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ABSTRACT

A set of prevalent emotions, including pity, anger, guilt, pride (self-esteem), gratitude, and resignatien, shares a common characteristic, i.e., causal attributions appear tc be sufficient antecedents for their elicitation. Research in the field of emctions has shown that the underlying properties cr dimensions of attributions are the significant determinants of these affective reactions. This relationship is pertinent to a number of issues in the study of emotion. The literature suggests that emotion takes a variety of formats, but all varieties rely on the verbal reports and judgments of the participants. Future research should include a systematic study of human emotions prevalent in everyday life, partly guided by the phenomenological method, and directed by the belief that cognitions are sufficient antecedents for feeling states. (JAC)

PRIDE, PITY, ANGER, GUILT: THOUGHT-AFFECT SEQUENCES IN THE CLASSROOM

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Pride, Pity, Anger, Guilt: Thought-Affect Sequences in the Classroom

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A set of prevalent emotions, including pity, anger, guilt, pride (self-esteem), gratitude, and resignation (hopelessness) share a common characteristic: Causal attributions appear to be sufficient antecedents for their elicitation. Furthermore, the underlying properties or dimensions of attributions are the significant determinants of these affective reactions.

The evidence supporting these assertions regarding cognition-emotion linkages is examined in this paper. First, causal attributions and their underlying properties are discussed. The relations between the dimensions of causality and the emotions indicated above then are presented. This is followed by a brief consideration of the pertinence of this approach to a number of issues within the field of emotion. It will be evident to the readers, as it is to this writer, that a myriad of problems remain to be resolved given this attributional analysis of emotional states. No attempt is made to hide these difficulties. On the other hand, it is hoped that it will be evident to the readers, as it is to the writer, that this attributional analysis facilitates the understanding of some important emotional experiences.

Causal Attributions

The guiding principle of attribution theory is that individuals search for understanding, seeking to discover why an event has occurred (Heider, 1958); Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1980a). Attributional search can be considered one

instance of the more general class of exploratory activities, and attribution theory therefore falls within the broad study of cognitive functionalism. It is now recognized that this search is most evident when an outcome is unexpected (e.g., failure when success is anticipated) and when desires have not been fulfilled (e.g., achievement goals are not reached; there is interpersonal rejection; see Folkes, in press; Lau & Russell, 1979; Wong & Weiner, 1981).

As intimated above, causal search is not confined to any single motivational domain. Individuals desire to know, for example, why their team has been defeated (an achievement concern; Lau & Russell, 1979), why they have been refused for a date (an affiliative concern; Folkes, in press), and why they have lost an election (a power concern; Kingdon, 1967). The number of perceived causes is virtually infinite, although the vast majority of answers to the above questions are selected from a rather circumscribed array. In achievement situations, success and failure typically are ascribed to ability (including both aptitude and learned skills), some aspect of motivation (such as short- or long-term effort expenditure, attention), others (friends, family), physiological factors (e.g., mood, maturity, health), the difficulty or the ease of the task, and luck (see Cooper & Burger, Note 1). In an affiliative context, acceptance or rejection of a dating request often is ascribed to prior behaviors (e.g., making a good impression, being too forward), physical appearance, and the desires or state of the potential date (wanting to go out, having a boyfriend or prior engagement; see Folkes, in press). And given a political contest, election or defeat tends to be attributed to party identification, the personality characteristics of the candidates, and their stances on issues (Kingdon, 1967).

Inasmuch as the potential list of causes is considerable within any motivational domain, and because the specific causes differ between domains, it is essential to create a classification scheme or a taxonomy of causes. In so doing, the underlying properties of the causes are ascertained and their similarities and differences can be determined. Causes that denotatively differ (e.g., intelligence as a cause of achievement success, physical beauty as a cause of affiliative success and personality as a cause of political success) may be connotatively quite similar (e.g., intelligence, beauty and personality, among other similarities, all refer to relatively enduring personal properties). The discovery of these bases for comparison, which are referred to here as causal dimensions; is an indispensable requirement for the construction of a relatively general attributional theory of emotion.

Causal Dimensions

Two methods of arriving at new knowledge, that I somewhat wantonly label dialectic and demonstrative (following Rychlak, 1968), have been used to determine the basic dimensions of causality. The dialectic approach has involved a logical grouping of causes, discovery of an apparent contradiction in reasoning, and the emergence of a new dimension of causality to resolve the uncovered inconsistency. This logical and introspective examination within the attributional domain initiated with a differentiation between causes located within the person, such as intelligence, physical beauty and personality, and causes outside of the person, such as the difficulty of a task, the prior engagement of a desired partner and the popularity of one's opponent. The internal-external distinction is primarily associated with Rotter's (1966) discussion of locus of control. However, this causal dimension has been

captured with various other labels, such as person-environment or disposition-situation, and is evident in contrasts between origin-pawn (deCharms, 1968), intrinsic-extrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975), and freedom-constraint (Brehm, 1966; Steiner, 1970). Within the achievement domain, causes such as aptitude, effort, and health are commonly considered internal causes, whereas task difficulty, help from others, and luck are among the perceived environmental determinants of an outcome. Within the affiliative domain, causes such as physical beauty and "charm" are internal, whereas the availability of the desired dating partner is an external determinant of acceptance or rejection. The placement of a cause within a dimension is not necessarily invariant over time or between people. For example, rather than being an external cause, luck can be considered an attribute of a person ("He is lucky."). Given the focus of this paper, the relative placement of a cause within a dimension is not important. Rather, what is important is that locus, for example, is perceived as a basic property of causes.

A shortcoming of this one-dimensional taxonomy became evident when it was discovered that disparate responses are displayed given causes with an identical locus classification. For example, in achievement-related contexts the perception that an individual has failed because of a lack of effort gives rise to greater punishment than failure attributed to low ability (Weiner & Kukla, 1970). Furthermore, failure perceived as due to lack of ability results in lower future expectancies of success than failure believed to be caused by a lack of effort (Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). These disparities show that ability and effort differ in one or more respects, although both are considered properties of the person. A second dimension of causality therefore was postulated; it was labeled causal stability (see Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1979, 1980a). The stability dimension differentiates causes on the basis of their

relative endurance. For example, aptitude, physical beauty, and personality are perceived as lasting, in contrast to mood and luck, which are temporary and can vary within short periods of time. Because ability is believed to be relatively permanent, whereas effort can change from moment to moment, it would be instrumental to reward and punish effort rather than ability. Hence, the postulation of a second causal dimension apparently resolves the disparity in punishment given ability versus effort ascriptions for failure. In addition, because ability is perceived as more enduring than effort, prior outcomes ascribed to ability are more predictive of the future than are outcomes ascribed to effort. This accounts for the expectancy differences produced by these two causal ascriptions.

In a similar manner, a third dimension of causality was proposed (see Litman-Adizes, 1978; Rosenbaum, 1972, Weiner, 1979) when it became evident that some causes identically classified on both the locus and stability dimensions yielded dissimilar reactions. For example, failure attributed to lack of effort begets greater punishment than failure ascribed to ill health, although both may be conceived as internal and unstable causes. This indicates that yet another dimension of causality requires identification. Introspection suggested a third causal property, labeled controllability. The concept of control implies that the actor "could have done otherwise" (Hamilton, 1980). Effort is subject to volitional control; one is personally responsible for the expenditure of effort. On the other hand, one cannot typically control inherited characteristics or, in most cases, the onset of an illness. Within the achievement domain, effort is the most evident example of a controllable cause, although so-called traits such as patience or frustration tolerance also often are perceived by others as controllable. Note, then, that ability (aptitude) and effort differ on two dimensions of causality, with aptitude internal, stable, and uncontrollable, while effort is internal, unstable, and controllable. The differential punishment given ability versus effort ascriptions for failure is therefore attributable to the stability and/or controllability

differences between these causes. On the other hand, disparities in punishment given failure perceived as due to temporary illness versus lack of effort are ascribable only to the controllability dimension.

At present, three dimensions of causality have been identified --- locus, stability, and controllability. In most instances, causes such as intelligence, physical beauty, and charisma are perceived as internal, stable, and noncontrollable. This reveals a fundamental similarity between three denotatively different causes that often are invoked to explain positive and negative outcomes in the three motivational domains of achievement, affiliation, and power.

A number of issues remain given this logical analysis. It is not yet determined if there are additional causal dimensions, such as intentionality or "globality" (the generality of a cause; see Weiner, 1979). In addition, it is uncertain whether the three postulated causal dimensions are orthogonal or even if it is logically possible for a cause to be both external and controllable, for controllability implies internal causation. And it is important to observe that the classification of causes is dependent upon the perspective of the attributor. For example, teacher bias is likely to be perceived as an uncontrollable cause of failure by an ~~unfairly~~ treated student, while an observer may contend that teachers should be able to control their biases. Some of these issues play a role in the discussion of emotions.

Recently, there have been a number of experimental (demonstrative) studies to discover the dimensions of causality (see Table 1). Table 1

Insert Table 1 about here

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reveals that there is fair agreement between the conclusions of the investigators, although there are some discrepancies. Discussion of the reasons for the inconsistencies falls beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to conclude that the dialectic and the demonstrative procedures have a reasonable degree of convergence and, as a working hypothesis, it can be stated that locus, stability, and controllability are among the dimensions of causality. These dimensions in part reveal the meaning of a cause and represent the manner in which the causal world is organized.

Hypothesized Dimension-Emotion Relations

I turn now to the relations between the causal dimensions of locus, stability, and controllability and emotions. The evidence to be presented bears upon the following propositions:

1. Pride and positive self-esteem are experienced as a consequence of attributing a positive outcome to the self, while negative self-esteem is experienced when a negative outcome is ascribed to oneself (the causal dimension of locus). This is the case whether the perceived cause is controllable (e.g., effort) or uncontrollable (e.g., aptitude). To paraphrase Kant, everyone can enjoy a good meal, but only the cook can experience pride. Pride and personal esteem are therefore self-reflective emotions.

2. Anger is experienced given an attribution for a negative, self-related outcome or event to factors controllable by others. Thus, for example, anger is aroused when one is prevented from studying due to a noisy roommate. In addition, anger is elicited when a negative, other-related outcome or event is perceived as under the personal control of that other. Hence, a pupil failing because of a lack of effort tends to elicit anger from the

teacher. It is believed that gratitude is a consequence of a similar configuration of perceived causality (attribution of a personally positive event to factors controllable by others). For example, one would not feel gratitude toward another if this other person was forced to provide help. Of course, the intensity of anger and gratitude will be influenced by many factors in addition to the controllability of the cause, such as the value of the attained or lost goal (see Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968).

3. Guilt is experienced when one has brought about a negative consequence for a personally controllable cause. Thus, for example, failure because of insufficient effort tends to elicit guilt within the actor.

4. Pity is felt when others are in need of aid or in a negative state due to uncontrollable conditions. Another's loss of a loved one because of an accident or illness (external and uncontrollable) or failure by another because of a physical handicap (internal and uncontrollable) are prototypical situations that elicit pity.

The relations between the causal dimensions of locus and controllability and the emotions of pride (self-esteem), anger, gratitude, guilt, and pity are summarized in Table 2. Table 2 differentiates the direction or target of the emotion (self- or other-directed), the locus of causality, and the perception of controllability from the perspective of the source of the emotion. Thus, for example, an observer feels pity toward another (an external target) when uncontrollable factors within that target (other) or uncontrollable factors within the environment have produced a negative state.

Insert Table 2 about here

I have yet to discuss the relation of emotions to the dimension of stability. Regarding stability, the following propositions are offered:

5. Given a negative outcome, attributions to stable factors give rise to feelings of helplessness and resignation. That is, if the future is expected to be the same as the past, then helplessness is elicited given a negative state.

6. The affects of anger, pity and perhaps self-esteem are exacerbated when the perceived cause that gave rise to the affect also is stable. For example, pity toward a blind person is anticipated to be greater than pity toward an individual with a temporary eyesight problem. In this case the stability dimension influences the magnitude, rather than the direction, of the experienced emotion.

A few clarifications of these propositions are offered before turning to the pertinent empirical evidence.

A. It is quite likely that anger and pity can be self-directed, with the locus of causality residing within the actor. Even in these instances the respective classification of the cause as controllable (eliciting anger) or uncontrollable (giving rise to pity) is anticipated. However, data have not been gathered concerning these possibilities and they are excluded from further consideration.

B. One can feel pride when a relation, a friend, or even one's country has succeeded for perceived internal reasons. Instances of affective experience mediated by personal identification are not considered here.

C. The postulated linked affect does not necessarily follow given the causal cognition. One might engage in a dastardly, controllable deed without guilt; a controllable negative outcome might not produce anger if there are mitigating circumstances. success because of ability could give rise to humbleness or even embarrassment rather than pride; failure of another because of an uncontrollable reason might produce apathy or relief. However, the affects under discussion are quite frequently elicited given the indicated attributional antecedents. Furthermore, given the affect, the linked cause may not be necessary antecedent. For example, one might experience guilt even though the cause of an event was not

controllable; one may feel angry because it has rained; and so on. On the other hand, perhaps feelings of gratitude do require that another has helped you. The postulation of a necessary relation is a moot and difficult issue. In any case, it can be stated that in many instances we experience pride, anger, gratitude, guilt, and pity if and only if the hypothesized causal pattern is first perceived.

Empirical Evidence

In the following pages, evidence bearing upon the six stated propositions is reviewed. The relevant data are contained in research investigations that often also gathered other information; only the data pertinent to causal dimensions and the affects under study here are presented. The research evidence is not equally apportioned across the six propositions: The data concerning pity and anger are most extensive, whereas only two studies contain data applicable to the postulated stability-hopelessness linkage.

The investigations to be reviewed have a number of dissimilarities: some are simulational, others ask about critical incidents in one's life; some have a free-response or operant format, others are respondent paradigms; some require the rating of many affects, others examine only one or two emotional responses; some are concerned with reactions in achievement-related situations, while others analyze emotions in affiliative or help-giving contexts. But all of the reported studies do rely upon the verbal reports and the judgments of the participants. This may or may not be considered a shortcoming of this research, for linguistic expression often is part of the emotional experience. As Schafer (1976) has remarked: "Without words for it, people in fact remain unprepared to experience much that we ordinarily regard as essential to adult emotional life" (p. 355).

Affective Reactions to Success and Failure

In our initial study of the relations between causal ascriptions and feelings (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978), we compiled a dictionary list of approximately 250 potential affective reactions to success and failure, and we also identified the dominant causal attributions for achievement performance, such as ability, effort, luck, and other people. Then a cause for success or failure was given within a brief story format, the success- or failure-related affects that had been identified were listed, and the participants reported the intensity of the affective reactions that they thought would be

experienced in this situation. Responses were made on simple rating scales. A typical story was:

> Francis studied intensely for a test he took. It was very important for Francis to record a high score on this exam. He received an extremely high score on the test. He felt he received this high score because he studied so intensely [or, his ability was high in this subject; he was lucky in which questions were selected; etc.]. How do you think Francis felt upon receiving this score? (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978, p. 70).

To overcome some of the weaknesses of this simulational and respondent procedure, in a follow-up investigation (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979) participants reported a "critical incident" in their lives in which they actually succeeded or failed an exam for a particular reason, such as help from others or lack of effort. They then recounted three affects that were experienced.

Both investigations yielded systematic and similar findings. First, there was a set of outcome-dependent, attribution-independent affects that represent broad positive or negative reactions to success and failure, regardless of the "why" of the outcome. "Happy" and "upset" are examples of these reported emotions. In addition, there were emotions uniquely related to particular attributions, such as long term effort-relaxation and luck-surprise. Finally, and most germane to the present paper, causal dimensions were reported as influencing affective life. To determine the affects associated with causal locus, the emotions elicited by internal causes such as ability, effort, and personality were compared with the affects related to the external

causes such as luck, help from others, or task ease or difficulty. It was found that pride and the esteem-related emotions of confidence and competence were linked with internal attributions.

In these experiments the controllability of the cause, such as "others," was not manipulated and could not be determined. Hence, the complex Locus X Controllability interactions that characterize the majority of the hypothesized cognition-emotion relations could not be tested. However, Proposition 1 concerning pride and self-esteem is fully supported.

In addition, it was found that the perceived continuation of a cause also influenced affective reports. Affects including depression, apathy, and resignation primarily were described given internal and stable attributions for failure, such as lack of ability or a personality deficit. This suggests that only attributions conveying that events will not change in the future beget feelings of helplessness (Proposition 5).

Protecting the Self-Esteem of Others

The prior experiments demonstrated, in part, that attribution of achievement-related outcomes to internal factors is linked with esteem-related affects such as pride and feelings of confidence and competence. That this association also is represented in naive psychology is demonstrated in the following experiment (Folkes, in press), which is concerned with feelings in an affiliative context.

Participants were told to imagine that they had rejected a request for a date. Sixteen reasons for the rejection were provided to the subjects, representing causes within the three dimensional causal matrix. For example, the rejection was specified as due to a lack of physical attractiveness (internal, stable, uncontrollable), a negativistic personality (internal, stable, controllable), religious restrictions (external, stable, uncontrollable), and so on. The female participants were asked to reveal what cause they publicly would give to the requester. In addition, the subjects also indicated the extent to which the public and private causes would "hurt the feelings" of the individual asking for a date, if that cause were known to him. It is assumed that this phrase captures the general category of personal esteem.

The relations between expectations of "hurt feelings" and the three causal dimensions are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 indicates that internal reasons for rejection maximize the belief that the other's feelings will be hurt. When the true cause of rejection was external to the requester, the participants reported that they would state that reason 99% of the time.

Insert Figure 1 about here

But when the real cause of rejection was internal to the requester, the female subjects indicated that they would lie, stating an external reason over 2/3 of the time. Hence, the behavior of the rejecting females was benevolent, guided by an attempt to protect the self-esteem of the other and mediated by the assumption of a causal locus-self esteem relation. In addition, Figure 1

reveals that a stable cause for rejection when the cause is internal (e.g., "His face and body type are not attractive.") exacerbates these perceived reactions more than does public rejection because of an internal, unstable cause (e.g., "He developed a temporary and ugly red rash.").

Affective Reactions to a Request for Aid

In another series of studies (Weiner, 1980b, 1980c) affective reactions and judgments of helping were examined when the cause of the need for aid was manipulated by experimental instructions. In one investigation (Weiner, 1980b), the participants read one of two scenarios:

> At about 1:00 in the afternood you are riding a subway car. There are a number of other individuals in the car and one person is standing, holding on to the center pole. Suddenly, this person staggers forward and collapses. The person apparently is drunk. He is carrying a liquor bottle wrapped in a brown paper bag and smells of liquor. (Alternate form: The person is carrying a black cane and apparently is ill). (Weiner, 1980b, p. 190)

The subjects were asked to assume that they were actually on the subway and to imagine the scene. They then described what their feelings would be in the situation, with three spaces provided for affective descriptions.

A second series of investigations attempted a conceptual replication of this research (Weiner, 1980c). Subjects were given the following two scenarios (as well as another not discussed here) and again were asked to describe their feelings:

> At about 1:00 in the afternoon you are walking through campus and a student comes up to you. The student says that you do not know him,

but that you are both enrolled in the same class. He asks if you would lend him the class notes from the meetings last week, saying that the notes are needed because he skipped class to go to the beach. (Alternate form: He needs the notes because he was having eye problems, a change of glasses was required, and during the week he had difficulty seeing because of eye-drops and other treatments. You notice that he student is wearing especially dark glasses and has a patch covering one eye). (Weiner, 1980c, p. 676)

It was initially assumed, and data confirmed this assumption (see Weiner, 1980b, 1980c) that being drunk, just as going to the beach, is perceived as an internal and controllable cause of need. On the other hand, carrying a cane, just as wearing an eye patch, conveys a disability that is internal but uncontrollable.

The reported affective reactions were classified into categories, including a subdivision composed of the reactions sympathy, pity, and concern, and a second subdivision including anger-related negative reactions. The percentage of reported affective reactions in these two categories as a function of the causal manipulation is shown in Table 3. Table 3 reveals that pity and sympathy dominate the reported feelings given the uncontrollable causes, whereas anger is most prevalent in the beach condition and also is strongly evident in the drunk condition.

Insert Table 3 about here

In subsequent experiments subjects again received the drunk-ill or the beach-eye scenarios. Following each scenario, they rated the degree to which the causes were perceived as personally controllable, their feelings of pity and sympathy, and their anger-related feelings (Weiner, 1980b, 1980d). Within each experiment there was a strong positive correlation between the judgments of controllability and anger (average r = .45) and an even stronger positive correlation between ratings of uncontrollability and pity (average r = .66). Within the drunk condition, where the free-response affective reports were most questionable regarding the hypothesized drunk-anger relation, the correlation between controllability and anger-related feelings was r = .46, while the correlation between uncontrollability and sympathy was r = .55. These data strongly support Propositions 2 and 4.

In a related but independently conceived investigation, Meyer and Mulherin (1980) created eight hypothetical situations in which a person was approached for financial aid. The reason for the need of aid was manipulated and corresponded to each of the eight cells of the Locus X Stability X Controllability causal matrix. For example, the stimulus person was described as being in need of money because she did not like to work (internal, stable, controllable) or could not work because of ill health (internal, stable, uncontrollable). For each condition, the subjects rated the degree to which they would experience each of twenty-five affects primarily selected from the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965).

A factor analysis of the emotional ratings yielded a bi-polar factor labeled anger vs. concern and a uni-polar factor labeled empathy, which included high loadings on the emotions of pity and sympathy. Table 4 shows

the mean affective factor scores in each of the eight experimental (causal) conditions. The table reveals that controllable causes gave rise to reported anger, whereas uncontrollable causes elicited empathy (pity).

Insert Table 4 about here

There also is a strong tendency for the affective loadings to be higher given stable causes, thus providing evidence that perceived causal stability influences the magnitude of the emotional reactions of pity and anger.

Pity and Anger Across Situations

The investigations by Meyer and Mulherin (1980) and Weiner (1980b, 1980c) examined the emotional reactions of pity and anger in situations of help-giving. In the following study (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, in press), reactions of pity and anger were ascertained in a variety of situational contexts.

Four story themes were created that involved the failure to repay a debt, committing a crime, failing an exam, and again needing class notes. Within each of these themes, eight situations were generated providing the reason for the negative event. Again each of these eight reasons represented one cell in the Locus X Stability X Controllability matrix. For example, the external, stable, and uncontrollable cause for each of the respective themes was: "The person cannot repay because a computer breakthrough suddenly made his job unnecessary;" "He committed the crime because he lived in a depressed area where there were no opportunities for employment or adequate schooling;" "The student failed the exam because her math tutor often incorrectly explained answers to problems throughout the quarter; and "The

student needs the notes because the teacher gave very confusing lectures throughout the entire course." For each of the 32 conditions (4 themes X 8 causes), the subjects rated the degree to which they would feel anger and pity toward the story character.

The general findings across the four themes were quite similar. Figure 2 depicts the reports of anger and pity in the causal conditions.

Insert Figure 2 about here

Figure 2 shows that if the cause is classified as controllable, then reports of anger exceed those of pity, whereas if the cause is classified as uncontrollable, then reports of pity are greater than those of anger. These relations are particularly true given the internal causes. Furthermore, stable causes maximize feelings of pity given uncontrollable causes, and exacerbate feelings of anger given controllable causes. These data are in agreement with the findings already presented and strongly support the hypothesized relations between causal dimensions and emotional reactions. There appears to be a thin line that determines if one will feel anger or pity toward another, and that line is decided by the perceived controllability of the cause.

Personal Experiences of Pity, Anger, and Guilt

One of the criticisms of some of the reported research is that it is simulational or hypothetical, asking one to report what they might feel if a particular situation were to arise. In a second study conducted by Weiner et al. (in press),

subjects were asked to describe instances in their lives when they experienced the emotions of pity, anger, and guilt. After describing two situations in which each of these feelings were experienced, the notion of causal dimensions was introduced and described. The subjects then rated the cause of the event in question, if applicable, on each of the three dimensions. In addition, two experimenters, one blind to the hypotheses and unaware of the subjects' ratings, classified the cause of the event into the eight dimensional cells (inter-rater agreement was 94%).

The participants' and the experimenters' ratings yielded identical results. Concerning pity, 71% of the causes were rated as stable and uncontrollable, with exactly equal apportionment between the internal and external alternatives. Two quite typical instances were:

a. A guy on campus is terribly deformed. I pity him because it would be so hard to look so different and have people stare at you ...

b. My great grandmother lives in a rest home, and everytime I go there I see these poor old half-senile men and women wandering aimlessly down the halls.... I feel pity every time I go down there.

Concerning guilt, 94% of the causes were classified as internal, unstable, and controllable. It may be that stable causes arouse greater guilt, but in the majority of reported stories guilt followed an atypical behavior. For example:

a. When I got caught cheating on a math final in high school, I had extreme guilt feelings... The bad part was that I was doing well in that class and had no reason whatsoever to cheat. I learned my lesson but I will

always feel guilt about the situation.

b. A friend and I studied together and I interfered with her studies by talking, wasting time, etc. On the midterm, I ... got a strong B, while she got a D. I felt guilty about this.

Finally, for the affect of anger, 86% of the situations involved an external and controllable cause, with the majority of the causes (63%) being unstable. Two typical anger-arousing situations were:

a. My roommate brought her dog into our no pets apartment without asking me first. When I got home she wasn't there, but the barking dog was... As well, the dog had relieved itself in the middle of the entry.

b. I felt angry towards my boyfriend for lying to me about something he did. All he had to do was tell me the truth ...

In sum, these reports clearly reveal the dimension-linked aspects of the emotions of pity, guilt, and anger. In a just-completed study, similar data were reported among children as young as five years of age (Graham, Doubleday, & Guarino, Note 5). The converging evidence regarding the relations between uncontrollability-pity, internal controllable-guilt, and external controllable-anger is rather conclusive.

Inferring Causal Thoughts from Affective Expressions

Thus far it has been documented that causal cognitions give rise to specific affects. It should then follow that, given certain affective displays by others, their associated attributions will be inferred. That is, emotional expression can act as a cue to others, revealing one's causal thoughts. In the following experiment (Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, in press) we examined whether knowledge about an actor's emotions, conveyed with verbal labels, enables an observer to infer the actor's causal ascription for an achievement performance.

In this investigation the participants were given scenarios such as:

> A student failed a test and the teacher became angry. Why did the teacher think that the student failed?

Among the affects manipulated were pity, anger, and guilt (along with others not discussed here). The attributions included as possible responses were insufficient effort, low ability, bad luck, and the task was too difficult because of a lack of teacher clarity. The participants indicated on simple scales how much each of the causes was perceived as a determinant of the affective response. The participants also rated the teacher's perceptions of the dimensions of the cause of failure. For example, we asked:

> If the teacher feels angry, is the cause of the student's failure perceived as internal or external to the student, stable or unstable, and controllable or not controllable by the student?

Figure 3 reveals that each of the affects was associated with a particular causal attribution. Given an expression of anger, the implication is that the student had not tried sufficiently hard. Anger appears to be an "ought" emotion and often indicates a moral evaluation. Pity, on the other hand, is expressed when lack of ability is thought to be the perceived cause. Finally, guilt is linked with the teacher blaming him- or her-self.

Insert Figure 3 about here

The causal dimension data are shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 reveals that if the teacher feels pity or anger, as opposed to guilt, then the cause of failure is perceived as

internal to the student. In addition, the cause for anger is perceived as controllable, whereas the cause is thought to be uncontrollable if the reaction is pity or guilt. Thus, pity and anger differ in their implications concerning the perceived controllability of the cause. On the other hand, guilt and anger differ in their implications concerning the perceived locus of the cause.

Note also the congruence between the specific attributional inferences and the causal dimension ratings. Effort, the perceived antecedent of anger reactions, is internal and controllable; ability, the perceived antecedent of pity reactions, is classified as internal and uncontrollable; while teacher clarity, the inferred antecedent of guilt, is external (to the student) and controllable by the teacher. The stability dimension played little role in differentiating between these three affective reactions.

Insert Figure 4 about here

General Issues in the Study of Emotion

The research reviewed in this chapter was not undertaken to resolve basic issues in the study of emotion. Nonetheless, the empirical findings are pertinent to a number of contemporary issues in this field. The following discussion is in part based on these data, but also greatly reflects my own theoretical biases. Any criticisms are communicated in a spirit of inquiry and mutual facilitation. It was once confessed that: "It takes great frustration tolerance and, perhaps, a bent toward self-destruction, to pursue the study of experiential states" (Weiner, Kun, & Benesh-Weiner, 1980, p. 112). Hence, I commisurate with others working in this area and the following comments are offered in the broader context to admiration. I also suggest that non-tenured investigators not initiate emotion research.

The Sequence Issue

It has recently been contended that affect often precedes cognition in a variety of psychological phemonena (Zajonc, 1980). The experimental paradigms employed by Zajonc (1980) to support this position are so disparate from the ones reported here that direct comparisons are not possible. Concerning the postulated affect-cognition sequence from an attributional framework, it is entirely possible that in some instances feelings antedate thoughts. For example, in certain situations anger might be a conditioned reaction which then serves as a cue that another is responsible for our failure. Inasmuch as emotional cues can be used to infer the thoughts of others, it is reasonable to presume that these cues also can be used to infer one's own thoughts (see

Reisenzein, Weiner, & Marrow, Note 6).

Although an affect-cognition sequence is a logically possibility, it is believed to be of secondary importance. There are a number of reasons for not considering this order as fundamental. First, the empirical evidence clearly documents that specific thoughts give rise to particular emotions. Furthermore, affects seem to be changeable solely by altering thoughts. Anger, for example, will readily dissipate when it is discovered that the faulted other is really innocent of wrongdoing. In addition, the affect-thought order does not account for why particular affects, such as anger or pity, are experienced. This is expressly the case when the situational contexts of these disparate reactions are identical.

In sum, it is my belief that cognitions quite typically precede and determine affective reactions (also see Lazarus, 1966). It seems inconceivable that in everyday life we first, for example, experience gratitude, and then decide that success was due to help from others. Rather, it is first decided that success is attributable to help from others and, in turn, gratitude is experienced.

Arousal

The concept of arousal is perhaps most conspicuous in this paper by its absence. This neglect is somewhat in opposition to the prevailing importance given to arousal in the conceptual analyses of emotion (see Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962), although the alleged functions of arousal presently are under question (Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979). In contrast to the position of Schachter and Singer, it is contended that arousal at times

follows, rather than precedes, cognitive activity and emotional experience. This presumption is in part based upon evidence that activation or calmness (degrees of arousal) following success depend on the perceptions of the causes of that outcome (see Weiner et al., 1978). Investigations by Lazarus (1966, 1968) also indicate that arousal is a product of cognitive appraisal. Lazarus reports that how one interprets a stressful event influences the amount of arousal elicited in that situation.

At present, it is not known whether arousal precedes, accompanies, or follows cognition and emotional expression, or if all or none of these might be true in disparate situations. But, for example, feeling gratitude because of an ascription of success to the volitional help of others, or feeling pride given self-ascription for success, do not appear to require a prior state of arousal that either accompanies the affect or that the individual must interpret prior to an emotional experience. The concept of arousal seems to be entirely superfluous to the attributional analysis outlined here.

There is, in fact, little evidence to support the position that arousal is necessary for emotional experience, or that arousal is a needed concept in the field of emotion (see, for example, Valins, 1966). In the area of motivation, the concept of arousal (drive) has been abandoned by even most of the animal psychologists (e.g., Bolles, 1975). We suggest that issues in the field of emotion are not clarified with an arousal or drive concept. A nondirective drive concept cannot explain the quality or direction of emotional experience, and falls prey to all the issues that caused the drive concept to be discarded in the study of motivation (e.g., Do all the sources of drive or

arousal pool into one, as Hull suggested? If they do, then how can different affects be simultaneously experienced? If they do not pool, then drive no longer is a nondirective energizer and the concept of arousal becomes unclear. Does all internal arousal result in a search for a label and yield an emotional experience? If so, then hunger, thirst, and even nausea, all sources of arousal, must produce emotions, and the concepts of motivation and emotion become indistinct. On the other hand, if arousal and a label do not produce an emotion on all occasions, then the boundary conditions of the Schachter position must be specified).

These are but some examples of the kinds of questions and issues that must be addressed and answered for the arousal position to be a viable theoretical option. But surely, is it really likely that we feel aroused prior to a cognitive experience? What, then, causes the arousal? And even if arousal follows or precedes a cognitive interpretation, it still might be an epiphenomenon, not causally related to emotions.

For the affects considered in the prior pages, the antecedent conditions are the particular causal cognitions to which the emotions are linked. The underlying general process that has been implied is that cognitions are sufficient determinants of affect. Arousal is not considered an emotional determinant.

Process versus Content

When psychologists study emotion, they most often are concerned with the emotional process. The search for the emotional process is understandable, inasmuch as the research psychologist typically is interested in laws that transcend any particular emotional experience. But one wonders about the

implicit assumption that there is an emotional process. This seems unlikely, given the possibility of conditioned emotions, emotions instigated by hormonal conditions, emotions that follow logically from particular cognitions, uncontrollable emotions or "passions," and so on.

The question of specific emotions and their meaning most often is left to philosophers. The differentiation of, for example, gratitude from joy from pride is usually not thought to be an empirically answerable issue. On the other hand, the research that has been presented here is concerned with the nature and the meaning of specific feelings, or the content of emotions. Meaning, it was suggested, is determined by the antecedent conditions and the properties of thought. Furthermore, meaning was ascertained or analyzed by making use of subjects' reports. Mandler (1975) has contended that phenomenological analysis will not lead to an understanding of emotion. That may be correct if he is addressing the emotional process, for most processes, such as learning or perception, are not understood by the experiencers of those processes and the processes typically are not verbalizable or available as conscious experiences. But if one wishes to study the content of emotions, emotional life, and the meaning of emotions, then one must turn to those who experience these feelings. As the research in this chapter has demonstrated, phenomenological analyses do aid in the understanding and the explanation of emotion.

One disappointment of this author is that in reading about emotion one rarely encounters an emotion. For the naive person, the study of emotions

should provide insights about envy, jealousy, love, hate, pride, guilt, and so forth, as opposed to a discussion of the physiological substratum, muscle movements, or other correlates that I believe have attracted disproportionate attention from psychologists. This is not to imply that psychologists must be guided in their work by the layperson, or that these other areas of study are not of great importance. Rather, I think there should be greater attention paid to the emotions experienced in everyday life.

Physiological Correlates

Although the supporting data are quite weak, some psychologists (even cognitive ones) cling to the belief that there will be physiological correlates of emotions. That is, each emotion will have associated with it a particular pattern of internal activity. That seems quite doubtful. For example, assume that someone has just passed an exam and feels happy. Then the teacher communicates that the student received the highest grade in the class. This immediately gives rise to pride. Is it really likely that pride is preceded and/or accompanied by a particular type of internal state? It may be that emotions of great intensity, or emotions that can be represented across species, such as rage or sexual excitement or fear, will have a physiological correlate or some particular internal representation. But this does not seem likely for the vast majority of emotions that are experienced in everyday life, such as gratitude, pride, pity, and guilt.

The Structure of Emotions

An intuitively reasonable belief held my many emotion theorists is that there are some basic emotions, and other emotions are somehow built from or develop

out of these more basic feelings. Personality trait psychologists assume a similar conceptual belief and have searched for many years for the basic traits or structures of personality, out of which other aspects of personality are presumed to develop. Unfortunately, the search for a taxonomy of personality has not been successful; there is little agreement concerning how many basic traits there are or what these traits are to be called.

This uncertainty also holds true in the field of emotion. And how complex emotions get built up from more basic ones is a mystery. For example, Plutchik (1962) has argued that pride is a mixture of the primary emotions of anger + joy. Inasmuch as pride relates to achievement success and requires self-ascription, while anger often is experienced when there has been volitional interference from others, it is hard to fathom that anger is a component of pride.

It would seem that what are called "basic" emotions should be represented phylogentically, such as fear, rage, anger, and surprise (startle). But what, then, is to be said about affects such as pride, which require self-appraisal and a self-concept? Must any affect that requires higher cognitive awareness not be considered fundamental? And how are self-reflective affects derived from affects which require less cognitive skills? Indeed, what is "primary" for humans may not be "primary" for infrahumans. But this possibility may render the discovery of the so-called primary or basic emotions quite unlikely.

The Development of Causal Dimensions

In has been intimated in this chapter that affective development awaits the growth of cognitive development, particularly that of causal ascriptions and the underlying meaning or dimensions of the ascriptions. Three causal

dimensions have been identified with certainty: locus, stability, and controllability. One might speculate that locus will be the first of the causal dimensions to emerge; many developmental theorists postulate that early in life infants learn to distinguish the me from the not-me, or what has been called the ego or self from others in the social environment. If this is true, then self-esteem and pride may surprisingly be among the early emotions.

Another important aspect of development is coming to understand and to predict the future. This involves the concept of causal stability, which seems to require greater cognitive capabilities (including seriation) than the locus dimension (and probably less than needed for an understanding of intention and volitional control). Feelings of optimism, pessimism, and related affective states such as certain forms of depression and hopelessness might not be experienced prior to the growth of the stability dimension.

The perception of controllability by others, as already stated, relates to principles of justice and "ought," and to the concept of intention. Hence, other-directed affects related to this dimension should develop at a rather late age. As previously suggested, pride therefore should be evidence before guilt.

At this point in time, the sequential development of the dimensions of causality, and how this maturity relates to affective development, are merely speculations. But they are heuristic thoughts to consider.

A Final Note

In this chapter I have attempted to explain some prevalent human emotions,

such as pride, pity, guilt, anger, and gratitude. These emotions have been related to antecedent thoughts, called causal attributions. In this endeavor, some underlying beliefs about the study of emotion have been communicated. I think there should be a systematic study of human emotions prevalent in everyday life, partly guided by the phenomenological method, and directed by the belief that cognitions are sufficient antecedents for feeling states.

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Footnotes

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Table 1

Empirical Studies of Causal Dimensions[1]

Investigator(s)	Motivational Domain	Method	Causal Dimension Found			
			Locus	Stability	Control	Others
Meyer (1980)	Achievement	Factor analysis	X	X	X	
Meyer & Koelbl (in press)	Achievement	Factor analysis	X	X	X	Mood vs. Uncontrollability Anxiety vs. Background Affect vs. Situation
Michela, Peplau, & Weeks (Note 3)	Affiliation	Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)	X	X		
Passer (1977)	Achievement	MDS	X			Intentionality
Weimer & Kelley (Note 4)	Many	Factor analysis	X	X	X	Simple-Complex[2] Motivation Necessary-Facilitative Common-Unusual Weak-strong Aware-unaware

[1] An investigation by Falbo and Beck (1979) is not included in this summary because it has a number of methodological inadequacies (see Weiner, Note 2)

[2] Distinctions within the dimensions of locus and stability are not included

Table 2

Relations of discussed emotions to emotional target, locus of causality and controllability of the cause.

Emotion	Emotional Target		Locus of Causality			Controllability		
	Self	Other	Self	Other	Environ.	By Self	By Other	Uncont.
Pride and self-esteem	✓		✓			✓		✓
Anger and gratitude		✓		✓			✓	
Guilt	✓		✓			✓		
Pity		✓		✓	✓			✓

Table 3

Percentage of Pity-related and Anger-related Reactions as a Function of the Story Theme and the Causal Manipulation (data from Weiner, 1980b, 1980c).

Emotion	Story Theme			
	Sue (N = 40)		Notes (N = 129)	
	Causal Condition			
	Drunk	Ill	Beach	Eye
Pity	30%	46	6	35
Anger	27	3	40	4

Table 4

Mean Affect Factor Scores as a Function of Stability, Locus, and Controllability of the Cause (adapted from Meyer & Mulherin, 1980, p. 205).

Causal Condition (N = 80)	Affective Factor	
	Anger vs. Concern	Empathy
Internal-Stable-Controllable	.83	-.48
Internal-Stable-Uncontrollable	-.79	.48
External-Stable-Controllable	.94	-.31
External-Stable-Uncontrollable	-.67	.53
Internal-Unstable-Controllable	.77	-.42
Internal-Unstable-Uncontrollable	-.66	.57
External-Unstable-Controllable	.03	-.28
External-Unstable-Uncontrollable	-.45	-.10

Note. The higher the number, the greater the anger and empathy.

Figure Captions

Fig. 1. The actor's estimate of the requester's degree of hurt feelings as a function of the dimensional classification of the cause (from Folkes, 1978, p. 104).

Fig. 2. Ratings of pity and anger, across four themes, as a function of the controllability of the cause (from Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, in press a).

Fig. 3. Attributional ratings as a function of the conveyed emotion (from Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, in press).

Fig. 4. Causal dimension ratings as a function of the conveyed emotion (from Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, in press).