to capitalize on and further develop its own resources (or to become more effective by selective development and/or retrenchment). This recognition leads us to suspect that planning is more ultimately effective when it is viewed not just as a mechanism for institutional development, but also as a mechanism for development of the involved individuals as well as of certain broad institutional capabilities. In any event, and whatever the existing traditions, mechanisms, and vulnerabilities, some deliberate choices need to be made in terms of what staff resources will be commissioned for carrying out the structural approach believed most suitable, with concern both for progress and results and for using group involvement and deliberations as a mechanism for development of the participants.

3. The Planning Process In Action

Planning, usually conceived as long range in nature--although sometimes necessarily short range for certain decisions--can be carried out in formal ways once mission is clarified, current status on many fronts is assessed, and the process of planning itself delineated. The planning responds to the question "What do we do next?" and outlines the various steps in implementation. Within the framework of this guide, effective planning at a minimum will include or lead to such policy and action matters as: market assessment, academic/technical program adjustments, recruitment strategies, faculty development, facilities studies, admissions policy, fiscal controls, revenue resources, management and organization structure, and vehicles for resolving new challenges as they emerge. An underlying factor of great importance is the assumption that each of these areas, as well as the total resulting plan, will have its own priorities and that that very fact means that planning must be selective at the same time that it is comprehensive.

Planning, as a discrete and ongoing function, can go on as a part of day-to-day operations, as the process involved in the allocating of budget for an operational year, or represent a projection of aspiration and milestones (or contingencies) for a "short-term" (usually 1-2 years) or a "long-term" (usually 4-5 years) in the future. Planning is also an inherent responsibility of each administrator, faculty member, and most staff persons, with regard to their own responsibilities. We are concerned here specifically with the matter of short- or long-term planning for the institution as a whole.

It will come as a surprise to some readers that not many of the institutions reviewed had any mechanisms in place for planning beyond the subsequent year, or had any comprehensive, reasoned, creditable, or generally known short- or long-range planning document. Some of the state institutions had such documents as a function of the state budgetary projection process; some public institutions saw the essential short- or long-term projections as a matter for system governing boards, usually based at least in part on institutional requests or projections of particular aspirations. For some of the private institutions, planning in any systematic sense seemed preempted by a constant hand-to-mouth condition; if the crops were good, students enrolled; if a benefactor appeared, the spoils were eagerly received and divided. Planning involves a definite commitment to formal activity concerned with improving the present condition through carefully developed decisions and strategies. Some institutions could not find time for active and thorough planning because of the demands presented by a variety of crises that, ironically we must presume, resulted in part from inadequate planning. Other institutions, with similar urgencies, mounted short-term planning efforts and decisions that held promise, at the least, for short-term solutions with long-term potential.

One of the clearest and perhaps most significant findings was that those institutions that had been substantively and responsibly involved in the long-range planning process--that is, where formal plans had been well formulated and continuously updated with full reference to any earlier planning document--were also moving positively as reflected by their improving fiscal statuses.

The experience of the strong and stable institutions, and their contrast with the vulnerable institutions, suggests that long-range planning initially involves a deliberate projection of what the institution is likely to experience,

to sustain, to become, in two, three, four, or five years if current trends continue and if anticipated events over which the institution has no current control in fact occur. This is, at best, the probable future of the institution if no actual planning and consequent action take place. It is also a first step in avoiding surprise crisis situations and in avoiding precipitous action with no time for more deliberate solution that would preclude the occurrence of associated consequences of such action. This process of "standard projection" not only helps to identify areas of "natural" growth and decline, but also may pinpoint particular hazards or suggest particular opportunities.

This sort of projection permits an examination of the institution's likely status and a formal consideration of whether this would be a satisfactory state of affairs. More importantly, however, it provides the basis for a reality-oriented revelation of what the institution may become, and suggests the actions and progressive accomplishments that will get it there--and beyond.

The formal short- and long-range planning documents collected vary somewhat in content and detail; all include some specification of program development or modification aspirations and a few outlined a procedure for selective retrenchment. We believe that the essential elements include, in addition to the projection of trends in market, enrollment, revenue and expenditures, some statement of (1) program development or modification aspects deliberately derived from mission explication, and from projection of probably and idealized futures; (2) the budgetary implications of anticipated costs, and strategies for revenue generation; (3) the specification of other instrumental needs and goals, such as enrollment, faculty development, and new acquisitions, facilities required, promulgation of particular images--in short, the correction or improvement of any conditions felt to be a deterrent to the full actualization and/or further development of the institutional mission; (4) the strategies and mechanisms for attaining objectives; and (5) the milestones by which attainment may be monitored.

While faculty in general, and particular administrative officials, should quite obviously have input into the planning process at some point (and as a partial consequence frequently become instrumental to the attainment of objectives), it seems not contrary to our observations and findings that the viable short- or long-range plan in the institutions examined is essentially the marching orders the president sets for the institution in general. This is where presidential hindsight and foresight, leadership skill, ility to

perceive consequences as well as impact, become crucial. We are aware that many good faculty or business officers have had a major part in institutional development and attainment; but we found no instance where planning solely as a committee function produced in itself anything more than holding an institution together in the absence of leadership, or where anything of consequence happened under a delegate for the president while he or she was on extended leave. In the latter instance, a strong temporary executive sometimes shored up some gaping holes in the dike, but we did not find that the fields made arable were fully planted and cultivated until a strong president was back in place and active as an overseer.

F.   The Implementation of Planning Priorities

Implementation and operationalization are a matter of ongoing management within the opportunities and constraints provided by the establishment of priorities and the allocation of resources. The result of a useful planning process should be a prescription and guide for specific actions on a reasonable timetable. And, quite obviously, the subsequent follow through will be the means of "taking action" as well as a means of validating the specifics laid out in the plan. Within the context of each individual campus situation, special attention might be given to such factors as market analysis (with attention to both statistical projections and more informal modes of sensing trends or program appeal); fiscal controls as part of a systematic management approach; new marketing and recruitment techniques; efficiency of organizational structure and line/staff responsibilities; generation of fiscal and other reports on a monthly basis for presidential review; and adjustments to academic and technical programs in terms of market findings (where alternatives to certain traditional majors might include dual programs with other institutions, interdisciplinary programs, or some other form of synthesis-- along with consideration and addition of new areas).

G.   The Assessment of Outcomes and Consequences

In a real sense, the elements outlined above revolve around two decision points for the institution in its developmental evolution. The first is: given our mission, resources, opportunities, status, and constraints, where do we go and how do we move that way? The second decision point comes at a later period of appraisal of what has been accomplished, when the question is asked:

What are the impacts and consequences, and what are the implications of the experience for starting the cycle anew?

Thus, if the prior elements in the cycle are not faulty, there is little more to say except that mission changes as a consequence of time and circumstances as well as of deliberately contrived modifications; that assessment of needs for determining the following year's budget is an annual need and event; that some things work out well and some don't; that reassessment and new planning must take place on a continuing basis in light of continuing experience. Conversely, if the prior elements in the overall planned process have not resulted in a reasonable condition or program quality, then conscious examination must be made of the factors involved individually and collectively: time period allowed, budget and resource projections, personnel participants, recruitment strategies, program planning, long-range planning process, and the rest. A cautionary suggestion is that these be assessed continually (on a 3-, 6-, 12-month basis) rather than only at the end of a 3- or 4-year period, in order to discover anomolies as they occur.

One matter is of specific concern, and should be highlighted. It comes not so much from our observations of what appeared to be good practice, but from what we found we had to do in trying to evaluate developmental progress. That is our rather simple conclusion that if all that the institution had done or has not done places or leaves it in fiscal jeopardy--if the trend in current fund balance is negative, if current or necessary resources cannot be afforded, if enrollment drops to a level insufficient to justify the minimum critical mass of courses and faculty--then any developmental process employed has failed at least for the immediate time being. This suggests that the assessment of outcomes and consequences cannot be adequate if only the developmental program or specific activity outcomes are assessed. We saw some exemplary developmental activities that could expire because, in the totality of the institution, it was likely that the institutional base could not maintain itself for a time sufficient to reap the ultimate benefits. However, we can not lose sight of the fact that many developmental efforts take time and that they carry with them the potential for later contributions to renewal or reversal.

Where true crises come as a surprise, or when, whatever the external circumstances, they are found overwhelming, the formal or informal developmental process has broken down. We do not mean, of course, to assert that any activity or function should not be assessed in terms of its own intrinsic merit along

49

whatever dimensions are feasible, or that one should back away from speculating on its contribution, however small or diffuse, to desired end results. But we do suggest that the bottom lines are, after all, what ultimately determine the life or death of the institution, or its reduction to brain-dead status and maintenance only by some life-support system. Realizing fuller potentials, or if that is not possible the effective management of decline, is a critical consideration. But the goal of development should be neither to find a way to survive with disease nor to develop muscles never put to use; it is to enhance the viability and impact of the institution on the students, faculty, and society it serves. This will be possible only as adequate generation and management of fiscal resources are carried out in line with the mission espoused and the program offered.

H.   Summary

To certain very real extents, institutions are not free agents able to fully control their destinies or operations or the influence of contextual factors that are societal in nature. And institutions per se are seldom able to arrange for the one single most importa .t desideratum in renewal and reversal-- a vital leader in the form of a (new) president.

But there are certain steps that can be taken, recommendations for which grow out of the current study. Institutions can intervene in their own situations, engaging in such practices or attitudes as the following:

1.   At any point, managing the entire enterprise through the medium of a long-range plan that itself has clearly defined parts capable of being pursued and then implemented. Make the long-range plan part of a larger, consistent, regular process for assessing status and making wise and/or needed changes.

2.   Listening to the market in its several manifestations. Sometimes it has demands (e.g., remedial/developmental studies, or "new" career/professional programs or options for nontraditionals).

3.   Tying budgeting and program development (and its various components) together. Budgeting by actual projections as well as prospective resources. Developing a plan for program that is directly tied to mission, making it a studied priority, and then seeking necessary resources and allocations--rather than the reverse.

4.   Finding ways to get staff and faculty (and alumni and others) consensus on mission, program, and student populations, and then on the programmatic and student-service changes that are needed. In order for a

59

useful "climate for change" to influence growth, these groups need
to be in tune with the whole enterprise, to accept and support it,
to participate in it, and to take some real responsibility for
institutional survival.

5. Recognizing that "developmental activities," however funded, are
    units of effort that are truly meaningful only as they benefit the
    institution as a whole. Even though Title III and other sources are
    necessarily "activity-focused," the payoff is seldom at that activity
    level per se. It would be well to avoid developmental activities in
    isolation, assuring instead that they grow out of a larger plan and
    real needs. Monitoring them (and changing them) so that they are
    working toward larger meaningful objectives. Choosing them on a
    priority basis so that the institution can derive the greatest
    benefit.

6. Moving from existing strengths of all sorts in all three domains
    (fiscal, administration, program), purposefully tying those domains
    together in action so that they can function interactively.

7. Being opportunistic (in the best sense), sensing solutions to problems,
    noting new markets or programs that fit current mission and program,
    utilizing resources that can lead to other resources, utilizing a
    variety of external resources, etc.

8. Putting priority on developing capabilities that, when accomplished,
    place the institution in a position where it can move rapidly to
    needed changes in operational style or program content when such
    needs are recognized (or even anticipated).

The long-range plan and all of its subparts, as suggested in this document,
are in a sense a blueprint for maintaining and enhancing the positive aspects
of the situation as an institution develops new desired potentials or avoids
hazards that may surface as a function of time and circumstances. The insti-
tution uses such a plan as a way of charting the future (or considering several
possible futures). As discussed earlier, this suggests that an important
initial step in planning is the projection of future status (in three to five
years) without special interventions or major changes--that is, without
actually generating and implementing a long-range plan--and then determining
in what ways that future status may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory to the
institution's leaders and constituents. The specific outcomes of this vital
preliminary step will then dictate the course of planning and assist in setting
priorities for immediate or more long-term action.

60

Appendix

Synopsis of Contents of the Full Final Report

entitled

The Anatomy of Institutional Development for
Higher Education Institutions Serving Students
from Low-Income Backgrounds

Chapter I - Overview:

This chapter presents the purpose of the study, as the determina-
tion of factors associated with the effective use of Title III
funds or other "soft" money for the improvement of the quality
of educational programs and of the long-term viability of
institutions of higher education. The case study methods and
sample of institutions are briefly described, followed by a
brief history of the Title III program from the original legis-
lation (The Higher Education Act of 1965) through the current
reenactment (The Higher Education Act of 1980). Final sections
provide a working formulation of institutional development as a
process of positive change toward self-sufficiency (independence
from the need for Title III support) in terms of three operational
domains: fiscal, administrative, and program. An overview of
the content and organization of the remainder of the report is
also given.

Chapter II - Description of the Samples of Institutions and Developmental
Activities:

The institutions and developmental activities were selected in
ways that would support the stated purposes and research strategies
employed, but which limit applications and generalizations for
other purposes. This chapter describes the sampling procedures
for institutions and for developmental Activities, and provides
descriptive data characterizing the institutions involved as
well as the total group of institutions with prime Title III
grants in FY82. These background statistical data should be
helpful to the reader in illuminating the particular segment of
American higher education on which findings presented later are
based.

Chapter III - Definitions of Effective Development at the Institution Level:

The 51 institutions selected for study were expected, on logical
grounds, to represent a considerable variety of developmental
statuses and of success in utilizing Title III or other external
funds for developmental purposes. This chapter presents an
account of how each institution as a whole was evaluated with
respect to overall developmental status, providing a basis for
extracting hypotheses about the underlying causes or associated
factors by contrasting the more successful institutions with
those less successful. Also presented are the characteristics
of the resulting clusters of institutions, with clusters expressing
the assessed status of institutional development.

Chapter IV - <u>Factors Associated with Effectively Developing Institutions</u>:

The previous chapter outlined how institutions were classified as "strong," "stable," "vulnerable," or "mixed," in terms of developmental status. This chapter provides a brief account of the analysis strategy for determining <u>why</u> the differences in developmental status may exist. Then, factors at the general institutional level that seem to account for the differences found are presented, with separate attention to fiscal, manage-ment, and program factors. This chapter addresses the question: "What is it that the kinds of institutions studied have done that results in continued progress toward overall fiscal viability and program quality?"

Chapter V - <u>Classes and Dimensions of Developmental Activity</u>:

We turn here from examination of the institution as a whole to a focus on what constitutes the basic unit for investment as the Title III Program operates: the developmental activity. This chapter presents several sets of dimensions, or classifica-tion schemes, that were found useful in characterizing discrete developmental activities and types. Section A summarizes the categorical descriptions and definitions provided by the current Title III legislation and regulations, including any restrictions established by current designations of unallowable costs. Section B presents several other schemes believed particularly relevant, in terms of Title III intent, noting that developmental activities may lead to one-time only events or to continuing operation, may have varying options for later operational support and fiscal contribution in return, or may be variously supported. The final section provides the broad functional framework utilized in the field examination of selected Title III activities, as reported in subsequent chapters.

Chapter VI - <u>The Nature of Effective Developmental Activity</u>:

In the site visits, certain developmental activities were examined in depth. This chapter provides, first, an oper-ational definition of what constituted a discrete developmental activity for study purposes. Then, the procedure for examining and analyzing the activities is described, with particular regard (1) to general criteria defining successful Activity con-tribution to institutional development, (2) to the procedure for applying these criteria, (3) to the characteristics of the developmental activities that were examined, and (4) to a summary description of the developmental activities selected in terms of their content and the preliminary evaluations.

Chapter VII - <u>Factors Associated with Effective Developmental Activities</u>:

This chapter examines the factors found associated with successful developmental activities. Activities reviewed in the general <u>administration improvement</u> area include MIS, PME, and MIS/PME development; institutional research; long-range planning; and "other" Activities. In the <u>fiscal improvement</u> area, developmental activities include fiscal accounting system development, resource enhancement planning, and fiscal management planning and improvement. In the <u>program improvement</u> area, developmental Activities include new academic programs or majors; strengthening, refining, or upgrading existing programs; instructional enhancements to instruction; and student support services. Successful activities in each domain are generally described in such terms as their origins and objectives, the inputs required, implementation strategies, problems experienced and solved, and their impacts on and consequences for the institution.

Chapter VIII - <u>Contribution of Title III and Other External Support to Institutional Development</u>:

This chapter provides, first, a summary of the implications of the findings in each of the three domains of particular relevance for Title III policy and procedures. Then, the more general (and Title-III relevant) characteristics of the positively developing (or "strong") institutions are discussed, in such terms as their degree of readiness for development (and factors contributing thereto), and characteristic response to program requirements and regulations. Finally, implications of the success experiences for Title III program policy, development, and operations are considered, with special attention to current program intent; use of consortia, assisting agencies, external evaluators, and consultants; and purchase of equipment.

Chapter IX - <u>Related Issues and Applications</u>:

Several special topics and issues that emerged in this study have not been properly addressed in the more general examination of institutional development. These are matters of substance, however, as related to the process of development and the kinds of institutions specifically eligible for Title III assistance (and other external support). This chapter highlights some of these special issues: the different developmental proposition for private as opposed to public institutions; the impact of "uncontrollable" external factors that affect institutions (e.g., political aspects affecting boards of control, competition, sudden wealth, accrediting agency pressure); development challenges in the historically black institutions as a special class; the minority student on the majority campus; and the matter of where "development" stops and "operation" begins.

Chapter X - A Functional Blueprint for Development:

In this chapter, a brief examination is made of what we believe
constitutes the essence of the process of development as it may
be deliberately controlled by the institution. This has to do
with long-range planning--its inputs, the process itself, and
the intermediate and ultimate criteria it must employ, with
emphasis on criteria of fiscal health. It is our "functional
blueprint for development," drawn broadly from what we observed
at the strong and the stable institutions, but found largely
absent at the vulnerable institutions.