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ABSTRACT

A great deal of research has been done in the area of "compliance-message" tactics and strategies, but this research has not produced a coherent framework for studying this interpersonal communication process. Based on six axioms concerning the nature of communication behavior in general and on one postulate and five theorems defining the interpersonal persuasion process, such a framework was created and partially tested in a study involving 104 college students. The study investigated whether (1) clusters of tactics constituting strategies could be identified on the basis of the content of the tactics, (2) tactics to resist persuasion could be differentiated from those to persuade on the basis of content, (3) messages identified theoretically as nontactical could be distinguished from tactical statements on the basis of content, and (4) general rules concerning interpersonal persuasion could be discerned from the judgments respondents made concerning tactics. The subjects sorted slips of paper containing statements corresponding to interpersonal persuasion tactics into at least 3 and not more than 11 piles based on the similarity of the content of the statements. Cluster analysis produced nine clusters and three centroids from the responses, all significant. Results indicated that there is a logic underlying the content of interpersonal persuasion tactics that is recognizable by those who use them and that tactics to resist persuasion and those to persuade can be differentiated, as can tactical and nontactical messages. (FL)

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INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION I:

Formulation and First Test of a Rules-Based Theory¹

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ABSTRACT

During the past few years, a great deal of research has been done in the area of "compliance-message" tactics and strategies. Although researchers have demonstrated relationships between the use of tactics and such variables as situation, relationship, gender, age, and cognitive complexity, no theoretical framework exists for incorporating different findings into a coherent perspective on this process. The purpose of this paper was to develop a theoretical framework in which to view "compliance-message" studies, and to provide a partial test of the framework. The study proposes an axiomatic, rules-based theory of interpersonal persuasion, and tests assumptions concerning the use of tactics within interpersonal persuasion episode. Three rules concerning the use of tactics in episodes were discovered, and recommendations for future research were proposed.

From the writings of Aristotle to popular advice proclaiming the "all-hits, no-misses way to get what you want," [2] tactics and strategies effective in influencing the behavior of others continue to arouse both academic and general interest. Beyond its ability to generate interest, however, the art of persuasion constitutes an important social skill, as Weinstein notes:

...if the socialization process is defined as equipping individuals to function as participating members of society, no set of skills (except the prerequisite linguistic ones), is as essential to participating in society as the skills enabling people to get others to think, feel, or do what they want them to do. [3]

Although a great deal of advice concerning persuasion has been generated throughout the years, the focus here is on a body of research initiated by Marwell and Schmitt. [4] Inspired by the work of French and Raven, [5] Etzioni, [6] Kelman, [7] and Parsons [8] in the areas of power and influence, Marwell and Schmitt developed a list of sixteen persuasion techniques that could be used in face-to-face influence situations. Since the publication of their work, authors have used, added to, or deleted from the techniques in the Marwell and Schmitt typology, in efforts to determine the impact of such variables as situation, relationship, cognitive complexity, communication apprehension, age, and gender on the choice of persuasion techniques. Far from Bowers' [9] complaint that theorists focusing on strategic behaviors in persuasion and conflict situations had done little toward identifying techniques beyond threats or promises, researchers in interpersonal persuasion have identified nearly fifty unique techniques which persuaders or persuadees may use (see Table One).

The epistemic roots of interpersonal persuasion are found in concepts of powers, although researchers in persuasion, [10] conflict, [11] and argument [12] have contributed to the understanding of persuasion techniques. As Seibold and Thomas note, the area of interpersonal persuasion represents a blending of other foci in communication, and has been researched under the rubric of "compliance-gaining message studies." [13]

Despite the seemingly productive marriage of persuasion and interpersonal communication, "compliance-message" research (hereafter referred to as interpersonal persuasion) has suffered from three major shortcomings. First, research in interpersonal persuasion has suffered from a lack of identity with any particular theoretic perspective. While some concepts of interpersonal communication have been applied to interpersonal persuasion situations--e.g., the impact of relational development on persuasion technique choice--the findings in interpersonal persuasion research have not been related back to theories of interpersonal communication. Research tends to be variable-oriented, with findings from different authors often unrelated and occasionally contradictory. No theoretic assumptions or framework exist for reconciling contradictory findings on the impact of different variables on technique selection.

Furthermore, this area lacks a vocabulary which would enable researchers to compare results more easily. For example, the words "strategy" and "tactic" are used by conflict researchers to refer to two different entities. King elaborates the issue:

A strategy is a general plan of action designed by the influencer to accomplish specific goals. For example, if you wished to move the proverbial obstinate mule, legend has it that you have two available strategies: the carrot or the stick . . . Once a particular strategy has been selected, specific tactics are developed to implement the general plan to strategy, e.g., how hard to hit the mule with the stick, or how far in front of the mule to place the carrot. [14]

In interpersonal persuasion research, "tactic" and "strategy" are used interchangeably and often refer to the same entity within a single study. Marwell and Schmitt refer to their generated messages as "techniques"; Miller et al. [15] call the same messages "strategies." Later research, e.g., McLaughlin et al., [16] refers to the cluster of messages as "strategy" and the specific messages as "tactics." Clearly, part of building a theory to account for behavior in interpersonal persuasion situations would be the construction of a vocabulary which could clarify and tie together the conclusions of research in the area.

A second major shortcoming of interpersonal persuasion research concerns the relationships of tactics to strategies. Despite repeated research, the five typologies of "compliance-gaining" and two typologies of "compliance-resisting" techniques developed thus far have produced different clusters of messages. There appear to be three reasons for this: (1) Messages for the cluster analysis have been generated in different ways, either deductively, from past research, or inductively, by having respondents generate messages, or by a combination of the two methods. Even within similar methods, however, clusters of messages differ. [17]. (2) Messages for the cluster analysis have always been situation bound. Respondents have been exposed to persuasion messages (or techniques) only as they relate to a hypothetical situation. Marwell and Schmitt note the danger in this:

Within each situation any given technique may be poorly or well represented by our example and thus provide a more or less accurate description of the respondent's tendency to use the technique. [18]

Thus, clusters of interpersonal persuasion techniques exist only in regard to situations, and differ across situations. Further, a message may make less sense to a respondent in one situation than in another. (3) Messages have always been clustered on the basis of their likelihood of being used in a particular situation. Rather than finding clusters of messages that have been generated on the basis of what they mean in relationship to one another, clusters have been generated in terms of the messages' meaning for a situation. Not only are clusters situation-bound, then; clusters may not reflect a logic in content which might appear had they been generated on the basis of their meaning.

A final shortcoming in interpersonal persuasion research is the confusion concerning the relationship of "compliance-gaining" messages to "compliance-resisting" messages. McLaughlin et al. argue that "compliance-resisting" messages may be simply a special case of the more general of "compliance-gaining" messages; i.e., they are not a unique set of messages. Hazelton, Holdridge and Liska differ:

In contrast, we see two distinct characteristics of compliance-resisting situations which suggest they may be conceptualized, at least initially, as unique and not a special case of compliance-gaining. First, compliance resisting is a response behavior and

presumes a prior communication between participants. The study of compliance gaining does not necessitate such an assumption. Second, there are options available to the resister which are not likely to be used by the person gaining compliance. [19]

There are three reasons why Hazelton et al.'s conclusion is as yet unwarranted. First, examination of Table One reveals messages that are common to both "compliance-gaining" and "compliance-resisting" typologies. While there may be some options open to the resister that are not open to the persuader, no exclusive set of resistance messages have been found for resisters of persuasion to date.

Second, Hazelton, et al.'s argument assumes a linear notion of the influence situation; i.e., A sends message M-a to B, and B sends message M-b back to A. The assumption is that the set of messages M-a does not overlap the set of messages M-b. Yet it is entirely possible for person A, originally perceived as the persuader, to become a persuadee in the course of an interpersonal influence situation. The roles of persuader and persuadee are not fixed--they fluctuate. For example, consider a situation in which person A frequently borrows money from person B. A again wants to borrow money, and approaches B to persuade B to lend A money. B may not only resist the persuasion attempt, but may turn the event around by trying to persuade A that borrowing money is wrong, or that A should manage money better, etc. Further, the event may again turn as A acknowledges B's right to influence A, but again renews the persuasion attempt. Although B is initially perceived as the persuadee, at some point in the episode B becomes a persuader. Thus, a variety of communicative options are open to both participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode, depending upon the enactment.

Finally, differences between "compliance-gaining" and "compliance-resisting" messages are largely artifactual. Even where messages have been generated by the respondents, they have always been as the respondent saw himself or herself as a persuader or a persuadee. Messages have not been generated or studied dyadically--i.e., by asking respondents what both people can say in the episode, or better yet, by observation of actual influence attempts. If messages to persuade are inherently different from messages to resist persuasion, they should be differentiated in cluster analysis which uses content as the organizing scheme.

In summary, three shortcomings exist in interpersonal persuasion research: lack of a theoretical framework, lack of a clear relationship of tactics to strategies, and confusion concerning the distinction between tactics used to persuade and tactics used to resist persuasion. This study is designed to alleviate the shortcomings by proposing a theoretical framework for studying interpersonal persuasion, provide a test of the framework, and clarify relationships between different tactics and their strategies.

Domain of Interpersonal Persuasion Research

The defining characteristic of interpersonal persuasion research has been its focus on the identification of various messages people use to induce cooperation in another person or to resist such attempts. Research in this area has relied upon an "expanded view of persuasion" [20] which acknowledges the interdependence of the participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode. Persuasion, as Reardon notes

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... is not something one person does to another. It is a means by which persons assist each other in the shaping of their private and shared versions of reality.[21]

Although the term "interpersonal persuasion" is somewhat problematic in that it may connote an outdated notion of the interpersonal communication process (two people in face-to-face interaction), the term refers to communication events ranging along an interpersonal-noninterpersonal continuum, as Miller suggested for interpersonal communication episodes. The interpersonal-noninterpersonal continuum is shown in the variety of tactics and strategies available to participants in interpersonal persuasion episodes. While no exclusive set of tactics have been identified for interpersonal versus noninterpersonal episodes, there are some tactics which are more effective in interpersonal contexts than non-interpersonal contexts. For example, the tactic "interpersonal cost," in which the participant argues that cooperation (or lack of it) will be harmful to the relationship, would be far more effective in an established relationship than in a noninterpersonal one.

The definition of interpersonal persuasion offered here is adapted from Reardon's work on persuasion. She argues that persuasion occurs when a threat to goals is observed and when the threat is sufficiently important to warrant the expenditure of effort involved in persuasion. Further, she argues that persuasion is something people do with one another, and interpersonal persuasion

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... is an attempt to bring the rules of the other interactant(s) in line with one's own. As such, it is a form of coordinated management of meaning, but it's original goal is to obtain that coordination without having to relinquish or accommodate the persuader's own rule set.[22]

Two characteristics of Reardon's definition should be expanded. First, there may not be a threat to goals. For example, consider the situation where A wants to borrow money from B. There is no threat to A's goals necessarily (unless B refuses to lend the money), but it is nonetheless persuasion. A better way of defining the generating force for interpersonal persuasion episodes would be to say that there is a threat to A's goals or that A's goals are dependent upon B's cooperation. Second, the definition states that interpersonal persuasion is an attempt to bring the rules of the other interactant(s) in line with one's own. It may be that the rules are the same for all interactants, in which case persuasion might also be the process of determining which rules apply to the situation. In the previous example, both A and B might share similar rules concerning borrowing money in general, but the persuasion attempt may be an effort to determine if there are other rules which supercede rules governing the borrowing of money (e.g., extreme need). In either case, the interpersonal persuasion process is one in which participants will negotiate appropriate rules for behavior.

Interpersonal persuasion is therefore: (1) a conscious endeavor; (2) a goal-directed endeavor; (3) a choice-laden activity; (4) characterized by mutual influence and interdependence; (5) characterized by efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome; and (6) guided by rules which are both imposed upon (relationship extrinsic) and negotiated by (relationship intrinsic) by the participants. Additionally, interpersonal persuasion is assumed to be episodic, following phasic development: initiation, rule definition, rule confirmation, strategic development, and termination:[23]

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A Vocabulary of Interpersonal Persuasion

This section will define some terms crucial to the development of a theory of interpersonal persuasion. The terms "A" and "B" will refer to participants originally (i.e., at the beginning of an episode) defined as the persuader and the persuadee, respectively.

Episodes: stereotypical interaction sequences which occur within a cultural environment. [24] They are defined by both societal and individual expectations, and participants can distinguish them on the basis of symbolic, temporal, or physical boundaries. What constitutes an episode is defined by the cultural milieu, and participants recognize the norms, rules, and expectations that apply to episodes. For example, in the instance where A wishes to borrow money from B, A is aware, at least implicitly, that there are certain times and places where it is best to make the request, and certain times, places, and methods that are not likely to be effective in making the request. An episode begins when A initiates the request, and ends when the request is met, denied or modified.

In his initial work on the coordinated management of meaning, Pearce argued that there were three types of episodes in communication encounters. [25] Episode-1 consists of culturally sanctioned patterns of meaning and behavior, and it exists independently of any particular individual or dyad. Episode-2 exists in the mind of the individual--it is the rules governing interpersonal persuasion which the individual has become aware of through past experience. Finally, Episode-3 consists of the created episode when two people engage in communication. Episode-3 is the jointly produced interpretation of a particular communication event. Thus, when people communicate, Episode -1 provides a repertoire of behavior, from which the individuals select an Episode-2 for the particular situation, and then enact an Episode-3 with the other person.

Cronen, Pearce and Snavely have identified the forms which an Episode-3 may take: enigmatic episodes (the actors know a pattern exists but cannot interpret it), alienating episodes (the actors know what is happening and how to act, but actions seem inconsistent with self-concept), coordinated conversation (actors perceive a developing pattern under their control), positive spirals (each act by one person leads to a more favorable response from the other), perfunctory rituals (the rules leave little latitude for behavior and the episode has little meaning for the actors), and value expressive rituals (the episode rules leave little latitude for behavior but the episode holds great meaning for the individual). [26] It seems more likely for interpersonal persuasion to occur in one of the first three kinds of episodes, rather than in the last three.

Situational Features: aspects of the context of an interpersonal persuasion episode identified by Cody and McLaughlin, [27] which affect its enactment, including (1) the intimacy of the relationship; (2) A's anticipation of B's resistance; (3) personal benefits to A of B's cooperation; (4) consequences of B's cooperation; (5) dominance of either A or B in the relationship; and (6) A's right to ask for cooperation, and B's right to refuse cooperation. Recent research has confirmed the consistency of situational perceptions by groups of individuals. [28] Types of situations are interpreted similarly within homogenous groups, and situations similar to one another will evoke the same decisions concerning situational dimensions affecting episode enactment.

Episodic Structure: phases of development through which an episode progresses, including initiation, rule definition, rule confirmation, strategic development, and termination. While phases are usually in sequence, some recycling can occur. Additionally, some phases may be skipped, e.g., initiation.

Interpersonal Task: the set of responses by B which A is trying to elicit.[29]

Strategy: a general plan of action designed by A to accomplish the interpersonal task.

Tactics: specific behaviors for enacting strategies, usually messages.

Rule: a followable prescription that indicates what behavior is obligated, preferred, or prohibited in a certain context.[30]

Outcomes: the result of interpersonal persuasion, involving rule changes of four types[31]: (1) Acquiescence, occurring when B relinquishes the rule in question. (2) Accommodation, occurring when rule revision rather than complete acceptance occurs. (3) Compromise, occurring when both A and B revise their rules. (4) Coadjuvancy, occurring when A and B work together to generate a mutually satisfying set of rules. Like compromise, rule revision occurs, but the rules are negotiated. In addition, no rule change may occur, e., there may be an immediate recognition of the applicable rules and both A and B agree on what they are.

Appendix One contains a sample conversation illustrating the various vocabulary terms.

A Theory of Interpersonal Persuasion

The approach taken in this study is to use the assumptions of rules-theory to help explain interpersonal persuasion. Several authors have identified issues which must be addressed in building rules-theory. We must know how episodes are generated, how episodes generate practical force, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for task accomplishment.[32] Further, we must be able to falsify the theory; in other words, it must be testable.[33] Although Shiminoff argued that theory construction from the rules perspective was still too new to have developed axiomatic theories, Reardon has discussed persuasion from a rules perspective and Smith has provided the beginning of an axiomatic theory of persuasion.[34] The approach taken here is to use Reardon's assumptions and Smith's axioms as a starting point to build an axiomatic theory of interpersonal persuasion. In building an axiomatic theory of interpersonal persuasion, Hawes' definitions of axiom, postulate, and theorem will be used.[35] An axiom is a statement assumed to be true; it is not directly testable, and the terms in an axiom are abstract. A postulate contains some observable and some unobservable terms; it is derived from an axiom. Theorems are derived either from axioms or from postulates; they contain observable concepts, although they are not directly testable. Theorems are tested by derived hypotheses.

Six axioms, one postulate, and five theorems are presented here as a theory of interpersonal persuasion. The axioms constitute fundamental assumptions about the nature of communication behavior in general and of interpersonal persuasion in particular. The first three axioms and Theorem-3 are adapted from Smith.

Four axioms are offered as general assumptions concerning communication behavior. They are:

Axiom 1: "Humans are self-directed agents, having the capacity for choice." [36] This axiom is based on the assumptions of rules-theory, which state that people do not blindly follow causal paths, but that they create their own realities and choose their behavior from available repertoires.

Axiom 2: "Humans are goal-directed agents, striving to maximize rewards and minimize punishments." [37] In other words, human behavior is rule-governed, and people use rules to create situations most favorable to them.

Axiom 3: "The external environment is a product of human cognitive schematic structures." [38]

The assumption behind this axiom is that to the extent there is a "reality," it exists only in our perception and interpretation of it.

The fourth axiom has its origin in the work of Pearce [39] and Cushman and Pearce. [40] Pearce argues that three interpretations of rules exist. In Episode-1, there are rules which are contained within societal expectations of behavior. People interpret the rules in Episode-2, and Episodes-3 are the enactments of rule-governed communication behavior. Cushman and Pearce suggest that Episode -2, or individual interpretations of rules, are located in the self-concept. They are learned and generated through interactions with others.

Axiom 4: The rules which guide individual behavior and inform individuals' expectations of others' behavior are located in the self-concept.

Two additional axioms serve to define the interpersonal persuasion process. Reardon noted that persuasion is an intentional process. [41] Certainly, it is possible to influence another person without being aware of it; for example, a student may emulate a teacher whom s/he respected, without the teacher's intention to influence the student. Persuasion, however, implies intentionality. The fifth axiom is therefore:

Axiom 5: Persuasion is an activity which is the result of human action; it is an intentional process.

Finally, the sixth axiom concerns the structure, function, and process of interpersonal persuasion. The definition offered earlier stated that interpersonal persuasion was guided by rules, with the interactants striving to negotiate a mutually satisfactory outcome. The sixth axiom is derived from these assumptions:

Axiom 6: Interpersonal persuasion is an activity in which human beings strive for coordination; it is not the result of simple information processing. As such, the structure of interpersonal persuasion consists of rules; the function of interpersonal persuasion is to regulate consensus; and the process of interpersonal persuasion is the adaptation of rules to achieve coordination.

A postulate derived from Axiom 4 is suggested by Reardon, who argues that people are persuaded by appeals to consistency, appropriateness, and effectiveness. [42] That is, people are persuaded to behave in a particular

manner because the persuader appeals to their senses of consistency (is this behavior in line with my image of myself?); appropriateness (is this behavior "proper" in this situation?); and effectiveness (will this behavior achieve my goals?). Further, she argues that to the extent that the self-concept is used as a generative mechanism for behavior, appeals to personal consistency will be more effective; when situational constraints are more salient, appeals to appropriateness and effectiveness are more successful.

Postulate: An individual's self-concept and the rules within it are affected by the individual's assessment of himself or herself as consistent, appropriate, and/or effective within a given interpersonal persuasion episode.

The five theorems presented here serve to further define the interpersonal persuasion process. Axiom 6 states that the structure of the interpersonal persuasion process consists of rules. From this axiom, a theorem concerning the use of tactics and strategies can be derived:

Theorem 1: Participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode use tactics to invoke rules for behavior.

Support for Theorem 1 is found in Morris and Hopper, who argue that two kinds of talk characterize problem solving: remediation, or rule application; and legislation, or rule creation.[43] The authors claim that social change results from rule application more often than from rule legislation. Tactics are methods of applying rules in the interpersonal persuasion situation.

A second theorem is derived from Axioms 5, 6, and the Postulate. According to Axiom 6, the structure of interpersonal persuasion consists of rules which are located in the self-concept (Axiom 5). The Postulate states that the self-concept will be affected by assessments of individual behavior which is consistent, appropriate, or effective within a given episode. Tactics are the method by which appeals to behavior are made.

Theorem 2: Participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode use tactics to make appeals for consistent, appropriate, or effective behavior on the part of the other.

Reardon's discussion of the Marwell and Schmitt tactics lend support to Theorem 2. She argues that the tactics of moral appeal, positive and negative self-feeling, and positive and negative altercasting are appeals to self-concept rules of consistency; while promise, threat, positive and negative expertise, linking, pre-giving, aversive stimulation, debt, altruism, and positive and negative esteem are appeals to self-concept rules of appropriateness. Examination of Table One shows that the tactics of consequences and benefits could be appeals to self-concept rules of effectiveness.

Axiom 6 stated that the function of interpersonal persuasion is to regulate consensus; an outcome of that regulation is whether or not the persuader achieves his or her goals. If the structure of interpersonal persuasion is rules, then the rules appealed to must be relevant to those involved. Theorem 3 is adapted from Smith:

Theorem 3: "People . . . will choose to comply with persuasive messages specifying contextually relevant rules or prescriptions for achieving goals more often than they will comply with messages stipulating contextually irrelevant rules." [44]

Finally, the last two theorems deal with the process of interpersonal persuasion, which is the adaptation of rules to achieve coordination (Axiom 6). A definition of episode was given in the vocabulary section; it is argued here that interpersonal persuasion is episodic.

Theorem 4: Interpersonal persuasion is episodic, progressing through phases of episodic development, and directed toward some interpersonal task.

Episodes-3 (enactments of rules designed to achieve coordination) can take one of six forms. How the episode is defined will depend upon individual perceptions, as the final theorem states:

Theorem 5: The definition of an interpersonal persuasion episode will be the result of the participants' perceptions of situational features, and outcomes of the episodes.

Given the theory in its present form, how have the expectations for building theory from the rules perspective been met? First, what tasks generate interpersonal persuasion episodes? Episodes occur when A perceives that his or her goals are either threatened by or dependent upon person B, and the threat or dependency is sufficient to warrant an expenditure of energy by A. In other words, a shortcoming or threat in the environment perceived by an individual to be significant will generate an interpersonal persuasion episode. Obviously, the threshold of significance will vary between individuals. For example, a person who objects to cigarette smoke may not attempt to persuade an individual not to smoke if the time spent in the vicinity of the smoker is negligible. However, the same person might try to persuade an office mate not to smoke because of the amount of time spent together.

Second, how do episodes generate practical force? The practical force of an episode will be the result of the participant's interpretation of the situational features, where the consequences of generating the episode are significant, creating high practical force, or not significant, creating negligible practical force. Again, the necessity, like significance, will depend upon individual perceptions.

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for task accomplishment? Interpersonal persuasion has been defined as the "attempt" at bringing another's rules in line with one's own, not necessarily the accomplishment. The attempt may result in five outcomes: no rule change, acquiescence, accommodation, compromise, or coadjuvancy. Even if A does not accomplish his or her original interpersonal task, task accomplishment will be met through one of the five outcomes.

Finally, how can this theory be falsified? Three methods are possible. First, it could be shown that interpersonal persuasion episodes are not guided by rules. Theorem 1 states that tactics are means for invoking rules for behavior. If this is so, respondents should be able to recognize patterns within the tactics, and be able to judge them consistently with regard to their use. This assumption will be tested in the present study.

Second, the theory could be falsified by showing a lack of relationship between the rule-generating mechanism and the behavior affected. In the case of the theory presented here, no relationship between the self-concept and interpersonal persuasion behavior would have to be found. Third, a lack of a measurable practical force for the episodes could be shown.

This would involve gauging the effectiveness of tactics with regard to a particular matrix of situational features and a particular person. Previous research has indicated that certain tactics have been assessed as more effective in some situations than others; however, no measures have yet been made of the necessity of initiating an interpersonal persuasion episode. The second and third methods of falsifying the theory will be addressed in future research.

Research Questions

Four questions are posed by this study; three of them arising from the shortcomings in previous research. The first question arises in regard to the relationship of tactics to strategies. As it was argued earlier, no enduring clusters of tactics constituting strategies have been found. Further, the clusters identified have been generated on the basis of the likelihood of tactic use within a situation. The first question to be addressed by this study is:

Q-1: Can clusters of tactics constituting strategies be identified on the basis of the content of the tactics?

Related to the first question is disagreement over whether resistance tactics are inherently different from tactics to persuade, as Hazelton et al. claim, or if they are similar, as McLaughlin et al. argue. The second question is therefore:

Q-2: Can tactics to resist persuasion be differentiated from tactics to persuade on the basis of their content?

A third research question concerns to overall nature of talk in the interpersonal persuasion episode. In research thus far, only the actual tactics a participant would use have been studied. No attention has been paid to the other talk which constitutes the rest of an interpersonal persuasion episode. Is everything said in the episode tactical, or are there non-tactical (e.g., questions and statements of fact) messages that can be exchanged in the episode?

Q-3: Can messages identified theoretically as non-tactical be distinguished from tactical statements on the basis of their content?

The final question to be answered by this study concerns the relationship of tactics to rules. If tactics are methods of invoking rules for behavior, judgments of the tactics should reflect some knowledge of general rules governing interpersonal persuasion episodes. The final question is therefore:

Q-4: Can general rules concerning interpersonal persuasion be discerned from the judgments respondents make concerning tactics?

Method

One hundred and four students enrolled in communication classes at the University of Southern California participated in the study. The majority of the respondents were attending classes on a full-time basis, majoring in social science areas. Their ages ranged from 18 to 32, with an average age of 21 years. Fifty-four respondents were female; 27 were male, and 24 declined to answer. Sixty-seven of the respondents were Caucasian, with 14 respondents reporting other ethnic affiliations and 24 declining to answer.

Respondents were asked to sort slips of paper on which statements corresponding to interpersonal persuasion tactics were written.[45] Forty-eight statements were adapted from the tactics listed in Table One and were written in such a way that they could be used by either a persuadee or a persuader in the course of an interpersonal persuasion episode. For example, promise, defined in Table One as "A promises some x in exchange for compliance," was written as "Promising something in exchange for getting your way." Additionally, eight statements were adapted from Bales IPA coding scheme and included as examples of non-tactics[46] (asks & offers information, opinion, & suggestions, expresses agreement & disagreement). While it could be argued that everything said in an episode is strategic, in that it is directed toward some goal, typically the tactics identified in previous research have been in the form "do x because y." Exchanges concerned with information, opinions, suggestions, and agreement have not been identified as tactical in previous research. Further, the IPA categories have been used successfully and reliably in the past to identify verbal behavior. Thus, they are presented as examples of non-tactics to determine whether there are kinds of behavior distinct from the reason-giving behavior typically associated with tactic. Finally, two other statements were added; one was a reflection of a tactic which could not be written from both the persuader's and the persuadee's point of view (reasonable). The other appeared as a tactic in conversations previously analyzed by the author, but has never been identified as a tactic in typology research. The tactic frequently appeared in conversations as "I'd do it for you," and became "Telling the other person you would cooperate with him/her if the situation were reversed." All items were randomly assigned identification numbers to avoid any biases inherent in a sequential numbering of items.

Participants were asked to sort the statements into no less than three piles and no more than eleven piles, where each pile reflected statements similar in content to one another. Respondents were told that the statements represented tactics which could be used as part of a strategy by either of two participants in a conversation. After sorting the statements into piles, the participants were asked to rate each pile of statements as a whole along a set of five seven-point scales: (1) intimate--not intimate (intimacy); (2) first thing I'd say--last thing I'd say (likelihood); (3) likely to hurt a relationship--likely to help a relationship (consequences); (4) not likely to get cooperation--likely to get cooperation (effectiveness); and (5) good to use--bad to use (appropriateness). Thus, a person making three piles of statements used three sets of scales. Respondents used the full range of possible discriminations, with most respondents making eleven piles of statements.

A frequency matrix was computed for the items. The 58 x 58 matrix consists of the proportion of the time in which two tactics occur within the same pile. As there are no existing programs to compute frequency matrices, a program was written for use on a microcomputer to produce the matrix. The matrix was analyzed using elementary linkage analysis,[47] which assumes that clusters of items or characteristics can be defined so that all members within a cluster are more similar to one another than they are to nonmembers of a cluster. The method defines a linkage as the largest index of association which an item has with any other item, so that each item is assigned to a cluster in terms of its highest index of association. No arbitrary index of association is set a priori; rather, the clusters and linkages emerge from the data. However, an a priori definition of significance may be set for the clusters. Clusters are identified by finding the highest index of association in the matrix, where the relationship is reciprocal. This relationship represents a centroid. Second order and higher relationships are determined until the cluster is completed. The next highest reciprocal relationship is located, until all items have been classified within a cluster.

The strength of the relationships within each cluster are interpreted by examining the frequency proportions. Those proportions which are .25 or less are considered independent, those between .25 and .40 share a moderate relationship, those between .41 and .60 have a strong relationship, and proportions over .60 indicate very strong relationships.[48] A significant cluster is defined as one in which the centroid has a relationship in excess of .40, and where all items with secondary or higher loadings have a relationship of .25 or greater with at least one other member of the cluster.

In addition to cluster analysis, scale values for the consequences and effectiveness scales were reversed and central tendency measures were computed for the items. Mean values for the items within the clusters are shown in Table Two.

Results

Cluster analysis of the frequency proportion matrix produced nine clusters and three centroids, all significant. The clusters are illustrated in Figure One, where a double arrow indicates a centroid and a single arrow indicates a highest loading, with the head of the arrow indicating the relationship.

Cluster One consists of seven out of the eight non-tactical statements, in addition to four tactics identified by previous research. All the statements are concerned with the exchange of information, opinions, and suggestions, and the cluster has been labeled Information Processing. Overall, these tactics as a group are rated more intimate, more likely to be used, having positive consequences, more effective, and more appropriate than the other clusters in the study.

Cluster Two is an oddity in that its core consists of three tactics which load on each other to form the main part of the cluster. The statements in this cluster are concerned with rejection, refusal to discuss the problem, and other behaviors which impede the identification of a mutually satisfactory outcome, and is labeled Nonnegotiation. The tactics are ranked as less intimate, less likely to be used, having negative consequences, less effective, and less appropriate.

The statements in Cluster Three tended to be ranked neutrally by the participants. The largest cluster consisted of tactics concerned with the relationship between the participants and their identities, and is labeled Identity Managing.

The items in Cluster Four were rated the most negative of all the clusters. Items such as deceit, threat, and explicit rejection make up the Manipulation strategy. Clusters Five and Nine, on the other hand, were ranked far more positively, and are constituted by tactics which identify the Empathy and the Negotiation strategies.

The remainder of the clusters tended to be rated neutrally on an overall basis by the respondents: Expertise, Ingratiation, Negative Exchange, Emotional Appeals, Equivocation, and Explanation.

Since all the clusters and centroids identified were significant, the first research question can be answered affirmatively: clusters of tactics can be identified on the basis of their content. Further, the content of the clusters consistently constitute strategies which can be used by participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode.

The relationship of non-tactical to tactical statements formed the basis for the third question. All but one of the non-tactical statements appeared in Cluster One, with expresses disagreement occurring in the Nonnegotiation cluster. However, of all the statements, those in Cluster One are rated most positively. Rather than thinking of these statements as non-tactical and therefore not within the realm of interpersonal persuasion behavior; it seems more productive to look at them as a first-attempt kind of strategy. That is, participants may prefer to initiate episodes through an exchange of information and opinions, and only initiate the reason-giving behavior associated with tactics as a second method of gaining assent.

The final question concerned the existence of rules in the interpersonal persuasion situation. Three rules are identifiable from the ratings of the tactics in this study. These rules represent more general rules, and occur at the Episode-1 level. The first rule that becomes apparent concerns the sequences in which tactics should be used. Given the preference for Information Processing tactics demonstrated by the respondents in this study, the first rule is:

R-1: Persuasion attempts should be initiated by statements which exchange information and/or simply request behavior from the other person.

A second rule emerging from the data concerns the tactics which should not be used under ordinary circumstances. Manipulative tactics are especially seen as unlikely and unacceptable.

R-2: Manipulation tactics are dispreferred methods of persuasion in interpersonal persuasion episodes.

Finally, respondents in this study show a tendency to reject tactics which impede the identification of mutually satisfactory outcomes. A third rule is therefore:

R-3: Participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode should make an effort to cooperate with the other person.

Discussion

Several conclusions may be drawn from this study. First, there appears to be a logic underlying the content of interpersonal persuasion tactics which is recognizable by the people who use them. Tactics sorted by the respondents formed significant, internally consistent clusters which represent strategies. Further, these tactics can all be represented by verbal statements in such a way that a conversational coding scheme could be developed from the clusters.

Second, there are tactics which are most likely to be used by a resister of persuasion rather than a person originally identified as the persuader in a conversation. The strategy consisting of nonnegotiation tactics is, with the exception of expresses disagreement, constituted by tactics which have been identified as means to resist persuasion. While they could undoubtedly be used by the persuader should the persuasion attempt turn into a counter-persuasive effort, they are, none the less, tactics which are used to resist rather than attempt persuasion. At the same time, it is equally apparent that all the tactics are open to both participants in an interpersonal persuasion episode, and there is no need to develop separate coding schemes for persuaders and persuadees.

Third, a cluster of tactics and non-tactical statements was found which is geared more toward information processing than toward providing reasons why a person should behave in a particular way. A distinction can tentatively be drawn between persuasive strategies which seek to convince a person that s/he should behave in a particular manner and strategies which seek to ascertain if the person is able to behave that way. Furthermore, the preference by respondents for the information processing tactics reflects a common assumption about the process of influencing others' behavior--it is more acceptable to simply ask people to do something than it is to resort to a variety of reasons why they should behave that way. It seems likely that information processing statements will constitute the bulk of conversation when actual interpersonal persuasion episodes are examined.

There are several limitations to the findings in this study. First, with the exception of the reasonableness tactic, only one item was written to reflect each tactic. One statement may not adequately represent certain tactics, and as a result, respondents may not have been able to make consistent judgments concerning the intimacy, likelihood, consequences, effectiveness, or appropriateness of the tactics. For example, the tactic new "information" had low associations with the members of an otherwise strong cluster. It may be that in the absence of a conversation in which it occurred, respondents were unable to clearly understand the tactic. Other tactics probably suffered from the same shortcoming.

A second limitation concerns the size and nature of the sample. The respondents in this study represented a fairly homogenous group, and the majority (at least 54%) were women. Differences between male and female choices of tactics in particular situations has been noted in past research, [49] and it may be that the findings here are more true for female respondents than for male respondents.

Finally, the judgment of tactics in this study was based entirely on the content of the statements. Obviously, the meaning of a tactic may change depending upon the way in which it is said. A statement may look like a nonnegotiation tactic in terms of content, but the modifying linguistic cues may prove it to be agreement. Reliable estimations of tactic use will only be determined through the observation of actual interpersonal persuasion episodes.

There are three sets of questions which remain unanswered by this study and should be addressed in future research testing the theory. First, how does the use of tactics guide episodic development? That is, are there tactics used within the initiation and termination phases of interpersonal persuasion episodes? Currently, videotaped conversations representing interpersonal persuasion episodes are being coded, and stochastic modeling of the speech acts may help to provide answers concerning episodic development through tactical use.

A second group of questions concerns the existence of societal rules governing interpersonal persuasion attempts. Are there rules which are common to all episodes, or are persuasion attempts guided by idiosyncratic rules. While the rules offered in the previous section are general, more rules may be discovered through the examination of actual conversations. Unless we are able to locate rules common to most interpersonal persuasion attempts, we are unlikely to make any meaningful predictions about the way people will behave. Further, it will be difficult for us to identify effective means of

behavior if there are no rules common to most episodes. One way of locating common rules is to study episodes generated in a variety of relationship levels, and to systematically alter situational features. Situational features will provide clues to applicable rules, and different levels of relationships can inform us concerning rules common to all episodes.

Finally, what tactics and strategies facilitate mutually acceptable outcomes? Are there tactics and strategies which are more effective than others in developing coordination? Answers to these questions will serve a pedagogical purpose in helping people to act more effectively in influence situations, and they can be obtained through a combination of observation and elicitation of assessments from the participants. The conversations now under analysis have been combined with self-report scales by the participants concerning their assessment of situational features, their satisfaction, and their perceived competency in the situation. Relationships between the participants' perceptions of the situation and analysis of their behavior should begin to provide information regarding effective behavior in interpersonal persuasion episodes.

The theory presented in this study has been tested only in part, and the initial findings are encouraging. Further work in testing the theory may necessitate the addition of theorems which further define the interpersonal persuasion process, or the formulation of alternative explanations for interpersonal persuasion behavior.

NOTES

1. This study is based in part upon work done for the dissertation under the direction of Kenneth K. Sereno at the University of Southern California.

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17. Two studies which used deductive methods of generating tactics, ratings of the likelihood of use within particular situations, and factor analysis to group tactics into strategies were Marwell and Schmitt, and Michael J. Cody.

17

Margaret L. McLaughlin and William J. Jordan, "A Multidimensional Scaling of Three Sets of Compliance-Gaining Strategies," Communication Quarterly, 28 (1980), 34-46. They produced dissimilar tactics and different strategies.

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49. see, for example, Fitzpatrick and Winke.

TABLE ONE
Linguistic Form of Tactics and Their Origins

	<u>Persuade</u>	<u>Resist</u>
PROMISE: A promises B some X in exchange for compliance.	x	x
PRE-GIVING: A gives some X to B before asking for compliance.	x	
LIKING: A acts friendly in order to put B in a good mood before asking for compliance.	x	
POSITIVE EXPERTISE: A tells B compliance will be rewarding due to the "nature of things."	x	x
NEGATIVE EXPERTISE: A tells B noncompliance will be harmful due to the "nature of things."	x	x
MORAL APPEAL: A tells B a moral person would comply.	x	
POSITIVE SELF-FEELING: A tells B that compliance will make B feel good about him/herself.	x	
NEGATIVE SELF-FEELING: A tells B that noncompliance will make B feel bad about him/herself.	x	
POSITIVE ESTEEM: A tells B that compliance will bring respect from others.	x	
NEGATIVE ESTEEM: A tells B that noncompliance will bring scorn from others.	x	
POSITIVE ALTERCASTING: A tells B that a person with good qualities would comply.	x	
NEGATIVE ALTERCASTING: A tells B that only a person with bad qualities would refuse to comply.	x	x
DEBT: A tells B compliance is owed because of past favors.	x	
ALTRUISM: A asks for B's compliance because of exceptional need.	x	x
THREAT: A will punish B if B does not comply.	x	x
AVERSIVE STIMULATION: A punishes B and makes cessation contingent upon B's compliance.	x	
NEGATIVE COMPARISON: A points out to B that no request like this has been made in the past.		x
REASONABLENESS: A points out to B that no reasonable person would ask for compliance.		x
PLEADING: A pleads with B not to force compliance.	x	x

	<u>Persuade</u>	<u>Resist</u>
HURT: A tells B how hurt s/he is by the request.		x
SURPRISED: A acts astonished that B would make the request.		x
MUTUAL TALKS: A tells B they need to talk about it more.	x	x
COMPROMISE: A tells B they can reach a compromise.	x	x
EXPLANATION: A asks B why s/he wants compliance.	x	x
CONCESSION: A offers B less than full compliance.	x	x
SIMPLE REFUSAL: A refuses to comply with B's request.	x	x
NO DISCUSSION: A tells B s/he won't discuss the request.	x	x
NO OBLIGATION: A tells B s/he has no obligation to comply.		x
CONSEQUENCES: A explains to B the negative consequences of A's compliance.		x
BENEFITS: A explains to B the positive benefits of A's noncompliance.		x
HINTING: A hints at requested behavior.	x	
DECEIT: A lies about the difficulty of the requested behavior.	x	x
SIMPLE STATEMENT: A asks B to comply.	x	
DISCLAIMER: A disavows negative implications of behavior while asking for compliance.	x	
CHOICE: A tells B the choice of action is up to B.	x	
OBLIGATION TO OTHERS: A tells B of obligation to others beside A to comply.	x	x
EMPATHY: A expresses understanding of B's position while asking for compliance.	x	
NO SELF-INTEREST: A disavows any benefit from B's compliance.	x	
NO SELF-AUTHORITY: A disavows any authority on subject matter while asking for B's compliance.	x	
PERSONAL REJECTION: A rejects B as person in relationship as result of noncompliance.	x	
INTERPERSONAL COST: A tells B that compliance will hurt the relationship.	x	x
EXPLICIT REJECTION: A uses obscene language to refuse compliance.		x

	<u>Persuade</u>	<u>Resist</u>
EQUIVOCATION: A tells B each will decide what each one wants to do.		x
REJECT WITH ALTERNATIVES: A refuses compliance while offering alternatives to B.	x	x
CHARACTER APPEAL: A tells B that B should trust A to know what is best.	x	x
NEW INFORMATION: A exposes previously unknown information to B as reason for noncompliance.		x
FALSE COMPROMISE: A indicates willingness to compromise while reaffirming self-interest.		x
IRRELEVANT EXPERTISE: A disavows any interest in the cost of noncompliance while refusing to comply.		x

[A indicates speaker, B indicates listener]

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TABLE TWO
Clusters, Their Items, and Mean Values for Scales

	Int	Like	Cons	Effrt	Appr
<u>Information Processing</u>					
*asks opinions	3.22	2.45	2.45	2.64	2.26
*asks suggestions	3.25	2.41	2.40	2.63	2.31
*expresses agreement	3.67	3.15	2.06	2.83	2.91
*asks for information	3.34	2.50	2.46	2.60	2.31
*offers suggestions	3.23	2.57	2.40	2.67	2.23
simple statement	4.21	2.73	2.96	3.14	2.98
explanation	3.12	2.63	2.71	2.90	2.47
reject w/ alternatives	3.16	2.75	2.60	2.72	2.50
*offers information	3.47	2.46	2.51	2.64	2.31
*offers opinion	3.40	2.65	2.71	2.81	2.54
new information	4.18	3.78	4.20	3.88	3.79
overall mean	3.48	2.73	2.68	2.86	2.60
<u>Nonnegotiation</u>					
personal rejection	5.32	5.00	5.71	5.11	5.07
simple refusal	5.22	4.75	5.52	4.86	4.96
no discussion	5.05	4.73	5.45	4.74	4.95
*expressing disagreement	4.88	4.45	4.88	4.47	4.28
irrelevant expertise	4.92	4.74	5.40	4.92	4.94
no obligation	4.92	4.50	5.08	4.50	4.56
false compromise	4.35	3.90	4.28	3.98	3.86
overall mean	4.95	4.58	5.19	4.65	4.66
<u>Identity Managing</u>					
negative altercasting	3.68	4.80	4.86	3.87	4.38
moral appeal	3.66	4.54	4.61	3.52	4.24
positive altercasting	3.57	4.32	4.42	3.55	4.04
reasonable--P	3.80	4.64	4.61	3.93	4.34
reasonable--R	4.25	4.63	5.08	4.42	4.53
obligation to others	3.54	3.98	4.05	3.49	3.95
positive esteem	3.62	4.32	4.33	3.39	4.16
positive self-feeling	3.51	4.27	4.21	3.63	3.98
negative self-feeling	3.91	5.06	5.13	4.05	4.88
interpersonal cost	3.68	4.86	4.97	4.19	4.57
negative esteem	3.89	4.89	4.89	3.94	4.54
no self-interest	3.80	4.10	4.16	3.83	3.90
overall mean	3.74	4.53	4.53	3.82	4.29

	Int	Like	Cons	Effrt	Appr
<u>Manipulation</u>					
deceit	4.86	5.24	5.61	4.64	5.19
threat	4.89	5.42	5.52	4.96	5.32
explicit rejection	5.09	5.20	5.71	5.04	5.35
aversive stimulation	5.01	5.61	5.67	4.99	5.62
surprised	3.98	4.85	5.11	4.21	4.58
overall mean	4.77	5.26	5.55	4.83	5.21
<u>Empathy</u>					
disclaimer	3.41	3.47	3.64	3.24	3.41
empathy	3.01	3.12	3.12	2.83	2.81
altruism	3.01	3.68	3.77	3.27	3.46
no self-authority	3.39	3.18	3.12	2.88	2.89
overall mean	3.21	3.36	3.41	3.06	3.14
<u>Expertise</u>					
negative expertise	3.82	4.34	4.43	3.71	4.19
positive expertise	3.74	4.00	3.97	3.38	3.78
character appeal	3.38	4.03	4.07	3.39	3.72
overall mean	3.65	4.12	4.16	3.49	3.90
<u>Ingratiation</u>					
promise	3.82	3.92	2.89	3.12	3.59
pre-giving	3.86	4.25	4.44	3.77	3.89
liking	3.73	4.08	4.07	3.42	3.87
hinting	3.85	3.66	3.80	3.48	3.59
overall mean	3.82	3.98	3.80	3.45	3.74
<u>Negative Exchange</u>					
debt	3.36	4.09	4.17	3.57	4.03
negative comparison	3.16	3.92	4.14	3.65	3.83
do for you	3.56	4.00	4.19	3.70	4.01
overall mean	3.36	4.00	4.19	3.70	4.01
<u>Negotiation</u>					
concession	3.24	3.00	2.84	2.98	2.76
compromise	3.29	2.65	2.44	2.48	2.29
mutual talks	3.29	2.79	2.77	2.90	3.14
overall mean	3.27	2.81	2.68	2.79	2.73

	Int	Like	Cons	Effrt	Appr
<u>Emotional Appeal</u>					
hurt	3.25	4.31	4.50	3.68	3.97
pleading	3.55	4.31	4.37	3.64	4.06
overall mean	3.40	4.31	4.44	3.66	4.02
<u>Equivocation</u>					
choice	4.04	4.02	3.89	3.89	4.18
equivocation	3.98	3.52	3.46	3.47	3.49
overall mean	4.01	3.77	3.68	3.68	3.84
<u>Explanation</u>					
benefits	4.08	4.15	4.50	3.88	4.17
consequences	3.74	4.14	4.58	4.09	4.06
overall mean	3.91	4.15	4.54	3.99	4.12

*statements adapted from 'Bales' categories

TABLE THREE
Frequency Proportions in Clusters

Information Processing

[illegible]

Nonnegotiation

personal rejection	xx						
simple refusal	73	xx					
no discussion	72	74	xx				
*expresses disagreement	56	55	52	xx			
irrelevant expertise	60	66	67	48	xx		a
no obligation	39	54	53	41	57	xx	
false compromise	15	18	17	17	27	36	xx

Identity Managing

moral appeal	xx											
negative altercasting	70	xx										
reasonable--P	65	61	xx									
positive altercasting	68	63	63	xx								
reasonable--R	37	41	55	39	xx							
obligation to others	40	40	39	45	27	xx						
positive esteem	54	50	45	64	27	41	xx					
positive self-feeling	50	39	42	54	23	32	62	xx				
negative self-feeling	51	53	44	42	26	36	51	55	xx			
interpersonal cost	42	50	43	36	30	31	34	37	54	xx		
negative esteem	52	55	51	47	34	30	59	51	67	53	xx	
no self-interest	28	23	28	25	20	45	29	27	24	21	32	xx

Manipulation

deceit	xx				
threat	66	xx			
explicit rejection	53	59	xx		
aversive stimulation	51	65	59	xx	
surprised	32	34	27	48	xx

Empathy

disclaimer	xx			
empathy	62	xx		
no self-authority	45	49	xx	
altruism	43	48	30	xx

(Table Three, cont.)

Expertise

positive expertise	xx		
negative expertise	60	xx	
character appeal	47	44	xx

Ingratiation

promise	xx		
pre-giving	58	xx	
liking	56	58	xx
hinting	21	31	34 xx

Negative Exchange

negative comparison	xx		
debt	51	xx	
do for you	35	45	xx

Negotiation

concession	xx		
compromise	49	xx	
mutual talks	27	47	xx

Emotional Appeal

hurt	xx		
pleading	46	xx	

Equivocation

choice	xx		
equivocation	43	xx	


Explanation

benefits	xx		
consequences	41	xx	


*statements adapted from Bales' categories

FIGURE ONE
Clusters of Tactics


Information Processing




Nonnegotiation




Identity Managing



Manipulation




Empathy



Expertise



Ingratiation



Negative Exchange

do for you \rightarrow debt \leftrightarrow neg comp

Negotiation

concession \leftrightarrow compromise \leftarrow mutual talks

Emotional Appeal

hurt \leftrightarrow pleading

Equivocation

choice \leftrightarrow equivocation

Explanation

consequences \leftrightarrow benefits

APPENDIX ONE

Illustration of Concepts in the Vocabulary Section

The following example will serve to clarify some concepts in the vocabulary section; it is a conversation analyzed in previous research.

A₁: Do you have time to help me out on my French?

B₁: When?

A₂: Tonight.

B₂: Tonight?

A₃: I know it's finals, but I just need a little help.

B₃: How much do you need? I have an exam coming up.

A₄: As much as you can.

B₄: Well, like how much?

A₅: Well, I don't know 'cause I don't get these first letters that, I don't know, as much as you want. Do you have any time?

B₅: Well, I have some spare time, but I think I would like to spend it on my studies. But, how bad is your French?

A₆: I'm failing it, so I really need help. But I don't know, can you help me?

B₆: Well--

A₇: A little would be good enough, I mean--

B₇: Yeah, I could do that, uh, we could study together if you want, and if you have any problem, then you could ask me then. Like, I study for my own, and you study for yours. Then if you have any problems with French, you can ask me then.

A₈: Okay, that's good.

B₈: Okay.

A₉: Yeah, I need help pretty good.

B₉: Okay.

This conversation represents an episode, and since the participants came to a mutually satisfactory goal through a progression of controlled thoughts, the episode is an example of "coordinated conversation." Situational features are not entirely discernable here; we may assume that the participants are friends (as they were instructed to assume in enacting the episode). A clearly will benefit if B cooperates, and B might lose studying time if s/he does. A apparently believes s/he has a right to make a request of B, although the first utterance (A₁) acknowledges that the request may be

untimely.

There is no initiation phase in the episodic development. Normally, some exchange of things would occur before A proceeds to Rule Definition in A₁. Rule Confirmation appears to occur immediately in B₁ by asking when help is needed. However, confirmation is not complete when in A₂ the request appears to go out of bounds for the accepted rule. In acts A₃ through B₇, strategic development occurs, with A providing reasons why B should help and B attempting to meet those demands without too much sacrifice. Acts A₈ through B₉ represent the termination or leave-taking phase of the episode.

The interpersonal task in the conversation is B's accommodation to A's request. It is the behavior which A is trying to elicit. The strategies used by A are to exchange information and make the request based on his/her exceptional need (failing the class). Specific tactics used are simple request (A₁) and altruism (A₆).

A rule apparent in the conversation is one concerning helping behavior, and may be expressed R₁: A friend is obligated to respond to a request, provided the request is reasonable.

The outcome of the episode in the conversation is accommodation, because some revision of the rule has occurred. B acknowledges A's right to ask for help, but does not offer as much help as A appears to want. Had B offered a counter-rule (e.g., It's not fair to ask for anything during finals) and later given it up, the outcome would have been acquiescence. Compromise would have been the outcome had B agreed to tutor A just this once, but had informed A that the request would not be honored in the future. Finally, coadjuvancy would have been the outcome had A and B negotiated specific rules governing future occurrences of similar episodes.