ABSTRACT
                Chaldean Americans in Detroit, Michigan, a growing
community of Roman Catholic immigrants from Iraq, are the focus of
this study. A description is given of the Detroit Chaldean community
centers around three key institutions, namely the church, the family,
and the ethnic occupation or community economic enterprise, and of
how these institutions have been affected by the migration experience
and by contact with the new culture. An analysis of the social
setting of migration examines religious and economic determinants of
migration to America, migration effects on the Detroit community, and
Chaldeans' relationships with other social groups in Detroit. An
exploration of Chaldeans' adaptation to their new setting considers
assimilation and acculturation processes, changes in social structure
and values, creation of a balance between old country patterns and
new practices, and the development of an ethnic identity and a sense
of nationalism. Ethnic conflicts and accommodation processes that
arise from efforts to achieve the balance between old and new are
explored, and it is suggested that family and friendship ties will
offset the divisive effects of conflict and American liberalism and
keep the Chaldean community from disintegrating. Finally, an
exploration of the future direction of American ethnicity points to
the need for unity in a culturally diverse society. (Author/MJL)

ED223740

THE
CHALDEAN
AMERICANS

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS
OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

وأبانا الذي في السماوات /
ليتقدس اسمك / ليأت
ملكوتك / لتكن مشيئتك /
كما في السماء كذلك على
الارض / اعطنا خبزنا كفافنا
اليوم / واغفر لنا خطايانا /
كما نحن ايضا نغفر لمن
اخطأ الينا / ولا تدخلنا في
التجربة / لكن نجنا من
الشرير / لان لك الملك
والقوة والتسبحة الى ابد
الابدين آمين ..
أجل أيها الرحمن الجبار ، يا
الاغنا الصالح وبابا الحانض
رحمة نطلب اليه مبتهلين
الى راحته الوافرة / لا يا
رب لا يا رب ، لا تدخلنا في
التجربة ، بل نجنا من
الشرير واعرانه ، لان لك
الملك والمقدرة والعزة ،
والجبروت والسلطان في
السماء والارض ، الان وفي
كل آن والى الابد آمين .

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Mary C.
Sengstock

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CHALDEAN AMERICANS
Changing Conceptions of Ethnic Identity

by
Mary C. Sengstock

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CHALDEAN-AMERICANS

Changing Conceptions of Ethnic Identity

by

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First Edition

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Staten Island, New York 10304

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This book is gratefully dedicated to the two men
who helped make it possible

In Memory of

Thomas Hakim
Born—April 22, 1884 in Telkaif, Iraq
Died—November 25, 1972 in Birmingham, Michigan

A merchant in Telkaif, Lebanon, and Mexico, Mr. Hakim immigrated to the United States in 1923. Following a midnight boat ride across the Rio Grande, he came to Detroit and established himself as a wealthy grocer and businessman. For many years he was a *Baba* (father of many — an esteemed leader) in Detroit's Chaldean community. He sacrificed many hours and much energy to provide me with information on Chaldean history and community life. His deep love and appreciation of his people and their culture were the foundation stone of his life. In a real sense, their history is also his own.

In Memory of

Frank S. Sengstock
Born—November 24, 1933 in Detroit
Died—December 28, 1975 in Detroit

Lawyer, teacher, counsellor, husband and friend, he was a legal scholar with knowledge and interests which ranged far beyond the narrow confines of the law. He followed my Chaldean research from its inception in 1962. His understanding and insights helped me to formulate many of the ideas included here. His advice and stringent criticism led me to revise and reformulate them. And his insistent urging encouraged me to organize the materials and put them into manuscript form. His keen mind and gentle ways are deeply missed.

Preface

THE study of ethnic diversity has been a major challenge to the professional dispassion and integrity of American social science for the last decade and a half. A large proportion of the social science community has personal and ideological reasons for not wanting to take the persistence of ethnicity seriously. Rootless as a matter of principle and universalists as a matter of conviction, they cannot help being a bit revulsed by the persistence of such primordial social components as nationality and neighborhood.

The pertinent question which must be asked of these scholars is whether they have been able to overcome such predispositions to examine objectively the actual functioning of ethnic diversity in American life. While there has been an enormous monographic literature concerned with the persistence of ethnic diversity during the past fifteen years, it must be confessed that the social science "establishment" has flunked the test to its scholarly integrity; journals tend to publish articles which "refute" the persistence of ethnicity and not those which provide evidence that ethnicity still has an effect on American social structure. Books which attack the "legitimacy" of ethnicity are reviewed and those which report on empirical ethnic research are not.

The principal prophets of ethnicity have been Orlando Patterson who refers to research on ethnicity as chauvinism and Stephen Steinberg who dismisses ethnicity as a "myth", the former innocent of empirical evidence (which he haughtily dismisses) and the latter using evidence in a narrow and rigid way that excludes broader interpretations.

Neither Patterson nor Steinberg pay any attention to the literature on specific groups such as the Chaldeans. It is as though such communities were beneath their notice and the careful documentation of how such communities maintain their identity irrelevant to understanding the complex mosaic of American life.

Ideology has never cared much for facts.

Nevertheless studies such as the present one are important for those of us who try to understand American life the way it is instead of the way it

should be—which, one would have thought, is the function of empirical research.

The neo-assimilationism of Steinberg and Patterson would see little point in the efforts of a small community like the Assyrians of Detroit to maintain their ethnic identity. Would not they be much better off if they forgot their Chaldean heritage—whatever that may be (and who are the King's Men anyway?)—and settle down to being good Americans just like everyone else?

Such a position may seem eminently reasonable from the ivory tower of a university campus, but it makes no sense at all to the members of the Chaldean community who are—unaccountably to the neo-assimilation-ists—proud of who and what they are and most reluctant to trade in their heritage for radio standard English and all that that implies.

The pertinent question then for serious scholarship is how the various groups within the society manage to maintain their identity, sometimes against what appear to be overwhelming odds, and still become economi-cally and socially successful. Small groups like the Chaldeans are inter-esting, not only in themselves (and the reader of this book will certainly find them fascinating) but also and especially because they are excellent laboratories for studying up close mechanisms of identity formation and preservation which seem to operate among larger groups too.

Much more research will be needed to say for sure but I will be very much surprised, if the dynamics working in the Chaldean microcosm are not very similar to those to be discovered in large groups. Surely there are striking parallels between the Chaldeans and what we know of Greek, Romanian, Maronite, and Jewish identity preservation in America.

Particularly important, it seems, is the role of the religious institution as a focus and a symbol of ethnic identification. One would miss the point if one said that the church is "used" to preserve ethnicity. Rather, religious and ethnic identification are so inextricably related that neither the church leadership nor the membership see any conflict between religion and ethnicity. There may be theological problems in such a situation, but the dynamism seems inevitable in a society which is at least as pluralistic as it ever was.

Long ago in his study of the Polish peasant in America, W.I. Thomas noted the importance of the Polish culture as a means of preserving religious faith and the parishioners flocked to the church in part because they wanted to continue to be Poles even though they were also Americans.

The present volume demonstrates that the story has not changed much. The Chaldeans want to continue to be Chaldeans even though they are also now Americans (and often quite successful Americans). The neo-assimi-

lationists may not understand why but that is probably because, unlike Sengstock, they don't know any Chaldeans.

Can you be a good American and still be a Chaldean? Is it worthwhile trying to preserve a heritage which goes back to ancient controversies about the person of Christ?

The neo-assimlationists would answer "no" to both those questions. I defy any reader of this book to agree with them when he bids a reluctant farewell to the Chaldean Americans.

<div align="right">

Andrew M. Greeley
The University of Arizona
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

1

The Importance of Ethnic Studies

MANY observers have been astounded by the unprecedented success of Alex Haley's novel, *Roots* (1976). What makes the novel so unusual is that it is based on one man's search into his personal genealogy. Readers are fascinated by the account of this investigation, which led the writer back through the slavery period in American history to one family's origin in Africa. They share the pride and excitement felt when the author discovered this ancestor's identity, learned the name of the slave ship on which he had traveled, and discovered the village from which he had come. They share the sense of kinship Haley experienced upon visiting that same village in which ong-dead ancestors had been born. Immense barriers of time, distance, and human misery had been conquered to answer the questions:

> Who am I?
> Where do I come from?
> Who are "my people"?

Roots is a fascinating account because it is, in a sense, the story of all Americans. The complex modern world in which we live is one in which many people are wrenched from their roots. The black American's experience is extreme, since it is complicated by the gruesome experience of slavery and involuntary migration. But the identity crisis of white Americans is very similar.

Most Americans have come from "someplace else" — from various parts of Europe, the Orient, the Near East, Africa, and other parts of the Americas.

Through the process of migration, many have lost track of their beginnings. Even those whose families have been in America for several generations may lack a sense of ancestral continuity, due to internal migration — from

one state or region to another, from city to city, or from rural villages to large cities. This has meant a severing of contact with relatives, and placed limits on their knowledge of events of personal historic value. Thus, the average American lacks a sense of the past — a group of people from whom he is descended and with whom he shares common traits of culture and genealogy.

The complexity of modern life further complicates the identity crisis of most Americans. Life in a complex, industrial society tends to be individuated and lonely. As Erich Fromm (1941) pointed out nearly forty years ago, the freedom which modern society has bestowed upon us is not an unmixed blessing. In giving us freedom from the oppressive controls of other people, it necessarily deprives us of their consiration and concern. We are free, but we are alone — lacking, to a considerable extent, meaningful ties to others. Many of us lack not only a sense of the past, but also a meaningful present.

This lack has led many Americans to develop an interest in genealogical research or ethnic identity. In his search for this ong-dead African ancestor, Alex Haley found his roots in the past and also his identity in the present. Third generation Polish Americans who join Polish student organizations are also seeking a sense of their historical place in the world. Italian Americans who seek to retain or relearn the Italian language are doing the same.

It is perhaps this desire for a sense of identity, past and present, which led to the increased interest in ethnic groups in the last decade or two. This interest is exhibited not only by Americans seeking their own ancestral ethnic heritage, but also by social scientists who are concerned with analyzing the rise of ethnic identity in the America of the 1970s. Some studies of American ethnic groups are premised upon the philosophy of the ethnographer. Such analysts investigate the culture of a group for the same reason the mountain climber ascends a mountain: because it is there. Among social scientists, no other reason for studying any group need be sought. Groups are interesting in and of themselves, and information about their cultures is desirable for its own sake. Ethnic communities are particularly interesting groups to study because they are often from faraway places and have exotically different cultures.

The pragmatic modern world demands a more practical answer to such questions, however. Of what value is the study of ethnic groups as America moves into its third century? Perhaps the most obvious rationale can be found in the fact that ethnic groups are very much a part of America. People may understand our society better, and plan for it more effectively, if they understand all the elements, including ethnic groups, that combine to give American society its form.

Interest in ethnic communities and recognition of their importance in

American life is relatively recent in this country, among social scientists and laymen alike. Throughout the bulk of American history, the existence and maintenance of groups with a distinctive sociocultural or "ethnic" pattern was not even recognized. Until the middle eighteen-hundreds, the prevalent American attitude toward the life styles of newcomers could be found in the philosophy which Gordon (1964:88) has called "Anglo-Conformity". Briefly, Anglo-Conformists held that anyone was welcome to come to the United States, provided they dropped the cultural patterns in which they were reared, and totally adopted the Anglo-American pattern of life which had been established by the early English colonists. By the mid-1800s, it had become obvious that some groups — eastern and southern Europeans, Orientals, Irish Catholics — were more reluctant to assimilate into the Anglo-American pattern. This led to several attempts, such as the Know-Nothing Party and the Native American Movement, to limit the numbers of migrants from these areas (Gordon, 1964:93).

Less ethnocentric Americans such as Ralph Waldo Emerson saw values in cultural traditions other than Anglo-Saxon. This appreciation of other cultures led to the development of alternative philosophies concerning the role of ethnic groups in American life. The first alternate approach was the theory commonly known as the "Melting Pot", which suggested that the developing American cultural tradition was not strictly an Anglo one, but rather a product of contributions made by the cultural traditions of immigrants from several different nations. In his Journal, Emerson expressed his dismay with what he called "the narrowness of the Know-Nothing Party", and then continued:

> ...in this continent,... — the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles, and Cossacks, and all the European tribes, — of the Africans, and of the Polynesians, — will construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature... (quoted by Sherman, 1921; xxxiv).

This viewpoint became known as the "Melting Pot" theory, and was romanticized in many writings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as the reprint of St. John de Crevecoeur's Letters from an American Farmer (1782 and 1925), and Israel Zangwill's play, The Melting Pot (1909). These writers hailed the creation of a new American culture, through the "melting together" or blending of the cultural traditions of all of its many immigrant components.

The inevitability of this blending process was presumed until the mid-twentieth century. Then it became apparent to some observers that the Melting Pot was not proceeding as rapidly as anticipated. A series of studies showed that in a number of instances, immigrants, their children and even their grandchildren, maintain social and cultural traditions which vary,

sometimes greatly, from the dominant American pattern (Gans, 1962; Glazer
and Moynihan, 1970; Greeley, 1971; Greeley, 1974). These studies suggest
that ethnic variations do not disappear very quickly, nor have these immigrant
patterns been absorbed into the dominant American pattern. On the other
hand some analysts (Vargus, 1978) have questioned the validity of the
contention that ethnicity remains a vibrant force in American life. They point
out that many so-called ethnics do not identify with their ancestral back-
ground, nor do they belong to ethnic associations or attend ethnic festivals.
However, consciousness of ethnic identity and membership in ethnic
organizations represent only parts of the phenomenon of ethnicity. Informal
friendship patterns also tend to be limited to persons of one's own ethnic
background (Gans, 1962:74-80; Gordon, 1964:34). Often the participants
in such informal networks are not even aware that they share a common
ancestry. They only know that they feel more comfortable with certain
people than with others. Cultural patterns such as family structure (Sengstock,
1975), visiting patterns (Greeley, 1971:77-78), and childrearing practices
(Gans, 1962:54-64), also vary from one group to another. Here again,
participants in such social networks may not be aware that their lifestyles
are ethnically influenced. They establish their families as their parents'
families were established; they rear their children as they were reared; and
they make friends from among their neighbors and schoolmates. Since
neighborhoods and school districts are often ethnically based (Agocs, 1977;
Thompson, 1974), such friendship patterns are also ethnically related.

Consequently, the sociocultural traditions of Italian Americans, Jewish
Americans, Irish Americans, Polish Americans, black Americans, and many
others remain as alternatives to the dominant American pattern. When
social scientists refer to "ethnic groups", it is these groups, with their
alternative sociocultural patterns, to which they refer. Such groups are an
important component of American society, and probably will remain so for
several decades.

Ethnic group importance is twofold. First, they are important in the lives
of their members. As Gordon (1964:34) points out, some Americans go from
the cradle (in a sectarian hospital) to the grave (in a sectarian cemetery)
without ever crossing the boundaries of the ethnic group. They attend
sectarian schools, live in ethnic neighborhoods, draw their friends from the
ethnic community; some may even be able to work in an ethnic occupation
such as a Catholic bookstore or kosher bakery, so that "...the isolation from
interethnic contacts even on the job is virtually complete" (Gordon, 1964:35).
If ethnic groups have such importance in the lives of a portion of the
American population, this alone is sufficient rationale for studying them.

However, there is a second respect in which ethnic groups are important.
Ethnic groups influence their members' participation in American society.
Political behavior is affected by ethnicity (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948; Berelson

et al , 1954; Campbell et al, 1954; Greeley, 1974: 126-130, 254-256; Lubell, 1974; Pratt, 1974; Wolfinger, 1974). Ethnicity affects an individual's chances of holding a prestigeous job, earning a high salary, and receiving an education (Greeley, 1971:67). Some ethnic groups are more likely to exhibit prejudicial attitudes towards other groups (Greeley, 1971:69, 72-73); thus, ethnicity may exert a profound influence over the interrelations of people in American society. Groups which affect American life in such important ways are well deserving of study by social scientists.

Andrew Greeley (1971) has noted with some dismay that ethnic groups in America are rarely examined with any degree of reasoned, careful attention. Either they are ignored on the assumption that they are not very important and, if ignored, they will go away and not bother anyone; or they are attacked as a modern social problem — white ethnic "hard hats" who must be eliminated in order that the rational, industrial society may proceed about its business in the proper manner, freed from the influence of such encumbrances as ethnic feelings. As Greeley(1971:182) points out, "...from a state of nonexistence, white ethnic groups have become a social problem without anybody bothering to do any careful study in between".

While social scientists have avoided careful analysis of ethnic groups, lay interest has grown. There seems to be a trend today to turn back to ethnic heritage. Many young people, born and reared in America, whose parents have changed their names and broken their ties with the ancestral groups, are now interested in their ethnic origins, learning the history and even the language of the nation from which their ancestors came. Leaders of the Polish Club at Wayne State University report that their membership includes primarily immigrants and third generation, but few second generation. Again it is the phenomenon Greeley (1971:54-57, 190-191) noted: ethnicity is viewed either as a problem or as a *Gemeinschaftlich* Utopia, with immigrants and second generation taking the former view, while many third generation Americans take the latter view.

In either case, ethnic groups are seen inaccurately. They are not the wholly negative, divisive social problems which their detractors would have us believe. Neither are they the heavenly, utopian societies which their proponents hope them to be. As Greeley also points out, ethnic groups, while they may eliminate anomie and create social communality, are also rather "...narrow, rigid, doctrinaire, and...quite intolerant of privacy, creativity and diversity" (1971:191). In short, ethnic groups are just that: GROUPS. And as such, they exhibit all the characteristics of groups: the positive ones — friendship, comraderie, understanding, mutual assistance — and the not-so-pleasant ones — conflict, antagonism, restrictionism, and limitation of freedom. Our utopian view of ethnic groups might be more realistic if we attempted to analyze both aspects of ethnic life.

Most ethnic group analysts have tended to take a static view of ethnic

groups, concerning themselves with the structures of ethnic religious or family life, the number of community organizations and so on. But they often ignore the process by which such structures develop: Were they brought from the homeland or developed here? Do they change? In what ways? What factors induce change? Such questions concerning the internal social processes of ethnic groups have largely been ignored. When social process is studied in connection with ethnic groups, the focus tends to be on intergroup process, on the relationships and adaptations between members of an ethnic group and members of the dominant group or another ethnic group: Do they assimilate and acculturate easily? Are they accepted by the dominant society?

Scholars have rarely dealt with the internal process of ethnic groups: How do the members get along with one another? How have the social institutions developed? Are they accepted by all the members? What happens when they are not? Under what conditions are they altered? Lopata's recent study (1976) *Polish Americans* is an excellent contribution to the analysis of the internal process of groups, but generally this issue has been neglected by analysts.

As a result, there exists a strange, idealistic picture of ethnic groups. On the one hand they are seen by outsiders as problems for the general society: close-knit, isolated groups whose members refuse to cooperate with anyone else. On the other, they are seen (again by outsiders) as close, friendly communities, whose members care for and cooperate with each other. The truth, as Greeley points out, is somewhere in between. Members of close ethnic groups are not always closed to outside influence; they are capable of cooperation with outsiders under certain circumstances. And within the group they can exhibit rigidity, intolerance of diversity, and social conflict, as well as cohesion.

2

The Impact of the Chaldean Case

ANALYSIS of ethnic groups can make a valuable contribution to the knowledge of ethnic phenomena which play an important role in modern America. This work attempts to contribute to this store of knowledge through a case study of the ethnic phenomenon. The group studied is made up of immigrants from Iraq living in the Detroit metropolitan area. Unlike the majority of Iraqis, who are Moslems, members of the group studied are Roman Catholics. They are known as "Chaldeans", a name that has special religious significance. From the purely academic view, the Chaldeans are worthy of study. They are from the Middle East, an area which is attracting considerable interest at the present time, and newspaper stories have described the Chaldeans as being a tale from the *Arabian Nights*.

From a pragmatic standpoint, the Chaldeans represent a most important new influence on the American scene. In the last half of the twentieth century, particularly since the passage of the 1965 United States' Immigration Law and the end of the Vietnam War, there has been a new wave of migration to the U.S., and these new migrants tend to be very different from their predecessors. Due to the nature of the United States immigration quotas (Bennett, 1963), early immigrants were primarily Europeans. The 1965 Immigration Act has altered this pattern (Tomlinson, 1967), such that more Oriental and Middle Eastern migrants are now gaining admittance to the United States. Since Middle Eastern migrants, like their predecessors, tend to cluster, these new migrant groups represent a very significant influence in specific cities or regions of the country. For example, descendents from Middle Eastern countries numbered about 70,000 in the Detroit area in 1974 (Aswad, 1974:10). An ethnic cluster of such size must inevitably exert a profound influence on the surrounding community.

This is especially true in view of the fact that recent ethnic groups have

very different cultural patterns from their European predecessors, and are likely to exert considerable impact upon American society: the schools, housing patterns, occupational structure, and political process. Several Detroit schools, for example, have added Arabic speaking teachers to work with Chaldeans and other children from Detroit's large Arabic speaking population (Doctoroff, 1978:23). Social agencies have added Arabic-speaking social workers. The growing population of immigrants from Arab countries is beginning to exert pressure to alter policies of the United States government in the Middle East.

All these examples illustrate the role which recent immigrant groups are playing in American life. Adequate information on the social structure and culture of these new arrivals is necessary if the nature of this impact is to be assessed and if adequate plans to integrate these new groups into American society are to be made. As one such new immigrant group, the Chaldeans are worthy of study.

Another rationale for such a study is the theoretical contribution it makes to our knowledge about all ethnic groups. The Chaldean community offers an opportunity to study several problems which have concerned analysts of ethnicity for some time.

The effect of the migration process on the development of an ethnic community has been noted by several researchers. MacDonald and Mac Donald (1964) showed how migration occurs in a "chain" fashion, with early migrants assisting those who come later; these bring still others; and so on. Eisenstadt (1952) described migration as a process in which migrants lose many of the important objects from their former lives: the relatives, friends, position, prestige; and this can affect the kind of community migrants develop. The Chaldean community offers an opportunity to analyze three major factors which influence the process of migration and the community the migrants establish.

Legal restraints on migration have long been a major factor affecting migration. The establishment of the quota system in the early 1900s was, in fact, a deliberate move to generate a specific type of ethnic community by admitting only certain types of migrants while excluding others (Gordon, 1964:101-102). Most large American ethnic communities, Irish, Italian, Polish, and Jewish, for example, developed prior to the imposition of legal restrictions in the 1920s. The Chaldean community, however, developed almost entirely after that time. Hence, this is a community which has been established under severely restricted migration. The first important problem, then, which may be analyzed in this community is the effect of severely restricted migration on an ethnic group.

The Chaldean community is also a community which continues to have a high rate of in-migration. For most major American ethnic communities, immigration has slowed to a trickle or even stopped entirely. Chaldeans,

like the Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, continue to receive large numbers of new migrants at an even greater rate since the lifting of the quota system in 1965. Again the Chaldean community provides an opportunity to analyze two additional aspects related to the question of migration: the effect of continued migration, and the effect of the new migration laws on an ethnic community.

The nature of the immediate environment also plays a significant role in the development of ethnic institutions. Lopata (1976:134-141) has shown that the Polish have developed somewhat different communities in different cities. An ethnic group which is established in a city with heavy unemployment might be expected to have a somewhat different form than one which develops in an area where jobs are plentiful. Even the two segments of the Chaldean community tend to be somewhat different, based, in part, on the fact that one is located in the central city, the other in the suburbs. Hence, the community provides an opportunity to consider the effect of the host environment on ethnic community development.

Value of an ethnic occupation as a community unifying factor is another topic which has not been discussed sufficiently in ethnic literature. Some time ago, Stanley Freed (1957) pointed out that there are social structural techniques by which cultural groups maximize their chances of maintaining themselves as a separate group. Raymond Breton(1964), in a study of ethnic communities in Montreal, noted that groups with several ethnic institutions, such as a church, welfare organization, or newspaper, were better able to maintain their ethnic identity then those with fewer institutions. It is not generally recognized that, for some ethnic communities, an ethnic occupation may well serve as one such unifying institution. The Chaldean community has a highly developed ethnic occupation that provides it with a significant source of social contact between members, as well as a common focus of community interest. The Chaldeans thus provide an ideal case for the analysis of various aspects of the question of the role of an ethnic occupation.

Probably the aspect of ethnic experience that most studies of ethnicity consider is the nature of the acculturation-assimilation process. What changes occur in the culture and social structure of an ethnic group as a result of contact with the society into which they come? The Chaldean data shed some light on some interesting questions in the area of acculturation and assimilation.

Data collected in the Chaldean community indicate that Gordon's (1964:77) suggestion that acculturation probably precedes assimilation is a highly complicated simplistic generalization not borne out by the facts. Culture can be said to change first only if we refer to the external aspects of culture: language, dress, and food patterns, which do, in fact, change rather rapidly. There is another perhaps more basic aspect of culture, however,

which centers around norms and values of that culture: which objects are important, how people should behave and how they relate to each other. This aspect of culture apparently does not change more rapidly than social structure.

Another significant acculturation issue concerns the relative rates of change in the ethnic community versus the mother country. In most ethnic literature there appears to be an implicit assumption that the changes in the country of origin are irrelevant to the ethnic community and may be ignored. However, in a community with constant immigration, the culture of the mother country is a factor which is constantly being reintroduced by new migrants, and hence cannot be ignored. In fact, the Chaldean data suggest that the culture of the mother country has, in this case, changed more rapidly than the ethnic culture. Recent Chaldean migrants were culturally more similar to American society than their predecessors, some of whom had been here several decades. Two factors were found to account for this. Because rapid industrialization and urbanization has recently occurred in the country of origin, migrants today have, in many respects, been acculturated to an urban, industrial society prior to their arrival in Detroit. On the other hand, many early migrants made extreme efforts to preserve their culture as they remembered it. In the homeland, change can be accepted as a natural consequence of progress; in the migrant setting, it must be resisted as an intrusion of the outside world into the traditional way. As a result we find the anomolous situation of recent migrants being more "acculturated" than earlier ones.

With regard to change in the social structure, the Chaldean data raise interesting questions regarding some common assumptions about the nature of change in the ethnic social structure. In his analysis of the assimilation process, Gordon (1964:34) suggested that primary relationships were more likely to be confined to the ethnic community, with secondary relationships outside being more prevalent. However, in some respects, close relationships outside the Chaldean community, such as intermarriage, were more prevalent than membership in formal associations. This questions the common assumption that ethnic group members develop peripheral contacts with the host society first and more intimate contacts later.

Another common assumption about assimilation maintains that the person who marries outside the ethnic community has become totally assimilated into the host society (Gordon, 1964:80). The Chaldean data cast some doubt on this assumption. Comparing two types of primary contacts, intermarriage and having a "best friend" outside the community, it was found that ethnic group members were more likely to marry outside the community than to seek their best friends outside. Apparently exogamy is not a totally reliable indicator of extreme assimilation.

Consequently several questions concerning the nature of the assimilation and acculturation process can be analyzed in the Chaldean community. These include: the relative rates of change in ethnic culture and social structure; the comparative rates of change in the ethnic community and the mother country; the relative acceptability of change in the areas of primary and secondary social contacts, including marriage, close friendships, and formal organization memberships.

Another crisis that most ethnic communities must experience in the new setting is the development of an ethnic identity. Migrants, even from a single nation, bring with them many competing identities. They are members of different families; they come from different towns, cities, or regions; they may be of different religions or social classes; or they may speak different dialects. What determines which of these factors will draw a group together with a common sense of ethnic unity? The Jews, for example, have overcome substantial divergence in national origin, language, and even religious practice, to develop a strong sense of Jewish identity. Herberg (1955) suggested that the movement to a religious rather than a national identity was the coming trend in American society. Yet Greeley (1971:chap. 6,7) argues that national identity is by no means dead. Hence the question remains; what makes for the development of a sense of identity?

The Chaldeans are an interesting case study in this regard, since the community includes a wide range of competing identities based on language, social status and village of origin; and supplies the analyst with the basis to study the question of how an American ethnic group develops a sense of "Who We Are".

Finally, the nature of internal conflict is a topic too little considered with regard to ethnic communities. Both Greeley (1971:191) and Lopata (1976:74) have suggested that ethnic groups are often the locus of considerable internal competition and intolerence, yet, this negative aspect of ethnicity has not been explored. The Chaldean community, with its many competing views subsumed within a single community, offers an opportunity to examine both the nature of conflict within the ethnic group and the way cohesion is maintained in the face of conflicting views.

These theoretical questions will be analyzed. using data which were collected by the author over a twelve year period beginning in 1962. At that time a series of interviews was begun primarily with Mr. Thomas Hakim, who came to the United States in 1923 and was a prominent leader in the community until his death in 1972. Interviews were also conducted with seventy-five respondents. In addition, considerable use was made of the *Chaldean Telephone Directory*, which is published approximately every two years by the Chaldean parishes. This *Directory* lists the name, address, telephone number and often the family size, and the occupation of

the head of household for every Chaldean family in the area. These data formed the basis of a community census conducted in 1962 and 1963.

A second wave of data was collected in 1973—1974. The *Directory* for that year was used to draw two samples to whom a mailed questionnaire could be sent. In the fall of 1973, the first sample consisted of 270 persons. From these fifty-two questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 19.3 percent. Unfortunately, the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East erupted at about the same time that the questionnaires were mailed out. It is to be expected that people from an Arabic-speaking nation might be hesitant to make their feelings known during such a tense period. Therefore, a second sample of 200 was drawn in the spring of 1974 and essentially the same questionnaire was again distributed. A slightly better response rate (24%) was obtained. Both rates compare favorably with the 20 percent response rate gathered in a previous study of peoples from the Middle East (Suleiman, 1969: 37), where the social scientific survey is much less trusted than it is in the United States.

Prior to the discussion of the theoretical issues that appear in the study, Part Two provides a brief description of the community today, each chapter centering around one of the three institutions that play a key role in Chaldean life: the Church, the Family, and the ethnic occupation. An analysis of the way the Chaldean community has been affected by the problems of migration and the nature of the Detroit community also appears in Chapter Three of this book.

Immigrant groups can move in either of two directions upon their arrival in a host country. They can alter their original social and cultural patterns through acculturation and assimilation, or they can maintain a sociocultural pattern which is distinctively their own. In actuality most important groups do a bit of both, producing an ethnic culture that is partly assimilated to and distinctive from the host society. In Parts Four and Five these two responses of the Chaldean community to the migration setting are analyzed.

Ethnic community life thus tends to represent a delicate balance between retention of old country patterns and adoption of new ones from the society into which they have come. This balance is achieved through a great deal of internal strife among segments of the ethnic community with varying points of view. Such internal ethnic conflict is usually ignored by analysts of the ethnic social process. Social scientists tend to focus on the more obvious points of agreement which ethnic group members share. And ethnic peoples themselves often try to mask their differences before the eyes of "outsiders" in order to "put up a unified front". Part Six of this work will attempt to remedy this lack by analyzing the processes of internal conflict and accommodation that form an important part of Chaldean community life. Part Seven provides an overview, and suggests that future direction in which ethnicity may go.

PART II: THE CHALDEAN COMMUNITY TODAY

3

The Church

The Chaldean Community in Detroit is centered around the religious tradition that was brought from the homeland in the northern part of Iraq, the modern-day descendant of the ancient land of Mesopotamia. Furthermore, the majority of Detroit's Chaldeans hail from a single town, Telkaif, (pronounced T'l kef or T'l kef), that is located near the northern portion of the Tigris River, not far from the ruins of the ancient city of Nineveh (See, Figure I, on page 42).

Resident Telkeppes or Telkeffes have maintained a stable population of about 12,000 persons from the early twentieth century, when the first migrants began coming to Detroit. This Iraqi town was primarily a community of family farmers, most of whom raised wheat and barley, and kept herds of sheep and goats.

In many respects Telkeffes are atypical of their fellow countrymen, but primarily because of their religion, for Telkeffees are Christians while the majority of Middle Easterners are Moslems (Aswad, 1974:2-3). Since before the nineteenth century this entire area around Mosul has been a heavily Christian section of Iraq. The province of Mosul is a polyglot of Christians of various denominations: Eastern Orthodox, Protestants, Nestorians, and several rites of Roman Catholicism. Telkaif people practice a rite of Roman Catholicism known as the "Chaldean rite", which is also the name they use to identify themselves.

Chaldean Catholics are actually former Nestorians who have converted to Roman Catholicism over the centuries. While Chaldean and Nestorian religious rituals are almost identical, Chaldeans recognize the Pope of Rome as their ultimate religious leader and Nestorians do not. In any account of religious history, there exists a variety of points of view.

Obviously, the Nestorians' account of who has "chosen the better part" would differ radically from the view of the Roman Church. Each would, in effect, brand the other "heretical". The following account of the origin of the Chaldean religious group presents essentially the Chaldeans' view of themselves.

Chaldeans, having affiliated with Rome, tend to take the Roman view and have been accused by some Nestorians and Orthodox Christians of being "more Roman than Rome herself". But even within the Roman church there are differences of opinion regarding the validity of the Eastern Catholic rites. Western rite Catholics tend to turn a suspicious eye toward the Eastern Catholics with their strange languages and unusual rituals. As one Western rite Catholic priest once told me, "The Chaldeans? I never heard of them, but they're probably Orthodox". The Chaldeans are in the uncomfortable position of being "too Roman" to please other Eastern Christians and "not Roman enough" to satisfy most Western Catholics. English language sources on the Chaldean Church are generally written by outsiders: Western Catholic scholars (Adeney, 1965; Attwater, 1945, 1947, 1961-62; Rabban, 1967); Eastern scholars who are not Chaldean (Colbi, 1969; Haddad, 1970); or Protestants seeking to convert them (Perkins, 1837). Each approach has its own particular bias in recounting the Chaldean Church's history.

Nestorius was a bishop and prominent leader in the Eastern Christian Church, who was censured by Rome in the fifth century for preaching doctrines at variance with accepted Catholic doctrine. Many Christians from the area now known as Iraq followed Nestorius rather than Rome, causing a breach in the relationship between the two branches of the Church. Throughout the centuries, various segments of the followers of Nestorius have united and then broken ties with Rome several times.

The official establishment of the Chaldean Catholic Church dates from February 20, 1553, when Pope Julius III proclaimed the Bishop of Mosul "Patriarch of the Chaldeans" (Rabban, 1967:428). Having affiliated with the Roman Church, the former Nestorians continued to maintain most of their traditional rituals. As a distinct "rite" or subgrouping in the Church, they retained a degree of autonomy under the direction of their Patriarch. The name "Chaldean" was selected for the rite, probably because most of its adherents inhabited the ancient land of the Chaldeans and were believed to be descendants of the Babylonians. Actually, "Assyrian" might have been a more accurate term, since most Chaldeans were from Northern Iraq, which is nearer to the ancient city of Ashur and the old Assyrian empire. Babylon and the Chaldeans were in what is now Southern Iraq.

The union between Mosul and Rome was fraught with conflict from the beginning. While some segments of the Chaldean Church continued to recognize Rome, the Patriarch of Mosul reverted to Nestorianism in the

late 1600s (Rabban, 1967:428). Then in 1791, John Hormizd, who was Nestorian Bishop of Mosul, again accepted the authority of Rome. After considerable conflict, John IX Hormizd was named Patriarch of Mosul on July 5, 1830 (Rabban, 1967:429; See also, Attwater, 1961-62; Attwater, 1974).

Informants, in the Detroit community report hearing tales from their grandfathers concerning a decision to unite with the Papacy in about 1830. The stories tell of actual physical violence between proponents and opponents of Roman union. Nestorians who united with Rome were derisively labeled *Maghlobeen* ("the conquered") by their co-religionists who withstood the efforts of the Roman missionaries.

Chaldeans are proud of their union with Rome, and are quick to emphasize that they are indistinguishable from other Catholics from a doctrinal point of view: theological beliefs and moral codes are identical. Ritually, the Chaldeans have a distinctive set of penitential customs, style of church structure, and pattern of prayers to be followed in offering the Mass and dispensing the sacraments. In recent decades, however, a definite westernizing influence has been felt in the Chaldean Church, not only in the United States but also in Iraq. The old architectural pattern of Chaldean churches had a wall between sanctuary and people. Informants state that such walls have now largely disappeared. Detroit's Chaldean churches resemble any other Roman Catholic church in the area. In former years, Chaldeans also separated men and women at religious services, but this too has been dropped in Detroit and, reportedly, in Iraq as well. The use of the immersion method of baptism has been retained, while most other Catholics baptize by pouring water. Today marriages are held in church, but formerly they were held in the bride's home. The Chaldean rite is also more favorably disposed toward cousin marriage as commonly practiced in Middle Eastern villages. Although liturgical music in traditional Chaldean worship uses only rhythm instruments to accompany the human voice, in America the organ is allowed. Chaldean clergy were also traditionally permitted to marry, while Latin rite clergy vow celibacy. In recent years, however, the use of married clergy is also disappearing in the Chaldean rite.

Chaldeans use a liturgical language variously called "old Chaldean", "Chaldean", "Syro-Chaldaic", "Syriac", or "Aramaic". Aramaic was the language which Christ spoke; hence Detroit area Chaldeans also refer to their language as "Jesus' language". This language is clearly distinct from the secular, everyday speech used in Talkaif, although the latter is a closely related Semitic language. Educated Chaldeans who know both languages call the church language "Chaldean", the spoken language "Swathia", and claim that the two languages are not mutually understandable. Most Chaldeans only understand the dialect they use every day. In addition, recent immigrants also speak Arabic, the national language of Iraq.

The Chaldean rite claims the distinction of being an "apostolic church". As Detroit's Chaldean pastor proudly told me in 1962, they have been Catholic "from the beginning". Their people, it is claimed, were converted by Saint Thomas the Apostle on one of his journeys; by Saint Addai, a disciple of Christ; and by Saint Mari. Some Detroit Chaldeans hold that the three Magi who visited the Child Jesus shortly after his birth were from among these people. Upon the Magi's return they taught their people about the Christ, so that when Saint Thomas visited them he had little trouble converting them. The Chaldean Mass ritual is also said to have been written by Saint Addai.

Like most nations of the Middle East, Iraq has a population which is extremely diverse in character, including Moslems, Jews, and Christians of many denominations who differ not only in religious and cultural beliefs, but also in widely varying social patterns. It is also the historic homeland of the Sumerians, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Arabs, to mention a few. Different portions of the Iraqi population claim descent from one or another of the ancient peoples. Most Chaldeans claim to be descendants of the Assyrian people, whose Empire was ruled from the city of Ashur (Olmstead, 1923:1) and included modern Northern Iraq. Their Aramaic language lends credence to this contention since the Aramaic language is said to have been spoken among the Assyrian people (Perrot and Chipiez, 1884,: Vol. I:18).

In their homeland, the Christian beliefs of Chaldeans starkly differentiate them from the surrounding society. As Christians in a predominantly Moslem society, they draw a sharp distinction between themselves and other Iraqis. Furthermore, many of Detroit's Chaldeans had left Iraq before its establishment as a separate nation and prior to the rise of Arab nationalism. Consequently, most members of the Detroit community think of themselves as Chaldeans or Telkeffees, rather than Iraqis.

Recent immigrants, however, have lived in urban areas of Iraq and some exhibit a greater sense of nationalism and sympathy with the Arab cause. They are still relatively few in number, which is not surprising in view of the historic relations between Christian and Moslem. A common sense of nationalism between Christian and Moslem is a new movement and has far to go to overcome the longstanding divisions in the Arab world according to class, region and tribe as well as religion (Berger, 1962:266).

These divisions were immensely complicated during the period of Western colonization in the area (Berger, 1962:294-298 ; Sharabi, 1966:23-41). Various Western European powers with territories in the area drew boundaries between them by agreements among the colonial powers, often with little regard for the cultural heritage of the indigenous population. Sometimes this may have been done through ignorance; however, some colonial powers deliberately divided historically unified groups so as to render them incapable of effective revolt. Indeed, some colonial powers distinctly selected specific cultural groups to serve in positions of leadership because they represented minority subgroups,

and could be depended upon to assist the colonialists in the consolidation of their power against that of the dominant local cultural group.

The political and religious tensions in the homeland have provided an impetus for many Chaldeans to want to migrate. Religious persecution, or at least a feeling of uncertainty regarding religious freedom (Badger, 1852:163), has often been mentioned as a reason for leaving Iraq. Some authorities point out that the relations between Christians and the dominant Moslems in the Middle East have been strained at times, to say the least (Hourani, 1946:126). However, though early immigrants report having left the village to escape the pressures of being members of a minority religion, many recent Chaldean emigrants, who have lived in the area since the establishment of the Iraqi nation, claim to have felt no pressures.

Though religious tension may not be a primary reason to migrate today, religion does become an essential rallying point for the Chaldeans in their new land.

The Chaldean Church in Detroit

Most Chaldean community activities in Detroit center around the Church. Even Chaldeans who are not religious find themselves drawn to the Church fairly often for weddings, funerals, meetings, and various social gatherings. In this respect the Chaldean community is like many other late 19th and early 20th century American immigrant groups. Glazer and Moynihan (1970: 217-287) have noted that family and religion play the key role in the lives of Irish Catholics. For Italians, the structure of the family and the view of Catholicism differ from that of the Irish, but again both institutions play a key role (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970: 181-216). For East European Jews, though the religious structure and beliefs are different, the religion and family are again of considerable importance (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970: 137-180). The same could be said of the Polish Catholics, German Lutherans, and other groups. Understanding the family and religious institutions of an ethnic community does much to promote an understanding of the community itself.

For the first two decades of the Chaldean community's existence (1910 to about 1930), there were few Chaldeans in Detroit, and most efforts were centered around establishing themselves locally and reuniting with families (most of whom had been left behind in Iraq). During this very early period there was little effort to establish their own Chaldean Church. From 1930 to 1947 community activity seems to have concentrated on establishing a Chaldean Church and obtaining a Chaldean priest from Iraq. Religion was a traditional center of Telkeffee village life and it remains so for Telkeffees in Detroit. Unlike Catholic immigrants from most nationalities they were not able to obtain services similar to those in their homeland simply by attending the local Catholic Church. Analysts of the Italian American community

point out that this group was served primarily by Irish American priests. To some extent, the Catholicism of Italians differs from that of the Irish, causing many problems (Gans, 1962:112-114 Tomasi, 1975). But at least the Latin ritual followed by the Irish priests was the same as that followed in their Italian homeland. Chaldean rituals, however, are quite unlike any other available in the United States. Chaldeans share doctrines and moral codes with other Catholics, but if they are to enjoy the familiar rituals, they must attend the Chaldean Church.

Chaldean rite Catholics in Detroit were without the services of a priest of their own rite for over thirty years, the first Chaldeans having arrived around 1912, the first Chaldean priest in 1947. During that first quarter century, Chaldeans were forced to rely upon other priests for their rituals and services. Most report having attended Mass at the nearest Latin rite Catholic parish, and many also sent their children to Latin rite Catholic schools.

For special events, such as weddings and funerals, some Chaldeans attended St. Maron's Church, which was located in the 1940s at 1555 E. Congress Street in Detroit. St. Maron's is a church of the Maronite rite, an Arabic-speaking Catholic rite which serves Detroit's Lebanese community. Their language and ritual are similar to that of the Chaldeans and members of the Chaldean community could feel more at ease with their service. The Church was also located near the center of the Chaldean population at that time, because most residences were in the vicinity of Jefferson Avenue and East Grand Boulevard. The first marriage between two Telkeffees to take place in Detroit (and probably in the United States) occurred at St. Maron's on November 30, 1922, between George Essa and Susan Yalda.

In the 1930s leaders of the Chaldean community, by that time numbering approximately 120 persons, began to plan for the establishment of a parish of their own rite. World War II, however, made immigration difficult and the prospect of obtaining an Iraqi priest was bleak. At the conclusion of the war in 1945, they renewed their efforts until the Latin rite Archbishop of Detroit, the late Edward Cardinal Mooney, and the leader of the Chaldean Rite in Mosul, Iraq, Patriarch Joseph Emmanuel Thomas II, arranged for the establishment of a Chaldean Mission at Detroit. The first pastor, Fr. Thomas (Rauphael) Bidawid, arrived in Detroit on February 23, 1947. Lacking a church building, he used the facilities of various Latin rite parishes, chiefly the Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament and the Monastery Chapel of the Carmelite Sisters, which was formerly located at 1534 Webb Avenue in Detroit.

The official founding date of the parish is listed as March 9, 1947. In December, 1947, a Protestant church located at Euclid and Second Avenues in the center of the community, was purchased and renovated for use as a Chaldean rite church. The church was blessed and dedicated by the Auxiliary

Bishop of Detroit, Allan Babcock, on August 15, 1948. Father Bidawid named the church "Mother of God", a most interesting title in the light of the rite's former Nestorian ties. The single most important point on which Nestorius diverged from the Roman church was his rejection of the Virgin Mary's right to the title of "Mother of God". The Chaldean parish name is, therefore, a symbol of its unity with Rome, a unity which is jealously guarded by the group. The first Chaldean church was condemned in 1932 for highway development, but a former funeral parlor located at 10213 Hamilton Avenue, Detroit, was purchased by the Chaldean community in April, 1953 (See, Figure II, Appendix), remodeled for use as a church, and dedicated by Henry Donnelly, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, on April 8, 1956.

Two churches have since taken the place of the Hamilton Avenue church (See, Figure III, Appendix). The original parish, bearing the name "Mother of God", is located in a new structure on Burt Road near Ten Mile Road, in suburban Southfield. It was dedicated by the Chaldean Patriarch from Baghdad during a visit to Detroit on May 15, 1973, and under the pastorship of Monsignor George Garmo it serves Chaldeans living in Oakland County. Under the direction of Reverend Jacob Yasso, a second parish renovated from a store on Seven Mile road between Woodward Avenue and John R Street in Detroit, serves families in Wayne and Macomb counties. The building has been altered to resemble the Gate of Ishtar in Ancient Babylon, and its name, "Sacred Heart", is the name of one of the two churches which are located in the village of Telkaif.

The two present parishes are well situated, one in the city and one in the suburbs, making it relatively convenient for most Chaldeans to attend services at one of the Chaldean churches. There is no stringent requirement that they do so, however. Catholics are urged to attend their own rite regularly, but Church regulations require only that a Catholic attend the rite to which he belongs on three occasions: for baptism, for marriage and for burial. Catholic priests are instructed not to accept requests for such services from members of another rite, without first obtaining the permission of the pastor of the nearest parish of the proper rite, unless, of course, there is no parish of that rite in the immediate vicinity. Theoretically, therefore, a Latin rite priest in Detroit should not marry, baptize, or bury a Chaldean without the permission of the Chaldean priest. With regard to weekly Mass, however, Chaldeans and Latin rite Catholics can satisfy their obligations at each others' churches. In practice, many Chaldeans attend the nearest Latin rite church whenever it is inconvenient to travel to the Chaldean church.

There are reasons other than convenience that draw Chaldeans to the Latin rite churches. Until recently, many American born Chaldeans were educated in Latin rite schools, most of which required attendance at the Latin Mass, and spent considerable time explaining the liturgy in school. However, as there are extreme differences in ritual from one rite to another, a person

who understands the symbolism of the Mass ritual in one rite may lack the background to understand that of another rite. Many Chaldeans, especially those educated in Latin rite schools in Detroit (or possibly even Baghdad) do not, in fact, understand the symbolism of the Chaldean ritual. Such Chaldean children know the Latin rite service well, but their knowledge of the Chaldean Mass is limited to what they have been able to grasp from their parents and from sporadic attendance at the Chaldean church.

Until recent years, attempts on the part of the Chaldean pastors to teach the Chaldean ritual were sporadic and short-lived. Furthermore, the traditional language of the Chaldean ritual is old Aramaic and considerably different from the spoken language of the Chaldean community. Even those American reared Chaldeans who were fairly fluent in modern conversational Chaldean were unable to understand the language of the Chaldean Mass, and most preferred the familiar Latin rite service. Recent immigrants have a problem, for their native language is Arabic rather than Aramaic. Since the late 1960s all Roman Catholics celebrate the Mass in the vernacular. The Chaldean priests have also responded to this movement by offering the Chaldean Mass in all three languages: Chaldean (old Aramaic) for the traditionalists, Arabic for recent immigrants, and English for the American born.

Since the establishment of the first Chaldean parish, the Church has fulfilled many functions for the community besides its obvious role in worship. The Chaldean Church serves as a central focus with which nearly all Chaldeans can identify. The "Chaldean" identity is essentially a religious one, centered upon alliance with a unique religious group. A highly Americanized young woman commented, "I don't go to the services very often, but I'm always conscious of the fact that I am a Chaldean. And I would never do anything to embarrass my heritage". One of the last remnants of Chaldean life for many peripheral members of the community is this sense of identity.

Another important role the Church assumes is as the center for key socioreligious events, both personal rites of passage and special feasts. Chaldeans are very family oriented, and the Church serves as the center for frequent personalized socioreligious activities: baptisms, weddings, funerals. Members are drawn to the church for the First Communion of children, their own as well as of neices, nephews, cousins, and grandchildren. Memorial Masses for deceased Chaldeans attract their relatives to the Church, especially during the first few months after bereavement and on the first anniversary of death. Christmas and Easter are also socio religious days of considerable importance, and persons who are otherwise nonreligious are again drawn to the Church.

At these and other times, the Church is an important social center for the community. Even Sunday Mass is as much a social event as a religious ritual. Members of the community congregate outside the church after Mass to

exchange greetings and gossip. If the Mass has been offered for the intentions of a particular family, such as an anniversary Mass of a deceased member, members of that family are often the center of social activity for the day. Because of the social character of the services, American born Chaldeans attend the Chaldean Mass fairly often. Even though many prefer the Latin rite Mass because the Chaldean Mass is foreign to them, they often attend the Chaldean services, "to see the people".

However, for some the extreme social character of the services detracts from them. A few Chaldeans, primarily people with tenuous community ties, avoid the Chaldean services because they feel that "people don't go there to pray. They go to see how everyone is dressed!" One man was so disturbed by the social nature of these services that he even refused to attend with his parents when they visited from Iraq. He drove them to the Chaldean Church for Mass and returned later to pick them up. "When I go there I don't feel like I've been to church", he complained. On the whole, however, the social nature of the services probably draws more people to the Church than it drives away.

The Chaldean Church also serves as a focus for community activities which are nonreligious in character. Most organizations in the community — the Iraqi Chaldean Association, the Chaldean Ladies of Charity, the Chaldean Youth Club — are established under the auspices of one of the Chaldean parishes. Meetings of all types are held in the church hall or rectory. The Church is a center for education, a process which goes in two directions at once. As Gordon (1964:244) says, ethnic communities "face two ways": toward the familiar ways of the old country, and toward adjustment to the new society.

At the ethnic church the immigrant finds a setting where his native language, either Chaldean (Aramaic) or Arabic, or both, is known and used, where family and religious customs are familiar; and where the attitudes and ideas are similar to his own. At the same time it is a place where he can get assistance with learning English, hints on starting a business, and help with any number of problems in adjusting to American society. Looking toward assimilation, the Chaldean parishes have offered English and citizenship classes for immigrants. Looking toward the original culture, they have offered classes in Arabic and Aramaic so that American born Chaldeans can learn their linguistic heritage and communicate more effectively with newcomers in their families. Thus, the newcomers' adjustment is facilitated by his association with a group which, like himself is oriented toward two different cultures.

In recent years, the Chaldean parishes have also introduced religious education classes for children. Previously when most Chaldean children attended Latin rite schools, the Chaldean priests had depended upon these schools to provide the Chaldean children's religious training. Doctrine and

moral principles were the same, and only customs and ritual differed. Yet Latin rite schools emphasized the customs of the Latin rite, and Chaldean children were drawn away (often unintentionally) from the Chaldean rite. Today with fewer Catholic schools operating, more Chaldean parents are sending their children to public schools, and looking to the Chaldean churches for religious training classes.

If the Church is the central institution for Chaldeans, the priest is the person to whom Chaldeans turn in times of happiness or trouble. Such reliance upon religious leaders seems to be characteristic of most ethnic groups which have a strong religious orientation. The Catholic priest exercised extreme influence among Irish and Polish immigrants; and the rabbi was consulted by orthodox Jews with all types of problems. Similarly, the Chaldean priest is expected to handle all difficulties, especially by immigrant Chaldeans who know no one else to consult. The priest becomes more than a priest. He becomes the lawyer to consult regarding immigration problems; the social worker who helps with family problems; and the counselor regarding financial problems. Some problems he refers elsewhere, but many difficulties he handles himself. Ethnic community leaders, laymen as well as clerics, are often called upon to accompany their members to immigration hearings and eventually they become more familiar with immigration problems than the average American lawyer. These community leaders can also help with marriage and family problems more effectively than an American social worker or marriage counselor, since they understand the traditional ethnic customs that apply to the situation at hand.

For Chaldeans, as for other groups which preceded them, the ethnic Church tends to take on a sort of omnipotent character, being all things to all people in the community. It is the center of their religious beliefs and feelings. It is the center of their social life — the central meeting place, the source of gossip, the locus of key organizations and social groups. And it is the source to which members of the ethnic community can go for help in solving their problems. If their religious leader cannot solve the problems, some direction to the correct source for help can also be given. In its attempt to be "all things to all people", the ethnic Church is never completely successful. Nonetheless, it is immensely helpful to new immigrants, adults and children alike, attempting to adjust to a strange new culture. As time passes, new institutions not associated with the church are established to serve the ethnic community. In the Chaldean community there have been several: two Arabic newspapers, Arabic and Chaldean radio programs, and organizations such as the Iraqi Club. To date, however, none have begun to approach the importance of the Chaldean Church to the community.

4

The Family

IT has been noted that family and Church are major institutions in Chaldean life. A further description of family structure and the key role it plays in the life of the individual and of the community (See also, Sengstock, 1975) will give emphasis to this. Social contacts between members of a Chaldean family are frequent and close, and extend not only to members of the nuclear family but also to more distant kin. Chaldeans jokingly comment that all Chaldeans are *nashwatha* ("cousins") to each other. The family is also of immense aid to immigrants, helping them come to this country and supporting them once they arrive.

Until recently, family studies in the United States have been plagued by what one sociologist has called "The Myth of the Middle Class Family" (Heiskanen, 1971: 14). These studies picture the typical American family as an isolated nuclear unit in which husband, wife, and their minor children establish a home apart from either spouse's family, and have little contact, if any, with extended kin (Wirth, 1938; Zimmerman, 1947; Parsons, 1949; Parsons and Bales, 1955). Increasingly, studies of American ethnic groups have questioned the breadth of applicability of this view. Immigrants tend to bring with them a tradition of extended family contact and this tradition remains strong after their arrival.

As Prothro and Diab (1974:61-62) point out, the traditional family structure in the Middle East was patrilineal, extended and endogamous. Households were established for the extended family rather than an individual nuclear unit; descent was traced through the father, with land and possessions being handed down from father to son; and marriages occurred between persons of the same village, or even the same family, as cousin marriages were often preferred (See also, Berger 1962:112; Patai, 1969:84-85; Sweet, 1974:48; Kassen, 1972; Ibrahim and Hopkins, 1977).

It is widely recognized today that this picture is more ideal than real, since the extended family which resides together has not been the norm in the Middle East for most of the twentieth century (Prothro and Diab, 1974:62; Farsoun, 1974:257 - 258). As an ideal it assumes considerable "...psychological importance, however, for it reveals wishes and values widely held..." (Prothro and Diab, 1974:62). For the older Chaldeans, born and reared in Telkaif in the early twentieth century, the extended patrilineal family definitely remains an ideal. Sons were to remain in the paternal household; together with their wives and children, and at the father's death, the eldest son became the head of the family. The ideal household thus consisted of husband and wife, their sons, their sons' wives and children, and their unmarried daughters, with the household supported by all the men working as a group. A few Telkeffees were shopkeepers, but most were farmers who worked the lands owned by the extended family. Older Chaldeans today recall this ideal, whether accurate or not, and try to induce their children to live with them after marriage. .

Even though Middle Eastern families have tended to forsake extended family residential patterns, it is clear that the extended family still occupies a very important role in Middle Eastern society. Prothro and Diab (1974: 67 —68) point out that about half of the wives in one village had lived with the husband's parent for at least a part of their married lives. And where extended families do not share the same house, they often locate their nuclear households in close proximity to each other (Williams, 1968:15). Most importantly, extended families continue to be what Farsoun (1974:257) has called a "functionally extended family". That is, the household is nuclear, but the family retains its economic, political, religious and stratification functions. In her study of a Middle Eastern village, Aswad (1971) found that the household unit was the nuclear family, but the extended family fulfilled a function of major importance as the property holding unit: all lands were held in the name of the extended family, rather than the nuclear unit or an individual. Thus, the Chaldean family in Detroit is what might be called a "functionally extended family", particularly in the economic sphere (getting jobs for members, forming business partnerships, and loaning money).

That this general picture of the Middle Eastern family is applicable to Telkaif is confirmed by Al-Nouri (1964:1 - 9; 200 - 206), who provides additional data on Telkeffee social patterns. He notes that the sexual division of labor was strict. Father and sons handled the heavy farming activities, while the women cared for the house and children. Women married young, usually at about twelve years of age. Men were generally ten to fifteen years older than their wives. Telkeffee couples had large families, usually eight or more children. (Even in Detroit, Chaldean families are relatively large, the median size for nuclear families being 5.6 in 1963.) In Telkaif, however, maternal and neonatal health measures were poor and there was a high

infant death rate. Hence, the number of children who reached adulthood was usually smaller in Telkaif than in the United States.

The father of a Telkeffee family according to Al-Nouri was the unquestioned head of the household. His wife, his children, even his adult sons were expected to bow to his wishes. Men of Telkaif looked forward to the day when they would head a household of married sons, grandchildren, perhaps even great-grandchildren, and would thus be entitled to be known as *baba* or "father of many". In addition to the *baba*, his wife, and their lineal descendants, many Telkeffee households included more distant kin. A man, following his father's death, was required to assume the support of his mother, his widowed sisters-in-law, his single sisters, as well as other relatives being supported by his father. Most men, Al-Nouri notes, willingly assumed this responsibility, for the larger the number of kin a man supported, the greater was his prestige in the town. Men often referred to these kin whom they supported as my *ardagh*, or my "dignity".

Like the villages studied by Prothro and Diab (1974:64 —65), Telkaif was almost entirely endogamous: nearly all young people married persons from their own village. Exogamy was highly frowned upon, and the few exogamous couples are said to have been severely ostracized. Several generations of intermarriage produced a village in which every Telkeffee could trace a relationship, either by blood or marriage, to almost every other village resident. All but a handful (less than 5%) of Detroit's Chaldean community can trace their ancestry back to this single town. Many recent immigrants, however, have had little contact with their ancestral village, having been born and reared in urban centers, chiefly in Baghdad, the major Iraqi city. Many of these Chaldeans are accustomed to a nuclear family style, which is characteristic of industrial centers of the Middle East (Prothro and Diab, 1974:68 —70; Ibrahim and Hopkins, 1977:85 —86).

For the older immigrants, however, the preferred pattern is that which they claim to have followed in Telkaif; a strong extended family which lived together in a single household and cooperated in all the tasks of daily life. These older immigrants have frequently complained that the strength of extended kin ties has diminished in the United States. A major source of displeasure is their belief that Chaldean youth, once married, resist establishing a household with their parents. Their impression is probably accurate, for many young people commented unfavorably upon the possibility of an extended family household. Many young marrieds had experienced parental pressure to live with them; nearly everyone had friends who had experienced such pressure; and none viewed with pleasure the prospect of living with the "old folks". It is interesting to note, however, that in the extended and expanded family, as opposed to the nuclear family, living arrangements appear to be considerably more characteristic of Chaldean families than of

most American couples.[1] Thus Winch (1968:130), using 1959 - 1960 data from the U.S. Census, found that less than one married couple in ten had relatives other than their own unmarried children living with them. In contrast, the 1962—1963 survey indicated that seventy-four percent of Chaldean couples lived in nuclear households. This leaves fully one-fourth whose living arrangements included relatives other than their own unmarried children. To the early immigrants, who remember Telkaif as a village wholly composed of extended family households, this constitutes an abandonment of the "old way", but the Chaldeans obviously have more households which are nonnuclear than the majority of Americans. Even Chaldeans who are married to non-Chaldeans often include relatives in the household, especially when the relative is an aged parent.

Although the true extended family household is rather rare in the Chaldean community, it does occur. Most often these are instances in which one child remains with his parents after marriage and brings his wife (or less frequently her husband) to live there. They continue to live there as children are born and grow up. The household then consists of two complete nuclear units; the grandparent generation with any unmarried children who remain at home, and the adult child with his (her) spouse and children. A less frequent type is the family in which two members of the same generation — usually two brothers together with their wives and children — establish a household together. I know of two households in the Chaldean community in which two brothers, each with a wife and several children, have made their home together over a period of several years. However, few couples agree to make their home with another nuclear unit over an indefinite period. Most living arrangements which include persons other than the nuclear family are more limited both in duration and in number of additional persons. Thus, a young couple may make their home with one of their parents, but as children begin to arrive they form a household of their own. Or they may move back, or have their parents move in with them when the parents are advanced in age. Meanwhile, both households would be classified as nuclear most of the time. In addition for periods anywhere from one month to several years most nuclear households serve as hosts to one or more various relatives who need a place to stay: an aunt visiting from Iraq, a niece or nephew in school, or a new immigrant couple who have not yet found a place of their own. This is more accurately termed an "expanded family household", one including a complete nuclear unit plus one or more additional persons.

Many couples who have relatives living with them are couples composed of an immigrant and an American born Chaldean. This pattern reflects to

[1] Household living arrangements may be classifed as: *nuclear*, including husband, wife, and unmarried children, if any; *extended* including two separate, relatively intact nuclear units; and *expanded* including a nuclear unit plus one to two single persons, such as grandparents, aunt or uncle (Pitkin, 1954:114). I shall combine both extended and expanded households under the term "non-nuclear".

some extent the pattern of immigration within the community. Most such couples are "passport marriages", the husband (or less frequently the wife) having come to the United States as a student or visitor and remained here through marriage to an American born Chaldean citizen. They are often anxious to assist parents, siblings, and other relatives in coming to the United States. Bringing them as cohabitants of the same household is an economical arrangement. Hence, in most nonnuclear households, one spouse, as well as the extended family members included in the household, are immigrants. Some of these households became permanent arrangements. Many others were temporary arrangements, lasting only a few months or years until the newcomers had the wherewithal to establish their own households. This is especially true where the extra relations are of the same generation as the couple. Brothers and sisters might be expected to marry and form their own household while aged parents would be less likely to do so.

It would be difficult to classify most Chaldean households as any specific type on a permanent basis. One might describe a major pattern of Chaldean living arrangements as an "intermittently expanded household". That is, over a period of years, a given household may be a true extended family type for a short period of time, a nuclear type most of the time, and an expanded type for periods ranging from a few months to a few years in duration. Most often the additional persons would be new arrivals from the old country.

If other aspects of family life are considered, the extended family is seen to have even more influence in the Chaldean community. In this community, as in other ethnic groups, the families of husband and wife are of considerable importance in the couple's life. There are usually a large number of kin living nearby; they visit each other often; and there are strong economic ties between them. On all of these measures, the Chaldean extended family remains strong. Nearly all Chaldeans have relatives in the Detroit area, with whom they have constant contact, both visiting them and giving various kinds of assistance.

One of the major practical functions which the presence of extended family kin continues to serve is that of economic assistance. The extended family reportedly served many economic functions in the old world (Al-Nouri, 1964: Chap. 1). It has retained many of these functions in the United States, not only for the immigrants but also for the American born Chaldeans, many of whom are engaged in economic ventures with parents, siblings, or in-laws in the Detroit area. The family also provides loans to its members; many Chaldeans prefer informal loans from the family to formal loans from banks or credit agencies.

The extended family also provides economic assistance in times of difficulty. If a man dies, his father or brother is expected to care for his widow and children. Kin are also expected to care for the aged and the sick. It is unheard

of for a Chaldean family to place its old people in a home for the aged. "We wouldn't send our parents there!" one Chaldean commented with regard to what is recognized as a rather nice nursing home in the area. Sick persons are placed in a hospital for necessary treatment, but recuperation takes place at home. Only in extreme cases (a severely retarded child, for example) is long-term institutional care ever considered. Failure to provide such care would bring great shame to a family. Conversely, the family which cares well for its needy members attains status in the community, not only because they have shown concern for the extended family, but also because it indicates they have the economic wherewithal to do so.

Informal social relations with extended family members are also strong in spite of the fact that extended family living arrangements have diminished. Most Chaldeans, immigrants and American born alike, visit or entertain their parents and siblings more than once a week. When asked to name a "closest friend", Chaldeans are very likely to mention a close relative. Many activities of the Chaldean community that are ostensibly religious or community functions seem in reality to have as their primary objective the establishment of an additional context in which extended kin can get together.

It is interesting to note that the American born Chaldeans, in many respects, appear to be more family oriented than some immigrants. While visiting for the immigrant often includes nonrelatives, Chaldeans born and reared in America frequently confine their visiting to members of the extended family.

As in other ethnic groups, the major tie that many second generation Americans have with their ethnic communities is the family. Lacking these family ties, many would probably not have any ethnic contacts. Immigrants are drawn to the ethnic community by a desire to be with people from their own social and cultural background. Their children are drawn to it by extended family ties. Many young Chaldeans admitted they went to the Chaldean church only because "my family wants me to". Some do not even think of themselves as Chaldeans any longer; yet their social contacts are almost exclusively with their Chaldean extended family. One Chaldean woman, whose non-Chaldean husband was in business with her father and brothers, denied belonging to the community: "I'm not really Chaldean — I'm just close to these people because I grew up with them". Another assured me that, since her marriage to a non-Chaldean, "I'm not in the Chaldean community anymore". It is true that she rarely attended the Chaldean Church. But she lived in a Chaldean neighborhood; her children played with Chaldean children; she worked as a clerk in a grocery store; and her closest ties were with her two sisters, whose daughters babysat for her children.

For such persons the ethnic community is almost exclusively the extended family. On a limited number of occasions, their family ties draw them into broader ethnic contacts. For immigrants, however, the ethnic group appears

to draw their interest, rather than the extended family alone. Few studies of the third generation have been done to date. There are some indications that the third generation may experience a revival of interest in the ethnic group for its own sake (Greeley, 1971:191). Ethnic clubs tend to include the first and third generation but few members of the second generation. Perhaps interest in the ethnic group itself is rekindled in the third generation. In the second generation, ethnic ties seem to be confined to the family. This is true with the Chaldeans and may be true of other groups as well.

Chaldean extended families also exert a great deal of influence over the lives of their members. Many young Chaldeans, immigrants and American born, consider family wishes in planning the course of their lives. Chaldean men chose their jobs on the basis of the needs or desires of the family: "to make my mother happy"; "my brother needed help in his store"; "my father wanted me to" et cetera. Although family wishes play an important role in the choices of a spouse, the strictly arranged marriage system that once existed in Telkaif is not practiced in the Detroit community. What exists is a modified arranged marriage system in which parents do not hesitate to make known their preferences to their children, often at length and with considerable vigor: "No daughter of mine will marry an American!" "You can't marry that girl; her grandfather cleaned privies in Baghdad!" "You should marry a girl from _____ family; they are good people and will have a good daughter". Many young Chaldeans openly state they intend to follow their parents' advice. One young man told me, "I will pick a girl by the family. We believe the family is more important, that a good family will raise a good girl." Then he added, "I suppose it's possible for a good family to have a bad daughter. But it's not very likely." He and others like him were quite willing to let their parents play a key role in selecting their spouses.

Families also exert a more subtle influence. One couple were the objects of a plot on the part of their respective families to "get them together". The boy's uncle told me "When my nephew dates someone else, I tell him to have a good time. When he dates Margaret, I tell him to have a good time and give him $20! [2] Such an economic subsidy can have considerable influence, especially for a young man whose funds are limited!" From the girl's point of view, she is usually discouraged from dating anyone. Having her parents' permission to go out (as long as they are not too obvious about their approval) is usually sufficient impetus for her to date the young man. Behind-the-scenes plotting on the part of families is often quite successful. Several young married couples assured me that, "Our marriage wasn't arranged; we picked each other". Yet other information revealed they had been the objects of a well-planned family plot to bring about a match. Older

[2] Incidentally, the plot was successful and the couple were married a short time later.

Chaldeans comment, "If we can only get them together, nature will take its course".

The immense importance of the extended family in Chaldean life does not preclude a role for the nuclear family, however. The nuclear family household, with no relatives living there, is still the predominant type. And the tie between husband and wife is strong. Of marriages witnessed by a Catholic priest (excluding passport marriages before a judge), I heard of perhaps six or eight divorces in over a decade of contact with the Chaldeans, and all of these were exogamous unions.

The nuclear unit tends to be centered around the mother. The father's relationship with his young children has been traditionally weak in the Chaldean community because child rearing is considered solely "women's work". Although Chaldean men do relatively little work around the house, this too is changing. Chaldean men even admit that the near royal position of the old Chaldean father is gone forever, and Chaldean fathers today are being drawn more and more into family life. In his analysis of Italians, Gans (1962:50 - 53) observed that extended family ties take precedence over the husband-wife bond. The Chaldean family does not resemble this pattern. Americans rarely understand the strength of the relationship which can develop under an arranged or modified arranged marriage system. A few couples may be personally incompatible. But most find that their common cultural background provides them with a great deal to share, and many years together give them even more. Indeed, young Chaldeans often see this as a major appeal of the arranged marriage. One said, "These old people — they share everything together!"

Social affairs may be extended family gatherings, but a man and his wife join their brothers and sisters, parents and in-laws, and they all sit together in a large group. There may be some separation (a small group of men here, of women there), but there is no general pattern by which the nuclear units break up into the men in one room, the women in another. This separation formerly existed at the church, with men seated on one side, women on the other. But today the nuclear unit remains together even at church. Chaldeans, especially the younger ones, attend ethnic community activities primarily to be with the extended family. But apparently they attend and participate as a husband-wife unit, and not as separate individuals. The pattern seems to resemble the one which Firth (1936:130) observed with Tikopia. He noted that the Tikopia extended family was very strong and had far-ranging functions, but in community social matters the nuclear family moved as a unit.

In conclusion, one must characterize the Chaldean extended family as an institution of extreme importance. With the Church it is one of the two most important institutions in the community. Moreover, extended family living arrangements are more common among Chaldeans than in the United States

population as a whole. Chaldeans have substantial contact with their extended families, not only through business dealings but also through the common custom of visiting, especially to the homes of siblings. In the 1962 sample, the "closest friend" for nearly half of the respondents was a relative.

Participation in the extended family does not, however, exist at the expense of the husband-wife relationship. The nuclear unit of husband-wife retains a considerable degree of importance, and surrounds itself with many extended family contacts, drawn from the families of origin of both husband and wife. In fact, participation in the ethnic community is, for many of them, essentially participation in activities of the extended family.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be derived from these data are their implications for the changing character of ethnicity. Ethnicity apparently has a very different meaning for American reared ethnic group members than it does for their parents. For immigrants, the tie to the ethnic group is largely an historical cultural tie to the land of their origin. However, for their children, who have neither memory of the "old country", nor any feeling of identity or loyalty to it, "ethnicity" is a social rather than a cultural tie. This point has been made by Gans (1962) and others (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). The social tie which binds such persons to their ethnic heritage is their tie to the extended family. Lacking extended family ties — parents, siblings, other kin — most American reared persons would cease to have any contact with the ethnic group.

5

The Ethnic Occupation[3]

FOR most nationality groups that have settled in the United States during the past century, Church (or Synagogue) and family have formed the central focus of their lives. Yet, for some immigrant groups an additional focus exists. In the Chaldean community as with the Chinese, the Italian and a few others, a common economic enterprise serves further to unite the community. (Gordon (1964:35) has noted that most ethnic groups do not have a community occupation, but for those that do, the ethnic occupation exerts a influence on the community. For the Chaldeans, the retail grocery business is the main occupation and a major topic of conversation. An understanding of this economic institution is as crucial to the analysis of this community as the study of its family and religion.

The 1917 *City Directory for Detroit* (p. 1179) lists a grocery store on Pasadena in Highland Park, under the ownership of George Najor and Thomas Kory. Six years later a store owned by Louis Najor and David Oraw is listed at 117 East Forest in Detroit *(Detroit-City Directory,* 1923 — 24: 1701 — 2). These were the first two stores in what has been the main support of the Chaldean community to the present time. In 1923, at the end of the first decade of the community's existence, early arrivals owned four stores: Thomas Hakim and Namo (Namen) Lossia owned a store at John R and Montcalm Streets; Joe John Assar, Namo Kassa, and Peter Namen owned a store on Park Avenue at Sibley Street: David Oraw owned a store across the street from theirs; and George and Louis Najor owned a store on East Jefferson Avenue. As their friends and relatives arrived they worked in the

stores until they had the resources to buy their own. By 1962, Chaldeans owned 120 grocery stores of various sizes; and by 1972 there were 278. In the 1962 community census, over half of the nuclear families were found to be supported primarily from some type of food and grocery merchandising.

Most were connected with single owner retail food stores — the "Mom and Pop" type store, owned and operated by one man, with his wife and children the only employees. Such stores carry a limited stock, and are open from early morning to late night. Some stores have expanded as several store owners formed partnerships in a larger store with increased stock at greater discount. This also allows each owner more free time, because partners rotate the operation of the store each day. The larger stores often employ non-Chaldeans, particularly persons who live in the neighborhood and are of similar ethnic background to the local customers.

In addition, some Chaldean businessmen have gone into the wholesale food industry, taking advantage of their ethnic contacts with a large number of retail outlets. Several Chaldeans own wholesale milk distributorships, linen supply firms, distributorships for snack foods, notions, paper supplies, etc. Furthermore, many Chaldeans, particularly new immigrants, obtain employment with non-Chaldean wholesale food suppliers, who hire them with the expectation they can deliver the substantial Chaldean market.

In an ethnic group with a complex and widespread economic operation, profound effects are produced on all other aspects of the ethnic group life. The family, community organizations, and the church are all closely tied to the occupation by which the bulk of the members make their living.

The strong economic tie in the Chaldean community helps preserve its strong family ties. Grocery store owners ease their work load and increase their capital by joining forces with relatives. Many Chaldeans work in close cooperation with relatives: father and son (or son-in-law), two brothers or brothers-in-law, uncle and nephew, or cousins often form partnerships in economic ventures. In 1962, nearly forty percent of Chaldeans who had adult relatives in Detroit were engaged in business ventures with them, either as equal partners or as employer-employee. Both types of working arrangements encourage close family ties as members work together everyday.

These business establishments also provide assistance for relatives and friends in Iraq who wish to immigrate. American immigration law requires that prospective immigrants be assured of a job on their arrival. Any ethnic community that has a strong economic structure can aid immigration considerably. Thus, the Chinese laundry or restaurant, the Jewish bakery or butcher shop, and the Chaldean grocery store have much in common with the Italian padrone who controlled jobs on construction sites. All help unite the community toward common economic ends: the support of people from their ethnic background already here, and the provision of jobs for those who

would like to immigrate. Those who control the system (like the Italian padrone) are frequently accused of exploiting newcomers. Unquestionably some do, paying very low wages for long hours because they know the immigrant employee has no other options. However, they are able to do so primarily because the service they supply is a very real one.

The function of the grocery business in facilitating immigration is well recognized in the Chaldean community. Many men openly state that they intend to open a store precisely for the purpose of bringing family members from Iraq. One Chaldean engineer left his profession to open a grocery store because it increased his ability to help relatives and friends join him. The independently owned business, such as a grocery store, bakery, or restaurant, obviously allows the owner to put his relatives and friends to work. In this way relatives become an economic asset immediately upon their arrival in America. Lacking knowledge of English is not a problem, since the new immigrants can use the ethnic language. If a man is employed in a large corporation, he cannot easily obtain employment for recently arrived relatives, especially if they do not know English. In such a situation new immigrants become a financial liability to the relative who brought them. With an ethnic occupation, the immigrant and his family are provided with a definite means of support.

The value of the grocery business to the family does not cease once the family is well established in America. Many Chaldeans choose to remain in the grocery business because it enables them to work closely with their families. In 1963, Chaldean respondents were asked why they had selected this occupation. A variety of responses were given: large income, job security, interesting or challenging work. But a full twenty-five percent mentioned family oriented reasons for their job selection. Either their fathers wanted them to take over the store or an uncle, brother, or cousin needed help in his business.

Some Chaldeans appear to enjoy their work, but it would be inaccurate to suggest that they enter the grocery business because of an inherent interest in the work itself. Chaldeans, like other ethnic businessmen, are drawn to the ethnic occupation precisely because of its ethnic and familial ties. The early immigrants had had many occupations in Iraq before emigrating, including many types of entrepreneurial jobs. Upon their arrival here they searched for a suitable occupation, and any number of occupations might have sufficed. Chaldean entry into the grocery business was almost accidental, occasioned by chance encounters of the first immigrants with Syrian and Lebanese grocers whom they met in Detroit. Had these acquaintances been restaurateurs or textile merchants, the Chaldeans in Detroit might have established a different economic pattern as did the Chaldeans in Mexico who are primarily textile merchants.

Once established, the grocery business became largely self-perpetuating, primarily because it became part of Chaldean family structure. Initially, immigrants became grocers because it was an available occupation and not too difficult to learn. Before long, however, new immigrants were becoming grocers for an additional reason, the desire to work with relatives. Furthermore, second generation Chaldeans also were joining the business to help fathers and uncles. Again, the motive was not primarily a desire to enter the grocery business, but rather a desire (or perhaps a feeling of obligation) to work with the family. It is clear that family ties help to draw young people into the ethnic occupation.

The effect of an ethnic occupation extends not only to the family but to the entire community. Just as families are drawn together by a common venture, so too is the larger Chaldean community. The resulting bond is not necessarily a cooperative one, however. With the large number of Chaldean stores in the Detroit metropolitan area, a community-wide purchasing and advertising body, — a Chaldean grocery chain — would seem to be an advantageous business procedure. Attempts at such a venture have been made but none have been successful. A leader of such venture commented ruefully, "They (Chaldean grocers) would rather show each other up than get together so they can both do better!"

Thus, the effect of the ethnic occupation is more often community competition than cooperation. Chaldean stores tend to be clustered in specific areas of the inner city of Detroit. Half of them were in census tracts with more than one Chaldean store. When businesses of the same type are located so close together and draw upon the same clientele, competition is inevitable. Consequently, there is considerable, sometimes fierce competition among Chaldean store owners for customers. This tends to perpetuate old family rivalries from Telkaif and generate new ones.

The American goal of personal economic success is accepted and followed with considerable vigor by Chaldeans. Like other Middle Easterners they prize wealth very highly. In Iraq, the family wealth is worn by the lady of the house in the form of golden jewelry they own. In Detroit, Chaldeans find other ways of displaying their wealth such as bigger, more attractive, and more successful stores than one's neighbor. While simultaneously helping an uncle or cousin to establish a business, Chaldeans also try to show that their own business can run more effectively.

There is a constant alternation between competing and cooperating. A man may help his cousin or brother to get established in business, but he expects eventually to obtain full return on his investment. Chaldeans often locate their stores near each other in order to see which can sustain the competitive race more effectively. The contrast between a highly successful store and a moderately successful one becomes more obvious when they are

in close proximity. Of course, the less successful competitor may lose his business completely. One Chaldean grocer commented, "Chaldeans will always help another Chaldean out — lend him money, help him find a good location, help him get credit. Then as soon as he gets started they'll open another store down the street and take all his business away. I think they'd rather see him fail because it makes them look better!" He spoke from sad personal experience, because his own store failed a short time before due to such competition.

The Chaldean economic structure exerts its influence on both the Church and community activities. Meetings and social affairs are set at times convenient to the retail grocer who closes his store at eight or nine o'clock. Nongrocers often complain that they start too late and that only the grocer is accommodated. As a result, some nongrocers no longer attend. For many years Church financial committees solicited donations from stores rather than homes. Such drives are reputed to have been quite successful. A committee of successful grocers would visit each store and survey the variety of stock, the volume of business, or the new refrigeration system, and tactfully suggest that last year's contribution was no longer adequate. This system was abandoned in the early sixties, and some old parishioners still insist it was more effective than the present envelope-in-the-collection-basket approach. The community economic competition extends into the sphere of religious rituals as well. As is true with other ethnic religious groups, notably the Jews, Polish Catholics, and Italians, weddings, baptisms, Bar Mitzvahs, even funerals become a sort of religious potlatch, with each family trying to see who can throw the biggest party and give the most expensive gifts.

Competition is not the only effect of the ethnic occupation, however. The close proximity of stores helps to increase community consensus by encouraging informal social contact with other Chaldeans. Over half the Chaldeans in the grocery or related businesses told me they visited other Chaldeans at their stores more than once a week. Some of these were business calls by wholesale suppliers or their employees to solicit and deliver orders, while many others were purely social calls. However, all help to increase community cohesion by increasing the number of social ties Chaldeans share.

Besides serving as an informal visiting network, it should be obvious that the Chaldean ethnic occupation operates as an informal ethnic welfare association. Not only does it provide jobs for community members as store employees (though many Chaldeans employ non-Chaldean workers also), but also it provides a source of clients for Chaldeans in the wholesale grocery trade (nearly all Chaldean retailers bought at least part of their stock from Chaldean suppliers, and this constituted a substantial part of the business of wholesalers). Such help is clearly most important for new immigrants who

require an immediate means of support, though it is also used by some
second generation Chaldeans. Apparently, a need for the security of an
ethnic occupation grows less important as members of the community are
established in American culture and society.

The existence of an ethnic occupation thus serves to unite the ethnic
community more closely, since it provides an additional setting in which
members of the ethnic group can meet and interact. Raymond Breton, in a
study of ethnic populations in Montreal, Quebec, noted that ethnic com-
munities which had several formal institutions were more able to retain a
high frequency of informal personal contact among their members (Breton,
1964). In Detroit's Chaldean community, the ethnic occupation fulfills the
function of such an institution.

Chaldeans who are engaged in grocery or allied occupations are more
likely to have married endogamously and be living near other Chaldeans,
than are their countrymen in other occupations. As Table 5.1 shows
eighty-eight percent of Chaldeans in the grocery or allied businesses were
married endogamously and resided in areas that were major concentrations
of Chaldean households. The corresponding figures for Chaldeans not in the
grocery business were considerably lower: only seventy percent of the
nongrocers were married endogamously, and seventy-seven percent were
living in Chaldean settlement areas.

Chaldeans who shared all three of these traits, like the ethnic populations
in Breton's study (1964), were likely to exhibit many other traits of the

TABLE 5.1

Household Location and Marriage Type by Occupation

| | Occupation | | |
	Grocery or Allied Industry (%)	Other (%)	
A. Marriage Type (0=0.348):			
Endogamous	87.8	69.6	(N = 249)
B. Household Location (0 = 0.152) Chaldean			
Settlement	88.1	76.6	(N=266)

TABLE 5.2

Selected Ethnic Traits by Index of Ethnic Community Participation

Ethnic Traits	INDEX[a]			
	High[b] (%)	Medium[c] (%)	Low[d] (%)	
A. Use foreign language with peers	77.8%	64.3%	13.3%	(N= 47)
B. Prefer Chaldean rite	88.2	60.0	28.6	(N= 46)
C. Attend Chaldean Church at least once/month	76.5	53.3	13.3	(N= 47)
D. Visit Chaldeans at least once/week	77.8	53.3	40.0	(N= 48)
E. Member of Chaldean-Iraqi Assn.	50.9	37.0	13.6	(N=246)

Notes: [a] Index composed of three (3) variables: Marriage Type, Household location, Occupational Type.

[b] High = Exhibits ethnic patterns on all three (3) variables.

[c] Medium = Exhibits ethnic pattern on two (2) variables.

[d] Low = Exhibits ethnic pattern on one (1) or no variables.

Chaldean social and cultural structure. In Table 5.2, five aspects of ethnic activity have been listed, and the likelihood of participation in each is indicated. Members of the community have been divided into three groups, depending upon their occupation, marital type and household location. Anyone who was related to the ethnic community on all three variables (e.g., was employed in a grocery or related industry, married to a Chaldean, and living in a Chaldean settlement) was rated "high" on the index of Ethnic Community Participation (E.C.P.). Those who exhibited only two of these characteristics were rated "medium"; anyone with less was rated "low" (Sengstock, 1967: Chap. VIII).

As the Table indicates, there is a direct relationship between these traits and participation in the other aspects of Chaldean life. Chaldeans with a "high" rating were most likely to speak the Chaldean or Arabic language with their peers. They were more likely to prefer the Chaldean rite and to attend services at the Chaldean Church. They had informal visits with other Chaldeans more often, and more of them belonged to the official Chaldean organization, the Chaldean Iraqi Association.

Hence the ethnic occupation plays an important role in the unification of the Chaldean community. It brings Chaldeans together, encourages them to use their language and other shared cultural traits, and in general, helps to integrate members of the Chaldean population into a more closely knit

community.

Of the three central institutions of Chaldean life, two of them, the Church and the extended family, are institutions long-established in Chaldean tradition and brought from the old country. The third, the ethnic occupation, uses the extended family structure as its foundation, but is actually a new institution built by the immigrants upon their arrival in this country. It remains to be seen how all three, the new institution built here and the old ones brought from Iraq, have been profoundly affected by the experience of immigration: both the contact with a new culture and the structures of the immigration process.

Part III: THE SOCIAL SETTING OF MIGRATION

6

The Migration Process

THOUGH supported by persisting institutions brought from the homeland, people who migrate from their place of origin must learn to face life in strange and unfamiliar surroundings. Eisenstadt (1952:225) has characterized the immigrant's new milieu as a "shrinking" social field. By this he means that many of the activities and social roles that were appropriate, even necessary, in the premigration setting cannot be adapted to the new land. Not only must many social relationships be broken, but also many techniques for solving problems no longer work. The examples of this "shrinking social field" are endless.

The man who migrates may have looked to father or brothers for help with problems; now he must find new sources of assistance. The woman who migrates may have depended upon mother and sisters for help with housework and childcare, as well as for friendly advice and support. If she leaves them behind, she must find others to depend upon. Techniques of economic support may have to be altered. Jobs that one did in the village of Telkaif may not be found in the industrial setting of Detroit. Even the physical setting may be strange. Iraq is considerably warmer than Michigan (more like the climate of the Carolinas or Georgia). Many Iraqi immigrants have difficulty adjusting to Detroit's severe winters, particularly if they arrive in December or January dressed in lightweight Iraqi clothing.

Thus, one of the major variables to be considered in an analysis of an ethnic group is the character of the new setting into which the group moves. What is it like? What problems does it present for newcomers? Does it differ markedly from the country of origin? One would expect that an immigrant, moving from one large city to another, might adjust more easily than a

migrant moving from a farm or rural village to a city. In fact, Chaldeans from urban Baghdad seem to adapt more easily to life in Detroit than do migrants coming directly from Telkaif.

Before migration, the social setting in which the individual lives determines in great part his likelihood to emigrate. Emigrants do not tend to come from the higher economic strata of society; persons who are doing well in an area hesitate to move. Hence the Irish were forced to migrate when the potato famine made living conditions intolerable at home, and, in general, migrants from throughout Europe have come from among the lower economic levels. They have not come from the very lowest levels, however, since the act of migrating requires a minimal amount of capital. Other factors promoting a tendency to migrate are religious or political persecution (Dinnerstein and Reimers, 1975:13).

Both religious and economic factors have played a role in the decision of the Chaldeans to come to America. The early immigrants who report that economic hardship was a major factor in their decision to migrate came from a poor village. As Christians, they were also quite conscious of their minority position in a Moslem world. Most early arrivals saw themselves as targets of the antagonism of their Moslem neighbors, and this became another reason to migrate. Because recent governmental changes have transformed con- temporary Iraqi society into a more pluralistic one, recent migrants report fewer religious reasons to migrate.

Conversely, groups which are well-off economically and under no political or religious pressure, are less likely to migrate. It is also true that some countries make it difficult for their citizens to leave. In recent years this problem has gained public attention as Jews who wished to immigrate to Israel were restricted by the U.S.S.R.

Migration theorists have pointed out that migration is motivated both by a push and pull factor (Ravenstein, 1885; 1889; Lee, 1966). The "push" consists of conditions in the homeland which cause an individual to become dissatisfied and to leave. The "pull" is the supposedly better situation in the new land. For obvious reasons, American sociologists have studied migration primarily from the point of view of the society into which the migrants come. Very little research has been done on the key factors leading to emigration; the effects of emigration upon the society which the migrants leave behind; and so on (Wigle, 1974). If one pictures an ethnic group as being "caught" between two societies and cultures, the outside influences impinging on an ethnic group come from many sources as seen in Figure I.

Influences from the country of origin continue long after the migrant has left his native land. Family and friends who have remained behind keep the migrant informed about the mother country through written correspondence and through visits to the United States. Newly arriving immigrants are also a

CHALDEAN-AMERICANS

FIGURE I

Problems Created by the Migration Process Itself

source of contact with the mother country. Even some governments, such as Iraqi engage in various formal attempts to retain contact with their former citizens dispersed about the globe, by encouraging visits to the mother country and supporting language and culture classes.

The United States educational system has been a major source of influence on American ethnic groups, as immigrants and their children are required by United States law to attend school (Gans, 1962; Glazer and Moynihan, 1970). Another major influence, particularly in the last quarter century, is the mass media. Within weeks of their arrival in the United States, most immigrants are subjected to a constant stream of American culture piped directly into their homes via television. Other outside influences come from neighbors, co-workers, and other members of the ethnic group who have already begun to adapt to American society. Thus, both the process of international migration itself and the new environment mold the ethnic group in specific ways.

Like many migrant groups, the Chaldeans were more emigrants than immigrants; for the impetus to move came from the country of origin rather than from the country of destination. Telkaif was, and still is, a poor peasant village. Most of its residents were farmers who depended on the occasionally unpropitious climate for the means by which to support their families. The promise of a better living in larger cities began to lure the Telkefees away from their home in the late 1880s. Most of the earliest immigrants went to the larger cities in the immediate area, to Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. A few traveled farther to Egypt, Greece, France, and North America.

The first known emigrant from Telkaif to the United States arrived in Philadelphia around 1889. His name was Zia Attala. He worked in a hotel in Philadelphia and later returned to Iraq and opened his own hotel in Baghdad. Word of the success of these early emigrants reached those who remained behind in Telkaif, encouraging many more to leave in search of economic betterment. The first migrants to the Iraqi cities fared little better than they had in the home village. Initially, many made their living by the unsavory

task of cleaning privies, but as time passed they became engaged in other occupations notably the hotel business and the sale of alcoholic beverages.

Destination was largely unspecified or unknown for the earliest emigrants to the Western hemisphere. Only after a number of Telkefes had settled in Detroit did this become a definite destination for their fellow countrymen. Prior to this, most emigrants primarily intended to go to "America", and secondarily found their way to New York, California, various parts of Canada and Mexico, wih smaller numbers scattered elsewhere throughout the United States.

In 1910—1912 the earliest emigrants from Telkaif to Detroit were males who did not intend to remain away from the village permanently. They left their families hoping to rejoin them once they had made a little money. In fact, a few of the early Telkeffee settlers in Detroit did return to their homeland. Most, however, eventually brought their wives and children to America. In 1923, when the chief informant on community history arrived, there were ten adults from Telkaif and a few Chaldeans from other Iraqi towns, such as Mosul.

Formal records on the size and composition of the community were not kept until the first Chaldean priest arrived in Detroit and founded a parish in 1947. At that time the priest listed eighty families of Chaldean background living in the Detroit area (See, Table 6.1). Five years later, in 1952, there were 120 families. In the next five year period (by 1957), the number of families nearly doubled (to 230 families). This was also the first year individual population figures were recorded and it was estimated that those 230 families represented 1,000 persons. In the first decade for which records were available, the number of Chaldeans families had nearly tripled (from 60 to 230).

The next decade also saw the Chaldean population increase threefold, from 230 families and about 1,000 persons in 1957, to 658 families and 3,416 persons in 1967 (Table 6.1). Between 1967 and 1972, the Chaldean population of Detroit more than doubled, from 572 families and 3,009 persons to 1,187 families and 6,130 persons. It nearly doubled again between 1972 and 1978, when it numbered 2,674 families and 11,452 persons. This represents more than a fourfold increase in families, and nearly a fourfold increase in population in eleven years (from 1967 to 1978).

The recent increase in migration to the Detroit community reflects, in part, the existence of increased difficulties in the homeland. For some time the northern portion of Iraq, near Telkaif, has been experiencing difficulties. Kurds have occupied the area for generations and claim an historic right to considerable territory which is now divided among the nations of Iraq, Turkey and the U.S.S.R. Their attempts to obtain control over these areas persuaded many more Telkeffees to leave the area in recent years. The

TABLE 6.1

Population of the Chaldean Community from 1947 to 1972

	1947	1952	1957	1960	1964	1967[b]	1972	1977[c]	1978[d]
Families	80	120	230	415	572	658	1,187	2,291	2,674
Persons	--[a]	--[a]	1,000[a]	2,300[a]	3,009	3,416	6,130	9,545	11,452

Source: Unless otherwise noted, these data are taken from *Mother of God Parish Telephone Directory*, 1972:4.
Notes: [a] Early censuses recorded only families. Number of persons for 1957 and 1960 are estimates.
[b] Data taken from *Mother of God Parish Telephone Directory*, 1967:7.
[c] Data taken from *Chaldean Directory*, 1977:4–5.
[d] Data supplied by Reverend George Garmo, Pastor of Mother of God Parish, from data collected for the 1978 *Chaldean Directory*.

Chaldean population in Detroit has grown to such an extent that there are now more persons of Telkeffe descent residing in the Detroit Metropolitan Area than in Telkaif itself. Telkaif's current population of 10,000 to 12,000 includes a large number of recent immigrants, most of them Moslem, leaving only about 6,000 present residents of Telkeffee ancestry. In contrast, in 1978, the Detroit community had over 11,000 members. Thus it is accurate to say that, in many respects, the Telkeffe community has been moved from its ancient homeland halfway around the globe to southeastern Michigan.

However, the growth of the Chaldean community in Detroit, like that of any immigrant group, also reflects the legal restrictions placed upon such a group. International migration, unlike migration from one place to another within a single nation, has been governed by legislation in most nations for the better part of the twentieth century. Prior to the 1920s it was fairly easy to enter the United States from abroad; no restrictions on the numbers and types of persons who could immigrate existed. In 1923, however, Congress passed legislation establishing the famous "quota system", which drastically limited migration to the United States. Migration was affected differentially, depending upon the nation of origin. Most favored were nations from which the bulk of the American population had originated. Nations such as England and Germany received large quotas of migrants, while less favored nations, such as Poland and Italy, from which migration to the U.S. had begun much later, received smaller quotas. The least favored nations where those whose migration to the United States had just begun, since quotas were based upon the size of the American population from each country. Nations such as Iraq, whose pre-1920 emigration to North America had been minimal, were given the annual quota of 100 immigrants into the United States. In actuality, slightly more than 100 Iraqis might be admitted each year, since some immigrants could be admitted as spouse or dependent child of an American citizen without obtaining a place within the quota. (See, Marion T. Bennett, 1963, for a good description of American immigration laws prior to that time).

Of necessity, the growth pattern for a community operating under quota limitations would be very different from one in which migration is not restricted by law. Thus in the period 1945 – 1946, over 50,000 migrants could enter New York City from Puerto Rico, which, as a Commonwealth of the United States enjoys unrestricted migration status (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:92). For a community such as the Chaldeans, however, where migration from the home country is drastically limited by law, community growth takes a very different pattern. The growth rate will not only be much slower but also it will vary with changes in the laws and with the development within the community of techniques for subverting or side-stepping the laws. In the Chaldean community, there are four periods of migration, each

TABLE 6.2

Date of Immigration for Immigrant Chaldeans Included
in the 1963 Census of Adults in the Community, by Sex

	1910—1919 (%)	1920—1929 (%)	1930—1939 (%)	1940—1949 (%)	1950—1959 (%)	Totals (%)
Total Number	5	35	91	104	247	482
Males	30.0	82.9	53.8	59.6	63.2	61.2
Females	20.0	17.1	46.2	40.4	36.8	38.8

The first period of Chaldean migration extends from about 1910 when the first Chaldean immigrants came to Detroit, to 1923 when the quota restrictions were imposed. Chaldeans could come whenever they could afford passage, and they were admitted to the United States as freely as were migrants from England, Germany, or elsewhere. This might have been a period of great growth for the community, save for the fact that the community was just getting established and had not yet developed the techniques for promoting migration. Migration is a community activity, in which early migrants learn the problems of migration and how to deal with them, and thus pave the way for those who follow. It takes time, however, to develop such techniques. The Chaldean community was just beginning to develop some patterns for easing migration from Iraq to Detroit when legal restrictions were placed upon entry. Consequently, only eight men, with a few dependents, came during that period. Other ethnic groups, such as the Italians, Slavs, and Jews, experienced substantial migration into the United States during the period immediately preceding the quota act (Dinnerstein and Reimers, 1975:64).

During the next period, from 1923 to 1947, the period of greatest restrictions, Chaldean immigrants used several techniques for entering the United States, including some that were clearly illegal. The legal method was to apply for a place under the quota before leaving Iraq, and if the visa were granted, to enter the United States as a permanent immigrant. Many would-be immigrants were unable to obtain immigrant visas, however, and sought other means to enter. The provision that spouses of citizens be allowed to enter outside the quota prompted many to arrange marriages with citizens for the purpose of entering the country. Most commonly, an American Chaldean would return to Iraq for a visit, contract a marriage while there, and bring back the new spouse. Immigration authorities were well aware that such techniques were used. The main concern was to insure that these were "legitimate" marriages, and not simply a temporary ploy until the new spouse had entered the country. During this period at least, Chaldean passport marriages were indeed "real" marriages; they were marriages between two Chaldeans, contracted under Church auspices, and were intended to last for life (which most did, since divorce within the community is virtually unknown).

The quota became a most severe problem for persons who had already left Iraq and who were on their way to the United States at the time the quota law was enacted. Rather than return to Iraq, many of these people entered either Canada or Mexico, planning to apply for visas there and eventually enter the United States. Under the immigration laws, however, they would have to enter under the Iraqi quota and not as Canadians or Mexicans.

Though some were able to do this, others found it difficult to accomplish.

Many were investing in the techniques they used to continue their journey. One man who came with three friends in 1923, the year the quota law went into effect, described in detail their experience in entering the United States. They came as wetbacks, crossing the Rio Grande River by rowboat in the dead of night. Once here they hired a lawyer and eventually obtained the assistance of a member of Congress who interceded with immigration authorities on their behalf. The whole process took two years, but they were granted immigration visas. He commented gleefully that he only told the authorities one lie. "He ask how we cross the border — I say I cross the bridge. Was the only lie I told!"

Other Chaldeans were not so clever or resourceful. They remained in Canada and especially Mexico, forming the nucleus of Chaldean communities in these countries. Thus Canada has several Chaldean communities, especially in Montreal, Toronto, and Windsor (which is largely an extension of the Detroit community). Mexico has a small Chaldean community, concentrated primarily in Ixtepec, Oaxaca. The Mexican born offspring of some of these families have since come to the Detroit community, entering as Mexican citizens. It is interesting to note that they become part of the Chaldean community upon their arrival here, and have little or no contact with Detroit's Mexican community.

The 1930s and 1940s were primarily years of legal immigration under the quota. This is especially true of the period during World War II, when United States security made it more difficult to use various subterfuges for entering. The war made migration difficult for other reasons besides the problem of obtaining permission to enter the United States. Travel itself was greatly complicated by the war, and some families were forced to endure long separations, often for the duration of the war. One Chaldean couple had come to the United States prior to 1940, had applied for American citizenship, and had begun to raise a family. They returned to Iraq for a visit shortly before the war broke out, and were forced to remain in Iraq for the duration of the war, returning to the United States in the late 1940s. This family is in the unusual position of having their oldest children American born, and their youngest ones foreign born.

A new era in immigration began when the 1948 Congress enacted legislation allowing foreigners to enter the United States with relative ease for the purpose of attending American colleges and universities. The student visa became a way to enter the United States and many immigrant groups in the United States used this type of entry permit to circumvent the immigration laws. During the period from 1948 to 1965, some Chaldean immigrants continued to enter as regular quota immigrants and were viewed by other Chaldean migrants as the "lucky ones". For those not so fortunate, the student visa remained an option.

To enter on a student visa, foreign nationals had to be *bona fide* students registered in an institution of higher learning in the United States. They were forbidden to work during their stay, and were expected to return to their country of origin once their studies were completed. The philosophy behind this legislation was that these students not only would learn a skill which would be helpful in their home nations, but also they would learn about the United States and return home with a favorable impression to convey to their countrymen. If they remained in this country, the underlying goals of international assistance and good will would not be achieved. Many students, Chaldeans as well as others, did not wish to return home after their stay here. Indeed, as was well known by immigration authorities, they had no intention of doing so even upon their arrival.

' There were two major techniques by which the change from student status to regular immigrant was accomplished. One technique was to obtain a job in some highly skilled area and have one's employer certify that the employee possessed a badly needed skill and should therefore be allowed to remain in this country. Students who used this technique could maintain their permanent immigrant status as long as they remained in the employ of this company. If they left its employ before obtaining citizenship, however, they could be deported. Some students remained with a company five years, just long enough to obtain citizenship, before changing jobs.

The other technique, probably the most widely used, was the "passport bride", a ploy well known both by immigration authorities and by college administrators. Upon their arrival in America, new students would immediately begin searching for an American citizen who was available and willing to contract marriage. Once married, they were eligible for nonquota status as the spouse of a citizen. Such marriages were thought to be highly unstable, both by the immigration authorities and by the general public as well. Many were, of course, simply marriages of convenience which were doomed to end as soon as the immigrant had obtained citizenship. (The waiting period at that time for the spouse of a citizen was three years.) Immigration authorities were well aware that such abuses existed, and often checked the addresses of newly married students to be sure that they were indeed "married".

In the Chaldean community there were a number of marriages of convenience on the part of students during the period from 1948 to 1965. Most students who contracted such marriages were careful to marry outside the Catholic Church, usually in a civil ceremony. Thus, the Church would not recognize their marriages as valid, and they could be divorced and remarry within the Church as soon as they became citizens. Often they would then use their citizenship status to bring a Chaldean bride from the old country.

Many Chaldean student marriages were indeed "legitimate" marriages,

however. It was relatively simple for Chaldean students to find a passport bride, for they quickly became part of the Chaldean community from which they might select a bride. Such marriages were always contracted in the Chaldean Church and have remained stable. Others married non-Chaldeans in Catholic ceremonies and these marriages also are stable. Immigration authorities recognized the importance of the Catholic ceremony for Chaldeans, and closely scrutinized students who claimed to have contracted civil marriages. The student visa-passport bride technique for coming to the United States was a very common means of entry for Chaldeans during the 1950s. From among 254 immigrants in the 1963 community census who had come between 1948 and 1963, 109 (or 42%) had entered this way.

The 1965 immigration law, which removed the national origin quotas, has been a great boon for the Chaldean community, as for many other communities from nations that were not favored under the old quota system. Since 1968 the only quotas which exist are hemispheric quotas: no more than 170,000 immigrants will be accepted in any given year from Eastern Hemisphere countries; and no more than 120,000 will be accepted from Western Hemisphere countries, with an annual maximum of 20,000 from any one country. Prospective migrants from a nation such as Iraq compete equally with migrants from Western European countries for the same number of allowable ent. / permits into the United States. Since many of the nations which formerly had large quotas never filled them, this new law amounts to a redistribution of the unused quotas of Western European nations to nations that are more likely to use them. Great Britain, for example, used only thirty-seven percent of its annual quota of 65,000 between 1952 and 1965 (Tomlinson, 1967:82). This redistribution is considered unacceptable by those who supported the old quota system that was designed to maintain the 1920 ethnic mix in the United States at a constant rate for future years (Alexander, 1956:387). By lifting the national restrictions on immigration, the 1965 act removed the legal restrictions which made it difficult for persons of certain national backgrounds to immigrate. It is this new legislation that has promoted the phenomenal growth of the Chaldean community in recent years.

The new law does not produce a totally indiscriminate migration process, in which every would-be migrant has equal opportunity, on a first come first served basis, with every other migrant. Prospective migrants with special skills or a close relative in the United States have the best chance of obtaining visas, thus, the 1965 law retains the priority system in the allotment of visas (Tomlinson, 1967:83). This law also makes provision for refugees from religious or political persecution. Some recent Chaldean immigrants have made use of this refugee entry permit, because their home village of Telkaif is in the section of Iraq currently being contested by Kurdish and Iraqi government forces.

The special preference provision for persons with needed skills relates to other important factors in understanding the operation of American immigrant communities. For an immigrant to obtain a visa on preference grounds, the need for his skill must be certified by an employer in the United States who intends to hire him upon his arrival. Not all migrants have the same ability to reach employers in the United States to obtain certification of their skills. A Chaldean migrant who can obtain assistance from friends and relatives in the Detroit community has a better opportunity to obtain such a visa than another Iraqi, perhaps with the same skill, who is not Chaldean and knows no one in this country. Such social contacts play an important role in the development of a migrant community.

7

The Social Process

ANALYSTS of migration have long been interested in the factors which cause migrants to choose one destination rather than another. When the first twentieth century migrant from Telkaif left his homeland he was destined simply for "America". The question arises as to how he happened upon Detroit as his destination rather than New York, Chicago, Boston, or perhaps Philadelphia, where his predecessor had lived two decades earlier. As well as can be determined, the choice of destination for the Chaldeans was largely happenstance. Perhaps they heard other migrants on the ship or in New York mention Detroit as the place where cars were being built. Possibly the early migrant may have met another migrant from the Middle East who was destined for friends or relatives in Detroit, where substantial numbers of Syrians and Lebanese already lived. Apparently, however, no definite plan was operating in the decision of the first Chaldean to locate in Detroit.

Once the first Chaldean from Telkaif had settled there, however, the operation of chance in the development of the Detroit community ceased. Then began the operation of what social scientists have termed "chain migration": the migration of a single individual is followed by the migration of relatives and friends (Lochore, 1951:23–25; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1962, 1964; Thompson, 1974). This pattern is quite common among Chaldeans. In the years 1920 to 1930 a typical chain began with the migration from Telkaif to Detroit of a male who usually journeyed alone. Though some were married, they left their wives and children in Telkaif when they migrated. Usually anywhere from five to ten years later, the original migrant was able to send for the second wave. For married migrants, this second link in the chain was often his wife and young children, while a single migrant frequently returned to Telkaif to marry and bring a wife to this country.

The remaining links in the migration chain are quite varied. Many men brought parents, brothers, and uncles, and some brought their sisters as brides for other Chaldean men already in the Detroit community. Often a Telkeffee family would seek a husband for their daughter from among the migrant males in order to better the family's chances of migrating. Once a man married, in addition to bringing his own parents, siblings, and other relatives, he would assist his wife's parents and siblings in migrating. In this way the chain could continue indefinitely.

The frequent letter writing and visiting between Chaldeans in various parts of the world (Baghdad, Telkaif, Detroit, California, and Mexico) also became part of the chain in Chaldean migration. Marriage between Chaldeans of these different communities is quite common. In recent years, several Detroit Chaldeans have married women from the Mexican Chaldean community. Hence a new segment of the chain begins, including Mexican Chaldeans in the pattern.

A description of the "chain" pattern does not illustrate the manner in which migrants "bring" or "assist" succeeding migrants in coming to the United States. In actuality, the terms "bring" or "assist" can have many meanings, any of which may be in operation in a single instance of "bringing" someone to this country. Perhaps the simplest type of help which a migrant provides to persons in the country of origin is information. The early migrant provides considerable assistance to those who follow simply by telling them about the problems of migration and the conditions which they will find upon arrival: where they can live, what kinds of jobs are available, whom to see regarding visas, and other necessary information. At the early stages of migration, this appears to be the predominant type of assistance provided.

As time passes and the early arrivals become better established in their new homes they can provide more tangible assistance. Some early arrivals actually sent home tickets for passage or money to pay for passage. This is especially true, of course, for their closest relations. Other types of very tangible economic assistance are provided in the form of jobs or a place to live upon the newcomer's arrival in Detroit. This pattern has been true in many ethnic communities. Italian communities in the United States have had their *padrones*, who provided jobs for newcomers and cheap labor for favored industries (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:190). In any type of migration, whether it be international or from one region to another within the same country, the fortunate migrant is the one whose friend or relative can ask the boss to "put him on" the job. In this way, many occupations become heavily or almost entirely populated with members of the same nationality group. So Italians have become associated with the construction industry, Jews with the clothing industry and other merchandising, Greeks

with the restaurant business, the Chinese with laundries, the early Irish with the police force and so on. Before long, both employee and employer are members of the same nationality, making the process of finding new labor, as well as the process of finding jobs for new arrivals, a much simpler one.

Entrepreneurial enterprises are especially useful in assisting the migration process. The man who owns his own business, whether it be a restaurant, store, manufacturing plant, or whatever, can more easily find jobs for relatives and friends who migrate than the man employed by someone else. The Chaldean grocery business has served this function from the very beginning of the community. As new arrivals came, they were given jobs in the stores owned by relatives or friends. In time, they became partners or were able to purchase their own stores, enabling them to give jobs to other new arrivals. Chaldean men have been known to leave highly skilled occupations of which they were quite fond, in order to open grocery stores so that they could support newly arriving relatives more easily. By working in the family business, the new arrival is able to repay his benefactor for any assistance given him.

This characteristic of many nationality businesses has not endeared them to native born Americans, who protest that such businesses take jobs away from those not of that group. Indeed it does. Many blacks, for example, who live near Chaldean grocery stores, charge that the stores sell to the blacks in the area but give jobs only to Chaldeans who live outside the area.

This process of economic assistance to newcomers has persisted almost unchanged from 1914 to 1974. It is questionable whether the community will be able to provide employment to all newcomers with the rapidly increased rate of immigration. Whereas a few hundred migrants formerly came in one year, that same number may now come in one month. The metropolitan area of Detroit can only support a limited number of independent grocery stores. Though the 1972 *Chaldean Directory* listed 244 stores; and by 1977, 444 stores, the community may be reaching the saturation point, both in terms of the number of stores and the number of employees who can be absorbed in these stores. Owners may also be nearing the point at which they will have difficulty finding a profitable location for a new independent store. Recent immigrants have complained to some social agencies of the unavailability of jobs, a rare complaint in earlier years when a job in the grocery business could usually be located as a last resort.

Economic assistance is not the only source of help to migration. In view of the various restrictions on American immigration, ethnic groups can provide considerable assistance in the process of obtaining a visa. The proof that chain migration can help newcomers obtain immigration credentials is that persons who are not part of a chain often encounter difficulty. One Chaldean man, who migrated around 1956, was the first from his family to come to the

United States. He told of waiting eight years for a place in the quota. While still living in Baghdad he had worked for several American firms in Iraq. Each year he would apply for a visa, only to be turned down in favor of other Iraqis who had more desirable occupations or relatives in the United States. At one point he commented ruefully to American Embassy officials: "It is easier to go to heaven than to the United States of America". Another Chaldean who had many relatives in America, heard this statement and commented: "It is very easy — you only have to know how". This referred, however, to the family preference pattern which had been unavailable to the other man.

In the absence of such family ties, would-be immigrants in some ethnic communities have found assistance through social welfare organizations or institutions. Chief among these has been the religious institution. Roman Catholic parishes and welfare organizations helped many Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants to settle here. After World War II, European Jewish refugees were resettled in America by American synagogues. The Lutheran Church helped many Germans and Scandinavians in the same way. The Chaldean Church has served this function only in the last decade or so. One local Chaldean priest has worked to encourage and assist migration to Detroit, particularly from the original town where Kurdish-Iraqi battles make life difficult. Prior to 1965, however, the Chaldean Church had mainly served the Chaldean population once they had arrived here, rather than assisting them to emigrate. Perhaps this was due to the relative youth of the Chaldean Church in Detroit. Founded in the middle 1940s, it had to become well established before it could serve a substantial number of social welfare functions. Thus, in the Chaldean community, most persons have depended upon family aids to migration.

In spite of the criticism directed against the family preference quotas, it should be recognized that this system was quite supportive of the goal which Congress had in mind when the quota restrictions were enacted. The purpose at that time had been to limit immigration to those persons who could most easily be absorbed into American society without presenting severe social disruption. By making it easy for citizens and resident aliens to bring their relatives, immigration law encouraged the migration of persons who were assured of a place to live, economic support, someone to turn to in time of need, people who could teach them the English language, in other words a general introduction to American society and culture. American ethnic groups provide a substantial service in that they are a "way-station" between the old country cultures and the American culture. New immigrants who can move into an established ethnic culture can thereby adapt to American culture as a two step process, and their adaptation is in this way simplified. United States immigration laws, by giving preference to persons with relatives

here, discourage those who know no one and may have greater difficulty adjusting.

In essence, the laws restricting immigration served to formalize what had previously been informal. Immigration had always been a part of a social network, with immigrants drawn to areas where they already had established contacts. With the 1920 immigration laws, such contacts became an integral part of the immigration process. Hence, an individual found it impossible to come to the United States unless a relative or friend could guarantee a home and job for the immigrant. In this way, the American government could insure that the new arrival would not become a public liability. Furthermore, chances of coming to the United States were greatly enhanced if a close relative were already here, for nonquota status or quota preference was given to persons who were the spouses, children, parents or siblings of American citizens.

Thus, the immigrants who came to the United States were almost exclusively persons who had close-ties in this country before their arrival. From the point of view of the dominant American society, the purpose of encouraging this pattern was to insure that the newcomers would not be a drain on society. From the point of view of the newcomer, it assured him that he would find assistance in this strange new setting. From the point of view of the ethnic community, it helped promote cohesiveness, for incoming members are bound to their predecessors by ties of blood and obligation. Their predecessors are relatives whose status as American citizens has brought them to America, and who may have aided them in more tangible ways, with passage money, job opportunities, and a place to live. Hence, the 1920 immigration laws almost assured that an ethnic community would be closely bound together.

Changes in the immigration laws enacted in 1965 have, to a degree, returned the immigration process to the pattern which existed prior to 1923, by doing away with the formal restrictions. However, the informal process continues to play an important part and persons with contacts within the informal immigration network have a greater chance of obtaining the opportunity to migrate. Although migrants are now able to enter this country in greater numbers, the ethnic community may not always be able to assist all new arrivals. This is particularly problematic if the receiving ethnic community is relatively small compared to the number of newcomers. When the Chaldean community consisted of three or four thousand persons, they were able to receive about 100 to 150 new immigrants each year with comparative ease. The 1978 community of nearly twelve thousand is less equipped to handle as many as fifteen hundred to two thousand new arrivals each year. A community of 100,000 or more, such as Detroit's Polish community, could absorb the same number with little difficulty.

In effect, the community is attempting to absorb a whole new community, one fourth the size of itself, each year. Previously, the Chaldean community had been fiercely independent, determined to solve its own problems without the assistance of outsiders. To date they have been quite capable of doing so. It is doubtful whether they can maintain this independence. If the present rate of migration continues, they will be forced to turn to outside agencies for help. Already there is some indication that Chaldeans are beginning to seek such assistance. United Community Services of Metropolitan Detroit, the International Institute, and the North End Concerned Citizen's Community Council (NEC4, a neighborhood service group), have all received requests for help. There have also been some recent attempts to obtain governmental help, such as special English classes for the children.

8

Inter- Group Relations

THE need to turn outside the community for some types of assistance is likely to bring about alterations in the Chaldean social structure. As Joan Moore (1970: 11-30) has pointed out in her analysis of the Mexican-Americans, the nature of an ethnic group's relations with the surrounding society profoundly affects the ethnic group itself. One might say that Chaldeans in Detroit have had very good relations with other groups, if the quality of intergroup relations is measured solely in terms of an absence of conflict. Chaldeans have had few conflicts with other groups largely because they keep to themselves and have little contact with outsiders. This is especially true of contact which is peculiarly group contact. Thus, some Chaldeans have rather frequent contacts with non-Chaldeans, but these are largely instances where they meet as individuals — two men who work together, two women who are neighbors, two young people in the same school. They do not meet as representatives of two separate groups. Even these contacts are rather peripheral or "secondary" in nature, since three-forths of the Chaldeans chose their closest friends or "primary" relationships from within the community. It is perhaps a mark of very good interethnic relations if members of two separate groups are able to meet and deal with each other as human beings and not in terms of their group memberships. Conflict with other ethnic groups might in fact occur if Chaldeans had more contact outside the community.

One of the major mechanisms by which the Chaldean community has managed to limit contact with non-Chaldeans has been the ethnic occupation By working together in a single occupation many Chaldeans manage to avoid a major source of interethnic conflict, the contact between employer and employee. Of course, Chaldean grocers have contact with their non-Chaldean customers, but such contact is more limited than in an employ-

er-employee relationship. A store owner sees even the most regular customer for only a few minutes each day or week; if he were working for a non-Chaldean employer he would have contact with outsiders forty hours each week. Thus, an ethnic occupation tends to inhibit contact with outsiders, making interethnic conflict less likely.

It is also possible that the Chaldean's relatively good relations with other groups may in part be due to the fact that they see themselves as rather well treated in America. Some analysts (Simpson and Yinger, 1958:76; Secord and Backman, 1974:175 - 178) have seen prejudice as a response to misfortune. Thus, poor whites are said to be more prejudiced toward blacks than are whites who are better off (or at least they exhibit it more openly). Chaldeans, however, perceive the American system as having been rather good to them. They have done well economically. Many, especially the earlier immigrants, claim to have found the religious and political freedom which they feel they lacked in the old country. Few Chaldeans feel they have been the targets of prejudice or discrimination in America. In the 1963 survey, only one out of seventy-five people interviewed complained of having experienced discrimination. The one case involved a student at a large state college who had been turned down by several fraternities, "because all the Gentile fraternities thought I looked Jewish, and the Jewish fraternities knew I wasn't!" But no other Chaldeans reported such feelings.

In part, the relative lack of intergroup conflict which the Chaldeans have experienced may be due to the fact that they have largely confined their extracommunity relationships to other Roman Catholics with whom they have less area for conflict. Chaldeans who attend Latin rite churches or send their children to Latin rite schools are rather well accepted, although the children sometimes are teased because Chaldean childrearing practices are more strict than those of most American groups. One girl complained of being teased because she was not allowed to date and because the mourning clothes she was forced to wear after her father's death made her look "odd" to her high school friends ("They called me 'the black spider' ", she said).

The clearest examples of intergroup unpleasantness and antagonism are found when the Chaldeans must encounter non-Catholic Americans. In the past these encounters have most frequently involved black residents in their business areas. A substantial number of Chaldean grocery stores are in low income black neighborhoods. In large part, this is due to the fact that these are the areas which the major supermarket chains have abandoned, leaving the market open for the independent operator. Black customers at Chaldean stores resent the higher prices which they pay for their food. They claim the Chaldeans cheat them. While some probably do, others simply charge the higher cost which is intrinsic to an independent operation. Blacks also resent the family orientation of a Chaldean store: it is owned by Chaldeans; all the

employees are Chaldeans; and all the profits go to Chaldeans. They see the Chaldean community profiting at the expense of the black community. Recent analysts have noted the existence of antagonistic relationships between blacks and Jews as a result of such economic differences (Gans, 1972:297—298). The same might be said of blacks and Chaldeans, whom some blacks refer to as "these damned Syrians". In recent years, particularly since the 1967 Detroit riots, Chaldean antagonism toward blacks has increased, both due to the fact that several Chaldean stores were looted and burned during the Detroit riot of 1967, and due to increased burglaries of Chaldean stores. About twenty Chaldeans have been killed in attempted robberies of these stores, usually by blacks (Doctoroff, 1978:15). Thus, Chaldeans tend to develop a sense of distrust of blacks, just as the blacks distrust them. Both have also experienced some antagonistic relations in the neighborhoods where they live. Several of these areas in which Chaldeans have lived have been racially integrated. The large Chaldean households with six or eight children and other relatives as well, engage in a good deal of homecentered socializing, often at odd hours, since their stores are open late at night. Middle class black neighbors have been known to complain that these large families and their loud, late parties depreciate the neighborhood.

In recent years, as Chaldeans have been moving to the suburbs new intergroup problems have been developing. Some of the areas into which the Chaldeans are now moving are heavily Jewish neighborhoods, such as the suburbs of Oak Park, Southfield, and Birmingham. Chaldeans have had limited contact with Jews in the past, and it is unfortunate that a period of increased contact with Jews in the Detroit area coincided with a rise of Arab nationalist feeling among Chaldeans and increased tension between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East. Both Jews and Chaldeans have told me of instances in which young people of both groups had mildly "hassled" each other at local schools. (See also, Doctoroff, 1978:31.)

A second problem also centers on the schools and stems from a basic difference in class related values between the Chaldeans and other upper middle class suburban parents. Chaldean families who move from Detroit tend to be economically well off; hence they move into the wealthier new subdivisions that are populated by other upper middle income families. Here the similarity between Chaldeans and their new neighbors ends. Most people in these areas have obtained their upper middle class incomes through professional occupations; many doctors, lawyers, engineers, junior and middle level executives reside there. These people tend to see education as the means by which they advanced in life, and they seek a good education for their children. Consequently, they have worked to develop what are recognized throughout the Detroit area as exceptionally good public school systems.

Some suburban Chaldeans, especially the post World War II immigrants, are also educated professionals and share their neighbors' concern for education. However, many Chaldeans do not, especially the earlier immigrants and their American born children who are now raising their own families. The early Chaldean immigrants came to this country with very little education, often barely able to read and write. They taught themselves English by reading the labels in grocery stores and they represent the epitome of the self made man, getting ahead on their own without benefit of education. Since many consider education unnecessary, they have transmitted this attitude to their children. In this trait they resemble the Boston Italians studied by Gans (1962:131 - 132), although they are more likely to aspire to a middle class life style than the Italian group.

In the past, most Chaldean children attended Roman Catholic schools where the other children were largely from working class Catholic groups. All shared the view that education is important primarily for imparting moral values and secondarily for vocational training. In recent years, as the number of Roman Catholic schools have substantially diminished, Chaldeans have been forced more and more to send their children to the public schools, a situation which excites little enthusiasm. Chaldean parents believe their children are receiving inadequate moral training. Furthermore, the public schools bring young Chaldeans into close contact with other children quite different from themselves, not only in national background and ritual style, but also in social class, race, and religious beliefs. In the past Chaldeans have felt most comfortable with other Catholics; however, they no longer are able to keep their children in such a religiously protected environment.

This has brought about some clashes with other groups in the neighborhood schools. Chaldean children who live in the city of Detroit attend public schools in which blacks constitute the major ethnic group. Due to their economic contacts, both groups are somewhat distrustful of each other at the outset. In general, students of both groups tend to avoid each other. Some young Chaldeans, especially at the junior high and high school levels, complain of unpleasant encounters with other students. As a result, some parents have withdrawn their children, particularly the girls, from school as young as they possibly could. When they attended Catholic schools, most Chaldean children, boys and girls alike, remained in school through high school graduation.

In the suburbs, the majority of Chaldean children attend the Southfield and Birmingham public schools, where the intergroup conflict assumes a different character. Here the lack of concern for education, on the part of Chaldean parents and children, has been a source of irritation for many of their neighbors and especially for their teachers. Southfield and Birmingham teachers are accustomed to children who have an extreme thirst for education

and strive to do well, and to parents who are interested in the school and encourage, even push their children to achieve. Many Chaldean parents do not do this, and as a result, their children are not interested in school. (See, Doctoroff, 1978, for a general discussion of school problems of Chaldeans.)

Thus, the problem of a group with an upper middle class income but a working class value structure. Teachers complain that many Chaldean children are disinterested in class, even disruptive at times, and are neither prepared nor inclined to cope. Non Chaldean parents, of course, are unhappy at having their own children's educational advancement disturbed by such influences. To complicate matters, some of the suburban Chaldeans are fairly recent immigrants whose children know little English. Central city schools have equipped themselves to handle such problems but suburban systems have not, and frankly resent the necessity of doing so, since it represents an added strain on limited funds. The advanced science, music, or athletic departments may be cut back in order to hire a specialist to teach English as a foreign language.

In truth, most residents of these areas, Chaldean and non Chaldean alike, are unaware of the full ramifications of their conflict. Non Chaldean teachers and parents know only that Chaldean kids are somehow "different". They do not quite understand why these children do not respond to school like the others, and tend to assume either that they will eventually "come around", or that they are hopeless cases. Most are unaware that they are dealing with a basic interethnic value conflict.

Chaldean parents, for the most part, are totally unaware that a conflict exists. This lack of awareness is just one aspect of the general lack of concern with extracommunity relationships on the part of many Chaldeans. Contact with non- Chaldeans, whether cooperative or conflicting, is limited in quantity and definitely of secondary importance. As immigrants come into the community in ever increasing numbers, it may be more difficult for the Chaldeans to maintain this "protected" environment. Their increased numbers will make them more "visible" to the surrounding community, particularly if they compete with persons from other ethnic backgrounds for jobs, housing, social and educational resources. The increase in Chaldean immigration is likely to result in greater contact with other groups, and these contacts may sometimes be antagonistic rather than cooperative.

Although the Chaldean community has thus far maintained a somewhat protective environment for its members, this protection is likely to diminish in the future, because no group in a large industrial setting can be thoroughly insulated. By their very nature, ethnic groups are Janus-faced. Like the mythological character, ethnic peoples face in two directions. On the one hand, they are different in many ways from the majority of the society in which they live. Necessarily they will have contacts with other people, albeit

infrequent ones, and these contacts may cause conflicts. On the other hand, most ethnic community members are much more concerned with each other than with outsiders and seek to preserve their identity as a separate group. Inevitably ethnic community characteristics frequently reflect this dual focus. Because the adaptive mechanisms of ethnic culture are an important aspect of ethnic group life, social scientists have studied such mechanisms when they analyze the ways in which the culture and social relationships of a group are altered in order to accommodate to the new physical and social setting. Both the characteristics of acculturation and assimilation among the Chaldeans and their concern about preserving their identity will be analyzed in the following chapters to further understand these mechanisms.

PART IV: THE RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNITY TO THE MIGRATION SETTING

9

Nature and Degree of Assimilation

UNTIL recently, social scientists were primarily concerned with a single consequence of the migrants' contact with the peoples of the host society. They viewed this contact as but one of a variety of circumstances under which peoples with quite different patterns of life come together—and they indicated that similar contacts occur with colonial conquest, missionary activity, military occupation, and Peace Corps-type activities (Gordon, 1964:60; See also, Locke and Stern, 1946). In all such intercultural contacts, sociologists and anthropologists noted that change occurred. The changes might occur in the cultural patterns of both groups; or one group might exhibit a great deal of change and the other very little. The changes might occur in the cultural patterns of the group or in their social relationships. But change of some kind was inevitable.

Anthropolog'sts have not been consistent in their analysis and interpretation of such changes, nor in the terminology they use to describe them. The variant interpretations of intercultural change will not be considered here, because good treatises on the topic appear elsewhere (Gordon, 1964:60—68, Newman, 1973). Suffice it to say that social scientific studies of intergroup contacts have established a few general principles. For example, when peoples of different cultures — like the migrant and the host society — come together, change is rarely, if ever, one-sided. Both groups change to a degree. Furthermore, one society will probably change somewhat (perhaps a great deal) more than the other. In American immigration contacts, the incoming group usually undergoes the most change.

Modern sociological theory distinguishes between two types of change which occur in intercultural contacts. Some changes occur in the area of

cultural characteristics, including such external cultural patterns as language, dress, and ethnic food, and also less tangible aspects of culture such as values, sentiments, or religious ideals (Gordon, 1964:65—68; Gordon, 1978; Green, 1952:66). Changes in the culture of a group are generally called acculturation. When Italians, Polish, or German immigrants cease speaking their native language and begin speaking English, this is acculturation. When they begin eating hot dogs (and WASPs enjoy pizza, golumki and weinerschnitzel), this is acculturation. And when Irish or Jewish immigrants change to the Protestant religion, this also is acculturation.

The other type of change which groups experience has come to be known as assimilation. This concept takes cognizance of the fact that the very social structure — the patterns of relationships which members of the group have with each other — may be altered when it encounters another group. Thus, members of a group begin to associate more frequently with outsiders than had been possible before their arrival here. Irish may work or go to school with Polish, Italian, Jewish, or white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They may even develop friendship ties with each other, or join the same clubs. Their contacts with outsiders may also affect their relationships with other members of their own group. The Irish American who develops some friendships with WASPs will likely find that his relationships with other Irish have been altered; he may have time for fewer relationships within his own group; and the character of the ties he does maintain may change. Many immigrants object to their children's contacts with "Americans" on the grounds that they adopt American style patterns of association within the family. As a result, children become more independent, less submissive to parental discipline; and wives become more "liberated" and less accepting of a husband-dominated family structure. Assimilation has been used to refer both to the changes in the internal social structure of an ethnic group (Gans, 1962:208), and to the adoption of social contacts with nongroup members (Gordon, 1964:70—71).

Social scientists have observed that acculturation proceeds much more quickly than assimilation. Herbert Gans (1962:204—206) noted this among the Italians of Boston; Sherman (1961) and Kramer and Leventman (1961) noted it among American Jews; and Glazer and Moynihan (1970) report the phenomenon occurs among the ethnic groups of New York City. Milton Gordon (1978:173—174) believes that acculturation may occur even if assimilation does not, and that "...this condition of 'acculturation only' may continue indefinitely". In contrast, other groups may achieve a fairly high degree of assimilation with the dominant social group (Gordon, 1978:175). Analysis of an ethnic community would be incomplete without a consideration of the ways in which the group has changed in response to the new setting into which it has migrated.

To a certain degree the Chaldean community has changed in response to the surroundings in Detroit. Several characteristics of the assimilation/ acculturation process, some of which may be unique to the Chaldeans, and some of which may be found in other ethnic groups are indicated, and several questions might be asked in this regard: 1) How have the social and cultural patterns bought from Telkaif been altered?   2) Does the Chaldean community exhibit the pattern of becoming acculturated rather quickly and does assimilation proceed more slowly? 3) Is the traditional picture of the American born generation as the primary "changers" an accurate one? Or do some changes occur with the immigrants themselves? If so, what kinds? 4) Is it accurate to speak of "acculturation" as a single phenomenon? Or can acculturation be subdivided into two or more component parts? It seems necessary to discuss change in at least two subareas of culture: change in external culture, such as outwardly observable characteristics style of dress, food type, language; and change in normative culture, such as be- havioral norms, value patterns, statements of ideals. 5) In conjunction with the distinction of external and normative culture, does acculturation proceed more rapidly in one type of culture than in the other? 6) Can assimilation also be subdivided? Gordon (1974:11) believes it can, and suggests a seven-fold division in which acculturation is viewed as a part of the assimilation process. The complex distinctions he suggests may not be necessary for the analysis of the Chaldeans. However, assimilation has been divided into two parts: change in external patterns of association — in which ethnic group members no longer limit their social ties to members of their own group and begin to associate with "Americans" or with persons of other ethnic backgrounds; and change in internal patterns of association — in which traditional patterns of ethnic social interaction, such as the family structure, are altered so that they more nearly approximate the social structure patterns of other Americans. 7) Do internal patterns of association change more quickly than external ones? Or are the external patterns of association adopted first, leading to change in the internal social structure? 8) What is the effect of continued migration on the assimila- tion/acculturation process? It might be expected that the continual arrival of new immigrants would bring about a constant reinforcement of the original culture and social structure. But this assumes that the sociocultural pattern of the mother country has remained rather stable. When the society and culture of the homeland have undergone substantial change, as is true with Iraq, the arrival of new immigrants may only compound the picture by introducing an additional sociocultural framework. The Chaldean community provides an ideal opportunity to analyze this problem.

In the present analysis, "change" will be measured in three ways:

1) By comparing the characteristics of Detroit's Chaldeans with those

characteristics which the original immigrants knew in Telkaif prior to their migration around 1910. Two sources are relied on for this information: the reminiscences of some respondents regarding their pre-migration lives, and reports of scholars, mainly Al Nouri (1964) and Bazzi (1969), concerning life in Telkaif. Such reconstruction is ·difficult and somewhat uncertain at best, especially in view of the fact that immigrants' memories of the old country tend to be somewhat selective. Lacking other evidence; these comparisons can provide clues as to the type of changes occurring;

2) By comparing immigrants with American born (or American reared) Chaldeans. On the assumption that place of birth is less important than the location of one's upbringing, American born Chaldeans are usually combined with those who come to America at less than ten years of age;

3) By comparing early immigrants with more recent arrivals. Some problems are encountered using this type of comparison, because it is difficult to assess the loci of any changes which are observed. If recent immigrants are found to differ from earlier ones, is it because the early immigrants have changed (become Americanized)? Or has the mother country changed, producing a different culture which new immigrants now bring with them? Or both? In the course of analysis some resolution of these questions must be worked out.

Before analyzing specific changes in community culture and social patterns, it is useful to discuss some of the sources of the impetus to change. Thus, the agents that bring American culture and social patterns into the Chaldean community are analyzed.

Source of American Culture

The Chaldean community is exposed to American culture in much the same way as are other immigrant groups in the United States. The mass media — the press, radio, television — are constantly beaming American culture into Chaldean homes. While the American press is only infrequently followed by Chaldeans, especially by the older immigrants, radio and especially television are common sources of entertainment for this group. Every Chaldean home visited during this study had a television set, and many stores made use of the radio to provide background music and conversation.

The store itself is a major source of acculturation for the Chaldean store owner and his Chaldean employees. In order to remain in business, it is necessary for the Chaldean merchants to adjust, at least minimally, to American society. They must gain sufficient fluency in the English language to communicate with American customers and suppliers; and it is precisely their early experience in dealing with American customers and products that

enables many Chaldean immigrants to learn the English language.

Unlike many immigrant groups, the Chaldeans have not been made the focus of large-scale special acculturating programs. Other ethnic groups have not been so fortunate. Gans (1962: Chapter 7) notes that the Italians of Boston have been the object of many efforts on the part of what he calls "caretaker" agents from the dominant community (social workers, community centers). These agents exert deliberate influence on the Italian immigrants and their children to induce conformity with middle class American behavior patterns. Until the early 1970s, no external social agency or community center had made efforts to work with the Chaldean community. There are three probable reasons for the absence. First, the Chaldeans are a relatively small group in proportion to the entire population of the city of Detroit. Their activities, therefore, were less visible, and any nonconformance with American cultural standards was not likely to be recognized as a problem by the caretaker agencies. Second, the Chaldean internally-funded, church-related organizations had previously handled many such problems. Finally, the Chaldeans, until recently, had the reputation of being a law-abiding group of people and unlikely to cause trouble. Law enforcement officials who were interviewed generally saw the group as hardworking small businessmen. Officials reported having little trouble with Chaldeans, and usually viewed the few instances of Chaldean law-breakers as exceptions to the rule. Hence, there was little feeling on the part of Detroit area leaders that any measures to "convert" or "educate" members of the Chaldean community to the ways of American society were necessary.

The phenomenal growth rate of the community since 1968 has altered this situation somewhat. School, unemployment, and housing problems have begun to be felt in the community, as the growth rate has outstripped the Chaldean community's ability to deal with these needs. Chaldeans have turned to formal agencies of the dominant community to deal with some of them: to the schools to provide language assistance, and to the Michigan Employment Security Commission to obtain employment. The International Institute, a social agency charged with assisting foreign visitors and immigrants, has received many more requests for service from Chaldeans in recent years as has the United Community Services of Metropolitan Detroit. North End Concerned Citizens Community Council (NEC4), a neighborhood social agency in the vicinity of the newest Chaldean residential area, has also received requests. NEC4 and Sacred Heart Chaldean Parish jointly applied for a grant from New Detroit, Inc., to assist them in dealing with some of these problems. Both the International Institute and NEC4 have recently hired Arabic speaking social workers to work with Chaldeans and other Arabic speaking groups in the Detroit area.

To date, most attempts to obtain assistance have been initiated by the

Chaldeans, who have not been forced to accept uninvited help. It is difficult to predict how long this situation will continue, for it is unlikely that agents of the dominant community will provide assistance only on the ethnic community's terms. Once they are aware of the Chaldeans and can see some of the problems, they are likely to exercise some influence, and to suggest new problems which must be handled or new ways of dealing with old problems. Chaldeans, like other ethnic groups, may soon find that the assistance of the dominant community is a mixed blessing.

The American educational system has always been a major source of acculturation for immigrant groups. In the past, when most Chaldean children attended Roman Catholic parochial schools, Chaldeans were acculturated into the dominant Latin rite, as interpreted by the nuns who were primarily Polish or Irish. While the Chaldean children learned the doctrines and moral standards of Catholicism, they also learned the liturgy and customs of the Latin rite, which was considerably different from their own. This situation drew the child, as well as his family, away from the Chaldean parish. With the closing of many Catholic schools, more Chaldean children attend public schools. Whether these schools will be as effective in acculturating Catholic ethnic groups as the parochial schools were is questionable, because the use of the public schools has prompted the development of some boundary maintenance techniques on the part of the Chaldean community.

Both Chaldean parishes in Detroit now offer religious instruction classes for Chaldean children on an after school or weekend basis. In terms of preserving their own religious ritual, the closing of Catholic schools may prove to be a great boon to the community. Because of these closings, Chaldean children are mow learning their unique heritage, rather than the dominant Latin rite heritage. For the first time they are getting instruction in the Catholic child's life — in their own church. Furthermore, there is a specific First Holy Communion Sunday in the Chaldean parishes for all the children of First Communion age (usually about seven or eight). Hence, the closing of Catholic schools has had a double effect. Not only has it prompted the Chaldean parishes to provide formal instruction in their own rite, but also these formal classes bring Chaldean children together, thus increasing the nonfamily ethnic ties.

Educators frequently hail the public school system as the great acculturating/assimilating agent of American society, because it brings together children of many different ethnic and social backgrounds and molds them into American citizens. If the Chaldean example is typical, then the public schools are probably less successful acculturation agents than are various sectarian schools. When a school draws together children of more limited backgrounds — similar religion or social class, for example — parents seem content to let the schools educate their children. The schools can thus have a

"leveling" effect: Polish, Italian, and Chaldean ethnicity becomes submerged in "Catholicism"; German and Russian Jews become simply "Jews". When the schools they attend have too diverse a sociocultural mix, parents may make a more determined effort, as the Chaldeans presently are, to inculcate their own cultural traditions. The result may be a pattern such as the one which exists in the central high school of one Detroit suburb. Teenagers from a large Chaldean population attend school with many Jews, other Catholic groups, Protestants, and some Eastern Orthodox. Though the area is predominantly white it does include a substantial black minority. The high school is a real "melting pot", except that students who have attended the school report that: "No one melts! Everyone just stays with their own. Chaldeans don't mingle with the Jews, and neither mixes with the WASPs or the blacks." One student even commented that specific clubs in the school (the Chemistry Club, Debating Team, various sports teams) became associated with particular ethnic groups, and that students from different ethnic backgrounds would not (or could not) join them.

This suggests that acculturation/assimilation may be more acceptable when it proceeds in minor steps. As was proposed by Ruby Jo Kennedy (1944) in the "Triple Melting Pot" theory, the move from being a "Chaldean-Catholic-American" to being a "Catholic-American" (ethnic group unspecified) may not be too difficult to accept. However, the move to "American" (which often connotes Protestant) may be greatly resisted.

10

Acculturation: External Change

SEVERAL varied contacts with American society have produced numerous alterations in Chaldean culture that can be divided into two types: change in the "external culture", and change in the value patterns or "normative culture". Two surveys, taken a decade apart, provide an opportunity to observe changes in acculturation and assimilation. However, the studies were not identical: the 1963 survey was directly concerned with sociocultural change, while the 1973 study was centered on identification patterns. Hence comparative data are not available on all variables.

With regard to external culture, the changes in dress, dietary customs, language, and ritual observances will be considered. In the area of dress, one notes little change between the immigrant generation and the second generation, largely because the change from traditional Telkeffee dress has been so complete at the immigrant level, that there is no outstanding difference between the immigrant and American reared generations. However, the older immigrants tend to wear less "stylish" clothes than the second generation, who complain that the older people are "too old fashioned" in their dress. Older Chaldeans particularly object to their daughters wearing mini-skirts and short shorts or to their sons in very tight trousers. Such intergenerational conflicts are hardly peculiar to the Chaldeans, or to ethnic groups in general, being rather a common ground for child-parent conflict. With regard to the distinctive style of dress of the village of Telkaif, there had been a total change at the time of the early field work in 1963. No Chaldean, immigrant or American reared of any age, was ever observed wearing the traditional Telkeffee dress, either at home or at any of the special ceremonial affairs, such as weddings, where the use of such costumes might be expected. The traditional costumes were preserved only in pictures and often in the dressing of dolls. In the area of dress, therefore, acculturation of the Chaldeans

was fairly complete even with the immigrant generation. However, recent immigrants have changed this pattern somewhat, as many new arrivals have brought with them samples of the traditional dress of Telkaif and other Chaldean villages that they wear for parties and other special occasions.

Regarding dietary patterns, a greater degree of variation among the different subgroups of the community is found to exist. Chaldean cooking is basically a general Middle Eastern style of food preparation, more like that of the Lebanese, Syrians, and Greeks. Chaldeans consume a great deal of rice, in preference to potatoes, which is served with a variety of sauces, usually containing vegetables, meat, and spices. Other favorite Chaldean dishes are yapprugh, or grape leaves stuffed with ground meat and rice; kibbe, or a round, flat, pizza-like pastry, containing layers of dough and ground meat; and shish-kebab.

Respondents were asked to specify which style of food they preferred, Chaldean or American. Immigrants, both early and recent arrivals, are more likely to express a preference for Chaldean style food than are American reared, most of whom either prefer American style cooking or state that they like both types equally well. Immigrants are also more likely to serve Chaldean style food in their homes than are American reared Chaldeans (See, Table 10.1).

The same pattern appears with regard to language usage. Nearly all the American reared Chaldeans reported that they could speak and understand either or both of the two ethnic languages, secular, modern Chaldean, the original village language, or Arabic, the national Iraqi language. Only a minimal number use these languages with any regularity. Married respondents were asked to report whether they customarily used English or the ethnic language with their spouses at home; and all respondents were asked which language they used with their Chaldean age peers at social affairs, such as weddings and parties, or meetings and ceremonies at the Chaldean church. Age peers were specified because many American reared Chaldeans admitted to using the ethnic language with their parents and their parents' friends but with their own friends they used English exclusively (See, Table 10.1-B). Clearly a change in language patterns has occurred. The American reared are able to use the ethnic languages but they do not do so with the frequency displayed by the immigrants. As one young woman, the American reared wife of an immigrant, commented: "It seems so much more natural to speak the language of the society in which you live".

However, one interesting pattern was observed in households that consisted of an immigrant and an American reared Chaldean spouse. In such households, while Chaldean food is served daily, as is the practice in most immigrant households, English is spoken, as is true among the American reared. Apparently the process of acculturation involves a degree of com-

TABLE 10.1
Acculturation: Change in External Culture

	Early Immigrants Arrived Pre-1950	Recent Immigrants Arrived 1950—65 [a]	Arrived After 1965	American Reared
A. Food Patterns				
1. Serve Chaldean Food Daily	n 80.0%(15)[b]	n 72.2%(18)	—	n 33.3%(15)
B. Language Patterns				
2. Use Ethnic Language in Home with Spouse (Married R's only)	n 73.3%(15)	n 68.4%(19)	—	n 6.7%(15)
3. Use Ethnic Language with Peers at Community Affairs	n 93.3%(15)	n 75.0%(28)		n 3.2%(31)
C. Ritual Patterns				
4. Attend Chaldean Ritual 1/mo. or more 1973 survey)	n 80.0%(15)	n 59.3%(27)	—	n 16.7%(30)

TABLE 10.1 (Continued)

Acculturation: Change in External Culture

	Early Immigrants Arrived Pre-1950	Recent Immigrants Arrived 1950—65	Arrived After 1965	American Reared
4a. Attend Chaldean Ritual 1/mo. or more (1973 survey)	n 70.0%(10)	n 48.1%(27)	n 66.7%(39)	n 17.6%(17)

Notes: a Obviously there were no immigrants who arrived in 1964—1965 in the 1963 survey. However, 1965 was chosen as the dividing line between the two groups because it was the date of the new immigration law eliminating the quota system.

b Numbers in parenthesis refer to the total number of cases on which the percentage is based. Where a lower-case "n" is used the figures were based on sample data; an upper-case "N" indicates population data were used.

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promise. Immigrants give up using the ethnic language in deference to their American born spouses' preference for English, and in return, Chaldeans born and reared in America adopt a diet consisting primarily of Chaldean style foods. Since immigrant American reared couples most often involve an immigrant male and an American reared female, this may require some effort on the part of the wife who must become adept at cooking old- country style to please her husband.

Outside the household, in general gatherings of the community, a similar situation prevails. In talking with their friends at church, at meetings of parish organizations, and at weddings and parties the language spoken by any given group of Chaldeans is dependent upon whether the members of the group are immigrants or American reared. Nearly all of the older immigrants speak Chaldean with other persons of their age group; one of the few exceptions is a man whose wife is non Chaldean and who insists that English be spoken as a courtesy to her. On the other hand few second generation persons use the foreign language with persons of the same age group; although some use the foreign language with their elders ("They like you better if you speak Chaldean to them"). The majority scarcely use it at all. It is interesting to note that one fourth of the recent immigrants also use the Chaldean language infrequently. Most of these cases involve immigrants who have infrequent contact with other Chaldeans and who have, in a sense, repudiated their background because refusing to speak the ethnic language is often a symbol of this rejection. Also included in this group are young immigrants whose social contacts outside the family are mainly with second generation Chaldeans who prefer to speak English. If they wish to participate in the activities of second generation persons of their age group, they must conform to the pattern of language usage. Arabic classes, provided with the aid of the Iraqi government, are an attempt to remedy this lack. But the use of any language other than English by the American born is rare, except for an occasional phrase of joking comment.

The one area in which the immigrant changes his language pattern almost as much as the American reared Chaldean is in the occupational sphere. Within the household, and in intracommunity activities, not only does the early immigrant use the ethnic language but also the recent immigrants tend to use it a great deal. However, in Chaldean grocery stores, use of either of the ethnic languages is far less common. Fewer than half the immigrants engaged in the grocery business reported speaking either Chaldean or Arabic in their stores. Those who used the ethnic language in the store usually explained that they did so because one of their coworkers had not yet learned the English language. Apparently the tendency to use English is an accommodation that the businessman makes in order to keep his customers happy. One early immigrant respondent, who would appear as quite

unacculturated on most points, insisted upon the use of English in his store, explaining that if Chaldean was used, "People might think we are talking about them". Many Chaldeans even make an effort to speak their customers' language, greeting them in Polish or Italian.

Chaldeans who must meet the public must also have names which are easy for Americans to pronounce. The use of Chaldean or Arabic names also disappears rather quickly as Chaldeans adopt more "American" sounding names. Sometimes the name is literally translated — thus Daoud (pronounced Da ood) becomes David; Wafa (Wa'fa) becomes Faith. In other instances a name with a similar sound is adopted; hence Naima (Na eem) becomes Norman and Norma; Jacob (Ya coob) becomes Jack; and Karim becomes Karl. Some names remain the same but change their pronunciation; Salim (pronounced Sa leem) becomes Sal im. There are many Chaldeans for whom the use of English names was begun in Telkaif in the early twentieth century during the British protectorate period. Many Christians in the area felt closer to the Western colonial powers than to their Moslem neighbors, and to some extent they adopted Western traits, including Western names. Names of British and French royalty — George, Victoria, Louis, Edward — were especially popular. Where names have been changed, however, the ethnic equivalent is often used when speaking the ethnic language. Basically this means that many immigrants have two names — an Aramaic or Arabic one used within the community, and an American one used in contacts with non-Chaldeans. American born Chaldeans rarely have Arabic or Aramaic names or if they do, they seldom use them. This naming pattern is similar to the one Gans (1963: 33 - 34) observed among Boston Italians.

Thus, the ethnic languages are preserved primarily in the homes and at community gatherings of immigrants. In all places where American born Chaldeans congregate and in the business world for immigrants, English predominates. Since native language usage is largely an immigrant phenomenon, it is essential to note the overwhelming effect which continued migration has had upon this particular ethnic community. Immense changes have occurred in Iraq during the present century, transforming it from a loose alliance of independent villages with their separate cultural patterns, to a modern nation with a national language and many other national patterns. The early immigrants from Telkaif spoke modern secular Aramaic (Chaldean) and reflected the village culture of the turn of the century. Recent immigrants are modern urban dwellers, and this difference is reflected in the fact that they speak the Iraqi national language, Arabic. Arabic is the everyday language in Baghdad and other large cities, and has come to replace Chaldean in the daily affairs of Telkaif. Many recent immigrants speak only Arabic and know no Chaldean at all. Those who do speak Chaldean rarely read and write it. The written language is always Arabic.

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Whether the Chaldeans define themselves as Arabs or not, they are an Arabic speaking people today, with the Arabic language the medium of exchange ror modern Chaldeans, particularly in its written form. Thus, the Detroit Chaldean language pattern has undergone a substantial cultural change, not only as a product of adjustment to American society, but also because of the changed language patterns of subsequent waves of immigrants.

Degree of change in the external culture of an ethnic group may also be measured with respect to the ceremonial practices that ancestors observed in the mother country. The unique nature of the Chaldean religious ritual makes it a fairly easy task to determine the degree to which members of the group make use of religious rituals which are peculiar to their religious heritage. Previously, the language of the Mass was an obvious ritual difference. Chaldean services were conducted in old Aramaic, while most Roman Catholics used Latin. The language difference has blurred in recent years, as the "Latin rite" has begun conducting the Mass in the usual language of the people. It is, therefore, somewhat anachronistic to refer to the "Latin rite", but for want of a better term, the dominant form of Roman Catholicism will be referred to as the Latin rite. Though the language difference is not so clear, with both rituals using the language of the people, the other differences between the two rites remain. The order of the prayers in the Mass is different; Chaldean Masses tend to be longer; and the traditional Chaldean rite employs no organ music, only the human voice and bells or cymbals. Furthermore, the Chaldean rite may have a married clergy while the Latin rite may not; and a Chaldean baptism is by immersion, while the Latin rite calls for the pouring of water.

Considering these ritual differences, "acculturation" of the Chaldean religion could mean several things. It could involve a Chaldean exchanging his rite for the dominant Latin rite or it could involve alterations in the Chaldean ritual to make it more like the Latin rite. At the extreme, it could mean giving up the Catholic faith entirely and becoming Protestant.

As of the first study in 1963, no one interviewed had adopted a non-Catholic religion, although one respondent reported occasional attendance at an Orthodox Church. By 1973, there were a few who had abandoned the Catholic religion. One respondent had become an Episcopalian, and another Chaldean (not in the sample) had joined the Jehovah's Witnesses. While the Chaldeans have not given up their Catholic tradition in any great numbers, the degree to which they have exchanged the Chaldean ritual for the Latin rite is considerable, and may be used as an additional indicator of the extent to which acculturation is occurring within the Chaldean group. Change in religious rituals can be measured in four respects: frequency of attendance at rituals; knowledge of Chaldean ritual; expressed preferences for Chaldean as opposed to Latin rite rituals; and changes in the ritual practices themselves.

As previously noted, Chaldeans are required by Church regulations to be baptized, to marry, and to be buried from the Chaldean Church. Marriages between Catholics of different rites should take place in the rite of the groom. This, of course, conflicts somewhat with common American practice, in which the bride's family determines the details of the wedding, including its location. Chaldeans are familiar with the common American practice, which is followed by Latin rite Catholics and taught in the Latin rite schools. Hence, a mixed rite couple is faced with a dilemma, in that both families may expect to determine the place of the wedding, each basing its expectation on a different set of customs.

The requirements concerning the appropriate location for certain religious services are, in theory, quite stringent. A Latin rite priest should not baptize, marry, or bury a Catholic of another rite, without first obtaining permission of the non-Latin rite priest a permission often reluctantly given. In practice, however, a mixed rite couple who wished to marry in the bride's rite, or a Chaldean couple who wanted their child baptized in a Latin rite church, would have little difficulty. Failure to observe these requirements would be indicative of an extreme degree of deviance from ethnic customs. A Chaldean who would marry or have his children baptized in the Latin rite would be quite highly acculturated, from a ritualistic standpoint.

Most Chaldeans marry in the Chaldean Church, even women who marry non-Chaldeans and who, therefore, should theoretically be married in the rite of the man. The Chaldean church wedding is largely due to family pressure. ("I didn't want my mother-in-law mad at me right off the bat", one non-Chaldean man said.) Furthermore almost all Chaldeans have their children baptized at the Chaldean Church; even those who rarely go to the Chaldean services plan to return there for their marriages and the baptism of their children. Sometimes this is done under severe hardship. One couple living in Virginia returned to Detroit to obtain a Chaldean baptism for their baby. The few instances in which babies are baptized outside the Chaldean rite (usually in a Latin rite church) are cases of extreme alienation from the community. One man, an immigrant, preferred to have his children baptized by the Latin rite priest for two reasons: "Those people (e.g., the Chaldeans) gossip too much, and the priest is too much after money".

This degree of alienation from the community is rare. Most Chaldeans, both American born and immigrants, turn to the Chaldean rite at the crucial points of their lives. However, the tie to the Chaldean rite is not so strong when viewed in terms of the individual's weekly religious participation. In 1963, few American reared Chaldeans (17%) attended Chaldean rite services even on a monthly basis, while over half the recent immigrants and eighty percent of the early ones did so. In 1973, the pattern was much the same, with eighteen percent of the American reared Chaldeans attending at least

monthly, as compared with seventy percent of early immigrants. Among recent immigrants, forty-eight percent of those who came between 1950 and 1965 attended monthly or more often, as did two-thirds of those who arrived after 1965. Clearly, regular attendance at the Chaldean Church is primarily an immigrant characteristic and tends to disappear with the second generation.

In a large part, this reluctance by the American born to attend Chaldean services may be due to a lack of knowledge of their own rite and a greater familiarity with the Latin rite. While it can be argued that the Chaldean rite retains a strong hold over American born Chaldeans for the most important events in their lives, it has substantially diminished in importance on a day-to-day basis. In essence, the Chaldean rite is retained for its ceremonial value — for baptisms, weddings, perhaps for Christmas and Easter. But for weekly Mass, the more "American" Catholic services are preferred. This pattern is much like that found in other ethnic groups. American born Polish and Italians, for example, often follow old country customs at weddings; and Polish Americans may hold a Wigilia, the traditional Polish Christmas dinner. But few Polish or Italian Americans follow ethnic religious customs throughout the rest of the year.

It should also be noted that attendance at ethnic religious ceremonies is not solely a measure of external culture retention. Such religious ceremonies also have a strong social interaction component. Most Chaldeans admitted they attended Chaldean services primarily for social reasons — to see their family and friends. This social nature of ethnic religion was characteristic of the early period in other ethnic communities as well. Thus Anderson (1970: 84) notes that the Lutheran or Methodist church was the center of the community for the early German immigrants. Sherman (1961:79) states that for the early Jewish immigrants, and to some extent, even today, the synagogue is the center of Jewish social activities. And Wrobel (1974:139) found that the Catholic parish was still the social center of the community for American born Polish in the 1970s. Hence, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether religious ritual adherence is evidence of cultural or social structural retention.

Using ritual adherence as a measure of culture retention, it is clear that a major cultural change has occurred. Most Chaldeans reared in America have adopted the Latin rite in preference to their own. There is another sense in which the religious traditions of the community have changed, however. The rituals of the Chaldean rite have themselves changed in the course of community adaptation to American society. At various times the Detroit parish had practiced baptism by pouring water rather than by immersion, as the Chaldean rite prescribes; and the Chaldean wedding frequently includes solo renditions of popular Latin and/or Protestant hymns by female vocalists

usually accompanied by an organ. Although informants, including the
Chaldean pastor, report that original Chaldean custom prohibits not only
the addition of English or Latin hymns but also the use of organ accom-
paniment and female voices as a part of church services, such innovations
have made their way into the Chaldean liturgy. The manner in which these
changes came about is an interesting commentary on the process by which
change occurs. One influential member of the community had a daughter
with a beautiful voice who enjoyed playing the organ. Though he was a
staunch Chaldean he wanted to hear his daughter sing and play in his church,
so he donated an organ. A less influential member would never have had the
same effect.

In analyzing these patterns of external culture, it is clear that substantial
change has occurred. All Chaldeans have totally adopted European-
American style clothing. Comparisons between the generations further
indicate that American style food is the preference of many second generation
Chaldeans; and the dominant language is used by almost all the American
reared Chaldeans for communication among themselves. Similarly, some
features of Chaldean religious practice have been largely discarded by many
American reared Chaldeans. Finally, American influences have also crept
into the Chaldean ritual itself, as evidenced by the use of the organ and
non-Aramaic hymns.

11
Change in Social Structure

THE degree of alteration in social interaction patterns among Chaldeans is generally less dramatic than the change in external culture. This validates the position taken by several ethnic theorists (Gans, 1962; Gordon, 1964; Glazer and Moynihan, 1972). Two types of social structural changes need to be distinguished: the alteration of internal structural patterns, in which members of the group continue to maintain contacts primarily with each other, but in a different form from that which they previously exhibited; and the adoption of external contacts, in which the ethnic group member takes on social relationships with persons outside the group.

Internal Structural Changes

There are three major areas in which change appears in the internal social structure of the Chaldeans. These include a change in household structure; a trend away from entrepreneurial structure in business; and an alteration in the traditional relationship between men and women.

Informant reports suggest that the household in Telkaif consisted of members of the extended family, rather than just the nuclear family, and these reports are confirmed by Al-Nouri (1964: Chap. 1). Assuming this to be an accurate description of the Telkeffee household, then it is clear that there has been an overwhelming change. As indicated in Table 11.1, Section A, less than one-third of the households in any of the community subgroups in Detroit include members other than the nuclear unit of husband, wife and unmarried children. It must be assumed that a substantial change in household structure has occurred. Older Chaldeans are aware that the extended family household has declined. They blame the young people, and complain that the American reared do not like to have their parents or other relatives living with them after marriage. Immigrants, they say, are more likely to live in such nonnuclear household arrangements. However, the data show this is

somewhat inaccurate. In 1963 about thirty percent of the households in both the American reared and the older immigrant group lived in nonnuclear arrangements. The group least likely to live in such households was the newer immigrant, with data showing only twenty-two percent of the 1950—1965 immigrants exhibiting this pattern.

The trend away from extended family living was even more pronounced in the 1973 study. A comparison of lines 1 and 1a of Table 11.1 shows that the percentage of nonnuclear households declined sharply in each of the groups present in the community in 1963. Among pre-1950 immigrants, the percent living in nonnuclear households dropped from twenty-nine percent to ten percent. Among the 1950—1965 immigrants, the frequency of nonnuclear households was cut in half (from 22 to 11%). A slightly smaller decline appeared with the American reared, where the percentage dropped from thirty percent to eighteen percent. It is interesting that the American reared continue to have the highest percentage of nonnuclear households of any of the Chaldeans who have been in the U.S. a substantial period of time. In the 1973 survey, the only group with a larger frequency of nonnuclear households was the most recent immigrant group, arriving since 1965, where thirty-one percent had such living arrangements.

One might conclude that a high frequency of extended family living is largely a function of the immigration period. During the period immediately following migration, extended family living is extremely functional. It is a low-cost means of providing food and shelter and aiding in the adjustment problems of new arrivals. Once the members of the group are established in this country, however, they tend to adopt the American practice of nuclear family households. Apparently this is an aspect of ethnic family structure that is modified quite early — even among the first generation.

One should keep in mind, however, that the number of extended family households in the Chaldean community is still high by American standards. Winch (1968: 130) has noted that less than ten percent of American families live in nonnuclear households. Among pre-1950 and 1950 — 1965 immigrants, ten and eleven percent, respectively, live in such households; and for the American reared the frequency was somewhat higher.

The prevalence of nuclear living arrangements among pre-1965 immigrants has important consequences for the traditional view of the American born as the acculturating group. A common complaint of immigrant parents — Chaldeans as well as other nationalities — is that American born give up the old way. These data cast doubt on the validity of this complaint, at least with regard to the closeness of family ties. Nonnuclear households were more characteristic of American reared than of the well established immigrant groups (here ten years or more). As Rose Hum Lee (1960: 119—120) pointed out in her analysis of Chinese Americans, immigrants who veer

TABLE 11.1

Assimilation: Change in Internal Social Structure

	Early Immigrants Arrived pre-1950 (%)	Recent Immigrants Arrived 1950-65 (%)	Arrived After 1965 (%)	American Reared (%)
A. Family and Occupational Patterns				
1. Percent of households which are nonnuclear (1963 survey)	N 28.9 (135)	N 22.1 (140)	—	N 30.2 (43)
1a. Percent of households which are nonnuclear (1973 sample)	n 10.0 (10)	n 11.1 (27)	n 30.8 (39)	n 17.6 (17)
2. Work with adult relatives (only for those with close male relatives in the area) (1963 survey)	N 29.4 (68)	N 44.1 (68)	—	N 40.0 (35)
2a. Work with adult relatives (1973 sample)	n 40.0 (10)	n 22.2 (27)	n 33.3 (39)	n 47.1 (17)

TABLE 11.1 (Continued)
Assimilation; Change in Internal Social Structure

	Early Immigrants Arrived Pre-1950 (%)	Recent Immigrants		American Reared (%)
		Arrived 1950-65 (%)	Arrived After 1965 (%)	
B. Heterosexual Social Contacts				
3. Mean age difference between husband and wife	n 9.6 yr. (12)	n 5.8 yr. (18)	—	n 3.0 yr. (15)
4. Sit in mixed sex groupings at social affairs	n 43.8 (16)	n 70.4	—	n 90.0 (30)
5. Members of mixed sex social club(s)	n 10.0 (10)	n 55.0 (20)	—	n 100.0 (19)

Note: *See*, Table 10.1, note b.

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away from tradition are often overlooked, but any breaches of custom by the American born are magnified. Thus the view of the American reared as the "changers" is not completely accurate. Most of the change in family living arrangements has occurred with the immigrant generation. As a result of these changes, the Chaldean extended family has a radically different function than it formerly had. It no longer has a major role as a living unit, and is now almost exclusively a social unit, with much social visiting among the several nuclear households which make up a single extended family.

For most Chaldeans, the extended family is also an economic unit, with many members of the community engaged in family based business enterprises. The two surveys provide an opportunity to analyze the role of the family in the Chaldean structure. In the 1963 survey (See, Table 11.1, line 2), there was a distinct difference between the pre-1950 immigrants, on the one hand, and the 1950—1965 immigrants and American reared, on the other. The early Chaldean immigrants were the epitome of the entrepreneur. They preferred small stores which they could run by themselves. As Table 11.1, A—2 indicates, less than thirty percent of early immigrants who had relatives in the Detroit area were in business with them. In contrast, forty percent or more of the recent immigrants and American reared worked with relatives. In this section of the Table, only persons with adult male relatives in the Detroit area have been included; so the difference noted could not have been due to the fact that early immigrants had fewer relatives available. Rather it suggested that the recent immigrants and American reared had a different style of doing business than their predecessors.

It is tempting to conclude that recent immigrants and American reared Chaldeans are more family centered in their economic behavior than their predecessors. Although in an earlier work (Sengstock, 1967:208—213) this has been suggested, the trend toward the family business appears to have changed somewhat in the past ten years. As line 2a of Table 11.1 indicates, the prevalence of intrafamily working arrangements has dropped considerably among the 1950—1965 group of immigrants. In 1963, they were most likely to work with relatives (44%); in 1973 they are least likely to do so (22%). In the most recent group of immigrants, those who arrived after 1965, thirty-three percent are engaged in a family economic enterprise. Apparently, the family business may perform an adjustment function for immigrants. They enter into economic ventures with relatives during their initial period in the United States. However, once they have adapted to their new environment, many prefer to go into business for themselves. This pattern had developed for the early immigrants by the time of the 1963 survey.

The 1950—1965 group exhibit this pattern in the 1975 survey. Further

analysis of the early immigrants is impossible because the 1973 survey included only a small number of this group who remain in the work force.

The American reared continue to remain in family oriented enterprises in fairly large numbers. In both surveys nearly half of them reported working with relatives. It appears that the American reared who remain in the ethnic occupation may do so for family reasons.

This extreme emphasis upon the individual, or at most, the family enterprise has prevented the Chaldeans from capturing a larger share of the retail grocery business in the Detroit area. With over four hundred retail grocery outlets, the Chaldeans could become a formidable rival to the large grocery chains. A few attempts to form such a union have been made, largely by recent immigrants. But the intense internal rivalry between individuals and extended families has interfered with their success. It is still a matter of great pride in the community if a man or a family partnership can best another man or family in business. As one grocer commented bitterly, "When a man sees another Chaldean is successful, he's got to move in across the street and see if he can take your business away".

The economic role of the extended family is apparently used by the immigrants as a mechanism of support until the individual is able to operate independently. Rivalries between individuals and extended families remain strong. Most crucial for the maintenance of the extended family is its continued importance for the American reared, many of whom remain with the family business. Thus, although changes have obviously occurred in the Chaldean extended family, it remains an important social and economic unit in the Chaldean community.

There is another aspect of internal Chaldean social structure where change is far more striking than extended family patterns. If the early immigrants worried about business rivalries, they usually had no threats to their authority and power at home. There the Chaldean male reigned supreme as patriarch. Relationships between the sexes has undergone considerable change in recent years. Chaldean males complain that they no longer have the same control over their wives and daughters that their fathers had and to a great extent they are correct.

The old Telkefee pattern of marriage was well-designed to make the male supreme in the household. Chaldean girls generally married very young, often at eleven or twelve, to men much older than themselves. Scarcely more than a child, the bride was taken into her in-laws' home and brought up to follow the wishes of her husband and his parents. She really had no opportunity to question her position or to develop independent ideas. As a result, Chaldean wives waited on their husbands in a way no American wife would consider. One young Chaldean man recounted an incident in his own home. His father, seated in the kitchen near the kitchen sink, called his wife

from upstairs to pour him a glass of water. The son commented ruefully that
he was sure his own wife would not do that for him: "She'd probably pour
the water on my head! But my mother didn't mind at all!"

The young man's estimate of his own wife's reaction is probably quite
accurate. One would not describe the Detroit Chaldean women as extreme
"Women's Libbers", but the Chaldean women of the 1960s and 1970s are
quite different from the child brides of 1930. For one thing, they do not marry
as young. Today, Chaldean girls in Detroit, and also Iraq, marry in their late
teens or early twenties. Most have finished high school, some have gone to
college, and the majority have had some type of job outside the home. They
have ideas of their own and are less likely to acquiesce to their husbands'
wishes. They are also approximately the same age as their husbands. As
Table 11.1, B — 3 shows, the mean age difference between husband and wife
was 9.6 years for the early immigrants. It was 5.8 years for recent immigrants,
and only 3.0 years for American reared. When a wife is much younger than
her husband, she may be willing to accept him as an "authority", but when
they are approximately the same age, his authoritative position tends to
diminish.

Not only in marriage is the relationship between the sexes changing but
also in general community activities. Among the early immigrants, males
and females had little contact with each other. Women congregated in the
kitchen, men in the living room. Men ran the affairs of the Church; women
had no part in them. In the Church itself men sat in front and chanted their
prayers, while women sat in the back and were silent. At community
gatherings the sexes were separate. Of course, there was no contact between
spouses before marriage; courtship and "dating" were absent.

None of these extreme patterns exist any longer. As Table 11.1 sections
B — 4 and B — 5 show, there has been a dramatic increase in the frequency of
contacts between the sexes. At a community social gathering today most
groups sit at tables containing members of both sexes: husband and wives
sit together, brothers and sisters, parents and children. Formerly, the men
would go to one side, the women to the other. In 1963, forty-four percent of
early immigrants sat in mixed sex groupings, while seventy percent of recent
immigrants and ninety percent of American reared sat in mixed sex groups.
At social affairs in the 1970s there were scarcely any tables which did not
have members of both sexes. There has also been an increase in the number
of persons belonging to clubs for both men and women. In 1973, only ten
percent of the early immigrants belonged to such clubs, but over half of the
recent immigrants and all the American reared were members. Thus, strict
sex segregation no longer exists in the Chaldean community.

Premarital contact between the sexes has also increased considerably.
Early immigrants usually reported that their parents had chosen their spouses

for them, and that they had not met their spouses or that they had seen each other only at a distance before the date of the marriage. In contrast, ninety percent of the American reared in the 1963 sample reported that they had dated prior to marriage. Among the recent immigrants the rate is also high, sixty-four percent, suggestive that premarital dating patterns have changed in Iraq also. In fact, some American born Chaldeans complain they are more restricted than their foreign born cousins.

Today's young Chaldeans, unlike their parents, are not content to let their parents choose their spouses for them. They are willing to consider their parents wishes, but they insist upon making the decision themselves. In reality, the present mate selection process in many families is a compromise between total freedom of choice for the couple and strict parental selection. Many parents engage in a good deal of behind-the-scene manipulations but they must be very subtle in order not to provoke outright rebellion. As one man said of his daughter's marriage: "They think they chose each other. They don't know what we did to get them together"!

The examples introduced in this study indicate that substantial change has occurred in the internal social structure of the Chaldean community. Many of these may have come about as a result of contact with American society. Others seem to be due to new patterns of behavior among twentieth century youth, whether in Detroit or Iraq. Such changes cannot be attributed exclusively to pressure from American society, since many Chaldeans maintain limited contacts with the outside.

External Contacts

Some analysts, social scientists and layman alike, would not consider the alteration of internal social patterns, as discussed in the preceding section, to be evidence of "assimilation". To most people, social assimilation means what it does for Gordon (1964:70): the merging of members of the ethnic group into the general society, especially in intimate contacts — what sociologists call "primary groups". Assimilation, then, implies the inter-mingling of ethnic group members with persons outside the group. This type of assimilation I have termed the adoption of external contacts. Such external contacts include both formal secondary relationships such as bureaucratic organizations, and the close primary groups to which Gordon refers.

One major source of outside social contacts for most ethnic groups is the economic sphere. Ethnic Americans are often forced into contact with outsiders by the necessity of earning a living. Many Chaldeans have been insulated from this type of contact by the Chaldean grocery business. As Table 11.2, A—1 indicates, far more American reared than immigrant Chaldeans had economic contacts outside the community in 1963. Fifty-six percent of the second generation worked outside the community, as opposed

to only twenty percent of the early immigrants. Clearly the American reared generation was more assimilated, in the sense that more of them had outside economic contact.

A substantial number of recent immigrants (34%) also had this type of contact. In part this reflects the relatively different character of the 1950—1965 Chaldean immigrants. While early immigrants were largely uneducated and the grocery business was satisfactory to them, many recent immigrants were educated professionals. A surprising number were content to open a grocery store initially because it was easy to obtain work within the community, and later because it was a convenient way to bring relatives from Iraq. However, some were anxious to pursue the profession for which they were trained, and thus their economic pursuits took them outside the community.

By 1973, many more Chaldeans were seeking jobs outside the community. The American reared had apparently reached a plateau in their job-seeking pattern, for the percent of this group employed outside the community was roughly the same for both studies (56% in 1963 versus 59% in 1973: lines 1 and 1a of Table 11.2). Among the immigrants, however, the pattern had changed drastically. Half of the pre- 1950 immigrants had outside employment, while in 1963 only twenty percent had such employment. In the 1950—1965 group, forty- eight percent were employed outside, versus thirty- four percent a decade earlier. Among the most recent arrivals (post 1965), the trend toward outside employment is exceptionally high, with sixty- four percent obtaining jobs outside the ethnic community. This is especially startling in view of the fact that this is the group which probably has the greatest need for employment within the ethnic community. Being recent arrivals they are less adapted to the American culture and could be greatly helped by employment among those whose cultural background is similar to their own. Yet, they seek jobs elsewhere. Why? Most likely it is because the community is becoming too large to be served by the ethnic occupation. As discussed earlier, Detroit can support only a limited number of independent grocery stores, and established Chaldean store owners can employ only so many new arrivals. Once the existing jobs are filled, other newcomers are forced to seek outside employment. Presently, more Chaldeans are seeking job assistance from the state employment agency than has occurred in former years. It is clear that there has been an increase in secondary contacts outside the community, at least in the economic sphere.

In other secondary relationships, greater outside contacts are also developing. Recent immigrants and the American reared generally have more such contacts than the earliest immigrant group. In 1963, only thirteen percent of the early immigrants belonged to any formal organizations outside the Chaldean community (Table 11.2, line 2). In contrast, over one-third of

TABLE 11.2
Assimilation: External Social Contacts

		Early Immigrants pre-1950 (%)	Recent Immigrants Arrived 1950-65 (%)	Arrived After 1965 (%)	American Reared (%)
A.	**Secondary Relations**				
1.	Male employed outside Chaldean occupation (1963 survey)	N 19.9 (141)	N 34.3 (131)	—	N 55.5 (54)
1a.	Males employed outside Chaldean occupation (1973 survey)	n 50.0 (10)	n 48.1 (27)	n 64.1 (39)	n 58.9 (17)
2.	Member of formal non-Chaldean	n 13.3 (15)	n 35.7 (28)	—	n 46.7 (30)
2a.	Member of formal non-Chaldean assn. (1973 survey)	n 10.0 (10)	n 18.5 (27)	n 25.6 (39) ·	n 29.4 (17)
3.	Prefer formal loan Sources	n 25.0 (8)	n 56.0 (25)	—	n 33.3 (24)
B.	**Primary Relations**				
4.	Exogamous marriage type (only for marriages contracted after immigration of first spouse to arrive)	N 34.9 (63)	N 44.4 (99)	—	N 43.4 (99)

TABLE 11.2 (continued)
Assimilation: External Social Contacts

		Early Immigrants pre-1950 (%)	Recent Immigrants Arrived 1950-65 (%)	Recent Immigrants Arrived After 1965 (%)	American Reared (%)
4a.	Exogamous marriage type (1973 survey)	50.0 (4) n	37.5 (16) n	—0— (11) n	68.8 (16) n
5.	Closest friend is not Chaldean	.25.0 (8) n	21.7 (27) n	—	28.0 (25) n
5a.	Closest friend is not Chaldean (1973 survey)	30.0 (10 n	22.2 (27 n	17.9 (39) n	23.5 (17) n

NOTE: *See*, Table 10.1, note b.

the recent immigrants and nearly half of the American reared belong to such groups. Most of the organizations are professional groups of various types, Roman Catholic organizations such as the Knights of Columbus, or various interethnic clubs, such as the international student clubs on some college campuses. In 1973 the pre-1950 immigrants exhibited the same propensity to develop outside secondary contacts as they had a decade earlier (Table 11.2, line 2a). But the percentage of 1950—1965 immigrants and American reared persons having such contacts had dropped substantially. This probably reflects the altered relationship between Chaldeans and other Catholics as a result of the closing of Roman Catholic schools. When they or their children attended Latin rite schools, some Chaldeans joined organization at the local Latin rite parish. With the move to the public schools, this impetus to join outside organizations is no longer present. In 1973, the percentage of post-1965 immigrants with outside organization contacts was unexpectedly high (26 %), essentially the same as the American reared (29%). This may be related to the recent immigrants' need for outside occupations, that may result in the requirement to join various professional or occupational groups, such as unions.

Another type of outside contact which many ethnic groups seek to avoid is the necessity of going outside the community for various kinds of assistance, such as financial loans. Three-fourths of the early immigrants preferred to stay within the community when they needed to borrow money, specifically borrowing from relatives. More than half of the recent immigrants prefer to borrow from formal loan agencies (banks, savings and loan associations, credit purchases, et cetera). It is interesting to note that the American reared were less likely to use formal loan sources than the recent immigrants. This probably reflects the considerable financial success that the early immigrants enjoyed and that now enables them to provide loans (or gifts) for their children, who seem quite satisfied to take advantage of their parents' economic good fortune.

Using most measures considered, it is clear that second generation Chaldeans and recent immigrants have many more outside contacts of a formal, secondary nature than did their predecessors, and are clearly more assimilated than the early immigrants. An analysis of their primary relationships will determine whether they have developed outside contacts of a close personal character.

Two measures of primary group assimilation were used in the Chaldean study. Respondents were asked to list the ethnic background of their "best friend" and the ethnic background of their spouses. Marriage is the most intimate of relationships: marriage to a non-Chaldean clearly indicates a high degree of assimilation on a personal level. In considering data on exogamy, some care must be taken to control for the place of marriage. For immigrants who were married prior to their immigration, exogamy is a

somewhat meaningless variable. Previous to immigration, the availability of non-Chaldeans for marriage partners was extremely limited, especially for those whose origin was the village rather than the urban areas; hence, only with immigration did exogamy become a practical possibility. Therefore, Table 11.2, B—4 includes only immigrants who were single at the time of immigration.

Immigrant parents, Chaldeans as well as other ethnic groups, often complain that young people born here spurn their own people when searching for mates. Only the immigrants "stay with their own". As the data show, this picture is somewhat inaccurate. Of those earlier immigrants who were single at the time of immigration, thirty-five percent had married outside the Chaldean community. Slightly more recent immigrants (44%) had married exogamously. Again, the image of the American reared as deviating a great deal from the immigrant pattern was not borne out. The American reared group was as likely to marry inside the community as were the recent immigrants. And the number of American reared marrying outside was only about ten percent greater than the number of older immigrants. In 1963, the American reared were quite likely to follow the immigrant pattern with regard to their choice of a spouse. By 1973 this pattern had changed, however, as nearly seventy percent of American reared in the sample had married outside the community. Half of the pre-1950 immigrants were married outside the community but there were only four cases in the sample and little can be said of so small a group. None of the very recent immigrants in the sample had married outside the community as yet.

Those who do marry outside the community are most likely to pick spouses who are Latin rite Catholics. Some Chaldeans have married Polish or Italian Catholics, and there are several married to Irish Catholics. This pattern is probably due to the high degree of contact which Chaldeans have had with other Catholics through the Catholic school system. It also indicates that Chaldeans are becoming somewhat enmeshed in the Catholic segment of what Ruby Jo Kennedy (1952) called the "triple melting pot". A few Chaldeans have married Protestants, but in most cases the Protestant spouse converts to Catholicism (usually the Latin rite) at the time of marriage. It is interesting to note that few Chaldeans have married persons from other Arabic speaking communities. Although the Detroit area has the largest population of migrants from Arabic speaking countries of any American city, there is little contact between the various subunits. Chaldeans from Iraq, Maronites from Lebanon, and Muslims from Yeman or Lebanon — each group maintains its own separate community. As Arabic sentiment develops within the Chaldean community, greater contact and perhaps intermarriage with other Arabic speaking groups may occur. If it does, there is every likelihood that such marriages will be limited to other Christian groups — Maronite or other Eastern rite Catholics or perhaps Eastern Orthodox. The

community is not likely to accept intermarriage with Muslims for some time to come.

If one equates assimilation with intermarriage, then it would appear that American reared Chaldeans, with an exogamy rate nearing seventy percent, are quite removed from the Chaldean community. It does not seem accurate to characterize them so, since Chaldeans are still very likely to stay within the community when seeking their closest friends. This trend is even stronger than the tendency to endogamy. Only about one-fourth of the respondents in any group reported that their closest friend was not Chaldean (Table 11.2, Section 5, 5a). Although American reared Chaldeans had more outside contacts of a secondary nature, when it comes to the choice of a very close friend in whom to confide they seek out another Chaldean. This was true with little change in both 1963 and 1973. With the exception of the most recent arrivals, none of whom had married outside the community, in every other group there is a larger percentage of persons with a non-Chaldean spouse than of persons with a non-Chaldean best friend. Apparently some of those who marry outside the community still feel the need for a close associate and confidante who is also Chaldean. In her study of Chaldean high school students, Doctoroff (1978:144 — 145) found the same pattern.

These data provide a clue to a not infrequent pattern in ethnic groups: the member who marries outside the community, but who maintains a high degree of contact within it. In such cases, it would actually be accurate to speak of marriage into the ethnic community rather than marriage out of it. For the net result of interethnic marriage is not necessarily the loss of an ethnic group member; it may be the addition of a new member. Some of these new members became active, with the zeal which often accompanies conversion. Neither are the children of such unions necessarily lost to the ethnic community. One young Chaldean girl, daughter of a Chaldean mother and an Irish father, was busily taking Arabic classes and quite involved with her Chaldean friends and cousins. Her father commented: "The only thing that bothers her is me! She thinks being half Irish is a real bummer!" Sherman (1960:189) noted the same phenomenon among American Jews, in that many so-called exogamus marriages really draw outsiders into the ethnic community, rather than causing insiders to leave (See also, Greeley, 1971:86 — 87).

To summarize the assimilation picture as defined by external contact, increased contact seemed to have occurred in two areas over the ten year period. First, substantially more immigrant Chaldeans were employed outside the community in 1973 than in 1963. Second, the rate of exogamy had risen among the American reared. In some respects, the lack of outside contact was striking. Major examples were the decrease in the percent having formal association memberships, and the continually low rate of close friendships

with non-Chaldeans. Most interesting to note was the tendency to maintain
one's close friendships inside the community which exceeded even the
tendency to marry within it.

In comparing primary contacts such as marriage and friendship patterns,
with secondary contact, such as occupational patterns and formal   association
memberships, an unexpected pattern emerges. Gordon (1964:34) has
suggested that primary group contacts are more likely to be maintained
within the ethnic group than secondary ones. Yet the Chaldean data show
that voluntary non-Chaldean association memberships and close friendships
outside the community occur with about the same frequency in most groups.
In 1973, the percentages were eighteen and twenty-two percent for the
1950—1965 immigrants; twenty-six and eighteen percent for the post-1965
group; twenty-nine and twenty-four percent for the American reared. For
the early immigrants, the frequency of outside friendships (30%) is greater
than the frequency of outside association memberships (10%). This might
be explained on the basis that Chaldeans apparently do not have much in-
terest in voluntary associations. However, using exogamy and external
occupation as the mesures of prim ry and secondary contact, the 1973
rates for the 1950—1965 immigrants are again quite close (38% for exogamy,
48% for external occupation). For the American reared the sixty-nine percent
exogamy rate is slightly higher than the fifty-nine percent rate for external
occupation. Clearly, the complexity of the assimilation process cannot be
explained by a simple dichotomy into primary and secondary contact.

12
Change in Normative Culture

HAVING analyzed Chaldean social structure, it is now appropriate to return to a consideration of normative culture, and to relate the changes in normative culture to the sphere of life which the values might be expected to regulate.

By their very nature, norms and values relate to all spheres of daily life. Groups establish standards which state their view of what constitutes a "good life": the proper material culture, the ideal type of social relationships within the group, the desirability of relations with the outside world. As the data in Table 12.1 suggest, values and norms are likely to exhibit change if they relate to a sphere of human life in which behavioral change is also occurring. On the other hand, if one considers values and norms within a sphere of life where behavioral change is absent, value change is usually also missing.

For example, the Chaldeans have been shown to exhibit a substantial degree of change in the practice of external ethnic customs. As section A—1 of Table 12.1 shows, the value placed upon such customs also seems to have undergone change. All of the early immigrants, and seventy-three percent of the recent ones, express a preference for the ethnic customs; this is true of only seventeen percent of the American reared. Apparently, as this trait was dropped, the value placed on the trait was also dropped.

As previously noted, the internal social structure of the Chaldean community has also been altered. Among the major changes indicated were: the phasing out of the extended family as a household unit; maintenance of the extended family as a visiting and helping unit; and a greater degreee of contact between the sexes. Have the value patterns of the Chaldeans also been altered in these areas of life? Value statements in some of the areas are available.

TABLE 12.1

Acculturation: Normative Culture
(1963 Survey)

		Early Immigrants (Arrived pre-1950)	Recent Immigrants (Arrived 1950—65)	American Reared
A.	*Values and External Culture*	n	n	n
1.	Prefer Chaldean Services	100.0%(15)	73.1%(26)	17.2%(29)
B.	*Values and Internal Social Structure* :ture			
2.	Consider Family in Occupation Choice	n 25.0%(12)	n 12.5%(24)	n 37.5%(24)
3.	Consider Family Preference in Spouse Choice	n 58.3%(12)	nn 25.0%(20)	n 36.8%(19)
C.	*Values and External Contact*			
4.	Believe Chaldeans are "Better"	n 100.0%(11)	n 31.8%(22)	4.0%(25)
5.	Believe Endogamy Preferable	n 80.0%(15)	n 63.0%(27)	n 42.9%(28)

NOTE: *See,* Table 10.1, Note b.

With regard to the role of the extended family, one aspect of the traditional
pattern was for the family to exercise considerable control over the actions
of its members. When the extended family shares a household such control is
essential in order that the household may operate properly. It is less
important, however, when members live in different households and have
only informal visiting bonds. With the demise of the extended family
household, do Chaldeans continue to believe the extended family should
exercise influence over its members?

An interesting phenomenon is observed when one considers the degree to
which the various subgroups of Chaldeans tend to consider family interests
in their own personal decision-making, such as choice of an occupation or a
spouse. As reported at an earlier point, American reared Chaldeans were not
less likely to marry endogamously or engage in traditionally ethnic occu-
pations than either of the immigrant groups. Similarly, the American reared
respondents in the sample exhibited a fairly high tendency to consider
extended family interest with regard to both marriage and occupation, a
tendency which was, in some respects, greater than that of the immigrants.
In reporting their reasons for choosing their occupations, thirty-eight percent
of the American reared stated they considered the interests of the extended
family. In contrast, one fourth of the early immigrants and only thirteen
percent of the recent ones reported considering similar factors.

With regard to choice of a spouse, one might consider it even less likely
that American reared Chaldeans would accept family influence. In addition
to the diminished role of the extended family household, this group tended
toward increased contact between the sexes, both before and after marriage.
Presumably such contact would promote the "romantic" approach to spouse
choice, in preference to following family influence. It must first be stated that
American reared Chaldeans do choose their own spouses — and insist upon
this right. However, as Section B—3 of Table 12.1 shows, family influence
definitely plays a role in their decisions. Respondents were allowed to list
several factors they would consider in choosing a spouse. Over half the early
immigrants would consider family wishes. The American reared were less
likely to choose a spouse to please the family, but were more likely to do so
than recent immigrants (37 versus 25%). Again it appears that the picture of
the American reared as the changers is somewhat inaccurate.

Every group has values which are concerned with the nature of the world
outside. Are the people "out there" worse than, as good as, or better than the
in-groups? To what degree do Chaldeans believe that ousiders are "OK" —
people with whom they want to associate? The 1963 data included two
items which bear upon this question. First was an item which asked Chaldeans
to compare members of their own group to other groups in terms of the
characteristic personality traits which could be expected of the members. In

order to determine the degree to which non-Chaldeans were considered to be "good people" as compared with Chaldeans, respondents in the 1963 survey were asked to relate how they thought Chaldeans and non-Chaldeans were or were not alike. All responses which made use of value laden terms were coded as to whether they were favorable to the Chaldeans, to non-Chaldeans, or indicated a belief that both were, in a sense, equal to each other. For example if a respondent said that he thought Chaldeans work harder than "Americans", were more industrious, more stable, and more self-controlled, he was recorded as believing that Chaldeans were better than non-Chaldeans. If he related that he thought the major difference between Chaldeans and non-Chaldeans lay in the fact that Chaldeans were "too prudish", "too envious of each other", and "too self-centered", he was recorded as believing that Chaldeans were not better than non-Chaldeans. Similarly, if he said that it was hard to tell since both groups had assets and defects, he was also recorded as believing that Chaldeans were not better than non-Chaldeans on the theory that if an ethnic group member sees good and bad in both groups, he has placed them on an equal plane and does not attribute a special quality of goodness to his own group.

Based on the social interaction patterns found within the Chaldean community, in which early immigrants tend to confine their interactions to members of the community, while recent immigrants and second generation Chaldeans venture outside for at least some of their contacts, we would expect that early immigrants would tend to be the strongest believers that Chaldeans were better than non-Chaldeans. As section C—4 of Table 12.1 shows, the expected pattern does appear. Early immigrants generally tend to extol the virtues of Chaldeans; recent arrivals and second generation Chaldeans are more likely to see their defects or at least to feel that Chaldeans are not better than persons of other ethnic background. Among the latter two groups, there appears to be an extreme hesitancy to see Chaldeans as "the best". This variable was included only in the 1963 survey, so it is impossible to determine whether the decline in secondary contacts outside the community for 1950—65 immigrants and American reared (Table 11.2, lines 2 and 2a) has affected this tendency in any way.

If many Chaldeans seem hesitant to claim a monopoly on "good people", still they are somewhat hesitant to recommend that their own members establish long-term relationships with non-Chaldeans. As section C—5 of Table 12.1 shows, eighty percent of the early immigrants and sixty-three percent of the recent ones express the belief that marriage to another Chaldean is the preferable form of marriage. With the American reared this percentage drops substantially, to forty-three percent. The reader will recall that there was essentially no difference between the exogamy rates of American reared and immigrants who married after coming to the United States. It may appear surprising, therefore, that so great a variation in the

corresponding value position is observed between the immigrants and the American reared. This apparent inconsistency is easily explained when one recognizes that included among respondents whose value positions were analyzed were a number of the immigrants married before immigration, who were, therefore, not included in the calculation of the endogamy rate. It was noted earlier that close personal relationships outside the Chaldean community are seldom sought. Apparently, they are not substantially valued by the members either. Since the 1973 survey did not consider this question, it is impossible to determine whether any change has occurred in this regard.

Values vs. Behavior

As noted earlier, the values attached to certain behavioral traits tend to change if the associated behavior pattern is also changing. It has not been determined whether the ethnic group first drops the external behavioral pattern to which the values relate, or conversely, the behavioral pattern is dropped gradually, perhaps imperceptibly; later the underlying value pattern may be brought into line with the real external pattern. Using the variables of endogamy and religious ritual maintenance, some suggestion as to the order of the process may be made.

As Table 12.2 - A shows, in both immigrant groups more persons express a preference for the Chaldean ritual than actually attend it (100 versus 80% for the early immigrants, 73 versus 59 % for the 1950—1965 arrivals). The same pattern appears with the immigrants' endogamy pattern. Eighty percent of the early immigrants prefer endogamy, while only sixty-five percent practice it; for the more recent immigrants, the figures are sixty-three and fifty-six percent respectively. These data suggest that values are more stable and behavior is more likely to change for the immigrants. For the American reared, however, the pattern is different. With regard to the religious ritual, values and behavior are essentially the same. But an analysis of marriage patterns showed more American reared were endogamous (57%) than their values would suggest, since only forty-three percent considered endogamy to be preferable. One might suggest that immigrants apparently maintain their ethnic traditions more in theory than in practice, while the American reared continue the ethnic tradition more than they care to admit.

Conclusions Regarding Acculturation and Assimilation

A number of questions were initially posed concerning the nature of acculturation and assimilation, and the relationships between these two processes. In a general sense, the Chaldean data showed that meaningful distinctions can be made between various aspects of assimilation and acculturation, for change does not occur at the same rate in the several aspects of ethnic culture and social structure.

Regarding the commonly held hypothesis that change in culture occurs

TABLE 12.2

Normative vs. Behavioral Change

(1963 Survey)

		Early Immigrants (Arrived Pre-1950)	Recent Immigrants (Arrived 1950-65)	American Reared
A.	Religious Ritual Maintenance			
	Values: prefer Chaldean services	n 100.0%(15)	n 73.1%(26)	n 17.2%(29)
	Behavior: attend Chaldean ritual 1/mo. or more	n 80.0%(15)	n 59.3%(27)	n 16.7%(30)
B.	Endogamy			
	Values: believe endogamy preferable	n 80.0%(15)	n 63.0%(27)	n 42.9%(28)
	Behavior: endogamous marriage	n 65.1%(63)	n 55.6%(99)	n 56.6%(99)

Note: *See.* Table 10.1, note b.

more quickly than change in social structure, this pattern appears true only with regard to external cultural traits such as language use, dress and food patterns, and religious ceremonial patterns. While these patterns appear to be dropped rather quickly by some immigrants, second generation Chaldeans are quite thoroughly "acculturated" with respect to their external cultural patterns.

Normative culture changes more slowly. Some value patterns, such as the high values placed on the family, persist rather strongly among the American reared. Other values and norms, such as the preference for endogamy are not strongly maintained by the American reared. Values and norms seem to be retained in the same spheres of life in which behavior patterns are stable. Where behavior patterns have been altered, the norms and values governing these patterns also have changed. Future ethnic research should attempt to analyze this question more thoroughly. We would then be able to determine

whether change in the normative pattern occurs first, and then "pulls" the behavior pattern along with it; or conversely, that behavior patterns change first, with the value change lagging behind. I suggest that the latter is probably the case. Many new patterns probably develop in ethnic groups as a result of deviance on the part of the members. That is, ethnic patterns do not appear to change deliberately through group agreement to alter its customs. Rather patterns are changed under duress. Young members of the ethnic group (and some older ones too) refuse to follow the traditional patterns and introduce new ones. Their more traditional relatives and friends are loathe to relinquish contact with these nonconformists. Over a time their deviant patterns come to be adopted by more and more people and gradually become an acceptable alternative.

Changes in the social patterns of an ethnic group tend to occur more slowly than changes in "external culture", but the rate of change is not the same for all aspects of the social structure. With regard to the family, Chaldeans have altered the composition of their households, and the pattern of relationships between husband and wife. However, one pattern which remains quite stable is the extremely important role played by the extended family. Although it has ceased to be a household unit the extended family remains the major unit for visiting and mutual assistance, that is often economic in nature. It also exerts a key influence over the decisions of its members.

Another aspect of assimilation concerns the development of social contacts outside the ethnic community. While in some areas, such as work relationships, considerable outside contact has developed; there are few voluntary association memberships. With respect to close primary relationships, exogamy has risen considerably, especially among the American reared. It should also be noted that individuals who develop external contacts do not necessarily leave the group and become assimilated into the general society. Sometimes the non-Chaldean contact is brought into the ethnic community, especially in the case of exogamous marriages.

Previous theorists were only partially correct when they suggested that acculturation precedes assimilation. With the present data this conclusion can be specified somewhat more clearly; it is only the external aspects of culture which change rapidly. Some aspects of normative culture (the value placed upon the family, for example) change very slowly. And some aspects of social structure, such as the pattern of relationships between the sexes, have changed rather radically. Values and norms seem to adopt the rate of change of the sphere of life to which they apply. Thus, values expressing the importance of external culture change rather quickly, as do norms relating to the exogamy rate; norms stressing the importance of the family are more stable.

A Final Note on Ethnic Culture

ETHNIC group culture is, in a sense, what might be called "artificial culture". Culture, by its very nature, is the pattern of living by which the people of a society adapt to conditions of life in a particular place at a specific point in time. It may include adaptations to geography, to economic conditions, to the political structure of the nation in which the group lives, and to other groups who live nearby. Upon migrating to another society, however, the group's culture assumes an artificial character; it is divorced in time and/or space from the conditions which spawned its original characteristics in the homeland. The culture is preserved, not because it is a useful adaptation to the social setting. Often it is not; it may even be maladaptive. Rather, it is preserved as a symbol of ethnic identity.

The family economic venture, for example, was a prominent feature of many village cultures in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The culture decreed that a son would enter his father's occupation and often the two would work together. This was appropriate to the village setting, with its relatively few available occupations and limited sources from which to learn a trade. Having the son follow his father helped both to establish the young man economically, and to replace older men as they retired from active work. Many groups have attempted to reproduce this pattern in America, however, where there are a wide variety of occupations open and many ways in which a new occupation may be learned. Furthermore, a saturation point may be reached in many occupations; some actually become obsolete, and hence it may be maladaptive for a son to follow his father. Thus, perpetuation of the family-run Chaldean grocery store may, at some point, cease to be advantageous either for the individual store owner, his family, the Detroit Chaldean community, or all three. Yet, ethnic groups attempt to continue the family-run business because it is "the way our people do things". Examples could be multiplied. Food patterns of a culture develop around types of available foodstuffs, and represent the use of foods which are most economical and easiest to obtain. In the new society such foods may not be so available, and ethnic people go to great expense to import traditional foods when their diets could be better served by the use of local items.

Because the ethnic culture is preserved as a symbol and not because it is adaptive, the culture of a migrant group is often a purer form of the historical culture of the mother country. In the home country, as times change, the culture changes to adapt itself to the new times. Some items of the culture are dramatically altered, while others are abandoned altogether. People in the society accept such changes as part of the natural course of events. Cultural changes are viewed as mere adaptations of the old ways to new times. Old people may object, but their resistance is easily overcome. Development of a village to an industrial economy with greater diversity of occupation and the

elimination of family enterprises is an indication of "progress". It is the culture's own answer to a change in times.

In the ethnic culture, however, change cannot be viewed as part of the natural course of events. Any change is viewed as coming from the outside — an attempt of the dominant American culture to lead young Chaldeans (or Polish or Irish or Jews) away from the "old way". As a result, there may be more resistance to change in the ethnic community than in the mother country. Chaldean teenagers born in the United States complain that their Iraqi born cousins, in America only a few years, have more freedom to date than they have. Parents of the American reared left Telkaif when the traditional arranged marriage system was relatively intact. They view their children's desires to engage in dating an encroachment of American culture on the "Chaldean way". Relatives who remained in Iraq, however, see the altered marriage pattern as a natural adaptation of the "Chaldean way" to changing times. Hence, the seemingly anomalous result: some American born Chaldeans follow the old arranged customs more closely than their recent immigrant cousins.

When residents of the original country resist change, they do so because of a fondness and attachment to their old traditions. Emigrants resist change for a dual reason; change represents not only a break with tradition but also with the mother country. Having broken physical ties with their homeland, many migrants resist any further breaks with the culture of that homeland. Thus, while those who remain in the original country can accept change as a natural part of their country and its culture, migrants view it as a choice between the old traditions and becoming "Americanized". Hence, they often resist change more vigorously.

This resistance to change in a migrant group produces an ethnic culture that is a more accurate representation of the mother country's traditional culture than the country's own culture today. Folklore specialists often find their best source for traditional folk tales is the migrant group living in a foreign land, where the tales are preserved long after they have been lost in the mother country.[4] Likewise Irish Americans, steeped in the traditional Catholicism of their Irish forefathers, are shocked at the agnostic character of Irish culture today (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:253).

[4] Personal communication from Professor John Gutowski of the Folklore Archives at Wayne State University, Detroit.

PART V: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ETHNIC IDENTITY

13

Ethnic Identity and National Origin

A MAJOR problem of every community is the development of an ethnic identity: the task of determining who "we" are. On the surface this would appear to be a very simple task. Every group must know who its members are and in what their origin consists. In reality it is an extremely complicated process. Every migrant group can define itself in a number of different ways, and the boundaries of the group will vary depending upon the definition used. The Jews are an example of a group which has had considerable disagreement and open debate over the question of identity. Must one adhere to the Jewish religion; observe certain ritual or cultural practices; possess Jewish ancestral ties; or support the Israeli national state? Views differ within the Jewish community, and the inclusion or exclusion of some persons will depend on the definition used (Massarik, 1959:243; Hertz, 1958:30; Gordis, 1970; Weiss-Rosmarin, 1970; Roth, 1977).

American ethnic groups are based upon a variety of characteristics which they share. National origin is a major source of ethnic unity; thus one speaks of the German, Polish or Italian community. Religion is also of key importance; hence Irish Protestants and Irish Catholics are not grouped together, nor are Polish Jews and Polish Catholics (Lopata, 1976:17). Some further groupings by local region or family ties also appear. Glazer (1954:165 – 167) noted that many ethnic groups — Poles, Lithuanians, Italians, Norwegians, Swedes, and Czechoslovakians — immigrated as members of village or religious groups. Their consciousness of a single nationality develops only after their arrival in America.

Thus, an important question arises concerning the source of ethnic identity of migrant communities and the manner in which unity is developed. How

does an ethnic community determine its boundaries? Who is a *bona fide* member and who is not? Which source of unity is selected under what circumstances?

A major factor influencing the process of identity formation is the nature of the identity patterns which the immigrants brought with them from their homeland. If village or region was an important source of identity in the country of origin, it would be expected to play an important factor for immigrants from all parts of Europe because this was a major identifying factor prior to immigration.

The Chaldeans are an excellent source of data on the problem of identification, as they are a group which is presently undergoing an intense identity crisis. A major reason for this is the fact that the Middle Eastern nations are themselves undergoing a crisis of identity. At least three different foci of personal identity can be found there. First, there is a strong tendency for residents of Middle Eastern countries to view themselves in purely local terms. As Hourani (1946:121) pointed out, many Middle Eastern tribes and villages defined themselves as a unique people, unlinked to their neighbors in any significant ways (*See also*, Hinnebusch, 1977:280). Second, there is often a fierce national pride, consciousness and concern, as exhibited by spokesmen for the various Middle Eastern nations (El-Hamamsy, 1977: 69 – 72). Lastly, there is a concurrent and at times conflicting plea for Arab unity, which requires a subjugation of nationalistic feeling to a broader feeling of oneness with all Arabs, whatever their nation-state affiliation (El-Hamamsy, 1977:72–76). These new movements of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism are major forces in the Middle East today, and are shaping, in large part, the internal relations of the Middle Eastern countries, as well as their relations with each other and with the non-Arab world. Outside observers often stand confused as they view these conflicting trends in the Arab Middle East. "Just what is the Arab goal?" is the question they ask.

Such confusion is not surprising in view of the fact that within the Arab community itself there is widespread disagreement over goals. In the course of research on the Chaldean community, examples of this disagreement were often encountered. In one incident, while discussing the community with two immigrants from Iraq, I happened to describe the Chaldeans as "Christian Arabs". The first turned to me, shocked, and said, "I am not an Arab!" The second, equally shocked, turned to his cousin and exclaimed, "Well I am!" In the close confines of this Iraqi family was a clear division of opinion over the question of Arab national identity. The incident illustrates the broader question of identity which permeates the whole of a developing nation-state.

A sense of nationalism plays an important role in the identity of an ethnic group. Nationalism is a relatively new emotion, because the "nation-state" is a recent arrival on the world scene (Seitz, 1978:14). The emergence of

national allegiance over narrow local loyalties is as recent as the last two centuries in many areas: the United States, Italy, Germany, Russia, Africa, and the Middle East (Langer, 1968:428 — 430; 708 — 811; 752; 1228 — 1240).

In 1922 British control over Egypt was relinquished and thus began the establishment of independent Middle East nation-states, free to control their own internal affairs (Haddad and Nijim, 1978:60). Other Arabic nations followed in the interval between the two World Wars; Lebanon and Syria during the Second World War; and Jordan shortly after (Berger, 1962:5; Haddad and Nijim, 1978:29). Thus nationalism, in the literal sense of the development of independent self-governing nation-states, has now been achieved in much of the modern Middle East. The nations of Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria have achieved the national independence which is implied in the concept of "nationalism". That the establishment of such independent separate states was not the ultimate goal of the peoples of the Middle East is clearly evidenced by the unrest of the area in the period since the most recent nation-state was established. The short-lived United Arab Republic, which brought Syria and Egypt together in the late 1950s, gives evidence of this dissatisfaction (Haddad and Nijim, 1978:30). "Nationalism", in the Arabic world, must imply something more.

Pan-Arabism and the Colonial History of the Middle East

Nationalism has traditionally implied more than the simple establishment of political independence for a group of people on a specific plot of land. Which people should be included and which land should be assigned to them have always been significant questions to peoples seeking to establish a nation-state. In the Hundred Years' War between France and England, the French were not seeking merely to establish an independent nation; they sought to establish control over certain portions of territory that had been conquered by England. These territories were occupied by people to whom the French felt a tie of language and culture, and thus believed rightfully to belong to France (Langer, 1968:297). Furthermore, the French speaking residents of the conquered territories sought reunification with the French nation-state.

Hence, the goal of nationalism is not solely a desire for self-government over an arbitrarily determined piece of land. Rather, it is a desire on the part of a group of people to be united in a self-governing nation-state: 1) which includes all persons with whom they share a sense of identity and a common culture, what Gordon (1964:23 – 24) has called "sense of 'peoplehood' "; and 2) which exercises authority over all lands believed to be rightfully theirs. Consequently, many peoples who have achieved self-government over a portion of land and a sizeable population still feel their nationalistic sentiments to be frustrated, since other plots of land and other populations to whom they feel a tie of culture and identity are still separated.

Frequently the problem is further complicated by two factors: 1) more than one people may claim a historical tie to a specific portion of land; and 2) there may be, among the residents of the area, individuals of several different tribes or families who share no single "sense of peoplehood". Rather they feel ties of identity and culture to different "peoples", and will, if given the choice, select different nation-states with which to unite. This may lead to conflict, as two nations vie for land they both claim, or as residents of an area oppose each other to determine which nationalistic identity shall hold sway.

In brief, this conflict between peoples of historically different identities has largely been the course of events in the modern Middle East. Essentially, all the conflicts between Israel and her several Arab neighbors stem from the fact that both Arab and Jew stake an ancestral claim to the same geographic area. Thus, two distinct peoples claim that they and they alone should have authority over a specific parcel of land, and that members of their own group should have the primary right to live there.

The second of these problems — the internal dispute concerning the historic ethnic or cultural identity of a nation — is crucial to an understanding of identity patterns in the Chaldean community. Ethnic identity is an important aspect of international relations within the Middle East, and one many Westerners fail to understand. Although Western observers have followed the activities in the Middle East since the Second World War and have watched the Arab countries attain national independence, they are puzzled to observe that national independence has not produced national satisfaction. Their puzzlement stems from the fact that most Westerners fail to understand the motivations of Arab nationalism.

As noted earlier, the motive of nationalism is a desire to unite all persons of a specific cultural heritage within a single nation, having authority over all these people and over the lands to which they lay claim. Hence, though Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have all achieved national independence, to many of their residents this is not sufficient. They seek unification in a single nation-state of all peoples with whom they share cultural and identity ties, and with power and authority over all the lands to which they lay ancestral claim. The essential element of Arab nationalism then, is the desire of all Arabic peoples for a single nation-state to govern all. As Berger (1962:267) pointed out, "...the sense of Arab unity cuts across boundaries", and even when disputes develop between various Arab states, "none questioned the 'right' of any Arab government to appeal across frontiers to the people presumably loyal to others" (See also, Marcuse, 1974, for a discussion of the supra-national character of revolution).

Conflicting with the goal of Arab unity, however, is the fact that some of the peoples of the area do not share the Arabic cultural and linguistic heritage. The Arabs share the lands they now dominate with many groups.

Persians, Armenians and Turks inhabit parts of the area, remnants of an era in which their peoples held empire over the Middle East. Many Lebanese claim Phoenician not Arab ancestry. Other people in the area, including the Chaldeans, are not Arabic but Aramaic speaking and trace their linguistic and cultural heritage to the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires of the pre-Christian era. The Kurds, who inhabit the area bordering northern Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Russia are Middle Eastern people who have steadfastly refused to relinquish their own cultural and linguistic heritage and "become Arabs", as witnessed by recent conflicts between Kurdish and government troops in Northern Iraq. It is just such groups to which Hourani (1944:127) referred when he said that Middle Eastern villages define themselves as "peculiar people", in contradistinction to their neighbors. Many Americans claim that the United States is the first country to include within its borders people of widely variant cultural heritages. Such persons must be unaware of the fact that the Middle East has been a multi-ethnic region for centuries (Sharabi, 1966:3 – 4; Harik, 1977).

Thus, migrants from the Middle East come to the United States with widely varying cultural and social identities. Different families, tribes, villages, and religious groupings divide the population of the area. Even within the major religious groups of Moslem and Christian, there are many subdivisions — the Moslems into Sunni and Shi'ah; the Christians into Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Nestorian and Protestant. These historical divisions with quite different cultural identities have their counterparts in other ethnic peoples in the United States. Italians, Poles, Scandinavians, Jews — all have come to America divided by religion, village, region, and/or family ties, and upon their arrival, have faced the question of "who are we".

Factors Promoting Nationalist Identity

Several analysts have examined the component factors of nationalistic sentiment. All have pointed out that the development of national sentiment calls for what Broom and Selznick (1977:554) have termed a "widening loyalty and consciousness". (See also, Bell, 1975:162 – 166). Alan Merriam, in an analysis of growing nationalism in the Congo, described the isolated village of Lupupa, pointing out that the people of the village had little knowledge, much less affinity, for anyone outside their village and its immediate neighbors. The idea of unification with all Congolese in an independent state was beyond their comprehension (Merriam, 1961: 176 – 179). Although the Belgian colonists were the target of much bitterness, there was also considerable suspicion and fear directed toward other Congolese who had different village or regional origins (Merriam, 1961: 180 – 181). Development of a national identity clearly had to overcome such localistic sentiments and interregional hostilities. Similarly, in his analysis

of the difficulties facing new national governments in West Africa, David Apter (1955:5) noted that national unity was made more difficult where there was no sense of historical unity, and where tribalism divided the area.

The phenomena noted in African national movements have their counterparts in the Middle East, as Hourani (1946:127) pointed out. The various nation-states of the Middle East, and the Pan-Arab movement as well, face the same difficulties that Apter outlined for West Africa. Berger (1962:266) and Haddad and Nijim (1978:31 – 32) noted that loyalty to family, clan, tribe, or village still made demands on the individual and weakened loyalty to the Arabic movement. Political stability in Lebanon long depended upon the maintenance of a delicate balance between religions (Sharabi, 1966:51; Haddad and Nijim, 1978:95 – 96), a balance which was violently shattered in recent years.

Development of national loyalty requires that such divisive loyalties disappear, or at least decrease in importance. Individual residents of a new nation must be induced to relinquish old loyalties to family, clan, tribe, village, and religious grouping (Seitz, 1978:10 – 17). This is complicated by the fact that such loyalties have been fed on fear and hostility toward persons from other subgroups, as occurred in the Middle East during the period of European domination (Berger, 1962:294 – 298; Sharabi, 1966: 23 – 41; Haddad and Nijim, 1978:29). In order to develop national loyalties a government must induce its citizens to give up these old hostilities and fear — in fact, to transform them into trust and friendship. In short, the out-groups of yesterday must become the in-groups of tomorrow.

For the Chaldeans, a major basis for out-group formation is religion. Chaldeans have long been a minority group in the Middle East for many reasons, but their religious affiliation is perhaps the most obvious. Being Christian, they stand clearly in contrast to their Moslem neighbors. Writing just after World War II, Hourani (1946:126) noted that many Chaldeans from the Mosul area (where Telkaif is located) had fled to Lebanon to avoid persecution by Moslem authorities. Even among Middle Eastern Christians the Chaldeans are a minority, for they are in union with the Pope of Rome in contrast to the Nestorians and Orthodox Christians.

In addition, Chaldeans have lived as "marginal men" in a political sense. The area of northern Iraq in which they live has been a broader area since before the founding of the Iraqi nation. Arabs live to the South. To the North are the Kurds, who have had strained relations with the Arabs for generations. The Chaldean area has been claimed and occupied by the Turkish and the British at various times. Thus, residents of this area have been on both the physical border of Arabic territory, and, in some sense, the psychological border of Arab identity. Years of rule by one or another foreign political entity has helped the Chaldeans retain their sense of identity which was the

only constant factor in their lives. The Chaldeans are also a classic example of an ethnic minority which was protected by the Kurds, Turks and Arabs, they welcomed British protection and many served the British colonial bureaucracy during its occupation of the Mosul area.

Hence, the Chaldeans are marginal to the Arab world in several ways. In the Middle East, the tendency to develop the broadened loyalties that accompany nationalism has come easier for Muslim than for Christian, not only because Muslims far outnumber Christians but also because of centuries of association between Arabic culture and the Muslim religion (See, Rabbath, 1977; El-Hamamsy, 1977, for a discussion of this). It is easier for a Muslim to discover common traits with which to identify. In a study of Lebanon, for example, most Moslems were found to favor a Pan-Arab state while Christians were more likely to oppose it (Kingsbury and Pounds, 1964:66). This tendency of Christians in some parts of the Arab world to resist identification with other citizens of the area who differ from themselves in kin ties, region, or especially religion can be seen in immigrants from Arab countries to the United States. In the Detroit metropolitan area the majority of immigrants who have claimed to comprise the "Arab community" have been Muslims. Many Lebanese Christians objected to being identified with the Arab community (Ahdab-Yehia, 1970:104 – 105).

A similar lack of identity with the Arab community was found in the Chaldean community. In 1963, most members of the community would "Telkeffees", based on their village of origin, but would object strenuously to being called "Iraqis" or "Arabs". In recent years, however, Chaldeans appear to exhibit a greater degree of orientation toward the Arab cause. Some of the more recent Chaldean immigrants actually identify themselves as Arabs. In one incident after another the conflict of identities within the community comes to the fore. One such incident involved a Chaldean man who described himself as an Arab, at which point his financee burst into tears. At weddings, parties, and wherever Chaldeans meet each other, long debates often develop over the question: "Are we Arabs or are we not?" One woman was severely criticized by her brother for teaching her children to speak Arabic. "You should teach them Chaldean; we are Chaldean", he told her. At this point a niece chimed in, "If they go back to Iraq they'll need Arabic". And the dispute goes on. As an "outsider" interested in the community, I was constantly being accused by the Arabic oriented group of being too close to the "Chaldeans", while those who defined themselves as Chaldeans or Assyrians complained that I was "too much with the Arabs".

At the present time the question is a very touchy one in the community, and direct, pointed pursuit of the topic appeared inadvisable. Therefore, for the present study only an indirect question concerning the respondents'

choice of a title was asked. Of the several options given, the largest number
(40%) preferred to be identified as "Chaldeans" (See, Table 13.1). Another
nine percent preferred to be identified as Chaldeans, but wanted their
American identity included also; so they asked to be known as "Chaldean-
Americans". A few (6%) wanted to be known as Telkeffees or other non-
Arabic names. Altogether fifty-eight percent expressed preference for one
or the other of the traditional designations. In contrast, only twenty-nine
percent wanted to be known by any of the nationalistic terms (Arab
American, Christian Arab, or Iraqi Christian/Iraqi Chaldean). The most
acceptable of these were the names which identified them with the nation of
Iraq (16%), rather than with the Arab cause itself (9% for Arab American,
4% for Christian Arab). Apparently the traditional religious identity is still
strong in the community.

This pattern also appears when the names least liked were examined.
One-fourth did not wish to be identified by any of the Arab nationalist terms,
with Arab American the least popular of these. The surprise, however, is that
the most disliked of all the names was "Telkeffee", with twenty percent not
wanting to be called this. Some immigrants have pointed out that in the
urban centers of Iraq, Telkeffee is a term of disdain used by many to refer to
those from any of the Christian villages near Telkaif. It connotes not only the
religious factor but also an old-fashioned, backward village society, and may
be the reason many Chaldeans reject this name.

Chaldeans appear to have relinquished the narrow village identity, but
they still prefer to be associated with the traditional religion. In this regard,
the most acceptable of the nationalist identities (Iraqi Christian or Iraqi
Chaldean) also includes their religious orientation as part of the title. This
broadened religious orientation is also seen in the dress patterns of the
community. On special occasions when Chaldeans dress in ethnic costume,
they sometimes wear the costumes of other Chaldean villages rather than of
Telkaif alone. This desire for a broader identity appears to have moved
toward the religious group rather than toward a distinctly nationalist tie.

The desire for a broader identity, one which transcends the narrow
bounds of village or religion, has moved in another direction as well. Most
Chaldeans, particularly those who are fairly recent immigrants, find village
and religious identities inappropriate to a modern, nationalistically oriented
world. At the same time, they are not satisfied to identify with Iraq or the
Arabic cause. For many Chaldeans, Arab nationalism is still inextricably
associated with the Moslem religion which they cannot accept, and indelibly
marked with the Arabic language and culture. Telkeffees however, originally
spoke a dialect of Aramaic, a language closely related to Hebrew. Chaldeans
who value their own Aramaic language find it difficult to accept a nationalist
identity that is based upon the Arabic language and necessarily repudiates
Aramaic language and culture.

TABLE 13.1

Identification Preferred/Disliked by Members of Chaldean Community 1973

			Liked Best (%)	Liked Least (%)
A.	Arabic Nationalist Names	Arab American	9	15
		Christian Arab	4	2
		Iraqi Christian or Iraqi Chaldean	16	8
	Total Arabic		29	25
B.	Traditional Names	Telkeffee	6	20
		Chaldean	40	4
		Chaldean American	9	2
		Assyrian/Babylonian	3	3
	Total Traditional		58	29
	Other Names or No Response		13	46
	Total		100	100

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A small number of Aramaic oriented Chaldeans have attempted to develop ties with other Aramaic speaking peoples. Telkaif is one of several villages in Northern Iraq that retained a version of the Aramaic language after the Arabic language and culture invaded and eventually dominated the Middle East. Unlike Arabic speaking villages, most of which are Moslem, Aramaic speaking villages were predominantly Christian, including Orthodox, Jacobite, Nestorian, several denominations of Protestants, Chaldean rite Catholics, and Lebanese Maronite rite Catholics who use a variant of Aramaic in their ritual. Over the centuries Aramaic speaking people have established villages throughout the Middle East and can be found in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as the Malabar Coast of India.

Their descendants in America have begun to form a group which emphasizes both their common linguistic heritage and their common tie to a Christian faith. In the search for a national group with which to identify, they have reached back to the original Aramaic speaking civilization. The ancient Assyrian Empire, whose people spoke Aramaic from about 1800 B.C., originated in the Northern Tigris Valley in what is now the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. At the height of their power they ruled a large portion of the Middle East, including the modern-day states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, as well as Iraq. The ruins of their capital city, Nineveh, are not far from modern-day Telkaif. Chaldeans and other Aramaic speaking Christians emphasize their linguistic tie to this ancient empire by calling themselves "Assyrians". They have formed a national organization entitled the Assyrian American Federation, which publishes The Assyrian Star in Chicago, Illinois. A few also identify with ancient Babylon, which ruled the area prior to the Arabs.

In order to emphasize their common linguistic heritage, Assyrian American leaders attempt to deemphasize the denominational differences which exist among them. Their national magazine periodically advertises: "Attend an Assyrian Church this Sunday" (The Assyrian Star, July – August, 1974:13). No reference is made to the fact that Assyrian churches cover a broad spectrum of Christian religious tradition.

The degree to which this linguistic rather than religious identity can be developed is somewhat dependent upon characteristics peculiar to each Aramaic speaking community. Detroit's Chaldean community and the Assyrian American community in Turlock, California, provide an interesting contrast in this regard.

As the preferred names of each community denote, the Turlock group has a strong linguistic-nationalistic orientation, centering upon the Assyrian heritage and Aramaic language, while the Detroit group remains identified with its unique religious heritage. The major factors promoting such a difference are the relative size of the two populations and the religious and

village origin of the members of each community.

In the Detroit Chaldean Community there are several thousand persons who share not only the Aramaic language but also the Chaldean religion and a common village origin. With so large a group sharing the religious/village ties, there is no need for Detroit's Chaldeans to extend their sense of identity to persons who do not share their religious tradition.

In Turlock, however, members of the Chaldean Church number less than two hundred families and come from various parts of Iran. Lacking a village tie and with fewer co-religionists available, they have a strong Assyrian-culture tie. Together with other Aramaic speaking persons in the area, they have formed an Assyrian American Club, which includes Nestorians and Protestants as well as Chaldean Catholics. Religious intermarriage is common, since the Assyrian cultural identity is stronger than the religious one. The Church is called the "Assyrian Chaldean" Church, and church officials downplay the Chaldean tie in favor of the Assyrian one.

As Table 13.1-B shows, "Assyrian nationalists" still represent a small portion of Detroit's Chaldeans (only 3% of the 1974 sample). However, their number and influence is growing, especially among those who seek a secular, non-Arabic identity. For this group the Chaldeans represent a strictly religious heritage, while Arab nationalism represents a foreign language and culture. Furthermore, the village identity is incomprehensible to most modern Chaldeans. Thus, some modern Chaldeans find an acceptable compromise between the need for a broader identity and the desire to emphasize their unique linguistic heritage in establishing ties to other descendants of the ancient speakers of Aramaic. Assyrian clubs are finding their way into Detroit's Chaldean community. An Assyrian Babylonian Club has been founded in the 7 Mile Road — John R. Avenue area to compete with the Iraqi Club located there, while an Aramaic-Language Student's Club was formed at Wayne State University in Detroit in 1974. To date, however, the Assyrian identity has considerably less influence in the community than either the Chaldean/Telkeffee identity or the Arab Nationalist one.

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Determinants and Appeal
of Nationalist Identify

AS in other ethnic communities, in the Chaldean community the variant identity patterns are not randomly distributed. Some members are more likely to assume a nationalistic identity, others a religious one, and so on. For example, it has been noted that Irish nationalistic sentiment was more characteristic of second and third generation Irish than of the immigrants themselves (Brown, 1956:331). To a great extent, the factors which promote acceptance of the nationalist identity among ethnic group members are similar to those which promote nationalist identity in the mother country.

Observing nation-state development in British West Africa, Apter (1955:5 — 8) listed several characteristics which made nation-state development difficult and several which eased the spread of nationalist sentiment. Among these are three factors which are applicable outside the West African setting and might be used to measure the nationalistic sentiments of citizens of other developing nation-states. These inhibiting factors are:

1) acceptance of traditional tribal customs, many of which are inapplicable to an industrial, urban society;

2) dependence upon family ties (nepotism) for economic support, and concurrent nonacceptance of bureaucratic administration, which is characteristic of the governments of nation-states; and

3) hostilities and fears between subgroups of the society, which make development of national identity difficult.

These variables might be viewed as the antithesis of nation-state development.

With reference to the problem of ethnic identity, "Chaldean" and "Telkefee" are not national group names recognized by even relatively knowledge-

able Americans. The Arabic identity is foreign to most Chaldeans, although some have adopted it, despite its association with a strange religion and an unknown language.

The Assyrian Babylonian identity allows the people to align themselves with an historically recognizable nation, whose culture and language approximate the one in which they were reared. In the Detroit community, the number of people identifying with the Assyrian Babylonian designation is too small to permit additional delineation of its adherents. Further analysis primarily concerns the Chaldean and the Arab-nationalist groups. To summarize, the hypothesized relationships are as follows:

1) Arab nationalist sentiment will be positively correlated with youth, immigrant status, recent arrival in the U.S., urban rearing, more education, employment in a bureaucratic setting, willingness to make contacts outside the community, and lack of concern with the traditional religion.

2) The Chaldean/Telkeffee identity will be found among persons who are older, American reared or immigrants of many years ago, self-employed or employed in a family setting, with a strong tie to the traditional religion, and few contacts outside the Chaldean community.

The main variables to be considered are age, immigrant or American born status, period of immigration, urban or village origin, degree of adherence to traditional religion, type of employment, education, and frequency of contacts outside the Chaldean community.

Although age was expected to be a very strong factor in determining whether members of the Chaldean community identify as Arabs or in the traditional village/religious manner, and the recent nationalistic movement was also expected to have its appeal largely among the young while most older persons retained the traditional identification patterns, this expected pattern was not supported, as Table 14.1-A indicates. Persons over forty are about as likely to prefer the Arabic identity as are younger Chaldeans, twenty-six percent of them liking an Arabic identity as compared with thirty-two percent of the under forty group. Apparently age is not a major factor in determining identity pattern in this community.

Since the nationalist movement has so recently been imported from Iraq, it was expected to be strongest among the recent immigrants, traditional identities being maintained both by the American born (or American reared) Chaldeans and by earlier immigrants.

Immigrants who have been in this country for many years would seem

unlikely candidates for the Arab nationalist movement. Obviously, living many years in another country one can lose a sense of identification with the country of origin. German, Italian, Irish — immigrants from many nations find that allegiance to their country of origin diminishes as the years pass and they become assimilated to American society. In addition, the Iraqi and Arab nationalist movements are recent phenomena, having gained momentum only with the Second World War. Early immigrants know of these movements second hand through later arrivals or relatives back home. Arab or Iraqi nationalism is not a part of the homeland they remember.

As Table 14.1 —B indicates, the predicted relationship is indeed the case. Among immigrants who came prior to 1961, seventy percent prefer the traditional identity; less than twenty percent identify as Arabs or Iraqis. Among those who came in the next five years (1961 —1965), about the same percentage (21%) have a nationalist identity. However, it is interesting to note that the percentage who have a traditional identity has dropped from seventy to fifty percent, and twenty-nine percent of this group are uncertain of their identity. Among those who came since 1966, the percent identifying as Arabs is more than double that of the preceding group (49 versus 21%), with very few unsure of their identity. It should be noted that this is the period in which the 1967 Arab-Israeli War occurred, and this may have substantially increased the feeling of nationalism among persons in the Middle East at that time. In 1967, an increase in Arab identity was noted among Arabs living in Canada (Abu-Laban, 1969:36). A similar increase was noted in the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab community at the time of the 1973 Middle East conflict (Wigle and Abraham, 1974). Outside threats are extremely effective in generating internal national sentiment.

From these data it is obvious that Arab national feeling is increasing among Chaldean immigrants. In contrast, none of the Chaldeans born and reared in America (by the traditionalist immigrants of earlier years) have a strong feeling for Arab identity. What factors have brought about this change in the orientation of Chaldean immigrants?

A major aspect of the social structure which must be altered if nationalistic sentiment is to develop is the dependence on a traditional base for the social structure. As long as members of a nation-state prefer to relate to others in the manner their ancestors have used for generations, new patterns, such as nationalism, are doomed.

The rural or village social structure is largely a structure based upon tradition: preferred patterns of behavior are those which have long been practiced in the area. The composition of households, role distributions within them, the interrelations between members of different households, leadership personnel of the village, customs of marriage and family com-position — all tend to follow very closely those of parents, grandparents,

TABLE 14.1
Preferred Identification Pattern by Selected Social Variables, 1973

		Prefer Traditional Identity (%)	Prefer Arab Identity (%)	No Preference (%)	(N=)
A.	Age Under 40	56.1	31.6	12.2	(57)
	Over 40	60.5	25.6	13.9	43
B.	Immigrant Period				
	Pre-1961	70.4	18.5	11.1	(27)
	1961–1965	50.0	21.4	28.6	(14)
	1966–1974	43.6	48.7	7.7	(39)
	Born N. America (including Mexico)	85.6	—	14.3	(14)
C.	Place of Origin				
	Village (Telkaif)	60.0	25.0	15.0	(40)
	Urban (Baghdad)	41.0	51.3	7.7	(39)
	Other Birth Place	(not calculated)			(21)
D.	Church Attendance At Least Monthly				
	Mother of God	54.8	35.7	9.5	(42)
	Sacred Heart	40.0	40.0	20.0	(25)
	Other (primarily Latin rite)	58.6	24.1	17.2	(29)
E.	Occupation				
	Ethnic Business	55.6	26.7	17.8	(45)
	Outside Occupation	59.3	31.5	9.3	(54)

TABLE 14.1 (continued)
Preferred Identification Pattern by Selected Social Variables 1973

	Prefer Traditional Identity (%)	Prefer Arab Identity	*No Preference (%)	(N=)
F. Education				
1. Amount				
High school or less	56.5	30.2	13.2	(53)
Some college or more	59.5	28.6	11.9	(42)
2. Place				
Baghdad	51.8	37.5	10.7	(56)
Telkaif (at least part)	52.9	35.3	11.8	(17)
U.S. and elsewhere	79.2	4.2	16.7	(24)
G. Outside Contact				
1. Organizational Memberships				
Chaldean only	65.2	17.4	17.4	(23)
Outside organizations	47.8	39.1	13.0	(23)
Neither	59.3	29.6	11.1	(54)
2. Closest Friend				
Chaldean-relative	48.7	41.0	10.3	(39)
Chaldean-non-relative	68.6	22.9	8.6	(35)
Non-Chaldean	56.5	17.4	26.1	(23)

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great grandparents. Novel or different patterns of behavior are shunned as unacceptable.

In contrast, urban social structures highly value change. The style of life is constantly changing, and the argument that a pattern of behavior has been followed before bears little import. Rather, each pattern is regularly subjected to the question of its immediate practicality. If the rural social structure is premised upon tradition, the urban structure is based upon frequent change.

Nationalistic movements assume the ability of a nation-state to alter the allegiance of its citizens, to entice them to exchange their old allegiance to family and village for such new alligiances, as to an Arab nation or Pan-Arabism. In Arab nations, as in industrial nations all over the globe, the emphasis is upon pragmatic, secular empiricism; religion, tradition, other worldly views are played down, while practical solutions to the problems of this world are emphasized. In Arab nations, there have been several secular political movements, the participants of which have come from many segments of the society. Chaldeans as well as Moslems and other Christians have been prominent participants in such movements. Broadly-based secular political participation of this type is essential to the development of a strong nation-state.

Urbanism, with its emphasis on change, would seem to foster such a secularist approach. It would tend to promote the altered personal allegiance that nationalism represents. Village traditionalism, on the other hand, represents the opposite of nationalism, namely, a tendency to retain old allegiances and reject new ones. As Table 14.1 – C indicates, the expected pattern does occur. Half of the respondents born in Baghdad identified as Arabs, as compared with only one-fourth of those who were born in the village of Telkaif. In contrast, sixty percent of the Telkeffee born respondents preferred to be known by one of the traditional labels, as compared with only forty-one percent of the urban born. One must conclude that place of birth is a factor of considerable importance in determining identity preference.

A major stumbling block to Arab nationalist feeling among the Chaldeans and other Christians has been the historical link between Arab culture and the Moslem religion. Analysts of the nationalistic movement in Middle Eastern nations and among immigrants from these areas have noted that Arab nationalism is more characteristic of Moslems (Kingsbury and Pounds, 1964: Ahdab-Yehia, 1970). For Christians, the decision to support Arab nationalism does not affirm old traditional religious ties, but appears in fact to conflict with them. This is especially true in view of the fact that Moslem leaders have, in previous generations, persecuted Christian villages in the name of religion (King, 1948). I would predict that Chaldeans who retain close ties with the traditional Chaldean religion would be least likely to maintain an Arabic identification. Those who have altered their ties to the

traditional religion in any way might be more drawn to the Arabic movement. Many Catholics from Chaldean villages were drawn into the larger Latin rite in the urban centers of Iraq, primarily through contact with teachers in Catholic schools that were run by religious orders from the West. Al Hikmat University, now part of the University of Baghdad, was formerly directed by American Jesuits who also staffed a high school, Baghdad College. Since such contacts draw people away from the traditional religion with its historic antagonisms toward Moslemism, I would expect these Latin-rite-oriented Chaldeans to be more Arabic oriented.

Table 14.1 – D shows that the expected pattern does not occur. Nearly three-fourths of Latin-rite oriented Chaldeans continue to prefer the traditional identity pattern. Only one-fourth identify as Arabs, the smallest percentage of any of the three groups. It is interesting to note that seventeen percent of this group prefer neither designation — perhaps an indication that they have completely relinquished an ethnic identity. The strongest tie to traditional identity is among those who attend Mother of God Church regularly. Being the oldest Chaldean parish, it tends to number the early immigrants and American reared among its members and these groups have exhibited a more traditional identity. Mother of God members include thirty-six percent with Arab identity, however, with only ten percent preferring neither. Ethnic identity appears to be strong in this parish.

Sacred Heart, the new Chaldean parish, presents an interesting picture. Persons in regular attendance there are less likely to prefer a traditional identity, but not significantly more likely to identify as Arabs. Instead, twenty percent of them lack a preference. One may guess that they have not yet attained sufficient confidence in America to be comfortable with an ethnic identity. Their cousins in suburban Mother of God may be sufficiently secure in their Americanism to identify as "hyphenated Americans". Another alternative explanation is that they are torn between the Arab and traditional identities. In either case, this group appears to be undergoing a crisis of identity, in which they are searching for the label which they feel suits them best. That this crisis should be strongest in this group is not surprising, for they are marginal individuals in two senses. First, as recent immigrants they are marginal to American society, and second, the marginality of Chaldeans in the Arab world is quite fresh in their memories.

In examining the occupational variable, some differences in the identity pattern between Chaldeans who work outside the community and those who continue to engage in small family or entreprenurial activities had been expected. The Chaldean ethnic occupation is highly characteristic of a village-type social pattern. In isolated village societies, intermarriage over several generations produces a population in which most of the members are related by blood, and family ties form the basis for almost all societal

activities: work, recreating, religious activities, and all the key decisions of life. In his analysis of Italian peasants, Banfield noted this phenomenon, and labeled it "amoral familism". He noted that one aspect was considerable distrust of people outside the extended family circle, and hence an unwillingness to include nonrelatives in one's social relationships (Banfield, 1958: 10, 85 —87).

Such a pattern is inconsistent with a nationalistic movement, since nationalism requires that citizens begin to move away from old traditional social ties, and toward social relationships with those of different backgrounds and traditions. Nationalism is much more likely to develop in a bureaucratic setting, for bureaucracies by their nature require that members place emphasis upon so called "universalistic" factors, such as competence in a job or specialized training, rather than family ties. Attention to family background in bureaucracy is labeled "nepotism", and viewed as dysfunctional for bureaucratic efficiency (Parsons and Shils, 1951: 79—80; Blau, 1963: 178 — 182). Hence, it would seem likely that a heavily bureaucratized nation-state would be more likely to develop a strong nationalistic sense than one based largely on traditional, family centered social patterns. Nationalism would probably develop among persons who have also developed an ability to work with others, such as in bureaucratic organizations or in other fields beyond the protective ethnic environment. I would expect that nationalistic Chaldeans would, in all probability, be those who have gained employment other than in the retail grocery business.

As Table 14.1 —E indicates, the expected pattern does not appear. Persons employed outside the Chaldean community are no more likely to prefer the Arab nationalist labels than their cousins in the grocery business (the percentages are 32 and 27% respectively). In both groups nearly sixty percent preferred the traditional labels. The one slight difference concerned the degree of uncertainty regarding Arab nationalist labels than their cousins in the grocery business (the percentages are 32 and 27% respectively). In both groups nearly sixty percent preferred the traditional labels. The one slight difference concerned the degree of uncertainty regarding identity labels. Chaldeans in external occupations were less likely to express uncertainty about their identity than persons employed within the community (9 versus 18%). Although the difference is small, this may suggest that persons who have contacts other than those in the community may be more conscious of ethnic differences. They are, in effect, forced to define themselves within an ethnic context. Such a person must explain to those of different backgrounds "who he is". Within the confines of an ethnic community one simply accepts his cultural heritage.

A major mechanism in the development of nationalistic sentiment is a nation's educational system. Governments use schools to foster a sense of

unity. Schools also bring together young people from the various villages, family groups, and traditions of the nation. Hopefully the carriers of these variant traditions may get to know and trust each other, and this under-standing can form the basis of a new feeling of unity which nationalism represents. I would expect that adherents of Arabic nationalism would be found among those who were more highly educated in the urban national schools of Iraq.

Again as Table 14.1—F shows, the expected relationships do not appear. Respondents with some college education are no more likely to identify as Arabs than their less educated cousins (Section F—1). Nor are those who have received some of their education in Telkaif any more traditional in their identification patterns (Section F—2). The traditional orientation remains strong regardless of where one has been educated. It is not surprising that the more traditionally oriented are those who have not been educated in the schools of Iraq. This includes both persons born and educated in the United States, and Chaldeans educated elsewhere, such as Mexico. Seventy-nine percent of this group prefer a traditional identification, as opposed to just over half of the other groups, lending some support to the nation, suggested previously, that tradition is preserved in its purest state among the *diaspora*.

In a previous section it has been noted that urban living is correlated with high nationalist sentiment. This is probably because life in an urban setting develops the individual's realization that there can be successful interaction with others of varied traditions. It tends to aid the development of intergroup trust. Thus, a more crucial question concerns the degree to which members of the Chaldean community have developed an increased tendency to put aside the hostilities against different groups that exist in most traditional societies. To the extent that such hostilities are eliminated, to that extent can bonds of national sentiment develop between previously antagonistic subgroups of a nation. One might ask: To what extent have Chaldeans expanded their image of "acceptable" people?

Respondents in the 1963 study discussed their group in relation to others, and were coded as to whether or not they believed that Chaldeans, in general, were "nicer people". Those who dissented either felt that non-Chaldeans were in fact nicer than Chaldeans or expressed the sentiment that "nice people" are not limited to any single ethnic group. Such ideas reflect a rejection of the traditional preference for one's own group, and a willingness to extend one's social contacts to members of other traditional backgrounds, a key element in nationalistic sentiment. At that time, all the earlier immigrants interviewed adhered to the traditional preference for one's own group. Most of the recent immigrants, the group more prone to nationalistic sentiments, were willing to concede that members of other groups may have had assets. "There is good and bad in every group", was a common statement.

Conse:quently, I suggest that Arab nationalist sentiment is associated with a willingness to move outside the community for one's social contacts. Persons who remain within the community for their social contacts would likely to be less accepting of outsiders and therefore less likely to join with them in a nationalistic movement. By "outside contacts" I mean social ties such as formal organization memberships and friendship ties.

Membership in formal' organizations can be a very peripheral type of social tie — for many members it represents only a payment of annual dues and no social contact whatever with other members. Even this, however, represents a degree of willingness to align oneself with others and, therefore, is an indication of trust and acceptance of outsiders It also indicates a degree of acceptance of bureaucratic structure, which is characteristic of most nation-states. I would expect that persons with formal organization memberships outside the Chaldean community would be more likely to identify with the Arab naions.

As Table 14.1-G—1 indicates, this appears to be the case. The most traditionally oriented group are those who belong only to organizations within the Chaldean community; sixty-five percent of this group prefer the traditional identity, with only seventeen percent identifying with the Arab group. Another seventeen percent are uncertain. In contrast, nearly forty percent of persons with formal organization ties outside the community favor the Arab identity, and the percentage preferring a traditional label drops to less than half. Those without any organizational ties form an intermediate group.

Apparently the extent of one's formal organization ties outside the community is a fairly good predictor of his/her nationalist feeling. One may surmise that identity with a nation-state is itself a distant, formal type of relationship. Persons who are accustomed to making such contacts have a greater propensity for national sentiment.

The same is not true for close friendship ties, however. When persons have close friends outside the community, both types of ethnic identity drop (See, Table 14.1—G—2). This is apparently an indication of their assimilation into American society, and all ethnic sentiments tend to diminish. It is interesting to note that an analysis of these outside friendships revealed that most were with "Americans", and very few were with non-Chaldean Arabs. Identity with the Arab nations appears to be growing in the Chaldean community, but close personal friendships with Arabic-speaking groups is still not frequent. Chaldeans whose closest friend was a relative were most likely to identify as Arabs or Iraqis (41% versus 23% for those whose best friend was an unrelated Chaldean). This may indicate that this group is still a minority within the community. Those persons who have strong Arabic orientation may be ostracized by the community and forced to turn to their own families for support.

Conclusion

Identity with the village of Telkaif has decreased substantially in the community. So narrow an identity is apparently inappropriate in the modern world, either in Iraq or America. Perhaps this is why most American ethnic groups eventually exchange their village or regional destination for a national one. But the majority of the Chaldeans still thought of themselves as Chaldeans or Chaldean Americans, suggesting that identification with the traditional ties of family and religion are still very strong. Most early arrivals and American born speak only the village language and know no Arabic. Even recent immigrants who know Arabic often prefer to use the Chaldean language. The degree of resistance to being labeled Arabs or Iraqis varies: some simply had a strong preference for the traditional label, while others found the national labels abhorrent.

Typical representatives of the traditional group have been in the United States several years, either having been born here or having immigrated prior to 1960. They attend the Chaldean Church services regularly, usually at the older of the two parishes, and have few contacts outside the Chaldean community. Many are accustomed to long explanations in response to queries from outsiders regarding their nationality, and have developed a complex description of Telkaif and the Chaldean religion. They rather enjoy the opportunity to discuss their background and tend to consider those who use Arabic or identify as Arabs to be traitors to their heritage.

In contrast, the Arab/Iraqi nationalists often scoff at the use of the Telkeffee and Chaldean designations. "We are Iraqis; Iraqis are Arabs. Chaldean or Telfeffee are not nationalities", they say. This group represents a strong minority in the community. Typically they are recent immigrants; the more recent the date of arrival, the greater the likelihood of an Arabic orientation. No American born respondents appear in this group. Most nationalist Chaldeans were born and reared in Baghdad and they knew the Arabic language and tradition well. Rather few Arab-oriented respondents were born in Telkaif. It seems that life in a modern Arab nation, with its problems and tensions — particularly in relation to Israel — may produce the stronger Arabic identity.

As evidenced by their propensity to join formal organizations outside the Chaldean community, the Arab nationalists are considerably more comfortable in the formal bureaucratic settings which nation-states represent. Both Arab oriented Chaldeans and traditionalists span the entire age range of the community. Apparently, persons of any age can develop a nationalistic orientation in modern Iraq. The Arab nationalists are still Catholic but they consider religion to be separate from nationalist feeling. At times they may use the form "Chaldean" as a purely religious designation. They use "Telkeffee" rarely, as it denotes a village connection which is totally foreign to them.

The Assyrian/Babylonian nationalists are few and tend to be clustered among young recent immigrants. There were too few in the sample to make any firm generalizations about the group. Impressionistically, they appear to be people with strong ties to their Chaldean origin. Yet, they are searching for a nationalist identity which fits this background. While Iraqi/Arabic nationalism is too closely related to the Arabic language and Moslem religion, the ancient Aramaic speaking nation of Assyria/Babylonia fulfills this group's need for a nationalist identity more closely akin to their own heritage.

The elimination of the village identity and the growth of Arab nationalism in this community suggest that the search for a wider identity may be a movement which many American ethnic groups experience. Ethnic group members turn to national identity as they look for a meaningful designation by which to describe themselves to other Americans. As Herberg (1955:257) suggested, the American setting almost forces an individual into a self-identification with his ancestors and their tradition. Each ethnic group must find a satisfactory way of defining that heritage. For the Jews (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:138--141), the Irish (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970: 230—231, 250—251) and many others, this definition has been, as Herberg predicted, a religious one. For others, such as the Polish (Lopata, 1976:21—32) and Puerto Ricans (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:99—100), a strong national feeling still remains. Some Chaldeans also have established an identity based upon their origin in Iraq and the other Arab nations. However, the majority prefer to identify with their own special variety of Roman Catholicism.

PART VI: THE ETHNIC SOCIAL PROCESSES

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Consensus Versus Conflict

A MAJOR factor that promotes consensus and communality in the Chaldean community is the common ancestry, or what Greeley (1971:42) calls a "primordial" sense, and what Milton Gordon (1964:53) called a sense of historical identification. That the group shares much in common, that their values are similar, and that their values are similar, and that their fates are tied together is greater if they can establish a time when their ancestors also shared a common fate. This is frequently mentioned as a major factor causing the Jewish community to exhibit a high degree of communal strength (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970:141–142; Gordis, 1970:10).

Members of the Chaldean community often mention their common ancestral ties as a unifying factor. "We are all one people" is a recurring statement. "Our grandfathers were friends in Telkaif, so we can work together here", one man told me. In another instance, when a man born in Telkaif but reared in Detroit was questioned as to how he happened to marry a Telkeffee woman he had never seen before the wedding, he responded, "She was the daughter of my father's friend. From a good family, we know she will be a good girl". "We look for the family", another man said. "Family background is very important".

Thus, ancestral ties are considerably important in the Chaldean community and help to unite the community. They do this in two major ways: 1) such ties give members a sense of their common fate through history: their respective ancestors shared a common fate; by extension, so should they; and 2) ancestral ties also provide a group with "presumed consensus". That is, members know that others in the group have been reared in the same traditions and values as themselves, hence, they can presume that they agree on many aspects of life: values, goals, means to achieve them.

Perhaps the most obvious area of value consensus is the area of religious tradition. Roman Catholicism, and specifically the Chaldean rite as practiced by members of the community, serves as a major point of consensus. Through their religion, Chaldeans share a common set of religious beliefs, a moral code, and the ritual for worship.

Combined, their common ancestry and religion contribute to consensus in the all important area of family structure. Common values regarding many aspects of family life appear in the Chaldean community. One of the most important areas of consensus centers around the indissolubility of marriage. Chaldean tradition forbids divorce from two bases: general Catholic tradition forbade it and the patriarchal tradition of the area generally frowned upon it. Viewing the Chaldean community from the vantage point of American family structure, where one marriage in three leads to divorce, one is struck by the amazingly small number of divorces. In ten years of contact with the community, I heard of no more than half a dozen divorces, out of a population of perhaps a thousand couples. Most divorces occurred between exogamous couples. Thus, there is extremely high consensus over the belief that marriage lasts for life. There also appears to be rather high consensus over the value of endogamy (See, Table 12.1-C-6), with over half of the Chaldeans preferring to marry from among their own people.

Parenthetically, one could raise a question as to what constitutes "consensus". What percent of the population must agree on an item before consensus exists? In democratic societies, officials are elected and programs effectuated when they carry a majority of the vote, and this may be an election in which perhaps only one-third of eligible voters participate. In such a setting, agreement among even fifty-five or sixty percent of a population is rather high.

In this more limited sense, other aspects of family life enjoy a degree of consensus. The extended family is considered very important by many Chaldeans. Its many functions include economic assistance, assistance with other tasks such as child care, visiting, and family occupational ventures. In the economic sphere, there is substantial agreement over the importance of the family enterprise and the so-called Protestant ethic virtues of thrift, self-help, and hard work. Another area of consensus is the view that the world of work is essentially a male endeavor. Chaldean women do work, but the preference shared by most men and many women, is that the woman's place is in the home. When women do work, it is usually prior to marriage and the birth of children, and the preferred occupation for women, married or single, is in the semiprotected setting of the family business.

All these areas of lesser consensus can also be considered areas of conflict, as subgroups of the community, sometimes representing substantial minorities, express disagreement.

Conflict Internal to the Chaldean Community:

Even casual observers, who have only a passing knowledge about the Chaldean community, note that the community in the first half of the 1970s is rife with conflict. Perhaps the greatest conflict in recent years has centered around the location of the new Church, following the sale of the Hamilton Avenue property in 1972. There was little disagreement, on *whether* the church should be relocated, for most Chaldeans had moved from the vicinity of the former church prior to its sale. However the *location* of the new church has been a matter of conflict. Suburbanites, most of whom live in Oakland County, felt that the church should be located in the suburbs, while those who remain inside the city of Detroit wanted it relocated there. In the process, two antagonistic groups developed within the community, one centered in the central city, the other in the suburbs.

The conflict over the location of the church dramatizes a number of other dimensions on which the community tends to polarize. Like most immigrant communities, the Chaldeans are divided between the immigrants and the American born, or more accurately, the American reared, since the place of birth is less important than where the bulk of education and socialization was obtained. Early Chaldean immigrants, like many immigrants, complain that "those born here" have given up the old way, do not respect the ethnic traditions, will not support and uphold the ethnic Church, and so on. Some of the complaints are valid; some are not. For their part, the second generation counters that their immigrant parents and grandparents are too old-fashioned, and too strict. "My cousins in the old country aren't brought up as strict as I am"! one girl complained. "My parents aren't keeping *Chaldean* customs, just old-fashioned ones".

Because of the constant immigration within the Chaldean community, another dimension of conflict is the period of migration. Recent migrants tend to view life differently from earlier arrivals. Recent migrants are urban; their predecessors were village people. The Iraq that recent migrants left behind was unlike the society that the early migrants remember. The stay in America has made the earlier "immigrants" much more "Americanized" than they care to admit. Even two different versions of Church ritual have arisen, the one used in the village and the other used in Baghdad, and each group sees its own as the "real" Chaldean rite.

These differences — immigrant versus second generation, early immigrant versus recent one — together with other factors, have produced several subgroups. A social class distinction exists within the community. Some of the old, well-established Chaldean families are quite wealthy; other families, primarily but not exclusively the new immigrants, have modest incomes. The socioeconomic differences give rise to other differences, including life style and political preferences (though American politics are not a matter of great

interest in the community. One man wryly explained his nonformity to the life patterns of prominent Chaldeans with the terse comment: "They are rich. I am not".

Perhaps the most obvious distinction present in the community centers around the identification question: Are we Arabs of Chaldeans? As discussed earlier, most Chaldeans, especially the earlier immigrants, think of themselves as Chaldeans or Telkeffees. But an increasing number, primarily recent arrivals, claim to be Arabs. Disagreements over which term is more appropriate are frequent and sometimes vehement. This leads to a conflict over language use: the former group uses Chaldean and advocates teaching it to the children, while the latter would prefer Arabic.

These conflicts have polarized the community to a considerable extent, for these several dimensions tend to correlate. That is, the period of immigration, economic status, place of residence, and identification often vary together, and the community is thus divided into two major subgroups: the earlier immigrants, who are now rather well-off, live in the suburbs, and identify as Chaldeans; and the recent arrivals, who are less well-off, live in the central city, and claim to be Arabs. (See, Appendix, Figure IV). The conflict has also crystalized around the two Chaldean priests. One is somewhat older, came to the United States earlier, and was instrumental in moving the original Chaldean church to the suburbs. He now serves as pastor of the suburban parish, and earlier immigrants and most American born Chaldeans tend to identify and work closely with him. Recent immigrants, on the other hand, tend to be drawn toward the younger priest, who is himself a more recent immigrant and was instrumental in founding the new parish in Detroit.

These major conflicts in the Chaldean community manifest themselves in the interpersonal relationships of individual Chaldeans with their families and friends. Chaldean families have the same husband-wife conflicts that other families have. There are the same intergenerational conflicts, between parents and their adolescent children, and between adult children and their parents. In this as in other ethnic communities, the conflicts are complicated by some factors which are peculiar to ethnic communities.

The ethnic family tends to be very close, since social interaction between generations is more frequent. As previously noted, Chaldeans are more likely to live in extended family households than most Americans. They also frequently visit nonhousehold members of the extended family. Hence, there is more opportunity for adult Chaldeans to see their parents, their brothers and sisters, their adult children. Perhaps it is a truism to say people who interact frequently are bound in conflict. Familiarity may not breed downright contempt. It does, however, make people aware not only of the areas on which they agree, but also of the areas of disagreement and irritation. These may range from religious differences to disagreements over cooking

and housekeeping. This is manifested inconsiderable interpersonal criticism. "You don't say the Chaldean prayers right"! "Well, you can't cook *yuppruch* at all"!

Among Chaldean families the major conflicts are those mentioned as community conflicts. Early immigrants complain the new arrivals have abandoned the "real Chaldean way". Recent immigrants complain the earlier arrivals are too much like peasants: "What's Telkaif? It is just a crummy little town"! American born Chaldeans complain that their immigrant parents are "old-fashioned"; their parents complain that they are not good children and do not obey.

Not surprisingly, a major area of dispute between parents and children is dating. The early Chaldeans, like many Arabs and such ethnic groups as the Italians, believed in arranged marriages and did not engage in dating. Their American born children want to date like their friends, and encounter objections from their parents. It is interesting to note that the children of immigrants who have been in the United States for twenty or thirty years encounter more objections to their dating than the children of new arrivals. Customs in Iraq have changed, and today couples commonly date there. As a result, young American born Chaldeans complain that their cousins, recently arrived from the old country, have more freedom than they do.

Other conflicts between parents and their adult or near adult children center around the child's choice of a job or a spouse. Husbands and wives, in the Chaldean community as elsewhere, disagree over child rearing, household management, and family problems. But in an ethnic community there may be other problems. Where an immigrant marries an American born Chaldean, there frequently are problems concerning which language to use in the home (Arabic, Chaldean or English), or whether Chaldean or American style cooking should appear on the table. These appear to be minor matters, but such minor matters make up the bulk of family conflicts.

The Chaldean Community has been presented deliberately as one that is rife with conflict for a number of reasons. First, it would be inaccurate to portray the community as one in which conflict was absent. Second, internal ethnic conflict is a social phenomenon which has been greatly ignored in the sociological literature that so often portrays these groups as ones in which consensus and cooperation predominate. The third reason for emphasizing Chaldean conflict involves a question of theoretical importance in sociology.

One of the most crucial problems plaguing sociology since its inception is the nature of social cohesion: what functions to keep a group together? This question is particularly difficult to answer in view of the existence of social conflict. Social conflict consistently raises the question of Hobbes: Why is society not the war of all against all? (Collingwood, 1942). Parsons (1937: 89—94) noting the importance of the Hobbesian question, called it, "the

problem of order". (See also, Coser, 1956; Mills, 1959; Wong, 1961; Turner, 1974:121–147; Bottomore, 1974, 1978; Warshay, 1975: 60–66). Whenever members of groups conflict, there arises the question of how the group manages to survive intact. Why do conflicting parties remain in the situation, rather than withdrawing to a less conflict-ridden one?

Several answers to this question have been posed. Levi-Strauss (1949: Chap. 5) and Malinowski (1926:39 –45) suggested that such a group remains intact because of reciprocal obligations which remain in spite of the conflict. Marx (1910) believed that members of a group, even if they are in competition, may remain united if their conflict with the outside is greater than their internal conflict. Still another basis for unifying groups is the existence of internal social alliances (Tocqueville, 1955: Vol. II: book 4: Chap. 2,7; Coser, 1956: Chap. 8). When many interests and alliances exist in a group, conflict is rarely total. Each member is in some way an ally, in other ways an enemy of every other member. Hence, conflicts tend to be tempered lest useful alliances be destroyed (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953:303 –306; Abel, 1970; Jesser, 1975: Chap. 6).

In the Chaldean community several of these cohesive mechanisms exist to prevent a total split. It must be recognized, however, that division, in the face of conflict, is a real responsibility. The conflicts in the Chaldean community could result in its destruction and this destruction could take several forms.

The community could become so conflict ridden that many members find no reason to remain with it. If large numbers of people leave, the "community" might be left with only a very small core of active members (as appears to have happened with the Irish), or may have so few members that it would cease to exist at all. While any predictions regarding the future are risky, I suggest this would be an unlikely possibility for the Chaldean community. With a constant stream of immigrants there is a constant pool of new prospective members to fill the positions the former ones leave. Furthermore, new arrivals present a constant need for an ethnic community. Most American ethnic groups, having a culture which is partly the traditional old country culture and partly assimilated into American culture, have served the new immigrants as "way stations" between the old culture and the new. Thus, new immigrants find such a community very helpful. If one did not already exist, or if the existing community should dissolve, they undoubtedly would form a new one. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Chaldean community will cease to exist in the foreseeable future.

Another possibility is that the community might fragment into several smaller ones. This has been the pattern with the Irish American, Polish American, Italian American, and German American groups, eacn of which has been a loose confederation of independent communities based upon the

country or province of origin in the home country, or the place of residence here. The Chaldean community is presently large enough for some type of division. Rose Hum Lee (1960:58) noted that the ideal size for an ethnic community was between 360 and 1000. With over 11,000 members, the Chaldean community is large enough to separate into as many as six or seven independent communities. One factor which makes such extreme fragmentation unlikely is the common village origin of the Chaldean community. Another is the fact that community members tend to be aligned into only two subgroups. If the community were split, the most likely possibility would seem to be that the group would divide into two parts, rather than any further fragmentation.

It must be recognized that the community could become so polarized that two completely separate communities would result. One would then consist of the early immigrants and their American born children. They would most likely live in the suburbs, belong to Mother of God parish, and be upper-middle class economically. They would define themselves as Chaldeans, and Chaldean would be their ethnic language. The other group would speak Arabic and think of themselves as Arabs and might even join with other Arabic groups in the city, such as the Lebanese or the Jordanians. They would be the group who are lower-middle or working class and live in the central city. This is a real possibility in the future development of the community, and may indeed occur because the conflicts promoting such a split are real and deep-seated.

There are, however, a number of mechanisms that work towards the maintenance of a single unified community, even in the face of the many real and deep conflicts. The first such factor is that there are numerous basic issues on which Chaldeans exhibit broad consensus. Their common religious tradition — so much a part of Roman Catholicism, yet so uniquely their own — is a strong tie uniting the community. Characteristics of the family — the indissolubility of a Catholic marriage and the important role the extended family plays in the life of the individual — are other areas of strong consensus.

The family itself is a major factor promoting unity. Most extended families have members on both sides of the controversy. I have already related incidents in which a brother or sister, a cousin, a husband or wife, a parent defines himself/herself as an Arab, only to encounter serious disagreement, even anger, from a sibling, cousin, spouse, son or daughter. Many families have members living both in Detroit and in the suburbs. Such families engage in visiting patterns which bridge the city-suburb boundary. As Table 15.1-A indicates, a substantial degree of interchange exists between Chaldeans living in different parts of the metropolitan Detroit area. About thirty percent of the Chaldeans living in the Detroit section of the community reported visiting relatives in other parts of the metropolitan area within the

week preceding their response to the questionnaire. Among Chaldeans living in Oakland County, the major suburban concentration, the number was somewhat smaller (22 %), but still was greater than one-fifth of the sample. This pattern suggests that the families gather in the largest, most comfortable house — that the suburban members will most likely be the hosts, with the central city relatives doing the traveling. Such family visiting decreases the city — suburb polarity.

The family tends to bridge the recent immigrant versus earlier immigrant gap also. Many recent immigrants have relatives who have been here many years. They may, in fact, have received help from them in coming to America, and may be working with them, as employees or in a joint business effort. "Rich" Chaldeans have "poor relations", and vice versa. Thus, family ties tend to cross boundaries of the two polar groups in the community.

Early immigrant	- - - - -	Recent immigrant
Suburban	- - - - -	Central City
Upper middle class	- - - - -	Lower middle class
Chaldean oriented	- - - - -	Arabic oriented

↑
Family
Ties

Friendship ties between unreligious persons are generally less important than kinship ties in this community. Even so, some friendship ties across community boundaries do exist. Eighteen percent of the suburban Chaldeans and eleven percent of those in the central city had visited Chaldean friends outside their own residential area during the week preceding the time they answered the questionnaire (Table 15.1-B). Chaldeans of both orientations meet each other fairly often — especially at weddings, showers, funerals. These occasions then become the focus for a continuing discussion of issues in the controversy. At one Chaldean wedding the controversy waged so heatedly that the next week I received requests for literature from both sides. From one group: "Dr. Sengstock, help me prove we're Arabic"! From the other: "Give me something for my immigrant friends to read so they'll know what Chaldeans really are"!

The family and friendship nets were inclined to draw together people from both sides of the controversy, and thus to unite the community. Several social analysts have pointed out the unifying effect of such interlocking social nets. Alexis de Tocqueville (1955:II: 114 —118), for example, saw

TABLE 15.1

Chaldean Community Ties Across
Geographic Boundries
(1973 Survey)

		Geographic Area of Residence	
		Wayne County (Sacred Heart Parish) (%)	Oakland County (Mother of God Parish) (%)
A.	Visited relatives in other areas in the past week	29.8%	22.0%
B.	Visited friends in other areas in the past week	10.6	18.0
C.	Attends the Chaldean Church in the other country, at least on special occasions	80.8	22.0
	N =	(47)	(50)

this as a major strength of American democracy. American's unlike the French, tended to belong to many social organizations, which served to unite opposition members in political controversies. As a result, the controversies themselves became less divisive. Similarly, Levi-Strauss (1949) noted that primitive societies which practiced cross-cousin marriage were more unified than those which practiced parallel-cousin marriage. He suggested this was because parallel-cousin marriage limits each person's social contact to other members of a very small segment of the group, while cross-cousin marriage brings together persons from diverse parts of the society (See also Homans and Schneider, 1955). Similarly, in the Chaldean ethnic group, a major factor that promotes the continuation of a fair degree of unity is the existence of family and friendship ties which cross the boundaries of the two polar groups.

Another factor is what social psychologists have called "anticipatory socialization". It has been noted that people who aspire to belong to a group — a fraternity or other organization, a higher economic class — often learn and begin to exhibit characteristics of what class before they actually gain

admittance. In his study of Levittown, Gans (1967:408 —410) noted that new residents changed their social patterns very little at the time of their move to the suburbs. He suggests that they had already adopted the attitudinal patterns of middle class suburbia. In effect, they had "anticipated" their entry into middle class suburbia by adopting its values and style of life prior to their actual entry into it.

The same phenomenon seems to exist in the Chaldean community. A social worker who has worked with a number of Chaldeans who are recent arrivals and live in central city neighborhoods commented to me: "They are all trying to get $5,000 together so they can get out of there and move to the suburbs!" Whether he is accurate in stating that all new immigrants feel this way is not certain. It does indicate, however, that some recent immigrants look to the early arrivals as examples of what they may become in the future. If they are not too well off economically, they look to those who have been here forty or even fifteen or twenty years, and hope that they may be as successful: own thier own businesses, or have a profession, and live comfortably in the suburbs. Thus they often begin to adopt some characteristics of the older immigrants. Although they may still speak Arabic rather than Chaldean, and live in the city, they are saving for a home in the suburbs and they frequently learn a great deal about the Chaldean aspects of their heritage which they previously did not know. As one fairly recent immigrant told me, "In Baghdad, everyone was embarrassed to be Chaldean. People made fun of them. So they tried to assimilate and become Arabs". In Detroit, however, being Chaldean is acceptable, and many new immigrants begin to adopt the characteristics of their predecessors. The reverse is also true. In order to communicate with new arrivals some earlier immigrants and their children have begun to learn Arabic. Arabic classes held in the suburban community at one time had ninety people attending.

It must be noted that community conflicts tend to polarize the group, but the polarization is by no means complete. Although the Arabic oriented are more frequently found among recent immigrants, many recent arrivals still identify with their Chaldean heritage (See, Table 15.—B). Among this group are those who have begun to emphasize their ancestral ties to the old Assyrian Empire. The Chaldean oriented early immigrants are also learning about the Arabic ties of today's Chaldean in Iraq. Polarization is further diminished in the economic area, as the recent immigrants prosper and move to the suburbs.

Several of the Arab oriented immigrants came to this country in the 1950s and 1960's. This group now includes a number of wealthy suburbanites. As Table 15.2 indicates, the Arab nationalist trend is much stronger in Detroit than in the Oakland suburban community. However, twenty-four percent of the suburbanites identified as Arabs. These wealthy, Arab oriented su-

TABLE 15.2

Preferred Identity by Area of Residence
(1973 Survey)

	Area of Residence		
	Detroit (%)	Oakland County (%)	Other (%)
Preferred identity			
Traditional	42.9%	66.0%	66.7%
Arabic	37.1	24.0	26.7
No preference	20.0	10.0	6.7
(N =)	(35)	(50)	(15)

burbanites bridge the gap between the Chaldean oriented suburbanite, early arrivals, and the Arabic oriented central city, newcomers. The suburban parish's introduction of an Arabic language Mass and the Arabic section of the Church paper is indicative of this trend. Among the recent immigrants, the other nationalistic movement emphasizing the Assyrian/Babylonian origin of the Chaldeans and the Aramaic language, has begun to take hold. Earlier immigrants and some American born Chaldeans have also become involved, and this movement has given the nationalistic new immigrants a basis for identification which mitigates against polarization in the community.

Community polarization then is in no sense total, and even decreases as new immigrants become adjusted and prosper and as the early immigrants and American reared learn Arabic. One sees community members crossing lines simply for variety, for fun, to get to know the gossip, or even to spite friends in their own group. One well established old-time member of the suburban community became disenchanted with the suburban priest, and began going to Mass in the city "just to show him". As Table 15.1-C shows, nearly one-fourth of the suburban dwellers attended the central city church at least occasionally (primarily for weddings or funerals); while over eighty percent of the Detroit Chaldeans attended the suburban parish upon occasion. Again it appears that the central city Chaldeans are drawn to the suburbs more than the suburbanites are drawn back onto the city.

It is clear that the Chaldeans remain a single community. The recent "Arabic" immigrants and the earlier "Chaldean" ones represent two distinct subgroups to be sure. For many purposes, however, social ties cross lines and members if both subgroups maintain contact. Subsequent to the establishment of the second parish, a question arose whether the Chaldean .

telephone directory should be divided into the parish directories, or remain a single unit. By the joint determination of the two priests a single directory for the community was maintained.

There is another characteristic of the Chaldean community which may be germane to the understanding of why his group can maintain unity in the fact of persistent conflict. Conflict is a phenomenon not unknown to the Chaldeans. Some of the first incidents related to me when I began field work within the community were conflicts of various kinds: community-wide disputes, family arguments, fist fights. Conflict is an accepted process in the Chaldean community; it is expected. Examples of community conflict vary considerably, and include examples of physical fights and verbal conflict, such as arguments, insults, and gossip from the early immigration period, from recent years, and from the old country. If "violence is as American as apple pie", then conflict is as Chaldean as *Yappruch* or *kibbee*.

Among the physical fights was an incident which can best be described as an Irish style donneybrook. It occurred in the late 1950s at the old church hall on Hamilton Avenue, and the police were finally called when the chairs being thrown through the front door threatened passersby on the street. There were some hurt feelings and some bruised muscles and egos — but no permanent community rift.

One young American girl, newly married to a Chaldean boy, told of the family fight which preceded their marriage. Her husband's brother, himself married to an American for several years, learned of their engagement and announced, "You aren't going to do this (*e.g.*, marry a non-Chaldean) to Mom and Dad". He proceeded to drag his brother to the front lawn for a sound thrashing. However, by the day of the wedding, the rift was healed, the parents were present, and big brother served as best man.

Modern incidents of conflict seem to pale when compared with stories told of the battle of Telkaif around 1830 between those who wanted to become Roman Catholic and those who wanted to remain Nestorian. "My grandfather told me they were fighting each other in the streets", one old man related. The conflict was resolved as the entire town became Roman Catholic. Few residents, if any, are known to have defected to nearby Nestorian towns. Apparently physical expression of conflict has a long and honored history for Telkeffee Chaldeans. One might say that conflict is institutionalized, that is, it is expected, it is planned for, and there are accepted ways of dealing with the tensions it produces. And one way of dealing with it is through physical fighting.

Another solution is found through verbal confrontations, of which there are many. On several occasions I have interviewed Chaldeans, and watched the interview produce an argument between husband and wife, father and son, two brothers or cousins, or any other onlookers, as to the "proper"

interpretations of community matters in which I was interested. Proponents
of the classical social scientific survey would greatly disapprove such an
approach to data collection. But it is an extremely effective technique for
observing the manner in which a community really operates.

Americans who know the community are often amazed at the amount of
arguing that exists; yet everyone remains friends. One American girl married
to a Chaldean was astounded at the amount of disagreement that surrounded
their wedding. "I couldn't believe it"! she said. "We sat down with the
Chaldean phone book and went through it, line by line. My mother-in-law
would say, 'Yes, that one has to be invited,' and my father-in-law would say,
'I don't want him to come.' Then the next one, my father-in-law would say to
invite him, and my mother-in-law would say, 'I don't want him to come'. It
was ridiculous"! When told of the incident a Chaldean commented, "Oh, we
do that all the time It is interesting to note that the young American bride
was not herself a member of a strong ethnic group. However, many Polish,
Italian, Irish, or Jewish Americans would understand the incident. Family
conflict is a common phenomenon in many American ethnic groups.

Direct and indirect verbal assaults occur frequently in the Chaldean
community. Indirect verbal attacks — telling someone about someone else's
real or imagined misbehavior — occur most often. This is usually termed
gossip and is common among groups with strong ethnic ties (Lopata, 1976:
9—10, 44). Chaldeans complain that a major problem they must endure is
habitual gossiping that centers around the younger generation and the
degree to which they fail to conform to the old traditions. Young Chaldeans
are frequently the target of the older generation's gossip about how poorly
other families have raised their children: they have dates; or they associate
too much with Americans; they do not know the ethnic language, and so on
and on. One girl complained that gossip even centered around such
insignificant matters (to her view) as dress. When she wore a khaki raincoat
the year her father died, community gossip claimed she did not wear proper
mourning clothes (e.g., black). Such gossip is a type of conflict, since it
expresses basic intra-community rivalries and competition.

Conflict is, after all, nothing more than the external expression of basic
underlying clashes of interest. However, when two individuals or groups
have interests which clash, they do not necessarily come into open and
direct conflict. Conflict in ethnic groups takes less direct forms. Families and
individuals may not engage in physical fights or verbal arguments, but
instead vie with each other through competition or gossip.

Competition in ethnic communities also takes many forms. The Boston
Italians competed in personal talents, clothing, cars, household skills (Gans,
1962·82—93). Chaldeans vie with each other in the lavishness of wedding
receptions and the size of wedding gifts. The Chaldean wedding, like the

Polish or Italian wedding and the Jewish Bar Mitzvah, often turns into a giant *potlach*. They also compete in the size of donations to the Church. However, the greatest area of competition is in business. Chaldean business men compete with each other in the site of their stores, the extensiveness of their stock, the exclusiveness of their clientele, the number of customers, *et cetera*. Conversations between many business men, especially old-timers, is frequently a long series of claims and counter claims. One Chaldean grocer, who had tried without success, to organize some inter-store cooperation, concluded "they're more interested in competing with each other than in having a successful business"!

Direct verbal attacks are less frequent, but they do occur. In one incident a Chaldean clergyman visiting from Iraq publicly criticized a woman from a prominent Chaldean family for the scantiness of her clothing, which was quite modest by American Standards. I was told that the woman stalked out accompanied by her family. "What happened? Did they leave the Church?" I asked, "Oh yes, for awhile", my informant told me. "But we calmed them down and they're back again".

What is most interesting is that the reconciliation of the conflicting parties is the rule rather than the exception. Conflicts do not lead to permanent breaches for the Chaldeans, or for most other ethnic communities.

Rather, the conflict is an accepted part of normal social relations. A temporary breach is expected; and an eventual return to the preconflict state (usually involving more conflict) will follow. The ethnic social pattern is much like the relationship between management and labor in the American corporate system. Each side invests a great deal in the conflict, which is intense and even bitter at times. But neither desires the total elimination of the other, and both plan a long-term, relatively satisfactory relationship, punctuated by infrequent vigorous incidents of conflict and numerous smaller, less intense ones. Some of the mechanisms by which such persistent conflict is contained within an existing social pattern can be seen from an analysis of the ethnic community.

One of the ways conflict is minimized in the Chaldean community is through the prevalence of accommodation. Accommodation is basically an acceptance of the notion that everyone should "give a little, get a little" in social relations. One hears a great deal of this sentiment in talking to Chaldeans. "My parents gave us alot, so we figure they are entitled to have us visit them". My brother helped me come here. Now he needs me to help in the store, so I help him". Accommodations appeared in data collected on language usage and food patterns in households. Those households in which one marriage partner was American reared and the other an immigrant, are an example of such accommodations. There was a high frequency of serving Chaldean style foods in such households, but the Chaldean or Arabic

language was not the usual language of the household, even though most Chaldeans reared here knew either or both languages. Apparently, the American spouse ate Chaldean style food to please his/her spouse, while the immigrant spoke English because it was easier for the American reared spouse. Thus, a major reason why conflict has not split the Chaldean community is that give and take, or accommodation in the face of conflict, enjoys broad acceptance.

Another reason is that there is a great emphasis on the group in this and many other ethnic communities. The individual is expected to subordinate his/her interests and wishes to that of the group. Gans (1963:84—85) noted this phenomenon among the working class Boston Italians, where the "peer group"—persons of the same sex and roughly equal age—formed the major center of a person's life; and everyone was expected to subordinate his interests to the family interest much of the time. This is not a one-way street, for Chaldeans recognize that the family does much for them.

It does mean, however, that individualism is much less prevalent in the Chaldean community and in many other ethnic groups, than in middle-class liberal circles. White ethnic Americans are less likely to think in terms of individual rights. They are more conscious of the rights of the group or the community. Perhaps this variance from American liberal views is one reason for the antagonism which Greeley (1971:120—134) has noted between ethnics and intellectuals.

American intellectuals place a great deal of emphasis on the rights of the individual to freedom of speech and self-expression, and on the rights of accused persons to be dealt with in certain clearly specified ways which minimize the likelihood of unfairness. Ethnic Americans like the Chaldeans, often have difficulty understanding the wisdom of such measures, especially those which deal with persons accused of antisocial acts. Their disagreement stems from the fact that they do not share a belief in the over riding importance of the individual. Where an individual has greatly offended the group, most ethnic group members are likely to believe he has relinquished his right to have the group treat him well. Group interests — the family or the community as a whole — are more important.

This is not to say that the individual has no rights; the family and community are expected to aid the individual in many ways. Nor does it mean that some Chaldeans do not emphasize the individual over the group. As in other ethnic groups, there are a few Chaldeans who find the group orientation of the ethnic community too stifling. Some Chaldeans interviewed complained that being in an ethnic community demands too many concessions — that one must give in to others' wishes (frequently true); that individuality is suppressed (it often is); and that people talk too much about anyone who tries to be different (they do). Among the Chaldeans as in other ethnic

groups, those who are most unhappy about such limits on individual expression are those who do, in fact, leave the group. In every social setting there is necessarily a strain between the rights of the individual — what is every person free to do without the restraint of the individual — what is every person free to do without the restraint of group pressure? — and the rights of society or the group — what must individuals give up for the sake of the group? In America during the latter half of the twentieth century, this controversy is largely resolved in favor of the individual. Parenthetically, this is true also in Jewish circles. Jews make up a large portion of American liberals and are outspoken proponents of the rights of the individual. But in their relations with the family and the Jewish community, Jews are frequently expected to subordinate their personal interests to those of the group (Gans, 1951, 1957).

This insistence upon the rights of the group is a major reason why conflict does not totally destroy the ethnic group. Members of the ethnic community realize that they may have their conflicts if they wish; they may even engage in bitter fighting. Gans (1951, 1957) in his analysis of the Jews in Park Forest, gives a picture of rather serious internal ethnic conflict over the proper place of religion in the community and the proper emphasis for the education of children. However, conflicts and differences of opinion must never be allowed to damage the group. This means they must stop short of a total split with the community. If conflicts threaten to destroy many contemporary social groups, it is largely because the members of these groups do not place such importance on the group. Rather, they believe that the individual's right to follow his own interests is paramount. If the group is not amenable, then the group must go. With such a highly individualistic philosophy, any conflict does indeed threaten the existence of the group. Less individualistic ethnic groups do not face this problem. Perhaps the inability of most social scientists to bridge the dilemma of conflict versus consensus in group relations stems in large part from the fact that most social scientists are themselves extreme proponents of the liberalist-individualist philosophy. In effect they are saying, "If I were in conflict with the group, and I could not convince them to follow me, then I would split the scene! Every one else must feel the same way". But everyone, notably the American ethnic, does not feel the same way. Conflict does not divide their groups because they presume that the group is, in the long run, more important than any individual's quarrel with it.

Conclusion

Predictions are always risky, and it is unwise to presume what another person or group will do in some future time. Recognizing the danger in such action, I still venture to predict that there will be no complete split in the Chaldean community. I base this prediction largely on these factors: 1) that

conflict is an institutionalized part of the community — it is considered "ok" to have conflicts, and there are means established for dealing with them; 2) that the various conflicting entities in the community are closely intertwined with each other through family and friendship ties, making a total split unlikely; and 3) that community is considered a very important part of their lives by most Chaldeans; to allow what are considered minor disagreements to cause separation is unthinkable.

I expect that some members will continue to be drawn off from the community, as has occurred in the past and as occurs with other ethnic groups. These persons are the ones who "assimilate"; they are drawn into contact with Americans and cease to have much contact with Chaldeans. Some of them join other ethnic groups. Some Ukrainians in predominantly Polish Hamtramck, Michigan, have, for example, married Poles and changed most of their lives to the Polish community. Among Chaldeans, some extremely Arabic oriented persons may move into closer contact with other Arabs in Detroit — the Jordanians, Palestinians, Lebanese. More often than not in the Chaldean community however, when exogamy introduces outsiders, family and friendship ties seem strong enough to hold a larger portion of Chaldeans within the community.

If the Chaldean community should divide into two or more subunits, it will not be conflict alone which causes it. Rather, it will be because the informal social networks become too attenuated to support it, or because American liberalism with its emphasis on the rights of individuals, is adopted by the majority of the community. I believe there is little likelihood that either of these will predominate in the foreseeable future.

PART VII: EPILOGUE

16

Future Direction of American Ethnicity

THE last quarter of the twentieth century is likely to be characterized by a continued heightening of ethnic sentiment. In communities such as the Chaldean one, constant migration provides a steady stream of new arrivals for whom the ethnic community is of considerable importance. Barring legal maneuvers which drastically limit migration, there will continue to be substantial numbers of people for whom the ethnic community must serve as an acculturating and assimilating agent, as a source of social and psychological support during the difficult period of adjustment.

What is more important, however, is the fact that ethnic social structure remains important to second and third, and even subsequent generations of Americans. Third generation Chaldeans in Southfield and Birmingham may speak the same language as their non-Chaldean classmates; their houses may look the same; they may even have switched to an "American" Catholic Church. But in many respects they are "different": their fathers are grocers, not professional men; they have a different view of the importance of education; they are more likely to have close ties with the extended family, and they may even have relatives living with them. Their friends are likely to notice, either explicitly or implicitly, that there are some basic variations in their social patterns, their interests, their general view of life. Long after they have lost a conscious indentity with their ancestral heritage, many Americans exhibit some residual characteristics of this background and maintain close social ties with persons whose heritage is the same as their own. For new arrival and third generation alike, the ethnic community remains a central focus of life.

The prospect of an America divided by ethnicity is objectionable to many people. They believe America can remain strong only if immigrants rather quickly exchange old allegiances for new and become "American" — without a hyphenated prefix. This view is reminiscent of Anglo-Conformist and Melting Pot philosophies (Gordon, 1954: Chap. 4,5) which preceded the immigration restrictions of the 1920s: anyone is welcome to come to America provided they exchange their former identity for the one they find here. They must, in the words of St. John de Crèvecoeur (1925:55) emerge as "a new race of men". It is now admitted that this is an unreasonable expectation. No human being can drop ancestral identity so easily.

Reluctance to relinquish old identities is rooted in two factors. First, it is difficult for immigrants to forget the land of their birth or the people who reared them, or for the second generation to forget the ways of their fathers. An individual must carry an intense closeness-identity, if you will —with the land and culture with which ancestors were associated. Thus, one reason for the persistence of ethnic identity is the alliance people feel for the land of their forefathers.

There is a second, more crucial reason why ethnic identity persists, a reason which stems not from the nature of the land of origin but from the character of America in he twentieth century. A feeling of closeness with one's ethnic heritage fulfills a need that exists in the United States today. This is a huge and diverse nation. In 1970 there were over 200 million Americans.[5] It is difficult if not impossible for one to feel a sense of emotional closeness to so large a group of people — its size alone boggles the mind. One cannot even imagine 200 million people, much less feel close to them. Social scientists who have studied the effects of size upon social interaction point out that the subdivision of a group into several components is likely to occur even in groups as small as ten or twelve persons (Jennings, 1950; Newcomb, et al. 1965:363). The likelihood grows as the group becomes larger.

A century ago, the 1870 census counted only 38.5 million Americans.[6] At that time it was perhaps conceivable that America could be welded into a single social group, sharing a single cultural pattern. With a population over five times this size, it is clearly reasonable. The size of this society alone is sufficient to produce what some theorists have called a "mass society" in which every one feels alienated, isolated, alone, unwanted, unimportant, and powerless (Schumpeter, 1947:260—61; Selznick, 1952:293—294). Coupled with this immense size is the fact that there are many different social characteristics — social class, politics, religion, race, national origin, to

[5] 203, 235, 298 (1970 U.S. Census).
[6] 38, 558, 371 (1870 U.S. Census).

mention but a few. If the "One America" of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s dream (1963) is an America with no internal division whatsoever, if it implies something more meaningful than an occasional surge of emotion when the National Anthem is played, then a unified America is likely to remain little more than a dream.

To avoid a sense of aloneness and isolation, the group with which one is able to identify must be sufficiently large for one to see its relation to society as a whole, but also small enough for one to envision its boundaries. Ethnic groups provide this for a large number of people. Ethnicity is not the only basis on which such social groupings might be built. Social class, occupation, region of the country might also form the basis for the societal subgroups (Gordon, 1964:39—51). In fact, they are the basis for the major social subgroups in many nations, and are of considerable importance in the United States also. However, the evidence seems clear that ethnic divisions and allegiances in America are very real at the present time, and are likely to remain with us for some time to come. There is little to be gained in continuing to wish for a nation with a unified culture and identity, when all evidence points to the contrary.

However, the role of American ethnic divisions need not be a totally negative one. The ethnic subgroupings of a nation can make positive contributions to the structure of society in three major respects: the cultural matrix, the social organization structure and the identity pattern.

Ethnicity and National Culture

The culture of a large, diversified nation such as the United States offers a wide variety of alternatives (Linton, 1936:273—274). The choices open to a young American are immense. He/she may choose among hundreds of occupational types. Educational options, particularly at the post high school level, are also broad, varying from vocational to liberal arts, from short programs to long, from small private schools to large universities. The range of philosophical codes is broad: from theistic to agnostic, from puritanical to libertarian. Recreational options are equally diverse: with a wide range of outdoor activities, athletic events, musical types from opera to rock, and reading material for the serious and the frivolous alike. The number of alternatives in American culture is too great to enumerate. If every option were an equally plausible possibility for every individual, the task of choosing among all the options would be a bewildering experience. An immense amount of knowledge would be required to make wise choices.

Of course, all opinions are not equally available to every individual. The various subgroups to which one belongs — racial, ethnic, and religious groups, social class and the region in which one resides — all limit the options available. The lower class child cannot reasonably expect to become

president of General Motors, nor an offspring of Joseph P. Kennedy to collect garbage. Catholics are unlikely to work in kosher butcher shops, Jews unlikely to publish Catholic books. Midwesteners are unlikely to become lobster fishermen; New Englanders do not operate cattle ranches.

On the negative side, this clearly limits the individual's freedom of choice. In a more positive view, it provides him with greater ease of choice. The number of decisions one must make is smaller, since many choices are predetermined. The Chaldeans do not choose their philosophy of life; their religious upbringing provides it. In many cases they do not select their occupation; they are very likely to become involved in the food industry. Many occupations are not reasonable alternatives, since they have little opportunity to learn about these alternatives. There are few Chaldean lawyers, even fewer doctors and skilled tradesmen; hence most Chaldean youngsters have little opportunity to learn about these positions. In the realm of recreational activities they are more likely to select those which are centered on family, home, and church; attendence at opera or symphony are options they do not encounter.

More than this, they are so reared that such activities are unlikely to attract them. The ethnic culture not only suggests the options to be accepted; it also provides the criteria on which the choices will be based. Thus, the Chaldean culture places strong emphasis on family life, such that family-centered recreation seems most appealing. With regard to occupational type, Chaldean culture emphasizes the economic aspects of a job, and the degree to which it can contribute to family solidarity. The personal satisfaction to be obtained from a job is not emphasized. Using these standards of evaluation, the grocery business appears as a desirable option. Similarly, Gans (1962:122 —123) notes that the cultural pattern of Italian Americans in .Boston emphasized strenuous physical activity; it also encouraged members to develop emotional ties to people, not objects (such as their occupations). Consequently, its members preferred manual labor jobs which they could "leave behind" at the end of the day. They resisted jobs that required them to take responsibility for the actions of others, or to worry about they jobs after working hours.

In both of these instances, the culture of the ethnic group helps the individual to choose among options allowed in the American cultural matrix. The ethnic culture helps with this choice, by presenting certain options with a high degree of frequency and by providing the criteria on which the choice between options is based. As a result, it is not surprising that many second and third generation Americans continue to exhibit occupational, religious, political, family patterns, or other cultural characteristics of their ethnic forefathers. They act as they have been reared to act, often without realizing their actions are ethnically based. It also indicates

that one of the strengths of a society built upon strong ethnic groups is that it provides a basis for evaluating and distributing cultural alternatives.

The Social Pluralist Matrix and the Unity of Society

In the wake of the tragedy of the Nazi era, some theorists (Fromm, 1941; Kornhauser, 1959) suggested that a "mass society" is one of the greatest threats to a free democratic government. By a mass society they mean one in which the members feel isolated, alone, and powerless to affect the outcome of either their own lives or the activities of their nation. When people feel powerless, they are prone to turn to direct action — mass protests, riots, or other disruptive activities (Heberle, 1951:378; Fromm, 1941: 19—22). Charismatic leaders who claim to have a simple solution to their powerlessness can also easily influence them. Thus Kornhauser (1959: 119—121, 237) suggested that the mass society could easily be tranformed into a totalitarian society. He believed that a society avoids becoming a "mass society" by having a network of groups which bind its members together.

Such groups need not be ethnic in character. They may be occupational, religious, recreational, or a variety of others. But given a society in which ethnic background is a matter of no small importance, ethnic organizations can provide one of the bases on which societal structure can rest. A recent Chaldean immigrant, newly sworn as an American citizen, may correctly feel powerless to influence the future of this new country. However, working with other Chaldeans through the Chaldean Church or other ethnic associations, they as a group may be able to attain some of their goals. In recent years some members of the community have become aware of the influence the group can wield. Both in the central city and in suburban areas, Chaldean groups have exerted influence on the public school system to provide services, such as special English classes which they feel their children need. The major political parties have become aware of the way ethnic groups can meaningfully involve the individual in social structure. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have ethnic or nationality committees that work closely with various nationality organizations to bring them into the political process.

The pluralist view suggests that persons who have a structural tie to the political process are less likely to surrender democracy for totalitarianism. Other variables such as social class or occupation also serve to organize the societal structure. In the United States, ethnicity is only one of several social groupings of which each individual is a part. In a positive sense, this is a distinct strength of the American social system. For no single focus, such as economic interest; become the dividing point on which society may be rent apart. Instead, those who are divided by economic interests may be reunited by ethnic identification, and vice versa. This consequence of ethnic diversity

is also recognized by less conservative theorists (Harrington, 1964: 150—151), who see ethnic divisions as obstacles to collective action by the economically disadvantaged.

As strong social groups which organize people for collective action, ethnic communities serve to relieve the sense of powerlessness that can come with life in a large complex "mass society". It can provide a medium through which wants and needs can be made known and, hopefully, alleviated. In this way ethnic groups become a powerful force inhibiting large scale and violent change. They are among the most useful mechanisms promoting the maintenance of existing democratic institutions. It is for this reason that the "white ethnic" has been so bitterly attacked in recent years by proponents of radical social change.

Ethnicity, Personal Identity, and Interpersonal Relations

In addition to a sense of powerlessness, the social isolation of the mass society tends to produce individuals who lack a strong sense of personal worth. Ethnic affiliation provides the individual with a response to the question of personal identity: Who am I? Critics of ethnic identity tend to see only its negative aspects — the fact that a sense of one's "own people" tends to turn an individual's interests and concerns inward upon self and those of the same group, and away from the needs and concerns of others, of mankind in general. What these critics fail to realize is that one cannot be concerned with others' problems unless one's own needs are met; one understands other needs largely by analogy to one's own; and one cannot accept others until there is self-acceptance.

Thus, a sense of personal identity and worth is prerequistic to the ability to perceive and sympathize with the problems of others. The concern which many groups felt for the plight of the Jews in Nazi Germany stemmed in part from a feeling that such action, if left unchecked, might well be directed against their own group at some future point in time. In talks to white ethnic groups regarding the problems of blacks in America, I have often noted that people understand "black rage" only by analogy to their own problems. A largely Ukrainian Polish audience once expressed dismay at what appeared to them to be the unreasonable demands of blacks for occupational advancement, until it was pointed out that blacks simply sought the same promotional opportunities that had been denied to Ukrainian and Polish immigrants and their children a generation earlier. By similar analogies ethnic group members are better able to understand the problems of other groups.

They are also better able to accept members of other groups. It has often been assumed that strong ethnic groups tend to produce ethnocentric people who are incapable of cooperating well with others and thus, the pluralist

society would degenerate into a series of antagonistic camps. The little data available suggest that this need not necessarily occur. If anything, individuals who are secure in their own identity are better able to accept others. Persons who are members of a close-knit ethnic group are likely to grow up with a feeling of pride in their heritage and confidence in themselves. They need not apologize for either themselves or their people; consequently they can accept other peoples as having value also. Andrew Greeley (1971:190) noted that the Polish people of Gary, Indiana, were unlikely to support the black candidate for mayor of that city. However, the Polish people who were most closely identified with and active in their own Polish community were more likely to support the black candidate. The Poles who were not active in their own ethnic community were least likely to support him. In this sense, men and women who are truly "black and proud", "Polish and proud", or "Chaldean and proud", are more likely to get along well with each other than persons of each of these backgrounds who are embarrassed or apologetic about their respective heritages. Ethnic identity provides a sense of personal worth that gives individuals the confidence to deal with others outside as well as within the group.

While promoting a feeling of worth for individuals who are closely aligned with their common heritage, ethnic identity presents problems for others. In a decade of teaching classes on American ethnicity, I have read scores of student papers on ethnic identity. Two types of students seem most disturbed by the increase in ethnic interest in America. People who have been in the country for several generations, whose ancestors came prior to the great immigration period of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have trouble developing an identity. They think of themselves as "just Americans", and many students report feeling "left out" when their friends talked of being Irish or Italian or Czech. How ironic that the descendants of the English founders of our country should one day feel that somehow they were less important because they have been here too long! Many of these students compensate by becoming "super-American", especially patriotic in all they do.

Another group which tends to lack an ethnic identity is the ethnically mixed group, persons whose ethnic heritage includes a number of ethnic, religious, or racial strains. Of course, many such persons maintain a dominant ancestral tie and are not ethnically marginal at all. But some are quite conscious of being a little of everything, and the lack of a single identity is a problem to them. They are much like the Chaldean who has not determined whether to be Telkeffee, Chaldean, Iraqi, or Arab. The most poignant case of this type was a young girl whose family hailed from a small southern town in which a great deal of intermarriage had taken place between blacks, whites, and native Americans. Some of her relatives had "passed"

as white; others were active in the American Indian Movement; and several were militant blacks. She refused to accept the notion that she should choose a single identity, and was not ashamed of bweing black—or white. She ended her paper with a plaintive plea: I am very proud of my diverse heritage...blacks are 'black and proud', and Poles are "Polish and proud'. Why can't I lift my head and say, 'Well damn it, I'm mixed and proud'"! Her feelings were shared, to a lesser degree, by students whose heritage consisted of a variety of Catholic or Protestant nationalities. How tragic that these products of the American melting pot should feel that their heritage is somewhat less valuable than that of their neighbors.

Perhaps a pluralist society is plural in many senses, allowing room for a broad variety of sociocultural identities that its members may develop. These include the national identities of relatively new immigrants, the colonial American identity of early arrivals, and the "hybrid" heritage of those whose ancestry is ethnically mixed. It may also include nonethnic identities, such as class or occupational identities.

A Need for Unity in Diversity

Ethnic pluralism provides the individual with a set of cultural alternatives and evaluative standards that are more clearly defined than the rather vague patterns of an amorphous national culture. It provides a network of social groups through which democratic institutions can operate effectively, and it provides a heritage on which individuals can base a sense of personal identity in their relations with others.

This is not to say that ethnic pluralism presents no problems for America. There are indeed problems implicit in ethnic diversity, the most serious of which stems from the very nature of diversity. The United States is a nation made up of many peoples with widely varying heritages. At the same time, it is a nation which purports to operate as a single people — to have one government, to have one system of laws, and to speak with one voice in international affairs. Though many and diverse, people must at the same time find a way to establish a degree of unity in multiplicity. Most United States citizens have some sense of being "Americans" if they travel abroad; but the sense of unity is lacking once they return home.

In the past it has been assumed that this oneness would necessarily follow upon entry into American society. Although immigrants from diverse backgrounds, with a little effort on the part of the new arrivals, a little patience on the part of their predecessors, and considerable good will on the part of everyone, a single people — Crèvecoeur's new race (1925:55) — would emerge. The romantic notion that America is a melting pot in which all cultures blend together and emerge as one has long since been abandoned. At the same time it is obvious that we must all melt a little, if the notion of a single nation is to have any meaningful basis.

This is especially true with respect to the development of a system of laws that reflects a fairly broad moral consensus in society. Coming from quite diverse cultural backgrounds, Americans tend to have divergent notions of morality. To some, drinking and gambling are immoral and legislation should be enacted against this; to others, these are legitimate activities but abortion or euthanasia must be condemned. Pornography, drug use, the extent of police activity and a host of other activities are also matters for substantial disagreement. Where a common moral consensus is lacking, the task of enforcement in the U.S. today demonstrates that a common moral code will not somehow emerge automatically. Time has come for representatives of different ethnic cultures to distinguish those moral standards on which the majority agree and therefore will accept as law, from the less important spheres of behavior in which ethnic cultural standards may prevail.

There are perhaps many other spheres of life in which the areas of common cultural agreement should be delineated from instances of legitimate ethnic deviation. In the first century after its founding the United States was a fairly unified nation, one in its espousal of the English Puritan ethic. In the past century it has become a diversified nation to which persons from widely varying cultural backgrounds have come. As the U.S. enters its third century, it greatly needs the development of a sense of unity in the midst of this cultural diversity.

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Appendix

FIGURE II

FIGURE III

Primary Settlements

Secondary Settlements

* Mother of God
    Chaldean Church

FIGURE IV

Primary Settlements

Secondary Settlements

Chaldean Churches
* Mother of God
* Sacred Heart

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