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ABSTRACT

Reflecting the ideas of Roland Barthes, this paper examines the nature and importance of myth as a type of speech. The investigation proceeds by discussing myth from the perspectives of both traditional and contemporary disciplines, then considers the universality of myth, its religious impulse, and its functions. Using examples from television news coverage (the Iranian crisis) and popular culture (other television programing, such as soap operas and situation comedies like "All in the Family," and the John Wayne myth), the paper delineates several functions of myth: (1) to interpret and fit unfamiliar situations into old symbolic molds; (2) to create exemplary models for a whole society by translating a single life-history into an archetype; (3) to construct a "language of argument," whereby conflict is presented and mediated, such as the resolution of contemporary social problems in the science fiction series "Star Trek"; and (4) to organize reality, history, and experience into recognizable patterns. The paper also examines the ways in which culture, myth, ritual, and ideology are entwined, and postulates the effects of challenging myths, creating myths, and destroying myths (demythologizing). In this last respect, and noting that myths must be unrecognized as being such to be potent, the paper questions the role of the communication scholar in exposing myths to public scrutiny. (RL)

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THE MYTH IN THE DISCOURSE

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For the great enemy of truth if often not the lie--deliberate, contrived, dishonest--but the myth--persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.

Too often, we hold fast to cliches of our forebears. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.

John F. Kennedy, June 11, 1962
Vital Speeches of the Day XXVII No. 19
(July 15, 1962) p. 598.

The Nature and Importance of Myth.

While the mere mention of the word "myth" today in communication circles evokes many interpretations, the present discussion will be guided by the meaning put forward by G.S. Kirk, Professor of Classics at Cambridge, and author of standard texts in the field.¹ "Myths concern us," claims Kirk, "because of men's endearing insistence on carrying quasi-mythical modes of thought, expression and communication into a supposedly scientific age."² As for a neat definition of myth, however, Kirk disabuses us even to the possibility. "There is no one definition of myth," because what the authorities call myths, "differ enormously in their morphology and social functions."³ The etymological strategy of arriving at a definition is also unhelpful in this case. The Greek word "muthos", Kirk reminds us, means a tale, something one utters, a statement, a story, a plot or a play.⁴ Clearly, there is more to myth than that. As a working strategy for this discussion, then, each authority will supply the definition required by the context.

The pioneer anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski, said that myths were sacred in essence and distinguished between myths and legends or folktales which might be historical or entertaining in character.⁵ Clyde Kluckhohn, the acknowledged authority on the Navaho, on the other hand, claimed other functions of myth included simple entertainment and intellectual edification.⁶ Kirk notes that many intelligent people expect myth not to be learned or reasonable, but rather to be poetical, symbolic and beautiful. He notes, however, that in reality "Myths are often none of these things--many are prosaic, utilitarian and ugly."⁷

Nineteenth century scholars were fascinated by the scientific study of myths and their concrete descriptions still have value: Max Muller said myth was a "disease of language." Andrew Lang asserted that myth resulted from a personification of natural forces or phenomena, a mental process characteristic of the animistic stage of culture. Sir James Frazer regarded myths as mistaken explanations of human or natural phenomena.⁸ Ethnology has shown, however, for "primitive" man, that myth meant a true story that was a most precious treasure because it was sacred, a model to live by, and deeply significant to the interior life.

If the various scholars can't agree on a definition, or if they are, in fact, discussing different entities all labelled "myth," why should the communication scholar, or more specifically, the rhetorical scholar, bother to study the phenomenon at all? The answer is that even if one were able to avoid the scholarly groundswell of interest in myth and quasi-myth, the insights provided by the study of myth speak to persuasive processes. Briefly, for the communication scholar, mythic analysis may explain much of what is most relevant.

A recurring description of myth is that as with spectacles, one sees through the mythical lens the objective world without necessarily being aware of the distorting function of those spectacles. Myth is a medium of communication. It seems that, without necessarily accepting McLuhan's vaunted equation, it is a medium which affects the reception of messages. That is, myth has a rhetorical function.

Roland Barthes is as generous in the extension of his term "myth" as McLuhan is in his definition of "medium." Barthes sees myth in

wrestling, in detergent and in automobile design. Everything can be myth:

Myth is a type of speech. Myth cannot possibly be an object, a concept, or an idea; it is a mode of signification, a form. Since myth is a type of speech, everything can be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse. Myth is not defined by the object of the message, but by the way it utters this message: there are formal limits to myth, there are no "substantial" ones.⁹

The study of myth, for Barthes, belongs to the province of a general science--semiology.¹⁰ Myth is a semiological system just as language is, and can be looked at in the Saussurian system of signifier, the signified and the sign. Language, however, is the object, or the raw material of myth. Myth applies a semiological system to a semiological system, a language to a language, and is, in Barthes' terms, a metalanguage. Thus writing, or pictures, or any other message-bearing object is fair game for the mythologist using semiological principles. His descriptions of the mythological attributes of the detergent Omo would be very familiar to a rhetorical critic who analyzed a television commercial for any American soap powder. Given the framework of rhetorical criticism as proposed by Becker,¹¹ or Booth,¹² Barthes is indulging in rhetorical criticism. In a rhetorical framework one could inquire into the ethos of the soap powder, or seek to determine the enthymema operating in his examples of mythic communication. Barbara Warnick has marked out the interface between structuralism and rhetorical criticism,¹³ and the implications she makes

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apply to the Barthesian insights.

Even with a semiotic perspective, the conventional communication scholar's insights into the nature of myth hold up well, and despite seeming contradictions to the semiotic approach, can be reconciled with it rather neatly. For example, A.J.M. Sykes, writing in 1970, defined myth as "the expression of abstract ideas in concrete form,"¹⁴ and said that myth was a narrative mode of a general situation; was emotional, concise, but not precise; was universally understood; although a generalization, yet was concrete and particular; and conveyed a perception of a whole. He claimed:

The propositions made above overlap to some extent and the relations between them seem vague and difficult to order in a logical sequence. This is unavoidable; the essence of myth is that it is an entity and cannot be broken down into exclusive categories. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.¹⁵

He went on to quote McLuhan: "Myth is the mode of simultaneous awareness of a complex group of causes and effects."¹⁶ The categorization he deemed impossible is not, however, the deep structure of the semiotic which Barthes, for example, would apply to myths.

Waldo Braden, limiting himself to a public speaking context and concentrating on Southern susceptibilities to mythic appeals, explained how myth must permeate a discourse, and how it is not a rhetorical appendage.¹⁷ Both Sykes and Braden add a dimension to the discussion on myths in that they show how specific human agents can use myths for their own ends. While this is not the prime concern of the

anthropologist, classicist, or essayist who might have a deterministic view of history and society, it is important to the scholar of communication.

The sociologist, C. Wright Mills sees myth as a step in the degradation of political philosophy to mere rhetoric:

Ideology, as the public face of a political philosophy, often becomes simply myth or folklore; very often too even a minimum of ideology withers away: all that is left is an empty and irrelevant rhetoric.¹⁸

Two English communication scholars with a structuralist perspective, John Fiske and John Hartley, also see myth as an intermediary between social vision and basic communication.¹⁹ They are interested in the progression from rhetoric to ideology, and in their structural critique of television newscasts, in which they describe their shot-by-shot analysis of a film of British troops in Northern Ireland, they postulate a hierarchy in symbolic communication. The first order is the sign itself, the second order is a myth (in the Barthesian sense), and the third order is an ideology.

The Universality of Myth.

One attribute of myths agreed on by scholars is their appearance across cultures geographically and chronologically separated. Campbell, for instance, mentions the universality of the myth of the virgin birth.²⁰ This leads to the supposition of the universality of myths and the question as to whether or not modern man has myths and is affected

by myths. Because anthropologists describe myths as methods of preceiving the world, by their nature myths are invisible to those whom they hold in thrall.

The psychologist, Carl Jung, found that myth was "what is believed always, everywhere by everybody."²¹ Jung posited the existence of a collective unconscious, below the level of each individual's personal unconscious. An indefatigable mythologizer himself,²² Jung spread the acceptance of the notion of archetypes or universal images which resided in the psychic life common to mankind. Acutely aware of Nietzsche's lamentable fate as the inevitable result of baring his innermost vision to an unaccepting generation, Jung couched all his writings in the guise of science as, for example, in the Jungian axiom: "The ontogeny of dream recapitulates the phylogeny of myth."²³ It is then ironic that in our supremely secular age archetypal criticism is so useful for a literary critic such as Frank McConnell who, in Storytelling and Mythmaking, uses the archetypes of King, Knight, Detective and Clown to explain cinema styles. The circle has been completed by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolution who found mythic dimensions in scientific thought.²⁴

The popularizer of science, Carl Sagan, considered myths to be the richest, most intricate and most profound insights obtained from human introspection.²⁵ A scientist with respect for precise scientific measurement of astronomical observation, geological duration, and submolecular activity, Sagan did not employ the term, "myth" in its popular meaning of something "widely believed and contrary to fact," but

as a "metaphor of some subtlety on a subject difficult to describe in any other way." He quoted Salustius' definition from the fourth century: "Myths are things which never happened but always are," and noted:

In the Platonic dialogues and The Republic, every time Socrates cranks up a myth--the parable of the cave, to take the most celebrated example, we know we have arrived at something central.

Sagan speculated that myth is so pervasive in the human species, so integral in the consciousness of the human being that it may be hard-wired in the brain. He pointed out how medical science has debunked the common sense notions that, from the view of brain physiology, reading and writing, or recognizing words and numbers are similar activities. He cited experiments with the brain-damaged which have shown that there are specific loci for the different mental activities, and various abstractions, such as "parts of speech" in grammar seem to be wired into specific regions of the brain. This view offers an explanation why myth has so basic an appeal and why it is lodged so deep in the human psyche.²⁶

Emic and Etic.

Communication scholars have long been familiar with the insights of Edward T. Hall as proposed in The Silent Language.²⁷ Hall pointed out that lessons learned "informally" (without technical or explicit instruction) are accepted as part of nature and reside in the individual's belief system. These factors of routine experience are

largely out of the individual's awareness and are usually taken for granted or ignored. Myths are similarly accepted without question.

Ralph Waldo Emerson categorically stated that we could not know our own mythology because distance was essential for the recognition and interpretation of myths.²⁸ Because of this inherent elusiveness, mythic thought is difficult to isolate and analyze, expressed as it is in what Clifford Geertz called "intricate symbolic webs as vaguely defined as they are, emotionally charged."²⁹ Because one of the essential features of myths is that they "operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact," as Levi-Strauss claimed,³⁰ this inaccessibility is reflected in current anthropological use by the terms "emic and "etic". Originally coined by linguist Kenneth Pike on the analogy of "phonetic" and "phomemic",³¹ the terms emphasize the differences between the perspectives of the carriers of a culture (emic) and a perspective that does not involve the viewpoint of those involved in a culture (etic). This may explain why communication studies have largely ignored mythic aspects of discourse within the U.S. Scholars who attempt to isolate the role of myth in the public discourse of their own culture are faced with all the constraints of emic analysis. As myth reifies the culture, it "naturalizes" many aspects of life for the scholar-participant also, thereby rendering itself invisible.

The Structuralist Perspectives.

Kirk, the classicist, claimed that there are three major developments in the modern study of myths. The first is that the myths

of primitive societies are relevant to the subject as a whole. The sociologists-anthropologists associated with this contribution include Edward B. Tylor, Emile Durkheim and Sir James Frazer. The second was Freud's discovery of the unconscious and its relation to myths and dreams. The third, the most current, is the structuralist approach of Claude Levi-Strauss who considered myth to be one mode of human communication, a product of language.

Kirk devotes much effort to explaining Levi-Strauss' ideas and provides a synopsis which is unavailable in Levi-Strauss' own work:

Just as the elements of language--sounds or phonemes--are meaningless in isolation, and only take on significance in combination with other phonemes, so the elements of myth--the individual narrative elements, the persons or objects--are meaningless in themselves, and only take on significance through their relation with each other. But it is not the formation of mere narrative as such that is significant; rather it is the underlying structure of relations that determines the real "meaning" of a myth, just as it is the underlying structure of a language that gives it significance as a means of communication.³²

Structuralism assumed that the human mind has certain universal characteristics and that they reflect common structures in the brain. Thus people in all cultures think alike, in the sense that they have the same mental processes, and must classify phenomena in order to function. While many, if not most, phenomena are continuous rather than discrete, a universal aspect of the need to classify is opposition or contrast. In Aristotelian terms, this may be compared to the definitions which depends on the genus, what the thing is, and the differentia, what

distinguishes it from everything else. For Levi-Strauss, all contrasts and oppositions, of which the most fundamental is binary (good-evil, white-black, high-low, young-old) are reflections of the human need to convert continuous contrasts into absolute contrasts. Myth, for Levi-Strauss, has the function of explaining the oppositions which may be intrinsically artifacts of the human mental classification process; that is, of resolving logical contradictions.³³ Kirk is careful to give his own view, however, which is that while Levi-Strauss formally maintains that the content of myths is irrelevant; he does, in fact, rely on specific content for his ultimate interpretation.

What is agreed upon by representatives of many disciplines, is that Levi-Strauss maintained that myths arise from the universal human desire to understand and come to terms with the fundamental and discomfoting contradictions in life experiences faced by all people in all cultures at all times. For example, William Kelly, a critic of American popular culture, used the structuralist approach to analyze Saturday Night Fever which portrayed societal and personal value systems in conflict.³⁴ The cultural anthropologist, Conrad Kottak, found it just as appropriate a procedure to apply Levi-Strauss's structuralist assumption to analyze modern Americans' attitudes to the mythology disseminated by the Disney organization as he did to the mythologies of the Mbuti pygmies in the Ituri forest. Kottak discussed the Mickey Mouse totem, the pilgrimage to Disneyworld, football, rock music and other aspects of American culture. He addressed the American to forestall objections: "As an American native, you probably question this structural anthropological

perspective on football and rock, just as South American Indians informants might doubt a structural analysis of their important myths.³⁵ Similarly, Michael Real, a critic of mass culture, described the Super Bowl as mythic spectacle, and chose to study Disneyland, Marcus Welby, and Billy Graham in an attempt to understand the relationship between culture and communication.³⁶

Myth and The Religious Impulse.

Mercea Eliade, an historian of religions, followed Malinowski in linking myth to the religious impulse.³⁷ In traditional societies, according to Eliade, the reliving of the deeds of the gods and heroes imparted a sacramental aspect to human existence which was rich in significance. Myth permeated daily life through work and handicrafts. Eliade's ideas bridge the interpretation of myth in primitive societies to myth in modern life. With the industrial revolution and the secularization of work, man feels himself to be the prisoner of work in which he can never escape from time. He, in reaction, expends his religious impulse in leisure time, in entertainment where one must look for the myths of modern man. The mythical attitude is found in the modern's distractions and in unconscious psychic activity (dreams; fantasies and nostalgias).

Because so much of modern man's leisure time is spent with television, for example, it is easy to see how Eliade's framework appeals to the mass media scholar, who can use the structuralist or semiotic approach to analyze and explain films or television programs.

Eliade would have the scholar apply the sciences of comparative religion, ethnology, orientalism, depth-psychology and the systematic study of symbolism (which helped modern society understand primitive societies), to the task of understanding modern media.³⁸ Myth has not been eliminated in modern society--it has been repressed, partly into the obscurer levels of the psyche, partly into the secondary or irresponsible activities of society.³⁹ In this view he echoed the bleak vision of Lewis Mumford who in The Myth of The Machine described the psychic consequences of mass culture determined by current technological priorities.⁴⁰

Eliade argued for modern Western understanding of archaic and Oriental cultures. He proposed that it is important to note that "archaic and oriental cultures succeeded in conferring positive values on anxiety, death, self-abasement, chaos . . . values which to modern man man are only terrifying, absurd or demonic."⁴¹ An observer chronicling modern American television's treatment of recent Iranian behavior, especially that of the Ayatollah Khomeini, must see the parallel with Eliade's ideas. Such an observer is a Professor of English at Columbia University, Edward Said, who writing in Harper's claimed that despite the network's million-dollar-a-day coverage from Tehran, little has emerged save a few myths amounting to "Islam hates America."⁴² The ritualistic sameness of the stories, the cabalistic recounting of the numbers (how many hostages, how many days), the personification of complex entities, the reductionism of "the three minute courses on the history of Islam" are all the stuff of myth for

the ethnocentric viewer.

Similarly, Eliade claimed that the mythological impulse operates for the modern Western adolescent who perceives real or imaginary heroes and tales of adventure on the screen.⁴³ Furthermore, claimed Eliade, even if we took no account of the ritualistic origins and mythological structure of the drama or film, and neglected aesthetic considerations entirely, the time spent by modern man in these diversions is a heightened, concentrated time of a different quality from mere secular duration. This physical time modern man devotes to diversion requires a mythological attitude similar to that of primitive man who followed mythical heroes through all details of human existence: labor, handicrafts, war and love. "The reliving of that which the Gods and Heroes had lived in illo tempore imparted a sacramental aspect to human existence," claimed Eliade.⁴⁴ With the secularization of work, modern man became the prisoner of time, needed to "kill time," and invented many diversions with "concentrated time" including the theatre and the cinema. From a perusal of the Nielsen ratings one can gain ample evidence of the devotion with which modern Americans perform these ritualistic exercises.

Functions of Myth.

While many of the applications of myth analysis have traditionally been in the context of religion and/or cultures temporally and geographically removed from our own, what is needed in the present context is a notion of myth that is secular in reference and that can be

applied to contemporary American media in a way that clarifies the relationship between culture and communication. Such a notion may be arrived at by studying myth through its cultural functions. Malinowski was one of the strongest proponents of a functional approach, that is, studying myth in its social, ritual and ethical effects rather than as a body of imaginative and pseudo-scientific tales. His definition of mythology, then, will serve as a starting point for a functional approach: myth is a body of narratives woven into a culture which dictates belief, defines ritual and acts as a chart of the social order.⁴⁵

1. Perceptual System.

Myth functions, firstly, as part of the perceptual system of a culture through which unfamiliar situations, originating either within the culture or outside it, are interpreted and fitted into old symbolic molds. In helping to pattern the relationships among basic beliefs, values and behaviors that organize social interaction, myths produce common social understandings of new social conditions.

Television is a medium with a high degree of both familiarity and credibility partly because it structures the culture's dominant mode of perception into all its messages, particularly into its coverage of unfamiliar situations. It does this in spite of its apparently iconic representation of reality. Perception of reality through television is mediated through the many different codes of TV, not the least of which is based on the corpus of myths which the producers of telemediated

messages share with their viewers. Indeed, there are many examples of the structure of these messages being organized according to the mythic needs of the culture for whose eyes and ears they are intended and not according to the internal needs of the "story" itself. In fact, the story is often made meaningful only when its manner of encoding interlocks with the perceptual process supplied by the viewer, which is itself culturally mediated by the myth-models of society.

A particularly apt example of myths functioning as perceptual models through which unfamiliar conditions are interpreted, is provided by Said's analysis of American press coverage of the hostage crisis in Iran. While the massive amount of highly-focussed media attention on Iran gave the sense that Islam as an objective reality was being analyzed in a detailed, rational way and was presumed by millions of Americans to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of events, in fact it served to fit the plethora of unfamiliar events in post-revolutionary Iran into the more familiar molds of previously-existing myths concerning Islam. American television presented a version of events that was based on extreme ethnocentrism, simple-minded cliches and a narrowly-defined self-interest which translated every event into either an affront to or an enhancement of U.S. power.

Said contended that press coverage was severely "flawed by ideological hobbles" among which were buried various powerful myths. These concerned the exclusive identification of being Western with having civilized ideals; subordinating the need to gain the release of the hostages to the real priority of "keeping America strong"; and

glamorizing the virtues of modernization. This "produced a concept of Islam whose apex and culmination was the ex-Shah of Iran, both at his zenith as a modern ruler and, when his regime collapsed, as a casualty of medieval fanaticism and religiosity." For most of the public, however, the mythical lens through which the news media focussed on events in Iran was itself invisible.

2. Exemplary Model

A second function of myth is to create exemplary models for a whole society in a process that translates a single life-history into an archetype, thereby setting up patterns for imitation. The processes of formal religions and formal education in every society are obviously of central importance in determining which powerful human images will be focussed upon and elevated to the rank of exemplary model. But as Eliade has pointed out, the screen media play a similar role in setting up heroes and heroines to carry on mythological traditions. The heroic figures of TV, however, differ in an important way from those of the more traditional media. Because of the obvious concern of TV for responding to the fluctuations in audience taste and because it relies very heavily on dramatic conventions, TV is an excellent medium for acting out the concerns of its audience. The private-life concerns of the public are translated into shared public images in the form of characters with whom the viewer can identify, in all genres of programming from soap operas to presidential election coverage. In the interaction with TV characters, a viewer condenses private concerns and projects them onto the screen. Since non-fictional TV also relies on

dramatic conventions of presentation, even the struggle between candidates becomes the struggle between groups, or the battle between Good and Evil.

Regarding the news on television, Gerbner and Signorelli have stressed that television is viewed non-selectively, and that many, if not the majority, of the most ardent news viewers are also heavy viewers of television drama. They conclude that "television is a regular ritual of which news is a minor part."⁴⁶ Bennett contended that television programs "shape public perceptions of ongoing reality through the dramatic enactment of myths, not through the construction of detailed, rational models of objective reality."⁴⁷ Most traditional media are time--rather than space--biased (using Innis terminology⁴⁸) and are non-iconic. This means that the audience is still able to project private concerns onto "mythic heroes and villains, who therefore require little up-dating by the story-teller. Television, however, is not only less time-biased but is also an extremely iconic medium. These qualities require that the visual impact of television heroes and villains be continually up-dated. Television, therefore, responds faster to changes in the culture and has a new set of heroic figures ready for each new season.

Certainly ideology in television is not restricted to coverage of current affairs. The vast amount of fictional programming is also a harbinger of ideology via the exemplary model, largely because of TV's reliance on a series format based on a particular "formula". Each episode of a program may be treated as a different version of a basic

mythology which is established in the opening episodes. The only changes from week to week in a police show, for example, are in the various characters and situations which signify the same mythic dimensions in the problems presented for solution. While a viewer can grasp the meaning of a single episode in isolation, a broader understanding can be obtained by comparing different episodes, because persistent principles are continually advocated throughout a series. Further insight into the mythic core of a series can be obtained by comparing it with other programs within the same genre. Thus, within the police series genre, for instance, lateral comparisons between "Ironsides," "Kojak," "Starsky & Hutch," "Columbo," "Baretta," "CHiP's" and "The Hill Street Blues" reveal that each triggers different myths, although the genre itself gives expression to the egalitarian ideology of America and "reifies the notion of the autonomous individual."⁴⁹

3. Conflict Presentation and Mediation

A third major function of myth is the power it gives for handling conflict, both within a culture itself and between cultures. When alternative forms of organization present themselves, myth is, as Aly reminded us, "a language of argument, not a chorus of harmony."⁵⁰ Levi-Strauss has opened up a new perspective on myth by proposing that the principal characters or imagery of a myth always stand in an initial relationship of opposition to one another and that this opposition is resolved through the narrative of the myth by a series of mediating characters. His method of structural analysis helps to illuminate the

role of myth in TV programs and other modern cultural events. Claus, for instance, examined "Star Trek" as a program based on moral problems which are stated in the form of conflict between opposites (the Enterprise crew, reasonably devoted to order and democracy, protecting the weak and innocent, is pitted against the Klingon Empire which, brutal and self-serving, exploits the weak and innocent).⁵¹ Captain Kirk, the "stereotypical ideal of America normalcy," is the chief mediator when opposing ideals of American society confront one another fictionally. The clarity with which the conflicts of life are presented and resolved in "Star Trek" may help to explain the cult-like following of viewers that it has generated.

Conflict between opposites is not confined to fiction, however, as a reexamination of news coverage of Iran indicates. The ethnocentric view of the American news media is fundamentally dualistic, resting on a series of mythic polarities which oppose the pure "we" to the evil "they". Said's analysis is pertinent here. While "we" were "normal", "they" displayed a "neurotic" moral fervor and writhed in "self-provoked frenzy, longing for martyrdom." Iran was reduced to "the rage of thwarted religious passion" and "Islam amok." While "we" were democratic and fair, "they" were militant, dangerous and anti-American. Resentment, suspicion and contempt were characteristic of "Islam". The rational order of life in America was contrasted with the disorder of Iran, and the images which conveyed this disorder easily resonated within American culture. Iran was, at one time, "suffering from revolutionary hangover," at another, "a crescent of crisis, a cyclone

hurtling across a prairie." Television, with its ability to juxtapose polarized, iconic images, could make powerful non-verbal statements too: an ABC three-minute course on Islam, for instance, complete with images of purdah, self-flagellation and mullahs, ended with "admirably wholesome" schoolchildren in Wisconsin organizing a patriotic "Unity day."

Press coverage of the denouement, the resolution of the hostage crisis, concluded the long mythic narrative of the conflict between opposites by concentrating almost exclusively on the mediators: the State Department officials waiting for the release before opening the bottles of champagne; the practical problems of the chief U.S. negotiator Warren Christopher (whom more than one commentator called a "folk hero") suddenly finding himself at noon on Inauguration Day stripped of his diplomatic status while still in Algiers, caught, as it were, between the battle lines; the tired President, denied the relaxed enjoyment of his last night in the White House because of the negotiations, then, more bitterly, denied the triumph of announcing the end of the saga because he too, Cinderella-like, was stripped of his heroic role when the clock struck twelve on Inauguration Day. This final, tragic twist in the saga (disappointment-in-the-hour-of-triumph), it was suggested, was the final taunt of the enemy, the last vicious twist of the dying dragon. The familiar symbolic format into which this inter-cultural conflict was fitted, shaped by all the previous epics in the Western tradition, was given formal closure by the heightened media attention given to the duration of the saga. This was

counted, not in months (14-1/2) nor in weeks (63-1/2) but in days (444). This last mythic choice provided a fitting recapitulation, not only in tacitly underlining the length of the hostage ordeal, but also in providing a number for the audience that is mnemonic, symmetrical and quasi-mystical.

4. Pattern Recognition

A fourth function of myth is the reduction of the continuous randomness of historical experience to an intelligible pattern. Myth is therefore more uniform than the history on which it is built, hence Maranda's description of myth as "the hallucinogenic chant in which mankind harmonizes the vagaries of history--the chant hummed for generations in the minds of men and humming itself in the human mind."⁵² As time passes, important events which were once full of detail lose much of their previous content and retain only the skeleton of their former meaning. In time, they may even become the vehicles of new significance. For instance, the metal plaques on Parisian walls name the times and places of death of the minority of French people who resisted the Nazis. Seen in retrospect, however, after four decades of accretion of meaning, the plaques signify not resistance but the Resistance, the struggle not of the few but of the whole nation. Myths, therefore, function as part of the reification of a culture, that is, they are part of the cultural construction of the reality of that culture. As Dolgin and Magdoff point out, the French Revolution is no longer merely history, but myth, the condensed symbol of the nation. Likewise, Independence Day in the U.S. signals "no longer merely a

metaphor for American independence, but a far more encompassing concept of the Nation.⁵³ Few French schoolchildren know that the Bastille was abandoned when it was stormed. Similarly, Americans are not reminded that a large proportion, perhaps the majority, of the population in 1776 were content to stay British.⁵⁴ Russians are not familiar with the bloodless entry into the Winter Palace in 1917, nor Irishmen reminded that passersby jeered at their patriots at the Dublin Post Office in 1916.

Culture, Myth, Ritual and Ideology.

The concepts of culture, myth, ritual and ideology are entwined. Culture, as defined by the anthropologist Conrad Kottak, "consists of traditions that govern the thought and behavior of individuals exposed to them."⁵⁵ Myth and ritual govern both thought and behavior and are elements of a culture. Kirk quotes Edmund Leach: "Myth . . . is the counterpart of ritual; myth implies ritual, ritual implies myth, they are one and the same."⁵⁶ The link between myth and culture was likewise made by Leach: "Ritual action and belief are alike to be understood as forms of symbolic statement about the social order." Levi-Strauss examined the nature of the relationship between myth and ritual by reducing both to their structural elements, thus emphasizing their similarities.⁵⁷ Kluckhohn's definition of ritual as "an obsessive repetitive activity" which is often a symbolic dramatization of the needs of the society is useful for a scholar who would use the concepts of myth and ritual to explain some of the behavior in our mass

culture.⁵⁸ The obsessive repetitive nature of television-watching surely qualifies it to be considered as a ritualistic activity. Eliade's view of modern man's religious-magical-mythical impulse also applies to the time spent on television, and the programs, be they soap operas or news, are clearly candidates for mythic analysis. Lawrence and Tinberg claimed that they identified mythic strains in news events and saw a "mythic preference" in determining what is considered news. They examined the recent hijack episodes of Mayaguez, Entebbe and Mogadishu.⁵⁹ Using content analysis, Robert Rutherford Smith also searched for mythic elements in television news.⁶⁰ Using the definition: "Myth is any narrative which explains or renders in fictive or anthropomorphic terms perceptions of physical nature of social life,"⁶¹ Smith came to the conclusion that television news could be "understood as a narrative that explained or rendered in fictive terms perceptions of our social environment. Gerbner and Connally synthesized similar ideas and concluded that "television presents a total world of meaning whose relationship to the state is not unlike that of the church in an earlier time."⁶²

The role of myth in this scheme is explicitly put forward:

TV appears to cultivate assumptions that fit its socially functional myths--myths regarding age, social stereotyping, cultural background, who in society is powerful and who acquiesces to that power. These myths form a value system that is presented almost twenty four hours a day, every day in millions of homes across the country. Television may indeed be the established religion of the industrial order.⁶³

Perhaps because of the spiritual and mystical elements involved in religion, television's role may be less well described by the term "religion" as by the term unencumbered by mysticism: ideology. The myths that form Garbner's and Connolly's value system may be precisely described as contributions to the dominant ideology.

This is the position taken by Lance Bennett, who, in his essay entitled "Myth, Ritual and Political Control," started from a precise definition of terms and ended in an overarching theory. Culture for Bennett, "consists of the patterned relations among basic beliefs, values and behaviors that organize social interactions and communication."⁶⁴ Common understandings result from cultural processes and so affect social conditions. He claimed, "The basic models of society are called myths, and the social routines through which they are applied are called rituals." He considered that the American political scene had no formal ideologies, so "political myths and rituals guide the processes in which policies are made and public opinion is formed."

While Bennett claimed that myths are "slipped into" the "subconscious thinking" of school children and "the body of myth is the basis of political consciousness in American society," his lists of these myths is not as coherent as Herbert Schiller's list.⁶⁵ Schiller described five myths that structure media content: the Myth of Individualism and Personal Choice, the Myth of Neutrality, the Myth of Unchanging Human Nature, the Myth of the Absence of Social Conflict, and the Myth of Media Pluralism. Schiller is concerned with the persuasive impact of media, and while he undoubtedly uses the word "myth" as

Something widely held but false," it also qualifies, as a myth in the Barthesian sense.

Alienation and Semantic Tension

Myth harmonizes the vagaries of history into a uniform pattern of meanings. One interesting feature of this process of cultural reification is that myths come to be regarded within the culture as "natural" and are taken for granted. As the histories that we make become naturalized, they also become invisible to us as Barthes pointed out. In the absence of a multi-cultural, comparative framework, we usually cannot conceive the reality of the lives of people who do not live as we do. We can see that other societies are culturally constructed but we feel that our world is not at all the result of a historical process. As innocent myth-consumers, we read our myths as facts instead of as culturally-constructed images. This ethnocentrism according to Dolgin, et. al., "makes our culture's 'common sense' into basic laws of human nature."⁶⁶ When the power of a myth misfires, when someone is in a position to perceive the myth as myth rather than as "common sense", the result is alienation, or what Geertz more accurately calls "semantic tension."

While, generally speaking, if one has to live in a culture, it is not profitable nor even comfortable to challenge dominant myths, minor myths can be demolished with charm and grace for the delectation of the audience. Such an occasion arose when no less an establishment organ than Fortune magazine included, in its book club offering, an expose of

George Washington's expense accounts. Dan Nimmo and James Combs went to considerable pains to trace the origin of another myth of Washington's honesty--the cherry tree myth.⁶⁸ It seems that the mythology inculcated in gradeschool must be tempered in college in an attempt to inoculate against alienation. If Vietnam and Watergate are any indication, the challenging of major political myths are accompanied by national trauma. The extinguishing of the major myths of Nazism required a fiery Gottterdammerung.

The nationwide semantic tension caused by a myth can be readily studied by a case analysis of the John Wayne image projection. Wayne was a hero in World War II movies such as Flying Tigers, They Were Expendable, and Sands of Iwo Jima and, according to McConnell, a "truly mythic" figure, a "king as seen from the vantage point of romance" in his more recent westerns: Red River, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Rio Bravo, The Searchers, True Grit, and The Cowboys.⁶⁹ His identification with the Hollywood hawks on Vietnam was epitomized by The Green Berets, a box office sensation in 1968.

According to McConnell, "John Wayne," during the years of America's involvement in the Vietnam war was for a generation, "not only a proper name but a common noun, an adjective, a projectile word fraught with political implications." In the time of national lack of confidence in its presidents and their policies, "Wayne's mime of authoritarian and withdrawn patriarchy was bound to become, even if he had not involved himself in the debate over the war, a metaphor for what was wrong with us rather than what was best about us."

As the furor over Vietnam died down, the conflicts receded, and Wayne's image prevailed. His influence in his later years was celebrated. Wayne's discussions with Trujillo the Panamanian dictator were credited with defusing some of the rightist anger at the return of the Panama Canal to Panama. He received a special medal from Congress and full-page advertisements of his eulogy appeared in major magazines and newspapers at his death.

McConnel has an explanation why the moments of conflict are transitory and how the outcomes are inevitable:

The human mind naturally orders its experience, naturally imposes a form and a sense on the world around it: language and storytelling are species-specific instincts with us. And so it is with cultures: they cannot choose but recapitulate the archetypes, for the archetypes are the very way in which cultures exist.⁷⁰

Facets of Ideology

Ideologies, of course, are not wholly static and change imperceptibly in order to meet new circumstances which they are not able to interpret. Thus, between 1965 and 1975, the American ideology of war (based on myths of adventure, of manhood initiation, of technology versus nature--what might be called the "recruiting poster" myth) had to be radically changed in order to absorb the defeat in Vietnam, but may now be reverting to the pre-1965 state. Between 1975 and 1981, the ideology governing American perceptions of its relationship with the Third World changed radically. (when compared, for instance, to what it

were in the Presidency of John F. Kennedy) to accommodate economic frustrations with OPEC, rhetorical frustration with the new leadership in the U.N., and, of course, severe humiliation in Tehran. More rapid ideological shifts are also possible, if external circumstances warrant them. Lewis Clapham, for instance, commented on how the public celebration over the return of the hostages from Iran (and the new tone of belligerence, in foreign policy that it promoted) functioned to conceal what was, in the eyes of most of the rest of the world, a resounding defeat for American prestige.⁷¹

One way for the critic to discover how television achieves an ideological significance is, by careful content analysis, to lay bare the myths underlying particular kinds of programming. Thus, for instance, the popularity of a program like "Dallas" may be explained by its articulation of dominant American myths set in competition with each other. This particular configuration of myths, like a grammar, acts expressively for programmers and receptively for viewers in their task of interpreting the options of response to events which are available to characters within the fictional world of "Dallas". Television, like bardic poets in non-industrial cultures, renders the perceptions of the day into consciously-structured stories which are based on a set of myths to which viewers have easy access. Intuitions about such an analysis can be most profitably tested against the reactions of foreign audiences whose responses are influenced either by a different set of myths or by perceptions of what American myths might be.

An equally important critical task is to turn attention to the

predominant mode of presentation of television programming, where ideology also lurks. The usual mode is based on the naturalistic fiction devices of the realist tradition of story-telling, which in turn is based on a set of narrative conventions derived from the literate bourgeois culture that produced the novel. Realism is so entrenched in Western culture that we generally fail to see it as an artificial construct, a mode in which this culture prefers the ritual condensation of its myths to be cast. Whorf points out that the language we use to come to grips with the world is culturally constructed (there is nothing "natural" about it) and yet it is self-effacing (it produces "real-seemingness").⁷² Likewise the thoroughly familiar conventions of film and television realism hide the fact that the very mode of narration, as well as the story content, is structured, that is, that the way a story is narrated is as fictional as the story itself.⁷³ Realism presents itself not as one way of seeing but as the way.

Only in the work of metarealist artists (who are very rare on television) is our relationship with realism defamiliarised. In the work of a Godard in film, a Joyce in prose or a Brecht in theatre we become aware of the conventions of the genre and the radical inadequacies of a realism which had previously obliged us to accept its version of reality, whether we liked it or not. Where the ideology of metarealism is overt (it criticizes the monopoly of realism as the way of seeing and its production of a consumerist, non-critical attitude) the ideology of realism is hidden. Once television's artificial reality has been established as familiar and "real", it becomes a

vehicle for the communication of the cultural ideologies of the dominant forces that have greatest access to television and the viewer loses the power to maintain a critical distance. Television realism, therefore, acts as a silent weapon in the extension of certain ideologies (those maintaining the socio-economic system within which television operates) over all other sections of society.

Mythologizing and Demythologizing

To what extent is it possible to influence ideology in a deliberate way? In the past, literary movements have been potent creators of new myths, and though the number of direct participants in the mythology has been small, certain myths have been strong enough to perpetuate themselves through at least a century. The Romantic Movement is a successful case in point.⁷⁴ In this century the Surrealist Movement consciously created the myth of love as an anti-social, disruptive force that exists beyond the frame of family, work and country. It also yielded the myth of the writer or artist as a subversive force, single-handedly attacking society, whence efforts to rehabilitate the Marquis de Sade, for instance, as a "grandiose, Luciferian creature".⁷⁵ With greater popular interest, science fiction writers have sought to express current tensions in mythic ways, on the premise that creative imagination is frequently able to give a more comprehensive view of a debate than rational argument can.⁷⁶ Despite the Science Fiction dictum that stories ought to be postulated on scientific concepts extrapolated from existing data, many stories enthusiastically adapt current

technology for their mythical purposes. Nuclear power, for instance, has become "a metaphor for the nearly magical fashion in which heroic scientists could overcome the inconvenient laws of nature and get space-borne cowboys out to the endless frontiers of intergalactic space."⁷⁷ With the increasing popularity of the genre through its adoption by film and television, SF undoubtedly qualifies as a most interesting example of deliberate intervention in the usually hidden cultural mechanisms which generate myths. It is beyond the scope of the present study, however, to speculate on the mythic genealogy of Romanticism, Surrealism or Science Fiction, particularly on the extent to which these movements truly represent new mythic departures from what has existed before.

Just as new myths are born, with or without conscious human collaboration, so old myths die. Once the full implications of a myth are understood, it will be discarded as either "propaganda" or "cliche". The screen media, despite their marginal interest in satire, are prime movers in this direction. "All In the Family," for example, contributed to the demise, among at least some sections of American culture, of the rugged individualism of the WASP as a national norm and ideal,⁷⁸ "Mary Hartman, Mary Hartman", "Soap" and "Fernwood Tonight" likewise undermined many of the myths that other programs had propagated. Sometimes audiences even take into their own hands the urge to demythologise, as in the case of "Reefer Madness", a 1950s film condemning the evils of marijuana which has become something of a cult film among young audiences today who enjoy ridiculing its ideology.

In analyzing the implications of myth, is the scholar also a

spoiler, discarding myth as propaganda or cliché by removing its "real-seeminglyness"—destroying the myth by explicating it? In some ways the charge fits and, as Roland Barthes suggests,⁷⁹ there are also personal consequences that the mythologist should consider: wreaking havoc in the language of the community cuts one off from the myth-consumers and makes the undertaking appear as an act of destruction. But it is doubtful if the spoiler role of the scholar is at all comparable in its effects to the broader cultural mechanisms (including media themselves) which periodically and spontaneously excise certain myths from the culture.

The broader responsibility of the scholar is founded on the belief that analysis of the mythical dimension of telemediated messages allows us more fully to appreciate how we are shaped into what our culture considers to be moral creatures by both the form and content of television programming. In contrast to print, which segments experience and segregates readers into private contact with books, television commands a community of viewers, who although spatially separated, are in multi-sensory, simultaneous contact with the same stimulus materials. Television has assumed the mythical role of the story-teller and is carving out for itself something of a monopoly in the creation and propagation of myth. The function of the mythologist is to point out how we are generally unaware of the ideological forms of television within which we think and act, because these forms are taken to be "natural". Such reflection should convince us that rather than great disparities between cultures, there are in fact common ways of reacting

to the symbolic systems each culture generates. The gains to be made both in clearer understanding of how intra-cultural communication works and in amelioration of rigid ethnocentrism are great. Scholarly attention to myth suggests that "we can no longer blithely assume that they have myth, while we have history, that they have superstition while we have religion, that they have magic while we have science".⁸⁰

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