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AUTHOR Saarni, Carolyn
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ABSTRACT

Regulated expressiveness (the modification of expressive behavior) is a complex phenomenon. Accomplished basically in four ways, regulated expressiveness has developmental dimensions, motivational precursors, and cognitive antecedents, including perspective-taking ability and the growth of self-awareness. Ability to regulate expressiveness appears to be a result of direct and indirect socialization practices and processes. Individuals regulate emotional expression by adopting cultural display rules, by using personal display rules to dissemble, or by engaging in either direct deception or dramatic pretense. Minimization, exaggeration, neutralization, and substitution are ways of regulating facial expressions to control the communication of emotion; these behaviors may be acquired sequentially. Research indicates that children regulate their expressive behavior in order to avoid trouble, sustain relationships, preserve self-esteem, and maintain norms. Probably, socialization practices promote the acquisition of such motives. By the time children enter school they are aware that internal expressive states and external expressive behaviors can be dissociated and that a significant motive for such dissociation is to avoid others' devaluation of one's self. Research further reveals that mothers' control orientation and fathers' permissiveness orientation are associated, respectively, with children's high-level understanding of the affective-expressive behavior of self and of others. (RH)

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Regulation of Expressive Behavior as Reflecting Affect Socialization

Carolyn Saarni

Sonoma State University, California

The monitoring and modifying of our expressive behavior constitute aspects of both self-regulation and interpersonal regulation. Such capability is gradually acquired as children refine their social-cognitive skills (including perspective-taking, recursive thinking, and impression management) and their voluntary muscle control (especially those in the face). By the time we reach adulthood we have learned to regulate habitually our expressive behavior so that we are able to produce for others' observation and for our own coping needs expressive transformations of our otherwise direct emotional experience (cf. Ekman & Friesen, 1975).

Before turning our attention to the socialization of emotions as reflected in regulated expressive behavior, four basic categories or types of modification of expressive behavior need to be described (cf. Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Saarni, 1982). They are: (a) the regulation created by adoption of cultural display rules; (b) the dissemblance created by personal or idiosyncratic display rules; (c) direct deception; and (d) theatrical or dramatic pretense. Each of these categories will be briefly discussed with the exception of the last, theatrical pretense, which may be more appropriately examined within the context of children's play rather than under the rubric of self-regulation of emotional behavior.

Cultural display rules. The dissociation of emotional state and external expressive behavior is most obvious in cultural display rule usage. Cultural display rules govern the appropriateness of expressive behavior: they are essentially social conventions that prescribe how one should look, even if one does not feel the emotion that would correspond to the acceptable facial expression. For example, one does not normally show one's

displeasure at receiving an unwanted gift if the gift-giver expects one to like it (cf. Saarni, in press). With cultural display rule usage the acceptable or normative expressive behavior is produced in a given situation, and the interpersonal exchange is thus reliably regulated in that the interactants dovetail their verbal and nonverbal responses to one another in in a predictable fashion (see also sociological consideration of this issue, e.g., Goffman, 1972; Hochschild, 1979).

Personal display rules. Personal display rules seem to be motivated by the need to relieve the discomfort of negative feelings by transforming their behavioral expression. They serve as coping strategies that allow the individual to regulate internal processes, such as a self-perceived equilibrium of emotional state. Common personal display rules in middle class American culture include appearing calm when feeling upset, smiling when feeling anxious, revealing an angry expression when really feeling hurt, and so forth. Some personal display rules which appear to be highly prevalent may in fact function as cultural display rules; they have taken on a ritualistic and predictable character and function, in part, to regulate social exchange.

Direct deception. Deceptive expressive behavior implies a deliberate attempt to mislead another about one's emotional experience in order to gain some advantage over the other or to avoid some distinct disadvantage. For example, an employee may mask an angry facial expression with a poker face while the boss rebukes her or him; revealing genuine feelings might aggravate the employee's situation, resulting in further disadvantages. Directly deceptive dissimulation of expressive behavior is the area in which the most developmental research has been carried out (see a review by DePaulo & Jordan, 1982).

Directly deceptive dissimulation of expressive behavior could certainly subsume both cultural and personal display rule usage in that

gaining advantages (or comfort) and avoiding disadvantages (or discomfort) are relevant to both types of display rule usage as well. However, the intent here is to highlight the sometimes subtle psychological distinctions among the categories of dissociation of affect and expression. The two categories of display rule usage have a prescriptive rule character to their application, whereas direct deception is much more dependent on a win-loss distinction within a particular and immediate situation.

Recent research by Ekman and his associates on deception (reviewed by Ekman, in press) suggests that voluntary (his term) facial expressions are associated with rather different autonomic nervous system patterns of response. The subjects were not induced to try to experience some emotion, rather they were instructed to contract certain facial muscles so that prototypical facial expressions of primary emotions were produced. An interesting question is whether these ANS patterns would also be obtained with habitually regulated expressive behavior (as with display rule usage) that often appears 'automatically' and with little awareness. In other words, the voluntary, posed quality would be minimal in habitual expressive behavior regulation, and of course, emotional states would also be involved, although not the presumed affective state reflected in the dissembled facial expression.

Observational research (Saarni, in press) on children's spontaneous use of the display rule "look pleased when someone gives you a gift -- even if you don't like it" does appear to confirm some of Ekman's other conclusions about voluntary facial expressions: latencies differ, different parts of the face are not expressively 'synchronized" (e.g., knit brows while smiling), and a general uneveness of expression occurs.

Development of Regulated Expressiveness

These categories of regulation of facial expression create four kinds of modification in the face. First, an individual may minimize the expression of his/her emotion (e.g., one might look mildly concerned when one in fact feels quite worried). Second, one's feelings may be exaggerated in degree (e.g., sadness could be intensified to elicit sympathy). Third, neutralization of expression occurs when one's feeling is masked behind a 'poker face.' Fourth, substitution of expression occurs if one's real feeling is concealed by displaying another expression which corresponds to a different affect (e.g., smiling is often used to conceal anxiety).

Ekman and Friesen (1975) contend that it is actually easier to substitute another expression than to adopt a neutral one (one's own emotion tends to leak through the poker face). They also cite Darwin for first noting that the smile is among the most common expressive substitutions because "the muscular movements required for smiling are most different from the muscular movements involved in the negative emotions" (p. 142). Our anatomy in this case provides us with a ready way out. However, there is currently no systematic research indicating a developmental sequence of acquisition of these four types of modification of affective expression. My hypothesis is that exaggeration may emerge first, e.g., when a toddler stubs a toe but howls as though she/he has surely broken her/his foot. Blurton Jones (1972) has also noted that children, ages 3 to 4 years, were likely to intensify their crying after falling and injuring themselves when they were aware of being observed as opposed to believing themselves to be unattended to. Minimization may follow next as preschoolers are often directly socialized to miniaturize their affective displays, both positive and negative. The former are often responded to by adults as boisterous, and the latter may invite reproach or invalidation. As for the acquisition order of substitution and neutralization, they may emerge simultaneously,

or a preference for one or the other may appear; both represent masking one's feelings. Some research evidence suggest that in our culture girls may be more likely to adopt smiling to mask their feelings (cf. Feldman, 1979; Saarni, in press). Popular stereotypic assumptions would suggest that the "stoic" poker face (neutralization) is more commonly associated with masculinity rather than with femininity. Some empirical support for the latter supposition may be found in Buck's (1977) research with preschool children and in Shennum and Bugental's (1982) research on grade school children's acquisition of inhibition of negative expressivity (boys exceeded girls in skill in expressive inhibition using neutralization; the girls were more likely to use expression substitution).

Cognitive precursors of regulated xpressiveness. Two studies done with grade school children substantiate that perspective-taking is positively associated with greater skill at controlled or managed facial expressions. , Shennum and Bugental (1982) used a spatial perspective-taking task while Feldman (1982) used a verbal story-telling method, and both measures significantly predicted skill in management of expression.

Buck (1982a) has proposed a complex model based on the interaction of right and left hemispheres in explaining relations between spontaneous affective state and controlled, communicated emotional expressiveness. The differentiation in left hemisphere-mediated symbolic schemes allows the growing child to construct "communication streams" that have interwoven in them right hemisphere-mediated affects with analytical appraisal of one's interpersonal situation. The result includes the development of impression management skills and what Buck call "emotional education" (Buck, 1982b).

Another cognitive component in the development of regulated expressive

behavior is the awareness of conventions or social rules (cf. Damon, 1977; Shantz, 1982; Turiel, 1978). With reference to regulated expressive behavior, the degree to which cultural (or sub-cultural) display rules are understood by the child would seem particularly related to the child's level of cognitive sophistication (see levels of cognitive organization proposed by Damon, 1977, and Turiel, 1978).

Selman's (1982) model of developmental levels for self-awareness is yet another cognitive precursor in the development of regulated expressive behavior. His Stages 2 and 3 are especially relevant for understanding the three basic categories of regulated expressive behavior. Briefly, his Stage 2 entails 'the emergence of an introspective self.' Selman suggests that "youngsters at this stage begin to reflectively understand that the self is capable of : (1) constantly monitoring its own thoughts and actions, (2) consciously and often deceptively presenting a facade to others, and (3) gaining inner strengths by having confidence in its own abilities." (Selman, 1982, p. 72). My own research on children's verbalized understanding of the dissociation of affective state and expressive behavior certainly supports Selman's conceptualization of self-awareness as having developmental stages of complexity, and this Stage 2 was especially discernible in the children's responses (Saarni, 1979, Note 1).

Selman's Stage 3 is more relevant to adolescence, and is characterized by a subtle appreciation of the self as "an active psychological manipulator of inner life (a forceful remover of painful ideas)...For the Stage 3 child, the mind (or ego) is now seen as playing an active moderating role between inner feelings and outer actions." (1982, pp. 72-73). A few 13-year olds in my most recent research did seem to

evidence this sort of thinking, and this study will be described shortly. To illustrate, however, consider the following quote, which was given in response to a question about how does the child personally 'decide' when to reveal her real feelings or not: "well, it would depend on how important the feeling was to me and how I'd think the people I was with would react to my showing how I really felt. Probably if I felt embarrassed about the feeling, I wouldn't show it, or I'd try to smile." Clearly this child appreciates the active simultaneity of self as agent as well as self as object.

Motivational precursors of regulated expressiveness. In addition to cognitive awareness of social rules or conventions regarding expressive behavior and awareness of the self as mediator between inner state and external display, there has to be a desire or motivation to implement regulated expressive behavior. My earlier research (Saarni, 1979) suggests there are at least four broad categories (as used by children) for why expressive behavior is modified; they are: (a) trouble-avoiding motives, which correspond to the direct deception category of regulated expressiveness; (b) relationship-relevant motives (such as not hurting another's feelings by revealing one's own genuine emotions), which can be any of the three categories of regulated expressiveness; (c) self-esteem preserving motives, which appear to correspond to the personal display rule category; and (d) maintenance of norms motives, which appears to correspond to the cultural display rule category. Finally, there also has to be present the ability to implement the expressive behavior regulation. Facial muscles and other body behaviors have to be controlled and coordinated along with one's awareness of self-monitoring and along with one's motivation to implement some sort

of expressive behavior regulation.

Socialization of Affective-Expressive Behavior

Modes of socializing influence. Socialization operates on affective-expressive behavior in at least five overlapping modalities. For the sake of brevity, they will only be listed here. What I call the direct mode of socialization includes social learning mechanisms, e.g., observational learning, operant conditioning or contingency learning, and modeling. Indirect modes include the remaining four modalities of socializing influence. They are: responding to expectations (cf. Saarni, Note 1), use of identification/ causal attributions (e.g., Lepper, 1982; Dienstbier, 1978), and via meta-communication (cf. Saarni, 1982; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967; Satir, 1967). All five modes of socializing influence contribute to the child developing a belief structure about reality that reflects his/her socio-cultural group and his/her developmental level or stage. This multi-faceted 'belief structure about reality' includes, of course, beliefs about how to make sense of one's emotional experience, how to cope with one's internal emotional states (particularly if they become intense), and how to communicate one's emotions 'appropriately' to others. The last set of beliefs is the focus of the present discussion.

(e.g., Kohlberg, 1969),

Socializing influence on regulated expressive behavior. The various modes of socializing influence would certainly influence what norms social conventions children become aware of about how, when, and whe to show one's feelings 'appropriately.' Children's motives to fulfill or enact these conventions for regulating expressive behavior would, in part, stem from socializing influences. One can readily think of how contingency reinforcement, modeling, and identification would contribute to the acquisition of assorted motives for modifying one's

affective-expressive behavior. More subtle influence on motivation to regulate one's expressiveness would come from socializing effects of expectations, causal attributions, and meta-communication. An example of an expectation's influence on regulation of expressiveness might be as follows:

> Parent (to child awaiting an injection): You may find that it hurts less if you look up at the ceiling and find a little spot to stare at very hard.

There are three expectations communicated here: one, that the child will feel pain; two, that the child can relieve the pain by concentrating on something else; and three, that looking upwards and staring hard at something minute are behaviors that will normally interfere with otherwise venting one's distress expressively (e.g., tears, gasping, etc.). Using the same example, the meta-communicative message (often experienced as an implicit 'command') sent by the parent to the child is two-fold: do not give in to the pain by expressing it, and the child should do something to control the intensity of his/her internal state.

Using a different example for an attribution's influence on regulated expressive behavior, consider the following:

> Mother (single parent; speaking exasperatedly to a child who has been caught *in delictu*): You and your father are one of a kind! He'd never admit to anything!
>
> Child: But I didn't do anything. (Accompanied by wide-eyed, earnest face and child's inference that he can stymy Mom by acting like Dad, to whom Mother attributes his similarity.)

The overlapping of these socializing modes allows for considerable redundancy in terms of getting the message across to kids: if they are

oblivious to one's expectations, they may pick up on one's more forceful attributions. (If all else fails, there are always direct contingency modes of reinforcement to fall back on, although there exists an intense debate over whether such direct reinforcement may actually undermine internalization of self-controls. See, for example, Baumrind, 1983; Lewis, 1981.)

Socialization of personal display rules. I find it especially interesting to consider how socialization contributes to this category of regulated expressive behavior. Recall that personal display rules are used to relieve the individually perceived discomfort of some emotional state, thereby protecting one's intrapsychic adjustment or equilibrium. Personal display rules can be quite idiosyncratic, passed on within a family, or can have some degree of cultural commonality (e.g., Americans' tendency to smile when actually feeling anxious). What seems to occur is that a child develops a "vulnerability barometer" about (a) how s/he evaluates her/his internal state(e.g., "it's bad to feel angry at baby sister") and about (b) how others will evaluate her/his self-presentation. The former signals its vulnerability threshold by the experience of anxiety and the latter by the experience of embarrassment.

My own research on grade school children's personal reasons for when they masked their feelings of hurt/pain and fear indicated that the avoidance of derision, of being teased, or of feeling embarrassed accounted for 58% of the reasonsgiven (Saarni, Note 2). Clearly by school-entry children are aware that inner states and external expressive behaviors can be dissociated and that a significant reason for such dissociation is to avoid others' devaluations of the self. This is a potent direct socializing contingency indeed. An interesting research problem to pursue would be to examine how the indirect socializing modes also contribute to the establishment of a "vulnerability barometer" for when to dissociate

external expression from internal state.

Empirical Research on Socialization of Regulated Expressiveness

Despite the vast literature on socialization (comprehensively summarized by Maccoby, 1980), the socialization of affect per se is rarely directly addressed. The only emotions that are typically studied in socialization research are the feeling of guilt in moral development or empathic responses in prosocial development. These socialization studies have generally examined the variable of parental discipline style and/or degree of warmth shown by parents for their children. (I am not including here either patterns of attachment or aggression socialization studies as these are not generally consider emotions per se, although affective development is obviously implied.)

Bugental (in press) has recently made a compelling argument for the transactional or reciprocal effects model in analyzing the socialization of affect in difficult-to-control, unresponsive children. She suggests that "the impact of certain types of child behavior will be heightened for adults whose attributions sensitize them to that particular child behavior. Their response is predicted, in turn, to elicit or maintain child behavior supportive of their belief system." (her italics, p. 6).

Turning now to my most recent study, I examined parental 'belief systems' about children's expressive behavior, their attitudes toward their own self-monitoring, and their attitudes toward their families' social milieu. These three parental variables were used as predictors of three child variables, the latter derived from structured interviews with children. The child variables reflected in turn the children's belief systems about the management of affective-expressive behavior. Specifically, the children (from grades 2, 5, and 8) were questioned about (a) the justification for another child's regulation of expressive

behavior, (b) the interpersonal consequences of regulated expressiveness (i.e., what would the observer think of the target child), and (c) the child's own rationale for how s/he personally figures out the balance between showing or not showing her or his real feelings to others. (Note that the first two variables refer to the subject child's understanding about transactions between others; the last refers to self-understanding.)

Procedure. The parents individually responded to the author-developed questionnaire, Parent Attitude toward Child Expressiveness Scale (PACES; which assesses the degree of control/permissiveness a parent espouses toward their child's affective-expressive behavior), to Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS; Snyder, 1974), and to Moos' Family Environment Scale (FES; Moos, 1974), of which only the Expressiveness, Independence, and Control sub-scales were used. (A copy of PACES has been appended.)

The children's qualitative responses were coded according to ranks of complexity, whereby the highest ranks entailed considerable sophistication in perpective-taking and self-reflective awareness such as the quotation from the 13-year old girl cited earlier.

The data were analyzed by means of stepwise regression analyses for each of the three child variables. Child's age was entered first, followed by the parental measures (11 predictor variables in all).

Results. Age of child was by far the most powerful predictor of all three child variables, which was expected, given that the coding schemes reflected gradations of complexity. However, father's Self-Monitoring was a significant contributor to both the justification variable and the consequences variable. Father's PACES score was also a significant contributor to the variation in the consequences variable. For both of these

child variables, more complex or higher level understanding was associated with father being less concerned about his own self-monitoring and being more permissive toward his child's affective-expressive behavior. Thus, fathers who themselves tend/to be more freely expressive and who profess accepting beliefs about their children's expressive behavior may also tend to be less constrained by conventional masculine role stereotypes regarding the importance of maintaining the stoic front. Such fathers, being more feeling-oriented, may also communicate more within their families about how they feel, how others reacted, how subsequent emotional interactions were affected, and so forth. The inference here is that such fathers make more salient for their children interpersonal affective transactions.

Turning now to the final child variable, that is, how the child decides for her/himself the balance between showing real feelings or not, we find that only mother variables contributed significantly/(in addition to age) to the variation obtained in this more intrapsychic variable. Whereas permissive father beliefs predicted their children's higher level understanding of affective-expressive transactionsabout others, when it comes to oneself, maternal controlling beliefs predicted higher level understanding -- yet these mothers also perceived their families' social climate as more/expressive. More specifically, greater maternal concern with self-monitoring, more controlling attitude towards her child's affective-expressive behavior, and greater maternal perception of family expressiveness significantly predicted the complexity and subtlety of her child's beliefs about how s/he integrates showing or not showing her/his real feelings.

Interestingly, whereas mothers' and fathers' perceptions of independence and control in their families' social climate correlated .42 and .63 respectively, for expressiveness the correlation coefficient was only r = .12. Parental PACES scores correlated only .15, and parental Self-Monitoring scores correlated only .05. These negligible correlations among the parental measures most directly related to beliefs about regulated expressiveness account for the divergent paths that fathers and mothers appear to traverse in the socialization of their children's beliefs about regulated affective-expressive behavior.

Conclusion

I am drawn to Bugental's (in press) argument for reciprocal effects of belief structures in socialization to explain the seeming discrepancies between mother and father data for predicting higher level emotional understanding on the part of their children. Consider the following "family:" Mom has married Dad, who does not particularly concern himself with monitoring his expressive behavior and who is fairly permissive toward the kids' expressive behavior as well. As a result, Mom perceives the family as having a rather expressive social climate, and she feels her belief that her own self-monitoring and more controlling attitude toward the kids' expressiveness is justified, what with all this husband-mediated expressiveness taking place. (Mom: "Somebody's got to show these kids some self-control and social skills.") The outcome is that the children are exposed to two sets of beliefs, two sets of models, and two sets of meta-communications about affective-expressive behavior. The children are stimulated in their perspective-taking and reflective self-awareness and demonstrate higher level understanding of affective-expressive transactions as a result. In the end, it may be a chaotic household at times,

what with different parental messages, but the kids get smarter quicker.

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2. Saarni, C. When NOT to show what you think you feel: Children's understanding of relations between emotional experience and expressive behavior. Paper presented at Society for Research in Child Development, San Francisco, March 1979.

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** insert in order:

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PARENT ATTITUDE TOWARD CHILDREN'S EXPRESSIVENESS

Carolyn Saarni

Sonoma State University
Rohnert Park, Ca. 94928

The scoring weights for the multiple choice format used in PACES range from 1 to 4, where 1 = most permissive attitude endorsed by the respondent about a child's emotional expressiveness and 4 = the most controlling or restrictive attitude. In the Table below each scale item number is represented by the number in parentheses; the numbers following are the weights assigned to the multiple choice options a, b, c, and d. The total score is obtained by adding the number of weighted options endorsed by the respondent.

(1) 4, 3, 1, 2	(6) 1, 4, 3, 2	(11) 4, 1, 2, 3	(16) 4, 1, 2, 3
(2) 4, 2, 3, 1	(7) 1, 4, 2, 3	(12) 1, 2, 4, 3	(17) 3, 2, 1, 4
(3) 1, 3, 4, 2	(8) 3, 1, 2, 4	(13) 4, 1, 3, 2	(18) 4, 1, 3, 2
(4) 4, 1, 3, 2	(9) 3, 1, 2, 4	(14) 1, 4, 2, 3	(19) 1, 4, 2, 3
(5) 2, 1, 3, 4	(10) 3, 2, 1, 4	(15) 2, 1, 4, 3	(20) 2, 4, 1, 3

The percent agreement on the above scoring weights, based on the ratings of 24 graduate students in a child clinical seminar and those of the author, was 71%.

The test-retest reliability, over a four-week interval, was calculated on 36 respondents (half of whom were in fact parents) who were graduate students enrolled in a psychological assessment class. The correlation coefficient was $r = .77$. The first mean was 33.5, s.d.=4.9; the second mean was 33.7, s.d.= 5.7.

For comparison purposes, 50 parents of middle class parochial school children obtained a mean of 41.26 and a standard deviation of 4.63, indicating that graduate students in a counseling department espouse more permissive attitudes toward children's emotional expressiveness than do parochial school children's parents. This difference is both significant ($p < .05$) and conceptually expected.

PARENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: In the following multiple choice questions please circle only one response which seems most similar to what you would be likely to do in the situation described.

1. If my school-age child is bragging about his/her skill in some activity to another child, proceeds to goof up and hurt him/herself, and then comes to me for aid, I would:

   a. tell them that they look foolish being so upset after bragging
   b. attend to them a little, but with some annoyance
   c. comfort them about the injury and ignore the bragging
   d. give comfort but also mildly chide them about the bragging

2. If my school-age child receives an undesirable birthday gift from a family friend or relative and looks obviously disappointed, even annoyed, after opening it in the presence of the person giving the gift, I would:

   a. be annoyed with my child for being rude
   b. look the other way
   c. remind my child to say thank-you
   d. say that it really was too bad they didn't get what they wanted

3. If my school-age child is very shy around adults who come to visit our home and prefers to stay in the bedroom during the visit, I would:

   a. let my child do as he/she pleases
   b. reproach my child about behaving like a mouse
   c. tell my child that he/she must stay in the living room and visit with the guest
   d. remind my child to be polite

4. If during a bus ride my school-age child continues to look intently at someone whose whole head is covered with scar tissue, I would:

   a. nudge my child and say to mind his/her own business
   b. permit the looking
   c. tell my child it is impolite to stare
   d. ask what he/she is doing

5. If my school-age child starts to giggle during a funeral, I would:

   a. ignore it
   b. smile understandingly at my child
   c. frown at my child
   d. frown and also tell my child to be quiet

6. If my school-age child is afraid of injections and becomes a bit shakey while waiting for his/her turn for a shot, I would:

   a. comfort them before and after the shot
   b. tell them not to embarrass me by crying while getting the shot
   c. tell them to try to get more under control
   d. tell them that the pain lies more in the fear than in the actual shot

7. If my school-age child shouts at me in anger after I accidentally throw away his/her favorite comic book, I would:

   a. apologize
   b. give them a piece of my mind about the disrespect shown to me and them to go to their room
   c. apologize but tell them to stop yelling at me
   d. send them to their room to cool off, then apologize later

8. If my school-age child carelessly loses some prized (but inexpensive) possession and reacts with tears, I would:

a. tell them not to get so upset about it
b. tell them how unhappy I am about the loss too
c. remind them to be more careful next time
d. say they should not feel so sorry for themselves since they were so careless as to lose it in the first place

9. If my school-age child is about to appear on a local television program and inquires with visible nervousness about how many people will be watching the show, I would:

a. say to get control of themselves and try not to show their nervousness
b. reassure and comfort my child
c. suggest thinking about something relaxing so that their nervousness will not be so obvious
d. tell my child to get a grip on him/herself if he/she wants a good performance

10. If my school-age child attends a family birthday dinner in a nice restaurant and exuberantly jumps out of his/her chair and shouts "Happy Birthday!" I would:

a. smile but also tell my child to try not to be so rambunctious
b. say nothing
c. smile understandingly about my child feeling so happy
d. say that proper restaurant behavior requires sitting down and speaking quietly, despite feeling happy and excited

11. If my school-age child becomes very angry at his/her sibling, begins to shout and stomp around the room, and I am nearby, I would:

a. tell my child to speak civily and apologize as well
b. not intervene
c. try to find out what the altercation was all about
d. tell my child to cool down

12. If my school-age child has some unfounded fear (e.g., of the dark, of dogs, etc.) and gets panicy in the feared situation, I would:

a. reach out with a touch and assure them I was there to help
b. give assurance that I was there to help but that it was time for them to realize they had no real reason to be afraid
c. tell them they are being silly and will embarrass themselves someday by being so afraid
d. tell them to control themselves better so that they will feel less afraid

13. If my school-age child is teased and called names by another youngster on the way home from school and arrives home trembling and tearful, I would:

a. say "if you don't want to be a sissy, scaredy-cat, or whatever, you should stick up more for yourself"
b. feel concerned myself and also comfort and reassure my child
c. tell my child to keep a stiff upper lip and not let the other child see him/her so upset
d. reassure my child but also say that showing one's fear to others sometimes causes problems

14. If my school-age child rather obviously watches a mentally retarded person as we ride the bus, I would:

a. permit the staring
b. nudge my child and say to mind his/her own business
c. ask what he/she is doing
d. tell my child that it is impolite to stare

15. If my school-age child wins a race in a track meet and after receiving everyone's congratulations continues to jump around gleefully and exclaim over the victory, I would:

a. say nothing but would begin to feel uncomfortable
b. smile approvingly and offer more congratulations
c. frown at the display and say that real winners do not keep "crowing"
d. suggest they were over-doing it and to calm down

16. If my school-age child appears to be quite afraid during an amusement park ride and other accompanying youngsters do not seem to be afraid, I would:

a. tell my child to shape up or he/she will be teased by the other kids
b. comfort and reassure my child
c. let him/her cope with the fear without my intervening
d. tell my child to try to get better control of him/herself

17. If my school-age child is in a recital (e.g., dance, music, gymnastics, etc.) and during a solo makes an error and proceeds to look as if on the verge of tears, afterwards I would:

a. say that the performance was fine, but it would have been better if they had not looked so upset about the mistake
b. compliment the performance and say nothing about the mistake
c. compliment the performance and say that the concern on their face after the mistake showed the audience that they really wanted to do well
d. say that no one would have paid attention to the mistake if they had not acted so babyish about it

18. If my school-age child comes home from school very angry about something the teacher has done and proceeds to slam doors, mutter dire threats, and scowl fiercely, I would:

a. reprimand my child for being so out of control and behaving inappropriately in the house
b. ask what had happened
c. tell my child that his/her behavior is disruptive
d. tell my child that I just hope he/she doesn't act this way at school

19. If my school-age child is staring with interest at a woman breast-feeding her baby, I would:

a. permit the looking
b. nudge my child and say to mind his/her own business
c. ask my child what he/she is doing
d. tell my child that staring is impolite

20. If my school-age child mutters "yecchh" and grimaces when Grandma serves some of her casserole on his/her plate, I would:

a. remind my child to be more polite
b. tell my child to apologize and shape up immediately or leave the table
c. smile rather nervously and ask my child "well, what do you think it is?"
d. frown at my child while asking him/her to apologize for the poor manners