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ABSTRACT
                Conclusions about public school labor relations
advanced in this report are based on analysis of data from a
two-phase study. The first phase consisted of case studies conducted
during entire collective bargaining cycles in eight school
districts--four in Illinois and four in California. The second phase
of the research expanded the work into 65 additional districts in the
same 2 states, using interviews and surveys as the primary means of
investigation. Approximately 240 persons were interviewed and a total
of 1,038 usable questionnaires returned. The authors conclude that
(1) public sector labor relations have changed the nature of school
governance and the patterns of participation of lay persons in the
schools; (2) three distinct generations and two highly
conflict-ridden intergenerational periods exist in school labor
relations; and (3) there have been important changes in school
operations and in the nature of work within schools. The body of the
report treats the concept of and evidence about the generational
development of labor relations. The appendices include case study
reports on each of the eight districts studied in the exploratory
stage as well as a detailed methodological presentation on the second
stage, including the instruments used. (Author/MLF)

FINAL REPORT

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THE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ITS IMPACTS

ON GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATION AND TEACHING

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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is pertinent to repeat three claims made about the dimensions of our research in the original proposal.

First, this research involves governance of schools, or put another way, how citizens present themselves in a school setting or are represented by others. In looking at citizen participation in governance, however, this research departs from much of the past work, which has concentrated exclusively on formal means of citizen access--advisory committees, community-school councils and the like.[1] Relying on a conceptual framework drawn from political theory, we recognize other forms of citizen representation--such as specific demands by community groups and disturbances that lead to a turnover in personnel. Thus the research proposed here follows in the lineage of Easton, Almond and Powell, Minar, Ziegler and Jennings, Wirt and Kirst, and Iannaccone and Lutz.[2]

Second, this research is about how collective bargaining is conducted. The theory of collective bargaining recognizes the effect of environmental forces.[3] But bargaining itself is still considered largely a bilateral activity carried out between agents representing Labor and Management. Most labor theory assumes a bilateral relationship, and most labor practitioners are trained in this heritage.[4]

However, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that

collective bargaining in the public sector is not bilateral at all, but inherently multilateral. Empirical work has repeatedly shown this to be the case, and there has, of late, begun to be the development of theory which recognizes the ways in which collective bargaining becomes entwined with partisan politics and other decision-making devices.[5] Juris and Feuille, in particular, make the point that the public sector provides multiple access points for unions and other interest groups, and that the result may be that substantive negotiations take place in city halls, courts or governor's offices--places removed from the formal bargaining table. Certainly, Peterson's landmark research on Chicago politics indicates a joining of collective bargaining activity to the political machine structure.[6]

Third, this research is about decision-making in schools. It follows the lineage of organization and environment research which suggests that organizational boundaries may be highly permeable and that decision-making may not be as calculatively rational as either Weberian theory or systems analysis may lead us to believe.[7] Labor and citizens groups both permeate existing organizational boundaries. Research into managerial work and labor impacts suggests that the substance and process of managing may be thereby changed.[8]

In following these three strands of labor relations research, however, we found that our preconceptions about how to approach the field were quite wrong. We had supposed that by studying active citizens we could understand their impact on governance, labor relations and operations. The more fruitful approach turned out to be just the opposite. In order to understand the influence of citizens and citizen organizations, one needed to study the development and history of labor relations rather than the development and history of citizens groups.

Early on in our exploration, we discovered what we later called the "paradox of high influence and low participation." Citizens were seldom found to be active in labor relations, but they had always been active at some time past. Inevitably, they had been highly influential in changing the course of labor relations in school districts. Citizen participation was highly fluid and episodic, hardly at all involved in the routine functioning of labor relations, but nearly always present at crucial turning points.

As we gained experience in the field, the importance of episodic citizen involvement in education became clear, and became the cornerstone of an expanded and enhanced theory of the progress of public sector labor relations. Our exploratory work was done in eight school districts—four in Illinois and four in California. The districts ranged in student enrollment from under 1,000 to more than 100,000. Descriptive statistics of the sites studied are shown in Table 1.1. We were active in each district for an entire bargaining cycle, which amounted to a matter of weeks in one district and over 18 months in another. We sought to discover what happened in bargaining, the development of issues, particularly who's issues were admitted to the process, how the dynamics of bargaining took place and how bargaining was integrated into the organization. We also came to understand the personalities of individuals and the culture of the organizations we studied. (Case study reports on each district are included in Appendix A and Appendix B.)

In the second phase of the research, we expanded the work into 65 additional districts in the same two states, using interviews and surveys as the primary means of investigation. We interviewed approximately 240 persons, each interview taking roughly 80 minutes. A total of 1,038 questionnaires were returned. (A more detailed methodological presentation, including the

Table 1.1
Characteristics of Study Sites

Name	Demographics (enrollment) (^ in enrol.) (location)	Strikes	Generation	Description
CALIFORNIA Homestead	40,000 -8% metro	1	First Inter-generational	Severe financial stress, history of labor unrest
Thresher	17,000 +5% suburban	1	Early Second Generation	Controversy over board and superintendent
Palermo	100,000 -2% metro	1	Late Second Generation	Overt attempts at smoothing conflict with union; board becoming critical; strong teacher org.
South Garfield	4,000 -5% suburban	0	Early Second Generation	Shows privitization of labor relations after First Inter-generational Conflict
ILLINOIS Riverview	25,000 -2% separate city	4	Late Second Generation	Well organized union. Accommodation with management on polit- and operating matters. Union under suspicion politically.
Boulder City	5,000 -3% separate city	1	Early Second Second	Union lacks direction while mgt. operates comfortably in Second Generation
Industrial City	3,500 -3% suburban city	2	Early Third Generation	Board, Superintendent pursue policy changes through labor contract
Tipid Village	900 no change suburban	1	Early Second	Demonstrates policy making in the labor process

instruments used, is contained in Appendix C.)

From the analysis of these data come what we believe to be an integrated and grounded set of conclusions about public school labor relations. First of all, public sector labor relations is having profound effects on the schools. Labor relations has changed the nature of school governance and the patterns of participation of lay persons in the schools. Second, labor relations has its own dynamic, and we have identified three distinct generations in school labor relations, and two highly conflictual intergenerational periods. Finally, there have been important changes in school operations and in the nature of work within schools. These are the topics of this report.

The Dynamics of Labor Relations

In the beginning there were angry teachers. By choosing collective bargaining as the means for expressing anger, forming organizations and gaining influence, American teachers have fundamentally changed education in this country. They set into motion not just a single dislocation, but a dynamic labor relations process that changes over time.

The metaphor of "generations" fits the data we have gathered. The word generation suggests movement in rather discrete, discontinuous terms, and that is what we intend. To an extent we oversimplify. The generational descriptions have elements of "ideal type" about them, just as the passages in life span psychology or the stages in cognitive development. Yet, we believe that the generalization adds clarity by allowing discussion of important deviations rather than by concentrating the discussion on the inherent complexity of labor relations.

Two social forces drive the generational development. Accommodation

exists and gives meaning to the phrase, "out of conflict, cooperation."
However, accommodation is not the sole social force in public school labor
relations. The case histories of our school districts show that accommodation
is interrupted by political upheaval and conflict. This pattern suggests that
the model of labor relations as a linear, developmental "rationalizing" force,
which it frequently is described as being, is a seriously flawed one.

Three generations and two distinct, intergenerational periods of conflict
emerge from the juxtaposition of accommodation and political conflict. The
first generation can be described as the "meet and confer era." Some states,
like California, had statutes that gave legal interpretation to the words, but
we are using "meet and confer" as common rather than legal descriptions. In
that era, teacher organizations exist. Conflict, between teacher
organizations and the administration, if present, tends to be muted or
stifled. The level of trust between teacher and administration tends to be
high, and there tends to be a genuine and sincere belief that school
administrators have the best interests of teachers at heart. The teacher
organization is legitimate, but not very strong or important, and it falls
into that general group of organizations that tended to interpret and to
"boost" the cause of education, thus producing a rather grand coalition of the
whole . . . or all the whole that mattered. (The important characteristics of
each period are shown in Table 1.2.)

The first generation breaks down when angry teachers combine voice and
action with sentiment and frustration thereby throwing employee relations in
the school district into the public arena. Two words are almost universally
used by teachers during this period. The first is _dignity_ and the second is
injustice, both of which teachers come to feel they are being wrongly denied.

Overt actions, including strikes are not uncommon during this period. Changes
in elected and appointed leadership of school districts are also common. This
period, which we call the First Intergenerational Conflict, usually comes to
an end over a single, symbolic event that serves to show that the newly
militant teacher organization is accepted as legitimate, and that it, in turn,
accepts the administration as a necessary part of running the district.

"Good faith bargaining," begins with the close of the First
Intergenerational Conflict, and labor relations enters the Second Generation,
which may last for a decade or more. Conflict may at times be high during
this period, but there is a tendency for it to be reduced, and there is a
tendency for strikes to occur over economic issues rather than ideological
ones. The primary point of continuing tension between labor and management is
the question of scope of bargaining, with the teachers organization wanting to
admit more subjects to bargaining and management wanting to keep them out.
Labor relations becomes institutionalized, experts are appointed and trained
to take care of the processes of negotiation and contract administration.
Labor relations in the Second Generation can become quite comfortable. School
managers and teacher leaders begin to trust each other, frequently cooperate
and develop a diffuse set of interactions that "handles" labor relations, and
frequently does so outside of the collective bargaining contract. Labor
relations in schools is, thus, managed by trained and competent insiders who
have found the art of developing a satisfactory relationship, sometimes a
highly helpful one.

Often at the point at which relationships between school administrators
and teacher organizations becomes most accommodative, the calm is broken by

Table 1.2
The Generations of Labor Relations

	First Generation	First Conflict	Second Generation	Second Conflict
Description of Labor Relations				
What Happens	teachers seek organization and voice	teacher organization legitimacy; negotiations begin	teacher org. accepted, accommodated; conflict decreases	opening of participation
Symbols Raised	"anger" "injustice"	"dignity" "protection"	"scope of bargaining"	"effiqiency" "propriety"
Conflict	rising	high and public	focused and private	high and public
Trust between teachers and district	declining	low; teacher leaders "radical"	moderate to high	moderate
Catalyst or trigger bringing	-statutes -issue -person	breaking a a taboo -demands	costs of conflict	dissatisfied -bd members -citizens
Dominant Coalition members	administration board	teachers board citizens	teachers administration	board citizens
Other events	organizing	political change	growth of expertise	political change

the rise in political discontent. The outsiders organize, throwing the school

district into the Second Intergenerational Conflict. Citizens and school

board members view labor relations as having gained control of

education--frequently far more than it actually has. They form interest

groups and more importantly they run for school boards, and reform of labor

relations is frequently the organizing principal. Labor conflict, again,

becomes high and labor-management trust becomes low. The rallying cry is that

the product of the schools has become bad or that the teachers are engaged in

an improper activity: "they got too much." However, the legitimacy of the

teacher organization is not in question. The public does not seek to do away

with the teacher organization, but it pushes hard to modify the term of the

relationship.

At the end of the Second Intergenerational Conflict period, management

becomes the active party in teacher negotiation, originating an agenda and

carrying it to the bargaining table. When the teacher organization accepts

managment's right to be the aggressive party and counters with a belief that

management is not attempting to thereby break the union, the stage is set for

the Third Generation of labor relations. Not many school districts have

reached this point, but we are prepared at least to sketch the formative

outline of the Third Generation.

The body of this report contains three chapters which treat the concept

and evidence of the generational development of labor relations. Chapter II

contains the theoretical groundwork for understanding public sector labor

relations as a mixture of conflict and accommodation, and explains

theoretically how the two operate in cycles, and why each cycle comes to an

end. Chapter III contains the field evidence for the existence of the

generations and the description of life in public schools during each

generation.   Chapter IV contains the analysis of our questionnaire and survey

interview data as they relate to changing attitudes across generations and

across role groups.

The Influence of Citizens and The Logic of Their Participation

Citizens, we find, are important at the crucial periods of change during

which generations are brought to a close and intergenerational conflict

periods are both formed and ended.   During the generations they tend to be

dormant or excluded.   By and large, teacher organizations and school

administrators have been successful in keeping parents away from the

bargaining process.   This has not been difficult, for usually citizens show

little interest in participation in school collective bargaining, sustained

interest largely taking place in upper middle class schools.   Thus, it came as

a surprise that in our eight study districts citizens were highly influential,

but indirectly so, in the process of collective bargaining.   They were also

influential in other decisional arenas--courts, legislatures and electorial

politics--in which the issues of employee relations are decided.

This seeming paradox of low direct participation and high influence has

led us to three conclusions, which are addressed in Chapter V.   First, there

is a logic to the decisions citizens make in choosing how and when to

participate in school affairs that leads them away from collective bargaining.

That logic involves the conversion of particularistic, child-centered

participation into the development of an interest as citizens that is aimed at

altering organizational policy and practice.   The logic of participation

involves choices of where and how to be active.   Because this is the case, the

logic of participation leads citizens away from collective bargaining when

they choose to be active. Second, public policy, to the extent that it values

citizens' activity ought to recognize that the means for influence in labor

relations are not those of direct participation, but rather knowledge and

participation in the electoral process, where clear legitimation is present

and potent influence already apparent. Third, the pattern of citizen

influence in collective bargaining has given us a fresh look at the theories

of school governance, the nature of democratic representation in governance,

and has guided us toward an optimistic synthesis of existing theories of

governance.

The Impacts on School Operations and School Work

We believe that the impacts of collective bargaining on schools, although

not universal, has been much more profound than generally recognized, and that

particularly the efforts to contain labor relations by restrictive scope of

bargaining statutes have largely been failures. They have masked the

realization that bargaining has changed schools. In Chapter VI, we describe

the changes that have taken place, first, in policy and the way policy is

made; and, second, in the nature of both teaching and managerial work in

education.

A large part of the educational policy that flows from labor relations is

accidential, unrecognized and visible only after the fact. This is the case

partly because the changes in school operations are largely second-order

consequences of labor relations caused not directly by the mandates of a

contract but through the way the contract is reintegrated into the school

organization. We believe, for instance, that there has been a clear cleavage

between the "regular" and the "extra" duties for teachers that the presence of
this cleavage is changing the curriculum of schools to emphasize organized
activity in classrooms and deemphasize the extra-curriculum. We see a growing
opposition to specialists and specialization in education largely because
specialists form a weak subgroup within the teachers organization. Finally we
see differences in the nature of duty, loyalty and the nature of the
relationship with the employer, judgments about which are highly normative but
the descriptions of which are fairly straightforward. Teachers are more
independent, cohesive as teachers, less loyal or dependent on the school
organization and more willing to realize and act upon their own interests
instead of subverting those to the interests of the organization.

Teaching work becomes more rationalized and more closely inspected as a
result of a complex set of processes involving labor relations. To an extent,
labor relations has made explicit what has been historically obvious about the
control and treatment of school teachers: that large amounts of teaching is
labor--not craft, hot art, not profession. The conduct of labor relations has
made it relatively clear that much of the crowing about professionalism
constitutes a shrill caw, without substance. Teachers were supposed to
maintain professional work standards and discipline, yet to be obedient to
clear directives whenever administrators or others wanted to intervene. The
redefinition of teaching work is an important aspect of labor relations.

School administrators, too, have changed. They have become less indirect
about identifying themselves as managers--as rationalizers, planners and
engineers of the educational process. Many are still largely involved in
boardsmanship and patching the hull of their financial ship, but there is a
growing recognition that the job of school administrators is to get the

employees to do what the manager wants them to do. This, as opposed to the

historic "logic of confidence" in which it was assumed that good and properly

credentialed people would be brought into the organization and then left to do

a good job.

The future of labor relations in educations centers around two questions,

which are addressed in Chapter VII. First, to what extent is the generational

development pattern we have described generalizable? There are some important

deviant cases: districts that never unionized, that have other forms of potent

teacher interest groups, and that for some reason or another appear to have

become fixed in one generation or another. Second, if the generational

pattern applies to most schools, as we believe it does, what does the Third

Generation portend?

We have called the Third Generation the era of negotiated policy. The

evidence from our study sites prompts us to conclude that the Third Generation

results from an incompleteness in simple good faith bargaining as a means of

employee representation and control. From the teacher perspective, part of

the original discontent over the lack of "dignity" in their work has not been

resolved through the collective bargaining process. That discontent has to do

with the legitimacy of teachers acting as representatives for their clients,

the students, and thus becoming involved in policy decisions. From the

managerial perspective, the problem of control and direction of education

becomes increasingly complex and difficult if control has to circumvent the

contract, and thus management is led to seek to use the contract as an

explicit policy tool.

The Third Generation, then, is one of more explicit policy setting. We

believe that there will be a general trend toward tight control,

centralization and uniformity, but that there will be important

district-specific variations depending on perceptions of the learning process

and the technology by which teaching is carried out, and the extent to which a

high level of trust exists between the parties.

Eight School Districts

The most vivid way to transmit a feel for the pattern of generational

development is to introduce the eight school districts involved in the most

intensive aspect of our study and from which we obtained the idea of

generational development and the dynamics that move schools from one

generation to another.

South Garfield is a small, unified (K-12) school district of about 4,000

students set in a rather traditional suburb with a relatively benign

environment. To be certain, there have been restrictions in revenue and the

closing of a school because of declining enrollment, but such changes are

taken as the norm, not the extreme. Also, relatively speaking, South Garfield

has been free of labor strife, and its administration and teacher organization

bear the marks of reasonableness and gentility. Yet, this district

demonstrates how difficult the passage is between the First Generation and the

Second, and it also demonstrates three aspects of the passage.

First, South Garfield demonstrates the rise and fall of citizen

participation surrounding the First Intergenerational Conflict period.

Citizens became involved in attempting to achieve labor peace when open

conflict broke out during the first contract negotiation. The citizens, in

effect, recognized the legitimacy of the teacher organization, and by so doing

they made it impossible for employee relations to remain as they were before,

largely a matter of administrative benevolence. But as labor relations passed

into the Second Generation, citizen activity declined, and even the former

citizen activist who had since been elected to the school board came to accept

the Second Generation belief that labor relations is better done in private

and left largely to experts.

Second, the change from First to Second generation in South Garfield

involved a change in school superintendents, something which is not unlikely.

The Conflict periods are characterized by involuntary changes--in board

members, superintendents and negotiators for both labor and management.

Third, taking on of Second Generation roles is painful for both labor and

management. For those in South Garfield, the Second Generation meant adopting

a degree of formalization in behavior, and the realization that communications

were matters of strategic importance and not simply an exchange of

information. In taking on their new roles, all parties began to think in

terms of coalitions as well as their place in them.

In the Thresher school district, life was not nearly as peaceful. This

larger suburban district of about 18,000 enrollment was quite dissimilar to

South Garfield, but it followed the same pattern of generational change. In

large part, the story of Thresher is that of an inability to return to a First

Generation administratively dominated teacher organization, when the

independent status of the organization had already been legitimated.

An early labor agreement in Thresher involved the acceptance of policies

whereby the teacher organization was to be part of a broad range of curricular

and organizational decisions. The agreement, reached prior to the state's

collective bargaining law, did not have the legal force of a contract, but

sociologically it represented the legitimation of the teacher organization as

the faculty's representative. In response to changes in the composition of

the school board, and following a difficult strike, there were conscious

efforts to eliminate the teacher organization, repeal the state's collective

bargaining law and avoid dealing with the teacher leadership.

These efforts were unsuccessful, and the district remained (during the

year and a half we studied it) poised at the entrance to the Second

Generation. The school board and the administration attempted to take it

backward over the First Intergenerational Conflict threshold, and the teacher

leadership was undecided whether to act as "radicals" trying to build an

organization and discredit the administration or Second Generation negotiators

trying to reach agreements and manage conflict.

Thresher is also a noisy district, enveloped in high visibility public

issues and internal conflict on matters tangential to collective bargaining.

There were shifting factions within the administration and on the school board

with the result that there was both an extremely fluid shift in coalition

partners and an equally rapid shift in the issues. Labor conflict was often

displaced, without being resolved, while other conflicts took center stage.

The Boulder City school district, which has some 5,000 students, covers a

portion of a metropolitan area with a stable urban population and a mixed

economy of retail and wholesale trade, manufacturing and financial services.

As is the cases above, the district has had difficulty establishing stable

Second Generation labor relations, but the reasons are different. In Boulder

City, the teacher leadership outran their followers. The district was one of

the early targets for organization by the state teacher organization, and a

favorable contract was achieved. But the teachers were never able to

consolidate their gains, never able to convince the rank and file that there

was much reason to support a teacher organization. Management generally has

accepted the Second Generation ideology of limited gains, but the teacher

organization has not. The teacher leadership is still fighting the battle of

the First Intergenerational Conflict period, fighting against the

administration per se or at least seeking unachievable ends without strong

support from their organization. As a result, the teachers have been poorly

organized, given to frequent conflict and frequent losses, and at one time

worked for a year without a contract at all.

However, during the negotiations we observed, the teachers, with the

assistance of a negotiator from the state organization, began to adopt the

rudiments of what we came to recognize as Second Generation negotiating

behavior: establishing bargaining norms compatable with the management

negotiator's style of incremental concessions, a desire to reach settlement,

and a bargaining agenda designed to gain support from the rank and file.

Homestead is a large school district of about 40,000 enrollment, which

has been troubled by both severe financial and labor relations problems.

There have been strikes, school closings and massive teacher layoffs.

Nonetheless, there are signs that the district is passing through the First

Intergenerational Conflict period and begining to establish Second Generation

charactistics.

The escalation of public conflict that was seen in South Garfield was the

hallmark of labor relations in Homestead. Representatives from the community

attempted to mediate a teacher strike, independent parents groups were formed,

and there was extensive newspaper coverage of school activities. There was

also a dramatic change in leaders. Members of the school board were recalled

from office in an election partly spawned because of the previous board's

handling of the teacher's strike. The "radical" leader of the teacher organization was removed from office and replaced by a more moderate leadership. Management's negotiator was replaced after a school board candidate pledged to discharge him was elected. Finally, the superintendent took another job having said earlier, "I have no illusions about my ability to survive here."

Throughout this entire period, there were painful and deeply personal conflicts among the individuals involved. Anger that crept past cynicism and inched toward hatred attended to persons attached to both labor and management. Operations of the district were clearly affected. Those aspects of school operations that might be considered normal and regular, continued. In the Weberian sense, the bureaucracy continued to work, but administrative initiatives at changing the communications and authority structure of the district largely came to naught. As in characteristic of the First Intergenerational Conflict period, the security of the respective teacher and management leaders was sufficiently in doubt, the trust between them so low and the conflict so pervasive that any form of constructive working arangement was impossible.

Tipid Village is the smallest district we studied, under 1,000 students in two sites. The surrounding town is a blue collar manufacturing area that supports strong ties to church and family and a belief in the legitimate authority of public officials. Labor relations in the district serves as an example of the extent to which policy is set in collective bargaining and the extent to which it is unrecognized. It also demonstrates how apparently stable relationships between teachers and the administration begin to unfreeze as the assumptions that underlie them are called into question.

As a means of resolving a conflict that had brought about the teachers
organizing some ten years ago, the individual classroom teachers achieved a
substantial amount of autonomy in their work and freedom from evaluation or
interference from the administration. The teachers, in turn, accepted lower
salaries than those of the surrounding districts supposedly with the
understanding that their district was less wealthy and could afford no more.
Essentially two spheres of influence were established: the classroom and the
boardroom. Teache. s ran the curriculum. The school board ran the financial
operation.

However, the arrangement rested on three assumptions about life in the
district, all of them shakey. The first of these assumptions was that the
teachers would remain content with their economic lot and accept the pledge
that the school board was doing the best that it could. As resources became
increasingly tight in the late 1970s it became clear that teachers were not
satisfied, and that a real economic strike was at hand. But pressing economic
conflict violated the implied policy of the spheres of influence agreement.
Second, the administration assumed that the teachers would not actually use
the procedural rights that they had in the contract, particularly the
grievance mechanism. For many years the teachers did not, but more recently
the teachers had become more active in pressing their grievances and
contractual guarantees. Third, the tacit assumption was made that the
community would not question the school board's leadership. This assumption
also held true for several years. When there was community participation, it
was of a booster variety. At one point, a parents group took over the
operation of band and music programs when there were insufficient tax funds to
run them. But more recently the community began to question the school board

about school operations and particularly about the competence of teachers.

Discontent was building in all quarters.

Two districts, <u>Riverview and Palermo</u>, have the characteristics that we

consider representative of the late Second Generation. The teacher leadership

and the administration have each found that the agreements of narrowly bounded

negotiations are insufficent, and that labor and management can be mutually

helpful to each other in a variety of informal ways outside of the labor

contract. This is not to suggest, however, that labor relations in either

district is a love feast. Both districts show the clear progression through

the generations. They have undergone strikes, heated public conflict

regarding labor relations and changes in personnel resulting from labor

strife.

Both districts are city systems serving urban areas with established

institutions and influence structures, and heterogeneous populations.

Riverview has approximately 25,000 students while Palermo has more than four

times that number. In each city there is potent external scrutiny of the

district, its finances and its management. Superintendents and veteran board

members talk of outsiders running for the school board, of people critical of

school system rather than supportive of it. Superintendents and their

subordinates have found it wise to smooth potential disagreements with the

teacher organization in order to avoid public controversy that will attract

negative attention to the schools.

Both districts have also formed extensive informal relationships. In

Palermo, the district tries hard to accommodate complaints and avoid written

grievances. In Riverview, the superintendent and union leadership frequently

confer over problems of the day unrelated to the labor contract.

However, in both districts the external political environment is becoming
harsh for the teacher organization, and indirectly for the administration.
The teacher organiation in Riverview is a well organized political voice, with
precinct lists, phone banks, car pools and the permanent establishment of a
political action group. But recently it has been losing elections, and the
number of school board members who have some loyalty to the teacher
organization is decreasing. Conversely, the number of board members who are
particularly critical of the quality of education in the district have been
increasing. In Palermo, the district is under constant and multiple interest
group pressures. The teacher organization has withdrawn from active support
of school board candidates partly because they were disappointed in the
performance of those they supported and the aniamosity generated among those
they didn't support. Questions about the quality of education are beginning
to become a public issue.

Industrial City provides us a glimpse of the Third Generation.
Industrial City high school district has about 3,500 students. It is located
in the same town as the Tipid Village elementary school district, largely a
traditional blue collar area. The teachers have been unionized for more than
15 years and a power in running the district for most of that time. Their
power came to be viewed as excessive.

It was the school board rather than the union that first drew public
attention in Industrial City. The board was split into two permanent voting
blocs. It became notorious for public fights, and over a two year period all
but one of the members was replaced through resignation or electoral defeat.
The superintendent was also replaced.

The new board sought control and direction of the district. It was

dissatisfied·with what it perceived as the relative quality of education, and

the apparent inability of the administration to manage the district.   In their

parlance, the teachers "had gotten too much." The board sought and hired a

superintendent who was known as a tough negotiator, backed him at the table,

and held fast through a strike.   During that period the administration had

become the agressive party in labor relations, specifically directing their

attention to evaluating teachers and controlling the hours and scheduling of

classes.   They were consciously translating their educational objectives into

contractual terms and taking them to the bargaining table.

[1]Don Davies, Schools Where Citizens Make a Difference, (Boston: Institute for Responsive Education), 1976. Donald B. Reed and Douglas E. Mitchell, "The Structure of Citizen Participation: Public Decisions for Public Schools," in Douglas Mitchell and Shelly Weinstein (eds.) Public Testimony on Public Schools, (San Francisco: McCutchan, 1976).

[2]Specific work cited in following section.

[3]For instance, Dunlop's structural theory of labor relations is of a web of rules partly determined by labor and management but resting in a context of political technological, market and ideological forces. See: John Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New York: Holt, 1958).

[4]For examples of labor theory, see: Neil W. Chamberlain, James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining, 2nd Ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill); Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
Practitioner training includes this example from the U.S. Civil Service Commission: "What is Collective Bargaining?" Collective bargaining (sometimes called bilateralism) may be defined as a process through which employees select a representative who deals with management within a systematic framework to seek agreement on terms and conditions of employment. (U.S. Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Training, Instructors Manual, Collective Bargaining for Public Management, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 3.)

[5]Hervey A. Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism: Power and Impact in Public Sector Bargaining (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973). Kenneth McLennan and Michael H. Moskow, "Multilateral Bargaining in the Public Sector," Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Winter Meetings, (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1968). Thomas A. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1 (July 1974): 525-542. The Kochan work contains a more extensive bibliography.

[6]Paul E. Peterson, School Politics Chicago Style, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). See particularly Chapter 8, "The Politics of Collective Bargaining."

[7]James March and Johan Olson, Ambiguity and Choice in Organization. (Bergen, Norway: Universitetforlaget), 1976. Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment. (New York: Free Press), 1965. Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Conflict. (Boston: Little, Brown), 1971.

[8]For a good example of research into managerial behavior, and also a summary of prior work, see: Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). Among Mintzberg's propositions are those which suggest managerial work is much more a function of response to the immediate rather than an ordered strategizing and control system. Thus, flows of problems, information, participants and resources become extremely important in the analysis of organizations. In a similar vein, Cohen and

March examine the college presidency and decision-making with respect to the flow of events. See Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, <u>Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College Presidency</u>, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). For an application to impacts of collective bargaining, see: Charles T. Kerchner, "Faculty Union Impacts on Community Colleges and Their Presidents," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: Northwestern University, 1976).

A THEORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

As a point of departure it is helpful to consider two nearly universal beliefs about labor relations, beliefs that have grown over the years and been transferred from the private to the public sector. The first of these beliefs is that relations between management and organized workers moves from conflict to cooperation. The second is that, with the exception of strikes, the dynamic of labor relations is mostly internal to the employing organization. It is these two aspects of conventional labor relations belief that our theory challenges. The challenge is possible largely because public education has special organizational and political characteristics. Labor relations as a field of study lacks general theory explaining its dynamic. Historically, labor scholars in the United States have been an interesting mixture of missionary ideology and practicality that parallel the labor movement itself.[1] The particularly pragmatic bent of American labor relations began in the 1830s as Samuel Gompers "business Unionism" supplanted the radically flamboyant Knights of Labor, and its attack on the wage system itself. The aligned theoretical movement grew from the pen of John R. Commons and his colleagues who formed the "Wisconsin School," a distinctly non-Marxist approach to understanding the rise of organized workers.[2] Their theory rested in large part on an understanding of expanding product markets and technological practices that damaged the competitive position of individual workers in relationship to management. These early writers were also missionaries. Labor had no legal standing in the United States during the period of the late 19th Century and the first two decades of the 20th. Thus,

both the plight of working people and the utility of collective bargaining in

redressing problems needed to be argued. If labor relations was not to

represent a socialist revolution, a system of labor relations compatable with

modern corporations and technologies of manufacturing and distribution, had to

be conceived and embodied in law. The mechanism of collective bargaining was

the primary one chosen for worker representation; this as opposed to ownership

or control of the enterprise or direct political action. The reforms sought

were primarily those of welfare rather than job control. By and large the

plea was for shorter hours and better working conditions, safety, pension .

security and fairness in the wage system, rather than the right to set

standards of the work itself.

After the Wagner Act was passed in 1935, most private sector employees in

the United States gained for the first time a legally protected right to form

and organize labor unions, and the development of industrial unions through

the forming of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in the late 30s formed

a union organization that paralleled corporate structures. Labor scholars

turned, then, to making collective bargaining work, and to describing its

processes. There were studies of the ways in which unions organized, the

development of working relationships between labor and management on the shop

floor, the effect of unions on wages and productivity, and perhaps most

crucially, the effect of strikes and the means to control their number and

severity within socially acceptable levels.

Also, during the period of roughly 1940 and 1960, labor relations became

a fasionable area of academic interest. Scholars from a number of disciplines

saw it as an exciting area in which to do research, and many young professors

later to gain prominence did their early work in labor-management relations.

The list includes Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, E. Wight Bakke, William Foote

Whyte, Alvin Gouldner, Derek Bok, Semour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow and James

Coleman.[3] The infusion of interest brought about a great intensity of output.

The great interest also brought about fragmentation. It was possible to grab

onto the interesting aspect of labor relations regardless of one's

disciplinary perspective--law, economics, history, and psychology--without

attempting to explain the labor phenomenon in any universal way. There was no

complete theory, but rather a series of clusters. Thus, macro level

structural treatments of wages and organizations tended to ignore entirely the

interactions of workers at the plant level, and the human relations management

scholars forgot that there were other important variables. From the

standpoint of structure, the most elegant conceptualization of labor relations

was John Dunlop's open system model, that linked the occurrences within the

firm with technology, product markets, sociopolitical beliefs and the common

ideology.[4] Dunlop, however, said relatively little about the dynamic of this

structure. As close as labor relations comes to a general model of process is

exchange theory. That is, regardless of which disciplinary base one uses as a

point of viewing labor relations, it is clear that something of value has

changed hands.

This then, was the situation in the early 1960s when the explosive growth

of public sector unionism and particularly teacher unionism began. The

integration of collective bargaining as the dominant method of worker

representation in public education took place without a single body of

explanatory theory, but within a framework of beliefs, understanding and

experience that constituted the conventional wisdom about what bargaining was

about and what its effects were.

The first is that about the bargaining process itself, of which the most comprehensive statement is found in Walton and McKersie.[5] Our data support their view that labor relations involves four types of bargaining. We observed a mixture of distributive (I win: you lose) and integrative (mutual gain) bargaining strategies. The tactics used in pursuit of these strategies were the familiar ones, and so were the inherent dilemmas that bargainers faced when they tried to achieve goals that were partly distributive and partly integrative. We also found that both teacher and management negotiators are frequently faced with perplexing and difficult problems of reaching agreements within their respective groups--problems requiring what Walton and McKersie call "intrarganizational" bargaining. Our findings regarding the ways in which labor relations are affected by the feelings and perceptions of each party toward the other--what Walton and McKersie call "attitudinal structuring"--differ in a subtle but quite important way from their theoretical framework. We found attitude structuring--especially attitudes having to do with each party's view of the other's legitimate rights and interests--to be highly important. We discovered, however, that within school districts these legitimacy feelings are controlled and structured to a very large extent by community political processes--not by interactions between the parties themselves. Hence, as we will argue more fully below, we come to recognize that the labor negotiations process in education has more direct and obviously political linkage with public opinion and electoral politics than we had expected.

The second stream of literature has to do with the managerial impacts of collective bargaining. We find ourselves in substantial agreement with the Brookings Institution studies of private and public sector impacts.[6]

Collective bargaining does impose rules that diminish the scope of

management's unilateral decision-making authority. There are tendencies to

formalize and centralize, to create more written policy and more careful

organizational planning that considers the impacts of the labor contract. The

number of ad hoc decisions tends to be reduced. Staff specialization and

expertise in labor relations grow. A keystone of the managerial effects

literature is also that there is great diversity in the tone and substance of

labor relations from institution to institution. Our data not only confirm

the existence of this diversity but also reveal that these differences in

labor relations are systematically related to the evolutionary development of

the bargaining relationship within each district. We found, in other words,

that both the overall level of conflict and the substantive issues creating

labor conflicts tend to change in predictable ways as the bargaining process

matures within each school district.

A third stream of literature involves the structure and environment of

labor relations and their interaction. In Dunlop's open-system description,

labor relations are carried out in context of market economics, work

technology, and social and political influence.[7] Labor relations itself is

portrayed as a "web of rules" in which both the formation and application of

rules are influenced by contextual factors. Overarching these, there is a

shared ideology without which union management relations are impossible:

"Thus, in a community in which the managers hold a highly paternalistic view

toward workers and workers hold therein no function for managers, there would

be no common ideology in which each actor provided a legitimate role for the

other: the relationship within such a work community would be regarded as

volatile, and no stability would likely be achieved in the industrial

relations system."[8] It is precisely the lack of a common ideology that makes

many of the conflicts in educational labor relations so difficult. The first,

and often the dominant, struggle in our school sites was over legitimization

of the union. Moreover, legal legitimization, signaled by management's

acceptance of the union as the exclusive representative of an employee group,

was frequently separated from either social or political legitimization--that

is, acceptance of union voice in the leadership of the school district or its

governance.

There are two common assertions about how systemic linkages operate in

labor relations. The first of these might be called the "legal structuralist"

perspective. This perspective holds that it is possible to identify clear

links between bargainable subjects, such as wages, hours, and conditions of

employment, and nonbargainable school or educational policies.[9] The presence

of this perspective is reflected, for example, in the California labor statute

which seeks to protect management and public interests by limiting the topics

that can be discussed at the bargaining table. Fearful of the impact of

bargaining on school operations and programs, the California legislature

sought to prevent a direct linkage between bargaining and policy through

statutory constraints. The historical progression of bargaining and our own

research, however, suggest that line drawing is difficult and that the process

of defining what is bargainable is itself a major area of contention. In

addition, there are substantial and frequently unnoticed spillovers from

clearly bargainable issues, such as wages, into educational policy

decisions.[9]

A second assertion about the systemic linkages in labor relations, could

be called the "political pressure" perspective. It asserts that public sector

unions form an almost overwhelming political force.[10] The argument runs that

public sector unions have a number of advantaged positions that, in sum,

provide them with a unique weapon. They bargain, they lobby for favorable

legislation, they enjoy civil service and statutory protection, they

electioneer, and they strike. The political pressure in a strike, it is held,

is almost always against elected officials who are blamed and punished for the

interruption in public services. Moreover, in the subjects of bargaining,

client interest voices are overpowered because these voices are largely

interested in single issues, and single-issue partisans are unable to

construct a strong coalition to do battle with the omnibus concerns of the

employee union. In its most extreme representation, the argument suggests

that "union rule" dominates the public sector.[11]

Our data suggest that the political context of labor relations in

education is more important than variations in the legal-structural framework

within which bargaining takes place. Highly complex, multilateral forms of

bargaining involving the flight of decisions to places other than the

bargaining table--such as school board elections, the courts, legislatures,

and state administrative agencies--and the involvement of parties other than

labor and management are stimulated by political pressures.[12] However, our

data suggest that the union-domination assertion is essentially wrong. Rather

than creating unstoppable political power, we found labor relations problems

to be associated with a growth in overall dissatisfaction with the public

schools and consequent public toughness toward both unions and schools. The

need for public support, the inability to substitute capital investment for

labor, and the difficulty in linking investment costs to ultimate educational

dividends has meant that public sector unions are quite vulnerable politically

as a symbolic focus for dissatisfaction.

Consideration of the political context of public education also highlights a disagreement between our findings and a fourth stream of labor relations literature, one which charts the progression of relationships of labor and management from conflict to cooperation. In the lore of private sector labor relations, it has become an accepted maxim that conflict-based labor relations is abandoned in favor of cooperation and a recognition of mutual need in which labor relations become almost but "not quite routine."[13] Our investigation suggests that the conflict-to-cooperation thesis must be modified in the public sector to take into account the importance of public opinion and its expression in the political arena. There is strong evidence[14] that the presence of unions in the private sector is less accepted than may have been thought. Accommodative relationships between school executives and teacher union officials do indeed develop in some cases, but cooperative relations are politically hazardous for both parties. Episodic upheavals in the political environment can sweep elected and appointed officials from office, challenge the legitimacy of established working relationships, and radically alter labor relations. We also noted that there are substantial, and often not very orderly, interactions between the labor relations system and such political or economic factors as tax revolts, declining enrollments, and demographic shifts.[15] The labor-intensive and future investment aspects of education make these poliitical processes especially volatile, capable of disrupting cooperative relationships. In short, we found collective bargaining to be a powerful political force but not necessarily an orderly or tightly controlled one.

We have come to believe that what is being worked out is the social order

by which public services are to be delivered, and to a significant degree the

nature of those services. Secondly, the dynamics of labor relations are

substantially different than the usually pictured movement from conflict to

cooperation. To the contrary, we found episodic increases in both the scope

and intensity of conflict. High conflict periods, in particular, are

associated with attempts to change the social order--to define who makes

critical decisions about school governance and how those decisions are to be

made.

The differences between our perspective and the conventional one can best

be seen as they relate to increasing or decreasing levels of conflict.

Accommodation models are essentially examples of mutual learning. Bargainers

learn to behave in particular ways because they are rewarded for their

behaviors. The more they experience interactions with other bargainers the

more they learn to shape their actions in ways that yield a positive response.

Behaviors of both bargainer and counterpart become more predictable. Conflict

decreases.

Cycles of Conflict

In the histories of the school districts we studied, we see cycles of

conflict mixed with periods of relative quiet. We believe that the social

order of schools is being changed during both periods, but it is changed most

dramatically during the periods of high conflict in which there are important

shifts in the issues involved in labor relations, the persons who participate,

and the ruling coalition.

The periods of relative quiet are the Generations of labor relations

described in the introductory chapter. Generations tend to last for several

years, and during those periods the structure of school organization appears

relatively stable. However, as we will discuss later, we believe that

important changes take place in the operation and governance of schools during

these periods as a result of the interaction between labor and management.

We call these periods of high conflict the Intergenerational Conflict

periods. They tend to be of short duration, usually a matter of weeks or

months, and they usually involve a dramatic and visible crisis. Conflict

swells to involve outsiders who had not previously participated in labor

relations because they were not sufficiently motivated to do so or because

they were in some way barred from participating.

The accommodation model of labor relations is pictured as a downwardly

sloping conflict curve over time. The image of the generational development

is that of a wave or sign curve moving from periods of low conflict to peaks

of high conflict and back again (Figure 2.1).

The concept of the social order implies important changes in the

macroscopic aspects of the organization under question. To change the social

order is to change the lineup of groups, organizations and persons that

produce the structural and procedural rules for smaller negotiations. As

Anslem Strauss notes, "In some social orders--for example, the pre-Civil War

American South--the structural conditions are such that certain kinds of

negotiations are impossible or improbable, while others are probable and

frequent."[16] Thus, changes in the social order are not always negotiable, but

the point of our argument is that seemingly absolute limits on who runs

schools are called into question quite frequently. Our task is to specify and

then to illustrate how they are called into question during the process of

labor relations.

Figure 2.1

Models of Accommodation Contrasted With Generational Development

Conflict

Conflict between the parties is reduced through repeated interactions
between labor and management.

Conflict

1st	1st	2nd	2nd	3rd
Generation	Intergenerat-	Generation	Intergenerat-	Generation
	ional Crisis		ional Crisis	

Conflict is episodic as the political environment of schools becomes
activated. The nature of labor relations changes as a result.

Changes in the social order are best specified by reference to the intellectual traditions of interactionism and of conflict theory. Of course, when taken at their polls, these perspectives are incompatible. The weakness of the interactionist tradition is that it can be made to seem that everything is negotiable. The weakness of the conflict perspective, particularly the Marxist versions, is that important changes in the social order are never possible through negotiation, and that changes in the participants and ruling coalitions are required to make any changes of significance. Our perspective suggests that both interaction and conflict are powerful, that important changes in the social order of schools takes place during the conflict periods between the generations, and that equally important but less dramatic changes take place during the generations themselves. The key to understanding our perspective, however, lies in recognizing why the generations of labor relations once having been formed are inherently unstable and why interactions during the Generations lead to desolving what appear to be stable relations. For this perspective, we turn to the literature on social conflict, particularly to that on coalition formation.

The Conflict Perspective

From the theoretical perspective, conflict is not viewed as pathological for the social system. Rather, it is seen as a useful means of transformation. Conflict theorists as diverse as Karl Marx and Georg Simmel have emphasized the idea of dialectics inherent in the contradictions in social relations. Marx, of course, built social change theory around the divisiveness of conflict, whereas Simmel saw conflict's more integrative possibilities.[17] Following in Simmel's tradition, modern conflict theorists

such as Lewis Coser have viewed conflict as arising less from a conflict of

interests as from a conflict in the perceptions of legitimacy.[18]   In a

conflict of interests, the exploited or disadvantaged become aware of their

true interests and seek to advance them by combining to overthrow their

exploiters.   In Coser's work, it is not so much that the distribution of

scarce resources is seen as against the interests of the underclass as it is

that there begins a new questioning of the legitimacy of those occupying those

positions.[19]

The questioning of legitimacy is precisely what we find taking place

during the intergenerational periods of school labor relations.   The fact that

the legitimacy of the existing coalition is at issue during the

intergenerational periods makes the conflict difficult to resolve.   The mere

presence of the opposite party in positions of power or places where important

decisions are made is sufficient to gather opposition.   During the First

Intergenerational Conflict period the legitimacy of the teachers org nization

is established.   During the Second Intergenerational Conflict, the issue is

the legitimacy of citizens and school board members.   During both periods,

usual negotiations are difficult.   There are almost no outcomes in which the

participants in the old social order feel are legitimate.   Any form of

recognition is unacceptable to the old order, and nothing short of recognition

can be acceptable to the new.   Second, frequently neither the old participants

or the would-be participants has the ability to make a binding pledge to one

another.   Third, the desire of those in the old order to maintain the sanctity

of their positions makes it difficult to bargain openly with the contending

group while attempting to prevent others from doing so.   Fourth, the value

systems of the contending parties are substantially different, so much so that

doubt is cast on their motives, even their rationality.[20]

For these reasons conventional negotiations cease to operate and the
dynamics of conflict start to build.   There are three essential stages in the
conflict cycle each of which will be elaborated:

1. the activation and buildup of conflict; its organization
    and the selection of issues.

2. changing the social order through the changing of
    coalitions; their composition, changes in personnel.

3. reduction in conflict and the routinization of relations
    under the new order.

Activation of Conflict: The Questioning of Legitimacy

The first segment of the conflict cycle is the withdrawal of legitimacy
from the existing leadership.   Persons or groups excluded from making
decisions, defining issues or sharing in the distributed rewards, begin to
question the rights of the ruler (or the ruling coalition) to rule.   The
attack is frequently personally directed; it is the ruler, rather than the
institution that is held at fault.   The existing leadership comes to symbolize
that which is wrong with the school system, whether or not those wrongs were
of their making or under their control.   Thus, we find that school
superintendents and school board members are frequently under attack by the
electorate as a result of labor related issues, and union leaders under attack
by their members.

Other than scapegoating, why the attack on the leaders?   The reasons are
primarily organizational and structural.   If we believe that schools are
essentially political organizations, then the existing leadership is the
expression of, and the legitimation of, the set of values that allowed that
leadership to be originally established.   They, in classic terms, represent

the legitimation of bias.[21] More than anything else, the existing leadership

controls the agenda, thus determining what problems and issues are attended to

and which are not. An administration can be highly successful in achieving

the goals that its original supporters had as their major interest and still

not prevent the rise of dissatisfaction that brews in the hearts of those, who

while not opposed to the goals of the first group, have other battles they

would rather have fought. In addition, the existing leadership develops

strong normative patterns regarding its own behavior. It takes on social

roles. In the pattern outlined by Katz and Kahn, administrators and school

board members are socialized in their positions by influential role senders,

who reward particular types of behavior and fail to reward others.[22]

The entrance of a new organization, such as a powerful teacher

organization, changes the entire pattern of role relationships and

expectations, not just the relationships with the teacher organization itself.

It is not necessary that the union be venal, harsh or overtly hostile for it

to pose a threat to the existing role perceptions of the superintendent and

the board. The union merely has to exist. Superintendents, boards, the whole

cast of social actors is already in place and functioning when the new actor,

in the form of the teachers organization, takes to the stage. The new arrival

brings expectations, sanctions and rewards, which must be attended to.

In addition to just being, unions organize. In order to be effective,

the union must have the ability to bring sanctions to bear, and in the

American labor system the primary sanction remains the ability to withdraw

workers from their jobs in a strike or other job action. The execution of an

action is not necessary for a powerful sanction to exist, but a credible

threat is necessary. Unions, therefore, require solidarity, the willingness

to sacrifice and more than a nominal level of dedication from their members.

They are particularly in the organizing stages, social movements. In the

process of building a separate loyalty and willingness to act, unions must

organize against the existing figureheads as well as for alternatives.

Organizers the world over, engage in "painting the devil", vividly portraying

the current leadership as evil, dramatizing mistakes and putting the worst

possible face on moments of administrative awkwardness. Administrators and

board members frequently aid in this process through outbursts of anger and

intemperate public statements. Unions also engage in training for militancy,

reinforcing the new roles that teachers are to undertake. Withholding

services, public protest or willful disobedience are activities that few

teachers would have engaged in 20 years ago. Now these activities are part of

what at least some teachers learn. Participation in teacher organization

activities constitute a major part of the learning process, and teachers

socialize one another. In the early years of the California bargaining

statute, for instance, it was relatively common to find informational

picketing and one-day strikes, which were terminated after that single

occurrence and which did not lead immediately to agreement on a contract. The

reason was frequently as much for training of teachers as it was to

demonstrate the ability to perform a work stoppage to the superintendent and

the board. "We just wanted to get the teachers used to the feeling of a stick

(picket sign) in their hands and the bricks under their feet," commented a

teacher leader.

   As the process of interaction between teacher organizations and school

districts continues, strong normative patterns develop for behavior on both

sides, but management's behavior is frequently somewhat more constricted by

the expectations of the public than is labor's. If teacher organization

leadership appears confused, intemperate or incompetent there is a tendency to

excuse their actions as either a function of inexperience or amateurism or as

not being representative of the "real" sentiments of teachers. If management

spokesmen show poor judgment or bad faith, however, teachers tend to interpret

this as a glimpse into the "true character" of the district leadership. Thus,

school managers run substantially higher risks of doing serious damage to

working relationships in the district by poorly handling contract negotiations

than do teacher organizations.

   The growth of symbols. Issues, or decisions in which people have an

interest, are always present in organizations. In times of rising conflict

and questioning of legitimacy issues take on a larger-than-life symbolic

content. The use of powerful symbols is a necessary ingredient in the

expansion of conflict and its ability to call into question the current

leadership, gain the attention of possible allies and bond supporters to the

cause.[23] The symbol becomes a tangible reality around which people can rally,

as did the lay teachers in the Los Angeles archdiocese who struck for

recognition of their union under the banner, "Catholic Teachers Have Rights."

On the face of it, the lay teacher's symbol was a rather bland assertion, but

in fact it proved a potent rallying cry for gathering supporters among

parents, and even the religious community. The lay teachers were able to

expand the symbol sufficiently to create the belief that they had rights that

were not being respected and that one of those rights was that the archdiocese

should negotiate with them.

   In this study, there were distinct symbols raised during the two conflict

periods, the First and Second Intergenerational Conflicts. During the First,

the nearly universal symbols raised by the teachers were "dignity" and

"protection." During the Second the issues raised by the electorate and

organized community groups was "propriety" (of the teachers orgnization) and

"efficiency" (of the schools).

Symbols allow more people and groups to join the fight. It is easier to

activate a broader constituency with ambiguous symbols than narrow,

distributive issues. Not surprisingly the expansion of symbols is coincident

with the appearance of very active leadership among the discontented group.

Within teachers organizations, we call this "the rise of the radical leader."

As leaders clothe themselves in the symbol of their organization, they can

complete the conceptual separation of their organization from the school

district and establish (nd legitimate) the role of critic and challenger as

opposed to the helping and support role, which was often historic for teachers

groups and parent groups. Expansion of issues involves intense activity,

which in the public schools takes the form of meetings, rallies, public

information, petitions and picketing.[24]

Not all issues, of course, can be expanded or are inevitably expandable.

Part of the kit-bag of administrative behavior is learned or innate skill in

containing aroused issues. In terms of the movement from generation to

generation of labor relations this has one of two effects. The existing

leadership of the teacher organization or the school district may contain the

conflict by lagging behind the opinion of others that it is time to change the

relationship between teachers and administration. We, for instance, have

witnessed school superintendents who are quite happy with their Second

Generation relationship with the teachers and not at all anxious to have the

relationship between the district and the teachers challenged by a rebellious

board even though they may personally believe that some of the allegations

against the teachers organization are factual and meritorious. Conversely,

the administration may _lead_ the district into a new relationship avoiding the

pain of conflict. We witnessed several situations in which the district had

adopted the _de jure_ form of collective bargaining without any of the social

changes that usually took place in such arrangements, and in other districts

we saw superintendents deliberately urge teachers to organize because they

thought they needed to assume more responsibility and control for their own

affairs.

Sometimes the efforts at containing the conflict are successful;

sometimes they are not. When the symbols continue to expand, the leadership

faces possible turnout, and the challenges have the potential for altering the

social order. The expanded conflict then requires action. There are two

prerequisites for action. The first is that there must be an issue. The

issue may be highly infused with symbolism, and may not amount to much as an

objective reality. The second is a choice event, a situation at which the

organization is expected to make a decision.[25] The issue, loaded with

symbolism, becomes coupled with the event that cannot be ducked. In school

districts there are many events whose timing is controlled by the turning of

the calendar, rather than the natural growth of issues or the political demand

for a decision. Most prominant among these events are expiration of

collective bargaining contracts and the holding of school board elections.

In order to be attended to, the new conflict must rise above existing

conflicts and realign the old coalitions:

> In this process friends become enemies and enemies become
> friends in a general reshuffle of relations. The new
> conflict can become dominant only if the old one is
> subordinated, or obscured, or forgotten or loses its
> capacity to excite the contestants or becomes irrelevant.[26]

The problem for the old order is irrelevance, for "the greatest hazard to any faction is not frontal attack but a flank attack by bigger, collateral, inconsistent and irrelevant competitors for the attention and loyalty of the public."[27] The old order may have done a superb job of settling, managing or dominating whatever the old conflict might have been, but if the new symbol is expanded to attract the public, attached to a tangible issue that then stands surrogate for the symbol itself (e.g., a 10 percent raise equals justice) then the next available decision event frequently leads to a change in coalitions and a change in the social order of school districts.

Changes in Coalitions: Reformation of the Social Order through Conflict

Understanding changes in coalitions is necessary if one is to understand conflict's part in school labor relations. There are two steps to this understanding. The first to appreciate why coalitions form at all. The second is to understand why and how they change consistent with the movement from generation to generation of labor relations.

Coalitions form because public sector labor relations are inherently more complex than the bilateral imagery of collective bargaining suggests. The business of labor relations involves many interested parties, none of whom has the authority or resources to govern in any singular sense. Because there are many interests, some mechanism is necessary to reduce the complexity of the conflict to measurable proportions. "The impulse to form coalitions with others who are fighting the same enemy is strategically irresistible and will usually continue until all the active combatants have been polarized into two camps."[28] In education, the impulse to form coalitons is heightened by the fact that hierarchial superiors are frequently dependent on supordinates for

the performance of their duties. The ingenious subordinate can nearly always

manage to sabotage a superior while continuing to observe all the rules of the

organization. While a hierarchy exists, it is often a mock bureaucracy, to

use Gouldner's term, and it is always open to the possibility of a

revolutionary coalition of subordinates or an improper coalition of

subordinate and superordinate that isolates and undercuts a person in the

middle.[29] A revolutionary coalition is one in which the lower order

participants in a hierarchy combine against a superior. In one sense, of

course, teacher organizations are in themselves such a coalition, which is why

they are an ideological affront in the First Generation and ultimately have to

be legitimated through the First Intergenerational Conflict. An improper

coalition is one in which a hierarchial superior, such as a superintendent,

combines with a lower order participant, such as the teachers organization,

against the building principals.

A third kind of coalition can also exist. It is a conservative coalition

in which underlings combine against the authority of a superordinate in order

to dull the dominance of the superior. In like manner a superior may coalesce

with a subordinate to prevent rebelliousness on the part of a third member

still lower in the hierarchy.

In our field work we found potential coalition partners, four of which

could be found as potential participants in a a coalition that dominated the

school organization:

Potential Dominant Coalition Members

1. central office Administrators, including the
   superintendent.
2. the school Board.
3. the teacher Leadership.
4. rebellious Citizens.

Others Less Frequently Found in Dominant Coalitions

     5. Site administrators
     6. Teachers other than leadership.
     7. Parents.

These seven pose some interesting problems for organizational operations when they form into coalitons. The school board, for instance, is hierarchially superior to any of the others. Yet the membership is dependent on the others in important ways. The school board members are dependent on the superintendent for information and expertise; they are dependent on parents and citizens for continued maintenance in office (and in some districts dependent on the teachers and their organization as well); they are dependent on the building leadership and individual teachers for an information network that allows them some independence from the superintendent in making up their minds or deciding what to believe. The superintendents are also hierarchially superior to everyone but the school board, but they must often combine forces in order to control a critical or maverick board. Likewise, coalitions between teacher leadership and superintendent are often formed in order to control school site administrators--the superintendents seeking to gain control or monitoring of teacher behavior, and the teacher leadership seeking limitations on the action of site administrators. This is an organizationally improper coalition, but a relat'. ly frequent one.

    Types of Coalitions. There are eight basic types of triad coalitions which have been observed in the laboratory and the field, the triad being chosen as the simplist form of multilateral organizational form, and the one into which multiple parties combine. The eight are differentiated from one another by the relative strength of the coaliton partners and the predicted coalition behavior of different parties. These are illustrated in Figure

2.2. One of the most interesting and frequently found is the Type 5 triad.

It has a dominant member, A, and two subordinates, B and C. Power among them

is distributed so that A is stronger than B, and B stronger than C, but the

combined power of B and C is greater than A. Thus, there is a possibility of

a revolutionary coalition of B and C against A. There is also the possibility

of a conservative coalition between A and B to keep C in line, and there is

the possibility of a. improper coalition between A and C, which undermines the

power of B over C. Since hierarchial organizations often display the

characteristics of a Type 5 coalition, such an arrangement serves as a good

beginning point for our discussion.

The other aspect of coalition behavior that is germaine to our discussion

of labor relations in education is the boundary coalition, a combination that

steps over the formal boundaries of school organizations. Boundary spanning

coalitions greatly increase the potential for increasing power on the part of

lower order participants. By going beyond the confines of the formal

organization potent coalitions can be formed that would otherwise be

impossible. Clearly, we observe these kinds of realtionships in the

coalitions between teachers organizations and school boards, or between

teachers organizations and various citizens interests.

Sometimes boundary coalitions are necessary as an aspect of the

organization's functioning. Caplow describes such a situation in advertising

agencies, where the account executive must maintain a coalition with the

executive of the client firm.[30] A similar situation is present for labor

relations specialists, who are ultimately expected to settle agreements, and

through the settlement process frequently assist their opposite number. Not

unsurprisingly, labor negotiators, like advertising account executives, are

Figure 2.2
Different Types of Coalitions

The Vinacke-Arkoff Game

		Assigned Weights	Predicted Coalition

Type 1

A = 1
B = 1
C = 1

Any

Type 2

A = 3
B = 2
C = 2

BC

Type 3

A = 1
B = 2
C = 2

AB or AC

Type 4

A = 3
B = 1
C = 1

None

Type 5

A = 4
B = 3
C = 2

AC or BC

Type 6

A = 4
B = 2
C = 1

None

Based on W. Edgar Vinacke and Abe Arkoff, "An Experimental Study of Coalitions the Triad," American Sociological Review 22,4 (August 1957), p. 406-14.

frequently tainted with a slight tinge of disloyalty and the suspicion if that

they had only tried harder they could have served their employer better. As

Walton and McKersie suggest, "the chief negotiator frequently faces a

difficult situation, "He is boxed in between the pressures stemming from his

own organization and those from his opponent's."[31]

Coalitions in Generations

At the onset of the First Generation, a condition that administrators

regard as a State of Nature, the teacher organization either does not exist or

is so domesticated that is does not functionally operate as a coalition

partner. If the triad is one in which the combined influence of the school

board and any other coalition partner could not defeat the management, a Type

4 triad, then management has no reason to have a coalition with any one. If

the triad is one in which the influence of management could be undercut by

rebellious teachers, a Type 5 triad, then management is likely to attempt

formation of a coalition with the school board. (Shown schematically in

Figure 2.3.) The Board and the Administration are joined in a conservative

coalition against the possibility of citizen Rebels. In many cases the

Administration faces a coalition between Site Administrators and Teachers.

This coalition is often a long standing fixture of school district life, and

the relative strengths of the parties assure that the Administration can

dominate the triad (a Type 4 triad) despite the joint efforts of teachers and

principals. The Teachers and Site Administrators, are, in turn, joined in a

conservative coalition against the possible meddling of parents (ST in STP).

There are, of course, other, more complex, coalitions that may face

Administrators as a function of the politics within an individual school

Figure 2.3
Coalitions in Generations

FIRST GENERATION

AB in ABC, conservative
ST in STP, conservative

FIRST INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT

AB in ABC, conservative
  (at the beginning of the conflict)
LC in BCL, rebellious
  (in the middle of the conflict)
BL in BAL
  (at the end of the conflict; former
  members of C become members of B)

AS in AST, conservative
TP in TSP, rebellious

Figure 2.3, continued
Coalitions in Generations

EARLY SECOND GENERATION

BA in BAC, conservative
    (reestablished after teacher
    organization legitimated)
BA in BAL, conservative
    (established for collective
    bargaining)
AS in ASL, conservative
    (for contract administration)
LT in STL, rebellious
ST in STP, conservative
    (reestablished)

Position of S is incompatible;
aligned with teachers in one
coalition and against them in
another.

LATE SECOND GENERATION

AL in ALC, conservative
AL in BAL, rebellious   and improper
AL in ALS, improper
BA in BAC, conservative
BA in BAL, conservative
ST in STP, conservative

Position of A in incompatible;
aligned with teacher Leaders in one
coalition and against them in another,
likewise with the school Board.

Figure 2.3, continued
Coalitions in Generations

SECOND INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT

BC in ABC, rebellious
  (at the beginning of the conflict)
AL in BAL disestablished
  (in the middle of the conflict)
AB in BAL, conservative
  (reestablished at the end of the
   conflict)
LT in LTS, rebellious
  (reemphasized during conflict)
ST in STP, conservative

district. Large, districts nearly always have a coalition of Site

Administrators that confronts the superintendent and sometimes dominates. For

reasons of clarity, these particularistic coalitions are not considered here

and only the most universal set of potential participants diagrammed.

Activation of the teachers organization changes the pattern by adding

another potential coalition partner. In the Figure 2.3 representation, circle

"L" representing teacher Leadership is activated. Teacher Leadership first

joins a coalition with Citizen rebels against the Administration (LC in BCL).

That coalition is openly rebellous. There may also exist a coalition of

Teachers and Parents at the school site level (TP in STP), particularly if the

teachers have organized around abuses of administrative practice.

As conflict increases in the First Intergenerational Crisis, a change in

the composition of the coalition partners takes place. Parents, who may have

been activated in their coalition with the Teachers become attached to the

citizen Rebels. They are the same persons they were before, but they take on

a different social role. No longer are they simply interested in the

educational rights and welfare of their children; they have developed an

interest in the policy and operations of the school district. Through the

process of conflict, which the Citizen rebel and teacher Leadership coalition

is active in forwarding, the size of the Citizen group increases. It is now

able to make a direct attack on Board, either replacing it or causing it to

modify its previous position toward the teachers. Thus, the Citizens and the

teacher Leadership come to dominate the triad of Board-Citizens-Leadership; a

successful rebellous coalition (LC in BCL). Because this coalition is

successful, there is a substantial replacement among the Board members.

Sometimes they are replaced outright, and our experience in the eight

intensively studied districts indicates that board member turnover is crucial

at this turning point in labor relations. Or board members change their

position about accepting the presence and the legitimacy of the union as the

teachers' representative. For a brief period a coalition exists between the

Board and the teacher Leadership against the administration, which is pictured

as unreasonable (BL in BAL). The Administration is either replaced, or it

sues for labor peace.

The Second Generation involves a series of coalition shifts. However,

the shifts may not be rapid. The Board and the Administration reestablish

their conservative coalition against the Citizen rebels, which is not

difficult because the rebels having taken over the board, are now insiders and

no new external critics have formed. The Board and Administration also form a

conservative coalition against the teacher Leadership (BA in BAL). This is a

part of the normalization of labor relations. The teacher Leadership is

admitted to interaction with the school district, but with the assumption that

it will be aligned against the board and administration and working as a

unitary body. The Administration also forms a coalition with the site

administrators against the teacher Leadership (AS in ASL). The Administration

and the Site administrators both badly need this coalition. The

Administration needs the Site administrators to enforce the contract with

expertise and finesse; the Site administrators need guidance, technical

assistance and support from the Administration, particularly when there is

labor trouble in the schools.

However, difficulty arises early in the Second Generation. Relations

between labor and management are often still tense, and therefore the process

often disagreeable. Moreover, relationships are often very rigid in part

because the adjustment to a rule-based mechanism is difficult for both

teachers and administrators. They find themselves in situations in which the

situationally preferred solution to a problem does not match the dicatates of

the rules. In addition the Site administrators are locked into incompatible

coalitions. They are part of a conservative coalition (AS in ASL) with the

superintendent against the teacher Leadership. Simultaneously, they face

pressure from teacher Leadership and Teachers (LT in SLT) over the

administration of the contract. They also attempt to maintain a coalition

with the Teachers against the improper intrusion of parents (ST in STP). The

Site administrator thus is aligned with the Teachers in some situations and

against them in others. This situation is highly unstable. One cannot

maintain a coalition partnership in one triad with someone against whom one is

aligned in another triad. (Or more directly: it's hard to keep your friends

if you two-time then.)

The pressures on the Site administrators formed by their incompatible

coalitions, plus the gnawing unpleasantness of tense rule-based interactions,

prompts the search for accommodative relations. Thus, as the Second

Generation proceeds, a number of different working arrangements begin to take

place, and these eventually take the form of new coalitions.

A quiet, unspoken coalition occurs between the teacher Leadership and the

top Administration. The coalition is never acknowledged publically, and

seldom privately. The operative langauage in describing the coalition is

that, "we have learned to work together," or "we have found ways to be

mutually helpful." Specifically, Administrators and teacher Leaders learn to

work together to keep rebellous Citizens from disrupting the school district

or the labor relations process (AL in ACL). While labor and management may

disagree on many things, they are generally united on keeping citizens out of

involvement in collective bargaining during the Second Generation. This

position, for labor, represents a decided change from the First

Intergenerational Conflict period when they went "public" with their

, complaints in order to increase the strength of their organization. Now, in

the Second Generation, the teacher Leadership is quieter and frequently

helpful in securing school board candidates that support the current

administration. A quiet coalition also exists between the Administration and

the school Board itself. This coalition is built on the ability to maintain

quiet and to make the school district continue to operate smoothly.

Essentially, the Administration is willing to exchange concessions to the

union in contract negotiations and in informal accommodations for the union's

ability to maintain smooth operations of the school district. The union can

assist in smooth operations of the district by moderating its demands, by

using internal means of dispute settlement and not seeking to make public

issues out of grievances, by preventing potentially explosive measures from

coming before the school board, and by enforcing generally agreed upon rules

upon their membership.

The Administration sometimes also finds itself in coalition with the

teacher Leadership against the Site Administrators (AL in ASL). This unlikely

sounding coalition exists because principals are reluctant to give up their

working coalition with the Teachers (ST in AST). Principals, understanding

the technology of education, know that there is no fail-safe way to create

·education with bureaucratic rules, and they know that if the teachers are

aligned against a Site administrator, that careers can be both unpleasant and

short. Thus, they are frequently reluctant to implement or carry out the

teacher control measures with the vigor that superintendents would have them

carried out.   Central office Administrators are willing to enter into

coalitions with teacher Leadership in order to gain control over the actions

of their principals.   Teacher Leadership is willing to join such a coalition

for the same reasons.   The means that principals and teachers use to work out

their productive relationship in the schools frequently involves violations of

the contract or particularistic handling of teachers.   That is, there are

attempts to reward and punish teachers on the basis of their performance or

the principal's desires that run counter to the contract.   Sometimes, teachers

in schools specifically agree to these contract violations, but the conflict

over whether or not the contract has been violated usually spills out of the

school and the into the labor grievance process.   This is particularly the

case when a transfer-between schools is involved or when a teacher's

assignment is in question.   Both the Administration and the teacher Leadership

need a better functioning bureaucracy, and both have come to realize the power

and importance of formal rules in normalizing relationships.

Once in a coalition, the teacher Leadership can show itself useful in

numerous ways to the Administration, through helping to solve small problems

so that the general quiet can exist

The Second Intergenerational Crisis exists because the coalitions

established by the administration are incompatible.   The Administration finds

itself in a coalition with the teacher Leadership against the Board, but also

with the Board against the Teachers and against the Citizen rebels.   This

incompatible situation can exist only so long as there is no active

dissatisfaction with the school operations or performance.   When opposition to

the Current operations or policies forms, the Citizen rebels claim that they

are being opposed by the teacher Leadership, and that the Administration is
assisting them improperly. They disclose the existence of AL in ACL. Even
the appearence of this coalition becomes an election issue, and eventually the
Citizen rebels are successful. They gain in strength, and come to influence
if not dominate BAC thus changing the dominant coalition in that triad from BA
to BC. Once the dominant coalition in the Board-Administration-Citizens triad
becomes suspicious of the superintendent's relationship with the Teacher
leadership, it suspects that the AL coalition exists not simply to operate the
schools more smoothly, but also to thwart the will of the Board. It begins to
suspect that the Boards wishes in the BA coalition in BAL have not been
forcefully carried out.

The Administration finds that it must abandon its relationship with the
teacher Leadership, and the teacher Leadership finds itself unable to form a
continuing coalition with either the school board or the Citizen rebels.

The New Order Moves Away From Conflict

As the new order is legitimated, the era of conflict comes to an end.
The termination of conflict is signaled by a symbolic event which indicates
that the values of the old order have been repudiated. Establishing the new
order has two effects. The first of these is privatization, erecting
boundaries around the new participants as a way of declaring them legitimate.
The second is rationalization, establishing rules and structures that prevent
conflict from again flaring out of control. These measures, as we suggest,
are ultimately unsuccessful in keeping a rebellious coalition from forming,
but they produce the appearance of stability and they can persist for a long
time.

Privatization. Teacher organizations need privatization as a means of
guarding their status in the new order. Labor organizations in the United
States depend on the exclusivity of their relationship to the management as a
means of effectively representing the membership. New teacher organizations,
representing members for the first time, have substantial amount of boundary
building to do. Without exclusiveness in representation, the labor
organization amounts to very little. Its members are or can be constantly
approached by others. But the difficulty in the public sector is that
exclusiveness does not provide for exclusive arena access by the labor
organization. Schoo_ boards continue to be public bodies and can be
approached by any interest which has stakes in the running of the schools.
The only place where the teachers organization has special, exclusive arena
access is in collective bargaining, where parents, legislators and others are
barred from arena access even though these "outsiders" to the labor process
can still frequently achieve status in the agenda.

In order to be effective, privatization must subsume the ability of the
new order to control the agenda as well as arena access to decision points.
Privatization does not stop disagreements among those persons or organizations
in the dominant coalition, but it does limit what those disagreements will be
about. Holding the coalition together requires that potentially devisive
issues not be raised. Thus, in one school district, a second echelon central
office administrator railing against the poor performance of some of the
district's teachers and management's inability to get them to perform. Yet,
when asked why questions of teacher evaluation had not been addressed or
incentive schemes been proposed, he replied: "I don't think that would be
appropriate here." Indeed, it would not have been. A movement of the

administration toward hard-nosed evaluation of teachers or toward an

unorthodox incentive system would have signaled to the teacher's organization,

that it was time to fight.   The administration had been through several years

of continuous strife with the teacher's organization, and the symbols of

legitimation had only recently become apparent when management and the

teachers organization changed leadership in a short period of time.   In terms

of the maintenance of coalitions, management felt there was more to gain by

joining with the teachers in a Second Generation coalition, to keep the

institution stable than there was to join a coalition with the critics of

education over scrutiny of teacher performance.   Just as the rise of conflict

and the delegitimation is necessary to replace the old order takes place, a

recognition that the new coalition is legitimate is also necessary.   Continued

existence is the hallmark of that legitimacy, and thus the means of

establishing boundaries around the members of that legitimate coalition are

important.

Maintaining and securing the boundaries of the coalition requires that

means must be found to prevent potential conflicts from spreading.[32]   One set

of techniques is aimed toward the challenging group, which must be discredited

or rendered impotent.   During the First Generation, labor leaders, who are

then unacceptable challengers, are "crazies"; whereas during the Second

Generation these same persons become "people we have to work with" and

citizens who wanted to intervene in the school labor processes are attacked as

"limosine liberals," and "social engineers."

The parties in the dominant coalition also reinforce the belief in their

own legitimacy by mutual recognition, giving complements to one's opposite

party in negotiations, expressing appreciations and reciprocating favors.[33]

Thus, it was very important in one of our school districts that the
superintendent was asked to attend teacher organization year-end banquets
after the district had passed through several years in which such appearance
would have been unthinkable.

At least as widely used as attacks on challenging leadership are means of
keeping issues from expanding into coalition-threatening conflict. These
techniques include hearing the opposition, providing controlled channels for
dissent, and providing a token response to any challenge. Also, new
sub-organizations can be created to "handle" the problem, thus isolating it
from the main functioning of the organization. Disturbances can be
anticipated and met by measures to smooth them. Perhaps most damaging to a
potentially conflictual issue, the existing coalition can co-opt the symbols
of the opposition. Thus, management attempts to sieze the fiscal
responsibility label from taxpayers associations, and all concerned parties
grab for the role of doing "what's good for kids."

Finally, there is the protest of constraint, the image of being bound to
a course of action, "that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on
the power to bind oneself."[34] The reply, "I would like to help you, but...."
is relatively common in public schools. However, we found that in the
schools, constraints based on the labor contract become breeding grounds for
further dissatisfaction and opposition. It is quite dangerous for school
officials to plead that they cannot accomplish some educational objective or
offer some service, "because their union contract won't let them." The image
of an administration held seige by the union becomes one of the elements for
expanding the conflict in the Second Generation and initiating the Second
Intergenerational Conflict.

<u>Rationalization</u> is the second aspect of legitimacy. Rationalization places a high value on the management of conflict as opposed to the management of organization processes, and it relies heavily on procedural due process as a means to control ambiguities and minor disagreements within the newly defined social order.

The new order gained office, in part, because it promised an end to overt conflict, and thus it is reluctant to expand conflict again, once stability is gained. There are several examples of union leadership, newly elected, on the basis of "getting both sides talking together again," and similar examples are present in managerial circles. All parties to a dominant coalition accept the fact that conflict can be harmful. To a union that is struggling to be accepted, a strike is a missionary event, an example of social protest which validates itself. However, to an ongoing, recognized union that has a legitimate status as the employee representative, the strike represents the potential for loss. If the membership's expectations outrun those results the leadership knows are achieveable, then the potential for an internal challenge to the union leadership is set.

The structures of labor relations are also designed to contain conflict. Grievances are substituted for workplace disputes and wildcat strikes of labor relations are also designed to contain conflict. Grievances are substituted for direct acts of protest. Bargaining itself becomes more of a game and less of a revolution. Negotiators create social roles for themselves and for their counterparts, and those role obligations cast bargaining into a normative style, which is one of the characteristics of any particular school setting. Even strikes can become partially routinized. A quite common interview response was something to the effect that, "yes, we had a strike, but it

didn't mean much; we just had to let the radicals blow off some steam before

we settled." Strikes become ritual compliance. As one informant put it when

describing a school district with long standing bargaining relationships and a

reputation for repeated walkouts, "Up there, they strike first and ask why

later." Finally, the union's position is rationalized and supported. Forms

of union security are common in statute and contract. Although all state

statutes that permit election of unions also allow for their decertification,

undoing a union is not a simple matter. Indeed, it was the intent of labor

statutes to provide stability in employee relations rather than turmoil, and

thus the incumbent union is usually protected from challenge during certain

periods. In addition, its exclusive representation position is frequently

recognized in contractual organizational security provisions which provide for

mandatory support of the union (agency shop or maintenance of membership) and

a payroll deduction of dues.

When the existence of the union is recognized as being an objective

reality, then the cycle of conflict is over. But changes in the social order

continue through interaction between the parties.

The Interactionist Perspective

The Interactionist Perspective places deep emphasis on the social process

rather than on structure and on the relative freedom of groups of individuals

to overcome and alter structural constraints through interaction. This

perspective is heavily identified with the work of George Herbert Mead, Robert

Park and Herbert Blummer and Anslem Strauss among others, and generally "the

Chicago school of sociolog, Generally it holds that social structure is

difficult to understand without recognizing that it represents an inter-lacing

of separate behaviors among individuals. Thus, in our bargaining studies we
spent considerable time and attention attempting to make sense out of the
interactions between chief negotiators with one another, between school
superintendents and teacher leaders, between school board members and both of
the former. Although we spent relatively little time in classroom observation
or school-site analysis, our experier es there combined with the literature on
teaching and bargaining have impressed us with the ability of rank-and-file
teachers to alter the meaning and enforcement of the labor agreements. The
real impact of labor relations has to do with the way in which contractual
agreements are reincorporated into the organization and expressed in classroom
behaviors.

The essential argument of the interactionist perspective is that these
behaviors are strongly attached to symbols, and that although the behaviors
may change but slightly, the symbol attached to behaviors changes. As a
result the social order can be altered even though formal changes in the
organizational structures have not been changed. For example, the principal's
tours of the school building may carry with them the symbols of distrust and
pettiness, they may be associated with tightness of organization, or they may
be taken as an interest in the work of teachers and the problems they face.
Sometimes structures are added or altered, as in the development of labor
relations specialists in school districts. But more frequently, fami' ar
changes take on different meanings. Similar structures for interaction, such
as those for the arbitration of labor grievances, can convey highly diverse
meanings. An arbitration decision in one situation may represent only its
face value--the ajudication of a dispute over the rights falling within the
contract--wherein another setting a grievance may represent a symbolic change

within the organization's control structure.

But just as interaction leads to change and adaptation, it also leads to
stability or expectations of stability. The concept of social role is key to
interactionist thought, and taking on a social role implies expectation that
one's opposite party will behave in an expected manner. Thus the definition
of social role becomes a matter of reciprocity. As roles stabilize they have
a tendency to form what Strauss, in his argument for a negotiated order,
called the negotiations context.[35] They become part of the structure of the
negotiated setting.

Symbolic Changes and Social Order Changes

'Meaning changes:

> While the perspective of social order research has not been
> overly well formed, but its basic identifying characteristic
> is clear:

> In the case of negotiated order theory the individuals in
> organizations play an active, self-conscious role in the
> shaping of the social order. Their day-to-day interactions,
> agreements, temporary refusals and changing definitions of
> the situation at hand are of paramount importance.[36]

In contrasts to structural or bureaucratic theories of organizations, social
order theorists downplay the importance of strict rules, regulations and a
hierarchial chain of command. The informal structure tends to act on the
formal structure, and thus power is not absolute or constant over time.

One of the ways in which the social order is renegotiated in everyday
working life is that the symbols attached to particular events changes over
time. The category of event may remain the same, but the meaning of the event
changes, and thus the definition of who and what are influential under what
circumstances. For instance, in the description of the first labor strike in

Homestead, for instance, it was clear that the essence of the disagreement had
to do with revolution. The labor organization there was attempting to define
itself as a new and openly threatening body to the existing order. The
existing order was represented in part by the structures and persons holding
offices; that is, the school board and the existing superintendent, and in
addition, the existing order was represented by a revolutionary concern over
who had the rights to enter the arena of decision making in the school
district. There was relatively little educational substance in the Homestead
strike, rather the question had to do with the legitamacy of persons. The
symbols were substantially different in the second Industrial City strike. In
this situation which occurred after some ten years of union domination in the
district, the question of the legitimacy of the teachers' organization and of
its access to the school board and the superintendent was not a question.
Clearly a question were some specific educational objectives and the question
of policy leadership within the district.

Symbols of a grievance change also. Processing grievances is about a
great deal more than assuring compliance with the contract. In the Palermo
district, for instance, the processing of grievances took on important
administrative helper functions.[37] The use of the administrative office from
the Central Office provided training for both employees and more particularly
school-site principals in the administration of collective agreements. His
presence also served as a communicative device for problems which occurred in
the district and which needed to be brought to the attention of the central
office.

By way of contrast, in the Homestead district, grievances were used as a
way of showing the potency of the teacher's organization and thereby

attracting members in a situation where there was a strong challenging

organization at least the possibility on a continuing basis of their being a

strong challenging organization. 'Grievance victories were tauted as "wins;"

there were visible demonstrations of the service of the teachers' organization

to the membership.

Stability Reinforced Through Social Roles

Among the most stabilizing functions of the generations within labor

relations is that for at least a brief period of time, and sometimes for

several years, the social roles of the various actors become stabilized.

People take on social roles essentially through adaptation and reward. Thus

the model of the role episode is similar to the model of Skinnerian training

or adaptation in the pigeon T-maze experiments.

As we noted earlier we found two dominant bargaining styles—distributive

and integrative.[38] Distributive bargaining involves a zero sum game. The

shares that are to be distributed are not thought to be expandable by either

party, and the only question is which of the parties will be most successful

in collecting the larger portion. In the words of one of our negotiators who

reflected on his experiences, "we bargain; they collect." Integrative

bargaining envisions an expandable pool of resources and carries with it a

statement of faith that there are collaborative ends in the bargaining

relationship. As one might expect, the strategy and tactics of integrative

and distributive bargaining are quite different. Integrative bargaining

requires high levels of trust; distributive bargaining does not. Integrative

bargaining requires that the parties freely share information so that new
alternatives may be discovered and solutions to problems previously unknown be
advanced and agreed to.   There is an expectation of discovery.   Conversely,
distributive bargaining treats information as strategic--words not to be
squandered and to be released only when there is the possibility of creating
gain by the use of information.   Partly to achieve control over information,
distributive bargaining requires that the parties maintain tight internal
control.   Strong leadership is necessary to prevent the other party from
"driving a wedge" between the parties.   Information is restricted, and a
premium is put on dutifulness as opposed to ingenuity.   Distributive
bargaining also requires a high level of commitment.   One has to, in
bargaining terms, stake a claim to a particular area or goal and appear to be
firmly committed to it even if the end may be self harmful.   As Schilling
noted in his classic essay on bargaining, one of the greatest powers in
bargaining is that of being able to bind oneself: "the sophisticated
negotiator may find it difficult to seem as obstinate as a truly obstinate
man.   If a man knocks at a door and says that he will stab himself on the
porch unless he is given ten dollars, he is more likely to get ten dollars if
his eyes are bloodshot."[39]

A distributive style leads to a formalization of relationships, a
splitting of shares and a reinforcing of the internal bureaucracy in
organization.   The parties may be either weak or strong, but what they do they
do largely by themselves.   An integrative style leads to frequent
interactions, trust, a perception that the union management relationship is
useful and upon occasion even to genuine interpersonal liking between the
individuals involved.   Palermo offers us an example of the development of

reasonably close relationships in a situation where hostility had reigned only

a few years before. The superintendent and the chief executive of the

teachers' organization are still a bit leary of each other, but they have

found that there are mutual benefits involved.

Stability and Loyalty

Stability of personnel and the establishment of roles eventually leads to

the reestablishment of loyalty, of course in varying degrees, of parties in

the regime one to another. School superintendents and union leaders actually

begin to feel a sense of diffuse involvement with one another, a desire to

protect and to maintain, not simply the existence of the other organization

but maintain the existence of the regime with which they are interacting.

Thus, it is of some concern to teacher union presidents when a superintendent

with whom they have had long relations finds himself in difficulty with the

school board, and by the same token it is a reason for alarm on the part of

school superintendents to find that the current leadership of the teacher's

organization is under fire from the membership itself. This kind of loyalty

can be exhibited in the Riverview case.

Loyalty also exists between teachers or teacher leaders and school-site

principals.[40] It is the existence of this loyalty and stability that in part

sows the seeds of discontent. They become, in the context of our conflict

paradigm, that improper coalition. It is around the improper coalition that

organization of dissent takes place and eventually the conflict paradigm comes

to rise and to swamp the existence of the highly cooperative relationships

which may have been built up during the periods of the generations.

Conclusion

We have layed out two processes--interaction and conflict--each with its own intellectual history and research tradition. Individually, each is a powerful shaper of school organizations, but it is the cycling back and forth between the two that gives educational labor relations what we believe to be its unique cast.

Perhaps because of the extreme decentralization of education in the United States, some 16,000 school districts, school districts are never far from their environments. The political, social and cultural world that exists just beyond the bounds of the formal organization is easily activated. School systems operate within what some writers have called a "zone of tolerance" and others call their culture, limits which if passed cause the activation of "outsiders" external to the school bureaucracy, and as we have earlier suggested, the reformation of coalitions that affirm or deny the legitimacy of the current leadership.[41]

When that structural leadership is changed, through removal or replacement of the school board, the superintendent, important chief negotiators or the leadership of the teacher organization, the micro level accommodative relationships are dashed also, or at least altered. The shift in coalitions and the rise of large scale public conflict puts many of the smaller negotiations in their proper perspective. As one observer of the negotiated order literature noted, "they are highly restricted, shallow, and at times very superficial or temporal in nature. . . ."[42]

Notes

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[2]Ibid., p. 260.

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[5]Richard E. Walton and JRobert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). For other general contributions see: Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations (New York: Academic Press, 1975); Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).

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[7]Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems.

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[11]William J. Grimshaw, Union Rule In The Schools (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1979).

[12]See an expansion of this view in Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy with Charles T. Kerchner, Teachers, Unions and Collective Bargaining in Public Education (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1980), especially Chapter 10. Also see

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[19]Turner, The Structure of Sociological Theory, p. 164.

[20]Strauss, Negotiations..., p. 9-10.

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[23]Cobb and Elder, _Participation in American Politics..._, p. 57.

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[26]Elmer E. Schattschneider, _The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) p. 65.

[27] _Ibid._ p. 68.

[28]Theodore Caplow, _Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966)>

[29]Gouldner, _Industrial Bureaucracy_ p. 182-187.

[30]Caplow, _Two Against One..._ p. 136.

[31]Walton and McKersie, _A Behavioral Theory..._ p. 301, also p. 283-289.

[32]Cobb and Elder, _Participation in American Politics...._ p. 125f.

[33]Walton and McKersie, _A Behavioral Theory..._ p. 250-253.

[34]Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining," in Gerald Zaltman, Philip Kotler and Ira Kaufman, _Creating Social Change_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) p. 338. Reprinted from _American Economic Review_ 46,3(June 1956): 281-306.

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[36] R. Day and J. Day, "A Review of the Current State of Negotiated Order Theory," _Sociological Quarterly_ 18(1977): 126-142, p. 132.

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III.

THE GENERATIONS OF LABOR RELATIONS

In this chapter and the following one we describe the evidence for the
existence of generations in labor relations in public education. The original
concept of the generations came from the case-study sites, where we were
involved for up to 18 months. Thus, much of what we attempted to do at our
survey sites was to collect those data that would help confirm or deny the
existence of generational development, and which would expand our vision about
how a broad range of school districts operate when their teachers organize.

Changes in the primary variables signal a realignment of coalitions which
are involved in triggering events or persons as labor relations moves from
generation to generation.

The First Generation: The Rise of Teacher Voice

It is here that the angry teacher started. Every teacher leader we
talked to throughout the length of two states, every one, had a story about a
particular moment when they were converted from "just being a classroom
teacher" to being a leader of teachers. Individual teachers chose to voice
their concerns. The stories vary, but they all have the same effect of almost
religious conversion:

> Willard McGuire's Story. [McGuire is the president of the
> National Education Assoication] It was in the spring. I
> hadn't been teaching very long, and the school board made
> its decisions about salaries for the next year. Two friends
> of mine that were in their third year of teaching were not
> given tenure, and there wasn't any pretense that they were

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not needed next year. It was just that the school board
didn't want any more tenured teachers. One of the teachers
who was a friend of a board member got the largest raise.
The rest of us got a middle amount, and the old ag teacher
who was about 55 at the time got a tiny raise because the
school board knew he was too old to move on to a new job.

Raoul Teilhet's Story. [Teilhet is the president of the
California Federation of Teachers]. This whole thing
started over textbooks. Max Rafferty was the state school
superintendent, and we had this awful high school social
studies text, unbelievably naive. Our activity started when
a bunch of us gathered together to try to use another one.

These are not events of heroic events. They take place within the framework

of everyday life in schools. They take place in response to person-based

authority, Weber's traditional model. What rules existed often followed the

precepts of Gouldner's mock bureaucracy or his representative bureaucracy.

Superintendents in this era were frequently referred to as patriarchial,

benevolent despots, autocratic, and most often as paternalistic. When teacher

leaders found their voices, superintendents were also seen as the targets. "He

controls the board." [C:19:T] (The coded notation following each quotation

indicates the state, California or Illinois; the district, a nominal number

indicating the district, and whether the comment was from a Teacher,

Superintendent, School Board Member, or Principal.)

Statutes. Issues and Persons as Catalysts

Typically, the adoption of collective bargaining as the mode of teacher

representation came about because of three catalysts, either acting singly or

in combination: first, the passage of statute and acquiescence in its wake,

logrolling of a sort; second, an issue, such as the lack of a salary

increase; third, a person, such as a superintendent around which teachers

organized in opposition.

In some places the acceptance of bargaining was virtually without overt

conflict, either because it was perceived that the law required bargaining or

that it was perceived that to fight bargaining was to invite unwanted

conflict. "We felt we should comply and conform to the whole wave of

bargaining throughout the state, to be in line with it. We didn't feel we had

much choice about it. . . ." [C:29:B] Even in situations where the

superintendent and board personally saw no reason for the teachers to engage

in bargaining, they followed the request for bargaining, "because the CTA

seemed to want it." [C:21:S]

Change because of enabling legislation was most clearly seen in

California districts, but in both states there was an acquired learning about

teacher organizations that had taken place over a number of years. In

Illinois, the learning had more to do with copying other districts that had

engaged in labor relations and giving voice to one's complaints. In

California, districts were brought to the point of accepting labor contractual

bargaining because they had a meet-and-confer statute for 10 years before, and

that there had been mutual socialization to the process of discussing putting

rules down on paper. This practice changed the nature of the school authority

system.

> The Winton Act educated the community and the administration
> and the school board and primarily the teachers on rules, on
> responsibility, on rights, on all the codifying legal
> mandates, so that you tell a teacher now or discuss
> something now such as evaluation, and they all know that May
> 1 is the deadline of the Stull Act by which evaluations must
> be finalized and there's no longer any doubt about who's to
> blame if something doesn't get done.

Many districts expected little change. School boards and superintendents

had met informally with teachers about salaries before, and they did not

expect that bargaining would be much different. In some cases they were

right, at least temporarily. One rural California district appeared virtually

unchanged even through it had carried on bargaining for four years. When

asked for a copy of the contract, the secretary responded with her only copy,

the signed original contract. In four years no one had ever had reason to

make a copy.[C:21] However, pacific employee relations should not necessarily

be associated with small, rural school districts. Less than five miles away

from the district that never copied its contract was a two-school, 175-student

district with a serious labor confrontation between its six teachers and the

district. The full paraphernalia of high conflict was apparent--picketing,

television cameras, newsletters known as "hit sheets", and active teacher

campaigning against the current board and administration. [C:25]

School executives, particularly superintendents, were frequent organizing

targets. While it is true that teacher organizations engage in "painting the

devil" as a standard organizing tactic, the development of activism appeared

as much more a function of local situations and organizing than it did as a

function of assistance from state-wide teacher organizations and the presence

of teacher organization staff members, who were universally known as "outside

agitators." In retrospect, board members and superintendents tend to agree

that the administration was indeed the target, and sometimes a justified one:

> . . . in '67 it looked to me like there had been some
> fairly militant, tough administrators who had not done their
> work in terms of finding accommodation for teachers. And
> that the teachers sued for attention through a strike and
> got a concession [recognition] that was given . . . by the
> president of the board almost all by himself. [I:15:S]

> One of the reasons that Dr. [Jones] was brought in was to .
> . . ramroad through this desegregation program. He made it
> clear that he was in charge and running the shop. If I'd
> been a teacher and heard his introductory remarks to

teachers as they were reported to me, I would have left the
room and tried to organize teachers. [I:3:B]

It was not always the administration alone that was organized against. In one

district, the newer teachers organized against the older ones along with a

principal who had been in the district for 41 years.

> The radical leadership of the union are the kind that never
> had an opportunity to be heard. They are always suspect [by
> the principal], always wondering whether they'd get rehired
> or not or whether he's [the principal] going to step into
> their classroom at any moment and jump on them about
> something or the other.
>
> Well, they are the ones who are the union leadership.
> They're the ones that spend many, many hours in the
> superintendent's conference room discussing everything they
> want about working conditions, etc. And after the old guard
> kept voting down their contract, the next contract they
> wouldn't let the old guard vote any more. [Whether this is
> literally true is not clear.] They had copies of their
> contract proposal made up, passed them out to all their
> members and said, [to the rest], "By the way, if you want a
> copy of this you can buy it." They were in their glory and
> the spotlight. They've got a position of power, of
> leadership, of influence. So, I would say that is the big
> change. [C:23:S]

Sometimes an _issue_ rather than or in addition to a person acts as the

trigger to activism. In one district it was lesson plans [C:23:T]; In another

it was English classes of 42 students [C:22:T]. Frequently it was salary (25

percent below the state average) [C:22:U], the lack of a raise [C:21:T], or

the perception of being "overworked and underpaid" [I:16:T]. Financial

issues, or programmatic ones with fiscal consequences, were frequently

shrouded in distrust. That is, when teachers started asking questions they

found the answers either hard to understand or hard to believe. Consider the

following from a board president in a district where the union organized

partly around the district's one and two percent salary increases and huge

building fund:

> I think the superintendent got them into more trouble than
> they got themselves by making the budget difficult so nobody
> could understand where we were at or what was going on in
> the district financially. The teachers were screaming there
> was money and he would insist there was no money and so on
> and so forth... one of the first things we [the newly
> elected board] insisted on was that we understand every line
> in the budget and that the public understand it. [C:23:T].

A change in personnel frequently acted as a trigger. In one small, rural

district there was an older teacher affectionately called "Mother" by the

other faculty. According to reports, she had determined that a teacher's

contract was not necessary, and the other teachers went along. When she

retired, the first contract was negotiated [C:15:T]. More frequently, a group

of new teachers was hired, such as in the small Illinois district in which,

the triggering event was the hiring of 14 new teachers who persuaded the older

ones to push for recognition, for less paternalism. At the beginning, the

young female teachers who tried to negotiate were not taken seriously. They

were expected to take notes, make coffee, and were disparaged by the

superintendent. This eventually led to picketing and other concerted

activities [I:9].

Along with the emergence of teacher activists, came the development and

recognition of teacher leadership. In some situations this change came about

through a recognition of state and national teacher organizations as important

bodies that teachers ought to listen to. School executives, in particular,

attribute the growth of teacher leadership to the teachers "paying attention

to the union" [C..:]. However, more frequently, the change in leadership is

attributed to a change in the leadership of teacher organizations. The

language system of school people tends to choose words of movement: "young

active leadership" [I:15:T]; "100 percent militant membership . . . most able

leaders" [I:9:B].

Changing superintendents can also act as a trigger. A pattern of trust

and accepted relationships that exists with superintendents sometimes breaks

down when a replacement takes office, and patterns of behavior that were

accepted or tolerated before, no longer are. A union president in Illinois

coupled the addition of new teachers with the change in superintendent as the

events that propelled the teacher organization to ask for its first "real

contract," to replace the loose agreements it had theretofore sought:

> That was also the time we started changing superintendents.
> So we more or less went on the defensive to try and protect
> what we had. The previous superintendent [had] nothing
> written down, and that was fine. We did not know who was
> coming in and . . . O.K. we have this now, we do not want to
> lose it . . . [I:13:T].

The innumerated list of things that the teachers didn't want to lose included

leave days, sick days, salary schedule, class changes, pay for going to

graduate school. Ironically, in the following years of bargaining some of

them were explicitly traded away during negotiations.

Anger and Injustice As Symbols

Injustice is frequently connected with salary; not so much an absolute

salary, but a perception that a norm--frequently one informally

established--had been violated. In one district teachers became militant,

"about two years ago when they gave the administrators two percent more than

the teachers . . . Right then the teachers started getting mad." [C:24:T]

Interestingly, in the same district, the layoff of 175 teachers because of

declining enrollment and declining revenues, was accepted by the teachers with

great frustration but with no particular feeling of injustice. The

superintendent said, "I'm surprised that this school year is ending so

quietly. This shows a lot of professionalism on the part of the staff. You

know, 175 people virtually layed off in two years and no end in sight, its not

a very charming perspective particularly for the younger people." [C:24:S]

The First Intergenerational Period:
The Rise of Radical Leadership and Disturbance

The First Generation draws to a close when teachers break a cultural

taboo about the way "in which teachers ought to act." Unteacherlike action

may take the form of asking for things in the labor contract that "good"

teachers shouldn't want, such as specific hours of work. Or the action may

involve behavior, such as strikes, not associated with legitimate teacher

roles. What follows is a period of mutual delegitimation. School executives

and board members consider teacher organizations as improper constructions

that either do not represent the will of the "really dedicated" teachers or

which is being lead by "radicals", "outsiders," or both. Teacher leadership,

in turn, actually becomes more militant--frequently abrasive in tone and

language, and bold in undertaking actions that would not have been considered

only years before. The legitimacy of management is called into question.

Sometimes it is publically asserted that "this place could run fine without

principals or superintendents."

Passage into the first conflict period is frequently signaled by the

adoption of collective bargaining as the form of interaction between teacher

organizations and school districts, but this is by no means universally the

case. Quite frequently, the change from non-bargaining to bargaining status

takes place quietly, as noted above, and the crisis occurs later--during the

negotiation of the first or subsequent contract.

> [We had] a very simple recognition agreement (in 1965) but
> it was a written agreement . . . and we were one of the
> first. But we got into a more sophisticated agreement
> later, in '69.

However, the district did go through a crisis a decade later. As the

superintendent reported: "We had a long, drawn-out, heated bargaining when

they brought in a big [state teacher organization] master contract package,

and our present contract is shaped around that. They did negotiate major

changes." [I:21:S]

School boards, particularly in blue collar towns, are often receptive to

the idea of unions as a way of "spelling things out", of rationalizing work,

or of recognizing the inherent right of workers to organize. Even in

relatively small towns with close-knit social systems, this appeared to be

true:

> A. The teacher formed a committee and came to the board and
> said they would like to negotiate their salaries and the
> board said fine . . . it's just a close little family
> here.
>
> Q. There wasn't the sense that father's judgement is being
> questioned?
>
> A. Oh, no; we all understood the fact that they would like
> to have more say as far as salaries and things like
> that, and when they asked for it, we gave it to them. I
> believe that there is a place for negotiations between
> the board and the staff [I:13:B].

In white collar towns, there was less understanding and frequently the

ideological opposition to the idea of unions. In rural towns, this

opposition was sometimes extreme, the polar position probably being

represented by a farmer board member in an area of California where the United

Farm Workers had been actively organizing. During an interview, he stopped

the flow of questions midstream, and slammed his fist down on the restaurant

table where we were meeting and shouted: "They're all bandits: anyone who

would ask a public school for more money is a bandit" [C:25:B].

The irony of the ideological support for unions in blue collar towns is

that there is also a firmly fixed notion of what workers are like and an

identification of teachers with that idea. Thus, blue collar towns, more than

white collar ones, tend to resist the expansion of the subjects of bargaining,

or generally tend to be unsympathetic with the pleas of teachers that they are

being overworked and underpaid. "Sure they don't make much, but it's not like

working shifts [in a factory]," noted one board member [I:Tipid Village:B].

One of the most hostile board members toward teachers we met was a business

agent for the electrical workers union local. He thought that the teachers

were illegitimate because they asked for a share in determining how the school

should be run, something that "real" workers don't ask for.

Alternative Patterns

Occasionally when the First Intergenerational Conflict begins prior to

official recognition, there is an effort to stop the unionization process, but

only very occasionally. The process of active opposition has taken place most

frequently in Illinois, where there is no statutory requirement that teacher

organizations be recognized as bargaining agents if they so wish. Thus,

frequently, a concerted activity, such as a recognition strike is required to

demonstrate teacher solidarity, but the presence of the strike itself violates

taboos on teacher behavior.

Quite infrequently, school board and superintendents decide specifically

that they will engage in a campaign to defeat collective bargaining--in

California an active "no agent" campaign. One California district became

quite notable for having done this. The superintendent reported that, "We

immediately decided that we were going to try to talk to teachers, try to keep

collective bargaining away, which we feel is an adversary position, and we

were going to see if we could depend on our past established

competency--dealing with each other and the team work concept--to avoid

collective bargaining" [C:5:S]. The district had decided on a list of

specific goals, the predominant one being the improvement of reading scores.

Schools are run on a highly competitive basis with inter- and intra-school

competition for spelling, reading and other scholastic skills as well as the

more traditional athletic competition. The superintendent, who is known as

"the general" commands an "army" of soldiers all deployed around specific

targets. The language of the administration was rife with metaphors of attack

teams, blue squads, red squads, and the nurse corps (special education)

designed to patch up the wounded and get them back into the war on illiteracy.

In this environment, collective bargaining was not readily accepted, and thus

far the superintendent has been successful in satisfying the needs of teachers

in such a way that a militant organization never formed.

Hore frequently, the lack of union formation is one of direct

relationships between superintendent and teachers, which is often, in turn,

associated with school district size. As a board member in a district of 36

teachers put it:

> I think that (money is) a silly issue anyway . . . you take
> a look at the salary range for a county, which is the only
> thing we can compare (the district) with . . . and the
> spread is only plus or minus 10 percent. The remaining
> things have to do with the education process. I have a
> feeling when a district gets to a certain size, it doesn't
> work like a town hall democracy anymore. I see board

members (from big districts) and they have a set agenda, and
the superintendent presents a set agenda and they accept or
reject . . . and that's all they do.   Rarely does the
superintendent enter a classroom in those districts . . .
there's lots of bureaucrats at the top [I:17:B].

In our sample, there have been one or two other dramatic cases of

deliberate organizing styles in which teacher organizations have real

authority but do not rely heavily on collective bargaining or affiliation with

state or national teacher organizations.   In one district, the teachers

organization has not sought bargaining because it has a strong,

university-style faculty senate.   The senate has real authority over the

curriculum, and more importantly it carries the educational ethos of the

community, one which has a tradition of support for public education and for

high standards that spans more than 60 years.   It is the type of place that

allows the president of the senate to say without exaggeration, "When a new

superintendent comes in, we have some rough times. We have to educate him.

Sometimes we have to tell him 'that's not the way things are done around

here.'   Sometimes we have to tell him three or four times, but eventually he

listens" [I:12:T].

In two other districts, the superintendents have developed such rich,

diffuse relationships with faculty organizations, that the collective

bargaining aspects of that relationship are barely visible.   In one, the

teacher organization is run as a local, in another it is affiliated with one

of the national teacher organizations, but is fiercely independent in its

actions and policy setting [I:8; C:31].   There is a tendency in the labor

literature to describe such operations as "company unions" because they often

appear to be dominated by the management or, at least to appear to share

central goals and operate without rancor.   We are persuaded that this is not

the case in any of the three districts considered here. Faculty in all three
have substantial amounts of individual autonomy, substantially more
independent ability to determine curriculum and freedom of movement about time
on campus and related affairs than do teachers in many strong bargaining
districts. Moreover, their organizations are vital and strong and powerful.
They have simply followed a different drummer, and circumstances have
permitted the growth of such teacher organizations.

There have also been districts in which changes in the administration
defused the drive toward collective bargaining. One teacher representative
from a non-bargaining district reported that the appointing of a new "fair,
consistent" superintendent had stopped any emotional appeal that the teacher
organization might have had and that employee relations in the district were
the best that they had been in a decade [I:27:T].

The Painful Establishment of Teacher Organization Legitimacy

The aforementioned efforts at stopping unions are rare. The statistics
on the unionization of school districts, which show that over 90 percent of
the districts with more than 1,000 students are organized, show at a glance
that the more usual pattern is to adjust to the presence of teacher
organizations. The process of adjusting is frequently prolonged and painful.
The story of the initial adjustment and eventual legitimation of the teacher
organization is the story told by the First Intergenerational Conflict.

Board members, at first, feel enveloped with conflict and the breakdown
of old modes of communication. Their nearly universal perception is that most
of the teachers don't really want collective bargaining, and that the tensions
produced by bargaining are quite harmful.

> Most of the personnel even will say "Gee, I wish we could
> speak to you personally," but they can't. Some say,
> "[Susan] this is dumb . . . let's do this and that," and we
> could [in former times] say, "yeh, let's do that, that, and
> that," but [such a conversation would be] committing a wrong
> if it was done under collective bargaining. We have to look
> at each other and gnash teeth, and its not right.
>
> I've had teachers come to me and say, "God, I wish this
> thing would end; let's sit down quitely and let's get back
> to the old way of doing things--not this collective
> bargaining. [C:27:B]

But things do not return to the old way. The phrase that school people
use in describing the situation is "putting the genie back in the bottle." We
have seen some notable attempts to stuff the genie, but we have not
encountered a single successful attempt to return to a relationship that
existed before the teachers raised the twin issues of dignity and protection.

Some districts stay in the first crisis period for a prolonged period,
however, because one party or the other cannot terminate the legitimacy issue.
In one district, the teachers have not come to grips with establishing a
legitimate relationship with the superintendent because the teacher's union
only represents 53 percent of the faculty and is under constant pressure from
a rival organization. In another district, both the superintendent and the
school board have attempted for the past three years to take the district back
to a non-bargaining status. It has been unsuccessful, but the district has
not moved forward in the relationship with the teachers because each of the
parties has had reasons for not wanting to. Radical board members find
flaying the teacher organization to be a good campaign technique, but they
have made only half-hearted and ineffectual efforts at decertification, and
while there have been statements about "getting" the union leadership, there
has never been so much as the circulation of a decertification petition. The
superintendent holds his position partly through verbal opposition to the

teacher organization, and through not wanting to appear "soft on labor." The
union president uses his position of being attacked to draw additional support
to the organization, by making appeals that the administration is really
anti-teacher.

Accompanying the decline in legitimation of the teacher organization, is
a decline in the trust and credence given to information. Teachers complain
about not being able to talk with school board members. School board members
report fear of being sued or charged with an unfair labor practice if they say
the wrong things [C:27:B].

The Expansion of Dignity and Protection

One small California district illustrates the expansion of the dignity
and protection symbols. There was a strong felt need for protection and
certainty, "instead of operating in this nebulous cloud of the principal
saying: 'today we do this and without question you do it.'" The teachers
sought a contract, according to the union president, because they, "just
wanted a little bit more autonomy in their professional lives. I don't think
we were trying to shirk any responsibility or trying to get anything that we
didn't feel was ours; it was just that we wanted to know in writing--there are
our responsibilities and these are our rights." [C:7:T]

Closely linked to the question of protection is the decline in trust.
Verbal assurances that the teachers had rights were no longer sufficient.
Information, itself, became suspect, or as one union leader put it: "I always
try to consider the ulterior motive that (the administration) has for doing
something." [C:24:T] One union president found protection in the bargaining
contract and reform of school finance procedures:

> there's a lot of information in this district that has been
> unethical, outright lies have been told and written--this
> has happened for the last 10 years. With the new budget
> procedures, and computerized budget analysis (which the
> state teacher organization provides its members) we know
> where the district is. [C:22:T]

He continued saying that the teachers could get the information before

collective bargaining, but that they couldn't do anything with it.

Interestingly, board members and administrators also repeatedly told us

about abuses that led to teachers feeling their dignity had been violated and

which subsequently led to their rightful unionization . . . but these

transgressions always occurred in other school districts. Superintendents in

cities would decry the ignorance and capriciousness of school operations in

small towns. Those in the country understood full well why city teachers

needed protection from their giant bureaucracies. For them, unions were a

fine idea, so long as they were located somewhere else.

Declining Trust and the Role of Radical Leadership

Universally, as this process continues, the teachers are considered as

militant and their leaders as radical. However, there was no universal

standard for either militancy or radicalism in terms of set behaviors. Some

"radicals" advocated strike, others didn't. Some were strong and well

organized; others weren't. The importance of the label "radical" lies in the

perception on the part of board and administration that teachers were behaving

in inappropriate ways.

The response was frequently confused and inconsistent, actions often not

matching words, strategies not matching voiced values. Consider, for example,

the situation of the superintendent who wanted to preserve a close,

comfortable relationship with his teachers. He repeatedly told us that he

wanted to rid himself of the the union, and that he had a plan to do that "by

1984." At the same time, the superintendent moved heavily in using the

collective bargaining contract as a means of managing the district, something

that usually doesn't happen until the Third Generation. He exchanged a

binding arbitration clause into the teacher contract, a concession that many

other superintendents and boards vigorously oppose, in order to get a teacher

evaluation clause that denies salary step advances to teachers who receive

unsatisfactory ratings. In retrospect, the superintendent is happy with the

bindi.. a. itration clause, too, because the teachers lost their first

arbitration and do not have a sufficient treasury to pay the arbitrators fees

in many more cases.

The superintendent has adopted the mechanism and the utility of

collective bargaining without adopting its ideology. He and the school board,

for instance are perfectly willing to bargain hard, cynically calculate

relations with his teachers, yet to decry the lack of close and trusting

relationships that they felt before:

> They (the teachers) wanted control, and I don't know exactly
> what that means. In a way its tragic, and in a way its
> humorous. In the first-go-round we were very restrained,
> aloof from them, we really played the game all the way. I
> believe that we did that because they wanted it that way.
> They wanted the game and made us take an adversarial role,
> which made us very aloof. In this adversary role, they
> really hurt themselves because they immediately sat down and
> negotiated on a very open basis where if right at the
> beginning, they would have found that our offer would have
> been about two percent higher (than the actual settlement).
> [C:19:B]

> I think it bothered them. They're stance was to have hard
> nose negotiation, but they've never had the manpower. I've
> used my principals, they've never had the manpower. When
> things bog down, I throw a lawyer at them--a lawyer can come
> in and walk circles around them. . . . [C:19:S]

Teachers have no corner on militancy in the First Intergenerational

Conflict. School boards tend to err toward being too zealous or too anxious

about loosing the close "family" relationship they had before or perceived

they had before. As zealots, school board members become forceful in

protection of their unilateral decision making status--sometimes to the extent

of forming a moderate group of teachers into a highly cohesive, forceful

organization. Those who long for the family relationship frequently put their

sentiments into contractual language, only to find later that the meaning of

contract and the meaning of intention are quite different.

Increasing Conflict Leading to Conflict

Conflict continues to rise and to become more public until it terminates,

typically, in a sharply defined issue or event. Resolution of that issue or

event has the effect of legitimating the existence of the union and setting up

the importance of conflict resolution as an important criteria in school

district governance. Sometimes the turning-point issue or event is a strike

or demonstration, sometimes it is the settlement of a hard-fought contract, or

the acceptance of a contested item into the contract, sometimes it involves a

change in personnel.

The crisis event was found in every one of the school districts that

subsequently displayed the characteristics of Second Generation labor

relations. That is, we found no place that behaved like a Second Generation

labor relations district, which had not first been through the First

Intergenerational Conflict. However, the crises varied substantially in

scope, duration and intensity. The key to the event is not the intensity, but

its meaning. For the relevant districts, everyone in the district agreed that

the same event signaled a turn in labor relations. There was meaning attached

to the event. In Thrasher, the event was the superintendent's acceptance of a

substantial policy document that effectively recognized the teacher

organization's interest in curriculum and evaluation matters. The subsequent

activity represents an attempt to delegitimize rather than prevent legitimacy

from being granted in the first place. In other sites, the crisis turned

over changes in personnel. In Palermo, both the chief negotiator for the

district and the president of the union left their positions in the wake of a

particularly hostile strike. The change in the tone of labor relation took

place almost immediately after successors were named.

Thus, it is the symbolism of the crisis--the meaning that people in

retrospect attach to events--that gives those events significance in the life

of a school district. For that reason, happenings as mundane as a one-hour

walkout were taken as the event that legitimized teachers:

> Q. There had been a strike?
>
> A. Yes, it was a one-period kind of thing where we were
> backing our negotiator who had given us some information and
> there was a lot of rumor going around; so everyone simply
> stepped out onto the tennis courts for a few moments for
> some explaination. That sent a lot of administrators into .
> . . applexy . . . is probably a good word for it. It was
> always the rallying point from that time forward. . . .
> "Remember the Tennis Courts" (was) like "Remember the
> Alamo." [I:16:T]

Public Involvement. Labor conflict becomes public during the First

Intergenerational Conflict. Usually the teachers enlarge the scope of the

conflict by taking their story to the community, particularly the parents.

They use newsletters, involve themselves in school board elections, and during

times of disturbance hold meetings in order to get their "story" across.

Community involvement expands rapidly in crisis situations, the most dramatic

of which is the strike. Strikes attract press and television coverage;

parents, sometimes by the hundreds, come to school board meetings; and

frequently outsiders intervene directly in the bargaining or organizing

process, as in Homestead where:

> After the strike had been underway for severa.. days three
> ministers from the community came to the school board
> meeting. The meeting was packed, and tempers ran high. The
> ministers got up and offered to mediate the strike, in fact
> told the school board that they were going to try to mediate
> the strike. "The immediate response from the school board
> was, "Sit down and shut up." Now, you just don't say that
> to a minister in this town.
>
> Later, a formal mediation process was asked for by ourselves
> and [the teacher's organization]. The panel included a
> state representative and a state senator with no love for
> this school district or the current superintendent . . . a
> man with enormous political ambition. Didn't you know that
> we had publicity about that. [C:Homestead:A]

Strikes automatically draw attention, and the effects of that attention are

difficult to control. As was the case above, quite frequently the public

attitude was a "Pox on both your houses." For a number of reasons, not all

related to employee relations, the district has had a very difficult time

securing public confidence or support since the first strike some years ago.

Hore frequently, teachers go public in order to build coalitions.

Parents often tip the balance giving the teachers potency, if not legitimacy

in the eyes of the administration. In one small town, teachers organized

40-50 parents who subsequently tried to meet with the superintendent in an

effort to resolve the growing differences between the superintendent and the

teachers. He refused to meet with them. The parents then agreed with the

teachers to hold school in their homes in the event of a strike, and the

teachers agreed to meet home study classes without pay. The district would,

of course, have lost a substantial chunk of state support money (which is

based on Average Daily Attendance). The coalition was successful and terms

more palatable to the teachers were agreed to by the board and superintendent,

who said later, "They had the advantage by using the parents . . . there was

a big crowd for a small town." [C:22:A]

As the conflict broadens, the reasonableness of the administration

becomes an issue, and then finally the existence of the conflict itself

becomes the issue. Continued conflict begins to make the administration look

arbitrary, or at least not very skilled. As one teacher in a tiny district

put it, "The people around here have little truck with unions, but they're

starting to ask why the superintendent can't keep six teachers in line."

[C:25:T] Indeed, many of the teachers' complaints draw a responsive chord

from parents, and often from board members, as we noted in earlier sections.

What the teachers wanted "sounded all nice and reasonable." [I:15:B]

If conflict continues, public pressure builds to solve or end the

conflict. In the First Intergenerational period, as has widely been

illustrated in the labor relations literature, that there is vast public

support for labor peace and for the continuation of services. · The short

term result of that sentiment is to give organized teachers the upper hand.

The contractual gains made during the First Intergenerational Conflict are

often not substantial. However, even when contractual assurances are

important, they are often temporary. Even the most powerful and notorious of

teacher organizations, those in the big cities, have been largely unable to

protect their members against the effects of urban economic cutbacks against

shifting population demographics that have cost thousands of teachers their

jobs, stifled chances of promotion, and dampered wage increases for a decade.

However, the long term importance of pressure for labor peace is of great

importance. The criteria for good management are changed shifting from the

ability to control organizational outputs and processes to the ability to

manage conflict. A solution to the First Conflict is a signal that the

difference between teachers and the school district as an organization are

proper and legitimate, and that it is the responsibility of school managers to

settle those differences avoiding public conflict. One superintendent

describes the pressure for settlement:

> Last year we got to the point where the teachers went public
> in a sense, you know, they advertised my salary in the
> newspaper, they carried on open communications with the
> community--you get the half-truths in the bulletins from the
> teachers. And we as a district quite frankly retaliated. .
> . I think in many ways it tore the community up.
>
> It was more of a dis-ease kind of thing. . . . I had a
> number of coffee klatches, O.K., to involve the community,
> and I think they did the same kind of thing. . . . I don't
> think that either side garnered any large support . . . we
> didn't get a lot of support.
>
> [The] Chamber (of Commerce) and Rotary and so on, would be
> somewhat supportive of administration, but I think that a
> distaste for the conflict was what was going on. [C:19:S]

   Turnover of Individuals. Frequently the First Intergenerational Conflict

involves changes in the individuals involved in labor relations. Negotiators

for both labor and management frequently leave, or are discharged. There are

primarily two reasons for individuals leaving involuntarily during the First

Intergenerational Conflict. First, they leave because individuals are

themselves a symbol of the old order in which teacher organizations could not

be recognized. Second, people leave because they cannot adapt their behaviour

to those required in the new situations. Sometimes both reasons are

applicable.

One superintendent attempted to end the First Intergenerational Conflict

by firing his attorney whose presence had become a public issue in a board

election. "He's competent, but the air is so poisoned that he has to go;

better him than me." In another district the teacher organization president

left office and management's negotiator suddenly quit in the middle of a

strike. These personnel turnovers formed the symbolism that the order of

things had changed. The superintendent and the teacher organization executive

director were both able to continue in their offices and began to rebuild

their personal working relationship [C:Palermo].

Often the turnover comes about because the incumbents in positions during

the high conflict period cannot adjust their normative perceptions about what

ought to be done to the realities of making peace and carrying on a longer

term stable relationship. As one state teacher organization leader put it:

> I constantly have to remind my leaders that the object of
> the game is to reach fruitful agreements, and to develop a
> relationship that might go beyond the contract. And they
> respond, "Yeh, sure; just as soon as I kill the bastard
> (superintendent)."

Often there are internal, teacher organization, elections in which the

militants are removed from office. The teachers require militant leadership

in order to get organized, but they tire of it. As in the case of one

long-fought and public negotiation:

> Well, the upshot of it all, it ticked off some teachers and
> they threw the negotiating panel out, and they established a
> new negotiating panel, and at that point we got some
> moderates in . . , and we settled just like that. [C:19:S]

Conflict fades at the end of the First Intergenerational period. The

symbolism attached to the removal of individuals, the distaste for public

conflict, or the resolution of a key issue has the effect of lowering the

tension and paving the way for the Second Generation of bargaining.

The Second Generation: The Era of Good Faith Bargaining

Changes in behavior and attitude by school superintendents signal the
readiness to end the First Generational Crisis. When those changes are
perceived by the teachers organization and accepted as genuine, the crisis
period of high conflict ends and labor relations enters the Second Generation.
As much as anything, the parties cannot endure conflict, and "try to find a
different kind of working relationship. It wasn't working for her (the union
president), it wasn't working for the board, and it wasn't working for me."
[C:25:S]

The Second Generation is characterized as the "era of good faith
bargaining." The warfare stops, and a very cautious mating dance begins. The
victory that the teachers organization has won is legitimacy, a recognition
that it has a rightful position as the agent for teachers. Once the teachers
organization has been accepted, it is very difficult to politically or
psychologically move back to the First Generation. Two processes take place
in the Second Generation. The first is routinization of the relationship
between labor and management, which means that both sides accept particular
norms about their behavior and that they gain expertise in those areas. Areas
of conflict are more defined, and the means of settlement more routinized.
Areas of common concern are discovered, and cooperative relationships often
formed in those areas. Conflict is focused on the scope of bargaining, not
the existence of bargaining itself.

Expertise and Bargaining Norms. Genuine expertise grows rapidly, and

with expertise comes strong beliefs about what constitutes "good labor
relations." In the social sense, mutual accommodation is taking place. The
parties are learning from their environments and their experiences.
Particularly early in the bargaining relationship a bargainers definition of a
"good" contract had its roots outside the school district in question. Both
management and labor were substantially influenced by their training and
personal beliefs. They were influenced, also, by teacher or management
organization contracts, settlements in surrounding districts and practices in
the private sector. Key concepts drawn from these environments tended to
drive the selection of bargaining priorities and the will to pursue them. The
environment governed to a far greater degree than did a consideration of the
problems of the particular school district.

As bargaining continues through a number of contracts, negotiators gain
the skill to determine what contract modifications they really need, and also
a sense of the emotional or symbolic content of particular offers or demands.
Take the negotiation of binding arbitration of grievances, for example. There
tends to be a movement from opposition on ideological grounds to acceptance on
pragmatic ones. In the former period superintendents typically say, "If we
ever give that away they can have the whole store; I couldn't manage a school
district that way." The latter maintains:

> Hey, before binding arbitration, we had a lot of grievances
> because it was a hassle . . . Now it has to be before an
> arbitrator and it going to cost them (the teachers) $500
> every time they go. [C:19:S]

Just as it is clear that norms develop about bargaining, it is equally
clear that negotiators in different districts reach different norms. We found
five distinct sets of normative rules for bargaining. The first view,

graphically portrayed by one state teacher organization staff negotiator, and less dramatically embraced by many individuals, is what we came to call "pursuing the ideal contract." This negotiator believed that he personally understood best what a "good contract" should contain and thus what teachers should demand (and what they could expect to get) during negotiations. As a result of this attitude, he spent at least as much time negotiating with his teacher team as he did with management negotiators, frequently telling them that they did not really need some contractual changes they were seeking. Because of his firmly fixed notion of the ideal contract, he also felt free to alter contract proposals while in the midst of a bargaining session without calling for a caucus with the rest of the teacher team members.

A very different set of norms was embraced by another professional teacher negotiator who holds what we called a "give-and-take" view about how to negotiate. This negotiator held to the view (generally shared by the manager with whom he was negotiating) that bargaining proceeds by each side putting a complete set of initial demands on the table and then sequentially closing the distance between the proposals by demanding something less each time management offered something more. Thus, for example, the teachers proposed a 30-cents-per mile reimbursement for required travel. Management countered with the 17 cents they had been paying. The teachers then reduced their proposal each time management raised their offer until a 21-cents-per-mile compromise was achieved. This negotiator spent a lot of time in caucus session with the teacher team, saying something like, "Management has shown some movement on this or that demand; what will we offer in return?" The district eventually had a strike because management reached the upper limit of their salary range long before the teachers had moved down

to the same level. Because of the give-and-take norms of the chief teacher
negotiator, it seemed both possible and necessary to hold the line on the last
teacher demand until management increased their offer. The strike was settled
when management, for the first time in the district's history, offered a
salary increase larger than the board initially agreed to in its preliminary
planning and the teachers were able to accept it as a compromise.

A third set of negotiating process norms were embraced by another teacher
organization professional who viewed himself as responsible for clarifying and
reinforcing the demands of the teacher bargaining team rather than moving
negotiators toward agreement. He worked to "rally the troops" and spent his
time in the teacher team caucus explaining the legitimacy of specific teacher
proposals and encouraging team members to hold fast to their resolve not to
give in too easily. This strategy also led to a strike in a district where
teachers had told us at the outset that teachers would not support a strike.
By persistent attention to the development of teacher support for their
bargaining team, this negotiator played an important role in creating needed
rank-and-file commitment.

A fourth set of procedural strategies was embraced by one local union
president who told us that the teachers had estimated carefully just how much
the management negotiators could give before the school board would reject
rather than ratify the contract. This negotiator fixed his sights on a "zone
of tolerance" settlement he thought to be just above what the board members
would like to approve but within the range they would, "however reluctantly,
still vote to accept rather than take a strike." This district, although it
has experienced numerous strikes in the past, settled quickly this year. The
zone of tolerance approach worked well because the teachers had good

information on each board member's attitudes and commitments.

A fifth set of process norms and strategies was displayed by one superintendent who utilized "package bargaining." This superintendent repeatedly put various teacher proposals together with various management proposals and offered to accept the set of proposals as a package--if the teachers would not alter any of the items. Unfortunately, this superintendent did not go to the table himself, his chief negotiator did not know how to deal conceptually with the bargaining packages which he presented to the teachers, and the teachers did not understand how to do package bargaining very well. As a result, both the teachers and the managers in this district thought that the other side was not being serious in their efforts to reach agreement.

Problems of misperception regarding the meaning and intent of the opposing team were, we found, quite widespread. Moreover, we noted that the risks of misunderstanding were not equally distributed. If teacher organization negotiators appear confused and incompetent, there is a tendency by management to excuse them as either "inexperienced" or "not representative" of the teachers as a whole. If management negotiators show poor judgment or bad faith, however, teachers tend to interpret this as a glimpse into the "true character" of the district's managerial leaders rather than excusing or ignoring it as an indication of ineptitude or misunderstanding. Thus, school managers run substantially higher risks of doing serious damage to working relationships in the district by poorly handling contract negotiations than do teacher organizations.

Regardless of what bargaining norm is established, certain individuals within school districts and teacher organizations become acknowledged experts in collective bargaining. They acquire specific knowledge of the law and

training in the tactics and strategy of bargaining. More importantly, they

learn to trust their own instincts and experience about how to bargain and

what to ask. This has been particularly tough for teachers because of growing

inflation and shrinking tax revenues, particularly in California where the

districts have suffered from Proposition 13 and the state's other tax

limitation measures.

> I sent him (the superintendent) a letter stating that we
> felt that due to the present money situation which was
> coming down from Sacramento, we had a pretty good idea of
> what the district gets in the way of money . . . and that
> we're not interested in playing a game. Ten percent was a
> fair figure. I know that when we came to the table that the
> attorney (for management) had been told that if he could
> settle for seven, do it.

The attorney came to the table and offered six percent, the teacher

leader responded with seven and one-half, and the matter was settled. The

teacher leader points to the settlement with pride contrasted with a

surrounding district where the teachers began at 20 percent and ended up

settling for five. [C:30:T]

Local teachers organizations also frequently gain independence in

operation from the state organization. "The CTA (California Teacher's

Association) would probably say that our (contract) is a long way (from

ideal). We say that as long as it works for us it's an ideal contract . . .

and it works for us." CTA is pretty benign. They are available for help when

we go to them." [C:15:T]

Expertise tends to nurture itself. Once a person is acknowledged as

having special knowledge and skill at labor relations, questions about labor

relations tend to flow to them, they gain more experience and hence more

expertise. It also establishes the condition in which experts deal with one

another, and the stage is set for the privatization of labor relations.

Acceptance of the Structure of Labor Relations

School districts react to the presence of teacher organizations by
establishing procedures and communication channels for interacting with the
labor organization at each level of the school heirarchy. The "technical"
level of negotiation and contract administration has drawn the most attention,
and has been one of the few growth industries within education. Of greater
importance to the movement of labor relations through the generations is the
acknowledgement of the teacher organization as a fait acompli at the political
level in which school board members begin to seek normalization with teacher
leaders, and at the executive level where superintendents seek to manage labor
relations through interaction with teacher leadership and teacher leaders seek
the same means of influencing the administration. Often least recognized, and
last to develop, are the relationships that develop within school buildings
between teachers active in the union, often the official "building rep" and
the school site principal.

Among the most important operating changes, particularly at the school
site level, is the use of the grievance mechanism. The grievance machinery
standard to labor relations contract administration is far from universally
used. We found many of our study districts had no written grievances, and
others had very few. But where the grievance process was used, it was highly
influential in changing the relationship between teachers and their employer,
and in establishing the importance of the teacher organization.

On the face of it, the right to grieve adds teeth to the contract, a
means of enforcing that which has been agreed to and defining that which is

vague. However, it does far more that that. The right to grieve socializes

teachers into the use of the teacher organization to resolve work-related

problems, and establishing a new authority system at the school site level,

and a communications system that often bypasses the building principal. Among

teachers we studied, the decision to use the grievance process rather than

deciding to strike was the first expression of militancy and involvement in

the teachers organization. Other teachers provide an enabling function by

admitting the filing of grievances to the accepted actions of fellow teachers.

As one grandmotherly type was overheard to say in a teachers lounge, "Honey,

you don't have to put up with that horse poo anymore; you can file a

grievance."

Because of the grievance mechanism the teacher organization building

representative takes on importance as an alternative to the principal for

problem solving and for communicating with the central office. And just as

the evaluation mechanism has historically been a means for the principal to

discipline and socialize teachers, the grievance mechanism has become a means

for teachers to socialize and discipline principals. Even the threat of a

grievance can be powerful, as we found in one of our large city school sites.

Our initial impression was that relations there were remarkably pacific. In

fact, only four written grievances were filed that year. We soon found out,

however, that the district maintained a full-time employee whose sole function

was to answer complaints and resolve disputes at school sites before they

became grievances. Thus, in that school district, the _threat_ of a grievance

was sufficient to obtain the intervention of a central office staff member and

to enlist his support in the behavioral modification of the school principal.

Grievances are also powerful agenda builders. In a world in which

managerial time and attention are scarce, the ability to file a grievance, which under the terms of the contract require an answer, is a powerful attention getting force. Whether the administration wants them to or not, grievances work their way into the agenda. In addition, grievances are an inherent communications device. They display discontent, point to problem areas in the district, and particularly in smaller school districts, they quickly gain the attention of the superintendent and the school board.

Finally, the grievance clause enables teachers to engage in what James Kuhn calls "fractional bargaining." The term means the ability of small work groups to negotiate for themselves to obtain changes in work rules or conditions. Most working condition complaints can be couched in terms of health or safety violations or as unilateral changes in working conditions, both of which are frequently grievable. Thus, teachers possessing a strong grievance clause and the ability to undertake the arbitration process, approach site principals with a substantial amount of leverage when they go to talk informally about changes they would like to see at the school. They go armed with the implied threat of a grievance, which if filed is costly to the principal's time and in some districts brings negative attention to the school site. (There are also cases in which management applaudes grievances because it sees them as the hallmark of backbone and managerial aggressiveness.)

In some cases explicit waivers of the contract are negotiated during the period of contract, not at the next negotiations cycle. One superintendent, after having been approached by the teacher organization, agreed to change work rules provided that the membership of the organization would sign a contract waiver. The change will likely be incorporated in the contract during renegotiation. [C:30:S]

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The Symbol of the Scope of Bargaining

The scope of bargaining becomes a central concern because management adopts the attitude that "the shortest contract is the best one." Despite the fact that almost every study undertaken of the dynamics of bargaining shows that the scope of contractual agreements tends to expand over time, the fight over the scope of bargaining is a fight in earnest. Although on the surface, a fight about where a decision is to be made has little relationship to the outcome of the decision, the two are indeed linked. Each party to the labor-management relationship attempts to move decisions to the arena in which it has the greatest potential influence. Management, for its part, attempts to hold on to the discretion that is associated with bureaucratic or administrative decision making, and these are precisely the areas of decision making that most impinge on individual teacher autonomy, thus propelling labor to seek to broaden the scope of bargaining.

Teacher organizations are also propelled by the political necessities of their organization. Success in a teacher organization is frequently measured by the relative status of their contract compared with those in other school districts. It is thus a matter of substantial pride and status to negotiate a "full" contract. Moreover, the leadership of the teacher organization is under constant pressure from the membership to bring in more substance to the agreement, and to have the agreement speak to issues that are on the member's minds. During recent periods of contracting enrollments, for instance, reduction-in-force clauses and agreements about transfer rights of teachers to leave or stay in particular schools have been high up in teacher organization bargaining agendas. The transfer issue particularly sets the stage for a

classic confrontation between discretion and autonomy:

> . . . The superintendent has indicated over and over that
> they want more flexibility in sending them (teachers)
> wherever they want to send them. Teachers resent the
> ability of the district to pull you out because you don't
> smile pretty, or you don't comb your hair right . . . and
> that's the way it used to be when I first came to the
> district. . . . We expect to have a dogfight about it.
> [I:6:T]

So, the question becomes, where will the conflict be taken? In the example

above, the teachers perceived a long history of transferring troublesome

teachers, particularly activists, from "good" (upper class) schools to others

considered not so good. In this instance, the transfer issue was one of the

organizing points for teachers, and they were subsequently able to negotiate

the terms of transfer into their contract.

Ly isolating the conflict around the scope issues and their resolution

through negotiation, the parties make available other channels of

communication and cooperation. Management leads in adopting the tactic of

managing around the contract through a variety of other decision mechanisms in

which the teacher organization becomes involved.

Informal consultation becomes an important mode of interaction.

Administrators begin to take information to teacher organization officers who,

significantly, become recognized as leaders, thus adding a new word to the

lexicon of education. "Yes, I work with the union leader, to make him aware

of problems." [C:22:S] The consultative relationship can, sometimes, become

quite extensive. Some superintendents meet weekly with the teacher leadership

and have an entirely unstructured agenda for doing so. Cooperation can also

turn to collaboration, a subject to which we will turn shortly.

Growing trust, iterative behavior and increasing mutual knowledge of one

another allow labor and management to enter into the sorting process that

picks through the issues or concerns of mutual gain and those over which there

is a permanent or long standing division of shares. One school board

president describes the process:

> I think that in all due modesty, prior bargaining teams had
> not been willing to listen to the teachers so there had been
> some build-up of petty issues that really didn't, when you
> got down to it, amount to any significant changes. They
> could be resolved without any real loss. So, I don't
> anticipate that many of those kinds of issues will come back
> this year. [I:21:B]

The board president, the manager of a manufacturing concern, went on to

describe his style of negotiating. He used the entire summer to listen to

teachers non-money complaints and issues, few of which were settled in the

contract, but most all of which were responded to by the administration and

the board in some manner. His sense of negotiations is that there is little

chance of a money settlement until September, because there is no deadline

pressure to settle until then. So, he talks about all the non-money issues

that the teachers want to discuss because "I don't intend to talk about money

until there is some chance for settlement." He continued:

> I believe we never . . . resolve issues until about the time
> school starts, and you know, by the ultimate leverage, when
> teachers are not in school . . . we can't lock them out, and
> they can't strike. Now, that's a pretty significant
> difference from the private sector.

Boards also learn how to interact with what has come to be known as "labor

types." The board president continues describing the union president as

aggressive and argumentative, but adding:

> Now those are qualities I can deal with, you understand. I
> don't let those kinds of things get under my skin at the
> bargaining table. I've seen a lot of tough guys across the
> bargaining table . . . it doesn't really bother me, but when
> a board member who has never been at a bargaining table

before, a housewife or someone, they don't know how to deal
with that.

Privatization of the Conflict

Experts find it easier to deal with other experts, and labor and
management agree early in the Second Generation that the process should become

essentially bilateral. Moreover, as the teacher organization becomes

legitimate, other potential parties become illegitimate intruders. Both labor

and management appeal less to outside sources as a way to get what they want.

They see dangers in opening up the relationship.

Privatization takes place on two levels. The first is respect to labor

relations as a whole. The community and external political influences that

were so much a part of the First Intergenerational Conflict fade from

prominence altogether. Even in California, which has statutory language that

requires public hearings over the subjects of bargaining, we were struck with

the extent to which the mechanisms went unused and how inconsequentia the

public testimony was when it was given. We noted with surprise that even in

districts where there had been substantial public pressure to establish

standards for public involvement through the hearing process, that once the

ground rules were agreed upon, those processes were not used by the very

people who insisted on their adoption. [C:Palermo] [C:31]

A conventional wisdom evolves which accepts the notion that agreement is

easier if there are fewer participants, participants are actively discouraged,

and finally the propriety of outside participants is questioned. The parties

are largely successful at this: "I have tried as hard as I can to keep it out

of the community, and we were totally successful on that last year." [I:21:B]

It is particularly interesting to note the extent to which former citizen

activists are socialized to the norms of privatization. In South Garfield,

one of the prominent school activists was elected to the school board. She

had been trying to gain access to the bargaining process as a citizen for a

number of years, but once elected to the school board we found that she

neither took a particularly active role in bargaining herself, nor was an

advocate of a continued citizens role. "We kept things quiet last year," she

said, "and it was the easiest settlement we ever had. We're going to do the

same thing this year." [C: S. Garfield]

Low-Key Politics. Another change, consistent with the privatization of

negotiations, is the partial withdrawal of teacher organizations from school

district politics. During the First Intergenerational Conflict and early into

the Second Generation, teacher organizations are very active in school board

elections. One of the ways in which teacher organizations were supposed to

show their power and influence was in their ability to elect public officials.

Indeed, this capability gave rise to the "two bites of the apple" theory

popular in public sector bargaining literature in which public employee unions

were supposed to have an unbeatable advantage over management because they

could install into office people who were beholden to them.   With respect to

public schools this has proven to be largely incorrect. As far as teachers

are concerned, school board members have a distressing tendency to act like

school board members.

Quite often, teachers have been disappointed. To begin with, teachers

have not been as successful electorally as it was thought they would be.

Typically, teacher's initial attempts at school board politics end with the

election of a candidate that they support. But in many communities teacher

organization involvement in local politics is considered illegitimate, and

hence it often becomes self-defeating. As one teacher organization president

in a large California city said, "When the newspaper came out with the

headline saying, 'Teachers Major Force in Local Politics.' I knew that we no

longer were." The second disappointing aspect of teacher support for school

board candidates is the disappointment in performance. School board members

are socialized to act like school board members, and teachers grow dismayed

that persons that they helped to elect do not support all the measures that

they would like to have backed. Thirdly, when school board members do remain

staunchly loyal to organized teachers, they often become isolated among their

peers, on the short end of lopsided votes, and totally without influence. As

a result, many local teacher organizations have abandoned electoral activity

or are being quite covert about support.

The Era of Accommodation. Once the privatization of labor relations is

established, something very much akin to conventional patterns of

accommodation takes place between labor and management. The textbook

expectation for industrial relations is that "out of conflict, grows

cooperation," and several of the time-honored pieces of research in private

sector labor relations trace the progression, for instance, from "armed truce"

to "collaboration." The late Second Generation affords the opportunity for

this to take place in public education, at least for a time.

Changes in the the contract often become of relatively little importance.

Strikes may or may not occur, but when they do take place they are in the form

of ritual or demonstration of power rather than a gut-wrenching ideological

battle. The recovery period following a labor disturbance is far shorter than

it was in the First Intergenerational Conflict period where disturbances were

notorious, and it is not unusual for interview respondents to recall with

vividness and passion the events of a strike that took place a decade ago.

In the latter stages of the second generation the "traffic" in the
labor-management relationship is between leaders. Both the leaders of the
teacher organization and the superintendent of the school district are
recognized as legitimate, and they develop what is frequently a highly
cohesive relationship, built around three elements: (1) a recognition of the
mutual advantages in the labor-management relationship; (2) a mutual
socialization of one to another and the development of a sense of mutual
obligation; (3) an acceptance of high trust levels that makes informal
agreements possible.

Mutual advantage. Some school superintendents like teacher organizations
because they add stability to their organization. Two administrators discuss
the change that labor relations brought to their district:

> Well, it makes everything a lot clearer.
>
> If I don't have a map, I don't know where we're going.
>
> But I can't imagine any school system that has been able to
> operate without written guidelines. There were always
> administrative regulations governing the schools. And now
> they are formalized. There are negotiable items and they
> are supposedly agreeable between two parties, which may give
> them more validiity. [C:26:A]

Or as a union president put it, "it's clearer where the lines of authority
are." [C:23:T] Personality conflicts are diminished, and the rule of contract
is recognized. [C:30:T]

> Since the contract has been negotiated, its (relationships)
> have mcved back into a rather informal, friendly relation
> . . . although the association president does act as a
> buffer so I'm not getting a lot of the nit-picky concerns I
> used to. They're solved sometimes at the association level,
> and then if they need to come to me, I'll hear about it . .
> . actually it has relieved me of a lot of unnecessary
> concerns.
>
> Q. Such as?

A. Oh, . . . the yard supervision schedule. People had to
rotate on that and they became a little bit upset because
they were out at different times. . . . So they talked
about it to me. There's no big problem, but to them it
was.

They thought it (the schedule) had been issued from the top,
so they went along with it until they got upset. . . .
Before, (the contract) I would probably have heard muttering
out there and would have gone on longer, and they would have
been concerned and disenchanted for a longer period of time,
but because they had a colleague to go to they did. . . .

It's kind of a sounding block for them, they can get it off
their chests and have someone solve the problem for them.
[C:15:S]

Teacher organizations also prove themselves to be instrumentally helpful

through lending their influence and personnel to support the goals of the

school organization. Even in situations in which the relationships between

the teacher organization and management are not otherwise close, they may join

together to lobby for school finance legislation burying the hatchet long

enough to fly to the state capital together [C:Thresher] or to work on a bond

issue campaign "when the superintendent needed some Indians." [I:21:T]

The helpfulness can at times be highly diffuse as in the Riverview

situation where the superintendent and the teacher organization agreed to

settle a contract without a strike so that the two could collaborate on a tax

levy election that was necessary the following year if the district was to

have the financial capability of settling its contract. The agreement was

rather extraordinary. The teacher organization in this particular district

has been aggressive, and had demonstrated its influence at the polls and by

hitting the bricks (and largely winning) four times during the past decade.

Still, the district was out of money, and the teachers knew it. A strike

would make passing a tax election impossible. So, the superintendent and the

union leadership agreed months before negotiations began that there would be
no strike. Further, just as formal negotiations began, they agreed on the
approximate of the salary settlement. They also agreed that if a settlement
along those terms could be reached that the rest of the contract, with which
the teachers were pleased, would not be opened to negotiation, thus protecting
the teachers from the intentions of some school board members who wanted to
alter the non-wage sections of the contract.

Another teacher organization helped management through a period of
severely declining enrollment and revenues by helping to "cool out" about 40
veteran teachers who were considered "dead wood." As in the case of the tax
election, the teacher retirement scheme required a high level of trust and
rather intricate interactions. The district's enrollment had declined by at
least one-third forcing the closure of several elementary schools and a high
school. It was clear to all that there would have to be layoffs, not just a
single purge, but several years of cuts as the enrollment decline continued.
On top of that came California's Proposition 13.

Labor and management agreed on a strategy of an early retirement plan and
counseling for employees to take the opportunity. Increased benefits for
early retirement were negotiated into the labor contract, benefits that were
substantially in excess of those which the teachers would normally receive
under the state retirement system's provisions. Then, 40 senior teachers were
encouraged to take advantage of those provisions. Some of those 40 were in
programs that had been cut back, some were teachers who had been threatened
with the possibility of dismissal for cause, and the union suggested that they
accept the early retirement package rather than subject themselves to the
rigors of dismissal procedures. [C:31]

Socialization/Obligation. School superintendents and union leaders also

begin to feel a sense of obligation toward one another--a desire to be

mutually protective, both in organizational and personal senses. As one

superintendent who has just seen teacher moderates take over control from the

"radicals" in his district said, "Between you and I, I tend to want to make

this group successful." [C:19:S] Or in another case where the old firebrand

had emerged from inactivity and was considering running for union office

again, the superintendent quietly approached the teacher organization

executive and asked if there was anything he could do to help influence the

election.

Teacher leaders are often able to respond by protecting the

superintendent from political candidates that run in opposition to the current

administration, particularly through screening of candidates that run on an

"education first" platform generally in support of the current district

policies and generally in favor of larger educational budgets.

It is important to note that these helping relationships are highly

private, that they frequently involve the passage of confidences that would be

personally harmful to both persons if they were known by the school board or

the rank-and-file of teachers. As one superintendent said, "I don't work with

teachers, I work with the president of the association." [C:25:S] Thus,

there is high belief in the information that is passed between the two

leaders, and substantial personal credibility attached to the other's word.

The credibility extends to both the information that is passed and the

ability of the other to honor commitments made. That is, if the

superintendent says that he can deliver a vote from the school board, that the

vote will, indeed, be forthcoming. Or that if the teacher leader says that he

can prevent a disturbance or sell the membership on an idea, that that result

will follow.

Activity among the rank-and-file teachers declines as the action centers

on the leadership:

> Q. Has there been a big change in the tone of labor
> relations?
>
> A. They're very apathetic. When I first came here, I was
> strongly urged to join the [teacher organization]. There
> was a strong drive, everything was union, union, union, . .
> . they're not going to take away our rights, very
> anti-board, anti-superintendent. Now, instead of finding
> teachers (leaders) in the teacher's lounge you'll find them
> in the superintendent's office having coffee . . . and
> saying . . . "Oh, the district can't afford that, we have to
> look at this realistically. . . ." [C:8:T]

Informal Settlements. The settlements between leaders can become highly

informal--not only managing around the contract, as noted in an earlier

section, but also negotiating around the contract. There are agreements to

selectively enforce the contract, fractional bargaining between groups of

workers and site management to not enforce sections of the contract, and

explicit waivers of the contract. ·

In some instances the contract is largely forgotten once it is

negotiated. Teachers tell us that they want the contract document as

protection against managerial excess, but that they have little vested

interest in actually following some of its provisions--"Sometimes it kind of

ignored by both sides. . . ." [C15:T]

The Second Intergenerational Crisis:
The Unexpected Revolution

Conventional labor relations wisdom, and theories of accommodation,
suggest that the Second Intergenerational Conflict isn't supposed to happen.
We are convinced, though, that it does happen and that by taking place the
Second Conflict sets labor relations in public education apart from that which
takes place in many other sectors. Of our eight intensively studied
districts, one has moved completely through the Second Conflict, and two
others show signs of beginning.

The Second Intergenerational Conflict, like the First is a conflict cycle
involving the activation of outsiders, their organization, and a reordering of
the ruling coalition. However, there are different outsiders in the two
crises. In the First, teachers and their organization are the outsiders, and
for that reason the First Conflict involves their quest for legitimation. The
Second Conflict involves school board members and citizens who are both
dissatisfied with the schools and feel excluded from its processes. The
symbols of the Second Conflict are "propriety" and "efficiency," in a
phrase--"the teachers got too much." There is a tendency to view these events
as backlash against unionism, and indeed that word was used frequently by our
respondents, but we are convinced that more than backlash is occurring, that
the nature of school labor relations is being changed. During the Second
Conflict an attack on the teachers' labor contract frequently takes place, but
the attempt usually is not to disestablish or "break" the union. Rather, the
attempt, which is usually initiated by board members, is to bring a new
emphasis to labor relations. Often without realizing that they are doing so,

school boards abandon the stance of the Second Generation that the "shortest

contract is the best one."   They begin to see the contract as a tool of

management control, and thus they usher in a new era of labor conflict, and

eventually, we believe, a new basis for stability and accommodation.

One must remember, however, that the Second Conflict is essentially a

political event, and that it does not have its origins at the bargaining

table, but rather in school board electoral politics. The process of the

Second Conflict is the classic conflict pattern of _activation_ and _conflict_

followed by _reformation_ and the return to quietude. First, formerly silent or

inactive persons and groups take on voice. These persons are frequently

"organizational critics" who eventually run for the school board and are

elected. Second, as conflict grows, there is an explicit connection made

between the dissatisfied persons and the conduct of labor relations. It is in

this context that the symbols of the teachers having too much are raised.

Third, activation of citizen interest gives rise to two patterns of activity.

The original activity often follows the pattern of interest group behavior

formed around rather specific ideas and needs, something as commonplace as

support for the band or athletics. These types of activities seldom intersect

with the conduct of labor relations, unless a specific clause in the labor

contract comes into conflict with the desires of the interest group.

Frequently, however, the activity of citizens is not confined to a single

interest, and is better characterized by a general dissatisfaction with the

performance of the school district. Dissatisfaction waits for an opportunity

to express itself, and that opportunity comes in school districts in the form

of school board elections and expressions of confidence (and continuation) of

the superintendent. Superintendents respond to pressure from their boards and

from the community by changing their relations with the teachers organization,
or the boards and the communities reflect their pressure by changing the
superintendents.

Fourth, the old coaliton between the superintendent and the leadership of
the teachers union breaks down. The administration, which in the era of good
feeling that characterizes the latter stages of the Second Generation, could
be counted on to accommodate teacher association problems and to protect the
association from attacks by the "radical" board members. The administration
can no longer perform this function. Superintendents are forced by their
boards and political publics to become the moving party in labor relations.
Often against their wills, they must conform to the expectations of the
community and become the moving party in bringing management issues to the
bargaining table. The result is an active period of open labor conflict and
labor relations issues being attached to school board elections and similar
occasions. The teachers organization feels betrayed, and there begins a
furious attempt to find new coalition partners. The teachers are also faced
with the problem of reintroducing militant behavior to their ranks, something
that is only a distant memory for some teachers and something that the younger
teachers may not have experienced at all.

The Second Conflict ends when the parties come to believe that mangement
will take an active and frequent leadership role in labor relations, and that
the teachers can continue to exist with an active management. Indeed, there
appear to be options about the way in which the third generation will develop,
and some of these scenarios are the subject of the chapter that concludes this
report.

Second Intergenerational Conflict Symbols

The symbols of the Second Intergenerational Conflict are the "efficiency"
of the school system, or the "propriety" of the teacher organization. As a
conversational or symbolic word, "efficiency" covers more ground than the
ratio of inputs and outputs economist would have it mean. It is attached to
complaints about levels of cost, and the thinness of the curriculum, and to
general perceptions that students don't learn much. The symbol of "propriety"
is raised when the teachers begin to act in ways that violate widely held
values about what teacher organizations should do, that some appears to vary
from place to place, having to do in one setting with the closeness of the
relationship between the union leadership and the superintendent, and in
others with the nature of the contract or the level of political activity
among the teachers. In any case, once the symbols are raised, they are
expanded and generalized, and the teacher organization itself becomes the
object of political opposition.

The raising of Second Intergenerational Conflict symbols is most vividly
seen in Riverview, where the union had been a powerful organization for over a,
decade. The teachers had been successful in electing a number of school board
members, and they had carried off strikes in a number of years, and from most
accounts the strikes had been successful in netting the teachers the
concessions they wanted.

The propriety symbol in Riverview was raised by the teachers successful
incursion into electoral politics outside of education proper. One of the
most distinctive features about the Riverview teachers was their political
organization and the quality of electoral support that they could generate.
When most teacher organizations talk about supporting candidates, they mean

that a cash contribution will be given or that the candidate's mailing will be
printed and mailed gratas from the teacher organization office. In Riverview,
political endorcement activates the teacher's campaign organization, complete
with precinct lists, door-to-door campaigners, a telephone calling system, and
a transportation pool for getting people to the polls. The teachers used
their campaign mechanism in school board elections, and in the late 1970s they
were successful in defeating a city clerk and a state senator of long
standing, who had consistently opposed public sector bargaining.

Where even the teacher strikes had not generated great opposition, their
election activities did.

The efficiency symbol had more diffuse origins. In an objective sense,
the teachers in Riverview were not being paid more than teachers in
surrounding communities. The opposite was true. They had a fairly extensive
contract, but specific clauses in the contract had not become the rallying
point for the dissatisfied. There, of course, remained some who wanted no
contract at all, and one school board member who wanted to strip all but the
wage and salary provisions from its contents. However, there grew in
Riverview a general opinion that the schools weren't doing a very good job,
and that it was the teacher's fault. The chairman of the citizen's advisory
committee told us in an interview that the community no longer believes the
schools when they say that they don't have enough money. Indeed, two tax
referenda failed to pass in 1978 and 1979. The image of the teacher in these
citizen interviews was basically one of slothful uncaring: they don't have
the long term committment to teaching that they used to; they don't display
the necessary sacrifice to be professionals; they would soak up; eat up any
revenue increases, and no changes would occur in the programs.

Movement Toward Coalitions

Because the symbols of discontent became attached to the teacher organization, it becomes the object of a coalition, something that is organized against. This explicit change in coalitions has taken place in Riverview. Candidates in the most recent school board election reported that the first question they faced when campaigning was whether or not they supported the Riverview Teachers Association.

Board members, who were originally elected with teacher support still perceive that the contract is necessary to protect the teachers from administrative excess; they still carry the symbol: of the First Intergenerational Crisis, and they believe that the school board members should be talking about how to best live with and "make this agreement work." However, a coalition of dissident forces, or citizen rebels has formed.

The coalition involves a loose alignment of disgruntled people, some of them unhappy about tax rates, some about the bargaining contract, some about the perceived quality of the schools. The common opposition was the teachers.

Thus, a period of high teacher influence is threatened as the teacher organization appears to have lost its political base and the superintendent is coming under more direct pressure to "tighten things up" and to particularly make teacher evaluations "more credible."

At least for the last ten years, education in Riverview has taken place in a politically divided house. There are four main groups. The Community Elites, who in former decades controlled the board outright, represent Riverview's established upper class families and longstanding economic

Riverview's established upper class families and longstanding economic

interests. A collection of Watchdog Groups, which are interested generally in

school efficiency but also in lower taxes. These groups, in addition, tend to

represent the newer, growing suburbs that surround central Riverview, and

whose citizens felt themselves poorly represented by the old elite. The

Citizens Advisory Council, which represents the business and professional

classes, but with a general "better schools" cast. This group has been

actively courted by the school administration. It is the only one of the four

that has official standing with the district, and the superintendent

encourages carefully selected memebers of the advisory council to run for

school board. Finally, there is the Teachers Organization, which first made

itself felt in electoral politics about a decade ago, and has subsequently

been a major influence.

Up until a few years ago the teachers had been successful in single

endorsements and in forming a working coalition with the Citizen's Advisory

Council. There was general sympathy for teachers and support for the idea of

more money for better schools. However, a few years ago there had been a

particularly bitter teacher strike, and the settlement of the strike was

politically controversial. In the election following the strike, the

successful school board candidates were those jointly endorsed by the Citizens

Advisory Council and the Watchdogs. The Watchdogs broadened their base of

acceptability by renouncing what were considered obstructionist positions

including a pledge to "dismantle the union contract." Politically, it became

acceptable to talk tough about teachers in Riverview, where it had not been

acceptable to talk about destroying their organization.

The current alignment of the board is:

Supporters	Condition
1. Teacher/Elite	Term nearly up; won't run again.
2. Teacher	Veteran member; won't run again.
3. Teacher	Veteran member; seeking new support.
4. Watchdog/Elite	Strong independent following in blue collar sections of the community.
5. Watchdog/Elite	Active in non-school politics with visibility beyond school board.
6. Watchdog/Advisory	Recently elected.
7. Watchdog/Advisory	Recently elected.

As one can readily see, the teachers are close to losing any direct

representation on the school board. Clearly, on the basis of political

action, the teachers have a weakened appeal. Their endorsements are not

greeted with glee, nor are they, particularly sought after anymore. In some

parts of town, a teacher endorsement is considered "the kiss of death." This

does not mean that the other members of the board are automatically

anti-teacher or necessarily anti-teacher union, although one of them clearly

is an unreconstructed opponent. Behaviorally, what the change in the board

composition has meant in Riverview is a, greater tolerance for hard critical

questions being asked of both the superintendent and indirectly of the

teachers. The contents of the labor contract has become a subject of

discussion in the campaigns and among the elected school board members. Three

of the current board members have advocated a direct attack on the language in

the current contract that allows the teachers' voice and participation in

educational policy decisions. In the last contract negotiation, a struggle

over language was averted only because the superintendent and union leadership

agreed to an early settlement on wages, while agreeing also not to open other

sections of the contract to discussion. This settlement, described in an

earlier section, was necessary because the district was to hold a tax election

that year, something that it could not easily do in a climate of labor strife.

Unfortunately, the tax election failed to pass. The teachers have thus been
left in a situation of settling for smaller wages, that they think they
deserve, and the district is in the position of both not being financially
able to respond to additional salary demands and having on its board a strong
minority that wants to play hard-ball with the union contract. The stage is
set for the Second Conflict.

Toward Public Conflict.

Quite often teachers and administrators ignore signs in the community
when they are not directly attached to the processes of labor relations:

> They just sprung up this year out of desperation with the
> board, not being able to get some things. ... . What's
> happened is a lot of younger people, professional people,
> teachers and people of that caliber have started having
> kids, their kids are in school, and this group has come in.
> It amounts to 10-12 people who want everything changed
> yesterday.
>
> We have chosen as a group not to get involved with them at
> all. [I:9:T]

However, these groups have a tendency to grow, to attract attention to
themselves. Their mere presence changes school politics by adding additional
participants and creating the potential for different coalitions in political
controversy. Not every parent or community protest group amounts to much.
Many disappear; many are not effective in expanding resources to acquire what
they want. But it is not necessary that such a group be formed in opposition
to the teachers organization in order to have it affect the course of labor
relations.

Sometimes the formation of a new coalition begins with the school
district management, which waits for years for board members who had

sufficient resolve to be interested in taking the initiative in negotiations.

One superintendent told of his newly elected board members as strengthening

the board:

> I guess that I use the word weak in the context of avoiding
> controversy as being the most important element to them.
> You know, peace, love, harmony. When you hear somebody tell
> you that "Why not agree to smaller class size, no
> supervision (of students outside of class) and a 16 percent
> pay raise. What's wrong with that? Let's go." Because
> they think that will buy them peace with the union. . . .
>
> Community pressures are to find peace with the union,
> without reference to price, almost. But the trend from 1970
> to 1980 is clear now in the direction of peace on good
> terms. Peace on terms where you get a good day's work for
> your money and you don't pay an enormous premium. [I:15:S]

By any number of means the will to change the contractual relations with

the teachers organization is strengthened, and the strength is publicly

demonstrated. Whereas in the First Conflict the public pressure was for labor

peace, in the Second Conflict it is for settlement on terms that are perceived

as being favorable to the public enterprise. Usually this means toughness.

Editorials appear under a "don't give up the ship" theme rather than following

the "get this thing settled theme." [I:3:B]

Reforming the Social Order in the Third Generation. Before conflict

returns there is often a decisive teacher organization defeat, but as noted

before this is usually a public drubbing rather than a disestablishment.

One of our intensively studied districts, Industrial City, has clearly

moved through the Second Conflict. The crisis came about after more than a

decade of teacher dominance in the district. Contract demands on the part of

teachers were achieved with very little difficulty, and the teachers maintained

a very cordial relationship with the superintendent and with individual board

members. Their written contract was not particularly strong, in part because

the teachers had not felt the need to press for some of the normally sought

contractual clauses, such as binding arbitration of grievances, because
grievances were nearly always settled to their satisfaction through the existing
Leachanism.

The second crisis in Industrial City did not erupt over labor relations
specifically. It came about because of the public antics of the school board
and a growing feeling that the schools were not as good as they should be. The
board had been divided into factions for a number of years, roughly along
political party lines, and it had been feuding among itself. The public
acrimony had caused great difficulty among the community, and attention was
drawn to the district in the newspapers.

Frequently, the debates were about inconsequential decisions, but said one
observer, "it looks like a three ring circus at board meetings." By 1975, the
chaos in the district had become highly visible. Newspaper stories included
mention of irregularities in letting bids for a new building and of school board
members pressuring administrators to make purchases from particular suppliers.

That year, three independent candidates ran for school board, and won.
Within the next year, three additional school board members were either
defeated, or chose not to run, with the result that all but one member of the
old, feuding board had been replaced. Although the alleged improprieties of the
old board were talked about as being a factor in the defeat, there was no grand
reform coalition. Rather, there was widespread dissatisfaction, but rather
diffuse and amorphous dissatisfaction, with the current state of affairs. As
one board member put it:

> I don't think that the people who ran had any knowledge . .
> . of what they were getting into when they ran, other than
> they wanted to rectify what they considered a fault in the
> district. I didn't know what the (teachers' labor) contract
> looked like before I got on the board."

They soon found out. Very quickly, the new board decided that labor reform

had to be part of reforming the district. The new board had branded itself as

an activist group, and both the teachers' contract and their intimate

relationship with the administration were now seen as illegitimate. As board

members were interviewed, it became clear that they had taken pains to

psychologically dissassociate themselves from the teachers, to consider them

as outsiders. Comments such as, "the teachers all live out of town; they

don't understand or support the community," were common.

The old superintendent left. The board conducted an interstate search

for a new one, which was unusual for that particular district, which had a

reputation for being inbred. The board specifically sought someone with labor

relations experience and a reputation for being a tough manager. They found

such a person in a distant state and hired him to "win back the keys to the

store."

Armed with what he called "the mandate from heaven," the new

superintendent marched into negotiations with a set of behaviors, and demands,

that the union had never before seen. In union terms, he wanted to go

backwards, to modify language in the contract that guaranteed autonomy to the

teachers, to limit that autonomy and grant greater discretion to management.

Not only was the superintendent proposing language changes in areas such as

the definition of a grievance, teacher evaluation, and teacher assignment to

non-classroom duties, it became apparent that the superintendent had the will

and resources to back up his stance. Principally, the superintendent was able

to embed his bargaining stance in a solid 7-to-0 support of his school board

and the willingness of the board to take a strike rather than retreat from its

position.

A New Ideology

The language of labor negotiators describes aggressive managers as engaging in "take backs." This description reflects a substantial over-simplification of what is happening. The superintendent in Industrial City was not going backward. He was introducing a new social order, a social order characterized by changes in the school's control system, changes in the communications network and the place of the teacher organization in that network, and changes in management's primary objectives.

The first, and signal, change was that management for the first time viewed the labor relations contract as a means of <u>control</u> and <u>coordination</u> of the district. Although management is historically associated with the bureaucratization of school districts, much of what passed for bureaucracy was more fairly termed, to use Gouldner's words, a "mock bureaucracy." Rules were only loosely enforced, exceptions were frequent, and it was generally understood that authority rested in the individual supervisor or manager rather than the office or the institution. This seems a reasonably acurate description of many of the school districts we studied, including Industrial City in its prebargaining and early bargaining days. The change that we saw in Industrial City is that for the first time management explicitly bureaucratized the district by asking for rules that allow the control of teacher behavior, having those rules placed in the contract, and then insisting on enforcement of the contract. In the words of the superintendent of Industrial City, "the whole area of curriculum, the board, the board's message to me was that they wanted to update the curriculum, they also wanted to <u>coordinate</u> the two schools." Evaluation was another concern of the board. The new superintendent in Industrial City instituted the first evaluation system for all teachers, and incidentally administrators too. The

communications system within the district and the relationships with the union
were regularized and formalized. The superintendent made it a point to set up
monthly meetings with the leadership of the union. During these meetings
there was some flexibility in conversation, but basically the agenda that was
agreed to beforehand had to do with the implementation of the contract and
little else. This was in marked contrast to the earlier relationships between
the union leadership and the previous superintendent in which meetings were
not regularized and the conversation consisted of whatever the two parties
wanted. In this relationship the union was the general agent for the faculty.
Whatever concerns, complaints or difficulties teachers had, the union had a
channel that could elevate those complaints to the level of the central
office. The new superintendent changed that communications network by
narrowing the channel of communications to things having specifically to do
with the contract. The superintendent said, "I try to keep my discussions
with the executive council of the union tied to the administration of the
contract. I do not feel that they necessarily represent in curriculum
matters, etc., the faculty." This was in marked contrast to the situation
which existed before in which it was generally agreed that the union had
established what they called a curriculum council in each building and that
all curriculum proposals came to the building level council. This
superintendent said:

> In other words there was very little practically no
> administrator review at all of these kinds of things. So
> there were, you know, a number of things like this that in a
> sense put the union in a position of control, much more than
> I think it is today.
>
> I don't want to give the impression that prior to the time I
> came that all the policies, etc., came from the union. I
> don't necessarily think that was true. All I am saying is

point: they are restricted to those things that have been
granted to them in the contract and that's it--no more--no
less and we deal with the faculty as a whole, not with the
union in other matters.

In making the changes in communications and control, the superintendent

found it necessary to violate one of the canons of Second Generation labor

relations. He no longer felt that labor peace was of paramount importance.

He was willing, and eventually forced to, take a strike. In his words:

You are not giving presents to anybody. No, I'm not saying
that in the process of deciding what is be, for the school
district that there isn't room to recognize some of the
demands or requests of the. faculty, if they are legitimate.
and will help improve the district, but if they are not, I
don't think that it is something you can decide you are
going to do--to give them a gift just to keep somebody
happy.

Interestingly, building administrators in the same district came to think

of the contract as much as source of authority than source of restrictions.

As one principal said, "I think it does heighten our authority and I think it

gives everybody a clear set of guidelines that we're going to function on and

by heightening the authority we have in the contract (I can say) now you

people, I expect you to abide by this contract." Thus, even while realizing

that the contract had the effect of making the administration more

"legalistic, direct, and rule abiding," the principal pledged allegiance to

the document saying, "I will not any more deviate from it. I will not break

that contract."

Bargaining with the new superintendent was difficult. The problem was

not simply that he was a tough bargainer, nor that he had a unified school

board behind him; it was not even that he had brought to the table a new

bargaining style, one involving "package bargaining" which represented a

different bargaining norm than the teachers had experienced before. The

fundamental dif..rence in bargaining was that what bargaining was about had

become different.   Management had become the prime mover, ~~desirous~~ of

estat'ishing organizational control, and aggressive at the bargaining table at

persuing its ends.   Labor had become the responding party.

There was a strike, what the teacher association leadership termed a

"frustration strike."   The teachers gained no concessions from management by

striking, and the apparent resolve of management to stick with its position

convinced the teachers to settle after three days.   But the strike was an

important turning point for the teachers organization in two respects.   First,

it marked their acceptance of management as the moving party in employee

relations, the party that would have to be responded to at least as much as it

would have to respond.   Second, the teachers' strike marked the beginning of a

new activism and militancy among the rank and file.   "We've grown flabby,"

said one of the association leaders, "these teachers have had it so easy for

the last decade, that they really don't know how to be, activists."

Perhaps the best indication of changing the social order is the change in

the evaluation system at Industrial City.   In the prior administration,

evaluation and discharge had been synonomous.   A se ies of bad evaluations led

to one's discharge.   And in fact only provisionary teachers were evaluated in

Industrial City.   The new superintendent's evaluation system clearly split

those aspects of evaluation which were within the province of the union and

those which were not not.   In Industrial City one could be discharged for

violation of rules of procedure, most of which were in the contract.   If one

were late to class, drunk, abusive, insubordinate or flagrantly immoral, one

could be discharged.   In both the substantive and procedural sense the union

was involved in these procedures, both before and after the ascendancy of the

new superintendent.   The superintendent's evaluation system had only to do

with teaching and classroom performance. The superintendent had virtually

conceded that teaching and classroom were not likely to be the causes for

discipline or discharge against a tenured teacher. It was simply too

difficult to prove misfeasance. The superintendent's evaluation system was

designed to bring administrators and teachers into contact with one another

and to establish the process of critical review of teaching work. Principals

and assistant principals were directed to spend substantial amounts of time in

classrooms, review and carefully analyze interactions between teachers and

students and then to review these analyses, not just the summary judgments,

with the teachers. Our field work ended before we were able to get a reading

on the academic effect on the new evaluation system, but its organizational

effect is clear. It established the union's relationship to the school

district as belonging to that area called contract, and it made the

administrator the moving party in other areas of the district. Administration

was perfectly willing to take things and place them in a contract when they

felt they were necessary.

IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE PERCEPTIONS AND GENERATIONAL EVOLUTION

In order to survey labor relations issues in a representative sample of
school districts in Illinois and California, we identified a total of 90
school districts clustered in ten geographical.regions (five clusters in each
state). Cluster sampling was utilized as a cost-efficient way of insuring
that the various regional areas in each state would be represented. Within
the regional clusters, specific districts were selected on the basis of four
criteria:

1. Matching the population distribution of elementary, secondary, and
    unified district types,

2. Insuring adequate representation of small, middle-sized and large
    school districts,

3. In Illinois, keeping the representation of bargaining and
    non-bargaining districts proportional to their respective number
    within the total population, and

4. Keeping the geographical size of each cluster group as small as
    practicable in order to keep data collection costs within our budget.

In California, two clusters were selected in the northern part of the
state, two in the seven southern counties, and one in the greater Fresno area.
In Illinois, two clusters were in the greater Chicago area, one in the Rock
Island-Moline area, one in Champaign and Vermillion counties, and one in the
greater East St. Louis area. The distribution of district sizes and types in

4-1

140

the total population of school districts in each state and within the sample

surveyed is shown in Table 4.1.

Characteristics of Sampled School Districts

Table 4.2 describes the 71 school districts represented in our final

sample. Even with replacement of several districts, we found it impossible to

gain access to a completely representative sample. School superintendents,

from whom we sought permission to conduct the survey were generally cautious

about the prospects of cooperating. Although it is impossible to be certain,

our research team is confident that the districts declining to participate

were generally comparable with those who did. We held interviews with

superintendents in several of the non-cooperating districts. Notes from those

interviews suggest that (apart from the personalities of the superintendents

involved), if there is a systematic bias in our sample it is that the

cooperating districts have somewhat less labor relations conflict and are a

bit less troubled by arguments over the legitimacy of the collective

bargaining process that those who did not participate.

As the entries in Table.4.2 indicate, Illinois districts were somewhat

more cooperative than those in California. This probably reflects the longer

history of bargaining in Illinois, and the higher sense of being forced into a

bargaining relationship in California school districts who were still reacting

to the legislative mandate to recognize teacher bargaining agents which passed

the legislature in 1975.

Elementary, secondary and unified school districts (called "Unit"

districts in Illinois) are all adequately represented in our sample.

Districts with less than 500 students enrolled are the most numerous in our

Table 4.1

Size, Type and Location of Sample Districts

	California			Illinois		
	Pop.	Smpl.	Resp.	Pop.	Smpl.	Resp.
ENROLLMENT:						
500 and smaller						
elementary	371	10	8	208	6	5
secondary	14	1	1	38	2	1
unified	23	0	0	89	3	5*
501 to 1,000						
elementary	91	3	1	76	3	1
secondary	23	2	2	18	1	1
unified	28	1	1	152	4	3
1,001 to 3,000						
elementary	112	5	4	120	4	1
secondary	32	1	1	40	2	1
unified	52	2	1	151	5	5
3,001 to 6,000						
elementary	49	2	1	27	2	1
secondary	12	1	1	19	2	2
unified	42	3	2	25	2	2
6,000 and larger						
elementary	43	3	3	7	2	1
secondary	34	7	1	10	2	2
unified	117	6	4	31	5	2
		46	32		47	33

* Additional respondents due to replacement of non-accessible districts in original sample.

TABLE 4.2   SCHOOL DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

1. STATE

Illinois	39 (54%)
California	32 (46%)

2. TYPE OF DISTRICT

Elementary	27 (42%)
Secondary	13 (20%)
Unified	25 (38%)
Missing=7	

3. TOTAL ENROLLMENT

500 or smaller	21 (33%)
501 to 1,000	9 (14%)
1,001 to 3,000	13 (20%)
3,001 to 6,000	7 (11%)
6,001 and above	14 (22%)
Missing=8	

4. OPERATING BUDGET	Mean	Std. Dev.
(in Millions)	$9.998	$17.768

5. COMMUNITY TYPE

Urban	13 (20%)
Rural	29 (45%)
Suburban	23 (35%)
Missing=7	

6. TEACHER ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION

Nat'l Educ. Assn.	45 (68%)
Amer. Fed. Tchrs.	9 (14%)
Other/none	12 (18%)
Missing=6	

sample (but are still less well represented in the sample than in the
population). Large districts are over represented in relation to their number
in the states. This over-representation is intentional, since the vast
majorit·· of both teachers and students are found in districts with enrollments
over 6,000.

The average budget in our sample was $9,998 million (with a range of $200
thousand to over $110 million, and a standard deviation of $17,768 million).

Urban, rural and suburban communities are all substantially represented
in the sample. The smaller number of urban districts is offset by their
larger size.

Of the districts identifying teacher organizations, 68% (45) were
affiliated with the National Education Association and 14% (9) with the
American Federation of Teachers. Twelve districts (18%) declared either that
they had no formal teacher organization or that the local unit was not
affiliated with either the NEA or the AFT.

Sources of Organizational Stress

Labor relations represents only one aspect of school district policy and
operations. In attempting to interpret the ways in which school systems
respond to teacher organizations and bargaining demands, it is probably
important to know whether other sources of stress and conflict are operating
within a school district.. In our interviews with superintendents, teacher
leaders and school board presidents we asked for information regarding:

1. The existence of any serious problems or crises within the community
    served by the district,

2. Estimates of school district enrollment trends during the five year

period immediately preceding our study, and

3. Views regarding the financial status of the district.

Table 4.3 summarizes responses to the three queries. Eleven (17%) of the

districts reported some sort of community crisis (ranging from rapid

population shifts and teacher strikes to floods and winter weather problems).

Eight of the districts (13%) had enrollment declines in excess of 25% over the

past five years and four (6%) additional districts had increases in enrollment

of more than 25%. No more than two (3%) of the districts were identified as

facing a financial "crisis", although 25% of the districts were viewed by one

or more of the leaders we interviewed as being financially "troubled."

(Teacher leaders and board members tended to hold a somewhat more sanguine

view of the district's financial health than did the superintendents).

The Respondents. In each school district we distributed questionnaires

to:

1. The superintendent of the district,
    The superintendent was, in turn, asked to distribute copies of the
    questionnaire to:
    A. 3 to 10 school principals, depending on the size of the school
    district. (Fewer principal questionnaires were used in very small
    districts where less then three principals are employed).
    B. 3 to 15 teachers, randomly selected from staff rosters.
    C. 10 to 25 citizens who are active in various school and/or
    community groups identified during the superintendent interview.

2. The president of the local teacher organization.
    The teacher organization president was, in turn, asked to distribute
    copies of the questionnaire to:
    A. 3 to 10 teachers who were active leaders within the district
    teacher organization.

3. The president of the school board.
    The board president was asked, in turn, to distribute copies of the
    questionnaire to:
    A. all remaining members of the school board.

A total of approximately 2,220 questionnaires were distributed. Of this

TABLE 4.3   SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS

1. COMMUNITY STABILITY

        Stable   53 (83%)
        Unstable   11 (17%)
            Missing=8

2. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT TRENDS

        Increase)25%   4 (6%)
        Increase 10-25%   3 (5%)
        Stable (+/- 10%)   34 (54%)
        Decline 10-25%   14 (22%)
        Decline)25%   8 (13%)
            Missing=9

3. VIEWS OF FINANCIAL STATUS (Supt.)   (TO Ldr.) (Bd. Mbr.)

        Crisis   2 (3%)   2 (3%)   1 (2%)
        Troubled   16 (25%)   9 (15%)   12 (19%)
        Under Control   22 (34%)   22 (37%)   27 (43%)
        Comfortable   23 (36%)   26 (43%)   23 (38%)
        Surplus   1 (2%)   1 (2%)   0 (0%)
            Missing=   8   12   9

number 1,038 useable responses were returned.   Table 4.4 presents the data on

the characteristics of those who responded.   As the table indicates, 56% of

the responses were from men, 44% from women.   The respondents are heavily

concentrated in the 30 to 45 age bracket (56%).   As would be expected, only a

very small number of senior citizens responded (1%).   Somewhat less expected

was the small number of respondents in the Under 30 age group (7%).   The vast

majority of the respondents identified themselves as "white" (94%).   Blacks

accounted for three percent of the sample, all other minority groups, along

with a handful or "others" accounted for the remaining 3%.

Our respondents are clearly in the middle and upper middle classes when

it comes to family income.   Two-thirds of all respondents reported a family

income in excess of $25,000.   Only 5% claimed incomes under $15,000.

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents identified themselves as members of

a labor organization.   Teacher respondents, of course, account for a large

proportion of these labor organization memberships.   Not all teachers,

however, identified themselves as members of a "labor organization."   To the

contrary, we found a number of instances where teachers who were members of a

recognized collective bargaining unit did not see this membership as

membership in a "labor organization."

Our respondents are notably on the conservative side politically.   On a

seven point (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) scale, the average

respondent gave a score of 4.6 to the question: "Generally speaking, I

consider myself a political conservative."

This mean score is well above 4.0, which represents the mid-point on the range

of possible answers.

As expected from the strategy used to distribute the questionnaires,

TABLE, 4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL
SURVEY RESPONDENTS
(Total Sample Size=1,038)

1. SEX

Men	571 (56%)
Women	454 (44%)
Missing=13	

2. AGE

Under 30	73 (7%)
30 to 45	575 (56%)
46 to 65	366 (36%)
Over 65	11 (1%)
Missing=13	

3. ETHNICITY

Blacks	33 (3%)
Hispanics	12 (1%)
Whites	968 (94%)
Asians	7 (1%)
Others	5 (0%)
Missing=13	

4. FAMILY INCOME LEVEL

Under $15,000	52 (5%)
$15 to 25,000	293 (29%)
$25 to 50,000	538 (53%)
Above $50,000	133 (13%)
Missing=22	

5. UNION MEMBERSHIP STATUS

Labor Org. Members	648 (64%)
Non-members	364 (36%)
Missing=26	

6. POLITICAL CONSERVATISM

	Mean	Std. Dev.
(On a 7-point scale)	4.60	1.80

7. ROLE IN SCHOOLS

Citizens	209 (20%)
Teachers	260 (25%)
Teacher Leaders	175 (17%)
Principals	111 (11%)
Central Off. Adms.	91 (9%)
Sch. Board Membs.	180 (18%)
Missing=12	

teachers and school district citizens are best represented among the

respondents (26% and 21% respectively). Central office administrators

(superintendents and a few other senior administrators) are least numerous

among the respondents with 84 completed questionnaires (9%) Though principals

slightly outnumber the superintendents, they are not evenly distributed across

the districts. The principals disproportionately represent larger school

districts where they are more numerous.

Respondent Attitudes About School Programs. Seven questions in the

questionnaire focused on respondent's attitudes toward various school program

goals. Two mean scores for each of these questions (along with their

respective standard deviations) are shown in Table 4.5. One mean is for all

of the 1,038 respondents in the sample. However, since there are not only

disproportionately large numbers of teachers and parents in the sample, but

also disproportunately large numbers of respondents from large districts, a

more representative picture of the overall state of labor relations is

generated by aggregating across role groups and districts before calculating a

total mean score. That is, in order to limit the biases particular groups and

districts in estimating overall attitudes toward school programs, we

calculated a second set of mean scores for these attitude questions in three

stages. Mean scores within each role-group (i.e. citizens, teachers, teacher

leaders, principals, superintendents, and school board members) were

calculated first. Then, across the role groups mean scores within each

district were calculated. Finally overall mean scores for the entire sample

were calculated by averaging the scores across all districts. The resulting

grand mean scores on the five program attitude questions are shown in the

first column of Table 4.5. A comparison of the two sets of means in Table

TABLE 4.5   RESPONDENT VIEWS ON SCHOOL PROGRAMS
(Mean scores on a seven point scale--
1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)

THE SCHOOLS SHOULD . . .	Agg. Dst. Mean Score N=72	(s.d.)	Total Sample Mean N=1038	(s.d.)
D1. emphasize fundamental skills	6.46	(.42)	6.52	(.91)
D5. provide high level academic training	6.14	(.42)	6.18	(1.06)
D4. emphasize vocational education	5.59	(.62)	5.57	(1.36)
D2. provide sports, drama & other extra curricula	5.56	(.54)	5.56	(1.44)
D3. support social and cultural enrichment	5.50	(.72)	5.59	(1.33)

reveals only modest changes due to the bias of role groups and/or districts.
Only the score for question D3 ("The schools should support social and
cultural enrichment") shifts in the _order_ of magnitude in the two sets of
means--moving from third place in the total sample to the lowest mean in the
aggregated means. Each of the five program goals offered to our respondents
received very strong support. Programs of "social and cultural enrichment"
which received the lowest overall aggregated support were still given a mean
score of 5.50 (half way between "agree somewhat" and "agree" on our
seven-point scale). The strongest support was given to basic or "fundamental
skills" programs. For this question the mean score was 6.46, just over a half
point short of the 7.0 maximum score that could be given. As the pattern of
mean scores in Table 4.5 reveals, our respondents place substantially higher
priority on fundamental skills than on high level academic training,
vocational education and extra-curricular programs as well as the social and
cultural enrichment goals just mentioned. While the differences between
vocational education, extra curricular and cultural enrichment programs
(questions D4, D2, and D3) are not significant, differences between the other
mean scores shown in Table 4.5 are in highly significant. Academic programs
(question D5) are given substantially more support than any of these less
broadly supported program goals, and significantly less support than the
highly desired fundamental skills (question D1).

Labor Relations Profile: The Interview Data

During our field interviews with key actors in each district, we asked
for information regarding various aspects of labor relations. A summary of
the responses to some of these questions is presented in Table 4.6 On the

TABLE 4.6   LABOR RELATIONS PROFILE DATA
(As provided during interviews)

1. Teacher Organization Membership   Mean   Std. Dev.

        (n=60 districts)   76.67   27.58

2. First year of Negotiations   1973.1   5.09 yrs.

3. Recognition conflict level

        — None   39   (67%)
        — Raucus Debate   14   (24%)
        — Job Action or Strike   5   (9%)

4. Current Labor Relations

    Conflict Level According to: Supts   TO Ldrs   Bd Mbrs
    (On 5-point scale, 1=Hi.
    Conflict, 5=Cooperation)

                    Mean=   3.63   3.42   3.50
            Std. Dev.=   (1.23)   (1.28)   (1.14)

5. Total No. of Strikes

        None   52   (84%)
        One   7   (11%)
        Two or More   3   (5%)
            Missing=10

6. Duration of most recent strike   Mean   Std. Dev.

        (in days, N=9 districts)   6.78   4.06

7. Year of Most Recent Strike

        This year   4   (40%)
        Last year   1   (10%)
        Two or more years ago   5   (50%)

8. No. of Grievances Filed During Previous Year

        None   35   (57%)
        One   7   (11%)
        Two or three   10   (16%)
        Four or more   10   (16%)

TABLE 4.6   CONTINUED.

9. Teacher Organization Active in Elections?

Yes	28	(49%)
No	29	(51%)

Missing=15

10. Teacher Org. Successful in Elections, If Interested?

Yes	14	(50%)
No	14	(50%)

11. Helpfulness of Collective
Bargaining, as seen by:-

	Supts	TO Ldrs	Bd Mbrs
(On 5-point scale;			
1=Harmful, 3=Neutral,			
5=Helpful) Mean=	2.59	4.38	2.42
Std. Dev.=	(1.49)	(.97)	(1.41)

12. Generational Placement as determined by Labor Relations Conflict
Level (Var. 4 above) and responses to Question C10 on survey
questionaire (Assessing school board acceptance of teacher
organization legitimacy) -- SEE FIGURE 4.A

	No. Dsts. (Agg. Means)	No. Grps. (Agg. Means)
1st Generation	19 (29%)	87 (27%)
1st Intergeneration Conflict	9 (14%)	44 (14%)
Early 2nd Generation	20 (31%)	71 (22%)
Late 2nd Generation	12 (18%)	60 (19%)
2nd Intergeneration Conflict	5 (8%)	58 (18%)

FIGURE 4.A   GENERATIONAL PLACEMENT OF SAMPLE DISTRICTS
AND INDIVIDUAL ROLE GROUPS (see TABLE 4.6).

REPORTED LABOR RELATIONS CONFLICT LEVEL

	Low (Mean > 3.9)	High (Mean <= 3.9)
PERCEIVED SCHOOL BOARD HIGH (>5.26)	LATE SECOND GENERATION 12 Districts 60 Role Groups	SECOND INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT 5 Districts 58 Role Groups
ACCEPTANCE OF MED (>3.97) TEACHER	FIRST GENERATION	EARLY SECOND GENERATION 20 Districts 71 Role Groups
ORGANIZATION LEGITIMACY LOW (<=3.97)	19 Districts 87 Role Groups	FIRST INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT 9 Districts 44 Role Groups

average nearly 77% of all teachers belong to teacher organizations within their local districts. Membership levels vary widely, however. The standard deviation for local teacher organization membership was nearly 29% (with a range from 0% in one small district to 100% in a number of districts being reported).

On the average, districts in our sample began formal negotiations with teachers in 1973. This average masks, however, the fact that a large number (25 began in 1976, the year that California's Rodda Act became effective). Contrary to the impression sometimes presented in the mass media, we found that 2/3 of all districts with contracts experienced no significant rancor or conflict at the time when they first recognized teacher bargaining agents. Only 5 (9%) of all organized districts reported that recognition conflicts involved any sort of job action by teachers.

When asked about the current level of conflict or cooperation between teachers and school district managers, most respondents indicated that "some trust" or an "adequate working relationship" best describes the situation in their districts. Superintendents and other central office administrators gave the most optimistic assessments of the current labor relations tone (3.63 on a 5-point scale). Teacher leaders were less sanguine in their estimates of conflict, giving only a 3.42 mean score on the 5-point scale.

Asked if they had ever experienced a strike, 84% of our sample said they had not. Only 10 districts (16%) had ever undergone a strike, and only 3 of those districts had experienced two or more strikes.

Districts with strike experiences were queried about the duration of their most recent strike. The average strike lasted just under 7 days (s.d.=4.06 days). Among these districts, four had undergone a strike during

1979-80 (the year of our data collection). One district had a strike the previous year and the other five had not experienced a strike for two or more years.

More than half of all districts (57%) surveyed had not had a single grievance filed during the 12 months prior to our interviews. Another 11% of the districts had a single formal grievance filed during this period, while only 16% had experienced four or more formal grievances.

As indicated in Table 4.6, roughly half of all districts reporting indicated that teacher organizations have played an active role in supporting school board candidates (or other local political candidates). Of the teacher organizations taking an active part in electoral politics, exactly half were reported to be successful in having the candidate(s) they supported elected to office.

Asked about whether, on balance, collective bargaining for teachers was helpful or harmful to their school districts, our respondents gave mixed replies. School board members were the most negative (giving an average of 2.42 on a 5-scale). Superintendents were also on the negative side of the scale (mean score = 2.59). As expected, however, teacher leaders hold a very positive view (scoring 4.38).

The last variable reported in Table 4.6 reflects our assignment of districts (and the respondent role-groups within each district) into a specific stage in the generational evolution of labor relations. Two bits of information were used to assign respondents to a particular generational stage. First, since analysis of our eight case study districts indicated that the first intergenerational conflict turns on the question of whether or not the district (i.e., the board and the management) accepts the legitimacy of

the teachers to organize and bargain collectively over the terms and

conditions of their employment, we accepted low scores on question C10 ("The

School Board . . . accepts as legitimate the rights of teachers to bargain

collectively.") as evidence that respondents were adopting a First Generation

or First Intergenerational Conflict orientation toward the labor relations

picture in their districts. Second, since our case study data also indicates

that conflict is relatively intense during each of the Intergenerational

Conflict periods as well as during the Early Second Generation period which

follows initial recognition of the teacher bargaining agent, we averaged the

assessments of current labor relations conflict (Variable 4 on Table 4.6) in

order to get a district conflict level measure for each district. As

indicated in Figure 4-A, each generational group is uniquely defined by a

particular combination of legitimacy and conflict scores.

First generation districts have low or medium willingness to accept the

legitimacy of bargaining. The First Intergenerational Conflict involves

continuing rejection of the legitimacy of organized bargaining with a

substantial increase in the conflict level in the district. As the district

moves from Intergenerational Conflict into the Second Generation, a moderate

level of acceptance for the teacher organization's legitimacy signals entrance

into the Early Second Generational period. Fuller acceptance of teacher

legitimacy, if our case data is to be trusted, is accompanied by a reduction

in the labor relations conflict level within the district. Hence, we defined

as in the Late Second Generation districts which reported high legitimacy

scores (i.e., above 5.26 on the 7-point scale) and high cooperation scores.

Our one Second Intergenerational Conflict case study district suggested that

labor relations conflict starts to become intense without a commensurate

withdrawal of acceptance the legitimacy of teacher organizations during this
stage.

Since, as we discuss more fully below, members of the various role-groups
in our sample (i.e., Citizens, Classroom Teachers, Teacher Leaders,
Principals, Superintendents, and School Board Members) have substantially
different views of the situation within their own school district, finding an
appropriate strategy for pooling the responses of all 1,038 respondents so as
to produce an accurate picture of the situation in each school district became
a bit complicated. The problem is that there are typically several teachers
and citizens, but only one superintendent respondent from each district.
Moreover, in larger districts we generally got a much larger total number of
respondents than in smaller ones. In order to keep the large numbers of
teac: : s or citizens from swamping the smaller number of administrators, and
to prevent large district respondents from outweighing the views of smaller
district respondents, we averaged the scores for all members of each
role-group within each district and assigned to the group the resulting mean
scores for each question in the questionnaire. After aggregating each of the
role-groups, we then averaged the scores for all role-groups within each
district. The final result, shown on Table 4.6 and repeated in Figure 4-A,
led to the identification of 19 districts as still operating within the First
Generational period, 9 districts in the First Intergenerational Conflict
period, 20 districts in the Early Second Generation, 12 districts in the Late
Second Generation, and 5 districts in the Second Intergenerational Conflict
period. As indicated on both the table and the figure, the average scores for
individual role groups (because they reflect the way members of that specific
role-group evaluate the school board's willingness to accept the legitimacy of

the teachers organization) are not distributed exactly the same way as the averages for all groups within each district. Hence, some role-groups can be thought of as "leading" or "lagging" behind other role groups within the same district. This statistical finding fits comfortably with our case studies where we frequently noticed that individuals or groups did not share the dominant perspective on the labor relations situation within the district. As shown, we found 87 role-groups with mean scores suggesting First Generation status, 44 in the First Intergenerational Conflict, 71 in the Early Second Generation, 60 in the Late Second Generation, and 58 moving into the Second Intergenerational Conflict period. We will return to a detailed analysis of differences among these groups after describing somewhat more fully what can be learned from and about the overall picture of labor relations from our survey data.

Labor Relations Profile: The Survey Questions

As shown in Table 4.7, seven questions included in our survey instrument were aimed at assessing the current state of labor relations within our sample districts. Two mean scores for each question (with their respective standard deviations) are shown on the table. One is the mean for all 1,038 respondents in the sample. The other means were calculated in three steps. First, a separate mean was calculated for the members of each role group (i.e., Citizens, Teachers, Teacher Leaders, Principals, Superintendents, and School Board Members) within each district. The resulting sub-group means were then averaged within each school district. Finally, the resulting district means were averaged across the 72 districts in the sample. This procedure was used to eliminate whatever biases may have been created by the fact that relatively

TABLE 4.7   LABOR RELATIONS PROFILE:
AGGREGATE DISTRICT MEAN SCORES.
(From Survey Questions.   Using a 7-point
scale; 1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)

		Agg. Dst. Mean Score		Total Sample Mean	
THE SCHOOL BOARD . . .		N=72	(s.d.)	N=1038	(s.d.)
C9.	is pre-occupied with collective bargaining.	2.92	(.85)	3.09	(1.53)
C10.	accepts as legitimate the rights of teachers to bargain.	4.53	(1.16)	4.55	(1.80)
C11.	is satisfied with current relationship with teachers.	5.00	(1.01)	4.81	(1.58)
THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION . . .					
B3.	acts responsibly in dealing with teachers.	5.13	(.80)	5.00	(1.63)
THE TEACHERS' ORGANIZATION . . .					
A1.	is strong and well organized.	4.71	(1.11)	4.87	(1.60)
A2.	is successful in dealing with school management.	4.82	(.84)	4.74	(1.52)
A10.	is quite likely to strike.	3.37	(1.32)	3.56	(2.05)

large numbers of teachers and citizens were included in the sample. It also

eliminates biases resulting from any tendency for various role groups to

selectively perceive events within some of the school districts. As shown on

Table 4.7, the biases thus eliminated were generally quite modest (with

differences in the grand mean for each question ranging from .02 to .19).

Three questions (C9, C10, and C11) sought to assess the mood and attitude

of school boards. On the average, it was reported, school boards are not

particularly pre-occupied with collective bargaining issues and are generally

satisfied with their current working relationship with teachers. While there

is substantial variance, our respondents generally believe that school boards

are more likely to accept than to reject the rights of teachers to organize

and bargain collectively.

Responses to question B3 show that the average respondent "agrees

somewhat" with the statement that the school administration acts responsibly

in its dealing with teachers.

When evaluating teacher organizations, the typical respondent reports

that they are well organized and that they tend to be successful in dealing

with the school management. Given the fact that only 16% of the districts in

our sample had ever experienced a strike, and that only 5% had undergone two

or more strikes (see Table 4.6), there was a surprisingly weak tendency to

disagree with the proposition that teachers are "quite likely to strike."

Apparently the fear of teacher strikes is rather more widespread than their

actual occurrence.

Overall View of School Boards

Table 4.8 reports the role-group and district aggregated mean scores (as

well as the total sample means) for eight questions aimed at assessing overall

perceptions of local school boards. The responses are listed in descending

order of mean scores. It is clear from these mean scores that school boards

are generally regarded as responsible. Their success in pursuing educational

goals, as well as their level of organizational efficiency, though less well

recognized, still tend to be viewed positively by the typical respondent. Our

respondents were still less sure that school board members are competent, or

that they reach their decisions openly and with adequate imput from all

interested parties, or that they maintain close contact with a broad

cross-section of district citizens.

Our respondents generally rejected descriptions of their school boards

are arenas of high conflict or objects of organized political opposition. On

this point, our data fit comfortably with previous research on local school

boards which indicates that they are typically devoid of rancc.ous political

debate and active political opposition.

Overall Views of School Administrations

When asked to assess the administration of their local school districts,

our respondents generally offered a positive appraisal. As shown in Table

4.9, the mean score of 5.49 on question B1 (assessing agreement with the

proposition that school administrators are successful in running the schools)

is higher than the success rating given to either school boards (mean = 4.81

on question C2--see Table 4.8) or teacher organizations (mean = 4.82 on

question A2--see Table 4.7). Similarly, the mean response of 5.26 on the

administration competency question (B2) is higher than that given for either

board members (mean ≠ 4.61 on question C3--see Table 4.8) or teacher leaders

TABLE 4.8   VIEWS OF SCHOOL BOARDS:
AGGREGATE DISTRICT MEAN SCORES
(From Survey Questions.   Using a 7-point scale;
1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly agree)

THE SCHOOL BOARD . . .	Agg. Dst. Mean Score N=72 (s.d.)		Total Sample Mean N=1038 (s.d.)	
C4. acts responsibly & in the best interests of the district.	5.13	(.81)	4.97	(1.64)
C2. is successful in pursuing educational goals.	4.81	(.82)	4.74	(1.58)
C1. is well organized and efficient.	4.80	(.85)	4.74	(1.60)
C8. makes all important decisions openly.	4.62	(.80)	4.51	(1.88)
C3. has competent members.	4.61	(.84)	4.48	(1.72)
C5. is in close contact with a cross-section of citizens.	4.47	(.72)	4.33	(1.73)
C6. is characterized by high conflict & split votes.	2.69	(1.17)	2.77	(1.72)
C7. has been the focus of political opposition.	2.67	(1 36)	2.70	(1.87)

(mean = 4.69 on question A3--see Table 4.10). On both questions, the higher administrator ratings are statistically significant well above the .001 level.

The last four questions listed in Table 4.9 were aimed at ascertaining what sort of management thrust predominates among local school administrations. Despite recent reports of financial hardship, we found that our districts generally reported that their administrations are more concerned with accountability (B6), student achievement levels (B7), and innovative program development (B4) than with maintaining existing programs (B5). In each case, however, the average response was above the 4.0 mid-point on our 7-point Likert scale. We also noted that there were no statistically significant correlations between reported levels of preoccupation with maintaining existing programs and the various assessments of district financial status provided by superintendents, teacher leaders, and school board presidents during our interviews (see Table 4.3).

Overall Views of Teacher Organizations

Table 4.10 presents aggregated and overall sample mean scores for seven questions assessing respondent views of their local teacher organizations. As indicated, teacher organizations tend to be seen as actively trying to influence school board policies (question A5). The teacher organizations also tend to be viewed as responsible (A4), competently led (A3), and active in trying to influence state legislatures (A7).

Our respondents were more equivocal regarding their assessments of teacher organization activities in relation to local district politics. The greatest variance in assessing teacher organization characteristics came in

TABLE 4.9   VIEWS OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIONS:
AGGREGATE DISTRICT MEAN SCORES.
(From Survey Questions.   Using a 7-point scale;
1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)

THE ADMINISTRATION . . .	Agg. Dst. Mean Score N=72 (s.d.)	Total Sample Mean N=1038 (s.d.)
B1. is successful in running the schools.	5.49 (.76)	5.43 (1.47)
B2. is made up of highly competent individuals.	5.26 (.79)	5.13 (1.63)
B6. has taken steps to tighten accountability.	4.92 (.91)	4.86 (1.59)
B7. is actively pursuing student achievement.	4.79 (.87)	4.72 (1.63)
34. emphasizes the development of innovative programs.	4.77 (.76)	4.83 (1.59)
B5. is pre-occupied with maintaining existing progs.	4.22 (.73)	4.21 (1.53)

TABLE 4.10   VIEWS OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS:
AGGREGATE DISTRICT MEAN SCORES.
(From Survey Questions.   Using a 7-point scale;
1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)

THE TEACHERS' ORGANIZATION . . .	Agg. Dst. Mean Score N=72	(s.d.)	Total Sample Mean N=1038	(s.d.)
A5. actively tries to influence school board policies.	4.91	(1.03)	5.10	(1.59)
A4. acts responsibly.	4.87	(.86)	4.94	(1.64)
A3. has competent leadership.	4.69	(.89)	4.80	(1.66)
A7. tries to influence state legislatures.	4.69	(1.07)	4.83	(1.85)
A6. supports political candidates.	4.24	(1.17)	4.43	(1.97)
A9. tries to influence parents.	4.20	(.93)	4.18	(1.70)
A8. is successful in rallying community support.	3.60	(.78)	3.72	(1.53)

response to question A6 which asks about their support for political
candidates. This is consistent with the interview data reported in Table 4.6,
above, which indicates that about half of all teacher organizations are active
in school board elections.

As seen in the low mean score (3.60) for question A8, our respondents
feel that teacher organizations are not particularly successful in rallying
community support. Again, this finding is compatible with information
garnered from our interviews with key actors indicating that when they do
enter the political arena teacher organizations are successful in getting
their candidates elected only about half the time (see Table 4.6). Pearson
correlations between reported teacher organization interest in school board
elections (variable 9, Table 4.6) and perceived support for political
candidates (A6) is .52 (p = .000). The correlation with perceived attempts to
influence parents (A9) is .29 (p = .014) and with success in rallying
community support is .28 (p = .019), indicating that once teacher
organizations become politically active they tend to combine electoral
campaigning with other types of activities aimed at attracting and holding
community support for their goals.

Role-group Characteristics

As reported in the discussion of Table 4.4, above, respondents were drawn
from six role groups in each district (citizens, classroom teachers, teacher
organization leaders, principals, superintendents, and school board members).
As might be expected, there are sharp differences among these groups in their
assessments of school board, school administration, and teacher organization
characteristics and operations. Except for differences between districts, the

differences in perception between the various role-groups are statistically
more significant than when they are grouped according to any other variable or
characteristic on which we had data. Before discussing these differences,
however, we should note that the role-groups differ significantly from each
other along six of the eight demographic dimensions listed in Table 4.11. For
the most part, the demographic differences conform to the expected pattern for
each group. Teachers and active parents, for example, are predominately
women, while only three of the 84 superintendents and nine of the 96
principals in the sample were women. The fact that 74% of all board members
are men may help to account for why men are more likely to be appointed to
high level administrative posts (we cannot be certain, however, because we
have no way of knowing whether there is any difference between women and men
board members with regard to the preference for male administrators).

The six role groups also differ significantly in age profile. Classroom
teachers are the youngest group and school superintendents the oldest.
Parents, teacher leaders, principals and board members all fall between these
two extremes.

Although they comprise less than 6% of the total sample, we found no
tendency for ethnic minorities to be disproportionately concentrated in any
particular role group ($F(5,963) = .57$, $p = .722$).

With regard to family income, superintendents belong disproportionately
to the higher paid groups, while teachers represent the lower income groups.
Note that superintendents tend to be more highly paid than the school board
members for whom they work and that teachers, on the average, earn
considerably less.

The adequacy of our sampling process is supported by the fact that there

TABLE 4.11   DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RESPONDENT
ROLE GROUPS.
(Univariate analysis of variance tests)

	F-Statistic (df=5,963)	p-value	Interpretation
1. Sex	46.59	.000	Only 3 Supts & 9 Prins. are Female; 74% of Board Mbrs are Male.
2. Age	21.06	.000	Classroom Tchrs. are youngest; Supts. are oldest
3. Ethnicity	.57	.722	Ethnic sub-groups are evenly distributed.
4. Income	27.64	.000	Supts. are high-est paid; Tchrs. are lowest.
5. State of residence	.93	.461	Role Groups are evenly distri-buted.
6. Political conservatism	8.25	.000	Bd. Mbrs. are most conserv-ative; Tchr. Ldrs. are most liberal.
7. Favorableness to unions	12.68	.000	Tchr. Ldrs. are most favorable; Bd. Mbrs. are least.
8. Union membership	118.40	.000	Union affili-ation was claimed by: Tchr. Ldrs.-80% Tchrs. -60% Bd. Mbrs. -17% Citizens -13% Prins. - 4% Supts. - 3%

are no significant differences in the distribution of role group memberships
between California and Illinois respondents.

As expected, school board members were most likely to agree with the
statement, "Generally speaking, I consider myself a political conservative."
Teacher leaders were least likely to agree with this statement; the other
groups were distributed between these two extremes.

When asked about their overall favorableness toward unions, the groups
line-up in the opposite order. Teacher leaders are most favorable while the
more conservative board members are least favorably disposed to organized
labor. Overall, however, the negative correlation between these two attitudes
is far from perfect (r = -.33, p = .002).

When responding to a question about whether they are actually members of
any union, our respondents present an interesting picture. Teachers and
teacher leaders are, by far, the most highly unionized groups. Board members
and citizens, reflecting typical patterns in society, report union membership
of 17% and 13% respectively. No doubt, the higher percentage of union members
on school boards reflects sex differences rather than a tendency for union
members to be more successful board candidates.

Although 77% of all teachers belong to local teacher organizations (see
Table 4.6), only 60% appear to view this as union membership. The remaining
17% apparently look upon the teacher organization as an "association" rather
than a union. This proportion is smaller than we had expected. It means that
even in the districts without full-fledged labor negotiations, some teachers
consider themselves to be union members. (Possibly this is the result of
membership in non-educational unions.) Eighty percent of all teacher
organization leaders claim to be union members. This number fits

appropriately with the fact that 20% of our sample districts did not yet

engage in collective bargaining with their teachers.

Principals and superintendents, as expected, seldom claimed to be union

members (4% and 3% respectively). Our interview data suggest that the

majority of those who are members have become so either as classroom teachers,

or in non-education related activities. We did not study any districts with

active principal or managerial unions.

Differences Between Role Groups

Tables 4.12-A, 4.12-B, and 4.12-C present the results of multiple

discriminant analyses applied to the views of teacher organizations, school

administrations, and school boards expressed by the members of each role group

(the role group scores were aggregated within each district prior to applying

the multiple discriminant analysis in order to eliminate biases due to the

disproportionate representation of teachers and citizens in some districts).

Table 4.12-A presents the coefficients and role group centroids for the

three most significant discriminant functions derived from an analysis of

responses to Part A of the questionnaire--views of teacher organizations).

The overall significance of each separate discriminant function is seen in the

canonical correlation coefficients (Multiple R's) and associated probability

of significance values (p's) shown at the top of each column of discriminant

function coefficients.

As these statistics indicate, the first two discriminant functions are

extremely reliable--with p-values of virtually zero. It is much less certain

that the third function is a measure of real differences between role

groups--the p-value of .071 indicates that there are slightly more than seven

TABLE 4.12a MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS:
AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Multiple R=	.60	.33	.21
p=	.000	.000	.071

THE TEACHERS' ORGANIZATION . . .

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
A2. is successful in dealing with school management.	-.60 *	.68 *	-.25
A4. acts responsibly.	1.08 **	.18	.22
A5. actively tries to influence school board policies.	.42	-.40 *	.37
A6. supports political candidates.	.29	-.54 *	-.71 *
A7. tries to influence the state legislature.	-.34	.75 **	-.26
A8. is successful in rallying community support.	.26	-.25	.19
A9. tries to influence parents.	-.14	.63 *	.11
A10. is quite likely to strike.	-.05	-.01	.92 **

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

----------------- ROLE GROUP CENTROIDS -----------------

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Parents & Other Citizens	-.22	-.07	.48
Classroom Teachers	.80	-.44	-.09
Teacher Org. Leaders	1.15	.28	-.03
Site Admins. (Principals)	-.71	-.50	-.20
Central Off. Adms. (Supts)	-.49	.45	-.15
School Board Members	-.68	.06	-.02

chances in 100 that it is a sampling artifact rather than a reliable finding.

The multiple R of .60 for the first function means that it accounts for about 36% of the variance in role-group members' beliefs about teacher organizations (i.e., the explained variance is proportional to the square of the multiple correlation coefficient). A correlation coefficient of such size is quite high in ordinary social survey research and indicates that our questionnaire instrument has succeeded in tapping basic differences in viewpoint among our respondent groups. When the further explanatory power of the second and third functions are combined with this first one, we are able to associate more than 51% of the variations in respondent's assessments of teacher organizations with their membership in a particular role-group. Survey research findings of this magnitude are rare indeed.

The substantive meaning of each discriminant function is found in the magnitude of the coefficients associated with each of the eight items from Part A of the survey questionnaire which contributed significantly to the overall discrimination. In the first function, the most important variable is question A4 which probes the extent to which respondents believe that teacher organization "acts responsibly" (coefficient = 1.08). Also contributing significantly to this first discriminant function are responses to question A2 which asks whether teacher organizations are "successful in dealing with school management." In this case the coefficient is negative (-.60) indicating that the role groups which view teacher organizations as responsible tend also to see them as not very successful, and vice versa.

None of the other questions in Part A yielded a coefficient greater than half the magnitude of A4 in this function, hence the scores of individuals on

this function should be interpreted as a measure of their tendency to see

teacher organizations as either "responsible but not successful" (positive

scores) or "irresponsible but successful" (negative scores).

The bottom part of Table 4.12-A shows the centroid or average

discriminant function scores for each of the six role groups. Note that for

the first function the teacher groups have positive centroids (i.e., see their

organizations as responsible but not successful) while each of the other four

role groups has a negative centroid (indicating a belief that teacher

organizations are irresponsible but successful). The teacher leaders with a

centroid score of 1.15 are the strongest in endorsing the responsible but not

successful view. School principals and with a centroid of -.71 are most

likely to take the opposing view.

As shown in the second column of the table, five Part A questions

contribute substantially to the second discriminant function (which is

statistically "orthogonal" to, and thus uncorrelated with the first). This

function, with a multiple R of .33, accounts for only about 30% as much

variance as the first. It is still a highly reliable way of distinguishing

among the various role groups, however. The largest coefficient for this

function (.75) is associated with question A7 which asks respondents whether

they believe that the teacher organization "tries to influence the state

legislature." Closely associated with this question are answers to question

A9 ("tries to influence parents"). Question A2, assessing whether the teacher

organization is successful, contributes significantly to this function as well

as the first--only in this case the coefficient is positive. Large negative

coefficients for this function are associated with questions A6 ("supports

political candidates") and A5 ("tries to influence school board policies").

Viewed together, these five substantial coefficients convey the picture of
teacher organizations as _successful_ and actively _trying to influence_ state
legislatures and local parents, but not directly involved in school board
elections or influencing school board decisions. Positive discriminant scores
on this function would reflect the external political orientation toward
legislatures and parents, while negative scores would indicate an internal
political orientation focused on the board itself. The positive coefficient
associated with the success question means that all respondents tend to agree
that the external political orientation is the one taken by successful teacher
organizations. Though it would be very helpful to know, we cannot tell from
our data whether respondents believe that the external political orientation
is the _result_ of teacher organization success in dealing with management or is
perhaps the _mechanism_ by which they are most likely to become successful.

Looking again at the centroids in the bottom part of Table 4.12-A, we can
see that superintendents and teacher leaders tend to hold the view that
teacher organizations have outside political orientations and are successful.
Principals and classroom teachers hold the opposite view.

Although some caution should be used in interpreting the third
discriminant function, it offers some important insights into the conflicting
views of teacher organizations held by our respondents. The largest
coefficient for this function is associated with question A10 (assessing the
likelihood of a strike). The only other question with a substantial
coefficient concerns the involvement of the teacher organization the support
of political candidates (question A6). This function, in other words,
separates those who believe that teachers are likely to strike, and are not
directly involved in electoral politics from those who hold the reverse views.

As shown in the centroid listings, only the citizens group has a positive

centroid (+.48) on this function. The two administrator groups have the most

negative centroids. Hence this function divides parents and other citizens

who fear strikes and do not see teachers involved in electoral politics from

school administrators who see strikes as less likely while fearing teacher

involvement in school board elections more strongly.

Additional insight into differences among the role groups' views of

teacher organizations can be garnered if we plot each groups' centroid scores

for the first two functions on a single two-dimensional graph. Such a plot is

presented in Figure 4.B. Note that the four professional educator groups are

widely dispersed, one located in each quadrant of the graph. Teachers and

teacher leaders share positive centroids on the first function, but are split

in their views on the second one. The administrators, both having negative

centroids on the first function are also split on the second function. Just

as the first function distinguishes teachers (who believe that their

organizations act responsibly but are not too successful) from administrators,

the second distinguishes district level groups (who believe that the teacher

organizations use external political strategies successfully) from the site

level groups (who see teacher groups playing internal politics

unsuccessfully). Both board members and citizen groups tend to side with

administrators on the question of teacher organization responsibility. They

split, however, when it comes to appraising the political orientation of the

teachers (parents and citizens adopt the site level perspective).

School board members, as might be expected, are located closest to the

superintendents whom they employ. Parents and other citizens, on the other

hand, tend to be located close to the mid-point of the graph, indicating that

FIGURE 4.B PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS:
AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS.
(Six role-groups; first two discriminant functions;
see TABLE 4.12a)

```
                          Function #2
                             1.5
                              I
                              I
                              I
                              I
                              I
                             1.0
                              l
                              l
                              l
                              l
                              I
                              I
                            0.5
                              l
            Supt.            I
                             I
           + Brd.           I                              TO Ldr.
-1.5----- -1.0----- -0.5----------I-------- +0.5----- +1.0----- +1.5
                             X    l              Function #1
                           Par.   l
                              I        .
                              I
                              I
                              l
                            -0.5
          Prin.               I              Tch.
                              I
                              I
                              I
                              I
                            -1.0
                              I
                              l
                              l
                              I
                              l
                            -1.5
```

they are caught between the competing views of the other role groups. While, on the average, the parents tend toward the board and administrator groups, this tendency varies significantly from district to district and from time to time within any particular district.

Table 4.12-B presents the results of a multiple discriminant analysis applied to the responses of each role group to Part B of the questionnaire (assessing their views of the school district administration). In this analysis each of the first three discriminant functions is highly significant. Summing the squared multiple correlations between these three functions and the role group identities of the respondents (R = .64, .25, and .24) indicates that a total of about 53% of the variance in group membership is accounted for by them. Once again, we can see that the roles occupied by key actors in public education has a very powerful effect on their perceptions and beliefs.

As indicated by the discriminant function coefficients, the first function is dominated by the answers to question B3 which asks whether respondents feel that school administrators "act responsibly in dealing with teachers." No other questions in this part of the questionnaire yielded a coefficient as much as 1/2 as large as the .94 associated with this question.

As indicated by the centroid scores presented at the bottom of Table 4.12-B, superintendents were, by far, most inclined to feel that the school administration is responsible in its dealings with teachers. Teacher leaders, on the other hand, were most likely to disagree with this assessment. Regular classroom teachers and parents tended to share the views of the teacher leaders (though less decisively) while principals and board members tend to adopt the viewpoint of the superintendents.

The second discriminant function (with a multiple R of .25 and a

TÀBLE 4.12b MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS:
AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Multiple R=	.64	.25	.24
p=	.000	.001	.010

THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION . . .

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
B1.	is successful in running the schools.	-.36	.61 *	1.34 **
B2.	is made up of highly competent individials.	.40	.49	-.95 *
B3.	acts responsibly in dealing with teachers.	.94 **	-.98 **	-.56
B4.	emphasizes the development of innovative programs.	-.34	.89 *	-.13
B6.	has taken steps to tighten accountability.	.37	-.53 *	.75 *

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

------------------ ROLE GROUP CENTROIDS -------------------

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Parents & Other Citizens.	-.14	.21	-.47
Classroom Teachers	-.83	-.06	-.08
Teacher Org. Leaders	-1.09	-.22	.18
Site Admins. (Principals)	.55	.06	.08
Central Off. Adms. (Supts)	1.19	-.33	-.03
School Board Members	.34	.39	.29

significance level of .001) is a bit more difficult to interpret. Question B4
("acts responsibly in dealing with teachers") produces the largest coefficient
in this function as well as in the first one. This indicates that conflicting
views on whether or not administrators act responsibly is of vital
significance in distinguishing among the various role groups. Taken together,
the other large coefficients in this second function reveal that the notion of
responsible action has a rather different meaning in this function than it had
in the first. Two questions, B4 ("emphasizes the development of innovative
programs") and B1 ("is successful in running the schools") yield large
coefficients which are opposite in sign to the -.98 associated with the
responsibility question. One other question, B6 ("has taken steps to tighten
accountability") has a large coefficient (-.53) which shares the negative sign
of the B3 responsibility assessment. As a group, these coefficients suggest
that a high score on this function means that a respondent views managers as
irresponsible in the sense of running a rather free-wheeling, innovative
(though successful) program which does not adequately hold either teachers or
accountable for its behavior. Thus, whereas the first discriminant function
discriminant function treats the responsible administrative behavior question
in terms of ordinary notions of fair play and equitable treatment for
teachers, the second function looks more at the programmatic and
organizational meanings of administrative responsibility.

As shown in the bottom part of Table 4.12-B, high scores on the second
discriminant function are more likely to be achieved by school board members
or parents than any other role group members. Thus, these two groups tend to
view the administration as free-wheeling, innovative, successful, and a bit
irresponsible in their actions. Teacher leaders and superintendents take the

opposing view. They express the belief that administrators are programmatically responsible, accountability conscious, less innovative, and less successful in running the schools.

This interpretation is further elaborated in the third discriminant function which has almost exactly the same explanatory power as the second (a multiple R of .24 as compared to the .25 for Function #2). This function is predominately concerned with the degree of administrative success in running the schools (question B1, coefficient = 1.34). High scores on this function also tended to mean that respondents view the administration as having taken steps to tighten accountability. Curiously, high scorers on this function also express the view that school administrators are not particularly competent (question B2). Thus, while the second function equates successful administration with innovation and responsibility in dealing with teachers (and to a lesser extent personal competence), this function attributes success to the establishment of accountability rather than to either competence or responsible dealings with teachers.

As shown in the bottom part of Table 4.12-B, the third discriminant function distinguishes board members (and to some extent teacher leaders) from parents and ordinary citizens. As compared with these ordinary citizens, board members see school administrations as achieving success through tightened accountability rather than personal competence. The citizens, by contrast, see administrators as personally competent but managerially weak due to a lack of accountability standards.

As indicated in Figure 4.C, the centroids for the first two school administration discriminant functions closely approximate a smooth curve when plotted on a single graph. Teacher leaders and superintendents are at

FIGURE 4.C PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS:
AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION.
(Six role-groups; first two discriminant functions;
see TABLE 4.12b)

opposite ends of the curve. Parents and board members are in the middle, with
the board members occupying the high point on Function #2. The
superintendents are most unanimous in affirming their responsibility in both
the fair play sense (Function #1) and the managerial accountability sense
(Function #2). Teacher leaders, and to a lesser extent ordinary classroom
teachers share with the superintendents (against board members and citizens)
the belief that school systems are accountable, but they strenuously reject
the notion that administrators treat teachers equitably and fairly.

Table 4.12-C presents results from a multiple discriminant analysis
applied to role group responses to Part C of the questionnaire (views of school
boards). This analysis shows clearly that there are substantial differences
between the six role groups in their views of the character and operations of
their local school boards. As indicated at the top of the table, the first
two discriminant functions are highly significant, while the third has only
about a 92% probability of significance. Summing the squared multiple
correlation coefficients for these three functions shows that they account for
about 58% of the variance in role group membership (again an extremely
significant survey research finding).

The first discriminant function in this group (alone accounting for
nearly 50% of the variance in role group membership) is dominated by responses
to question C8 which asked respondents to judge whether their school board
"makes all important policy decisions openly and with adequate input from all
interested parties." No other question produced a coefficient as large as 1/2
the size of this one.

As indicated by the centroid scores, this function sharply discriminates
the two teacher groups from the school board members and superintendents

TABLE 4.12c   MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Multiple R=	.70	.24	.19
p=	.000	.018	.084

THE SCHOOL BOARD . . .

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
C2.	is successful in pursuing educational goals.	-.41	.19	-1.03 *
C4.	acts responsibly & in the best interest of the district.	.37	.16	1.07 **
C6.	is characterized by high conflict, split votes.	.02	.73 **	.09
C8.	makes decisions openly and with adequate input.	1.02 **	.24	-.33
C9:	is pre-occupied with collective bargaining problems.	.10	.46 *	.43
C10.	accepts as legitimate the rights of teachers to organize.	.12	-.67 *	.41
C11.	is satisfied with current relationship with teachers.	-.16	.00	.07

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

----------------- ROLE GROUP CENTROIDS -----------------

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Parents & Other Citizens	.12	.14	.31
Classroom Teachers	-1.12	.41	-.08
Teacher Org. Leaders	-1.34	-.31	-.04
Site Admins. (Principals)	.22	-.31	.00
Central Off. Adms. (Supts)	1.01	.05	.29
School Board Members	1.05	-.02	.13

group. If there is one unequivocal finding that stands alone in our data it is that teachers believe that school boards are closed political systems, unwilling to listen to the legitimate interests of anyone who does not qualify as a political "insider." Board members disagree, of course, with this assessment of their mode of operation. They are supported in this disagreement by the superintendents. Our interviews and case study data make it abundantly clear that this belief by teachers that their school boards are closed to legitimate input and interests is a very important factor in their recent willingness to join militant professional and labor organizations.

It is important to note that both principals and parents are caught in the middle of this tension between school policy makers and teachers. While they are somewhat inclined to believe that boards are open to legitimate interests, the centroids for parents and principals are almost exactly equidistant between the policy makers and the teacher groups.

Coefficients for the second discriminant function listed on Table 4.12-C indicate that this function separates those who see the board as embroiled in conflict (question C6) and pre-occupied with collective bargaining issues (question C9) from those who believe that it has already accepted the legitimate right of teachers to organize and bargain collectively (question C10). The centroid scores reveal that regular classroom teachers, and to some extent parents, believe that battles over collective bargaining are still being fought in the board. Teacher leaders and principals are more confident that the issue has already been resolved in favor of accepting the legitmacy of bargaining. Our interview and case study data suggest that the views expressed by teacher leaders and principals may be sustantially influenced by their fears and wishes. Principals are generally anxious about the negative

effects of collective bargaining on their authority, and they tend to feel

that the board has "sold them out" by negotiating contracts which are

difficult for them to live with in the schools. Teacher leaders, on the other

hand, have a stake in proclaiming their legitimacy as representatives of

teacher interests, and probably proclaim acceptance by the board before it has

been fully granted.

The third discriminant function (which, again, must be interpreted

cautiously) separates those who believe that boards act responsibly (question

C4) but are not very successful in pursuing educational goals (question C2)

from those who feel that the board is successful without acting in a

responsible manner. Parents and superintendents generally got high scores on

this function, indicating that they see the board as acting responsibly, but

fighting a losing battle when it comes to important educational goals.

Once again, graphing the centroid scores for the first two discriminant

functions (see Figure 4.D) draws our attention to specific aspects of the

relationships between the six role groups. The most obvious feature of this

figure is the fact that the six role groups fall into three distinct clusters.

The superintendents and board members make the tightest cluster, with high

scores on the first function and near zero scores on the second. The teacher

groups, at the opposite end of the first function are much farther apart than

the policy maker cluster. Rank and file teachers diverge from their leaders

primarily on the second function (because they do not believe that boards have

yet accepted the legitimacy of teacher bargaining). Parents and principals,

though they disagree somewhat over the degree of board acceptance of

bargaining, are clearly "caught in the middle" and play very important roles

in moderating the potentially explosive teacher-policy maker conflicts.

FIGURE 4.D   PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS:
AGGREGATE ROLE-GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD.
(Six role-groups; first two discriminant functions;
see TABLE 4.12c)

Function #2
       1.5

       1.0

       0.5

       O
      Tch.

             X
             Par.

-1.5----- -1.0----- -0.5------- ------ +0.5----------- -1.5
                                                  * Supt.
                                                  + Brd. Function #1

       a   #
      10 Ldr.   Prin.
      -0.5

      -1.0

      -1.5

Labor Relations in Evolutionary Perspective

Having found that powerful and systematic differences in perspective

separate the major role groups in public education, we turned our attention to

ascertaining whether the evolutionary pattern of labor relations found in our

eight case study sites, and in the interviews (Chapter 3), is adequately

corroborated by the survey data. As indicated in the discussion of Figure

4.A, above, we felt that the generational evolution could be best approximated

by measuring the combination of two variables: 1) the overall level of labor

relations conflict in each district and 2) the perceived extent to which

school boards accept as legitimate the rights of teachers to organize and

bargain collectively. As reported in Table 4.6, and depicted in Figure 4.A,

we used the data on these two variables to divide the role groups (aggregated

by district) into five clusters. First Generation labor relations (reported

by 87 role groups, representing the majority viewpoint in 19 school districts)

is characterized by low scores on both the labor relations conflict and the

teacher organization legitimacy variables. As teachers seek to establish a

formal bargaining relationship, the case data suggests, conflict levels rise

sharply because boards and managers reject bargaining as an infringement on

their rights. Hence, the First Intergenerational Conflict period involves

continued low legitimacy scores combined with a sharp rise in the conflict

scores. (This viewpoint was embraced by 44 role groups, representing the

majority view in 9 districts).

The First Intergenerational Conflict period comes to a close as boards

and managers stop rejecting the legitimacy claims of organized teachers groups

and enter, albeit reluctantly, an adversary bargaining relationship. Thus, an

Early Second Generation period begins as legitimacy scores become moderate but

conflict levels remain quite high. (This view was embraced by 71 role groups,

representing the majority view in 20 districts).

Once the legitimacy of formal bargaining has been thoroughly accepted,

the case data indicates, conflict subsides and a Late Second Generation period

begins. This period is reflected in high legitimacy scores combined with low

conflict scores. (We found 60 role groups, representing the majority

viewpoint in 12 districts, in this group).

The most significant finding in our case data was that the expected Late

Second Generation pattern of labor relations is not stable in the public

schools because a new political conflict over the proper content of bargaining

erupts. This produces the Second Intergenerational Conflict period which is

characterized by a return to high conflict scores which are accompanied by a

continuation of high legitimacy for the teachers organization. (A total of 58

role groups, representing the majority viewpoint in 5 districts, fit this

pattern).

The views of these five generationally clustered role groups were

examined through multiple discriminant analysis. Table 4.13-A presents the

first three discriminant functions resulting from an analysis of the five

generational group responses to the questions regarding teacher organizations

in Part A of the survey questionnaire.

As shown at the top of the table, each of the first three discriminant

functions is statistically significant. Summing the squared multiple

correlation coefficients (R=.54, .36, and .23) for these three functions

reveals that they account for nearly half (47%) of the total variance in

generational group membership. As with the role group findings discussed in

the last section, discriminations of this magnitude are rare in social survey

research and deserve careful analysis and interpretation.

The substantive meaning of the first discriminant function is to be found

primarily in questions A2 ("successful in dealing with school management") and

A4 ("acts responsibly"). Since the coefficient for A2 is negative while that

for A4 is positive, a high score on this function indicates that a respondent

believes that the teacher organization is not very successful but is acting

responsibly. Conversely, low scores are associated with the belief that the

teachers are successful while acting in an irresponsible manner. The

generational group controids at the bottom of Table 4.13-A show that during

the early phases of the labor relations process, respondents have higher

scores on this function. Especially during the First Intergenerational

Conflict period, teacher organizations are seen as unsuccessful in dealing

with school management.

Although, as we saw in Table 4.12-A, administrators and school board

members tend to view teacher organizations as relatively irresponsible (and

successful), all role groups taken together are inclined to see the teachers

as responsible (though unsuccessful) when pressing for the recognition of

their rights to collective bargaining.

The second discriminant function shown on Table 4.13-A is dominated by

questions A3 ("has competent leadership") with a function coefficient of .87,

A5 ("actively tries to influence school board policies") with a coefficient of

-'75, and A6 ("supports political candidates") with a coefficient of .49.

Thus, respondents with high scores on this function believe that teacher

organizations are well led and politically active and that they refrain from

attempts to directly influence b ard policies. As indicated by the

TABLE 4.13a   MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
ROLE-AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS OF TEACHER
ORGANIZATIONS

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
Multiple R=		.54	.36	.23
	p=	.000	.000	.051

THE TEACHERS' ORGANIZATION . . .

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
A2.	is successful in dealing with school management.	-1.26 **	.03	.07
A3.	has competent leadership.	.15	.87 **	.07
A4.	acts responsibly.	.71 *	-.01	.44 *
A5.	actively tries to influence school board policies.	.24	-.75 *	-.08
A6.	supports political candidates.	.40	.49 *	.21
A7.	tries to influence the state legislature.	-.34	-.28	-.11
A8.	is successful in rallying community support.	.26	-.15	-.59 *
A9.	tries to influence parents.	-.16	.32	.82 **
A10.	is quite likely to strike.	.06	-.29	.58 *

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

------------ GENERATIONAL GROUP CENTROIDS ------------

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2	Fcn. #3
1st Generation	.18	.04	-.41
1st Intergeneration Conflict	.85	.10	.17
Early 2nd Generation	-.09	-.23	.38
Late 2nd Generation	-.47	.60	-.10
2nd Intergeneration Conflict	-.33	-.47	.12

generational group centroids, this viewpoint is especially characteristic of

Late Second Generation labor relations--a period when formal bargaining is

seen as a legitimate, low conflict process. The opposing view (i.e., when

teacher organizations are seen as by-passing electoral politics and attempting

to directly influence board policies--actions viewed as the outgrowth of

incompetent teacher leadership) surfaces during both the Early Second

Generation period of intensely adversarial bargaining and even more strongly

during the Second Intergenerational Conflict period.

The third discriminant function (with a multiple R of .23, p=.051) is

based largely on a positive view of questions A9 ("tries to influence

parents"), A10 ("is quite likely to strike") and A4 ("acts responsibly"),

balanced by a relatively negative response to question A8 ("is successful in

rallying community support"). The picture suggested by these questions is one

of responsible teacher organizations seeking parental support but failing to

actually rally that support because, in part at least, they threaten to

strike.

As the centroids for this function indicate, First Generation and, to a

lesser extent, Late Second Generation respondents are the ones who see the

teachers as successful in rallying community support. During these periods

teacher organization success seems to depend on avoiding both direct appeals

to parents and threats of job action. At the same time, such success does not

seem to require especially responsible actions by the teacher organizations.

A clearer picture of the meaning of these three functions can be gained

from a close look at Figure 4.E. By plotting the centroids for each function

across the developmental sequence from First Generation through Second

Intergenerational Conflict we can see how responses to each function shift

from one generational phase to the next. As the figure shows, centroids for the first function, which we might call the "failure of responsible action" function, rise sharply going into the First Intergenerational Conflict, drop off through the Second Generation, and then rise again as the Second Intergenerational Conflict phase begins.

The second function (shown in the middle of Figure 4.E), which we might call the "competent and circumspect political action" function, is of little significance during the early phases, but sharply distinguishes the Late Second Generation period from the Second Intergenerational Conflict period. Apparently, the accomodative style of labor relations developed during the Late Second Generation is treated by teachers as a time when political actions are seen by teachers as appropriately directed toward the broader community but is not narrowly targeted on specific board policies. This view collapses dramatically with the onset of the renewed conflict associated with the Second Intergenerational Conflict phase. It is impossible to tell from the survey data whether the dramatic shift toward seeing teacher organizat'ons as less competently led and interested in more directly influencing board policy is a cause of the movement from a relatively placid and privatized Late Second Generation bargaining relationship or a consequence of this movement. Our case data suggests, however, that this movement to a more overtly politicized relationship is often precipitated by charges that the teacher organization has acquired "undue influence" over board policy. The fact that such charges serve to catapult a district into the Second Intergenerational Conflict period suggests that it is the perception, if not the actual fact, of teacher efforts to directly influence board policy which creates instability in the Late Second Generation.

FIGURE 4.E   PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS
FOR ROLE-AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS
OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS.
(Five generational groups; first three discriminant functions;
see TABLE 4.13a)

The plot of the generational group centroids for function #3, shown at the bottom of Figure 4.E, reveals a steady rise in this "unsuccessful direct influence" function through the first three generational phases, followed by a sharp drop in the Late Second Generation period and a modest recovery during the Second Intergenerational Conflict. The conclusion is fairly clear, teachers are viewed as "responsible" when they take direct action to influence parents and when they threaten to strike, but they are generally believed to be only stimulating conflict without rather than rallying community suport when they approach labor relations problems in this way. Unfortunately, on this important point our survey data does not allow us to know whether the linkage between lost community support and attempts to influence parents or threats of a strike is real or only perceptual. It is quite possible that teacher organizations are perceived to be unsuccessful in rallying community support at the very moment when they are being most successful in gaining the needed leverage to resolve labor relations conflict problems. The more likely, and if true more important, interpretation is that teachers generally succeed in winning labor relations concessions at the expense of long term community support for both themselves and public education in general.

Table 4.13-B presents the results of a multiple discriminant analysis applied to generational group perspectives of school boards. As seen on the table, only the first two discriminant functions (accounting for 42% of the variance in the generational groups) were statistically significant.

As indicated by th function coefficients, the first discriminant function is defined primarily by questions C11 ("satisfied with current relationship with teachers") with a positive coefficient of +.79 and C9 ("pre-occupied with collective bargaining problems") with a negative

TABLE 4.13b   MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
ROLE-AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2
Multiple R=		.54	.36
p=		.000	.000

THE SCHOOL BOARD . . .

		Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2
C1.	is well organized and efficient.	.02	.64 **
C5.	is in close contact with a broad cross section of citizens.	-.01	.07
C6.	is characterized by high conflict, split votes.	.26	.34 *
C8.	makes decisions openly and with adequate input.	.20	.46 *
C9.	is pre-occupied with collective bargaining problems.	-.44 *	.45 *
C11.	is satisfied with current relationship with teachers.	.79 **	-.02

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

----------- GENERATIONAL GROUP CENTROIDS -------------

	Fcn. #1	Fcn. #2
1st Generation	.40	-.09
1st Intergeneration Conflict	-.71	-1.14
Early 2nd Generation	-.59	.10
Late 2nd Generation	.76	.35
2nd Intergeneration Conflict	-.11	.51

coefficient of -.44. Thus, a high score on this function reflects a belief
that the labor relations process is functioning smoothly in the district.
Conversely, low scores indicate a belief that poor labor relations are taking
a lot of board time and attention. As the centroid scores at the bottom of
the table indicate, labor relations appear to be comfortable during two
distinct periods. During the First Generation, before teachers demand formal
bargaining rights, there is no sign of labor trouble. This first period of
perceived harmony is ended by the First Intergenerational Conflict which
dramatically alters this picture, destroying board satisfaction and focusing
their attention on bargaining issues. This dissatisfaction and pre-occupation
continues into the Early Second Generation period, when teacher rights are
accepted as legitimate but labor relations is seen as an intensely adversarial
process. Once boards have developed substantial experience with this new
labor relations process, however, satisfaction returns and labor strife
recedes into the background in board policy making once again. As the dynamic
process continues this second period of comfortable labor relations breaks
down and the district moves into a Second Intergenerational Conflict period.
This picture is graphically portrayed in the plot of generational sub-group
centroids shown at the top of Figure 4.F.

The second highly significant school board discriminant function shown in
Table 4.13-B summarizes respondent views on four questions. The largest
coefficient (+.64) is for question C1 ("well organized and efficient"). Each
of the other three contributing questions also has a positive coefficient,
indicating that responses to them are positively associated with ideas of how
a well organized and efficient board operates. Question C8 ("makes decisions
openly") has a coefficient of +.46 indicating that respondents feel that well

FIGURE 4.F   PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS
FOR ROLE-AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL BOARD.
(Five generational groups; first two discriminant functions;
see TABLE 4.13b)

The large coefficient for question C9 ("pre-occupied with collective

bargaining") indicates that our respondents feel that well organized boards

are giving attention to this important policy issue. Interestingly, the

coefficient for question C6 ("characterized by high conflict") is also large.

This, no doubt, reflects the fact that collective bargaining is a highly

controversial approach to labor relations policy and that well organized,

politically open boards are likely to be deeply divided over how to deal with

its impact on policy.

The fact that question C9 ("pre-occupied with collective bargaining")

contributes significantly to both of the school board discriminant functions

requires some interpretation. In the first function this question is

negatively related to the degree of satisfaction boards seem to express

regarding their relationship with teachers (i.e. question C11). In the second

function, however, pre-occupation with bargaining is positively associated

with board organization, openness, and conflict levels. Apparently there are

two different ways of being pre-occupied with bargaining problems. In the

first function pre-occupation appears to mean that boards are annoyed and

distracted by the demand to bargain. This annoyance leads board members to

become unhappy with their relationships with the teachers. In the second

function, however, pre-occupation appears to mean taking collective bargaining

as a major issue and focusing substantial board energy on responding to its

policy ramifications. That is, in the first function pre-occupied means being

distracted, while in the second one it means being focused-on bargaining

problems.

The generational group centroids for the second function are shown at the

bottom of Table 4.13-B and are presented graphically in the lower section of

Figure 4.F. These centroids indicate that school boards are judged to be very poorly organized and distracted by collective bargaining issues during the First Intergenerational Conflict period. They appear to be progressively better organized following this low point and are best organized and most serious about labor relations during the Second Intergenerational Conflict period. This is exactly what our case study data would predict. It is the school board which initiates the Second Intergenerational Conflict, and they do so from a position of relative political strength.

Taken together, the two significant discriminant functions based on generational group views of school boards suggest that the boards move from:

1) a period of rather poorly organized but satisfied labor relations in the First Generation, to

2) a period of intensely unhappy, distracted and poorly organized responses to labor conflict during the First Intergenerational Conflict, to

3) a period of unhappy and distracted, but much better organized grudging acceptance of, the bargaining relationship during the Early Second Generation, to

4) a period of much more satisfactory, still better organized and less distracted labor relations during the Late Second Generation, to

5) a period of renewed dissatisfaction which is highly organized and seriously focused pre-occupation with the bargaining relationship during the Second Intergenerational Conflict.

As shown in Table 4.13-C, when they are grouped according to their generational placements, our respondents only provide one significant multiple discriminant function describing their views of school administrations. This one function is highly significant with a multiple R of .51 (p=.000) which

TABLE 4.13c   MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
ROLE-AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATION

	DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
	Fcn. #1
Multiple R=	.51
p=	.000

THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION . . .

B3.	acts responsibly in dealing with teachers.	-1.16 **
B5.	is pre-occupied with maintaining existing programs.	-.26
B6.	has taken steps to tighten accountability.	.37

** Largest discriminant function coefficient
* Coefficients at least 1/2 the magnitude of the largest.

------------ GENERATIONAL GROUP CENTROIDS ------------

	Fcn. #1
First Generation	-.11
1st Intergeneration Conflict	1.34
Early 2nd Generation	.13
Late 2nd Generation	-.49
2nd Intergeneration Conflict	-.50

accounts for a little more, than 25% of the variance in the generational

groups. This single function is fairly simple to interpret because it depends

very largely on responses to question B3 ("acts responsibly in dealing with

teachers").

As shown at the bottom of Table 4.13-C, strong rejection of this view of

administrators is characteristic of respondents in districts undergoing the

First Intergenerational Conflict. Administrators are viewed as about neutral

with regard to this question of resonsibility during the First Generation and

Early Second Generation periods. They are viewed as positively responsible

during both the Late Second Generation and the Second Intergenerational

Conflict periods. Thus, respondent assessments of school administrations

indicate that they are irresponsible during the First Intergenerational

struggle with teachers over whether their rights to organize and bargain

collectively are being resisted. They are not viewed as irresponsible during

the Second Intergenerational Conflict when the issue is contract content

rather than teacher organization legitimacy. In fact, insofar as views

regarding administrations are concerned, we find no evidence of the existence

of the Second Intergenerational Conflict. Note that the centroid plot line in

Figure 4.G is virtually flat from the Late Second Generation through the

Second Intergenerational Conflict. This means that these two groups have no

measurable differences in their views regarding school administrative

operations. This finding conforms perfectly with our case study data which

highlights political rather than administrative factors as the primary forces

stimulating the re-emergence of conflict and underscores the importance of

school boards rather than administrators in challenging the relatively placid

and comfortable Late Second Generation relationship so widely endorsed by

labor professionals.

FIGURE 4.G   PLOT OF DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CENTROIDS
FOR ROLE AGGREGATED GENERATIONAL GROUP VIEWS OF THE SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATION.
(Five generational groups; first discriminant function;
see TABLE 4.13c)

Summary

In this chapter we have reviewed the results of questionnaire survey of key actors in a representative sample (N=72) of school districts in California and Illinois. Usable questionnaires were returned by a total of 1,038 individuals and tape recorded interviews were held with a total of 247 superintendents, school board presidents and teacher organization leaders (including a few designated substitutes where the intended interviewee was not available).

We discovered, as expected, that respondents in most districts believe that teachers are well organized, administrators effective and responsible in their dealings with teachers and school boards able to be successful while accepting collective bargaining as a legitimate process. We also found that two factors account for the bulk of the variance in respondents' beliefs about teacher organizations, school administrative behavior and school board operations. These two factors--membership in a particular role group and the evolutionary stage of labor relations within each school district--confirm and elaborate findings from our eight case study districts.

Multiple discriminant analysis of the six major role groups in the data (i.e., citizens, teachers, teacher leaders, principals, superintendents, and school board members) reveal that each group has a unique view of teacher labor relations. Teachers and teacher leaders embrace teacher organizations and formal bargaining procedures much more enthusiastically than non-teachers, confirming that they are the driving force behind this major shift in educational policy. Our data offer little comfort to those who believe that rank and file teachers are being manipulated or that school managers are being duped by a handful of "radical" teacher leaders. While randomly selected teachers differ significantly from organizational leaders, they are much closer to their leaders than to any of the other role groups studied. More

importantly, we found that citizens are typically "in the middle" in their

views on collective bargaining as well as in the political process through

which policy decisions are made. Our case study data suggested that political

control over the development of bargaining depends on the behavior of the

voting members of the school district citizenry and our survey reveals that

they can be expected to support teacher demands for a greater voice in

district policy formation rather frequently. The battle over teacher labor

relations policy, we are now convinced, is being settled by the citizens. And

the citizens will side with teacher groups if they begin to see school

administrators or board members as irresponsible and closed-minded. They

will, however, just as quickly demand reforms in labor relations if teachers

begin to exert "undue influence" on board policy or if they begin to feel that

incompetent or irresponsible teachers are being protected by restrictive

contracts.

The generational evolution of labor relations, first identified in our

case study data, is powerfully confirmed in the survey data. We found that,

as districts move a First Generation, "meet and confer" relationship with

teachers into a period of intense political conflict over the legitimacy of

bargaining, teacher organizations are generally perceived to be unsuccessful

(but responsible) in their dealings with school management. During this

period managers are perceived as irresponsible in dealing with teachers, and

school boards appear less well organized and more preoccupied with labor

relations issues than before.

Once formal bargaining is accepted as legitimate and a Second Generation,

"good faith bargaining" relationship is established the perception of teacher

organizations as successful rises sharply, board organization and

effectiveness look better, and school managers look more responsible. It is

not, however, until the adversarial conflict process characteristic of the

Early Second Generation relationship subsides that the board once again
becomes satisfied with its relationship with teachers and ceases to be
preoccupied with labor issues. As districts move into the mature Late Second
Generation stage, managers are seen as even more resonsible, teacher leaders
as genuinely competent, and teacher organizations successful in rallying
community support while lowering their apparent willingness to strike.

Confirming our case data, and adding a dramatic new dimension to our
knowledge about collective bargaining in the public sector, our survey data
confirm that mature "good faith bargaining" is not the end point of labor
relations evolution in public education. A second period of conflict erupts
in some school districts. This time, however, the controversy focuses on
redefining the relationship between teacher organizations and the schools--a
redefinition that challenges their right to political influence over board
policy and calls upon school boards to be more open, more politically active,
and more effective in controlling school policies. As the case data details,
this Second Intergenerational Conflict is characterized by a shift from the
"good faith bargaining" strategy dominated by management resistance to
expansive teacher demands for higher wages and increased job security and
autonomy to a relationship of "negotiated policy" wherein the board and their
management representatives begin advancing major contractual proposals of
their own for defining teacher work responsibilities. In short, the Second
Intergenerational Conflict, rather than involving a withdrawal of legitimacy
from teacher organizations, leads to the introduction of basic educational
policy issues into the negotiating process.

Much remains to be learned about the emergence of the "negotiated policy"
bargaining relationship. It is too early to be certain that our data are not
documenting a temporary aberration in the ongoing evolution of public school
labor policy. If, as we suspect, however, the change is fundamental,

permanent, and spreading across the educational landscape, it bears close

scrutiny and calls for a substantial revision in current conceptions of how

collective bargaining can or should work in public schools.

V

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

The literature on the relationship between collective bargaining and
school governance contains two seemingly contradictory threads.[1] Teacher
organizations are said to gather much of their strength through broad
political influence particularly with elected officials, and labor conflict is
said to bring disruption and attention to schools. At the same time,
collective bargaining is seen as highly private. As a Taxpayers Association
official told us, "collective bargaining is the most impossible thing to get
your arms around. The negotiators for both sides say that to be successful,
things have to be private--that going public binds or inhibits them."

Both statements are true. School labor relations are largely private,
yet parents and lay citizens are extremely influential. They are influential
because their participation is required in the First and Second
Intergenerational Conflict, which is when the nature of labor relations and
the nature of the governing social order is being redefined. Thus, we begin
this chapter with a paradox of high influence and low participation on the
part of citizens. In order to understand the paradox and why citizens are so
influential, we need to first understand the logic by which parents and
citizens come to participate in school affairs, what activates them and what
makes them interested in collective bargaining.

The second task of this chapter is to examine policy as it relates to the preservation and advancement of democracy in school districts through means of direct involvement of citizens in school district decision making. Citizen participation has been an important policy emphasis in education for a generation--the same generation that has witnessed the growth of active and influential teacher organization and the transformation of public schools into a unionized work environment. During this period, the involvement of parents in school district decision making has been expanded from the citizen involvement movement of the 1950's, an offshoot of human relations management, to a means of citizen participation intended to yield substantial influence.[2] Because both citizens and unions have sought access, influence, and legitimation, it is not surprising that they have tended to clash. Nowhere has the clash been more obvious than in citizen group attempts to participate in collective bargaining.[3] Citizen organizations hold that collective bargaining, in effect, preempts important areas of school policy by allocating resources through mechanisms that are closed to them. Teacher organizations typically view parents as a threat and as illegitimate, unwelcome visitors. Politics, contends Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers, is not the parent's place!

> When it comes to student achievement, the most important
> role for parents is not committee work, politics, or a role
> in school governance. It is what they do with their own
> child in their own home that counts, how much they help, and
> how much they reinforce what goes on in school.[4]

With respect to student achievement, Shanker may well be right, but it is precisely the relationship of lay people to policy that has been brought into question by citizen activists.

By and large, teacher organizations and school administrators have been successful in keeping parents away from the bargaining ...ocess. This has not been a difficult task. Usually citizens have not attempted to participate, and, when they have, labor and management agree on excluding outsiders. Thus, it came as a surprise that in the eight school districts we studied, citizens were highly influential in determining the course of school labor relations; they were influential, but they did not participate directly. Citizens, singly and in organizations, influence the tone of labor relations, the toughness or meekness of the parties at the bargaining table, and frequently the issues. In addition, citizens were highly influential in other decisional arenas that affected employee relations such as courts, the state legislatures and electoral politics.

This seeming paradox of low direct participation and high influence has led us to examine the logic citizens use in choosing how and when to participate in school governance. That logic, which often leads them away from collective bargaining, involves the conversion of particularistic, child-centered participation into participation aimed at altering organizational policy. It also involves choices of where and how to participate.

In our eight intensively studied districts, we found only two cases of direct participation by citizens in the collective bargaining process, this despite the opportunities for greater participation. What surprised us most of all was that the special structures for citizen input called for under California law were so seldom and inconsequentially used.[5] This initial impression was intensified by the sample of 30 California districts in which there was no substantive counterproposal made through the public hearing

mechanism called for in that state's public sector collective bargaining law.

In one district, the League of Women Voters expended substantial effort to get

the school board to adopt specific procedures for public comment on initial

proposals, but, after being adopted, those procedures were used only once. In

two California districts, groups attempted to gain access to the bargaining

table as observers. The requests were denied. No further attempt was made to

obtain access or present either labor or management with issues or conditions

that the citizens organization wanted bargained. We found one district in

each state (outside of our study districts) in which bargaining had been

actually opened to the public. However, the public observers were barred from

participation in the negotiations and, as far as we can tell, this openness of

negotiations did not affect their course. This appears also to be the general

case in Florida, the only state in which there is open statewide bargaining.[6]

Citizen influence, however, is a substantially different matter. At the

three sites to be illustrated, in fact at each of the eight study sites, we

found citizen influence instrumental in advancing the movement from one

generation of labor relations to the next--in changing the official perception

of the teacher's union from renegade radicals to legitimate opponents, in

changing the perception from comfortable and improper partners with the

administration to employees that need watching:

> Case 1: South Garfield. South Garfield is an old, staid
> town with both a history and a civic identity. As one
> observer put it, "There's a lot of the South in South
> Garfield." Municipal conflicts here are always low key, but
> the coming of teacher collective bargaining was as
> conflictual as any recent event. The teachers had been
> negotiating on their first contract for nearly nine months,
> there had been informational picketing and a whiff of a
> strike threat, and there was charge and countercharge about
> the district's ability to end the bargaining impasse by
> raising its salary offer. Nora Sloan, the leader of a

citizen's group, organized a public forum in which spokesmen
for labor and management presented their cases.

Case 2: Industrial City. The teacher's union had been
accepted by this blue collar town. Teacher-backed
candidates held a majority of seats on the school board, and
the contract gave teachers both a relatively good financial
settlement and unassailable classroom autonomy. It was a
violation of the contract for a principal to enter a
classroom without a teacher's consent. But the school board
came under attack for its blatant patronage in personnel
policies and in the purchasing of supplies and equipment.
Within two years, the control of the school board changed
hands as "reformers" defeated incumbents at the polls or
replaced those who resigned. Part of the general complaint
was that the school district was out of control and that the
"teachers got too much."

Case 3: Homestead This district began collective
bargaining violently, with an 11-day strike. Citizens were
agitated. Both union and management had its vocal
proponents, but most citizens just wanted the schools opened
again. A group of ministers attempted to mediate the
dispute. When they stood and presented their findings in a
packed school board meeting, the president of the board
responded in the heat of the moment, "sit down and shut up!"
After the strike was settled several days later, a campaign
began to recall a majority of the school board from office.

Clients and Citizens

Each of the incidents above started quietly as a case of client

participation rather than citizen participation. Client participation is the

usual activity of parents. It involves intervention in the school system on

behalf of a specific child. The goal, in the first instance, is not to reform

the school system, but to have the school system accommodate their child.

Most client participation is over securing the child's rights or what parents

perceive to be the child's rights. Most occurs at the school site level

directly with the principal or teacher. Generally, what the parent wants is

not continued participation but fair adjudication. One might note that these

cases are not unlike grievances within collective bargaining. Generally, the

plea of the grievant is not to participate in the school's management, but to

have the school do what the grievant perceives it has already agreed to do.

The case of parent's rights is generally less legally explicit than that of

teachers working under a contract, and thus "rights" for parents are often

embedded in customary practices of the school district or in a community

culture that defines good practice.

The vast majority of potential citizen activity is absorbed by school

districts at the client participation level. Principals or teachers

accommodate parent demands. They do so either out of an agreement that

parents do have a specific right, out of agreement that the action sought by

the parent is educationally meritorious, or out of a feeling that it is easier

to accommodate than fight. If a demand carries with it an implied threat of

further disturbance, then accommodation is more likely. However, the key

question for this discussion is: what happens to parents who feel that they

are denied their rights? Client participants may press for their perceived

rights through the courts or administrative appeal mechanisms, which are

becoming more common. They may accept the judgment of a school official as

legitimate and thus leave not with the answer they wanted but with the feeling

that they had achieved a fair hearing. They may exit the system or withdraw

their children. Or, they may become citizen participants.

The conversion of a client participant to a citizen participant depends

first of all on a perception of an _interest_. Attention moves from fair

adjudication of a complaint to changing the policies and practices of the

school district. Because the application of those policies is not restricted

to the single child, the realization that one wishes to change the policies of

the school district almost always initiates the search for others with a

similar interest in change. In each of the three cases introduced above, the

public intervention in school district affairs began as a case of client

interest and was transformed into a situation of citizen interest and

participation:

> Case 1: South Garfield. Nora Sloan, who led the citizens
> collective bargaining forum, was a well-read, well-educated
> mother of a professional-class family and background. She
> had been active in the schools as a parent before teachers
> began to bargain collectively. As the impasse in bargaining
> became deeper, she became increasingly concerned that the
> rift between teachers and administrators was poisoning the
> harmonious relationships that had previously existed. She
> and her children were not affected in any specific way, but
> her feelings about the well-being of the school system were
> altered. She felt compelled to act. As she put it: "We
> believe in education and in our town's schools; we're bound
> to get involved." Mrs. Sloan had been an active member of
> the League of Women Voters and had been its "school board
> watcher", attending meetings, making reports; not because
> she had a particular reform in mind but because she felt a
> sense of duty. Thus, she organized the forum at which labor
> and management aired their views.
>
> Case 2: Industrial City. This was a stable town, not
> filled with community activists. The community culture
> honors traditions--church, family, and social organizations
> which often have roots in Eastern European homelands.
> People tend to leave school affairs alone. As one mother
> who had attempted to organize parents of a curriculum reform
> disappointedly noted, "we're just not that kind of town."
> But the community was becoming dissatisfied because their
> sense of well-being surrounding the school system was being
> violated. There was no universal complaint, no single
> organized campaign, but the community came to feel
> dissatisfied with the present leadership. Candidates
> independent of the dominant political parties ran
> aggressively for election, and they were embraced by the
> electorate.
>
> Case 3: Homestead. The teacher strike took on the
> appearance of a free-for-all. It was not a simple two-way
> affair between teachers and administration. Everyone, it
> seemed, was involved. The local newspaper, parents trying
> to secure physical safety for their children, local state.
> legislatures trying to look effective. The school
> organization could not contain the fight.

Nora Sloan became a citizen participant out of a sense of _obligation_. She
rather enjoyed the process and the company of other serious, intelligent
women, but, most of all, working in the schools was something that people
"like her" did. The reform candidates in Industrial City became active
because they sensed the possibility of _influence_. Their campaigns grew and
attracted support because the old board had become notorious for blatant
political patronage and an inability to carry on business quietly without
squabbling. As in Homestead, parents became activated because of the
attraction of disturbance. As Elmer Schattschneider put it: "The number of
people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the
number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of
particpants affects the results."[7]

The attraction of disturbances deserved an expanded comment because
disturbances are so frequently associated with labor relations. A strike, or
the threat of a strike, is the most powerful event in transforming client
participants into citizen participants. The usual and swift citizen reaction
is to press for restoration of services. A decade ago, Wellington and Winter
hypothesized that the strike weapon gave labor unbeatable power because the
public would always press governments for continuation of services at the
expense of management's bargaining issues.[8] Indeed, citizens do seem to press
for resumption of services, but the Wellington and Winter thesis is undercut
by two types of citizen action. First, parents are less reluctant to cross
picket lines and send their children to school with substitute teachers than
had been believed. In two of our California sites, strikes have not been
successful in closing the school. Second, pressure has been directed at both
sides. In California, we find parents in struck districts communicating with

parents in other districts who have been through strikes. A communication

network is operated through such groups as the PTA, League of Women Voters,

and the Informational Project of Education-Network (IPEN) in Palo Alto. Two

parental strategies are emerging to pressure management and labor to settle.

One is to camp out outside the negotiating rooms and to stay there until

settlement is reached. The other is to capture media attention in any way

possible and emphasize that both parties are culpable. Citizen activity in

strike situations has a broader effect of creating citizen leaders. Because

of her League of Women Voters experience, Nora Sloan developed genuine

expertise in collective bargaining, or what was perceived as such within South

Garfield; Other citizens called her to explain the state's collective

bargaining law. She became visible and known in the community and ultimately

was appointed to official advisory committees within the school district. In

Homestead, too, involved citizens started to gain name recognition. The

issues in which these persons were active became symbolic of larger community

issues. Parents protecting the rights of their children had become converted

into citizens advancing an interest.

The Opaqueness of Citizen Interest

One of the reasons that labor disturbances are so effective in activating

citizen participation is that citizen interests become clear and visible

during times of disturbance. Such is not the case at other times, when the

labor relations process often obscures the fact that one's own interest is

connected to the processes of labor relations. Thus, parents and other

citizens are usually not activated except in times of disturbance. Citizens

are repeatedly assured by school officials and the legislatures that

collective bargaining has to do with the wages and salaries of teachers and

certain employment conditions, but that questions of education are not..

discussed. The assertion is only partly true.[9] In most cases, educational

policy decisions are not discussed per-se, but the educational policies and

practices of the schools are decidedly affected. The curriculum is changed

and particularly the extracurriculum, the intensity of contact with children,

as are the types of contacts that occur between teachers and children outside

of the classroom. There are explicit tradeoffs, such as class size traded

against teacher salary, and implicit tradeoffs that have to do with the

substitutability of resources, for instance, the time of aides versus the time

of teachers, the use of personnel versus the use of instructional hardware.

Meeting with parents and time for meeting with parents is often an explicit

topic of bargaining, but the implications of meeting with parents are

frequently not drawn at the negotiations table because the focus is more

frequently on the dollar cost of agreement than it is on the instructional

costs of agreement. Labor relations also affect the psychological contract

that teachers have with their work, their level of craft and commitment to

art, and their identification of work role. The decisions to give and grade

homework are often affected by the ebb and flow of labor relations, but are

seldom an explicit topic of bargaining.[10] The relationships between

collective bargaining and the education of children are profound, our research

convinces us, but they are indirect and thus often unrecognized. A more

frequent occurrence is that a citizen is activated by a sense of obligation or

a desire to influence a particular issue. After their initial activation,

citizens find out that achieving their interest is affected by collective

bargaining.

The Criteria for Participation

We found that activated citizens do not automatically choose to be active in school collective bargaining even when a labor disturbance motivated them to be active in the first place. Quite to the contrary, we found that citizens tended to drift away from labor relations and toward other places where school policy decisions are made.

In trying to follow this movement of participation, we considered three different arenas of decision making and two different phases of the decision process. The arena of decision making has to do with where in the organization decisions are made and what process is used to reach a conclusion. Some decisions are made within the professional and bureaucratic arena, that is, within the formal structure of the school organization and according to criteria that dictate attention to standards of "good practice."[11] Others made in the political/legal arena involved parties other than the professional school hierarchy including school boards, legislatures, and courts. These decisions are made according to criteria for winning coalitions or for amassing evidence according to precedent. Finally, there is the arena of labor relations, which embodies elements of the other three arenas and adds the special environment of labor law and the peculiar mechanism of collective bargaining.

The choice between these decisional arenas is not trivial. Each potential participant to a decision has resource advantages in different arenas and will thus tend to carry decisions to areas of decision making in which he or she dominates. School superintendents seek to establish professional and bureaucratic hegemony over decisions, and unions try to

increase the scope of issues carried into collective bargaining. In any

decision opportunity, a potential participant chooses where to use resources.

In addition, the participant chooses what aspect of the decision to

influence. In their work on political systems, Gabriel Almond and Bingham

Powell distinguish between the interest articulation and interest aggregation

phases of decision making.[12] Articulation is the process of forming choices

either of a position or an issue or of general disssatisfaction with the

present state of affairs. The process of interest articulation is highly

information dependent. Communication channels are important, as are feedback

mechanisms. Interest aggregation involves the making of choices between well

defined alternatives. It is highly dependent on the ability to build viable

coalitions or to garner other forms of support. Communications capability is

not without value, the crucial attribute in building influence is

commitment--persons or organizations who will commit their resources or their

actions to support a defined issue.

A finding that one's interest is affected raises three criteria for how

and when to participate. The first two, highly interrelated, are the efficacy

of the particular arena and the permeability of that arena. That is, can one

get to the place where decisions are made and, once there, what are one's

chances for success? The third criterion is efficiency. The permeability

criterion is stacked against citizens. Statutes are generally unfriendly to

their access to the bargaining table, as are both labor and management. This

point has drawn most of the ire of citizen activist groups, so much so that it

obscures the question that underlies it, which is: would citizens have an

efficacious access to the bargaining table if they could legally permeate the

arena? Our data suggest that they would not, primarily for two reasons.

Successful negotiations require a certain amount of technical expertise that

is costly to acquire, and successful negotiations take a long time.

It is quite possible to sit at the bargaining table and not understand

what is going on, not through lack of intelligence but through lack of

expertise and knowledge. First is the level of legal expertise. The meaning

of a contract clause is very seldom obvious on its face, the import turning on

the subtlety of wording--the differences between may and shall for instance.

Many important sounding clauses, such as management rights and no-strike

agreements, may be practically meaningless. Labor jargon adds to the

confusion: a COLA is not for drinking, and a zipper clause is not nearly as

interesting as it sounds. The second aspect of expertise is behavioral skill

in negotiation, and that is quite different from legal knowledge, as several

attorneys in our study districts proved. The internal dynamic of negotiation

is often highly private, both in interpersonal trust and confidence and in the

appearance of a proper moment for settlement. Timing is often more important

than substance. Sensing the moment is a function of exposure and experience,

reading verbal and nonverbal cues and discerning genuine emotion from

feigning. The factors of experience and the internal dynamics of bargaining

have the combined effect of making bargaining take a long time. This is

particularly true in the public schools where there is frequently a summer

hiatus in negotiations and where the strike or disturbance threat is

practically meaningless for part of the year.

The crusher for parents and citizens is that sustained participation is

often necessary to be successful in bargaining. School bargaining is

protracted, and success often turns on a willingness to wait matched with a

sense of when to move forward with a concession. All these factors make the

efficacy of citizen participation difficult even if a legitimated right to
access.

The third criterion for citizen participants choosing a decision arena is
that of efficiency. Citizens obviously can learn to negotiate, and the
technicalities of the law are not above them. However, quite frequently the
time, energy resources, or the training time is not available to turn laymen
into experts. But parents have more than one possibility for spending their
time, and those parents in our case study generally chose to spend time
elsewhere rather than attempting to penetrate the collective bargaining
system.

In each of the three cases introduced previously, there was an attempt at
direct citizen participation in collective bargaining. In each case, direct
participation ceased or was never really begun. Participation took place in
other decisional arenas, and the activities of citizens in those arenas
continued to affect the course of labor relations even though citizens were
not directly involved.

> Case 1: South Garfield. A permanent organization of
> citizens interested in collective bargaining was never
> formed in South Garfield. Although various citizens had
> strong normative ideas about collective bargaining, and
> particularly the "adversarial relation" they saw engendered,
> in the end parent involvement stopped when the new contract
> was signed. Nora Sloan, however, continued to be
> interested. She tried to get the new superintendent to
> allow her to observe the teacher negotiations that took
> place two years after the ones that were concluded with a
> public debate between teachers and the school
> administration.
>
> The new superintendent was adamant about not allowing
> citizens at the bargaining table. But Nora Sloan found
> another way to participate; she ran for the school board.
> Successfully.

The transformation of Nora Sloan from parent activist to school board member was remarkable on two counts. First, she did not go to the bargaining table, even as a school board member, when she had a legitimated right to involve herself in collective bargaining. One might have expected her to summarily appear at the bargaining table, or at least to advocate board members participation in bargaining. In South Garfield, as in most districts, school board members did not sit at the bargaining table. In addition, our interviews with Mrs. Sloan indicate that she assumed her seat on the school board without strong, well articulated demands on the collective bargaining process. Rather, she had a general concern that conflict could harm the school district and that parents were being excluded from the decision making, but these general concerns did not breed action.

The second aspect of Mrs. Sloan's transformation had to do with the privatization of her behavior. As activist, she was the archtype of the demanding citizen firm in her belief that access to the arenas of decision making and to information about school operations were a citizen's right. Interviews with her revealed a candid and highly revealing person. She became known for these stances in the community, and within the school district itself persons with similar leanings became known as "Nora Sloan types." Six weeks after her election, we interviewed Mrs. Sloan again, and we found a person wearing, albeit a bit uncomfortably, the role of school board member. The legal requirements of confidentiality and good bargaining practice prevented her from discussing collective bargaining with outsiders, she said. The proper behavior of school board members had oeen reinforced by the existing incumbents, and it must be remembered that South Garfield is a town of substantial tradition; through meetings directly with the superintendent

and the labor attorney; and through workshops with the California School

Boards Association. It became increasingly apparent that Mrs. Sloan perceived

herself differently as a school board member than she had as a citizen

activist.

Not all school board members followed the pattern of socialization that

Nora Sloan appeared to be taking. In another district, reform candidates were

elected to the board and the following took place:

> Case 2: Homestead. The strike ended in Homestead, and the
> recall campaign against three of the five incumbent school
> board members began. One of the major themes during the
> recall campaign was that teachers and citizen "weren't being
> listened to." There was a certain lack of specifics about
> what this term meant, and the election turned more on the
> apparent tone of the school board in dealing with the public
> than disagreement over specific policies.
>
> The challenged incumbents were turned out of office. Among
> the replacements elected was John Jacobs, a community-
> college professor who ran on a platform of openness and
> honesty.
>
> He made good his platform. He was open and honest about his
> support for the teachers and indirectly the teacher union.
> He asked tough questions of his fellow board members. He
> offered contrary views. In the end, he played the role of
> dissenter frequently on the short end of 4-1 votes. He grew
> frustrated and resigned after serving a single two-year
> term.

Jacobs became an isolate on the school board because he failed to attend

to the board's internal demands for accommodation. In Jacob's case, unlike

the one of Nora Sloan, the new board members formed a majority, and they had

been elected on a pledge of responsiveness to the citizens and the public.

Still, however, the board developed internal allocation mechanisms for

influence with some board members becoming opinion leaders and formers of

coalitions. Jacobs did not fit well. His behavior was considered erratic.

He was an iconoclast of sorts, and ill-suited to political trading. This turn

of events appears true in other districts, also, where union supporters are

elected to school boards. Even the reform board developed an internal sense

of rules about how information was to be handled, about handling of

confidences. There was, however, a decided turn in the response of the school

board to _issue_ oriented groups:

> _Homestead._ The general and public activity that
> characterized the recall period subsided. But within
> Homestead, groups formed around particular interests, and
> they became more vocal. They also became successful.
>
> Within two years groups had formed in support of the
> district's outdoor education program which was costly and
> financially suspect following the passage of the statewide
> tax limiation initiative, Proposition 13. These groups were
> successful.
>
> Most spectacularly, a group of parents in favor of
> fundamentalist education organized, and over the school
> board's and administration's initial opposition were
> successful in getting a school site converted to that mode
> of education.
>
> In each case supporters of the change attended the school
> board meeting in mass quite literally packing the relatively
> small meeting room. On each occasion the board adopted at
> least part of the proposed change.

The proposals in Homestead had common elements. Each involved a specific,

defined subject rather than a general plea for better schools or more open

schools. The adoption or rejection of a proposal was clear; there was clear

feedback to the proponents about winning or losing. The actions of the school

board in Homestead had become very closely lined to the activities of external

groups. The board was not isolated from the external community, and activity

or pressure from the community was matched by a response from the board.

The nature of citizen involvement in the Homestead district changed

between the time of the recall and the time of the successful interest groups.

Both the goals and the arenas for action changed. The first activating event
was the strike that impelled a citizen response to deal directly with the
problem of disturbed school services, but ho permanent interest attachment to
labor relations was formed. Instead the question of whether or not the school
board was representative was raised. The recall, which was largely devoid of
specific issues, involved the electorate picking school board members who were
"like us." In the process of the recall election and subsequent elections,
the characteristics of school board members changed from those clearly of
blue ribbon socio-economic status to those who were more specifically
identified with particular issues—in Iannaccone and Lutz's words from a
trustee board to an arena board.[13]

Once the arena had been established, public emphasis changed to specific
issues. Achieving success became linked to making the board responsive to
particular issues, not changing the composition of the board. There was no
discernible public attention paid to labor relations during this period even
though there was great contention between two factions within the teacher
organization.

The situation in Homestead can be contrasted with another of our case
study districts, which also had an active public including organized interest
groups and several controversial issues decided during our study. In
Homestead there were no resources, or organizational slack, to absorb external
pressure. The district was financially troubled, having suffered both
declining enrollment and loss of tax funds. The superintendent did not have
an independent political base in town, and the board, because of the recall
and other membership changes was unstable in composition and constituency.
Single purpose advocacy groups were quite effective particularly when there

was no organized external opposition to their ideas. In the second district,

however, there was a high degree of cohesion between superintendent and board,

and external pressure was frequently absorbed. The administration was active

in sponsoring structured means for inviting citizen participation, and to a

substantial degree controlling it. In addition, there were also <u>opposing</u>

external groups that were particularly active in the controversy over the

district's racial integration plan, which served as somewhat of a lightning

rod to attract controversy. While this issue was active in the district, the

attention paid to other decisional areas decreased. This included a decrease

in the amount of public attention paid to collective bargaining except during

strikes. The second district also has the financial resources to absorb

external demands. It had the means to answer specific program demands, such

as one that the district review its reading programs, without making public

tradeoffs with other programs. It, quite differently than Homestead, was able

to absorb much of the external pressure either by responding in limited ways

or in defining the range of participation activities in such a way that the

internal relations between the school board members and the superintendent

were not upset. In Homestead, the school district became tightly linked to

the pressures of the environment. Decisions between the staff and between

staff and board became far less certain as the staff became subject to

reversals, sometimes summary ones, by the board.

The path of citizen influence took a different turn in the third of our

illustrative districts. In this case, the school board was also replaced, but

interest group activity did not follow.

> Case 3: Industrial City. The political turnover in the
> school board centered around throwing the rascals out.
> There were allegations of financial impropriety and a

widespread feeling of exclusion, that others were running
the school district and that the district had run out of
control.

Thus, the electoral cry of "winning back the keys to the
store," and the specific target became the relations between
the school district and the teachers. The restrictive
language in the teacher's collective bargaining contract
became an electoral issue brought forth by the reform
candidates, who won.

After the seating of the new board, the school
superintendent was dismissed, and a search started for a new
superintendent, with the specific intent that the new
appointee deal aggressively with the teachers during
contract negotiations. Such a person was found. He came to
the district with the specific intent--what he later called
"the mandate from heaven"--to change job control language in
the teacher contract.

In the subsequent round of labor negotiations, the new
superintendent introduced the concept of package bargaining.
Work rule changes were presented to the teacher bargaining
team members in tandem with whatever substantive concessions
management was prepared to make. Packages were always
presented but they were always presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. The union leadership felt it was
close to its economic requirement, but it did not understand
management's concern with working condition "rights" that
the union had already achieved in previous contracts.

The union found that it no longer had a viable set of
relationships with the school board. It could not appeal to
the reasonableness of the school board members in the face
of an unyielding superintendent. What was later termed a
frustration strike ensued and was followed three days later
with settlement essentially on management's terms.

The community intervention in this case was highly influential, but only

participative for a short while. The school board members elected during the

reform movement were brought to their positions with an understanding that the

electorate wanted them to "gain control of the system." There was a clear

message to that direction and the message was exercised in their choice of

personnel and the choice of bargaining issues. The new superintendent was

chosen primarily because of his familiarity with collective bargaining and his

success in bargaining with a strong union. He, incidentally, did not try to

disestablish the union. The bargaining sessions, and the comments made to us

in interviews, did not reveal a particular animosity toward the teachers'

union or unions in general. So, in this case the attack on the existing

contract was part of a management strategy that had to do with the direction

of the enterprise rather than an ideological struggle over the status of

employees. The prime issue was the teacher evaluation clause. The board

wanted to change the contract so that responsibility for evaluation rested

with the administration. The community, through changing participants, had

greatly influenced the course of collective bargaining in Industrial City.

The Indirect Influence on Collective Bargaining

The presence of substantial indirect influence and low levels of direct

citizen participation in collective bargaining can jointly be explained by the

relatively low motivation for citizen participation and the attractiveness of

arenas for participation other than collective bargaining. Our three

illustrations provide examples.

If one first examines the series of choices that appear in the logic of

participation--this series of choices is sketched in Figure 5.A--one quickly

sees that at any decision point the potential citizen participant is faced

with a potential alternative to activity. The citizen can stop being active

and cope with what is a disagreeable state of affairs, and frequently citizens

have the alternative of leaving, ignoring or otherwise exiting public

education. Even if structural barriers were lowered and any parent who wished

would have a chair pulled up to the bargaining table, a high level of

Figure 5.A

THE LOGIC OF CHOICE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Is there a perception of
unfulfilled rights?

Rights? → No → No Participation

Yes

Attempt at fair
adjudication of rights.

Adjudication

Success? → Yes → Participation ceases

No

Is there a perception
of an unfulfilled interest?

Interest? → No

Yes

Motive base for participation
--obligation
--possibility of influence
--disturbance

Motive? → No

Yes

Is there a mode that meets
the tests of
--efficacy
--permiability

Possible? → No → Increased dissatisfaction

Yes

Consideration
of exiting
system

Which decisional arena is
most efficient?

Most Efficient?

Bureaucratic   Political   Labor Relations

participation at school board meetings is guaranteed by open meeting

statutes.

The relationship between the criteria for participation and the various

arenas for decision making is shown in Table 5.A. The labor relations mode of

decision making within school districts appears as difficult to permeate, of,

questionable efficacy and relatively inefficient. The permeability question

is really one of access—of having an opening for direct participation or

acquiring an agent to particpate. The external political arena has already

developed ports of access.

School boards are elected, and in some states such as California they are

sometimes recalled from office. Lobbying in support of particular school

programs or particular educational legislation is an available avenue. Access

to school professionals may be technically present, but operationally access

is highly dependent on the perceived legitimacy of those seeking it, or the

ability of that group to cause a disturbance if they go unheard. If one's

group or concern is not considered legitimate, then the ability to coerce

becomes important. Gaining access through disturbance has been part of the

lore of community action groups going back at least to Alinsky. Labor

relations has a relatively low permeability. As discussed above, statutes

frequently allow labor and management to bar outsiders, and the technical

ability of outsiders to participate is limited even if they were allowed.

The efficacy criterion asks whether what people want done can, in fact, be

accomplished in each of the three decision modes. An exact answer, of course,

depends on the specific suggestions involved, but there are general

characteristics of each decision mode which make them more or less generally

efficacious. The political mode of decision making has become increasingly

Table 5.1

RELATIONSHIP OF ARENAS OF PARTICIPATION TO CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION

	Permeability (Access)	Efficacy (Scope)	Efficiency (Resources)
External Political	HIGH Lobbying Recalls Elections	MODERATE Specific legislation can be obtained, but the implementation is frequently unsure	HIGH TO MODERATE Pressuring school boards can sometimes be quite easy, accomplished through massing citizens at a board meeting.
Professional Bureaucratic	MEDIUM Highly dependent on perceived leg- itimacy of person making request or their ability to make a disturbance	UNCERTAIN A proposal can be framed to reflect what citizens want. It is frequently problematic as to whether school administrators can respond to those proposi- tions.	HIGH Legitimate small groups or persons are frequently successful
Labor Relations	LOW Legal and technical restrictions against citizen access.	LOW The basic agenda of labor relations is determined by the primary parties; citizen concerns may be touched upon, but so will other matters.	LOW Generally requires systemic change before parents and citizens can participate. The cost of structural change is very high relative to other opportunities for influence.

important in educational decision making as the state and federal governments have been transformed over the last two decades from monitors of education to policy advocates. Teacher organizations have been heavily involved in lobbying, and so have citizen groups interested in particular educational changes, the most dramatic example being the national coalitions of parents of handicapped children. The difficulty with legislation from the standpoint of its efficacy comes during its implementation. As the political literature reminds us, passing a statute and implementing it are quite different. The efficacy of the professional/bureaucratic mode of decision making is problematic. In one sense, the mechanism is clearly efficacious. Citizens can shape specific proposals tailored precisely to achieve what they want. Whether the professional school administrators can respond is altogether a different matter. They are frequently constrained from acting, although parents suspect, not so frequently constrained as they allege. Labor relations appear somewhat less efficacious. Most of the citizen agenda appears to involve items that fall beyond what is customarily negotiated in labor contracts, so the effects of labor contracts are indirect. In addition, much of what goes into labor contracts is of little direct interest to parents and citizens. We have yet to find a parent, othe. than one who happens to be an insurance agent, who is very interested in the name of the school district's insurance carrier, something known to hold the attention of labor negotiators for weeks on end.

The efficiency criterion asks the question of what resources are necessary to gain an end. At least in our impressionistic evaluation, the efficiency of the political mode of decision making appeared to be relatively high from the citizen activist perspective. School board election campaigns

were relatively easily undertaken. Except in big cities, campaign costs are
generally low, and the organizing required is ad hoc and of short duration.
Moreover, school boards in our study sites have shown themselves quite easy to
influence by citizens who appear in large numbers at school board meetings in
support or opposition to a specific issue. Even in large districts, the
appearance of 300 people at a school board meeting gains immediate attention
and, frequently, modification of position. Electoral recall, which is
becoming a common feature in California school politics, is quite potent.
Even the threat of recall, signaled by the circulation of a petition to put a
recall measure on the ballot, is sure to garner attention. Of our four
California study sites, one had a successful recall, another a threatened
recall. The professional/bureaucratic mode of influencing decisions is
perhaps the most efficient of all, and hence it is usually the first
attempted. But as indicated in the previous paragraphs, the efficacy and
permeablility of this mode of decision making is frequently questionable.
Labor relations appear a relatively inefficient mean of citizen
participation. Even if there were no structural barriers, the amount of time
that a citizen or group of citizens would have to spend directly participating
in bargaining or closely monitoring its behavior is quite extensive. An
understanding of the extent of required participation can be gained by
examining the actual participation of labor and management in our study
districts. Bargaining a single contract continued on for months; issues may
go partially resolved for years.

Citizen Participation and The Generations of Labor Relations

On examination, one can clearly see that citizen participation is related to the dynamics of moving labor relations from one generation to to another. Moreover, at these crucial times, citizens chose the political arena for their most direct participation. In Industrial City, the board was replaced, and in Homestead it was both replaced and used as a form for response to specific issues. In South Garfield, parents acted independently of the school board at first, but ultimately placed one of their own among the board members. While there were tentative efforts in all three districts to directly participate in collective bargaining, those efforts ended early. Influence, however, flowed from the citizen activity to alter the nature of labor relations.

South Garfield was clearly a First Generation district prior to the involvement of citizens. The importance of the citizens' involvement, beginning with the forum organized by Nora Sloan was not so much the immediate settlement of the contract. From interviews with the two parties it appears highly likely that labor and management would have settled in a few days with or without the intervention of the citizens forum. What is of substantially more import is the question of legitimation of the teachers' organization; that is, whether the ethos of the community which was highly supportive of teachers and education but quite paternalistic at the same time, will be changed to include a rightful place for a teacher's organization which is outspoken and aggressive.

Citizen activity, including the election of Mrs. Sloan, the appointment of a new superintendent and the subsequent pursuit of bargaining, have brought the town into the Second Generation of labor relations. The teacher

organization gained a legitimate and unopposed right to represent. Consistent

with the expected change into the Second Generation, the issues in South

Garfield became not whether or not teachers had the right to negotiate, but

the scope of negotiations and the quiet and privacy with which settlements

were reached. The Board employed an outside attorney to handle labor

relations, and agreements on closed negotiations and leaks to the newspapers

were agreed to. Management's negotiator who believed in a close and collegial

relationship with the teachers' negotiator was replaced by others who believed

in specific, limited agreements.

Issues created by the parent activity have come to the bargaining table

in Homestead, and more are likely to. As noted in Chapter III, the

establishment of the fundamental schools was accompanied by parents who had

strong ideas about curriculum and the code of behavior, both of which differed

from the standards elsewhere in the district. These events threaten to propel

the district into the Second Intergenerational Conflict. The parent group,

armed with a curriculum gained from a nationwide group of fundamental school

parents, asked for a dress code and disciplinary procedures. They also wanted

to pick the teachers and to evaluate them. The teachers defensively have

carried these issues to the bargaining table. Transfer, discipline and

evaluation clauses were all introduced into collective bargaining by the

teachers during the last round of negotiations. They were not bargained to

completion, but the fundamental school issues have not yet appeared in a

specific transfer case. Thus far, all the teachers in the Homestead

fundamental schools have voluntarily transferred from other schools, and there

is a common educational philosophy among them. But that situation is not

likely to last. The district is faced with the prospect of closing several

schools because of declining enrollment, and school teachers will doubtless be

dismissed from the fundamental school on the basis of seniority and other

teachers will doubtless be assigned there. Questions will clearly arise at

the bargaining table or the grievance processes. Moreover, the relatively

specific expectations of parents place the school board and administration

under some constraints about their bargaining positions on those issues.

It would be hard to overstate the effect that citizen influence has had

in Industrial City. There was never an attempt at direct bargaining table

intervention by the public or opening the session to public view. Yet, via

the election process, citizens clearly spelled out what the new issues would

be. They also reinforced those issues with publicly announced commitments to

specific demands. The school board president personally became the chief

negotiator, and although there is substantial testimony that he was not the

most skillful spokesman, there is little question that the issues on which the

board ran for election were clearly represented during negotiations.

Moreover, they prevailed.

Summary

In closing this section of the chapter, it is proper to reiterate its

basic argument. Parents and citizens participate in school affairs when it

becomes apparent that they have interests, that those interests are expressed

in school policy, and that policy appears possible to change. The process of

collective bargaining and its attendant public strife and disturbance often

triggers a perception of those interests among parents. In the forwarding of

that interest, parents face a choice of what decisional arena to attempt to

influence and what aspect of decision making process to enter. Direct access

to collective bargaining poses a problem, but even if it did not participation

there would be difficult because parents generally do not possess the time,

the expertise or the sanctions to participate effectively. Conversely,

citizens have shown their ability to efficiently influence other arenas

particularly the political arena through electing and lobbying school board

members for response to particular issues. The important point, though, is

that there are choices between places and ways to influence school districts,

and the public policy outflow of that realization is that parents and citizens

ought to be cognizant of the range of influence possibilities. This same

variable--the variety of influence possibilities available--suggest that there

are a number of ways to achieve a workable equity in influence between parents

and possibilities suggests that influence may not be obtained through the same

means in all school districts, or through the same means all the time in a

single school district. The variety of influence alternatives discovered in

our field investigation also leads us to a reexamination of the traditional

theories of school politics and of the implications that the logic of

participation has for the application of those theories.

<div align="center">II.</div>

Models of School Democracy and Equality of Influence

Essentially, the clash between parent/citizen organizations and teacher

unions is over the equity of influence. Organized parents and citizens feel

that collective bargaining preempts other school organization decision.

Resources allocated through collective bargaining bypass decision mechanisms

to which parents and citizens have access, and thus there is no direct voice

for parents and citizens, and in many cases no consistent and reliable

information about what was being discussed. In terms of influence, the advent

of collective bargaining signaled a flight of decisions from arenas in which

parents had a voice to those where parents did not have a voice.

As might be expected, the response of parent and citizen groups was, in

the first instance, to attempt to obtain access to collective bargaining or to

obtain sufficient feedback from the bargaining process so that parent and

citizen interests could be protected before a contract was finalized.[16]

Essentially, this response followed an informed competition model of obtaining

equity in influence. In informed competition, equity centers on a perception

of legitimacy in how decisions are made. Equity is present if there is a

finding that the permanent structures for access and influence are present and

legitimate. Operationally, one looks for widespread knowledge about school

issues in the population, a lack of any excluded segments in the population

and established means for access and information flow. Informed competition

theory flows from the research of David Minar and of Harmon Ziegler and Kent

Jennings.[17] It has also been the dominant theory followed by the federal

government in pursuit of "maximum feasible participation." However, our

research reveals that influence is achieved through means other than informed

competition. Particularly, citizens increased their influence by pressing for

specific issues or through establishing coalitions around dissatisfaction with

the incumbent leadership of the school district. These two means of

establishing influence are consistent with two alternate models of school

democracy--issue responsiveness and dissatisfaction.

In issue responsiveness, a finding of equity centers on a finding of

legitimacy in what is decided. The key is what is decided rather than how.

The mechanisms for influence are potent lobbying and pressure groups for or

against specific issues and issue dominated elections. Thus, direct

participation in collective bargaining becomes of little importance because

what is important is that the interests get what they want rather than their

participation in the getting. In issue responsiveness, demands may be carried

into collective bargaining by others--either labor or management--and the test

of issue responsiveness is what emerges from bargaining, not how bargaining is

conducted. Or the issue may not be carried into collective bargainig at all.

It may be carried into another decisional arena, such as the school board's

deliberations or into the state legislature. In the education literature,

issue responsiveness is best represented by Frederick Wirt's edited volume,

The Polity and the School.[18]

In dissatisfaction theory, equity is present if there is a finding of

legitimacy of the individuals who make decisions. Actual issues are

frequently not present, ana participation is episodic rather than continuous.

Levels of dissatisfaction periodically rise, citizens are motivated to action,

and subsequently the leadership is replaced. Long periods of apparent

dormancy may be observed. During these periods, the school district political

mechanisms are generally not activated at all, and the district may be said to

be operating within a zone of tolerance established by community culture.

However, the observation that a school district is currently quiet provides no

justification to assume that it will remain so.

When the levels of dissatisfaction do rise, that dissatisfaction has the

effect of overriding other issues, and the dissatisfaction with the current

leadership becomes the "issue" around which a coalition is formed.

Replacement of the leadership may take the form of electoral defeats of school

board members or challenge of incumbent board members through recall

elections. The recall election challenge was particularly a factor in the

California districts in our sample. Indeed the threat of a recall was

sometimes sufficient to persuade the incumbent not to run for another term.

Dissatisfaction can also be aimed at the appointed leadership, from

superintendent on down the hierarchy. Frequently, as in the Laurence

Iannaccone and Frank Lutz research, dismissal of the superintendent follows

school board electoral defeats.[19]

Equity Through an Unstable Combination of Means

Each of these three models of school equity is usally considered

separately. Therefore, the test of the presence or absence of equity becomes

whether the criteria of a single model, such as informed competition, are met.

In terms of citizen participation in collective bargaining, the criteria of

the informed competition model have very seldom been met, and thus it has been

concluded frequently that citizen influence is low. However, our findings

suggest that influence is actually quite high, but that influence operated

through either issue responsiveness or dissatisfaction modes rather than

informed competition. In the school districts we studied, citizens followed

the logic of participation, choosing whether to participate and where. The

consequence of the citizen search for different modes of influence was that

the use of any one of three modes of influence contributed to the achievement

of equity.

We also wish to advance three other points about the relationship of the

three means of achieving school democracy. First, from our observation in the

eight case study districts, dissatisfaction theory modes of influence appeared

to swamp or override activities being undertaken in one of the other two

modes. Either responsiveness mode and informed competition activities ceased,

or they ceased to be important determants of school policy. Second, the

choice of one of the three means of influence appears to be related to the

level of conflict apparent in the school district. Third, we conclude in a

tentative way that each of the three means of influence is unstable and

carries with it the seeds of its replacement or abandonment.

As we examined the political histories of our eight case study districts,

we observed that the mode of participation changed over time and that

eventually activities consistent with dissatisfaction theory took place. When

dissatisfaction rose, the activities which followed altered the social order

of the district in such a way that the structures that allowed informed

competition or responsiveness to operate were altered, too. In Industrial

City, school politics changed from responsiveness mode to dissatisfaction

mode. In the responsiveness mode, the two factions of the school board and

the teacher organization dominated. Dissatisfaction grew, primarily aimed at

the school board, and the board was replaced in successive elections. When

the realignment of the school board took place, the set of relationships that

caused the former board members to be responsive to the teacher organization

failed to exist. Responsiveness activity has not reestablished itself through

teachers or any other interest group.

In South Garfield, a period of informed competition was followed by

dissatisfaction and finally by responsiveness. The informed competition

period took place when the structured forums were set up to mediate the

impasse between the teacher organization and the district. Dissatisfaction,

muted though it was, appeared in the removal of the old superintendent and the

turnover in board members. The informed competition activity, which was

earlier supported, was abandoned because the new school board felt that

dealing with the teachers in private was the best way to achieve labor peace.

And that decision was supported by the former citizen activists, who now held

seats on the school board. Since the installation of the new superintendent,

activity has tended to be of the responsiveness type. Parents in specific

neighborhoods have organized to block the closing of "their" schools. Parents

in non-affected neighborhoods are without an issue and have not participated.

Teachers have perceived their own interests in organization. Both the school

board and the administration have perceived separate interests, and the

internal structures of each organization have been tightened.

At Homestead, responsiveness activity continues as dissatisfaction grows.

Teachers by their organizing have become one of the interests that are

responded to, and the teachers themselves have become the source of irritation

and dissatisfaction to organized parents groups. The superintendent's

intentions to establish informed competition forms of participation have

largely been abandoned because the teachers, in their dislike for the

superintendent, avoid activities that make him "look good" and because the

parents know that they have a more potent means to influence.

The choice of which mode of influence is used is related to the level of

conflict in the district. When conflict is high, dissatisfaction theory

activity spreads and dominates. Of course, dissatisfaction activities lead

toward open conflict, but general dissatisfaction also grows from more narrow

conflicts when those conflicts become notable and public. Informed

competition or issue responsiveness appeared as mechanisms of citizen

influence on the slopes of the curve, as conflict was building or subsiding.

In the trough of the curve there was very little political activity at all.

Citizen influence is most apparent when it occurs as issue responsiveness.

There is organized activity to watch, and issue related activity has within it

a feedback mechanism that constantly reminds the participants of their

achievements--or the lack of them. Thus, one would think that responsiveness

structures, working through interest groups, would have great stability once

they were established, but to our suprise we found that these forms of

influence were unstable; that indeed all three forms were unstable.

Informed competition is unstable because continued citizen particpation

is not the general culture of American education. As we have suggested

earlier in this paper, a continued obligation to participate is not generally

felt by persons not holding formal office in organizations. In addition,

there is great competition for time. Parents in particular have a relatively

short interest span, at least short in terms of organizational functioning.

Even discounting the possibility of family dissolution, physical relocation in

urban America affects something like 20 percent of the families in a given

year. If a permanent structure is formed--one with the earmarks of a

continuing organization--then that organization is faced with the problems of

access and of accommodating itself to outsiders. Sooner or later, and

probably sooner, the structure formed to provide parent input will be

challenged by alternative viewpoints. That is, the parent organization will

face the problems of dissatisfaction with the current leadership. The other

possiblity is that the "competition" aspect of informed competition is lost;

that parents become highly socialized to their new roles, as has frequently

been alleged in conventional parent-teacher types of organization.

Issue responsiveness as a participative mode is unstable because issues

are answered. Organizations that form for the purpose of achieving a

particular goal are frequently perpetuated, by finding another worthy goal.

However, loose ad hoc organizations seldom reform in exactly the same way.
New coaltions are formed, and new persons are activated. Our field research
suggests that issue responsiveness may continue for several years as the
dominant way in which a school district accommodates parent, citizen and other
types of demand, but that eventually it comes to an end over the question of
resource scarcity or over the question of the legitimacy of the current
leadership. The resource question is the most straightforward. It takes
place when there are not enough slack resources in the organization to satisfy
the different contenders, thus meaning that in addition to being happy issue
responsive winners there will be unhappy issue responsive losers. The
organization is simply unable to meet all the claims upon it.

The inevitable displeasure with issue responsiveness produces a transfer
to the dissatisfaction mode. Eventually, the current leadership, which is
unable to honor all the claims upon it, comes under attack itself. Then, one
of three courses is followed, and each of the three courses causes an end to
the dissatisfaction mode of participation and a return to one of the other two
modes. Following the first course, the current leadership may find itself
able to negotiate a compromise agreement that reduces dissatisfaction. The
dissatisfied come to believe that the school cannot honor all their wishes,
and their expectations are reduced. This course was widely followed in
California school districts following the passage of Proposition 13, and it
happened in Illinois school districts following the defeat of a tax override
elction. Second, the attempt to oust the existing leadership can be
successful. A new leadership is installed, and in addition to the honeymoon
period usually accorded to new leadership, dissatisfaction activity abates
because the source of the dissatisfaction has been removed. The presence of

the common enemy is the only factor driving the various participants, and, indeed, activating them in the first place.

So, we find ourselves in a situation in which there is no single means of providing for citizen equity in school districts, and that the means most likely of achievement changes from time to time. This finding, in turn, suggests alterations in the labor policies of both unions and of citizen groups.

Policies of Influence and Participation

We have followed the two important concepts of _influence_ and _participation_ throughout this chapter, and thus it rests with the conclusion to come to grips with the policies that affect each of them. First of all, we must recall the distinction between citizen and parent and between participation and influence. Citizens are policy focused, parents client focused. Participation is activity focused; influence is outcome focused. We believe that the proper pairing of the terms is "citizen influence" and "parent participation" thus implying policies that address increased amounts of school outcome control on the part of citizens and increased involvement in the child's education on the part of parents.

Regarding citizen influence, the major problem is to achieve a wider recognition that various means exist for achieving a working equity between citizens, teachers and the school executive. We have demonstrated the existence of these various means, but the existence of alternative paths to influence is typically not recognized in the literature or in specific policies. As a result, policy makers who attempt to induce citizen influence in the schools through the sole use of informed competition are often frustrated when they find low levels of sustained participation on which

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informed competition rests. If influence was the clear objective instead of
participation, training, and organizing could then be directed toward making
choices among the different modes of influence. As the citizens in our study
districts showed us they were already doing, policy and practice would be
directed toward using the resources to gain influence in each mode of
governance. While, we must recognize that even a combination of citizen-
influence mechanisms is no guarantee that equity in the policy process will
accrue to citizens, the chances of increased influence grow with fuller
realization of the tools available.

However, increasing citizen influence does not solve the parent's
problem. Our research indicates that issue responsive and dissatisfaction
mechanisms are more effective than informed competition mechanisms, but from
the standpoint of individual parents, they are often unwieldly and very slow.
Children can be graduated from school before issue responsive or
dissatisfaction mechanisms influence the school system.[20] The problem for the
parent is to obtain adequate access to the school system so that they can be
knowledgeable and adequate responsiveness so that their participation has
meaning.

The policy mechanisms for enhancing direct parent participation in their
children's education are different than those which increase citizen
influence. Parent participation centers around the relationship with the
individual teacher. It involves the ability of teachers and parents to have
expectations of one another, to communicate with one another, and to
understand the communications. For instance, parent participation is enhanced
if fathers and mothers understand the school curriculum and can assist their
son or daughter in homework or study. Parent participation is also enhanced

when teachers understand that an important aspect of their job is satisfying

the client specific demands of parents, having both the resources and the will

to respond to requests.   Policies that enhance parent participation are those

that encourage contact between teachers and students: time for meetings and

phone calls, communication of the curriculum, the provision of telephones for

teachers and curricular reforms so that teachers have sufficient ability to

respond to parents' demands, and teacher evaluation and training mechanisms so

that they have to desire to involve parents.

We believe that we could argue the case for parent participation on

educational outcome grounds alone, but it is more consistent with the

development of this chapter to argue the wisdom of parent participation

policies on political system grounds.   It is the logic of participation that

unresolved parent complaints and rising dissatisfaction give rise to citizen

activity--the rise of coalitions and general dissatisfaction.   However, it is

not only in the interests of political stability that we advocate policies

which enhance the ability of school districts to involve parents in their

children's education and to respond to their demands.   Parents have an even

stronger weapon than citizen activity through interest groups or turning out

the superintendent and superintendent in their dissatisfaction.   They can

withdraw their support from public schools, and withdraw their children.

It is only partly true that there is no ability to exit from a public

school system.   Private school enrollments are up, and there is reason to

believe that public school enrollments are somewhat overstated and the extent

to which students themselves have abandoned education is understated.   More

students would leave public schools if the financial means were available and

there is now a gathering political impetus for the federal tax credit plan or

a voucher plan.[21] A second form of exit is more subtile. Children are not

withdrawn from schools, but rather the belief grows that schools are not

places where important life chances are determined. What follows is a

withdrawal of expectations and a growth of what we call "generalized

non-support." Education continues to be important to its users, but it lacks

the general social priority it enjoyed before. Generalized non-support spills

over into the policy world in which choices are made between public services

and levels of services. This is particularly the case in school districts

with declining enrollments and settings where families with school age

children constitute a minority of households in the community. This is the

case in seven of our eight study districts.

School systems, and school employees, badly need generalized support.

They exist only through the continued belief that schools are doing a good job

and that employees are acting either in the public interest or in the

legitimate private interest. This requirement presents school labor relations

with a serious overload problem. Labor relations historically is seen as a

legitinized system of self interest. Particularistic self-interest among

school teachers is not an adequate political base. The activities of parent

and citizen groups and of the electorate generally appear to be suggesting

that teacher unions use their organizations to support the commonweal

interests of education, including efficiency interests; or at least that

unions join in supporting special parent and citizen interests.

Collective bargaining, the dominant tool of American labor relations, is

not well suited to broad participation. It is doubtful whether unions could

achieve public participation if they wanted to and likewise questionable

whether widespread citizen participation in bargaining itself would yield much

support for schools. The problem for unions, and for management, is to develop ways of accommodating parent and citizen interest and legitimating the school's role and parents' role in education and the citizens role in the community.

NOTES
1   The National Education Association counts about 1.8 million members and
the American Federation of Teachers about 450,000. Their combined numbers
account for approximately 91 percent of the public school teachers in the
United States. As an industry, public school teaching is more heavily
unionized than steelmaking or construction. (For union growth and state
statutes see: Anthony M. Cresswell and Michael J. Murphy with Charles T.
Kerchner, Teachers, Unions, and Collective Bargaining in Public Education.
(Berkeley, CA: McCutchan, 1980). .

2   For a summary of the citizen participation movement and its history
see: Donald B. Reed and Douglas E. Mitchell, "The Structure of Citizen
Participation: Public Decisions for Public Schools," in Public Testimony on
Public Schools, editors Shelly Weinstein and Douglas E. Mitchell (Berkeley,
CA: McCutchan, 1975), p. 122-159.

3   A detailed bibliography of other citizen participation literature can
be found in Don Davies and Ross Zerchykov, Citizen Participation in Education:
Annotated Bibliography 2nd edition. (Boston: Institute for Responsive
Education, 1978).

4   Albert Shanker, New York Times, December 2, 1979, p. E9
(advertisement).

5   California Government Code, Sec. 3547.

6   John R. Pisapia, "Open Bargaining: Florida Style." (Morgantown, West
Virginia: West Virginia University, 1980).

7   Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View
of the Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

8   Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the
Cities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971).

9   Charles T. Kerchner, "From Scopes to Scope: The Genetic Mutation of
the School Control Issue," Education Administration Quarterly, 14:1 (Winter
1978), 64-79.

10   William T. Garner, "Linking School Resources to Educational Outcomes:
The Role of Homework," Research Bulletin, 19 (November 1979): 1.

11   Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics:
A Developmental Approach. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). Other elements in
the Almond and Powell typology include the formation of rules, the enforcement
of rules (rule application) and decisions about the application of rules in
individual cases (rule adjudication) and finally the communication of

activities in the political system to the external environment.

12   Ibid.

13   Laurence Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz, Politics. Power and Policy:
The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill,
1970).

14   David W. Minar, Education Decision Making in Suburban Communities
(Evanston: Northwestern University, Cooperative Research Project 2440, 1966).
L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, with G. Wayne Peak, Governing American
Schools (North Scituate, Mass.:   Duxbury Press, 1974).

15   L. Harmon Zeigler, "Creating Responsive Schools," The Urban Review,
6:3:38-44, 1973, p. 41.

16   Charles W. Cheng, "Community Representation in Teacher Collective
Bargaining: Problems and Prospects," Harvard Educational Review, 46:153-174
(May 1976).   Cheng enumerates the forms of community participation as (1)
seeking input during the formation of demands, (2) multi-level bargaining with
some issues settled at the school site or other location less centralized than
the school district, (3) bargaining in public, (4) observer status to
designated community representatives or groups, (5) formal negotiator status
to community groups.

17   Fredrick M. Wirt (ed.), The Polity and the School (Berkeley, Calif.:
McCutchan, 1976).

18   Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

19   Frank W. Lutz and Laurence Iannaccone (eds.), Public Participation in
Local School Districts: The Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy, (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath), 1978.

20   There are substantial unresolved methodological issues regarding
dissatisfaction theory research.   Among these is the development of an
adequate direct measure of public dissatisfaction not tied to election
results.   See Douglas Mitchell, "Measurement and methodological Issues Related
to Research on Incumbent Defeat and Superintendent Turnover," in Lutz and
Iannaccone Public Participation . . . , p. 73-100.

21   In this respect, collective bargaining becomes analogous to what
Cohen and March call an "organizational garbage can" in which particular
settings provide a decision point or choice situation for problems that do not
in any strict sense belong to that setting.   See: Cohen and March, Leadership
and Ambiguity.

VI

THE IMPACTS ON POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND TEACHING

·When we asked a well-known labor lawyer about the impact of teacher
organizations and collective bargaining on school programs or policies, he
responded, with the conventional wisdom of his profession, that "just as you
wouldn't say that collective bargaining with auto workers has altered the
product mix at General Motors very much, I don't think you will see very much
impact on the way schools work."

We have come to the conclusion that his casual, all-too-prevalent
analysis is fundamentally and dramatically wrong. Collective bargaining and
its attendant processes--teacher organization and contract administration
--have introduced major operation and policy changes into the public schools.
Three aspects of policy change will be considered. First, we found that,
although recent school policy shifts are easily recognized by teacher leaders,
school administrators, and perceptive board members they are not generally
seen as a direct outgrowth of labor relations. Thus, if our evidence is
right, important changes in the way schools operate are being made to a
surprising extent as accidental by-products of a labor relations process in
which negotiators focus their attention on conflict management rather than
policy making. These accidental policy effects--even when they are recognized
as substantial--are, as far as we can tell, not being very carefully
considered by teacher and management negotiators as they prepare for

bargaining. We found that, in planning for negotiations or contract

administration, both teacher organizers and school managers emphasize their

need to respond to political and economic realities whion sharply curtail

their flexibility and threaten their capacity to keep labor strife under

control. Frequently we found that leaders on both sides of the bargaining

table had to pause and think carefully before they could respond to questions

about overall program and policy impacts, while they could talk easily (and in

animated terms) about immediate bargaining strategies or what they felt are

the legitimate interests of either side when it comes to settling on

contractual language. We could not escape the feeling that, in their struggle

for control over teachers' working conditions and terms of employment,

bargainers for both sides have lost sight of the impact their decisions are

having on the overall shape of public education. This finding is, of course,

consistent with studies suggesting that managers respond to immediate

problems, particularly crises and disturbances and neglect long-range and

strategic planning[1]. The extent to which labor relations are driving school

policy making, however, makes such ad hoc management particularly weak.

    Second, we found tendencies to reinforce the rationalization of teaching

work and its direct inspection or monitoring. All occupations, we suggest,

can be considered as some combination of labor, craft, art or profession, with

"labor" in this case having no necessary relationship to unions but rather to

work under the inspection and guidance of others. The processes of collective

bargaining, contract making and enforcement in particular, have a tendency to

enhance this laboring aspect of teacher work.

    Third, we found substantial change in managerial beliefs and operations.

The position of the first line manager, in schools the site administrator, has

been altered substantially. Authority structures have changed, and

relationships between principals and teachers are truncated during periods of

high conflict. Moreover, the criteria for managerial behavior change. The

substitution of managing conflict for managing outcomes is, of course, of

central importance to our generational development scheme. In addition, there

are important normative definitions of a "good" contract, norms about how much

discretion managers need and norms for the conduct .of negotiations

themselves.

Accidental Policy

We had expected the most dramatic changes to emerge from the advent of

collective bargaining are associated with the overall character of teachers'

work changes (such as those specifying the length of the school day or

limiting the number of after-school meetings a principal may require) which

directly affect how teachers spend their time. We discovered, however, that

the effects of such specific work-rule changes are fairly small compared to

three more general aspects of the labor relations process. In our sample we

found that extensive changes in teacher work roles are arising from: (a) a

separation between "regular" and "extra" duties which has been formalized in

most bargaining agreements; (b) the exacerbation of pressures to curtail or

eliminate the work of many specialist teachers; and (c) the creation of a

climate encouraging minimal work effort on the part of teachers during periods

when negotiations or other relations are not going well, periods when

negotiations or other relations are not going well--periods which typically

last from a few days to several months every year or two.

Regular versus extra duties. Teacher contracts in each of our eight case
districts contained language which explicitly recognized the difference
between teachers' extra duties and their regular work responsibilities. The
number and types of extra duties identified vary greatly from one contract to
another. Some contracts have long lists of extra duty assignments and specify
the rights of management to call upon teachers to perform extra duties on an
"as needed" basis up to a certain number of hours per week or month. In
general, contractual agreements have communciated to teachers that extra
du' s are tasks which they can choose to perform (if they are sufficiently
attractive and rewarding to be worth the effort) but which they can also
decline if they wish. Or, if the extra duties are required, the implied
message is that they are less important and less central to the job of
education than are other, regular duties.

The educational impact resulting from this split between regular and
extra duties, unrelated to the question of whether or not teachers are working
more or less hard than they did before the advent of bargaining, springs from
the fact that collective bargaining has altered the mix of tasks teachers
typically perform in the course of their work. Some extracurricular and
parent-contract activities which formerly were a routine part of teacher work
responsibilities are no longer being performed by teachers at all. Others are
being performed less frequently and then only after building-level
administrators exert strong efforts to entice, cajole, or coerce the teaching
staff into accepting responsibility for them.

Although managers are frequently heard to complain about the inability to
recruit teachers to perform many extra duties, we found that they were also
generally insensitive to the natural consequences of permitting the

distinction between regular and extra duties to be contractually formalized.
Managers, accustomed to unilaterally specifying teacher work responsiblities,
generally resent the limitations on their discretion to demand work or the
need to pay teachers for work responsibilities, formerly though to be simply
"part of the job." Consequently, management negotiators have generally made
strenuous efforts at the bargaining table to keep both the number of
compensated extra duties and the size of the stipends paid for their
performance to a minimum. As a result, teachers find that compensation is so
small as to make the performance of these duties more a matter of volunteer
work than overtime work for pay. Hence, both the psychological and the
economic effects of separating regular from extra duties contribute to the
likelihood that teachers will be discouraged from performing those work
activities identified as extra. The substantive consequence has been to
diminish the importance of extracurricular programs, after-hours meetings, and
student supervision activities in public schools. Attempts to rationalize and
define workloads through collective bargaining have given non-classroom work a
decidedly reduced priority in the school districts we studied.

Resistance to specialist teachers.--After several months in the field, we
began to realize that most labor relations discussions begin with the tacit
assumption that collective bargaining is almost exclusively concerned with
structuring the working relaitonships between teachers working in regular
classrooms and the line administrators who supervise them. Although a large
number of specialized teacher and support roles are found in today's schools,
we discovered few references to those specialists in our discussions with
educators.[2] When we looked at initial teacher organization contract demands,
it was easy to recognized that many early proposals represented the interests

of specialist teacher groups. It was equally apparent that the specialist

demands were rarely viewed as crucial. When we inquired directly about the

relationship between collective bargaining and specialized teacher roles, we

found first that teacher organizations have a great deal of difficulty

supporting the interest of specialists. Different types of specialists have

direct interests and problems and thus cannot generate cohesive support for

particular proposals. At least as important as this divergence in interest,

however, is the fact that regular classroom teachers tend to resent

specialists, whom they see as having protected, less demanding, and less

productive jobs. Moreover, they find that specialists in funded categorical

programs (e.g., special education teachers) benefit from negotiated salary and

fringe benefit increases but are not subjected to the same risks of job loss

from declining enrollment.

Second, we learned that--contrary to our expectations--the specialist

teachers themselves tend to be less active and influential in teacher

organization policy formation than regular classroom teachers. We had

expected that, since specialist teachers are freer to move about the schools

during their work day, and since they have an opportunity to interact with

each other and with other teachers more frequently, they would emerge as

leaders within the teacher organization, making up for their small numbers by

serving crucial functions within the teacher union. Instead, we discovered

that, largely because they think of themselves as already having left the

tedious rigors of the classroom, the specialists do not frequently seek or

acquire leadership positions within the teacher organization. Thus, they

invite the union to bypass their complex and varied interests in order to win

basic benefits for the majority of regular classroom teachers during contract

negotiations. Subgroups of influential specialists were formed in two of our

case districts, Homestead and Thresher. In both cases coaches formed a caucus

within the overall teacher organization, and they used their influence with

parents and school board members to further their special interest in extra

duty salary items as well as the general interest of the teacher contract.

However, in cases where specialists had no strong external constituency, they

were unable to form a viable caucus and their special interests were not

pursued with vigor at the bargaining table.

Our third discovery about the plight of specialist teacher roles was

equally surprising. We found that administrators are also disinclined to

strongly support special working conditions for specialist teachers. When

asked about specialists' demands, school managers indicated that supporting

their needs and demands made the bargaininig process more difficult to

control. If specialists, for example, are granted planning or conference time

during the regular school day, union negotiators understandably insist that

the school district must be prepared to give all teachers planning periods.

Unless managers have solid reasons for granting special working conditions to

some employees and not to others, and unless they are prepared to fight for

those special conditions throughout protracted and often tense negotiating

sessions, they will simply be abandoned in favor of a homogeneous set of work

rules for everyone.[3]

We are forced to conclude that there is a serious and permanent

contradiction between collective bargaining and the creation of specialized

teacher roles in the school. We see a future in which economic hard times

will fall more heavily on specialist programs (unless they are protected by

statutory requirements or funds) and the good times will be absorbed more by

the regular teachers than by the specialists. Thus, we see a steady drift
away from the use of categorical specialists to carry on the instructional
program of the school. The exceptions, of course, are specialists who are
funded and specifically required by law. For these specialists, however, we
see continuing tension and frustration in their efforts to collaborate with
regular classroom teachers, who will resent their protected status and their
"cushy" jobs.

The minimization of work effort. A third mechanism by which collective
bargaining is redefining teachers' job responsibilities is less formal but no
less powerful than the resistance to specialization and the separation of
regular from extra duties. That is the periodic pressure on teachers to
minimize their work performance in order to bring pressure to bear on managers
during the negotiating process or during other times of labor unrest. While a
fair amount has been written in the last few years about the disruption in
educational services created by strikes and other overt work stoppages by
teachers, little has been done to examine the impact on teacher work
performance of the negotiating process itself. In our sample districts, we
were repeatedly told that while negotiations are in progress, especially if
they are prolonged, there is a general increase in tension between site-level
managers and rank-and-file teachers. These tensions are generally focused on
teacher demands for work rule changes and are frequently accompanied by a
feeling among teachers that they should refuse to cooperate with management
goals and among managers that they cannot afford to give teachers their
unequivocal support. We do not have clear indicators of the extent to which
these feelings actually alter day-to-day work performance by teachers, but the
depth and intensity of the feelings is undeniable.

Not counting strikes (which occurred in two of the eight districts we
studied intensively), large numbers of teachers in fully half our sample
districts engaged in some sort of protest or demonstration activities aimed at
communicating their feelings of frustration to school board and/or community
members. The nature of these protests varied from informational picketing and
speaking at board meetings to so-called working to rule by refusing to
undertake any activities or abide by any deadlines not specifically required
by contract. In one case, we witnessed a form of organizational civil
disobedience in which the teachers met their classes but refused to teach on
one day a week. Strikes, while dramatic, are usually over in a matter of
days. This sort of simmering discontent and protest typically lasts for much
longer--for several months in some of our districts. During such a period,
communications between staff are disrupted and program planning typically
stops. While every school district reports increased cooperation and a marked
reduction in tension once a contract has been signed, these reports highlight
the disruptive impact of the negotiations process just as much as they
underscore the positive contributions made by reaching contract settlement.

Tendencies Toward Change In Teacher Work

As a general tendency, unionization has accented the rationalization of
tasks and close supervision of teacher role performance thus highlighting
laboring aspects of teaching rather than the skilled craft, professional
service, or artistic components of the work. In saying this, we do not mean
to denigrate teachers, teaching, or unions. We intend the word "labor" as a
descriptive term not a value judgment. As described more fully below, we use
labor to refer to a particular kind of work activity not to characterize

workers.[4] Teaching, like many other jobs, involves a mixture of labor, craft,
professional, and artistic work activities. This was true before the advent
of collective bargaining. It remains so now. However, in changing the ways
in which teachers engage in their work and relate to others in the school,
collective bargaining has highlighted laboring activities and deemphasized
other types of work.

The Structure of Teaching Work

School teaching is unique work involving many activities not found in any
other job. It is illuminating, however, to compare the activities of teachers
to those of other workers. Although there are many different ways to classify
organized work activities, all jobs have two characteristic features. First,
every job has some system of "task definition" to specify the particular
activities workers are expected to perform. And second, all have some sort of
"oversight mechanism" for monitoring the performance of these tasks. By
distinguishing among various "ideal type" alternatives for defining tasks and
overseeing worker performance, we can develop a framework for comparing
teaching with other types of work in society.

Task Definition. There are two basic approaches to task definition.
Some tasks are structured primarily through "rationalization." That is,
specific tasks are pre-planned (by either managers or the workers themselves)
and then undertaken as a matter of routine enactment of "standard operating
procedures." In other job settings, however, tasks are primarily "adaptive"--
requiring extensive accommodation to unexpected or unpredictable elements
within the work situation. In this case, the task definitions cannot be
embodied in a pre-planned program. Instead, the emphasis must be on

responding to conditions arising on the job, exercising proper judgment
regarding what is needed, and maintaining intellectual and technical
flexibility in the performance of needed tasks.

Oversight Mechanisms. Monitoring or overseeing workers in the
performance of their tasks is also typically structured in one of two basic
ways. Some jobs are subjected to direct oversight either through close
supervision or through stringent reporting requirements. Workers are
monitored by assessing how they perform required tasks. In other jobs
oversight is indirect. Workers' preparation and skill--that is, their
ability to perform the work--are the prime considerations. In the first case,
the work itself is "inspected." In the second, the work frequently goes
unexamined while the workers are "licensed" or certified to perform the work
on their own.

The criteria used to evaluate these two different types of work are quite
different. Licensed workers are expected to have at their disposal a set of
learned techniques for performing needed tasks, and they are held accountable
for the care and precision with which they apply these specialized techniques.
Where work is inspected rather than licensed, however, a worker's
cooperativeness, dedication and overall level of effort, are seen as the prime
considerations. If special skills or techniques are required, managers are
expected to guide workers in their application through direct supervision and
critical review.

As indicated in Figure 6.A, four distinctive work structures are created
when the basic task definition systems and oversight mechanisms are combined.
"Labor" (upper left cell in the figure) is the term which best describes those
work settings where tasks are rationally planned and oversight is undertaken

Figure 6.A

Task Definition and Oversight Structures

OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING MECHANISMS

	Direct/ Inspection ------ (Activity Monitoring)	Indirect/ Licensure ------ (Technique Monitoring)
Rationalized -------- Pre-planned programs -------- Routinized	LABOR (loyalty/ insubordination)	CRAFT (precision/ incompetence)
TASK DEFINITION APPROACHES		
Adaptive -------- Situation responsive -------- Flexible	ART (sensitivity/ frivolousness)	PROFESSION (responsibility/ malpractice)
	(dedication & effort)	(care & precision)

by direct supervision and monitoring of workers. As used here, the word

"labor" has a special meaning. All jobs involve labor to the extent that they

all require an expenditure of effort directed at task accomplishment. In this

sense the word labor often is used more broadly than we intend here, to

describe any job requiring concentrated effort and attention. The word labor

is also frequently used as a term of denigration—to label some jobs as

"merely labor." While this usage captures the important sense that laboring

jobs have limited technologies, it deflects attention away from the important

structural and organizational differences between labor and other types of

work. Laboring is not distinguished by its association with "low-level" jobs.

It is rather the rationalized and pre-planned character of the tasks involved

and the direct inspection of how those tasks are performed which uniquely

distinguishes labor from other ways of structuring work. While low level jobs

are more frequently subjected to close scrutiny and supervision, there is no

intrinsic reason why high status jobs cannot also be so structured. William

H. Whyte's Organization Man paints a picture of the carefully planned and

closely supervised work we are calling "labor" being performed by people

holding executive job titles but confronted with a social ethic which

"rationalizes the organization's demands for fealty and gives those who offer

it wholeheartedly a sense of dedication in doing so. . . ."[5]

Loyalty and insubordination are the most important concepts in evaluating

laboring work. It is very important for laborers to give allegiance to the

organization for which they work and to respond energetically and promptly to

directions given by superiors. This need for loyalty arises because laborers

are not expected to take personal responsibility for the overall purposes

toward which their efforts are being directed. As Frederick Taylor's

Principles of Scientific Management makes abundantly clear, it is the
manager, not the laborer, who must decide when, how, and for what purposes
work effort should be directed.[6] The worst offense of a laborer is
insubordination to a supervisor--not inadequate results. Laborers need to do
what they are told to do, when they are told to do it. If the result is
unproductive it is the manager's, not the worker's, fault.

Craft workers (upper right cell of Figure 6.A) differ from labor workers.
These workers are generally freed from direct supervision but held responsible
for selecting and applying appropriate specialized techniques to their work.
They are expected to know how and when to apply these techniques in order to
realize the goals or objectives of the work. In place of direct supervision,
craft workers are licensed, certified or otherwise explicitly identified as
having special abilities. Managers (or clients in the case of craft workers
who operate on a direct contract basis) establish the overall objectives of
the work, but once the craft specialist takes an assignment he/she is expected
to carry it out without needing detailed instructions or close supervision.
Licensure has become public policy in many craft areas because incompetent or
unscrupulous craft workers are difficult for unskilled clients to recognize.
Thus the watchful eye of the state is often substituted for the caveat emptor
of the marketplace when technical competence is crucial to adequate task
performance.

Precision and competence are the basic criteria used in the evaluation of
craft work. The care and precision with which craft tasks are performed are
of utmost importance. Craft workers are even expected to risk insubordination
toward their superiors in order to competently execute techniques required by
their craft. While laborers are not expected to know when or how to perform

particular tasks without direction from supervisors, craft workers are deemed

incompetent if they are unable to recognize which techniques to use in the

performance of particular tasks.

The rationalization and planning of tasks are important in both labor and

craft work structures, but they take very different forms. For laboring work

rationalization is conventional and refers to <u>standardization</u> of procedures or

<u>specificity</u> of managerial directions. For craft workers, however,

rationalization is technical and refers to the <u>expertise</u> of the worker or the

<u>appropriateness</u> of the methods being used. For laborers, standard operating

procedures are right because they are standardized. For craft workers, by

contrast, they are standardized because they are accepted by the craft as

technically correct.[7] As Parsons has noted, Weber's failure to understand

this difference led him to an inadequate conception of modern bureaucracies--a

conception that did not adequately account for the expert professional or

craft employee, or their work roles in their organization.

Professional workers (lower right cell of Figure 6.A), like craft

workers, are expected to possess a set of specialized techniques. Where

professional work differs from craftsmanship, however, is in the way tasks are

recognized and defined. While both craft and professional workers are

expected to be able to competently perform specialized tasks, professionals

are expected to analyze or diagnose situational factors and adapt their working

strategies to the true needs (not just the expressed wishes) of their clients.

A craft worker has to know whether a particular task <u>can</u> be performed and how

to perform it. But a professional is responsible for deciding whether the

task <u>should</u> be performed. As craft worker, a surgeon should know how to

perform an operation; as a professional he/she should know whether or not it
is actually needed by the patient.

Responsibility and malpractice are the key elements in evaluating
professional work. Professionals are expected to be competent craft workers
and apply their competence responsibly. Professional responsibility involves
considering the implications of choosing a particular course of action,
resisting interference and pressure from superiors or outsiders, and accepting
personal responsibility for the outcome. Thus, while the worst criticism to
be leveled at a craft worker is incompetence, malpractice is the appropriate
label for inadequate professional work. Malpractice differs from incompetence
in two important ways. First, even if the execution of a task is completely
competent, a professional worker is guilty of malpractice if it can be shown
that the task was unnecessary or inappropriate to a particular case. Second,
in cases of malpractice, the judgments of peers within the profession, rather
than supervisors or other superiors are recognized as most important in
determining whether the work was properly executed.

We have given the label "Art" (lower left cell of Figure 6.A) to work
characterized by both adaptive task definitions and direct monitoring of
workers' activities. Although artistic work may require a high level of
technical skill, the social organization of this type of work is not based on
the particular skills to be utilized in its execution. Artists are recognized
in the products they produce and by the quality of their engagement in the
work itself. While competence in applying specific techniques may be
important, it is not the ultimate concern in the execution of an art. Artists
are expected to rise above the limits of established conventions when
necessary, and to develop novel, unconventional or unexpected techniques.

Like professional workers, artists are expected to be flexible and adaptive in defining their work responsibilities. Like laborers, however, artists are monitored and evaluated directly--by assessing whether their work is engaging, exciting and creative.

The key concepts for the evaluation of artistic work are sensitivity and frivolousness. Whereas the professional is required to be responsible, the craft worker to be competent, and the laborer to be loyal, the artist in an organizational setting is called upon to be sensitive to the need for integrity, creativity and spontaneity. Artists are frequently granted a great deal of autonomy in order to allow for the exercise of this artistic sensitivity. There is no such thing as malpractice for the artist--only frivolousness and a refusal to enter fully into the creative process. Art work requires dedicated and serious effort. Loyalty to pre-planned institutional programs, a basic requirement in laboring work settings, is often the enemy of great art.

The works of solitary artists (like novelists or painters) are evaluated through inspection and critical review by individual consumers, or by editors, juries, and reviews in journals and newspapers. Organized artistic ventures, such as the design of a building or the performance of a play are closer in form to teaching. Here the creation of an artistic masterpiece depends heavily on adequate coordination or direction as well as sensitive review and critical evaluation.

The work structures presented in Figure 6.A are "ideal types" in the sense in which Weber used that phrase.[8] Real jobs will always involve a mixture of labor, craft, art, and professional work activities. Abstracting these four ideal types is helpful in the interpretation of teacher

organizations and collective bargaining in two ways, however. First, by
applying these analytic distinctions to teacher work, we are able to show the
relationships between teachers' specific job responsibilities and the control
and supervision systems utilized by school administrators to oversee their
work. Second, we can also interpret the personal stresses and organizational
tensions that arise when workers are confronted with multiple job
responsibilities falling into several different ideal types simultaneously.
When, for example, teachers are on lunchroom duty or are asked to report
student attendance to the school office, they are performing tasks which
closely fit the ideal definition of labor. No special skills are presumed, no
advanced training for this work is offered, and the work is expected to be
performed in strict accordance with pre-planned guidelines. How t'ese tasks
are generally defined and supervised is quite different from such craft or
artistic tasks as planning curricula, leading discussion, or instructing
students. If, however, either teachers or their supervisors come to see
lunchroom duty and attendance taking as the model for all teaching work
responsibilities, we can expect substantial changes in how other tasks are
defined and how day-to-day working relationships are structured. Similarly,
if teachers and/or their supervisors come to believe that all work activities
are (or should be) essentially professional, craft, or artistic in character,
pressures for organizational and job performance arrangements reflecting these
assumptions will follow.

The Impact of Labor Relations on Teacher Work Structures

The impact of teacher organization and collective bargaining on public
education can be interpreted from the perspective of the four ideal type·work

structures described above. The evidence shows that the influence of labor

relations on teaching work transcends the typical statutory mandates to

bargain over "wages, hours and conditions of employment." Moreover, it is not

accurately captured by such flip generalizations as: "they're like truck

drivers now," or "it's like the difference between slavery and freedom."

Both rationalization (preplanning and routinization of activities) and

inspection (close monitoring of teacher work performance) tend to be supported

by the evolution of formal labor relations. Rationalization has been a major

goal of organized labor. "Getting things clear" has been one of labor's

answers to the perceived abuses that led teachers to ganize. When teachers

began to perceive a fundamental conflict between management interests and

their own, they started to demand protection. Managers reciprocated with

demands for more explicit "management rights." The resulting redefinition of

roles has had substantial rationalizing effects. In Tipid Village six of

thirty teachers were arbitrarily dismissed. The notification produced instant

unionization with a sharp and immediate change in teachers' perceptions of

themselves. Within less than a week compliant helpmaidens became insistant

rule definers. In that district, unilateral management judgments and

particularistic (teachers read "capricious") treatment of employees is no

longer permitted.

In many districts desire for participation in resource allocation and

educational program definition have given a powerful impetus to militancy. In

these districts greater rationalization of the work is a response to

longstanding teacher complaints that managers have poorly allocated school

resources. As a principal in one well-off suburban district noted, "This

place is a luxury liner . . . dead in the water." In that district, the

organization of teachers was motivated less by salary and benefit considerations or the need for grievance arbitration than by teacher demands for greater influence over the educational program.

While greater rationalization has been stimulated by teachers' attempts to protect themselves, closer inspection of teachers' performance has resulted from management responses to unionization. Inspection is a natural reaction when workers are resisting management control, where jobs have been rationalized, and where the technology of the work process is weak--that is in situations where the relationship between workers and managers is tense and it is difficult to determine how hard an employee has worked solely on the basis of measured outcomes.

Although both craft and labor conceptions of teaching have received broad support by educators, the labor definition is more compatible with collective bargaining. Craft conceptions, which encourage rationalization through improved techniques rather than close inspection, rely on teacher training to assure the development of needed skills and on licensure to guarantee that schools of education teach those skills. But in the workplace managers can respect these craft conceptions only if they are confident that predictable results follow from the use of these techniques and that workers are not "gold bricks" unwilling to do their assigned work.[9] Widespread doubt about the efficacy of specific techniques, when combined with a lack of confidence in teacher dedication, has encouraged managers to feel that the school program--not the skill of individual teachers--is what counts. Nationwide concerns about student achievement have created doubts about teacher competency. The New York Times makes the typical argument:

> Incompetent teachers wind up in the classroom because the
> state sets <u>virtually no standard of performance.</u> Most
> candidates become teachers after obtaining state
> certification, which simply means that the college student
> passed the required number of education courses at an
> accredited college or university.[10]

University degree requirements and teacher licensure were keystones of the

"craft movement" in teaching. They were used to break a political patronage

system which subordinated teaching skill to political party allegiance. But

these requirements are no longer viewed with confidence by school managers

faced with rebellicus teachers openly asserting the legitimacy of their own

self interests.[11] Inspection is a natural management strategy and the

redefinition of teaching as labor an inevitable result.

Labor relations also encourages inspection through the grievance

mechanism. By making adjudication depend on explicitness of supervision and

exactness of contractual work rules, grievances make close inspection of job

performance necessary. Furthermore, labor relations makes the teacher union

leadership more open to the idea of inspection. As AFT president, Albert

Shanker (Interview, 1981) puts it, current pressures for educational vouchers

and tuition tax credits require union leaders to:

> turn around to the members and say, "Look, you may not like
> evaluations, you may not like testing, you may not like to
> do things that will involve some discomfort. It may involve
> for some people (not a great many, but for some people) a
> loss of position. It may involve a good many things. But
> unless we in the public schools respond in a very strong and
> obvious way, a way which is viable to the public, a way that
> turns around the present weaknesses and balance; then at the
> end of the decade there is going to be no such thing as
> public education left in this country."

The Mechanisms for Rationalization and Inspection

Figure 6.B summarizes the ways in which current labor relations practices

in education support a laboring conception of teaching. As indicated in the

figure, contract language, social relationship changes, and new political

decision-making mechanisms within the schools each contribute to the

rationalization of teaching tasks and encourage increased inspection of

teacher job performance.

The Contract. As indicated in the first row of the figure, three aspects

of typical teacher contracts encourage rationalization of the work. First, by

specifying hours and duties, contracts encourage the general industrial

society drift from "mission bounded" work to "time-bounded" work. As

Burnstein put it,

> From the Olduvai Gorge to the spinning jenny, in both
> primitive and pre-industrial societies, man's work was
> task-oriented. He picked nuts and berries until a
> sufficient number had been gathered for the meal; he hunted
> until the kill was made; he tended the cows until the
> milking was done; he worked from dawn to dusk in the harvest
> and hardly at all in the winter; and so on. He often
> measured time by the task. . . .
>
> In the last two centuries, at first in Europe and by now in
> much of the rest of the world, work has become
> time-oriented. It has been divorced from the task. For
> those who are employed the amount of work to be performed is
> endless. . . . Time is traded for money.[12]

Whereas the "school day" has always been time bounded, the teacher's day has

been ambiguous. Classes begin and end at set hours but an undefined duty

extends beyond those hours for grading and preparing lessons and non-class

interactions with students and parents. Through collective bargaining,

teachers have asked that previously undefined hours and duty requirements be

specified--when teachers are to be on campus, in class and when they are to be

available for after-school activities, meetings with parents, open houses and

the like.

Figure 6.B

How Labor Relations Supports Labor Work Structures

THE LABOR PARADIGM SUPPORTED THROUGH

	Rationalization	Inspection
SUPPORT PROVIDED THROUGH CONTRACT LANGUAGE:	1. Specifying hours and duties. 2. Separating regular & extra duties. 3. Elaborating procedural rules.	1. Creating grievance processes. 2. Requiring standard practices. 3. Defining evaluation procedures.
(primary motivation)	(protecting teacher interests)	(enforcing management rights)
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM:	1. Dual organization system. 2. Homogenization of work roles.	1. Need to demonstrate power. 2. Intervention by labor pros.
(changed principal work roles)	(manager)	(supervisor)
(emergent teacher leader roles)	(policy maker)	(advocate)
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:	1. Need for support coalitions. 2. Lobbying for remote control	1. Breakdown in the "logic of confidence" 2. Evaluation based politics.
(dominated by)	(group solidarity building)	(winning elections)

As we previously noted, contracts formalize the distinction between teachers "regular" and "extra" duties. Regular duties are largely limited to classroom instruction while extra duties cover most extra curricular and student supervision responsibilities. By making this separation obvious contracts encourage teachers to narrow their sense of responsibility for outcomes and concentrate on explicitly stated (i.e., rationalized) tasks. Less rationalized, spontaneous, and extra-curricular forms of teacher-student interaction receive little support from contract language and are so low that the teachers are frequently observed turning them down.

A third contribution of contract language to rationalization arises from the propensity for negotiators to develop elaborate procedural rules to cover all adjustments in teacher job definitions and assignments. By expanding requirements for notification, consultation, and review of work assignments (through lay-off and transfer policies, curriculum planning councils, etc.) contracts encourage planning and rationalization for every aspect of a teacher's job.

As indicated in Figure 6.B, the primary motivation for using contract language to rationalize tasks rests with teachers who perceive rationalization as a mechanism for securing and protecting their interests. By contrast, inspection is a management concern. Three elements found in most contracts support increased inspection of teacher job performance.

First, because arbitration proceedings require school site managers to show a contractual basis for their orders and to show that they have enforced the same work rules for all employees, grievance clauses encourage inspection of teacher job performance. Grievance threats force management to give

attention to situations that they might have preferred to ignore. Since

managerial time and attention are scarce, the ability to file a grievance, is

a powerful attention getting device. Grievances are communications

mechanisms. They display discontent, point to problem areas in the district,

and particularly in smaller school districts, quickly gain the attention of

the superintendent and the school board. Thus the existence of grievance

mechanisms encourage closer inspection of teachers at the expense of other

management functions.

Managers are also motivated to inspect teacher job performance because

contract administration requires standardization of practice in all buildings

and classrooms.[14] As principals come to accept their role as contract

administrators, they also tend to adopt a diminished definition of management,

confining their oversight to work rules explicitly set forth in the contract.

Contractual specification of teacher evaluation procedures encourages

inspection by linking evaluation more closely with discipline and discharge.

Quite apart from the matter of difficulty in dismissing teachers, collective

contracts have changed the definition of legitimate causes for dismissal.

Judgments of technical competence or personal adequacy by superiors have been

replaced by a factual assessment of whether a teacher did or did not follow

rules. This objectification of evaluation standards separates the substance

of teaching from behaviors for which teachers are subject to discipline and

discharge. In the celebrated case of Cyril Lang, an English teacher in

Rockville, Maryland, a suspension for misconduct and insubordination was

ordered because Lang exposed tenth-graders to Aristotle's _Poetics_ and

Machiavelli's _The Prince_--books not on the approved reading list. To school

officials, the issue was not learning but whether rules were followed. As

superintendent Edward Andrews said, "I don't know whether Lang is right or

wrong about the books, but in a public school system, you have to have

reasonable procedures to determine what is to be used and the superintendent

has to uphold them."[15]

The Lang case clearly illustrates the application of laboring standards

to the evaluation of teachers. If teaching were considered otherwise,

different standards would have been applied to the case. For instance, if

teaching were treated as a craft, the question would have been whether the

children learned not whether orders and procedures had been followed. If

teaching was viewed as an art, the assignment of Aristotle and Machiavelli

might be subject to criticism, but the improvement of instruction, not

employee discipline, would have been the central concern of the critics. If

teaching was viewed as a profession Lang's selection of material for his

courses would have been recognized as something only other English teachers

(i.e., other professionals) could adequately evaluate.

Teacher union response to abuses in evaluation has been to insist upon

narrow standards and explicit procedural due process. Teacher organizations

also supply vigorous representation for nearly all teachers who are evaluated

harshly, especially those who are subjects of disciplinary action or

dismissal. We found no instances in which support for procedural due process

was denied to a teacher, even those who have been judged by fellow teachers to

be incompetent. Procedural standards in and of themselves have become an

important value for teachers.

The Social Organization. As shown in the second row of Figure 6.B,

changes in the social organization of the school resulting from teacher

organization and collective bargaining also contribute to rationalization and

inspection of teachers' work. In some respects these social system changes

are more dramatic than those resulting from written contracts. As one

national teacher organization staff member told us, "schools changed a lot

when senior teachers shifted from bringing the younger ones into line with

what principals wanted to adopting the ideology that any grievant is right."

With the arrival of the Second Generation school districts, contain two

distinct social organizations--each competing for the loyalty and cooperation

of teachers. An administrative organization led by the superintendent wants

teachers to adopt district goals as their own and to pursue those goals

diligently. A teacher organization led by the union president or staff

executive, needs teachers to be willing to challenge the legitimacy of

management directives and perhaps even withdraw services if a suitable

accommodation to their demands is not forthcoming. The integration of these

two social systems is accomplished largely by rationalizing each of them.

Rationalization in this case means closely circumscribing the powers of each

system and emphasizing the importance of formal "official" interpretations of

all rules and organizational practices. One result is that principals face

sharply increased pressures to treat all teachers alike, and teachers find

that "peer-pressure" from colleagues becomes very intense whenever tensions

between the teacher organization and the school administrative system are

high. These pressures are kept under control by formulating explicit rules

for behavior and encouraging all teachers to follow them closely.

While competition for teacher loyalty encourages rationalization, the

need for both social systems to demonstrate their vitality and power increases

the level of inspection. Administrators feel a great need to show that they

are willing and able to monitor and enforce the rules governing teacher

behavior. At the same time, although they often do not recognize it, teacher

organizations need to call attention to the behavior of their members. As

teachers try to show that they are serious about demands for improved working

conditions they invariably go out of their way to attract attention to their

work. Teacher organizations will often publicly remind members to "work to

rule"--doing only explicitly mandated tasks. In 1980, the House of Delegates

of the Los Angeles teacher organization opted for this strategy by voting to

recommend that teachers refuse, "extra volunteer work at their school site

until the present crisis is past."[15]

The right to grieve has encouraged teachers to rely on the power of the

teacher organization to resolve work-related problems, thereby strengthening

this new authority system at the school site level. Grievances utilize a

communications system that often bypasses the building principal. Among the

teachers we studied, using the grievance process is generally the first

expression of militancy.

Rationalization of teaching work is further encouraged by surprisingly

strong pressures for the homogenization of teacher job definitions. Both

teachers and administrators have generally come to believe that collective

bargaining requires identical working conditions for all teachers. Among

teachers this pressure stems, in part, from a suspicion that administrative

attempts to differentiate work roles are aimed at controlling teachers rather

than improving education. In large measure, however, the trend toward

homogenization springs from the political structure of teacher organizations

and from the dynamics of collective bargaining. As noted in the previous

section, the contract demands and proposals of specialist teachers are

frequently put forward in initial proposals but rarely embodied in completed

contracts. Specialist teachers generally lack political influence within

teacher organizations and thus cannot advance their interests relative to

those of other teachers.

Labor professionals also contribute to both rationalization and

inspection of teachers' jobs. Because they have a communication network that

extends across district boundaries, labor practitioners' beliefs tend to be

shared in many districts. Representatives for teacher organizations, school

administrator groups, and school boards associations, along with numerous

labor consultants, frequently suggest contract clauses or master contracts,

and rationales for why they should be adopted. Teacher organizations,

particularly those affiliated with the NEA, have begun to engage in

coordinated bargaining in some districts--seeking to establish a common

working condition for all teachers in a cluster of school districts.

More important than their contributions to the spread of rationalized job

definitions, is the encouragement given by professional organizers,

negotiators, arbitrators, consultants, etc. to closer inspection of teachers

work performance. These professionals generally bring with them the ethos and

assumptions of private sector labor relations. Within this frame of

reference, workers are thought to be motivated primarily by salary incentives

and to need close supervision in order to work productively. In schools, such

a view encourages principals to believe that classroom observation and teacher

evaluation are primary vehicles for controlling educational outcomes.

The overall impact of these various changes in the social system of the

school can be summarized in terms of changes in the roles of two groups of key

actors: principals and teacher organization leaders. For school principals,

collective bargaining has meant giving greater attention to the aspects of

their work captured by the terms "manager" and "supervisor." These two

concepts have received increasing attention in both professional and scholarly

circles since the advent of collective bargaining. The widespread use of

"management by objectives" (MBO) techniques, and recent enthusiasm for

"clinical supervision" are perhaps the most obvious indicators of this new

emphasis. As managers, principals are expected to help rationalize the

teaching process. As supervisors they are asked to increase the level of

inspection in the system. Evidence of these new role expectations for school

principals is reflected in the opinions of 1,500 school board members who in

substantial majority (63 percent) felt that collective bargaining would force

school districts to adopt more effective management and budgeting practices,

to be more informed about school operations (65 percent) and to take a more

aggressive role in planning, goal setting, and the like (78 percent).[16]

The Political System. Though economic factors are important, it has been

obvious from the outset that public sector labor relations are more political

than economic. Some of the political aspects of teacher organization and

bargaining are highlighted in the bottom section of Figure 6.B.

Achieving a satisfactory contract settlement in education depends heavily

on the ability of each side to form and sustain strong political support

coalitions. While solidarity within labor and management groups is necessary

for effective bargaining, it has become increasingly clear that attracting and

holding the support of politically active members of the public is a critical

element in creating serious pressure for accommodation to bargaining demands.

While the economic interests of teachers are real, they can bring almost no

economic pressures to bear on management to settle. Moreover, managers have

political survival and personal pride--not economic benefit--at stake in

trying to resist teacher demands. Previous research suggests, and our field

data confirm, that citizen support (especially in the matter of voting for

school board members) sets the overall direction for school policy.[17]

Enhancing the importance of political coalitions in school labor

relations is a breakdown of what Meyer and Rowan call the "logic of

confidence."[18] They argue that schools have traditionally operated on the

basis of "ritual" classifications rather than closely inspected work

performances. Thus, for example, special requirements for credentialing

mathematics teachers are scrupulously followed--but then almost no attention

is paid to what they actually do once certified. Ritual classification is

applied to both students and teachers. It enables schools to assure

themselves of at least the appearance of success by simply declaring that

teachers are fully-certified or that students have "passed" from one

classification to another. Maintenance of these ritual classifications is

perilous, however. Meyer and Rowan argue that they can be sustained only

through a "logic of confidence," As they put it:

> Parties bring to each other the taken-for-granted,
> good-faith assumption that the other is, in fact, carrying
> out his or her defined activity. The community and the
> board have confidence in the superintendent, who has
> confidence in the principal, who has confidence in the
> teachers. None of these people can say what the other does
> or produces, but the plausability of their activity requires
> that they have confidence in each other.[19]

By formalizing conflict, labor relations makes this logic of confidence more

difficult to sustain. Our data suggest that school board suspicion of teacher

dedication and loyalty, and consequently an interest in the inspection of

teacher work, is easily triggered once bargaining has been institutionalized.

School managers are fond of saying that teacher unionization robs them of

their ability to manage. That is importantly wrong. The politics of

unionization forces school managers to act more like managers than they ever

have. They are forced to plan programs more carefully, inspect how well

teachers execute these plans, and give a more detailed accounting of both to

school board trustees. Unionization has made it more difficult, however, for

school administrators to socialize teachers, to create internal cohesion

within school sites, and to rely on loose inspection systems based on mutual

confidence.

There are two other aspects of school politics which interact with labor

relations to encourage the adoption of a laboring conception of teaching. One

is the emergence of teacher organizations as lobbyists and major political

contributors at the state and federal levels. In appealing to state and

federal policy makers for support, teachers have endorsed the belief that

education can be rationalized and controlled through program structures,

funding categories, and procedural regulations. While this belief, taken by

itself, would tend to support the craft rather than the labor paradigm, it has

interacted with a second factor--a widespread demand for accountability and

assessment underlying the "politics of evaluation" which has dominated most

recent state and federal initiatives.[20] The interaction between teacher power

and evaluation politics has led to a climate in which state and federal policy

frequently encourages compliance rather than excellence, maintenance of effort

rather than appropriateness of service, and following guidelines rather than

responding to needs.

The political dimensions of public school labor relations are best

summarized by noting that political influence depends about equally on

generating group solidarity and winning elections. Rationalization of

teaching helps to create solidarity within both manager and teacher groups.
More importantly, it facilitates a sense of commonality between educators and
citizen groups or public policy makers. In the present climate of
accountability demands and weakened confidence in the schools, promises of
closer inspection of both teacher and student performance are important in
winning election to school boards and other education policy bodies. Teacher
organizations are vitally concerned with both solidarity and election winning.
They have influenced numerous local and state election outcomes. They have
recently become visible in national politics. There has, however, been a
significant realignment of coalitions in the Second Intergenerational Conflict
period, which is sometimes perceived as a backlash against teacher involvement
in politics. [21]

Changes in Managerial Work

Not suprisingly, changes in managerial work take place in concert with
those in teacher work. For managers, and particularly school principals,
there is also a tendency toward rationaliztion, formalization and
specialization of daily operations. The changes in managerial authority that
flow from the bargaining table are much more significant to the operations of
school districts than they are the economic conditions of employment. As is
illustrated in the passage of labor relations from one generation to the next,
the tension between managerial discretion and teacher autonomy and security is
a permanent fixture of labor relations.

The most obvious feature of this tension is the redefinition of the means
by which managerial authority is expressed. There is a clear embrace of
rule-based management and a consequent diminution of the importance of either

charismatic or autocratic leadership. In contrast to what the literature on

bureaucracy leads us to expect, this change, when applied to the school site

level, has not produced a comfortable relaxation and the self-assurance that

obtains in rule-bound bureraucracies. This is largely the case because the

rules invoked concern procedures, and are curiously silent on the production

or enhancement of education. Thus, the rules operate as constraints. Site

principals can be criticized, even fired, for failing to abide by and enforce

the rules. But they cannot educate using the rules, because the rules are not

standard operating procedures for "production" but standard operating

procecures for organizational maintenance.   This is the case because in the

Second Generation management's goal is to prevent the scope of bargaining from

broadening to encompass the substance or technology of education, both these

being protected as a "management prerogative." Principals and teachers too

must look elsewhere for the ability to forward education, and great ambiguity

and frustration about what to do accompanies the Second Generation of labor

relations, when contracts are established and rule enforcement taken in

earnest. In the Second Generation the teachers come to believe that

managerial authority ought to be expressed in rules. The site managers are

looking for other ways to run the organization. In the Third Generation,

managers, too, come to believe in rules, and the transformation of that belief

into action is the substance of the Second Intergenerational Crisis.

A second product of the tension between managerial discretion and teacher

autonomy and security is the change in the criteria for a "good" manager.

This central aspect of the changing relationship between managers and teachers

has been noted throughout the preceding chapters, and there seems little need

to expand on what has already been said. To reiterate briefly, in the Second

Generation, managers accept the criteria that containing conflict within the organizational shell of the school district is a highly important criterion for good mangement. Peace claims a higher value than productivity. However, the criteria change as the generations change, and during the Second Intergenerational Crisis, managers risk being "soft on unions" if they appear to want labor peace too much.

Third, the continuing tension produces a continuing struggle for loyalty. Both the school district and the teacher organization require dedication, support and sacrifice in order to achieve their ends. But loyalty in this case is not a simple choice between one organization and the others. Teachers remain dependent on the district for their livelihood and their occupational identification. Teacher organizations depend on fiscal, and hence the political viability of school districts in order that they may possess something for which the employees can bargain. School districts require a large measure of unspoken devotion to duty on the part of their teachers, that which has been referred to as the psychologycal contract. School operations, in large measure, depend on the recognition of interdependency. As Johnson put it in her study of collective bargaining and principals, "Teachers could not be effective in their classrooms without fair and balanced class assignments, while principals could assure order in school only if teachers upheld administrative rules and policies. Principals could not superivise all the activities in the school and instead, granted teachers considerable discretion in their work."[22] The interdependency between the teacher organization and the school district brings into being what the labor relations literature calls "limited warfare, but still, the manipulation of those aspects of the relationship that are competitive and those aspects which

are cooperative makes the process of leadership substantially more complex and frequently frustrating.

Mutual Strategy and Adaptation

We learn in the Second Generation that teachers and administrators do mutually adapt: they cope, they strategize and they work to maintain and strengthen their coalitions.

How one copes is often a function of acculturation. The ideological affront of the First Intergenerational Period of teacher activism and militancy is more acute in locations without a union culture or tradition. As we noted in Chapter III, the ease with which teacher organizations were accepted in blue collar towns was usually substantially greater than in professional class or rural communities. Where teacher organizations have been established long enough, as in New York City, principals were often former members and leaders of the teacher organization, the legitimacy of which is unquestioned.[23]

The extent to which one has to cope depends, of course, on the strength of the teacher organization at the building level. Only about 50 percent of our survey districts had building representatives at each school site, and the interviews revealed generally that these persons were not particularly well trained or active. One will recall the Illinois district in which the superintendent has simply been able to ignore the union except at negotiations time, and the site principals have remained active in utilizing a committee structure for academic governance and innovation—a structure of the principal's own choosing. The level of coping is strikingly different in schools with strong building representatives.

Other than the obvious reduction of personal rancor, and the mutual

adoption of social amenities in conversation and manner; the most universal

coping mechanism for site administrators has been learning the rules of the

new system. The curve varies greatly from school district to school district,

but principals learn how to operate under collective bargaining because they

must learn. One's performance in contract performance inevitably becomes one

of the spoken or unspoken criteria by which principals are evaluated. In one

case district, Boulder City, 8 of the 11 principals were removed from their

positions over a five-year period because the superintendent did not feel they

were administering the contract with the toughness and uniformity that he

wanted. Expertise in the law and its application, knowledge of the norms for

bargaining, a perception of the consequences of different actions, and

knowledge of the opposite parties--all these are acquired relatively quickly

by principals, who by-and-large do not like the experience, but learn to live

with it.

Strategies. After administrators learn to cope, they learn to

strategize. They strategize, in part, to regain influence at the site level.

Two main mechanims are used. The first is selective enforcement in which the

operating rules become more lax than the official rules for people who are

otherwise cooperative. The second is reciprocity. Just as district-level

labor relations proceeds on the basis of interaction and matching the changes

given by the other side, similar changes take place at the site level. The

introduction of the manager's goals into labor relations has been found in

earlier studies and in this one. Kerchner's investigation of community

colleges found their presidents making conscious use of incidents in contract

administration to further their own goals, to change the strategic balance for

the next round of negotiations, or to circumvent the union.[24]   Johnson

divided the principals in her public school study into aggressors, defenders

and reciprocators. In summary she commented, "the reciprocal strategy was most

consistent with the interdependent character of the school organization and

with the notions of shared management central to collective bargaining.

However, the effectivness of this strategy depends in large·part on

maintaining a staff that share common goals and on being able to shape school

site practices without interference from the district level union

officers."[25]   In this study, the movement toward the Second Intergenerational

Conflict and the Third Generation are embodied on district level management

becoming aggressive in its strategy. Site level strategy was often at

variance with the district level and reflective of the need of site managers

to maintain their existence in more than one coalition.

    <u>Coalitions</u>. Coalition management is of the utmost importance.

Understanding that the coalitions will change, or will be challenged as the

generations pass is the first lesson. Different actions are required of

principals· and superintendents in each generation. As we noted in Chapter II,

during the First Generation the principal is a part of a coalition with the

teachers against the superintendent, largely over flexibility at the school

site. Principals and teachers are also in coalition against parents over

control at the school site. These two coalitions are manageable so long as

the parents remain relatively quiet and so long as the coalition against the

superintendent does not become openly rebellious. During the same generation

the superintendent dominates his coalition with the board and needs no

assistance in the relationships with teachers and principals.

Then comes the First Intergenerational Conflict. The site principals'
best prescriptive is to lie low. The essential organizing conflict between
the teacher organization, the administration and the school board cannot be
solved at the school site level. The most successful of the principals are
prepared to suffer a certain amount of social estrangement from their old
close relationships and still maintain a public acknowledgement of "when this
is all over, we still have to work together." Superintendents face
particularly severe pressure. Only in rare instances can they join a
coalition with the teachers to, in effect, support their organization. They
run great danger in putting the best face on teacher organization actions
because they do not control potential excesses of the teacher organization in
the future. However, the greatest danger they face is to appear too
repressive or unreasonable to the rebellious public. If they wish to continue
their employment in the district, they must appear capable of ending the
conflict when the time comes that the public, and school board grow tired of
it. If the superintendent becomes the symbol of the district's intransigence
and its inability to extend legitimacy to the teacher organization, the
superintendent cannot survive the First Intergenerational Conflict.

The Second Generation presents the most severe test for the site
principals. Opportunities for coalition, and with whom will vary from school
building to school building. In situtions in which there is strong and
popular building leadership among the teachers, the principal can form a
coalition with the teacher leader. If there is no teacher leader, or an
impotent one, the principal can continue with his former coalition with the
teachers as a whole against the parents. If the teacher leader is both strong
and rebellious, then the principal faces a serious problem. Coalitions with

parents are seldom sufficiently potent to tame a rebellious teacher. The only

remaining avenue is to form a conservative coalition with the superintendent

(in which the superintendent dominates) against the teacher leader. This may

assure support and job security, but it provides no relief from continuous

tension and conflict at the site level. We experienced this open rebellion at

the site level at Thresher, and the experience was unpleasant for the

principals involved.

The superintendent's coalitions in the second generation are clear, and

ultimately fatal. In order to maintain order the superintendent must form a

coalition with the teacher leadership. At the same time, a coalition must be

maintained with the school board in order to dampen potential criticism in the

community. The superintendent cannot maintain the three coalitions

simultaneously. As we noted in Chapter II, they are incompatable. The

Administration has found that the rules which abide within the labor contract

are potent devices to regulate the behavior of their Site principals. The

Administration is also joined in coalition with the teacher Leadership against

Citizen rebels essentially in support of the present board composition.

Meanwhile the Administration remains aligned with the Board against the

teacher Leadership in the standard labor relations coalition. The

Administration also is aligned with the Board against rebellious citizens.

The appearance of coalition with teacher leaders becomes suspicious. Citizen

rebels use the real or imagined relationships in coalition ACL as an

organizing point. Our suspicion is that the Second Intergenerational Crisis

is inevitable; that sooner or later the Citizen rebels will gain sufficient

popularity to become members of the school board and change the

Administration-Board dominant coalition to an Board-Citizens coalition in

which the reformed Board dominates the superintendent and perhaps changes the
person occupying that position.

Yet, we know from our field observations that Second Generation
accommodations with the teacher Leadership can last for a long period of
time. Three arrangements appear to be productive of a long Second Generation.
The first is discretion. Contacts between labor and top administration are
quite careful and private. Official contacts between the school district and
the teacher organization are kept to the operational level and undertaken
through a subordinate for labor relations. In these situations, the
superintendent usually maintains distance from the negotiations and contract
administration processes. Second, superintendents engage in open
discrimination. They maintain that certain issues or topics can be discussed
with the union leadership informally, because they are areas of mutual benefit
(eg. integrative bargaining). Others may not be informally discussed because
they involve areas of substantive disagreement between the Board and the
teacher Leadership, and when there is a substantive disagreement, the
Administration must side with the Board, thus preserving the
Administrative-Board coalition. Third, superintendents can prevent issues
arising for Citizen rebels to exploit. They can respond to specific
complaints, smooth differences and embrace potential opponents. Clearly,
though, the strategy is only partly effective, severely constrained by the
organizational resources available to respond to different demands.

Eventually, we believe, the strains become too much, and the Second
Intergenerational Conflict takes place.

Notes

1 See, for example, James G. March and Herbert Simon, _Organizations_ (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), and Henry Mintzberg, _The Nature of Managerial Work. (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1975)._

2 Douglas E. Mitchell, "A Study of the Role Definitions for the Special Education Resource Specialist." Technical Report no. 75-147. Fresno: California State Department of Education, June 1976.

3 This is partly a function of organizational size. Some large-city school districts either have separate bargaining units for specialists or have organized subunits within the teacher union. Specialists, however, have a consistently low level of influence compared with regular classroom teachers.

4 There is no single word that perfectly describes the combination of rationality and inspection that we ascribe to "labor." "Worker" is more generic than we intend; "employee" describes the nature of hiring and payment, not the work itself. We should note, however, that our use of the words "labor" and "laboring" stand in marked contrast to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "laborer" classification, which is applied only to unskilled or semi-skilled work.

5 William H. Whyte, _The Organization Man_ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956) p. 6.

6 Frederick W. Taylor, _Principles of Scientific Management_ (N.Y.: Harper, 1911).

7 Alvin Gouldner, _Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy_ (N.Y>: The Free Press, 1954) p. 223-224.

8 Max Weber, _The Theory of Social and Economic Organization_, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, introduction by Talcott Parsons, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1947).

9 Gouldner, _Industrial Bureaucracy_, p. 64.

10 M. Chambers. "Teacher Licensing Considered," _New York Times_, July 3, 1979, Section III, p. 4.

11 William Grimshaw, _Union Rule_ (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1979).

12 Irving Bernstein. "Time and Work," _Proceedings of the 25th Annual Winter Meeting_, (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1977), p. 1-8.

13 Peggy O. Gonder, _Collective Bargaining Problems and Solutions._

(Arlington, Va.: American Assn. of School Administrators, 1981).

14 "How To Protect Tender Minds" Time 116, 24 (Dec. 15, 1980), p. 77.

15 "Don't Volunteer Reps Advise," United Teacher, 12 (Dec. 1, 1980), p. 4.

16 Gonder, Collective Bargaining Problems and Solutions, p. 12.

17 Frank Lutz and Laurence Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1980)>

18 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, The Structure of Educational Organizations in Marshall W. Meyers and Associates, Environments and Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

19 Ibid. p. 101-102.

20 Ernest R. House, The Politics of Educational Evaluation (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing, 1974).

21 Teachers are big lobbying groups. They have been active in most states, and in some they rank among the largest political action groups. The California Teachers Association ranked 9th in lobbying activity in 1978 according to the California Fair Political Practices Commission, and was first among campaign contributors. The Michigan Education Association outspent the United Autoworkers in the 1978 state legislative elections, and the NEA's political action committee raised more than $3 million for 1976 state and federal elections. See Terry Herndon, "Annotating a Reader's Digest Article: The NEA A Washington Lobby Run Rampant," Phi Delta Kappan 60 (Feb. 1979): 420-423.

22 Susan Moore Johnson, "Collective Bargaining and the Principal," Institute for Educational Policy Studies, Harvard Graduate School of Education. Presented before the American Educational Research Association annual meeting, Los Angeles, California, April 2, 1981.

23 Neil G. Ellman "Union-Administration Cooperation in the Public Schools of New York City," unpub. MS, Teachers College, Columbia University.

24 Charles T. Kerchner, "The 'Unionization' of College Presidents--Their Response to Faculty Unions," Educational Administration Quarterly 13,3 (Fall 1977) 87-104.

25 Johnson, "Collective Bargaining and the Principal," p. 27.

VII

THE THIRD GENERATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

Thus far in considering development of labor relations we have treated progression through the generations as if it were inevitable. It is not. We believe that our data and the logic of our theory demonstrate that passage through the generations as we have described them is highly likely, but there are alternative possibilities. There are indications that some school districts in our study, have either become stalled in one of the generations for such a long period, or have deviated from its descriptions so substantially that the theory of generational development is of questionable applicability to them. These outliers in the data are interesting, as deviant cases always are, because they help illuminate the conditions that produce unusual social situations.

Of more universal application, however, is the second topic of this chapter--the Third Generation, itself. Assuming that the generational progression continues as we have hypothesized, what does the future hold? Our scenario for the Third Generation forsees a tightly controlled, explicitly policy oriented school organization, a state which poses opportunities and potential problems.

The Third Generation

We have called the Third Generation the era of negotiated policy. The

evidence from our study sites prompts us to conclude that the Third Generation
results from an incompleteness in simple good faith bargaining as a means of
employee representation in education. In Chapters II and III we traced the
rise of teacher discontent in the First Generation as teachers organized and
gave voice to their feelings. The symbols of discontent were "injustice" and
"dignity". Some of the threats to dignity and injustice were answered by
teachers gaining the legitimate ability to represent themselves--to make
contracts, and to include procedural due process protections in those
contracts. But part of the original discontent was not resolved through the
collective bargaining process. This unresolved aspect of teacher dignity had
to do with legitimacy of teachers acting as representatives for their clients,
the students.

The question of teacher client interest has never been cleanly addressed.
Teachers historically have been expected to act in the best interests of their
students, and the literature on teaching as an occupation shows that teachers
draw their most important occupational rewards from the interactions they have
with students.[1] Yet organizational authority for teacher as client
representative has always been lacking. Formally, schools are bureaucracies,
and unions or no, they distribute authority as such. The nature of teacher
influence is commonly taken to be higher than that accorded by their
bureaucratic position, a function of respect for their expertise or the
organizational structure of schools. As Bidwell puts it, teacher autonomy is
a function of the relatively isolated position of classrooms and other
instructional units.[2] Still, teacher authority has been contingent on a
revokable license from management, which itself operated within tolerances
granted by the community.

Collective bargaining was established within the framework of the formal
authority system of schools, not its informal but powerful influence
structure. As Lortie explains:

> [W]e cannot conclude that collective aggressiveness
> legitimates individual ambition; group activity to raise
> salaries is not the same as individualistic attempts to
> raise one's standing. [3]

Bargaining statutes were, in fact, designed to preserve the formal structure
of authority and protect it against expansion of teacher self-interest persued
through bargaining. Host statutes severely restricted the scope of
bargaining, the issues over which bargaining was permitted. In California,
the entry into collective bargaining itself was prompted by two court
decisions that drastically broadened the scope of bargaining under the state's
meet-and-confer statute. School boards and administrators supported the
collective bargaining statute partly because it contained a clause specifying
the subjects of bargaining. [4] Even in non-statutory states, such as Illinois,
the recognition agreements between teacher organizations and the district
specify the limits to bargaining. This situation established the Second
Generation struggle over the scope of bargaining, and in so doing it made
collective teacher representation of child interests organizationally suspect.
Teachers continued to express themselves in child interest language, but they
were less seldom believed. Teacher "quality education" proposals were
interpreted to us by school board members and administrators as job protection
boondoggles, and efforts to involve the union in inservice education as a
power grab.

Teachers were trained by their own organization and by management that
the conduct of education and the formation of policy was a management

prerogative. Management's activities reinforce the idea that it must protect

the "right to set policy" and that the way to do this is to negotiate over as

little as possible. By protecting the bureaucratic structures of policy

determination from direct influence by collective bargaining, school

executives and teacher leaders alike perpetuated the myth that bargaining was

largely a procedural transformation removed from the essence of education.

Yet, as Chapter VI indicates, the assertions by labor and management and the

web of policy designed to keep collective bargaining from influencing

educational policy has been almost wholly a failure. The public comes to

believe that collective bargaining is having an effect on education, and that

teacher self-interest is unbounded, and the Second Intergenerational Conflict

takes place.

The Third Generation comes about when the teachers for their part agree

on a need to support the general good of education and of the enterprise.

They achieve the ability to operate in the Third Generation when the

membership realizes that its economic well-being and occupational status are

dependent on a perception that they are doing a good job, are competent and

have the best interests of students as their interests. Teachers are ready

for the Third Generation when they understand that what the public thinks

counts, and the public is ready to accept them when they believe that

"teachers want what kids need."

Management enters the Third Generation when it realizes that important

school policies are made through collective bargaining, despite the best

efforts to separate policy from the bargaining process--to operate the school

district around the contract. Likewise, management comes to realize that

bargaining in public education fundamentally involves political exchanges

rather than economic ones, and that in order to maintain political support, the enterprise of education must appear robust and effective.

The irony of the transformation into the Third Generation is that it begins with the allegation of low productivity or improper self-interest on the part of teachers and a politically generated movement to back management in regaining control. Yet, the implementation of Third Generation bargaining involves legitimation of the teacher organization's role as a representative of the teacher interest in representing the clients of education.

Thus in the Third Generation there is an explicit joining of bargaining and policy. For its part, management frequently signals the entrance into the Third Generation by expanding the scope of bargaining, the first expansion coming in teacher evaluation clauses. It does this by becoming the aggressive party at the bargaining table, coming to negotiations with an agenda of items through which it attempts to exercise managerial control over the organization. Management has always been interested in modifications of the contract: cleaning up language that is cumbersome to implement, and eliminating substantive or procedural requirements that were found to be disadvantageous to the administration. However, in the Third Generation, management treads into areas that it would have avoided a few years before, preferring to have handled in decision arenas removed from collective bargaining. Bargaining and the labor contract are perceived as integrated into the web of decision arenas that have come to include the administrative machinery, the school board, the legislatures, and teacher elections. Interestingly, the teacher organization participates in all of these to one degree. Third Generation bargaining is an acknowledgement that the teacher organization does have access to the decisional arenas in which policy

decisions are made.

What direction will teacher bargaining take? We believe that there are some general trends toward tight control, centralization and uniformity, but that there will be important district-specific variations depending on the perception of the technology of education and the level of trust between teachers and the administration-board coalition.

The general trends derive from the fact that labor relations is always environmentally driven. Employees and managers use bargaining to respond to those decisions that are important and which they believe can be resolved in that forum. For instance, during the 1960s relatively few teacher contracts had provisions for reductions in force. There was no need to address the question of laying off teachers because schools were growing. Since 1971, however, a substantial percentage of teacher contracts have come to incorporate reduction-in-force agreements, which specify the criteria (largely seniority) and procedures that will be used for firing teachers when enrollments decline.[5] In similar fashion, our field research at the turn of the 1980s revealed great managerial interest in teacher evaluations, the procedures to be used for transferring teachers from one school site to another, and in discipline policy for students.

We expect the immediate future to continue to concentrate on tight control. There has been a clear emergence of goal-based management in the literature and direction of education administration, and in the political structures surrounding education.[6] The use of organized interest groups, which are outcome oriented, continues, and the demography and finance of public schools suggest that the level of slack resources will not be high. Allocation decisions will thus be both carefully watched and sharply fought.

School management, having recognized the teacher contract as a control mechanism, will become more willing and perhaps eager to advance an explicit, tightly-coupled control over school organizations. This relationship will extend to known and expressible behaviors of teachers--work rules including the time and behavioral requirements for teaching, the procedural requirements, and the expected outcomes.

Still, it seems to us, that within this general trend there is substantial room for variation from district to district, and perhaps within the institution of public schooling as a whole. These variations will turn on two factors: the extent to which there is an acknowledged belief that there exists a known technology of learning, and the level of trust between management and labor. Acknowledgement of a technology does not necessarily imply that the technology of education be elegently or even accurately described, but only that there be a wide-spread belief that such is the case. Belief in a technology is most likely to be a national phenomenon, requiring a pervasive and somewhat permanent definition to good practice. Levels of trust in teachers, though related to national levels of feeling about public employees, are more likely to vary from school district to school district.

There are four possible combinations of high and low trust and known and unknown technology, as illustrated in Table 7.1. Each of these combinations, tends to advance a particular aspect of teaching work--art, labor craft or profession--as described in Chapter VI. This does not mean that any form of work comes to eclipse all the others, for as we have noted earlier, all work is a combination of all four elements. However, the relative strength of the particular work element is advanced or retarded according to the combination of trust and technology assumptions incorporated into the bargaining process.

Both the formal and informal aspects of the organization are affected.

Table 7.1
RELATIONSHIP TO BARGAINING CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS OF TEACHER WORK

	TRUST	
	Low	High
TECHNOLOGY		
Known	Formal organization supports, "labor" through work rules; Informal organization supports "cottage craft" through exceptions negotated at school sites.	Both formal and informal organizations support "craft" through negotiating standards, controls, and worker entry and training.
Unknown	Formal organization supports "labor" through work rules; Informal organization supports "underground art" through work-place autonomy.	Both formal and informal organizations support organized "art" through negotiating procedures for peer review and teacher work involvement.

If there is a known technology, the development of standard procedures can be expected in order to implement that technology. Standard procedures are embodied in specified curricula, work rules, schedules, standard diagnostic routines and subsequent rules for student placement, and in general, set responses to conditions specified in advance.

If the perception of a known technology coincides with low trust, then the labor aspects of teaching will be accented by the formal organization and its rules. Closer supervision of work can be expected along with a more highly standardized curriculum. One can also expect a more explicit division of labor among job categories, and a more specific direction of operations by administrators. Teachers will be responsible for the faithful rendition of the curricular material, but they will not be responsible for its success or

failure.

It is important to note that the level of trust associated with a laboring definition of teaching need not be directly associated with relations between the school administration and the teachers. In fact, most of the advance of accountability standards, minimum competency testing and similar measures has been the function of legislative intervention.

Even when there are strong external pressures, however, there is often a counter tendency at the school site and classroom levels. We have labeled this tendency "cottage craft". It exists through informal and often counter-policy arrangements among teachers and between teachers and administrators. The essential nature of cottage craft is an agreement that certain rules and procedures, which are part of the formal laboring rules can be broken or avoided if the standards of the craft are thereby advanced.

If trust is high, and the technology is known, craft organization can be advanced. Teachers are granted autonomy over the choice of techniques they apply to a range of educational problems. They are expected to be able to choose between a range of treatments, and to have independence in doing so. Two aspects of trust are necessary for craft organization to persist. The first is trust in the competence of teachers, and the second is that teachers will not take unfair advantage by using their craft for self-interest.

If there is no strong, accepted technology of education, then there will be a tendency for schools to accent those aspects of teacher work that involve response to situational problems and discovery of interesting and valuable approaches to learning by engagement rather than preplanning. These approaches are what we have called art.

The low technology/low trust condition (the lower left hand quadrant of

Table 7.1) presents a particular contradiction between the formal organization and its informal substructure. If trust is low, the demands of the school's external environment are for laboring standards just as they are in the case in which the technology is high. This is the case, because the only form of control that can be expressed in a low-trust situation is control over the work process. Time has been traded for money. Confidence does not exist that teachers are competent or eleemosynary enough to perform without being watched. The informal organization of schools, however, recognized that the procedural rules and the formal curriculum does not, in itself, teach. Teachers gain islands of autonomy, either through agreements with their site administrators that they need to be left alone to respond to the current problems or by using the procedural due process guarantees in the labor contract to prevent the administration from interfering. We call this tendency "underground art."

As is the case with cottage craft, underground art may exist in an environment of low trust, but is is not advanced by the policies and structure of the official organization. Organized art, which is represented in the lower right hand cell of Table 7.1, requires policies that allow the hallmarks of art, such as peer review. This discrepancy is a serious one because the standards for employee evaluation in a laboring work structure are based on compliance with rules. Evaluation is inevitably connected with employee discipline and discharge, and in such a setting it is not likely that one employee would subject himself or herself to the criticism of another. Nor is it likely that criticism would be freely offered. To do either would be risky, signaling either incompetence and weakness or lack of support for fellow teachers. Also, if there are no policy provisions for the advancement

of teaching as an art, then there is no organized training in the use of
artistic techniques, such as criticism.

Organized art, as is the case with organized craft, aligns policy of the
formal organization with that in the informal teaching subculture. Policies
are advanced for the use of critical techniques, such as peer review, and the
use of criticism is expected without resort to the threat of discharge. In
terms of labor relations, teacher contract might well continue to work with
questions of economic protection and security as do contracts with writers,
screen actors and journalists, but labor relations would distinguish itself by
being concerned with the rights of employees to set the goals for work and the
choice of work processes toward those goals.

Consideration of the type of work that labor policy should advance is the
open option of the Third Generation of labor relations. Once teachers have
become openly involved in the setting of policy, and management recognizes
that labor negotiations is an explicit policy-making forum, the parties will
have to forecast the meaning of the policies that they are changing. The
consequences for teaching and learning are substantial.

Deviation From Generational Development

In beginning this chapter, we noted that some districts did not appear to
be moving from one generation of bargaining to another as we would have
expected. This gives rise to consideration of three ways in which schools may
deviate from the generational pattern.

Scenario One: The Declining Importance of Labor

We have seen situations in which the teachers organization appears to be

moribund. Earlier, in the description of the generational pattern, we alluded to districts that had adopted the form of collective bargaining but none of its other characteristics. Those districts remained in the First Generation despite their contracts. There are also conspicuous examples of districts which apparently have become fixed in the early Second Generation. They have gained a contract, but it is either a highly limited one or it is largely ignored. There is little leadership or cohesiveness within the teacher organization.

These are situations in which necessary ingredients for generational development were missing. The crucial event that is required to signal the realignment of coalitions did not take place. In the case of the district apparently fixed in the First Generation, there was never a sufficient rise of reaction against "injustice" or "dignity" to move the teachers to concerted activity typical of the First Intergenerational Crisis. In non-statutory states, such as Illinois, districts can also be stalled in the First Generation because the school board, by its opposition, raises the price of organization.

The most apparent examples of declining union significance take place in the early Second Generation. The union is established, sometimes strongly, but the organizational support that is necessary for its maintenance is never put in place. Boulder City, in part, represents such a condition. The coalition between the teachers, teacher leaders and administration, which we view as prototypical in the Second Generation, never comes about because one of the coalition partners is not motivated to join.

In the case of Boulder City, the radical leadership of the union, necessary for its early organizing and success was never replaced. External

assistance from the state teacher's organization was never replaced by

internal solidarity between the rank-and-file and the teacher leadership. The

teachers lacked a creditable strike threat, and at one point went for a year

without a contract when an agreement could not be reached. For several years,

there was no necessity for the administration to enter a Second Generation

coalition with the teacher organization for no such coalition was necessary in

order to maintain labor peace.

This pattern of activity is not unusual for weak unions in the private

sector. They go through the motions of representation, and they may provide

significant welfare benefits for employees--pension plans, representation in

infrequent grievances, and continued contract negotiations. But no one would

describe such unions as being important determinants of either the policies of

the firms for which they operate, or important determinants of their

production technologies. The contracts they negotiate conform to patterns and

wage scales set by others.

In schools that follow this scenario, teacher organizations are involved

in relatively few areas of concern, and not particularly potent in those in

which it is involved. The teacher organization has a stable position. It is

not being threatened with disestablishment, but it has little access or

influence, either. The vital communications networks within the school are

controlled by the administration, and the teacher organization is not called

on to involve itself in such. It becomes functionally separate from the

process of determining the social order.

Scenario Two: The Non-Establishment or Disestablishment of Unions

Although it did not happen in our study sites, there is always a

possibility of union disestablishment. There are two types of possible

disestablishment--both of them external to the school district. The first

comes about through repeal or drastic alteration in the state statutes that

permit bargaining. The second takes place because a forceful alternative to

union representation gains popularity among teachers.

Legal disestablishment is a constant fear of teacher organization

leaders, and with good reason. Attacks on public sector bargaining laws are

frequent. In California, for instance, there has been a bill introduced to

repeal the Educational Employment Relations Act in every session of the

legislature since the act was passed in 1975.

While teacher unions in elementary and secondary education have faced

hostile legislation, they generally have not faced strong alternatives to

collective bargaining as the main means of achieving their goals. There have

been occasionally successful attempts to form "house unions" or other

domesticated forms of teacher organizations, which are not really independent

organizations at all, but extentions of the administration both forwarded by

it and protected by it from outside interference. But these are minor and

inconsequential. There has been nothing resembling the contest between

different means of faculty influence that is represented in higher education.

In colleges and universities, the contrast between powerful faculty senates

and faculty unions is quite clear. Occasionally, when the senates are well

established, both can be vital simultaneously, but more frequently there is a

contest between the two.

The only widespread organization in elementary and secondary that

presents a broad organizational challenge to one of the two major teacher

organizations, is the Professional Educators Association, an anti-bargaining

group, which has unsuccessfully competed for representational rights. The

difficulty with senate type arrangements in elementary and secondary education

is that they have no historical or legitimated place in school organizations.

Although senates typically have no wage setting power, they have enormous

influence over operations and policy which schools call management

prerogatives. The statutes that legally protect public sector bargaining

generally do not allow or encourage alternate forms of representation.

California's statute allows consultation among teacher organizations and the

administration, but such consultations occur at the option of the

administration, and those provisions of the law have been little used.

Nowhere has there appeared a popular alternative, although alternatives have,

in fact, taken place.

Scenario Three: Changing the Form of Teacher Organizations

Alternative forms of teacher organizations appear particularly likely to

form in the First Generation and in the latter part of the Second Generation.

In the former case, they take a decidedly non-union, and sometimes anti-union

appearance. In the latter, they embrace the form and ritual of collective

bargaining, but rely on other means to gain their ends.

In Chapter III we cited examples from our field study of schools that had

formed vigorous, influential teacher organizations that did not engage in

collective bargaining. Most notable among them was the Illinois district with

a full-fledged faculty senate, which the administration and faculty agreed

virtually ran the educational program of the high school district. It picked

the curriculum, had recommendary power over staffing, and maintained access to

the school board members independent of the administration.

We found a somewhat parallel situation in a Second Generation California
district in which the teacher organization, which was well established before
the State's 1975 collective bargaining law. It entered collective bargaining
and also maintained a vigorous policy representation of its members through
interaction with school board, parents, and the administration. Clearly, the
organization engages in bargaining, but only part of the bargains are entered
into the labor contract.

This kind of relationship is generally popular with the administration
and the teacher leadership because it accords high status to teachers and
leaders along with low levels of overt conflict. The key to being able to
maintain such a relationship is to avoid the appearance of an improper
coalition. As one will recall from Chapter II, the late Second Generation is
characterized by two coalitions. In the first coalition, the administration
and teacher's organization are joined against the improper outsiders,
particularly upstart citizens and "radical" board members. At the same time,
the superintendent is forced by job role to be a coalition partner with the
school board against the union. These positions are incomparable because the
superintendent cannot be aligned with the school board in one coalition and
against them in another. Continuance in the late Second Generation is thus
predicated on the ability of the superintendent to carry on these
relationships without appearing to do so, of giving the appearance of doing so
without having violated the bounds of coalition behavior.

To an extent, one can avoid the appearance of being involved in coalition
behavior by preventing controversial issues from being brought forth by
adopting superordinate goals or by negotiating between the two coalitions
oneself. The first is the "smoothing" approach to organizational conflict

advocated by human relations management experts. The common techniques are to
prevent issues from becoming public by responding to them at early stages in
their development. In terms of the governance paradigm in Chapter V, such
smoothing activity would show the administration actively involved in
answering parent complaints before they became the source of either issue
formation or organized dissatisfaction. Administrators also control the
arenas for conflict, access to them and the types of issues that can be
presented at any arena. By preventing issues that divide the two coalitions
from coming into open debate, the superintendent can avoid the appearance that
coalitions exist at all. In using superordinate goals, superintendents create
important commonweal goals for the institution so that individual and subgroup
interests are subordinated. Superordinate goals are highly effective in
bringing school districts together, but they are far from automatic. We found
one non-union district which had adopted a superordinate goal of achievement
in reading, but only one district. The single dominant goal, which charms
management strategic planners, often alludes educators simply because school
politics exist largely because there are real differences about what the goals
of schools should be.

The ability to adopt these means of maintaining the First or the Second
Generation in part depends on the hostility or munificence of the environment.
David Horton's analysis of our California data shows that conflict among
unionized districts was largely a function of how difficult the environment
was. Districts with declining enrollments and severe financial stress were
more prone to have labor strife--impasse, grievances, strikes--than were other
districts.[7]

The second means of perpetuating the Second Generation is for the

superintendents to take on the role of negotiator, not necessarily the

district's labor contract negotiator but the person who leads through solving

problems between defined interest groups. As Cohen and March put it:

> First, he attempts to mediate disputes between the interests...
> and help them find mutually satisfactory agreements. In this
> activity he is a faciliator of compromise or invention. Second,
> he supervises the implementation of the agreements, serving each
> of the interests to the degree specified by the bargaining outcomes. . [8]

The difficulty with this conception on a permanent or structural basis is that

each competing coalition requires the superintendent's loyalty, and the school

board coalition in particular feels that its position is the only legitimate

one.

So, it is our expectation that unless the culture of the community is

such that an alternate form of teacher organization is brought into being that

the toughness of the environment and the perceived illegitimacy of the teacher

organization as they deal with policy matters will eventually force the

district into open conflict over the relationship of the teacher organization

to educational policy in the district and set the stage for the Third

Generation.

Notes

[1] Dan C. Lortie, _Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 110.

[2] Charles E. Bidwell, "The School as A Formal Organization," in James G. March (ed.) _Handbook of Organizations_ (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 976.

[3] Lortie, _Schoolteacher_, p. 102.

[4] Patrick Bushman, "A Social and Political History of California's Educational Employment Relations Act of 1975," unpublished dissertation proposal, Claremont Graduate School, 1981.

[5] Loraine McConnell and Anthony Pascal, _Organized Teachers in American Schools_, (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1979), p. 11.

[6] Daniel Resnick, "Minimum Competency Testing Historically Considered," in David C. Berliner (ed.) _Review of Research in Education_ 1980 (Washington: American Educational Research Association, 1980), pp. 3-29.

[7] David Morton, "Predictors of Labor Strife in Selected California School Districts," unpublished paper, Claremont Graduate School.

[8] Michael Cohen and James G. March, _Leadership and Ambiguity_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: McGraw-Hill, 1974), p. 38.

The South Garfield Unified School District

LOW CONFLICT AND PAINFUL ADAPTATION IN THE SECOND GENERATION

South Garfield is in many ways typical of small older districts with homogeneous community cultures which have been called upon to respond to collective bargaining. Teacher-district relations in such communities were conducted for years on an informal basis; respondents still remember with varying degrees of fond nostalgia the time when the district was "like a family," the time when labor relations were in the First Generation.

Although many of those interviewed in the district (administrators, several board members and a few teachers) say they would be much happier if collective bargaining could be rescinded, most are resigned to its reality. They accept the teacher association to the extent that they feel the organization is, in matters of salary and benefits at least, the legitimate avenue of voice for teachers. Still, however, there is great uncertainty about the best way to conduct labor relations in the district. The old way, which was based on informal discussion between teachers, administrators and board members with a clear understanding that the board had the final word, is no longer acceptable. Alternative ways of relating have proved difficult to develop. Even in a situation not characterized by high conflict, or conflict sustained for a long period of time, transformation from the First Generation to the Second is difficult. The story of South Garfield recounts the

adaptation in organizational roles and behaviors that are associated with even

peaceful passage between generations. In addition, one can find clues to the

eventual breakdown of the Second Generation, for even though the teachers in

South Garfield have been legitimated in their ability to organize, questions

about their representation of student and educational interest are already

being asked.

Accommodation to a new relationship has been complicated by the arrival

of a new superintendent. The requirement to bargain was largely responsible

for the resignation of a former superintendent, who was, according to

respondents, unwilling or unable to cope with the sudden dislocation of

relationships and management styles necessitated by collective bargaining.

The new superintendent, although apparently accepting the legitimacy of the

teachers'. association, has suffered from inexperience. Her first year was

characterized by shifts in management styles and strategies as she attempted

to define policies, procedures and ways of behaving which were comfortable and

effective. The result has been confusion by subordinates, teachers and, to a

lesser extent, board members, over directions in all areas of district

operations. These shifts have compounded the difficulties of labor relations

by increasing uncertainty among teachers. Citizens and board members have

spent a great deal of time trying to mediate administration-association

conflict, soothe feelings and reduce anxieties while, at the same time, cope

with such problems as dwindling revenues, declining enrollments and increased

demands for special education.

To understand the district, we will examine, first, the district and its

labor relations history, second, the issues involved in settlement of the

current contract and, third, at the impact of collective bargaining on

relationships between participants in the district.

The District

"There's a lot of the South in South Garfield," says the new
superintendent, Marilyn Bennett. The chief negotiator for the teachers'
association, Sue Baker, whose husband once served a term as school board
president, tells us that the superintendent had recently been the subject of a
little gossip because she walked into a local pub unescorted; such behavior is
not acceptable in staid South Garfield.

The community was formed in 1888 and the school district, which shares
the city's boundaries, soon thereafter, after neighboring Garfield passed dry
laws and sent saloon keepers south. South Garfield incorporated in order to
have its own dry laws and send drinkers into unincorporated territory.

City old timers report a relatively recent change in the character of
South Garfield. While population has remained stable, at about 23,000 people,
apartments have been built in the last seven or eight years and there are more
transient children in the schools. There are new single family dwellings,
too. Newly elected board member Nora Sloan, who went to South Garfield High
with Sue Baker, is representative of young South Garfield families who
migrated to the town ten or fifteen years ago. The town has also attracted
upper middle class immigrants who seek good schools for their children. These
children need extra help learning English; one kindergarten class counted
eight languages last year.

The school district in 1979 had a total enrollment of 3,800 students in
seven schools: five elementary, one junior high and one high school.
Employees totaled 354, of which 186 were teachers and 14 administrators.

The school age population has declined dramatically from a high of 4,110

in 1971-1972. It is expected to drop to 3,600 in 1980-1981, and the district

has been forced to merge two elementary schools, a move which prompted an

unsuccessful lawsuit by parents in 1979. Although total enrollments are

decreasing, the schools have a relatively high minority population which is

increasing: 14.4% of the children are Asian, 10.5% are Hispanic, 1.8% Black

and .2% Indian. District test scores are exceptionally high. Sixth graders

in 1978-1979 scored in the 86th percentile statewide in all subjects except

math, in which they scored in the 92nd percentile. Twelfth graders were above

the 94th percentile in all subjects.

The district is governed by a five member board which is homogeneous in

its ethnic makeup and in its public voting patterns. Participants, however,

feel there are sharp differences between board members and characterize them

as liberal or conservative, generally, it seems, on the basis of their

educational philosophies. Liberal board members are construed to be those who

favor experimentation in learning styles and structures, i.e., use of learning

labs, remedial reading programs and other enrichment activities. Conservative

board members are those who are apt to allocate funds to basics, often meaning

not only basic educational programs and materials, but also the other budget

priorities, such as reserves and plant maintenance.

Two vacant board seats were up in 1979 and each seat had several

contenders. The election revealed no issues in the sense that the community

demonstrated concern for any aspect of district operations, nor did

ideological issues (i.e., sex education, patriotism) surface as they have on

occasion in the past.

On the current board, Sloan and Lynn Flory are thought to be quite

liberal. Two others, housewife Dorothy Tyler and accountant Jim Simpson are

considered conservatives. Newly elected Gordon Wright, a retired businessman, is seen as the swing vote. The question of liberalism vs. conservatism and associated labels is an annoying one to those who find themselves characterized as liberals. "That's the way they try to get you in this town," said one, "they call you a liberal." The new superintendent was also warned by a real estate saleswoman to "walk the fence real carefully between liberal and conservative; but when you fall off, fall onto the conservative side. There are more of us."

In spite of its seeming conservatism, one long-time observer of the board notes a drift over the past thirty years toward a less conservative attitude. He believes that present-day boards, perhaps, because of the demographic changes in the community, are more likely to bring diverse interests to the board. He thinks boards in the past decade have become less business oriented in the sense that they spend 90% of their time not on business related issues (e.g., finance, maintenance) as used to be the case, but on instructional problems. New mainstreaming requirements for the handicapped, School Improvement Programs and state bilingual requirements have changed the priorities for present day boards, increased their awareness of instructional operations and their interest in progr m outcomes. Moreover, because of the new programs, there are now, he says, two separate groups reporting to the board--the staff and citizen-parent committees. The board has to sift through this input and, in the case of conflicting information or recommendation, try to "find out where the truth lies."

Since its beginnings in 1886, the district has had five superintendents, all of whom, with the exception of Dr. Bennett worked their way up in the district. Bennett's predecessor resigned in 1978. Bennett inherited a number

of administrative headaches. Excluding problems with collective bargaining,

which will be explored in detail below, they were:

- -suspicion on the part of the board and involved citizens that the administration, the former superintendent, was not "open." The quality of openness" does not refer to access in this case but to communication. According to three board members, the superintendent was perceived as secretive and, in fact, did not always give the board the information they needed to make decisions. Board members say they often were not informed of problems by the superintendent but heard about them from teachers, who felt free to approach the board as friends and neighbors.
- -a clouded financial picture. The district has long prided itself on having the highest test scores in Los Angeles County and the lowest per pupil expenditures. After passage of Proposition 13, the school district was unable to raise its per pupil expenditure limit and unable to capture additional state funding because formulae were based on previous expenditures, thus leading to the contention that the district has been punished for being frugal. The former administration also neglected to make certain hard decisions in the face of declining enrollments. One of Bennett's first duties was to send RIF notices to 60 teachers. Another imperative was to merge two schools.
- -a divided board. Although the South Garfield board is not given to raucous debate or rudeness, their lack of unanimity in private sessions seems to worry the new superintendent. She has devoted an extraordinary amount of time to coaching board members and to workshops and study sessions led by experts in board-superintendent relationships.
- -low teacher and mid-management moral. The RIFing process led to an exodus from the district of young and popular teachers.

Labor Relations

Formal bargaining began in the district in 1976 after the South Garfield

Teachers' Association (SGTA) was elected bargaining agent. Prior to that

time, bargaining was informal and sporadic--the superintendent and key

administrators would sit down with SGTA and California School Employees

Association and engage in "unsophisticated bargaining," as one administrator

puts it. He characterizes those informal meetings, four or five a year, as

friendly. "There was no formality involved," he says, "we held all the aces

and we were never seriously challenged."

The passage from the First Generation to the First Intergenerational

Conflict began in 1976, when the district negotiated its first contract under

California's Educational Employment Relations Act. Assistant Superintendent

for Business, John Carter, went to the table as chief negotiator for the first

time in October, 1976. The teams bargained until June of 1977 and could not

reach agreement. SGTA asked for a mediator at that point and the district

agreed. The mediator could not reach closure and the district went to

factfinding.

The prime issue, according to Carter, was salary. The prime issue,

according to board member Flory, was not salary but redistribution of power.

She claims that the teachers in that first year were reacting to mistreatment

which teachers related to her was his habit of misquoting the law--of telling

them that what they wanted was illegal. And, when they did demand what was

legally theirs (after they found out that it was) the superintendent was apt

to try to talk them out of it. For example, one teacher found she had

pregnancy benefits coming and asked the superintendent for them. He refused,

claiming that if he granted her request it would bankrupt the district.

Teachers involved in the first negotiations claim that the district was

in the habit of dragging its feet. Whether or not the district did, several

factors contributed to the slow pace of negotiations.

First, inexperience on the part of both groups led to reliance on

outside advice which in turn led to confusion about the purpose and correct

style of collective bargaining, about how the process should work in South

Garfield, and about who should be involved.

The superintendent saw the process as a win-lose situation with teachers

as adversaries making very heavy demands. The district's chief negotiator,

Andy Marshall, believed bargainers should try for a win-win outcome.

Assistant Superintendent Carter claims no one knew exactly which philosophy to

adopt and that, although administrators attended numerous workshops, workshop advice proved to be bad.

Bargaining participants were unclear about who, exactly, should be involved in the process. The superintendent and management team took the position bargaining should be intensely private, should not be a matter of public or media debate and should involve board members as little as possible. To their dismay, there was a great deal of movement "behind the scenes." Teachers (friends of board members) called board members and pleaded for their intervention, and there were "leaks" not only from board members to teachers but also from management team members to teachers and board members.

Board members initially took the advice they heard at workshops to stay out of the process and away from the table. Ultimately, however, Flory, frustrated by the number of calls she was getting and her apparent lack of knowledge about what was really going on, informed the superintendent that she intended to sit in on bargaining sessions to reassure the teachers that the board did, indeed, know what was going on. The board backed her up, but, again obeying advice given them in state workshops, worked out a set of rules for board behavior in the sessions. Not only were board members never to talk, they were not to establish eye contact with bargainers since to do so might indicate approval or disapproval of what was being said.

The second factor contributing to the slow pace of negotiations grew out of the first. As participants in the process grew more confused about their proper roles and as negotiation issues seemed more difficult to resolve it seems that administrators backed away from bargaining. Carter believes the toll was heavy, not only in terms of his physical health, but also in terms of lost friendships and in terms of the time lost on his regular job.

At this point, in November-December, 1977, the community intervened. After interviewing school district and SGTA personnel and after expressing concern repeatedly over the months to both entities about the failure to reach agreement, Nora Sloan, PTA president at the time and League of Women Voters Education Chair, called a community meeting under the auspices of the LWV. Over 200 people showed up, mostly teachers. Charlie Green, the teacher's chief negotiator convinced the board to sign a contract retroactive to September.

At this point, the superintendent threatened to resign and the board did not attempt to persuade him to stay.

Thus did the First Intergenerational Conflict come to an end. It was a mild crisis to say the least. After the community meeting, the citizenry and board accepted the legitimacy of the teachers' organization. The Superintendent, who could not, left the district. His departure and the resignation of Charlie Green made adaptation to second generational bargaining relationships very difficult. Primary participants have had to adapt to each other over a broad spectrum of concerns since they are, for the most part, newcomers.

Taking On New Roles

The story in South Garfield during the period of observation is that of a search for new procedures, rules and timetable which will allow employees, administrators and the board to feel comfortable with each other once again. The process was not to be an easy one for the new Superintendent.

Upon her arrival in July 1978, Bennett faced bargaining issues in the form of reopeners. Salary was the main point of the dispute, with negotiations again protracted. The district settled in April, 1979

(retroactive to December 1978) on a 4.5% increase and 20% increase in coaching

pay only after teachers picketed the district headquarters in April.

Negotiations for 1978-79 were so lengthy that the next years negotiations

began almost immediately. The key demands were:

    -agency shop
    -removal of the no-strike clause
    -new grievance language and binding arbitration
    -shorter work year (to 178 days)
    -compensatory time for substituting
    -reimbursement for damage to property
    -transfers based on seniortiy
    -salary increase of 7%
    -longevity pay of $200-$250
    -new evaluation procedures
    -rules for personnel files
    -class size maxima of 25

The administration's real desire was to come to a quick resolution. To

that end, the Superintendent offered teachers a 5% pay raise immediately in

the hope that salary could be settled quickly and settlement of other issues

flow equally quickly from that.

The ploy did not work. Negotiations continued through the summer and

SGTA asked for mediation in September. At that point, SGTA had increased its

salary demands to 9.2%, and the district had countered with 6%. Other issues

had surfaced--SGTA wanted long term subs included in the bargaining unit,

agreement from the district not to contract for educational services that

could be provided by certificated personnel, and contingency language on

salaries, i.e., an agreement to raise salaries during the next two years

(assuming a three year contract) by percentages equaling increases in state

funding.

Factfinding began on November 30. SGTA and district attempts to reach

agreement failed because the board, which had lost a member, was split 2-2 in

late October over money. Two board members were unwilling to spend the $30,000 necessary to bring the salary increase from 6% to 7%.

The factfinders returned in January with the recommendations that the district give a wage increase of 7% retroactive to September 1, that SGTA accept the board's class size language, that an annual increment be given for 20 and 25 years of service (the factfinder recommended 10% of salary; Bennett recommended to the board that it be a great deal more--$250 for 20 years of service and $700 for 25 years), and suspension of the no-strike clause during negotiations.

At the beginning of March, 1980, the contract was settled with a 6.5% salary increase, annual increment (the Bennett plan), the board's language on class size, and retention of a no-strike clause.

Behind the formal give and take on the issues lay many problem areas which deeply affected management and governance of the district, the tone of relationships and group and individual self-perceptions. They were:

(1) Perception on the part of participants that the new Superintendent was vacillating and somewhat weak in her approach to teachers and collective bargaining. One member of the management negotiating team felt, as did SGTA leaders, that she was too giving and trying to be too friendly, "hugging the enemy," in the words of the SGTA's negotiator. Another member of the management team saw no difference between the two superintendents--both, she thinks, overcontrolled the process, only now "we have to run to mommy (instead of daddy) whenever we want to do anything at the table." The team's attorney, too, criticized Bennett after it was all over for taking too active a role in negotiations and for failing to give the team room to negotiate.

Bennett, however, expressed uncertainties about the capabilities of team

personnel and was hampered by a 2-2 board which, on at least two occasions

would not ratify agreements she had reached with SGTA leaders.   Rather than

"get out in front of my board" she bore the onus for the board's failure to

ratify.   This, in turn, confused teachers who were not sure what her position

was--she was the teachers' savior at one point and then a loser as the board

seemed not to back her up. At the close of negotiations she continued to

recommend a 6% salary increase to the board knowing that only 7% would satisfy

teachers and thus became their nemesis. The new board chose to go to 6.5% and

appeared to be the teachers' friends.

Bennett's basic desire was to end contract negotiations as quickly as

possible. She was consistent in her attempts to develop a sweetheart contract

with the teachers and consistent in her instructions to site managers to go

easy on teachers, to manage the contract in a flexible way. As the junior

high principal explained, she was, in this regard, the polar opposite of the

former superintendent * he·said, "I like to view the contract loosely because

it builds good will to let the teacher have time off for dental work, to cover

for each other for medical things. The other administrators voted that idea

down when the former superintendent was here. Then Bennett came and said it

was OK, so the administrators all voted for it. The trouble with being too

flexible, like letting a teacher go early for a (college) class is that the

word gets around to other schools and other administrators don't like it."

(2) <u>SGTA leadership changes, management team changes and the intrusion

of external parties into bargaining.</u> After Green left the district,

leadership of the teachers' negotiating team was given to Sue Baker, an

elementary teacher. Marshall's responsibility on the management team was

subject to change by the Superintendent who tended to rely on a local attorney

for advice. The attorney was originally to have acted only in an advisory

capacity but was brought to the table to negotiate after impasse was declared.

Both sides felt that negotiations were proceeding in an improper manner.

(3) <u>A lack of common understanding as to how the process should work.</u>

Even though the new superintendent demonstrated more willingness than the

former to reach quick accommodation with teachers, participants were no closer

to a common understanding of how bargaining ought to work than they were in

the first series of negotiations. Baker believed that bargaining was a

trading operation, that the parties should trade item for item until a package

had been bargained. District particpants seemed to feel that bargaining was

an exercise in consensual decision making. Qnly when the attorney was brought

into the process did trading start: Baker was able to announce to teachers

only in October that bargaining had finally begun. Teachers were puzzled to

hear this, and the management team felt betrayed by SGTA leadership; they

thought they had been been bargaining.

(4) <u>Unexpected outcomes from the open budgeting process.</u> Just as

Bennett permitted the managers to shift to more flexible enforcement of the

contract in hopes of improving teaching morale at the site level, the Budget

Committee was designed to draw <u>teachers</u> and <u>citizens</u> into the process of

budgeting so that they could weigh for themselves the costs of contract

demands and assist the superintendent in making decisions. This intent was

satisfied in many respects: citizens and teachers were more comfortable with

the budget process and budget figures since they understood them (as was not

the case the year before), they were able to begin to lobby the state together

for increased funding and to make some cuts which could be agreed to, and they

began to understand the real impact of class size changes to the budget with

the result that teachers had to give up demands for lower class sizes and
accept instead parents' recommendations. One management team member stated
that the budget process made at-table bargaining much easier during this
negotiation year and that idea worked.

There were several unanticipated outcomes which made governance and
management more difficult, at least temporarily.

First, the formation of interest groups for certain budget priorities
exacerbated the 2-2 split on the board and left it paralyzed on occasion. The
superintendent at one point had to develop a fourth alternative budget (the
citizens recommended three alternatives based on three possible state funding
percentage increases) designed to take the board off the hook. Teachers
ridiculed the alternative, calling it the "I" budget (because "I did it") and
refused to attend any more budget meetings. This destroyed one cf the
purposes of the open committee, which was to involve teachers in shaping the
budget.

Second, the process made citizens more aware of the impact of collective
bargaining on the budget and thus on programs and tended to harden them toward
teachers. Even the most liberal citizens (liberal, that is for South
Garfield) expressed dismay that teachers would ask for so much and would even
vote (as they did) to RIF teachers, thus demolishing whole programs, in order
to obtain a salary increase. Other parents insisted that teachers should have
healthy raises--but it was difficult to buttress this statement in view of
ample publically displayed evidence that healthy raises would not be possible.
The board's position hardened and made it very difficult for Bennett to
continue to try to negotiate a sweetheart contact with SGTA and avoid an
adversarial relationship.

Clearly, collective bargaining has had enormous impact on the established network of relationships within the district. As the district struggled through the first intergenerational period and, with the arrival of the new superintendent, passed into the early second generation, relationships between (a) the board and administration, (b)the Superintendent and her staff, (c) the administration and teachers association and (d) the teachers' association and teachers underwent a corresponding change.

Board and Administration

The South Garfield boards have traditionally been able to maintain informal, friendly relationships with teachers (especially those who live in town) while, at the same time maintaining a relationship with the superintendent in which it was clearly understood that the superintendent handled teachers on the job and the board took care of finances (including raising new revenues) and maintenance. The former superintendent was unable to retain control of the informal communications between teachers and board in view of the new conflicts brought about by collective bargaining. The new superintendent is struggling to find the best way to keep the informal network from impacting the collective bargaining process. Rather than allow the bargaining process to become informal (which is one possible alternative), she has elected to train board members in new ways of relating to teachers, ways which are more private to the board itself, more legalistic and more bureaucratic.

The socialization of Nora Sloan by the superintendent is a good illustration of this process. Sloan was first interviewed as a citizen in the district, as one who was gravely concerned with collective bargaining and knowledgeable both about bargaining and her schools. In the first two

interviews she was open and candid about the process, about her feelings and about mistakes the board, superintendent and teachers had made in the past. By the time of the third interview, however, she had been elected to the board. When asked to give factual information about the negotiations process then underway, she refused to do so. When asked why, she told us that the law did not allow her to disclose what went on in executive sessions and that the superintendent had made it clear that board member responsibilities were very different than those of the interested citizen. The superintendent said board members needed to trust the management team and the administration to do a decent job; if they did not trust the team they should find a new one. Second, all discussion which took place in executive sessions was privileged information and not to be shared with anyone (including teachers). The impression Sloan got was that only private strategizing and board non-interference in management team business could guard the public trust.

The second impression Sloan was given was that it was illegal for her to talk to teachers about bargaining issues because such talk co 1 be construed to be bargaining away from the table and could result in filing an unfair labor practice charge.

The net result of these strictures by the superintendent has been to channel the communications process so that the superintendent, and only the superintendent, controls access to the board in terms of both information and communications.

Both Sloan and Flory express reservations about this relatively businesslike and closed relationship between the superintendent and board. Sloan still feels the citizenry should input into collective bargaining in some way; the one way to do that, she feels, is for citizen's committees to

work with the board in writing counterproposals. She, however, lived with the

formalization and privatization of negotiations saying at one point, "things

are more peaceful when we can decide them behind closed doors."

Superintendent and Staff

The new superintendent had difficulty finding comfortable ways to deal

with assistant superintendents and principals and the item was not, in any

event, high on her list of priorities. Her tendency, as we have already

noted, is to control each aspect of a problem, she has been reluctant to

delegate authority, a reluctance which was compounded by her assessment that

central office administrators could not handle all the problems they faced.

Delegating authority rightfully belonging to administrators to other personnel

(as she did in the case of the senior accountant whom she made finance

consultant to the management team) tended to break traditional status

relationships and embarrass administrators.

Site managers were facing tremendous problems with low morale. Again,

the superintendent tried to solve the problem by intervening directly. She

visited all schools at the time of salary reopeners in 1978 and tried to

convince teachers there was no money. They convinced her, instead, that she

should find some. She visited the junior high school again in October, 1979,

when collective bagaining was touchy and tried to get them to be specific

about their problems. The junior high principal felt her visit helped him.

Teachers felt it did not help them: "we talk to her," they said, "but she

just doesn't listen." Teachers were afraid they would be RIFed and were

concerned that program cuts were being blamed on them, which, to a certain

extent, they were, at least by parents. In effect, while her intervention

managed to soothe the principal, it only increased teacher animosity toward

the central administration.

Certain teachers also continued to bypass their principals and the

teacher association and go directly to the superintendent with a problem.

Because this route generally resulted in action, there was a tendency to use

it. For example, one principal said he had been trying for months to repaint

the exit and entrance signs on his parking lot and the assistant

superintendent refused to get the job done. Teachers at the school finally

complained to the superintendent and the signs were painted the next day. The

superintendent talked freely to teachers who called her and often used them as

sources of information about their schools and about the teacher association.

The net result was that the chain of command became very unclear to teachers

and managers and she was accused of being arbitrary and capricious, as her

predecessor had been.

Administration and Teachers' Association

The administration by 1979, had little difficulty accepting the

legitimacy of the teacher association. The community meeting in 1977, the

resignation of the former superintendent, the new superintendent's initial

acceptance of the association and the spring march by teachers all were

pivotal events which combined to create legitimacy for the association, at

least by administrators and most board members.

While the superintendent seemed willing to live with the association on a

non-friendly, formalized basis, the association was not clear about how it

expected the superintendent to act. The chief negotiator stressed the need of

teachers for dignity, i.e., for a measure of independence from the

superintendent and the right to bargain for salary and working conditions as

equals, but then during the course of negotiations, demanded less toughness

from those on the management team. Like many superintendents Bennett clearly

recognized that she would have to guide association leaders through the

bargaining process so that they could save face, appear to the rank and file

to have won with dignity, avoid any hint of chumminess with teacher

negotiators and yet not to spark criticism by appearing to be too harsh.

Bennett was sometimes unable to carry out this difficult role. She

brought one unfair labor practice charge upon herself by pulling back a new

policy for preparation time for 4-6 grade teachers and trying instead to put

it into negotiations when impasse was declared. While there was honest

disagreement as to whether or not she had the right to make such a move,

teachers were upset and association leaders encouraged the misunderstanding by

assuring the rank and file that Bennett knew exactly what she was doing.

Bennett also was apt to call teachers whom she knew and ask them to call Baker

or other association leaders to lobby for her (Bennett's) position. This

adoption of a tried and true union tactic (for lobbying board members) did not

sit well with the association. Bennett was accused at one teachers' meeting

of trying to tear the union apart.

Teachers' Association and Teachers

Although Bennett's miscommunications served to draw teachers closer

together, the union was not strong in the sense that members were committed to

association ideals or willing to work for the association, nor in the sense

that teachers were willing to do much more than picket after school. Baker

described the association as being "in the teenage stage." Although about 80%

of the teachers belonged to the association, many teachers were still

accustomed to going straight to the superintendent with a problem. There were

few grievances (none that reached the board level) although the association

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had formed a committee to facilitate grievance filings. The superintendent's
success at cultivating informants tended to foster and to continue the
vertical line to the superintendent, which had traditionally been in place.

Parents and administrators were unanimous in their declaration that
collective bargaining has hurt education in South Garfield. Parents thought
that teachers were volunteering less for after school activities although the
situation was complicated by the many RIFs--several of which were band
teachers and coaches who worked after school. Administrators, with the
exception of Marshall, felt that collective bargaining seriously impaired
their ability to do other things. Bennett had three or four staff development
projects she wanted to implement and couldn't because of (a) the time
pressures of collective bargaining, (b) lack of funds and (c) bad teacher
morale.

Conclusion

It is clear that passage into the Second Generation of labor relations
drastically altered traditional working and social relationships in South
Garfield. Legitimation of the teacher organization created a social situation
in which the teachers had a right to represent themselves, but the new right
did not in and of itself create the new set of social roles for implementing
new relationships. That set of expectations for reciprocal behavior was
still taking place as we closed our field investigation. While the new
superintendent invested heavily of herself in attempting to develop smooth
relationships, a stable set of relations had not yet developed. At the same
time, the seeds of public dissatisfaction had been planted. There was shock
and disappointment among the most active citizens that the teachers had "asked
for so much." There were perceptions that the teacher demands threatened the

quality of the educational program, and the superintendent shared some of

those beliefs. There was a growing belief that the teachers were not working

as hard as they had in the past, and there were moves to institute a more

explicit form of teacher evaluation. All these are expected forerunners of

the Second Intergenerational Conflict.

Homestead Unified , hool District

SEEKING TO END THE FIRST INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT

The Homestead Unified School District was formed after World War II to serve the growing population. During the 1960s the population of the area jumped from 90,000 to more than 160,000. The population now stands at 200,000 and continues to grow.

The community is largely white and middle class. Ninety-four percent of the district's residents are White; 41% of the district households reported combined family incomes of over $25,000 per year in 1979; a similar percentage report having attended college. School district data for 1978 places the district in the 87th percentile statewide in terms of the education level of parents of twelfth graders and in the 85th percentile in terms of socioeconomic status. Relative to other California districts, the Homestead district is below average in terms of percentage of minority students and families on welfare, average in terms of numbers of limited English speaking students and above average in socioeconomic status and level of parent education.

1975 census data and recent school district figures show the community to be relatively stable. Half of the district's households have lived in their present homes for four years or more. Sixty-eight percent of the district's sixth graders were enrolled in the district as third graders.

Stability in housing patterns has led to instability in school

enrollment. The Homestead schools have declined in students by about 25

percent from their 1970 high of more than 50,000. Almost 60% of the

district's households do not have children in the public schools and

enrollments have declined to 38,000 in the 1979-1980 school year. Declining

enrollment and the belief that the trend will continue downward has prompted

the school board to close ten of the district's fifty-one schools this year.

Labor relations had a hard birth and a difficult infancy. The district

entered the First Intergenerational Conflict almost immediately after the

passage of collective bargaining legislation. A number of circumstances have

combined to make its ending the generational conflict difficult, among them

the difficult environment, which made real accommodation difficult, and a lack

of trust between union and managers that spilled over into personal animosity.

Those attitudes have still not changed. There is evidence that the teacher

association has been accepted as legitimate. Some of the behavioral

indications of the Second Generation are present. These include conflict over

the scope of bargaining, a concern with the preservation and advancement of

the teacher organization, and growing expertise among both school

administrators and union leaders. But the respective leaders have not settled

comfortably into their Second Generation roles.

The First Generation: to 1975

During its era of steady growth, the Homestead district was, according to

all accounts, a stable organization with few significant problems. The

district was and is governed by a five-person board, whose members tended to

- have a background of involvement in school-related support groups or in civic

affairs in one of the surrounding communities. Issues at election time were

muted or nonexistent, and distinctions between candidates on the basis of
ideology difficult to discern. Board members then and now report that most of
the community expects from school board members not adherence to a particular
platform, but rather a high standard of self control, good manners and a
consensual attitude.

Management in the early years was remarkably stable. The district has
had four superintendents in thirty years; the first served for 17 years, the
second for 10, the third, John Burroughs for 4 years, from 1976 until 1980,
and the most recent, Thurston White, from his departure to the present.
Managers, at least until 1975 when the period of declining enrollment began,
had adequate resources even though the district was never particularly
wealthy. Board members who served during this era report that the community
has never been enthusiastic about voting money for the schools; the last bond
issue, attempted some ten years ago, failed by 9-1 margin.

Formal labor relations were peaceful. The district's meet and confer
council (the CEC) authorized to speak for employees under California's Winton
Act, consisted of representatives from the Public Employees Union, which spoke
for custodians and maintenance personnel, CSEA, representing white collar
clerical workers, and AFT local and HEA, which represented most teachers and
was large enough and strong enough to employ a full-time executive director,
David Curling.

HEA sustained a comfortable working relationship with district
administrators and, when exclusive representation was mandated by the 1976
Rodda Act, was chosen by district teachers to represent them.

Intergenerational Struggle: 1975-1980

This first period of labor peace and relative prosperity was threatened

in 1975 when the decline in enrollment which had become apparent in the

1971-72 school year began to be felt in the school budgets. Purportedly

because he could not deal with the strictures of declining revenues, the

superintendent retired abruptly in the middle of the 1975-76 school year. The

incoming superintendent, Burroughs, was faced with the immediate necessity of

cutting $1.5-million from the 1976-77 budget to stay solvent. Under his

administration, the financial picture continued to be clouded and unstable as

he struggled to balance resources and programs while state funding formulae,

after passage of California's Propostion 13, changed from year to year.

Burroughs saw no option but to close schools in 1976-77 in order to

balance the budget. Concurrently, though, the district was beginning

negotiations under the new bargaining law, and the next of problems stemming

from declining enrollments quickly found their way into negotiations. The

tone of labor relations quickly deteriorated as the closing of Taylor High

School, the administration's failure to make program cuts in order to free

money for teachers' salaries and the threat of massive involuntary transfers

because of declining enrollment created a climate of instability and anxiety

among teachers.

A charismatic young teacher, Dan Riley, emerged in the spring of 1977

from the ranks of discontented high school teachers to challenge HEA's

leadership and demand more money--and more recognition--for teachers.

According to all observers, Riley's appeal was to teacher feelings of dignity

and self worth; his rhetoric contained an extraordinary appeal for teachers

smarting from low salaries (even then their salaries were in the lowest

quartile among 27 neighboring districts--and there they have stayed) and the

threats of layoffs and involuntary transfers. Riley captured the presidency

of HEA in May, 1977, and the executive director, Curling, promptly resigned.
Riley did all of the negotiating for the teacher team for the rest of the
year.   Curling was replaced as executive director by Fran Erickson in early
September.

Riley led the teachers to strike in September 1977, over the issue of a
salary reopener.

Athletic coaches fired the first shot in August.   They went on strike and
refused to ready teams for play in the fall.   On September 1, six football
practices were cancelled, which made the Homestead teams ineligible to play
the first few games of league play.   Coaches demandé   extra pay of $10 per
hour, up from the $2 they were receiving.

Community reaction was swift.   One Parent-Faculty Club at a high school
wrote to the board asking that it review its priorities and try to pay
teachers more. The Homestead Youth Council, a city sponsored advisory
committee, issued a statement in support of the teachers--a move which
provoked the city council to order the students to make no more statements.

On September 9, 1977 teachers voted to strike.   On September 11 the
strike began.   Seventy percent of the teachers were out on the first day and
a relatively high percentage stayed out.   The day was marked by a march on
district headquarters, traffic jams and, according to some, obscene picket
signs.   By September 14 attendance began to go up at district schools, but
vandalism increased, tires had been slashed, windows broken and board members
had become the target of picketing and threats.

On September 16, a temporary restraining order was issued which the
association ignored.   HEA did, however, bring its demands down to a request
for a 13.5 percent salary increase.

The strike ended on September 24 with the appointment of a factfinding panel. The panel consisted of the local state senator (representing the district) an assemblyman representing the teachers and a third neutral, the chairman.

Amateur mediators meanwhile were busy trying to bring the parties to settlement.   Two ministers from the local ministerial association met with both sides and, according to participants, were successful in reaching an agreement in the form of a memorandum of understanding.   This memorandum was part of a tacit understanding purportedly reached between district administrators and leaders of the teachers association that a 10 percent salary increase would be offered by the district and would be accepted by the teachers.

Events culminated in a tumultous public meeting on October 13.   The factfinding panel presented its report to the school board; one member claimed he had found $600,000 in the budget which could be used to fund salary increases for teachers but district administrators retorted that the money was restricted and could not be used for teacher salaries.   The ministers put forward their memorandum of understanding and were told by a board member to "sit down and shut up."

The board would not agree to a 10 percent salary increase, even though it had held out an even larger offer earlier.   Teachers were angry, and at this point joined forces with a group of citizens who had launched a recall effort on September 23.

The board agreed to give the teachers an 8 percent salary increase at the end of December and the salary reopener for 1977 was officially settled.   The recall effort continued, however, and enough signatures gathered to place the

issue on the November 7, 1978 ballot. Three new members were elected at that
time; two survived recall. Two of the new members, Jane Thomas and Bob
Worden, were heavily supported by teachers; a third, Rod LeFevre, ran as an
independent.

The strike and associated events, such as the recall, had several short
and long range consequences for both internal district management as well as
for governance of the district.

Internally, the strike left not only teacher discontent but also a legacy
of grievances. The new executive director, Erickson, who arrived at work
three days before the strike began, reported that there were 80 grievances
filed for 1978-79 of which 25 went to arbitration. More than 50 were filed in
1979-80. The excessive number of grievances troubled negotiators for both
sides and impacted negotiations for the period studied. Erickson felt her
preparation for negotiations was less than adequate because of the backlog of
grievances she had to attend to. The district's negotiator, attorney Stan
Adams, displayed a concern in negotiation sessions for wording which was as
precise as possible; he believed precise language--or no language at all-- to
be the district's best defense against grievances. His concern shaped the
district's responses to many of the teachers' initial proposals during the
1979-80 round of negotiations.

Also internally, the superintendent was never able to establish a level
of trust with teachers as a result of continuing conflict. This lack of trust
lay at the heart of his inability to establish an innovative school management
system initiated in 1977 in an effort to decentralize school decision making
by allowing parent-teacher-principal school site councils responsible for
assessment, implementation and evaluation of all school site programs.

Because of the deterioration in trust after the 1977 strike, Burroughs was

never able to surmount teachers' anti-administration feelings to implement his

ideas. One teacher stated that "anything to do with his (Burrough's) greater

glory was anathema to teachers." Rather than restore and improve trust

between teachers and management at a particularly sensitive time, the plan was

not accepted at intermediate or high schools. At the latter especially,

powerful curriculum council (elected committees of teachers which meet

formally to advise the principals on most matters) voted not to participate in

the plan.

Labor relations conflict seems to have impacted the linkages between

board and professional personnel and between the district and community.

The teachers' organization heavily supported two candidates pushed

forward by the recall. These two were elected, but, to the teachers' dismay,

were quickly socialized to their roles as trustees by the administration.

Teachers were especially disappointed by the performance of one of those they

elected during the recall and who was reelected in 1979; they claim she was

totally co-opted by the superintendent in policy decisions and has been subtly

discouraged from acting independently by social pressure of unanimity and

by asssurances from administrators that the law and limits of legal liability

dictate certain actions. The second teacher-supported board member was able

to vote independently but found himself isolated from the rest of the board on

many issues. While remaining sympathetic to teacher needs, he found his

position uncomfortable as teachers attacked the board as a whole and as the

teachers' organization distanced itself from him. He did not seek reelection

at the end of his one year term.

The net effect of the board change, however, and of the impacts of new

confusing conflicts within the system, was to erode the unanimity and

harmonious outward behavior traditionally expected of trustee boards. Parents,

citizens and teachers came to expect and demand board member intervention in

program implementation; board members themselves discussed administrators

critically and analytically and viewed themselves as intervenors now and then

when things were not running smoothly.

As a less direct outcome of the 1977 strike, community unrest and

dissatisfaction with the district were echoed by a group of parents who, in

1977 expressed dismay over "minimal learning and lack of discipline" in the

schools and who set about to implement a fundamental school as an alternative.

Although ultimately successful in starting a school, these parents reported

two years of frustration as their plans were delayed or blocked by

administrators and as plans and programs were changed by management and

teachers to conform with contractual or informal agreements reached with the

teachers' organization.

In general, however, the community remained satisfied with its schools,

and it cannot be demonstrated that the strike or labor relations seriously or

permanently eroded the community's overall confidence in the district.

Forty-five percent of a random sample taken in 1979 thought the schools were

doing an excellent or good job. Dissatisfaction with the schools rose with

the age of the respondent in this survey. While only 7.9 percent of the 18-30

year olds thought the district deserved a "poor" rating, 26.8 percent of those

61 or over gave the district a "poor." Almost half of those responding (43

percent) were over 45. Satisfaction with the schools was markedly greater

among those who had visited a school in the past year. Of those who had, 68

percent reportd that the schools were doing an excellent or good job.

Respondents, especially those with elementary school children, were pleased with the level of information supplied by the schools through newsletters and parent organizations. The local newspapers listed by all respondents as important sources of information about the district (68 percent). The next largest number (16 percent) found out what the district was doing by attending board meetings and another 10 percent listened to radio broadcasts of board meetings.

The aftermath of the 1977 strike, then, was not labor peace, at least within the system, but increased conflict which affected most aspects of school policies and programs. Negotiations in 1979 took place in this context of uneasy relationships and uncertain expectations.

Labor Relations: Contract Negotiations, 1979

The most important items for teachers in this new round of bargaining were salaries, the teacher evaluation process, assignment of teachers, involuntary transfer policies and pay for extra duty assignments. Significant management desires were for specified (minimum) extra duty hours per week, for elimination of top and bottom transfers and, on the part of several members of the management negotiating team, for language which was less management oriented, language which would, in the words of one, "bring us labor peace." While the latter desire may have been a sincere one, the teachers' perception of the district's chief negotiator (an attorney hired to negotiate and handle grievances) as a tough and unreasonable bargainer mitigated against the easy introduction of conciliatory language—such language was not his style.

Salary Negotiations: .The board opened in July by offering teachers a 6 percent wage increase. This, plus maintenance of health benefits and funding

of the existing salary schedule equaled a total increase of 7.1 percent. The

teachers built their bargaining strategy on the assumption that real

concessions on salary would come in immpasne. The district went to impasse in

September. By October the Board was offering 15 percent to be spread over two

years. During the final week of mediation (the second week in November) the

Board approved a 14 percent offer for two years. For reasons which are not

clear to any of the participants, the attorney misunderstood the Board's offer

and proposed a 16 percent increase which the teachers' association accepted

and which Board members were reluctant to take back.

Teacher Evaluation: HEA tried for several months to have Board

guidelines for teacher evaluations adopted as contract provisions. Adams, the

attorney, consistently objected on the basis that the minimal contract was

easier to defend. Teachers dropped this issue before mediation.

Assignment: Layoffs for declining enrollment had created a pool of some

nine teachers who were unassigned--they were stationed at the high schools as

substitutes. The right of the district to assign them arbitrarily was

disputed by HEA which, because of pressure from one or two unhappy unassigned

teachers insisted on adoption of a procedure for autonomous choice of a

suitable position by these teachers. The district steadfastly claimed that

teacher assignment was not in scope and the issue was taken to PERB by HEA as

an unfair charge. HEA then successfully combined the transfer and assignment

issues; top and bottom transfer whereby the most senior teachers were

transferred (along with the most junior teachers) was eliminated and a new

two-step procedure initiated for reassigning people who have been

involuntarily transferred. The procedure includes a bidding system for

assignment for the unassigned pool.

Staffing Ratios: HEA remained adamant as negotiations began to center
that staffing ratios for non-teaching personnel be in the contract. The issue
was an important one to the association because of the inclusion within its
ranks of active counselor, librarian—and nurse groups. Management
consistently opposed the demand pleading the necessity for flexibility in view
of serious personnel cutbacks. HEA dropped its demand suddenly in the last 27
hours; management says the association cannibalized the positions in return
for a salary increase.

Extra Duty Hours: Management was anxious to obtain clarification of
assigned after school hours principals might require and proposed that no more
than five extra hours per week be available to principals for specified
activities, such as back to school nights, conference, etc. The management
team privately expressed surprise that teachers took this five hour limitation
to be the imposition of five mandatory extra hours each week. HEA literature,
in fact, focused on this point as evidence that district administrators were
viciously unfair to teachers. Management did not compromise the item early in
negotiations but left it until the end when they used it as a bargaining tool.
The item, along with the salary, was one of the last to be settled; a
compromise was struck which satisfied HEA.

Levels of commitment to negotiations were curiously low with both sides
accusing each other periodically, and, often simultaneously, of lack of
movement. The slow pace was quite likely due to several factors. First, both
sides admitted to being ill-prepared—at least on occasion. Grievance
handling occupied both chief negotiators. Erickson, HEA's executive director,
had received notice that her post might have to be eliminated by the state CTA
and she had the added risk of directing and shaping a new teacher bargaining

team. Adams had other districts to handle, and long distances to drive. He
tended to tire easily, a fact which Erickson noticed and consistently took
advantage of, since Adams was more malleable when he was tired. Members of
both teams, the school board and the superintendent actually displayed little
zest for collective bargaining, perhaps as a result of the district's stormy
and unpleasant labor history. Finally, HEA appeared to drag its feet in
initial negotiations because of its belief that the district would not
increase wages without first going through impasse.

Low levels of trust initially hampered negotiations, although the climate
seemed to improve as bargaining unfolded. The assistant superintendent for
personnel who managed the district team, succeeded in gaining a measure of
trust from teachers. The new assistant superintendent for business services
also persuaded the superintendent's cabinet to remove all padding from the
budget--the practice of hiding money in order to have some left for eventual
salary demands was no secret. As a result, the district's budget figures were
generally trusted--an important factor in bringing closure to layoff and
transfer items.

The HEA team suffered from lack of experience and from ideological splits
within the team and within the membership. Erickson reported that she needed
to settle in the final days because militants on the team (one of whom quit in
the final week) were pushing hard to strike. Teachers had waged a sick-out
just before settlement, a fact which Erickson credits for the district's
willingness to settle, but Erickson did not feel the organization could
survive a strike.

HEA also faced a serious threat from its rival, the Homestead Federation
of Teachers. HEA survived a summer decertification election--but only by a 4

percent margin. HFT opposition reinforced the opinion of others in the

district, particularly administrators, that Erickson and the HEA board were

not particularly strong and that Erickson would therefore not be able to take

a strong leadership position in negotiations. While the association did lack

the kind of solidarity which Riley had been able to foster, events did not

prove Erickson to be a particularly weak negotiator. Her determination to

settle, for instance, seems to have the key factor in bringing negotiations to

a close and although her team was not at all pleased with the contract, she

had been able to convince HEA leadership to enter into a rather more

consultative relationship with the school district.

She was also able to convince management to agree to agency shop if

teachers voted to institute it. One board member, after voting to ratify the

final offer, was startled later to find that it included agency shop. She

does not believe the board knew what the contract said--and was ashamed when

they found out to amend it and reopen the conflict.

The dynamics of the negotiation process show a slow initial pace with

broad input; negotiations began with five or six members of the HEA team and

four or five at any given time from the management side. The HEA president

sometimes spoke, but Erickson and Adams appeared to have done most of the

talking. Erickson ordinarily initiated, Adams usually reacted. As the

district headed toward impasse, fewer participated at the table and the two

teams were often left out of the process. During mediation the talks became

conversations between the mediator and Erickson and the mediator and Adams,

with the assistant superintendent for personnel sometimes in attendance.

Board members were never included in any way until the last day when each side

had to assess the board's willingness to vote for certain items. Negotiations

did open up briefly when HEA came close to entering into a coalition

bargaining arrangement with CSEA and the PEU Local. The district, however,

quickly settled with the latter for a 10 percent wage increase ai 1 pleaded

difficulty in negotiating with a coalition of the other two because the

lengths of the proposed contracts were different. The attempt ended with

nothing changed for the teachers.

As negotiations drew to a close, the community was electing a new board

member to fill one vacant seat. Dan Stevens was elected out of a field of

nine. Stevens, who did not receive HEA contributions, admitted to a lack of

issues in the campaign, but said he did promise to try to improve labor

relations. One specific plank he put forth was a pledge to fire the

district's negotiator, attorney Adams. Adams was fired.

Closure of the contract and the firing of Adams signaled the end of the

First Intergenerational Conflict and the beginning of a new phase, in which

the administration and teacher organization struggled to find ways of relating

to each other. Burroughs, however, had apparently had enough and the new

Board did not seem to enthusiastically support him as he, together with the

teachers' organization, initiated plans to close 10 schools in the face of

still declining enrollment. Burroughs resigned early in 1980.

Interpretation

The Homestead district's difficulties in adapting to the new processes of

collective bargaining were exacerbated by factors such as declining enrollemt,

community demands for educational alternatives, and superintendent turnover.

However, the district's experience highlights some important characteristics

of the intergenerational struggle and of the conflict which occurs, and can

spread, as organizational subunits try to adapt to a new and untried set of

relationships.

Some of these characteristics are:

1. <u>The rise and fall of a radical leader.</u> In 1976, Riley was able to
capitalize on the discontent of ill-paid teachers to win offices with the
promise of better pay and more dignity for teachers. The executive director
of the teachers' association resigned and Riley not only directed the
association's internal affairs until the new executive arrived, but also
handled all negotiations. He was, according to management sources, a tough
bargainer with his position made stronger because of the support he was
receiving from the rank and file. Riley's reign was relatively short,
however. He was defeated in his next bid for the presidency by a coalition of
teachers who, with the quiet support of the new executive director, were able
to convince most association members that a more moderate approach than that
taken by Riley might be in the teachers' best interests.

2. <u>Legitimation, or acceptance, of the union as a proper spokesperson
for teacher only after two protracted negotiations.</u> Before and during the
period of observation, doubts were expressed by board members about the
efficacy of teacher unions, and by superintendent, attorney and other
administrators about the potency of teacher leadership (the association's
executive director in particular), especially in view of the existence of a
competing union.

As negotiations continued, attitudes toward the HEA and the question of
whether or not it had a right to represent teachers and whether or not in fact
it did represent teachers began to change slightly. While the superintendent
and most central office administrators pulled away from negotiations and
ignored the process and the participants, the assistant superintendent for

personnel who handled negotiations on a daily basis, began to exhibit

understanding of the teachers' positions and began to express the view that

trust between the central office and the teachers' association was important

and that, moreover, it was his job to build trust. The association then

survived a decertification attempt which re-established its authority with

teachers. Toward the end of negotiations, the executive director showed

strength in her dealings with both management and the association board which

was split between moderates and militants. The militants quit before the

contract was signed. By the end of the period of observation, the association

was accepted as a participant in the district decisions and their demands were

listened to and dealt with by both administrators and board.

3. <u>An unwillingness on the part of management (and board) to work
together with the teachers' association on items not related to direct
negotiations.</u> This characteristic is an outcome of the failure to believe that

the association has any business representing the teachers. Whereas

administrators and board rarely talked to teacher leadership at the beginning

of the period of observation, by the end of negotiations they were not only

talking but solving problems jointly. The biggest problem was the closing of

ten schools; the two groups made tentative and halting steps to work together

to resolve the problems of teacher layoffs and tranfers and thus avoid making

internal management decisions matters of community concern. In the end,

however, these questions ended in overt conflict.

4. <u>Vivid public demonstrations calling attention to internal conflict,
demonstrations which brought the community to attention and signaled the
spread of labor dissatisfaction to the community at large.</u> Where in the first

generation dealings between administration, board and teachers were kept

private, these same relationships in the first intergenerational phase became

matters of intense public debate. Both management and labor were willing to

bring their conflict to the public, hoping for support from the community for

their respective positions. With the ending of the first intergenerational

phase, it seems that openness is no longer called for and administrators and

the association have again pulled inward and have kept community members and

even board members from dealings which again are viewed as private and no

concern of the community.

5. Episodic minimization of work effort. Both in the first series of

negotiations, when there was a bitter strike, and in the second set, when

there was a sick-out, teachers refused to perform their duties in order to

call attention to their dissatisfaction with the process of negotiations.

Here, teachers withheld their labor to make a symbolic point which was

intended to reach and impress both administration and the community. For that

reason, the teachers closest to the community, the athletic coaches, were the

first to threaten to withhold work in 1977. The possibility of not being able

to participate in league football play drew the instant attention of the

community to labor relations.

6. Lack of trust in district officials and in the district's budget

figures. Lack of comparable salaries and the belief that the district had

more money than it admitted to propelled teachers into the intergenerational

phase and continued lack of trust kept them there. The attitudinal shift of

the assistant superintendent for personnel and attitude taken by a newly hired

assistant superintendent for finance to show all of the budget as honestly as

possible and eliminate the past practice of padding certain accounts were key

factors in bringing the district out of the First Intergenerational Conflict

and into the Second Generation.

The Thresher Unified School District

BACKWARD TOWARDS THE FIRST INTERGENERATIONAL CRISIS

Labor relations in the Thresher Unified School District have taken a
most unusual turn in which management follows behaviors that are consistent
with the Second Generation while espousing values consistent with the First
Generation. The superintendent and the school board harbor an ideological
antipathy for teacher unionism, invoke the rhetoric of destroying the union
and its leadership, and hold hope that collective bargaining statutes will be
repealed. Yet, suprisingly, it was the superintendent's actions several years
ago that signaled to the teacher organization that it was considered a
legitimate agent for the teachers. Thus, the association, led by a forceful
teacher, is unified and determined. Teachers believe that the process of
collective bargaining is vital to their interests and that it has been
effective.

Because of these divergent views the organization acts out many of the
characteristics of the Second Generation while it engages in an ideologlical
conflict between teachers and management in which the superintendent appears
to be unsuccessfully attempting to take the district back toward the First
Generation through a period of public conflict in which the teacher
organization is delegitimated. The activities in the Thresher district can
best be seen in four historical phases. First, there was an embrace between
the organized teachers and management, particularly the man who is now

superintendent. The meaning of this relationship has been interpreted quite differently by the parties involved. The superintendent views his efforts as attempting to build a coalition of the whole and insure an era of good feeling for the district and its teachers, allocating to those teachers an important voice, but one modulated by himself. To the teachers, however, the embrace signaled a legitimation of their organization, and more particularly a legitimation of their involvement in educational policy and policy making.

The second phase of the Thresher case is the separation between labor and management. This was signaled by the withdrawal of support for policy involvement of teachers when the independence of the teacher organization became apparent and when negotiation for the contract began. The separation was followed by disavowal of t' legitimacy of teacher unions by the superintendent and the board.

The third phase exhibits the high conflict that has been found in other First Intergenerational Conflict districts. Conflict in Thresher Valley is not muted, as it is in some communities, by a culture which frowns on disturbances. A surge of newcomers, an unstable ruling elite and politicized boards have intentionally or unintentionally created friction points within the district, some of which encompass or attach themselves to ongoing labor relations.

The fourth phase of the relationship exhibits Second Generation behaviors even as the ideological struggle continues. Both teachers and administrators realize, consistent with the expected behavior in the Second Generation, that labor peace is necessary, and they are willing to forfeit part of their objectives in order to reach agreemnt.

Thresher Valley. The Thresher Valley is one of the fastest growing

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areas in California, an agglomeration of new suburbs being built on huge land

grant ranchos formerly devoted to grazing, orchards and row crops. The valley

contains no incorporated cities and little industry. Residents are

overwhelmingly white and affluent. Enrollment in the Thresher district has

jumped from 3,600 in 1973-1974 to 18,000 in 1979-1980. The annual growth rate

is approximaately 8%. The district has three high schools, three intermediate

schools, 18 elementary schools, and auxillary facilities. The influx of new

students, dwindling sources of revenues, and the inability to pass bond issues

for new schools are of deep concern to district officials. Disputes over the

siting, naming and boundaries of new schools are common and acrimonious.

Conflict cannot be contained by a stable, influential community elite.

Because the community is relatively new and growing, there are few foci for

potential board members, although one Service Club has provided a base for

several school board candidates. A growing retirement community produces no

leadership but is a sought-after source of votes. Another source of influence

in the Valley is a strong fundamentalist religious movement. Two new board

members are affiliated with area fundamentalist churches (one as a minister)

as are two incumbents. Teacher leaders and two former board members believe

the born-again Christian influence on current board members is strong, that

the religious networks in the Valley are important sources of votes and that

they are anti-union.

Participants in school board governance are viewed as likely to

socialize conflict for political gain. Observers and participants claim that

school board meetings are the "only show in town" and that school board

politics is "the only game in town" because there is no other public outlet

for the politically ambitious. County and statewide offices are beyond the

grasp of the political neophyte and municipal government, the traditional

stepping stone to higher office, non-existent. Almost all interviewees

characterize the school board as "political." As evidence, they point to

public comments by the current board president, Anne Beeman, that she intends

to run for higher office and to the fact that she spent $17,500 in 1977 to win

3,500 votes. Ideological clashes are common at board meetings and the house

is usually packed.

The Embrace

The district's first Superintendent, Ken Richards, was hired on a 3-2

vote over the protests of a majority of teachers who felt he was too

conservative fiscally and educationally. They quickly organized the Thresher

Teacher's Association and appointed Tim Wilson their negotiator. The Board

designated Deputy Superintendent Harold Quinn to meet and confer with them as

was appropriate under California's Winton Act.

Quinn established himself as a teacher supporter and leader. He

negotiated a written agreement with the teachers at a time when written

agreements were not common, an agreement which he himself admits was generous.

Wilson characterized the agreement as "paradise." Fringe benefits improved

dramatically and teachers gained liberal rights--the right to leave campus at

any time, for example, with no restrictions as to work hours and with minimal

extra duty requirements. The items were placed in a Memorandum of

Understanding in 1973, a document which came to be known as the White Paper.

1974 was a difficult negotiation year. Relationships between the

superintendent and Quinn were deteriorating. Quinn went into negotiations but

soon withdrew because, according to one administrator, the board wouldn't give

him enough for the teachers and he pulled back rather than displease te   s

and risk losing his base of support. Wilson and his organization began to

bargain in earnest. Impasse (or a persistent disagreement as it was then

known) was declared in June over issues relating to salary, salary schedule

and fringe benefits. A mediator and attorneys were hired. Agreement was

reached in September on an 8.7% salary increase, but the board balked at

agreeing to teacher requests for input into hiring administrators, to a better

definition of what a grievance was and at shortening the school calendar.

Problems with teachers and the problem of low employee morale were

pinned on Superintendent Richards and the board majority. A coalition of

district principals (the "rat pack") headed by a district principal, Warren

Drake plus the board minority and leaders of the teacher association, plunged

into the 1975 board election determined to unseat Richards and install Quinn

as superintendent. The new board's first action was to elevate Quinn to

Acting Superintendent. He immediately appointed Drake associate

superintendent in charge of personnel.

The Separation

Quinn's support by the teachers, and indeed by the board, remained

shortlived. Two series of labor related events illustrate the depth and

significance of Quinn's loss of support.

Finances became a problem in October 1975 and Quinn predicted a

$900,000 budget deficit for the next year. He recommended a tax override to

the board and established a budget committee of 35, including teachers, to

propose program cuts. In January, 1976, the budget crisis disappeared when

more money came to the district than Quinn had anticipated. He rescinded the

recommendation for a tax override, a move which annoyed and embarrassed the

board. Program cuts were also not necessaary and teachers who had served on

the committee accused the board and Quinn of not being "open" (the reason for
which they were elected), of hiding money and of establishing committees which
were nothing more than a facade. This complaint was to be repeated in 1978
when, after passage of Propostion 13, Quinn formed another budget committee,
again with teacher appointees, to recommend cuts. Association leaders report
that after they worked diligently with the committee to cut programs, bailout
money arrived from Sacramento and Quinn was able to restore the cuts. As in
1975, they were left with the onus of having recommended cuts but were given
no credit for participating in the restoration of funds.

The second series of events began in September 1975 when the Rodda Act
passed. The TTA was anxious to incorporate into a formal contract those items
agreed upon in the previous Memorandum of Understanding which Quinn had
procured for teachers. Quinn and the board, however, in consultation with a
labor attorney, Mike Palmer, began to back away from the negotiated agreement.
Palmer advised the board to start from ground zero in arriving at a first
contract. The TTA responded to this determination with an unswerving policy
of "no backward movement," i.e., no softening of those rights and concessions
granted teachers in the White Paper. Board members vacillated on the question
of exactly what the board posture toward collective bargaining ought to be.
Three board members and Quinn publically questioned the legitimacy of the
teacher association and began to attack collective bargaining and the whole
idea of "teacher unions" in statements to the press and parents. Teachers
counterattacked by the same means, charging administration and board with
incompetence and callousness. Wilson and his troops were determined to engage
in meaningful bargaining.

The board's insecurity and confusion about how to deal with the

teachers' new rights to a contract seriously affected the conduct of initial

contract negotiations. The board first asked Assistant to the Superintendent

Ben Silva to act as chief negotiator for them because he had been an officer

in the TTA and was considered friendly to teachers. Impasse resulted on May

28, 1976, however, and Palmer was brought back until October to get tough with

teachers. He was released because the board thought he was too abrasive.

Quinn then stepped in and, because Wilson was in the hospital, negotiated a

contract with association president Stu LaChance. Wilson objected to the

contract and persuaded teachers not to ratify it. Negotiations began again.

The contract was still up in the air when board elections were held in

March, 1977 and the scope of labor relations conflict broadened to include the

whole community. The election revolved about issues of unionism and finances.

Stan Fuchs won a four year term with a platform of "no unions, no new taxes"

and did not receive, this time, union support. Anne Beeman defeated the

remaining incumbent who was still regarded as pro-teacher. In her victory

statement, Ms. Beeman remarked that "voters have defeated a strong bid by the

teacher's union for control of a major school district governing board." The

teacher supported candidates lost.

The Conflict

In May the teachers mounted a three day strike. While the strike won

teachers the support of some members of the community, it was not successful

in terms of winning contract demands (agency shop, binding arbitration or

salary schedule compaction) nor in gaining legitimacy for the association.

According to most observers, the strike exacerbated existing rancor and

polarized the factions to an even greater degree. The board was internally

divided in the hiring of yet another attorney to resolve the strike; the firm

which was hired without Quinn's approval. The outcome of the strike, in other

words was increased dissatisfaction and increased cohesion in the teacher

ranks and increased conflict between the administration ar.i board. While

board members claim teachers lost the strike, one administrator believes it

was the superintendent who lost in terms of control of the board, control of

teachers and control of the collective bargaining process.

Directly after the strike, the board's attention was diverted from

collective bargaining to management of the district. The board engaged in

nearly two years of severe criticism of the superintendent, which nearly lead

to the superintendent's forced resignation. The disputes were rancorous and

public, but largely did not involve the teacher organization.

In February 1978, Quinn informed the board he was looking for a new job.

In April, the board indicated to Quinn that his contract would be bought out

and ordered him to go on vacation. Quinn objected to this order and hired an

attorney to sue the board for lost earning power, lost vacation pay and

punitive damages ($500,000). The community reacted to these events by

beginning a recall campaign against the board majority. Sufficient signatures

could not be gathered to force the issue to a ballot

In April, 1979, Quinn withdrew the lawsuit when Beeman reversed herself

and voted with the board minority, Collins and Fuchs, to extend Quinn's

contract for another year. The reason for her switch was a matter of much

private and public speculation. Beeman herself says she felt she had to

resolve the stalemate in the interests of good management. Several

respondents claim she was persuaded to take the action by the pastor and

members of her church who appealed to her on religious grounds. Others say

the move was politically opportune for her--she traded her vote for a chance

to become board president.   She was, in fact, elected president in early May,
sided thenceforth with Collins and Fuchs and actively isolated the other two
from decision making.

Negotiations for the district's second contract began shortly before
settlement of the lawsuit and the new board alignment.   The negotiations were
to have both the private character, typical of the Second Generation, and the
raucous public debate typical of the First Intergenerational Conflict.   The
alteration between public and private behavior took place depending on whether
the parties wanted to increase support for their position, which they did in
public, or whether they wanted to settle their differences, which they did in
private. 'Negotiations started in private.   Community input was weak. The
first phase of negotiation was spent clarifying and refining issues and
deciding who the players would be on each team.   Both parties decided contract
content by surveying their constituents.   The school board appointed Warren
Drake the chief negotiator and he appointed a team which included Ben Silva,
one elementary and one intermediate school principal and one high school
vice-principal.

While the process for the formulation of contract demands was similar for
both parties, similarities ceased once bargaining began.   Management
strategies quickly became the business of a very few, Quinn, Beeman and the
board's new attorney, Ken Jones.

Important association demands in the opening round included:

    -establishment of site level budget and personnel committees with
     association appointed teacher membership
    -agency shop
    -a salary increase based on the CPI index
    -increased supplementary pay
    -100% medical/dental coverage
    -reduction to 10 hours from 15 in the number of hours required of a

teacher for adjunct duties
    -fewer teaching minutes for 4-6 grade teachers
    -only one special ed student mainstreamed into regular classes
    -staffing rules for the music program
    -binding arbitration

Management demands were fewer and included:
-reduction in the number of supplementary positions
-definition of the work week to require 35 hours on campus, and increased
required supervision hours (to 20).

Negotiations began on April 1, 1979, and became increasingly muddied by a

series of events:

Board Politics: The superintendent-board struggle and realignment of the

board distracted board members and Quinn from details of negotiations. Drake's

position as leader of the management team was not firm; he was neither trusted

nor respected by the board and, as a result, did not receive guidance from the

board in specifics. For example, the board authorized the team to offer

teachers a lump salary increase to do with as they pleased. However, the

offer was not costed out by the district in advance in terms of alternative

possible bargaining outcomes. The union was able to get the district's

business manager to admit that a 7% lump sum gift would result in a 1.3%

decrease in existing teacher salaries if coupled with reduced class sizes,

district sponsored changes in maternity and long term leaves, salary schedule

compaction, etc. Union officials attacked the board for misleading teachers

and the board chastised Drake for the move.

Management team weakness. The team, except for Silva, was inexperienced

and Drake was not able to exert leadership because the board refused to back

him. One board member admitted privately that Quinn and Beeman appointed

Drake the chief negotiator so he could fail; the union surmised this as well

as publically characterized Drake as a "lame duck" administrator who was

"clearly under attack" early in the first phase of negotiations. Drake in

fact did fail, took a medical leave and was pushed out of the district in August. Inexperienced management team members could not assess the union position and looked to Silva (who left for another job in June) for direction.

Intra-union struggles. Contract proposals relating to music teachers, special education mainstreaming provisions and coaching duties posed special difficulties for union leaders. Association committees worked to establish the music and special education positions and were successful in blunting specialists' demands by pointing out the illegality or undesirability of certain provisions. Wilson suggested to the coaches that they form a special lobbying effort and speak directly to administrators and board members requesting more supplementary pay; he did not feel that the association had resources necessary to mount a special effort for supplementary pay for coaches. The decision to urge the coaches to form a separate lobbying group was an important but risky one for the association. The downside risk was that the formation of subgroups would disturb group cohesion. There was also, in this case, the added threat of introducing competition among union subgroups for scare resources. The positive benefit of the new group was its potential for disturbing the board through a new source and direction of pressure. The gamble ultimately paid off for the union. The contract was settled the following spring only after coaches threatened to walk out of spring sports. Anne Beeman saw existence of the subgroup as evidence that union leaders lost control of their own people. Union leaders viewed the subgroup as an effective source of pressure, a fresh means for precipitating events and a new avenue for coalitions with the community.

The Thomason incident. In May, 1979, Quinn appointed a permanent

principal to a vacancy created by the death of the former principal at

Thomason Elementary School. He did so without following district procedures

for the selection of administrators. The school's parents, who had become

fond of the acting principal, were infuriated. They withdrew their children

from school for several days, stormed board meetings, and took out petitions

seeking recall of the two board members who would not have to stand for

election in November. The petitions accused the two of:

> -mishandling budget and finances
> -poor personnel management
> -inconsistant action resulting in dissension between
> teachers, citizens and administration
> -failure to oversee the physical maintenance of school facilities
> -blatant disregard of the board's own policies
> -a disrespectful and arrogant attitude toward district
> taxpayers, parents, teachers and students
> -failure to consider community input in administrative matters
> -failure to provide administrative continuity and leadership
> in district schools.

The Thomason incident provoked increased turmoil at the board level,

deflected time and attention from collective bargaining and served to

underscore the union's public position that the board and administration were

incompetent. While the association did not officially join in the recall

effort, one union activist was designated the liaison between citizens and

teachers to arrange for monetary contributions and to locate teachers willing

to pass petitions.

The Performance

These factors and the uncertain status of state funding formulae,

prompted both the board and the union to pull back from negotiations in June,

1979. Management used this time to disband the management team and rehire the

consulting attorney, Jones, to work with the board in developing positions in

preparation for the resumption of negotiations. The recall effort continued

until late July when it was dropped for lack of signatures. One week later
Quinn appointed the parents' choice to the principalship at Thomason School.

When bargaining began again on August 3, the district had received more
state money than anticipated and teachers asked for a 15% wage increase. The
school board majority had decided its positions over the summer and had
privately agreed that 10% was a bottom line figure. By the end of August, the
19% ?? figure was firm and tacitly agreed to by the union. It never
subsequently changed.

Lee Jones was given wide latitude to negotiate by the board typical of
Second Generation negotiators. On September 8, negotiations broke down and an
impasse was mutually declared. There is confusion about the reasons for
seeking impasse. Initially the union claimed impasse was necessary to resolve
questions of salary and class size. However, the issue of who declared
impasse, and why, became inflamed when teachers staged their first disturbance
on September 19. Two hundred teachers packed a board meeting to complain
about impasse, the board's failure to grant salary and reduce class sizes and,
in fact, the board's general "prejudice against unions." Jones responded that
impasse was necessary because the union wanted agency shop and the board had
refused. Wilson and members of the team objected, claiming that Wilson had
removed agency shop from the table one week before impasse was declared.
Union leaders and the board minority both stated privately that the board was
trying to delay negotiations in order to make collective bargaining an issue
in the November 2 board elections.

And in fact collective bargaining and the questions of teacher union
legitimacy did become an issue during the election. Two candidates were
endorsed and given money by the union; one of them, Sue French, won. The

other two winners, Ben Carter and the Reverend Sam Phillips, took a relatively
vigorous anti-Quinn (?? anti-Quinn or anti-uni a) stance. The latter was
particularly outspoken, charging that teacher unions were immoral and strikes
and slowdowns illegal. Union legitimacy was not, however, the campaign's
overriding issue. Of equal concern to the winning candidates were such issues
as the need for more teacher evaluation, better planning, better management of
the district, lower class sizes and an end to crisis management.

During September and October, teacher leaders escalated disturbances.
Board meetings brought out hundreds of teachers who marched, delivered
speeches during board meetings and picketed·outside district he ·"uarters.
Pickets were also routinely present outside the offices as mediation sessions
took place inside.

Six days after the election, November 8, teachers staged a sickout to
protest stalled negotiations. The demonstrations were centered at the three
high schools and in one intermediate school. 151 teachers were absent, a
number far greater than the 40-45 ordinarily absent.

At this point there seems to have been only one substantive issue of
disagreement upon which bargaining pivoted. This was the issue of the number
of teaching minutes per day for 4-6 grade teachers. The current contract read
305 minutes and the initial proposal had asked for 275. The district's
counterproposal called for 275. During the summer, however, the board decided
to increase the teacher minutes back to 305 and, during mediation, did so,
claiming that mediation offered both sides a chance to begin bargaining
afresh. The union filed an unfair labor practice change on the basis that the
district was bargaining in bad faith.

Not only were issues centered by this time, but bargaining became

increasingly private. Wilson and an adviser, the CTA regional representative, kept apart from the teacher's team and Quinn and Beeman were likewise separated from the board. Mediation sessions consisted of the mediator taking positions from room to room in an effort to reach consensus by the four groups. The board and teacher's team, however, served as ratifying agents rather than initiators or bargainers.

The mediator was successful in arriving at an agreement which was taken to the teachers by both sides in a series of school by school appearances by both Quinn and members of the teacher team in early December. This contract called for a teaching time of 290 minutes, a 10% pay increase and 7 1/2% supplementary pay increase. It was to be a three year contract, with salary increases for the second and third years contingent upon state funding allocations.

On December 12, teachers voted 494-39 to reject the board's offer on the basis that a three year contract which did not guarantee salary increases was unacceptable.

The third phase of bargaining began on Januaray 23 when the parties returned to the table, agreed to disagree, and asked the mediator to sign them into factfinding. Teachers were, at this point, asking for guaranteed pay increases of 8% and 6% for the second and third years, plus agency shop the second year and binding arbitration the third. The board countered by refusing to grant binding arbitration or agency shop.

Disturbances increased in scope and intensity. Picketing spread to the schools before and after classes and teachers began a work slow down. Isolated teachers refused to continue volunteer co-curricular activities and. resigned from volunteer assignments on district committees.

Before the factfinding panel was selected, however, district coaches
drafted a letter to both Wilson and Quinn threatening not to continue
extra-curricular spring coaching assignments unless negotiations resumed and
were continued toward a successful conclusion. Resignation of other teachers
from extra-curricular paid positions swelled the protest. Teachers and
coaches resumed their positions after Wilson and attorney Jones managed to
meet privately and Wilson assured teachers that progress would be made toward
settlement.

The district's last and final offer was ratified by teachers on March 15.
It included guaranteed pay raises of 8% the second year and 7% the third,
guaranteed increases each year in supplementary pay, a 100% paid fringe
benefit plan and salary schedule compaction.

Conclusion

It should be clear from the above narrative that collective bargaining
impacted every facet of school district operations since formation of the
district. The district illustrates, in high relief, all of the
characteristics of first intergenerational conflict: warring subgroups in the
administrative ranks, disturbances which spill out from the central office and
catch up the community, a feeling by teachers and administrators that
collective bargaining is always implicitly adversarial plus the presence of a
quietly militant teacher leader.   Advent of the bargaining process was not
softened by a history of board-management cooperation nor by a community
culture that told board members how to behave. Simultaneous with the public
conflict behavior, the district continued to bargain, make reasonable
compromises, and finally agreements. This aspect of its labor relations, it
carried out in the best traditions of the Second Generation, privately and

within·the bargaining process.

The Impacts of Collective Bargaining

Although collective bargaining has been inextricably intertwined with most of the important decisions made in the district's history and even though labor relation's considerations shaped events in the district to an extraordinary degree, it is possible to isolate several specific impacts of collective bargaining on district governance.

The impact of collective bargaining, as a process, upon district governance has been, first, to impair and contort the relationships between teachers and administration. Before 1976, teachers and the teacher association had established themselves as important sources of influence on the district; they were successful in electing board members and in influencing the selection of a superintendent. They were successful in trading that support for a written agreement which they, the teachers, regarded as a contract and which contained significant rewards for them. The step into formalized bargaining was, for them, an easy and natural one.

Quinn and the school board elected in 1975 found the step a difficult one. What Quinn had beneficently granted as a negotiator in 1973 was difficult for him to live with in 1975 as a superintendent. The munificent financial environment, too, was changing in 1976 and resources becoming increasingly limited. Instead of opting at this point to continue a relatively harmonious relationship with the teacher, by promoting shared decision making, for example, or at least including the association in non-bargaining decision situations, Quinn and the board chose to institute and maintain a steady state of organizational conflict by refusing to deem the union and its demands legitimate and by trying to start bargaining at ground zero by ignoring the

White Paper. Once having put the relationship on a new footing, the board and
superintendent tried (and are still trying) to resolve the attendant conflict
politically by raising and expanding issues to include potential allies and
exclude enemies. Quinn and the board majority are not interested in a
problem-solving approach to the labor relations conflict, nor in persuasion
nor in bargaining--all techniques requiring a degree of privacy, compromise
and mutual goal setting. The mode they use, and feel they must use, is the
political.

On balance, however, the choice of this mode of governance for resolving
conflicts, seems to have favored the teachers' organization rather than the
district team. Teacher leaders, at first willing to particpate in joint
decision making, pulled back, accepted their role as antagonists and began
formulating counterstrategies. They proceeded to form a cohesive
sub-organization capable of entering into profitable ad-hoc coalitions with
board minority, managers and community members to keep the kinds of gains made
pre-collective bargaining in salaries and working conditions. The board and
superintendent have been unable to manage their side of the table, and through
a failure to set goals, establish equitable personnel procedures, set long
range financial plans, etc., have weakened their position.

Second, collective bargaining is used by the board and superintendent as
a symbolic issue, especially at election time. To legitimize the process
would be to destroy its use as a symbol, although only by legitimizing the
process can the superintendent hope to control it. Teacher leaders are not
overly concerned about their lack of standing or about the administration and
board's use of symbolic issues associated with unionism and collective
bargaining , probably because the, have been successful in manipulating the

process in the absence of district control.

Third, it is important to note that conflict and its resolution by political means is a characteristic only of governance and administration at the central level. Perhaps because collective bargaining conflicts have been so severe at the central level, site managers tend to avoid conflict by asking for, and generally getting, a high degree of cooperation locally from teachers and parents. Principals also spend a relatively large amount of time in Thresher fostering harmonious relationships with the neighboring community in order to avoid the kinds of disturbances which will place them in the central arena of conflict. They tend to ignore orders from the board (such as "fire the bastards") which will ignite site level conflict. Teachers reciprocate by supporting their principals, even in schools where enforcement of the contract (on both sides) is relatively strict. Teacher and parent support is, of course, very important to a principal who might be called upon to justify his position to the central office -- where allies count.

Bargaining will begin again in Thresher in 1982. Unless personnel changes, it is reasonable to assume that labor relations in the future will continue to be as contentious and volatile as they are now. There are no indications that the superintendent or board members will reverse themselves and agree to recognize the importance of the teacher association or the validity of the collective bargaining process. There is no indication that the teacher organization will seek ways to insure labor peace.

The Palermo Story

EVOLUTION FROM CONFLICT TO CAREFUL COOPERATION

The story of collective bargaining in the large Palermo Unified School

District has been the history of a slowly evolving, first intergenerational

phase which progressed from an episodically conflicted meet and confer era

through a period of seriously disturbed relationships between teachers and

district into a present Second Generation cooperative arrangement.

Intergenerational struggle in Palermo resulted in the gradual realignment

of managerial and governance attitudes, and creation of structures and

procedures to cope with the changing conditions and periodic dislocations

brought about by collective bargaining. This realignment has had at least

three outcomes: (1) a gradual privatization and bureaucratization of disputes,

(2) the tendency of both administration and union to adopt similar frameworks

(i.e., structures and procedures) for similar tasks, such as the formulation

of bargaining demands, at-table bargaining styles, handling of grievances, and

approaches to non-bargaining types of issues, (3) increased cooperation

between union and administration to deal with the external environment.

To understand the Palermo story, it is necessary to understand the

community, the evolution of labor relations and the impact of certain pivotal

events upon the district. We will look first, at the community, second at the

District, its governance and labor relations history up to and including the

1979-1980 bargaining cycle, third at the development of the current tone of

labor relations and its unique characteristics and, fourth, at the impacts of

second generational collective bargaining on governance, on teachers and on
managers.

The Community and School District.

The city of Palermo has grown rapidly in the past thirty years. A
significant aerospace industry and military installations prompted growth in
the 50's and 60's and, with the decline of military expenditures, growth has
continued in the North Palermo suburbs as light industry locates in new
industrial parks. As of 1979, the district and an enrollment of approximately
100,000. Enrollment peaked in 1970 and has been declining since, with an
increasing rate of decline, now about 3% annually.

The government, trade and service sectors employ most Palermo residents.
The school district, with 11,000 employees, is the city's second largest
employer. A district sponsored survey of 500 randomly selected registered
voters in 1979 revealed a largely white, relatively old, relatively well
educated population. 53% of the respondents were 40 years old or older, 92%
had completed high school and 69% had at least some college. 73% of those
sampled had no children in district schools and only 14% had youngsters who
would be expected to enroll in school in the future. Schools have a higher
percentage of minority attendees than are present in the population as a
whole: approximately 20% of the city is counted in the minority population
while approximately 40% of the school age population is non-Anglo.

City influence and governance structures have changed over the last three
decades as the population and growth patterns have shifted. Where the ruling
elite used to be a largely white, male dominated group of businessmen, bankers
and retired military, leaders now are likely to be involved in partisan
politics and are likely to be arrayed on one side or the other of issues of

growth and environment, issues which manage to spill over into school board
elections. New constituencies among blacks and Hispanics have made an impact
on the makeup of the school board. The five school board members, who are
elected by districts, are apt to represent diverse but fairly well defined
economic, social and racial interests.

The change in the community has changed the way the superintendent
interacts with the external environment. The superintendent fifteen years ago
had an advisory group of 20 businessmen who assisted him in campaigning for
bond issues. That group was disbanded by the current superintendent, Dan
Steele, who now relies instead on non-educator subordinates (e.g., the finance
director, the systems and procedures director) to nurture relationships with
downtown business interests and upon a public information officer to manage
relationships with the mass media. Other community interests are apt to be
appointed to ad-hoc, broad based committees to handle specific issues. The
Taxpayer's Association, League of Women Voters and Urban League are mentioned
most frequently by respondents as the most potent non-school affiliated
community groups likely to be asked to send representatives to ad-hoc school
committees.

Total expenditures were about $300-million. Of these funds, 71% came
from state and local tax sources and 9% from federal. An additional 15%
represented the carryover. Categorical aid was extremely important to the
district providing about 15 percent of its operating revenue. The district
maintains lobbyists in Washington and Sacramento to protect these sources of
income.

The district has faced four particularly severe problems in the last
decade: the district's declining enrollment, the court order to integrate

schools, heated board elections and labor relations.   The problems associated

with labor relations began with an inter-union struggle for membership and

domination in anticipation of passage of the California bargaining statute.

The struggle between PTA and PFT for exclusive representation status came

to a head in March, 1977. PFT charged that PTA would force agency shop on

employees and claimed that it, PFT, had experience as a tough bargainer.

Despite these claims, PTA was chosen by a large margin to represent teachers

(67%-33%).

The PFT filed a challenge in March with the Educational Employee

Relations Board to delay the certification of PTA as exclusive representative.

The challenge was withdrawn three weeks later. Talks dragged on for several

months with teachers protesting salary offers, transfer policies, the calendar

and a proposal for self insurance. The Association filed three unfair labor

practice charges against the district, charging bad faith bargaining.

PTA threatened to strike on June 6 if a contract agreement was not

reached by June 5 and on May 23, according to the district, called for a

rolling sick-out. 1,392 teachers participated during the week of May 23-27 at

target schools, with a high of 759 teachers sick on May 22. The district

filed a bad faith charge against PTA for the latter's threat to strike while

at the bargaining table.

As PTA prepared for a strike, the scope of conflict widened. EERB

officials met with district and PTA attorneys to investigate unfair practices

charges and to offer conciliation services. Board members became involved,

with Homer Moore suggesting that the board offer binding arbitration on

grievances to soothe PTA and Barbar Simpson suggesting rescinding the master

calendar, negotiating self insurance and granting a contingency salary

increase plus class size reduction.

Board agreement could not be reached and PTA president Jay Mendoza announced the strike on a Sunday afternoon. The strike lasted four days. On the first day, the district sought a temporary restraining order. One was granted but ignored by the teachers.

A local Assemblyman, who had earlier indicated to several constituents that he was on PTA's side, called the district and two board members on Wednesday to offer his help as an intermediary. The EERB also intervened and asked the district to return to the table. That evening the two board members called a press conference and announced that they would seek amnesty for striking teachers, a move which prompted the district's chief negotiator, David Manners, to resign.

On Thursday, June 9, 2,000 picketing teachers marched to the board of education meeting, and submitted 600 signatures on petititions asking for the superintendent's resignation.

The board voted (3-2) to grant the strikers amnesty and to sign a contract providing an 8% salary increase but without binding arbitration of grievances.

The cause of the four day strike is disputed. District officials and some citizen observers blame the association president, who, they say, was simply radical and a tool of the NEA which had targeted the PUSD for a strike in 1974 and was behind the 1977 strike as well. Mendoza, they claim, did not exhaust administrative remedies (mediation and factfinding) before urging teachers to strike--proof, say his critics, that he was using the strike for his own personal gain Others blame district management for a lack of flexibility and point to the district's chief negotiataor as a teacher hater

and a too-tough negotiator. One administrator admits that the district's

initial salary position (publically rescinded by the board before the strike)

was probably too harsh and that teachers were justified in protesting it.

Whatever the causes of the strike, the action was clearly designed by the

strikers themselves to call attention to their plight in a concerned way.

Association members were seeking legitimacy. The current association

president, John DeAnza, claims they won legitimacy: "Management," he says,

"used to say to us 'you don't represent the teachers.' They don't say that

since the strike. The strike proved the union was there."

Settlement of the strike, the resignation of the district's negotiator,

and defeat of the militant teacher leader proved to be the pivotal events

which launched the district into the second generation. Participants

immediately began to accommodate to one another by reshaping procedures and

redefining personnel and tasks in ways which would produce minimal conflict

and maximum cooperation.

The defeat of the association leader eliminated a source of irritation as

far as the district was concerned. The district appointed assistant

Superintendent Jerome Sills management's chief negotiator. Sills instituted

what he calls a "problem solving approach" and abandoned the adversary style

of the former negotiator.

Although the 1978-1979 contract took from March until August, 1978 to

settle, those five months were not spent, apparently, in rancorous debate but

in firming up personnel and procedures on the part of both the district and

teachers' association. The new president saw his role as that of communicator

and left negotiations to his experienced negotiation team. Sills'

conciliatory attitude encouraged teachers on the team to relax and concentrate

on contract issues.

Although a state wage freeze precluded salary increases for 1978, 1979, teachers gained improved benefits, an early retirement plan and a clearer transfer policy. The association won language spelling out it rights to visit employees at schools and a consultation clause which formalized procedures for assocation-district consultation on matters not in scope.

Negotiations for 1979-1980 began in March presentation of PTA's proposal and the board counterproposal. There was no public comment. Agreement was reached one month later.

Both parties report mild negotiating sessions with little substantive conflict, little game playing between the two, and, in fact, some evidence of an eagerness to compromise, if not cooperate, in getting the contract settled. For example, one team member, a newcomer who had bargained for an NEA affiliate in New York, wanted a weekly grievance meeting required between site representatives and principals at each school. The district quickly compromised and agreed to meet "periodically." In another potentially volatile area of the contract, the association asked to expand contract scope by asking for the right to appoint a site committee at each school to advise the principal on all matters. Management declared the item out of scope and the union (much to management's surprise) dropped the demand. A contract item which was important to management was a clearer definition of transfer and reassignment; reassignment was redefined to exclude the assignment of teachers within schools to a specific grade level. Again both sides tell us, compromise on the item was reached with little discussion.

The money offer which the board put out early was settled with little controversy for two reasons: first, the union may have felt pressure from the

rank and file to take at least the seven percent--the raise came one month

after a retroactive 5% had been given teachers whose salaries had been frozen

by the state for almost a year and teachers seemed disinclined to argue with a

further 7%. In addition, classified employees had recently settled, and were

receiving their checks. Second, the district had accumulated a large surplus

because of the salary freeze to which was added a very large carryover of 15%.

This ability to stay ahead of potential salary demands has enabled the

district, since 1977, 1978 to settle money items with relative ease. Third,

there appeared to be no desire for a strike.

The current tone of labor cooperation turned upon several pivotal events,

most noticeably the legitimation strike of 1977, the defeat by the teachers of

Hendoza as president of the union in 1977, the resignation of Manners and the

appointment of the more moderate Sills to the chief negotiator's spot, the

defeat of teacher-backed Barbar Simpson in 1977, and the decision to use an

accumulated budget surplus in 1979 for teacher salary increases.

The current state of association-administration cooperation in the

district has created, or led to, three important organizational

characteristics which will, in turn, impact how the district is governed, how

teachers teach and how principals manage.

(1) The tendency to privatize and bureaucratize disputes. Grievances

have been reduced in number because both association and district have

established sets of policies and procedures for grievance resolution before

they are formally filed.

Grievances are few now (10 to step 2 in 1978-1979) because contract

language is clearer according to Dr. Sills. The association president claims,

however, that teachers are unwilling or afraid to file grievances--possibly

because they are afraid of damaging school site morale. In any case, both

agree that the process for solving disputes has been improved as the tone of

labor relations has improved. "We're not there to kick hell and prove

something," says DeAnza. The chief negotiator expresses both the need to avoid

opportunities for adverse publicity at school sites.and to improve teacher

morale by solving problems promptly at the site level.

The result has been formation of grievance teams by both parties which

insert themselves into a site at the informal level of the grievance process,

before the complaint is written and submitted to the principal. The informal

level of grievance has thus become quite standardized, handled by central

staff according to rules, precedent and the negotiated contract--but also

handled in such a way that potentially negative publicity is blocked and so

that morale at the site level is improved and undisturbed.

The district also tends to handle interest disputes privately and to try

to shape interest group participation through sets of rules and procedures

designed to minimize conflict. Both at the site and central levels, in-school

groups are regulated by procedures for the conduct of their meetings. A

deputy superintendent is held accountable for in-school committee work and

reports to the executive cabinet yearly on each. Non-school related group

input, as we have seen, comes through appointment to a school related

committee or through ad-hoc committees formed to handled special problems,

such as discipline and integration. Bureaucratization in this area has caused

members of several community groups and some teachers, too, to complain about

district control of public input, called "a closed system with the trappings

of being cpen." One activist, however, says she doesn't mind; she has found

that one can beat the system by putting things in writing and having them

adopted as policy. She has watched several policies she wrote for the
establishment of alternative schools work their way up to adoption by the
board. Rule based behavior and the written rule are extremely important to
the district.

Interests disputes are not as easy to privatize since district management
has less control over non-school affiliated groups who become involved in
certain issues. District attempts to forestall conflict by establishing
ad-hoc committees has, however, generally been successful. Overt conflict has
erupted on only one issue in the last several years, the planning and
construction of North Suburban High School. Activists, too, turn from overt
disturbances and show preference for legal action when committee work and
lobbying efforts fail.

In general, respondents report a trend toward cooperation by union and
administration because both recognize the need, in the words of one official,
to "save each others' jobs." Both feel that public conflict threatens their
employment in the sense that board sensibilities dictate calmness and control
by administrators, especially at the site level, and in the sense that union
leaders have found that they can please the rank and file an atmosphere of
stability.

It is precisely this kind of cooperation to save each others' jobs which
infuriates the executive director of the Palermo Taxpayers' Association. He
and members of the organization regularly conduct one-on-one sessions with
board members to point out the conflict of interest inherent in
administration--union cooperation. While the Taxpayers' Association is
concerned about the numbers of expensive programs which Palermo opts to put in
the schools, of even more concern is the practice of giving principals and

administrtators salary increases of at least as much, or more, as are awarded
teachers. Management, they assert, is in the position of being able to
negotiate for its own salary increase and can win quite a bit for itself by
pretending to give in to teacher demands.

    (2) <u>The tendency of the association and district to adopt similar,
parallel frameworks (structures and procedures) for the conduct of business
which, in turn, facilitate cooperation and joint decision making.</u>

In terms of grievance handling and contract enforcement, both parties
after the 1977 strike became more rule based and amenable to parallel
structures for contract compliance. Those responsible for handling grievances
at the informal state now talk to each other from a common base; the union's
executive director and grievance steering committee purposely shapes its
approach to parallel that of the two district employees who handle grievances.
They have a common understanding of the contract and common instructions to
head off conflict. The union president and head of the district's employee
relations, each tell us they tell their people to "go by the book" and to
observe due process in enforcing the contract.

Over the last two years, the processes for drawing up contract proposals
have become parallel. Both entities used to survey their constituents and
assemble contract proposals after refining that input. Now each depends on
on-going notes from teachers and managers for new proposals or contract
revisions. Dr. Sills claims that the shift to cooperation, to "not taking
advantage of each other," in terms of the bargaining load has kept costs for
staff time, surveys and workshops down for both sides

Neither the superintendent nor the union president become involved in the
details of bargaining. He maintains a relatively narrow span of control and

delegates almost all bargaining matters to Steele or his legal staff; he acts mainly as a communication link with the school board. The negotiator is thus not put in the position of having to negotiate first with the board.

The chief negotiator does have to work with the superintendent's council in signing off on contract proposals. The approach here is to "filter" issues on a weekly basis through the council for input from the deputy superintendents and directors of various divisions. The executive council includes the district's in-house attorney; additional legal staff is not hired for collective bargaining.

The union president and executive director also delegate much of the responsibility to a volunteer teacher who has been the district's chief negotiator for three years. She has assembed a team, which, like the district's management team, is broadly representative of functional units rather than areas of concern.

At-table bargaining styles and strategies are now parallel, where three years ago they were different. Three years ago, Manners' aggressive tactics at the table led to a situation in which everyone talked on a high emotional pitch when they were allowed to speak. Manners did most of the talking, say the participants, "and everyone else listened." Sills and the chair of the teacher team now do most of the bargaining but welcome input at the table from team members on specific proposals which may be areas of individual responsibility.

Association leaders and the Superintendent share a common understanding of how conflict is best resolved. The association's executive director puts it in this way: "When you can't bargain it, you run it legislatively. We try to get our way at the table first, then go to the administration, then the

legislature." The Superintendent, a former lobbyist also spends a relatively

large portion of his time trying to influence legislation, particularly

legislation concerning financial items--funding formulae, insurance, benefits,

etc. Sometimes, of course, administration and union (which generally works

through the CTA on matters of general statewide concern) are on opposite sides

of the fence. The important point is that both sides use political means for

resolving problems only -outside- the district, rarely within. The union is

not likely, for example, to seek the support of one or more of the potent

interest groups in Palermo to wage war on the administration, nor do

administrators or board members question the union's legitimacy publically in

an effort to do away with collective bargaining. There seems to be tacit

understanding that tactics of this kind and disturbances in general are

unnecessary and counter-productive.

(3) There is a high degree of cooperation between union and

administration in confronting the external environment in matters which relate

to the health of the organization as a whole.

\ The union executive director and superintendent cooperate to persuade

state legislators of the merits or demerits of a particular bill and to

suggest needed legislation.

The main focus of this type of cooperation has been to assure adequate

finances through lobbying for funding formulae which will be favorable to the

district, pressing for federal impact funds and money for special programs at

the state and federal level.

Cooperation is not limited to lobbying activities. Union and district

representatives meet regularly to discuss items such as early retirement

proposals and programs for employee assistance for such problems as mental

illness and alcoholism--problems which teachers say are increasing in severity

as teachers age.

The impact upon governance of this gradual organizational realignment to

cope with the realities of collective bargaining, has been to continue the

rule based, bureaucratic norm for behavior which has characterized district

operations under the current superintendent. The PTA, although legitimized

only after the 1977 strike, has been brought into the governance process as a

cooperative partner in intra-district, non-bargaining situations and as an

effective and powerful partner for lobbying external controlling

organizations, such as the courts, state legislature and federal government.

The district is beginning to suffer pressure from a large number of

potent interest groups who are growing increasingly frustrated with their

inablity to affect decisions in the district. The tendency of both union and

district to "not rock the boat" in the labor relations arena and bureaucratic

defensiveness on the part of administrators when any aspect of school policies

or programs is challenged, has led district activists to characterize the

governance systems as "closed with the trappings of being open." Various

citizen groups, including the League of Women Voters, the Urban League and the

Taxpayers' Association, continually call for more openness on the part of the

administration, by which they seem to mean more communication with the public

and greater access to formulation of policy by citizens and board members.

Members of these organizations set about last year to defeat an incumbent

and elect a new board member whose promise was to question administration

recommendations, seek alternatives and expose these options to public view.

He and the new Black member of the board, although split from the board on

many votes, have joined with the more conservative majority to demand a change

in the administration's relationship with the board. They have asked the

Superintendent for minority staff reports to accompany his recommendation in

order to increase the options available to them and have asked for increased

opportunities for board oversight.

It is not yet clear whether their thrust will result in increased public

exposure to and input into potentially explosive issues such as those related

to collective bargaining. Nor is it clear just how the board will deal with

inherent conflicts between interest groups. For example, the interests of the

Democratic Party, which heavily supported the new board members, are not the

same as the demand of the Taxpayers' Association. The Democratic Party is

likely to call for stronger union action on behalf of teachers; the Taxpayers'

Association is heavily lobbying the board to place less of its money into

salaries and the collective bargaining process.

Collective bargaining in Palermo is clearly not now as important in terms

of priority nor as all-consuming in terms of interest as it once was. It is

also apparent, though, that personnel changes, new rules and mutual

accommodation have conspired to reduce the volatility of collective

bargaining, to defuse those who might make labor relations more problematic

(manager, for example) and to attempt to keep out those who, it is felt, have

no business in the process. The tendency has been to privitize labor relations

conflict.

This cooperative phase is being threatened from at least two directions:

the first is from the community and will most likely take the form of a

taxpayer's revolt or parent demands for shifts in priorities away from

salaries into programs, or both. The second is a threat by managers to form

their own union in order to press for higher wages and better working

conditions. If these concerns are brought to the bargaining table and the

scope of the contract widened to account for them, the district will enter its

Second Intergenerational Conflict. Until then, late Second Generation

collaboration will insure labor peace for Palermo.

Boulder City

WORKING TO ESTABLISH SECOND GENERATION NORMS FOR BARGAINING

Boulder City is located in the center of the state and is a clearly defined community with a population of approximately 50,000 residents. It has a relatively stable tax base which is anchored by a single large company with its international headquarters located in the eastern section of town.

The story of labor relations in Boulder City is one of leaders who outran followers. The district was one of the early teacher organization "targets," and a favorable contract was achieved. But the teachers never consolidated their gains. In the most recent negotiations, management and state teacher organization negotiators were successful in operating as Second Generation counterparts. Each adopted the same norms for bargaining including a desire to limit proposals to what was achievable, a desire not to embarass the opposition and a willingness to engage in intraorganizational bargaining within their respective organizations.

The district functions in the Second Generation somewhat uncomfortably. The teachers have not yet accepted the Second Generation ideology of limited gains and enforcement of the contract, but management generally has. The local teacher leadership, which lacks a solid following, is still fighting the battle of the First Intergenerational Conflict—battling against the administration per se or at least seeking the unachievable without supports from their own organization.

Social and Demographic Setting

Boulder City, as one current board member said, can be divided into three
distinct socio-economic sections. The western part of the district is
populated by lower economic and less educated groups including a substantial
number of minority (predominantly black) citizens. Some community leaders who
represent schools in this portion of town, according to the same board member,
feel slighted when compared to the elite central and east side sections.
Partially for this reason and also because of racial unrest in the early 70's,
west side residents took collectivist action and spearheaded the drive to
elect the only black to serve on the school board in the mid-70's.

The second socio-economic grouping is located just east of the downtown
area and is populated by influential elites. The rallying point for this
group, which sends relatively few children to the system, is a local grade
school which has traditionally represented both stability and prestige. While
this group is numerically small, it still can exert tremendous political
influence, as the Superintendent discovered when he attempted to close an
elementary school. Although the Superintendent was able to produce reasonable
arguments to support the school closure, his recommendation was rejected by
the Board of Education. As one influential citizen from this area stated, "We
still haven't forgiven him for that action." As a reminder of their
displeasure, the community elected a single issue, anti-school-closing board
member who was subsequently re-elected and now serves as board president.

The eastern section of town represents both a growth area and a rather
extensive grouping of older, well established homes. The international
headquarters of a large corporation is housed on this side of the city as is
the airport and a wide variety of restaurants and other establishments which

appeal to young professional families. According to one board member, it is

this section of the district that is most critical because "bad schools out

east would mean that the kind of people we want to keep in town will move to

our neighboring district."

Boulder City has experienced a significant decline in student population.

In the 1970-71 school year the board reported a population of 7,241 pupils,

however, by 1978-79, that figure had decreased to 5,741 pupils. While the

Superintendent notes that these figures are beginning to stabilize, especially

at the first and second grade levels, he also states that good housing in

Boulder City is relatively scarce due to the demand exerted by young

professionals associated with the large corporation. Many of the district's

operating problems stem from the fact that it has had to learn to live with

its environment. Little relief can be expected from the enrollment decline;

housing sites are virtually all in use; and the district is

landlocked--surrounded by another larger district. In many respects, the

situation is typical of central cities that are cut off from finding

additional growth or resources from the suburbs.

Labor Relations

Labor relations in the Boulder City Unified School District have for

years been locked into a series of battles between management and the

teacher's organization over the issue of whether or not the organization has a

legitimate right to speak for teachers and involve itself on their behalf in

school management and governance.

Although skirmishes of this sort occur frequently in the First

Intergenerational Conflict, the combative stage in Boulder City has been

particularly long and drawn out because of two factors: unwillingness of rank

and file teachers to commit to an organizational victory and the perception of

boards during this period that there was no pressing need to legitimize the

organization even though contracts have been signed,

In the early 70's Boulder City was identified by one of the large state

labor organizations as a district which could be organized as a "downstate

showpiece" of teacher labor strength. The state labor organization committed

sufficient personnel and resources to energize the teachers and obtain a

contract for the 1971-1972 school year. In spite of a strike in 1970,

however, the tactics used by Association activists to move the rank and file

to the picket line did not have a long lasting impact. As one teacher who

supported the strike said: "They told me that the strike would get more for

the children, but what they really meant was that it would get more for

themselves--I'll never go on strike again."

The strike had several unintended negative outcomes for the teacher's

association. Teachers mistrust leadership partially because of the divisive

impact it had on rank and file members. One teacher talked about the "hard

feelings" among faculty members after the strike. She contends that the

"scars from the first strike" still have not been healed, and that every time

there is an Association meeting, the old feelings are regenerated. She

continued by saying: "How can we expect to teach kids how to behave when

adults can't even meet without fighting." Several teachers discussed the

"dirty notes that were left in teachers' mailboxes who did support the strike"

and one said that her car had been vandalized because she continued to go to

school.

While field interviews substantiate the depth of hard feelings that still

exist among Boulder City faculty, the Association leadership views this

divisiveness as a weakness on the part of those teachers who do not understand

the greater importance of organizational unity. For example, one disaffected

teacher leader told this researcher that "teachers in this town will never

have a voice in what happens as long as they are dominated by the big

corporation's thinking." In a year when two successive strike votes ended in

a tie and the Association president broke the stalemate by casting his ballot

with the anti-strikers, he complained that the rank and file placed him in the

impossible position of either angering those activists who originally

supported his presidential nomination or voting for a work stoppage endorsed

by only 50% of the members and thereby doomed to fail.

Many Boulder City teachers find themselves living in the past. As one

former activist told this researcher, "If we could just turn back the clock to

the good old days, working here would be fun again." Rank and file members

find themselves both frustrated by their working conditions, which many

perceive to have deteriorated when the planning periods were eliminated, and

distrustful of Association leadership, which many believe to be unable to

protect their interests without initiating another drastic strike.

Even though the board capitulated to strikers and permitted a contract in

1971, board and management strategy in the decade following was to weaken the

organization (which was perceived as externally motivated) and vitiate future

contracts. Three incidents illustrate management's attempts to minimize the

ability of the teacher's organization to engage in meaningful bargaining.

First, after the teacher recognition strike settlement, the

Superintendent hired the teacher leader in a central office capacity for

curricular instruction which some have said was a clear attempt to weaken the

Association by depriving it of its most important strategists. Field

interviews suggest that employing this teacher leader in a central office capacity had the dual effect of demoralizing the rank and file while providing the Superintendent with an opportunity to demonstrate his concern for curriculum improvement.

Second, a former board president, who was particularly outspoken on this subject, prepared an analysis of collective bargaining for the board in which he clearly expressed his concern that there is undue Association influence on board policy making. He is an important actor in Boulder City, because his interest in and writing about this topic regularly reminded both the Superintendent and the other board members of the possible impact of collective bargaining upon district policy decisions. For example, in a policy paper presented in 1975, this board member noted that teacher collective bargaining activities were originally established to facilitate the discussions of local concerns and eliminate "petty grievances" by developing routinized avenues for the solution of problems. However, he concludes that the stated objectives have not been met and that issues of local concern have become subservient to the larger bargaining agendas of "statewide labor organizations" who in turn are formulating district policy. The important implication in this statement relates to the formation of school board policy as an accidental byproduct of both local and statewide labor concerns. He questions whether these statewide organizations represent the best interests of Boulder City teachers or if they only articulate the viewpoint of the more "vocal and active" teachers in the system who seem to be uninterested in local school board policy development.

This former board president additionally addressed the impact that collective bargaining was having on the Superintendent's and Board's ability

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to conduct district business. He noted that the entire process was, in his
opinion, contributing to the "deteriorating public image" of the school system
and that this factor, while not directly measurable, might be undermining the
credibility of those persons duly sworn to uphold the public interest.

Another policy initiative took place several years later when in the face
of what the board perceived to be a severe monetary crisis, numerous
non-tenured and tenured teachers were released from the system. Besides
releasing teachers, administrative and clerical personnel were also dismissed
and all teacher planning periods were eliminated. This action coincided with
a time when there was no contract in effect (1976-77) and represents the most
noteworthy action taken by the board to counteract teacher contractual gains.
By following the tenure dismissal guidelines outlined in the contract when
releasing the teachers, many young, aggressive, Association activists who
helped engineer the recognition strike were removed from the system according
to a teacher leader. According to the Association president, the elimination
of all teacher planning periods insured that "there would be no dialogue about
either Association and/or school business." This president captured the
feelings of many rank and file members when she said, "By the time I am done
teaching all day without a planning period, I'm too tired to do anything
except rest."

Because of the peculiar dynamics of a weak teacher organization and a
board which has been historically reluctant to grant the teacher's
organization the legitimacy it needs to become a participant in school
district management and governance, the decade since 1970 has been marked by
fits and starts at negotiations with marked shifts from year to year in
negotiating styles and contract substance.

In 1971-72 after nine months of negotiations, a five day recognition strike, and the use of mediation, a one year comprehensive contract was settled, which according to the Association president, "was a good one, because it contained a seniority clause and provisions for binding grievance arbitration." It should be noted, however, that the teachers were not paid for the days that they were on strike. From 1972-1974, a two year contract was approved with wage re-openen provisions during the second year. Mediators were employed both years and each negotiating period lasted approximately six months. In 1975-76, a single year pact was signed again with the use of a mediator, however in 1976-77, agreement could not be reached and in the absence of a contract the district was governed by school board policy. As one labor leader, associated with the other state teachers' union said, "1976-77 was the year that management 'gutted' the Boulder City contract and the teachers have not yet recovered." 1976-77 was a watershed year in a historical context because during that period of time, "bloodbath" solutions were applied to solve the district's financial plight. The school board eliminated its debts in one year by reducing employees, closing buildings and eliminating teacher planning periods.

From 1977-1979, contracts were signed, however, before negotiations began, formalized "meet and confer sessions" were conducted between the Superintendent's staff and members of the Association. The purpose of these sessions according to the Superintendent was to address district problems in a "non-crisis" atmosphere. In order to achieve unanimous accord on items being discussed, the "meet and confer" format stated that all parties present had to agree to a proposal before it was approved. According to the Association president, this model was disbanded because the unanimous consensus format

became unworkable and the rank and file teachers started to "feel uneasy about

the deals that were being made behind closed doors."

The negotiating environment for the 1979-80 contract was clouded by a

series of aggressive moves by the board, which were particularly offensive to

labor groups in the school system. In an effort to express their concern over

practices that had either been incorporated in the contract or were part of

the negotiations process, the Board in the spring of 1979 adopted the

following policies:

> (A) There would be no negotiations conducted after August
>   first.
> (B) All teachers as well as other labor groups like custodians,
>   would be required to vote on contract ratifications,
>   regardless of their labor membership status.
> (C) The Board of Education could conduct a second round of labor
>   elections to insure that the first election results were
>   valid.

When the Association became aware of the Board's action, they refused to

participate in the negotiations process. A crisis over this matter ensued

with the Board vowing to maintain the policies and the Association threatening

job actions. Demonstrations were held to protest the Board's unilateral

decision-making posture and many accusations were exchanged between board

members who perceived their position to be legally defensible and teachers

who, as one leader stated, "were tired of being pushed around." The

custodian's union also objected to the second policy and labeled it an

"anti-labor, union busting technique." The impasse was eventually settled

after the board president, "visited the school sites and found that the

teachers were really mad." He consequently persuaded the full board to alter

policy B and both sides proceeded to come to closure on an agreement in a

relatively short period of time.

The willingness of the board to accommodate to the teacher's
organization on a fairly important policy point represents a turning point in
the board's attitude toward the organization.

A second set of circumstances surfaced in this bargaining cycle which
tended to move the district toward a new stage in terms of labor-management
relationships. The Teachers' Association had for the first time notified the
Superintendent that they planned to use a state teacher association negotiator
and, while there was a generalized administrative perception that this
outsider would complicate rather than simplify the bargaining process, the
complication did not materialize. Once the process began, it became clear
that the normative bargaining rules prescribed to by both chief negotiators
were compatible. The compatible normative negotiating beliefs included:

(A) The concept that both sides were struggling to "pursue an ideal
     working contract" for the district as opposed to extracting
     maximum concessions at all costs.
(B) A significant amount of spontaneous bargaining over the contract's
     language, which insured that discrepencies seldom escalated into
     major points of confrontation.
(C) The extensive use of "horizontal bargaining"
     (intra-organizational) to define for team members, as opposed to
     their counterparts, what contractual provisions were worth
     debating further.
(D) A determined attempt to bound the negotiations within a "Range of
     Practical Bargains." That is, labor never allowed its
     expectations to seriously escalate beyond management's ability to
     accept, and management never pursued proposals totally
     unacceptable to labor.
(E) A determined effort not to embarrass the opposing party. Labor
     did not insist upon extracting all available money because,
     according to their chief spokesman, "This tactic would make my
     counterpart look like a fool since he would not be able to show
     the school board that he was able to underspend their top dollar."
     Likewise, management did not attempt to significantly reduce
     contractual language by resorting to harsh rhetoric or refusing to
     accept any of labor's spontaneous suggestions. According to the
     management spokesman, "I was afraid this outside negotiator would
     cause problems at first, but really he has been very reasonable
     and has helped cool out strong teacher personal feelings about
     me."

Whether because of mutual respect, proper chemistry, experience, or an

overwhelming desire to avoid a strike, neither side attempted to play "one

upsmanship" with the other and consequently a serious labor/management

confrontation was avoided. As the chief Association spokesman said: "I can't

get mad at their negotiator, because he is not an evil man who is determined

to destroy the teachers' organization." The fact that these two chief

negotiators both agreed and accepted a second generational bargaining

philosophy, led to a rather quick ratification of a new contract. This was

the case despite the fact that the rank-and-file of the teacher organization

was still in the First Intergenerational Conflict where total victory rather

than an agreeable settlement are the criteria, where a glorious defeat counted

more than an incremental gain.

Although board members and administrators have come to recognize the

teachers' right to bargain and have accepted the obligation to bargain with

them in good faith, and although negotiating styles, for the first time, have

been adjusted to maximize a harmonious labor relations environment and thereby

an acceptable contractual outcome, it is not clear that either the

organization or the rank and file teacher accept the contract as a means

through which to manage the school district.

The school board has been able to enact a contract and, at the same

time, ignore its actual and potential impact because, as several board members

stated, "No one complains about it." Board members make it clear that even

during the widely publicized negotiating period, they received minimal

feedback from citizens, teachers, or administrators, and therefore they

concluded that the document must be acceptable to all parties.

From management's perspective, the contract is not seen as something

which will interrupt or disturb management practices or inhibit

administration's ability to deflect volatile situations which might reach the

community or board. The administrator responsible for labor relations

summarized his relatively long tenure as the board negotiator in the following

manner. "My success with the board rests in not having to approach them with

problems or from a position of weakness. I make sure the board knows that we,

the administration, can work with this agreement and that what we have now is

not bad. As long as I don't have to give up too much, I'm in good shape with

them."

Finally, teachers, as their chief negotiations spokesman stated, neither

understand nor pursue the contractual mechanisms available to them. Their

passive attitude and a strong, centralized management demand for

administrative control of teachers at the school site level has led to a

general situation in schools in which principals are simultaneously expected

to use contract procedures rigorously where it is to their advantage and

interpret contract provisions flexibly where they feel the need to retain

discretionary authority, even though such action may tempt grievances.

The Second Generation characteristics of stable bargaining, lowered

conflict and a relatively narrow scope of interaction between management and

the teachers organizations appear stable in Boulder City. This is the case

despite the continuation of a small, core of teacher leadership that is

attempting to continue fighting the First Intergenerational Conflict, that it

does not realize it has already won. The administration and the school board

have adjusted to the realities of collective bargaining and contract

administration, even when the teachers have not. As one of the board members

said, "we don't like the contract (actually the relationship) but we've got

it. We wouldn't do it again in the same manner, but now we must live with

it."

The Second Generation in Boulder City is interesting because a stable relationship has been achieved largely on management's terms rather than largely on labor's terms, which is the more usual condition. Boulder City, for instance, stands in contrast to Industrial City where the teachers achieved dominance during the Second Generation and that dominance served as an organizing principle for the board and superintendent during the Second Intergenerational Conflict. In Boulder City there would appear to be relatively·little for the outgroup to organize around. The relationship between labor and management is quite distant; not at all intimate as it is in late Second Generation situations, and the teachers have not made enormous gains that are likely to engender a belief that "they got too much."

Riverview School District

CHANGES IN COALITIONS THROUGH THE GENERATIONS

Riverview is an old industrial and commercial town about 25 miles away
from the central city. Its physical character suggests that "some things
never change," but in the case of Riverview the handsome old houses and brick
factories only partly reflect reality. The population has grown, political
power has shifted from old, elite families to newer, but established interest
groups, and population has shifted from the central city to the surrounding
housing tracts. As these demographic changes were occurring, teachers
organized and became a powerful establishment in the Riverview Unified School
District, which enrolls roughly 25,000 students from the city and its
environs.

The story of labor relations in Riverview is one of chronically
conflictual political relations including four strikes, in which an active
union sought both influence and legitimacy with the school board. At the same
time, the story of Riverview involves the development of a strong working
accommodation between the school superintendent and the union leadership,
which is characteristic of the late Second Generation. Labor relations are
now coupled to rising discontent among critics of the school system and
political unpopularity for the teacher organization. The discontent comes
from two quarters: (1) those who never fully accepted the idea of a teacher
organization, and (2) those new elements which feel that the school district

is less productive than it should be. The net effect of these changes is that

Riverview appears to be feeling the tensions apparent in the close of the

Second Generation and the onset of the Second Intergenerational Conflict.

There is, of course, a possibility that the currently dominant coalition of

teacher supporters and moderates will continue to be maintained in power, and

the substantial persuasive powers of the superintendent will prevail.

Social and Demographic History

Riverview is a self-contained city with its own industrial base and

suburban developments. According to 1979 district data the population was

approximately 127,000, an increase of 33 percent since 1970. While all

portions of the district have grown, the expanding bedroom communities in the

western portion have expanded faster. Families with school aged children have

tended to settle in the newer areas with the consequent strong push to build

new buildings and direct services toward the areas of growth. This change has

contributed to the creation of factions on the school board and resentment

toward residents of the bedroom communities who "simply moved out here to get

away from the city, who are Catholic, and have no ties to the original town."

It has reduced the commonweal support the district once enjoyed. As the

school district director of community relations stated: "Over the years, our

effort has increasingly been directed at getting out the vote in the portions

of the district where school children reside. This emphasis, plus the general

aging of a large portion of the population in the original community, has made

it very difficult to pass bond referendums." The last three referendums, one

in 1980 and two in 1979, all failed by substantial majorities, this despite a

variety of campaign tactics (i.e. high visibility vs. low visibility, personal

contact vs. telephone banks, hiring professional campaign firms vs. organizing the effort locally) employed by the district. In fact, the last referendum to pass in Riverview was held in 1974 when funds were approved to construct five schools, all but one to be located in the newer communities. Additional tax .levy for the education fund have not been approved since 1964. The primary source of negative votes for all referendum initiatives has come from the older portions of the district where one community member who was interviewed said: "Look, I've already sent my children through this school system and besides teachers get all the money anyway, not the kids."

Collective Bargaining. Collective bargaining came to Riverview in the late 1960s. The first wide reaching contract was negotiated in 1969-70. Since that time there has been a growth of substantial labor relations expertise on the part of both labor and management. Negotiating for the teachers has passed from being a rather honorific task rotated among volunteer teachers to one largely conducted by the state teacher organization, which provides the district a full-time staff member, and trained teachers.

The teachers organization enjoys wide popular support among the rank-and-file, and it is viewed as being one of the best run in the state, something that attracted us as researchers to the district.

The teacher organization in Riverview has approximately 1,100 teachers. (In addition, there are 393 full-time and 386 part-time classified employees employed in the system.) The percentage of membership and the subsequent operating budget have increased steadily throughout the decade so that by the 1978-79 school year 91.5 percent of all teachers had joined the organization and the operating budget had increased to $44,200 a year.

The current superintendent had been the chief management negotiator for the early contracts, but he relinquished his position shortly after he assumed the superintendency in 1971. A period of labor unrest followed. There was a two day strike in 1971 followed by a one day-strike in 1972.

In 1973-74, a new negotiator was appointed by the teachers, and he was generally perceived to be "exceptionally abrasive" by a majority of the management team. A three year contract was negotiated, the first multi-year agreement. However, in 1975-76 a three day strike ensued over economic reopeners to the 1974 contract. Management was unsuccessful in keeping the schools open.

During the 1976-77 school year, labor changed its chief negotiator once again and management followed suit in an attempt to move from a First Intergenerational confrontation to the Second Generation. The net result, at least partially because these two chief negotiators were long on logic and short on rhetoric and because the new board negotiator was a former activist in the teacher organization, was two years of relative labor peace, the signing of a new two year agreement with economic re-openers the second year and the obvious absence of outside assistance. As management's chief negotiator stated: "We attempted to lower our voices and work together in our mutual goal of achieving labor peace." The managerial attitude expressed by this chief negotiator is both an acceptance of Second Generation bargaining strategy and an identification of the superintendent's management style.

In 1978-79 the labor harmony disintegrated. By September no contractual agreement had been reached and a three-day strike began. On the first day, management attempted to open school, but had to close by 10:00 a.m. The following day management attempted the same strategy, however, all buildings

were again closed by 9:45 a.m. The regular school program resumed two days later after one other board member sided with the three pro-labor members and agreed to pay wage amnesty to the teachers for the days they did not work.

A tax referendum was defeated in the spring of 1978. Both parties realized that continued labor conflict would produce negative reaction at the polls, that the school district's financial position was deteriorating, and that programs acceptable to the school board and wages acceptable to the teachers could not be negotiated within the bounds of existing revenue. Further, the new school board elected in 1978 included two members that the teacher's considered highly anti-labor, and so they were particularly anxious to avoid overt conflict. These factors caused the superintendent and the leadership of the teacher organization to adopt a most unusual bargaining stance--one requiring a high level of mutual trust and confidence.

First they agreed that there would be no strike during the following negotiations year. Then, after informal discussions, an agreement was reached whereby the school board would attempt to pass another referendum in the fall of 1979 after the teachers accepted a wage settlement not to exceed 7 percent. The agreement stipulated that contract language would not be re-opened in the hope that the community would not be aroused by labor problems.

·Finances. Despite the lack of referendum passage, and some music and physical education cuts the last few years, the district is currently in relatively sound financial condition. The Superintendent monitors expenditures carefully. And he is widely recognized as highly competent. He has persuaded the Board of Education to adopt a long term financial strategy which includes gradual adjustments in programs in order to balance the budget rather than abrupt massive reductions in either programs or personnel. This

philosophy is in keeping with his general attitude that the system must be

protected from the unpredictability of a public debate. In the

superintendent's thinking the outsiders are considered not to be persons of

high quality.

The future of financial well-being is in question. Despite the best

efforts of the board, active support from the Citizens Advisory Council, and

overwhelming participation by the teachers' organization, the last three tax

referendums were defeated by overwhelming majorities. One explanation for

referendum failure in the face of overwhelming establishment support was

offered by the current board president: "The people I represent believe that

we haven't yet made significant cuts and eliminated the fat from the

budget--they won't approve a referendum until we first get our house in

order."

In addition, labor unrest over the last decade has created the erroneous

impression that teachers as a group are receiving an increasingly large

proportion of the education budget. In fact, a decade ago, Riverview had a

total operating budget of almost $17-million, roughly 85 percent of which was

spent in the education fund, mostly for teacher salaries. By 1978-79, the

total operating budget had increased to over $25-million and the per pupil

expenditure rate had doubled, but the amount of money spent in the education

fund had increased to only slightly over 86 percent of the total operating

fund--a clear indication that teacher salaries have not been substantially

increased when compared to the rest of the budget.

Labor Relations And School Board Politics

Four clusters of political influence operate within Riverview school

politics, and over the last decade, these have combined in various coalitions. The four are:

1. <u>Community Elites</u> representing Riverview's old families and traditional economic interests.

2. <u>The teacher organization</u>

3. A collection of <u>Watchdog Groups</u> and

4. A <u>Citizens Advisory Council</u> representing professional and business interests.

School board candidates in Riverview, according to one prominent old guard member, used to be drawn primarily from the business hierarchy, all of whom lived in town and found their self-interests compatible with a commonly held concept of quality education. This began to change over a decade ago when the bedroom communities began to grow and many community leaders took up residency in socially prestigious communities outside the school district and only came downtown to operate their businesses. Thus, traditional community elites have declined in influence largely because they have declined in level of activity. As the public relations director of the Chamber of Commerce put it: "It's just darn hard to get people to take a unified community/business approach when their community interests are directed toward the needs of their children in another town." It is clear that many old-line community leaders perceive that the educational standards have been lowered by the loss of enlightened, civic-minded, elitist leadership on the board of education.

The teacher organization has been extremely active in electoral politics, and it possesses a level of organization and sophistication that is unusual among organized teachers. In most school districts, when the teachers say they supported candidates they meant that they made a public endorsement,

made a contribution to the campaign or provided some in-kind services such as
postage or printing. In Riverview, teacher support means the activation of a
precinct-level organization complete with phone banks, transportation to the
polls and the other aparatus usually associated with a political party or a
machine.

However, despite this impressive campaign ability the success of
teachers in electing candidates has declined as teacher-activity has come to
be seen as inappropriate. The teacher organization has lost much of its
influence on board elections, or so it seems.

There was a time in the not too distant past when the teachers could
actively endorse school board candidates and be assured that they had a
reasonably good chance of winning. Prior to 1978, the board of education was
always split over the issue of teacher contractual rights. The association
was perceived to be fighting only for just wage and working conditions.
However, during that year when there was a very heated school board campaign,
a strong supporter of the teachers' association upset an incumbent board
member. The new board member claimed victory on the basis of the teachers'
endorsement and proceeded to vote in favor of most "teacher" issues. Then, as
one leader of the Chamber of Commerce stated, "The election of this candidate
woke the public up and made them realize just how much power the teachers had
gained." The school board member subsequently drew great attention to herself
by supporting a wage amnesty provision in a strike settlement, an action that
galvanized political opposition to the teachers. During the same year the
teacher organization, in an attempt to broaden its political influence,
actively supported a candidate in the election for a city office. Although
the candidate was defeated, the endorsement was interpreted by the press as

the teachers' organization attempting to extend its influence into areas that were beyond its rightful perimeters.

Watchdog groups concerned with taxes or school operations have been conspicuously visible and verbally aggressive throughout the last decade. However, the significance of their relationship to teacher organizations has changed over the years. In the early 1970s the litmus test of candidate purity for the watchdog groups was to agree in advance of the endorsement to "dismantle the teachers' contract." Despite the abundance of watchdog groups, a board of education never has been elected with a clear mandate. In 1973 the two elected school board members were publicly split in their attitudes toward labor relations. The pattern repeated itself in the board elections of 1974, 1976, 1977, and 1978. In 1979, for the first time a coalition in which the watchdogs participated, elected candidates in both contested races. However, the stance of watchdog candidates had changed. The successful candidate who received the primary watchdog endorsement did not run to "dismantle the teachers' contract." Rather, he ran for the board pledging to bring all elements together and to avoid another teachers' strike. The other candidate endorsed by the watchdog group can best be characterized as a compromise, single issue candidate who after successfully being seated on the school board, soon found that her single concern was not of global district interest.

The Citizens' Advisory Council is one of two organizations officially embraced by the Board of Education. The other organization recognized by the board is the PTA Council, however its influence and importance is small by comparison. The Citizens' Advisory Council provides a platform from which community members can identify with particular causes and eventualy run for

election to the school board. Advisory Council candidates are generally

broadly supportive of schools. The central office administrators generally

felt Advisory Council members have a much better understanding of the school

district's problems and therefore can be expected to be oriented toward

district-wide problem solving.

The Citizens Advisory Council is playing an increasingly important role

in the policy and decision-making process in the district by either giving or

withholding its support of tax referendum drives. The president of the

Council was reluctant to support a referendum immediately following a

teachers' strike. It was at least partially this apprehension that led the

Superintendent and leadership of the teacher organization to agree upon a

mutual pact whereby the teachers would accept a modest salary increase if the

school board did not re-open contract language for the purpose of deleting

items. This settlement allowed the Superintendent to assure members of the

Citizens Advisory Committee that new money approved would not be immediately

absorbed by the teachers' salaries, but would be used to reinstate some music

and physical education offerings which were eliminated in earlier budget

cuts.

Coalitions.

In most cases, school board candidates must be able to bring together at

least two of these four factions if they are to be successfully elected. The

dominant coalition before the 1978 election was the teacher organization and

the Citizens' Advisory Council. The watchdog group lacked cohesiveness and

the Old Guard Elites seemed to be waning in both activity and political

influence. The teacher organization managed to successfully utilize this

coalition to elect a majority of board members which most impartial observers

would define as pro-teacher, at least when they voted on labor relations
matters.

After the controversial 1978 board election coalitions became changed.
The teacher organization, which had become too controversial for many Advisory
Council members, began to seek alliance with the Old Guard elite. This new
alliance has not yet been successful by comparison and the teacher
organization has been far less visible in candidate endorsement.

The successful 1978 candidates were sponsored by the Citizens Advisory
Council and the watchdog organizations. This coalition took place because:
(1) candidates who perceive themselves to be community leaders, have recently
concluded that the "watchdog" group can be a potent political organization
whose previously elected candidates have not acted as obstructionists; (2) the
Superintendent has persuaded influential Citizen Advisory Council members to
run for the school board with the firm belief that they, because of their
Council experience, have a broader and more all-encompasing understanding of
the complex district issues. This strategy has been successfully developed
during the last two elections.

The current composition of the board of education includes persons endorsed
by each of the four major groups in coalition with the others:

1.	Teacher/Elite	Term up, will not run again
2.	Teacher	Veteran Board member
3.	Teacher	Veteran Board member, looking for new support
4.	Watchdog/Elite	Strong independent following in blue collar sections of community
5.	Watchdog/Elite	Active in non-school politics with visibility beyond the school board
6.	Watchdog/Advisory	Recently elected
7.	Watchdog/Advisory	Recently elected

The teachers still have endorsed three of the seven candidates, but they
lack a clear winning coalition in the voting and a clear winning coalition in

future elections. The Watchdog and Advisory Council elements seem quite likely to dominate in the near term future, and it is precisely these members of the board that are raising questions about the district's labor relations and the quality of education generally in the district. Many of the newer members of the board have voiced the opinion that basic student skills, once considered routine achievements acquired simply by attending school on a regular basis, are no longer being taught. It is this theme in conjunction with fiscal conservatism and the contractual loss of managerial discretion which dominates the thinking of most watchdog members.

In a very general way, many school board members, and we suspect voters, have come to believe that the teachers' organization is driving school board policy, by both limiting management's discretionary authority while increasing the amount of security and autonomy for teachers. Whether true or not, many of those interviewed perceived the teacher's contract as so extensive and so biased toward teacher interests that neither the Board of Education nor the administration could control school policy or teacher performance. As the current school board president said, "I don't mind teachers making good money, but they should not have a contract which dictates policy to the board. If I had my way, I would reduce all their protections to one page. If we did this, the teachers would be adequately protected, but the Board of Education could still determine policy."

Following second generation negotiating rules, labor and management professionals have established harmonious relations. But the informal agreement for a 7 percent settlement, constructed by the Superintendent and labor leadership prior to the beginning of formal negotiations created the suspicion that there may be collusion between the two parties. As one school

board member put it, "After all, you must remember that at heart they are all
teachers."

Labor Relations and Management

Given the contentiousness of school politics, the factions on the school
board and the level of conflict associated with labor relations, it is
surprising that Riverview has had only a single superintendent in the last
decade. (In fact, it has had only two since the close of World War II.) The
current superintendent, Joseph Henry, and his central office staff are
concerned with labor peace and building an accommodative relationship with the
teacher organization. Both Henry's personal style and his political instincts
dictate the use of accommodation.

While Henry has lost some critical bargaining rounds to the teachers, or
perhaps because of these losses, he is keenly aware of the disruption that
another protracted strike might have on both his and the district's future.
He sees no need to make the teacher organization a less important part of the
school's governance. Over the years he has learned to not only accept the
organization as a viable part of the educational system, but also utilize it
to alert him to administrative practices which are abusive or ineffective.
Henry does not consult the teacher organization on all district matters. For
example, he explicitly kept them away from the adoption of new disciplinary
procedures at some of the building sites, he accepts them as a part of the
managerial structure.

The district's accommodative attitude has produced two types of effects
at the school building level. The first is accommodation or "fractional
bargaining" on the part of principals in which they reinterpret or ignore
sections of the contract on a selective basis. This, despite strictures from

the central office that they adopt uniform personnel practices. The second

reaction is frustration on the part of principals and voiced feelings of loss

of autonomy because the contract impinges on the actions that could have

otherwise been taken.

For example, one high school principal when asked to describe the nature

of contract implementation, stated that he had a sound working relationship

with the teachers and on more than one occasion had "covered a class for a

teacher" and not required that person to use personal leave time even though

this practice was clearly forbidden by the contract. In another elementary

school, the principal stated that "teachers down here know how to work with

me, and we work together not to get caught doing something wrong. People who

don't understand the system here are encouraged to transfer to other

occupations." Finally, one elementary principal strongly condemned the

contract as being most restrictive. Yet, she was able to say: "I can't ever

act like a principal here if I pay too much attention to this document, I

mostly have to ignore it and play like I don't understand it if someone asks.

If you're smart you don't get caught." While the central administration has,

because of teacher collective bargaining activities, developed a fairly good

working relationship with the teacher leadership, some principals contend that

this arrangement has been at the cost of their autonomy. One junior high

school principal contends that "I am no better than a shop foreman now who has

to deal with the teachers' shop steward before I can do anything in their

building." In a grievance against this principal, the arbitrator, restricted

his ability to make assignments of after school duties. In another case, the

central office told a building administrator that he could not reassign

teachers on the basis of "gut reaction" even though the contract did not

specifically prohibit the action he had contemplated. Finally, in a third

incident, a principal was ordered to apologize to the teachers in his

building, because he alledgedly overstepped First Amendment rights by

prohibiting teachers from discussing strike issues in his building.

School principals in Riverview have learned through experience that if

they challenge the central office's perception of proper labor relations

administration, they lose in an embarrassing way. Therefore, many have

adopted a "streetwise logic" which calls for the informal negotiation of

separate "sweetheart" contracts with the faculty members in their building.

These contracts allow principals to maintain an authority base while at the

same time providing teachers with relief from excessive contractual demands

which call for accurate accounting of all personal time. Those principals who

accepted teacher collective bargaining as a reality of life, were most

effective in adopting "street wise logic". Those middle managers who at one

time perceived that they possessed total autonomy and now are constrained

because of the contract, most often characterized themselves as being

"buffeted around" and no longer able to be as effective in their jobs as they

once thought they were.

One of the effects of a strong teacher organization is the establishment

in many teachers' minds of dual loyalty, to the institution and to the labor

organization which becomes the primary support system for many teachers. As

one teacher put it: "when problems occur in my classroom or with parents, I

take my complaint to the building representative first who I know will work

hard to solve the problem in my favor."

A second result of the teacher's influence was discovered after

interviews with teachers were analyzed. They suggest that the former stigma

of administrative approval or disapproval has lost its importance primarily because the procedural safeguards established in the collective bargaining agreement have replaced the need for administrative praise and has eliminated the possibility of reprisal. In many cases peer or organizational values have replaced administrative ones. For example, one elementary teacher who repeatedly stayed after the contractual dismissal time to prepare for the following day's instruction. One day this teacher told the principal that while she would still like to be able to follow her previous practice, the building representative had counseled her to stop staying later than required because it was making the rest of the teachers look bad by comparison. Under this peer pressure, the teacher choose not to stay.

Finally, the teachers' organization has become a communications and appeal mechanism for management. A principal noted that he, as well as other principals, use the teachers' organization to procure additional supplies or aides. He said, "If the teacher organizatio.. grieves, they get what they want, however, if I call downtown it is hard to get an unbiased hearing. I'd rather let the teachers get it for me."

Summary

In the Riverview case in a generational context: Riverview was a First Generation district during the era when the superintendent was the chief school board spokesman and labor was represented by a rotating "in house" teacher representative. The period between 1969 and 1971 marked the First Intergenerational struggle in which both fact finders and mediators were used to eventually construct a master contract as a basis for future negotiations. The First Intergenerational struggle was not characterized by a job action nor

was there a change of superintendents. The community did not react

negatively, and the school board composition was not radically altered. In

1971, the Superintendent relinquished his position as chief negotiator and the

teachers assigned their negotiating duties to a regional director.

During the Second Generation, management has attempted to establish a

new working relationship with the teachers, this despite several rough years

of strikes and other job actions. The teachers have assumed both credibility

as a political entity and as part of the management system of the school

district. During this Second Generation period both management and labor have

become quite comfortable with their relationship. Management, with the help

of the teacher supported candidates, has managed around the contract in an

effort to maintain relative labor peace and insure that educational process

continues.

The school board members represent several generational persuasions.

There are still two members who are firmly committed to accommodation with

teachers and who are quite comfortable with the Second Generation format.

Another board member, who also was elected with teacher support, is now

comfortable with Second Generation bargaining, however, he is very pragmatic

and could either progress or regress generationally depending upon the

political momentum. Two other board members can be characterized as First

Intergenerational actors, because they have never fully acepted the legitimacy

of either the contract or the teacher organization. One of these is a

prominent citizen who has significant influence over the other. The school

board president, while he completely accepts the legitimacy of the contract,

and the teachers' organization, wants to delete objectionable clauses. In

this regard he is not pleased with Second Generation bargaining and must

therefore be described as a Second Generation transitional actor. The final board member seems to represent the kind of candidate who is most electable in the future. He is a supporter of the superintendent and seems to be most comfortable in a Second Generational mold.

The superintendent was influential in persuading this last school board member to run for election. If this type of candidate can be perpetually persuaded to run and can be elected, the superintendent may be able to prevent generational change in the near future. If, however, more actors of the board president's and First Intergenerational board member's mold are elected, the district could move quickly into a Second Intergenerational Conflict and perhaps a Third Generation of bargaining. There is also the unlikely possibility that there will be a movement back toward refighting the First Intergenerational Struggle. Clearly, some of the current school board members do not feel that the teacher organization is a legitimate representative of the teachers. However, this is seen as extremely unlikely in Riverview because of the electoral strength of the teachers and the shyness of the school board for an open confrontation. Indeed, in none of the study districts has there been a successful movement to retrace the First Intergenerational Conflict. The more likely result will be that the movement is toward the second intergenerational dispute in which the conservative school board members attack the teacher's contract rather than the teacher organization. Any number of events may precipitate this change: replacement of even one or two school board members, a change in top level management or the executive of the teacher organization, or continued financial pressure that draws the parties so far apart that there are few resources left with which to form a compromise.

Tipid Village

ACCIDENTAL POLICY FLOWING FROM LABOR RELATIONS

Tipid Village is a geographically compressed elementary district which has approximately 874 students, 36 teachers, a superintendent, and two building principals. Many Tipid Village residents also reside in that portion of the Industrial City High School District which is populated by blue collar workers with Eastern European heritages. Although some new homes are being built on the west side of the district, most of the available land has already been developed.

As in Industrial City, many of the Tipid Village residents attended local schools and therefore expect teachers to perpetuate the traditions and values of the previous generation. As might be expected, loyalty and allegiance are valued highly in this working class community. As one school board member said: "Teachers who don't follow the rules around here and refuse to teach values need to find somewhere else to teach." Teacher salaries were compared to the hourly wage rate of community workers as the superintendent said: "That's the language that people in this community understand. When people realize what teachers make per hour, it's a whole lot easier to argue for a smaller percentage increase." A school board member shared the same opinion. He said: "People in this town who work shifts all year aren't making as much money as the average teacher who only works 185 days." When a union spokesman attempted to counter this argument (which arose during negotiating session) by discussing the number of years teachers prepare

for the profession and the amount of work they do at home, this same board

member responded by saying: "Teachers' work just doesn't compare to the

hardship of shift work and manual labor." Thus, in Tipid Village, there is a

rather low regard for formal education and "working" is defined as manual

labor.

Labor and Contractual History .

The contemporary management/labor relationship in Tipid Village first

came about in 1967-68 when the school board arbitrarily fired five of the

approximately 40 teachers, 15 percent of the teaching staff. One labor leader

summarized her feelings at the time by saying, "We were simply shocked by the

board's action and for a while we didn't know what to do." Inertia soon gave

way to action and the teachers requested help from the state's top labor

organizations; the Illinois Education Association and the Illinois Federation

of Teachers. Only the Illinois Federation of Teachers responded to this plea

and, as a result, it became the official bargaining union. As the Tipid

teacher organization president stated, "By coming to our meeting, they earned

the right to represent us."

When the mass firing took place, the teachers attended a school board

meeting to question the action and were told: "We don't have to give you any

reasons for these firings because it's none of your business." This statement

was perceived by rank and file members as irrational and led the teachers to

believe that the board suffered from insensitivity, paternalism, and a basic

lack of respect for the dignity of their work. As a result, the first

inter-generational struggle began which culminated in the psychological

acceptance of the written bargaining agreement, the electoral defeat of the

powerful school board member and the replacement of the district's chief

executive. Eventually, the first inter-generational crisis passed and the district entered the second-generational mode of high conflict with comparatively few strike-related scars. Tension increased rapidly and within a few days the teachers conducted a "sick-out," there was a representation election, and the district legitimized the teachers by agreeing to formally bargain with them over wage and working conditions.

Partially as a result of the district's labor turmoil, the superintendent was fired soon after the teacher organization was recognized. According to the former Union president, the firing was generated by the dominant school board member who was disgusted with the way the labor relations issue was settled. She said: "He was really mad and let people know it. Really, he was embarrassed because without his extreme action we probably still wouldn't have a union here."

Partially as a result of community norms, the collective bargaining process flowed smoothly once the first-generational issue of legitimacy was resolved. The first master contract was signed in 1968 and addressed only the issue of wages. In 1969, a few working conditions were added to the contract; and, by 1970, the document was sufficiently expanded to include class size, sick leave, binding grievance arbitration, and additional provisions that dealt with teacher compensation. The language of the document has remained substantially intact since the early 1970's.

Management accepted the concept of collective bargaining with mute resistance because they believed that the teachers were both (a) not aggressive or astute enough to literally interpret the document and (b) willing to accept modest wage increases for expanded contractual language. As the superintendent states: "The school board knew what it was doing when they

gave them all that contract language. The teachers know that if they don't

accept the money we give them, then we'll just open up the contract's language

and take away something." As a result of this attitude, which was at least

informally accepted by both parties, a system of delegated managerial

responsibility developed wherein teachers exchanged larger wage increases for

significant influence over educational issues like curriculum selection,

course development, and classroom autonomy. As one state Union leader said

when talking about Tipid Village's historical development, "The teachers got a

lot of freedom to do what they wanted to do, but the price they paid was

keeping their mouth shut." Another union leader reflected upon this agreement

by saying, "At the time, it looked like a pretty good deal because no one felt

that teachers here would ever go on strike for any reason."

Management's acceptance of this arrangement with the Union effectively

bought peace until the 1979 teachers' strike. It also allowed virtual

abandonment of policy decisions relating to teacher dismissal and improved

classroom instruction to become accidental by-products of the bargaining

process. For example, one school board member talked at length about a

teacher with a drinking problem who could not be removed from the system

because the contract prohibited the principal from entering a tenured

teacher's room without prior notice. While it was clear that this board

member blamed the state tenure laws for causing "part of the problem," he also

stated that "you have to live by the terms of the contract whether they are

good or bad." Another school board member who is concerned about "teachers

not teaching like they used to," talked about how the contract "blocked the

principals from uncovering bad teachers and doing something about them." He

continued by saying: "The teachers know they've got a lot of protection so

they cover for one another--you never see a bad evaluation on any of them."
While both professional management and labor have grown accustomed to the
parameters of the contract, at least two board members are showing
characteristics associated with the second inter-generational
struggle--namely, the inability to replace incompetent teachers and perceived
collusion between management and labor brought about by the bargaining
agreement.

The 1979 strike was an interesting contrast to the previous one because
it was essentially a technical failure in collective bargaining rather than an
ideological dispute over the existence of the teachers as an independent
voice. In essence, the 1979 strike was unavoidable because the two chief
negotiators had firmly anchored beliefs about the process of negotiation
which, when applied to teacher salary increases, were incompatible.

Management's concept of bargaining was driven by their overwhelming
desire to balance the district's budget. Since any large expenditure (such as
increased teachers' salaries) was detrimental to this goal, the superintendent
and board of education violently objected to the Union's initial demand for an
18 percent raise. This double digit figure was particularly shocking to most
board members because in 1977 and 1978 the teachers had accepted salary
increases of three and four percent.

Management was convinced that the teachers would eventually accept their
final wage offer and therefore they adopted a negotiating strategy which,
while it accurately reflected their views, conveyed a different message to the
Union. Instead of moving slowly upward from their initial wage proposal of 2
percent, management escalated to their final wage offer of 7 percent in a very
short period of time. The Union, however, viewed 7 percent as a point of

departure for future negotiations and accused management of "negotiating in bad faith" when they refused to discuss a higher compromise figure.

The fiscal position of the Tipid Village schools is a very important issue. For some time the district had been spending more money than it had collected. From 1977 to 1979 the superintendent effectively narrowed the deficit gap by persuading the teachers to take minimal salary increases. He argued that large raises in the base salary was a permanent step which would have a negative psychological impact upon the teachers. He stated, "If I let the teachers think they're getting a big raise this year, they'll only come back and ask for a lot more next year and we'll never balance the budget." The school board unanimously supported this budget balancing approach. As the board president stated, "Getting this budget under control is simply more important than teachers getting cost of living increases. Right now we have to use our working cash fund every year just to give any kind of salary increase." (The working cash fund is a levy which the school district may abolish and reinstate at the end of each fiscal year. The outstanding interfund loans from working cash are paid to the education fund, which is the source of personnel salaries.)

In 1979-80, the superintendent and board of education talked about the same budget balancing strategy of limiting the size of the wage settlement in matter-of-fact tones--as though it were a _fait accompli_. When the teacher organization resisted this argument, several board members reacted in a hostile manner. One said: "What kind of educated idiots are you--don't you understand this is the only way to save money?" Another said: "Well, if you are crazy enough to continue pushing us and strike, don't let the door hit you in the fanny on the way out." The superintendent was equally unhappy with the

new labor resistance. He said: "The teachers just won't listen to
reason--they're not bright enough to know when they have it good."

Labor's interpretation of the budget-balancing process was slightly
different. The Union president stated: "Sure, we went along with three and
four percent raises the last couple of years because we knew it was important
for them to balance the budget--so we helped them out. Now, however, they're
trying to do this on a regular basis. This year when we really need the money
to catch up to the cost of li.ing, they won't help us out." In a very real
sense the teachers did not perceive themselves to be less rational. Instead
they felt betrayed by management.

In 1979, the teacher organization employed an "outside" chief negotiator
from the Illinois Federation of Teachers, a persistent man, slow to anger and
consistent in his beliefs that negotiators were most productive when both
sides mutually respected each other. As he said: "Negotiations is a two-way
street. You don't expect to win every time but neither do you expect the
other side to consistently stonewall the issue."

Management considered him an outsider who was hindering the negotiations
process. One school board member best summarized management's frustration
when he angrily walked out of a particular negotiating session. On his way
out the door he shouted back over his shoulder at the Union's chief
negotiator: "I'm tired of that same old stuff--we told you a long time ago
it's 7 percent and no more. It was 7 percent then, it is 7 percent today and
it will be 7 percent forever."

The negotiators in Tipid Village met on a regular basis for six months
without perceptible movement. The bargaining process finally disintegrated
and a week-long strike ensued which was eventually settled when the teachers

received a 9 percent raise but were not paid for the days they were on

strike.

While both parties typically share responsibility for work stoppages,

the 1979 Tipid Village strike was primarily generated by management. One

particularly knowledgeable labor relations negotiator, who is associated with

a large Chicago law firm, accurately described the situation in Tipid Village

when he said: "Sometimes a board of education can bargain too tough and bring

on a strike. It's simply not enough for school boards to be tougher than

their Union counterparts because the entire system can suffer a demoralizing

blow if boards consistently win too big a victory. Repetitious displays of

the victory banner only breed resentment among the rank and file."

Analysis: A Case of Accidental Policy

Tipid Village stands as an example of accidental policy. The district,

in effect, gave the teachers great autonomy in running the educational aspects

of the schools in return for stability and fiscal solvency. It may be that

"accidental" may be too sharp a term, for in many ways the policy balance that

stood for more than a decade was completely consistent with the culture and

values of the community. The community did not value being on the forefront

of education, but it did value stability and economics. These values resulted

from the tradeoffs that it made in its early collective bargaining period.

So, perhaps the policy was not entirely accidental, but it was clearly

implicit and unspoken, and partly because the understandings between teachers

and administrators were implied and not stated, they were also not fully

understood, and the "technical" strike of 1979 raised the growth of

dissatisfaction in the district and the expectations that teacher work may

become more inspected in the future.

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By negotiating contract language which gives the teachers extensive latitude over curriculum decisions, the principals are facilitators rather than educational leaders. In this regard, the work rules are determined jointly by the superintendent and labor leadership which means that the principal's job is that of implementation. As one principal stated, "The teachers run themselves and I have little to say about curriculum or evaluation. As long as I provide the things the teachers need like heat, shelter, washroom facilities, and so forth, everything runs smoothly." The other principal stated: "My main job is to keep this plant operating. That means I spend most of my time talking to parents about their children. I spend very little time with teachers because they go to the superintendent."

While both principals contend that their jobs are easier because the contract "tells us what we can and cannot do," they also are concerned about the impact of the contract's boundaries on their decisions. For example, one stated: "I can't call meetings with teachers without giving them 24 hours' advance notice and then the meeting has to be held between 8:30 a.m. when teachers arrive and 8:40 a.m. when classes begin." The other principal stated: "Since we can't evaluate tenured teachers at any time, we have to rely on parents to tell us when things are going badly in the classroom. If we don't hear anything, we assume it's o.k."

Thus far, the school district has not heard much from the parents, at least about the conduct of education. Most citizen activity in Tipid Village is channeled into special interest "booster" clubs. For example, the band parents are a cohesive organization which, according to the superintendent, "organized and supported their own program when district funds for this activity were cut off." One board member said, "No one has ever called me

about negotiations or things like that but a whole lot of people called when
we changed the children's lunchroom schedule." A principal recalled that
during his nine years in office, "Parents have been concerned about student
behavior; however, no one has ever asked about what we teach here."

However, there is growing evidence that quietude in Tipid Village has
been deceptive. There was for years an assumption that the superintendent was
controlling the educational processes in the district. Because the place was
small, it was thought, the relationships would be close. In fact, nothing of
the sort existed. Because the superintendent had in effect traded fiscal
stability and political quiet for classroom autonomy, the lines of
communication and control between the school district and the teachers had
grown quite superficial.

The 1979 strike broke the terms of the unspoken agreement. At least a
minority of the school board members are now calling for closer scrutiny of
teacher performance and getting rid of teachers who are perceived to be weak
or incompetent.

Industrial City

MOVEMENT INTO THE THIRD GENERATION

Industrial City is a stable suburban community with a substantial manufacturing base. Its population is predominantly white with strong Eastern and middle European ties and cultures. The teachers in Industrial City have been unionized for more than 15 years, and they have been a power in running the school district for most of that time. The story of Industrial City is the story of how that power became to be viewed as excessive and the subsequent activation of the school district's political environment as a means of coping with union influence in school governance and operations.

The high school district includes two separate communities, each with different ethnic compositions and other characteristics. One is substantially more industrialized and blue collar than the other. The communities are not without rivalry, and this is accentuated because different political parties dominate the administration of the towns and because each town sends it students to a different high school. (There is also an adult school, which has a separate campus.)

The 1970 census reflects the stability and ethnicity of Industrial City. The population is largely Polish, German and Dutch; moreover the cultural patterns of identification with homeland and its traditions remains important. A large proportion of students remain in the community after they leave high school, or return if they have gone away to college. A great majority of the school board members and citizens we interviewed were born and raised in the

same neighborhoods as their parents. They view the schools as an extension of

this culture, with two resultant con. equences: First, the quality of

schooling is judged by the perceived fit between the schools and the community

values. As one interviewee put it, "The schools here are pretty good. I went

there and did O.K., and I know that my child must be learning more than I

did." Second, the influence and authority system of the schools is based on

personal knowledge and tradition. Citizens provide continuing support based

on personal loyalty and with their expectation that their personal needs would

be cared for. Industrial City embodies the values of ward politics, even

though there were no wards.

No one remembers for sure when bargaining started, but veterans in the

district recall at least informal agreements dating back to the 1940's,

although the teacher's organization was largely a social club during those

years. The transition from a bargaining committee to a contractual

labor-management relationship took place in 1966, and was a product of both a

felt necessity on the part of teachers and of a favorable court ruling. The

teacher's felt need for a contract took place because the school board decided

that it would no longer meet with the teacher's committee on an informal

basis. The teachers responded by forming a union. The union's press for

recognition was aided by an Illinois court decision that allowed, but did not

require, recognition of unions in the Chicago school system. As the ruling

became applied to school districts outside of Chicago, the pressure on the

school board for recognition in Industrial City was intensified. That

pressure extended to a short recognition strike, but when that strike was

over, quick legitimation of the union was not difficult. A large percentage

of the population in Industrial City belongs to unions themselves. As one

respondent said, "everyone needs to have a union; the only problem here was

that the teachers got too strong." Thus, Industrial City did not go through

as extended an ideological struggle over the acceptance of a strong teacher

organization as we witnessed in many of our other research sites.

The teachers became powerful after the 1966 strike, largely because they

formed a loose alliance with the dominant school board coalition, but teachers

never really were accepted by the community. A large percentage of the

teachers continue to live outside the district boundaries. Indeed, a forced

residency issue has been a major point of disagreement in recent negotiations.

The traditional loyalty considerations on the part of the board are strong. As

one board member put it, "teachers that want to get paid by the people of this

town ought to have an allegiance and live here." In a broader sense, teachers

were distant from community concerns: "teachers don't listen to parents,

because they don't live in the community and have to face us, "a school board

member commented. At the same time this board member complained that the

teachers were beyond the control of the board because he did not know them

personally, and they were thus beyond his (traditional) influence.

Labor Relations History

Following the 1966 strike and contract a highly accommodative

relationship existed between the teacher union and school officials. This

relationship is typical of what we have called late generation. It was built

on the allowance of political patronage in hiring and promotion and

continuation factions within the school board which in effect allowed the

teachers great autonomy and favorable contracts.

This relationship between union and school board was made possible by

earlier political events. For a period in 1960's, school politics had been

run largely by a consensus caucus. However, following the 1966 strike, when the issue of recognition was still in the air, the school board members elected by the caucus gained disfavor of the community and the caucus itself by refusing to acceed to the teacher's demands for recognition. As one administrator in the district put it, "board members were (seen as) being too unreasonable by not giving recognition to teachers." The conflict over labor relations was seen as a function of the school board rather than the teachers. Support for caucus candidates fell off, and voting patterns on the school board fell into a 4-3 pattern that would last for a decade. The split was based on town loyalties, and political party loyalties even through school board candidates in Industrial City do not run under party labels.

It was within this framework that the union-board coalition was to exist for more than a decade. The teachers found the board very receptive to their requests. Contract negotiations were generally easy, and the teachers received substantial amounts of autonomy as a result. There were contract clauses, for instance, that forbade the evaluation of tenured teachers, that did not allow principals or the superintendent to alter the school day without faculty permission, and there was the development of a building-wide seniority system that eventually led to serious imbalances between available teaching staff and the programmatic demands of students.

But more than the contract itself, change in the board's composition ushered in a new authority system—one in which the teacher union benefited by multiple access points to the decision making mechanisms of the school district. The union enjoyed a close relationship with the man who was the school superintendent, who had himself been a teacher in the district. It could generally achieve what it wanted from the superintendent directly. In

addition, the union maintained access to the school board directly. As one union leader told us, "we could always get a hearing before the board, and the superintendent knew it." Individual teachers, not necessarily the union leadership, were able to approach board members directly in search of their support, particularly on personnel actions. The high school principals and their assistants were clearly bypassed in the authority system.

The school board picked what were described as weak administrators and fired them frequently. During the 10 years following the caucus collapse, the district had six superintendents. Some site principals believed that the union became more dominant not because it was necessarily assertive, but because there was an administrative vacuum. As one union leader put it: "Management in the past has been afraid to make decisions because they faced getting fired, and therefore the union has to be strong to make this place operate on all eight cylinders."

The school district could thus be best pictured as a relatively straightforward patronage system. Individual teachers, more than the union, played a part in the patronage operation, but the union was brought into a permanent position of influence because the community had a low tolerance for disturbance within the school district and the teachers had a proven ability to carry off a strike.

After a decade the patronage system and the raucousness of the controversy between the board majority and the minority eventually led to a second change in governance. Discontent rose. There had been deals alleged on administrative promotions as well as on custodial employment. School district purchases were not always put out to bid. Favored teachers received highly advantageous placement on the salary schedule through "generous"

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counting of post-baccalaureate education credits. Because patronage was a

major aspect of the school district's operations, and because the split

between the voting blocs was so unstable, the controversy among board members

became particularly heated. Frequently the debates were about inconsequential

decisions, but said one observer, "it looked like a three ring circus at the

board meeting." By 1975, the chaos in the district became highly visible.

The local newspapers carried stories on almost a daily basis. These stories

included mention about irregularities in the letting of bids for a new

building and of school board members pressuring administrators to make

purchases from particular suppliers.

The Building of Political and Labor Reform

In 1975, the political alignment of the school board changed

drastically. Three independent candidates ran against the majority bloc, and

they won. Within the next year, three additional board members resigned, with

the result that within a year there was a 6-1 majority on the school board--a

majority of persons elected to bring about change in schools.

It is important to note that this new board majority did not run for or

against the teacher's union in their campaigns.

From the existing record and from interviews with school board members,

both past and present, it is not clear whether the reform was intended as a

reaction to the board's patronage activities or whether it was a case of "more

attractive candidates" showing themselves. The most pervasive theme that runs

through the interviews is one of general, diffuse dissatisfaction. The one

big issue was the chaos in the district, but there was no grand coalition, and

the victorious candidates did not run as a slate.

Only after the election did the reform of labor relations become an

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important task for the new board majority. As one board member put it:

> I don't think that the people who ran had any knowledge to
> any great extent of what they were getting into when they
> ran other than they wanted to rectify what they considered a
> fault in the district. They didn't know how to accomplish
> that when they first sat on the board. I didn't know what
> the (teacher's labor) contract looked like before I got on
> the board.

The diffuse feelings of dissatisfaction produced a mandate for strong administration after the election. The old superintendent, who was characterized as "waiting to retire," was allowed to wait no longer, and the board set about to employ an executive who had the skills and abilities to "lead the district rather than observe its movement." The superintendent search was exhaustive, and after a period of instability during which there was a series of interim appointments a new superintendent was appointed in the spring of 1978.

The decision to hire the new superintendent was given direction and impetus by the building principals, who after the board elections felt they had gained an understanding ear. The principals, sensing a change in the board attitude wrote a position paper that argued that the union contract and the union's influence in the school district were at the root of the district's difficulties. The memorandum complained about four areas in the contract. The first was the inflexibility in scheduling brought about by incorporation of the school day in the contract. In Industrial City the contract language was quite specific; extending to the times that particular periods were to be dismissed as well as the more usual starting and ending times for the school day. Special events, such as school assemblies, were difficult to schedule and required the principals to engage in ad hoc negotiations with the building representatives of the teacher's union for each

desired change,

The principal's memorandum also complained about the very broad
grievance language which allowed teachers the right to grieve the policies and
practices of the school district as well as the contract itself. The
assignment of parking spaces, for instance, was the subject of a grievance.
As a result, the principals grew timid generally understanding that a show of
authority on their part would be met with a grievance. Also the contract had
effectively removed tenured teachers from performance evaluation. Finally,
the principals complained about the removal of the power to assign teachers to
extra duties. Prior to the 1966 contract, assignment to duties such as lunch
room supervision has been at the discretion of the principal. Following the
negotiation of that contract a rotation system took place, which the
principals said prevented them from assigning the most effective teachers to
the tasks to which they were most suited. (Teachers said the old system
allowed favoritism and an unfair distribution of unpopular duties.) In sum,
the principals argued that the new superintendent should be a person who
understands labor relations and one able to re-establish school board control
and in their word, "win back the keys to the store." The board agreed.

Thus, the new superintendent came to office in the Spring of 1978 with a
clear mandate for change in labor relations and district organization. He is,
it is generally agreed, tough. He believes in strong line authority, a
classic public bureaucracy reinforced by rules. He believes that the labor
contract should be among the most important of those rules. In 1978, the new
superintendent's role in negotiations was minor, but in 1979 he dominated the
process. He went to the table with bargaining issues of his own. He wanted
to regain management flexibility over the school day, over the ability of

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principals to evaluate teachers and over changes in the curriculum offerings of the two major high schools. He coupled his tough demands with an equally tough bargaining stance in which he developed specific packages in which management concessions on wage, salary and working conditions were explicitly linked to labor concessions on contractual language and management control.

The superintendent's bargaining style proved as hard for the union to swallow as his terms and conditions. The superintendent created packages and suggested to management's chief negotiator, who was the school board president, an attorney, that he present a new package at each negotiating session. These were essentially, take-it-or-leave-it proposals. They put the momentum of negotiations on management's side of the table and lead to anger and frustration on the union side, where members accused management of "playing games." Union leaders could not agree to management's packages, could not abide management's unwillingness to open the packages and negotiate the contents, and did not understand that management was seeking a response of labor-created packages.

After four months of bargaining, the union undertook what its leaders later called a "frustration strike." There was no hope of winning concessions from the school board, and the union could only keep its members out for three days before settling on what were essentially management's pre-strike terms. However, the strike was seen as necessary by the union leaders as a means of reestablishing solidarity among the teachers. The union had gotten what it wanted without a fight for so long that even a losing fight was seen as having some residual benefit.

Conclusion

Industrial city is unusual, a valuable research site, because it alone

among the eight school districts we intensively studied exhibited the

characteristics of management agressiveness and commitment toward policy

through contract that we have come to call the Third Generation.

It should be noted that the public hardening of opinion and the school

board's toughness was not an attempt to disestablish the teacher organization.

Management was bent on winning specific concessions. As we followed

negotiations during the troubled summer of 1979, we heard no comments, even

privately voiced ones, that the goal was to return the district to a non-union

status. During times of conflict in other districts, we have heard such

opinions. It was the board's belief that the union had become a permanent

part of the school district's operations, and the new superintendent was hired

to deal with it directly, through the contract.

APPENDIX C

CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

As originally planned, this research project was to employ three distinct
methods:

1. a series of comparative case studies (N=6),
2. a small sample (N=35) unstructured interview study
3. a moderate sample (N=200) structured interview and
    document study.

The purpose of the case studies was to clarify and indéntify measurable
indicators of the operational characteristics of each of three theoretical
models posited in the research proposal. The case studies would identify and
analyze leadership styles, substantive issues, and group influence structures
within school governance and the labor-management relationship as the
bargaining year progressed.

The 35 site unstructured interview sample was to have provided the data
needed for defining and testing some of the basic hypotheses implicit within
the original framework or hypotheses which arose out of the case studies. It
was anticipated that through guided interview techniques, it would be possible
to gather a set of richly textured data which would permit both substantive
exploratory probing for solid indicators and a testing of some indicators by
means of at least rough-and-ready nonparametric statistical techniques.

The larger sample survey was proposed with two essential purposes in
mind. The first was to test whether the earlier work on the smaller samples
had been able to identify adequate, measureable, meaningful and reliable

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indicators of the theoretical framework being tested. The second purpose for

the larger survey was to get an adequate descriptive picture of the extent and

character of various collective bargaining processes and structures as they

occur in the population of school districts under study. Only a moderately

large survey would provide an adequate basis for determining the extent to

which school districts generally share critical features identified in case

study sites.

The methodology originally proposed was altered in three significant ways

as the research unfolded.

First, it became apparent that limiting our case study work to six

districts would not sufficiently cover the wide variations within each state's

labor relations patterns nor would it permit reasonable comparisons across

states. The number of case study sites were therefore expanded to eight, four

in each state.

Second, the survey strategy for the N of 35 had to be revised because it

became apparent that one key informant in each survey district would not

suffice to give us an adequate picture of the widely varying perceptions in

each district. Instead, three key actors within each district were

interviewed, using a semi-structured interview format which allowed time for

several open ended questions.

As a result of this change, third stage (the N of 200) sampling was

combined with the second stage. Instead of 35 followed by 200 sites, we

selected 90 sites in the two states for both semi-structured interviews and

distribution of a survey questionnaire. 2,000 questionnaires were distributed

to interviewees, school district personnel, school board members, and involved

community members. Structured interviews were held with the superintendent,

board chairman and teacher organization leader in each district. Mail and

personally distributed questionnaires went to others in districts. The

questionnaires served to elaborate and confirm interviewee perceptions as well

as a useful way of gathering important data about labor relations in each of

the survey districts.

Survey interviews in each state were begun in January, 1980 and completed

by June, 1980. Questionnaires were distributed at the same time and followed

up on an ongoing basis. (See chronology in Figure C.1.)

Method of Selection

Case Study Sites. Selection of case study sites began in February, 1979.

The intent was to provide substantially different types of case examples in

districts which varied as to size, demographic characteristics and financial

stability, but which had an active labor relations history.

In California, the search began using California Public Schools Selected

Statistics, 1976-77 and Profiles of School District Performance, 1977-78

(California State Department of Education). The research narrowed its focus

to 50 possible sites selected on the basis of: 1) representativeness, 2)

organizational stability, 3) level of collective bargaining activity, 4)

evidence of citizen participation in district affairs, 5) whether or not

bargaining would take place during 1979-1980.

Very large districts (Los Angeles) were rejected as requiring more

manpower than the project had available. Small elementary and high school

districts of less than 4000 enrollment were rejected. Generally their union

locals were weak, and engaged in the form but not the substance of

negotiation.

FIGURE C.1

RESEARCH CHRONOLOGY

	1979	1980
	J F M A M J J A S O N D	J F M A M J J A S O N D

Site Criteria	XXX
Sites selected	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Case study interviews	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Districts Settle	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Survey developed	XXXXXXX
Quest. developed	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
N of 80 interviews	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Questionnaires distributed	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Case study analysis	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Survey Analysis	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Questionnaire analysis	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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Five students as well as the research associate and principal investigator then interviewed appropriate personnel in 18 districts selected as possibilities. The student researchers were given instruction on interviewing techniques and provided with a list of questions and areas of inquiry to pursue. Interviews were open-ended; the goal was to discover the history and nature of collective bargaining in each district, citizen and community participation in collective bargaining (if any), and possible contacts for further information.

In addition to district based queries, the team interviewed citizens and staff associated with the Information Project on Educational Negotiations (IPEN) and attended the groups' southern California workshop (March 1979) and interviewed John Donaldson, director of negotiations for the California Teacher's Association. Leads from these sources were followed and two additional sites added to the list of eighteen.

Some 43 interviews were conducted in the 20 districts between March and July 1, 1979.

The Illinois research team began by interviewing Joseph Cronin, State Superintendent of Education, on March 1, 1979 and obtained from him a list of influential and knowledgeable public sector labor relations veterans including Ron Booth, Illinois Association of School Boards, Ken Drum, President of the State of Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT), Ken Bruce, Chief, Illinois Educators' Association (IEA) lobbyist, and Leo Hennessey, Illinois Office of Education (IOE) troubleshooter and mediation specialist.

During each interview with the individuals listed above, the research team emphasized the importance of identifying districts with a high level of collective bargaining, citizen participation and/or vivid and activist

collective bargaining histories. Other significant variables included a
representational sample of both union (IFT) and association (IEA) district,
maximized differentiation between management-union leadership and operational
styles, identification of at least one district which had an officially
recognized citizen's advisory committee or its equivalent and one district
that exhibited a rather closed decision-making posture. As was the case in
California, the research team attempted to identify districts with colorful
labor relations' histories, districts which considered teacher collective
bargaining to be a highly significant educational phenomena and districts
where both sides demonstrated a spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm for the
project. The team additionally attempted to identify districts with varying
degrees of union strength, districts with pupil population of at least 4,000
students, and finally districts which employed different types of chief
negotiators on both sides of the table.

Screening interviews were held in some ten districts that met the general
criteria. Some were rejected because they were not bargaining this year,
others rejected because some facet of their organization made them seem highly
idiosyncratic. Finally, some sites were eliminated because the research team
did not feel that it could obtain the extent of access and openness that was
needed to conduct the research.

Survey Sites. For the forty-five survey sites in each state, a cluster
sample of districts was drawn from among representative counties in each state
which were likely to have large, medium and small school districts within
them. The districts in each county were stratified and on the basis of size
and one district chosen from each of 6 levels. Five counties in each state

were drawn from; an average of 8 districts were selected for study in each

county. (See Table 4.1).

Research methodologies.

Case Studies. The research methodologies used to complete the case

studies were document collection, simple observation and interviews.

Documents were collected according to an extensive outline (Exhibit I at

the end of this Appendix). It included board minutes, business publications,

newspaper clips, research studies, and census data. The information was used

to develop a community profile and to gather h'storical information.

Board meetings, negotiation sessions, caucuses, mediation sessions and

rallies were observed to determine the tone and style of labor relations.

Interviews were conducted extensively in each district. Interviewees

included present and former board members, superintendents, principals,

negotiators, union officials, teachers, PTA leaders, League of Women Voter

members, newspaper reporters, candidates and one or two students.

Access to both the case study sites and survey sites was granted by the

Superintendent who was asked to sign a written release permitting us to

interview others in the district. In each case the school board was either

officially notified or asked to note approval for conduct of the study.

Survey Sites. Three people in each survey site were interviewed using an

interview schedule useable in districts which had contracts and as well as

those which did not (Survey attached as Exhibit II). In each district

interviews were conducted with the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent

in charge of employee relations, the school board president or designee and a

teacher association representative, (usually the association president or the

chief negotiator). In districts without representation, a teacher leader was interviewed.

The interview began with gathering factual information and continued into perceptions of labor relations and an historical summary of labor-management relations within the district. Interviews generally took no more than one hour. Some were completed in as little as one-half hour, however, while the longest took as much as two hours.

Each interview was taped except in two or three cases in which the respondents refused.

Ques. naires. Questionnaires were given to those in each district who were interviewed. (Questionnaire form in Exhibit III.) They were asked to give them to certain categories of their co-workers or employees and also to involved community members they might know. An attempt was made to ask that the questionnaires be given to active and non-active association members, to community leade s who were concerned about collective bargaining and those who were not, and to principals who had militant teachers on their faculties as well as those who did not. In some cases, superintendents asked that we distribute the questionnaire. In those cases, lists of PTA members were used as well as the school directory.

Questionnaires were distributed in the following quantities:

School board members: 1 each (5-7 per district)
Superintendent: 1 each (1 per district)
Principals: 1 for every five buildings (1-9 per district)
Union/Association: 1 for the interviewee and 2-4 for other union
    officers.
Teachers: enough questionnaires for distribution to 10 percent of the
    teachers in small districts and up to 2 percent of the teachers in
    very large districts. Actual numbers ranged from 2 - 45
    questionnaires.
Community members: 3 to 12 to each selected group. Up to nine citizen
    groups were identified in each district.

A total of 2000 questionnaires and self addressed stamped envelopes were
distributed between January and June of 1980. Some 1103 questionnaires from
69 districts were returned, 1038 of which were useable and included in the
calculations.

Analysis.

Case studies. Since the case studies were intended to be brief histories
of labor relations within the eight districts and also an in-depth look at
interesting bargaining situations in each district during the negotiating
cycle, each case district was treated as a distinctive unit with its own story
to tell. A case study outline was provided which resulted in the same kind
and amount of quantitative and interview data being gathered for each
district. Collection of similar kinds of information did not, however, result
in similar outlines for analysis. Historical and descriptive materials
gathered in each district were used to conceptualize and interpret the labor
relations picture in each district. Concepts developed during interpretations
of the case data were incorporated into the questionnaire and utilized to
interpret interview data and statistical analyses of the survey responses.

Survey Data

The three interviews gathered in each of the N of 80 districts were
subjected to three iterations of analysis.

First Iteration: Basic Categorical Information. The first pass of
categorizing the interview data involved recording selected information from
the interviews on cards (Example in Exhibit IV). Some of these data were

historical and demographic (eg. enrollment, number of years involved in

bargaining) and some involved coding or recording the perceptions of the

interviewees (e.g. the extent of financial pressure on the school district,

and the tone of labor relations.)

Work on this level was completed in September, 1980.

Second Iteration: Variables and Descriptions. This analysis, much more

time consuming than the first, required listening to all three tapes in order

to transcribe onto 6 x 8 cards direct quotes or observations which bore

directly upon:

1. the assignment of categories and whether or not each individual
   within a district had the same perception of the district's
   development,
2. the presence or absence of external events, such as a natural
   disaster, unusual community culture or an extreme financial
   situation,
3. parent participation or community participation in bargaining,
4. the effects of collective bargaining on teaching, teachers, managers
   and governance,
5. level of conflict or strife,
6. historical timeline with critical incidents indicative of
   generational movement.

At this level, certain tapes were heard by two or more researchers who

indexed the information by generation and then cross indexed by other areas of

interest, such as "conflict", "teacher militancy" or "strike aftermath."

Questionnaire Data Analysis

The final step in data analysis was statistical processing of the 1,038

usable questionnaires. As described in Chapter 4, this analysis consisted of

three basic procedures (each using the Statistical Package for the Social

Sciences, Versions 8 and 9). The first procedure involved calculating simple

descriptive statistics on 51 variables. These descriptive statistics are

reported in Chapter 4 in Tables 4.1 to 4.10.   Secondly, a one way analysis of

(ANOVA) procedure was used to determine the extent to which members of the six

basic role groups in the study (i.e. parents, teachers, teacher leaders,

principals, superintendents, and board members) could be characterized in

terms of eight social, demographic, and attitude variables.   The results of

these ANOVA's are discussed in relation to Table 4.11.

A third statistical procedure, multiple discriminant analysis was used to

test whether respondents who are members of the different role groups and/or

live in districts undergoing different stages in the evolution of labor

relations have unique perceptions regarding the teacher organizations, school

administration or school boards within their districts.   As shown in Tables

4.12a through 4.13c, these ultiple discriminant analyses are highly

significant and provide extensive corroborations of the theoretical concepts

developed during the case study data analysis process.

EXHIBIT I

Case Study Documents and Questions

1. **Identifying Information**

   1.1 SCHOOL DISTRICT FORMAL NAME, and other commonly used forms of reference

   1.2 CITY, COUNTY AND METRO AREA WHERE LOCATED

   1.3 STATE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER, IF ANY

   1.4 NUMBER OF SCHOOL SITES

   1.5 CURRENT ENROLLMENT AND 10 year history, 10 year projections, ethnic and racial breakdowns.

   1.6 Roster of administrative names (get a listing if possible)

   1.7 ORGANIZATION CHART

   1.8 Community character. While some of the data elements below are standardized, the aim here is to be able to paint a picture of the type of town it is. We have done this well in our conversations with one another. We need to be able to reduce it to writing. In addition to the raw discription, we also need our insights into what is happening here. Particularly in the formative states our hunches and hypotheses about what the town is like. As we review each other's drafts we will generate ways to confirm or challenge these assertions.

   1.8.1. POPULATION AND 10 YEAR HISTORY, 10 YEAR PROJECTIONS

   1.8.2. socioeconomic status and distribution

   1.8.3. ethnic breakdown

   1.8.4. characterization of cosmopolitaness of setting and urbanization

   1.8.5. economic base

   1.8.6. educational level

   (Districts, the public library, the municipality or the Chamber of Commerce will probably have the necessary statistical information.)

   1.8.7. political heritage and something of the history

   1.8.8. labor relations climate in the town. PERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE UNIONIZED

2. **School organization and environment information**

   2.1 NUMBER OF SUPERINTENDENT TURNOVERS IN LAST 15 YEARS. Also the story of those turnovers, the reputation of the superintendents, whether they vacated voluntarily, whether there was identifiable public opposition to them.

   2.2 School board election history in the last 15 years. Generally the tone of the elections and the reputation of the candidates and those elected. Specifically, THE NUMBER OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS, THE NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS DEFEATED AND WHEN, AND SITUATIONS IN WHICH THERE WAS UNION SUPPORT AND/OR ENDORSEMENT OF CANDIDATES. VOTER TURNOUTS.

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2.3 Major incidents, disturbances, interventions by state of federal education officials, COURT SUITS INCLUDING DESEGREGATION CASES. In addition to recording the event, we need to know something of the importance and the pervasiveness of the intervention. Some external disturbances are absorbed by the organization, handled routinely. Big city school districts get sued every week with relatively little internal notice. But some interventions are of major impact, and change the district's focus of attention away from other concerns.

2.4 Financial condition of the district. The story of its financial shape. Budget surpluses, failures of bond issues, TOTAL BUDGET, OPERATING COST PER STUDENT IN CURRENT OR MORE RECENT AVAILABLE YEAR. Attempts at bond issues, tax override elections or other opportunity for public reaction to the schools.

2.5 Relationships between other political subdivisions (e.g. city, county, township) and the school district.

2.6 Generally , the reputation and regard of the district. What people say about the schools. Differences between its reputation and what you perceive to be reality. Specifically, COPIES OF ANY PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS either commissioned by the district or done by independent concerns.

2.7 Any substantial public notice of the district by outsiders. RECENT ACCREDITATION REPORTS, INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT BY NEWSPAPERS, STATE EDUCATION OFFICIALS OR OTHERS.

2.8 Any scholarly notice of the district or its subunits. Get references, copies if possible of UNIVERSITY STUDIES, DISSERTATIONS AND THE LIKE.

3. Community Participation and Influence Structure

3.1 Describe district sanctioned committees dealing with all subjects. LIST THE COMMITTEE NAME, NUMBERS OF PEOPLE INVOLVED, NUMBER OF MEETINGS THEY HAVE, SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION. It is important to understand how these organizations function. Whether they are substantially ratification or support organizations or whether they articulate new alternatives. Whether they are advisory or whether they have some measure of independent decisional authority. The perceptions of these organizations by administrators, labor leaders and others is important. THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY, EXPERTISE AND POTENCY OF THE COMMITTEES.

3.1.1. Describe the relationship of any district sanctioned committee to labor relations.
3.1.1.1 do any of them introduce issues into negotiations.
3.1.1.2 do any of them take positions on matters under discussion at the bargaining table.

3.1.1.3 have there been instances in which these committees or task forces have affected the course of collective bargaining.
3.1.1.4 has the labor contract or the presence of the union been a factor in the process of deliberation of any of these committees or task forces.
3.1.1.5 has the labor contract or the presence of the union been a factor in the ability of a committee or task force to tender a decision or recommendation. (Has limited the scope of what these committees can do.)
3.1.2. What types of persons serve on these committees.
3.1.2.1 does membership change frequently.
3.1.2.2 do the same people serve on different committees. (The object here is to determine if there are long-standing sets of community elites and if they are now they are chosen.)
3.1.2.3 do people serving on these committees later find employment with the district.
3.1.2.4 do people on these committees later run for the school board.
3.1.3 Have there been interactions between these committees and their members and the union?
3.1.4 Have there been coalitions formed. Specify the nature of the coalition and the issues or substance involved. Particularly, whether any of the coalitions involved supports for collective bargaining issues or the formation of those issues.

3.2 Describe committees, organizations and the like concerned with educational matters that are not sanctioned by the school district. LIST THE COMMITTEE NAME, NUMBER OF PEOPLE INVOLVED, NUMBER OF MEETINGS THEY HAVE, THE SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION AND THE RESOLUTION. Note the perceptions of PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY, EXPERTISE AND POTENCY.

3.2.1 where do these organizations get their financial backing, and how much of it is there
3.2.2 is there a political constitutancy. Characterize it.
3.2.3 see questions 3.1.1 and 3.1.4 above

3.3 Have their been instances in which the known values or preferences of a segment of the community has altered school decision making without explicit voice being given to those positions.
3.3.1 have any of these situations affected the union-management relationship.

3.4 Are there segments of the community (persons or organizations) that the school board and/or superintendent feel it advisable to consult prior to making major decisions.

Note: these last two questions also approach the issue of management style and its determinants. In the language of role theory, the questions ask whether the superintendent's professional training and self are the primary role senders or whether those expectations are transmitted as part of an understood influence structure or a shared culture in the community.

3.5 Has labor relations had an impact on school board elections or other elections relating to how schools operate.

    3.5.1. Has labor relations been a campaign subject for school board elections (Either pro or anti-union)

    3.5.2. Have there been attempts by the union to select and support candidates for office.

        3.5.2.1 by overt means such as endorsement and campaign contributions.

        3.5.2.2 informal means such as having members of the organization available to help in the campaign.

3.6 Has the election of pro-union or anti-union candidates changed the functioning of the school board in terms of the issues it considers or the processes it uses.

4.   Labor Relations Information

4.1 BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES, LIST UNITS AND NUMBERS AND TYPES OF PERSONNEL IN EACH, NATIONAL AFFILIATIONS, WHEN ORGANIZED, WHEN RECOGNIZED AS A BARGAINING AGENT.

4.2 For the teacher's organization, the details of its history such as STATUS OF STAFF SUPPORT, FULL OR PART TIME PAID STAFF, SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS FROM NATIONAL ORGANIZATION, FINANCIAL STATUS, COMPETING FACTIONS WITHIN THE UNION OR COMPETING UNION ORGANIZATIONS.

    4.2.1. Decertification attempts, if any

4.3 For school administrators, the extent of their organization—whether their organization, if any, has bargaining rights, the type of its relationship with the administration, the source of its influence, if any.

4.4 Describe strikes or other job actions.

4.5 Number of teacher contracts.

4.6 Describe for the teacher organization any non-strike disturbances such as unfair labor practices charges.

4.7 Describe the grievance history. NUMBERS OF GRIEVANCES, NUMBERS TAKEN TO ARBITRATION OR TO WHATEVER FINAL STEP.

4.8 Describe the major bargaining issues in each negotiation.

4.9 Describe the process of deciding on bargaining issues and strategy in the union—openness, procedures, important groups or persons who must be considered.

    4.9.1. Have there been instances of minority opinion or pressures about the issues of bargaining. How have these been resolved.

4.10 Describe the tone of labor management relationships.

4.11 Describe the bargaining process. Tone, physical setting, level of emotion at different times.

    4.11.1 describe communications patterns. Do the opposite parties speak freely. Is communication centralized through a central spokesperson. Is message content understood by the receivers in the same way as it was by the senders.

4.12 The contract. Get copies of THE MOST RECENT CONTRACT, INITIAL DEMANDS IN THE CURRENT ROUND FROM BOTH SIDES.

    4.12.1 be able to track the path of negotiations, major concessions and the abandonment of issues.

(The contract analysis system for the case study sites will be expanded into questions for the other districts so that we can be informed about key sections of the contract rather than attempting a total analysis.)

5.   Reiteration of needed documents

Collect the following documentary information:

5.1 THE CONTRACT
5.2 Memos, press releases, minutes or other similar information about the bargaining process.
5.3 ORGANIZATION CHART, Administrative roster.
5.4 Newspaper clips.
5.5 Copies of union publications
5.6 School district publication.
5.7 Studies of school district by outsiders.

EXHIBIT II

Interview Schedule

Claremont Graduate School
Faculty in Education
Claremont, CA 91711

```
.District _____

Code _____

Respondent/Title _____

_____

Code _____
```

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH PROJECT

Opening note: This research involves inquiry into the dynamics of labor relations in school districts and the outcomes of employee relations processes. I am going to ask questions about the current status of labor relations in the district and something about their history and development. Finally, there will be some questions about the impacts of labor relations as you see them and about the future of labor relations for teachers.

I. School Background and Context

1. Enrollment _____

2. Trend over the last five years

   (+25%)   (+10 to 25%)   (+10 to -10)   (-10 to -25%)   (-25%)

3. Enrollment projection for the next five years

   (+25%)   (+10 to 25%)   (+10 to -10)   (-10% to -25%)   (-25%)

4. Approximate number of Title I students _____

5. Approximate percentage minority enrollment _____

6. Approximate change in minority enrollment over the last five years.

   (+25%)   (+10 to 25%)   (+10 to -10)   (-10% to -25 %)   (-25%)

7. Total operating budget for the current fiscal year in millions_____

8. Amount of budgeted deficit or reserves at end of last year, in

   thousands _____

-2-

9. How would you describe the financial status of the district?
   (interviewer classify according to the following scale)

   (Desperate   (Troubled)   (Tight or   (Comfortable)   (Trouble
   or crisis)   under control)   spending or
                                                                 big surplus)

Comments:

10. How long has the current superintendent (have you) been here?_____

    (probe) +++ What were the circumstances of the turnover?
            +++ Did the turnover involve labor relations?

11. Describe the community?   (circle the terms that apply;   add others)

    (rural)   (urban)   (industrial)   (bedroom)   (blue collar)   (upper class)

    (diverse)   (active)   (conservative)   (moderate)   (liberal)   (demanding)

    (apathetic)   (polarized)

12. Have there been major crises or disturbances in the school district
    during the last 5 years?   (Circle responses and write others, but
    DO NOT PROVIDE CUES TO RESPONDENT)

                                                        (Desegregation)

                                                        (Enrollments)

                                                        (Collective Bargaining)

                                                        (School Closings)

                                                        (Lay-offs)

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II. Current Labor Relations

13. Does your district currently have a collective bargaining agreement

    with the teachers' organization? (Yes) (No) --- go to part IV, page 10

        +++ Could we have a copy of that contract?

14. What national organization is your teacher organization affiliated with?

    (NEA) (AFT) (Other: List_____) (A local only)

15. When was a teacher organization recognized as a bargaining agent?

    _____approximate year

16. How many contracts has your district negotiated?

        (In Ill. all contracts) _____

        (In Calif. under Rodda) _____

        (In Calif. substantive pre-Rodda agreements) _____

17. How would you characterize the current tone of labor relations in
    this district?

    (High conflict) (Uneasy truce) (Some trust) (Working relationship) (Cooperation)

    Comments:

18. Are you currently dealing with any labor-related law suits or

    unfair labor practices charges. (No) (Yes)

        +++ Substance, Initiation, Probable outcome

19. How many written grievances would you say the district has in a year? ___

20. Have any of these cases gone to arbitration; how many? _____

21. Has this been an unusual year?

22. How strong is the teacher organization in this district?

23. Percentage membership_____or agency shop_____

24. Released time for officers _____

25. Stability of leadership group _____

26. Active building representatives_____

27. Perception of Financial Status _____

28. Are you negotiating now or will you be this year? (Yes) (No)

29. Do you have an idea of what issues will be on the table this time

    (next time)? (Yes) (No)

        +++ Can you tell me what those issues will be?
        +++ Who has initiated the issues e. g., board, management,
            teachers, community pressures, commonly recognized
            problems?

30. Do there seem to be serious administration problems with the current

contract?   (Yes)   (No)

Describe:

III. Bargaining History

Could we go back now to when this district first started serious

bargaining with the teachers....

31. Were you affiliated with the district et that time?   (Yes)   (No)

32. When did the teachers first ask to negotiate collectively_____ .

33. What seemed to be the primary reasons for this shift to collective

bargaining?

    +++ Probe for events, goals, the law, etc.
    +++ Probe for radical teacher leaders, vs. response to
      catelytic events

34. How would you characterize the district's and the community's reactions
to the demand for collective bargaining?

    +++ events, legitimacy, election disputes (CA)
    +++ management tactics
    +++ election issues
    +++ public meetings, extensive newspaper coverage

35. How long was it between the initial demand for collective bargaining

and the start of formal negotiations on your first contract?_____mon

36. Were there demonstrations or strikes on the part of teachers in
this period?

(No) (Strike) (Job Action) (Mass Meetings) (Other)

37. (Illinois): Why did management decide to negotiate?

(California): Why did management decide not to run a no-agent campaign

38. Approximately how long did it take to settle the first contract _____

39. Was it difficult?

(Strikes) (Demonstrations) (Job Actions) (Disruptive to operations)

40. Do you remember if the school board ratified the first contract

unanimously?

(Yes) (Split Public Vote) (Split Private Vote) (Don't Remember)

41. In the first agreement who were the chief negotiators for each side?

    management -- (Super) (BD) (Professional) (Staff)

    union   -- (Union Staff) (Local Staff) (Volunteer Teachers)

42. What was the most important substance of that first contract?

    (Wages) (Grievance Procedure) (Working Conditions)

        +++what was the hardest to resolve.

43. Was there pronounced public sentiment about the substance of the

    first contract? (Yes) (No)

        +++Was it a board issue? (Yes) (No)

44. Can you tell me if there were major problems in the administration of

    the first contract? (Yes) ( )

        (principals have problems)

        (grievances)

        (scars from negotiation or strikes)

45. Can you tell me if there have been big changes in labor relations

    from the time of that first contract to now? (Yes) (No)

                                                (contract language)
                                                +++changes

                                                (tons of relations)

                                                (school board relations)

                                                (effort to strengthen
                                                management)

                                                (other strikes)

46. Has the teachers' organization taken an active interest in school

    board elections? (Yes) (No)

    (financial support) (campaigning) (behind the scenes)

    (successful) (unsuccessful)

        +++was this different at different times?

47. Have there been any community groups who have taken an active part
    or an active interest in labor relations here?

            +++who, what circumstances
            +++coalitions

48. Does that pretty much bring us up to date on the negotiations process in your district?

49. Do the union and management work together on matters of mutual concern in settings other than bargaining?

    +++ informal meetings, agreements

50. Has there ever been a serious effort to return to a non-union

    status in this district? (Yes) (No)

      +++what happened?

51. In your judgment, how close is the current contract to an ideal working relationship with teachers?

    +++what would have to change to get closer to an ideal
       arrangement?

IV. Non-Contract Districts

THIS SECTION FOR DISTRICTS WITHOUT LABOR CONTRACTS ONLY

52. Tell me a little about the working relationships between teachers

    and administrators in this district?

      +++ trust, control, tenseness, quietness, deliberateness.

53. What is the overall tone of the administrative relationship?

54. How would you describe the teachers' organization?

      +++ why do teachers belong
      +++ how effective are the leaders
      +++ what sorts of interests does it pursue

55. Have there been attempts to gain recognition?

56. On the whole do you think collective bargaining has been helpful or harmful to education?

    +++ why?

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V. Collective bargaining Impacts

THIS QUESTION ONLY FOR DISTRICTS WHICH HAVE A BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP WITH
TEACHERS; THEY NEED NOT HAVE NEGOTIATED THE FIRST CONTRACT

Could we talk a bit about your sense of what effect collective bar-
gaining has had on school operations and programs?

56. On the whole do you think collective bargaining has been helpful or
harmful to education?

+++ why?

57. Does your contract specify certain teacher tasks as <u>extra</u> duties?

(No)   (Yes)

+++ how is the extra duty question handled here?

(limited hours)   (limited list of duties)   (extra com-
pensation)

58. What kinds of duties are considered "extra?"

59. In some districts we understand that there have been real problems in
getting teachers to perform these extra duties. Has that been the
situation here?

+++ details.

60. Does your contract specify a certain number of sick leave days? (Yes) (No)

+++ how many _____

61. Does the district have problems with teacher absenteeism? (Yes) (No)

+++ extent, trend, are records specific?

+++ why do you think that there has been a change?

+++ would your district bargain for a buy back of unused days?

62. Some people have suggested that absenteeism is partly due to the fact
that teachers feel they are entitled to the days-off negotiated into
the contract, how do you feel about that judgment?

63. Does your contract contain any special work rules for specialized
teachers, such as math, art, music, reading, special education, etc.

(No) (Yes)

+++ class size, hours, special pay, aides

64. Are there staffing ratios for these specialists, or counselours,
psychologists, nurses, etc.

65. Are specialists influential or not influential in the teachers' organization?

(Weak)   (Moderate)   (Strong)   (Don't Know)

66. Why would you say the specialists have the level of influence they do?

67. How does management feel about the specialists job classification?

    +++ has it ever fought for them, against?
    +++ have they expanded or become fewer?
    +++ is there a difference between specialists on categorical
        funds and those which are not?

68. Has your collective bargaining arrangement changed the way teachers
    meet with parents, or evaluate students, or handle student discipline
    problems?

    +++ probe matters of contract, practice
    +++ contract as a cause versus informal practice, versus
        interpretation of the contract

69. Have practices for teacher evaluation or handling complaints against
    teachers changed as a result of collective bargaining?

). What effect do you think that collective bargaining has had on teachers?

    +++ morale, dignity, status of work — what do these mean?

L. What has been the impact of collective bargaining on the working
   relationships that principals establish with teachers and with the
   central office.

    +++ has that been an important change?

!. Has collective bargaining changed the structure of the organization
   in any way?

    +++ has it changed the way it works in practice?

VI. Questionaire References

We want to give survey questionnaires (short ones) to school board members, citizens, middle level administrators and some teachers in the district....could you help us identify these appropriate individuals?

Group: Contact:
                                              Address:
        Size of Group: Phone:
Primary concern:

Group: Contact
                                              Address:
        Size of Group: Phone:
Primary concern:

Group: Contact
                                              Address:
        Size of Group: Phone:
Primary concern:

Group: Contact
                                              Address:
        Size of Group: Phone:
Primary concern:

CLOSING NOTE: Say thanks, be sure to get a copy of the contract.

[ ]   Check here if contract is in hand

[ ]   Check here if consent form signed and returned.

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EXHIBIT III

Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE IMPACTS OF COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS

This survey is an important part of research being con-
ducted into the impacts of collective bargaining on school
districts, parents, students, teachers and school admin-
istrators.

The research is financed by the National Institute of
Education and is being accomplished by researchers from
the Claremont Graduate School, the University of
California and the University of Illinois.

Your response to the survey will be kept completely con-
fidential. You will not be identified in any way, nor
will your community or your school district. The code
number below merely allows us to tabulate this response
with others received from the same school district.

Please return the completed survey in the envelope pro-
vided to:

> Dr. Charles T. Kerchner
> Labor Relations Research Project
> Claremont Graduate School
> Claremont, California 91711

School District Code _____

Thank you for agreeing to help.

This survey concerns the effects of teachers' organizations
and collective bargaining on schools and how they operate.
Each question in the survey asks for your feelings and per-
ceptions about different aspects of employee-relations and
school operations.

Answer each question by circling the response that best
reflects your feelings about the question. Answer with
your first impression. There are no right or wrong answers.

Please answer all the questions. Most questions are in
the same general form as the question below.

```
                    SAMPLE QUESTION

                         1. Strongly Disagree
                         2. Largely Disagree
                         3. Disagree Somewhat
                         4. Mixed Feelings
Schools in the United    5. Agree Somewhat
States are basically     6. Largely Agree
well run.                7. Strongly Agree

                    -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-
```

If you strongly agreed that the schools in the U.S. were
well run, you would circle the number 7; if you felt that
they were not at all well run, you would circle the number
1.

If you felt that schools were best characterised as being
somewhere between these extremes, you would circle the
number that best represented your feelings. For instance,
if you felt that the schools were well run in most cases,
you would circle 6, to largely agree with the statement.

3

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A. THE TEACHERS' ORGANIZATION

In this section we are concerned with the teachers' organiza-
tion--whether it is called a union or an association--and
your perceptions of it.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

The teachers' organiza-
tion. . .

A1 ...is strong and well
organized.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A2 ...is successful in
dealing with school
management.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A3 ...has competent
leadership.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A4 ...acts responsibly.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A5 ...actively tries to
influence school
board policies.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A6 ...supports political
candidates.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A7 ...tries to influence
the state legislature.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A8 ...is successful in
rallying community
support.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A9 ...tries to influence
parents.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

A10 ...is quite likely to
go out on strike.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

4

B. THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

These questions concern the overall management or administra-
tion of the schools.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

The administration of this
school district. . .

B1 ...is successful in
running the schools.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B2 ...is made up of highly
competent individuals.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B3 ...acts responsibly in
dealing with teachers.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B4 ...emphasizes the
development of innova-
tive programs.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B5 ...pre-occupied with
maintaining and sup-
porting existing pro-
grams.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B6 ...has taken steps to
tighten accountability
and performance stan-
dards for teachers,
other employees and
students.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

B7 ...is actively achiev-
ing student achieve-
ment through program
evaluation and reorg-
anization.
-1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

5

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C. THE SCHOOL BOARD

The third set of questions has to do with the school board in your district.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

The school board in this district. . .

C1 ...is well organized and efficient.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C2 ...is successful in pursuing educational goals.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C3 ...has competent members who understand educational problems.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C4 ...acts responsibly and in the best interests of the school district.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C5 ...is in close contact with a broad cross section of citizens.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C6 ...is characterized by high conflict, loud debates, and split votes on important issues.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C7 ...has been the focus of political opposition (including defeats of incumbent board members in contested elections or recall elections).   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

6

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

C8 ...makes all important policy decisions openly and with adequate input from all interested parties.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C9 ...is pre-occupied with collective bargaining issues or problems.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C10 ...accepts as legitimate the rights of teachers to bargain collectively.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

C11 ...is satisfied with the current relationship it has with teachers.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

7

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D. OPINIONS ABOUT SCHOOLS

In this section we are concerned with your own views about
education and employee organizations.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

As a rule, I believe that
the public schools
should. . .

D1 ...emphasize a thor-
ough grounding in
fundamental skills.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

D2 ...support a broad
range of socially and
culturally enriching
activities.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

D3 ...provide a full
schedule of sports,
drama and other extra-
curricular activities.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

D4 ...emphasize voca-
tional education.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

D5 ...provide very high
level academic train-
ing.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

E. ABOUT YOURSELF

It would be helpful to know a bit about you personally.
These responses are optional and will be used for the pur-
poses of statistical tabulations only.

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Largely Disagree
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Mixed Feelings
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Largely Agree
7. Strongly Agree

E1 Generally speaking, I
consider myself a
political conserva-
tive.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

E2 Generally speaking,
I consider myself
favorably disposed
toward labor unions.   -1----2----3----4----5----6----7-

E3 What is your relationship to the school district coded on
the front cover of this questionnaire? (Please circle
all the responses that apply.)

a. Parent of child in
   district

b. School principal or
   assistant

c. School board member

d. Central office
   administrator

e. Classroom teacher

f. Leader in teacher
   organization

g. Active in parent-teacher
   group

h. Member of a school site
   council or advisory
   committee

i. An interested citizen

j. Active in a school monit-
   oring organization such as
   the taxpayer's association
   or the League of Women Voters

k. Other _____

8

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E, continued--

E4   Your sex (Male)   (Female)

E5   Your approximate age (Under 30) (30-45) (46-65) (over 65)

E6   Your ethnic background (Black) (Hispanic) (White)
     (Asian) (Other)

E7   Your approximate family income (0-$15,000) ($15-$25,000)
     ($25-$50,000) (Above $50,000)

E8   Your occupation _____

E9   Are you a member of a labor organization? (Yes) (No)

F.   COMMENTS

We would appreciate it if you would take the time to tell
us about any other factors that explain the impact of
teacher organizations in your school district, or help us
to understand that process.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

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EXHIBIT IV

Summary District Record

District Name_____ I.D._____

Enrollment _____; trend   (>25%)   (+10-25)   (+10-10)   (-10-25)   (>-25)

Budget millions_____   1.   2.   3.   4.   5.

Financial Status: Crisis   Troubled   Under Control   Comfortable   Surplus
  Super   1   2   3   4   5
  Union   1   2   3   4   5
  Board   1   2   3   4   5

Community: [urban (1), rural (2), suburban (3)] [stable (1), unstable (2)]

Labor Perception: Hi. Con.   Truce   Some Trust   Working   Cooperation
  Super   1   2-   3   4   5
  Union   1   2   3   4   5
  Board   1   2   3   4   5

Bargaining Agent: NEA (1), AFT (2), Other (3), None (4)   1st Year?_____

Percent Membership: _____; Grievances this year?_____

Recognition Conflict: None (1), Raucus Debate (2), Job Action (3), Strike (4)

Strikes: number _____; year of most recent _____; duration of most recent _____

Board Elections: interest? [yes (1), no (2)] [successful (1), unsuccessful (2)]

Impact: harm   mixed-harm   neutral   mixed-help   help   don't know
  Super   1   2   3   4   5   6
  Union   1   2   3   4   5   6
  Board   1   2   3   4   5   6