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ABSTRACT

Six presentations, an introduction, and a summary discussion are included in this publication, which focuses on the various complex factors involved in the negotiation of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Titles of the six presentations are: (1) Critical Issues in the United States-Soviet Relationship; (2) Basic Elements of Strategic Theory: Military Relations in a Nuclear World; (3) United States Defense Capability; (4) A Closer Look at Soviet Capabilities; (5) Strengthening United States Security Through SALT; (6) How to Tell a Good SALT Treaty from a Bad One; and (7) Citizen Involvement in the SALT Debate. A concluding section contains questions and topics covered in panel discussions. Questions and topics were related to a basic proposition that strategic arms limitation agreements could enhance world security by restraining additional development of the mutually deterrent nuclear weapons systems of the United States and the Soviet Union. (NE)

UNITED STATES SECURITY AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

Report
of
A Wingspread Briefing
convened by
Institute of World Affairs
of
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
and the
United States Department of State
in cooperation with
The Johnson Foundation
Racine, Wisconsin
June 29, 1978

Report prepared by
Douglas McLain, Jr.

Mr. McLain, a retired Foreign Service officer, is Assistant Professor, International Relations Major, and Assistant Director of the Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

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FOREWORD

The Johnson Foundation was privileged to cooperate with the Institute of World Affairs - University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the United States Department of State in the Wingspread Briefing convened in June, 1978 on the subject **United States Security and the Soviet Challenge**. The distinguished speakers whose presentations are reported in this publication addressed a Wingspread audience of Wisconsin leaders from the fields of business, labor, academic life, the media and the professions.

The Johnson Foundation's commitment to a better understanding of the arms control issue by citizens and government officials began as early as 1959. This initial project was in the form of position papers prepared by a number of the nation's outstanding experts in the field, including the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Harrison Brown, Paul M. Doty, Henry M. Kissinger, Bernard T. Feld, Louis B. Sohn, and others. During a conference convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and The Johnson Foundation, the papers served as the basis of discussion. The papers were subsequently published in an issue of **Daedalus**, the scholarly journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, made possible through a Johnson Foundation grant. The volume was distributed widely in the United States and abroad and deemed to have a strong influence on public and official understanding of United States-Soviet relations and arms control at that time.

We recognize that changes which take place in political, economic and social affairs require that foreign policy issues be reexamined regularly. Of all the foreign policy issues with which the nation must deal, it is clear that none is more important to the security of the United States and the entire globe than working out agreements which will prevent the unthinkable holocaust of a nuclear war. It is for this reason that the Board of Trustees of The Johnson Foundation continues, with other institutions which share the same strong commitment, to support steadfastly study of the complex factors which must be considered in negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

In the recent past The Johnson Foundation has initiated or supported many projects, each of which relates in its own way to the improvement of the human environment. These have included:

- Coping with changes in American family life
- Improvement of basic education
- Human rights and United States foreign policy
- Prevention of youth delinquency
- Racial justice in the United States
- Long term care and the aging of America
- Economic growth
- Wilderness preservation
- Reducing urban youth unemployment
- Cooperation with the President's Commission on Mental Health
- Health care in the United States

It is right that the Foundation should convene specialists to deal with these subjects, and we have seen positive results grow from these efforts. However, the Foundation never allows itself to forget that programs aimed at improving the human condition will count for nothing if millions of lives are lost and the physical environment becomes unlivable through nuclear destruction and contamination.

For approximately a decade prior to his present appointment as Principal Advisor on Soviet Affairs to the Secretary of State, Professor Marshall Shulman served as consultant to The Johnson Foundation in the field of United States-Soviet Relations and Arms Control. At that time Professor Shulman was Director of Columbia University's Russian Institute.

Through Professor Shulman's commitment and exceptional knowledge of this subject, The Johnson Foundation was able to remain active in this field, and we continue to be grateful for his valuable contribution to the work of this organization.

Under policy guidelines regularly assessed by the Board of Trustees, The Johnson Foundation will continue its educational role in advancing public understanding of important United States foreign policy issues, including the control of nuclear weaponry. Consistent with this commitment, The Johnson Foundation will convene in early 1979 another Wingspread Briefing on United States security, the Soviet challenge, and SALT II. This briefing will be convened by the Committee on the Present Danger and the Institute of World Affairs of The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, in cooperation with The Johnson Foundation.

Leslie Paffrath
President
The Johnson Foundation

INTRODUCTION

We cannot assure our security by military strength alone. New weapons systems acquired by one side stimulate the other side to develop more counter measures. The net effect is the expansion of weapons systems on both sides without a real increase in the security of either.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
April 10, 1978

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1969. Stated United States aims include limitation and reduction of strategic weapons designed to increase national security and promote strategic stability. In 1972 SALT ONE ended with two agreements, a treaty limiting antiballistic missile defense systems (ABM) and a five year pact providing limitations on strategic offensive weapons. Both were approved by Congress. The ABM agreement remains in effect. The offensive weapons limitation has expired, although both sides have agreed not to take any actions inconsistent with that agreement so long as the present negotiations are continuing.

A second round of talks, SALT TWO, began in 1972 and is still in process. These talks, thus far, have produced the 1974 Vladivostok understanding which proposed that a new agreement, to be reached in 1975, would extend through 1985, limit the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles of each nation to 2,400, and limit land and submarine missiles equipped with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) to 1,320.

The United States and U.S.S.R. were unable to reach the anticipated agreement by 1975. In the fall of 1977, President Carter stated that a new SALT agreement was in sight. However, by mid-1978 it was generally agreed that several difficult issues had prolonged the negotiations, and that an uphill fight for Congressional consent was in prospect. Unresolved disputes included controls on the Soviet Backfire bomber and restrictions on the deployment of new types of ICBMs. United States flexibility on these issues was increasingly limited by what could realistically be expected to gain Senate approval.

Prospects of trouble for SALT in the Senate may reflect confusion in the mind of the American public. The ongoing growth of Soviet military might and adventurism in Africa have brought expressions of public concern for the nation's security and have made further accomodation on arms control increasingly controversial. At the same time, the general climate for SALT has been soured by widely publicized accusations of Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki accord. These have produced official protest in the United States and corresponding resentment in the Soviet Union.

The outcome of the SALT process will shape the nature of United States-U.S.S.R. relations for generations. These relations could affect the fate of the human race. Given the crucial importance of SALT and indications of uncertainty and unease regarding these talks, the Administration has sought to clarify the issues and seek responses from the ultimate arbiter of United States foreign policy — the American public.

Against this background, on a day in June 1978, a group of Wisconsin civic leaders met for an educational briefing on United States Security and the Soviet Challenge, including issues involved in the current SALT TWO negotiations. In her remarks opening the briefing, Carol Edler Baumann, Director of the Institute of World Affairs, stressed the critical importance of public understanding of the problems of United States national security and the crucial role of our relationship with the Soviet Union to that security. Within that relationship no issue is more controversial than that of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. She expressed satisfaction that the United States Department of State had become aware of the need to consult with the American public on the vital question of national survival and had developed a program to inform the public about United States military strategy, to explain the purposes of SALT within that strategy, and to solicit the public's views and concerns about SALT.

Dr. Baumann noted that Marshall Shulman, the Secretary of State's advisor on Soviet affairs, has characterized United States public opinion toward the U.S.S.R. as vacillating widely between euphoria and despair depending on perceptions of the current state of detente. She concurred with Dr. Shulman's conclusion that no consistent or successful policy could be based on such uncertainty and that public support and understanding of a "measured, balanced, and realistic" approach to relations with the Soviet Union was needed.

With such understanding a corresponding dampening of the swings of public opinion between too high expectations and disillusioned hostility should occur.



CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

William J. Dyess

If public attitudes regarding the Soviet Union have been characterized by vacillation, this reflects to some extent the actual course of the mixed and ambiguous history of United States-Soviet relations. William J. Dyess, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, described the context within which SALT TWO is being negotiated and within which the United States Senate will consider a treaty. Tracing the path of United States-U.S.S.R. relations, Mr. Dyess noted that at their outset the United States sought to intervene in 1917 and bring about a change in the fledgling government wrought by the successful Red Revolution. While this abortive effort is perhaps best forgotten by the United States, each generation of Soviets is reminded by its government of early Western hostility. It was not until 1933, after more than a decade of little contact, that formal diplomatic relations were established by the new Roosevelt Administration. This initiative toward normality was soon blunted by the Soviet purges of the 1930's which shunted United States-Soviet relations into diplomatic limbo. The Soviet's subsequent war against Finland produced near unanimous hostility in the United States toward the U.S.S.R.

WILLIAM J. DYESS, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State, is an 18 year veteran of the United States Foreign Service. For most of his career he has dealt with the United States and the communist world. Before his present assignment, he was Chief of the United States Soviet Bilateral Affairs Staff in the State Department. In the late 1960's in Berlin he was Chief of Liaison with Soviet Authorities in East Berlin and before that was a Political Officer at the American Embassy in Moscow. He also served as Political Officer at United States Embassies in Belgrade and Copenhagen and served as Czechoslovak Desk Officer in the Department of State. He served seven times as the State Department member of United States maritime delegations which negotiated United States Soviet agreements on cargo sharing and port access. A native of Alabama, Mr. Dyess is a Phi Beta Kappa educated at the Universities of Alabama, Syracuse, and Oxford.

World War II made allies of the United States and the Soviet Union. But, following the war, as the United States partially dismanteled its military machine, another swing in relationships took place. When the United States initiated the Marshall Plan the Soviet Union blocked Eastern European participation, and its ensuing policy made clear that our wartime cooperation was at an end. Although we were on opposite sides during the Korean war, Stalin's death in 1953 and the advent of Khruschev brought renewed attempts to cooperate. Following the hiatus occasioned by the U-2 incident in 1960, a thaw initiated under the Kennedy administration produced several pacts between the two countries, including the Limited Test Ban, an agreement on the use of outer space, and establishment of the hot line. The Vietnam conflict placed us on opposite sides again. Notwithstanding, the United States and the U.S.S.R. reached the milestone SALT ONE agreements in 1972 and other agreements in the nuclear weapons field were concluded in subsequent years.

The brief history of United States-U.S.S.R. relations is one of intermittent confrontation interspersed with attempts to control and replace rivalry with negotiation. On occasion our interests overlap and produce circumstances encouraging cooperation. (President Carter's June 7, 1978 commencement address at Annapolis in its entirety is a description of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.)

Although the two superpowers confront each other in a variety of ways, fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet domestic systems are at the core of their rivalry. These fundamental differences are reflected in the means by which political power in each system is distributed, exercised, and accounted for. Since in neither country is systemic change likely, we will continue to compete for influence throughout the world for a long time to come.

Given the adversary nature of our relationship, the military area has the greatest potential for conflict — largely in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons systems. With both sides recognizing that we are the only two countries in the world with the capacity to do one another lethal harm, strategic arms limitation will constitute the most important aspect of United States-Soviet relations in the foreseeable future. While there can be no guarantee that a SALT treaty can be reached, there is agreement that we have a mutual interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

Concluding with a list of guidelines for a measured view of United States-U.S.S.R. relationships, Mr. Dyess counseled acceptance that the competition/cooperation dichotomy will continue, and that the United States would be unable to influence Soviet domestic policies significantly in the near future. Americans must realize that in some cases United States and Soviet interests will be congruent and that in others they will diverge. This attitude would encourage a calm assessment of the costs and benefits of United States policy options and the preservation of a sense of priority among these policies.



BASIC ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC THEORY: MILITARY RELATIONS IN A NUCLEAR WORLD

David J. Fischer

You are going to be hearing a good deal today about nuclear war and weapons systems. Because the consequences of such a war employing these systems would be so devastating, so disastrous, prevention of this requires considerable resources on our part and considerable energy for those of us who deal with nuclear weapons.

It is difficult to conceptualize nuclear weapons In the first instance we have in some ways erected a bureaucratic screen that prevents us from understanding the realities of the world. First and foremost are the acronyms. You will be hearing today about ICBMs and CEPs and SLBMs and MIRVs. It is an alphabet soup. But I think it is important that we begin to understand these concepts because what we are really talking about is the national security, the future of this nation, if not the future of our civilization. We need to understand some of the fundamental concepts which guide the thinking in Washington, not only as they relate to our diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union but also in regard to our defense planning. In the light of the success of Proposition 13 in California, this should be of immediate interest since twenty-five cents of your tax dollar and my tax dollar go to defense spending.

Both sides today, the Unites States and the Soviet Union, have vast forces To give you some idea, we have over nine thousand strategic — meaning long-range — nuclear bombs. The Soviet Union has roughly half that. One Soviet missile can carry on its nose cone the equivalent of twenty million tons of TNT. Twenty million tons is in itself something we simply cannot conceptualize. I was looking for an analogy which all of us could understand; if one were to load twenty million tons of TNT into railway boxcars, the train would stretch from New York to San Diego. That is simply the potential of one missile.

There are many paradoxes in the nuclear age and the greatest of these is that the weapons have been designed not to be used in time of war but to prevent a war from ever occuring. This concept is the single most important factor governing all aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union. The reality of the nuclear age is that each side today is capable of withstanding an attack from the other side and retaining such overwhelming force that it could retaliate and obliterate the attacker nation as a viable society. The analogy often used is that of two scorpions in a bottle. One scorpion strikes the other knowing full well that in its victim's death throes he, too, will be struck and killed. It is no accident that this concept has come to be known as 'mutually assured destruction,' the initials for which are MAD. It is a mad concept in many ways, but it is a fact of life which I would argue has operated successfully to limit the competition so that it cannot grow into full scale nuclear war. We believe that this fundamental nuclear balance, this deterrent, has worked in the past and it must be maintained in the future. And it is this concept which I think guides all our thinking, not only in terms of what we are doing in the SALT talks, but in terms of what we may have to do in order to modernize our forces in the future.

Many Americans ask the question, 'Well, why not achieve superiority? We are a strong country. We have a stronger technological base than the Soviet Union. Why not just go all out, make the hard, tough decisions and beat them?' The answers to that are complex. But technology is not something which is unique to this country. The Soviet Union is also an advanced society capable of developing the kinds of weapons in which we, perhaps, may have a small lead. The history of United States-Soviet strategic relationships has shown that as one side moves ahead with a weapons system the other side either creates defenses against it or adopts similar weapons systems. There really is no way today that you can put controls on technology. It cannot be unique to one side or the other.

Fundamentally there is a more important point. It is that politically neither side is willing to risk not only inferiority but even appearance of inferiority. The President, for example, has made perfectly clear that if it is necessary we are going to make the defense decisions required to assure that this country and our forces will remain second to none. Mr. Brezhnev, I am sure, in his response to his board of governors, the Politburo, also feels it necessary to guarantee that the Soviet Union maintains strategic parity with the United States.

The concept of mutually assured destruction rests on a number of important premises and some important ideas with which I believe you should be acquainted. Many arcane theories are involved, but I will touch on only one or two. In the first instance, one of the most important premises of deterrence is the concept of survivability — that your weapons systems can survive an attack of these 4,500 Soviet warheads and that you will have enough left over to be able to threaten retaliation against the other side.

Over the years we have developed the concept known as the "Triad."

David J Fischer, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, United States Department of State, is a career Foreign Service Officer with extensive background in arms control and East European political issues He has held assignments in Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Nepal (where he was a member of the American Bicentennial Mount Everest Expedition) In Washington, Mr Fischer has served with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and was a member of the United States Delegation to the first round of SALT at Helsinki A native of Connecticut, he was educated at Brown University, the University of Vienna, and Harvard Law School

Basically, it means putting our nuclear eggs into three separate baskets. First, we have bombers, the B-52s, which will shortly be armed with a fantastic new system, the cruise missile. Second, we have our land-based missiles, ICBMs. Finally, we have missiles in submarines. We have distributed our forces in this way, because we want to insure that under any foreseeable circumstance we still would have forces after an attack which would be able to obliterate the Soviet Union. Each leg of this so-called Triad — bombers, submarines, and missiles — is capable of performing that task on its own.

Now submarines are clearly the most survivable weapons system because they are virtually immune to detection. They ride deep under the waters of the Atlantic, indeed under the Arctic ice cap, and there is no technology we are aware of, or anticipate in the foreseeable future, that would let the other side know where these submarines are and permit an effective attack. Similarly with our bombers, because of the lead time required, we would have sufficient warning to get airplanes into the air and on their way to their targets.

But we are now facing a problem for the 1980's with an issue of increasing concern to this country. Its tag name in Washington is 'Minute Man Survivability.' What this really means is that land-based ICBMs are increasingly vulnerable to attack. As the number of warheads grows on both sides, and as the accuracy of these weapons systems increases, the theoretical possibility exists that an enemy could launch an attack which would destroy our ICBM force despite the measures we have taken by building very hard concrete shelters for our missiles. If a nuclear weapon is sufficiently accurate to land on top of the concrete doors, it can destroy the missile system. The same is true of Soviet missiles. We have about 30 percent of our strategic forces in this one 'basket' of land-based missiles. The Soviets, for many reasons, have a far greater proportion of their weapons systems on land — about 70 percent. The possibility of our Minute Men becoming vulnerable is viewed with great concern in Washington. But for a variety of reasons, although of concern, it is something we will be able to deal with over the next five to seven years.

When I say the Russians will have a theoretical capability for such an attack, I stress this because, first of all, it would require extreme precision. It demands a high degree of technical sophistication to launch such an attack and be assured that all of those missiles can be destroyed. It is not enough to destroy 50 percent of them. You really have to go in and wipe out 90 to 95 percent, and that is extremely difficult. Above all, it is theoretical because, although the Soviets could launch an attack against our ICBMs, there is no way that they could do so without full recognition that we could retaliate with our bomber force and from our submarines with sufficient force to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society. This strategic deterrent, our ability to prevent the Soviets from making this irrational choice, will continue to exist in the foreseeable future.

The previous question highlights another aspect of the concept of deterrence, that is confidence in and understanding of each side's capabilities. Military men in Washington and military men in Moscow are charged with the defense of their country. They must therefore make extremely conservative estimates embodying what has come to be called 'worst case' analysis of what the other guy is up to. There is always a possibility that your opponent is going to do something. As a defender, one must take that possibility into account. In a way, both sides tend to look at each other through a telescope. We thus tend to magnify the other side's capabilities. (You are, I am sure, all cognizant of the missile gap which turned out not to have existed in the early 1960's.) I think one of the things we are trying to do through a variety of mechanisms is to decrease uncertainty and to have some understanding of what the other side really does have.

A new SALT agreement would set a tremendous precedent in this regard. The Soviets are stripping away four hundred years of secrecy and for the first time are providing us with explicit, precise numbers — which will confirm estimates arrived at through our intelligence mechanisms — of the vast range of their strategic weapons systems. This would be published as part of a SALT document. This kind of exchange of information will tend to reduce the uncertainties in the future. Hopefully, it also will allow us to formulate more rational defense spending policies. We will be able to divide our defense pie in a



way which makes more sense, because we will have increased confidence in what the other side has.

Another paradox in the nuclear world is that "defense may be bad." Defense creates instability. Let us imagine that tomorrow morning some mad scientist runs in to Mr. Brezhnev and says, 'I have developed a magic banana. This is it. This will allow us to destroy any American rockets or any American bombers when they are a hundred miles away from us. There is no way that those warheads can explode.' Clearly, under this situation Mr. Brezhnev or his successor could be more inclined in a time of crisis to launch an attack against the United States, knowing it would be unable to retaliate.

One of the major steps in arms control and the whole United States-Soviet relationship was the agreement in 1972 for both sides to renounce the concept of strategic defense utilizing anti-ballistic missile systems. In any case, both sides agreed to limit — in essence, do away with — anti-ballistic missiles. The concept of defense has come increasingly to the public attention. You may have read articles on the Soviet civil defense program. A defense program need not be active, it need not be a missile system to shoot down other missiles. You could have, in theory, a civil defense program by which all of your people could be put underground. This would be destabilizing because whichever side it was that had this program would think, 'Well, in a time of crisis we can go ahead and launch, and although missiles are going to go off in our territory, a large percentage of our population is going to survive.'

In theory, therefore, civil defense is an issue of some concern to the strategic balance. Now again I say 'in theory' because we have looked carefully at the Soviet civil defense program. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is a man who, believe me, is no softy on the Russians. The Defense Department has done several studies, and it is Secretary Brown's conclusion that the civil defense program the Soviet Union has today would not allow it to survive a retaliatory attack. It is true that the Soviet civil defense program is larger than ours. We made the decision in the mid-1960's that civil defense in the nuclear age did not make sense. The Soviets have not come to that conclusion and they continue to invest some resources in this. But there is no way the Soviets can avoid the immediate effect of nine thousand weapons exploding over their territory. And certainly there is no way that that society could survive the long-range effects of nuclear war about which we know very little. What kind of society is it after you have been in your shelter for three weeks and you open the door to get out? What is left? Nothing. We cannot even send people to Bikini Atoll twenty-five years after the tests, much less three weeks after. Admittedly, the idea of civil defense plays a certain role in the strategic concept. It is something we may want to deal with in SALT THREE. We may want to negotiate limits on this with the Soviets. But for the moment, it does not change the fundamental balance.

That nuclear balance today is stable. Neither side has the incentive which might confer the capability to launch an attack against the other and survive. But we are concerned about the buildup in Soviet strategic forces which has gone on for almost a decade. Although they started in second place, they have parity in this critical year of 1978. The President has said we will maintain the strategic balance at any cost. We will do so through a program of modernization of our own forces, moving ahead if necessary with a mobile missile system, moving ahead with a vast range of cruise missile programs, and developing new submarines.

We are also trying to maintain a strategic balance through arms control. I think there is a misperception in this country today that arms control is somehow soft, that it is 'liberal,' that you are playing footsie with the Russians. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Arms control and a strong national defense policy are not contradictory. They are complementary. They are two paths to the same goal, because our goal with arms control is to limit the buildup in Soviet forces. In fact, the SALT agreements that we are negotiating will for the first time require real reductions in Soviet weapons systems. The Soviets will be required to destroy between two hundred fifty and three hundred of these vast systems which are now targeted against the United States. It is fortuitous, but I am pleased to say that we will not be required to destroy any.

That is less important, however, than the fundamental goal which is to strive to maintain the strategic balance. The issues are terribly complex. They are difficult. You will hear many numbers and acronyms about systems on both sides. But in this discussion and in this public debate which is taking place, do not lose sight of the forest for the trees. The idea is to maintain the balance, and therefore to reduce the theoretical possibility — however small — of a nuclear war.



UNITED STATES DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Henry H. Gaffney

Henry H. Gaffney, Deputy Director of Nuclear Policy in the Office of Policy Planning and National Security Affairs of the United States Department of Defense, described the contents of the United States nuclear arsenal and the U.S.S.R.'s counterforce. His presentation included slides and an accompanying sound track.

After brief review of the concept of deterrence, Dr. Gaffney turned to a discussion of the fundamentals involved in strategic nuclear weaponry. Since the first atomic blast, different types of nuclear weapons have been developed and a variety of nuclear warheads have evolved. However, basic to the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence is the requirement that the weapons must be able to survive a first strike and be delivered to their targets. In strategic terms, delivery generally encompasses intercontinental distances, though systems based at sea may have shorter range.

There are three principal strategic delivery systems in use by both sides today — the bomber, the land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and the Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). They have differing characteristics. Bombers can carry both nuclear missiles and bombs. They take hours to reach their targets and they are vulnerable to enemy defensive measures. Land-based ICBMs equipped with nuclear warheads take about one-half hour for delivery. No adequate defense against a large-scale ICBM attack has been devised or deployed. However, the "hardened" sites of concrete silos and their ICBMs within become increasingly vulnerable to attack as the numbers, power, and accuracy of opposing missiles increase. Missile bearing submarines can launch their weapons from beneath the surface of the sea. Delivery time would be generally less than that required for land-based ICBMs, since they fly shorter ranges. Thus far the submarine forces are essentially invulnerable, since neither side has developed a reliable method of locating and destroying substantial numbers of the other's underwater fleet at a given time.

In his analysis of the delivery systems of the United States and the U.S.S.R., Dr. Gaffney noted significant differences in emphasis. The United States has opted for a systems mix that divides our strategic force about equally between the three methods of delivery. This weapons distribution of the United States is known as "the strategic Triad," and serves to hedge against launching and other uncertainties. The Soviet Union has placed greatest emphasis on land based ICBMs and the greatest part of its strategic force is deployed in this manner.



At present the United States has 350 B-52 bombers and the U.S.S.R. has 140 Bear and Bison bombers. The Soviet bombers are not kept on alert as are a large portion of the B-52s. There are 41 United States missile submarines with 656 tubes and 62 Soviet submarines with 950 tubes. Thirty-one of the United States boats carry MIRVed Poseidon missiles. Deployment of MIRVs in Soviet boats may have begun recently. The U.S.S.R. has a 1,477 to 1,054 numerical advantage in land-based ICBMs over the United States. Overall, the United States has 2,050 delivery systems and the Soviet Union has 2,440. The United States has superiority over the Soviet Union in number of warheads by more than a two-to-one margin, while the Soviets enjoy a substantial superiority in throw-weight (deliverable useful weapon weight).

Numerical comparisons, while pertinent, are insufficient when evaluating the strategic forces of the two nations since numbers do not reflect technological differences or the circumstances of an exchange. It is more useful to consider the totality of the two forces and whether, juxtaposed, they constituted strategic nuclear balance. He emphasized the importance of maintaining deterrence, stability, and equivalence in forces.

Several factors threaten stability and these vary in potential. Both sides are engaged in modernization programs. The United States has begun to build Trident submarines with more missiles, longer range, and better defenses against "killer" submarines to replace aging Polaris/Poseidon boats. The Soviets are

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completing development of one generation of MIRVed ICBMs and developing a new generation of ICBMs. Since MIRVs will threaten United States ICBM sites, the United States is considering making our ICBMs mobile. The Soviets have also largely completed their modern submarine buildup and have a newly operational MIRVed submarine missile.

Dr. Gaffney included a detailed description of the United States' newest weapon — the cruise missile. This is a small, unmanned, cheap aircraft about the size of a submarine torpedo. It is capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses at an extremely low altitude. Its development was made possible by the miniaturization of warheads and propulsion and guidance systems. The cruise missile achieves great accuracy by virtue of its ability to orient itself from landfall grids and correct course. The development of the cruise missile was decisive in the decision to abandon plans to build the B-1 bomber and has enabled the United States to opt for extending the life of the B-52 in spite of improved Soviet air defenses by equipping them with these devices.

The advent of ballistic missiles with intercontinental range has wiped out previous restrictions of geography and time in warfare, according to Dr. Gaffney. With no nation immune from the threat of nuclear attack, the mission of the United States forces is to deter attack by ensuring stability and balance of forces. Although this equivalence now exists, modernization continues, forced on by perceived advances and threats on either side.

A CLOSER LOOK AT SOVIET CAPABILITIES

Martha C. Mautner

I would like to deal with the Soviet Union itself, the target of all of those weapons that we have been talking about and our main protagonist in the world. All of you have discovered that everyone has a different view of what the Soviet Union is and what it means to us. Every one of you also will have a different question on the subject, and so an important part of this session is going to be your questions and, hopefully, some of the answers that I can give to you. What I want to do is to try to put something of a perspective and a proportion into our assessment of the Soviet Union.

You will have heard all kinds of views of the Soviet Union. Some see it as an ominous menace on the horizon, others accept every word of the peace rhetoric at face value and assume it will be translated into reality tomorrow. You will have heard extreme assessments by those who are obsessed with the military might of the Soviet Union, who see tank armies and gigantic missiles and naval armadas everywhere, and who assume that we must mobilize all our armed forces immediately to meet this threat. At the other end of the spectrum there are those individuals who are somehow obsessed with the lack of plumbing that they may have run into in the Soviet Union, who see only the underdeveloped aspects of its economy, and who see a technology which looks backward by Western or American standards. Focusing on this, they assume that the Soviet Union is nothing to worry about. 'It's not a threat to us. We can just ignore the whole subject altogether. It will go away eventually. We are powerful.'

The interesting part about this contrast in views is that both of these extreme assessments are correct in certain aspects. It is the conclusions which are drawn from them that are wrong. The point is that the Soviet Union is an enormously respectable adversary. There is no question about it. It is a military power of tremendous proportions. It is the only other global power that interacts with us all over the world. It is a threat to our allies. It is the only other nation which has the capacity to destroy us or to inflict intolerable damage on our country. There is no getting around that fact.

On the other hand, by our Western industrial standards, the Soviet Union is a backward country. It is underdeveloped to a very great extent. It is a nation with tremendous potential resources but unable as yet to exploit those resources on its own. It has always had to import outside technology to plug the gaps. It keeps falling behind the technological level of the rest of the world. It has to stop periodically to gird itself, or import outside technology to catch up. It is a country in which the tremendous investments that go into the military establishment are practically sterile as far as the civilian economy is concerned. There is no spinoff. It consists of two separate worlds. What goes into the military is lost in the military maw. It does not return to Soviet citizens' benefit.

All of those things make up this country with which we must deal. It is a country which has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. Above and beyond all security requirements, that tremendous military establishment that the Soviet Union maintains is there to compensate for and to camouflage her weaknesses. When dealing with the U.S.S.R. we should not forget these aspects. It is because of this complex of strengths and weaknesses and because of its national fear of the outside world that the country is so difficult to deal with. Because of this it also is difficult for us to cope with the Russians in negotiations or to understand them. It follows that it is equally hard for the public to understand why the SALT process is so difficult. SALT is difficult because it impinges so intimately on both the strengths and weaknesses of both sides.

There is a simple answer to the oft-heard question of why it is that a country to which military might is so important would be willing to cut back on its military arsenal. The answer is that the alternative to such cutbacks is so undesirable. This is really the focus of our whole discussion. We and the Soviets are adversaries, and we are going to remain adversaries. They know that. We know that. This means that inevitably there is going to be tension in our relationship, that tension is going to lead to friction, and both of us are going to find it necessary to keep our defense establishments in top priority order to meet any threat from the other. This leads to an action/reaction cycle — a constant competition in the arms race. Down the road, both of us — the Soviets particularly — can see the looming danger that sometime, someplace, something is going to happen — perhaps via a third party — that can involve us in a confrontation which could lead to our mutual destruction. In essence this is the entire basis of why we really want arms control. It is not a question of statistics or balance sheets.

This is the first regime in the history of the Soviet Union which has been willing to negotiate seriously on issues so basic to its security. We have had other agreements in the past but all have been peripheral.

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We are now down to gut issues. This is the first regime that has been willing to do this, and it is also the first time in Russian history when that land mass which constitutes the Soviet Union has been as secure as it ever could be in the contemporary world. It is a type of security the Soviet state has never had before. And it is the type of security that gives the Soviet Union the measure and the sense of confidence with which to go ahead and at least try to discuss security issues to see if some common ground with us can be found.

The Soviet Union derives its sense of security not merely from its large military establishment, but because it feels it finally has achieved a relative parity with its major adversary I may injure the sensibilities of all of the arms experts here by the claim that parity really has very little to do with numbers or weapons systems Rather, it has to do with the sense or the ability, one way or the other, to inflict intolerable damage on the other side. And whether you do it with one big bang, or with a lot of little bangs, or whether you do it with slingshots, the effect is the same. You have equalized the balance. No matter what happens you have struck a situation where the intolerable aspect of that damage factor gives you the rough balance that exists in the world today. It is a weird sort of balance but it's the only one, the only type of security, we have in today's world.

Now, for the Soviet Union, the acceptance and the recognition of that sense of equality is of prime importance and a major factor in the SALT process. Being acknowledged as an equal justifies the Soviets' willingness to negotiate in SALT to their allies, to themselves, and to their own domestic hawks. Recognition of that equality to a very great extent compensates for and makes less pertinent the vulnerabilities and the weaknesses in the Soviet system. They no longer have to feel humiliated by the fact that they are inferior in certain areas. And being recognized as equal also reduces the importance of military posturing toward the outside world to maintain status and prestige. This has important psychological ramifications and means that it is easier to behave with restraint in the world. More concretely, it now is easier for the Soviet Union to begin considering cutting back on the size of its arsenal if it can get some assurance that arms competition with the United States can be contained, perhaps reduced, or even reversed.

The Soviets want this not just because the cost of arms spirals is so horrendous in social and economic terms, but also because the constant competition in arms aggravates all of the vulnerabilities of their system. They have their own action/reaction cycle domestically. Their emphasis on the military and sterile investments in the military means losses to the civilian economy. If threatened, the Soviet Union naturally will do anything it must to maintain its defense. It will spare nothing. But entering another round in the arms race will mean that an economy that is already stretched to take care of the present danger and the looming threat of China is going to be stretched even further. And that stretching is going to mean it will be necessary to return to the tight domestic controls of a previous era and to Stalinist practices to keep the situation under control. Forcing production out of the population to get the results that are necessary would mean a reversal of all the gradual easing of life that has taken place in the years since Stalin's death. Additionally, it would necessitate a more militant international stance to justify domestic controls. If there is no arms control agreement, there is going to be more tension.

In dealing with a situation as complex as this, one must be able to cope with the strengths and, at the same time, exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviet adversary. This must be done in ways which will enhance not only our national interests, but also theirs. This requires presenting the security equation in such a way that it answers Soviet security needs as well as ours. We cannot have it all our own way. It does require compromise.

We often forget that the United States has strengths in the competition with the Soviet Union beyond the merely military dimension. We have a tremendous economic base and technological capacity, and perhaps even more important, we have the ability to absorb change and use it profitably in our system without destabilizing our society. We overlook these strengths when we estimate the Soviet Union's perception of us. We forget that they take them into account. The point is, successful arms control would reduce the impact of the military element in our relationship and would bring all of the United States advantages to the fore. Here there is no parity for the Soviet Union, and there will not be at least in our lifetime. But we tend to forget that these are elements which the Soviets have to put into their calculations. We are a far more formidable enemy than we sometimes think. The Kremlin is willing to take a chance with that future risk of United States advantage in return for being able to head off the more immediate risk of another arms race or nuclear confrontation.

The Soviets have reservations about the SALT talks just as many people in this country do. They have their own views of the way the world is supposed to be and these are quite different from ours. But we and they also have one very fundamental aim in common; both of us really approach the SALT process much the same as Maurice Chevalier approached old age. He said he was not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of getting old, but he preferred it to the alternative. That is really the basis for SALT.



STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES SECURITY THROUGH SALT

Paul C. Warnke

Today I would like to address the major concerns that are expressed to me about SALT. I think that both the national polls and certainly my own experience speaking throughout the country would indicate that the American public has mixed feelings about dealing with the Soviets on arms control matters. On the one hand, there is a deep desire for peace and an easing of international tensions. On the other, there is the continuing suspicion about Soviet policies and Soviet ambitions.

These feelings coalesce into two big questions that I am frequently asked. The first one is why the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement now being negotiated will contribute to our security. The second question is, if that's the case, why would it be that the Soviet Union would have any interest in entering into that kind of agreement.

Some even ask why — if the Soviets are acting as badly as they are in the African situation, if they continue to suppress independent voices within the Soviet Union itself — we should try to deal with them on matters of such importance to us.

I believe that President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance have put the question of United States-Soviet relations into its proper perspective. President Carter observed in his press conference earlier this week that we will probably stay in a "state of competition" with the Soviet Union for many years, but that "we want to have accomodation when we can mutually benefit from that accomodation." Secretary Vance told the House International Relations Committee last week that our policy toward the Soviet Union should be based, first, on "maintaining our military, economic and political strengths" and, second, on pursuing "areas of negotiation which are vital to peace and to our national security."

I think it is essential that we keep our eye on one main fact, and that is that a sound, fair, verifiable agreement limiting strategic arms is not a favor that we are doing for the Soviet Union. It is instead something we do for our own national security.

Sound arms control measures, including a good SALT TWO agreement, serve our own interests. I thought I would list five reasons why a SALT agreement does serve the security interests of the United States.

First, there is now a continuing buildup of the strategic nuclear forces of both sides. We have to keep pace. We can't have the Soviets gain any sort of a strategic advantage. We have kept pace. We have today about 9,000 nuclear warheads on our strategic intercontinental systems. These include the intercontinental ballistic missiles, our ballistic missile submarines and our heavy bombers equipped with bombs and short-range missiles. The Soviet Union doesn't have as many warheads. It has only something in excess of 4,000. But between us, we have almost 14,000 strategic nuclear warheads — more warheads than there are targets on either side.

There is, today, a stable strategic balance. By that I mean that neither side could plan to initiate a nuclear war without being faced with the certainty of retaliation which would destroy the attacker as a modern functioning society. Many millions — opinions vary as to how many, maybe as few as 30 or 40 million, maybe hundreds of millions — would be killed in the initial exchange. The survivors would face a devastated country stripped of industrial capacity, contaminated by fallout, deprived of the means of food production and devoid of the health facilities needed to deal with the unexampled casualties. It is the very fact of sure retaliation that today provides the only sure deterrent to nuclear aggression.

The extent of our retaliatory capability is illustrated by a study that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has recently completed. What the study did was to measure United States and Soviet strategic forces against a sample targeting pattern of approximately 6,500 targets. This was a mixture of hard targets, such as missile silos, and soft targets, such as cities. Against this sample targeting pattern, the study shows that the United States forces could absorb a Soviet strike, and in retaliation could destroy more of the Soviet Union than the Soviet Union had destroyed of the United States by striking first. The study also shows that by the mid-1980s our ability to retaliate after a Soviet nuclear strike will be greater than the entire destructive power of our strategic forces if we were to use them first in a strike today. So what that means is that we do possess in ample quantity the only security against a nuclear attack. And the question is how this security can be best maintained.

There are alternative ways available to us. We can continue in the unrestricted competition in the accumulation of more and more nuclear weapons. It's a competition in which neither side would allow the other to gain a strategic advantage. We could, and I am sure we would, keep up in this competition. But the fact is that after the expenditure of billions and billions of additional dollars on both sides, the

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most we could hope is that we would not be much worse off than we are today and that the strategic balance would not have been rendered more precarious.

If instead we can reach an agreement that limits and then reverses the buildup of nuclear weapons, a stable strategic balance can be maintained. And if we can maintain that sort of a situation, then we can devote more of our time and wealth to the pursuit of the positive elements of our foreign policy and to dealing with our many domestic problems.

My second reason for recommending to you the emerging SALT TWO agreement is that it will in fact preserve and increase this strategic stability. I think we sometimes lose sight of the fact that the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1974 gave rise to a breakthrough in strategic arms control which is of immense importance. What happened at this point was that the two heads of state agreed that the SALT TWO agreement would provide for equal ceilings on the intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of both sides; that each side would have an equal entitlement of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and that each side within that overall total would have a ceiling of 1,320 for launchers of MIRVed missiles. (The MIRVed missiles, of course, are the missiles that have multiple warheads that can be directed at widely separated targets.)

The significance of this agreement in equal aggregates is two-fold. Politically, it meets the requirements of the Jackson Amendment, which was passed in 1972 at the time of SALT ONE. And that required that all future SALT agreements have equality in intercontinental range nuclear weapons. Then from the military standpoint, the significance is that the Vladivostok understanding provides for equal aggregates without taking into consideration the so called forward based systems that the United States has in Europe. We have systems in Europe that can deliver nuclear weapons on Soviet territory, and the Soviets until Vladivostok had insisted that these had to be taken into account in any SALT agreement. They have not been, and from that standpoint we retain the advantage of those systems.

Strategic stability is further promoted in the SALT TWO agreement by the fact that the Soviets have agreed to reductions. They have agreed that they will cut back both the aggregate number of 2,400 and also the sub-ceiling of 1,320 on MIRVed ballistic missiles. As a practical matter, as a result of SALT TWO, the Soviets will have cut out of their forces approximately 300 nuclear delivery systems. There will be 300 less of these systems targeted against the United States. In the absence of SALT, it is estimated that the Soviets would increase by some 600. So SALT TWO means a swing of almost 1,000 strategic nuclear delivery systems — 1,000 less targeted against the United States. Because our present total is less than the new ceiling, we, on the other hand, would not have to cut back at all, and could, in fact, increase by some 250.

Also contributing to a stable, even strategic balance are certain subceilings to which the Soviets have already agreed. We felt that the most dangerous of the strategic nuclear weapons is the intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads. It is the most destabilizing because it has the accuracy and yield that can challenge the viability and the survivability of the ICBMs on the other side. What that means is that as the technological competition continues the intercontinental ballistic missiles of each side are becoming at the same time both more dangerous and more vulnerable. What that does, of course, is to create the risk that at a time of extreme international tension, one side will be tempted to use its intercontinental ballistic missiles first, because it will be afraid it will never be able to use them second, because they would be gone. So it promotes such concepts as "launch on warning" and therefore decreases strategic stability.

With regard to the question of intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRVs, the Soviets have agreed to set a ceiling which will mean 100 less of these particular missiles than they would otherwise have, not enough to eliminate all risk to the survivability of our forces but a very desirable first step toward bringing about a more durable situation of assured stability.

And then finally, as an attempt to strengthen strategic stability, we have been trying since March of 1977 to negotiate a ban on new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviets have agreed in principle to have that kind of a prohibition. It will for the first time begin to restrain the qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race — not just quantitative reductions but actual qualitative controls. The exact extent of this limitation is something which is still under negotiation. It is one of the more difficult problems with which we are presently struggling.

One factor that makes this a difficult problem to solve is that the Soviet Union is more dependent upon ICBMs than we are. Whereas we have split our resources about equally over the ballistic missile submarines and the manned bombers as well as the ICBMs, the Soviet Union still has about 70 percent of its strategic forces in the land-based ballistic missiles. Thus, the kind of restraint we are negotiating will affect them more severely, more stringently than it will us.

SALT will thus make us safer by providing for equality in ceilings, actual reductions in Soviet weapons and restrictions on new types of ICBMs.

A third reason why a SALT TWO agreement will protect and improve the security of the United States is that it doesn't rely on trust of the Soviet Union. It relies instead on limits and rules that we can verify ourselves by our own national technical means. Without adequate assurance that arms control provisions were being complied with, there really wouldn't be much point in having an arms control agreement. It would be a source of suspi-

cion rather than comfort, and you would have the constant question as to whether the other side was taking advantage. We can, however, with our highly sophisticated national technical means, determine that the quantitative controls and the qualitative restraints that I have been discussing are in fact being met by the Soviet Union. In order to improve verification, we have also obtained Soviet agreement to an exchange of data on the strategic forces of both sides. In earlier SALT discussions, they had refused to do this, but they have now agreed to supply their figures on their forces so that we can check them against our own and have an agreed-upon base from which we can start to bring about reductions.

They have also agreed on a total prohibition of any measures of concealment that would lessen our verification capability. And they have agreed on a ban on any interference with national technical means of verification. We have developed counting rules under which we can verify particular types of launchers as a result of their physically observable features, so that our national technical means enable us to tell what particular launchers ought to be counted as launchers of MIRVed missiles. In fact, in the months that have passed since the two delegations went back to Geneva in May of 1977, the Soviet Union has accepted fully the American position on verification. Now we have in addition on verification the experience of SALT ONE in which questions of compliance have been considered and resolved within the Standing Consultative Commission composed of United States and Soviet experts. This Commission will continue to function in verifying compliance with SALT TWO.

The fourth reason why you can have confidence in the SALT Agreement being negotiated is that the process is extraordinarily careful and detailed in every respect and at all stages. It's an inter-agency process. I sometimes read columns by critics that say that Warnke is giving away the farm in Geneva. You can be sure I have no intention of doing that. But even if I was inclined to do so, I couldn't. Each step in our negotiations is based on a fully staffed-out and fully coordinated American position. The substantive positions and, for that matter, much of the negotiating tactics are decided upon in the first instance by the Special Coordinating Committee, which is a subcommittee of the National Security Council, chaired by Dr. Brzezinski, as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. And in SALT, it includes the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. If this Special Coordinating Committee can't reach an agreement on a particular question, then that is referred to the National Security Council, which consists of the same people but, of course, includes the President and the Vice President.

The negotiating delegation in Geneva has the same inter-agency composition. It includes representatives of the Joint Chiefs, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And it operates on the basis of instructions that are furnished by the President, based on the National Security Council decisions. The negotiators in Geneva are never faced with the possibility of an ill-considered or impetuous decision. They operate, instead, in complete consonance with Washington decisions. Sometimes that makes for a certain amount of frustration on the part of the negotiators, but I would have to concede that it does improve the product and does contribute to protecting the security of the United States.

Fifth, and finally, the SALT agreement will protect our security because it preserves the military options that we have concluded are necessary in order to update and modernize our strategic nuclear forces. I have mentioned the fact that, under the agreed upon provisions, heavy bombers are included in the total, and we have the right under the SALT agreement to modernize the heavy bomber forces by equipping them with long range cruise missiles. These will allow our bombers to stay outside of Soviet territory beyond the reach of Soviet air defenses and still strike the key Soviet targets. Now for several years, ever since Vladivostok, the Soviets had insisted that heavy bombers with cruise missiles should be treated as if they were MIRVed ballistic missiles. In other words, each bomber of that sort would be counted against that side's entitlement of MIRVed ballistic missiles. It is now agreed, however, that both sides will have the same entitlement for MIRVed ballistic missiles and that each side can have in addition over 100 heavy bombers with strategic cruise missiles, which is certainly adequate to encompass the program that the Air Force has in mind.

In addition, the Soviets have accepted our proposal that the limits on cruise missile range, the limits on the deployment of cruise missiles on ground launchers and sea launchers, and on the prohibition on the deployment of mobile launchers will all be contained in a protocol, which has a three-year life span rather than through 1985. This will permit us to determine, within this three year period, whether to trade off continuing restrictions on some or all of these systems for certain additional limitations on Soviet forces, or whether instead we should go ahead and deploy some of these systems. It would be illogical and illusory to claim that in arms control you can get something for nothing. You can't. Obviously we have had to accept some restrictions on our military options in order to gain significant Soviet concessions with regard to their own forces. But, as I have indicated, all of the options that we need are preserved in the SALT TWO agreement.

There are, of course, some that would argue that any restrictions at all on our forces are unacceptable concessions. But those who criticize SALT on that basis are really saying that what they want is unrestricted freedom to continue the competition in strategic nuclear arms. For reasons that I regard as vital to national security — the risk to strategic stability, the adverse consequences for non-proliferation policy, the greater chance of nuclear war — I

can't agree with those who take that position. I am confident that the restrictions we have accepted on our military programs are more than offset by the limitations and reductions that SALT will require of the Soviet Union.

This focuses inescapably on the second concern that I noted in my opening remarks. If in fact the SALT TWO agreement is as good as I think it is, if it makes this sort of a contribution to American security, then why would the Soviet Union have any interest in completing it? Is it perhaps so they can neutralize our strategic weapons, put more money into their conventional forces and thus gain a military advantage over the United States and its Allies?

It's clear, I think, that strategic nuclear weapons, with or without SALT, can't substitute for conventional military power. We need and will continue to need strong conventional forces to ensure that nuclear weapons are a final option and not our only choice. We can't be indifferent to the amount of money and effort the Soviets put into their European forces. But the facts rebut any assertion that SALT may somehow contribute to shifting the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military buildup in Europe predates SALT and must be met apart from SALT — preferably by mutual and balanced force reductions, and, if this is not possible, by the kind of actions agreed upon at the recent NATO summit.

So the goal of outpacing us on the conventional side is not an explanation for Soviet interest in a SALT agreement. However there are, I think, a number of sound reasons that do explain their interest.

First, from the political standpoint, there is little doubt that President Brezhnev has a big political stake in completing the SALT agreement. He went out on a limb at Vladivostok. A number of Soviet officials have mentioned that a great deal of political blood had to be spilled in order for Mr. Brezhnev to get his colleagues' acceptance of the principle of equal aggregates.

Second, and I think more important, the Soviet leadership has to understand that an unrestricted competition would allow them no advantage. We have the money, we have the technology, we have the will to keep up with anything the Soviets might do in the strategic nuclear field. Therefore, an unrestricted competition holds no promise of advantage for them. All it promises is that their inordinately high military expenditures would be increased, but that no Soviet strategic superiority could result.

Finally, despite our many differences in philosophy, our different stance on human rights, our different views on a desirable world order, we do share certain interests. One is the common interest in survival. I've heard it argued that the Soviet Union, because it lost 20 million people in World War II, is used to it and is prepared to accept that or heavier losses and therefore will plan to fight, survive and win a nuclear war. But that to me is sort of tipsy-topsy reasoning. It doesn't make any sense. The experience of tragedy on that massive a scale can hardly be regarded as habit- forming. It's like saying that the burnt child doesn't dread the fire. No thinking Soviet leader, no matter how malevolent his motives, could seriously contemplate advancing his interests by attacking the United States and evoking a nuclear exchange.

In addition to the common interest in survival, we have a common interest in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970, the United States and the Soviet Union in Article VI undertook to take prompt steps to bring nuclear armaments under control. We haven't done it yet and I think that the inducement which that constitutes for other countries to give up the prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons is beginning to look like a fake. I think it's unrealistic to assume that, if we and the Soviet Union are unable to agree on nuclear arms control and continue instead to develop more and more nuclear weapons, other countries are going to continue to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons themselves. I think the Soviet Union recognizes that fact and that they also must regard a world in which more countries and even subnational terrorist groups may acquire nuclear weapons as at least as dangerous for them as it is for us. They know today that for the other nuclear powers — China, France, Britain — they're target number one, not the United States. And the other developed countries that could acquire promptly a nuclear weapons capability would represent again an increase in the threat to the Soviet Union.

So we have today a coincidence of interests that logically leads the Soviets to view with favor a SALT Agreement, even though it protects the security of the United States. And whatever our distaste for certain Soviet behavior, our own self-interest requires that we seize this opportunity to advance our own security and to make more remote the prospect of nuclear catastrophe for us and for the world as a whole.

HOW TO TELL A GOOD SALT TREATY FROM A BAD ONE

Alton Frye

Alton Frye, Washington Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, discussed the principal elements of a successful SALT treaty and stressed the need for establishing patterns of mutual restraint through SALT.

Alton Frye, Senior Fellow and Washington Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a former staff member of the Rand Corporation, Research Fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, and Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He has lectured at the Universities of California and Southern California and was Legislative and Administrative Assistant to Senator Edward W. Brooke from 1968 to 1971. A native of Nashville, Tennessee, Dr. Frye received his degrees from St. Louis University and Yale University.

Dr. Frye maintained that the three tests by which a SALT treaty should be measured are:

(1) Does it enhance the confidence of each party in its own security?

(2) Does it satisfy requirements already established by Congress?

(3) Does it lay a sound basis for future efforts to strengthen security by negotiation?

Dr. Frye also discussed the prospects for Senate consent.

Dr. Frye's remarks were completely off-the-record and therefore not reproduced here.



DISCUSSION

Substantial time was devoted to a panel discussion by the speakers and to question and answer periods following each presentation. Participation was stimulated by Mr. Dyess' comments on the State Department's "credibility gap," — its difficulty in convincing people that it sincerely sought and actually utilized the views of the public. Public input is sought, he said, for the eminently practical reason that no long-term foreign policy can be sustained without the support, understanding, or at least tolerance of the public.

Questions and topics were related to a basic proposition that strategic arms limitation agreements could enhance world security by restraining additional development of the mutually deterrent nuclear weapons systems of the United States and the Soviet Union. In these discussions, four principal categories emerged. (1) Alternatives to Strategic Arms Limitation, (2) Factors Affecting SALT Negotiations, (3) Technological Considerations, and (4) Ratification Problems.

Alternatives To SALT

Although not unchallenged, the maintenance of conventional and strategic forces and the concept of mutual deterrence have been accepted by both the United States and the Soviet Union as fundamental to national security. Predictably, questions regarding alternatives to strategic arms limitation revealed opposing views. There were suggestions that United States security could and should be pursued by continuing to develop new weapons systems and attempting to achieve equality or superiority vis-a-vis the Soviets in all weapons categories. Opposing proposals for total disarmament, new approaches to arms control, or freezes on arms developments also were advanced.

Response to the "match the Soviets" school of thought concluded that such activity is costly, risky, and sterile. Experience suggests that each weapons advance is promptly countered by a defense or counterweapon. This produces constant competition enormously costly in terms of human effort and resources. The threat of a destabilizing strategic weapons development with consequent risk of a nuclear outbreak is ever present. Ironically, if such escalating arms expenditures are successful in maintaining arms parity and risk is averted, the inescapable net result can only be the status quo antes, but at a higher level.

It was conceded that the impracticability of preventing technological advances and the military characteristics of new devices inhibit attempts to control the development of additional weapons. This, of course, has the effect of encouraging additions to the overwhelming overkill capacity already possessed by each side. The seeming illogic and inherent danger of this spiral has stimulated interest in different or unilateral steps in pursuit of international security. However, it was pointed out that previous concessions designed to elicit reciprocal Soviet behavior have only resulted in Soviet pressures for additional, unrequited concessions, and dramatic initiatives for a disarmament breakthrough have not been effective in the past.

The possibility of unilateral steps toward disarmament based upon prior agreement was not entirely discounted. However, policy makers regarded most presently proposed alternatives to the strategic arms limitation route as ineffective or entailing unacceptable risks — or both. The concensus among the panelists was that there is a sound basis for ultimate agreement based upon mutual restraints and that a step by step approach and cautious search for balanced arms limitation is the course most likely to prosper at this time.

Factors Affecting SALT Negotiations

In an age of proliferating acronyms, SALT has come to symbolize a single finite treaty embracing some master arms control plan. In fact, SALT is precisely what its full name suggests — strategic arms limitation talks. These talks constitute a process of ongoing attempts to negotiate separate treaties and agreements whose totality is designed to enhance strategic stability, halt and someday reverse nuclear arms competition. This process began in 1969 insofar as SALT *per se* is concerned. Actually, it originated with Hiroshima.

Several questions centered on factors, other than the preservation of a strategic balance, which also provide impetus for the conclusion of a strategic arms limitation pact. One such involves non-proliferation. Attempts by the major powers to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by convincing other nations to remain non-nuclear will gain in legitimacy and moral force only with progress in their own efforts toward disarmament. The spectre of uncontrollable numbers of smaller states or terrorist groups with nuclear capabilities is a matter of deep concern to United States officials who indicated their belief that present controls to prevent proliferation are insufficient. Paralleling these considerations are efforts by the third world for disarmament through United Nations mechanisms. Although lacking the compulsion of self-preservation, South vs. North demands that world resources be diverted from an arms race to economic development place appreciable psychological and moral pressures upon the United States and the Soviet Union.

Fundamental to attempts by the United States to seek arms accommodation with the Soviet Union are assumptions that Soviet leaders construe their national interests as favoring such an agreement, and

that they perceive and accept the existence of a balance in strategic deterrence. Some questioned this. Obviously, misconceptions of Soviet perceptions are possible and dangerous. However, panelists pointed out that even though United States calculations of anticipated Soviet behavior may err, the United States can and has established certain military parameters for the U.S.S.R., defining what can and cannot be tolerated.

The advancing age and declining health of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has inspired speculation that he seeks to achieve a meaningful SALT agreement as his monument. This consideration gave rise to questions regarding the possible effects of a change in Soviet leadership occurring in the midst of SALT negotiations. The concensus was that the impact upon policy of both leadership and communist idealogy appear to have much in common. Both affect style. Both color views. Both have significant influence upon domestic affairs. But neither seems likely to cause basic changes in the pattern of United States-U.S.S.R. relations or in fundamental beliefs of what constitutes national interests. (Since Chinese hostility has fostered Soviet accommodation elsewhere, different policies by the Chinese or a shift in the U.S.S.R.'s ideological differences with the People's Republic of China could conceivably influence the course of SALT.)

If evidence of the transcendental importance of SALT were required, one need look no further than the willingness of both sides to continue talks at a time when differences between the United States and the U.S.S.R. have produced acrimonious rhetoric unmatched since the U-2 incident. The possible "linkage" of problems affecting United States national interests in the success or failure of SALT was the subject of considerable discussion and conjecture. Soviet additions to conventional military capacity beyond all conceivable defense needs, adventurism in Africa, and domestic harshness on human rights have produced growing concern and indignation in the United States. The response by the United States in the form of direct and public criticism at the highest levels of government and United States efforts to encourage a counterforce to the Soviet presence in Africa have created profound resentment within the U.S.S.R. While admitting that there would be a better climate for SALT in the absence of these differences, United States government officials maintained that these issues can be kept separate from SALT, which is a matter of preeminent concern and should stand or fall on its merits alone.

There are precedents which suggest that the Soviet leadership accepts the concept of such separation of issues. This is clearly the position of the United States Executive Branch. As Mr. Warnke stated in January, 1978, "If the Soviet Union were to stand up tomorrow and say, 'Okay, we're getting out of Ethiopia and by the way, Mr. Carter, we agree with your position on human rights,' it wouldn't have the least effect on our delegation in Geneva. It wouldn't lead them to be one degree softer in terms of their basic positions." However, while cooling relations may have no linkage with the terms of any SALT agreement reached, they will constitute an obstacle to the United States Senate's approval.

Inevitably, a linkage exists between SALT and that state of collective mind known ambiguously as "detente." The panelists indicated that, while the Soviets generally resist and reject the concept of package deals, relationships do exist and are non-controversial insofar as they do not become explicit. Perhaps the most tenuous but vital linkage concept is that of a possible tie-in between strategic arms controls and conventional arms limitation. Although the recent Soviet agreement, in principle, to an equal ceiling for NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces was reached in apparent independence of SALT, it has been considered as an encouraging sign. A preponderance of arms expenditures are allocated to conventional forces and some participants envisioned the expansion of future SALTs to embrace this area.

Technological Considerations

The complexities of strategic weapons systems and nuclear technology are mind-boggling. Almost literally inconceivable, they are sometimes paradoxical. Earlier this year, Mr. Warnke referred to the "crazy logic of the strategic nuclear age (in) that one could think of defense as being bad, but anything that challenges the retaliatory capability of the other side is necessarily destabilizing and contributes to the arms race."

The "crazy logic" Mr. Warnke described is exemplified by MAD, the acronym which stands for Mutual Assured Destruction. This assumes that both the United States and the Soviet Union have the ability to absorb a first nuclear strike, and still retain the capacity to retaliate and destroy the attacker. The theory is that as long as both sides believe this MAD condition prevails, neither will invite certain obliteration by attacking the other. However, any development which could cause either to believe that a successful nuclear attack is possible — that is, an attack which would destroy the enemy's lethal retaliatory ability — could destabilize the nuclear balance. Of course, the idea that either side would actually avail itself of an opportunity to destroy the other, even if it could, is open to question. Nevertheless, in the MAD world it is when such "worst case assumptions" are made by planners on both sides that mutual deterrence becomes more credible. This is so because if either side believes the other will do less than its worst, then the prospect of profiting by nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, could arise. An additional assumption by United States strategists is basic to the above. This assumption, which was challenged by some participants, is that strategic superiority is impossible to achieve over any long period of time and that the Soviets, therefore, accept long term strategic parity as inevitable, if not desirable.

A possibly fatal flaw in the basic tenet of mutual deterrence emerged in a question concerning the national will of the United States to


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actually employ nuclear weapons. This seemed particularly relevant in view of the quantitative disparity in conventional forces which exists in Central Europe. One scenario suggested that, in the event of conventional warfare there, the military disadvantage to NATO forces could be redressed only by the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This means that the effectiveness of United States tactical and even strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet conventional military adventurism in Europe is conditioned by that nation's belief in United States readiness to resort to one or another level of nuclear response.

Secretary of State Vance has said that any SALT agreement must "maintain or improve our overall security as compared to the likely situation without an agreement." However, such respected figures as former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze have warned that SALT TWO agreements, as presently contemplated, would lead to a strategic imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. Mr. Warnke flatly rejected this view although he admitted that there are "asymmetries" in the balance SALT TWO would maintain.

The intricacies of an attempt to match nuclear apples against nuclear oranges are such that honest men seem certain to disagree. What, for example, is the advantage (if any) to the Soviets of their superiority in throw-weight (maximum useful weight which can be delivered)? What will the United States give in return for Soviet agreement to destroy 300 missile systems? Why should the United States consent to limits on the numbers and deployment of the cruise missile?

Since SALT ONE permitted the Soviets to increase their missile arsenal, a Soviet reduction to proposed SALT TWO limits might be viewed as only a limited concession, especially since the systems affected are approaching obsolescence. Additionally, auxilliary to the basic package putting a ceiling on missiles is a proposal that the United States accept a three year period of restraints on the deployment of the cruise missile and mobile ICBM systems. The controversy over the significance of a Soviet throw-weight advantage was compared with proposed limits on United States cruise missile numbers and deployment. Both sides have the ability to match the other in these areas but have opted for alternatives. Those minimizing the impact of imbalances in these areas argue that, in the final analysis, development time and weaponry mix are at issue here rather than comparative strength in one field or another.

The trend of discussion clearly indicated that a major stumbling block to the quest for peace through arms control is mutual distrust. Panelists conceded that the keystone of any SALT agreement must be a reliable and independent means of verification of compliance and a reasonable assurance that some event or development cannot suddenly skew the balance of mutual strategic deterrence. Reliable verification is essential to both sides and the present state of technology appears to guarantee that violations of agreements contemplated by SALT will be impractical. United States State Department representatives stated that reports of Soviet violations of previous arms agreements have involved ambiguities, differing interpretations, or misunderstandings. Although both sides have raised questions regarding compliance, neither has ever formally accused the other of a violation. There are agreements not to interfere with means of verification, and the combination of technology and intelligence sources available to both sides enable each to know exactly what the other has and is doing. This does not eliminate the need for great care to remove ambiguities from future agreements or for improving existing mechanisms for prompt investigation when questions arise.

One nightmare of those in charge of national security is destabilization. Participants raised the question of possible developments of a weapons or defense system or a sudden technological breakthrough which would give the adversary the ability to win a decisive military victory. The consensus was that no nation could have absolute confidence in a new weapons system until it had been flight-tested and deployed. Even though technological research and development cannot be restricted, both flight and deployment are verifiable. As a result, chances of sudden technological breakthroughs were discounted. More difficult for national security planners are problems presented by known systems. A significant improvement of a system by one side demands an equivalent response. For example. The United States decision to "MIRV" its installations threatened destabilization until the Soviets established countervailing MIRV deterrence.

Crucial destabilization problems center on the development of the United States cruise missile and the threat that the Soviets will deploy missiles in numbers and accuracy sufficient to destroy our ICBM force. The panelists contended that the cruise missile is "stable," in that it is too slow to be used as a first strike weapon. They admitted, however, that it is small enough to create verification problems for the Soviets and that the types and numbers of the vehicles carrying cruise missiles are at issue. Insofar as the United States ICBMs are concerned, it was conceded that theoretically there is no way to assure their total safety. However, a SALT agreement would retard their increasing vulnerability and the United States would retain the option of deploying a mobile ICBM system (after the expiration of the proposed three-year protocol). In practical terms, any Soviet attempt to wipe out United States ICBMs would entail enormous risks for questionable advantages.

Future weapons development could affect strategic stability. On the United States side, most potentially destabilizing developments are on the back burner. Although research money remains, it seems certain the United States decision to abandon development of the B-1 bomber in favor of the cruise missile is final. This option was dictated by strategic and financial considera-

tions and Paul Warnke has said in jest that, "if I could persuade the Soviets to build the B-1, I would regard it as a victory." Development of the controversial neutron bomb has been deferred although President Carter has stated that the ultimate decision will depend on Soviet restraint on conventional forces.

From the questions that arose, it was apparent that the decision on the neutron bomb and its potential as a weapon were subjects of great interest and concern. The panelists pointed out that, although controversial, it is a weapon entirely separate from SALT. It is not considered a strategic weapon, but a tactical defensive device designed to help NATO forces counter the three-to-one tank superiority enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact nations. Although the United States has put off a decision on production of the bomb, it has ordered modernization of the Lance missile nuclear warhead and the eight-inch (artillary) weapons system to accommodate it.

Thus far, the strategic arms race has not extended to outer space. Both the Soviet Union and the United States continue research and development work on anti-satellite weapons, but the United States is preparing proposals for anti-satellite arms control.

Ratification Problems

No formal agreements or treaties have yet been reached by SALT TWO. Panelists emphasized that the United States is operating under no time constraints and that negotiations will continue until the United States gets the kind of agreement it wants. However, the general shape and content of the eventual SALT agreement that would go to the Senate for consideration is known.

Queries regarding chances of Senate approval of ratification seemed to reflect a general opinion that SALT is in trouble. Although the Administration panelists held that SALT is too important to be linked to other issues, it appeared that there was widespread belief by participants that a SALT agreement probably will not stand on its own merits in spite of any logic that it should. Chances for ratification seem unbreakably bound to Soviet behavior and to public and Congressional views of the national security credentials of the present Administration.

It was conceded that while Americans favor arms limitation, they do not trust the Soviet Union. Huge Soviet arms increases, meddling in Africa, and human rights harshness have generated widespread opprobrium. There is equally extensive suspicion that anything the Russians would sign would be either greatly to their advantage or not entered into in good faith. If so, this would make SALT too risky. A substantial minority of the American public believes that the U.S.S.R. already has military superiority over the United States either in conventional forces or in strategic weaponry. Psychologically, widespread publicity given to the Soviet arms buildup seems to have contributed to a fear that momentum is on their side. Misgivings about dealing with the U.S.S.R. have not been allayed by confidence in United States strength. On the contrary, recent rulings affecting our national security have been controversial. The decision not to build the B-1 bomber, to delay development of the neutron bomb, to postpone action on mobile land-based ICBMs have inspired critical comment questioning the Administration's commitment to national security.

In addition to problems with the public, the Administration faces a Senate which may have a predisposition unfavorable to SALT that was created by prior events. The Administration's earlier dramatic attempt to shortcut the tedious SALT process with its comprehensive proposal was rebuffed by a Soviet government unprepared at the time to deal with arms reductions on so sweeping a scale. One result may be that a subsequent more limited and achievable SALT agreement will be in double jeopardy. It risks rejection not only by those Senators who believe it goes too far but by those who believe it does not go far enough. Also, the nomination of Mr. Warnke in a dual role as both director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as chief SALT negotiator was controversial in the Senate. Finally, in spite of White House claims that the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties created a momentum for SALT, events could prove that the reverse is true — that with just so much Executive credit in the Senate bank, Panama may have been a costly inversion of priorities. Expressions from the audience indicated that a combination of eroding public confidence, Soviet behavior, and Senate unhappiness with some features of national security policy could result in the failure of a SALT treaty to overcome the first foreign relations partisan split in Congress in many years.

The prospect of Senate rejection of a SALT agreement was seen to have grave implications. Soviet reaction could fuel an accelerated arms race. Rejection also would cast doubt on the future ability of the United States Administration to negotiate seriously. Alternate prospects for Senate agreement to ratification in exchange for beefed-up United States security measures could have equally serious ramifications. A possible Senate price tag — development of the neutron bomb or deployment of mobile ICBMs — could destabilize the the nuclear balance.

Administration spokesmen said that the White House is acutely aware of the consequences of Senate rejection of a SALT treaty and that it does not want to sign an agreement it cannot present to the Senate with some degree of assurance. One panelist, admitting that the extent of opposition to the Panama Canal treaties had been badly underestimated, insisted that the Administration is unlikely to make the same mistake with SALT. Can SALT survive a restive Senate? The consensus of both panelists and participants was that part of the answer will depend on the extent to which public support for SALT can be enlisted and brought to bear on its elected representatives.

CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SALT DEBATE

Carol Edler Baumann

During the past six hours we have been privileged to hear the chief United States negotiator for a SALT TWO agreement as well as five of the most knowledgeable experts in this country regarding the United States-Soviet relationship, strategic theory, Soviet and United States military capabilities, and the proposed elements of a strategic arms limitation agreement. We have heard about — or heard allusions to — strategic nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces, the Backfire bomber, the B-1, and the cruise missile, arms limitations and verification problems, the African-Cuban "linkage" question, MIRV, MARV, and MAD (the delightful acronym for "mutual assured destruction"). If any of us remain confused — there can be no doubt that we are at least confused at a much higher level!

What we have not heard, however — at least in any comprehensive framework — is the other side of the debate. We have not heard from a Mr. Paul Nitze, although we did provide you with a copy of the New York Times Magazine article in which he argued that unless the United States takes urgent measures at once to reverse current trends, 'the Russians in a few years' time will have the capability to fight a nuclear war — and to win such a war in the military sense of ending up in undisputed command of the battlefield and being in a position to dictate the peace.' Neither have we heard the hard-line views of the Committee on the Present Danger nor the pessimistic prognostications from the research scholars of the Hudson Institute and the National Strategy Information Center.

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I mention this in no way to challenge or to denigrate the validity of the views expressed here today, but simply to illustrate the point that there is in fact a foreign policy debate going on in this country which is far more likely to wax than to wane and which is certainly destined to become more heated before it is eventually drowned — whether in a sea of rhetoric or in one of reason is yet to be seen. Our purpose at this conference has been to set forth the wider parameters of that debate and to present a framework for understanding the nature of the issues with which it will have to deal — the entire relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the relationship between United States national security and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Our hope is that regardless of your own particular point of view you have gained insight into the complexities of these interrelationships as well as a more sobering realization of the critical nature of the decisions which lie ahead.

George Kennan perhaps came closest to setting these issues in a proper perspective when he described the need for developing what he called 'a more workable consensus' behind United States policies toward the Soviet Union 'to take the place of the resounding disagreements that affect, and threaten to paralyze, the formulation and execution of policy in this field today.' Kennan went on to set forth the requirements which he regards as necessary for developing that consensus. First, to set aside 'the whole question of the (purely) military relationship and all the arguments about who could conceivably do what to whom if their intentions were of the nastiest; and that we elevate our vision . . . to the question of the real nature and situation of the particular foreign power we are dealing with.' Second, he suggested 'a series of private gatherings in which would be included not only high level policy-makers . . . but leading figures of (the) opposition . . . not to air our prejudices and convictions on the basis of our present knowledge and our present ignorance, but where we would all listen . . . to what could be told to us by the most experienced and knowledgeable people who could be found in (their) respective fields. . . .'

To the extent that this conference can lead to further exchanges of the sort envisioned by George Kennan — whether in other parts of the country or here in Wisconsin — we will have succeeded. To the extent that the Institute can provide any or all of you with information, speakers, or other resources on any of the topics discussed today, we will be ready and eager to do so. Our hope is that this meeting will serve as a launching pad for a whole series of public education programs, not only on SALT, narrowly defined, but on all aspects of United States relations with the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, it is my own personal belief based on several years of work in the area of public opinion and foreign policy, that the United States government at all levels — now perhaps, more than at any time in our history — needs the advice and support of informed and concerned citizens, is actively seeking that advice — and will listen. This significant cadre of government representatives who came from Washington to meet with us here in Wisconsin would seem to provide ample proof of that.

Many of you are familiar with the Biblical quotation that 'For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven.' Let me simply remind you of four additional lines which refer to 'A time to keep silent, and a time to speak; . . . a time to war, and a time for peace.' I would like to conclude this meeting with the proposition that if we indeed seek 'a time for peace,' then now is not the time 'to keep silent.'

WINGSPREAD

The building Frank Lloyd Wright called Wingspread, situated on a rolling prairie site just north of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed in 1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In 1960, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H. F. Johnson, it became the headquarters of The Johnson Foundation and began its career as an educational conference center.

In the years since, it has been the setting for many conferences and meetings dealing with subjects of regional, national, and international interest. It is the hope of the Foundation's trustees that Wingspread will take its place increasingly as a national institution devoted to the free exchange of ideas among people.

The rolling expanse of the Midwestern prairies was considered a natural setting for Wingspread. In the limitless earth the architect envisioned a freedom and movement. The name Wingspread was an expression of the nature of the house, reflecting aspiration through spread wings - a symbol of soaring inspiration.

The Johnson Foundation encourages the examination of a variety of problems, facing the Midwest, the Nation, and mankind. In the belief that responsible analyses and proposals should reach a substantial audience, The Johnson Foundation assists in the publication of various papers and reports. Publication, of course, does not imply approval.

Because the views expressed at the conference reported in this publication largely represent the position of the United States Department of State, a second Wingspread conference has been scheduled to present other positions on this important topic.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained from The Johnson Foundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401.

Editor for this Report, Rita Goodman, Vice President-Area Programs, The Johnson Foundation,
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