DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 231 706 SO 014 742

TITLE	U.S.-India Relations: The Asia Society. A Media Source Guide, Issues for the '80s.
INSTITUTION	Council on International and Public Affairs, New York, N.Y.
SPONS AGENCY	Office of International Education (ED), Washington, DC.
PUB DATE	82
GRANT	GOO-80-01865
NOTE	49p.; This guide was prepared under a grant from the Language and Area Research Program. Not available in paper copy due to marginal legibility of document. For related documents, see SO 014 738-741.
PUB TYPE	Guides - Non-Classroom Use (055)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Economic Change; Economic Factors; *Foreign Policy; Human Resources; Institutions; *International Relations; News Media; Nuclear Technology; Social Change; *United States History
IDENTIFIERS	Afghanistan; Gandhi (Indira); *India; Pakistan

ABSTRACT

One of a series of guides dealing with diverse topics of concern to the U.S. media, this publication is intended to provide journalists with concise, authoritative background information on India and India-U.S. relations. The guide begins with a series of background papers (by Philip Oldenburg) discussing issues and interests in Indo-U.S. relations, India as a major power, and the political style and personal influence of Indira Gandhi. A fact sheet dealing with Indo-U.S. relations discusses East-West relations, Afghanistan, arms to Pakistan, nuclear power, economic assistance, China, and the Indian Ocean. A partial listing of diplomatic visits between India and the United States and a chronology of major events in the life of Indira Gandhi are provided. A chart of selected indicators of change in India between 1950 and 1980 is provided. The guide concludes with lists of individuals and institutions specializing in India and India-U.S. relations. (RM)

G00-80-01865

A MEDIA SOURCE GUIDE



Issues for the '80s

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U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

The Asia Society

COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
777 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017

1982

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This guide is intended to provide working journalists with concise, authoritative background information on India and India-U.S. relations, along with some suggestions of individual specialists and institutions able to provide additional background. It was prepared by the Public Affairs Department of the Asia Society for the Council on International and Public Affairs.

The Asia Society, through its media relations program provides background material on recent developments in Asia, sponsors briefings when events warrant, offers consultation and referrals on specific stories, and assists correspondents prior to posting in the field. Further information on the program and its services is available from Marshall Bouton, Director of Public Affairs for the Asia Society at the address below.

The Council on International and Public Affairs also has a longstanding interest in working with the media as one of the principal instruments for enlarging American public understanding of international affairs. Through efforts such as this series of source guides for the media, it seeks to strengthen contacts between working journalists and academic and other specialists on major world regions and international problems. Concerned with pluralizing international news flows, especially from the Third World to the U.S., it works in cooperation with media and other organizations in making available additional sources of international news to the U.S. media. Further information about the Council is given on the outside back cover.

This guide is one of a series of similar guides dealing with diverse topics likely to be of continuing concern to the U.S. media. Additional titles and information on their availability are given on the inside back cover.

The media source guide on U.S. relations with India and a parallel one on China are also seen by the Asia Society as an experimental first step in its media relations program toward the preparation of a more comprehensive source guide. This follow-on publication will be based in part on the seminar organized by the Society for representatives of the media on "Covering Asia in the 80's" in September 1981. At that all-day symposium, academic specialists and former Asian correspondents identified and discussed future issues in the regions of Asia and the problems involved in covering them.

Because of the experimental nature of this source guide, comments and suggestions by users would be very much appreciated. They should be sent to Marshall Bouton at the Asia Society (725 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10021, 212/288-6400).

Ward Morehouse
President
Council on International
and Public Affairs
New York

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This Media Source Guide was prepared under a grant from the Language and Area Research Program, Office of International Education, US Department of Education. The content is the responsibility of the grantee institution and does not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of Education.

BACKGROUND PAPERS ON

INDIA AND INDO-U.S. RELATIONS

by

Philip Oldenburg*

INTRODUCTION

The difficulties that have bedevilled Indian-American relations have recurred so often that we cannot any more dismiss them with excuses of "misunderstandings" or of personality clashes as Prime Ministers meet Presidents. We must suspect more fundamental divergences of interest underneath what we see as grounds (which we never seem to reach) for firm and enduring friendship, most prominently that the U.S. and India are vigorous democratic societies. (U.S. relations with France are remarkably similar).

We must peel away the surface patterns, as they emerge from a consideration of the issues which are salient in our relations today, to reveal the conflicts and convergence of interests (Indo-U.S. Relations: Issues and Interests). We will then assess the basis for India's view of herself as a third world

*Department of Political Science, Columbia University. This essay was commissioned by The Asia Society for use in its Media Relations Program. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Society.

country that has succeeded in moving significantly toward solutions of its problems (India as a Major Power), and examine what this visit of Prime Minister Gandhi might accomplish, once we know how her political biography might influence her foreign policy posture (Indira Gandhi and Indo-U.S. Relations).

Most Americans simply refuse to believe that India has in any way succeeded in solving her problems of poverty, overpopulation, and achieving political stability and social and economic change within a democratic framework. For most of us, Indian talk of being a major power is a joke and her commitment to the goals of the nonaligned movement is hypocritical sloganeering. We must take Indian claims seriously, and we should remember that the debating point scoring style too many Indian spokesmen adopt may mask deep felt convictions.

INDO-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES AND INTERESTS

The issues likely to be raised during Mrs. Gandhi's visit can be put into three categories: (1) security issues, centering on the threat posed to the subcontinent by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (the U.S. perspective), and the danger to India of U.S. arms aid to Pakistan and the military dimension of closer U.S.-China ties (the Indian view); (2) economic issues, focusing on the need for continued U.S. contribution to multilateral aid agencies and a more liberal U.S. trade policy vis a vis India (the Indian perspective), and the value of opening up the Indian market to American exports and investment (the U.S. view); and (3) matters of bilateral concern, primarily arranging a decent burial of the Tarapur nuclear power plant agreement.

Differing U.S. and Indian perspectives are at the back of these issues. India clearly believes that it must be recognized as the dominant military power in South Asia -- one which must be trusted to pursue its own interests in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. This is a delicate task, given the long and essentially unbroken friendship with the USSR, based significantly on the Soviet Union's supply of vital military and economic assistance in

times of India's greatest need, on India's terms. As important, India sees herself at times as an Asian power, as significant as China, and at times as the leading power of the non-aligned countries. From India's point of view, its non-aligned position has been consistent and genuinely independent of both superpower-led blocs, and must remain a pillar of its foreign policy.

The U.S. approach continues to downplay regional perspectives, and clearly assumes that U.S. leadership in resolving the Afghan crisis, and in countering the expansion of Soviet forces into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, must be recognized by those in the region. In this view, India cannot expect to play in the same league with the superpowers.

We find starkly contrasting overall views on economic issues too. India has adopted what she calls a "socialistic pattern" in her economy, but she actually maintains a mixed economy, in which private sector firms, particularly small-scale enterpreneurs, are encouraged in most areas. India sees no reason, however, to give up her system of state enterprises in the critical sectors of the economy. The stringent control of the entry of goods and investment from abroad, using criteria of how those fit into government planning (or politically valuable schemes) rather than profitability or even getting access to the most technologically advanced items, has been significantly loosened recently.

India believes that these policies have, by and large, worked well. Her economy has developed significantly since independence, and she has weathered the oil price rise crisis better than most (and is hoping to reach self-sufficiency in oil production soon, relying on public sector enterprise and

managing to keep inflation under control). She has achieved an admittedly somewhat precarious self-sufficiency in food production for the past ten years, and she has put in place a firm infra-structural foundation for future growth, again relying almost entirely on public sector corporations. India has not overburdened herself with foreign debt, and the contribution of foreign aid (especially when measured in per capita terms) has not been as important as it has for other countries, like Taiwan.

Over the years, U.S. governments have seemed to think of a "socialist success story" as a contradiction in terms. They have seen India's attempts to emphasize autarky in many sectors of the economy as doomed to failure in a world market of increasing interdependence. The U.S. tends to look at the corruption and ineffieciency inevitably spawned by an excess of government regulation, and the apparent lack of progress in the declared goal of eradicating poverty. It has continued to look for signs of a significant movement toward, if not a complete adoption of, a capitalist free market system.

Both the U.S. and India seem more comfortable with a normal diplomatic give and take when most bilateral issues arise. The exception is the dispute over the Tarapur nuclear power plant agreement. The nuclear issue touches on both security and economic concerns. India has a large and sophisticated nuclear power establishment, and ambitious plans for nuclear power development, which were originally backed by the U.S. and which continue to draw inspirations from U.S. plans, in the development of breeder reactor systems. That it ill-behooves the superpowers who continue a "vertical proliferation" of their nuclear weapons systmes (and do not protest continuing French and Chinese atomic testing) to lecture India on the danger her "peaceful nuclear explosion"

poses to the world is a genuinely felt Indian argument, though it is one that is partiularly suspect because it is so often put in irritatingly self-righteous terms.

Discussion of these issues through the years have been too often conducted with an acerbity, with even ill-concealed contempt and hostility, which is quite startling. (Again, French-American relations have suffered from a similar problem). Explanations for this vary: one view is that both India and the U.S. see themselves with "moral missions" in the world and so tend to preach at each other. Another view is that the Indian elite, steeped in British traditions, and inheriting a nationalist pride in their civilization, resent the bluntness and self-confidnece of a rich and powerful U.S (the "poor but proud relative" explanation), while U.S. diplomats lose their patience when faced with Indian pretensions (the "Krisha Menon phenomenon").

The underlying motiv of the Indian position on all these issues is a proud and prickly independence and self-reliance. She insists on making her own way in the world, suspicious and resentful of those who ask (or worse, attempt to force) her to adopt their system or method. Her experience of having won her independence has undoubtedly given her a strength of nationalist feeling quite reminiscent of the U.S. when it was a "new nation." And yet, along with this, there is a considerable sensitivity to how other countries -- and the U.S. in particular -- judge her record.

U.S. and Indian interests: convergence or conflict?

The issues we have sketched suggest conflicts of interests which are at the surface of Indo-U.S. relations. India is on one side of the nuclear nonproliferation issue, the U.S. on the other; the Soviet Union is India's friend and America's enemy; India is a leading state of the "south" and the U.S. of the "north," on issues such as the law of the sea. Indian and U.S. interests clash when it comes to Pakistan's military strength. And so on.

Beneath the surface, though, Indian and U.S. intersts converge. The U.S. has a major interest in India's stability, if only because an unstable, revolution-prone India might prove to be a very tempting body of troubled water for the Soviet Union or the Chinese to go fishing in. India has made it clear that she has no wish to see Soviet influence expand on the subconinent: both India and the U.S. are convinced of the importance of keeping the USSR within its current borders, with Soviet forces out of Afghanistan.

The U.S. also has an interest in seeing India's economy develop into a self-reliant one, in which domestic oil and other energy production is brought to levels where the Indians are able to reduce their dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and one which will provide a market for U.S. goods, including some food grains and high technology capital and consumer goods. India has a western-style legal system, and its long links with the international market (and, increasingly, Indians are working in U.S. companies), along with its record of consistently honoring agreements on capital and profits repatriation, will make investment in India increasingly attractive, as labor costs increase in other Third World countries. India has reached a point where it needs to expand exports, and government policy has changed accordingly to a certain

extent, and the U.S. -- already her largest trading partner -- is obviously a crucial market.

We should not downplay the convergence in interest summed up by "India and the U.S., the world's two largest democracies." We do share much in the way of political values. This bond has been fleshed out in recent years by the rapidly growing Indian community settled in the U.S., which now numbers more than 300,000 people. This is a group well above average in education, income, and willingness to become involved in American politics and society. There is also a growing group of Indians who have returned home after studying in the U.S. India is making efforts to encourage Indians settled abroad to invest in India, and has de-emphasized the "brain drain" aspect of the matter and pointed to the "brain bank" aspect instead. The U.S. is clearly a good place to "bank" professional and managerial talent until the Indian economy grows sufficiently in size and sophistication to accommodate them, should they wish to return.

This is a picture which suggests that U.S. and Indian relations should improve, as the recognition of the convergence of interests beneath the surface-level conflicts of interest occurs. There are, however, at a more fundamental level, conflicts of interest far less easy to resolve, and it may be that the inability of the U.S. and India to improve their relations over the years can in part be traced to those conflicts.

There are more than a few Indian analysts of foreign policy who believe that the U.S. has demonstrated an interest in keeping India weaker militarily than her size and resources warrant. Strong enough to protect herself against

Pakistan and China, but not so strong that she could play an active role in the Indian Ocean region and beyond, Indians have an interest in making their relationship with Pakistan resemble, as they are fond of saying, that of the U.S. with Canada. But the U.S. has supported first Pakistan's effort to be India's military equal, and then to develop a military "defensive" capacity which the Indians find threatening.

Some Indians believe that the U.S. wishes to limit the countries who will count as serious players in the global security system to itself and the USSR, and the European powers and China. (They feel it is no accident that these countries comprise the nuclear "club.") That perception is given life by the U.S. tendency to ignore Indian interests -- or worse, forget that Indian interests even exist -- when policy on protecting Gulf oil and the sea lanes to Japan, or the military dimension of the normalization of relations with China, is made.

U.S. policy makers deny that the U.S. has deliberately aimed to keep India "in its place" in the international system -- important as a non-aligned country, pre-eminent (not "dominant") in South Asia, simply one of many littoral countries where Indian Ocean security is concerned, but no more. In the long term India will emerge, if her foreign policy and military programs continue as they have, as a power that cannot be ignored (see "Indian as a Major Power"). Given the way the U.S. defines its national interest, it remains to be seen whether the maintenance of its current position in the international system can accommodate that emergence.

There is a parallel conflict in economic interests. Here, we must look at

the India of some decades in the future. The U.S. has an interest in keeping the Indian economy from collapsing, but it may not be in the U.S. interest to help India move rapidly toward reaching its full economic potential.

India has the natural and human resources to match her giant size, and an Indian economy developed to a high level would pose a significant challenge to the allocation of shares of the world's resources and markets as they exist. India would be a formidable competitor, dwarfing Korea, Taiwan, and the other NICs in this regard. Once India moves beyond the point where its own people are well taken care of, it will be in its interest to move even more actively into international markets. (One wonders whether the U.S. would have been quite as generous in aiding Japan's post-war recovery, had the U.S. anticipated the economic challenge Japan would mount only a couple of decades later; there was no underestimate of the potential military challenge.)

We need not agree that Indians are right when they see decisions such as the U.S. opposition to the recent IMF loan facility as a U.S. attempt to slow down India's economic development. But we must recognize that the Indians have good reason to put themselves firmly on the side of the south in north-south issues.

INDIA AS A MAJOR POWER

Most Americans think of India as a country mired in poverty, unable to solve even the simplest economic problems, with a government hard-pressed to deal with an anarchic politics and endemic corruption, and therefore a country so weak that its pretentions to major power status are laughable.

Many Indians, on the contrary, believe that their country is strong and getting stronger, already able to defend itself militarily, with an economy poised to develop rapidly on the foundation of a sound infrastructure, a large heavy industrial sector, and a modernizing agriculture; an economy not "dependent" on the export of a single commodity, or on multinational corporations, or on foreign aid. They see a political system resilient enough to meet popular demands and retain its legitimacy.

We will argue that India <u>is</u> a "major power." Not in the sense that she can shape world events (though Indians argue the potential for that remains), but in the sense that world events are not likely to alter her course, except

slowly. She is like a large ocean-going ship, whose momentum is so great that it will coast many miles without power if need be, will change direction slowly and, as it were, reluctantly, and is far less vulnerable to winds and waves than smaller vessels.

Defence

India sees herself surrounded by enemies. She has fought with Pakistan in 1948, 1965 (twice), and 1971. Only recently have India and China started negotiations aimed at solving the border dispute which provoked the Chinese invasion of 1962. India is perhaps the only country in the "free world" which seems to feel herself threatened by the U.S. militarily. She is content with throwing out hints of the danger of U.S. gunboat intervention (no Indian has forgotten or forgiven the sending of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal in 1971, and the Falkland Island war sparked discussions in the press about India's ability to defend her offshore islands). She is more serious when she speaks of Pakistan, newly armed with F-16s, being used against her by "others." Loose talk by U.S. officials of India being a "proxy" or "client" of the Soviet Union makes Indian fears of a U.S. military threat seem less silly.

India recognizes that she has nothing to fear from Pakistan (acting alone) at the moment. In the decade since her decisive victory in the Bangladesh war India has continued to maintain her force levels, and defence expenditure, at twice to four times those of Pakistan. The modernization of her army, air force and navy, with weapons purchased from abroad and designed domestically, and with ammunition and spare parts production facilities, has pro-

ceeded apace. Pakistan's military capacity has in the meantime tended to stagnate. If Pakistan were to develop a nuclear weapon, that picture would change, but Indian leaders have not said that India will automatically go in for a nuclear weapons program as a response.

In the twenty years since the Chinese invasion, India's northern frontiers have been made secure: India now has the mountain roads, the troops trained and equipped for mountain warfare, and the communication systems to take full advantage of the natural advantages of shorter supply lines and a frontier closer to the heartland of the country. China of course has nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system which India has not attempted to match, but a nuclear war threat is sufficiently deterred by the Indo-USSR treaty of friendship. There are some in India who favor the development of an Indian nuclear deterrent (drawing on the expertise which has launched earth satellites).

The Indian navy too is being modernized and expanded. When the warships now on order are delivered, she will have about 30 frigates, four destroyers, 12 submarines, an aircraft carrier (with eight Sea Harriers) and an appropriate panoply of helicopters and missiles. Such a force is clearly not capable of operating with much effect too far from India's shore, though visits to Mauritius and other Indian Ocean countries have been made, but it does provide a meaningful defence to threats from the sea.

Internal Security

Threats to India's internal security persist. In the northeast, the Assamese have been mounting a largely non-violent campaign to have "foreigners" (mainly refugees from Bangladesh) removed from the electoral rolls, and guerilla groups continue to be active in Mizoram and Nagaland. Recently, a separatist demand for a Sikh homeland, "Khalistan," has surfaced. It does not seem to have made much headway in the Punjab, where most Sikhs live, even if its leaders in Britain and elsewhere have gained considerable attention. But in comparison to earlier times -- when there was an active separatist movement in South India, or when there were hundreds of villages "liberated" by revolutionary communists, in 1948-53 and again in 1967-70 -- the internal security situation should not cause Delhi alarm. The police and paramilitary have been expanded and strengthened considerably in the last ten years.

There are many Indians who see a great increase in crime and violence (particularly between upper castes and upwardly mobile ex-untouchables), but overall the ability of the government to maintain order has not even begun to erode. Even the "increase in violence," others argue, is more a function of an increased willingness of the press to investigate and publicize violent clashes. Hindu-Muslim riots have not disappeared, but they do not seem to be getting more frequent or more destructive.

Administration

Civil servants are unquestionably underpaid and given responsibility for a range of decisions that mean a great deal to people, from school admission to granting a license to manufacture pots and pans (and the permission to get electricity, and a sewer connection, and a share of the aluminum quota, and permissions without end for the factory) -- a sure-fire formula for corruption. And yet one sees factories springing up; most children do go to school. One sees an administration which slowly, inefficiently, at times callously and at times humanely, works. One suspects that its inertia is so great, its size so large, that it is able to carry the system -- the legal system and taxation, the welfare and service functions the state has assumed (education, most health care, power supply, communication, banking, distribution of essential commodities, among many) -- over the patches of inchoate policy or party anarchy that are bound to recur. In some areas corruption obviously gums up government machinery, while in some areas it provides grease, but its undoubted increase has not meant the breakdown of the machinery as yet; it is moreover a subject which stimulates more unverifiable accusations than most.

The Economy

The Indian state, then, is strong. But it will quickly weaken if the economic system should prove incapable of sustaining growth, or worse, should begin to break down, or if the political system ceases to function for a sustained period. The economy presents contradictory signals. There has been almost no progress in reducing the level of poverty, as measured by food intake of the poorest half of the population. Rates of agricultural and industrial growth, which have kept barely ahead of population growth (real per capita income has grown at the rate of about one percent per year since independence) are getting smaller. Public sector factories generally run at well below rated capacity, and bottlenecks in power supply, in railway wagon movement, and in many other areas seem to threaten growth prospects.

On the other hand, the economy is far from "stagnant." It has an absolute size which accommodates an impressive range of economic activity, and which makes it not only possible but also imperative to develop a domestic market orientation rather than an exports market one. There is no question that were India to be cut off tomorrow from the outside world, its economy, while severely crippled, could adjust and resume its growth. And that economy is not a subsistence-agriculture, non-industrial one, but irrevocably a modern industrial, commercial one. India now exports hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated machinery and other engineering goods, to other Third World states, and to developed countries.

We tend to see a widening gap between rich and poor countries, as measured by per capita GNP and other statistics. Most Indians, however, measure their economic progress not against a goal of affluence literally beyond their wildest dreams, but think of how far they have travelled from a well-remembered past. The one percent a year growth in real income is not seen as a rate so low that they will need centuries to reach the level of income Americans now enjoy, but as a slow but steady rate which has brought Indians out of the fifty year-long "nothing changes" stagnated economy of the pre-independence era.

Nor do ordinary Indians rely entirely on quantitative indicators. Per capita availability of textiles has not increased since independence, but villagers will tell you "then we got English cloth; now it is Indian made." Similarly, "calorie consumption" may measure nutritional standards, but from the point of view of the poor Indian, the form those calories take is meaningful. They eat about the same amount of food grain as they did thirty years ago, but it is now, to a certain extent, a "better" grain (wheat rather than millet, for example). Many Indians are living a visibly better life than their parents did, and there is enough mobility in the system that many more have hopes of "making it," and so are loath to question the system.

The Political System

Is there a danger of the collapse of India's political system, resulting in the too familiar syndrome of military-bureaucratic takeover, followed by resurgent revolutionary movements, followed by authoritarian repression, and so on? A free press and a vocal opposition has helped to make it crystal clear that the political system of India is changing toward a more unprincipled, more chaotic, and possibly less democratic one.

Mrs. Gandhi has remade the Congress party into an organization centered on its leader, in which fitness to govern a state as Chief Minister is measured by loyalty to her and the ability to keep followers in line, not (as before) in part on having grass-roots support in the state. As a result there has been an increase in the role of money in politics, particularly during elections, and vote fraud is also more common. No opposition party is in a position to challenge Mrs. Gandhi's hold over the country, though the Communist Party of India (Marxist) is firmly in power in the state of West Bengal.

Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the record to date; a political system which weathered the crisis of the food scarcity years of the mid-sixties and the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, and which saw the overthrow of a quasi-authoritarian "Emergency" regime through the election of 1977. It is a politics in which citizens have come to expect access to government policy-makers, and have learned to bargain with the currency of votes and political support

they have. By the time Mrs. Gandhi's current term of office (measured by the life of this parliament) is up, in 1985, she will have been prime minister for almost as many years as her father. When the question "after Nehru, who?" was asked, with trepidation, few predicted that "Mrs. Gandhi" would be the answer. It is likely that the question "after Mrs. Gandhi, what?" reflects an equally misguided concern.

If India is to be recognized as a major power, she must continue to demonstrate an independence of action in the international arena, based on a sturdy defence capability and a secure and stable state system. That state strength depends, in the long term, on an economy that is capable of sustained growth, is free from distortions too great a dependence on the international economy can bring, generates sufficient new jobs, and reaches an acceptable level of equity in the distribution of goods. These tasks are certainly not impossible for India, though pessimistic observers here have the edge. Similarly one is right to wonder whether the political system can continue to adapt to changing popular demands. Still, we should stop being surprised if the Indian state continues to get stronger, drawing on an improving economy and a vigorous politics.

INDIRA GANDHI AND INDO-U.S. RELATIONS

"India is Indira and Indira is India" is a slogan (coined by a Congress party official) which has been repudiated by Mrs. Gandhi. Nonetheless it captures an important facet of her persona. She feels she can speak for India in a way that no other Indian leader can, as someone born into the nationalist movement, growing up in a household where her grandfather and father were making her country's history, spending the early years of independence constantly at her father's side, and acting as prime minister for thirteen of the eighteen years that have passed since his death. She has been everywhere in India and has met literally hundreds of thousands of her citizens; her continuing popularity is more a measure of the genuineness of her ties to the Indian electorate than a judgment of how well her government works.

She also appears to treat criticism of herself as criticism of India. But she has been able to distance herself from responsibility for the action of her governments, blaming the old-guard leadership of the Congress for the lack of progress during the splitting of the Congress in 1969, arguing that

a few officials committed "excesses" during the Emergency (and denying that her son Sanjay was exercising "authority" in that period), occasionally attributing failure and opposition to conspiracies of unnamed (but evidently American) agents of subversion.

Since we are concerned with how her political style and persona influence her conduct of India's foreign affairs, most of the analyses of her record and style within India are not directly relevant. (One of the most insightful is by Ashis Nandy, "Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics"). A recurrent theme, when psychological factors are discussed, is her distrust of others, rooted in an insecurity dating from her childhood - thus her emphasis on loyal followers, and the vehemence with which she discards those who were once trusted members of her inner circle of advisors and supporters. The consequence has been her isolation from the political mood of the country, for which she paid the price of electoral defeat in 1977. Her quest for loyalty explains the effort to groom first her son Sanjay and now her son Rajiv to succeed her, all the while, denying that she is doing it, since that would contradict her genuinely felt democratic values which among other things link her to her father.

"Her values were democratic, her instincts authoritarian," according to Nandy. It is a mistake to treat her as a hypocritical and cynical dictator dressed up as a democratic politician. The freely expressed support of the Indian people is clearly important to her, even while she interprets opposition and

criticism as the result of the malicious twisting of the truth by the privileged members of the intelligentsia, particularly as represented in the press. She has not pursued power for its own sake, and adopts a simple style while in power. She lives in a modest home, does not use a Mercedes Benz, has no lavishly appointed Prime Ministerial retreat (indeed she doesn't seem to take holidays of more than a day or two at a time), nor has she "bought" herself huge portions of India's land or business -- Indians clearly believe that she serves her country, not herself.

Mrs. Gandhi sees herself as a champion of India's poor masses, a representative more authentic than those leaders of the opposition who "represent" only parts of the country: a single region, the urban middle classes, organized labor, the "middle peasants." Her policies and ideology are not coherently developed, drawn explicitly from one political philosophy or the other, though she makes use of socialist ideas. It is revealing that she labelled the document on which almost all her social and economic policies for the last decade have been based, her "stray thoughts." She is committed to social justice, to the economic betterment of India's citizens, and above all to India's continued existence as a united nation, but she is not committed to any particular means of achieving those ends. Indeed, she has been prepared, as during the Emergency, to use authoritarian tactics, and she tends to interpret opposition to the means she has chosen -- when judges declare a certain law unconstitutional, for example -- as opposition to the goals, so that

those who criticize her policy become more than opponents, they are enemies.

Foreign policy has by and large not been an area of disagreement in Indian politics: self-reliance, non-alignment, major power aspirations are not disputed by opposition leaders. Nothing infuriates Mrs. Gandhi more than the assertion that India has followed Soviet "dictates" or that the Soviet Union or any other power, through threats, persuasion or bribery with aid can in some way "determine" what India will do. Mrs. Gandhi has no illusions about how other countries determine their foreign policy. As she points out:

> How many countries, whom we call friendly, would really be able to help (us in a war)? The fact is that India, today, has about as many friends as any other country. How we keep our friends does not depend merely on how we act, but also on what happens to be their national interests at any given time. If it is in their interest to be friendly, they will do so, but, if they believe their national interest lies elsewhere, they will not be our friends no matter what we do.

Alliances as well as friendship in the international arena are purely pragmatic: "courage and conviction must be allied to an astute, hardheaded analysis of international affairs and events. At all times this analysis has to be devoid of emotion or sentiment."

There is no doubt that Prime Minister Gandhi has followed these maxims. Though she -- and most Indians -- are grateful for the support the USSR has given to India over the years, she does not seem to translate that into a "loyalty" similar to that she expects from her political followers in domestic politics. Yet she is quick to perceive "slights" to India's honor and dignity, in particular the "wrong image" of India that is projected in the West. She blames the media for this, but at the same time suggests that these media-disseminated "slights" are inspired by governments retaliating in this fashion for their inability to get Indian policies changed to their liking.

Mrs. Gandhi seems to want to be admired and judged to be doing the right thing by all but a handful who are, as the privileged or one exploiting, justly harmed by her policies. (As Nandy writes: "it was not enough even if most newspapers supported her; she felt threatened by the few which were critical. She was not content if most intellectuals sang her praises; she wondered why all of them did not.") Similarly, she insists that India will not be swayed by judgments and opposition on the part of foreign countries, and yet she is acutely aware of what foreigners say about her and about India. (Indian journalists have almost never been able to get private interviews with her, while foreigners literally by the dozens have been accommodated.) At times it seems that she reads the statements of foreign leaders, and even press reports, like auguries, which should be minutely interpreted to discover meanings behing meanings behind the words used.

She herself guards against misinterpretation by making vague assertions, refusing to name "outside powers" who have on occasion attempted, she claims, to "destabilize" her government. The difficulties in communication some have experienced with her are not entirely her fault; Americans, in particular, seem to be constantly waiting to get the opportunity to be outraged by a statement which reveals the realpolitik underlying what is immediately seen as Indian pious posturing.

Indira Gandhi's personality and political history are not likely to influence very much the content or even style of her talks with President Reagan and other American leaders. The constraints implicit in the basic structure of the relations between the U.S. and India, which depends almost entirely on the national interests of the two countries rather than the history of interactions between them, are what count. Mrs. Gandhi is, within that context, an eloquent and representative voice of India.

FACT SHEET ON ISSUES IN INDO-U.S. RELATIONS, JULY, 1982*

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

India's relationship with the Soviet Union, begun by Nehru in the mid-1950's, has been a constant source of irritation to Indo-U.S. relations for the past two and a half decades. Indo-Soviet ties reached a crucial moment in 1971 when India, partly in response to the Bangladesh crisis, signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty's primary result was to increase the level of Soviet arms transferred to India, largely on concessional terms. The treaty also defines a wide area of consultation and coordination in defence policies, but stops short of automatic mutual defence provisions. Since 1971 India has tended to play down the significance of the treaty.

India has received a large amount of military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, including coproduction arrangements in arms manufacturing. Most recently, India concluded a $1.63 billion arms deal with the Soviets in 1980. Out of $2.2 billion in arms received by India between 1975 and 1979, $1.8 billion were from the Soviet Union. India has from time to time taken stands on international issues that closely parallel Soviet positions.

*Prepared by the Media Relations Program of The Asia Society for briefings in conjunction with the visit of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India to the United States, July 28-August 3, 1982

One example is the Indian recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea in 1980. However, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan some friction has appeared in the Indo-Soviet relationship. This is evidenced by India's downplaying of the 1981 anniversary of the Indo-Soviet treaty, India's annoyance at the March 1982 visit of a large, high-level Soviet military delegation, Mrs. Gandhi's apparent reluctance to travel to Moscow since her return to power, and finally, India's demonstrated intention to diversify its foreign sources of military equipment.

AFGHANISTAN

India was alone among non-Soviet bloc nations in abstaining from voting on U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. India's abstention and statement to the General Assembly during the emergency session of the General Assembly in February 1980 was particularly resented in the U.S. India's explanation for abstaining was that the U.S. resolution would only serve to exacerbate tensions surrounding Afghanistan, and that a vote for the resolution would prevent India from playing a mediating role in the crisis. In the early months after the invasion Mrs. Gandhi seemed to defend Soviet actions in Afghanistan in her public statements on the topic.

Recently the Government of India seems to have become impatient with the Soviet position on Afghanistan, but still urges that only a political settlement involving all parties to the dispute will solve the problem. In addition, India warns that U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance will cause further deterioration of the Afghan and regional situation.

ARMS TO PAKISTAN

In 1954 the U.S. decided to arm Pakistan as part of its containment of communism policy. India protested the decision, claiming that it upset the natural balance of forces on the subcontinent. India also claimed that the U.S. was not giving proper consideration to India's security needs.

In 1959 the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship was strengthened by an agreement which committed the U.S. to assist Pakistan in the event of aggression by a communist power. In 1965 Pakistan attacked India using U.S.supplied tanks. India was angered by the failure of the U.S. to take immediate action to restrain Pakistan. However, U.S. military assistance to Pakistan was significantly diminished after the 1965 war. The relationship was further disrupted by the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war; and Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO in 1972.

Events in Afghanistan and southwest Asia in 1979 have led the U.S. to revitalize its security relationship with Pakistan. President Carter offered to revive arms transfers to Pakistan immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1982 the Reagan administration approved a five year, $3.2 billion military and economic assistance program to Pakistan, and the immediate sale of two squadrons of high-performance F-16 aircraft.

The Indian response to U.S. arms aid offers to Pakistan has been angry. Three primary Indian objections are: 1) U.S. military assistance will encourage an arms race on the subcontinent; 2) the Pakistan-U.S. military relationship increases superpower involvement in west Asia, possibly exacerbating the situation in Afghanistan; 3) providing U.S. F-16's to Pakistan enhances the threat of Pakistan attacking sensitive targets in India.

Despite increased tensions due to the armaments issue, India and Pakistan have recently engaged in a sporadic discussion of a possible no-war pact and other measures to reduce tensions.

NUCLEAR

India has a major nuclear energy program, including three operational power facilities, five research reactors, and the demonstrated ability to convert nuclear technology and materials into explosive devices. Nuclear power has been both a point of cooperation and disagreement in Indo-U.S. relations.

An important example is the Tarapur nuclear power facility, built by the U.S. as India's first nuclear power plant. Low enriched uranium fuel was to be provided for the facility by the U.S. according to an agreement signed by both states in 1963.

In May 1974 India detonated a nuclear device. In 1978, partially in response to the explosion, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which requires that countries receiving U.S. nuclear exports have all their nuclear activities under international safeguards at the time of export. Although India has accepted safeguards for Tarapur and other foreign supplied facilities, India refuses to allow international inspection of installations built without external help. As a result the U.S. has delayed and withheld shipments of fuel to Tarapur under the provisions of the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The last two shipments were approved by Congress in September of 1980. One of the approved shipments was sent, the other has been withheld.

The Tarapur fuel issue has been a strong irritant to Indo-U.S. relations since 1978. Negotiations continue, with the intention of terminating the agreement. The U.S. insists that safeguards should apply even after termination of the agreement; India maintains that on termination Tarapur's more than 200 tons of spent fuel is under India's exclusive control. Recently there have been unilateral assurances from Delhi indicating that spent fuel will not be used for military purposes.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

India is one of the world's largest recipients of post World War II economic assistance. However, economic aid plays a relatively modest role in the

Indian economy. Aid, which amounted to an estimated $2 per capita in 1981, is currently only 10 percent of India's capital development budget. Nevertheless, aid is critical in balancing India's external accounts.

Before 1971 India was a major recipient of U.S. development assistance. U.S. aid was halted during the 1971 war, not to be reestablished until 1978. More important to India than U.S. bilateral economic assistance (now only approximately 5-6 percent of India's aid receipts) is U.S. policy in multinational financial and development institutions. Until last year India received 40 percent of the World Bank (IDA) concessional loans. Because the U.S. contributes about 25 percent of the IDA's program budget and with the Reagan administration's reduced contribution to IDA in 1981, India's share of IDA loans in 1982-83 will be reduced to 35 percent.

The Reagan administration has indicated its disapproval of the Indian mixed economy by abstaining from the vote which granted India a $5.7 billion loan from the IMF in 1981. The U.S. explaination of the abstention is that the loan was for development rather than balance of payments purposes, and that conditions of the loan were not stringent enough.

To offset diminished financial flows from official sources India has since the late 1970's begun to use private sources of capital, such as the Eurocurrency markets and foreign industrial collaborations, more extensively.

However, India will continue to need concessional sources of funds, especially in light of reductions in India's share of IDA resources.

CHINA

Sino-Indian relations have been acrimonious for much of the period following the chinese attach on India in 1962. In recent years, however, Sino-Indian relations have improved. In 1978 Prime Minister Gandhi normalized relations with China, and opened an dialogue on a number of issues which continues until the present. Most importantly, several high level discussions have occurred on the very salient border issue.

Nevertheless, India is approaching relations with China cautiously. First, Indian public opinion would not tolorate a settlement of the border issue that did not include significant concessions by China. Second, Indian distrust of China was revived by the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February, 1979, which the Chinese compared to the earlier Chinese attack on India. Third, India is apprehensive about future U.S. military relations with China, and the possibility of the U.S. providing sophisticated military equipment to China in particular.

THE INDIAN OCEAN

In keeping with India's insistence that security in the Indian Ocean region be the responsibility of the states in the region, India has long opposed American use of Diego Garcia and superpower military presence in the Indian Ocean. India has supported U.N. initiatives to declare the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace." The Carter administration expressed interest in limiting superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean and began negotiations on demilitarization with the Soviet Union in 1977. Subsequent developments in the region compelled Carter to reverse U.S. policy, moving instead towards a strengthened military presence in the Indian Ocean. This reversal led to heightened Indian criticism in 1979 and 1980. Recently India seems to have muted its public criticism of the U.S. on this issue.

NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES

As a founding member of both the nonaligned movement and the Group of 77 developing nations India has long played a leading role in international fora concerned with both economic and political matters. Recently at the Global Summit held in Cancun, Mexico in October, 1981, India argued for strengthened multilateral financial institutions, liberalized trade regimes and an appreciation by the West of the role of the public sector in mixed and socialist economics. India has also recently demonstrated her desire

to play a leading role by hosting a conference of nations of the "South" in New Delhi in February, 1982. Generally, however, despite her leading role, India has tended to take relatively moderate positions in the non-aligned movement and in fora concerned with North-South issues.

PARTIAL LISTING OF DIPLOMATIC VISITS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S.

Date	Person and Place	Purpose/Result
Feb. 28, 1947	Asaf Ali, Ambassador to U.S., in Washington	President Truman receives first Indian Ambassador. Says U.S. will aid in economic development of a democratic India.
Oct. 13-15, 1949	P.M. Nehru, in Washington	Nehru visits U.S. as guest of President Truman. Addresses U.S. Congress. Declares that an Asian pact similar to NATO is premature.
May 17-28, 1953	Secretary of State Dulles, in India	Discusses India's neutrality with Nehru.
Nov. 29-Dec. 2, 1953	Vice President Nixon, in India	Nixon meets with Nehru on U.S. encirclement of Russia and U.S. action in Korea.
Dec. 16-20, 1956	P.M. Nehru, in U.S.	P.M. Nehru and President Eisenhower issue a joint communique expressing their broad areas of agreement.
Dec. 9-15, 1959	President Eisenhower, in India	As part of his Asian tour Eisenhower meets with Nehru.
Sept. 26, 1960	P.M. Nehru, in U.S.	Nehru and Eisenhower meet in New York as part of Eisenhower's "personal diplomacy" effort.
May 18-19, 1961	Vice President Johnson, in India	Meets with Nehru. Joint communique on what was described as a forthcoming "major attack" on Indian poverty and illness by the U.S.
Nov 5-14, 1961	P.M. Nehru, in U.S.	Nehru meets with President Kennedy.
April 16-20, 1965	P.M. Shastri cancels trip to U.S.	Shastri cancelled proposed visit after President Johnson postponed it, probably due to Indian criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy.
Mar. 28-29, 1966	P.M. Gandhi, in U.S.	Meets with President Johnson and discusses need for food aid and the Vietnam War.
July 31-Aug 1, 1969	President Nixon, in India	Nixon and Gandhi confer on Vietnam.

Date	Person and Place	Purpose/Result
July 8, 1971	Secretary of State Kissinger, in India	Kissinger (en route to Pakistan and China) discusses Bangladesh crisis with Gandhi.
Nov. 4-6, 1971	P.M. Gandhi, in U.S.	Meets with President Nixon to discuss the Indo-Pakistani crisis.
Oct. 29, 1974	Secretary of State Kissinger, in India	Meets with P.M. Gandhi. Joint statement on nuclear weapons and the world food shortage. Kissinger signs an agreement establishing and Indo-U.S. Commission for technical, educational and cultural cooperation.
Feb. 26, 1975	Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan cancels trip to U.S.	Cancellation of trip due to U.S. ending arms prohibition to Pakistan. Trip had been the first meeting of Indian-U.S. joint commission.
Jan. 1-3, 1978	President Carter, in India	Carter addresses India's Parliament, discussing the triumph of democracy in both countries. P.M. Desai and Carter issue a joint declaration committing both nations to reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
June 13-14, 1978	P.M. Desai, in U.S.	Desai and Carter issue a joint communique stating that there had been significant improvements in relations between the two countries in the last 2 years.
Jan. 31, 1980	Former Secretary of Defense Clifford, in India	Clifford sent by President Carter to reassure India about U.S. plans to resume aid to Pakistan. Meets with P.M. Gandhi.
Aug. 24-27, 1981	U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Kirkpatrick, in India	Kirkpatrick states publicly that arms to Pakistan is a cornerstone of President Reagan's policies.
Oct. 22-23, 1981	P.M. Gandhi and President Reagan, in Cancun, Mexico	The two heads of state meet for the first time.
July 27-Aug. 3, 1982	P.M. Gandhi, in U.S.	Goodwill visit results in generally improved atmosphere in Indo-U.S. relations and apparent breakthrough on nuclear fuel issue.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE LIFE OF INDIRA GANDHI

Date	Event
Nov. 19, 1917	Born, only child of Jawaharlal Nehru.
1929	Created Vanar Sena (Monkey Brigade), a children's organization whose 6000 members assisted the Congress Party by running messages, sewing national flags, etc.
1936	Entered Somerville College, Oxford University. There she met again the man who would later be her husband, Feroze Gandhi, and became close friends with Krishna Menon, who later became Minister of Defense in her father's cabinet.
1936	Joined the Congress Party.
Feb. 1942	Married Feroze Gandhi, after her father's initial misgivings were overcome.
1947-1964	Served as her father's official hostess. Travelled with him extensively, meeting Winston Churchill, Charles DeGaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, and other important figures.
1955	Served as a member of the Congress Party Working Committee. She was later elected to serve on the powerful 11-member Central Election Board.
1959-1960	Elected President of the Congress Party. She resigned after one year because of ill health.
Sept. 1960	Husband, Feroze, dies, leaving Indira with two sons, Sanjay and Rajiv. Feroze Gandhi had been an important independent Member of Parliament.
1962	After the Chinese border attack, Gandhi served as the Chairman for the Citizens Central Council, where she organized civil defense efforts.
June 9, 1964	Became Minister of Information and Broadcasting in the Cabinet of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's successor as Prime Minister.
Jan. 24, 1966	Gandhi becomes Prime Minister following the death of Shastri.
1967	The Congress Party maintains a majority in the 1967 general elections, but it loses control of half of the state legislatures.
July 1969	Growing division between conservative elements in the Congress Party and younger, left-leaning followers of Mrs. Gandhi comes to a head over Mrs. Gandhi's nationalization of 14 major banks. The division was formalized into Mrs. Gandhi's faction, Congress (R), and the Congress (O). Mrs. Gandhi retains post of Prime Minister.

March 1971	Mrs. Gandhi calls a general election one year ahead of schedule. The election results in a two-thirds majority for her party.
Dec. 1971	India-Pakistan war ends Bangladesh crisis.
Feb. 24, 1972	State elections put Mrs. Gandhi's party into an even more powerful position.
June 12, 1975	Mrs. Gandhi is convicted by Allahabad High Court of malpractices in the conduct of the 1971 elections. She is barred from holding office for six years. Mrs. Gandhi refuses to resign pending appeal of the ruling.
June 25, 1975	Mrs. Gandhi declares a national state of emergency.
Aug. 9, 1975	Constitutional amendment passes in Parliament which has the effect of nullifying the ruling by the Allahabad High Court.
March 22, 1977	Mrs. Gandhi and many of her most loyal colleagues are defeated in an election which she had called. This precipitated the formation of the Janata government, with Moraji Desai as Prime Minister.
Oct. 3, 1977	Mrs. Gandhi is arrested on charges of official corruption. She is released after one day.
Dec. 27, 1977	Congress Party Executive Committee splits, beginning the Congress (I) or Congress (Indira) Party.
Nov. 5, 1978	Mrs. Gandhi is reelected to parliament, a victory for both her and her party.
Dec. 19, 1978	Lower House of Parliament finds Mrs. Gandhi guilty on several counts, including obstruction of government officials. Mrs. Gandhi is expelled from the Lower House and sentenced to a brief term in jail.
Jan. 3-6, 1980	Congress (I) Party is swept to victory in national elections. Mrs. Gandhi resumes post as Prime Minister.
June 23, 1980	Son, Sanjay, is killed in a plane crash.
Jan. 15, 1981	Mrs. Gandhi is cleared in the two court cases that remained.
June 15, 1981	Son, Rajiv, is elected to parliament.

INDIA: SELECTED INDICATORS OF CHANGE, 1950-1980

Indicator	1950	1960	1970	1980[b]
Per capita net national product at 1970-71 prices (in rupees)	466	532	633	712
Agricultural production index (1960=100)	70	100	128	149
Industrial production index (1960=100)	55	100	186	279
Consumer price index (1970=100)	44	54	100	195
Imports				
1) in billions of constant 1970 dollars	2.4	3.9	2.5	3.1
2) U.S. share (percent)	18	16	14	12
Exports				
1) in billions of constant 1970 dollars	2.5	2.6	2.2	---
2) U.S. share (percent)	19	16	14	12
India's share of the total value of world exports (percent)	2.1	1.2	0.7	0.4
Government revenue as a percent of net national product	7	11	14[a]	---
Defense expenditure				
1) as a percent of GNP	---	1.9	3.0	3.0
2) as a percent of central government expenditure	---	---	19	17
Life expectancy at birth	(1941-1950)	(1951-1960)	(1961-1970)	(1971-1980)
1) males	32.4	41.9	46.4	52.0
2) females	31.7	40.6	44.7	
U.S. aid (grants+loans) (in billions of dollars)		(1946-1961)	(1962-1971)	(1971-1980)
		2.7	6.1	1.6

[a] 1968-69 figures [b] some figures are for 1978 or 1979

INDIA: SELECTED INDICATORS OF CHANGE

SUPPLEMENT

Indicator	1950	1960	1970	1980
Electricity generation (billion Kilowatt hours/year)	—	17	56	103
Annual production of				
Coal (Mn metric tonnes)	32.8	55.7	75.8	107.0
Pig iron (Mn metric tonnes)	1.6	4.3	7.0	8.6
Cement (Mn metric tonnes)	2.7	7.9	14.4	18.4
Fertilizer ('000 metric tonnes)	18.0	150.0	1,059.0	3,004.0
Machine tools (Mn rupees value)	3.0	70.0	430.0	2,004.0
Motorcycles & scooters (thousands)	0.0	19.4	97.0	317.0
Bicycles (millions)	0.1	1.1	2.0	4.1
Radio receivers (millions)	0.1	0.3	1.7	1.9
Irrigated area (million hectares)	23	25	38	52
Percent of primary school age children in primary school	—	63	—	84
Debt service ratio (debt repayments as a percent of exports)	—	—	22%	10%[b]
Exports				
Percent share of "traditional" items (jute, tea, cotton textiles)	—	48	27	12[a]
Percent share of engineering goods	—	1	8	12[a]
Principal imports; share of total value		(1965-66)		
1) consumer goods (includes food)		23	13	1[a]
2) raw material and intermediate manufactures		35	55	72[a]
(includes petroleum:)		(5)	(8)	(25)
3) capital goods		36	25	19[a]

[a] 1978 figure [b] 1977

INDIA COMPARED: SELECTED INDICATORS

Indicator	INDIA	Indonesia	Korea	Brazil	U.S.
Per capita gross national product (1978)	$180	$360	$1,160	$1,570	$9,590
Per capita annual foreign aid (loan+grant) commitment (1971-73)	$4.07	$7.56	$22.40	—	—
Annual inflation rate (1970-78)	8.2%	20.0%	19.3%	30.3%	6.8%
Per capita daily food consumption (calories, 1977)	2,021	2,117	2,785	2,562	3,576
Population per physician (1977)	5,800	14,580	1,960	1,700	580
Income distribution: percent share of national income received by	(1964-65)		(1976)	(1972)	(1972)
1) bottom 20% households	6.7%	—	5.7%	2.0%	4.5%
2) top 20% households	48.9%	—	45.3%	66.6%	42.8%

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

ON

INDIA AND INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS

The following are individuals and institutions that specialize in Indian affairs and/or Indo-American relations. This is not an exhaustive listing of the sizable body of individual and institutional expertise across the United States, but it is instead a cross-section of the resources available.

INDIVIDUALS	Office/Department Phone	Special focus/ background
Professor Mary Carras Department of Political Science Rutgers University -- New Brunswick	(609) 757-6084	Author: Indira Gandhi in the Crucible of Leadership; a Political Biography (1979)
Professor Stephen P. Cohen Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign	(217) 333-3880	South Asia security issues
Professor Francine Frankel Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania	(215) 243-7641	Indian political economy
Ambassador Robert F. Goheen President Emeritus Princeton University	(609) 924-4713	Former ambassador to India
Mr. Selig Harrison Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	(212) 572-8213	South Asian international relations
Dr. John Mellor Director International Food Policy Research Institute	(202) 862-5600	Indian economy and economic relations; former chief economist, U.S. A.I.D.
Professor Leo Rose Department of Political Science University of California-- Berkeley	(415) 642-6323	India-U.S. relations
Professor George Rosen Department of Economics University of Illinois at Chicago Circle	(312) 996-2684	Indian economy

INDIVIDUALS (cont'd)	Office/Department Phone	Special focus/ background
Professor Susanne H. Rudolph Professor Lloyd I. Rudolph Department of Political Science University of Chicago	(312) 753-4337 (312) 753-4331	Indian politics; India-U.S. relations
Professor Myron Weiner Department of Political Science M.I.T.	(617) 253-6627	Indian politics

INSTITUTIONS

Organization:	Contact:
Southern Asian Institute Columbia University 1128 International Affairs Building 420 West 118th Street New York, NY 10027 212-280-4662	Dr. Morton Klass Director
Center for South and South East Asian Studies University of California at Berkeley 260 Stepehens Hall Berkeley, CA 94720 415-642-3609	Dr. Jyotirindra Das Gupta Director
Committee on South Asian Studies University of Chicago Foster 214 1130 East 59th Street Chicago, IL 60637 312-962-8637	Dr. Frank Reynolds Chairman
Department of South Asian Regional Studies University of Pennsylvania 820 Williams Hall Philadelphia, PA 19104 215-898-7475	Dr. Rosane Rocher Director
Asian Studies Department University of Texas at Austin Student Services Building 4.126 Austin, TX 78712 512-471-5811	Dr. Thomas Jannuzzi Director
South Asian Studies University of Wisconsin 1242 Van Hise Madison, WI 53706 608-262-3012	Dr. V. Naranaya Rao Chairman and Director
India, Nepal, Sri Lanka Office United States Department of State Room 5251 2201 C Street Washington, DC 20520 202-632-2141	Howard B. Schaffer Director

INSTITUTIONS (cont'd)

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